Citizens, Complexity and the City

Lessons from citizen participation in urban (transport) planning in Santiago Chile, 1997-2012

By

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract

Twentieth century, citizen “revolts” against highway projects have influenced thinking about public transport (Toronto, Vancouver, New York), governance (Portland), and cycling (The Netherlands) to this day. Less is known about how these emerge in developing countries, and what they can tell us about citizens’ role in innovation to achieve more socially just, good and livable cities. Using a complexity-based approach, this dissertation explores lessons from an anti-highway movement in Santiago, Chile (1997), which challenged authoritarian planning paradigms inherited from the Pinochet regime (1973-1990). In 2000, these leaders of diverse communities founded a citizen institution, Living City (Ciudad Viva), which today is a prize-winning, citizen-led planning institution.

Participation is recognized as important to community development, health and urban planning. Nonetheless, a rich literature notes many limitations. Is improving participation just a matter of “getting the process right”? Or does it require re-formulating frameworks to redistribute power, fostering self-generating civil society organizations, and treating democratization as ongoing rather than a “steady state”?

Re-formulating frameworks has far-reaching implications. It requires acting consistently with the premise that the local is central to change in human living systems, and the need to create the civic “infrastructure” conducive to citizen learning and the emergence of multiscalar citizen organizations, able to mobilize ecology of actors for innovation. To effectively address the challenges of climate change, loss of biodiversity, the social determinants of health, the “obesity epidemic” and other issues, the answers lie in city neighbourhoods and human settlements.

If we aspire to good, just and livable cities, uncertain futures require planning for change. This research suggests that we can identify dynamics likely to leverage significant change and activate capacities throughout a system. This requires moving to an inclusive planning paradigm that fully integrates citizen planners.
Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not have been possible without the active, ongoing support of the leaders and communities featured in this account. They nourished this research with their knowledge, and encouraged me with excellent meals and even better conversation. I really had two committees, one steeped in the knowledge provided by the university of life; the other, the demanding new world of academics and social science. I would also like to express special thanks to Loreto Rojas, who conducted many of the interviews, as discussed under methodology.

I am deeply grateful to the Social Science and Research Council of Canada for financial support, without which this work would not have been possible. For their inspiration and insights, I thank friends and colleagues in Toronto (Richard Stren), India (Anvita Arora, Geetam Tiwari), the Netherlands (Tom Godefrooij, Jeroen Buis), Bogotá (Carlos Felipe Pardo, Bernardo Toro), Mexico (Monica Tapia), Brazil (Amalia Fischer), US/Brazil (Daniel Domagala), Santiago (Ximena Abogabir, Gonzalo de la Maza) among many others, who helped me to work through my ideas in different contexts. Similarly, the UBC PhD Jamboree (June 2011) run by John Friedmann and Leonie Sandercock, was a refreshing and stimulating forum.

The Synergos network of senior civil society fellows, the Ashoka network of social entrepreneurs, and the Avina network of civil society leaders also afforded diverse arenas -- with public, private and citizen actors -- which helped to test much of my thinking. Similarly, the Across Latitudes and Cultures Centre for Bus Rapid Transport Excellence and EMBARQ gave me privileged access to transport engineers and planners to exchange ideas from this research with them, as they worked on thorny problems in their field.

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Andre Sorensen, for his critical support, and to my committee, Amrita Daniere, Katharine Rankin, Ron Buliung, for their questions and critiques at key steps in the process. Abigail Friendly, Luisa Sotomayor, and Gabriela Sauter, receive special thanks, for creating a space for support and discussion about Latin America. I am also grateful to Loreto Rojas, who assisted me by conducting many of the interviews, and commenting on her perceptions as a result.

I would like to express my love and thanks to Gabriela Byron, my house-mate and constant support in Toronto; Joan Simalchik and Robin Breon, for their friendship, Robin’s bottomless creativity and Joan’s brilliant work on gender, memory and human rights; my Santiago family, Patricio Lanfranco, Cecilia Jadue, María Inés Solimano and María Elena Ducci, for looking after me and my life during my many absences.

My parents and the refuge and distraction they provided in Honey Harbour is also present here, between the lines, as are the Lesley Street spit and Tinquilco.

This is for my sons, Jaime, Camilo and Daniel; my grandson, Mateo; and all the granddaughters and adopted daughters, along the way and still (I hope!) to come.
The main human activity is “not merely to produce and consume, but also to give meaning to the world, to make sense of the world around us. And the giving of meaning to the world around us, as an area of human action that involves both discourse and embodied praxis, is the province of a deep legitimated collective representation of that world, the social imaginary.” Castoriadis (cited in Wright 1997)
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Introduction

Urban Movements and Mobilities: The View from the End of the World

Any coward can fight a battle when he’s sure of winning, but give me the man who has pluck to fight when he’s sure of losing. That’s my way, sir; and there are many victories worse than a defeat. George Eliot

Speaking from the end of the world

End-of-the-world books. My shelves house a solid set of titles by distinguished authors and I start this dissertation squeezed between two piles of books presaging disaster for planet earth and the human civilization that has colonized it so successfully for millenia.

My first awakening to these issues was Ward’s book, The End of Evolution (1994). A paleontologist at the University of Washington, Ward notes that the first of the two major mass extinctions that have affected our planet occurred 245 million years ago. “Many earth scientists believe... [it] was brought about by a slow yet inexorable change in climate and sea level occurring when forces of continental drift caused the earth’s great continents to merge together slowing into a single, gigantic supercontinent.” The resulting “new world of endless glaciers and waterless deserts” killed off more than 90 percent of the earth’s species” (p. xvii, Ward 1994).

The second mass extinction, 65 million years ago, saw sudden changes in sea levels and climate, possibly caused by a violent collision of a large asteroid or comet with the earth, end the Dinosaur Age and destroy over 50 percent of species. Only a few meek crawlers and burrowers, including a shrewlike ancestor of humanity, proved able to hide out long enough to inherit a largely vacant earth (p. xvii, Ward 1994).

In the rest of the book, Ward argues that the symptoms are clear and a third great mass extinction is already underway and may be unstoppable. As he concludes, “All species evolve until they die. Extinction is the end of evolution” (p. xviii, Ward 1994).

The same year, Rich accused the World Bank of “mortgaging the earth”, impoverishing the environment and generating “a crisis of development” (1994). Laurie Garrett (1994), meanwhile, published an encyclopedic account of “the coming plague” (“newly emerging diseases in a world out of balance”). Three years later, the Canadian biologist David Suzuki (Suzuki and McConnell 1997) set out to remind us that there is such a thing as a “sacred balance”, and that it is vital if humanity is to rediscover “our place in nature”. Shortly thereafter, a reader in social theory at the University of Wales and a member of an EU study team, Adam (1998) re/constituted and re/
conceptualized nature and time, before revisiting two major disasters, the irruption of mad cow disease in the United Kingdom in 1996, and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. Notes Adam:

In addition to the separation of culture from nature, the achievements [of industrialization] and their associated dangers can be traced to the operationalisation of specific conceptual practices, most particularly the reduction of complex, interdependent processes to their component parts and functions, the isolations of things and linear event chains from their contextual interdependencies, and the imposition of the mathematical grid of a linear-perspective vision on the phenomena under investigation.

She emphasized that “This particular world view is strengthened by the conception of time as empty and neutral as well as its use as a standardised, quantified medium for exchange” (p. 195, Adam 1998). Thus, she went on to argue, humanity is ill-equipped to deal with “environmental destruction of enormous spatial and temporal proportions and untold numbers of dead in degrees: there and then, a bit later, tomorrow, and some time in some elastic future somewhere” (p. 198, Adam 1998). As the tsunami-triggered disaster plays out in Japan twenty five years later, we see again how difficult it is to estimate the true proportion of this kind of event and its long-term consequences for life, of all kinds, in places as different as the ocean depths and downtown Tokyo.

A decade later, predictions of disaster were coming from all directions. During the 2004 Massey lectures, Canadian author and anthropologist, Ronald Wright, summarized humanity’s “short history of progress”, dissecting the decline and fall of diverse civilizations -- Easter Island, Rome, the Maya -- to draw parallels with 20th century patterns of runaway growth and consumption, placing an overwhelming strain on natural systems (2004). Wright echoed Adam’s concern about the “unintended dangers of industrialisation” (p. 195, Adam 1998), referring to the “progress trap”, that is, innovations that produce new problems that society cannot or will not solve, and which may in fact worsen rather than improve pre-existing conditions. Moreover,

things are moving so fast that inaction itself is one of the biggest mistakes. The 10,000-year experiment of the settled life will stand or fall by what we do, and don’t do, now. The reform needed is not anti-capitalist, anti-American, or even deep environmentalist; it is simply the transition from short-term to long-term thinking. From recklessness and excess to moderation and the precautionary principle (p. 131, Wright 2004).

Over a century’s worth of cities’ experience with the automobile suggests that it may turn out to be the most significant symbol of the progress trap to date. The soaring dependence on oil that it has generated and the incredible complexities of escaping from that trap may pose one of the biggest challenges facing humanity today. It shouldn’t be this way -- compared to the urgency of building new governance styles and infrastructure for a post-oil world or quickly developing greater energy efficiency tools and new “alternative” energies, just weaning ourselves off the car doesn’t seem
that difficult. And yet, much of the money borrowed to keep the staggering US and other economies on their feet in the oil price/sub-prime mortgage crunch went to shoring up the car industry and banks whose main business, aside from mortgages, is financing bigger and better cars, rather than new industries that could reduce oil dependence and build more sustainable economies and societies.

A couple of years earlier, Beckman (2001) called this car-centred aspect of modern society “automobility” or “automobilisation”. He argued that the car, “one of late modernity’s most recognized and contested objects” has “changed the ‘lived’ spaces and times of human activity”, noting how it has “reinforced...the accelerated expansion of suburban spaces”, “parcelisation of the urban fringe,” but also contributed to “a fragmentation of space” (pp. 593-598). Nowadays

Modern individuals, apart from interacting in living spaces, sleeping spaces, working times, and free times, now encounter each other in driving spaces and driving times. It seems that road space and highway lanes which are not just produced or altered by the automobile, but exclusively occupied by and reserved for it are now spaces where humans meet (in ‘love’ or in ‘anger’). Parking lots as red light districts and highways as combat fields have provided an alternative meaning of what was once seen merely as road infrastructure. Road use nowadays encompasses activities other than simply driving. With road rage the streets are rendered into grounds for battle. The driver as the significant other is a potential enemy, a threat to one’s private space within the metal cocoon (p. 598, Beckman 2001).

Beckman also underlined the “Janus-face of automobilisation”, which has both “opened up the urban fabric and freed the individual from some of his or her former physical boundaries” and “simultaneously moulded another, more dangerous and disperse structure that continually forces people and goods to maintain their movement” (p. 598, Beckman 2001). Like Adam, Beckman sees time, the invisible ingredient of much social and urban planning, as being distorted, perhaps dangerously, by automobility, as it has both accelerated time as experienced by urban residents, but also as it “has caused a self-critical response and promoted attempts to counterbalance the disruptive results of the speed-up by means of a slowdown” (p. 599, Beckman 2001). He quotes Sheller and Urry who argue that “automobility constitutes a civil society of hybridised ‘car-drivers’ and not of ‘pure’ human subjects” (p. 600, Beckman 2001).

As with Wright’s view of the “progress trap”, Beckman argued that “traditional automobilisation has become reflexive: it has produced dangers and risks that threaten its own foundation”. Whether ‘transport experts’ or ‘lay transport users’, people are “engaged in responsive actions against automobilisation risks”, which all too often “do not reflect critically on the mobility paradigm itself” (p. 605, Beckman 2001).
A year after Wright, Diamond (2005) left behind his amusing comparison of primate penis size (humanity as the third chimpanzee), and switched to a darker view of human development and the role of guns, germs and steel in its rises and demises, past and potentially future (2005). He developed the theme of society’s collapse in a later book (2011). Also in 2005, Jane Jacobs, published her last book, *Dark Age Ahead*. There, she identified five pillars of modern culture, which she considered in serious decline: community and family; higher education; the effective practice of science; taxation and government; self-policing of learned professions. She blamed environmental destruction, racism and the growing divide between rich and poor for this decline, warning that humanity could be headed for a new Dark Age, in which the many achievements of civilization could be lost to future generations (Jacobs 2005).

These distinguished authors were writing from their own, widely varied, fields -- paleontology, international finance and development, world health and the environment, urban sociology and economics -- yet they were all coming to remarkably similar conclusions. In 2006, this pessimism converged in the media, as the documentary, *An Inconvenient Truth*, took the message of global warming into day-to-day conversations and the nightmares of many. Since then, warnings of coming disaster have multiplied, and details proliferated.

Of all these books, Atwood's *Payback*, seems to sum up the wide variety of themes and the sense of impending doom, as the result of a runaway lifestyle in a world that is literally growing out of control. *Payback*’s diverse sources suggest that we will have to mix multidisciplinary, scientific and literary, mystical and rational approaches, to respond successfully to the paradigm change that is bearing down upon us with the force of a tsunami.

Invited by the Massey lecture series, like Wright, to deliver five interconnected lectures (2008), Atwood started by asking “Are we in debt to anyone or anything for the bare fact of our existence? If so, what do we owe, and to whom or to what? And how should we pay?” (p. 1). Using examples from the social sciences, literature, ancient Greece and biology, she argues that there is “an innate human module that evaluates fairness and unfairness and strives for balance”. This conviction and the need to oppose injustice and strive for fairness is the foundation for virtually all social relations, whether morality based on religious beliefs of judgement after death, or modern-day contracts, markets and children’s games.

In her final chapter, Atwood has three Spirits, of Earth Days Past, Present and Future, guide a corporate CEO named Ebenezer Scrooge through three different epochs. When Scrooge visits the
city of the future, it looks “a lot like what he saw in Europe during the Black Death: chaos, mass
death, the breakdown of civic order. All five of the erstwhile Mrs. Scrooges are peddling their
bodies on the street in exchange for tinned sardines...”

In Atwood’s take on Wright’s “progress trap”, Scrooge’s Spirit explains that

Mankind made a Faustian bargain as soon as he invented his first technologies... Now we have
the most intricate system of gizmos the world has ever known. Our technological system is the
mill that grinds out anything you wish to order up, but no one knows how to turn it off... (pp.
201-202, Atwood 2008).

Horrified by what he is seeing, our modern Scrooge begs the Spirit to confirm that if he, Scrooge,
makes amends and acts differently from now on, he will be able to improve the grim outlook. “I
deal in futures,” is the reply. “My best offer is Maybe.” (p. 202).

After mulling this over, Atwood suggests that perhaps “we need to count things, and add things up,
and measure things, in a different way. In fact, maybe we need to count and weigh and measure
different things altogether.” As her lecture ends, she has Scrooge climb out of bed to find a present
world, beautiful again, except for a subtle, significant shift:

It used to look solid, but now it appears fragile, like a reflection on water: a breath of wind
would ripple it, and it would vanish. I don’t really own anything, Scrooge thinks. Not even my
body. Everything I have is only borrowed. I’m not really rich at all, I’m heavily in debt. How do
I even begin to pay back what I owe? Where should I start?

The “Other” End of the World

My dissertation starts at the “other” end of the world, in Chile, the country where I have lived all
my adult life. Chile has often been called “the end of the world”. Isolation, a wild geography and
varied climate, the extremes of dictatorship, the striving for democracy, fine wines, centuries of
massacres, fresh fruit and fish, the death and rebirth of social movements. These are all
characteristics of life where the world ends. This dissertation explores the multiple conflicting
experiences of one of the first urban movements to emerge in the 1990s, after seventeen years of
military rule under a single dictator, General Augusto Pinochet. Like the many exiles, misplaced
and displaced persons around the globe, like Atwood’s Scrooge, I too am aware that everything I
have is “only borrowed. I’m not really rich at all, I’m heavily in debt. How do I even begin to pay
back what I owe?”
A foreigner and an immigrant to Chile at one of the most difficult moments in its history, I lived for many years as an inside-outsider, working for 20 years as an independent journalist, covering the triumphs and defeats of the military regime and its opponents, choking on teargas and drowning in the rush of the watercannon, while pursuing -- news, people, the dead, the missing, protestors and defenders, the “humans and humanoids” as the navy’s member of the Junta put it.

In the 1990s I turned to a more reflective mode, writing a history of the opposition to the regime as a series of non-fiction stories, followed by another book about thousands of years of life and contrast, struggle and thirst, dreams and sophisticated trading cultures in the Atacama desert. As the decade advanced, though, I became involved in the micro-battles of our arts neighbourhood, just off the city centre. Nightlife exploded after years of curfews finally ended, and my husband, our neighbours and I suddenly found ourselves wide awake at four in the morning, writing letters, shouting at drunken carousers, marching on the municipality, as we battled the noise.

My gaze shifted from national politics and Chile’s growing role in world trade to the micro reality of neighbourhood life. There, uncertain of the language of civility, we joined our neighbours in an effort to rebuild the basics of any community, trying to resume life together, after a long and darkly terrifying parenthesis, during which we never dared to meet each other’s eyes. I found myself spending more time knocking on doors, talking to neighbours, keeping a newsletter going, getting petitions signed, trying to get our newly elected municipal authorities to answer. I worked with an Ecological Committee, a group of mostly older women and some young and enthusiastic kids.

In 1995, we discovered that all our small battles were about to become meaningless. Our neighbourhood was scheduled to disappear under the pavement of Chile’s first major urban highway, the Costanera Norte, a flagship concession project with major political, economic and cultural ramifications. Our mimosa-lined streets, the wild thrush and parrots, the rebellious gardens that we cultivated between road and sidewalk, constantly trampled into cement-like clay, and then reclaimed by our geraniums and grass -- they were all about to vanish, and we were expected to bow our heads and learn to live under the shadow of the new freeway.

Suddenly we, the residents and neighbours of Bellavista, were also a species threatened with extinction. Suddenly we too were forced to look at what we liked about our lives and make difficult choices. I continued to edit and write, but increasingly my life was pushing me into the hard reality of asphalt streets and urban transport planning. Who was the city really for? Who gets to decide? Where do people fit?
Like Atwood’s Payback, my life began to sprawl and spread from literature, beyond journalism, into social science and even transport engineering. It was a bizarre shift, one that eventually turned me into a “bridging”\(^1\) kind of leader. At the same time, it pushed me into a master’s program in planning and community development, and my first encounters with the academic world’s attempts to organize complex systems of human experience, theory and knowledge, to gain some meaning, some understanding about them.

This dissertation calls on these multiple resources to explore issues of community involvement, neighbourhood planning, transport and cities. It deals with neighbourhood realities and organizations that balance constantly on Ward’s sharp-edged coin of evolution-extinction. It looks at a reality that seems solid and “objective”, but can vanish in an instant, under a wrecking ball or a concrete shroud.

It takes Adam’s admonition as a practical challenge. If I am to avoid “the reduction of complex, interdependent processes to their component parts and functions...” their isolation “from their contextual interdependencies,” and above all “the imposition of the mathematical grid of a linear-perspective vision” I must do more than simply collect, classify and analyze a set of data. In terms of methods, this involves enriching the traditional third-person approach to research with the first-person, and even a first-person plural. It also requires that I address complexity: a community experience is more than the sum of its individual members.

Cities are about people, and planning is about how cities respond or fail to meet their aspirations for some minimal but essential plank of justice on which to build their lives. This dissertation, then, portrays one such struggle, one I know well and from the inside out. I attempt to do this in a multi-dimensional way, one that looks at the subtleties of individual discourse and collective transformation, as they interact on the border where real people composed of bodies, minds and, yes, spirits, meet the city by way of the urban transport system.

It is also about people who take seriously Wright’s observation that “Things are moving so fast that inaction itself is one of the biggest mistakes”. These are ordinary people, quiet heros who may stand out for a moment, a meeting, a year or two, then move out of the limelight and back into their lives. It is about some very ugly battles and the way social movements can also torment the innocent, trip up or even cannibalize themselves. It is not about an ideal community, although it is

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\(^1\) This is a term and a concept developed by the Synergos network of senior civil society fellows to describe a specific kind of leadership, which reaches across different silos, bringing together people and thinking from highly diverse fields of action and usually separate or even conflicting types of knowledge.
about people who’ve done some amazing things and, on occasion and rather surprisingly, have
been recognized and even rewarded. Mostly, however, their experience and their voices continue
to be ignored, or exalted in ways that isolate and keep them powerless, in terms of exercising real
influence over how their neighbourhoods -- and ways of living -- evolve.

It is not about me, but it is about what I have learned from working with them, becoming a part of
them, in some strange, inside-outsider way. That, of course, is the debt, the payback part. Because
we have shared more than 20 years of very surprising living together, and I am the writer, and now
the academic, the one with the opportunity to study, analyze with them and report on what we
think this all means.

**Anti-highway revolts, citizen learning and urban planning**

In the last quarter of the 20th century, citizens in cities throughout North America and Europe
staged the first major rebellions against the car-centred city planning paradigm that became
dominant in the 1960s, consuming housing, razing communities with strong ethnic and racial
identities, and replacing them with the sprawling, suburb-driven cities that characterize many of
these places today. These anti-highway revolts spawned local, regional and national citizen
movements that questioned the foundations of planning processes and contents (Mohl 2002; Mohl
2004; Schragg 2004; Ladd 2008; Mohl 2008; Johnson 2009; Cannon 2012; Mohl and Rose 2012).
To this day, their far-reaching impacts and influence are apparent in, for example, thinking about
public transport (Toronto, Vancouver, New York), governance (Portland), and cycling (The
Netherlands).

Less is known, however, about how these interactions emerge, as “automobility” (Beckman 2001;
Urry 2004) has spread, becoming the ubiquitous face of globalization in developing countries.
While private vehicle modal share is relatively high in the Global North, in the Global South it is
very low. Building infrastructure for those who already travel most comfortably and quickly
through the city, then, reinforces inequalities, dedicating expensive facilities to those most
privileged, as it segregates, isolates and excludes those most in need. This is particularly grave,
given that this is often an impoverished majority, the ostensible priority for public finance and state
resources.

Using a complexity-based methodology, this case study examines a social movement against the
country’s first major highway concession, which arose in Santiago, Chile (1997), challenging and
changing urban planning paradigms. In 2000, the campaign founded a citizen institution, Living
City (Ciudad Viva). Twelve years later, it has become a prize-winning, citizen-led planning collective, although tomorrow it could collapse and disappear.

Living City’s experience suggests that even in an apparently hostile, authoritarian environment, independent, self-organizing civil society institutions can work with actors in government, universities and the private sector to co-produce significant shifts in urban planning processes, particularly transport. Unlike the rather frustrating results of government-led participatory processes, moreover, citizens’ commitment is profound and far-reaching. “Small” groups can accumulate “large” results, particularly in positioning cycling on local, regional and national planning agendas, and raising participation in planning as a major public demand.

To do so, Living City has acted as a catalyst, mobilizing actors throughout the public policy ecology, in favour of more sustainable, socially just transport. Enthusiasm for cycling among men and women, neighbours of all ages, different classes and politicians of all political stripes has grown, as has cycling’s modal share. This has occurred at the same time as the city’s public transport system is still staggering from the near-collapse that accompanied its launching (2007-2008), when a new bus system, supposedly well “integrated” into the Santiago Metro, left all modes overloaded, resulting in lengthy lineups, long waits, and tardy arrivals to work and other commitments for months, as technical staff desperately tried to get the system working properly. The contrast between citizen attitudes to the two transport modes reflects many factors, among them, the government’s insistence on limited, largely ritualistic participation in public transport planning, as opposed to a major citizen- and government-led partnership that consolidated cycling as a major planning priority (2007-2010).

Results suggest that rethinking the city and transport as complex systems, and providing room for leadership from citizen, as well as “technical” and “governmental” planners, opens the way to more effective strategies for innovating in cities, to address the social, environmental and other challenges humanity faces today. Small-scale participatory efforts that draw in actors with well developed relational networks can generate transformative deliberation and paradigm shifts.

“Complexity” is both an adjective and a new approach from the physical sciences, presented to a general audience by New York Times science writer, James Gleick, in Chaos, Making a New Science (1994). Chaos and complexity are intimately linked to each other and to deep change. As simpler systems merge into increasingly complex ones, they drive the system as a whole toward the edge of chaos. This is where major change -- a paradigm shift -- occurs and new organisms (or systems) “self-generate” (Maturana and Varela 1980; Merry 1995; Boonstra and Boelens 2011).
Complexity acknowledges profound paradoxes in natural (and social) phenomena. Underlying specific aspects of complex behaviour, there may be two or three relatively simple rules, as Reynolds’ BOID computer simulation model (1987), discussed in more detail in chapter 2, illustrates. In applying complexity to planning, Portugali (2011) suggests theorizing and researching from a perspective that understands cities as complex adaptive systems; defines an appropriate planning process; and develops an appropriate planning. Innes and Booher (2010) argue that collaborative planning processes offer the best potential for managing these kinds of systems.

This study examines particular aspects of the complex city, examining how citizens (self-) organized to influence transport planning processes and results. This apparently simple action-reaction (highway project-citizen resistance) had a much deeper than expected impact on the planning system over all. This reflects a bridging across the “sharp dichotomy between the planners and the planned” (pp. 289-291, Portugali 2011).

Key concepts from complexity that provide insight into city and planning systems include their non-linear nature, that is output is not proportional to input; cause and effect formulations do not hold (Lorenz cited in Merry 1995). Rather, interactions among actors and between actors and their environments (including technical systems such as those involved in urban transport) may act as open-ended systems, whose main characteristic is unpredictability (Young, cited in Merry 1995) and uncertainty, particularly in a far-from-equilibrium system (Jansch, cited in Merry 1995). Thus, small differences (or errors) in initial conditions can trigger large (and unexpected) differences in outcomes, as they are blown up by repetitive amplification (Lorenz, cited in Merry 1995), a condition known as the butterfly effect.

Portugali distinguishes between mechanistic/engineered/entropic planning and self-organized planning. The first refers to a relatively simple ‘closed system’ planning process, “in the sense that it is...fully controlled. The second refers to a relatively complex ‘open system' planning process, which like other open and complex systems exhibits phenomena of nonlinearity, chaos, bifurcation and self-organization." (p. 289). Participation, then, becomes an ethical obligation and an essential planning tool and goal.

In cities, this gap between the machine-based world view of the engineers and “soft” systems (Checkland 2000) that characterize citizens, whether in their individual transport mode choices or their collective views about public versus private transport, is highly relevant and the source of enormous conflict and misunderstandings, which can seriously hurt efforts to innovate. Although participatory processes are increasingly recognized as a useful part of planning, they seldom
mobilize the full range of possibilities that a more strategic approach to participation could offer. Thus, this dissertation explores these issues in depth, based on the experiences in Santiago.

### The anti-highway revolt (1997-2000)

In the 1990s, Santiago was a metropolitan region with 5.4 million inhabitants, a reasonable density of 70 people/hectare, and 16.5 million trips daily. In 1991, the modal split was just 16% for private cars, versus 54% for public transport, 22% walking, 2% cycling, and 2% other. Ten years later, this was changing, as cars rose to 22.2%, public transport fell to 33.4%, while human-powered travel remained predominant (walking, 37%, and cycling, 3%), accounting for 40%, and other modes 4% (SECTRA 2012).

Based on the assumption that Chile was suffering from an “infrastructure deficit” and that more cars required more roads, the public works ministry set up an elite concessions unit to invite private construction and infrastructure management firms to create a highway network within the city. In the early 1990s, it announced its emblematic first project, the *Costanera Norte*, a 29-kilometer highway, three lanes wide in each direction, with design speeds of 80-100 km/hr, and an initial price tag of US$120 million. The highway was to cut a swath across city (figure 3.3), running from the wealthy neighbourhoods (with high rates of car ownership) in the foothills of the Andes to the east, through the city centre where many of them worked, and on to the airport and the coast, where Chile’s main ports and seaside resorts were located (Quijada 2003, 2009).

The project erupted into a city already marked by the spatial segregation characteristic of a strong-growth economy that also suffered from very poor income distribution (Nickson 1995; Sabatini, Wormald et al. 2009; OECD 2011). High-income communities on the city’s western edge had high car ownership and usage rates, whereas the low-income communities where most of the highway is located depend primarily on public transport, walking and cycling as their transport modes, with little opportunity to own a car.

Thus, the highway stood to benefit a small proportion of the population, living in new real estate developments in distant suburbs, with the highest car-use rate, while distributing externalities such as air pollution, congestion (at entries and exits), parking and others across the city, particularly amongst vulnerable populations with the most need for improved transport and access to the city’s benefits. A large part of the city was in effect being asked to sacrifice wellbeing (homes, heritage, clean air, green space, etc.) for a major transport project that would not meet their needs, and indeed threatened to isolate them further (Tirachini 2011).
Of the ten municipal areas (*comunas*) affected, communities in three led the anti-highway debate. These involved the residents of low-income, heritage housing in Independencia; the market and street vendors, residents and artists of the area around the Vega Central and in Bellavista Recoleta; the residents, artists and intellectuals of Bellavista Providencia; and the high-income professionals and business people of Pedro de Valdivia Norte, also in Providencia.

From 1997 to 2000 and beyond, the country’s most powerful ministry and a project worth hundreds of millions of dollars was questioned and delayed by seemingly powerless citizens. Attempts to dismiss the campaign, intimidate or overrun the communities\(^2\) failed. To the surprise of their fellow citizens, the politicians behind the project, and academics alike, the *Coordinadora* successfully organized a major campaign against the project, forcing it into the environmental assessment process, questioning it publicly in the media and in private letters to companies interested in tenders. They also demanded that participatory processes offer equal time to project proponent and critics alike, consider home-owners, renters and market people threatened with displacement, and consider the environmental, social and other impacts of the project, throughout the city.

The *Coordinadora* raised some US$3,000 a year to fund its efforts. While the EIA was the main site for increasingly sophisticated debates, where even some public agencies questioned the project (CONAMA 1998-2000), streets and squares saw marches, communal hugs, posters and banners demanding respect for city neighbourhoods vital to ordinary people (the parks, the market, the cultural and recreational activities), but considered of no account by the government and powerful private interests.

Ultimately, the project, which was first tendered in April 1997, died at the end of 1999, only to be revived by then president Eduardo Frei, who found a consortium willing to build it in late 2000. The winning consortium (Impregilo, Fe Grande and Tecsa) pushed hard for the highway to go under the river in the neighbourhoods that had led the anti-highway revolt. Whether this was a victory or a defeat for the Coordinadora is discussed in depth in chapter 4.

Along the way, citizen participation in planning decisions went from nuisance status to a deeply felt public demand, which ultimately found its way into new planning processes at the local level, a presidential decree ordering ministers to include public participation in their processes (Lagos

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\(^2\) These included threats by Recoleta mayor against market leaders (personal communication to Coordinadora, 1998); a campaign to convince government staff not to hire independent professionals in the Coordinadora (personal communication from people approached); and other tactics.
2000), a law on participation in public processes (GobiernoChile 2011), and a right to information (transparency) law that modified the national Constitution (GobiernoChile 2005). At the organizational level, the coalition that led the anti-highway campaign functioned as a school for developing effective citizen planners, capable of reading plans, speaking out, and linking their issues to wider claims for democratization of urban planning decisions that, in Chile it should be noted, take place as much at the national and regional levels as within local municipalities (Nickson 1995; Huerta 2000; Posner 2003).

Moreover, the experience forged a new way of exercising citizenship that broke away from the “clientship” and clientelism of previous periods (Oxhorn 1995; Taylor 1998; Taylor 2004), creating civil society groups capable of cooperating with political authorities on policies with which they agreed, and critiquing when they did not. In 2000, these shifts, plus the ongoing problems that were threatening the communities involved with urban blight, motivated Coordinadora leaders to create Living City (Ciudad Viva) a permanent citizen institution, to bring citizens’ perspectives, proposals and skills to urban planning processes.

**Citizen-led planning: Living City (2000-2012)**

In 2000, leaders of the neighbourhood associations of Bellavista, Pedro de Valdivia Norte and Independencia joined with those from the market vendors of Tirso de Molina, Acofer, Pergola Santa María and the Vega Chica to found Living City (Ciudad Viva), a citizen institution growing out of the work of the Coordinadora. Like its predecessor, Living City forged dialogue across diversity and interdependence into a powerful unity among leaders and their organizations in central neighbourhoods of Santiago. Unlike the Coordinadora, its work went beyond defensive campaigns to propose groundbreaking change, in recycling and transport systems, in neighbourhood and heritage recognition and management processes, and neighbourhood recovery. Typically, despite some tension between leaders and municipal politicians and staff, Living City proved able to both critique problems (for example, booming crime associated with the municipalities lack of control over drug trafficking, illegal discotheques and other activity in Bellavista), and to propose solutions through innovative use of charrettes, participatory mapping and other methods that brought neighbours and other actors into direct contact with municipal and other planners.

Living City achieved considerable recognition for its first two projects, *Recycle to Live Better* (Fondo de las Américas, 2001) and *Get Moving for Your City: A Citizens’ proposal for transport for equality* (UNDP-GEF, 2002). Each won the prestigious award for Innovation in Citizenship (2002,
sponsored by the Ford Foundation, the Foundation for Overcoming Poverty and the University of Chile’s public policy institute. Both involved extensive external evaluations, including interviews with neighbourhood, private sector and government partners.

Together the two awards helped to consolidate Living City’s reputation and participatory methods, enabling it to expand throughout the decade. One emblematic process involved the renovation of Pio Nono street in Bellavista, an eight-year effort that culminated in its launching, with widened sidewalks, a cycle way and other amenities, in 2008. The process was led by Living City volunteers and municipal planners, who were able to obtain significant funding from the national housing ministry. The initiative won widespread recognition and a major award from the national government, again the result of a rigorous external evaluation.

Thus, Living City developed a series of tools for participatory mapping, charrettes and other activities to bring citizens together with public sector planners. Of most relevance here, however, is the contrast between its efforts to gain entry for citizen participation in Santiago’s transport planning process, and concrete results in its pro-cycling endeavours. Transport, of course, was a central issue to Living City’s work from the moment it was founded by the Coordinadora.

In 2001, by sheer chance, two Living City leaders were able to spend a week visiting Bogotá, where they interviewed technical staff, planners, business people, and others involved in implementing a visionary transport plan for that city, based on an innovative bus rapid transport system, Transmilenio, and an extensive network of cycleways, complemented by social and other initiatives. Through its own media (website, print magazine with a circulation of 5,000; a radio show with an audience of 14,000), Living City endorsed these new initiatives as examples of the kind of sustainable transport initiatives required in Santiago, and translated them into a Citizen Agenda for Sustainable Transport.

At the time, Living City was meeting regularly with the regional interministerial transport planning secretariat (SECTRA), which was preparing an urban transport plan for Santiago (PTUS). The result was that SECTRA presented the PTUS as part of the launching of the Citizens’ Transport Agenda. Unfortunately, as the new bus system (now known as TranSantiago) began to take shape, citizen participation faded into the background. Despite a concerted effort by Living City, participation was restricted to several large, formal events, which focused on providing information to citizens, rather than their integration into the process.
In 2003, as part of the UNDP project, Living City convinced the World Bank to bring Enrique Peñalosa, the former mayor of Bogotá, to Chile, for a seminar at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). More than 200 people from city and regional government, civil society and other organizations participated, and transport and housing ministry speakers found themselves speaking to a committed, demanding audience by day’s end.

From 2007-2010, Living City received significant support from a Dutch NGO, Interface for Cycling Expertise (I-CE). This experience, which focused on creating more cycling-inclusive conditions in Santiago (modal share had risen from 2% in 2000 to 3% in 2006), contrasted with Living City efforts for inclusion in planning of the bus rapid transport system. By applying ideas from planning theory to participatory processes, Living City partnered with the Undersecretariat of Transport and the Santiago Metropolitan Regional Government (GORE), creating deliberative spaces where staff from all levels of government, other pro-cycling organizations working together through Ciclistas Unidos de Chile (CUCH), academics, consultants, neighbourhood associations, environmental NGOs, and business people came together.

Thus, a small group of some 25 members met monthly to develop a Chilean design manual based on the Dutch CROW manual; mixed groups participated in on-street audits, using a tool developed by Living City; the women’s cycling group, Macletas, developed a school for women that moved with the open streets initiative, CicloRecreovía; additional exchanges took place through the Bicicultura festival; and so on. Similarly, small workshops developed innovative public sector and private sector initiatives, while civil society groups contributed significant educational and other activities focusing on behavioural change (Sagaris and Olivo 2010).

The whole process both drove and was driven forward by an umbrella group, the Citizen-Government Roundtable for a Cycling Culture in Chile. This group, which met three or four times a year in 2008-2009, was co-chaired by a Living City representative and the regional governor of Santiago, and attended by 60-80 representatives from every public, private and citizen group with an interest in improving cycling.

The Roundtable reversed typical procedures, with citizens speaking first and presentation rights based on reporting on hard work carried out between meetings. Thus, rather than the generalities or the authoritarian government-informs-citizen format that characterizes many such efforts, both citizens and public sector representatives reported on progress made in their different initiatives. Santiago’s Metro developed cycle parking, recyclers working with the El Bosque municipality developed plans for integrating tricyclers, and so on. In 2009, through a participatory action-
mapping process, cyclists’ evaluation of existing infrastructure became a part of the diagnosis that led to a significant update to Santiago’s Cycling Master Plan. Indeed, prior to discussion in the Roundtable, the Plan, developed by a consultant in the late 1990s, was virtually unknown, except to a minuscule circle of government officials.

Today, cycling facilities are expanding rapidly throughout the city, and its modal share has risen, although the latest figures are from 2006, prior to these efforts. When the the Concertación, which had ruled Chile since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship (1990) lost elections to a right-wing coalition headed by Sebastián Piñera (2009), cycling policy remained a high priority with the new government. Indeed, his victory photo in USA Today had him riding a bicycle (AP 2010). The Santiago network has expanded significantly in the past ten years, from under 50 km to 197 km (DICTUC-CV 2011), fuelled by US$45 million in funding, the product of an interministerial agreement brokered by then regional governor of Santiago, Adriana del Piano, in 2007, at the beginning of the collaborative process. A study by Living City and the private consultant, Urbanismo y Transporte, headed by former SECTRA director Hernán Silva, found that cycle rates on the main cycle paths had risen 20% annually, from 2005 to 2012 (Mancilla 2012).

Public attitudes have also shifted profoundly. While in the 1980s, the media typically covered the bicycle as an antiquated, poor man’s ride that should be eliminated in a modern Chile, today it is covered with enthusiasm and support, given its health, environmental and other benefits.4

Exploring participation by self-organizing civil society organizations

In The Tipping Point, author Malcolm Gladwell explores current knowledge about the factors that turn an idea into a major trend, attributing shifts to information-rich “mavens”, acting through powerful “connectors”, with support from “persuasive salespeople” (2002). Although it is a simplification, Living City’s experience in the Santiago case offers insight into how committed civil society organizations can leverage these capabilities and catalyze change throughout entire ecologies of diverse policy actors, in public, private and citizen spheres.

3 Particularly powerful was an advertising campaign in the 1980s, still available on youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVb5LehWHk) today, featuring popular actor Nissim Sharim trying to take his girl for a ride on a bike, and a driver yelling at him, “comprate un auto perico!” -- get yourself a car, man!, which entered the popular lexicon in the decades that followed.

4 See for example a recent 10-minute news feature on the main news broadcast by TeleTrece (18-VII-2012), http://www.13.cl/t13/sociedad/ciclistas-acusan-falta-de-cultura-vial.
Living City could do this, because as an organization it stored, developed and nourished a collective memory, which combined evidential and experiential knowledge, and kept these available throughout the process. Similarly, the cycling-inclusive initiative mobilized citizen, public and private planners and policy entrepreneurs, with significant international support, turning traditional participatory procedures on their heads (citizens spoke first, government responded; citizens co-chaired with government; citizens led significant information-gathering initiatives and the results were enshrined in the Santiago Master Plan and a final process report, which has formed the basis for the next phase of work).

Moreover, by working through and with autonomous, self-organizing citizen organizations, rather than the typical list of participatory activities, political leaders and technical staff taking innovative positions found they had significant support -- indeed pressure -- to move ahead, thus generating a win-win situation. By integrating citizen planners, power to deliberate, make decisions and act was spread among diverse groups, so the whole system benefited from diverse strategies, personalities and approaches, able to absorb tension and conflict, and to progress.

It should be noted that within complexity thinking the term “self-organizing” does not mean self-sufficient. Rather, it refers to the way system components and particularly simple systems interact or merge to create more complex systems. This involves taking what is available from the surrounding environment, so when we refer to a citizens’ group or a city as self-organizing, we mean that it has taken existing components/simpler systems and combined them in new ways that act in substantially different ways from anything that came before them. This is consistent with views, such as the ecological footprint (Rees and Wagernagel 1996), which document cities’ use of resources from widely diverse sources and across enormous distances.

Aside from their independence and ability to introduce innovation into existing systems, what is important about these movements is that they are “not closed, but open and coupled to an environment, with which they exchange resources” (p. 110, Boonstra and Boelens 2011). Thus, and as this case exemplifies, they can accumulate knowledge, credibility (with peers, public opinion and technical-political players) and can significantly influence issues important to citizens.

**Interrogating citizenship, democratization and change in the urban sphere**

By exploring the Chilean experience, this dissertation seeks to answer questions associated with the interactions between citizen learning, democratization, and significant change in the urban sphere. Thus, I am asking:
What, if anything, can this Chilean experience tell us about how citizen participation and democratization in urban planning can foster innovation for sustainability, building the consensuses necessary to generate new forms of urban living, more suited to the energy, environmental, social justice and other challenges of the 21st century?

To find answers, I apply Portugali’s suggestion that we theorize and research cities from the understanding that cities are open adaptive systems. I therefore examine particular aspects of the complex city, specifically how citizens self-organized to influence both the planning system and the city system, and what this tells us about how the “sharp dichotomy between the planners and the planned” (Portugali 2011) may be breached or bridged.

Additional questions then, explore the following:

Where do active citizens and effective civil society organizations come from, in post-authoritarian contexts where they have been deliberately destroyed? What role can participation in urban planning play in building the active citizenship skills necessary for more democratically capable citizens? Does this involve single- or double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1974; Healey 2006; Innes and Booher 2010), or can it actually include learning from the future as it emerges (Scharmer 2009)?

How does citizen participation in urban planning interact with public and private policy fields, to achieve goals? Does this have relevant “side effects” in terms of how these goals are achieved and impacts on democratization and sustainability? Is there a significant relationship between these three factors? Is there anything special about streets or transport planning with regard to these processes?

What kinds of organization enhance or limit this development? Are new kinds of organization, participation and leadership emerging? Can we speak of a need for “civic infrastructure” to facilitate (or limit) civil society development in the urban sphere?

I start (chapter 1) by examining key issues in thinking about cities and planning, from Fainstein (2010), Friedmann (2000), and Evans (2002), identifying key concepts developed by these three thinkers as they relate planning to the “just” city (Fainstein), the “good” city that encourages human flourishing (Friedmann), and the “liveable” city (Evans), which manages to combine environmental concerns with employment and other factors crucial to social justice and human flourishing. I explore thinking about cities, planning and power, as developed by the American planners, Booher and Innes, particularly in their work on network power (2002) and planning with complexity (2010). I contextualize thinking about planning in the framework developed by Tilly (2007), in his study of democratization and dedemocratization in countries around the world, with additional comments from Avritzer, which shed light on some crucial differences in both participatory and democratizing processes in Brazil (2002; 2010).
To develop a methodology (chapter 2) appropriate to these themes, my subject matter, positionality and the richness of my data, and to help identify what is crucial about these ideas as they play out in the stories of the Coordinadora and Living City, I use thinking about complexity as applied to cities by Booher and Innes, mentioned above, de Roo et al. (2010) and Portugali (2011). Concepts developed by all three were essential to hone my focus and bring attention particularly to actors, their interactions with each other, and their interactions with both city and planning systems. I combined this perspective with a participatory action research methodology, ethnography, and a series of dialogical methods to test my views and enrich them with those of others.

Chapter 3 presents and discusses the relevant experiences of the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte, focusing on actors and their interactions with each other and their planning and city environments, before examining them from the perspective of self-generation, through mutual learning-teaching processes to develop active citizenship and other relevant skills.

Chapter 4 discusses the main observations and conclusions for the Coordinadora phase of this process, particularly as it responds to my questions regarding personal involvement and change, generated within and by particular spaces for citizenship learning.

Chapter 5 examines the experiences of Living City using a similar methodological approach, adjusted for the growing complexity of the organization and its work, as it faces major challenges, near collapse and growing maturity, despite the ongoing precariousness of its existence.

Chapter 6 discusses the main observations and conclusions for the Living City phase of this process, particularly as it responds to my questions about how apparently small, “powerless” citizens’ groups and organizations were able to act significantly on the both planning and city systems.

Chapter 7 summarizes the key conclusions from chapters 4 and 6, and presents my final reflections on this case study, focusing on the concepts of citizen planners and their role in city and planning systems; the difference between self-organized groups working within a citizenship rather than a government-organized participatory framework; and the usefulness of combining concepts from complexity thinking with participatory action research, to approach and synthesize the complex data available from this kind of study. I close with a reflection on where this approach could lead, in terms of future research.
Chapter 1 Rethinking Cities, Planning and Power

1.1 Defining and creating the “good”, the “just” and the “livable” city
1.1.1 The Good City
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1.1.3 The Livable City: ecologies of actors
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1.4 Thinking across scale: the urban, the meso, transport and innovation
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1.4.2 The Meso
1.4.3 Streets and transport
1.4.4 Innovation

1.5 Final reflections: From building infrastructure to fostering living systems

Figure 1.1. Map of the Imaginary City. Grade 4 students’ Map of their imaginary city, part of Living City’s participatory mapping activities in 2007-2008.
1.1 Defining the “Good”, the “Just” and the “Livable” city

In the eyes of three distinguished planning theorists, we separate planning theory from theorizing the city at our peril. If planning’s raison d’etre goes beyond the mere administration of things and systems to improving the lot of the diverse people living together in human settlements, then we must, they argue, consider both processes and essential purpose as indelibly and dynamically intertwined. To achieve these goals, as discussed in more detail below, Portugali (2011) argues that planning theory must address structural issues more directly.

Thus, as the century turns, Friedmann, with his extensive background planning in both developing and developed countries, argues that planners should focus on the “good city” (Friedmann 2000; Friedmann 2002). Fainstein, speaking mainly for and about Western Europe and the United States, proposes the “just city” (Fainstein 2000; Fainstein 2005; Fainstein 2011). Writing primarily from his background in development planning, Evans (Evans 2002) identifies the creation of “livable cities” as the “archetypal challenge of twenty-first-century governance” and argues that “ecologies” of agents or actors are central to their creation.

The three concepts overlap and complement each other. All three are important to this dissertation, Friedmann and Fainstein in terms of their proposed purpose of planning theory, and Evans because his search for livability reflects priorities more common in developing countries and an interesting theory about how to achieve them, particularly his thinking about “agents of urban livability” or “ecologies of actors”, a concept that has become foundational to the work in this dissertation.

But planning for this kind of systemic transformation is essentially a complex task. If we hope to go beyond description and prescription, to identify what is important, essential or simply useful to planning for change, then we must seek to move beyond “what exists” to identify “what could become and how”. For this purpose, I have used a methodology based on complexity science to explore this case study of a citizens’ anti-highway revolt in Santiago, Chile.

This chapter discusses key concepts used in this dissertation, regarding the good, livable and just city. In particular, it develops a series of definitions -- network power, ecologies of actors, citizen learning and trust networks -- which are the focus throughout this case study. As these terms suggest, they arise from varied levels of engagement with thinking about systems and networks, raising interesting possibilities for both analytical framework and methodological approach. Thus,
the next chapter will complete this conceptual framework with a discussion of complexity science, as applied to this case study.

Succeeding chapters discuss the data within the conceptual framework developed in this chapter and chapter 2, with observations and conclusions regarding the Coordinadora presented in chapter 4, and those on Living City presented in chapter 6. The final chapter revisits the key concepts discussed in these first two chapters and offers some final observations and conclusions.

1.1.1 The Good City

Friedmann describes “the city of everyday life” in counterpoint to the city at “the service of power.” Planning’s essential purpose should focus on creating a “good city”, whose “foundational value” is “a principle of human flourishing” (p. xxv, Friedmann 2002). This poses a challenge in terms of understanding and shaping the future, because:

Utopian thinking, the capacity to imagine a future that is radically different from what we know to be the prevailing order of things, is a way of breaking through the barriers of convention into a sphere of the imagination where many things beyond our everyday experience become possible. All of us have this ability, which I believe to be inherent in human nature, because human beings are insufficiently programmed for the future (p. 103, Friedmann 2002).

For Friedmann, utopian thinking inextricably joins “two moments... Critique and constructive vision.” Like the old one-two punch or, more aptly, the easy gait of the flaneur’s stroll, the critical gaze gives rise to consequential actions, and each follows on the other, alternating critique-action, continuity-change, theorizing-building. Whatever the pace, and it typically varies, this movement can carry individuals, communities and whole societies onward, to somewhere new in terms of how we live, together.

Significantly, Friedmann’s first question concerns “whose city are we talking about?” Despite arguments that “common good is either propaganda or false consciousness”, Friedmann insists on “continuing to search for the common good of a city, if only because, without such a conception, there can be no political community” (p. 108, Friedmann 2002). Both process and outcome are essential, he adds (p. 109), if we are to achieve what he argues to be the most fundamental human right: “those minimal conditions -- political, economic, social, physical, and ecological -- that are essential for human flourishing” (pp. 110-111, Friedmann 2002, his emphasis). Importantly,

in this understanding, the ‘common good’ of the city appears as something akin to citizen rights, that is, to the claims that local citizens can legitimately make on their political community as a basis for the flourishing of all its citizens. Making these claims, and at the
same time contributing to their realization in practice, is one of the deep obligations of local citizenship (p. 111, Friedmann 2002).

For Friedmann, the “solid material base” required for citizens to flourish in the “multipli/city” are adequate housing and complementary community services, affordable healthcare, adequately remunerated work, and adequate social provision “for the weakest citizens, if their own efforts are insufficient to provide for what is regarded as the social minimum” (p. 468, Friedmann, 2000). He does not address the physical city, leaving those issues to Jacobs and Appleyard, whose work shows affinities to Friedmann’s. Nor does Friedmann include environmental concerns, leaving that to other experts. This is because, to Friedmann, while genuine material equality is unlikely (without brutal repression), “what we must never tolerate is a contemptuous disregard for the qualities of social and political life, which is the sphere of freedom” (p. 469, Friedmann 2000).

Moreover, from the start, Friedmann seamlessly links “citizenship” and “rights”, as essential components of the good city. This case study explores these elements as they emerge in neighbourhood battles, offering insight into how “ordinary” people can use these critique+build, act+think, theorize+practice sequences to transform the embattled city, threatened by highway and other projects that do not reflect their aspirations. Often, it is civil society organizations (CSOs) that raise these critiques and struggle to propose new ways of living, moving, building, eating, that can correct the problems they identify and move humanity forward. But where authoritarian rule, not democratic practice, has been the prevailing culture for years or longer, where does civil society come from, and where does it get the skills and resources it needs to function effectively? How do we get the chicken without the egg? This theme, involving complex issues of emergence, recurs throughout this dissertation.

One of the few comparative studies of civil society in both developed (more established democratic) and developing (newly democratizing) countries (Lewis 1999) examines different hypotheses about what triggers civil society’s emergence and development. Salomon and Anheier conclude that its emergence reflects multiple factors rooted in the social groupings and class structures within society at large:

In particular, vibrant nonprofit organizations are likely to emerge where the hold of traditional landed elites is effectively challenged by middle class elements, or where traditional elites turn to such institutions as a way to forestall more radical demands from below, often in alliance with conservative religious forces (p. 87, Lewis et al. 1999).

Adil Najam characterizes citizen organizations as “policy entrepreneurs”, noting their rapid growth as a global phenomenon, significantly influencing the political systems in which they are
embedded. He warns of the dangers of overestimating their capacity to fulfill global expectations, and, as part of his efforts to create an analytic framework composed of “empirical typologies or holistic conceptual maps” (p. 143, Lewis et al. 1999), identifies four groupings, according to whether citizen organizations act as:

- **Monitors**, performing the function of keeping policy 'honest';
- **Advocates**, lobbying for the policy options they prefer or against the ones they oppose, building strategic coalitions and public support;
- **Innovators**, developing and demonstrating ways of doing things differently; or
- **Service providers** (pp. 152-153, Najam in Lewis 1999).

I will return to these functions elsewhere in this dissertation, both to describe contextual factors in Chile and to discuss some aspects of my conclusions.

1.1.2 The Just City

Fainstein, meanwhile, argues for the importance of values in planning and proposes justice as primordial: “the purpose of planning is to create a just city” (p. 121, Fainstein 2005). The “just city” is an alternative to the “current emphasis on competitiveness and the dominance in policy making of neoliberal formulations that aim at reducing government intervention and enabling market processes” (p. 8). Two rationales from philosophy form the basis of her position. The first, on universality, echoes Atwood’s argument (Introduction) that human beings are “wired” for fairness. Thus, Fainstein quotes Harvey’s contention that

universal...
Fainstein compares Rawls’ position to that of Habermas’ ideal speech situation: “in both instances the outcome is a theory of justice formulated under conditions that ensure fairness” (p. 15). She notes a fundamental difference between the two, however, which forms the basis of her critique of Healey’s theory of collaborative planning.

Rawls, however, does not base his argument on communication, and in presenting the difference principle, he deduces that equality of primary goods constitutes the content of justice. Disagreement arises over the principles that should define what is just and unjust rather than the precedence of justice itself (Rawls 1971, 5, quoted on p. 15, Fainstein 2010).

For Fainstein, justice is composed of three interlocking elements: democracy, equity and diversity. She discusses the tensions between the three (p. 48, Fainstein 2010), and argues that planning theory must look beyond its usual focus, exclusively on planning processes and the role of the planner, to contextualize these within “the field of forces in which planners function and a formulation of what a better city might be in relation to justice” (p. 57, Fainstein 2010).

This dissertation explores urban planning experiences in which claims for democracy and equity arise from diverse groups and become articulated in ways consistent with Fainstein’s ideas about the just city. It examines planning in the city, particularly on its streets. And it explores the actions of planners in municipal, regional and national structures, as they interact, negate or reinforce the efforts of upstart communities whose leaders also claim the right to plan, or at least participate in crucial vision, strategic and other decisions that, they argue, will profoundly affect equity and the quality of life of thousands of people. This case also reveals how private actors “plan” the city, often through “non-planning” processes. Ultimately, it argues that citizens too are planners, although to date their participation is most evident in “anti-planning” stances, as discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

1.1.3 The Livable City and its “ecologies” of actors

As planning spills into public debate about highways, transport and other issues, “the field of forces” expands to include an increasingly complex set of actors. Rigid rules and overly causal readings may offer tools too limited to fully explore their interactions. Thus, based on case studies from Seoul and Bangkok, Taipei, Vietnam, Hungary, São Paolo and Mexico, Evans introduces the dual concept of “livability” as central to theorizing planning. He notes that “the poor cities of the developing world are often vibrant hubs of global economic and cultural activity, but they are also ecologically unsustainable and, for ordinary citizens, increasingly unlivable” (p. 1, Evans 2002) and goes on to link jobs and the environment as crucial. Thus, livelihood and ecological sustainability are the two faces of “the coin of livability”.

Livelihood means jobs close enough to decent housing with wages commensurate with rents and access to the services that make for a healthful habitat. Livelihoods must also be sustainable. If the quest for jobs and housing is solved in ways that progressively and irreparably degrade the environment of the city, then the livelihood problem is not really being solved... (pp. 1-2, Evans 2002).

As with the good or the just city, thinking about livability brings people into the centre of the planning equation, examining their importance in terms of their relationships with each other, their immediate urban environment, and the city’s “hinterland” (Evans’ term). To answer questions about how to achieve our goals, governance becomes central:

Is there room for collective action on behalf of livability? If so, who might organize and channel it? Are local communities still effective political actors? Are governments and political parties, the traditional vehicles of collective projects, plausible candidates? Or must trajectories of livability rely on less conventional institutional instruments, such as social movements or NGOs? (p. 2, Evans 2002).

To answer these questions, Evans focuses on collective rather than individual agency, but questions whether civil society, a concept which “lumps together plutocrats and the poor” (p. 14) is a useful answer. Instead, he argues:

Local communities, translocal intermediary organizations such as NGOs and political parties, and last but not least, the variegated collection of organizations that constitute the state are all more promising candidates. These three categories of actors have their problems as well, but in combination they provide a good beginning for constructing a vision of agents of urban livability (p. 14, Evans 2002).

This view then, requires looking not at individual participants, as much of the literature on participation does, but rather at citizens and their organizations. It also requires looking beyond citizens or civil society. Those responsible for government policies and procedures, at different levels (local, regional, national) are equally relevant, as are others. In this way he identifies an “ecology of agents”, or “assemblage of actors”

whose prospects and capabilities cannot be assessed without taking into account the aims, strategies, and capabilities of the rest of the actors with whom they share a common arena. Focusing on sets of actors is useful not because interconnections are the solution in themselves but because it allows us to distinguish patterns of interconnection that enhance liability from patterns of interaction that undercut it (p. 23, Evans 2002).

Moreover, and in an important departure from “friend-enemy” dichotomies common in post-dictatorial situations,

Each type of actor -- communities, intermediary organizations, and state agencies -- has a complementary contribution to make to the fight for livability. The capacity of each depends on
its internal coherence as well as the aggregated experience and ability of its individual members, but the power of each to effect change also depends fundamentally on its relations to the others (p. 244, Evans 2002).

Intrinsic to livable cities, then, are the ways that these different actors and the living systems to which they belong interact in general, but also, in particular, how their deliberate (and deliberative) interactions can mobilize what Booher and Innes describe as “network power” (2002).

Thus, everyone has a role and we can get away from readings of power that are sometimes helpful but that can impose sterile limitations, for example, when municipal staff are assumed to be “the enemy” of a citizen movement, simply because they work with local government. This also sharpens attention to how actors connect and work together (or against each other) through both “formal linkages and alliances” and “networks of individuals [operating] within organizations and agencies...” (p. 244, Evans 2003).

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand the effectiveness of the citizens’ organization in this case study without taking an ecology of actors approach. Living City developed by working closely with technical staff at different levels of government, other citizens’ organizations and groups, as will be discussed, but it also involved other players.

The private sector is often forgotten in discussions of civil society-government relations, but in terms of livable (or just or good) cities, accepting this invisibility is unwise, to say the least. While the private sector in Chile plays an often destructive, even predatory role in urban development, some companies see some version of livability or sustainability as functional to their business model. Moreover, the private sector is more diverse than some analyses assume: the city may perpetuate or offset exclusion, as we see in the case of recyclers and street vendors in this case study. Furthermore, it is important to note that academics often straddle the private and quasi public spheres of the university, as they derive significant income from working as consultants, often for real estate developers and construction companies. This means they are not necessarily the independent or “objective” observers that they are often assumed to be. I do not wish, by this observation, to downplay their importance, but rather to locate them appropriately within our ecology of actors, and note the shifting nature of categories that might otherwise appear fixed or be taken for granted.

1.1.4 Network power
On the urban scale, many issues may be fundamental, but they tend to affect small groups of people: a high-rise development in a low-rise heritage neighbourhood, for example, excites the response of mostly local people. Even a large proportion of these may be quite a small number of people. This study reveals a link between formal citizen institutions and the “insurgent citizenship,” which Friedmann defines as coming from “active participation in temporary, nonterritorial political communities engaged in a dual struggle” to defend existing and claim new rights (p. 78, Friedmann 2002). Depending on the holder’s personal beliefs, one or other may be preferable because it is more “revolutionary” or more “reform-oriented”.

How do these ecologies of actors achieve their ends? Many, particularly those in opposition to dominant planning paradigms, come from vulnerable groups within the city. Typically, they battle multiple forms of exclusion and discrimination. Nonetheless, they often achieve seemingly impossible goals. How does this happen?

Booher and Innes develop the idea of “network power” to address these issues. This is a key concept within this dissertation, because it allows a more nuanced reading of the traditional view of power as something that one, usually small, group has and something the majority needs, but can only accumulate by bringing together huge numbers of people. As Booher and Innes put it:

Network power is a shared ability of linked agents to alter their environment in ways advantageous to these agents individually and collectively. Network power emerges from communication and collaboration among individuals, public and private agencies, and businesses in a society. Network power emerges as diverse participants in a network focus on a common task and develop shared meanings and common heuristics that guide their action. The power grows as these players identify and build on their interdependencies to create new potential. In the process, innovations and novel responses to environmental stresses can emerge. These innovations in turn make possible adaptive change and constructive joint action.

Booher and Innes define three conditions essential for network power “to emerge in a significant way”. The first is diversity, in multiple dimensions, ranging from the nature of the agents involved in the network (citizens, municipal and national planners, private sector and academics), but also in terms of “values, resources, experience, and information”. The second is interdependence: each player must have “something to offer that others want and something they want from others”. The third, authentic dialogue, requires that “the communication flowing through the network must be both accurate and trusted by participants to allow the full advantage to be taken of the agents’ diversity and interdependence” (p. 226, Booher and Innes 2002).
Network power doesn't just happen. In the case of the Chilean experience that forms the basis of this dissertation, I find that ecologies of actors offer an important, perhaps essential space for mobilizing network power, and that this can be done more effectively when it is done consciously. Rather than thinking in terms of traditional lobbying, manifestations or alliances, participating strategically as part of an ecology of actors can mobilize power and resources far beyond those of the catalyzing group or issue. In this case study, participating strategically meant framing communities as “citizen planners”, thereby placing their efforts on equal footing to those of official planners and decision-makers.

1.2  Closing the power gap: democratization, participation, citizenship

All three of the perspectives discussed so far rest on common assumptions about equality, rights and citizen participation, three essential components of a democratic political system and culture. But where authoritarian rule and deeply violent conflicts and repression have been the norm, can urban planning offer a significant space for significant change, particularly democratization?

Very few countries are “truly” democratic. All suffer from democratic “deficits”, whether these are expressed in voter apathy or mad candidates rushing from the fringes into key posts, a lack of answers or non-existent debates about the major issues threatening humankind. In Latin American countries, ruled until recently by dictatorships, democratic deficits are apparent in imperfect electoral systems, as this Chilean case illustrates, but also in the lack of a democratic culture -- egalitarian and empowering ways of thinking, interrelating, acting -- that make democracy’s virtues apparent to whole populations.

In his seminal book, Amartya Sen (1999) was among the first to challenge the idea that far from being a luxury that a poor country can’t afford, “the intensity of economic needs adds to -- rather than subtracts from -- the urgency of political freedoms” (p. 147, Sen 1999). These freedoms are also important to finding meaningful, and therefore lasting, solutions to the challenges of over-consumption and environmental destruction wherever they occur. That massive numbers of people in very diverse countries around the world increasingly perceive this and are determined to achieve it through democratization, is a sign of our times. Every wave, however, comes with an undertow, and as Huntington (1991) and Tilly (2007) note, the more countries democratize, the more they experience “reverses” (Huntington) or “de-democratization” (Tilly).

These swings back to authoritarian and forth to increasingly democratic political cultures reflect contradictions that emerge when examining conflicts in a country like Chile. There the vast
majority of the population has battled for over a century for inclusion against a small, closed elite that has used every means, including civil war and military coups, to maintain exclusion (Blakemore 1974; Loveman 2001; Huneeus 2007). In countries with more established democracies, the deeply democratic cultures and traditions in which political procedures are regularly re-enacted are taken for granted. The dynamic role played by the media, citizens’ watchdog or advocacy groups, formal and informal participation are taken for granted, just part of the democratic bundle. But elsewhere these institutions do not exist, or exist differently, in forms that are riskier and more precarious, but also enriched by recent histories of organizing and social movements.

1.2.1 Democratization as foreground

While democracy may be the white noise in the background of planning theory in the North, it must be central to thinking about city planning in the South. Democracy has traditionally been considered desirable because it avoids tyranny, guarantees essential rights, provides general freedom and self-determination, allows for moral autonomy and human development, protects personal interests, offers political equality. Modern democracy also contribute to peace and prosperity (Dahl 1998). Indeed, in a rigorously designed study, Przeworski et al. find the argument that dictatorships achieve better economic results completely specious, with democracy significantly improving political stability, living conditions and other factors.

Political scientists use “empirical, descriptive, institutional, and procedural definitions” to define democracy (pp. 67, Huntington 1991). Procedural definitions are used the most, as they are easiest to identify, categorize and compare. These examine the set of procedures used to select political leaders, and the set of civic and political rights that accompany these procedures. The rule that “democracy is a system in which [incumbents] lose elections” (p. 10, (Przeworski 1991), remains useful.

But democracy is as much a story we tell ourselves as a fixed, political category. Usually framed as a 2,500-year-old Greek invention, Dahl nonetheless observes, “it would be a mistake to assume that democracy was just invented once and for all... Like fire, or painting or writing, democracy seems to have been invented more than once, and in more than one place” (p. 9, Dahl 1998). The metaphor suggests that democracy is more a creative art, exercised by society, than a precise science, with clear rules that, properly applied, will always provide the desired results. In reality, we are inventing democracy today, in cities and countries all over the world. As Avritzer argues,
there is no reason why Latin America would follow the model of Europe’s democracies, established after World War Two.\textsuperscript{5}

In his foundational study of democracy (2007), Tilly notes that he “dared not call this book by its true name: “Democracy, Democratization, De-Democratization and Their Interdependence” (p. xi). His cases reveal democracy to be a struggle, rather than a steady state, reflecting a crucial relationship between “state capacity” and the advance or retreat of democracy. State capacity is “the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions” (p. 34, Tilly 2007). This capacity, of course, is what planning is all about.

Tilly identifies three factors as crucial to democratization if de-democratization is to be avoided or, presumably, overcome. These are “the integration of trust networks into public politics, helping to shield public politics from categorical inequality, and working against the autonomy of coercive power centers” (p. 205, Tilly 2007).

Trust networks refers largely to the kinds of trusting relationships that simplify interactions, described by Putnam (2000), among others, as social capital. “Categorical inequality” refers to the organization of social life around boundaries separating whole sets of people who differ collectively in their life chances, as is commonly the case with categories of gender, race, caste, ethnicity, nationality, and religion and is sometimes the case with categories of social class. To the extent that such inequalities translate directly into categorical differences in political rights and obligations, democratization remains impossible (p. 75, Tilley 2007).

In India, categorical inequality is exemplified by the caste system; in the US or South Africa by a socio-economic and political legacy that remains, after centuries of systematic, legal racism. In Chile, as I will discuss in the next chapter, categorical inequality is more insidious, as it is associated with discrimination against low-income, low-education “popular” classes, a group not easily visibilized, as occurs with sex, race or other markers.

In Chile, Tilley’s autonomous, coercive power centres are casually referred to as \textit{poderes fácticos}, the powers that be. Everyone knows exactly who they are: the military; the rightwing owners of the country’s main media, particularly the newspaper chain led by El Mercurio; and the class of

\textsuperscript{5} “Democracy” as we think we know it is very new. Only in the second half of the 20th century did majorities actually gain legally sanctioned access to the right to vote. In Europe, manhood suffrage prevailed until the late 1960s in Switzerland and Spain, with Finland achieving full suffrage and representation first, in the early 1900s, followed by Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway before 1910 (figure 3.2, p. 63, Tilly 2007).
ruthless business leaders created by Pinochet’s murky privatizations of profitable public corporations. The Catholic Church is also included in this powerful group. Where Marxists once organized on the assumption that the challenge to this powerful elite (because they are, in essence, a small group of powerful, wealthy, autocratic families) would come from an up-and-coming working class, in today’s neoliberal economies some theorists believe these struggles will increasingly focus on cities (Oxhorn 1997; Oxhorn 2009).

1.2.2 Latin America and Avritzer’s Participatory Publics

On democratization in Latin America, Tilly notes that

Latin American states generally ended up with weaker central structures, less effective intervention in routine social life, and more autonomous power centers than prevailed in modern Western Europe (based on Centeno, cited on p. 174, Tilly 2007).

The Brazilian scholar, Avritzer explores these differences more deeply (2002). He argues that for democratizing countries in Latin America, the institutional issues central to these processes are not as important as finding an answer to the question:

How can they produce a new stock of democratic practices capable of providing specific answers to the region’s cultural tradition? Unlike the second-wave democracies, the Latin American democratizations point in the direction of the rehabilitation of those traditions within democratic theory that stress the importance of participation at the public level (p. 10, Avritzer 2002, my emphasis).

Because Avritzer assumes “the impossibility of furthering democratization in Latin America by drawing solely on political elites” (p. 7), he sees the need to take “informal publics” and turn them into “deliberative, problem-solving publics”, without which “Latin America will not be able to bridge the gap between democratic society practices and a hybrid political society that resists its full democratization.” His “informal publics” include, but go beyond civil society as theorized in the north, for example by Benjamin Barber (1998).

To mobilize this potential, “participatory designs” are

the most sensible way to further democratize state-society relations... deliberative publics become the central arena for completing democratization due to the way they manage to connect renovations within the public culture to institutional designs capable of transforming non-public and hybrid practices into democratic forms of decision-making (p. 10, Avritzer 2002, my emphasis).

These process require “citizenship learning”, as discussed primarily in adult education literature (Merrifield 2001; Daly, Schugurensky et al. 2009; Pinnington and Schugurensky 2010). But is this
simply the kind of learning that arises from deliberation (Forester 1999), the single- and double-
loop learning first studied by Argyris and Schon (1974), which forms the basis of Healy’s 
collaborative planning paradigm (2006)? Where does it occur and what are some of the 
mechanisms involved, particularly in post-dictatorial societies like Chile’s?

Reflection from the planning literature, adult education and political communications fields 
coincides: citizen learning begins with a particular kind of conversation, called 
“deliberation” (Forester 1999; Gastil 2008), “authentic dialogue” (Innes and Booher 2010), “re-
presenting experience” (Merrifield 2001). Gastil, whose focus is political communication, offers a 
precise list of the characteristics he considers most important (table 1.1), emphasizing that 
deliberation contains both analytic and social processes, along with a willingness to accept and 
process challenges to one’s own existing belief system.

The important of diversity, emphasized by Innes and Booher in their discussion of authentic 
dialogue, is highlighted in work by Sunstein (2000), which demonstrates that deliberation amongst 
homogenous groups can lead to extreme positions, which are not conducive to democratic 
citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1 Key Features of Deliberative Conversation and Discussion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General definition of deliberation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a solid information base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritize the key values at stake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify a broad range of solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weigh the pros, cons and trade-offs among solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make the best decision possible</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytic Process</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequately distribute speaking opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure mutual comprehension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider other ideas and experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect other participants.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Where these reflective conversations occur is also relevant, since their depth and capacity for 
changing those involved depend in part on their continuing over time. One important location for
citizen learning is within processes common to urban planning spheres. Berry et al. (1993), Thomson (2001) and Sirianni (2009) demonstrate the close ties between neighbourhood-level democracy and democratic attitudes to politics at every scale in the US. Peterman (2000) does not explicitly link his cases to democratization per se, but does address key values, particularly equity and advocacy planning. In Latin America, Brazil has pioneered participation through health councils, municipal budgeting and some planning initiatives. Based on his studies of their results to date, Avritzer too emphasizes

the scale of the changes that have taken place in face-to-face interaction and deliberation... how within the realm of voluntary associations, new neighborhood associations express the emergence of a new conception of autonomy for claiming material goods and establish a new moral parameter to the practice of politics. Members of voluntary associations support democratic values more than do Brazilians at large (p.8 Avritzer 2002, my emphasis).

Avritzer’s work, too, indicates that participation, mainly at the urban or local level, is key to democratization in both the political-procedural and political-cultural senses. In these democratizing societies and cities, planning models tend to specifically exclude those directly affected and the concept of collaborative planning is virtually unknown. As this case study illustrates, in Chile and most of Latin America, a rational-technical approach prevails, constituting an ideology that attempts to justify the exclusion of the vast majority of those most affected by planning decisions. Notwithstanding, critiques of collaborative planning theory are useful, precisely because they call for theory to go beyond aiding practitioners in their work, by providing “conceptual resources for... communities... to help in imagining futures” (Healey, quoted on p. 923, Yiftachel and Huxley 2000).

Indeed, planners identify a significant catalyst of citizen learning and action, when they note that the answer to the question “What is to be done?” may be that “planning itself should be resisted, or that cities and regions might be shaped by forces that planning has no ability to influence” (p. 923, Yiftachel and Huxley 2000). In this case study, a coalition of diverse neighbourhoods takes its first steps into planning through resistance to a specific planning project, an urban highway framed as the essence of “modernity” and “progress”. By doing so, it raises questions about how cities are put together in Chile and, given the strong socio-political similarities, throughout Latin America. In the quintessential neo-liberal context -- Chile was the first and the “purest” laboratory for the creation of the neo-liberal project -- we could debate whether the way decisions are made in Chile is really planning, a lack of planning, or a rational-technical dictatorship disguised as “objective planning”. But as this instance of self-generated, citizen action moved from an initial movement phase into the building of a citizens’ institution, it found itself framing its leadership and its work
increasingly as “citizen-led planning”. Improvised, experimental, complex, it certainly has been. But as the organization grew, seeking out the knowledge necessary to achieve its goals of a just, sustainable and friendly city, it increasingly brought neighbourhood rebels into contact with ideas from planning, mostly from the Anglo Saxon strain. To do so, it both borrowed from and modified collaborative planning theory to suit its own reality and needs.

As this discussion illustrates, the elements of a democratic culture don’t just fall into place because people vote for the president, senate or municipal council. That culture must be forged with the elements at hand, despite their apparent poverty and abundant lacks. The experience of Living City provides some insight into how this can happen, on the kind of learning involved, and the role that urban planning can play in facilitating or paralyzing these processes.

Civil societies and the networks they form are “the connective tissue of a democratic culture”, serving “essential functions in democratizing planning and governance” (p. 9, Gurstein and Angeles 2007). This case study shows how action specifically in the urban sphere can perform these functions, contributing to democratization from a perspective that seeks to increase the sustainability, in the sense of social justice (Fainstein 2010), human flourishing (Friedmann 2000) and livability (Evans 2002), as discussed in chapter 1.

In their comparative study of democratization in Latin America and the Middle East, Kamrava and O Mora (1998), too, underline the importance of civil society organizations (CSOs) to democratization. For CSOs to “become agents of democratization”, however, they must operate democratically themselves, respecting pluralism and diversity; the must expand their own issue-driven agendas to include demands for political democracy; and they must muster sufficient power, alone or “in a process of horizontal relations” with other civil society actors (p. 895, Kamrava and O Mora 1998). This raises issues of structure and capacity, which also recur throughout this study.

Moreover, as Latin America’s experience in the second half of the 20th century illustrates, de-democratization remains a significant risk. For Tilly, it occurs due to the

reversal of one or more of the basic processes: disconnection of trust networks, re-inscription of categorical inequalities, and/or formation of autonomous power centers that jeopardize popular influence over public politics and hence the state (p. 164, Tilly 2007).

Thus, de-democratization reflects the
withdrawal by privileged, powerful political actors from whatever mutually binding consultation exists, where democratization depends on integrating large numbers of ordinary people into consultation (p. 195, Tilly 2007).

Resolving these tensions without sliding back into violence is a major challenge throughout Latin America, making the production of Avritzer’s “new stock of democratic practices” highly relevant to society’s ability to function reasonably, fairly and inclusively for all members now, and for a sustainable future. Thus, like the theorists cited above, Avritzer too emphasizes the need to create specific mechanisms that foster face-to-face deliberation, free expression, and association. These are central to building the trust networks that Tilly considers so important, but they also give social actors tools to challenge and correct categorical inequalities and neutralize autonomous power centres. While Avritzer’s studies have focused on government-initiated participation, in health councils, municipal budgeting and plans, this study examines self-created, autonomous neighbourhood organizations and those involved in urban issues, particularly sustainable transport, walking and cycling. In this dissertation, I will treat his “participatory publics” as specific sets of ecologies of actors mobilized through participation.

1.2.3 Participation as active citizenship

Writing about England, Brannan et al. observe that active citizenship “has become a central concept in the government policy agenda”, driven by “a vision of strong, active, and empowered communities increasingly capable of doing things for themselves, defining the problems they face and then tackling them together” (p. 993, Brannan et al. 2006). Looking at the Western Cape, Miraftab and Wills offer an interpretation that enriches understanding of the Chilean case, discussed in this dissertation.

As opposed to a statist citizenship that assumes the state as “the only legitimate source of citizenship rights, meanings and practices” (Holston 1998, 39), this alternative drama of citizenship is active, engaged, and “grounded in civil society” (Friedmann 2002, 76). It moves beyond formal citizenship to a substantive one that concerns an array of civil, political, social, and economic rights, including the rights to shelter, clean water, sewage discharge, education, and basic health—in short, the right to the city (Lefebvre 1996) (Miraftab and Willis 2005).

In a continent where major social struggles for the past 30 years have often focused on human, labour, women’s, indigenous and other rights, the right to the city has long echoed with powerful connotations, so powerful in fact that Brazil enacted right to the city legislation and created a ministry of urban affairs to implement it. Establishing and enacting citizens’ right to the city, however, is hotly contested and it is often in the heat of practical battles over urban space or its
appropriation by different groups that major philosophical and theoretical positions are hammered out.

Writing about Latin America, Taylor and Wilson (Taylor 2004; Taylor and Wilson 2004) distinguish between citizenship in the legal sense and citizenship as agency and they note how ideas about citizenship have evolved significantly in post-dictatorial contexts:

The idea of citizenship re-emerged during the transitions to democracy of the 1980s as a way of talking about how people interact with the state and the kind of power exercised by them. This turn towards citizenship signalled a shift of focus away from a view of politics as the domain of ‘important’ white men in suits and reflected the rising aspirations of ordinary people in their shanty towns, shops, fields and streets to grasp hold of new identities as political actors (p. 154, Taylor and Wilson 2004).

A line continues to divide however, since “while all citizens can enjoy the protection of the law and all have the duty to obey it, only some are given the chance to make the law” (p. 156, Taylor and Wilson 2004, my emphasis). Thus,

deciding who can determine the fate of the community has been a central point of contention throughout the history of citizenship everywhere, as different -- and subordinate -- sectors of society (workers, ‘Indians’, women) argue that they too deserve to be heard and to have a say in the way their community is run. Processes of contestation and negotiation take issues of citizenship far beyond the setting out of rights in Constitutions... (p. 156, Taylor and Wilson 2004).

Participation is often developed without thinking about implications for learning or practicing active citizenship. Participants are assumed to have certain skills or motivations, or processes are considered to be virtuous through the simple addition of the adjective “participatory”. Taking active citizenship or a healthy civil society environment for granted, and not investing in its development, can turn “participants” into free labour or worse. When successful policies, such as cycling-inclusion, are examined, the role of civil society may be mentioned, but seldom explored or treated with the kind of relevance it merits as planning results, rather than the political processes that made them possible, constitute the main focus (Pucher and Buehler 2006; Pucher and Buehler 2007; Pucher and Buehler 2007; Pucher and Buehler 2011).

Based on experiences with participation in the US, Italy, the UK, Belgium, Scandinavia and Brazil, Boonstra and Boelens (2011) offer four key arguments in favour of citizen involvement in planning. These are social, in the sense of empowerment and shared responsibility; spatial, in the sense of their ability to contribute daily to their immediate environment; financial, as their involvement is expected to reduce errors and save money; and political, as the government seeks to reinforce
support for public policies. Moreover they criticize the “bankruptcy” of traditional methods, observing that in the Netherlands this “led to a kind of hit-and-run mentality among project developers, who reaped the benefits and left the civic and public community the environmental burdens” (p. 102, Boonstra and Boelens 2011).

This bears little resemblance to the possibilities for citizen-government cooperation to go beyond paternalism and conflict to “co-production”, identified in studies from the 1970s and 1980s (Susskind and Elliott 1983). Indeed, participatory processes may even constitute a kind of “tyranny”, as Cook and Kothari Illustrate in their thoughtful collection reflecting on participation as widely practiced in the 1990s (2001). There, Robins et al. (2008) associate these failures with approaches that may not address the specific local contexts in which participation is practiced. Echoing Yiftachel and Huxley, they see “strategic non-participation” as a viable strategy in some contexts, questioning the idea that “‘democratic’ spaces and arenas are easily filled with democratic subjects who are embedded in deeper democratic relations” (p. 1072, Robins et al. 2008). They recommend treating “all acts of political struggle” as “profoundly incomplete”. Thus, citizenship is not about the realisation of a fully coherent and harmonious rational contract, but rather about the temporary (and never fully achieved) stabilisation of the polity around a set of participatory practices and new agreements, rooted in democratic and non-democratic contracts and rule making (p. 1073, Robins et al. 2008).

This makes the main question for democratic citizenship not eliminating power, but rather how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic and participatory practices. Instead of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, as some of the citizenship literature seeks to do, democratic politics requires us to bring them to the fore, to make them visible” (p. 1073, Robins et al. 2008).

From both development and planning fields, then, we find this view that citizenship from below is not synonymous with agency for democracy. Genuine participation requires more than just a model or a process copied from experience elsewhere. To understand what really works and why, we need to look at two phenomena that are intertwined: first, the emergence of grassroots organizations, but second, and extremely important, how much they are able to enter “higher order (more influential) political arenas and democratic institutions” (p. 1072, Robins et al. 2008).

This case study explores how individuals learn citizenship skills and mobilize to create their own participatory publics. It demonstrates that even in authoritarian contexts, city planning offers a significant arena for citizen action. Indeed, it reveals how concerned citizens can, under some conditions, activate network power by mobilizing ecologies of diverse actors, and that through
these efforts they can, to some degree, enter higher order political arenas, and thereby significantly challenge and even change the political environment.

To understand these processes, we must bring together thinking from different disciplines on how people learn active citizenship (adult education), how organizations constitute memory (social movement and other theories), and how participatory processes may facilitate or block citizen involvement in governance, particularly at the local level. The next section briefly explores key concepts from these fields, which are relevant to this case.

### 1.3 Fostering participatory publics

Despite enormous differences of scale, history and culture between Chile and Brazil, Avritzer’s concept of participatory publics remains intriguing. In the 20 years since Chile began its painful redemocratization, few governments at any scale have attempted the kinds of participatory experiments for which Brazil has become well known (Abers 2000; Baiocchi 2005; Fung 2011). In Brazil, innovations in participation have often been led by visionary individuals located within relatively powerful governance institutions, such as Jaime Lerner of Curitiba, or by sweeping legislative and political changes, such as the right to the city. In contrast, in the 1990s Chile’s new elected government turned its back on the participatory movements that had brought it to power (Garretón Merino 1994; Garreton Merino 2003; Garretón Merino 2009), and citizens themselves were often forced to do battle to revindicate basic political and civil rights, considered a “normal” part of democratic life.

As this case study reveals, much of this played out in the intimate arenas of neighbourhood politics and city planning, first in metropolitan Santiago, and later in Valparaíso and other cities. This focus on initiatives in the urban sphere also brings out the interactions between individual learning and person change; the organizations that collect and conserve knowledge, thus enriching possibilities and capacities for action; and the role of environmental factors, particularly the legal process and institutions that, even in very difficult circumstances, shape action and can provide arenas for action by concerned citizens.

#### 1.3.1 The individual: From activism to active citizenship

As discussed above, there are many ways to exercise citizenship, and not all of them will contribute to democratization in a post-dictatorial context such as Chile’s. I have already mentioned the importance of citizen initiatives themselves having democratic structures if they are
### Table 1.2 Clientship Contrasted with Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clientship</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competes against rivals</td>
<td>Autonomous political agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expects favours</td>
<td>Demands political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiates without challenging the authoritarian framework</td>
<td>Exercises civil rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions framed as personal ties</td>
<td>Interactions framed by social rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumes inequality and does not attempt to change it</td>
<td>Requires equality and struggles to establish it where it does not exist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration using definitions by Lucy Taylor (2004).

to contribute to the democratization of political, social and other institutions. Experience from adult education indicates the importance of specific components for citizen learning.

In his reflections on the problem of civic competence (1992), Dahl defines “the good citizen” as:

- highly concerned about public affairs and political life; well-informed about issues, candidates, and parties; engaged often with fellow citizens in deliberations on public matters; an active participant in efforts to influence governmental decisions by voting, communicating views to public officials, attending political meetings, and the like; and motivated in all these activities by a desire to foster the general welfare (p. 46, Dahl 1992).

Dahl admits, moreover, that “It is clear that few citizens in democratic countries actually measure up to this idealized portrait, and most appear to fall far short of it.” Where, then, do good citizens come from? How do you get eggs with no chickens? If these are difficult questions for countries with established democratic systems, they are even tougher in a post-dictatorial environment, such as Chile’s in the 1990s.

Asia-based Juliet Merrifield, working with the Institute of Development Studies Participation Group, explores citizen learning, as essential to developing “good” citizens. It is motivated by individual and collective aspirations:

- Citizens believe that a good society is one in which they can participate in public spheres to make their own contribution toward the public good … They want to be heard and consulted on a regular and continuing basis, not merely at the time of an election… They are asking for participation and inclusion in the decisions taken and policies made by public agencies and officials (Merrifield 2001).

Based on Gaventa, Merrifield notes that this requires

An underlying critical or questioning stance, an attitude of inquiry, a scepticism toward authority, can be seen as an underlying disposition that is essential to democratic participation.
and protection of freedoms. Allied with this is sense of efficacy -- a sense that one can have an impact, and the self confidence to attempt it (Merrifield 2001).

As Gramsci put it, this requires “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” (Gaventa discussed on p. 7, Merrifield 2001). To achieve this, citizen learning should:

1. Help people acquire new knowledge by linking to the core concepts in their existing patterns of knowledge.

2. Practice what it preaches, provide experiences of engaging in democracy not just information about it.

3. Provide opportunities to practice problem solving and to become self-aware about their problem solving processes.

4. Provide opportunities to re-present experience in different ways, in order to deepen analysis and understanding.

5. Allow spiral learning (revisiting and understanding at a deeper level), to facilitate growth and development.

6. Provide ‘scaffolding’ opportunities, in which those who are more experienced help novices with tasks that they cannot quite manage themselves, giving control back to the novice when he or she can manage alone.

7. Provide practice at all levels of reflection from immediate to deeper self-examination.

8. Best be conducted in the context of communities of practice -- establishing group norms, values, language, meanings and purposes.

9. Incorporate a range of cultural expressions and social activities to create the learning community.

10. Engage with values.

These processes involve social learning, defined as “conscious learning-by-doing practiced by organizations, communities, or social movements, which are simultaneously actors and learners that gather knowledge from their own social practice” (p. 10, Gurstein and Angeles 2007). Like Merrifield, they emphasize the importance of a learning community. There are many examples of these mutual teaching/learning processes in this case study. Rather than being merely a “smaller” version of “large” social or national phenomena, in this case Santiago offered sensual environments and living systems in which civil society challenged and somewhat changed decision-making procedures, fostering citizenship skills and contributing to a more democratic culture on political, social and personal levels.
The result, at least in terms of democratization, requires a shift away from the practice of what Taylor calls “clientship”, toward “citizenship”. This requires leaving behind deeply engrained experiences learned from decades, if not centuries, in which “citizenship rights were granted selectively to co-opt particular actors and contain popular sectors’ pressure for greater structural change and inclusion” (Oxhorn 2011). These distinctions are important, since clientship shores up unequal and undemocratic systems, whereas citizenship is comprised of the characteristics necessary to effect change (table 1.2). In contrast, citizenship as agency, “reflects the active role that multiple actors, particularly those representing disadvantaged groups, must play in the social construction of citizenship so that democratic governance can realize its full potential” (p. 30, Oxhorn 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.3 Moyer’s “Effective Activism” as Active Citizenship</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ineffective roles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disempowered and hopeless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative attitude and energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitist: self-identified leaders or vanguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics in isolation from strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any means necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealistic utopianism or minor reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive or overly aggressive/competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriarchal/absolute truth/rigid ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put the “masses” down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominator paradigm</td>
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</table>

On a more personal level, this involves developing a vision and a way of being in the world and interacting with other people that Moyer captures, when he contrasts ineffective with effective roles in activism. Thus, to be effective, activists should avoid playing negative roles, espousing violence as a legitimate means to achieve their ends, despising the majority of people, and so on. Throughout this study, we will see people moving between the ineffective and effective roles, and gradually consolidating the effective end of the spectrum, as part of the definition of “active citizenship”, which became central to Living City’s work around 2009.
1.3.2 The organization: Nonmovements, movements and citizen institutions

How citizens structure their efforts, as they learn and as they apply their learning, and in the process generate new learning and new knowledge, is also relevant to this case study. Often, the literature treats social movements as very different entities from citizen institutions or, in Bayat's analysis, social nonmovements. Instead, I see these three elements as phases through which citizen organization may shift, often oscillating among them with different characteristics predominating at given moments or on specific issues.

Thus, concern for preserving heritage (the “best” of past urban innovations) motivated much of the organizing in these communities during the early years. Particularly at first, their organizations functioned like Bayat's social “non-movements” (Bayat 2010), painting homes in bright colours (see figure 3.10) or inventing wild gardens that gave character to streets and reinforced neighbourhood identity. These are, as Bayat notes:

    the collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations. The term movement implies that social nonmovements enjoy significant, consequential elements of social movements; yet they constitute distinct entities (p. 15, Bayat 2010).

Social nonmovements are action-oriented, rather than ideologically driven, overwhelmingly quiet, rather than audible, since claims come largely from individuals rather than united groups. Rather than mobilizing constituencies to pressure authorities, “theirs is not a politics of protest, but of practice, of redress through direct and disparate actions” (pp. 19-20, Bayat 2010).

Bayat’s observations are based on case studies in the repressive, undemocratic conditions of several Middle Eastern countries, which share many commonalities with the hazards of life in Chile under Pinochet. As Chile democratized, however, these instances coalesced into specific social movements, among them, the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte, the furious cyclists’ movement, local efforts to save heritage buildings and so on. In the urban sphere, these catalyzed the “extraordinary deeds of mobilization and protestation that go beyond the routine of daily life (e.g. attending meetings, petitioning, lobbying, demonstrating, and so on),” which Bayat associates with social movements. Thus, as Chile democratized, significant nonmovement practices “that are merged into, indeed are part and parcel of, the ordinary practices of everyday life” (pp. 19-20, Bayat 2010) erupted into modest social movements, before changing, yet again, to become citizen institutions (in the Coordinadora’s case). Tarrow, meanwhile, distinguishes between contentious
social action by social movements and the representational approach followed by citizen institutions (table 1.4). By examining interactions more closely, using a complexity approach (chapter 2), this study suggests that part of generating network power is the capacity to move back and forth between a social movement and citizen institution phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.4 Social Movements and Citizen Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentious (social movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media, marches, other public manifestations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From repetitive argument to fertile debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge “powerholders, produce solidarities, have meaning within particular population groups, situations and national cultures” (p. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Movement entrepreneurs” (p. 6 Tarrow): ordinary people versus elites or authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Representational (citizen institution)               |
| Marketing, lobbying, collaborative planning initiatives |
| Proposal-driven                                      |
| Deliberation: from empty ritual to transformative    |
| Critique, cajole, threaten, propose, work with powerholders |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contentious (social movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounting collective challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing on social networks, common purposes and cultural frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building solidarity through connective structures and identities to sustain collective action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Representational (citizen institution)               |
| Raising collective proposals and building alliances to achieve them |
| Building social networks, bridges across diverse categories; fine-tuning common purposes and cultural frameworks |
| Building memory and identity by injecting new information, approaches and ideas that both reinforce and change structures and identities to sustain collective action |

Source: Own elaboration, using Tarrow’s observations (p. 4, 1998)

The interactions between these three forms of political organization for change are very much apparent throughout this case study.

1.3.3 The environment: Integrating concepts, considering processes and structures

Central to the case study in this dissertation are experiences with citizenship learning, participation, governance and democratization. Curiously, these issues are often analysed separately, or even by completely different academic disciplines. In city planning, however, they are thrust together, sparking conflicts and political fires, as we have seen.

Looking at different disciplines, we can summarize (table 1.5) the main kinds of citizenship stances, participatory instances and types of governance, as they interact, influencing the direction of power and key outcomes. Thus, in this case we see community leaders moving from victim
Table 1.5 Categories of citizenship, participation and governance compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main types/categories</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation* stances (Atwood)</td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Survivor</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation (level of organization)</td>
<td>None or limited</td>
<td>Ad hoc coalition (social movement)</td>
<td>Citizen institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation: predominant interaction</td>
<td>Others help</td>
<td>Others help and work with</td>
<td>Lead systemic change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of participation (Susskind et al.)</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Co-production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of governance (Kooiman)</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Self-governance</td>
<td>Co-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Policy system (my categories, based on Tillly)</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Democratizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power direction</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Bottom up</td>
<td>Middle out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key outcome</td>
<td>Imposition</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Autonomy and resilience, co-responsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on typologies developed by Atwood, and used by Living City (1972), Susskind et al. (1983) and Kooiman (cited in Somerville 2011)

Through survivor to leader stances. Based on their studies of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, Susskind et al. (1983) categorize citizen participation as characterised by paternalism, conflict or co-production, while Kooimans describes the governance equivalents, which are hierarchical, self-governance, or co-governance (Somerville 2011). All of these both reflect and influence the participatory procedures within a given society, and are associated with the level of democratization (or authoritarianism), as per Tilly’s categories (2007).

While it would be a mistake to assume that each category lines up with the next as perfectly as they do in the table, clearly there are interactions that can reinforce or negate each other. In a world of “single bullet” solutions, where we should “either” do one thing, “or” its opposite, this suggests, rather, that we should accept (even take advantage of) paradoxes and contradictions, and learn to play the whole keyboard, picking our notes according to our purpose, accepting both dissonance and harmony. Where we can bring together as many of the notes in column three as possible, we have the most likelihood of achieving some reasonably lasting version of our good, just and liveable city. But they will always be echoed, shadowed, contradicted, and even risk being drowned out by the realities reflected in columns 1 and 2.
These seems like relevant operational categories, when we ask how to achieve the good, just and livable city theorized in the first part of this chapter, and I will come back to them in my discussion of this case study. Citizens’ organizations, then, are not just an adjunct to regular governance processes. Because of their unique characteristics, and particularly their independence from state and private hierarchies, this theoretical review and this case study suggest that they are central to building long-term change. Who is involved, how they are organized, what kind of social structures and conventions support or limit their development, are all as relevant as the specific procedural rules typically considered to define the quality of a participatory process.

Moreover, this case study suggests that, in a democratizing context, fewer participatory structures may exist, but demands for more democratization, accompanied by concrete proposals, may nonetheless receive more positive responses than might be expected. They may also, however, stimulate counter-processes that can become extremely damaging if not dealt with effectively. In the city, moreover, this study suggests that certain kinds of conflict, over transport and streets, are more likely to generate responses based on unity across diversity. I discuss this in terms of spatial and social aspects comprised in the “meso” nature of transport systems, using the concept of “transportsheds”. Like the more familiar environmental or geographical concept of “watersheds”, this enables me to refer to road, traffic and transport systems as they branch through the city, influencing different kinds of flows, but also enabling or truncating the social and other types of life surrounding them.

How these relationships become structured, according to the processes, institutions and resources available to citizen initiatives, is very important. Portugali notes the problematic divide between the planner, “a professional that is working for the government” and “the planned”, that is, the public. This divide has long troubled planners, stimulating approaches such as empowerment (Friedmann 1992), equity (Krumholz and Forester 1990; Krumholz and Clavel 1994), deliberative (Forester 1999), advocacy (Krumholz 2001), collaborative (Healey 2006), and complexity (Innes and Booher 1999; Innes and Booher 2010) planning, which all discuss this gap and the multiple, complex situations derived therefrom.

Perhaps not surprisingly, several planners have seen their work on participation, collaboration and deliberation lead into a growing focus on mediation, a role compatible with the practical-communicative approach. These efforts address the planning system, but not the city system. Like Fainstein, Portugali argues that planning theory must contemplate planning and city systems, but he also argues for bringing structure into planning theory (figure 1.2). This is particularly important
because otherwise planning works against, rather than with, city systems, failing to respond to a reality shaped by the unpredictable nature of complex adaptive systems within the city:

enfolded in the complexity of the city and in the self-organization processes that typify it, are several important qualities that modern town planning has almost destroyed -- qualities that need to be preserved. The planning system in its current structure is not built to do so -- not in its rational comprehensive form, nor in its communicative-strategic form (p. 290, Portugali 2011).

In my conclusions, I will discuss an important structural component, which, this case study suggests, deserves a lot more attention: the environmental conditions that make possible robust, effective civil society ecologies and the full integration of citizens as planners, and not just guests at the planning table.

1.4 Thinking across scale: the urban, the meso, transport, and innovation

Are cities just smaller versions of the national? Is small just “less” or can it sometimes be a significant “more”, contributing a vital missing link to the governance chain that can make a whole system of systems function more effectively?

1.4.1 The Urban

Before I go on, it is necessary to pause for a moment over the definition of “community” and of the “urban”, as central to this study. “Community” is a term long debated in the literature. For my purposes, the communities I am referring to are territorial (specifically, neighbourhoods), and thematic (groups united by interest in walking, cycling and public, that is, sustainable transport). Their focus, moreover, is on the urban, as discussed below. They are diverse and, often, conflict-ridden, so I reject any view that idealizes community as some essentially harmonic micro-society.

“Urban” may refer to anything that occurs in an urban as opposed to a rural sphere, that is, it is often treated as an adjective that refers mainly to “where” a social movement, conflict or planning decision takes place. “Urban social movements”, for example, often involve discriminated groups fighting for civic, political, social or economic rights for homosexuals, women, people of colour,
workers, etc. The urban is relevant to these groups, but their movements do not focus on the actual material of which cities are made -- and the patterns of their making.

In this dissertation, I am specifically referring to movements and institutions that focus on the city itself, and particularly, how the organization of city systems in a specific place may bar or grant citizens access to spatially organized goods and services. Whether they contest how well transport includes the poor in city systems vital to their survival, the right of non-traditional families (gay couples, single parents, unrelated young people) to social housing, or women’s right to safe streets for themselves and their children, these kinds of urban movements strive to create the elements they (and their children and grandchildren will) need, to achieve the “human flourishing” that Friedmann describes. Sometimes more, sometimes less consciously, for these kinds of movements, the city is their raw material for building survival and a better life.

Moreover, cities are typically examined primarily as spaces that obtain relevance because they are linked to something else, which the theorist considers important. This may be (capitalist) accumulation or competition in a world race for dominance, and often involves significant economic benefits. Sometimes city politics are the object of study, and many theorists see them as a kind of “junior” level of government, where people can “learn” to participate politically. (Sometimes this even happens.)

But cities are spatial and above all sensual and emotional places. Cities are where we live, eat raw seafood or garlicky pasta, breathe dust or crisp fresh air, drink rotgut or fine wine, vomit or thrive, give birth, expire, suffer, and share whatever’s going round. Abstract readings of cities tend to leave these elements out or treat them as subordinate, unimportant or problematic. Thus, many modest, urban movements, such as those described in this case study, are typically construed as selfish NIMBYs, not-in-my-backyarders, who oppose the “common good”, social “progress”, “modernity”.

1.4.2 The Meso

Research on social movements (Staggenborg 2002) suggests the usefulness of taking a more multiscalar approach to a case study such as this. In the 1980s sociologists “began to call for theories that connected micro-level interactions with macro-level social structures and changes”. This was needed to address the gap between “micro-sociological analysis”, looking at “behaviour and patterns of interaction among individuals”, and macro-sociological analysis, focusing on “large-scale and long-term social processes”. Thus, some researchers stopped tracing links from
micro to macro (or vice versa), and instead began to link to micro and macro levels of analysis by beginning with the meso (p. 125).

Somerville (2011) examines experiences in neighbourhood organization in the UK from a multiscalar perspective, which I find compatible with this case study. In the UK, local governance is mainly located in local councils, but even there spaces for potential co-governance are “captured by a system of multiscale hierarchical governance” (p. 83, Somerville 2011). This makes it reasonable to argue that, in response, “community participation or organization must itself be multiscalar and strategic” (p. 87, Somerville 2011). Although this raises issues of co-optation, which are similar to those involving “clientelism” in Chile, Somerville argues for rethinking neighbourhoods as multi- rather than mono-scalar. As we will see, these views become all the more relevant in a place like Santiago, where most city “planning” takes place anywhere but in local government.

1.4.3 Streets and transport

A meso perspective suggests that transport systems, as they reach throughout cities, serving locations and functions that range from the most local -- buying bread, for example -- through to the national and global (train, maritime and air transport systems and their connections within the city), may be a particular kind of urban system with social, cultural and other implications relevant to our quest for a better, juster and more livable city. But streets are more than mere courses through which traffic flows like water.

Again, Bayat (2010), with his eye for the subtle and significant, notes that neoliberalism turns the city inside out, and

a massive number of inhabitants become compelled by the poverty and dispossession to operate, subsist, socialize, and simply live a life in the public spaces. Here the outdoor spaces (back alleys, public parks, squares, and the main streets) serve as indispensable assets in the economic livelihood and social/cultural repro-duction of a vast segment of the urban population, and, consequently, as fertile ground for the expression of street politics (p. 12, Bayat 2010).

Moreover, within the “spaces of flow and movement” afforded by streets, people not only forge identities, they also connect with others, extending “their protest beyond their immediate circles to include the unknown, the strangers” (p. 12, Bayat 2010). Thus, throughout history we see the importance of streets to the emergence of protest movements, large and small, the expression of social nonmovements, and as sites for action by citizen institutions too.
This is not a static relationship, where the street is a mere stage for actors who appear and disappear during the different acts of a politically motivated play. Streets themselves and struggles over their nature and use can inform citizen actions, as we see in this study. Indeed, accounts of anti-highway revolts in North America and Europe in the 1960s and 1970s indicate this happens relatively often and can be very significant to citizen, planning and city systems. They reveal that a significant, but often implicit, achievement of these citizen movements was building more democratic processes into city planning. Portland is perhaps the most outstanding example, in that anti-highway and other conflicts in the 1960s led to reorganization and significant democratization of the city’s governance structures (Berry, Portney et al. 1993; Hovey 1998; Hovey 2003; Alarcon de Morris and Leistner 2009; Cotugno 2010).

This is interesting because transport systems are relatively easy to define and examine. From a modal perspective, the main system components are cars, public transport, walking and cycling. While some characteristics may line up according to transport mode, the modes themselves share the same streets (for better or for worse) and significantly different categorizations are possible within modes, particularly the prevalent ones, such as driving (developed countries), walking (everywhere) and public transport (developing countries). Anti-highway movements are arguably easier to identify and study than women’s movements, as they are more limited by place and time. Examining the neighbourhood or cyclist subsets of civil society is simpler than trying to take on the whole universe of civil society organizations. This makes it easier to see the potential for links between social movements and civil society institutions, as I will explore in later chapters.

In North America, for example, anti-highway revolts saw:

neighborhood groups lined up against an alliance of downtown interests and suburban commuters, raising objections about the loss of parkland, waterfront views, historic buildings, and housing stock, as well as the failure to consider improved mass transit as an alternative. Neighborhood organizations’ coordinated efforts made it difficult for planners to find a path of least resistance” (pp. 107-108, Ladd 2008).

Whether these revolts merely expressed or actually caused new ways of thinking about city planning is less important than noting that these public actions led to significant city-wide and national anti-highway movements in Canada, Europe and the US. Thirty years later, many of the cities where these revolts were most heated show significant exceptions to the car-centred city planning paradigm prevalent elsewhere. Ladd describes these connections, as local not-in-my-backyard responses blossomed into major political battles questioning the values underlying urban renewal projects and “progress”: 
The freeway revolts began as a quintessential NIMBY phenomena. After all, hardly anyone wants a superhighway in their own backyard. Neighborhood activists seized upon every tool available to them, whether lying down in front of bulldozers... storming public meetings, hounding bureaucrats with their own rules, or filing lawsuits over procedural issues (p. 117, Ladd 2008).

In Chile too, highway proponents argued they were "necessary for the national wellbeing" and that opponents were standing in the way of progress, but these movements "outgrew their parochial origins because many people disputed that very necessity" (p. 118, Ladd 2008). As debates progressed, moreover:

Anti-freeway activists in many lands... realized that NIMBY cries would do little more than pit one neighborhood against another. To stop the freeway juggernaut, they needed to change national transportation policies by knocking the political and bureaucratic props out from under the highway programs" (p. 118, Ladd 2008).

Opponents began to finger the economic interests behind the highways and by the late 1960s they had generated a national movement, with anti-highway activists in Europe also collecting evidence on how the road lobby was controlling roads or transport ministries (p. 119, Ladd 2008).

In the Netherlands, during the same period, civil society movements organized to resist the rise in traffic fatalities, a movement that evolved into ongoing civil society groups focusing on cycling-inclusive urban planning. Today, the Netherlands has the highest cycling mode shares in the world, and has become a world leader in both the social and the technical know-how essential to achieving this kind of inclusivity (Godefrooij 2007; Buis 2012).

Thirty years later, car-centred cities and urban planning models obsessed with highways, speed and “flows” are nonetheless a most concrete expression of globalization. Automobility (Beckman 2001) has become the most cherished emblem of “modernization”, “progress” and social advancement in countries all over the world. There is less documentation of anti-highway movements in developing countries, although they are mentioned in larger narratives about displacement or “domicide”, the murder of home, as Porteous and Smith (2001) call it.

Hasan (2005) describes how opposition to an expressway along the Lyari River in Karachi catalysed resistance among the thousands of families affected, generating the creation of community organizations and alliances with local academics, researchers and non-governmental organizations. This process reshaped the initial NIMBY framing of the conflict into a process where the media increasingly recognized the legitimacy of community demands. He concludes this only became possible when these groups came together in support of the interests of poor communities
Indeed, his description of events portrays the mobilization of an ecology of diverse actors with interesting similarities to the Chilean case.

In Karachi, “a number of important Karachi-based NGOs” (p. 140), including Hasan’s own Urban Resource Centre, already existed. But what happens when no such institutions exist and where civil society structures generally are weak and focused on only a small number of theme areas? The Chilean case reveals some of the intricate mechanisms involved in generating new kinds of civil society to deal with new issues. It also suggests a significant relationship between social movements and citizen-led institutions, and how, through steadily accumulating organizational, research and communicational skills, diverse communities were able to unite and leverage relatively meagre resources into significant innovations.

In this case study, we can see the city containing, connecting and projecting micro-level ecologies, teeming with discontent, a will to change and, consequently, a potential for innovation, throughout macro-levels, whether national or global, where decision-making is concentrated. From this perspective, the citizen institution, Living City, emerges as a “meso” actor, not only midway between different kinds of civil society and territorial organizations, but also, increasingly midway between a powerful, state-backed rational-technical planning culture, on one hand, and the growing demands of a mobilized-when-necessary urban population. Cycling, perhaps, is even a “meso-mode”, with the potential to connect diverse transport systems and contribute to the creation of a good, just, livable city. I will discuss these issues as they emerge through the features of this case study.

1.4.4 Innovation

Looking at cities from a multiscalar, and particularly a meso, perspective, also suggests interesting links to innovation, a characteristic first noted by Jacobs (1961; 1969; 1985). Indeed, a great deal of urban innovation is arising in Latin America, as it re-democratizes after half a century of dictatorships and civil wars. Participatory budgeting and health councils, bus rapid transit, national and continental associations of recyclers, who until recently were the most marginal among the marginalized, Brazil’s efforts to legislate the right to the city into existence in the daily reality of people’s lives. Behind these changes are major planning institutions, new for Latin America at least, with the power to apply significant changes in cities that barely a decade or two ago did not even have elected city councils (Brugmann 2009). A reading of the relevant development literature suggests that while, like the missionaries that preceded them, institutions and agencies are attempting to bring participation to development around the world, Latin America is
democratizing itself -- borrowing from abroad, of course, but above all, from within, for its greatest successes. Cities are both the site and the matter of which this change is being built.

As discussed above, examining the urban transport system as I do in this case study brings out its meso role, as it connects and integrates across scales and in multiple directions. This is associated with significant innovation in urban planning and form, as exemplified by bus rapid transit systems (Bogotá, Curitiba) or cycling-inclusive planning models (The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany). These innovations typically start in an individual city level, but debate shoots across scales, in every direction, and over time. Policies spread both locally (among rival towns for example) and upward, nationally (into major transport policy and laws). Ultimately, as we see today through the Interface for Cycling network or global initiatives to sell BRT, these innovations may, moreover, leap from local to global, before they are ever enshrined in national planning paradigms.

This “meso” perspective, then, requires a closer look at multiscalar intersections, which reveal how people’s thinking and, particularly, their behaviour, can shift whole cities and societies toward more socially just, lower consumption, sustainable living systems. This seems contradictory to current approaches to international issues, in which, for example, global warming is treated in isolation, with its own set of agencies and experts, and apart from public health challenges, such as the “obesity epidemic” or the “social determinants of health” that are increasingly the focus of the World Health Organization. Transport, energy, biodiversity and food security: at the global level, each issue seems to multiply into endless fractals of agencies and institutions, each attempting to elaborate effective responses in isolation from the others.

When we forget about the local, the micro-neighbourhood, the meso-city-region with all its capacity for interconnections, we miss what is probably the most important part of the chain of potentially effective responses: the streets and neighbourhoods, slums and hills and dusty parking lots, where people breathe, live, dream. By working with people to change the daily living systems that knit us together, relatively small interventions at local and city levels across the planet can provide the most stunning responses to macro-issues. The city is not just “smaller”, it is vitally, essentially different and a part, and we need to make more of this potential if we are to survive the challenges of the 21st century.

Moreover, and I believe this case study illustrates this well, many of the characteristics that these supposedly anti-progress, NIMBY movements have been defending for the past 50 years, promise significant insight into low-consumption, more sustainable ways of life. The high-consumption model that has devoured North America and Europe for the past 50 years is associated with
enormous inequality in the developing countries. Automobility (Beckman 2001), perhaps its most powerful trojan horse, is relatively new, contested and unfeasible at the scale achieved elsewhere. Even the US, arguably its maximum proponent, is seeing car purchases and car use decline, as energy prices skyrocket and other factors make suburban living increasingly expensive (Newman and Kenworthy 2011). The traditional building styles, medium densities, street fairs, parallel economies, local land use patterns, informal transport provision, and other characteristics of cities in the developing world may well prove crucial to more sustainable living overall.

In the past 30 years, many cities and countries have begun to respond to the challenges of over-consumption. But even where policymakers, citizens or “experts” decide that making the city more sustainable is important, the issue of how to bring this about remains. The what may be clear, but who should be involved, how, and when, is not. Despite an abundant literature in several different disciplines (public administration, planning, political science, adult education) in favour of some kind of citizen participation, the reality is that many policy makers, and planners fail to see how essential participation is, not as a method, but as a strategy, whether to get the most out of Kingdon’s “policy entrepreneurs”, encourage local appropriation of policy transplants (De Jong 1999; Abers 2000; Jong, Lalenis et al. 2002; Abers 2003; Nasr and Volait 2003) or enhance its contribution to the deeper democracies (Fung and Wright 2003; Dagnino, Olvera et al. 2008; Gaventa and McGee 2010) essential to creating more sustainable living systems.

1.5 From building infrastructure to fostering living systems

For this study, as discussed in chapter 2, I have used a perspective borrowed from complexity science to structure my gaze. As will be discussed, rather than seeking to identify simple, linear causal relationships, I am examining interrelationships as they influence power in the urban sphere, focusing on the role of different kinds of actors, particularly those from organized communities, whether territorial (neighbourhoods) or thematic (cyclists, women cyclists), whom I see as acting as catalysts for innovation.

What is important, then, is looking at actors, contexts, interactions and how they find ways to redistribute power through systems, to make cities better places. Within this view, as discussed elsewhere, the issue of democracy, democratization and de-democratization is important, because these factors weigh heavily on who knows, who defines, who decides, and above all, who benefits and who suffers from different urban governance systems, policies and results. This is not about identifying models to be copied or applied, but rather exploring a rich vein of experience in search
of principles that may be useful to the actors themselves, and others like them, elsewhere, to locate themselves within their own ecologies, and change them for the better.

In the 19th century, planning began as a response among reformers and crusaders to social inequalities and demands. In the 20th it focused largely on locating and designing things (buildings, infrastructure). In the 21st, it is increasingly required to define whole living systems, involving land use, transport and parks, but also, measures to deal with health, crises, and disasters. Food insecurity, toxic pesticide use, travelling diseases, urban aesthetics, intangible heritage, and other issues are increasingly thrown into the planning cart, for ready-made, effective, solutions. On a social level, particularly in Latin America, this is often interwoven with demands based on the concept of rights, rather than needs, expressed as the right to the city.

All of these challenges require shifts in the way we locate and design, but also in how we imagine and make -- both decisions and cities, ourselves and the Other. This is true for everything, from our smallest choices, such as how we will make our daily journey around the city, through to our formal governance structures, and the informal spaces that generate both capacity and support for necessary innovations.
Chapter 2  Methods: Shaping the gaze, crafting the tools

“Technical knowledge simultaneously sharpens our focus and obscures our vision.”
Lane & McDonald, quoted on p. 23 (Brand and Karvonen 2007).

Figure 2.1. Computer simulation similar to Reynolds’ BOIDs: by following three relatively simple rules, the programmer is able to simulate the complex behaviour of an entire flock. Source: http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~dt/siggraph97-course/cwr87/cwr87p1.gif

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2.3.2 Data presentation: Metaphor, narratives and BOIDs
Introduction

**Complexity theories further show that every urban agent is a planner at a certain scale and that the urban process is not a mysterious outcome of the invisible hand of the market, but rather a result of a process of self-organization that starts with the interaction between the urban agents and their plans, at a variety of sizes and scales** (p. 296, Portugali 2011).

Schram (2006) notes the importance of distinguishing clearly “between research tradition and research method,” recommending Wolcott’s (1999) “useful distinction between a way of seeing (directing attention to perspective and intent) and a way of looking (directing attention to methods and procedures,” (p. 93, Schram 2006). The discussion of methods that follows takes “complexity thinking” as my way of seeing, while elements of participatory action research and ethnography shape specific methods. To my knowledge, this is a novel application of complexity, so in my research I have sought to define what this means in practice, and to apply and test this approach.

I made this decision because as I moved through the different stages of research, “complexity” was a constant but shifting presence. The “complexity” of my positionality, as a leader in the events and institution at the centre of my case study was an issue from the moment I developed my research proposal. The “complexity” of the rich data available to me, because of this positioning, was both a blessing and a challenge, demanding clear criteria for selecting what was most relevant. Dynamic complexity was also a feature influencing this analysis, as individuals and groups shifted and changed, with apparently minor shifts giving way to significant metamorphoses, as occurred when the Coordinadora became Living City (chapters 4 and 5), or when Living City seemed on the brink of extinction, and nonetheless reorganized and bloomed into new strengths and possibilities (chapter 5). Finally, as discussed in the final section of this chapter, my case study occurred in a city with particularly fragmented governance, introducing significant complexity at the contextual level too.

Moreover, the main questions motivating this research echoed with complexity and called out for a structuring of the exploration and answers that reflected this reality. I started from an essential paradox: although I participated deeply in the events that form the basis of this case study, I did not understand them and I could not grasp their meaning, to me individually, but also to the group overall, and policymakers, citizens and private actors around us. Thus, my questions took shape around a search for individual and collective meaning.

As the discussion in previous chapter suggests, it was impossible to find answers to these questions without taking an interdisciplinary approach. Moreover, these questions raise crucial issues about
emergence, transformation, and the kinds of dynamic interactions that make them possible. Friedmann’s utopia joins “two moments... critique and constructive vision”. Fainstein’s just city is founded on three interlocking -- and often conflictual -- elements: democracy, equity, and diversity. Likewise, Evan’s livable city joins two often uneasy partners, jobs and the environment. Understanding how this kind of city might be achieved, or at least planned for, requires considering how those excluded might wield a new kind of power, theorized by Booher and Innes. While participation of citizens may be crucial to achieving these changes, citizenship and civil society are complex subjects, as the many debates -- in different disciplines -- just to define their nature, indicate.

Through this case study, I seek insights into the dynamics that shape events, to create (or change) Fainstein’s “field of forces”, particularly the ones Avritzer calls “participatory publics”. These, he writes, must come equipped with a “stock of democratic practices”, necessary to turn “informal publics” into the “deliberative, problem-solving publics” to deepen democracy. This requires burrowing further into Tilly’s “trust networks” to examine how trust is forged within diverse ecologies of actors, and how they may become able to mobilize sufficient power to achieve their good, just and liveable city. In this post-dictatorial context, examining citizenship and civil society also requires answers dealing with their emergence (where do they come from?) and resilience despite heavy odds (how do they survive and act, consistently and effectively?).

A closer look at metropolitan Santiago, where all this occurred, reveals a multiscalar system of city governance, often hidden from citizens. Thus, a multiscalar prism such as complexity helps to grasp how action and decision-making work among scales. It also serves to re-view the relationship between micro and macro, local and global, by integrating the meso, and understanding how generalizations are useful, but contingent on the local. Altogether, a framework of this nature applied to my inquiry has helped to identify more clearly where, when, and how a series of changes may shift into transformation of the paradigms shaping work by city planners and citizens. It also makes it easier to understand and address the conflicts and paradoxes that emerge as we explore these ventures.

As I discuss in this chapter, complexity science\(^6\) as it has evolved in recent years, speaks directly to these concerns. I have based my approach on work by other researchers, at the same time as I

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\(^6\) Here I am using the word “science” in Byrne’s sense of nauk (from the Polish and Russian), meaning “organized knowledge, whatever the method used to obtain it, whether it involves simple description, the construction of typologies, the establishment of either single causes or of complex causation” Byrne, D. (2001). *Understanding the urban*. Houndmills, Basingstoke [England] ; New York, Palgrave..
have added components. I have found complexity helpful to shape specific aspects of my methods and methodology, identify what was relevant within my rather extensive data, and make sense of my findings. Even today, more than a decade after complexity’s initial incursions into the social sciences, this application of complexity as a conceptual tool, rather than a framework for analysis, remains less common, at least in this kind of study. I therefore hope that this approach will contribute to both a rich and emerging vein of planning theory, informed by complexity (Byrne 2001; Innes and Booher 2010; Roo and Silva 2010; Portugali 2011), and to the application of complexity in the social sciences, particularly qualitative research.

Why not rely solely on a participatory action research (PAR) or ethnographic approach? The answer has a lot to do with my own positionality. Where the researcher examines her own organization, PAR risks becoming too practically oriented, focusing too much on evaluation of one kind or another. This was not suited to my questions or my case, since I was leader and designer (but not the main implementor) of many initiatives described here. Ethnography, meanwhile, offers a rich tradition, particularly with regards to participant observers. However, there is a significant qualitative difference in my positioning, as “observing participant”. I wanted to make the most of my access to extraordinarily rich data, but still meet conditions of rigour and validity. Complexity, which offers several potential tools for identifying categories and characterizing underlying dynamics, enabled me to meet the challenge of sifting through the enormous richness of the data without producing a narrative so long the main findings get lost. Moreover, it is compatible with my main strategy for offsetting the disadvantages of my positioning, which involves triangulation, collective reflection, and other methods described in more detail below. Finally, the concept of research in living systems by engaging with less than pristine “living laboratories”, also helped to understand the collective, citizen dynamics of theorization and practice, critique and action explored here. Instead of attempting to position myself in the (obviously false) position of an “objective outsider”, I see my position as more akin to that of a (social) scientist reporting from a living laboratory, where s/he has participated in the complex processes that comprised the experiment and testing and must take a different kind of precautions to ensure validity.

Fundamental to complexity thinking is the idea that scale and size should not be conflated. In his interrogation of the global, Law (2004) asks, what if the global is “small and incoherent?” He argues that seeing the global as large and therefore including the (smaller) local, is a “particular and romantic method for imagining complexity”. He counterposes Kwa’s baroque alternative, which “looks down and discovers limitless internal complexity within, which is materially heterogeneous, specific, and sensuous” (p. 13). To understand water, macro manifestations such as
clouds or oceans can be useful, but examining its properties at the “small” micro, or molecular, level is essential too. Interpreting this concept as it relates to cities and planning, Portugali (2011) observes that:

The fact that global and local planning co-exist and interact in the dynamics of cities, and that in many cases local planning can be more dominant and effective in the overall urban process than global planning, implies that it must be perceived not as a reactive force, but as an important source for planning ideas and initiatives (p. 290).

Portugali suggests theorizing and researching cities from a perspective that: understands cities as complex self-organizing systems; defines an appropriate planning process; and develops a planning system appropriate to a complex self-organizing system (p. 291). This dissertation speaks to particular aspects of the complex city, examining how citizens (self-) organized to influence planning processes and results. This apparently simple action-reaction (highway project-citizen resistance) had a much deeper than expected impact on the planning system over all. This could reflect a forced bridging (perhaps even a short circuit!) across the “sharp dichotomy between the planners and the planned” (pp. 289-291, Portugali 2011).

My general question, then, asks:

What, if anything, can this Chilean experience tell us about how citizen participation and democratization in urban planning can foster the innovation necessary to achieve good, just and livable cities? What processes might be involved to build the consensuses necessary to generate new forms of urban living, more suited to the energy, environmental, social justice and other challenges of the 21st century?

I seek answers by asking some very “local” questions about the urban social movement against the Costanera Norte highway and the citizen institution, Living City, that emerged. These are motivated by the concern expressed above and framed by the discussion of the city and democratization in chapter one. These focus on the individual, collective and policy action spheres, as follows:

**INDIVIDUAL: CITIZEN LEARNING** Where do active citizens and effective civil society organizations come from, in post-authoritarian contexts where they have been deliberately destroyed? What role can participation in urban planning play in building the active citizenship skills necessary for more democratically capable citizens? Does this involve single- or double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1974; Healey 2006; Innes and Booher 2010), or can it actually include “learning from the future as it emerges” (Scharmer 2009)?

**ORGANIZATION: COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY** What kinds of organization enhance or limit this development? Are new kinds of organization, participation and leadership emerging? Can we speak of a need for “civic infrastructure” to facilitate (or limit) civil society development in the urban sphere?
How does citizen participation in urban planning interact with public and private policy fields, to achieve goals? Does this have relevant “side effects” in terms of how these goals are achieved and impact on democratization and sustainability? Is there a significant relationship between these three factors? Is there anything special about streets or transport planning with regard to these processes?

The next section examines complexity thinking (2.1), as it evolved from the physical to social sciences (2.1.1), how it is different from systems or network thinking (2.1.2), and how I use it to address issues of positionality (2.1.3). I then examine specific methods (2.2), particularly participatory action research (2.2.1) and ethnography (2.2.2), before explaining how this conceptual framework shaped analysis and tools (2.3) as they influenced data processing (2.3.1) and presentation of data (2.3.2).

### 2.1 Complexity: from the physical to social sciences, cities and planning

“Complexity” is both an adjective and a new approach in planning from the physical sciences, presented to a general audience by New York Times science writer, James Gleick, in *Chaos, Making a New Science* (1994). As the book’s title suggests, chaos and complexity are intimately linked to each other and to deep change. As simpler systems merge into increasingly complex ones, they may drive the system as a whole toward the edge of apparent chaos. This is where major change occurs and new organisms (or systems) “self-generate”, in what biologists, Maturana and Varela, call autopoeisis (Maturana and Varela 1980; Maturana and Varela 1992).

Complexity acknowledges profound paradoxes in natural (and social) phenomena. For example, underlying complex behaviour, there may be two or three key factors shaping a specific dynamic of interest to the researcher. This was suggested by Reynolds’ BOID (for “bird”) computer simulation (Reynolds 1987). By following three relatively simple rules -- birds avoid collisions, attempt to match others’ speed, and stay as close as possible together -- Reynolds’ flocks of “BOIDs” performed, swerving, diving and soaring across the computer screen, very much as a real life flock of birds moves across the sky. Thus, complexity encompasses both habitual rules, which we need for continuity, stability and a sense of security, and the issue of where change comes from, how it comes about, and the role of individual and collective actors in those processes. When Kuhn describes revolutions in scientific thought, or major paradigm changes (Kuhn 1996), when Marxists (based on Hegel) address how seemingly superficial quantitative may eventually accumulate into profound qualitative change (Cornforth 1977), they are describing processes akin to the shifts addressed by complexity.
Note, however, that Reynolds’ BOIDs simulation does not explain away all the complexity of bird behaviour. Environmental change, mating, migration, and many other factors ultimately go into shaping the “whole” bird system. Thus, while these sort of rules or dynamics may be useful for teasing out relevant factors shaping a phenomenon under study, they should always be approached with considerable caution. Moreover, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, Byrne’s comments on finding and testing local rules, rather than universal laws, are highly relevant, as is Cilliers’ insistence on modesty in claims.

2.1.1 Complexity and the social sciences

In their discussion of the evolution of complexity science and thinking about cities, Batty and Marshall (2012) note how humanity’s understanding of the world has evolved, from the highly centralized views from Greek philosophy and medieval religiosity, which “defined away” essential questions about natural and human organization by ascribing them to all-knowing deities. As classical Newtonian physics developed, this shifted to reflect the emergence of the individual, followed by Darwin’s theory of evolution. This formally established that “life must be generated from the bottom up without the need for a divine hand” (p. 22, Batty and Marshall 2012).

In the 20th century (figure 2.2), research from diverse disciplines led to the emergence of systems thinking and then complexity science, nourished by the development of computers and their ability to conduct massive calculations. Thus, in the 1970s, there was enormous excitement about systems, cybernetics and artificial intelligence, which gave rise to dynamic systems theory, new social systems theory, and agent-based modelling. In the 1980s, ideas about chaos and complexity arose from discoveries in the fields of meteorology (Lorenz’s “butterfly effect”), mathematics (Mandelbrot’s “fractals”), physics (Prigogine’s work on dissipative structures, complexity and irreversibility), and biology (Maturana and Varela’s work on organization and cognition). This, in turn, nourished new approaches to modelling, system dynamics and thinking about networks (Castells 1996). There is a tendency to think it is “new”, although in fact it may only be new to western science.⁷

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⁷ There is a tendency to think it is “new”, although in fact it may only be new to western science. Chamberlin notes that paradox was central to the beliefs of North America’s indigenous peoples Chamberlin, J. E. (2003). If this is your land, where are your stories? Finding common ground. Toronto, Random House. Further south, for millennia the Andean (Aymara, Quechua, Atacamenian) people’s belief system has incorporated a universal force involving moments of great upheaval, when the world turns upside down, and everything changes. They call this pachakuti, from the word “Pacha”, which refers to the union of time and space, and “kuti”, a revolution or turning point (sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, cited on p. 1, Aparajita, S. and M. C. Stephenson (1998). “Introduction: Contested Spaces in the Caribbean and the Americas.” Modern Fiction Studies 44(1): 1-9.
Figure 2.2. The New Science of Complexity. Castellani (2009) provides a useful map of the evolution of complexity science, starting with systems sciences in the 1940s and 1950s, followed by discoveries in physics, mathematics, and meteorology (1960s-1970s), which led to application in the social sciences from the late 1990s on. Batty, Allen, Portugali, and Byrne were the first to try this new science on cities, often starting from its usefulness for studying spatial or statistical phenomena.

A significant branch of complexity has emerged in organizational research and practice, particularly Senge’s work on the “learning organization”, which has undergone multiple revisions since it first came out in 1990 (Senge 1990; Senge 2006). Senge has also collaborated closely with Otto Scharmer, whose thinking about individual and organization learning (Scharmer 2009; Scharmer 2010), has been relevant to this study. Senge and Scharmer’s work is largely based on their practice with change in private corporations composed of complex systems. Westley, Zimmerman and Patton, meanwhile, apply Holling’s and other work to more general issues of social change, blending poetry, science- and social science-based knowledge to inspire social entrepreneurs in the private and citizen sectors (2006). In a similar vein, Walker and Salt (Walker and Salt 2006) focus on the resilience aspects of Holling’s and others’ work, offering case studies as examples of new kinds of complexity-based management approaches involving the interactions between ecosystems (the Everglades, coral reefs, etc.) and people. Focusing on emergence, Holman (2010) explores complexity’s usefulness in the for-profit and non-profit sphere.

What is usually missing from these accounts, however, is a serious consideration of issues of power as they relate to system functioning. Gunderson and Holling (2002), discussed in more detail below, only mention communications, technology and intention, as key differences between social and ecological systems. Indeed, it is only as we enter the sphere of the urban, and particularly planning, that we find a closer examination of issues of power, particularly in Innes and Booher, as discussed in chapter 1. Portugali (2011) discusses it indirectly, when he posits citizens as planners and argues for the need to theorize planning structures. Presumably structures should contribute to a more socially just distribution of power. I return to these issues throughout this study and in my conclusions.

In terms of complexity science and its implications for cities and planning, Batty (Batty and Longley 1994) was among the first to study echoes of complexity’s fractal forms in city design, while Allen analyzed cities and regions as self-organizing systems (1997) and Merry (1995) began to consider complexity in organizational theory. Jane Jacobs had early access to these new ideas through the multidisciplinary Macy seminars. James Holland, a professor of psychology and engineering, pioneered thinking about adaptation, complexity and emergence (Holland 1998). These early works were soon joined by efforts to apply complexity to the social sciences (Byrne 1998; Cilliers 1998), sociology (Eve, Horsfall et al. 1997), organizations (Stacey 1996) and government (Kiel 1994). Work by a Canadian ecologist, C.S. Holling, examined systems theory in
natural and social worlds, examining resilience, adaptive cycles, and panarchy (Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002), a concept similar to the part-whole units of analysis, or holons, employed by Ostrom in her analysis of institutional diversity (Ostrom 2005).

Following on Batty’s interest, Portugali discussed self-organization and the city (2000) and Byrne explored patterns of urbanization (Byrne 2001). He also contributed significantly to thinking about complexity and social science methods (Byrne 2001; Byrne 2005; Uprichard and Byrne 2006; Byrne and Ragin 2009; Byrne 2011), which has been fundamental to this dissertation. Similarly, Cilliers, Stacey and, later, Tsoukas (Tsoukas 2005; Tsoukas 2005; Tsoukas 2005; Tsoukas and Knudsen 2005), influenced Innes’ and Booher’s pioneering work on planning with complexity (Innes and Booher 2010) and also provided considerable insights into this process as I moved through it. Portugali’s most recent work (2011) and his collection on complexity and cities (2012) have also served as sources for inspiration and concepts important to this dissertation, as discussed in this and later chapters. Several collections edited by de Roo reflect his explorations of complexity in general and particularly as it applies to planning (Roo and Porter 2007; Roo and Silva 2010).

In light of the range of disciplines and approaches described here, it is hardly surprising that definitions and applications of complexity science vary enormously, according to the user, the discipline and their purpose. For my definition of complexity (there are many), I have used Byrne’s, who considers complexity science “the interdisciplinary understanding of reality as composed of complex open systems with emergent properties and transformational potential” (p. 97, Byrne 2005). Thus, as with my case study, complexity involves things that are constantly changing, seeks to describe and explain things that seem inexplicable, looks at the pattern of change. As Cilliers (1998) and Byrne himself argue:

> the complexity project necessarily confronts the subjective relativism of postmodernism with an assertion that explanation is possible, but only explanation that is local in time and place. Complexity science addresses issues of causation with cause, necessarily, understood as complex and contingent (p. 97, Byrne 2005).

Like other thinkers, Byrne notes that thinking about complexity has been with humanity for hundreds of years. By applying it the way I am discussing here, we are “reconstructing the tools and theories that we already have in complexity terms” (p. 98, Byrne 2005). Byrne is critical of simplistic, or mechanistic, applications of complexity, citing Holland’s development of “microeconomic/rational choice-style specifications of agents and/or game theory-style rules” that attempt to “generate artificial analogs of real complex systems”. He positions complexity as an
integrative approach, that is essentially historical, describing and interpreting qualitative change in systems; is always exploratory; uses both quantitative and qualitative procedures (or products); is reflective; and generates models that “combine measurement and documentary as an aid to action rather than as set of prescriptions” (p. 71, Byrne 2001).

Cilliers (2005) defines complexity in terms of a series of characteristics, which are compatible with those of Byrne, and useful for this case study. Complex systems are open, rather than closed, and they operate out of equilibrium. Their behaviour comes from the interactions between their components, rather than the components’ own inherent characteristics. Asymmetry, rather than symmetry or balance, tends to be the rule, and structures renew themselves and remain over time, even though their components change. Rather than being fixed elements, structures are “the result of action in the system, not something that has to exist in an a priori fashion” (Cilliers, p. 66, in Byrne 2001). One important observation to keep in mind is that

Since different descriptions of a complex system decompose the system in different ways, the knowledge gained by any description is always relative to the perspective from which the description was made (p. 258, Cilliers 2005).

This is relevant to any discussion of my positionality, as a researcher located within the systems of interest. The presentation of this case study, primarily in narrative and analytic form, does not pretend to be the sole possible narrative. Rather, it is one narrative that attempts to make the most of my position within the organization, but also recognizes that individuals who have opposed the Coordinadora or Living City, would tell the story differently. Where possible, and as discussed in more detail below, I have tried to include these opinions, as part of this narration, but I recognize that in all likelihood I have not been able to obtain every critical opinion, despite my best efforts.

In this sense, Cilliers notes that we cannot know complex systems completely, but argues against arrogance, for “modesty”: recognizing that knowledge itself has limits, and that, moreover, to achieve understanding of complex systems we need to find meaningful ways of simplifying what is most important about them.

2.1.2 Key concepts applied in this study

Complex adaptive systems emerge as simpler systems interact and merge. They have three main characteristics: non-reducibility, emergent behaviour, and both unpredictability and regularity (Merry 1995). Non-reducibility refers to the fact that the system cannot be understood solely by looking at parts, while emergence refers to “surprising and unexpected behavior” that seems a
property of the system as a whole. This combination of both surprise and regularity is one of the basic paradoxes that complexity thinking encloses (Stein, 1989, quoted on p. 59, Merry 1995).

Three central concepts that I have used come from Gunderson and Holling’s thinking about ecological and social systems (Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002). The first is their observation that amidst complexity, we can identify key dynamics or rules, which account for a significant aspect of the system’s functioning. The second involves the multiscalar nature of complex systems, which are constituted by simpler systems interacting to define structures and more complex systems, consisting of nested hierarchies. The third is their explanation of the adaptive cycle, which is what makes a system adaptable or rigid in the face of external challenges. Thus, Holling and Gunderson remark that

> the complexity of living systems of people and nature emerges not from a random association of a large number of interacting factors [but] rather from a smaller number of controlling processes. These systems are self-organized, and a small set of critical processes create and maintain this self-organization... These process establish a persistent template upon which a host of other variables exercise their influence (p. 391, Holling 2001).

This is consistent with the BOID experiment, described above, in which Reynolds simulates the flight of a flock of birds using three relatively simple rules. In seeking to establish key rules governing dynamics (or BOIDs) behind some of the events in this case study, I am very aware of their exploratory nature. In the spirit of Cilliers’ modesty, I can say they seem to capture crucial aspects of the complex dynamics underlying the achievements of the cycling roundtable (chapters 5 and 6), for example, and offer the possibility for testing their usefulness in understanding -- or influencing -- citizen-government policy interactions in other contexts. In this sense, Byrne’s distinction between rules, that may apply in specific situations, and laws, which are expected to function universally, throughout entire systems, is useful (p. 102, Byrne 2005).

To work within this framework, a researcher should “be as simple as possible but no simpler’ than is required for understanding and communication”; “be dynamic and prescriptive, not static and descriptive”, “embrace uncertainty and unpredictability” (p. 391, Holling 2001). Thus, I have sought simplicity, despite the complexity of the topic I am exploring, worked with narrative structures that attempt to go beyond the descriptive, and avoided assumptions that the situations I am describing follow any linear pattern of development.

The second contribution from Gunderson and Holling to my thinking is their characterization of complex systems as nested hierarchies, as “semi-autonomous levels” formed from interactions among sets of variables, with each level communicating information or material to the next higher
level. They call these “panarchy” to avoid the command and control aspect often associated with “hierarchy”. Figure 2.3 (left) illustrates this idea using a time-space scale for a boreal forest, whose simplest system is a leaf, which over time develops into a patch, a stand, a forest and ultimately a landscape, influenced by events such as fire or budworms, a breeze, a thunderstorm, or climate change. In terms of social systems (figure 2.3, right), we see similar concepts applied to a socio-political system, comprised of people in small groups, bound by policies or contracts, laws, and general cultural rules. These “dynamic hierarchies” perform two functions: the higher, slower moving levels “conserve and stabilize conditions for the faster and smaller levels”; and they also generate and test innovations, through experiments occurring within each level (p. 393, Holling 2001).

The third contribution from Gunderson and Holling is their explanation of the adaptive cycle, which they portray as a figure eight (figure 2.4), in which the system moves through exploitation and the accumulation of resources, becoming slower and more rigid as it becomes increasingly interconnected/accumulates more. Eventually it peaks, “releases” (or collapses), and must reorganize, before resuming the accumulation process. They liken this release-rebuild phase to the “creative destruction” described by Schumpeter (1947). They call this cycle adaptive, because the first phase “maximizes production and accumulation”, while the second involves “invention and reassortment”. This occurs sequentially, as growth and stability alternate with change and variety.
Thus, we see “reorganization”, which may follow systemic collapse, can lead to emergence, that is, new entities, which did not previously exist, and are fundamentally different from what might be expected from the original components. This also reminds us, rather uncomfortably, that death is an immutable, essential part of life, whether natural, social or individual.

These uncertainties, inherent to the open nature of the system, also makes it important to distinguish between complexity and complication. Sending a rocket to the moon is complicated, for example, requiring a series of steps that, if followed correctly, should produce the desired result virtually every time. In contrast, raising a child is complex: rigid protocols and even success with one child does not guarantee outcomes with another (Westley, Zimmerman et al. 2006).

Moreover, while closed systems, even complicated ones, are expected to maintain some equilibrium, complex adaptive systems do not, because they are always open to the environment, and therefore susceptible to surprises. Batty and Marshall distinguish between the organism, which is (relatively) finite, stable, in equilibrium, and relatively predictable. In contrast, an ecosystem involves “co-evolving subcomponents, is indefinite in extent, is never in equilibrium, and though it may be stable in the short run, is unpredictable in the long run” (p. 34, Batty and Marshall 2012).
Thus, these systems move constantly through different versions of the adaptive cycle, which also includes death and regeneration, whether for species, ecologies, or social constructs. Human systems differ from natural systems, in that they practice foresight and intentionality, communicate, and use technology (Holling 2001). This makes setting an objective such as “sustainability” problematic. Indeed, from this perspective, concepts such as “sustainability” and “resilience” become controversial. Sustainability is often seen as an “equilibrium” for which societies and cities should strive, but in complex adaptive systems this goal makes no sense. Similarly, approaches based on simplistic complexity (a term from Byrne 2005), tend to treat resilience as the ability of a species or a community to respond to turbulence or trauma by “bouncing back” to their original state. While this sometimes happens, these events may actually offer the opportunity for profound, and necessary change, to restore what was most important about the affected community, and change those aspects that made them most vulnerable. These are not comfortable concepts: however well we plan, there is no easy, painless path for life, whether individual or social.

This has enormous implications for planning, which includes many activities based on attempts to predict and thereby manage the future. Population projections and most transport projections, for example, are based on modelling future trends based on patterns from past to present. They risk becoming self-fulfilling prophecies, however, as occurs when more highways are built in response to future “demand” for travel by car, a process which creates a positive feedback loop: more highways = more cars = more highways. Rather than giving up, most planners in this field (Byrne 2005; Cilliers 2005; Bertolini 2010; Innes and Booher 2010; Portugali 2011; Portugali 2012) argue that we should introduce more collaborative, evolutionary approaches within planning systems.

These differences go to the essence of planning, as occurs, for example, after a disaster like the Chilean earthquake in 2010. As society attempted to rebuild, it became clear that for those in power, “recovery” meant getting infrastructure up and running again, bulldozing damaged homes and buildings, housing the homeless, and rebuilding quickly. In practice, this meant enormous, and often unnecessary, destruction of older heritage and other buildings, particularly those made of adobe, as developers took advantage of damage (some of it minor) to move in and purchase desirable, central properties at bargain prices. This approach never addressed the role that chronic poverty played in the destruction. Although some new buildings were destroyed, the greatest suffering affected those who were poor, and therefore chronically vulnerable and less able to respond, for lack of resources. As the country “recovered”, these families ended up in “temporary” shacks (where most of them remain, two years later), suffering from the same conditions that made them vulnerable in the first place. While the government poured its rebuilding funds into
equipment, labour and supplies from a single large corporation, civil society and other actors in a consortium with the Avina foundation responded more slowly, using participatory design methods (for buildings and towns), and raising funds to purchase supplies from local suppliers and hiring labour locally, to help rebuild local capability (Scallan 2010). Thus we can contrast the two approaches, one based on solving a “complicated” problem, and the other seeking a complex systemic approach, able to address and change factors creating vulnerability.

The mathematical roots of complexity science are apparent in several key terms applied in social science discussions. I have tried to avoid using too much terminology, but some concepts are useful for this account. Attractors, for example, express the idea of a “phase/state/condition space”: this is the shape and characteristics of the system in question. Torus attractors reflect the “normal” or starting state, while strange attractors describe how this state can become increasingly distorted, to the point where the system actually flips into something completely different. This is popularly associated with the butterfly or Lorenz effect: a small shift in initial conditions which triggers vastly different outcomes. Moreover, shapes characteristic of complex systems go beyond the regular circles and straight lines of Euclidean geometry (based on whole numbers), to fractals, a mathematics (based on fractions) able to describe the irregular regularities of mountains, coastlines, trees, and snowflakes (Mendelbrot, discussed on pp. 38-39, Merry 1995). Both Allen (1997; 2012) and Batty (Batty and Longley 1994; Batty 2010) apply these concepts in their work on city and city region forms.

In the early years, some thinkers tended to conflate chaos and complexity, but there are important distinctions between the two concepts, with chaos reflecting a specific state of a complex adaptive system, a point in which it is susceptible to major change. Cilliers emphasizes that while systems in a far-from-equilibrium state are constantly changing, they are “not balanced on a knife’s edge between chaos and order”. Rather, they “have mostly robust structures, which change over time and enable the system to respond to changing circumstances” (p. 264, Cilliers 2005).

From a complexity perspective, causality ceases to be predictable and linear, as occurs within positivism, but can be considered and studied, as “complex, multiple, contingent” and the result of unobserved mechanisms (Byrne 2001a). For Byrne

The trajectories of complex systems will always be directed by complex and contingent cause. History will matter. There will be path dependency. Context will matter. Agency will matter... [However] the same outcome might be produced by different causal combinations. There are different ways to the same future (p. 105, Byrne 2005).
2.1.3 Complexity in planning

As we have seen, uncertainty lies at the heart of complexity: Batty and Marshall define a complex system as “one that we will always be uncertain about”, especially as we attempt to explore, study and to some degree understand it. Three main sources apply these ideas (and some practices) in the planning sphere. De Roo and Silva’s *A Planner’s Encounter with Complexity* (2010) offers diverse authors tackling complexity as it relates to spatial realities and practices in cities. Innes’ and Booher’s *Planning with Complexity* (2010) uses complexity to understand interactions in participatory contexts that can rewire traditional power relations in planning. It focuses on theorizing and exploring examples of practice in which collaboration has been used to deal with complex systems, and considers collaborative processes themselves to be open-ended complex systems. Portugali’s *Complexity, Cognition and the City* (2011) starts from the premise that planning is a cognitive function of all those involved in city life, requiring new, explicitly inclusive structures for planning, something, he argues, planning theory fails to address.

How can complexity be applied to planning theory and used to shape a methodological approach? Chettyparamb (2006) discusses its use as a metaphorical device, which allows the “transfer of concepts, ideas and notions” by mapping knowledge “from one domain to another in a way that holds together systems of relations.” It may also be “essentially sensuous or intuitive” since metaphors invoke “images that aid cognition” (p. 76).

Unlike literary metaphors, which tend to lose their power over time, when effective, theory-construction metaphors are taken up by widening circles of researchers and thinkers, and can help to democratize knowledge (pp. 76-79). In her analysis of an early article by Innes and Booher, on consensus-building and collaborative planning (1999), Chettyparamb argues that they have used complexity primarily as metaphor, and that it has helped to reconceptualize consensus-building. But she also argues that it should be taken further to both “yield the relational structure within the abstraction in finer detail” and to identify, through more empirical work, “how the imported structural mapping plays out in the new target domain, thereby yielding new insights” (p. 82). This is the intent of the research approach described in this dissertation.

But treating the city as a complex adaptive system requires interrogating planning strategies from many angles. Current thinking about path dependence in urban planning (Sorensen 2010) is congruent with the directional nature of complex adaptive systems, identifying factors that influence system evolution in specific directions. In response to these ideas, Bertolini (2010) explores whether “evolutionary planning” would be the best approach to both acknowledge
Table 2.1 Complexity in City and Planning Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>In cities</th>
<th>In planning</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-linear and unpredictable</strong></td>
<td>Decisions such as using posts or underground installation of electric networks produce both expected and unexpected results (aesthetics, theft, resilience/vulnerability to natural phenomena) and so on.</td>
<td>A citizen movement may not achieve specific goals, but still influence planning in unexpected ways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Butterfly effect”</strong></td>
<td>Widening streets, increasing speeds, to “fix” congestion actually stimulate an ever-expanding urban model that generates more car use than ever before.</td>
<td>Excluding citizens from decision-making seems “more efficient”, but citizen revolts can totally disrupt and ultimately change “normal” planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Far-from-equilibrium state</strong></td>
<td>Urban planning system fails to produce a city that distributes benefits fairly among citizens and users, producing tensions that may explode.</td>
<td>Citizen revolts become increasingly likely and can express in multiple locations and forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strange attractor</strong></td>
<td>Many “anomalies” that occur when plans or projects are put into practice may reflect the unexpected pull of strange attractors, such as bribery for example.</td>
<td>Participation in planning as strange attractor, may reshape processes/results according to neighbourhood priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kinds of states</strong></td>
<td>Systems and subsystems may oscillate or flow between states (near-equilibrium, far-from equilibrium, edge of chaos), interacting to produce cities that thrive or decline, but never stay the same.</td>
<td>Planners seek to generate a “steady state”, but this aspiration may be unrealistic, or unwise given the likelihood of unintended consequences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fractal forms</strong></td>
<td>Similar social, ethnic, class or other cultures play out in similar but different patterns for neighbourhoods and the people who inhabit them.</td>
<td>The “ideal” solution according to theory or expert practice may require substantial change to function effectively in city settings. Imposition produces different levels of critique or even rebellion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autopoiesis or the ability to self-generate</strong></td>
<td>Urban transport systems may require a significant component of self-generation and self-management to function well.</td>
<td>Could explain how organizations emerge even where the necessary conditions don't appear to exist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on terms and definitions discussed in previous section.

uncertainty and still provide operational policy recommendations (Lempert et al, cited on p. 19 Bertolini 2010). He defines the three key features of evolutionary change: it alternates periods of incremental, quantitative change and periods of radical, qualitative change; changes are path dependent; and change, to a significant extent, unpredictable. “As a consequence, interventions in the system will always also have significant unexpected effects” (pp. 87-88, Bertolini 2010). In response, he argues, “robust” planning measures are characterized by leaving open the widest range of acceptable paths for the future, distinguishing “between uncertainty about goals and uncertainty about means” (p. 93, Bertolini 2010). This dissertation will not attempt to rethink planning overall from this evolutionary perspective, but I will use the results of this case study to consider aspects regarding citizens’ role in urban planning and the structural implications, or “civic infrastructure”, that can facilitate citizens’ more effective involvement.
Echoing Fainstein’s views on the perils of theorizing planning without theorizing cities, Batty distinguishes between the complexity of the city as system and the complexity of planning itself (Batty 2010). In this study, I analyzed my data with this distinction in mind, focusing mainly on planning systems, but also examining interactions with city systems, particularly transport, a complex system within the even more complex city system. Table 2.1 summarizes the way these components can influence planning and city systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2 Key Paradoxes within Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a fundamental contradiction (or paradox) between the assumptions that cities are predictable and therefore can be planned and the uncertainty inherent in all enterprises based on an unknown future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sided, fuzzy or contradictory goals, solutions and rules prevail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planners tend to start with specific solutions, rather than first examining the underlying “big mess”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus building and collaborative planning should be framed as self-organizing, complex, adaptive systems, but planning is often treated as part of a Newtonian world of linear cause and effect.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Summary of key points from sources, as listed.

As the previous discussion suggests, finding ways to live with paradox is central to complexity thinking. Table 2.2 summarizes four key paradoxes within planning, raised by researchers, that are particularly relevant to this case study. Although it does not attempt a very detailed analysis of complexity in planning, Innes and Booher’s work is particularly relevant, as they offer substantial evidence to support their view that collaborative approaches offer the most effective response to complex planning issues that involve conflict and unequal power dynamics. The diversity and evolution of participatory processes apparent in this case study sheds light on where, even in authoritarian systems and hostile environments, citizen initiatives can catalyze more collaborative approaches to clean up “big messes” (Grunau and Schönwandt 2010).

2.1.4 Shaping the gaze: living versus machine systems

Phelan (1999) contrasts more recent complexity thinking with older systems theory, which developed in science and engineering in the 1970s, since the two share key terminology, including emergence, nonlinear dynamics and the word “complexity” itself. One difference is that systems theory tends to focus on problem-solving, rather than exploratory approaches, seeking positive or negative feedback elements. It treats problems as “complicated” rather than “complex”, in the
Efforts to apply systems concepts to “soft” social systems have proven problematic, with Checkland (2000) arguing that this reflects radically different world views. Soft systems methods start from the assumption that each individual has a different world view based on experiences from birth onward, and questions the idea that reality can only be determined through careful observation by an objective observer (pp. 241-242 Phelan 1999). Although there are similarities between systems and complexity, the guiding metaphor (machines versus complex living systems) is fundamentally different. Both metaphors are valid, but may turn up different, even contradictory results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine/industrial perspective</th>
<th>City system example</th>
<th>Planning system example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry seeks “single point” and “closed loop” (pp.33-35, Merry 1995) repetitive processes that constantly produce the same result, but in living systems, repetition occurs but never produces exactly the same result.</td>
<td>To (re)produce a rational city, planners apply zoning by-laws, transport modelling, etc. modelled on closed loop approaches, sometimes placing human and non-human living systems at risk.</td>
<td>In its attempts to act as a predictable and closed system, the planning system excludes many of those affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry seeks uniformity of inputs to ensure reliability of outputs.</td>
<td>Supposedly uniform rules produce highly diverse outcomes: comfortable neighbourhoods for the rich, no parks for the poor who need them most.</td>
<td>Diversity and redundancy are treated as problematic rather than essential to resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When machines break down they cease to function; living systems, however, tend to reorganize and generate new ways to function</td>
<td>Politicians, media and others threaten “collapse” if highways are not built, but in fact, when they are closed or eliminated, the city adapts and moves on.</td>
<td>Failures or gaps in governance tend to produce barriers and reflect path dependency, but they can also trigger significant opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on rules, repetition and conformity, rather than recognizing the presence and value of self-generating and self-managing systems.</td>
<td>Police repression of young people who use parks for juggling, street theatre and barter on weekends -- they don’t recognize the value of a self-managing system applied in public space.</td>
<td>Self-generating, autonomous citizens’ movements and institutions may be seen as problematic rather than ideal partners in managing the complex city system.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In this sense, another reason for my interest in complexity over systems or network theory is because it allows the social scientist to go “beyond the metaphor of the machine” (Tippett 2010). Metaphor is important, because instead of isolating the rational, it recognizes the embodied nature of human thought, and its existence within specific, biological, spiritual and built environments. Based on work in the field of cognition and linguistics, Lakoff and Johnson (1999; 2003) argue that
the way we are able to reason is fundamentally linked with the way in which our bodies orientate spatially in the world and interact with the environment. These basic relationships between our bodies and the world help to build primary metaphors, which are used in abstract thought. How we can know is not just influenced by what we see, but also fundamentally by how we can see and feel” (quoted on p. 243, Tippett 2010).

Too often, social phenomena are analyzed without their sensual and spiritual components. In this study, which examines citizen movements as they play out in the sensuous, suggestive spaces of kitchens, offices, neighbourhoods and city streets, I believe this apparently minor omission can lead to huge gaps in understanding. The different frames also have explicit implications, since machines or industrial approaches are very different from biological or ecological frames. Table 2.3 summarizes key differences for the purpose of this study. Thus, I have framed my observations and conclusions in terms of living systems rather than machines or technical components.

This approach also has implications for the way I look at participation. Portugali (2011) argues that although complexity theory originated in the sciences with no ethical message, its application to cities has ethical implications. Because he starts from a cognitive view of planning, as both a professional area of expertise and an innate human activity, planning a self-generated complex system such as a neighbourhood or city requires participation by all kinds of planners (p. 287).

Portugali distinguishes between mechanistic/engineered/entropic planning and self-organized planning. The first refers to a relatively simple ‘closed system’ planning process, “in the sense that it is…fully controlled. The second refers to a relatively complex ‘open system’ planning process, which like other open and complex systems exhibits phenomena of nonlinearity, chaos, bifurcation and self-organization.” (p. 289). Participation, then, becomes an ethical obligation and an essential planning tool and goal. Table 2.3 identifies some contrasts depending on how cities and planning processes are framed as engineered or self-organizing.

Thus, with this approach, I am also choosing to substitute new metaphors for old ones and to test whether (or how) this can produce new insights. As I discuss this case study, I choose to think of an agent’s role not as trigger, but rather as catalyst, and I model interactions among agents using relational trees (and forests), rather than the more common networks. The purpose is to complement the insights that a systems or network approach might identify (and count, represent using mathematical formulae, or computer mapping programs), with an essentially qualitative focus that considers the regular irregularities and features of living systems.
2.1.5 What's in a location? Positionality and living laboratories

Evans and Karvonen (2011) discuss the concept of living laboratories as they study transitions toward more sustainable living systems. They note that “laboratory” implies an epistemology, a way to know the world that enables technicians to experiment in isolation from the “unpredictable whims of nature”. This makes it easier to break things down into parts, separated from the whole. Although this approach has generated significant new knowledge, it omits the complex interactions that may also shape phenomena of interest.

Living laboratories, in contrast, are messy, in both the academic and practical sense, blurring boundaries and “contaminating” the pristine laboratory with germs from the teeming swamps of real life. They are also, Evans and Karvonen argue, necessary for innovation, based on “sensing, testing and refining complex solutions in real-life contexts” (p. 128, 2011). They cite several paradigmatic cases of early field biologists (among them Charles Darwin, who called the Galapagos a living laboratory) and pioneers in population biology whose work in the field made it possible to establish the “bedrock of modern ecology: ecosystems” (pp. 127-128).

Just as scientists report on results from their own institutional or living laboratories, social scientists, particularly psychologists and psychiatrists, educators, and anthropologists, extract data and theory from situations in which they have been deeply involved. In planning, some of the main thinkers (Krumholz and Forester 1990; Sandercock 1998; Forester 1999; Roy 2001; Booher and Innes 2002; Innes and Booher 2010; Forester 2012) base much of their analysis on cases -- of deliberation, participation, mediation -- in which they have been personally involved. Virtually all speak explicitly from the perspective of planners within official, usually governmental, planning systems, or their advisors from private and academic bodies. I have adopted a similar stance, but from a location within the citizen planning sphere. I therefore reverse the usual order, in which planners located in governmental or academic planning environments look at citizens’ from the outside, and their own environments from the inside, to explore citizen initiatives from the inside, and official planning activities from the outside. This reflects an emancipatory component to this research, which forms part of the participatory action research component, discussed below.

The potential for bias, manipulation of intrinsic or extrinsic power relations, and other elements that could deform data and/or lead to deliberate or unconscious manipulation of results is inherent in all these situations. The assumption, however, is that as social scientists we take measures to make these situations both explicit and transparent to those who read our work, and to ensure that ethical considerations shape our methods in ways that prevent harm.
A conventional third-person methodology, based on the pristine laboratory idea, presents the data of the case study from a single perspective, that of an academic expert and outsider who has gathered data through archival research and a relevant interview strategy, combining the results to produce a narrative suitable for her or his analysis (p. 100, Merry 1995). While this approach is often considered to enhance “objectivity” and reliability, in fact it is based on a positionality that offers certain advantages -- a fresh and “independent”, outsider’s perspective -- but also, as with all positionality, disadvantages, such as less intimate knowledge of the data, potential for manipulation by research “objects” themselves.

It also assumes power relations (on the researcher’s side) that may not in fact hold true. Miraftab (2004) describes her experience, when she interviewed Mexican women, who interrogated her for their own “research” purposes, as much as she questioned them. This turned traditional assumptions about the powerful researcher on its head and, for Miraftab, redefined the “insider/outside” relationship “as a two-way relationship constructed by actors on both sides” (Oakely 1981, cited on p. 599, Miraftab 2004). Miraftab’s experience underlines the complexity of power dynamics in research situations and the potential for applying measures and methods to reinforce or make explicit the rights and power of those “being researched”, to generate a more balanced and more mutually useful relationship. The methods and measures described in the next section reflect a conscious attempt to do this.

The limitations of third-person inquiry also involve issues of transparency and fairness. Outsiders may have less access to quality information and responses from informants, rather than more, as seems to be the assumption. They may be demonstrably independent of the group or phenomenon under study, but they will still bring their own biases and previous experiences (or lack of experience) to their research. Trust may be insufficient or other factors may interfere with the researcher’s ability to elicit honest testimony. They lack their own memories of events and may not have the relationships necessary to triangulate information, to ensure its relative accuracy. This may not be evident, however, to those receiving the results of the research.

In this kind of urban research, expertise is also an issue because an “expert” (or someone aspiring to be an expert), may have no personal or practical experience with the issues at hand, but expects to cull the most significant aspects of a highly complex experiential world, composed of many individual world views that have interacted over time, usually in unpredictable ways. Power is deeply entangled in this issue, in that the researcher who sets her or himself apart reserves the power to comment, responsibly or otherwise, on the subject at hand, to third parties. Thus, the
researcher becomes an “authority”, based on the theoretical and practical knowledge developed by a community, while the community remains disempowered, the source and generator of knowledge, but not its owner. Its own knowledge may be used against it, behind its back (in academic journals and technical environments) or in its face, through excluding practices.  

To offset this tendency, I have worked hard to make this research “emancipatory” (Horton, Bell et al. 1990; Freire 1998; Coghlan and Brannick 2009), in the sense that it empowers the communities and other actors involved in the phenomena being researched. This starts from recognizing the hybrid nature of the knowledge generated here, and its essential rooting in both social science approaches and the empirical, theoretical and practical experimentation of people educated in the “university of life”, who have tested their theories and practices in living laboratories, markets and streets and neighbourhoods. To do so I have applied three central measures: first, a participatory action research methodology (Senge and Scharmer 2008; Scharmer 2009) that involves the organizations being researched as co-researchers, giving them significant power over the research process; second, using workshops and other activities to validate observations and conclusions; and third, carefully consulting key observations and conclusions to add a “first person plural” voice to the three voices (first person, second person and third person, discussed by (Torbert 2008). This has involved an ongoing process of collective reflection throughout the research process.

Thus, my community partners control the process, and the content of information, theory and analysis ascribed to them, but I retain the freedom to express my own opinions, where they are different from those of Living City. The research “voice” is primarily first person plural, “we”, and on some occasions may refer to “their” views, and “my” views, when these diverge. These boundaries maintain respect, integrity, but also freedom of thought. They require a particularly transparent set of methods, to function. They are important, because our motives and goals are different. Living City’s objectives for this research are practically oriented: community leaders seek knowledge that will enrich their intense, pressured and innovative practice and increase their impact on urban planning (Leaders 2012). In contrast, by doing doctoral work I have committed to an academic environment, interested in theoretical and knowledge-related implications, with established rules of engagement for how these are generated in the social sciences.

Moving beyond traditional assumptions about third-person objectivity versus first-person bias, Herr and Anderson (2005) describe a continuum of positionality, starting from the insider, researching

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8 These comments are based on Living City’s experience with external researchers, in Santiago.
her or his own self/practice, then moving on to the insider working with other insiders, insider(s) working with outsider(s), reciprocal collaboration between insider-outsider teams, and then outsider(s) working with insider(s), outsider(s) studying insider(s), and finally, multiple positionalities (pp. 29-48, Herr and Anderson 2005). They warn of the dishonesty and risk inherent in an insider applying outsider rules to their insider work: “This… causes epistemological and methodological problems, since validity criteria – particularly for qualitative research – was designed with outsiders in mind” (p. 47, Herr and Anderson 2005). This is problematic, since the challenges tend to be the opposite:

Academics (outsiders) want to understand what it is like to be an insider without ‘going native’ and losing the outsider’s perspective. Practitioners (insiders) already know what it is like to be an insider, but because they are ‘native’ to the setting, they must work to see the taken-for-granted aspects of their practice from an outsider’s perspective (Anderson, Herr & Nihlen, 1994, quoted on p. 47, Herr and Anderson 2005).

Figure 2.5 illustrates Herr and Anderson’s spectrum of positionality, as I have applied it for the purpose of this case study of Living City. The inner core (position A) is formed by those people most involved in the organization, particularly its board, staff and closest advisors. Positions B-D reflect the positionality of inside-outsiders at a growing distance from the inner core. In Living City’s case, this would be regular advisors (B), people from partnering organizations who participate directly in specific initiatives coordinated by Living City (C), people from external partnering organizations such as municipalities (D), external observers who receive regular information from Living City and identify with or view positively some aspect of its work (E and F), and complete outsiders, who have traditionally had little or no contact with Living City. From a
research perspective, research teams from the NGO Sur or the Catholic University who have been watching Living City, civil society, local organizations and/or conflicts for different periods of time would be located at (G), while I was at (A) and, since I left the leadership in August 2011, (E).

Complexity uses the famous question of Schrodinger’s cat to question traditional views of observation, as an external activity that does not affect results. The act of observing influences what is seen because, (i) the **position of the observer** shapes what is invisible and visible, as do the particular combination of senses involved in the observation (a collision will look different for the radio journalist watching from a helicopter, a video camera fixed to a traffic light at the junction where the accident occurs, or for the neighbour who mostly hears, rather than sees the event); the **role of the observer** also shapes perception (the person who is behind the wheel, walking across the road, or speaking on their mobile telephone as they approach), and (iii) the **beliefs of the observer** also filter what is observed in largely unconscious ways. Informal settlements are “slums” to people from developed countries, but have more diverse connotations in their own languages: “squatters” in English may be heroic leaders of *tomas*, land occupations, at home. Transparency and reflection have been my main strategies to avoid distortion and provide the most responsible account possible.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) reject the Cartesian separation of mind and body, arguing that our thinking is “grounded in our capacity to function successfully in our physical environments. The fact that our common environments generate shared responses, enhanced by imagination, scientific ability and other possibilities makes some level of universality possible. Nonetheless, differences require that “any discussion of truth may need to be multilevelled” and when examined at different levels “may be contradictory” (p. 244, Tippett 2010). This adds an important physical dimension to positionality.

Interestingly, both Byrne (2005) and Stacey (2005) discuss action research in relation to working with complexity. Partly, at least in Byrne’s case, this reflects an ethical concern raised by Cilliers in a 1999 lecture at the University of Durham, based on the principle that it is “unethical to reason about social systems while being ‘outside of them’” (p. 74, Byrne 2001). Byrne also relates it to Paolo Freire’s pedagogical theories, seeking dialogical engagement with actors as part of social research, and taking the process of reflexivity out of the epistemological ghetto and into social life” (p. 108, Byrne 2005).

Stacey and Griffin (2005) take a different tack. Their research process, at the Complexity and Management Centre at the Business School of the University of Hertfordshire, *requires* that
students work in the research organization that they study (p. 24, Stacey and Griffin 2005). Reflective narratives form the raw material of their research, and it is processed through different kinds of group reflection in the university setting. In this case, their research has no objective validity “for the obvious reason that the research is an interpretation, a subjective reflection on personal experience”. Nor is it an “arbitrary account”, however, in that it must make sense to others and participate in a wider tradition of thought (p. 27, Stacey and Griffin 2005). I have shaped this study to meet similar criteria, starting from personal and collective reflections, to produce an account that makes sense within the conceptual framework presented here.

As discussed, this positionality offers certain advantages: insights, extensive and intensive knowledge of people and events. But it also involves significant limitations. Because I designed and led many of the initiatives discussed here, it would be inappropriate for me to attempt to evaluate their effectiveness or success. Fortunately, several rigorous external evaluations of our projects are available, as they formed part of the awards systems that examined and recognized the impacts of several of our initiatives (the 2001 recycling project, the 2002-2003 transport project, the 2000-2008 Bellavista-Pio Nono recovery initiative). Moreover, while some analysts, particularly working within organizational disciplines, might find it important to analyse leadership, I can offer some comments, as I do in the discussion of leadership and followship, but as a leader myself I cannot position myself at the equidistance necessary to analyse the different styles of leadership and how they interacted to produce the Coordinadora and Living City. Finally, although I have made an effort to obtain a wide range of opinions, particularly from those most critical of these experiences, as discussed in more detail below, some protagonists were not available for interviews or chose not to have their views cited.

It is possible, too, to assume that some of those interviewed did not feel comfortable telling the “truth” or did not tell the whole truth about their opinions. It is clear from the positive tenor of the majority of interviews that Living City was riding something of a wave, of recognition, even acclaim, at the time these interviews took place (2010). If I had done this research in 2006, right after the problematic Bicivilizate campaign (chapters 5 and 6), opinions would have been more negative, suspicion and mistrust in the forefront, in the case of actors from other organizations (Macletas, Bicicultura, CicloRecreovia). By 2010, these opinions had evolved, substantially, in light of subsequent events and Living City’s own actions. I do believe, however, that these events and their evolution have been honestly and accurately portrayed, largely by maintaining transparency with regard to my involvement, and allowing other actors, all of them central and representative of significant and diverse viewpoints in these conflicts, to speak for themselves throughout this text.
2.2 Methods: Participatory Action Research, Interviews and Processing

2.2.1 Participatory Action Research

One significant way of controlling potential for abuse or manipulation is to make those researched partners, rather than objects, thereby committing to transparency and guaranteeing specific rights. In this case, I partnered with Living City, signing a memorandum of agreement (January 2010). Living City committed to helping with the logistics of organizing interviews and workshops, providing input, feedback, and analysis to develop a “first person plural” voice. As with all Living City initiatives, this did not give the organization the right to censor or impose views that I do not share on my dissertation. Rather, it gave them the right to require specific outputs. This became particularly important when, in August 2011, a new leadership took over.

Participatory Action Research (PAR) approaches share five characteristics: a focus on participation and democracy, knowledge-in-action, grappling with practical issues, seeking human flourishing, typically centred on and requiring an emergent developmental form. PAR implies a world view. For Bradbury and Reason:

> Each theory of the way the world is gives rise to particular ways of seeing the world… we have argued that action research emerges from a participative way of seeing or acting in the world in which we find ourselves always in relationship (p. 344, Bradbury and Reason 2008).

Based in the work of Miles Horton and John Gaventa in the 1960s, the “emancipatory” tradition of PAR is most deeply associated with the Brazilian, Paulo Freire and his book, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970). From this perspective, key components include:

- The point of departure is a vision of social events as contextualized by macro-level social forces;
- Social processes and structures understood within a historical context;
- Integration of theory and practice;
- The subject-object relationship becomes a subject-subject relationship through dialogue;
- Research and action (including education) become a single process;
- Community and researcher together produce critical knowledge aimed at social transformation;
- The results of research are immediately applied to a concrete situation (Schutter and Yopo 1981, cited on p. 15, Herr and Anderson 2005).

These elements are apparent in this case study and are well served by the overall complexity approach I have adapted for my research. They also help to visualize the dialogical nature of this process, expressed in most of the specific research methods. My commitment to Living City, then, required that this process:
Be useful to the communities, organizations and individuals who contributed their time and knowledge to its success, and to others, in Chile and abroad;

- Document and systematize experiences of a kind that are often not explored in this depth or so directly from the perspective of civil society actors themselves;
- Produce a dissertation that represents fairly and accurately the collective views, wisdom and analysis of those involved, in their richness and complexity.

Key PAR Partnership Activities

We implemented these objectives through the following activities:

- Reflective data gathering workshops, one on Living City (22 July 2010) and one on the Coordinadora (29 July 2010);
- A report to the Living City board with initial results from all workshops and semi-structured interviews (20 January 2011) for their feedback;
- A workshop on implications for Living City structure and planning (25 May 2011);
- My support for and participation in an additional workshop organized by Living City treasurer and staff (June 2011);
- A presentation to the Living City plenary and bi-annual meeting that establishes strategic goals and actions for the next two years (26 July 2011);
- A workshop with Living City board and staff to discuss and validate initial findings (18 January 2012);
- A workshop with Living City board and staff to validate final findings (August 2012).

Throughout, I prepared summaries of key information in Spanish. After completion, the full dissertation will be available in Spanish and I plan to publish several components to ensure that results are available to all those who are interested. This also ensures the right to reply through private exchange or public debate, should anyone feel they have been misrepresented or wish to extend the conversation about these themes on their own terms. The interviews and all resulting documents will be housed in Living City’s archives and the organization will decide their use.

2.2.2 Data collection: Ethnography, sources and sampling

2.2.2.1 Ethnography, dialogue and ethics

As discussed under positionality, wherever researchers are located on the spectrum they need to adopt measures to enhance the benefits and offset the limitations of their location. In this sense, I applied measures that were pertinent and appropriate to my general complexity approach.

a. Ethnographic measures: I came to this research process as a mature writer, with a documentary bent honed by my 20 years of work as a journalist and non-fiction author, covering an unfamiliar country and culture, that gradually became my own. I was deeply influenced by Joseph Campbell’s
thinking about mythologies (Campbell 1973; Campbell 1976; Campbell 1990; Campbell 1993; Campbell and Kennedy 2001), and the need to suspend judgment and listen with an open heart to -- if not fully understand -- at least grasp some essential aspect of beliefs foreign to my own. In the social sciences, anthropologists use ethnography for this purpose,

suspending their own immediate inferences, commonsense assumptions and theoretical presuppositions, as far as possible, so as to try and take full account of what people say about their world and what they do. ...it is equally, if not more, important to adopt this stance in studying familiar settings, where the tendency to assume that one already knows what is going on, and why, as well as who is involved and for what purposes, is particularly strong (location 6426, Hammersley and Atkinson 2009).

The challenge for the ethnographer (as for the writer) is to simultaneously “make the strange familiar, so as to understand it, and to make the familiar strange, so as to avoid misunderstanding it” (location 6442, Hammersley and Atkinson 2009). Achieving this balance was aided by the fact that I genuinely sought to understand -- actors, processes, and outcomes -- that surprised and puzzled me. As Living City’s reputation grew during the 2000s, it was difficult to understand why academics, peers and even former opponents seemed to view us so positively. My research questions were born from this sense of strangeness.

Ethical and methodological questions arise when observation is covert: some or all of those being observed are not aware that their comments and actions may be the object of academic work (Hammersley and Atkinson 2009). Living City’s participation as co-researcher and information provided at all events and interviews ensured that those involved knew of my research and the purpose for which their views were sought.

b. **Named participation and transparency:** A second measure was to refrain from offering anonymity to those participating, and specifying that my interest was to include their perspective, and accredit it as such. This met certain requirements of my sampling method (described below), but also made explicit that I was seeking “official” opinions, whether from individuals or representatives of institutions (whether public, private or citizen), and viewpoints (whether critical, friendly, committed or detached).

Thus, after providing informed consent, contributors knew they would receive credit for their observations and form part of the overall research process throughout. This was important to avoid people feeling that they had been “robbed of some essential element of dignity” (location 5928,

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9 The “location” is the equivalent of the page number in the electronic (Kindle) edition of the book, which I have used, given that in Santiago I do not have access to a library with these physical resources.
Hammersley and Atkinson 2009). It also reinforced “ownership”: in most cases, participants were eager to express their views and comfortable with the knowledge this contribution would be formally recognized throughout the dissertation and resulting documents. It is possible that some interviewees might have felt more comfortable expressing negative opinions if anonymity were provided. This is hard to estimate and evaluate. My reading of this environment is that many of those interviewed, particularly citizen leaders, are tired of having their views “stolen” by others, and that guaranteeing recognition of their contributions to this study was an important incentive and social justice measure. In general, the opinions expressed seem deep, and honest, and consistent with people’s actions.

A small number of interviewees (three) refused interviews or exercised strategies equivalent to refusal or at least reluctance. In one case, the busy owner of Patio Bellavista, this seems more likely to reflect pressures and priorities associated with getting a new phase of his project up and running, and the fact that his views were already on record, having been expressed frequently on public occasions, in the media, and in a feature article prepared with his support in the Voz, Living City’s flagship publication. In the second case (the president of the Bellavista neighbourhood association at the time), refusal clearly reflected dissension from a positive view of Living City. Although I could not include specific criticisms, I did attempt to provide a reasonable summary of these objections at appropriate points in the text. In the third case, the person granted an interview and his criticisms form a part of this text, but when I requested permission to quote strongly worded criticism of the Bicivilizate campaign’s collapse, he refused, preferring to leave those elements of the debate to the past.

My positionality would make any claim to this being the “definitive account” of the cycling or other conflicts unreasonable. Instead, I maintain that this is a reasonable, valid account and that other accounts are both possible and necessary. In the past 15 years, I have often granted interviews to other researchers and encouraged them to develop and publish their own accounts of these events. This has meant that at many points during this study, I have been able to triangulate my own readings of events with those of others, including academic researchers working within social science traditions and constraints similar to the ones that inform this dissertation.

c. Reflexivity through dialogic methods: In contrast to positivist paradigms, the ethnographer understands that his or her work is “a constructivist product of the intersubjectivity between the researcher and the researched” (p. 7, Whitehead 2005). Reflexivity is a useful strategy to address the potential for bias (Whitehead 2005). In classic ethnography, reflexivity often involves
researchers reviewing their notes to build self-awareness of how their implicit assumptions may be distorting their gaze. This seemed unsuitable in a study where the main risk was that I might become too engrossed in my own perspective and drown out others’, possibly conflicting, views. To address this, I employed several reflexive components, consistent with my complexity approach: **dialogue across distance**, **dialogue across diversity** and **dialogue among equals**. This was complemented by the open structure of the PAR workshops, designed to be mainly **reflective**, rather than for gathering information.

**Dialogue across distance**: This involved discussing my observations and analysis as I went along with diverse actors (government, private and public sector) in other cities and very different national contexts. To distance myself and develop more perspective on events in Santiago, I was able to present, discuss and listen to people grappling with similar themes and issues in Bogotá, Seville, Brussels, Copenhagen, London, Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Monterrey, Stuttgart and Delhi. These city visits and associated events helped define the limits of what was peculiar to Santiago and other elements that seemed common to experiences elsewhere. They also forced me to think of nuances and exceptions in my own case study, and pointed to interesting commonalities, suitable for more systematic, comparative research in the future.

**Dialogue across diversity**: To define the boundaries between questions peculiar to urban civil society, I was also able to dialogue with other civil society traditions, through the Ashoka (several meetings during the research period), Avina (interviews with leaders in Chile and Colombia, where this initiative began) and Synergos (annual meetings in New York, Windhoek and Sao Paulo) networks, which brought in different perspectives from Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as North America and Latin America, where I am rooted. The Dutch Interface for Cycling Expertise (I-CE) network was also vital to looking at similarities and differences in approaches to cities, cycling and sustainable transport in Africa, India, Latin America and the Netherlands, a country with an extraordinarily rich civil society environment in this area. Similarly, participation in the Velo-City global cycling conferences (2009-2012), conversations and interviews with members of the European Cycling Federation, helped to identify tendencies in their experience that, through contrast, helped to hone my appreciation of our own, in Santiago.

In a similar vein, I worked through ideas with transport engineers and other transport planning professionals, particularly those involved in fostering bus rapid transit and public transport initiatives in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, United States, South Africa, the UK, India and elsewhere. These exchanges enriched my understanding of the commonalities and contrasts, helping me to
locate boundaries and identify categories of relevance that I have applied in the Chilean case study. Again, these experiences also suggest that the next step for this kind of research would be a comparative effort involving cities in developing and developed countries.

**Dialogue among “equals”:** While relationships may never be as equal as we would like, the dynamics within the Coordinadora and Living City, and between Living City and this researcher, tended to take the form of relatively egalitarian exchanges across difference. Throughout, the strongest control against exploitation or manipulation was the voluntary nature of all relationships. All participation, including that of Living City’s paid staff, was entirely voluntary (and, as with leaders and other participants, individual staff member opted out of specific activities when they wanted to) and opinions were freely provided in both formal and informal venues.

In seeking a balanced and suitably multi-faceted set of perspectives on the case study, the sampling strategy and semi-structured interviews were also important, as discussed in the next section.

2.2.2.2 Sampling and semi-structured interviews

Altogether, 33 people participated in group reflections during the course of this research, with another 38 individuals involved in semi-structured interviews, conducted by a second interviewer, Loreto Rojas, who holds a Master of Urbanism. One person (Andrea Cortínez, Macletas) was interviewed and participated in the women’s reflection group, where questions were substantially different. Another (staffmember, Magda Morel) participated in the Living City group reflection and the women’s group, which were substantially different. This provided an additional perspective on data, from outside Living City’s central core. In the case of all interviewees, the inclusion of government and academic officials, many from male-dominated disciplines (transport-related), meant that for the overall sample, 58% were men. The rate for civil society organizations (51% women, 49% men) is more representative of Living City’s civil society environment.

For the purposes of data collection from key informants in the citizen, public and private sectors, I identified and interviewed representatives of the bodies and agencies that have interacted with Living City on different undertakings. The sample consists of individuals who are both representative of their institution and had significant interactions with Living City. As discussed, they are identified by name and position and their opinions are representative and “official”.

The sample also consciously sought to balance representation from citizen, public and private sectors. Finally, it sought to include individuals who supported, criticized, opposed and had no expressed opinion about Living City. In particular, for the two major conflicts (anti-highway revolt,
Bicivilízate campaign), opinions were sought from the different camps: transport planners in SECTRA and government; the architect in charge of the main studies in the case of the highway project; civil society groups that publicly critiqued Living City for its work on the cycling campaign, but later revised and changed their positions. It was not possible to include all voices, however, so media reports, official government documents, and public statements are cited to reflect these viewpoints (anti-highway campaign) and critiques by key actors (Bicivilize conflict). In the case of the latter, if my interest were primarily to identify what happened, I would have invested more time in going back and searching for specific e-mails documenting some events or the particular language used in attacks. However, my intent is not to establish a history but rather to take certain events, such as the collapse of the Bicivilize campaign, as given, and explore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.4 Civil Society Sector Sample Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinadora/Ciudad Viva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current and 1 ex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role CN/CV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 of 6 founding orgs., 7 of 9 current leaders, all current and 2 former staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coordinadora**

- Independencia  
  - President  
  - Founders  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 3 of 4 sectors, 6 of 9 orgs

**Neighbourhood Associations**

- JV Mario Baeza #13  
  - Executive  
  - Founders  
  - # of Interviews: 3  
  - Analysis: 6 people from 4 orgs (1 extinct)

- JV 35  
  - President  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 6 people from 4 orgs (1 extinct)

- JV 34  
  - Pres. & VP  
  - New partner  
  - # of Interviews: 2  
  - Analysis: 6 people from 4 orgs (1 extinct)

- Corporación Bellavista  
  - Leader  
  - Former partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 6 people from 4 orgs (1 extinct)

**Other Urban/Community Organizations**

- Ciudadanos por Valparaíso  
  - Key leader  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 3 people from 8 possible orgs

- Recicladoras El Bosque  
  - Key leader  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 3 people from 8 possible orgs

- ComunActiva  
  - Founder  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 3 people from 8 possible orgs

**Other Cycling-Transport Organizations**

- Macletas  
  - Leaders  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 2  
  - Analysis: 5 people from 10 possible orgs

- Bicicultura  
  - Founder  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 5 people from 10 possible orgs

- Ciclorecreovías  
  - Founder  
  - Current partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 5 people from 10 possible orgs

- Arriba e la Chancha  
  - Founder  
  - Ex - partner  
  - # of Interviews: 1  
  - Analysis: 5 people from 10 possible orgs

Source: Own elaboration, based on interviews and group reflections. I facilitated (workshops) or supervised (interviews, carried out by Loreto Rojas), but do not count myself within these numbers.
them as they impacted on the general system, interactions between relevant actors, resilience, and so on. I have therefore focused on data relevant to these phenomena.

Table 2.4 analyzes the sample for representation of key actors within civil society, as they reflect the criteria described here. There were fewer interviews with other urban/community organizations because many were extremely new,¹⁰ and Living City was just beginning to work with them as interviewing began. Table 2.5 provides a similar analysis of public sector and academics interviewed, while Table 2.6 provides the same analysis for private sector actors interviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.5 Public Sector and Academic Sample Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal and Regional Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maipú</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chile planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic University Urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic University Transport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on analysis of interviews and group reflections.

¹⁰ It could have been interesting to study specifically how much the Coordinadora and Living City influenced their emergence and evolution as organizations, but tempting as this was, it would have expanded the focus of this research considerably and, more importantly, many were still so new that the full import of these interactions are probably not yet apparent or even defined.
The sample also included a selection of representatives from the different orbits included in Living City’s methods of participation, so people with different levels of proximity, measured as frequency and quality (personal, e-mail, meetings, etc.) of contact. For the overall sample and the citizen sector interviewees, I made an extra effort to include people from different socio-economic backgrounds and I evaluated the sample on this basis. Table 2.7 shows the breakdown of those consulted by position within Living City’s circles of participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Municipal and Regional Government</th>
<th>Natura</th>
<th>Green Map/CEO</th>
<th>Former partner</th>
<th>Intervi -</th>
<th># of groups</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>Current partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 of 5 business partners (lg., med., sm.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC Bicicletas</td>
<td>Potential partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 of 5 business partners (lg., med., sm.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on analysis of interviews and group reflections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Table 2.7 Conflict Sample Analysis</th>
<th>Representativity in sample/ Role</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th># of groups</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart CN</td>
<td>Architect in charge of the project</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Main sides represented (government/citizen for CN; government/citizen Bicivilizate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart Transport</td>
<td>Engineer in management team</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart Regl Transport</td>
<td>Senior staff transport ministry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart Anti-cycling groups</td>
<td>Arriba e la Chancha/MFC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart Other cycling groups</td>
<td>Macletas, Bicicultura, Ciclocreovia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator (UNDP)</td>
<td>Person in charge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on analysis of interviews and group reflections.

Those interviewed also represented people in different positions within Living City’s circles of participation. Thus, 18% were located in its core (board and staff), with regular face-to-face contact with the organization and close involvement in decision-making and implementation. Moving outward from the core, relationships rely less on regular, intense, face-to-face conversations and increasingly on occasional involvement, in board and other informal and formal
activities (four advisors); in monthly meetings of a specific working group for example (21 allies); in less frequent meetings and therefore more reliance on communications, especially e-newsletters and announcements; occasional involvement (participation in a major annual event, such as the Pio Nono open street or the launching of the Santiago Green Map); or distant (9 people), that is, people who have heard about the Coordinadora/Living City, but had little or no (Zero, 8 people) personal contact beyond receiving the Voz or hearing the radio program.

The semi-structured Interviews included an opportunity for participants to score, using a Likert scale, Living City’s work in its four theme areas (transport for equality, recycling/green economy, heritage and identity, empowerment of citizen organizations); and its main working tools, such as charrettes, participatory mapping, workshops, public events and publications. All interviewees’ scores, which could range from one (very poor) to five (excellent), tended to be high (above 4 out of 5). People who knew Living City tended to like it, a lot, regardless of their positioning in government, private or citizen sectors. The strongest criticisms of Living City came from those closest to the organization and some of those involved in the Bicivilízate conflict (chapters 5 and 6). With regard to the two main conflicts, the anti-highway revolt and the Bicivilízate campaign, Table 2.9 presents the different actors/positions included through interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Representativity in sample</th>
<th>Role CN/CV</th>
<th>Interv. Groups</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Program head</td>
<td>Current partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avina Chile</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Former &amp; current partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avina Latin America</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Non-partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kellogg Foundation Brazil</td>
<td>Program head</td>
<td>Non-partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Development Program</td>
<td>Program head</td>
<td>Former partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashoka</td>
<td>Chile rep.</td>
<td>Former partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundación Innovación en Ciudadanía</td>
<td>Program head</td>
<td>Evaluator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interface for Cycling Expertise</td>
<td>Tom Godefrooij</td>
<td>Former partner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on analysis of interviews and group reflections.
Finally, to provide feedback on the question of the conditions in Chile for civil society development, table 2.10 lists funder-partners interviewed. These represent virtually all the main funders in Chile, except the Ford Foundation. All run much broader programs and dealt with Living City for specific projects, although Avina and Ashoka remain ongoing partners regardless of funding arrangements. I interviewed the former head of the Kellogg Foundation in Brazil, a Synergos network member, because he had theorized and put into practice ideas about civic infrastructure as part of the foundation’s exit strategy. He was the only interviewee who had thought about issues involving civic infrastructure explicitly.

**Complexity of positionality:** As the following chapters illustrate, positionality is also complex because actors are constantly in motion. Thus, “independent” academic researchers who initially watched these phenomena from afar, were drawn into Living City, joining the core (María Elena Ducci, 2007), as the organization recovered from a harsh blow; or partners (Juan de Dios Ortuzar, 2011), when an opportunity to combine citizen and academic know-how about cycling arose in a consultancy. Similarly, transport engineer, Rodrigo Quijada, worked closely as partner (part of the student transport group, Tranvía), and later staff person, before drifting away, but then became president of Living City in 2012, at the same time as he was working for Transantiago, the government’s bus agency. Loreto Rojas participated as a master’s student in Living City’s charrettes (2006), worked part-time on its green map project (2008), drifted away and then joined Living City’s board (2011), partly as a result of her growing fascination after doing the interviews for my PhD (personal communication, debriefing meetings 2010). Thus, for at least some key individuals, Living City’s “orbits” are far from stable, but rather capture people momentarily as they move closer or away from the organization, according to how their own interests and its needs intersect.

**2.2.2.3 Other sources**

**Media coverage** was particularly extensive during the anti-highway revolt, and I have used it to triangulate key information in the narratives that cover this part of the case study. Some academics became interested, in the Coordinadora itself or the highway project, and wrote journal and other articles, so their work has been also been used where possible to triangulate anecdotal, memory- and interview-based data. Rodrigo Quijada wrote a book about the Costanera Norte, focusing on a broader range of factors than the citizen movement that opposed it. That book is available on the Living City website in manuscript format.

**Living City’s archives** were another major source. Given the level of detail, I restricted my use to its annual reports and main publications (La Voz, e-bulletins, Temas Urbanos), available on the Living
City website, particularly its transparency section, supplemented by some key documents, particularly from the Bellavista neighbourhood files. These are in two forms: I converted all electronic material to current word processing formats and stored them on an external hard drive; print and published material remains in boxes, stored in the Living City library.

2.3 Data processing and presentation

2.3.1 Data processing categories

Ethnography offers a series of categories to be examined when studying a cultural system: the individual, the social system, behavioural patterns, idea systems, expressive culture, material culture, physical environments, needs and the characteristics of any shared history (p. 8, Whitehead). In my case, these seemed at once too general and too specific, as they did not account for the spatial aspects of the city-based phenomena under study and the particularities of urban planning systems. I therefore opted for a combination of variables borrowed from Thomson (2001), Grunau and Schönwandt (2010), and Booher and Innes (2010).

Thomson’s empirical study of neighbourhoods in the United States (2001) organizes relevant categories under the headings of internal democracy (“the participatory core”), community relations (“aggressive outreach”), and relations with government (“the policy link”). From a complexity perspective, Grunau and Schönwandt (2010) list relevant components of complexity (in cities), as: the number of variables, their interdependence, internal changes in a system component (or component system), external changes (between a part or component system and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Summary description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>The system comprises large numbers of individual agents connected through multiple networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td>The agents interact dynamically, exchanging information and energy based upon heuristics that organize the interactions locally. Even if specific agents only interact with a few others, the effects propagate through the system. As a result the system has a memory that is not located at a specific place, but is distributed throughout the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonlinearity</td>
<td>Interactions nonlinear, iterative, recursive, and self-referential. Many direct and indirect feedback loops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System behaviour</td>
<td>The system is open, the behaviour of the system is determined by the interactions, not the components, and the behaviour of the system cannot be understood by looking at the components. It can only be understood by looking at the interactions. Coherent and novel patterns of order emerge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness and adaptation</td>
<td>The system displays both the capacity to maintain its viability and the capacity to evolve. With sufficient diversity the heuristics will evolve, the agents will adapt to each other, and the system can reorganize its internal structure without the intervention of outside agents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.10 Categories for Analysis, from Thomson and Complexity Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Application in this case study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomson</td>
<td>participatory core</td>
<td>a specific group of agents that led the anti-highway revolt and the founding of Living City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community outreach</td>
<td>the communications “weave” that enabled both bodies to reach out to their own constituents and agents in other spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relations with government</td>
<td>interactions between agents and resulting systemic or other relevant changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From a national study (US, Thomson 2001): categories to identify what exists and how well it works</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grunau and Schönwandt</td>
<td>emergence and self-generation</td>
<td>Does this help to understand the Coordinadora’s and Living City’s emergence, and through that, how civil society can develop even in hostile, post-dictatorial environments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booher and Innes</td>
<td>agents</td>
<td>specifically in the citizen and public sectors, with some attention to the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interactions</td>
<td>(a) internal, within the core and between the core and their communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) interactions with others (planning system) and environment (city system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>system behaviour</td>
<td>citizen system, city system (including transport, which will sometimes be examined specifically), planning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>robustness and adaptation</td>
<td>relevance to Living City’s survival and evolution and the nature of the changes wrought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Own elaboration, using categories from Booher and Innes (2010), Thomson (2001) and Grunau and Schönwandt (2010).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Booher and Innes offer a summary of the features of complex adaptive systems, offering definitions as these apply to the collaborative planning cases they present (table 2.9). Nonlinearity is a feature of the system(s) apparent in my study, so is treated as contextual, while my data selection and analysis focus on agents, and their interactions -- with each other, the planning and the city systems -- and how these influenced system behaviour. One result of these interactions that interests me is where they produce or hinder robustness and adaption, both key to resilience.

Thus, my analysis of the Coordinadora period focuses on how it emerged, as a new, complex and previously inexistent entity, and how this new player interacted and introduced some changes into

the external context/environment, the hidden nature of some aspects of the process (due to secrecy or uncertainty), time pressure, plurality of goals, novelty, non-determinism, limited function decomposability, distribution of nature and representation, emergence and self-organization (pp. 44-45, Grunau and Schönwandt 2011). While all these variables can be observed interacting in this case study, I find the concepts -- and the distinctions between -- internal and external changes particularly relevant, along with emergence and self-organization.
both city and planning systems. This involves looking at the simpler, “citizen system” of Living City, which functioned within the city and the planning system. Table 2.10 summarizes these elements and how they have been applied to this case study.

2.3.2 Data presentation: documentary narrative, rules/BOIDS

For the sake of both brevity and precision, the data presented in the following chapters is selected from a rich variety of possibilities. It is based on the objective of seeking out any significant, “simple”, rules that may be behind the complex systems examined. As discussed, to make an appropriate selection, I identified the categories and dynamics listed above, and results presented in each chapter and in the final discussion are based on these. As per normal practice, appendices include highlights and give some insight into specific aspects of data collection, analysis and evaluation.

The data presented includes tables summarizing key information, and figures providing photos and images of key documents, to reinforce information reflecting the categories I have developed through the application of complexity to thinking about neighbourhoods and planning. These are woven through this dissertation, using mainly narrative structures and conventions. This is consistent with Uprichard and Byrne’s observations regarding the importance of narrative to complement iconic models based on algorithms, nonlinear equation sets and game rules, which are often the focus of complexity-based studies of city and other complex systems (2006).

As Uprichard and Byrne note, “all stories move through time...” (p. 668, Uprichard and Byrne 2006). Thus, narratives describe not single systems but rather the interweaving of personal and collective truths, myths, confusions and searches for connection and meaning.

Using narrative as central to structuring this data is meaningful, and from both my and Living City’s perspective, this research is largely about finding meaning in what we have done. Uprichard and Byrne argue, and I agree, that narrative helps to represent agency that is multiple, multiscalar, and reflects conscious reflection by diverse participants (p. 666, Uprichard and Byrne 2006). Moreover, through narrative, people’s visions and structuring of events is also manifest in, and either confirmed or undermined by their actions.

Much of the data comes from two longer, documentary narratives prepared as part of data processing and the initial revision. The first describes the communities and context of the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte (101 pp.), while the second provides a more detailed, chronological narrative of Living City as it moved through periods of transition, collapse and
consolidation (172 pp.). These will be available in the Living City website (November 2012), but not the print, version of this dissertation, as they are too long for a normal document of this nature.

Chapters 3-6 are summaries of key aspects from these documentary narratives, with the selection of items designed to reflect key situations, actors, interactions and dynamics, as presented in more detail in Chapter 3. Thus, I used a “telescoping” narrative technique, which provides considerable detail to locate and understand specific situations and methods as first developed and used by Living City, but do not repeat these elements in later examples, focusing instead on new developments.

Thus, in the case of the projects and initiatives described in Chapter 5 (Living City), project descriptions tend to get shorter as the narrative advances. This is not because projects got simpler -- they did not -- but rather because the techniques described for the earlier projects formed the foundation of the later ones. Where new initiatives and techniques developed, such as the cycling roundtable, I have provided more detail, and included appendices detailing specific tools, to give a sense of how Living City's work was evolving.
Chapter 3

Citizen learning through an anti-highway revolt: The Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte (1997-2000)

Introduction

3.1 Context: Exclusion as a way of life
   3.1.1 Historical roots
   3.1.2 Santiago: Segregation and fractured governance

3.2 The Anti-Highway Rebellion: Starting from nothing, taking on the world
   3.2.1 The Project: the Costanera Norte highway concession
   3.2.2 The Communities: Diverse actors in three municipal jurisdictions
   3.2.3 The Campaign: Key features and events
Introduction

Democracies cannot be understood simply as a mechanism or a set of institutions and norms, yet nor can these elements be ignored for it is they which articulate the relationship between citizen and citizen, citizen and state, and citizen and governor. These relationships are not ‘natural’ or ‘fixed’, though; they are a key site of politicization and ideological interpretation, and they are all the more powerful for appearing beyond political contestation” (Taylor 1998, p. 9)

This chapter introduces the context for my case study and describes the first phase in the organization under examination. As discussed in chapter 2, this material is based on a longer (101-page) documentary narrative, selected using the criteria developed in chapter 2, reorganizing the categories (table 3.1, based on table 2.10, chapter 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Analysis of the Coordinadora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Starting system behaviour: national, city and civil society context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agents and interactions: core, community outreach, and relations with government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Emergence and self-generation: emergence of citizenship as agency and an appropriate organizational structure and process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Impacts on system behaviour: effects, intended and unexpected, of the emergence of a self-generated citizen movement with a different way of exercising citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Implications for adaptation within planning and city systems and for resilience and robustness of citizen-led planning initiatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the framework of my general question about the interrelationships between democratization, participation and the emergence of active citizenship, these two chapters focus on issues concerning individuals and citizen learning, and organizations as they capture, accumulate and create collective ability, that is:

**Individual - Citizen learning:** Where do active citizens and effective civil society organizations come from, in post-authoritarian contexts where they have been deliberately destroyed? What role can participation in urban planning play in building the active citizenship skills necessary for more democratically capable citizens? Does this involve single- or double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1974; Healey 2006; Innes and Booher 2010), or can it actually include “learning from the future as it emerges” (Scharmer 2009)?

**Organization - Collective capability:** What kinds of organization enhance or limit this development? Are new kinds of organization, participation and leadership emerging? Can we speak of a need for “civic infrastructure” to facilitate (or limit) civil society development in the urban sphere?
Chapters five and six will look more closely at collective capability as it influences the contextual environment, and particularly policy action. Thus, to explore answers to my questions about where active citizenship and effective civil society organizations come from, particularly in an authoritarian context such as Chile’s, this chapter focuses on starting systems and actors, as they begin to emerge and interact.

Chapter 4 discusses the results and their implications, focusing primarily on issues of emergence and system behaviour. In my approach to extracting and presenting key information from the wealth of data available, I have opted for providing thumbnail sketches of key individuals, most of them leaders of the different communities involved, some specific examples of interactions and dialogues, within a structure based on an orderly chronology of events. This has meant telescoping many incidents into a series of salient moments and synthesizing ongoing phenomena using key examples. Most of the individual processes and events described here, then, should be understood not as single events but rather as representative of the ongoing dynamics of the Coordinadora as it evolved and interacted with an increasingly broad ecology of actors and institutions.

The top-down nature of planning during this period and Portugali’s divide between the planners and the planned (2011) is very apparent in this phase of my case study, as technical staff, primarily engineers, in the national public works ministry (MOP) seek to impose a major highway concession on the city, regardless of the desires of many citizens along its route. Here I explore different aspects of these interactions, characterized mainly by conflict, but also diverse examples of collaboration, as the defence of neighbourhoods forges a new sense of “citizenship”, and a claim, in democracy, of the right, as citizens, to participate, with real power in planning.

As this chapter illustrates, these developments challenged both the prevailing neoliberal notion of citizenship, deliberately fostered by the military dictatorship as an individualized right exercised primarily through the market place, what Oxhorn calls “citizenship as consumption” (1995; 2011), and traditional views of citizenship considered primarily as clientelist negotiation, in which political legitimacy is traded for socio-economic benefits, and it is assumed that an unequal situation will remain unequal (Taylor 2004).

This chapter begins, in section 3.1, by presenting the context (starting system behaviour) for events, examining Chilean history and its constant patterns of exclusion (3.1.1) as they shaped conditions
in 1997 when the highway conflict first emerged, and then examining how these factors presented in metropolitan Santiago (3.1.2), the country’s largest city and the site of my case study.

Section 3.2 describes the Costanera Norte highway project (3.2.1), locating it within both a political and an urban context, before presenting the main features of the communities (3.2.2) that organized to oppose it. It then summarizes events (3.2.3) that catalyzed the emergence of the Coordinadora from the perspective of the communities themselves, the (non-)planning system that they chose to confront, and the unexpected results of their campaigns, including significant changes to the highway project and the emergence of Living City, as citizen-led planning institution. Two appendices summarize arguments in favour (3A) and against (3B) the project.

Chapter 4 discusses the results of the campaign, particularly how smaller local systems interacted with the planning system in general, influencing and being influenced by events within the policy world, as debates and policies regarding “citizen participation” evolved toward the end of the decade. I do not argue a linear cause-and-effect interaction, but rather apply the key dynamics from complexity thinking (chapter 2) to understand these interactions and their role in strengthening the living practice of democracy, despite a highly authoritarian context.

In this case study, I use the term urban sphere to differentiate between the descriptive use “urban” to denote both events that merely occur in cities (“urban social movements”) and those acting on the nature of cities (“urban planning”). By discussing citizen organizations in the “urban sphere”, I am referring to citizens’ efforts to influence how the city is constituted, in terms of transport, land use, heritage and other configurations. As this case study unfolds, we will also consider the multiscalar nature of urban governance in Santiago, as it becomes evident that planning functions and power are scattered across different levels of government, many of them invisible to citizens.

3.1 Context: Exclusion as a way of life

This first phase of my case study focuses on my questions about where active citizens and effective civil society organizations come from, in post-authoritarian conditions, what kind of learning is involved, and how even hostile interactions in an unfriendly context may produce significant shifts in citizen and public sector actors. It also begins to explore the kinds of organization that may enhance or limit these developments.

At the heart of this experience lie issues of participation and citizenship, urban planning, and the kind of civil society that can make citizen involvement meaningful, in terms of content, and
significant, in terms of power to influence. These are far from unproblematic concepts, as debates in political science, sociology, adult education and planning clearly indicate. For this examination of the city, then, I have carefully selected relevant aspects of each concept, to discuss, analyze and reach some conclusions about the people, events and systems discussed.

This chapter, then, explores those aspects of citizenship most relevant to creating Avritzer’s participatory publics, that is citizens as they struggle to influence power, in this case, in the urban sphere. I am not looking at civil society as a general sociological or political construct, but rather specifically as it manifests when organized citizenship involving specific individuals, but above all communities, join together to confront (and wield) power, they hope more effectively, in the urban sphere. Moreover, I am exploring how social movements, usually conceptualized from a macro sociological perspective (women, anti-globalization, etc.) emerge in micro (neighbourhoods) and meso (metropolitan governance and interactions) spaces of the city.

These two chapters explore citizenship as it emerges through a social movement (the anti-highway rebellion led by the Coordinadora), then converges into a citizen-led planning institution (Living City), and what this reveals about how democratic cultures are forged. Thus, I am exploring the connections rather than the distinctions between social movements and citizen institutions, two phenomena that are often examined separately, or even treated as opposites. Indeed, based on this experience, I see citizen action as shifting between a movement phase and an institution phase, in response to shifting oppressions and opportunities. Mobilization is required to open doors, but once citizens achieve a place at the planning table, they require research, argumental and implementational capacities better “stored” and “cultivated” in a citizen institution. Based on the experiences presented here, I argue that it is the ability to handle both movement and institutional phases, that is, the dynamic generated by the interactions between the two, that defines the robustness of ideas and the resilience of action necessary to act over the lengthy horizons required to significantly challenge and change urban planning paradigms.

The context for this case study is deeply influenced by a paradox that Chile shares with the rest of Latin America: political democracy is more firmly entrenched than ever, but “other rights are precarious at best, and declining at worst” (Oxhorn 2011). This reflects “the culmination of historical processes dating back at least to the 1920s, with the great Depression and the emergence of the developmentalist state” (p. 5, Oxhorn 2011). To understand the people and events described here, then, it is important to understand some of their history.
3.1.1 Historical roots

Chile today stretches down the western edge of South America, squeezed between one of the world’s highest mountain ranges, the Andes, to the east, and its largest body of water, the Pacific Ocean, to the west. Officially “conquered” by the Spanish in 1540, the territory that would become Chile saw ongoing rebellions by the Mapuche, the largest indigenous group, who successfully defended a border at the Bio Bio River for 300 years (Bengoa 1985), before succumbing, after a fiercely fought rebellion, in the 1880s. Earlier, in 1843, the Chilean-born Spanish autocracy (criollos) sent a battleship racing southward to claim Patagonia, and its oil reserves. Then, backed by the British anxious to exploit the nitrate-rich Atacama, Chile’s newly formed army hurried northward, winning the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) against Bolivia and Peru, cobbling together Chile as nation-state and securing the mineral wealth (first nitrates and later copper, silver and gold) that created the country’s first proletariat and fueled economic growth to this day (Blakemore 1974).

Thus, Chile is also surrounded by past or potential “enemies”: Peru, Bolivia and Argentina. Within its borders, approximately 1 million indigenous people struggle for survival and political rights, and the country’s primarily mestizo population sees itself as mostly “European”, in contrast to the “Indios” of Peru and Ecuador. Moreover, most immigration comes from these neighbouring countries, as their economies boom or bust. Chilean identity is fractured and distorted by discrimination on the basis of race, origin and above all, income and education, embodied in “popular” sectors, often known as pobladores. Both middle-class and popular communities played a crucial role in the formation of the Coordinadora, so “lo popular” is an important concept.

Throughout history Chile experienced fierce conflicts between a powerful elite, of relatively “pure” European (mostly Spanish, and from the 1880s on, French, German, Swiss and British) immigrants, and the masses of common people, of mixed (indigenous-Spanish origin). Loveman (1988) describes the longstanding exploitation of people in the popular classes when he writes:

Harsh exploitation of the labour force in mines, farms, and industry has been the most persistent characteristic of Chilean society since the arrival of European conquerors in the sixteenth century. Despite the recurrent efforts by progressive Church officials or government reformers to improve the lot, first of Chile’s indigenous population and, then, of the ethnically mixed working classes, the Chilean economy continued to rely upon forced labor, agricultural service tenants, and then a highly mobile but miserable wage proletariat. From the first years of conquest and into the 1980s Chilean society and culture reflected the tensions between attempts to better the living and working conditions of the majority of the Chilean people and the realities of an economic and political order resting upon the foundation of conquest, subjugation, and coercion of labor (p. 3, Loveman 1988).
In the early 1960s, these battles became particularly acute and, as reformist Christian Democrats competed with socialists and communists, even the Roman Catholic Church declared a “revolution in liberty” to maintain grassroots support. In 1970, a leftwing coalition, led by Dr. Salvador Allende, won elections, promising to nationalize copper and reform land ownership. This government, and Chile’s democracy, ended in a military coup in September 1973.

Coupstore through most of Latin America in this period. Chile’s was different, though, both because it had had a more established democracy, and because the regime, headed by Augusto Pinochet, and its elite allies, deeply altered power relations and restructured society, building a solid, complex foundation of power sustaining the authoritarian regime, which enjoyed the support of the armed forces, business interests, and right-wing parties, and which had intended to remain in power until 1997, as established by the 1980 constitution. A plan for succession had been carefully designed that involved the ratification of General Pinochet in a plebiscite...

This plan was thwarted not by a coup or by a military defeat, but rather through an electoral reverse in the 1988 plebiscite” (pp. xxii-xxiii, (Huneeus 2007).

To consolidate this model, the military regime and its allies persecuted “perceived enemies” (p. 5, Keech 2004), effectively silencing criticism.

While all Latin American economies saw their GDP shrink by a few points in the early 1980s, Chile’s plunged by -14.2% (figure 3.2), by far the worst in Latin America (pp. 108-110, (Délano and Traslaviña 1989; Navia 2010). This reflected the regime’s experimentation with neoliberalism.

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11 Keech (2004) notes that “Chilean democratic traditions command respect in their own right, as well as in comparison to other Latin American countries. Outside the North Atlantic nations, Australia and New Zealand, Chile was the only country in the world ‘to have consistently selected its political leaders by competitive elections throughout the 1932-1973 period’” (Remmer 1984, 210, quoted on p. 2, Keech 2004). Moreover, despite a literacy requirement, “the electorate grew steadily from 9.0 percent of the population registered to vote in 1932 (with 80 percent actually voting) to 37.0 percent of the population registered in 1970 (with 83 percent of that actually voting)” (p. 10, Keech 2004). Chile was also unique in that it had “the broadest spectrum of parties in Latin America in this period” (Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994, quoted p. 11, Keech 2004).
As Pinochet's power waned, in the early months of 1990 he signed hundreds of laws, redistributing Santiago's municipal boundaries and stacking the supreme court with his most fervent supporters, a measure designed to prevent human rights trials, but which also created an extremely conservative body, hostile to citizen initiatives. With the regime’s end (11 March 1990), people expected the country to return to some degree of normalcy, but what “normalcy” could be, was far from clear. The elected government did not want to challenge the military (through corruption or human rights trials) or the powerful elite it created. Although the many authoritarian traps built into this new “democracy” left Chileans dissatisfied (Garretón Merino 1994; Oxhorn 1995; Posner 1999; Garreton Merino 2003; Posner 2004; Posner 2008; Garretón Merino 2009), the changes made a difference. As the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) notes, living conditions improved and by 1995, Chile rose eight spots in the [human development] ranking of its per capita GDP, evidencing that the country’s economic growth has slowly translated into benefits for its population over the past few decades (UNDP/PNUD 1998).

National poverty dropped steadily, from 33% in 1990 at the end of the regime, to 14.7% in 1996, when this case study begins, and 10.6% in 2010 (Casen 2006). Navia (2010) argues that despite limitations, the new democracy also significantly improved policies and institutions. Inequality, however, remained acute.

In Chile, the wealthiest 10% of the population makes three times more than the poorest 40%. This is well behind progress other Latin American countries have made, such as Argentina and Mexico, where the ratio is 2.1:1, Costa Rica (1.6:1) or Uruguay (1.2:1) (ECLAC:1995, cited in summary, UNDP/PNUD 1998).

| Table 3.2 Chilean and German Elites: Father’s socio-economic level (percent) |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Low                             | Medium | High |
| Chilean elite                  | 4     | 31 | 65 |
| German elite                   | 35    | 30 | 35 |


Indeed, Chile became one of the world’s most unequal countries, by both developed (OECD) and developing standards (UNDP 2010, World Bank, 2004, p. 2, cited on p. 124, (Sabatini, Wormald et al. 2009). Society was also failing women, with Chile falling 15 spots to 40th spot on the world scale and 13th in Latin America (summary, UNDP 1998).
These trends reflect discrimination and limited democratization, as evidenced in rule by a closed, authoritarian elite. Fourteen years into democratic rule, the UNDP used father's socio-economic level to compare Germany’s elite, composed of a relatively even percentage of people from low-(35%), medium- (30%) and high-(35%) income families with Chile’s (table 3.2). In Chile, just 4% of the elite come from low-income backgrounds (about 55% of the population), while 31% come from middle-income backgrounds (38% of the population). High-income households (7.2% of Chilean households) constitute 65% of the Chilean elite (PNUD 2004). This exclusion has implications for socio-economic wellbeing and rights.

Moreover, reinforced by an ideological discourse that treats inequalities as “natural”, functional to a patron-based clientelism, or the result of competition based on merit (Taylor 1998), inequalities and discrimination interact. Throughout Latin America, people consider equal treatment the most important factor in securing citizens’ trust, but they perceive high discrimination, mainly against the poor (39%), those with less education (15%), or fewer connections (11%), due to age or skin colour (both 5%), or being a woman (4%). Just 5% believe people are treated equally (p. 36, (Latinobarometro 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Characteristics analyzed</th>
<th>Wage gap due to characteristic examined (%)</th>
<th>Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Socio-economic origin</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Núñez and Gutiérrez (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Hispanic/White, non Hispanic</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Reimers (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Mexican/White, non Hispanic</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>Reimers (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>White immigrants/non-white immigrants</td>
<td>10 to 17</td>
<td>Steward (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>White men/Afro-american men</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Howland and Sakeliariou (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Elias and Purcell (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>White women/AfroAmerican women</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Howland and Sakeliariou (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Physical appearance</td>
<td>5 to 10</td>
<td>Hammermesh and Biddle (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>White women/AfroAmerican women</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Borjas (1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 29, p. 182, UNDP 2004.

In Chile, researchers have identified this discrimination, by examining the wage gap between...
different kinds of workers, all other factors being equal. Discrimination is most intense (the gap is largest) on the basis of socio-economic origin (table 3.3). That is, a university-trained professional from the popular class faces a 35% wage gap, based on socio-economic origin. This was the highest for the different countries studied, followed by wage gaps reflecting discrimination in the US: of 28% between Hispanic and white non-hispanic workers, and 17% between Afro-American and white men (UNDP/PNUD 2004). These historical forces of exclusion and discrimination have also produced two phenomena of relevance to this study, a popular majority of the population, and a profound mistrust and devaluation of civil society.

**Lo popular**

In Latin America, the popular refers to disadvantaged groups in extremely unequal societies, with limited life chances and consumption possibilities (p. 299, Oxhorn 1995). This reflects the reality of social discrimination and territorial segregation, the widespread poverty of both the unemployed and the working poor, and families’ consequent dependence on precarious employment and income from recycling and other informal sector activities.

The pobladores and their organizations constitute the most studied expression of the popular class, particularly when discussing the city. The term is usually translated as squatters or shantytown dwellers, but a literal translation would be: those who populate. In Spanish it recalls the massive land occupations that were popular Chileans’ response when the rural to urban migrations of the 1950s left them homeless, hungry and hopeless in the periphery of the main cities (hence the common translation, “squatters”) and the low-income but comfortable communities that grew wherever those movements succeeded (“shantytown dwellers”).

It is true that these groups are, as they are usually portrayed in studies, poor, vulnerable and marginalized. But complexity invites us to be aware of paradoxes, which allow us to entertain both an idea and its opposite. Thus, it is important to realize that both physically and socially, most of Santiago today is the result of these successful urban movements of the past. Moreover, Chile’s successful movement for redemocratization received powerful support from the pobladores and their organizations, as documented in Oxhorn’s detailed study (1995).

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12 Moreover, lest this sounds like singing sadly of past glories, let me emphasize that these “old” movements continue to act in new ways and forms in the city today. Far from dead and gone, they have transformed and kept up with the many, difficult and sometimes brutal challenges of the present.
I will explore these themes further in my discussion of the Coordinadora, because the market vendors and some of the residential communities involved in the anti-highway campaign came from this majority segment of the population and exercised a significant influence on its development. Moreover, the **popular** includes a significant cultural dimension, expressed in intertwined traditions of oral history, folk music and poetry, and food, which also played a role in the Coordinadora. Finally, although not often recognized, much of Chile’s “middle class” consists of the daughters and sons of the **popular** classes, who have obtained greater access to education (teachers, nurses, daycare workers, etc.), money (some market people and “small” shop owners have achieved significant income, including wealth), and even power (mostly through well established clientelist relations). Moreover, many of Chile’s more urbanized, middle-class professionals experience similar precariousness (which may bring significant impoverishment due to a lack of safety nets). Thus, boundaries blur, and these shifting, permeable borders among social groups that Chileans usually think of as radically separate and different, also played a role in both internal dynamics and how outsiders understood the **Coordinadora**.

**Civil society as marginalized and mistrusted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.4 The National Civic League’s Civic Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation—making it a “contact sport.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leadership -- has to come from everywhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance—professional, entrepreneurial, and open. Volunteerism and philanthropy—increasing the leverage of your local “points of light.” Intergroup relations—strength through diversity. Civic education—the community as classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community information sharing—it takes more than watching the evening news.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for cooperation and consensus building—turning potential conflict into positive action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community vision and pride—you can’t build a future without a common vision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercommunity cooperation—whom are we really competing with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong>: This list is from the article by the League’s former president, John Parr, first published in 1993 and republished in 2008 (Parr 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A “civic index” developed by the National Civic League in the United States (table 3.4) looks primarily at community (citizen) capacity, although it mentions government performance and some skills ("capacity for cooperation and consensus-building"), presumably required for both government and citizen sectors. This reflects a democratic context, which is taken for granted, and
which tends to afford important supports to citizen initiatives, although, as discussions of exclusion indicate, these are often lacking when it comes to particularly excluded groups.

In the case of Chile, a recently democratizing and developing country, the context is very different. Citizen initiatives must struggle to organize, achieve legal status (where this is useful), find funding and develop spaces for effective interaction with public and private spheres, in a fragmented governance environment that is largely opaque, rather than transparent, and excluding, rather than open. Bernardo Toro, the main architect of Avina’s strategy toward civil society building, emphasizes that mistrust of citizens and their initiatives is deeply embedded in Latin American attitudes. He contrasts these with Anglo Saxon narratives of hardy citizens who organize to take on problems, thereby complementing or even replacing the State.

Families went to North America to start a project... They had to invent their institutions, so it was society itself that invented institutions, according to their daily needs and their perceptions of the world in which they were involved. But Latin America was conquered. Society had no opportunity to build its own institutions, so Latin America gets used to, or acquires the habit of not building its own institutions, and considers the [citizen] institutions that get built second class.

Similarly, Gonzalo de la Maza, professor at the University de los Lagos and one of the foremost experts on citizen participation in Chile, emphasizes that each society builds civil society in its own way. Chilean society begins with the conquest and the exclusion of its original peoples, which remains unresolved to this day,

This is a political order that allows some progress in society but cannot resolve the fundamental problem, of that fracture in society that makes it excluding. People can express themselves but they cannot effectively change their conditions, because the problem of these countries, not just Chile, is that when you talk about civil society development, it is not just a case of developing a plurality of actors: you have to break through that exclusion and generate a field in which everyone can organize (De la Maza 2010).

To a significant degree, the segment of civil society defined here as “active citizens” is the modern expression of a political, but non-partisan, component within the non-profit sector. For Chile, as the previous comments suggest, its status today reflects a history of conquest and exclusion, that created a philanthropy from above, based on the generosity of the monied elite and the charity of the Roman Catholic church, born with the republic of Chile in the 1800s. From this basis, and as a working class developed in the nitrate fields, civil society expanded to include a multitude of self-help organizations (mutuals, cooperatives, etc.) and political organizations, particularly the left political parties, who battled for rights and recognition from the late 1800s through the 20th century, until the 1973 military coup. Then, civic initiatives abruptly found themselves stigmatized,
persecuted, controlled or worse. Again, the Roman Catholic church became the chief dispenser of assistance, although now with considerable involvement from small, professional NGOs, usually with funding from abroad, and large grassroots organizations, many focusing on survival needs, such as *arpilleras* (embroidered canvasses), soup kitchens and other activities. These were joined by human rights initiatives, led directly by the relatives of victims (the disappeared, the murdered, the shot, the exiled, the tortured), or political party representatives (Oxhorn 1995; Sagaris 1996; Irarrázaval, Azócar et al. c. 2006).

Although Chilean society “has a tradition of self-organization, ... what happens is that this is not expressed in a new order, it is not absorbed into the Republican order” (De la Maza 2010). Thus, as they carry out their specific mandates, civil society organizations also struggle to move from a marginal position into a more central, more generally respected position in society overall. How society at large perceives and interacts with civil society significantly influences the range of roles and actions available and thus, the kinds of “participatory publics” generated, and available to society at large. Where society, and particularly the dominant elites, are excluding and denying, citizens find that action requires conflict, campaigning and considerably higher risks: in response to non-planning and planning, they must denounce and resist, that is assume primarily anti-planning stances. Where civil society is an accepted partner, societies can access more of the new perspectives and skills it can offer, improving policy, decisions, projects and practices.

These circumstances undermine Tilly’s networks of trust, so important to democratization. Depending on the year, asked about other people’s intentions, 85-90% of Chileans say “you can’t be careful enough”, with just 10-15% believing “you can trust most people” (CERC 2004). In countries with longer democracies trust is high. In Denmark and Sweden, over 66% believe most people can be trusted, for example (van Schaik 2002).

As the discussion of Tilly’s work (chapter 1) explored, categorical inequality (discrimination on the basis of sex, race, socio-economic or other features) and trust are two of the three factors crucial to democratization (Tilly 2007). Thus, in post-dictatorial Chile, where exclusion and discrimination lined up closely with social class and mistrust was high, democracy remained weak on two of three key counts.

3.1.2 Santiago: Segregation, fractured governance, and service-oriented civil society

Discrimination and inequality also played out spatially in Santiago, the capital of Chile. With a population of 6 million, Santiago remains home to most government functions and 40% of the
population and, although mining, forestry and other major economic activities occur mainly in regions, the city accounts for over 40% of GDP (CentralBank 2003-2006).

Restructuring saw city governance fractured among numerous comunas (52 municipal territories in the Metropolitan Santiago Region, 2011), each with its own mayor and council, elected by list. Thus, candidates with the most votes can sweep their list partners in with them, even when the latter have very few votes, far less than candidates from other lists. To put it simply, under this system, those with more votes often lose. Indeed, in municipal elections, “on average, 43% of members elected in metropolitan Santiago in 1996 received a lower percentage of the vote than the highest vote getters among losing candidates” (Posner 1999). A classic example affected Ricardo Lagos, a popular socialist party leader and protagonist of this case study, when he ran for the Senate in 1989. His list partner, Christian Democrat Andrés Zaldívar, won with 29.8% of the vote, while Lagos received 29.2%, and the pro-military candidate received 16.4%. Despite their combined 58.9%, Lagos lost, while the right’s candidate, with 30.9% of the total list vote, joined the senate (p. 71, Taylor 1998).

Santiago’s regional government, meanwhile, consists of an appointed Intendente, with very limited powers. Most planning functions are located in central ministries or in their regional offices. Thus, the national Ministry of Housing and Urbanism has a metropolitan regional secretariat, or office, which plays an active role in developing planning legislation, for congress, and applying planning decisions and general policies on housing, road design and standards, participatory projects in poor neighbourhoods, and so on. Similarly, the national Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications has a regional secretariat, which among other functions reviews and approves transport plans for new developments. There is little cooperation, and sometimes bitter competition, among these regional offices, which undermines the potential for coordinated planning approaches. The highway project contested during the Coordinadora phase of this study was coordinated by a specially created, elite unit within the national Ministry of Public Works. During the Living City phase of this study, the regional government began efforts to coordinate activities by these different instances, and its environmental office played an important role in the cycling-inclusive planning initiative. Santiago’s first cycle ways were built on sidewalks, not because these were technically better, but rather, because municipal governments, which pioneered this innovation, have no power over roads (chapters 5 and 6).

Since Chile’s founding constitution (1833), “local government has acted largely as an agent of central government” (p. 31, Nickson 1995). Under the military, decentralization boosted local

The military's resettlement policies reinforced the spatial expression of exclusion (figure 3.3), creating socially homogeneous municipalities and growing disparities in per capita expenditure by municipalities (Portes, p. 133, Nickson 1995). Newly arrived in Chile in 1981, I watched caravans of flatbed trucks moving shacks and possessions of people from informal settlements in La Florida, Las Condes and elsewhere to the outskirts. In the 1990s, inequality and exclusion consolidated, especially in labor markets and the political arena... Even though residential segregation is declining in Santiago, its social effects have become more severe among the poor compared to the period prior to the economic reform at the end of the 1970s (p. 122, Sabatini et al. 2009).

This spatial inequality was reinforced by unequal access to the “power structures in the economic, political and social functioning of the country”. As one business leader graphically described it, “Chile will not change if the elites don’t stop sucking the teat, and I don’t think the economic and political elites will decide to let it go” (Lamarca 2005, quoted on p. 125, Sabatini et al. 2009).

In terms of civil society, interest grew throughout the 1990s (figure 3.4). However, using Najam's groupings of civil society by function, as monitors, advocates, innovators or service providers (chapter 1), we see the category of “service providers” is overwhelming in its size and importance. This reflects the top-down, charitable approach inherent in its religious roots. Officially, Chile’s

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In 1983, this policy generated two major land occupations in what is now the La Pintana municipal district, on the southern outskirts of Santiago. One, the Silva Enríquez, involved 15,000 people, while the Fresno, involved another 5,000.
nonprofit sector is one of Latin America’s largest, accounting for US$1.4 billion in expenditure (1.5% of GDP), and employing 303,000 people (160,259 remunerated full-time equivalent jobs, 143,624 FTE volunteers), equivalent to 2.6% of the economically active population, that is more than three times the mining sector and two-thirds of the construction sector.

Almost half (47%) of work is done by volunteers, with the government contributing 46% of income, double the average (23%) for developing countries and approaching levels in by Europe’s welfare state economies (55%). Private philanthropy plays a minor role (18%), compared to self-generated income (36%). Private philanthropy, moreover, tends to be practiced directly, rather than through arms-length foundations, significantly reinforcing the potential for co-optation and variants of clientelism (Irarrázaval, Azócar et al. 2006).

These seemingly positive figures reflect government subsidies to and the privatization of primary, secondary and university education, which accounts for 70% of remunerated jobs and 57% of...
total income for the “non-profit”\textsuperscript{14} sector. Moreover, established nonprofits, particularly foundations and corporations, concentrate both resources (60\%) and paid staff (71\%), while community and rights-based organizations function mainly with volunteers (48\%), despite the fact that they account for 53\% of nonprofit organizations (Estevez 2012; Irarrázaval, Azócar et al. c. 2006).

These last are the organizations most significant to the practice of active citizenship, democratization and the building of a more egalitarian, democratic culture. During the military regime, their efforts focused primarily on defending human rights and providing social welfare programs in impoverished urban neighbourhoods, with some efforts by funders to address health issues (often related to human rights violations) and women’s needs (inspired by the UN’s International Year of the Woman (1975). Several environmental organizations also formed during the final years of the military regime and, in the early years of the transition, major conflicts erupted over plans to clearcut native forests on Tierra del Fuego (Trillium conflict), to dump pulp mill sewage in fishing bays (Mehuín), and to build a natural gas pipeline through the Cajón del Maipo. These conflicts influenced the anti-highway coalition, which became the first major urban movement against a particular project.

In the urban sphere, although neighbourhood associations, \textit{juntas de vecinos}, had enjoyed legal existence since the late 1960s, their development was uneven and constantly undermined by their.

\textsuperscript{14} These so-called non-profits often include major profit-generating components, which take advantage of legal loopholes to function as non-profits. The San Sebastian University project (Bellavista) involves a real estate “arm”, which plans to build and sell apartments in three 20-story towers, and will also make substantial long-term profits, by renting the facility to the university. This is one reason why the massive student movement of 2011-2012 made “No to profits” (¡No al lucro!) its central demand.
marginalization from policy and planning systems in general, and lack of even the most basic resources, particularly where membership enjoyed very low income, the reality in all but three or four of Santiago’s comunas.

Thus, in the 1990s, a fragmented and largely untransparent governance system ruled the segregated city, with few, if any, civil society instances capable of responding effectively. The highway project that catalyzed the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte was the flagship initiative of a national ministry, the powerful Ministry of Public Works, led by former senatorial candidate, Ricardo Lagos, on his way to the presidency. When citizens clamoured for more information about the project, they often found themselves rubbing shoulders with municipal staff doing the same.

This was the reality that a ragtag bunch of artists, market vendors, writers and small business people chose to challenge, in 1997-2000, when the country’s new democratic government decided to run a major highway, the country’s first urban concession, through the middle of Santiago, to connect wealthy new suburbs on the eastern edge of the city to the downtown, the airport and the ports on the country’s western coast.

### 3.2 Rebellion

#### 3.2.1 The project: the Costanera Norte highway concession

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<td>Vitacura</td>
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<td>79,914</td>
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<td>Las Condes</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>228,030</td>
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<td>Providencia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>728</td>
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<td>Lo Barnechea</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>667</td>
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<td><strong>Middle income</strong></td>
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<td>Santiago</td>
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<td>461</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>214,563</td>
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<td><strong>Low-income, high-poverty areas</strong></td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70,986</td>
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<td>Independencia</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>110,071</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quinta Normal</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>156,671</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recoleta</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>169,684</td>
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<td>Pudahuel</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>243</td>
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In the 1990s, Santiago was a metropolitan region with 5.4 million inhabitants, a reasonable density of 70 people/hectare, and 16.5 million trips daily. In 1991, the modal split was just 16% for private cars, versus 54% for public transport, 22% walking, 2% cycling, and 2% other. Ten

Figure 3.5. The Costanera Norte Highway Project in its geographic context (top), the communities that formed the Coordinadora, and the socio-economic distribution of the city. The pink rectangle is the airport, while the blue is the ENEA real estate development. The red line indicates areas through which the highway was initially supposed to pass, while the green line reflects the route that actually entered the environmental assessment process. Source: Quijada 2009. Below: The territorial jurisdictions of the comunas and socio-economic information. The green patch indicates the four main territories involved in the anti-highway revolt led by the Coordinadora, Pedro de Valdivia Norte, Bellavista, Vega-Recoleta, Independencia. The highest income (ABC1) is the darkest blue, shading lighter as income drops.
years later, this was changing, as cars rose to 22.2%, public transport fell to 33.4%, walking and cycling accounted for 40%, and other modes 4% (SECTRA 2012).

Based on the assumption that Chile was suffering from an “infrastructure deficit” and that more cars required more roads, the public works ministry set up an elite concessions unit to invite private construction and infrastructure management firms to create a highway network within the city. In the early 1990s, it announced its emblematic first project, the Costanera Norte, a 29-kilometer highway, three lanes wide in each direction, with design speeds of 80-100 km/hr, and an initial price tag of US$120 million. The highway was to cut a grin-like swath across the city, running from the wealthy neighbourhoods in the foothills of the Andes to the east, through the city centre where many worked, and on to the airport and the coast, where Chile’s main ports and seaside resorts are located (Quijada 2003).

Figure 3.5, top map, shows two different versions of the highway project (red line: initial route; green line: route debated during the environmental assessment process) in the context of the metropolitan region as a whole, while the larger map shows the communities that led the opposition (green shape), in a context of socio-economic distribution\(^{15}\) throughout the city (large

\(^{15}\) This is determined using a measure that combines education and ownership of consumer items, ranging from a shower, through colour television, car, internet, and so on, as proxies for income. Adimark 2010.
Figure 3.6. Map Locating the Communities that led the anti-highway rebellion, through the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte coalition. The yellow line throughout marks both the Mapocho River and the highway project as built, underneath the river, as a result of the communities’ battle for survival. The red lines show where the highway goes under the river and therefore has no visible or physical impact on the surrounding communities. To the east and to the west of the red line, the highway runs on the surface, separating and segregating the city and requiring extensive expropriations. The labels marked in yellow are the main community-territories involved, while those in grey indicate other city jurisdictions, including those of Recoleta and Providencia, which became major partners, discussed in the next chapter. Source: Basemap from Google Maps ©2012, with additional labels by author.

map). Wealthy communities on the western edge (ABC1, dark blue) have high car ownership, whereas the low-income communities where most of the highway is located, depend on public transport, walking and cycling. From the start, a large part of the city was in effect being asked to sacrifice wellbeing (homes, heritage, clean air, green space, etc.) for a major transport project that would not meet their needs, and indeed threatened to isolate them further (Tirachini 2011).

Thus, as table 3.5 indicates, the highway stood to benefit a small proportion of the population, living in new real estate developments in distant suburbs, with the highest car-use rate, while distributing externalities such as air pollution, congestion (at entries and exits), parking and others
across the city, particularly amongst vulnerable populations with the most need for improved transport and access to the city’s benefits.

3.2.2 The communities: Diverse actors in three municipal jurisdictions

Of the ten comunas affected, communities in three led the anti-highway debate and are the focus of this study (figure 3.6). These involved the residents of low-income, heritage housing in Independencia; the market and street vendors, residents and artists of the area around the Vega Central and in Bellavista Recoleta; the residents, artists and intellectuals of Bellavista Providencia; and the high-income professionals and business people of Pedro de Valdivia Norte, also in Providencia.

Each territory had its own history, identity and relationship to the city and Chilean society overall, but all shared a privileged location, near the heart of the city, on the “wrong” side of the Mapocho river, just across from the official downtown, where a small and privileged elite had ruled the stock market, the country, and society since the late 1880s. Being on the wrong side of the river meant facing discrimination, but also ensured an enormous degree of freedom, which played out in the diverse mercados populares, popular markets of the Vega Central (Recoleta) and the artistic and intellectual tradition of Bellavista, which together formed the heart of an older district, known as “La Chimba”. For centuries houses of ill repute, monasteries and nunneries, vineyards and social housing, hospitals and cemeteries rubbed shoulders in La Chimba, giving it a reputation at once negative and enviable, making it both contemptible and a powerful magnet in uptight Chilean society, hedged in by powerful conventions and a strong conservatism. Even the newer, wealthier Pedro de Valdivia Norte neighbourhood differed substantially from its more conservative cousins in the new suburbs of Vitacura, Las Condes and Lo Barnechea, living behind bars and guards in the new gated communities. In Pedro de Valdivia Norte, neighbours were accustomed to receiving visitors from all over the city, who thronged to the San Cristobal Hill, which marked the neighbourhoods’ northern limit, and the students who attended the Catholic University’s Faculty of Architecture, located in a heritage complex in its midst.
3.2.2 Communities:

Independencia

Starting from left to right, west to east (figure 3.7), the communities that led the anti-highway rebellion extend along the north shore of the Mapocho River. The two Independencia neighbourhoods consisted mainly of low-income families (popular and middle-class), often very elderly although some with children. In Independencia-Borgoño they rented, owned or lived as allegados (usually extended family members camped out in a room or outbuilding, with no official status). Ninety families lived in this complex, around 60 of them renters. Thirty households had lived there for over a decade and several descended from the original owners, who had proudly taken possession almost a century earlier. Homes had survived major earthquakes in the 1960s and 1980s. Their main leaders were Luis Olivares (homeowners), and Alfredo Basaure (renters). Most had grown up in the neighbourhood with easy access to some of the city’s best public schools, its cheap markets, cultural life and easy access to the main employment areas.

In the smaller community of Independencia-Olivos, families rented. They were led primarily by Alicia Cid (figure 3.7) and her brother, César Cid, with Alicia playing a leading role in the...
Coordinadora. Thirty households lined the unpretentious passageway, behind the Vega Central with its cheap nutritious food and major transport connections. Most had lived in these homes more than 60 years and had applied to the then Municipality of Santiago to purchase them, under social housing programs. For eight years, on the promise that they were in effect buying their homes, they had paid property taxes, but when the military created the new municipality of Independencia, their claims got lost and they remained renters.

Altogether, 140 people, 112 adults and 28 children lived in homes in an area that wasn’t in the pathway of the highway project (Araya and Sagaris 1997). The lots were, however, under consideration to relocate the municipal building, which would be torn down for the highway. Leaders of the Coordinadora were witness to an appalling campaign, as municipal staff bullied to make families leave.
Main claim: These communities protested the Costanera Norte as an example of “injustice” (p. 52, Araya and Sagaris 1997), noting their existence was not even mentioned in the Environmental Impact Assessment, despite the expropriations of owners.

Recoleta: The Area Surrounding the Vega Central

Next came the many organizations in the bustling markets surrounding the Vega Central, Santiago’s largest market, both terminal receiving and re-selling fruit, vegetables and other products from rural areas servicing Santiago, and retailer, through multiple small markets, with different specializations. Of these, the main organization of the Vega Central used a tried and true approach based on Taylor’s clientship. Thus, their position shifted constantly throughout the conflict, as they mobilized to negotiate their own security, then settled into silence when they thought they were safe, only to mobilize again when conditions shifted. Often they supported the Coordinadora. Street sellers and some of the smaller markets also participated for a time, but eventually were moved by the municipality.

Figure 3.9. Nury Gatica, of the Pérgola Santa María, in front of her stand, c. 2000. Nury was a third-generation pergolera; her grandmother participated in the legendary battle of the pergoleras for the right to sell on the street that inspired Chile’s first major play, a musical by Isadora Aguirre that remains one of the country’s landmark cultural productions.

Figure 3.10. Serving up a fresh lunch in the Vega Chica, 2003.
Although this neighbourhood, the essence of the popular, is poor and often strewn with garbage, black with diesel from trucks using its main patio and bumping along its narrow, hole-filled streets, the Veguinos themselves are diverse, in ethnic and socio-economic terms. Some are wealthy and live in the high-income municipalities. Most are comfortably off, despite their lack of education. Most ensure that their children complete highschool and many complete post-secondary education, including post-graduate studies, evidence of their extraordinary talent, given the obstacles they face. Like Bellavista, the Vega is central to the city’s imaginary, a place that is constantly painted, filmed, photographed and celebrated by tourists, artists and ordinary people. As a saying goes, Después de dios está la Vega (after God comes the Vega): as the poor are driven from one neighbourhood to another, they find refuge and a chance to start again in the Vega.

Mauricio Palma, of the wholesalers, Arturo Guerra, of the Chacareros (fresh vegetables), and Rafael Lawner participated at times with the Coordinadora and Living City. They were not permanent members, but appeared in response to specific threats. Applying a similar strategy of clientship, two main leaders of the Patronato Chamber of Commerce, Carlos Abusleme and William Banduc, preferred to negotiate their own path through the conflict, although their positions often coincided, and at some points they explicitly supported Coordinadora positions.

The main organizations from this sector, which became leaders within the Coordinadora, were the flower vendors organized in the Pergola Santa María (60 stalls, some 500 people affected), led primarily by Nury Gatica (figure 3.8); the eateries and other retailers in the Vega Chica (figure 3.10, 120 stalls, some 2,000 dependents), led by Sonia Abarca (who became the first president of Living City); the fruit, vegetable, cheese and other small kiosk operators of the Tirso de Molina (408 stalls, supporting some 4,000 family members), led by Jorge Cannobbio (figure 3.9) and Domingo Pérez; and the small shopkeepers organized in an association, Acofer, represented by Inés Fernández, who lived in Bellavista Recoleta. Two additional groups in this neighbourhood also participated in the Coordinadora: the Remodelación Recoleta, about 100 sidewalk vendors.
working out of 20 stalls on Recoleta street; and a small group of vendors from the Baratillo, represented by Carlos Galleguillo, who died, tragically, in a fire (c. 1999). Altogether the Vega groups accounted for roughly half the membership and leaders of the Coordinadora.

**Main claim:** Concern about their livelihoods, always precarious in the segregated, discriminating reality of Santiago, prompted the active participation of these organizations in the Coordinadora. As their involvement progressed, they also expressed concern about environmental and other impacts. A strong motivation were the analyses, rumours and incidents that pointed to an agenda as powerful as it was invisible: developers’ (associated with the pro-Pinochet UDI party) strong interest in moving the markets out of the prime real estate and into the periphery, to replace them with malls and high rise development, as they were doing elsewhere in Santiago.

**Straddling Recoleta and Providencia: Barrio Bellavista**

To the east of the Vega and Patronato, came the arts community of Bellavista (figure 3.12), split (by the new municipal divisions signed into existence during Pinochet's last days) between two municipal jurisdictions, the comunas of Recoleta (2,659 people in 861 households) and Providencia (3,806 residents in 1,363 households, according to census data).

Bellavista in the 1950s and 1960s became synonymous with some of Chile’s best artists and intellectuals, particularly the painter, Camilo Mori, the sculptor Marta Colvin, and the Nobel-prizewinning poet, Pablo Neruda. During the military years (1973-1990), the country’s first cultural centre, Taller 666, took over an old house, working ceaselessly for freedom of expression. Bellavista’s nascent (2001) cultural and development non-profit corporation was led by Carmen Silva, a distinguished painter, who had worked with Ecuador’s Guayasamín during her exile. The Bellavista neighbourhood association, which started in the late 1980s, was headed by Mario Baeza, a beloved cultural icon as a choir director who brought music to thousands of people throughout Chile, during his long life, and María Inés Arribas, an inspired and dedicated architect and urban planner.

Although a single neighbourhood for more than a century, the split jurisdiction meant that by the early 1990s Bellavista had become a no man’s land, neglected by both municipal governments, and a centre for illegal discotheques, drug dealing and crime. Neighbours began organizing during the early years of redemocratization (1993). They came mainly from low and middle-income sectors, many popular, or the university-educated children of popular families, living in housing
built for local industries from the late 1880s onward. The printing industry, writing and literature had shaped the local identity for decades, linking “cultural workers” with important intellectuals, a relationship reinforced by the leftwing affiliations of many, including communist party member and Nobel-prizewinning poet, Pablo Neruda, who lived until his death (just ten days after the 1973 coup) in a self-designed home in Bellavista. In segregated Santiago, this multi-class integration became a significant part of Bellavista’s identity, and as neighbourhood leaders we often emphasized and celebrated this.

Indeed, the Bellavista neighbourhood led a fierce campaign to have our -- mostly modest, working-class -- heritage (figure 3.12) officially recognized and protected, an experience that also nourished the anti-highway campaign. This went on in parallel to and beyond the highway campaign, and reinforced its relationship with the market neighbourhoods of the Vega. Moreover, many Bellavista residents and the restaurants that became the foundation of its regional-scale economy during this period, purchased their fresh materials in the Vega, so strong ties existed.
between the two neighbourhoods prior to the conflict. Bellavista enjoyed a central location and unusually multi-class and multi-cultural residents.

Bellavista’s main organizations were the two neighbourhood associations \((\text{Juntas de Vecinos})\), and EcoBella, an ad hoc environmental committee.

Leaders flowed between the different groups, and the non-profit cultural foundation \((\text{Corporación Cultural y de Desarrollo de Bellavista})\), led by a respected artist, Carmen Silva, ably backed by two architect-residents, Tomás Carvajal and Sergio González, who played key roles in the Pio Nono renovation (chapter 5). The main Bellavista leaders involved in the anti-highway campaign were María Inés Arribas, Patricio Lanfranco, Mauricio Montecinos, María Eliana Bustamante (Junta de Vecinos #13); Joan Morrison, Waleska Salinas, Bernarda Contreras, María Inés Solimano and Lake Sagaris (EcoBella); several generations of leaders of the Recoleta Junta de Vecinos, and Carmen Silva.

**Main claim:** Bellavista’s main claims were environmental quality, heritage, culture and the right of low- and middle-income neighbours to remain -- and continue to enjoy a high quality of living -- in a friendly neighbourhood near the city centre and all its amenities. EcoBella was particularly concerned about air pollution from the highway project, and a local pharmacist joined the group, providing much needed information on pollutants and their health effects. For the starting demonstration, the neighbourhoods’ declaration of war on the project, the ceramist and artist, Joan Morrison, built a cardboard representation of the highway’s gigantic chimneys, while I demonstrated how dangerous ozone was formed in the presence of sunlight, using balloons to show how the molecules combined. Heritage was key, because the project\(^{16}\) threatened to destroy landmarks such as the gateway to the San Cristóbal hill, designed by “Chile’s Gaudí”, Luciano Kulchewsky, and the Art Deco homes around Pablo Neruda’s Santiago house, La Chascona.

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\(^{16}\) There were many versions of the highway project over the years. I will use this term to refer to the project presented as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment. The MOP later proposed a “Bellavista variant”, which was actually approved, but the company opted for a “Mapocho river variant”, which was built.
project included ramps that potentially impacted on other parts of the neighbourhood, and described ventilation, which sometimes required “chimneys”, with or without filters.

Pedro de Valdivia Norte

Pedro de Valdivia Norte (figure 3.13) was a high income neighbourhood, home to judges, business people, successful professionals and other well-to-do Chileans. As mentioned, however, this community was far from “typical”, having chosen to remain near the city centre, rather than moving to the wealthy suburbs, as they developed under the military regime and thereafter.

The architectural faculty of the Catholic University is located on a carefully conserved property, once the gracious home of a major landowner on this side of the river. Over the years of the campaign, professors from what was then the Institute for Urban and Territorial Studies and other departments hosted debates, wrote articles and issued opinions on the conflict over the Costanera Norte. Despite its more conservative outlook (particularly after depuration under the military regime), the prestigious and wealthy Catholic University contributed several key advisors to the anti-highway campaign, particularly Dr. María Elena Ducci, an architect and urbanist, and Dr. Juan de Dios Ortúzar, a world authority on urban transport modelling, and a highly respected professor in the transport department, located on the San Joaquin campus.

Two organizations participated in the Coordinadora and founding Living City. The first was the legally constituted neighbourhood association, the Junta de Vecinos #12, headed by an engineer, Ambrosio García-Huidobro and Juan Luis Moure, an owner of one of Chile’s most successful perfume importers. The second was an ad hoc committee in defense of the San Cristóbal Hill park, led by Dr. Ricardo Araya, a community psychiatrist; Alfredo Gredig, who owned a store catering to the needs of the owners of luxury yachts; Inés Watine, a French immigrant who moved to Chile in the 1970s to marry Judge Juan Guzmán;17 and her friend, Céline Désramés, a more recent French immigrant to Chile, who was both a historian and a bookstore owner. An architect, then working for her family’s drug store, Katia Cotorás, also played an active role at this stage of the campaign.

Main claim: The key issue for the neighbourhood and people from elsewhere in the city who participated in the ad hoc committee was the defense of the Cerro San Cristóbal (Saint Christopher hill), home to Santiago’s largest park, the Parque Metropolitano, with picnic areas, botanical gardens, the zoo, eucalyptus, mimosa and other flowering trees. Although most of the park borders

17 The Judge who put Pinochet on trial and played a crucial role in bringing some measure of justice to the victims of human rights, Guzmán was a staunch support of the Coordinadora, came to fundraising events and supported Inés, who, along with Alicia of Independencia-Olivos, were our best door-to-door campaigners.
on Bellavista, the Pedro de Valdivia Norte neighbours feel its presence as part of their
eighbourhood much more strongly. They walked its borders, measuring and demonstrating
inaccuracies in the Ministry’s claims, investing countless hours and endless arguments in
defending a common good, a right and need of everyone in the city.

3.3 The Campaign

“South America is not the poorest continent in the world, but it may very well be the most unjust” (Ricardo
Lagos, president of Chile, in Monterrey Mexico, 2004, cited on p. 4, Oxhorn 2011).

Human beings have built cities and their neighbourhoods with the primordial objective of living in them, and
all other functions related to human activity, whether commerce, industry, management, entertainment, etc.
should be subordinate to this fundamental objective. Our neighbourhood, exceptionally well located and in
balance with the environment, between the River Mapocho and the San Cristobal Hill, is suffering from the
devastating aggression associated with an excess of polluting, commercial activities, which are out of control.
Despite the above, we are probably the only part of the old sector of Santiago that still conserves its historic,
artistic and cultural heritage, due mainly to the long defense that the inhabitants of Bellavista have led...
(Lanfranco and Vergara 1993, 1995)

As mentioned, Pinochet split Bellavista two distinct municipal jurisdictions during his last months
in power, the territorial equivalent of being pulled apart by two horses running in opposite
directions. Lax regulation and enthusiasm for new freedoms brought a rash of poorly designed but
profitable nightclubs. Formerly quiet, residential streets erupted with noise, drunken behaviour,
trafficking, break-ins, and related issues. These catalyzed participation in the neighbourhood
associations, as people couldn’t sleep, and neighbours emerged on weekends to find their
sidewalks, gardens and plazas full of broken glass, puddles of urine and human excrement. Thus,
the two neighbourhood associations, the Junta de Vecinos #35 (Bellavista Recoleta), and the Junta
de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza (Bellavista Providencia), were soon joined by EcoBella, an activist-
committee and the Bellavista Cultural and Development non-profit, mentioned above.

With little regulation, an improvised discotheque would start up on a street, often in the middle of
the block, expelling neighbours able to move away and, in many cases, buying up the properties
thus vacated, only to repeat the pattern over and over. These trends produced long, seemingly
endless battles between neighbours and local governments that revealed corruption in some
offices and, on occasion, collusion between nightclubs, drug traffickers and officials. They also
provoked the first, mostly frustrating and hostile encounters between these emerging citizens and
politicians. These events forced neighbours to seek out allies and build new networks and alliances
between neighbourhood groups, an NGO-community consisting primarily of environmental
organizations\textsuperscript{18}, professional associations (particularly the College of Physicians and the College of Architects) and even, in some cases, frustrated planners and other officials within local governments themselves. As a result, neighbourhood leaders began to acquire some of the citizenship skills and contacts that would become useful to the anti-highway campaign.

Neighbourhood struggles against concrete issues -- the noise, the dirt, the garbage and the poor management of alcohol licenses -- impacted on the ground in multiple ways. More than 800 people participated in the 1993 election, the first since the coup, of the Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza. Neighbours organized Christmas parties, Independence Day celebrations with folk dancing and food, children’s events and all-candidates forums in newly conquered public squares. To the timid question from some participants, “don’t we have to ask for permission to use the square?” militant neighbours replied over and over, “No, it’s OUR square. In democracy, we have the right to use it!”

The issue of rights was ever present in Bellavista and two neighbours, neighbourhood association leader, Patricio Lanfranco,\textsuperscript{19} and Jorge Vergara, a philosopher, developed a Declaration of the Rights of Bellavista Residents (Lanfranco and Vergara 1993, 1995), cited at the beginning of this chapter, which was unanimously approved in an assembly of 150 neighbours.

An undercurrent, never mentioned but ever present, was the deliberate effort by many neighbours to heal the political rifts that had turned people against each other during the 1970s and 1980s. This is hard to convey in abstract terms, so I will give some examples, starting with the children’s first day at school, at our local daycare centre, which coincided with the inauguration of the newly elected government, headed by President Patricio Aylwin. Many neighbours met regularly at parents’ meetings at the local daycare centre, but we had never discussed politics. As we walked our five-year-olds to school, the kiosks were plastered with photographs of civilian cabinet members in formal suits, swearing allegiance. Pinochet had been reluctant to hand the presidential sash to Aylwin in Congress and there were photos of that too. As our children lined up in their new grade one classroom, we all formed a semi-circle, singing the national anthem together.

...we sing shyly together, glancing sideways at the other parents, as if we have never met before. The only political message is one of unity and pride. It’s as if the music is slowly waking

\textsuperscript{18} During the dictatorship, civil society organizations consisted primarily of human rights groups, social service NGOs, and the environment, among them Codeff, the Committee to Defend Chile’s Flora and Fauna (Chile’s oldest NGO), the Political Ecology Institute, and Renace, a network of environmental groups. Neighbourhood organizations were controlled by military appointees, as were a series of service groups headed by generals’ wives.

\textsuperscript{19} Also my husband.
us from a long and terrible dream. ... Each day from now on will be subtly and completely
different. We can say different things to each other, provoke different reactions, do and feel and
live things differently. I realize from the snatches of conversation that float in the air around
me, mostly about yesterday’s inauguration, that many of these parents, who we’ve ‘known’ for
as long as five years, opposed the regime, but we have never spoken before. It’s equally clear
that the parents of Rafa, [my son] Camilo’s best friend, and María Jesús, Camilo’s first girlfriend,
supported the regime and are worried about the future. Round-faced, sharp-featured Daniel,
Matias’s father, cracks a joke about the kids looking like a line-up of cabinet ministers and we
all laugh at once (p. 272, (Sagaris 1996).

A year or two later, it was my regime-supporting neighbours (wielding baseball bats) who came to
my rescue when several men broke into my house. Around 1995 or 1996, exhausted by a car
whose alarm had been going for hours, a group of 15 or so of us picked it up and set it in the
middle of the road, so the police would have to move it. The alarm abruptly fell silent and we were
left staring at each other, disconcerted. When a puzzled police officer threatened us with arrest, if
the car remained in the road when he returned after a quick trip around the block, we picked it up
and put it back. The story became a source of endless laughter in the ensuing years.

We never explicitly said that doing these things together, helping each other, was our way of
healing the wounds opened by the repression. But these moments cemented -- deep friendships, in
some cases, and “deep acquaintanceships” in others. When the highway erupted into our lives,
this emotional and social healing and the citizenship learning were the only capital we possessed.

3.3.1 The highway project is launched

Toward the end of 1996 and early 1997, rumours about the highway project began to reach the
different groups that would soon form the Coordinadora (figure 3.14). In Bellavista, Ernesto
Moreno, the Concertación (Christian Democratic Party) mayor of Recoleta, offered a meeting in the
local school. In Chile, all municipal elections occur on the same day, and the races are dominated
by the official national parties. Thus, the former opposition to the military regime, organized into
the Concertación, formed the national government (1990-2010), while its supporters, united into a
coalition formed by the Unión Democrática Independiente and Renovación Nacional parties,
became the official opposition, with both coalitions competing nationally and locally. Regional
governments are led by appointees of the national president, who tend to change annually, while
planning functions are carried out by the regional offices of national ministries, which typically do
not cooperate or coordinate, and may actively compete with each other.

Mayor Moreno, as a member of the Concertación, was an active supporter of the national
government and its flagship project, the Costanera Norte. His attitude at this first meeting, then,
was terse and threatening as he reported that he had negotiated the final route with his government. This would take the highway out of sensitive parts of the comuna and place it squarely along the river. His message was “you can’t fight this, so just negotiate some money and other advantages for your neighbourhood.” When a couple of us dared to question this position, he shouted us down. But, like neighbours everywhere, we stood around afterward, picking over the meeting and discussing what we should do. I remembered the successful rebellion against the Spadina expressway in Toronto where I grew up. “We can say no,” I said.

The Chilean government, headed by engineer and businessman Eduardo Frei (Jr.), had announced the Costanera Norte project in March 1995, but the news created little stir amongst the communities potentially affected. There was little clarity about the specific route and little certainty about its execution. A two-inch headline in the evening paper, reflects the attitude: “Urban road investments must double or triple to maintain (not even improve) current levels of congestion,” followed by the proclamation, also in large print:

Minister Lagos painted a pretty “terrifying” picture with regard to the perspectives for one of the problems of today that produces the most stress amongst Chileans and is going to worsen.

---

20 I was present; this scene is based on my memory of the events there.
He called on the private sector to invest in profitable projects and on the finance ministry to give priority to infrastructure, with growth in this item of from 9-10% of public expenditure (Segunda 1995).

As the year progressed and the ministry of public works (MOP) negotiated with municipalities, the highway’s route shifted constantly, moving closer to downtown. This reflected the economic imperative -- the highway would have to generate profits -- inherent in the decision to make the project a poster child for an ambitious, but improvised concessions program (Silva 2011). Its development required public tenders, private partners, and sufficient profits.

In March 1996, some government experts tried to broaden debate. Daniel Fernández, executive secretary of the interministerial transport planning commission, tried to get people to think about the “big mess” (Grunau and Schönwandt 2010) before leaping to “solutions” that might not reflect the real, underlying problem. Reminding readers that 77% of daily trips were made by public transport, he emphasized the need for bus-only routes on major streets, adding:

These projects aren’t profitable for an investor, since there could be no charge for vehicles using this infrastructure, as there would be for cars... So, does this mean that in the case of urban projects, they can only happen if they’re a good investment for a private investor? The answer is no. Here we are faced with the unavoidable role of the State... (Fernández 1996).

His words vanished, however, in a deluge of articles about the catastrophe if the highway weren’t built (Appendix 1). Lagos announced “an agreement between the authorities and the community, that the urban road project, the Costanera Norte, is an initiative that generates enormous urban opportunities that should not be ignored” (MINVU 1996) and promised repeatedly that the final decision on the highway’s location would be backed by “environmental impact and technical studies”. Meanwhile, in the year since Frei first announced the project, the price rose to US$233 million.

Lagos’ comment, that the “community” supported the project, raised the antenna of the Bellavista groups. The two Bellavista juntas de vecinos organized a public meeting about the project in the Liceo Alemán (German highschool), then located at Dardignac and Pio Nono streets. Led by urbanist María Inés Arribas and artist Carmen Silva, more than 300 neighbours packed into the hall, anxiously perusing the highway plans, taped to the walls.

MOP officials also heard about the meeting and hastily sent two representatives: Fernando Valderrama, the MOP official in charge of the project, and Julio Alegría, an architect and external consultant responsible for initial studies. When they arrived they produced the project plans with a
flourish, only to discover that the versions obtained by neighbours were more recent than theirs. The incident marked what would become a constant: the lack of transparency in the MOP’s provision of information, and neighbours’ ability, often thanks to dissent within the government itself, to obtain key information and place it under public scrutiny.²¹

The Bellavista organizations studied highway projects and their impacts (Appendix 2). At first, transport engineers who opposed the project were reluctant to talk to opponents, for fear of reprisals from government, their main source of employment. Later, as the campaign progressed, several academics began to take public positions, most notably María Elena Ducci, Ignacio Santa María and Alberto Gurovic, distinguished architects and urbanists; Juan de Dios Ortúzar, Francisco Martínez and Juan Carlos Muñoz, transport engineers; Simón Figueroa, a Bellavista neighbour and chemist, who dedicated long hours to collecting information about contaminants and what they would mean for the health of those living along the path of the highway; Pablo San Martín, a geographer working with the Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales (an NGO that observed environmental conflicts in Latin American countries); Chris Zegras, a staff person with the International Institute for Energy Conservation (now an MIT professor of transportation).

Under their tutelage, the Bellavista groups realized how devastating the project was going to be.

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²¹ Anecdote recounted by María Inés Arribas and other leaders of the neighbourhood association.
Benefits would accrue primarily to residents in the wealthy east end, and real estate projects planned for both ends of the highway. The central communities risked being erased and either replaced with “modern” projects involving malls, parking and high rises (the Vega area) or densely polluted and degraded urban areas (Bellavista), while Pedro de Valdivia Norte would see its congress with the hill cut off by a six-lane highway, and the Independencia communities would simply disappear under the asphalt ribbon and cinder block administration buildings.

On 7 June 1996, EcoBella members presented their analysis to an assembly of neighbours in the Plaza Camilo Mori. In our declaration (figure 3.15), we called on the Bellavista community to oppose the project, and launched the slogan “No a la Costanera Norte”. The event, coming on the heels of major environmental conflicts elsewhere in Chile, reflected the first major urban environmental conflict to hit Santiago itself.

Despite the magnitude of the challenge, this event, like most of the campaign, was cheerful and friendly, helping to build ties among neighbours and their supporters. Privately, however, leaders had no illusions about the results of the conflict we had just begun. Even friends, especially those with close ties to the governing coalition, warned us there was no way the government would back down. The way we saw it, we were headed for sure defeat. There was always a point in these conversations when we would look at each other with despair, and then shrug. As mentioned earlier, after resisting the Spanish for 300 years, when faced with the nascent Chilean republic, the country’s largest indigenous group, the Mapuche, staged a major rebellion in the 1880s. They had decided to die, if necessary, defending their right to their lands (Bengoa 1985). We felt that if our neighbourhoods were going to die, then we too would defend them, showing a minimum of human dignity.

While most of upscale Providencia had been a rightwing stronghold for decades, politically mixed, ragtag Bellavista was best known for its opposition to the military regime. Nonetheless, the Costanera Norte project was being championed by socialist Ricardo Lagos, a highly popular leader who was angling to become the next president of Chile. Indeed, many saw his presence in the public works ministry as an effort to show that in post-Pinochet Chile a socialist could be president without the economy falling apart, and could work well with business and economic interests. As a result, discussions amongst leaders of the Junta #13 and EcoBella led to the conclusion that the groups would oppose the project but would refrain from attacking the individuals associated with it. This approach later became a hallmark of Living City’s work.
In July 1996, María Inés Arribas, president of the Junta de Vecinos #13, was surprised to receive a call from Jaime Márquez, urban advisor (the equivalent of head planner) in the municipality of Providencia. He had been trying to get information about the highway and had noticed that the neighbourhood association had been more successful than he. He therefore proposed that

neighbourhood representatives join him in a meeting with MOP officials about the project. Thus began an uneasy truce between the Bellavista groups and the municipality of Providencia.

Indeed, a Bellavista leaflet from that period (Bellavista 1996) quotes Jaime Márquez as concerned because of the lack of studies of the highway’s impact and ends with questions that became central to the campaign:

If this is about solving a transportation problem, why not seek solutions that benefit more people? Authorities (Recoleta, MOP, MINVU) say we shouldn’t worry, they’ll take care of the quality of life and avoid negative environmental impacts. How are we supposed to believe they’re capable of this, when the levels of noise,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisor</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juan de Dios Ortúzar</td>
<td>Director, Department of Transport Engineering, Universidad Católica de Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Martínez</td>
<td>President, Chilean society of Transport Engineers (Sochitran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Zegras</td>
<td>Director, Transport, International Institute for Energy Conservation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juan Carlos Muñoz</td>
<td>Transport engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nikkola Boregaard, PhD</td>
<td>Environmental economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat Palmer</td>
<td>Landscape architect, UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myriam Beech</td>
<td>Landscape architect, UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Plubbins</td>
<td>Landscape architect, UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignacio Santa Maria</td>
<td>Architect and urban planner, UC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Pedro Gutierrez</td>
<td>Forestry engineer, UCh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauricio Montecinos</td>
<td>Forestry engineer, JV#13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrosio García-Huidobro</td>
<td>Industrial engineer, JV#12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Leonel Gil, PhD</td>
<td>Expert on local pollution, Faculty of Medicine, University of Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ricardo Araya</td>
<td>Expert on measuring health risks, Faculty of Medicine, University of Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Inés Arribas</td>
<td>Architect and urban planner, JV#13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katia Cotorás</td>
<td>Architect, JV#12</td>
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Source: List of Members and Advisors, Coordinadora Archives, 1997.
violence, social problems have already overcome the authorities, who are incapable of correcting these situations? If they can’t even close a discotheque that makes unbearable noise all night, how will they do anything with a superhighway? What about the vibrations (during construction) and the toxic gases (once the highway is up and running?) (Bellavista 1996).

The year ended with an event that would serve as a warning of what the MOP was willing to do to save its flagship project. On 2 December, a young woman appeared at my door, claiming to be a friend of María Inés Arribas (president of the neighbourhood association). Using the familiar “tú” form, she told me she had heard about a meeting to discuss the future of the neighbourhood, where they were “probably going to discuss the highway project”, and thought it was really important to ensure that some of the neighbours opposing it were present. She asked for the list of EcoBella members, which I gave her, and invited several of us\(^{22}\) to the meeting, in a few hours time. The “meeting” (figure 3.16) promised a conversation about our hopes and fears for the neighbourhood. As the facilitator increasingly focused in on the highway project, our suspicions became aroused and we started to ask questions, until the organizers admitted that we were being filmed and recorded.

In a reasonably democratic society, this would have been an obvious violation of ethics: a “focus group” in which participants were not informed of the rules of engagement. In a post-dictatorial environment, the impact was terrifying. To think that a national ministry, led by a socialist who had himself been the victim of repression during the regime, would stoop to this kind of spying was appalling. We were forced to choose between fear and paralysis, or the more frightening but also empowering option of denouncing this event. When we denounced it publicly, we received enormous support from other civil society organizations, particularly Casa de la Paz, an NGO located in Bellavista, which became a quiet, powerful enabler of the Coordinadora’s efforts. The support was crucial, as all of us felt vulnerable.

It’s hard to convey how frightened we were, throughout these early years of conflict. The burden of fear from the military years did not just disappear on the day that Aylwin was sworn in. In post-Pinochet Chile, the repetition of patterns associated with the repression was deeply threatening and we were all afraid, all of the time. What we also carried over from the regime, however, was the urge to resist fear, to control it and find a way through and beyond the fear. For some of us, particularly in Bellavista, this became very central to our feeling about and motivations for continuing. We wanted our new democracy to work. We wanted our neighbourhood to survive. And we used these aspirations to tempt people out of their homes and into our squares and streets,

\(^{22}\) María Inés Arribas, María Eliana Bustamante and I went, along with five or six others.
to march, but also to hold hands in a huge neighbourhood hug, to show that our “fight” was fueled not by hatred or rage, but by a deep, abiding love for our neighbours and the places we shared.

To see people emerge from their homes and venture out into the square, to see our seniors march, with canes and crutches, and the enthusiasm they must have felt in the 1960s under Chile’s previous democracy, was to reconnect our past with our present, despite all attempts to sever the two. It inspired and pushed us on. It required daring and offered healing. As it turned out, this spoke strongly to the rest of the city, calling out support, sometimes where we least expected it, among other groups but also even within government offices and the MOP itself.

Enrique Silva, who studied the Costanera Norte highway concession process, as part of his PhD studies, characterizes Chile’s implementation of franchised highways as “an instance of deliberate improvisation” (2011). He notes that unlike planning traditions in the north, “Chile’s central government has framed planning as a narrower, technical-market enterprise,” designed to support “production by facilitating the construction of large infrastructural projects” and encourage “private companies to actively participate in the public works sector” (p. 36, Silva 2011).

What emerges in Chile is an argument about improvisation as planning strategy or what I call deliberate improvisation, a political choice that signals the power of the state to define what should be planned, how and when. More simply, deliberate improvisation is planning without a plan (p. 36, Silva 2011).

Silva considers the implementation of the new concessions program with its flagship Costanera Norte urban highway concession, a “foundational moment” in Chile’s political and economic liberalization under the new government. This helps to explain why the unexpected strength of the opposition movement and its efforts to contest and even contain the government’s most powerful ministry, became considered a turning point in urban planning, in post-dictatorial Chile (Sepúlveda and du Monceau de Bergendal 1998; Sepúlveda 1999; Ducci 2000; Ducci 2002; Allard 2003; Ducci 2004; Sabatini, Geisse et al. 2004; Poduje 2008; Tironi, Poduje et al. 2010; Poduje 2011).

As 1996 folded into 1997, there was every sign that the government expected no opposition to its multimillion dollar baby. Promising new infrastructure and a shiny new financing mechanism, the build-operate-transfer concession, seemed like a winner from every perspective. The MOP saw this as the perfect strategy to free up government funds needed for social programs.

23 Indeed, one of the external consultants responsible for several studies of the Costanera Norte, once told me that although the project had taken years to develop, no single study had had more than two months to examine conditions, analyze and prepare conclusions and recommendations.
... the newly elected leaders of the country had no choice but to act quickly and decisively to invest heavily in upgrading and expanding the network of roads, ports and airports previously ignored by the Pinochet military regime. In the words of a former Minister of Public Works, not to act on the infrastructure front ‘would be intolerable ... the costs of inaction would be too high’ (p. 38, Silva 2011).

These arguments of urgency also justified the lack of consultation, as a national ministry, the MOP, stepped into the delicate interrelationships of a city ecology to impose a massive highway project.

...deliberation on anything other than the technical and financial dimensions of concessions risked delaying the implementation of the system and the construction of much needed infrastructure; and the political costs of not delivering infrastructure would be higher than the costs associated with any political fallout linked to concessions and its projects. This perspective, moreover, was built on the assumption that if and when unforeseen consequences arose, the government would have the capacity to manage them (p. 41, Silva 2011).

The previous minister, Carlos Hurtado, had deliberately designed the concession system to bypass stakeholders within the government itself, setting up the Concessions Unit as an elite, standalone unit whose professional staff enjoyed some of the highest wages in the whole government and the least restraints on their actions.24

Suspicions of irregularities were corroborated many years later, but meanwhile, the MOP claimed (falsely, as became apparent) that the Costanera Norte’s design was “already 95% ready. The only task left is

Table 3.7 Founders and Leaders of the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte (1997-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization or group</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Asn. de Propietarios y Arrendatarios de Independencia</td>
<td>Borgoño</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Unidad Vecinal #15</td>
<td>Borgoño</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Pasaje Olivos Independencia</td>
<td>Olivos</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Comité de Defensa del Parque Metropolitano</td>
<td>Pdev Norte</td>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Junta de Vecinos #12</td>
<td>Pdev Norte</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Unión Comunal Providencia</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
</tr>
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<td>8 Comité Ecológico Bellavista*Silvino Zapico</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia-Recoleta</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Corporación Cultural y de Desarrollo Bellavista</td>
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<td>Providencia-Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Proño Gastronómico Bellavista</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia-Recoleta</td>
</tr>
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<td>11 Junta de Vecinos #35</td>
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<td>Recoleta</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Asn. de Comerciantes de la Perifería de la Vega (ACOFER)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Remodelación Recoleta</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
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<td>14 Asn. Gremial/Cté Defensa Tirso de Molina</td>
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<td>15 Asn. Gremial Comerciantes de la Vega Chica</td>
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<td>16 El Baratillo</td>
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<td>17 Asn. Gremial Paseo Santa María</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Comerciantes de la Vía Pública</td>
<td>Avenida Recoleta</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7 Founders and Leaders of the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte (1997-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization or group</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Asn. de Propietarios y Arrendatarios de Independencia</td>
<td>Borgoño</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Unidad Vecinal #15</td>
<td>Borgoño</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Pasaje Olivos Independencia</td>
<td>Olivos</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Comité de Defensa del Parque Metropolitano</td>
<td>Pdev Norte</td>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Junta de Vecinos #12</td>
<td>Pdev Norte</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Unión Comunal Providencia</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Comité Ecológico Bellavista*Silvino Zapico</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia-Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Corporación Cultural y de Desarrollo Bellavista</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia-Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Proño Gastronómico Bellavista</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Providencia-Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Junta de Vecinos #35</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Asn. de Comerciantes de la Perifería de la Vega (ACOFER)</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Remodelación Recoleta</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Asn. Gremial/Cté Defensa Tirso de Molina</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Asn. Gremial Comerciantes de la Vega Chica</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 El Baratillo</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Asn. Gremial Paseo Santa María</td>
<td>Vega</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Comerciantes de la Vía Pública</td>
<td>Avenida Recoleta</td>
<td>Recoleta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quijada 2009, Sagaris and Araya 1997, Coordinadora Archives Living City. Judicial investigation, CBZ was convicted, receiving a three-year suspended sentence in July 2010, and an order to personally repay US$1.6 million (LaNacion 2010; Quijada 2010; Silva 2011).
to define a few details, based on the environmental impact study, whose recommendations increased by 15% the initial cost estimates for the project” (ElDiario 1997).

The rest of the summer (Jan/Feb 1997) was relatively quiet, although an article in La Segunda announced that more than 1,000 neighbours would be invited to participate in the environmental impact assessment process (Segunda 1997) and there was some mild debate about integration of existing roads into the Costanera highway project, the tender and the rules of the concession. As most city people enjoyed the summer, swimming in the ocean or southern lakes, in an op ed piece, national prize-winning architect, Mario Pérez de Arce was warning that the highway would destroy the river, one of Santiago’s most salient natural features (Pérez de Arce 1997). The neighbours of Pedro de Valdivia Norte were “on alert” (see figure 3.12), and had begun to study the project’s impacts on the San Cristobal Hill park (Díaz Raffo 1997), while mayors and neighbours were criticizing the lack of participation in several megaprojects, including gas pipelines, thermoelectric generating stations and the Costanera Norte (ElMercurio 1997).

3.3.2 The Coordinadora takes centre stage

Quiet negotiations during the early months of 1997 brought onboard most of the Santiago mayors, from the governing coalition (the Concertación) and the opposition (Las Condes, Vitacura, Lo Barnechea), except for Providencia’s Mayor Labbé. Moreover, it successfully neutralized opposition from the wealthier comunas, where it might have been expected to arise. It seems the MOP did not expect the low- and middle-income communities of Bellavista, La Vega and Independencia to mount any serious opposition to its flagship project.

In March 1997, Lagos announced he was willing to delay the call for bids on the Costanera Norte until month’s end, to reach an agreement with the Pedro de Valdivia Norte neighbours. He casually dismissed the neighbours’ concerns “We’re in the presence of a project that will benefit tens of thousands of santiaguinos”, which “everyone knows” has existed for more than 30 years, and has been duly discussed with local authorities from Providencia (Henríquez 1997). By month’s end, Lagos’ patience with Pedro de Valdivia Norte had vanished: the MOP announced bids as planned (ElMercurio 1997).

Meanwhile, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) system, initially voluntary, became compulsory on 3 April 1997, as the result of a major conflict over native forests on Tierra del Fuego, led by a coalition of Chilean and American environmental groups. Notwithstanding, the MOP called for tenders on the Costanera Norte, now estimated at US$333 million, showing no
intention of presenting an environmental assessment. Bellavista and Pedro de Valdivia Norte filed suit, complaining that the project had no EIA approval. Rather surprisingly, the courts in the first instance ordered the paralysis of the tenders. The MOP hurriedly prepared a study and presented it to the EIA, thus successfully winning the lawsuit. On 19 June, the Santiago region environmental commission, Corema, began a citizen participation process, as required by the new environmental rules. Early sessions were marked by a painful clumsiness that reflected the conditions prevailing in a post-dictatorial society, but also a fear of conflict. Numerous researchers from different disciplines have noted that the early years of the democratic transition in Chile were marked by a deliberate attempt to de-mobilize civil society and other forces that fought so effectively for re-democratization (Garretón Merino 1994; Garreton Merino 2003; Garretón Merino 2009; Posner 2009; Posner 2009; Smith 2009; Oxhorn 2011). Oriana Salazar, who worked for Casa de la Paz at this time, and later became head of citizen participation in the national environmental commission, Conama, noted that:

Conama maintained a low profile, because it was barely a year old. No one in Chile knew how to organize citizen participation. Conama was always indecisive about conflicts in general -- 20 years of dictatorship bore deep into the bone (nos hizo mella) (Salazar 2010).

Lack of experience was apparent during the first session of “citizen participation” in the EIA, a half-day that took market people away from their stalls and Bellavista neighbours away from work, only to hear a lengthy explanation of “the methodology”. We had concrete questions about project and process: access to studies and plans, guarantees that our observations would weigh on the final decision. These concerns received no reply.

Participants did learn, however, that everyone from “architects and engineers who were experts all the way down to ignorant housewives, who know nothing” would receive “equal treatment”. “Isn’t that reassuring?” I whispered to a rosy-cheeked woman on my right. Sonia Abarca, president of the Vega Chica, nodded her agreement. Within a week we were sitting together in what would become regular meetings, with representatives of organizations from Independencia, Recoleta, Bellavista and Pedro de Valdivia Norte. These group meetings, held in our homes, above shops or in Casa de la Paz, became trainings in urban and transport planning, pollution, the environmental assessment process, political analysis and strategizing.

The diverse knowledge available to the Coordinadora, every time leaders from each sector sat down in someone’s living room or around a table in the church hall in Pedro de Valdivia Norte, was quite extraordinary, particularly if we include the advisors who approached during public events, offering advice, support, practical knowledge, and much needed contacts.
The level and quality of debate was also extraordinary, for a group this diverse in a society as divided as Chile’s. Partly, and particularly at first, this reflected the courtesy that tends to rule any group of relative strangers. But as the process and the meetings progressed, relationships deepened, nourished by a mutual need in the face of powerful opponents who threatened essential components of the different communities’ lives: livelihoods, homes, health, the park. Out of these meetings a stable body of leaders emerged (table 3.7), supported by a group of distinguished advisors (table 3.6). Decisions were by consensus and many advisors and NGOs participated. Mauricio Montecinos, who would later become president of the Bellavista Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza, was a forester who worked in Conaf, the national forestry agency, and an expert in environmental assessments under the new law. He trained other Coordinadora members and coordinated the communities’ 200-page response.

Allard notes (2003) that “civic groups needed to develop strategies based on lessons learned from past conflicts.” In its early meetings, the Coordinadora analyzed conflicts that had preceded it, particularly that of the Trillium forestry venture in Tierra del Fuego, in which foreign and Chilean environmental groups successfully challenged a foreign company’s right to exploit a native forest; a cellulose company’s unsuccessful efforts to dump wastes into Mehuín Bay, a major source of fish for local fishing families; and the GasAndes conflict in the Maipo canyon, near Santiago. Environmental groups involved in all three conflicts, but particularly Mehuin and GasAndes, actively supported the Coordinadora, and community leaders from the Maipo canyon provided some assistance. It then examined the process that the highway would go through, identifying breaking points where it could potentially fail. These included possible:

- **Rejection by the Environmental Commission**: unlikely, since the government is judging its own project and the final decision will be made by a high-level commission of political appointees, but the system is new and should be tried.

- **Rejection by companies**, because the financial guarantees and other conditions are not enough; possible, and indeed occurred on several occasions during the process.

- **Rejection by the government**, due to pressure from public opinion or because the project had grown so expensive that it was no longer viable.

- **Rejection by the courts**, if strong enough legal arguments can be found.

Based on this analysis, the Coordinadora outlined a strategy based on mobilizing at specific times to concentrate all energies and force on these specific pressure points. This was an unusual process for the time. Faced with similar problems, many groups would seize on a tactic, particularly the courts, mobilization or the media, as if a single tactic could substitute for a general
strategy. Indeed, “strategic” debates often focused on passionate and sometimes bitter arguments over one tactic versus another. Instead, with the benefit of collective wisdom from highly diverse groups, the Coordinadora was able to match tactics to specific breaking points in the process, and use them to greater effect. Thus, it opted for a combination of five main efforts, in the framework of initial action to win more time for the entire process. Without that first effort, to force the project into the EIA system, there would have been no time for opposition: building was scheduled for 1998. The five components were:

1. **Communications** to mobilize public opinion (mass media), and own community communications network, to mobilize neighbours and other supporters.

2. **Mobilizations** to bring attention to its issues, involve neighbours and other concerned citizens and apply pressure on local and national politicians.

3. **Political pressure and alliance-oriented tactics** to mobilize specific professional groups, particularly environmental, medical, academics, urban-related and others, to take strong positions against the project.

4. **Legal tactics** to push the judicial system to take a position on the project and potentially stop it for good.

5. **Company-centred tactics and demands for mitigation that would integrate external costs**, demonstrating the financial inviability of the project.

The results of these events and strategies are presented and discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 Results and Discussion of the Coordinadora (1997-2000), Winning by Losing: Citizen Learning and Democratic Emergence

4. Introduction
4.1 Winning by losing, The Coordinadora’s Unexpected Achievements
  4.1.1 Legal battles
  4.1.2 Catalyzing an ecology of actors amidst democratic claims

4.2 Forging the core: Diversity, voice and vocería
  4.2.1 Diversity through dialogue and deliberation
  4.2.2 Voice and vocería
  4.2.3 When small becomes large

4.3 Learning active citizenship
  4.3.1 What kind of learning?
  4.3.2 What kind of citizenship?
4.4 Wither or whither? Emergence

Figure 4.1 La Segunda Headline 6-August-1997. The front page headlines read Costanera Norte Won Court Battle (suit by neighbours in Bellavista and Pedro de Valdivia Norte rejected). The article in this major daily slams the neighbours of Bellavista and Pedro de Valdivia Norte when they lose their suit in the courts. But the major (if one-sided) coverage reveals the real threat that citizens unexpectedly posed in the new Chile.
Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the results of the Coordinadora phase (1997-2000) of my case study. As discussed in chapter 2, this material is based on a longer (101-page) documentary narrative, which describes individuals, interactions and events in more detail. I have filtered and selected data for comprehension and relevance to my central questions, summarized as follows:

Where do active citizens and effective civil society organizations come from? What role can participation in urban planning play in building the active citizenship skills necessary for more democratically capable citizens? What kind of learning and what kind of citizenship are we talking about? What kinds of organization enhance or limit this development?

Thus, this chapter provides some interesting answers to the question about where active citizens and effective civil society organizations come from, in post-authoritarian contexts, the type of learning involved, and how this intersects with generating a more democratic culture. It also explores the question of what kind of organization can enhance or limit this development.

As the previous chapter indicates, the Coordinadora was a temporary body, with an open-ended structure, communications and relational strategies that functioned in formal and informal spheres. It made strategic choices about its own role and behaviour, and influenced other actors, drawing many into its sphere of influence. These exchanges enriched the Coordinadora with diverse perspectives, diverse types of knowledge and skills, and made it an incubator for a new kind of urban citizenship, independent of political parties and distant from the prevailing practices of clientelism and “clientship” (Taylor 2004).

This chapter begins by describing and discussing the results of the anti-highway campaign, a process I characterize, based on leaders’ own reading of these experiences, as “winning by losing” (4.1). The next section (4.2) explores how the anti-highway campaign forged a core group with new attitudes and new ways of exercising leadership (4.2.1). I pay special attention to how the Coordinadora resolved issues of “voice” through definitions involving vocería, that is decisions about who would speak for whom, and how they would do so (4.2.2). This section also examines the question of size as it relates to urban scale, particularly how such a “small” group (4.2.3) could, through outreach combining traditional community communications methods and new technologies, mobilize network power (Booher and Innes 2002). Combined with the location of urban governance at different scales and levels of government, these factors ensured that the Coordinadora achieved a more extensive sphere of influence than might be expected.
### Table 4.1 Key Events in the Anti-Highway Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>Frei government announces CN, US$130 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1995</td>
<td>Patronato business community opposes CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-June</td>
<td>EcoBella and others gather information about impacts, 7 June, Bellavista launches No a la Costanera Norte campaign with 300-person rally and march</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1996</td>
<td>Las Condes &amp; Vitacura mayors oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July 1996</td>
<td>Bellavista groups meet with MOP executives and Providencia municipal staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>Tender postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October 1996</td>
<td>Neighbours file first habeas corpus against project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12-1996</td>
<td>MOP presents project to municipalities; tender postponed again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1997</td>
<td>Open Assembly Providencia, Mayor Labbé opposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April 1997</td>
<td>Environmental impact system becomes compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April 1997</td>
<td>MOP tenders project, US$333 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April 1997</td>
<td>Las Condes neighbours file suit. Fails. Bellavista and Pedro de Valdivia Norte file suit and 8th Chamber of Appeals court rules project requires EIA (22-25 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 1997</td>
<td>MOP presents EIA to Metropolitan environmental commission (Corema)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1997</td>
<td>Tender postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June 1997</td>
<td>Corema starts citizen participation in the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1997</td>
<td>Cade-Idepe, hired by Providencia, begins independent EIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 1997</td>
<td>Coordinadora marches from Vega to downtown to present its response to EIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 August 1997</td>
<td>Independent EIA (CADE-IDEPE) report released, negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1997</td>
<td>Court of Appeals rejects neighbours’ habeas corpus; neighbours appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1997</td>
<td>Coordinadora/OLCA publish book, Costanera Norte ¿Qué ciudad queremos?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1997</td>
<td>Tender postponed again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>COREMA advisory council rejects project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 Sept 1998</td>
<td>MOP and Builders Association (Cámara de la Construcción) define subsidies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1998</td>
<td>Bellavista variant approved; Coordinadora motion rejected by courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1998</td>
<td>MOP and Las Condes/Vitacura mayors reach agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Mar 1999</td>
<td>Project’s future uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 1999</td>
<td>Project reborn with US$80 mn subsidy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>Coordinadora/Ciudad Viva and Nelson Avila denounce corruption of companies, several drop out. Cruz answers to Congress for subsidy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Nov-6 Dec.</td>
<td>Impregilo wins tender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 January 2000</td>
<td>Lagos wins presidential election (second round)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 January 2001</td>
<td>MOP and Impregilo agree on river route in Coordinadora territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 2001</td>
<td>New EIA for new route; provisory approval requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 August 2001</td>
<td>COREMA grants provisory approval (SAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August 2001</td>
<td>COREMA receives comments on new EIA from Coordinadora and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sept. 2001</td>
<td>New route approved; work begins 7 December 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 January 2002</td>
<td>COREMA accepts MOP proposal to compensate displaced families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>Concessionaire complains of slow MOP expropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 February 2002</td>
<td>COREMA approves new EIA and river route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>JV13MB receives award in Colombia for defense of Bellavista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April 2005</td>
<td>President Lagos inaugurates Costanera Norte</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Quijada (2010), Araya and Sagaris (1997), du Monceau (1998), and press clippings (Coordinadora archives).
The following section (4.3) examines the issues involved in learning active citizenship and discusses what kind of learning (4.3.1) and what kind of citizenship, particularly the “active citizenship” developed and propagated by Living City. The last section (4.4) describes how, from the chaotic beginnings and complex interactions of the Coordinadora, a citizen-led planning organization, Living City (Ciudad Viva) emerged.

4.1 Winning by losing: The Coordinadora’s unexpected achievements

From 1997 to 2000 and beyond (table 4.1), the country’s most powerful ministry and a project worth hundreds of millions of dollars was delayed by seemingly powerless citizens. Attempts to dismiss the campaign, intimidate or overrun the communities failed. Through an annual art auction, the Coordinadora raised some US$3,000 a year to fund its efforts. While the EIA was the main site for increasingly sophisticated debates, streets and squares saw communal hugs, posters and banners demanding respect for city neighbourhoods vital to ordinary people (the parks, the market, the cultural and recreational activities), but considered of no account by the government and powerful private interests.

4.1.1 Legal battles: early lessons

In other countries where anti-highway revolts occurred, legal initiatives formed an important, often decisive, part of campaigns (Dunn; Hovey 2003; Deben, Salet et al. 2004; Ladd 2008; Fackler 2009; Mohl 2012). In Chile, however, with the way Pinochet had stacked the courts before leaving power (see chapter 3), legal options were more limited. Although several groups filed complaints, only the Coordinadora’s first suit was initially accepted, with the courts paralyzing progress until the case was fully heard, an action that forced the MOP into the EIA system.

Still convinced of the importance of pursuing legal aspects of the case, the Coordinadora made a huge effort to raise funds, and hired Fernando Dougnac, an experienced environmental lawyer with several emblematic victories to his credit. Dougnac did his best, but by the end of 1998, his

25 These included threats by Recoleta mayor against market leaders (personal communication to Coordinadora, 1998); a campaign to convince government staff not to hire independent professionals in the Coordinadora (personal communication from people approached, and Ricardo Araya, who left Chile as a result); and other tactics.

26 There was another important lesson from this loss. Bellavista neighbourhoods worked with Cristián Espejo, a lawyer financed -- and selected -- by the Municipality of Providencia. After a meeting with Bellavista leaders Espejo filed the writ and contacted other groups, charging additional, and substantial sums to Acofer (personal communication at the time from Inés Fernández). When called to argue the substance of the writ, Espejo did not appear. The Coordinadora lost, and the final resolution reflected the MOP’s defense very closely.
own observation was that judges thought they were seeing too many environmental cases and dismissed them with great haste. Toward the end of the conflict (2000), the Coordinadora abandoned legal strategies and used its scarce resources to create a temporary, quarter-time staff position, to help get its new organization, Living City, off to a good start.

These and other defeats during the campaign generated a series of running jokes. We called ourselves a *mono porfiado* (the Chilean equivalent of those punching dolls that children beat down and constantly bounce back) and *hormigas* (the tiny ants that can ruin a fancy picnic), and these motifs began to appear in our campaign graphics, along with images of humming birds (fragile, high-energy), silhouettes of children playing, and so on (figure 4.2). Early in the campaign we started to call all our main publications *La Voz* (the Voice), a theme I will discuss in more depth in section 4.2.

We also began to notice that we were seeing “side effects”, that is, “failures” in terms of not achieving our central goal of stopping the highway, that could also be read as “successes”, in terms of creating new ways forward. Thus, we began to speak of “winning by losing”. We lost the court case, for example, but that “defeat” forced the MOP and the project into the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system, which made our whole campaign possible.

4.1.2 Catalyzing an ecology of actors amidst democratic claims

Our experience with the EIA system provided several more examples of winning by losing. Above all, it highlighted the reality of network power, discussed in chapter 1, as a way of mobilizing forces in different parts of society — public, private and citizen sectors — to oppose or support particular initiatives. The Coordinadora’s experience in this context also illustrates how it acted as a
catalyst, bringing out skills and abilities amongst its own members, but also in the ecology of actors relevant to the highway, environmental, and urban issues.

Thus, the first victories occurred when the Coordinadora demanded and was able to restructure the participatory process. First, we rejected the commission’s ordering of participation by territories, which split Bellavista in two and separated Providencia from Recoleta and Independencia. The Commission was forced to accept that we would participate as a group.

The next victory proved foundational, not only for Living City (Ciudad Viva, the organization the would grow out of the Coordinadora) but for many citizen organizations that followed. It involved the way the Coordinadora framed its demands on the system, not simply on a not-in-my-backyard, NIMBY basis, but rather, as a deeply felt claim to citizen rights. Thus, blindly searching for the arguments to support its claims, the Coordinadora reached beyond the conflict over the highway project to demand the democratization of the EIA process and, eventually, urban planning itself. Its work began to take shape in a way consistent with Kamrava and Mora’s comments on how civil society organizations’ demands must move beyond their own particular interests to become agents of democratization (chapter 1).

In this sense, it was driven by need -- for minimum conditions for fairness, to have its voices heard -- and drawn by opportunity, the presence, amongst its own leaders, of people concerned with rights and democratization, particularly amongst the Bellavista leaders.

I will discuss internal democratization and diversity (the first of Kamrava and Mora’s three requirements) in more depth in the next subsection and focus here on how the Coordinadora complemented its own agenda with demands for democratic guarantees. It also reached out to build more powerful positions through horizontal relations with others. To characterize these relations I return to Evans’ concept of ecologies of actors, discussed in chapter 1. Consistent with Evans’ term, I see the Coordinadora acting as a catalyst, spurring its own members and others into more sustainable positions regarding city transport issues, and more democratic attitudes, as it developed relations with other NGOs, academics, local and national government staff.

The Coordinadora’s members had few illusions about the EIA process. We thought it highly unlikely, if not downright impossible, that the environmental commission, appointed and directly controlled by the national government, would reject a crucial project proposed by one of the country’s most powerful ministries. Nonetheless, the first small victory on participation led to modest victories that began to impact on urban planning in unexpected ways. Bellavista had
already started to frame its demands on political authorities in terms of a “declaration of the rights of neighbours” (see chapter 3). Partly to document its mistrust of the system, but also to challenge the injustice, the Coordinadora developed a series of reflections about citizen participation in the EIA system, published first as a document, and then as a book (Araya and Sagaris 1997).

Born of the deliberations of a very diverse group, these reflections highlighted the importance of equality and respect, access and impartiality, as central to genuine citizen participation in democracy. The communities’ particular claims came together in a collective demand for equal information, equal resources and an environment favourable to dialogue and participation (p. 100, Araya and Sagaris 1997). These demands circulated widely, among citizens’ groups, the government and others following the conflict, and the environmental commission tried to rise to the occasion. Contradictions within the government became apparent: the environmental commission was the first major new legal initiative born of Chile’s hard won democracy and the first in Chilean history to require citizen participation. Many staff were idealists with high hopes that the system would represent a democratization of environmental management.27

During the formal proceedings that constituted the EIA process, when the MOP presented its project, its opponents in the Coordinadora got “equal time” for presenting their arguments against it. This occurred during the general hearings (1997-1998) and during the considerations by the environmental commission’s advisory committee. Coordinadora representatives were even able to present to the political authorities responsible for the final decision, although they reported that the regional intendente and governors paid scant attention.28

The Coordinadora’s participation in the EIA took the form of both verbal remarks and a 200-page written document, which analyzed the government’s EIA section by section, offering extensive sourcing and evidence to support the Coordinadora’s positions. This result, the product of the Coordinadora’s own research, among its communities, in relevant literatures and through advisors in the academic and NGO worlds, caught the attention of many observers (Sepúlveda and du Monceau de Bergendal 1998; Ducci 2002; Sabatini, Geisse et al. 2004). They wrote articles but also organized panels and debates, bringing in Coordinadora leaders, urban and other experts, to debate the project with its proponents, all members of the MOP team. This dynamic cracked the

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27 Indeed, many of the early leaders of the citizen participation department came from environmental NGOs, particularly Casa de la Paz, which served as a school for participatory methods. Thus, Oriana Salazar, Angélica Fanjul, and others, all worked with Ximena Abogabir, developing participation among city neighbourhoods and in other contexts, before accepted jobs with the environmental commission.

28 Personal communication at the time, by Patricio Lanfranco and Ricardo Araya, who made the presentation.
prevailing assumption, that urban issues were “too sophisticated” for ordinary neighbours and therefore participation was just a waste of time and money, and reinforced pro-participation tendencies in both public and citizen sectors.

Academics, particularly transport engineers, frustrated as years of “rational”, back office discussions about public transport were abruptly shelved in favour of massive spending on urban highways, found their alliance with citizens took their opinions to the general public and, curiously, back into the policy world, in a significant way. This was often frustrating, as when Santiago mayor Jaime Ravinet told Coordinadora leaders and transport advisors that he didn’t give a damn about what “experts” said, Santiago needed a highway and it was going to get one. But it also began to have an impact, particularly as Living City developed its own communications media. In the short term, during the presidential debate between Lagos and his rival (1999), for example, both debated and strongly supported public transport, a first for the period.

The Coordinadora’s opposition also led to the manifestation of criticism, veiled or direct, from within the government’s own ranks. As part of the “technical” evaluation, government agencies with different jurisdictions were required to comment on the project. Thus, the metropolitan region transport ministry secretariat, for example, noted that with no information on where accesses would be located, it could provide no definitive opinion on the project’s environmental impacts. The National Monuments Council, responsible for heritage, complained plans were inconsistent and asked for clarification on the “real” route, noting, moreover that key monuments such as Neruda’s house-museum were not even mentioned. Other agencies too complained about the lack of precise information, among them the national mining and geology service (Sernageomin), and the environmental health service. The national tourism office expressed concern about the highway’s impact on Bellavista, especially La Chascona (Neruda’s house, a famous landmark and museum) and the entry to the San Cristobal Hill Park, while the housing and urbanism metropolitan secretariat noted there were insufficient provisions for the residents who would be displaced (CONAMA 1998-2000).

Aside from efforts through the environmental assessment, the Coordinadora sent personal letters to CEOs from the companies interested in bidding, distributing pamphlets and marching against those with the worst reputations, to convince them the highway would be bad for their image and their bottom line.

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29 Reported back to Coordinadora leaders’ assembly, after the meeting, c. July 1997.
In mid-1998, for example, more desperate than ever to get the project off the ground as Lagos prepared to leave the MOP to prepare his presidential campaign, the MOP met with potential builders and administrators of the project, most belonging to the powerful Chilean builders’ association (Cámara de la Construcción). Forgetting promises that the project would save the government funds need for social programs, Lagos asked finance minister Eduardo Aninat for a US $60-million direct subsidy and a state guarantee of minimum income covering 90% of the investment and operating cost for the first 17 years, a state guarantee of 85% of income should drivers use the highway without paying, and the offer that the MOP would assume any overruns for expropriations and environmental impact mitigation (p. 104, Quijada 2009).

These benefits fed opposition from three academics at the University of Chile’s Centre for Applied Economics. Engel, Fisher and Galetovic waged a fiercely critical campaign in the press, from 1997 onward, warning that it was dangerous for a single governmental entity, the MOP, to be involved in the dual role of marketing build-operate-transfer concessions to private companies, and then supposedly supervising their eventual implementation (p. 85, Quijada 2009).

In a classic example of Silva’s planned improvisation, Carlos Cruz, the head of the concessions unit frankly admitted, some years after the conflict:

> We had to carry out specific projects and we could see the failure of concessions in Spain, France, Mexico, the absolute incapacity of the Argentines and the Brazilians to carry out a concession program. In this context, were we going to debate the institutions necessary? The regulatory framework? Who should regulate a non-existent industry? The possibility that this industry might not be born? What we did was first create the industry and later see how to regulate it (cited on p. 86, Quijada 2009).

In August 1998, the Coordinadora took to the streets, inviting people to fax finance minister Eduardo Aninat on his direct office line to express opposition to any public funding for the highway. Ultimately, Aninat never approved a subsidy, killing the project for a while, as Lagos left the public works ministry (August 1998).³⁰

This was almost the end of the project. With the MOP and finance at loggerheads over subsidies, Hernán Doren, president of the Chilean builders’ association, demanded that President Frei make

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³⁰ This fax campaign became one of the few instances where MOP staff revealed the discomfort that the Coordinadora’s challenge to their apparently absolute power. During 1998, several supporters from within the government or the governing political parties reported that Lagos was furious that a small group of neighbours with access to a fax machine could do so much damage to his project. Indeed, an article in La Tercera (20-Aug-1998), then undersecretary of the MOP, Guillermo Pickering commented rather obscurely that there were other social problems much more important that those mentioned by the Coordinadora, especially on Santiago’s west side, which would receive many benefits from the highway “and doesn’t have fax or internet.”
the final decision. In 1999, Frei stepped in, ensuring that a new finance minister willingly signed off on an extensive set of benefits. While Lagos’ replacement as minister of public works organized a roundtable with the Coordinadora, the concession unit head was meeting with interested companies to negotiate sufficient benefits for a successful tender, in a ski resort high up in the Andes outside Santiago (pp. 116-118, Quijada 2009).

At the same time, then mayor of Independencia, Antonio Garrido, began a new wave of intimidation, threatening the residents of the Independencia-Borgoño and Olivos neighbourhoods with instant eviction, if they didn’t sign a document agreeing to leave immediately, upon request from the Municipal government. The threats of police breaking down doors and throwing families and their possessions into the street led to anguished calls throughout the Coordinadora.

Coordinadora leaders noted these threats violated the national rental legislation and demanded that concession’s head Cruz keep his promise to provide housing for displaced residents. Tohá himself spoke to Garrido, who finally suspended the visits to the community (MOP ordinance, Coordinadora letter to Tohá and report in La Tercera, cited in Quijada 2009). The municipality attacked again a few months later, however, demolishing a wall belonging to the University of Chile, which had been damaged by rain, and was adjacent to the Independencia-Olivos homes. Another round of memos followed between the MOP and the Municipality of Independencia, which brought more press coverage and a writ of habeas corpus, filed by resident Rosa Acosta (Recurso de Protección, Santiago Appeals Court, 22 December 1998, No.: 005200-98).

These tactics delayed eviction, and eventually most of the Independencia and Independencia-Olivos families, owners and renters, received compensation. None, however, were able to remain in “equivalent housing in the same neighbourhood” as demanded by the Coordinadora, promised by the MOP on multiple occasions (see, for example, La Epoca 5-IV-1997, Mayors of Recoleta and Independencia support Costanera Norte project), and required by the environmental resolution.

This was probably the most tragic failure of the Coordinadora: both communities were dismantled and their residents dispersed to the outskirts, where rents more closely matched their meagre incomes. By the time the Coordinadora held a memorial for the Independencia communities (May 2003), several had died and others complained of serious illness. Alicia Cid developed a cancer and, although she continued to make the enormous effort to attend early meetings of Living City, we eventually lost touch.
Each time the tender failed, the MOP had to rework its plans, not only for the Costanera Norte, but for the whole “calendar” of urban concessions. In early 1999, MOP minister Jaime Tohá announced the government was considering other priorities for the project list, because of the need to “open up a space of opportunity for new investors” (ElDiario 1999). Investors and government alike seemed resigned to the idea of taking on smaller, less controversial projects, in order to get the concessions program underway with private investment (Isla 1999).

Yet another round of negotiations, however, more subsidies (equal to 10% of the ministry’s annual budget, according to Engel et al. (Engel, Fischer et al. 1999), and by December 1999, with just four companies in the running, the government finally achieved a successful tender. The winner was a consortium formed by Impregilo (Italian) and its Chilean partners, Fe Grande and Tecsa, for an offer of just US$12 million, well below the US$60 million that Cruz had confidently told the Chilean congress the project would earn the national treasury (Public Works Commission Session, Chamber of Deputies, Chilean Congress, 7 September 1999).

Despite the urgency of previous years, for over a year, nothing visible happened. Behind the scenes, the company met with the Coordinadora, asking primarily about an alternative route. This involved sinking the six-lane highway under the Mapocho River, to avoid impacts on Pedro de Valdivia Norte, Bellavista and the Vega. In Independencia, however, the highway continued to emerge in the properties occupied by the Escanilla-Borgoño families. Whether this was due to the municipality’s protocol, which included a spanking new administrative building in exchange for giving up its claims to properties on the riverbank, to the families’ poverty, or some other reason was never clarified.

Quijada sees some tendency to division within the Coordinadora, particularly between the majority and Pedro de Valdivia Norte over this new route, which was publicly supported by Juan Luis Moure, VP of the Junta de Vecinos #12. For the coalition itself, however, these different nuances were normal, particularly after the experience with the protocols discussed elsewhere in this chapter. The Coordinadora as a whole did not accept the alternative. The consensus was to wait and watch with interest the battle of wills between the government, which insisted on the original route, and the equally determined company.

Within a year, the company had won, with its route under the river, and work began in December 2001. For years, however, some threads of the campaign continued, particularly in Recoleta. There, the markets (Tirso de Molina, Pérgola de las Flores) battled to obtain the permanent buildings promised in their protocol. These were eventually built by the MOP itself, in 2010-2011.
Was this defeat, an unexpected victory or a consolation prize? As the discussion in this chapter suggests, the results of the anti-highway campaign can be read in all three ways. Lengthy reflections, multiple debates, were necessary before we defined our own bottom line: the communities had won (except for Independencia, and that defeat hurts to this day) by ensuring their own survival, but the city as a whole lost, because the highway was built and with it, a car-centred approach to urban transportation took precedence over more socially just and environmentally friendly options.

The conflict, however, was extremely successful in placing the issue of citizen involvement and rights into the public debate, enriching larger debates about Chile’s democratic deficit, participation and legitimation of public policies, private projects and governance in general. For the communities, the conflict also left us with a rich, and unsuspected, store of knowledge, credibility and political capital, as the remainder of this dissertation describes.

4.2 Forging the core: Diversity, voice and vocería

What was happening at the core of the Coordinadora to make these kinds of dynamics and their impacts possible? As discussed in chapter 2, Thomson measures the effectiveness of neighbourhood associations in US cities by analyzing their cores, their outreach and their policy impacts. In the case of the Coordinadora, it is important to examine how the anti-highway campaign and the internal dynamics of the diverse leaders, reinforced certain aspects of the debate and, in the process, resulted in the emergence first of a temporary, and then a permanent, citizen organization, fiercely jealous of its own independence, despite the mainly clientelist environment into which it was born.

4.2.1 Diversity through dialogue and deliberation

The Coordinadora illustrates the importance of combining diversity, authentic dialogue, and interdependence (Innes and Booher 2010), and the fact that these can be applied by “the planned”, in a way that produced considerable interest among more powerful policy actors and academics. Its very existence, and above all its diversity in classbound Chile and segregated Santiago, confused many. The Catholic University’s Pablo Allard, for example, notes:

The novelty of this case, at least in Chilean history, is the fact that the coalition included for the first time a variety of actors and interests that bridged historical divisions such as political interests and both social and economic status. Chile is still a country where power structures are socially determined; therefore, the fact of having “pobladores” or informal settlers sitting at
the same table with rich homeowners, businessmen, and informal street merchants, was completely unprecedented (2003).

This diversity was apparent in terms of socio-economic status, but also in the claims raised by the different communities and how the Coordinadora resolved conflicts. In 1998, environmental advisors questioned the participation of market groups, when the government offered the Tirso de Molino and the Pérgola Santa María an agreement, or protocolo, which guaranteed they would not be expelled from their precarious locations on publicly owned land that was officially green space. They were fighting for their survival, rather than “pure” environmental motives.

This conflict also illustrates that for diversity to work, authentic dialogue (Innes and Booher 2010) or deliberation (Forester 1999) is essential, producing the strategic conviction (Healey 1997) necessary for groups to bond across difference, learning to live with nonessential contradictions. Thus, at a meeting of the Coordinadora to discuss the government’s protocolos, leaders listened attentively as environmental advisors argued that any group signing a protocol should be forced to leave the Coordinadora, because this involved selling out the environment for motives they considered illegitimate, that is, survival of their families and businesses. After a round of opinions in which every leader and advisor expressed their opinion, the Coordinadora as a whole politely rejected this idea. The consensus was that while the campaign aimed to stop the highway project, its central purpose was to ensure that communities survived. Social needs were as important as environmental goals, and the market groups were encouraged to sign the protocols, as a bottom line that guaranteed that, no matter the final outcome of the campaign, they would survive. This position affirmed the market leaders’ commitment to the group, and they remained active leaders throughout the campaign and into the early years of Living City, going on to fight for and achieve further concessions from the MOP, including new buildings, which were completed in 2011.

The Coordinadora experience also illustrates how interdependence strengthens practice and increases effectiveness. We needed each other to fight this campaign. I was involved in many conversations with outsiders who expressed their doubts about how we worked. They imagined that neighbours from Pedro de Valdivia Norte serving as the brains and contributing funds, the market people acting as “foot soldiers”, and Bellavista working as a kind of creative hinge (informal personal communications, 1999-2001).

They were mostly right about Bellavista as the hinge, but as it turned out, the leaders from Pedro de Valdivia Norte proved to be excellent at going door to door, talking to their neighbours, getting people on board and out to events. Their contribution to campaign finances was pretty similar to
the other groups, however, and there were times when they proved unable to contribute urgently needed funds.

Then it was often the markets and Acofer, the storekeepers in the market neighbourhood, who made a vital contribution: individually these were poor communities, but they were also desperate to survive, and a quick round of fundraising could produce significant amounts. When events were held in their territory, the market people were massive in their response. They were more reluctant, however, to join events elsewhere, although a small group of 6-8 leaders would usually go as far as the environmental commission, a ministry office or Bellavista, as required, particularly if they could count on the moral support of leaders from the other communities and expert advisors.

Independencia, the two poorest communities and those who felt that everything they held dear was at risk, proved to be a cable to earth, as the Chileans put it. The reality of these communities, of low-income, mostly elderly people facing displacement was compelling. Alicia Cid (Independencia-Olivos), elderly, soft-spoken, tenacious, was an avid leafletter, bringing in news about opinions on the street, and the Christian Democrat party in which she had long been a member. Like Bellavista’s Montecinos in the case of SEIA-related issues, Luis Olivares (Independencia-Borgoño), was a master of detail, a skill that ultimately ensured that -- for the first time -- homeowners and renters alike obtained compensation for the homes lost to the highway.

In Pedro de Valdivia Norte, business men Alfredo Gredig and Juan Luis Moure (often as vice-president of the neighbourhood association) mobilized their neighbours and obtained inside information from some of their business and political colleagues. Bellavista provided political expertise, the result of involvement of Patricio Lanfranco, a key leader, in anti-regime movements in the 1980s, particularly the Cultural Association of the University, among others.

In Bellavista, María Inés Solimano (now over 80 years old, still an inspiring leader on the Living City board) also proved an extraordinary resource. After spending much of her life working with some of Chile’s most outstanding artists, she had a wealth of social contacts and ideas about how to raise funds, get people involved, and keep them connected. One week, early in the campaign, she single handedly convinced shopkeepers and neighbours along Bellavista Avenue to make the necessary donations and hang anti-highway banners up and down the busy road, an initiative that made the television news and remained in newspaper’s photo archives for frequent use for the rest

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31 There is a chapter on this extraordinary effort in my book, After the First Death (Sagaris 1996). The ACU, as it was known, successfully pitted music, theatre, painting and literature against the fear and weapons of the military, during the early years after the coup (1978-1983), opening the way for students in Chile’s politically influential universities to take their associations and federations back from the military’s appointees, as the regime weakened in the 1980s.
of the campaign. She also invented the art auction that ultimately provided the Coordinadora’s funding. An excellent cook, she made fundraising dinners a central feature of the campaign, an effort that brought in modest amounts of money (about $300 each time) but enormous social capital amongst sectors who did not participate in regular meetings.

Deliberations at Coordinadora meetings often returned to the nature of our central purpose, as opposed to goals. The campaign’s goal was to stop a project that threatened to demolish our neighbourhoods and livelihoods and would also be harmful to the creation of a good, just and livable city. But as we progressed (and our understanding of urban issues grew), we realized that our purpose was to ensure the survival and healthy evolution of our beleaguered communities, with their glorious pasts and problematic presents. This became clear in the debate over the market organizations’ signing the protocols, when we consciously chose to remain together. Living communities could fight on, we realized. Dead ones could only be mourned.

As mentioned, the ultimate result -- the highway project got built, but in our territory (see map, chapter 3, figure 3.5) went under the river, leaving our communities intact -- can be read as both failure and success. Although there was never any official recognition, this routing, which added considerable expense to the project, does seem to have been the result of our campaign: the highway goes under the river only in the Coordinadora’s territory. Moreover, the company consulted us on this option, and although we refused to support it, we did not oppose it. We also received reports from inside the company that without the route change, the firm was refusing to go ahead, and the government finally had to give in. As the discussion in this chapter reveals, it was our efforts played back to us in the mirror of people around us, including academics, planners, policymakers and key private sector actors, which turned around our sense of failure, and led us to create Living City.

4.2.2 Voice and Vocería

In 1999, as tenders continued to fail, business leaders and the ministry admitted they were concerned about “the risk, because it is the first urban concession, the conflict with environmental groups, its profitability or current economic conditions” (Rivas 1999). Nury Gatica, leader of the Pergolera Santa María, spoke for the whole Coordinadora when she told La Tercera that this was a relief, because “these works would be very bad for us. We’ve said this all along. That’s why we’re in no rush to see this project go ahead.” The Coordinadora, moreover, expressed its dismay that the MOP would consider providing “millions in insurance” for the project, when the national budget was subject to cutbacks due to difficult economic times (Rivas 1999).
Gatica’s role as spokeswoman was no accident. Early on, the Coordinadora established procedural rules that played a crucial role in building trust, leadership and unity amongst the diverse organizations. Major declarations were vetted and corrected by leaders of every community. More urgent press releases were consulted amongst at least two or three members, and sometimes more, depending on the amount of prior discussion. Communities always chose their own spokespeople, a practice that the media and other organizations found disconcerting. Although, as an experienced journalist, I drafted most press releases, I was seldom a spokesperson. Instead, each community had its own spokespeople and we also had experts on specific topics. A journalist asking about the markets, for example, would be referred to Sonia, Nury or Domingo. If the questions focused more on transport and the environment, I would refer them to Mauricio, Ricardo Araya (as a physician knowing about pollution and health), or one of our advisors, particularly Juan de Dios Ortuzar and Francisco Martínez.

Similarly, the way the Coordinadora organized its relations with the authorities also evolved during the anti-highway campaign. In Chile at the time, the arrival of any kind of elected official or well known politician at a community gathering was immediately the occasion for major interruption, the ushering of the authority to the front of the room, the interruption of all proceedings until the visiting dignitary had established himself comfortably at the head table, and then proceeded to emit his (these were usually men, so the male pronoun seems most appropriate) considered opinions on whatever topic he deemed fit (regardless of its interest to those present or its relevance to the meeting itself). Bellavista had broken with this procedure, however, during the 1993 municipal elections. After considerable internal debate, leaders decided that instead of supporting candidates from a specific party, they would host an all-candidates meeting in a public square. Neighbourhood association leaders would speak first, presenting the neighbours’ diagnosis of the severe problems they faced, reading a list of commitments to change, and demanding that all candidates express their support, verbally and by signing a formal declaration of commitment. Among the candidates present at this first public assembly was Cristián Labbé, who signed the declaration and was elected mayor. Although he did not keep his commitment to the letter, this was the first step in what became a lengthy, deep, if somewhat uneasy, form of cooperation between the neighbourhood and the municipality of Providencia.

Thus, when after months of unanswered requests, the MOP finally contacted the Coordinadora with an invitation for three leaders to meet the minister, there was intense deliberation on how the meeting should be organized and above all, who would speak. Who could represent the full diversity of such a group? And if only one person did so, how could they possibly capture all the
issues and nuances involved? Above all, a single-leader approach would empower one and
disempower many, with a high risk of repeating the same patterns of exclusion that the
*Coordinadora* was meant to challenge.

Based on my experience in the student movement in Canada, I argued that we had requested the
meeting, so we should not let the ministry tell us who could represent us. Moreover, as we were all
aware, each organization had its own reasons for opposing the project (see Claims, chapter 3) and
each had its own organization and leadership, democratically elected to represent them, and
exercise their *vocería* (literally, collective voice). Who was the *Coordinadora* to ignore these
democratic roots? The group decided that each community should send its own spokesperson.

As deliberation progressed, we noted that crucial issues affected the city as a whole, and therefore,
specific experts should also attend. Finally, we recalled, government officials are famous for taking
over these long-awaited meetings and not letting citizens talk, so we decided that our group
should have its own leader, to “chair” the meeting, respectfully but firmly keeping it on track.

At the meeting itself, our chair, Patricio Lanfranco, effectively took the initiative when the
minister entered, introducing an impressive array of leaders and experts, 14 in total, each of whom
spoke as part of the first round of conversation, taking the minister by surprise, and forcing him to
respond to specific observations and demands in his own remarks.

Of course, despite all this splendid preparation, the project continued to advance. But at least one,
and possibly two, substantial changes came out of this innovative procedure. The first was that as
the *Coordinadora* participated in more activities on this basis, the separate claims of each
community became part of common claims made by the whole group. This forged bonds of
understanding and trust. Rather than being represented by a single leader/voice, our voices were
multiple, female and male, *popular* and professional. Thus, each voice grew stronger, as leaders
learned how to speak in public, how to address the powerful “*de tú a tú*”, as equals. It is not that
everyone learned everything, and was therefore equal. But each participant developed essential
skills for active citizenship: critical thinking, public speaking, dealing with the media, and so on.

The second change was that although Lagos never abandoned his flagship project, his staff did
commit to a greater fairness in handling expropriations and other crucial issues. Moreover, we

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32 I was involved in preparation and subsequent press work, but did not attend, since Bellavista had other strong leaders
who were more relevant: Patricio Lanfranco, who chaired the *Coordinadora’s* participation, and Mauricio Montecinos,
our environmental impact expert. Thus, this account is the collective version, based on reports at the time and the
collective molding of a narrative that became central to “who we were”, as *Coordinadora*. 
seem to have had considerable impact on Lagos himself, and his thinking about citizen participation. Although at first he treated us as ignorant and selfish neighbours, standing in the way of progress for all, throughout his presidency he showed a surprisingly favourable (although still remarkably top-down) attitude to citizen participation. Thus, one of his first actions when he assumed the presidency in 2000, was to issue a presidential edict requiring citizen participation from every ministry and government office (Lagos 2000). Moreover, at the inauguration of the National Council for Sustainable Development he mentioned his initial disgust with the “neighbours who fought the highway project”, but noted that he now understood their stance and believed Chile needed more citizens like them.\(^{33}\) I am not arguing here that because of the Coordinadora, Lagos changed his views (cause-effect), but rather that it contributed to a paradigm shift on citizen participation, driven by many forces, and that for Lagos the Coordinadora certainly seems to have been a significant experience, one that he carried with him, along with many others, into the presidency.

4.2.3 When small becomes large

Despite its apparent size and the 50,000 population that the Coordinadora’s organizations claimed to represent, with little experience, we were nervous about our ability to mobilize significant numbers, especially in a country where an ordinary demonstration typically numbered in the tens of thousands. Coordinadora events were modest affairs, focusing on getting neighbours out of their shells and into public spaces. The rally in which Bellavista announced its opposition to the highway involved around 200 people; the rally and march from the central markets to the downtown offices of the environmental commission united some 300 people; and a “wave of hugs of our neighbourhoods” started out in Independencia with no more than 50 people, before extending to Bellavista (some 200) and Pedro de Valdivia Norte (a similar number).

We also staged smaller events, taking a giant cheque to the MOP offices downtown (27 July 1998), to symbolize the large subsidy necessary to ensure private interest. Standing outside the presidential palace or marching along the sidewalk to deliver it to the MOP, Ricardo Araya and I argued vociferously with police officers who wanted to arrest our hardy group of no more than 15 people: “This is freedom of expression! We’re allowed to do this now! You can’t arrest us for exercising our right to an opinion!” We were so insistent that in fact there were no arrests that day, or at any of the Coordinadora’s events.

\(^{33}\) Personal communication from Ximena Abogabir, who was present at the meeting, at the time, and confirmation on 19-July-2012. The comments were also covered by TV news, and reported to me by Patricio Lanfranco.
Why did such small events ultimately have so much impact? In retrospect, I believe two powerful forces were at work, which, moreover, interacted favourably in a relatively small country like Chile (total population 14 million) with a small, closed elite, as discussed in chapter 3. The two reinforced each other in very significant ways and they also had implications for the structures of both the Coordinadora and Living City. The first was the series of relationships we were able to mobilize, through direct, face-to-face contact and our diverse activities. This was strongly reinforced by a communications “weave”, which the Coordinadora invented as it went along, starting from face-to-face meetings and conversations on the street, adding phonecalls and phone-trees, and then other technologies as they emerged. These reinforced face-to-face communication with every other medium available at a time when communications technologies were rapidly changing and, as a journalist, I was constantly learning to use them. Thus, we reached out, but we also pulled in, and held people within a web that, as we progressed, became accumulative.

Communications “weave”

I have already mentioned the fax campaign that helped to prevent Aninat from approving subsidies. With very few resources, we needed to keep a growing group of neighbours, market vendors and interested followers informed and involved in our progress. To do so, we used everything from traditional mass media through to the “witches’ post”, the Chilean term for the neighbourhood rumour mills, feeding quality information into the system by talking at length with key street folk (neighbourhood gossips, recyclers, artisans, the people who parked cars), the Chilean equivalent of Victorian running patterers, who announced headlines and kept people informed.

Wall posters designed to look like newspapers, with shared content but oriented to the specific neighbourhood, became the earliest versions of our newspaper, La Voz (the Voice), published every two or three days or weeks. As e-mail and later websites became available, we integrated them into our weave, developing a campaign site on Geocities in English, French and Spanish, to build support among environmental organizations and advertise opposition to companies from those countries, interested in the tender.

We also used more traditional media work: news releases, comments, guest editorials and letters, radio interviews and the like. But we almost always added our own touch, holding a breakfast with the press, for example, in a Bellavista restaurant, with home-made bread, jams and juices (using fruit from the Tirso de Molino), to underline the multi-dimensional nature of our communities.
Relational trees

What we didn’t realize at the time, was how much our communicational efforts reinforced and expanded our own relational trees, and how we were able to grow these trees into forests of relatively dense relationships, capable of taking our messages into parts of society, and the elite, where we could not reach directly. The way Ximena Abogabir’s story of my encounter with the regional governor (described below) circulated among people we did not know very well, for example, suggests how our actions indirectly and unexpectedly brought people closer.

Those who did not attend our events, meetings, marches and rallies were always aware of the results, through our internal bulletin “Entre Nosotros” (Between Us), which was sent out, mostly by fax, and reinforced in the case of key leaders without fax, by phone conversations. This had the unintended effect of making us look larger than we were, and keeping people in touch.

Our market people had multi-class relationships, with each other, other market and transport people important to their work, and to their customers, many of whom were regulars, affectionately know as caseros. Indeed, just as I am her casera, the woman who regularly sells me vegetables is my casera, creating a curious equality of exchange, even when income and social standing may be radically different. With her flower business, Nury in particular was well connected with the press, government officials, students and others who were able to slip us information and broadcast our news in their own circles.

The people who came to our art auctions and fundraising meals came for the fun, the good food and conversation. They were seldom leaders of our organizations, but rather represented a whole different segment of Santiago society that was curious about us and increasingly sympathetic. Other neighbourhoods, particularly Yungay, across the river in the older part of the comuna of Santiago, and citizen initiatives in the port of Valparaíso, followed our example in some things, developed their own processes on others, and we shared, copied and critiqued initiatives by our peers. What I realize now is how many of these seemingly casual contacts were actually powerful transmitters, carrying our ideas, transforming them according to local realities, and helping to build a body of theory, but mostly practice, about citizen participation in urban planning. During this period it was virtually all insurgent discussed by other planning theorists (Sandercock 1998; Friedmann 2002; Holston 2008), in an oppositional sense, that is, it consisted primarily of anti-planning, resistance and other conflict-related stances.
This spontaneous application of Innes and Boohers’ DIAD (diversity, interdependence and authentic dialogue) did more than build consensus within the *Coordinadora*, as is the expectation in formal, usually government-led planning situations described by these theorists (Innes and Booher 2004; Innes and Booher 2010). In citizen hands it was a powerful tool for campaigning, but also for building *citizenship as agency* rather than co-option (Oxhorn 1995; Oxhorn 2011).

Thus, the *Coordinadora* was able to mobilize the strength within its own diverse membership. But more was needed. In a short period, the coalition’s communities had to acquire just about every skill in the political, analytical, urban planning and movement book. This required learning crucial citizenship skills on the run.

### 4.3 Learning active citizenship

As discussed in chapter 1, finding -- or creating -- the “good citizen” (Dahl 1992) is a challenge anywhere. Nonetheless, Gaventa’s critical consciousness (discussed by Merrifield in chapter 1), was certainly present. Appalled by a project that, like a juggernaut, threatened to crush our communities, the *Coordinadora*’s leaders started from critical positions. But these were refined and developed through the deliberative processes at meetings, the resulting decisions and actions. This involved valuing the perspective of people with very different skill sets, bringing out the knowledge about the city inherent in each community and leader, and pooling it in ways that met specific needs. The core group of the *Coordinadora* forged a new political culture, which, when taken into the arenas of public debate, and particularly the EIA, challenged and changed the prevailing norms of conduct, long shaped by the authoritarian procedures of the military regime.

One telling example of how the *Coordinadora* did this was in its meetings, when they finally occurred, with the ministers behind the project, described above.

Merrifield applies thinking about how people learn, to define the key components in citizenship learning. As table 4.2 indicates, all these components were present in the improvised pressure cooker that turned the *Coordinadora* into a respected actor in the highway debate. New knowledge was deeply linked to each community’s historical and present identities, current patterns for living and surviving, reinforced by their particular claims to the city and, therefore, against the highway project.

The processes involved in the SEIA, media debates, judicial actions and mobilization all demanded that leaders not only talk, but also practice their values, internally but also in their meetings with a
A wide variety of authorities and occasional clashes with police. The attacks from powerful

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship learning should:</th>
<th>The Coordinadora:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Help people acquire new knowledge by linking to the core concepts in their existing</td>
<td>Started from each community’s/leader’s survival and environmental aspirations, to acquire and structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>patterns of knowledge.</td>
<td>new knowledge appropriately.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Practice what it preaches, provide experiences of engaging in democracy not just</td>
<td>Functioned in a horizontal manner, practicing direct democracy, as key to committing, training and</td>
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<td>information about it.</td>
<td>empowering leaders from diverse organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Provide opportunities to practice problem solving and to become self-aware about their</td>
<td>The campaign process, involving challenges on the streets, in the judicial, environmental, communications</td>
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<td>problem solving processes.</td>
<td>and financial spheres required sensitive, aware problem solving.</td>
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<td>4. Provide opportunities to re-present experience in different ways, in order to deepen</td>
<td>Reframed imposed narratives (&quot;selfish neighbours&quot;, &quot;self-interested market people&quot;) to articulate their</td>
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<td>analysis and understanding.</td>
<td>communities’ needs as democratic rights, essential to social justice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Allow spiral learning (revisiting and understanding at a deeper level), to facilitate</td>
<td>Collective deliberations involved all participants contributing their knowledge, willingness to act,</td>
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<td>growth and development.</td>
<td>ideas and capacities, and constant analysis of the state of the campaign formed part of these processes,</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Provide 'scaffolding' opportunities, in which those who are more experienced help</td>
<td>thus developing critical and analytical skills.</td>
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<td>novices with tasks that they cannot quite manage themselves, giving control back to the</td>
<td>Each community had specific strengths and weaknesses; through collective action in the Coordinadora, the</td>
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<td>novice when he or she can manage alone.</td>
<td>tendency was to supplement weaknesses and limit errors, through collective analysis and decision-making.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Provide practice at all levels of reflection from immediate to deeper self-examination.</td>
<td>Generated a variety of spaces, mostly informal, that encouraged a variety of reflection.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Best be conducted in the context of communities of practice -- establishing group norms,</td>
<td>Successfully created a collective identity based on common practices across diversity during the anti-highway</td>
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<td>values, language, meanings and purposes.</td>
<td>campaign, and passed this along to Living City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Incorporate a range of cultural expressions and social activities to create the learning</td>
<td>Combined a range of experiences, interests, spaces for participation, learning and action.</td>
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<td>community.</td>
<td>Questioned assumed values (inequality as symbolized by the highway), counterposing issues of rights,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Engage with values.</td>
<td>inclusion and citizenship.</td>
</tr>
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Source: Own elaboration using Merrifield’s 10 components of citizen learning, pp. 28-29, Merrifield 2001.
politicians, business organizations and pro-business media also forced leaders to debate, reframe and challenge prevailing values, creating a solid core of leaders with common views, and capable of communicating them to their grassroots membership.

“Foreign” actors, attitudes

The presence of three foreign women was also important to the Coordinadora’s development. Inés Wattine (PVN), Céline Désramés (Committee to Defend San Cristobal Hill), and I came from countries with democratic traditions, Inés and Céline from France, and I from Canada. Inés’ father had served in the resistance against the Nazi invasion of France, while Céline was a student of history, working on a PhD dissertation on public space in Chile in the 1900s. Along with Alicia Cid (Independencia) Inés was the best door-to-door person I have ever met, reliable, serious, quiet and humble in her attitudes at meetings, but indignant at the arrogance and discrimination often dealt out to our campaign. Céline, too, was articulate and lively, an active, responsible participant who later edited a book on heritage, published by Living City, before returning to France.

I had been largely formed by the student movement in Canada, and particularly the two national organizations, the National Union of Students (the predecessor of today’s CFS) and Canadian University Press. Again, as with the class differences discussed above, this foreign presence was the object of some misinterpretation and caricatures about our role.

Far from reflecting the typical cliches of foreign “experts” with enormous power and resources to tell people how to do things and make them do it, we were all experiencing the reality of being outsiders, unable to interact in more than a superficial way with and upon our Chilean environment. Always insular, Chile at once “loved” foreigners, and ruthlessly excluded us from meaningful political and social involvement, locking us into a belljar of clichés: upper class Chileans tended to see us as cute little versions of Ronald Reaganites, while lower income people could be resentful, classifying us indiscriminately as rich powerful gringos, “yankee go home!” regardless of our precarious incomes and lifestyles. In 1991, for the first time since immigrating to Chile in 1981, I was thinking about moving back to Canada. With three young boys, I was concerned about the inequality they were being bred into, which seemed impossible to challenge.

On a practical level, all three of us helped to reach out to organizations in the countries of origin of the foreign firms interested in bidding on the project. The trilingual website that we published existed for this purpose, and we also corresponded with groups abroad, such as Friends of the Earth, obtaining formal support and signatures on letters to the companies.
On a deeper level, it’s harder to define just how our “foreignness” contributed to building the interclass relations within the *Coordinadora*. Over the years, other leaders and observers have commented on this. Patricio Lanfranco, María Inés Solimano and Ximena Abogabir emphasize our role in creating a spirit of equality, for the simple reason that we hadn’t grown up with the superior attitudes -- expressed in body language, accents and other, often subtle, characteristics of communication -- that typically characterized high-income Chileans’ relations with market and low-income people. Ximena Abogabir, for example, said:

I think you, as a Canadian were a great contribution in terms of democracy. What we see in most organizations are very authoritarian leaders. They want to be protagonists. In contrast, you were stubborn about sharing power, visibility. From my perspective, I always learned from the way you exercised your leadership (Abogabir 2010).

There was one incident, too, that circulated widely (we did not know this). It was originally witnessed by Ximena Abogabir, who commented on it to many of her friends and acquaintances (Salazar and Ortuzar, for example, both recounted Ximena’s version of this incident during their interviews in 2010). During the closing event of *Santiago Como Vamos*, at the Catholic University, amidst the hundreds of participants, I seized the opportunity to approach German Quintana, then the Intendente (regional governor) of Santiago. In Ximena’s words:

You went up to him and said, Intendente, we’ve been asking you for a meeting for three weeks and you haven’t answered us. He says, I’ve been busy, and keeps walking past you. You intercept him again, and then again, and insist that it’s his obligation to receive you. So he says to one of his assistants, Aldo, look after this little girl (*niñita*) would you? And you intercept him for the fourth time and say, Intendente, I’m not a little girl. That ... showed such profound dignity and self-respect, something we Chileans don’t think of doing (Abogabir 2010).

Ortuzar reacted similarly, first noticing, then feeling called upon to respond.

What caught my attention at first was Lake. I saw her speak in public a couple of times and I thought how can we be such geese in this country, that we don’t do anything, and this fantastic *gringa* from another country gives us a class in how to stand up against this atrocious thing, they’re trying to do in our city, and we do nothing. This moved me deeply... To say the right thing and make the government listen to citizens, seemed extraordinary to me: people with no preparation were willing to stand up and defend their neighbourhoods. That was really good (Ortuzar 2010).

**One-two dynamics**

Within these interactions, two dynamics stand out as relevant to the citizen learning that took place. The first was that the *Coordinadora*’s key leadership functioned mostly as pairs of individuals combining strong commonalities and complementaries. In Independencia, Luis Olivares and
Alfredo Basaure clearly had differences, but much of their early participation was based on their functioning as a complementary unit. In Recoleta, Jorge Cannobbio-Domingo Pérez (Tirso de Molina) and Nury Gatica-Sonia Abarca (Pérgola-Vega Chica) came to Coordinadora meetings together and it was clear they talked things back and forth, weighed and made own decisions, based on that dynamic of deliberation. Similarly, in the early stages Patricio Lanfranco and Ricardo Araya (Bellavista-Pedro de Valdivia Norte), spent hours on the phone comparing notes and developing the political analyses that were then chewed over in general meetings. María Inés Solimano and I (Bellavista) became inseparable, doing most of the grassroots organizing, fundraising and outreach. Inés Watine and Céline Désramés (Pedro de Valdivia Norte) played a similar role. These close friendships gave the Coordinadora’s loose bonds a strength they would otherwise have lacked, and a foundation for deeper trust and greater risk-taking.

The second dynamic was one that we noticed early on, between the specific neighbourhood groups. This was most evident in Pedro de Valdivia Norte and Bellavista, but also played out in the markets and Independencia. In both of the former, ad hoc committees (EcoBella and the Committee to Defend the Metropolitan Park) interacted with the legally recognized neighbourhood associations (Juntas de Vecinos #12 and #13 Mario Baeza). This was unusual at a time when ad hoc groups formed to campaign often did battle with everyone, including the neighbourhood associations. In contrast, the Coordinadora successfully harnessed the energy and focus of the more radical ad hoc groups and the legal recognition and official status of the neighbourhood associations. This allowed it to play a wider range of roles in its relationships with its own grassroots and the official world of government. Later, we recommended to other similar groups that they get involved in their neighbourhood associations, rather than writing them off, and this occurred in several neighbourhoods, particularly in Providencia and Recoleta, the Coordinadora and later the Living City strongholds.

Motivations

Was this all motivated by narrow self-interest, as some theorists, particularly economists, tend to argue? Ducci (Ducci 2002) examines this question, from the perspective of Sen’s dual concepts of sympathy and commitment.

Sympathy as a basis for decisions would fall within the realm of selfishness, since “...conduct based on sympathy is largely selfish, because one enjoys it when others are pleased, and feels pain when others suffer.” On the other hand, behavior based on commitment would not be selfish if we understand commitment as “...a person choosing an act [in a manner that] he
believe will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is also available to him” (quoted on p. 179, Ducci 2002).

After observing close up how these groups operate, Ducci notes that:

all have some members, generally very few, who, without necessarily being the most visible leaders, devote a large part of their energy and time to working on the issue that brings their group together. It is amazing to see how after long hours of work, day in and day out, the leaders and individuals most involved invest time in meetings and discussions to reach agreements and define strategies for their struggle. This is especially the case among the middle-class and poor sectors, who have a harder time making themselves heard and seen (p. 179, Ducci 2002).

Beyond self-interest, she identifies safety, stability and one’s sense of self as crucial factors in bringing neighbours into these movements. Nonetheless, she notes that when one’s sense of identity is threatened, “the strongest passions are aroused to defend the place where one lives or works” and cites the example of groups in the Coordinadora (and later, Living City), particularly the traders of the Vega and the Pérgola Santa María:

who feel that the importance of their work goes beyond the neighborhood and the city. Indeed, the pergoleras take great pride in their symbolic importance as the persons in charge of bidding farewell, with showers of flower petals, to all illustrious persons who pass by on their final trip to the cemetery. Also noteworthy, in a city that appears so little beloved by its inhabitants as is Santiago, is the ardor with which the residents of Bellavista defend their neighborhood from the invasion of nighttime activities that threaten its peace and tranquility. They defend a bohemian and urban way of life, a neighborhood life that enjoys a mix of artists and social classes, where everyone knows the corner storekeeper and the old woman from the house at the end of the street (p. 180, Ducci 2002).

This perspective enriches Merrifield’s typology and offers some insight into the particularities of citizen learning as it relates specifically to urban spaces and territories. Thus, “the material use of space cannot be separated from its psychological use”, Ducci argues. “People feel that their neighborhood is the place that best meets a complex set of conditions: from solutions to practical problems to the security and peace of mind one derives from knowing and trusting your neighbors (a ‘use value’)” (p. 181, Ducci 2002). Finally, in response to those analysts who argue that these are merely “fundamentalist and reactionary responses to the necessary and constant changes” in city life, she notes that:

While most of the movements oppose specific projects that have a detrimental impact on quality of life, the social dynamics that these battles are setting in motion do not appear to be reactionary in the least. To the contrary, they are giving rise to and sometimes proliferating solidarity and partnerships among distinct groups and different social classes, who are quickly learning the value of collaboration and mutual support in advancing towards a common goal: a better quality of life in the city in which they live (p. 182, Ducci 2002).
These changes, arising from citizenship learning, were evident in citizens’ insistence on playing a significant role in city governance. But it is important to underline that they played out as much in people’s hearts as on the streets, in private as well as public spaces. There was nothing theoretical about the transformations that this learning-acting wrought. Domingo Pérez (Tirso de Molina fruit and vegetable market) says:

> When I joined the Coordinadora, I didn’t even know how to talk. I learned a lot in that group -- even how to read blueprints. I just wanted to defend my people, to ensure that any old political project, no matter how important, couldn’t just roll right over us. We learned how to act as a group, how to fight in a democratic way, how to organize (Pérez 2010).

Mauricio Montecinos, who led the Coordinadora team that prepared the response to the EIA and later served two terms as president of the Bellavista neighbourhood association (Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza), described what he and the group learned together as follows:

> The anti-highway fight made us learn. We realized that what we were fighting for was a much more global issue. It changed our lives. We learned to look at the city differently. This issue was about the city as a whole, not just something local (Montecinos 2010).

On 29 July, 2010, several leaders from Independencia, Recoleta and Bellavista who had been fundamental to the Coordinadora gathered to reflect on their experiences and what they meant to them, individually, and to the group, a decade after the most intense period of the highway conflict had ended (Olivares 2010). María Inés Solimano (Bellavista, 79 years old), began:

> There came a time when I heard they would sell the school next door and the highway would go right past my house. This activated my animal instinct of belonging, not animal, my sense of belonging. I began to work [on the campaign] like crazy. I remember the meetings at the ministry -- 20-25 of us would go. They would say stupid things to us, like promising to remove the gases via the River. The stupidity of the things they said to us affected me. I never had a very high idea, but I was impressed by the lack of ethics of the staff involved. I remember, Nury, the marvellous bouquets of flowers you used to bring to the art auctions. I’ll never forget the celebration at your house, when the highway was stopped. You loaned us bathing suits for 17 women more or less.

Luis Olivares started his reflection on the Coordinadora remembering a similar event:

> Inés Fernández made a paella… (Everyone chimes in, and there is much laughter at the memory of artist, Carmen Silva, in improvised bikini, at the side of Nury’s pool.)

Then he described how he had first heard about the highway project, joining and then being elected president of the association of owners and renters.

> I was amazed by how little we all knew about what an expropriation was going to mean. We were totally lost. After a meeting with the Mayor, he seemed to promise something, but
underneath there was nothing but words, nothing concrete. Afterward, in practice, that was exactly what happened. Then I heard there were other groups in Bellavista. That was how I came to the meetings and we formed the Coordinadora.

We were just emerging from the dictatorship at the time. Citizens had no experience with what it meant to be an organized community. There had been too many years of “organizations” in quotation marks, where people participated, but we knew they were all run by the authorities of the time.

Luis added:

_The Coordinadora had a lot of presence. It reached the press. It reached the other media. It got us a voice in different instances, the College of Architects, for example. It triggered an enormous debate about the project, as something that would break into the city, a consolidated area, of older communities, very representative places._

Nury chimed in: _You remember Señora Alicia? [The fragile, determined leader from Independencia-Olivos]_

Lake: _We couldn’t find her to invite her._

Nury: _She went to Maipu [a very distant comuna, on the south-western edge of Santiago.]_

Lake: _She kept coming for a long time._

Nury: _Afterwards she had a problem with her daughter’s husband (where she was living), so she moved in with her son._

_MIS: She ended up allegada (homeless), just living in someone else’s house._

Nury: _The most affected. She ended up with nothing. If you’re allegada no one will let you keep your furniture, your things. She was very sick the last time I saw her._

Luis: _Citizen participation -- after so many years of darkness and lack of citizen organization, it was so important!_

This weaving of parallel threads into a conversation, blending concern over a friend and fellow leader with a more analytical perspective on the meaning of the experience overall, was typical of the way information was exchanged, energies replenished and decisions made within the Coordinadora. Although we hadn’t met together for at least five years, the old patterns for sharing affection and intellect, spirit and laughter, solidarity and pain, remained.

Certainly “citizenship” is a way of acting in and on the public world, but there is also an emotional quality to it, which glues people together or, in other circumstances, tears them apart. For the communities of Independencia, displaced by the highway project, the Coordinadora was a lifeline that enabled them to salvage something of their lives, a minimum of dignity. Luis contrasted the benefits for the company with the treatment of the people who were losing their homes.
We couldn’t stop the expropriation. The highway could have emerged [from the tunnel under the river] just a few meters further along, and it wouldn’t have touched our homes. Because the Municipality didn’t support us, the fight with the Ministry was really hard, it didn’t want to give us anything. But with the ruling by the Comptroller’s office we forced the Ministry to provide us with compensation. They couldn’t kick us out without complying with the [environmental commission’s] resolution. With that, we managed a payment very quickly, in late 2001-early 2002 (Olivares 2010).

He concluded that:

the arrival of democracy hadn’t changed how the State dealt with its citizens. It was very comfortable for politicians not to change that structure, because it gave them the facilities to do exactly what they wanted... The community that organized managed to achieve much more than we expected at the start. And the Ministry’s attitude changed. That’s something I found very valuable for the communities themselves, for the city, and especially for a city that is so segregated (Olivares 2010).

As Luis finished, María Inés commented on the darkness of the period, and Nury took up her part of the story on behalf of the flower vendors (pergoleras):

We were the most affected, the most defenseless, because we knew nothing at all about the project. No one knew about it. All of a sudden we heard that the highway would run right through the Pérgola, that we would be demolished, that we could do nothing to stop it. I had thought it would run through the north -- why should I care? Let them do it up there! I never imagined it would pass right through my source of work, that it would take away my income. I spoke to Sonia from the Vega Chica and she mentioned this association, so we said, let’s go, we’ve got nothing to lose (Gatica 2010).

Nury remembered the first meeting, at the home of Lake and Patricio. “I said nothing. I went to listen, to learn, to find out what this was about.” She captured the contradictory sense of fatality and determination of those early days:

I was going to fight, though, even if I had to do so alone. I found that at the first meetings we were like kids at school, waving a little flag to protest because the bus wouldn’t stop for us. We were pretty small fish. I had no faith that we could pull off something big. But afterwards, when more people started to come, we started to talk to more people (Gatica 2010).

Nury recalled how leaders from the Tirso de Molina, the Bellavista neighbourhood associations, other groups began to join, and this nucleus began to attract advisors

professional people, who knew a lot about the terrain, about the impact on the city, the urbanists, the architects, the people from Conama, the government itself. The Coordinadora grew stronger. There were journalists in the group. There was an enormous variety of people, housewives with no special knowledge, people like me, a vendor. I had no idea how to fight, how to write a letter so it would be read. I was tremendously enriched as a person. I learned a lot, so many things that if I’d just sat in my business I would never have learned (Gatica 2010).
Describing the process, Nury reveals both an inward-reaching experience, that enriched her personally, but also something that changed her interactions with everything around her.

For me this meant feeling that when someone does something right, for people, for the community, with no personal ambition and without selfishly seeking praise, but rather just because this is what feels right, people give you support. They feel what you’re feeling. They listen (Gatica 2010).

Moreover, she was very clear about the link between the Coordinadora and Living City.

This organization was born from that [spirit] and later became Living City, an organization with an obligation -- to teach. That is the main point of this organization. To teach the community everything it can do, everything it can achieve, and how to do this. More than an organization for citizens’ rights, it is about teaching people how to organize: Look lady, they’re telling you you’re being evicted so they can build a high rise, complain, that’s your right. Look lady, you own a house and they want to run a highway through it, complain, that’s your right... It’s not just the government, people have to learn that no one can trample on their rights (Gatica 2010).

All those interviewed felt that although the coalition was unable to stop the whole highway project, it had modified it so much that their communities had achieved significant victories, reflecting the different claims by each community (chapter 3). For Luis (Independencia), the victory was forcing the MOP to provide much higher compensation to the displaced households. For Nury (Recoleta-markets), “it was a big deal and what I achieved for my community was a big deal too. If I hadn’t participated, they would have run right over us, demolished us, and we would no longer exist.” For María Inés (Bellavista):

It could have been so much worse. We made a great contribution, when we fought the Costanera Norte. We said a lot would happen, and it’s happened. We said the highway wasn’t a solution, that with more roads would come more vehicles, and so it is. That the pollution would increase (Solimano 2010).

This kind of learning was able to change political culture, through a combination of theorization and practical action, reflection and analysis, movement and dreams, a collective, human synthesis of the creative presence of artists (Bellavista), but also the sensuality of fresh foods and flowers (the markets), the urban dwellers’ link to nature (Pedro de Valdivia Norte) and the need for both refuge and relationship (Independencia) in the city. Thus, the Coordinadora started from a critical premise and was able to send it spinning through many different spheres and orbits of public and private opinion, with its varied actions, its diverse membership and variegated strategy, and its development of its own Chilean version of interrelated community media. By daring to question a flagship project and a powerful politician, it also demonstrated, simply, that this could be done.
4.3.1 What kind of learning?

In planning terms (Argyris and Schön 1974; Healey 2006), the experiences described in this chapter reflect both single- and double-loop learning applied to citizenship: taking the learning necessary to perform single skills and tasks and expanding it to rethink situations and reorganize understandings, in order to act differently (and more effectively. Thus, single-loop learning helps us to build the habits that increasingly structure our lives and actions, while double-loop learning enables us to confront, reflect upon and restructure our actions, when faced with change, but “the theory-builder becomes a prisoner of his programs if he allows them to continue unexamined indefinitely (p. 19, Argyris and Schön 1974).

Diverse forms of theory-building lie at the root of these learning processes. In a formulation consistent with the complexity approach taken in this dissertation, Argyris and Schön note that “theory-building is reality building”, because our theories shape our actions, which in turn shape our behavioural world, which in turn influences our actions (p. 18, Argyris and Schön 1974). In collective learning situations, there is both a private and a public dimension to achieving change, and how these dimensions interact is often decisive to the depth of learning involved. While private spheres afford more safety and trust, it is essential to test “theories-in-use” publicly, to avoid their becoming “self-sealing processes that again make the actor less likely to receive valid information the next time he tries to test an assumption publicly” (p. 78, Argyris and Schön 1974).

Thus, public and private, formal and non-formal spaces for participation are equally important to citizen learning. Events that seemed incidental or accidental, such as the fund-raising meals, the art auction, the shared beer after a meeting, coffee breaks and snacks, were equally important, indeed, interacted with the formal spaces for deliberation that Living City and its partners were able to generate as part of their participatory planning initiatives.

Otto Scharmer, of the MIT Organization Learning Center, takes this further, arguing for bringing in the non-rational components of learning as essential to profound individual-organizational change. He hypothesizes four levels (figure 4.3), with the first two equivalent to Argyris and Schön's single- and double-loop learning respectively, but the next two going beyond -- in fact deeper than -- that. Thus, Scharmer's first level involves reacting (manifest action); the second, redesigning (process structure); the third, reframing (thinking). The fourth stage is what he calls presencing, that is, becoming aware of emerging complexity, “the ability of individuals and collective entities to link directly with their highest future potential” (pp. 30-32, (Scharmer 2009).
It is hard to say how well his model applies to the way the Coordinadora learned citizenship, but it does address the emotional, sensual and other aspects that get lost in more rational-centric views.

During the final PhD workshop with Living City, Carvajal interpreted Scharmer’s presencing as a dual process of simultaneously watching and experiencing:

I am not clear about the concept of “presencing”. I understand presenciar\(^{34}\) as being present and part of the action, because it can also be to watch, to stand outside of, and I think that the presencing you describe is to be within, because that allows you to go back to the U that is the relationship, the redesign, the framework, and after the framework there has to be an action, in a propository, active sense... The idea is not just to observe, but to be someone inside (CiudadViva 2012b).

Vivian Castro added:

It’s like being a witness, we are witnesses, we have to have that ability, despite coming from a less experienced group, of changing the framework. I don’t think this is definitive, but rather

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\(^{34}\)“Presencing” is a creation by Scharmer, but the verb presenciar exists in Spanish. Thus, interpreting the term involved exploring new shades of meaning within an existing word in Spanish, making the process at once more comfortable, but also challenging to capture what is new.
you could get out and observe what’s new around you, and come back and redesign yourself, evolve in an organic way, and not like a structure (CiudadViva 2012b).

María Inés Solimano recalled how the wealthy had built cities of the past -- Rome, Paris, Santiago itself -- with an eye to livability and comfort, but today “the city doesn’t know what city to build, what city is being built, what human group, what power, is behind the city”. Patricio Lanfranco emphasized the emotional quality of this intellectual work, “by working with those directly affected, we have always worked, fought, from our own pain, so to speak” (CiudadViva 2012b).

Thus, Living City’s interpretation of Scharmer’s model emphasizes a dual positioning within and outside, and the value of learning to see, feel and think in new ways, which involve questioning and changing often deeply entrenched beliefs, about oneself, other people, and society.

It is hard to imagine the Coordinadora surviving if it had not deliberately fostered the different communities’ voices, internally, in its outreach, and in its contacts with those in power. Moreover, the processes described in this case study reveal this dual positioning -- in one’s own reality, looking at someone else’s from the outside, in combination with learning to place oneself in the other’s reality, and even to view one’s own values from the outside -- as part of learning to change and accept others, as genuinely equal to oneself. This is very similar to Gastil’s view (chapter 1), when he specifies the need for the analytic process to “recognize the limitations of your own preferred solution and the advantages of others” and the social process to involve listening “carefully to what others say, especially when you disagree”.

Faced with a complex problem -- how to improve people’s access to the cities benefits and destinations -- the MOP insisted it was really simple: more congestion could be solved by more, wider, faster, roads. Driven by the same authoritarian models of behaviour inherited from the military regime, the MOP’s Concessions Unit was confident the power of the State could ram through a solution (Silva 2011), without consulting other parts of its own ministry or the government, never mind other players (although it paid a lot of attention to one segment of the private sector).

The Coordinadora, meanwhile, struggled to find new ways to involve neighbourhoods excluded from the planning table, drawing in a much broader group of actors (urban planners, physicians, geographers, nurses, architects, transport engineers, other professional and environmental groups, etc.). This suggests, as Scharmer argues, that “The greater the emerging complexity, the less we can rely on past experiences” (p. 61, Scharmer 2009). I find his ideas relevant because while most
learning looks at individuals, his theory is based on collective, organizational learning, although from the private, profit, rather than the citizen, non-profit environment. Obviously, this involves a component of individual learning but to some degree also attempts to address how individual

### Table 4.3 Scharmer’s Nine Learning Environments and Citizenship Learning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge/Intelligence</th>
<th>K1</th>
<th>K2</th>
<th>K3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open Mind - IQ</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dynamic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>complexity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-reflective knowledge: knowledge without self-reflection</td>
<td>Lecturing</td>
<td>Weekly sessions in which “expert” leaders lectured, e.g. Mauricio on the EIA</td>
<td>Training: Practice + feedback Reflection on exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharmer</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Scharmer</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Open Heart - EQ</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Embodied</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social</td>
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<tr>
<td>complexity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action, projects, immersion, empathy walk, tacit-embodied knowledge</td>
<td>Organizing rallies and marches, meeting with ministers and other officials</td>
<td>Case Clinics, action-reflection papers, dialogue walk, reflection-on-embodied knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharmer</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Scharmer</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
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<td>Coordinadora</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Open Will - SQ</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not yet embodied</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emerging</td>
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<tr>
<td>complexity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deep immersion practice; existential storytelling, total immersion journeys</td>
<td>Sharing some life histories (bilateral rather than whole group)</td>
<td>Deep inversion practice: guided journaling, Generative dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharmer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-transcending knowledge: reflection-in-action</strong></td>
<td>Analysing events, successes, barriers that have involved physical as well as intellectual action.</td>
<td>Representing and speaking for communities to press and others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharmer</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Scharmer</td>
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<td>Coordinadora</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Daring to improvise in real life, doing things for the first time, speaking in public, arguing with a mayor or minister, disagreeing with power

Counter-attacks, threats, confession and building solidarity to overcome fears.

Cautious sharing of histories and deeper spiritual and other beliefs, usually in informal, low-risk settings

Source: Own elaboration, comparing Scharmer’s nine learning environments, in italics (from Table 22.1, p. 448, Scharmer (2009) with experiences in the Coordinadora.)

learning interacts with that of a group. It is interesting to apply it to a specific kind of learning, of citizenship (as agency), and look at its emergence despite a relatively hostile environment.
Of Scharmer’s nine types of learning environments, which could foster innovation in economic, political and cultural spheres, I find examples of both non-reflective and self-reflective knowledge within the Coordinadora (table 4.3). Perhaps this is just a more detailed way of looking at single- (K1, non-reflective) and double- (K2, self-reflective) loop learning, particularly when we look at row 1, “Open Mind”. However, when we look at row 2, “Open Heart, embodied social complexity”, we find risk-taking, in its physical, emotional and intellectual dimensions; and, under K3, collective confession and work to overcome fears under duress.

Finally, under row three, “Open Will, not yet embodied, emerging complexity”, that is, the ability to face the unknown, learn from and respond to it appropriately, we find examples of this kind of learning in conversations that occurred most within subgroups in informal settings. In these conversations I/we learned that Inés Fernández had supported the dictatorship and remained loyal to Pinochet; that Luis Olivares had worked in the Chilean prison system (as an administrator) throughout the military regime; that the participation of some members of the group was inspired by their own profound beliefs (world view) based on Catholicism (in Nury’s case) or Gestalt (in María Inés Solimano’s case) and they brought these ways of structuring thought and action to bear in their contributions to the group, in diverse ways.

What is interesting is that the fourth column, self-transcending knowledge, does seem to describe the Coordinadora’s citizen learning in a particularly significant way, as individuals faced their own fears or limitations, overcame them, and brought specific gifts from these processes to the group. These kinds of learning, ranging from rational to almost therapeutic and/or spiritual in nature, were vital to developing the leadership that characterized the Coordinadora, and which Living City’s founders infused into the organization they created.

4.2.4 What kind of citizenship?

Architect and urban planner, María Elena Ducci, became one of the first to study the Coordinadora and other urban social movements post-regime. She compared them with Latin American social movements of the 1950s-1970s, when population growth rates reached new records, and rural to urban migration meant city development reflected acute tensions between “three opposing forces: the state, the private sector, and the ‘popular’ (low-income) sector”. These movements “invaded open land left aside by the real estate developers” to build new homes and communities, known as shantytowns, favelas, or in Chile, poblaciones (Ducci 2002).

35 Indeed, she eventually became an advisor and friend of Living City, serving on the board between 2005-2007.
A large part of the urban population of Latin America participated in this form of urban life, and the battle for land, a home, and services characterized urban dynamics. By the late sixties, thousands of squatters who had invaded urban land on the city’s outskirts began to form popular urban movements “endowed with effectiveness, continuity, institutional response, social recognition, accumulative progress and organizational development” (Borja 1975:100). National governments, completely overwhelmed by the organizing strength and size of these popular groups, let them be, and little by little began to implement policies of service provision and the legalization of property held in these irregular areas (p. 6, Ducci 2002).

Military regimes, neoliberal economic policies, the achievements of these early movements in terms of housing, health and education, combined with an end to the rural-urban flows into cities in the 1980s and 1990s, brought with them a decline in social movements, on one hand, and a shift in the forces shaping the city. By the 1990s, conditions were changing, as large infrastructure projects, with frequently unforeseen (by their proponents) impacts, real estate capital and organized citizens groups were profoundly changing this historical pattern (p. 6, Ducci 2000).

The new citizen movements, writes Ducci, are more heterogenous than their predecessors of the 1950s and 1960s, raise environmental as well as socio-economic concerns, and no longer require the massive participation levels and mobilization that were necessary to thrust working class and poor organizations into the public limelight and political debate. Although high-income groups may be unwilling to ally with others, alliances among different social classes can produce surprising results. Based on several Santiago case studies, including the *Coordinadora* experience, Ducci describes the changing dynamics of citizens’ organizations in post-Pinochet Chile:

> If the group includes one determined professional, journalist, artist, or television personality, the organization can gain media access that will strengthen the group’s position and allow it to be heard (although this does not guarantee the success of its efforts). Furthermore, when organizations include a small upper middle-class group with access to political, economic, and communications resources, the chances of success rise enormously... In this sense, we see a profound change in the urban dynamics in the seventies as compared to the end of the nineties. Then, the world was polarized, and positive social change could only come from the popular sector, while the work of middle-class elites with a social conscience was to support the demands of the poorest members of society. Today, many environmental movements are led by middle-class groups and, above all, by multiclass alliances. There are also interesting examples of positive change in cities produced by groups, not necessarily popular or multiclass, but still marginalized by society in some way (p. 8, Ducci 2000).

There was opposition and undercurrents flowing against the *Coordinadora’s* leaders in every organization, throughout the campaign. The market leaders in particular faced opposition from more traditional leaders, accustomed to a whole different practice of citizenship. They did not believe in or trust the *Coordinadora’s* independent style, relying instead on the “clientship” that had served them for decades (perhaps centuries).
In the neighbourhood associations too, there was a clear split between the Coordinadora leaders, who dominated elections and organizations during this period, and others who opposed them, often through methods involving rumours and manipulation behind the scenes, rather than in direct debate. Undoubtedly there were personal factors involved, but there was also a central difference in approach, even world-view. The Bellavista leaders who led the Coordinadora and joined in the founding of Living City believed that neighbourhood organizations existed to represent the neighbours’ interests and fight for them before the authorities. This contrasted with others who deeply believed that the role of the neighbourhood association was to represent the municipality in the neighbourhood, working for the mayor in exchange for benefits, such as free outings for the elderly, Christmas gifts for children, and so on.

An assembly in Recoleta in 1998 illustrates several of the themes in this section. The market leaders were very insistent that I attend, so I went to a gathering of around a hundred leaders from the markets, Patronato and other organizations. It had been called by Mayor Moreno, to get leaders to sign a letter supporting the highway project. From the front of the room he dominated the meeting, reporting that the project was a done deal, and insisting that the best way for those present to hold on to their livelihoods was to support the project and negotiate for benefits to help them mitigate its effects. No one was given a copy of the letter to be signed. Nor were its contents read or even summarized at the meeting.

As it progressed, with most participants listening in confusion and enormous passivity I slowly realized why our market people wanted me there: the livelihood of everyone in the room depended on licenses and other permits and facilities provided by the municipality of Recoleta, directly controlled by the mayor himself. Many were unsure of what he was saying, and, while some, including the Coordinadora’s own leaders, were inclined to disagree, they did not dare to publicly question such a powerful figure. As the Mayor continued his “report” on the status of the highway project, I realized he was lying outright, announcing it already had the environmental permits, the financing and other elements necessary to go ahead. Of course, I stood up and challenged these lies. Someone had to do it, and apparently that was why my presence had been required. I also insisted that no one should sign a letter they hadn’t even read, giving away their rights and leaving them vulnerable to desperate consequences.

The incident, and other scenes I observed during the campaign, drove home to me for the first time that we were forging a new kind of leadership, organization and relationship with the authorities, and that this was both highly controversial to many and deeply attractive to some. It is not that we
radically changed everything with our new style, but we did create an alternative, a point of reference and a challenge, that would weigh on the public, private and citizen sectors in years to come, as the next two chapters further explore.

For María Inés Solimano (Bellavista), there is another dimension to citizenship that goes beyond the rational, reflecting changes in self-image, but above all, in the strength and nature of the bonds forged through conflict.

As a founder, I feel Hey! I participated. With all the people I met, we hug, we’re happy to see each other again. The relationship that remains is very special. It’s in times of trouble that people really come together. And the CN brought us together very deeply (Solimano 2010).

This sense of pride and belonging reflect an emotional aspect of citizenship, truly belonging, not just in a formal or legal sense, but in practical terms reflected even in how one walks down the street, greeting and exchanging with neighbours and friends.

Altogether, for each of us individually and for our groups and the Coordinadora overall, these constituted significant, even life-changing achievements. Nonetheless, for those of us in the centre of the battle, it took a long time to realize that what we had achieved was significant beyond our own core group. Comments from those around us were important. The NGO Casa de la Paz was the first to receive community leaders, as we searched for allies and information. Its executive president, Ximena Abogabir, observed the Coordinadora virtually from the start. She considers our campaign a “landmark achievement”, which deeply influenced government decisions but also changed processes.

What’s interesting about this story is how in parallel the new environmental law was being born. This became a great exercise in citizenship and probably we all were learning to be citizens at the same time as the government was learning to be government and the MOP was learning to be MOP. In other words, it was a process of growth, with all that involves in terms of things poorly done by all. This was its value, because it was the first great exercise of citizenship to take advantage of the formal spaces created by the environmental law. [The Coordinadora] became a tribunal for the academic world (Abogabir 2010).

Alfredo Rodríguez, of the NGO Sur, which specializes in urban and social issues, saw the Coordinadora/Ciudad Viva as a new kind of citizen organization. “Before, there were popular organizations, which lined up according to certain political ideologies. Living City demonstrated that it was possible to put together another kind of organization” (Rodríguez 2010).

These experiences, then, suggest that a new addition to civil society was coming into being, one able to educate citizens and politicians, and society at large. To do so, it fostered an egalitarian
and democratic culture in its own internal relationships, and externally, through outreach, by assuming a kind of practical equality, even (especially) in its relationships with those in power. Thus the Coordinadora offered a sketch, an idea, the suggestion, of a new kind of citizen organization in Chile: one not affiliated with political parties, as the labour (Collier and Handlin 2009) and pobladores movements (Oxhorn 1995) of the past had been; able to bring out the best in diverse leaders and communities, and demonstrate their essential value, build a just, inclusive, livable city, in the sense discussed in chapter 1.

The Coordinadora achieved important victories for its member communities, and was widely recognized, respected and even loved, as a result. But beyond the concrete goal of survival, its leaders did not really notice these other effects, at this stage. It was only when it shifted into a new phase that it began to see the changes it had wrought, in its own ability to lead significant urban planning projects, but also in the citizen movements that sprang up in its wake.

4.3 Wither or whither: Emergence

Underlying the Coordinadora’s mixed “success” was the ongoing presence of three of the four main communities involved in the conflict. This opened up a new possibility: that of their voices remaining, to offer a citizens’ perspective on crucial urban issues, from a social justice, rather than a dry “technical” perspective. In fact, even Luis Olivares, whose community had been dispersed, went on to organize the community in the Avenida Matta neighbourhood where he settled, after he lost his home in Independencia. Nury, who had left the Living City board in 2004, remained in touch, participated in market-specific initiatives, and continued to argue and advocate for her group, although she was no longer an elected leader of their association.

Moreover, in the years that followed, similar conflicts sprang up in different communities, over highways, the Transantiago Bus Rapid Transit system, high rise development, malls, parking lots under popular squares, the authorities’ efforts to shut down street markets, garbage collection, insecurity, holes in roads, and a vast array of urban issues, many of which increasingly came under the overall heading of cultural heritage and identity.

As the 1990s gave way to a new century in 2000, public transport became the subject of presidential debates, Lagos recognized the importance of public participation, and his successor, Michelle Bachelet campaigned and governed under the slogan that hers would be a “citizen government”.

Sagaris, Chapter 4, 181
Despite the obvious gap between promises and practice, citizen participation ceased to be a set of minor procedures to be skipped where possible, to avoid delays and cut costs. In the years to come, it would become a political demand that no politician in Chile could afford to ignore.

I am not arguing that the Coordinadora “did” all this, but what it did do was demonstrate that it was possible to question authority effectively, to achieve meaningful objectives (if not all of them), and to survive, and thus be capable of carrying on and assuming new challenges. As Ducci put it in an early study for the Wilson Center in 2000:

> Although the Coordinadora continued its battle and maintained pressure on the authorities and interested firms, to date there has been no clear victory. However, the people of Santiago, other organizations, and many politicians view this citizens’ group as an exemplary organization that is opening the way to achieving a city that is truly sustainable and livable (p. 14, Ducci 2000).

This process was occurring in the city itself, not in the tame spaces of the urban sphere, usually controlled (and studied) by planners. Rather, this happened in a social wilderness of citizen engagement that invaded every nook and cranny of urban, physical, psychological and symbolic space, pushing systems beyond the limits and borders of normal legal and procedural norms. Moreover, it dared to engage with those official processes, both challenging them and demanding changes, thereby raising crucial issues that have become central parts of debate, and the subject of concrete political advances, such as right to information legislation, in the ensuing years.

Beyond Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation” (1969) or Healey’s “collaborative planning”, active citizenship claimed real political power in a nascent democracy, and “citizen planners”, born of conflict, rejected paternalism to demand co-production (to use Susskind’s categories) (Susskind and Elliott 1983, chapter 1), a planning based on conversation, criticism and cooperation among public officials and residents. This last typology was not, of course, fully realized during the anti-highway campaign, but will become useful for analyzing the next phase of this case study.

Success, notes Moyer in his analysis of the different phases of a social movement (1987; 2001) may take the form of “dramatic showdown, quiet showdown, or attrition.” During the course of its short life, the Coordinadora experienced all three. The pitfalls of success include “compromising too many values and key demands; achieving minor reforms without building basic social change, having activists feel dismayed and powerless because they do not recognize success; and having apparent final victory end the movement” (p. 33, Moyer 1987).
In Chile in the late 1990s we did not have the benefit of Moyer’s insights, but we needed to derive some meaning from what we had done and what we had become. In late 1999, conscious that the highway project might eventually be revived (as it was), Coordinadora leaders sat around in a circle, to discuss next steps. We were aware of the high cost of saving our communities -- the energy spent over the previous three years. Although the communities’ survival now seemed guaranteed (at least for three of the four), the problems that plagued our sectors, noise, dirt, poverty, urban decline, trafficking, delinquency, remained.

What if we all stayed together? someone asked. Could we use all that we’d learned in the anti-highway fight to create some kind of movement for changes? Positive changes, though, someone else said. Defensive campaigns were important, but ultimately they left you where you started, or even a little behind. We had to start making our own proposals.

What would we do? someone else asked. The conversation fired back and forth across the room, with different leaders contributing their ideas about what they would really like to achieve in their communities: recycling, sustainable transport, clean air, gardens, trees, a stronger economy with more emphasis on the services offered by small entrepreneurs.

What would we call this? Someone finally asked. People had listed an awful lot of concepts and hopes to squeeze them all into a single organization. How about Living City? I asked, ever the writer. I was fed up with endless acronyms and wanted an active name. Ciudad Viva. People chewed it over, let it settle on tongues.

We looked at each other and grinned. We liked each other. We were happy we’d found a meaningful way to stick together.

That’s how we all embarked on a new phase, a citizen institution, Ciudad Viva, Living City.
Chapter 5 From Citizen Movement to Citizen Institution: Living City 2000-2012

5.1 Foundations, 2000-2004
5.1.1 Defining La Chimba
5.1.2 Recycle to live better, 2001-2002
5.1.3 Get moving for your city: transport for equality
5.1.4 Bellavista, living laboratory

5.2 Crisis and resilience, 2004-2007
5.2.1 Institution and community building with support from Avina
5.2.2 Bicivilizate: anything but civil, 2005-2006

5.3 Active citizenship, 2006-2011
5.3.1 The Metro Santiago Green Map
5.3.2 Re-emergence: The Metro Santiago Green Map with Natura
5.2.3 Bellavista: the double-edged blade of success
5.2.4 Active citizenship-citizen planners
5.2.5 The participatory research process and its impacts on Living City
This chapter presents the main events of the Living City phase (2000-2012) of my case study, in terms described in previous chapters. The material in this chapter is also based on a longer (172-page) documentary narrative, which describes individuals, interactions and events in more detail. While in chapters 3 and 4 I focused primarily on my questions dealing with citizen learning and collective capability through the emergence of new forms of organization, these two chapters look mainly at organization and effective action on the policy environment, reflecting the growing complexity Living City as its role expanded beyond a single-issue campaign stance and took on a more proposition-based strategy. Thus, these chapters focus particularly on the questions:

Are new kinds of organization, participation and leadership emerging? How does citizen participation in urban planning interact with public and private policy fields, to achieve goals? Does this have relevant “side effects” in terms of how these goals are achieved and impacts on democratization and sustainability? Is there anything special about streets or transport planning?

Thus, we see Living City’s base consolidate in two of the three comunas, and three of the four original communities involved in the Coordinadora. Based in the Bellavista neighbourhood, rooted in both Providencia and Recoleta, Living City remains strongly connected to the food and flower markets, to the west, and to Pedro de Valdivia Norte, to the east. It begins to work actively at local
neighbourhood, municipal and, increasingly, the metropolitan region scales, while participating in networks that extend its reach into national and international spheres (Appendix 5). Key partnerships for this stage include the civil society networks led by Avina, Interface for Cycling Expertise, Ashoka, and Synergos, which enriched skills and enhanced its reputation.

This chapter describes events, as new initiatives and partnerships shaped a citizen institution, Living City, while the next chapter discusses results and the main dynamics at work. Although it follows primarily a chronological order, dividing Living City’s development into three periods, many initiatives and characteristics overlapped.

As the organization progresses, the fragmented nature of urban governance in Santiago emerges, a phenomenon I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6. Increasingly, Living City and its partners learn to challenge and even make this complex system work in their favour, building a multiscalar institution similar to those described by Somerville, in the case of UK neighbourhoods (2011).

The first section of this chapter starts with early initiatives, that build from the Coordinadora’s strengths, a strategy that brought Living City its first significant awards and recognition. The next section follows Living City through its most difficult challenge to date, as it partners with Avina, wins a bid for a major cycling promotion campaign, and develops the metropolitan Santiago Green Map in its first major partnership with the private sector, Natura, from 2004-2007.

Figure 5.3. Legalization. It took almost two years for Living City to gain legal status, but on 16 January 2001 the Ministry of Justice official recognized is existence and Living City duly published the required degree, in Chile’s Diario Oficial.
The last section examines Living City as a more mature organization, for which active citizenship has become its central focus, combined with a search for relevant knowledge that brings its first attempts at developing not only a library and resource centre, but also its own knowledge development capacity.

The chapter that follows (chapter 6) will discuss results and conclusions from this phase.

5.1 Foundations, 2000-2004

On 14 May 1999, leaders of the Coordinadora gathered in the apartment over Inés Fernández’ hardware store, in the Vega area (Recoleta), to approve statutes for a non-profit corporation, Ciudad Viva, under title 33 of Book 1 of Chile’s Civil Code (figures 5.2 and 5.3). They elected a provisional board (Appendix 3), which reflected the Coordinadora communities relatively equally: led by Sonia Abarca, president of the Vega Chica, seconded by Luis Olivares (Independencia, vice-president); Lake Sagaris (Bellavista, communications and secretary); Juan Ladrón de Guevara (Bellavista, treasurer); Inés Wattine (Pedro de Valdivia Norte, deputy treasurer); and Inés Fernández (store-owner in the Vega area), Nury Gatica (Pérgola Santa María) and Alicia Cid (Independencia) as directors at large (CiudadViva 2004).

Its statutory goals were to:

- Defend human and civil rights, among them, and especially, the right to participation;
- Participate in developing a theory of urban ecology and the basic principles for a socially and environmentally sustainable society through experiences of citizen participation;
• Work on activities and projects that seek to reduce poverty and exclusion of our communities and to build a better future that is sustainable in the triple, socio-cultural, economic and environmental sense;

• Work for participation, conservation and inclusive, non-discriminatory development of urban heritage in all its dimensions, whether cultural, architectonic, human, artistic and environmental.

• Cooperate with similar organizations and institutions in cities elsewhere in Chile, Latin America and other parts of the world to achieve our goals and consolidate solid citizen relationships at the global level;

• Achieve broad and democratic participation from the grassroots of our own organizations, through our own and other communications media, the integration instead of segregation of urban spaces;

• Achieve models of transportation that give priority to human beings, whether pedestrians, cyclists or through green spaces, interconnected paths through the city.\textsuperscript{36}

In practice, Living City organized these goals into four thematic areas of work: transportation for equality; recycling to live better; heritage for local identity and memory; empowerment of citizens’ organizations to take part in key decisions affecting their territories. Communications (figure 5.4) remained central as ever.

In terms of structure, the new institution retained the assembly and added a nine-person board. Initially, the Coordinadora discussed establishing membership by organization, rather than individual, but we were told this was not possible.\textsuperscript{37} The end result was that individuals representing Coordinadora communities signed the statutes forming the new organization.

While it might have made more sense to develop Living City as a federation, this proved impossible due to the diversity of its founders, reflected in different municipal boundaries (Independencia, Recoleta, Providencia) and different kinds of organizations (vendors’ associations, neighbourhood associations and ad hoc groups), each covered by different laws.

This transition was marked by two characteristics that arose from this Coordinadora’s unusual nature. The first was its revindication of a spatially defined, historical and cultural identity, and the second was the reality that this identity spread across administrative boundaries. The product of both historical and recent events, this reflected the way living systems in the different neighbourhoods interacted. Bellavista, for example, developed a restaurant-based economy, thanks

\textsuperscript{36} My translation.

\textsuperscript{37} I do not remember now where this opinion came from, but it was either incorrect or the law later changed. By then, however, the much looser structure described in this section had become the usual practice for Living City.
in part to the proximity of cheap fresh food from the Vega’s markets. Artists from Bellavista, meanwhile, flocked to the Vega to celebrate daily scenes in multiple formats and materials. Thus, the different identities (Bellavista-arts-residential; Vega-fruit-vegetable-urban-rural) intertwined. Similarly, the hill united all three neighbourhoods, with its parks and problems.

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<th>Table 5.1, Organizational Characteristics Compared</th>
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<td><strong>Attitude to Participation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Type of participation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Type of links</strong></td>
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*Source: Own elaboration.*

Grassroots-based and extremely heterogenous, this was not meant to be an “NGO” as the term was used in Chile. An NGO was a small body of likeminded individuals working together on a common purpose. In contrast, although it had professional staff (Appendix 4), Living City started from the premise that it had to represent the variety of interests, opinions and aspirations of highly diverse grassroots members of its founding organizations, and other groups that might join. One challenge was how to keep its grassroots participation alive, as it built skills necessary to act effectively in a complex city environment.
The shift from Coordinadora to Living City brought significant changes (table 5.1), at the same time as it effectively built on and brought into this new organization the values of honesty, conversation and transparency. The anti-highway campaign had built deep trust, a mutual language, and understanding among the diverse communities and their leaders. Twelve years later, these remain key reference values for Living City, as the 2012 workshops with its core group revealed (CiudadViva 2012). Research, lobbying and mobilizing activities also served as a hands-on school in urban planning from the bottom up.

The emotional charge also shifted from negative to positive. Coordinadora members functioned in overdrive, amidst tensions between work and civic responsibilities, and within families. Leaders lived with a stressful sense of victimization, given the enormous power of the government and the tactics used against several. As Mauricio Montecinos (Bellavista neighbourhood association), put it:

> The fight against the [highway] project changed our lives. We learned to see the city differently. We were all tired after a five-year fight. We wanted to rest, but as leaders we were concerned that the group could fall apart and get lost. ...Some leaders said we should work at the neighbourhood level, while others said that if we worried only about the neighbourhoods, new projects would come along and threaten the city. We thought that if we could create an organization capable of dealing with major issues, maybe we could turn around the planning mentality in Santiago (Montecinos 2010).

In creating Living City, leaders chose to make participation an integral part of their lives. The knowledge, experience and reputation acquired during the campaign became significant resources, while strategies such as pooling capacities were complemented by external funding.

### 5.1.1 Defining La Chimba

Defining the territory served by the new organizations led to much discussion, since none of the official boundaries worked. This brought the first mapping experience, an informal one in which leaders literally redrew the lines on the map to define “La Chimba”, a name that in itself was controversial.\(^{38}\) Originally the Quechua for “the other side of the river”, it effectively turned into “the wrong side of the river”, as the original monasteries, nunneries and farms of the 1500s were joined by hospitals and cemeteries, bars and houses of prostitution. Nury Gatica, in particular, was sensitive to this negative image, but ultimately agreed that reclaiming the name was part of redefining the neighbourhoods, recognizing their valuable heritage and developing them based on these intertwined identities past and present.

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\(^{38}\) Indeed, as we discovered many years later, in Colombia and other Latin American countries, it is actually an unacceptable word for women’s genitals!
Figure 5.5. Defining the Territory. Living City’s new board defined its territory (within yellow lines) as “La Chimba”, just across the river from the city centre (south and slightly west) and the upscale shopping district of Providencia (south and slightly east), nestled into the San Cristobal Hill and Cerro Blanco, all the way to the General Cemetery and beyond.

The three territories were highly visible to the rest of the city (figure 5.5). Despite segregation, most people visited these areas at some point in their lives, to shop, recreate or at least to change buses. This fishbowl quality (efecto vitrina) became strategic: high visibility could make innovation and challenges to the dominant planning paradigm highly visible to people elsewhere.

5.1.2 Recycle to Live Better, 2001-2002

Our interest, as citizens, was not opposition for opposition’s sake. We want to do things well, to do things that serve all citizens. In that sense and looking at the weaknesses and strengths of each community we began our project, “Recycle to Live Better”, teaching and taking this serious problem of solid waste and dumps to our grassroots, creating consciousness in a body of citizens who feels untouched by this problem. Sonia Abarca, president (CiudadViva 2003).
After some debate, encouraged by Ximena Abogabir, of Casa de la Paz, Living City applied for funding from the Fondo de las Américas\(^{39}\) (FDLA) in 2000 for a recycling project, Recycle to Live Better, which ran from 31 July 2001 to 30 September 2002, a little over the original one-year period (Final report, Anexo 2, (CiudadViva 2003).

As with the next project, Transport for Equality, this one was led by Living City in partnership with the Asociación Gremial Pérgola Santa María de las Flores, Asociación Gremial Vega Chica, Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza, and EcoBella. The FDLA funding brought in the equivalent of US$40,000. For Living City, this involved the challenge and opportunities inherent in finding an office, hiring and managing staff, and creating an institution. This made it less vulnerable to fluctuations in volunteer interest and capacity, but it also raised the risk of the organization losing its close ties with communities that

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had nourished its development. After an initial attempt at an office in María Inés Solimano’s house, in 2002, we moved into our first headquarters, baptized CasaBella (figure 5.1), at 024 Antonia López de Bello Street, in the heart of Bellavista.

Living City paid the rent for the three-story house, a reasonable US$1,000, by subletting offices to other non-governmental organizations, a yoga teacher and a music teacher (figure 5.6). Thus, a large meeting space on the third floor became the home for assorted cultural and recreational activities, on the principle that activities should address planning but also quality of life issues.

Project funds also permitted investment in a modest but crucial collection of office resources: telephones, computers and printers, paper and ink,

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40 I was personally responsible to the owner of the house, Ximena Abogabir for monthly payments, and I sometimes had to make up the difference. I was working as an editor and translator, and this was a willing contribution. This kind of “godmothering” by me, Ximena and other leaders was a crucial part of building the institution, and Living City would not become fully independent of this kind of support until 2010.
previously supplied by volunteers. Hiring was a challenge and Nury Gatica (Pérgola Santa María), Alfredo Gredig (Pedro de Valdivia Norte) and María Inés Solimano (Bellavista), all with experience managing staff, were key to finding a suitable staff person, an Uruguayan, Donatella Fuccaro, who remained with Living City for the next seven years. For the recycling project she was joined by Eugenia Villanueva, a skilled secretary.

**Main activities**

The project was based on mobilizing community resources to deal with solid waste more creatively, backed by a communications campaign to motivate people to recycle, using existing systems. It also attempted to identify gaps and supplement them, or generate alliances that could eventually achieve this. Donatella researched and the Voz published a guide to the very extensive recycling facilities available. This raised awareness and connected potential users to these resources. Instead of competing, moreover, this approach generated cooperation with other groups, particularly the Comité de Defensa de Flora y Fauna (Committee in Defense of Flora and Fauna, Codeff, Chile’s oldest NGO), which received some of its funding from recycling glass bottles; Coaniquem, a charity providing assistance to child victims of burns using a similar system;
and a small firm that was importing composters from Toronto, to teach about composting. In the market area, fearful of competition, Sergio Maturana, the main cardboard recycler, began a rumour campaign against the project. Sonia invited him to join the project and he became a leader, using the Vega Chica telephone to receive orders, and thus expand his small business (figure 5.8).

Recycle to Live Better established some fundamental rules for Living City’s work. Recycling had to relate directly to deeply felt values and ways of doing things. The communities chose the activities that most interested them, from a “Menu” of possibilities, designed to generate the sense of pleasurable anticipation of sitting down to a good meal with friends. The Vega Chica opted for recycling glass, plastic, tetrapaks (used for milk), paper and cardboard (figures 5.7 and 5.8), while the Pérgola chose to focus only on recycling soft drink cans (figure 5.9). With its love of food and the urgent need to recover public spaces, EcoBella organized...
to recover street gardens, and published a cookbook that emphasized food, markets, composting, re-using and recycling.

Activities expanded as the project generated new opportunities. Thus, the Recoleta municipal staffer responsible for hygiene offered a course on food preparation, which the Vega Chica eagerly snapped up (figure 5.10). Young people in the Los Gráficos sector of Bellavista wanted to raise funds for an end-of-year party, so recycling paper became their preferred activity (figure 5.11). Living City had watched how many NGOs worked with community-based organizations, using grassroots volunteer labour to meet their goals, without investing in building stronger, more effective local organizations. To avoid this model, aside from the staff and other resources supporting each group’s initiative, the recycling project included a modest but significant US$6,000 as a Local Initiatives Fund (LIF). Funds were distributed through a simple participatory budgeting process: as ideas emerged, they were analyzed and estimates collected for the key items that could make their implementation possible. Then, the Living City assembly, where all neighbourhoods participated, discussed and assigned the funding.

Thus, the Vega Chica participants opted for financing aprons (figure 5.9), designed by EcoBella artist Joan Morrison. The young teenagers of Bellavista’s Hormiguitas (little ants) group wore the aprons, but in addition requested and received funding for carts (figure 5.10) to collect the materials they were recycling. EcoBella bought demonstration composters and paid to design and print its recipe book.

Moreover, this project won a major award, for Innovation in Citizenship. For the first time in her life, Living City president Sonia Abarca addressed an audience of several hundred. Moreover, she proudly received the award, with Ricardo Lagos, now president of Chile, smiling (a bit awkwardly) in the background (figure 5.12).

5.1.3 Get moving for your city: a citizens’ proposal for transport with equity, 2003-2004

Transport was foundational to Living City’s work. In 2000, the World Bank held part of its transport policy review at the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago. I was able to attend, and ended up summarizing the citizens’ view at the final plenary. This event brought us together with many of the transport experts we had met during the Coordinadora’s battles, and coincided with our efforts to develop a Citizens’ Agenda for Sustainable Transport, along with the NGO Casa de la Paz and the transport students’ collective, Tranvivo. Our advisor, transport engineer Juan de Dios Ortuzar, connected us with Aldo Signorelli, then executive
director of SECTRA, the interministerial transport planning secretariat. SECTRA was about to deliver Santiago’s first comprehensive transport plan (*Plan de Transporte Urbano Sustentable*, PTUS) and participated in our event, responding to our citizens’ agenda with a preview of the PTUS. This generated an extraordinary exchange among citizens, government and other interested parties.

Bogotá became a major inspiration, when, through complete serendipity (we won two free trips to that city to attend the finals of the Americas Soccer Cup), my husband Patricio and I were able to visit, try out the new transport systems and interview different players, including Transmilenio’s head of studies, the team responsible for *Misión Bogotá*, the foundation that manages Bogotá’s main heritage area (La Candelaria) and the main planning body, the Institute for Urban Development. These experiences opened the way to preparing a book about transportation in Santiago, which included contributions from academics, civil society and others, along with information on Bogotá’s experience with Transmilenio, car-free Sundays, cycle routes and other visionary measures. Based entirely on volunteer labour, the book was ready for publication in 2003, when, with funding from the UNDP, Living City launched a major transport project.

**Activities**

This new project, *Get Moving for Your City: A Citizens’ Proposal for Transport for Equality*, involved grassroots initiatives in Pedro de Valdivia Norte, Bellavista and the Vega markets, marches, informational campaigns, lobbying and citizen inspections (of the new Metro lines) throughout the Chimba. The World Bank finally agreed to Living City’s petition to bring Bogotá mayor, Enrique Peñalosa, to Chile, and Living City, with a 100 volunteers, organized a major event in the impressive sessions chamber of the UN’s Economic Commission in Santiago.

The week’s events included a cycle ride to launch the transport for equality book, a cocktail party organized as a miniature fruit and flowers market, meetings with major politicians and academics, a tour of the Vega, and other activities that underlined the importance of transport to building more socially just, livable cities. It also led to preparation of Living City’s first film, and brought in undersecretaries of housing and transport to speak during the main sessions, attended by some 200 people. This became a landmark event in Living City’s work with municipalities: more than half of Santiago’s 34 attended, with many staff demanding participation in major city projects with as much vehemence as citizen groups.
Headed by transport engineer, Rodrigo Quijada, this project, too, won an award for Innovation in Citizenship. Together, these first two projects provided important opportunities to test Living City’s tools, methods and skills, which received important certificates of quality from independent evaluators.

A foundational characteristic of Living City as it created itself as a citizens’ institution through these first two projects was the implicit way it addressed issues of inclusion. Young (Young 2002; Young 2005) and Fraser (1997) talk about the challenge of identifying discriminated groups or exclusionary patterns of behaviour without reinforcing that very discrimination and exclusion. Living City did not specifically set objectives regarding women’s participation, but nonetheless from its own leadership, through the teams serving each community, women participated in large numbers and they were also in charge. Similarly, the project involving young people created an enabling environment that encouraged a group of young people to take charge of and run their own initiative, with limited assistance from María Eliana Bustamante. Interestingly, girls led this initiative, although boys were also involved and, because decision-making was collective, played a leadership role.

Moreover, in the Vega markets, women normally excluded from direct, empowered participation ran the program.41 During the celebration that followed the food preparation course, for example, Living City staff served food and drink to participants. These were small reversals of longstanding patterns that implicitly reflected and reinforced the power differences in society at large. Overall, however, as the discussion below, under results, notes, they were cumulative, creating an environment that genuinely empowered -- and benefited from -- the wisdom and experience of people typically excluded from significant participation in leadership in the society at large.

In later years, Living City would integrate the idea of “graduates from the university of life” and it would continue to base its proposals on the fundamental premise that both experiential and academic/technical knowledge are required to build better cities. A totally bizarre idea when Living City, as the Coordinadora, first insisted on integrating citizens’ knowledge into the transport

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41 Initially Living City had partnered with a respected consulting firm to lead a garbage analysis exercise. Conflicts developed, when the highly professional consultants refused to coordinate with Sonia Abarca and Vega Chica leaders, insisting that their method required they deal directly with the small business people. This generated problems in coordinating with other project partners and, ultimately, disrespect for the community’s elected leaders and managers. In a meeting to discuss this, the consultant’s representative addressed all comments to Donatella or me, patently ignoring Sonia. We ultimately decided to end the partnership with the consultant, a decision that reinforced the local community’s self-management and leadership role throughout.
planning process, this view became more commonly accepted during the 2000s, as the organization matured and its interactions with different levels of political and technical authorities both increased in number and grew richer in content.

5.1.4 Bellavista as Living Laboratory

Mr. Mayor, for years we have warned of the multiple security problems associated with the presence of this and other discotheques in the [Bellavista] neighbourhood. With other organizations we have also reported drug trafficking and its appalling effects on safety, especially around Pío Nono Street. It is time for maximum coordination, to fully investigate these situations, and to eliminate once and for all the conditions that make this kind of violence possible. Letter to Providencia Mayor Cristián Labbé, from Mauricio Montecinos, president, and Lake Sagaris, secretary, Junta de Vecinos #13 Bellavista (my translation, 16-October-2001).

At 9.30pm, 12 October 2001, my husband, our two boys, and I were ambling down López de Bello toward Pío Nono, for a family dinner at a local restaurant. Suddenly people were running toward us and we could hear gunshots. The squeal of car tires and again shots rang out. In less than 15 minutes, Heriberto Valdés lay dead, a block away. Barely two nights later, at 1.30am, on 14 October, we neighbours woke to eight firetrucks and groups of firefighters running desperately along Crucero Exeter, Mallinkrodt, López de Bello and other nearby streets, trying to find water to put out a fire in the Rase discotheque, located on Chucre Manzur street, a business associated with the person who was murdered last Friday (CiudadViva/JV#13 2001).

Bellavista’s problems had not magically vanished during the years of the anti-highway fight. From 1998-2000, María Inés Solimano and I had served on the executive of the Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza, and in 2000 we ran again, and were reelected, as part of an executive headed by...
another Coordinadora veteran, Mauricio Montecinos.

The fire, in an illegal discotheque on a property that the neighbourhood association had been reporting for assorted violations since the mid-1990s, occurred next to La Chascona, a museum for Chilean Nobel-prizewinning poet Pablo Neruda. His personal library, of priceless original texts that inspired his poetry and prose, was housed in a room one metre from the fire.

The community’s immune system went into overdrive. We were frightened, but furious. The lack of response from local, regional and national authorities to our efforts to bring some order and safety to the neighbourhood had detonated this situation.

The strength of this response stemmed largely from an incident that occurred on 9 July 1997. María Inés Arribas was still president of the Junta de Vecinos #13, and a prominent ceramicist and artist, Lise Moller, was an active participant in EcoBella. One night, around 7.15pm, María Inés phoned me. Lise’s daughter had called her moments before: by pure chance she had glanced out the window, seen her mother dragged into a car by two men and driven off. María Inés Arribas filled in the details: this was the fourth kidnapping in the same three-block area in recent months. The Junta #13 had reported each to the police and the municipality, with no response, not even a warning to neighbours to be on the lookout.

With trembling hands, I dashed off a desperate plea for help, faxing it with one hand while talking to editors on the phone. We begged, implored, demanded the media help, as the minutes ticked by and neither the local government or police showed up. In less than ten minutes (I learned from María Inés, our spokeswoman), the first reporters arrived and the street was soon packed with neighbours and reporters from television, radio and the press. The police arrived some 40 minutes later. The media’s quick response probably saved Lise from serious harm. Unlike the previous three kidnappings, Lise’s captors did not take her to a nearby bank machine (they used the same one in

Figure 5.13 The Aliens discotheque on Pío Nono street. Neighbours’ demands that the place be closed because it did not meet building standards quickly reached the owner and several leaders were approached and threatened for “persecuting” this innocent business.
two of the kidnappings), rape or otherwise harm her. Rather, they drove to their dumping ground in Quilicura, and left her, frightened, but unscathed.

In the limelight of extensive media coverage, the police proceeded to pick up the kidnappers, and the whole incident led to a round of high-level coordination between representatives of the neighbourhood association and the top body within Carabineros, the police force. As had occurred with the dictatorship, we learned that impunity keeps crime coming, whether against human rights, people or property. Despite our obvious vulnerability as unarmed neighbours, we could not let criminal acts go unreported, or sit by quietly while those in power failed to act. In the months that followed the 1999 shooting, our Junta de Vecinos executive met with top-ranking Carabineros police officers and, semi-secretly, with Nelson Mery, head of Investigaciones, Chile’s civilian detective police force. We learned that our fears of a vendetta between drug lords fell short: the “hit” had been ordered by a man from his gaol cell. The situation improved, but this second round of major crime made it clear that just pleading with authorities was not enough.

As the writer in the group, I was constantly reminded of Camus’s doctor (Camus 1970) who, amidst the plague that is destroying all around him, continues to nurse the sick, with no hope of improvement or ultimate triumph. Rather, he is compelled to endlessly reenact his training and convictions, even when there is no hope. We did this too, with no hope and little faith, just a blind need to act in the face of what was happening to us.

Those of us who denounced the discotheques (figure 5.13) received visits at home. Three or four hulking fellows would ring our doorbells, identify us by name, and say they came from such and such a discotheque, and had learned that we had reported them, for noise, alcohol or other irregularities. They were appalled, they would exclaim, to think we could accuse decent law-abiding citizens such as themselves of illegals. Moreover (some would add) the very events that we had denounced were attended by some of the most powerful politicians and famous figures from popular television shows. How could we possibly question the way they ran their business?

However the patter ran in the middle, it would conclude with the speaker expressing an exaggerated concern for our safety and our children, given the dangerous neighbourhood in which we lived, and the illegal behaviour we were constantly denouncing. Until then, we had happily worked, met, and functioned out of each other’s homes, but this was clearly becoming unwise. This made the offices afforded by Living City particularly important.
Despite these threats, for years Carmen Silva, Patricio Lanfranco, Mauricio Montecinos, María Inés Arribas, María Inés Solimano and I, among others, mobilized neighbours to denounce the problems with noise, alcoholism and violence, which were deeply linked. Providencia had passed an anti-noise ordinance (1993) in response to our first campaigns in the early 1990s and our challenge then became getting the police and municipal security teams to apply it effectively.

After reporting a noise ordinance violation, usually late at night, I had even gotten into the habit of waiting for police and municipal security and following them up to the discotheque in question. There I would insist, amidst a rain of insults from the owner, that the police give those responsible a ticket. In one incident, I took my son along, up the dark alleyway to the Discoteca Oz (Chucre Manzur s/n). The manager came out and produced his wallet, waving it under a young policeman’s nose like a waiter with a tray, ostensibly providing his identification. As the minutes passed, I insisted that the officer had to issue a ticket. “Don’t worry,” he kept saying. “You can go home now. I’ll take care of this.” He even tried to usher me away.

I was naive, but even I realized that if I left, this would be yet another infraction that would vanish, and we knew that the local courts required three to consider suspending a license. Seeing the police officer weaken before my insistence, the (Italian-born) manager lunged at me, yelling that I should go home where I came from and stop making trouble for good Chileans. My 14-year-old son lunged back, and the officer stepped in. I replied that the neighbours had elected me to defend them, and that’s what I was there to do. Finally he backed down, the police officer issued the ticket, and my son and I went home to sleep.

For years, EcoBella members distributed notices door-to-door, reporting on the campaign and telling neighbours how they could push to make new rules stick. Thus, we were constantly pressuring the enforcers -- the regional health office, police and the municipality itself. It took over a decade all told (1993-2003), before the municipality began to suspend the licenses of those businesses with repeated infractions. Gradually, the noise receded, although, as we quickly learned, every victory brought a new set of problems.

Shortly thereafter, Patricio Jadue, co-owner of one of the neighbourhood’s largest firms (a publisher of children’s albums), approached us. A good friend of Carlos Cruz (head of the concessions unit during the Costanera Norte conflict) and big brother to my neighbour, Cecilia, Jadue had met with us during the conflict. He owned property and wanted to develop something that would work for the neighbourhood and himself, but was worried about how insecure Bellavista had become. Thus,
Living City teamed up with Carmen Silva’s corporation (see previous chapters), Patricio Jadue, the architects Sergio González and Tomás Carvajal, developing a diagnosis and a plan (figure 5.14).

If participating in the Coordinadora had taught us a lot about transportation, car-centred cities and their impact on social justice and quality of life, the battle for Bellavista taught us about urbanism, security and governance in a post-dictatorial society. In the 24-page proposal, entitled *Toward Bellavista 2000* (EcoBella/JuntaVecinos#13 1999), EcoBella and the Junta de Vecinos #13 laid out the principles for sustainable urban development in Bellavista and invited the two municipalities to work with instead of against us. These included the prompt resolution of reports of legal violations, joint work with municipal planners to improve transport and parking impacts, a proposal for a new zoning framework (*plan seccional*) and commitment from the municipality to create a school and recreational centre, develop a recycling program, and fund local citizens’ groups.

Thus, from the start, Bellavista was more than an address for Living City. It was a citizens’ laboratory, where we tried, failed, and occasionally succeeded, at solving complex urban problems.

### 5.2 Crisis and recovery, 2004-2008

As the transport project concluded, big invitations and big partners brought Living City into contact with new challenges. In 2003, as a well-known leader of Living City, I was invited to join two key civil society networks, Ashoka and Avina. Founded in 1980 by Bill Drayton, Ashoka is a global network of “social entrepreneurs... individuals with innovative solutions to society’s most pressing social problems.” These are people who are ambitious and persistent, tackling major social issues and offering new ideas for wide-scale change. Rather than leaving societal needs to the government or business sectors, social entrepreneurs find what is not working and solve the problem by changing the system, spreading the solution, and persuading entire societies to take new leaps. Social entrepreneurs often seem to be possessed by their ideas, committing their lives to changing the direction of their field. They are both visionaries and ultimate realists, concerned with the practical implementation of their vision above all else.

The selection process was long and complex, involving several questionnaires, observation, in-depth interviews by the country representative and, in the final phase, an intense two days of interviews by a panel of social and business entrepreneurs. Successful candidates become permanent members of the global fellowship and receive a monthly stipend for three years, to further develop their initiatives (Appendix 6).
Avina was a complementary institution, and Avina and Ashoka fellows often cooperated. Founded in 1994 by Swiss billionaire, Stephan Schmidheiny, after the Rio Summit for the Environment, Avina was the practical expression of his conviction that the secret to ensuring a decent future lay in bringing together the best of civil society with the best of the business world. With strong ties in Latin America, Avina opened its first offices in Argentina in 1998 and expanded to Peru, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile in 1999. It focused on individual leaders, convinced that

the leader of the project is the most important factor for the success of the initiative, and that a key factor lies in offering him or her much more than financing. This is why Avina partners with the leader it is supporting and starts to develop a whole range of complementary services (www.avina.net/esp/Historia.aspx, accessed 9-December-2011, my translation).42

For the leader of a newly formed, grassroots organization, both networks with their seasoned leaders and access to high-level expertise, were fascinating. On a personal level, I was uncomfortable at being singled out from what was then a very collective leadership, but also delighted to find myself in the company of others, equally obsessed by their work for collective social benefits, rather than personal financial gain. For a long time, I had questioned my own sanity and priorities, as I put every spare hour into “saving the neighbourhood” instead of raising my family or earning more money. Both Avina and Ashoka offered me personally and Living City, as the organization, access to new contacts and a wider web of trust, among senior civil society leaders.

This coincided with an invitation from Avina Chile to develop a more comprehensive strategy to structure our work. The proposal, which became an 18-month project “For a Living City,” was intended to begin as funding from our UNDP grant ended in March-April 2004.

The changing core

In 2004, Living City experienced the first major changes to the board, with Sonia Abarca and Nury Gatica leaving, for personal reasons. Sonia eventually travelled to Saudi Arabia, the honorary aunt taking care of her niece’s children, while Nury remained an independent voice in her sector, joining Living City for a few specific, market-related initiatives. Bellavista intensified its role as a source of leaders, with four members on the board, all “graduates” from the Junta de Vecinos #13 Mario Baeza. I reluctantly assumed the presidency and a more prominent role in its work.

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42 This, of course, was a major departure from the traditional donor model practiced by the Ford and Kellogg foundations, for example, international and government programs.
Of the newcomers, three did not meet the Coordinadora profile. Gregorio Valdés and María Elena Ducci had both been present during the anti-highway fight. Gregorio, or “don Goyo” as he became fondly known, was an older man, a rebellious member an “aristocratic” old family. A major vehicle for his expression of difference was his bicycle, which he and his wife (a judge) rode regularly, and ubiquitously. He had followed Living City’s progress from the moment I joined the Acción Ciudadana por el Medio Ambiente network in Casa de la Paz, in 1997.

María Elena, meanwhile, had watched us closely but kept her distance in previous years, because she had been studying us as part of her longstanding interest in urban citizens’ movements in Chile. She served a four-year stint on the board at this crucial juncture.

Federico Allendes was the most radical break from the profile established by the Coordinadora. His arrival seemed wrong from a formal perspective, but right on the intuitive level that ruled many of Living City’s main decisions. A corporate lawyer, well on his way to partnership in one of Chile’s most prestigious firms, we met him through our efforts, with ProBono, to obtain citizen representation on the board planning the city’s new public transport system, Transantiago. He initially saw Living City as a NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) kind of group, “fighting for their own interest against the welfare of the rest of the city. How could they oppose a highway that would bring progress?” In his elegant offices he received representatives of Living City. Shortly afterward, he attended a Living City dinner.

I don’t remember the menu, but it was delicious... At that meal, I learned for the first time that you were not simply a NIMBY group, but rather I heard a discourse based on equity, voices of a group seduced by a different, city-based perspective on sustainability and justice. I was surprised at how informed you were about the negative impact of the car on development and equity in a city (Allendes 2011).

In particular, Federico responded to a set of values that had become increasingly explicit since the 2001 visit to Bogotá, that is, the powerful impact the city could have on creating equality.

What really got to me was the constant reference to and inspiration for equity as the mainstay of the vision, the need for true participation, the democratic values. In the end, I felt that my heart belonged to that community of values. I became and remain very happy to belong to Living City. If you’re born a cricket, you’ll die singing (Allendes 2011).

Claudio Olivares, representing a cycling group Arriba e’la Chancha, joined Living City’s board and staff in 2004, leaving in August for a cycling trip around Latin America.

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43 This term sounds odd, but indeed the older, more established and powerful of Chile’s elite families did and do consider themselves part of a self-appointed aristocracy.
5.2.1 Institution and community building, with support from Avina, 2004-2006

The Avina project got off to a rough start, the result of an unplanned eight-month gap between the end of our UNDP funding and the arrival of the Avina grant. Living City barely scraped up enough to keep Donatella on part-time. Moreover, an IT centre for the markets depended on strong leadership in the Vega Chica, which disappeared with Sonia’s resignation. Work focused on reinforcing citizen management of urban territories, particularly in Bellavista and the markets, incorporating heritage as a crosscutting issue, creating a service unit to generate income, and building an audiovisual unit as a civil society-private partnership with filmmaker and leader, Patricio Lanfranco.

Activities

The main activities included the formation of an Urban Rights network and declaration of urban rights (Appendix 7), under the leadership of Federico Allendes. Living City was no longer alone: a growing number of communities were struggling to influence crucial decisions about their quality of life. Thus, this new Coordinadora reflected battles over urban planning issues, ranging from concessions for underground parking, destruction of green areas and trees, high-rise building, and new regulatory plans (planos reguladores), to define land use, building heights and other rules. Thirteen groups formed under the banner of the Declaration of Urban Rights.

Income-generation through service development With support from Avina, Living City invested enormous energy in testing possible sources of self-generated funds. The strategy was based on a three-step process of experimentation, starting with short-term, easy-to-implement initiatives, then moving into more complex medium-, and long-term projects. These included possible tourism- and heritage-related activities, and real estate developments ranging from our own community centre through to social housing for the elderly widows of Bellavista.

The role of the Avina project was not to realize all these dreams, but to help us identify what worked and make significant initial progress through these phases of social entrepreneurial development. I had designed the project inspired by Jane Jacobs’ thinking about innovation, particularly the many failed experiments necessary before one or two -- often unintentionally! -- yield useful results. In her book on cities and economies, she defines economic development as improvising to make everyday life “feasible”: :
an improvisational drift into unprecedented kinds of work that carry unprecedented problems, then drifting into improvised solutions, which carry further unprecedented work carrying unprecedented problems... (Jacobs 1984), pp. 221-222).

This idea of “improvisational drift”, with its echoes of our earlier strategies of “winning by losing” meant being prepared to fail often, as we sought out new ways of doing things. Thus, although 18 months later Living City was far from a self-sustaining social entrepreneur, it nonetheless had developed the foundations necessary for its survival, as we soon discovered.

5.2.2 Bicivilízate: anything but civil, 2005-2006

The Bicivilízate campaign was led by Living City, Casa de la Paz and an ad hoc cycling group, Arriba e la Chancha. The campaign’s name was a pun that combined the idea of making cycling more visible and generating more civil interactions in public spaces. The government liaison, was César Garrido, a longstanding leader of the Movimiento de los Furiosos Ciclistas. He had assisted Living City with its first website during the anti-highway campaign, written a brief chapter in its book Muévete, and participated as a commentator in the seminar with Enrique Peñalosa. The three-year, $500,000 campaign was funded by Global Environmental Facility resources, controlled by the World Bank and managed, in Chile, by the UN Development Program. As part of the Avina project, we had prepared for this kind of growth both internally, in terms of governance and financial management, and externally through our community-based transport work. Nonetheless, the experience exposed Living City’s weaknesses and placed everything we had achieved at risk.

Of the proposal’s six main professionals, two were from Living City; two from Casa de la Paz; and two from Arriba e la Chancha (Appendix 8). In theory, these were well-tested

Figure 5.16. Guillermo Díaz, undersecretary of transport, at the inauguration of a new cycleway in Nuñoa, 9-September-2005.

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44 The Bicivilizate campaign was a tender in which the consortium led by Living City competed with traditional consulting firms with expertise in engineering, communications and social marketing. For some time, Living City had been arguing that these processes could and should be led by citizens’ organizations themselves. As part of the Avina project, then, Living City competed for both the cycling promotion campaign, which we won, and a second project, tendered through a similar process, for a participatory process to develop a new plan for the centre of Santiago, which we lost.
relationships, but in practice, this was not the case. Under the terms of reference we had to define the staff as part of our proposal, with no formal hiring process. Moreover, the six main positions, intended to ensure that traditional consultants include an expert in participation on their team, did not fit well with the civil society-led, participatory design of the campaign. Having someone “in charge of” participation, when the whole process involved participation, and at every level, generated the first issues in project application. Moreover, although these rules could, in theory, be taken up with our counterparts in the Chilean government, in practice, our proposals for change were rejected.

Claudio Olivares had worked closely with Living City, but he left Chile shortly after we won our bid, leaving in his stead two members of the Arriba group: Eduardo González (“Udo”) and José “Pepe” Vásquez, a talented designer working with an advertising company. Udo was, in effect, project head, equivalent to Donatella on the recycling or Rodrigo Quijada on the transport project. He headed the equipo móvil (mobile team), responsible for project activities and was the only full-time employee.

The campaign was designed to complement investment in significant cycling infrastructure by three municipalities, Santiago, Providencia and Ñuñoa. Its purpose was to run pilot safe-routes-to-schools experiences, bring in businesses, foster cycling integration into the public transport system, and generally encourage and improve cycling conditions in Santiago. It was a small part of a large, World Bank-financed sustainable transport project that included Transantiago, the new public transport system. This meant that government staff’s primary concern was buses, not bikes.

Transantiago was already in serious trouble, with implementation delayed due to multiple problems, which were undermining the government’s reputation during an election year. We had
expected to have a cooperative relationship with government and funders, through the UNDP, as we had during previous projects, based on our very detailed proposal, which had gone into the contract, verbatim. With the government as partner, we expected that permissions for events would be easier and that things would flow smoothly.

In retrospect, the government’s decision to choose us was remarkable, and probably reflected the attitude of then under-secretary of transport, Guillermo Díaz (figure 5.15), with whom we had cooperated at several events. Díaz explicitly supported our positions and showed genuine understanding of what we were trying to do. Unfortunately, not only was he tied up in the Transantiago implementation, but a scandal erupted and he was forced to resign.45

Implementation began in the September-December phase of the year, marked by hotly contested presidential elections between Michelle Bachelet and Sebastián Piñera. As the months progressed, the Concertación was calling in all favours and focusing on electoral activities in favour of their candidate, who won the first round with a slim majority, requiring a run-off vote (January 2006). Activities planned for this first phase were relatively simple: completion of campaign design, an international seminar on best practices for fostering cycling in the city, organization of two Pío Nono A-Tracción Humana events that were planned to lead into a “Cycle to vote” campaign on election day (11 December 2005), planning and preparation of the next phase during the summer (January-February 2006), with implementation of programs in schools, with companies and municipalities scheduled to begin in the fall (March 2006).

Coordination with government began with a round of presentations and a particularly enthusiastic response from health promotion teams. This opened up an important opportunity, and we built the

45 Interestingly, Díaz was part of the same team formed by public works minister Ricardo Lagos and led by Carlos Cruz, head of concessions, which we opposed in the anti-highway campaign. They were accused of triangulating funds illegally to finance the concessions unit, and Díaz was swept up in the ensuing investigation. In 2008, he was found guilty of using US$18,000 of these funds to finance post-graduate studies in Spain. In May 2009, he was sentenced to 61 days in jail and a fine of $2,000 (Radio Cooperative, 4-May-2011, accessed 13-December-2011).
health teams into our activities. Communications, however, became a morass of contradictions, as the government first approved, then withdrew approval, issuing successive demands for the government logo to become larger and larger, and finally predominant. This intensified after a massive response to our call for participation in the *Cyclón*, an annual cycling event (1 November), leading to endless delays, as we waited for approvals, deadlines loomed and sometimes passed. The government also dictated the date, format and contents of the news conference launching the campaign. When it finally took place, the Bicivilízate team had not even seen the final news release. This led to a critical but positive conversation with Guillermo Díaz, still in charge, and a renewal of his commitment to give us the headroom needed for genuine citizen participation. But we were concerned. This intervention, in an independent campaign to encourage cycling, was highly problematic.

At the same time, team members held meetings with cycling groups and prominent individuals, who had drifted away from advocacy. We heard the same bitter story over and over, of new leaders forming with new ideas, only to be accused of excessive protagonism or stealing funds, and then marginalized. Udo, our team member, who had worked with Garrido for years, accused these individuals of irresponsible behaviour, and we attempted to find a middle course, to draw people back into the campaign. We also began to experience frictions with Garrido. His attitudes in our office brought complaints from the Living City team, mostly women, who found him difficult, at times aggressive and insulting. He was inconsistent, giving and taking away permission for invitations, communications and events. The day before the seminar, he toyed with suspending it, despite the fact that international guests were already flying in. These logistical problems affected attendance. Nonetheless, more than 100 individuals from government, cycling and other groups came. The day after the seminar, the international experts held a training workshop with our newly formed staff and volunteers.

Problems with Udo worsened, however. Despite his crucial role, for the first month he refused to quit his previous job, and Donatella had to replace him. During the following months we tried him with different sets of responsibilities, but found that Living City’s staff, employed to work on the Avina project, were using valuable time to cover Udo. This came to a crunch in December, when we had to present our second report to the government. With considerable reluctance, but after discussion with our partner, Ximena Abogabir, we decided we had to let Udo go and restructure, if the *Equipo Móvil* were to function. These changes required governmental approval, so were duly included in the proposed plan for the next phase.
The summer months (January and February) were intended for rest and preparation, as we awaited approval of our plan for the next phase. Without this approval, the government’s team nonetheless demanded an exhausting schedule of activities. Donatella and the Living City team struggled to accommodate. Both Udo (February 2006) and Pepe Vásquez (March 2006) walked out, but continued to demand wages. Legally Living City could not pay them for services not completed: this became one of several Catch-22s in those final months. Our decision to lay off Udo detonated a major conflict with Garrido, who defended his friend and responded by attacking my leadership. By this time, I was back in Toronto, finishing my master’s thesis. Living City formed a team to deal with the government, composed of Federico Allendes, Mauricio Montecinos, Patricio Lanfranco and Gregorio Valdés. They refused to accept my leaving my studies, a project both personal and part of the organization’s own development, so I remained, anxious and divided, in Toronto.

On 15 March 2006, the government issued a memorandum accusing Living City of incompliance with labour legislation and failure to deliver products, thus laying the grounds for suspending the contract. Led by Mauricio Montecinos, who had extensive experience working on these kinds of contracts, Living City replied (Appendix 9 summarizes the government’s observations and Living City’s answers). Conflicts erupted, with government officials changing demands from one meeting to the next and arguments becoming increasingly fierce. Garrido, meanwhile, developed a letter signed by several cycling organizations, accusing Living City of embezzling campaign funds. These were serious accusations and everyone in Living City was horrified. For months it looked like the government might take punitive action that could ruin the organizations involved. In May 2006, Casa de la Paz and Living City proposed restructuring, with Casa de la Paz heading the team, and Mauricio Montecinos, as executive director. The government rejected this and our consortium withdrew. Ultimately, it was the UNDP’s role to investigate, mediate and reach a fair solution. Living City presented its final report (figure 5.17). Finding no irregularities, the UNDP approved it and on 20 July 2006, Living City, Casa de la Paz, and the UNDP, terminated the contract, “by mutual agreement” (p. 25, Annual Report, Ciudad Viva 2006).

Although, legally speaking, its honesty was upheld, Living City’s reputation seemed shattered. Either we were dishonest and the UNDP was conniving in a coverup, as some suggested. Or we were incompetent, as was “typical” of civil society. We decided to practice total transparency,

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46 Personal communication from Amarilis Horta, Bicicultura; Mario López; Gonzalo Stierling and others informed me of these developments.

47 Confident he would now have full control over the GEF funding, Garrido promptly hired his housemate, Udo, to work in the government office on cycling initiatives. The UNDP vetoed this decision.
particularly campaign finances, publishing all information on our website and answering questions from anyone who asked.\textsuperscript{48} We also decided not to engage in the verbal attacks, circulating on the electronic lists of the MFC and \textit{Arribas}. Civil society organizations faced enough problems, we felt, without publicly cannibalizing each other. Furthermore, we refused to scapegoat. Suffering from burnout, Donatella resigned, but we elected her vice-president. Mauricio left for personal reasons. I was reelected to the presidency, as were other directors who led our defense. We were determined to leave the aggression behind, and demonstrate with our actions that we were competent, legitimate civil society actors.

5.3 Active citizenship, 2006-2011

...ten years have passed since the campaign and initial conflict that gave us life and the founding of our institution. We have built an organization with good support, excellent capacities, a wide network of friendships, contacts and a very good reputation. At the same time, these capacities have triggered some resentment and there has been some wear and tear. (Sagaris, p. 2, Ashoka report, 16-January-2007)

By March 2007, Bicivilizate conflicts had decimated Living City. Of the staff who led our work (Appendix 4), only one remained, with a partial wage. The seeds sown by the Avina project and our own daring flourished, however, with startling fertility. The damage to our reputation, which had seemed crippling, proved minimal. Support from our communities proved remarkable: within a year Living City was stronger than ever, its finances solid, its partnerships more carefully chosen, and its impacts in terms of both the media and urban planning enhanced by new initiatives.

A new heritage community centre

In 2007, we were able to buy and recover a heritage house for Living City’s headquarters (figure 5.18). After consulting with friends and advisors, lengthy discussions about our old age between my husband and myself, and a course on real estate at University of Toronto, we put together a private-Living City alliance to develop the new centre. With little security about its future, Living City was in no position to buy a property.\textsuperscript{49} As independent professionals, Patricio and I had learned about a common survival strategy: the purchase of properties to put together an old age “pension” with the rental income. It took lengthy battles with banks, but I obtained a mortgage to buy the house. This left us short CLP25 million (about CAD$50,000), to recover the buildings. My

\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, around this time an NGO called Chile Transparente published a series of guidelines for transparency in the civil society sector. We adopted them wholeheartedly, creating a “transparency” section on our website and providing background information on core group members, as recommended.

\textsuperscript{49} Restrictions on NGOs accessing this kind of finding are so extreme that obtaining a mortgage is difficult, if not impossible.
own savings amounted to CLP10 million. For the rest, I used every credit available and for years, after food and bills, everything I earned went to paying these debts.

The results, however, were spectacular. Previously, my savings in the Banco Santander had financed highways, high-rise and other neighbourhood-destroying projects. Now the old house, of noble materials, emerged in all its splendour, and the gardens, balconies, and first-floor salon welcomed visitors (figure 5.18). Seeing my savings come to life in the intense arguments, bright smiles, and exciting results of the next few years was the highest interest anyone could receive on hard-earned savings. In 2010, we formalized our agreement. For the rent on two offices, Living City also had a meeting room, kitchen and patios. In exchange, it managed the property. For the debts and the risk assumed, particularly covering when income did not cover expenses (as occurred frequently), I should eventually own the property once the 25-year mortgage is paid off. It is hard to predict where we will all be then. But for now, Living City has a secure home, and with luck I will eventually have income when I can no longer work.
Figure 5.18 (next page): Photos of Living City’s new community centre. Top right, the second house on the right is the Living City centre, circa 1918. The view is from the San Cristobal hill, long before the funicular and other buildings that characterize it today were built. The road to the left is Pío Nono. Top left, the building while undergoing repairs before Living City’s arrival in June 2007, with pictures of some of the maestros, including supervisor Víctor, and guitar playing during the celebration of completion of the main repairs. Bottom right, the building once repaired, in June 2007; bottom left, the main stairway, up to the Living City offices.
5.3.1 Re-emergence: The Metro Santiago Green Map with Natura

Between 2007 and 2008, thanks to an introduction from Ashoka, Living City developed its green mapping project with funding from Natura, a Brazilian cosmetics firm, and an agreement with the New York-based NGO Green Map, for use of its icons. The project included processes as well as the final product, a boxed set of 10 large maps and a 200-page directory, including ideas and instructions for living a greener, more sustainable lifestyle in Santiago, based on getting the most of existing systems and developing citizen capacity to demand additional services and policy shifts.

Key processes included participatory mapping activities with cyclists to trace existing routes, grade 4 students at the Bellavista public school, and older adults in Bellavista. Originally, the project was to map only a group of comunas, but it grew to encompass the whole metropolitan region, as Natura CEO Guto Pedreira became increasingly enthused and Living City’s team rose to the challenge. The project ended with the successful launch of version zero, attended by more than 300 people and covered in Santiago’s major media, in 2008. Earlier, Natura wanted us to help it
develop green maps in other Latin American countries. For transparency’s sake, I had insisted on Natura bringing in the director of Green Map for the launching. She applied to Natura for funding of her own, and we ended our relationship shortly thereafter.

The agreement with Natura brought in substantial funding, allowing us to consolidate in our new building, hire the staff necessary for the mapping, expand the Voz from 5,000 to 20,000 copies, four times a year, and consolidate our reputation as part of the media blitz that accompanied the launching. As the Map Zero was completed, however, Guto Pedreira moved on to a new posting, and Natura opted out of continuing the mapping activities. Nonetheless, this experience left lasting results. Participatory mapping remained a major tool. Moreover, during Living City’s annual evaluation (2007-2008), staff recommended we develop a more serious research capacity. This led to active policies to encourage our staff to pursue more advanced degrees, and my own decision, in consultation with family and Living City board, to return to Toronto for a PhD.
5.3.2 Bellavista: the double-edged blade of success

This phase also brought significant developments in the Bellavista neighbourhood associations’ efforts to achieve a balanced development for Living City’s home neighbourhood, based on a good quality of life for residents and its traditional heritage, both built and cultural. In 2005 (Recoleta) and 2006 (Providencia), both municipalities had developed new planes reguladores, the zoning ordinances that define land use in Chilean cities. We participated in both, achieving some victories in Recoleta, and substantial ones, in Providencia.

In December 2007, we teamed up with Claudia Woywood, a Chilean architect living in France, to develop a heritage proposal for the whole of Bellavista. This was virtually unheard of at the time, since the national monuments law focused primarily on large old buildings designed by famous architects (as its name suggested). However, with a substantial part of Valparaiso being recognized as a world heritage site (UNESCO) and the stunning victory of central Santiago neighbourhood, the Barrio Yungay, the time seemed ripe to attempt a more blanket protection of Bellavista. Thus, Claudia and I participated in SIRCHAL, an annual workshop and ongoing network involved in diverse initiatives to defend and develop heritage throughout Latin America, organized by Leo Orellana, a Chilean architect who had lived in Paris for many years.

Moreover, this period saw implementation, with full support from both municipalities and the ministry of housing, of the Pio Nono renovation project, and its inauguration in August 2008 (figure 5.22). Our proposal for a strict ordinance controlling the use of the new public space and provisions for citizen participation in, for example, organizing a festival to choose the street artists who would animate specific areas, was not accepted by the two municipalities. They did, however,
create a joint ordinance for Pío Nono, a major breakthrough, since one side of the street falls under Recoleta’s and the other under Providencia’s jurisdiction. The ordinance also required better quality sidewalk furniture, without advertising as had previously been the case, but it was a long way from the participatory management and inclusion of street artists and other cultural activities that our original proposal called for.

The improvements to the Bellavista neighbourhood attracted developers, anxious to implement the kind of high rise development that had been so profitable in the city centre. While Providencia went to the Supreme Court and defeated a 21-story project on one corner of Pío Nono and Bellavista, the Recoleta mayor worked closely with developers from his own party (Unión Democrática Independiente) to push a similar project, owned by a private university, through several loopholes in national legislation. Although the project violated the plan regulador, the national urban laws provided for conjuntos armónicos, harmonic developments, under specific circumstances. Strictly

Figure 5.22. The joy and unity of inauguration of the new Pío Nono, 23 August 2008, gave way to frustration as developers and delinquents moved in, driving out residents and creating new challenges. Above, the view from the stage down Pío Nono street, Gerardo Lanzarotti, president Junta #35 dances cueca with a neighbour, and neighbourhood association, municipal planners and the minister of housing (centre) celebrate the completion of a major project.
speaking the property did not meet these requirements, but the project was allowed to go ahead. All of a sudden, Bellavista’s human-scale development of 1-4 stories, much of it around a century old, was to be dwarfed by a massive university building and three residential towers. The university did not even enter the environmental impact assessment system, while the residential project entered only under a declaration, rather than a full environmental impact assessment. The declaration cheerfully reported that the project would not affect natural, cultural, religious or any other kind of heritage, and after some controversy, received approval.

We took these irregularities to the national comptroller’s office, which, after a long delay, found in our favour on several points. However, this had no impact on the project, or the Recoleta works department, which had committed these illegalities.\(^{50}\) For that our only recourse was to go to court, an expensive process for people with low incomes like ours. We attempted it and, in theory at least, our case is still somewhere in the winding halls of Chilean justice as I write. Meanwhile, the first tower has been completed and a second begun.

In 2010, Claudia and her team won funding to prepare the technical file that must support a heritage nomination. Living City had applied for UNESCO funding, which was finally approved in late 2011, although funds arrived much later. Claudia went ahead, with support from María Inés Solimano on behalf of Living City. Tensions arose as work advanced, and Bellavista leaders were excluded from decision-making and access to her results, particularly the data on land use and other key elements to local management. In August 2011, she sent her final report directly to the National Council of Monuments, declaring she was under no obligation to give us access to her results. After a formal request, she sent us a summary. The team held together, though, and by mid-2012, the heritage process was advancing, using a roundtable approach, developed by Tomás Marian, based on our cycling initiative.

### 5.3.3 Partnering with Metro Santiago government and I-CE

Rather surprisingly, in 2007 Living City was able to resume its efforts to promote a cycling-inclusive city, through a partnership with the international NGO, Interface for Cycling Interface (I-CE) and a formal agreement for technical assistance, which I-CE signed with the GORE, Santiago’s

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\(^{50}\) At time of writing, the works department director, responsible for permits, has been charged with corruption and bribery. After being released on bail, he became a fugitive, but eventually gave himself up in May 2012. La Tercera (2012). Suspendido director de obras de Recoleta cumple un mes prófugo de la justicia. La Tercera. Santiago, Chile. Copesa., RadioBioBio (2012). Ex director de obras de Recoleta se entrega a la justicia tras estar prófugo más de un mes. Radio Bio Bio Chile. Santiago, Chile.
metropolitan regional government. The I-CE method consisted of supporting Living City’s Active Transport Centre and sending a mission of experts for training once a year during 2007, 2008 and 2009. It also took Living City core leaders to international meetings in Ecuador (2008) and The Netherlands (2009) and funded our participation at the global Velo-City conference in Brussels (2009).

Throughout the three years, Living City, with two young, capable staff members, Magda Morel and Tomás Marin, organized a series of activities and meetings, mostly of groups involved in developing a Santiago cycling-inclusive design manual (2007-2009), mapping existing cycle routes (2009), auditing existing facilities (2008-2009) and other activities. With support from I-CE and GORE, Living City also led the development of a citizen-government roundtable (figure 5.23), which met regularly during 2008-2009, developing specific objectives and contents for Santiago’s cycling master plan, which had originally been developed by a consultant in the late 1990s, but never presented to the public or other government staff for ratification.

**Actors and interactions**

Key to these advances was Hector Olivos, a staff person in the regional government environmental office. Like Garrido, who

*Figure 5.23. Scenes from the GORE-ICE-Living City process. Top, Intendente Adriana del Piano signing the agreement for cooperation with Tom Godefrooi, head of the I-CE delegation (16-Nov-2007). Middle, CSO representatives, the regional Intendente, Undersecretary of Transport and head of Metro, at a Roundtable meeting (17-Jul-2008). Bottom, participatory exercise during the first ICE training, November 2007.*
remained in charge of the cycling issue within the national transit safety commission until the end of 2008, Olivos came from civil society, but unlike Garrido, he had functioned within democratically structured organizations, particularly non-profit foundations and the federation of neighbourhood associations. The two had also worked with Casa de la Paz, at the time the main “school” for civic participation.

Both had also moved on into government positions, through the environmental commission, where Garrido worked on a national trail project and Olivos worked on citizen participation. Olivos’ political affiliation, as a grassroots member of the Christian Democratic party, was transparent. From there he could move among, negotiate and reach important consensuses with the different parties of the concertación, the governing coalition (1990-2010).

Perhaps the most telling evidence of Olivo’s skill was the cycling project’s steady progress during the three years, despite the appointed intendente changing twice during the process. As the political head of the process, the Intendente’s attendance at the Roundtable and an attitude of receptivity were crucial. Attendance at annual training sessions remained high and diverse, while workshops with specific municipalities catalyzed new attitudes to cycling, but also to cooperation, as municipalities on Santiago’s southside combined forces to coordinate cycling initiatives (2011).

Olivo ensured that the process integrated new actors, such as the Canalistas del Maipo, an association formed to manage irrigation along the Maipo River. They developed a cycle route along their water courses, with advice and workshopping from I-CE and Living City. Moreover, Olivo was careful to schedule meals and other meetings between the I-CE team and key political figures, including the newly appointed Intendentes themselves, to reinforce support for the work. He also showed enormous clarity about the boundaries between government and civil society, scrupulously respecting our right to distribute the Voz at training sessions, for example, regardless of whether it included articles criticizing government policy, as it often did. This contrasted sharply with the government’s attitude during the Bicivilízate campaign, which questioned even our right to include our community centre’s name in our official address.

**Critical tools**

The process both built on existing and developed critical new tools for consolidating participation in building a more cycling-inclusive Santiago (see Appendix 10 for details). These included the annual I-CE-GORE-Living City training sessions, attended by up to 100 government, civil society, academic and other interest people; cycling audits of existing facilities; in-depth workshops on
cycle plans with selected municipalities (Maipú, Recoleta, Providencia, Concepción, and through the private Maipo irrigation association, La Reina); participatory mapping; and many other activities (figure 5.24). I-CE provided several matrices for planning purposes, developed by the Dutch province of Noord Brabant and other instances, and Living City also developed its own.

The final outcome was significant progress in terms of cycle facilities throughout the city; several government tenders to further improve studies and cycling policies; and improvement in many (although not all cycleways); cycle parking facilities in several Metro stations; development of an active women’s cycling school, run by the Macletas; an annual cycling and culture festival, led by Bicicultura; and a growing open streets event, led by CicloRecreovía. As discussed under results, these last three became close partners of Living City, overcoming the bitterness left by Bicivilízate (they had signed the original letter accusing Living City of theft), to create Ciclistas Unidos de Chile, a pro-cycling network created in 2007 to generate more effective cycling advocacy.
This initiative culminated in 2010 in an official report (figure 5.26), prepared by Living City, I-CE and GORE, summarizing the participatory process, the Roundtable and the four chapters of the Design Manual completed by the cycling design working group. In the years to come, it proved to be extremely useful, an important record of the work done and a certificate of sorts testifying to the value and contents of this three-way process of civil society, government and international cooperation.

5.3.4 Active Citizenship and Transparency (EU, OSI)

In 2010-2011, as the partnership with I-CE ran down (and their own funding application to continue the work failed to convince the newly elected Dutch government), Living City brought together a council of organizations to lead a new project, with support from the European Union (active citizenship) and the Open Society Institute (OSI). The OSI project offered funding to map transparency in neighbourhood-municipal relations, using the right-to-information provisions in Chile’s new transparency law. This complemented the main focus of work on the two-year EU project, which sought to build active citizenship through community management of neighbourhoods, heritage and other urban issues in Santiago, Valparaíso and the southern town of Tomé.

For the first time, Living City was working at a national, as well as a neighbourhood and metropolitan scales. Moreover, for the first time it had sufficient resources (€150,000) to work on all four issue areas (transport for equality, recycling and the green economy, heritage and identity, empowerment through democratization) at the same time and for two years. It maintained its Local Initiatives Fund, distributed using a participatory budgeting approach designed by Magda Morel and Tomás Marín, and applied by the council of organizations in charge of the project. The 11 partners in eight Santiago neighbourhoods and two other cities, included heritage-based citizen groups in Valparaíso, recyclers, women cyclists, neighbourhood organizations in Bellavista, Yungay, Conchalí (Santiago) and Tomé (near Concepción, in southern Chile), along with Villa Olímpica, a Santiago neighbourhood badly damaged by the 2010 earthquake.

The main focus of this initiative was to develop neighbourhood management and political advocacy skills among the different citizen organizations, focusing on recycling, heritage, cycling
and other issues consistent with Living City’s four main thematic areas. To do so, it organized many events focusing on skills development, ranging from visits to permaculture centres through to a learning circle on citizen-led urban planning, run very much like a graduate seminar. It also developed five major research papers (on recycling, democratization of urban governance and management, transport, transparency and heritage), and, on that basis, a Citizens’ Agenda for Socially Just, Sustainable Cities. The agenda, moreover, was designed to serve as a challenge to all candidates in the 2012 municipal elections and as the basis for indicators, which citizens could use to measure candidates’ commitments and the results, once they were elected.

The agenda catalysed a more direct approach to political figures, as prominent mayors and national politicians were involved in its launching (2011). Moreover, although it was far from the only reason, it was part of a trend that saw a significant group of leaders move from the civil society sphere into the political arena during the campaign. Most significantly, for Living City, this included its former treasurer and president, Josefa Errazuriz, who decided to run for mayor of Providencia, against retired army colonel Christian Labbé. With elections in October 2012, it is impossible to predict results, but, rather surprisingly, as of this writing Errazuriz was leading the polls, as she combined neighbours and student leaders, outraged by Labbé’s handling of student unrest at Providencia’s high schools, into a grassroots electoral campaign.

Rodrigo Quijada thus became Living City president, its first man and first government staff person (he was working for Transantiago at this time) to hold such a key position. I will close with a brief summary of the participatory research process, which has informed this dissertation and also influenced events occurring in this period.

5.3.5 The participatory research process and its impacts on Living City

Working as co-researchers on this doctoral study was a challenging and surprising process from many perspectives. In January 2010, it was formally established through an agreement jointly signed by Living City and myself. As described in more detail under methods (chapter 2), implementation took the form of assistance with interviews and coordination, and participation at key points in the research process (table 5.2). These points were marked by workshops, whose primary goal was not data collection, but rather collective reflection on the progress of the study.

Thus, the first workshops, with the Coordinadora and Living City leaders (2010), focused on how people saw their involvement in each process, how it affected their own skills and sense of self, and whether it had changed their interactions with the policy/power environments. We also
explored how they perceived Living City itself. Finally, as some of the longer quotations in these chapters attest, through these reflections we were able to capture examples of how deliberation worked in the different groups that formed the core of these two instances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living City Workshop</td>
<td>22-07-2010</td>
<td>Board and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinadora Workshop</td>
<td>29-07-2010</td>
<td>Leaders of Coordinadora from Bellavista, Recoleta markets and Independencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to Board on semi-structure interview results</td>
<td>20-01-2011</td>
<td>Board and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal development workshop</td>
<td>25-05-2011</td>
<td>Board and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar and elections</td>
<td>26-07-2011</td>
<td>Board, members, staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living City Workshop</td>
<td>18-01-2012</td>
<td>Board and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living City Workshop</td>
<td>4-08-2012</td>
<td>Board and staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration, based on p. 5, Living City’s Annual report 2002 (Ciudad Viva 2003).

As research developed, it was clear that each researcher had different, although complementary, goals. Both Living City and I wanted to reach a more explicit understanding of what it was, how it worked, why it had been able to make significant progress, even in such a seemingly hostile environment. For Living City, this was central to both its survival and learning to have greater impact on urban planning in Santiago and Chile. For me, this study was central to my interest in contributing to both the theory and practice of urban planning, in academic and other spheres, and to do so, where possible, from a collective, community-based positioning.

The 2010 interviews, which nourished the 2011 workshops, were particularly important. Although interviewees were surprisingly positive about Living City, a central concern was my growing profile as president, and the way that was starting to mask the collective efforts and multiple skills and contributions from diverse communities. Positive media coverage of the Green Map effort, for example, gave way to a feature in the news magazine, Que Pasa (figure 5.27), which carried a three-page feature entitled “The Silent Canadian threat”, which began with a callout that declared:

Lake Sagaris set up shop in Chile in 1982. She was a correspondent for foreign media such as Newsweek and the London Times. But her interest was in battles. Today, this Canadian presides over Living City, an institution that watches over urban heritage. From that trench, aside from a lengthy list of contacts, she has touched off alarms among real estate companies, mayors and ministers who follow her every step closely (p. 20 (Comandari 2008).
As a former journalist I tried to avoid the press and preferred knocking on neighbours’ doors to rubbing elbows with politicians and powerbrokers, so I didn’t much like the spotlight. Apparently the fruit of our growing reputation for influencing planning decisions throughout Santiago, the article cites praise from consultant and academic Iván Poduje, who considers Living City the most significant group working on urban issues (Poduje 2008; Tironi, Poduje et al. 2010; Poduje 2011), and bitter criticism from Francisco Walker, a partner in the Universidad San Sebastián development in Bellavista, upset that after a couple of meetings and minor changes to their plans, we nonetheless filed a formal complaint against the project with the environmental commission. It personalizes our collective efforts, and both demonizes and heroizes my role. Notwithstanding, many of those around us interpreted it as a clear sign that we had “arrived” and were a force to be reckoned with when it came to urban development in Santiago.

Around the same time, Revista Paula, one of Chile’s most well read women’s magazines, in a major photo feature on power in Chile, included “citizen power” amongst its categories, along with photographs of a journalist who had fought for inclusion of MS under public health insurance, a leader who had fought for depenalization of homosexual relations, and me, “who got them to put the Costanera Norte under the San Cristóbal Hill” and, as president of Living City, which had won awards for innovation (Paula 2010).

While this kind of recognition marked some progress, it also raised issues. Many Chilean NGOs remained unipersonal institutions, their work synonymous with their charismatic individual
founders. From the start, however, Living City, was the result of a new kind of collective enterprise, with many outstanding leaders. Moreover, the founders’ intention was to create a space for developing leaders (old and new) and retaining the many collective achievements, particularly knowledge, skills, contacts and concrete changes, that collaboration could produce.

Thus, the internal development workshop, in May 2011, was particularly important. Based on the results from the semi-structured interviews, Living City’s core group (board and staff), settled on some fundamental definitions. Over the years it had struggled with others’ perceptions of it as an NGO; some odd kind of community organization; a sort of super neighbourhood association; a kind of school or federation. Some of those interviewed suggested it should open offices in other cities, while others insisted it should lose the “other” issues and just focus on transport. At this stage, founders and leaders old and new, declared:

We are a community of communities and individuals, who support and teach each other mutually, making an effort to reach consensuses on goals and proposals, to integrate them, effectively, in the country’s agenda, to achieve more democratic, just, green, inclusive and friendly cities. We dare to experiment and we are a creative organization in search for new paths to democracy. What we do is citizen-led urbanism, that is, the city is made by its citizens (CiudadViva 2011).

Using a model from Synergos, Living City defined its theory of change. Based on the belief that out of diversity and an active commitment to equality and a healthy and beautiful environment, we can mobilize “ecologies” of actors, that is, everyone relevant from their different spaces (citizen, government, private sector), through deliberation, a kind of transformative communication,

Living City

researches and listens, deliberates and proposes, carries out campaigns of interest to citizens, shares knowledge, innovates.

Moreover, it declared its commitment to including in every activity

the joy and strength of sharing, in private and public spaces, honesty, respect, consistency, coherence and collective commitment, transformative experiences at the personal and collective levels (slide 5, CiudadViva 2011).

It also defined a series of “vital interactions” that compose citizen-led urbanism and its four-fold focus on transport for equality, green living as the foundation for a more just economy, heritage as our collective memory, and democratization as a constant process. These included most of Living City’s main tools, including participatory action research, participatory mapping, community
communications, active and creative citizenship, denouncing and making proposals (co-responsibility), work in groups large and small, transparency in our actions and our demands (slide 6, CiudadViva 2011).

It went on to define a series of participatory spaces within the organization itself, and reached a series of operational and organizational agreements to reinforce its work, despite the insecurity that makes its own existence quite fragile, despite successes.

This workshop was followed by a second, prepared by other leaders (Pepa Errazuriz and Tomás Marín), and together results were presented, discussed and adopted by the members, at its biannual seminar, in July. Elections took place and for the first time only one founder from the Coordinadora, María Inés Solimano, remained on the board. I left the presidency and the board. These were major changes, which tested its development and maturity. They were reinforced by my lengthy absences, as I spent more time in Canada, working toward completion of my PhD. For the time being, I continued to represent Living City at many international gatherings, as “advisor”, with a more formal definition of my role left to 2012-2013, once I have graduated.

Main observations

During the January 2012 PhD workshop, we focused on my main observations, to identify where they reflected collective opinions, or where my opinions and Living City’s diverged. Central to these discussions were some of the data gathered for this dissertation regarding inequality, discrimination and diversity in Chile, and the importance of diversity as an ongoing, central value from the Coordinadora and throughout Living City’s development. After some discussion and clarifications, there was agreement that our circles of participation “method” was actually a pretty good diagram of

![Interacciones vitales](image)

Figure 5.28. Living City Tools. A slide from the May 2011 workshop, defining “vital interactions”, mostly involving the key tools developed by Living City in the previous decade. See text for the full list and explanation.
Living City’s structure, although it was important to note that individuals leapt back and forth among the different orbits, rather than proceeded through them in an orderly step-by-step manner (CiudadViva 2012a).

This, combined with its varied communications methods, gave Living City a level of transparency vital to building and maintaining trust, the foundation for all its relationships and work. This open-ended structure also posed some risk, however, since Living City’s collective memory, its most important asset and the key to its ability to function effectively and grow, is fragmented among different individuals, spaces and times, held together by a combination of action (ability to work), communications (ability to transmit and receive) and structure (ability to relate and interact). It is through these interactions (figure 5.28) that the organization has been able to have considerable impact on both city systems and planning systems.

Examples of effective action on city systems, for example, include both the physical renovation of Pio Nono street (Bellavista), development of the Patio Bellavista (by private developer Patricio Jadue, as part of a Living City team), and the revival of public space that has formed an integral part of its activities in the past ten years. Examples of effective interactions with the planning system include participation in the zoning bylaws for Bellavista, the Citizen-Government Cycling Roundtable, the joint bylaw approved by the two municipalities to govern Pio Nono, and other similar initiatives. I will discuss these results and their implications in more detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 6 Results and Discussion: Living City, Structure of change

A city is a structure of change even more than it is a model of planning, an instrument of economic policies, a nucleus of social polarization. The soul of a city -- the strength that makes it breathe, exist, and progress -- resides in each one of its residents. Jaime Lerner, former mayor of Curitiba. (Sheehan, Starke et al. 2007).

Figure 6.1. President Bachelet signs the draft cycling law before sending it to Congress (November 2009). Looking on, transport minister René Cortazar (right) and Living City's Tomás Marín (left), while Caroline Moren, of the Arriba e la Chanchas (behind Cortazar) looks on.

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6.1 Transparent heart: structuring memory and action
6.1.1 The core: Multiple views on involvement -- civil society
6.1.2 Early evaluations and awards: From victims to protagonists
6.1.3 From Bicivilízate to Cycling-Inclusive Planning
6.1.4 Neighbourhood: Territorio Chile award for Bellavista

6.2 Outreach: mobilising ecologies of actors
6.2.1 Multiple views on involvement: government
6.2.2 Multiple views on involvement: private sector and academics
6.2.3 At the root: hybrid forms of sensual-emotional-rational communication
6.2.4 Outreach nourished by relational “trees” and “forests”
6.2.5 Holding it all together: A communications “weave”

6.3 The importance of the Meso: City and planning systems
6.3.1 Understanding Living City as a meso institution
6.3.2 Understanding transport as a meso system within the city system
6.3.3 Understanding multiscalar governance in Metro Santiago
6.3.4 Living City’s “BOID”: a three-way policy dynamic
6.4 Living City: structuring chaos for systemic change
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget US$</th>
<th>Main projects</th>
<th>Main funders</th>
<th>Main staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Founding boards led by Sonia Abarca, leaders of the Coordinadora 2000-2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Getting started; Citizens’ Transport Agenda</td>
<td>Self-financed</td>
<td>Board, Teresita González*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>16,529</td>
<td>Reciclar para vivir mejor</td>
<td>Fondo de las Américas</td>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro, Eugenia Villanueva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>51,980</td>
<td>Míevete para tu ciudad, Avina</td>
<td>UNDP-GEF, Avina</td>
<td>Rodrigo Quijada, Donatella Fuccaro, Eugenia Villanueva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>78,966</td>
<td><strong>New board elected, led by Sonia Abarca, first non-Coordinadora leaders, 2004-2005.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>54,996</td>
<td>Por una ciudad viva</td>
<td>Avina</td>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>133,246</td>
<td>Por una CV/Bicivilízate</td>
<td>Avina. GEF</td>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro, Neftalí Garrido, Mariana Huerta, Valeria Artigas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>New board elected, led by Lake Sagaris, few Coordinadora and more new leaders, 2006-2008.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>60,542</td>
<td>Por una CV/Bicivilízate, Charrette Bellavista, Guia de Cultura de La Chimba</td>
<td>Avina, GEF, DOS, Cultura</td>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro, Valeria Artigas, Neftalí Garrido</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>58,260</td>
<td>Stgo Green Map, Active Transport Centre</td>
<td>Natura, I-CE</td>
<td>Armando Escoffier, Loreto Rojas, M. Eliana Bustamante, Magda Morel, Carolina Muñoz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>46,488</td>
<td>Stgo Green Map, Active Transport Centre</td>
<td>Natura, I-CE</td>
<td>Armando Escoffier, Loreto Rojas, M. Eliana Bustamante, Magda Morel, Tomás Marín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>New board elected, led by Lake Sagaris, mixed individual and community leaders, 2009-2011.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>72,199</td>
<td>Active Transport Centre, RedActiva Sustran LAC</td>
<td>I-CE, ITDP</td>
<td>Magdalena Morel, Tomás Marín, Fabiola Espíndola, Mery Guerrero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>125,671</td>
<td>Ciudadanía Activa, Transparencia Municipal</td>
<td>EU, Open Society Institute</td>
<td>Magdalena Morel, Tomás Marín, Tamara Ortega, Juan Pablo Frick, Diego Mallea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>New board elected, led by Josefa Errazuriz (2011)/Rodrigo Quijada (2012), 1 coordinadora leader left, 2011-2013.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>231,600</td>
<td>Active citizenship/ transparency/services</td>
<td>EU, Open Society Institute, others</td>
<td>Magdalena Morel, Tomás Marín, Cristobal Donoso, Dalila Aguilera</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the results of the Living City phase of my case study, focusing on actors, their interactions with each other, and with city and planning systems. Table 6.1 summarizes the main initiatives, changes in board and staff, and resources. Based on the information presented, workshops and interviews, and evaluations by external examiners, I will explore the answers to my questions regarding the nature of Living City.

I start by examining the core, Living City’s “transparent heart” (6.1) as the external evaluator of its Recycle to Live Better project (Valle 2003) put it, particularly the multiple views on involvement among civil society participants (6.1.1), evaluations and awards as they marked leaders’ evolution (6.1.2), the factors that made possible a rapid recovery from Bicivilizate (6.1.3) and recognition of Living City’s ability to participate significantly in neighbourhood management (6.1.4).

The next subsection (6.2) explores multiple views on involvement with civil society, particularly Living City, among key government (6.2.1), and private sector and academic actors (6.2.2), before exploring the hybrid communication (6.2.3) that constitutes the kind of deliberation or authentic dialogue practiced within Living City, both nourishing and nourished by “relational trees” and “forests” (6.2.4). It will close with the communications “weave” (6.2.5), which holds the organization and its work together, and contributes significantly to its effectiveness.

The final section (6.3) discusses how these experiences reveal city governance in Santiago as fragmented, mostly hidden, and multiscalar, (6.3.1) requiring an equivalent response from citizens (6.3.2). This suggests a key feature of Living City’s work: its location at a meso, rather than micro scale, where other citizen organizations in the urban sphere are located. Within this complex governance environment, I discuss transport and roads as a meso-system within the general city system (6.3.3), and how this influences the civil society that has arisen around them, in Santiago.

6.1 Transparent heart: structuring memory and action for change

6.1.1 Multiple views on involvement: civil society

As the Coordinadora, neighbourhood and market leaders first reached out to the members of their own immediate communities (figure 6.2), all with specific territorial boundaries and characteristics, as discussed in previous chapters. They then extended this search to other organizations in their immediate environment. Ximena Abogabir (Casa de la Paz) notes that this process began at a time when there was
resentment in Chilean civil society, because most of its leaders had been captured by the State. Moreover the Government of Chile took over international cooperation, so instead of going to NGOs it went to the Government, which kept the resources that had traditionally gone to NGOs.

It did this, moreover, in a way that surprised other players, notes Abogabir:

Faced with the same actors, you could be collaborating one day and opposing the next, all with the same smile. That, for Chileans, was very odd. For us you’re either on one side or the other. But this attitude, of not taking a specific side, but dealing with each issue on its own merits and then taking a position, was very revolutionary for Chile.

Tomás Carvajal, one of Bellavista’s most longstanding advisors and supporters, compares Living City with the Bellavista Cultural Corporation, noting that the latter had more than 20 members, with leadership exercised mainly by Carmen Silva. He says that Living City

successfully consolidated, based mainly on the leadership of Lake and Patricio, with a very fluid relationship with the neighbourhood associations... Both organizations had a pretty personalized leadership, but Living City had much more real support from people and that kept it alive (Carvajal 2010).

Carvajal, a busy architect who for over a decade has always made time for Bellavista meetings, drawings and proposals, sees many concrete achievements from these years of work.

The first achievement was to have the municipality realize that through the Corporación citizens were watching over the permits it was handing out and noting the irregularities and the interests associated with drugs and mafias that began to settle in the neighbourhood. Another was enforcement and showing there were real possibilities for organizing, generating some kind of institution of our own... A specific achievement of Living City was the building of the Pío Nono boulevard; what Patricio Jadue did with Patio Bellavista (from the perspective of bringing private capital into the idea we were proposing); the partial pedestrianization of Pío Nono (Carvajal 2010).

He notes the current, frustrating, impasse with the San Sebastián University’s real estate projects. Nonetheless, he continues to participate, motivated by his

vision as an architect of the city, of how one can act in a concrete way. Moreover, I believe it is extremely important to reinforce citizen participation. This hasn’t gone far enough from an institutional, governmental perspective... (Carvajal 2010).

With the years, although the leadership of neighbourhood associations has shifted, new leaders and longterm partners alike have experienced Living City’s support. Jessica Gjuranovic and Víctor Hugo Luzzi, for example, joined Living City in the mid-2000s, as they began to revive a neighbourhood association in the Patronato neighbourhood, located between Bellavista Recoleta and the markets. Says Luzzi:
I see Living City as an organism that encourages the community to do things. It’s always doing things, provoking the community to show concern for the neighbourhood (Luzzi and Gjuranovic 2010).

Daudelina Bazan, a recycler from El Bosque, one of Santiago’s poorest municipal areas, joined the Active Citizenship (2011) initiative, working closely with the participatory council running that project. As a local leader, that project funded her participation in a conference (in Rosario, Argentina, 2011) on participatory democracy as a way of life. This experience, combined with an invitation to present at a recycling congress in Lima, Peru, led to her expulsion from the Association of Recyclers of El Bosque. On that experience, she comments, drily:

I belonged to an organization of ecological recyclers, but they don’t want to see me anymore because when I went abroad they felt abused, now they won’t see me, not even a picture (Bazan 2010).

A single mother and member of diverse initiatives focusing on poverty relief in popular sectors, Daudelina takes this in stride, noting that “my people are very conflict-ridden”. As a relatively new participant she wondered why people with so much education, who are getting along all right, with plenty to enjoy in life, why they would be concerned about us, the most torrejas (the poorest, the most bothersome, the most marginalized). We worry about the street, if it’s dirty, we try to help our peers, and I wonder why they would worry about us? I mean Lake, the girls (Macletas) who are sociologists, physical therapists, who studied for the good life, and on top of all that they have to go through a hard time with people from El Bosque. They’re the real Quijotes (Bazan 2010).

Through Living City, Bazan and the Macletas, the women’s cycling group, organized a school for women to learn to cycle in El Bosque. Feeling left out, the recyclers’ association boycotted the school, but it went ahead anyway, with excellent results.

At first I thought the [women’s cycling school] wouldn’t work, people would come and then they’d leave. I felt very committed. In the end though, everything went along just fine every Sunday, and finally we ended with a spectacular closing, tears, laughter. It was very fulfilling, comforting (Bazan 2010).

For Daudelina, participation in different initiatives, particularly Living City, has meant she has grown as a person, as a feeling, I’ve grown in love for others and I’ve realized something really important for me: I am very intelligent and before I never thought I was and I think I’m capable of facing whatever comes. My self-esteem was always very low, but being with people like you and everywhere, I find I am much stronger as a person (Bazan 2010).
Andrea Cortínez, of the Macletas, came into contact with Living City for the first time during the Bicivilízate campaign. She notes its rapid recovery in 2007, when Magda Morel joined the staff, and the alliance with I-CE began.

Living City became a point of reference that the government looked up to. It was also an important time for sustainable transport in Chile. If you want quality information, it’s Living City, and the same for links with other organizations. We the Macletas have developed a very trusting relationship. We’ve talked about the difficulties, we’ve been wise about working together but not losing our independence, to avoid losing the richness of each organization (Cortínez 2010).

Clearly, learning from a trusted source, one that respects one’s own knowledge as well as adding information from other sources, remains central to Living City’s actions. Vivian Castro, who joined the board in August 2011, adds:

I feel that Living City is a place for ciudadano-terapia (citizen-therapy). Here everyone is a master of being a citizen. In the end, they teach you to be a citizen. When you start you don’t believe anything of what they say, then you start putting together your own strategies, you know more or less what will happen... And then there’s this transformation, which is pure alchemy. It has to do with how Living City gives you -- as if through osmosis -- an empowered citizen attitude, where you feel you have the right to ask questions, send letters, and so on (CiudadViva 2012b).

Moreover, this is based on an environment of trust, which she describes:

Here you realize that this is a place where everyone has an open heart, and that everything aims to benefit the community, citizens themselves. You feel trust, you open up, you feel support. You feel that at any time you can send a message for help and it will come (CiudadViva 2012b).
Rodrigo Quijada contributes an example of how, as someone with experience working with citizens (Living City’s 2003 Transport for Equality project), he can help citizens as they confront the Santiago bus system, Transantiago (where he now works):

A short while back, this guy phoned me and said he was worried that Transantiago was going to run right over his neighbourhood, and he needed my help. I met with him several times, told him where to send letters, what they should say, how at first they would deny that the information existed, but then he would get the information he needed for his own arguments, and that it would take about three months. The fellow did all this and he won! So yes, really, we should put a little sign up outside offering “Citizen-therapy” (CiudadViva 2012b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement of citizen capacity to exercise rights to information and involvement in decision-making that affects them, including information gathering, practical learning and deliberation over alternatives</td>
<td>p. 861, Valle; p 155 Sepúlveda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of diverse skills necessary to practice rights: ability to take a strategic approach to urban territories, identify problems, visualize human and other resources available and those needed, and plan strategically</td>
<td>p. 861, Valle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of leadership abilities to interact with government, business, etc. “The testimonies collected during field work indicate the enormous expansion in skills experienced by leaders as a result of participation in a socially heterogeneous organization, that functions horizontally, in which they feel as appreciated as professionals and are listened to, thus coming to value their own words and knowledge more” (p. 861, Valle 2003).</td>
<td>p. 861, Valle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders communicate issues and information to their grassroots and have significantly developed and expanded networks of cooperation and exchange</td>
<td>p. 861, Valle; p 155 Sepúlveda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living City is autonomous and self-managed, fostering dialogues with authorities that have been key in people’s realization that they can get involved and influence local governmental decisions.</td>
<td>p. 861, Valle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoleta’s mayor expressed his satisfaction with the concern for cultural and architectural heritage</td>
<td>p. 862, Valle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conama, the national environmental commission, reported it would attempt to duplicate this experience with the Vega Central, generating a composting facility for that area of the markets.</td>
<td>p. 863, Valle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant innovation in citizenship based on urban management and problem-solving, expanding beyond typical focus on local demands to address collective interests in city building</td>
<td>p. 864, Valle, p. 155 Sepúlveda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing a powerful group of diverse citizens’ voices into urban debates and making proposals for significant urban improvement</td>
<td>p. 146, Sepúlveda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective communication strategy to focus urban issues</td>
<td>p. 146, Sepúlveda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A “relevant example of innovation and development of citizenship”</td>
<td>p. 156, Sepúlveda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on evaluators’ reports (Valle 2003, Sepúlveda 2005) and Living City annual reports (2003, 2004).

This sampling of voices from NGOs and grassroots organizations with which Living City has worked (figure 6.1) brings out themes that continue with other types of actors, particularly its role...
as a leader, taking positions based on solid information and increasingly “technical” knowledge. The interviews revealed that this was a major component of its reputation among its peers.

6.1.2 Early evaluations and awards: From victims to protagonists

Aside from the satisfaction among the different leaders and communities, probably the most significant indicator of the success of Living City’s first two projects were reports from external evaluators, who interviewed leaders, local groups, counterparts in government and the private sector, as part of considering Living City for the Innovation in Citizen award. It won this award for both its recycling project (2003) and its transport initiative (2004). These evaluations identified specific achievements, particularly in terms of Living City’s ability to foster empowerment and rights among the highly diverse participants (table 6.2). Organized by the national Foundation to Overcome Poverty, the University of Chile’s Public Policies Institute, and the Ford Foundation, this competition represented one of the earliest attempts to build a more participatory, more effective civil society into Chile’s new democratic culture. In her evaluation of Recycle to Live Better, the evaluator concluded that:

The most important achievement of this project has been to connect citizens with the solution to problems affecting their communities, revitalizing organizations, articulating their work and breaking through a climate of distrust and reluctance that existed among some of them. Moreover, there has been an active transfer of skills to grassroots organizations, not only on the specific issue of recycling, but also in terms of tools such as the use of computers and Internet that has reinforced their own specific work (Valle 2003).

She added that while the initiative worked primarily through grassroots membership and organizations, it also brought them together strategically with local authorities and public bodies. A key element was building participation through local needs and identity “which, to date, has guaranteed citizens’ appropriation of this work.” (p. 845, Valle 2003). This had generated “positive expectations about the future and given citizens back the sense that they could control their environment” in a surprisingly short period of time, an achievement Valle attributed to Living City’s “circles of participation”, noting the importance of the innermost circle being “transparent and open” for this to work (p. 846, Valle 2003). Valle also found the diversity of participation in the Living City initiative differed from work by traditional NGOs, in that

neighbours, from different social strata and diverse cultural backgrounds discovered that, given that they lived together, sharing common spaces, they could find a shared language and work together. This required developing a process that moved ahead carefully, with much tolerance and leaving prejudices aside (p. 855, Valle 2003, my translation).
She found the local teams “spontaneous” and noted that the Hormiguitas collected waste to help finance a community centre, La Terraza, in their sector of their neighbourhood.

Important factors in these achievements included:

- A group of leaders with prior experience in grassroots organizations (churches, neighbourhood associations, mothers’ centres),
- The ability to listen to each other and focus these diverse perspectives on shared problems,
- The ability to integrate cultural, social, economic and environmental elements, rather than dealing with them separately,
- Inside knowledge of the territories themselves,
- The presence of two foreign professionals, a Canadian journalist and a French student who “offered visions of more democratic and heterogeneous societies, helped to overcome classical political divisions and mistrust and the class and gender prejudices that characterize Chilean society (summarized from p. 857, Valle 2003, my translation).

Her report also notes the double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1974; Healey 2006) involved:

one of the initiative’s most significant impacts had nothing to do with recycling itself, but rather that sectors that previously worked in parallel, have been brought together for a common task. Now, apart from the garbage issue, they’re dealing with other problems in their sectors, such as the enormous conflict that emerges from time to time with the authorities, who want to eliminate the markets and apply an urbanistic project (p. 859, Valle 2003, my translation).

These organizations used their newly acquired skills to work together against the delinquency and pickpockets that plagued the sector, at the same time as they re-framed the image of the independent recycler “traditionally associated with that of a ‘vagabond’, to someone carrying out beneficial tasks for the sector” (p. 860, Valle 2003, my translation).

For Living City, one of the most interesting aspects of Valle’s evaluation were the positive views from the municipalities, who

agreed that the link with Living City is constantly stimulated by neighbourhood leaders, who constantly seek out their technical teams. This motivates the municipalities and keeps them alert and active.

Providencia municipal staff told her that

51 So open and transparent were these interviews that Valle listened to an impassioned argument amongst the Hormiguitas themselves on why they had participated. María Eliana Bustamante, a little worried, told me afterward that, while some (girls) said they were recycling for the good of the neighbourhood and the environment, several of the boys said that was ridiculous, they were really doing it so they would have money for a year-end party and sporting equipment. In our team evaluation, we were delighted that this had come through, and that no one had parroted a prepared speech. To us, this was exactly what the project was about: getting people to do the right thing for the environment, for whatever reason motivated them the most.
It is easier, more attractive, more motivating and more productive to work with active citizens, who propose, commit themselves and get to work. Often before, they had tried to install recycling recipients in different sectors, with poor results, they failed because people weren’t accustomed to using them or used them wrong; this was the first time that they had worked out (p. 863, Valle 2003, my translation).

Recoleta said it was planning on duplicating the Living City model in neighbourhoods and schools, and one Recoleta staff person said that “although the relationship with Living City does not determine the decisions we make in the municipality, it does encourage them a lot...” (quoted on p. 863, Valle 2003, my translation).

The evaluation concluded that the Living City initiative made a significant contribution to a “bottom up” democratic model for action, “respecting the identity of the grassroots, listening, educating and ‘being educated’ by the community” (p. 864, Valle 2003, my translation).

Similarly, Leandro Sepúlveda, the external evaluator of the Transport for equality initiative, noted new forms of understanding State-civil society relations; democratic forms of debate regarding city-building and creation; expansion of networks for cooperation and exchange; and the ability to connect specific interests with crosscutting proposals for change (pp. 155-156, (Sepúlveda 2005). He noted strengths in the organization’s ability to mobilize diverse actors from citizen, public and private spheres, and weaknesses in its dependence on external funding and ongoing resistance in the public sector to citizen involvement. Moreover, he saw a significant opportunity to develop “a model of integrative citizenship”, which could be threatened by the public sector’s refusal to consider citizens a legitimate actor in policy initiatives (pp. 157-158, Sepúlveda 2005).

### 6.1.3 From Bicivilizate to Cycling-Inclusive Planning

As described in chapter 5, in mid-2006 Living City seemed devastated by the failure of the Bicivilízate campaign and the particularly vicious attack on its reputation and leaders. Its quick recovery reflects the strength of the bonds of trust within the organization, but also with other actors. By 2007, it had fully recovered and was arguably able to do more than it had within the constraints of the Bicivilízate campaign.

Thus, although Living City and Casa de la Paz relations were strained during the climax of the Bicivilízate conflict, they quickly resumed a normal level of mutual respect and cooperation. The conflict had no noticeable effect on Living City’s participation in Avina. In the case of Ashoka, for which honesty and ethics are central, the accusations reached the Chile representative, Maria Isabel Hamilton, and she investigated, with the result that I remained a fellow. This was very
important as we rebuilt in 2006, since the Ashoka stipend allowed me to work full time on Living City for the first time, rather than squeezing it between my survival (work) and family activities.

Although the fury of the anti-campaign from the MFC, led by Garrido, and the Arribas did considerable damage, it failed to destroy Living City. Says Amarilis Horta, founder of one of Chile’s most significant pro-cycling initiatives, the Bicicultura Festival:

I knew that Living City had organized a seminar on cycling, but I didn’t know much about this group. I got my information from César Garrido and the person who was affected, Udo. I was preparing the first festival of Bicicultura with Arriba e la Chancha members. They told me there were irregularities, payments that they made that they shouldn’t have, which made me distance myself from Living City (Horta 2010).

Horta herself soon fell victim to Garrido, however:

We pulled together a Coordinadora Ciclista [a coordinating body of pro-cycling groups], which César rejected. I tried to convince him this wasn’t a threat. Mario López showed up, but César said he was on Living City’s payroll, sent to take over the presidency so he could control all the groups (Horta 2010).

Andrea Cortínez, founder of the women’s cycling group, the Macletas, noticed problems in the campaign, from the start:

I witnessed some very telling incidents: important meetings where Udo was outside taking care of his baby. It was unfortunate, because the people with whom Living City was working were capable of doing harm to other people, denigrating them... They went to Mario Lopez’ house to threaten him. They covered Living City’s door with excrement... [To work with] people who do that kind of thing, it is because something went wrong when they were choosing their partners for the project (Cortínez 2010).

Horta describes how her opinions evolved:

When I approached Living City I understood that this had been a conflict with someone who wasn’t up to the role he had been assigned and that the team included several competent women... [Garrido and his supporters] turned a labour conflict into a witch hunt, piling on political, ideological, ethical stuff. You have to react when you see an organization being stamped on. Living City had no chance to defend itself, it was really ugly (Horta 2010).

In the years following Living City’s withdrawal from Bicivilízate, Gonzalo Stierling, of CicloRecreovia, the Sunday cycling initiative, experienced his own conflicts with Garrido. These came to a head just as his initiative was finally gaining the government support necessary to expand throughout the city. After seven months of studies in conjunction with the national transport safety commission (where Garrido worked), the regional transport secretariat and other technical bodies, and having obtained approval from the municipalities and police, Stierling was
ready to implement his project on major city centre roads. Then, at a meeting on 10 December 2007, Garrido, as the person in charge of the GEF funds for “Promoting the Use of the Bicycle”, offered to take charge of the activity, moving it two blocks over to the Alameda street.

He offers funds for this; affirms he can dedicate 50 people to its realization, and that he knows or has someone who can coordinate. When the regional governor asks why these funds can’t be used to hire CicloRecreovía, Mr. Garrido affirmed that both Lina Zuluaga and Gonzalo Stierling (members of CicloRecreoVía) were vetoed by the World Bank (who runs the GEF fund) due to participation in the cancelled project, Bicivilízate (CUCH 2007).

No one associated with the Bicivilízate campaign was ever included on a World Bank veto list. Stierling consulted Iván Jaques, general coordinator of the GEF funds, who noted that these funds were not available for this kind of activity, and confirmed that neither of the CicloRecreoVía leaders were affected by a veto (CUCH 2007). Although Garrido won this battle, taking over the carfree Sundays in central Santiago, this proved the last straw for Stierling and other CUCH members. They prepared a formal complaint against Garrido (CUCH 2007), and he was eventually released from government service. Looking back on these experiences, Stierling sees Living City as one of the better organized groups in Chile, but criticizes its focus on seminars and working groups, rather than on-street activities. Although he, like Horta, signed the original letter accusing Living City of theft, in 2010 he reflected that

After all these years I realize that it is impossible for something to function if Garrido is involved in the issue. Living City may have made some mistakes but with him, nothing can work. If anyone threatens his limelight, he’s very destructive, has no standards or limits (Stierling 2010).

Moreover, Stierling saw Living City as the “most structured organization” with regard to transport and the city, “the most active group”. He criticized it for being “open on too many fronts, with too many areas of action,” but added that it was fundamental: if Living City did not exist nothing could replace it... They have great people working for them, it makes me envious! Living City can really get people involved and do important things (Stierling 2010).

With the failure of Bicivilízate and subsequent events, a major gap opened between the “traditional” and the “new” pro-cycling organizations. By the end of 2006, Living City had

52 He circulated e-mails on the cycling lists, inviting people to apply for jobs and requiring that applicants identify their affiliation with a cycling organization.
### Table 6.3 Building the Social Imaginary: A Cycling-related Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cyclist-centred</th>
<th>Community-based</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defining view</strong></td>
<td>Cycling as an end</td>
<td>Cycling as a means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participants</strong></td>
<td>Cyclists, young, athletic, mostly male</td>
<td>Diverse in: age, education, family, incomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td>Urban tribe, tough, “road warrior”, macho</td>
<td>Collective, community view, gender aware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td>Bonding (strong shared interests, fellowship)</td>
<td>Bridging diverse: networks, alliances, diverse relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrative strategy</strong></td>
<td>Must survive the hostile city, “real” cyclists versus others who are not, competitive, aggressive (speeding on sidewalks, etc.)</td>
<td>Inclusive: cycling and walking is healthy, safe, empowering, etc.; multi-modal, ride respectfully; interconnection of all road users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Needs</strong></td>
<td>Tough bike, helmet-wearing (or not — according to local culture), specialized cycling gear: cyclist uses what’s available, esp. sporting equipment</td>
<td>Women-friendly, task-friendly, clothing-friendly bikes and accessories sought. Cycling world should adapt to diverse users, particularly women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizations</strong></td>
<td>Usually <em>ad hoc, de facto</em> rather than elected leadership</td>
<td>Collective styles of leadership, <em>ad hoc</em> groups and legally constituted organizations, with elected leaders, transparency, accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>Anathema, except for small amounts raised through selling cycling-related paraphernalia to supporters and fans</td>
<td>Membership fees and external funding to finance increasingly sophisticated <em>programmes</em>; Tendency toward professionalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Successfully restored its relationships with the new group, led by the *Macletas, Bicicultura, CicloRecreovía* and several smaller groups. This led to the creation of *Ciclistas Unidos de Chile* (United Cyclists of Chile, CUCH). As with the *Coordinadora de Derechos Urbanos*, the seven founders of CUCH preferred a loosely knit network. This allowed each organization to follow its own developmental path, establishing its own profile and identity, but still facilitated cooperation among the group as a whole, or in bilateral or multilateral initiatives. Deeply scarred by the conflicts with the de facto leaders of the two older cycling groups, MFC and *Arriba e la Chancha*, CUCH called for cycle-friendly public policies, but also specified founders’ support for active non-violence, a willingness to work with a wide variety of public, private and civil sector actors, and democratic procedures within pro-cycling organizations themselves.

From Living City’s perspective, these experiences brought a major shift in its approach to alliances. Through its work with Dutch experts from Interface for Cycling Expertise (I-CE), facilitated by Hector Olivo as part of the agreement for technical assistance signed in 2007, Living City

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VeloSantiago withdrew in 2008, when the conflict with Garrido peaked, and resumed working more closely with the *Arriba e la Chancha* group.
demonstrated its capacity to convoke a variety of actors in diverse spaces, characterized by the quality of the deliberation these produced. It defined cycling-related groups as a spectrum, ranging from the “cyclist-centred” to the “community-centred” (table 6.3). Based on the premise that groups all along the spectrum were necessary to create a dense, robust civil society able to push the issue of more cycling-inclusive city planning onto the public agenda, provide necessary skills, and keep it on a priority long enough to achieve real changes, Living City worked with CUCH, I-CE,54 GORE and national transport ministry staff to design a participatory process that generated a variety of spaces, in which participants from diverse citizen, public sector and private institutions and groups were able to deliberate and produce new consensuses about cycling in the city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Main outputs</th>
<th>Main outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Plan Commission/I-CE trainings</td>
<td>Participatory process involving citizens in planning and input into Master Plan through participatory mapping; priorities, best and worst identified; final report. Common language and consensuses reached on some key issues; audits of existing cycleways; intensive workshops with private actors (Canalistas del Maipo) and municipalities.</td>
<td>Four Metro (subway) cycle parking stations implemented and more planned (2010). Modest, though insufficient improvement to cycle way design. Ongoing commitment from political authorities to cycling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design manual/Technical commission</td>
<td>Research completed and four chapters written. First time coordination among government actors in cycle-related planning; first time citizens involved in planning and evaluation; Santiago Master Plan supported by president Bachelet.</td>
<td>Main input for review of national roads design standards (REDEVU); growing consensus on appropriate design. Some improvement to design, although some remain very poor. Importance of cycling to diverse issues recognized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>Bicicultura festival, Ciclocreovías in several areas, women's presence in events, walking and cycling as tools for better urban living, regular news and education through Voz and Green Map, monthly cycle rides by university and other groups.</td>
<td>Ongoing commitment from authorities to cycling-inclusive planning. More unity and cooperation among different pro-cycling and neighbourhood associations. CUCH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling Law</td>
<td>Citizens’ initiative for law taken up by Congress, transport authorities and presidency.</td>
<td>Considerable debate, experience for citizens’ groups; Law not passed (for variety of reasons, including undesirable components)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling Economy</td>
<td>Initial contacts and interest among business partners.</td>
<td>Some sponsorship of specific activities (Ciclocreovías, Bicicultura) and Cycling guide (Ciudad Viva-Macletas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, gender</td>
<td>Three* women’s courses developed by Macletas and Living City, with support from Dutch, Brazilian, Peruvian and Canadian expertise.</td>
<td>Courses tested and effective for beginners, intermediate and monitor levels, with diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Ready to expand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 4, p. 285, Sagaris 2010. This initiative continued to thrive, as did the Ciclocreovías, with ten courses completed by 2012, and Ciclocreovías expanding to cover more and more comunas.

54 Especially mission leader, Tom Godefrooij, whose experience as head researcher for the Dutch national cycling federation, the Fietsersbond, and as a planner with the province of Brabant, proved a rich source of ideas for formulating a effective, citizen-led strategies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Stgo Master Plan</th>
<th>I-CE/CV trainings</th>
<th>Desig Manual</th>
<th>Cyclin Cycl Law</th>
<th>Implement, infrast</th>
<th>PAR Plan Maestro 2009</th>
<th>Promo</th>
<th>Techni cal commiss</th>
<th>REDE VU</th>
<th>Educa tion, gende r</th>
<th>Safe cyclin g manu al</th>
<th>Cycli ng Econo my</th>
<th>Total participation/group</th>
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The results from these efforts (table 6.4) involved the mobilization of the diverse capacities of participating organizations, a process that required each to exercise leadership skills in their own areas, but also followship skills when it came to supporting others’ initiatives. Some of these wrapped up with the end of the Concertación government in 2010, but others continued. In the years that followed, CUCH organizations developed friendly, cooperative relations with both the older organizations (whose leadership changed) and with newly formed groups, helping them to consolidate, as Living City and other organizations had previously done.

In terms of participation, the creation of different working groups, as part of the roundtable and the I-CE/GORE/Living City exchange, ensured that while ministry and other officials tended to participate more in some spaces (during working hours, for example) and citizens in others (evenings and weekends, on-street activities, etc.), overall, the process achieved a balance (figure 6.3). Table 6.5 summarizes the different participatory instances and groups from the public, private and citizen sectors that participated. There was considerable overlap among the different groups, and extensive outreach too, the result of the highly diverse environments and activities that the process as a whole managed to incorporate.
Of the groups with the highest participation (table 6.5), Living City (12 instances) and the GORE (10) led, followed closely by the Macletas (8) and the new cycling groups (8), the private firm, Oxford (8), and the government agencies, Conaset (national transport safety commission, 8) and SECTRA (interministerial planning secretariat, 8). Virtually all participated in the Santiago Master plan (column one, 25) and the I-CE/CV trainings (column two, 21), with the design manual working group (17) bringing together a surprising variety of actors during the three-year process.

6.1.4 Territorio Chile award for Bellavista and Pio Nono project

In 2008, Living City’s efforts to keep Bellavista proposals moving ahead, mostly with volunteer labour, were rewarded with the inauguration of the Pio Nono project (see previous chapter) and a prestigious Territorio Chile award, from the Chilean government. As with the two previous awards, this involved an external evaluation, which highlighted Living City’s adaptation of a New Urbanism-style charrette to combine technical and practical expertise, among other measures. The evaluator notes the ability to shift from a defensive stance (No to the Costanera Norte) to a positive one, with the community showing its ability to manage resources, coordinate political actors (the
two municipalities) and alliances (Ashoka, Avina, Natura-Green Map) to achieve its ends. He also finds that the initiative had positive economic, territorial, environmental and social impacts.

The award allowed two municipal staff, a housing ministry staff person, and Tomás Carvajal, Living City’s advisor on the initiative, to visit Bogotá to learn about similar initiatives in Colombia. It also provided a sum of $3,000 to Living City to continue its work.

6.2 Outreach: mobilising ecologies of actors

Over the centuries, humanity has constructed specific structures to channel a few family members’, a hundred, thousands or even millions of individual human wills into narrow specific purposes, primarily to generate economic wealth. These are businesses and corporations and most of our knowledge of human organization comes from this field.

Under Chilean law, Living City is a non-profit “corporation”. Indeed, its governance mimics that of a private company: headed by a president, a board of directors (directiva) is responsible for overseeing operations. In practice, its structure is far more complex, however, reflecting, and a sometimes bitter struggle for a toehold within a changing environment, and the eternal battle to live its values, albeit imperfectly.

Over the years, founders have come and gone, financing has expanded and, on occasion, vanished, but somehow the organization has managed to continue. Despite its apparent “success” and much-heralded “importance”, as reflected in the evaluations cited elsewhere, it remains at once powerful and fragile. In the future, Living City could flourish or disappear. At its heart, only love keeps it going, and love is not a fuel, a structure, or a kind of capital that social scientists are content to measure or even consider “real”. I suspect this is true of many organizations with a strong, grassroots component.
Beyond this rather unsatisfactory “love” answer, what is essential about an organization like this one? Based on my research, the answer requires looking at how, in an action-oriented context, it has constituted both knowledge and a fragmented, collective memory often expressed as a shared identity. This multi-dimensional identity includes the rational, but also the sensual and the ability to dream. It has allowed the organization, like an individual, to progress toward goals. This section looks more closely at the sensual, emotional and rational components of deliberation as practiced by Living City, as they constitute the collective memory, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, makes continuity and an accumulation of skills, relationships and impacts possible (figure 6.4). These deliberations are both nourished by, and nourish, an environment -- the city system, on one hand, and the planning system, on the other. The vehicle for these exchanges are relational “trees”, some of which are individual, but which also can be accumulated into relational “forests”, particularly when an organization such as Living City is involved. Finally, this section examines some indicators for this kind of outreach, using Living City’s communications “weave”. Thus, we begin to see how a “small” core can nourish, transmit and receive information-action-emotions from hundreds and even thousands of people, acting effectively to mobilise an extensive web of action, based on a dynamic, constantly self-constituting, and dispersed collective memory.

6.2.1 Multiple views on involvement: government

As Living City emerged, leaders realized that an enormous tangle of legislation, policies and projects controlled by different levels of government influenced neighbourhood life. Many of these relationships began with conflicts, but evolved into active cooperation. Both Paulina Ahumada, asesora urbana (head planner) with Recoleta and Jaime Márquez, asesor urbano with Providencia recall early debates in the 1990s, to recover Bellavista, and mark the 2003 charrette as a turning point. Ahumada notes the importance of relationships:

We got to know each other on a human level. We started to recognize that people have their dreams and we learned to respect that. Living City goes beyond just opposing a project and it had a concrete influence on the plan regulador.

For government leaders in the Bicivilízate campaign, the relationship was difficult, but the conflicts that sank the campaign did not destroy the relationship. Alvaro Henríquez was the most critical. He first encountered Living City as part of the cycling component of the GEF-World Bank project and later headed the studies unit in the undersecretary of transport. He recalls conflicts and incompliance in terms of deadlines, duties, actions, even meeting objectives. In less formal terms, there was a conflict between the interests of the organizations, from the point of view of their leaders, but also within the organizations. On the government’s side, it was César
Garrido, who was also a leader of the furious cyclists, with relevant knowledge, ... his double role caused conflicts. I think Living City was incapable of meeting its goals, unable to fulfill its role as consultants (Henríquez 2010).

Similarly, Silvio Albarrán, head of the regional transport office and the political head of the government team involved in Bicivilizate, criticized Living City for their “lack of experience working with the harder public institutions, with engineering” and thought they were “a bit messy” in their reporting on their obligations (Albarran 2010). He was ambiguous on the subject of participation in general, thinking it might be necessary, but unsure that it would be beneficial. He noted that the government tried to “show people” Transantiago, but “no one listened” (Albarran 2010).

The UNDP’s Luis Ibaceta continued to consider Living City’s work “important, well focused,” after the campaign’s termination, while Hernán Silva, who had been in contact with Living City on transport-related issues since the mid-2000s and eventually headed SECTRA, saw Living City as a vital reference point, because of its technical base and its informed and propositional, rather than defensive attitude (Silva 2010).

As Living City began its partnership with I-CE, the more positive views prevailed. Working under Álvaro Henríquez, Cristián Navas took on cycling within the transport ministry, meeting with all the cycling groups. He saw Living City as being more “structured, more mature”, and notes that government attitudes were also changing.

We’ve become more open to understanding participation and in that knowledge, we discovered Living City and its documentation centre. I think there’s been some progress since 2007 and people have joined in who have made a contribution. Professionalization is also relevant: dialogues require a more technical perspective. If you work with people who are more prepared, you can reach more beneficial agreements, with greater depth (Navas 2010).

For Hector Olivo, the regional government’s coordinator of cycling policy (2007-2010), Living City’s alliance with Interface for Cycling Expertise was essential to cycling-related achievements. He sees Living City as

an institution that develops initiatives, that promotes citizen participation in transport issues. I like their methodology -- they systematize their experience. It is assertive and effective. There’s a model that takes international experience, and develops real citizen participation. It’s not just innovative: it catalyzes participation and places all the elements on the table (Olivo 2010).

These shifts were important as both Living City and government staff moved around, and they took their views with them into new positions. Rodrigo Quijada, the transport engineer who headed Living City’s 2003 transport for equality project, took a job with Transantiago, the bus system, and, in 2011, rejoined Living City, this time as a board member. Mariela Aranda, who led municipal
involvement in the pro-cycling work (2007-2010), moved from her post in one municipality, to replace Paulina Ahumada in Recoleta (2011), where she and Living City created a roundtable, very similar to the cycling roundtable, to move the Bellavista heritage declaration forward. Inspired by Living City, she also supported a similar organization to bring active citizenship to her home neighbourhood of Conchalí, one of the poorest in metro Santiago. *ComunActiva* became a lead partner in Living City’s active citizenship work, always represented by an active group of local citizens. Like Ahumada, Aranda describes the warmth and closeness of Living City’s style of work, as “very professional, very welcoming, very inclusive” (Aranda 2010).

### 6.2.2 Multiple views on involvement: private sector, academics, consultants

Interestingly, Living City’s reputation from its years campaigning made it an attractive partner for some private sector actors, although its autonomy and its avoidance of traditional methods of paternalism or clientelism disturbed others. This section examines key relationships with four private sector partners (*Natura, Bicicletas Oxford, Carlos Abusleme/Patronato Chamber of Commerce, Bicicletas Caupolicán*), two academics (an urbanist and a transport engineer), and a consultant who was deeply involved in the anti-highway project and later followed Living City’s progress from his volunteer position with the architects’ national association.

Julio Alegría, an architect, headed part of the external team responsible for planning the Costanera Norte. From the start, he was one of the few people on the government side who would speak to the community, answering questions with considerable openness. He sees the Coordinadora’s emergence raising the social issues associated with the highway project.

> My situation always struck me as difficult. You know, as an urban planner, that the solution should focus on public transport. There’s also the experience of developed countries where people keep buying cars, but use them mostly on weekends. We couldn’t see any expectation of transforming public transport in the medium term (Alegría 2010).

For Alegría, participation developed gradually over the years, “there was no tradition that the ministry should provide any explanation to people”. Indeed, the project assumed that the municipalities would participate on behalf of citizens, but there was no expectation that citizens would want, or be able to represent themselves. He foreshadows Gurovic’s critical view of urbanism in Chile generally (below).
We wouldn’t have to build a highway if society (and this is what is so terrible), its government, its economic and social systems, were well planned... Chile has no long-term urban solutions and on the other hand economic implementation is very behind and confusing (Alegría 2010).

Although he expresses discomfort at the “confrontational” attitude of Living City during the anti-highway campaign, and particularly the word “No”, in retrospect he notes that

It seems to be that although they were aggressive with the issues, they had to be to be better. Nowadays I see them as confrontational, but gentle. Technically a harsh opposition is necessary -- it shows a solid position (Alegría 2010).

In 2007-2008, Living City partnered for the first time with a private company, the Brazilian cosmetics firm, Natura, as it established its base in Chile. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is well developed in Brazil, and chief executive officer, Guto Pedreira found Chile lagging behind. “Few companies had incorporated CSR in their business model and strategy” (Pedreira 2010).

Pedreira and his team chose Living City’s Green Map proposal from several presentations:

We worked with two or three different groups, but I felt that Living City had the most concrete proposal and wanted to build... There was also some luck involved: we met, felt we had some values in common, it’s not that we were planning to map. Ashoka was also important: they made the recommendation (Pedreira 2010).

The Green Map project grew in size as the work progressed and there was often tension between the Natura group and the Living City team, especially when funds were due or work called for additional funds. Nonetheless, looking back on that experience,

I found it fantastically good. It is not easy for a private organization to sit down with a social organization, but we got along very well and reached agreements very easily. I had an expectation, but it was difficult to plan a structure, these are very enterprising processes. Living City didn’t have a structure for very clear and long-term planning. But the result in the end was spectacular.

In late 2008, Natura moved Pedreira on to another country, and the new staff did not continue the Green Map project. His sentiments echo those of Living City itself:

We should have done more of a plan. We should have structured a five-year plan, for example, but instead we did a two-month plan. We had ideas for the future but we didn’t do something well structured, with risks, costs, the next steps, and I think we lost some control of planning. We didn’t have a somewhat deeper structure to build the project (Pedreira 2010).

During the Bicivilízate campaign, Gustavo Burgos of Bicicletas Oxford watched Living City from afar. A veteran of other similar meltdowns, he said:
the failure of Bicivilízate had no influence on our relationship with Living City, because some projects just fail. The rumour campaign was very personalized and intended to destroy Lake, later Amarilis... It was a time when the cyclists’ groups weren’t thinking about the common good, but rather their own egos. When the whole thing got too big, I just closed the door on it (Burgos 2010).

He partnered actively with Living City throughout the I-CE-Living City-GORE process and then sponsored a handbook to safe cycling in Santiago, prepared by Living City and the Macletas (2010). A veteran of the battles between different cycling contingents, the accusations that formed part of the collapse of Bicivilízate did not influence his opinions.

In Living City the monetary invitations are for a project, which you can take or leave, but regardless, the relationship doesn’t end there. I feel that sometimes they’re more interested in our participation in workshops than in the money we can contribute. That makes it really valuable (Burgos 2010).

While Burgos and his firm were constant partners of Living City during this phase, René Fuentes, representing a cycle retailer, participated in just one of the roundtable meetings, on the cycling economy, remaining in contact via regular e-mail communications. He found this “cold”:

there’s no approach, we’ve never sat down together. It’s not a criticism of them, but also of myself, I’d like to participate in something good. I don’t like it when things are done poorly, or when someone makes money when one is trying to share experience, and that bothers me (Fuentes 2010).

The difference between Fuentes and Burgos partly reflects different attitudes and levels of education. Burgos is a physician, while Fuentes runs a store. But it also illustrates the difficulties in reaching out and building trust, even after years of intense work. Occasional personal contact and isolated meetings can open doors, but on their own do not foster the relationships necessary for more ongoing change. Nonetheless, Fuentes’ store offers discounts to Macletas and Living City members, and he remains an interested observer.

The most distant informant in this group, Carlos Abusleme, of the Patronato Chamber of Commerce, illustrates some of the more curious aspects of Living City’s role and relationships. Abusleme came to an EcoBella meeting, in 1997 when we were forming the Coordinadora. He told us our ideas for a horizontal coalition-type structure would never work in Chile, that organizations needed strong leaders and that everyone had to back a single voice. Years later we heard from contacts within the government that he had told them that “Lake Sagaris and the Coordinadora” represented his organization on the highway issue. When approached for an interview in 2010, he invited interviewer Loreto Rojas to have a coffee, read the consent form and politely told her he would not sign it or give her an interview. He then went on to tell her how
unhappy people in Patronato were with Lake and Living City, because their insistence on heritage declarations was ruining the value-added of people’s houses. He’d been with the Coordinadora from the start, he added, but then Lake took over the idea, turned it into a profession and a business, not social service but rather personal interests. When Loreto asked him if he wanted her to communicate all this to me, he said yes.

I include this vision, because it reflects a part of the story, or an organization of this narrative, that is substantially different from the rest of this dissertation. While it does not ring “true” to me, it certainly represents what someone critical of Living City thinks about us.

As with government, some of these private sector actors have partnered closely with Living City (placing them as close as some partner civil society instances), while others have kept their distance, but nonetheless observed closely, an attitude that suggests that even where they do not agree with Living City, its opinions and actions are nonetheless an important point of reference. In the academic sector, for Alberto Gurovic, head of urbanism (University of Chile),

Participation is a promise. It grows stronger with people like Living City. Living City is a demonstration that in future it has to become more systematic and serious. The way to practice participation and urban discussion requires interactive elements (information, archives). I’ve talked to Living City about how to demolish the arrogance of urbanists. Living City has become a frontline in the struggle (frente de lucha) (Gurovich 2010).

Gurovic considers his discipline “a crusade”, with Living City a good example. “You never get any recognition” he says, “and in the end you’re a bother” but Living City has always acted “with its eyes open” and that is an advantage. He has a critical opinion of urban planning in Chile generally, “today with luck we do urban acupuncture”. Nonetheless, among the academics with whom he associates, “Living City is very respected”. Since the Coordinadora phase, in 2010 when he was interviewed, Juan de Dios Ortuzar (transport, Catholic University), had had little direct contact with Living City, but remained in contact through emails and other electronic exchanges. The initial contact left him convinced that deeper alliances between citizens’ organizations and academics were a necessity, however, and in 2011 he worked with Living City on the Cycling Master Plan as part of a consultancy to the transport undersecretariat.

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55 I take the liberty of including this summary of this conversation, despite the lack of formal permission, because i) Loreto formally requested and received his permission to communicate it to me in the context of this PhD research, and ii) because I interpret this as a form of communication intencionada, as the Chileans call it, that is, deliberately given so that a negative view can be expressed, without the person necessarily taking responsibility for it.
6.2.3 At the root: a hybrid form of sensual-emotional-rational communication

As this case study illustrates, Living City has pursued its goals through meals, dancing, friendship, street fairs, book launchings, cycling schools, research, formal and informal proposals, and a wide variety of other kinds of action. These reflect Living City’s version of deliberation, a hybrid form of communication, based on action, individuals and organizational structures. Together, these have forged the bonds that make Living City both resilient and effective (figure 6.5).

The first, “information-rational” communication, characterizes much of the communication between individuals and Living City as citizen institution. It involves (relatively) rational communication, based on Living City collecting and exchanging information with diverse individuals (and, often, their institutions or movements).

The second, “dream-identity” communication, uses both metaphorical action (leaders serve meals, wash dishes, kneel to garden or scrub floors) and narrative language in formal (public speeches) and informal gatherings (arguments and humour, over food or drink). This kind of communication involves people expressing their fears and dreams, identifying commonalities and forging a shared identity and trust. This is a kaleidoscope identity, able to absorb and even thrive on contradictions (in terms of ideas, positions, class and other factors), but possessing a central focus, associated with a striving for the “good”, “just”, “livable” city, discussed in chapter 1.

Figure 6.5. Three Kinds of Communication have created the bonds that have made Living City both resilient and effective: they interact and overlap, but can be characterized as dream-identity-forging communication, information-rational communication, and sensual-rational communication, discussed in the text. Together these forms of communication generate energy, interest, solidarity, but above all a “collective memory” understood as the capacity for both action and incidence.
he third form of communication, “sensual-rational” is similar to the second. However, it occurs primarily as the organization engages in specific action, handing out the Voz on the street and chatting to passersby, going door to door with information on the anti-noise campaign, etc. Action is involved but there is a formal, institutional aspect to it that makes it easier to interact with strangers. Thus, while “dream-identity” occurs more in the more intimate relationships in the action-individual-structure angle on the left side of the triangle (figure 6.5), “sensual-rational” occurs through more formally structured interactions within the action-structure-individual angle.

Together, this hybrid communication generates a transformative form of conversation, equivalent to Innes’ and Booher’s “authentic dialogue”, Forester’s “deliberation” or Gastil’s “deliberative conversation and discussion”. What is particularly relevant here is that, congruent with Gastil (2008, chapter 1), who studies political communication and deliberation (2008), this kind of conversation involves intense personal and emotional experiences, self-questioning and honesty, in ways compatible with Scharmer’s thinking about reflective, “U-shaped” learning (chapter 4). We see all three forms of communication in action, for example, on the steps of the headquarters of Santiago’s Metropolitan government (figure 6.6), as cyclists, undersecretaries, environmentalists, neighbourhood, business and other leaders gather to attend the Citizen-Government Roundtable.
for Cycling, greeting each other, cracking jokes, exchanging handshakes and pecks on the cheek, drawing aside to whisper about more confidential matters or crouching down to squeeze yet another bike into the crowded bike rack.

At the micro level, these three kinds of communication generate trust and Healey’s “strategic conviction”, founded on and accumulating in layers of mutual knowledge over time. This memory never belongs exclusively to one actor: a municipal planner retains her own version of the Pio Nono project (Ahumada 2010), for example, and can break into Living City’s own narrative, challenging and correcting it, thereby forcing the citizen organization to understand that the project’s owners include municipal sector, as well as citizen sector, actors and that suitable acknowledgement is essential for these relations to continue and prosper.

The higher the quality of these three hybrid forms of communication, the more “complete” the knowledge, and therefore the collective memory, and the greater the ability to mobilize that memory in the form of effective actions. When captured by the right structure, this capacity accumulates, enhancing, but never guaranteeing, the group’s effectiveness.

In the previous chapters I identified several key dynamics that infused the Coordinadora with specific kinds of energy and strength for action. Here I would like to highlight that these forms of hybrid communication both reflect and influence the functioning of dynamics, based on the complementary nature of actors and their interactions, within ecologies of actors. Discussions of participation often assume that all participants require the same, or similar characteristics, capacities, skills, connections, opportunities. When participation is exercised collectively, this is not the case. In fact, the opposite may be true, because people with similar skills may be more likely to compete. Thus, we see that not everyone in the Coordinadora needs a taxi or a fax machine, the ability to produce amazing flower arrangements or contacts with friendly artists: it is sufficient that one or two people do, and are willing to use them to further the purposes of the group. Similarly, in Living City we see that not everyone has to master the intricacies of preparing a delicious meal, cycling-inclusive planning or bus rapid transit. Rather, what is important is the participation of diverse people with these and other complementary skills and knowledge, particularly about the streets and living systems relevant to inclusion. Combining and mobilizing these different kinds of knowledge are central to city planning, where social justice, human flourishing and liveability are the goals. Thus, we see practical ways in which complementarity can help bridge the gap between the planners and the planned, to achieve optimum solutions.
Complementarity also functions at the intimate, human level. In this study, many of the dynamics that formed the foundations of larger groups were based on strong synergies between two people, as discussed in chapter 4. Warmth, friendship, solidarity, a place to discuss issues that matter, and to act on disturbing problems: all these are clearly part of why individuals get involved with neighbourhood, cycling and other groups. Another reason seems to arise from even deeper motivations: people seek completion, what is missing from their own lives, models for living better or differently, low-consumption life styles despite the overwhelming influence of the neoliberal model inherited from the military regime, human spaces based on producing rather than consuming entertainment, the art of conversation. This was particularly clear in the workshop with women participants and leaders (CiudadViva 2010), which formed part of this co-research process.

In urban spaces where even traditional meeting places such as bars and restaurants are increasingly dominated by loud music and television, the interactions across ages apparent here also play a crucial role in expanding people’s choices about how they will live, where they will live, what responsibility they will exercise over their family and urban environments. We see also how these movements shift endlessly between private, semi-private, semi-public and public spaces. To some degree, this mirrors the nature of the market and residential neighbourhoods, where sidewalk gardens, lovingly tended by residents and used (or abused) by visitors, are part of both public and private space, and pets and children, friends and strangers, flow endlessly back and forth, as homes, offices and streets themselves are all equally important locations for reflection and action, critique and proposal.

Proximity is another factor. As Sofía López pointed out, with considerable anguish,

This isn’t just about social actors, but also about geography, which to some degree has helped Living City. Located right beside Plaza Italia, which to an important degree is Chile’s “kilometer zero”, everyone in Chile is looking at it, whereas if you head out to the smaller comunas... You realize that things are very different, and problems are much more severe.

How Living City uses the advantages, the resources and the reputation it has accumulated will also influence the inclusion of other civil society groups. As the discussion elsewhere in this chapter reveals, even civil society initiatives may not be sensitive to or build solidarity with emerging groups. Indeed, there is a tendency for them to attempt to monopolize scarce resources for their own development. This is another reason why making explicit the issues involved in building effective civic infrastructure could be useful.
6.2.4 Outreach nourished by relational trees and forests

Living City’s formal and informal communications structures are well-defined, as we have seen in previous chapters. But how do they actually influence systems, and what can they tell us about both participation generally, and Living City’s own structure? To tease out the mechanism I have used a simple “tree”, to trace the different degrees of communication-information-participation as they play out in the case of Living City’s relationships.

In this example, I am thinking primarily about the neighbourhood level, and illustrating a single parent (Living City) and multiple related nodes (different people as they exercise roles in the neighbourhood). If we think, however, that this is only of the trees involved, with diverse individuals each the centre of their own relational trees, which overlap and interact, positively or negatively, in larger or smaller ways, then we can start to visualize how these mechanisms, and people interact as a forest of relational trees, capable of transmitting significant sensual-rational-emotional knowledge to potentially large numbers of people.

Thus, to follow the blue strand (figure 6.7), for example, Living City holds a charrette, which brings together neighbours, municipal staff and business people, who in turn transmit relevant information to other levels of government (municipal staff), fellow neighbours and others (residents), clients and staff (businesses). Some actors live or work on the street; others in kiosks, homes, schools, restaurants or theatres. Most of these actors are also trees, with their own roots, branches, connections. Not all are equally rich in this sense. As citizen institution, Living City acts as a particularly powerful combination of the information-rich maven, powerful connector and persuasive salesperson that Gladwell describes in The Tipping Point (2002), attracting diverse people from different lifeworlds, connecting and motivating them to act. In this role, Living City becomes an organizing force or catalyst on certain issues. Its messages are appropriated, adapted and transmitted by individual followers, leaders and combinations of both, who transmit the most interesting (to them) parts of messages to others, linking up with more trees of similar and different kinds of relationships and people. This explains why an organization can seem small to those directly involved, but look large and powerful to those around it.

The tree also illustrates how people participate, not as individuals, but rather through webs of relationships in which different people play different roles, a significant insight into understanding this particular ecology of actors (Evans 2002). Participation varies depending on who people are, their own identities, and their roles within these webs. Some will participate indirectly -- husbands through wives, families through their children, and so on. Others participate directly in formal or
informal processes, will come out for a march or a dinner, write an article for the Voz, or attend every meeting of the communications commission. Virtually no one will do all these things (although members of the core come close). Two things are important, then, to every kind of participatory process. One is the quality of the information injected into the system (packaged appropriately for the receiver/retransmitter). The other is ensuring that those people linked directly into the process are as well connected as possible with others through their own diverse relational trees. A leader’s chat with an elderly neighbour who spends part of her day sitting in the square can inject quality information into the rumour mill (“the witches’ post”), that will then circulate among the people who sell newspapers, park cars, sweep streets and so on. These people, in turn, “gossip”, that is transmit information of varying quality, amongst themselves and with clients, restaurant owners, shopkeepers.
Living City board member, a landscaper, Viviane Castro, notes the systemic import of these relational trees and forests:

I like this idea of living forests. I started to think about how this forest of citizens functions a bit like societies of forests, like those species where, when there is nothing, there's just a piece of land, and the colonizing plants...move into those swamps where nothing grows, and suddenly some poplars appear. They're the first and since they have high evaporation rates they change the whole reality, the whole community. Afterward, other species move in because the characteristics change, other beings can exist there, and once the swamp is gone, they also disappear (CiudadViva 2012b).

Thus, just as these relational trees help to expose important qualitative aspects of the relationships fostered by the hybrid communication discussed here, they also generate relational forests, which foster the emergence of “new species”, in this case, new forms of citizenship and organizations that fit the limitations and opportunities inherent in the local environment.

Using the tree/forest metaphor then, is a way of moving from the quantitative approach of, for example, social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994), to examine the qualitative aspects of these interactions, in a way that facilitates seeing how changes within individuals, themselves the product of interactions, generate new dynamics that in turn produce innovation within systems: something new, which did not exist before, emerges. Unlike technology-inspired, network metaphors that tend to inspire more quantitative approaches, the tree encompasses both uncertainty and irregularity, helping to visualize the fractal, rather than linear, pattern of relationships. This also emphasizes the nature of the medium itself -- fragile, diverse, open and therefore vulnerable to multiple factors in the environment. Information doesn't just “flow” between nodes, it is shaped and reshaped, taken into people's dreams and life histories, and re-gifted in multiple, uncontrollable, and often unpredictable ways.

Like all living entities, these trees are both self-generating and reliant on exchanges with their environment. They require light and care to flourish and will die, if care is insufficient or catastrophe strikes. But they also produce seeds and sprouts, creating a life-death-life continuity not normally associated with “networks”. A gap or hole may be filled in unexpected ways: despite the disappearance of the Bellavista corporación, a commission emerges that makes the Pío Nono renovation possible. Out of the collapse of Bicivilize comes new understanding and a more mature approach to democratization and the cycling initiatives of others, embodied in CUCH.
6.2.5 Holding it all together: The communications “weave” again

As with other planning theorists, whose work has inspired this dissertation, my study is as much about the specific kinds of communication involved -- between individuals, within groups, and among groups and others relevant to their urban environment -- as it is about the mechanisms of participation in urban planning. In this sense, more than a tool, Living City’s evolution from the Coordinadora reveals that communications are an integral part of an institutional structure with certain social movement characteristics, that forms the heart of a web of people in public, private and citizen sectors who join together to influence city planning in new directions.

Table 6.6 Living City Partners, Participants and Communications, 1997-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Networks</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Voz/Radio</th>
<th>Mass media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Founders</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Recycle to Live Better</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Transport for Equality</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>For a Living City</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>GEF/Active transport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Coordinadora Pro Derechos Urbanos</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>CUCH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>Green Map Santiago</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>I-CE/Active Transport Centre</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>OSI/Transparency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>Active Citizenship</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definitions.** Partners: Minimum formally defined, usually by project design (there were additional partners who joined during implementation), and additional leading participants; participants minimum and maximum in specific meetings or, in case of Active Transport Centre, 3 ongoing groups (manual, 25; technical committee, 15; Roundtable, 60); events, participants in major events associated with period/activities, usually Pío Nono A-tracción Humana (one spring, one winter, one summer). Outreach: Voz (average 2 readers per copy) or Voz and radio program Viva la ciudad. Mass media coverage: extensive (high percentage of major media), medium (considerable coverage of key activities, especially launchings), minimum (occasional opinion, column, etc.).

Table 6.6 summarizes the variety of partnerships led by Living City during this 11-year period, the growing number of networks in which it has been involved, and the media which nourished them (tables 6.7, 6.8). The summary reveals the growing size and complexity of its relationships. This section discusses how it uses a variety of media to build and maintain them.
As with other aspects of Living City, communications strategies and tools are diverse, pursuing diverse purposes, at different times and points in the different processes involved. In this case, however, they seem to provide substantial insight into how Avritzer’s participatory publics both emerge and are nourished on an ongoing basis. Living City’s open structure facilitates this further, drawing people in and holding them within its sphere, but still permitting different levels of commitment and integration. Thus, people are part of Living City but can remain rooted in their own spaces and institutions, creating an open-ended relationship that offers both freedom and a sense of belonging. This is paradoxical, even risky, as discussed in the next chapter, but this
strategy has nourished Living City’s initiatives with the strength of others’, whose contribution is duly recognized, and celebrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Editors</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Costanera Norte, ¿Qué ciudad queremos?</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>Araya, Sagaris</td>
<td>OLCA</td>
<td>OLCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Recetario para la buena vida</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>EcoBella</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Muévete</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>Quijada, Lanfranco, Sagaris</td>
<td>Lom, authors</td>
<td>World Bank, Lom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Enríquez Ñañulosa en Santiago</td>
<td>Short film</td>
<td>Lanfranco</td>
<td></td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Cultura y Patrimonio de La Chimba</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>Desramés, Klein-Krankenberg, Sagaris</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Govt, local sponsors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Bellavista: Dos alas una historia</td>
<td>Short film, charrette 2006</td>
<td>Lanfranco</td>
<td>JV#13, 35, restaurants</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Santiago RM Green Map</td>
<td>Book and maps</td>
<td>Sagaris, Shallat</td>
<td>Green Map</td>
<td>Natura, I-CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>¿Qué hacen aquí? Short film on the making of the Stgo RM Green Map</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Lanfranco</td>
<td>Natura</td>
<td>Natura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Fundaciones Comunitarias ¿Estamos preparados para este desafío?</td>
<td>Printed report and presentation</td>
<td>Rojas</td>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>WINGS (global foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Plan Maestro para la Bicicleta</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Sagaris, Olivo</td>
<td>I-CE, GORE</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Agenda Ciudadana (corto), <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB6lVlE3wcg">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB6lVlE3wcg</a></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lanfranco</td>
<td>Consejo Ciudadanía Activa</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Guía de Pedaleo de Santiago RM</td>
<td>Handbook</td>
<td>Sagaris</td>
<td>Macletas</td>
<td>Sponsors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Citizen’s Agenda for Cities</td>
<td>Summary, notebook</td>
<td>Marín</td>
<td>Consejo Ciudadanía Activa</td>
<td>EU, Avina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration, based on CV library and Memoria Anual for each year.

It is interesting to note that proximity does not line up by category, as our original theory of “circles of participation” assumed: some public and some private sector players are closer to Living City than many civil society actors. Moreover, people do occasionally move through the circles sequentially, coming closer or moving away step by step, but more often they may fade back or leap in, when they see a need they feel able to fulfill (figure 6.2). Each circle is nourished by some version of the hybrid communication described in these chapters, and the mode often overlaps: that is, regular face-to-face encounters (strongest bonds, at the core), are reinforced by email, Voz and other communication. Moreover, occasional encounters are also supplemented by email,
newsletter, and other electronic media, with more massive and more distant audiences drawn in by the Voz (15,000-20,000) and Viva la Ciudad, the radio program (14,000, 2001-2005).

These communications media are dependent on energies, priorities and resources, and vary over time, as a result. Messages are consistent across diversity, providing considerable continuity and credibility, as the same material serves its own grassroots, public opinion, and elite decision-makers (the media, politicians, technical bodies). This enables Living City to position itself in an intermediate position, reaching both down- and upward, to invert the usual “bottom-up”, “top-down” directional metaphors. This helps to visualize and explain how Living City works from the “middle out”, and thus build mainly cooperative, horizontal relationships. This would be difficult (if not impossible) for a governmental body or a neighbourhood association alone. This phenomenon played a significant role in shifting power relations to allow new, citizen planners, into planning spheres in ways that also enhanced their effectiveness, allowing them to be heard and engage in (and even lead) real deliberative processes that brought different degrees of transformation to participants, and significant change to both the city system (Pío Nono, increase in cycling infrastructure) and the planning systems (cycling master plan, citizen participation in neighbourhood and transport planning).

Moreover, they are further anchored by a series of publications and, since 2006, films, which summarize activities and take them to different audiences (table 6.9). Thus, Living City’s communications weave does not follow the usual pattern of outreach, based on a public relations strategy that reaches out -- to the media, public opinion and so on. Rather, it starts from the need to bring in and combine different kinds of knowledge (academic and popular or experiential), required for a better city.

In practical terms, these processes make Living City much larger than it would otherwise be. The core of staff, board members and close advisors is tiny (the blue line barely visible in Figure 6.8), but provide the foundation, while
community outreach, particularly massive street events, the Voz and the radio program *pulled people in*, amplifying its impact, particularly when these people also transmit its messages, often as their own.

### 6.3 The importance of the Meso: City and planning systems

As discussed (chapter 1), borrowing from Staggenborg (2002), who argues for the importance of exploring the “meso”, I position Living City as a *meso actor*, in an urban governance system characterized by fragmentation of power across scales. The “meso” is a relative position and is important, in this context, because it allows us to move beyond the usual “top-down” (macro) and “bottom-up” (micro) perspectives, to consider an in-between scale and the possibility of working horizontally, from the middle out. This ability to build horizontal relationships is particularly important in a democratizing context (Kamrava and O Mora 1998), such as Chile’s.

The meso is important, then, because looking at complex urban planning dynamics only from the bottom-up or top-down “misses the point that multiscalar governance is produced by complex combinations of different modes of governance operating simultaneously on different scales” (p. 88 Somerville 2011). As discussed in this section, the Coordinadora/Living City illustrates how a complex response is possible, as citizens rise to the challenge of a multiscalar city, creating an institution able to stretch across categories and scales, and reach outward in many directions.

#### 6.3.1 Understanding Living City as a meso institution

Driven by its own diversity, since its creation Living City has bridged across society, reaching horizontally between very different territories (the markets, the arts neighbourhood, the low-income and the wealthy neighbourhoods), and vertically to build support from the bottom up, among street vendors, kiosk owners and other grassroots actors within its ecology, and reaching upward through municipal, regional and national government offices and actors. It also reached out diagonally, to actors (located in other countries) organized around different but relevant issues: the public service research that made its critique of the companies involved in the tenders possible, or its relationships through I-CE and Synergos with local organizations in Africa and Asia.

Viewing Living City from a multiscalar perspective helps understand how it used the processes discussed above to catalyze change, often when it seemed like the least powerful actor in a given situation. Like the teaspoon of yeast that makes a kilo of bread possible, its role has been to
Figure 6.9 Living City’s Positioning in its Ecology of Actors. a. The Coordinadora faced powerful opponents, with only a hardy group of supporters, mostly in the civil society sector to encourage and amplify its efforts to influence major planning processes and decisions.

Figure 6.9b. As Living City matured it accumulated a significant stock of partners and fans, although it continued to face powerful opponents on key issues.
generate a spirit of effervescence and openness, activating individual actors with similar aspirations in many different niches within the urban sphere’s ecology of actors.

Figure 6.9 illustrates shifts in its positioning within its ecology of actors, using an actors’ mapping tool (developed originally by the Dutch province of Nord Brabant). The tool calls for involving opponents, cooperating with partners, informing outsiders and mobilizing fans, a crucial moments in a campaign or policy process. In effect, this provides a rather accurate description of the Coordinadora (top), as neighbourhood and market associations reached out to mobilize fans and inform outsiders, but basically faced a very powerful alignment of government forces in a David and Goliath scenario.

Living City, however, has retained its original partners and added many more, from public, citizen and private sectors, through diverse initiatives offering different incentives and interdependencies. Thus, when it lines up against the Universidad San Sebastián (highrise development in Bellevista), it enjoys considerable credibility and support, although these actors take diverse positions too.

This illustrates both the multiscalar nature of city planning and how a civil society organization like Living City, operating at the meso scale and bridging across diversity, can catalyse shifts in ecologies of actors in favour of (or against) specific policy actions, depending on power relations and other conditions in the urban (and other overlapping) spheres.

Living City did not “cause” these changes: this study shows that some key government staff and private actors actively sought new ideas about cities, planning and participation. Indeed, the role of municipal planners in the Pío Nono renewal project, for example, or Olivo’s role in the GORE-ICE-CV cycling planning work reveal the kind of inside activism that Olsson and Hysing identify as integral to innovative policy-making (2011). Rather, Living City catalyzed new processes, by challenging prevailing orthodoxies with transparent values, sound technical and other arguments. These empowered likeminded individuals in different sectors and at different scales from macro, through meso, to macro. Living City also made working together appealing, although its approach stimulated opposition, too.

Some urban territories are more multiscalar than others and this influenced the effectiveness of both the Coordinadora and Living City. At their centre, Bellavista performs micro (residential), macro (national and international tourism, sports, culture) and meso functions (metropolitan region recreation, restaurants, retail), an example of how “different scales can be mutually constitutive”, as Somerville puts it (chapter 1), even though subject to different levels of governance. The
established neighbourhood associations, the *juntas de vecinos*, however, function only at the micro- and local (municipal) governance level. Indeed, they are subordinate to the municipal government and the mayor can suspend their juridic standing at any time.

We can see how Living City of necessity had to function at a meso scale, as it reached across municipal boundaries, bringing together micro-territorial organizations (*juntas de vecinos*, market vendors), but also public transport, cyclists, car users from all over the metropolitan region. Unlike many urban developments, moreover, the highway project itself was multi-scalar, erupting simultaneously in micro, meso and macro territorial areas. This raises the need to examine transport more closely, as it forms a subsystem among the complex city system.

### 6.3.2 Understanding transport as a meso system within the city

To explore the nature of the transport system, we can compare the Coordinadora/Living City to...
other conflicts and groups in Santiago. By the 2000s, many citizens groups were emerging and conflicts sprang up all over Santiago. Today, the NGO Sur has identified a hundred significant conflicts (figure 6.10), distributed in middle- to high-income and some of the poorest comunas.

By category (figure 6.11), conflicts focus mainly on heritage and high-rise development (32%), followed by planning (29%), housing, greenspace, and finally transport, which accounts for just four. This suggests that it was not the number, but rather the nature of the Costanera Norte conflict that made it relevant. Using the number of comunas (municipal administrative areas) as a proxy for socio-economic diversity, we can see that 92% of conflicts involve a single comuna, just 4% two comunas, and 4% occur in three or more comunas. Of the four conflicts involving two comunas, three are in the central area, Vega-Bellavista (Recoleta-Providencia), also affected by the anti-highway conflict. Two of the four conflicts reflect leadership by the Coordinadora/Living City: the Costanera Norte and pro-cycling initiatives. The other two are conflicts over the right of the Ferias Libres (street fairs) to continue to occupy city streets and a campaign against proposed changes to the MetroSantiago Planning Regulations, which would encourage sprawl and loss of agricultural lands (spearheaded by Defendamos la Ciudad, with support from Living City -- active citizenship expressed as followship).

The fact that the other cross-boundary campaign involves the Ferias Libres is interesting. As with Living City, these are conflicts over streets, specifically the right of some citizens -- vulnerable,  

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56 "Planning" conflicts include urban interventions, particularly zoning bylaws, mobile telephone antennae, expropriations and others. They also include tunnels inflicted in Pedro de Valdivia Norte and three conflicts regarding the location of Transantiago bus terminals, which I have categorized as local interventions, although they are also transport-related.

57 Note that nine involve the housing debtors’ local committees in specific comunas. Sur categorizes these as separate conflicts, given their specific locations. I have maintained this, since I am using the comuna as a proxy for diversity. Although the locations are somewhat diverse, the issue affects a group with similar socio-economic, legal and other traits. While movement, it lacks the diversity of interest here.
excluded, popular -- to use them for non-transport purposes. A recent study by the ministry of agriculture found 120 street fairs, serving up to 10,000 persons per day, distributed across Santiago’s 52 comunas, with 70% of the population depending on fairs for fresh fruit and vegetables (Pulgar 2012), and income, from selling plants, clothes and second-hand objects. As with the Costanera Norte, car-centred transport models threaten streetfairs, and through them, the right to income and survival, access to food, significant (heritage) social relations, and other factors, that touch the interests of diverse classes of people in different parts of the city.

As discussed in chapter 1, Bayat (2010) underlines the importance of the street to social nonmovements, describing how new feelings emerge and gel as new, often dissenting, ways of doing things in public space. The geography of streets, treeing through whole metropolitan regions and beyond, connecting micro- and macro- locations, suggests they could be considered a meso system among urban systems. Conflicts over streets, as this case illustrates, tend to affect diverse territories, people, mode-users and activities, while their importance to health, both individual and economic, is increasingly documented by public health and other studies. Thus, we can see this meso role of the streetshed, in its traffic (motorized, human, private, public), but also in its crucial and diverse economic, social and cultural dimensions, serving as a “medium through which strangers or casual passersby are able to establish latent communication with one another by recognizing their mutual interests and shared sentiments” (p. 12, Bayat 2010). This also has important political implications, both because of the street’s crucial role in collective protest, but also because they street itself is constantly contested, not only on the street itself, but in the policy world, and over the kitchen table.

As part of streets, transport modes too generate specific kinds of space. Living City director, Sofía López, both cyclist and regular bus user, sees cycling and buses as extensions of public space:

I find that the transport space is a meeting place, so egalitarian... It’s almost a miraculous act, in a city where people live so separated, that there is a place in time and space where two people with totally different life histories can meet up. Any time of day, you sit beside someone on the bus. I bring my whole life with me and so does that person. I find it incredible! Cycling’s the same: you look drivers in the eyes, there is visual contact with other transport users. It is really something miraculous: you really build citizenship, it is a space of citizenship (CiudadViva 2010b).

From a complexity perspective, it is interesting to contemplate where an analysis of transport and/or traffic as self-managing, open-ended systems would take us. Like playgrounds, markets or other arenas of social interaction, the effective functioning of streets, particularly traffic systems, depends largely on people knowing and respecting the rules, and applying them in ways that keep the
system running. For cyclists in cities such as Toronto or Santiago, this is a particularly onerous challenge: in a traffic system that ignores their existence and therefore excludes them, they alternate between behaving as pedestrians with wheels or drivers without motors, shifting between modes and inventing solutions where the rules consistently fail them, particularly in intersections. The police are there to increase the incentives for respecting the rules, but traffic systems in particular largely depend on users for their functionality. Thus, in some cultures, roads are racetracks where people compete as if on the qualifying round for the Indy 500 (Santiago), or

Figure 6.12. In Santiago, urban decision-making and shaping is fragmented, taking place at national and regional levels, particularly in post-Pinochet Chile (top left, 1997). By 2011, after the Coordinadora’s campaign, this had changed, as citizen initiatives emerged, including Living City (top right), complemented, in the private sector, by national organizations of recyclers and street fairs. This shift is also reflected in power dynamics, which in 1997 (bottom left) were top-down. By 2011 (bottom right) resistance-based anti-planning, stances have been joined by other, more sophisticated planning tactics, thus enriching the flow of bottom-up influences. By functioning at the meso level, Living City created a “middle-out” power dynamic. Source: own elaboration based on case study.
delicate dances where drivers typically stop, often with a friendly wave or grin, for pedestrians and cyclists as they attempt to negotiate (Vancouver). Excluding social systems are clearly reflected on roads, where hierarchies play out vividly, with pedestrians and non-motorized users literally driven off the road, and thus placed in even greater danger, while drivers speed in and out, honking horns and throwing their weight around in ways that give the biggest and fastest significant advantage (Delhi). Indeed, how roads are used and who is “king” may be the most accurate, instant reflection of society at large, in most places.

Thus, the multidimensional roles of streets, and their importance to work, play, civic organization, conflict, manifestation and mobilization, come together in complex ways. I have adopted the term “transportshed” to underline how something as apparently as straightforward as a road, traffic or transport system can also link directly into the heart of political and civic rights, sought by civil society and individuals in democratizing contexts. This summarizes how, as a meso system, transport moves among other city systems, connecting and fostering (or blocking) interactions, synergies, tensions and potentials.

6.3.3 Understanding multiscalar governance in Metro Santiago

The dictionary defines planning as “a detailed proposal for doing or achieving something,” and specifically “the control of urban development by a local government authority, from which a license must be obtained to build a new property or change an existing one”.

As we have seen, this is not the case in metropolitan Santiago. Here, planning takes place in an urban sphere whose governance is scattered among national ministries, regional ministerial offices, an appointed and largely protocolar regional government and 52 municipal governments.

As Chileans attempted to resume life in democracy in the 1990s and even in the 2000s, this fragmented governance left little room for citizen involvement. Notwithstanding, the emergence of a social movement against a highway (1990s), followed by a citizen-led planning institution (2000s), pushed its way into the system, with help from staff in governmental offices who were also interested in new, more sustainable forms of cities and more participatory forms of planning. Thus, planning in Santiago occurs within an urban “sphere” that combines public-citizen-private sector actors, functioning at global, national/regional and local scales.

Although we tend to assume a neat correspondence between the local (city) and local governance (municipality and other actors), then, in Chile the urban sphere is much more fragmented, with

\[58\] Both definitions are from the IWork dictionary, 12-March-2012.
major decisions taking place primarily at the national and regional levels, particularly when this case study begins, in post-Pinochet Chile (figure 6.12, top left). Cities were shaped by powerful private forces, real estate developers and builders, but also the media, banks and other financial institutions, particularly private pension fund managers and health insurance providers, often owned by the same small group of economic interests. Government initiatives, particularly at the national level, and through the regional offices of each ministry were the other main sites of urban decision-making. They operated in isolation, indeed, often competed with each other. This has led to a situation where, as urbanists (Gurovic 2010, Ducci 2010) emphasize, planning consists largely of non-planning. Municipal governments, meanwhile, have few powers but major responsibilities, generating a serious mismatch between resources and problems.

In this sense, first the Coordinadora and later Living City and other emerging citizen organizations have been able to significantly change this pattern of relationships (figure 6.12, top right). Today, private initiatives are often contested, the public sector at all levels is subject to scrutiny by diverse citizen organizations, and “middle-out” and “bottom-up” planning and other city-building initiatives are also possible, although not prevalent. Contradictions remain, and the planning sphere continues to exclude citizens, favouring unhealthy collusion between the public and private spheres, as both the highway and the University of San Sebastian projects illustrate. Where, however, citizens are able to intervene, generating a space for citizen action, transparency improves and with it there is a considerable reshaping and democratization of planning, Avritzer’s “democratic publics” (chapter 1). In this case, self-generating citizen organizations disseminate more democratic ways of operating, both internally, in their own cores, and in their outreach to other civil society actors and other sectors.

The emergence of a citizen sector, determined to find ways into the urban planning system also has implications for power. Figure 6.12 (bottom left) illustrates the top-down nature of decision-making and power relations, in Chile 1997, whereas in 2011, resistance-based, anti-planning stances have been joined by other, more sophisticated planning tactics (proposals such as Pío Nono, cycling-inclusive master plan, etc.), thus enriching the flow of bottom-up influences. By functioning at the meso level, Living City has created a “middle-out” power dynamic, which draws in private sector players, key government staff and political figures, to build more systemic, although still incomplete, changes into both the urban planning and the city systems.

The Bellavista experience, moreover, reveals that top-down power exercised by national ministries and even “local” municipalities fails to manage criminal and other components of urban decline.
Conflating size and scale is a mistake in this context: “big” (political authorities’) power is not enough and “small” (neighbours’) power is equally important for healthy neighbourhoods, cities and societies.

The Coordinadora and Bellavista experience also indicates that, when planning and policy measures fail to introduce some balance into the system, top-down models in the private sector (real estate developers, car dealers and banks for whom financing automobility is crucial to profits), often acting with support from public authorities, impose brutal patterns of exploitation on urban neighbourhoods, which produce domicile and displacement, destroying structures for survival, such as the markets of the Vega, the Independencia, Bellavista and Pedro de Valdivia Norte neighbourhoods. In these circumstances, micro-level organizations, whether in the private sector (market, recyclers and other smallscale enterprises) or citizen sector, risk annihilation if they are unable to respond at the meso level, as they did with the Coordinadora and, later, Living City.

This multiscalar analysis also reveals another dynamic: macro-scale private actors impose their own logic on a deregulated city, such as Santiago. They reap profits at the macro level, while those at the bottom of the chain (micro scale neighbourhoods) pay high costs in terms of externalities, such as alcoholism, delinquency, collapse of public space, traffic congestion, and so on. Meso-scale levels of government (and the police) are then required to fix these problems, a challenge, given the appalling mismatch between distribution of problems/costs and profits/resources.

6.3.4 A three-way policy dynamic: Living City’s “BOID”?

As discussed in chapter 2, specific, relatively simple rules can sometimes capture complex dynamics, in open, complex systems. For this case study, the communicational dynamics discussed earlier in this chapter summarize the components involved in building trust, knowledge and ability to act, as developed by the Coordinadora/Living City.

This case study also suggests a three-way policy dynamic that expresses how these relationship-based, multiscalar mobilizations of ecologies of actors act, making it possible for a seemingly small and powerless citizen group to achieve significant change in urban planning systems.

Thus, as discussed above, in 1997, we see a city planning system in which political and technical forces, heavily influenced by a handful of powerful private interests, make most of the decisions shaping the city itself. Private interests do this through influencing the public sphere, but primarily through their own action directly on the city, as they pursue profits in a relatively de-regulated environment, inherited from the military regime, which was closely entwined in the business
groups running the economy (Délano and Traslaviña 1989; Huneeus 2007).

Citizen organizations act on policy, that is the “variegated collection of organizations that constitute the state” (Evans 2002) primarily through individual, often clientelistic, negotiations with political figures and, on the technical level, through meetings, formal complaints and other instances (figure 6.13, top). Keeping in mind the interactions portrayed in previous sections, we can see how starting conditions involve a planning system\(^\text{59}\) controlled largely by politicians (from a very closed socio-economic elite) and technical staff, 

\(^{59}\) Here it is important to remember that I am using “planning” in the sense of planning, non-planning and anti-planning, as per theorists discussed in chapter 1, because as this case indicates, it is quite reasonable to argue that planning as such does not really exist in a Chile profoundly shaped by a market-centred paradigm hostile to “planning” as an unwanted and potentially disastrous intervention in market dynamics.
with a strong rational-technical bias, which deliberately excludes citizens, who are labelled ignorant, untrained and unable to understand the city and planning. This makes it particularly easy for private and/or political interests to co-opt resources for their own benefit.

Unlike traditional thinking about exclusion, which seems to assume that only a small group on the fringes of society (for racial, economic, educational or other reasons) is excluded, in this case we can see that in terms of practical decision-making in the urban sphere, the vast majority of citizens is excluded. The Coordinadora reveals the power that can be mobilized when citizens from different backgrounds and territories join together to demand inclusion. Moreover, although some might predict that those “most powerful” within the coalition would “get more”, in fact, all groups obtained significant benefits, directly associated with those that they established as primordial for themselves. While Bellavista and the Vega saw lasting benefits, Pedro de Valdivia Norte subsequently faced one disastrous urban project after another (tunnels and underpasses).

Through the Coordinadora, some members of Chile’s excluded majority learned active citizenship and created significant civil society capacity. Although they were able to generate enough power to significantly influence participatory processes, they did not accumulate strength enough to change an exclusionary system. With Living City, in contrast, we see a more systemic application of these forces, based on the understanding that when each part of the system functions in isolation, the results are less optimal than if actors throughout the system can be mobilized together (figure 6.13, bottom). By working simultaneously with both political and technical levels of government (at local, regional and national scales), citizens generated transparency and greater ongoing control over inputs (for example, knowledge about cycling-inclusive planning from the Dutch), policy decisions expressed as orders (from the regional governor to staff, or within municipalities that design cycling facilities), and technical application of both knowledge-orders (through the cycling design manual working group). This approach also brought other -- excluded -- private actors (small and medium-sized players such as recyclers, Patio Bellavista or Bicicletas Oxford) into the debate, and placed more weight on evidence from academic and other sources, which influenced the content of deliberations and changed people’s thinking.

**Two-way dynamics of importance**

A couple of additional two-way dynamics are worth noting at this point, as they emerged particularly as drivers of the cycling roundtable, which continued to progress despite changing political authorities and other factors that introduced considerable complexity into what might otherwise have been a more complicated situation. These capture key workings of civil society and
policymakers, as they interact to produce a new paradigm, in this case a more cycling-inclusive city system. What we see is that to obtain a more cycling-inclusive city system, we need a more cycling-and-other-inclusive planning system.

Private sector actors (recyclers, the electrical distributing company Chilectra, bicycle producers and retailers) became important: although they did not drive the dynamic, they did enhance its effectiveness and help drive it forward. But the key dynamics involved a one-two rhythm as first civil society actors, then policymakers at different levels and instances, took up cycling. As one flagged, or imploded, as occurred with the civil society component through the Bicivilizate campaign, the other took up the challenge, as we see when unexpected actors appear in the environmental department of the regional government (GORE), creating an opportunity for the I-CE, Living City, GORE alliance. This is an important dynamic to nourish when attempting a paradigm shift away from automobility toward more “sustainable” transport (whatever that might be), because the policy-planning-realization horizon is so long, typically 30-40 years, far beyond the capacity of most individual actors.

This first two-phase dynamic influences the internal process of change, but is also linked to an equivalent dynamic, at the process-public interface. That is, when public policies begin, for example, to replace car-space for cycle-, walking and public spaces, opposition emerges. It is then important to have strong voices for change among policymakers. But if these are not complemented by equally strong support from other sectors, with different relational trees and therefore different credibility and other capacities, then the policymaker may draw back, be forced to resign, and the policy can be eliminated. Civil society is a crucial source of this: while support from one’s own party or political allies is important, it does not build sufficiently broad, and far-reaching credibility, unless credible actors at different scales and in different social groupings also take positions. While individuals also play a role in this dynamic, organizations are crucial, since they last over time, accumulate knowledge for increasingly sophisticated debates, and build up credibility as they function.

It would be unwise to exaggerate Living City’s accomplishments to the point of talking about profound systemic, that is paradigmatic change. Although parallel to these processes, Chile has made significant strides to toward more egalitarian and inclusive socio-political practices, urban planning falls far short of the legislative, enforcement and attitudinal changes that would reflect a genuine shift to planning for a good, just and livable city.
As Peat noted (2.1), when a system is pushed too far up a mountain, “it can either fall back to its limit cycle or down the other side of the mountain” (Peat 1991, quoted on p. 95, Merry 1995). In this case, Living City has formed part of a movement that has pushed the system far up the mountain, but, particularly under the Piñera government, which is less permeable to participation than its predecessor, the system has slipped back somewhat, although not all the way. This is clearest in the case of cycling and public transport, both of which continue to advance, despite the radical change from a Concertación to a conservative government in 2010. Quality, however, remains a challenge and systemic changes (particularly the introduction of cycling design standards in the national roads manual) is still awaiting approval from the housing ministry.

This incomplete progress is also clear in debate about reforming city-related laws, to include new forms of public participation, although these remain limited in their impact. Moreover, public debate has begun to address structural issues, particularly the undemocratic nature of a key level of government, Santiago’s regional body.

6.4 Living City: Structuring chaos for systemic change

No meeting at Living City was ever larger than 40-50 people and even the plenaries of the cycling roundtable never exceeded a hundred. Nonetheless, the accumulated numbers on the attendance lists for different activities reveal that several thousand people contributed endless hours of work during its first decade, thanks to a gossamer structure able to combine action, individuals, structures in common endeavours that achieved significant results. More than a node within a more conventionally articulated network structure, Living City embodied the knowledge and mobilized the energy of diverse wills toward common goals. Although there was enormous turnover from one meeting to the next, the core and partners provided continuity -- memory -- in a way that facilitated the integration of new wills and ways. Thus, large numbers of diverse people participated in different ways, without losing sight of specific goals.

Through sheer incapacity, Living City was unable to monopolize these processes and was often forced to step back and let others provide the continuity it could not. Thus, for example, although Living City leaders and staff played key roles in getting the women’s cycling school going (2008), bringing in know-how from the Netherlands, Peru and Brazil to enrich course design, a new generation of Macletas took on the school, kept it alive and innovated, turning out graduates -- both instructors and students -- year after year.
This ability to harness an open-ended, fragmented kind of memory is both powerful and perilous. Powerful, because it has brought new players into urban issues and provided them with crucial knowledge to make them more effective. Perilous, because through this process Living City often ends up in the background. Catalyzing new processes, empowering new groups, providing assistance, pushing recently formed groups into the foreground with tools to make them more effective -- this is not the high profile role that funders often demand from their favourite projects. By the end of 2011, as more groups were emerging and taking on important roles in urban conflicts, Living City was starting to feel the pressure from competition for the funding necessary to continue. Chile was no longer a priority for most international development organizations and the international partnerships, with I-CE, the EU and other bodies had run their course, with little sign that repetition would be possible. As always, then, despite its progress, awards, recognition, Living City’s future looked grim. I will explore this question in the final chapter.

Aristotle defined the essence of the city as its people and Jaime Lerner, of groundbreaking Curitiba, associates cities with “structures of change” whose fundamental building block, their “soul” resides in citizens themselves. Gaventa, meanwhile, defines participatory processes by their need to be “meaningful” and to involve real shifts in who holds power, and how that power is exercised (Gaventa 2004). These observations are inextricably intertwined in the case of a citizens’ organization, such as Living City, that attempts to challenge prevailing inequalities, using the city itself as the stuff of dreams and endeavours. To demand democracy, one must democratize oneself. To practice citizenship, one must be open to having it practiced on oneself. Unlike other human rights, the right to the city is profoundly collective and human organizations are essential to defining the intricacies of how that right is to be realized, in specific territories, by specific groups of people, including all the facets of their diversity. For Living City, then, not only the city, but the citizens’ organization itself, must structure change, in its external demands upon the urban, but also in its internal demands and aspirations for its own functioning.

In Living City’s case, that “structure” involves both the formal components of a non-profit foundation and an open-ended communications weave that makes sense and memory out of a chaotic forest of relationships. As Tomás Carvajal put it:

> From neurobiology we know that the brain alone cannot generate knowledge... The only way to create self-awareness is through the head’s connection to a reality, with emotions, with space. In terms of the difference between machines and living systems, I think Living City is a body and we are part of that body. We can generate knowledge because we’re sensitive to our surroundings and that makes us act, mobilize... and become self-aware (CiudadViva 2012b).
Chapter 7 Final reflections: Citizen planners, self-organization, complexity and PAR

Introduction

7.1 Citizen planners and innovation

7.2 Self-generation, participation and civic infrastructure

7.3 Complexity in qualitative research

Figure 7.1. Cooking up social change and enjoying the results along the way. A celebratory lunch 12 July 2008, during the I-CE mission’s annual visit. In the photograph, cycling leaders Amarilis Horta and Elba Lizama, along with city planner Mariela Aranda, and other government staff, Tom Godefrooij, head of the I-CE missions to Santiago, Jeroen Buis, I-CE engineering specialist, and others.
Introduction

From the outset, we were interested in understanding how to create events, not simply observe them. Our theory was not only about action, but about how to create action. Moreover, we began with a bias, which we still hold, toward designing and carrying through on actions that could serve as liberating alternatives to the status quo. Therefore, a major focus of our work has been and continues to be developing interventions that produce rare events. (p. xi, Argyris and Schön 1974).

Like Argyris and Schön, Living City’s leaders have focused on creating “rare events”, in our case, ones that can somehow meet our aspirations for a better life. As this study illustrates for the urban sphere, living systems are interconnected and interact, within the nested living systems of ecologies (Holling 2001). In neighbourhoods and cities, the extended threads of global warming, health, energy, and other issues, twist together and come to earth. By changing the city, you can change society. Changing the intricate weave of local living systems should be a crucial starting point for ensuring humanity’s survival.

But what kind of city-society do we want to create? “Sustainability” has so many definitions that it is often used in ways that empty it of meaning. Thus, in chapter one, I defined a kind of urban destination, using crucial ideas from three key planning theorists. As discussed, Fainstein (2010), Friedmann (2000), Evans (2002) come from diverse backgrounds, but their contributions echo very precisely the vision motivating the citizen movements explored in this dissertation. It is not that the citizens here have read these thinkers and decided to apply their ideas in the living city. Rather, their ideas reflect how closely planners’ ideas can match those of citizen planners, and this study reveals some of the complementarity and the tensions as people try to make these visions a reality.

To do so, this dissertation suggests that we need to plan with complexity, in the human and collaborative sense, explored by Innes and Booher (Booher and Innes 2002; Booher 2004; Booher 2008; Innes and Booher 2010), and in the systemic and structural sense, noted by Portugali (Portugali 2011; Portugali 2012) and the contributors to de Roo’s collection (2010). Planning needs to identify and work with key subsystems within city systems: recognizing their multiscalar nature (Holling 2001; Somerville 2011) and the crucial role of transportsheds for livelihood and civic action, health, play and happiness as well as access and mobility.

In a developing country such as Chile, grappling with the legacies of 17 years of brutal military dictatorship, it is impossible to aspire to achieving a good, just and livable city without also considering issues of democratization (Tilly 2007), citizenship (Oxhorn 1995; Dahl 1998; Taylor 1998; Taylor 2004; Oxhorn 2011), and participation. Indeed, I have taken Avritzer’s arguments for
the importance of “democratic publics” (2002; 2010) as one significant way of influencing the “field of forces” that Fainstein considers important to thinking about planning.

I have looked at these diverse forces and factors as they play out in the living laboratory of Santiago, by exploring the roles of the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte (1997-2000) and Ciudad Viva (Living City), to gain greater understanding of the roles, rules and dynamics involved in changing cities along these lines, when real people are involved and power seems irremediably skewed in favour of a tiny minority. If we aspire to a good, just and livable city, then, this study suggests that three systemic elements are particularly important. These involve:

1. **The role of citizens as planners**, not just guests at the planning table, which is the way our participation is often framed. I see this as vital for both ethical and practical reasons, particularly our role in innovation. This section begins by summarizing key findings from the discussions in chapters 4 (Coordinadora) and 6 (Living City), before reflecting on some additional aspects.

2. **The importance of self-generation and the role of participatory “nooks and crannies” afforded by the urban sphere, in building participatory publics** even in hostile environments. In this sense, Avritzer’s own work and the experiences presented in this study indicate that politically-oriented elements within civil society are a vital, catalysing force. Enabling them requires paying attention to the need to think about structure within the planning systems, and particularly to provide the “civic infrastructure” necessary for individuals, citizens and diverse kinds of organizations to emerge and interact effectively with the policy and private sectors.

3. **The usefulness of combining a participatory action research approach with some concepts from complexity**, to facilitate looking at the links between actors, scales, innovation and renovation. This also examines the use of BOID-like descriptions, in the form of diagrams, to illustrate key interactions or dynamics underlying some of the complex changes discussed in this dissertation. In this sense, as discussed earlier (chapter 2), I recognize that, just as the original BOID experiment addresses only one aspect, flocking, of birds’ highly complex behaviour, these dynamics cover only one particular aspect of interest within a complex phenomenon, and do not come close to defining simple rules for everything related to the system. They do offer the potential for looking for and potentially testing the functioning of similar dynamics in other complex urban planning situations, potentially facilitating comparison. I am, then, looking for “rules”, in Byrne’s sense (2005), whose application is contingent on local conditions, rather than
universal “laws”, which may help explain and shape planning and city systems in ways that contribute to meeting our objectives.

Thus, in chapters three and four we see the Coordinadora emerge from the exhaustion and decline of a planning system based on extreme authoritarianism, exclusion and other characteristics that concentrate goods and riches in the hands of a few, forcing an impoverished majority to assume most of the costs. Within this overall decline of the city system, as per Hollinger’s model (chapter 1), we see a citizen system emerge, as simpler local organizations join together to create a more complex, loosely knit group, able to intervene more effectively in an excluding planning system. To do so in the first instance, communities were restricted to an anti-planning stance.

As the narrative progresses, however, we see them able to create a citizen institution, Living City. Contrary to more rigid definitions of organizations, I have described its nature as a mobile, diffuse site for storing memory, with memory understood as the collective capacity to theorize and act effectively on the planning and city systems. This institution reflects a significant shift by the Coordinadora into a more complex system, positioned in an intermediate, citizen space between public and private sectors, and at a meso level in a multiscalar planning system. This makes it able to function across scales and shifts power dynamics, as top-down, and bottom-up phenomena are joined by a possibility to work “from the middle out and from the middle in” (chapter 6).

Understanding the emergence of this new actor from a complexity perspective helps us to move away from the “chicken-egg” dilemma (chapter 1), regarding how to get effective civil societies in recently democratizing environments, where there is none, or very little, to start with. Thus we see components from the starting point begin to interact and eventually generate a new kind of citizenship and diverse organizations practicing some version thereof (chapters 3-6). Moreover, we see these interact with public and private actors and institutions, to significantly influence thinking and planning around diverse issues, particularly heritage, recycling, (active) transport, and citizen involvement in planning, generating something of a phase change in the planning system. I would add, however, that this shift is far from complete or consolidated, as it continues to lack a significant reinforcement within urban laws and relevant planning institutions, particularly the fragmented and highly undemocratic governance system that shapes planning at every level in Chile today.

Nonetheless, we can see that through its existence, its theory and its actions, Living City has catalysed and supported processes for change and innovation throughout the planning system. This causality is not direct, linear, or even proportional to the “small groups” generally involved. Rather,
it reflects how diverse citizen experiences refer to each other (positively or negatively), amplifying what seems most relevant in their own and others’ actions, producing what are often exponential impacts. In this they are pushed by need and pulled by the specific opportunities available in their own, local environment. This too is consistent with complexity’s focus on the contingent and therefore the local as defining how general rules play out in specific situations.

As we have seen, these dynamics generate genuine shifts in the fields of forces in city planning, altering power and contributing to the emergence of democratic publics, primarily (in this study) in the urban sphere, but also in society at large, as exemplified by the presidential decree requiring participation early in the Lagos’ presidency (chapter 4), or the national laws for participation (Gobierno de Chile 2011) and transparency (Gobierno de Chile 2005). These results, then, do not pretend to argue linear cause-effect relationships, but rather trace some of the ways in which challenges raised by diverse actors may reverberate throughout the planning and social system and coalesce into specific, game-changing elements.

In Chile in the past 20 years since the military regime ended, these kinds of dynamics and shifts are apparent in two key sectors, which seem to have spearheaded the growing democratization of Chilean society as a whole. These are education, with spirals of increasingly complex and sophisticated action by high school and university students, and the urban planning sphere discussed in the case study. Both education systems and cities concentrate people in specific locations, offering opportunities for the citizen learning described by Gaventa, Merrifield and others (chapter 1). No matter how simple or complex their goals -- turning down the noise from a discotheque or recovering a neighbourhood threatened by crime and impoverishment -- there was no way for citizens to achieve their goals without confronting, challenging and changing the authoritarian legacies embedded in political, planning and city spheres.

The remainder of this chapter offers some final reflections on citizen planners and their importance to innovation (7.1); self-organization as it depends on “civic infrastructure” (7.2); and the usefulness of complexity, as an approach to qualitative research (7.3). Several appendices address additional issues that may be of interest to some, particularly regarding a more detailed look at the nature of participation from this complexity-based perspective; and methods for evaluating participation, using both quantitative and qualitative metrics.
7.2 Citizen planners: diversity and innovation

As discussed throughout this dissertation, I have explored the case of the anti-highway revolt, as embodied in the Coordinadora No a la Costanera Norte, and the citizen institution that grew out of that movement, to answer questions about how citizen participation and democratization in urban planning can foster the innovation necessary to achieve good, just and livable cities, and the processes required to build necessary consensuses.

To find answers, I explored the interactions between citizen learning, at the individual level, primarily through small group interaction; the kinds of organization that may arise and how they are both shaped by and shape collective capability; and how these two components may also, perhaps surprisingly, shape a particular policy environment and the power relations it contains. The discussion of the Coordinadora experience (chapter 4), focuses on the first level of interactions, while the discussion of Living City (chapter 6), examines primarily collective capability, as memory, and how these interact with and influence a given power-policy environment.

This case study illustrates that, like the planners cited in chapter 1, citizens too theorize the city of their desires, as they act for social justice, inclusion, more life-centred environments. As events in chapter 5 reveal, in Santiago, long before community leaders heard about the right to the city, new urban citizen initiatives intuitively articulated a declaration of urban rights and a network-based organization to work for its implementation in diverse arenas. Thus, we see in action a phenomenon noted by Argyris and Schön, in Theory in Practice,
their foundational work on organizational learning: “All human beings -- not only professional practitioners -- need to become competent in taking action and simultaneously reflecting on this action to learn from it” (p. 4 (Argyris and Schön 1974). In his writing on cognition, complexity and the city, Portugali (2011) takes this further, based on the premise that

Planning... is a basic cognitive capability of humans that is sometimes executed solitarily and sometimes collectively. Planning is also a profession and academic discipline and as such a par excellence collective activity (p. 266, Portugali 2011).

Around 2005, while editing his film on the judge who brought Pinochet to justice, Living City founder Patricio Lanfranco began to visit San Francisco regularly, to coordinate with the rest of the team. During his Sunday rambles, he happened to pass a centre for citizen planning, and he came back to Santiago imbued with the idea that this was what Living City was trying to do. Whatever the idea or the centre meant in its original San Francisco setting, his use of it to describe Living City’s work caught on, and in 2007, when Living City moved into its new community centre, it was formally labelled Centro de Urbanismo Ciudadano, centre for citizen-led urban planning. As with many similar decisions, this just seemed “natural”. In fact, however, the term heralded a shift away from participatory, or even empowerment approaches, toward a new paradigm that recognizes three key sectors in planning: the public, the private and the citizen.

This formulation (figure 7.2) feels at once both natural and obvious, and radically different. It notes the importance of Chile’s public sector, as it makes and attempts to apply rules, and is, in consequence, limited by the experiences and visions of the past, on which those rules are based. Of the three sectors, the public is the most limited and trapped by an essential paradox of planning, all the more insidious, since it is usually ignored, the need to plan an uncertain future.

This view recognizes that the public sector plays an important role in providing the continuity and reliability that human enterprise requires. But a planning environment that attempts to ignore unpredictability also limits the public sector’s vision and its capacity to respond to the many surprising and hazardous features of city systems and their environments.

This formulation (figure 7.2) also makes visible the largely hidden role of the private sector, as it acts on both city and planning systems. While this sector’s actions on the city system tend to be, often hideously, visible, in Chile today, its actions on the planning system are mostly invisible, despite enormous influence. This case offers several examples of how this invisibility excludes the majority and facilitates both incompetence and corruption. Moreover, by looking more closely at the private sector, we see how a small group of wealthy, powerful actors shape the city, excluding
other medium-, small- and micro-scale private actors, as the former concentrate wealth, proximity and other advantages. Finally, we have seen how this produces a dangerous mismatch between profits (to companies) and the costs (to communities, local, regional and national governments), as others must clean up the mess (pay for the “externalities”), whether of highways that generate congestion, air pollution and inequality or high-rise developments that collapse already overloaded public spaces.

Thus, private “planners” practicing non-planning shape the city system through their investments, as they demand highways and repeat profitable models, such as the monotonous high-rise buildings that havedevoured much of Santiago in recent years, twisting and breaking rules to suit their own interests, rather than those of the city overall.

Most notably, from the perspective of this case study, this three-dimensional view of planning also lays claim to a role for the citizen sector as an equal actor, a planner among planners, rather than a guest at the planning table, able to “participate” on occasion, but excluded from the full cycle of analysis, evaluation of alternatives, implementation, testing, evaluation, which constitutes most urban planning cycles. While citizens can (and often should) be viewed as vulnerable, excluded, the least powerful in an explosive mix of city-shaping, in fact, they do significantly shape the city system, as exemplified here by the land occupations (“squatters’” movements) of the 1950s and 1960s, the Vega markets’ successful battles to remain on central city lands despite all efforts to displace them, or by cyclists and fairs, who demand and exercise their right to use dangerous, excluding streets, thus challenging and ultimately reshaping some aspects of the transport system.

By looking at citizen initiatives in the urban sphere over a relatively long horizon (22 years), this case study suggests a continuity among social nonmovements (Bayat 2010), social movements (Tarrow 1998) and “citizen institutions”, at least in the case of the Coordinadora and Living City.

Thus, we see people who organize, first as a social movement in the urban sphere. Through their efforts they acquired new knowledge, citizenship skills and sufficient capacity to generate a more complex instance, the citizen institution, Living City. While primarily a representational institution, in Tarrow’s sense (1998, chapter 1), Living City nonetheless retains the ability to lead its own and support others’ campaigns. Thus, in collective action terms, rather than accepting either/or processes and forms, Living City functions according to an and/and dynamic, oscillating between contentious and representational phases (table 1.4), enriching processes with a multi-sector conversation that fosters a revision of personal beliefs and collective values (table 1.1).
Of the three types of planners, citizens are the most likely to catalyze significant innovation. I am not saying that citizen planning initiatives are always, automatically, or “all”, innovative. Rather I am arguing that by their nature, they play distinct and crucial roles within the planning system, which public and private actors are often unable to play. There are several reasons. The main one is because, where they are diverse, they bring in “new” people, ideas, positions, currently excluded from the planning system, although these may be present (in positive or negative ways) in the city.

Citizen initiatives at the micro and meso level, moreover, are essential to translate (figure 7.3) between citizen desires expressed as (often fierce) needs, and potential policy responses offered by formally trained planners. Without this translation function, rather than collaborative planning, we see conflict, cost and conflagration, even where a planning initiative is potentially beneficial for the vast majority.

As discussed throughout this study, diversity is also important because of the kind of fruitful conversation it can nourish. Putnam’s work on the dangers inherent in bonding social capital (2000) and Sunstein’s on “enclave deliberation” illustrate how “social homogeneity can be quite damaging to good deliberation” (Sunstein 2000), leading to polarization and support for the most extreme positions. In contrast, Innes and Booher (Booher 2004; Innes and Booher 2010) argue the value of diversity to achieve authentic dialogue and successful planning outcomes.

Often, local planning, particularly at the neighbourhood level, falls through the cracks in municipal government, landing squarely on the shoulders of citizens, whether neighbours, local businesses, walkers or cyclists. Experiences with neighbourhood-led governance in cities such as Portland and elsewhere (Berry, Portney et al. 1993; Hovey 1998; Thomson 2001; Fackler 2009) or cyclist involvement in obtaining more inclusive planning processes and cities (Batterby 2003; Godefrooij, Pardo et al. 2009; Godefrooij 2010) suggest that citizen planners can play a role in

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**Figure 7.3. The Translation Function.** Someone has to translate between the vernacular language of citizen problems and dreams, and the possibilities offered by formal planning systems and policy options. Citizen planners, with their feet in the neighbourhood (or on pedals), and their capacity for accumulating planning skills and knowledge, offer the best options for this role in many cases.
bringing crucial local knowledge and skills to the planning table, which would not be available without them. This case study reinforces this view. Moreover, citizen planners, moving between levels of government, can bring out issues of scale, particularly the reality that
global and local planning co-exist and interact in the dynamics of cities, and that in many cases local planning can be more dominant and effective in the overall urban process than global planning... [This] implies that it must be perceived not as a reactive force, but as an important source for planning ideas and initiatives (p. 290, Portugali 2011).

Self-organizing groups may be particularly important to innovation, as they bring out “new protest issues, methods, identities, structures and organizational forms... Self-organizing systems are complex networks of entities that synergize and produce novelty (p. 110, Boonstra and Boelens 2011). This case supports this view.

Finally, as the “least powerful” actor, citizen planners tend to be the least threatening, although there are many exceptions. Indeed, the common dynamic wherein planners are fearful that citizen involvement will disrupt their well laid plans, indicates this is often not true. Nonetheless, even “powerlessness” has its own power -- when people come, they come voluntarily. Living City could never coerce or order people to participate. They came because they wanted to, as the enormous support and long hours donated to its different efforts indicate. Some groups were larger, others smaller, some more, others less effective. To a large degree, this accurately reflected people’s perceptions of the importance of the issue at hand.

A clear example of this occurred during the first Bellavista charrette (2003), where planners and other municipal staff from Recoleta and Providencia met for the first time to work on the neighbourhood’s problems. They emphasized how, in conditions where their political authorities were often competing or blaming each other, the invitation to meet on “neutral ground”, facilitated by community groups, made it possible for them to work together effectively for the first time.

This was a lesson that Living City applied in future initiatives. Perhaps the most telling example was the Citizen-Government Roundtable on Cycling: government staff participated actively in the different working groups, most of which met in Living City’s community centre, on the street, or in other events. These spaces, facilitated by community leaders and Living City staff, brought out tough conflicts and debates as, for example, individual cyclists met and exchanged criticism and debate with actual city planners. These initial skirmishes quickly gave way to passionate debates, which saw rigid we-them positions yield to more nuanced views and deeper understandings of the possibilities and constraints in the existing systems, and how they could be addressed. In this
sense, aside from Hector Olivo (discussed in chapter 6), city planners from Providencia, Recoleta, Maipú and El Bosque worked closely with neighbourhood and cycling leaders to push a pro-cycling agenda forward more effectively. Often they became “inside activists” (Olsson and Hysing 2011) through these interactions, overcoming seemingly impossible institutional barriers, such as the resistance to financing the Pio Nono street renewal.

7.3 Self-generation, participation and civic infrastructure

If, as Bertolini (2010) suggests, we are to develop “evolutionary planning” (chapter 2) to help us cope with complex adaptive systems, and if citizen planners are an integral part of ensuring our cities are indeed conducive to the “good”, the “just” and the “liveable”, then we require participatory publics, and the structures that will help them grow.

Frustration with “participatory planning” and its many failings (Cooke and Kothari 2001) has brought out the importance of independent civil society groups. Boonstra and Boelens, for example, blame meagre results on the government-centred nature of participatory efforts. Specifically, the government sets the agenda, decides who to invite, defines the problem, and the rules of engagement. This approach was clearly evident in Santiago, when the participatory methods applied by the environmental impact assessment system, for example, ignored the specific characteristics of participants, and particularly the reality that “certain spaces and places are always engaged with other places and spaces elsewhere” (p. 108, Boonstra and Boelens 2011).

Both the Coordinadora and Living City offer powerful examples of situations “in which citizens and/or other stakeholders contribute to urban developments out of their own motivation and interests in specific actor-networks” (p. 108, Boonstra and Boelens 2011), highlighting the importance of independent, self-generated groups. In this sense, we should understand that “self-generate” does not mean these groups acted alone or developed their new capacities in splendid isolation. Rather, self-generation refers to their ability to take key elements from their environment -- support from leaders and members of local communities, international agencies and other partnerships -- to build simpler organizations into more complex entities, able to address planning challenges at multiple scales. As this case illustrates, this is a hugely difficult process that brings as many defeats as victories. Nonetheless, it can also bring sufficient recognition and results to encourage other similar groups and to strengthen and make more effective the original catalyst.

This is an ongoing process and Living City’s recent experiences illustrate this well. Since 2011, Living City has been working with other organizations to develop a framework for citizen and
private sector actors to monitor urban policy developments, measuring them against specific goals. This reflects an effort to operationalize key components of good, just and livable cities, and measure progress toward achieving them. During the August 2012 workshop, which concluded our co-research process, Living City board member Loreto Rojas noted that at a recent partnership meeting, an academic had insisted that Living City had to give up its activist stance, if it was to work in a “technical” manner.

This reflects an either/or world, in which Living City insists on an and/and approach, connecting and integrating, rather than choosing one alternative and thereby rejecting the other. Advisor, Tomás Carvajal, noted how when people locate themselves in one world, they abdicate responsibility for the other:

So for academics it is very important to see the superstructure, discourse, language, but by not being active, they set aside their responsibility, so they can say anything... What I see in Living City and what attracts me to it, is that it is responsible because it locates itself in both worlds. On one hand there is an academic discourse and on the other, action. We can also see this is a more complex vision... (CiudadViva 2012b).

Rodrigo Quijada, Living City president, picked up this idea with enthusiasm:

I love this point. I think it is really clear. If I stop talking about something, then I delegate responsibility to someone else. For sure in some cases this is necessary, and to avoid being arrogant I prefer to delegate. But often on these issues when you delegate you let go of that sense of responsibility, and in reality you shouldn’t do that. Even if you don’t know much, you have to learn more (CiudadViva 2012b).

In an either/or environment, then, Living City insists on combining the pursuit of knowledge with action, mutual empowerment with shared responsibility. It does so, moreover, in an environment hostile to any attempt by citizens to validate their own knowledge and bring it to the planning table. Patricio Lanfranco noted a recent, example, in which the architect behind the University San Sebastian’s controversial high-rise project in Bellavista, ninguna (literally, “nobodied”) Pepa Errazuriz and Living City. In an interview, the architect, Christián Boza declaimed:

I spend all my time explaining myself and I suspect they’re just talking to hear themselves talk. These organizations show up -- Living City, Detendamos la Ciudad; a while ago there was a critique, by Pepa Errazuriz. Who is Pepa Errazuriz? What is Living City, what architects are behind it? It is architects who build the city! ... I am the expert. I have a post-graduate degree from Edinburgh. I have been a professor of architecture and urbanism, and I am probably the person who knows most about these issues in Chile... My discussions aren’t at the level of a Pepa Errazuriz! (Wahr and Dannemann 2012).
His comments touched off impassioned responses among a wide variety of observers and, in combination with similarly contemptuous views of his own students at the San Sebastian University (for being lower income -- *popular* -- and therefore having “no culture, no sophistication”), Boza was soon out of a job. This situation gives a sense of how public opinion has shifted away from the view that only a small elite should plan the city. This is reflected in politicians’ attitudes too: when another private university, the Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello, approached him about developing a new campus in Bellavista, the mayor of Providencia told them to talk to Living City -- if Living City was for it, he would support it.\textsuperscript{60}

**Civic Infrastructure**

These situations show how self-generation fosters strength and independence, and can significantly shift how power is managed within a system. It illustrates Boonstra and Boelens’ contention that, while “participation” refers to activities controlled by government, self-organization involves citizens taking the initiative, a positioning that underlines the complex synergy between responsibility and power. This does not mean that self-generated organizations act on their own or that they suddenly become the holders of superhero powers: this case study indicates quite the contrary. But it does show that, although they stand to lose a great many battles, where an organization is capable of capturing and mining these experiences, citizen planners can play a significant, and sometimes decisive, role.

By its very nature, however, and as we have seen, a presidential decree, a law defining participation, or other top-down approaches do not create the conditions necessary for a healthy, effective, robust civil society ecology. This holds particularly true if we consider independence and critical thinking to be crucial components. Can we, within existing systems, plant certain seeds that can help to foster a healthy civil society environment? I believe that an important aspect of the structures that Portugali argues should become the object of planning theory (chapter 1) is something I will call “civic infrastructure”.

I defined this as a set of formal, informal, institutional and other spaces; rules expressed in laws, ordinances, statutes and their interactions. Asked about civic infrastructure, the funders-experts that I interviewed mentioned key issues, such as values; the general legal and institutional framework (as it governs citizen-government and to some extent private relations); capacities; basic

\textsuperscript{60} Personal communication, from Tomás Marín (Living City) and María Elena Ducci, 10-August-2012, who teaches at this university and subsequently attended the meeting between university representatives and Tomás Marín, in Living City. This was followed by a formal letter, from Living City to the university representatives, summarizing the meeting.
structures (governing civil society organizations themselves); resources and economy; and other issues.

Table 7.1 The State of Civic Infrastructure in Chile Today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Sphere</th>
<th>Score*</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Citizenship as the cornerstone, diversity as source of strength, diverse ways of operating, diverse theories/sources of inspiration, transparency and accountability</td>
<td>Public, citizen and private sectors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Exercised in diverse and often contradictory ways; little recognition from private sector (although changing); public attitudes vary enormously (little consistency or consensus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and institutional framework</td>
<td>Focuses on rules for including participation (EIA, zoning bylaws) and two national laws</td>
<td>Public-citizen interface (no private)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strong contribution from national transparency law; little contribution from national participation law; strong support from active citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacities</td>
<td>Funders focus on building practical, management and organizational skills and achieving project goals; strong political awareness in civil society</td>
<td>Public-citizen interface, some private (CSR)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Civil society environment contains growing number of reasonably skilled organizations; NGOs typically act as intermediates, with very little funding reaching grassroots or community-based organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic structures</td>
<td>Established by national laws governing NGOs, neighbourhood associations, vendors’ associations, etc.</td>
<td>Public-citizen-private interface</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Much easier to form an organization today; legal requirements vary by government; established hierarchy; social enterprise and cooperatives severely hampered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and economy</td>
<td>Requires recognition of the value that civil society initiatives add to society and the economy; diverse models for functioning (NGOs, CSOs, movements, cooperatives, etc.)</td>
<td>Public-private-citizen interface, enormous barriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Most funding comes from foreign funders and has dropped to virtually nil in the past 20 years. The Concertación government financed many NGOs through consulting contracts; this disappeared with Piñera government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other issues</td>
<td>Much of the participatory infrastructure does not permit real deliberation, but rather functions only at the information or debate end of the spectrum.</td>
<td>Public-citizen and some private interface</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reflect scale (grassroots organizations have little access to funding and political decision-makers); monopoly of significant spaces by a small number of organizations; under-use of some existing structures; strong relation with democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall score (out of 18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status: 1=dysfunctional and highly problematic; 2=functioning well in one or two sectors, but not the whole planning system; 3=functioning well. CSR=Corporate Social Responsibility.

Source: Own elaboration based on funder-experts interviews and studies of participation mechanisms in municipal governance (Huerta 2000) and general participation in Chile today (Márquez 2001; Espinoza 2004; Canto 2005; Araya Moreno 2006; Fernández and Ordóñez 2007), with additional comments from Ximena Abogabir, Casa de la Paz...

Table 7.1 summarizes the state of civic infrastructure in Chile as very poor, scoring 8 out a possible 18 points, according to the issues discussed in interviews and a followup workshop (with Abogabir and De La Maza) in August 2012. These reflect conditions in society at large, reflecting the experience of those interviewed, rather than focused specifically on the urban sphere.
Is there a civic infrastructure BOID, that is, relatively simple rules that, contingent on local conditions, tend to shape civil society in a given environment? This could provide considerable insight into how we can enhance the probabilities of the emergence of Avritzer’s participatory publics, so important to democratization.

We can condense the elements identified in the funder/civil society interviews (table 7.1) into three components that overlap and interact, shaping and reshaping each other (figure 7.4). These are **civil society itself**, the **legal and institutional framework**, as it fosters or hampers citizen participation, and **resources and economic role**. Values are crosscutting, irradiating through and
reflected in all three. Capacities and basic structures are expressed in civil society, reflecting how the legal and institutional framework encourages or stunts development. Together these constitute a potential BOID that could be used to develop specific policies for a healthier civil society.

The first component, civil society, embodies the values and capacities it is able to self-generate. We can also see how, by using anti-planning strategies, the Coordinadora, and later Living City forced their way into political and policy arenas, with their demands for participation and a significant role in urban management and planning. Previous chapters explore in detail the specific characteristics that were present: particularly a kind of deeply individual, emotional, intuitive as well as rational learning of citizenship values and skills, which moved away from traditional participatory instances, typically controlled by governmental or private sector (consultants) actors (chapter 4). This also involved a form of thinking-action based on deliberation in small groups and on-street experiences (both formally organized and informally catalyzed, during the Pio Nono A-tracción Humana events, for example), as evidenced in Living City’s role as catalyst within an ecology of actors (chapter 6).

The second component, the legal and institutional framework, highlights crucial aspects of the environment as it shapes and is shaped by actors and their interactions, particularly those involving participation. Without the new environmental law, which enabled the communities to organize to defend their interests under clauses requiring participation in environmental assessments, the Coordinadora would have been, if not impossible, extremely difficult and fundamentally different, with few tactical options beyond protest and oppositional campaigning. While very limited, the EIA provisions nonetheless brought out and honed participatory, analytic and other skills, not only within civil society organizations as they were being born, but also amongst government technicians, academics and some private sector consultants.

The institutional framework creates -- or fails to create -- the spaces where participation takes place and can play a significant role in shaping the interactions that become possible. Without careful design, fruitful deliberation may be virtually impossible, at least across difference, and exclusion remains the norm. The presence within Chile’s existing legal institutions of the juntas de vecinos, was also an important capital for the social movements discussed here, and their evolution into amore complex, regional scale citizen institutions.

By looking at this case in light of equivalent tendencies in other countries, we can identify changes in Chile that would significantly improve the involvement of citizen planning organizations. A central challenge, in institutional terms, is the authoritarian structure of the metropolitan regional
government (GORE), with its appointed governor and the fragmentation of planning powers among regional offices controlled by national ministries (chapter 6). Democratization, then, requires not only the election of the regional level of governance, but also the reorganization of planning into an institution controlled by the political authorities, as has occurred in Bogotá or Curitiba (Brugmann 2009). This is unlikely to occur in the short term.

Other institutional factors could also push Santiago governance in a more democratic, inclusive direction. These include: fairer electoral procedures at every level; simpler rules for binding plebiscites; urban rules governing transparency in the office, but also on the street (public announcements of plans to develop or demolish, for example); participatory budgeting, health and citizen councils, as developed by Brazil (Abers 2000; Baiocchi 2005; Avritzer 2009; Avritzer 2010); and community control of key planning bodies, such as the national heritage commission, through citizen involvement on multiple boards, advisory commissions and other instances, as occurs in Toronto (Stren 2012).

The role of Chile’s juntas de vecinos merits special attention. Today, their many inadequacies has made them a favourite target for civil society bashing, by neighbours themselves and those in power. The military regime first reduced their legitimacy, by appointing leaders as local representatives of the regime. It then amended the law to allow more than one junta de vecinos in a given territory. In Recoleta, this has reinforced political affiliations (both for and against local mayors) and created organizations that, in effect, cancel each other out. Moreover, it has fostered the clientship discussed in this dissertation. The new participation law, too, treats neighbourhood associations as a minor NGO, equivalent to local clubs, and other kinds of organizations.

This limits their role and, above all, the kinds of resources available for them to fulfil virtually impossible tasks. Nonetheless, this dissertation offers many examples of anonymous, yet almost heroic, efforts to make neighbourhood associations an effective part of local planning. By working with, rather than against, these citizen planners, the planning system overall could improve interactions between actors at different scales and results in terms of city living.

Indeed, Thomson’s work on the effectiveness of local neighbourhood associations as partners with city governments in Portland, Dayton, St. Paul and Birmingham in the US (2001) suggests that rethinking, reinforcing and highlighting the role of Chile’s juntas de vecinos, along with their equivalent bodies at the municipal, regional and national levels, could offer a major breakthrough in improving both the quality and the degree of democracy practiced in urban planning. Each city has generated different institutional and resource-related arrangements that, overall, bring
neighbourhood organizations into local planning processes, reinforcing their internal democratic structures and outreach to citizens, and bringing citizens’ voices into diverse deliberative processes crucial to the quality of urban life. In Chile, stories from the 1960s suggest that there were some elements of this in the way the juntas de vecinos were originally planned. This would raise the hierarchy of the neighbourhood association to a key governance and citizenship site, more akin to the municipality than a sports club or mothers’ association (Centro de Madres).

The third component, **resources**, should be understood more broadly than the funding mechanisms available to civil society organizations, although these are very important (for those interested in more detail, Appendix 12 offers an analysis of Living City that informed this part of the discussion). Resources include **opportunities to learn and interact**, with peers and counterparts in other spheres. The Synergos network provides a powerful example of how simply bringing civil society leaders from different backgrounds, countries, and cultures can generate powerful learning situations, new ways of seeing, and shaping, realities. Avina and Ashoka, meanwhile, combined innovative forms of mutual teaching-learning with resources, in Avina’s cases, for leaders’ projects, in Ashoka’s case, for the leaders themselves. This illustrates the importance of diverse formats for providing resources and their enhanced effectiveness when they form part of ongoing partnerships for social change, *as defined by actors themselves, not funders or outside “experts”*.

Resources also include the **economic possibilities**, institutional frameworks and basic structures open to civil society initiatives. Legal restrictions in banking, for example, make it virtually impossible for nonprofits to purchase the properties where they function. Funders’ rules, too, favour renting, and may even prohibit using project funds to pay off a mortgage. These restrictions are crippling in developing countries like Chile, where real estate is a common instrument to build capital and social progress. These institutional restrictions also affect how nonprofits can operate, with many -- from civil society or the bodies controlling them -- interpreting “nonprofit” to mean money can be spent, but not generated, by activities. Although in theory rules for tenders (for example) now allow nonprofits to participate as consultants, in practice, this seldom occurs, and there is no specific funding, for example, to allow citizens’ organizations themselves to choose who will “facilitate” a participatory process for zoning, assessments or other legal instruments, which now require participation of some kind.

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61 I am basing this observation on conversations in the late 1990s with Silvino Zapico, the founder of Bellavista’s first neighbourhood association, and with others such as Hector Olivo, who have also had some involvement in these organizations.
In the urban sphere, as discussed, places, especially streets, are an important resource. Thus, the city as resource, where some actors have full and many have little access to its spaces, is important. Finally, funding mechanisms and awards like those received by Living City, which involve external evaluation and thereby certify “quality”, are crucial: their nature and diversity reflects how civil society is viewed by society at large, and defines their ability to function.

Altogether, these reflections suggest that, along with working toward specific goals for Bellavista, cycling, recycling or other areas in which it works, Living City and other concerned citizen planning groups should concentrate a significant part of their energies on achieving key systemic changes, that would open up the planning system to more structural ongoing participation from different kinds of citizens. In response to the complex and fragmented urban governance system described previously, these must be highly diverse, multiscalar and creative, ranging from micro provisions, such as requiring neighbourhood association approval of liquor licenses (whether new or under renewal), through meso provisions for citizen involvement and oversight of regional cycle planning initiatives (for example), to significant involvement in national initiatives and particularly the crucial laws framing urban planning in Chile, and their respective regulations.

Even where civil society has considerable capacity and will to act, however, resources are a significant limiting factor. It seems unfair to pin so much responsibility for change on the least powerful actors in the mix, civil society groups themselves, particularly where they are often grappling with basic issues such as how to finance travel to meetings or the time to attend them, lack of formal education or, also important, the system’s contempt for non-formal and informal learning. Building alliances across difference can contribute significantly to overcoming some of these handicaps, indeed can uncover enormous riches even amongst those considered the “poorest” in the group. But substantial inequalities and barriers remain.

Nonetheless, the experiences examined here suggest that civil society itself does have to lead in its own development and fight for integration into city planning (and other) systems. Living City did this, seeking support within Chile, but also from outside its immediate environment, from foreign companies with more expansive views on corporate social responsibility (Natura), traditional development funding agencies (the EU), or hybrid initiatives such as Avina, Ashoka and Synergos. The experience with I-CE suggests that civil society experiences from more democratic environments can make an enormous contribution, when they bring in resources (both knowledge and monetary) into egalitarian partnerships and exchanges, generating their own networks, moreover, to stimulate chains of learning-teaching across countries and cultures. Sadly, other
global civil society actors working on transport and other urban issues are less involved in this kind of practical solidarity.

ICLEI, for example, is the “world’s largest international association of local governments as determined by budget, personnel or scale of operations. The council was established when more than 200 local governments from 43 countries convened” in 1990, at the United Nations headquarters in New York. ICLEI partners with major global agencies, particularly UN Habitat and other bodies, participating in “good governance” and other campaigns (ICLEI 2003). With eleven offices on five continents and millions of dollars in income from governments, local, national and global agencies and foundations, ICLEI does not build civil society into its work, despite the diversity of its campaigns, advocacy, consulting and other activities.

Specifically in the transport field, both ITDP and Embarq are global NGOs, with offices worldwide and substantial funding (their annual reports do not specify amounts), mainly from US foundations and corporations. Like ICLEI, their focus is working with local and regional governments and other planning instances and, while they may cooperate with local civil society, their reports mention no initiatives oriented to building or sustaining civil society organizations in their partner cities (Embarq 2009-2010; Embarq 2010; ITDP 2010).

It is not my intention to criticize hard-won achievements by other civil society organizations, but this important work exhibits a blind spot that could significantly undermine its effectiveness. Like the butterfly effect (chapter 2), a small error in calculation can lead to large problems. Although I-CE’s initiatives closed (2010), when its last round of funding from the Dutch government ended, most of its partners in Latin America, Africa, India and the Netherlands remain both active and in contact, with progress ongoing in the different cities. In contrast, Embarq’s and other bus rapid transit initiatives, which are great on paper, are constantly hampered by lack of public support, public subsidies and other facilitating factors that could, arguably, be mobilized more effectively by partnerships that include civil society actors.

As democratizing movements in countries on every continent indicate, people are tired of top-down dynamics. When global NGOs work only through government, they risk being conflated with the same authoritarian procedures, generating ill will, or simply failing to mobilize the passion and commitment that citizen groups exhibit when truly involved in new initiatives.

This case and experiences from elsewhere indicate that civil societies can challenge -- and societies can shift -- institutional arrangements toward those more favourable to civil society health
and diversity. Institutional arrangements both reflect and influence how much civil society is valued as a crucial social actor, influencing the resources available and the economic participation that can allow active citizens to generate significant revenue from their own ventures. Together these two influence the quality of participation, while participation can also significantly influence both institutions and resources.

These three components are vital for different reasons, but above all because of how they shape (or exclude) opportunities for citizen participation. Appendix 11 explores these issues in more detail, from the perspective of three useful questions that help to position participation as strategic, in the sense of contributing significantly to civic infrastructure, or merely instrumental, as it is often employed today, suggesting elements for qualitative analysis and scoring.

Today, all over the world, citizen nonmovements, movements and institutions are grappling with issues as diverse as cities, water, global warming, peak oil, loss of biodiversity. The “normal” of the 20th century, fuelled by cheap sources of enormous energy, seemingly endless growth, and unfettered consumption, is about to end. As the thinkers discussed in the introduction convincingly argue, humanity faces a profound paradigm shift, a *pachakuti*. Changing the economic rules, new scientific discoveries or more efficient engineering projects are part of solutions. But people themselves are the living, beating heart at the centre of humanity’s survival.

Paul Hawken likens the plethora of citizen initiatives addressing these challenges to the activation of the world’s immune system (2007). Citing two complexity scientists, he notes that:

> Francisco Varela and Antonio Coutinho describe an immune system that can best be understood as intelligence, a living, learning, self-regulating system -- almost another mind. Its function does not depend on its firepower but on the quality of its connectedness. Rather than ‘inside cells’ automatically destroying ‘outside cells,’ there is a mediatory response to pathogens, as if the immune system learned millions of years ago that détente and getting to know potential adversaries was wiser than first-strike responses, that achieving balance was more appropriate than eradication (p. 143, Hawken 2007).

### 7.4 Complexity and PAR in qualitative research

This case afforded the opportunity to study in considerable detail the spiral of relationships, from the intimate personal level, through small to large groups, and city-planning and city-system interactions. I examined these processes with a particular focus on self-generating, autonomous groups acting within a framework of active citizenship or citizenship as agency, rather than clientship (Taylor 2004) or citizenship as consumption (Oxhorn 1995). By combining a participatory action research approach, in which those “studied” also exercised a high degree of
power over the research process, with concepts from complexity thinking, I was able to examine both individual and collective interactions, as they affect those involved and as they influence, and are influenced by, the city and planning environments.

This has required referring to literature from diverse sources and disciplines. With planning theory as the central structuring component, I have found useful insights and references in fields as diverse as adult and organizational learning, development, political science, physics, biology and communications. This reflects the enormous complexity of the local and the fact that it is not just a smaller or simpler version of societal, national or global entities. Rather, like the roots of a tree, this scale proves as diverse and complex as the more visible crown.

This project was born from a search for knowledge, deeply felt by the collective leaders of Living City, and made possible my own characteristics. From the start, I wanted to engage honestly and fully with the world of academic learning, but I did not want to forget my roots on the citizen side of the planning table. I believe this difficult process has enabled me to make that journey to become a social scientist with all that that implies in terms of methods, rigour and validity. At the same time, my position remains not within official government, private or academic, but rather squarely in the citizen sphere.

Positionality

Complexity has played an important role in making this possible. Combined with the other methods discussed in chapter 2, it gave me a way to acknowledge and work with, rather than against, my own positionality within the organization and events under study. There is a subtle but important distinction between the traditional “participant observer”, and my role here, as “observing participant” (Lewis 1999). As discussed in chapter 2, within complexity, the observer is never separate from the events under observation. *The very act of observation influences what occurs.* To ensure validity, then, other measures are required (Stacey, chapter 2). In my case, I have been able to offer considerable insight into subtle dynamics that might otherwise be ignored and I have had access to enormous amounts of data, more than can usually be obtained by interviews alone. Since I was involved in planning and designing many of the initiatives, however, I have avoided evaluating them myself, relying instead on those from external sources, as discussed throughout this dissertation. Moreover, the risk existed that I could impose my memories and views on what was essentially a collective effort by a very diverse group of people, distorting events in ways harmful to the quality of my results. To triangulate my inputs, observations and conclusions
then, I used a participatory action research approach, integrating collective reflections and other methods throughout the research process, as detailed in chapter 2.

This study, moreover, makes no claim that all citizen initiatives can or should be like Living City. It does recognize that unusual organizations can have important impacts and could be nourished more effectively for this purpose. Living City is unique because it was the first of a new kind of urban social movement-citizen institution to appear in post-Pinochet Chile, and reflects many unique characteristics: proximity; the neighbourhoods’ age and diversity, and their unique roles in metropolitan Santiago; the intertwined ways of life that made it easier for them to come together. Culture and creativity are also present, in these neighbourhoods and in Living City, in a way that reflects popular culture, sensuality and the role in the city’s imaginary of the Vega and Bellavista in particular, but also Independencia, with its past glories nourishing and humble present, and Pedro de Valdivia Norte, an upper class community that remains central to the city, rather than fleeing to the hills and suburbs, as most high-income Chileans have done.

At the same time, Living City is not unique in many of its aspirations and efforts. This is clear in the emergence, in its wake, of other organizations that have significantly influenced both planning and city systems, particularly the organizations in the Yungay neighbourhood (Santiago centre) and Valparaíso, and conflicts in Lo Espejo (a very poor, popular neighbourhood) and Vitacura (one of Chile’s wealthiest comunas). At the Metropolitan level, with fewer grassroots ties, Defendamos la Ciudad has specialized in citizen “fiscalización” (enforcement) of norms and laws, constantly twisted and broken as part of urban planning today. Sometimes these organizations achieve a high level of cooperation, as occurred with Living City’s urban rights and active citizenship initiatives. At times, they dispute leadership (and styles of leadership). More recently, in the 2012 municipal elections several (Rosario Carvajal, Yungay; Pepa Errázuriz, Ciudad Viva - Providencia; Patricio Herman, Defendamos la Ciudad) campaigned for political office, raising thorny issues of how to define and manage the border between citizen and the political worlds (CiudadViva 2012d).

Issues of quality, of knowledge-building, of skills and continuity become ever more pressing, as the ecology of citizen actors grows richer and more complex. The lack of a solid civic infrastructure threatens to undermine these efforts, causing collapse, perhaps particularly at those moments when they become most effective. In a hostile environment, there are many incentives for citizen groups to compete, rather than cooperate, and these conditions reinforce old patterns of clientism, which hold inequality in place, rather than challenging it.
Almost 40 years ago, Argyris and Schön recognized their work was “not only about action, but how to create action”, how to produce “rare events”. Living City and organizations like it are “rare events”, complex happenings that emerge as circumstances, times, people require and make possible. Just as humanity needs repetition and constancy, habit and pattern, it also needs this ability to generate modest, but escalating change, to adapt, and survive catastrophe.

**Complexity in planning**

As discussed (chapter 2), this research drew from considerable resources developed in recent decades as part of humanity’s search to understand aspects of our experience that are not adequately explained by traditional methods, particularly those based on simple, linear cause-and-effect formulations, which do not work well on complex adaptive systems. New discoveries began to reshape thinking in mathematics, physics, meteorology in the 1980s and 1990s, giving rise to significant discoveries as biology shifted from a focus on individual to systemic phenomena. These co-evolved with the growing power for calculation and simulation of computers. In the 1990s, we can see these ideas begin to filter into the social sciences, particularly thinking about networks and organizations. We see them expressed in efforts to apply fractal models to cities and to improve the modelling methods used in many planning instances, particularly transport (chapter 2).

Phelan underlines some vital differences between systems theory and complexity, noting the former’s focus on problem-solving, while the latter tends to be more open to exploratory approaches, a perspective shared by Byrne and Cilliers, among others. In the 2000s, these ideas have begun to percolate through thinking about cities. Influenced by their backgrounds in statistics (Byrne) and simulations (Portugali), urbanists began to think about cities as complex adaptive systems, and to explore the implications of this approach. As discussed in chapter 2, Byrne emphasizes that the idea behind this is not to throw out all previous social science understandings and methods, but rather to rethink them using this new prism. Indeed, many problems in city planning remain complicated and, as such, are susceptible to suitable solutions. Nonetheless, we increasingly recognize the need to distinguish between complicated problems that require relatively simple solutions (the engineering details of surfacing a cycle track, for example), and the “big messes” or “wicked problems”, characteristic of complex adaptive systems discussed in chapter 2. Above all, their unpredictability and the fact that the functioning of general rules is contingent on local conditions is crucial to any effort to address big messes.

Thus, in this case study, we see how treating traffic congestion as a complicated problem, which can be solved by building new highways, ignores the essentially complex nature of roads as
transportsheds, vital to movement and access, but also to the full exercise of social, political, economic and civic rights. These issues emerge with the citizen movement and institutions that arise in opposition to the first approach, and we see the planning system first challenged, and then at least the beginnings of significant change.

In this sense, thinking by Innes and Booher about planning with complexity illustrates the importance of participatory methods to grapple with and resolve problems as they emerge within complex adaptive systems. As Chettyparamb discusses, they use complexity primarily as a working metaphor, to enrich their analysis by expanding our view of important points of reference.

**Concepts from complexity for qualitative research**

In this study, I have used complexity in a similar fashion for analysis, but I believe I have taken it further, developing some significant tools for its application in qualitative research. Again, I agree with Byrne’s observation about building on and getting more out of traditional research methods, and for this reason, participatory action research and ethnography have also played an intrinsic, vital role in this research. Key concepts from complexity, discussed in more detail in chapter two, also proved useful in this sense.

Thus, I was able to move beyond the prevailing paradigm in Chile, which treats planning as a closed system that functions best when left to rational, technical experts, who attempt to achieve a balance between different forces, one that, in practice, tends to favour a powerful, closed elite (chapter 3). In contrast, using the concept of a living laboratory (Evans and Karvonen 2011), I could view these experiences as occurring in a messy, unsterile, real life environment, where citizens tried and tested, failed and in some cases succeeded, in their efforts to influence both city and planning systems.

This approach, particularly asymmetry as discussed by Cilliers (2005) and Byrne (2005) in chapter 2, offered insight into how seemingly powerless citizens were able to effectively challenge power and shift urban planning, even as they appeared to lose major battles. Indeed, complexity’s reading of asymmetry, rather than balance, as the intrinsic state of complex adaptive systems, provided considerable insight into the inner workings of network power (as theorized by Innes and Booher 2002). An initial reading from a more traditional stance, such as that applied when the highway conflict first emerged, strongly suggested that in post-Pinochet Chile, power relations were so unequal as to make it impossible for citizen groups to achieve any significant, systemic change. In contrast, in both phases we can see citizens catalyzing a kind of “butterfly effect”, as both the
Coordinadora and particularly Living City were able to navigate the uneven distribution of power, drawing in planners and other city staff, private actors (recyclers, small and medium-sized cycling retailers and the Patio Bellavista), to reconfigure existing power relations from within, effectively subverting, redirecting and innovating on some issues, with Bellavista and the cycling roundtable offering the clearest examples.

Similarly, insights from complexity shed new light on organizational structures, which in both the Coordinadora and Living City shifted constantly over the years examined in this study, and never really conformed to more traditional models, whether legally defined (non-profit corporation, under Chilean law), or by common practice (non-governmental organizations versus community-based organizations), particularly in Chile. I was therefore able to understand how the organization could constantly change shapes, as structures renewed themselves and yet remained through time. This was evident as the Coordinadora’s original leaders and founders gradually moved on with their lives, and new kinds of organizations and communities joined Living City. Complexity’s understanding of how structures are not fixed elements, but rather “the result of action in the system”, provided the insights that led me to define Living City primarily in terms of its role in storing, building and sharing “memory”, understood as both knowledge and capacity for (effective) action. Thus, I was also able to move from either/or questions, such as: is it a social movement or a formally constituted organization?, to see first a spectrum of characteristics and, finally, how interactions among those characteristics ultimately gave Living City its own specific nature.

Holling’s work on both ecological and social systems, meanwhile, emphasizes that the nature of complex adaptive does not arise from “random” associations, but rather from a few “controlling processes” (Holling 2001). Using this idea I was able to identify one-two and three-phase dynamics (which I have called “BOIDs”, after Reynolds’ experiments of the 1980s), which were crucial to driving the planning system into new ways of thinking-acting. While they don’t capture all the complexity in the system, and therefore its susceptibility to other kinds of change, I found several that helped to conceptualize and define crucial factors influencing both the emergence of these citizen initiatives and the new power relationships they were able to catalyze.

I do not see these tools as universal laws, but rather as useful rules that could be tested in diverse circumstances, to examine civil society/power-policy interactions in urban planning. Discussions with colleagues grappling with similar issues in Bogotá and Delhi (as mentioned under reflexivity as method, in chapter 2) suggest that this framework could be useful in other contexts besides the Santiago case for which it was developed.
The discussion of participation also suggests some ways that **participatory strategies can be measured against wider goals, rather than general checklists of activities**. Communications media are usually analyzed in terms of the ability to transmit information, but it is clear from this experience that, when applied as part of participatory processes, they also **pull in and hold actors’ attention, building commitment**. This reinforces and extends relationships, and may, in some circumstances, constitute the kind of memory discussed in this dissertation. This is in line with the formulation that a system has a memory, which is not located in a specific place, but rather distributed throughout (Innes and Booher 2010), making it both vulnerable and resilient, as was the case with Living City. This dissertation provides some clear examples of how participation can be strategic to generating new attitudes, friendly to more sustainable urban transport paradigms for example (chapters 3, 5 and 6), and offers some more detailed characteristics for analysis, to understand how different processes may vary or could be better structured according to their purposes (Appendix 11).

The use of **relational trees and forests** may seem redundant or even controversial, alongside the different methods for mapping networks, most of them quantitative (Wasserman and Faust 1994). However, by using the tools I derived from them, some of which are included in this dissertation, I was able to reference significant quantitative factors (for example numbers to evaluate the size of Living City’s communications weave), but still focus on the **qualitative factors** intrinsic to human beings, and therefore our systems, mentioned by Gunderson and Holling (chapter 2). Thus, sketching out a forest of relational trees (figure 6.7) brought to the fore spatial aspects of these relations, as they played out in formal meeting rooms, on streets, in public squares and public manifestations, and as the interactions within and between these different spaces could reinforce each other through methods such as Living City’s planning charrettes. Moreover, this brought out how these nested hierarchies (Gunderson and Holling 2002), communicate amongst each other across scales, interacting as information moves from local to global (the Coordinadora’s campaign drawing in environmental groups in the countries of origin of firms interested in bidding on the project), from neighbourhood to national (Bellavista’s ability to win ministerial support for the Pío Nono renovation), from local to national scales (the citizen’s agenda, developed by Living City but validated through a national network of local city organizations). Thus, I was able to complement the useful concepts of top-down, bottom-up power relationships, with the more nuanced idea that these may also work “from the middle out” (chapter 6).

These relational trees also brought out how these interactions are influenced by roles, identity and diversity, as experienced by neighbours, men or women, children and the elderly, street or market.
vendors, rational technical planners, and so on. They provide insight into how the one-two
dynamics described by Friedmann appear and disappear as information and emotion travel along
different paths through people’s diverse sensibilities, constituting the critique-action, continuity-
change, theorizing-building so important to his thinking about the good city (chapter 1). I believe
the dynamic nature of these forces has been well served by this complexity approach.

Future research

Perhaps the most exciting outcome of this approach is the potential for future research, based on
the ideas and methods developed here. As discussed elsewhere, both PAR and complexity offer an
interesting framework for exploring potential and even testing ways of catalyzing change in living
systems such as neighbourhoods, cities or the planning arrangements that help to shape them.

From complexity, the adaptive cycle (Gunderson and Holling 2002, discussed in chapter 2) traces
how exploitation drives a system through conservation, increasing rigidity, and finally collapse
(they call it “release”) and reorganization. This is a useful way of understanding how events may be
structured. In this case study, a violent coup marked the collapse of one system and its
reorganization within a violently different paradigm. In planning terms, the regime developed a
rational-technical approach that justified the exclusion of all but the most “expert”. This may have
yielded some benefits, but ultimately produced a city model where an increasingly rigid elite lives
in growing segregation, accumulating enormous profits at the expense of the majority of
neighbourhoods and citizens. By the late 1990s, this system was providing dwindling benefits, at
soaring costs. Although many urban planners and transport engineers could see the problems, an
automobility-centred paradigm became predominant and their voices were not heard.
Nonetheless, in effect, citizen groups became a strange attractor, able to reconfigure power
networks and pull the system toward a new planning perspective. Arguably, this drove it toward a
paradigmatic change, which contributed to the election, in 2012, of key mayors committed to
citizens’ National Agenda for Just, Sustainable and Inclusive Cities, originally developed by Living
City.

Altogether, this combination of participatory action research, in which those under study, lead and
contribute to every phase of the investigation, with some concepts from complexity, allows us to
identify key dynamics that could drive significant change in city systems, while still respecting the
demands arising from diversity, complexity and also ethics. From this perspective, I am particularly
intrigued by three interesting areas for future research.
The first is both theoretical and practical, addressing the gap in thinking about structure that Portugali notes in planning theory. This should involve further into the critical components of civic infrastructure, to reinforce citizens’ role in planning and innovation, in line with Bertolini’s thinking about evolutionary planning. It would therefore involve finding ways to enhance diversity and thus the options for responding well to disasters and unforeseen events. Moreover, complex adaptive systems underlie many of the “messy” problems, which respond poorly to “best practices” or rigid models. A complexity approach offers ways to deal with this more effectively by reminding us that, although many tools are similar across time and place, they must be adjusted to fit local conditions, capacities and values. Within complexity, the insights into resilience also offer intriguing possibilities for theoretical and practical application to the life cycles of civil society organizations. Certainly this case study illustrates moments when the stability of its leadership gave Living City the edge on survival amidst what seemed fatal collapse (2006, Bicivilizate campaign). Similarly, the capacity to change (2004, 2011) also clearly played a role in its survival, particularly the ability for founding leaders to move on and leave room for new kinds of leadership to address changing contexts. I have not gone into this in detail in this study, because I believe this inquiry would be best served by a comparative approach, looking at other civil society organizations in Santiago, particularly some of the most long lived, which have nonetheless experienced collapse after the change of government in 2010.

The second area for additional research arises from the potential to apply complexity thinking to urban transport systems. Thus, we could look at “BOIDs” to reinforce the positive aspects of self-management within existing traffic and transport systems: most regulations rely on users to apply them independently of coercion, with enforcement functioning primarily as reinforcement, applied to those who most severely break the rules. As we attempt to establish paths to good, just and livable cities, it will also be worthwhile to examine transport mode “ecologies”, looking at countries with the richest, most diverse mix of modes and examining how to reinforce their roles in providing door-to-door services (cycle or auto-rickshaws such as those widely available in Delhi, for example, and proposed by Cervero for the US). This approach would reveal richer ecologies in some developing countries, where low consumption patterns and low incomes have, of necessity, involved less reliance on cars, trains and buses. This approach could also shed light on how richer modal ecologies influence income distribution and concentration, and other factors.

The third, and perhaps most intriguing, area for future research, challenges us to develop a richer, more complex definition of sustainable transport itself. This would address the issues inherent in transportshed, raised here, and theorize the transport system as it interfaces with the city, rather
than in reference to itself and the productive needs of the economy, as occurs today. This also requires finding ways to distinguish between complicated and complex problems, and thereby matching them to more effective solutions. To date, for example, sustainable transport is typically defined in terms of energy consumption, and is often conflated with specific transport modes, particularly public transport based on trains and bus-based systems, complemented in many cases by growing interest in cycling’s potential as both a private and public (bikeshare) transport mode, and modal integration (Newman and Kenworthy 1999; Kenworthy 2006; Pardo 2006; Gilbert and Perl 2007; Kenworthy 2007; Newman, Beatley et al. 2009; Cox 2010; Schiller, Bruun et al. 2010; Robinson 2011). This focus, while very promising, continues to view the city from the perspective of, that is, from within the (existing) transport system.

What happens if we complement this approach by reversing our perspective, that is, looking at transport from the outside in, from the perspective of the city and living systems, rather than technology? How could the idea of transportsheds, for example, be applied to address “sustainable transport” from the perspective of the street fairs? Throughout Latin America, street fairs bring destinations to people, rather than people to destinations. Nonetheless, they are literally being driven off roads and out of public spaces by car-obsessed urban planning, “automobility” (Sheller and Urry 2000; Beckman 2001; Urry 2004). Public transport, so-called “sustainable” transport systems pay no attention to these kinds of temporary destinations or needs. Approaches based on economic requirements, particularly for balanced budgets or private profits, depending on operators, also ignore the reality that in developing cities like Santiago, getting more people off public transport is as necessary as discouraging car use, to generate a more sustainable urban transport system overall. To date, this very thorny issue is seldom addressed by sustainable transport definitions based primarily on mode/efficiency of energy consumption.

Moreover, like most of the transport system itself, “sustainable” transport solutions tend to show a bias toward production, rather than reproduction. In a segregated city such as Santiago, people typically cross the whole city to take their children to “better” schools in wealthier neighbourhoods, whether private or public (depending on family income). As with street fairs, reversing direction by bringing schools to neighbourhoods would facilitate more sustainable living options, particularly walking and cycling, with their close links to health. Similarly, primary health care models based on taking professionals to homes and neighbourhoods (on bikes and trikes), could significantly improve conversations about smoking, diets, and travel options, and therefore health results. Only some of these issues are addressed by combining land-use with transport planning.
Planners, wherever we are situated, need to generate rules that facilitate positive dynamics, sharing power and integrating citizens’ instincts, gifts and knowledge into the planning system. This is not just because these things are “good”, “ethical” or more “democratic”, but rather because they are necessary: as both the academics and the community leaders cited here agree, people only feel responsible to the extent that they exercise real power.
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Appendices

A1 Main arguments in favour of the Costanera Norte highway
A2 Main arguments against the Costanera Norte highway
A3 Living City Boards
A4 Living City Staff
A5 Main Activities of Living City
A6 Ashoka selection criteria
A7 Declaration of Urban Rights (2005)
A8 The Bicivilizate Campaign and Main Activities
A9 Tasks Pending, According to Government Memorandum (Bicivilizate)
A10 Tools for a Cycling-inclusive Santiago
A11 Three Key Questions about Strategic Participation
A12 Rethinking Resources (Self-Generation and Civic Infrastructure)
**Appendix A1: Main arguments in favour of the Costanera Norte freeway**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Main proponent</th>
<th>Other proponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure “deficit” threatened Santiago’s economic development</td>
<td>MOP concessions</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ assn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising car ownership and use threatened to &quot;collapse&quot; road system</td>
<td>MOP concessions</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ assn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving times would fall 40%</td>
<td>MOP concessions</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ assn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Included in two key planning instruments, the metropolitan plan (1960s,</td>
<td>MOP concessions</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ assn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratified in 1994) and the Transportation Master Plan (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The concession model would encourage private investment, thereby freeing up public funding for social needs.</td>
<td>MOP concessions</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ assn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition were selfish NIMBYs who opposed progress, modernization and the interests of the city overall</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project would bring economic benefits to poor communities on western edge of Santiago</td>
<td>Local mayors (Recoleta, Cerro Navia, Santiago, Pudahuel)</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A social benefit study (Ministry of Planning) had approved the project.*</td>
<td>MOP concessions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The flagship project would bring in much needed private investment, to the benefit of the city and the country overall, demonstrating Chile’s ability to overcome barriers that had left other countries’ goals mired in red tape, corruption and conflicts.</td>
<td>MOP concessions unit</td>
<td>Chilean builders’ association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Coordinadora struggled for years to get a copy of this study, finally managing to do so around 2002. Based on a method that valued professionals’ time more than others’ and that assumed design speeds and therefore shorter travel times, the study does not examine the projects many externalities. Nor does it consider project cost-benefits compared to other transport investments.

## Appendix A2: Main arguments against the project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Proponent</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing highways to resolve congestion, pollution and other urban transport problems had failed everywhere applied.</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Transport engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The highway would increase pollution, by increasing car use and diverting key investment away from public transport, cycling and other areas.</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Environmental, and other groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve transport the government should focus on improving public transit, cycling and walking conditions.</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Transport engineers and urbanists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The highway would seriously damage the San Cristobal Hill, Santiago’s largest park and its most important “green lung”</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Environmental and other groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1960 plan was for a road, not a major highway, and plans this old need to be updated before implementation</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Architects and urban planners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The highway would destroy the riverside, Santiago’s main natural feature</td>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The highway required expropriations that in effect give priority to transport for the wealthy over social housing for the poor.</td>
<td>Coordinadora</td>
<td>Some urban planners, communities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix A3: Living City boards, 2000-2011

### Living City's first, transitional board and membership, 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Coordinadora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sonia Abarca</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Vega Chica</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Olivares</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Ladrón de Guevara</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inés Wattine</td>
<td>Deputy treas.</td>
<td>Pedro de Valdivia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Sagaris</td>
<td>Communication (secretary)</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inés Fernández</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Acofer-Vega</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nury Gatica</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Pérgola Santa María</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicia Cid</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Independencia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domingo Pérez</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>Tirso de Molina</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Céline Désramé</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>Pedro de Valdivia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Inés Solimano</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Luis Moure</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>Pedro de Valdivia</td>
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### Living City Board, 2005

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lake Sagaris</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauricio Montecinos</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregorio Valdés</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Huechuraba</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Víctor Hidalgo</td>
<td>Deputy treasurer</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federico Allendes</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>ProBono, Chile Transparent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Elena Ducci</td>
<td>Deputy secretary</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Inés Solimano</td>
<td>Culture &amp; heritage</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricio Lanfranco</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nury Gatica</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Pérgola Santa María</td>
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### Living City Boards, 2006-2011

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<th>Origin</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lake Sagaris</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>former staff</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federico Allendes</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Nuñoa</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregorio Valdés</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Huechuraba</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricio Lanfranco</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Inés Solimano</td>
<td>Culture &amp; heritage</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Elena Ducci</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Vitacura</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lezak Shallat</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>La Reina</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Giesen</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Peñalolen</td>
<td>No</td>
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**Fourth Board, 2009-2011**
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<td>President</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>La Reina</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federico Allendes</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Nuñoa</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregorio Valdés</td>
<td>Deputy treas.</td>
<td>Huechuraba</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josefa Errázuriz</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricio Lanfranco</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Inés Solimano</td>
<td>Culture &amp; heritage</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lezak Shallat</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>La Reina</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Eduardo Donoso</td>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fifth Board, 2011-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Josefa Errázuriz</td>
<td>President, 2011</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodrigo Quijada</td>
<td>President, 2012</td>
<td>Former staff</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Eduardo Donoso</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viviane Castro</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Paine</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Inés Solimano</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofía López</td>
<td>Active transport</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>María Contreras</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Estación Central</td>
<td>Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto Rojas</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulina Ahumada</td>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Annual reports (Ciudad Viva, Memoria Anual, 2001-2010), website 2011. The green indicates new members.*
## Appendix A4: Living City Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro</td>
<td>Executive officer</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Biology degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Rodrigo Quijada</td>
<td>Transport project head</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>Transport engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Neftali Garrido</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Finishing high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Valeria Artigas</td>
<td>Designer</td>
<td>Venezuela/Chile</td>
<td>Designer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Armando Escoffier</td>
<td>Green Map</td>
<td>La Florida</td>
<td>Designer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Magda Morel</td>
<td>Active Transport</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>BFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carolina Muñoz</td>
<td>Active Transport</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>Master's urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loreto Rojas</td>
<td>Contents (GM)</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>Master's urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Eliana Bustamante</td>
<td>Children and senior maps</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Tomás Marín</td>
<td>Red Activa; communications</td>
<td>Nuñoa</td>
<td>Sociologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Magda Morel</td>
<td>Co-Exec. director</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>BFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tomás Marín</td>
<td>Co-Exec. director</td>
<td>Nuñoa</td>
<td>Sociologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fabiola Espíndola</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mery Guerrero</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Lo Espejo</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Magda Morel</td>
<td>Co-Exec. director</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>BFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tomás Marín</td>
<td>Co-Exec. director</td>
<td>Nuñoa</td>
<td>Sociologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tamara Ortega</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>La Pintana</td>
<td>Sociologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juan Pablo Frick</td>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Geographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diego Mallea</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Quinta Normal</td>
<td>Public admin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Magda Morel</td>
<td>Co-Exec. dir. (until August)</td>
<td>Providencia</td>
<td>BFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tomás Marín</td>
<td>Executive dir.</td>
<td>Nuñoa</td>
<td>Sociologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cristobal Donoso</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dalila Aguilera</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on the Memoria Anual for the respective year. Note that many of these posts were part-time or did not last throughout the year, as discussed in text.
### Appendix A5: Main Activities of Living City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Team leader</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Main results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td>Annual art auction</td>
<td>María Inés Solimano</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Volunteers, donations from artists</td>
<td>Funds to operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Citizen Transport agenda</td>
<td>Lake Sagaris, Isabel Pemjean</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>With support from Casa de la Paz, others</td>
<td>SECTRA responded with PTUS (Santiago Transport Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>GEF-STAP meeting</td>
<td>Lake Sagaris</td>
<td></td>
<td>ITDP-GEF</td>
<td>Participation in key international meeting, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>UN Environmental commission mtg</td>
<td>Patricio Lanfranco</td>
<td></td>
<td>ITDP</td>
<td>International experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Recycle: General</td>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro</td>
<td></td>
<td>FDLA</td>
<td>Award for Innovation in Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Recycle: Vega</td>
<td>Sonia Abarca</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volunteer participants and assistance from municipality</td>
<td>Recycling and training in hygiene, cooperation with firms and recyclers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Recycle: Pérsgola</td>
<td>Nury Gatica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recycling tins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Recycle: Bellavista</td>
<td>Lake Sagaris, M. Eliana Bustamante, Joan Morrison, Waleska Salinas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer participants</td>
<td>Recipe book and children’s recycling group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Muévete: General</td>
<td>Rodrigo Quijada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Academic skills and volunteers</td>
<td>Award for Innovation in Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Muévete: Vega</td>
<td>Sonia Abarca, Jorge Oliveses, Silvia Bastidas, Pedro Pino</td>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer participants and assistance from Metro, other local actors</td>
<td>Study and changes to local traffic management patterns, trucks, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Muévete: Pérsgola</td>
<td>Nury Gatica, Mabel Mena</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>Bellavista</td>
<td>Lake Sagaris, Patricio Jadue, Tomás Carajal, Sergio González, Carmen Silva</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Volunteers, municipalities, police, businesses, craftspeople.</td>
<td>Charrette Pio Nono, concensus and support from Recoleta/Providencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Peñalosa en Chile: seminar at ECLAC</td>
<td>Patricio Lanfranco</td>
<td></td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>More than 200 participants, from CSOs, municipalities and national authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>World Bank transport policy event, ECLAC</td>
<td>Lake Sagaris</td>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>Reinforced contacts with transport engineers, SECTRA responded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own elaboration based on the Memoria Anual for the respective year. Note that many of these posts were part-time or did not last throughout the year, as discussed in text. Phases coincide with board periods, previous table.*
Appendix A6: Ashoka selection criteria

Ashoka looks for:

1. **The “knockout test”:** a new idea that will “change the pattern in a field, be it human rights, the environment, or any other. We evaluate the idea historically and against its contemporaries in the field, looking for innovation and real change potential.”

2. **Creativity** in leaders, who act as “goal-setting visionaries and as problem solvers capable of engineering their visions into reality. Creativity is not a quality that suddenly appears—it is almost always apparent from youth onward.”

3. **Entrepreneurial ability,** embodied in “leaders who see opportunities for change and innovation and devote themselves entirely to making that change happen. These leaders often have little interest in anything beyond their mission, and they are willing to spend the next ten to fifteen years making a historical development take place. This total absorption is critical... Ashoka is looking for the Andrew Carnegies, Henry Fords, and Steve Jobses of the citizen sector.”

4. **Social impact,** “Ashoka is only interested in ideas that it believes will change the field significantly and that will trigger nationwide impact or, for smaller countries, broader regional change.”

5. **Ethical fiber,** because “Social entrepreneurs introducing major structural changes to society have to ask a lot of people to change how they do things. If the entrepreneur is not trusted, the likelihood of success is significantly reduced. Ashoka asks every participant in the selection process to evaluate candidates for these qualities rigorously. To do so often requires one to resort to instinct and gut feelings, not just rational analysis. The essential question is: ‘Do you trust this person absolutely?’ If there is any doubt, a candidate will not pass” ([http://www.ashoka.org/support/criteria](http://www.ashoka.org/support/criteria), accessed 9-December-2011).
Appendix A7: Declaration of Urban Rights (2005)

On 16 November 2005, the newly formed Coordinadora de Derechos Urbanos linked representative democracy directly with citizen participation, as a means of improving institutions and processes. On this basis, the declaration stated its claim that every person has a right to:

- Remain in the same neighbourhood, sector, or comuna, when urban interventions occur;
- Citizen participation in the design, development, application and management of urban policies and interventions;
- Enjoy beautiful, accessible and safe public spaces, available for social encounters;
- Access to public information on the design, development, management and application of public policies and urban interventions;
- Move around safely and without obstacles;
- Access to community, commercial, cultural, municipal and other equipment (schools, parks, squares, health facilities, etc.);
- Live and develop in an environment that respects its urban, social, cultural and natural elements. This right includes the obligation to weigh and suitably priorize social, cultural and environmental costs and benefits within any project or regulation;
- Spatial closeness to urban facilities, services and infrastructure;
- Urban beauty;
- Participatory and socially integrated social housing;
- Neighbourhood identity (CoordinadoraDDHH 2005), my translation).
### Appendix A8: The Bicivilízate Campaign and Main activities (2005-2006)

**Bicivilízate team, 2005-2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo González</td>
<td>Team leader</td>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>Arriba e la Chancha</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesvina Policardo</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Casa de la Paz</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winko Franz</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Casa de la Paz</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Sagaris</td>
<td>Project head</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Ciudad Viva</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Vásquez</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Arriba e la Chancha</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatella Fuccaro</td>
<td>Executive dir.</td>
<td>Half-time</td>
<td>Ciudad Viva</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Campaign support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paulina Marfull</td>
<td>Public relations</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Casa de la Paz</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arturo Arriagada</td>
<td>Social marketing</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Casa de la Paz Tank</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonzalo Stierling</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>CicloRecreoVía</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lina Zuluaga</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>CicloRecreoVía</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolina Moren</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Arriba e la Chancha</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Logistical support (beyond the campaign)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neftalí Garrido</td>
<td>Assistant producer</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>CasaBella</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariana Huerta</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Ciudad Viva</td>
<td>Architect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valeria Artigas</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ciudad Viva</td>
<td>Designer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresita González</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Ciudad Viva</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Bicivilízate activities, Oct.-Dec. 2005 (as per Activities Plan approved September 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Other observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International seminar</td>
<td>2 November</td>
<td>100 participants, panelists from Bogotá, Quito, Lima, Toronto, Florianópolis, Chilean transport authorities, health authorities, civil society representatives. Associated activities: Cyclón (1 November), support with media; Intensive training seminar (3 November).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-tracción humana event, Pío Nono</td>
<td>18 December</td>
<td>Reduced to one Sunday instead of two, held post-election day, making election-centred (cycle to vote) campaign impossible. 5,000 Voz/Bicivilízate distributed; participation of cyclists, pedestrians, cycle rides from Nuñoa, Lastarria, Plaza Brasil, Pío Nono.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with municipalities</td>
<td>October, seminar</td>
<td>Santiago, Nuñoa, Providencia among others participated in seminar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with media</td>
<td>Throughout, as planned</td>
<td>Within limits imposed by the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic network development</td>
<td>First stage.</td>
<td>Created electronic network with sign-up via web page, functioned from November 2005 to February 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools-universities</td>
<td>Previous to seminar.</td>
<td>Initial contacts to invite to seminar, Preparation of materials, contacts with authorities, November 05-January 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participatory council</strong></td>
<td><strong>Post-seminar</strong></td>
<td>Seminar, training workshop, assembly and weekly meetings to present campaign to different groups and activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Films</strong></td>
<td><strong>Post-seminar</strong></td>
<td>Ideas shifted each time we met with government, so we prepared a visual registry, with scenes from the seminar and the Cyclón, and a 4-minute short on the Cyclón, with post-production starting on an 8-minute feature on the seminar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Let's vote by bike</strong></td>
<td><strong>11 Dec.</strong></td>
<td>Suspended, until after the election, making this activity impossible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contacts with companies</strong></td>
<td><strong>Prior to A-tracción humana</strong></td>
<td>Contacts were made with restaurants, cafés, and other institutions involved in the A-tracción humana event. Oxford, Chile’s only bicycle producer, was also contacted and joined the campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermodal trips</strong></td>
<td><strong>First stage.</strong></td>
<td>An activity involving leafleting Metro stations was postponed until a more detailed study and plan was available, as agreed on in meeting between Sagaris, Julio Urzúa and Silvio Albarrán (transport officials).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparation Manual for Cyclists</strong></td>
<td><strong>First stage:</strong> outline to be prepared; next stage, publication.</td>
<td>During the first week of January, a proposed outline was presented to Conaset, and initial draft texts were prepared, pending approval of the outline, which was not forthcoming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Web site</strong></td>
<td><strong>October-November</strong></td>
<td>An initial version was launched, including information from the international seminar, including presentations, photos, etc. Additional sections added as detailed in report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bicivilicemos la comuna manual</strong></td>
<td><strong>Programmed for phase II</strong></td>
<td>Rodrigo Quijada, transport engineer, prepared first outline in January 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cycling map of Santiago</strong></td>
<td><strong>December 2005</strong></td>
<td>A special summer issue of the Pig/Bicivilízate publication was published with this material November-December 2005 and 5,000 copies distributed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CD Bicivilízate</strong></td>
<td><strong>November 2005</strong></td>
<td>Prepared and included in press kit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bicivilízate notebook</strong></td>
<td><strong>November 2005</strong></td>
<td>Prepared and included in press kit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summer activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>January-February 2006</strong></td>
<td>Completed, with some delays, included stands and delivery of materials, activities were completed with number of stands doubled during February. Preparation of work with schools and companies: suspended when government objected to second report. Evaluation and planning continued through February-April, due to government’s rejection of second report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International women’s day</strong></td>
<td><strong>6-8 March 2006</strong></td>
<td>Special issue of PigNews/Bicivilízate prepared. Support provided to new women’s group, Macletas, to develop their own materials and stand. Relevant information added to web page.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review of reports and plans</strong></td>
<td><strong>March-April 2006</strong></td>
<td>Completed, according to requests and objections from government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presswork</strong></td>
<td><strong>October-January 2006</strong></td>
<td>See report 2 for more details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community communications</strong></td>
<td><strong>October-January 2006</strong></td>
<td>Two radio programs per month, from September 2005-January 2006. Issues 1,2,3 and 4 (March, Women) of the separata PigNews/Bicivilízate published; additional articles in La Voz, according to planning in original proposal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own elaboration, based on Final Report Bicivilízate (2006).*
### Appendix A9: Tasks Pending, According to Government Memorandum (Bicivilízate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Observation, Living City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School banner</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>This product does not exist in any campaign document, report or activities list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban cyclists’ manual</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>Only proposed outline due in phase 1 (delivered).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal team</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Contacts made as indicated in report 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s team</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Established, as indicated in report 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentary, seminar</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>The seminar was 2 November: how can we produce the documentary on this event before it has taken place?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website launch</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Report 2 covers this. Initial website implemented, to be built up as campaign progresses, with official launch to take place on a date to be agreed upon with the government, as stipulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 short films</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Report 2 covers this. Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outings</td>
<td>Summer 2005-2006</td>
<td>This product does not exist in any campaign document, report or activities list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followup seminar contacts</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Completed as planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation schools</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Making progress, but some delay due to government withdrawing its approval of campaign graphics, which had to be redone in October and November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion website</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training sessions</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Completed with international experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with NGOs</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Initial phase completed through seminar activities and followup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalogue of educational material available</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Despite efforts to develop, there is very little material available in Chile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermodal trips, distribution of information on Metro stations</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Study completed with proposed strategy for modal integration. Distribution of information in phase 1 premature, since no program exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with companies</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Completed as per plan Phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary health centres</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies: local group</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Completed as part of Pío Nono A-Tracción Humana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of cyclists’ manual</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle parking installed</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>This product does not exist in any campaign document, report or activities list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling to work in city government</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td>Not scheduled for phase 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling to work</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling to school</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal newsletter</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External newsletter</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety plan</td>
<td>No date indicated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration, based on summary of observations in government memo, 15 March 2006 and Living City’s response.
Appendix A10: Tools for a Cycling-inclusive Santiago, developed during the I-CE-Living City-GORE process

The I-CE GORE training sessions: The foundation of the three-year process for cooperation was the annual work visit from an I-CE delegation of two or three people. Headed by Tom Godefrooij, an architect and former researcher for the Dutch cyclists’ union, it also included Jeroen Buis, our “Zen engineer”, a nickname we gave him because his presentations, typically based on photos and a series of mild but maddeningly insistent questions, could hold the audience enthralled for hours, well after sessions were supposed to end. These usually took two days of the 10-day visits, leaving time for intense workshops with three municipalities, cycle rides and evaluations, and meetings with the manual working group and others. In 2009, an I-CE delegation spent several days in the southern city of Concepción, speaking on tin civil society and cycling-inclusive training at a seminar organized by the university, consultants, and SECTRA.

A Plenary for the Process: The design of the Roundtable took advantage of the government’s proclaimed interest in fostering citizen participation. President Bachelet had declared hers to be a “citizen government” and instructed all ministries and government departments to develop and implement clear procedures for participation. In 2008, during CUCH meetings with Cristián Navas, a staff person in the studies department of the undersecretariat of transport whose responsibilities included cycling, the issue of participation in cycling and the master plan had arisen. We (CUCH) offered to design a participatory process, and the Roundtable, with detailed terms of reference emerged, in time for inauguration during the annual I-CE visit. The 12-page terms of reference (UCH 2008) specified goals, coordination (Subtrans, CUCH, GORE, with support from I-CE), who would participate and how meetings would be run (jointly by one citizen and one government representative), minutes prepared, and a methodology for the work to be undertaken. In essence, they defined the Roundtable as a kind of plenary, with four commissions, to be co-coordinated by one civil society organization and one governmental representative.

Rules: Typically 50-90 people from government, private sector\(^6\) and diverse civil society organizations participated in the Roundtable meetings. Presentations followed a general order of civil society presenters, followed by government responses, a complete reversal of previous and contemporary procedures. Moreover, as work progressed the right to present became directly linked to participation in specific subgroups and activities. Anyone present could question or speak briefly on the topics that arose or make their own announcements. There were time constraints, as with any meeting, but coordinators ensured there was always time for a good round of opinions from participants, and presenters were not allowed to reply to each point as it was made, but instead were allowed to make a brief closing. This linking of the right to present to specific working spaces associated with the Roundtable (the design working group, the Metro’s cycle parking initiative, the women’s cycling school or gender studies) helped to prevent “capture” of the participatory process by a voluble individual or group, bent on making the same rigid speech at every opportunity, a pattern we had observed at other “participatory” meetings, while the care taken to preserve time for participants ensured there was an even distribution of opinions. Anyone who hadn’t spoken took priority over those who had previously spoken.

Collective Objective-Setting: For the Santiago Cycling Master Plan commission, we used a Dutch matrix for a collective exercise to define the objectives and strategy for the Santiago Master Plan commission. The strategic objective defined why the plan was being undertaken: “to achieve substantial improvements in the quality of life of all Santiaguinos, through the full integration of the bicycle as a means of transportation, recreation, socialization...” The tactical objectives, meanwhile, specified how we would go about this: 1. A strategic plan for modal integration in Metropolitan Santiago; 2. A Cycling Master Plan based on routes and not only segregated cycle ways; and 3. Citizen and government participation in the plan, that should include resources to support participation. The identification of diverse tactical objectives meant that if progress on one became blocked for political or other reasons, it could still advance on other fronts. The operating

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\(^6\) Consultants working on cycling design participated, as did Bicicletas Oxford and Phara 4 (cycle parking), usually on a regular basis. Chilectra (electrical distribution), a carpark concession firm, and other companies also attended, however, depending on the topic.
objectives, meanwhile, defined specific activities to be undertaken to achieve the central goal, including infrastructure, studies, coordination, field visits and other activities.

**Identifying and Priorizing Key Actors:** Similarly, another Dutch matrix proved useful. As part of the I-CE/GORE/Living City agreement, a working group to adapt the Dutch manual (CROW 2010) functioned with regular meetings during 2007-2009. The manual working group (15-25 people per meeting) consisted of representatives from different government bodies, Transantiago, Conaset (the transit safety commission, usually represented by someone other than Garrido at these meetings), municipal governments, cycling and neighbourhood groups, among others. Early on, at the insistence of planning staff from Recoleta, who were active participants in all these initiatives, the group used another Dutch matrix to identify key players in the Santiago environment, and where they stood on the issue of cycling-inclusive city planning.

**Participatory mapping and action research:** As discussed under methods (chapter 2), there are many versions of participatory action research (PAR), often based on the idea of academics engaging a specific community in a joint venture to identify and mobilize knowledge within its boundaries, whether territorial or theoretical. I had read about them as part of preparing my field research and when it became clear that we needed to present the Santiago Cycling Master Plan and collect as much information -- evaluations, critiques, proposals -- as possible. With no additional resources, our Active Transport Centre team seized on the idea, designing a process that relied on volunteer participation from highly committed individuals in municipal governments and local cycling groups, supplemented by a detailed questionnaire available for response on-line or in person. We were aware that this would not cover the whole city evenly, but we reasoned that this would provide essential data for those areas with the most interest.

**Traditional pressure tactics:** As a group, Ciclistas Unidos de Chile was primarily interested in fostering activities that would get people onto their bikes and trikes. Thus, CicloRecreoVías struggled for years to convince municipal and other authorities to organize car-free streets on Sundays, achieving major progress in the upscale La Reina, popular Lo Prado and other areas, despite the harassment described in the previous chapter and other obstacles. Similarly, the Festival Bicicultura, which later became a centre as well as an event, organized seminars, presentations, massive cycling festivals and displays, as well as a “Bicycle Pact”, which over the years accumulated more than 40,000 signatures.

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63 Indeed, in many ways the planners from Recoleta and to some degree Providencia became star partners in Living City’s processes, as we worked closely with them on cycling, but also on Bellavista and some citizen participation initiatives too.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REQUISITO</th>
<th>LAS MEJORES</th>
<th>PTJE</th>
<th>LAS PEORES</th>
<th>PTJE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEGURA</strong></td>
<td>Isabel la Católica (Las Condes) 3,9</td>
<td>Rosas (Santiago) 2,3</td>
<td>Pajaritos (E. Central) 2,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pocuro (Providencia) 3,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parque Bustamante (Providencia) 3,7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIRECTA</strong></td>
<td>5 de Abril (Estación Central) 4,4</td>
<td>Dublé Almeida (Nuñoa) 2,3</td>
<td>Doctor Johow (Nuñoa) 2,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isabel la Católica (Las Condes) 4,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curicó/Tarapacá (Santiago) 4,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CÓMODA</strong></td>
<td>Isabel La Católica (Las Condes) 4,1</td>
<td>Vícuña Mackenna (La Florida) 1,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 de Abril (Estación Central) 4</td>
<td>Dublé Almeida (Nuñoa) 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vespucio (Vitacura) 3,5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alameda (Santiago) 2,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ATRACTIVA</strong></td>
<td>Pocuro (Providencia) 4,3</td>
<td>Curicó/Tarapacá (Santiago) 1,8</td>
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<td>Parque Bustamante (Providencia) 4,2</td>
<td>Vícuña Mackenna (La Florida) 1,9</td>
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<td>Pajaritos (E. Central) 2,2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COHERENTE</strong></td>
<td>Isabel La Católica (Las Condes) 4,2</td>
<td>Dublé Almeida (Nuñoa) 1,9</td>
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<td>Alameda (Santiago) 2,1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vespucio (Vitacura) 3,7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Doctor Johow (Nuñoa) 2,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A11: Three key questions about Strategic Participation

From the perspective of this dissertation, more than a list of activities or a method, participation is a strategic space where different kinds of people can meet, deliberate, plan, implement, criticize, evaluate, change. Building a more robust civil society, which in turn can accelerate the democratization of an excluding society and make cities better, more just and liveable, requires a complex, multiscalar approach, one that focuses on generating a stronger, more robust, and diverse ecology of civil society actors. Participation, then, plays a crucial role in the quality of civil society available to society at large to perform the different functions summarized by Najam (chapter 1).

Participation as site can be located in many places and scales: the local neighbourhood, the regional government, the streetshed as a whole. It can cover a specific or several nested issues and it can perform a wide variety of functions. What is important about participation will also vary according to these factors. Nonetheless, we can now identify a series of characteristics that can be useful to analyse the participation as it contributes to the quality of results and particularly civic infrastructure, which essentially makes those results ongoing over time.

Since 2003 and as articulated in a formal policy document in 2012, Living City itself has defined citizen participation as “the day-to-day practice of democracy” and a human right, whose purpose is to build consensus and ensure that those affected genuinely “own” the project or process. It involves a “transformative debate” that builds agreement and appropriation by people. It should occur “in every stage of the process” (Quijada and Sagaris 2012).

Most participatory approaches start from specific tools and procedures. These remain relevant in a strategic approach, but must be shaped and organized according to the purpose of the process, and the understanding that, in a complex environment, these tools will probably not work exactly as planned. Special attention should be paid to exceptions and “abnormalities”, as they are likely to suggest ways in which the process can be enriched. With regard to strategic participation, this study suggests three central questions useful to shape future research, but also to define and evaluate the usefulness of specific participatory processes or structures, in building civic infrastructure. These concern the definitions necessary to: (i) define and evaluate the “health” or “quality” of civil society and the institutional environment; (ii) evaluate participatory spaces as they may enhance (or limit) civil society and the institutional environment; and (iii) ways of effectively addressing the issue of resources, particularly in hostile or unstable environments, where democratization may be a goal, but authoritarian procedures remain the rule, and development funding reflects funders’ priorities and their shifting interests in today’s world.

(i) How do we evaluate the “health” or “quality” of civil society and the institutional environment?

Najam and Avritzer (row 1, column 1, table A11.1), for example, discuss civil society from the perspective of weakness or strength, which is also related to whether political authorities support or oppose civil society involvement in formal planning processes. But how processes contribute to civil society organization, rather than individual involvement, is also relevant. Thus, we see Moyer (row 1, column 2) focusing on the inner workings of social movements, which often start from anti-planning stances, and Tarrow comparing the different natures of social movements and citizen institutions. Thomson (row 1, column 3), meanwhile, encourages us to look at structural issues, and how they enable or limit the citizen organization’s interactions with its own membership and the political sphere. This dissertation, meanwhile, suggests the importance of identifying policies that can support and enhance the development of self-generated organizations (row 1, column 4), able to contribute significantly to the strategic conviction (as Healey puts it) that makes positive behaviour habitual, and therefore reinforces self-managing tendencies within the system, instead of requiring constant renewal, through repression, incentives or a combination of the two. One approach helps us to enhance self-managing factors in the desired direction, while the other may neutralize or even crush them.

Similarly, the questions we ask about who is invisible and who holds power (middle rows, table 7.11), in terms of both internal procedures and who “owns” results, will highlight who assumes responsibility for
decisions. Again, this can make the difference between building and/or reinforcing an effective self-managing system, versus one requiring constant stimuli or control.

Table A11.1 Qualitative Analysis: Civil Society and the Institutional Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Categories used to evaluate interactions (by others, yellow) this case study (green)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Strong or weak (Najam, Avritzer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social movement (Moyers) or citizen institution (Tarrow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural: core, outreach (Thomson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial or thematic, self-generated, wild, citizen institution, single or diverse focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Political authorities pro or contra (Avritzer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional or informal practices (De Jong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual issue- or institution-specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-cutting, integral, multifaceted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is invisible?</td>
<td>Private sector: all or some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Academics and/or consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excluded social groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society “not directly involved”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who holds power within the process</td>
<td>Who runs it: know-how within team or improvised? (Boonstra &amp; Boelens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who controls it: government, citizens, or mix (Boonstra &amp; Boelens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who participates - individuals or organizations, one-off, short-term, ongoing systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who decides: Legally required, binding or “advisory”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who own the process</td>
<td>One (powerful) actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several (powerful) actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| What roles are offered to participants? | Passive (invitee, consumer, “learner”)                                                                                                               |
|                                         | Active individual (letter writer, commentator, etc.)                                                                                           |
|                                         | Gatekeeper                                                                                                                                   |
|                                         | Representative answering to organization(s)                                                                                                    |
| Is the whole person involved or only specific aspects? | Rational only (uni-dimensional)                                                                                                                    |
|                                         | Rational-physical (two-dimensional)                                                                                                            |
|                                         | Integrative: rational, physical, emotional, spiritual (multi-dimensional, complete)                                                             |
|                                         | Other dimensions alone or in incomplete combinations (multi-dimensional, not complete)                                                            |
| What self-image is offered to participants? | Victim or passive recipient                                                                                                                      |
|                                         | Survivor or mere provider of information                                                                                                        |
|                                         | Protagonist, creator and implementor                                                                                                            |
|                                         | Partners                                                                                                                                     |
| What collective image is available to participants? | Alone, individualistic, risk of citizenship as consumption                                                                                      |
|                                         | “We”, collective, potential for diversity, citizenship as agency                                                                               |

Source: Own elaboration, using concepts from Najam, Avritzer, Moyers, Thomson, De Jong, and observations based on this case study.

The last two questions in the table are often assumed or only implicit to participatory processes, but they are fundamental to the personal and social imaginary which organizes and gives meaning to any participatory process. They also influence how transformative involvement can be, at the individual level, but also in collective terms, which in turn deeply influences the longevity of change, in that organizational and institutional involvement generates longterm memory, as discussed in previous chapters.

By measuring the spectrums inherent in some of these categories, we can establish indicators for measuring some aspects of participatory processes (Appendix 7B).

(ii) How do we evaluate participatory spaces as they may enhance civil society and the institutional environment?
As mentioned in the previous section, more than a series of activities or methods, participation is a site for interactions crucial to building a civic infrastructure capable of nourishing healthy planning environments, with diverse civil society ecologies. Can we, then, define goals and evaluate them with regard to the quality of participatory spaces in this regard? Table A11.2 summarizes work by key authors, adding observations from this case study to examine the quality of communication fostered by different participatory spaces (advisory panels, consultative processes, ongoing citizen representation, citizen-government roundtables or working groups, and so on). We can pay particular attention to how they influence the quality of deliberation, interactions among members or between members and other groups, and their timing (one-off as for a project, for example, or long-term, for developing and implementing policies). The framing of relationships, whether egalitarian or paternalistic, conflict- or cooperation-driven, is also relevant, as is the direction of power, and the different measures that can be brought to bear for analysis.

| Table A11.2 Qualitative Analysis: Participatory Spaces as they Contribute to Civic Infrastructure |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| What...                                      | (Categories used by others - yellow or suggested by this case study - green) |
| ...kind of communication                     | One-way                                       | Two-way                                       | Debate                                        |
| conditions for deliberation                  | Diversity (Innes and Booher)                  | Interdependence (Innes and Booher)            | Authentic dialogue (Innes and Booher)         |
| kind of interactions                         | Excluding (of the external)                   | Bonding (internal dynamic)                    | Bridging (internal or external)               |
| role: tactical or strategic                  | One-off or short-term project-related process  |
| degree of citizenship learning               | Single-loop, one task or issue only (Argyris and Schon) |
| type of practice                             | Paternalism, usually in formal spaces (Susskind et al.) |
| kind of power arrangement                    | Bottom-up (Avritzer)                          | Power-sharing (Avritzer)                      | Ratification (Avritzer)                       |
| kind of measures                             | Armitz’s ladder (process quality, power)      | Susskind: paternalism, conflict, co-production (process quality, power) |
| outcomes and impacts on city systems and planning systems |

Source: own elaboration, based on sources mentioned, including Putnam, applied to types of interaction within participatory processes; Argyris and Schon, Scharmer, types of learning applied to citizenship skills.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A11.3 Qualitative Analysis: Participation and Time Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When In the policy cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When How much of the policy cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Usually issue-related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arentz: espacios públicos de concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Public space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration, based on sources mentioned.
When, in the policy cycle and the time of day (“citizen” hours versus “professional” hours), also becomes relevant, as does where, particularly circumstances that allow both formal and non-formal conversations, in friendly environments (table A11.3).

(iii) How can we effectively address the issue of resources, particularly in hostile or unstable environments?

How resources are distributed across the participatory process (or institutions, or activities) plays a major role in determining how effectively civic infrastructure allows civil society actors to accumulate the necessary knowledge, skills and other abilities for their particular environment. We must, however, remember the butterfly effect: small resources but strong wills can counteract the most “powerful” of ministries (Chile’s MOP, in the case of the Coordinadora) or mobilize effectively for the most excluded transport mode (the Santiago Cycling master plan initiative).

Rethinking resources as they influence actors’ involvement in planning and city systems is, then, a significant part of theorizing planning structure, as proposed by Portugali. Based on a more detailed analysis of the past, present and future resources developed by the Coordinadora and Living City, this section suggests ways of rethinking participation as it influences resource distribution to civil society organizations. As with building more cycling-inclusive cities, it is important to mobilize two crucial strategies for developing civic infrastructure: redistributing existing resources and providing new resources where existing resources are insufficient. Thus, redistributing existing resources should involve recognizing functions, such as neighbourhood management or enforcement of local planning codes, as requiring the involvement of local civil society, particularly neighbourhood associations. This could involve something as simple as locating the salaries for some municipal inspectors within juntas de vecinos, or associations of juntas de vecinos, to improve the effectiveness of those fulfilling this role and the transparency of the process. By encouraging associativity -- among neighbourhood associations and other bodies, or among municipal governments, or diverse actors relevant to this function -- resources can be used more effectively, while incompetency or opportunities for corruption become more limited, by enhancing transparency through the inclusion of additional actors with different paths for accountability.

Reallocating funds away from purchasing consulting services toward investing in civic capacity can also provide substantial resources for civil society development. This could involve restructuring relations, by providing resources to encourage neighbourhood associations to hire expert advice from a recognized list of professionals or groups. Similarly, employing civil society organizations to lead, facilitate or train for participatory processes would also build more lasting civic infrastructure than the current practice of hiring consultants, whose skills, relationships and knowledge do not remain available once a given process ends.

Providing new resources may be a challenge in many conditions, but simply building civil society-enhancing elements into existing systems could contribute significantly. When companies enter an environmental impact assessment, for example, they typically hire a wide variety of expertise to produce the relevant documents and studies. Incorporating a fixed percentage into project costs could generate sufficient funds for a kind of citizen participation that, again, would invest in organizational and community capacity, rather than stripping communities of crucial resources, by requiring leaders and members to work long, often frustrating hours, for free, with little respect and no guarantees their contribution will influence final results. To avoid distortions, and particularly clientelism, this requires the creation of independent bodies to manage and distribute these funds, and diverse mechanisms for encouraging their use. Finally, changing existing rules to facilitate social enterprises, cooperatives, and other revenue-generating approaches available to civil society groups is also important. Understanding that it is not how funds are generated, but rather how earnings are distributed, that marks the difference between a private and a social undertaking, needs to be built.

Many of these shifts require that society as a whole assign real value to civil society’s contributions, paying for some components of “services”, that are now demanded, for free, as part of participatory processes. While institutional arrangements can play a significant role, they themselves reflect these collective values. This makes it essential to focus not on the “magic bullet”, one-size-fits all solutions, but rather on driving the
dynamics portrayed by the BOID toward more civil-society-friendly arrangements all round. This discussion suggests that the concept of civic infrastructure, particularly in democratizing countries in the developing world, can be useful to understanding how to draw in the active citizens in any given population, catalyzing their abilities and interests, and developing them in a way that can favour both democratization and more sustainable (just, liveable, good) cities. It also, as Fainstein and Harvey discuss (chapter 1), points to processes that are both universal in some of their components, and unique in terms of which components are used, and the priorities assigned them -- and their results -- in the context of each local urban culture.

A single case study does not “prove” that these are essential ingredients to any attempt to address the global challenges facing humanity today. But, I would argue, this case study does reveal how significant active citizen planners can be in addressing these issues, and how fundamentally local many of the debates, and the solutions, must be, as they are ultimately embedded in ways of living together and with our environments that are profoundly immediate, local experiences.

This discussion also suggests that participatory institutions and spaces can significantly contribute to improving local civic infrastructure. It suggests that redistributing resources to incorporate active citizenship into global initiatives for more sustainable living and transport systems could constitute a highly worthwhile investment. Investing in citizen coordination rather than consultants, for example, could go a long way to building better processes and a healthier ecology of actors. While providing detailed comparisons is beyond the scope of my research, I have certainly found equivalent citizen initiatives in many cities during my travels. Often, these had received significant support from global networks such as I-CE, Ashoka or Synergos. The skills and capacities produced by double-loop (Argyris and Schön 1974; Healey 2006) and deep learning (Scharmer 2009) were evident in most of these groups.
Appendix A12: Rethinking Resources (Self-Generation and Civic Infrastructure)

Rethinking resources

Participatory processes mobilize human, spatial, knowledge and other resources for the common good, through the development of specific skills, particularly citizenship learning and consensus-building among planners from the different spheres, interactions and ongoing relationships, based primarily on trust, diversity and interdependence. The more complex the planning situation, the more it requires, and to some degree should contribute to building, organizations able to accumulate skills, credibility, contacts, and so on. Aside from participation, then, how resources are distributed across the participatory process (or institutions, or activities) will, to some extent, determine how deep and how lasting the results achieved. Note, however, the butterfly effect: small resources but strong wills can counteract the most “powerful” of ministries (Chile’s MOP, in the case of the Coordinadora) or mobilize for the most excluded transport mode (the Santiago Cycling master plan initiative).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget US$</th>
<th>Main projects</th>
<th>Main funders</th>
<th>Staff* (fulltime equivalents)</th>
<th>Main partners/volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Getting started; Citizens’ Transport Agenda</td>
<td>Self-financed</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Coordinadora members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>16,529</td>
<td>Reciclar para vivir mejor</td>
<td>Fondo de las Américas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bellavista JV#13 Mario Baeza, Vega Chica, Pérula Santa María</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>51,980</td>
<td>Múevete para tu ciudad</td>
<td>UNDP-GEF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>78,968</td>
<td>Por una ciudad viva</td>
<td>Avina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Above, plus Arriba e’la Chancha, Casa de la Paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>54,996</td>
<td>Por una CV/Bicivilízate</td>
<td>Avina, GEF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Above, plus Junta de Vecinos #13 &amp; 35, Bellavista, Artists and firms in Bellavista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>133,246</td>
<td>Charrette Bellavista, Guía de Cultura de La Chimba</td>
<td>Avina, GEF, DOS, Cultura</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>60,542</td>
<td>Por una CV/Bicivilízate</td>
<td>Natura, I-CE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Diverse (Green Map), Centro Bicicultura, Macletas, YMCA cyclists, VelóStgo, Ciclistas UCentral, CicloRecreovía, Club Burunú (CUCH), Municipalities Providencia, Recoleta, Maipú, others; Conaset, Transantiago, Subsecre Transporte, GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>58,260</td>
<td>Stgo Green Map, Active Transport Centre</td>
<td>Natura, I-CE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>46,488</td>
<td>Active Transport Centre, RedActiva Sustran LAC</td>
<td>I-CE, ITDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>72,199</td>
<td>Ciudadanía Activa, Transparencia Municipal</td>
<td>EU, OSI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>125,671</td>
<td>EUAvina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>231,600</td>
<td>EUAvina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Fulltime equivalents, plus external accounting assistance.

Resources, nonetheless, are a crucial part of the civic infrastructure conducive to robust and diverse citizen planning. Resources are key and are not usually theorized. Mostly, they just fail to exist, particularly when it comes to grassroots organizations fighting to play a role in the city. Rethinking resources as they relate to actors’ involvement in planning and city systems is, then, a significant part of theorizing planning structure, as proposed by Portugali. In this sense, the Coordinadora/Living City’s evolution provides insight into structural issues. I will start this analysis by asking, where did the resources come from? And where will they come from in the future?

Where did they come from?

If we look at Living City’s funding (table A12.1), self-generated income has always been modest (but significant), US$6,000 to finance the Coordinadora and, at the turn of the century, to get Living City started. Through the years, this sum -- supplemented by awards, payment for services (as secretariat of the Latin American sustainable transport network, or consulting on the Santiago Cycling Master Plan), and other similar efforts -- has remained modest, never exceeding US$10,000 in a single year. These amounts are important, though, because they have tended to be the only discretionary funds available to Living City, that is, funds not allocated within a specific, unalterable project budget.

Living City, like most grassroots organizations, has received little funding from the Chilean government, no more than $3,000-$4,000 per initiative, to finance the Bellavista planning charrette (2006) and the heritage guidebook (2005-2006). Nonetheless, Living City developed significant resources, which gave it considerable continuity, although with significant breaks, particularly between 2003-2004 and 2006-2007, as described. All of Living City’s main funders -- whether agencies (UNDP, EU), private companies (Natura) or partnerships (I-CE, ITDP) were from outside Chile, however, reflecting the reality of a newly democratizing, developing country. Moreover, as Abogabir noted in the August workshop and as discussed in the previous chapter, the possibility of repeating any of these partnerships are slight or non-existent (CiudadViva 2012c).

Where will resources come from in the future?

Living City today is trapped in a curious paradox: it has been widely acclaimed by academics and the media for its methods and successes (Ducci 2004; Ducci 2004; López 2008; Poduje 2008; Tironi, Poduje et al. 2010; Poduje 2011) and, in the semi-structured interviews, its work scored highly with government, private sector partners and citizens alike. Moreover, government staff (Navas 2010; Silva 2010) and others (Gurovich 2010) suggested it should become a national organization, developing local offices elsewhere in Chile. Nonetheless, the reality is that in coming years its future looks extremely precarious.

As participants noted during the 2012 civic infrastructure workshop (CiudadViva 2012c), little of the funding that made Living City possible remains. Indeed, there are far fewer funding possibilities today than there were in the 2000s. Just as international funding for the NGOs and human rights groups of the military period shifted to formal channels with the 1990 transition to democratic rule, causing much of civil society to collapse or even disappear, today, with Chile’s entry into the OECD and other developments, it is no longer a funding priority for international agencies and foundations. Indeed, Latin America as a region has slipped from funders’ priority lists, as they focus mainly on Africa (anti-poverty, habitat and human development efforts) and Asia (transport initiatives). While it is certainly legitimate for funders’ priorities to shift, as the world and challenges change, the fact that they leave little civic infrastructure behind is highly problematic.

Nonetheless, Living City forms part of a complex system, has collapsed and recreated itself several times. Will it have to depend on love, all over again, to ensure its survival? Or will some new, unsuspected source appear? Where does civic infrastructure come from? How is it built?

I have no solid answers to these questions, but would like to apply Scharmer’s “presencing”, his learning from the future as it emerges, to this dilemma, starting with Living City itself, and then looking at examples from elsewhere in the world for some guidance.

On paper, the Avina project was probably Living City’s “least successful” project. It failed to produce a spectacular event, like the Peñalosa/ ECLAC seminar (2003), or the participatory marches and other neighbourhood events of both the recycling and transport projects (2001, 2002). It contributed significantly to the success of the Pío Nono renewal project, but the inauguration was two years after the Avina project ended (2006). Moreover, the stress and demands of the Bicivilizate campaign, which was supposed to
### Table A12.2 Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guide to heritage of La Chimba</td>
<td>Publication in Voz, with three maps and additional text</td>
<td>Volunteer authors, Avina-design, publication</td>
<td>Significant step forward in mapping heritage, also drew on experience of Recoleta and Providencia planners, reinforcing the relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guía de La Chimba</td>
<td>History and guidebook</td>
<td>Volunteer authors, Communications fund for publishing, Avina-volunteers for development</td>
<td>First major mapping exercise and publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellavista: Uniendo Dos Alas</td>
<td>Short film with original music, by audio-visual unit</td>
<td>Avina-AudioVisual unit</td>
<td>Helped to establish the importance of working class heritage in Bellavista and the markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buttons</td>
<td>Both a product and a service</td>
<td>Avina-volunteers-Nef</td>
<td>Very popular, especially with Macletas, but did not generate sufficient funds for the work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Sueño Posible</td>
<td>Inclusion of Peñalosa vista film in catalogue, for promotion</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recetario para la Buena Vida</td>
<td>Inclusion in catalogue, for promotion</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-shirts</td>
<td>Development, production and inclusion in catalogue</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menus for restaurants</td>
<td>Development and design of a pilot, for the Venezia</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellavista postcards</td>
<td>Development, production and inclusion in catalogue</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellavista poster</td>
<td>Developed by Junta de Vecinos, inclusion in catalogue for promotion</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria</td>
<td>These products proved important to establishing Living City’s reputation as it entered into new relations with different actors. However, the income generated was minimal, partly because prices were so low that without high volumes of sales, income remained less than the effort involved. This also reflected the fact that CasaBella’s design and Living City’s own institutional possibilities did not permit an active sales- or tourist-related activity, which could have improved sales.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration using Catálogo Ciudad Viva, April 2006.

### Table A12.3 Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production of events and services</td>
<td>Catalogue, and several small experiences</td>
<td>Volunteer, other organizations, Avina</td>
<td>See results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design and printing</td>
<td>Catalogue and promotion in neighbourhood</td>
<td>Avina-Valeria-Nef</td>
<td>Pilot experience with Venezia restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound equipment</td>
<td>Service including sound expert</td>
<td>Avina-AudioVisual unit</td>
<td>Used sporadically, but most requests were from unfunded organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation</td>
<td>Applied in charrettes</td>
<td>Avina-Living City core and community</td>
<td>Very important, but all requests from unfunded groups and organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration using Catálogo Ciudad Viva, April 2006.
represent a new path for Living City, ate up resources from the Avina-supported initiative, taking away the many volunteer contributions typically mustered to complement regular project funding.\textsuperscript{64}

The effort to raise funds using products (table A12.2) demonstrated that income from sales was far less than the publicity and goodwill generated when they were delivered as gifts.

The possibility of offering services was also tested (table A12.3), with initial results providing some limited income, but clearly indicating the need for major planning and additional investment (particularly in the equivalent of a sales person). Did this mean that services were not a possibility either, or was this simply another example of winning by losing? Certainly if we look at the less tangible aspect of the project -- learning to strategize the future from current strengths (table A12.4), we can see how there was no causal, do-this, earn-that, progress, but nonetheless, a surprising number of those initiatives came to fruition, or led to further experiments, with significant results, in subsequent years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Later results (beyond this period)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Community centre in heritage building, with facilities for cyclists and first-floor meeting access</td>
<td>Implemented through LC-private partnership, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Active transport programs for companies</td>
<td>Pilot implementation 2007, BancoEstado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 A school for cycling</td>
<td>Pilot implementation with Macletas, full implementation (Macletas, 2010-2011), full development application pending response (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 A campaign for drivers</td>
<td>Back burner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 A self-financed Voz, through sponsorships of relevant content</td>
<td>Back burner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Collection of income through online service</td>
<td>Possible in 2011 with direct monthly charge through donor's own account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Publications including manuals for urban design, cycling, etc.</td>
<td>Green Map 2008, Cyclists' guide 2010 (with volunteer labour and sponsorships to cover design and printing), progress on urban design manual (2008-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Consulting based on skills developed and knowledge accumulated in the organization</td>
<td>2009, assistance to DICTUC/Transantiago team with participatory techniques; 2011, international and technical specifications with DICTUC/Plan Maestro team; bid with AltaPlanning/RecursosLimbicos for public bicycle feasibility study excluded from competition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on Annual Report 2006 (Ciudad Viva 2007), Secretary for Girls and Women Initiatives project application (2011).

What can we learn from these experiences? The first lesson is that nothing is simple, and that implementation may bring as many problems as solutions. After the Bicivilízate campaign, for example, Living City was unwilling to lead a consortium responding to a government request for bids on any kind of activity. In 2010, it participated with a team led by Juan de Dios Ortuzar, and the Catholic University’s engineering consultancy (DICTUC), preparing several studies that formed part of a contract with the under-secretary of transport. That contract ended in dissension between the university and the government. These

\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, Living City always calculated both monetary budgets (from funders) and volunteer contributions to all its initiatives, with volunteer and in-kind support typically accounting for 50% or 100% of monetary resources received, thus effectively doubling their impact. It did so rather conservatively, moreover, calculating what it would cost if volunteer articles in the Voz had to be paid for, or adding up board members’ time in meetings or specific, measurable activities, but not including the thousands of hours of work by government professionals, private sector and civil society partners.
differences had nothing to do with Living City, which produced the work required and it was duly approved. Nonetheless, when the government refused final approval and payment, DICTUC did not make the final payment to Living City. Moreover, the experience with the 2011 bid on the bikeshare program for Santiago was highly educational: although Living City’s partners both had strong curricula, and AltaPlanning was the only participant in the whole bidding process with any experience with bikeshare, the group was disqualified on a technicality, reallocated on appeal, but the official memo never reached the evaluating government office on time (!). Whatever these experiences say about consultancies in Chile today, they clearly indicate that a small player such as Living City will face significant challenges in both winning bids and obtaining funding through this strategy.

But there are other lessons here: one is that it is worth planning in the medium- and long-, as well as the short terms. That private partners want concrete results, and are particularly likely to support publications and other physical objects that they can then distribute on their own. Furthermore, the general recognition of Living City’s “technical” expertise -- so important in the Chilean environment -- has been reinforced by further, formal training for key leaders, advisors and staff. Offering training and education seem like areas of enormous potential for income generation, given Living City’s experience, its library, and its reputation. Partnerships, such as the one with Patricio Lanfranco that developed our audio-visual unit and films (2004-2010), or the one with me that made possible our community centre, have so far tended to rely on a few individuals who are very close and very committed to the organization. Nonetheless, their success opens the way for involving new partners, probably with lower risk thresholds, and experimenting with new organizational possibilities, particularly cooperatives and social enterprises.

There is no guarantee that any of these possibilities will come through, or that whatever does materialize will be enough to keep Living City going. There never was. We can never repeat the same actions and expect the same results. Every time, something large or small is different, and that changes the whole world in which we interact. It changes us too. Living City today is not the Coordinadora: it is not even the Living City it was in 2001, or 2003, or 2008, or 2009. Between the Coordinadora and the emergence of Living City, the end of the transport project and commencing the Avina initiative, after Bicivilízate, after Natura, after the OSI transparency effort or the EU active citizenship campaign, Living City has both collapsed and been reborn, with new staff, new community partners and even new leaders. To date, however, it has managed to keep its memory alive, that fragmented, gossamer, vital structure that makes the very activity of planning possible.

It seems likely that new needs will continue to drive this collective effort, and that new opportunities may pull it over the next horizon. Perhaps that is the most important quality that the Coordinadora embedded in our collective DNA: the understanding that failure is a part of every process and does not diminish what we do.

\[65\] Personal communication from Xavier Genot, at the time of the bid. This development has no logical explanation beyond a deliberate decision to exclude. Indeed, the other main contender, the wellknown transport consultancy, Steer Davies Gleave, failed to win the bid too, leaving only an unknown engineering company as the victor.

\[66\] Several board members have post-graduate degrees (transport, urbanism) or substantial experience in relevant areas (green roofs, walls and other forms of “greening” the city), while both Tomás Marín and Magda Morel are completing Master’s degrees, Tomás in public policies at the University de los Lagos, Magda in urban planning at the London School of Economics. My own PhD -- unheard of until now on the citizen side of urban planning -- has also excited considerable interest among potential university and other partners.
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