CRITICAL CIVIC EDUCATION: WHEN HISTORY BECOMES GEOGRAPHY

by

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Abstract

This tri-theoretical study of globalization attempts to contribute to the limited scholarly research on global citizenship in education. Utilizing three important critical theories – neo-Marxism, gender and postcolonialist theory – this study analyzes in-depth the hidden process behind the formation of current global citizenship education. The findings reveal that it is possible to teach global citizenship education through critical civic education; however, a better understanding and application of critical theory and especially the critical sociology of space is required in current curriculums. In the absence of resources, motivation and infrastructure within school boards to implement a more state-guided critical citizenship education within their global citizenship education programs, assimilation of critical theory by teachers becomes absolutely necessary.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the problem

This thesis is essentially a study of space. The aim of this study is to understand space as a social dimension within the realm of critical theory, specifically to investigate complex cultural vortexes within spaces and spatiality, as well as around and through which hegemonic power flows and interacts and negotiates differences with the powerless. This study represents a conclusion of my graduate studies in sociology of education as it relates to my research of critical theory, Marxist and neo-Marxist, gender and postcolonial critical thought. They all have framed my quest to trace the meaning of the metaphor of space in the so-called process of “globalization” and what it means to education and, more importantly, what it means in my professional life as a public school teacher in the province of Ontario. Therefore, the focus of this thesis project is to question the discourse of globalization in present global citizenship education in Ontario, in teacher education and in society in general. This thesis paper also represents a scholastic attempt to bridge the seemingly unbridgeable; that is, to merge three theoretical frameworks noted above, which have never been comfortable with each other, for the purpose of analyzing globalization.

In Canada, civic education historically centered on a membership in a larger cultural group as individual rights and duties focused mainly on the maintenance of group cohesion and horizontal integration. In modern history, however, with the growth of cultural diversity within the population due to immigration patterns, these loyalties were gradually replaced by loyalty to the emerging democratic institutions as the government
felt the need to initiate, educate and preserve “good citizens” in the democratic process, or in the process of proposing, developing and administering the new nation’s laws.

The paradigmatic shift from traditional ethnocultural nationalism to civic nationalism in modern history is again being challenged in recent years by the emergence of a kind of “global nationalism” spearheaded by the process of globalization. However, very little attention is being given to the kind of a universal acceptance necessary to conceive such an ideal society spanning across the entire globe. So, this thesis seeks to address those hidden processes, or it attempts to bring into focus the kind of a citizen, or more particularly the kind of a civic education, would be required for a future borderless world within the predatory conditions in the age of globalization. My main argument is centered on the need for an emergence of a **critical civic education** and its relation to neo-Marxist geography, gender conceptualization of space, and postcolonialism’s space embodiment, or particularly the critical connection to David Harvey’s historical-geographical materialism¹.

Most of the general literature confirms my own perception that there has been very little productive “trialogue” among researchers involved in neo-Marxism, postcolonialism and gender studies on the topic of globalization even though this pressure is strongest in the spaces where the vectors of these three theories intersect, especially in the spaces of global *powerlessness*. There has been, however, some dialogue between Marxist and gender theorists, as both theories are necessary for a better understanding of capitalism and capitalist dynamics. But most gender scholars have viewed their relationship with Marxism to be an unhappy “marriage,” or as Hartmann (1979)² notes,

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¹ In Harvey, *Globalization and the Spatial Fix*. p.30
this was a marriage of convenience in which Marxism, as the husband, held the more
dominant view within this union; and feminism, as the unhappy wife, had to be
subordinated to patriarch’s theory. Consequently, the theoretical interaction and
cooperation between these two theoretical frameworks has never been an easy one.

The relationship of the two schools of thought noted above with postcolonialist
thought has been an even more complicated affair. In many ways, Marxism has been
generally dismissive of postcolonialism, viewing the entire field as rather unmaterialistic,
ahistorical and, in many ways, collusive with imperialism. On the other side, Marxism
has been considered by postcolonialists as undeniably Eurocentric, complicit with the
master narrative, and highly minimalistic and, as such, has very little application in studies
and literature dealing with the issues in former imperial colonies. Similarly, feminist and
poscolonialist studies view each other with great suspicion, which evolves mainly around
Eurocentricity and bourgeois-centric prejudice that reduces postcolonialist thinkers to the
less important “third-worlders” within the ranks of critical social theory. So, just as
proponents of gender theory resisted Marxist homogenization of people into crude classes
without accounting for critical sub-differences such as sex, so do postcolonial critical
thinkers resent feminist crude categorization of all women into a single, homogenous
social formation.

Consequently, bringing these three schools of thought under one umbrella in this
research for a purpose of an in-depth analysis of globalization has not been an easy
scholarly task. However, it has been made possible by the infusion of the critical
sociology of space into the analysis, or, as many social theorists have noted before, by
taking a “spatial turn.” By examining how materiality, gender analysis and postcolonialist
deconstructivism interact with each other and with the concept of space allows for a
greater, in-depth, three-dimensional analysis of the problems associated with present-day
globalization. And, in contrast to the polarizing and exclusionist views of the three
critical theories, this approach allows for the development of a more balanced Marxist-
gender-postcolonialist critical view, which is basically the aim of this study.

Chapter 1 of this research paper begins with a brief introduction of the current issue in
citizenship education, in particular the problematic global citizenship education. Global
citizenship education is a concept in education that has gained in prominence the past two
decades in response to the challenges relating to the search for meaning of civic
citizenship in a changing world. The paradox here is that while we claim the existence of
a nascent global citizenship, and a corresponding emerging global society, we ask nation-
states to guarantee this new, supra-state citizenship. In essence, we are asking them to
sign their own capitulation. What state in the world would sign over the ownership papers
to a non-existent authority? Therefore, my main argument in this chapter is that, while we
naively engage in teaching the idealism of a greater social good spread over the larger,
global space, in essence, what we are really creating are consumers for the global
capitalist order, which is the real global state. So, we willingly or unwillingly participate
in this process instead of creating critical thinkers, which should be the main goal of any
public education.

In this chapter, I also demonstrate that globalization is neither new nor benign, but
simply a continuous complex process of capital displacement within the space-time
continuum: from the 19th century *protoglobalization*, two world wars and
*microglobalization* (the solidification of the nation-state), and finally to the post-1945
triglobalization, or the emergence of the First, Second and Third Worlds and the related discourses of this trilateral division whose legacies we still feel today.

Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I pose a question whether the emerging cybertariat, a new class within the working class, can reverse the transformation of global citizens into mere global consumers and bring more balance between capital and labor, thereby redirecting the vector of the global economic forces toward a more equitable distribution of our planetary resources.

The second chapter discusses what globalization means to stronger nations, who don’t necessarily have to fear globalization as powerless nations do, particularly what the process of globalization means to the United States, the only remaining military superpower and the world’s largest economy at the time of writing of this paper. However, this discussion also involves examining the discourse of globalization through a critical gender lens. Just as one object can be understood differently when viewed by two different sets of eyes; similarly, globalization has a different meaning in different parts of the world. In this chapter, I argue that for American hegemonic power, globalization is an opportunity to recreate its past frontier; that is to create a new superfrontier and a new America, on which it can base its hegemonic power, which is currently in a state of flux. Therefore, the American superfrontier is coming into existence by the twinning of two discourses: the so-called “Global War on Terror” and expansion of the global capitalist order.

For Americans, the frontier is not just an area of wild, unconquered space; it is a critical part of their national identity and national mythology. America was founded on a frontier, and if it ever ceases to exist, it will also be on the frontier. From the first wild,
pre-1890 frontier, to the epic battle on the Red Frontier (i.e. the battle with the Soviet Union) to the present frontier of the globe, this mythology-building process brings to the imagination important cultural symbols – the symbols of frontier democracy, frontier hero, epic struggles with the elements and indigenous populations, and unlimited economic opportunity, all of which are deeply embedded in the past and present American psyche. So, just like capitalism, as discussed in Chapter 1, I argue that American hegemonic power is extremely spatial, or frontier-al, and without that critical space for expansion, or at least the perception of it, American global nation-building project will come to a halt.

And finally, in Chapter 3, I explore the human component of globalization, specifically immigration. In this chapter, I argue that there has emerged a new type of transnational migrant, who together I call species-space. Species-space moves from one space to another and, in the process, becomes space itself. As controversial as it sounds to compare living beings to “dead space,” I argue that the new species-space is neither “dead” nor powerless, as the discourse of globalization would like them to be. On the contrary, they represent a new discourse created by the discourse of globalization as they are neither the 19th century immigrants who were easily assimilated upon their arrival to the New World, nor the 20th century extensions of national states into other state’s territories or the classical diasporas. Species-space are space, but they can also create and compress spaces, as well as create conduits that lead to almost anywhere their imaginations would take them. They are alternatively loyal to no one and to everyone, and they are both good citizens in their new homelands and also good nationalists when it comes to issues relating to their old homelands. But species-space have a much greater
role to play in the new world order because they are the answer to the question of where are the borders of the deterritorialized states within the predatory conditions of globalization.

The algorithm that is proposed in this thesis for a better understanding of globalization from a critical civic education standpoint is not necessarily a highlighting of new knowledge, but rather an attempt to provoke critical thinking in the subject on which everyone claims to be an expert. From that perspective, I don’t make a claim to be a producer of new knowledge but rather a provocateur of new knowledge.

In each chapter, I begin my analysis primarily as a critique, a challenge to the insularity of the subjects that I examine and, most importantly, my own perception of space and spatiality in everyday life. Perhaps there lies the power of any analysis dealing with everydayness because as social theorist Henry Lefebvre reminds us critical analysis is an observation of everyday phenomena around us. Capitalist geography is all around us and everywhere. It is present in the subordinate relationship between genders, the distant spaces of former-imperialist/present-day colonies, as well as the production circuits of modern day capitalism’s working places. Therefore, any analysis devoted to resisting capitalist domination needs not travel distances or across spaces and places but simply start by looking at our own privileges and un-privileges in our own personal spaces and around us.

The research that follows is by no means all-encompassing or exclusively representative of the respective theoretical fields analyzed. It is, however, critical in the sense that it tries to challenge the mainstream thinking about the world today or that we have but fewer choices at our disposal as to where we go from here in our economic
development. Granted, critical civic education of the future cannot be framed entirely as a critique and as a critique alone because, as such, it would not help connect knowledge to power since it would become an infinite opposition and polarity. So, the globalization debate then becomes a discussion or a forum about the different views of the kind of world we want to see in the 21st century and how those views are ingrained in different knowledge concepts taught in our schools. The role of critical civic education of the future becomes not to answer all the questions in a critical manner but to open more questions and provoke critical thinking and locate them in the realities of both student and teacher. Only then can we truly understand all the questions that await us in the globalized world of the 21st century.
CHAPTER 2: MARX, GLOBALIZATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION

“Young people need to see that part of the rationale for global citizenship education is that we are all global citizens just by the very fact of being alive in this century.” (Ontario high school teachers in *Educating for Global Citizenship in a Changing World*)

The worldwide collapse of socialist economies and the apparent triumph of global capitalism has hardly validated the continued relevance of Marxist theory in our time. Has Marxism as a socio-economic theory become obsolete? Neo-Marxists continue to argue its relevance, pointing to the strengths (and weaknesses) of Marxist tradition and theory in examining critical issues such as globalization, ecology, class, the state, culture and the other pressing problems related to the said issues.

However, how is Marxist theory relevant to the analysis of global citizenship education? Marx’s very notion of citizenship and the concept of the citizen are inevitably tied up with the capitalist mode of production and a worldview that rest firmly on a materialist interpretation. But as many social scientists and education theorists including McLaren and Farahmandpur (2005) note, as a society, we don’t only manufacture flat-screen TVs, iPods, Blackberries and iPhones, but we also manufacture citizens, or rather consumers. Contemporary, large-scale, fundamental developments are transforming our society, both inside and outside of our classrooms, yet educators have a tendency to conveniently ignore them or not put enough critical thought into assessing them.

Consequently, our education is essentially evolving into a kind of “capitalist schooling” – a materialist schooling – since we (as teachers) “participate in the production, distribution and circulation of knowledge and social skills necessary for reproducing the social division of labor and hence capitalist relations of exploitation.”(50). The end product of this process is almost the same as the end product of factory assembly line: controlled,
subdued and uncritical – perfectly malleable to the ubiquitous capitalist logic.

Furthermore, as McLaren and Farahmandpur remind us, education is (in)directly involved in the production of the one commodity that generates the entire social universe of capitalism in all its dynamic and multiform existence: labor power (51). Therefore, for teachers, there can be no greater struggle than the one to prevent the loss of the classroom to the capitalist logic because this represents ground zero, here is where education, globalization, consumerism, class, race, imperialism, neo-liberalism, sexuality, ability, gender and postmodernism are all collapsed into a singularity.

It is impossible, however, to analyze the present global citizenship education in Canada without at least giving some attention to the discourse of globalization and what it means. After all, Aristotle identified this problem two thousand years ago in his quest to define the primary purpose of schooling, or whether students should pursue studies that are economically practical or morally edifying (Hyslop-Marginson 2005: 1). So, a theoretical probe into this question will inevitably lead to a conclusion that globalization is neither a new nor a benign force because the expansions of capitalist logic everywhere today is neither a new nor a novel idea in the history of classes and class conflict. What makes this new push unique, however, is that we are nearing the physical or terrestrial limits as we face the near exhaustion and depletion of our biohabitat, and Marx was one of the first ones to recognize this paradox. So, from that perspective, Marxist, and in particular neo-Marxist critical thought, seems to be one of the more relevant theories for a better understanding of the present process of globalization.

And finally, when it comes to capitalist logic expansion, as neo-Marxists remind us, nowhere is the collapse of race, class, gender, sexuality and ability more clearly visible
than in the case of globalization because it is a process that is “a universal system of
domination that integrates and coordinates and ultimately subsumes all other forms of
oppression to its commodity logic and privileges hierarchies of exploitation” (McLaren
and Farahmandpur 2005: 29). Therefore, it is useful to use Marxist theory as the starting
point of any globalization discourse analysis.

This chapter will utilize Marxist theory in examining the issues related to the discourse
of globalization presently, particularly the utilization of Marx’s theory of cyclical
fluctuations of capitalism. However, this paper accepts the use of Marxist theory through
a human geography lens of French social thinker and metaphilosopher Henri Lefebvre
and his consideration of space as a social identity-making process and then reconstructed
by social theorist and anthropologist David Harvey’s theory of “temporal and spatial
displacement” of capital, or as capital’s answer to periodic crises. From this cumulative
perspective, capital is seen in a more organic way than traditional Marxist viewpoints;
that is, like a living creature, it is born, feeds and grows, as well as responds to changes in
environment that cause it to “fall sick.” Whether capital and capitalism will eventually
grow old and die as an economic system, however, is another question that is beyond the
scope of this research.

So, viewed from this perspective, present-day globalization can be viewed more as a
strategic politico-economic reconstruction rather than a social (r)evolution of a
fundamentally different, all-encompassing territorial formation of “the society.” It is a
complex cycle of capitalism in capital’s attempt to survive yet another crisis. However, it

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3 Harvey reconstructs Marx’s model of the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production through three
basic premises: a) capitalism cannot remain static as it requires constant expansion and input in order to
sustain accumulation; b) labor is an integral part of capitalist production circuit, thus class relations
between capital and labor will always emerge; c) capitalism continuously invents new technologies and,
consequently, new economic and political organizations will always emerge. For further elaboration see
is also too simplistic to analyze globalization just through the commonly accepted thesis of “global imperialism” or the perspective of the 19th century global liberal order. The process of globalization is much more complex and deeper than the basic theory of economic exploitation. Nevertheless, we are entering an era of human development that is largely unknown at this time, and the only certainty is that the consequences of globalization will be felt in every corner of our planet.

2.1 Spatial-temporal displacement of capital

Most social science research today tends to view the discourse of globalization as a *histoire événementielle*, or a discourse started by a revolution in information, communication and transportation technologies, brought to the fore by the end of Cold War and the strategic victory of the Western capitalist order over the Communist world. This view neglects to account for the evolutionary historicity of the current process that constitutes the discourse of globalization. Marx had long known and forewarned about capital’s internal drive and its far-reaching ambition to “annihilate space by time,” which seems to be at the driving force behind the present discourse of globalization (Marx 1993: 539). As Harvey defines it, the present “time-space compression” of global capital must be analyzed as a continuous, ongoing process of constant expansion of capital in the space-time continuum, rather than just a periodical historical phenomenon (Harvey 1990: 286).

The theoretical framework behind the continuous spatial-temporal expansion, supported by Harvey and other postmodern geographers, gives much to the evolutionary
and organicist nature of global capital over a prolonged period of time rather than as a causal loop of notable revolutionary events relating to our time. Therefore, when overaccumulation occurs within a closed continuum (i.e., a country), a state of surpluses takes place in a given capitalist economy. Harvey argues that Marxism always viewed this problem as generally unsolvable as any capitalist closed circuit eventually reaches overproduction because of physical laws (inherent drive for unlimited expansion within a finite continuum). This means primarily a surplus of labor – the most problematic component of the circuit – which is then registered as rising unemployment and consequently a surplus of capital resulting in an overflow of commodities on the market that cannot be traded without a loss. Finally, the capitalist circuit reaches an idle productive capacity of surpluses as capital must be dumped into productive and profitable investments or the production will eventually reach diminishing returns.

But here is where the perverse logic of capitalism comes into focus as the actual overaccumulated surplus of material prosperity in a closed continuum in reality becomes an absence: an absence of new consumers, an absence of new markets and resources, and ultimately an absence of profits, which all leads to a development of a cancerogenous system; that is, a capitalist order collapsing under its own weight and eating in itself.

There are nevertheless multiple ways of resolving this problem including war, destruction of labor (part of it), devaluation of prosperity or institutional regulations but as Harvey notes, the most optimum solution is to reestablish the infinite productive capacity of the capitalist circuit, not in the manufacturing plants – but in factories of space and time. Harvey calls this “a spatio-temporal fix, or a metaphor for solutions to capitalist crises through temporal deferment and geographical expansion” (Harvey 2003: 115).
One way of solving the alarming state of surpluses and overaccumulation is through the actual absorption of the system itself; however, as Harvey further elaborates, spatial and temporal displacement “provides a much richer and long-lasting, and also a more problematic, terrain” for the sick (emphasis added) capital (Harvey 1990: 185). But the temporal displacement of capital through investment in long-term infrastructure projects or social expenditures such as science, education and research that deny the re-entry of current excess capital values into circulation until well into the future also gives a chance to make some social amends with the problematic “other,”4 or labor. On the other hand, the spatial displacement is a far more stressful state for labor as it stretches thin the capitalist fabric of space and, as such, puts extra lateral pressure on the already stressed-out labor. The spatial displacements, i.e., through opening up of new markets, new production capacities and acquisition of new resources, opens up social and labor possibilities elsewhere; however, it also creates a vortex of a whole new universe of problems or by allowing some of the Other (in a postcolonialist sense) to make a way into the problematic Other (in Marxist sense). As Panitch (2001) notes, this type of displacement has a purpose of exporting conflict to the ranks of labor (376), which then becomes very problematic on its own as the collapse of class and race into a singularity makes the exported problem now internalized. This problem is also something that Marxism, as a social theory, has never been adequately suited to deal with.5

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4 Labor is in capitalism defined as the problematic “other” to capital, as it “must be controlled and subdued” as it “persistently circumvents or challenges.” See Dyer-Witheford, 1999, as cited in Sneider, 2009, p. 393.

5 Marxist and postcolonialist labor movements experience a lot of friction which is skillfully explored by capital. Neo-Marxists stress the importance of a unified effort in the anti-capitalist struggle, without focusing on particularities such as race. Postcolonialist respond that Marxists in that respect are simply color-blind, and Eurocentric by insisting that economic oppression is the root of all problems in the world. See Huddart, 2006. p. 29.
The temporal displacement of capital is particularly socially important when we speak of a fixed capital of an independent kind built within the local geographies. This is a kind of capitalist architecture that makes the consumed space so identifiable as it also reconstructs our social and biospace to its purpose. Urban jungles, redesigned and destroyed biohabitats, superindustrial complexes, national and international agglomerations, transportation superstructures and information highways all dot the landscape of the capitalist geography at the expense of social and biogeography. Clearly, this is not a minor sector of the economy and it is capable of absorbing massive amounts of capital and deploying hordes of labor, particularly under conditions of rapid geographical expansion and intensification. Furthermore, it also allows for rather greater social benefits of such capital investments by transforming the Durkheimian “economic egoism” of the corporation into more positive socio-economic developments in the long run. However, it is only through this constant destruction and reconstruction of geography and manufacturing of relatively static and immobile capitalist structures can capital’s fluidity continue to expand in a space continuum against the time horizon. Therefore, as Harvey concludes, it becomes absolutely necessary to force a “spatial organization” in the invaded geography in order to “conquer space” and to make sense and order from the emergent capitalist geographical superstructure (Harvey 2001: 328). In the following pages, we will look at some of the examples of capitalist geographies through a contemporary historical lens.
2.2 Early 19th century space production

A number of notable economic historians have noted that there was a phase of unprecedented “space-production” in the 19th century, or more precisely in the period stretching roughly from 1870 to World War I. The elaborate space-production process was largely a consequence of a larger process of Western European territorial expansion, which sought to expand the Western European capitalist continuum by inflating the necessary physical space to deal with overaccumulations of goods and labor as well as consequent social processes. Following a rapid growth due to industrialization and, more importantly, the organizational efficacy of the nation-state, which encased and protected industrialist capitalist circuits, Western European military powers globalized most of the world by the end of 19th century through a process of colonization. The Western European global conquest, which actually had begun in the 15th century during the age of geographic discoveries, was greatly accelerated in the 19th century due to industrialization and mechanization of the colonizing process, which allowed a far greater “time-space” compression than witnessed before. Therefore, by the beginning of the 20th century Western European imperialists had created a vast global network of markets, raw material complexes and slave/cheap labor centers dotting the coasts of all navigable seas and oceans, thus securing the necessary physical continuum of chaos that the capitalist order required for survival and sustainable development well into the future.

But what prompted this sudden explosion out of Western Europe at that particular point in history? There are multiple explanations for this phenomenon; however, at the end of 19th century in Western Europe there was an emergence of a new type of a space, or an absolute space, that fused all the spaces together within any given, neatly encased,
independent spatial continuum that was impenetrable to outside influences. As Lefebvre observes, the modern state’s natural instinct was to produce an absolute space within its own space, or a type of a space with an intrinsic drive of violence toward other spaces within any given closed physical continuum (Lefebvre 1991: 280). It is only in the wake of this revolutionary transition from producing guns and butter to producing “spaces,” in particular *violent spaces* – encased, armored spaces that exerted absolute control over other spaces through sovereignty and monopoly on violence – was Western Europe transformed from a continent dotted with a patchwork of villages, regions, kingdoms, towns, cities, fiefdoms and empires into a powerful capitalist imperial machinery that drove capital’s intrinsic expansionist nature and globalized the rest of the world in a span of just less than a century.

The human and ecological costs of the 19th century Western European capital’s outward explosion were staggering. In the Americas as well as in Australia, entire indigenous cultures were eradicated, displaced or subsumed to capitalist production circuits established between Western Europe and the colonies. In Africa, slavery and the slave trade inflicted enormous, continental-wide adverse consequences for social development as millions of young people of working age were taken captive and transported to distant Western European colonies as slaves. In Asia, however, whose population was much greater and its civilizations too firmly established for imperialists to rule directly, Western Europeans established monopolies over all commercial and economic affairs. In vast sovereignties like India and Indonesia, they ruled by proxy through local aristocracies.
So, in summary, the 19th century Western European *microglobalization* inflicted enormous human and environmental cost in the rest of the world, even if it did somewhat stabilize the endemic violence of feudal Europe by compartmentalizing the continent into a universe of solid, encased national worlds that acted as monopolies within their own defined borders. The emergence of nation-states in Europe had a somewhat stabilizing effect on the continent because, as postcolonialists argue, the internal contradictions and conflicts were now externalized and exported elsewhere using the agency of the state. So, instead of a single global economic continuum encompassing the entire liberal global empire created by 19th century imperialism, the world solidified into a continuum of many micro globes – Westphalian nation-states – within which all of human affairs were conducted and regulated with little or no contact with the outside world. However, as Harvey observes, this was just a temporary state as the tense “interimperialist rivalries sharpen(ed) and the threat of autarky within closed trading empires” started looming on the horizon as the world inevitably started spiraling toward the events of the First World War (Harvey 2001: 348).

### 2.3 World wars and temporal displacement of capital

The crucial period for understanding the globalization process is the period between 1914-1945, the age of extreme statism in Europe. During the period of unlimited expansion by Western European imperialists, capitalism and capitalist production reached the spatial limit and were thus forced to start pushing for the expansion of temporal boundaries. However, the enormous spatial displacement of capital prior to the First World War also created enormous inter-state tensions as each nation-state experienced a
different temporal trajectory of homogenization. As Lefebvre notes, “space that homogenizes thus has nothing homogenous about it” since spaces of national domination also conceived conflicting ideologies between different nations from within and to the outside, contributing extra tension to the already tense global system (Lefebvre 1991: 308).

Geostrategically, these tensions were primarily concentrated in three critical regions before the First World War: the Great Depression in the United States, the rise of Bolshevism and creation of the Communist superstate in Russia, and the emergence of fascism and the creation of a totalitarian state in Germany and corporatist state in Italy. In Marxist terms, the pre-1914 global imperial order was fractured into smaller but stronger, insular states – capitalist societies fortified within boundaries of nation-states, or as Desai terms it “Capitalism in one country” system (Desai 1998). The agency of the nation-state was thus a perfect vehicle for temporal displacement of capital as the nation-state was also a sound political, cultural and social project. To fortify and secure the temporal displacement of capital within a closed national continuum, trade barriers and tariff systems were imposed as states took control over their own money supply and abandoning the Gold Standard (the global currency), fracturing the global economy even further (Desai 2000). The movement of people, goods or any commerce across the fortified borders became nearly impossible as the borders also became delineations between different and competing national capitalist ideologies.

This period also witnessed a further development of the nation-state, or what economic historian Nigel Harris called the emergence of “the territorial social State,” during which the state folded the entire space of “natural economic geography” under the
space of the *State* and to the interest of the dominant political geography of space (Harris 1995). The closed encased continuum of the territorial nation-state became Hobbes’ Leviathan on all human affairs as the entire internal geography was reconstructed in a pyramidal shape with the ruling power formed as a *space* rather than person, group or class. This also made it appear as if governing power was above or outside of society and social relations, almost mythical in character, and vested in the abstract space of the *State*. Therefore, rule was not *personified* but *spatialized* as the ruling elites ruled by proxy, or by the power vested in them by state, which also made hegemony and ideology far more socially acceptable and maintainable.

The absolute rule of state space was also evident in the economic sphere where the emerging nation-states dismantled the remnants of the globalized world of the 19th century through development of autarkies. In Germany, as economic historian Gustav Stolper notes, this process was termed as “War Socialism,” while Lenin referred to it as “State Capitalism” in reference to the temporary fusion of capital and political power. The dismantling of the liberal global empire of the 19th century was further evident by the New Deal in the United States, Hitler’s centralized planning and Soviet Five-Year plans. The state became the final frontier as nothing or very little was done at the supra-state level and as the world degenerated into a form of global feudal order of an inter-state system.

The period between the two world wars was also a period of intense temporal displacement of capital as a result of the fractured liberal global order of the 19th century and spatial expansion that led to the events of the First World War. Survival was the key

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7 In Desai, 2000.
strategy for nations and states, as well as capital. Therefore, most of the capitalist production was directed towards fortifying the agency of nation-state as the protective shell of individual national capitalist economies.

2.4 Post-1945 and triglobalization

The great human and material cost of two world wars and the effects that followed created an environment where survival became the only objective for many states, as well as capital. Hyperinflation, mass unemployment, trade wars and currency fluctuations all supported the idea of intensive economic engineering by individual states or continued temporal displacement of capital. Moreover, the defeat of Germany and its Axis allies by a combined effort of Western liberal democracies strengthened by the statist approaches of both the United States (the New Deal) and socialist Soviet Union and its planned economy further reinforced the idea of the nation-state as the central agent or, more importantly, critical space, for protecting interests of capital within its own continuum, rather than the nascent liberal global order that was now almost completely shattered thereby accelerating the process of deglobalization that started with the beginning of the First World War.

In the postwar period, however, the titanic struggle of the Cold War trifurcated the globe into three smaller and ideologically different globes, each possessing nation-states as building blocks. Consequently, there was a great amount of temporal displacement of capital, primarily into military infrastructures of the three different worlds. The nation-state, which was the critical agent for survival during the Cold War, diverted all available resources (and capital) to military purposes in the name of security. In the liberal
democracies of the now-formed West, comprised mostly of the industrialized nations of North America and Western Europe, the combination of private and state-owned capital slowly but steadily began the postwar economic recovery by fuelling the growth of mass consumerism, trade unionization, corporate power and government as an essential public institution. The most evident superstructure that emerged out of the temporal displacement of capital in the West was the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, a military space designed to protect the interests of Western European and North American capital. Although it was theoretically designed as an integrated multinational strategic defense space, it rested primarily on U.S. military and economic power as well as on the territoriality of the American global empire, but ultimately securing the interests of American global corporate power. As Lefebvre notes, national space is ultimately connected to violence, which is then channeled through military space in order to achieve political and, more importantly, economic goals, therefore, any corresponding supranational or supramilitary structure would have the same strategic objective despite its claim of being purely defensive in nature (Lefebvre 1991: 50).

In the Communist world, though, which consisted primarily of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe, state-owned capital quickly made some gigantic leaps (due to the sheer mass of mobilized capital in a short period of time) and rapidly started closing the economic gap with its Western counterparts, prompting Soviet economic experts to declare (rather prematurely) that capitalism was in its terminal crisis and that its breakdown was imminent. The unprecedented growth in the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet world fuelled the optimism that state-owned capital
economies would eventually supercede capitalism as an economic system. Consequently, the Soviet/Russian state capital was dumped into the superstructure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, or more commonly known as the Warsaw Pact, which was created in 1955. Similar to NATO, it rested preponderantly on the Russian military space and the power of Russian state capital. However, unlike NATO, it possessed a parallel political superstructure that monitored and ensured that the political spaces of the allied nations remained firmly subdued to the Russian political space. And unlike the U.S., in the post-1945 Soviet Russia, political and economic power were never divorced as Russian state capital remained firmly subdued to the Russian superstate. Whereas in the post-1945 period the American corporations were building the necessary space and superstructure to migrate to once the space of continental U.S. “shrinks” for corporate profits, the Soviet-Russian superstate was consolidating internally by displacing massive amounts of capital temporally.

There was, however, more than just a spatial-temporal differential in the way American corporate and Russian state capital were displaced, as the vectors of American capital was expanding outward from the core, or the continental U.S., as opposed to the Russian capital direction which was basically imploding and pointing inward to the core, which fundamentally reflected the difference of their imperial architectures. As Lefebvre notes, these spatial-temporal contradictions are unavoidable, as the laws of closed spatial continuums dictate unequal implosion-explosion across the entire field. As a result, American and Russian imperial cartographies followed two different spatial trajectories, which became glaringly apparently at the end of the Cold War in 1991.
In the rest of the world, outside the two ideological blocs, rapid post-1945 decolonization led to an upsurge of nationalism and chaotic state- and nation-building. As a result, there was very little capital available for temporal or spatial displacement. What later became deemed as the “Third World” became the battlefield for competing influences, capital and ideologies of the Western and Soviet blocs, as there was very little native capital available for any kind of supra-state spatial or temporal displacement. Consequently, any country’s entire national resources in the region were spent on solidifying the protective shell of nation-state to ensure critical state survival immediately following the decolonization process. The so-called Third-World countries would also become the target of the next phase of Western capitalist survival, or the gigantic spatial displacement of capital, beginning in the 1970s.

To the ideological divide of the world by the two fundamentally different statist approaches, another division was added, that of the North and the South. The North/South divide was, however, a purely economic spatialization, and as Desai (2000) notes this division basically reflected the asymmetrical relationship between the industrial countries of the capitalist and Communist blocs of the North and the underdeveloped and primarily agrarian countries of the South. In essence, this line reflected the relationship between exploitative capital (state or private) and the exploited. The North/South divide quickly started developing into a boundary between the temporal displacement of capital (where capital was invested in state and social infrastructure) and the spatial displacement of capital (where capital was invested in new markets, resource extraction and cheap labor centers).
The period following the global oil crises of the 1970s proved to be a defining moment for the three worlds or, more importantly, three *globes*. As Harvey notes this period was the moment when the seeds of the present-day globalization, or present spatial expansion, were planted (Harvey 2003: 128-29). In the Western corporate galaxy, profitability was eroded due to continuous full employment and growing trade-union strength. Shock of continued growth of oil prices created additional significant difficulties in the economies of Western nations. Desai notes that capitalism somewhat recovered from the crisis in the 1970s, or by renegotiating the social contract with labor, abandoning full employment as a key objective of the economy, reducing inflation and de-nationalizing and privatizing public enterprises, thereby leading to the restoration of profitability of corporations (Desai 2000). Consequently, these economic factors became precursors for the beginning of the second spatial-displacement phase that emerged in the late 1970s in the United States.

The Soviet system, which peaked in the 1970s, did not recover from the stagnation that followed. Massive temporal capital displacement, particularly in the military sphere, combined with the low economic output, inefficiency and steady growth of the massive institutional and state weight of the Communist Leviathan, simply strangled capital, which was simply not able to survive the communist *super bureaucracy*. Consequently, the ultra massive center of the Russian *superstate* survived whereas the surrounding spaces simply detached from the core, leaving a smaller but more manageable empire.

In the rest of the world, however, there were some fundamental spatial and temporal capital reconfigurations, especially in mixed economies of East Asia, which economically and as a region emerged as the “third way,” effectively displacing the former Third
World after the dissolution of the Communist bloc in 1991. Led by the Asian “tiger economies,” these economic spaces started emerging with double-digits growth based on a rapid industrialization and inexpensive exports to Western Europe and North America, which were also undergoing a strategic spatial and capital reconfiguration. State-planned economies and autarkies were abandoned in favor of a superficial control of the state over capital and capitalist production. The establishment of a market economy in China, emergence of East Asia as trading bloc (opposite to the European Union and North America), the world oil crisis of the 1970s and developments in the Western industrialized countries released the forces of capital into the next stage of globe-wide capital displacement as capital and state separated. This process we call present-day globalization.

2.5 The present-day spatial displacement

The production of commodities in the present-day, globalized capitalist economy is in many ways similar to the 19th century imperialist order; however, it possesses some rather different dynamics. As social anthropologist John Gledhill (1998) observes, capital today simply ignores state and national boundaries as the manufacturing process is no longer localized and centralized in one location, and production is now based on the distribution of components from one plant in a different part of the world to its final assembly into a finished product in a different location anywhere in the world (5). Consequently, capitalist production circuits are now critically dependent on information, communication and transportation technology to critically connect all the components of the production (ibid.). Most of the technologies and critical infrastructure are directly
provided by the corporations themselves; however, the vast array of auxiliary systems supporting the operations of global corporations still falls under the domain of host national governments and their national infrastructures, and ultimately, local hosting populations. So, from the perspective of economic integration of transnational capitalist production circuits, our world is truly globalized horizontally as most national and international boundaries simply do not correspond to the economic borders. Indeed, these vast global and supra-state capitalist production circuits have re-lineated the world in a much similar manner than did the nation-states in the post-Westphalian era.

The reallocation of capital and labor surpluses to manage such investments through spatial-temporal displacement, however, also requires the mediating help of financial and/or state institutions. Arguably, these supra-state institutions need to have the sufficient mediating capacity to support corporate operations generating production away from home bases. However, not only are they absent in numbers along the vector of corporations-governments, but they also perform in a single direction, or just in support of corporate interests internationally. As many neo-Marxist note, today, the host governments are increasingly becoming hostages of the foreign corporations they support in their own territory. In the 19th century global imperial economy, monarchs reluctant to balance the books of their proxies easily disposed of trading companies and corporations, but as Gledhill observes, in our time, however, governments must heed to the dictates of global corporations or face capital flight and disruptions in their economies. Even more destructive is the capacity of global financial markets to create temporary crises and devalue any nation’s assets overnight (5), which is in many cases more damaging and costly than any army could have done in the past.8 From this perspective, it is more than
evident that the present-day globalization clearly indicates that capital’s global economic capacity has simply outgrown the utility and, more importantly, the finite space of the nation-state, signaling the end of the state’s absolute control over spaces within its own continuum, or the so-called economic monopoly.

Labor-capital relations, however, still remain largely unchanged and tense as globalization radically magnifies the problem of managing relations between capital and labor since only the interests of capital are clearly imbedded in the foundations of the fewer transnational institutions of regulation that exist (e.g. the World Bank), in the absence of any, universal, Weberian, inter-state, global legitimate authority as well as any significant counterweight from transnational global labor movements. So, since the early 1970s, capitalist geography has steadily reconstructed and reproduced the historicity of global space to resemble the 19th century global imperial economy. As anthropologist and geographer Neil Smith (1998) notes, it maintained capitalist continuums of global-regional-national-and city level horizontal integrations but at the same time reconstructed and reproduced space to maintain vertical social divisions based on race, gender, class and sexuality.9 The deregulated, flexible labor markets and high international capital mobility have had disruptive effects on the social foundations of family in many local communities as many communities have also seen a rapid and significant degradation of social support services provided by government, resulting in even more social disruptions for the stressed out labor (Long 1996).10 Consequently, the asymmetry between labor and corporations becomes socially devastating as the state, as a critical balancer, no longer functions in that capacity but acts more as a referee and even enforcer. This then becomes

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9 Cited in Light and Smith (eds.), 1998. pp. 50-51
10 Cited in Moore (ed). 1996. p. 46
a critical issue as even Marx considered the state to be a critical mediating agency, a
necessary social mediator, even if at time it pursued the interests of capital (Harvey 2001: 281).

On the surface, globalization may appear as a zero-sum game in which one community’s loss is another’s gain as capital deconstructs and reconstructs within the single continuum to maintain profitability. However, as Gledhill and neo-Marxists point out, the simple disappearance of jobs from region is much more complex on a systemic level because the effects are “generational,” or caused by the micro stress to the family structure under the weakened state and labor-capital imbalance. Consequently, the regional disruptions in social mobility become more permanent and, more importantly, global-wide, as capital needs to remove more labor from other regions causing even further social stress in the regions affected. As a result, labor migrations then become structured not according to market demand but according to the old racial and neo-colonial ideologies (Gledhill 1998: 6). This trend is not only visible in Western countries, but also in the emerging trade blocs of the South and East Asia, which are also absorbing great numbers of migrant workers from their own peripheral and poorer regions, so they can maintain their own supply to the imperial centers in Western Europe and North America. Therefore, the global cities of today are increasingly becoming centers of global inequality based on a fused hierarchy of class, race and gender. Service industries in these cities that are built on a deep global horizontal integration also maintain visible and invisible barriers denying access to ladders of social promotion based on a profound vertical separation. All this ultimately leads to the conclusion that, in the environment of globalization and increased transnational interdependence, culture, race, ethnicity,
language or religion are indeed becoming global classes of what Marx would define as the emergent capitalist universal empire (Ashley and Orenstein 1995: 379).

For the disadvantaged global labor movement, very few instruments remain available in the struggle against global capitalist forces. But some neo-Marxists including Eric Hobsbawm, suggest that labor needs to reevaluate its strategic worldview in the new global economic order. One of the proposed realignments is to form an unholy alliance with the Right, or the centering of politics around citizenship and the nation. As Hobsbawm elaborates, “the European Left began when a class, or a class alliance, decided to declare itself ‘the nation’ as against the minority of the ruling class, thus creating the very concept of political ‘nation’”(Hobsbawm 1996: 45). But sociologist Todd Gitlin goes even further by declaring that “what is Left if it is not, plausibly at least, the voice of the whole people? … If there is no people, but only peoples, there is no Left”(Gitlin 1995). Yet, this seems impractical in a world where the nation-state itself is increasingly under attack on many fronts: porous and eroded borders, global environmental crises and the inability of the state to deal adequately with issues of global importance. The agency of the state seems like a poor vehicle for the interests of global labor when the state itself bows most of the time to the interests of global capital while at the same time waging a seemingly hopeless war against sub-state actors in the so-called global “War on Terrorism.” In many ways, liberal democracies may have indeed become silent dictatorships of the majority interested only in the accumulation of wealth and social power, while ordinary citizens have to cope with a swollen bureaucratic apparatus and failing government services that only support the interests of capitalist production domestically and abroad.

11 Cited in Hobsbawm, 1996. p. 45
On the surface, globalization does offer some advanced venues for the reestablishment of the balance of power between global capital and labor. Information age technologies, as well as communication and transportation technology do not benefit only global capital circuits and corporations, but they are also a “force multiplier” even for the disadvantaged sub-state actors. With the new communication and information means, local, marginalized groups can map themselves on the global grid and as such inform spaces even if not reconstructing in the way them in the way capitalist geography does. In fact, the most critical capacity of the global transnational migrants is to become the message itself, and as such, physically relay their message between any two points in the global grid. As Kerney argues, the transnational migratory capacity (as the medium of the message) remodulated the politics of ruralism at the very moment when the “peasantry,” the way it existed in the past, was nearing extinction in many places around the world (Kerney 1996: 7).

Notwithstanding the above, it is important to stress that critical information infrastructures and industries, on which critical social messages travel, remain firmly the under control of global corporations. The key media industries that invent and produce critical cultural information and, what Foucault called, the “truth,” are located primarily in the West with the sole objective of supporting a type of electronic imperialism currently pursued by Western corporate powers, most notably the U.S. In many places around the world, they are the only beacons of information as the critical infrastructure like the information superhighway, satellite television etc., remain firmly under Western

12 International terrorists or substate actors have been utilizing these technologies effectively in their war against states. Al-Qaida terrorist network used electronic mail as its primary means of communication as well as satellite phones. In Al Qaeda suspect reveals communication strategy, CNN U.S. Posted on August 4, 2004. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2004-08-03/us/terror.threat_1_al-qaeda-terror-targets-web-sites?_s=PM:US
corporate control. Culturally, these media symbols impose meanings on people, households, family, religious orders and youth advocating active changes to indigenous lifestyles, attaching, what Durkheim would define as “subjective meanings” to the concepts they promote (Wutnow 1989: 11). Therefore, any critical social messages coming out of regions in distress that are attempting to relay to a larger global audience are inevitably bound to have their meaning distorted and subjectified, in many cases rendering them largely useless.

2.6 The “new labor”

A new type of tension seems to be emerging in the class struggle between the transnational elites and global labor. While manufacturing workers are still at the forefront of the struggle against corporations, a potentially new force is emerging out of the developing information age, one that is not alienated from the means of production, as Marx argued, but critically bound to it. Arguably, labor has never been a unified body, and within it there was and continues to be class division according to occupational hierarchy, which is further stratified according to privileged subgroups. In the 19th century, factory workers were often at the leadership of labor struggle, just as skilled technicians were during most of the 20th century. Today, however, the critical component of labor’s potential leadership is vested in the road workers that are building and maintaining capital’s so-called information superhighway, a critical infrastructure on which the entire global capitalist system of production is rested. The information age capitalism has created a new class of workers upon whom it critically relies and depends in many aspects relating to information production, processing and transmission. The
ultimate dependence of corporations on information technology (IT) workers is evident in
today’s capitalist production circuits, and marks what neo-Marxist Ursula Huws labeled
as the emergence of the cyber-proletariat, or the “cybertariat.”

This new class of workers, although fragmented, highly disorganized and mostly
integrated with general labor movements, could rightly be called a class on its own, or a
class within a class, because of its asymmetrical relationship to capital’s critical
information space as well as to the rest of labor. This segment of labor also has the
greatest potential to develop a Marxian “class conscious” in an increasingly globalized
capitalist economy because of its centrality in the capitalist production circuit, its location
within the labor and its connection to present-day critical technologies. As
communication theorist Christian Fuchs elaborates, cyberspace has also become cyber-
battlespace as “human actors cooperate in cyberspace in order to attack the information
infrastructure of or to criticize their opponents” (Fuchs 2008: 284). Furthermore, even if
this segment of labor is a “spatially and temporally distanced and disembodied form of
social protest, it is nevertheless networked, and most importantly globally
distributed” (285).

For the reestablishment of balance of power between global capital and labor, the new
emerging cybertariat will most certainly have a critical role to play in this global struggle.
Corporate interests have, however, already recognized this new labor threat and are
correspondingly offshoring and outsourcing their operations to less regulated markets, in
which India is emerging as a critical global power. Thanks to its highly skilled local
population, the widespread national use of the English language and low labor wages,

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India is increasingly becoming a weapon of global corporate interests in a struggle to subdue transnational labor in the IT sector.

In many ways, capital-labor relations of the 21st century are starting to increasingly look like the “19th century with computers.” In his study of the workplace in the Silicon Valley in California, social scientist Chris Benner showed that the global centers for innovation and production of the most critical commodity of our time (i.e. information) are no longer centers of workers’ prosperity and security, but centers of long hours, temporary employment and places in dire need of strengthened bargaining for wages and labor conditions (Benner 2002: 38). Granted, this does not reflect the appalling conditions of some of the manufacturing jobs in the developing countries or some of the service sector jobs in the so-called “global cities” of the industrialized countries, however, whether the cybertariat will gain “class consciousness” and assume a more active position and even a leading role within the global labor movement in the restoration of the global balance between capital and labor remains to be seen.

But why is the cybertariat critical in the global struggle of labor against capital? According to Huws, resistance by the cybertariat is less likely to be expressed in traditional organizations like labor unions and in more conventional means of labor struggle, but rather “in more sporadic and anarchic forms, such as writing of viruses or other forms of sabotage” (Huws 2003: 176). From this perspective, the cybertariat provides a critical link between spaces of resistance through the computer medium: young people concerned for our environment and human rights, ecological and Greenpeace protestors, political dissidents and peace activists; however, more importantly, it can link the spaces in so-called Third World countries with movements in
the so-called developed countries.\textsuperscript{14} As Hardt and Negri write in the opening of \textit{Empire}, “the creative forces that of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges”\textsuperscript{14}(Hardt and Negri 2001: xv). So, the very forces that sustain the flow of capital through global space and between spaces, the bloodline of the global imperial economy, are also capable of subverting and autonomously constructing alternative networks of resistance of global ideas and potential.

Still, the greatest potential of the cybertariat is its capacity to engage in so-called \textit{cyberterrorism} (a controversial and contested term), which could paralyze entire systems and cause enormous material damages to corporate profits. The reporting media, however, rarely questions underlines the social messages underlining these attacks and instead focuses on the material damage incurred to both corporate profits and infrastructure. In his analysis of these activities, Internet pundit Sandor Vegh defines the typology of these activities in cyberspace and locks them in three broad categories: awareness/advocacy, organization/mobilization and action/reaction (Vegh 2003: 72).\textsuperscript{15} The typology of cyber activities, or more importantly the vector of initiative on which these categories is based, remind us that capital’s \textit{production} of means of production also create new means of self-destruction. As capitalist production circuits create new spaces and new labor pools upon which it critically depends in the production process, but the capacity to control them remains relatively partial and even weak. As Hardt and Negri point out, there is a very fine line between the Empire and the counter-Empire, and those

\textsuperscript{14} For example, \textit{The Electronic Disturbance Theatre} (EDT), a virtual online community, supports the struggle of the Mexican Zapatistas by “electronic civil disobedience.” See Fuchs \textit{Internet and Society}, 2008. p. 285.

\textsuperscript{15} In McCaughey and Ayers (eds.) \textit{Cyberactivism}, 2003. p. 72
fine lines are ultimately symbolized by the cable lines that IT workers stretch across our global space.

Although not all forms of cyberspace struggles are generally associated with the tensions between global capital and labor, they could nevertheless be understood from this perspective as resistance by labor-associated forces to globalization and global spatial displacement of capital in our time. Even though computer hacking and virus writing may have different motivations behind them, they inevitably expose just how vulnerable capital is from its arch enemy labor, primarily in some of the critical industries such as the IT industry. Damaging of the crops and breaking of farm tools by the American slaves in colonial United States, industrial sabotages by factory workers in the early stages of industrial development of 19th England, as well as illicit breakings into computer systems by teenagers in our time, all define capital’s ultimate vulnerability in the profit-making process to the problematic “other” while simultaneously critically depending on it. Deconstruction and reconstruction of the two antagonists will remain a constant process as neither will capital be able to subdue labor nor will labor be able to (successfully) dispose of capital in our present global economic universe. However, what will be possible with the current potential residing in IT workers is the creation of a state of better balance rather than an overwhelmingly predatory marriage of capital and labor that currently characterizes the process of globalization. The workers of future critical industries, such as the IT sector, will be the key determinants of this process as they will define whether the ongoing information revolution will ultimately benefit corporate interests or serve greater social good. In this process, however, Marxism will still remain the critical programming language of this discourse.
2.7 Conclusion: The Empire strikes back or striking back at the Empire?

As we look towards the restoration of balance of power between global capital and transnational labor, this chapter argued that the very technological advances that allow capital to exploit and dominate labor are at the same time capital’s weakest link. It was also argued that capitalism’s innate nature is generally expansive, whether temporal (historicity) or spatial (globalization). As more and more goods, services, workers, social divisions, and consumers are manufactured, the acquired surpluses are in need of new spaces for dumping or disposal, which in return need more spaces, and so on. Subsequently, new spaces and consumers are manufactured, and the present discourse of globalization seems to be doing so. By consuming all available natural resources, capital potentially creates armies of adversaries as it threatens to reach its natural limits to its own growth and as it stretches the fabric of space so thin to a point of tearing. And this is exactly where neo-Marxists see potential sites of resistance or in slowing down the spread of globalization as capital allows for the fabric of space to properly heal. In essence, there lays the paradox because, as the neo-Marxists are quick to point out, all the past agencies that caused social suffering (trade barriers, nationalism, religion, nation-states, military/security alliances, trading blocs, etc.) now all act as buffers against the tidal wave of global capitalism and the unlimited powers of corporations.

However, capitalism’s Achilles’ heel will always remain the corporations’ ultimate dependence upon the problematic “other,” or labor. Class composition may be in a state of flux, but the very dependence of capital on labor ultimately prevents it from completely destroying it. By realizing its role and organizing accordingly, the coming cybertariat, which is seemingly not alienated from the means of production, can use its
own creative capacity on which capital critically depends to determine a more equitable distribution of common global resources that would benefit everyone rather than just the few. By doing so, the cyberteriat could be at the forefront of the struggle of labor with global capitalism to achieve a more equitable balance of power between the exploiters and the exploited.

Globally, however, there needs to be a sufficient cross-understanding between the military and the old structures of power linked to nationalism and nation-states to maintain the shape of the world that we have known through most of the 20th century to prevent corporations from becoming the new “governments” of the 21st century. Merging labor power with some of these forces is another way of countering the forces of global imperial order, especially in the so-called Third-World countries, or developing nations. Whether an alternative system inspired by social tradition can emerge on local levels depends on whether socialist forces are willing to devote more attention to non-conventional means of struggle for the mobilization of the cybertariat and other new forces. The long and protracted war of the American state with the so-called “global terrorists” has shown that non-conventional, although generally disapproved of methods can be used to develop a balance against overwhelming forces.

And finally, by redirecting the vectors of exploitation from a spatial to a temporal dimension or by forcing capital to invest more in infrastructure in the regions of exploitation is another way of redirecting the exploitation into more positive social development. Reviving statism and extreme nationalism can have more positive effects for developing countries than just the rush to jump on the globalization wagon, as is the case with the present expansion of the European Union. Dissolving borders to the free
movement of people is also a way of dissolving barriers to exploitation. By strengthening the agency of the nation-state as a protective shell in the developing countries and renegotiating more equitable distribution of benefits from the exploitation of common global resources is perhaps the only viable way for the development of a more equitable global society of nations and cultures.
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Can geography annihilate history?

Presently, the true meaning of globalization and, more importantly, global education remains indefinable and challenging for critical civic education. The sheer volume of scholarly work on the subject only adds to the confusion. What’s more, most researchers approach the question in terms of the *internationalization* of state affairs without analyzing the hidden processes. Correspondingly, global citizenship education is treated as the internationalization of state citizenship education, or its “evolution” into a global citizenship education program.

The problem, however, with this type of approach is that this process inevitably leads into a type of cultural imperialism when introduced into national curricula. Globalization does not have the same meaning everywhere in the world so global citizenship education is eventually bound to turn into a contested ground, which then becomes dominated by those who are able to impose their own values, socially or technologically, over a wider global space. Just as media control has been critical for nation-states and regimes to control the channels on which social messages travel, control of global media channels (e.g., Internet, satellite television, etc.) also becomes critical for the builders of a global state and society.

This seems to be one of the main messages to the educators by social scientists and education theorists Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur, who in their book “Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New Imperialism” stress the reluctance of educators in graduate schools of education and teacher education programs to engage in political and ideological debates over the current social, political, and economic crisis of
capitalism” (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2005: 6). Even more problematic, than just remaining silent on the issue, is that most educators choose to teach global education that reflects their own personal values and education background, which not only produces differentiation in understanding of global education within the same school boards, but can potentially produce considerable differentiation even within the same schools and programs (Horsley and Bauer 2010: 425).

Looking again critically at the notion of global citizenship education, the question of space and spatiality sooner or later resurfaces in the analysis. As Kymlicka has noted, it becomes increasingly difficult to elaborate a more defined global education citizenship curriculum in the absence of a global politico-institutional structure, or space, on which to rest the educational process in the manner state citizenship education is implemented at present time (Kymlicka 2003). The issue becomes even more complicated when competing ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism and social democracy are introduced and infused into curriculums, which just reinforces the notion that global versus national citizenship is not a political issue but a cultural one.

McLaren and Farahmandpur, though, seem to understand the criticality of the issue of cultural homogeneity better than Hardt and Negri, authors of the seminal work “Empire.” As McLaren & Farahmandpur state, there cannot be any Empire without global cultural homogenization. However, the sheer fact that states (United States in particular) are still standing in power denies the premise of an emergence of a universal empire (emphasis added). 16 States and, in particular, nation-states have been the main agents of culture protection against imperialist forces of homogeneity and monoculturality for centuries, so despite global capital’s impressive victory over any other economic system or systems

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16 McLaren and Farahmandpur, Teaching Against Global Capitalism, 2005. p. 3.
(such as the command economies of the Communist bloc in 1989), global capital has still not been able to dispose of global cultural diversity, on which the current system of nation-states is built.

To better understand these processes, however, we need to look at the historicity of nation-states and their struggle to achieve absolute monopoly and control on their territories and over all other spaces. In this process, some states (particularly in Western Europe) were able to assimilate the entire universes within their territories by establishing absolute control and monopoly. Other states, on the other hand, were not so successful in their state-building projects. Furthermore, some states were able to negotiate a social contract with their predecessors and establish a partial supremacy, which consolidated or weakened over time. A number of states, however, were not able to prevail over other competing spaces on their territory, and these states today constitute regions of endemic violence. Consequently, it is safe to assume that, in a similar manner, globalization will not diffuse equally around our planet and the places where it will take deep roots are the places of concentration of global capital’s domination.

So, what is the critically revolutionary pedagogy according to the authors that oppose Hardt’s and Negri’s “Empire,” or what is the critical theory that needs to be introduced in classrooms for civics teachers? Critical revolutionary pedagogy, or critical civic education of the future, is an entity of:

“cross-border” social movement unionism aimed at organizing and supporting the working classes and marginalized cultural workers in their efforts to build new international anticapitalist struggles along the road to socialism” (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2005: 3)
And this is exactly the paradox that McLaren and Farahmandpur cannot seem to avoid or address properly. Undeniably, it is not only that empires and Empire fall into a trap of global homogenization (economic, cultural, technological, etc.), but so do counter-empires. To create a balance with global capital, labor must unite along the Marxian lines of “workers of the world, unite!” However, this process of bringing all the labor movements together would essentially become an imperial project in itself. As postcolonialists have noted before, stratification of labor along euroimperial lines becomes an inevitable process whenever labor movements from around the globe are involved together in a common global struggle, which essentially brings us back to square one, that is, the inevitability of cultural and value-laden neo imperialism.

3.2 When history becomes geography: Globalization and spatial theories

David Harvey’s “Spaces of capital: Towards a Critical Geography” takes the argument about globalization even further by explaining the organic nature of capitalism. This largely explains the main reason why global capital holds an upper hand in its worldwide struggles with labor. If seen from an organicist perspective, capital is disseminated – it then grows both in space and time continuum and disseminates again to new spaces, and so on. Thus, it most certainly holds an advantage over labor and, more importantly, the grouping of global labor movements, which themselves must contend with internal hierarchies, divisions, rankings and other processes that divide rather than unify.

It is critically important to understand the relationship between power and space in any analysis relating to globalization as space or geography appears to homogenize (as
exemplified by the current globalization) as opposed to time, which seems to diversify (e.g., the world’s cultural diversity). As Foucault explains:

The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development… The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space… One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics oppose the pious descendants of time and the determined inhabitants of space (Foucault 1986: 22).

Understanding how history is created, undoubtedly gives us insight into how inequalities are constructed, maintained and passed further along the vector of time. Therefore, the assimilation of this body of knowledge relating to space and spatial geography should be a main goal for any analysis aiming for an emancipatory and practical theoretical framework of resistance. However, even if geography may not have yet displaced history at the core of postmodernist critical thought, today more than ever, the meaning of space hides more than it reveals making the construction of human geography slightly more critical than making of the human history within the condition of postmodernity. As a result, critical studies of social justice have experienced a radical “spatial-turn,” witnessing a proliferation of academic research into how privileges and oppressions are maintained rather than inherited. And in today’s world, as globalization demonstrates, privileges, power and oppression are projected more intensely along horizontal vectors rather than just vertically, or through time. Therefore, in today’s classrooms, more than ever, it is critical that teachers have a critical knowledge and understanding of “space” and the concept of spatiality rather than just a good grasp about history.
3.3 Globalization and teacher agency

In Canadian academic research, the concept of citizenship has been a contested term for quite some time. However, the idea about global or world citizenship has only been brought to the fore in recent decades by technological revolutions in information and media which gave birth to, what Marshall McLuhan famously coined in 1962, “the global village.”\(^\text{17}\) The sheer volume of information flooding into our lives about global and local issues from elsewhere has created a feeling of a world becoming physically smaller and culturally more homogeneous. In the early 19th century, ships sailed across the Atlantic in about six weeks carrying information physically. In just a little more than a century later, information travels instantly through the Internet between any two points on the globe. This kind of social empowering means that people are now enabled to exert changes on a wider, global level even if only through information exchanges.

The sheer amount and availability of information, however, has brought into question the quality of information and, most importantly, the critical importance of education, in particular teacher agency, as a way of building capacity among national citizens to manage and process the vast flow of information properly. Here, the term “properly” means that terms such as “citizens” and “citizenship” no longer are the contested terms but rather the term teacher agency becomes contested. In multinational, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-racial countries such as Canada this becomes profoundly problematic and even more difficult to resolve.

Social theorists and educators Mark Evans and Cecilia Reynolds outline this new approach in their work “Educating for Global Citizenship in a Changing World,” which is a collection of practical teacher’s resources designed to help educators, parents and policy-

\(^\text{17}\) For the concept and definition of “global village” see McLuhan The Gutenberg galaxy, 1962
makers better understand citizenship within today’s global context. The ideas and practices were developed primarily by practicing teachers and teacher educators in their own school settings and, as such, could be said to reflect the state of civic education in Canada today.

The book’s thesis is simple and straightforward: we are all global citizens by virtue of living in this world, or as Audrey Osler defines it as:

“…an increasingly interdependent world, where the action of ordinary citizens are likely to have impacts on others’ lives across the globe. In turn, our lives, our jobs, the food we eat and the development of our communities is being influenced by global developments. It is important that young people are informed about the world in which they live and provided with the skills to enable them to be active citizens and to understand how they can shape their own future and make a difference. Education for living together in an interdependent world is not an optional extra, but an essential foundation.” (Evans and Reynolds 2004: 6).

Educators Graham Pike and David Selby go even further by stating that “Worldmindedness is no longer a luxury but a necessity for survival in the new millennium,” (ibid) which reflex the prevailing thinking that global citizenship is not merely an idealistic image but something closer to physical reality. From this perspective, global citizenship education is linked not so much to the teacher agency but to the agency of individual, or the social/emotional self. Most global citizenship educators today believe that it is precisely the development of this personal dimension, the notion of inner good and the capacity to help others around us, that should be the ultimate goal of any citizenship education. From this perspective then, it could be understood that global citizenship education becomes not so much a citizen’s obligation but our moral responsibility toward our planet and home because by helping our planet, we creating our own senses of worthiness.
Some of these convictions, however enlightened, could raise immediate objections. As it will be argued in the next chapter, the present-day “civilizing” mission of the global educators bears striking similarity to the past mission of the Anglo-American Puritans who viewed themselves as beacons of light in the then-dark, un-colonized North American continent. As critical education theory research shows, global citizenship educators tend to be generally dismissive of different realities and tend to teach the subject in a rather uniform manner and according to their own personal worldviews, as mentioned earlier in chapter 1. Therefore, teaching about global citizenship education without a clear sense of what the global polity may or may not be then becomes a very problematic issue.

In this chapter, we began by looking at the spatiality of the emerging critical theory of space literature and scholarly research and how they relate to globalization, global citizenship education and most importantly, teacher agency. Findings in the literature relating to spatiality, personal geography and teacher agency as well as problems and tensions they create are also been examined as they all provide a healthy foundation for analyzing the challenges and achievements of global citizenship education. However, they also point us toward a need for a more comprehensive understanding of critical theory especially in the field of education.

Therefore, in the following chapter, we will start looking at some of those hidden process behind space and spatiality from a critical gender perspective and how space is perceived by those who don’t necessarily fear the discourse of globalization, or those who feel a missionary obligation towards the rest of the world.

4.1 New America and the superfrontier

In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau declared the American frontier as officially “closed.” For nearly three centuries, since the arrival of the first white European settlers to the continent, the American frontier was a central agency in sustaining the identity of white Anglo-American manhood. The existence of an area of free land and its continuous recession due to settlement and exploration, man’s contest with nature and wilderness, and Anglo-American colonization of the vast space was critical to the identity-making process of Anglo-American hegemonic power.

This chapter argues that the present American hegemonic power is experiencing a crisis of identity within the so-called postmodernist conditions that have emerged at the threshold of the 21st century. It also argues that the frontier, or at least its concept, historically has been the most critical agency for creating and sustaining Anglo-American hegemonic masculine power and identity. Therefore, in the absence of such mythological space, there is an even greater need for the creation of such agency, the one I term the superfrontier. This agency, or more precisely, this space, is being formed by twining two critical discourses at the present time, the processes of globalization and the so-called “War on Terrorism.” The creation of such a space, real or imaginary, reflects the need of Anglo-American hegemonic forces to manufacture such space as a socializing agent in order to sustain dominance within a growing American global superpower through the 21st century. As then President George W. Bush announced in his speech in 2004, “America's history is and will be always [emphasis added] built on a desire to open new
frontiers and to seek new discoveries.”¹⁸ These powerful words of the former American president are reminiscent of what another American statesman, Lewis Cass, said more than 150 years ago on the eve of American colonization of the West: “We want almost unlimited power of expansion. That is our safety valve”(Greenberg 2005: 18). Two centuries later, the American global empire still rests on the power of the frontier, a super-agency that would create and sustain the American imperial superstructure through most of the 21st century.

4.2 Frontierism in American history and psyche

Some of the most critical pages of American history schoolbooks have been assigned to the subject of frontiers and the socio-economic factors producing them. Ever since the first contact between the Native Americans and colonizing Europeans, American history schoolbooks and governments have been preoccupied with the nature of frontiers, their creation and their maintenance. Most of American traditional scholarship on the concept of frontiers comes from notable American historians Jackson Turner, Herbert Eugene Bolton and Walter Prescott Webb, of which Turnerian frontierism deserves special attention.¹⁹

Turnerian frontierism, or a type of a raw, distinctive egalitarian democracy that best captures the Anglo-American national character and that was best portrayed and personified by legendary actor John Wayne in the mid-twentieth century John Wayne, has been historically the most dominant frontier ideology on the American frontier. By 1932, the time of Turner’s death, most leading American history departments and schools

were teaching courses about American frontier history as defined and formulated by Turner. This ideology also served as an important springboard for hundreds of scholarly works that gave American historians the necessary tools to create a workable national mythology based on the social, economic and political developments from the American frontier.

The agency of frontier and the values it embraced were ideally suited for the development of what gender historian Amy Greenberg called American “primitive masculinity” (Greenberg 2003: 9). This type of gender identity represented an ideal type, or an identity highly desirable for and coveted by white American men in the 19th century America because it socially reengineered gender, race and class from a position of white man’s superiority. This ideal was also in line with the 19th century social-Darwinist thought and the typology of a frontier hero as it was believed that white frontiersmen possessed the physical and sexual prowess to dominate women and men of “lesser” races and of lower economic classes due to their resilience to the harshness and inhospitality of the wilderness and endemic violence, and with their capacity to take advantage of enormous economic opportunities on the frontier.

As Greg Grewell notes, when, in 1882, “George S. Wilson, First Lieutenant of the Twelfth U.S. Infantry,” then a military historian, “proposes the organization of a reservations for Pima Indians, one that would become the model for colonizing other tribal peoples,” Wilson was reflecting on what was considered to be one of the principal beliefs of white frontiersmen about the rest of the world: *colonize or be colonized.* (Grewell 2001: 25) In many ways, Lt. Wilson and his contemporaries perceived the

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20 A large research exists on the controversy over Turner’s frontier thesis. For major attacks and defenses of his work see Billington, The Frontier Thesis, 1966.
frontier as an important social responsibility, or as an important social space that needed to be colonized and, as such, civilized for the Anglo-American race based on a Darwinian hierarchy of races. As Greenberg explains, the Anglo-American colonists saw themselves as a “city upon a hill” and “as a beacon of light for all less blessed people” living on the vast North American continent (Greenberg 2003: 20)

This legitimizing ideology of white American settlers had been already built earlier by the Anglo-American Puritans who believed that the settlement of the New World was their “civilizing” mission. Such ideology proposed that colonization of the American frontier was legitimized by God itself because the Creator intended for all the lands to be cultivated to serve Man, and since the Native Americans, although they may have been the first inhabitants in North America, were a hunting and gathering society, and in essence nomads, they were not the legitimate owners of the American land. Their rights were, according to Puritanism, merely that of tenants. Also, they needed a custody agency of protection (the reservations), which was to be created for them by the newly arrived Anglo-American custodians. Conclusively, the “true” ownership of the vast North American continent was, therefore, vested in the Anglo-American land cultivator.21

So, from this perspective, the frontier and ideology of frontierism with its recurring and cyclical “savage wars” served an important social identity-making and, most importantly, spatial function in the formation of the United States. The agency of the frontier was a social distributor and mediator of privileges for men, women, classes and races in the emerging American society. In this context, the frontier, or what Lefebvre called the creation of “perceived space,” was a mythological three-dimensional space

where white American men could unify in celebration of their social power. Therefore, it provided the vital racialized space in which white American men, ordinarily struggling through socio-economic and other transformations, could find their redemption and rediscovery of their identities. On the frontier, all men rode together, regardless of class, took parts in gunfights, lassoed cattle and shot at “Injuns,” participating in, what many American historians including Turner, called the raw *frontier democracy*. Frontiers, from this perspective, offered a limitless and timeless opportunity, complete with what Slotkin called “regeneration through violence” potential for the white American men, far greater than any other social agency (Slotkin 2000). As Anderson has explained, the ability of nationalism to turn “chance into destiny” is dependant of men imagining a community or nation “as a deep horizontal comradeship,” regardless of “actual inequality and exploitation.” (Anderson 1991: 7). Therefore, the frontier, and its ideology of patriarchal frontierism, has been critical in transforming the American gender-based system of domination into a social formation of class and hierarchy of races, in which the white frontiersmen genderized the Native Americans they encountered in order to legitimize their colonization. In essence, the gender dynamic was at the core of what propelled American penetration westward toward the Pacific Ocean.

Race was also critical to the understanding of America’s civilizing mission on the frontier. In the absence of an organized state, law and regulations, and in a space of difficult living conditions, violence was endemic on the frontier and the law and power of white American frontiersmen reigned supreme. Economic opportunities were abundant as mining and cattle herding offered in most cases good and profitable returns. Coupled with the aforementioned social conditions, there was very little contestation of the social
power and domination of white American men. In essence, within the stateless
dimensions of the frontier and the fluidic boundaries of the emerging American polity, a
sense of racial superiority, based on a fictional horizontal Anglo-American brotherhood,
was vested in the white frontiersmen.

4.3 Redemption on the Red Frontier

At the beginning of the 20th century, a number of powerful influencing factors on
frontierism were coming from Western Europe, which was experiencing a deep and
significant social upheaval. As Conell notes, this was a period of fundamental
transformation of the hegemonic forms of Euro-American masculinities. Political
instabilities, industrialization and, most notably, the growth of the bureaucratic state, all
contributed to the displacement of the form of primitive masculinity, which dominated
the 19th-century American frontierism, to a more calculative, rational and regulated
masculinity defined by businessmen and bureaucrats (Connell 1993: 611). As many
gender historians argued, the state and capitalist forces became hostile to the ideology of
frontierism in white settlers’ colonies like the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand because they wanted to encourage more family settlement, urbanization and
greater women’s rights in the age of rapid industrialization, or all elements that were
antithetical to white men’s frontierism. In essence, the growth of bureaucratic state and
monopoly capitalism demanded that the white American men invest their energies more
into building families, towns and cities, laying down the necessary industrial
infrastructure, and work in factories and businesses rather that just *run amok on the frontier and shoot at Indians.*

When, in 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau declared the American frontier officially “closed,” the closure was not due to the actual absence of physical or perceived frontier space, but primarily because of the changing nature of socio-economic factors in the world. As Malcolm Waters explains, most transformations of gender systems are exogenous since without those external factors the domination systems could stably reproduce themselves indefinitely (Waters 1989: 201). For Hoshchild and Machung, the “motor” of all these social changes that affect gender-based systems of domination are essentially economic as they relate primarily to the (perceived) decline of man’s purchasing power, the imbalance between skilled and unskilled jobs and, most importantly, growth in women’s rights and the subsequent “feminization” of jobs in important industries (Hochschild and Machung 2003: 269).

Connell also notes that economic changes in the early 20th were not only affecting the social but also the military sphere. The primary cause of such deep changes was the influence of new economic relations and their application in war. Mechanized warfare and, more importantly, mass armies became the primary tools of modern war in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. The consequence of this was not only that the institution of violence as an important dominant-gender-supporting process was not only separated from political and economic power, but it also became highly institutionalized and instrumentalized within the capacity of mechanized mass armies. This was the dawn of tanks, battleships and aircraft, in which raw physical strength was less important than

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22 Or follow their perceived “nature” as “boys will be boys.” See Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia in Cohen (ed.) Men and Masculinity, 2001. p. 30
technical expertise necessary to operate the weapons of war. As Prussian political
philosopher Carl von Clausewitz noted, violence was institutionalized, bureaucratized
and mechanized to the point where it became a social technique.\(^{23}\) This type of
organization of violence threatened the very agency of war in terms of gender
socialization. It de-emphasized the individual violence of men, particularly that of Anglo-
American frontiersmen, and replaced it with a more organized form of violence within
mass armies and mechanization, as men were socialized to fight as a part of a more
organic setting and not individually. As such, violence and its agency became far more
deceptive as men were no longer directly exposed to killings and destruction but
participated in it in knowledge that was easier to assimilate by a far greater number of
men regardless of personal physical strength and stamina. Such type of war was far more
conducive to formation of national identities forged in battle than the maintenance of a
gender-based domination through a system of violence. So, at the beginning of the 20th,
gender identity was increasingly taking a backseat to formations of nationalism and
national states in Western Europe and North America.

The end of the Second World War and the consequent emergence of the Cold War
continued to further diminish the power of white hegemonic forces in the United States.
As the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in an arms race, war as an important
utility and socializing agency for white American men continued to decline rapidly. The
technologization of warfare as an important instrument of violence, the advent of nuclear
weapons and the consequent “balance of terror” between the superpowers transformed
the nature of warfare into a kind of highly bureaucratized, institutionalized and
technologized environment in which very little actual physical violence happened. People

were killed en masse almost in the same manner as with capitalist production – a large, endless conveyor belt was bringing bodies into a giant war machine where they were efficiently slaughtered instantly and painlessly. The growth of destructive capacity of war through application of science to weapons, both in designing them and operating them, has given a new significance to a masculinity attached to a technical expertise rather than sheer brute force of pre-industrial warfare in colonial empires (Connell 1993: 609).

In the big picture, however, the U.S. economic muscle continued to grow during the Cold War. This initiated some very important socio-economic and technological transformations. The increase of quality of life in the U.S. led to a proliferation in the number of male professionals as an increasing number of men started to build their identity around their occupations. This technocratic type of masculinity that had already been developing in the military and modern 20th warfare became even more widespread in the American workplace with the accelerated growth of information technologies in the 1980s. These large-scale changes in the American economy and culture created a further distancing from the 19th hegemonic masculinity type embodied in the frontier heroes. As Connell points out, masculinity centered on physical dominance was becoming increasingly incompatible with the expertise masculinity (611). Donaldson further explains that hegemony, one of the most critical concepts coming from Gramscian philosophy, must be understood in terms of not only winning and holding of power in society, but, more importantly, also in terms of being able to control the emergence and destruction of social formations in process (Donaldson 1993: 609). Therefore, the ability of white American men to impose their definition of American society and, as such,
control the evolution of gender, race and class systems in the U.S. was largely denied by
the growing power of the bureaucratic state and that of corporate capitalism.

Techno-militarocrats in charge of the two world superpowers, both within the
capitalist ruling class in the United States as well as in the Communist Party elites in the
Soviet Union, grew increasingly frustrated about losing their control to these emerging
forces. Therefore, towards the end of the Cold War there was a nostalgic feeling within
the hegemonic masculine forces for the agency of the frontier, the one that unified all
aspects of American power. As Conell elaborates on this process, early in the 20th
century, a rupture began to emerge within the hegemonic masculinity of dominant white
Americans, or between masculinity centered on personal domination and the one
organized around knowledge and expertise that was emerging under corporate capitalism.
Lateral pressures from labor movements and early feminism, and within the conditions of
mass-scale industrial production, dominance and expertise masculinity separated from
one another and became two distinct strategies for defending patriarchal capitalism (613).
In many settings, these two types even became conflicting: business field management
versus office management, military war command versus peace command, practical
experience versus university experience, resulting in American political ideologies
becoming polarized and clustered around these masculine subdivisions (ibid.)

It was within this space of many subdivisions that a romantic nostalgia for the
frontier – a mythical space of salvation where all men are horizontally unified in
celebration of their manhood – emerged from a cultural production in the period after the
First World War. The emergence of this system of myths, designed to reconcile the
opposing ideologies and unify, again, white American manhood, manifested itself in
American cinematographic production at the beginning of the 20th, which ushered in the golden age of the American Western as a movie genre and a hot commodity in the American cultural export abroad. Even though by then the American frontier as a physical space has long ceased to exist, the cultural iconography in American society built around it continued to reproduce this mythological space and the heroic struggle on the frontier as an important social myth. Frontier genre was especially popular during the silent movie era; however, it really reached its apex during the height of the Cold War when the Western cinematographic phenomenon produced a myth of a physically strong but emotionally vulnerable cowboy-hero. This marked the emergence of what Slotkin dubbed the making of the “gunfighter nation,” an important socio-cultural myth that was an important representation of the American hegemonic masculinity abroad. The Wild West cinema, as a cultural phenomenon, transformed the past American-frontier experience, an otherwise bloody and costly colonizing project, into a kind of a glorious and fantastic, romantic national past (Horowitz 1976: 53). In this process, a powerful galaxy of masculine icons emerged that populated and dominated American culture and society, and, more importantly, exported the ideas of American hegemonic power to the rest of the world, until this cinematic genre declined under the onslaught of television in the 1960s.

The medium of television was even more important for the growing American power and position in the world after the Second World War. Domestically, though, American cultural production attempted to repair the rift between conservative/hardliners pursuing coercive strategies toward gender, race and lower economic classes and the liberals/reformers depending on technological success and economic growth to allow for

24 For more on this phenomenon see Slotkin Gunfighter Nation, 1992.
integrative strategies for race, gender and class. For Kimmel (2004), this was more of a
temporal gap, a clash between two ideal types from two different centuries, the 19th and
the 20th centuries. That is because the “true American was vigorous, manly, and direct,
not effete and corrupt like the supposed Europeans,” notes Wilkinson, who analyzes this
more as a spatial gap, as “he was plain rather than ornamented, rugged than luxury
seeking, a liberty loving common man or neutral gentleman rather than an aristocratic
oppressor or servile minion.” (Wilkinson 1986: 96).

This branching of the Anglo-American white manhood between the rugged frontier
hero and the aristocratic (and later technological/bureaucratic) types demonstrates how
frontiers are deeply lodged in the American psyche. An area of unbound space, sparsely
populated by inferior races and women, that offers unlimited freedom and economic
opportunities still remained the critical agency in sustaining the American hegemonic
masculinity ideology. Yet, even though the television media and popular literature and
popular literature continued the task of rebuilding the American national myth of a
cowboy/frontier hero, and in many ways took it to new and more powerful levels, the
mass culture produced by the Western movie phenomenon ultimately broke down and
almost completely dissolved by the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet
Union in 1991. It left American society in a laminal moment with people seeking a new,
or at least revised, national myth, a myth by which white American men would be able to
understand themselves and shape their place in the world. That moment came in 2001, on
September 11, when America and the rest of the world were stunned by the hijacking of
four passenger airplanes and the downing of those planes in New York and Washington,

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26 Cited in Murphy, ed. Feminism and Masculinities, 2004. p.192
D.C. This moment was a defining point, marking the emergence of a new American chapter in history: the creation of the American superfrontier.

4.4 American superfrontier: A force still in creation

“… the boundary between science-friction and social reality is [just] an optical illusion” (Harraway 1991: 149)

The enormous impact of the September 11 attacks on the U.S. extends beyond economics, the military, politics or geopolitics and deep into the social, cultural and psychological domain. Aside from far greater military, police or private-security presence in almost every pore of American life, the long-term effects of the 9/11 attacks are in essence spatial, particularly frontier-al. Some of the immediate post-traumatic terror management strategies, as American psychologist Bernard Carducci notes, were greater attention to home and family life, as well as church attendance, resurgence of religious ceremonies and an increase in patriotic feelings and expressions such as flag-flying. But more important were the religious and spiritual, or “God has a higher reason for the attacks,” and security symbolisms that took place in the aftermath of 9/11 (Carducci 2006: 200). In the American collective psyche, these symbols had existed for nearly a century and a half. They symbolized the occasional raids by Native Americans, nearly two centuries ago, on encroaching colonizing settlers’ villages and settlements in their desperate effort to stern the tide of the expanding American frontier.

When, in 1969, the U.S. launched Apollo 11 in response to the Soviet Union’s earlier launching of the first man in space, very few Americans saw this historical moment in connection with the crossing of the Atlantic Ocean by the first white English settlers several centuries ago. However, whereas the patriarchal system of domination was
relatively stable for the first English colonists in America, the social reality of the American race-gender system of domination in the 1960s and 1970s was truly a testing time for white American men. From the perspective of white American manhood, this was an era of social and political upheaval, turmoil and global conflict. The prospect for a stable and prosperous future defined by white, middle-class American men were rapidly diminishing. Women’s liberation movements were gaining in strength, as were the ideologies of the Left. Racial and class tensions were reaching an intolerable level in American inner cities. As Susan Alexander stresses, feminism, gay rights movements, racial and ethnic equality fronts, as well as military impotence during the Vietnam War, all contested the American hegemonic power as they contributed significantly to the erosion of domination of white American men (Alexander 2003: 539).

Another, perhaps greater, source of anxiety for white American men in this period was the fear of “getting crowded” in their own space. As Hodges explains, dire predictions of global overpopulation, and consequent economic and environmental devastation, fed by media footages of the Third-World countries, created a kind of Malthusian fear among white American men that their country was getting “smaller,” and the growing American population was on a brink of a major famine, and on the verge of being overrun by uncontrollable epidemics originating in the poorest countries of the world (Hodges 2003: 175). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the romanticizing for the agency of the frontier and its cleansing and regenerating properties resurfaced at the same time that the Western movie mythology-building was collapsing as a popular cultural genre.

Undoubtedly, this was a time of harsh social realities for white American men in the mid-20th century.

In terms of master social narrative, the emergence of the science-fiction genre about space exploration and colonization (by a brotherhood of men led by white Americans) has attempted to fill the gap left by the demise of the Western movie as a popular movie cultural genre. Although sociologists and scholars have struggled to define this new genre in terms of cultural iconography, which was based on some kind of fusion of technologies and social reality, or at least imagined future realities, sociologist Kingsley proposed that the hero of a science-fiction narrative is often the plot itself and that the main idea is for the plot to continue unfolding until it finally resolves itself (Kingsley 1960: 137). Therefore, as the plots of most science-fiction productions are generally heroic and seminal in essence, the motivation behind this type of cultural manufacturing was to snapshot the colonization narrative that so many American men were craving for in this period. However, as Suvin points out, the science-fiction message is meaningless without a proper “given socio-cultural context” or key to decode it as it cannot be read outside of it (Suvin 1982: 1). So, for most American men, the Western movie genre had a much greater socio-cultural understanding and appeal as it was recreated as a fiction based on a familiar historical past that created an understandable present and was led by a hero-frontiersman. The science-fiction genre, which was essentially an unfamiliar and confusing future populated by a technologically saturated human race in which everyone was equal regardless of their gender, race or class and which struggled with unearthly abominations in spaces beyond our imagination, did not have the same mass appeal.
The science-fiction cultural narrative has never quite delivered the expected cultural symbolism, as did the Western movie genre before it. Although the *Star Trek* television series with all the familiar elements of the frontier emerged as a major popular American cultural brand both at home and abroad, the culture phenomenon of this type of myth production, however, revealed and exposed the weakness of such agency. It is rather inconceivable for present-day white American hegemonic forces to project themselves into an idealistic future without the ghosts of frontierism and violence of the colonization. As Jameson notes, the industry of science fiction’s “deepest vocation is over and over to demonstrate and to dramatize our (American) incapacity to imagine the (peaceful) future” (Jameson 1982: 153). However, most science fiction “does not seriously attempt to imagine the ‘real’ future of our social system, rather its multiple mock futures serve the quite different social function or transforming our own present into the determinate past of something yet to come.” (ibid. 152).

The American frontier dream was reborn much later, on September 11, 2001, as the images of the hijacked civilian passenger jets crashing into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, traveled across the globe faster than any event before. By then, the elements of the American *superfrontier* had already been in place as the familiar terms such as “globalization,” “global economy,” “global village” as well as “global education” had entered our daily lives much earlier in the twentieth century.28 The existence of a vast, global area of free land and resources and its continuous recession due to exploitation and exploration, as well as the penetration of American colonization into vast planetary space were now all provided with the missing link, the familiar and

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28 For the concept and definition of “global village” see McLuhan *The Gutenberg galaxy*, 1962
regenerative violence on the frontier. So, for the second time in less than two centuries it was time to unpack the Stetsons and gun holsters again.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyze, through a gender-spatial temporal survey, the spatiality of power in American society in terms of social formation and domination of race and gender on such created space. It has tried to argue that, counter to the postmodernist notion of relational power, the nature of present-day American global power is fundamentally spatial, and more importantly, frontier-al, and at present time this has been reconstructed by twining the discourses of globalization and the “War on Terror.” Historically, and perhaps mythologically, this space has always been sustained by the agency of the so-called frontier, whereas traditionally, it has been always occupied largely by white Anglo-American men. The discussion in this chapter has shown that women and other races are occasionally granted access to this power but only on a “per-need” basis. From this perspective, it is argued that the space of the frontier has been, is and most likely will remain the source of power for any dominant social group in American society. Consequently, any American global power, future or present, cannot be conceived without addressing space and spatiality.

How we understand globalization, spatiality and power will remain a critical question as we enter the so-called postmodernist period of development. The superfrontier seems to bring together all the familiar conflations of colonization, conquest, gender and race differences, violence and the conquest, as well as other familiar concepts of the American security era. Paradox is that the term postcolonialism has never been an accurate
descriptor given the persistence of frontier impulses in human history and imagined realities as, clearly, colonization of the global frontier is still right ahead of us.

In the next chapter, we will look at space in a fundamentally different and unconventional manner, and through a critical postcolonialist lense. Postcolonialism is one of the most unorthodox critical thoughts when it comes to analysis of space and spatiality since postcolonialism as a social science discipline examines people that have been formally (or officially) *de-spaced*. However, as it will be evident at the end of the chapter, the process of *de-spacing* or *deterritorialization* of people is not what it appears to be on the surface.
CHAPTER 5: POSTCOLONIALISM: PUTTING A FACE TO GLOBALIZATION: GLOBALS, LOCALS AND TRIBAL PEOPLE IN WORLD CITIES

5.1 Transnational tribes and new territoriality

They are dominated spaces, the spaces of peripheries, the margins and the marginalized, the third worlds that can be found at all the scales, in the corpo-reality of the body and mind, in sexuality and subjectivity, in individual and collective identities from the most local to the most global. They are chosen spaces for struggle, liberation and emancipation (Soja 1996: 86).

In the human universe, the relationship between space and power is uncontested. Any space can be dominated by the stronger, whether it is material, ideational, economic, social or political, or any other space and reality human communities can exist. Therefore, it is not surprising that space has always been a dimension of human existence that has been contested between the powerful and the powerless.

In recent history, the social and technological revolution has produced an enormous amount of migration around the globe, with movements of people shifting from one physical space to another. Humans are migrating rural to urban areas, from one region to another and from one country to another, all seeking some form of membership in a larger group or social organization.

This chapter explores the migration of people from one country to another, or from one sovereign space to another. By moving from one physical space to another, or from one boundar(y)-ied territory to another, individuals are claiming new spaces as they violate other people’s territories, unless they are moving into empty lands. However, this has not been a case for thousands of years. So, the focus herein is on immigration from the impoverished countries to the industrialized nations. It is argued here that this phenomenon is an intentional, if not centrally planned, strategy of the weak nations to
reclaim some of the space denied to them in discourse of globalization and global capitalism. I define this phenomenon as *species-space*, building my theoretical framework on Marx’s notion of *species-being* and Henry Lefebvre’s geographical theory of body, particularly his philosophical thought on creative body as a critical part of the social process. As postcolonial theorist and culturologist Homi Bhabha reminds us, “it is not only the displaced who experience a displacement” within the postmodernist condition and discourse of globalization, but within the predatory environment created by the global capital forces, the *displaced* can also become *displacers*.

As postmodernist critical theory, particularly applied to gender and postcolonialist studies, seeks to reassert space and spatiality in social theory research, essentially countering what Marx called global capital’s ambition to “annihilate space by time;” I theorize that people can also counteract (if not annihilate) hegemonic spaces within the process of globalization by means of themselves as space and, as such, deterritorialize dominant spaces of globalization forces and global capital. As socio-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai notes “space is to globalization what time is to

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29 I define *species-space* as discourse within a discourse, or the discourse to the discourse of globalization itself, because it challenges the theory of globalization and the deterritorialization of people, communities and cultures. The logic of this argument is simple but sound. If we use the anthropological convention that every individual in society occupies approximately 0.64 square meters of personal, biological space, any diaspora/transnational community numbering about 100,000 members will claim approximately 64 square kilometers of territory (in biological space) for the community at any given time. The numbers become even more impressive if one calculates claimed spaces by average size diasporas (1 million and above), which would translate into 640 square kilometers of surface area. By comparison, St. Kitts and Nevis, the smallest country in the Western hemisphere has a surface area of 261 square kilometers, and Maldives, the smallest country in Asia, has a surface area of 300 square kilometers. Seychelles, the smallest country in Africa, has a surface area of 452 square kilometers. So, by this argument, an average-size diaspora/transnational community would be equal to a size of a small country within the host country at any given time. For anthropological definitions of personal, social and public spaces and the concept of *proxemics*, see Hall, *The Hidden Dimension*, 1990.


31 See Marx, *Grundrisse*, 1993, p. 539
modernity.” Similarly, I argue that within the postmodernist conditions of historicized globalization, *people can actually become space.*

While some may critique this premise of apparently objectifying living beings and equating people to “dead space,” I counter by arguing that postmodern cultural geography sees space neither as dead nor as static but a rather dynamic agency of identity creation and social change. Moreover, gender scholars and postcolonialists have successfully argued and “territorialized,” or “spatialized,” the body in their analysis before.

In this process of *deterritorialization,* which is done primarily through the formation and maintenance of so-called “transnational communities,” the powerless are also reclaiming some of the power connected to space and spatiality that has been denied to them by globalization and the unleashing of global capital. Bhabha notes that counter-hegemonic resistance can assume many shapes and forms as “counter-narratives of the nation” can erase boundaries and delineate spaces and thus disrupt a hegemonic nation-building of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” just as easy as they are forcefully created (Bhabha 1990: 300). Therefore, within the realm of space and spatiality of postmodernist conditions, the weak and powerless can use space, or the agency of *species-space,* as resistance against hegemonic forces of global capital, just as governments of most industrialized countries unchain global corporations for their assault on new markets and consumers. As it will be demonstrated throughout this study, the vector of globalization does not only need to exert pressure *from above* but can also generate counter-pressures *from below.*
This chapter’s treatment of immigration, as a form of space reclamation by the powerless, builds on postmodernist theories of space, in particular from human and cultural geography of Edward Soja’s and his theory of multiple spaces, as well as postcolonialist and globalization thoughts of Bhabha and Appadurai.

5.2 Postmodernist spatiality and theories of transnationalism

The last quarter of the 20th century is often identified by a majority of social scientists as a time of when monumental paradigmatic shift occurred from modernism to postmodernism. Although the actual timing of this shift may vary, there is an overall agreement that there was a fundamental political, economic, social and cultural change in the world that have pushed us into a new era, or that of postmodernism.

In the new paradigm, space and spatiality are awarded a critical role. Social space has emerged as a primary target of social science research because of the perceived decline of military, political and, in many ways, economic space. However, some social scientists, including Toulmin, argue that the meaning of space has not fundamentally changed so as to call for a shift between modern and postmodern paradigms based on changes in social spatiality. As Toulmin elaborates, the concept of space has only become more “humanized” under postmodernism and that very little has changed in the fabric of the social-space continuum, as the organized worlds inspired by Descartes and Newton still remain intact (Toulmin 1990: 180). Harvey disagrees, claiming that spaces and spatiality can be very useful in examining critical socio-cultural processes and sub-processes. Hence, according to Harvey, space and time or, more importantly, “time-space,” are fundamental dimensions of human experience whose meanings are derived from
dominant material processes (Harvey 2000). Therefore, the human construction of spaces and analogously their deconstruction are critically dependent on the social experience of the builders.

In the field of socio-spatiality research, Soja has developed some very convincing theories and framework-building on the development of human spaces. In his research, Soja has built on theories of Foucault and his concept of heterotopia (or the world of “Otherness”) and Lefebvre’s social production of space to create his own theory of parallel universes, or different spaces in which communities can exist. Thus, according to Soja, many communities can reside simultaneously in three distinct spatial domains: Firstspace, or the physical or perceived space; Secondspace, which is ideational or conceived space; and Thirdspace, or the space in which all realities converge (Soja 2000). From a perspective of critical theory, this is a very useful theoretical framework because it allows for a postcolonialist framework to merge with postmodernist spatial theories, thus permitting the concept of “Otherness” to locate itself in a more comfortable setting or space, even if it does challenge the binarism of “other-ing” from current critical theory framework. From this perspective, Soja’s theoretical framework is less predatory as it offers another dimension as a potential site for existence and resistance, which also aligns with the postmodernist notion of power being everywhere (and not just being concentrated in certain spaces).

So, according to Soja, the Firstspace is essentially the material space, or a space produced by our human activity. It is a world produced and reproduced by capitalist production and that of raw power, and, as such, it represents both the outcomes of our behaviors and experiences in the material world. In this space, most of the old power
structures remain strong: race, class, ethnicity, gender, etc. This is the space of old
capitalist-imperialist networks of power, hegemonic forces, global capitalism and
globalization. Here, resistance is futile because, as Marx noted, the means of production,
or, more precisely, the means of space production, are indisputably in the hands of the
strong. In essence, this is the world that we see, or, as Lefebvre calls it, the “real” space.
In this space, we can physically see, hear, taste, smell and touch our privileges or un-
privileges, and which is also a world or space where our mind makes us believe that the
human universe can be locked in a physical continuum of materiality.

Secondspace, however, is the space of ideas or mental space – a universe of unlimited
possibilities and opportunities. It is a representation of the hegemonic ideological world
obscuring social practices by rendering them invisible. It is also an ideational space that
is constructed by powerful ideas, dominant ideologies and coercive regimes, but also a
world of liberating thoughts, emancipation, empowering agencies, counter-narratives and
islands of resistance.

Finally, Thirdspace represents hybridness – the hybridic space – which is a distorted
amalgamation of the two other spaces, Firstspace and Secondspace, that is, physical and
mental. As Soja elaborates, Thirdspace is where reality completely breaks down as raw
power and powerful ideas interact in unimaginable ways. However, Thirdspace is more
than just a simple fusion of two different worlds or spaces. In the Thirdspace, all of our
human concepts converge and interact in unique ways: physical and ideational, global
and local, national and postnational, modern and postmodern. Samples of this space are
most visible in present-day economic sphere or the local retail and consumer spaces,
which are a direct result of local demand to global supply – a “glocalism” of kind.
Sprawling Asian shopping “Dragon” megamalls spread across North America, McDonald’s restaurants in every major city of mainland China, homeless people sleeping at night in front of glass lobbies of major skyscrapers in America – these are all samples of a growing architecture of Thirdspaces being constructed all over the world by breaking physical and cultural boundaries that delineate spaces. These emerging bubbles of Thirdspace all over the world are just one of many examples of the hybridic space that transcend traditional geographical and culturographical boundaries, or in the cases mentioned before, the convergence of spaces of the “East” with that of the “West;” a fusion of Said’s “Orientalism” and “Occidentalism.” It is in this continuum that we can also find the antithesis of globalization, and that of global tribes – communities of existence and resistance, which are local in origin but global in nature. We will explore this phenomenon in the following pages.

5.3 *Exist and resist: Transnational spaces and their origin*

In recent ethnographic and anthropological studies of recent immigrants and their hybrid identities, which are built based on their relationship to homelands, hostlands (countries of settlement) and kinship ties, space has emerged as a critical dimension and target study of social science research. Although the term “transnational space” has only recently emerged in social science studies and is most commonly used with a twist of “globalization” and “postnationalism,” transnational identities are not a recent phenomenon as historically this concept has been embodied in the term “diaspora.” The diaspora concept stretches back to ancient times and describes groups of people that have been dispersed from their native lands by forceful or voluntary expulsion. But, as Castle
argues, a recent surge in scholarly research on the subject is not due to an emergence of a rather new concept to define deterritorialized communities and cultures but due to the resurgence of old concepts tied to it, including colonialism, industrial expansion and nationalism, and most recently globalization, which are critically connected to the mass movement of people and goods between spaces (Castle 2002: 1144).

No general consensus, however, exists among social scientists about the terminological difference between the so-called phenomenon of transnationalism and diaspora. Some sociologists use the term diaspora to define people that have been scattered from their ancestral lands and who try to maintain some form of a communal identity in their new lands, the Jewish diaspora representing a classical template. Likewise, Richard Marienstras (1989) describes diaspora as any community that possesses the critical mass to make it socially visible in the hostlands, adding however, that “in order to know whether it is really a diaspora, time has to pass”(125) 32.

But in the age of globalization or globalization of localities, these concepts acquire new meanings, or in case of diasporas/transnationalism, new meanings of survival. So, given the criticality of identity politics for diasporas (as a mean of cultural survival), some postnationalists, including Yasmen Soysal, who researched the phenomenon of guestworker citizenship in Germany, propose that diasporas are nothing more than the mere extensions of nationalisms into other states’ nationalisms, or a kind of “foreign nationalisms” in recipient countries (Soysal 2000: 2). In many ways, this understanding of diaspora can be seen as a critical discourse to the nation-state model, as it challenges the connection between territory (space), people, culture and identity.

32 In Chaliland (ed). Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States, 1989
Social science scholars, however, have approached the concept of transnational space in very broad and sometimes different ways. Most definitions revolve around the ability of immigrants to sustain relationships and build social fields across spaces utilizing technological advances in the era of nation-state decline. As anthropologist and gender scholar Linda Basch elaborates in her study of Caribbean transmigrants, transnational space includes all processes of immigrants, both with homelands and hostlands, to sustain a viable socio-cultural community across geopolitical and cultural borders (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 2000: 5-6). These processes can include everything from economic import-export relationships and socio-cultural links to religious and political connections.

The complexity of relationships, however, is more than just a sum of homeland and host-land experiences, or transnationalism plus multiculturalism. These relationships can essentially be localized in Soja’s Thirdspace, as transmigrants form relationships that are neither hegemonic (Soja’s Firstspace) nor imagined (Soja’s Secondspace). Therefore, transnationals represent a critical discourse in the discourse of globalization itself as they operate in spaces and between spaces neither as settlers nor as visitors.

More recently, as social science scholars are revisiting diasporic spaces in their attempt to locate transnationalism/globalization in the age of liberalization of movement of people and goods across vast spaces augmented by a revolution in communication, transportation and information, as well as the restrictions of the previously mentioned discourse of the so-called global War on Terrorism, these concepts are regaining strength. Diasporic spaces and transnational identity-making is also gaining in strength on the ground what many social scientists, notably Soysal, call the emergence of *postnational*
rights – loyalties that are no longer bound to spaces or larger groups but to citizenship rights, institutions and democratic processes.33

Similar cases can be observed in states with strong democratic traditions, and in particular with developed multicultural institutions and policies, which cause newcomers to feel loyalty to the institutions rather than to the lands, which are, arguably, contested between the indigenous people and the colonizers (e.g., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.). Here, globalization and postnationalist theories seem to be synchronized as people are allowed to live a certain “way of life” (or the one they brought from their ancestral lands), and they are not assimilated or culturified into the dominant culture but still continue to enjoy full citizenship and democratic rights, even if their economic, cultural and linguistic ways have not changed. But Michael Kearney, in his seminal research on Mixtec migrant farm workers in southern California and Oregon, counters the theories of transnational/diasporic loyalties by arguing that transmigrant Mexican nationals, despite their economic disadvantage, form autonomous, if not sovereign, spaces in the southern U.S. in which neither the American nor Mexican state have access or control (Kerney 2006: 69). From this perspective, the process of globalization and the corrosion of the agency of the border appears as an useful utility for everyone: transnationals use it to form their independent, even if not sovereign, spaces, and governments use it for their own gains; the Mexican government to export poverty and illegal narcotics traders to the United States, and the U.S. to open up markets and consumers for the American corporations in Mexico. Therefore, in this process, it is very difficult to assess who is the

33 Soysal argues that German-Turkish citizens in Germany, or children born in Germany of Turkish descent (children of Turkish guestworkers), although not possessing the “blood” to be true Germans and loyal to the fatherland, have, in essence, a different type of loyalty to the German state and its institutions as a guarantor of their democratic rights. In Soysal. Limits of Citizenship, 2000. p. 3
winner and who is the loser in the process of globalization in cases such as present-day American-Mexican border.

The process of deterritorialization, whether intentional or unintentional, brings into focus the importance and power of human agency. As the donor states are ensuring their own state survival by sometimes sending human waves, sometimes forcefully, across borders and international lines, the resulting dual-national, hybrid or even independent identities create multiple opportunities in political, economic, religious and other spheres to be explored. These spaces could sometimes provide critical pockets of resistance to hegemonic powers in the geopolitical environment in which most weak states find themselves incapable of resisting. Just as governments of strong states sometimes hide their interest behind global corporate assaults, weak states fight back by hiding behind human waves of transmigrants advancing against borders and boundaries.34

5.4 Global space, local realities

The proliferation of autonomous transnational communities, however, is not a recent historical phenomenon. As scholarly research on diaspora confirms, immigrants of the 19th and early 20th century also maintained a form of transnational/trans-spatial communities and did not sever their links upon resettling in the United States, Canada and Australia. Cultural, economic, religious and even political relations were maintained with homelands despite the hardships of everyday life. So, what makes the present transnationals different than the past immigrants? Some of the factors that have been mentioned such as globalization of capital and its disruptive influence on the so-called Third World, the crisis of the nation-state and worldwide political transformations caused

34 Cuba blames U.S. for migrants' death. CNN. Friday, August 26, 2005.
mostly by post-1945 decolonization and the growth of the agency of human rights, also
do not render much persuasion as they have all been experienced in some form or shape
in history before. Capitalism has always had, as Marx noted, international and global
ambitions, states have been appearing and disappearing from the world stage all thorough
history, and postcolonialists have persuasively argued that the brief post-1945
decolonization has been now replaced by a more contemporary form of
neocolonialization, thus questioning the validity of the claim about the growth of global
human rights.

What makes the present-day diasporic space of transnationals a “real experience”
could be crudely called as postmodern fusion of technology and space – a unique spatial
organization – which gives to the possibility of maintaining those links between two
spaces in real-time, or instantaneously. Essentially, the phenomenon of instant-ness is the
imagined perception of occupying two points in space at the same time. Information and
communication technologies such as Internet instant messaging, high-definition video,
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Skype, videoconferencing etc., all compress space
and time into singularities, allowing for the “illusion” of perceiving existence in two
distant points in space simultaneously. As Harvey explains it, “time-space” compression
makes the time horizon of communication shrink while the technological advances and,
more importantly, the decreased cost of technological availability, make it increasingly
possible to extend the message across a vast space (Harvey 1990: 147).

In many ways, this represents a type of “spatial paradox” as it allows transnationals to
be located in two different points in space simultaneously. Whereas the 19th century
postal systems allowed transnationals to form these links between any two points in space
with a time difference of just weeks, the horizon of time was greatly reduced by the proliferation of telephone technology in the mid-20th century, which allowed for these connections to become near-instant. However, the marvels of today’s information, video and communication technologies make these communications instant and multidimensional as they recreate realities beyond the imagination of yesterday’s diasporas.

For the hardworking immigrant of the 19th century, the boundaries between his living world (Soja’s Firstspace, or the material world) and the distant memories of his abandoned homeland (Soja’s Secondspace or imaginary reality) were real and concrete. However, for 21st century transnationals, these boundaries are collapsed in the Thirdspace because the technological reality, or the imaginary dimension, makes these connections between the Firstspace and Secondspace instantaneous and in real-time. As media historian and social theorist Josh Durham Peters elaborates, bifocality, or in the case of transnationals – bilocality, is an essential ability to locate oneself in two different points in space regardless of the physical distance under the conditions of postmodernity. So, in a technological sense, the revolution of modern media challenges “the continuing relevance of place as a marker of intelligibility in social description.”35 Thus, media-produced reality, or the imaginary dimension (the Thirdspace), diminishes location as a personal continuum of experiences where lived reality clashes with imaginary ones since the imaginary dimension represents a very powerful process and is hardly benign in the discourse of globalization. As Appadurai stresses, for transnationals, both the drive to move out of one space as well as survive in another (culturally, economically, linguistically, etc.) is “deeply affected by a mass-mediated imaginary that frequently

35 In Gupta and Ferguson (eds.) Culture, Power, Place, 2001. p.79
transcends national spaces” (Appadurai 1996: 6). Therefore, it is an inevitable process that nations, groups, cultural communities come to imagine themselves in opposition to the significant “Other” as they try to reinvent or reinforce their identities. Taken in the context of diasporic/transnational spaces, this becomes very problematic because not only do transnationals become spatial “detached” as borders or “borderlands,” between their hostlands and abandoned homelands, but they also become temporal borders – borders between past and present – or the arrivals from less developed parts of the globe and the so-called Thirdworlders. Therefore, as the process of globalization further denudes state borders, boundaries and natural barriers, both the colonizer and the colonized are forced to face each other but not somewhere on the distant frontier but inside the metropolis itself.

It is important to note, however, that the imaginary realities of the Thirdspace experience is more generational-determined, that is, it is experienced more profoundly by the transnationals of the younger and mid-generations that assimilate rapid technological changes much more easily than their parents and grandparents did. As ethnic geographers Wei Li and Carlos Teixeira (2007) note in their study of immigrant population in host countries, large numbers of present-day transnationals include highly skilled, educated, middle-class professionals, even if the overall profile ranges from capitalist millionaires to unskilled refugees, which makes Thirdspace technologies much easier absorbed than was the case with yesterday’s diasporas (95).

Older generations, however, prefer to reside in Thirdspaces that are not technologically but socially constructed realities. These are self-surviving ethnic enclaves that were created by pooling of newcomers into certain spaces; “Chinatowns,” “Little
Italies,” “Portugal Villages,” “Little Indias” and other spaces that dot the maps of world cities. These spaces, depending on the social power of the community, flourished, and continue to flourish, despite the overwhelming pressure from both inside and outside.

Security studies, however, prefer to give more primacy to the systemic and structural factors in the micro/macro analysis of globalization than to the technology or social factors favored by the so-called technological utopians or postcolonialists. Postnationalist scholars of security studies believe that the present geopolitical climate, caused primarily by the decline of state authority and resulting from the end of the strategic Cold War and the emergence of global multipolarity, is the primary driving factor for changes worldwide rather than the ongoing technological revolution of globalization. The “end of state” thesis, “clash of civilizations” and other post-state, postmodernist theories view the emergence of transnationalist spaces as a consequence of weakening of nation-state authority rather than any other universal, overarching, global process at work, whether it is economic or technological.

Scholars associated with this thinking maintain that we are not heading toward a uniform, global (imperial) order but rather the opposite, a global anarchy – a global chaos – in which a new global feudal order, caused by the end of the oil civilization, the collapse of our biohabitat as well as other systemic factors would eventually create a new world (dis)order populated by global corporations and global tribes. As American security scholar Robert Kaplan tries to warn, “corporations are like the feudal domains that evolved into nation-states; they are nothing less than the vanguard of a new Darwinian organization of politics”(Kaplan 1997: 73). Regardless of what school of
thought will establish primacy in social theory about the new coming world order, the transnationals are well suited to survive in this environment.

5.5 Global nomads and species-space: When people become space

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, anthropological studies argue that people have always migrated to and between spaces and mobility has never been extinguished in human history, even during great natural cataclysmic events or wars. Therefore, in many ways, the science behind sovereign borders and boundaries becomes contested because from this perspective borders could simply be viewed as gateways or conduits between spaces rather than “endings” (or beginnings) of spaces. In the same vein, postcolonialists seem to deny the physical property of boundaries as they view borders as places of hybridity – borderlands – as points of contacts where two spaces essentially meet, melt and mix. As Gloria Anzaldua notes, borders can be “narrow strip(s) along steep edges” of national spaces, an entirely objectified phenomena for inhabitants of those spaces (Anzaldua 1999: 25). This, however, raises another issue, that of distinction, because without the actual physicality that delineates spaces, it becomes very difficult, if not almost impossible, to separate spaces or identities from one another.

In the age of rapidly expanding mobility technologies that exist today, this problem of distinction becomes even more problematic because people are constantly moving around, leaving spaces and occupying new ones. Arguably, they are contained in a global continuum of sovereign spaces and somewhat limited in their movement by political, social, economic, cultural or other types of “borders,” but ultimately they are not
physically constricted by any natural forces to move around our global planetary space in the absence of any impassable natural barriers.

Current social theory tries to attribute the exponential growth in human mobility in recent time to the process of so-called globalization; however, anthropological studies show that this capacity has always existed and has always been practiced, even if restricted or at least attempted to be restricted by various social forces. As many social researchers have noted before, 19th-century world was just as integrated as it is today, even if politically reconfigured differently, and states and empires were losing some of their powers, just as they are today. So, from this perspective it could be argued, even if not persuasively, that globalization is not a recent historical phenomenon because its capacity always existed in human history, as long as there were no impregnable natural barriers, such as a vacuum of space, to restrict or prevent human migrations.

The anthropological view on human mobility, however, sharply clashes with modern theories of nationalism, which seek to recreate a somewhat organic link between people and space. These theories also recreate a kind of a dead or “static” space as they argue that given groups of people have originated in certain assigned spaces and have been there since the beginning of time. But within these debates of migrations versus homelands, terms such as “ancestral lands,” “native lands” or “our land” become increasingly contested as the fluidity of global space and a general feeling of deterritorialization caused by the spread of global capital and markets encroaches on cultures and identities in a devastating way.

From a certain standpoints it could be argued that these problems are not entirely new as refugees, exiles, migrants, castaways, deportees and stateless people have always lived
in deterritorialized or “homeland-less” conditions for thousands of years in history and still managed to maintain strong cultural gluens and identities. But the present problem is more than just an absence of empty lands to colonize or settle within the conditions of postmodernity and an exploding number of new identities. Such proliferation of new identities within the continuum of finite space results in more people and communities around the globe feeling the effects of a general space syndrome, or what Said described as “a generalized condition of homelessness.” (Said 1979: 18). This structural syndrome of borderlessness and deterritorialization is not easy to acknowledge or to remedy as it strikes at the heart of many modern identities, including the link between people and land.

For the transnationals, however, this condition is neither new nor entirely problematic. In the universe of transnational existence, greater movement of people, goods and information, cultural flow, economic fluidity and melding of spaces is actually a preferred state rather than a feared one. In the infinite space of diasporas and transnational communities, terms such as “home,” “over there,” “old country,” “abroad” or “back home” lose their meaning and become increasingly unclear and distorted because the social organization of diasporas/transnationals are neither static nor grounded in space.

But the boundaries and borders are not just delineated in the universe of diasporas and transnationals, as global commodification of cultures, homelands, language or just about anything in the era of global capitalism expose just how weak has the link between the people and a fixed territory become.36 What becomes even more problematic is that the

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distinction between the colonizer and colonized becomes even more blurred as wealthy, educated and generally economically better off transnationals migrate and purchase new lands in their hostlands, effectively displacing the native populations.

It could be argued, however, that this has always been the case with migrations of people around the globe as land has never been reserved for purchase strictly to native inhabitants but was also available to new settlers regardless of their origin, even if regulated by the authorities. The main difference, however, is in the ability of transnationals to collapse spaces, in particular spaces between two points, to allow for a manageable reconstruction of a reality that is both “here” and “over there,” something that was very difficult and to a degree impossible for transnationals of the previous centuries.

So, where are the borders and boundaries of 21st-century globalized, delineated world that is connected instantly from any two points, where the economic “prosperity” is provided by the corporations and where governments play a marginal role except to stream revenues from one social space to another, and where people, goods and information flow uninterrupted from one continent to another? The answer is simply that people become the borders as space acquires a new meaning within these ultra-integrated conditions. National, regional, provincial and city boundaries have never been able to contain cultures in the way nationalists often implied. The emergence of so-called global public space, fuelled primarily by environmentalism and other supranational ideologies, means that fictional science of boundaries that encase cultures and regulate cultural flow can no longer be sustained in the globalized world.
Americans will continue to exist in the 21st century, just as Canadians will, however, whether the United States of America or Canada will exist in a globalized world then becomes a matter of debate. To challenge the organicness of the connection between America and the Americans, or any nation with its land for that matter, is going to be a challenging task for every nation in the 21st-century globalized world.

The reconfiguration of space in the new century is going to be by far the greatest task ahead of us. In this process, a fundamentally different science, theory and thinking about borders will have to emerge. As it was argued in this chapter, the process of deterritorialization is threatening to dissolve not only nationalism’s notion of “us versus them” but other identities as well because in the environment of not clearly fixed and contained spaces, it becomes almost impossible to distinguish “us” from “them” without the physicality of borders. However, instead of focusing too much on deterritorialization (which could also suggest a “loss” of space despite our planet’s surface area remaining constant), we need to start thinking about ways how to reconceptualize space within postmodernist, postnational conditions, particularly how we map space in the era of globalization. As the transnationals demonstrate, there is a much shorter spatial distance between the Chinese living in Toronto and the Chinese living in Hong Kong than there is between the former and the French-Canadians living in the same city.

Regardless of how space and borders are reinvented in the era of globalization, we also need to account for that horizontal delineation that has been historically the only way of separation and that has never succeeded in diminishing the vertical integration on which many groups, including the transnationals, have been glued together. Perhaps there lies the greatest challenge in mapping the surface of our planet and envisioning a new
kind of territoriality – the one that separates but does not delineate as ethnicity, nation, race, class, and other identities, that are critically dependent on separate spaces, can be just as empowering as they proved to be destructive. For the human geographer of the 21st century, constructing these kinds of multidimensional borders and boundaries is going to represent a significant challenge.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: TOWARD CRITICAL CIVIC EDUCATION OF THE FUTURE?

6.1 Learning the alphabets of power

How we see, understand and ultimately teach about space will remain an important factor in determining whether we can transform present global citizenship education into the critical civic education of the future. As discussed in the previous chapters, current literature in global citizenship education is becoming much richer in regards to spatiality as many educators are realizing that potential of the infinity of space, as a social field for continuous exploration, and as it offers limitless possibilities as opposed to historicity, which is limited by its linearity and determinism. Time, unlike in our physical universe, is a very simple dimension in the human social universe, whereas space offers unlimited possibilities. In space, as such, analysis is involved in an endless and continuous production and reproduction, as well as deconstruction and reconstruction of all our social relationships and identities, as we can move forward, backward, left and right and through all the rich dimensions space has to offer. Consequently, space cannot be seen as inert and eternal, much like history is, but rather as dynamic and important agency tied up to other important power dimensions such as gender, race, class, and culture.

Critical civic education of the future therefore must be spatial. Spatial in a sense that we cannot analyze space as an innocent and benign social box in which our own realities unwind and interact with others in a three-dimensional universe. As Lefebvre notes, cities and towns are not simply three-dimensional social boxes occupied by people but are power continuums that are built according to certain logics in which the builders wish to convey to tenants the real vectors of power. Therefore spaces must be read and, more importantly, studied, much like the mystical ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, however,
through a critical eye and in the manner they are produced, as well as their relationship to its occupants and not its builders. Therefore, students of the future, much like the archeologists of the past, must learn to read and understand these future alphabets of power, or critical social spaces.

Much like history starts at certain points so too does a critical study of space. For the students of future, spatiality starts with their own personal universe and its location in larger space(s). Just as species-space from earlier chapters, students must learn to analyze themselves as spatial elements or points and then slowly but steadily expand their critical views further onto a larger geometrical plain or family, neighborhood/community, village, town/city, region/province, country and, finally, the world – as the final space. But here is where the problem comes into focus as spatiality and borders are reinvented and deinvented as space presses against the time horizon. So, in this process determining the correct spatial delineation becomes a challenging task.

Borders and their understanding will pose a significant test for the future students as our world becomes more and more delineated under the irresistible pressures of the predatory conditions of globalization. Boundless spaces, much like the American superfrontier noted in earlier chapters, will become very problematic topics of critical civic education of the future. Gender scholars, however, have been working in a similar spatial orientation as they sought to infuse gender issues into the subject of space and spatiality. In their critical analysis, borderless space was perceived as a threat, since it denudes from all protection in an area of open space and, as such, exposes raw power imbalance. So, for a woman, smaller, bounded, communal space was a solution to the vulnerability of endless open space. Generally, analyzing infinite space in its entirety...
ultimately becomes a futile task, however, reading and analyzing spaces community by community, or by its integral parts, ends up as a libratory exercise.

And finally, reading architectures of spaces becomes an important component of any critical civic education curriculum that seeks to guide by passion and principle in the process of helping students develop critical understanding to connect knowledge to power. Notable geographers from Marx and Engels to Lefebvre and Foucault and finally to Harvey and Soja have stressed the importance of spatial architecture and its critical meaning to class creation. Critical civic education of the future must not focus on how class has been produced and reproduced historically and through time but how it’s being built in space, in geography, and, more importantly, how space is integrated in power relations based on economics and material production. Scholarly research and findings in recent postmodern human and cultural geographies could produce critical knowledge in curriculums and contribute to critical citizenship education in times when these programs are in a state of flux.

In conclusion, this thesis has not attempted to “map” a potential critical civic education of the future (the choice of word “map” is not coincidental), but instead tried to argue for the need “to carry one” in the absence of a critical sociology of space from present school curriculums in Ontario and across Canada. The multidimensional meaning of space and spatiality (as opposed to the one-dimensionality of history) suggest that it is more liberatory to seek and integrate other knowledges about our own location within space and spaces than to question our own linear, timely moment in history. Similarly, students should not question why they are the way they are through the line of history, but they should focus instead on understanding their present location in the social
universe and their relation to others who occupy the same or other spaces. Having a multidimensional social map, in which all students can find and locate themselves in a future space, should be a teaching instrument and tool every teacher needs to bring to his/her class when seeking to create a critical thinker in the 21st-globalized classroom.
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