HUMANISTIC NATIONISM: A FIRST STAGE COMMUNICATIONS MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT BASED ON LANGUAGE AND IDEOLOGY

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(international, vol. 11, no. 1, April 1986)

INTRODUCTION

Many theories have been advanced in the last hundred years with regard to social change and development in the Third World, but none has emphasized enough, what appears to be the central element of all change and development. This missing element is the human one, humanity in the totality of a species' life, past and present. The model presented in the following pages views a development process in terms of the maximization of the human individual and the human species. National development is viewed, as such, as maximization of the capability of the human species within a specific sociopolitical context.

The model is based on the premise that states of underdevelopment (Frank, 1966) of Third World countries is a function of not only the "social gap" (Deutsch, 1953) between the masses and the elites within a country, but also of what I shall call a value gap as well. By 'value gap' is meant: (a) the difference in value orientations among different segments of society, and (b) the difference that exists between man's "outward development" (Montessori, 1949) in the fields of knowledge, technology, institutions, etc. on the one hand, and on the other hand his inner development in terms of 'principles' and 'rules' internalized by us.

When we say that there is a 'gap' among different groups, what we are essentially saying is that there is a

This paper is based on the author's doctoral thesis, Humanistic Nationism: A Language and Ideology Based Model of National Development for Post-Colonial Nations (1978), University of Toronto, (unpublished). The present paper was revised in June, 1985. This is an editor revised version of that paper.

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break in communication between/among them. Thus the model presented considers the maximization of communication as the immediate preceding condition of national development.

It is important to understand the sense in which the term 'condition' is used here. It is used as part of the wider concept of conditioned causality, inspired by Buddhism (see fn. 9), compromising the concepts: multi-conditionality, reciprocal causality and circular causality. When reference is made to an 'immediately preceding condition', it is suggestive of other conditions. Thus, for example, the lack of economic development can be adduced to certain economic conditions. (such as insufficient production, low consumer demand, poor technical know-how, shortage of foreign exchange, lack of raw materials, etc.). It is then the notion that every event in nature results from the presence of several conditions that we call 'multiconditionality'. The notion of 'reciprocal conditionality' holds that such event A (e.g., economic development), which resulted from the presence of, among others, a necessary condition B (e.g., political conditions), itself serves as a necessary condition for B (which 'originally' served as a condition for A).

'Circular causality' is an extension of reciprocal causality. That is, each event, or result, A serves as a condition for B, B to C, C to D, etc., until finally D serves as a condition for A, having gone a full circle.

The advantage of the concept of conditioned causality over linear causality is that it does not take into the chicken and egg controversy of the type surrounding, for example, Rostow's (1959) model of economic development which posits stages of economic growth as pre-conditions, an approach which would require us to concede, or argue, that a maximization of communication (condition A) would automatically lead to national development (condition B). What it does not allow us to say is that the maximization of communication is the condition for national development, in the presence of other conditions (multiconditionality) serves as a condition for the maximization of communication, directly (reciprocal causality) and indirectly through other conditions (circular causality).

If the maximization of communication is the immediate condition of nations' development, the model here posits two 'cooperating' conditions: language and ideology. With the help of a cyclical model, I shall attempt to show how the two cooperating conditions would serve to bring about the immediate condition, and eventually national development, as more and better communication serves to undermine the social and value gaps, and eventually undermine the "widening gap" between the Third World and the industrialized nations.
HUMANISTIC NATIONISM

Any nation has a geopolitical aspect (a people living in a defined geographic space) and a sociocultural aspect (sharing a culture). While the geopolitical boundaries of a new 'nation' might be determined by political independence, the task of a nation is to bring together the different collectivities of people that may come to inhabit the new nation, through its institutions (economic, political, legal, educational, etc.). The goal and outcome of such integration geopolitically and socioculturally is referred to as nationism (Fishman, 1968a).

Conditions for Humanistic Nationism

In attempting to understand the process of nationism, e.g., Deutsch ([ibid.], 1967) seeks a conceptual model that will meet three conditions he believes are basic to it, namely the concept of nationism be "operational", "fruitful", and "critical". He finds this in the notion of 'communication'. Chodak (1973:35) in fact unequivocally links societal development with communication, as does Lerner (1963:353), who perceives communication as the "crux of modernization", modernization being equated by him with development.

COMMUNICATIVE DEVELOPMENT

The maximization of communication with humanism, or that is, the idea of communicative development, as I shall call it, is the immediate condition for the maximization of human-ness in a national setting. By 'Communicative Development' here we initially mean the quantitative increase in the flow of communication among individuals and collectivities in society. This, however, would not contribute to our goal of individual and societal wisdom and compassion, unless it maximizes humanization of oneself in relation to others. Communicative Development, therefore, means more and qualitatively better communication. It is in this double sense that the concept serves as the immediate condition for Humanistic Nationism.

The Role of Language in Communicative Development

A common language in a nation allows for communication between two or more people. It logically follows that the larger the number of people that share this language, the wider is the particular communication network. The process of developing such a common language for purposes of promo-
ting national development is referred to here as Language Development.

What then are the features of a Language of Development that makes it different from any other language? Perhaps this can best be understood by examining the process by which it is to be derived. The goal of such a process is to encourage and facilitate more and more people, though never all, into a common linguistic network that eventually comes to be co-terminous with the geopolitical boundary of a given country. This does not, however, suggest that the country would or should legislate all other languages/varieties out of existence. Such a process of tampering with language has come to be known as 'language planning'.

In most Third World countries several languages are used. The process of language planning in such instances begins by selecting a single language under certain criteria (see Sugunasiri, 1978:302-52) from among the several languages in the country. The choice of a single language is, of course, fraught with controversy, given the conflicts such as we have in Ireland, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, etc. But, while historically speaking, neither a single language policy nor a bonus policy is inherently or overridingly advantageous, there is increasing evidence in development literature that a multiplicity of languages can be associated with a lack of development (Deutsch, 1953:29-71). By contrast, Fishman (1968:x:60) observes, on the basis of a comparison of "cross-policy files", that "linguistic homogeneity is currently related to many more of the "good" and "desirable" characteristics of politics than is linguistic heterogeneity". Indeed, Kelman (1971:31-2) declares that a common language is a potentially unifying force, while Ferguson and Odi (op. cit.:4) contend that "the development process tends towards the dominance of a single language of development". It is on evidence such as this that the proposed model in this paper is based on a single-language policy. The single language so chosen must be one that is potentially conducive to a quantitative increase in communication and which will eventually be selected as the Language of Development. To the extent that this language will also be subjected to change later on in the process, it would only be an interim choice.

The Language of Development, then, is a linguistic variety that emerges through a process. To that extent it is not a variety that presently exists, nor would it be an end-state. It will contigate to grow and change, like any and every other language. The emergence of a Language of Development, then, is one cooperative condition of Communicative Development.
While a common language serves this important function of uniting people in thought and action, it is only one condition. Other conditions must prevail as well (multiconditionality) to bring or keep a group of people together. Bringing together people in communication and action at the national level, of course, requires much more sophistication, complexity and formality than is required in pulling a net or voting. Concepts and terms such as socialism, communism, democracy, capitalism, or combinations thereof, have been used by nations to unite a people in thought and action. An ideology can thus provide for the common explicit content of communication.

**THE MODEL OF THE 'DEVELOPMENT CYCLE'**

The two cooperating conditions of language and ideology result in the emergence of the immediate condition of Communicative Development and eventually of Humanistic Nationalism. This process can be shown in the form of the following model:

As in any communication model, the figure shows an input (left box) which, following a series of complex processes taking place in three stages (circles in the middle), result in an output (right box). The inputs, in the model are the two cooperating conditions, the two-way arrows indicating the causality (i.e., circular and multi-conditional) between them. The Language of Development implies the following:

- a. The government of a given country would be committed to language planning as a conscious form of social intervention.
- b. A selected variety of selected interim language would be identified, under suitable criteria, at the national and sub-national levels; and
- c. The process of enrichment and dissemination of the selected language and of promoting socially constructive language usage would be started.

The label, 'Ideology of Development', likewise implies commitment to 'political planning' as conscious policy, and the adoption of the dyadic concept of humanistic decolonization and humanistic incrementalization that certain development sub-ideologies (economic, political, educational, legal, etc.) have been planned/developed along the same dyadic lines, and/or the mechanism set up for it. The inputs put into motion or serves as conditions for (bottom arrow to circle one) a process which at stage 1 operates along three
dimensions: sociolinguistic (a), individual (b), and sociocultural (c).

The individual changes, along with the sociolinguistic changes, now serve as a potential facilitating base for 'participation'. Given men's essential praxic nature of being an individual-in-community, the adoption of the ideology of humanistic nationalism has so far provided a "body of coordinated ideas" that potentially "meets the social needs" and results in the "psychological arousal and preparedness", thus minimizing the psychological strains associated with making new communicative links. Such minimizing further prepares the already psychologically aroused individuals and collectivities for "psychological action", and eventually to individual and collective "physical action"; that is, participation. The new participation brings increasing satisfaction, stemming also from the incremental approach advocated in the ideology.

What we get here is not merely a participation, but a concerned one, given that the world view and praxis promoted through the proposed language and ideology is humanistic. Thus what emerges in the process is a concern/data based participation. So we have three outcomes of the input at stage 1 in a conditioned origination relationship (i.e., circular and multi-conditional).

Stage 1 could be called, in the Kuhnian (1962:48) sense, a 'pre-paradigm period', marked by "frequent and deep debates over legitimate methods, problems and standards of solution". This then prepares the stage, and serves as a condition (as indicated by the lower arrow leading from circle one to circle two) for the emergence of the next stage, of which there are three outcomes: one individual (b) and two social (a and c).

At the individual level, there is now emerging personal development in more people, as the data base takes shape into knowledge, and concern develops into empathy. The latter is the second level of humanistic development. We now have a higher level of participation, what could be called a knowledge-based empathic participation (b).

At the societal level other changes are taking place as well. Following the attempts at implementing language policy by government and individuals, the process of drawing from other languages will be in motion, resulting in an emerging unifying language (precursor to the Language of Development, and step 2 of the language planning process and socially constructive language usage). Likewise, through attempts at implementing ideological policy there is now emerging a unify-
Figure: A Communications Model of Development Based on Language and Ideology
ing ideology, as society, in pursuit of self-reliance, digs into the past in search of its own cultural base (decolonization) and builds upon the present with an eye to the future in small but meaningful steps (incrementalization), resulting in a changing psychological infrastructure.

At stage 2 there is a casual relationship among the three dimensions. The Language of Development is stabilized politically and standardized linguistically through the continued process of socially constructive enrichment. The process of dissemination has begun as well. The ideology of Development is established likewise, politically, psychologically and practically. As society gains such stability and confidence in its systems, participation comes to be at the highest level: i.e., knowledge-based and compassionate.

When a society reaches the development maturity of stage 3, the stage is set for the social and value gaps, posited as the conditions for underdevelopment, to be progressively narrowed because now the only officially recognized language is the Language of Development and thus the opportunities (economic, political, sociocultural, and so on) in society are not only equally open to all, but there is a real practical possibility of achieving them. Further, all segments of society are now governed by the same ideological, perceptual and practical orientation (i.e., values).

As the differences between the governed and the governors come to be minimized, those between the rurality and the metropolis come to be minimized as well, as both individuals and the environment come to be humanized and signs of an emerging ideal society appear. Exploitation, rural or urban, comes to be increasingly difficult to be "pushed" by the "doers" or tolerated by the "receivers". With decreasing exploitation, conditions can be said to have emerged for the gradual demise of 'internal colonialism' - the rurality by the metropolis, the masses by the elites, etc.

A parallel sociocultural outcome of the demise of internal colonialism, and of increasing sociopolitical integration with a humanistic base is the emergence of an increasingly united and strong society - what Redfield (1960:40) calls an "autonomous cultural system", in a causal relationship with the other two dimensions.

The movement from stage 1 to 3 then, can be characterized as a 'stagewise approximation', or incrementalization - movement in small but meaningful steps. The process envisaged here is that of "paradigmatic change", as characterized by Kuhn in relation to scientific revolutions. To summarize the process, the paradigmatic change process begins when one
or more scientists begin to question an existing scientific
tory of a given stage. But so long as a majority continues
to accept it, there is no threat to the theory (social struc-
structure, value, etc. of the stage). Soon, however, one and then
another and yet another and so forth, begin to question it.

Now the scales are beginning to tip in favour of the emerging
hypothesis (proposed linguistic and ideological changes). As
soon as a majority comes to question it, and eventually re-
drect the earlier theory (social structure of a stage, etc.),
as part of the maturational and humanizing process, we have a
new theory, and paradigm, the new stage, replacing the
earlier, but only to be replaced by a higher one following a
similar process.

We return to the bottom arrow leading out from circle
three. There is now in a given country, a substantial quan-
titative increase in the flow of communication compared to
where the country was at the input stage. The country also
has now qualitatively better communication, concomitant with
or due to the minimizing of the social and value gaps. This,
then is the final outcome of the three-stage process shown as
leading from the 3rd circle (stage) but still within the rec-
tangle incorporating the process. The top arrow back to
stage 3 symbolizes a similar process as the ones from three to
two and two to one.

By this stage, a country can be said to have achieved
the level of humanistic nationalism, because on the one hand
the linguistic boundaries could now be co-terminous with the
geographic boundaries. In other words, everyone will be, at
least theoretically, using one common language. This would
be geopolitical integration. Now everyone, or ever
increasing numbers, would be sharing common institutions
(economic, political, legal, educational). Such socio-
cultural integration along with geopolitical integration con-
stitutes humanistic nationalism. The model of humanistic na-
tionism through communications development in the form of
language and ideology is now complete.

CONCLUSION

It needs to be pointed out in conclusion that thinking
of development in terms of human values is no longer an al-
ternative to economic development as it once used to be.
and Streeter (1983) are only a few of the western economists
who have sought to weave human values into economic thinking.
There are any number of non-western social scientists who
have likewise called for a developmental paradigm that in-
cludes a value component (see Warda, 1983, for a discussion).
The birth of the journal of Humanomics itself is reflective of this emerging trend.

Secondly, even though there is enough recognition of this value dimension in development, most theories still deal with only aspects of development, economic or other. A holistic view, as for example, argued for by Rugina (ibid.), Mehta (1978) and others, requires that we deal with total man and total society, and not just the economic or political or other asperctual man or society. The exclusion of an economic component, then, reflects an attempt to de-emphasize materialistic development in favour of an emphasis on the holistic, balanced and multicontingual nature of development. This, of course, does not mean a rejection of economic development, but rather giving it its due place as a subcategory of development that falls under the superordinate concept of development, just as political, institutional, educational or legal development are subcategories of development.

It would now be evident that the exclusion of an economic dimension arises from the very philosophical basis of the model and not from a rejection of it as being insignificant. The model thus serves as a strength rather than a weakness.

Now we deal with issues stemming directly from the model. The first issue is that it has been referred to as a 'first stage' model. This is to suggest that in its 'pure' form, the model is ideally applicable only at the very first stage of development of a country (e.g., a newly independent country or a post-revolutionary nation (Cuba, China)). For example, one aspect of the model is to adopt a single Language of Development. But once the language selected for this official status is on its way to 'enrichment' and 'dissemination', there will be other languages that will continue to prove to have sentimental or instrumental significance. There is no reason why such a language cannot be incorporated into the Language Plan in subsequent stages.

Further, implicit in the adoption of a single Language of Development is the exclusion of exogenous languages at this first stage (see Sugunasiri, 1978:254-308). In an increasingly interdependent world, this may at first seem odd from a pragmatic point of view. But it is important that interdependence be not blown out of all proportion. Sir Arthur Lewis, e.g., argues that if either the rich countries of the North or the poor countries of the South were to sink under the sea, "after a period of adjustment, the losses would be negligible" (Streeter, ibid:11). The theoretical justification for the exclusion of exogenous languages at
this stage is that it would allow a country breathing space during which time it can develop its linguistic, ideological, and other resources such that it can interact with other nations as equal partners and in a way mutually beneficial. Once this process is underway, there is no reason why an exogenous language, selected under suitable criteria, should not be incorporated into the Language Plan.

Yet another disconcerting aspect of the model, both to Westerners as well as to Buddhist scholars, may be the attempted marriage of what may be seen as ‘Eastern’ concepts (e.g., Buddhist) with so-called ‘western’ ones (e.g., planning). To meet such concerns, first of all, is the argument that the democratic or the nationalist approach to development advocated here, as well as some of the key implementational strategies recommended such as rational analysis and planning, though seemingly of western origin, may not be necessarily incommensurate with Buddhism. For example, the democratic tendencies of Buddhism are only too well known. As for nationalism, while it is arguable that an attachment to a nation encourages ethnocentrism that would undermine a teaching in Buddhism such as of extending loving-kindness (metta) to all (beings), it is equally arguable from a Buddhist point of view that attachment to a nation need not be antithetical to other nations or peoples if included therein is a humanistic component, just as much as the development of oneself need not be antithetical to the development of others. Indeed in Buddhism, love of others begins with love of self. By extension, love of other nations then should indeed begin with love of one’s own, though clearly not exclusively. As for the notion of nation itself, while the teaching of non-continuity (dukkha) may challenge the reality of such an entity in the ‘absolute’ sense - and Buddhism talks of two levels of reality (Jayatillake, 1963) - we know that in a practical sense such an entity does exist, just as much as an individual can be said to exist at the relative level, even though Buddhism teaches that an individual is a mere series of energies coming together and falling apart (see Stecherbatsky 1930). Further, Buddhism has been referred to as the ‘Religion of Analysis’, and the Buddha calls himself an ‘analyst’. Finally, even planning itself may not be all that un-Buddhist after all. Planning, for example, entails three components: identification of policy or goal, implementation and evaluation. The Buddhist approach to self-development can be said to incorporate all these elements. For example, it begins with a goal (nibbana) or the attainment of a lomistic, or contemplative state, recommends an implementational strategy (e.g., the Middle Path of meditative techniques) and exhorts that one self-monitor oneself at every step. By extension then, social planning would not be un-Buddhist.

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There is enough compatibility between Eastern and Western thought incorporated in the model that allows me to urge the reader to dispense with rigid dichotomies and instead entertain a unified and global perspective, looking for conceptual matching rather than source matching. This also helps obviate a tendency some may have, to call the model a 'Buddhist model', and thereby being led to the pertinent question as to how such a model would be acceptable to non-Buddhist countries.

If then the inclusion of a Buddhist component need not be a disadvantage, the humanistic and the philosophical element is indeed one that people of all nations can relate to. Despite the historical evidence of man as a wat-monger, out to get each other, there is evidence to show that human society would welcome a religio-philosophic basis in societal development. Educators, from Comenius (1632) onwards, have of course emphasized the importance of educating one to his/her full humanity, as does the UN Declaration (Article 26). As early as 1938, Kohler drew our attention to the Place of Values in a World of Facts. Weber's thesis linking Protestantism to the rise of capitalism remains the most compelling argument in favour of a religio-philosophic basis for societal development. We have seen how economists have come around to thinking in terms of an ethico-values dimension (Carrico, 1985; Nienhaus, 1985 and Sun, 1985). But perhaps of greatest importance, as mentioned earlier, is that the leaders of Third World countries have themselves come to recognize such a significance, as for example, Tanzania and Sri Lanka. Finally, the current protests in Western countries against pollution, seal hunts, pornography, abortion, nuclear arms, etc., the Christian church taking up the cause of social justice (in Latin America, Canada, etc.) and so on, provide evidence of the rising worldwide concern for the quality of life. Now to lay to rest the sceptic's concern that the humanistic approach advocated here has no basis in reality, one could point to (BC 268 to 237) which was not only a righteous kingdom but a materially prosperous one as well, one achieved in relation to the other (see Warder, op. cit., for a discussion). The Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka, with followers in Europe, is a contemporary example, where material development and value development go hand in hand.

A third concern may relate to the question as to what extent Third World leaders can be expected to think and act wisely and compassionately, as called for by the model? Power does not necessarily corrupt everything that touches it, as Cederberg would have us believe. Power is not only natural in social relations (observe, e.g., how when children get together, a leader emerges naturally) and legitimate, but
necessary as well for social functioning. It is only a fail-
ure to see the distinction between "socially beneficial" (Buddha's 'athasāsāhitam') and "socially harmful" power, as Ruglea (ibid.; 936) points out as well, that makes us become suspicious of political leadership. The model of development proposed here seeks to meet the challenge of socially harmful power by (a) including at the philosophical level a humanistic component, but (b) at a more pragmatic level, building in mechanisms to both facilitate and ensure the ongoing development of a new leadership from among the masses (e.g., linguistic entrepreneurs, progressive elements of society) who can at least be expected not to have internalized a socially harmful bent to begin with.

A final concluding remark is that the model is primarily addressed to the Third World rather than to the industrialized world. Here again, it would not equally apply to all Third World countries, or situations. A country with pockets of several linguistic varieties, such as creoles, pidgins and dialects (e.g., Nigeria, parts of India) would find all the steps of the language planning process relevant while a country where a language hat, for historical reasons, emerged as the dominant, or official language (e.g., Korek, a country of the West Indies) would only need the later stages (e.g., the selection of a variety within the language). 16

A country in which a developmental ideology (e.g., socialism) is already in place (e.g., Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Burma) might find the dimension more appealing than others, Tanzania because it has already adopted its national goal as "human development" as contrasted with material or economic development (Arusha Declaration and Nyerere (1976)), and Sri Lanka because of the historical region of having a Buddhist base, if not a declaration of working towards "the creation of a New Society based on Human and Moral Values" (1977 UNP election manifesto), as for example in Sri Lanka.

Warda (1973; 446) has correctly argued that "there is too much diversity (in the Third World) to be subsumed under any one single theory (of development) or set of concepts'. What the model of humanistic nationalism has sought to provide are certain principles (e.g., decolonialization and incrementation) under which each country and era could develop specific rules. Thus, the model is both generalizable and particularistic. It is also flexible. Even though, for example, it deals with the national level, almost every dimension is easily adaptable, if not applicable, to a lower level (village) or a higher level (Pan-Arabic, Pan-African), or any system or sub-system.

Thus, no level is terminal, except the global level, the
goal and outcome of which would be a 'Humanistic Globalism'. The model also represents merely one phase of a developmental cycle (thus the label, "a first stage model"), and allows for both intervention in the process of societal growth as well as natural growth. It accommodates both small and large scale social change, and is conscious of the reality of the process of change, in language, ideology, people, etc., rides it, facilitating it at every step.

Theoretically speaking, the model also encompasses aspects of theories of development advanced thus far, as analysed by Paulston (1975), namely (a) evolutionary and neo-evolutionary theories, (b) structural-functional theories, (c) system theories, (d) Maixian and neo-Marxian theories, (e) cultural revitalization theories, and (f) anarchist and Utopian theories. Finally, if the model draws its strength from its multidisciplinary nature, perhaps its greatest theoretical strength, and the contribution to social science research, is modelling itself on the concept of conditioned causality.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 'value gap', which is entailed in the 'social gap', and also in the 'widenig gap' is given a separate existence in order to underscore the significance of the value domain.

2. Here I have in mind not only the mass-elite distinction, but other linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural ones as well. Part of this difference may be explained in terms of both the colonial history during which time a different world view had been introduced and the neocolonial present during which the colonial world view may continue to exert an influence.

3. A 'rule' is a "prescribed guide for conduct of action" (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7:231) while a 'principle' is a conceptual guide within which a given rule fails.

4. A 'necessary condition' prevails, as explained in Buddhism as well as in western scholarship (Jayatilleke, 1965:449), when an event A, for example, comes to be present if and only if, B is present (along with other co-conditions). By the same token, the absence of B ensures the absence of A.

5. See for example, Ponsioen (1968:109ff) for an critique of Rostow. See also Levontin (1983) for a rejection of such
linear causality by western scholars.

6. Buddhism, for example, speaks of up to 24 such conditions (de Silva, 1973:81).

7. The term 'communicative development' is used by Young (1968) as a measure of industrial success in relation to development. But as will be evident from the text, I have used it here in an expanded sense.

8. The concept of a top-down planning directive may appear to run against the very fundamental freedom of choice given to individuals in Buddhism, as evident, in the Discourse to Kalamā, (see Warder, op. cit. for a discussion). However, such a state-sponsored approach need not be anti-humanistic, or even specifically anti-Buddhist, if the implementation of policy incorporated a humanistic dimension as well.

9. To the extent that the goal here is to bring to as many people as possible a mass variety of language (i.e., creole, pidgin) better suited to them than an elite language. As examples of present day national languages based on such mass varieties, Afrikaans in South Africa, Swahili in Tanzania, and Bahasa Indonesia in Indonesia readily come to mind.

10. While the concept of Language of Development and the process involved therein may appear complicated, it is not without parallel in the real world.

11. In developing such an explicit content, a country would needlessly to say, develop other sub-ideologies, significant among them being an economic sub-ideology. This also is an example of how economics comes to be a means of development.

12. While 'empathy' (here as well as earlier) may include the Lernerian notion of empathy, characterized as "being able to step into someone else's shoes" (Lerner, 1958), our notion does not suggest that one gives up one's own value orientation, as is implied in Lerner's. It further encompasses a humanistic component, also absent in Lerner's.

13. A Buddhist interpretation here would be that individuals come to be harmonious, socially useful, or excellent in their understanding, thought, language, conduct, livelihood, effort, awareness (mindfulness) and repose. Other religions may have other interpretations, each of which would be valid in light of a Kohlbergian type (1971)
level 6 morality. In arriving at this stage, a country could use whatever method is suitable - drawn from its religio-cultural base or from other contemporary approaches, such as for example, Kohibergian-type moral development training, T-groups, meditation (Buddhist, Christian, Transcendental, etc.), Freirian conscientiza-
tion, and so on.

14. The concept here is one of the metropolis in a country and what I call the 'composite aristocracy', made up of the political, bureaucratic, industrial, labour, linguistic and religious elites, underdeveloping the majority, namely, the masses.

15. An "autonomous cultural system" is "one which is self-
sustaining - that is it does not need to be maintained by a complementary, reciprocal, subordinate or other dispensable connection with a second system" (Redfield, 1960:40).

16. See Sugunasiri, op. cit.: 356-71, for an applica-
tion of the language planning process proposed in the model to a hypothetical country, 'Utonia' (Hijhoff, ed. 1967).

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