Sport and the Making of World Cities: A Case Study of South Africa

Lisa Danielle Plenderleith

Master of Arts

Graduate Department of Geography
University of Toronto

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Abstract

This thesis explores two distinctive ways in which sport is deployed as a development strategy in South Africa, and specifically considers how sport may play a role in the configuration of the nation’s cities. First, a case study of the sporting mega-event, the 2010 FIFA World Cup, is presented. It is posited that this tournament was a speculative world-making strategy aimed at elevating host cities and the nation to world-class status. Second, a discourse analysis of South African policy documents regarding the reintroduction of physical education is performed. It is argued that despite the fundamental neoliberal elements of physical education, there is a possibility that if the government maximizes certain opportunities, it could be a way of forging ordinary cities that are based upon equitable access to sport for South African children. These assessments suggest that sport can play a role in both the spatial and symbolic development of cities.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my namesake, my ultimate inspiration, my guidepost, and my very best friend. Thanks for everything you do, Mom. I love you.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire, it has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. Sport can create hope, where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than governments in breaking down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of all types of discrimination. (Mandela, 2000)

1.1. Overview of Thesis Research

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has played host to numerous sporting mega-events, most notably the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The South African government views these major international sporting events as a strategy for development, because they allow for host cities to improve physical infrastructure, boost economic development (i.e. create jobs, increase tourism, attract foreign investment), and showcase themselves, and in turn, the nation, on the world stage (i.e. Black, 2007; Cornelissen, 2010; Haferburg, 2011; Pillay & Bass, 2008). South Africa is not the only place in the Global South to embrace this alluring, yet high-risk, development strategy. In recent years, there has been a marked rise in many other nations (and cities) of the Global South competing fiercely for a chance to host these global spectacles, as well as an increasing willingness on the part of international sport governing bodies (i.e. International Olympic Committee, FIFA) to award major events to these sites (Cornelissen, 2010). In addition to South Africa hosting the 2010 World Cup, Beijing hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics, while Brazil is currently preparing to host both the 2014 FIFA World Cup (held across 12 Brazilian cities) and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.
While mega-events are the most popular and attractive mode of using sport as a vehicle for development, there has also been a growing interest and effort by several nations of the Global South, including South Africa, to utilize sport as a development strategy in a different manner: through the implementation of compulsory physical education programmes in schools.\(^1\)

In the post-apartheid era, there has been a quiet attempt by the South African government to reintroduce physical education as part of the national curriculum. South Africa’s physical education initiative has been underway since 1995, and can potentially achieve many of the same things as mega-events (i.e. improved sports facilities, enhanced social cohesion), yet it has gained little to no scholarly (or media) attention. Over the past several years, the Department of Basic Education\(^2\) and the Department of Sport and Recreation have come together to put forth several key policy documents regarding the reintroduction of physical education, and the potentially transformative role it can play in South African schools, cities, and more widely throughout South African society.

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\(^1\) Although many areas of the Global South are unable to offer quality physical education programmes because of resource constraints and lack of qualified staff, emerging states, like China and Brazil, do offer compulsory physical education as part of the school curriculum. In China, the Ministry of Education has made it a requirement for all students to have at least one hour of physical education per day, and physical fitness testing scores are now a key element of school prestige rankings. The Ministry of Education has also increased salaries and other benefits for physical education teachers in order to attract more competent professionals to this field (“Ministry to disqualify schools that fail to meet PE tests,” 2012). In Brazil, the government recently created Academia da Saude, a national programme that will create new and accessible opportunities for regular physical activity in more than 4,000 municipalities over the next 5 years. This programme offers a convenient way for children to engage in play while at school (Parra & Brownson, 2012). Brazil is also home to 400 Physical Education College Institutions and 12 Physical Education Masters and Doctoral programmes; these programmes train and develop qualified physical education professionals (Hardman, 2005).

\(^2\) The Department of Basic Education was formed in 2009 after the election of President Jacob Zuma. At this time, the former national Department of Education was divided into two separate entities: the Department of Basic Education, which is responsible for all schools from Grade R to Grade 12, as well as adult literacy programmes; and the Department of Higher Education and Training, which oversees university and other post-secondary education in South Africa (Department of Basic Education, 2013; Department of Higher Education and Training, 2012).
Through my thesis research, I will investigate these two distinctive ways in which the South African government utilizes sport as a strategy for development, and consider how these may play a role in the configuration of cities. At first glance, these case studies may seem disparately connected, given that one involves the world’s largest single-sport mega-event, while the other is about a relatively commonplace curriculum-based sporting initiative. However, I have intentionally selected these case studies in order to demonstrate that sport, in its diverse range of forms, and sports-based strategies and policies can be used to address various goals or concerns of national and city governments (i.e. infrastructure development, international exposure and recognition, fostering social inclusion), and play important roles in shaping the city, both literally and figuratively. On one hand, the government used the sporting mega-event, the 2010 FIFA World Cup, to discursively and spatially reshape the nation through its host cities. I will argue that the plan to create “world cities” with distinguishing world-class markers (i.e. stadiums and infrastructure), and in turn, elevate the South African nation on the global stage, proved to be a largely speculative urban strategy. On the other hand, the government is attempting to use physical education as a way of creating “useful” South African citizens (i.e. healthy, productive, economic) by instituting opportunities for all children to participate in sport and recreation during the school day. Although there are many neoliberal elements inherent to physical education (both in the way it is described in South African policy documents, as well as how it is implemented worldwide), I will argue that this policy programme offers the possibility of forging “ordinary cities” (Robinson, 2002; 2006) that are based upon providing all children just, equitable and accessible opportunities to enjoy their fundamental right to play. This is dependent upon the government’s ability to forge alliances with and learn from relevant actors, such as civil society organizations and South African Sport
for Development NGOs, city officials, construction companies, social justice groups, and perhaps most importantly, children.

1.2. Background

1.2.1. Apartheid’s Impact on Sport in South Africa

South Africa is a country enamoured with sport, and one that is often revered for its athletic prowess. Yet the history of sport in South Africa is severely fragmented, and “sport has tended to occupy an uneasy position in South African society” (Cornelissen, 2008, p. 487) due to the country’s troubling legacy of apartheid. Apartheid was a system of legal racial segregation enforced by the National Party government from 1948 to 1994, under which non-white South Africans were subjected to grave human rights violations. Apartheid policies affected all aspects of everyday life and society, including the South African sporting landscape. During apartheid, non-white athletes were forbidden from participating on South African national teams, and South African national pride was largely “dependent on the achievements of its white-only sports teams” (Sugden, 2010, p. 262). Furthermore, sport played a key role in reinforcing the notion that white South Africans were superior to all other races, as well as promulgating “ethnic and racial stratification and power relations [within the country]” (Sugden, 2010, p. 262). By the late 1960s, the South African government stood as world’s lone advocate of sports-based segregation, as National Party ministers staunchly declared, “interracial contact in sport exacerbated social stress [in the country]” (Booth, 2003, p. 478).

Beginning in mid-1950s, the international sporting regime took swift action against South Africa and its apartheid policies. Apartheid-era sport “provoked the moral sensibilities” of the international sporting community (Booth, 2003, p. 480). The sport boycott against South
Africa was “organized around loosely connected causes related to human rights, social equity, democracy, anti-racism and anti-imperialism” (Cornelissen, 2011b, p. 153), with the ultimate goal of deracializing sport in South Africa (Booth, 2003). Kidd (1988) also suggests that the “hierarchal governance of modern sport” (p. 644), as well as the “tremendous prestige and financial revenues available through international sport” (p. 664) are key reasons for the successful sport boycott against South Africa. All international athletes, coaches, and officials “are subject to the discipline of powerful and monopolistic associations” (Kidd, 1988, p. 645), such as the International Olympic Committee (hereafter IOC); therefore, if an athlete or nation has the desire to compete in and financially benefit from sanctioned international sporting events, they must comply with the rules and expectations set forth by international sport governing bodies, including participating in the sport boycott against South Africa.

In 1961, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) suspended South Africa when the government refused to do anything about sports-based racial discrimination and segregation (Kidd, 1988, p. 652). That same year, South Africa lost the opportunity to participate in the Commonwealth Games (Kidd, 1988, p. 643). Then, in 1963, non-white South Africans, with the support of Scandinavians, Soviet, and Brazilian sportspersons, lobbied the IOC to ban the all-white South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) from the Olympics. The IOC complied with these demands, and expelled South Africa from Olympic competition. South Africa’s Olympic ban lasted from 1964 until 1992 (Kidd, 1988, p. 652). The Commonwealth Games Federation and the IOC also banned South Africa from other major sporting events that fell under their jurisdictions, and discouraged contact with other member states. Similarly, other international sporting federations of Olympic sports, such as track and field, “expelled South Africa from membership altogether and [penalized] those who
[attempted] to further contacts” (Kidd, 1988, p. 643). These international sport federations saw “White South Africa’s obsession with sport [as] an opportunity to destabilize the apartheid regime by successfully lobbying the international community to impose a sport boycott on that country” (Sugden, 2010, p. 262).

During the same year in which South Africa was expelled from the Olympics (1963), a large number of prominent anti-apartheid sportspersons met in London to form the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC). Their goal was to replace the recently expelled, all-white SANOC as the primary sports governing body in South Africa, and to further expel white South Africans from international sport as long as apartheid policies were in effect (Kidd, 1988, p. 653). SANROC forged a bond with the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA), which wanted to “boycott all major competitions to which South Africa was invited” (Kidd, 1988, p. 653). Sam Ramsamy, former executive chair of SANROC, stated during the sport boycott against South Africa:

We have no illusions that the sports boycott by itself can end apartheid. But the knowledge that the vast majority of sportspersons around the world would refuse to ‘play with apartheid’ has greatly undermined the legitimacy of the government, boosted the morale of South African blacks, and encouraged the resistance at all levels. (Kidd, 1988, p. 646)

In 1968, the IOC was willing to accept SANOC’s entry for the Mexico Summer Olympics, so long as South Africa sent an integrated team of white and non-white athletes. In response, the SCSA threatened that all 32 African nations would boycott the Games, along with the USSR, Barbados, Trinidad, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and several American athletes, if South Africa were permitted to compete while still under apartheid rule. The IOC balked at
this long list of potential absentees, and quickly withdrew its invitation to SANOC. As a result, South Africa remained barred from Olympic competition until 1992 (Kidd, 1988, p. 653-654). By the mid-1970s, the IOC had effectively used its “moral suasion” against South Africa, even in non-Olympic sports, including rugby and cricket (Kidd, 1988, p. 655). Rugby and cricket boycotts were especially significant to the cause, and even more troublesome to the apartheid government, since these are the preferred sports of white South Africans, and sports at which the country typically excels.

During the late 1970s and onwards into the 1980s, various South African sporting federations slowly began to make a “concerted effort to get back into international competition,” including permitting clubs and sports associations to engage in “multi-racial” competition. However, participants (i.e. athletes, coaches, and spectators) were still subject to apartheid laws, like the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act, “which require and enforce residential segregation. Once the sportspersons leave the grounds, they must go their separate ways” (Kidd, 1988, p. 658-659). In 1990 at the Stockholm International Conference against Apartheid in Sport, former IOC President, Juan Samaranch, ruled that South Africa could be reinstated to the Olympic Movement, and could thus participate at the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, Spain, based on the fact that apartheid rule was on the verge of demise, and “a democratic South Africa was in the making” (Swart and Bob, 2004, p. 1314). Moreover, in March 1992, “South Africa’s new relationship with the IOC was symbolically established” when prominent member of the African National Congress, and future South African President, Nelson Mandela, visited the organization’s headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland (Swart and Bob, 2004, p. 1314).
1.2.2. South Africa’s Mega-Event “Habit”

Following the end of apartheid and Mandela’s election as President in 1994, the South African government established the Department of Sport and Recreation (also known as Sport and Recreation South Africa, or SRSA), whose chief responsibility would be “To transform the delivery of sport and recreation by ensuring equitable access, development and excellence at all levels of participation and to harness the socio-economic contributions that can create a better life for all South Africans” (Department of Sport and Recreation, n.d.). According to the Department of Sport and Recreation, sport was “central to the achievement of every single one of the aspirations, policies and principles that underpin the objectives of the Government” (Department of Sport and Recreation, 1995, p. 1). President Mandela took strong heed of these views, and made a conscious effort to harness South Africa’s passion for sport as a means of transforming the country into a “new” South Africa. Mandela envisioned the “new” South Africa as the “Rainbow Nation,” in which citizens of all different races could live and play in peace together, and transcend past racial divisions (van der Merwe, 2007, p. 72). In accordance with this vision, Mandela “encouraged all races to unite behind the national teams that he believed could be gradually remodelled to reflect a vibrant and peaceful multi-racial state” (Sugden, 2010, p. 263). One year into Mandela’s presidency, South Africa hosted and won the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which represented a pivotal moment for the country, as South Africans of all races joined together in supporting and celebrating the first multi-racial national rugby team (Sugden, 2010, p. 263).

The successful hosting and subsequent victory of the 1995 Rugby World Cup demonstrated to the South African government the “significance of such events for strengthening national unity and manufacturing legitimacy for a newly created, still fragile
political order” (van der Merwe, 2007, p. 72). In the two decades following apartheid, South Africa has developed what Black (2007) refers to as a “habit” that can border “on a kind of addiction” (p. 267) to hosting mega-events. Most of the sporting mega-events that South Africa has hosted in the post-apartheid era can be categorized as “second-order” events, in that they are “lower in profile, participation and spectatorship [compared to “first-order” events, like the Olympics and FIFA World Cup, but] are nonetheless important international occurrences that in today’s world, [because they] evoke similar interest, and significant capital outflows” (Cornelissen, 2008, p. 481). Examples of these second-order sporting events hosted by South Africa include: the 1996 and 2012 African Cup of Nations (football), the 1996 World Cup of Golf, the 1998 World Cup of Athletics (track and field), the 2003 Cricket World Cup, the 2003 President’s Cup (golf), the Women’s World Cup of Golf from 2005 to 2008, and the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup (football). Relative success in hosting these second-order affairs allowed for South Africa “to use such events as a launching pad for other bids” (Black, 2007, p. 264). In other words, South Africa was able to demonstrate its technological sophistication and managerial capacity in hosting these international sporting events, which played a role in helping the nation secure the rights to host one of the world’s most sought-after, prestigious, and important “first-order” sporting mega-events: the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

1.2.3. Reintroduction of Physical Education in South African Schools

As we will see in greater detail later in Chapter 3, the 2010 FIFA World Cup was an opportunity for South Africa to further economic and urban development, and to showcase itself on the global stage, but in actuality, the event “did little to change the position and plight of the people who are marginalized” within the country (Cornelissen & Swart, 2006, p. 113). Despite the largely negative outcomes of the World Cup, mega-events remain the most attractive way in
which sport is utilized as a vehicle for development by the South African government, as well as explored by media and scholars, in the post-apartheid era. At the same time, however, there has also been a quiet effort by the South African government to use sport as a means of furthering development by instituting a much different kind of sporting initiative in the country: the reintroduction of compulsory physical education programmes in all South African schools. The government recognizes that to fully realize its vision of South Africa becoming an “active and winning nation” (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2009b, p. 5), it must also think about sport at a more fundamental level (i.e. physical activity and recreation in schools), rather than just in terms of major international events. Physical education may not offer the financial prosperity and media publicity that can potentially result from hosting large-scale events, but the South African government asserts that it is nevertheless a critical initiative, and that “Ensuring optimal conditions for a child’s participation in sport and recreation is one of the best investments a government can make” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 2).

Proponents of physical education declare that quality, school-based sport programmes should be made available to every child in every school system worldwide as a educational entitlement and fundamental human right (Bailey & Dismore, 2005). Substantial evidence exists that physical education “presents the child…with life skills in a way unsurpassed by any other activity” (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2012a, p. 29), including physical development (movement skills, fitness, health), cognitive development (improved academic performance), social development (moral reasoning, personal responsibility, social inclusion), affective development (enhanced self-esteem, pro-school attitudes), and lifestyle development (lifelong physical activity) (Bailey, 2006). In addition to these benefits, the South African government
envisions the transformative role that physical education can play in undermining the legacy of apartheid in South African society. That is, the education system and curriculum, including physical education, have the capacity to “counter the legacy of violence by promoting the values underlying the democratic process” (Department of Education, 1995, p. 18), such as tolerance, cooperation, conflict management, and respect, in South African children. Additionally, physical education demonstrates the progress that South Africa has made in the two decades following apartheid, because it guarantees all children the right to participate in sport and recreation, regardless of age, gender, disability, or race, which is a drastic departure from the deeply segregated state of South African sport during apartheid.

1.2.4. Historical Overview of Physical Education in South Africa

The reintroduction of physical education in South African schools is not an entirely new concept or initiative, rather one that finds its roots in the early years following apartheid. During apartheid, the school curriculum “played a powerful role in reinforcing inequality” (Department of Education, 2002, p. 4), in that children were taught according to the social, political, and economic positions occupied by their constituencies under apartheid (i.e. race and class). In particular, subjects that required extra funding and teacher specialization, like physical education, were only taught in affluent, white schools (Department of Education, 2002).

Following the end of apartheid, the country came to function under a single education system governed by the national Department of Education. Through the rigorous processes of syllabus revision and subject rationalization led by the National Education and Training Forum, the Department of Education aimed to develop a national, unified core curriculum. In 1998, the South African government introduced its first comprehensive post-apartheid education policy,
known as Curriculum 2005. Under Curriculum 2005, there was a strong emphasis on academic-based content, such as mathematics, coupled with a lack of focus on activity-based subjects, like physical education (Department of Education, 2002).

According to this new education policy, physical education was no longer an independent subject, rather a component of one of the eight designated learning areas, known as Life Orientation (other learning areas include Languages, Mathematics, Natural Sciences, Arts and Culture, Economic and Management Sciences, Technology) (Department of Education, 2002). Broadly defined, Life Orientation “guides and prepares learners for life and its possibilities” and “specifically equips learners for meaningful and successful living in a rapidly changing and transforming society” (Department of Education, 2002, p. 6). South Africa is a nation “characterized by socio-political change” (Department of Education, 2003, p. 19), and serious challenges, such as socio-economic development, environmental degradation, and unemployment (Department of Education, 2003). Therefore, Life Orientation is looked upon to prepare South African youth to adequately deal with such changes and challenges. Life Orientation helps learners make informed decisions and take suitable action in the areas of health promotion (personal, community, environmental health), social development (constitutional rights and responsibilities, acceptance of diversity), personal development (achieving potential, respond to challenges), physical development and movement (participating in physical activity), and orientation to the world of work (making decisions about further study and career choices) (Department of Education, 2002, p. 26). Life Orientation was only allotted 8 percent of learning time per week, while the majority of learning time was allocated toward academic subjects, like languages and mathematics (Department of Education, 2002, p. 18). It was during this period of curriculum reform that physical education lost its full subject status.
within the South African curriculum, and has since been in slow demise.

This marginalization of physical education in post-apartheid South Africa has not deterred a few branches of the South African government (namely, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation) from taking several important, yet incremental, steps to revitalize school sport throughout the country over the past two decades. In 1994, the newly-created Department of Sport and Recreation established the United School Sport Association of South Africa (USSASA). The organization was “responsible for the coordination and delivery of organized school sport programmes” (Department of Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 2). However, a lack of coordination, lack of communication between the organization and provincial and national sport federations, and lack of funding led to the dissolution of the USSASA in 2005, which left no formal entity in charge of school sport within the country (Department of Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 3).

Shortly after the dissolution of the USSASA, Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor, and Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile, signed the Framework for Collaboration: Coordination and Management of School Sport in Public and Ordinary Schools (hereafter Framework for Collaboration) on March 17, 2005 (Department of Education & Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2005). The purpose of this document was to formalize government responsibility for the delivery of school sport in all South African schools, as well as to facilitate collaboration, enhance coordination, and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities between the departments (Department of Education & Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2005). Although the Framework for Collaboration was a step in the right direction, the document had several significant flaws, which limited its ability to achieve its intended goals. In particular, there was a
lack of resources (i.e. funding, equipment, facilities, training), lack of participation by schools, and poor communication and collaboration between stakeholders (i.e. roles and responsibilities of stakeholders were not clearly defined). The fundamental weakness of the *Framework for Collaboration* was its inability to ensure or enforce compliance of schools in the delivery of quality school sport programmes (Department of Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 5).

After several years of relative inactivity on the matter of physical education, the South African government released three new important policy documents in 2011. In June 2011, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation released *An Integrated School Sports Framework*, which built upon ideas laid out in the previously-published *Framework for Collaboration* (2005), and would ensure that the institutional structures were in place to implement and monitor school sport, regulate access and delivery of school sport for all learners, clarify roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, and develop a quality school sport system enshrined with the principles of excellence, inclusivity, respect, fair play, professionalism, ethics, accessibility, capacity development, and social cohesion (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a). Several months later in December 2011, the Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, and the Minister of Sport and Recreation, Fikile Mbalula, signed the *Memorandum of Understanding on An Integrated School Sport Framework*, in order to demonstrate their understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities, and commitment to the delivery of a sustainable, accessible, and implementable school sport programme in South Africa (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011b). To complement these two documents, the two departments also gazetted the *School Sport Policy for Schools in South Africa* for public
comment in December 2011. The purpose of this policy is to “regulate the delivery of school sport for all learners, irrespective of ability, across all schools in an age-appropriate and/or grade appropriate way, based on the principles of equity and access” (Department of Basic Education, 2011, p. 5). On March 28, 2012, Minister of Sport and Recreation, Fikile Mbalula, officially launched the initial roll-out campaign of South Africa’s new school sport programme, with plans for nationwide implementation by late 2013 (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011b). In his kick-off speech, Mbalula emphatically declared that as a result of this school-based sport programme, “South Africa will never be the same again. Ten to twenty years time, this programme [will] put us in the same league of Australia, the UK and the US” (Mbalula, 2012). Minister Mbalula wants to emulate places like Australia, the UK, and the US, which all have historically been known to provide children with access to physical education programmes. He acknowledges that these places not only utilize physical education to ensure that children can regularly engage in sport, have fun, and live healthy lifestyles, but also as a way to identify and prepare talented athletes to compete and excel at the national level (Mbalula, 2012). In this respect, Mbalula envisions that South Africa will never be the same again because the long-term health and values system of its citizenry may be positively affected by their participation in physical education, and physical education will also enable sports federations to better identify, develop, and nurture young, talented South African athletes for international sporting competitions.

1.3. Problem Statement

In the modern world, sport is recognized for its ever-growing economic, political, social, and cultural significance, and has become an “innovative instrument” (Beutler, 2008, p. 359) for various kinds development (i.e. economic, urban, social). It is a tool that is increasingly
deployed by governments in myriad ways for multiple ends. That is to say, governments are not
monolithic creatures with a single or universal vision for how sport can be used as a strategy for
development. Rather, governments often have multiple visions of how sport can be used to
further development; these visions for sport can be complementary visions, or competing
visions, and are often enacted simultaneously. This rings especially true in South Africa, where
sport has long been an element of the post-apartheid government’s policy repertoire, and a key
feature of the nation’s strategy for development. Most prominently, South Africa has hosted
many sporting mega-events in the post-apartheid era. The 2010 FIFA World Cup in particular
allowed for the government to imagine and enact its vision for the nation through its host cities.
That is, the World Cup gave South African host cities the opportunity to become “‘must see,
must visit, must invest’” (Speake, 2007, p. 3) places by remaking themselves with distinctive,
world-class markers, such as expensive and sophisticated infrastructure; highlighting themselves
as attractive sites for foreign tourism and investment; and thereby elevating themselves and the
nation on the world stage. Furthermore, sporting mega-events are the primary way in which
sport in South Africa has been taken up from a scholarly perspective. Much of this critical and
evaluative scholarship focuses on the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and tends to emphasize the unjust
outcomes and uneven distribution of costs and benefits that occurred as a result of this mega-
event (i.e. Pillay & Bass, 2008; Cornelissen, 2008; Newton, 2009).

This thesis will build upon current scholarship on sporting mega-events to provide a
critical assessment of South Africa’s mega-event “habit,” with specific emphasis on the 2010
World Cup, and then focus upon the government’s incremental movement toward the
reintroduction of physical education in the South African school curriculum. As I outlined
earlier, the government’s quiet attempt to reestablish physical education in South African
schools has been ongoing since 1995, yet it has garnered little to no scholarly (or media) attention, perhaps because it does not carry the allure or potential prosperity and publicity of sporting mega-events. The South African government views this school-based sporting initiative as a strategy for development, and believes quality physical education can positively impact learners, educators, cities, and the nation, because of the policy’s emphases on mass participation, equal access, and social inclusion.

As I mentioned earlier, these seemingly distinct case studies are linked because they both demonstrate that governments can utilize various kinds of sports-based policies to potentially shape and develop cities (and citizens). Therefore, my research will be guided by the following three questions, which focus on precisely how said policies are imagined and put to practice (the first is more general, while the other two are more specific): (1) In general, what role can sport play in the development of South African cities, and hence, the nation (i.e. “making” cities, transforming the nation)? (2) How did the 2010 FIFA World Cup make or transform (or fail to make or transform) South African host cities, and in turn, the nation? (3) What do key South African policy documents about physical education tell us about the potential role which physical education can play in making the city, and in turn, the nation? In order to successfully answer these questions, I have opted to use two different research methods in the two major components of my project. I have chosen to perform a discourse analysis of South African policies about physical education, given that this is a relatively new government initiative, and based on my research, other scholars have not yet discursively analyzed this body of policy documents (i.e. I could not look at or incorporate their analyses). Such an approach is important and necessary, therefore, because it allows me to gain a strong understanding of these policies, including who wrote them and why they were written, and it will also help me to make my
argument that even though physical education is a neoliberal policy programme, the possibility exists that this sporting initiative could lead to the forging of ordinary cities in post-apartheid South Africa. Contrastingly, in my case study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, I have decided to conduct a review of existing literature about mega-events and the 2010 World Cup, as well as relevant world city scholarship. I elected not to use discourse analysis in my exploration of this particular case study because numerous other scholars have already performed their own analyses of government legitimations and rationales surrounding the 2010 World Cup, as well as the event’s impact on the nation, cities, and its citizens (i.e. speeches, interviews, newspaper articles). As a result, I am able to utilize this comprehensive body of secondary source material to demonstrate that the plan use the World Cup as a means of creating world cities in South Africa should be understood as a speculative world-making strategy.

1.4. Outline of Thesis Chapters

In this introductory chapter, I have provided important background information about sport in South Africa, as it pertains to the nation’s proclivity for hosting major international sporting events, and the government’s quiet attempt to revitalize physical education as part of the school curriculum. Furthermore, I have positioned sporting mega-events and physical education as two distinctive ways in which the South African government deploys sport as a strategy for development in the post-apartheid era, and suggested that these initiatives are linked by the perceived role that they can play in the spatial and symbolic development of South African cities. In the coming chapters, I will explore precisely how these two sporting initiatives are imagined and/or put to practice by the South African government, and provide my own assessments for how each may play a role in making South African cities. In Chapter 2, I provide a literature review of the state of geographical knowledge on the concepts of sport,
education, and children. This literature review demonstrates how these seemingly distinctive concepts intersect in my research, and it will also play a key role in informing my discourse analysis of South African physical education policies (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3, I describe sporting mega-events as way in which government’s use sport for development. I build upon Michael Goldman’s (2011a; 2011b) concept of speculative urbanism, and argue that the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa is a mega-event that should be understood as a speculative world-making strategy, aimed at elevating South African host cities and the nation to “world-class” status. In Chapter 4, I perform a discourse analysis of recent physical education policy documents produced by the South African government. Here, I build upon the literature review I previously conducted in Chapter 2, and make the argument that despite the fundamental neoliberal elements of this sporting initiative, there is the possibility that physical education could lead to ordinary cities (in the tradition of Jennifer Robinson) in South Africa, where all children can enjoy equitable and accessible opportunities for sport and play. Chapter 5 concludes my thesis. In this chapter, I revisit the common theme of my research (sport as a strategy for development) and summarize my findings, while also acknowledging some of the limitations of my research, and presenting implications of my project, as well as possibilities for further and/or future research.
Chapter 2
Review of Existing Literature about Sport, Education and Children

2.1. Introduction

This thesis research brings together three potentially distinctive concepts that are infrequently studied together in existing geographical scholarship: sport, education, and children. These are the main concepts that I am employing in my thesis research, given that it is the intersection of sport, education, and children that forms my entry point for examining the South African government’s effort to reintroduce physical education in schools. In this chapter, I will present a literature review about the state of geographical knowledge on these topics, and doing so will bring to light the significance of my research on both a conceptual, as well as an empirical, level. In the final section of this chapter, I will explain the concept of the city as the site of analysis for my research, and the potential spatial and symbolic role that sport can play in the configuration of the city.

2.2. Past Geographical Approaches to Sport and Education

2.2.1. Positivism

As objects of geographical inquiry and analysis, sport and education have historically been part of the positivist tradition. Positivism is a movement within philosophy, which affirms that only observable, verifiable knowledge is real knowledge, and denies the validity of non-scientific (i.e. non-observable, non-verifiable) speculation or theorization (Barnes, 2009). Positivism is typically characterized by six main tenets: (1) the importance of observation; (2) the importance of verification (or falsification) in determining truth; (3) the absence of causality
(one event merely occurs after another); (4) skepticism in non-observable theories; (5) the universal applicability of positivism to all areas of study, including the humanities, social sciences, and physical and natural sciences; (6) the denial of metaphysics (i.e. non-physical means non-observable, non-verifiable) (Barnes, 2009).

Some of the tenets of positivism became particularly relevant in geography during the period known as “Quantitative Revolution” in the 1950s and 1960s. During the Quantitative Revolution, empirical observation was central to the discipline, as was the pursuit of the verification of data through “sophisticated formal statistical techniques” (Barnes, 2009, p. 559). Positivism was attractive to geographers because it offered the prospect of a “unified method” through which physical geographers and human geographers alike were able to more easily communicate their quantitative observations and findings to one another (Barnes, 2009, p. 559). However, geography’s Quantitative Revolution did not follow all of the tenets of positivism. In particular, the fourth tenet (skepticism in non-observable theories) did not apply at all to the Quantitative Revolution. In fact, the ongoing empirical observation and verification within geography was significantly bolstered by a strong disciplinary interest and acceptance of non-observable, non-verifiable theory. For instance, burgeoning subdisciplines, such as economic geography and urban geography, underwent massive transformation during the Quantitative Revolution because of valuable theoretical insights borrowed from physics, economics, and sociology, and did not rely on observation and verification alone (Barnes, 2009). Therefore, it is likely that for geographers, the point of the Quantitative Revolution was not to advance the positivist agenda, but a chance to conceive and produce new theories, and test them using advanced statistical and quantitative methods. Over time as geographers became more attune with the importance of theory and discourse (i.e. gender, poverty, race), positivism experienced
severe critiques, and suffered its demise in geography following the end of the Quantitative Revolution (Barnes, 2009). Until very recently, however, positivism continued to pervade the geographical subfields of sport and education, which I will describe below.

2.2.2. Sport

Prominent sports geographer, John Bale (1988), suggests that geographers have traditionally been prone to overlook the ideological or sociocultural significance of sport in favour of undertaking more empirical or quantitative analyses, such as studies about the regional variations in sports participation (Bale, 2000). Bale (2003) identifies John Rooney as “the ‘father’ of modern sports geography and [as] an example of a scholar who has built his reputation on sports-geographic writing” (p. 3). Much of Rooney’s work is deeply rooted in the positivist tradition, given that he used “the map as the principal tool of analysis,” and sought to identify geographical variations in the production of elite-level athletes (Bale, 2000, p. 176). This approach is especially evident in Rooney’s (1969) seminal study about the geographical implications of football in the United States, as well as in his book (Rooney, 1974) about the geography of American sport, in which he calculates the number of high school athletes per state that are recruited by NCAA Division-I colleges. Rooney’s “per capita” or “regional” approach to sports geography (Bale, 2000, p. 176) has been replicated by numerous other scholars analyzing a wide variety of sports, such as Ojala & Gadwood’s (1989) study of the geographical origin of Major League Baseball players from 1876 to 1988, and has also inspired other geographical, quantitative studies related to the relocation of professional sports franchises (i.e. Euchner, 1993), the global diffusion of particular sports (i.e. Bale 1978; Bale 1982), and sports talent migration (i.e. Maguire, 1994). As a result of this subdisciplinary emphasis on empirical and locational analyses, the geography of sport has been historically plagued by “’yet
2.2.3. Education

Despite the pervasiveness of schools (i.e. in quantity, as educational spaces, as sites of social production and reproduction) and the everyday significance of education for children, families, communities, and nations, education has historically received far less attention in geographical research than other institutions, like the hospital or the clinic (Collins & Coleman, 2008, p. 282). Before the 2000s, the geography of education was mostly limited to the mapping of schools (Cook & Hemming, 2011), and quantitatively examining the “spatial variations in the provision, take up, quality of and outputs from” education (Johnston, 2009, p. 186). Major quantitative-based studies on the geography of education focus on educational opportunity and achievement, wherein scholars statistically compare class-based or race-based differences in academic performance (i.e. Clark 1987; Clark, 1988), without much regard for supplemental theory. Past geographical offerings to the study of education also reflect a contributory, rather than an interactional approach (Collins & Evans, 2007 as cited in Taylor, 2009). That is, many scholars conducting research on the geographies of education simply deployed common geographical vocabulary (i.e. space, place) in their work, without an appreciation for what these terms mean or a “tacit knowledge [of how] to practice or ‘do’ geography” (Taylor, 2009, p. 652). According to Robertson (2009, p. 2 as cited in Taylor, 2009), such an approach fails to offer new geographical insights into the study of education, as he argues, “it is not sufficient to simply bring a spatial lexicon to our conceptual sentences (as in ‘geographies’ of classroom emotions; the school as a ‘place’; communities of practice). This is to fetishize space” (p. 652).
2.3. Contemporary Geographical Approaches to Sport and Education

In the following two sub-sections, I will describe how contemporary human geographers now more frequently utilize qualitative research methods (as opposed to solely quantitative or positivist methods) in their approaches to both sport and education, and also place much greater emphasis on the social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of these concepts.

2.3.1. Sport

In recent years, human geographers have paid increasing attention to sport because of its extraordinary popularity in the modern world, and its ever-expanding economic, political, social, and cultural significance.\(^3\) As a result, geographers more readily accept sport as “a productive laboratory for furthering geographical understanding” (Bale, 1988, p. 518), and continually seek to explore overlapping areas of interest between the discipline and the modern-day “sportscape” (Vertinsky & Bale, 2004). Of particular interest to geographers and other social scientists have been the ways in which sport has emerged as a vehicle for various kinds of development. Two primary ways in which sport has been looked upon to drive development is

\(^3\) While I have focused my overview of contemporary geographical approaches to sport on the role sport can play in various kinds of development, Mike Crang (2009b) provides a more comprehensive summary of how geographers have come to study sport in recent years in his entry on “Sport(s)” in *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (5th ed.). Crang (2009b) acknowledges the increasing economic and cultural importance of sport, and categorizes modern geographical studies of sport into one of five approaches: (1) The economic aspects of sport, as it relates to mega-events (i.e. Olympics), the competition over sports franchise and stadia location, and the implications for urban development; (2) the diffusion and distribution of different sports around the world; (3) the development of sports in the colonial and post-colonial world, such as how cricket became widespread across South Asia (see James, 1963), and how Japan adopted baseball during the post-WWII period; (4) the historical geography of sport, as it pertains to the emergence of sport as spectacle, mediatization of sport, rise of spectator sport, and sporting arenas as abstract space; (5) sport as a way of further exploring the concepts of identity, body cultures, discipline, power, emotion, performativity, and landscape (p. 718).
through the hosting of sporting mega-events (i.e. Olympics, FIFA World Cup), and through the implementation of Sport for Development programmes, both of which have been extensively studied by geographers. First, sporting mega-events – a topic that will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 3 – have become highly sought after commodities in the globalized world because they are increasingly viewed as vehicles for economic, urban, and social development (i.e. Roche, 2000; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). Mega-events allow for hosts to spatially reshape the built environment, attract foreign direct investment, bolster tourism, and showcase themselves to the world through the intense global media attention surrounding these events. Scholars are keen to analyze the long-term impact of these events in host cities and local communities, and often find that the costs greatly outweigh the benefits, in that many hosts incur substantial financial losses, and that economic gains are not distributed equally throughout society (i.e. Swart & Bob, 2004; Zimbalist, 2010; Andranovich et al., 2001; Matheson & Baade, 2004). More conceptually, scholars also want to understand and explore how mega-events are deployed as social and political tools that governments use to “signal important changes of direction, ‘reframe’ dominant narratives about the host, and/or reinforce key messages about what the host has become/is becoming” (Black, 2007, p. 262). In other words, governments use the grandeur and opulence of global sporting mega-events to manufacture, circulate, and legitimate certain visions of themselves, both domestically and internationally (i.e. Black & van der Westhuizen, 2004; Black, 2007; Cornelissen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2010).

Second, Sport for Development refers to “the intentional use of sport, physical activity and play to attain specific development and peace objectives” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group [SDP IWG], 2008, p. 3). Sport for Development organizations (i.e. Right to Play, Grassroot Soccer) are committed to conflict resolution and
intercultural understanding; building physical, social, sport, and community infrastructure; raising awareness through education; empowering individuals and communities; having a direct and positive impact on physical and psychological health and general welfare; facilitating economic development; and alleviating poverty (Levermore, 2007). These programmes are so appealing to development professionals and participants because sport creates spaces in which people from different backgrounds, cultures, classes, religions, and races can come together to play, and accrue positive tangible and intangible benefits from their participation (i.e. new sports facilities and equipment, cooperation and teamwork skills). Particularly in war-torn or poverty-stricken areas, participation in sport and other recreational activities can be an “escape” that allows for participants to feel safe, a sense of belonging, fun, and teamwork that they might not experience otherwise.

However, critics of the Sport for Development movement claim that these programmes are often deeply rooted in neoliberalism because of their emphases on capacity-building, upgrading infrastructure, and increasing investment (Coalter, 2010; Spaaij, 2009; Levermore, 2009). There are neo-colonial or hegemonic elements to Sport for Development programmes, given that the “development goals [of these programmes] take place within power relations that are neither flat nor benign” (Darnell, 2010, p. 57). That is to say, Sport for Development programmes are often formulated and implemented by developed nations and transplanted to developing nations, which suggests that these programmes may be overly simplistic and lack vital local or indigenous input, and ultimately reinforce inequalities between the Global North and the Global South (Levermore, 2007). Scholars who have undertaken such studies stress that for Sport for Development programmes to be successful, they must be integrated into the larger development framework, rather than isolated within their own autonomous field (i.e.
Schulenkorf, 2012; Levermore, 2011a; Levermore, 2011b; Lytras & Peachey, 2011). In other words, programmes that are directed toward training interns and volunteers, or preparing athletes and coaches for organized competition are not technically Sport for Development, rather, they facilitate “‘sport for sport’s sake’ or sport development” (Kidd, 2011, p. 604). These programmes are important and make some meaningful contributions, but they do not explicitly follow a prescribed model of development, or aim to improve social reconciliation, social inclusion, or social cohesion. Kidd (2011) proclaims that the most successful and sustainable Sport for Development programmes are those that not only recognize sport (or play) as a fundamental human right, but ensure that each person is able to actively enjoy this right. These programmes adhere to “best practices” of development, in that they are planned by the community, they are needs and assets-based, and they are linked to other initiatives beyond sport, such as those related to health and education (Kidd, 2011, p. 604).

2.3.2. Education

Recent scholarship about the geographies of education readily acknowledges education and schools as “central to the social geographies of everyday life” (Collins & Coleman, 2008, p. 282), and explores the socio-spatial processes that take place within and flow from these institutions (Cook & Hemming, 2011). Geographers continue to conduct research about variations in education provision and attainment, but contemporary work emphasizes these as “complex social phenomena which…are located at the intersection of space, social structure and social processes” (Butler & Hamnett, 2007, p. 1164), rather than just as data to be mapped. As such, geographers are able to examine how factors such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, and family structure impact education provision and attainment. Furthermore, education has become one of the main benchmarks by which nations judge their ability to compete in a global
economy, compare themselves to others, and evaluate their readiness for the future (Butler & Hamnett, 2007; Holloway & Jons, 2012). Neoliberal education frameworks have emerged, particularly in the Global North, in which education has become a commodity that can be sold and purchased by those who can afford it. In other words, more affluent parents can choose to send their children to better schools so that they may achieve better educational outcomes, whereas poorer families lack financial resources to provide high-quality education for their children (i.e. Witten et al., 2003). Such a trend was prominent in the United States during the 1960s, when white parents chose to send their children to private schools or to move to suburban school districts that African American families could not afford (Johnston, 2009).

Schools are also studied as sites of disciplinary power and control, in that education and the curriculum play central roles in producing (and reproducing) social norms, shaping children’s behaviours, values, and identities, creating “ideal” or “useful” types of citizens, and structuring children’s future opportunities (Holloway et al., 2010; Collins & Coleman, 2008; Taylor, 2009). Geographical exploration of the school curriculum and the way it shapes children’s lives has led scholars to give increasing attention to children as learners within educational spaces. That is, children are not just mere objects of education, but active participants that are able to accept and/or resist the often “adultist” notions of normality that are imposed upon them in the school setting (Holloway et al., 2010, p. 594). In the next section, I will explain how this geographical interest in children as participants has evolved in recent years, and how children are able to enact (or unable to enact) their social agency in the institutional context of the school.

2.4. The Geographies of Children

Children have historically been positioned as the antithesis of adults. Whereas adults are sexual, competent, strong, and responsible human beings, children are asexual, incompetent,
weak, irresponsible human “‘becomings’” (Valentine, 2000, p. 257-258). The geographies of children is a vibrant, expanding field of research which negates these patronizing views of children, and considers how these attitudes have evolved since the 1990s. In recent years, the geographies of children as a field of study has been strengthened by achievements such as the creation of the international journal, *Children’s Geographies*, the formation of the Royal Geographical Society with Institute of British Geographers Working Group on the geographies of children, the publication of numerous edited volumes (i.e. Skelton & Valentine, 1998; Holloway & Valentine, 2000a), and a noticeable increase in international workshops, conferences, and special sessions about the geographies of children (Katz, 2009). In this geographical subfield, children are no longer viewed as “silent objects who are dependent on adult care and control” (Barrow, 2002 as cited in Skelton, 2007, p. 169), but as key actors in society, and “competent arbiters of change” (Aitken et al., 2007, p. 4) (i.e. Holloway et al., 2010; Taylor, 2009; Aitken et al., 2007; Lund, 2007; Skelton, 2007; Kjorholt, 2007). Now more than ever, social scientists are interested in how children are encouraged and facilitated to participate in a wide variety of political, social, and cultural contexts, so as to have a say on issues that have a direct impact on their lives (Skelton, 2007, p. 166-167). Authentic and meaningful participation involves listening to children, allowing them to articulate their concerns, and providing them with ample opportunities to help plan, monitor, and evaluate those activities which directly affect them (Lund, 2007, p. 136). Geographers also look at childhood as a social construction that varies based on geographical location and historical time, seek to understand childhood “for itself rather than as a stage on the road to adulthood” (Katz, 2009, p. 81), and examine how gender, race, class, and sexuality affect children’s unique experiences and shape their understanding of the world in which they live (i.e. Skelton & Valentine, 1998; Holloway & Valentine, 2000a).
Despite the growing disciplinary acceptance of (and fascination with) children as social agents, children’s identities and lives are still constantly mediated, controlled, made, and remade in everyday institutional spaces, including the school (i.e. Fielding, 2000; Holt, 2004). According to James et al. (1998, p. 38 as cited in Holloway & Valentine, 2000b), the school is “dedicated to the control and regulation of the child’s body and mind through regimes of discipline, learning, development, maturation and skill” (p. 770). Within schools, therefore, children are caught in the in-between, in that they are at the same time both active participants, and subject to institutional power and control (Fielding, 2000, p. 202). Furthermore, schools have become the primary sites for government interventions, most notably the implementation of school-based health initiatives due to growing concerns over childhood obesity and inactivity (Cook & Hemming, 2011). That is, schools are recognized as “the primary institution with responsibility for promoting physical activity in young people” (Cale & Harris, 2006, p. 401), and monitoring and regulating health behaviour, mostly because of the inordinate amount of power that schools have over children, and the substantial amount of time children spend at school each day. Governments doubt young people’s capacity to make health-conscious decisions, and position them “as a threat to accepted social values, and as likely to engage in risky behaviours” (Wyn & White, 1997, p. 21 as cited in Burrows et al., 1999, p. 194). For instance, “moral panics” (Crang, 2009a, p. 624) about childhood obesity in the Global North have led many national governments to institute compulsory physical education and/or health education as part of the school curriculum (i.e. Hemming, 2007; Burrows et al., 1999). These curriculum-based initiatives may be viewed as “a particular form of ‘governmentality’ engendered through neo-liberal discourses of ‘freedom’ and ‘individualism’” (Hemming, 2007, p. 354). Additionally, dominant pedagogical approaches to physical education demonstrate Foucauldian ideas of disciplinary power through the practices of “surveillance,”
“normalization,” “exclusion,” and “regulation” of the human body (Gore, 1998 as cited in Hemming, 2007, p. 358). That is, these programmes can position children as subordinate subjects in need of adult guidance and support on how to make proper, healthy lifestyle choices, rather than as self-regulating, self-determining social agents (Hemming, 2007).

Moreover, many physical education programmes emphasize competitive sport and improving fitness levels, instead of encouraging regular physical activity and developing basic motor skills (Cale & Harris, 2006). Such an approach places too much of a focus on power, winning, competition, and heterosexuality, rather than fun, cooperation, and basic movement skills (Kirk, 1998 as cited in Hemming, 2007, p. 359). In geographical and social science studies about physical education, findings suggest that these school-based sport initiatives are actually most effective when children are encouraged to take part in activities that they enjoy, instead of doing them solely for health or competitive reasons (i.e. Burrows et al., 1999; Hemming, 2007; Cale & Harris, 2006). Hemming (2007) points out that “a bigger focus on enjoyment may give children the motivation to continue these activities after their time in school and could lead to healthier adult lifestyles” (p. 368). Thus, school-based sport interventions should focus more on positive affective, behavioural, and cognitive outcomes and the development of basic movement and skills, rather than on competition and improving physical fitness levels (Cale & Harris, 2006). Furthermore, the efficacy of such programmes is highly dependent on various environmental and contextual factors, namely involving learners in the decision-making process.

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4 The breadth of existing social science literature about physical education is usually conducted by scholars in other disciplines (i.e. outside of geography), such as sociology or sports studies, and typically explores the potential benefits that school-based sport programmes may provide to children, such as improved academic performance and development of basic motor skills (in particular, see the work of Richard Bailey). In recent years, however, some geographers have demonstrated an increasing interest in these types of school-based sport programmes, especially given the inherent connections between physical education, and children’s and institutional geographies (i.e. Hemming, 2007; Evans, 2006; Punch, 2000).
(Bailey et al., 2009, p. 11). It is possible that “overly prescriptive school-based programmes are unlikely to be attractive to youngsters or particularly effective in promoting lifelong participation” (Cale & Harris, 2006, p. 411). Therefore, young people must view these types of interventions as relevant and acceptable, and must be given some choice in what kinds of activities in which they would like to participate so as demonstrate their agency in an institutional context.

2.5. Intersection of Sport, Education, and Children

Physical education demonstrates the nexus between sport, education, and children, and form my entry point for exploring the reintroduction of physical education into South African schools. As I have shown, current research trajectories in the geographies of sport and education demonstrate a strong adherence to neoliberal values, in that both sport and education can play major roles in enhancing a nation’s overall global competitiveness. Drawing upon these burgeoning bodies of literature, I have conducted a discourse analysis to find that physical education in South Africa does in fact elaborate on these current research trajectories, where schools are sites of institutional control and neoliberal governmentality, and governments often institute physical education programmes in order to build certain types of proper, economic subjects that are useful to the nation. More specifically, the South African Department of Sport and Recreation believes compulsory sport and physical activity in schools “have meaningful [roles] to play in positively activating the youth of a country” (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2009a), and that they are key to making South Africa more globally competitive in the long-term (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2012b). In other words, physical education in South Africa is not a just benign policy programme, but a strategic venture by the government that allows for more children to have the opportunity to participate in sport, and either become
positive contributors to the workforce or excel toward higher levels of elite sport. Despite this strong infusion of neoliberalism in South African physical education policy, I am able to mobilize concepts from current children’s geographies scholarship to make the argument that there is the possibility that this sporting initiative could lead to the forging of ordinary cities in which all children have accessible and inclusive opportunities to enjoy their fundamental right to play for fun. That is to say, I posit that if given meaningful opportunities to enact their agency and participate in the decision-making process, children can help in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation these school-based sport programmes, which could produce more just and equitable outcomes (i.e. emphasis on fun and mass participation, rather than overemphasis on competition). These insights also prepare me to imagine carrying out a more comprehensive future research project, in which I would be able to conduct ethnographic fieldwork to observe how South African children are able (or unable) to be agents of change through their participation in physical education during the school day.

From a more empirical standpoint, this research is most obviously applicable to South Africa, but it can also be roughly translated to other areas of the Global South where compulsory physical education in schools remains largely absent in many countries due to lack of resources, trained staff, and basic political will (Hardman, 2005). My critical analysis of South African physical education policy documents may be useful to other nations in the Global South looking to implement their own school-based sport programmes. Such critical research on physical education can provide these nations with another option as to how they can deploy sport as a strategy for development and achieve some of their development goals (i.e. construction of new sport and recreation facilities, increased social cohesion), beyond relying upon high-risk and speculative sporting mega-events, which is what so many nations of the
Global South have come to do in recent years. In the next section, I will explain the concept of the city as the primary site of analysis for my research.

2.6. The City as a Site of Analysis

I have selected cities as the primary site of analysis for my research, and make arguments in this thesis about how the FIFA World Cup in South Africa should be understood as a speculative world city-making strategy, while physical education might be a way of forging ordinary cities in South Africa. We live in the urban century at a time when more than half of the world’s population is now urbanized, and cities function as the primary sites of culture, commerce, consumption, and innovation. Today’s urban society is characterized by rapidity and the never-ending flow of information. Therefore, I am concerned with sport’s (i.e. how it is deployed as a strategy for development) potential impact on cities because of the multitude of ways in which it can make or shape the city (and its citizens), both spatially and symbolically. On a spatial level, sport can have a literal and visible impact on the city and configuration of the urban landscape because of the construction of sports venues and infrastructure, which is especially apparent in the case of sporting mega-events (but also relevant in terms of physical education, and building functional sporting infrastructure in the city). On a more symbolic or fundamental level, sport can play a role in the lives of urban residents in either instrumental or non-instrumental terms. In instrumental terms, sport is a tool used to create economic, healthy, productive, and useful subjects (i.e. physically fit, disciplined) that can help advance and enhance the city and nation’s long-term competitiveness (i.e. as part of the workforce, as elite-level athletes). In non-instrumental terms, sport and play offer urban denizens opportunities for calmness, contact, companionship, fun, and enjoyment. At its most basic level, playing sports (for no other reason than to play) provides an escape or a break from fast-paced city life.
2.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of geographical scholarship about sport, education, and children, while also reflecting on how these individual topics intersect to form the basis of my research. Additionally, I have explained the concept of the city as it pertains to my research. This literature review will inform the arguments I will make about how the South African government deploys sport as a strategy for development in the coming chapters, and play an especially prominent role in shaping my discourse analysis of physical education policy documents in Chapter 4. In the next chapter, I will seek to answer my second research question (How did the 2010 FIFA World Cup make or transform South African host cities, and in turn, the nation?) by presenting a case study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Here, I will argue that this sporting mega-event (and all sporting mega-events) should be understood as a sport for development strategy that also proved to be a speculative world-making venture, aimed at elevating South African host cities, and hence, the nation, to world-class status.
Chapter 3  
Mega-Events as Speculative World-Making Strategy and the  
2010 FIFA World Cup

3.1. Introduction

Globalization and World Cities (GAWC) scholarship states that world cities, such as New York, Paris, and London, are important nodes in the global political and economic systems, and typically rank these cities according to their economic prowess and sphere of global, national, and regional influence. This tendency for hierarchization based upon the amount of economic power that cities command consigns many cities – particularly those in the Global South – to irrelevancy and pushes them “off the map” of urban theory (Robinson, 2002). These cities that have been pushed off the map maintain strong aspirations to improve their ranking and move up the hierarchy. Occupying a place in this global world order means that cities are included in the exclusive space of global capitalism, and may benefit (i.e. economically) from their insertion into transnational networks of global business and finance. The prospect of moving up the global hierarchy entices many “off the map” cities to compete and vie for the ubiquitous labels of “world-class,” “global,” or “international.” Therefore, a critical question becomes: What kinds of strategies do Global South nations pursue in order to put themselves and their cities “on the map,” and achieve “world-class” status?

In this chapter, I will argue that a relatively new, but increasingly popular, world-making (or, world city-making) project – and a way in which governments deploy sport as a strategy for development – that has been embraced by many nations of the Global South is the hosting of major international sporting events (otherwise known as mega-events), such as the Olympics or FIFA World Cup. Sporting mega-events have emerged as “perhaps the best stage upon which [a
nation or] city can make a claim to global status” (Short et al., 2000, p. 320) because they allow for hosts to quickly remake their cities with distinctive, world-class markers (i.e. first-rate infrastructure, such as airports, sporting venues, and hotels), and to showcase themselves to the world in front of foreign tourists, potential investors, and a global television audience. The ability to showcase the city on the world stage is of critical importance in the 21st century, given that cities have become the principal sites of business, finance, information and technology, productivity, creativity, and social interaction. National governments, therefore, hope that hosting a successful event will attract further investment, translate into increased stature in the global political arena, and firmly embed their cities into these transnational business and financial networks.

The mega-event, the 2010 FIFA World Cup hosted by South Africa, represents a way in which the government deploys sport as a strategy for development, but what is distinctive about this particular sport for development model is that it is also a world-making strategy. The South African government pursued this world-making strategy in order to elevate its cities, and hence, the nation to world-class status. Great cities make great nations in the urban century. Building upon Michael Goldman’s concept of speculative urbanism (2011a; 2011b), I will argue that this world-making practice is a speculative urban strategy that governs by mobilizing aesthetic governmentality (Ghertner, 2010; 2011). The World Cup is the world’s largest single-sport mega-event, and the 2010 event marked the first time that the tournament was held on African soil. FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, declared the tournament to have been “one of the most successful FIFA World Cups ever” (Department of Environmental Affairs [DEA], 2011b, p. 10), and gave South Africa a 9 out of 10 rating as host (Cooper, 2010, para. 1). The event took place in nine host cities across the country, including Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria,
Durban, Port Elizabeth, Polokwane, Nelpruit, Bloemfontein, and Rustenburg. The South African government viewed the 2010 FIFA World Cup as an opportunity “to place South African cities in a global hierarchy of competitive metropolitan economies” (Pillay, 2005 as cited in Black, 2007, p. 271), because it would potentially increase economic development (i.e. job creation, tourism), expedite key infrastructure projects (i.e. the Gautrain, a high-speed train linking Johannesburg and Pretoria), and enhance the country’s international image in the post-apartheid era. In this regard, speculation surrounding the FIFA World Cup operated in a differentiated fashion in South Africa, given that the event was hosted by multiple cities across the country, and funded by the national government (rather than a single city, à la the Olympics). South African host cities were able to utilize these funds from the national government to carry out major development projects – which we will see throughout this chapter, were often carried out at the expense of ordinary citizens – that would hopefully recreate their landscapes and images, stimulate their economies, and position themselves to gain favour with and acquire investment from global corporations (Haferburg, 2011). These host cities, therefore, were not only competing with other recognized world cities (i.e. New York, London, Paris) within the global hierarchy, but they were also competing with and comparing themselves to each other in an effort to become regarded as the pinnacle of South African modernity and cosmopolitanism.

My two key arguments about the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a world-making project for South Africa are as follows. First, the World Cup allowed for the South African government to reimagine and enact its vision for the nation (i.e. the “new,” post-apartheid South Africa) through its host cities. The nine South African host cities, particularly major metropolises such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban, were looked upon to act as the “[sparkplugs] needed to kickstart [the] national [economy] and catapult [it] into the global marketplace” (Goldman &
Longhofer, 2009, p. 33). The government followed the premise that if host cities were able to put on a successful event, South Africa as a whole would become recognized as a world-class, “modern, technologically advanced, democratic, business-friendly, tourist destination” (Alegi, 2008, p. 399-400), and a more legitimate and respected actor in the global political arena. Second, this particular mega-event illustrates the highly aspirational, but largely speculative, nature of world-making projects. That is, although the World Cup provided the country with a global platform upon which it could showcase itself as the “new” South Africa, the event also came with high opportunity costs, undermined the localized development needs of cities and communities, and resulted in the consolidation of wealth for the elite few, as well as the spatial and social marginalization of many poorer citizens.

3.2. Theoretical Explanation of Mega-Events as Speculative Urban Strategy

Seminal pieces within GAWC literature (i.e. Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991) place world cities as the command and control centres of globalization (i.e. economic, political, cultural), and global hubs of business, finance, advertising, and service provision. This scholarship also tends to overemphasize the role that global processes (particularly, economic processes) play in the formation of cities, and fails to account for the “differential and dynamic pathways” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, p. 489 as cited in Roy, 2011, p. 308) in which world cities come into being. That is to say, cities do not simply rise and fall up and down the global hierarchy because of the forces of globalization. Rather, they are discursively and spatially imagined and constructed by “social agents” (Paul, 2005, p. 2106), such as governments, institutions, and transnational actors. Scholars, such as Gilbert (1998) and Douglass (1998;
2000), ask a key question previously overlooked throughout much of the early world cities literature: precisely how does a city become a world city?

Cities may become world cities when these aforementioned social agents undertake world-making projects in order to help their cities achieve objective markers of world-class status (i.e. advanced infrastructure), and greater global recognition and significance. These world-making projects allow for national governments and city managers to enact and perform their cities’ sophistication and modernity, and to demonstrate that they too belong in the exclusive category of “world city” (Short, 2004). While national governments and cities increasingly demonstrate their willingness undertake these “worlding practices” (Ong, 2011, p. 4) – projects that aim to enhance and display a city’s worldliness or cosmopolitanism (i.e. through infrastructure, its citizens), and to make the city a reference point or ideal to which other cities aspire – it is important to recognize that by their very nature, these projects are highly aspirational and experimental ventures. In other words, there is “a mix of speculative fiction and speculative fact” (Ong, 2011, p. 12) that goes into them, in that these projects are typically carried out with the belief that they are for the betterment of society, but in actuality, there is no guarantee of successful or democratic outcomes. Sporting mega-events are instances of worlding or world-making projects that are driven by the desire to elevate the city to world-class status, but at the same time, are wrought with high degrees of uncertainty and speculation.

Michael Goldman’s (2011a; 2011b) concept of speculative urbanism, which is when governments undertake risky development projects to improve the city that may or may not pay off (read: they speculate about their prospects of success), is a useful concept to understand mega-events. Speculation, a practice usually reserved for businesses (i.e. engaging in risky financial transactions), has emerged as a new form of governance by which states and cities seek
to transform the urban landscape and city life. Goldman uses speculative urbanism to understand the world-making projects carried out by governments, such as the development of major infrastructure (i.e. roads, airports), which are sometimes funded by foreign investment firms and multinationals, in an effort to transform the built environment, improve city life, and elevate their global status. Goldman (2011a) characterizes these projects as speculative urbanism, because they “rely on the confidence that rates of return can be high for investments, at different stages of the urban worlding process” (p. 230). This statement can be interpreted in two different ways: First, private investors must predict what an asset (i.e. real estate, land) will be worth in the future, and remain involved in these large-scale, world-making projects long enough in order to seize an increase in the asset’s value before pulling out (Goldman, 2011a). Second, governments mobilize these risky world-making efforts with the expressed belief that things will go according to plan, and they will be successful. Speculative urbanism, however, is a highly volatile practice. That is, governments require land in order to proceed with world-making projects that build up the urban environment, and as such, are often forced to appropriate land and displace citizens in order to do so (Goldman, 2011a). Goldman (2011b) studied this speculative form of governance in Bangalore, India, where residents living in the rural periphery have had their land dispossessed in the name of major world city-making projects, such as the Bangalore-Myosore Infrastructure Corridor, the IT corridor, and the Bangalore International Airport (p. 564). Rural Bangaloreans are being “actively dispossessed as part of the effort to build up a world city based on a speculative imaginary” (Goldman 2011b, p. 577), in that this vision may never fully materialize or fulfill all of the government’s unrealistic expectations of what the city should be. The inherent speculation involved in these worlding projects creates “new anxieties differentially experienced across class, community and place” (Goldman, 2011b, p. 556). In other words, world-making projects rarely result in just
outcomes and egalitarian distribution of costs and benefits, and instead often lead to “mass displacement and mounting inequality,” as experienced by many of those living in rural Bangalore (Goldman & Longhofer, 2009, p. 33).

Governments and city managers mobilize speculative urbanism in world-making projects through “aesthetic governmentality” (Ghertner, 2010). Governmentality – a term coined by Michel Foucault – typically refers to the organized practices or formal techniques through which governments intervene in city life. Governments rely upon state-generated data, surveys, assessments, and calculations to persuade its citizens that there is a problem or a perceived need that requires government intervention (i.e. constructing a road, building a new shopping mall). However, aesthetic governmentality allows for “legality and essential features of space [to] be determined entirely from a distance and without requiring accurate survey or assessment” (Ghertner, 2011, p. 288). In other words, a city’s world-classness is not based on fact or data, rather, it is dependent upon the city’s outward appearance and visual appeal: “if a development project looks ‘world-class,’ then it is most often declared planned; if a settlement looks polluting, it is sanctioned as unplanned and illegal” (Ghertner, 2011, p. 280). This “world-class aesthetic” (Ghertner, 2011, p. 281) is based upon normative visions of how a city should look. Governments undertake speculative world-making projects that will hopefully enhance the city’s visual appearance, and ultimately elevate it to world-class status, regardless of actually calculating and statistically enumerating the costs and benefits of doing so. That is to say, speculative world-making projects are often made possible only by excluding, hiding, or destroying spaces or citizens that do not confine to normative visions of beauty, and that is all the rationale that is needed. Here, governments create a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005 as cited in Goldman, 2011b, p. 556), whereby they can transcend the rule of law and the interests
of (many, but not all) their peoples. The state of exception traditionally refers to the temporary retraction of laws in the name of national security or in a state of emergency (i.e. martial law); in this case, however, it denotes the (temporary, although sometimes permanent) suspension of basic civil and human rights in the name of enhancing the urban landscape and highlighting the city as “world-class” (Goldman, 2011b).

Together, speculative urbanism and aesthetic governmentality are components of the market-oriented neoliberal policy repertoire, which emphasizes capital accumulation and competition between cities, rather than development and social equality within the local community (Haines, 2011, p. 162). Cities engage in fierce inter-city competition – often at the expense of their own citizens’ well-beings and livelihoods – in order to bolster their international stature and to appear as more attractive sites for investment. These world-making strategies (speculative urbanism and aesthetic governmentality) are “hegemonic projects,” because they are based upon “explicitly or implicitly [advancing] the long-term interests of the hegemonic class” (Jessop, 1997, p. 62 as cited in Paul, 2005, p. 2106). They advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class because these projects follow “narrow-minded pro-growth [visions] of the city” (Pillay & Bass, 2008, p. 331) espoused by economic elites (rather than equity-based considerations), and bring most (if not, all) of the benefits to the dominant class, such as major corporations and sports governing bodies. Furthermore, governments today “are confronted with the immutable fact that there is no alternative to world-city building [which]

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5 For example, the Indian state rules by aesthetics and creates a state of exception in an effort to transform Delhi into a world-class city, and highlight it as India’s “showpiece” (Ghertner, 2011, p. 286). In the years leading up to the 2010 Commonwealth Games (hosted by Delhi), the Indian government reallocated funds previously earmarked for education, housing, healthcare, and food subsidies, toward opulent, modern infrastructure projects such as the Delhi Metro Rail, and the Commonwealth Games Village (Ghertner, 2011, p. 280). Many poorer citizens were forced from their homes and their slum settlements were demolished to make way for these developments, since these particular people and places perpetuated the image of India as a poverty-filled country.
suggests the depth, vitality, and hegemony of this phenomenon we can call speculative urbanism” (Goldman, 2011a, p. 250). In other words, speculative world-making strategies are hegemonic projects because they have become the principal way in which elites proclaim their city’s “arrival” or “graduation” to world-class status (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006b, p. 8 as cited in Black, 2007, p. 270), and propel them upwards in the global hierarchy of cities. The Appendix provides a detailed description of recent instances (beyond the 2010 World Cup in South Africa) in which sporting mega-events can be regarded as speculative world-making strategies that mobilize aesthetic governmentality and advance the interests of the hegemonic class. In the next section, I will present an in-depth case study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa as a world-making project, and demonstrate that this mega-event should be understood as an instance of speculative urbanism, aimed at elevating South African host cities, and hence, the nation, to world-class status.

3.3. The 2010 FIFA World Cup

Mega-events are alluring world-making projects because they offer hosts the unique opportunity to “kill two birds (or more) birds with one stone” (Black and van der Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1208), in that host nations and cities can advance urban and economic development, as well as elevate their international standing, and foster social cohesion and national pride within local communities. However, the presumptions that governments often make about the perceived benefits of hosting sporting mega-events are inherently speculative, and as such, do not always materialize as planned. That is, mega-event hosts carry out these world-making strategies with the expressed belief (read: speculation) that they will host a successful event, transform the built environment, generate investment, and be catapulted to world-class status. These tempting supposed benefits are often enough for hosts to downplay or disregard the heavy
monetary, human, and opportunity costs of hosting such events, and pursue these speculative world-making strategies unabated.

In 2003, during the kickoff of South Africa’s bid for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, stated, “‘We are bidding to host the 2010 World Cup on behalf of the (African) continent, as we are confident that our success will have advantages for the whole region’” (Cornelissen, 2008, p. 486). The bid’s slogan was “Ke Nako (‘It’s time’): Celebrate Africa’s Humanity” (van der Westhuizen & Swart, 2011). No longer would South Africa be looked upon as a place of “victimhood and disadvantage but one built on positive constructs of African agency” (Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3018). The World Cup was a chance to bolster the so-called “African Renaissance,” and highlight South Africa as the touchstone of “African modernity” (Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3018), helping the country to achieve greater international respect after decades of having been condemned as a pariah state. Furthermore, the South African Organizing Committee defined its vision for the World Cup as one that would “strengthen the African and South African image [to] promote new partnerships with the world…[and to] be significant global players in all fields of human endeavour” (Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3018). Thus, the hope was that the World Cup would help embed South Africa and its cities (and possibly the entire continent) into key transnational business and finance networks, and put it on the map of global significance. It was also perceived as an opportunity for South Africa to further establish itself as a technologically sophisticated country, and to demonstrate that its host cities could effectively market and manage one of the biggest and most important sporting events in the world.

This tournament will likely be remembered by those outside South Africa (i.e. FIFA, tourists) as one of the best World Cups ever because many South Africans embraced the event
with great fervor, and the event proceeded smoothly without any major setbacks or noticeable problems. The event provided the South African government with an opportunity to highlight South Africa as a world-class destination for foreign investment and tourism, and a nation worthy of the world’s attention and respect. However, the World Cup also demonstrates that mega-events as world-making projects should be understood as speculative urban strategies that often result in deleterious and unjust outcomes, as well as the exclusion and marginalization of many ordinary citizens. In the coming sub-sections, I will illustrate the ways in which the World Cup represents a speculative world-making strategy. It is important to note that while most instances of government speculation during the World Cup did not work as planned (i.e. resulted in negative outcomes for large portions of the population), there were two instances in which speculation may actually prove to be beneficial to South African society in the long run (National Greening Programme and World Cup Legacy Trust). The South African government speculated on: its ability to host an African event, given that FIFA’s strict hosting requirements prohibited South African vendors from participating in or benefitting from the World Cup; slum demolitions and evictions that occurred as a result of the World Cup “beautification process” (Newton, 2009, p. 94); the opportunity costs and effects of stadium and infrastructure development; pre-tournament predictions about the World Cup’s impact on employment and tourism; and the degree to which World Cup policy programmes would be successful and benefit citizens in local communities both during the tournament and in the long-term.

3.3.1. Exclusion of Informal Vendors

It proved difficult for South Africa to host a truly “African” event because of stringent hosting requirements and commercial restrictions imposed by the tournament organizer, FIFA. FIFA owns all World Cup-related television, advertising, merchandising, and stadium rights,
and enforces upon World Cup hosts 17 compulsory requirements related to immigration, security, information and communication technologies, property and marketing rights, healthcare, and financial-technical rules (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011, p. 17). These strict requirements helped FIFA earn over $3 billion from sponsorship and television rights for the 2010 World Cup, and make $600 million in profits (Conn, 2013, para. 4). In order to comply with FIFA’s guidelines, the South African government outlawed local merchants from conducting business near World Cup venues in its host cities. For instance, women selling traditional African food outside football stadiums is a staple of professional football matches in South Africa, but these women were forbidden from selling their food near World Cup venues, unless they agreed to pay over $8000 to FIFA to place a bid for an official food stall (Desai & Vahed, 2010). Similarly, street vendors were pushed out of “exclusion zones” and fan parks near the two stadiums, Soccer City and Ellis Park, in Johannesburg as early as 2009 to prevent them from competing with FIFA’s official merchandising partners, including Adidas, Sony, Hyundai, Coca-Cola, Emirates, and Visa (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011; Desai & Vahed, 2010). According to the NGO, Streetnet, 100,000 informal vendors lost their source of income during the World Cup because of these commercial restrictions and exclusion zones (Amaral & Viana, 2013, para. 11).

An ice cream vendor in Durban describes what he refers to as “hostile raids” carried out against street vendors found operating near World Cup venues by the municipal police (Fihlani, 2010, para. 3). Furthermore, he accuses “the Durban municipal police and the Moses Mabhida [Stadium] management of promoting inequalities between the ‘haves and the have-nots’” (Fihlani, 2010, para. 5). If police caught vendors conducting business near stadiums or fan parks, vendors’ goods were confiscated and they were fined between $13 and $40, which is
typically an entire day’s pay (Fihlani, 2010, para. 23). Here, the World Cup is a speculative world-making project because it is made possible only by “paving over vibrant rural economies and livelihoods” (Goldman & Longhofer, 2009, p. 35) of local street vendors who were simply trying to give the event a truly African feel and earn a living. The South African government created a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005 as cited in Goldman, 2011b, p. 556), in which the moral rights of informal vendors – in their quest for survival and dignity – to participate in and financially benefit from the World Cup were temporarily suspended in the name of appeasing FIFA, generating corporate profits, and ultimately advancing the world-making project (see Bayat, 1997). Moreover, informal vendors were excluded from the World Cup because they did not conform to FIFA’s normative visions of world-classness. That is, FIFA’s official corporate sponsors represent the “world-class aesthetic” (Ghertner, 2011, p. 281) that will bring in revenue and be attractive to foreign tourists because they are familiar and visually appealing. In the end, FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, proudly declared the 2010 World Cup as the most commercially successful World Cup ever, which is largely due to the fact that corporate interests superseded the moral rights and interests of ordinary South Africans hoping to be part of this monumental, global event.

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6 Asef Bayat (1997) describes the how the urban disenfranchised carry out informal activities not necessarily as conscious political acts, but out of necessity as a means to survive and live a dignified life. He outlines the two chief goals of the disenfranchised as redistribution and autonomy; these goals are unlikely to be attained through legal or institutionalized means. Therefore, informal vendors selling food and products on the streets of South Africa during the World Cup do not necessarily have legally sanctioned rights to be a part of and benefit from the event, but these actions taken by the vendors are “seen as natural and moral responses to the urgency of survival and the desire for a dignified life, however defined” (Bayat, 1997, p. 61).
3.3.2. Slum Evictions and Demolitions

Forced evictions and slum demolitions that occurred in host cities during South Africa’s event preparation also highlight the World Cup as a form of speculative urbanism. The best known example of these evictions occurred in Cape Town, as residents living in squatter settlements along the N2 gateway (a strip of land that runs from the Cape Town airport to the heart of downtown) were forced from their homes, and slums were demolished to make way for newly-developed rental flats and terraced family houses, which were built as part of the World Cup “beautification process” (Newton, 2009, p. 94). According to a FIFA representative, “A billion television viewers don’t want to see shacks and poverty on this scale” (Desai & Vahed, 2010, p. 158). The slums along the N2 gateway had to be demolished and repurposed, therefore, because they were seen as “eyesores” (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011, p. 21) and obstacles that stood in the way of Cape Town (and South Africa, in general) becoming regarded as a “world-class” destination. Evicted residents were relocated (read: hidden away) to a decrepit makeshift settlement known as Blikkiesdorp, or “Tin Can Town” (Smith, 2010, para. 2) in the township of Delft located on the outskirts of the city (Haferburg, 2011). One resident of Blikkiesdorp describes the makeshift settlement as a “dumping place…It’s like the devil runs this place. We have no freedom…South Africa isn’t showing the world what it’s doing to its people. It only shows the World Cup” (Smith, 2010, para. 3-4). Again, the South African government evoked a state of exception in which the interests of its citizens living along the N2 were disregarded for the sake of enhancing the urban landscape with “beautiful formal housing opportunities” (Newton, 2009, p. 94) that the evicted residents could never possibly afford. In the three years since the World Cup, most residents have had to remain in Blikkiesdorp due to increased rent and land prices in the N2 area (Newton, 2009).
Similarly, the local government in Johannesburg wanted to upgrade Bertrams, the suburban area surrounding Ellis Park Stadium, through an initiative referred to as the “Greater Ellis Park Development Plan” (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011, p. 21). Private developers acquired derelict buildings in Bertrams at virtually no cost from the City of Johannesburg, and were required to upgrade and maintain them. The Johannesburg government saw this as a prudent strategy, given that it did not have to pay out any public subsidies to upgrade these buildings. In turn, the value of the property and price of rent in Bertrams increased significantly, so as to attract more affluent residents to the area (Be’nit-Gbaffou, 2009, p. 204). The city government did not receive anything in return from private developers (i.e. no rent control, no investment, no contributions to the public good), and did not use the boom in property prices to obtain funds that could be used to subsidize social housing. Instead, this revitalization project led to the displacement of many residents living in and around Ellis Park, and excluded many of those directly affected by the urban regeneration plan from the decision-making process (Be’nit-Gbaffou, 2009, p. 208). The City of Johannesburg government’s reluctance to intervene in private developers’ affairs (i.e. attempting to regulate the real estate speculation that led to mass displacement) is due to its desire to attract further private investment, and to continue to build up the city, even at the expense of its own citizens.

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7 Be’nit-Gbaffou (2009) interviewed officials from the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), which is the entity responsible for managing and facilitating development in Johannesburg, in order to “build an equitable, sustainable and resilient city” (Johannesburg Development Agency, 2013). Although the JDA was the “‘implementing arm’” of the Greater Ellis Park Development Plan, many of the project’s most important elements, such as transportation and housing, were very much beyond the JDA’s control because these aspects involved other agencies, city departments, and government departments (Be’nit-Gbaffou, 2009, p. 202). These officials interviewed by Be’nit-Gbaffou (2009) ultimately deemed the Greater Ellis Park Development Plan to be a wasted opportunity on the part of the City of Johannesburg.
These forced evictions and slum demolitions in World Cup host cities are attempts by the government to display a world-class image of South African host cities to FIFA, tourists, and the media, by making visible social problems “invisible as quickly as possible” (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011, p. 22). Goldman & Longhofer (2009) suggest, “When the imagined spark-plugs of the ‘new’ global economy [i.e. host cities, such as Cape Town and Johannesburg] overshadow lived urban experiences, city leaders risk planning an urban landscape devoid of a place people can call home” (p. 36). In other words, these “beautification” initiatives helped South African host cities (and the nation, in general) look clean and modern to World Cup tourists, and generated investment and facilitated infrastructure development (i.e. formal housing) by allowing private developers to engage in real estate speculation. However, this aesthetic ordering of the urban environment also caused city officials to exhibit little regard for how the everyday lives (i.e. homes and livelihoods) of citizens living along the N2 and in Bertrams would be negatively affected as a result of these “development” projects. Ultimately, these slum demolitions and evictions, which spatially and socially marginalized thousands of ordinary citizens, serve as a “painful reminder of the forced removals under the previous apartheid regime” (Newton, 2009, p. 94).

3.3.3. Stadium and Infrastructure Development

In 2007, then-Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile, stated, “[We] believe that preparations for the 2010 World Cup must leverage the fast-tracking of some elements of our transformation agenda…[We] must use this opportunity to level the proverbial playing grounds, both in respect of infrastructure and otherwise” (Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3018). In this respect, the World Cup provided justification for substantial government investment in elaborate (perhaps in some cases, unnecessary or over-the-top) infrastructure projects that would
transform the nation. The government hoped that said infrastructure development would put South African cities in the same class as other recognized world cities. Stadium development was a key element of South Africa’s transformation agenda and World Cup preparation. The government regarded stadium development as a central element to achieving a “lasting legacy for local communities for decades to come” (South Africa 2010 Bid Company, 2003 as cited in Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011, p. 313), and could “serve as a catalyst for further urban development and recreational facilities” (Cornelissen, Swart & Bob, 2011, p. 313). That is to say, if stadium planning and construction were carried out pragmatically, with the long-term interests of the nation and its citizens in mind, South African citizens would be able to utilize these facilities (as spectators at sporting events and for their own play and recreation) in the years following the World Cup.

Five new stadiums were constructed and five more underwent significant refurbishment at a final cost of $1.1 billion, approximately one third of the government’s total World Cup spending (“World Cup 2010 report released,” 2012, para. 2). Interestingly, Moses Mabhida Stadium was constructed in Durban at a cost of over $250 million, when the existing rugby stadium across the street could have been renovated at a fraction of the cost (Desai & Vahed, 2010, p. 156). Stadium construction and refurbishment was funded entirely by the state, and the primary beneficiaries of stadium development were elite, prominently white South African construction companies, such as Group Five and Murray & Roberts (Alegi, 2008). Although it

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8 In June 2013, South Africa’s antitrust body fined 15 construction companies, including Murray & Roberts and Group Five, a combined $140 million after a thorough investigation into collusion over contracts related to the construction of stadiums for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In particular, the building or expansion of six World Cup stadiums, including Cape Town’s Green Point Stadium, were key points of investigation (Bhuckory, 2013). The antitrust body alleges that seven major South African construction companies met twice in secret in 2006 to allocate tenders on World Cup stadiums and to agree on a 17.5 percent profit margin (Nicholson, 2013, para. 1).
proved difficult to find out precisely how much these construction companies financially benefitted from their involvement in the World Cup, economist Stephen Gelb is able to put their likely earnings into perspective by highlighting the opportunity costs of World Cup stadium development. He argues that the public funds allocated toward stadium development alone would have built approximately 90,000 new houses per year between 2006 and 2010 (Desai & Vahed, 2010, p. 157). According to this view, World Cup stadium development serves as a prime example of “public funds being used for private profit” (Desai & Vahed, 2010, p. 157), as money that should have likely been used for the provision of basic services (i.e. housing) was instead funneled toward this sporting mega-event.

World Cup stadiums became the aesthetic focal points of South African host cities, and these iconic venues ultimately served as the backdrop for soccer’s biggest stage. However, since the conclusion of the event in June 2010, World Cup stadiums have been referred to as “white elephants” (Pillay & Bass, 2008): they are visually stunning, but severely underused in South Africa – where attendance at Premier League football matches is relatively low (Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011) – and they require expensive maintenance fees and government subsidies for consistent upkeep. Pre-tournament expenditures on stadium development (coupled with post-tournament maintenance fees) are likely to far exceed post-World Cup stadium usage in the long-term (Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011). These white elephant stadiums demonstrate the fact that the World Cup was a speculative world-making project, in that newly-constructed and refurbished stadiums are a critical component of hosting a successful mega-event, and undoubtedly highlight South Africa and its host cities as world-class, modern, and technologically sophisticated. But, at what cost? Billions of dollars in public funds went into (and will continue to be put toward) these stadiums, and stadium development benefitted private
construction firms, inevitably making the rich richer. The government is unlikely to see a return on its $1.1 billion investment, given that most of these stadiums, namely Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane and Mbombela Stadium in Mbombela (Haferburg, 2011, p. 337), are unlikely to ever fill to capacity again (unless they are utilized for another mega-event). Additionally, these massive sporting venues do not serve a functional purpose in local communities, since ordinary citizens cannot use them as accessible (or free) sport and recreation facilities whenever so they choose. Perhaps these public funds spent on elaborate stadium development would have been put to better use if directed toward solving the country’s housing backlog (as suggested by Stephen Gelb), or solving other existing social problems (i.e. poverty, inequality) within the country.

Beyond stadium development, other World Cup flagship infrastructure projects include the Gautrain, South Africa’s first high-speed metropolitan train system that connects Johannesburg and Pretoria, and a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system that was established in several host cities. First, van der Westhuizen (2007) describes the Gautrain as a political mega-project that would help establish South Africa as a technologically advanced nation, and a legitimate player in the global political arena. Development of the Gautrain was conceived long before South Africa was awarded the World Cup, but it ultimately became the “central thrust of the city of Johannesburg’s developments around the World Cup” (Cornelissen, 2008, p. 492). The Gautrain was developed at a cost of nearly $4 billion by a public-private partnership between the Gauteng provincial government and Bombela Consortium, which consists of Bombardier Transportation, Bouygues Travaux Publics, Murray & Roberts, the Strategic Partners Group and RATP Développement, the J&J Group, and Absa Bank (Dixon, 2010, para. 3; Venter, 2009, para. 35). It was constructed for the purpose of alleviating traffic congestion in
South Africa’s elite business and industrial sectors (van der Westhuizen, 2007, p. 334). Critics of the Gautrain claim it is nothing more than a fancy mode of transportation aimed at attracting “the middle class and…international visitors” (Haferburg, 2011, p. 338). Furthermore, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) blamed two major train crashes in February 2009 that left 131 people injured on overinvestment on the Gautrain, and underinvestment in local transportation infrastructure. Similarly, the South African Road Federation estimated that the abysmal conditions of roads, particularly in poor areas, cost the country approximately $200 billion per year due to “vehicle damage, accidents and traffic jams which led to higher fuel consumption, lost production hours and higher transport costs” (Desai & Vahed, 2010, p. 156). COSATU issued a statement that it vehemently opposed the Gautrain, and “‘argued that the billions being spent on this prestige project for a rich minority of commuters should rather be spent on upgrading the existing public transport system, which is used by the poor majority’” (Desai & Vahed, 2010, p. 156).

Second, there was also controversy surrounding the BRT system that was implemented in larger South African cities, including Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Nelson Mandela Bay. Though the BRT catered to a greater number of people than the Gautrain and promoted increased use of public transportation, its design is severely flawed. The system relies upon turning one lane of main roads into an exclusive BRT lane, while minibus taxis, other modes of public transportation, and private vehicles are prohibited from using these BRT-exclusive lanes (Haferburg, 2011, p. 338). Although there was limited information available as to which companies built the various BRT systems in South African municipalities, this public transit system has the full support (financial and rhetorical) of the national Department of Transport and the provincial transport departments. Minibus taxi associations remain strongly opposed to
the BRT as a form of government “subsidized competition” (Braumann et al, 2010 as cited in Haferburg, 2011, p. 338), claiming that these systems adversely affect their income. Prior to the World Cup, many taxi associations organized large-scale protests against the BRT that disrupted traffic flows, and some of these demonstrations even turned violent as BRT vehicles were shot at (Mail and Guardian, 2010c as cited in Cornelissen, 2012, p. 340).

Having sophisticated and accessible transportation infrastructure is an important characteristic of all world-class cities. In this respect, these transportation developments were looked upon to put South Africa and its host cities on par with other recognized world cities. The Gautrain and BRT were significant components of South Africa’s World Cup legacy, and were supposed to benefit South African citizens long after the tournament ended. However, these major transportation initiatives also reflect the speculative nature of South Africa’s World Cup, and the opportunity costs associated with hosting such an event. The Gautrain was created to cater to the needs and interests of the South African elite (i.e. construction companies, middle-class commuters) and international visitors, while the government-subsidized BRT system took away valuable income from South African taxi drivers. It seems as though these transportation developments were conceived without much concern for the possible impact they would have, beyond their impact on those individuals who are actually using the systems (i.e. middle class commuters, but not taxi drivers). Of course the government (and hopefully, the international community) view these projects as symbols of South African modernity, but would it have a more prudent long-term investment to meet the needs of the poor majority, and channel more funds toward upgrading existing and affordable transportation infrastructure?
3.3.4. Employment and Tourism Predictions

Speculation and uncertainty surrounding the World Cup is similarly evident in pre-tournament forecasts about the event’s impact on employment and tourism, in that many of these predictions were grossly exaggerated. The prototypical world city is one in which citizens have jobs, and outsiders want to visit. Therefore, one can surmise that the South African government inflated their pre-tournament predictions in order to procure public support for the World Cup as a world-making project. In 2010, newly-elected South African President, Jacob Zuma, declared that 3.2 million job opportunities would be created as a result of the World Cup (Institute for Democracy in South Africa [IDASA], 2010, p. 14). In reality, the World Cup directly created 130,000 jobs and indirectly created 415,000 jobs. However, most of the jobs directly created by the World Cup were temporary construction jobs. While these temporary jobs gave many South Africans some much-needed income and helped them develop new skills and knowledge, they did little to help citizens and stimulate the economy in the long-term. In fact, unemployment in South Africa actually increased by nearly 2 percent from 2009 to 2010 because of all of the temporary jobs that had been eliminated when World Cup construction projects were completed (IDASA, 2010).

Moreover, the World Cup was supposed to have a significant impact on South Africa’s tourism industry. It is estimated that 309,000 tourists visited the country during the World Cup, one-third fewer than the 480,000 tourists that were initially predicted (Haferburg, 2011, p. 333). Tourist expenditure during the event is estimated to have been approximately $360 million, significantly less than the $900 million anticipated prior to the event (Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011, p. 312). In the immediate aftermath of the event, “early indicators of the 2010 FIFA World Cup’s economic legacies are mixed, and...long-term positive macroeconomic impacts
projected pre-tournament is still uncertain” (Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011, p. 312). On a positive note, a survey conducted by African Response, a South African market research company, found that 92 percent of tourists would recommend South Africa as a travel destination to their friends and family (IDASA, 2010, p. 10). These results suggest that although initial speculation turned out to be exaggerated and overly optimistic, in the long run, this world-making strategy could potentially have a positive and sustained effect on the South African tourism industry. Prior to the event, many foreign tourists were skeptical of visiting South Africa because of its portrayal in the media as a poverty-stricken, crime-ridden nation. Now, more tourists (both returning and new visitors) may be more inclined to visit the country in the future because so many outsiders perceived the World Cup to have been a success (“Study reveals tourism impact in South Africa,” 2010). The notion that the South African tourism industry may benefit in the long-term as a result of the World Cup demonstrates a relatively brief instance in which speculation might pay off (given the abundance of examples I have provided in which speculation did not work). In the next sub-section, I will provide two more concrete examples in which government speculation during the FIFA World Cup may actually prove to be beneficial, rather than detrimental, to South African society in the long-term.

3.3.5. Other Policy Initiatives

In the preceding sub-sections, I have described several instances in which the South African government carried out so-called “development” projects as part of the World Cup,

9 When projecting the World Cup’s long-term impact on the South African tourism industry, it should also be taken into consideration that over 3.2 billion people (or 46.4 percent of the world’s population) watched at least some part of the 2010 tournament (“Almost half the world tuned in,” 2011, para. 1). Members of this global television audience may be inclined and excited to visit South Africa in the future, especially after witnessing the nation’s relatively successful turn as World Cup host.
which were aimed at improving the everyday lives of citizens, and highlighting the nation as sophisticated and modern. Most of these projects actually resulted in unjust outcomes and deleterious effects for many members of South African society. Now, I will discuss two instances in which government speculation during the World Cup may prove be to the advantage, instead of to the disadvantage, of the majority of South African citizens in the long run. The 2010 FIFA World Cup spawned several important policy initiatives in South Africa, two of which I will discuss in greater detail below: the National Greening Programme and the World Cup Legacy Trust.

3.3.5.1. National Greening Programme

The 2010 World Cup was the first time South Africa hosted a sporting mega-event with a dedicated sustainability agenda: FIFA’s Green Goal 2010 programme, and South Africa’s own National Greening Programme. South Africa adopted these event greening initiatives because now more than ever, sustainability plays a key role in a state (or city) “becoming a legitimate and respected actor of the international community” (Mol, 2010, p. 523-524), and a world-class city is a sustainable and environmentally conscious city. In December 2006, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) announced that it would work with FIFA and the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) to implement FIFA’s Green Goal 2010 (DEA, 2011b, p. 13; United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2012, p. 8). This programme would carry on the Green Goal programme that was established at the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Through Green Goal 2006, Germany hosted a carbon-neutral event, made possible by successful emissions offset programmes, waste minimization efforts, and reduced car use in its host cities (Death, 2011). Under Green Goal 2010, South African host cities were required to develop their own Greening Business Plans that adhered to Minimum Environmental Standards set forth by
FIFA (UNEP, 2012, p. 14). This programme presented major challenges to host cities, as a result of limited financial and human resources, lack of reliable monitoring systems, and the absence of legally binding environmental guidelines in Host City Agreements (DEA, 2011c, p. 23). Despite these obvious challenges, the main reason behind Green Goal 2010 failing to achieve its goals was the “excessive influence” of tournament owner, FIFA (van Lill & Thomas, 2012, p. 3665). This excessive influence refers to the fact that after the success of Green Goal in Germany, FIFA copyrighted the program so that “all greening activities collaboration were sought only from FIFA affiliated partners” (UNEP, 2012, p. 18). In turn, FIFA ensured that its partners were not contacted for further support, and prohibited partnerships with non-FIFA affiliated entities, making it difficult for most host cities to finance and implement Green Goal projects (Death, 2011, p. 110). Additionally, Minimum Environmental Standards were identified by FIFA without taking local contexts into account, especially host cities’ financial resources (or lack thereof). FIFA relied on the logic that what worked in Germany 2006 would work in South Africa 2010, and applied a broad, one-size-fits-all model based on relatively unachievable quantitative targets, such as offsetting all carbon emissions from the event (UNEP, 2012, p. 67).

Due in large part to the perceived and predicted limitations of Green Goal 2010, the South African government created the National Greening Programme and the National Greening brand in 2008 in order to communicate its long-term commitment to sustainability and the means to achieve it (DEA, 2010, p. 4). In this case, the government’s prediction about the likely inefficacy and failure of FIFA’s Green Goal proved to be accurate. That is, the government had a “back-up plan” in place in the form of the National Greening Programme, which could be used to bolster South Africa’s commitment to sustainability beyond Green Goal. Prior to the 2010 World Cup, South Africa was characterized by its reluctance to adopt ecological modernization
policies, an overreliance on coal-power and the environmentally detrimental mining industry, and its dismal ranking (115 out of 163 countries) in the 2010 Environmental Performance Index (Death, 2011). The South African government speculated that the World Cup – because of its grandeur and theatricality – would be a prime opportunity to “move the sustainability agenda forward across a broad range of sectors” (DEA, 2011b, p. 10), and to roll-out this greening programme in an attempt to host a sustainable mega-event. The main objectives of the National Greening Programme were to reduce the effects of the World Cup on global climate change, and to make South Africa’s long-term development path more sustainable (Department of Environment and Tourism, 2008, p. 12). The programme pursued several specific goals, including: creating a model for hosting environmentally sustainable mega-events in developing countries; reducing waste production and resource consumption; building South Africa’s capacity to host green events, thereby creating new job opportunities; upgrading infrastructure; and raising awareness about environmental best practices and sustainable development in South Africa (DEA, 2011c, p. 18).

At the national level, South Africa sought to communicate messages of sustainable development and build awareness of environmental issues through initiatives such as volunteer programmes, green education centres, print media (i.e. cartoon strips, “Soccer and the Environment” programme), radio advertisements, and a Green Passport program (DEA, 2011a; UNEP, 2012). Following the event, over 15,000 World Cup volunteers completed a DEA-commissioned survey to evaluate the success of greening-related marketing and communication efforts. Nearly 90 percent of respondents claimed they were not aware of any greening initiatives linked to the World Cup other than the volunteer program (DEA, 2011a). The programme seemed to be more effective at the local level, where host cities were able to
implement local solutions to global environmental problems. For instance, Cape Town recovered and reused 95 percent of demolition waste from its old stadium to construct the new Green Point Stadium, used natural ventilation systems in the stadium to cut power use, and reduced emissions by fitting streetlights with low-energy bulbs and traffic lights with LEDs (“UNEP evaluation of 2010 World Cup’s greening performance,” 2012, para. 9). In May 2011, Cape Town was awarded the 2010/11 IOC Award for Sport and the Environment for their demonstrated commitment to greening the World Cup. FIFA’s Head of Corporate Social Responsibility, Federico Addiechi, commented on Cape Town’s proactive approach: “The diverse projects and the awareness raised on important environmental issues contributed to the legacy of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa. We learned a lot from the Cape Town experience and will use those lessons for our future competitions” (“Cape Town crowned in Doha,” 2011, para. 5).

While Cape Town is one of South Africa’s World Cup sustainability success stories, many other host cities did not implement successful greening projects because they lacked vital resources to do so. That is, larger centres such as Cape Town (43 projects) and Durban (21 projects) were very active in implementing World Cup greening projects, but less affluent municipalities like Polokwane and Mbombela only carried out three and two projects, respectively (Death, 2011, p. 105). This inequality between cities reflects the negative side to speculation, in that the government mobilized this programme with the belief that it would be a resounding success (making up for the failures of Green Goal), and show off the nation’s “green credentials” (Dolles & Soderman, 2010, p. 590). Unfortunately, a mixture of shortsighted planning, lack of necessary resources, and insufficient direction and leadership from the national government and FIFA led to the unequal distribution of sustainable outcomes throughout South
Africa. That is, the greening of the World Cup produced some clear winners and losers, as citizens in larger urban centres were able to reap the benefits of these initiatives by learning from and participating in greening projects, while residents of smaller and less affluent host cities did not. Despite some of these unequal results, the National Greening Programme has put South Africa in a good position to utilize the “event-greening measures, skills and capacity” (Cape Town, 2008, p. 45) acquired during the World Cup, and incorporate them into future mega-event planning, such as Durban’s preparations for its possible bid for the 2024 Summer Olympics (Kitchen, 2013). Tournament organizers believe this experience will leave “an important environmental sustainability legacy…and will assist in building its strategic advantage in bidding for future events which require environmentally responsible event hosting infrastructure to be in place” (Durban 2010, p. 18 as cited in Death, 2011, p. 112).

3.3.5.2. World Cup Legacy Trust

Several months after the conclusion of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, presented South Africa with the World Cup Legacy Trust. The trust was established to “support a wide range of public benefit initiatives in the areas of football development, education, health and humanitarian activities in South Africa” (“FIFA launches 2010,” 2010, para. 1). Beneficiaries of the trust are selected for projects that fall within the following four categories: Football (administration, development, coordination, promotion of non-professional football); Education (provision of education as defined by the South African Schools Act); Health (provision of healthcare to disadvantaged communities, with a particular emphasis on HIV prevention and education); Humanitarian Activities (community development for marginalized populations, and anti-poverty programmes) (“FIFA launches 2010,” 2010, para. 4). All eligible projects must be located within South Africa and must be registered as a public
benefit organization with the South African Revenue Service (“2010 FIFA World Cup,” 2013, para. 2). This is a critical element of the Trust, because it ensures that programmes are being designed and implemented by South Africans, for South Africans. Many Sport for Development programmes are often formulated by NGOs and governments of the Global North and implanted to the nations of the Global South, which suggests that these programmes may lack vital localized input (Levermore, 2007). Unlike these, the World Cup Legacy Trust’s Sport for Development programmes are designed by South Africans, and therefore have the potential to succeed, because they will be based upon contextual and targeted goals that reflect the specific needs of South African citizens. The trust amounts to $100 million, of which $80 million will be directly allocated to selected social development and community projects, while the remaining $20 million was previously provided to the South African Football Association (SAFA) during preparation for the World Cup and for the construction of SAFA House, the organization’s headquarters (“FIFA launches 2010,” 2010, para. 2).

The World Cup Legacy Trust “delivers on FIFA’s pledge to ensure that South Africans will continue to benefit” from the 2010 tournament (“FIFA launches 2010,” 2010, para. 1). In January 2013, the World Cup Legacy Trust board (which consists of one representative each from FIFA, SAFA, the government, and the private sector) selected the first 973 beneficiaries (from 4,347 applications) for a total amount of nearly $6 million (“FIFA launches 2010,” 2010, para. 3). All selected projects will be monitored by the Board, and must submit regular progress reports and proof of expenditures. The initial round of beneficiaries includes: 24 projects to build the capacities of current and future South African football administrators (approximately $50,000); 33 projects in the area of football for development, with a focus on education and health (approximately $650,000); and numerous projects that emphasize the development of
women’s football, futsal, and beach soccer (approximately $5 million) (“2010 FIFA World Cup,” 2013).

The World Cup Legacy Trust also adds to a series of other Sport for Development initiatives that were launched during the 2010 World Cup in host cities and local communities. Some of the other notable projects include Football for Hope, the Win in Africa with Africa initiative, the Football for Health/11 for Health campaign, and the 2010 FIFA World Cup Ticket Fund (“FIFA launches 2010,” 2010, para. 7). These Sport for Development programmes varied in their approaches, but their overarching goal was to facilitate development in South Africa through youth participation in football. ¹⁰ Although the World Cup as a speculative world-making strategy has been shown to produce many unjust outcomes, in the case of the Legacy Trust, it seems likely to do the opposite. That is, the South African government and relevant NGOs recognized that the World Cup would bring “Sport for Development and Peace initiatives to the spotlight” (Cornelissen, 2011a, p. 504) because of its global visibility and obvious connection to sport, and made the most out of this unique opportunity by establishing numerous Sport for Development initiatives in South Africa (created by South Africans, for South Africans). Of course the $100 million Legacy Trust seems inconsequential given that the South African government spent over $3 billion to host the World Cup; however, in the long term, this

¹⁰ Cornelissen (2011a) provides a useful and detailed description of some of the Sport for Development programmes that were launched in South Africa during the World Cup, including the few initiatives that I have mentioned in the body of my thesis. Football for Hope (20 Centres for Hope) was introduced by the SRSA, and provincial and local authorities, with institutional support provided by FIFA; the objective of the programme is to construct football pitches, as well as health and education facilities, for youth. Win in Africa with Africa was established by the Local Organizing Committee, implementing partners, and major South African corporations, with institutional support (i.e. financing) provided by FIFA and the public sector; the core objective of this programme is football development, and providing participants with adequate training, coaching, as well as pitches, facilities, and equipment. Football for Health/11 for Health is a FIFA-led campaign aimed at disseminating health and hygiene information to youth through football. The World Cup Ticket Fund, led by the Local Organizing Committee with support from six FIFA global corporate partners, provided World Cup match tickets to disadvantaged youth, and aimed to support and empower youth through life skills training programmes.
programme can play a critical role in transforming the demographics of South African sport (i.e. providing disadvantaged youth with opportunities to participate in sport and recreation). In order for this to occur, World Cup Legacy Trust beneficiaries should not be selected solely for the purpose of developing elite-level athletic talent for international competitions. Rather, these programmes should be chosen for their emphasis on mass participation and their ability to instill in South African youth the values and skills typically associated with sports participation (i.e. teamwork, fair play, confidence, basic movement skills).

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have illustrated that hosting major international sporting events is a type of sport for development model that seeks to remake cities. I have made a case for understanding this particular sport for development model as a speculative world city-making strategy that has become increasingly popular in today’s world. The worlding of cities through the hosting of mega-events has been embraced by many nations of the Global South, as it allows hosts to imagine and enact new visions for their futures and remake their cities with objective, world-class markers, and offers the possibility for economic, urban, and social development. The premise of these Global South nations is that sporting mega-events provide unparalleled levels of global exposure, and the opportunity for hosts to achieve international recognition and legitimacy. However, as I have demonstrated, these global spectacles are inherently wrought with high levels of risk, uncertainty, and speculation, and this was clearly evident in the case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.

In its 2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report (released in 2012), the government reported that South African citizens can “reap long-term intangible benefits” of the event, and that “there
are numerous unquantifiable benefits that will be realized by future generations” (Conn, 2013, para. 14). During the event, there was a noticeable boost of pride in the country, as most South Africans “embraced a festive outlook” by decorating their homes, cars, and bodies in celebration of the World Cup, and by wearing South African national team football jerseys on Fridays leading up to the start of the tournament in support of Bafana Bafana (Tomlinson et al., 2011, p. 40). From an international point of view, South Africa proved pre-tournament doubters wrong, given that World Cup critics predicted that the country was not technologically sophisticated enough to manage the event, that vital infrastructure would not be ready in time, and that the country’s high crime rate would ruin the tournament (Tomlinson et al., 2011). South Africa ultimately showed the world that it could deliver on a global stage, as “the event proceeded smoothly, peacefully and allowed for new versions of South African (and African) identity, in terms of both practice and experience, to emerge” (Tomlinson et al., 2011, p. 41).

Although the event helped South Africa temporarily boost morale within the country, enhance its global visibility and alter its international image, transform its dated transportation system and other infrastructure, and kick-start some worthwhile policy initiatives, “a good proportion of these may be ‘glitter’, a shiny patina magically sprinkled over lived actualities” (Tomlinson et al., p. 40). That is, the South African government was unable to deliver on its promise that the World Cup would bring about a better life for all South Africans, and in actuality, the event made the lives of some South Africans much worse. That is to say, the World Cup gave South Africans a “dizzy high,” followed by a brutal “hangover” (Conn, 2013, para. 7) during which the sobering reality of the unjust outcomes and opportunity costs of the World Cup set in. More specifically, in pursuing a speculative urban strategy and attempting to launch South African host cities, and hence, the nation to world-class status: informal vendors
were excluded from participating in or benefitting from the event; local residents were evicted from their homes; stadium and infrastructure projects tended to only benefit South African elites; lofty predictions about employment and tourism failed to materialize; and the long-term impact of World Cup sustainability and Sport for Development programmes look promising, but remain to be seen for now. Furthermore, critics of the World Cup question whether it was worth spending over $3 billion on a month-long event, instead of investing public funds in other critical long-term programmes, such as ones that directly focus on alleviating poverty, the provision of basic public services like proper sanitation, adequate healthcare, and quality education, or solving the country’s housing backlog. The World Cup may have briefly excited the nation and began to facilitate new narratives about South Africa (Tomlinson et al., 2011), in that the nation proved itself capable of hosting a world-class, international event; however, the tournament did little to resolve deep social stresses, and likely even exacerbated existing inequalities within host cities and local communities. Ultimately, Carlos Amato suggests that “The World Cup did show us what South Africa could become, but we are a long way from that” (Conn, 2013, para. 15).

In the next chapter, I will continue my exploration of the ways in which the South African government deploys sport as a strategy for development, but extend my analysis beyond the mega-event. That is to say, I will shift my investigation to the reintroduction of physical education in schools by the South African government, and seek to answer my third research question (What do key South African policy documents about physical education tell us about the potential role which physical education can play in making the city, and in turn, the nation?). I will perform a discourse analysis of recent government policies about physical education, and contextualize this analysis within a framework of geographical scholarship about sport,
education, and children. I will make my argument that despite the strong neoliberal elements embedded in this policy programme, there is a possibility that physical education could result in the formation of ordinary cities in South Africa in which all children can enjoy equitable and accessible opportunities to sport and play.
Chapter 4
Physical Education and the Possibility of Forging Ordinary Cities

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that the 2010 South African World Cup should be understood as a speculative world-making project, in which the government sought to elevate its host cities, and in turn, the nation, to world-class status. For the most part, this speculative urban strategy resulted in deleterious outcomes, the uneven distribution of benefits, and exclusion and marginalization for many South African citizens. World-making projects, such as the World Cup (and world city literature, in general), ultimately prescribe a universal image of what constitutes a successful city, and privileges certain, objective markers of “world-classness,” including the state of a city’s infrastructure, or its insertion into transnational business and financial networks. This narrow definition of the “world city” limits us in our understanding of the various ways in which all cities can and should be understood as creative, complex, diverse, and modern, and how they choose to perform their own versions of “city-ness” (Robinson, 2002, p. 546). As such, Jennifer Robinson (2002; 2006) (following the tradition of Amin & Graham, 1997) calls for a broader, less ambitious, and more inclusive approach to urbanism, and rejects the Western-dominated mode of thinking that rests upon placing cities into pre-given categories, such as world, global, Third World, developed, or developing. Robinson’s (2002) alternative view of cities subverts the global hierarchy, as she argues that all cities should be recognized as “ordinary cities,” in that there is no singular vision for what constitutes city-ness or what a city can become (p. 546). That is, the city is simultaneously “a place for belonging, a site for development, a platform for growth, and an arena for political redistribution” (Robinson, 2008, p. 86). Furthermore, viewing cities as ordinary does not imply that all cities are the same.
Rather, it gives credence to the multiple dynamics within a city, and vibrant histories, current realities, and future possibilities of all cities, instead of just focusing on the state of a city’s development or its geographical location. In this view, urban scholars can learn as much from a city like Lusaka – a city that falls “off the map” of world cities scholarship – as they can from a major metropolis, such as New York.

Taking an ordinary view of cities does not diminish the fact that most cities are still eager to improve their international standing. The inclination of cities looking to enhance their global stature through speculative world-making projects (or perhaps, through more ordinary means, if possible) will likely continue unabated. However, it is my contention, following Robinson, that viewing cities as ordinary – “as constituted through multiple and overlapping networks of varying spatial reach, and as composed of a diversity of economic, social, and political relations” (Robinson, 2008, p. 75) – is a necessary intervention, as it extends past the narrow confines of economic globalization, and lends itself to understanding the variety of innovative ways (i.e. through policy) in which national and city governments address the range of interests at stake within their increasingly diverse societies, and articulates an openness to the fact that there are multiple ways of being urban. Robinson (2006) explains, “Without a strong sense of the city’s potential dynamism and creativity, imaginations about urban futures are truncated, perhaps by consigning futures to the limited imagination of developmentalist interventions, or through a narrow focus on the globalizing sectors of the economy” (p. 142). In other words, there is a diversity of interests, demands, and activities at play within cities, and urban policymakers must be able to develop and adapt integrative strategies that address this confluence of concerns, and not just selectively enact policies that will either improve the provision of basic services in the city (i.e. developmentalist) or enhance their city’s international
standing (i.e. modernist) (Robinson, 2008). Employing an ordinary cities approach, therefore, allows for government officials to institute policies directed toward improving city life, “which aim to build upon [their] unique combination of assets and opportunities” (Robinson, 2008, p. 75). Rather than relying upon high-risk, speculative ventures with no promise of success, cities can utilize the resources at their disposal (i.e. human capital) to meet the everyday needs of their citizens, perhaps in a more inclusive and equitable fashion. In this way, the ordinary city is a useful conceptual framework – and one that I will employ in my analysis throughout this chapter – for exploring and understanding the wide range of creative policies and strategies that governments may formulate in order to enact their own versions of city-ness, imagine their own distinctive visions for the future, and ultimately, forge cities that are based upon equity, justice, and opportunity, rather than on exclusivity.

As I stated previously in Chapter 2, more than half of the global population now lives in cities. Children make up a significant portion of this urban demographic. Cities, therefore, must be capable of catering to the needs and interests of young people and their families. I suggest that schools are one of the primary sites upon which to build the ordinary city, given that these institutions house such a large portion of the urban population for extended periods of time each day. In today’s world, education and the school curriculum have found themselves at the heart of the political agenda of many nations, as critical elements of strategies for enhancing national competitiveness, social mobility, and social inclusion (Butler & Hamnett, 2007). Through curriculum-based policy initiatives, “the modern state has pursued economic and political goals and intervened in the production of social identities, dominant political discourses, and distributional outcomes” (Witten et al., 2003, p. 203). In other words, curriculum-based education policies regarding what is taught to children in schools and how it is taught to them
are inherently neoliberal in that they aim to create proper, economic citizens that are useful to the nation. In this chapter, I will explore a specific type of curriculum-based policy initiative, physical education. I argue that even though physical education, like most curriculum-based policies, is infused with strong neoliberal values, it offers a certain germ of possibility that it could result in the imagining and formation of ordinary cities. That is to say, I am utilizing the concept of the ordinary city as a framework for understanding how physical education as an innovative policy programme could potentially facilitate wider and more equitable opportunities for sport and play in the city.

Physical education has long been recognized as an important component of the school curriculum because of the presupposed role that it can play in the holistic development of youth. Physical education has the potential to promote lifelong physical activity and basic movement skills in young learners, help children build social capital within their schools and communities, and contribute to the moral character and development of youth (International Platform on Sport & Development, 2009). The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) first recognized sport as a vital tool for education in 1952 at its General Conference in Paris. Several years later in 1959, the United Nations acknowledged every child’s fundamental right to play and recreation in its Declaration on the Rights of the Child (SDP IWG, 2008). In 1978, UNESCO released the first international policy directly related to physical education, known as the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport. This groundbreaking document declares, “Every human being has a fundamental right of access to physical education and sport, which are essential for the full development of his [or her] personality” (International Platform on Sport & Development, 2009, p. 11).
Despite these monumental international policy initiatives and the perceived benefits of regular physical activity, physical education has been in a near universal decline since the 1990s. Physical education programmes have suffered from significant cutbacks in both quality and quantity in most countries throughout the world. In fact, some experts surmise that children today are less likely to receive regular physical education than they were ten years ago (SDP IWG, 2008, p. 104). Worldwide challenges to implementing quality physical education programmes in schools include decreased time (i.e. during the school day) allocated toward physical education, loss of subject status, lack of trained staff, inadequate training provided for physical education teachers, and lack of sufficient resources (i.e. funding, equipment, facilities) required to deliver physical education in schools (International Platform on Sport & Development, 2009, p. 6).

These challenges notwithstanding, recent evidence suggests that many “national governments have committed themselves through legislation to making provision for physical education” (Hardman, 2005, p. 11). South Africa is one such example of a national government making a concerted effort to revive physical education in its nation’s schools, and utilizing sport in schools as a vehicle for development. Although my research specifically focuses upon physical education policy in South Africa (i.e. as part of the curriculum), it is important to note that there has always been some attention to sport in schools to varying degrees in South Africa. That is, sport in schools typically takes the form of school sport leagues and inter-school competitions (as opposed to mass participation), with the main objective being to identify,
develop, and nurture talented student-athletes for future provincial and national competition. These leagues are extremely popular in South Africa, and it is not uncommon for thousands of spectators to attend a weekend schoolboy rugby match (Whitfield, 2012). School sport in South Africa is similar to the education system, in that it remains highly racialized and unequal, even in the two decades following apartheid. Football is the sport of choice among the black majority, and black schools are typically characterized by the presence of football pitches on their school grounds. Meanwhile, white schools are known for dominating the rugby paddock, as rugby is a major component of white South African identity and remains intimately connected to the apartheid regime. These elite, white schools, such as Grey College in Bloemfontein, groom the nation’s future rugby stars, and impose prohibitive fees to attend, which limits access for black children, essentially maintaining the schools’ whiteness and prestige (Walt, 2007). In contrast to these more exclusive and competitive inter-school sport leagues, physical education represents the South African Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation’s vision of facilitating an environment in which all South African children can regularly participate in sport through physical education as a compulsory

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11 For more information on school sport leagues in South Africa, please visit http://www.saschoolsports.co.za/. This website is dedicated to providing the latest news and information about school sport leagues in South Africa, including athlete profiles, statistics, scores, schedules, and recaps. The emphasis on competition in these leagues is readily apparent, given that the website uses expressions, such as: “South Africa’s future sporting legends,” “Showcasing the best sporting stars from around South Africa,” and “Tomorrow’s stars, today.”

12 As I outlined in the introductory chapter, education played a critical role in reinforcing inequalities between white and non-white South Africans during apartheid. This fragmentation of South Africa’s education system under apartheid continues to have serious implications for the nation’s current education system. Post-apartheid education policies have failed to fully rectify inequalities between racial groups, and the current system can be said to reproduce apartheid-era trends, given that “race remains the main correlate of both education quality and quantity” (van der Berg, 2007, p. 851). That is, enrolment in schools since apartheid has improved for both white and non-white learners, but educational achievement in non-white schools remains substantially lower than in white schools, and children in non-white schools are more likely to repeat a grade. The disparity between the quality of education provided in white and non-white schools is attributed to the lack of basic infrastructure in non-white schools, the presence of under-qualified teachers, and differentiated access to extra funds between schools (Jukuda, 2011).
component of the school curriculum. These departments view this government intervention and mass participation initiative as central “to the development and transformation of the South African society as well as sport in the country” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 7).

In this chapter, I will perform a discourse analysis of select South African government policy documents about physical education, and contextualize my analysis within a broader framework of geographical literature about sport, education, and children (which were discussed in detail in the Literature Review conducted in Chapter 2). Based on my analysis, I will demonstrate that the reintroduction of physical education in South Africa – like most physical education programmes throughout the world – has fundamental neoliberal elements, in that this policy programme is largely about creating certain types of useful subjects through children’s participation in structured forms of sport and recreation. Development policy in post-apartheid South has shifted away from an originally redistributive approach, and has since taken on a neoliberal character. Following the end of apartheid, the newly-elected ANC government instituted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which involved a strong government commitment to redistributive and sustainable development that increased the poor’s ability “to mobilize sufficient development resources including from the democratic government where necessary” (ANC, 1994, p. 15 as cited in Peet, 2002, p. 71). Shortly afterward in 1996, the ANC began its GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution) programme, which was similar in some respects to RDP, but argued that “much higher economic growth rates were necessary to achieve social objectives” (Peet, 2002, p. 74). Therefore, GEAR advocated for a series of policies that promoted “an outward-oriented industrial economy integrated into the global environment and responsive to market pressures” (Peet, 2002, 74). GEAR and
subsequent policies have done little to resolve inequality in the country, and have actually played a significant role in exacerbating class divisions, as well as furthering the specific economic, political, and social interests of elite citizens. As a result of these market-oriented policies, the South African government increasingly demonstrates “a neoliberal devotion to globalized markets,” and “competition [has become] the order of the day” (Haferburg, 2011, p. 336), in the sense that the government aims to strengthen its national competitiveness and enhance its international standing (as well as the competitiveness and standing of its municipalities) in all aspects of daily life. It is in this regard that I believe South African physical education policy bears objective markers of neoliberalism.\(^\text{13}\) Despite these fundamental neoliberal elements of physical education policy, I argue that there is a possibility that physical education in South Africa could result in the formation of ordinary cities, so long as the government is able to maximize certain opportunities and form certain alliances. That is to say, if the government is able to include more voices in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of physical education in South Africa, such as civil society organizations, Sport for Development NGOs, city officials, social justice groups, and most importantly, children,\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{13}\) James Ferguson (2009) describes how much of the critical scholarship on neoliberalism reaches the same conclusion: “neoliberalism is bad for poor and working people, therefore we must oppose it” (p. 166). He goes on to advocate for scholars to go beyond their preconceived notions about neoliberalism as “an evil essence,” and instead see it within a “field of specific governmental techniques, [then] we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word” (p. 183). Even though I maintain that these policy documents produced by the South African government have fundamental neoliberal ideas embedded in them, I would agree with Ferguson that these neoliberal “techniques” could be repurposed or reformulated (based on the suggestions I make later in the chapter) in the name of creating more equitable and accessible spaces for sport and play. Additionally, this policy programme should not be perceived as negative or “bad” just because I have pointed out some of its more neoliberal elements. As I mention later in this chapter, these byproducts of physical education, such as developing healthy citizens and elite athletes, can be seen beneficial for the country, but they should not be the main objectives or overshadow physical education as an inclusive and equitable mass participation initiative.
then this school-based sport initiative could lead to ordinary cities in which all children can enjoy accessible and equitable opportunities to sport and play.

For the purposes of this project, I will be focusing my attention on schools in urban centres, even though many schools in South Africa are located in rural areas. Schools located in rural areas face unique challenges that negatively affect the delivery of quality education (i.e. compared to urban schools), and the Department of Basic Education recognizes the “need to have a different strategy for rural development and rural education” (Surty, 2011, p. 8). Rural schools are typically located in remote and relatively underdeveloped areas, lack basic infrastructure and resources (i.e. sanitation, roads, transport, electricity, information and communications technologies), have difficulty attracting qualified teachers, and are sparsely populated such that students must learn in a multi-grade setting (Surty, 2011). In other words, there are likely more serious concerns that must take priority and be addressed in order to enhance the delivery of quality education in rural South African schools, before turning attention to implementing physical education in these schools. Though, it should be noted that South African Deputy Minister of Basic Education, Enver Surty, acknowledges that the Department should “adapt formal sport activities [as part of the curriculum] to the rural context…For example, you may have to combine two or three schools to be able to play a team sport” (Surty, 2011, p. 13). Therefore, even though I am focusing my attention and analysis specifically on city schools in this thesis project, I can imagine incorporating an exploration and observation of how physical education is (or is not being) instituted in rural schools into a more comprehensive, ethnographic research project that I envision conducting in the future.
4.2. Methods

4.2.1. What Is Discourse and Discourse Analysis?

Before delving into a discourse analysis of physical education policy documents produced by the South African government, it is important to first of all define the terms discourse and discourse analysis. “Discourse” is often recognized as an ambiguous term in geography and other social sciences because of the myriad meanings typically associated with it. Alvesson & Karreman (2000) seek to provide clarity to this fuzzy term by drawing a distinction between “Discourse” (upper-case ‘D’) and “discourse” (lower-case ‘d’). Whereas “Discourse” (upper-case) describes “the study of social reality as discursively constructed and maintained” (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1126) through language and other modes of representation, “discourse” (lower-case) refers to “the study of social text (talk and written text in its social action contexts)” (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1126). Furthermore, discourse (referring to both upper-case and lower-case) is intimately connected to language. It is through interpreting language (i.e. how people choose to represent the world and their ideas about it with words and other modes of representation) that various realities are produced (and reproduced), and we are able to make sense of the world in which we live (Campbell, 2009a).

Over the past 35 years, there has been a demonstrable “discursive turn” in the field of human geography (and other social sciences), which has brought political significance back to previously-neglected categories of grammar and rhetoric, and their roles in shaping ideas about the world (Dittmer, 2010, p. 275). As a result of the discursive turn, geographers have become increasingly interested in “[understanding] language as a social practice” (Campbell, 2009b, p. 167), and as such, often undertake the practice of discourse analysis. Discourse analysts
examine and interpret communication and/or text (i.e. newspapers, speeches, policy documents) to uncover meaning, reveal truth, and gain new insights, particularly about how language “[enables] virtually all social activities” (Dittmer, 2010, p. 274). Trappes-Lomax (2008) explains that all people unconsciously engage in discourse analysis in their everyday lives by noticing how language is used and under what circumstances (i.e. in conversations with their family, friends, and colleagues). The discourse analyst takes this everyday, unconscious activity a step further, and does “noticing consciously, deliberately, systematically, and, as far as possible, objectively, and to produce accounts (descriptions, interpretations, explanations) of what their investigations have revealed (Trappes-Lomax, 2008, p. 133).

4.2.2. Modified Two-Dimensional Approach to Discourse Analysis

I will perform a discourse analysis of key textual policy documents about the reintroduction of physical education in South Africa. Although discourse analyses have become innumerable in contemporary human geography research, “there are very few explicit discussions of how that research was undertaken” (Dittmer, 2010, p. 279). Despite the absence of a specific or universal research method, Fairclough (1992 as cited in Lees, 2004) outlines three key elements that researchers should seek to highlight when undertaking discourse analysis. This three-dimensional framework includes textual analysis, discursive practice, and social practice. I will follow a modified version of Fairclough’s model, in that I will adhere to the first two tenets of the framework (textual analysis and discursive practice) in my discourse analysis of South African physical education policies. Given that I did not travel to South Africa to conduct fieldwork (i.e. observe physical education firsthand, speak with government officials), I cannot use Fairclough’s concept of social practice because it is suggestive of more ethnographic work that I am not doing as part of this particular project.
The first dimension of this modified framework is textual analysis, which “describes the attempt to understand the content, mode of address and authority, organization, and other aspects of language-in-use, specifically for the purpose of understanding their contribution to the intellectual scaffolding of our existence” (Gee, 1999 as cited in Dittmer, 2010, p. 280). In other words, how do language and the particular ways in which it is deployed produce reality and enable human activity? In terms of textual analysis, Dittmer (2010) instructs researchers to ask themselves two critical questions: First, why am I doing a textual analysis, and second, what should I analyze (p. 281)? The answers to these questions must be directly linked to the object of analysis and the research objectives (Dittmer, 2010). First, I am performing a textual analysis not only because I am conducting this research outside of South Africa, but also because I imagine this analysis as the first step of a larger and longer research project. There is significant value in this textual analysis because it allows for me to gain a strong sense of these policies, including who wrote them, who did not write them, why they wrote them, and what the government’s objectives are (or seem to be) for physical education. I imagine that this textual analysis would support the next step of a more comprehensive future research project, which would involve conducting ethnographic fieldwork and observing how physical education is deployed in schools. Second, I will textually analyze the following policy documents: the Framework for Collaboration: Coordination and Management of School Sport in Public and Ordinary Schools (2005), An Integrated School Sports Framework (2011), Memorandum of Understanding on An Integrated School Sport Framework (2011), and the gazetted draft of the School Sport Policy for Schools in South Africa (2011). I have selected these specific documents for textual analysis because they are the most significant and comprehensive physical education policies produced by the government in the post-apartheid era.
The shift from textual analysis to the second dimension of the framework, known as discursive practice, revolves around “connecting the data set analyzed earlier to the broader realm of geographical practice” (Dittmer, 2010, p. 282), which involves being aware of the geographical location and historical time in which discourses are situated, and their connection to other bodies of geographical scholarship. In order to do this, I will remain mindful of the context in which these policy documents were written, because “the social setting in which language is deployed makes a tremendous difference in how it is understood” (Dittmer, 2010, p. 279). As such, I will be cognizant of important contextual factors that will ultimately inform and shape my discourse analysis, such as the increasing neoliberalization of sport and education (in South Africa, as well as worldwide) and fragmented histories of sport and education (and physical education) in South Africa as a result of apartheid legacies. Additionally, I will draw appropriate connections between these policy documents and previously discussed bodies of geographical scholarship about sport, education, and children.

4.3. Discourse Analysis of South African Physical Education Policies

In this section, I will perform a discourse analysis of recent policy documents produced by the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation about the reintroduction of physical education in all South African schools. Through my analysis, I have found that physical education in South Africa has strong neoliberal elements and adheres to an instrumental envisioning of sport, where schools are sites of institutional control and governmentality. Sport and physical activity as part of the school curriculum are looked upon to create proper, economic citizens that can play a role in enhancing the nation’s global competitiveness (i.e. as part of the workforce, as athletes competing at international sporting
events), both now and in the future. Despite these inherent neoliberal features, I argue that there is a possibility for physical education to be wielded toward other, more egalitarian, ends (i.e. beyond competition), and that it could result in the formation of ordinary cities where all South African children can enjoy their fundamental right to play.

4.3.1. Neoliberalization of Physical Education

Together, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation have come together to identify the absence of physical education in the South African school curriculum as a problem, and their solution to this problem has been to produce this collection of policy documents in order to reintroduce physical education into South African schools. The Department of Basic Education and the Department of Sport and Recreation are the entities that have been given the power and authority to speak on the matter of physical education, and articulate how it should be deployed in schools. They readily “accept the central and, where necessary, the interventionist role that Government must play” (Department of Education & Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2005, p. 4) in increasing children’s participation in sport and recreation, and helping them make healthy lifestyle choices. They acknowledge that their departments are “best placed to provide the leadership that is required” (Department of Education & Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2005, p. 4) to carry out such an initiative, and are responsible for the funding, monitoring, and evaluation of physical education programmes in South Africa (Department of Basic Education, 2011). In terms of the responsibilities of the individual departments (i.e. delineation of duties), the Department of Sport and Recreation must oversee the development of sport and athletes within South Africa, while the Department of Basic Education is obligated to ensure that all learners have access to quality physical education during the school day (Department of Basic Education, 2011). This clear division of duties
between the two departments illustrates the heterogeneity of South African physical education policy, in that there are two potentially competing and contradictory visions espoused within the same policy programme: one department wants to ensure that it can identify and develop talented athletes, while the other wants to ensure that all children have equitable access to sport and recreation in schools. The Department of Sport and Recreation’s mandate tends to dominate South African physical education policy, and undermine it as a mass participation initiative, given the heavy emphasis on capacity building and enhancing competitiveness throughout this collection of policy documents.

These policies represent a top-down approach to governance, and demonstrate how the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation have been given the power to speak on the matter of physical education, while others are seemingly left out of the policy formulation process. That is, there does not appear to be much (if any) consultation with entities or individuals that fall outside of the government sphere. For instance, children are positioned as the primary participants and beneficiaries of South Africa’s physical education initiative, yet their voices are absent from the rhetoric of these policy documents. Children get to take part in the programme itself, but it does not seem as though they get to have meaningful roles in the decision-making or policy formulation processes. These policy documents reveal that South Africa’s school-based sport initiative fits into the larger narrative of what most governments (i.e. nations of the Global North) believe physical education ought to be. That is, the government’s dominant mode of thinking about physical education is based upon an instrumental, neoliberal envisioning of what sport should do for citizens and for the nation. Inviting outsider consultation and participation could potentially infringe upon this particular vision for physical education and make it more difficult for the government to achieve its
intended goals through this programme. The government seeks to institute school-based sport programmes in order to achieve certain goals, such as, “Using [physical education] and sport to inspire learning and achievement; Enabling every person to enjoy competition and providing sport to the most talented; developing a new generation of coaches working in schools; Supporting the development of young leaders and volunteers” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, Annexure C). According to this view, sport and physical education further the hegemonic interests of the government, because they are looked upon to manufacture healthy, useful, and productive subjects that can play a critical role in enhancing South Africa’s global competitiveness and advancing the nation’s long-term economic interests (i.e. the workforce, international sporting competition).

According to these policy documents, physical education provides children “with opportunities to have fun and be active, reinforcing their desire to make physical activity a lifelong habit” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011b, p. 3). Physical education has long-term implications for children’s physical and intellectual well-being because it encourages learners to transfer what they have learned “from the curriculum context to the sustainable development of self and communities” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 9). In other words, physical education is looked upon to make children not only more prone to participate in lifelong physical activity, but also “more likely to be academically motivated, alert, and successful” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, Annexure C). These documents suggest that South African children participating in physical education programmes are likely in a better position (i.e. compared to children who do not participate in regular physical activity) to lead healthy lives, do well in school, get good jobs, and ultimately
be contributing members to society and to the national economy. Additionally, physical education is not just for enriching the lives of children, but also the lives of educators. That is, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation emphasize the necessity to “build the capacity, empower, and further develop educators to be coaches, referees, sport administrators, and to develop other expertise identified as crucial” (Department of Education & Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2005, p. 9). By taking part in professional development and training programmes, educators can open up new career opportunities for themselves at different levels of South African sport and education (i.e. as volunteers, coaches, managers, administrators). The government is utilizing physical education as a means of structuring the current realities and future opportunities of South African learners and educators. In this way, schools are sites of institutional control, and physical education is a form of governmentality used to “restrain, control, treat, ‘design’ and ‘produce’ particular and supposedly improved versions of human minds and bodies” (Philo & Parr, 2000, p. 513) of both children and adults. Here, we see the inherent neoliberalism in this policy programme, based on the instrumental envisioning of physical education: the key element of its attractiveness to the South African government is the fact that it can help build healthier and more productive citizens that will inevitably enhance the nation’s overall global competitiveness in the long-term.

Neoliberalism is further evident in South Africa’s physical education policy programme, as the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation declare, “Investing in children [through sport and recreation] increases a nation’s capacity to compete and grow in a global economy” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, p. 3). According to this rhetoric, creating opportunities for children to engage
in physical activity is a calculated investment on the part of government, and play is a structured part of the school day so as to ensure that the government can receive the best possible return on its investment (i.e. identifying talented athletes, achieving international sporting success). In this view, sport and play are not necessarily valued for their own intrinsic sakes (i.e. playing to have fun), but for what tangible benefits that they can bring to the nation.\textsuperscript{14} That is, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation recognize physical education as a prime vehicle for developing South African sporting talent and preparing athletes for elite-level competition. (i.e. provincial, national, international). School sport provides an “important pipeline for talent identification and excellence in sport” (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, Annexure C). Here, we see an explicit instance of the competing visions within South African physical education discourse: the policy is designed as a mass participation initiative, but this vision is undermined by a strong emphasis on advancing competitive sport. Global competitiveness in the sporting arena is inherently linked to the nation’s ability to grow its existing human resource base and increase the talent pool. Past approaches to sport (i.e. during apartheid) left only a small fraction of the population available to compete at international events, but mass participation initiatives, such as physical education, increase the number of participants in sport and recreation, which effectively increases the likelihood of identifying talented athletes that can excel toward the national level. Physical education, therefore, plays a role in advancing the neoliberal agenda by helping South Africa to yield stronger and more competitive national teams.

\textsuperscript{14} It is worth mentioning that the word “fun” is stated only twice throughout these four policy documents, while the word “enjoy” is used only once, but it is deployed in the context of competition: “Enabling every young person to enjoy competition and providing support to the most talented” (Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, Annexure C).
4.3.2. Physical Education and the Possibility of the Ordinary City

In the previous sub-section, I revealed the South African government’s dominant mode of thinking about physical education, which is characterized by a highly instrumental, neoliberal envisioning of what sport ought to do for the nation and its citizens. Despite this strong infusion of neoliberal values in South African physical education policy, I believe that there may be a possibility for physical education to result in ordinary cities, which provide all children with equitable and accessible opportunities to enjoy their basic right to play sport and have fun. Physical education’s ability to forge ordinary cities in South Africa is contingent upon the government’s capacity and willingness to invite more organizations and individuals into the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation processes. Doing so would likely ensure more equitable outcomes, and create cities that offer wider opportunities for sport and play. Therefore, the government must: forge alliances with and learn from civil society groups (i.e. South African Sport for Development organizations); work with relevant stakeholders to provide basic sporting infrastructure to those most in need; and perhaps most importantly, allow for children to be meaningful participants and have a role in the decision-making process.

South Africa’s physical education initiative may lead to the formation of ordinary cities if the government can work with and learn from civil society organizations that have experience with implementing mass participation-based Sport for Development programmes. In theory, South Africa’s physical education initiative bears objective markers of most successful and sustainable Sport for Development programmes (Kidd, 2011): it is designed by the local community or government; it is needs and assets-based, in that it fills a perceived need (physical education in schools) by drawing upon existing resources, such as school children and the nation’s passion for sport; and it will be linked to other initiatives beyond sport (i.e. health and
education), such as government interventions related to HIV and AIDS awareness, and crime prevention (Department of Education & Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2005). Yet, physical education falls short in becoming a truly equitable Sport for Development programme because of the South African government’s neoliberal and instrumental envisioning of what sport should do for citizens and the nation, and it tends to privilege competition over mass participation. Therefore, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation should forge alliances with civil society groups, such as Grassroot Soccer, Sporting Chance, SCORE, Kicking AIDS Out, and Hoops 4 Hope (among others), to learn about best practices in providing equitable and accessible opportunities for mass participation in sport. These organizations adhere to more democratic and inclusive conceptions of sport, in that they aim to create safe spaces in which children can play with and learn from one another, and are connected to broader visions of social change (i.e. HIV prevention). By forging alliances with these types of organizations, the government would be inviting knowledgeable actors into the policy formulation and implementation process, potentially increasing the likelihood of creating more equitable and just physical education programmes in South Africa.

Another way in which physical education may forge ordinary cities in South Africa is through the delivery of basic sporting infrastructure. The Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation must “mobilize resources to ensure provision of sport infrastructure and equipment for all schools” (Department of Basic Education, 2011, p. 7). Existing sporting facilities will be upgraded, or new ones will be constructed in order to

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15 For more information on these South Africa Sport for Development organizations (i.e. vision, mission, history), please visit their official websites: Grassroot Soccer (http://www.grassrootsoccer.org/); Sporting Chance (http://www.sportingchance.co.za/); SCORE (http://www.score.org.za/); Kicking AIDS Out (http://www.kickingaidsout.net/Pages/default.aspx); Hoops 4 Hope (http://www.hoopsafrica.org/)
guarantee accessibility for all learners throughout South Africa. This infrastructure development will take place in the school, as well as beyond the school (i.e. off of school grounds in local communities and neighbourhoods). In this way, the government is building sport and play into the urban fabric of the city, and physical education is literally making ordinary cities because governments are building necessary, functional infrastructure that can be utilized by its citizens in the long-term. Whereas venues specifically built for the 2010 FIFA World Cup were massive, 100,000 spectator stadiums that proved to be of little use to everyday citizens because of their size, locations, and inaccessibility, physical education infrastructure will be upgraded and constructed, managed, and maintained by city governments (Department of Basic Education & Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011a, Annexure G). The main caveat is that these sport facilities must be constructed in areas of the city that are most in need of such infrastructure, such as disadvantaged communities. During apartheid, and even to this day, poorer areas of South Africa have lacked quality sport and recreation infrastructure, because these facilities tend to be constructed in wealthier, predominantly-white areas. In this way, cities today have become gated communities, in which places of play, such as well-lit playgrounds and well-maintained sports fields, are places of exclusivity and privilege. Those who can afford to live near such infrastructure have safe places to play, while those cannot afford it must either make do with what they have (i.e. play in the streets) or not play at all. Therefore, local governments, city officials, construction companies, and social justice groups must work together and be actively involved in the monitoring and development of physical sporting infrastructure, so as to ensure that all children have access to the facilities, and not just those living in more affluent areas. Creating accessible, public spaces for sport and recreation in these areas of the city may lead a greater number of children (and adults) to more frequently participate in unstructured play and physical activity outside of the school (i.e. for fun), and may also translate into the establishment
of other mass participation initiatives outside of the school (i.e. sports clubs in the community, summer camps).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, physical education might result in the formation of ordinary cities if children are given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process and assert their agency in the school setting. During apartheid, physical education was reserved for children that attended more affluent, predominantly-white schools. Involving children of all different genders, races, and classes in the decision-making process, therefore, would be illustrative of how far South African sport and education have come over the past two decades. That is to say, children could be agents of social change and play a role in transforming South African physical education from an exclusive, segregated school subject, to one that provides equitable opportunities for all children to regularly enjoy sport and physical activity. As I outlined earlier, these policy documents are currently lacking any visible input from children, even though they are the key participants and beneficiaries of South Africa’s physical education initiative. As a result, these policies place significant emphasis on neoliberal ideas of competition, power, and winning, rather than on more democratic and egalitarian principles of fun, cooperation, and basic movement skills. Even though children have been left out of the policy formulation process, they can still play a vital role in the monitoring and evaluation of physical education programmes in South Africa. That is, the Department of Basic Education and the Department of Sport and Recreation can establish formal programmes – like focus groups, semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and surveys – to regularly check in with children about their views of and experiences with physical education, especially during the early stages of the policy’s implementation. Are children taking part in the kinds of activities, and playing the kinds of sports, that they want to play? Are children having fun and enjoying themselves, or
do they find that there is too much emphasis on competitive sport? Are disadvantaged groups, such as girls or people with disabilities, being given the same opportunities for participation as everyone else, and are these programmes able to meet their diverse needs and interests? These monitoring and evaluation techniques and criteria can help to ensure that children’s voices (of all genders, races, and classes) are being heard and their concerns are being incorporated into physical education programmes. In this way, South African children would be authentic, meaningful participants in this policy programme, and get have a say on decisions that affect their everyday lives. Furthermore, inviting children into these processes is important because evidence suggests that if children are playing sports/activities they enjoy (i.e. rather than playing sport solely for competitive reasons), they will be more inclined to participate in physical activity and lead healthy lifestyles onward into their adult lives (Hemming, 2007).

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated through the practice of discourse analysis that physical education policy in South Africa has many neoliberal elements, which are directed toward making proper, economic citizens through sport and recreation. Physical education can play a role in enhancing the nation’s global competitiveness because it creates healthy, productive subjects that can contribute to South Africa’s workforce, and also increases the likelihood of identifying talented athletes for elite-level competition. Despite this inherent neoliberalism, I have argued that physical education in South Africa offers an opening for the formation of ordinary cities based on equal opportunity and social justice, so long as the government is able to forge alliances with and learn from relevant stakeholders, such as local Sport for Development organizations, city officials, construction companies, and children. Doing so would help ensure that all children can enjoy their right to play, regularly engage in
inclusive and accessible forms of sport and play, lead healthy and active lives, and have fun while doing so. As I mentioned earlier, I would be particularly interested to conduct a more comprehensive research project in the future, in which I would be able to ethnographically observe whether or not these (or similar) steps that I have suggested have been taken by the government to incorporate more voices into the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of physical education in South Africa.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that the ordinary city is not devoid of objective world-class markers, such as healthy and productive citizens, or international sporting success. However, these world-class indicators are not the only criteria by which a city is defined, in that the ordinary city is one that is also characterized by other metrics of globality, such as its ability to provide for the diverse needs and interests of all of its citizens, rather than just the elite few. That said, the South African government will likely continue to use physical education and school sport as a means of building useful citizens and identifying talented athletes. This strategy does not necessarily have to inhibit the possibility of physical education’s leading to the formation of ordinary cities, but it cannot be the main objective of this sporting initiative. That is, if the government first and foremost maintains a strong and clear commitment to its stated objectives of mass participation, equity, inclusivity, and accessibility, and strives to listen to and incorporate relevant stakeholders’ views into physical education policy, I would suggest that enhancing South Africa’s global competitiveness in the long-term can simply be viewed as a positive byproduct of physical education. In the final chapter, I will provide an overview of my research, and outline the limitations of my research, as well as its implications, and possibilities for further and future research.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

5.1. Introduction

In this final chapter, I revisit the common theme of my research – sport as a strategy for development – and review the differential ways in which I have argued that sport may play a role in the imagining and making of cities in South Africa. First, the South African government has traditionally relied upon sporting mega-events as a way to elevate its host cities, and hence, the nation to world-class status. Specifically, the 2010 FIFA World Cup should be understood as a sport for development programme that also proved to be a speculative world-making strategy, aimed at creating “world cities” in South Africa. That is to say, the event provided justification for South Africa to adorn itself with technologically sophisticated infrastructure, such as iconic stadia and modern transportation systems, and to showcase itself on the international stage. However, this world city-making venture was carried out largely at the expense of the rights (moral and legal), homes, livelihoods, and identities of everyday South African citizens. Additionally, even though the tournament did bring about some potentially positive policy programmes (i.e. National Greening Programme and World Cup Legacy Trust), it is impossible to wholly negate or to simply ignore the widespread deleterious effects of this sporting mega-event that occurred in pursuit of catapulting South African municipalities to “world city” status.

Second, since the end of apartheid, South Africa’s Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation have been attempting to reintroduce physical education in schools. Although this school-based sport initiative is premised as a mass participation initiative based on principles of equity, inclusivity, and accessibility, there are fundamental neoliberal
elements that dominate this policy programme and threaten to undermine these more democratic ideals. That is to say, physical education in South Africa is very similar to physical education programmes implemented in the Global North, in that it is strongly centered on governmentality and making certain types of proper, economic citizens through structured forms of sport and recreation. These “useful” subjects are looked upon to enhance South Africa’s global competitiveness in the long-term, because they can become healthy, disciplined, productive citizens that can eventually participate in and contribute to the workforce, or develop into talented athletes that compete for South Africa in international sporting events. Despite these strong neoliberal elements and underlying emphasis on competition, I contend that physical education offers a certain germ of possibility that this policy programme could lead to the imagining and forging of ordinary cities in South Africa. While physical education in schools has yet to be fully implemented nationwide, I believe that the government can work to maximize the programme’s ability to create equitable and just cities that offer its citizens accessible opportunities for sport and play. To achieve this, the Department of Basic Education and Department of Sport and Recreation must bring more voices into the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of physical education, and work to forge important alliances with and learn from certain actors, including civil society organizations, city officials, social justice groups, and most especially, children.

5.2. Research Limitations

I have identified one main limitation in my research, which must be acknowledged. I conducted literature-based research outside of South Africa, rather than performing ethnographic fieldwork. I did not speak with anyone in South Africa that had experienced the effects of either the 2010 FIFA World Cup, or the reintroduction of physical education in
schools firsthand. However, I was able to negotiate this limitation and lessen its impact on my work because of plethora of scholarly literature that has been written about the South African World Cup in recent years, as well as the number of South African physical education policy documents that are readily available and accessible online. I would also suggest that conducting literature-based research, particularly as it pertains to my discourse analysis of South African physical education policy, does not necessarily have to be looked upon as a limitation. Rather, as I have previously stated, it can be viewed as the first step in a more comprehensive research project, wherein ethnographic research would be the next logical step (i.e. interviewing government officials, stakeholders, participants, and observing physical education programmes in action). More specifically, because South African physical education policy is still in its infancy and has not been fully rolled out nationwide as of yet, discourse analysis of relevant policy documents is perhaps the most valuable research method available to me. In other words, even if I did travel to South Africa to conduct fieldwork, I imagine that discourse analysis of policy documents would have still been a necessary component of my project, so that I could develop a strong sense of the core components of this particular government initiative (i.e. who wrote it, why was it written, what does it involve, who are the key stakeholders and beneficiaries, and so on), before actually seeing and understanding this policy in action.

5.3. Research Implications and Opportunities

This research raises several important implications, as well as possibilities for further research. First, despite the fact that mega-events as world-making strategies have shown to be highly speculative ventures (for examples of mega-events that have proven to be speculative world-making strategies beyond the case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, please refer to the Appendix), I believe that the pursuit of these global spectacles will continue unabated. Nations
and cities – particularly of the Global South – have fully embraced this “sport-media-tourism complex” (Nauright, 2004, p. 1326), and as such, are unable to resist the “seductive discourse of development” (Swart & Bob, 2004) that these events offer. Black & van der Westhuizen (2004) suggest that the concerns over the opportunity costs and inequity inherent to mega-events are usually “trumped by the larger political and developmental aspirations of ambitious regimes” (p. 1207), which highlights the need for more critical research about the growing trend of mega-events taking place in the Global South. Such research is particularly crucial at a time when Brazil is currently preparing to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, Pyeongchang, South Korea was recently selected to host the 2018 Winter Olympics, Qatar will play host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and several cities of the Global South (including Durban, South Africa) are also preparing to bid for the 2024 Summer Olympics. Although the prospect of being elevated to world-class status is highly alluring, relevant actors (i.e. governments, boosters) in these places must ask themselves critical questions, including (but not limited to): Is it worth it to spend large amount of public funds on one-off, temporary events? How else could such funds be put to use? Who stands to benefit from these events? Is there a way to guard against the exclusion or marginalization of poorer members of society? How can the gains (and losses) be more equally distributed throughout society? What are the prospects for long-term economic benefit, urban regeneration, image enhancement, and internal social cohesion? The answers to these questions have the potential to help aspiring hosts determine whether hosting major international sporting events is the most sensible world-making project to pursue, or if their vision for the future could be better achieved through some other type development strategy.
Second, this research adds to the growing body of geographical scholarship about physical education. While most social science research about physical education tends to emphasize the positive and negative benefits that participants can accrue, my research highlights that physical education can go beyond affecting just the individual (i.e. fitness, academic performance, value system), and can potentially play a more prominent role in the transformation of citizens, cities, and the nation. Furthermore, a significant amount of recent geographical (and social science, in general) research focuses on sport as a spectacle (i.e. sporting mega-events), and the ever-increasing commercialization and commodification of modern sport (Crang, 2009b). However, by studying South African physical education policy, I am able to explore sport at a more fundamental level (i.e. school-based sport). Of course there are neoliberal elements engrained into South African physical education policy (which I have discussed in Chapter 4), but I believe this research shows that there is also value in government’s providing children with accessible opportunities to enjoy their fundamental right to play (i.e. for no other reason than to play).

Third, this research can help inform other Global South nations looking to implement physical education into their school curriculums, given that physical education is almost entirely absent from this part of the world. Many nations of the Global South have been quick to embrace sporting mega-events as a strategy for development, but far fewer have demonstrated a similar commitment to sport at a more fundamental level in the form of physical education. Governments may be more eager to implement these kinds of sporting initiatives knowing that they can have positive effects on the citizens’ long-term health, happiness, and productivity, and ultimately boost the nation’s global competitiveness over time. This South African case study serves as an example that sport in schools a way of furthering the neoliberal agenda (i.e. creating
certain types of citizens), but my analysis also suggests that governments can work and take practical steps to maximize physical education’s role as a mass participation (rather than overly-competitive) initiative based on equity, accessibility, and inclusivity.

Fourth, this research highlights the importance of effective monitoring and evaluation criteria for physical education in South Africa. Even though children’s voices were not visible in policy documents about physical education, children are the main participants and beneficiaries of this policy programme because they get to engage in sport and play, and reap the benefits of their participation. What becomes important now is that this emphasis on children’s participation in South African physical education programmes does descend into mere “tokenism” or “decoration” (Hart, 1997 as cited in Skelton, 2007, p. 169). As this programme moves forward and becomes implemented nationwide, the government must be able to monitor and evaluate the degree to which children’s voices are being heard and their input being seriously considered and incorporated into physical education policy. Are children being permitted to play the games and sports they want to play? Are they having fun and enjoying themselves, or is competition taking over? Physical education in South African schools must be judged on its ability to integrate children into the democratic process, create spaces of fun and physical activity for youth, and transform sport and education in the country, rather than on whether or not this programme is producing top-tier athletes or successfully acting as a feeder system for higher levels of South African sport.

Fifth and finally, I imagine this thesis research as the first step toward (and major component of) a larger and longer research project about physical education in South Africa. As previously stated, discourse analysis of physical education documents was the first, requisite step in gaining of a sense of this policy initiative. I was able to develop a strong understanding
of who wrote the policies, who did not write the policies, why they wrote them, the context in which they were written, and so on. The next step would be to follow these policies as they are put into practice and implemented into all schools throughout South Africa. In this more comprehensive research project, I would be interested to observe this policy in action through ethnographic fieldwork, and explore questions such as: How are these programmes being monitored and evaluated? How do South African children respond (i.e. embrace or subvert, assert their agency) to the government’s neoliberal envisioning of physical education? Which actors (i.e. social justice groups, government agencies, NGOs) must come together in order to maximize the possibility for physical education in schools to result in the formation of ordinary South African cities? How are schools in rural areas implementing physical education? How does children’s everyday experience with physical education and sport in schools “make” the city?

5.4. Concluding Remarks

In the end, this project makes a unique contribution to geographical literature about sport because it puts scholars interested in sport and development in conversation with those concerned with urbanism, and it reveals the distinctive ways in which sport may play a role in the spatial and symbolic fashioning of cities. Furthermore, this research helps us further understand and clarify the difference between the “world” and the “ordinary” city through a more practical, rather than abstract, employment of these concepts. On one hand, sporting mega-events, like the FIFA World Cup, make world cities through the development of iconic buildings and infrastructure, and by elevating hosts on the global stage. In this approach, there is no opportunity for governments to craft any sort of alternative vision of the city, other than this universal, neoliberal (and limited) vision of the city as “world-class.” On the other hand, the
reintroduction of physical education offers such an opportunity for an alternative imagining of the city: the ordinary city, in all of its diversity, complexity, and creativity. While it is very neoliberal in its philosophy and approach, there is a certain germ of possibility and a glimmer of hope that, if carried out in such a way that maximizes its potential to achieve equity and produce opportunity, physical education may very well be a way of forging ordinary and equitable cities, where all children can enjoy their basic human right to play and have fun.
References


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Appendix
Practical Examples of Mega-Events as Speculative Urbanism

In this Appendix, I will provide various examples in which sporting mega-events can be understood as speculative world-making strategies. These practical examples illustrate that my argument about the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa as an instance of speculative urbanism is a sound one, given that I am able to further demonstrate it with a wide range of other mega-event cases, beyond the South African World Cup.

The 1984 Olympics were the first, and remain the only, Games in history that were funded solely by private investment. The chair of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC), Peter Ueberroth, raised large amounts of money by selling sponsorships to private corporations. These private backers engaged in speculation by investing large sums of money into Los Angeles’ risky world-making project, and ultimately, were able to seize a significant return on their investment. The LAOOC ended the Games with $225 million surplus, and generated approximately $9.6 billion in tourism revenue around Southern California, $145 million of which directed toward local governments (Andranovich et al., 2001, p. 125; MacCargar, 1985). Los Angeles’ successful Olympics “created the model for a successful entrepreneurial approach to hosting the Games that subsequent bid cities found

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16 Los Angeles agreed to host the 1984 Olympics, only on the condition that the city would not have to spend one cent of public funds on the event or incur any sort of financial obligation whatsoever. The IOC was left with no alternative but to accept LA’s condition, since no other city wanted to host the Games. That is, the 1976 Olympics left Montreal with a $2.8 billion debt (or, the equivalent of approximately $10 billion in 2009), and took the city three decades to pay off (Zimbalist, 2010, p. 9). At the time, Montreal fiasco scared many cities away from hosting the Olympics, as they feared incurring the same type of insurmountable debt; LA was the only city to step up and take on this challenge. Therefore, the Los Angeles Olympics represents a very high-risk investment, and speculative undertaking, for private backers and corporations.
extremely attractive” (Andranovich et al., 2001, p. 124). However, subsequent mega-event hosts have found it nearly impossible to replicate Los Angeles’ strategy and “procure the same proportion of private support” (Zimbalist, 2010, p. 10), and thus, have had to rely primarily upon public monies to fund sporting mega-events.

Most mega-event hosts commit billions of dollars of public funds to host these events (if they cannot procure private investment), and nearly as many end up incurring billions of dollars in debt, as well. For example, the 1992 Barcelona Olympics left the Spanish national government, as well as city and provincial governments, over $6 billion in debt, while the 1998 Nagano Olympics left various units of the Japanese government with an $11 billion debt. Meanwhile, Athens projected that the 2004 Olympics would cost $1.6 billion, but actually cost the Grecian government $16 billion, whilst Beijing estimated the 2008 Games would cost the Chinese government $1.6 billion as well, yet actually cost a spectacular $40 billion, the most money ever spent on an Olympic Games (Zimbalist, 2010, p. 10). Even cities that do not win the bids to host mega-events end up directing millions in public funds to world-making projects that never come to fruition: Cape Town, South Africa paid $26 million for their unsuccessful bid to host the 2004 Summer Olympics (Swart & Bob, 2004, p. 1314), while Chicago spent $100 million of public monies on its failed bid to host the 2016 Olympics (Smith, 2009, para. 9). The incredible amounts of debt that hosts (and failed bid nations/cities) are willing to absorb as a result of mega-events underpin the speculative nature of this world-making strategy. That is, nations and cities aspire to host these global spectacles, even if there is a very high likelihood that they will exceed their initial budgets, lose money and incur debt, and be forced to use public funds that may have been previously earmarked for other important social projects, such as those related to education or healthcare. Aspiring hosts undertake these risks all in the name of
potentially elevating themselves to world-class status through this speculative world-making project. So then, on what exactly are mega-event hosts spending billions of dollars in public funds?

A significant amount of hosts’ budgets is dedicated to transforming the built environment and brandishing host cities with distinctive markers of world-class status, such as state-of-the-art infrastructure (i.e. transportation, public transit, telecommunications), and iconic sports facilities. Mega-events hosts mobilize an aesthetic governmentality, in that they are primarily concerned with giving their cities “urban makeovers” (Short, 2008, p. 323), and making the urban landscape visually appealing to foreign tourists and international media. These visions of a visually appealing urban landscape are based on normative ideas of what cities should look like, and are not grounded in any sort of rational or statistical calculation (i.e. cost/benefit analysis). For example, Beijing spent almost $2 billion on building new athletic facilities for the 2008 Olympics, and in 1988, Seoul, South Korea expanded its airport, constructed three new subway lines, and cleaned up the polluted Han River prior to hosting the Games (Short, 2008, p. 330). Additionally, Barcelona (1992) transformed a decrepit industrial area into the Olympic Village and open public space, while Sydney (2000) cleaned and converted a contaminated wasteland into its Olympic Village (Chalkley & Essex, 2004 as cited in Sun & Ye, 2010).

However, many world-class facilities built specifically for these events are seldom used afterwards, yet take up valuable land that could have been used for other purposes, and are highly expensive to maintain. For instance, Sydney, Australia spends $30 million per year to operate the Olympic Stadium, while the Water Cube in Beijing is “severely underused,” and Turin (Italy, 2006 Winter Olympics) paid $108 million for a bobsled venue that cannot be
repurposed, and will likely never be used again (unless for a bobsled-specific event) (Zimbalist, 2010, p. 11). The underutilization of these mega-event venues illustrates the speculation inherent to the world-making process, as national governments and city officials may have provided their cities with iconic, visually stunning venues (i.e. the world-class aesthetic) that proved useful only for 2 to 6 weeks of mega-event competition. How are these venues beneficial to local communities or integrated into everyday life in the years following the mega-event?

Citizens and local communities must be able to utilize or repurpose these stadiums in the long-term, otherwise these facilities do nothing but require millions of dollars (usually in the form of government subsidies) in yearly maintenance fees (money that could likely be better spent), and take up valuable real estate that could have been used for other, more practical purposes, such as housing.

Perhaps even more troubling than the monetary and opportunity costs, such as financial debt and misuse of land, that mega-event hosts are willing to absorb as a result of this speculative world-making strategy, are the human costs. In Brazil, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics are looked upon as prime opportunities to solidify the country’s place in the first-tier of world-class nations. However, there are ongoing nationwide riots taking place in Brazil ahead of the World Cup. Many Brazilians have exhibited their severe displeasure and have engaged in sometimes-violent protests over the fact that as many as 170,000 people have been evicted from Brazilian favelas, so that the government can proceed with various “development” projects, like new roads, hotels, and venues (Romero, 2012, para. 15). Aesthetic governmentality manifests itself in Brazil’s mega-event preparation, as government attempts to build up the urban landscape in Brazilian host cities, and hide visible social problems, like poverty and squatter settlements, in order to project an aesthetically pleasing
image of this emerging nation. Again, this aesthetic ordering of Brazilian host cities is not based on surveys, assessments, or statistical data, but on a global imaginary of what a “world city” looks like. Additionally, private construction companies are engaging in real estate speculation by turning these impoverished areas into temporary facilities for the World Cup and Olympics (i.e. Athletes’ Village, media facilities, and accommodations), and then eventually repurposing them into “up-market residential [compounds]” (Watts, 2013, para. 12) for the Brazil upper-middle class, and a massive commercial centre that includes two to five Trump towers (Watts, 2013, para. 10). Here, the Brazilian government is engaging in speculative urbanism because it creates a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005 as cited in Goldman, 2011b, p. 556) in which the moral and legal rights of local Brazilians (i.e. living spaces, livelihoods) are disregarded in favour of aestheticizing Brazilian host cities with objective world-class markers, procuring private investment, and ultimately furthering Brazil’s world-making project.

This controversy surrounding the Brazilian World Cup and Olympics not only further demonstrates that mega-events are a speculative world-making strategy, but also suggests that there are significant reputational costs to hosting these global affairs. That is, Brazil is typically regarded as an emerging world power, and a model for economic growth and political stability. Yet, most news articles about the upcoming sporting mega-events in Brazil focus on the deleterious outcomes and violent exclusion of the Brazilian urban poor. As such, mega-event hosts are engaging in speculation by undertaking these risky world-making strategies, because there is no way to say for certain how they will be received or portrayed by the international media. Although hosting international sporting mega-events undoubtedly “[represents] an international showcase which can enhance a city’s global recognition, image and reputation” (Chalkley and Essex, 1998, p. 189), the media can also distort what they see and portray host
societies as unstable, poverty-stricken and “backwards” (Black & van der Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1209). Therefore, bad publicity and/or demonstrated incompetence can diminish, rather than enhance international standing, which is a risk inherent to this world-making strategy (van der Westhuizen & Swart, 2011). Like Brazil, India is also an emerging economic power, and one of its major cities, Delhi, recently hosted the 2010 Commonwealth Games. The Indian government viewed the Commonwealth Games as an opportunity for India to further legitimize itself as a serious economic player on the world stage, while the international business world regarded the event as a “management competency test” for the Indian government (Timmons, 2010, para. 3). However, the event will likely be remembered for the state’s abysmal planning, filthy accommodations for athletes (many of the top international athletes also withdrew from competition, citing reasons such as safety concerns, scheduling conflicts, and injuries), a tourist shooting, allegations of corruption, and an outbreak of dengue fever (Timmons, 2010).

It is important to note that in the case of India, not one of the 54 participating countries and 71 teams backed out of the India Commonwealth Games because of the fact that India “has become too important on the world stage” (Timmons, 2010, para. 8). Similarly, FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, predicts that despite the pre-tournament protests, “Brazil will deliver a great FIFA World Cup” (Leahy & Blitz, 2013, para. 3). India and Brazil are part of the BRIC grouping of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), in that they are classified as “emerging powers,” and “important players in the contemporary world economy” (Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3010). That said, had it been some other nation (or city) that suffered from the significant negative publicity as experienced by India and Brazil – perhaps a nation or city in its more infant stages of development or less recognized on the world stage, such as Pyeongchang, South Korea as host of the 2018 Winter Olympics, or Qatar as host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup – the results could
have been disastrous, in that its chances of successfully integrating into the global political economy and being elevated to world-class status would have likely suffered.

Ultimately, as the number nations and cities vying to host sporting mega-events increases, so too will the imperative to speculate, as well as the risks and opportunity costs involved (i.e. massive financial debt, underutilized facilities, displacement of citizens from their homes, negative publicity), especially for developing and emerging states and cities (Black & van der Westhuizen, 2004). Therefore, aspiring hosts must critically and logically evaluate their visions for the future in order to determine whether or not hosting a sporting mega-event is the most prudent way to achieve their short-term and long-term development goals, before engaging in such a speculative world-making strategy.