University of Toronto G8 Information Centre
G7/G8 Scholarly Publications and Papers

An Evaluation of the G8's Commitment
to the Kananaskis Pledges

Professor John Kirton, Director, G8 Research Group,
and Dr. Ella Kokotsis, Director of Analytical Studies, G8 Research Group

Discussion paper prepared for a meeting of the
Council on Foreign Relations G8 Africa Round Table
Washington, DC, February 4, 2004


Introduction
1. Promises Proudly Made: The G8 Africa Action Plan’s Commitments
2. Promises Poorly Kept: Compliance with the G8 Africa Action Plan’s Priority Commitments
3. New Promises Made: The Africa-Related Commitments at Evian 2003
4. New Promises Partly Kept: Compliance with Evian’s African Commitments
5. Conclusion: Prospects and Possibilities for Africa at the G8 in 2004 and 2005
References
Appendix A: Number of Leaders’-Directed G7/8 Africa Commitments, 1975–2003
Appendix B: G8 Summit Remit Mandates Related to Africa, 2002
Appendix C: Africa-Related G8 Institutions Created, Adjusted and Approved, 2002, 2003
Appendix D: Priority Commitments for Compliance Assessment, Kananaskis 2002
Appendix E: 2002 Kananaskis Interim Compliance Scores
Appendix F: 2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Scores
Appendix G: Priority Commitments for Compliance Assessment, Evian 2003
Appendix H: 2003 Evian Interim Compliance Scores
Appendix I: Compliance with Africa-Related Priority Commitments, 2002, 2003

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Introduction

The G8 Africa Action Plan (G8AAP), proudly proclaimed by the leaders of the world's major market democracies at their annual Group of Eight (G8) summit held at Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002, heralded an innovative and ambitious approach to transform the one region that the modernization of the past half century, and the rapid globalization of the previous decade, had largely left behind. With its 132 specific, concrete, future-oriented commitments, the Plan represented by far the greatest attention and collective commitment to Africa by the G8 since the inception of its annual summit at Rambouillet, France, in November 1975. The Plan was extraordinarily comprehensive and ambitious, for it included the traditional poverty reduction instruments of official development assistance (ODA) and debt relief, as well as important attention to trade liberalization, foreign direct investment (FDI), the confidence required for capital repatriation, good governance and conflict prevention (Kirton and Stefanova 2004). It was innovative, in its inclusion of support for a process of African-designed and -delivered peer review, in the G8’s first serious attention paid to gender, in its emphasis on eliminating deadly conflict and in encouraging good governance as the key to poverty reduction.

Perhaps more important, the G8AAP offered a potential breakthrough in its new spirit of equal partnership between the G8 and the new vanguard democracies of Africa itself. The Plan was not the top-down imposition of a G8-constructed initiative, but a bottom-up response — and an overwhelmingly supportive response — to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) brought to the same G8 leaders a year earlier at Genoa by the major, largely democratic leaders from Africa — Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The first four of those African leaders returned to Kananaskis a year later, to participate for the first time in G8 history as equals with the G8 leaders in a session on Africa, held on the Summit’s final day. As the Summit concluded, these African leaders and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan from Ghana pronounced from the mountaintops of Kananaskis that they were pleased with what the G8 and they together had done.

Has the G8AAP made any difference? In particular, has it made a difference of the sort that the democratic leaders of the G8 and Africa together desired when they constructed and combined their respective plans 18 months ago? To provide a comprehensive and authoritative answer to these questions, it would be necessary to undertake several component analytical tasks. The first would be to assess whether the African agenda chosen, the particular principles and norms affirmed, and the specific commitments made in the two plans and in their fusion constituted an appropriate strategy for securing the intended goals, and if these goals were what Africans themselves really wanted and needed. The second task would be to determine if, a year and a half after Kananaskis, the G8 leaders had complied with the spirit of the promises and the letter of the commitments they made in the Plan. The third would be to assess whether the G8’s African partners had lived up to their promises, which were necessary both to transmit and transform the promises at the Canadian mountaintop into real change on the African ground, and to ensure that the G8 had lived up to its promises, which were heavily conditional upon the Africans keeping theirs. The fourth task would be to assess whether other stakeholders in and outside Africa, including other countries, international organizations, political actors, civil society and the business community, had responded in the intended and in supportive ways. The fifth would be to evaluate whether the G8AAP at Kananaskis, as reinforced and adjusted by the G8 leaders at their Evian Summit in June 1–3, 2003, remained valid, in the light of new knowledge and changed conditions in the world today.

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This paper concentrates on the critical second stage of this process — examining whether the G8 countries have kept the specific commitments they made in their G8AAP at Kananaskis. It also considers part of the fifth stage, by assessing whether the G8’s commitments at Evian were supportive reinforcements, implementing extensions or appropriate adjustments of the Plan, and whether the relevant Evian commitments themselves had been complied with, by the time responsibility for chairing and hosting the G8 passed from the France to the United States on January 1, 2004. This narrow focus provides an essential foundation for the larger assessment task that is required. It is intended to assist the G8 and African leaders in monitoring whether the G8 is on track, and what lessons might be learned, as a basis for any mid-course corrections or additional action at forthcoming summits that should come. Because the G8AAP was so ambitious and wide ranging, and because the tasks of eliminating conflict, installing good governance and reducing poverty in Africa will take much longer than the 18 months since Kananaskis to achieve, it is arguably premature to focus too heavily at this time on the on-the-ground changes and the resulting outcomes in Africa itself. It is, nonetheless, timely to examine closely whether the G8 countries have at least begun to undertake the instrumental, implementing actions they so boldly and impressively committed themselves to in June 2002.

This paper thus begins, in Part 1, by exploring the collective, “decisional” commitments, contained in the Kananaskis Summit’s G8AAP, with some contextual consideration of the G8’s action in regard to Africa in earlier years, and to the commitments in NEPAD that the African leaders brought. Part 2 examines the compliance of G8 members with their priority commitments in the Plan, both at the six-month mark when the G8 chair passed from Canada to France and at the one-year mark when France’s 2003 Evian Summit began. Part 3 addresses the African-related commitments made at the Evian Summit and their relationship to those of Kananaskis the year before. Part 4 reviews the compliance record of the G8 with the Evian commitments, both overall and in regard to Africa itself. Part 5 offers some conclusions about what this record of G8 commitment and compliance might mean for the prospects and path of catalyzing useful action on and for Africa at — and after — the U.S.-hosted Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, on June 8–10, 2004.

This analysis concludes that the G8’s 2002 Kananaskis Summit, infused by the spirit of solidarity bred by the events of September 11, 2001, produced a uniquely high number of innovative and ambitious commitments to Africa. However, G8 members complied poorly with these Africa-related commitments during the following year, in part due to the distractions and divisions among the G8 arising from the war with Iraq in the spring of 2003. The 2003 Evian Summit made far fewer and far less ambitious commitments to Africa, although they remained substantial and reinforcing. Seven months later, G8 members were complying with their Evian commitments to a moderately high degree, in part because the divisions over Iraq had begun to fade. This re-emerging spirit of G8 unity, and the United States’s record of making and keeping Africa-related commitments at G8 summits, suggests there is value in trying to catalyze action on those parts of the G8 Africa Action Plan that are closest to the themes of security, prosperity and freedom that President George W. Bush has chosen as a focus for the G8 Summit he will host in June 2004.

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1. Promises Proudly Made: The G8 Africa Action Plan’s Commitments

The G8AAP constituted one of the four centrepiece achievements of the Canadian-hosted Kananaskis Summit of June 2002, and did much to make that summit an overall success (Kirton and Kokotsis 2003). The master grader of summits, Nicholas Bayne, awarded Kananaskis an overall grade of B+, one of the highest in summit history. The G8 Research Group, in its annual Performance Assessment, generally agreed. Kananaskis produced a total of 189 specific, concrete, future-oriented commitments, the highest in the first 28 years the annual summit had been held, and surpassed only by Evian the following year (see Appendix A).

A. The G8 Africa Action Plan Commitments

The importance of the G8AAP to the overall success of the Kananaskis Summit is seen in the first instance in the component of the G8 Research Group’s Performance Assessment. Here, of the nine issue areas evaluated, three issues received above-average grades: Africa at A–, ODA at B and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative at A. Universal primary education received a dismal D+.

A stronger sign of Africa’s importance comes from the high portion of commitments to the region. The G8AAP, unveiled on June 27, 2002, contained 132 commitments, or 70% of the 189 total. In addition, all three of the commitments in the leaders’ statement on HIPCs related to Africa. Of the 12 commitments in the Chair’s Summary, highlighting what the leaders themselves had discussed and cared about most, a full half related directly to Africa and its poverty reduction concerns.

B. Comparison with Past G8 Commitments on Africa

Taken together, as Appendix A shows, Africa accounted for 73% of the Kananaskis commitments. This was far higher than any other summit. At the same time, Africa has been a direct part of G8 leaders’ commitments at every summit since 1993, with the single exception of 1999. During this time, the G8 countries most committed to Africa as G8 hosts have been Canada (73% in 2002), Britain (22% in 1998) and the United States (9% in 1997).

More broadly, the issue area of north-south development, along with the issues of macroeconomic policy and international trade, has been a constant part of the agenda at every summit since the start in 1975. But never before Kananaskis had north-south development in general, and Africa in particular, been so central. The first summit at Rambouillet devoted only one of its 14 commitments to the subject, and that only to north-south dialogue. Versailles in 1982 had given it 3 of the 23 commitments, with a focus on the International Development Association (IDA), commodity arrangements and food. Paris 1989 — the first post–cold war summit — had given the subject only 3 of its 61 commitments, with the focus now on the highly indebted poorest of the poor. Lyon 1996 — the first “globalization” summit — had taken a great leap forward, assigning 20 of its 128 commitments to development, and a further three to the new subject of infectious disease. The violence-scarred 2001 Genoa Summit, which launched NEPAD and thus the G8AAP, devoted half (29) of its 58 commitments to north-south development, including the two in the G8 Genoa Plan for Africa.

Even against its immediate Genoa precursor, Kananaskis stood apart, raising the portion of commitments devoted to development from 50% to 73%, of a total that was more than three times as large. Kananaskis was the first summit after the September 11 terrorist attacks on America, and thus faced the need to focus on combating terrorism and weapons proliferation — a fact that made its attention to Africa all the more remarkable. If a highly thematically focused agenda is a cause of summit success and successful implementation, then Kananaskis was the most promising one of all time.

C. Comparison with the NEPAD Commitments

Another promising sign for the implementation of the G8AAP commitments was their strong commonality and convergence with those the African partners had placed in the NEPAD. This confluence was most evident in the overall architecture, where both plans gave a prominent place to conflict reduction and prevention, good governance, trade liberalization and FDI. One notable divergence came in regard to gender, which the G8 alone highlighted for the first time in its history. The G8 emphasized civil society participation, an issue on which NEPAD showed a lack of concern. A second divergence came in regard to spending on physical infrastructure, debt relief, trade access and environmental issues, which stood high on only the Africans’ list (Bayne 2003b).

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2. Promises Poorly Kept: Compliance with the G8 Africa Action Plan’s Priority Commitments

At the time the G8AAP was unveiled, there was a rich debate about the prospects of its timely, reliable implementation and eventual success (Fratianni, Savona and Kirton 2003, Doumbé-Billé 2003, Mbirimi 2003). Even the sympathetic critics pointed to design flaws and obstacles such as the lack of understanding and participation from many African countries and African civil society, the differing emphasis of the Plan with the NEPAD document and the apparent reservations on the part of African partners about a genuine process of African peer review (Bayne 2003a, 2003b, Maxwell and Christiansen 2002). Nonetheless, there were several “built-in” implementation mechanisms that promised considerable implementation success. In addition to the equal participation of the African leaders in the Kananaskis Summit, at the top of the list were the money mobilized, mandates remitted and institutions created.

A. The Built-in Implementation Mechanisms

The first promising built-in mechanism was the sheer amount of money mobilized to put the Kananaskis commitments into effect. As a G8 “fundraiser,” Kananaskis was a US$50 billion summit — the most successful by far in G8 history. Apart from the US$20 billion for the Global Partnership on Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, virtually all the rest was dedicated or available to support the G8 Africa Action Plan. The clearest component was the US$6 billion decision to devote “up to half” of the US$12 billion in new ODA pledges at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in March 2002 at Monterrey to Africa, if the Plan’s conditions were met. The second component was a new “up to” US$1 billion to top up the HIPC trust fund. The final item was the decision at the leadup G7/8 finance ministers meeting in Halifax to provide US$24 billion to fund the 13th replenishment of the IDA.

The second mechanism — remit mandates — saw Kananaskis make six specific commitments to return to a subject at the Summit the following year. This was the highest in G8 history, matched only by the Halifax Summit in 1995. Of the six remit mandates, four were directed at Africa. As Appendix B shows, these four mandates together asked for a report on HIPC from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), promised to deliver by 2003 a joint plan with African partners for peace support operations, pledged to “take the necessary steps to ensure the effective implementation of our [Africa] Action Plan,” and committed to review progress on implementation on the basis of a “final report from our Personal Representatives for Africa.”

The third mechanism was the number of G8 institutions created or instructed to help put the Plan into effect. Kananaskis had a record high of eight G8 institutions created, adjusted or approved. Yet illustrated in Appendix C, only two dealt with Africa. These were “to each establish enhanced partnerships with African countries whose performance reflects the NEPAD commitments” and to mandate “a task force of senior officials to consult with developing countries, relevant international organizations, and other stakeholders and suggest ways in which the G8 might best support the achievement of these goals.”

At Kananaskis, then, Africa received two thirds of the money mobilized and mandates remitted to the subsequent summit, but only a quarter of the directives for institutionalized activity. This latter lacuna was offset in part by the creation of a new forum for G8 ministers of development co-operation, which met for the first time in Windsor, Canada, in September 2002. That meeting produced 16 commitments that together very closely mapped the content and emphasis of the G8AAP. It was thus clear from the record of Canada’s year as host that Canada had sought to bind the G8 to Africa through the G8AAP more broadly as much as it could.

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B. The Interim Compliance Record

In G8 history, it is Canada — a member of both the Commonwealth and la Francophonie — that is viewed as the strongest consistent advocate for north-south development in general and for Africa in particular. Together with the unusually strong binding mechanisms from Kananaskis, there were thus high hopes that compliance with the Kananaskis G8AAP commitments — despite their far-reaching nature — would start to come plentifully and quickly, before Canada passed the G8 chair on to France on January 1, 2003.

At the halfway point of the annual summit compliance process, the 13 priority commitments of Kananaskis, detailed in Appendix D, had a compliance record at an overall level of +29%, as Appendix E shows. This record is measured on a scale where compliance equals +100% and no compliance, or actions that are the antithesis of the commitments, equals –100%.

The Africa-related priority commitments comprise 11 of the 13 (shown in bold) — all but those for arms control and terrorism. These average 20%, or slightly under this overall level. The September 11 effect was clear, outside the African agenda, in the +100% compliance level for terrorism and the 63% for arms control and disarmament. Even within the Africa-related category, conflict prevention at +60% led the list. However, all African-related priority commitments secured positive compliance, save for peer review (which could not be assessed until the Evian Summit took place), agricultural trade and sustainable agriculture, all at zero, and HIPC at –50%, because the promised US$1 billion was slow to flow from the G8 members to the international financial institutions.

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C. The Final Compliance Record

Five months later, as the French-hosted Evian Summit opened, compliance with the Kananaskis priority commitments had risen to only +34%. As Appendix F indicates, the 11 Africa-related priority commitments (shown in bold), at an average of +29%, were again just below the overall average. The pattern shows that the September 11 effect was still in force, if somewhat less compellingly than it had been, for while the unity on terrorism remained, the divisions over Iraq kept compliance on arms control and disarmament low.

By far the highest complier was Summit host Canada, with an interim score of 77% and a final of 85%. Britain came second, with an interim score of 42% and a final of 62%. The most improved was France, rising from an interim score of 38% to a final of 62% and a second-place tie with the UK. The cadence of both the Canadians and the French over the year suggests that hosting matters in inducing a country to increase its compliance level when it holds the G8 chair. The United States moved from an interim 25% and rank of fourth to a final 38%, still in fourth place. American compliance was particularly strong with the Africa-related priority commitments, even though its time as chair was still one year away. This evidence suggests that the G8 institution can autonomously bind the U.S. to comply with African commitments, even ambitious ones, produced at and by the G8 summit, or at least a summit hosted by its North American neighbour.

The final Kananaskis priority commitment compliance score of 34% is close to the 31% average for all economic and energy commitments made at the summit during its first 15 years (von Furstenberg and Daniels 1991, Li 2001). During this first period, across the 10 component issue areas, aid ranked fifth with a compliance level of 27%, well below the Kananaskis Africa compliance average of 34%. During the second period, from 1988 to 1995, U.S. and Canadian compliance with commitments in four issue areas broadly defined as sustainable development rose to 43% (Kokotsis 1999, Kokotsis and Daniels 1999). Among the four components, the issue area of developing country debt, with a 73% compliance level, came in at a much higher level than that for climate change and biodiversity, but below that level for assistance to the former Soviet Union. During the third period, from 1996 to 2001, overall compliance with priority commitments achieved an average of 42%. Commitments relating to Africa (development, debt of poorest/HIPC, education for all, health, conflict prevention, UN reform for development) averaged 45%. Both overall and in regard to Africa, compliance with the Kananaskis commitments was well below the summit norm from 1988 to 2001.

Although there is no previous evidence on the difference between interim and final compliance levels, as the year after Kananaskis moved from the halfway point to the final point, the rise from only 29% to 34% is consistent with two conjectures. The first is that the push from the last summit is stronger than the pull of the forthcoming summit in inducing members to comply. This is true even with the French decision to host a second meeting of G8 development co-operation ministers in the leadup to Evian. Taking place in Paris on April 24, 2003, that meeting generated nine commitments. While they, too, closely mapped the G8AAP’s content, they were well down from the 16 commitments produced by the Canadian-hosted ministerial in September 2002.

The second conjecture is that the distractions and divisions among the G8 over enforcement action in Iraq in the first half of 2003 took a toll on compliance within the G8. This conjecture is consistent with the effort made by G8 countries to assess their own African-related implementation progress, through the public release by each one of a national report on this subject on the eve of the Evian Summit, or at the Summit itself. Even these Iraq-bred divisions did not markedly deter the United States from keeping faith with the Kananaskis commitments where Africa was concerned.

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3. New Promises Made: The Africa-Related Commitments at Evian 2003

Despite the distractions and divisions bred by the war in Iraq, the 2003 Evian Summit proved to be a major success. That summit produced a new high of 206 commitments. A tight definition of north-south development suggests that 36 of these focused on development in Africa: 11 on famine in Africa, 9 on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, and 8 in the G8 leaders’ summary communiqué. A more comprehensive definition would add many commitments made in regard to corruption, trade liberalization through the Doha development agenda, water and sustainable development. Of the 16 commitments in the summary, half (eight) addressed African development: one on trade, two on Africa directly, three on health, one on an international finance facility and one on HIPC.

Evian’s commitments thus covered, and reinforced, much of the Kananaskis G8AAP and related African action. They paid less attention to conflict reduction and prevention, good governance as a whole, education and gender, but more to water, food security and corruption. Among the leaders themselves, attention to Africa suffered from the spontaneous interest in structural reform in continental Europe, the drama over the relationship between presidents George Bush and Jacques Chirac, and President Bush’s departure a day early to promote his peace plan in the Middle East. One clear casualty of this early departure was the Global Health Fund, which was discussed after President Bush had left. Without the President present to explain the details of his January 2003 US$15 billion dollar pledge for global health, including up to US$3 billion for the G8’s Global Health Fund, the other G8 leaders quickly concluded it was an initiative designed to fail, and that they thus had no need to pledge the matching funds needed to make it work.

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4. New Promises Partly Kept: Compliance with Evian’s African Commitments

The dramatic handshake between President Bush and President Chirac halfway through the Evian Summit paved the way not only for the flood of 206 commitments, but also for a robust level of compliance with them in the following seven months. Overall interim compliance with the 12 Evian priority commitments (see Appendix G) was 47%, as Appendix H shows; this was almost 60% higher than the year before.

Compliance with the four Africa-related priority commitments (trade, ODA, HIPC, HIV/AIDS) averaged 38%, or 9% below the overall average. By contrast, compliance with the eight non-African-related commitments averaged 52%.

Once again, the September 11 effect was evident, as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction each received 100%. Yet development and health each received 88%, a substantial rise from the previous year. Here too, debt scored low, at zero, although this too was a rise from a year before. Only trade, with a score of –25%, was lower than the year before.

Compliance by country showed a familiar cadence. The highest compliers across the 12 priority issue areas were Canada and the UK, tied for first with 58%. France (the host) and the U.S. (the next in the hosting rotation) tied for second place with an overall compliance score of 50%. This represented a substantial rise from their interim scores, if not rank, from the year before. Germany, Japan and Russia followed with a score of 42%, with Italy in last place at 33%. In most cases, compliance with both the overall and the Africa-related commitments was very similar, suggesting that in the G8, Africa is a mainstream problem rather than a world apart.

To some degree, the overall rise in interim compliance from the previous year reflects the reduced ambition of the Evian commitments and the absence of difficult issues such as peer review and good governance from the list. Yet even so, the dominant pattern is that both France and the U.S. have come together to comply at the same high levels, to a substantially greater degree than before.

This pattern again suggests the strength of the push from the last summit, even without a rapid development co-operation ministerial meeting to follow up. It further suggests that the Iraq war divisions have effectively ended, and that the U.S. will comply with French-incubated G8 commitments even more than Canadian ones.

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5. Conclusion: Prospects and Possibilities for Africa at the G8 in 2004 and 2005

Should the same ratio between interim and final compliance levels seen in 2002–03 recur in 2003–04 as the Sea Island Summit starts, final compliance with the Evian priority commitments will be an unusually high 70% overall, and close to the same high level in the Africa domain. This suggests that the Franco-American “war” over Iraq has indeed ended, and supports the unifying, binding force of the G8 summit even at the worst of times, when two of its founding countries are engaged in a bitter geopolitical dispute. It further suggests that even though at his Sea Island Summit President Bush currently intends to take a sabbatical on the African agenda of the past four years, there will not be a legacy or backlog of unkept promises to confront when British prime minister Tony Blair puts sustainable development in Africa as the primary or even exclusive focus for his summit in 2005. Moreover, the most recent compliance records of Russia and Germany, G8 hosts in 2006 and 2007, offer promise for the G8’s African agenda in the years beyond. It is therefore too soon to give up on the G8 as a forum for seriously addressing Africa’s concerns in ways that count.

It is easy for those outside America to assume that among the G8 members, only Canada, Britain and, perhaps, France really care about Africa, and that especially after September 11 and the 2003 war in Iraq, the United States has a very different agenda in the G8 and in the world. With this assumption, it is easy for G8 experts to see the advantages of allowing the United States to focus its 2004 G8 summit on security, prosperity and freedom, and leave the issues of development, sustainable development and Africa to Britain when it hosts in 2005. From this perspective, one should not lament the fact that the African Personal Representatives (APRs), who agreed at Kananaskis would give their final report at Evian in 2003, will not be coming to Sea Island in 2004. Rather, one can laud the fact that all G8 members agreed at Evian that the APRs would return for Britain’s summit in 2005. For the G8 to take a sabbatical from Africa on Sea Island seems to make sense.

Yet the evidence assembled in this paper suggests that the premise of an America that does not care about Africa is incorrect. Since 1975, the U.S. stands third among the G8 countries most committed to Africa as G8 hosts, after Canada (73% of all commitments in 2002) and Britain (22% in 1998); the U.S. had 9% in 1997. During the past two years, while Canada and Britain have led in compliance with overall and African-related commitments, the U.S. has come in the middle, rather than at the bottom. To be sure, the U.S. may very seldom lead on Africa or put it in first place on America’s agenda, although it did so in 1997 and in 2003 over a feared famine in southern Africa. Yet America will follow and allow itself to be bound by the overall commitments and by the African-related commitments created at the G8. This was true in the crusade against apartheid in South Africa from 1987 onward, and it was true in the G8 Africa Action Plan at Kananaskis. It is thus too soon to give up on the U.S., and U.S.-hosted summits, whether chaired by Republican or Democratic presidents, where Africa is concerned. Houston 1990 generated a commitment to support talks between the South African government and representatives of the black majority. Denver 1997 produced “Africa: Partnership for Development,” within which 13 commitments were contained.

When considering what the G8 might do “on” or “for” Africa, it is useful to recall that African-related commitments have secured reasonable levels of compliance in the most recent past. As Appendix I shows, the clear winners are ODA followed by education, good governance, conflict prevention, water, corruption and, most recently, health/AIDS. The clear loser is free trade. An examination of the African-related U.S. compliance record over the past two years suggests that the U.S., much like the G8 as a whole, has complied with commitments on ODA, followed by good governance and conflict prevention, and then education, growth and health.

At first glance, this would appear to be a poor fit with a Sea Island Summit agenda that focuses on security, prosperity and freedom, with prosperity referring to trade liberalization, and freedom referring to the democratization of the Middle East. In addition, binding action on ODA and health confronts an expressed desire by the U.S. administration not to have Sea Island produce commitments that would require new spending for their implementation.

However, it may be possible to adapt and extend the existing thematic trilogy to forward the African agenda, in ways that forward the G8 Africa Action Plan. In the field of trade liberalization, this suggests a focus on the development purposes of the Doha development agenda. One possibility is to produce, as a good-faith downpayment on Doha, a commitment to phased schedule of reduced G8 subsidies for those particular agricultural products that are most important to the export and economic prospects of the poorest African countries, and that currently cost the American and G8 treasuries the most.

A second possibility is to concentrate on the political agenda of conflict prevention, good governance and corruption and consider how they can be linked legitimately in an African context to the freedom and security themes. Here the task is to identify how the absence of freedom is a root cause of terrorism of global reach, and how timely preventive action to support democratization might be a useful and effective complement or alternative to more costly pre-emption. Here, a focus could be placed on priority action in regard to those African countries most involved in the past several years in breeding terrorist attacks on the U.S. and its allies, or in the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. One could also look in the first instance for support within Africa from Algeria and Egypt, which are important in the development and delivery of NEPAD as well as in the process of extending freedom in the Middle East.

A third, less ambitious possibility, is to secure commitments on Africa that consist of remit mandates and institutional activity taking place after America’s year as host. Here, one concept would be to explore the value of holding an early meeting of G8 ministers of development co-operation, and of foreign ministers, in each case with African counterparts most relevant to the issue at hand.

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References

Bayne, Nicholas (2003a), “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the G8’s Africa Action Plan: A Marshal Plan for Africa?” in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Challenges and Contributions (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 117–130.

Bayne, Nicholas (2003b), “Impressions of the Kananaskis Summit, 26–27 June 2002,” in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Challenges and Contributions (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 229–240.

Doumbé-Billé, Stéphane (2003), “Is African Development through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Synonymous with Sustainable Development?” in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Challenges and Contributions (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 141–153.

Fratianni, Michele, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds. (2003), Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Challenges and Contributions (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis (2003), “The G7/8 Contribution at Kananaskis and Beyond,” in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Challenges and Contributions (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 207–228.

Kirton, John and Radoslava Stefanova, eds. (2004), The G8, the United Nations and Conflict Prevention (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Kokotsis, Eleonore (1999), Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988–1995 (New York: Garland).

Kokotsis, Ella and Joseph Daniels (1999), “G8 Summits and Compliance,” in Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds., The G8’s Role in the New Millennium (Ashgate: Aldershot), pp. 75–94.

Li, Quan (2001), “Commitment Compliance in G7 Summit Macroeconomic Policy Coordination,” Political Research Quarterly 54 (June): 355–378.

Maxwell, Simon and Karin Christiansen (2002), “‘Negotiation as Simultaneous Equation’: Building a New Partnership with Africa,” International Affairs 78(3): 477–491.

Mbirimi, Ivan (2003), “Designing for Development in Africa: The Role of International Institutions,” in Michele Fratianni Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Challenges and Contributions (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 131–140.

von Furstenberg, George and Joseph Daniels (1991), “Policy Undertakings by the Seven ‘Summit’ Countries: Ascertaining the Degree of Compliance,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 35: 267–308, North Holland.

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Appendix A: Number of Leaders-Director G7/8 Africa Commitments, 1975–2003

Year

# of Africa-Related Commitments

Total Commitments

Percent Africa

1975

0

14

1976

0

7

1977

0

29

1978

0

35

1979

0

34

1980

0

55

1981

0

40

1982

0

23

1983

0

38

1984

0

31

1985

3

24

13%

1986

2

39

5%

1987

0

53

1988

0

27

1989

0

61

1990

1

78

1%

1991

2

53

4%

1992

0

41

1993

2

29

7%

1994

1

53

2%

1995

3

78

4%

1996

2

128

2%

1997

13

145

9%

1998

16

73

22%

1999

0

46

2000

1

105

1%

2001

2

58

3%

2002

136

187

73%

2003

14

206

7%

Notes: Data on Total Commitments collected from “G7/8 Summit Commitments, 1975–2002, Complete Data Set,” identified and compiled by John Kirton, Ella Kokotsis and Michael Malleson, March 27, 2003. Africa-Related Commitments consists of all commitment containing a direct reference to Africa, plus commitments listed in a section of the communiqué with Africa in the title, compiled by Janel Smith, January 27, 2004.

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Appendix B: G8 Summit Remit Mandates Related to Africa, 2002

Kananaskis 2002

“We will continue our dialogue with our African partners. At our next Summit, we will review progress on the implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from our Personal Representatives for Africa.” (Chair’s Summary)

“Noting the importance of commercial creditor participation, we agreed to ask the World Bank and IMF to prepare a comprehensive report on legal action brought against HIPCs by non-participating creditors, including by commercial creditors, and on options for HIPCs to obtain technical assistance to facilitate resolution of disputes.” (Statement by G7 Leaders: Delivering on the Promise of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative)

“We will take the necessary steps to ensure the effective implementation of our [Africa] Action Plan and will review progress at our next Summit based on a final report from our Personal Representatives for Africa.” (G8 Africa Action Plan)

“Continuing to work with African partners to deliver a joint plan, by 2003, for the development of African capability to undertake peace support operations, including at the regional level.” (G8 Africa Action Plan)

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Appendix C: Africa-Related G8 Institutions Created, Adjusted and Approved, 2002, 2003

2002: Kananaskis, Canada

Existing Institutions Adjusted

“We adopted the G8 Africa Action Plan as a framework for action in support of the NEPAD. We agreed to each establish enhanced partnerships with African countries whose performance reflects the NEPAD commitments.” (Chair’s Summary, June 27, 2002)

Existing Institutions Approved and Continued

“At the Genoa Summit in July 2001, we reaffirmed our commitment to help countries meet these goals, with a special emphasis on the achievement of universal primary education (UPE) and equal access for girls — two objectives that are also reflected in the International Development Goals contained in the 2000 Millennium Declaration. We mandated a task force of senior officials to consult with developing countries, relevant international organizations, and other stakeholders and suggest ways in which the G8 might best support the achievement of these goals. Their report is attached. We welcome and endorse their conclusions.” (A New Focus on Education for All, June 26, 2002)

2003: Evian-les-Bains, France

Existing Institutions Adjusted

“Our discussions with the Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, the Leaders of countries represented on the NEPAD Steering Committee, demonstrated our common will to contribute to the development of Africa. We endorsed the report prepared by our Africa Personal Representatives. We agreed to widen our dialogue to other African Leaders on NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan. We invite interested countries and relevant international institutions to appoint senior representatives to join this partnership. We will review progress on our Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report.” (Chair’s Summary, June 3, 2003)

Existing Institutions Approved and Continued

“At Kananaskis in 2002 the G8 adopted an Africa Action Plan (AAP) in response to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The G8 shares the fundamental objectives of NEPAD. The Africa Action Plan sets out how each of the G8 partners, together or individually, will enhance their engagement with African countries in support of NEPAD. The G8 agreed to review, at their next Summit, progress made in the implementation of the commitments they made in the Africa Action Plan. The following implementation report illustrates the thrust of the G8 response and outlines efforts for implementation in the next years.” (Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, June 1 2003)

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Appendix D: Priority Commitments for Compliance Assessment, Kananaskis 2002

1. Africa: Good Governance (2002: 31, G8 Africa Action Plan). We commit to expanding capacity-building programmes related to political governance in Africa, focusing on the NEPAD priority areas of: improving administrative and civil services, strengthening parliamentary oversight, promoting participatory decision-making, and judicial reform.

2. Africa: Peer Review (2002: 37, G8 Africa Action Plan). NEPAD maintains that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. We agree, and it has been our experience, that reliable institutions and governance are a precondition for long-term or large-scale private investment. The task of strengthening institutions and governance is thus both urgent and of paramount importance, and for this reason, we commit to:

Supporting African peer-review arrangements — including by:

• Encouraging cooperation with respect to peer-review practices, modalities and experiences between the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the ECA, including the participation by the ECA in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer-review process where the countries under review so agree;

• Encouraging, where appropriate, substantive information sharing between Africa and its partners with respect to items under peer-review; and,

• Supporting regional organizations in developing tools to facilitate peer-review processes.

3. Africa: Education (2002: 81, G8 Africa Action Plan). Supporting the development and implementation by African countries of national educational plans that reflect the Dakar goals on Education for All, and encouraging support for those plans, particularly universal primary education by the international community as an integral part of the national development strategies;

4. Development: HIPC Initiative (2002: 6, Chair’s Summary). We will fund our share of the shortfall in the HIPC initiative, recognizing that this shortfall will be up to US$1 billion.

5. Development: ODA (2002: 7, Chair’s Summary). Assuming strong African policy commitments, and given recent assistance trends, we believe in aggregate that half or more of our development assistance commitments announced at the Monterrey could be directed to African nations that govern justly, invest in their own people and promote economic freedom.

6. Arms Control and Disarmament (2002: 6, Statement by G8 on WMD). The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.

7. Conflict Prevention (2002: 19, G8 Africa Action Plan). Training African peace support forces including through the development of regional centres of excellence for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support, such as the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre.

8. Economic Growth: Agricultural Trade (2002: 57, G8 Africa Action Plan). Without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, applying our Doha commitment to comprehensive negotiations on agriculture aimed at substantial improvements in market access, reductions of all forms of export subsidies with a view to their being phased out, and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.

9. Economic Growth: Free Trade (2002: 58, G8 Africa Action Plan). We will work toward the objective of duty-free and quota-free access for all products originating from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), including African LDCs [Least Developed Countries], and, to this end, each examining how to facilitate the fuller and more effective use of existing market access arrangements.

10. Environment: Sustainable Agriculture (2002: 116, G8 Africa Action Plan). Supporting the development and the responsible use of tired and tested new technology, including biotechnology, in a safe manner and adapted to the African context, to increase crop production while protecting the environment through decreased usage of fragile land, water and agricultural chemicals.

11. Environment: Water (2002: 129, G8 Africa Action Plan). Supporting African efforts to promote the productive and environmentally sustainable development of water resources.

12. Fighting Terrorism (2002: 1, Chair’s Summary). We are committed to sustained and comprehensive actions to deny support or sanctuary to terrorists, to bring terrorists to justice, and to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks.

13. Transnational Crime and Corruption (2002: 45, G8 Africa Action Plan). Working to secure the early establishment of a UN Convention on Corruption, and the and the early ratification of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

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Appendix E: 2002 Kananaskis Interim Compliance Scores

 

CDA FRA GER ITA JAP RUS

UK

U.S.

Issue Average
Africa: Good Governance

+1

0

0

N/A

0

N/A

+1

+1

+0.50

Africa: Peer Review

0

0

0

0

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.00

Africa: Education

+1

0

0

0

0

0

+1

0

+0.25

Development: HIPC

0

0

0

–1

–1

–1

0

–1

-0.50

Development: ODA

+1

+1

0

0

0

0

+1

+1

+0.50

Arms Control/ Disarmament

+1

0

0

0

+1

+1

+1

+1

+0.63

Conflict Prevention

+1

+1

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

+1

+0.60

Agricultural Trade

+1

0

0

0

N/A

N/A

0

–1

0.00

Free Trade

+1

0

0

0

N/A

0

0

0

+0.14

Sustainable Agriculture

0

0

0

0

0

N/A

0

0

0.00

Environment: Water

+1

+1

0

N/A

0

N/A

+1

0

+0.50

Fighting Terrorism

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1.00

Transnational Crime/ Corruption

+1

+1

0

0

0

0

0

0

+0.25

Individual Country Average

+0.77

+0.38

+0.08

0.00

+0.10

+0.14

+0.50

+0.25

 

Overall Issue Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.30

Overall Country Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.28

Overall Compliance Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.29

Notes: The issue average is the average of all countries’ compliance scores for that issue. The country average is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. N/A indicates that no information on a country’s compliance score for a given issue area was available; no compliance score is awarded. Countries are excluded from the averages if the symbol “N/A” appears in the respective column.

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Appendix F: 2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Scores

CDA

FRA

GER

ITA

JAP

RUS

UK

U.S.

Issue Average

Africa: Good Governance

+1

+1

0

–1

0

–1

+1

+1

+0.25

Africa: Peer Review

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

Africa: Education

+1

+1

0

N/A

+1

–1

+1

+1

+0.63

Development: HIPC

+1

0

0

0

–1

–1

+1

0

0.0

Development: ODA

+1

+1

0

0

0

0

+1

+1

+0.50

Arms Control/ Disarmament

0

0

0

0

0

+1

0

+1

+0.25

Conflict Prevention

+1

+1

+1

–1

–1

0

+1

+1

+0.38

Agricultural Trade

+1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

+0.13

Free Trade

+1

0

0

0

–1

0

0

–1

-0.13

Sustainable Agriculture

+1

+1

0

0

+1

N/A

+1

0

+0.57

Environment: Water

+1

+1

0

N/A

+1

N/A

+1

0

+0.67

Fighting Terrorism

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1.00

Transnational Crime/ Corruption

+1

+1

0

0

0

0

0

0

+0.25

Individual Country Average

+0.85

+0.62

+0.15

–0.09

+0.08

–0.09

+0.62

+0.38

 

Overall Issue Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.35

Overall Country Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.32

Overall Compliance Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.34

Notes: The issue average is the average of all countries’ compliance scores for that issue. The country average is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. N/A indicates that no information on a country’s compliance score for a given issue area was available; no compliance score is awarded. Countries are excluded from the averages if the symbol “N/A” appears in the respective column.

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Appendix G: Priority Commitments for Compliance Assessment, Evian 2003

1. World Economy and Growth: 2003-5. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen investor confidence by improving corporate governance, enhancing market discipline and increasing transparency.

2. ICT: 2003-69. We will develop an implementation plan to achieve these objectives by next spring's Tokyo ministerial conference.

• We will develop close co-ordination of our respective global observation strategies for the next ten years; identify new observations to minimise data gaps.

• We will build on existing work to produce reliable data products on atmosphere, land, fresh water, oceans and ecosystems.

• We will Improve the world-wide reporting and archiving of these data and fill observational gaps of coverage in existing systems.

3. Trade (MTN): 2003-47. We are therefore committed to delivering on schedule, by the end of 2004, the goals set out in the Doha Development Agenda, and to ensuring that the Cancun Ministerial Conference in September takes all decisions necessary to help reach that goal.

4. Development (ODA): 2003-15. We welcomed the report of our Finance Ministers' discussions on our increased resources and on financing instruments. We invite them to report back to us in September on the issues raised by the financing instruments, including the proposal for a new International Finance Facility.

5. Debt (HIPC): 2003-16. We reaffirmed the objective of ensuring lasting debt sustainability in HIPC countries and noted that these countries will remain vulnerable to exogenous shocks, even after reaching completion point. In this context, we have asked our Finance Ministers to review by September mechanisms to encourage good governance and the methodology for calculating the amount of "topping-up" debt relief available to countries at completion point based on updated cost estimates.

6. Environment (Marine Environment): 2003-121. We commit to the ratification or acceding to and implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the overall legal framework for oceans.

7. Health (AIDS/Infectious Diseases): 2003-10. We agreed on measures to strengthen the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and other bilateral and multilateral efforts, notably through our active participation in the donors’ and supporters’ conference to be hosted in Paris this July.

8. Crime and Drugs (Terrorist Financing): 2003-36. We reaffirm our commitment to fight financial abuses and to encourage wider accession to and ratification of the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized` Crime so that money laundering, corruption and other relevant crimes are universally criminalized and that all countries have the power to identify, trace, freeze or seize and ultimately confiscate and dispose of assets from the proceeds of these crimes.

9. Terrorism (CTAG): 2003-150. The G8 will create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group, to focus on building political will, co-ordinating capacity building assistance where necessary. Other states, mainly donors, will be invited to join the group. A representative of the CTC will be invited to CTAG meetings. Representatives from relevant UN bodies, IFIs and other regional and functional organisations will be invited to relevant meetings (first meeting to be held by July 15).

10. Transport Security (MANPADS): 2003-168. Given the increasing number of Manpads in world-wide circulation, we commit ourselves to reducing their proliferation and call upon all countries to strengthen control of their Manpads stockpiles.

11. WMD: 2003-186. We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.

12. Energy: 2003-75. Participate in the International Conference on Renewable Energies, spring 2004 in Bonn.

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Appendix H: 2003 Evian Interim Compliance Scores

 

CDA

FRA

GER

ITA

JAP

RUS

UK

U.S.

Issue Average

World Economy/Growth

0

0

1

–1

0

0

0

1

0.13

ICT

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.00

Trade (MTN)

0

0

0

0

0

–1

0

–1

–0.25

Development (ODA)

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0.88

Debt (HIPC)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

Environment (Marine)

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0.38

Health (AIDS)

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0.88

Crime (Terrorist Finance)

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.25

Terrorism (CTAG)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.00

Transport Security

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0.38

WMD

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.00

Energy

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.00

Individual Country Average

0.58

0.50

0.42

0.33

0.42

0.42

0.58

0.50

 

Overall Issue Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.47

Overall Country Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.47

Overall Compliance Average

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+0.47

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Appendix I: Compliance with Africa-Related Priority Commitments, 2002, 2003

Commitment

2002 Interim

2002 Final

2003 Interim

ODA

+50

+50

+88

HIPC

–50

+25

00

Free Trade

+14

–13

–25

Good Governance

+50

+25

Peer Review

00

00

Education

+25

+63

Conflict Prevention

+60

+38

Agricultural Trade

00

+13

Sustainable Agriculture

00

+57

Water

+50

+57

Corruption

+25

+25

Health/AIDS

+88

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