NOTES

1. I would like to acknowledge the support and assistance offered during the preparation of this study by my colleagues at the Centre for International Studies, whose good spirits and collegiality made this project a rewarding and enjoyable experience. Special thanks to Claudia Diaz for her many hours of research assistance, her continuing emotional support, and her enduring good humour.


4. Norman Kogan has noted how a national Italian foreign policy based on a widespread political consensus emerged only in 1975, emphasizing Italy's place as a western, Atlanticist power. That consensus settled a longstanding debate in Italian foreign policy over whether Italy should pursue a European or a Mediterranean orientation in its approach to the outside world, a debate grounded in the North-South regional division within the Italian political economy. Kogan fails to note the third pillar of Italy's contemporary foreign policy, however, its membership in the Seven Power Summit, which complemented its western orientation in the mid-1970s and which has been strengthened further in the more recent re-emphasis of Italy's position as a Mediterranean power in Italian foreign policy. See Kogan's "Italy, the European Community, and the Alliances", *International Journal* 32 (Spring 1977): 272-87.


6. For a related discussion limited to Italy's approaches to the EEC and NATO, see Kogan, op. cit.

7. Unless otherwise specified, the chronological account presented here is a compilation of those found in Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Guido Garavoglia, "From Rambouillet to Williamsburg: A Historical Assessment" in Merlini, *Economic Summits and Western Decision-Making*, op. cit., 1-42; and David Watt, *Next Steps for Summitry* (New York: Priority Press, 1984). It also reflects the findings of a comprehensive survey of international media coverage of the various summits, specific items from which are cited when significant pieces of evidence are attributable exclusively to them. I also acknowledge with gratitude the important contribution made to my account of the history of the summit of my colleagues in the Summit Research Group of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto.


11. The power of these constraints were real, especially concerning terrorism in Italy. Prior to the summit, for example, a Turin court was unable to enlist enough jurors to try 57 alleged members of the famous "Red Brigade" (F. Lewis, op.cit.). And it was in the very next year that the kidnapping and ultimate killing of Aldo Moro, the worst high-level terrorist incident on record, would rock Italy and the world.


13. The expression, and the general discussion surrounding this issue, are borrowed from Putnam and Bayne, 110-118.

14. The effects of the Guadeloupe summit are summarized effectively in Putnam and Bayne, 102-8.


20. See Putnam and Bayne, 188-90.

21. See the communiqué and Putnam and Bayne, 203.


26. The indicators proposed for use by all parties to chart economic patterns in order to forecast inflationary or deflationary trends were: GNP, inflation, interest rates, unemployment, fiscal deficits, trade and current balances, money growth, foreign reserves and exchange rates.

27. Funabashi, 1988: 140-41

