DURAND OF ST.-POURÇAIN ON COGNITIVE ACTS: THEIR CAUSE, ONTOLOGICAL STATUS, AND INTENTIONAL CHARACTER

by

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The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology—theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought—during the High Middle Ages (1250–1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today—intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception—were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand’s cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period.

Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to
which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought.

This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us ‘forms’. On Durand’s view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new ‘form’. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand’s causal theory of content against salient objections to it.
DEDICATION

Wooster, family, and friends.
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INTRODUCTION

Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages (1250–1350) subscribed to, in one form or another, what has come to be known as the conformality theory of content, according to which the contents of our mental states are fixed primarily owing to the fact that such mental states either are or at least involve ‘forms’ in the mind.¹ This theory can be cashed out in a variety of different ways, but the basic idea is that my thought is about cats rather than dogs because it either is or at least involves the ‘form’ of cats rather than dogs. Durand of St.-Pourçain (†1334) rejects this thesis without reserve, and one of the primary aims of this dissertation is to show both why he came to be dissatisfied with the conformality theory and what he replaces it with.

Called the Doctor Modernus and the Doctor Resolutissimus, Durand was viewed as an important thinker by subsequent generations of philosophers, and as a controversial figure during his own day.² William Courtenay claims that Durand was “one of the most frequently cited Dominicans of the century” (Schools and Scholars, 182), and Leen Spruit notes that Durand held “a surprisingly high position in the philosophical firmament of those days” (Species Intelligibilis I, 281).³ A Durandian chair was eventually established

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² Elizabeth Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain (London: Routledge, 2003), 72: “But his titles Doctor resolutissimus and Doctor modernus are perhaps more indicative of his personality than of his metaphysics. Indeed, Durandus’s contemporaries remarked upon his clear thinking, tenacious memory and eloquence but recognized his impatience with doctrines which conflicted with his own.” She goes on to (mis)quote the following passage from Iacobus Quétif and Iacobus Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, 2 vols. (Paris, 1719–21), vol. 1, f. 586b: “Vir fuit ingenii praestantia clarus, omni scientiarum genere excultus, tenacio memoriae, facili praeditus eloquio, quo mire ac feliciter mentis conceptus exprimebat: Sed qui tantis dotibus fretus, priuatis suis sensis nimum adhaesit. Vnde relicta quam in scholis imiberat S. Thomae doctrina, hoc fraeno coercreni non patiens, genio se totum permisit suo.”

³ To cite but one example, on April 29, 1400, Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, wrote a letter from Bruges recommending the works of Durand to his younger associates at the College of Navarre. Oeuvres Complètes (ed. P. Glorieux), vol. 2, letter “Iucundum est...” 30–5: “Iuuant quasiones Doctorum super Sententias et praeertim illorum qui purius et solidius conscriberunt, inter quales meo iudicio dominius Altissiodorensis, Bonaventura, et Durandus utique resolutissimus numerandi uidendi.”
at Salamanca in the 15th century, and the views of, as Leibniz calls him, “le celebre Durand”, especially in the domain of philosophy of mind, were a favorite topic of discussion well into the early modern period. Durand defended distinctive claims in this domain. His theses were a direct challenge to the Aristotelian synthesis in cognitive psychology exemplified in the writings of his more famous confrere Thomas Aquinas, and intended as such. Indeed, he rejected almost every entity thought necessary by Thomas Aquinas in order to explain the mind.

Durand was a highly critical thinker and often blunt in his assessment of others’ views. His philosophical method is largely negative: he establishes his own position only after the careful destruction of the alternatives, based upon their internal incoherence and, quite often, appeals to experience and parsimony—but never based upon appeal to authority. Indeed, Durand writes:

However, the way we should talk and write about other matters, which do not touch upon matters of faith, is to depend upon reason and not the authority of any given doctor, no matter how famous or solemn, and to pay little attention to all human authority when, through reason, the truth reveals the contrary.

(\textit{Sent. C Prol. n. 12})^{7}

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5. \textit{Essais de Théodicée} I.27. Leibniz declares that Durand was a party unto himself (“qui faisoit assez souvent bande à part”). See \textit{Essais de Théodicée} II.330 and III.361, 381.

6. Between 1508 and 1594 the third redaction of Durand’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s \textit{Sentences} was reprinted no less than fifteen times. Durand’s views concerning cognitive psychology were discussed by \textit{inter alia} John Capreolus, Peter Crockaert, Francisco Suárez, Francisco Toletus, Thomas de Vio (a.k.a. Cajetan), John of St. Thomas, Thomas Compton, Peter Hurtado de Mendoza, Raphaele Aversa, Emanuel de Goes, Agostino Nifo, and Gassendi. For more on Durand’s legacy in the 15th and 16th centuries, see the references in Serge-Thomas Bonino, “Quelques réactions thomistes à la critique de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourçain,” \textit{RT} 97 (1997): 99–128, Leen Spruit, \textit{Species Intelligibilis II: From Perceptions to Knowledge. Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy}, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 49 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), and Müller, \textit{Die Lehre vom verbum mentis}.

7. See also ibid., “[…] omnis homo dimittens rationem propter autoritatem humanam incidunt in insipientiam bestialem ut comparatus sit iumentis insipientibus et similis factus sit illis.” See also \textit{Sent. C Prol.q. 1 n. 6} : “[…] quia naturalis philosophia non est scire quid Aristoteles uel alii philosophi
As a result of both his doctrines and, no doubt, his attitude and personality, Durand’s writings found immediate censure—twice—by his own Dominican order, and Durand’s views were frequently cited by his contemporaries usually in order to refute them.

Durand himself operated during a period of intense philosophical investigation into the mind. As a student, he was in Paris when John Duns Scotus was in Paris refining his famous distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition. Duns Scotus together

\[3\text{senserunt, sed quid habeat ueritas rerum. Vnde ubi deuiat mens Aristotelis a ueritate rerum, non est scientia scire quid Aristoteles sensorit sed potius error.}^{8}\]


9. On cognitive psychology issues alone, see, e.g., Peter Auriol, e.g., *Sent. I 35.1*, Peter of Palude, e.g., *Sent. II 3* (whose *Sentences* contains an almost verbatim copy of either Durand’s first redaction or second redaction), Hervaeus Natalis, e.g., *Quodl. III 8* and *Quodl. II 8*, Nicholas Medensis, e.g., *Evid. I 4* and *II 8–12*, Gregory of Rimini, e.g., *Sent. II 7.2–3*, Henry of Lübeck, e.g., *Quodl. I 23*, and Thomas Wylton, e.g., Quaestio “Quod in intellectu...”. Russell Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect,” in *PDP*, ed. Stephen Brown, T. Kobusch, and T. Dewender, STGM 102 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2009), 433–464 and Thomas Jeschke, *Deus ut tentus vel usus. Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320)* (Leuven: E.J. Brill, 2011) discuss some of the contemporary reaction to Durand’s views on, respectively, his thesis that the intellect can have but one act at a given time and his thesis that a reflexive act and a direct act aren’t distinct.


with Durand’s erstwhile teacher, Hervaeus Natalis, can be credited with establishing the psychological notion of intentional existence, or, as Franz Brentano called it, intentional inexistence. This is also the period of William of Ockham, famous, of course, as one of the earliest advocates of the language of thought hypothesis, a theory that anticipates certain contemporary theories of the mind such as Jerry Fodor’s.

579–99, and Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 285–311. In Duns Scotus see Ord. I 1.1.2 nn. 35–36, Lect. II 3.2.2 n. 285, Quodl. 13 n. 8, and Quaest. Meta. VII.15 n. 18. It is interesting to note that H. Mansel, who collected William Hamilton’s notes on Thomas Reid, writes: “To the above anticipations of Kant’s doctrine may be added that furnished by the scholastic distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, some account of which has been given by Sir W. Hamilton. The definition of Durandus [. . . ] nearly resembles one of those above quoted from Kant.” The reference is to Sent. C Prol. q. 3, which, in fact, is simply Durand’s way of putting Duns Scotus’s distinction! Sent. C Prol. q. 3 n. 7: “[. . . ] distinguunt duplicem cognitionem, scilicet abstractiuam et intuitiuam. Vocant cognitionem intuituiam illam suam immediate tendit ad rem sibi praesentem objectue secundum eius actualen existentiam, sicut cum uideo colorum existentem in pariete vel rosam quam in manu teneo; abstractiuam autem uocant omnem cognitionem suam habetur de re non sic realiter praesente in ratione objecti immediate cogniti.” The passages from Kant that H. Mansel has in mind are Logik §1—his translation: “All Representations relative to an object are either Intuitions or Conceptions. The Intuition is an individual representation (repraesentatio singularis); the Conception is an universal or reflected representation (repraesentatio per notas communes, repraesentatio discursiva). The Conception is opposed to the Intuition, for it is an universal representation, or a representation of that which is common to a plurality of objects; therefore a representation in so far as it can be contained in several things.”—and Kritik der reinen Vernunft §11 (1799 edition, 377) where Kant defines Intuition as a representation “which is related immediately to an object” and Conception as related to objects “mediately”, i.e., by means of Intuitions. See William Hamilton, The Works of Thomas Reid (Edinburgh-London: Maclachlan-Stewart-and-Co. / Longman-Brown-Green-and-Longmans, 1863), 987.


13. See Claude Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. Spade (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 53–75 and Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2004). Towards the end of his career, Durand was chosen as the head of the commission established to investigate his works for signs of heresy. See Auguste Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam, censurés en Avignon, en 1326,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 18 (1922): 240–70, Josef Koch, “Neue Aktensticke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Proess,” in Bormann, Kleine Schriften, 275–366, C. Brampton, “Personalities at the Process against Ockham at Avignon, 1324–26,” Franciscan Studies 26 (1966): 4–25. C. Brampton notes, incidentally, that Durand used his status as chair to omit the fatal word ‘haereticum’ from the first report; and in any case, he was a dissenting voice on several articles. There have been a few suggestions of an influence of Durand on Ockham,
In the present dissertation, I intend to limit myself to three issues. Put as questions, these are: (1) What are the causes of mental acts—acts of seeing, hearing, thinking and so on—and what sort of cause are they? (2) What sorts of items are mental acts? (3) And what explains the aboutness, content, or intentional character of mental acts? I will tend to focus on what we would nowadays call perceptions—mental acts directed at or about sensible features of the world—although I will sometimes address other forms of cognition. I choose to focus on perception because it is in some ways a less complicated form of cognition, thus allowing us to acquire a clearer grasp of what is distinctive about Durand’s views; I choose these three issues because, I think, Durand’s answers to these questions constitute the most distinctive and to my mind the most interesting aspects of his philosophy of mind.

The primary thesis which I pursue is that Durand defends what we would nowadays call a causal theory of content, according to which the contents of our mental states are fixed by the causes of those mental states. My thought about cats, say, is about cats rather than dogs because it was caused somehow by cats rather than dogs. This is a controversial interpretation, indeed a controversial theory. It is less of an issue, however, that Durand defends a theory of content which is very different from the theory of content that most of his contemporaries defended, namely, the conformality theory of content, although little indication of an influence in the other direction. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel uisus, ch. 5, §7 does an expert job in tracing Durand’s views on the nature of a so-called ‘reflexive act’ and fruitio to Ockham across la Manche. Girard Etzkorn, “Ockham at Avignon: His Response to Critics,” Franciscan Studies 59 (2001): 9–19 argues that Ockham’s Quodl. V was written by Ockham while at Avignon as a kind of reply to his critics. Walter Chatton, famous of course for his interaction with Ockham, cites Durand by name in Rep. I 4.1. And, of course, Ockham would have read Peter Auriol’s works or at least some of them—he seems to have left a blank page in Ord. 127 dedicated to the chance when he might get his hands on more of Auriol’s works (Brampton, “Personalities at the Process against Ockham at Avignon, 1324–26”); and Auriol’s works contain quite a number of references to Durand. Part of the issue here is that we’ve lost (thanks to certain happenings in England vis-à-vis their monasteries) many a witness to what the English Dominicans were up to during this period. For some discussion on the mysterious English Dominicans, see Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority, 61 and Hester Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310–1340, STGM 81 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2004), 32–46, 57–71.
according to which the contents of our mental states are fixed not primarily by their causes but owing to the fact that such mental states either are or at least involve the ‘forms’ of other things. Durand rejects this thesis and there is little doubt about this. What I aim to show in the present dissertation is that he replaces it with a causal theory of content.

One reason this might seem to be a controversial interpretation is because Durand is famous not just as one of the earliest to abandon the so-called doctrine of species (forms) and the conformity theory of content associated with it, but he also rejected a doctrine which I will call AFFECTIONISM. What is affectionism? Sir William Hamilton, the 19th-century editor of Thomas Reid, writes:

Durandus, I may notice, seems to deny, like Reid, […] absolutely and without reserve, the affection of sense by the agency of the object. He requires only the mutual approximation of the sense and its object; and then ensues the sensitive perception, simply because the one is capable of perceiving, the other capable of being perceived. […] This doctrine is only correct if limited to the primary qualities; but it is a nearer approximation to the truth than, before Reid, was accomplished by any modern philosopher. (The Works of Thomas Reid, 958b)

Affectionism, then, is the doctrine that perception (at least) is a matter of the affection of the senses by the agency of the object. To say that the senses are affected by the agency of the object is to say at least that those objects are in some sense causes of perceptive states. Durand rejects this doctrine. But it would seem that if Durand is to endorse the causal theory of content then he must endorse affectionism, for, at least under ordinary circumstances, the cause of my perceptive act is the object. It is the lemon that causes me to see it and the fire which makes me feel its heat. Hence, if perception is not a matter

14. However, it has been misunderstood, and in Chapter 4 and in the first section of Chapter 5, I aim to rectify these misunderstandings.
of the affection of the senses by the agency of the object, then, well, how can Durand possibly defend the thesis that the content of a perceptive state is fixed by its cause?

This is the problem that the opening chapters of the present dissertation address. As a first approximation of the argument I will pursue, Durand, as I interpret him, does, indeed, reject affectionism. However, he does not reject the doctrine that the object is the cause of a perceptive state. Durand establishes and defends a distinction between efficient causes and what he calls *sine qua non* causes. To say that X is an efficient cause of Y is to say something *more* than that X is a *sine qua non* cause of Y. Very roughly, the relation of *sine qua non* causality, as Durand explains it, is what we would nowadays consider a *counterfactual dependency* relation.\(^{15}\) To say that X is the *sine qua non* cause of Y means that were X to occur, Y would occur, and were X not to occur, Y would not occur. By contrast, the relation of efficient causality is counterfactual dependency *plus something more*. More precisely, an efficient cause induces or impresses a ‘form’. The stove efficiently causes the water in the kettle to boil, and this means that it induces or impresses the ‘form’ of heat upon the water in the kettle. The heat in the water doesn’t simply counterfactually depend upon the heat in the element on my stove.\(^{16}\) Now, Durand doesn’t reject the notion of efficient causality; he would, for instance, accept this analysis of the heating of the kettle. He, however, holds that it is inappropriate to characterize the objects of our perceptive states as efficient causes of those states; rather such objects are mere *sine qua non* causes. Our perceptive states counterfactually depend upon the presence of their objects. Affectionists, by contrast, hold that our perceptive states counterfactually depend upon the presence of their objects.


and something more, namely, that when object is present to the senses, it also affects the senses and so induces or impresses somehow its ‘form’ upon the senses. It is this doctrine, then, that Durand rejects and not the doctrine that objects are the causes of our perceptive states.

In Chapter 1, I will sketch, briefly, what motivates Durand to reject affectionism. In Chapter 2, I will take up the affectionist doctrine as defended by Durand’s older contemporary at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfrey maintains an extreme form of affectionism: the object of all our mental states is the efficient cause of those states, or, in other words, any form of cognition (not just perception) is the affection of the relevant mental faculties by the agency of the object. As it turns out, Godfrey develops a celebrated argument against the thesis that the object is not the efficient cause but a mere sine qua non cause. Hence, his position offers a challenge to Durand’s position, a challenge, I argue in Chapter 3, Durand meets. Along the way, in the second section of Chapter 2, I address an alternative form of affectionism: self-affectionism. On this view, as defended in one form by John Duns Scotus, the object is a sine qua non cause and the mind the efficient cause, impressing upon itself the ‘form’. John Duns Scotus limits this analysis to a certain sort of mental act, namely acts of the will, but some people extended this analysis further, to include all mental acts, even perceptions. Durand, by contrast, rejects affectionism tout court. Mental acts just ain’t (or at least just ain’t gotta involve) ‘forms’ added to and so in the mind, at least not so far as their causation is concerned.

In the second part of the dissertation, I turn to the issue of the content of our mental states. In Chapter 4, I take up Durand’s refutation of the conformality theory of content, according to which the content of a mental state is to be fixed by appeal to a ‘form’ in the

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17. In what follows, I will use the term ‘cognition’ to mean the most general form of one sort of mental activity, e.g., thoughts, visions, auditions, in short: apprehensive acts. A cognition is to be contrasted with another form of mental activity: appetitive acts, e.g., acts of sensory desire and intellective desire. All cognitions are mental processes but not all mental processes are cognitions. For some discussion of the term ‘cognition’, see Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: CUP, 1993).
mind, focusing primarily on his refutation of Thomas Aquinas’s version of the theory. In Chapter 5, I take up Durand’s positive theory of content. I mentioned above that the causal theory of content is itself a controversial theory. While the general form of the causal theory of content has been a popular theory in the last fifty years, it has its problems. For instance, if the content of all mental states are fixed by their causes, then how is Durand to explain mental states that are about items that do not, indeed cannot, be causes? I can think about St. Nicholas and a baby to be born on the 4th of July, after all. These, and other such problems, plague Durand’s account as well, and I put forward and defend the thesis that Durand’s causal theory of content is not as naive as it might at first seem.

**Method**

I attempt to present Durand’s position in the context of the late 13th- and early 14th-century scholasticism, a rich and vibrant period which hardly requires justification. I will discuss *inter alia* Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, John Duns Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, Nicholas Medensis (*a.k.a.* Durandellus), Peter Auriol, James of Viterbo, and William of Ockham. I will also, inasmuch as they discuss Durand’s view, look at late medieval and early modern scholastic thinkers, such as John Capreolus, Francisco Suárez, and Thomas de Vio (*a.k.a.* Cajetan). I will also on occasion allude to contemporary discussions which parallel the medieval debate, usually with the aim of illuminating the latter by means of the former, although sometimes the other way around. It is my view that knowledge of the contemporary debate can inform our knowledge of the medieval debate and vice versa, especially in the domain of philosophy of mind, where the questions aren’t so much how does the brain work but how does the mind and the mental fit into our picture of the natural world.

While Durand was viewed as a celebrated thinker well into the early modern period, he, unfortunately, never received a revival in the 19th and early 20th centuries in the way that, say, Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus did, or, more recently, William of Ockham and Henry of Ghent. Hence, the texts I have worked with are, with a few exceptions, not to be found in critical editions. Indeed, most of the first and second redaction of his *Sentences* commentary remain in manuscripts; and his third redaction in various early modern printed editions, rife with typographical errors and homeoteleutons. As a result, I have tried to, in cases where meaning is at stake, consult the manuscript witnesses, and I also provide the Latin in the footnotes when not otherwise available in the form of a critical edition. I include in the bio-bibliography at the end of this present dissertation a discussion of the *status quaestionis* on Durand’s texts, and what I hope will be an useful summary of extant manuscripts and critical editions. Translations and transcriptions are my own, unless otherwise indicated, and I have freely modified the Latin orthography and punctuation.

I will tend to focus on Durand’s earliest views and not his later views. There is a complicated and interesting story to be told about the development of Durand’s position, a story which, no doubt, will be easier to tell once we have critical editions to all three versions of his *Sentences* commentary. In brief, however, as a bachelor, Durand lectured on the *Sentences* sometime in the first decade of the 14th century, and these lectures, either in the form of students’ notes or more likely a copy of his own lecture notes—Durand tells us they were “snatched away from me by certain *curiosi* before I had completed my corrections”—received an immediate and negative reaction from his

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20. For more precise dates, see the *status quaestionis* in the bio-bibliography at the end of the present dissertation.

21. f. 432rb: “Scripta super quattuor Sententiarum libros iuuenis inchoauit, sed senex compleui, siquiudem quod in primis dictaueram et scripseram fuit a quibusdam curiosis mihi subreptum antequam fuisset per me sufficienter correctum, propter quod hoc opus solum quod per omnes libros incipit […] tamquam per me editum et correctum approbo.” On the term ‘*curiosi*’ see Josef Koch, *Durandus de S.*
Dominican confreres, primarily Hervaeus Natalis. (It is this version of his work that is censured twice.) In it, Durand makes some of his most interesting and, as a result, most patently anti-Thomist claims on a whole host of issues, cognitive psychology included. Since one’s lectures on the *Sentences* were, in many ways, the analogue of a dissertation, Durand, thus, at some point produced a second version, which must have been finished before 1312 when he received his degree and became *regens actu magister* at Paris. This version often omits controversial claims and in general toes a more Thomist line. This version also is much less interesting as a result. Once Durand had received his degree, he continued to be harassed by clutch members of his order—notably, Hervaeus Natalis. Two committees were established with the purpose of drawing up a list of Durand’s theses which were either false, heretical, or at least against brother Thomas (1314 and 1316/17 respectively). Yet around 1313, the pope at the time invited Durand to take up the position at Avignon of *lector sacri palacii*, a position which provided Durand with something of a safe haven against the (so to speak) Thomist sycophantism exemplified by Hervaeus Natalis and others in the Dominican order. (Thomas, it should be noted, was canonized in 1323; and Hervaeus was a key player in this process.) Indeed, Durand seems to have, if finding foe among his Dominican confreres, found friend among the upper echelons of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, where he was shuffled from one bishopric to another. It is during this period that Durand produced a third and final version of his *Sentences*. This is the version which we can find in at least fifteen printings from 1508 to

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22. Hervaeus was too sick to attend the ceremony (July 18, 1323), yet lived to know about it—he died in Narbonne on August 8 of that year. On this episode, see Agustin de Guimarães, “Hervé Noël (†1323). Étude biographique,” *AFP* 8 (1938): 75–6. Hervaeus, I should note, did not always adopt or even endorse the positions of the Angelic Doctor: he rejects the real distinction between *esse* and *essentia* to name one obvious case. For more points of difference, see Russell Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330,” in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Chris Schabel, 2 vols., Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition 7 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2007), 432–3.

23. As a twist to this story, Pope John XXII, who without doubt saved Durand from his own order, asked Durand, towards the end of his life, to comment on a treatise the pope had written concerning the beatific vision. Durand, it should come as little surprise, finding the treatise absurd, didn’t hesitate to tell the pope as much, and so, at the very end of his career Durand found yet another of his works
1594. In this version, Durand returns to quite a few of the positions he had omitted from his second version; and while he still retains many of his distinctive theses in cognitive psychology—he rejects *species* and the agent intellect, for instance—he remains silent on what, I think, is his most interesting innovation, namely, his claim that the cause of our mental acts is a mere *sine qua non* cause. Whether or not this is due to a change of mind, or simply a change of dialectical context, is unclear, and further research, this present dissertation included, as well as the publication of critical editions to all three redactions of his *Sentences*, should allow us to eventually answer this question.

**Status Quaestionis**

In 1927, Josef Koch produced the first volume in a proposed two-volume study on Durand of St.-Pourçain. In it he covers a massive amount of terrain on the transmission and authentication of the available manuscripts. The second volume, which never appeared, was intended to be a study focusing on Durand’s philosophy, and in the intervening four score and five years, there has been no attempt at a systematic investigation into Durand’s philosophical doctrines. By contrast, Durand’s theology has received quite a bit of scholarly attention, and, while various purely philosophical topics have been singled out before a committee to be looked into for signs of heresy, Durand was nothing if not an independent thinker, which no doubt justifies the apocryphal epitaph on his tombstone: “*Durus Durandus jacet hic sub marmore duro, An sit salvandus, ego nescio, nec quoque curo.*” For more on Durand’s life, see the references in the bio-bibliography provided at the end of the present dissertation.


out in the secondary literature,\textsuperscript{26} including some very recent work on Durand’s cognitive psychology or philosophy of mind.\textsuperscript{27} Durand’s views on a whole host of philosophical topics, from metaphysics on up to epistemology, which, to be sure, are as coherent and rich as the views of, e.g., William of Ockham, John Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas, still remain largely unevaluated.


Part I

Causation and Cognition
1  **Affectionism and its discontents**

Let us stipulate that the object alone moves the intellect—which never entered my head nor will enter it, so I believe—such that the intellect is only passive. *Ponamus quod obiectum solum moueat intellectum, quod nunquam intrauit caput meum, nec intrabit ut credo, ita quod intellectus solum sit passiuus.*

Durand of St.-Pourçain, *QLA* 1 459

It just seems ever so obvious that we are affected by the world: when I place my hand next to the fire, it becomes hot and when I plunge it into the ice water, it becomes cold. What goes for physical changes also goes for at least some mental changes: when I place my hand next to fire, I feel its heat. It seems ever so obvious, in other words, that perception is a matter of being affected by the perceptible object. It might, of course, be up to me to open my eyes or place my hand next to the fire, and, of course, in quite a few cases present perceptible objects don’t cause perceptive acts, e.g., while asleep, distracted, and so on, but once a perceptive act does occur, under ordinary

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1. This qualification and henceforth assumed is important and in making it I am attempting to bracket out a number of phenomena. For instance, there is a Daniel Simons’s by now famous gorilla and the basketball court case, meant to support the notion of inattentional and change blindness (2010). In the present context, such a case might make it absurd to claim that when the perceptible object is present I can’t help but perceive it. Such qualifications are meant to bracket such cases: when a perceptive act does occur of the obvious sort, e.g., when I do perceive the Gorilla, then it would be absurd to deny that the Gorilla somehow affected me such that I perceived it. For an interesting discussion of Thomas Aquinas and the phenomena of blindsight and agnosia, see Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2003), ch. 8. For an interesting discussion of Francisco Suárez and selective attention, see Cees Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought,” in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 237–63.
circumstances, its ultimate cause does seem to have to have been the perceptible object.\textsuperscript{2} Of course, perception does involve certain neurological events in the brain and some forms of perception will involve the firings of rods and cones in the eye and other physiological changes in the body, but the ultimate cause of the perceptive act, at least in ordinary situations, is, indeed, has to be, the perceptible object. As we go about the world, we acquire information about the world from the world, and this is a matter of the affection of our senses by the items in the world. Who would ever wish to deny such an ever so evident doctrine?\textsuperscript{3}

Yet, Durand does, or at least he seems to. Sir William Hamilton writes, as a result, and with some praise, that “Durandus, I may notice, seems to deny, like Reid, […] absolutely and without reserve, the affection of sense by the agency of the object” (The Works of Thomas Reid, 958b). Jean-Luc Solère writes that, for Durand, “the object of the senses or of the intellect cannot be the cause of the senses’ feelings or the intellect’s understandings” (“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”) and Russell Friedman notes that, for Durand, “material objects cannot affect the soul, neither through the senses nor through the intellect” (“Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourçain on Intellectual Cognition”). Indeed, Durand declares that “sensing and thinking are not in us from the objects as efficient causes” (Sent. II-A 3.5 17) and he holds it as absurd to suppose that sensible qualities, through which sense objects purportedly affect our senses, might be able to do just that.\textsuperscript{4} Such statements make it certainly look as if Durand rejects the ever so evident doctrine that, at least under ordinary circumstances, perceptible objects are the causes of our perceptive acts.

\textsuperscript{2} The qualification ‘under ordinary circumstances’ is meant to bracket unordinary circumstances, e.g., divine and demonic intervention, illusions and so forth. I’ll deal with these issues in passing throughout.


\textsuperscript{4} See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 13 quoted below fn. 44.
One of the primary theses which this dissertation aims to establish is that Durand
does not reject this thesis, but rather he rejects a nearby thesis—call it Affectionism—
that perception is a matter of being affected by perceptible objects, where this is taken to
mean that perception is a kind of change wherein the percipient acquires or receives the
‘form’ of the object. According to most philosophers in the High Middle ages, perception
is a change more or less like other sorts of physical changes, and all physical changes
involve, in one way or another, the production and reception of ‘form’. When the stove
makes the kettle hot, it produces in it the ‘form’ of heat which the kettle receives. So
too when the stove makes me feel its heat: it somehow produces in me the ‘form’ of
heat. Of course, there are disanalogies: when I see the red wall, I don’t become red, but
I do, all the same, come to acquire the ‘form’ of red. Indeed, all intentional mental acts,
according to most philosophers in the High Middle Ages, are a matter of reception of
the ‘form’ of the object of those acts owing either in whole or in part to the agency of
the object.\footnote{5} Now, Durand does not deny the thesis that when the stove makes the kettle
hot it gives to it the ‘form’ of heat. Nor does he deny the thesis that when I place my
hand on the stove it becomes hot, that is, it receives the ‘form’ of heat from the stove.
What he denies is that the same sort of analysis applies to perception. On Durand’s
view, a perceptible object is a \textit{sine qua non} cause and not an \textit{efficient} cause,\footnote{6} and what
this means, at least, is that the object causes a perceptive act even though it does not affect the senses. More precisely, I will argue, what this means is that perception does not involve, as an essential component, the reception of a ‘form’ of the object owing to the object as cause. The distinction between a sine qua non cause and an efficient cause is a subtle one, of course, but it is more than a mere fuss about the names. In the present chapter, I will look at Durand’s refutation of two positions which defend, in one form or another, affectionism. In §1, I will look at how he understands such positions, and in §2 I will look at the sorts of worries he raises against them. This should allow us to understand what it is, precisely, that Durand rejects when he rejects the doctrine of affectionism.

1.1 Varieties of Affectionism

Durand addresses the question “How is it that, in us, acts of thinking, seeing hearing, and so forth come about?” in the first article of his treatise on cognition, contained in the first redaction of book two of his commentary on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* (*Sent. II-A 3.5*). As typical, before presenting his own answer to this question, he attacks certain contemporary opinions. More precisely, he attacks two affectionist theories. The first theory maintains that extramental objects are the efficient causes not of perceptive acts themselves but of certain ‘forms’ or ‘species’ in the senses in virtue of the reception of which perceptive acts, then, come about. The second theory maintains that these objects are the efficient causes of the perceptive acts themselves, conceived of as ‘forms’ or ‘species’. Both theories subscribe to the affectionist dogma, the thesis that perception is a matter of the affection of the senses by the agency of the object. Indeed, the starting point of both theories is Aristotle’s *dictum* that perception is a kind of being affected.

7. I would like to thank Russell Friedman for providing me with the incredibly hard to find second edition of Joseph Koch’s critical edition to *Sent. II-A 3.5*. 
(quodammodo pati),\(^8\) and this means, at least, that such mental acts involve the reception of a ‘form’ or ‘species’ caused at least in part and at least ultimately by the object itself.

1.1.1 The first opinion: the species theory

We can call the first opinion the species-theory of cognition, although in the present context we might want to call it the species-theory of the causation of cognitive acts, for it is a theory which, like the second opinion and Durand’s own ultimate opinion, attempts to explain how it is that an episode of cognition comes to be. (I will, however, continue to call it the species-theory of cognition and sometimes even STC for this takes up less space, and, in any case, this is what it is called in the literature.)

It is important to distinguish between a theory about the causation of cognition from a theory about the content of cognition. Indeed, part of the reason Durand separates his treatise on cognition into two articles is because he wishes to separate these two issues. In the first article he enquires into what the cause of a mental act is and what sort of cause it is, and in the second article he enquires into what fixes the content of a mental act and whether or not a species, conceived of as a representation of some sort of the object, is necessary.\(^9\) This is both an obvious and an important distinction to draw. It is important, for it avoids an immediate confusion which usually surrounds the species.\(^10\)

A species, at least according to people like Thomas Aquinas, is characterized as that by which (id quo) the mind thinks, sees, hears, and so on whatever it is it thinks, hears,

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9. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 23: “Per quid autem praesentetur sensibile sensui et intelligibile intellectui, utrum per speciem vel per aliquid aliud, non dicetur modo, quia alias per intentionem agetur de hoc. Sed hoc tantum ex dictis habeatur, quod species non requiritur ut eliciens actum per se, sed solum, ut repraesentans obiectum, si tamen umquam requiritur.” Sent. II-A 3.5 24: “Species autem nullo modo requiritur ad actum intelligendi, nisi solum ut repraesentans obiectum[. . .]. Ergo solum in hoc sensu tractabitur, utrum essentia angelic sit ei ratio repraesentans omnia quae intelligit uel aliqua ei repraesententur per species.” In his third redaction—Durand omits the question entirely in his second redaction—he only discusses this latter question and so omits the text that we find in Sent. II-A 3.5 up to page 24. I discuss Durand’s refutation of species as representations in Chapter 4 and the first section of Chapter 5.

10. In what follows, I italicize ‘species’ to distinguish this technical term from logical species, i.e., species as opposed to genus. This, of course, isn’t the usual confusion.
sees, and so on.\footnote{See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *ST* I.85.2: “[…] the intelligible *species* is related to the intellect as that by which the intellect thinks.” For some discussion, see Robert Pasnau, “Id Quo Cognoscimus,” in *Theories of Perception from Antiquity to Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 6 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 131–50. See also Chapter 4 and the references therein.} This way of putting things is ambiguous about the role of the *species*: a *species* might be taken to be that in virtue of which the mental act is about whatever it is about (i.e., it is that in virtue of which the content of the mental act is fixed) or a *species* might be taken to be that in virtue of which (at least in part) a mental act comes about.\footnote{Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 5, many authors exploited this ambiguity in their defense of the conformality theory of content, for the *species* is both a ‘form’ ultimately produced somehow by the object and also a likeness (*similitudo*) of that object. Aquinas, I should note, clearly recognizes these two functions of the *species*. See, e.g., *QDV* X.4: “Omnis cognitio est secundum aliquam formam quae est in cognoscente principium cognitionis. Forma autem huiusmodi dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente, alio modo secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cuius est similitudo. Secundum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscentem actu cognoscere, sed secundum respectum secundum determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum.” This text is quoted in Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition*, 105–6, who remarks, ibid., 113: “[…] Aquinas distinguishes between two functions of intentional species: their role in bringing about a cognition in the agent, and their role in making that cognition have a certain content.” See also *Sent.* IV 49.2.1 obj. 8, *ST* I.55.1, 56.1, 75.5, 85.2.} The distinction is obvious because the question “What makes me think?” is not the same as the question “What makes me think about whatever it is that I think about?” The elements which go into our answer to the first question need not be the same as those that go into our answer to the second question.\footnote{Indeed, as Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis I: From Perceptions to Knowledge. Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions*, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 48 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 283 demonstrates, Durand’s criticism of *species* seems to have been an important impetus behind the later distinction between the effective/causative/virtual representation and the formal representation. See, e.g., Peter Crockaert, *In DA* (discussed by ibid., ch. 5.2.7) III.1.5. Rodrigo Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus* (qtd. in Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis II*, 330) f. 712v: “[…] species, quae non est formalis et expressa obiecti imago et repraesentatio, sed tantum virtualis, non potest per seipsam formaliter determinare, sed concurrendo efficerent ad cognitionem.” Raphaele Aversa, *Philosophia metaphysicam physicamque* (discussed in ibid., 324) f. 820a. Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria in De anima* (discussed in ibid., 298–9) ff. 304–6.}

According to Durand, the *species*-theory of cognition holds that

thinking (*intelligere*) is an action of the intellect informed with the *species* of the intelligible thing really distinct from both. The *species*-informed intellect is related to the [action of] thinking just as hot water is to the action of making a hand or foot hot. Indeed, just as water, which in itself isn’t hot,
can’t actually make a hand or foot hot unless it first receives into itself heat, so too our possible intellect can’t think unless it first is actualized through the *species* of the intelligible thing. And just as heat received in water is for it the reason it actively makes something else hot (*ratio calefaciendi alterum actiue*), so too the *species* of the intelligible thing is for our intellect the reason it actively elicits the act of thinking (*ratio eliciendi actum intelligendi actiue*). Nor is there any difference between the two cases except this: the act of making something else hot is an act that passes into outside matter and the act of thinking is not. (*Sent.* II-A 3.5 8–9)

Durand seems to have either Thomas Aquinas or Hervaeus Natalis (or both) in mind as the primary proponent(s) of this position, although it was a common enough view.  

I should note that I won’t fuss too much on the issue of whether or not Durand gets their views right. In any case, on this view, as Durand presents it, Aristotle’s *dictum* that

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15. Aquinas lays out his doctrine of *species* in *ST* I.84–85. Aquinas’s theory of *species* has been, of course, extensively studied. However, most of the secondary literature has focused on his view that the *species* is somehow a representation (*similitudo*) of the object, with little interest in the thesis that the *species* is somehow an item that goes into the causation of a cognitive act. On this aspect of the *species* doctrine, see Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis I*, ch. 2.3, Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas’s Account of the Mechanisms of Intellecitive Cognition,” *Revue internationale de philosophie* 52 (1998): 287–307, Stump, *Aquinas*, ch. 8, John O’Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 175–82 and Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition*, chs. 3.4 and 4. Hervaeus’s theory of *species* has, by contrast, received hardly any attention at all, which is a shame least of all because he seems to have changed his mind on certain aspects of the doctrine between *Quodl.* II and *Quodl.* III. See here Francis Kelley, “Some Observations on the ‘Fictum’ Theory in Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis,” *Franciscan Studies* 38 (1978): 260–282, Prospero Stella, “La prima critica di Hervaeus Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: II De intellectu et specie del cosiddetto *De quatuor materiis*,” *Salesianum* 21 (1959): 125–70, and Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis I*, ch. 4.1.3.
thinking is a kind of being affected (intelligere est pati) shouldn’t be taken to mean that thinking is entirely an affection but rather that, ‘concomitant’ with an affection, namely, the reception of the species, there is also an action.

They tell us that the Philosopher’s dictum from De anima II—that thinking is being affected—is true but not essentially (essentialiter) but concomitantly (concomitatiue), since we don’t think unless beforehand we come to receive the species of the intelligible thing. (ibid., 9: “Dictum autem Philosophi 2 De anima, quod intelligere est pati, exponunt quod hoc uerum est non essentialiter, sed concomitatiue, quia non intelligeremus, nisi prius recepta specie rei intelligibilis.”)

What ‘concomitant’ seems to mean here isn’t what it looks to mean, for on this view the reception of the species is in some sense prior to the act. However, I take it the point is that at the same time and always when one receives the species one elicits the act, even though the reception is conceptually prior to the elicitation.

What goes for the intellect also goes for the senses, a point Durand makes a little further on in the text, inferring that “if the species in the intellect is the principle by which the intellect elicits in an active way its operation of thinking, then, by the same token, the species in the sense is the principle by which the sense elicits in an active way its operation of sensing” (ibid., 11). Now, one could accuse Durand of misinterpretation here, for he moves a little too fast from the intellect to the senses. As Robert Pasnau, among others, has pointed out, for Aquinas at least, whereas the intellect is only partially passive, the senses are entirely passive. One might be right in making this charge, but,

16. The passage continues: “quae receptio est passio large dicta.” See also ibid., 13 (which is Durand’s presentation of the second opinion): “Igitur in intellectu non fit species praeter ipsum intelligere, quod est ab obiecto effectiue, et est quoddam pati, non solum concomitatiue, ut primi dicunt, sed essentialiter[...].” On the continuation: The reception of a species is broadly speaking a reception of form for a couple of reasons. First of all, when the mind receives the ‘form’ of heat it doesn’t become hot, unlike the kettle. Second: usually when X receives a form, it loses some form which it already had—when the kettle receives heat it loses the form of cold which it had. But when the senses or intellect receive the form of cat, there is no form lost. See below.
17. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 128–129. See, e.g., Quodl. VIII.2 a. 1. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition,
as we’ll see, it won’t matter one wit as to Durand’s general objections, for were one to hold that the senses are entirely passive, then, at least in regards to this aspect of the theory, one would be committed to the view which the second opinion puts forward. In either case, what is clear is this much: at least part of what cognition involves is the affection of the cognitive faculty by the agency of the object, and what this seems to mean is that, at least, the object, either in whole or in part, gives to that faculty a ‘form’, called a ‘species’.

But let’s suppose Durand is right about his inference from intellect to sense. Suppose, then, that all forms of cognitive change involve two elements: the reception of a species and the elicitation of the act. What is the precise causal role of the species? Species are said to be both really distinct from mental acts and also that by which mental faculties (e.g., intellect and senses) elicit their mental acts, and so this would seem to place a kind of constraint on how we interpret their causal role. While there are quite a number of interpretations afoot as to what an individual author might have taken their causal role to be, I think, in the present context, we should understand species to be a causal precondition for mental acts, and even more precisely, as kinds of (acquired) dispositions which allow our mental faculties to elicit their mental acts. In scholastic terms, a species is, as Durand understands it, the active principle by which (principium actium quo) a given cognitive faculty elicits in an active way its mental act much as heat is the active principle by which the stove elicits its act of making some other item hot.18 In any case, cognition at this stage [i.e., intellectual cognition] does have an active component. But here, as at every other level of human cognition, the process’s distinctively cognitive feature is the reception of forms from without. […] This is not of course the whole story. It is only the initial reception of information that is entirely passive at the level of sensation and partly passive at the level of intellect.”

See also the references in footnote 54 below.

18. A lively debate has sprung up around Aquinas on this issue. R. Pasnau (Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 127, 190) declares that, for Aquinas at least, the species is the agent cause of the perceptive act. But this can’t be right since a species is that by which the agent elicits the cognitive act. Another interpretation, pursued by, e.g., O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn, 175–182, is that the species is the formal cause of the cognitive act, and he does so in part because he wishes to downplay the real distinction between species and acts. Indeed, he writes (176): “[…] I hold that the species is the form of the act of understanding and thus cannot be some thing in addition to it.” But this too can’t be right since a species is supposed to be really distinct from the cognitive act. On this last point—that
Chapter 1. Affectionism and its discontents

Case, what is important in the present context is this: perception, according to such a view, necessarily involves an affection—the reception of form—owing to the agency of the object as the ultimate (efficient) cause.

Species are really distinct from acts—see Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, 28–9. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition*, 204, fn. 18 and, in Aquinas, e.g., *QDP VIII*: “Differt autem [sc. conceptio -PJH] a specie intelligibili, nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus[...].” See also *SCG* I.53 and *Quodl.* V.2. For a recent balanced assessment, see Stump, *Aquinas*, ch. 8. My own interpretation is inspired by Hervaeus Natalis. See, e.g., *Sent.* II.3.4.1 (*H*) ff. 212b–3a (emph. mine): “Primum est uidere quam habitudinem (habitudinem beatitudinem ! *H*) importat haec praeposito ‘per’ quando quaeritur utrum angelus intelligat per speciem. [...] Quantum ad primum, ergo, sciendum, quod ‘per’ dicit habitudinem aliquis causae communiter, siue aliquid aliud dicat, siue non. Quattuor sunt causae per quas, siue propter quas potest aliquid esse tale uel tale, sicut: <1> Aqua est calida, sicut per causam subjectivam et actum, per potentiam receptuam caloris; <2> sicut per causam efficientem, <aqua> est calida, per ignem calefacientem; <3> sicut per formam, per calorem ipsum; <4> sicut per finem, siue propter finem, propter cionem uel lodationem uel aliquid tale. Et sic etiam quando quaeritur per quid intelligit angelus, potest quaeri <1> per quid sicut per principium passuum et susceptiblem in quo recipiatur talis actus intelligendi, et sic non est dubium quin sit illud per quod angelus intelligit, quia est sua potentia intellectuam, in qua sicut in subjecto recipitur suus actus intelligendi. Similiter si fiat quaesitio <4> de causa finali, non est dubium [...]. Si autem quaeritur per quid intelligit, <3> quid sc. illud quod facit ipsum formaliter et denominat intelligentem, etiam facile est uidere, quia hoc est actus intelligendi et nihil aliud, sicut etiam sola albedo facit album formaliter, ita solus actus intelligendi facit intelligentem formaliter. Si autem quaeratur per quid, <4> sicut per principium actuum quo agens agit, angelus intelligat, sic intelligit quaestio, quando quaeritur, utrum angelus intelligat per speciem, sicut per principium actuum per quod angelus faciat se intelligentem in actu. Quod autem aliquando dicitur, quod species est principium formale quo intelligens intelligit, si bene intelligatur, non est contra praemissa. Ad eunm evidentiam sciedandum est, quod efficere respicit duo, unum ut agens, et aliud ut formam quaee est principium agendi. Quando, ergo, dicitur quod species est principium formale intelligendi, sensus est, quod species non est principium effectuum, quod est suppossitum agens, sed quod est principium effectuum, quod est forma agentis. Non autem est sensus, quod species formaliter denominet intelligentem esse intelligentem, uel faciat formaliter intelligentem, sicut albedo formaliter facit esse album. Sensus, ergo, quaestionis est, utrum angelus intelligit per speciem, sicut per principium effectuum intelligendi.” See also *DIS* 143–4. “Quantum uero ad causalitatem, sciedendum quod species illa non est causa formalis actus intelligendi; nec est illud quo formaliter intelligens est intelligens; licet sit forma aliqua ipsius intelligentis; immo solo actu intelligendi est formaliter intelligens; sed per speciem intelligit intelligens sicut per principium effectuum sicut etiam grae descendens est formaliter graue sola grauitate et formaliter descendens solo descensu.” This interpretation, I think, is also the one that Richard Cross, “The Mental Word in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries,” in *The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and Psychology: Acts of the 13th International Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Kyoto, 27 September - 1 October 2005*, ed. T. Shimizu and C. Burnett, *Rencontres de philosophie médiévale* 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 300 is putting forward: “[T]he species is a causal disposition (a habit or principle), not an object of cognition. Talk about the intellect being ‘made actual’ is just a way of claiming that the intellect with a species has thereby a dispositional belief or cognition that enables it to have an occurrent belief or cognition about something: the occurrent cognition can be thought of as the disposition actualized.”
1.1.2 The second opinion: Godfrey of Fontaines’ theory

The second opinion which Durand considers is precisely Godfrey of Fontaines’ position as found in *Quodl.* IX.19. On Godfrey’s view, as Durand correctly interprets him, the object is the efficient cause of the mental act itself (be it a perceptive act of the senses or a thought). Cognition—even intellectual cognition—is not also an action elicited by the *species*-informed cognitive faculty but simply the affection of that faculty by the agency of the object. Hence, Godfrey too—and perhaps more obviously—subscribes to affectionism, for on his view cognition is a matter of being affected by the agency of the object, where this means that it involves the reception of the ‘form’ or ‘*species*’ of the object. It is important to stress here that although Godfrey rejects the idea that,

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Durand, *Sent.* II-A 3.5 12: “quae tamen species non est essentialiter ipsa sensatio aliqua quae esset in medio et in organo uirtute sensitiua corrupta.”

Godfrey, *Quodl.* IX.19 274: “quae etiam non est essentialiter sensatio aliqua quae esset in medio et etiam in organo uirtute sensitiua corrupta.”

As well, Durand’s own positive position (pages 17–23) bears a close resemblance to the first opinion which Godfrey considers on pages 270–1, as has been pointed out in the literature. See, e.g., Solère, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject.” I discuss this resemblance in Chapter 3, §3.1.5. Godfrey’s academic career ends roughly the same time Durand’s begins. For Godfrey’s biographical details, see Maurice de Wulf, *Un théologien-philosophe du XIIIe siècle. Étude sur la vie, les oeuvres et l’influence de Godefroy de Fontaines* (Brussels: M. Hayez, 1904), Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines,* and John Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century,” in 1277, ed. Jan Aertsen, A. Speer, and K. Emery, Jr, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 359–89.


21. Ibid., 13: “igitur in intellectu non fit species praeter ipsum intelligere, quod est ab obiecto effectiue, et est quoddam pati, non solum concomitatiue, ut primi dicunt, sed essentialiter[].” See also ibid., 14: “[…] intelligere est pati secundum rem.” In Godfrey, see, e.g., *Quodl.* IX.19 276: “[…] obiectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et mouentis[…].” *Quodl.* XIII.3 193: “[…] actus potentiarum animae […] non sunt effectiue a potentia animae in qua sunt sed potius ab obiecto.” *Quodl.* IX.19 276: “[…] et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passiui et receptiui.” Ibid., 280: “[…] iulu quod hoc nerbo [sc. intelligere -PJH] signifiucatur est uere passio intellectus possibilis et sic uere in ipso subiectiue.”
during cognition, the object (efficiently) causes a *species* distinct from the act in virtue of the reception of which the mind then elicits its mental act he still maintains that the act itself should be viewed as a kind of ‘form’ and can even be called a *species*.\(^{22}\)

It will also be important to observe, this early on, that Durand and Godfrey don’t reject at least one form of the doctrine of *species*, for both Durand and Godfrey admit that there exist, both in the ambient medium and also in our bodies, various *species* owing to the agency of the object. The air is affected and so comes to receive the ‘form’ of the object (called a *species in medio*) because, for one thing, action at a distance is impossible.\(^{23}\) As to our bodies, no one would deny the obvious fact that my hand becomes hot when I place it next to the fire. Hence, fire acts upon the hand and makes it hot just as it does the water. Such a form Durand and Godfrey call a *species in organo*.\(^{24}\) While

\(^{22}\) Godfrey, *Quodl.* IX.19 275: “Et quia huismodi condiciones conueniunt formae et speciei, ipsum intelligere etiam potest dici species sive forma. Etsi intelligere non consistit in receptione alterius speciei a se ipso realiter differentis, consistit tamen in receptione speciei pro tanto quod ipsum intelligere est quaedam formalis perfectio et sic quaedam species intellectum perficiens et informans et rei intellectae assimilans.” See also ibid., 280–1. See also X.12 361: “[…] sed bene dicit [sc. Aristoteles -PJH] ipsum actum intelligendi quandam speciem in quantum est quaedam similitudo rei per quam etiam intellectus dicitur rei assimilari et quodam modo secundum hoc fieri res ipsa; prout intellectus dicitur fieri intelligibilia in quantum efficitur actu intelligens illa. Et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus quod lapis non est in anima sed species lapidis. Id autem quod de lapide est in anima constat quod est ipse actus intelligendi. Et quia actus intelligendi non est ipse lapis secundum esse reale quod habet extra, ideo respectu talis esse dicitur esse species eius.” See also ibid., XII.3 193–4 and II.5 87.

\(^{23}\) Godfrey also appeals to the Aristotelian thesis (a dubious inference from the case of sight) that all forms of sensory perception require a medium between the object and the senses. See, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodl.* IX.19 274: “[…] quod medium etiam requiritur in immutacione sensitiuae eo quod sensibile supra sensum positum nullum facit sensum, quod immutatur quidem immutacione intentionalii, quae tamen non est sensatio[…].” For Durand’s discussion on the necessity of a medium, see *Sent.* II-C 13.2. On the notion of an ‘intentional change’ (*intentionalis mutatio*) in both the organ and the medium, see Chapter 4, §4.2.2. In Aristotle, see: *DA* II.7 419a12–21, *DA* II.11 423b20–1, and *DA* III.3 424b24–425b3.

\(^{24}\) For slightly more complicated reasons, which I’ll get into in Chapter 4, both Godfrey and Durand also subscribe to the distinction between an intentional form (or *species*) and a non-intentional form. In brief: the eye receives the form of the red object even though it does not become red. Hence, it receives the intentional form of this object. But the eye in a corpse also receives the intentional form of the red object. The reason the eye receives the intentional form of the red object is because it shares the same matter as the air—it is ‘diaphanous’—and diaphanous items take on forms without taking on the characteristic of those forms, or, in other words, they take on intentional forms. Godfrey, *Quodl.* IX.19 274: “[…] consistit etiam mutatizatione potest et ipsum organum immutari, quae etiam non est essentiaet sensatio, et hoc quod etiam esset sensatio in medio et etiam in organo, uiritae sensitiuae corrupta. Constat autem quod in uiritae sensitiuae, secundum quod huiusmodi, est alia immutatio secundum essentiam differsens, quae est ipsa sensatio; et sic ipsa uiritae sensitiuae secundum formam dupliem informatur, quia ratione qua in organo communicat cum medio, quod primo intentionaliter immutatur, potest etiam uius sensitiuae huiusmodi immutatione dici immutari. Sed in quantum est uius animalis et sensitiuae sola sensatione
there are interesting features which go along with such a species, e.g., in the case of sight at least the reception of the species of color does not color the eye, what is important to stress here is that such species in organo are not to be taken, as they are in the STC, as causal dispositions or abilities by which the senses elicit their sensitive acts. For Godfrey, the reason we shouldn’t make this further claim is because, as we will see in the next chapter, such a position violates the principle that nothing can be both active and passive with respect to the same thing at the same time; but the senses are, at least according to Godfrey, passive with respect to perceptive acts since they are their passive recipients; hence, they can’t also be active with respect to those acts, for otherwise the principle that nothing can be both active and passive with respect to the same thing at the same time would be violated. For Durand, the reason we shouldn’t make this further claim is because, as we will see in a moment, such a claim treats the senses as insufficient with respect to the sensitive act, and on Durand’s view the senses and indeed all our cognitive

immutatur; et sic illud, quod per se immutat sensible in potentia sensitiuam, ut sensitiuam est, non est nisi ipsa potentia, secundum quod talis, et illud, secundum quod sensible ipsum potentiam sensitiuam immutat, non est nisi sensatio; sed tamen hoc etiam aliter immutatur, modo praedicto.” Cf. Durand, Sent. II-A 3.5 12: “Dico autem in sensu, quatenus sensus est, quia organum sensus, quatenus communicat cum medio in aliqua qualitate, ut pupilla cum aere in diaphanitate, praepter sensationem, quam recipit sensus inquantum huiusmodi, recipit etiam speciem intentionalem rei sensibilis ratione qualitatis, in qua communicat cum medio, quae tamen species non est essentiaiter ipsa sensatio; alioquin sensatio esset in medio et in organo uirtute sensitiua corrupta.” Durand’s use of ‘dico’ here is rhetorical; he is in fact presenting Godfrey’s position. Durand agrees, however, with Godfrey on the point that the organ receives the species. See, e.g., Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 11: “Quamuis enim color imprimat in medio et in oculo suam speciem, propter similem dispositionem diaphaneitatis, quae est in eis[. . .].” He disagrees, however, that we should further claim that the sense object also brings about a sensitive act. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 23: “[. . .] sensibile non agit in potentiam sensitiuam, sed in organum ratione qualitatum disponentium ipsum, quae actio, cum sit praesens sensui, non latet ipsum, et ideo sentitur, nec est aliud sentire nisi sensibile praesens non latere sensum[. . .].” For a discussion of these points more generally, see Tachau, Vision and Certitude and Katherine Tachau, “The Problem of the species in medio in the Generation after Ockham,” Medieval Studies 44 (1982): 394–443. In Aquinas, see Stump, Aquinas, 253–6. (Aquinas also recognizes that in most cases perception involves, in addition to the reception of the sensible species the reception of the natural form of the sense object.) For further discussion and references, see Chapter 4, footnote 19 and the surrounding discussion.

25. Quodl. IX.19 273: “[. . .] ad cuitandum ista, dicitur, in secunda positione, quod obiecto agentes fit similitudo eius in intellectu et intellectus, secundum illam, factus in actu, elicit actionem intelligendi—non uidetur bene dictum: [. . .] quia etiam si fieret in uiutite illius, intellectus non posset in se ipso efficere actionem intelligendi, quia secundum quod in pluribus locis est probatum, intellectus factus alioqu modo in actu, tamen per hoc non potest se ipsum reducere in actu ulteriori ad quem remanet in potentia, huiusmodi prima actualitate posita, quia unum et idem secundum rem non potest reducere se ipsum de potentia ad actu.” See also ibid., 275, 280, Quodl. X.12 361, VI.7 154, 169, VIII.2 30.
faculties are totally sufficient on their own for carrying out the tasks assigned to them.

1.1.3 Summary of the two opinions

Both opinions agree, then, that perception involves the affection of the senses by the agency of the object: perception either is or at least necessarily involves a ‘form’ of the object which that object as efficient cause somehow gives to the percipient. The analogy with hot water is appropriate in many ways. On the second view (Godfrey’s), perception is the affection of the senses by the agency of its object in much the same way that becoming hot is the affection of the water owing to the agency of the stove—the stove gives to it, so to speak, the form of heat; on the first view (the species theory), ‘concomitant’ with this affection, perception also involves a further action by the species-informed senses much as making some other item hot is a further action which the heat-informed water elicits. Both opinions, I think, are, thus, clearly committed to the affectionist dogma.

1.1.4 Self-affectionism, in brief

What I will be arguing in the following chapters is that Durand doesn’t reject the thesis that the object is a cause of the perceptive act; however, he does reject the thesis that it is an efficient cause and that perception either is or necessarily involves the affection of the senses by the agency of the object, where this means that perception either is or necessarily involves the reception of a ‘form’ owing to the object as efficient cause. In the next section, I want to look at what motivates Durand to reject this affectionist doctrine. However, before I do I want to first register the fact that the denial of these sorts of affectionist theories (call such a view Object Affectionism) does not right away entail the thesis that Durand eventually endorses. Basically, one can reject the thesis that cognition is a matter of being affected by the agency of the object and still be an affectionist, for one can hold that cognition is a matter of self-affection, the mind
becoming affected by itself, in the mere presence of the object; the intellect, for instance, might be held to impress upon itself the ‘form’ as efficient cause. This is the theory which several medieval philosophers endorsed in at least some cases of psychological acts. I will look at these theories in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{26} Durand, however, doesn’t go in this direction. Instead, he rejects the affectionist dogma \textit{tout court}. In the next section, then, I will limit myself to his concerns with object affectionism, the doctrine that perception is a matter of the affection of the senses owing to the agency of the \textit{object}. In the second section of Chapter 2 I will take up John Duns Scotus’s defense of self-affectionism in the case of certain sorts of mental acts, and in Chapter 3 we will see why it is that Durand thinks that such self-affectionist doctrines are also wrong-headed.

\textbf{1.2 Against object affectionism}

So, why shouldn’t we be object affectionists? That is, why should we reject the thesis that perception involves the affection of the senses by the agency of the object, either as a necessary or a sufficient condition? While Durand raises a whole host of arguments against affectionism in both of the forms which he considers in \textit{Sent. II-A 3.5}, there are, I think, two primary worries which motivate him to abandon the doctrine. These two worries involve very different considerations. The first is a kind of metaphysical worry, and it comes close to what we would nowadays call the interaction problem, a subset of the mind-body problem: on Durand’s view, it is hard to see how something as ignoble as the sense object (a rock, say, and its various sensible qualities) can affect something as noble as the senses. The second worry appeals to the idea that we are cognitive agents,

\footnote{\textit{Quodl. I.4 10}: “Cum tamen pars superior iudicet de eisdem, ergo species immutat organum corporale et organum immutatum excitat animam ad immutationem sibi consimilem suo modo quam anima facit in se ipsa de se ipsa. […] Vnde ita formatur anima a specie quodam modo acsi cera per impossibile uiueret et propelleret se in similitudinem sigilli. Ita enim anima habet aliquid activum et aliquid materiale quasi passiuum quod est in potentia omnia intellecta et fit actu res intellecta dum excitatur ab extra et propelleret se in eius similitudinem, et hoc naturali colligatione animae cum corpore, ubi non exigitur praecognito sed naturalis colligationis ductio.” \textit{ibid.}: “[…] species illae nascuntur de se per occasionem excitatiuam, non per causam impressiurn.”}
and moreover the idea that we are *sufficient* cognitive agents, an intuition Durand holds based, in part, on the way we ordinarily talk about cognition using active verbs in active sentences. Now, neither of these worries should be taken to constitute knock-down arguments against the affectionist dogma, but such considerations, I think, do motivate us, and to be sure Durand, to reconsider the alternatives.

1.2.1 *Agency and Language*

Peter John Olivi, a generation before Durand, declares:

> We clearly *feel* that our acts of seeing or thinking go out from us or are produced by us on the inside and this in an intimate way. (*Sent. II*72.24)

Durand too holds that we are cognitive *agents* and moreover that we are *sufficient* cognitive agents. What Durand takes this to mean is that our various cognitive faculties (the senses and the intellect) are sufficient on their own, able to allow us to do whatever it is that they allow us to do (see, smell, hear, think and so on). While the proponent of the *species*-theory of cognition, as we saw above, would seem to agree with Durand on the claim that we are cognitive agents, Durand rejects their view on the grounds that it treats our cognitive faculties as *insufficient*: according to the STC our cognitive faculties still require *species* or ‘forms’ added to them in order to allow us to elicit our cognitive acts. But this is wrong; and the reason it is wrong seems to be that, granted the premise

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27. See also *Sent. II*58 463–4: “[…] nos intime experimur in nobis actus istos procedere a nobis et quod nos uere operamur illos.” See also (a little more proximate to Durand) Bartholomew of Bruges, *De sensu agente* 51 (he is reporting the view of an anonymous opponent): “Sentire est operatio quae est cognitio. Ergo oportet quod fiat ab agente [sc. as opposed to the object -PJH].” On the resemblance between Durand’s views and Peter John Olivi’s views, see my discussion of the sources of Durand’s view in Chapter 3, 3.1.5.

28. Peter John Olivi had been making noise about the same point. See, e.g., *Sent. II*58.466: “[…] illud quod per se faciet ibi ipsa potentia, poterit facere absque specie, quia quantum ad illud habebit sufficientem rationem principii actiui.” See ibid., 466–467: “Non enim potest dici quod sicut a duobus impulsibus nauis factis a duobus impellentibus eam sequitur unus motus, ita quod ab uno illorum solo non posset sequi, quod sic sit in proposito; quia actus intelligendi est prima actio aliumus uirtutis agentis non facta per aliquem praecedentem impulsum.” I owe these references to Solère, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject.”
that we are cognitive agents and the further premise that cognition is something we, as cognitive agents, naturally do, then it is wrong to suppose that we are not sufficient, for in every other case of a natural agent, that agent has already in it the natural wherewithal to do whatever it naturally does. Fire, for instance, has heat which allows it to make other items hot and it doesn’t need, in order to do this, some new ‘form’ added to it. Moreover, if we are to put much value into the chief analogy that the STC raises here with hot water, then we would have to admit, it would seem, that, while the hot water is an agent when it makes some other item hot, it is the heat that is doing all of the work, for water on its own, by its nature, can’t make other items hot. But this, again, flies in the face of the idea that we are sufficient cognitive agents having in ourselves the relevant wherewithal to elicit cognitive acts provided the right conditions obtain. A third argument Durand raises here presses the species theory on its commitments to a broader doctrine of species. If the species which the senses receive from the sense objects are, at least on some interpretations of their theory, the same sort of items which the

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30. The background assumption here is that Water consists in the Cold and the Wet and, on its own, by its nature, it makes things cold not hot. For some discussion on medieval theories about the elements see Pasnau, “Scholastic Qualities: Primary and Secondary.”

31. *Sent. II*-A 3.5 9: “[...] quandocumque aliquis actus principiatur a duobus, quorum unum est materiale et reliquum formale, uerius principiatur a formalii quam a materiali, ut patet in exemplo de aqua calefacta. Sed secundum hanc opinionem intelligere nostrum principiatur ab intelle<sub>c</sub>tu informato specie, ita tamen quod species est forma et actus intellectus, per quam factus in actu potest elicere actum intelligendi. Ergo uerius causatur nostrum intelligere a specie quam ab intellectu, immo plus, quia licet totum compositum ex intellectu et specie sit illud, quod agit uez elicit actum intelligendi, sola tamen species est principium quo et nullo modo intellectus, sicut solus calor aquae est principio, quo aqua calida calefacit, licet totum compositum ex aqua et calore sit illud, quod calefacit.” Compare with Hervaeus Natalis, *Sent. 13*.4 (quoted in part above in fn. 15).
ambient medium (e.g., the air) receives, then, granted the further thesis that \textit{species} are that by which their recipients elicit cognitive acts, then, so it would seem, the air too would, having received the \textit{species}, elicit cognitive acts.\textsuperscript{32}

Now, it will be observed that Durand seems to be committed to a violation of the principle alluded to above in our discussion of Godfrey’s position, namely, the principle that nothing is both active and passive with respect to the same item at the same time. I will return to this principle in Chapter 2, as it forms something of the cornerstone of Godfrey’s position on the matter, but suffice it to say here Durand rejects the premise that we are also patients (passive recipients) with respect to perceptive acts in the sense that perceptive acts are ‘forms’ which we receive, no matter what we might point to as their agent—even self-affectionists are wrong to insist on this point. Quite the contrary, perceptive acts neither are nor necessarily involve the passive reception of forms, neither from ourselves nor from objects.\textsuperscript{33} If the chief analogy for the \textit{species} theory is water and its passion of becoming hot and its action of making other items hot, and the chief analogy for Godfrey’s view is the water and its passion of becoming hot, then the chief analogy, I think, for Durand’s view is \textit{fire} and its natural action of making some other item hot, for fire, as opposed to water, already has in it the wherewithal (heat) and

\textsuperscript{32} Sent. II-A 3.5 11: Discussed in Ch. 5 there “[...] omne, quod habet formam, quae est alicuius actionis principium, potest per formam, quam habet, in illam actionem. Sed eamdam formam secundum speciem quam habet sensus—puta uisus—habet medium; qualis enim species recipitur in oculo talis recipitur in medio. Ergo si ipsa est principium eliciendi actionem sentiendi, sicut per eam sentit oculus, ita per eamdem sentiret medium; quod non est uerum.” Of course, the obvious response here is to insist that the recipient must be a special \textit{kind} of recipient. See Chapters 4 and 5 on the prospects of this line of defense. Durand here raises and briefly rejects this objection. ibid., 11: “Sed dicetur, quod non, quia actus non solum requirit principium a quo sit, sed etiam subiectum in quo sit. Licet autem species sensibilis, quantum est de natura sua, sit elicitiuam actus sentiendi, tamen medium non est eius susceptuim, sed organum solum. Et ideo medium non sentit, sed organum. Iust autem excluditur per id quod prius dictum est, quod sentire est actus manens in agente per se et non per accidens. Propter quod quidquid est preceptium formae, quae est principium actionis, est similiter receptuim actionis.”

\textsuperscript{33} I will return to this in Chapter 3, but see e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 18: “[...] operatio formae [sc. intelligere et sentire -PJH] non est forma ei addita [sc. addita intellectui et sensui -PJH].” DQ 1 38: “[... ] intelligere est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compositionem cum intellectu, nec es res absoluta superaddita intellectui.” DQ 1 33: “[... ] cum intellectus sit forma, si intelligere faceret cum eo compositionem, recipereetur in eo per modum formae. Sed hoc est impossible.”
doesn’t require the reception of the form of heat in order make other items hot.

He rejects Godfrey’s theory—that sense objects are the efficient causes of our perceptive acts full stop—on the obvious grounds that it does not even treat cognition as a kind of action at all but treats it as a passion. One of the arguments he makes here appeals to language. This is a popular enough move in the history of philosophy. For instance, Thomas Reid, whose theory of perception, incidentally, his 19th-century editor, Sir William Hamilton, reckons Durand to have anticipated, writes:

In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems therefore to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs. (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 21; see also ibid., 26 and 57)

A little more proximate to Durand, Peter of Trabes declares that “thinking is an act since, according to the grammarians, it is an active verb” (Sent. II 24 281), and one argument which, slightly after Durand, John Buridan considers in this context is that sensing (sentire) is a [kind of] acting (agere) and so the sensitive [power] is an active power. [...] The antecedent is proved: this word ‘sensing (sentire)’ is active in form, and such grammatical modes of signifying ought to be taken from a property of things and to be consonant with them, for otherwise they would be made up and false, which is unfitting; and it would not be consonant in the case at hand if sensing were a [kind of] being affected (pati) and not a [kind of] acting (agere). (Quaestiones longae obj. 3 241–2)35

34. See Hamilton, The Works of Thomas Reid, Note M quoted in the introduction.
35. See also John Buridan, Quaestiones breves obj. 2 261: “[...] probo antecedens primo per grammaticam quia hoc uerbum ‘sentire’ est uerbum actionum quod dissonat ueritati si sentire non esset agere,
Of course, such arguments are slightly dubious.\textsuperscript{36} Was Reid that much of a polyglot? Only a philosopher in the grip of a theory would claim that we can reliably read off from the surface structure of natural language to the way things are in reality. (Cheese smells, after all, and I’ll bet the house—tho’ my competence in foreign languages be limited—that \textit{most} natural languages have similar sorts of mix-ups present.)\textsuperscript{37} In any case, Godfrey dedicates a large portion of \textit{Quodl.} IX.19 to this gap between reality and the Latin language (267–280)\textsuperscript{38} and Durand, of course, recognizes his efforts.\textsuperscript{39}

Durand doesn’t adduce this sort of naive language argument, but he does raise a slightly more interesting variation on it to establish his worry. Suppose that Godfrey is right that verbs of cognition are active in form but passive in meaning. Durand reasons,
if verbs of cognition, e.g., to see, to hear, and so on, are active in form but passive in meaning, then the passive forms of those verbs, e.g., to be seen, to be heard, and so on, should be taken to be passive in form but active in meaning. After all, when a sentence is changed so that the mood of its verb is switched up, any number of prescriptivist rules about things being said in the passive voice will be violated, but nothing much about what was said will have been changed. “Socrates is being hit by Plato” says more or less the same thing as “Plato is hitting Socrates”. Hence, on Durand’s view, Godfrey must be committed to the further thesis that the passive form of verbs of cognition are passive in form but active in meaning. Just as ‘to see’ picks out a passion on the side of the one seeing, so too ‘to be seen’ picks out an action—indeed, the corresponding action—on the side of the item being seen, i.e., the object. But, even if we allow language its quirks, and so allow that the active forms of certain verbs are active in form but passive in meaning, it is a stretch to suppose that the passive form of verbs of cognition are passive in form but active in meaning as well. For one thing, Durand points out, if the passive form of a verb of cognition were active in meaning, then it would pick out the action on the side of the object which corresponds to the passion on the side of the subject which the active form of that verb picks out. But then we would seem to be committed to the thesis that I see the object because the object is being seen; but our intuitions on the matter seem to run in the other direction: the object is seen because I see it and not the other way around. Secondly, if the object’s being seen were an action on the side of the object and


41. As the last sentence demonstrates, prescriptivists about the English language are probably right to insist on this point. See, e.g., Arthur Quiller-Couche: “Generally, use transitive verbs, that strike their object; and use them in the active voice, eschewing the stationary passive, with its little auxiliary its’s and was’s, and its participles getting into the light of your adjectives, which should be few. For, as a rough law, by his use of the straight verb and by his economy of adjectives you can tell a man’s style, if it be masculine or neuter, writing or ‘composition’” (*On the Art of Writing*, 1916, ch. 7 [available online at: http://www.bartleby.com/190/7.html]).

Chapter 1. Affectionism and its discontents

if my seeing the object were the corresponding passion on the side of me, then, seeing as actions are more noble than their corresponding passions, we would be committed to
the claim that the sense object’s action is more noble than our perceptions. But this, as we will see in a moment, does not sit well with Durand, for it violates the more basic principle that the animate is more noble than the inanimate.43

1.2.2 Nobility and the Animate-Inanimate Gap

Durand holds that affectionists are committed to a violation of two very basic causal
principles: (1) what is less noble cannot affect what is more noble,44 and (2) what is
less noble can’t bring about a more noble form.45 But, at least on Durand’s view, the

43. Sent. II-A 3.5 14: “[…] Sed omnis actio perfectior et nobilior est intelligi quam intelligere. Quod est absurdum[...].” In his early work (if authentic) Duns Scotus makes a similar argument, QDA q. 12 n. 25: “Item, si sentire sit pati, sentiri est agere; sed agere est nobilior quam pati; si objectum igitur intelligi est nobilior quam intelligere, per illud inanimata, quae non intelligent sed intelligentur, sunt perfectiora quam homo qui intelligit.”

44. More precisely, the active principle by which an agent affects a patient must be more noble than the passive principle by which the patient is affected by that agent. Sent. II-A 3.5 13: “[...] quamuis agens non semper sit praestantius patiente quantum ad id quod est secundum suppositum—puta ignis non est praestantior homine in quem agit—tamen oportet uniuersaliter agens quantum ad principium quo agit esse praestantius et nobilius patiente quantum ad id quo patiens patitur, sicut nobilior est caliditas ignis per quam agit quam sit siccitas vel humiditas hominis per quam ab igne patitur.”

45. Sent. II-A 3.5 16: “[...] omne causa [...] habet formam per quam agit quae eiusdem est rationis cum illa quam inducit si sit agens uniocum uel est perfectior ea si sit agens aequiuocum.” Cf. Godfrey, Quodl. VI 7 151: “[...] omne principale est nobilius, si sit non-unioocum, effectu uel aequo noble, si sit uniocum[...].” According to a common medieval distinction, there are two kinds of agents: equivocal agents and univocal agents. A univocal agent has a form, F, which allows it to bring about an effect, G, which is formally identical—i.e., the same in kind—with F. For instance, the soapstone has a form (heat) which allows it to bring about an effect (heat) in what is placed upon it. Hence, the form in the univocal agent and the form produced in the corresponding patient are of equal nobility. An equivocal agent, by contrast, has a form, F, which allows it to bring about a more noble effect, G, which is not formally identical with F. For instance, by common consent, must medieval philosophers held that the sun, even though not itself hot, was still able to bring about heat. Now, in such a case, the produced form must be less noble than the form in the equivocal agent. As John Buridan puts it, Quaestiones longae 254: “[...] oportet principale esse nobilius genito uel saltem aeqe noble, quae agens non potest, uirtute propria, dare plus quam habeat.” See also Gonsalvus of Spain, DQ 15 309: “[...] non solum enim causa aequiuoca est nobilior suo effectu sed et illud quod est ratio agendi in causa aequiuoca est nobilius[...].” Even Descartes can be found defending some version of this principle. See, e.g., CMS II 116: “Whatever reality or perfection there is in a thing, is present either formally or eminently in its first and adequate cause.” I discuss this causal principle in more detail in Chapter 2, in the context of Henry of Ghent’s and John Duns Scotus’s arguments against Godfrey’s view about the causation of an act of the will.
senses and their sensory perceptions are more noble than sense objects. Why? This can’t be because the former is material and the latter immaterial, because there is nothing immaterial about Fido, his sensitive powers, and his sensory perceptions. Rather Durand thinks that sensitive powers and sensory perceptions are more noble than sensible qualities because he holds, as a general thesis, that what is not alive (the inanimate) is less noble than what is alive (the animate). In another context—his discussion of the nutritive power and its operations—Durand declares that “acts proper to the animate are more perfect than acts common to both the animate and the inanimate” (Sent. I-A 3.3 f. 42va), and in Sent. II-A 3.5 he notes that it seems “very problematic” to hold that sensory perceptions and thoughts have “non-living efficient causes” because other “less noble vital acts, such as nutrition and growth” do not. In general, he tells us, “the acts of living things and cognizant things are more noble than any property common to the non-living and the living, the cognizant and the non-cognizant” (Sent. II-A 3.5 14).


47. Sent. II-A 3.5 16: “[…] inconueniens ualde uidetur, quod actus uitales, ut est sentire et intelligere, sit in nobis effectui quia actus uitalis minus nobiles, ut nutriri et augeri, sunt in nobis a principio intrinseco et nullo modo ab extrinseco effectui.” Notice that Durand calls even acts of nutrition and growth vital acts. The adjective ‘vitalis’ gets flung around in these discussions and it isn’t clear what an individual author might have meant by such a qualification. Peter John Olivi, Henry of Ghent, James of Viterbo, and John Duns Scotus, for instance, tell us that acts of the intellect and the will are vital acts. Duns Scotus, Lect. II 25 n. 20 and Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 316, 340–1, 399 (cf. Ord. I 3.3.3 n. 410, 451–2, 509); Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XI 5 f. 450vR, 452rF; Peter John Olivi, Sent. II 58 400–8, 412–4, 437–515; James of Viterbo, Quodl. I 12 165. Most authors also held that acts associated with both the so-called vegetative powers and sensitive powers are vital. (Hence, ‘vitalis’ seems to mean what we would nowadays call biological). See, e.g., Aquinas, ST I 18.1 ad 2: “Sed plantae et aliiae res uiuentes mouentur motu uitali[…].” Peter John Olivi, Sent. II 58 479: “[…] uidere et audire […] actus uitalis sunt[…].” (Olivi, it is worth noting, holds that sensory perceptions are not extended with the extension of bodies. See also Sent. II 61 577. For discussion, see Juhana Toivanen, Animal Consciousness. Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensible Soul (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Jyväskylä, 2009), ch. 7, §3.) Henry of Ghent. Quodl. XI 5 450vR: “[…] operationes uitalis cognitivae quales sunt uisio, auditio, et uniusraliter sensatio ex parte sensus et intellectio ex parte intellectus […]” See also Aquinas, Sent. III 13.2.1 ad 5, ST I-II 17.9 ad 2; John Duns Scotus, Lect. II 18 mm. 37–8, Ord. II 8.1 n. 1, Ord. I 117 n. 13; and Godfrey, Quodl. VI 14 249. Durand talks of ‘vital heat’ involved in digestion and growth in Sent. II-C 1.4 and the nutritive and augmentative powers in Sent. I-A 3.3 and Sent. I-C 3.2.2. On the notion of a vital act, see Lonergan et al., The Triune God: Systematics, Appendix I, §8: ‘Actus Vitalis’. See also Solère, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject” in connection with Durand’s use of the term in this text.

48. Sent. II-A 3.5 14: “[…] actus uiuentis et cognoscentis semper est nobilior omni proprietate communi uiuentibus et non-uiuentibus, cognoscentibus et non-cognoscentibus.” But what about animate
While Durand does defend the thesis that the human soul is immaterial, Durand’s focus here isn’t on the immateriality of the soul but rather on the fact that it is animate, as opposed to sensible qualities which are inanimate. Likewise, his focus isn’t on a purported divide between the mental and the physical, but on what he sees as a more basic divide between the animate and the inanimate.

Now, most authors from the period accepted these two causal principles. However, there seems to have been something of a disagreement among medieval philosophers as to whether or not sense objects are less noble than the senses and sensory perceptions, and by insisting upon this, as it were, metaphysical intuition—that the inanimate is less noble than the animate—Durand seems to be aligning himself with a kind of minority powers, e.g., the sensitive powers or the so-called vegetative powers? Durand doesn’t really say, but there’s an argument in the neighborhood. John Buridan, presenting an argument not unlike Durand’s, Quaestiones longae 252-3: “Primo, supponebant quod non posset argui nobilitas potentiae nisi ex nobilitate operationis vel modi operandi.” See also Quaestiones breves 264 and QDA II.13 270–1. The same position (almost verbatim) is discussed in Radulphus Brito, QDA III.2. James of Viterbo makes a similar argument in Quodl. 1.12.

49. Durand holds that the immateriality of the human soul follows from the thesis that it is separable from the body. See, e.g., Sent. I-C 8.2.3 n. 14: “[...] anima autem propter sui separabilitatem a corpore non est capax quantitatis[...].” Durand, however, doesn’t think that a decent argument can be made that establishes the soul’s capacity to exist as separated from the body. In Sent. II-A 18.3 he rejects the standard argument (which makes an inference from the fact that the soul carries out an operation that doesn’t depend upon the body to the claim that the soul itself doesn’t depend upon the body); and in QA II.11 (221) he notes that this argument is merely ‘probable’. Durand was, indeed, censured on this point. See Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deuiat ... n. 82. For some discussion of Sent. II-A 18.3, see Peter King, “Immateriality and Intentionality” (Forthcoming). For contrasting takes on the value of the argument Durand rejects, see Robert Pasnau, “Aquinas and the Content Fallacy,” Modern Schoolman 75 (1998): 293–314 and John Haldane, “The Metaphysics of Intellect(ion),” PACPA 80 (2007): 39–55.

50. Indeed, Durand never once uses the term ‘immaterial’, ‘incorporeal’, or ‘spiritual’ in Sent. II-A 3.5. The question of whether X is corporeal or incorporeal is orthogonal to the issue of whether it is animate or inanimate: purely corporeal things, like plants and dogs, are animate.

51. Indeed, both Augustine and Aristotle were taken to agree on this issue. In Aristotle, see DA III.5 430a18: “Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiencie.” In Augustine, see De Gen. ad lit. XII.16: “Omni enim modo praestantium est qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit.” Even Godfrey agreed on this premise. See, e.g., Godfrey, Quodl. V.10 35: “[...] uniuersaliter agens sit praestansius patiencie, secundum Augustinunm duodecimo super Genesin[...].” Quodl. VIII.2 19: “[...] agens est praestansior et prior patiencie, secundum Augustinum et secundum Philosophum.” Quodl. VI.7 151: “[...] omne agens principale est nobilius, si sit non-uniuocum, effectu uel aeque nobile, si sit uniuocum; et est nobilius et actualior eo ex quo uel in quo prodicetur huismodi effectus.”

52. See, e.g., Bartholomew of Bruges (who is presenting an anonymous objection), De sensu agente 49: “Oppositum, quia petit id quod est in principio, quia deberet probare quod sensibile ducat sensum de potentia in actum; et ad hoc probandum sumit quod sensible est actu tale qualis sensus in potentia et ista sunt idem et consequuntur se. Quare, etc.”
position on the matter. While we can find, especially among the Franciscans, proponents of a ‘gap’ between the sensible and the sensitive (so to speak)—John of Jandun in 1310 quips that the claim “that the sensible form [of the extramental object] is more noble than the cognitive power seems to me absurd” (Sophisma de sensu agente 164)—by far and large the majority position, especially among his Dominican confreres, denied such a ‘gap’. Hervaeus Natalis, for instance, declares that “the senses do not so obviously surpass sensible qualities as the intellect [does] material quiddities” (Quodl. III.8 69), and Thomas Aquinas, as Adriaan Pattin puts it, “ne présente guère d’importance” on

53. See also ibid., 138: “Si uera sunt ostenditur quod nullus sensus per se patitur et recipit ab obiecto, semper enim agens nobilior est patiente, ut acceptum est tertio De anima; inconvenient autem reputatur quod uirtutes animae cognosciuiae sint minus nobiles uirtutibus obiectorum. Ergo non solunt ab eis non suscipiunt sensationem, sed nec speciem sensibilem, ut uidetur.” Tractatus de sensu agente 167: “Si enim species sensibilis ut habet uirtutem actiuam sensationis est nobilior uirtute sensitiuia oportet quod ista uirtus speciei sit nobilior quam uirtus animae cognosciuia, quod est contra quartum suppositionem quam declaramus in Sophisme de sensu agente.” Anonymous (presenting John of Jandun’s view), Quaestio “Vtrum praeter potentiam…” 383: “[…] supponit quod efficiens sensationis non sit objectum nec species sensibilis quia ista sunt ignobiliora sensu; actium autem debet esse nobilior passo.” John of Jandun and Bartholomew of Bruges exchanged verbal blows (it is an apt metaphor) on this issue. John of Jandun, Tractatus de sensu agente 174: “Et tunc [Bartholomew -PJH] dicit quod numquam dixit eam et ideo minus est credendum mihi ut dicit; sed sine dubio eodem baculo possum ipsum ipsum percutere quo ipse me percutit—numquam enim dixit!” This debate is edited in Adriaan Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent: La controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun, ses antécédents et son évolution, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 1.6 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988). John Buridan, a generation later, tells us that arguments like Durand’s nobility arguments are both probable and persuasive (probabiles et persuasuae) but not demonstrative, in part because the first premise is not so obvious to all people as opposed to, say, the law of non-contradiction. But in psychology, he remarks, perhaps we should not expect strict demonstration. Quaestiones longae 257: “Et cum istic rationibus apponuntur aliae quae prius tactae et posita sunt tamquam probabiles et persuasae. Tales forte rationes sufficient in hac materia; non enim in omnibus est demonstratio petenda.” In the forthcoming critical edition, Peter Sobol reads ‘acerboria expetenda’ instead of ‘demonstratio petenda’. See also ibid., 253: “Sed quamvis illa ratio sit bene ordinata et apparentis, tamen aliqui cauillant contra eam dicentes[…].” The position that Buridan quotes in these texts and calls probable is almost verbatim the first position found in Radulphus Brito, QDA III.2.
the activity of the senses (Pour l’histoire du sens agent, 7). For such authors, there is little wrong with the idea that sense objects can (and do) affect our senses, although some authors, like Nicholas Medensis (a.k.a. Durandellus), did admit the debate about the further thesis that such objects can bring about more noble forms.

Some people have noted that on this issue there is a kind of loggerheads between ‘Augustinians’ (mostly Franciscans) on the one hand and ‘Aristotelians’ (mostly Dominicans) on the other. Indeed, Jean-Luc Solère (“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”) claims that Durand here is simply taking on an ‘Augustinian’ stance resisting the Aristotelianism of his Dominican confreres. I’m not sure if this a way of thinking about the issue is that helpful. Setting aside the fact that Durand, when he opens his Sentences commentary, disowns all human authority, and this would include Augustine as well as


55. See also, e.g., Walter Burley, QDA 7 n. 20: “The object is the active [cause] of this activity [e.g., sensory perception or thought] and I grant that what is inanimate is an active [cause] of an animate act.” Laurent of Lindores, De sensu agente 325: “Probatur, quia species sensibilis productur bene ab inanimato.” Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.9 381: “Ergo obiectum sensus et intellectus est praestansi quantum ad principium quo agit ante suam actionem, quam sit sua potentia.” ibid., 385: “Ad primum contra secundum patet ex dictis, qualiter obiectum est praestansi ipsa potenti; in quantum habet in actu illud quo ipsa potentia habet in potentia.” See also, of course, Godfrey, Quodl. IV.8 258: “Sic sit enim dictur quod qua sensibilium extra possum se suscipere mouere et immutare uiuorem sensitivam, et ideo non possit communitur sensus sensus[...].” Peter of Auvergne, Quaestio “Vtrum ponere sensum agentem”, “[... ] sensibilia enim quae sunt actia sensus sunt actia existentia in rerum natura et ideo possum agere in sensus[... ].” Radulphus Brito, Questiones “Vtrum sensus sit virtus passiva” “Vtrum praeter sensitiva[... ], and QDA III.2. Bartholomew of Bruges in De sensu agenta raises no less than 24 arguments against the agent sense! In his assessment of Bartholomew’s position, Thomas Wylton(?) quips (De sensu agenta 351): “[... ] et puto namque quod ad eandem conclusionem non possit fieri 24 demonstrationes[... ].”

56. Evid. II.9 382: “Sed hic est dubium, se. qualler aliquod agens possit formam imprimere in aliquod passum perfectiori modo quam sit in se ipso? Sicut enim non imprimit nisi formam quem habet, ita non uidetur posse imprimere nisi in eo modo quo habet. Ad hoc dubium estet facilis responsio ex parte intellectus, in quem agit obiectum mediante uiure intellectus agens.”

Aristotle,\(^58\) I think that there is more to Durand’s recalcitrance here. At least two things more: parsimony and upwards causation.

1. Parsimony.

Even if we don’t think that sensible qualities and sense objects are less noble than senses and sensory perceptions, almost everyone, Augustinian and Aristotelian alike, would agree that material qualities and material objects are less noble than intellects and intellec
tive acts, for the latter are immaterial. Hence, almost everyone posited a ‘gap’ between the material and the immaterial, and almost everyone posited an ‘agent intellect (intellectus agens)’ whose function at least is to explain how it is that the less noble can affect the more noble or bring about a more noble form. (And, for those who took seriously Durand’s intuition at the sensory level, we can find authors positing an ‘agent sense (sensus agens)’.)\(^59\)

\(^{58}\) See \textit{Sent.} C Prol. n. 12, translated in the introduction: “Modus autem loquendi ac scribendi in caeteris, que fidem non tangunt, est ut magis inmitamur rationi quam autoritati cuiuscumque doctoris, quantumcumque celebris utem solemnis, et paruipendatur omnis humana autoritas, quando per rationem elucescit contraria ueritas. […] Omnis homo dimittens rationem propter autoritatem humanam incidit in insipientiam bestialem, ut comparatus sit iumentis insipientibus et similis factus sit illis. Quis enim nisi temperarius existens audet dicere quod magis sit acquisitum auteritati cuiuscumque doctoris quam autoritati sanctorum doctorum Sacrae Scripturae, Augustini, Gregorii, Ambrosii, et Ieronini, quos celebri
tate condigna sancta Romana Ecclesia sublimauit? Et tamen Augustinus, inter doctores celeberrimus, dicit de se ipso III De Trinitate circa principium: ‘Noli meis literis quasi scripturis canonici inseruire, set in illis et quod non credebas, cum inueneris, incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmum retinere.’” There is, of course, not a little irony in the fact that Durand goes on to cite Augustine to support his anti-authoritarian attitude. But he did say \textit{little weight}, after all!

Durand, however, finds it hard to understand how it is that simply positing an agent intellect, say, allows the less noble to affect what is more noble. He examines a number of different theories in this context and decides that none of them really explains what needs to be explained. If we want to be object affectionists—rather than, say, antiaffectionists or self-affectionists—and yet also want to cling to the immaterial-material gap, then we will have to come up with a convincing account of how it is that the object, which is material, can be an efficient cause, even if a partial efficient cause, with respect the intellect, which is immaterial. In Durand’s lights, the sorts of accounts he finds among his contemporaries—he directly addresses Hervaeus Natalis’s solution to the problem and alludes to Thomas Aquinas’s position—are, as a lot, wanting.

Of course, most of his opponents thought they did have a convincing enough account. However—and here’s the crucial point about parsimony—Durand thinks that such a complication—the postulation of a theoretical entity called the agent intellect—is unnecessary, for if we simply stop thinking of cognition as a kind of being affected by

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Pattin, *Pour l’histoire du sens agent* and Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought.”

60. Durand is rather (in)famous for his refutation of an agent intellect. In the 17th-century, John of St.-Thomas remarks that “Durand alone (who had denied that impressed *species* were required for cognition) also had denied that an agent intellect is needed in order to produce them” (Cursus III:296). On the legacy of Durand’s take on the agent intellect, see Bonino, “Quelques réactions thomistes à la critique de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourçain.” Durand’s view on the agent intellect also found censure among the Dominicans: *Articuli nonaginta tres . . . n. 2 and Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deuiat . . . n. 8: “D. 3 a. 4 dicit quod non est certum quod intellectus agens inter caeteras partes animae teneat supremum locum nec aliquem locum; nec Augustinus unquam de eo fecit mentionem, nec forte oportet aliquam intellectum agentem ponere, ut infra patebit. Contra communem doctrinam et Philosophi III De anima et Thomae ubique, praeципue p. 1 q. 79 a. 3.” On Aquinas’s view on the agent intellect, see Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa theologicae 1a*, 75–89 (Cambridge-New York: CUP, 2002), 267–295 and Stump, *Aquinas*, 244–276. For an interesting analysis of Aquinas’s view, which also engages with Durand, see Thomas de Vio’s commentary on ST I.79.3. In Aquinas, see *QDV* 10.6 ad 7 and ST I.84.6 a. 6 where he tells us that the agent intellect’s action is a real action, and that it is the primary cause of the reception of *species* in the possible intellect, with the phantasm an instrumental cause of this reception. In what follows, I use the so-called *additiones* to Durand’s first redaction (which I will call *Sent. I-A 3.5*) and his discussion of the agent intellect in his third redaction (*Sent. I-C 3.2.5*). On the *additiones*, see the bio-bibliography; the transcriptions of the text (found in *ERFURT Allgemeinbibl. der Stadt*, Ampl. F 369 ff. 76ra–77rb) I use are from:

- K = Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*, 44–9
- J = Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des tätigen Intellekts bei Durandus”
- S = Prospero Stella, *Nicolai Medensis (Durandelli) Evidentiae contra Durandum* (Tübingen: A. Francke Verlag, 2003), I.4
the agency of the object, then we will no longer need to posit such an entity in the first place. In an addition to the third distinction of his commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, Durand writes:

Concerning the intention of Aristotle, who posited an agent intellect: there isn’t any doubt that this was his intention, and perhaps he was motivated to do so because he believed that the intellect changes and that singular material items or phantasms don’t have in themselves the ability to change the intellect, since no material item in itself can [change] an immaterial item. Hence, he posited an agent intellect in virtue of which this action comes about. But this motivation is not a sufficient one, for, as will be shown in book two, distinction three [i.e., *Sent. II-A 3.5*], no object changes a power, be it a sensitive or intellective power, as the efficient cause of the cognitive act. Rather, the object is a mere *sine qua non* cause. Hence, just as the heaven acts upon those items that are below it but is not affected by them—since it does not have the same matter—and yet it is still in contact (*tangit*) with them, in terms of a metaphysical contact (*tactu metaphysico*), so too the immaterial soul united to the body changes the body but is not changed by the body nor does it receive something from a body. (*Sent. I-A 3.5 (S) f. 77rb*)

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61. *Sent. I-A 3.5 (S) f. 77rb*: “De intentione Aristotelis ponentis intellectum agentem, non est dubium hanc fuisset intentionem eius. Et forte motus fuit quia credebatur quod ipsum moveret et quia singulare materiale vel phantasma non habent de se uriturum mouendi intellectum, quia nullum materiale de se potest in immateriale, ideo posuit intellectum agentem, in cuius uritur actio fieret. Hoc autem motium non est sufficiens, quia ut patebit 2 libro, dist. 3, nullum objectum mouet effectu potentiam quamcumque sensitiuam vel intellectuuam ad cognitionem sui, sed solum est causa sine qua non. Vnde sicut coelum agit in haec inferiore et ab eis non patitur, quia non communicat cum eis in materia, tangit tamen ea tactu metaphysico, sic anima immaterialis unita corpori mouet corpus et a corpore non mouetur nec aliquid recipit a corpore.” See also *Sent. I-A 3.5 (K) f. 76va*: “Iste modus salvaretur conuenientius ponendo unam solam potentiam intellectuum quae de se nata est intelligere omnia, nec requiritur nisi quod ei praesententur obiecta, qui modus explicabitur 2 libro, dist. 3.” This last comment is prompted by the thesis that the agent intellect might act upon and so impress the form of the thing upon the possible intellect even though the thing does nothing at all but behaves as a mere object or terminus. *Sent. I-A 3.5 (S) f. 76va = Sent. I-C 3.2.5 (C) n. 17*: “Primum non potest dici, scilicet quod solus intellectus agens
Hervaeus Natalis, commenting on Durand’s position, emphasizes this connection between the *sine qua non* thesis and Durand’s rejection of the agent intellect.

However, according to his fairy tale (*falsa imaginatio*)—he who posits that thinking (*intelligere*) is not some [absolute form] superadded to the possible intellect but rather a mere relation to a newly produced or presented object—it isn’t necessary to postulate an agent intellect since nothing is wrong with the idea that something more noble can have a new relation to something less noble produced by something less noble. (*De articulis* a. 2 443)

Clearly, an upshot of Durand’s position touches upon parsimony: we can abandon the agent intellect and—if we felt inclined to endorse the more low-level animate-inanimate gap—an agent sense as well, and so we can have a more parsimonious theory about the causation of our mental acts at the end of the day.

It is clear too that what Durand objects to is the thesis that an absolute item—a form—is impressed upon or given to the intellect from the agency of the object. The worry isn’t so much that the less noble might be a cause of a more noble effect—for Durand holds that material objects are in some sense the cause of intellective acts; it is rather the worry that the object might be able to, as efficient cause, bring about a more noble form and so in this way somehow affect something more noble than itself.

2. Upwards Causation.

Nowadays, philosophers of mind are interested in what is sometimes called the issue of *downwards causation*: How can a mental event *cause* a physical event? Rarely, however, are they interested in the issue of upwards causation. Durand’s concern touches on

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62. Indeed, what is interesting about David Chalmers’s introduction to the issue (*Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings*, 1) is that he outlines only two positions: Interactionism—physical
Chapter 1. Affectionism and its discontents

upwards causation. He, of course, holds that perceptible objects can cause perceptive acts, and so he holds that physical events can cause mental events. But he thinks that the way that his contemporaries go about analyzing upwards causation doesn’t take enough into account the very different nature of the mental. Indeed, I see his animate-inanimate gap as being not so much a gap between the mental and the physical but a kind of gap between the biological and the physical. And this, I think, is interesting.

Recast the animate-inanimate gap in contemporary terms as a gap between the physical and the biological. Can physical events cause biological events? Well, clearly they do, but in what sense of the term ‘cause’? If physicalism is true—the thesis that all that exists are physical items—then, it is sometimes argued, dualism—the thesis that both the physical and the mental exist—must be false. But, as some have argued, if physicalism is true such that dualism is false, then, well, it would seem that not just mental events are to be eliminated but biological events as well. One problem that contemporary philosophers of mind are now worried about, in fact, is precisely how biological and psychological events, on the one hand, and physical events, on the other, causally interact, and while Durand’s nobility arguments will strike modern readers as very foreign, I would suggest that their basic motivations are analogous. One upshot here is this: on Durand’s view, what matters is whether or not a property, event, or thing is biological, which is only as spooky, so to speak, as the entities postulated in the biological sciences: it is, at the very least, less spooky than immateriality or spirituality—which I take it drives the ‘Augustinian’ position. Durand is not appealing to a mind-body

events can cause mental events and mental events can cause physical events—and Epiphenomenalism—physical events can cause mental events but mental events can’t cause physical events. But, logically at least, there is a third option: mental events might be able to cause physical events even if physical events can’t cause mental events.


64. See, e.g., Fodor, “Making Minds Matter More.”

65. See, esp. Peter John Olivi who argues that even sensory perceptions are not material. Durand, by contrast, although he holds that the intellect is immaterial, does so on faith, and in fact rejects the going argument for its immateriality. Indeed, Durand even argues that something purely material
gap nor is he appealing to an immaterial-material gap, but a more general gap between biology and physics.

1.3 Conclusion

Durand has other arguments too. For instance, he worries that, on Godfrey’s view, mental acts would be diversified in kind in accord with the specific diversity of their objects, a thesis he thinks violates the idea that all human intellective acts, at least, are the same in kind across all human intellects. He worries as well, interestingly enough, that both the species theory and Godfrey’s view would entail certain skeptical worries. Granted that God is able to bring about any absolute item independent of everything else, provided that this absolute item can exist in the first place, then the species theory would entail, Durand reasons, that we can’t infer from a mental act to a mind. As to Godfrey’s theory, both this and another obvious skeptical consequence follow: we can’t infer from mental acts to extramental objects.

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66. Sent. II-A 3.5 16: “[...] diversorum agentium secundum speciem sunt diuersae actiones et effectus secundum speciem. Sed intelligibilia differunt specie, ut homo et asinus. Ergo intelligere causata ab his differunt specie. Quod est inconueniens, quia proprius actus speciei non potest plurificari secundum speciem; sed intelligere ex phantasmatibus uel ratiocinari est actus specificus hominis. Ergo omne intelligere hominis est unum secundum speciem; non enim potest homini assignari alia propria operatio praeter suum intelligere.”

67. Sent. II-A 3.5 19: “Quaecumque differunt per essentiam absolutam, possunt diuina uirtute separari secundum existentiam, nisi alicui eorum repugnet ratio actualis existentiae, ut est materia prima, de qua dicunt aliqui, quod, cum sit pura potentia, non potest existere sine forma. Omne autem accidens absolutum, cum sit actus quidam, potest existere diuina uirtute sine subiecto.”

68. Sent. II-A 3.5 10: “[...] si intelligere uerius causatur a specie quam ab intellectu, cum uirtute diuina possit fieri, quod intelligamus sine specie, ut in uisione beata, multo magis posset fieri, quod intelligeremus sine intellectu, quod est absurdum.”

69. See the continuation of Sent. II-A 3.5 19 (quoted above fn. 67): “Sentire autem non potest existere sine sensu, nec intelligere sine intellectu. Ergo non dicunt aliquid reale absolutum supra sensum et intellectum.” I discuss this argument in more detail in Chapter 3, fn. 25.

70. Sent. II-A 3.5 17: “[...] Deus potest facere effectum cuiuslibet causae secundae efficientis sine ipsa. Sed Deus non potest facere, quod intelligere sit sine objecto, quia tunc homo posset intelligere, dato, quod nihil intelligeretur.” Godfrey responds to this sort of objection in Quodl. XII.1 (which asks: “Vtrum Deus possit potentias animae passivae reducere in actus suos absque suis objectis faciendo visionem sine uisibili et sic de aliis?”). For some discussion on this question, see Giorgio Pini, “Can God Create My
So, what is Durand rejecting when he rejects the doctrine of affectionism? It is this. He rejects the thesis that perception is a matter of the affection of the senses by the agency of the object, where this is taken to mean that the senses come to receive or take on the ‘form’ of that object owing to the object as efficient cause.

In general, Durand finds that his own theory can account for the causation of our mental acts without leading to such worries as those discussed above. However, at least with respect to some of these worries, Durand’s peculiar solution to the problem, already alluded to by Hervaeus Natalis above, which attempts to analyze such mental acts as relations, isn’t the only option on the table. At least with respect to the metaphysical and agency arguments, self-affectionism is still a live option, according to which the mind is the efficient cause of the mental act and affects itself in the mere presence of the object, impressing upon and receiving into itself the ‘form’ of the object.

Hence, before I turn to Durand’s positive solution in more detail in Chapter 3, I want to first look at a lively debate between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines and John Duns Scotus on precisely this topic, although limited to a certain subset of mental acts, namely, acts of the will. Godfrey as we have seen defends what we might call object affectionism—the thesis that cognition is a matter of being affected by the agency of the object as efficient cause—and he does so across the board: all mental acts, including acts of the will, are owing to the agency of their objects; Henry of Ghent had argued, against Godfrey, for self-affectionism in the case of the will, and Duns Scotus, at the turn of the new century, sides with Henry on the issue. This issue was a kind of ‘hot topic’ issue in Paris when Durand was lecturing on his Sentences and so an analysis of this debate will prove useful. More precisely, I think it will be useful for at least two reasons. First, it will show us where Durand is not a self-affectionist, a potential confusion among his

interpreters. The antiaffectionist theory which Durand pursues is not self-affectionism, and Chapters 2 and 3 will make this very clear. Second, Godfrey can be seen as offering us a rather good argument in defense of at least object affectionism, and, as Duns Scotus recognizes, any future proponent of an alternative thesis, be it antiaffectionism or self-affectionism, must face up to his arguments here.

71. Solère, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject,” for instance, places Durand amongst the Augustinian-Franciscans, e.g., Peter John Olivi, Roger Marston, John Pecham, John Duns Scotus, and Henry of Ghent, who, by and large, endorsed a kind of self-affectionist doctrine. As we will see, this isn’t where Durand should be placed. Durand is rather, as Leibniz put it, although in another context (Essais de Théodicée I.27) a party unto himself (qui faisoit assez souvent bande à part). I’ll return to this issue when I take up the sources of Durand’s view, in Chapter 3, §3.1.5.
2 AFFECTIONISM AND SELF-AFFECTIONISM

Godfrey of Fontaines defends the thesis that the object is the efficient cause of a mental act, a thesis that Durand rejects. On Durand’s view, the object is the cause of a mental act, but it is not to be characterized as an efficient cause, but rather as a so-called ‘sine qua non’ cause. In this chapter, I want to look at Godfrey’s position in some detail. My aim in doing so is to put us in a better position to appreciate Durand’s own positive answer to the question: What causes a cognitive act? As we will see, Godfrey not only defends the thesis that the object is the total cause of the cognitive act but he develops a kind of master argument against what seems to be the only alternative—that the subject is the total cause of the act and the object a mere sine qua non cause. In the first two sections, I will look at both Godfrey’s defense of his own view and this master argument. In the third section, I will look at John Duns Scotus’s limited defense of the notion of a sine qua non cause in the case of a certain subset of mental acts, namely, volitions or acts of the will.

2.1 GODFREY’S DEFENSE OF AFFECTIONISM

Godfrey, whose scholarly career in Paris ends about the same time Durand’s begins, defends the thesis that cognition is passive and its object an efficient cause due primarily to his metaphysical commitments. He is perhaps most well-known to scholars of medieval philosophy as a tireless advocate of the so-called act-potency axiom, according to which

1. See, e.g., Quodl. XIII.3 193: “[…] actus potentiarum animae […] non sunt effectiue a potentia animae in qua sunt sed potius ab objecto.”
2. See, e.g., Sent. II-A 3.5 17: “Ex his patet, quod sentire et intelligere non sunt in nobis effectiue ab objecto.” ibid., 20: “[…] intelligere et sentire sunt in nobis […] ab objecto sicut a causa sine qua non.”
3. Godfrey’s first Quodlibet was held in Paris in 1285; his final and fifteenth Quodlibet in 1303/4. Durand is known to have been in Paris on June 21, 1303, since he signed an appeal of the convocation against Boniface VIII. For Godfrey’s dates and biography, see Chapter 1, fn. 19. Durand engages with Godfrey’s view on a host of other topics, more often than not taking up and defending his position. For some discussion of Durand’s intellectual relationship with Godfrey, see Iribarren, Durandus of St. Pourçain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadows of Aquinas, ch. 5.
nothing one and the same can be in both act and potency with respect to the same thing at the same time, the most general form of Aristotle’s dictum that what is moved is moved by another (*omne quod mouetur ab alio mouetur*). Godfrey decides that this act-potency axiom ought to be considered so certain and fundamental as to be inviolable and universal in scope.

It is fitting that certain principles are the most certain, for otherwise nothing could be investigated through them. Therefore, those principles of metaphysics, which somehow is every science, ought to be assumed in each special science; and therefore, since it is from metaphysics that we ought to know this—that one and the same item can’t be both in act and potency and that what is in potency to something can’t reduce itself to act with respect to it, and this pertains to metaphysics since it is common to every being—therefore we ought to assume this concerning angels and the soul and, with this assumed, investigate other matters which pertain in particular to the soul; nor, on account of ignorance or doubt about posterior things ought we to deny the most certain and first things. (*Quodl. VI.7* 170)\(^5\)


\(^5\) See also *Quodl. XIII.3* 193: “Et qui dicit contrarium hoc non probat et manifeste dicit contradictoria et contradictit primis principiis generalissimis fundatis super terminos generalissimos, scilicet super ens et non-ens, et super actum et potentiam.”
Godfrey appeals to this principle to resolve such diverse philosophical, physical (in a broad sense), and theological issues as the proof of God’s existence, the natural downwards motion of rocks, and his refutation of the (notorious) distinction between essence and existence. Accordingly, it isn’t surprising to discover that he appeals to this axiom in his discussion of issues that pertain to the subject-matter of psychology.

Godfrey’s reasoning can be put as follows. It is evident that a cognizant subject, or more precisely, a given cognitive power in a cognizant subject, is not always engaged in cognitive activity, or, in other words, it is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. For instance, Socrates, a cognizant subject, has a power for sight and a power for thought, each of which is sometimes engaged in its associated cognitive activity and sometimes not. Granted this, then, one might well wonder what actualizes a given cognitive power, that is, what reduces a cognitive power from potency to act. What reduces, for instance, Socrates’ power for sight from potency to act? (In what follows I will often talk of an


8. Godfrey also maintains the further thesis that all of our cognitive powers or potencies are really distinct both from each other and the essence of the soul (DQ 12 and Quodl. II.4). Durand also maintains this thesis (Sent. I-C 3.2.2–4, Sent. I-A 3.3–4, Sent. II-C 3.5). Durand, in fact, borrows Godfrey’s argument from DQ 12 and Quodl. II.4 in Sent. I-C 3.2.2 n. 37 (omitted in Sent. I-A 3.3). On Godfrey on the real distinction between powers and the soul, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 202–7, 314–47. For the distinction in general in scholastic debate, see Peter King, “The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism,” in Transformations of the Soul: Aristotelean Psychology 1250–1650, ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2009), 31–52 and Pasnau, “The Mind-Soul Problem.”
item ‘being reduced’ from potency to act or of something ‘reducing’ it to act; this is a very special and technical use of ‘reduce’, a literal translation of the scholastic Latin ‘reddere’.) Since whatever it is that reduces a passive power from potency to act is to be considered an efficient cause, the question “What reduces Socrates’ faculty for seeing from potency to act?” is the same as “What is the efficient cause of Socrates’ vision?” Hence, since a given cognitive power is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, what, as efficient cause, reduces it from potency to act? What, as an efficient cause, causes a cognitive act to occur?

On the surface, there are three options: (1) it reduces itself; (2) an item outside it reduces it; (3) both it and this item reduce it (as two necessary causes, jointly sufficient). In fact, Godfrey considers a fourth option (4): the composite of it and a certain ‘disposition’ added to it (presumably, from the object) reduces it. A cognitive power can’t reduce itself, neither (1) on its own, nor (2) together with the object, nor (4) together with an acquired disposition, because then, Godfrey reasons, the act-potency axiom will be violated. It will be violated because, as I’ll spell out in some more detail below, a cognitive power is (at least) passive with respect to the cognitive act since it receives it, and this much, Godfrey reasons, everyone would admit. But nothing can be both passive and active with respect to the same thing at the same time, for then it would be in potency and act at the same time with respect to the same thing. It follows that if the cognitive power were to reduce itself from potency to act (on its own, with a disposition, or with the object), then it would be both passive and active at the same time, and so both in potency and act at the same time.

Hence, it has to be the case that (2) something outside of it reduces it. The most plausible candidate here is, of course, the object and so Godfrey maintains that the object (and it alone) is the efficient cause of the cognitive act, reducing the cognitive power from

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9. Godfrey and other authors also sometimes speak of a power being actuated (*actuare*), educed (*educere*), drawn out (*extrahere*), or, more simply, transitioning (*exire*) from potency to act.
10. This is the *species*-theory of cognition discussed in Chapter 1.
potency into act.\textsuperscript{11} Hence, we are, Godfrey will go on to insist at length, in fact totally passive with respect to cognition and not at all active.\textsuperscript{12} Godfrey defends this thesis in the case of each form of mental activity: in the case of any psychological act (including an act of the will) the object is the total active cause; and so vision, thought, and volition are all passive and their objects are to be taken to be their efficient cause.\textsuperscript{13} As he puts it:

It ought to be said that neither the will nor the intellect moves itself or educes itself from potency to act but it is rather \textit{per se} changed by the object. (\textit{Quodl. X.14} 379)

Godfrey’s position can be seen as a kind of minority position on two counts. First, in the case of cognition, although many would agree that the object and the object alone is the efficient cause of our sensory perceptions, few would allow that it is the sole efficient cause of our intellectual cognitions. However, disagreement here usually concerned Godfrey’s account of the role of the agent intellect, although some authors, notably John Buridan and John Duns Scotus, also argued that, even setting aside the issue of how the intelligible object comes to be present and so able to move the possible intellect, it is impossible that it alone move the possible intellect without the possible

\textsuperscript{11} See, e.g., \textit{Quodl. IX.19} 276: “\textit{Obiectum ergo intelligibile habet rationem mouentis et agentis respectu intellectus possibilis educens ipsum de potentia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum illud[. . .].} \textit{Obiectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et mouentis[. . .].}” \textit{Quodl. XIII.3} 193: “Quia actus potentiarum animae qui dicuntur quaedam operationes non sunt effective a potentia animae in qua sunt sed potius ab obiecto.”

\textsuperscript{12} See, e.g., \textit{Quodl. IX.19} 276 “[. . .] et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passivi et receptivi.”

\textsuperscript{13} On Godfrey’s view, the object of the will is the extramental thing itself, the same thing which is the object of the intellect. See, esp. \textit{Quodl. VI.7} 168: “[. . .] quia dicitur quod illud idem quod est objectum intellectus est objectum voluntatis.” ibid., 170: “Vnde pro tanto intellectus mouet voluntatem in quantum voluntas non fit in actu a suo obiecto nisi natura saltem prius intellectus factus sit in actu ab codem obiecto. Vnde unum et idem objectum secundum rem efficit duplicem actionem ordine naturae, tamen prius unam quam alteram, sed simul tempore in codem subiecto, id est in anima ratione dictarum eius potentiarum, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis.” Godfrey discusses volition in \textit{Quodl. VI.7} and VIII.2. Godfrey’s view of volition, in contrast to his view of cognition, has received significant attention in the secondary literature. See (inter alia) Wippel, \textit{The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines}, 194–202 and Stephen Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” In Aertsen, Speer, and Emery, Jr, \textit{1277}, 719–94.
intellect also concurring as a partial efficient cause. Second, in the case of volition, quite a few authors argued that a view like Godfrey’s does not account for freedom.

One way to appreciate Godfrey’s position is to look at how he defends it against attack. We are fortunate here for many people attacked it. One of the most famous was Henry of Ghent, Godfrey’s older contemporary at Paris. Henry and Godfrey, in fact, sparred with each other on this topic (with a special focus on the will) in a series of public debates that spanned a baker’s dozen years or so. What is more, we have a more or less complete record of these debates. While this debate has been discussed in the contemporary literature, I want to focus on it again in order to illuminate Godfrey’s position, for in its dialectical context it really shines. An examination of this debate should also, I think, help us better refine what Durand has in mind when he tells us that the object is a *sine qua non* and not an efficient cause, for Henry of Ghent had also characterized the object (at least in the case of the will) as a *sine qua non* cause and not an efficient cause. As I will argue in the next chapter, Durand’s theory of *sine qua non* causality, in the end, looks very different from Henry of Ghent’s theory of *sine qua non* causality.

On Henry’s view, the object—something presented to the will by the intellect—does not actualize the will’s potency in the manner of an efficient cause but rather it is to be thought of as a so-called *sine qua non* cause, a mere necessary condition without which there would not be volition. It is not the object but the will itself that actualizes its own

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14. On Godfrey’s view, the agent intellect does not act upon the possible intellect, neither on its own, nor together with the object, but it rather removes an impediment on the side of the object so that the object can then act as an efficient cause upon the possible intellect. On the role of the agent intellect in Godfrey, see *Quodl.* V.10, VI.15, VIII.2, IX.19, and X.12. For some discussion see Wippel, “The Role of Phantasms in Godfrey of Fontaines’ Theory of Intellecction” and Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, 195–9.


potency. If acts of the will were caused by something other than the will, then these acts would not be free.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, at least in the case of volition, the act-potency axiom does not apply. Volition is a kind of self-change, a process wherein the will affects itself in the mere presence of an object. Even if in other cases (sensory perception and thought) the object is an efficient cause, in the case of free willings, the object can’t be an efficient cause. However, an episode of volition as a psychological act does demand an object and so the object of the will is a necessary or \textit{sine qua non} condition without which there would not be a volition. But it is not an efficient cause.\textsuperscript{18}

\section{2.2 Godfrey’s ‘\textit{achilles’} argument}

As mentioned, this debate spanned quite a few years and took place in the form of quodlibet disputations held at the University of Paris. During the course of these debates, Godfrey developed and refined a kind of master argument both in defense of his own position and against a position like Henry’s. John Duns Scotus, in his own recapitulation of the debate at the turn of the new century, labels this argument (or at least important bits of it) Godfrey’s ‘\textit{achilles’} argument against \textit{sine qua non} causality, meaning that it drives at the core theoretical problem with \textit{sine qua non} causality and any future proponent of the theory must face up to this argument if they wish to defend the notion.\textsuperscript{19} The \textbf{Achilles Argument}, as I will be calling it, is complex, having a number of components or steps. I think it is best to view it as having the following \textit{four} steps even though strictly speaking what Duns Scotus takes to be the \textit{achilles} are steps

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\item[\textsuperscript{17}] See, e.g., \textit{Quodl.} X.9 235: “[...] voluntas mouet se scilicet quia aliter periret liberum arbitrium[...].”
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] On Henry’s response to Godfrey, see Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
three and four in the analysis below. This analysis will abstract away from some of the smaller details in order to provide a better picture of the whole; I will allude to some possible responses to each of the steps and in the section that follows this I will explore some of these responses in a little more detail.

### 2.2.1 The necessity principle

Let’s begin with the alternative: a psychological power (in this case, the will) is an active not a passive power. But this seems impossible. An active power is by definition a power or ability to bring about a change in something else (*potentia activa est principium transmutandi aliud inquantum aliud*). For instance, when the hot stove, having an active power to make something else hot, acts, something else, outside the stove, becomes hot. But when Socrates wills or sees something, nothing else, outside of Socrates, changes. We might call this the **Necessity Principle**: if A acts, then it is necessary that there be a P (somehow distinct from A) which is affected by A. The opposite is also true: if P is affected, then it is necessary that there be an A (somehow distinct from P) which is acting upon P.\(^{20}\) In short, when an agent is acting, some patient is being affected; and when a patient is being affected, some agent is acting. Unless Bob is a thespian, it just seems odd to say that Bob acts even though he is not acting upon something.\(^{21}\)

The necessity principle is not simply true by definition. Godfrey recognizes two kinds

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\(^{21}\) In what follows I will be using the term ‘agent’ and its correlate ‘patient’ in their technical scholastic sense. Agency, in this sense, has nothing to do with acting upon reasons and so even ovens are agents: an agent (*agens*) is something that does something or performs an action (*agere; actio*) and a patient (*patiens*) is something that has something done to it or undergoes a passion or affection (*pati; passio*). For some discussion of this point, see Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, 21, fn. 1.
of agents: univocal agents and equivocal agents. In the former case, Godfrey argues, in order for an agent to make a patient F, it must itself be F. For instance, in order for the stove to make water hot, the stove must itself be hot, or, to use an example Godfrey uses, “the liver can only make the stomach hot if it is itself already made hot” (Quodl. VI.7 165). This principle, too, can be found in Aristotle, and we might call it the Actualism Principle.\(^{22}\) Hence, if an item is a univocal cause and were it able to reduce itself from potency to act—from being able to be hot to being hot—then it would have to be already in act—already hot—in the first place, and so it will be in potency and act with respect to the same thing at the same time, a patent violation of the act-potency axiom.

However, in the case of an equivocal agent, the agent does not need to be F in order to make the patient F. For instance, by common consent, most medieval philosophers held that the sun is an equivocal agent: it is able to make things hot even though it is not itself hot.\(^{23}\) Hence, the actualism assumption seems to apply to univocal agents but not equivocal agents. It might seem that, were an equivocal agent to act upon itself, the act-potency axiom would not be violated, since an equivocal agent need not be F in order to make something F.

In fact, both Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus attempt to exploit the notion of equivocal agency in order to explain, as it were, the self-motion of the will. For instance, Duns Scotus writes (of Godfrey’s view):

> As to the first argument of the second opinion (which fully renders the soul vile) when it is argued that “nothing moves itself” [NB: ‘moves’ is to be taken in its broadest sense as a change], it ought to be said that an item can be moved by some other item in two ways: either as by a univocal cause or as by

\(^{22}\) See, e.g., Quodl. V.II 41: “[...] ad hoc quod aliquid agat uel producat aliquid sufficiat quod sit ens [...] in actu tale quale est aliud in potentia [...].” Quodl. VIII.2 19 and VI.7 152–4. In Aristotle, see, e.g., Phys. III.2 202a9–12.

\(^{23}\) Better examples? Indeed, the fact that it is hard to come up with better examples suggests something about the dubious nature of the distinction itself. For a list of examples, see footnote 25 below.
Chapter 2. Affectionism and self-affectionism

an equivocal cause. Now, it is impossible that an item be moved by itself as univocal cause. In fact, this totally entails a contradiction. Why? A univocal cause that moves an item already has the form towards which the moveable item is moved. If, then, an item were to move itself as univocal cause, then, before it moves itself, it would have the form towards which it moves. But a moveable item lacks the form towards which it is moved. Therefore it will both lack and have the same form at the same time and so it will both have it and not have it at the same time, or, in other words, it will be in potency and act with respect to the same form at the same time—which entails a contradiction. [...] However, if we are talking about an item moved by an equivocal cause, then this does not follow, since an equivocal cause has some other form than the form towards which the moveable item is moved. (Lect. I 3.3.2–3 n. 403)²⁴

Godfrey, of course, recognizes this option and rejects it as well.²⁵ First, Godfrey points out, the example they appeal to (the case of the sun) is not a case of, as it were,

²⁴. See also Ord. I 3.3.2 n. 513: “Cum probatur quod possibilis [sc. intellectus -PJH] non potest habere causalitatem aliquam, quia nihil idem agit in se—respondeo quod illa propositio non est uera nisi de agente uniuoco, nec illa probatio eius quod tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia concluidit nisi quando agens agit uniuoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit; si enim sic aliquid ageret in se, ergo haberet simul formam eiusdem rationis ad quam mouetur, et dum mouetur ad illam, careret illa; ergo simil haberet illam et non haberet—saltem hoc sequitur de duabus formis eiusdem speciei, uel de cadem. In agentibus autem aquiuoco, id est in illis agentibus quae non agunt per formas eiusdem rationis cum illa ad quam agunt, propositio illa quod nihil mouet se non habet necessitatem, nec probatio eius quod aliquid sit in potentia et in actu respectu eiusdem aliquid concluidit: non enim ibi agens est tale formaliter in actu quale passum est formaliter in potentia, sed agens est virtualiter tale in actu quale formaliter est passum in potentia; et quod idem sit virtualiter tale in actu et formaliter tale in potentia, nulla est contradictio.” Rep. II 25 n. 12 (quoted below). See also Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XIII.11 131 and Quodl. X.9 221, 230.

²⁵. Quodl. VI.7 150: “[...] Et ad declarandum quomodo voluntas mouet seipsam, dicunt quod [...]erum est etiam quod agens siue mouens semper est tale in actu quale est mobile in potentia. Sed esse tale contingit dupliciter, sc. virtualiter et formaliter. In quibusdam enim est agens tale uirtute quale passuum est in potentia, sicut in sole, qui est calidus uirtute, et inducit caliditatem formalem in aliquo corpore mixto; sicut etiam graue habet formam secundum quam habet similitudinem uirtualum ad locum deorsum et ideo mouet se ad illum, amoto impedimento; ita etiam appetitus humanus habet a creante formam liberi arbitrii qua uult secundum actum, aut potest uelle, amoto impedimento, quod est absentia obiecti, quo facto praesente in intellectu per cognitionem, libere uult illud, si sit finis, uel potest uelle liberum arbitrium, si sit ad finem. Sed ista positio non uidetur rationabilis[...]”
self-motion, for the sun, even though it is an equivocal agent, acts upon something else distinct from it in subject. Hence, the solution seems a bit too ready-made and ad hoc since there doesn’t seem to be a case of equivocal self-agency (other than, of course, the will).\textsuperscript{26} Second, while it is true that an equivocal agent doesn’t have to be formally F in order to make some patient F—the sun doesn’t have to have the form of heat in itself in order to make the water hot—still an equivocal agent must be virtually F in order to make some patient formally F. This distinction—between formal act and virtual act—was a common one.\textsuperscript{27} As Godfrey understands this distinction, this means that the equivocal agent must be in a virtual act and so have some form which is more noble than the form which its patient has being in formal act. The form that the sun has (whatever that might be) in virtue of which it makes water hot is more noble than heat. But, Godfrey goes on, if an equivocal agent were to act upon itself and give to itself the form which it produces in something else, then it would reduce itself from a more noble or more perfect state. It wouldn’t just add heat alongside whatever form it already has because it is, by hypothesis, a simple item, and so it can have but one form at one time. Hence, it would reduce itself from a more noble state to a less noble state. This, Godfrey thinks, is unfitting.\textsuperscript{28}

Admittedly, it is less clear that such a situation is a clear contradiction, in the way that a univocal agent acting upon itself is a clear contradiction. Even so, Godfrey goes

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[26.] Quodl. VI.7 151.
\item[27.] See, e.g., Henry of Ghent Quodl. II.6, X.9 231, Thomas of Sutton, Quaest. Ord. 7 and Quodl. I.11 81, John Duns Scotus, Quodl. 15 n. 3, Lect. II 25 n. 44, Durand, Sent. II-C 12.1 and Sent. II-C 14.1.
\item[28.] Quodl. VI.7 151: Praeterea, sicut impossibile est quod illud actuum quod est formaliter quale debet facere passuum sit illud passium et se ipsum faciat formaliter tale, ita impossibile est quod illud quod est virtualliter tale quale debet facere passuum sit illud passium et faciat se ipsum formaliter tale. Sicut enim contra rationem eius quod formaliter est tale quale debet facere passium est quod ex quo iam est tale faciat se tale, quia iam esset in actu et in potentia secundum idem et respectu eiusdem, item essent in eodem numero et subiecto plura accidentia numero differentia et plura alia inconuenientia sequeruntur; ita etiam contra rationem eius quod virtualliter est tale quale debet facere passium, formaliter est quod ex quo iam est tale eminentiori et perfectioni modo, quia est principale agens quod faciat se tale minus perfecto modo. Inconueniens etiam est quod qualitas secundum quam agens aliquid tale dicitur uritur et qualitas secundum quam aliquid tale dictur formaliter illi correspondens, cum haec dicantur esse tali non-univoce sed aequivoce, quod sint perfectiua unius et eiusdem subiecti, etc.\textsuperscript{7}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
on, in the particular case of the will such a situation faces a special problem. If a will, before it wills, being in virtual act, is in a more noble state than a will, while acting, having the formal act, then it would seem that the will, when it wills, is less noble than the will when it it doesn’t will. But, of course, the nature of the beatific vision and other considerations make this a rather implausible position: a will that is willing, all things considered, is better than a will that is not willing, and in particular, a will that is willing God is more noble than one that is not.29

Now, both John Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent have their answers to this sort of objection, but I want to leave these details to one side.30 What we can take away from the above discussion of the necessity principle is this. Nothing can act upon itself and reduce itself from potency to act. A univocal agent can’t act upon itself and reduce itself from potency to act, for then it would be in both potency and act at the same time with respect to the same thing. An equivocal agent also can’t act upon itself and reduce itself from potency to act, for then it would reduce itself from a more perfect state to a less perfect state.

2.2.2 The sufficiency principle

However, if we want to reject the necessity principle and so allow that an item can reduce itself from potency to act, we face another problem. Whenever a sufficient agent is present to a sufficient patient, then the action will come about. When the pie is next to the stove, the pie will become hot: the stove’s action will come about and a passion

29. Quodl. VI.7 151: “The primary agent is either more noble than the effect (if it isn’t a univocal agent) or as noble as the effect (if it is). Further, [if it is not a univocal agent] it is more noble or more actual than that out of which or in which the effect is produced. Further, if the agent is a composite, then it is more noble or as noble as the composite it produces. If, then, nothing [other than the will] is the agent with respect to the will proper—neither the intellect nor the object in virtue of the intellect—and the will itself educes itself through itself from potency to act, and it does so as the primary (and not the instrumental) agent such that it is virtually the sort of item that it makes itself [formally] be in act, then the will without volition will be more noble than the whole [composite of the will and] volition.”

30. See, e.g., Duns Scotus, Quodl. 15 and Quaest. Meta. IX.14 n. 23 (discussed below). In Henry, see, e.g., Quodl. X.9 223–5 (discussed below).
on the side of the pie will come about.\footnote{31} Call this the \textit{Sufficiency Principle}. Hence, since the will is the sufficient patient with respect to a volition—for it receives it—then, were the will also the total efficient cause or agent, it would always be engaged in volition. But we do not always will. (Nor see, hear, and so on.) As Godfrey puts it:

When the \textit{per se} active item is present to the \textit{per se} passive item then the action will follow, under the assumption that all the impediments have been removed, as is clear based upon the Philosopher, \textit{Metaphysics IX}. Therefore, if the will is claimed to be both the passive and the active item which are always present to each other [\ldots], then the action will follow—and one can’t propose an impediment to this, for what can impede the same item from being present to itself? (\textit{Quodl. VI.7 151–2})

This problem, known in the literature as the problem of omniactivity,\footnote{32} compels us to admit that there is \textit{some other cause} over and above the will that is necessary in order for a volition to occur when it occurs. What might this something else be? The most obvious candidate is, of course, the object.

Why can’t we claim that what is also necessary is an act of volition? Well, if our analysis is the causation of an act of volition, then this answer will be pretty uninformative: we will when we will and don’t will when we don’t will! If, however, our analysis is the causation of some psychological act other than an act of the will, then this answer starts to look very implausible: I don’t see when I will, for if Fido is present and all obstacles have been removed, it would seem that I see Fido regardless of whether or not I will.

\footnote{31. Godfrey, \textit{Quodl. X.14 381: “[\ldots] praesentibus actiuo et passiuo consurgit action[\ldots].” See also \textit{Quodl. VI.7 151: “[\ldots] quando actiuum per se est praeens passiuo per se sequitur actio et in hoc exclusum omne impeditiuum, ut patet per Philosophum nono Metaphysicae.” In Aristotle, see \textit{Meta. IX.5 1048a5–7}.}

Hence, even if we claim that the will is both active and passive, we must take the object to be a necessary cause. Of course, we need not take the object to be a necessary efficient cause. This is, presumably, what Henry of Ghent and others who endorse the notion of *sine qua non* causality mean when they claim that the object is a cause but not an efficient cause: the efficient cause is the will which reduces itself from potency to act and affects itself *if and only if* the object is present.

We now arrive at the core theoretical problem with the notion of a *sine qua non* cause. In Godfrey’s lights, such a view is mysterious and *ad hoc*. It is mysterious because it is committed to the claim that the object is a cause but not one of Aristotle’s recognized four kinds of causes. It is *ad hoc* because it seems committed to the claim that *sine qua non* causality applies only in the case of the will: in all other cases if an object is present to a power, then, if that power is passive, the object is the agent or efficient cause reducing it from potency to act, and if that power is active, the object is the patient or material cause reduced from potency to act.

Let’s look at each of these objections in a little more detail.

### 2.2.3 The mystery objection

Aristotle recognizes but four kinds of causes: the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final. Since the subject and not the object is the recipient of the thought or volition, the subject and not the object is the material cause. Nor is it plausible to insist that the object is the formal or final cause, and since the object is denied to be an efficient cause, it would seem that it is not a cause at all. In other words, what *kind* of cause is the object? If there is a fifth kind of cause over and above Aristotle’s gang of four, I would like to hear a bit more about it. Hence, the notion of *sine qua non* causality is mysterious. To put it differently, a *sine qua non* cause is not classified as a cause.\(^{33}\)

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33. *Quodl.* XV.4 24–5: “Si autem sit causa sine qua non aliquid faciens ad effectum, quaero in quo genere causae se habet? Constat quod non in genere causae formalis, quia objectum non est forma actus uolendi; nec etiam est causa materialis, quia objectum non est subiecutum in quo recipiatur actus uolendi [. . .] nec
Of course, all that one will have to do in order to face up to this objection is provide some explanation of what a *sine qua non* cause might be. After all, why should the Stagirite have a stranglehold on the kinds of causes that are? I'll look at Duns Scotus’s attempt at providing us with just such an explanation in the next section. In the chapter that follows this one, I will take it to be something of my goal to provide us with Durand’s own explanation of *sine qua non* causality.

### 2.2.4 The ad hoc objection

The other core problem with the notion of *sine qua non* causality is that an appeal to a *sine qua non* cause seems rather ad hoc, a ready-made solution to the problem. We must have a reason to suppose that one instance of change is to be a case of self-change, involving a *sine qua non* cause, and another instance of change a case of as it were ordinary change, not involving a *sine qua non* cause. As Godfrey had already noted, we shouldn’t deny certain metaphysical principles such as the act-potency axiom on account of any particular matter. We ought not, in other words, make swiss cheese of our metaphysics and limn it with provisos and exceptions to the rule.34

To put it somewhat dramatically, if we admit into the world so-called *sine qua non* causes then we will have made causal explanation impossible. If we admit that there are *sine qua non* causes, such that P, in the presence of A, becomes \( \varphi \) (whereas P not in the

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34. *Quodl.* IX.19 273: “Vniuersaliter igitur tam in voluntate quam in aliis dicendum quod nihil mouet se ipsum […]; et hoc praeципue propter rationes actui et passui […] , quia si de ratione potentiae actuœ, secundum quod huimusmodi, est posse agere in aliud secundum quod aliud, passuœ autem est transmutari ab aliud secundum quod aliud, patet quod in quolibet genere entis oportet actuum et passuum esse raliter distincta. Si autem dicatur quod in quibusdam de ratione potentiae actuœ est transmutare aliud in quibusdam idem hoc sine ratione dicitur et in hoc etiam manifeste contradictoria implicatur et qua ratione dicitur in uno et in aliio. Vnde posito quod in uno solo idem agat in se ipsum uel educat se de potentia ad actum aequali facilite ponetur in omnibus.”

31. *Lect.* II 15 n. 23 (quoted below, footnote 59).
presence of A does not) and that this is owing to (i) P’s self-affection and (ii) A as a mere *sine qua non* cause, then we might as well claim that whenever it looks as if any item whatsoever becomes \( \varphi \) owing to some other item as efficient cause, in fact what has occurred is that the former item became \( \varphi \) owing to (i) its own self-affection and (ii) the latter item as a mere *sine qua non* cause. Hence, branches will become burnt thanks to their self-action together with fire as a mere *sine qua non* cause. Any *prima facie* passive power can be said to be the active cause of its own act and the purported active power or agent said to be a mere *sine qua non* cause. As Godfrey puts it:

> If this can be said about the will, then with equal ease and with reason one might deny that there is any active power distinct from the passive power and so claim that each and every thing moves itself from potency to act. [...] Also, how will one prove that the branch or a body becomes hot thanks to fire? Rather, one can say that it makes itself hot when the fire—as *sine qua non* cause—is present. (*Quodl.* VI.7 158)

Or, to quote Bartholomew of Bruges (writing in Paris between 1307 and 1309):

> [...] matter would change to a form in the [mere] presence of some extrinsic thing and a woman would impregnate herself when a man is present and the wood would change itself into artificial forms (e.g., a stool or a bed) when the artisan is present. (*De sensu agente* 57)

Hence, provided the alternative—self-change across the board—is off the table, then one must provide a criterion which can be used to decide whether an instance of change is a case of ‘ordinary’ change or a case of self-change. And Godfrey, for one, is little convinced that his opponent has a decent criterion at hand.\(^{35}\) As he puts it:

\(^{35}\) *Quodl.* VI.7 158: “Non est enim dare quare in unum exeat potius quam in aliud si nulla facta sit in ea mutatio quae prius non erat, aut si, quacumque mutatione facta secundum quenquemque influxum, adhuc manet indifferens quantum est de se ad utrumque.”
Nor does it seem that it could be postulated to be otherwise about whatever specific thing, that one and the same item in reality and in subject might move itself—except if one were to say as one pleases and for no reason: “This is its nature”—since whatever reason is given for its being otherwise, this can be found in whatever other item. Hence, I say, as a universal claim, that nothing one and the same (I mean: in reality) is, thus, active upon itself and reduces itself from potency to that act with respect to which it was in potency. (Quodl. VIII.2 23)

On Godfrey’s view, there is no plausible criterion we can appeal to as to why one set of things (wills, say) is capable of self-action whereas another set of things (everything else, in fact) is not. A disjunctive attitude about the issue seems to be rather arbitrary: If a change in X in the presence of Y is either a case wherein Y is a sine qua non cause or a case wherein Y is an efficient cause, then, well, upon what ground do we decide upon one of the disjuncts over the other? Hence, on his view, it is a kind of all-or-nothing affair: either every purported instance of causation is in fact an instance of self-change or every purported instance of causation is in fact an instance of ‘ordinary’ change involving an extrinsic efficient cause. Godfrey, of course, thinks it is better to claim that when X becomes ϕ this is not ever owing to the fact that X made itself ϕ in the presence of something else which although it looks to be an agent in fact is not, but it is rather always because there is some other item which is really an agent—which acts upon as efficient cause whatever changes. If we admit sine qua non causality, in other words, then it will be a slippery slope into a view about causality which makes no sense at all, at least according to Godfrey.36

36. One might find this alternative—self-change across the board—attractive, for it comes close to the analysis of causation which we find attractive nowadays, namely, counterfactual dependence. But notice that the self-change or self-affection doctrine still clings to certain, as Hume would call them, mysterious entities as part of its analysis of change: there is still an active power (the will, say) and a passive power (again: the will) and the impression and reception of a ‘form’ (the volition). This is not how Durand analyzes the notion of sine qua non causality. All that such a view does is take the standard scholastic-
2.3 Duns Scotus’s defense of self-affectionism

To be sure, Godfrey’s achilles argument didn’t convince his opponents. Henry of Ghent, for one, continued to insist that Godfrey’s arguments simply do not compel us to abandon the view that the will (at least) is the sole efficient cause of its own volitions, the object being a mere *sine qua non* cause or condition.

This debate was carried on by Godfrey’s student, John Lesage *a.k.a.* John Sapiens, who became engaged in a similar back-and-forth with Gonsalvus of Spain (the regent Franciscan master in Paris). Gonsalvus rejected Godfrey’s arguments and took up a defense of Henry’s arguments and Lesage responded on Godfrey’s behalf, a debate that continued for some years.\(^{37}\)

John Duns Scotus (who worked under Gonsalvus while at Paris), interested as he was in the absolute freedom of the will, took a special interest in this debate.\(^{38}\) Duns Scotus’s views are interesting here for at least two reasons. First of all, the solution that Duns Scotus arrives at is not (as I will aim to show in Chapter 3) the solution that Durand arrives at. Second, Duns Scotus *seems* to have changed his mind while in Paris on the issue.\(^{39}\) Now, I want to stress ‘seems’ here because (*pace* Dumont) it still seems to me

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Aristotelian analysis of change and apply it to cases of self-change and sets those alongside the others. Durand invents a new analysis of causation altogether and sets it alongside the others. But insofar as Durand is a disjunctivist about change—change is either counterfactual dependence or affection—he will still have to face up to Godfrey’s objections here, as we will see.


that it is an open question as to whether he changed his mind or merely softened his tone in order to ameliorate his supervisor, Gonsalvus.  

What is clear, however, is this. In his early treatment of the issue at Oxford (Lect. II 25), Duns Scotus presents Godfrey’s position as one extreme (according to which the object is the total cause) and Henry of Ghent’s position as the other extreme (according to which the will is the total cause), and opts for a middle way (via media) according to which both object and will are two partial causes, jointly sufficient, neither of which is on its own sufficient.

I answer, therefore, to the quaestio that the efficient cause of an act of willing is not just the object or the phantasm as the first opinion claims (because this in no way safeguards freedom) nor is the efficient cause of an act of willing just the will as the second opinion claims (because this does not safeguard all the conditions which follow an act of willing). Therefore, I hold a middle way: both the will and the object cooperate in causing an act of willing such that the act of willing is from the will and from the object as from an efficient

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40. Dumont thinks he did change his position. Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” 749: “But what does all of this indicate about Scotus’s doctrine of the will in the Reportatio question? Why has Scotus focused exclusively on Godfrey’s view and left aside all criticism of Henry’s position? Why has he not explicitly explained volition in terms of partial causality, as he did in the Lectura, but instead reached a conclusion similar to Henry’s position, which he had so emphatically rejected at Oxford? The answer can only be that at Paris Scotus undertook a defense of Henry’s position against Godfrey.” See also ibid., 773: “All evidence considered, it is clear that the Lectura and the Reportatio contain two different positions on the causality of the will[. . .].”


42. Lect. II 25 n. 54: “Alia opinio—Gandaui—extrema est quod sola uloluntas est causa effectiuæ respectu actus uolendi et objectum cognitum est tantum causa sine qua non[. . .].”
cause. (n. 69)

However, in his later treatment at Paris, Duns Scotus changes the presentation. He presents and refutes the first extreme opinion (Godfrey’s) but then presents and offers some defense of what was previously the second extreme opinion (Henry’s). He also drops the five arguments he had raised against it. Finally, he omits his own positive ‘partial cause’ thesis. However, despite the somewhat spirited defense of the second extreme opinion (that the will is the total cause), his own responsio which comes towards the end is presented as the following negative claim:

I say, then, to the quæstio that nothing created apart from the will is the total cause of volition in the will.\[46\]

So did Duns Scotus change his mind on the will? Did he abandon the partial cause thesis in favor of the sine qua non thesis? The problem is that this negative thesis is compatible with both the partial cause thesis which he had defended earlier at Oxford and the sine qua non thesis, for on both views it is true that the object (i.e., something apart from the will) is not the total cause of the act of willing.\[47\] Even though Duns Scotus does provide some positive argumentation on behalf of Henry of Ghent’s position (more on this below), and even though Duns Scotus doesn’t provide any positive argumentation

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43. A potential confusion. In what follows I draw from three texts to reconstruct Duns Scotus’s position at Paris: (1) the text contained in the Vivès edition, volume 23, which I will call the Reportatio, (2) the text contained in the Vivès edition, volume 13, which I will call the *Reportatio*, and (3) William of Alnwick’s Additiones magnae II.25 (edited in Carolus Balič, Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences. Étude historique et critique, Bibliothèque de la revue d’histoire ecclésiastique (Leuven: Bureaux de la revue, 1927), 264–301.) For some discussion, see the Vatican edition, volume 7, pages 4*–5* and volume 8, 89*–92*. See also the introduction in François Lauret, La cause du vouloir suivi de l’objet de la jouissance. Traduction, présentation et notes (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2009). In brief: Reportatio is the most pure, although the differences between these texts is not that dramatic.
44. Lect. II 25 nn. 55–68.
45. ibid., nn. 69–80.
46. *Rep.* II 25 n. 22: “Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod nihil aliud a uoluntate est causa totalis uolitionis in uoluntate.” *Rep.* II 25 n. 20: “Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod nihil creatum aliud a uoluntate est causa totalis actus uolendi in uoluntate[...].” It is true that the Latin (indeed the English) could mean: The will is the total cause and nothing else is the total cause. However, there’s other evidence that Duns Scotus means to keep his options open. See below.
47. To be explicit: (A) Nothing apart from $X$ is the total cause of $\varphi$ is compatible with (B) $X$ and $Y$ are two partial causes of $\varphi$ and (C) $X$ is the total cause of $\varphi$. 
in defense of the ‘partial cause’ thesis, he still seems to wish to leave his options open. He seems to take, in other words, an ambivalent stance; he never determines which is better: the partial cause thesis or the *sine qua non* thesis.

To pick one example, consider his answer to the first opening argument from authority, which is the same in both the Oxford text and the two Paris texts. The argument is that Aristotle in *De Anima* III tells us that the appetible moves an appetite as an unmoved mover and he seems to mean by this that it is an efficient cause.\(^{48}\) This argument, of course, is an argument based upon authority; even so it is a good authority and so one should have an answer to it provided one wishes to to hold that the object is not *at least* a partial efficient cause of the volition.\(^{49}\) Hence, in *Lect*. II 25, Duns Scotus finds no reason to even give an answer to it since it supports his case.\(^{50}\) But in *Rep*. II 25 and *Rep*. II 25 he gives *two answers*. The first is the answer that someone who holds the partial cause thesis *might* give. The second, however, is the answer that someone who does not hold to either the total or partial cause thesis *might* give. Hence, he seems to


\(^{49}\) The argument itself is a common one. It is present in, e.g., James of Viterbo, *Quodl*. I.7 and Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*. X.9 228, 238–9.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., n. 81: “Ad auctoritatem primae partis patet responsio quod est pro hac uia, quod obiectum mouet simul cum uoluntate respectu actus nolendi; unde ista opinio [sc. Scoti -PJH] habet pro se rationes affirmatias et negatias.” The affirmative arguments are the arguments in defense of the thesis that the object is at least a partial efficient cause (nn. 2–11); the negative arguments in defense of the thesis that the will is at least a partial cause (nn. 12–20).
wish to keep both answers on the table as live options.\textsuperscript{51}

In general, Duns Scotus seems to take this ambivalent stance about the causation of volition in \textit{Rep. II 25} and \textit{*Rep. II 25}. He is clear, however, that the total cause of an act of willing is not the object; but he is less clear whether or not he thinks we should opt for the \textit{sine qua non} thesis or the partial cause thesis at the end of the day, and whenever he defends the \textit{sine qua non} thesis he is careful to use qualifiers such as “by maintaining the view that” or “one might say”.\textsuperscript{52}

By contrast, consider his treatment of the issue of the causation of a cognitive act. At Oxford, in his \textit{Lectura} (\textit{Lect. I 3.3.2–3}), he had also considered Godfrey’s thesis and a \textit{sine qua non} thesis and he rejects both, using some of the same arguments from II.25. (He maintains, of course, the partial cause thesis.) In \textit{Ord. I 3.3.2} and \textit{Quodl. 15} (i.e., at Paris)\textsuperscript{53} he considers, again, Godfrey’s thesis and a \textit{sine qua non} thesis. In \textit{Ord. I 3.3.2} he adds an interesting revision, a comment as to how one might be able to defend the notion of a \textit{sine qua non} cause in the case of volition.\textsuperscript{54} Yet, in \textit{Quodl. 15} and \textit{Ord. I 3.3.2}, he does not take an ambivalent stance about the issue of the object’s causal role: he clearly opts for the partial cause thesis. He writes:

I should answer to the \textit{quaestio} that an actual thought is something that isn’t perpetually in us but it has existence after it had non-existence just as we

\textsuperscript{51}. \textit{Rep. II 25} n. 21: “Ad primum principale, sustinendo quod objectum mouet effectuie uoluntatem, non tamen est causa totalis, tunc auctoritas Aristotelis est pro me. Vel sustinendo quod tantum appetibile mouet metaphoriue, tunc uult Aristoteles intelligere quod sicut appetibile mouet appetitum metaphorice ita appetitus motus mouet effectiue animal ad exequendum, ut acquiratur illud appetibile.” \textit{*Rep. II 25} n. 24: “Ad primum principale, qui diceret quod objectum mouet uoluntatem effectue, non tamen ut totalis causa sed ut aliquid ibi faciens, tunc non esset glossanda auctoritas quod mouet sc. metaphoricue, ut tunc auctoritas esset pro me. Vel sustinendo et dicendo quod appetibile mouet appetitum tantum metaphorice, tunc debet intelligi, quod sicut appetibile mouet appetitum metaphorice, ita appetitus sic motus mouet effectiue membra ad exequendum, ut acquiratur illud appetibile.”

\textsuperscript{52}. \textit{*Rep. II 25} n. 18: “[. . . ] sustinendo quod quamquam uoluntas sit actiua, tamen intellectio uel objectum apprehensum est illud sine quo non sicut ponunt ali quod intellectio sine phantasmate non est in actu, et hoc facit naturalis ordo potentiarum[. . . ].” \textit{Rep. II 25} n. 14: “[. . . ] sustinendo quod quamquam uoluntas sit actiua, tamen intellectio est sine qua non uel objectum quamquam nihil agat, sicut ponunt ali quod intellectio non est sine phantasmate actu et illud facit ordo naturalis potentiarum[. . . ].”

\textsuperscript{53}. He omits the question in his Paris \textit{Reportatio}, book one, distinction three.

\textsuperscript{54}. In fact, an \textit{additio}: \textit{Ord. I 3.3.2} n. 417–421 (quoted in footnote 57 below).
experience. It is fitting to posit some active cause of this actual thought which is somehow in us for otherwise it would not be under our control to think when we want (which is against the Philosopher in *De Anima* II). However, it seems obvious here that it is fitting that the soul and the present object concur [. . .]. I say, then, that the total active cause of this thought is not the object [. . .] nor is the total cause of the thought the intellective soul or something formally belonging to it [. . .]. If, therefore, neither the soul alone nor the object alone is the total cause of the actual thought—and these alone are what seem to be required for the thought—it follows that these two are one integrated cause with respect to the generated cognition. (*Ord.* I 3.3.2 nn. 486–94)

Hence, object and intellect are two partial causes, both necessary, and jointly sufficient in causing the thought—a thesis Duns Scotus doesn’t back down from throughout his career.\(^{55}\)

Whether or not Duns Scotus changed his mind on the will is an intriguing issue, of course, but I think we can set it to one side at the moment, for what is important here is how he goes about defending (even if it is a tentative defense) the *sine qua non* thesis—both against Godfrey’s attack and, for that matter, against his own earlier one from the *Lectura*. In what follows, then, I want to first go over his analysis of Godfrey’s position, showing where he agrees and disagrees with Godfrey’s attack on *sine qua non* causality, and then I will turn to his later defense of *sine qua non* causality.

### 2.3.1 Duns Scotus vs. Godfrey

Now, common to both the Oxford and Paris texts is a rejection of Godfrey’s thesis that the object is the total efficient cause of the act of willing, a view which, of course, entails that

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55. In a *very* early work (if authentic), *QDA* q. 12 (Vtrum potentiae animae, sc. intellectiva et sensitiua, *sint tantum passiuae*), Duns Scotus discusses the same issue, but his presentation and his answer (if he even gives one) are very different. He doesn’t, for instance, discusses Godfrey’s view nor the partial cause thesis. The editors of the (recent) critical edition make the interesting case that this text is also from Paris, albeit from an earlier stay, sometime in the early 1290s.
the will is totally passive. This view, as Duns Scotus puts it, fails to safeguard freedom.\textsuperscript{56} However, such a view, Duns Scotus admits, does follow from the act-potency axiom. But the act-potency axiom is not as certain as Godfrey thinks it is: there are, in fact, quite a few \textit{prima facie} exceptions to the act-potency axiom (other than the will) which at least suggest that it might be neither the most universal metaphysical principle nor the most certain. Indeed, Duns Scotus doesn’t hesitate to ridicule Godfrey’s recalcitrance on this point. In \textit{Rep. II} 25, for instance, Duns Scotus writes:

This [“that something can move itself”] is not opposed to a metaphysical principle since metaphysical principles are most evident and this principle [“that nothing moves itself”], when its terms are made evident, does not occur to many people; in fact, it seems to them that it is false. (n. 10)

In \textit{Quaest. Meta. IX.14} he writes:

What he adds there concerning metaphysical principles is true: there are most universal metaphysical principles and none of them allows for a particular exception to the rule. […] But how is this [“that nothing moves itself”] said to be a principle since so many \textit{absurda} follow from it? I do not believe that Aristotle had posited such a complex principle as the first much less the tenth which entails so many obvious \textit{absurda} in so many particular cases! (n. 23)

In the \textit{Ordinatio} we find similar passages: “there are no metaphysical principles that entail that so many singular instances are false” (\textit{Ord. I} 3.3.2 n. 516). Hence, “the principle that they rely upon is false, namely, that the mover and the moved must be distinct in subject” (\textit{Lect. II} 25 n. 46).

So, Duns Scotus rejects the act-potency axiom both at Oxford and at Paris. This, of course, makes perfect sense since a rejection of Godfrey’s thesis that the object is

\textsuperscript{56}In the case of cognition, his main line of argument is to appeal to various cases of intellectual cognition which suggest that the intellect is at least in part active. See \textit{Ord. I} 3.3.2, \textit{Lect. I} 3.3.2–3 and \textit{Quodl. 15}; cf. \textit{QDA q. 12}. 
the total cause does not entail the *sine qua non* theory. As we saw above, on Duns Scotus’s view, the necessity principle—the thesis that an action is always an action upon something else somehow distinct from the agent (see page 56 above)—is true in the case of an univocal agent, but quite false in the case of an equivocal agent.\(^{57}\) An equivocal agent is able to act upon itself and reduce itself from potency to act as both the efficient and material cause. Even more generally, Duns Scotus tells us, if the act-potency axiom were without exception, then we would be unable to account for the contingency we find in the world.\(^{58}\)

### 2.3.2 Duns Scotus vs. Henry of Ghent

However, as mentioned, granted a rejection of the act-potency axiom, we are still free to endorse either the *sine qua non* thesis or the partial cause thesis. In *Lect. II 25*, Duns Scotus seems to have taken a liking to Godfrey’s mystery and ad hoc objections against the *sine qua non* thesis (see page 62 above) and so opts for the partial cause thesis. Indeed, Duns Scotus uses these two objections in his refutation of Henry’s position, and he rejects the *sine qua non* thesis as both ad hoc and mysterious in the *Lectura*. For instance, he writes:

> In addition to the four kinds of causes it would be necessary to posit some

\(^{57}\) In addition to the passage quoted on page 57, see also *Rep. II 25* n. 12: “Et cum dicitur passum est tale in potentia quale agens in actu, dico quod hoc est uerum in actione uniuoca et impossibile est quod idem sit in actu ens formaliter tale, et in potentia ante actum formaliter tale; tamen in actione aequiuoca numquam oportet hoc esse uerum quia ibi agens oportet esse nobilius et uirtualiter tale.” See also *Ord. I 3.3.2* n. 516: “[...] intelligendo autem quod nihil est in actu virtuali et in potentia ad actum formalern, et quod ista repugnantia accipiatur ex ratione actus et potentiae, multa sunt singularia satis patenter falsa, ex quo satis sequitur quod istud non est principium metaphysicum. Sed quod nihil est in actu formal et in potentia respectu eiusdem actus formalis, est uerum, scilicet quod sic nihil est simul in actu et in potentia. Et si omuinò contendas quod ‘etiam loquendo de actu virtuali et potentia ad formalern actum, sit principium metaphysicum’, quomodo aliis erant ita caeci, et ille solus uidens, ut rationem terminorum communium metaphysicorum non possent concipere, et ex eis apprehendere uritatem talis complexi quod ipse ponit principium metaphysicum? — quod non tantum ab aliis non ponitur principium, inmo in multis falsum, et nusquam necessarium ratione terminorum.”

\(^{58}\) *Rep. II 25* n. 20: “[...] aliquid euenit contingentem in rebus, hoc est, euitabiliter [...]. Quaero igitur: a qua causa contingentem euenit?” For further discussion of Duns Scotus’s rejection of the act-potency axiom, see King, “Duns Scotus on the Reality of Self-Change” and Effler, *John Duns Scotus and the Principle ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’*. 
other cause or to reduce a *sine qua non* cause to one of them, since when all the causes are posited, it is necessary to posit the effect.\(^{59}\)

And likewise he applies the ad hoc or slippery slope objection:

Against this [i.e., Henry’s opinion] it is argued with the argument of the other people who hold the opposite position [i.e., Godfrey]: [If it is true], then it can be said that any item whatsoever changes itself (e.g., the branch burns itself when fire is present). This is because, on this view, the following is a *non sequitur*: “When fire is present the stick becomes hot and when fire is absent the stick doesn’t become hot; therefore fire makes the stick hot.” On this view, what follows is: “Therefore, the branch makes itself hot and fire is a *sine qua non*.\(^{60}\)” Just as, according to you [i.e., Henry], the following is a *non sequitur*: “When the object cognized by the intellect is posited a volition is posited and when the object is removed the volition is removed; therefore, the object is the cause of volition.” On this view, what follows is: “Therefore the object is a *sine qua non*.\(^{60}\)”

Hence, in the *Lectura*, Duns Scotus decides that at least these last two steps in Godfrey’s achilles argument convince: they convince us to maintain that the object’s causal role is efficient even if they do not convince us to maintain that the object is the

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59. *Lect.* II 25 n. 58. Duns Scotus makes the same charge against the *sine qua non* thesis in the case of cognition in *Lect.* I 3.3.2–3 n. 324: “Praeterea tantum sunt quattuor genera causarum, ex II Physicorum et V Metaphysicae, quae simul accepta sufficienter ponunt effectum in esse si sint sufficienter approximata passo et passum sit summe dispositum quia si causae quattuor existentes in tali dispositione non producerebant effectum in esse, tunc non sufficienter essent causae, sed esset ponenda quinta causa. Praesentibus igitur causis—uel quattuor uel duabus uel tribus uel quotquot habet necessitas—illis positis et sufficienter approximatis ad passum, effectus producitur ab eis uel necessario, si agant ex necessitate naturae, uel possunt producere, si agant libere. Sed objecto non existente praesente, non potest anima habere actionem suam intelligendi, et tamen anima tunc est sufficienter disposita; sunt etiam quattuor causae, secundum istam opinionem, nam sufficit quod duae causae praeecedant, scilicet causa efficiens et materialis, forma autem et finis secundum esse sequuntur. Sed si anima sola sit principio sufficientis eliciendi actum, tunc istae duae causae praeecedunt, quia anima est et efficiens et recipiens et sunt summe disposita; ergo anima objecto non praesente intelligeret, quod falsum est. Non igitur anima est sufficienti principium eliciendi actum sed requiritur aliud in rationem principii eliciendi.”

60. *Lect.* II 25 n. 57.
only efficient cause. In other words, he thinks that there is no problem in the view that
the subject acts upon itself as both agent and patient (and so violates the act-potency
axiom). However, the mystery and ad hoc arguments compel us to avoid the thesis that
the subject is the total cause of an act of volition and the object a mere sine qua non
cause. For what kind of cause is a sine qua non cause? And, were we to allow sine
qua non causality in the one case, then we would seem to be forced to allow it in every
case. Rather, the object is a partial efficient cause cooperating with the will as the other
partial efficient cause in much the same way that a mother and a father cooperate in the
production of a child or the husband and the wife in good housekeeping.61

While Duns Scotus gives four other arguments against the sine qua non thesis, I want
to highlight just one more of these before I turn to his very different treatment in Rep.
II 25 and *Rep. II 25. The third argument he raises against the sine qua non thesis is as
follows:

The act of willing is essentially related to the object as what is measured
to the measure and not the other way around (for from the fact that the
stone is willed, it does not follow that it depends upon the will). But what is
measured depends upon the measure either as a posterior effect upon a prior
effect or as an effect upon a cause. (I am not talking about the sort of priority
with respect to which the human nature depends upon the suppositum of the
Word and an accident upon its subject […].) But the act of will does not
depend upon the cognized object as upon a prior effect. Therefore, as upon
a cause.62

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61. Lect. II 25 n. 73: “Tertio modo aliquando plura agentia concurrunt in causando ita quod alterius
ordinis sunt aut rationis, contra primum modum, quorum neutrum capit ab alio uirtutem actiunam sed
utrumque habet causalitatem propriam perfectam in suo genere—unum tamen est agens principale et
aliud minus principale, ut pater et mater ad productionem prolis et stilus et penna ad scribendum
et uir et mulier ad regimen domus. Sic in posito: uoluntas habet rationem unius causae, scilicet
causae partialis respectu actus uolendi et natura actu cognoscens objectum rationem alterius causae
partialis—et utraque simul est una causa totalis respectu actus uolendi.”

62. Lect. II 25 n. 66. For discussion of the issue related to the parenthetical aside, see Giorgio Pini,
“Substance, Accident, and Inherence. Scotus and the Paris Debate on the Metaphysics of the Eucharist,”
Call this the **Dependency Objection**: a volition depends upon the object; yet this dependence relation isn’t the kind of dependence relation that one effect has upon some prior effect. Therefore, it is the dependence relation that an effect has upon its cause.

Notice that Duns Scotus never gives us a *reason* why the dependence relation can’t be of one effect upon some prior effect, which is interesting since this is precisely how he explains *sine qua non* causality in *Rep.* II 25 and *Rep.* II 25.

### 2.3.3 Duns Scotus vs. Duns Scotus

So, how does the Duns Scotus at Paris answer to these objections from the Duns Scotus at Oxford?\(^{63}\)

**The mystery objection, Duns Scotus’s reply**

Duns Scotus decides that there can be a kind of ‘natural priority’ which is not the priority that obtains between a cause and its effect. He points out that even Godfrey would have to admit this much, because Godfrey holds that there can be no volition unless there is first a cognition, and yet a cognition is neither material nor efficient cause of the volition. Hence, it is a necessary or *sine qua non* precondition: “igitur tale sine qua non necessario praeexigitur” (*Rep.* II 25 n. 16). In general, Duns Scotus declares, if one effect,

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*in Boulnois et al., DSP, 273–312. See Lect. III 1.1 and Ord. III 1.*

63. He raises the ad hoc objection against himself in *Rep.* II 25 n. 4; *Rep.* II 25 n. 4. *Rep.* II 25 n. 4: “Si dicatur quod non sequitur [sc. semper esset actio -PJH], quia objectum est causa sine qua non et ideo non potest esse semper ulitio nisi obiecto praesente, contra: Sic posset sustineri quod quodlibet semper agit in se quantum est ex parte sui quod tamen non semper agit in se, hoc est, quia aliquid deficit sine qua non. Vnde lignum est combustiun sui non tamen combustur se nisi igne praeente quia ignis est sine qua non. Ita igitur probabiliter posset sustineri quodlibet agere in se sicut volutatem agere in se.” *Rep.* II 25 n. 4: “Dices quod objectum apprehensum requiritur, sicut causa sine qua non […] contra: quia sic posset sustineri, quod quodlibet agit in se, nam si lignum approximatum igni comburat, dicam eodem modo quod ignis non comburit sed lignum comburit se, et ignis est causa sine qua non, et sic dicam de omnibus.” He raises the mystery objection against himself in *Rep.* II 25 n. 15; *Rep.* II 25 n. 20. *Rep.* II 25 n. 15: “Dices effectus non dependet nisi a causis prioribus, ut materia, efficiente, quantum ad fieri, igitur si objectum non sit actium nec est materia actus uolendi, igitur non dependet ab obiecto.” *Rep.* II 25 n. 20: “Si etiam instes sic: Effectus non dependet a causis prioribus quantum ad suum fieri, nisi a materia et efficiente; cum igitur objectum respectu actus uolitionis non se habeat nec ut materia nec ut efficiens, igitur ulitio non dependebat ab obiecto, et sic esse poterit sine obiecto.”
B, can’t come about unless some other effect, A, already exists, then, provided A is not the efficient cause of B, A is a *sine qua non* cause of B. B depends upon A as a *sine qua non* cause or necessary precondition (*praeexactum*). The example he goes on to give is the following:

Example: The sun can’t illuminate the posterior part of the medium unless it illuminates first (in nature) the part closer to it; and yet the part closer to it having been illuminated is not a cause with respect to the illumination of the posterior (more distant) part since it is immediately illuminated by the sun as the immediate cause. Whence, so too sensory imaging (*phantasiatio*) or the apprehended object is necessary for volition and as a *sine qua non* cause.

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64. Rep. II 25 nn. 15–6: “Dices effectus non dependet nisi a causis prioribus, ut materia, efficiente, quantum ad fieri, igitur si obiectum non sit activum nec est materia actus uolendi, igitur non dependet ab obiecto; igitur semper erit in actu, sicut sensus semper sentiret si esset activus. Dico quod necessario est aliqua prioritas naturae quae non est prioritas causae respectu effectus quia, secundum sic arguentes, intellectio est necessario prius natura uolitio et tamen non in aliquo genere causae, igitur tale sine qua non necessario praexigitur, et non sufficient causae per se ad fieri, ut actio et passio. Istim prioratem oportet ponere propter ordinem potentiarum et tamen potentia inferior non est causa superioris. Vnde phantasiatio non est causa totalis intellecctionis et tamen necessario est prius in nobis ut plurimum et maxime secundum istum doctorem [sc. Godfrey -PJH] qui ponit quod agentem et patiens sunt distincta subiecto, oportet ponere prius uolitione aliquid in parte intelletuina ut intolectionem quae tamen per eum nullo modo est causa uoluntatis. Dico igitur quod quando unus effectus est posterior alio effectu et neuter habet rationem causae respectu alterius, posterior effectus habet dependentiam ad causam prioram et effectum priorem tamquam ad sine qua non.” *Rep. II 25 n. 19: “Dico igitur hic primo, quod oportet in hac materia, etiam secundum eos, dare aliquid prius, quod tamen non sit causa efficiens, sed sit causa sine qua non, et hoc probo per ipsum, qui hanc opinione ponit. Nam secundum ipsum intellectus non est causa intellecctionis, nec uoluntas uolitionis, sed solum phantasma est causa utriusque, et tamen, secundum eum, impossibile est phantasma prius causare uolitionem, nisi prius natura causet intellecctionem, et ita ponit intolectionem esse causam sine qua non ipsum uolitionem. Quod igitur uoce negat, dictis suis affirmat, scilicet causam sine qua non. Intellectio enim, secundum eum, est prior natura uolitione, tamen in nullo genere causae se habet respectu uolitionis; quando enim aliquis effectus praeceedit alium effectum ordine naturae, non potest causa exire in actum causandi effectum posteriori, non prius causato effectu priori illa prioritate.”  n. 20: “Patet satis per praedicta huius objectionis solutio, licet enim effectus dependeant solum a causis prioribus, quantum ad suum fieri per se et suum esse per se, materia scilicet et efficiente, potest tamen dependere ex alio tanquam ex illo, quod est praexactum necessario.”

65. The proviso ‘in nature’: because both effects might come about at the same precise time; but conceptually the prior effect is prior to the posterior effect.

What Duns Scotus is driving at is a defense of the option he rejected in the dependency argument. It would seem that X might depend upon Y for its very existence even though (a) Z (not Y) is the efficient cause of X and (b) Y is neither the material, formal, or final cause of X. A *sine qua non* cause is simply a necessary precondition.67

67. Duns Scotus makes the same point, at some greater lengths, in an *additio* to *Ord.* 13.3.2 (nn. 417–21). This addition comes after his refutation of the *sine qua non* thesis of cognition, a refutation which is the same as the one found in *Lect.* 13.3.2–3. In brief, he outlines four cases where a *sine qua non* cause has purchase: (1) volition/pleasure: one can’t take pleasure in something unless one already is engaged in an act of volition; but the act of volition isn’t the efficient cause of the act of taking pleasure; (2) thought/desire: one can’t have a desire unless one has a thought; (3) the intelligible *species* or phantasm/thought: one can’t have a thought unless one has a phantasms or intelligible *species*; (4) sunlight in the air/water: light isn’t in the water unless it is in the air. I quote this passage at length, even though it is a kind of scattered note because I think I haven’t been emphasized in the literature. Moreover, it would seem that Duns Scotus might allow for a *sine qua non* analysis of at least intellectual cognition. “Haec tamen ratio concluderet similo modo ut uidetur contra actionem uoluntatis. Vnde responderi potest quod quando formae habent essentialem ordinem ut recipiuntur in eadem siue natura siue potentia, et hoc siue ab eodem agente siue alio, dato etiam quod neutra sit ratio recipiendi alteram, numquam secundum potest induci ab agente in suo receptiuo nisi prima prius inducta. Exemplum de uolitione et delectatione: ponendo illa esse diversa realiter, numquam secunda recipitur nisi prima prius recipitur; cum tamen secunda habeat causam actuam naturalam [sc. obiectum -PJH] praesentem sibi antequam sit uolitio, in huismodi ordinatis negatur maior. Simile de specie intelligibile ad intellactionem, ponendo speciem intelligibilem non esse causam nec receptiunm intellactionis; simile de lumine in medio, si non sit actuam nec receptiunm speciei coloris. Nota: aliter dicitur quod quandoquemque aliquam formam recipi in suo potentiali de necessitate praexigit aliam formam recipi in suo susceptiuo, falsa est illa maior ‘agens perfectum approximatum passo et non impeditum potest agere’, intelligendo de potentia propinqua—et hoc siue receptiunm formae prioris sit eadem potentia cum receptiunm formae posterioris (exemplum: uolitio et delectation in uoluntate), siue sit eadem natura (exemplum: in anima intellectio et uolitio, ponendo uoluntatem totaliter actuam respectu uelle), siue in eodem supposto recipiuntur non in una natura nec potentia (exemplum: de phantasmate et intellactione, si negetur species intelligibilis et actio tota detur intellectui), siue in alyo et alyo supposto recipiatur forma prior et posterior (exemplum: lumen in aere et in aqua, a sole). Nec hic salvatur propositum quod ‘forma prior sit actiua respectu posterioris uel ratio recipiendi’ sicut lumen in medio respectu speciei coloris, quia si in talibus instetur, nihil ualet instantia, quia ibi actuam proximum deficeret uel passuum proximum: in quattuor instantiis iam positiis [sc. volution/delectation, intellaction/volution, phantasm/intelllection, lumen -PJH] neutro conditio [sc. quod actuam proximum deficit uel passuum proximum -PJH] accidit, nam nec uolitio est causa actuam delectationis, sed obiectum, nec receptiua, sed voluntas; sic in alii [instantiis -PJH] secundum illas opiniones. Nec est dicendum quod maior illa est uera nisi ab eodem agentem sint duo effectus necessario secundum ordinem producibles, quia etiam non est uera si necessario sit ordo inter formas a diversis agentibus inducibles, sicut patet in instantiis positis. Vniversaliter ergo, quaequemque forma ad hoc ut recipiatur in suo passiuo requirit aliam prius recipi in quocumque et a quocumque, numquam actuam formae secundae est in potentia accidental ad agendum in receptiunm illius nisi forma priore iam inducta. Ergo forma posterior quoad fieri dependet essentialiter ab alio a suis per se causis in fieri quae sunt agentes et materia. Potest concedi hae conclusio, quia prius essentialiter non tantum competet causae (patet in tractatu De primo principio cap. 1) tamen non probabiliter negatur illa nisi ostendatur prioritas formae alterius—uel ut actiua respectu secundae uel ut rationis recipiendi uel ut effectus propinquioris causae communi uel cause necessario prius causanti.”
As to the ad hoc objection, Duns Scotus gives a number of answers. One answer he gives appeals to control (potestas):

I say, therefore, that it is fitting that a patient be affected by something else (pati ab alio) and when it can’t be affected by something else, it follows that it is affected by itself (pati a se). But the will is not affected (in connection with its act) by some other created item apart from itself, since to will is under the control of the will, whereas an extrinsic agent is not under the control of the will. (Rep. II 25 n. 15 [om. *Rep. II 25])

This looks to be a direct answer to Godfrey’s charge: the rational criterion which Godfrey worries about is simply the fact that the will has control over what it undergoes, whereas other patients do not have such control. Hence, in cases where an effect in some subject is under its control then we can claim that what looks to be the efficient cause of that effect (i.e., the object in the case of a volition) is, in fact, a mere sine qua non cause. This seems to provide a neat enough division between branches erupting into flame and Socrates’ wanting something.

Still, an appeal to ‘control’ seems rather dubious; indeed, it looks close to Godfrey’s complaint that one can simply declare that “this is its nature” and be done with it. Moreover, it comes close to begging the question: Why is the will so special? Well, it’s because it has control. What does it mean to have control? Well, to be the will, of course.

Another answer he gives is more interesting. He writes:

One doesn’t have to claim that, therefore, all items are active with respect to themselves and simply lack sine qua non causes since, as Aristotle in De generatione [et corruptione] II [says]: “Nature always does what is better.” Hence, just as one ought not to ever posit a plurality without necessity, so
too one ought not to ever posit that a nature is ignoble without necessity. However, an item receptive of a perfection is more perfect if it is able to be active with respect to this perfection and so nature supplied the need as often as it could. (*Rep. II 25 n. 16 [om. *Rep. II 25]*)

I want to call this Scotus’s **RAZOR**: \textit{numquam est natura ignobilitanda sine necessitate.} One shouldn’t, in other words, suppose without good reason that something is so ignoble that it is incapable of self-action.

What Duns Scotus seems to be doing with this answer is shifting the burden of proof. Our default intuition, he seems to be saying, should be that X becomes Y owing to X itself as efficient cause. This should be taken to be the standard case and so anytime something changes from one state to another we should assume that it did it to itself \textit{unless there is some manifest reason why not}.\footnote{Rep. II 25 nn. 16–17 (emphasis mine): “Cum igitur existens in actu primo perfecte et tantum in potentia accidentalis ad actum secundum non eget agente extrinseco ad hoc quod exeat de potentia ad actum, ut patet octauo Physicorum et secundo De anima, illud est nobilitas naturalis. Ideo dico uniuersaliter quod omne existens in actu primo perfecte sufficat ad hoc quod exeat in actum secundum nisi possit manifeste probari quod aliud ad hoc requiratur. Sicut manifeste patet quod uiusus non sufficit existens in actu primo ad hoc quod exeat ex se in actu secundum quia ut patet in tenebris non uidentus.” *Rep. II 25 n. 20: “Dico tertio, ad instantiam de ligno calefactiuo sui, cum dicitur, si ita esset de uoluntate, ita possit dici de quocumque alio, scilicet quod lignum comburit seipsum praesente igne, qui est causa sine qua non, concedo quod existens in actu primo non indiget aliqo effectiuo ducente ipsum ad actum considerandi, nisi habens actum primum deficiat in aliquid, quod necessario requiritur ad hoc, quod possit exire ad actu secundum; sicut quamuis oculus hominis, qui non potest immutare medium, haberet actum primum uident; non tamen possit uidentie rem in tenebris.”}

2.3.4 **Concluding remarks on Duns Scotus**

I want to close this discussion of Duns Scotus’s theory of \textit{sine qua non} causality with a few concluding remarks.

1. First, I want to stress one aspect of Duns Scotus’s position here which will be important when we come to Durand’s view. On Duns Scotus’s view, the will \textit{is} affected. The will receives or takes on its own volition. Of course, it is not affected by \textit{something else} (\textit{pati ab alio}) but it is affected by \textit{itself} (\textit{pati a se}). Hence, I characterized Duns
Scotus’s position as a kind of self-affectionism. The will is both active and passive: it is passive, at least, because it is the passive recipient of the volition; it is active, as well, because nothing else could be the corresponding agent, at least not in the created world. Durand, by contrast, will want to insist that the will (and for that matter any psychological powers) is not passive in this sense, for no psychological change should be analyzed as a kind of being affected, even if we have available the resources to cash out this notion in terms of self-affection, that is, even if we aren’t committed to the further thesis that the object is the agent which acts upon the power. What is at issue here, as we’ll see in Chapter 3, is the ontology of psychological acts. On Duns Scotus’s view, a psychological act is an absolute form received into the subject. He makes this explicit when he defends the thesis that our mental acts are, ontologically, absolute items (qualities) as opposed to relative entities in Quodl. 13. Durand defends the opposite thesis: a mental act is a relation and not an absolute form superadded to the mental faculty. Hence, he holds that psychological change isn’t a kind of being affected (and so doesn’t involve the reception of form) but it is rather a kind of being related: it involves the acquisition of a new relational property and not the acquisition of a new non-relational property.

2. Second, Duns Scotus seems to be, thus, committed to a disjunctive analysis of change. On his view, a given case of change is either what we might call a so to speak standard case of change involving an extrinsic agent or it is a special case of change involving a sine qua non cause. Such a disjunctivist position is one which, I have suggested above, Godfrey of Fontaines rails against. On Godfrey’s view, if there is a case

69. ibid., n. 4: “Cum igitur operatio non sit praecise relatio, ut probant rationes iam posita, sequitur quod non sit praecise respectus, et per consequens est ibi aliqua entitas absoluta[. . .].”
70. Obviously, there are non-standard cases of standard change: sometimes the effect has weak or intentional existence, sometimes the effect requires the constant presence of the agent, sometimes an effect requires one or more extrinsic agents, sometimes an effect is acquired together with the concomitant lose of an existing property in the patient and sometimes it is not, and so on. What makes all of these cases standard however is the fact that one (or more) extrinsic agent is required and that the change is to be analyzed in terms of the giving and receiving of forms.
of change, then this is a standard case of change, and he finds it implausible to posit a special case of change, for then we will have to find some principled reason to decide whether a given case of change is to be analyzed as a special or a standard change. This theory works perfectly well in explaining other kinds of natural effects, so why not put it to work in our explanation of psychological effects? The problem with disjunctivism is that we must have some criterion that determines us towards one of the disjuncts. Of course, we might have such a criterion, but I doubt Scotus’s razor will hold up under analysis in the way Ockham’s razor has.
3 DURAND’S THEORY ABOUT THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS AND CAUSATION OF OUR COGNITIVE ACTS

According to Godfrey of Fontaines, the present object is to be characterized as the efficient cause of the cognitive act. Hence, on his view, the presence of the object to a cognitive power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition under which cognition can be said to come about, for what is also necessary is that the object act as efficient cause upon a cognitive power in the cognizant subject, reducing it from potency to act. Such a view takes cognition to be a passive enterprise, the reception of form owing to the object as efficient cause.¹ Durand, by contrast, holds that the presence of the object is a sufficient condition under which cognition occurs.² On Durand’s view, the object should not be characterized as an efficient cause, which impresses a form upon the cognizant subject when it is present and in this way reduces a cognitive power in her from potency to act, but rather the object should be characterized as a so-called sine qua non cause. In other words, whereas Godfrey holds that the object causes the act, Durand holds that it occasions the act.

In the last chapter, we saw some of Godfrey’s argumentation in defense of his position. When object is present to subject, then, were the object not to cause the act, the subject

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¹ In fact, Godfrey seems to hold that presence is not even a necessary condition, for God might be able to cause a thought without the object’s being present. See Chapter 1, fn. 70. In what follows, I will ignore this wrinkle. In other words, at least in the natural order of things, Godfrey holds, the presence of the object is necessary, for if the object were not present, then it could not act upon the subject as efficient cause.

² Durand seems to think that his position doesn’t even force us to make the proviso: “at least in the natural order of things”, for, while God can bring about in a direct manner an absolute entity, he can’t bring about in a direct manner a relative entity. Hence, even God must present the object to the mind in order to cause a thought. See below. It is interesting to note here that Thomas Wylton thinks that even Durand must still make this proviso. Quaestio, “Quod in intellectu…” 509: “Ideo non est necesse quod omne objectum cummuniter per se causet actum, uel per se cum aliis, uel etiam sine quo non causatur actus. Nam Deus posset causare in uirtute phantastica mea speciem alicuius rei praesentis uel futurae quam nunquam uidi. Per ipsum speciem haberem actualm cognitionem de re illa, qualem nunc habeo de absente. Ista tamen objectiue cognita a me nec per se causauit actum cognitionis in me, neque per se cum aliis, nec fuit causa sine qua non, quia dato quo esset, talem cognitionem habere potero per phantasiam.”
would have to be said to cause the act. But the subject can’t cause the act, since nothing can be both passive and active with respect to the same thing at the same time, a thesis that follows from the act-potency axiom. Since Godfrey holds that the act-potency axiom is the most certain of all metaphysical principles, he thinks that we must, therefore, maintain that the object is the efficient cause of the cognitive act—and this despite whatever inchoate intuitions we might have about the relative nobility between things and the purported active nature of cognition. Moreover, all the going attempts at explaining the notion of a sine qua non cause, Godfrey argues, are either mysterious or ad hoc. If the intellect (or the will) which looks to be the passive recipient of the act owing to its object as cause were, in fact, the agent cause, then why not claim that in any case where it looks as if X became Y owing to Z as efficient cause, what has actually transpired is that X became Y owing to X itself (as efficient cause) and Z as mere sine qua non cause? Furthermore, the cognitive act depends upon the object for its existence as upon a cause; yet Aristotle offers us but four kinds of causes upon which some effect might depend and so a sine qua non cause must reduce to one of these, for otherwise it would be a rather mysterious sort of cause.

Durand, by contrast, holds that the object simply can’t be an efficient cause, for, as we saw in Chapter 1, he takes serious both the intuition that we possess some sort of cognitive agency along with the idea that the inanimate can’t be an efficient cause with respect to the animate. Hence, he holds that Godfrey’s view, as attractive as it might seem, just can’t stand. Rather, Durand tells us, one ought to characterize the object as a mere sine qua non cause. But, as Godfrey had asked, what is a sine qua non cause? Moreover, even provided a coherent and adequate answer to this question—which avoids the further charge of being a ready-made solution—is it appropriate to characterize the cause of a cognitive act as a mere sine qua non cause?

In the first section of this chapter, I want to examine Durand’s answer to the first question. That is, I want to outline Durand’s basic defense of the notion of sine qua non
non causality. I will argue, in brief, that he does meet the challenge that faces him: he provides a positive account of the notion of a sine qua non cause and in doing so he points to other domains (besides cognition and volition) wherein the notion has purchase. In the second section, I will take up the issue of whether it is appropriate to characterize the cause of a cognitive act as a mere sine qua non cause.

3.1 Durand’s theory of sine qua non causality

In Sent. II-A 3.5, after his discussion and rejection of two theories about the causation of our cognitive acts—the species-theory of cognition and Godfrey’s theory—Durand tells us that the first thing to be done here is to investigate the question: Quid sit cognoscere? He takes this question to be an ontological one and its scope includes both so-called intellective acts (intelligere) and sensitive acts (sentire). Is a cognitive act, he asks, something absolute superadded to the cognitive power?\(^3\) He goes on to argue that it is not. Having established this much, he then provides his answer to the causation question: A quo sit intelligere et cognoscere in nobis? Durand’s decision to address the ontological question first is not incidental, for as we will see his distinctive thesis about the causation of a cognitive act is tied up with his distinctive thesis about the ontological status of a cognitive act. In fact, he thinks that his account of the causation follows in part from his account of the ontology. He writes:

And so the first [sc. quid sit cognoscere] is clear: thinking (intelligere) doesn’t make reference to something [absolute] superadded to the intellect. As to the second [sc. a quo sit cognoscere], it should be said that thinking and sensing (sentire) are in us (i) from what per se gives us an intellect and our senses (i.e., the creator or the generator) and also (ii) from the object as sine qua non.

\(^3\) This is the same question which Duns Scotus raises in Quodl. 13; indeed, Durand comes to the opposite conclusion which Duns Scotus comes to: Durand argues that such acts are relative items and not non-relative items; Duns Scotus argues that they are non-relative items not relative items.
Chapter 3. Durand’s theory

non cause. The first member of the conjunction is clear based upon what has already been said, for if thinking and sensing are not something [absolute] superadded to the senses and the intellect, then it follows that they are from the same thing. (Sent. II-A 3.5 20)

Now, it will be important in what follows to distinguish three elements in Durand’s positive account about the causation of a cognitive act. First, there is the ONTOLOGICAL CLAIM. On Durand’s view, a cognitive act—an occurrent episode of cognition in a cognizant subject—is not something absolute added to the cognitive power—the non-occurrent capacity for cognition in a cognizant subject. In fact, it is not something absolute added to the cognizant subject at all but it is rather a kind of relation that the subject enters into once the object is present. In contemporary terms, we might say that, on Durand’s view, a thought (or a sensory perception) is not a monadic property but rather a polyadic property.⁴

Second, there is what I will call the GENERANS CLAIM: a cognitive act comes about in us (somehow) from what furnished us with our capacity to engage in such cognitive acts in the first place. Just as what made fire and gave to it its capacity to make other things hot is the cause (in some sense) of its episodic acts of making things hot, so too what made Socrates and gave to him his mental capacities is the cause (in some sense) of his episodic mental acts.

Finally, there is what I will call the SINE QUÁ NON CLAIM: the object is involved in the cognitive process not as an efficient cause but rather as a mere sine qua non cause (whatever that might mean).

These three claims Durand evidently feels are connected with each other. Indeed, he tells us that the generans claim follows from the ontological claim. But at first sight the

connection between the three claims isn’t at all obvious; in fact, at first sight the claims themselves aren’t at all obvious. Hence, in what follows, I hope to unpack this passage so that by the end of this section we should be in a better position to see how these three claims might be connected to each other and, ultimately, whether or not Durand does provide an adequate account of *sine qua non* causality in light of the sorts of objections to it that we saw in the last chapter. My ultimate goal, of course, will be to show what Durand’s account of cognition amounts to and what the prospects are for its success. Hence, in the second section I will address some further issues which his account seems to face.

3.1.1 THE ONTOLOGICAL CLAIM

Why would Durand even want to defend such a *prima facie* absurd claim? After all, I sometimes think and sometimes do not, which would seem to suggest in a pretty obvious way that thoughts *are* something superadded to if not my intellect at least me, for a thought is something which I have which before I did not. This sort of objection rests upon precisely the false assumption Durand wishes to undermine. It is true enough that I sometimes think and I sometimes do not think, but this does not entail that a thought is, therefore, something absolute superadded to me or my intellect. Quite the contrary, a thought is not something absolute superadded to me or my intellect.\(^5\) Thinking should be thought of in relational terms: a thought is not (*pace* almost all of his contemporaries) an absolute entity like a qualitative form which inheres in or informs whatever it is added to but it is rather a relative entity like a relation—or, in other words, it is not something I *have* but it is a way in which I am related to something else. When I think, nothing non-

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\(^5\) See, e.g., ibid., 20: “Cum igitur intellectus sit quandoque sine intelligere, uidetur, quod intelligere faciat compositionem cum intellectu [...]. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod intellectus non est perfectior, cum actu intelligit quam ante intelligere per se, sed solum per accidens eo modo, quo graue perfectius est, cum est deorsum quam impeditum. Quae tamen perfectio non est per compositionem; sicut enim graue simil cum grauitate acquirit locum, nisi prohibeatur, sic habens intellectum statim per ipsum intelligit, nisi sit defectus obiecti intelligibilis, ut magis patebit infra.”
relation is added to me or my intellect which wasn’t there before; rather the intellect enters into a new relation which it hadn’t been in before. On Durand’s view, just as relations aren’t in or added to the related subject, so too thoughts aren’t in or added to the thinking subject. Or, to put it the other way around: Just as relations are in or added to the related subject, so too thoughts are in or added to the thinking subject; but the manner in which a relation is in or added to its foundation is quite different from the manner in which an absolute accident is in or added to its subject. According to Durand’s ‘modalist’ theory of relations, absolute accidents inhere in or inform their subjects whereas relative accidents do not.\(^6\)

His ontological claim seems to have prompted a fairly immediate response from his academic supervisor, Hervaeus Natalis.\(^7\) In *Quodl*. II.8, while answering the question

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7. Josef Koch used Hervaeus Natalis’s second *Quodlibet* (Christmas 1308 or Easter 1309) as a *terminus ad quem* for Durand’s first redaction, since in it Hervaeus quotes Durand while attacking several of his positions whereas in Hervaeus’s first *Quodlibet* (Christmas 1307 or Easter 1308) there is no mention whatsoever of Durand’s views. For a *status quaestionis* on the dating of Hervaeus’s *Quodlibeta*, see Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature.” However, the *terminus a quo* for Durand’s first redaction is still very much an open question, although 1303 is the usual answer. For a *status quaestionis* on the dating of Durand’s *Sentences* see Russell Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Current Research*, ed. G. Evans, vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002), 41–128 and the bio-bibliography at the end of the present dissertation. In sum, we can’t conclude that Durand, therefore, delivered his lectures which culminate in his first redaction between 1307/8 (when Hervaeus delivered his first *Quodlibet*) and 1308/9 (the date of his second), although very recently William J. Courtenay, “The Role of University Masters and Bachelors at Paris in the Templar
whether thinking and saying (dicere) are the same in God, Hervaeus makes one of the earliest explicit references to Durand’s ontological claim.

But here what remains is but one doubt, namely, what sort of thing is an act of thinking? Concerning this some say that all cognitive dispositional states (habitus) and [episodic] operations, both of the intellect and of the sense and of their respective appetites, are pure relations (pure relationes); however, I hold that they are certain absolute qualities and the foundation of certain respects that follow upon them as will be proved in Quodlibet III. (Quodl. II.8 f. 48vb)\(^8\)

As advertised, in Quodl. III.8 (Christmas 1309), Hervaeus returns to Durand’s ontological claim and he attacks, point-by-point, Durand’s Sent. II-A 3.5. Not only did Durand’s thesis initiate an immediate reaction from his supervisor, it also stuck. Even after Durand’s second redaction (before 1312), which omits these claims and the discussion entire, we can find authors citing (and refuting) Durand’s ontological claim as found in Sent. II-A 3.5.\(^9\)

ARGUMENTS FROM THE disputatio

We owe a great deal of debt to Josef Koch, who first brought Durand’s Sent. II-A 3.5 to the attention of historians and philosophers interested in medieval philosophy of mind.

Affair, 1307–1308,” in 1308, ed. Andreas Speer and D. Wirmer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 35 (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 176–7 argues for this idea based upon the fact that Durand is not yet listed as a bachelor in 1307.

8. Durand defends the further thesis that habits and dispositions are mere relations and not super-added absolute items. See, e.g., Peter of Palude’s and Nicholas Medensis’s presentation of his (lost) Sent. III-A 23 in Sent. III 23.1–2 and Evid. III.30 respectively.

9. Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5, Peter Auriol, Sent. I 35.1 f. 751ra–b, Gregory of Rimini, Sent. II 7.2–3 85–6 (in the margin: “Hanc opinionem, si bene meminit, tenuit Durandus in secundo opere libro 2. Sic recitat Aureolus”), John Capreolus, Defensiones I 35.1 355b (his source is Peter Auriol) and Defensiones II 3.2 258b–9b (his source is Gregory of Rimini), Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.10, and Peter Schwarz, Clipeus II 46 (his source is Hervaeus). Durand himself, although he returns to most of the theses he omitted in his second redaction, never in fact bothers to return to the issue of a thought’s ontological status. Cf. Sent. II-C 3.5–8. In fact, Durand subscribes to the alternative thesis “for the moment” in QLA 1–3 and his second redaction (see, e.g., Sent. II-B 38.2).
Josef Koch had also discovered a disputation with the same title as Hervaeus’s *Quodl. III.8* wherein Durand features as an *opponens*.\(^\text{10}\) In line with the format of a disputation, the *opponens* (Durand) first gives an opening argument *quod non*—in this case, that thought is *not* something absolute superadded to the intellect (33.6–9)—followed by an argument from a *respondens* (to date: anonymous) *quod sic* (33.10–34.17). Next, the *respondens* replies to the *opponens*’s original argument *quod non* (34.18–24). The debate, then, takes off: Durand first argues against the argument *quod sic* (34.28–38.11) and then the argument against his *quod non* argument (38.12–21), followed by six further arguments *quod sic* (arg. 2: 38.22–41.5; arg. 3: 41.6–24; arg. 4: 41.25–42.6; arg. 5: 42.7–11; arg. 6: 42.12–15; arg. 7: 42.16–42.21).\(^\text{11}\)

In what follows, I want to provide a brief summary of these various arguments, with analysis to follow.

1. Durand’s opening *salvo* (33.6–9) appeals to the idea that while hylomorphism makes sense, morphomorphism does not: forms are added to either matter or the matter-form composite (and so “make a real composition”); but forms are not added to other forms. Hence, granted that a cognitive power is a *form* (and not the composite or matter), then the cognitive act can’t be itself a form added to it, since then a form would inhere in or inform another form, which doesn’t seem quite right.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^\text{10}\) He suggests that *Quodl. III.8* might have been its *determinatio*. On the format of *Quodlibeta*, see John Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibet XIV on Justice as a General Virtue: Is It Really a Quodlibet?” In Schabel, *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, 287–344.

\(^\text{11}\) I take the opening argument *quod non* to be arg. 1.

\(^\text{12}\) *DQ* I 33: “Videtur quod non, quia, cum intellectus sit forma, si intelligere feceret cum eo compositionem, recipetur in eo per modum formae. Sed hoc est impossible, quia formae non est forma.” See also Durand’s argument against the opponent’s argument against this argument a few pages later (38): “Vlterius arguebatur [sc. Durando -PJH] contra responsionem rationis. Dixerat [sc. respondens -PJH] enim ipsum actum intelligendi esse formam et ideo formae esse formam concesserat. Contra hoc: Quia quando aliquam duo ad inuicem distinguuntur, illud quod est ratio distinctio non potest utriusque esse commune. Quod patet. Sed actus primus distinguuitur a secundo actu, quia actus primus est forma, actus secundus est operatio. Igitur operationi non potest communire, quod sit forma. Ergo nec intelligere dicitur forma esse.” This line of reasoning is captured in the first argument from *Sent. II-A 3.5* discussed below (fn. 26). Note that Hervaeus Natalis in *Quodl. III.8* uses this as the second argument *quod non*
2. The absolute items which are the *relata* of a given relationship can be understood on their own—one can understand Socrates’ color on its own without also taking into account Plato’s color or the relationship which obtains between them. Hence, were a thought an absolute item upon which a relationship to the object were founded—as Hervaeus and Duns Scotus hold—then the thought could be understood on its own, without its relationship to the object and indeed without its object. Hence, as Durand puts it, “I can think about a thought even though I don’t think about its object” (ibid., 38: “Ergo possum intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam obiectum[...]”). Durand declares that this is false. Hence, thought is itself a mere relation (*relatio sola*) and so, seeing as it is a mere relation, it doesn’t make a real composition with the intellect nor is it an absolute item superadded to the intellect.

3. If something is in accidental potentiality then it doesn’t need, in order that it be reduced into actuality, some form added to it; yet at least the intellect after a *habitus* has been acquired is said to be in accidental potentiality. Hence, at least in this case its reduction to act does not need something that changes it and gives to it a new form.

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(43): “Secundo: quia omnis forma absoluta est primus actus. Sed intelligere non est primus actus. Ergo est forma relata.”

13. See, e.g., Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* II.8 (quoted above). See also Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III.8 (quoted below) and John Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* 13. In the margin to *Quodl.* III.8: “Vide pulchre etiam in consimili materia Scotum in Quol. q. 13.”

14. Duns Scotus, in *Quodlibet* 13, argues that it is quite possible, and that the belief that it is not is owing to sloppy linguistic practice.

15. *DQ* 1 38–9: “Viterius arguitur ad principale sic: Omnis forma absoluta quae est fundamentum relationis potest intelligi sine relatione. Sed intelligere est huissumodi, quia est fundamentum relationis referentis ad obiectum, ut ponebat Respondens. Ergo poterit intelligi sine relatione ad obiectum. Ergo possum intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam obiectum, quod falsum est. Ergo intelligere est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compositionem cum intellectu, nec est res absoluta superaddita intellectui. Maior patet, quia possum creaturam intelligere sine relatione ad Deum.” This argument shows up in a variant form as the fourth argument in Peter of Palude’s text (see below fn. 27).

16. *DQ* 1 41: “Viterius ad principale: Illud quod est in potentia accidentaliter tantum, non est in potentia ad aliquam formam facientem compositionem realem. Sed intellectus post habitum est in potentiam
4. In the case of an action that passes outside, like the stove’s operation of making something else hot, the elicitive principle of the operation and the operation are the same thing, as viewed from the perspective of the agent. For instance, when the stove makes the kettle hot (whereas before it was not doing this) there is no non-relational item superadded to the stove which wasn’t there before. Hence, in an immanent operation like thought, the elicitive principle and the operation are the same thing, as viewed from the perspective of the thinking subject.  

5. In *Physics* VII, Aristotle makes the claim that “circa intellectum non est alteratio”. Hence, were thought a thing making a real composition, then the intellect would be altered.  

accidentali tantum respectu actus intelligendi. Ergo, etc. Maior patet, quia illud quod est in potentia accidentalis, ad hoc quod fiat actuum, non indiget transmutatione. Sed quod est in potentia ad formam, indiget transmutatione, quia forma non potest induci in subj ecto nec educi de subj ecto nisi per actionem agentis transmutantis. Vnde 3 De anima dicitur, quod aliter est in potentia intellectus ante habitum scientiae et post habitum, quia primo <modo> est in potentia essentiali quae respicit formam, in quo indiget transmutatione [et] a sensibus ad intellectum; secundo modo est in potentia accidentalis tantum, in quo non indiget transmutante, sed seipsum cum uoluerit potest exire in actum, remotum prohibente, sicut patet de motu grauis deorsum.” In *Sent.* II-A 3.5 (see below) Durand will drop the qualification that the intellect “post habitum” is in accidental potentiality; on his view, the intellect both before and after the habitus can be said to be in accidental potentiality. For the reference to DA III.4 see below.

17. *DQ* 1 41–2: “Item ar<gui>tur: Principium elicitiuum actus in operatione immanente non minus conuenit cum actione quam principium elicitiuum operationis transeuntis cum actio ne. Sed in operatione transeunte idem est principium elicitiuum et operatio, ut est in agenti, sicut in igne idem est calor et calefacere, ut respicit ignem calefacientem; ex hoc enim quod ignis nouiter calefacit aquam uel lignum, nulla realis et noua additio uel composito facta est in igne. Ergo idem de intellectu cum scientia, et sic intelligere non superaddit compositionem nouam.” On the qualification “de intellectu cum scientia” see the last footnote.

18. *DQ* 1 42: “Praeterea 7 Physicorum dicitur quod circa intellectum non est alteratio; sed si intelligere esset res faciens realem compositionem, tunc intellectus alteraretur, cum factus sit de non intelligente actu intelligens. Ergo, etc.” See Aristotele, *Phys.* VII.3 247b1. See also Durand, *TDH* 4.8 46: “Sed scientia acquiritur in nobis non ut per se et immediatus terminus alicuius actionis, sed solum ut secundarius terminus alterationis factae secundum partem sensitivam. […] Minor patet ex 7 Physicorum, ubi probat Aristoteles ex intentione, quod ad scientiam non est per se et primo neque alteratio neque aliqua actio, sed fit in nobis facta alteratione secundum corpus et uires sensitivas.” See also *TDH* 4.8 55: “Vbi autem Aristotelis loquitur ut naturalis philosophus, sc. 7 Physicorum, plane dicit, quod nobis non motis secundum ullam potentiam intellectuam fit scientia in nobis; quod non posset esse, si scientia esset in intellectu subjectivae, maxime si esset aliquid absolutum. Et expresse dicit ibidem, exemplificando, quod non solum scientiae usus, sed prima acceptio eius fit in nobis per solam realem alterationem corporalem.” Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quodl.* 13 n. 19: “[…] quod accepitur ex 7 Physicorum, si dicetur, quod Aristoteles omnia illa dicit non secundum opinionem propriam, sed secundum opinionem Platonis, uidetur posse
6. God can separate two absolute accidents from each other, e.g., he can make the white sweet milk simply sweet. (In general, Durand holds, God can destroy any given absolute item and create any given absolute item—provided the absolute item doesn’t have a ‘repugnance’ towards existence. He can annihilate Plato, just his color, and so on.) Hence, granted that the intellect is an absolute form, then, were the thought an absolute accidental form, it would seem to follow that God could separate the thought from the intellect, which, on Durand’s view, is absurd, since then there would be a thought even though there is not someone thinking it.\textsuperscript{19}

7. At least in the case of self-knowledge, i.e., when the intellect thinks about itself, the thought is not something absolute superadded to the intellect.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Arguments from Sent. II-A 3.5}

Some of these arguments show up in Sent. II-A 3.5. Now, I have found evidence to suggest that there were at least three versions of Sent. II-A 3.5 in circulation; the first—call it A1—is what we find in MAGDEBURG Domgymnasium 91 and VATICANUS Chigi., lat. B VIII 135, the former of which was used by J. Koch in the second edition of his critical edition of Sent. II-A 3.5.\textsuperscript{21} The second—call it A2—is the text that Peter of Palude used in Sent. II 3.3–5.\textsuperscript{22} Finally, the third—call it A3—is the one that Hervaeus Natalis used in

\textsuperscript{19} DQ 1 42: “Praeterea Deus potest duo accidentia re absoluta differentia separare ab inuicem. Sed intelligere non potest separari ab ipso intellectu, ita quod sit intelligere et non sit aliquis intelligens. Ergo, etc.” This (in expanded form) is the third argument from Sent. II-A 3.5 (see fn. 25 below).

\textsuperscript{20} DQ 1 42: “Praeterea magis conuenit extremum cum medio quam extrema ad inuicem. Sed intelligentem et obiectum est actus intelligendi medius. Cum igitur idem sit intellectus et res intellecta, cum anima se intelligit, ergo ad minus tunc intelligere est idem cum intellectu et non faciens realem compositionem.”

\textsuperscript{21} Nicholas Medensis seems to have used A1 in his Evidentiae.

\textsuperscript{22} J. Koch, in the first edition of his critical edition of Sent. II-A 3.5, had used this text, being unaware of MAGDEBURG Domgymnasium 91 at the time. The text which J. Koch uses for Peter’s Sent. II 3.3–5 can be found in BASEL Universitätsbibl. B II 22 and VATICANUS lat. 1073.
Quodl. III.8. The difference isn’t great. In A1, there are three arguments in defense of the ontological claim whereas in A2 (Peter) and A3 (Hervaeus) there are four. However, this fourth argument is different in A2 (Peter) and A3 (Hervaeus). In any case, the first three arguments are the same in all three versions.

Now, of these three arguments, the third argument is (an expanded form of) the sixth argument from the disputatio (re God’s absolute power), and the first argument here seems to be a variation of the opening argument quod non from the disputatio. As well, the fourth argument in A2 (Peter) is a variation on the second argument from the disputatio (re second-order thoughts about thoughts).

Hence, we can add to this list the following two further arguments in defense of the ontological claim:

23. Peter Auriol, Gregory of Rimini, and John Capreolus all use A3 (or someone who used A3). Judging by the fact that Peter Auriol adduces the same arguments against Durand that Hervaeus does, I’d suggest that Auriol used Hervaeus.

24. More precisely, the arguments in A2 (Peter) and A1 are verbatim the same whereas in A3 (Hervaeus) the arguments are paraphrases. This seems to suggest to me that Hervaeus was dealing with an early reportatio whereas Palude had before him an ordinatio, or the beginnings of one.

25. Sent. II-A 3.5 19: “Tertio patet idem ex inseparabilitate ipsius intelligere et sentire a sensu et intellectu sic: Quaecumque differunt per essentiam absolutam, possunt diuina uirtute separari secundum existentiam, nisi alicui eorum repugnet ratio actualis existentiae, ut est materia prima, de qua dicunt aliqui, quod, cum sit pura potentia, non potest existere sine forma. Omne autem accidentis absolutum, cum sit actus quidam, potest existere diuina uirtute sine subjecto. Sentire autem non potest existere sine sensu, nec intelligere sine intellectu. Ergo non dicunt alicui reale absolutum supra sensum et intellectum.”

26. Sent. II-A 3.5 18: “Primo ex natura operationis secundum se et absolute sic: Actus primus est forma, sicut intellectus in homine et calor in igne; sed actus secundus est operatio formae, ut intelligere et calere uel calcinare, et sic de similibus. Operatio autem formae non potest esse forma distincta ab ea, quae est actus primus, quia tunc operatio non esset actus secundus, sed primus. Forma enim quaecumque substantialis uel accidentalis dicit actum primum. Et iterum, si operatio secundum se esset aliqua forma, eius esset aliqua operatio, et procederetur in infinitum, quod formae esset forma, et operationis operatio. Quare melius est sistendum in primo, sc. quod operatio formae non esset forma ei addita.”

27. Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5 20–21: “Quarta ratio sumitur ex habitudinem istorum actuum ad sua objecta, quia si intelligere sit alicui absolutum faciens compositionem cum intellectu, tunc intelligere et intelligibile erunt relativa secundum dici tantum et multo modo secundum esse, quia relationum secundum esse est illud, cuius esse est referri et essentia est relatio, quod non convenit alicui absoluto. Ex hoc sic arguitur: Relativa secundum dici non claudit se mutuo in intellectu suo, sicut si Sortes sit filius Platonis, in intellectu quidem patris clauditur filius et e contrario; sed in intellectu Sortis non includitur Plato nec e contrario, quia pater et filius sunt correlatia secundum esse, eo quod paternitas et filiatio sunt essentialiter relationes, Sortes uero et Plato sunt relativa solum secundum dici. Intelligere autem et sentire necessario includunt intelligibile et sensibile. Ergo intelligere et sentire non sunt relatio secundum dici, nec per consequens sunt alicui absolutum additum super sensum et intellectum, faciens cum eis compositionem.” I will return to this argument in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3. Durand’s Theory

8. An operation that does not pass outside the operator, e.g., whitening or shining, is not some absolute item added to the form already in the operator in virtue of which it operates, e.g., whiteness or light. But a thought is an operation that doesn’t pass outside. Hence, it isn’t a form added to the intellect.\(^{28}\)

9. Under the assumption that efficient causes which differ in kind bring about effects which differ in kind, then, were cognitive acts the effects of objects as efficient causes, it would follow that objects that differ in kind would produce acts that differ in kind (and so too contrary objects would produce contrary acts). But one can see at once a black item and a white item and a green item. Hence, were cognitive acts absolute forms, then in such a case the subject would be informed with several contrary absolute forms at the same time.\(^{29}\)

Analysis

One thing that this motley crew of arguments suggests is that Durand seems to be interested in a very broad and uniform account of what cognition is (and by extension: what causes a cognitive act). Hence, his appeal in arg. 7 to the case of self-cognition and...

\(^{28}\) *Sent.* II-A 3.5 18: “Secundo patet idem ex natura operationis intramentis sic: Vbicunque actus secundus non transit in materiam exteriorem, actus primus et secundus, sc. forma et operatio, non dierunt realiter sic, quod faciunt ad inuicem compositionem, sed differunt solum dictione uerbali et nominali, ut lux et lucere, calor et calere, albedo et albescere, et sic de aliis; sed sentire et intelligere sunt actus intramanentes; ergo sunt idem realiter quod sensus et intellectus, nisi quod designantur uerbaliter et illa nominaliter.” This is the second argument in A1, A2 (Peter) and A3 (Hervaeus).

\(^{29}\) Hervaeus, *Quodl.* III.8 46: “Quarto sic: quia si intelligere diceret aliquam formam absolutam, ergo et sentire. Consequentia patet. Consequens est falsum. Ergo et antecedens. Probo falsitatem consequentis, quia simul et semel aliquis uidet album et nigrum, uiride et talia. Aut ergo eodem actu aut pluribus. Si pluribus, tune plures actus sentiendi in uno sensu particulari—puta uisu—sunt simul, quod est inconueniens. Si uno, et iste unus actus est absolutus, sequitur, quod uno et eodem actu sentitur album et nigrum et uiride, quod est inconueniens, quia diversitas obiectorum facit diversitatem actuum. Ergo ponere actum sentiendi esse aliquid absolutum additum potentiae est falsum et inconueniens.” This is the fourth argument in A3 (Hervaeus). It is also in *Sent.* II-A 38.3. Durand himself refutes this argument in *QLA* 3 and *Sent.* II-B 38.3. For some discussion of this argument in Durand and Thomas Wylton, see Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect.” I will return to this argument in Chapter 5.
his appeal in arg. 3 to the case of scientific cognition (i.e., cognition which occurs “after the habitus”). We can add to this the observation that in Sent. II-A 3.5, Durand aims to establish both the ontological claim and his account of the causation of a cognitive act in the case of both sensory perception and intellectual cognition.30 Hence, on his view, cognition about an external object (no matter what sort of cognition it is, be it a direct perception or an act of remembering) is not something absolute superadded to its associated cognitive power, or, as we might put it, it is not a monadic property (like a quality). It is rather best to view it as a relation to a present object, or, as we might put it, it is a polyadic property. This is true in the case of sensory perception, pre-scientific intellectual cognition, scientific intellectual cognition, and self-cognition.

There is still some considerable qualification that must be made to this thesis. Is thought a conceptual relation or a real relation? Is it a mutual or a non-mutual relation? Is it a relation in the category of Relation, or is it in one of the other categories? Under what conditions can we claim that the object is present to a cognitive power? Is the object present to, say, the intellect in the same sense of ‘presence’ as it is to, say, the visive faculty? What stands in for the present object when the object is not, in fact, present, e.g., when I think about some past event? I will return to these (and other such questions) below. This much, however, we can be sure of. On Durand’s view, a cognitive act (no matter what kind of cognitive act it might be) is not an absolute accident or form superadded to the cognitive power in the cognizant subject; it is rather best to view it as a relative item or relational property which obtains between a cognizant subject, with a cognitive power, and a present object of the right sort: a vision, for instance, is the relation which obtains between a thing with a visive power and a present visible quality, audition the relation of presence between a thing with an auditory faculty and a sound, and so forth.

30. As well, arg. 9 (fn. 29 above) begins with the modus tollens: “[...] si intelligere diceret aliquam formam absolutam, ergo et sentire. Consequentia patet. Consequens est falsum. Ergo et antecedens.”
Having established, then, that the cognitive act is not an absolute entity superadded to the cognizant subject or its associated cognitive power, Durand addresses the issue of its causation. What item or items cause a cognitive act? What sort of cause is it? The cause of a cognitive act is not, of course, the object as efficient cause (as Godfrey had held); nor is it the composite of intellect with species as the first opinion had maintained. Rather, Durand declares, it is from whatever caused the cognitive power to be in us (the ‘generans’) as the ‘per se cause’, on the one hand, and the present object as the ‘sine qua non cause’, on the other hand.

3.1.2 The generans claim

Durand claims that what generated or created the intellect is the ‘per se cause’ of its natural operation, thought, and, likewise, what generated or created a given sensitive power is the ‘per se cause’ of its associated sensitive act.

Now, the claim that the generans or creans is the per se cause of the natural operation is open to quite a number of interpretations. Usually, in these discussions, a per se cause is to be taken in contrast with a per accidens cause. Even more usually, a per se cause is one of the four Aristotelian causes. Hence, to call the generans the per se cause of the cognitive act makes it look as if Durand is claiming that the generans is the efficient cause of the cognitive act. The generans or creans seems to do, on Durand’s model, what the object does on Godfrey’s, and in the present context, it might look as if Durand is committed to a kind of Occasionalism, the doctrine that God is the proximate efficient cause of each and every natural action, or, at least, each and every mental act. However, it can’t mean this. Durand is quite famous, in fact, as one of the only proponents of the thesis that God is a mere conservative cause and so he does not at all intervene in the natural world in the way that an Occasionalist would have him intervene.31

31. Part of the reason Leibniz declares that Durand is ‘le celebre Durand’ and a ‘bande à part’ (Essais de Théodicée I.27, II.330; see also III.361, 381) is because of Durand’s commitment to the view that God is a mere conservative cause and not, as others took him to be, even a partial proximate cause of
Rather, what I take it that Durand means is something a little less controversial. It is the trivial idea that whatever gives a causal disposition—a capacity or ability to do something—to some item is in some sense the cause of that item’s doing whatever it is that that causal disposition allows it to do. Consider a jack-in-the-box with a rock that rests upon its lid. Whoever wound up the jack-in-the-box or made it is in some sense the cause of Jack’s springing forth. So too with other capacities or abilities: whatever item (call this the *generans*) gave a capacity to some other item to do something is in some sense the cause of its doing it. Durand’s point is simply that natural operations follow naturally from natures. If we want to find an efficient cause of such operations, we should look rather at what made the nature in the first place, that is, whatever gave to the item its natural abilities and capacities with respect to which such operations and motions are associated. Indeed, as Durand puts it, “the *generans* giving a form gives as well the operation or motion associated with that form” (ibid., 21: “[… ] *generans* dans formam dat etiam operationem et motum conuenientem formae[…].”). For instance, what gives the form of heat to fire gives to it its combustive activity and what gives the form of lightness to fire gives to it its upwards motion (ibid, 21: “[…] sicut dans calorem igni dat ei ut calefaciat combustibile praesens et dans ei leuitatem dat ei per se motum sursum.”). We need not take this generator (*generans*), giver (*dans*), or creator (*creans*) to be also the proximate efficient cause of each and every combustive act which the fire elicits or each and every downwards motion that the rock undergoes. Furthermore, I events which occur in the natural world (*Sent.* II-C 1.5). See Alfred Freddoso, “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature,” in *Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism*, ed. Thomas Morris (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 74–118 (who calls Durand ‘William Durandus’), Alfred Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991): 553–85 (again, gives him the wrong name), and Alfred Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects,” *ACPQ* 67 (1994): 131–56 (which contains a detailed study of *Sent.* I-C 1.5 and (finally!) gets Durand’s name right). For someone who holds that the generator is the efficient cause of the rock’s downward motion (a surprisingly common view), see, e.g., Giles of Rome, *In Phys.* f. 193r: “Nam huissimi motus effectue est a generante, formaliter autem est a forma grauis.” For discussion, see Edith Dudley Sylla, “Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies,” *Vivarium* 31, no. 1 (1993): 37–83.
would submit, we needn't even pin things back onto God. Durand, of course, thinks we should, but this doesn’t have to follow. It seems to me that it is compatible with what Durand says to modernize his position a bit: whatever natural processes, presumably evolution-driven, went into generating a well-defined species with well-defined natural proclivities, abilities and routines can be taken to be the *generans*.

In any case, Durand here is using language which one can find in Aristotle, and, indeed, he goes on to clarify his idea by appeal to Aristotle’s *Physics* VIII.4 and the technical apparatus of essential and accidental potentiality. Durand writes that it is Aristotle’s view that whatever made the form is in some sense the cause of the natural operation of that form.

Something that has a form is in mere accidental potentiality with respect to the activity or motion associated with that form. Hence, in order for it to be reduced to actuality, it doesn’t need some agent which gives to it a new form, since then it would not have been in accidental potentiality but rather it would have been in essential potentiality. Therefore, it is from the same item from which it has a form that it also has whatever second actuality is associated with that form. (ibid., 21)⁳²

The distinction between essential and accidental potentiality is an important one, for it, among other things, can, Durand tells us, allow us to establish both the *generans* claim and the ontological claim. He writes:

And an argument that establishes both articles [i.e., the ontological claim and the *generans* claim] can be formulated based upon this. That which is

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³² ibid., 21: “Auctoritas etiam Aristotelis 8o Physicorum est ad hoc; dicit enim ibi expresse, quod *generans* dans formam dat etiam operationem et motum conuenientem formae, sicut dans calorem igni dat ei, ut caelefaciat combustibile praesens et dans ei leuitatem dat ei per se motum sursum; habens enim formam solum est in potentia accidentali ad operationem et motum conuenientem formae; et ideo ad hoc, ut reducturar in actum, non indiget agente dante nouam formam quia iam non esset in potentia accidentali solum sed essentiaii. Ab eodem ergo a quo habet formam habet etiam quantum est de se quod sit sub actu secundo.” Durand’s language here is taken from Averroes. See *Comm. Phys.* VIII.32 and *Comm. De Coelo* III.28.
in mere accidental potentiality is not in potentiality to a new form nor does it need, in order to be reduced into actuality, an agent giving a new form. But something having first actuality alone is in accidental potentiality with respect to second actuality, that is, the operation. Therefore, etc. The major and the minor are clear based upon Physics VIII. Therefore, the first article is clear, namely, that sensing and thinking are per se from what gives the form of sense and intellect. (ibid., 21)³³

On Durand’s view, there are two kinds of potentiality (essential and accidental) and so too two kinds of reductions (essential and accidental) which in turn demand two kinds of analyses. If A is in essential potentiality with respect to B, (1) B is something absolute superadded to A (“a new form”) and (2) A’s reduction requires an agent or efficient cause, C (“an agent giving a new form”). By contrast, if A is in accidental potentiality with respect to B, then (1) B is not something absolute superadded to A and (2) A’s reduction does not require an efficient cause. In other words, whereas essential reductions can be explained with the ‘standard’ causal model (involving an agent with an active principle, a patient with a passive principle, and the impression and reception of form—i.e., an action and a passion)³⁴ an accidental reduction demands a very different causal model. Whereas our analysis of an essential reduction will make reference to an efficient cause (indeed, an efficient cause distinct from the item so reduced), an accidental reduction will not; instead it will make reference to, on the one hand, the fact that the item has some form already (and so by extension the generans) and, on the other hand, something else, which, whatever causal role it can be said to perform, is not an efficient cause, for,

³³. ibid., 21: “Illud, quod est solum in potentia accidentali, non est in potentia ad nouam formam nec indiget ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, agente dante nouam formam. Sed habens actum primum solum est in potentia accidentalis ad actum secundum, qui est operatio.” See also DQ 1 41 (arg. 2 in fn. 15 above): “Illud quod est in potentia accidentalis tantum, non est in potentia ad aliquam formam facientem compositionem realem. … Maior patet, quia illud quod est in potentia accidentalis, ad hoc quod fiat actu, non indiget transmutatione. Sed quod est in potentia ad formam, indiget transmutatione, quia forma non potest induci in subiecto nec educi de subiecto nisi per actionem agentis transmutantis.”
³⁴. See Chapter 2, §2.3.4.
as Durand put it above, if this were an efficient cause then “it would not have been in accidental potentiality but rather it would have been in essential potentiality.”

This is all still very abstract, and so before I turn to Durand’s *sine qua non* claim, I want to first look at this distinction between essential and accidental potentiality in a little more detail.

### ACCIDENTAL AND ESSENTIAL POTENTIALITY

The text that Durand appeals to here is Aristotle’s *Physics* VIII.4. There, Aristotle writes:

> In the same way, too, what is potentially of a certain quality or of a certain quantity or in a certain place is naturally movable [NB: ‘moveable’ in its broadest sense of changeable] when it contains the corresponding principle in itself and not accidentally (for the same thing may be both of a certain quality and of a certain quantity, but the one is an accidental, not an essential property of the other.) So when fire or earth is moved by something the motion is violent when it is unnatural, and natural when it brings to actuality the proper activities that they potentially possess. But the fact that the term ‘potentiality’ is used in more than one way is the reason why it is evident whence such motions as the upward motion of fire and the downward motion of earth are derived. […] Thus what is cold is potentially hot: then a change takes place and it is fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and hinders it. So, too, with heavy and light: light is generated from heavy, e.g. air from water (for water is first such potentially), and air is actually light, and will at once realize its proper activity unless something prevents it. The activity of lightness consists in the thing being in a certain place, namely high up: when it is in the contrary place, it is being prevented. […] As we have said, a thing may be potentially light or heavy in more ways than one. Thus not
only when a thing is water is it in a sense potentially light, but when it has become air it may be still potentially light; for it may be that through some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position, whereas, if what hinders it is removed, it realizes its activity and continues to rise higher. (255a25–b23; tr. R. Hardie and R. Gaye)

This passage, to be sure, offers a variety of interpretations. However, it seems clear enough that Aristotle is drawing our attention to a distinction between two kinds of potentiality (known nowadays as the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second’ potentiality). Medieval authors tended to characterize this distinction as a distinction between potentia essentialis and potentia accidentalis. These technical terms seem to have been first introduced into the debate by (the Latin translation of) Aristotle’s great Arabic commentator, Averroes. Hervaeus Natalis, when he attacks Durand’s position in Quodl. III.8, writes, pedantically:

As to what is said about being in accidental potentiality, it ought to be known that these words—“being in accidental or essential potentiality”—are not the direct words of Aristotle in Physics VIII but rather they are of his Commentator, who seems to have derived this distinction from Aristotle’s

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36. On the distinction between essential and accidental potentiality in medieval philosophy, see Anneliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 2nd edition (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1952), and Sylla, “Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies.” For actual examples, see Roger Bacon, Summulae Dialecticae 2.1.6 n. 387–8; John Duns Scotus, Lect. II 25 n. 46–50; Quodl. 15 n. 3; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X.9 222–3, XL.6 f. 453v; Peter of Palude, Sent. II.3.3–6 8–9; Guy Terrena, Quodl. II.13 600, 608 and III.3 625; John of Jandun, In Phys. VIII, q. 11, f. 117v; Thomas of Sutton, Quodl. I.9 67, I.19 103 and Quaest. Ord. 7 215–6; “Master Thomas Anglicus”, Quaestio magistrorum 521; Thomas Wylton(?), De sensu agente, 352; Walter Burley, In Phys. VIII f. 239rb; Thaddeus of Parma, Quaestio "Vtrem sit possibile . . . " 399; John Buridan, Expos. in Ar. De Coelo IV.1.3, 209–10 and Expos. in Phys. tr. 2, ch. 2 363–4; and John Baconthorpe, Sent, Prologus, q. 2, a. 4 ff. 22bB–23aA.
words there where Aristotle says that “an item that is light in potentiality and up in potentiality is in potentiality with respect to being up in a way that is different from an item that is light in actuality and up in potentiality.” The first of these the Commentator labels as “being in essential potentiality”; and the second he labels as “being in accidental potentiality”. (73–74; see Averroes, Comm. Phys. VIII.32; Comm. De Coelo III.28)

In any case, in the passage from Physics VIII.4 Aristotle does, indeed, appear to be drawing a distinction between two kinds of potentiality; moreover, he seems to apply it precisely to, on the one hand, the natural capacities and abilities of the elements and, on the other hand, their natural activities and motions. The heavy, for instance, has a natural capacity towards downwards motion and the hot a natural ability to make things hot. If the heavy or the hot is prevented owing to some impediment from executing its natural action or motion, then it can be said to be in accidental potentiality with respect to that action or motion. Accidental potentiality is quite different from essential potentiality, the sort of potentiality the cold is in with respect to being hot or the heavy with respect to being light; in these cases, a mere removal of an impediment won’t be sufficient, for what will also be necessary is an efficient cause which reduces the patient from potency into act giving to it a new form (usually at the cost of the existing form).\(^{37}\)

Medieval authors also associated this distinction between two kinds of potentiality with a distinction between two kinds of actuality, namely, \textit{actus primus} and \textit{actus secundus}.\(^{38}\) An essential reduction—the reduction of an item existing in essential potentiality

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\(^{37}\) See, e.g., Peter of Palude, Sent. II 3.3–5 (emph. mine): “Sed potentia essentialis non reductur in actum sine causa per se, formam imprimente, nisi forte per violentiam, sicut graue sursum non fertur nisi ui aut leuitate sibi impressa et gravitate expulsa.” Most medieval philosophers recognized a distinction between corruptive and non-corruptive changes. A corruptive change is the addition of form with the concomitant loss of an existing form, \(e.g.,\) when a thing acquires the form of heat it loses the form of cold. Non-corruptive change is simply the acquisition of form, \(e.g.,\) when the moon acquires the form of light, or, more to the point, when the senses and the intellect acquire forms.

\(^{38}\) Auct. Ar. 6 n. 39: “Duplex est actus, sc. primus et secundus: primus ut scientia, secundus ut speculare secundum scientiam.” See, e.g., Nicholas Medensis, Evid. II.15 434: “[…] duplex est actus: primus et secundus. Et huius ratio est quia duplex est potentia, sc. potentia ad esse et potentia ad operari.”
from potency to act—results in *actus primus* (at least) and provided it is able to execute a second act and nothing is preventing it *actus secundus* as well. But sometimes an item, having been reduced from essential potentiality, is impeded so that it can then be said to be in first act but not second act; or, in other words, it can then be said to be in accidental potentiality. For instance, when the cold becomes the hot (and so reduced from essential potentiality to act owing to some agent) it might be impeded from making something else hot (owing to the absence of a heatable item); hence it will be in first act with respect to heating but not second act, or, alternatively, in accidental potentiality. So too the heavy which rests upon a plank and anything which has a nature upon which certain operations and motions naturally follow which is in the wrong circumstances so that its operation is impeded. Remove these impediments, and an accidental reduction occurs and so the item transitions from its first act into its second act even though it received no new form from an extrinsic efficient cause.

On Durand’s interpretation of *Physics* VIII, Aristotle is offering us a very general discussion of two kinds of potentiality which in turn demand two sorts of analyses. As mentioned, an essential reduction can be analyzed with the ‘standard’ causal (affectionist) model: it involves a patient that undergoes something owing to an agent that does something to it, to wit, impresses a form upon it. But an accidental reduction doesn’t seem to require the same explanation. Does an accidental reduction require an efficient cause which reduces the item in accidental potentiality from potency to act? Durand’s answer is that it does not: all that an accidental reduction requires is, on the one hand, a thing with a form (and so by extension an appeal to the generator which gave to that thing its form) and, on the other hand, the removal of any impediments to the realization of that form’s natural activities or motions.

Hence, Durand takes Aristotle to be committed to the following two claims:

1. All essential reductions require an extrinsic efficient cause.

2. No accidental reduction requires an (extrinsic) efficient cause.
We can drop the qualification ‘extrinsic’ as well, for it seems quite clear that Durand would also hold, although he never says this, that we shouldn’t think of an accidental reduction as requiring an *intrinsic* efficient cause either, for, as Durand put it above, if a reduction requires an agent which gives to the item so reduced a new form (be this agent identical with the patient or distinct) then its reduction will have been an essential reduction and not an accidental reduction. (*Sent.* II-A 3.5 21: “Illud, quod est solum in potentia accidentali, non est in potentia ad nouam formam nec indiget ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, agente dante nouam formam. Sed habens actum primum solum est in potentia accidentali ad actum secundum, qui est operatio.” See fn. 33 above.)

This marks an important difference between the way that we saw Duns Scotus analyze volitional change (as a “*pati a se*” and not a “*pati ab alio*”) and the way that Durand thinks of psychological change (see, e.g., Chapter 2, §2.3.3).

This also makes clear, I think, that Durand’s appeal to the generator is not, as with some of his contemporaries, an appeal to a proximate efficient cause of the reduction, for, once more, if a reduction requires an agent—even God—which gives to the item so reduced a form, then that reduction will have been essential and not accidental. (*Sent.* II-A 3.5 21: “[. . .] et ideo ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, non indiget agente dante nouam formam quia iam non esset in potentia accidentali solum sed essentiiali.” See fn. 32 above.)

Hence, even God does not reduce fire (say) from accidental potency to act.

### 3.1.3 The *sine qua non* claim

To sum up, Durand holds that (a) mental acts (e.g., thoughts and sensory perceptions) are not absolute forms superadded to mental faculties (e.g., the intellect or the senses), (b) that cognitive change does not require an efficient cause or agent, and (c) that the object is a mere *sine qua non* cause. Having established the ontological claim and the *generans* claim, Durand goes on to establish the *sine qua non* claim; in doing so, he tells us, he will also answer the nearby questions: How is it that thought and sensory
perception come about in us and why do we not always think and sense granted that we always do have intellects and senses?  

First a large quote and then some analysis.

(A) Sometimes first and second act perfect a thing without reference to something else and, thus, are signified as, e.g., heat and heating or whiteness and whitening. In these cases, a thing is made to be under first and second act all at once from the same item [i.e., the *generans*]. For instance, at once and from the same item something is hot and heats or is white and whitens. However, sometimes first and second act perfect a thing not without reference to something else but in relation to something else and, thus, are signified as, e.g., able-to-make-hot or able-to-break and makes-hot or breaks; and the first act implies the relationship as potential whereas the second act as actual. In these cases, something is not always at once under the

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40. According to the standard scholastic view, things with heat which are hot make other things hot (of course) and things which are white ‘disregate’ other things, namely, sight. Cf. Molière’s *Monsieur de Pourceaugnac*, Act I, Scene 8: “SECOND MEDECIN: [... ] Je les approuve tous, manibus et pedibus descendo in tuam sententiam. [... ] le sel est symbole de la sagesse; de faire blanchir les murailles de sa chambre, pour dissiper les ténèbres de ses esprits: album est disgregativum visus[... ].” The ultimate allusion seems to be to Plato’s *Timeaus* 67d–e, where the idea seems to be the whiteness dilates and blackness contracts. In any case, Durand’s choice of the example is not important.
first act and the second, but it might happen sometimes that it has the first act without the second.

(B) The reason behind this: First act requires the presence of that with respect to which it is said only in potency whereas activity or second act requires its presence in act. For instance, in order for something to be able-to-make-hot it is sufficient that it be able to have a heatable item; but in order for it to make-hot it requires an actually present heatable item. And since it might happen that something is present in potency which is not present in act, therefore, it might happen that something is under first act without second act.

(C) However, numbered among such acts are the intellect (or the intellective principle) and thinking, for both of these are spoken of not without any reference whatsoever to something else but in relation to an intelligible item; the intellect implies this relationship as potential whereas the act of thinking implies it as actual. Hence, an item having an intellect does not always think since it does not always have an intelligible item actually present. […]

(B) Cuius ratio est, quia actus primus requirit praesentiam eius, ad quod dicitur, solum secundum potentiam; sed operatio uel actus secundus requirit praesentiam eius secundum actum. Ad hoc enim, quod aliquid sit calefactium, sufficit, quod possit habere calefactibile, sed ad calefacere requiritur actualiter praesens calefactibile; et quia contingit aliquid esse praesens secundum potentiam, quod tamen non est actu praesens, ideo contingit aliquid esse sub actu primo absque actu secundo.

(C) De numero autem talium actuum sunt intellectus uel principium intellectuum et intelligere; dicitur enim utrumque non-omnino-absolute, sed in habitudine ad intelligibile, quam habitudinem importat intellectus secundum potentiam, intelligere autem secundum actum. Propter quod habens intellectum non semper intelligit quia non semper habet intelligibile actu praesens. […] [O]biectum autem praesentans obiectum est causa
However, the object’s being presented or the presenting of the object is the cause sine qua non since an act of thinking is not a perfection that makes no reference to something else but a perfection in comparison to something else. [...] And the same is the case with an act of sensing.

Durand is doing a number of things in this passage, and it will be helpful to go over the details. His primary aim, of course, is to establish the conclusion that the object is the sine qua non cause of a cognitive act. He does so, however, by first (A) drawing our attention to a distinction between two kinds of first/second acts, (B) analyzing the second kind, and (C) applying this analysis to the case at hand.

(A) TWO KINDS OF FIRST/SECOND ACTS

In the first part of the passage, Durand draws our attention to two ways in which first and second act “perfect” a thing; in some cases, first and second act perfect a thing with no reference to anything else at all whereas in other cases first and second act perfect a thing with some reference to something else. Hence, I will call the former sort of first/second act NONRELATIONAL and the latter RELATIONAL.41

Now, the examples he puts forward here as examples of the first case aren’t too illuminating at first sight; in fact this bit of the passage is almost impossible to translate

41. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis’s presentation of Durand’s position in Quodl. III.8 44: “[...] actus primus et secundus quandoque nullam habitudinem important ad aliquid aliud, sicut lux et lucere; et talia semper sunt simul actu; quandoque vero important aliquam habitudinem ad extra, sicut calefactium et calefactibile et calefaciens ad calefactum.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis’s presentation of Durand’s position in Evid. II.11 394: “[...] actus primus et secundus aliquando perficint rem absolute et tunc inseparabiliter aliquid efficitur sub actu primo et secundo, sicut simul aliquid efficitur sub calore et calere. Aliquando perficint rem non-absolvente sed in ordine ad aliquid ut calefactum et calefacere et in talibus aliquid potest esse sub actu primo et tamen non erit sub secundo.” Since Durand’s position here has not been analyzed in the secondary literature, I provide not only the Latin (as above) but also in this footnote and some footnotes below, the Latin from Nicholas Medensis and Hervaeus Natalis who both provide a close paraphrase of Durand’s entire position.
into English. In an earlier passage (the second argument from Sent. II-A 3.5 in defense of the ontological claim), Durand adds a third example to this list:

If second act does not pass into outside matter, then first act and second act, that is, the form and the activity (operatio), are not really distinct such that the latter enters into composition with the former, but rather they are distinct in the way that a word said as a verb and a noun is, e.g., sunshine (lux) and shining (lucere), heat (calor) and heating (calere), whiteness (albedo) and whitening (albescere), and so on. (18; the Latin is quoted above, fn. 28)

What is Durand on about here? One thing is clear: in the first case second acts are expressed by way of intransitive verbs (calere; lucere; albescere; cf. in English ‘to twinkle’, ‘to glow’, ‘to live’) whereas in the second case second acts are expressed by way of transitive verbs (calefacere; disgregare; cf. in English ‘to burn’, ‘to break’). This grammatical distinction points at a more fundamental metaphysical distinction: just as the transitive verb takes an object so too the (so to speak) transitive second act takes an object; and just as the intransitive verb doesn’t take an object so too the (so to speak) intransitive second act doesn’t take an object. In other words, some second acts are object-oriented whereas other second acts are not. (Or, alternatively, some operations associated with a form are object-oriented and others are not.)

For instance, the second acts of twinkling, shining, living, glowing, and so on, do not take objects whereas the second acts of burning, breaking, freezing, drying, and so on, do. A cognitive act, of course, is a second act which takes an object. Hence, the first difference between the two cases rests on whether there is a reference to something else, taken to be the object.

A second difference between these two cases is that whereas object-oriented second acts are episodic, intransitive second acts are not: Socrates always lives as long as he has life (i.e., he is in second act as long as he is in first act) whereas the stove does not.

42. Of course, downwards motion or upwards motion aren’t object-oriented but place-oriented.
always bake as long as it has heat (i.e., it is not in second act as long as it is in first act). Hence, sometimes a thing is said to be perfected so that the first and second act always occur at the same time and so that the one can’t occur without the other and sometimes a thing is said to be perfected so that the first act might occur even if the second act does not.

(B) RELATIONAL FIRST/SECOND ACTS

Durand suggests in (B) that we should view both dispositions (e.g., calefactivity or the ability to make something hot) and operations (e.g., calefaction or the action of making something hot) as non-absolute (that is, non-monadic) properties. In the case of a disposition like calefactivity this property is a relation to heatable items; in the case of an operation like calefaction this property is a relation to present heatable items. So too intellectivity—the ability to think—and the action of thought or sensitivity—the ability to sense—and the action of sensory perception. This isn’t to say that a cognitive power is itself a relation; Durand rejects this view in Sent. I-A 3.3. A cognitive power is an absolute item superadded to the essence of the soul just as heat is an absolute item added to the stove. What Durand maintains, however, is that a cognitive power can

43. Of course, Durand’s choice of an example here is poor and assumes a medieval view about the elements, Fire being one of them. The idea is that it is possible to find an instance of Fire (which has the Hot and the Dry) which isn’t at the moment making something else hot just as one can find an instance of Water (which has the Cold and the Wet) which isn’t making something else cold, and so on (Earth: Cold and Dry; Air: Hot and Wet). See Pasnau, “Scholastic Qualities: Primary and Secondary” for further discussion. More generally, the idea is that something with the capacity or ability to do something isn’t always doing it, e.g., a stove that ain’t cookin’ a pie.

44. Sent. I-A 3.3 f. 42vb = Sent. I-C 3.2.2 nn. 38–9: “Ergo potentia est aliquid additum super essentia [sc. animae -PJH]. Et si dicatur, quod illud additum est solus respectus et non aliquid absolutum, contra[. . .].” The entire argument (Sent. I-A 3.3 (A) f. 42vb [PARIS Bibl. Nat., lat. 14454] [transcription is my own]): “Primo, ex diuersitate actuum sic: Illud, quod de se non dicit ordinem ad aliquem actum (ad aliquem actum) sed est indifferens ad diversos actus, oportet quod per aliquem determinetur ad quemlibet eorum, si aliquem producere debet (producere debet) inv. C. Sed essentia animae non dicit aliquem ordinem ad actum hunc vel illum de se (de se) om. C) sed est indifferens ad quemlibet illorum, aliquo cum essentia animae sit una et (et) om. A) actus sint plures et realiter diversi, umum et idem et secundum idem esset simul determinatum ad plura realiter diversa, quod est inconueniens. Ergo oportet quod essentia (quod essentia) [text. corr. A] animae determinetur ad hunc et illum per aliquid (ad hunc...aliquid per aliquid ad hunc et illum C). Illud autem quo essentia determinatur ad actum unicam potentiam. Ergo potentia est aliquid additum super essentia. Et si dicatur, quod
be said to be a disposition only in the right circumstances; so too it can be said to be an operation only in the right circumstances. Consider the soapstone which has heat. Now, heat is a monadic property that the soapstone has (much as the intellect is a monadic property that Socrates has). In a world in which there is no heatable item at all, the hot soapstone won’t be said to have the disposition associated with calefaactivity—the ability to make items hot—whereas in a world with at least one heatable item it will be said to have this disposition. If we transport the soapstone back and forth between these two worlds, it will acquire and lose this disposition even though none of its monadic properties varied. Likewise, in the case of an operation. None of the monadic properties change when the circumstances change such that a heatable item which before existed now comes to be present to the soapstone. So too in the case of thought and sensory perception.45

45. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis (presenting Durand’s position), *Quodl.* III.8 45: “modo dicunt quod in istis semper sunt simul forma a qua aliquid dicitur esse calefactiuum et esse calefactibile quia calefactium importat calefacere secundum esse possibile. Nunc autem licet calefactibile non semper sit praesens calefactionum, tamen semper est praesens aptitudine et possibilitate. Sed in calefaciente et calefacto forma per quam comenuit aliquid calefacere calefaciens et calefacere non semper sunt simul. Vnde non semper est simul calor et calefacere.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis (presenting Durand’s position), *Evid.* II.11 395: “Cuius ratio est quia actus primus, puta calefactiumum, requirit id aliquid quod dicitur secundum potentiam tantum. Actus autem secundus, puta calefacere, requirit id ad quod dicitur secundum actum. Et quia aliquid potest esse praesens aliqui secundum potentiam, quod non secundum actum, ideo aliquid potest esse sub actum primo quod non est sub secundo.” Cf. also Peter Auriol (presenting Durand’s position), *Sent.* 135.1 (P) f. 751bC: “[. . .] situt lux et lucere se habent, sicut actus primus et actus secundus, sic intellectus et intelligere, nisi quod lux semper est in lucere, quia non exigitur ad obiectum nel aliquid extrinsecum praesens, intellectus autem indiget praesentia obiecti ad intelligere, sicut et calefaciens ad calefacere indiget praesentia (praesentia) potentia P) calefactibili. Et hinc est, quod intellectus non
Thought and sensory perception will, of course, turn out to be analyzable along the same lines, for thought and sensory perception are also relative object-directed second acts, the natural activities of items that have senses and intellects. Hence, since thought is an activity characteristic of the form (in this case, intellect) and vision an activity characteristic of the form (in this case, the visive power), once a thing has an intellect or visive power, and provided something intelligible or visible exists in the world, it is in relative first act (i.e., it has a disposition) and so in one of two states: it is either in accidental potency if it is prevented or it is in second act if it is not. What prevents it, of course, is the absence of the intelligible or visible object and so when the object is present to it it will then be said to see or think. Hence, the object is the cause sine qua non of a cognitive act.46

Durand’s theory of sine qua non causality, I would submit, looks a lot like the theories of causality that we can find nowadays, for Durand seems to analyze the causal relation here as nothing short of and nothing more than counterfactual dependence: if X were present, then Y would occur, and if X were not present, then Y would not occur.

It is important to highlight one aspect of Durand’s analysis here. On Durand’s view, cognitive acts, although not productive, are structure-wise the same as productive second acts, e.g., soapstone’s second act of producing heat in something else. Both are object-oriented or object-directed. Recall the fourth argument from the disputatio (fn. 17 above):

The elicitive principle of the act in the case of an immanent operation goes

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46. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis (presenting Durand’s position), Quodl. III.8 45: “Et dicunt quod sicut intellectium nihil addit super potentiam intellectuum nisi solum respectum ad objectum possibile esse prae sens, ita intelligens super potentiam nihil addit nisi habitudinem ipsius potentiae ad objectum prae sens licet semper intellectus sit intellectius non tamen semper intelligit.” Cf. also Nicholas Medensis (presenting Durand’s position), Evid. II.11 395: “Huiusmodi autem actus sunt intelligere et intellectus. Vnde quia intelligere non perficit rem nisi in ordine ad alind, ideo illud requirit non tamquam causam per se, sed tamquam causam sine qua non, quia, ut dictum est, per se est a generante.”
with an action no less than the elicitive principle in the case of an operation that passes outside. But in the case of such an operation, as it is in the agent, the elicitive principle is the same as the operation. For instance, in fire, the [the principle] heat and the [operation] makes-hot are the same as viewed from the perspective of the hot-making fire. Indeed, because fire newly makes the water or the branch hot, there is no real and new addition or composition made in the fire. (41–42; the Latin is quoted above, footnote 17)

I take it that what Durand means here is that it is *incidental* to our analysis of the causation of an operation whether or not that operation is a production (as with calcination) or non-productive (as with thought or sense perception). What matters, rather, is that there be something able to $\varphi$ (see, burn) present to something able to be $\varphi$ed (seen, burnt), or, in other words, what matters is that what is $\varphi$ive be present to what is $\varphi$able. Hence, Durand, can declare that cognition is an action (and so active and not passive) even though cognition is not, obviously, productive, neither of something outside the cognizant subject (of course) nor even of something inside the cognizant subject.47

I should note an important upshot that touches upon the purported activity and passivity of thought and sensory perception. Jean-Luc Solère underscores Durand’s commitment to the activity of the cognitive agent, and, indeed, some of the arguments which Durand makes against Godfrey’s position make it seem as if he is interested in a radically active picture of the mind (see Chapter 1), akin to the picture of the will that Henry of Ghent defends. Yet the problem with viewing the mind as radically active is that, while delivering on the intuition that the mind is spontaneous, it fails to deliver on the intuition that the mind must meet up with a certain amount of resistance with the world.48

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47. Durand is, indeed, emphatic that Aristotle’s claim that thought and vision are immanent actions from *Metaphysics* IX should entail that such actions are not productions, neither of something outside the agent nor of something inside the agent. See *Sent.* I-A 27.2 and *Sent.* I-C 27.2–3, e.g., *Sent.* I-C 27.3 n. 6: “[...] intelligere enim non est producere intellectionem tamquam rem distinctam, sed est habere intellecionem[...]”

48. This tension is what we find in, e.g., John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
mind is active, then it seems hard to understand what sort of traction thought might have with the world. Indeed, Duns Scotus, in his comment on the ‘Augustinian’ picture of cognition is baffled by the thesis that the mind is the total cause and the object merely inclines or excites it to elicit its mental acts. The will, of course, can be taken to be the total cause but such a view makes little sense in the case of, say, sensory perception.49

On Durand’s view, however, thought and sensory perception, seeing as these are relations which obtain between the mind and a present object occur regardless of whether I want them to or not. It is, of course, under my control to open my eyes but, once eyes are open, it isn’t up to me to see what is there to be seen.50 I can be said to be an agent or active with respect to my mental acts insofar as such acts are attributed to me much as the campfire is said to be an agent or active (setting aside the fact that it is also productive) with respect to its combustive acts insofar as such acts are attributed to it. We attribute such acts to them as agents because they have forms in them upon which such acts naturally follow.51 This, to be sure, is a thin sense of agency, for not just minds are agents but also rocks, campfires and, indeed, anything which has a nature upon which certain natural operations or motions naturally follow when the circumstances are right. Of course, such items are not patients or passive in the strict technical sense of the term: such items do transition from potentiality to (second) actuality but this transition is not owing to an efficient cause which impresses upon the item so reduced a form. Yet there is a perfectly clear sense in which such transitions are passive—it is not up to the rock to

49. Ord. I 3.3.3, Lect. I 3.3.2–3.
50. Durand also holds that the mind can issue commands to the imaging faculty, which also can be trained, and so to speak open and close the eyes of the intellect. See Chapter 5 and fn. 52 below.
51. On the notion of attribution at work here, see, esp., Sent. II-C 15.2.
fall down when one removes the plank and it is not up to me to see the rock when it is presented to me. The sense in which we are agents is thin (and so too the sense in which we are patients): it has nothing to do with productivity and it has nothing to do with spontaneity, in the sense of *freedom of choice*.52

Let’s sum up. Durand makes three closely connected claims when he develops his positive account concerning the causation of cognitive acts. As Durand puts it at the close of his discussion in a passage that mirrors the passage that opened his discussion (quoted above, pg. 85):

Through what, then, is [the intellect] reduced from potency with respect to

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52. See *Sent.* II-A 3.5 26: “[...] licet in potestate agentis liberi, hominis uel angeli, sit approximare actiua passiuis uel ea quae quocunque modo sunt ad operationem necessaria, tamen eis approximatis non est in potestate voluntatis eorum, quin sequatur actio, sicut in potestate angeli uel hominis non est quod ignis approximatus stuppe comburat uel non comburat, licet sit in eorum potestate approximare unum alteri. Sed ad intelligere solum requiritur intellectus et praeentia obiecti, ut declaratum est.” See also ibid., 26: “Sed intellectus noster non potest non intelligere rem, cuius speciem habet praesente phantasmathe speciei et rei correspondente.” See also *TDH* 4.3 17: “Quid si quis dicat quod immo operantur ex imperio rationis, quia ex imperio rationis possunt aperiri palpebrae uel claudi, et sic potest oculus uidere uel non uidere, dicendum est quod istud non valet, quia istud non est ex hoc, quia potentia uisua oboediat imperio rationis, sed quia organa corporis oboediunt voluntati ad nutum, puta palpebrae uel manus, per quae ratio potest ponere actui uidendi impedimentum; sicut non est dicendum, quod Sortes oboediat mihi quoad motum, quia possum eum ponere in uinculis ut non moveatur.” See also *Sent.* II-A 3.8 f. 173va–b: “Non enim potest fieri, quia agent et passo approximatis necessario fiat actio. Nec similitur fieri potest quin praesente obiecto potentiae cognoscitiae, necessario fiat cognitio. Vnde in potestate voluntatis non est quod intellectus noster non intelligat praesentato sibi obiecto in phantasmate. Sed quia voluntas potest facere quod phantasia non phantasietur de aliquo, potest etiam facere per consequens quod intellectus nihil consideraret de illo.” (The text is from Stella, *Evidentiae.*) Cf. Augustine, *De lib. arb.* III: “Non est in potestate nostras quibus uisus tangamus.” Durand’s position about the causation of psychological acts, in general, was censured, and in one of these censures we discover the charge that such a view is *dangerous to freedom of choice!* *Articuli nonaginta tres . . . n. 19: “Ibidem etiam dicit quod huiusmodi actus immanentes sunt a generante per se et ab obiecto solum sicut a causa sine qua non. Nec iste articulus est in suo novo, sed in antiquo tantum. Periculosum propter libertatem arbitrii reputamus.” As Sol`ere understands this censure, it is because “Durand’s epistemological position opens the door to a blantly anti-Thomist theory of free-choice” (“The Activity of the Cognitive Subject”). I’m not so sure about the inference here. Durand, it seems to me, will have to develop—and in fact does—an alternative way of safeguarding freedom. But his view on *sine qua non* causality, it seems to me, won’t harm him with an anti-Thomist (read: Franciscan) theory of free-choice! Durand’s *sine qua non* causality makes it as hard for him to safeguard the freedom of the will as it is for Godfrey! Durand, in fact, defends the thesis that a purely passive power can be still said to be free with freedom of choice. See *QLA* 1–3, *Sent.* II-C 21.1–4, Quaestio vespertiarum, Quaestio in aula, Quaestio in aula resumpta. In contrast with Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Peter John Olivi, the *sine qua non* thesis is orthogonal to the issue of the will’s purported freedom.
the act of thinking? It ought to be said, as was discussed, that it is through that which per se gives the intellect—since what gives the form also gives the thought quantum est de se because to have an intellect is to think about a present object; however the presented object or the presenting of the object is the cause sine qua non because to think is not at all an absolute perfection but a perfection in comparison to something else. (Sent. II-A 3.5 22–3)

He adds that it doesn’t matter, at the moment, what account we give as to how it is or through what it is that the object is said to be present to the power.

Through what, however, is the sense object presented to sense and the intelligible object presented to the intellect? Is this through a species or through something else? An answer won’t be given here, since I intend to discuss this elsewhere. But this alone should be held from what has been said: the species is not required as what per se elicits the act but only, if it is ever required, as what represents the object. (ibid., 23)

Durand’s account of the causation of mental acts can be reduced to the following three claims. First, he makes the ontological claim that mental acts are mere relations. Second, he claims that the per se cause of a mental act is the generans in the sense that any natural activity or motion is in some sense from whatever gave to a thing the form with respect to which that activity or motion is associated. Finally, he claims that the object is a sine qua non cause, that is, the absence of the object is a kind of impediment with respect to the realization of a cognitive power’s natural operation (thought or sensory perception) which is removed owing to its presence.

On Durand’s view, when a thing able to cognize and a thing able to be cognized are present to each other, cognition ensues; there is no need to suppose that the object act upon as efficient cause the power, nor is there any reason to suppose that, at least as far as the causation is concerned, cognition requires the reception of form. On this view, the
presence of the object is sufficient whereas, on Godfrey’s view, its presence was taken to be a mere necessary condition, for, on Godfrey’s view, the object must also act upon, as efficient cause, upon the cognitive power.

3.1.4 Replies to Godfrey’s ‘achilles’ argument

I think the foregoing discussion should now put us in a position to examine how Durand would respond to Godfrey’s ‘achilles’ argument discussed in Chapter 2. On Godfrey’s view, Henry of Ghent’s characterization of the object of the will as mere sine qua non cause is both ad hoc and mysterious. It is mysterious, because Henry claims it is a cause, yet it doesn’t classify as any of the four kinds of causes Aristotle lays out. It is ad hoc because it looks as if in every other case, the present object is an efficient cause, or, to put it the other way around, if we allow that in one case where it looks as if X becomes Y owing to Z as an efficient cause what actually has transpired is that X has become Y owing to X itself as efficient cause and Z as a mere sine qua non cause, then what prevents us from claiming that in any cause where it looks as if X becomes Y owing to Z as an efficient cause what actually has transpired is that X has become Y owing to X itself as efficient cause and Z as a mere sine qua non cause?

Durand (in contrast with Duns Scotus) doesn’t pose these problems to his account and so he doesn’t provide us with an explicit answer. However, he certainly had the debate in mind, and, I think, based upon what he does say, we might provide the following answers on his behalf.

The mystery objection, Durand’s reply

Now, in order to answer the mystery objection—the charge that the a sine qua non cause is a mysterious fifth kind of cause—all one must do, of course, is provide an adequate positive account of the notion. Scotus, as we saw, attempts to articulate the notion of a causal precondition. Durand explains sine qua non causality in terms of the Aristotelian
distinction between essential and accidental potentiality. On Durand’s view, the cause of an accidental reduction can’t reduce to one of the four kinds of causes, for, were it an efficient cause, then it would have caused an essential reduction and not an accidental reduction. Whenever a natural operation or motion is impeded, then whatever removes that impediment should be treated as a *sine qua non* cause of the natural operation or motion. Who could ask for a better explanation than that?

**The ad hoc objection, Durand’s reply**

Nor is an appeal to a *sine qua non* cause ad hoc, for on Durand’s view a *sine qua non* cause is not involved in a few exceptional cases, such as volition or mental acts, but it is involved in *any* accidental reduction: the fire’s transition from inactivity to activity and a rock’s downwards motion are both owing to the removal of an impediment as a *sine qua non* cause. When fire acts upon water and heats it up, for instance, water is a *sine qua non* cause. When a rock falls down, the removal of the plank is a *sine qua non* cause.

Provided we are committed to the idea that there are natural forms which have associated with them natural activities and motions, then, I would submit, Durand’s position avoids the slippery slope. Provided, in other words, a distinction between, on the one hand, an event that occurs with respect to X which is *natural* to X and, on the other hand, an event that occurs with respect to X which is *not natural* to X, then we can claim that, in the one case, that event occurred owing to an extrinsic efficient cause whereas in the other case it occurred owing to a *sine qua non* cause. It is natural to fire and not water to make things hot; it is natural to rocks to fall down. Hence, fire as efficient cause makes the branch burn; but the presence of the branch as *sine qua non* cause ‘makes’ the fire burn the branch or Socrates perceive it.

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53. The water also happens to be *consequently* a material cause, but *antecedently* it was first a *sine qua non* cause.
Durand’s position is, like Duns Scotus’s, a disjunctivist one: either a case of change has as its motive cause an efficient cause or it has a sine qua non cause. However, Durand’s position, unlike Duns Scotus’s, (1) doesn’t force us to violate the act-potency axiom even a little and (2) has, I think, a much more principled reason for choosing one of the disjuncts.

3.1.5 The sources of Durand’s view

Durand’s view, to be sure, is peculiar, but is it unique? There have been various attempts in the secondary literature at tracing back Durand’s position, at finding its source. Jean-Luc Solère decides that Durand’s position here resembles none other than Peter John Olivi.\textsuperscript{54} I would submit that Durand’s view resembles that of James of Viterbo, a contemporary of Godfrey and whose view it is that is most likely the one that Godfrey paraphrases in Quodl. IX.19 as the first opinion.\textsuperscript{55} Durand, as mentioned, without doubt

\textsuperscript{54}Solère, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject.” It is interesting to note that whereas Olivi appeals more often than not to what we would nowadays call phenomenological considerations, Durand more often than not does not. Durand is interested in metaphysical and ontological, even linguistic, considerations. Durand also doesn’t ever talk about the attention or intention of the soul (unlike Suarez, Henry of Ghent, and Olivi), at least not in this discussion. The adverb ‘attentius’ appears once in the text, as part of a quotation from Augustine meant to bolster his defense of the claim that the sense object doesn’t act on the soul but on the organ and so then can be said to be present or not-hidden from the soul (\textit{Sent. II-A 3.5 23}). The text is \textit{De Musica VI.5}. On Peter John Olivi’s theory of cognition, see Robert Pasnau, “Petrus Iohannis Olivi Tractatus de Verbo,” \textit{Franciscan Studies} 53 (1993): 134–48, Pasnau, \textit{Theories of Cognition}, 271–6, Robert Pasnau, “Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul,” \textit{Medieval Philosophy and Theology} 6 (1997): 109–32, Dominik Perler, \textit{Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter} (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002), ch. 2, and Toivanen, \textit{Animal Consciousness. Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul}. Solère also compares Durand’s views with those of John Pecham, Roger Marston, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus. Pattin, \textit{Pour l’histoire du sens agent} attempts to trace back the source of the ‘Augustinian’ position against which John Duns Scotus argues in book one of his commentary on the \textit{Sentences}. This position is mostly a mash-up of Peter John Olivi and Henry of Ghent. On the term ‘sine qua non’ in Olivi (he prefers the term ‘terminative’), see F. Simoncioni, \textit{Il problema della libertà umana in Pietro di Giovanni Olivi e Pietro de Trabibus} (Milan, 1956), 87–91, E. Bettoni, \textit{Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi} (Milan: Societa editrice ‘Vita e pensiero’, 1959), 429–446, and Kent, \textit{Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century}, 129–37. Note that Bettoni, \textit{Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi}, 439, n. 143 argues that Olivi’s view is not to be confused with the sine qua non thesis.

\textsuperscript{55}See Côté, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines” who makes a convincing argument for this case. In addition to the textual evidence, he presents the following bit of external evidence. According to a “disciple admiratif de Godefroid”: “Item, quae stione undeuciesima, contra unam opinionem quae ponit actum intelligendi fieri in intellectu non uiutute objecti nec uiutute speciei, sed seipso si adsit obiectum. Et ibi dicitur contra speciem quod non sit ponenda alia praeter
Chapter 3. Durand’s theory

had Godfrey’s *Quodl.* IX.19 in front of him when he composed *Sent.* II-A 3.5 and he seems to have simply launched a defense of this first opinion. However, it seems to me


56. The position in full (*Quodl.* IX.19 270–1): “Dicendum quod uidetur aliquibus quod uirtute objecti nec species nec actus intelligendi fiunt in intellectu, sed ipse intellectus habet esse in actu intelligendi se ipso, si adsit objectum huismodi sui actus. Omni formae enim debetur aliqua actio; intellectus autem quaedam forma est; ergo aliqua actio ex debetur. Hoc autem non uidetur nisi intelligere. Quare, etc. Et hoc declaratur per simile. Cum enim alia entia imperfectiora habeant formas secundum quas se sips sunt in actu primo, sc. semper, et secundo etiam si adsit objectum uel materia talis actionis, puta: ignis semper est calidus actu primo, quo sc. secundum se calet; et ex hoc etiam semper est in actu secundo, sc. calefaciendi si adsit materia; quae quidem materia uel objectum talis actionis ad hoc quod ignis sic in huismodi actu nihil penitus facit in ipsum ignem, sed ignis primum suum actu hac materia praeente exit in hunc secundum actu. Ita etiam uidetur in proposito, quod intellectus secundum se sit aliqua res et natura secundum formam et actum, secundum quem semper est in suo actu primo, et etiam ex se ipso ex huismodi actu primo nata est exire in actu secundum, qui est intelligere in actu, praesente objecto no quidem ut agentem aliquid in ipsum intellectum, sed ut id in quod terminatur actio intelligendus. Et secundum hunc modum ponendi possit dici quod, licet objectum sic per se nihil faciat in intellectu, est tamen ut causa sine qua non fit ipse actus intelligendi; nec respectu alciuus in intellectu habet rationem causae ut sine qua non nisi respectu ipsius actu et non alciuus alterius speciei quae ad actu ipsum requiratur, quia ad hoc sufficit ista actualitas intellectus secundum quam est secundum se in actu suo primo. Et secundum istos intelligere non est species aliqua proprie dicta ad modum alciuus qualitatis per modum inhaerentis et informantis se habens, nec etiam ad ipsum intelligere requiritur aliqua alia species uel forma ultra actualitatem naturalem ipsius intellectus, sed est intelligere actio exercitura.” Durand clearly rallies to the defense of this view; indeed, at one point he even calls a thought an exercise of an action. *Sent.* II-A 3.5 18–19: “Vnde satis irrationali bliter uidetur alciu dicere ponentes, quod intelligere non est exercere aliqua actionem, sed solum habere formam aliqua, sicut calere non est exercere aliquam actionem, sed solum habere formam caloris; et tamen dicunt, quod intelligere non est solum habere intellectum, sed est intellectum habere quandam aliam formam, quae est ipsum intelligere; quod est simile, ac si dicetur, quod calere non est habere calorem, sed est calorem habere quandam aliam formam, quae sit ipsum calere, quod est ridiculum.” Note as well,
that Durand can’t have read James of Viterbo, but rather, most likely, he latched onto the position presented in Godfrey and ran with it. For one thing, Durand doesn’t use the same language that James does. James rarely if ever calls the object a *sine qua non* cause but rather he constantly—at least 30 times in *Quodl.* I.12 alone—characterizes it as an ‘exciting’ or ‘inclining’ cause. James also, as we will see below, has other peculiar language which Godfrey omits: James uses terms like ‘incomplete actualities’, ‘aptitudes’, and so forth, none of which can be found in Durand.

Even so James’s position has most the hallmarks of Durand’s.\(^57\) He seems to hold that an episodic act is not a new form added to the intellect. He holds to a kind of antiaffectionism, arguing that neither our senses nor our intellects can be affected by the agency of the object. He makes some of the same arguments which Durand makes (discussed in Chapter 1), and even appeals to some of the same authoritative passages to support his case. Indeed, he insists on an important disanalogy between physical change and so to speak mental change.\(^58\) He argues that cognitive change isn’t a matter of being affected by the object as efficient cause but a kind of formal change with a formal cause.\(^59\) And he even seems to want to treat cognition as more or less a matter of

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\(^57\) The primary texts are *Quodl.* I.7 and *Quodl.* I.12.

\(^58\) ibid., 165: “Sicut et huiusmodi motus, qui sunt proprii uiuentibus, sunt alterius rationis et modi, quam illi qui sunt communes etiam non-uiuentibus.”

\(^59\) 166: “Est enim quaedam actualitas incompleta, pertinens ad secundum speciem qualitatis, quae est potentia naturalis, considerata secundum exordium et praeparationem quamdam respectu actus ulterioris. Vnde dicitur aptitudo et idoneitas naturalis ad completum actum. Illud autem, quod sic est in potentia secundum actum quemdam incompletum, mouetur ex se ad completum actum, non quidem efficiens, sed formaliter. Et ita secundum idem est passium et actium, licet non eodem modo, nec actione et passione transmute.” See also ibid., 167: “Eodem modo et uniformiter ponendum est aliiquid actium in omnibus huiusmodi potentias, quia ipsa potentia cum suis aptitudinibus, secundum quod nata est perfici per ulterioribus actus, dicitur possibilis, secundum uero quod ad illos actus mouet se, non quidem efficiens, sed formaliter, dicitur agens. Et sic est intelligendum quod intellecut possibilis et agens est una et eadem potentia, diversimodo sumpta.” See also *Quodl.* I.7 110–1.
relational change.\textsuperscript{60} And, of course, he extends his analysis all the way down, from will to the senses.\textsuperscript{61}

However, James’s view is different from Durand’s on a very important point, and part of the reason I bring all of this up is because James is an innativist and Durand is not. In the next section, I will look at this issue in more detail.

By way of conclusion, as I hope has been established, Durand’s account of \textit{sine qua non} causality is very different from the account which Henry and Duns Scotus defend. The most striking difference pertains to the ontology of psychological acts or states. On Duns Scotus’s and Henry of Ghent’s view, a psychological act (be it an act of the will or a cognitive act) is, ontologically, a monadic property: an absolute form superadded to its associated power.\textsuperscript{62} Durand, by contrast, rejects this view. On his view a psychological act should not be thought of as an absolute item superadded to the psychological power or the subject in the manner in which an absolute accident is added to a subject: psychological acts are mere or pure relations between things capable of thought and things capable of being thought (or desired, or seen and so on).

Durand is, if not unique, at least peculiar in combining these two theses—the \textit{sine qua non} thesis and the ontological thesis—and defending with such zeal antiaffectionism. Most authors were either affectionists or self-affectionists, that is, most philosophers in the High Middle Ages thought that mental processes involve the reception of ‘form’

\textsuperscript{60} Quodl. I.12 178 where he draws an analogy with the relational change involved in color-similarities. Durand, in \textit{DQ} 1 draws the same analogy.

\textsuperscript{61} Quodl. I.12 171–5 is an extended discussion of sensory perception.

\textsuperscript{62} Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quodl.} IV.7 f. 93vV: “[. . . ] et ipse actus [sc. intelligendi elicitus in intelligente -PJH] informat intellectum tamquam operatio intrínseca ei inhaerens[…]” ibid., f. 93vV–4rX: “Et per hunc modum determinans intellectum ad intelligibile et informans ipsum tamquam similitudo intellecti et species eius potius ponit debet eius actus qui consistit in notitia de re intellecta quam aliqua alia species ab ipso impressa. Vnde actus uidendi quo oculus percipit extra rem usiam obiectiue perfectius assimilat oculum rei nisi quam species rei impressa ei, quia species ista non informat neque assimilat oculum nisi sub ratione speculii; actus nero ille informat et assimilat oculum sub ratione cognoscentis, et sic specie illa principalis informatur et assimilatur rei nisiae organum quam uis uisius, in act autem uidendi contingit econuerno.” Duns Scotus defends this thesis in \textit{Quodl.} 13. See also \textit{Quodl.} 15 n. 2: “Intellectio aliqua in nobis est nova, ut experitur quilibet, et est forma absoluta, ut dictum est in quaestion de hoc habita.”
owing either to the agency of the object or to the agency of the mind or to both. But not Durand.

3.2 IS DURAND’S THEORY adequate?

Recall that I started this chapter with two questions.

1. What is a *sine qua non* cause?

2. Is it appropriate to characterize the cause of a cognitive act as a *sine qua non* cause?

I hope the above will have provided us with an answer to the first question: a *sine qua non* cause reduces an item in accidental potentiality to act whereas an efficient cause reduces an item in essential potentiality to act. Or, in other words, a *sine qua non* cause reduces an item in potency to act without giving to it a new form or ‘affecting’ it.

But even provided that the above account of the notion of *sine qua non* causality meets up to the ad hoc and mystery objections—which I think it does—and so is available for use in an analysis of the causation of a cognitive act, there is still the further question of whether or not it is appropriate to characterize the object as a mere *sine qua non* cause of a cognitive act. More precisely, is it appropriate to maintain that the intellect, without anything else added to it, is in accidental potentiality (as opposed to essential potentiality) with respect to thought?

In this final section I want to look at one objection to Durand’s account which I will call the ‘innatism’ objection. In Chapter 5, I will address a second objection which I will call the ‘intentionality’ objection. In brief, these objections are:

1. The ‘innatism’ objection: Innatism is false, and one thing this means is that in order for the intellect to think about the world it must acquire or receive information from the world.
2. The ‘intentionality’ objection: If the object does not add its species to the intellect (be this species identified with the act as with Godfrey or held to be separate and really distinct from the act, as the species theorist maintains), then there would be no more reason to claim that a thought is about this object rather than that object.

3.2.1 The ‘innatism’ objection

On Durand’s view, the intellect is in accidental potentiality without anything being added to it; it is an actual form much as heat is an actual form and thought is a natural operation that follows upon this natural form much as calefaction is a natural operation that follows upon heat as a natural form. Hence, a thing with an intellect doesn’t need an efficient cause that reduces it to its act of thinking about something when it is in the presence of an intelligible object any more than fire needs an efficient cause that reduces it to its act of heating something when it is in the presence of a heatable object. So too with the other cognitive powers: sight vis-à-vis a visible object, hearing vis-à-vis an audible object, etc.

The ‘innatism’ objection, in short, is that this view seems to attribute a bit too much wherewithal to our intellects. In other words, the intellect comes into the world in essential potentiality and not accidental potentiality and it must first acquire a new form from the object (somehow) before it can be said to be in accidental potentiality. If the intellect were already in accidental potentiality, then we would be forced to admit that the intellect already had such forms in it. As Hervaeus Natalis puts it:

Some people say that the possible intellect is not moved by the phantasms [i.e., the objects]. And these people can be divided into two groups. The first group maintains the opinion of Plato which is that the intellect has concreated species of all things and it doesn’t require the phantasm except as what excites it and so reduces it into an actual consideration of those things which it already had knowledge of. […] The others are those who
 maintain the same conclusion—that is, that the intellect is not moved by the phantasms—and they say that the intellect formulates in itself all those items that are in it and that the phantasms are required so that the intellect can act directed at (circa) it as at its object. (Sent. II 17.2.3 f. 255aA–B)

The second option here looks to be a kind of self-affectionist position, but the first option here looks to be subscribed to the sort of antiaffectionism that Durand subscribes to. 63  Durand, of course, doesn’t wish to be labeled a Platonist on this issue. He in fact tells us that the intellect is a blank slate. 64  Indeed, Durand, in contrast to his contemporaries, offers a picture of the mind that takes this metaphor to its logical extreme. On Durand’s view the intellect is not just a blank slate before it acquires knowledge from the world, but it is also a blank slate even after it has acquired knowledge and, indeed, even when it is engaged in an occurrent episode of thought, for Durand rejects not just the idea that a thought is a received form and species as forms received in the mind, but he also rejects the hypothesis that habitus are themselves added to or in the intellect.

63. The first view—a kind of antiaffectionist doctrine—seems to James of Viterbo’s, or one very much like it. See Quodl. I.7 and Quodl. I.12 and below. The second view—a kind of affectionist doctrine—looks to be one like the one John Pecham defends. See Quodl. I.4 quoted in Chapter 1, fn. 26.

64. TDH 4.8 51: “[…] intellectus, qui secundum se natus est determinari per obiectum nec de se habet aliquam indispositionem ad quaecumque actum, cum sit sicut tabula rasa.” He discusses Augustine’s discussion of Plato’s famous slaveboy in ibid., 43: “Si enim proponantur intellectui principia per se nota et sub eis gradatim accipiantur ea, quae sunt eis per se connexa, determinatur intellectus ad cognitionem ueri et scientiae. Si uero proponantur principia non per se nota, sed dubia, ut per syllogismum dialecticum, uel apparentia et non-existentia, ut fit per syllogismum sophisticum, determinatur intellectus ad opinandum uel ad erronee sentiendum […]. De primo istorum dicit beatus Augustinus 12o De Trinitate c. 15 recitans sententiam Platonis, qui ‘retulit puerum quemdam de geometria interrogatum, quod uidendum erat.’ Et subdit beatus Augustinus ex sua sententia, non ex sententia Platonis, quod ‘de rebus intelligibilibus illud fieri potest, ut bene interrogatus quisque respondeat, quod ad quamque pertinet disciplinam, etiamsi eius ignarus est’, nec assignat istius aliam causam, nisi quia mentis intellectualis ita condita est natura. Videtur ergo, quod ad determinationem seu facilitatem intellectus, sufficiat determinatio et facilitas uirium, quae requiruntur ad repraesentationem objecti.” Durand does have, it is true, a different view of what Plato thought. Sent. II-C.3.6 n. 24: “Ad tertium dicendum quod numquam fuit intentio authoris De causis, quod in angelo uel in intelligenter sint species, de quibus alii loquentur, sed cum ipse fuerit Platonicus posuit tales formas esse in intelligentis quales ideas posuit Plato, quas etiam quandoque uocauit formas. Plato autem secundum ueritatem uocauit ideas cognitiones rerum uel res ut cognitas et non aliquas formas intellectui inhaerentes uel per se subsistentes, sicut fabulose imposuit et Aristoteles, et tales formas, hoc est, rerum cognitiones, dicit author De causis esse in intelligentiis.”
Quite the contrary, *habitus* exist somewhere in the body, explaining how it is that we elicit our thoughts with more or less ease, and how it is that we engage in disciplined trains of thought.\(^{65}\) The model of mind which emerges from all of this is spartan: the human intellect was, is, and will remain totally empty, void of any absolute entities or forms (*e.g.*, *impressa uel expressa species*, acts as traditionally conceived, and *habitus*). Indeed, Jerry Fodor’s characterization of the ‘Wicked Behaviorist’ seems apt here:

Each day, he would climb to his attic and throw things out, for it was his ambition eventually to have *almost nothing in his attic at all*. (Some people whispered this was his *only* ambition, that the Wicked Behaviorist was actually just a closet Ontological purist. For all I know, they were right to whisper this.) (“Precis of *Modularity of Mind*,” 195)\(^{66}\)

In any case, Durand still must answer the objection. The ‘innatism’ objection is based upon the premise that in order to think it is not enough to have an intellect; something more must be involved, namely, some sort of form added to the intellect. Call this the **Insufficiency Assumption**: the intellect on its own is not sufficient in order to think. Durand, as we saw in Chapter 1, rejects this assumption. We are cognitive agents and we are *sufficient* cognitive agents.

The insufficiency assumption itself can, I think, be analyzed as the conjunction of two doctrines. First, there is the doctrine which, at the moment, I will call **Conceptualism**: in order to think about X an intellect must have or possess a concept, A, of X and in order to think about Y it must have some other concept, B, of Y. We can cash out the notion

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\(^{65}\) Durand also rejects, it goes without saying, the idea that the mental word is something distinct from the cognitive act in *Sent*. I-A 27.2 (cf. *Sent*. I-C 27.2). His rejection of habits in the intellect is in *Tractatus de habitibus* (cf. the text found in Peter of Palude, *Sent*. III 23.1–2). See Chapter 5.

of a concept in a number of different ways (e.g., as a mental representation, as a causal disposition, and so forth). Second, the insufficiency assumption is based upon a denial of Innatism, in this context, the doctrine that the intellect comes into the world already in possession of all the concepts it’ll ever need to make use of. Hence, anti-innativists maintain that the intellect is a kind of blank slate upon which nothing has already been written, that is, it does not yet have concepts and it must acquire such concepts as it moves about in the world.

The doctrine of conceptualism and the doctrine of anti-innatism, I think, combine together to make up the insufficiency assumption: in order for the intellect to think about X, it must first acquire or receive the concept associated with X. In the context of the distinction between first and second act and accidental and essential potentiality, this seems to suggest that the intellect is in essential potentiality and must be reduced from essential potentiality to first act owing to some agent as efficient cause before it can be in a state where it is able to think about something in particular. By contrast, conceptualism combined with innatism yields the claim that the intellect is not in essential potency but in accidental potentiality, or, in other words, it is already in first act and so able to think about something without an efficient cause or the reception of a new form. And this looks to be precisely Durand’s position.

Is Durand, then, an innativist or is he, perhaps, an anti-conceptualist? Does he in other words, hold that the mind already has all the concepts in it that it will ever need or does he hold that minds simply do not need to have concepts in order to think? I will argue that there is a perfectly good sense in which we can take Durand to be both an


68. See, e.g., Sent. II-A.3.8 f. 173va: “Quod enim dicitur, quod intellectus angeli numquam est in potentia ad actum primum, uerum est non solum de angelo, sed etiam de nobis. Intellectus enim comparatur ad intelligere sicut actus primus ad secundum, ut declaratum fuit prius. Et ideo dicere quod habens intellectum sit in potentia ad actum primum est implicare contradicitionem.” (Text from Stella, *Evidentiae.*)
anti-innativist and also a conceptualist. However, before I do, let’s look at the charge in a little more detail. I will first look at how some of Durand’s contemporaries took Durand to be committed to innatism. I will then look at what a real medieval innativist looks like. I will then argue that Durand is not an innativist, according to these standards.

**The charge that Durand’s position entails innatism**

In *Sent.* I.35.1, Peter Auriol argues against a view which is clearly Durand’s. He argues that it entails innatism and that, since innatism is false, it is false.

> If the intellect and the thought (*intelligere*) were the same item in reality, then the intellect wouldn’t be a *tabula rasa* and also it wouldn’t be all things in potency but rather it would be all things in act. (f. 753rb)

More precisely, he goes on to argue that a view like Durand’s entails that the intellect would have an infinite number of ‘perfections’. But it is impossible that a human intellect (seeing as it is finite) have or possess an infinite number of items.

> It is impossible that a created substance contain in itself in a unitive mode an infinite number of perfections. But if the substance of the created intellect—be it angelic or human—were that in which the undetermined concept of thought coincided, then it would follow that this substance would contain in itself in a unitive mode an infinite number of perfections. For that in virtue of which a stone appears is a stone and that in virtue of a flower appears is a flower, and so on. In general, that in virtue of which a creature appears is a creature. Hence, if the substance of the intellect is the same as the thought, and if a thought is that in virtue of which a thing thought appears, then it follows that the substance of a created intellect is that in virtue of which any

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69. See Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pouçain on Intellectual Cognition” for a discussion of this argument. Auriol uses A3, that is, the same text as found in Hervaeus Natalis and Gregory of Rimini. See footnote 9 above.
given thing appears. Hence, the perfections of all created things will be in it in a unitive mode—which is not possible. Therefore, one can’t maintain that the thought is really the same as the intellect, at least not with thoughts about thinkable things whatever might be the case in the case of thoughts about itself. (ibid., f. 753rb)”

The charge is mixed in with some of Peter Auriol’s distinctive views about cognition. The idea seems to be that in order to think about X, the intellect must first have X present to it owing to a mental representation of X. Hence, if the intellect did not acquire these mental representations from the world but rather came into the world already in possession of such representations, then the intellect would have an infinite number of representations.

We can also make the same charge without appeal to the thesis that in order to think about X the intellect must be in possession of a mental representation of X. John Duns Scotus, for instance, argues that if the intellect were the total cause of its acts, then this would entail that it would be infinitely active, since in order to elicit a thought about X, the intellect must have a ‘perfection’ associated with X which allows it to elicit that thought. In this case, a perfection is a kind of causal disposition and not a mental representation.

70. Sent. I 35.1 f. 753rb: “Quod autem illud absolutum non sit nuda potentia intellectus, sic patet: Im-
possible est enim quod aliqua creatua substantia continet unitiue infinitas perfectiones. Sed si substantia intellectus creati, angelici uel humani, esset id in quod coincidit indeterminatus conceptus intellec tionis, sequeretur quod substantia ista (ista] illa F) creatua contineret unitiue perfectiones infinitas. Omne enim quod facit lapidem apparere quodammodo est lapis; quod uero florere, quodammodo est flos; et ita quod facit omnes creaturas apparere, est quodammodo omnes creatuarie. Et per consequens substantia intellectus, si est id ipsum quod intelligere et intelligere est id quo res intellecta praesens est per modum apparentis, sequitur quod substantia intellectus creati est id quo res omnes creatae praesentes sunt in esse apparenti, et sic erit perfectiones creaturarum omnium unitiae, quod impossibile est. Ergo (Ergo] igitur F) ponit non potest quod intelligere sit realiter idem quod intellectus, saltem respectu omnis intel ligibilis quidquid sit respectu sui ipsius.” The base text is the 1596 edition; F = Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourçain on Intellectual Cognition.”

[If the intellect were the total cause], then the soul would have an infinite causal activity since in order to think *this* it requires a perfection and in order to think *that* it requires some other perfection. Therefore, if nothing else apart from the soul cooperates in eliciting a thought and since it can think about an infinite number of things, it will be claimed that the soul has an infinite causal activity. This is false. If its being able to achieve this thought is attributed to a perfection, therefore its being [able to achieve] an infinite number [of thoughts] will be attributed to an infinite number of perfections. Therefore, the thought is not from the soul alone as the only efficient cause.

(*Lect. I* 3.3.2–3 n. 363)\(^72\)

Whereas Auriol’s worry concerned the representational aspect of cognition, Duns Scotus’s concerns the causal aspect: a perfection is not simply that in virtue of which X appears, but it is that in virtue of which a thought occurs. A ‘perfection’, for Duns Scotus, seems to be a kind of disposition or capacity which cooperates with the intellect in causing the thought whereas a ‘perfection’ for Auriol seems to be a kind of mental representation.

However, the worry is the same: in order to think about X, I must have A, and in order to think about Y, I must have B, and so on. The precise role of the perfection is incidental. Since the intellect is finite yet its capacity for thought infinite, it would seem to follow that *either* we endorse the view that we acquire such perfections *or* we endorse the view that we have an infinite number of such perfections. Better to do the former than the latter, of course.

Finally, consider Peter of Palude’s objection to Durand’s account.

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\(^72\) See also *Ord. I* 3.3.2 n. 492: “*Videtur etiam *<quarto>* quod tunc esset infinita actiuitas in intellectu, in quantum intellectus est actius respectu omnium intellectionum, quia ad unam intellectionem requiritur aliqua perfectio in causa illius intellectionis, et ad aliam intellectionem alterius rationis requiritur tanta perfectio, uel maior, *<quia continens virtualiter duas perfectiones causarum propriarum, hic et ibi:>* ergo habens hanc et illam, erit perfectius quam habens illam tantum, et ita habens infinitas tales ut totalis causa, est infinitum perfectione.” The pointed-brackets indicate *additiones* identified by the editors.
[T]he possible intellect before it has acquired knowledge (scientia) is in essential potentiality since it lacks the first act of knowledge. Hence, the Philosopher tells us that it is none of those items before it knows since the soul is like a tabula rasa upon which nothing is written; and the Commentator tells us that the possible intellect is, in the class of intelligible stuff, what prime matter is in the class of sensible stuff. Therefore, since it can’t be coerced, before it transitions to an act of thinking it needs a form impressed upon it. (
*Sent.* II 3.3–5 8–9)

According to Peter, in order for the possible intellect—Socrates’ actual intellect, say—to be in such a state that it is or is able to think about some item—cats, say—then it must first acquire knowledge (scientia). Now, judging from the context of the passage—it is a defense of the necessary role of intelligible species—what this would seem to mean is that in order for Socrates’ intellect to think or be able to think about cats (say), it must first acquire the intelligible species associated with cats, presumably from cats themselves as efficient cause.73

The foregoing discussion makes clear, I think, two things. First, it makes clear what conceptualism in this context amounts to. A conceptualist holds that in order to think about X, I must possess A and in order to think about Y, I must possess B, where A and B can be cashed out in a number of different ways. It doesn’t matter if A, B, C, and so on are cashed out in terms of causal dispositions or mental representations or species or perfections. Second, it makes clear what an innativist is in this context: an innativist is someone who thinks that A, B, and so on are not acquired but innate.

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73. See also Godfrey, *Quodl.* IX.19 271: “Sed uidetur inconueniens quod intelligere sit actio sic procedens ab intellectu et in intellectu per se nihil agente obiecto respectu intellectus. Cum enim intellectus possibilis de se sit in potentia ad actum intelligendi, nullo modo uidetur quod possit se ipsum reducere in actum intelligendi hoc intelligibile uel illud, nisi aliquid fiat in actu irtute cuius possit prosilire in talem actum intelligendi. Oportet ergo quod ab intelligibili fiat ipsum intelligere in intellectu uel saltum aliqua forma et species mediante qua intellectus factus in actu secundum illam possit in se ipso producere actum intelligendi.”
Durand, however, is both an anti-innativist and a conceptualist. In the next section I will make this case. First, I will look at what a real innativist looks like. We should then be in a better position to judge whether or not Durand is an innativist.

**James of Viterbo: a real innativist**

It is, of course, an open question what ‘innatism’ might mean, both in a medieval context and nowadays. However, innatism in this context, I have been arguing, is to be understood as a commitment to the view that the intellect does not acquire concepts but is born with them. Most medieval authors were not innativists in this sense, associating this view with Plato, as an absurdum to which one reduces a view. But in the High Middle Ages there were a few proponents of innatism; one of these was James of Viterbo.

James of Viterbo is a good source here: he is proximate enough to both Durand and Godfrey to be considered a possible source. In his first *Quodlibet*, probably disputed in 1293 or 1294, James defends a kind of innatism. James, like Durand, is concerned with safeguarding some semblance of cognitive agency and, more importantly, the relative nobility of the ‘vital’ over the inanimate (see Chapter 1). However, unlike Durand (as I will argue) he is committed to the same kind of concept of conceptualism that others were committed to. Hence, he recognizes that the truth of conceptualism demands that we either embrace innatism or abandon some of our intuitions about nobility and agency. James does the former.

On James’s view the mind is not purely passive but it has a certain incomplete actuality (*quaedam actualitas incompleta*). James cashes out this notion in terms of innate propensities (*idoneitates*) or aptitudes (*aptitudines*). He draws a distinction between

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74. For some discussion on innatism in medieval thought, see Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis I*, ch. 2 (with caution), Gerd van Riel and Caroline Macé, *Platonic Ideas and Concept Formation in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), and (recently) Martin Pickavé, “Innate Cognition” (forthcoming).

general aptitudes—our various psychological powers—and special aptitudes, that is, aptitudes added to a given cognitive power. The special aptitudes are founded upon the intellect and perform the role that acquired intelligible *species* perform on the alternative paradigm: such aptitudes are distinct innate likenesses or forms of thinkable things.

James, then, is an innativist. He tells us that Plato’s error consists in his endorsement of innatism and the thesis that our souls exist before their union with our bodies; innatism itself, however, is not a problem in James’s lights.

James also does not reject Aristotle’s metaphor of the blank slate or *tabula rasa*; however, he reinterprets it. On his view, to characterize the intellect as a blank slate is to claim that the intellect has no *actual* or *occurrent* thoughts already in it; but it is compatible with the claim that the intellect is a blank slate that it might have already written upon it certain propensities or incomplete thoughts. The intellect is in accidental potentiality and this is what it means to be a blank slate: it has no occurrent thoughts but is able to have them. However, James, unlike Durand, is committed to the idea that the intellect in accidental potentiality has added aptitudes—which ontologically are forms. It is blank with respect to its complete thoughts but it is quite stock full of incomplete thoughts or aptitudes.

How does James answer to the objections raised above? Isn’t he, thus, committed to the idea that the (finite) human intellect has an infinite number of incomplete actualities, propensities, or dispositions? As far as I can tell, this isn’t a worry for James; it isn’t, to be sure, one of the five worries he raises against his account.

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76. *Quodl.* I.7 92–3; see also *Quodl.* I.12 166.
77. Côté, “L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines,” 411–2: “En effet, pour Jacques de Viterbe—et c’est là une de ses doctrines les plus caractéristiques—l’intellect agent n’a pas à abstraire les formes des phantasmes car celles-ci se trouvent déjà dans l’intellect possible sous forme de ce qu’il appelle des *idoneitates*, c’est-à-dire des actualités incomplètes ou des ‘inchoations’ relativement à la perfection ultérieure de l’intellect.”
78. *Quodl.* I.12 171.
79. *Quodl.* I.12 170.
80. *Quodl.* I.12 170.
Durand is not an innativist and he is not an anti-conceptualist

Both innativists and anti-innativists would seem to agree, then, that conceptualism is true: in order to think about X, one must possess the concept associated with X. On both views, concept-possession is to be analyzed in terms of form-possession of some sort. We can claim, for instance, that one possesses the concept, C, associated with X when one has an intelligible species—be it identified with the act (Godfrey) or held to be separate (the species theorist); or we can claim that one possesses C when one has an incomplete act (James); or when one has “that in virtue of which X appears” (Auriol). However it is that we cash out the notion, concept-possession involves the possession of some monadic property added to the cognizant subject.

Is Durand an innativist or an anti-conceptualist? The foregoing discussion makes it look as if this is an either/or situation: either Durand denies the conceptualist thesis that in order to think X one must already have the concept X or Durand denies anti-innatism—that in order to have the concept X one must acquire the concept X from the world.

It is true enough that Durand would reject one version of conceptualism. He denies that in order to think about X, we must have the concept associated with X where “have the concept” means something like have the form as an item that inheres in or informs the mind. Let’s distinguish, however, between two versions of conceptualism. According to type A conceptualism, what it means to have a concept is to be in the possession of a monadic property, or, to put it in scholastic terms, to be informed with a non-relative accident, e.g., a species. Hence, this view is committed to internalism about concept-possession: to have a concept is to have some intrinsic property. Type B conceptualism is committed to externalism about concept-possession. A has a concept, C, under certain external conditions; the intrinsic properties of A tell us nothing about whether or not A possesses the concept C; rather it is the relational properties which matter. To put it in scholastic terms, A has a concept when A has founded upon it a relative accident.
Chapter 3. Durand’s theory

I submit that Durand is a type B conceptualist. Here’s how. In general, Durand is an externalist about ability-possession: X has an ability (or disposition) to do $\varphi$ provided certain external conditions are met. For instance, soapstone has an ability to make things hot not in virtue of its having heat (strictly speaking) but in virtue of the relational fact that it is related to something able to be made hot. The possession of heat is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Recall my discussion of dispositions when I discussed Durand’s *sine qua non* claim above (§3.1.3). On Durand’s view, a relative object-oriented second act is related to a present and existent object whereas a relative object-oriented first act is related to an existent but non-present object. On this view, soapstone, having heat (a monadic property), can be in one of three states: it can either be in second act (if a heatable item is actually present to it) or it can be in first act/accidental potency (if a heatable item is not actually present to it but rather is potentially present to it). However, it can also be in a third state: suppose the soapstone, having heat, exists in a world wherein there is no heatable item at all, i.e., no heatable item that is even potentially present to it. In such a world, soapstone, having heat, will have all the same monadic properties that soapstone, having heat, does in the alternative world (where there is something heatable, be it actually or potentially present to it). The relevant difference between the two will be in terms of their relational properties: in the one world, the soapstone, having heat, will have no relation at all to something else heatable whereas in the other world it will have a relation to something else heatable. This relation will either be a relation of potential presence or a relation of actual presence. Hence, soapstone’s calefactivity, that is, its ability to make something hot, is attributed to the soapstone along externalist lines: if the soapstone exists in a world wherein there is some item able to be heated, then the soapstone is able to make something hot; if not, it is not, even though all the intrinsic properties of the soapstone are by hypothesis the same in both worlds. Hence, on Durand’s view, I would submit, an ability or disposition to $\varphi$-able items ($\varphi$ativity)
obtains if (a) there exists some subject, S, with some monadic property, M, and (b) there exists some \( \varphi \) able item. An oven is not able to cook if there is not something able to be cooked that exists. An oven is able to cook (but not cooking) if a cookable item exists but is not present. And an oven is able to cook and also cooking if that cookable item both exists and is present.

Applied to the intellect, the story should look something like this. Socrates has an intellect (a monadic property). Provided there is at least one item in the world able to be thought, then we can claim that Socrates’ intellect bears a relationship to that item—Socrates has a disposition to think about that item. Provided that item is, then, made to be present to Socrates’ intellect, Socrates’ intellect will then be said to think it. Now, it might be true that Durand is committed to an infinite number of relations—although Durand does, in fact, deny that an actual infinity is possible.\(^82\) But, even if he did think an actual infinite number of items were possible, it still wouldn’t be a problem, or at least not the problem Peter Auriol and Duns Scotus seem to be worried about, for a finite item can have an infinite number of relations, even if it can’t be informed with an infinite number of forms or perfections or have an infinite activity.\(^83\) Just as the actual thought is not a non-relative item added to the power, so too a possible thought is not a non-relative item added to a power. The intellect is truly a blank slate, both before, after, and when it thinks.

This, I think, is Durand’s position. Hence, on Durand’s view of conceptualism, in order to think about X, I must have the concept associated with X. But concept-possession is not to be analyzed in terms of the possession of a monadic property but in terms of a polyadic property. On the alternative view, I have the concept associated with X when I have some monadic property (a perfection). Hence, the threat of innatism is that I


\(^{83}\) See especially Sent. II-C 1.4.
will have an infinite number of monadic properties, which is absurd. On Durand’s view, I have the concept associated with X when I have some polyadic property (a relation). The threat of innatism does not arise. Of course, I have a relation to everything that exists (and is intelligible, which, as it turns out, is everything that exists), but this is not infinite. In any case, even if an infinite number of items existed, the threat is not a threat, because a finite item can be related to an infinite number of items.
Part II

Content and Cognition
Durand of St-Pourçain and Thomas Aquinas on Mental Representations

In his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Thomas Reid writes:

All philosophers, from Plato to Mr. Hume, agree in this, that we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some image present to the mind. (II.7)

Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages agreed that what we immediately perceive are external objects and that the immediate object of perception must not be some image present to the mind. Yet, most philosophers in the High Middle Ages also held, following Aristotle, that perception is a process wherein the perceiver takes on the form or likeness of the external object. This form or likeness—called a *species*—is a representation by means of which we immediately perceive the external object. But how can perception be both mediated by such representations and also immediate? How can an item represent an external object to someone without itself being perceived?

Thomas Aquinas is one of these philosophers. For Aquinas, all our cognitive activities, from vision on up to our most abstract thoughts about the world, require *species* or *similitudines* which function somehow as representations of the thing.¹ Durand rejects this thesis on two fronts.² First of all, he argues, in order to explain how it is that a

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2. The best analysis of Durand’s criticism of *species* remains Fumagalli, *Durando di S. Porziano*, 65–76. See also (with some caution) Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis I*, 281–3. Both authors limit themselves to Durand’s printed third redaction (‘C’). More recently, Solère, “The Activity of the Cognitive Subject” and Friedman, “Peter Auriol versus Durand of St. Pourçain on Intellectual Cognition” discuss aspects of Durand’s criticism of *species* from his first redaction (‘A’).
perception—the mental act—comes about, one does not need to postulate that a form somehow comes to be received in the percipient. In order to perceive, all that is needed is an item able to perceive and an item able to be perceived and their mutual approximation.\(^3\) One does not need to posit that the object acts upon the percipient, nor does one need to suppose that the percipient comes to acquire or take on a form or *species* of the object. Second of all, one does not need to posit a *species* or form in the percipient in order to explain what the perceptive act is about.

In his discussion of the *species*-theory of cognition, Durand clearly distinguishes between two roles associated with the *species*: as a necessary postulate in an account of the causation of a cognitive act and as a necessary postulate in an account of the aboutness of a cognitive act. We have already seen some of the basic assumptions which motivate him to reject the first role associated with a *species*. In this chapter, I will be concerned with Durand’s arguments against the second role associated with a *species* or form received or possessed by the mind, that is, its role as a representation.

One of the arguments which Durand makes in this connection is the following. The postulation of a *species*, conceived of as a representation, runs against the tribunal of experience, for were direct forms of cognition to involve *species* as representations, then we would experience them, since whatever represents something is perceived.\(^4\) Durand’s

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4. *Sent.* II-C 3.6 n. 102: “Et quod non sit ponere speciem in sensu, puta in uisui, ad praesentandum uisui colorum ut uideatur, patet sic. Omne illud per quod tamquam per praesentatium potentia cognitiua fertur in alterum est primo cognitum. Sed species coloris in oculo non est primo cognita, seu uisa ab ipso—immo nullo modo est uisa ab eo. Ergo per ipsam tamquam per praesentatium uisus, non fertur in aliquid aliud.” *Sent.* II-C 3.6 n. 12: “Quod autem in intellectu nostro non sit ponere speciem talem patet per eandem rationem, quia oportet quod esset ab intellectu primo cognita, cuius oppositum experimur.”
refutation of *species* raised the immediate ire of his 14th-century contemporaries, and even during the early modern period Durand’s arguments were regularly addressed by proponents of the *species*-theory of cognition. One of the more common criticisms of Durand’s refutation, reiterated by Robert Pasnau in *Theories of Cognition*, is that Durand simply misrepresents the theory. A *species* is, it is true, a representation of the external object, but it is not a representation *in which* the external object is perceived but rather a representation *by means of which* it is immediately perceived. A *species*, in other words, represents an external object to a percipient even though it is not itself perceived.

In what follows, I want to re-evaluate the success of Durand’s criticism of representational *species*. I will first (§4.1) present one of Durand’s arguments against the *species*-theory of cognition, followed by this common objection to it. I then (§4.2) argue that Durand’s criticism is better than all that, for it is part of a more general kind of burden-of-proof argument which goes roughly like this. It is natural to suppose that a representation is apprehended before whatever it represents is apprehended and it is also evident that my perception of an external object does not involve my apprehension of anything other than the external object. Hence, the burden of proof is not mine but yours to show that there is such a thing as a representation which represents something to someone without itself being apprehended and that such an entity necessarily mediates perception. Such is the burden that is never met by the proponent of the *species*-theory of cognition. I close (§4.3) by considering some options that such a proponent might take

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6. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis I*, 281: “In the eyes of later generations of philosophers, especially the authors of the Second Scholasticism, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain is one of the main opponents of the intelligible *species*. L. Spruit discusses Peter Crockaert (ibid., ch. 5.2.7; *In DA* III.1.5 and Raphaele Aversa (Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis II*, ch. 10.2.2.5; *Philosophia . . .* vol. 2, f. 820a). See also John Capreolus, *Defensiones* II 3.2, Francisco Suárez, *Comm. DA* 5.1, and Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), *ST* I.84–85. On Durand’s legacy, see Müller, *Die Lehre vom verbum mentis* and Bonino, “Quelques réactions thomistes à la critique de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourçain.”

in response.

4.1 Against *species*

Durand rejects *species* as representations throughout his career, and offers a series of arguments against the *species*-theory of cognition—the view that all cognitive activities are mediated by representational *species*.\(^8\) One argument which Durand makes, which seems to invite the criticism that he misrepresents the theory, is the following:

Such a *species*, if it were to direct [a cognitive power] into the cognition of some other item, would do this as a likeness (*similitudo*)—indeed, it is commonly called a likeness of the thing (*similitudo rei*)—and so it would have the nature of an image. But an image directing [a cognitive power] into the cognition of that of which it is an image is cognized first, which can’t be said about such a *species*. (*Sent.* II-C 3.6 n. 11)

Durand’s argument is simple. An ordinary representation (e.g., an image) is apprehended, by whatever cognitive route, before whatever it represents is apprehended. As he put it earlier, in general, “that through which, as through a representative, a cognitive power is directed to something else is cognized first” (ibid., n. 10:\(^2\) “Omne illud per quod tamquam per repraesentatiuum potentia cognitiua fertur in alterum est primo cognitum”).\(^9\) The image of Hercules in the courtyard, his reflection in the pond, and the utterance ‘Hercules’ represent Hercules; yet in each case, the representation is something which is apprehended first: I hear the word or see the statue and then I think about Hercules. As Durand explains:

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8. His most extensive discussions are in *Sent.* II-A 3.5 and *Sent.* II-C 3.6. But see also *Sent.* I-C 3.2.5, *Sent.* I-A 3.5 (= *Additiones ad comment. I Sent.*), *Sent.* II-C 3.7–8, *QLA* 3, and *Sent.* IV-C 49.2.

9. See also *Sent.* II-C 3.6 n. 11: “Et sine dubio de se uidetur absurdum quod potentia cognitiua ducatur in cognitionem alicuius per tale repraesentatiuum, quod est sibi totaliter incognitum. Contrarium enim nerissimum est, uidelict quod per notum ducitur in cognitionem ignoti.” Spruit, *Species Intelligibis I*, 283 remarks that “this methodological rule, which Durandus assumes to be self-evident, has a brilliant future ahead of it.”
Whatever holds itself as object (*se habere obiectiue*) to a cognitive power *qua* cognitive is or can be cognized by it. But whatever represents something to a cognitive power holds itself as an object, for it stands in for the thing which it represents (*supplet enim uicem rei quam repraesenta*), which thing, were it itself present, would hold itself as an object to the cognitive power. Therefore, any such representation is or can be cognized by it, and when it directs it into the cognition of some other item, it is cognized before that item (either in time or in nature). (*Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 10*)

Yet a *species* is not apprehended before the external object, for when I perceive Hercules, I do not first perceive a representation of Hercules. Hence, a *species* can’t be a representation, at least not an ordinary representation.

### 4.1.1 An Objection

An obvious objection to this line of attack against the *species*-theory is this. A *species*, to be sure, is a representative or representation, but it isn’t an *ordinary* representation. Quite the contrary, it is a *special* representation, and special representations can, as it turns out, represent external objects to percipients without themselves being perceived first. For instance, John Capreolus, a 15th-century thinker known to early modern philosophers as the prince of the Thomists (*princeps thomistarum*), in his *Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis* writes:

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10. What Durand means by the proviso ‘either in time or in nature (*tempore vel natura*)’ is that one might at the very temporal instant that one grasps the representation also grasp the *representatum*; but even so, the grasp of the representation is conceptually prior to the grasp of the *representatum*.

11. It will be useful in what follows to make something explicit: The ordinary or folk conception of a representation treats it as a triadic-relation: X represents Y to Z.

[Durand] was deceived by an equivocation in the terms ‘image’, ‘likeness’ and ‘medium of cognition’, for each of these is said in many ways. There is a medium of cognition in which \( medium \ in \ quo \), a medium of cognition by means of which \( medium \ quo \), and also medium of cognition under which \( medium \ sub \ quo \). In the case of vision, the medium of cognition under which is light, the medium by means of which is the \textit{species} impressed upon the sense, and the medium in which is a mirror or some other object outside the one who is seeing which, when looked upon, directs sense into the cognition of something else. And just as I distinguish here between many media, so also one can draw these distinctions in the case of [the term] ‘image’. For an impressed \textit{species} is an image by means of which \( imago \ qua \) the thing is seen and a mirror or a statue is an image in which \( imago \ in \ qua \) that item is seen. Hence, it is answered [to Durand’s argument] that an image in which a thing is seen is seen before [the thing is seen], but an image by means of which a thing is seen is not. (II.3.2 300)

More recently, Robert Pasnau, in his study on medieval philosophy of mind, has reiterated this charge, telling us that Durand’s argument here is a good example of a bad argument against Aquinas’s theory of \textit{species} since Durand fails to recognize “that the following situation is perfectly conceivable: X represents Y to A, and A thereby perceives Y without A’s perceiving X” (18). Pasnau writes:

The issue, [Durand] says, is whether the species is a \textit{representative} of the external object. It quickly becomes clear that Durand’s argument against species rests on a very narrow interpretation of what it could mean for one thing to represent another. The example he immediately cites of one thing representing another is of someone’s understanding a cause through the rep-
representation of the effect.\textsuperscript{13} That [. . . ] is hardly the sort of example Aquinas would have used to illustrate the role of species. For an effect to represent its cause, the effect must be explicitly apprehended, and an inference to the cause must be made. This is precisely how Durand supposes species would operate. \textsuperscript{(17)}

For Capreolus and Aquinas (as Pasnau interprets him), a \textit{species} is a representation, but it isn’t an ordinary representation. There are two kinds of representations: ordinary ones, like a statue or an effect, which, when apprehended, direct us to something else (a \textit{medium in quo}) and special ones, like \textit{species}, which direct us to something else without themselves being apprehended (a \textit{medium quo}).

Now, the idea that a \textit{species} is a special representation is, I will argue, one of the problems with the \textit{species}-theory of cognition. What does it mean to say that something both represents an external object to someone and, at the same time, is not perceived? Robert Pasnau goes on to suggest an analogy with vehicles (‘cognitional vehicles’) which convey us to external objects.\textsuperscript{14} Dominik Perler suggests an analogy with microscopes.

By looking through the microscope one is able to see some microbiological aspects that are inaccessible to the unaided senses. Likewise, by using an intelligible \textit{species} the intellect is able to grasp the thing’s universal aspect that is inaccessible to the senses and to the unaided sensory faculty. The crucial point is that the intelligible \textit{species}, like the microscope, is that \textit{by which} something is seen under a certain aspect, not at all that which is seen. (‘Things in the Mind: Fourteenth-Century Controversies over Intelligible Species,” 242)\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 4: “Haec praepositio ‘per’ potest denotare uel principium intellectiuum [. . . ] uel illud quod est subiecti repraesentatiuum, sicut dicimus quod homo intelligit causam per effectum[. . . ].”


\textsuperscript{15} In this passage, Perler has in mind John Duns Scotus, who also defends intelligible \textit{species}. Perler suggests that Duns Scotus required such \textit{species} only in the case of intellectual cognition of a thing under
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In any case, Durand’s argument does seem to get the target theory wrong: a species is a representation which is able to represent the external object even though it is not itself perceived beforehand. It can be characterized as an image, but it is not, as Capreolus puts it, an image in which but an image by means of which.16

4.2 Defensio Durandi

It would be an embarrassment indeed if Durand did glide over the common scholastic distinction between a medium quo and a medium in quo. Fortunately, Capreolus is quite mistaken when he tells us that Durand was unaware of the distinction. In his criticism of the species theory in his first redaction, for instance, Durand begins his discussion with that very distinction in mind. He writes:

If, in an angel, there were species representative of things, then either these would operate as a cognized medium (medium cognitum) or as mere means of cognition (ratio cognoscendi) [i.e., an uncognized medium]. Not as a cognized medium. First of all, this isn’t how we ordinarily use the term ‘species’, its universal aspect, relying on his celebrated notion of ‘intuitive cognition’ to explain sensory contact with a thing. But Duns Scotus retains sensible species in his account of human cognition—indeed, one of his main arguments for intelligible species is an inference from ‘how it is in the senses’ to ‘how it is in the intellect’. See Ord. I C.3.31–3, Lect. I 3.1.1–3, Rep. I A 3.3.3–5, Quodl. 13 and (with caution) QDA. For further discussion, see King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content.” To my mind, the microscope metaphor breaks down in such a case. Do I use a normal-setting microscope to grasp the sensible aspects of a thing? On this last point (in connection with Aquinas), see Stump, Aquinas, 245, fn. 2: “[I]t does not seem sensible to say that wearers of contact lenses see what they see with mediated cognition; it does seem right to suppose that use of an electron microscope produces mediated cognition; and it is hard to be clear about the categorization of cognition resulting from the use of an ordinary light microscope.”

for otherwise we would say that a cause is the species of the effect and vice versa[...]. Second of all, the role the species performs in an angel’s mind is the same as the role the species performs in our senses and intellects [...]. But the species (if there is one) in our senses and intellects isn’t a cognized medium. (Sent. II-A 3.5 27, emph. mine; see also ibid., 7–8)¹⁷

And in another text, from his third redaction, Durand recognizes these three senses of the term ‘medium’:

There are three media involved in vision, namely, a medium by means of which (medium quo), for example, a species in the eye or, according to those who postulate it, an intelligible species in the intellect, a medium under which (medium sub quo), for example, corporeal light in the case of corporeal vision or, according to Aristotle and his followers, the intellectual light of the agent intellect [...]. But there is a third medium: a medium in which (medium in quo) the thing is said to be seen, for example, in the case of corporeal vision, a mirror in which or by the mediation of which someone sees their own face or in the case of intellectual vision, an effect through which its cause is cognized or something like this. But this [latter kind of] medium is not a mere means of cognizing something else (which is what the species is said to be) but it is rather a cognized medium. (Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 9, emph. mine)

Finally, in the very same text in which Durand made his (according to Capreolus and Pasnau) dubious argument, Durand declares that the species is a “medium by means of which the thing is cognized” (n. 19: “[...] species quae est medium quo res cognoscitur [...]”).

¹⁷. On the distinction between a ratio cognoscendi and a medium cognitum, see Sent. II-A 3.5, Sent. I-C 6.1, Sent. II-C 3.6, Sent. IV-C 49.2, Sent. II-C 13.2, Sent. 3 Prol. q., Sent. IV-C 44.8, QA II.11, Sent. I-C 36.3, and QA III.1.
Hence, Durand recognizes the distinction between a medium in which and a medium by means of which, and he recognizes that, on the \textit{species}-theory of cognition, the \textit{species} is not to be understood as the former but rather should be taken as the latter: it is a representation by means of which someone perceives something else even though it is not itself perceived. As he puts it, in still another text, the \textit{species} in the eye “does not terminate the soul’s activity but rather it is that by means of which (\textit{illud quo}) the soul tends towards its object, for the \textit{species} of the color [in the eye or the air] is not itself seen but rather the color in the corporeal object is seen by means of the \textit{species}, as some people say” (\textit{Sent.} II-C 13.2 n. 9).\footnote{\textit{Sent.} II-C 13.2 n. 9: “Ratione enim imperfecti [sc. \textit{species} -PJH] non terminant actum animae sed sunt illud quo anima tendit in objectum. Non enim \textit{species} coloris uidentur sed color corporis objecti mediante specie, ut quidam dicunt.” See also \textit{Sent.} II-C 3.6 n. 10: “Sed \textit{species} coloris in oculo non est primo cognita seu uisa ab ipso—immo nullo modo est uisa ab eo.” See also \textit{Sent.} I-C 36.3 n. 12: “[…] nec idea est ratio intelligendi quae sic est ratio intelligendi quod non est intellecta sicut est \textit{species} secundum ponentes ipsa[…].” See also \textit{Sent.} IV-C 49.2 n. 9: “Tale autem medium [in quo] non est solum ratio cognoscendi alterum, sicut de specie dicitur sed est medium cognitum.”}

Hence, Durand is not confused by an equivocation in the term. Nor does he (\textit{pace} Pasnau) suppose that a \textit{species} represents the external object in the way that an effect represents its cause. As we saw above, Durand clearly places effects into the category of cognized media as opposed to uncognized media, like \textit{species}. But if Durand isn’t confused by an equivocation, then, well, why does he make what appears to be an obviously bad argument against the \textit{species}-theory of cognition?

Now, one thing that is interesting about Durand’s refutation of \textit{species} is that he, unlike some of his contemporaries, such as William of Ockham, doesn’t eliminate \textit{species} entirely—and this, I think, is an important fact, for on Durand’s view there are \textit{species} with well-defined natures and well-defined roles; yet such entities are \textit{not} representations. Durand holds that there are certain \textit{species} which exist in the air, in the eye, and even in certain inner parts of the body.\footnote{\textit{Sent.} II-C 3.6 n. 11 [= \textit{Sent.} IV-C 49.2 n. 13]: “Color does impress a \textit{species} of itself upon the medium and the eye[…]” \textit{QLA} 3 494: “An organ does receive the \textit{species} of a color[…]” \textit{Sent.} II-A 3.5 31: “Res enim distans ut color pari etis effectura praeens usui per id quod causat in organo quod cum sit accidens est in eo ut in subiecto.” This distinguishes Durand’s rejection of \textit{species} from William
cognition is that, on their view, such entities operate as representations or representatives during a direct act of perception. In his *Questions on Freedom of Choice*, Durand writes:

> An organ does receive the *species* of a color because it has the right kind of corporeal disposition needed for its reception. However, this *species* received in the organ or in the medium does not contribute at all to the act of seeing. Rather, sight, as what is able to see, is directly changed to an act of vision from the whole visible object. On this view, such a *species* in the organ or in the medium *conveys* (refert) nothing when one sees something white or black regardless of whether there is one *species* or several since it contributes nothing at all to the act of seeing, neither as a *representation* nor in some other way. (*QLA* 3 494)

And in *Sent.* II-C 3.6 he concludes:

> And so it is clear that there is no *species* in the eye for the purpose of *representing* to sight a color, that it may be seen. For even though color does impress a *species* of itself upon the medium and the eye owing to the like of Ockham, who eliminates *species* entirely. On Ockham’s rejection of *species*, see Eleonore Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species,” in Spade, *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, 168–203 and Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, ch. 2. Durand’s position is much closer to Godfrey of Fontaines’ or Peter John Olivi’s, both of whom retain *species in medio* and *species in organo* but reject representational *species* in direct perception. On Godfrey’s views about *species*, see Chapter 1 and footnote 25. On Olivi, see Chapter 3, footnote 54.

diaphanous disposition that exists in them, nevertheless this *species* does not at all contribute to the act of seeing, nor does it *represent* a color to sight so that it may be seen. (n. 11 [= *Sent.* IV-C 49.2 n. 13])

On Durand’s view, a *species* does exist both in the intervening medium (the air) and also in the eye but neither of these contributes to—i.e., has a positive effect upon—the act of vision and neither of these is a representation.

### 4.2.1 The burden of proof

On Durand’s view, the proponent of the *species*-theory of cognition motivates the thesis that cognition is mediated by special representations—items that both represent and are unperceived—through an appeal to such natural *species*. But the fact that there exist such natural *species*, which are, it is true, unperceived media, does not warrant the further claim that during a direct act of perception there exists a *species* in the percipient itself which, as a representation, directs her to the external object. In a prolegomenon to his discussion of *species*, Durand describes the situation as follows:

These *species*, however, seem to have been introduced originally on account of the sense of sight and the sensibles of that sense. For color seems to effect its *species* in the medium and the [sense] organ, just as it appears sensibly [to

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21. Suárez, in his question commentary on *De Anima*, puts Durand’s view succinctly (disp. 5, q. 1): “On this topic there is one opinion that asserts that the conjunction of the cognizable object with the cognizing power is not necessary for cognition. This virtually everyone who denies intentional, sensible or intellectual, *species* asserts. [...] Durand ([II-C] 3.6 n. 11 and [II-C] 13.2) does not reject *species*. However he tells us that they do (*conducere*) nothing for cognition. ‘Rather when an object’, he says, ‘is put in front of sight, it is at once seen, not on account of the *species* but because the one is able to see and the other able to be seen.’” Cf. Durand, *Sent.* II-C 3.6 n. 21: “Sicut ergo sensibilia secundum se praesentia sensui cognoscuntur per sensum, puta omnia colorata et omnia lucentia quae secundum se praesentialiter obiicintur uisui statim uidentur, quia unum est uisium et aliud visibile propter quod eis approximatis statim sequitur uisio a quocumque sit effectue et similiter est de alis sensibus [...].” Cf. also Durand, *Sent.* II-A 3.5 31: “Ad primum argumentum principale dicendum quod ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat sufficit quod res intelligibilis sit praesens objectu intellectui secundum se ul summum aliqud eam repraesentans. Quod autem sit in intellectu subjectu accidit sicut in anima nostra contingit maxime in potentiiis sensitiiuis, quidquid sit de intellectu. Res enim distans ut color parietis efficet praesens uisui per id quod causat in organo quod cum sit accidens est in eo ut in subjecto. Quod enim sit praesens uisui, necessarium est ad uisionem; quod autem sit in eo ut in subjecto, accidit uisioni.”
do] when reflected in a mirror. And if it were not for this, perhaps mention would never have been made of \textit{species} required for cognition. But because some believe that the \textit{species} of color in the eye \textit{represents} to sight the color of which it is the \textit{species}, they therefore posit, both in our and in angelic intellects, certain \textit{species} for the purpose of \textit{representing} things, that they may be known both by us and by angels. (\textit{Sent. II-C} 3.6 n. 10, [= \textit{Sent. IV-C} 49.2 n. 13]; tr. Tachau, \textit{Vision and Certitude}, 4, emph. mine)

On Durand’s view, proponents of the \textit{species}-theory were motivated to postulate psychological \textit{species} based upon considerations taken from the going optical theory. In optics, there are \textit{species} in the air which are invisible mediators between the a mirror placed on one side of the room and a mirror placed on the other side of the room; hence, it might well be the case that in psychology there are \textit{species} in the mind which are unperceived mediators between the perceiver and the perceived object. However, Durand goes on to argue, the \textit{species}-theory of \textit{optics} does not, at the end of the day, furnish us with an entity that \textit{represents} an item to or for someone even if it does furnish us with entities (also called \textit{species}) which are invisible means by means of which someone sees something else. In other words, something’s being a \textit{species} (that is, the theoretical entity identified and talked about in the \textit{species}-theory of optics) is not sufficient for its being a representation, for the optical \textit{species} does not represent. We must supplement our theory with something more if we hope to make the further claim that a \textit{species} is a special representation. This, I would submit, is the burden that Durand thinks his opponent has not quite met.

It will be useful to speak of two \textit{species} theories, one psychological and the other physical. What I will call the \textit{Species-Theory of Cognition} (STC) is the psychological theory. It claims that a \textit{species} (whatever this might be) performs a necessary representational role in each and every cognitive act, from vision on up to our most abstract thoughts. Call these psychological \textit{species}. STC is the theory Durand rejects. The
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physical theory, which I will call the Species-Theory of Optics (STO), is a theory meant to explain optical phenomena, such as the fact that a color travels across a great distance from wall to mirror or eye without coloring the intervening medium. Call these natural species. This is the theory that Durand retains. Durand goes on to reject not just the extension of natural species into the domain of (human and angelic) intellectual cognition but also the very idea that a natural species (the species in the eye) represents a color to sight.

One might respond to the above line of reasoning in one of two ways. On the one hand, one might insist that the natural species (the entity identified and talked about in the species-theory of optics) does in fact represent albeit in a special way. STO does give us support for the claim that a psychological species is a special representation since a natural species is a special representation. Durand has simply misunderstood the species-theory of optics. On the other hand, one might insist that a psychological species and a natural species, although having a thing or two in common, are fish and fowl. In other words, one might simply deny Durand’s story about the origins of psychological species. However, if one pursues this strategy, then one will have to tell some other story about why an account of perception or psychological activity must involve species, that is, special representations. Indeed, part of the reason that one might have wanted to appeal to natural species in the first place is because such a move allows us to explain what seems to be obscure—the nature of mental representation—in terms of what is, in theory at least, less obscure—the entities postulated by our best science about optics. This, it seems to me, is a laudable goal, to naturalize the mind, as it were.

22. Durand maintains that while there are species in the eye and air and perhaps other organs of our body, there are no species in our intellect, a power that has no organ, and likewise angels (which don’t have organs at all).

23. Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 10: “Hoc autem non reputo uerum esse, nec in sensu, nec in intellectu nostro, nec in angelico. Et quod non sit ponere speciem in sensu, puta in uisu ad repraesentandum uisui colorem ut uideatur, patet sic […]”
Before I turn to the first option, I should note that, based on the texts, it isn’t clear how we should take Thomas Aquinas on the issue. Does Aquinas think that the only grounds for countenancing psychological species is taken from considerations about natural species? Or does he think that the two are fish and fowl? Curiously, Aquinas hardly ever gives us an explicit argument in defense of psychological species. Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), Aquinas’s famous early modern commentator, in his running commentary on Aquinas’s Summa, arrives at ST I.84.3 (which asks whether we know through innate or acquired species) and quips:

This seems to be a bad way of going about things—a very difficult question has been omitted, namely: “Does the soul know with species?” There are, indeed, quite a few different opinions about this issue, and it ought to have been tackled here. Indeed, before one asks whether [it knows] with innate, influxed, or acquired species, one ought to have established first that it knows with species. (f. 318a)

He decides, however, that the omission is warranted since it is a universal assumption: “For no one would deny that in the cognizing soul there is a likeness of the item that is cognized” (ibid.).

24. An interesting note: Hamilton, The Works of Thomas Reid, Note M, 959a: “It has been an almost universal assumption of philosophers, that the relation of knowledge infers similarity of nature between the object known and the subject knowing.” Cajetan thinks that people like Ockham and Godfrey of Fontaines, who reject species, reject the thesis that this likeness (similitudo) is an entity distinct from the act itself, but they do not reject the thesis that all cognition is by way of the likenesses of things existing in the soul. On this score, he is right: both Godfrey and Ockham maintain that the act itself can be taken to be a likeness (Godfrey: Quodl. IX.19; Ockham: Quodl. IV.35; Quaest. Phys., q. 2). For Ockham, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, ch. 7 and Cyrille Michon, Nominalisme: La théorie de la signification d’Occam (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994), 147–148. For Godfrey, see Chapter 1, fn. 22. However, Durand rejects the thesis that in the cognizing soul there is a likeness of the thing, be it the act or a species distinct from the act. There are species in the body and in the air, but not, at least not necessarily, in the soul. See, for example, Sent. II-A 3.5 31, quoted in footnote 21 above.
4.2.2 The *species*-theory of optics: a neutral description

Is Durand correct, then, that in the original *species*-theory of optics a *species* does not represent?25 Now, a theory of optics is not a theory of cognition, for each has their own explananda. As suggested in the quote above, one thing that a theory of optics hopes to explain is the phenomenon of optical reflection, when a color is reflected in or by a mirror. The *species*-theory of optics is the solution of those who would prefer not to deny the principle that action at a distance is impossible. Thomas Aquinas and most Thomists defended this principle, and so did Durand.26 The color on the wall first transmits its *species* to the air and the air then transmits it to the mirror in much the same way that the element on my stove transmits heat to the kettle which in turn transmits it to the water. As Aquinas puts it:

> Color must actually move the translucent medium, for example, air or something else of that sort, and by that the sensory capacity—the organ of sight—is moved, as by a body in contact with it. For bodies don’t alter one another

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unless they are touching. (In DA II.15 §432; tr. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 43)\textsuperscript{27}

Obviously, the air does not become colored in contrast to the kettle which becomes hot, but it still must receive something since nothing can act at a distance. What does it receive? Well, it receives the species of the color.

One peculiar feature a species does have, then, is that it is a form that is received but one that is able to exist in a subject without that subject taking on the characteristics of that form. A number of often-deceptive terms were trotted out to characterize this peculiar mode of existence that a species has in the intervening medium, for example, ‘spiritual’, ‘intentional’, ‘weak’, ‘imperfect’, and even ‘immaterial’.\textsuperscript{28} Some of these terms (e.g., ‘spiritual’ and ‘immaterial’) might suggest something rather mysterious. But they don’t, at least according to Durand and Thomas Aquinas. Notice, for starters, that the species in medio exists in the air even if nobody is around to perceive something by means of it. To say that a color exists in the air in an immaterial way is to say that the color exists in something which has some other matter than the matter that the wall (say) has. As Aquinas puts it:

Sometimes a form is received in the thing affected in keeping with a manner of existence different from the agent’s, because the affected thing’s material

\textsuperscript{27} See also In DA III.12 §773 and In DA II.14 §425, Sent. IV 10.1.4 and QDP V.8. Both Durand and Aquinas are committed to the real existence of secondary qualities. See Pasnau, “Scholastic Qualities: Primary and Secondary.”

\textsuperscript{28} For a recent survey, see Myles Burnyeat, “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception,” in Perler, Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, 129–54. Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition” (quoted below) prefers the term ‘spiritual’ and Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 39, invents the acronym ‘ISI’ (intentional, spiritual, and immaterial). I will use the term ‘imperfect’ as this is Durand’s preferred term, although he does use most of the above terms to pick out the phenomenon: Sent. II-C 13.2 n. 11: “Esse autem intentionale est esse imperfectum.” See esp. Sent. II-C 13.2 (quoted below) where he tells us that something is intentional in the broad sense if it is weak in a certain sense and all of this is in virtue of the fact that it is imperfect in a certain sense. In Sent. IV-C 44.4, 8, and 10 he uses the term ‘spiritual’. I have not seen him use the term ‘immaterial’, but Aquinas, as Pasnau has convincingly argued, does often use this as synonymous with what I will call imperfect. In Aquinas, see QDV XXVII.4 ad 4; In DA II.20–21; In Meta. I.16; ST I.67.3 and 82.3; and Sent. IV 44.2.1, II 13.1.3 and IV 44.3.1 For a good list of the various terms which scholastic philosophers deployed in this context, see Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum I.1 and Gregory of Rimini, Sent. II7.3.
disposition for receiving is not like the agent’s material disposition. (In DA II.24 §553; tr. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 40–41, emph. mine)\textsuperscript{29}

Likewise, the term ‘intentional\textsuperscript{30} might suggest something more. However, at least according to Durand and Thomas Aquinas, to say that the species has intentional existence is to say nothing more than that it is a form which exists in something without that thing taking on the characteristics of the form. To be sure, it doesn’t mean that the species is somehow mind-dependent, for the species will still be said to have intentional existence in the air in between two mirrors even if no minds exist at all. Durand underscores this point—and I think very well—in his discussion of the nature of light as it exists in the medium:

‘Intentional existence (esse intentionale)’ can be taken in two ways. In one way, as opposed to real existence (esse reale) and in this way an item is said to have intentional existence if it exists owing to intellectual activity, as is the case with [logical] species, genera, and logical intentions (logicae intentiones). This is the proper way to understand the terms ‘intention’ and ‘intentional existence’. Taken in this way, light and the species of a color as they exist in the medium do not have intentional existence since an item that exists because of real principles with all intellectual activity having been set aside will have real and not intentional existence. But light and the species of a color as they exist in the medium are like this. […] In another way, an item is said to have intentional existence in a broad sense inasmuch as it has weak existence (esse debile). Now, ‘weak existence’ can itself be taken in three ways. […] In a third way, an item is said to have weak existence […] because it falls short of the perfection proper to its kind (perfectio propriae

\textsuperscript{29} See also In DSS 2–3 and In DA II.14–15.
\textsuperscript{30} Which we’ve already seen Godfrey use in Chapter 1. For an interesting discussion, see Katherine Tachau, “Some Aspects of the Notion of Intentional Existence at Paris, 1250–1320,” in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, ed. S. Ebbesen and R. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 331–53.
speciei). It is in this way that light and the species of a color as they exist in the medium have weak existence, which also can be said, in a certain way, to be intentional existence. (Sent. II-C 13.2 nn. 6–8)\footnote{Sent. II-C 13.2 nn. 6–8: “’Esse intentionale’ potest dupliciter accipi. Vno modo prout distinguitur contra esse reale, et sic dicuntur habere esse intentionale illa, quae sunt nisi per operationem intellectus, sicut genus et species et logicae intentiones. Et iste est proprius modus accipiendi ‘intentionem’ et ‘esse intentionale’. Et isto modo lumen in medio uel species coloris non habent esse intentionale, quia <illa>, quae sunt a principiis realibus circumscripta operatione intellectus, habent esse reale et non intentionale. Sed lumen et species coloris in medio sunt huiusmodi. Ergo, etc. Alio modo dicitur aliquid habere esse intentionale large, quia habet esse debile. Sed ‘habere esse debile’ adhuc tripliciter. […] Tertio modo dicitur aliquid habere esse debile non solum per comparationem ad causam proximam naturalem, sed quia deficit a perfectione propriae speciei. Et sic lumen et species in medio habent esse debile, quod etiam potest dici aliquo modo intentionale.” The other two kinds of weak existence are (i) the kind of existence that processes or changes have, that is, things that can be said to exist only over a span of time (non habent suum esse simul siue permanens sed in successione ut motus et tempus) and (ii) the kind of existence that an item that depends for its entire existence upon its cause has (ad sui existentiam requirunt praesentiam suae causae proximae naturalis). Durand makes much the same point in QLA 3 493–494.

31. Sent. IV-C 48.8 n. 12)
Elsewhere, he makes much the same point:

The alteration that the sense object produces in the medium or in the sense [organ] seems to be natural and real. ‘Natural’ since it is from natural principles acting naturally. ‘Real’ since through it there comes about a true and real form in the recipient and this form has its entire existence when every activity of the soul is removed. (Sent. IV-C 48.8 n. 12)

I take it that what Durand is driving at here is that a species is a real mind-independent entity with certain peculiar properties but none of these properties makes it unreal or mental or conceptual. A species is as physical as the color on the wall is.\footnote{32. See below.}

So the claim that the species has intentional, spiritual, or immaterial existence isn’t that mysterious. To claim that a color as it exists in the medium (i.e., a species) has intentional, spiritual, or immaterial existence is to claim that it exists naturally and really in the air even though—for whatever reason—the air does not become colored. I submit that this is also the view that Thomas Aquinas endorsed about the nature of species.

Here, I am in good company, for Pasnau also interprets Aquinas along these lines:
To put the point differently, a form of some character (e.g. a certain color) that exists intentionally does not cause its subject to take on that character (e.g., take on a certain color). This, I believe, is all Aquinas means by intentional existence. (Theories of Cognition, 37)\textsuperscript{33}

There is, to be sure, still something odd in saying that a color is still a color when it exists (invisibly) in the air. However, the claim is that the form which is called a color when it exists in the wall is the same (in kind) as the form which is called a species when it exists in the air. In fact, Durand suggests, we might clean up our language to make this perspicuous. In Latin, the noun ‘lux’ picks out light as it perfectly exists in a dense body, e.g., a star, whereas the noun ‘lumen’ picks out the same form (light) when it imperfectly exists in the air. Lumen and lux are the same form. Lumen in the air makes the air illuminated (illuminatum) whereas lux in the star makes it shine (lucens). So too with colors and species. A color in the air (a species) makes it qualified-in-some-way but it does not make it colored (coloratum). This ‘qualified-in-some-way’ is to the species-informed air as ‘illuminated’ is to the lumen-informed air.

‘Whiteness’ or ‘blackness’ do not name the nature of the species without qualification but rather the nature in its most powerful degree—which is only found in a transparent item determined by opacity—just as ‘lux’ names the form in a diaphanous item which is in its most powerful degree—which is

\textsuperscript{33} See also Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 41–42: “Notice that ISI existence [= imperfect existence] is defined in negative terms. All we are told is what it is not: it is not natural alteration. What we would further like to know is what ISI existence is, but here Aquinas falls silent. Yet even though he is unable to explain ISI existence in any definite way, it is not hard to see why he feels the need to introduce some such concept. On the one hand, he believes that the likenesses of objects are somehow transmitted through the air into the eye. On the other hand, he also knows that the intervening air and the eye do not in any ordinary sense take on the forms of these objects. So Aquinas is committed to there being some nonordinary way in which species are present in the medium and the sense organs. I have been arguing that such species could well be present physically and could bring about physical change, despite the superficial appearance of his terminology. But Aquinas, quite reasonably, seems to leave open the question of exactly how this spiritual alteration happens. He gives the theoretical outlines of an account but leaves the specific details to be filled in. Understood in this way, lack of specificity can hardly be seen as a weakness in the account.”
only found in a dense diaphanous item. And since there is no color in the medium in this degree, therefore the medium can’t be properly said to be colored (coloratum) even though it belongs to the same specific nature with the color from which it was caused [i.e., the color in the wall], just as the medium is not properly said to be shining (lucens) since it does not have lux in its perfect degree (which is what ‘lux’ names), even though it might have lumen which belongs to the same species with light although in a weak degree. However, it is said to be illuminated (illuminatum) since there was a name imposed in this denomination which ‘lumen’ makes. However, in the denomination which ‘speices’ makes (in the medium) there is no name imposed.\textsuperscript{34}

If we refine our language, then, we can speak of the species-informed air as not color-qualified (coloratum) but species-qualified (specialis?) just as the lumen-informed air is not lux-qualified (lucens) but lumen-qualified (illuminatum). Unsurprisingly, and thankfully, no one seems to have taken Durand up on his suggestions for improving the Latin language.

In any case, the point to take home is that a color can be said to have intentional existence (i.e., said to be a species) and all that this means is that it exists in a body such that that body does not exhibit the characteristic features of color: it does not become colored. All the same a species is a real and natural mind-independent feature of the world. This is, in part, why I characterize STO as a physical theory: the entities that

\textsuperscript{34}Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 17: “Ad secundum dicendum quod albedo et nigredo non nominant naturam speciei absolute sed secundum potissimum eius gradum quae solum reperitur in perspicuo terminato per opacum, sicut lux nominat formam diaphani secundum potissimum gradum quae solum reperitur in diaphano denso. Et quia secundum illum gradum multas color est in medio, ideo medium non proprie potest dicit coloratum, quia nec illa species proprie potest dici color, licet sit eiusdem naturae specificae cum colore a quo causatur, sicut medium non proprie dicitur lucens, quia non habet lucem secundum perfectum gradum, secundum quem nominatur lux, quanquam habeat lumen quod est eiusdem speciei cum luce licet in gradu remisse, dicitur tamen illuminatum quia illi denominationi quam facit lumen est nomen impositum. Sed denominationi quam facit species in medio non est nomen impositum.” See also Sent. II-C 13.2 n. 13.
STO countenances and the way it goes about talking about them refrains from talk of psychological or cognitive entities and psychological or cognitive concepts. In this sense, STO is what we might nowadays call naturalistic. The details of the theory might be wrong, but the method is, more or less, right.

There is a surprisingly large amount of literature dealing with the question of whether or not this is all that Aquinas meant with the notion of imperfect existence. As mentioned, he prefers the terminology of spiritual or immaterial existence, and this has led some interpreters to suggest that he rather means something more. On one interpretation, Aquinas really does mean to say that the species has a kind of immaterial existence, at least as it exists in a cognizant subject. I will return to this interpretation in the third section (§3).

I take the above account to be one that both Thomist and Durandian alike would accept. There are, to be sure, other important issues concerning STO that authors disagreed upon. Notably, there was the further question of whether or not the species as it exists in the air is really the same in kind as the color as it exists in the wall, that is, whether or not both are bona fide instances of color. Durand maintains that it is,


37. See, for example, the debate between Ockham and Walter Chatton recorded in their commentaries on the Sentences. Ockham: Rep. III.2; Chatton: Rep. II.4.1. Walter Chatton, abandoning scholastic
but other authors, and many Thomists, maintained that it is not.\footnote{38}

As I understand Durand’s position, Durand wants to point out that the fact that a \textit{species} has this peculiar mode of existence does not mean that it is a representation. Something more must be added to our story here, for so far we simply have a causal story about the transmission of a distal color across the intervening medium and onto some remote recipient, e.g., a mirror or an eye (embodied or not). The \textit{species}-theory of optics does, it is true, get us \textit{part} of the way to the claim that the \textit{species} is a representation of the sort he views his opponent as wanting to endorse: (i) a \textit{species} is a form of the color that is taken on by some item without that item’s taking on the characteristics of that form, (ii) it is also a medium by means of which we perceive distal colors, and (iii) it is not itself perceived. But STO hasn’t gotten us the \textit{whole} way to the claim that his opponent wants, for a lot of items take on the imperceptible forms of color—air and disembodied eyeballs—and yet there isn’t any representing going on in such items. To claim that a \textit{species} represents color because it exists in X with intentional, spiritual, or immaterial existence is not enough. Something more must be added to our story.

\footnote{38. See e.g., Nicholas Medensis, \textit{Evid.} II.12 410: “Ad exemplum dicendum est, primo, quod multum est dubium quod color, in quantum color, in medio et oculo, sint eiusdem rationis.” See also, e.g.,., Capreolus, \textit{Defensiones} II 3.2 and Francisco Suárez, \textit{Comm. DA} 5.2, Walter Chatton, \textit{Rep.} II 4.1, Gregory of Rimini, \textit{Sent.} II 7.3. I cite most of these authors in Chapter 5, fn. 22. For more on this debate, see Maier, “Das Problem der \textit{species sensibilis in medio} und die neue Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts,” Tachau, “The Problem of the \textit{species sensibilis in medio} in the Generation after Ockham,” and Tachau, “Walter Chatton on Sensible and Intelligible Species.” But cf. Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 139: “The likenesses that are identified as sensory species and phantasms may be literally ‘likenesses’: images—realizations of the material forms (colors, sounds, textures, etc.) of external objects in different matter, the matter of the external/internal sensory apparatus of the human body. And., in keeping with the formal-identity theory, the sensory species, at least, are likenesses that lose none of the detail present in the external senses themselves (which, of course, vary in sensitivity among individuals and from one time to another in the same individual)[…]” He cites \textit{In DA} II.23 § 547 (his translation): “A sense organ is affected by the sense-perceptible thing, because to sense is to undergo something. For that reason the sense-perceptible thing, which the agent [in sensation], makes the organ be actually as the sense-perceptible thing is, since the organ is in a state of potentiality to this [result].” But cf. ibid., 139, fn. 37: “Although Aquinas expresses himself in ways that at least permit the interpretation of the sensory species as literally images (visual, aural, etc.), an interpretation of them as encodings of some sort, involving no iconic resemblance, is also possible and seems not only more plausible but also in some respects better suited to his account generally.”}
4.3 Some responses

So, if the above is correct, then one can’t appeal to the *species*-theory of optics on its own in order to justify one’s claim that, in cognition, there is a *species* which represents, and, more precisely, an item that represents without itself being grasped beforehand. The notion of a special representation, as opposed to a familiar representation, still requires argument.

So, what more can we add to the story here? Imagine a well-lit room, then, with a mirror on one wall. In this room, according to STO, there will be a *species* (probably several) in the intervening air between the mirror and the wall opposite it. But there will not be a representation. How does a representation enter the room? There are two answers one might give, a bad one and an initially plausible but ultimately unsuccessful one.

4.3.1 The bad answer

The bad answer is to insist that the reintroduction of the visual agent causes the *species* to take on the role of a representation. A *species* in the air is not a representation but a *species* in the eye or the intellect is. This is the bad answer because one will have to provide us with a convincing argument as to why this might be the case, and, to my mind, this argument will do nothing but beg the question, since it will presumably eventually make the claim that all cognition is through representation. But is all cognition mediated by representations?

A variant on the bad answer is to insist that the *recipient* does some real work here: the air’s reception or the organ’s reception of a *species* is one thing whereas the *soul’s* reception is another. The *species* as it exists in a *power of the soul* (the faculty of sight, say) is a representation whereas the *species* as it exists in a mere *organ of the body* (the eye) is not. But this is an even worse suggestion. First, what reason do we even have for supposing that a *species* is received in the *soul*? STO tells us that a *species* is received in
the body, of course, but it does not warrant the claim that it is also received in the soul. It tells us that a *species* is received in a body because that body has a certain kind of *material* disposition. STO is a physical theory and not a psychological theory.\(^{39}\) Further, Aquinas himself tells us that a *species* involved in sensory perception is not received in the soul but in the body.

[T]he [soul’s] sensory part does not receive *species* in itself, but in the organ, whereas the intellective part doesn’t receive them in an organ but in itself.

\((DUI I \S 24; \text{tr. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 46})\)

Moreover, even if one can convince us that a *species* is received in the soul, one will still have to explain how this makes it a representation. Some authors take Aquinas to be committed to the idea that representationality is a function of immateriality: the intellect is totally immaterial and the senses partially immaterial and so, if the recipient is totally or in part immaterial, then the *species* will represent, and if not, it will not.\(^{40}\) But this—to my mind—is a bad position to be in, for it seems to explain the obscure (special representationality) by way of the more obscure (immateriality).\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) Durand makes this point in a different context when rejecting the need to postulate a *second species* in the intellect, the so-called *forma expressa* or mental word in order to acquire a clear and express cognition of a thing. *Sent*. I-C 27.2 n. 25: “Ergo propter hoc non oportet fingere quamdam formam productam uel intellectam sicut isti dicunt de uerbo. Et mirum est de hac fictione, quia, cum haec materia sit mere physica, nullus physicorum unquam posuit in intellectu nostro aliquam talen formam ad habendam quamcumque cognitionem quantuncunque expressam.” Durand also resists the idea that a material or nonliving item can bring about an effect in an immaterial or living item, like the soul. For these arguments, see the first half of *Sent*. II-A 3.5 and his rejection of an ‘agent intellect’ whose job it is to somehow facilitate this transference in *Sent*. I-C 3.2.5 and *Sent*. I-A 3.5. On Durand’s rejection of the agent intellect, see Bonino, “Quelques réactions thomistes à la critique de l’intellect agent par Durand de Saint-Pourçain” and Jeschke, “Die Ablehnung des tätigen Intellekts bei Durandus.”

\(^{40}\) See footnote 35 above.

\(^{41}\) Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation” label this objection the “mystery objection”. However, this does seem to be the view that many Thomists would endorse. See, for instance, Cajetan’s comment on *ST* I.84.3. When confronted with the problem that the mere reception of a form is not sufficient for cognition—since many things that are not cognizant receive forms—he considers the following (uninformative) answer to the question “Why is the soul cognizant (*cognoscitium*)?”: “There is no reason other than that it is what it is” (f. 317a). Rather, Cajetan decides, a more informative answer is this: “Being cognizant follows from being immaterial (*esse cognoscitium sequitur esse immateriale*) [=]. Even though the question ‘Why is a cognizant thing a cognizant thing?’ is empty, nevertheless the question ‘Why is this substance cognizant and that one not?’ is a very subtle one. [=] Hence, in *De Anima* II the reason given as to why plants are not cognizant: because they are material” (ibid.).
4.3.2 The plausible (but wrong) answer

The plausible answer, then, is the answer offered by some interpreters of Aquinas. On this view, a *species* in the original theory (STO) might not have anyone to whom it represents, but it nevertheless still “carries information about” its source, and, when we reintroduce visual agents, it will carry information about its source to that visual agent. Hence, it will be a representation in the sense that it carries information about something else.

The idea that a *species* is the bearer of information is usually explained in the following way. Consider what occurs during a television or radio broadcast, the conversion of one’s music collection (from vinyl to 8-track to CD-ROM to MPEG-4), the architect’s boardroom, and so forth. Representation as *information* is all around us and the imperfectly existing (or spiritually existing) *species* of the color in the air or eye is simply an isomorphic copy of its source existing in air format (so to speak) rather than wall format. Or whatever. Here’s Stump:

> To say the sensible species are received in the medium with spiritual reception is to say that the forms are imposed on a medium such as air but in such a way that they do not make the air itself brown and round. The phrase ‘spiritual reception’ and the notion of imposing a form on air in any way are alien to us, but the phenomenon Aquinas was trying to capture is itself very familiar. Consider, for example, blueprints. In a blueprint of a library, the configuration of the library itself, that is, the very configuration that will be in the finished library, is captured on paper but in such a way that it does not make the paper itself into a library. Rather, the configuration is imposed on the paper

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in a different sort of way from the way it is imposed on the materials of the library. What Aquinas thinks of as transferring and preserving a configuration we tend to consider as a way of encoding information. Aquinas calls it “the spiritual reception of a form,” or in the case of sensory cognition, “the spiritual reception of sensible species.” For Aquinas, to say the sensible species of the cup is imposed on the air with spiritual reception is to say the configuration of the cup is preserved by some quality imposed on the air from the cup, but in such a way that the air does not itself take on the features of the cup.

(“The Mechanisms of Cognition,” 170; see also Stump, Aquinas, ch. 8)

The medievals might not have had the luxury of 8-track, but they did have the relevant notion of information encoding. After all, the \textit{species} of a color is a form and it is said to \textit{inform} the air and so the air can be said to have or “carry information about” the color. Of course, we must distinguish between two kinds of, so to speak, informings—those wherein the informed subject takes on the characteristics of the form and those wherein it does not—but common to these two kinds of informings is the fact that the informed subject has or carries the form, that is, the information.

Durand, I think would concede this point. As mentioned, he thinks that—and he thinks that Aquinas too thinks that—a \textit{species} is a real likeness (\textit{similitudo}) of a color. In fact, on Durand’s view, it belongs to the same specific nature (\textit{ratio specifica}) in virtue of the fact that color as an active quality acts with so-called univocal causation on what is next to it just as heat does when it heats first the kettle and then the water; and so the air or the eye has the form of color even though it is not colored.\footnote{\textit{Sent.} II-C 3.6 n. 19: “Actio omnium aliorum sensibilium in medio et organo est uniuoca. Calor enim distans ad hoc ut sentiatur oportet quod calefaciat medium usque ad organum et ipsummet organum ut experimur. Et idem est de sapore et de quocumque alio sensibili. Ergo a simili uidetur quod actio coloris in medium et organum sit uniuoca, quod non esset nisi color et sua species essent unius rationis.” See footnote 37 above and the surrounding discussion. Others disagree on precisely this point. See footnote 38 above.} We can call this form in the air a real likeness of the color on the wall, since any two \textit{forms} of the same
specific nature (e.g., two instances of redness) will really be like each other—i.e., formally identical—even if the one is visible and the other invisible, that is, even if the one is had and taken on whereas the other is merely had but not taken on.

One must admit this is an appealing solution to the problem, indeed plausible. The problem is, however, this. What does it really mean to say that the species carries information about X?\textsuperscript{45} Well, Thomas can give one of two answers. He can say that it means that the species is really the same form as X or he can say that it is not really the same form as X. If it is really the same form as X—not numerically identical with X but formally identical, of course—then it is really the same form as X. But this means that the species of whiteness, being really the same form as whiteness, can’t exist in the mind at the same time as the species of blackness, for two contradictory forms can’t be possessed at the same time by the same thing. This is, of course, a common enough argument, and Durand doesn’t hesitate to make it.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, and secondly, if it is really the same form as X, then, since the species is an accidental form, indeed an accidental incorporeal form, it seems that it will not be able to be really the same form as corporeal forms and substantial forms. But, surely, I can think about a whole slew of things that aren’t accidental incorporeal forms. At the very least, Thomas thinks I can. Again, this is a common enough argument, and Durand makes it.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} I will return to this objection, indeed this issue, in Ch. 5 in more detail.

\textsuperscript{46} See, e.g., \textit{Sent.} IV-C 49.2 n. 14: “[…] formae contrarium se simul in eodem subiecto. Sed si species repraesentans et essentia repraesentata essent eiusdem rationis specificae, contraria essent in eodem subiecto.” See also \textit{Sent.} II-C 3.8 n. 5 [= \textit{Sent.} II-A 3.8]: “Haec opinio ponit quod angelus intelligat per species, quod prius improbatum est. Et adhuc improbari potest communi ratione, quae talis est: Sicut corpus non potest simul figurari diuersis figuris, sic, ut uidetur, nec intellectus noster uel angelicus potest simul informari diuersis speciebus. Nec ualet si quis dicat quod non sunt ibi in actu simpliciter, nec simpliciter in potentia, sed medio modo, sc. in habitu, quo modo nihil prohibit plures species esse in eodem, quia quantum ad actum informandi omnes species sunt simpliciter in actu sive intellectus consideret actu siue non.” This objection is the one raised by Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 223 and King, “Rethinking Representation,” 85. I will return to this argument in Chapter 5, fn. 37.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Sent.} II-A 3.5 27: “Sed nihil existens in mente angeli potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum quidditatisibus rerum nec secundum genus, cum illae sint substantiae, haec autem quaedam accidentalia.” See also \textit{Sent.} I-A 19.3 §3: “[…] omne, quod est subjectiu in intellectu, est accidentis eius autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo ul conformitas in essendo, cum sint diuersorum generum.” See also \textit{Sent.} I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.2: “[…] omne, quod est
So, to the alternative. Commentators have noticed that Aquinas is a bit mum on the subject. If it is not really the same form as X, then, well, in virtue of what is it that a species of X is a species of X and not Y? Durand raises this too as a problem. He notes that most options should be dismissed out of hand either because such accounts would violate the principle that we are unaware of the species—hence, it can’t be a matter of its being a picture of X and not Y—or such accounts fail to deliver the goods: access to the world. At the end of the day, this thesis, call it the quasi-formal identity thesis, looks to be, as Durand notes, nothing more than the claim that the species represents Y and not X because, well, X and not Y is represented by the species. But that’s no solution at all.

subiectiue in intellectu, est accidentis; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis, uel, si sit accidentis, est accidentis corporeum; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas in essendo, cum sit diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 17: “Sed nulla species existens in intellectu angeli, cum sit accidentis, potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum substantiis rerum tam spiritualium quam corporalium, quas angelus intelligit.” ibid., n. 20: “Et per eandem rationem non intelligit accidentia rerum corporalium per speciem, quia in angelo, qui est substantia mere spiritualis, non potest esse aliquod accidentis eiusdem rationis cum accidentibus corporalibus.” Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation” labels such arguments the “quiddity objection”. Again, I return to this argument in Chapter 5, fn. 12.

48. To pick three examples. ibid., based on objections like the foregoing and the following, decides that Aquinas isn’t a reductivist about intentionality but holds it as a brute fact, a nonrelational property of the species. King, “Rethinking Representation,” 85 declares that Aquinas’s silence suggests mystery, and so failure. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 112 tells us that his silence on the issue is warranted and prudent.

49. Sent. II-A 3.5 28: “Si quis autem dicat, quod species repraesentans est eiusdem rationis cum re repraesentata non in essendo sed in repraesentando, uane loquitur.” See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C) n. 14: “[...] illud, quod dicitur quod ex quo species repraesentat naturam rei specificae ut sola ratio cognoscendi (cognoscendi cogendi C), ideo uidetur esse eiusdem speciei cum ipsa re, non uale[...].” ibid., n. 18: “Quod autem tertio additur—quod sufficit quod species repraesentans sit eiusdem naturae specificae cum re repraesentata in repraesentando et non in essendo—fruolum est et sola fuga difficultatis quoad hominem.” See also Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1 and Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.2.

50. Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C) n. 18 (emph. mine): “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum re repraesentata in repraesentando, aut intelligitur, quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad repraesentationem, ita sc. quod sicut unum repraesentat aliquam rem, ita aliud repraesentat eandem rem secundum speciem (speciem spaciem C), et ista identitas non potest ponitur inter speciem repraesentantem et rem repraesentatum per ipsam; aut intelligitur quod unum repraesentat et aliud repraesentatur; sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secundum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, est absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et eommero etiam in aequiuscios et in multis aliis, quantuncunque genere uel specie differentibus, quae tamen, propter repraesentationem, non dicuntur unius speciei cum eo quod repraesentant.” Again, I return to this argument in Chapter 5.
4.3.3 Chalk and cheese: antinaturalism about representational species

I mentioned above that there are two sorts of responses that one might be tempted to give to Durand’s argument. On the one hand, one might attempt to show that Durand has gotten the species-theory of optics quite wrong: in point of fact, species in the species-theory of optics do represent. I hope the foregoing has shown that this sort of answer doesn’t look too promising. However, the other answer one might give is to deny Durand’s story about the origins of the species-theory of cognition. As it turns out, a sensible species and a species in medio are the same in name alone; other than the name which they share, a species in medio and species in the mind are as similar as chalk and cheese. In this final section, I want to explore this answer.

Now, if we want to go down this road, we will need to provide some other motivation for the postulation of a form or species in the mind which necessarily mediates between the percipient and the perceived object (albeit such that it is not itself perceived). One, obvious, motivation involves a commitment to an Aristotelian analysis of change. In fact, this motivation can motivate in two directions.

The first direction is this. According to Aristotle, as Aquinas and others interpreted him, cognition is passive: it is the passive alteration of a cognizant subject owing (somehow) to the object as efficient cause. On this view, cognition involves the reception of form in the trivial sense that any change involves the reception of form. Now, Durand rejects this analysis of cognitive change at length in Sent. II-A 3.5. On his view, cognition is not at all to be analyzed as the passive alteration of a cognizant subject owing to the object as its efficient cause. Hence, on his view cognitive change does not necessarily involve the reception of form. So one strike against this move here is that provided an alternative theory of cognitive change—which Durand thinks he has at hand—one doesn’t need to even posit a species or form in order to explain how it is that a cognitive act comes about.

However, and moreover, the details of this debate won’t, in fact, matter much to us
here, for the fact that a form is received in the mind might be true or it might be false, depending on what view one takes about the causal mechanism which goes into producing a cognitive act, but an account of the causation of a cognitive act is not an account of the representational nature of a cognitive act. Indeed, Durand is careful to distinguish these two issues in his discussion in *Sent.* II-A 3.5. After his refutation of several theories about how it is that thoughts and sensory perceptions come about in us—including of course the *species*-theory of cognition—and having established his alternative ‘*sine qua non*’ theory of cognitive change, he closes the first article with the following note:

Through what, however, is the sense object presented to sense and the intelligible object present to the intellect? Is this through a *species* or through something else? An answer won’t be given here, since I intend to discuss this elsewhere. But this alone should be held from what has been said: the *species* is not required as what elicits the act *per se* but only, if it is ever required, as what represents the object. (23)

In the second article, he goes on to argue that, regardless of how it is that a *species* got into the mind—in the case of angelic cognition, for instance, the proponent of the *species*-theory of cognition holds that such *species* are ‘co-created’ with the angel and so put into the angel by God—one still can’t hold that a *species* is up to the job of explaining what it is that a thought is about,51 and, moreover, a *species* as a representation is under-motivated, for, as we saw, sensory perception and human thought do not require *species* as representations.

The second direction—which might be viewed as the flipside of the last direction—is this: thought as an *action* (as opposed to a *passion*) requires a *species*. To quote Aquinas at some length:

It ought to be said that the intelligible *species* is related to the intellect as

51. See Chapter 5.
that by which the intellect thinks, which is shown as follows. Since there are two kinds of actions, as Aristotle tells us in *Metaphysics* IX, those that remain within the agent, e.g., vision and thought, and those that pass outside into the external thing, e.g., heating and cutting, and since both of these are in accord with a form, it follows that since the form in accord with which an action that passes into the external thing comes about is a likeness (*similitudo*) of the object of that action (e.g., heat in the thing producing heat is a likeness of the heat in the thing made hot), so too, therefore, the form in accord with which an action that remains within the agent comes about is a likeness of the object. Accordingly, the likeness of the visible thing is the form in accord with which the sight sees and the likeness of the intelligible thing (i.e., the intelligible *species*) is the form in accord with which the intellect thinks. (*ST* I.85.2)

One thing that Aquinas seems to be saying here is that, granted that thought is an action, and granted the further premise that every action comes about in accord with a distinctive form in the agent, it follows that thought comes about in accord with a distinctive form in the agent. A *distinctive* form because, even though the intellect is itself a form in the agent, it is not distinctive enough to do the job, for otherwise all our thoughts would be the same in kind just as much as all the acts of burning which the fire elicits in accord with the form of heat are the same in kind. Hence, since every action is in accord with some form, and since different thoughts are different, and since thought is an action, therefore it is in accord with some distinctive form.

This is an interesting thesis, but it hardly seems necessary. In fact, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand’s erstwhile teacher and a staunch advocate of the Angelic Doctor, alluding to the above-quoted passage, tells us that this isn’t the sort of argument *he* would use to motivate the thesis that cognition is by way of *species* or forms in the mind.

And so I didn’t posit above that there is a *species* distinct from the act of
understanding which is necessary for thought owing to the fact that this operation (i.e., to think) is an immanent operation [...] and so requires some form in the knower in addition to the act of understanding through which the knower is actualized; but I posited this based on some other motivation [see below]. (DIS 149)

What bothers Hervaeus with this sort of answer is that thought (as opposed to calefaction) is not a real action. Hence, it is true that a real action is in accord with a real form which is in the agent, but it is not true (or at least not obviously true) that a mental action is in accord with a (mental) form which is in the mental agent.52 Durand rejects this sort of answer, as we saw in Chapter 1, for a different reason: it treats us as insufficient cognitive agents, committed as it is to the claim that in order to elicit its act the mind must acquire some species or form beforehand conceived of as a causal disposition. Quite the contrary, the mind is fully able to pull off the feats that it was designed to pull off, just as much as heat is.

In sum, an appeal to causation—in either of these two ways—won’t land us with a necessary argument that all cognition is by way of a form in the cognizer.

Of course, 13th- and 14th-century authors put forward a wide variety of arguments in defense of species in one or another cognitive domain. For instance, a popular enough argument, notably pursued by Duns Scotus, is based upon the idea that the primum objectum of the intellect is a universal and so a species is necessary as a representation.53 But, of course, this is a limited victory, for Durand’s criticism is against the thesis that a species is involved in each and every cognitive act from vision on up to our most abstract thoughts—and, moreover, it is against the idea that direct perception might somehow be

52. DIS 148-9: “[...] ita dico de intelligere et uidere, quod licet non conueniant nisi enti in actu, non tamen oportet quod conueniant illi enti in actu cuius sunt operationes, puta intelligenti et uidenti, per aliquam formam sibi inhaerentem, aliam ab actu intelligendi et uidendi, ad hco quod possit dici intelligens et uidens operari siue operans, quia ut dictum est supra, tale operari siue tale agere non est causare actum, sed habere actum.”

53. See footnote 15 above.
necessarily mediated by unperceived representations.

Hervaeus Natalis appeals to the fact that imagination clearly involves *species* and infers from this to the conclusion that all forms of cognition involve *species*.\(^{54}\) But this doesn’t seem like a well-founded inference, since Durand would admit that during imagination a *species* (or something like it) is involved. But this doesn’t seem to entail that during *direct* perception a *species* is also involved. Why should we think that *direct* perception is mediated by *species* as representations?\(^{55}\)

Another line of argumentation, most notably pursued by Peter Auriol, appeals to what we would nowadays call the argument from illusion. Curiously, Peter doesn’t himself use such arguments to support the *species*. Auriol pointed to a whole host of optical illusions which show that something other than the thing is what one is cognizing during an illusion. He inferred from this to the conclusion that in every cognitive act there is

\(^{54}\) *DIS* 142: “Quantum ergo ad primum uidetur mihi quod possit probabiliter teneri quod in intellectu sit aliqua species intelligibilis, diversa ab actu intelligendi. Hoc autem probabiliter potest persuaderi et ratione et auctoritate. Ratione sic, quia qua ratione aliqua potentia cognitiva passiua a suo obiecto requirit aliquam similitudinem obiecti sibi impressam quae sit ratio cognoscendi et sit alia ab ipsa cognitione, eadem ratione uidetur hoc debere conuenire omni potentiae cognitivae passiuae ab obiecto. Sed in imaginatiuam oportet ponere aliquam similitudinem obiecti, diuersam ab actu imaginandi, quae sit ratio ipsi imaginatiuamae quod imaginetur. Ergo oportet ponere in omni potentia cognitiva passiua ab obiecto aliquam similitudinem obiecti, praeter actum cognoscendi, quae sit ratio cognoscendi. Et per consequens sequitur quod haec debeat poni in intellectu possibili.”

\(^{55}\) Hervaeus does, however, push upon what would seem to be an important blind-spot in Durand’s theory. If, as Durand holds, *species* stored in the brain are what explain memorative and imaginative acts, then, it would seem, our memorative and imaginative acts would be about those *species* and not about something else outside. *DIS* 142-3: “Sed adhuc posset aliquis dicere quod similitudines sensibilium, quae remanent ab entibus sensibilibus, non sunt in imaginatiuam, uel quaecumque alia uis cognitiua interius existente, sed sunt in aliqua parte cerebri sicut in subiecto, in qua nulla est uis cognitiuam; et quod tales species existentes in tali parte cerebri mouent uirtutem imaginatiuam ad actum imaginandi, sicut species in speculo mouent uisum ad actum uidendi, ita quod in imaginatiuam nihil imprimitur nisi actus imaginandi. Sed hoc non sufficit, quia si tales species existentes in alia parte cerebri ab imaginatiuam, mouerent eam ad imaginandum, sicut species existens in speculo mouent uisum ad uidendum, tacu, sicut uisio terminatur ad speciem, quae est in speculo, sicut ad obiectum uisum, nec terminatur ulterius ad rem, cuius illa species est similitudo, ut ipsam rem cuius est similitudo uideat, ita etiam tunc imaginatiuam ueteretur illis speciebus ut obiectis imaginatis. Hoc autem est falsum, quia experimur in nobis quod quando imaginamur sine memoramus, non memoramus aliquas species, sed magis aliquam rem prius sensatam. Ergo oportet quod illa species rei prius sensatae, per quam aliquis imaginatur rem absentem, non sit in alia parte cerebrui ab illa in qua est uirtus imaginatiuam, et se habeat ut obiectum extrinsecum mouens, sed oportet quod sit in ipsa imaginatiuam ut ratio imaginandi aliquid alius a se.” However, it seems to me that Durand’s theory makes perfect sense of the phenomenon: if, as he puts it, cognition stops at the *species* and doesn’t treat it as an image of something else, then we are deceived, taking the images inside to be things outside.
a special sort of entity somehow distinct from the thing; it just so happens that in a
veridical cognitive act we don’t notice this other item since it is indiscernible from the
thing.\footnote{56}

The problem with this line of defense is that, granted an alternative theory which
also explains illusions yet doesn’t force us to draw the entailment that Auriol draws, why
should we, therefore, commit ourselves to \textit{species} involved in direct veridical perception?

\textbf{DOES AQUINAS THINK THE \textit{SPECIES} IS EVEN A REPRESENTATION?}

It might be worth batting down an objection here which would be, were it true, completely
devastating to Durand’s line of attack: Aquinas doesn’t in fact think that a \textit{species} is a
representation. On this line of interpretation, Aquinas is a direct realist.\footnote{57} As Claude
Panaccio characterizes the view:

\begin{quote}
Why so many commentators see Aquinas’s theory of intellectual cognition as
a brand of direct realism is straightforward. [...] The upshot would seem
to be that when cognition takes place, it is \textit{the very same nature}, the very
same essence which is in the cognized thing on the one hand, and in the
\end{quote}

\footnote{56. On the problem of illusions in medieval debates, see Pasnau, \textit{Theories of Cognition}, ch. 5 and Dominik Perler, \textit{Zweifel und Gewissheit: Skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter} (Frankfurt am Main: Kloster-
mann, 2006). Durand rarely discusses the problem of illusion, and he doesn’t discuss Auriol’s cases at all. See \textit{Sent.} II-C 7.3–4, \textit{Sent.} IV-C 1.4 (on demonic manipulation) and \textit{Sent.} C Prol. q. 3 (on cognition of non-existents). In Auriol, see \textit{Sent.} 13.14. For discussion see Tachau, \textit{Vision and Certitude}, ch. 4, D. Denery, \textit{Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World. Optics, Theology, and Religious Life}
notion de \textit{presentialitas} au XIVe siècle,” in Perler, \textit{Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality}, 270–
7, Dominik Perler, “What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional
also, of course, Ockham. \textit{Ord.} I 27.3.}

\footnote{57. See, e.g., Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 138–9 (the section is titled “Intellect—Aquinas’s
Direct Realism”), G.E.M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, \textit{Three Philosophers} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1993), 38–59 (among others).}
cognizer on the other hand, except that in the latter this nature is abstracted from the individuating conditions which singularize it within the material cognized objects. [...] What more direct form of realism could one hope for than such a doctrine which says that the very nature of the external thing—its essence—comes to exist in some way within the cognizing subject? ("Aquinas on Intellectual Representation," 186–7)\(^{58}\)

In support of this line of interpretation, we can point to quite a number of passages in Aquinas. For instance, in *Summa contra gentiles*, Aquinas writes that “the actually understood forms come to be one with the actually understanding intellect” (*SCG* I.44: “[...] formae autem intellectae in actu fiunt unum cum intellectu actu intelligente”).\(^{59}\)

The problem with this line of interpretation, as many have pointed out,\(^{60}\) is that the textual evidence suggests that Aquinas did think of *species* as *representations*. For instance, in *De veritate*:

An item is cognized as it is represented (*repraesentantum*) in the cognizer and not as it exists in the cognizer. (II.5: “[...] aliquid cognoscitur secundum quod est in cognoscente repraesentatum, et non secundum quod est in cognoscente existens.”)

Or, again, in his commentary on *De Anima*:

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58. This line of interpretation often appeals to Aquinas’s debt to Avicenna’s doctrine that an essence can be either considered in itself, in the singulars, or in the mind. On this point, see Deborah Black, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” *Mediaeval Studies* 61 (1999): 45–79. See also Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition*, ch. 6 for a discussion of Aquinas and the interpretation that he is a direct realist. Pasnau and Panaccio argue against this interpretation.


However, the soul isn’t the thing as they claim since the stone is not in the soul but the species of the stone and it is in this way that the intellect in act is said to be the item understood in act—insofar as the species of the item understood is a species of the intellect in act. (In DA III.7)

Moreover, the identity thesis must be able to make sense of the fact that Aquinas tells us that the species in me is not the same in number as the species in you.

However, the intellect’s object is not the intelligible species but the quiddity of the thing […] and so the intelligible species are distinct in number in you and in me. (Comp. Theol. 85)

And, of course, there is the rather devilish passage from his Sentences:

Between the cognizer and the cognized a likeness (similitudo) which is in accord with the sameness in nature isn’t required but rather a mere likeness as representation (secundum repraesentationem), for it is agreed that the form of the stone in the soul is quite distant from the nature of the form of the stone in the matter—yet insofar as it represents it it is a principle directing towards its cognition. (Sent. IV 49.2.1 ad 7)\(^{61}\)

Such passages, and many others, compel us to think that Aquinas held that a species is a kind of representation, albeit, of course, of a special sort. But, as Durand points out, why should we think that direct cognitive acts require such representational species in the first place?

4.4 CONCLUSION

On Durand’s view, our theory of cognition should conform to our intuitions about what it is to see, think, hear, and so on. But if we look at our intuitions, then it would seem that

\(^{61}\) I will return to this passage in Chapter 5. See also QDV II.5 ad 5: “Ad cognitionem non requiritur similitudo conformitatis in natura sed similitudo repraesentationis tantum, sicut per statuam auream ducimur in memoriam alicuius hominis.”
there is no such thing as a representation involved in at least our direct cognitive activities about external objects. Of course, overt acts of memory and imagination will involve representations, and so too will indirect forms of cognition, but direct acts of perception do not seem to involve representations. We have this intuition because we do not experience a representation when we engage in such forms of cognition, for a representation is something that is experienced, e.g., a statue in the courtyard, the word ‘Hercules’, or a picture on the wall; such items are perceived before whatever it is that they represent is cognized. Hence, we must motivate the thesis that during direct forms of cognition about external objects there are special representations—representations that represent something to the percipient even though they are not themselves perceived; moreover, we must motivate the thesis that there are even such things as special representations in the first place. As we saw, an appeal to natural species (the entities identified and talked about in the species-theory of optics) won’t suffice, for, as Durand points out, such entities as they exist, so to speak, in the wild—in the air in a room with no percipient—are not representations. Hence, we must motivate this thesis in some other way, and Durand is confident that there is no decent argument forthcoming from the proponent of the species-theory of cognition.

It is better, then, and more simple, to hold that when object is present to the percipient, and all conditions such as lighting and so forth are right, that object will be perceived. A species, it is true, might be said to exist as part of these background conditions (in the air and even in the eye), but such a species is not involved in perception as a representation of the external object any more than the air or a functioning eyeball is involved in perception as a representation of the external object. It is only in the case of an overtly indirect form of cognition, e.g., an act of remembering or imagining something, that a species (or something like it) functions as a representation. But no one ever doubted that overt acts of remembering or imagination involve representations; what is up for debate is whether all forms of cognition involve, indeed, require representations,
and, for Durand, our answer to this question is an emphatic ‘no’.
5 DURAND OF ST-POURÇAIN AND ABOUTNESS

Most mental states are such that they have intentionality, that is, most mental states are about something else. When I think about Felix, my mental state is about Felix, and when I think about how much Felix weighs, my mental state is about Felix’s weight.¹ An account of intentionality or aboutness ought to tell us how it is that a mental state—as opposed to some other state—is able to be about something else. I will call this the GENERAL QUESTION OF INTENTIONALITY: In general, what is it that makes mental states (as opposed to non-mental states) such that they have aboutness? Further, an adequate account of intentionality ought to answer what I will call the SPECIFIC QUESTION OF INTENTIONALITY: In virtue of what is a mental state about whatever it is about, rather than something else? In virtue of what, for instance, is my thought about cats, rather than, say, dogs; St. Nicholas, rather than, say, Hercules?²

In this chapter, I aim to provide Durand’s answer to these questions.

5.1 THOSE THAT CAME BEFORE...

The previous chapters will have put us in something of a position to recognize the sort of answer that Durand’s opponents might give to the specific question of intentionality. According to Durand’s interpretation of their theory, the proponent of the species-theory of cognition—the view that cognition comes about owing to the reception of a form, distinct from the cognitive act, which is a kind of likeness (similitudo) of the thing—

¹ ‘Most’ because pain, for example, and anxiety do not seem to have an intentional character; such mental states do not seem to be about anything at all. In what follows, I take this proviso as assumed.
² For some recent discussion of this issue in the 13th and 14th centuries, see King, “Rethinking Representation,” Giorgio Pini, “Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,” in Klima, Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy and Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation.” For less recent, although still quite good, discussion, see Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter and Martin Tweedale, “Mental Representations in Later Medieval Scholasticism,” in Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. J. Smith (Dordrecht, 1990), 35–51. For a recent discussion of the issue in the medieval Arabic tradition, see Black, “Arabic Theories of Intentionality and their Impact in the Latin West.”
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holds that a mental state (the cognitive act) is about whatever the species is about; and the species is about whatever it is about because it somehow resembles or shares the same form as whatever it is about. Similarly, Godfrey of Fontaines, who denies species as distinct from acts, still maintains that a cognitive act is a kind of form or likeness of the thing, and so he too can be seen as holding that a mental state (the cognitive act) is about whatever it is about because it somehow resembles or shares the same form as whatever it is about.\(^3\) Indeed, one of the motivations behind the thesis that the object is at least an efficient cause (somehow) of either the thought or the species (against the view that it is a mere \textit{sine qua non} cause) is because otherwise no \textit{similitudo} would come about in the intellect.\(^4\) As Nicholas Medensis puts the point:

As to his [i.e., Durand’s] position, it ought to be said that the presence of a thing is not sufficient provided there is no likeness (\textit{similitudo}) of knower with known. But he gives us a reason for the presence but not the likeness.

And so his position is not sufficient. (\textit{Evid. II.12 412})\(^5\)

On both views, it is some form inherent in the mind which explains the aboutness of thought. On the one view, this form is the cognitive act itself whereas on the other view it is a \textit{species} somehow distinct from the cognitive act, but in both cases there is a

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\(^3\) Godfrey, as mentioned (Chapter 1, fn. 22 tells us that we can even call the act itself a \textit{species}. See, e.g., Godfrey, \textit{Quodl. IX.19 275}: “Et quia huismodi condiciones conueniunt formae et speciei, ipsum intelligere etiam potest dici species siue forma.” See also, e.g., X.12 361: “[...] sed bene dicit [sc. Aristoteles -PJH] ipsum actum intelligendi quandam speciem in quantum est quaedam similitudo rei per quam etiam intellectus dicitur rei assimilari et quodam modo secundum hoc fieri res ipsa; prout intellectus dicitur fieri intelligibilia in quantum efficitur actu intelligens illa. Et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus quod lapis non est in anima sed species lapidis. Id autem quod de lapide est in anima constat quod est ipse actus intelligendi. Et quia actus intelligendi non est ipse lapis secundum esse realis quod habet extra, ideo respectu talis esse dicitur esse speciei eius.”

\(^4\) I labeled this the ‘intentionality objection’ in Chapter 3. See, e.g., Duns Scotus, \textit{Ord. I 3.3.3 n. 490}: “[...] quia tune actus non est similitudo objecti.” See also \textit{Lect. I 3.3.2-3 n. 360} and \textit{Quodl. 15 n. 9}. Another argument is that were the intellect totally active, then we would not be able to individuate our cognitive acts. See, e.g., Duns Scotus, \textit{Ord. I 3.3.3 n. 490}: “[...] quia nec distinguenter essentialiter propter distinctiolem objecti, quia essentialis distinctio non est ab eo quod non est causa.” See also \textit{Lect. I 3.3.2-3 n. 361} and \textit{Quodl. 15 n. 9}.

\(^5\) For similar criticisms of Durand’s position, see, e.g., Peter Auriol, \textit{Sent. I 35.1}, Hervaeus Natalis, \textit{Quodl. III.8}, Gregory of Rimini, \textit{Sent. II7.2-3}, and John Capreolus, \textit{Sent. II3.2}. 
form that the mind takes on in virtue of the causal activity of the object which somehow factors into an account of the aboutness of mental states.\(^6\) As Durand puts it at one point:

Some people claim [...] that the conformity between intellect and thing is to be analyzed in terms of an item that is in the intellect as in a subject, e.g., the species of the thing (which is a likeness (similitudo) of the thing), or, for those who would deny species, the act of thinking itself (which is also a likeness of the thing). But this view does not seem right. (Sent. I-C 19.2.5–6 §3.1 [= Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1])

Let’s call the species theorist’s answer to the specific question the Object Theory of Intentionality and the act theorist’s answer the Adverbial Theory of Intentionality.\(^7\) According to the object theory, intentionality is an intrinsic property of a privileged class of objects that exist in the mind which are not themselves the same as the cognitive act itself.\(^8\) According to the adverbial theory, intentionality is an intrinsic property of the cognitive act itself—the form that the mind takes on.\(^9\) On the first view,

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\(^6\) In fact, the qualification “in virtue of the causal activity of the object” can usually be dropped, since most authors accepted the idea that, in principle, God can cause the thought directly rather than the object and, moreover, that in the case of angels the species are placed into the angel’s mind by God (not the object). Both of these considerations suggested that the primary item that fixes the content is the species and not the causal relation. On angels, see below, fn. 34. On God’s intervention, see Chapter 1, § 1.3 and Chapter 3, fnn. 1 and 2.


\(^8\) This isn’t to say that the species is the object of cognition. It is rather best to view it as an unrecognized vehicle of cognition, or, in scholastic terms, the species is not that which is cognized but that by which it is cognized. See Chapter 4, footnote 16 and the surrounding discussion on this distinction.

my cognitive act is about cats because it is somehow associated with a likeness of cats distinct from it, and on the second view, I think about cats in a cat-like fashion and it is my cognitive act itself which is the likeness of the cat. On both views, some item intrinsic to the mind is what bears the mark of intentionality. We might take both views, then, to be committed to a kind of *internalism* about intentionality.

On Durand’s view, by contrast, the aboutness of a mental act can’t be explained by appeal to a ‘form’ or ‘likeness’ in the mind (be these the same as acts or held to be distinct). Durand, of course, rejects *species*, but he does so in part because he rejects the thesis that form reception is necessary for cognition. Hence, he must reject whatever theory of intentionality is associated with such views, that is, views which hang the intentional upon some form in the mind. Durand also must reject the adverbial theory of intentionality. On Durand’s view, as we saw from Chapter 3, a mental act is, ontologically, a relational property and not a non-relational property—it is a relation founded upon the mind and not an absolute form inherent in the mind. Durand can’t, in short, embrace what we might call a traditional ‘conformality’ theory of intentionality, that is, any theory which insists that when the mind is engaged in a mental act it has or takes on a distinctive form, which is a likeness (*similitudo*), in virtue of which we can claim that it is about whatever it is about. I do not think cat-like thoughts nor is there a cat-like mental representation in the mind when I think about cats.

Durand, of course, recognizes that even if one has no good reason to postulate a *species* or form in the mind as necessary for the *causation* of a cognitive act, one might still want to postulate such an entity as necessary for the *representationality* of a cognitive act, that is, as a necessary element in one’s account of the aboutness of a mental act. Hence, setting aside issues having to do with causation, what are Durand’s reasons for

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10. Not only does Durand reject acts (conceived of as forms) and *species* in the mind, he also rejects two other sorts of commonly posited mental entities, namely, *habitus* (*TDH*)—which he argues are not in the intellect or the will, but in the body—and mental words, conceived of as produced or expressed forms (*Sent.* I-AC 27.2)—which he argues are to be identified with intellections.
rejecting such internalist pictures of aboutness—views which analyze the conformity of the mind to the thing in terms of a form, called a likeness, in the mind?

5.1.1 Durand’s rejection of internalist theories of aboutness

Durand rejects the idea that a form in the intellect (be it the act or the species) might be said to be that in virtue of which the mental state is about whatever it is about in both his first redaction (Sent. II-A 3.5 a. 2) and his third redaction (Sent. II-C 3.6). His focus in these texts is on the idea that the species, as a similitudo of the thing, might be taken to be a representative of the thing. However, as we will see, his attack also covers the alternative theory that the act itself (conceived of as a form in the mind) is itself a similitudo and so representative of the thing. (With this in mind, we can simplify our exposition by talking about the species—be it the act or something distinct from the act.)

So, in virtue of what does the species represent whatever it represents? Durand argues that the only plausible answer to this question is that the species bears what I will call a real formal identity with what it represents: the species is really a form which is really the same in kind as the form which it (supposedly) represents.

Any such species representing something and the form represented immediately through it are of the same specific kind (eiusdem rationis secundum speciem) even though they differ in terms of their modes of existence. (Sent. II-A 3.5 27: “[. . .] omnis talis species aliquid repraesentans et forma per ipsam immediate repraesentata sunt eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, licet differant in modo essendi.”)\textsuperscript{11}

However, Durand argues, the real formal identity thesis seems to be problematic, for the

\textsuperscript{11} See also Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 13: “Species repraesentans et essentia per ipsam immediate repraesentata sunt eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, licet differant in modo essendi.” Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 17: “Species repraesentans rem aliquam et res cuius est species sunt eiusdem rationis specificae, licet differant in modo essendi.”
intelligible species, at least, is really an incorporeal accidental form, and so it can’t be really formally identical with a substantial form or a corporeal accidental form. Hence, if what a thought is about is a matter of a real formal identity that obtains between the species and some other form, then none of our thoughts could be said to be about substantial forms or corporeal accidental forms. Yet we do think about these items all the time, don’t we? The same line of reasoning applies to Godfrey’s view which holds that one should not posit a species in addition to the cognitive act itself. On his view, the cognitive act just is what (on the alternative view) the species is, and so it too, as an accidental form, won’t be able to represent what it is supposed to represent.

But why should we believe Durand when he tells us that a species must be really formally identical with whatever it represents? For that matter, what is real formal identity? Let’s answer the second question first.

Durand, drawing from Aquinas’s discussion of images, argues that there are two necessary conditions of an image. First, an image bears a causal relationship of some sort to that of which it is an image. Second, an image bears a resemblance relationship of some sort to that of which it is an image. This latter relation is a relation that obtains between some property (or set of properties) in the image and some property (or set of properties) in that of which it is an image. Hence, X is an image of Y if and only if (1)

\[ \text{X is an image of Y if and only if (1)} \]

12. Sent. II-A 3.5 27: “Sed nihil existens in mente angeli potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum quidditatisibus rerum nec secundum genus, cum illae sint substantiae, haec autem quaedam accidentia.” See also Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1: “[…] omne, quod est subjectivum in intellectu, est accidentes; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas in essendo, cum sint diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. I-C 19.2.5-6 §3.2: “[…] omne, quod est subjectivum in intellectu, est accidentes; res autem exterior est quandoque substantia materialis, uel, si sit accidentes, est accidentes corporeum; inter haec autem non potest esse similitudo uel conformitas in essendo, cum sit diuersorum generum.” See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 17: “Sed nulla species existens in intellectu angeli, cum sit accidentes, potest esse eiusdem rationis specificae cum substantiis rerum tam spiritualium quam corporalium, quas angelus intelligit.” ibid., n. 20: “Et per eandem rationem non intelligit accidentia rerum corporalium per speciem, quia in angelo, qui est substantia mere spiritualis, non potest esse aliquod accidentes eiusdem rationis cum accidentibus corporalibus.”

13. This seems to be what Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation” call the ‘quiddity objection’.

14. Sent. I-C 3.2.1 n. 5: “Quantum ad primum est intelligendum quod ‘imago’ importat duo. Primum est ‘similitudo ad id cuius est imago’ (non quaecumque, sed secundum ea, quae demonstrant rem expressius, ut apud sensum color et figura). Et hoc patet in his quibus ululgariter nomen ‘imaginis’
X bears a causal relation to Y and (2) X bears a resemblance relation to Y. As Durand and Aquinas put it: one egg isn’t an image of another egg and a worm isn’t an image of a human being. In the first case, this is because there is no causal relation between the two eggs (even though there is a resemblance relation); in the second case, this is because there is no resemblance relation between the worm and the human being (even though there is—disturbingly enough!—a causal relation). (A less revolting example: a sunburn isn’t an image of the sun.)

Durand admits that there are at least two sorts of resemblance relations which might obtain between an image and that of which it is an image, which I will call STRICT and LIBERAL. A strict resemblance relation obtains between two items that ‘participate’ in the same species or nature or specific nature. Judging by the examples, this would seem to mean, roughly, two tokens of the same type, e.g., a father and his son, two eggs, or two instances of red. A liberal resemblance relation obtains between two attribuimus. Si enim alterum desit, non dicimus esse completam imaginem. Sed quia istud non sufficit (multa enim sunt sibi similia in colore et figura et in his quae rem expressius repraesentant, quorum unum non est alterius imago, sicut ouum, quantumcumque sit alii ouo simile, non dicitur eius imago), ideo requiritur secundum, scilicet quod sit similitudo ab imaginato expressa, actiue vel exemplariter. Dicitur enim imago quasi imitago, quia fit ad alterius similitudinem uel imitationem, modis quibus dictum est—exemplariter quidem, sicut pector facit imaginem Herculis uel Sortis inspiciens et considerans ad Sortem tamquam ad exemplar; actiue autem, sicut pater generat filium sibi similem.” Cf. Aquinas, In DA II.7, ST I.93.1–2, and Sent. 128.2.1. For discussion, see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, ch. 3.4.

Durand recognizes two causal relations: either the image is caused by that of which it is an image (e.g., a son is caused by his father), or an image is as it were made in the image of that of which it is an image by something else which uses whatever it is of which it is an image as a kind of ‘exemplar’. On this latter causal relation, see Durand’s discussion of divine ideas in Sent. I-C 7.1, 8.2, 35.2, 36.3–4, 38.1, 44.2, 45.2, Sent. III-C 31.1, Sent. IV-C 49.3. I take it that the causal condition is supposed to capture the asymmetric nature of representations: representation is asymmetric whereas resemblance is symmetric. On the symmetric/asymmetric distinction see Sent. I-C 48.1 n. 2 and n. 8. For some discussion on the causal aspect of a similitudo in Aquinas, see André Hayen, L’intentionnel selon saint Thomas, 2nd edition (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954), 210–26 and J. Jacobs and J. Zeis, “Form and Cognition: How to Go Out of your Mind,” The Monist 80, no. 4 (1997).

15. ibid., n. 6: “Et sic duo sunt de ratione ‘imaginis’, scilicet ‘similitudo’ (quantum ad ea, quae expressius rem repraesentant), et ‘quod exprimitur ab imaginato actiue vel exemplariter’. Propter primum, umeris non dicitur imago hominis, licet originetur ab homine, quia non est similis; propter secundum, ouum non est imago oui, licet sit simile, quia non exprimitur ab co, nec exemplariter nec actiue.” Cf. Aquinas, ST I.35.1 and ST I.93.1–2.

16. Admittedly, this would seem to leave things a bit vague. Couldn’t we claim that the spoken utterance ‘weasel’, the written utterance ‘weasel’, and the mental concept ‘weasel’ are tokens of the same type? I take it that ‘participate in the same nature’ is doing some real work here. The spoken utterance ‘weasel’ does not, seeing as it is a spoken utterance, participate in the same nature as the
items which do not ‘participate’ in the same species/nature/specific nature; rather, the image ‘participates’ in some species/natura/specific nature which is ‘demonstrative’ of the species/nature/specific nature of that of which it is an image. Judging by the examples he gives, I take it he means that a liberal resemblance relation is a proportion that obtains between a set of properties in the image and a set of properties in that of which it is an image, e.g., the color and shape of a statue of Hercules and the color and shape in Hercules.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, the relation of real formal identity is the relation of strict resemblance: X is really formally identical with Y just means that X and Y are two individuals of the same species.\textsuperscript{18}

But why does Durand think—especially in light of his distinction between two kinds of images—that a \textit{species} must be a strict image? It is true that a \textit{species} is a \textit{similitudo} in virtue of which the knower comes to be assimilated with the known, as Aristotle suggests, but this cognitive assimilation thesis doesn’t need to be cashed out in terms of strict resemblance—the \textit{species} and that of which it is a \textit{species} need not be \textit{really} formally identical—for it can be cashed out in some other way. Durand is aware of this written utterance ‘weasel’, much less the mental concept [weasel]. I owe these questions to Peter King. My solution is my own.

\textsuperscript{17} Sent. II-C 16.1 (C) n. 4: “Circa primum sciendum quod cum imago dicat perfectam representationem eius cuius est imago, hoc potest fieri dupliciter. Vno modo participando eamdem (eamdem) in idem (C) speciem, sicut filius simillimus patri, dicitur imago patris. […] Alio modo dicitur aliquid imago alterius, non quidem participando eamdem speciem, sed alteram (speciei tamen demonstratiam), sicut imago Herculis dicitur aliquid sculptum in lapide uel pictum in pariete, quod, licet sit alterius naturae a natura Herculis, tamen Herculem demonstrat uel repraesentat.” See also n. 6: “Hoc autem sit non participando eamdem naturam secundum speciem […] sed participando aliam naturam […] tamen naturae repraesentatiam.” See also Sent. I-C 3.2.1 n. 8: “Ad primam rationem in oppositum dicendum quod aliqurum potest esse species indifferens dupliciter. Vno modo participando eamdem naturam secundum speciem, sicut filius simillimus patri dicitur imago patris. […] Alio modo dicitur aliquid imago alterius, non quidem participando eamdem naturam secundum speciem, sed alteram (speciei tamen demonstratiam), sicut imago Herculis dicitur aliquid sculptum in lapide uel pictum in pariete, quod, licet sit alterius naturae, tamen Herculem repraesentat.” See also Sent. I-C 48.1 n. 4: “Cum quae primam de conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad diuinam, aut quae primam de conformitate earum secundum esse reale uel in essendo, prout quaelibet est quaedam res secundum se[…]. Haec autem conformitas non est participando eamdem naturam specificam, sed in participando aliam (speciei tamen demonstratiam), sicut expositum fuist supra distinctione 3a.” See also ibid., n. 7: “Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod non omnis conformitas est secundum participationem eiusdem formae specifica inhaerentis uel non-inhaerentis, sed secundum phures alios modos[…].”

\textsuperscript{18} Hence, as we saw, Durand’s various formulations (fn. 11 above): “eiusdem rationis secundum speciem”, “eiusdem rationis specificae”.
sort of objection.

If someone were to say that the representational *species* is the same in kind (*eiusdem rationis*) as the thing represented but not really (*in essendo*) but as a matter of representation (*in repraesentando*), then he would speak in vain. (*Sent. II-A 3.5 28: “Si quis autem dicat, quod species repraesentans est eiusdem rationis cum re repraesentata non in essendo sed in repraesentando, uane loquitur.”*)

Speak in vain he might, but this is precisely the answer that Hervaeus Natalis will give to Durand’s objection in *Quodl. III.8.* On his view (more on this below, §5.7.2), an intelligible *species* represents whatever it represents not because it is the same in kind (i.e., a strict image) of whatever it represents, but rather owing to some other relation. I will call this the *quasi-formal identity* thesis: a *species* is formally identical with what it represents but not really formally identical.

19. See also *Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C) n. 14: “[…] illud, quod dicitur quod ex quo species repraesentat naturam rei specificae ut sola ratio cognoscendi (cognoscendi cogendi C), ideo uidetur esse eiusdem speciei cum ipsa re, non uale[it] […]” ibid., n. 18: “Quod autem tertio additur—quod sufficit quod species repraesentans sit eiusdem naturae specificae cum re repraesentata in repraesentando et non in essendo—frivolum est et sola fuga difficultatis quoad hominem.” See also *Sent. I-A 19.3 §3.1 and Sent. I-C19.2.5-6 §3.2. See also Nicholas Medensis (who is presenting Durand’s position), *Evid. II.12 402: “Si autem dicatur quod est eiusdem rationis in repraesentando et non in essendo, uane dicitur.” I’ll discuss Durand’s answer to this vain ‘fuga’ below in 5.7.2.

20. *Quodl. III.8 67–68: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod species requiritur ut similitudo informans intellectum et mouens ipsum ad cognosceendum, et non ut medium cognitum, prout una res cognita duct in cognitionem alterius. Ad probationem, quae adducitur in contrarium, dicendum quod illa ratio peccat in duobus. Primo, quia procedit de similitudine in esse, nos autem loquimur de similitudine, quae est secundum esse repraesentativum, prout similitudo existens in intellectu repraesentat intelligibile. Secundo defect, quia procedit utendo similu ut medio cognito ad probandum alterum, sicut si probaretur aliquid de niue alba in eo, quod alba, et ex hoc concluderetur, quod conueniret lapidi albo. Nos autem loquimur de similitudine, quae est ratio cognoscendi, non ut medium cognitum.” See also Nicholas Medensis, *Evid. II.12 409: “Ad rationem probationis dicendum est quod est perfectae similitudinis non essendo sed in repraesentando.”

21. See, e.g., Nicholas Medensis, *Evid. II.12 407: “Advertendum tamen est quod non requiritur omnimoda similitudo inter species et res, quas repraesentant, puta generis uel speciei, sc. quod sint eiusdem generis uel speciei, quae nec species, quae sunt in imaginatione nostra, quas non est facile negare, isto modo [non] assimilantur rebus repraesentatis per eas. Immo, quanto magis potentia cognitiuas perspiciacior fuerit, tanto minorem similitudinem requirit. Cuius ratio est: Nam, in hoc conveniunt ratio cognoscendi et medium cogitum, quod utrumque duct in cognitionem alterius, licet aliquo modo different. Sicut igitur uidemus quod ex medio magis distant ab aliqua conclusione intellectus subtilior ductur in cognitionem ipsius conclusionis, ex quo medio intellectus minus subtilis duci non posset, nisi
In the last chapter, I discussed one argument Durand made in defense of the thesis that a *species* must be really formally identical with that of which it is a *species*. On his view, one of the motivations which prompted philosophers to postulate intelligible *species* in the first place was because of so-called *species in medio*. However, a *species in medio* is really formally identical with that of which it is a *species*, even though the *species* (of whiteness, say) and that of which it is a *species* (whiteness on the wall) differ in their modes of existence, for the former has weak or imperfect existence (and so it doesn’t terminate the activity of sight) whereas the latter has perfect existence (and so it does). Hence, an intelligible *species* should also be held to be really formally identical with that of which it is a *species*. However, there are at least two problems with this line of argumentation. First of all, one might not think that the *species in medio* is really formally identical with that of which it is a *species*. Second, one might not buy Durand’s story about the origins of intelligible *species*, or, in other words, one might insist that an intelligible *species* and a *species in medio* are chalk and cheese—true enough a *species in medio* is really formally identical with the color of which it is a *species*, but an intelligible *species* is not.

A second independent argument which Durand gives in defense of the claim that an

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23. See the discussion in the last chapter.
intelligible *species* must be really formally identical with that of which it is a *species* bears upon the thesis that an intelligible *species* is an uncognized representation (*ratio cognoscendi non cognita*) as opposed to a cognized representation (*medium cognitum*), that is to say, the thesis that a *species* represents something to some percipient even though it is not itself perceived.

Durand argues as follows. If a *species* is a representation which directs the thinker to something else, then either it does so as a cognized representation or as an uncognized representation.\(^{24}\) Now, everyone agrees that a *species* is not a cognized representation, for a *species* is not that which is cognized but that by which the object is cognized.\(^{25}\) However, the *species* also can’t be an uncognized representation, because whereas a cognized representation can represent something else or direct us to think about something else owing to any number of relations between it and what it represents (liberal resemblance or opposition, say), an uncognized representation, seeing as it is uncognized, can’t.\(^{26}\)

\(^{24}\) Even though a cognized representation can be characterized as a *ratio cognoscendi*, it is clear from the texts that Durand means to be drawing a contrast between uncognized *rationes cognoscendi* and cognized ones. Durand is explicit elsewhere. See, e.g., *Sent.* I-C 36.3 n. 12: “[…] nec idea est *ratio intelligendi*, quae sic est ratio intelligendi quod non est intellecta, sicut est *species* secundum ponentes ipsas[…].” Henceforth, I take this proviso as assumed: a *species* is an uncognized *ratio cognoscendi* and not a cognized *ratio cognoscendi a.k.a. medium cognitum*.

\(^{25}\) *Sent.* II-A 3.5 27: “[…] si in angelo essent *species* represeantatiuae rerum, ut *medium cognitum*, uel solum ut *ratio cognoscendi*. Non ut *medium cognitum*: Primo, quia sic non consueuimus uti nomine ‘species’; alioquin diceremus causam esse speciem effectus et e comuero et habitum speciem prinitionis, quia talia sunt media cognoscendi. Secundo, quia eamdem uicem, quam tenet *species* in sensu uel in nostro intellectu, tenet *species* in mente angeli, licet non accipiatur a re sicut aliae. Sed *species* in sensu et intellectu nostro (si qua sit ibi) non habet rationem medii cogniti.” See also ibid., 7: “[…] si angelus intelligeret per *species*, aut *species* esset solum *ratio cognoscendi* uel *medium cognitum*. Non potest dici, quod sit solum *ratio cognoscendi*, […]. Item nec est *medium cognitum*, quia *medium cognitum* potest ducere in cognitionem alterius ratione cuisuscunque habitudinis, siue ut simile, siue ut contrarium, uel qualitercumque aliter. […] Item nullus dicit *species* esse *medium cognitum*, sed *solum rationem cognoscendi*.”

\(^{26}\) *Sent.* II-A 3.5 28: “Illud, quod est solum *ratio cognoscendi* et non proprie *medium cognitum*, non ducit cognitionem alterius nisi ratione perfectae similitudinis. Vnde et similidito dicitur per quamdam expressionem. *Medium autem* cognitionem potest ducere in alterius cognitionem ratione cuisuscunque habitudinis, sc. ut causa uel ut effectus, ut simile uel ut oppositum et qualitercumque aliter, sed *species* ratione solius similitudinis, ut dictum est. ‘Perfecta autem similidito non est differentium secundum speciem.’ See also ibid., 7: “In contrarium arguitur, quia si angelus intelligeret per *species*, aut *species* esset solum *ratio cognoscendi* uel *medium cognitum*. Non potest dici, quod sit solum *ratio cognoscendi*, quia quod est solum *ratio cognoscendi*, habet rationem perfectae similitudinis cum eo, in cuius cognitionem ducit. Vnde et similidito dicitur per quamdam expressionem.” See also *Sent.* IV-C 49.2 (C) n. 13: “[…] alio modo represeantatur res per *medium cognitum* et alio modo per *medium quod est ratio cognoscendi*,
I take it that part of what Durand has in mind here is the following. A *species* has this extraordinary ability to represent an item even though I am not aware of it. This would seem to put a certain constraint on what it is in virtue of which this *species* represents whatever it represents. It can’t represent like a statue, which does so in virtue of the proportion that obtains between its shape and color and the shape and color in Hercules, because this, so it would seem, requires some sort of *awareness* on my part of that proportion. But a *species* is supposed to represent a color, say, while we are unaware of the *species*. The only representation that could even do this would be a strict representation: it might be plausible to suppose that one shade of red, A, represents

\[ q\text{qua medium cognitum potest ducere in cognitionem alterius ratione cuiuscumque habitudinis, siue ut simile, siue ut contrarium, siue ut causa, siue ut effectus, uel qualitercumque alter. Sed medium quod est solum ratio cognoscendi non ducit in cognitionem alterius, ut uidetur, nisi ratione simulitudinis (similitudinis simulitudine C). Vnde et (et) ut C simulitudo dicitur per quandam expressionem. Similitudo autem non est differentium secundum speciem. Ergo species, quae est medium quo res cognoscitur, et (et) ut C dicitur simulitudo rei, non differt secundum speciem a re quam immediate repraesentat."

See also Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 19: “[.. .] species non ducit in cognitionem alterius, ut uidetur, nisi ratione simulitudinis. Vnde et simulitudo dicitur per quandam expressionem. Similitudo autem non est differentium secundum speciem. Ergo species, quae est medium quo res cognoscitur, et dicitur simulitudo rei, non differt secundum speciem a re quam immediate repraesentat.”

Cf. Hervaeus Natalis’s presentation of Durand’s position, Quodl. III.8 61: “[.. .] species aut requiritur ut medium cognoscendi, quo est cognitum, aut ut simulitudo sola cogniti. Non primo modo, ut auctores illius positionis de speciebus dicunt. Probatio, quod nec secundo modo. Primo: quia talis simulitudo, ut dicunt, est eiusdem speciei cum eo, cuius est simulitudo, sicut albedo et similium eius in aere, ut dicunt, est eiusdem speciei, licet habeant diversum modum essendi. [.. .] Secundo, quia quando aliquid ducit in cognitionem alterius ut simulitudo, non differt in cognitionem eius, nisi prout assimilatur sibi.”

Cf. also Nicholas Medensis’s presentation, Evid. II.12 401–2: “[.. .] nec ut ratio cognoscendi, quia omnis talis species est eiusdem rationis specificae cum forma repraesentata per ipsam, licet differant in modo essendi. [.. .] Illud, quod est solum ratio cognoscendi et non medium cognitum, non ducit in cognitionem alterius nisi ratione perfectae simulitudinis. Vnde et per quandam expressionem simulitudo dicitur. Medium autem simulitudo potest ducere in cognitionem alterius sub quacumque habitudine, uel sicut causa, uel sicut effectus, uel sicut simile, uel sicut oppositum. Perfecta autem simulitudo est secundum rationem speciei.” Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 18: “[.. .] repraesentatio, cum sit habitudo rei repraesentantis ad illud quod repraesentatur, habet aliquod fundamentum, ratione cuius comeniet ei repraesentare. Et illud non potest esse nisi natura speciei, non quatenus est effectus rei absolutae, quia multis effectibus non comeniet sic repraesentare. Deducendo esset in omnibus aliis, nunquam imenitut ratio et fundamentum talis repraesentationis. Non enim imenitur in omni re, sed in illa tantum quae est effectus univocus, deficiens tamen in tantum a perfectione speciei, quod non terminat in actum potentiae, et ita non est obiectum cognitionis, ut simile, sed est solum ratio et medium cognoscendi alterum, ut simulitudo. Si enim talis species non esset eiusdem rationis cum re quam repraesentat, nullo modo posset esse ratio repraesentandi perfecte alterum, cum ipsa sit quid imperfectissimum; quin potius res quae sunt naturae perfectioris essent perfectionis repraesentationis.” See also Sent. II-C 3.7 n. 10: “[.. .] omne reale repraesentatium, quod repraesentat naturaliter aliud, repraesentat ipsum secundum conditionem eius realem. Sed talis species, si esset et alicuius repraesentaret, repraesentaret ipsum naturaliter. Ergo repraesentaret ipsum quantum ad eius conditionem realem.”
precisely some other shade of red, B, such that I grasp B without being aware that I did so by means of A. We might, then, put to use such a strict notion of representation in our theory of the mind, if we were so inclined. But we couldn’t put to use anything short of this, for any representation short of this sort of representation would require us to be aware of the representation, and so that representation would not be an uncognized representation (ratio cognoscendi non cognita) but a cognized representation (medium cognitum).

Hence, we are stuck between two horns. On the one hand, we can claim that the species is really formally identical with X and so we can also claim that the species is an uncognized representation; but then species will be unable to represent what they are supposed to represent (substances and corporeal accidents). On the other hand, we can reject the claim that the species is really formally identical with X and so we can claim that a species can represent what it is supposed to represent (substances and corporeal accidents); but then species won’t be uncognized representations!

In any case, Durand, as we saw in the preceding chapters, has other reasons to want to hold that nothing in the mind is able to represent something outside the mind, for he holds that nothing outside the mind can bring about an effect in the mind, be it the species or the act.27 It is true that he might have, all other things considered, opted for a thesis like John Pecham’s, wherein the mind itself formulates the species inside itself in the mere presence of the object.28 But Durand doesn’t think that this sort of view is coherent: for then the mind would be in essential potential and not accidental potency.29

27. See Chapter 1.
28. John Pecham, Quodl. I.4 10: “Cum tamen pars superior judicet de eisdem, ergo species immutat organum corporale et organum immutatum excitat animam ad immutationem sibi consimilem suo modo quam anima facit in se ipsa de se ipsa. [...] Vnde ita formatur anima a specie quodam modo acsi cera per impossibile uiueret et propelleret se in similitudinem sigilli. Ita enim anima habet aliquid actuum et aliquid materiale quasi passium quod est in potentia omnia intellecta et fit actu res intellecta dum excitatur ab extra et propellitur in eius similitudinem, et hoc naturali colligatione animae cum corpore, ubi non exigitur praecognitionio sed naturalis colligationis ductio.” ibid.: “[...] species illae nascentur de se per occasionem excitatiuam, non per causam impressiuan.” See Chapter 3.
29. Another view Durand considers is the view that one species might represent several items. But then, Durand argues, there would be no reason why someone using that species would think about one of
5.2 The causal or covaration theory of intentionality

But if there is nothing intrinsic to the mind in virtue of which its mental states are about whatever they are about, then, well, in virtue of what is a mental state about whatever it is about?

One option that calls out here is that, perhaps, Durand should be viewed as a kind of covariationist or causal theorist about representation: a mental state represents X because it covaries with X. For example, when Felix is present, Socrates will think about Felix, and when Felix is absent, Socrates will not think about Felix. This suggests an alternative reductivist answer to the specific question, namely, that representation is covariation. On this view, an item is about something else just in case it covaries with something else. X represents Y and not Z because X covaries with Y and not Z.

But doesn’t Durand’s thesis that the object is not an efficient cause but rather a *sine qua non* cause preclude this interpretative option? On Durand’s view, a cognitive act is not an effect of the object as cause. However, a cognitive act, on Durand’s view, does covary with a present item, even if it is not caused by that item. Now, the fact that a cognitive act is not caused by an item but is rather occasioned by an item is a fine metaphysical point to have made, but it is a difference that doesn’t seem to make a difference in our account of intentionality. What *matters* is that an item that is about something else should covary with that item, and, on Durand’s view, cognitive acts do covary with present items just as much as, on Godfrey’s view, cognitive states as effects.

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covary with their efficient causes. Hence, Durand’s theory could be that a cognitive state is about something else, in general, because it is occasioned by something else, and it is about something else in particular because it is occasioned by that item.31

5.2.1 The problem with covariation

Covariation theories face an obvious problem: their insufficiency. Not everything that covaries with something else is a mental representation. Sunburns covary with ultra-violet radiation, but do not represent ultra-violet radiation, and smoke covaries with fire, but does not represent fire.32 This might be a reason to suspect that Durand is not a covariationist: not every effect represents its cause. Indeed, Durand had made precisely this point in Sent. II-A.3.5. In his rejection of the quasi-formal identity thesis, he had argued that if conformality isn’t a matter of a relation that obtains between something the form or species really has and something the object really has, then, well, what is it? He dismisses the idea that it might be cashed out in terms of efficient causality:

If someone were to say that the representational species is the same in kind (eiusdem rationis) as the thing represented but not really (in essendo) but as a matter of representation (in repraesentando), he would speak in vain, for it represents not because it is the effect of a thing, since, then, every effect would be a species[...]. (Sent. II-A.3.5 28)33

31. Indeed, Godfrey’s view, too, could be the same; but Godfrey makes explicit his commitment to the thesis that the act, as effect, is thus a simulitudo of the object, as cause; and it is in virtue of its being a simulitudo that it is about whatever it is about. See footnote 22 above. By contrast, William of Ockham holds that, at least in the case of intuitive cognitions, the act’s being a simulitudo has nothing at all to do with our account of what it is about—see the debate below—and his socius, Walter Chatton, even goes so far as to declare that an intuitive act is not even a simulitudo! Walter Chatton, Rep. II.4.4 219: “[D]ico quod actus non est simulitudo.”


33. See also Sent. IV-C.49.2 n. 18: “[... ] repraesentatio, cum sit habitudo rei repraesentantis ad illud quod repraesentatur, habet aliquod fundamentum, ratione cuius commun it ei repraesentare. Et illud non potest esse nisi natura speciei, non quatenus est effectus rei absolutae, quia multis effectibus non commun sic repraesentare.” ibid.: “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum re repraesentante in repraesentando, aut intelligitur, quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad repraesentationem, ita sc.
A tempting answer here for someone who wants to defend this line of interpretation might be to point out that, according to Durand, cognitive states are not *effects*, strictly speaking, but rather second states that cognitive faculties are put into in the bare presence of objects. Hence, there is a difference that might make a difference between smoke and sunburns, on the one hand, and cognitive states, on the other. Unfortunately, this answer won’t work. Even if we do admit into the equation this distinction between an effect of an object as cause and a second state that is occasioned by the bare presence of an object, we will still have to admit that, say, an oven’s operative state *represents* the pie, because an oven’s operative state, as we saw in Chapter 3, is a second state that is occasioned by a present pie just as much as a cognitive agent’s cognitive state. We will still have cast the net too wide.

5.3 And so: The general problem of intentionality

Hence, covariation is *insufficient*, which, I take it, is part of the reason that one might be motivated to reconsider the object and adverbial theories for these theories recognize covariation as a perhaps necessary but insufficient condition. The *species* covaries with cats but it also resembles or shares the same form as cats, and (on Godfrey’s view) the cognitive state itself is an effect of cats but it also, as it turns out, resembles or shares the same form as cats.\(^{34}\)

\[\text{quod […] unum repraesentat et alid repraesentatur; sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secundum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatum, est absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et ecomerso etiam in aequiuocis et in multis aliis, quantumcunque genere uel specie differentibus, quae tamen, propter repraesationem, non dicuntur unius speciei cum eo quod repraesentant.}\]

\(^{34}\) In fact, such theories drop the covariation requirement entirely or relegate it to the role of a contingent or empirical fact of the matter. An angel, for example, will contain *species* but these are not caused to exist in it by the object; rather, God put those *species* in an angel, and so on the *species*-theory, at least, covariation is not even a necessary condition. It doesn’t matter *how* the *species* got there; what matters is that it is there and that it look like or is formally identical with something else. On angelic cognition in Thomas Aquinas, see T. Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome* (Paris: Vrin, 2002). For different medieval views, see Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Medieval, Renaissance, and Reformation Angels: A Comparison,” in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*, ed. I. Iribarren and M. Lenz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 187–200. For Godfrey on the causal condition, see *Quodl.* X.12. On the possibility of divine deception, see
However, we must admit that the going alternatives—views that analyze mental representation in terms of resemblance or conformality (with or without causality)—will also have cast their nets too wide, and will also require supplementation. For example, the species theorist seems to be either committed to the view that a species is unique to cognizant agents or committed to the view that a species is not unique to cognizant agents. The former thesis makes species mysterious, whereas the latter thesis does not. (Indeed, it can be viewed as having the laudable goal of naturalizing the intentional.) But the problem with this view, of course, is that whatever has a species will be intentional: the air will be intentional and so too a disembodied eyeball. Hence, if our particular view about intentionality is that the intentionality of our mental states can be analyzed in terms of the intentionality that species have, then we will have to suppose that anything that possesses a species will be in an intentional state. As Durand put the point (in connection with the causal role of the species although it would apply here too):

Whatever has a form which is the source (principium) of some action can, through the form which it has, carry out that action. But the same form (in kind) which a sense has (sight, say), the medium also has. For the species that the eye receives is the same sort as the one that the medium receives. Hence, if this form is the elicitive active principle of some sensitive operation (so that by means of it the eye would see), then, so too, by means of the same form the medium would see. Which isn’t true. (Sent. II-A 3.5 11; the Latin is quoted in Chapter 1, footnote 32)

Air and disembodied eyeballs do possess species and if the possession of a species is all that intentionality amounts to, then we will have made intentionality very cheap indeed. A similar point can be made as well with respect to Godfrey’s theory. If a mental state is
about something because it is an effect of its cause, then we will have, obviously, cast our
nets too wide. The reason why a mental state as an effect is able to share the same form
as or resemble its cause seems to be because it is a univocal effect, but not all univocal
effects represent their causes (we should hope). For example, the heat which the water
receives from the fire is not just a bare effect but is a univocal effect—it shares the same
form as the form of heat which is in the fire.

Hence, if the covariation theory is victim to the charge that it casts its net too wide,
then so too will the going alternatives be victim to the same charge. And so we must
supplement our theory—no matter what theory it is—with something more. In other
words, we might be able to claim that the specific content of a mental state is owing to
the fact that it was caused or occasioned by X or resembles (in whatever sense) X or is
the same form as the form of X; but we won’t be able to claim that this is the end of the
story, for we need to draw a line in the sand: not all effects (or second acts) are mental
representations and not all likenesses or forms are mental representations.

As far as I can tell there are four ways that one might respond without biting the
bullet, that is, without endorsing the claim that species in medio or combustive acts are
intentional or about something else.36

1. One could endorse covariation or resemblance or conformity but supplement these
theses with some thesis about the kind of thing which possesses the act or species.

bites the bullet. ibid., 485: “This is to say that air and water receive intentionally existing forms, which
would seem to imply that they are cognizant. This is a result that no one could accept, and I rejected
it out of hand in my earlier work. But how can we avoid that result, given the rest of Aquinas’s claims?
My own view is that we should understand the capacity for cognition as coming in degrees, so that some
things have enormous amounts of information about the world and so are highly cognitive, whereas other
things have lesser amounts of information about the world and so are less cognitive. Air and water can
take on intentionally existing forms, but they do so in the most minimal way, and thus are not to be
regarded as cognitive at all.” I’m not sure how Pasnau thinks he can get away with the move from the
claim that cognition is a matter of degree (which starts this passage) to the claim that air and water are
not cognitive at all (which closes this passage)! For some discussion on this point, see John O’Callaghan,
“Aquinas, Cognitive Theory, and Analogy: A Propos of Robert Pasnau’s Theories of Cognition in the
2. One could supplement these theses with some thesis about the kind of possession involved.

3. One could abandon the reductivist approach entirely and insist that an intelligible \textit{species} (say) represents whatever it represents as a kind of brute or primitive fact of the matter.

4. One could supplement these theses with functionalism, the view that a mental representation is an effect (or occasioned act) which is a representation inasmuch as it functions as a representation within the cognitive or intentional organism as a whole.

Let’s look at these seriatim.

\section*{5.4 Special kinds of possessors}

On this view, a \textit{species} or an act is an ordinary act or form possessed in an more-or-less ordinary way (e.g., in the way that other, non-cognitive agents possess it) but by an extraordinary subject. Hence, the \textit{species} as it exists in the air is not about something else but the same \textit{species} as it exists in the animate eye or the mind \textit{is} about something else. Or a second act in fire is not about something, but a second act in a human being is.

However, as we saw in the last chapter, I’m not so convinced that this view, upon reflection, will turn out to be very satisfying. In virtue of what is the mind the right kind of possessor and the air not? In virtue of what is fire’s second act not intentional and Socrates’ second act intentional? In virtue of what is the effect of fire in Socrates (called a sensitive act) intentional whereas the same effect of fire in the air (called a \textit{species in medio}) not? We might appeal to the fact that the recipient in the one case is \textit{immaterial} whereas the recipients in the other cases are not, but, as I argued in the last chapter, immateriality is mysterious; indeed \textit{more} mysterious than intentionality,
and so we will have wound up explaining the obscure with the more obscure. Moreover, not just immaterial things exhibit aboutness, for, at least I should hope, Fido’s sensory perceptions are also about whatever they are about.

Of course, we could simply stand tall and declare that the mind is special, but then we won’t be reductivists about the intentional; we won’t be analyzing intentionality in terms of something more familiar but rather we will declare it a brute fact.

5.5 **INTENTIONAL POSSESSION**

The second option is to insist that cognitive acts or *species* are ordinary items received in ordinary recipients but in an extraordinary way. The air doesn’t receive the *species* in the right way; fire’s second act isn’t quite the same thing as Socrates’ second act; and so on.

This view seems to share the same problem as the last view: what makes for an extraordinary possession? Is it just that the possessor is a mind in the one case and not a mind in the other case? Moreover, in the case of a view like Godfrey’s or the *species*-theory, where the idea is that an ordinary form is possessed in an extraordinary way, it would seem that this view is either incoherent or mysterious. If intentional possession is like ordinary possession, then, it seems incoherent, for I can think about two contradictory things at once which would imply that I possess two contradictory forms at once—but I can’t possess two contradictory forms at once. On the other hand, if it isn’t like ordinary possession, then, well, what is it like?

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37. This objection is the one raised by Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 223 and King, “Rethinking Representation,” 85. Durand also raises it. See, e.g., *Sent.* IV-C 49.2 n. 14: “[. . . ] formae contrariae non compatiuntur se simul in eodem subiecto. Sed si species repraesentans et essentia repraesentata essent eiusdem rationis specificae, contraria essent in eodem subiecto.” See also *Sent.* II-C 3.8 n. 5 [= *Sent.* II-A 3.8]: “Haec opinio ponit quod angelus intelligat per species, quod prius improbatum est. Et adhuc improbari potest communi ratione, quae talis est: Sicut corpus non potest simul figurari diversis figuris, sic, ut uidetur, nec intellectus noster uel angelicus potest simul informari diversis speciebus. Nec ualet si quis dicat quod non sunt ibi in actu simpliciter, nec simpliciter in potenti, sed medio modo, sc. in habitu, quo modo nihil prohibit plures species esse in eodem, quia quantum ad actum informandi omnes species sunt simpliciter in actu siue intellectus consideret actu siue non.”
5.6 General complaint about both intentional possession and intentional possessors

My general complaint is this: If we wish to remain a reductivist, but we also want to be stingy about mental representation, then, it seems, we will be forced to admit that a mental representation is something which exhibits feature A, and, once we recognize that other items also exhibit feature A, we will then drum up some feature B which those items do not exhibit. But, as it turns out, feature B is just unique to mental representations anyway, and so we will have run ourselves around in a circle. For example, we might insist that, true enough, species in medio are intentionally possessed by the air, but a mental representation is not just a species, and not just a species which is intentionally possessed, but also a species which is intentionally possessed by the mind. But it was the species which was supposed to confer intentionality to the mental state to begin with, and so we will not have come up with a reductivist answer at all.

Recall from the beginning of the chapter the two questions, which I called the specific and the general question of intentionality. It is true that a species (or whatever) might explain the specific content of a mental state, but granted that species (or whatever) are not limited to mental states, we don’t seem to have an answer to the general question: in virtue of what is a mental state about something at all (as opposed to a non-mental

See also QLA 3, Sent. II-ABC 38.3, and the fourth argument reported by Hervaeus Natalis in Quodl. III.8 (discussed in Chapter 3, fn. 29). Durand, in fact, offers a kind of solution to this problem, for he holds that, although there are no such things as intelligible species (and, in general, cognitive species), there are such things as species in medio and species in organo (see Chapter 4), and the problem is relevant there too. Imagine a well-lit room (with no visual agent in it) which has a black west wall and a white east wall and two mirrors, one on the north wall and one on the south wall. At the very center of this room, it would seem that a species of white and a species of black should coexist. One solution that Durand offers appeals to an analogy with the hot and the cold in water. What occurs here is a ‘mixed quality’ which ‘virtually contains’ both the hot and the cold. So too in the case of the species in medio. See, e.g., Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 16: “Qualiter duae species (sc. albi et nigri) cum sint contrariae, possint simul esse in cadem parte medii? Et ad hoc dicendum est quod non sunt ibi distinctae nautiae contrariae, nam sicut calidum et frigidum in cadem subiecto non causant calorem et frigus, quae sunt contraria, sed causant tepidum, quod est qualitas media, uno impediente puram actionem alterius et ecomerso, sic album et nigrum causant in cadem parte medii speciem medium continentem virtutaliter utrumque, sicut tepidum continet calidum et frigidum.” For a more extended discussion, see QLA 3.
To return to Durand’s theory, it might also seem that the same dialectical situation confronts us. He can either make intentionality cheap, and so anything which is occasioned by something else is about something else (and so ovens will be about present pies and so forth), or he can make intentionality expensive, but at the cost, it seems to me, of explanatory traction. He will have to tell us what it is about a cognitive state which makes it different from an oven’s operative state, and it doesn’t seem that any non-circular account will be any more available to Durand than to his opponents. (It is because cognitive states are states of minds and, well, minds are special and ovens aren’t.)

5.7 THE PRIMITIVE-INTENTIONALITY THEORY

Perhaps, then, we should not be reductivists about intentionality at all; perhaps we should not analyze intentionality in terms of some more basic concept (resemblance, say) but rather take it to be a kind of primitive or unanalyzable concept.

In a recent article, Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland argue that Aquinas’s theory of intentionality should be described as a kind of ‘primitive nonrelational theory’. For both textual and philosophical reasons, the authors decide that Aquinas cannot endorse any reductivist theory of intentionality. “As we have seen, what all reductive interpretations share in common is the assumption that Aquinas’s account of the intentionality of concepts is committed to an analysis of intentional likeness in terms of two more basic relations: a relation of sameness (which concepts bear to the objects they represent) and a relation of intentional possession (which concepts bear to the mind)” (“Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 205). After canvassing the various ways of cashing out these two relations, which in practice turns out to be only three ways of cashing out the relation of
sameness—identity, formal sameness, and resemblance—\(^{38}\) the authors conclude that none of these reductivist approaches will work, and so propose an alternative—"what appears to be the only alternative—namely, an interpretation that takes Aquinas's notion of intentional likeness as primitive or basic" (225). They call this the 'primitive-intentionality theory', and it comes in two different colors, the primitive nonrelational and the primitive relational theory. In either color, intentionality is an "unanalyzable feature of its possessors," in this case concepts, which the authors end up identifying with intelligible species.\(^{39}\)

For instance, the fact that a species is called a likeness (similitudo) might be suggestive, and might even suggest that it can be analyzed in terms of likeness, but, the authors point out, Aquinas insists that it is sui generis and so not analyzable in terms of normal likeness. This, at least, is how they interpret this selection from Aquinas:

> The likeness holding between two things can be understood in two ways. In one way, it can be understood as an agreement in nature. This sort of likeness is not required between cognizer and cognized. . . . In another way, however, it can be understood as representation (secundum representationem)—and this sort of likeness is required between cognizer and cognized. (QDV II.3 ad 9; tr. "Aquinas on Mental Representation," 227)

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\(^{38}\) What the authors take to be the identity thesis is what I called the identity thesis in the last chapter, §4.3.3. What the authors take to be the formal sameness thesis is what I called above the real formal identity thesis. And what the authors take to be the resemblance thesis is just one way of cashing out what I called a quasi-formal identity thesis.

\(^{39}\) Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 226: “Finally, at least as we shall be developing it, this theory assumes that intentional likeness is not only a primitive feature of intelligible species but also an internal (or essentially possessed) feature of them.” On the identity of concepts with species (which the authors qualify), see ibid., 194, fn. 2: “Aquinas’s notion of intelligible species is roughly the same as the contemporary notion of a concept, especially insofar as the latter is taken to include mental representations [. . .]. Since Aquinas thinks that intelligible species are the only such mental representations to have their intentionality nonderivatively, it will be convenient hereafter to speak as if they exhaust the class of concepts. Strictly speaking, however, this is an oversimplification. Aquinas actually recognizes two classes of mental representations that would qualify as concepts in the contemporary sense—intelligible species and another class for which he introduces the Latin term ‘conceptus’.”
According to the authors, Aquinas means to be *distinguishing* intentional likeness (likeness as representation) from ordinary notions of likeness rather than *reducing* it to them (228).  

The authors recognize that this sort of position is open to the charge that intentional likeness or aboutness is, seeing as it is an unanalyzable primitive, mysterious. However, on their view, the mystery objection which one could raise against, say, the intentional possession view, is not the same as the mystery objection that the primitive intentionality thesis faces (229). On the authors’ view, the latter mystery objection is less problematic than the former mystery objection. The reductive approaches all aim to analyze intentional likeness in terms of something else which is even more mysterious than intentional likeness. “By contrast, our interpretation simply claims that such intentionality does not admit of genuine analysis. Granted, this leaves us with a certain amount of mystery, but no more than we started with” (229).

I dwell on these points not because I’m particularly interested in the proper interpretation of Aquinas, but because, at this point, it looks as if our interpretation of Durand’s view might have to make the same move. If intentionality is not grounded in intentional possession, resemblance, conformality, or covariation, then, well, what is it grounded in? Perhaps, this is a wrong-headed approach. Rather than reduce intentionality to something else, more basic, we should take intentionality as itself basic. Of course, as I will argue, Durand’s view, if it were compatible with this line of thought, would have to be a relational and not a non-relational primitive, and it couldn’t be a primitive property of the *species*, but it would be a primitive property all the same.

Before I take up this option, I can’t resist putting forward an objection to their interpretation of Aquinas. This objection is derived, of course, from Durand. Recall our discussion of what I called the quasi-formal identity thesis above. As we saw, Hervaeus

40. For an alternative interpretation of this passage, see Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition* and Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation.”
Natalis (and others) had insisted that Durand’s interpretation of the notion of a *similitudo* in terms of real formal identity was dead wrong. In *Quodl.* III.8, for instance, Hervaeus writes that Durand’s objections to the *species* made in *Sent.* II-A 3.5 are based upon the assumption that *similitudo* is to be analyzed in terms of what I called real formal identity (*similitudo secundum esse vel in essendo*); quite the contrary, Hervaeus declares, the *similitudo* here is as representation (*similitudo secundum esse repraesentatiuum*).\(^{41}\)

Durand, as we saw above, argues variously for the thesis that the *similitudo* here must be interpreted as real formal identity. One further argument he makes (found in *Sent.* IV-C 49.2) appeals to authority. He writes:

> And this line of reasoning is the one that brother Thomas pursues in book four, distinction 49 where he expressly says that a *similitudo secundum speciem* is required between the *representans* and the *representatum* even though both don’t have to have the same mode of existence. And the structure of this entire argument (upon which he bases his position) makes it obvious that he meant this to be a specific identity in reality (*in essendo*) and not as a matter of representation (*in repraesentando*), for otherwise his reasoning would not be worth a single piece of straw. He says that it is owing to this that the divine essence can’t be represented through a *species* since every created *similitudo* differs from the divine essence *secundum genus* and is not the same as it except *secundum analogiam*. Indeed, if he meant this to be a real difference, then his thesis stands; but if he meant this to be a conceptual difference as a matter of representation, then he begs the question, since one can say that, however much the *species* differs *secundum genus* in reality, still it is the same *secundum speciem* as a matter of representation, since it perfectly represents the divine essence inasmuch as the divine essence is perfectly seen by

\(^{41}\) See footnote 20 above.
Aquinas argues that a *species* is not involved as a representation in at least one case: the beatific vision, a mental act about God. Durand’s interpretation of his argument for this conclusion commits Aquinas to the premise that all representations are really formally identical with what they represent. Hence, if Aquinas weren’t committed to this claim, then his argument in defense of a *species*-less beatific vision would be, as he put it, not worth a single piece of straw.

Of course, John Capreolus is quick to point out that one shouldn’t read too much into Aquinas’s (youthful) Sentences commentary and that we should rather focus on what he says in, e.g., *De ueritate*.

It should be known that sometimes St. Thomas does seem to say that a *species*...
and that of which it is a species are, indeed, the same in kind although distinct in terms of their modes of existence, as is clear from, e.g., Sent. IV.49.2.1. Indeed, Albert the Great in Super Porphyrium 2.6 admits this and supposes that the same essence of a universal nature is according to real presence in the soul and also in the singular; he says the same thing in his De Anima III and his treatise De intellectu et intelligibili. But on this score, he is not in concord with St. Thomas. (Defensiones II 3.2 304) 43

5.7.1 IS INTENTIONALITY A PRIMITIVE RELATIONAL PROPERTY?

The second kind of primitive intentionality which Brower and Brower-Toland describe is primitive relational intentionality. 44 On their view, however, Aquinas shouldn’t be taken to be committed to this sort of primitivist thesis, since, on their view, according to Aquinas, “we can have intellectual cognition, and hence concepts, of things that don’t exist” (231–2). 45

Be what may about Aquinas, the primitive relational theory of intentionality looks to be a good fit in the case of Durand. 46 Durand, of course, holds that a cognitive act just is the relation between the mind and a present item. In his disputatio, for instance, as we saw in the Chapter 3, Durand argues that were thought a nonrelational property added to the intellect, then it would be possible to think of the thought and not think

43. Capreolus appeals to, e.g., QDV VIII.11 ad 3 and II.3 ad 9, in order to make his case. On Albert the Great, see Spruit, Species Intelligibilis I, ch. 2, §1.5 and Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 31.

44. Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 231: “There are, however, two different ways in which the theory can be further developed: one can say that the primitive feature is either a relation (a dyadic or two-place property) or a genuinely monadic (one-place) property. According to the first—call it “primitive relational theory”—concepts are entities that by their very nature stand in a relation to the objects they are about. According to the second—call it “primitive nonrelational theory”—concepts are by their very nature about other things, but their aboutness consists, not in any relation in which they stand, but rather in a monadic or nonrelational feature they possess.”


46. In a recent book on Thomas Reid’s theory of perception, which shares many of the essential features of Durand’s own theory of perception, R. Nichols (Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), ch. 2) argues for a similar interpretation of Reid.
of its object, e.g., a thought about cats without thinking about cats.\footnote{DQ 1 38–9: “Vilterius arguitur ad principale sic: Omnis forma absoluta quae est fundamentum relationis potest intelligi sine relatione. Sed intelligere est huissmodi, quia est fundamentum relationis referentis ad objectum, ut ponebat Respondens. Ergo poterit intelligi sine relatione ad objectum. Ergo possum intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam objectum, quod falsum est. Ergo intelligere est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compositionem cum intellectu, nec est res absoluta superaddita intellectui. Maior patet, quia possum creaturam intelligere sine relatione ad Deum.” See Chapter 3, footnote 15.} Hence, Durand takes the aboutness of thought to at least be an \textit{essential} feature of the thought. The reason that Durand can claim that, on the view that thoughts are relations, one can’t help but think about the object of some thought were one to think about the thought is because the thought is a relation, and when one thinks about a relation, one can’t help but think about something else. (By contrast, one can think about an absolute item \textit{full stop}, so to speak, i.e., on its own without thinking about something else.) Durand makes this very clear in the fourth argument, present in Peter of Palude’s presentation of his position. Durand here argues that, on the alternative view that thought is a monadic property, we would have to claim that thought is related to its object merely \textit{secundum dici} and not \textit{secundum esse}, because an absolute item is related to some other absolute item \textit{secundum dici} and not \textit{secundum esse}. For instance, Socrates is related to Plato \textit{secundum dici}. In such a case, we can think about Socrates and not think about Plato (and vice versa). But in the case of relative entities, whose very existence, as Durand puts it, is reference (\textit{esse est referri}), we can’t think about that entity without thinking about something else.\footnote{This is the fourth argument found in Peter of Palude, \textit{Sent.} II.3.3–5 20–21: “Quarta ratio sumitur ex habitudinem istorum actuum ad sua obiecta, quia si intelligere sit aliquid absolutum faciens compositionem cum intellectu, tunc intelligere et intelligibile erunt relatiua secundum dici tantum et nullo modo secundum esse, quia relatiuum secundum esse est illud, cuod esse est referri et essentia est relatio, quod non comenit alicui absoluto. Ex hoc sic arguitur: Relatiua secundum dici non claudunt se mutuo in intellectu suo, sicut si Sortes sit filius Platonis, in intellectu quidem patris clauditur filius et e contrario; sed in intellectu Sortis non includitur Plato nec e contrario, quia pater et filius sunt correlatiua secundum esse, eo quod paternitas et filiatio sunt essentialiter relationes, Sortes uero et Plato sunt relatiua solum secundum dici. Intelligere autem et sentire necessario includunt intelligibile et sensibile. Ergo intelligere et sentire non sunt relatiua secundum dici, nec per consequens sunt aliquid absolutum additum super sensum et intellectum, faciens cum eis compositionem.”}

\begin{itemize}
\item In \textit{Sent.} I-C.27.2 and \textit{Sent.} I-A.27.2, Durand takes up the vexed issue of whether a
mental concept or word (*conceptus mentis*; *uерbum mentis*) is to be identified with the cognitive act or taken to be a form really distinct from the cognitive act. It won’t be surprising to learn that Durand opts for the former. In this discussion, he makes certain comments about representation, or, as he calls it, manifestation (*manifestatio*). On his view, that in virtue of which a thought represents or manifests some other item to the mind is, well, that’s the sort of thing it is: thoughts manifest items to the mind. He writes:

A word is able to manifest something (*manifestatium*). Now, there must be a first word (*primum uerbum*), that is, a word that manifests something but not in the way that a sign or a *species* or an image manifests something, as others suppose, for otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Hence, there must be something that is able to manifest something by its very essence, and so the [mental] word just is the manifestation of the thing to the mind (*manifestatio rei apud intellectum*); yet the manifestation of the thing to the mind just is the cognition of the thing—for a thing is not manifested unless it is cognized. (n. 26)

A mental word, which Aquinas, by the way, calls a *similitudo*, is, on Durand’s view, nothing but the manifestation of a thing to the mind; which, in turn, is to be analyzed as the cognition of the thing by the mind. What Durand seems to be driving at is the thesis that intentionality can’t be analyzed in terms of something else (in terms of signification,

49. Also called an *expresa forma* (in contrast to the *species* which is an *impressa forma*).
like signs, or resemblance, like images, or real formal identity, like *species*), but it ought to be taken as basic, or original, an essential and not a derivative feature of thoughts themselves.  

5.7.2 THE PROBLEM WITH PRIMITIVISM

However, I’m not sure that Durand would, at the end of the day, wish to align himself with such an antireductivist strategy. Consider, for instance, his objection to the quasi-formal identity thesis. In *Sent.* II-A 3.5 Durand is brief in his dismissal of this proposal. If formal identity isn’t a matter of a real sameness in form, then, well, what is it a matter of? What other relation can we appeal to? If the *species* represents some thing, this can’t, to be sure, be because it is the effect of that thing, because then any effect would represent its cause.  

Nor can, as we saw in the passage above, the mental word represent a thing in the manner of a sign, or an image. In *Sent.* IV-C 49.2, Durand returns to the proposal and provides us with a little more argumentation. Perhaps what quasi-formal identity—that is, the thesis that the *species* and the *representatum* are the same in kind but not really but as a matter of representation (*in repraesentando*)—amounts to is the thesis that a real formal identity obtains between two representations which represent the same thing. But then, Durand demurs, we will still need some thesis about the relation between a given representation and the thing itself. Indeed, he writes, this thesis of quasi-formal identity seems to be nothing short of the claim that the *species* represents A and A is represented by the *species* because the *species* represents A and A is represented by the *species*.

51. See also *Sent.* I-C 27.2 n. 27: “Et confirmatur: quia omne quod dicitur tale denominatione extrinseca, ut signum uel causa, reducitur ad aliquid quod est tale per essentiam, sicut sanum dictum de urina ut signum et de medicina ut de causa reducitur ad sanum dictum de animali quod sanum est per essentiam, ita quod sanitas animalis est sanitas per essentiam et non signum uel causa sanitatis. Similiter in proposito manifestatum dictum de uerbo uocis ut signo et de specie uel imagine ut causa uel qualitercumque alter reducitur ad manifestatum per essentiam, quod est ipsa cognitio rei, quae ob hoc habet rationem prii uerbi.” See also *Sent.* I-C 19.2.5–6 and *Sent.* I-A 19.3)

52. See fn. 33 above.
If the representing species is said to be of the same species with the thing represented as a matter of representation (in repraesentando) either this means that this identity is attended to with respect to the representation, that is, such that one item represents some thing and so too another item represents the same thing [. . . ] or it means that one item represents and another item is represented.53

I take it that what Durand is driving at here is that such an answer is circular. In virtue of what does the species represent what it represents? Well, it is because it is formally identical with what it represents. In virtue of what is a species formally identical with what it represents? Well, it is because. . . it represents it!

5.8 Functionalism

The fourth option on the table is functionalism, the view that X acquires its specific content from the item which caused it—covariation—and X is considered a representation (at all) because X performs a certain functional role (representation) within the cognitive system as a whole. Could Durand be another ‘medieval functionalist’? Peter King, in a recent series of articles, interprets William of Ockham as a ‘linguistic-role’ functionalist.54

According to Ockham, mental acts can be taken to be mental signs which perform certain

53. Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C) n. 18: “Si enim species repraesentans dicitur eiusdem speciei cum re repraesentata in repraesentando, aut intelligitur, quod illa identitas attendatur quantum ad repraesentationem, ita sc. quod sicut unum repraesentat aliquid rem, ita alius repraesentat eandem rem secundum speciem (speciem spaciem C), et ista identitas non potest poni (poni) ponitur C) inter speciem repraesentantium et rem repraesentatam per ipsam; aut intelligitur quod unum repraesentat et alius repraesentatur; sed dicere, propter hoc, esse identitatem secundum speciem inter repraesentans et repraesentatur, est absurdum, quia causa repraesentat effectum et eum vsus etiam in aequinocis et in multis aliis, quantumcumque generi vel specie differentibus, quae tamen, propter repraesentationem, non dicuntur unius speciei cum eo quod repraesentat.” See also in his analysis of Aquinas’s argument (quoted above footnote 42): “[. . .] si vero de differentia rationis in repraesentando petit principium, quia potest dici quod quantumcumque species differt secundum genus in essendo, conuenit tamen secundum speciem in repraesentando, quia repraesentat perfecte diuinam essentiam inquantum perfecte uidetur ab intellectu creato.”

linguistic-roles in mental language. A mental sign has a certain syntactic structure and it acquires its specific content from the world—covariation—and it is a representation (at all) owing to how it combines with other mental signs as a syntactic unit in the language of thought.55

The virtues of this sort of approach to the intentional are legion, as well as its problems,56 but at first sight it doesn’t look as if Durand can make the requisite moves to be classed as a bona fide functionalist—for a number of conditions must be met in order for someone to be viewed as a functionalist about intentionality. First of all, they must develop an allergic reaction to resemblance as a viable solution to the specific question of intentionality. This much, to be sure, as we have seen, Durand does do. But, further, they must suppose that the units which function as mental representations in the cognitive system must function as units within the cognitive system; that is to say, they must somehow interact with other units within that cognitive system. This, however, looks to be something Durand’s view on the ontological status of mental acts would prohibit, for Durand holds that mental acts (the most obvious candidates for being units in the mind) aren’t anything absolute superadded to the mind, but rather mere relations. But how can a mere relation perform a functional role in a cognitive system?58

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55. King, “Rethinking Representation,” 95–96: “What is relevant to our purposes is the suggestion that a concept represents what it does—it is the concept it is—only if it is connected to other contentful concepts in the appropriate ways, as words in a language are. Roughly, Socrates’s concept [sheep] represents a sheep in virtue of its having the right (linguistic) role: it is subordinate to [animal] and [living creature], able to be the subject in propositions, a constituent of the belief that sheep are edible, and the like. Anything that plays this complex role is ipso facto the concept [sheep], that is, represents sheep. […] Although [covariation] and [linguistic role] are distinct, their combination is powerful. It is no less than a medieval version of functionalism, the idea that determinate content is fully specified by inputs (covariance) and outputs (linguistic role).” ibid., 97: “Thus Ockham epitomizes the philosophical struggles of his generation in bringing psychology to a new functionalist paradigm in place of the old conformality and likeness theories.”


57. See Mark Rowland, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 33: “For now, we can note the general explanatory profile—attenuation of the role of representation coupled with augmentation of the role of action.”

58. S. Harnad calls this the symbol-grounding problem. See S. Harnad, “The Symbol Grounding
Consider Robert Cummins’s example of a primitive cognitive system called LOCKE:

Consider, then, the mechanical device LOCKE [...]. LOCKE is equipped with a TV camera hooked up to some input modules [...], which in turn are hooked up to a card punch. When the TV camera is pointed at something, a punch card called a concrete idea of sense or a percept is produced. Percepts are fed into a sorter, which compares them with a stack of master cards called abstract ideas or concepts. When a percept matches a concept—i.e., when the percept contains at least all the holds the concept contains—LOCKE displays the term written on the back of the concept. Any word can be written on the back of any concept; that is a matter of convention. But once the words are printed on the concepts, everything else is a matter of physics. (*Meaning and Mental Representation*, 37)

What is important here is that the punch cards must have a distinctive qualitative structure in order to function as percepts in LOCKE. It doesn’t matter, of course, what their qualitative structure is—the punch cards need not look like cats—but it is important that cat-percepts have a distinctive qualitative structure of some sort in contrast to, say, dog-percepts.

However, it might be that we can avoid this demand—that a unit which functions as a mental representation have some distinctive qualitative structure—and instead insist on a more spartan thesis: the unit need not even have a distinct qualitative structure; all that it needs is the capacity to interact with other units in the system in terms of cause and effect.59 Could Durand be a functionalist in this second, more spartan, sense?

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Chapter 5. Aboutness

Durand is quite clear that a cognitive act has no distinctive qualitative structure, of course; but he is also quite clear that one cognitive act can’t directly cause another cognitive act. Durand rejects this thesis on the grounds that *two intellectual acts cannot coexist in the same intellect at the same time*, a thesis which William of Ockham (for one) rejects.\footnote{2003), 291–334). This seems to be also the view which P. King (King, “Rethinking Representation”) attribute to Ockham. See, e.g., ibid., 98 (online version): “Ockham is notorious for his attack on the intelligible species, arguing *inter alia* that the intelligible species isn’t needed for the purposes of mental representation, one of its traditional roles […]. Although he preserves the traditional terminology, declaring that ‘the act of understanding (*intellectio*) is the ‘likeness’ of the object’ […], it’s clear that this is an empty formula: as noted […], ‘the object sufficiently represents itself in a cognition’ […], a point Ockham later repeats: ‘[the object] can be present *qua* object to the intellect, without any species’ […]. It’s not that Ockham thinks there are no mental events. Rather, there is no need for mental *representation* as traditionally conceived. There are mental acts of thinking, but there is no need to postulate independent contents, or indeed any discernible intrinsic structure to the mental act: it is what it is in virtue of its functional inputs and outputs, not because of its inner nature. On his mature theory of mind, Ockham countenances only the spartan ontology of mental acts of thinking, which are then paired with their external objects directly, not requiring any mediation. In short, Ockham, at least in his mature view, argues against what is traditionally called a ‘representationalist’ theory of mind and for what is usually called ‘direct realism.’” See also King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version]” and King, “Le rôle des concepts selon Ockham.” For an alternative (standard) interpretation of Ockham on *similitudo*, see Claude Panaccio, “Réponse à mes critiques,” *Philosophiques* 32 (2005): 449–57, Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, ch. 7, and Claude Panaccio, “Conceptual Acts,” in Pacheco and Meirinhos, *IIMP*, 37–52. Notice that P. King seems to have changed his mind here. See footnote 83 below.\footnote{60. For Ockham, see Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, 32–4. Panaccio writes (33): “Human thought, for Ockham, is basically compositional.” See also Panaccio, “Conceptual Acts.” On Ockham, see also Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Mental Language and Mental Representation in Late Scholastic Logic,” in *John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300–1700*, ed. R. Friedman and S. Ebbesen, Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 2004), 248, fn. 37 and Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition*, 288, fn. 68.\footnote{61. On Durand’s role in the subsequent debate about this thesis, see Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect.” Thomas Wylton seems to have been the first to have championed the alternative thesis—a thesis that in Ockham’s cognitive psychology does some real work. For more information on this debate between Wylton and Durand, see Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*, 153–9, Prospero Stella, “Le Quaestiones de Libero Arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano,” *Salesianum* 24 (1962): 505–6; Anneliese Maier, *Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae*, Studi e Testi 170 (Rome: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1952), 38, Anneliese Maier, “Das Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton,” *RTAM* 14 (1947): 106–110, and Dumont, “New Questions by Thomas Wylton.” In addition to the authors quoted there, see also: Nicholas Medens, *Evid.* II.16 436: “Et ideo non potest esse nisi unus actus in intellectu simul.” For Durand’s statements of this thesis, see *Sent.* C Prol. q. 1 n. 24, 28–9; *Sent.* I-C 6.2 n. 13; *Sent.* I-C 38.2 n. 5; *Sent.* II-C 6.2 n. 5; *Sent.* II-C 11.2 n. 10; *Sent.* II-241.n. 5; *Sent.* II-C 34.1 n. 18; *Sent.* II-ABC 38.3; *Sent.* II-C 40.3, nn. 3–4; *Sent.* III-C 31.3, nn. 13–15; *Sent.* IV-C 44.4 n. 23; *Sent.* IV-C 49.6 n. 5.} Since two thoughts (even about compatible things) can’t coexist in the intellect at the same time, it also
follows that one thought can’t directly cause another thought, for the simple reason that, in order for A to directly cause B, A must exist at least at the very instant that B comes into existence. In *QLA* 3 Durand addresses two questions: Can several psychological acts coexist in the same psychological power such that one is the efficient cause of the other? *(Vtrum in eadem potentia libera possint simul esse plures actus intelligendi uel uolendi, quorum unus sit principium effectium alterius).* This is a kind of two-birds-one-stone question, and that’s precisely how Durand handles it. He writes:

This *quaestio* has two principal parts. The first is: Can two psychological acts coexist in the same power? The second is: If so, can one of them be the [proximate] efficient cause of the other? Hence, if a negative answer is given to the first question—that two acts can’t coexist—then there can be no doubt about an answer to the second question—“Can one of them be the [proximate] efficient cause of the other?”—because the [proximate] efficient cause and its effect must coexist, for if the [purported proximate] efficient cause were to have dropped out of existence before its effect would have comes about, then it couldn’t have produced that effect, since an action can’t be attributed to an item that is not an actual being. Hence, there wouldn’t be an effect. But if the answer to the first question is affirmative, then there might be some doubt about an answer to the second question. Therefore, I will take up the first question alone for the sake of brevity, for it will be shown that two psychological acts can’t coexist in the same power; and so the second question will be answered automatically. (*QLA* 3 488)\(^{62}\)

In other words, an intellective act can’t be a proximate efficient cause with respect to another intellective act because a proximate efficient cause must exist when it efficiently

\(^{62}\) See also ibid., 474: “[…] secundum cursum naturae, de quo nunc loquimur, nec duo actus intelligendi nec duo actus uolendi possint esse simul, sed adueniente secundo primus cessat. Quare sequitur quod primus non sit causa secundi, quia causa proxima et immediata, siue sit effectiua siue sit materialis in qua uel ex qua, simul est cum effectu.”
causes whatever it efficiently causes. Hence, it must exist at least at the moment its effect exists. But two intellective acts cannot coexist. Therefore, one intellective act cannot be a proximate efficient cause with respect to some other intellective act, even if it is true that one can’t entertain a given intellective act unless one had, beforehand, entertained some other intellective act.\textsuperscript{63}

Hence, Durand doesn’t seem to be in a position to be a functionalist about mental representation. But perhaps we are looking in the wrong place. Durand, as mentioned, holds to a spartan ontology of mind: on his view, the mind is a blank slate before, after, and even when it thinks; there is nothing absolute added to the mind at all, but rather the mind comes to enter into certain relations with the world. Hence, it is rather obvious that Durand can’t be a functionalist, if, that is, a functionalist is committed to the thesis that the mind has in it certain items which perform certain functional roles in the mind. But perhaps the mind isn’t the right place to look here. Perhaps, rather, we should look not in the mind (on Durand’s view, the combination of intellect and will)\textsuperscript{64} but instead look in the brain.

Now, I have already alluded to several cases where Durand, so to speak, moves the mind outside the mind, that is to say, he holds that various aspects of human cognition, which his contemporaries felt required the postulation of certain entities added to or in the mind, could be accounted for, more simply, by the postulation of entities inside the body. For instance, he holds that there is no species in the soul, but does maintain that there are certain species or impressions in certain corporeal spirits in the body, put to use

\textsuperscript{63}. This discussion connects up with Durand’s arguments against a view about the compositionality of thought called atomism. On Durand’s view, our simple mental acts are not atomic elements aggregated together to form complex mental acts, but rather each complex mental act is a whole unit which merely ‘virtually contains’ simpler mental acts. I would submit that atomism is a kind of prerequisite for at least linguistic-role functionalism, the functionalist view attributed to William Ockham. See Durand, Sent. I-ABC38.2. For some discussion here on the compositionality thesis in Durand, Wylton, and Ockham (among others), see Russell Friedman, “Mental Propositions before Mental Language,” in Le langage mental du Moyen Age à l’âge classique, ed. J. Biard (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 95–115; for Ockham, see Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language” and Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 53–55.

\textsuperscript{64}. Sent. I-C 3.2.4.
as the source of remembering. He also holds that *habitus* (both moral and intellectual) are merely attributed to the intellect or will and in point of fact dwell in a certain organ inside the body (more on this below). Durand also holds that even if the intellect is material, it could still engage in universal cognition.

When it is said that if the soul were extended, then it wouldn’t be able to cognize the universal, it ought to be said that this is false. (*Sent. I-C* 8.2.3 n. 18)

Durand does, of course, hold that the intellect is immaterial, which he thinks follows from its capacity to exist when separated from the body. However, until its reunion with a body, the separated human soul won’t be able to carry out *any* of its cognitive functions. It won’t be able to engage in sensory perception, since sensory perception requires an organ, and it won’t even be able to engage in thought, since thought requires a phantasm.

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65. *Sent. II-C* 3.6 n. 14: [...] *licet in nulla potentia sensitiua uel intellectiua sit species ad repraesentandum ei suum obiectum, tamen in spiritibus corporeis non-sentientibus *<nobis>* remanent quandoque species seu impressiones sensibiles abeuntibus sensibilibus, quae dum nobis dormientibus <nobis> ab eis etiam apprehenduntur, et si in eis sint quantitates, decipimur.* See also *Sent. I-C* 27.2 n. 30 (quoted below, fn. 82). See also *Auct. Ar.* 7 n. 85: “Abeuntibus sensibilibus remanent species eorum in organo sentiendi.” On these ‘corporeal spirits’, see, e.g., *Sent. I-C* 10.1 n. 4: “[...] ‘spiritus’ non est proprium nomen tertiae Personae sed appropriatum tantum, idest de communi tractum ad proprium propter qualia specielam convenientiam. Sic enim ‘spiritus’ sonat in subtilitatem, unde subtilia in corporalibus spiritus uocamus, sicut ventum et aerem et corpus subtile quod est instrumentum uirium animae; magis etiam proprius spiritus dicuntur omnia incorporalia, sicut dicimus angelos spiritus. See also *Sent. IV-C* 4.7.

66. His argument (n. 19) is, roughly, that the fact that what represents the universal is singular doesn’t prevent it from representing the universal, since, on the *species*-theory of cognition, the *species*, which represents the universal, is a singular. And if the fact that the singularity of the representation doesn’t prevent it from representing a universal, then a *fortiori* the fact that the representation is extended or quantified doesn’t prevent it from representing the universal (“sed singularitas non impedit talem repraesentacionem, ut dictum est; ergo nec quantitas”). See also *Sent. I-A* 3.5, *Sent. I-C* 3.2.5, *Sent. II-AC* 3.7, and *QA III* 1.1.

67. *Sent. I-C* 8.2.3 n. 14: “[...] anima autem propter sui separabilitatem a corpore non est capax quantitatis[...].” Durand, however, doesn’t think that a decent argument can be made that establishes the soul’s capacity to exist as separated from the body. In *Sent. II-A* 18.3 he rejects the standard argument (which makes an inference from the fact that the soul carries out an operation that doesn’t depend upon the body to the claim that the soul itself doesn’t depend upon the body); and in *QA II* 11 (221) he notes that this argument is merely ‘probable’, i.e., not demonstrative. See Chapter 1, fn. 49.

68. *Sent. I-C* 8.2.4 n. 15: “Partialis autem causa est quae in suo gradu coeexit aliud ut concausam, sicut anima est partialis causa recipiendi suas potentias organicas, quia coeexit animam, nec est imaginandum.
in the brain, or, at the very least, some activity on the side of the senses. Now, when Durand claims that thought requires phantasms, or at least some activity on the side of

quod potentiae organiae habeant pro immediato et totali receptino animam et materiam pro remoto, sicut dictum est de colore respectu quantitatis et subiecti, immo habent pro immediato subiecto et pro immediata ratione receptina compositum ex materia et forma seu ex corpore et anima, ita quod haec duo sunt immediate cause partiales supplentes uicem unius totalis cause recipientis immediate predictas potentias. Et quod ita sit, patet; nam si separaretur quantitas a substantia, sicut fit in sacramento altaris, in quantitate separata remanebit color, quia quantitas est totale receptiunium eius immediatum. Si autem separetur anima a corpore, in anima separata non remanebunt potentiae sensitiuae nec in corpore, quia neutrum fuit totalis causa receptina talium potentiarum, sed quaelibet fuit partialis et sui coniunctione supplebant uicem unius totalis cause.” See also Sent. IV-C 44.3, Sent. I-C 3.2.2, and Sent. I-A 3.3.

69. QA II.11 221; Sent. II-C 3.7 n. 11, Sent. II-A 3.8, f. 173vb–b (in the critical apparatus to Evid. II.15 fn. 31); Sent. II-C 3.6 n. 8; Sent. II-A 3.5 24, Sent. IV-C 49.2 n. 24. On the soul after death, see Sent. IV-C 43–4. Durand does admit that at least one human cognitive act occurs without a phantasm, namely, the beatific vision. But this is owing to, on his solution to the problem, the fact that God changes the natural mode of human cognition. Sent. IV-C 49.2 (C) n. 24: “Tertius modus est quod ad uidendum Deum clare et manifeste non requiritur species repraesentans diuinam essentiam, ut dicit prima opinio, nec aequum lumen creatum elevans intellectum ut dicit tam secunda opinio quam prima, sed sufficit quod diuina essentia immediate repraesentetur intellectui creato, quod utique non potest fieri secundum ordinem naturae, quem (quem) quam (quam) experimur, secundum quem nihil intelligimus nisi ex sensatis et imaginatis, sed potest hoc fieri secundum ordinem diuiniae gratiae, et illud potest patere sic: ubicunque natura et uirtus potentiae se extendunt ad (ad) ab (C) obiectum, praesentato obiecto per se et immediate et excluso impedimento omni causante aenigma, necessario sequitur cognitio clara et manifesta qualis est possibilis inter tam potentiam et obiectum secundum quemcumque modum. Sed noster intellectus de se potest in essentiam diuinam tamquam in obiectum, et totum impedimentum clare et manifeste cognitionis diuinae essentiae est, quia cognoscitur per medium inferioris gradus, quod est essentia creatae, quod medium potest excludi, ut probabatur. Ergo hoc excluso, et praesentia diuina essentia intellectui secundum se et immediate, sequitur cognitio clara et manifesta qualis possibilis est intellectui nostro respectu diuinae essentiae. Maior patet, quia ex quo potest potest in obiectum de natura sua potest ipsum cognoscere, et si impedimentum causans obscuram cognitionem excludatur, consequens est, quod potest cognoscat obiectum clare et manifeste aenigma, necessario sequitur cognitio clara et manifesta qualis est potest in obiectum tamquam in essentiam diuinam, nam et philosophi probauerunt Deum esse quandam naturam quae consequatur ad intellectum, et habent omnen perfectionem; quod autem huuismodi cognitionis esset nobis obscusa et eius [eius] eius (cuius) causa est, quia naturali ordine non cognouerunt, nec nos cognoscamus Deum nisi ex creaturis, quae, cum sunt inferioris gradus, non repraesentant ipsum clare et manifeste. Hoc autem impedimentum potest amoueri uirtute diuinam, quae potest omne quam quod non implicat contradictonem. Quod autem intellectus noster, qui secundum ordinem naturalis non consurgit in cognitionem Dei nisi ex creaturis, potest ipsum habere praesentem secundum se, contradictonem <non> implicat, quia in actionibus naturalibus uidemus quod Deus potest modum agendi immutare. Hoc etiam attestat omnis opinio circa materiam istam, quia omnes ponunt quod Deus in uisione beata immutat illum ordinem quo [non] cognoscimus ipsum ex creaturis, et praepresentabitur intellectui nostro nullo alio praecognitio (praecognitio) Draecognitio C. Et haec fuit minor. Sequitur, ergo, conclusio. [...] Ex quo potest sic argui: quod essentiam diuinam fit praens intellectui nostro in ratione obiecti, quae pror itur non erat ci sic praens, oportet quod hoc sit uel ex mutatione sui, uel ex mutatione intellectus; non ex mutatione uin, quia ipsa est omnino immutabilis; nec ex mutatione intellectus per aliquod receptum, quod est species uel lumen, quia speciem negant, lumen autem ponitur ut dispositio patriae; ipsi autem dicunt quod talis potest communicari intellectui habenti solas dispositiones uiniae. Oportet, ergo, quod per hoc solum mutetur intellectus, quia mutatur ordo naturalis quem habet in intelligendo, secundum quem [non] cognoscit Deum ex creaturis.”
the senses, he doesn’t mean to be claiming that thought is thus trapped behind a veil of phantasms; rather, just as no sensory perception can come about unless the sensible object brings about an effect upon the body, even though this effect is not the object of sensory perception or involved in sensory perception in any way, so too no thought can come about without physiological changes, even though, at least in cases of direct thoughts, the thoughts are about the external thing and not the internal physiological changes.

Perhaps, on Durand’s view, mental representations aren’t in the mind at all, but rather in the brain. On this interpretation, a mental representation is a certain item in the brain which acquires its specific content owing to covariation and performs a certain function (representation) with respect to other units in the cognitive system as a whole. It doesn’t, of course, matter what these units are, or even what they look like, but what matters is rather that these units are connected up with the world via covariation, connect to other units in the system in terms of either sine qua non causation or efficient causation, which in turn are connected back down to other units in the system responsible for behavior output. Less abstractly, the idea is that the specific content of a thought is to be specified by the item which occasions that thought, be it an extramental present thing or a phantasm in the brain; these phantasms in the brain (at least) can be causes or occasions with respect to thoughts and other phantasms in the brain; thoughts themselves can, in return, causally interact with the phantasms; more precisely thoughts themselves can direct the nervous system to execute certain actions or the imagination to change and so present to the intellect some new item or chain of items.70

One piece of textual evidence that might support this line of interpretation is to be found in Sent. I-AC 27.2 (which concerns the mental word). In his first redaction, Durand had attacked Hervaeus Natalis’s position as found in Hervaeus’s Tractatus de uerbo. In

70. Even though, as we saw in Chapter 1, Durand believes that upwards causation is impossible, such that a physical cause can bring about a mental event, seeing as the former is less noble than the latter, nothing prevents a mental cause from bringing about a physical event.
reply, Hervaeus Natalis had attacked Durand in *Quodl.* II.8. Durand, in return, attacked Hervaeus’s *Quodl.* II.8 in his third redaction. The issue which is of interest here is Hervaeus Natalis’s claim that a mental word is (somehow) produced by the mind. One objection which Durand had raised against this thesis appealed to the thesis (which Hervaeus also endorses) that the intellect can have but one act at a given time.

The cause of this express concept (which you posit) is either the intelligible species alone or the species together with the confused thought. Not the intelligible species alone, since then the effect would be more noble than its cause. Not the species together with the confused thought, because then two thoughts would coexist, because the confused thought would coexist with the express species, since a [proximate] cause coexists with its [proximate] effect; but the confused thought coexists with the express species; therefore, from first to last: the confused thought will coexist with the express thought and so two thoughts will coexist. (*Sent.* I-C 27.2 n. 16)

In *Quodl.* II.8, Hervaeus takes up Durand’s challenge, and attempts a solution.

71. Hervaeus, *Quodl.* II.8 and *TDV,* e.g., 4.2.1 f. 22ra: “Dicendum quod ut ex dictis patet duo sunt de ratione uerbi unde uerbum est. Vnus et primum est quod sit repraesentatiuum rei et hoc ci conuenit ut est similitudo vel exemplar ipsius rei cognitae. Secundum est quod sit productum ab aliqua intelligente.”

72. Compare: Hervaeus, *Quodl.* II.8 (H) f. 49va: “Secundo sic, quia istius conceptus expressi quem tu ponis aut sola species intelligibilis est causa aut species cum actu confuso; non sola species intelligibilis, quia tunc effectus esset nobilior sua causa; nec species simul cum actu confuso, quia tunc esset simul duo actu intelligendi quia simul esset actu intelligendi confusum cum specie tali expressa, quia simul esset causa cum effectu; sed cum tali specie expressa siue conceptu expresso est actu intelligendi expressus; ergo a primo ad ultimum: cum actu intelligendi expresso erit (erit est H) actu intelligendi confusus et sic erunt duo actu intelligendi simul.” Compare also: *Sent.* I-A 27.2 [= PARIS Bibl. Nat., lat. 14454] f. 75ra. Notice that Hervaeus, in *Quodl.* II.8, quotes from the text as found in Durand’s third redaction; this text is, as is clear from the transcription above, not the text found in the first redaction. J. Koch (Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano,* 64–67) provides other passages in *Quodl.* II.8 where Hervaeus quotes from Durand’s first redaction.

73. ibid., ff. 49vb–50ra: “Ad secundum dicendum quod quando dicitur ‘aut sola species, etc.’, dicendum primo quod posito quod sola species esset causa immediata illius conceptus expressi; nullum tamen incommeniens sequitur. Et quando dicitur quod immo, quia effectus esset nobilior sua causa, dicendum quod idem sequitur de actu intelligendi confuso, quia nobilior esset quam sit species quae ponitur eius causa ab omnibus qui ponunt species. Dicendum igitur quod non est incommiens effectum esse nobiliorem sua causa immediata dummodo illa causa immediata agat in uirtute alicuius nobilioris concurrentis cum ista causa ad effectum producendum; et sic ponitur in proposito de intellectu agente et specie; sicut etiam ponitur a negantibus speciem de intellectu et phantasmata respectu actus intelligendi confusi. Vnde ista
Under the assumption that two thoughts can’t coexist, I say that, since a human achieves every thought by the mediation of a phantasm, the confused thought is said to be the [proximate] cause of either the word or the express thought insofar as the object, by the mediation of such a confused thought, causes a desire (∼amor) for such an express thought; and this desire is the [proximate] cause of a change in the phantasm; and when this change has been finished (which doesn’t occur in an instant) the intellect is then changed to the word or the express thought. Therefore, when it is said that the confused thought coexists with the word or the express thought, since it is its cause, it ought to be said that this is not necessary in the case of something which is the cause of something else by the mediation of some other change, as is obvious in the case of someone who shoots an arrow. In the case at hand, however, it is such that the confused thought is the cause of the word or the express thought by the mediation of a successive change which occurs in the phantasm. (f. 50ra)\textsuperscript{74}

Hervaeus’s solution to the problem is, as is clear, to appeal to certain physiological changes in the brain which mediate between the two thoughts. A confused thought

\textsuperscript{74}. ibid., f. 50ra (H): “Ad istam difficultatem posset faciliter dici secundum illos, qui ponunt quod non est inconveniens duos actus intelligendi ordinatos ad inuicem simul esse. Sed posito quod duo actus intelligendi non possunt simul esse, dico quod, cum homo ad omnem actum intelligendi phantasmate mediente attingat \textit{quod intelligere ipsum confusum} \textit{dicitur causare} \textit{vel uerbum vel intellectionem expressam inquantum objectum} \textit{mediante tali actu causat amorem talis intellectionis expressae et amor talis est causa motionis phantasmatis qua quidem motione facto, quae non fit in instanti, movetur intellectionus uterius ad uerbum vel ad expressam notitiam. Quando ergo dicitur \textit{quod intelligere confusum stat cum uerbum siue cum notitia expressa cum sit causa eius dicentem quod non oportet de eo quod est causa alterius mediente aliquo alio moto (moto] motiuo H) sicut appareat de sagittante. Nunc autem ita est quod notitia confusa est causa uerbi siue notitiae expressae mediente motione successione facta in phantasmate.” The text in italics is quoted verbatim in \textit{Sent.} I-C 27.2 n. 17.
about X causes a physiological change in the brain and once this physiological change has finished a mental word about X occurs (which in turn causes an express thought about X). Since the physiological change takes time, the confused thought has a chance, so to speak, to drop out of existence before the express thought comes into existence, and so we can claim that the confused thought (somehow) caused the express thought even though it doesn’t exist at the very moment that the express thought comes into existence.

Durand, in turn, in his third redaction, offers the following response to this solution to the problem. First of all, it isn’t always the case that express thoughts follow upon confused thoughts. For instance, if someone has developed a certain scientific disposition (\textit{habitus scientiae}), she will at once elicit an express thought in the presence of the object of that disposition with no prior confused thought.\footnote{ibid., n. 18: “\textit{Instantia autem illa non valet, quia non semper peruenitur ad cognitionem expressam mediante confusa, quia habens habitum scientiae proposita conclusione cuius habitum habet statim intelligit eam expressam et Clare nullo actu confuso praecedente.”} Second, even if we do assume that every express thought is consequent to some confused thought, it still doesn’t follow that the confused thought is (somehow) the cause of the express thought because the confused thought should be treated as, rather, a necessary antecedent condition and not an efficient cause of the express thought.

For instance, in the generation of an animal, the semen is first soft and then hard [….] and yet softness isn’t the efficient cause of hardness. Likewise in the case of confused and express thoughts in the generation of a scientific habit. In general, if something changes from a less perfect state to a more perfect state, the less perfect state is prior to the more perfect state and yet it is not its efficient cause (ibid., n. 18)

At the end of his discussion in Sent. I-C 27.2, Durand takes up the issue again:

An express \textit{enuntatitiva} thought (for the sake of which it is said we form a
[mental word] is either a clearly true thought or it is a thought that comes after a confused thought. The first can’t be right, since some *enuntiationes* appear as clearly true right away as soon as their terms are cognized, e.g., *de quolibet esse uel non esse* or *omne totum est maius sua parte*; and so too with *calor calefacit* or *albedo disgregat* to those who have experienced this; nor is it necessary, in order to have a clear thought of such things, that one should have some other representative than the thought of the terms and, consequently, it is not necessary, on account of them, that such a word is formulated of the sort which they posit. But if it were said that the word is required just for the sake of a clear thought with respect to which a confused thought is prior, against: According to them, we do not achieve an express thought from a confused thought except because the object, by the mediation of such a confused thought, causes a desire (*amor*) for such an express thought; which desire changes the imagination (*phantasia*), and when this change has been finished, an express thought occurs. And from this it is argued: An express thought does not follow from a new change in the imagination (*phantasia*) except because some phantasm representing something to the intellect *de novo* appears through which the truth of the ‘*enuntiatio*’ [roughly: proposition] appears as evident and express which, before, did not appear as evident and express. But just as this is necessary, so too it is *sufficient* without anything else. Now, this ‘representative through the phantasm’ is a representative either as cause, effect, like (*simile*), opposite, antecedent, or consequent, for from any of these the truth which before did not appear as evident and express but rather appeared as confused might appear as evident and express. Therefore, for the sake of this, it is not necessary to cook up a certain form produced or understood, as they say about the word. And it is remarkable,

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76. On this list, see the discussion above concerning strict vs. liberal images in 5.1.1.
this fiction, since this is a purely physical issue (*materia sit mere physica*),
yet no physicist ever posited in our intellect some form necessary in order to
have a thought no matter how express.\(^{77}\)

Durand, then, seems to think that Hervaeus’s move—to appeal to physiological
changes in the brain—is, in fact, a rather useful move; but, *pace* Hervaeus, we shouldn’t
think that these physiological changes are merely necessary and not sufficient in order to
explain the causation of express thoughts. Quite the contrary, such physiological changes,
seeing as they result in a new image which presents or represents an item to the mind, are
*sufficient*. Hence, we don’t need to suppose that a mental word is *also* produced somehow
distinct from the express thought itself. Rather, the intellect is newly related to a new
object, albeit in the brain and not in the world, which *functions* as a representative.

This debate is striking. For one thing, Durand tells us here that issues having to do
with what we might nowadays call concept formation ought to be, so to speak, offloaded
from the mind to the body. On Durand’s view, this is a purely physical affair. Durand,
of course, isn’t a physicalist, in the contemporary sense of the term, for, he holds that
the mind (the conjunct of intellect and will) is immaterial.\(^{78}\) However, he seems to be
committed to a kind of broadly physicalist or naturalist methodology: we should only
appeal to entities which, so to speak, aren’t countenanced by our best physics when
absolutely necessary. In order to explain the causation of a thought, however, no matter

\(^{77}\) ibid., n. 25 (*C*): “Si uero dicatur quod uerbum requiritur solum propter claram cognitionem quam
praeedit confusa cognitione, contra: quia secundum istos ad cognitionem expressam non peruenimus
ex confusa, nisi quia obiectum mediante cognitione confusa causat amorem cognitionis expressae, qui
amor mouet (mouet *C*) phantasiam, qua motione (motione *C*) facta sequitur cognitione
expressa. Et *<ex>* hoc sic arguitur: ex noua motione (motione *C*) phantasiae non sequitur
cognitione expressa, nisi quia de novo appareat aliquod phantasma representans aliquid intellectui per
quod apparat uindens et expressa ueritas emuntionis quae non apparebat prius, et sicut huc necessario
requiritur, ita et sufficient sine quocumque alio; sed illud representaitionem per phantasma est causa uel
effectus, simile uel oppositum, antecedens uel consequens. Ex omnibus enim his apparat uindens et
expressa ueritas quae prius non apparebat aut confuse apparebat. Ergo propter hoc non oportet fingere
quandam formam productam uel intellectam, sicut isti dicunt de uerbo, et mirum est de hac fictione,
quia cum hae materia sit mere physica, nullus physicorum unquam posuit in intellectu nostro aliquam
talem formam ad habendam quacumque cognitionem quantumcumque expressam.”

\(^{78}\) Albeit with some reservation. See Chapter 1, fn. 49.
what sort of thought it is, one doesn’t need to appeal to a mental form, for one can simply appeal to the physical facts.\(^79\)

To return to the issue of what we might call physical functionalism (as opposed to mental functionalism), the point I want to make here is that Durand seems to want to move most of the processing outside the mind and into the body. This is even more clear in his discussion of habitus, but before I turn to that discussion I want to highlight one more passage from Sent. I-C 27.2 (not found in the first redaction). Durand, here, is responding to an argument in defense of the mental word which appeals to an analogy with the senses (sicut est in sensu, ita suo modo est in intellectu). Now, in the case of the senses, there is a good reason to suppose that there is such a thing as a form in which the thing is sensed, which form is not identical with the act of sensory perception, for, as Aristotle points out, we sometimes use certain images (imaginés; idola) which are in the sense-organs as images of things.\(^80\) In response, Durand writes:

Neither in the exterior senses nor in an interior sensitive power is there some form which is the first object of cognition and that in which or through which some other thing is cognized, since, either no sensitive power is able to reflect upon its own acts or itself or something which is in it, or, if it is able to reflect, nevertheless no sensitive power with a direct act [can cognize such a form]. In fact, the intellective [power] can’t tend into such items [with a direct act], as was proved before.\(^81\)

\(^79\) Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 12: “All that we know of the body, is owing to anatomical dissection and observation, and it must be by an anatomy of the mind that we can discover its powers and principles.”

\(^80\) ibid., n. 3: “In contrarium arguitur quia, sicut est in sensu, ita suo modo est in intellectu; sed in sensu est dare formam in qua res cognoscitur, nec est notitia rei; ergo similiter est <in> intellectu; illa autem forma dicitur esse urbem; ergo, etc. Probatio minoris, quia secundum Philosophum in libro De memoria et reminiscentia quandoque homo utitur imagine existente in sensu siue tali idolo ut medio ducente in cognitionem alterius, quandoque ut re cognita, sicut quando in somnis apprehendunt homines ipsas imaginés ut quasdam res. Hoc autem non esset nisi in sensu esset dare aliquod idolum quod non est notitia rei, sed est imago in qua res cognoscitur; ergo, etc.”

\(^81\) The earlier proof is the following (Sent. I-C 27.2 n. 21): “Tertio sic: intellectus nec se nec habitus suos nec actus intelligit actu recto; sed uerbum est aliquis actus intellectus; ergo non est uerum quod
et reminiscentia, this isn’t against us, since the impressions of sense objects which persist in us when the sense objects have gone away and when we do not [in fact] sense do not persist in sense-organs, since then they would either always or never be sensed; but they persist in [corporeal] spirits in other parts [of the body], and when they are moved, from whatever cause, and put in front of the organ of imagination (phantiasia), be this while asleep or when awake, there come about these appearances (apparitiones) about which the Philosopher talks there and in De somno et uigilia where he expressly posits what has been said. Whence, such images aren’t in the sense as in a subject, as they assume. (n. 30)82

The picture that is emerging here, I want to suggest, is a spartan model of mind which moves representations outside the mind (and indeed, outside even the sensitive powers of the soul) and into the body (certain ‘spirits’ in ‘other parts’ which aren’t in the sensitive powers as in a subject).

Durand sticks to the same methodological principle when he takes up habitus. In fact, Durand’s analysis of habitus supplements what I have been calling physical functionalism...
so as to avoid what I think would be a rather tragic flaw in his model of mind. Consider the following objection.

Assuming that the above story about covariation coupled with physiological functionalism is true, then, one might object, we will have no explanation of how it is that humans (and certain higher-order animals) seem to engage in thoughts that can’t possibly be explained by appeal to such a model. On this model, all thought would seem to be limited to singular cognition about either the things themselves as present or their sensory representations in the brain.

Recall, for starters, Durand’s appeal to experience and scientific dispositions (habitus scientiae) above. What I want to argue for here is that Durand interprets habitus as acquired competencies or skills, which, when coupled with the story we have been

83. King, “Two Conceptions of Experience,” King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version],” King, “Le rôle des concepts selon Ockham” argues that Ockham understands habitus along these lines. King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version],” 11–2: “Ockham, I think, appreciated this point, and that is why he threw out all previous ‘mentalistic’ theories of mind as unhelpful. Instead, Ockham proposed an account of mental activity that used a bare minimum of internal machinery and introduced a new way of talking about our competence in interacting with the world, namely through forms of acquired expertise (habitus), a matter of complex interlocking abilities. Having dispensed with causal mechanisms, as noted above, Ockham can talk directly about our skills in getting around in the world without being tempted to give reductive explanations how this comes to pass. Furthermore, Ockham’s talk of habitus (skills) is usually cashed out in terms of abilities to do things, including recognizing and identifying singular items or kinds of items. For this they don’t have to be ‘in the head’ in any interesting way; they are competencies of the whole person as much as they are specifically mental. Take, for instance, Ockham’s discussion of universals. What he says amounts to noting that human beings learn to get around in the world by dividing things up into groups in pretty much the same ways, depending on the kind of past experience each person has had. This is not explained by the grasp of some recondite primitive metaphysical maximal similarity at work in each of us. Rather, it is something most humans do at an early stage in cognitive development, in almost exactly the same ways. If we want to talk about such abilities, we can do so in linguistic terms; but Ockham’s point is that having a concept is no more than being competent in getting around in the world in a certain regard. Our expertise in sorting things into kinds is remarkable, to be sure, but no more remarkable than many other things we do. If we are interested in the whole phenomenon of skilled competence, there is no particular reason to try to work out a reductive account of this particular skill, which explains why Ockham seems uninterested in doing so.” Notice that P. King seems to have abandoned his previous interpretation of Ockham as a linguistic-role functionalist (King, “Rethinking Representation,” which, despite its publication date, comes earlier [indeed, cited in King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts [presentation version]”).] If P. King has not abandoned his earlier interpretation, then he owes us some explanation about the connection between the two—to my mind—conflicting models of mind, for one can’t be both Bob Brandom and Jerry Fodor, even virtute divina. On habits in Ockham, see also Oswald Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1952) and Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, ch. 1.
telling so far, offers a richer view of human cognition.

Unfortunately, my comments here will have to remain speculative because, if I’m right, then the text where he would have made this claim explicit is one which we have lost, namely, his discussion of *habitus* in his first redaction. However, we can speculate about what he might have said there based upon (a) Peter of Palude’s discussion in *Sent.* III.23.1–2; (b) Nicholas Medensis’s *Evid.* III.30, (c) Durand’s *Tractatus de habitibus* and (d) an anonymous treatise against Durand’s *Tractatus.*84 In the *Tractatus* Durand defends the peculiar thesis that intellective virtues (cognitive *habitus*) and moral virtues are not *in* the intellect or the will as in a subject but rather these are attributed to the will or intellect. In fact, such virtues are at base something in a (non-cognitive) organ (called variously the ‘ostensive’, ‘presentative’, or ‘representative’ organ).85 This organ is not cognitive as such—that is, it does not think, see, or hear and so on, nor does it even imagine or remember—and its function in the cognitive system is to store and present sense images to the intellect and presumably other inner sensitive powers, such as the imagination and the memory.86 These sense images are, of course, combinations of sensory impressions which were in fact made upon the various outer sensitive organs and so are acquired. The more the mind thinks about a sense image, the more the ostensive

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85. *TDH* 4.8 50: “[…] in potentia quae ostendit objectum intellectui[…].” ibid.: “[…] in eadem potentia repraesentatius[…].” ibid., 53: “[…] in potentia ostendente seu proponente objectum[…].” ibid., 57: “[…] in eo quod repraesentat objectum[…].”

86. *TDH* 4.8 50 (emphasis mine): “[…] in intellectu non sit aliquis habitus nec in aliqua potentia cognitiua ut sic, et multo minus in appetitiua, ut probatum fuit supra, sed solum in potentia, quae ostendit objectum intellectui, *siue sit cognitiua siue non*—et hoc dico quantum ad habitus pure speculatiuos—uel in eadem potentia repraesentatiua cum dispositione corporali acquisita quantum ad habitus practicos et morales, ut sunt prudentia et uirtutes morales.” ibid., 57: “Propter quod habitus est ponendus subiectiue in eo, quod repraesentat objectum et non in illa potentia, propter cuius actum quaecitur, nisi sohm attributiu.” See also Anonymous, Questio, “*Vtrum habitus acquisitus…*” 71 (emphasis mine): “[…] nec in intellectu nec in aliqua potentia cognitiua, *ut cognitiua*, est aliquis habitus subiectiue, et multo minus in appetitiua, sed habitus intellectuales et morales dicuntur esse in intellectu et appetitu solum attributiu, subiectiue autem sunt in potentia, quae objectum intellectui offert, quantum ad habitus intellectuales, uel in eadem potentia objecti repraesentatiua cum dispositione corporali acquisita quantum ad morales.” Recall, as well, Durand’s remarks on the ‘impressiones’ which exist in certain ‘corporeal spirits’. See above 65 and 82.
organ is put to use in presenting that sense image, and so it comes to acquire a kind of *facilitas* at presenting that sense image. Hence, there is no reason for postulating a cognitive or speculative habit in the intellect because of the *facilitas* with which we think about something. Moreover, the mind has control over this organ such that it can cause it to present one image after another to it and so this organ can be trained so that it presents a series of sense images to the intellect in a certain order just as a horse is trained to trot.\(^{87}\) Further it can somehow (the details get a bit murky at this point) be trained to associate certain values to various sense images (or chains of sense images: "*ordinata formatio specierum in uiribus sensitiuis apprehensiuis interioribus*")\(^{88}\) just as a dog is trained to fear bread presented to it in the right hand.\(^{89}\) Hence, even moral habits can,

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\(^{87}\) Peter of Palude, *Sent.* III 23.1 f. 116vb–117ra (presenting Durand’s view): “Debemus ergo imaginari quod sicut equus docetur ambulare inquantum <ex> consuetudine sic ambulandi efficitur (efficitur) sit \(S\) pronus ad consimiliter ambulandum, nec ex hoc efficitur (efficitur) sit \(S\) in eo aliqua res absoluta, sed solum talis modus consuetudinalis et pronitas talis, sic ex consuetudine talium (taliom) *om.\ P* actum honorum uel malorum fit in nobis quaedam pronitas ad consimiliter agendum, eo quod consuetudo (conseutudo) consuetudo (\(P\)) inclinat quasi ( quasi) *om. P* per modum naturae." (\(S = \text{Stella, Evidentiae, III.30; } P = \text{Paris, 1517.}\) See also Nicholas Medensis, *Evid.* III.30 905 (reporting on Durand’s position): “Dicit ergo, pro opinione sua, quod sicut equus docetur ambulare ex sola consuetudine sic ambulandi absque eo quod fiat in eo aliqua res absoluta, sed solum quidam modus consuetudinalis et pronitas ad sic ambulandum, sic ex sola consuetudine talium actuum honorum uel malorum fit in nobis quaedam pronitas ad sic agendum.”

\(^{88}\) Anonymous, *Quaestio "Vtrum habitus acquisitus..." 71.*

\(^{89}\) *TDH* 4.5 26–7: “Mediantibus autem actibus imperatis potest iudicium potentiae aestimatiuae et cognituali circa ad hoc, ut concorditer judicet cum ratione, quae alias indicaret contra rationem *et hoc potest fieri dupliciter, sc. ex variatioc circa obiectum et ex alteratione dispositionis nostrae. Primum,* quod est ex variatioc circa obiectum, commune est nobis et brutis, quae assuescunt quibusdam operibus a ratione hominis imperatis; quod patet: Canis enim esuriens secundum se appeteret panem et ipsum acciperet, per quamcumque manumibi sibi porrigeretur, dexteram uel sinisteram; et tamen assuescit sic accipere a dextera manu, quod milo modo a sinistra propter varitationem factam circa obiectum per actum imperatum a ratione hominis, per quem objecto delectabiliter iungitur triste superhabundans; v. gr. quando cum pane porrecto cani sinistra manu, quem canis uult accipere, percutitur grauissime in ore et dentibus, quando autem porrigitur per manum dexteram, non percutitur, sed permissitur libere accipere, ex frequentia talium actuum formatur aestimatiua canis, quod accipere panem a sinistra manu est laesium et inimicum naturae, et memoria firmatur; propter quod talis canis semper sic aestimat, ut expertus fuit in actibus praecedentibus, et assuescit facere, quod ratio hominis imperat.” See also ibid., 4.9 66: “Sed in habentibus solum alterum appetitum potest circa unum actum proponi ratio mali cum bono et e comerso, ut patet de brutis. Proponitur enim cani esurienti panis, qui est ei delectabils, cum baculo, quo consueuit percuti, quod est ei triste, et idea nec sequitur sine timore nec dimittit sine tristitia, et utohique est voluntarium mixtum eo modo, quo bruta agunt voluntarie, ut dicitur 3 Ethicorum. De angelis autem, utrum quid tale possit eis proponi, latet nos. Sed certum est quod in nobis ex hoc solo, quod per intellectum proponitur voluntarii ratio boni cum malo circa eundem actum, sequitur voluntarium mixtum, etiamsi per possibile uel impossibile non concurreret appetitus sensitiuis.”
although attributed to the will, be located in this ostensive organ.\textsuperscript{90}

What is the upshot of all of this? Well, we might be able to assign to these items in the ostensive organ the role of representation in the cognitive system: such sense images acquire their specific content from what caused them and they function as representations in the cognitive system as a whole in terms of the relevant output (behavior) of the cognizant animal.

5.8.1 Conclusion

Durand clearly refuses to think about the intentional in traditional terms: the aboutness of a mental state is not a matter of resemblance or conformality; but neither is it totally a matter of causation, since not every effect represents its cause. Of course, on Durand’s view a mental state isn’t an effect of the object as efficient cause—he rejects affectionism (Chapter 1)—but the same problem can be posed to his own account: an oven’s operative state or second act is not about the pie as \textit{sine qua non} cause. Hence, Durand would seem to be either committed to the thesis that intentionality is a primitive concept, not to be analyzed in terms of covariation, resemblance, or conformality, or anything else, or committed to an even more odd theory, what I have been calling physiological functionalism. But maybe this even more odd theory isn’t that much more odd than the theory it was meant to replace. To be sure it has its mysteries, but these will be different mysteries, and in my view, more interesting mysteries than the mysteries which

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{TDH} 4.5 27–8: “Et consimiliter est de omnibus aliis, in quibus bruta animalia disciplinantur per hominem. In nobis etiam consimiliter; iudicium enim cognitionis sensitiuae secundum se de detectabili secundum tactum, puta de adulterio, est, quod adulterium esset prosequendum; quod est contra rationem. Fit autem, ut aestimativa iudicet, quod adulterium est malum et fugiendum, in quo concordat cum ratione; quod fit, quia cum adulterio detectabili proponitur aliquod triste superabundans sibi annexum; et idem dico de furto: v. gr. aliquid uidet frequentem uel audiet ab aliis uel legit, quod adulter fustigatur, diffamatur, et quod fur suspendatur; et ex hoc formatur aestimativa, quod furtum uel adulterium ratione adiuncti, quod est interemptium naturae uel priuatum maioris boni quam sit delectatio adulterii uel utilitas furti, est fugiendum tamquam malum. Ex frequentia autem corundem actuum firmatur memoria, in qua manent impressiones huismoedi actuum. Ratio autem et voluntas imperant memoriae, et ipsa oboedit immediate huic imperio quoad motum localem spirituum, in quibus sunt tales impressiones: quo facto representantur potentiae cognitivae aestimativae actus illi conjunctim, ut prius fuerant sensati, et indicatur de his similiter ut prius, sc. concorditer ratione.”
tag along with the conformality theory of content.
6 Bio-bibliography

6.1 Biographical sketch

Durand of St.-Pourçain (Durandus de Sancto Porciano) was probably born at Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule in Auvergne in the early 1270s and he died on September 10, 1334. Around 1294, he entered into the Order of Preachers at Clermont. We do know that he was at Saint Jacques in Paris on June 26, 1303, which would have been a pretty good year to be in Paris, since both John Duns Scotus and Hervaeus Natalis are supposed to have been lecturing on the Sentences and Godfrey of Fontaines delivering his Quodl. XV at Paris during this year. In any case, Durand is also known to have been in Paris on November 17, 1307, since he participated in the process against the Templars. We also know that Durand became master in Paris in 1312 and was regens actu magister until 1313 when he was called to Avignon by Clement V to become lector sacri palacii. In 1316 he was the papal ambassador and chaplain and on August 26, 1317 he was appointed to the bishopric of Limoux (previously Narbonne) as a result. He was transferred to the see of Le Puy-en-Velay on February 13, 1318. In July, 1318 he took an oath renouncing temporal jurisdiction over his canons and clergy. In 1326 he was transferred to the see of Meaux. We also know that during this year he presided over the trial of William Ockham at Avignon.\(^1\)

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6.2 Critical Editions, Manuscripts and Early Modern Printings

6.2.1 Sentences - Status Quaestionis

Russel Friedman\(^2\) provides a recent \textit{status quaestionis} on Durand’s \textit{Sentences}. Durand authored three commentaries on Peter of Lombard’s \textit{Sentences}. The date, place, and form of the first redaction is a matter of some debate: Hervaeus Natalis in \textit{Quodl. II}.8 is the first author we know of to quote from it, and this fact establishes a \textit{terminus ad quem} of either 1308 or 1309. Most scholars, following Anneliese Maier’s suggestion, have agreed that it is connected with lectures Durand gave at some provincial Dominican \textit{studium} outside of Paris.\(^3\) No manuscript to date has been found containing book III; however,

\begin{quote}


3. Maier, “Literarhistorische Notizen.” However, Courtenay, “The Role of University Masters and Bachelors at Paris in the Templar Affair, 1307–1308,” 176–177 challenges this thesis, and argues that Durand was in fact in Paris: “This proves, contrary to what has sometimes been written, that Durand was at Paris in the academic year 1307–1308, not at some other studium of the Dominican order, but he was not yet formally lecturing on the ‘Sentences’ at Paris, since unlike some of the others, the title of bachelor was not applied to him. Yet he was considered important enough to be mentioned as attending the Templar confessions, and that in itself is significant. He may have been lecturing on the Bible and/or preparing himself to read the ‘Sentences’ in the following year. Josef Koch dated the first version, version A, of Durandus’ commentary to 1307–1308, and its description in the censure of 1314 as a quaternus originalis that the author did not intend for circulation suggests that it was a pre-lectura version. If written in 1307–1308, then written at Paris, which would explain Hervaeus Natalis’ access to that early version.” Note that if W. Courtenay is correct, then de Guimarães, “Hervé Noël,” 47–8, 57 proposal that Hervaeus’s \textit{Quodlibet II} should be dated to Easter 1309, in order to give Hervaeus enough time to respond might be right. See Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 434, fn. 101: “Guimaraes was attempting to show there, pace Koch, that Durand’s \textit{Sentences} lectures began in September 1308; in order for Hervaeus to have had enough time to have responded in his \textit{Quodl. II} to Durand’s work, Guimaraes postulated the Easter 1309 dating for \textit{Quodl. II}. The proposal appears to be otiose in this context, however, since Hervaeus was not responding to Durand’s \textit{Sentences} lectures, but rather to the written commentary that he composed between 1304 and 1307/8.” I’m inclined to side with Courtenay/Guimarães on this issue. First of all, as mentioned in chapter three, there is the fact that the text that Hervaeus quotes from in \textit{Quodl. III}.8 looks to be a report rather than the written form, which is the text that Peter of Palude and Durandellus comment on. This suggests that Hervaeus
we do have manuscripts which contain books I-II and IV. We also have the so-called *additiones*, or at least a fragment of it, to the first book, dist. 3 (on the agent intellect). This is without doubt an addition to A, and I call it *Sent.* I-A 3.5.

After the negative reaction his first redaction received, Durand then lectured on the *Sentences* a second time, sometime before 1312, when he became master. Friedman argues that there is also a written ‘*ordinatio*’ version associated with these lectures (*pace* Maier who had supposed that they must be a mere *reportatio*).\(^4\) We have manuscripts which contain books II-IV but not book I.

Durand left Paris in 1313 for Avignon. He is supposed to have written his third and final (‘C’) *Sentences* commentary between 1317 and 1327. It is this version that was published numerous times in the early modern period. Most of the fifty manuscripts which contain some version of Durand’s *Sentences* contain this one.

Durand’s third redaction can be found in numerous printings: Paris (1508, 1515, 1533, 1539, 1547, 1550); Lyons (1533, 1556, 1560, 1569, 1595); Antwerp (1567, 1576); Venice (1571 [Reprinted in 1964 by the Gregg Press, Inc., Ridgewood, New Jersey], 1586). I use Venice, 1571. Books I–IV of this printing can be found online via SIEPM. A searchable version of Book I of this printing with a partial critical apparatus is available online at the Durandus Projekt.

There is no complete modern critical edition of any of Durand’s three redactions.

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\(^4\) Maier, “Literarhistorische Notizen.” Friedman argues that we must be dealing with a *ordinatio* for otherwise one couldn’t explain the fact that Durand’s *Sent.* II-A 3.5 bears such a close resemblance in a number of spots with passages in Duns Scotus’s *Quodl.* 13 (which is 1306/7). This suggests to me, at least, that Durand lectured on the first redaction in 1307/8 and began writing it sometime shortly afterwards. Hence, the fact that Hervaeus Natalis’s *Quodl.* II.8 contains a reference doesn’t tell us whether or not it is a reference to the written version or a reported version.
However, several individual questions have been edited or at least transcribed. What follows is a list of these editions / transcriptions.

### 6.2.2 Sentences Critical Editions


*Sent.* I-ABC 38.3 (ed. Schabel et al., 2001) in Schabel, Friedman, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude.”


### 6.2.3 Sentences Manuscripts


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5. I would like to thank Thomas Jeschke for giving me an early version of this work. Since I haven’t had access to the published version, page references will have to be corrected.
Chapter 6. Bio-bibliography


Book I-B: No MSS / Never existed.

Book II-A: Magdeburg Domgymnasium 91 (now in Berlin’s Staatsbibliothek) ff. 77r–137r; Vaticanus Chigi., lat. B VIII 135 ff. 163r–215v.


Book III-A: No MSS / Never Existed.


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6. Contains dd. 1–2. Saint-Omer Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer 338 contains dist. 25–48, although it is uncertain if this is the first redaction.
7. d. 22, q. 3 – d. 44.
8. dd. 1–25.
9. d. 1, q. 1 – d. 45, q. 2. The order of the distinctions are mixed-up: dd. 1–23; dd. 43–45 (q. 2); dd. 24–27. It is missing: dd. 28–42 and distinctions about d. 45, q. 2.
10. d. 10 q. 3 – d. 45, q. 2.
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*Bibl. Nat., lat.* 12331 ff. 84r–150r; \(^{11}\) SAINT-OMER, *Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer* 335 ff. 1r–321v; \(^{12}\) SAINT-OMER, *Bibl. de l’agglom. de St-Omer* 336. \(^{13}\)

6.2.4 *Quodlibeta* - *Status Quaestionis*

Russell Friedman\(^ {14}\) also provides a recent *status quaestionis* on Durand’s *Quodlibeta*.\(^ {15}\)

In 1927, J. Koch had identified five *Quodlibeta*, two in Paris and three in Avignon. Durand’s two Paris *Quodlibeta* occurred when he was *magister actu regens* (1312–1313); his three Avignon *Quodlibeta* while he was *lector sacri palacii* (1313–1317). *Quodlibet Parisiensis* (QP) I is found in two redactions. The first redaction is a *reportatio* of Durand’s first quodlibetal disputation, probably held in Easter, 1312.\(^ {16}\) The second redaction is an *ordinatio* which Durand wrote after 1317.\(^ {17}\) The second redaction of QP I contains six questions, the first four of which have been edited by T. Takada. *Quodlibet Parisiensis* (QP) II is a *reportatio* and it remains unedited. It was disputed likely at Christmas 1312 (or perhaps Easter 1313). *Quodlibeta Avenionensia* (QA) I-III were held during Christmas in 1314, 1315, and 1316 respectively. P. Stella has edited all three.

6.2.5 *Quodlibeta* Critical Editions

*Quodlibeta Avenionensia* [QA] I–III (ed. Stella, 1965).\(^ {18}\)

*Quodlibet Parisiensis* [QP] [first redaction] I (unedited).\(^ {19}\)

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\(^{11}\) dd. 1–43, q. 1.  
\(^{12}\) dd. 14–42.  
\(^{13}\) dd. 43–50.  
\(^{14}\) Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 449–51.  
\(^{15}\) See also Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*, 93–128.  
\(^{16}\) Hervaeus Natalis in *Reprobationes excusationum Durandi* (late 1314) and Guy Terrena in *Quodl. I* (1313) both make use of the first redaction of this *Quodlibet*.  
\(^{17}\) In *Quodlibet Aven.* III Durand refers to *Quodlibet Aven.* I as his “first *Quodlibet*” and in *Vaticanus lat.* 1075 the second redaction of QP I is called *Quodlibet IV*, coming after *Quodlibeta Aven.* I-III. Hence, Durand would have revised it when working up his three Avignon *Quodlibeta*.  
\(^{18}\) Since P. Stella, several more manuscript witnesses have been found: MÜNSTER, *Universitätsbibl.* 175 ff. 216va–217vb (QA I.8); PAMPLONA *Biblioteca de la Catedral* 28 ff. 88v–93r (QA III.5–6); ff. 159v–160v (QA III.5); PEPLIN *Bibl. Sem. Duchownego* 53/103 ff. 225ra–23v (QA III.1); SIENA *Bibl. Comm. degli Intronati* G VII 40 ff. 94ra–101vb (QA III.1).  
\(^{19}\) *Vaticanus lat.* 1076.
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Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] [second redaction] I, qq. 1–4 (ed. Takada, 1968).\(^{20}\)
Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] I, qq. 5–6 (unedited).\(^{21}\)
Quodlibet Parisiensis [QP] II (unedited).\(^{22}\)

6.2.6 Miscellanea

Quaestio “Vtrum sit ponere intellectum agentem partem animae” = Sent. I-A.3.5 = Additiones ad comment. I Sent.\(^{23}\)


Excusationes (lost).\(^{24}\)

Quaestio vesperiarum “Vtrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia uel actus uel habitus” (ed. 

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20. The title of questions 1–4 are:
   1. Vtrum omnia illa quae different realiter in codem supposito faciant compositionem
   2. Vtrum sex ultima prae dicamenta dicta de Deo uel de creaturis dicant aliquid absolutum uel dicant solam respectum
   3. Vtrum relatio dicat perfectionem formaliter
   4. Vtrum ratio boni sit absoluta uel respectiva

21. VATICANUS lat. 1076 ff. 17r–18 and TORTOSA Arch. Cap. 43 f. 85va. The titles of questions 5–6 are:
   5. Vtrum numerus ternarius personarum divinarum uel creaturarum sit aliquid unum realiter
   6. Vtrum motio ulimi finis et motio efficentis sint motiones eiusdem rationis, supposito quod finis et efficiens sint idem realiter

See Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature.”

22. PARIS Bibl. Nat., lat. 14572 ff. 5ra–7va. The titles are contained in Glorieux, La litterérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320.


Quaestio in aula “Vtrum potentia pure passiua possit esse libera” (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid., 454–5.\textsuperscript{26}

Quaestio in Aula resumpta “Vtrum potentia pure passiua possit esse libera” (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid., 457–61.\textsuperscript{27}

Quaestiones de libero arbitrio \textit{[QLA]} (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid., 471–99.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{Tractatus de habitibus} \textit{[TDH]} q. 1–3 (ed. Takada, 1963).

\textit{Tractatus de habitibus} \textit{[TDH]} q. 4 (ed. Koch, 1930).

\textit{Tractatus de habitibus} \textit{[TDH]} q. 5 (corrupt).\textsuperscript{29}

For Durand’s other works not mentioned in this dissertation, see Käppeli, \textit{Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi} vol. 1, #924–960.

**6.3 PRIMARY SOURCES BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**Note:** Early modern print editions are identified with city, year. Modern critical editions, by contrast, are usually identified with editor, year, sometimes with the comission (e.g., Leonine Commission), year.

**MULTI-AUTHOR**

Peter of Palude, John of Naples et al. \textit{Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durandi de S.}

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Vaticanus} lat. 1086 f. 164ra–5ra. On the vesperies (\textit{uesperiae}), see Koch, \textit{Durandus de S. Porciano}, 160–8 and Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature” 201. The evening before the promotion to \textit{magister}, two masters would challenge the candidate to a dispute on a certain number of pre-arranged questions—in Durand’s case, these concerned freedom of choice. We do not yet know who the anonymous masters were (Peter and Thomas). The next day, in the hall (\textit{aula}) of the bishop of Paris’s residence, the candidate took over the dispute and determined it as master.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Vaticanus} lat. 1086 f. 165ra–6ra. On the \textit{quaestiones in aula} see the footnote above.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Vaticanus} lat. 1086 f. 171va–3ra.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Vaticanus} lat. 15875 71ra–3vb and TORTOSA Arch. Cap. 43 86ra–90rb.

\textsuperscript{29} See the introduction in Josef Koch, \textit{Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. Tractatus de habitibus. Quaestio quarta [De subiectis habituum] addita quaestione critica anonymi cuiusdam}, Opuscula et textus 8 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930). We can reconstruct this \textit{quaestio} based upon at least Peter of Palude, \textit{Sent. III} 23.1–2 and Nicholas Medensis, \textit{Evid. III} 30.


Anonymous


Quaestio 30 “Vtrum uelle et nolle sit in potestate nostra” (ed. Stella, 1962) in ibid., 463–7.31

Aristotle

30. Vaticanus lat. 1086 f. 166ra–vb.
31. Vaticanus lat. 14572 f. 170va–1va.
De anima (uersio Moerbekiana) in Sancti Thomae. Sentencia libri de Anima (Opera Omnia XLV, 1984).


De generatione et corruptione (uersio antiqua) in Averrois commentaria (Venice, 1574).

De memoria et reminiscencia (uersio antiqua) in ibid.

De sensu et sensato (uersio antiqua) in ibid.

**Augustine**

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**Averroes**


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\(^{35}\) The second(?) redaction of QDA II.
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See John of St.-Thomas.

JOHN QUIDORT

See John of Paris.

JOHN OF SAINT-THOMAS


JOHN SAPIENS

See John Lesage.
LAURENT OF LINDORES


MARISILIUS OF INGHEN


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6.4 **Abbreviations**

Abbreviations for primary sources are listed in the bibliography above. I have also used the following abbreviations for secondary sources:

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACPAP</td>
<td>American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPQ</td>
<td>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum</td>
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<td>AHDLMA</td>
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<td>The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600</td>
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<td>Cahiers de l’institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin</td>
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<td>HUMA</td>
<td>L’Homme et son univers au Moyen Âge. De septième congrès internationale de philosophie mévale. 30 Août - 4 Septembre 1982</td>
</tr>
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</table>

JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy

OUP Oxford University Press

PACPA Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association

PDP Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century

PSMLM Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

PUP Princeton University Press

RSPT Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques

RT Revue thomiste

RTAM Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale

RTPM Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales

STGM Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
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