THE MAKING OF SOVIET CHERNIVTSI:
NATIONAL “REUNIFICATION,” WORLD WAR II, AND THE FATE OF JEWISH
CZERNOWITZ IN POSTWAR UKRAINE.

by

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Abstract

This dissertation revisits the meaning of Soviet expansion and sovietization during and after World War II, the effects of the war on a multiethnic Central-Eastern European city, and the postwar construction of a national identity.

One of several multiethnic cities acquired by the USSR in the course of World War II, modern pre-Soviet Chernivtsi can be best characterized as a Jewish-German city dominated by acculturated Jews until the outbreak of World War II. Yet Chernivtsi emerged from the war, the Holocaust, and Soviet reconstruction as an almost homogeneous Ukrainian city that allegedly had always longed for reunification with its Slavic brethren. Focusing on the late Stalinist period (1940–1953) but covering earlier (1774–1940) and later (1953–present) periods, this study explores the relationship between the ideas behind the incorporation; the lived experience of the incorporation; and the historical memory of the city’s distant and recent past. Central to this dissertation is the fate of the Jewish residents of Czernowitz-Chernivtsi. This community was diminished from an influential plurality to about one percent of the city’s population whose past was marginalized in local historical memory.

This study demonstrates a multifaceted local experience of the war which was all but silenced by the dominant Soviet Ukrainian myth of the Great Patriotic War and the
“reunification of all Ukrainian lands.” When the authors of the official Soviet historical and
cultural narratives represented Stalin’s annexation as the “reunification” of Ukraine, they in fact
constructed and popularized a new concept of “historical Ukrainian lands.” This concept—a
blueprint for the Soviet colonization of the western borderlands in the name of the Ukrainian
nation—tied ethnically defined Ukrainian culture to a strictly delineated national territory.
Applied to the new borderlands and particularly to their urban centres characterized by cultural
diversity, this policy served to legitimize the marginalization and, in several cases, the violent
displacement of ethnic minorities, bringing to an end Jewish Czernowitz.
To take pride in [the] tools of statehood? To worship these toys? To crow about them? Not I. If we must maintain these tools, including the instruments of death, it must be not only with glee but with wisdom as well. I would say with no glee at all, only with wisdom—and with caution. Nationalism itself is, in my eyes, the curse of mankind.

Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (1993)

... [E]very expression determined by a semiotic sign function sets into play a mental response as soon as it is produced, thus making it impossible to use an expression to make its own content disappear. If the arts of memory are semiotics, it is not possible to construct the arts of forgetting on their model, because a semiotic is by definition a mechanism that presents something to the mind and therefore a mechanism for producing intentional act...[I]t is possible to forget on account not of defect but of excess, just as, though it is not possible to destroy the meaning of an assertion pronounced aloud, it is possible to pronounce another assertion in the same moment, so that the two assertions are superimposed. There are no voluntary devices for forgetting, but there are devices for remembering badly: it is necessary to multiply the semiosis....One forgets not by cancellation but by superimposition, not by producing absence but by multiplying presences.

Umberto Eco, "Ars Oblivionalis? Forget It" (1988)
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List of Russian and Ukrainian Terms and Abbreviations

*Artel* small enterprise of cooperative type

CP(b)Ukr SSR Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

*GChK* Extraordinary State Commission for the Identification and Investigation of Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist invaders and their Accomplices, and the Damage Inflicted by them on Citizens, Collective Farms, Social Organizations, State Enterprises and Institutions of the USSR, established 1942

*Glavlit* Central Literature Department

*GOSET* State Jewish Theatre

*Gosplan* Central Soviet Planning Agency

*Kinofikatsiia* Soviet campaigns aimed at developing and disseminating film as a tool of mass education and propaganda

*Kinokhronika* (Department of) News Films

*Kinoprokat* Film Distribution and Exhibition System

*kolkhoz* Collective Farm

*Komsomol* The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, Soviet Communist Youth Organization, established 1922

*KPP* Border Control Point

*MGB/MDB* Ministry of State Security, formerly Cheka, NKGB, later KGB.

*Miskkom/Gorkom* City Committee of the Communist Party

*Miskvykonkom* City Soviet Executive Committee

*Narkomnats* People’s Commissariat of Nationalities

*NKVD (NKVS in Ukrainian)* People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs; later MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs)

*Obkom* Provincial Committee of the Communist Party
Oblast Province

Oblykonkom Provincial Soviet Executive Committee

Orhanizatsiino-Instruktors’kyi Viddil (OIV) Organizational-Instructional Department of the Provincial Party Committee

OUN Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, established 1929

Profsoiuz Soviet Trade Union

Raikom District Communist Party Committee

Sovet po delam religioznykh kul’tov pri Sovnarkome SSSR v Ukraïnskoi SSR Council for Religious Affairs of the Soviet Government

Sovnarkom or SNK (Radnarkom or RNK) Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR; established in 1917 as the highest organ of government and administration in Soviet Russia; became the highest organ of government and administration of the USSR in 1922; in 1946 renamed the Council of Ministers (Sovet Ministrov or Sovmin).

UkrSSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

UNDO Ukrainian National-Democratic Union, established 1925

UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army, established 1943
Map 1: Chernivtsi province of Ukraine today (Source: https://maps.google.ca)

Map 2: A map of Austrian Bukovina from 1910, prepared by the historian Ion Nistor (Source: http://czernowitz.ehpes.com). The historical region of Bukovina can be roughly delineated by the Dniester in the north, Bystrytsia/Bistriţa in the south, and Siret/Syret in the south-east, with the rivers Prut and Seceava/Suchava flowing through it eastward. The province borders on Romania and Moldova in the south and on Ivano-Frankivs’k, Ternopil’, Khmel’nyts’kyi, and Vinnytsia provinces of Ukraine in the west, north, and east.
Prologue

I was born and lived until my early twenties in Chernivtsi, an average-sized Ukrainian city. It is the administrative centre of Chernivtsi oblast, or province, of Ukraine, as well as the major city of Bukovina—a historical region adjacent to the slopes of the outer eastern Carpathians. Considered today a part of the Western Ukrainian geopolitical region, Chernivtsi province is one of the smallest in the country, spreading over a little more than 8,000 square kilometers (see maps 1 and 2). Chernivtsi is located in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, on the banks of the Prut River, and only 40 km from the state border with Romania. According to the 2001 census—the first in post-independence Ukraine and the latest so far—the city had a population of 236,700 characterized by a national composition typical of present-day urban Ukraine: 79.9 percent Ukrainians, 11.3 percent Russians, 6 percent Romanians and

Moldavians, and a miniscule percentage of “others,” 0.6 percent of them represented by Jews.\(^2\) The Ukrainian identity of contemporary Chernivtsi is visible and undoubtedly dominant. An average-sized provincial centre, Chernivtsi has a few higher educational institutions, a drama theatre, several local TV and radio stations, and a standard set of museums, including those of local lore, rural architecture, and the arts. Ukrainian is not only the official language of education, administration, and the local media, it is widely spoken in the city.

Today’s media and educational institutions disseminate the prevailing Ukrainian historical narrative about the city and its surroundings, which can be outlined as follows. Bukovina was part of Kievan Rus’ and the later the Galician-Volhynian principality in the medieval period, and belonged to the Ottoman Empire in early modern times. In 1774, the territory was included in the Habsburg Empire, which colonized and exploited the local population dominated by (proto-) Ukrainians, and sponsored an influx of Germans and other foreigners, but also supported the rapid development of the central town, officially named Czernowitz, into a provincial capital. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I, Bukovina was absorbed by the aggressive interwar Romanian state, its capital was renamed Cernauți and forcefully Romanianized, while the local Ukrainian population and its culture were oppressed. In 1940, the Soviet government fulfilled the centuries-long aspiration of Bukovinians to reunite with Ukraine: it included the part of the region where Ukrainians predominated, Northern Bukovina, in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. After another four-year occupation by Romania during World War II (1941-1944), Northern Bukovina was

\(^2\) V. Kamins’ka, ed., *Natsional’nyi sklad naselennia Chernivets’koї oblasti ta ioho movni oznaky (za danymi vseukraїns’koho perepysu naselennia 2001 r.)* (Chernivtsi, 2003), 1, 34.
liberated with the rest of Soviet Ukraine which, by 1945, included all of its “historic borderlands.” The city finally received its supposedly historic name, Chernivtsi (Chernovtsy in Russian translation), and, despite surviving another tragic period of oppression, developed into a mid-sized centre of Ukrainian culture and industry during the Soviet period.

For many consumers of this popular historical narrative, the dominant storyline of foreign oppression and re-established ethnic Ukrainian purity is sufficient. However, recently the prevailing narrative about the connection between the local space and the Ukrainian “ethnos” has been amended by an accompanying discourse about past multiculturalism and tolerance with an emphasis on the patience and hospitality of the Ukrainian people. The post-independence interpretation of Soviet rule as Russian communist imperialism and as the ultimate evil in local history allowed for the consideration of the history of earlier, pre-Soviet colonizations of the area with curiosity and even fascination rather than demonization, which had been characteristic of the Soviet-era interpretations of local history. Local scholars, writers, and amateur urban historians are fascinated mainly by the eclectic architecture of Chernivtsi, dating primarily from the nineteenth century. A small but active cohort of urban heritage admirers among the local elite not only strive to spur interest in regional studies among the wider public but also tend to stress the Western style of the city’s heritage to reinforce the

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3 Galicia and Volhynia were included into the Ukrainian SSR in 1939; Transcarpathia was incorporated in 1945. Technically, the last addition to the territory of Ukraine as it exists today was the transfer of Crimea from Russian Federation to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954; however, present-day historical interpretations, both scholarly and popular, do not justify this transfer as a reunification based on historical precedent or strong cultural connections.

4 For more on Soviet and post-Soviet interpretations of local history, as well as major Romanian, west European, and Jewish approaches to the city’s past, see Svitlana Frunchak, *Studying the Land, Contesting the Land: A Historiographic Guide to Modern Bukovina. The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2011).
“European-ness” of Ukrainian culture. The predominance of the German-speaking population in the prewar city is also mentioned occasionally in public and scholarly discussions.

Diverse stories and urban legends that emerge from this spontaneous regional studies movement seem to resurrect the ghosts of a different, forgotten, non-Ukrainian past. However, there is a gap between the vague alternative shapes of the local past and the established public narrative of Ukrainian national liberation in Bukovina achieved through reunification with the Ukrainian mainland. This gap is only visible to readers outside the nationalist paradigm of understanding of the local space. In other words, the dominant Ukrainian interpretation of local history does not make sense alongside the multiple local urban myths of Chernivtsi unless one takes for granted a romantic and irrational idea of eternal connection between territory, ethnicity, and the political state—the idea that lays the foundation for a contemporary Ukrainian reading of Chernivtsi’s history. However, this divergence between an official Ukrainian

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5 For example, journalist Vasyl’ Selezinka has since 1998 been running a TV series, “The City of My Love,” on a local TV station. Each show is dedicated to a particular historical or cultural aspect of the city’s past and present life, architecture, or urban legend. Selezinka often invites specialists or amateurs of various degrees of expertise as guests on the show. Selezinka also published two volumes of edited scripts of his show (Vasyl’ Selezinka, Misto moieї liubovi. 2 vols [Chernivtsi: Kariova osvita, 2002 and 2006]). Another activist on behalf of local urban and regional studies is Ivan Snihur, an artist and collector who possesses a large collection of local urban artifacts, including public and family photographs, books, art, and household items. He also claims to be gathering oral histories and other personal accounts. Snihur is often invited to participate in the abovementioned and other TV and radio talks, organizes exhibits, and has published several works (for example, Ivan Snihur, Chernivtsi i chernivchany [Chernivtsi: Prut, 2008]). The architecture of Chernivtsi has also recently become the subject of several studies and conferences. The most notable and recent reports and publications concerning the history of Chernivtsi’s architecture include Arkhitekturna spadshchyna Chernivtsiv avstriis’ї doby (materialy konferentsiї 1-4 zhovtnia 2001 r. conference proceedings (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavyr, 2003); Bohdan Kolosok, “Zvit pro naukovo-doslidnu robotu vyznachennia mezh istorychnoho arealu tsentral’noї chastyny m. Chernivtsi iak ob’iektu nominatsiї do spysku vsesvitnioї spadshchyny UNESCO” report for UNESCO nomination (Kiev: Derzhavnyi naukovo-doslidnyi instytut teoiї ta istoriї arkhitektury i mistobuduvannia, 2003); Natalia Shevchenko, Chernovitskaia Atlantida (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavyr, 2004) (journalist account); Svitlana Bilenkova, Arkhitekturna Chernivtsiv XIX–pershoї polovyny XX stolittia (Chernivtsi: “Bukrek,” 2009) (architectural history).

6 It seems that even Ukrainian intellectuals who are fascinated by the “historical phenomenon of multiculturalism” in Chernivtsi find it hard to reconcile the idealization of the past “ethnic tolerance” with the overarching ethos of
historical narrative, on the one hand, and alternative urban histories, on the other, often becomes obvious to outside observers of the city’s well-preserved architecture. In 2004, a group of Berlin architects reflected on their experiences in several East European cities that “at first... seemed familiar” but “something was different: the articles in the window displays did not reflect the buildings” because “the present urban society has different origins and speaks a different language.”

And yet, in at least one case, the abovementioned contradiction became clear to a long-time resident of Soviet and post-Soviet Chernivtsi. The journalist Natalia Shevchenko discussed in her book, *Chernivtsi’s Atlantis*, the Jewish part of the city’s cultural history, or, more precisely, the city’s predominantly Jewish cultural past. The meticulous art-historical study of the city’s architecture reveals numerous traces of various Jewish traditions, once flourishing in Ukrainian ethnic-based nationalism. The work of a local journalist, the late Ihor Chekhovs’kyi, is a good example of the challenge to reconciling the acknowledgement of “historical multiculturalism” of Chernivtsi with its unconditionally Ukrainian present and future. On the one hand, Chekhovs'kyi celebrated acts of rehabilitation of some personalities, facts, and ideas from the city’s non-Ukrainian past. He also admitted the profanation, simplification, and political speculation that some of these acts involve. It seems, however, that Chekhovs’ky nonetheless remained trapped in the framework of a nationally-defined historical narrative, ascribing a predetermined and leading historical role to Ukrainians of Bukovina. He also employed the logical twist of using the “past multiculturalism” to demonstrate the “European-ness” of Ukraine and Ukrainians rather than “returning” historical Chernivtsi to (non-Ukrainian) Europe. See Ihor Chekhovs'kyi, *Chernivtsi—kovcheg pid vitrylami tolerantnosti* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2004); Olexandr Masan and Ihor Chekhovs'kyi. *Chernivtsi: 1408-1998. Narysy z istorii mista* (Chernivtsi: Misto, 1998) (104-105 on profanation of neo-multiculturalism, omitted from the later publication). In 2009, a school textbook was published based on the works Chekhovs’kyi. The book represents Chernivtsi as “a place of meeting of cultures and religions;” however, only 37 out of its 207 pages are dedicated to the Jews of Chernivtsi, who are discussed in the very last section of the book, following the Orthodox, the Catholics, the Protestants, and the Armenians. See Ihor Chekhovs'kyi, *Chernivtsi—Misto zustrichi kul'tur i relihii* (Chernivtsi: Misto, 2009).

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7 Günther Zamp Kelp and Julia Lienemeyer, eds., *Czernowitz Tomorrow: Architecture and Identity in the Surge of Central Eastern Europe* (Düsseldorf: Institut für Aussenwirtschaft, 2004), 50 (quoted here in translation from German by Leo Spitzer and Marianne Hirsch, see Spitzer and Hirsch, *Ghosts of Home*.)
These traces vary from a huge replica of a synagogue’s interior on the façade of a major cultural institution, to mezuzot still preserved on numerous doors of the historic downtown, to the half-destroyed Jewish cemetery, a ruin of the palace of Hassidic leaders, and small ornamental details on many residential buildings hidden under careless Soviet-era painting.

The weak voice of the city’s Jewish past, revealed in Shevchenko’s sad narrative about the dying memory of a dead urban culture, almost lost in the loud noises made by the dominant Ukrainian historical narrative, provoked my own twofold inquiry: what happened in the streets, squares, houses, shops, parks, temples, and cemeteries of the city between its “occupied” past and “liberated” present, and how was it forgotten? My sharpest interest was even more specific: how could forgetting be so successful in a city where the architecture and urban structure were preserved so well, in comparison to other European cities that survived World War II? In other words, why was the contradiction that seemed apparent to the German architects in 2004 not evident to the majority of the city residents, including myself, as they were growing up, working, and living in Chernivtsi for several generations after the war? I returned to Chernivtsi years after I left it as a consumer of the mainstream Ukrainian state nationalism and a young person desperately trying to build for myself a better future than my peripheral hometown could offer. I came back to Chernivtsi as a foreigner this time, both physically (to do my archival work) and metaphorically, as a researcher whose interest in Ukrainian nationalism was purely

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theoretical, to find Czernowitz where I could not see it before, and to explain why it was so thoroughly hidden in Chernivtsi, a city almost untouched by wartime physical destruction.

As I was working out ways (at times painful) to combine my status as a former insider with that of an outsider and detached scholar, I was able to see many contradictions akin to those noticed by the German architects. One of them came from the recollection of an event from my own life and became symbolic for my consequent study. As my family was struggling with post-independence economic hardships, my mother decided to sell a collection of books she had been presented with many years ago. The library contained German classics, all in expensive bindings, printed in prewar German and Austrian publishing houses, in the Gothic alphabet. The collection was given to my mother by an elderly and lonely family acquaintance, because she was a student of German linguistics, with the hope that she would use the books. All I knew about the previous owner was that she had lived in Chernivtsi since prewar times.

My mother did appreciate the meaning of the gift, but she never mastered the Gothic schrift, impractical as it was for her occupation, and there was no space in our cramped apartment that housed a family of three generations and a large library of Russian, Ukrainian, and translated world classics. After two decades of keeping Goethe and Schiller in the attic, we dusted off the books, carefully packed them, and took them along on a family trip to Kiev, where one of the largest second-hand book stores agreed to purchase what was such a specific collection for a modest price. I remember the strange feeling of handling beautiful books that had no meaning for me, as I could hardly even read their titles. With all our appreciation of books, both my mother and I felt almost physically that German volumes did not belong in our lives and our culture. They were useless and illegible, and thus they caused feelings of
discomfort, probably arising from the questions they invited. At that time, I did not answer their call, and moved on with my life.

Years later, when doing my preliminary doctoral research, I found out the story behind the German library from conversations with my mother and grandfather. The owner of the collection, Gella Zukher—an accountant and a former colleague of my late grandfather—was one of the very few lifetime residents of the city who had survived the war and remained in Sovietized Chernivtsi until she died in the 1980s. In 1941, as she was relocated into the urban ghetto with the other Jews of the city, she had to abandon all her possessions except for a small bag she could carry with her. According to the story she told my grandfather, the night after she arrived in the ghetto she secretly escaped, returned to her still empty apartment, and threw her library out the window. She managed to bring the books back to the ghetto, where they survived the Holocaust together with their devoted owner, and were returned to their old home after the city was liberated by the Red Army in 1944. (Gella was lucky to have her apartment returned to her and to keep it, as her private property, until the end of her life.)

I was surprised to learn that a handful of senior urbanites who had grown up in prewar Chernivtsi still lived in the city. As some of them had lectured at the department of foreign languages or tutored students in German, French, and Latin, they were often still in possession of books similar to those we had taken to Kiev, and told their students—Soviet youth born in postwar Chernivtsi—about their visits to Vienna, a city mysterious and inaccessible to most of Soviet citizens. I started my research too late to be able to speak to most of them, but their
stories forced me to bring books and people into a history that I was seeking to reconstruct: the transformation of prewar Czernowitz into its postwar incarnation.  

One path I took in my inquiry was to look for similar personal life stories. Before long, I was carried away for some time in a quest for people who lived in the buildings of Chernivtsi before the generation of my grandparents arrived from eastern Ukraine and other Soviet republics. The discovery was an array of materials, from scholarly accounts to memoirs and fiction, about the last several decades of prewar life in the city and its loss by those who managed to survive the war and leave the city for good. These accounts, thanks to their number and diversity, helped me reconstruct many aspects of life in the interwar city.

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9 I recorded the story of Gella Zukher from conversations with my mother, Natalia Frunchak, and my grandfather, Mikhail Zhylin. My mother also told me about her German tutor Karolina Tabak, who grew up and lived her entire life in Chernivtsi, and worked as an instructor of foreign languages at Chernivtsi State University in the Soviet period. She liked to tell my mother and other students about her frequent trips to Vienna in the 1930s. I personally met with Zinovia Peniuk who grew up in a lower-middle or working class family in Chernivtsi and, with a brief interruption for her university studies in Soviet Lviv, also spent her entire life in the city, lecturing at the State University and translating foreign literature. The last native Czernowitzer I met personally was Taras Ridush, who grew up in a rural suburb of the city and was in his late teens at the time of the Soviet annexation in 1940. He later became an actor and eventually a producer at the State Ukrainian Drama Theatre in Chernivtsi. None of the natives of the city whom I met is still living.

It was undoubtedly a very Jewish city, probably more Jewish than the majority of other urban centres in Eastern and Central Europe. Its German-language high culture was supported by the easternmost and, by the interwar period, the only German-language university in the East European region. This culture was maintained by a vibrant urban middle class dominated by acculturated Jews. As late as 1930, the Romanian census listed 38 percent of the Cernăuți population as Jews, 27 percent as Romanians, 14 percent as Germans, 10 percent as Ruthenians (retrospectively called Ukrainians today), 8 percent as Poles, and 2.5 percent as “others.” The absence of strong national movements in the region spared the local urban Jewish community from significant exposure to antisemitism—a typical twin-brother of radical nationalism in the modern era. Thanks to this and other historical circumstances, the local Jewish community was able to maintain the leading economic position it acquired in the second half of the nineteenth century until the outbreak of World War II. Chernivtsi’s oldest part was known as the Yiddish-speaking lower town, while one of the most important Hassidic centres in the world developed in Sadagora, or Sadiger, a small neighbouring town that is today a part of the city.

In spite of the overpowering Romanianization policies of the interwar years, greater Czernowitz retained its dominant Jewish-German cultural outlook until the outbreak of World War II. The latter became a catastrophe for the urban Jews and for the city’s urban culture which had developed over the previous one-and-a-half centuries. The Holocaust in Bukovina, though, took a shape different from the more widespread narrative about death camps and their unspeakable death tolls. Jews from Bukovina and other parts of what was then Romania were sent on what often became death marches to the region known as Transnistria, where very many of them died, while others endured inhumane sufferings and losses. However, an unusually large
number of Jewish residents from the city of Chernivtsi—probably as many as tens of thousands—were able to remain in their city during the war or return to it at various stages of the Romanian occupation, if only to leave it soon and for good, in different, although not much more cheerful, circumstances under Soviet rule.

The accounts by Czernowitz Holocaust survivors tell a common narrative of loss. Many of them conform to the dominant story about a paradise lost in the city taken over by Hitler, Antonescu, and Stalin in an apocalyptic sequence of occupations and “liberations.” Others offer more nuanced interpretations of prewar life and dramatic stories of survival and departure from Chernivtsi. Those who left the city during or soon after the war took their memories—or strong desire to forget—with them, but their fascinating and disturbing recollections did not answer my questions about what happened in the city after they left and how they were forgotten.

Instead of, or rather along with, a story of loss I was looking for a story of replacement, a story of the dramatic transformation of urban culture of the city that resembles its nineteenth-century photographs. The next seemingly logical direction in my search was recent Ukrainian historiography, which is focused on revising Soviet-era interpretations of Soviet rule. This direction, however, bore very modest results: unlike the several amateurs of local heritage, present-day Ukrainian historians in Chernivtsi and beyond were hardly interested in serious study of the Jewish past of the city and its collapse. Their revisionism, for the most part, was limited to fierce criticism of the Soviet repression of Ukrainian culture and re-interpreting Soviet history—often with references to the so-called Western totalitarian school in Soviet studies—as an oppressive colonial regime based in Moscow and aimed at the full eradication of Ukrainian national identity.
Several locally published recent works on the history of Bukovina and Chernivtsi offer a variant of Soviet-era accounts of a historically justified reunification with the Ukrainian nation and a bittersweet story of Soviet industrial progress, cultural oppression, and political repression. Modest acknowledgement of the region’s past “multiculturalism” (bahatokul’turnist’) and brief mentions of its demographic changes, marginalized in the massive narrative about the past and present achievements of Ukrainian society and culture in Chernivtsi province, left the puzzle about the urban transformation unsolved.11

11 The first post-independence historical revision of local history was published in 1998 (Stepan Kostyshyn et al., eds., Bukovyna: istorychnyi narys [Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 1998]). A short history of the city of Chernivtsi came out in the same year (Masan and Chekhovs’kyi, Chernivtsi 1408-1998: narysy z istoriï mista). A great number of smaller books, conference proceedings, and articles dedicated to various periods and themes of local history, including World War II, came out after 1991. Major works by Ukrainian historians include a survey of Bukovinian political history and diplomatic issues concerning the region, Vasyl Botushans’kyi, Serhy Hackman, Yurii Makar, Olexandr Masan, Ihor Piddubnyi, and Hanna Skoreiko, Bukovyna v kontekstii ievropeis’kykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn (z davnikh chasiv do seredyny XX st) (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2005) and, more recently, a volume dedicated to the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the first record of Chernivtsi in written sources, Vasyl’ Botushans’ky, Olexandr Dobrzhans’kyi, O. Zaluts’kyi, et al., Chernivtsi. Istoriia i suchasnist’ (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2009). Of particular interest to me were the contributions by Volodymyr Piddubnyi and Ivan Fostii on World War II and Vasyl’ Kholodnyts’kyi’s on the Soviet period. The 2009 book is authored by the established local authorities on historical scholarship and represents the current “official interpretation” of local history which continues the Soviet tradition of emphasizing the Ukrainian roots of the local population and culture and marginalizes other ethnic groups as well as historical interpretations that differ from this “official line.” The history of the war in the city and region, as presented in the work, can be outlined as an epic of struggle between local Ukrainian activists (members of Ukrainian radical nationalist organizations, which were in fact not numerous in the region before or during the war) and the occupying powers of the Soviet Union and Romania; the destruction of Jewish communities is mentioned only in passing, and then in terms of the passivity of the Jews who were deported and killed, as opposed to the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian patriots (p. 237). The Soviet period is represented as a time of rapid industrial and social welfare progress and phony cultural achievements, downplayed by forced Russification and limitations on Ukrainian culture. Local Ukrainian historians are more eager to deal with ethnic minorities when earlier periods of history are concerned (see, for example, Olexandr Dobzhan’s’kyi, Mykola Kushnir, Maria Nikirska, eds., Ievreis’ke naselennia ta rozvytok ievreiskoho natsional’noho rukhu na Bukovyni v ostannii chverti XVIII-na pochatku XX st [Chernivtsi: Nashi knyhy, 2007]) Notably, several post-independence publications that stand out from this historiographical trend and address issues marginalized in the mainstream narratives were initiated or prepared by local linguists and scholars of literature. One good example is a study and a collection of documents on the resettlement of Germans from Bukovina in 1940 (Serhii Osachuk, Volodymyr Zapolovs’kyi, and Vasyl’ Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!” Pereselennia nimsiv z Pivnichnoi Bukovyny 1940 roku (materially, svidchennia, documenty) (Chernivtsi: Zolotyi Lytavry, 2004). For more on recent approaches to the history of Bukovina by various ethnic schools, and for references to more works, see Frunchak, Studying the Land.
The Holocaust, modestly represented in these Ukrainian accounts, was narrated as someone else’s tragedy, not a local catastrophe that transformed the social and cultural landscape of the city. A two-sentence paragraph devoted to the Holocaust in a popular history of local cemeteries aptly exemplifies this treatment of the Holocaust: “Only the hard times of the war signified a real-life tragedy for [the local Jews]. This, however, is a well known fact that

defies redundant comments." Entirely omitted from the book, incidentally, is the Soviet period of the existence of the Jewish cemetery and any references to its badly neglected condition which has only recently started to improve thanks to the efforts of international and Ukrainian Jewish organizations and volunteers from various countries.14

The discomfort of discussing the humiliation and mass murder of Jews, endemic to Ukrainian and East European historical scholarship and public discourse until very recently, was made almost palpable in my conversation with a local artist and collector in Chernivtsi. A local Ukrainian from a neighbouring rural area who found himself in Chernivtsi in 1940 and lived through the change I was seeking to explain, he seemed a promising interlocutor who could potentially add a personal Ukrainian perspective to formal accounts about the war and the Holocaust in the region. After sharing several dramatic stories of his personal hardship during the years of the Soviet and Romanian annexations, he requested that I switch off my recorder and explained to me that, although he had to practice political correctness in his public speeches and publications, he believed that “Romanians did a good job punishing Jews” for some kind of misdoings against Ukrainians I was supposed to know about, since he did not care to explain.

13 V. Shupenia, Iu. Prestupenko, M. Chuchko, B. Mykhalunio, I. Siomochkin, Chernivets’ki nekropoli (Chernivtsi: Misto, 2000), 66. The paragraph is preceded by a description of the successful development of Jewish communities in Chernivtsi that acknowledges the numerical predominance of Jews in the city in the late Austrian and Romanian periods.

14 Ibid., 78. The book, however, mentions the fact that the Jewish cemetery has been a part of a “Historical-cultural preserve” since 1995. The only vague reference to the extremely neglected state of the cemetery is the note that the funeral home located on its territory is in an “unsatisfactory condition.” The cemetery had been deteriorating throughout the Soviet period and was a dangerous place to visit in the early post-independence years due to uncontrolled growth of vegetation, including large trees. See http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/, go to The Czernowitz Jewish Cemetery link on the left bar (last accessed on 15 August 2011).
Luckily, the antisemitism mixed with the suffocating air of the collector’s apartment cramped to the rafters with local artifacts of dubious origins, from antique furniture and German books to porcelain and artwork, was the exception rather than the rule in the course of my investigation. Throughout my research, I was fortunate to meet many genial and some wonderful people, but also came across many instances of milder versions of the “Holocaust discomfort syndrome” in Ukraine and in Ukrainian scholarship. Avoiding the themes of the Holocaust and the postwar demographic change in Chernivtsi seemed to be the norm in the mid-2000s, whether it came from ideological conviction or conformity with the established “political line” of local authorities.\(^\text{15}\)

Most works that deal with local demographic change in Chernivtsi and Bukovina belong to Western, Israeli, and, more recently, Romanian and Moldavian scholars. These studies of the Holocaust in Bukovina and Bessarabia reconstruct the complex and disturbing dynamics of the violent end of significant and pronounced Jewish presence in the area. These works became critical for my research, providing the context for the eventual transformation I was investigating.\(^\text{16}\) The few works that deal with the Soviet contribution to this transformation during and after the war are short and/or based on limited sources; they deal primarily with the

\(^{15}\) On the tendency of contemporary Ukrainian historiography to represent Ukrainians “solely as victims of one power or the other” see, for instance, a comprehensive survey by David Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, 2d ed. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008).

policies and practices of population movements or elucidate separate moments of the complex transformation.  

These works helped to reconstruct the general dynamics of the change as it was seen from Kiev, Moscow, or abroad. The story they told was essential for understanding the history of Chernivtsi, providing a link, missing in most local Ukrainian histories, between the vague references to the multicultural past of the city and its present-day almost homogenous identity. These accounts, though, tend to be detached from the city’s buildings and streets. They did not explain the rupture between the complex social structure and its physical space that, it seems, had developed in the city by the middle of the twentieth century; nor did it elucidate the process of filling this urban space with its new, postwar social and cultural contents. The case with my German library, the contradiction that the German architects and Natalia Shevchenko pointed out, and the dozens of other personal accounts convinced me that this yet untold story of transformation had to include the buildings, the “books,” and the people of the city in transition. 

The decision to explore these three elements of an urban ecosystem in flux and the relationships among them was based on the premise that architecture itself does not have a clear meaning. Its meaning is produced when a connection is built between architecture, people, and narratives that surround and populate the physical space of a city. Svetlana Boym suggests that the past of a city is illusive and uncanny and does not live in a stone “heritage,” and that the best way to understand an urban space in its relation to time is by means of a “dual archaeology of the concrete urban space and of urban myths through architecture, literature, and new urban ceremonies.”

The notion of myth, and urban myth in particular, is often associated with fictional account(s) that distort the reality of “historical truth.” My search for Czernowitz led me to appreciate the concept of myth as useful for analyzing the past, since it helps to acknowledge the limitations of any historical reconstruction. In the context of my study, I understand the concept of urban myth as a multiplicity of perceptions, opinions, and stories about a city that may or may not be based on real-life and documented events. This concept is closely related to the collective identity of urban residents who associate themselves with the urban myth rather than its physical space alone. Although no myth is a coherent narrative, I maintain that one can usefully operate with the notion of a dominant myth if certain features of a city, real or perceived, are revealed in the majority of narratives (personal or public, oral or written, official or underground) that construct and reflect the myth at the same time. By the same token, if a

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substantial number of narratives emerges or exists that are united by a different set of beliefs about the city, the concept of an alternative urban myth becomes a useful analytical category.

The contradictions that triggered my initial interest in this research project suggest that a nearly complete replacement of the dominant urban myth has occurred in Chernivtsi between the early 1940s and present. The incongruity between Chernivtsi’s buildings and their contents surprised German architects because they came to the city equipped with the outside narratives about the city’s past and strong associations between Habsburg-era architecture and West European culture. This inconsistency was a non-issue for most residents of late-Soviet and post-Soviet Chernivtsi who grew up absorbing and partaking in the development of a completely different urban myth which was part of a larger ideological system in the making, that of Soviet Ukrainian state nationalism. Somehow within a comparatively short period of several postwar decades this new myth became—however absurd it can seem to outsiders—strongly connected to the city’s physical space on many levels, from the deeply personal to the public and official. Exploring the complex process of myth-making and re-making which happened during and after World War II, along with analyzing the dramatic changes that were occurring in the city’s population and, to a much lesser degree, appearance, became my key to explaining the transformation of Czernowitz into Chernivtsi.
In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev described in detail his participation in the design of a monument to General Nikolai Vatutin to commemorate the General’s leading role in the liberation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic in 1944. The then head of the Ukrainian State Committee of the Arts, M. Khrapchenko (who had a Ukrainian surname but in fact came from the Smolensk region and was “not a Ukrainian,” remarked Khrushchev) rejected the inscription proposed by Ukraine’s political leader: “To General Vatutin from the Ukrainian people.” Khrapchenko believed that “[t]hat would be a nationalist inscription.” He said, “Probably Bazhan¹ thought it up, and after all, Bazhan is a nationalist.” Khrushchev replied:

Wait a minute. It wasn’t Bazhan who proposed it. It was I. Bazhan was also pleased by it, I don’t deny that, but what kind of nationalism is there in this – an expression of gratitude from the Ukrainian people to a Russian? This honor – this statement of gratitude – will have the opposite effect. The Ukrainian nationalists will go out of their minds if an inscription is dedicated in the name of the Ukrainian people to a Russian.

Khrushchev recalled that much effort was required from him in defending the wording of the inscription, and that he won out only when he appealed to Stalin and said that the whole thing was outrageous. According to Khrushchev, Stalin answered, “Tell them to go to hell! Do what you propose, and that’s all there is to it.” And so Khrushchev did, feeling proudly later, when he

¹ A survivor of the repression of the “Ukrainian literary renaissance” of the 1930s, one of the most venerated establishment writers in Soviet Ukraine since 1941; a long-time member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) (CP(B)) and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR); the head of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine (1953-59); from 1958 head of the editorial board of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house.
wrote his memoirs, that the monument stood in Kiev in memory of Vatutin’s life and work, and “acknowledgment by the Ukrainian people of the services he rendered in the struggle against the aggressor.”

Khrushchev spoke out of a conviction, common among Ukrainian elites of the day, that there were two types of Ukrainian nationalism—dangerous and alien bourgeois nationalism, and Soviet Ukrainian nationalism, the official ideology of the Ukrainian semi-state. The major difference between the two ideologies, as Khrushchev made clear in his remark, was their perspective on Russia. Of course, the Soviet variety was never acknowledged as nationalism but was branded patriotism instead. An “outsider” like Khrapchenko could not always distinguish between the two. (“There are educated people who concern themselves with problems of culture in the Soviet Union. . . .”—Khrushchev reflected on the matter—“But that man showed his ignorance and lack of political education.” 2) But, whether he spoke from the position of an internationalist or a great-Russian chauvinist, politically ignorant (in the context of Soviet Ukraine) Khrapchenko got it right: it was Ukrainian nationalism and a perfect example of state nationalist monumental propaganda of the twentieth century. Today’s Ukrainian Chernivtsi, likewise, is not an example of the triumph of Soviet rule; neither is it an example of the triumph of Ukrainian independence from this rule. It is a symbolic monument to the triumph of one particular aspect of Soviet rule in Ukraine—one that the Soviet state shared with other modern polities but implemented in a more authoritarian manner: ethnic-based state nationalism.

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2 This and preceding quotes are from Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 1 Commissar (1918–1945), transl. George Shiver (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2004), 601.
In recent decades, scholars have tended to analyze Soviet Ukrainian nationalism in the context of Soviet nation-building described by various terms such as “ethnic particularism” or racism without racial theory. Ukrainian nationalism (I will adhere to this general term) of the Soviet era was restricted and limited, as was the nature of its semi-state, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), within the Soviet Union. This nationalism was an inseparable part of a more comprehensive ideology of the USSR, defined by different historians as “the friendship of peoples,” a brand of imperialism, national Bolshevism, or simply Soviet state ideology. A number of credible works, including the ones cited above, demonstrated that the Soviet state supported the spread of modern nationalism and used national markers and identities (often newly created) for its repressive politics.

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4 Terry Martin adopted the “Friendship of Peoples” as a term to indicate Soviet state ideology and its approach to nationality questions since the late 1930s; David Brandenberger described Soviet state ideology as “national Bolshevism” (National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002]); several historians re-conceptualized the USSR as a particular type of empire (as opposed to a more traditional Sovietological understanding of the Soviet Union in terms of imperial domination and national/colonial subjugation), drawing on recent developments in colonial and post-colonial theory (for example, Douglas Taylor Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004]; Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin [Oxford University Press, 2001], and the above-mentioned works of Terry Martin and Serhy Yekelchyk).
Such a conceptualization of Soviet nationality policy has now become widely accepted among Western scholars. Timothy Snyder, for example, described Soviet nationality policy as a contradictory combination of “an early modern approach to nationality” with some aspects of a modern understanding of the question. If the former prescribed dividing the land into national territorial units and encouraged distinct languages, the latter rooted the nation in the masses rather than elites, assigning a nationality to every citizen, and thus in fact created nationalities.\(^5\)

In his case study of Lithuanian nationalism, Snyder aptly remarked that the nationalist dreams about nationhood of the few Lithuanian Romantics of the nineteenth century, re-interpreted by the Lithuanian nationalists of the twentieth century in ethnic terms, were fulfilled under Soviet rule in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic not by “Russian invaders” but by indigenous as well as non-Lithuanian Soviet functionaries who created a (Soviet) Lithuanian nation and state.\(^6\)

When it comes to discussing the history and contemporary situation of Ukraine, however, there is still a strong tendency to separate the notions of “Soviet” and “Ukrainian” or to equate “Soviet” and “Russian/Russified,” which leads to a serious analytical fallacy. This separation creates a perceived dichotomy between the Ukrainian (defined in terms of indigenous population and society) and the alien Soviet power (defined in terms of a foreign state or empire). For instance, Snyder himself asserted in his discussion of Soviet historiography that “Ukrainians were told that Kyivan Rus’ was a Russian state,”\(^7\) leaving out another very

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\(^6\) Ibid., 97. Another study that focuses on promoting Polish national identity in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and later using Polish nationality for political repression in the 1930s is Brown’s *A Biography of No Place*.

\(^7\) Ibid., 210.
important aspect of the Soviet Ukrainian historical myth: Kievan Rus’ was interpreted, first and foremost, as a cradle of the three brotherly nations, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. The Soviet interpretation of medieval Kievan Rus’ appropriated some claims from Ukrainian pre-Soviet Romantic historiography and refuted others, maintaining a certain degree of continuity while changing important emphases.8

Although stressing common “roots,” the Soviet historical narrative recognized a separate Ukrainian (and Belorussian) nation, thus legitimizing modern Ukrainian nationalism and the construction of the Ukrainian polity by means of creating national institutions, promoting a national language and symbolic culture, and purifying the Ukrainian body cultural from foreign elements when and where their presence seemed threatening to the authorities. Both constructs—the national myth and the national polity—were inherited and put to use by the post-Soviet Ukrainian state. The magnifying lens of a local history helps investigate important aspects of this continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet historical eras in Ukraine.

This dissertation is an urban case study exploring the process and impact of the Soviet incorporation of western borderlands, and, specifically, their major historical urban centres, during World War II. The importance of urban culture for the Soviet project, or civilization, as Stephen Kotkin has branded it, is widely accepted among scholars. Born in an urban revolution and considering the proletariat its social base, the Soviet regime was always at odds with things

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8 While the founder of the modern Ukrainian historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, was banned from the national pantheon as a bourgeois nationalist, and his argument about the continuity of (proto)Ukrainian statehood from Kievan Rus’ to Galician-Volhynian principality rather than the Muscovite state and later Russian Empire was rejected, Hrushevs’ky’s premise of basing the history of Ukraine on the wider masses of people rather than elites and political institutions and thus legitimizing the concept of a Ukrainian nation was transferred to the Soviet variant of Ukrainian historical narrative. For more, see Yekelchyk, 2004; Snyder, 2003, 125-32.
rural, peasant, and agricultural; the regime was especially suspicious of borderland spaces, often seen as ultimately rural and backward. Surrounded by the unmanageable and unproductive rural world, cities were the fortresses and the living exhibits of Soviet civilization, providing a venue for industrialization and cultural development as well as more opportunities for better control of the population.

Urban planning—that is, the planning of controlled, manageable, and productive space—turned abstract concepts like “building socialism” and “socialist reconstruction” into the practical tasks of concrete localized, everyday practices to shape and control people’s lives through controlling the space where they lived. At the same time, the goals of urban planners and politicians who supervised urban development always remained political, since urban spaces were meant to be the symbols of Soviet socialism and the only venues where truly socialist industrial production was performed and proletarian culture was developed. In this sense, Soviet urban planning was all about modernization and progress. According to Stephen Kotkin, Stalinist urban civilization was based, in its essence, on the rejection and suppression of

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10 For more on spatial politics and experiences of socialism, for example David Crowley and Susan Emily Reid, Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Berg Publishers, 2002).

capitalism, from its general ethos to the smallest feature of everyday life.\textsuperscript{12} Building socialism (where it was built “from scratch”) meant, according to the official Soviet interpretation, a radical transition to “a superior form of modernity” that was centred on a broad conception of social welfare and social justice built into property relations according to Marxist ideology.\textsuperscript{13}

If “manipulating urban space… in order to control and reshape the experience of socialism… was an important part of the Soviet broader political project,” it had to be even more important in a situation where the reshaping was as radical as the transition from capitalism (in its borderland, and therefore, foreign, form) to socialism (in its Soviet Ukrainian variety).\textsuperscript{14} In Chernivtsi, as in many other historic cities of the USSR, Soviet socialism had to be quartered in existing housing before it could be built anew on socialist construction sites. While the Latin letters on the street signs of Chernivtsi were changed to Cyrillic, and the remnants of the city’s former demographic diversity were being reduced dramatically by means of population movements characterized by various degrees of coercion and violence, the Soviet had to coexist with the pre- (and non-) Soviet in everyday life; later, during a more planned reorganization of city life, socialist content had to fill many prewar and non-Soviet architectural forms.

The case of Chernivtsi was both archetypal and unique. The story of postwar radical change in urban population, culture, and outlook is typical for Eastern Europe. However,

\textsuperscript{12} Kotkin, \textit{Magnetic Mountain}, particularly, 6, 355.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 358.

\textsuperscript{14} Citation from Heather Diane Dehaan, “From Nizhnii to Gor’kii: The Reconstruction of a Russian Provincial City in the Stalinist 1930s” (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2005), 12.
postwar Chernivtsi remained an unusually Jewish city for Soviet Ukraine in the demographic sense. In the wake of the Holocaust, between 50 and 70 percent of its population was Jewish.\textsuperscript{15} In the late 1950s, when Jews comprised only 2 percent of Ukraine's population, around 20 percent of Chernivtsi’s population were Jewish.\textsuperscript{16} Until the late 1970s, Chernivtsi retained a comparatively high percentage of Jews: according to the results of the 1970 census, Jews made up around 12.7 percent of the city’s population, while only 2.9 percent of all urban dwellers in the Ukrainian SSR were Jewish in 1970.\textsuperscript{17}

The demographic situation began to change with the launch of the last mass emigration wave of Soviet Jews in the 1970s and 1980s. More than 250,000 Jews emigrated from the USSR between 1970 and 1980, when restrictions on exit permits were eased due to international pressure and the Soviet government’s desire to improve its image. It is estimated that 17,554 Jews emigrated from Chernivtsi province between 1968 and 1980, which constituted about 47

\textsuperscript{15} For various estimates, see TsDAHOU, f.1, op.23, spr.817, ark.4; Altshuler, “The Soviet ‘Transfer’ of Jews from Chernovtsy Province to Romania,” 54-75; DACH, f.1, op.2, spr.61, ark.1-2; Lev Drobiazko, “Repressirovannye ievreiskie pisateli Ukrainy (dokumenty arkhivno-sledstvennykh del i materialy chastnykh arkhivov). Naftali Serf-Kon,” Holokost i suchasnist, no. 1(7) (2003): 7. For more about Jewish survivors in postwar Chernivtsi, see chapter six.


\textsuperscript{17} It is known that 12.7 percent of all urban populations in Chernivtsi province were Jewish in 1970. It is highly probable that the majority of them lived in the provincial capital, given the historical pattern (discussed in chapter one) and the absence of other large urban centres in the province. In absolute numbers, 37,221 urban Jews were identified in Chernivtsi province out of an urban population of 292,312. Note that the number of urban Jews in the province did not differ substantially from the total number of Jews: 37,459, or 4.43 percent of the total population of the province. Ukrainians constituted 60 percent of the urban population of Chernivtsi province, and 62.9 percent of the republic’s urban population. In Chernivtsi province, 15.9 percent of the urban population identified as Russians, and 8.9 percent as Romanian or Moldavian. Data from Tsentral’nnoe statisticheskoie upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR. Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda. Vol. 4. Natsional’ny sostav naseleniia SSSR, soiuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik, kraiiev, oblastei, i natsional’nyh okrugov (Moscow: Statistika, 1973), 191, 158.
percent of the province’s Jewish population of the time. (To compare with the two other largest
centres of Jewish life in the republic: probably 20 percent of all Jews in Odessa province and 15
percent of all of Kiev’s Jewish population left in the same period of time.) However, even in
1989, Jews represented 6.1 percent of the total population in the city of Chernivtsi, in
comparison to 0.6 percent that would be identified as Jewish in the next Ukrainian census of
2001, when Chernivtsi finally resembled a typical Ukrainian city in its demographic
composition.19

Hence, the story of the urban transformation told in this dissertation presents a unique
laboratory in which to explore the areas of direct contact between the Soviet and non-Soviet
worlds as well as communities of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds in the context of
World War II and its aftermath. Chernivtsi is a case that combines a borderland geopolitical
position, outstanding (for the region) significance of its prewar local urban Jewish community,
unprecedented (for the region) mass survival of the Holocaust by thousands of Chernivtsi Jews
and the unusual expulsion of these survivors by the Soviet government after the war, as well as
the most completely preserved prewar urban architecture in Ukraine. Investigating the
transformation of prewar Czernowitz into a Soviet urban centre is a way to explore how Soviet
expansion and Sovietization during and after World War II influenced the development of the
modern Ukrainian Soviet and post-Soviet polity, ideology, and culture. In the contexts of the


19 V. Kamins’ka, ed., Natsional’nyi sklad naseleennia Chernivets’koї oblasti ta ioho movni oznaky (za danymi
vseukraїns’koї perepysunaseleennia 2001 r.) part 1 (Chernivtsi, 2003), 34. In absolute terms, in 1989 there were
15,671 Jews in the city; only 4,130 declared Yiddish as their native language; 66.5 percent were Ukrainians, 17.8
percent Russians, and 7.5 percent Romanians and Moldavians (ibid., 92). On 2001 census data, p. 34.
Holocaust and postwar Soviet antisemitism, the fate of the Jewish community in Chernivtsi acquires a central place in this study of Soviet Ukrainian transformation.

Along with the general historiography on Soviet nationality policy and studies of Soviet urban planning, this dissertation builds on two important sub-fields of (primarily Western) scholarship: the first studies geographic borderlands and cultural borders, while the second focuses on the German-Soviet war and the postwar Soviet Union. Border areas have been avoided for a long time as historians preferred to structure their studies within the traditional frames of empires or nation-states. Recently, scholars have challenged the established traditions and begun studying geographic borderlands, producing path-breaking studies. Borderland studies reveal the modernizing, homogenizing nature of modern nation-states, while emphasizing the importance of local voices in centre-periphery relations; they prove helpful in understanding the complexity of “nation-building” processes that usually are based on the grand idea of modern nationalism but exercised differently in each individual case, involving a confusing interplay of shifting memories, interests, and power relations.20

Until very recently, however, not many works of this kind could be found in the Soviet field, which is still to a large degree centre-focused. The existing borderland studies point to the great importance that frontiers have for a fuller historical understanding of the centralized Soviet empire-state. These studies convincingly support the important thesis of the Soviet Union’s similarity to other modern states in terms of the “gardening” approach to managing their territories and populations and the violent methods of its implementation. Moreover, frontier studies reveal how the Soviet state utilized the category of nationality as a tool of modernization and homogenization of the borderlands, which were perceived as profoundly rural, backward, and dangerous. According to these works, the Soviet authorities believed progress for the Soviet borderlands to lie in their “elevation” to the condition of “national” which was necessary for further social engineering. At the same time, these studies challenge the concept of the powerful and unitary Soviet state when they reveal the two-way nature of the homogenization process, involving a great degree of upward, or periphery-centre, influence. Yet, the majority of existing borderland studies are focused on the prewar period or on localities that had been parts of the

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Soviet polity since its creation; the war, if considered, is seen as a culmination of prewar developments rather than the beginning of a new epoch.23

A growing but still small body of literature in the Soviet field focuses on the war and the immediate postwar period. No longer dominated by the study of the Russian Revolution and the 1930s, Western historiography of the Soviet Union began to acknowledge the war’s unprecedented impact on the Soviet Union’s existence even before the “archival revolution” of the early 1990s; and new archival materials released since 1991 spurred interest in revisiting the history of the German-Soviet War. 24 More recently, Amir Weiner suggested that the Soviet-German War deeply influenced the dominant Soviet ethos, providing a new foundation for official Soviet ideology and collective identity.25 His and other recent works demonstrate how the war became the most important prism through which the Soviet state and many Soviet citizens came to see themselves and their past.26

23 One exception is Jan T. Gross’s monograph that remains, to date, the only influential and focused study of the Soviet incorporation of Eastern Poland/Western Ukraine and Belorussia into the USSR in 1939-1941 (Jan Tomasz Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); another, more recent work studies a case of postwar urban cultural transformation: William Jay Risch, The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).


These studies also show how the official interpretation of the war’s meaning and history helped legitimize the USSR’s postwar expansion of international influence and how the new, simplified and hierarchical, official approach to the nationality question was adopted, limiting the number of recognized national identities and differentiating between “good” and “bad” national groups. At the same time, recent studies stress that the wartime experiences of violence, occupation, and contacts with the non-Soviet world had far-reaching consequences, possibly laying the foundation for the crucial social changes of the Thaw and Perestroika times. Still, the picture drawn by the existing literature on the war and its aftermath in the Soviet Union is far from complete. The recent tendency to “go local” in Soviet historiography continues to prove a successful way of studying societies under Soviet rule and their complicated relationships to the Soviet state in the postwar era. Yet, until recently, historical literature concerned itself mostly with the central territories of the Soviet Union, leaving the borderlands incorporated in the course of the war largely unexplored. Drawing particularly on the

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28 Important recent and forthcoming contributions to this sub-field include, besides the abovementioned book by William Jay Risch, Alexander V. Prusin, *The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870-1992* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Tarik Cyril Youssuf Amar’s thesis “The Making of Soviet Lviv, 1939-1963,” (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2006); Amir Weiner’s forthcoming monograph *Wild West, Window to the West: Russia’s Western Frontier, 1939 to the Present* which engages the territories between the Baltic and Black Seas that were annexed by the Soviet Union during the war, and the most recent contribution to the study of World War II’s eastern front and the impact of the war on East Central Europe and the European Soviet Union by Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), in
The abovementioned studies by Amir Weiner that analyze the purification and homogenizing drives of the postwar years as essential elements of re-forging society and culture and of the development of the Ukrainian nation, this study investigates in more detail the concept of “reunification of Ukrainian lands” during the war. A local focus allows for the deconstruction of well-established historical narratives and the argument that “reunification” can be best understood as a (double-)colonization project performed by the Soviet state in the name of the Ukrainian nation, when the latter became simultaneously a colonized entity and a colonizer of its diverse borderlands. The major premise of this colonization—and of the Soviet project in general—was the dual drive of social purging and social advancement.

Reflecting the two-fold aim of this study to examine the lived experience of the war and the incorporation of Chernivtsi into Soviet Ukraine, on the one hand, and the development of the ideas and narratives that supported and interpreted this incorporation, on the other hand, this dissertation is structured chronologically and thematically. In the local historical context, neither the traditional chronological frames of World War II (1 September 1939-8 May 1945) nor the Soviet and post-Soviet historical notion of the Great Patriotic (or, according to a more neutral definition, Soviet-German) War of 22 June 1941—9 May 1945 is very useful. The northern part of Bukovina was officially annexed to the Soviet Union on 28 June 1940 but the processes directly related to the transfer, from population movements to the administrative settlements, continued for many months. Although the Soviet-German war broke out on 22 June 1941 and Chernivtsi was one of the first Soviet urban centres to be bombarded, Romanian military rule
was not established in the region until 6 July 1941 (the actual German presence in the region was minimal during the war). Events that occurred during the period of the “power vacuum” resulted in the deaths of thousands of local residents of Northern Bukovina, most of them Jews, even before the official deportations and killings by German and Romanian authorities began. The region was officially liberated by the Red Army on 29 March 1944. The period between 1944 and the late 1950s became the time of ultimate radical change in the city’s social structure and cultural outlook as well as the time when the foundation for the present-day urban identity of Chernivtsi was built.

The dissertation opens with a chapter that sets the stage for the analysis of the wartime and postwar periods. Chapter One traces the development of Czernowitz as an urban entity from the late eighteenth century through 1940. It focuses on the relationship between urban culture and architecture and the reflection of this relationship in images of and narratives about the city created by educated people of different professional, religious, and ethnic backgrounds.

Chapters Two, Three, and Four explore “the first Soviet year” (June 1940 through June 1941), which became the basis for the later postwar transformation of Chernivtsi. Together, these three chapters argue for the importance of early, “prewar” practices and representations of “reunification” for the understanding of modern Ukrainian national ideology and historical memory.

Chapter Two traces the development of the master-narrative of “reunification” of Northern Bukovina with Ukraine, from the formulas derived from diplomatic declarations produced in the Kremlin to detailed Soviet popular books, museum exhibits, and films, as well
as the early attempts of adaptations of these centrally-produced narratives to the realities of Chernivtsi. Although eventually “reunification” and the victory in the Great Patriotic War were closely connected to each other in the Soviet Ukrainian discourse, by looking closely at the “prewar” period of annexation this chapter shows how the “reunification” was initially constructed as a millennial event in itself.

Chapter Three shifts the focus to the complex process of matching the Soviet Ukrainian “images” of the city with actual developments in this multiethnic local society dominated by German-speaking Jews. A detailed micro-study of a local experience of political and cultural transition, the chapter focuses on public and inner-party discourses and practices surrounding the social restructuring of local society and the redistribution of local space. It demonstrates that the local policies and actions of the Soviet authorities were highly dependent on human agency and specific interpretations of the official messages and formulas as well as on the transitory (liminal) condition of Chernivtsi in 1940-1941.

Chapter Four digs even deeper into the complex encounter between the local world of Chernivtsi and the new state power that was taking place simultaneously in many spheres and on many levels. Continuing with a focus on living space and the “stone heritage” of the city, Chapter Four investigates the daily, real-life interactions between the city’s residents who were intimately connected to their material world and local ethos and the growing community of Soviet newcomers wielding various degrees of power and influence.

Chapter Five covers the period between late 1940 (the time of the first mass population movement operation under the Soviet regime) and March of 1944 (the Soviet “liberation” of the
city). It investigates the dynamics and impact of the resettlement of Bukovina Germans, Soviet deportations and other population movement campaigns, and the Holocaust in the city and the region. Challenging traditional chronology dictated by decisions made in distant capitals, Chapter Five views this period as a single era characterized by the violent “purge” of the city in accordance with the radical ethos of the World War II era, shared by different states including the Soviet Union. Focusing on the Jewish population of the city, considered to be the most numerous and thus most dangerous “aliens” by both the Soviet and Romanian governments, Chapter Five shows how this most radical demographic change in the city’s history was started and made irreversible.

It is the completion of this wartime “purge” of Chernivtsi’s social fabric that is the subject of the next, sixth chapter. Chapter Six examines the re-annexation of Chernivtsi to Soviet Ukraine, the unique “evacuation” of more than 20,000 Jews from Chernivtsi province to Romania in 1945-1946, and other Soviet policies that concerned the local population in general and Jews in particular in the immediate postwar Stalinist years.

Together, Chapters Five and Six demonstrate that, although Soviet purges claimed a universal rationale of cleansing the border regions of “enemies” and “unreliables” and were not directed specifically against a single ethnic group, they also had a very important local, specific dimension, determined by the local authorities as much as—if not more than—by central Soviet leadership. In the context of Chernivtsi’s urban structure dominated by German-speaking Jews, the Soviet prewar and postwar forced population movements targeted largely the Jewish population and were perceived in most cases by the authorities, victims, and witnesses as anti-Jewish actions and policies aimed at cleansing national Ukrainian territory.
Chapter Seven explores the history of Chernivtsi in the first decade after the war, in the wake of unprecedented human loss, trauma, and destruction, and uncovers the meaning, on the local level, of the postwar shift in Soviet nationality policy from an emphasis on internationalism to the promotion of national identities. Chapter Seven shows how Chernivtsi became, for a while, an important centre of Jewish life in the postwar Soviet Union, which was not an easy fate for a Ukrainian city in the making. Chapter Seven examines the effects of a short-lived boom of Soviet Jewish culture in the city triggered by the transfer of the State Ukrainian Jewish Theatre, previously located in Kiev, to Chernivtsi in 1945, until its abrupt end during Stalin’s anti-cosmopolitan campaign. Jewish life in the postwar city is explored against the continuous process of the Soviet construction of mass Ukrainian identity and—even if somewhat curtailed—policies of affirmative action in support of Ukrainian culture and its bearers.

The same period of time—1944 to the mid-1950s, in particular—is approached from a different perspective in Chapter Eight, which offers a close examination of the policies and practices of urban development and architectural preservation in early Soviet Chernivtsi. Chapter Eight investigates how multiple actors negotiated the city’s place in modern Ukrainian geopolitics and the body cultural, showing that eventually Soviet planning changed little about the physical appearance of the city’s core. In the process of postwar transformation, however, this appearance had to be translated into “Soviet Ukrainian.” Using the architecture as the only existing link between the past and present of the city in question, Chapter Eight explores how decisions were made regarding its preservation, utilization, or neglect. The chapter shifts the
focus from remembering to forgetting, an analytical mechanism that offers a more nuanced means of determining how humans define, interpret, and delimit their collective past.

The process of “translating” the physical remains of prewar Czernowitz into Soviet Ukrainian cultural language was complex and lengthy; it was part of a larger project of (re)construction of collective historical consciousness—39—or creation of a new urban myth of Chernivtsi—that involved the twin processes of forging memories and triggering forgetting. The exploration of these two processes is taken to the next level in Chapter Nine which serves as an epilogue to this study, covering a longer period between the early 1950s to the early 2000s. As noted by Umberto Eco, humans forget by means of the superimposition of narratives and images, and this is because it is not possible to produce or sponsor the absence of memory otherwise.30 As it examines the elaboration of narratives meant to dominate collective memory about the city’s past, the epilogue attempts to trace the process of superimposition rather than simply interpreting the objects and stories that forge active memories.

This work revisits the meaning of Soviet expansion and Sovietization during and after World War II, the effects of the war on a multiethnic East Central European city, and the postwar construction of Ukrainian national culture and identity. By drawing on a variety of

29 The notion of historical consciousness understood as the human capacity to remember and interpret past events was developed in opposition to the distinction between memory and history, by Susan A. Crane (“Writing the individual back into collective memory,” American Historical Review 102, no. 5 (1997): 1372-85). On the relevance of this notion in the contests of Soviet history and the blurred boundaries between literature and other types of discourses in the USSR, see Denis Kozlov, “The Readers of ‘Novyi Mir,’ 1945-1970: Twentieth-Century Experience and Soviet Historical Consciousness” (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2005).

archival documents and other original materials, this dissertation helps attest to the ultimate fragility of diverse societies in the face of exclusive modern nationalism. At the same time, it further contributes to our understanding of Soviet history—a phenomenon that, to a large degree, shaped the twentieth century—by putting the periphery in the centre and exploring the encounters of the “Soviet civilization” with the non-Soviet “other.” By revealing how these encounters continuously (re)shaped and (re)defined the Soviet world itself, this study offers a more nuanced and complex hindsight view of “Soviet rule” as one which was influenced by powerful central ideas and strong political leaders as much as it was by millions of agents on all the levels of its implementations and the tools these agents developed and used.

Finally, on a more theoretical level, it is my hope that this study will add value to the scholarly understanding of the relationship between three important political phenomena of modernity: empires, nationalism, and world war. By localizing analytical language describing the processes of encounter, conflict, and collaboration in a complex imperial situation, while keeping the connections with imperial centre(s) in sight, this study explores the mechanisms of perceiving otherness and translating cultural differences into the black-and-white language of nationalism. Tracing the influence of the war on the semantics and functionality of the practical political language of “ours” and “others,” this study uses the lens of an urban study to access and interpret the process of altering and simplifying the past during and after the catastrophe of wartime destruction.
Chapter One

Czernowitz-Cernăuți: People, Books, and Buildings, 1774–1940

Paul Celan’s description of his birthplace, Czernowitz, as the place “where human beings and books used to live,” could refer to any city. However, this statement acquires a special significance because it was uttered by a poet who died unable to reconcile his identity as a German poet and a Jew. Celan spoke of the human beings and the books that formed his German-Jewish identity which he could never shed completely. How did Romanian Cernăuți, in the era of growing radical nationalism and antisemitism, engender Celan’s Jewish identity and love of the German language? What was that city like? This chapter traces the development of Czernowitz from a modest destination on the south-eastern border of the Austrian empire to a significant urban phenomenon. Recognizing that “it is not easy … to recreate the images and mindsets of a hundred years ago,” I find my window on the urban past of Czernowitz by focusing on the relationship between urban culture and architecture and the reflection of this relationship in the images, or myths, of the city created by its educated residents and visitors of different professional, religious, and ethnic backgrounds.¹

The dominant urban identity among the city’s residents in the late Austrian period was based on liberal German-language culture and local, regional, and Austrian (or European) loyalties and affiliations. The national identifications that became more widespread toward the end of Austrian rule represented only one layer of the self-perception of most Czernowitzers.

By 1918, when the city became one of the largest urban centres of the Romanian Kingdom, Chernivtsi had an unusually coherent architectural structure, devoid of the distinct historical layers typical of many European cities. The city also possessed a dominant urban myth based on German language and culture and maintained primarily by German-speaking Jews. The urban landscape of Chernivtsi was changed only partially during the twenty-two years of Romanian rule; to a large degree, the city retained its overriding German-Austrian identity, or myth, throughout the interwar period of Romanian rule, in spite of aggressive policies of Romanianization orchestrated by Bucharest and fiercely implemented by local Romanian authorities.

1. From Clay Huts to Habsburg Provincial Capital (1774–1849)

Chernivtsi is located at the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, on the high green hills over the Prut River. The area around it had for centuries been a “perfect borderland.”\(^2\) It made up the margins of the medieval Slavic states and the early-modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the mid-fourteenth century; it then gradually became a part of the Moldavian Principality. For four centuries preceding annexation by Austria, the region remained part of the Principality which, in its turn, had been a vassal of the Ottoman Empire for more than 200 years by the end of the Russo-Turkish war. Having obtained the neighbouring territory of Galicia (as a part of Poland) in 1772, the Austrian Empire considered Bukovina, which was rich

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\(^2\) The name Bukovina derives from \textit{buk}, meaning “beech tree” in eastern Slavic languages. Different variations of this toponym were rather common in eastern and central Europe. “Bukovina” was used locally but did not denote any political or administrative entity until the late eighteenth century when it was chosen by Austrian officials over other possible names for their new territorial acquisition. Ion Nistor, \textit{Un capitol din Vieața Culturală a Românilor din Bucovina (1774–1857)} (Bucharest: Socec, Sfitea, Suru, 1916), 7.
in forests and rivers and had a predominantly cattle-raising local population, to be a highly desirable territorial acquisition.

Delineating the borders took two years and involved many actors, both central and local, from the Austrian, Russian, Ottoman, and Moldavian sides. The inclusion of Bukovina into the Austrian empire was completed in October 1776, and in 1777 all the local nobles and high-ranking clergy of Bukovina swore fealty to the Austrian Empire in Chernivtsi. Festivities with fireworks, receptions for those recognized as local nobility, and plenty of wine, food, and petty cash for the “folk” organized by the Austrian administration on the occasion were unlike anything ever seen in this town before.

The late-medieval town whose few remnants have survived to the present day in the oldest part of Chernivtsi’s “old city centre” began to develop on the south, hilly bank of the river Prut, between its two small tributaries. The first record of settlement dates to 1408 and is attributed to the Moldavian Prince Alexander the Good. The origins of the name Chernivtsi and its other existing forms are not clear; most likely it derived from the old-Slavonic chernyi (black), referring to the colour of the surrounding fortification walls. If any medieval

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3 For a recent account of the incorporation, see Vasyl’ Botushans’kyi, Serhy Hackman, Yuriy Makar, Olexandr Masan, Ihor Piddubnyi, Hanna Skoreiko, Bukovyna v kontekstii ievropeis’kykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn (z davnikh chasiv do seredyny XX st) (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2005), 169-244. The first extended description of Bukovina by an Austrian official belongs to General von Spleny (Johann Polek, ed. General Splenys Beschreibung der Bukowina (Chernivtsi, 1893). For more on the annexation, see Johann Polek, Die Erwerbung der Bukowina durch Österreich (Chernivtsi, 1889); Johann Polek, Die Bukowina zu Anfang des Jahres 1801 (Chernivtsi, 1908).


5 See Yu.O. Karpenko, Toponimita tsentral’nykh raioniv Chernivts’koi oblasti (Chernivtsi, 1965.) Until the city name was first standardized under Austrian rule, various spellings and variants were used. For example, an urban
fortifications existed on the territory of the modern city, they had long since been ruined before
Austrian annexation. By 1774, the town was indistinguishable from the surrounding villages
and acquired its higher status only due to its location on the border between the Moldavian and
Polish-Lithuanian domains: it was used for customs inspections and duty collection.

As a remote settlement significant only as a border check-point, the town was relieved
from heavy taxation by the Moldavian princes but also deprived of any meaningful protection,
suffering continuously from epidemics, robberies, fires, and devastating raids during the
frequent military conflicts as well as in periods of relative peace. Local residents, largely
illiterate (including those of noble and semi-noble status), left no clues about their views of their
surroundings and themselves. It seems that, to occasional travellers who left written accounts,
and to the first Austrian officials who arrived in their new domain, late eighteenth-century
Chernivtsi was no more than a destination characterized by backwardness and semi-emptiness—a
“nothingness” or a place yet to be, at best. The town had a population of about 1,000, most of
them Greek Orthodox (Eastern Rite) Christians occupied in agriculture and characterized largely
The town was sparsely populated and had a large territory consisting of a small town centre with clay houses. The only religious building located within the city core was the “large” synagogue located on the highest point of the area, indicating the prevalence of the Jewish population in the centre of pre-Austrian Chernivtsi. The best houses also belonged to Jews, according to General Splény, the chief of the military administration of the province until 1778. At least four wooden Orthodox churches, serving the largely Orthodox rural population, as well as smaller synagogues, were located in the outskirts of the town. The only stone church

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8 The earliest information about the town’s population comes from Joseph Boscowich, a Jesuit traveller who stayed in the town briefly in 1762 (Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 55, 63). In 1775, the Austrian general Splény ruled over the region at the time reported that the town with its closest outskirts had 290 families, or about 1400 residents. Of these families, 112 were Jewish, 48 “peasant,” 10 were those of Orthodox priests, and the rest were of local nobles, state servants, and others. (Ibid, 261). Splény noted that Jews were “as numerous in this little town as nowhere in the region.” (Ibid, 263). He characterized the majority of Bukovinian rural residents as Orthodox and Moldavian. He was likely simply referring to the region’s political affiliation with the Moldavian principality. (Raimund F. Kaindl wrote in his Geschichte von Czernowitz: “unter …den “Moldauern” … wir Rumänen und Ruthenen verstehen müssen…” (Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 263). The Austrian statistical records classified populations according to their language of communication (Umgangssprache) and religion, leaving room for multiple interpretations by the interested national groups in later times. The numbers of “Ukrainians” and “Romanians” in pre-Austrian Bukovina have been debated for a long time by Ukrainian and Romanian historians. For more on the polemics in the historiography of Bukovina, see Frunchak, Studying the Land. Historians have recently discussed difficulties of national classifications in borderlands, noting that even the categories of language and religion, not to mention nationality, were not fixed enough when it came to censuses. For example, see Peter Sahlins, Boundaries, and Brown, A Biography of No Place.

9 Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 54.


11 Splény quoted in Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 263.
that existed at that time—a typical medieval fortified monastery church—was located outside of the town.\textsuperscript{12}

Austrian administrators chose Chernivtsi as their military base thanks to its border location, viewing it as convenient for its new role as the empire’s easternmost outpost.\textsuperscript{13} This new function defined the development of Bukovina and its newly chosen capital during the first part of Austrian rule. The new political order and rapid economic development brought significant demographic changes. The province now attracted mass in-migration and immigration of numerous German-speaking Protestant and Catholic colonizers, new Orthodox settlers from nearby regions, and, most of all, Jewish communities of different backgrounds. Many of the latter came from Galicia’s large Jewish population.\textsuperscript{14} Bukovina also became a desirable destination for less numerous communities of Russian Old Believers fleeing persecution; Hungarian-speakers from Romania known as Szeklers; Slovaks; Czechs; and other migrants. The movements were encouraged by the Austrian administration in order to enhance the region’s economic development. After Bukovina lost its initial semi-autonomous military-ruled status in 1786 and became part of the neighbouring Galician administrative district

\textsuperscript{12} Another important feature of the town was the residence of the town’s senior (\textit{starosta}), fortified in the past and used as the early residence of Bukovinian Orthodox metropolitans after they were transferred, in 1782, to Chernivtsi from a similar small town of Rădăuți. Hugo Weczerka, “Die städtebauliche Entwicklung von Czernowitz 1775–1900,” \textit{Analele Bucovinei} 4, No. 3 (1997): 657.

\textsuperscript{13} Splény, in fact, argued for the division of the new territory (usually referred to as Crownland although it had a special military status) along the river Siret, a tributary of Dniester, with two centres in Suceava and Sadagora (another small town near Chernivtsi). However, his recommendations were not implemented immediately, and with time various administrative and judicial organs developed in Chernivtsi around the military administration. The Austrian government eventually settled on keeping the region’s administrative centre in Chernivtsi. See Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte von Czernowitz} (2005), 127.

\textsuperscript{14} The large Jewish population acquired by the Habsburgs in Galicia was perceived by the empress Maria Theresa (reigned 1740–1780) “with horror and disgusts,” which demonstrated well the attitudes toward Jews in the upper circles. Quoted in David Rechter, “Geography Is Destiny: Region, Nation and Empire in Habsburg Jewish Bukovina” \textit{Journal of Modern Jewish Studies} 7, No.3 (2008): 326.
(Kreis), its demographic and religious profile was further changed by Polish migrants and the consequent stronger presence of the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁵

Spectacular changes had occurred in the city, whose name was now standardized as Czernowitz. Official censuses showed urban populations of 9,863 in 1843 and 21,588 in 1857.¹⁶ Initially German military personnel, administrators, priests, and teachers were the most numerous in-migrants. They became the active transmitters of Kulturdeutschtum, the official culture hegemonically promoted by the empire. Local peasants made up another source of urban population growth. Only the Jewish population declined temporarily after the eviction of “Jewish beggars” in 1782 and the ensuing restriction on Jewish settlement in the town. The old Moldavian administrators, deemed semi-illiterate, uneducated, and generally inappropriate for the new administration, were gradually replaced by Austrian bureaucrats.¹⁷

The town’s infrastructure developed to accommodate the needs of the new military and civilian administrators. Czernowitz also had to accommodate the demands of royals who visited

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¹⁶ In Chernivtsi only, without outskirts. Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 262, 266.

their new eastern outpost on many occasions and who often personally ordered important measures in its urban development, such as the construction of churches and roads. In 1823, Czernowitz even hosted a meeting between Franz I of Austria and Alexander I of Russia on the question of Greek revolts against the Ottomans. As a border city, Chernivtsi not only enjoyed the benefits of personal royal attention, but also continued to suffer the usual vices of frontier regions: turmoils during wars, popular upheaval, and frequent epidemics. Yet none of them slowed down the city’s growth for long.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the configuration of the Chernivtsi urban landscape had profoundly changed, accommodating the town aesthetically to its new role. The creation of a new, large market square outside of the old city centre and the cutting of new streets to connect this new centre with the major roads resulted in a new, classicist city structure. The new public architecture itself also had the features of Viennese “bureaucratic classicism.” The core of the new city centre was completed in 1843, with the opening of Chernivtsi’s city hall, the most important public building of the time and the first of the city’s major administrative buildings. Several new and old streets connected the new central square

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18 Kaiser Joseph II (1765–1790) visited Chernivtsi in 1783 and 1787; Franz I (1804–1835) visited in 1817 and in 1823 for the meeting with Russian emperor Alexander I (1801–1825). Emperor Franz Joseph (1848–1916) visited Czernowitz several times and revealed many signs of affection to this city and its “good people” (Kaindl, *Geschichte von Czernowitz* (2005), 103). Apart from the emperors, princes and other members of royal families were not infrequent visitors in the city of the time.

19 In fact, the common problem of urban fires was one of the reasons that pushed Splény’s successor, Enzenberg, to develop the first urban statute of 1785. The statute encouraged construction from stone instead of wood to prevent fires, regulated land ownership and urban construction, and, most important, established the magistrate to which all urban residents could be elected, with the exception of Jews who could not occupy high positions in the city government. At the same time, the engineer Pitzelli developed the first city land use plan. Urban territory indicated on the plan makes up about a half of the city’s current territory. Kolosok, “Mistobudivna spadshchyna Chenrivtsiv,” 23; Iryna Korotun, “Renesansna shkola arkhitektury Chernivtsiv,” in *Materiały IV Bukovyns’koї Mizhnarodnoї istoryko-kraieznawchoї konferentsiї, prysviachenoi 125-richchiu zasuvaannya natsional’noho universytetu imeni Jurija Fed’kovycha. 5 zhovtnia 2000 r.* (Chenrivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 2005), 375-79.
(Ringplatz) with the city’s major religious buildings, the Greek-Catholic Church of Peter and Paul (1821), the Roman Catholic Church of the Holy Cross (1814) – personally ordered by the emperor – and later a Lutheran church.

This new urban structure stressed the new, West European urban ethos of the city.\textsuperscript{20} At the same time, another large square (later named Austria Platz) suitable for cattle and wood trade was created on the periphery, on the highest hill of the area. A new “large” synagogue, which replaced the initial one in 1850, continued to dominate the old, lower town.

Numerous residential, public, and religious buildings erected during this period share the symmetrical structure of classicism.\textsuperscript{21} The Czernowitz of the first part of the nineteenth century had plenty of green spaces, including a park with public baths constructed in 1830. By the late 1840s, all these developments turned the former neglected settlement into a small but rapidly growing Austrian provincial town and military outpost. During the revolution of 1848-1849 the city survived another turbulent period marked by political and social tensions, closure of the first newspaper that had opened only shortly before, epidemics, food shortages, and anxieties about popular revolts raging in the countryside.\textsuperscript{22}

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20 City development of the first part of the nineteenth century was led by the regional construction engineer Marin and a building master, Andreas (Andrii) von Mykulych, a native of Galicia educated in Chernivtsi. These two builders supervised the construction of the city hall and several other administrative buildings, new streets, and a recreational pavilion in the new city park. For more on the construction and history of the city hall, see Dagmar Redl, “Pomizh Vidnem i Chernivtsiamy: do stanovlennia i vplyvu istorychnoi arkhitektury tsisars’ko-korolivs’koї monarkhiї,” in \textit{Architekturna spadshchyna Chernivtsiv}, ed. Rykhlo, 45-60; Masan and Chekhovs’kyi, \textit{Chernivtsi: 1408–1998}, 71-88.

21 Unlike the older cities with larger developed medieval parts, the new classicist city plan of Chernivtsi was realized with minimal disruption to the established urban structure. Thanks to the spacious empty areas of the town, the new centre was added to the existing one, preserving the latter while simultaneously creating a new, modern look for the city. Redl, “Pomizh Vidnem i Chernivtsiamy,” 46; Larysa Vandiuk, “Videns’ki vplyvy na arkhitekturu Chernivtsiv (1775–1918),” \textit{Architekturna spadshchyna Chernivtsiv}, ed. Rykhlo, 81.

22 In 1849, Lukian Kobylytsia—one of 8 peasant deputies to the Reichstag from Bukovina elected for the first time in 1848—led a popular social revolt mainly of Hutsuls, mountaineers of the Carpathian region. Only several years
\end{footnotesize}
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addition to the abolition of servitude and the election of deputies to the imperial *Reichstag* (a gymnasium prefect, Anton Král, was elected from Czernowitz), Bukovina nominally received the status of a Duchy independent from Galicia. By 1854, new administrative organs were created and the first president of Bukovina, Franz Schmück, arrived in his new office. Czernowitz became, *de facto*, a provincial capital.

In 1851, during a visit by Franz Joseph, the city dutifully exhibited the loyalty and diversity of its residents. As he moved into the city, the emperor was greeted with flowers and traditional bread and salt by communities of Orthodox Christians, Greek (Eastern) Catholics, Roman Catholics with their pastors, Jewish elders and “simple Jews” led by the chief Rabbi, groups of German colonists, imperial army detachments, students of several schools, and servants from a dozen administrative offices and associations, leaving his majesty delighted with the “patriotic feelings” of his easternmost urban subjects. A census in 1857 translated the motley picture that the emperor saw in Czernowitz into bureaucratic statistical language: 810 (4 percent) of the urban residents spoke Polish; 3,500 (16 percent) spoke Ruthenian (Rusyn); 4,800 (22 percent) spoke Romanian; and 12,290 (57 percent) spoke German. Around 22 percent, or 4,678 Czernowitzers, were Jewish. Censuses of the time categorized populations by spoken language and religion. (Yiddish was not in the list of spoken languages and was substituted with German; therefore, it is impossible to determine how many Jews at that time actually claimed

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23 Kaindl, *Geschichte von Czernowitz* (2005), 103-6. When Franz Joseph visited the city again in 1855, he seemed to have displayed similar favour and delight.
German as their spoken language.)\textsuperscript{24} From the “no place” of just half-a-century before, Czernowitz had been transformed into an East European imperial urban space dominated by the German language, offering opportunities not only for its western colonizers in the form of land and career growth, but also for diverse locals, some of whom, it seems, were escaping the “backwardness” of the surrounding countryside in this emerging island of Western-style modernity.

2. “The End of Europe:” Late Austrian Czernowitz (1849-1918)

After another administrative and political experiment in 1860, when Bukovina was subordinated to Galicia for a short time, and following a petition to Vienna from “all classes, nations, estates, and confessions” for the “emancipation of Bukovina,” Bukovina was finally made a fully-fledged separate province (\textit{Land}) with a provincial parliament (\textit{Landtag}) and a provincial committee (\textit{Landesausschuß}) in 1861. After the \textit{Ausgleich} of 1867 that established the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, Bukovina was brought into the Austrian part of the empire, \textit{Cisleithania}, which made Czernowitz an island of German-language culture in the most remote corner of Habsburg’s domain, marking the “end of Europe” to its Western-minded residents and travellers. Yet, two other political changes of the 1860s determined the character of the city for the next hundred years: in 1860 Jews were legally permitted to own land, and in 1867 they were granted full citizenship in the Habsburg Empire.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} Census data quoted by Kaindl, ibid., 266.

Jewish communities were able to benefit from the economic opportunities offered by this quickly developing province.\textsuperscript{26} Along with the late arrival and limited nature of modernization and the continuously hegemonic powers of German-Austrian domination in the areas of education and administration, Bukovina was characterized by the absence of an established non-German speaking local elite. Jews filled the niche: soon after the emancipation, a considerable segment of the Jewish population of Bukovina belonged to the social and landowning elite.\textsuperscript{27}

Officially, after the \textit{Ausgleich}, German was no longer a dominant language in the Austrian part of the empire; the dominant languages of individual provinces assumed primacy in political and administrative dealings. Whereas in Galicia this development resulted in Polonization, in Bukovina German retained its predominance. From 1867, almost all the Jewish children of Czernowitz attended German state schools, in an environment strongly committed to German culture. By the end of Austrian rule, peripheral Czernowitz presented a much more “Western” image than Galicia’s capital Lemberg which actually lies 300 km further to the northwest. Although the highest military, administrative, and teaching positions were still occupied by other speakers of German—officials from western Austria—it was the acculturated, upwardly-mobile, entrepreneurial Jews who forged the Western image of late Austrian Czernowitz and became the most numerous bearers of its German-language culture. Identified by historian Fred Stambrook as “[t]he most fortunate Jews in eastern and east central Europe,”

\textsuperscript{26} Until the 1880s, the province’s industry enjoyed modest prosperity, followed by a period of moderate decline before the full-fledged crisis brought by World War I.

\textsuperscript{27} Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 50.
the Jews of Czernowitz formed a strong urban East-central European middle class and created a number of impressive cultural and welfare organizations.\textsuperscript{28} The Jews of Czernowitz certainly appreciated the civic rights, protection, and opportunities brought by the Austrians, and responded with the highest degree of Austrian patriotism and loyalty to Franz Joseph. This loyalty was apparently sensed by the emperor during his third and last visit to the city in 1880 when he attended, among many other institutions, the major synagogue on the Day of Atonement.\textsuperscript{29}

The emperor, it seems, developed a sincere affection for his youngest provincial capital, and for good reason. Much as the German language was clearly the dominant language of its public sphere, the European style of a typical provincial capital of the Habsburg monarchy became the dominant architectural language of late-Austrian Chernivtsi.\textsuperscript{30} The Viennese-style manners of uptown residents, the impressive German-language press, the pretentious coffee houses filled with German conversation, and the Western architectural styles made the central streets of Czernowitz familiar and comfortable to newcomers and visitors from western parts of

\textsuperscript{28} Quotation is from Stambrook, \textit{The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina}, 14; 1, 2. (He also referred to the Bukovinian Jewish population as “the most accepted and least persecuted [one].” For similar arguments, see Sha’ari, “The Jewish Community of Czernowitz, 182–83; Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina” 39, 43.

\textsuperscript{29} On loyalty and civic patriotism, Stambrook, \textit{The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina}, 13; Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 55; Rechter, “Geography Is Destiny,” 330. Franz Joseph’s last visit to Czernowitz was his most informal and emotional one. He visited many institutions, and even accepted personal requests from citizens just as he walked the streets. Impressed by the warm reception and extraordinary revelations of popular patriotism, the emperor allegedly said to the mayor: “I thank you. The city did too much for me.” Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte von Czernowitz} (2005),117.

Unlike Vienna, however, where architectural styles were more period-specific and tended to replace each other, in Czernowitz fashions changed more slowly and often coexisted. In the second half of the nineteenth century, one of the local newspapers remarked that public, religious, and residential buildings grew in Chernivtsi “like mushrooms after rain.”

New additions included many educational institutions and several churches, including the Orthodox Cathedral of the Holy Spirit—the largest Orthodox cathedral in the empire—whose frescos were painted in the “Viennese” manner. Others included a pseudo-gothic Jesuit church, a number of military quarters, at least five hospitals, six hotels, a National theatre, a Palace of Justice, and the provincial government building. Of special importance and imperial significance was the Czernowitz Universität named after Francis-Joseph, the easternmost German-language university in Europe and the only fully German university in Eastern Europe after the Polonization of Lemberg/Lwow University. A new railway station, built in 1907-9,
replaced the original one constructed in the 1860s. Similar to the university, it acquired importance as the easternmost “Viennese” Stadtbahn. The young city was treated as an experiment in imperial modernist urban development, reflecting the radical tendencies in the art and philosophy of the time.

This experimentalism had sources other than the youthfulness of the city. If the dominance of German language and Viennese styles in material and public culture was one defining feature of late-Austrian Czernowitz, its other important characteristic was the undeniable diversity of its population. The predominance of Kulturdeutschum never fully subjugated or assimilated—and hardly aimed to do so—the variety of cultures and languages that had arrived in rapidly growing Czernowitz along with its new residents. In 1880, the city had a population of 44,600; in 1900—65,767; by 1910—85,458. The following table demonstrates how Czernowitzers identified themselves by spoken language:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spoken language</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>22,720</td>
<td>34,441</td>
<td>41,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>6,707</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>14,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>13,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenian</td>
<td>8,232</td>
<td>13,030</td>
<td>15,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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36 I am grateful to Bohdan Cherkes, professor of architecture at Lviv National Polytechnic University, who first pointed out this fact in our illuminating conversation in Lviv in summer of 2008.
Categorized by religion, in 1910 the urbanites identified themselves as follows: 32.8 percent were Jewish, 27 percent Roman Catholic, 23.7 percent Greek Orthodox, 11 percent Greek Catholic, 4.9 percent were Lutherans of Augsburg confession, 0.1 percent Lippowans (the local name of Russian Old Believers), 0.4 percent Armenian Catholic, and 0.1 percent of Helvetian Confession. The “others” included Armenian Orthodox, Old Catholic, Muslim, Anglican, Mennonite, and individuals with no religious affiliation.37

These numbers, though, only begin to describe the cultural and linguistic environment of late-Habsburg Czernowitz. Although Austrian censuses offered multiple identification categories by language and religion, they still limited the choices of respondents, compartmentalizing and fixing affiliations that were likely to be fluid and multiple. As demonstrated by many studies, East-central European identities of the time could be “located” at the same time in places as small as villages of their ancestors, as large as Europe, as real and concrete as emperor Franz Joseph, and as imagined and vague as the early Ukrainian nationalist ideology.38 Even German colonists who occupied several of the city’s suburbs preserved their distinct dialects, often hardly comprehensible to speakers of literary German of the time who

37 Based on Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz,” 43, 46 and Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 266.

38 On popular identities in eastern and central Europe of the time, see David Blackbourn and James N. Retallack, Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930, German and European Studies. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007; Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit. Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe, Austrian History, Culture, and Society (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005). These and similar studies of local experience of culture reveal new facets of identities that were neither fixed nor stable. On “the location of culture” see Homi Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 139–70. Bhabha suggests seeking this “location” by studying how people have scattered and gathered in times and places that figure in larger stories of how nation states come about.
studied in gymnasiums and Franz-Joseph University. Maintained vigorously by numerous Jews and less numerous Germans, the German language also represented an obvious benefit to all population groups in the city, even when/if they began embracing ethnic and political nationalism, as did many Romanians and some Rusyns/Ukrainians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Linguistic hybridity, in forms of both multilingualism and mutual influences between spoken languages, was the norm in late Austrian Bukovina and especially in its capital. 

It was the multi-confessional rather than the multilingual character of Czernowitz, though, that dictated much of its aesthetic diversity; indeed, the eclecticism of the urban architecture made it quintessentially Habsburg. Most of the architects of the Austrian part of the empire received their training in three major schools: the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna, the Royal Polytechnic Institute in Vienna, and the Polytechnic Academy in Lemberg. Thus, they shared basic approaches and methods in their work. At the same time, coming from various

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40 The multilingualism of Czernowitzers was proverbial, as were the linguistic localisms that most often were the results of mutual borrowings. They are described in many memoirs from the late Austrian and interwar periods; see Spitzer and Hirsch, Ghosts of Home, 89–91. Georg Drozdovsky writes extensively on this: Drozdowski, Damals in Czernowitz und Rundum. Erinnerung eines Altösterreichers; see also Gregor von Rezzori, The Snows of Yesteryear: Portraits for an Autobiography, (New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1989). “Czernowitz German” still survives among the few elderly (former) residents of the city. Localisms are less widespread in today’s Chernivtsi after decades of official education and culture in standardized Ukrainian and Russian. They are still rather common in rural Northern Bukovina.

41 As argued by Alofsin, Habsburg’s “strange architecture” traditionally did not fit into the modernist history of European architecture which was nearly obsessed with the purity of styles. In spite of the often pejorative connotation of the term “eclecticism,” Habsburg architects, as the agents of the particular cultural networks, created a “different kind of eclecticism:” a hybridity that reflected coherent motivations to graft “differing elements to create a new, vigorous organism” rather than insipidly collaging elements of various styles. Alofsin insists, though, that this architecture is important precisely because it reflected the complex layers of culture, identity, and historical development of the empire. Alofsin, When Buildings Speak, 15, 177.
corners of the empire, many of these professionals had knowledge of and strong interest in the local features of architecture and art and enthusiastically utilized them in their projects. In the general atmosphere of romanticism and the popularity of historicism in the second part of the nineteenth century, these institutions, thus, provided an environment for the creation of localized, particular architectural styles in the framework of the single imperial architectural school.42

One graduate of the Habsburg architectural academies who influenced the urban silhouette and the ethos of Czernowitz was Prague’s native Josef Hlávka, a graduate of the Vienna Fine Arts Academy. He distinguished himself, along with his philanthropy, by the “local historicism” in his architectural work. For years, he worked actively in research and preservation of the monuments of art and architecture of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Bukovina, experimenting with his findings and preservationist inspiration in his own architectural work. Between 1864 and 1882, Hlávka designed and supervised the construction of the new residence of the Orthodox metropolitans of Bukovina and Dalmatia in Czernowitz.43 The complex consisted of the metropolitan’s palace, a theological faculty, a seminary, the church, and a park. Hlávka borrowed the general plan from his earlier work on the Arms museum in Vienna. Plentiful elements of folk motifs in interior and exterior decorations, the use of local materials in its construction, and the overall “Eastern” tint coexist in this work along with the typical West European, Versailles-style layout.


It seems that contemporaries of the palace’s construction could not agree on the aesthetic values of the complex but did agree that no expense had been spared on its creation. A quintessential example of Habsburg architectural hybridity and an impressive symbol of the affluence of the Church in Bukovina, the residence was perceived as an important architectural marker of local urbanism by many Czernowitzers and visitors to the city. Others, though, found it tastelessly eclectic and inappropriate for a city that was too small and provincial in their opinion. Along with personal tastes and degrees of local patriotism, urbanites’ opinions about the residence were influenced by its political meaning. The residence reinforced the role of Bukovina as the centre of Orthodox Christianity in the empire, a fact that was greeted with enthusiasm by local activists who belonged to that confession.\(^{44}\) The position of the palace complex in the outskirts of the city seems very appropriate: although nobody doubted the predominance of Orthodox Christianity in Bukovina at large, it appears there was a common understanding that the city itself was not dominated by any single religious denomination.

This common acceptance of the symbiosis of cosmopolitanism and cultural particularism in Czernowitz, combined with the growing significance of the city’s Jewish community, gave

\(^{44}\) Jan Badeni, a Jesuit who visited Czernowitz in the late nineteenth century, summarized the common perception of the residence as a place of cultural pilgrimage and an object of urban pride of many urbanites, noting also the disproportionality of the size and the splendor for the small city. Jan Badeni, W Czerniowcach. Wrazenia z kilkudniowej wycieczki (in Polish and Ukrainian) (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 2006), 33-45. More negative perceptions were noted by a German from Czernowitz, Peter Demant, who later published his works under pseudonym Vernon Kres, remembered the “constant discontent of the intelligentsia [such as] my parents with the bombastic architecture of the palace complex of the metropolitan…” (Vernon Kres, Moia perviaia zhyzn’ (2008) 210, 188). The high cost of the splendid palace was the issue that was most likely to cause disagreement: what for the Orthodox elites and enthusiasts was the rightful demonstration of the might of their Church could be a demonstration of the worldly values and political power of this religious institution in the eyes of puritan-minded Protestants or modern atheists. On the political and cultural role of Orthodox church in Bukovina, see Hanna Skoreiko, “Pravoslav’ia na Bukovyni: faktor iednosti chy rozbratu? (dr.pol.XIX – poch.XX st.)” Naukovyi visnyk Chernivets’koho Universytetu. Istoriia 6–7 (Chernivtsi: ChDU, 1996), 81-95; Emanuel Turczynski, “Die Bedeutung von Czernowitz für die Orthodoxe Theologie in Südosteuropa,” Geschichte der Ost- und Westkirche in ihren Wechselfeitigen Beziehung (Wiesbaden, 1967), 166-95.
rise to situations that were hardly conceivable to a contemporary outsider. In 1873, when the construction of the reformist Jewish Temple began, the first stone was laid by the Chief Rabbi Lazar Igel and the second one by Greek Orthodox Archbishop Eugene Haeman.\textsuperscript{45}

As if translating their cultural predominance into the language of urban architecture, the civic leaders of the Progressive Jews invited a Lemberg-based architect, Julian Oktawian Zachariewicz, to create their Temple, leaving the existing major synagogue in the lower town to communities with traditional orientation. Zachariewicz was a graduate of the Vienna Royal Polytechnic institute and a founder of the Lemberg architectural school that had an empire-wide significance.\textsuperscript{46} He was a representative bearer of the cosmopolitan, liberal culture of the late Austro-Hungarian empire. An Armenian by birth, he was a Protestant by confession and was married to a Dane. His personal religious transitions were probably marks of his general interest in and wide knowledge of theology, which he drew upon when planning religious buildings. The Temple of Czernowitz was completed in 1877 on a hill in the new centre of the city, steps from the \textit{Ringplatz} around the city hall. A proponent of the then popular historicism, Zachariewicz insisted on the Moorish style and a large, impressive dome to stress the Eastern origin of the Mosaic faith and to differentiate it from the surrounding Christian churches. At the same time, he took advantage of the liberties allowed by reformist Judaism and created a building that was

\textsuperscript{45} Stambrook, \textit{The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina}, 1.

\textsuperscript{46} Zachariewicz co-designed the building of the Lemberg Polytechnic Academy, one of the important architectural monuments of the city. See Ihor Siomochkin, “Chernivets’kyi period tvorchosti Juliana Zakharevycha” in \textit{Architekturna spadshchyna Chernivtsiv}, ed. Rykhlo, 163-8.
more akin to Christian sacral architecture than to a traditional synagogue in its general plan, reflecting the modern, acculturated character of the religious community.  

Part of a diverse urban society, the Jewish community of Czernowitz itself was multicultural and divided along religious lines. The most apparent division was between the traditionalist residents of the poverty-ridden lower “Jewish” town and the modest, rural-looking urban outskirts on the one hand, and the highly successful occupants of the most fashionable dwellings of the fast-growing upper town, on the other. However, many Jews were abandoning the culture of their Yiddish-speaking parents faster than they were moving “up” along the steep streets of hilly Czernowitz.  

Another important aspect of Jewish life in greater Czernowitz was the Hassidic court of the Zaddik (“holy one,” Wunderrabbi in German) in Sadagora located just across the Prut River. Sadagora Zaddiks, who belonged to the well-known Friedman dynasty, led an aristocratic life and built an impressive palace that attracted crowds of pilgrims.  

Until the turn of the century, though, modernized patrician businessmen controlled, financially and

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48 The high degree of linguistic assimilation and the preference of many Jews of Czernowitz for the German language is discussed in the works of Stambrook, Lichtblau and John, Sha’ari, and Rechter quoted in this chapter. Aron Appelfeld discusses extensively the phenomenon of acculturation among Czernowitz Jews in his semi-biographical fiction. See, for example, Aron Appelfeld and Aloma Halter, The Story of a Life. 1st American ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004.). A graphic description of the topographical differences between lower and upper Czernowitz can be found in Martha Blum, The Walnut Tree (Regina: Coteau Books, 1999), 38. More examples of personal accounts dealing with this issue are discussed further in this chapter.

49 The designer of the palace, which is in an extremely deteriorated condition today, is not known. Its architectural style is quite similar to Hávka’s residence, although it is unlikely that the famous architect participated in its creation. For more on this, see Natalia Shevchenko, Chernovitskaia Atlantida (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 2004). For more on the Hassidic court of Sadagora and the community around it, Mykola Kushnir, “Mizh “Svitlomi” ta “Morokom”: do pytannya pro vyynkennia “Sadahurs’koї” dynastiї rabyniv ta pro deiatki aspekty khasyds’koho rukhu na Bukovyni v 60-kh–90-kh rokakh XIX stolittia, Bukovyns’kyi zhurnal 1–2 (2001): 226-35; David Assaf, The Regal Way. The Life and Times of Rabbi Israel of Ruzhin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Ben-Saar (Rubinstein), Der Jüdische Vatikan in Sadagora 1850–1950 (Tel-Aviv: Olamenu, 1958).
politically, the Jews of Czernowitz. Owing in part to the strong leadership of their acculturated elite, the Jewish community of late-Austrian Chernivtsi made an outstanding contribution to the development of the city’s physical outlook and culture. The community’s real estate, funded by generous donations from the oligarchs, consisted of dozens of synagogues and prayer houses, guild and corporation buildings, clubs, sports and youth organizations, a large orphanage, a nursing home for the elderly, a hospital for elderly handicapped people, two shelters for poor adults and children, and a Zionist cultural centre.50

The dominance of the acculturated Jewish elite was replaced by a fragile unity in the early 1890s, under the charismatic local leader Benno Straucher who managed to unite the rivals—progressives and traditionalists—at least nominally, for the sake of the “common good” of the community.51 The most important political representative of Bukovinian Jews, Straucher was a parliamentary deputy and, from 1903, the President of the Jewish community of Czernowitz. A native of a village near the Hassidic Sadagora, Straucher united in his political and cultural views the ideas of German liberalism and Jewish nationalism.52 Under Straucher’s leadership the Jewish community of Bukovina achieved unprecedented success in political integration. Bukovina had the only regional parliament with a Jewish bloc (led by Straucher and

50 In addition to the quoted works on the history of the Czernowitz and Bukovina Jewish community, see L. Fuks, N. Shevchenko, V. Zatulovskii, Chernovtsi ievreiskie (Chernivtsi: Khesed-Shushana, 2001). Note that in spite of widespread linguistic assimilation, the assimilationist movement did not become a serious political phenomenon in Czernowitz. On the contrary, local Jews were ardent supporters of the Zionist movement, ever since its emergence in the 1890s. (Sha’ari, “The Jewish Community of Czernowitz,” 183.) On the phenomenon of combining love of German culture and language with Zionist values, see Hirsh and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home.

51 David Rechter explained the unity of late Austrian Bukovinian Jews in terms of the blend of a modernizing east European Jewry with highly acculturated west European Jewry, in a multinational context with no dominant nationality. It was a particular instance of a broader phenomenon of Austrian Jewry. Rechter, "Geography Is Destiny," 330.

52 Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 51.
called the “Jewish club”); Czernowitz was the only provincial capital with two Jewish mayors, one of them a nationalist Jew; finally, Bukovina became the only province where Jews received de-facto recognition as a nationality and not just a religious group as a result of the so-called Bukovina Ausgleich of 1910-1911. In 1908, an important international conference on the question of Jewish languages was held in the city. Known consequently as “the Czernowitz conference,” it voted, after heated debate, to accept Yiddish as a national language of European Jews.

Benno Straucher seems to have been a typical Czernowitzer of his time who navigated between the spirit of “national ideas” and the local cosmopolitanism of the city. He befriended Catholic and Orthodox priests and fellow politicians, many of whom were in the midst of their own inner struggles between local, regional, imperial, and national loyalties. It seems that the

53 Legislative districting was initially to be revamped to take national criteria into account. This proved to be extremely challenging, and a compromise agreement was reached when a few separate Jewish electoral districts were created. Rechter, "Geography Is Destiny,” 330; Stambrook, The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina, 10; Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 54.


55 One of Straucher’s “personal and political friends” was Nikolai/Mykola (Ritter von) Wassilko/Vasylko, a member of parliament and a Rusyn/Ukrainian political leader who came from a family of local landlords (Stambrook, The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina, 12). Wassilko was an open-minded liberal typical of the Czernowitz political establishment. A younger Ukrainian leader, Omelian Popovych, noted in his memoirs (written and first published in the 1930s) that Wassilko first assumed an “old-Ruthenian” identity (that is, had a Russophile orientation) but later joined the “Ukrainophile movement” although he never spoke Ukrainian well enough to use it in a public setting. Omelian Popovych, “Vidrodzhennia Bukovyny. Part 2,” Bukovyny’kyi zhurnal 2–3 (1992): 180-1.

Representatives of the highest Orthodox elite also had multiple political, religious, and cultural loyalties. For example, two Bukovinian metropolitans, Eugene Hacman (1835–1873) and Vladimir Repta (1902–1924), navigated between the two national movements without displaying strong personal national identities. Generally, by the end of the nineteenth century, Romanian nationalist propaganda intensified and became more successful than the much weaker at the time Ukrainian nationalist agitation. As a result, the Orthodox church in Bukovina acquired a noticeable Romanian orientation and became a vehicle for Romanization, at least in the minds of conscious Rusyns/Ukrainians. (Stambrook, The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina 2004, 189–201). On Hacman, see Jan Badeni W Czerniowcach, 21-2; 26-31; on Repta, see Popovych, “Vidrodzhennia Bukovyny. Part 2,” 171. Other
comfort of this local cosmopolitanism, made functional by a shared German language and not challenged seriously by any nationalist idea or movement able to dominate in the region, prevented any significant degree of antisemitism otherwise common in the empire. It also moderated the intensity of nationalism that was present, although in modified regional forms, among every ethnic community in Czernowitz. The Jewish elites of Czernowitz synthesized national and imperial loyalties in the regional framework, rather than seeing these loyalties as competing and conflicting. Because they predominated in this provincial capital, this “synthetic” approach to identification became common in Bukovina, providing other elites and wider communities with a temporary escape from the ultimately inescapable modern choice of a national identity. Local elites were promoting tolerance rather than national exclusivity, a tolerance reflected in joint Christian and Jewish celebratory religious services, everyday business operations between, for example, the Trust Fund of the Orthodox Church and enterprising Jews (even if for no other reason than there were no non-Jewish enterprises available), and publicly known personal inter-confessional friendships.

More often than not, the wider population seems to have followed this example. Czernowitzers, while not completely devoid of the more common prejudices and still keen to preserve the particularities of their communities, not only embraced the diversity of their environment as a norm and a matter of fact, but often went beyond superficial tolerance in their inter-cultural relations.⁵⁶ Well-known, for example, was the habit of Czernowitzers to observe, Czernowitzers, it seems, easily fluctuated between German and Polish identities when choices were necessary (Jan Badeni W Czerniowcach, 47).

⁵⁶ The argument about “synthesis” in the identity of Austrian and Bukovinian Jews belongs to David Rechter who describes the dominant Jewish identity in the province as “a regional nationalism rooted in an imperial framework.” (Rechter, “Geography is Destiny,” 331). Jewish and German politicians were actually regarded as mediators between Romanians and Rusyns (later Ukrainians) who were gradually developing national affiliations and
by voluntarily abstaining from hard and “dirty” work, major holidays of all religions of the city.  

The most visual representation of Straucher’s success in unifying the Jewish community was the large, four-storied, late-baroque building of the Jewish People’s House, funded by the contributions of many Jewish communities of Bukovina. From its most general conception to its smallest details, the architecture of the House is replete with aesthetic symbols referring to Judaism, various Eastern cultural traditions, and the complex Jewish politics of the time.  

Constructed in 1907-08, it became an important part of the architectural composition of the newest square of the city, *Fischplatz*. Just several years earlier, in 1904-05, two successful Viennese architects, Felner and Gelmer, erected a city theatre on the same square. The Chernivtsi theatre was almost an exact replica of the city opera theatre in Graz (Austria), the most representative theatre of Felner’s and Gelmer’s *atelier* and replicated by them, with variations, throughout the empire. This typical “monarchical” theatre was a symbolic space that added to the Austrian and European outlook of the city, completing the image of a fully-fledged identities. (Fred Stambrook, *The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina*, 12). Jan Badeni, quoted in the previous note, also noted the mediating role of Jewish-German politicians, and the moderating effect that their numerical dominance had on local politics and everyday life was noted by contemporaries. He described the heated atmosphere during an election to the regional parliament which revealed the hidden potential of nationalism, placated by the victory of Kochanowski, the candidate from the united bloc of Germans, Jews, Poles, and Rusyns, against nationalist Romanian candidates. Kochanowski would later serve as a city mayor and would gain strong popularity.  

57 On practices of everyday coexistence, see, for example, Petro Rykhlo, ed. and transl., *Kolya' Chernivtsi buik hebriy'kym mistom...* Svidchennia ochevydtsiv / "Czernowitz Is Gewen an Alte, Jidische Schtat..." Ueberlebende Berichten (In German and Ukrainian) (Chernivtsi: Molodyi Bukovynets, 1998); Rechter, “Geography is Destiny”. Fred Stambrook demonstrated that cultural and political loyalties in late Habsburg Bukovina tended to be multiple and competing; national identities—when and if they developed—were linguistically determined, while radical nationalism was very rare. See Stambrook, "National and Other Identities in Bukovina": 185-203. For more on Bukovinian regionalism, see Ortfried Kotzian, “Zwischen Föderalismus und Zentralismus. Die Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Regionalbewusstseins in der Bukowina,” *Analele Bucovinei* 4, no.3 (1997): 633-43.  

provincial capital. It became an important site that materialized the connection of the urban elite of Czernowitz to the “gigantic” and “prodigious” German culture of which they were, as Benno Straucher remarked, “followers” and “admirers.”

The rapid growth of the city’s population was reflected not only in the mushrooming new construction but also in heightened renovation and revitalization activities. The city core became a dense business centre. At the same time, new districts of spacious luxury villas belonging to prosperous businessmen emerged on the outskirts, replacing some of the settlements of local peasants and neighbouring closely the remaining ones. The growth of international commerce and banking as well as the light and food industries promoted the construction of plentiful hotels, restaurants, and entertainment businesses. Two large hotels designed in the style of late Art Nouveau, “Bristol” and “Under the Golden Lion,” were built in the 1910s. These hotels represented the cutting edge of Austrian hotel building and became new landmarks of the rapidly modernizing city. The late emergence of the easternmost provincial capital became its advantage as Czernowitz benefited from the newest developments in arts and

59 Straucher cited in Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 41 and 52. The atelier of Ferdinand Felner and Herman Gottlob Gelmer was founded in Vienna in 1843 and existed for more than 40 years. Among the more than 200 buildings constructed by the atelier, 50 were small and medium-sized theatres. The first decade of Felner’s and Gelmer’s work coincided with the major innovations in the design of theatres in Europe, which was reflected in their projects. For more on their work, see Fridrikh Buv’ie, “Mis’kyi teatr u Chernivtsia u kontekstі arkhitektury Felnera ta Gelmera na koronnykh zemliakh Avstro-Uhors’koї monarkhiї,” Architekturа spadshchyna Chernivtsiv, ed. Rykhlo, 135-146. For more on the history of Czernowitz theatre, Horst Fassel, “Das Czernowitz Deutschen Theater: Stationen einer Entwicklung,” Südostdeutsches Archiv, 36-37 (1993-1994): 121-62; Horst Fassel, “Das deutsche Theater von Czernowitz im vielsprachigen Umfeld. Mit und Gegeneinander von Kultureinrichtungen,” Analele Bucovinei, IV, 3 (1997): 683-95.

60 In 1787, Czernowitz (without outskirts) had 414 houses, in 1836, it had 956, and in 1900, 2869 (Kaindl, Geschichte von Czernowitz (2005), 242.)

61 Korotun, “Etapy formuvannia ta zabudovy mista Chernivtsi,” 13; Vandiuk, “Videns’ki vplyvy na arkhitekturу Chernivtsiv,” 87. Many of the older buildings were redone according to the new fashion and the new, more ambitious outlook of the city centre, often receiving additional stories. By the end of the century, most of the rental apartment buildings of the city centre had three or four stories. Following the imperial capital, the Art Nouveau type of residential complexes had larger, more convenient and modern apartments.
urban engineering. At the same time, the city’s numerous decorative balconies, domes, turrets, window décor, pillars, and artistic roofs revealed the “Eastern spirit” of this city with Western configuration. Another place that revealed the “flavour” of a multiethnic city was a new urban cemetery, dating from the 1860s, divided into Christian and Jewish sections by a road.

Along with the urban space, another part of the urban phenomenon—the myth of Czernowitz—was under construction in the late Austrian period. The dominant, widely known, and actively popularized part of this myth belonged to the German-language public sphere and printed word. An important source of myth-making was scholarly study of the region and the city, pioneered by Austrian historians in the 1870s. The most famous student of the region’s local lore and history and the pioneer of Czernowitz’s urban history was Raimund Friedrich Kaindl. Born in Czernowitz in 1866 to a family of Bukovina-born German-Austrian colonists, Kaindl grew up fascinated by the city and the surrounding countryside, and later dedicated his professional life to the study of his city and province. Kaindl’s history of Czernowitz became

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62 Most of these “Eastern” marks were specifically Judaic religious symbols; others had local folk elements or generically “Eastern” features. Other small forms were West European, rooted, for example, in Greek and Roman mythology. The array and diversity of these forms created multiple distinctive architectural ensembles by accenting street corners, crossroads, and roofs. See Shevchenko 2004; Vecherskyi 2003, 159; Bilenkova 2009, 42-82; Suzanna Agne, “Chernivetski dakhy, abo tradytsii u panorami mista” Architekturna spadshchyna Chernivtsiv, ed. Rykhlo, 61-70. V.Shupania, Iu. Prestupenko, I.Siomochkin, Chernivets’ki nekropoli (Chernivtsi: Misto, 2000).

63 On the architecture and history of historic cemeteries of Chernivtsi, see Shupania, Prestupenko, and Siomochkin, Chernivets’ki nekropoli.

64 The early Austrian historians of Bukovina focused on the civilizing role of their own ethnic group and their empire-state, while praising the peaceful development of all the other ethnic groups of the region. For more on the development of historiography of modern Bukovina, see Frunchak, Studying the Land.

65 In addition to frequent outings to the countryside, local peasants were present in lives of people like Raimund Kaindl as the market sellers, milk deliverers, and nannies who brought to the city their outfits, languages, and the worlds of oral traditions so fascinating to young minds. Like Kaindl, Rezzori and Appelfeld (cited earlier in this chapter) were deeply influenced by their Hutsul maids and nannies. See for example A. Nibio, “Zum Tode R.F.Kaindls,” Archiv des Deutschen Kulturvereines in the Bukowina 1 (Chernivtsi, 1931): 2-8.
the most cited source for authors of popular guides and other narratives that popularized the

dominant myth of a diverse, backward-but-fascinating, and opportunity-providing modern

provincial capital. For Kaindl, who opened his monograph with a long poem dedicated to his

beloved Czernowitz, the city’s success was inseparable from its Austrian loyalty.\textsuperscript{66}

Another famous chronicler of life in the city, novelist Karl Emil Franzos, pictured an

imperfect space that could seem almost monstrous but was always endlessly fascinating in its

hybridity:

… Do you want to see a small Russian town in a provincial German city? Here we have small
white houses, large orchards, a Russian bathhouse, Byzantine Churches… Do you want to see a
bit of Byzantium? Here a metropolitan’s residence rises in its full splendour. And close to it, the
proud domed building of the synagogue. … the ancient small wooden church and the

surrounding low houses create a picture of magnificence and poverty at the same time, and there
is a part of the Middle East in this spirit… But not far from here there is a part of America… the

\textit{Austria Platz} in the outskirt looks like a prairie [settlement]. Right next to the houses on the

square, a virgin desert begins and spreads for many more miles….There is a monument in the

middle of the square. You probably cannot find anything like this in Europe.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} “…Wo Tod und Not einst hauste / Ist froher Arbeit Sitz/Denn unter Österreichs Wappen / Stehst Du, mein
Czernowitz (Where once reigned death and poverty/ Now lives cheerful work/ Because under the Austrian coat of
arms/Is now my Czernowitz). Raimund Friedrich Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte von Czernowitz von den ältesten Zeiten bis
dezur Gegenwart} (Chernivtsi: Pardini, 1908). In addition to two detailed general historical accounts of Bukovina from
the earliest times to the end of nineteenth century, Kaindl published a number of more specific works. For example,
Raimund Friedrich Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte der Bukowina}. 3 vols. (Chernivtsi: Czopp, 1888-1898); Raimund Friedrich
Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte der Bukowina von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart unter besonderer Berücksichtigung
der Kulturverhältnisse} (Chernivtsi: Pardini, 1904); Raimund Friedrich Kaindl and A. Monastyrs’kyi, \textit{Die Ruthenen
in der Bukowina}. 2 vols. (Chernivtsi: Czopp, 1889-1890); see also Raimund Friedrich Kaindl, \textit{Zur Geschichte der
Stadt Czernowitz und ihrer Umgebung} (Chernivtsi: Czopp, 1888). For reference to more specific works of Kaindl,
see Frunchak, \textit{Studying the Land}.

\textsuperscript{67} Karl Emil Franzos, \textit{From Half-Asia} 1878 cited in Petro Rykhlo, ed., \textit{Architekturna spadshchyna Cernivtsiv
Avstriis’koi doby (Materialy konferentsii 1-4 zhotnia 2001 r.)} (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavy, 2003), 1. Translation is
mine. A contemporary of Kaindl’s, Franzos was born in 1848 and grew up in eastern Galicia and later attended
gymnasium in Czernowitz. He was taught by his father to be German “by choice” but was also reminded that he
was a Jew “by obligation.” Only when he moved to Czernowitz in 1859, he “no longer was an outsider, but rather a
German among Germans”—a circumstance that supposedly helped him and so many of his contemporaries to
forgive Czernowitz for its provinciality and value its opportunities more than its backwardness, cherishing the myth
City guides, postcards, and similarly popular materials replicated this myth, citing authoritative scholarly sources and men of letters like Franzos. A popular guide of the early nineteenth century invited tourists to a city with “a predominantly German character, largely thanks to Jews most of whom spoke German, demonstrating this way their belonging to German culture….”

At the same time, the guide “marketed” Czernowitz’s urban diversity:

On the elegant Herrengasse, the houses of separate ethnic communities—centres of national-cultural life and places of spiritual meetings—stood close to each other: “German house,” a massive four-storied building with bay windows and sharp arches, with an old-German beer pub on the first floor; “Polish house,” opened in a grand manner in 1905, a renovated old building decorated with works of well-known Polish artists. Not far from them is a “People’s House” of Ruthenians. A “Jewish people’s house” that had room for all the community activities as well as a large concert hall, was located a bit further…. Chernivtsi had not only a motley mixture of people and languages but also of styles.

Although they did not yet challenge the dominant urban myth of Czernowitz, frequent visitors to these “people’s houses” were often engaged in lively discussions of alternative visions of modernity for their city and their larger society. Politicians and men (and women) of letters also voiced these visions—in the form of various national(ist) ideas.

One alternative project was Polish nationalism, which was cut short as a political prospect with the final separation of Bukovina from Galicia in the 1860s, but continued to live on in cultural and religious spheres. A Polish traveller, the priest Badeni, for example, openly of this German-speaking “flourishing little piece of Europe” hidden behind the “half-Asian” Galicia. First quote: Franzos quoted in Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 42; second quote: Franzos quoted in Rechter, “Geography Is Destiny,” 327. For more, see Karl-Emil Franzos, Aus Halb-Asien: Culturbilder aus Galizien, Südrussland, der Bukowina und Rumânien. 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1876).

68 Hermann Mittelmann, Illustrierter Führer durch die Bukovina, herausgegeben von Helmut Kusdat (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2001(first published in Chernivtsi, 1907–8), 144.

69 Ibid., 142. Translation is mine.
challenged the myth of German Czernowitz in an account of his visit to the city where he was surprised to find much more of the Polish language and Polish spirit than he expected. Inspired by the vitality of the Polish culture and Catholic religion in Czernowitz, he saw redemption from the “Asiatic” condition of Bukovina (“[o]n the one hand— the Eastern barbarianism; on the other—Jewish-German indifferentism…”) in the Catholic—the “truly Christian”— morale.70

Two other important ideas were slowly developing underneath, or within, the very “problematic German-Jewish symbiosis” that held together the dominant myth of Habsburg Czernowitz. One of them was exclusive and increasingly antisemitic German nationalism; the other was Zionism (and, to a lesser extent, less prominent forms of Jewish particularism).71

Other projects of local modernity for Bukovina and Czernowitz were proposed by Romanian and Rusyn/Ukrainian nationalist movements.72 Both deserve some attention here in view of the roles they were to play in the future life of the city. Both Romanian and Rusyn/Ukrainian “national awokeners”—most of them speakers of perfect German and

72 Romanian nationalism, inspired and supported by the young irredentist independent Romanian state created in 1878, spread among groups of the younger generation of historians and other intellectuals in Bukovina. By the turn of the century, the ideas of “national revival” also gained ground among the eastern Slavic intelligentsia. Bukovina became a subject of interest for the representatives of two major intellectual movements widespread among the eastern Slavs of Austria-Hungary and their supporters in the Russian Empire. One of the movements, known as Russophilism or, sometimes, Moscophilism, advocated unity among all eastern Slavs in a single Russian nation; it considered all eastern Slavs in Eastern Europe as the once lost branches of the Great Russian people. Russophiles used the autonym of the Bukovinian eastern Slavs—Rusyns—in favour of this argument and conceptualized Bukovina as a “forgotten Russian corner in Austria.” The rival intellectual current was represented by the early Ukrainian national movement, often referred to as Ukrainophilism, which was gaining grounds as the Russophile current was weakening in the early nineteenth century.
graduates of German gymnasiums and the university—used Austrian Czernowitz as a public space for their intellectual and populist polemics.  

One of the well-known radical Romanian leaders, Ion Nistor, born in Bukovina near Suceava, was a graduate of Franz-Joseph University, and, after gaining a doctorate and teaching at the University of Vienna, he became the Chair of Romanian history at his alma mater and a member of the Romanian academy. His works, although concerned little with the spirit of Bukovina’s major city, came close to challenging the dominant interpretation of this urban phenomenon by constructing the past of Bukovina in terms of Romanian nationalism and, in fact, locating the future of this city within a Romanian polity and culture. However, it seems

73 An important venue for political discussions in the city was the press. The first regional newspaper appeared in Bukovina in 1848 (but was closed within a year); in 1885 there were already 10 newspapers in the region, and by 1914 their number grew to 63. By the 1890s, many newspapers in Bukovina had a clear political orientation. The major regional newspapers included: German-language Bukovinaer Zeitung, Bukovinaer Rundschau, Czernowitz Tagblatt, Czernowitzer Zeitung, Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung, Volkspresse, Vorwärts; the Romanian-language Gazeta Bucovinei, Deșteptarea, Privitorul; the Polish-language Gazeta Polska. Russophile newspapers were usually published in Russian or Iazychie, a mixture of Russian, Church Slavonic, and local dialects, and included Pravoslavnaia Bukovyna, Bukovyns'ki Vidomosti, Narodnaia rada, Pravoslavnaia rus.' Ukrainophile papers of different political or religious orientation included Bukovyna; Nova Bukovyna, Narodnyi Holos, Rus'ka rada, Ukraina; Pratsia, Narodna volia, Borot'ba, and Zaliznychny. For more on the press of the period, see Erich Prokopowitsch, Die Entwicklung des Pressewesens in der Bukovina (Vienna, 1962); Myroslav Romaniuk, M. Halushko, Ukraïns'ki chasopysy Pivnichnoї Bukovyny (1870–1940) (Lviv: Oblasna Knyzhkova Drukarnia, 1999).

The polemical arguments between eastern Slavic and Romanian authors on the issue of the early native population and, therefore, the question of who should rightfully “inherit” Bukovina, became the leitmotif of the historiography of this borderland throughout and beyond the twentieth century. At the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, however, the proponents of the Romanian interpretation were much more aggressive in claiming their historic rights to this land than were their eastern Slavic counterparts. Partially due to the different, more political and irredentist stage of the Romanian national movement in general, this assertiveness can be also explained by the fact that the Romanian conceptualization of Bukovina went openly against standard Austrian interpretations.

74 Ion Nistor, Români și Rutenii în Bucovina (Bucharest, 1915). Similar interpretations were expressed in the work of Nistor’s colleague Nicolae Iorga: Românismul în Bucovina (Bucharest, 1903); Neamul Românesc în Bucovina (Bucharest, 1905). Nistor published many more works on the history of Bukovina in the interwar years.
that Nistor’s ideas touched the hearts of very few of his “ethnic brethren” until the last days of the Habsburg empire.\(^\text{75}\)

Rusyn/Ukrainian movements did not produce nationalist figures of Nistor’s calibre in the Austrian period. Political leaders of Rusyn background, such as the local landlord Nikolai/Mykola (Ritter von) Wassilko/Vasylko, and the Galician-born Professor Smal-Stots’kyi, although claiming a “Ukrainian” identity at times, ultimately were more concerned with the issues of Bukovinian regionalism vs. Galician “influences.”\(^\text{76}\) Above all, both seemed to be Austrian loyalists.\(^\text{77}\) The leading Ukrainian party in Bukovina—the National Democrats—advocated Austrian loyalty on the eve of World War I.

Austrian loyalty was also the norm for the young Yuri Fed’kovych, destined to become one of the two most important symbols of Ukrainian culture in Bukovina. Fed’kovych was born as Osyp-Dominic Gordyns’kyi in 1834 to a state servant of noble Polish background and an illiterate Rusyn-speaking Orthodox mother. Baptized in the Roman-Catholic church; raised in noble manners although in relative poverty; and educated in the German schools of Czernowitz, Gordyns’kyi was fascinated by German culture and literature and wrote his own poetry in

\(^{75}\) This fact was noted as early as 1905 by Nistor’s nationalist colleague Iorga and confirmed by later historians. Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung Der Bukowina*, 82.


\(^{77}\) For another example, a “conscious” Rusyn/Ukrainian school instructor, Omelian Popovych, who would later be regarded as the father of Ukrainian national education in Bukovina, wrote a book portraying the good deeds of Franz Joseph, raised funds for its publication, and was delighted to see 150 copies of it donated to schools in Austrian Bukovina by the “Rusyn school” (*Ruska shkola*) society. Later, in the 1930s, Popovych became much more exclusivist in his views of “national consciousness.” In his memoirs he called the Bukovinian metropolitan Repta a “werewolf” who became an ardent Romanian [in order to advance in his church career], “forgot his Ukrainian origin,” and betrayed his initial “Rusyn” identity. (Popovych, “Vidrodzhennia Bukovyny,” part 2, 171). On the book about the emperor, see Stambrook, “National and Other Identities in Bukovina,” 194.
German until the late 1850s. At the same time, his personal development was strongly influenced by his life-long hatred of his father who was despotic and abusive toward Osyp’s mother. The desire to dissociate from his paternal background led the obsessive and melancholic Osyp to convert to Orthodox Christianity, change his given name to Yuri, take a new last name, and eventually don Hutsul folk garb and move to his native mountain village of Putyla to live in “simple ways.” He broke with the German culture that he so admired as a youth and began writing romantic poetry in his mother’s native Rusyn. Suffering from nervous disorders, alcoholism, and generally weak health, obsessed with astrology, isolated and depressed, Fed’kovych was saved from oblivion in the late 1880s by several Rusyn/Ukrainian activists who turned him into the central figure of the Ukrainian cultural movement in Czernowitz for the last two years of his life.

Another future great poet and symbol of the local Ukrainian movement, Ol’ha Kobylians’ka, was born in 1863 to a Galician Rusyn father and a Polish-German mother and raised to speak “Ruthenian,” German, and Polish equally fluently. A romantic and sensitive girl who lived with financially stressed parents and six siblings, she received only an elementary education but was fascinated by the ideas of women’s emancipation and dreamed of a writing career from the time of her youth, when she wrote her first poetry and prose in German. Unable

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78 He retained his admiration of the “German spirit” and of the “highly talented men who came during the Austrian period from German regions to Bukovina” even when he switched to writing in Rusyn. Osyp Makovei, Zhyttiepys Osypa Iuriia Hordyns’koho-Fed’kovycha (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 2005), 97.

79 According to memoirs of his contemporaries and to his biographer, Osyp Makovei, Fed’kovych’s search for identity began early and was a life-defining experience. Initiated by his complex relationship with his father, whom Osyp presented as his step-father, this search was probably also influenced by his encounter with the Italian liberation movement as an officer of the Austrian army during the revolution of 1848–1849. He spent most of his remaining life in Putyla, with the exception of a short period in Lemberg, as an editor for the Ukrainian cultural society publication “Prosvita,” and his last years in Czernowitz (1876–1888). See Makovei, Zhyttiepys; Popovych, “Vidrozhennia Bukovyny. Part 2.”
to afford formal education and with meagre prospects of marriage, she found an outlet for her talents and ambition in writing prose in Rusyn/Ukrainian. Deprived of access to the German-language high culture of her city due to her social standing, she was well received by the young and unpretentious world of Ukrainian literature, to which she eventually made an important contribution with her powerful romantic works about love, women’s roles and freedom, and peasants’ lives.  

Neither Gordyns’kyi-Fed’kovych, whose Rusyn self-consciousness was largely an outcome of his personal relationship with his parents, nor Kobylians’ka, who aspired above all to personal emancipation, financial sustainability, and education, went beyond asserting their cultural identity and using the opportunities of cultural expression and relative freedom of consciousness provided by the Habsburg state. For them and for the growing numbers of local intelligentsia—primarily teachers and priests—of Romanian and east Slavic background, “national consciousness” coexisted with various degrees of Austrian patriotism, monarchical loyalty, religious affiliation, and regional and/or urban identity.

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80 Fascination with the Ukrainian idea and the development of Ukrainian consciousness was closely related to Kobylians’ka’s unrequited love of a Ukrainian activist from Galicia, Osyp Makovei, who worked in Czernowitz as the editor of Bukovyna in 1895-1897. Her letters and other personal accounts reveal that she was always driven primarily by the desires of personal emancipation which she connected to education and entering the “cultured world.” While still living in a village family home, feeling suffocated by poverty and the “idiocy of rural life” (to use Marx’s famous expression), she heard about an elderly professor in Czernowitz who was allegedly looking for an “unpretentious” young woman to marry. Desperate to change her life, she wrote a letter to him, offering herself as a candidate. She did not send the letter, dissuaded by her sister and a friend. One wonders if Olha would have chosen to write in Ukrainian had she married this German- and Polish-speaking professor and received her doctorate, as she had wanted. For a recent biography of Kobylians’ka, see Volodymyr Vozniuk, Bukovyns’ki adresy Ol’hy Kobylians’koï. Biohrafichno-kraieznavcha monografiia (Chernivtsi: Knyhy–XXI, 2006). On her marriage idea, pp.44-45.

81 For example, Fed’kovych was able to change his religious confession officially while in the army; while Kobylians’ka used to go to Vienna to unwind and find new inspiration.
It seems that for most educated Czernowitzers, identifying with the Habsburgs was a more concrete way of affiliating with European civilization. Operating within various value systems simultaneously most probably presented no problem on an individual level. Even Nistor, who after the collapse of the Habsburg empire would become the most ardent fighter for the complete Romanianization of Bukovina, participated in the royal anniversary celebrations in Vienna as late as 1908. Political leaders joined together in a “progressive bloc” to counterbalance any single national group that was aspiring for cultural and political dominance in the region (most often, Romanians, toward the end of Austrian rule). An important local politician, Romanian loyalist Aurel (Ritter von) Onciul, described the limits of “national consciousness” typical for an educated Czernowitzer of the time, when he stated: “the national principle does not involve the suppression of others.”

Once their differences were recognized and “ethnic sensibilities” respected by the local and imperial governments, educated Czernowitzers with a different national consciousness or with none at all shared their regional and imperial loyalties and their urban space. This sharing was made easy by the predominance of the German language but at the same time it promoted voluntary and opportunistic multilingualism. The “national houses” advertised as the symbols

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82 Stambrook, “National and Other Identities in Bukovina,” 187-95; Onciul quoted on p. 195. Onciul was a member of the progressive bloc, or “free-thinking union,” comprising Ukrainian, Romanian, Jewish, Armenian, and German deputies from Bukovina in the Vienna parliament. Radical Romanian currents in Bukovina included irredentist nationalists and antisemitic Christian Socialists. See Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics of Greater Romania*, 56. Social democrats were also acquiring stronger influence toward the end of the Habsburg period. For more on the local politics, see Theodore Ciuciura, “Provincial politics in the Habsburg Empire: the case of Galicia and Bukovina,” *Nationalities Papers* 13(2) (1985): 247-73.

83 Quotation from Stambrook, “National and Other Identities in Bukovina,” 190.

of diversity and difference were, in fact, commonly shared as public spaces: the larger Jewish house was used when the German house was not big enough for an event; the Ukrainian house hosted the 1908 Yiddish conference when acculturated Jews of Czernowitz did not even want to hear about promotion of Yiddish; and students from “ethnic” fraternities regularly attended each others’ annual balls and sports events. Interethnic and inter-religious marriages not only transcended personal ethnic identities and ideological convictions, but occasionally also altered them.85

Czernowitz was also devoid of the “modern cult of monuments” associated with the development of modern nationalism and compartmentalized collective memories.86 The few existing monuments in the city reaffirmed its regional, religious, and Austrian loyalties. The earliest of the existing statues were religious ones, such as the well known Mariensäule, or


85 On Ukrainian and Jewish houses, see Stambrook, “National and Other Identities in Bukovina,” 190; on student fraternities, see Georg Drozdowski, Damals in Czernowitz und Randum; Vladimir Trebici, “Relațiile dintre societățile studențesti române si germane de la Universitatea din Cernăuți ca model de înțelegere interetnică (1875–1938),” Analele Bucovinei 4, no. 2 (1997): 281–89. See chapter four of this thesis for a discussion of Jewish-German marriages. A resident of Chernivtsi, Liudmila Adamova, who moved to the city in 1940 as a child, told me about a case of change of personal identity due to a marriage. The adopted son of the owners of the apartment occupied by Adamova’s parents in 1940 was a member of Nazi organizations and a fierce self-defined antisemite, in spite of his Slavic or Romanian ethnic background (he was raised only by German parents). However, when he met his future wife in 1941 and realized that she was a Jew, his attitude toward ethnic and cultural identities was visibly changed, as was his future fate as the spouse of a Jew during the Holocaust. Liudmila Adamova shared this story with me in July of 2011.

86 The writer Peter Demant (pen name Vernon Kres), the son of an Austrian high-ranking officer who chose to stay in Bukovina after the collapse of the empire, remarked in his autobiographical novel that there was “no cult of monuments” in Chernivtsi and similar provincial cities and towns of the empire. (Vernon Kres, Moia pervaiia zhyzn’, 208.) For more on the role of monuments in assigning meaning to the built environment, see, for example, the essay by Alois Rielg, “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Essence and Its Development, “in Nicholas Stanley Price, M. Kirby Talley Jr., and Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro, eds., Historical and Cultural Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage, trans. Karen Bruckner and Karem Williams (Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute, 1966), 69-83.
Bildnis der trauenden Gottesmutter (1827) on the central square in front of the City Hall. Later on, several busts, plaques, and monuments to members of the royal family, famous cultural figures, and local political activists appeared in the city. However, most of them were located in parks or in the courtyards of buildings, remaining more intimate and aesthetic than pompous and political. Two exceptions were the stately monument to Austria constructed in 1875 on the newest and largest square, Austriaplatz, and a stele in commemoration of the fallen soldiers of the Forty-first, “Czernowitz” regiment named for Archduke Eugene, erected in 1902 at the intersection of two major streets. The stele with a figure of an eagle on top became widely known as “the fallen soldiers’ memorial” or “the Black Eagle.” Because it was openly non-religious, or rather multi-confessional, the monument was often interpreted as the symbol of Bukovina’s multicultural regional identity.

3. World War I

World War I marked the beginning of the end of the German-Jewish symbiosis in Czernowitz, a symbiosis that was becoming more and more problematic with the advent of modern antisemitism and nationalism. After the relative stability of the late Austrian period, Bukovina became a battle ground. Its capital’s residents, if they were not able to flee the city, saw the Russian army for the first time after the turbulent years of 1848-1849. The war

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89 The location of the famous Russian Brusilov offensive in August 1914, Bukovina survived three occupations by the Russian imperial army—the last one in 1916 jointly with Romanian military units—and three consequent Austrian takeovers, before it was finally held by Romanian troops. First-hand accounts of these events include:
intensified national movements, resurrected the old, Russian and Romanian, claims on the province, and brought about a new political force in Eastern Europe: the Ukrainian national movement, or rather two separate movements based in Kiev and Galicia.\textsuperscript{90} Wartime censorship, arrests, and other security measures further antagonized radicals and pushed more “nationally conscious” Romanians to their camp.\textsuperscript{91} While local radical Romanians were inspired to action by the Romanian state, Ukrainian leaders in Czernowitz felt lost and “abandoned by Vienna and Lviv.”\textsuperscript{92} The Jewish local community which, even more than Ukrainians, was fully affiliated with and dependent upon the Habsburgs for its well-being, felt similarly lost.\textsuperscript{93}

Apart from several mass demonstrations, general disarray, and criminal incidents, Czernowitz remained comparatively calm and saw no serious violence. When emperor Charles I

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\textsuperscript{90} For a first-hand account of the Ukrainian movement of the time, see Vasyl Kuchabsky, \textit{Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923}. Transl. by Gus Gafan (Edmonton-Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2009) and a review by Svetlana Frunchak in \textit{Canadian Slavonic Papers}, vol. 52, no.1-2 (March-June 2010): 227-28.


\textsuperscript{92} Popovych, “Vidrodzhennia Bukovyny. Part 2,” 185. Other accounts of the events of 1918 include: Myron Korduba, “Perevorot na Bukovyni” \textit{Lviv’s’kyi Naukovyi Visnyk} 80-82, book 10-12 (L’viv, 1923); Myron Korduba, “Do perevorotu na Bukovyni Lviv’s’kyi Naukovyi Visnyk” 3-4 (1923); I. Pihuliak, „Spomyny pro lystopadovyy podiі na Bukovyni“Ukrains’kyi holos” (Winnipeg, 1927); for more, see Frunchak, \textit{Studying the Land}.

\textsuperscript{93} The Jewish National Council became the third local political force in the region. It hesitated between supporting Romanian or joining Ukrainian-Romanian councils while avoiding any serious internal disputes. On the Jewish national council during the transfer, see David Sha’ari, “Ha-mo`asah Ha-le’umit Ha-yehudit Be-buqovinah Ba-ma`avar Min Ha-Shilton Ha-habsburgi La-shilton Ha-romani, November 1918-Desember 1919” [The Jewish National Council in Bukovina during the transition from Habsburg to Romanian rule, November 1918-December 1919], \textit{Shvut} 15 (1992): 7-39.
stepped down on 11 November 1918, the empire collapsed, and the last President of Bukovina Count Joseph von Etzdorf transferred his power to the politically helpless Ukrainian Council joined by federalist-minded Romanians. The political glue that held Bukovinian society together was removed. The German-Jewish capital and its “motley” province were to be inherited either by its Romanians or Rusyns/Ukrainians. Given an aggressive Romanian state hungry for the lands of the empire that had Romanian populations, and a fragmented Ukrainian movement squeezed between Bolshevik, “White” Russian, and Polish armies, the Romanian solution was a more realistic option.

According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed on 3 March 1918 between Russia and the Central Powers, Bukovina remained a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Given the empire’s agonizing political situation, however, Romanian and Ukrainian national organizations formed provincial national councils in Czernowitz. The Ukrainian Council, headed by Omelian Popovych, was joined by Romanian activists who favoured Bukovina’s remaining within the federated Habsburg empire. The joint council proclaimed a provisional regional Ukrainian-Romanian government on 6 November 1918, with the prospect of a possible division of the province into Romanian and Ukrainian parts, depending upon the results of a popular vote. The creation of a Romanian National Council, around the same time, headed by the local chauvinist landowner Iancu Flondor, was a revolutionary departure from the more flexible politics practised in the city up until 1918. The council advocated the incorporation of Bukovina into the Romanian state, something that was becoming an inevitable political reality. On 11 November 1918, Romanian military forces entered the capital of Bukovina and the region

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94 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 57.
effectively became part of Greater Romania. Politically, Austrian Czernowitz ceased to exist; its collapse as an urban phenomenon, though, was conditional on the cultural and demographic change that was yet to happen.

4. Czernowitz in Cernăuți: Challenging Continuity (1918–1940)

As a part of the highly centralized Romanian state, Bukovina was deprived of its autonomous status and turned into a regular province; as a result, members of its non-Romanian populations were considered national minorities. Despite the promises made by the Romanian government to the international community, the rights and interests of the city’s multicultural population enjoyed little legal protection in the Romanian Kingdom. The Romanian state

95 The Romanian National Council organized “a general congress of Bukovina,” where representatives of select political groups and organizations in the region approved a resolution about the unconditional unification of the province with the Romanian Kingdom. This congress was attended by representatives of Romanian, German, and Polish organizations but had no Jewish or Ukrainian official deputies. (Livezeanu, Cultural Politics of Greater Romania, 59.) Meanwhile, a more popular demonstration—“People’s Assembly”—was called in Czernowitz by the Ukrainian National Council, and allegedly voiced the will of the people to join the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic proclaimed in Lemberg/Lviv. According to the memoirs of its participants and witnesses, the Assembly, although widely attended and quite emotional, had a vague political character; it was a semi-chaotic mass meeting typical of the revolutionary era. On the assembly, see works by Popovych and Korduba quoted earlier in this chapter; on general impressions of life in the city during and immediately after the war, see Rezzori, Snows of Yesteryear. It is also important to note that Bukovina was promised to Romania by the Allies in exchange for joining the war against the Central powers (declared in 1916). See Leonid Sonevytsky, “Bukovina in the diplomatic negotiations of 1914,” The annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. 7, no. 1-2 (23-24) (1959): 1586-629; Sherman D. Spector, Romania at the Paris Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I.C.Brătianu (Iași: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1995).

The annexation of Bukovina to the Romanian Kingdom was legalized only in September of 1919 by the treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. For more on the last days of Austrian administration and the transfer, see Erich Prokopowitsch, Das Ende der Österreichischen Herrschaft in der Bukowina, (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenburg, 1959) or its Ukrainian translation, Erikh Prokopovyč, Kinets’ Avstriiš’koho panuvannia v Bukovyni. Transl. O.Matiichuk, N.Panchuk (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 2004); for a more general background of Bukovina’s history during World War I, see Volodymyr Zapolovs’kyi, Bukovyna v ostannii viini Avstro-Uhorshchyny 1914-1918 (Chernivtsi, 2003).

96 At the time of signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Romania was obliged to incorporate into its constitution articles that recognized citizenship rights and cultural equality of minorities, and particularly full emancipation of Jews.
sponsored the migration of Romanian peasants into the region in order to change its
demographic profile. In the economic sphere, most of the Austrian financial investments were
replaced by Romanian funds while investments by Entente members were also encouraged. But
the major tool for the Romanianization of Bukovina was cultural politics, and in particular
educational reform. The Romanian government in Bucharest and the local Romanian authorities
in Bukovina embarked on a zealous struggle with German culture and Bukovinian regionalism
which—provided that German culture was maintained primarily by a Jewish-German urban elite—resulted in an increase of everyday antisemitism even before it was officially promoted
by the state.

For the statesmen in Bucharest and their enthusiastic messengers sent to the provinces,
cultural Romanianization was an important part of the process of unification of the Romanian
nation-state: having made Romania, they now had to make Romanians. For the majority of
Czernowitzers, though, Romanianization was an assault on the urban phenomenon they knew
and valued. There were very few “old Czernowitzers” who embraced Bucharest’s view. One of
them was Ion Nistor who, after taking refuge during the war in Bucharest and Bessarabia,
returned to Czernowitz in 1918, joined the Romanian National Assembly of Bukovina, and was
one of the fifteen Bukovinians who presented the Union Act to Romania’s King Ferdinand I.
Freed from imperial censorship and probably also from the remnants of the multilayered
ambiguities of Habsburg self-identification, Nistor reconstructed his province’s past and
projected its future accordingly, when he wrote in 1918:

[The Austrians] sought by all means at their disposal to erase all traces of the past and to smother
the national consciousness of the native population. [They] found support in our alien
compatriots. … Since some of them had no homeland, and others had one elsewhere, they began
to preach the doctrine of “Bukovinism” (Bukowinärthum) a favorite of both the Vienna and Cernăuți governments. According to the principles of this doctrine, all the peoples of Bukovina, especially the Romanians, had to rid themselves of their national consciousness, to break all ties with their co-nationals in other countries, to abandon their language, and to forget the ancestral traditions and mores so as to melt together with the other peoples into an exotic Bukovinian species, having German as the language of conversation….

Today, when the national principle is celebrating its great triumph, when the old states are tumbling down, and in their ruins are arising rejuvenated national states within the ethnic boundaries of each nation, “Bukovinism” has to disappear. …Bukovina has reunited with Romania, within whose boundaries there is no room for homo bucovinensis, but only for civis Romaniae.97

“Normalizing” Bukovina according to the modern “national principle” turned out to be a challenging task. The nationalization of the education system was the most important tool of Romanianization. For rural Bukovina it meant the reform of primary schools. Romanian statesmen expected to raise the educational level (thus increasing the upward mobility) of ethnic Romanians and to “bring back” to the body national the “Ruthenianized Romanians” of Bukovina who considered themselves Rusyns/Ukrainians. Making Romanian the mandatory language of instruction and suppressing most of the possibilities for cultural expression and education formerly available to Slavic speakers, the school reform made the choice of a nationality almost unavoidable for Bukovinian peasants, pushing more and more of them into either “Romanian” or “Ukrainian” flocks led by nationalist activists. Although the nationalist ethos was slowly spreading among the peasant population, and opportunistic, survivalist choices and fluid, flexible identities were still very common, the Romanian authorities were convinced of the general “goodness” of the “simple folk” and their allegedly easy redemption from

97 Nistor quoted in Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 49 and 59.
“Ruthenianization.” It was the educated strata of “Ruthenianized” Bukovinians—people like Mykola Wassilko (Vasyl’ko), Stepan Smal-Stots’kyi, and Omelian Popovych—who were considered the troublemakers in this respect.\(^98\) However, the troubles that a few such people created by spurring the alternative, Rusyn/Ukrainian identity among local Slavic-speakers in Bukovina were of a much lesser scale and political significance than among the urban population of Cernăuţi itself.

Romania inherited not only a “perfect city”—the embodiment of vanguard urban planning ideas.”\(^99\) Romania also inherited an urban population of 91,852 people, 47.4 percent of whom were Jews.\(^100\) No more than 20 percent of the urbanites considered Romanian their native tongue. The biggest problem, in the eyes of the Romanian authorities, was that the city’s public sphere, secondary school system, university, and physical space were all dominated by German-speakers.\(^101\) Jews and Germans predominated in urban secondary schools, reflecting the demographics of the city.

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\(^{98}\) Rusyn/Ukrainian speakers who developed some degree of “national consciousness” or just resented the disruption of customary ways of life often avoided Romanianized public education by sending their children to clandestine Ukrainian schools instead. For more on nationalizing primary education, see Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 63-68.

\(^{99}\) Korotun, “Etapy formuvannia ta zabudovy mista Chernivtsi,” 15. The architect Vechers’kyi calls the early twentieth-century Chernivtsi “a unique urban space” where “the traditional—for older European cities—multiplicity of stylistic layers was absent” (Vechers’kyi, *Spadshchyna mistorbuduvannia Ukraïny*, 158). Thanks to the relatively short period of the construction of the entire city, it was divided into a compact business centre and several suburbs. It had a comparatively low density of buildings and plenty of parks and green areas. An industrial district formed along the banks of Prut River. The city had up-to-date communications and infrastructure: it was connected with the nearest large city of the empire through railway; in 1895, its first electrical station emerged; in 1897, the streetcar line was built. In addition to its electrical street lighting, water and sewerage systems were built between 1895 and 1912, bringing the city’s living conditions up to par with the west European standards of the time. See Ihor Zhaloba, *Infrastrukturna polityka*; Sergiy Tarkhov, *Istoriiia mis’kelektrotransportu Chernivtsiv* (Chernivtsi: Prut, 1997).

At first, Jews were not officially singled out among the enemies of the state; even non-loyal Romanians were treated as harshly as others deemed unpatriotic. By their sheer number, however, urban Jews became a “special” problem for the authorities. The nationalization of the secondary school system compartmentalized education according to nationality, creating several urban lycées in place of the Austrian state gymnasia, in order to cordon off the “minorities” into separate schools and to reduce their social resources and influence. The Jewish community also started experiencing a dramatic institutional loss of power: their employment in the public sector, including education, became more and more problematic with the state-sponsored promotion of ethnic Romanians and the policy of appointing teachers and state servants from the Old Kingdom to positions in Bukovina while local educators, branded “superfluous,” were sent to the Romanian heartlands. Realizing that replacing the Jewish elite of Cernăuți was not possible in the short run, Romanian authorities hoped to separate the Jews from their German/Austrian identity and to give them a Romanian orientation, setting a transition period of ten years, after which all instruction would be only in Romanian and Hebrew. Even if this policy was pursued out of Bucharest’s desire to integrate the region into the Romanian state, the wider public, it seems, received it as a message of antisemitism, which began to grow ever stronger in the early 1920s.

In 1923, parliamentary discussions about the Romanian constitution and citizenship resulted in intensified agitation against Jews by rightists all over the country. In Czernowitz, urban Jews still constituted an entrenched elite despite efforts to reduce their resources and influence. The numerical predominance and social influence of Jews in the city, while

101 Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 60.

102 Ibid., 71-78.
instigating nationalism among the Romanian urban minority, nevertheless also protected the city from wide-spread radicalism and outbursts of violence until the mid-1920s. The urban community resisted the government’s efforts to destroy it with all the means still available to it in the centralized and authoritarian Romanian state. Tireless Benno Straucher employed Romanian patriotic rhetoric, which had become the only legitimate framework for public discourse, arguing in his parliamentary speech in 1924 that the Jews of Czernowitz were good Romanian citizens who did not deserve to be discriminated against. Although technically speaking up for Jewish rights, according to the contemporary political realities, it was the loss of Bukovinian regionalism and Czernowitz urbanism that Straucher was in fact lamenting: “The flowering city of Cernăuți with a very patriotic and loyal, civilized, and prudent population, has lost the function and position of a capital, has suffered various economic, moral, and political charges, in a word… it is losing its significance day by day.”

Straucher got it right: the Romanian statesmen in charge of Bukovina despised the city as a sickly, corrupted spot on the healthy body of the “Romanian” countryside, taking all possible measures to change the city’s character. When in 1925 the government introduced a standardized examination for the graduates of secondary schools applying for university studies (the baccalaureate), it was effectively creating—or at least was interpreted so among minorities—a tool of state manipulation in order to control access to higher education in the newly incorporated borderland regions. In Cernăuți, where the 1926 lists of examinees comprised 91.8 percent minorities and only 8.2 percent Romanians, the examination led to the first serious incident of anti-Jewish violence.

103 Straucher quoted in Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 73.
In 1925, at one of Cernăuți’s high schools, all the Romanian students passed the baccalaureate while only 30 percent of German and Ukrainian and only 15 percent of Jewish students received positive results. The next year, two-thirds of all examinees and 80 percent of the Jewish students failed the exam in the entire city. These results were wholly out of proportion to national pass/fail levels that averaged 50 percent. These surprising numbers, together with widespread gossip about the corruption of the external baccalaureate commission that had been sent from the old kingdom, aroused popular discontent and led the failed students to organize public demonstrations. In response to the complaints, the government formed a commission to investigate the test results and procedures. The commission, representing the centralized state in this unsubdued city, found the results fair, blaming “the corrupt, unhealthy, cosmopolitan atmosphere of Cernăuți” with its “frequent evening dances and superficial learning” and the “more frivolous life of young people” in comparison with the rural areas and smaller towns where students achieved better results. “The height of ignorance,” read the report of the commission, was demonstrated “in the history and geography of the fatherland.”

The discontent quickly became strongly politicized; however, the oft-heard slogan, “down with the Romanians,” referred, most probably, to “real” Romanians (that is, political authorities from Bucharest and the messengers of the new cultural politics) rather than “Bukovinians.” One of the popular leaders, a Jewish student, David Fallik, who struck a teacher during a street meeting, was arrested along with several other students. Their trial was to take place in the small Bukovinian town of Câmpolung known for its popular antisemitism. On the


105 Report quoted in Ibid., 82.
eve of the trial, a 21-year-old University of Iaşi student active in the proto-fascist Brotherhood of the Cross, Neculai Totu, shot and killed Fallik. This crime brought the nationalist, regionalist, and ethnic issues underlying the Cernăuţi events into national public debate. Totu himself was tried in Câmpolung on 21 February 1927 in an atmosphere of public exaltation favouring the defendant, and he was acquitted as a hero. The popular nationalism that was gradually penetrating Cernăuţi was fully endorsed by the authorities. 106

Although the early centralizing policies of Romanianization, initiated by the National Liberal Party of Romania, were to some extent counterbalanced by attempts by the National Peasant Party of Romania in 1928-1933 to accommodate the needs of national minorities, these adjustments were met with no enthusiasm by the local authorities of Bukovina who tended to be “more Romanian than Bucharest.” 107 Radicalism was also spreading among the youth across the entire Romanian state. In 1927, antisemitism became the central idea to attract supporters for the newly founded League of Archangel Michael (Iron Guard) organized by the radical activist Corneliu Codreanu. In 1933, when the Liberal Party came to power, the Iron Guard was banned for several years. The Jews of Romania felt no relief from antisemitism, however, since liberals appropriated much of the radical rhetoric in order to mobilize public support. In 1934, when Ion Nistor became the minister of labour, he called upon Romanians to “proceed in a careful but determined manner in order gradually to wrench the bread out of the mouths of the Jews.” 108

106 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 85-86.

107 For more on political developments, see Mariana Hausleitner, Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina.

108 Nistor quoted in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 78.
Many Jews of Czernowitz experienced employment difficulties and the growing feeling of insecurity gradually permeating a city that had previously been immune to any significant and consistent expressions of antisemitism. And yet, in spite of the growing hardship, everyday life in the city seemed to have changed little since Austrian times. Urban Jews, who in 1930 constituted 38 percent of the city’s population and the majority of its elite, refused to consider themselves Romanian. 109 In some respects, they lived in the shadow of World War I, and probably began to sense the approaching shadow of another horrifying world war. They were making the necessary adjustments to their lives as the policies of Romanianization intensified and antisemitism was becoming more and more difficult to ignore.

It seems, however, that in a kind of collective denial the residents of Czernowitz continued to live, culturally, in Habsburg Czernowitz. As a result, the city as a whole appeared to spurn its new identity, symbolized by its Romanian name, Cernăuți, until the end of Romanian rule in 1940. Instead, it maintained the myth of Czernowitz, with adherence to German as its core ingredient.110 Another important feature of interwar Czernowitz was its persistent cultural hybridity and the unique local jargon based on the mixture of languages.

109 According to the Romanian census of 1930, the population of Chernivtsi was 112,427 with the following ethnic composition: 38 percent Jews, 27 percent Romanians, 14.5 percent Germans, 10 percent Ukrainians, 8 percent Poles, and 2.5 percent others. Romanian census statistics quoted in Denys Kvitkovs’kyi, Teofil Bryndzan, Arkadii Zhukovs’kyi, eds. Bukovyna – îi mynule i suchasne (Paris-Philadelphia-Detroit: Zelena Bukovyna, 1956), 429. The increased percentage of Romanians was due to the state-sponsored influx of Romanian state servants and authorities from the old kingdom as well as change of official identification of some urbanites who were willing and able to claim Romanian nationality, most often Orthodox Slavs who might have given “Ruthenian” as their spoken language to Austrian census takers. The decreased number of Poles is due to emigration to Poland during and after World War I.

110 On the meaning of the myth of Czernowitz and the German language as its central pillar, Hirsh and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 89.
The physical landscape and structure of the city did not change much either, regardless of the ambitious desire of the new urban planners to Romanianize the appearance of the city.\footnote{On the policies of Romanianization through urban planning, see Kolosok, “Mistobudivna spadshchyna Chernivtsiv.”} Several blocks of modern four- to five-storey cooperative and rental apartment complexes were incorporated into the older city structure, extending the old city centre without disrupting its wholeness. The Romanian House in the \textit{Art Noveau} style was one dissonant structure that was added to the former \textit{Fischplatz} (renamed \textit{Alexandru} square)—admittedly disharmonious but widely recognized as the most beautiful and intimate square of the city. Propagated by the new administration as a part of its ideological and aesthetic Romanianization, the so-called “neo-Romanian style” actually fitted into the hybrid urban fabric of the city without disrupting it.\footnote{Vandiuk, “Videns’ki vplyvy na arkhitekturu Chernivtsiv (1775–1918),” 88.} Luxury cottages behind the \textit{Volkspark} added to the city’s attractiveness and greenery. Several new Orthodox churches were located mostly in the outskirts of the city. New industrial districts arose on the outskirts, as well. Along with its population (the census of 1930 showed 112,427 residents), the city grew and was further modernized, but its skyline and appearance were by no means significantly changed.

Aesthetic Romanianization was modestly successful only in the realm of monumental propaganda which was mostly destructive. Romanian authorities removed or relocated to inner courtyards many Austrian-era public statues, including the Austria monument, a memorial to Schiller in front of the city theatre, several depictions of the Habsburg royal family members, and even the statue of Our Lady, the “Mariensäule.”\footnote{Osachuk, Shevchenko, Zapolovskyi 2009, 9-32.} The latter was removed from the central
square to clear enough observation space for the most grandiose project of the Romanian era, the “Unification” (Unirea) memorial (1924). Located on an elevated round platform, the memorial depicted a soldier-liberator greeted by a kneeling girl in a peasant folk outfit, representing grateful Bukovina. Beneath the massive sculpture was the figure of an ox (the symbol of Romania) trampling upon the Austrian eagle.\textsuperscript{114}

The nationalist Romanian dream symbolized by the impressive memorial never had a chance to materialize in the city. The Czernowitzers enjoyed and cherished their “Austrian heritage,” popularly perceived as the elegance and splendor of the city centre which reflected the aspiration to a truly “European” life. Like their grandparents and parents, the young generation of lower-middle-class, middle-class, and not infrequently working-class urbanites, whether educated at home or in public and private schools, grew up knowing in detail the streets and architecture of Vienna and Paris, as well as European literature from the classics to Hugo, Verlaine, and Flaubert. According to their recollections, literature helped them to imagine the European places considered central to “Western civilization” and to connect them with the architecture of their own city.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} On the creation and installation of the monument, see N. Petrescu, “Istoria dramatică a monumentului unirii de la Cernăuți,” \textit{Glasul Bucovinei} 1 (Rădăuți, 1994): 6-13.

\textsuperscript{115} Many Chernivtsi residents who attended public and private schools in early twentieth-century Chernivtsi have similar memories of the high quality of the education that they provided as well as the very strict rules of discipline. They also often stressed the accessibility to secondary education for a wide range of the population, regardless of ethnic background, religion, and social standing. For example, Zenovia Peniuk who grew up in a working-class Ukrainian family (that nonetheless spoke German at home) claimed in a conversation with me in 1997 that the education in languages and humanities which she received at a state Orthodox lyceum for girls was far superior to the instruction in the Soviet Lviv State University which she attended to obtain a formal diploma after the war. Similar observations were made by Pearl Fischman who noted in her memoir that the instruction in the Soviet State University of Chernivtsi that she was able to join in 1940 was a mere formality in comparison to her studies in a public gymnasium, which left deep memories and profound knowledge in many fields. See Fichman, \textit{Before Memories Fade}. Many Jewish residents of the city, interviewed in 1998 about their prewar and wartime
The younger generation of Czernowitzers in the 1920s and 1930s did not live in a frozen past. They watched the latest films and discussed the latest books; inspired by the modern German youth movements, they took trips to the city’s surroundings and more remote Carpathian Mountains, dressing in Tyrolian costumes; they explored their sexualities and tested the limits of the modern effect of increased personal freedom. They also were often political, and the world of their politics was modern and radicalized.

As nationalism was spreading among various national groups, many Jews leaned toward socialism (which also attracted youth from other ethnic groups) or Zionism, or experimented with all of them, but few were active in their movements beyond discussions, fearing arrests and imprisonment. Many Zionist groups seemed to consolidate their allegiance to German culture and language as well as to their local environment, that is, Czernowitz’s urban and regional identity. For example, Hashomer Hatzair (The Young Guard), a youth labour Zionism group, was brought to Czernowitz from Vienna by a group of young men and women who found refuge in the capital during World War I. “Their outdoor and athletic activities appealed to us greatly, and we loved summer camps and excursions into the mountains of Southern Bukovina. …

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experiences, shared similar memories of their childhood and adolescence: for most of them, German was the native tongue spoken at home (where, in many cases, Yiddish was not spoken at all), and German literature (often including Marxist) and theatre were a “sacred thing.” One of the persons interviewed, Roza Tzukerman, remarked that she was later frustrated to hear Soviet “lies” about how “the poor of the city” had no access to education, whereas she never paid a penny for hers. Rykhlo, ed. and transl., "Kolys' Chernivtsi Buly Hebreis'kym Mistom...", 78-85.

116 The modernism of life in the interwar city is discussed particularly extensively in Vernon Kres, Moia pervaia zhizn’ and Fichmann, Before Memories Fade. This modernism was also reflected in the diverse urban presses. See Marten-Finnis and Winkler, "Location of Memory Versus Space of Communication": 30-55.
In spite of learning a little Hebrew and singing Hebrew songs, we spoke German at our meetings,” recalled a former group member Carl Hirsch.117

The love of German Kultur declared by many Czernowitzers in the 1930s was accompanied by a disdain of the “inferior Balkan” culture that was being pushed upon them by the nationalist, increasingly antisemitic government. Female Czernowitzers often refused to follow Paris in their fashions, as did the newcomers from the French-inspired “old [Romanian] kingdom” and continued to dress à la Vienna.118 They sabotaged Romanian plays in the city theatre and attended instead guest performances by Viennese and Berlin groups staged in the German and Jewish “national houses.” 119 Pearl Fichmann, who was a youth in interwar Czernowitz, wrote in her memoir later: “In our house and all around me people spoke German, read German books and the daily local German newspapers. Once a month we would get Scherl’s magazine, published in Berlin, the equivalent of Life magazine, combined with articles similar to those in The New Yorker. …”120

The poet Rose Ausländer noted that in interwar Cernăuți, “in spirit, [they] remained Austrians; [their] capital was Vienna and not Bucharest.”121 A lifetime resident of Czernowitz-Chernivtsi, the 1909-born Rosa Tsukerman, recalled the city of her childhood and youth as “one

117 Memories of Carl Hirsch quoted in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 85.

118 Vernon Kres, Moia pervaiia zhizn’, 203.

119 The last German production was staged in the Cernăuți City Theatre on 22 January 1922; afterward, German performances continued in German and Jewish houses and in the Philharmonic hall, with many guest groups from Vienna. Younger Czernowitzers attended Romanian theatre with Romanian friends, but their parents, who rarely mastered Romanian and strongly resented Romanianization, ignored them. Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 92.


121 Ausländer quoted in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 51. Former residents of the city recalled that their escape to Vienna during World War I reinforced their Austrian affiliations. Ibid., 49.
of the most cultured cities in eastern Europe.....” So it seemed to so many young Jews of the interwar Cernăuți who, while their parents might have been attending the city’s seventy-six or so synagogues, indulged themselves in “European culture” of the Austrian variety and allegedly often “did not realize that they were Jewish” until “they found themselves in the city ghetto.”

Like many other chroniclers of life in interwar Cernăuți who retrieved their memories through the filter of “nostalgia for the future that never happened,” Rosa clearly romanticized and idealized her recollections: although they considered themselves Europeans, most Czernowitzers still deemed Cernăuți a backwater and dreamt of leaving it for the real European capitals. They perceived it as “the end of Europe,” to the east of which were “Russia” (later, Soviet Union) and the “Balkans,” both representing an unknown, foreign, and closed world.

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122 Quote from “Kolys' Chernivtsi Buly Hebreis'kym Mistom...”, ed. Rykhlo, 78.

123 Ibid. Despite common linguistic and cultural assimilation, secularization among Jews of Czernowitz-Cernăuți did not reach the levels of the larger German and Austrian cities and many of them preserved moderate religiosity. Marten-Finnis and Winkler, “Location of Memory,” 49.

124 The metaphor of “Nostalgia for the future” belongs to Svetlana Boym. The perception of Cernăuți as a provincial backwater was mentioned by Hirsch and Spitzer, Fichmann, Vernon Kress, and others. Von Rezzori, for example, maintained that his parents considered Cernăuți of the 1920s “deeply backwards” and “nostalgic” in character, although not devoid of “a whiff of Occidental luxury.” Von Rezzori, The Snows of Yesteryear, 121.

125 Fictionalized, memorial, and other personal accounts about Cernăuți carry a great degree of subjectivity and are the products of conscious and sub-conscious individual myth-making. When read collectively, they do create a myth of Czernowitz that exists apart from the physical city and belong to the realm of cultural production. However, I disagree with Marten-Finnis and Winkler who argue that these accounts create “a perception of interwar Czernowitz as pre-industrial, pre-modern, and a heaven of multi-ethnic, harmonious co-existence” and are thus “unreliable as historical evidence.” (Marten-Finnis and Winkler, “Location of Memory,” 34.) As this chapter demonstrates, the myth of Czernowitz was emerging gradually and was a constituent part of the urban phenomenon, including its most idealistic elements. The related notion of genius loci—a distinct character created by the multiplicity of available memoirs—is discussed by urban scholars and philosophers. See Pert Vail, Genii mesta (Moscow: KoLibri, 2007); Jerzi Mikulowski Pomorski, “The City and Its Genius Loci,” Purchla ed. 1996, 21–37. An interpretation of the history of Chernivtsi along these lines can be found in Krzysztof Czyzewski, “Czerniowce (Czernyovtse): A Forgotten Metropolis on the Frontier of the Habsburg Monarchy” in Purchla ed. 1996, 193–204. As opposed to more romanticized accounts—such as Drozdovsky’s—that are openly driven by the nostalgia for the lost “paradise,” others, such as the works of Vernon Kres, Hirsch (Carl Hirsch, “A Life in the Twentieth Century: A Memoir.” Unpublished manuscript. Leo Baeck Institute, New York, 1996 and www.ghostsofhome.com), and Fichmann, reconstruct a more complex reality. See Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, for analytical interpretations of the memories of Austrian and Romanian Czernowitz.
In addition to the feelings of isolation in the periphery and the rapidly diminishing opportunities for physical relocation to the “real Europe,” with the rise of Nazism the admirers of German culture in Cernăuți, including the future famous German poet Paul Celan, found themselves painfully trapped in their German identities in the suffocating atmosphere of the rapidly intensifying antisemitism of the late 1930s. Within the myth of Czernowitz, a “deterriorialized German” that was at the core of this myth was becoming “unspeakable while still being spoken” by its assimilated Jews.

In 1936, a second incident of anti-Jewish violence occurred in Cernăuți when the police arrested and allegedly assassinated the local musician and Bund activist, Edi Wagner. In January of 1938, a Revision of Citizenship decree invalidated all citizenship papers granted to Jews after World War I, rendering more than 33 percent of the country’s Jews stateless; a large percentage of them were Cernăuți Jews. An all-out antisemitic terror campaign followed. At the same time, nationalist Ukrainian groups, although marginal to local politics and largely

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126 For more on Celan’s personal identity in the context of interwar Chernivtsi, see Amy Colin, Paul Celan. Holograms of Darkness (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991).

127 Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 247.

128 A trained optician and a charismatic youth leader who abandoned his earlier Zionist ideas in favour of socialism, Edi organized a multi-ethnic musical ensemble of left-leaning amateurs. The group, who never missed the opportunity to sing the International during their concerts, acquired popularity in the city and its environs but also attracted the attention of the police. The group was arrested during police raids in response to the murder of a local fascist leader during a politically charged scuffle in the central park. As a leader of the group, Wagner was tortured, beaten, and probably thrown out of the window of the secret police office. He died soon after in a hospital. I am grateful to Charles Rosner, a native of Cernăuți and a nephew of Edi Wagner, who shared with me his unpublished account about Edi Wagner’s life and death. The incident is also mentioned in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 79.

129 After the 1937 election failed to create a government, king Carol II returned from exile and appointed the minority party (the National Christian Party ). It later became known as the Goga-Guza regime that re-oriented Romania towards Nazi Germany and proclaimed policies aiming at creating “Romania for Romanians.”
imported to Bukovina from neighbouring Polish Galicia, became active in antisemitic propaganda and violence.\textsuperscript{130}

Another antisemitic force was represented by ethnic German groups inspired and openly supported by the Nazis. Since the 1920s, ethnic German groups of Bukovina had begun establishing ties with Austria and Germany. \textit{Auslandsinstituten} in Berlin, Vienna, and Stuttgart were created for this purpose. Along with cultural pursuits, they became the platforms for intelligence activities (according to the Romanian secret police) and later, from the 1930s, avenues of intensive Nazi propaganda. In 1923 a German consulate was opened in Chernivtsi. After the University of Cernăuți was Romanianized, local Germans brought home National Socialism and antisemitism as they were returning from the foreign universities they now increasingly attended.\textsuperscript{131} The city was becoming noticeably polarized along ethnic lines.

And yet, even when the possibilities were still available, local Jews were still largely reluctant to emigrate. Carl Hirsch remembered: “we were not [completely] carefree, we were worried, but not enough to flee. In fact, those who had gone to Western Europe to study—Hedy Brenner, Paul Celan, many others—came back, one by one, after \textit{Kristallnacht} and the \textit{Anschluss}. The war … came to Czernowitz much later.”\textsuperscript{132} Between 1918 and 1945, Cernăuți writers and journalists produced more German works, and of a higher standard, than during the


\textsuperscript{132} Carl Hirsch quoted in Hirsch and Spitzer, \textit{Ghosts of Home}, 82.
Austrian period.\textsuperscript{133} The most well known of them was Paul Celan, “whose name and poetry are virtually synonymous with the \textit{Sprachlosigkeit}, the loss of language and reason that has been seen as emblematic of postwar European thought.”\textsuperscript{134} Others were Rose Ausländer, a poet and author of the romanticized descriptions of the city, and young poet Selma Meerbaum-Eisinger, Celan’s cousin, who did not survive the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{135} Four out of five German newspapers in Czernowitz had Jewish editors and contributed to the lively and fierce debates along with numerous Romanian, Ukrainian, and Yiddish newspapers.\textsuperscript{136}

This outburst of German cultural production might also be explained by the change, rather than continuity, of Czernowitz life under Romanian rule. Limited political, career, and even travel opportunities concentrated the self-expressions of the educated and ambitious youth in the literary sphere. The same limitations, caused by the rise of antisemitism, spurred the development of a distinct Jewish national identity in some Czernowitzers. Increasingly, left-leaning youth was using Yiddish, and a strong sub-current of Yiddish culture appeared in the city. Although some Yiddish writers were unassimilated refugees from Bessarabia (including Jacob Sternberg), home-grown Yiddish writers such as Itzik Manger and Joseph Burg appeared in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{137} At the same time, younger Jews, Ukrainians, and some Germans were fluent in


\textsuperscript{134} Hirsch and Spitzer, \textit{Ghosts of Home}, 247.

\textsuperscript{135} For more on Selma and her poetry, see Selma Meerbaum-Eisinger, \textit{Harvest of Blossoms. Poems From a Life Cut Short}, ed. and introduction by Irene Silverblatt and Helene Silverblatt, trans. by Jerry Glenn and Florian Birkmayer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{136} Marten-Finnis and Winkler, “Location of Memory,” Myroslav Romaniuk, \textit{Ukrains’ka presa Pivnichnoï Bukovyny (1918–1940)} (L’viv: Feniks, 1996); Prokopowitsch, \textit{Die Entwicklung des Pressewesens in der Bukovina}. 

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Romanian, and many activists argued for the introduction of Romanian into Jewish education and the public sphere in order not to obstruct Jewish integration into the Romanian state and nation.\footnote{138}

In spite of important changes in urban life brought about by Romanian rule, particularly in its final years, on the eve of World War II German still dominated the Jewish public sphere of Czernowitz, and Jews predominated in the city. A former Czernowitzter, Hardy Breier, recalled early in the twenty-first century that

> Most of us were born in Rumanian Bukowina. We spoke German but had no German formal education. German we learned at home and [from] reading books. The [German] slang, which gives the language its richness and flavor was missing. … Our street slang was a German spiced with Yiddish, Ruthenian, Rumanian and understandable only to town people. Even local ethnic Germans were speaking dialects we wouldn’t understand. But we declared boastfully that we had Deutsche Kultur! Rumanian we learned from kindergarten age, there we learned the anthem: Traiasca Regele—long live our King. This I still remember. …

> When we came to Rumania, the local Jews despised us. They couldn’t stand our stance of superiority, high nosed declarations: "We are not Rumanians! We are different and much superior!" We were proud of our heavily accented Czernowitzter speech! We even stressed it to make it obvious. We were aristocrats! We could recite Wilhelm Busch in original of whom these savage Regatler haven't even heard of! How couldn’t they see and admit our supremacy? And how they hated us! They called us Czernoschwitzers. Even in Israel we resented being called

\footnote{138 For a Ukrainian perspective, see Davyd Romaniuk, \textit{Pryborkannia pravdy, abo dobroadiinist’ iak sposib zhyttia}, ed. Illia Havanos (Chernivtsi, 1998). During my conversations with two elderly Czernowitzters of Ukrainian background, Zinaida Peniuk (in 1997) and Taras Ridush (in 2008), they stressed that resentment of radical Romanianization politics among Slavic speakers did not result in their rejection or hatred of the Romanian language. Multilingualism being very common and traditional, they considered it normal and even beneficial to be fluent in several languages, including Romanian.}
Rumanians. [When asked,] "Are you from Rumania?" we would reply with obvious uneasiness and sorrow: "Technically we are."\textsuperscript{139}

In 1940, they were still in Cernăuţi, worried but living their usual everyday lives, reading their German books, and strolling the Western-looking streets of their city. To many of them, “the Dniester River, the Eastern border between Romania and Russia was like the end of Europe.”\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{139} This citation is from a post on the listserv Czernowitz-L, a virtual space of communication between “old Czernowitzers,” most of whom are Jews. For more information, see http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/ (I preserved original spelling and grammar). Hardy Breier is one of the most dedicated contributors to the internet-based myth of Czernowitz that acquired a life of its own. The “aristocracy” of “Austrian” Jewish Czernowitzers as perceived by “Romanian” Jews is well described by Norman Manea, \textit{The Hooligan's Return: A Memoir} (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 63, 77.

\textsuperscript{140} Fichmann, \textit{Before Memories Fade}, under “Childhood,” http://www.ibiblio.org/yiddish/Places/Czernowitz/Fichman/
Part I.

“Reunification”

Following an ultimatum demanding transfer of Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union in twenty-four hours, in the late afternoon of 28 June 1940, artillery and cavalry Red Army units crossed the Dniester River that demarcated the Soviet-Romanian border. These units belonged to the Southern front recently created from the Ukraine-based Kiev and Odessa military districts in preparation for the Soviet incorporation of the Romanian regions of Bessarabia and Bukovina.1 In a matter of hours they marched on the streets of Cernăuţi, renamed Chernovitsy, or Chernivtsi in Ukrainian. The march of the Red Army continued for several days. Well dressed and generally well behaved, the Soviet military moved through the central streets of the city toward the new border located around 40 km to the south of the city. The march became a military parade demonstrating Soviet might to the locals.

In the first hours, days, and months of Soviet rule, the city underwent a rudimentary aesthetic “sovietization.” The new rulers promptly removed obvious markers of the Romanian regime and adorned the major buildings with Soviet symbols.2 Many flags of the USSR and

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1 The Front was under command of the General of the Army Georgii Zhukov. Botushans’ky et al., Bukovyna v konteksti, 598.

2 For a detailed scholarly account of the military operation and political incorporation, see Botushans’ky, Bukovyna v konteksti, 613-22. Many city residents who witnessed the annexation described later the impressive march of the Red Army. See, for example, Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 99-109. Czernowitz-born Lotte Hirsch remarked in an interview that “[t]he on-the-surface symbolic transformation of the city was rapid and efficient” (Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 100). Particularly interesting is the account by a Swiss consular agent in Chernivtsi N. Künzle that was written soon after the event and contains detailed descriptions of the march and the first changes under Soviet rule. Künzle noted the neatness and controlled behaviour of the Soviet soldiers. See his account published in Ukrainian translation in Volodymyr Zapolovs’kyi and Serhii Osachuk, eds., Bukovyna: natsional’ni
Ukrainian SSR were brought along with the Red Army detachments, and additional banners were made from the abandoned blue, yellow, and red Romanian flags. In several days, the city’s streetcars, which never ceased regular operation during the transfer, were “beautified” with red stars and small red flags. Before the end of summer, the Romanian Unification memorial was destroyed and its base used to install a large scarlet star made of plywood and draped with fabric. The square where it stood, officially renamed Unification square under Romania but still popularly known as Ringplatz, was semi-officially renamed Red Square. The first new signboards appeared on the city hall and other important institutions. An obelisk and later a monument to Lenin were constructed on Theatre square where the first celebration of October Revolution day (officially celebrated on 7 November by the new calendar) took place. Later in the year the city was “adorned” with many smaller standard pieces of Soviet monumental propaganda, primarily busts of Stalin and Lenin. Visual change was supplemented by aural experience with the help of the traditional Soviet public radio broadcasting devices installed in central public places.

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3 Among other preparations for the incorporation of the new territories, 1,000 flags of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR were prepared. Botushanskyi, Bukovyna v konteksti ievropes’kykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn, 600. Using Romanian flags to make red banners is mentioned by N. Künzle, Zapolovs’kyi and Osachuk, Bukovyna: natsional’ni rukhy, 209.

4 Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Chernivets’koї Oblasti (DAChO), f.72, op.1, spr.11, ark. 90

5 All of them where later demolished by the Nazis and the Romanian military authorities after the occupation of Chernivtsi in early July. Sculptures were gathered in a big pile; the statue of Lenin was “decapitated” (1941 photographs of them taken by a German Willy Pragher are available in Landearchiv Baden-Württemberg.

6 The first days of Soviet rule were filmed by the central Soviet agencies of documentary chronicles and widely used in cinematographic chronicles and documentaries. They focused on the central squares and depicted the broadcasting radios in action. Tsentral’nyi Derzhavniy arkhiv kinofotofondokumentiv Ukrainy (TsDAKFFU),
The change seemed surreal to many Chernivtsi locals. Although rumours about the annexation had been around for several days, many residents learned the news the night before or even only when they saw Soviet tanks on the streets. Only a minority of the city’s residents—those who were openly opposed to, or afraid of, Soviet rule, were busy arranging their departures in states of panic, shock, and despair. The majority of locals became spectators of the Soviet march and the impromptu aesthetic transformation of the city. Many greeted the newcomers with flowers and tears of happiness; others showed some enthusiasm; still others observed with curiosity. It is safe to assume that, according to popular geopolitical notions of the time, most residents of Chernivtsi realized that their city was “moving” beyond the border of Europe. And yet, they greeted, expected, or hoped for different things. Many Marxists and left-leaning urbanites were excited about the possible social change and the liberation from the national discrimination of non-Romanian nationals; many Jews, in particular, hoped for liberation from the growing antisemitism that seemed more and more inescapable.


8 According to the available estimates, the number of refugees from Northern Bukovina to Romania comprised 1,100 as of December of 1940 and 7,000 as of June 1941. Between 28 June and 3 July 1940, the border was simply “open” and all who wished to do so could leave, provided they could find the means. Vasyl’ Kholodnyts’kyi, “Vplyv politychnykh protsesiv na demohrafichni vtraty narodonaseleennia Chernivets’koї oblasti v 1940–1950 rr.,” *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivets’koi universytetu*, 6-7 (1996), 170.

9 Marxist, and generally leftist, moods were prominent among the crowds that greeted the Soviets. Numerous contemporary accounts of the Chernivtsi locals describe the anxieties of the moment about the annexation and the complexity of choices that many locals had to make. For the majority of urban Romanians, especially well-to-do and politically active ones, it was rather clear that fleeing to Romania was the safest choice. For the rest of the
There was one thing that very few people in Chernivtsi associated with the Soviet transfer in June of 1940: the unification of Bukovina with the Ukrainian nation. Those who had been contemplating such a unification—the few radical Ukrainian nationalists of Chernivtsi—did not welcome the Soviet transfer and soon found themselves among the Soviets’ most important “enemies.” However, Stalin and his close associates in the Kremlin officially justified the annexation of Northern Bukovina and Chernivtsi exactly in terms of the triumphant “reunification” of the region’s population with its “blood brethren” within the Ukrainian nation.

To a large extent, the ethnic principle of the incorporation was a façade. Annexation of Bukovina was a strategic and imperialist move and part of the complex international political developments of the late 1930s. It derived from the Soviet government’s drive for territorial expansion justified ideologically on a general level (implied but not always stated directly) as the export of the revolution. In more specific terms, this expansion was explained as a wise

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10 Radical nationalist Ukrainian ideas and organizations were marginal in interwar Bukovina (see Chapter 1). The most active members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations and movements in Bukovina fled along with Romanian politicians and state employees during and immediately after the Soviet annexation. V. Kholodnyts’kyi, M.Zahainyi, B. Bilets’kyi, “Represyvni aktsii radians’koї vlady na teritorii Chernivets’koї oblasti v 1940-1941 rokakh,” Pytannia istorii Ukrainy 1 (Chernivtsi, 1997), 219; Kvitkovs’kyi, Bryndzan, Zhukovs’kyi, eds., Bukovyna - Ді ми нуле i сучасне, 428–40; Kostyshyn et al, eds. Bukovyna: історичний нарис, 257-58.

11 Viacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, was the major negotiator and the signatory of the official documents pertaining to the wartime Soviet annexations. However, his actions and pronouncements were most probably closely monitored by Stalin himself who always maintained firm personal control of all important political decisions and processes. For more on the relationship between Stalin and his associates, Gorlizki and Khlevnuik, Cold Peace.
necessity dictated by increasing international insecurity. At the same time, the “ethnic principle” was second only to “historical precedent” as the major decision-making factor in interwar European international politics: either one or the other was necessary to justify the official making and breaking of states. The Soviet Union was no exception: “applied ethnography”—the active usage of ethnographic knowledge in policy-making and state-building, combined with the principle of economic expediency and central planning, was at the centre of its politics.12 When it came to delineating borders and territorial regionalization, the “ethnographic paradigm” was the only way of legitimizing political actions, lest Soviet expansion appear to be an imperialist colonial expansion. According to this paradigm, the revolution could be exported to a territory based only on the ethnic unity of its population with a Soviet nationality.

Therefore, the application of the “ethnic principle” to Bukovina made perfect sense to Soviet rulers. Central newspapers published front-page articles that interpreted the incorporation of the new regions, and their distribution between the republics, in terms of historical fairness based on the ethnographic principle. One article stated that “one could hear the noise of the turning pages of history” when the session of the Supreme Soviet passed the law on the separation of territories of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia between the new Moldavian Union Republic and the Ukrainian SSR. It praised the unique, quick, and easy, making of a

border that was possible because these were Soviet republics fulfilling the “great and wise Stalin’s nationality policy.”

Northern Bukovina was incorporated by the USSR simultaneously with Bessarabia, a region with a mixed but largely Romanian-speaking population, and which had been an important diplomatic issue between the USSR and Romania throughout the 1930s. Part of the Russian Empire between 1812 and 1918, Bessarabia was absorbed into the Greater Romanian state in 1918 but was never given up entirely by Soviet leaders. In August of 1939, the opportunity to reopen the “Bessarabian question” was presented by the German offer to sign the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact that divided the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe between Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s USSR. The pact assigned Bessarabia to the Soviets together with the Baltic states, the eastern Polish regions, and Finland. Bukovina, however, was not mentioned in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and German-Soviet negotiations.

After World War II began and the western Ukrainian and Belorussian regions (formerly eastern Polish lands) were annexed by the USSR, an opportunity to incorporate Bessarabia was open. On 23 June 1940, Moscow officially notified Berlin about its decision to execute the annexation of Bessarabia as well as (all of) Bukovina. The former was claimed on the grounds of historical rights; the latter on the grounds of its allegedly Ukrainian population and as the

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13 Izvestia, 2 August 1940, p.1

14 A series of frustrating negotiations between the USSR and Romania took place in the early 1930s in which the Soviet government continuously refused to recognize the validity of the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia in 1918. Only in 1934 did the Soviet government implicitly recognize Romanian “authority” in Bessarabia and signed the Definition of Aggression with the USSR. See W. M. Bacon, ed. Behind Closed Doors: Secret Papers on the Failure of Romanian Soviet Negotiations, 1931-1932 (Stanford, 1972), 3-25. In June of 1940, however, the Soviets reverted to their claim about the illegal and violent nature of Romanian occupation in Bessarabia.

allegedly last missing constituent part of national Ukrainian territory.\textsuperscript{16} The German side admitted its commitment to their promises regarding Bessarabia but was surprised about the Soviet claim on Bukovina. The latter, according to the German minister of foreign affairs Ribbentrop, was “something new.” Bukovina was seen by Ribbentrop as “a former territory of the Austrian crown densely populated by Germans.”\textsuperscript{17} German diplomats strongly advised the Soviets to give up the idea of incorporating of Bukovina to ease and speed up the process of settlement with Romania. Germans could sense Soviet hesitation and uncertainty regarding the question of Bukovina. Indeed, by 26 June the Soviet government decided, although reluctantly, to limit its demands to the northern part of Bukovina, where eastern Slavs (Rusyns/Ukrainians) predominated, but insisted on including the city of Chernivtsi in the Ukrainian part. According to the memoirs of a German diplomat, Molotov later attempted to re-open the question of Southern Bukovina, predominantly inhabited by Romanians, on several occasions, demonstrating the Soviets’ pragmatic approach to the “ethnic principle.”\textsuperscript{18} It was a question of strategic and military importance to spread Soviet territory to Bukovina, or at least its northern

\textsuperscript{16} Molotov, quoted in Botushans’kyi, \textit{Bukovyna v konteksti}, 595.

\textsuperscript{17} Quotes from a telegram from German minister of foreign affairs Ribbentrop to the German ambassador in the USSR Schunleng published in Russian translation in \textit{Pakt Molotova-Ribbentropa i ego posledstviia dlia Besarabii. Sb. dokumentov} (Chisinau: Universitas, 1991), 12-3 and in Ukrainian translation in Botushansky, \textit{Bukovyna v konteksti}, 636-37.

\textsuperscript{18} Botushansky, \textit{Bukovyna v konteksti}, 595-97, 613. It was established in ethnographic studies of Bukovina by the early nineteenth century that the eastern Slavic population was more numerous in the northern part of province and Romanians/Walachians dominated the southern part. The exact numbers, the origins, and the “authenticity” of ethnic identities as recorded by Austrian census-takers were fiercely disputed by Bukovinian scholars of Romanian and Rusyn/Ukrainian orientation. Ion Nistor became the pioneer in the field of statistics on ethnicity in the region in the “Romanian camp,” creating an ethnographic map of the province based on the 1910 census data. Nistor’s map became the ultimate source on the question for scholars and politicians for the next half-century. When the idea of dividing the province of Bukovina into “Romanian” and “Ukrainian” parts emerged in earnest for the first time toward the end of World War I, delineating the border between the two presented a problem. See, for example, Volodymyr Serhichuk, \textit{Etnichni mezhi i derzhavnyi kordon Ukrainy} (Kiev: Ukrains'ka vydavnycha spilka, 2000), 236-37.
part, to allow easy and direct communication between Bessarabia, whose incorporation was no longer in question, and the already annexed Lwów—renamed Lviv (Lvov in Russian). Molotov was quite straightforward in his arguments: along with the “ethnic factor,” Northern Bukovina was requested as “a means of reimbursement for the tremendous losses caused to the Soviet Union and to the population of Bessarabia during the 22-year lordship of Romania in Bessarabia.”

Just as all three players in this strange bargaining generally agreed on the relative predominance of eastern Slavs in the northern part of the province and that of Romanians in its southern part, all three sides were at least generally aware of the special demographic composition of the city of Cernăuți. As the Soviets bargained with Germany for this provincial

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19 According to Romanian intelligence data, the concentration of the Soviet military along the Soviet-Romanian border to the north of Bukovina began as early as late 1939. This was explained by the convenience of the prospective Soviet advance through Bukovina that would allow a march through the plain and avoid obstacles such as the Dniester River. It is not clear whether Stalin and his major advisors thought about the actual claiming and annexation of Bukovina (rather than just using it as a platform for the attack on Romania and the march to Bessarabia) before June of 1940. See Botushansky et al., Bukovyna v konteksti, 599. In any case, given the determination of the Soviet government to re-annex Bessarabia, and the geographical position of Bukovina, it was clearly convenient for the USSR to include as much of Bukovinian territory as possible. It is highly probable that Stalin had secret intentions in respect to Chernivtsi or all of Bukovina long before the ultimatum and the actual incorporation in June of 1940. Bulgarian communist leader Georgi Dimitrov asserted that during the celebration of his sixtieth birthday, Stalin had mentioned to his guests that “it had become cramped in Soviet Union. It would not hurt having Finland, Bessarabia, and Chernivtsi.” (Dimitrov quoted in Osachuk, Zapolov’s’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, ed. “Dodomu v Raikh!,” 28.)

20 The full text of the ultimatum was published in a special issue of the newly created local Ukrainian-language newspaper Radians’ka Bukovyna (Soviet Bukovina) on 30 June 1940; notes about the annexation were also published in part or in full in several central Soviet periodicals. All publications were heavily focused on Bessarabia, emphasizing the region’s strong historical connections with Russia and Ukraine and the USSR’s refusal to accept the Romanian incorporation of Bessarabia. Northern Bukovina was mentioned almost incidentally as a region populated “primarily by Ukrainians” who “did not differ from the Ukrainians of Volhynnia and Podillia.” For example, editorial articles in Izvestiia, 2 August 1940: 1-3 and Pravda, 29 June, 1940; “Mynre rozv’iazannia radians’ko-romuns’koho konfliktu v pytanni pro Bessarabiï i pivničnu chastunu Bukovyny” [Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna—Soviet lands].

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capital that was also a major railway hub, the Romanians made a last attempt to hold on to
Cernăuți, by emphasizing its German (and thus, non-Ukrainian) character. The Soviets
ultimately “won” the city, although Molotov had to go a long way to convince the Germans. (He
later considered this an important diplomatic victory over Germany.) Molotov and Stalin fully
realized the strategic importance of the city and the irrelevance of the Soviet ethnic claim when
applied to Cernăuți, noting allegedly that the city “was returned to us although it had never
belonged to Russia.”

Clearly counting on the short-term nature of this arrangement in the context of its
military plans, Nazi Germany ordered the Romanian authorities to comply with Soviet requests.
When, on 26 June 1940, Molotov handed to the Romanian ambassador Gheorghe Davidescu the
ultimatum and a map with a vague and thick line indicating the future border, requesting they
evacuate the indicated territories within twenty-four hours, he made it clear that, although a
peaceful resolution of the issue was desirable, military action was quite possible in the event of
resistance. The ultimatum requested the return of “the part of Bukovina whose population is
predominantly connected with Soviet Ukraine by their common historical fate as well as their
commonality of language and national composition.” The Romanian government ordered the
retreat of its military and evacuation of the authorities. The Soviet army proceeded with
annexation and occupied, along with the initially requested area, the town of Herța (Hertscha in
Ukrainian) with a surrounding district that was part of the Romanian old kingdom rather than
Bukovina. Whether by a simple military error, or in order to include another strategic railway

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21 The German-Romanian communication and Molotov’s comments are quoted in Botushansky et al., *Bukovyna v konteksti*, 607-8.

22 The telegram is quoted in Botushansky et al., *Bukovyna v konteksti*, 596.
line, or just to push the state border further from a major city (Chernivtsi), Hertsa district remained Soviet Ukrainian, in yet another violation of the “ethnic principle.”

Today, the ethnic justification of the territory of Ukraine is fully endorsed and strongly advocated by most scholars and politicians of Ukraine who apply this principle to the wartime “reunifications” and attribute it to “the foundations of Ukrainian nationalism” retrospectively. In 1940, the ideas of what “Ukrainian ethnic territory” comprised were indistinct in the minds of Soviet ethnographers and politicians. They were also vague in the minds of Ukrainian nationalists. Ukrainian scholars of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries wrote generally about Ukrainians “under the Russian, Austrian, and Hungarian states.” Short-lived eastern Ukrainian governments of the revolutionary era between 1917 and the early 1920s included only Bessarabia in their territorial plans for the Romanian border. Western Ukrainian

23 The occupation of Gertsa district was never officially explained by the Soviet government or historians. See Ion Gherman, Istoria Tragică a Bucovinei, Basarabiei și ținutului Herța (Bucharest: Editura All, 1993).

24 Interpretation of the wartime annexations of Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, parts of Bessarabia, and Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) into Ukraine as an anomalous historical justice implemented by the otherwise repressive and anti-Ukrainian Moscow government, is dominant among today’s historians in Ukraine. Particularly on Bukovina, a good example is the already quoted book by Botushansky et al, Bukovyna v konteksti; the more general argument pertaining to all the western territories annexed during the war is well illustrated by Serhichuk, Etnichni mezhi i derzhavny kordon and Vasyl’ Boiechko, Oksana Hanzha, Borys Zakharchuk, Kordony Ukraïny: istorychna retrospektvyta ta suchasnyi stan (Kiev: “Osnovy,” 1994). This interpretation is rarely questioned by scholars of Ukraine in the west, who agree with the ethnographic justification for the incorporations. See, for example, Paul R. Magocsi, A History of Ukraine: the Land and its Peoples (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). Serhy Yekelchyk, one of the pioneers of the re-conceptualization of Soviet Ukrainian history in terms of national construction (along with Terry Martin and Amir Weiner), recognized the great importance of the war in “defining contemporary Ukraine as a political and geographical notion” and suggested that “unification unwittingly fulfilled the old nationalist dream of the state unity of Ukrainian lands” (Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 151). Although this statement is quite apt in the case of the annexation of Galicia, dreams of Ukrainian nationalists were uncoordinated and diverse, and the most ambitious of them included a territory much larger than that of post-1945 Ukraine (note the famous formula “From the San River to the Don River”) but were not very precise regarding some of the territories that were ultimately annexed to the Ukrainian SSR. It seems that in the cases of Bukovina and Transcarpathia in particular, the ideas of their belonging to the Ukrainian polity had not at all been widespread among radical nationalists of the interwar era and were developed primarily by Soviet cultural authorities. It was only later—during and after the war—that this new political map of Ukraine, created under the Soviet rule, was adopted by Ukrainian radical nationalists.

25 Stepan Rudnyts’kyi, quoted in Serhichuk, Etnichni mezhi, 4.
politicians mentioned Bukovina in their documents on a few occasions. In 1918, few Ukrainian activists in Czernowitz—“abandoned by Vienna,” facing the radical nationalism of their Romanian counterparts, and having no support of the Galician Ukrainian movement that had been their inspiration in the past—proclaimed the “popular will” of the population of Northern Bukovina to “join Ukraine” which was an amorphous notion at the time. Ukrainian representatives mentioned Bukovina several times in their attempts to influence the decisions of the Paris Peace conference, but very few decision-makers had the time and opportunity to listen to them. Eventually, the Ukrainian delegation withdrew its claim for a part of Bukovina. 26 

After Bukovina was ceded to Romania, the majority of its non-Communist “conscious Ukrainians” were preoccupied with legal and parliamentary activities, striving to return to the cultural rights of Austrian times, with partial success. Often with aversion to “Galician foreigners,” local Ukrainians were continuing the strong tradition of Bukovinian regionalism that was common among all ethnic and cultural communities of the province. Bukovinian “territorial nationalism” was widespread among conscious Bukovinian Ukrainians who took pride in what they considered a hard-won victory in Bukovina’s legal battle for independence from Galicia. An important element of Ukrainian Bukovinian regionalism was the Orthodoxy of

26 On varying views regarding Bukovina and other lands with ethnic Ukrainian populations during the revolutionary era of 1917-the 1920s , see Kuchabsky, Western Ukraine in Conflict, particularly pp. 32, 35, 316-17; Serhiichuk, Etnichni mezhi i derzhavnyi kordon, 233-37. Ukrainian politicians of the revolutionary period published a collection of documents to be presented at the Paris Peace Conference to support their diplomatic struggle for international recognition of the short-lived Western Ukrainian Republic, proclaimed in Galicia in 1918 and eventually claimed parts of Bukovina and the Transcarpathian region. Les Documents les Plus Importants de la République Ukrainienne de l’Ouest, II, La Bukowine (Vienna, 1919). Western Ukrainian diplomats included northwestern parts in their territorial claims on several occasions but remained uncertain and flexible in their propositions of the alleged Ukrainian-Romanian border. However, the success of Ukrainian diplomats in attracting the attention of the big powers remained very limited. The British Foreign Office, for example, issued a special publication based on the material about Bukovina prepared for the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, which openly supported Romanian claims for the region. G. W. Prothero, ed. Bukovina. Handbooks Prepared Under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, no. 5 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1920.)
Bukovinians vs. the Greek Catholic (Uniate) rite of the majority of Galician Ukrainians who had settled in late-Austrian Chernivtsi and Bukovina, escaping the atmosphere of cultural Polonization common in Galicia. Local Ukrainians perceived the nationalism that many Galician newcomers brought to Bukovina to be a foreign import to the region.

Even the Communist Hryhorii Piddubnyi who argued for the Ukrainian predominance in Bukovina and criticized the “territorial nationalism” of local “bourgeois” Ukrainians, nonetheless proposed the creation of a Bukovinian [Autonomous] Socialist Republic within the Ukrainian SSR noting the mixed and unique nature of this region. When it was proposed at the Peace Conference in 1919 that a small part of Slavic-dominated Bukovina be joined with Poland, Romanian politicians in Bukovina also played the card of regional loyalty. They circulated among the population a petition addressed to Georges Clemenceau opposing the division of the region, and Ukrainian newspapers in the area took an active part in advocating for unity. Different individuals in Bukovina who embraced the ideas of political nationalism and the unification of Ukrainian lands were far from unanimous on the shape of the future polity; the most widespread idea envisaged a separate state comprising regions of Romania with a substantial Ukrainian population. A lack of attention to Bukovina in the 1920s among Ukrainians, Soviet and nationalist alike, was noted by Hryhorii Piddubnyi, who emigrated from Romanian Bukovina to the Ukrainian SSR. Equally attracted to Marxism and Ukrainian nationalism, Piddubnyi published several works about Bukovina in the 1920s, in which he took

27 Hryhorii Piddubnyi, Bukovyna, ïï mynule i suchasne (Kharkiv: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukraïny, 1928).
28 Botushansky et al., Bukovyna v konteksti, 506-15.
a defensive line against the tendency of Ukrainian historians either to include the region vaguely within “western Ukraine” or to ignore it entirely.\footnote{Piddubnyi was later arrested in one of several waves of repressive purges in the 1930s. He wrote his lengthiest work, a monograph about Bukovina, to “provide citizens of Soviet Ukraine as well as Bukovinian emigrants in America with credible information about the region.” Hryhorii Piddubnyi, \textit{Bukovyna, ïï mynule i suchasne.}}

The only consistent proponents of the idea of “reunification” with “greater Ukraine” in Bukovina were communists, who were an illegal party with weak influence: left-leaning Bukovinians were dominated by Social Democrats whose opposition to the USSR was growing during the interwar period. The earliest Soviet interest in Bukovina dates from the 1920s, but it belonged to the realm of strategic ethnography. The 5\textsuperscript{th} congress of the Third (Communist) International issued a resolution on the Ukrainian question in July of 1924, urging the communist parties of Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia to lead the struggle for the unification of Ukrainian lands. This resolution worried the communists of Bukovina who technically belonged to the Romanian communist party since 1926.

Toward the end of the 1920s, Bukovinian communists created their first separate legal organization “Liberation” (\textit{Vyzvolennia}), which advocated for social justice, minority rights, and, covertly, for unification with the Ukrainian SSR.\footnote{Ihor Piddubnyi, “Politychna zhyttia,” 64, 73. The new stress of the “Bolshevised” Comintern on Ukrainian unification was most probably inspired by the ideas of the old Communist and Soviet military leader Grigorii Kotovskyi, who wrote to the Central Committee in February of 1924, suggesting the creation of a separate Moldavian republic with “propagandist and political” goals of attracting the attention of the Bessarabian population and creating a case for the annexation of Transnistria (\textit{Zanstrovie}). In this respect, Kotovskyi mentioned Bukovina and Galicia in passing as a channel of influence on Central Europe. In April of 1924, Lev Trotskyi—the proponent of “permanent revolution”—also spoke about the influence on Bessarabia and ultimately Romania. (Kotovs'kyi and Trotskyi quoted in Serhiichuk, \textit{Etnichni mezhi i derzhavni kordon}, 231-32.) In July of 1924, the “strategic” Moldavian republic was created, not in the form of a union republic, as Kotovskyi suggested, but initially as an autonomous republic within the Ukrainian SSR.} Moscow’s claim for Bukovina was not unprecedented: such a claim had been made during World War I on the basis of the connections
of a large part of the local population with the Great Russian people. In 1940, repeating such a claim would sound openly imperialistic. Thus, the connection with the Russian people was now possible to express only in the context of the friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian nations. Thus, Bukovina (and later Northern Bukovina) was claimed by the Soviet government in 1940 in the name of the unity of all Ukrainian people in one state as “the only part that is lacking in unified Ukraine.”

By the end of the 1930s, nationality (natsional’nost’) had become one of the core concepts of Soviet ideology. Ethnographic knowledge became a widely used and commonly accepted tool not only to “nationalize” political decisions but also, and even more often, to formulate state policies. In this context, a Ukrainian nation was crystallizing not in spite, but as a constituent part of the Soviet state system and ideology. The Soviet state as a political entity and Soviet socialism as a social system operated within the central themes of the twentieth century: modernism, nation, and empire. Although these themes were reframed in Marxist and Leninist constructivist and class terms, the Soviet approach to the “nationality question” remained trapped in primordialist notions, cultural determinism, and heavy reliance on ethnography.


33 Quotation from Botushansky et al, Bukovyna v kontekstsi, 595.

34 See Brandenberger, National Bolshevism.

35 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 11. Hirsch convincingly argues that within this state ethos (which was akin to that of other modern states), Soviet republics and national oblasts were acquiring strong resemblance to modern nation states.

36 A number of important works demonstrated that Soviet state supported the spread of modern nationalism and used national markers and identities (often newly created) for its repressive politics. The most credible studies concerned with the USSR as a whole include Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire; or Suny and Martin, eds., A
The most important aspect of Soviet applied ethnography was the notion of an ethnographically defined territory. This notion enabled every legitimate national group of the USSR to be assigned to a separate “room” in the “communal apartment” of the Union, to use the metaphor coined by Yuri Slezkine. In such a setting, there was no contradiction in combining the strategic interests of the central power (Kremlin) in its relationships with neighbouring “apartment owners” with the interests of the patriarchs of a particular “room” to expand their footage by “gathering” territories that belonged to them according to the “sciences” of history and ethnography. The Soviet nation-building project appropriated many categories and symbols from the available Ukrainian nationalist discourses, giving them new directions and interpretations. It also created new categories and notions such as the one of an established Ukrainian national/ethnic border that would later be appropriated by Ukrainian nationalists.

State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press, 2001); Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment”; a work that focuses on the features of politics and ideologies shared by different modern states: Weitz, A Century of Genocide, and his article “Racial Politics Without the Concept of Race.” Studies that deal with Ukraine in particular offer even more nuanced analysis. Serhy Yekelchyk, for example, traced the crystallization of the official Soviet Ukrainian culture in the Stalinist 1930s using the notion of negotiation to describe the process of elaboration of the core cultural values and notions between Soviet Ukrainian elites and Moscow authorities that resulted in restricting but also legitimizing and promoting ethnic Ukrainian identity: Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory. Studies that focus on distinct regions that at various points of time were incorporated into the Soviet Ukrainian (semi)polity trace and analyze the fascinating evolutions of once local identities into more standard “nationalities:” see Brown, A Biography of No Place; Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations.


38 See Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment.”

39 In his study of forced migrations in Stalin’s USSR, Pavel Polian called the occupation of the western territories of “reunited” Ukraine and Belorussia “the new form of nation building” that, in fact, started World War II for the USSR. Polian, Against Their Will, 115. The traditional interpretation of the war in Soviet and mainstream post-Soviet Russian historiography considers 28 June 1941 (the day of the official German attack on the USSR) as the day when Soviet Union entered the war.
Just as had been done with respect to the external border with Romania, Soviet statesmen applied strategic ethnography to define the new territory of Ukraine within the Soviet empire-state. On the ethnographic map of the USSR which had become simplified and essentialized by the late 1930s, Ukrainians were among the privileged “Soviet nationalities” whose nation-building project received support from the central authorities. Ethnic or national groups such as Poles, whose “cores” were located abroad, were turned into de facto “enemy nationalities” targeted for ethnic-based mass repression. Accordingly, the new regions of Bessarabia and Bukovina were initially claimed in the name of the Ukrainian nation rather than that of the Moldavians whose collective fate within the USSR was not yet finally decided.40 Ultimately, however, the territory of Bessarabia was split in early August of 1940 between the newly created Moldavian SSR and Chernivtsi province within the Ukrainian SSR, although

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40 The official note handed to the Romanian ambassador and published widely in the USSR mentioned “the ancient unity of Bessarabia … with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.” Molotov also insisted on the existence of a predominantly Ukrainian population of Bessarabia, while admitting that Bukovina is “predominantly Ukrainian” only in its northern part, in his conversations with the Romanian ambassador (Botushansky et al, Bukovyna v konteksti, 597). Note that Hryhorii Piddubnyi mentioned in his 1928 study of Bukovina, quoting statistical documents, that Ukrainians constituted only 20 percent of the Bessarabian population (Hryhorii Piddubnyi, Bukovyna, 9). In preparation for the annexation, the Soviet government made serious preparations in the realm of propaganda and popular entertainment, such as mobilizing teams of writers, journalists, and propagandists; organizing concert groups; organizing newspaper editorial boards in advance and publication of populist printed material in both the Ukrainian and Romanian languages. At the same time, the Southern Front command issued a special order to make 1,000 flags of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR alone (Botushansky et al, Bukovyna v konteksti, 601). Propagandists also widely popularized the fact that the newly proclaimed (May 1940) marshal of the USSR Semion Timoshenko had been born in Bessarabia (ibid., 621). The question of administrative and national belonging of the newly incorporated Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was fateful for the Romanian (Moldavian)-speaking Soviet population in this respect. The Soviet government ultimately decided to turn the existing autonomous Moldavian Republic within the Ukrainian SSR, which had been no more than an artificially created Soviet Piedmont for the Romanian communists, into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. The latter included a larger part of the newly acquired Bessarabia. Thus, Soviet Moldavians were turned into a fully-fledged Soviet nation, and declared separate and different from Romanians who remained beyond the new Soviet-Romanian border. The declaration of the Moldavian USSR on 2 August 1940 was a controversial and risky act that opened the possibility of irredentist claims by the Romanian state.
negotiations about the border between these two entities lasted until 4 November 1940. The border was finally drawn in accordance with the “ethnic principle.” The Ukrainian SSR had to give up several districts in the Khotyn region—a historic part of Bessarabia that was included in Chernivtsi province in early August of 1940—since they were determined to be “predominantly” populated by Moldavians. In the end, locals of Northern Bukovina were claimed to be Soviet subjects/citizens within the Ukrainian body national.

Before the residents of Chernivtsi could make sense of Bukovina’s “reunification” with Soviet Ukraine, many Soviet officials, professionals, and intellectuals from the Ukrainian “mainland” also had to make sense of it. Political and cultural authorities in Ukraine developed the narrative of “reunification” of Northern Bukovina with Ukraine and, more generally, of the unification of all Ukrainian lands. The “first Soviet year” of 1940-1941 can be usefully conceptualized as an encounter between the new power and the locals, an encounter that took place simultaneously in many spheres and on many levels. One of the two major elements of this encounter—the development of a new myth, or image, of the city by means of historical

41 On 2 August 1940 the VII session of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Republic issued a decree about the incorporation of the northern part of Bukovina as well as Khotyn, Akkerman, and Izmail counties of Bessarabia into the Ukrainian SSR and the rest of the territory of Bessarabia into the Moldavian SSR. The decree charged the presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council to set the day of elections of people’s deputies for these territories. “Zakon pro vkliuchennia pivnichnoї chastyny Bukovyny, Khotyns’koho, Akkermans’koho ta Izmaïl’s’koho povitiv Besarabiï v sklad Ukraïns’koї Radians’koї Sotsialistychnoї Respubliky [Pryiniatyi VR SRSR 2 serpnia 1940 r.]”, Bil’shovyk Ukraїny 8 (1940): 27; Za bil’shovyts’ku propahandu i ahitastiiu 15-16 (1940): 23; Komsomol’s’kyi propahandyst 8 (1940): 8; Partrobitnyk Ukraїny 15 (1940): 12. Based on this decree, on 7 August 1940, a decree of the presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council formally created two new provinces, that of Chernivtsi (consisting of Chernivtsi and Khotyn counties) and Akkerman (consisting of Akkerman and Izmail counties and renamed Izmaïl oblast in December of 1940). See Botushansky et al, Bukovyna v kontekstі, 646.

42 Botushansky and other Ukrainian historians posit that the Ukrainian border that resulted from the Soviet annexation is “generally satisfactory and in accordance with the ethnic principle.” They interpret the Ukrainian-Moldavian border delineation as an “act of good will” (Botushans’kyi) on the part of Ukraine, which allegedly lost some ethnically Ukrainian territories of Khotyn region. Botusansky et al, Bukovyna v kontekstі, 647; Serhiichuk, Etnichni mezhi i derzhavnyi kordon, 232-33. Although the official Soviet press stressed how quickly the Ukrainian-Moldavian border was delineated, the negotiations in fact lasted for several months.
narratives, exhibits, rituals, and universal formulas that ran through all of the above—is discussed in Chapter Two. The other major element of the “Chernivtsi encounter”—the penetration of the actual urban structure of Chernivtsi—is the subject of Chapters Three and Four.
Chapter Two

Applied Ethnography and the New History

Long before the construct of power/knowledge was formulated by Michel Foucault and argued to be essential to understanding modernity, the formula “knowledge is power” (znanie-sila) was in wide use in the Soviet Union.¹ From a retrospective point of view, this construct—or rather its English translation²—was more than a propaganda slogan found in every Soviet secondary school: it was the major premise on which the party-state system functioned. There was no clear separation between the notion of public governance and Stalin’s personal power, and the acts of claiming knowledge and exercising power were becoming indistinguishable. Stalin de facto functioned as the ultimate specialist in all fields of knowledge and his decisions and pronouncements were expected to become the ultimate sources of knowledge and power alike.

Even with his great ambition to control the life and politics of the entire country, Stalin was not capable of dealing personally with every political issue and policy; much less was he able to control the practical implementation of his orders, particularly in remote areas.

¹ Foucault’s understanding of knowledge production as an anonymous, institutionalized, and rule-governed model led him to coining the power/knowledge construct that explains knowledge as a conjuncture of power relations and information-seeking that cannot be fully understood independently of each other. Simply put, according to Foucault, any information or knowledge that is produced involves erasure of alternative, probably more relevant systems of knowledge and is related to affirming power relations. In Foucault’s model, knowledge, which is accepted as “truth” or “facts,” is kept in place by a complex web of social relations, mechanisms and prohibitions. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon Books: 1980). For a brief survey of Foucault’s thought about power/knowledge, see also Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (London: Routledge, 2003).

² The Soviet slogan “Znanie-sila!” means in fact “knowledge is power” understood as “might” or “strength” rather than “authority.”
Therefore, the production of knowledge (which was closely related to the execution of power *according* to this knowledge) most often resulted from top-down initiative but bottom-up execution.

In a Stalinist variant of “working toward the *führer*,” Soviet subordinates—from the “inner circle” of Kremlin politicians to the humble specialists in republican provinces—were responsible for adjusting their actions, decisions, and productions to the highest orders and formulas that were often general, vague, and (upon closer consideration) controversial. The gap between the grand claim of Bukovina’s ethnic unity with Ukraine and the scarce practical knowledge about this small piece of foreign land newly attached to the USSR was yet to be filled, quickly and in accordance with the “ultimate truth” endorsed by Stalin.

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3 Since the late 1960s, scholars of Stalinism interpreted the personal role of Stalin in the history of the USSR, and the phenomenon of Stalinism, differently. For example, an early revisionist of the “totalitarian” model, Robert Tucker, explained Stalinism as a special political formation and autocratic system of rule in which the psychopathological personality of Stalin was a powerful driving force. (*The Soviet Political Mind. Studies in Stalinism and post-Stalin change* (New York: Praeger, 1963). An important social and cultural historian of the USSR, Moshe Levin, saw Stalinism primarily as a combination of development and terror (*The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia*, (London: Methuen, 1985). Other scholars tended to reduce the personal role of Stalin and stress the role of Soviet elites, seeing Stalinism as the power of a few and Stalin as an arbiter between different camps of bureaucrats (for example, Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: the Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). More recently, Amir Weiner re-conceptualized Stalinist USSR as a “gardening state,” stressing, again, social engineering and professional state bureaucracy with its cross-ideological ethos of rational and impartial management of society (see, for example, *Landscaping The Human Garden, 20th-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), and Peter Holquist focused in his explanation of Stalinism on state violence as a “productive force” to build new society and new personality, detaching violence “as a technique” from the personality of Stalin. (“Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work,” *Journal of Modern History* 69 [September 1997]).

On the concept of “working toward the *führer*” in Nazi Germany, see Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Wendy Lower developed this concept in her *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill [N.C.]: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
1. Creating the Ethnography of Northern Bukovina

Using the scarce sources at their disposal, propaganda specialists and cultural workers prepared the first Soviet narratives about the annexation that was to appear in the all-union, republican, and local press. These narratives repeated, like a magic formula, the original text formulated for the ultimatum of 26 June 1940, requesting the transfer of Northern Bukovina from Romania to the USSR. What these early narratives elaborated on in more detail was the emotional story of class and national oppression, with graphic descriptions of misery and economic statistics on exploitation and backwardness under Romanian rule. They also provided basic information about the region, promoting its Ukrainian cultural activists. The same articles were reprinted as special brochures and booklets designed to help ideological workers dispatched to the “liberated land” as well as those whose work was to inform the population about the rest of the parts of the enormous Soviet state, and particularly the Ukrainian republic, about the reunification of the “last part of Ukraine” with the Ukrainian SSR. Equipped with this propagandist literature, educators and agitators of Ukraine began popularizing knowledge about the reunited parts of Ukraine. When the schoolchildren of Ukraine began a new academic year in September of 1940, they were informed through “political information sessions” and posters

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4 See editorial articles in Izvestia, 2 August 1940: 1-3 and Pravda, 29 June, 1940, and other quoted in note 20 of the previous section. Citing sources was not a tradition in Soviet propaganda writing, but the scarcity of historical information and emphasis on generic discourse of oppression and struggle for liberation in the early publications point to the fact that sources available to the writers were very limited.

5 G. Medvedenko and I. Starovoitenko, “Besarabia i Pivnichna Bukovyna (istoryko-heohrafichnyi narys),” Komunistychna Osvita 8 (1940): 24-37; Sovetskaia Bessarabia i Sovetskaia Bukovina (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoj literature, 1940). The latter publication stated that the northern part of Bukovina was “inseparably connected” to the question of return of the primordially Russian territory” of Bessarabia (p. 6); that its population, in its “absolute majority,” was “connected to Soviet Ukraine by the commonality of historical fate as well as the commonality of language and national composition.” It further asserted that “By their language and customs, Bukovinian Ukrainians do not differ from Ukrainians of Podolia and Volhynia” (p. 15).
about the writers and cultural activists of western Ukraine, including Yurii Fed’kovych and Ol’ha Kobylians’ka.⁶

The initial formulation from the ultimatum was also repeated, using strong rhetoric usually associated with nation-states, during the grand rituals staged in Moscow for the ultimate legitimization of the incorporation. On 1 August 1940, the joint meeting of the Union Council and Council of Nationalities received a delegation of workers from the two annexed regions, heard their requests, in the name of the entire population, to include their territories into the Ukrainian SSR and the newly created Moldavian SSR, and officially satisfied the requests by making the appropriate laws.⁷ “One could hear the noise of the turning pages of history,” wrote the central newspaper Izvestia on 2 August 1940, when the head of the Council of Peoples’ commissars of the Ukrainian SSR L. R. Korniets repeated Molotov’s formulation and asked the 7th joint session “to reunite the population of Izmail, Akkerman, and Khotyn counties and the peoples of Northern Bukovina in the single Ukrainian Soviet state (Ukraïns'ka radianska derzhava), in the single Ukrainian nation (narod), and on the territory that is assigned to the Ukrainian SSR.” Comrade N. S. Mykhal’chuk, a worker from Chernivtsi who spoke in the name of the Bukovinian delegation, added some gruesome details about Romanian rule before

⁶ Mikhail Zhylin, who would later be appointed to Chernivtsi province as a legal worker, recalled learning about Bukovina for the first in his life on 1 September of 1940 from posters in the rural school that he attended in Zaporizhzhia province of Ukrainian SSR. Unpublished memoir (obtained from the author in May 2006).

⁷ On the role of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) and the Council of Nationalities, see Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 65. Arguing against the “divide and rule” explanation of the USSR’s territorial division, Hirsch demonstrated that the USSR took its shape precisely because the party did not fully control the process of regionalization. The ethnographic paradigm was institutionally supported by Narkomnats, an organ called to attract non-Russians to support the Revolution; the economic paradigm of division, related to the colonial attitude toward non-Russian republics, was advocated by the central planning agency, Gosplan. Ethnographers consulted were thus both shaping a new field of applied Soviet ethnography and influencing the very formation of the Soviet Union. The result was a compromise between ethnographic and economic principles of division.
concluding that “… for hundreds of years the people of Northern Bukovina were artificially separated from their blood brethren, Ukrainians.” He assured the meeting that “[t]oilers of Northern Bukovina are burning with passionate desire to reunite forever with the Ukrainian nation (narod) in the single Ukrainian socialist state” and asked “to include the territory of Northern Bukovina in the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”

For the absolute majority of Soviet people, knowledge about the new Ukrainian regions was derived from these basic formulas, reproduced in print, orally, and by local educators and propagandists. It is highly probable that articles in Pravda and Izvestiia were the only and ultimate sources of knowledge about Bukovina and Bessarabia for Ukrainian Soviet authorities in June 1940, from low-level party officials, who were on their way to Chernivtsi to head provincial and district party committees, to Nikita Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine since January 1938, who personally supervised the sovietization of the newly incorporated territories in 1939-1940.

Khrushchev was a product of his time and political environment and took Soviet Ukrainian nation-building ideology seriously. He also took seriously the science of ethnography. For him, the annexation of eastern Polish territories in 1939 and Bukovina in 1940 was simple: it was a wise strategic move that increased state security, but it was also a

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8 Izvesitiia, 2 August 1940: 2-3.

9 For example, while participating in the liberation of the Transcarpathian region by the Soviet Army in 1945, as the question of the transfer of this territory was being decided, Khrushchev used his knowledge of Ukrainian ethnography (which he probably gained during the Sovietization in Galicia, Volhynia, and Bukovina in 1939-1940) to characterize the villages and settlements he was passing. He concluded, based on the forms and styles of rural architecture and folk dress, that in spite of some ethnographic difference, the region undoubtedly belonged to Ukraine Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev. Volume 1 Commissar (1918-1945). Transl. George Shiver (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2004), 608-9.
reasonable and natural act of gathering Ukrainian lands in one state that “satisfied … the national aspirations of the Ukrainians.”¹⁰ Khrushchev matter-of-factly maintained in his memoirs: “Historically, the population of Bukovina was Ukrainian. That is why Bukovina was given to the USSR.”¹¹ As he visited the newly incorporated areas, he must have realized that the formula “populated primarily by Ukrainians” did not apply to the cities; he also knew that a great many residents of those cities, including Lviv, were Jewish.¹² The Ukrainian communist leader did not elaborate on this urban issue, however; after all, his specialty was agriculture and construction. His visits were short and he probably hoped that local communist authorities would do a good job in their urban management.

In fact, Khrushchev’s first visit to Chernivtsi was so short that he was not even sure whether he had in fact visited Chernivtsi or Kishinev (the soon-to-be capital of the newly created Moldavian SSR) in the early days of August 1940. After a party in the native village of Semion Tymoshenko, the senior Soviet Military commander, Khrushchev flew into a major city—“near Kishinev or in Chernovitsy”—where he had a telephone conversation with Moscow.¹³ The local newspaper in Chernivtsi, Soviet Bukovina, straightened it out with a brief note stating that “on the 4th of July Khrushchev visited Chernivtsi, after his visit to Tymoshenko’s fatherland in Moldavia.” He allegedly studied the condition of the city and the

¹⁰ Ibid., 264.
¹¹ Ibid., 108.
¹³ Ibid., 263.
village and “gave the workers of the county a set of practical directions.” As in the official narrative of the 1940 reunification, in the mind of Khrushchev (who was quite elderly when he wrote his memoirs), Bukovina remained in the shadow of its neighbour, Bessarabia. For his statesman’s mentality, ethnographic notions like “predominant population” and “linguistic and cultural likeness” seemed to represent much more powerful knowledge than statistical details about certain localities.

So it was for the highest authorities who stood behind the negotiations. Strategy merged easily with the vague “science” of ethnography but not always with statistical figures, especially if the latter were not easily available. Bukovina was declared ethnically Ukrainian, while Chernivtsi was deemed strategically and economically important even if it did not fit into the ethnographic framework. If these two pieces of knowledge did not coincide, strong and repressive state power could be used to reconcile them, altering the narratives and, later, the actual demography of the city. Soviet ethnography was meant to be a science that had its own pure laws, but not all of them were necessarily usable and useful in real life. Ethnography was a science used to explain human societies, delineate borders, and draw maps; applied ethnography was a set of policies that could be mended and modified but did not influence the basic “scientific laws.”


15 The Soviet way of accommodating minority rights within the national units—union republics—was the creation of small administrative units with a degree of autonomy, from autonomous republics to national village districts. (Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 160; also see Brown, *A Biography*, on this). A large concentration of a minority population in a major city and provincial centre, then, presented a problem: although the cultural needs of this population had to be accommodated, especially in the early months of the Soviet rule when the new power was trying to attract local supporters, the “autonomous solution” was out of the question in a large and strategically important urban centre.
A legitimized source of Soviet ethnographic knowledge was the ethnographic museum in Leningrad.\textsuperscript{16} It was the base and core not only of ethnographic research in the USSR but also of the interpretation of the produced knowledge on the “cultural technologies of rule” such as census-taking, defining the list of legitimate national identities, and map-drawing. The Leningrad museum was staffed primarily by specialists trained still in the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire, who were deeply influenced by the model of government based on European colonialism, which favoured the participation of scientific experts in administration and political rule. And yet, the museum became the “microcosm of the Soviet Union” and “a nexus of Soviet cultural production and state-building” in the 1930s. Its experts were reconciling the Revolutionary “ideal” with “real” life through explaining the revolution’s setbacks, the surviving remnants of the feudal and colonial legacy. At the same time, they were essentializing Soviet nationalities and rooting them in the primordial past.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1940, the specialists of the Leningrad museum embarked on the twofold task of grounding the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in scientific research and educating the wider public about the newly “reunited” parts of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Moldavia.\textsuperscript{18} Several well-known academic authorities were responsible for organizing an exhibition about the peoples of the new Soviet territories. Based on the exhibit, ethnographers also produced a folder of photo collages with brief commentaries for distribution among

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, 188.
\item[17] Ibid., 190.
\item[18] The Archive of the Russian Ethnographic Museum in St.Petersburg (further Archive REM), d.783 (\textit{Otchety otdelov sektii}) and 785 (\textit{Tematicheski-eksposizitsionnyie plany vystavok “Narody Sovetskoi Bessarabii i Bukoviny.”})
\end{footnotes}
research and cultural institutions of the USSR. Nina Shmidt, the senior specialist in the
department of Eastern Slavs, contacted the large Russian museums in search of available
information on the new regions, and Andrei Danilin, the head of the Ukrainian department, was
in charge of practical preparations and field research. In the wake of the great terror of the late
1930s, and the preceding purgative restructuring of the museum itself, ethnographers had to
exercise extra caution when dealing with the politically sensitive question of Ukraine and its
former “younger brother”—the Autonomous Moldavian Republic suddenly upgraded to the
status of a separate union republic.

In addition to the political sensitivities regarding the new Moldavian republic and the
still unsettled Moldavian-Ukrainian border, Ukraine had a reputation as the nationality that had
“too much” national consciousness which, according to Soviet leaders, made nationalism a
potential (or at times real) problem, as opposed to, for example, Belorussia, where national
consciousness had to be strengthened, even if by imposing it from above. However, after a
field trip to Ukraine and Moldova, and extensive correspondence with the republican

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19 K. M. Kazanskii, Bessarabiia i Severnaia Bukovina. Pod redaktsiei akademika N.S Derzhavina, ehlena-
korrespondentia akademii nauk D.K. Zelenina, professora M.I. Artamonova, ovetstvenyi redaktor D.A. Solovei
(Leningrad: Gosudarstvennyi muzei etnographii, 1940). Although “big names” were officially appointed to
supervise the work on the exhibit and the album, most of the work, it seems, was done by Danilin himself. Archive
REM, d. 785.

20 At the time of the preparation of the Bessarabian and Bukovinian exhibition, the museum was in the wake of a
purgative restructuring that attempted, within the limits of scarce resources, to re-construct the museum, and, by
extension, Soviet ethnography, according to the emerging distinctly Soviet understanding of ethnicity. The reform
also targeted some the old-regime specialists, promoting the new generation of Soviet-trained ethnographers. As a
result of the long and frustrating (due to the chronic lack of resources) restructuring, the Soviet Union was
represented as a unity of stable territorial-national constituent parts (rather than a state populated by numerous
nationalities at different stages of historical development). These parts (republies) represented the major
nationalities which could have autonomous units within their territories. Autonomous units were depicted in fact as
less significant and subordinate to the union nationalities. For more, see Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 200-27.

21 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 158-59. For example, this view of Ukraine was expressed by Avel Enukidze—an “old
Bolshevik” who would later fall victim to the purges.
ethnographic museums, Danilin and other organizers applied to the new territories the “strong” nation-building approach usually reserved for the republics with “weak national consciousness” such as Belorussia. Whether compensating for the insufficient (in terms of numbers and quality) Ukrainian consciousness they found in “real” Bukovina, or simply working vigorously “toward” the highest knowledge expressed in the official state documents about the annexation, they created a straightforward visual narrative of “predominantly Ukrainian Bukovina,” making no exception for its capital city.

The historical part of the exhibit material established a single narrative of the past for both annexed regions, drawing the lines of the Ukrainian-Moldavian-Russian connections and stressing the common struggle and common enemies, first and foremost Polish and Romanian landowners. The main, ethnographic sections of the photo exhibit and folder characterized the populations of the regions, starting with the major nationalities of Ukrainians and Moldavians and adding some information about “other” ethnic groups whose existence was recognized. The language used in the text made it clear that the project’s primary concern was establishing the “predominance” of nationalities that were granted a scientific right to claim the two regions.22

Ukrainians were recognized as the major population of Northern Bukovina but they were said to make up only one-fifth of the population of Bessarabia. The Leningrad ethnographers reported that “Ukrainians call themselves Rusnak’s or Rus’ki” and Bukovinian mountain Ukrainians, known as Hutsuls, call themselves Russkie or gorskie (highlanders). According to the album, Ukrainians who densely populated northern Bessarabia were very close to

22 K. M. Kazanskii, Bessarabiia i Severnaia Bukovina, 4, 5.
Bukovinian Ukrainians known as *podolians* (lowlanders).\(^{23}\) “Particularly interesting” to Soviet ethnographers was “the art of the Hutsuls.” The Hutsuls would later receive the greatest interest and attention in various Soviet narratives as a backward but exotic and romanticized branch of the Ukrainian people, and their image would serve as the major symbolic representation of Chernivtsi province and “Soviet Bukovina.”\(^{24}\)

The vocabulary used to characterize Moldavians of the newly incorporated regions clearly reflected the “upper” standing of Ukrainians in the list of Soviet nationalities and the doubts around the question of recognizing Moldavians as a nationality worthy of their own semi-state—union republic. The caption accompanying the photocollage dedicated to Moldavians had it as follows:

> A bit less than a half of the population of Bessarabia are Moldavians. In the middle part of Bessarabia they constitute the majority. Some Moldavians can also be found in Northern Bukovina. Moldavian language belongs to the Romance linguistic group. However, it has a very large amount of Slavic elements. Almost exclusively Slavic are words concerning agriculture, military, administration, housekeeping, and literacy. There are reasons to suppose that Moldavians are Romanianized Slavs, the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of Bessarabia and Moldavia. In their costume, everyday life, and all material culture Moldavians are extremely close to Ukrainians.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{23}\) One wonders if this statement became the source of misinterpretation by the authors of the first Soviet texts about Bukovina quoted above: they asserted, inaccurately, that “[b]y their language and customs, Bukovinian Ukrainians do not differ from Ukrainians of Podolia and Volhynia. For example, *Sovetskaia Bessarabiia i Sovetskaia Bukovina*, 1940, 15.

\(^{24}\) K. M. Kazanskii, *Bessarabiia i Severnaia Bukovina*, 16.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 9. Note that Romanian historians and politicians promoted a reverse theory of “Ruthenianization” of Bukovina and Bessarabia allegedly encouraged and even forced by the Habsburg state. See Chapter 1 and Frunchak, *Studying the Land.*
The most interesting sections were dedicated to the “legitimate others” found by the Leningrad ethnographers in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. The first among them were “the great Russians” of Bessarabia and Bukovina, the descendants of Russian Old Believers who moved there under Catherine II, as well as some of the Don Cossacks (the latter found only in southern Bessarabia). These Russians allegedly had fully preserved their “great Russian” customs, dress, and language. In Bessarabia, the ethnographers also indicated the presence of Jews, Bulgarians, Gagauz people, and Gypsies “in small numbers.” No Jews were identified in Northern Bukovina.

The diversity of the two new regions was represented only modestly in the visual materials dedicated to current and future progress, dominated as these were by images clearly referring to Ukrainian culture. In a photo-collage dedicated to the regions’ happy new life in the Soviet country the central images included happy girls in Ukrainian costume dancing in the streets of Kiev, a monument to Shevchenko in Kiev (in the very centre of the page), and folk art of Soviet Ukrainians. Against the backdrop of this privileged position of Ukrainian culture and nationality in the western part of the Soviet empire, “Moldavians” were marginalized and depicted together with “minorities.” Jews were nowhere to be found in the sections representing the present and “the future.” Apparently, in the view of the Soviet ethnographers, without their own territorial unit—at least in the western part of the USSR—Jews could be identified in Bukovina’s past but not in its present. Whether Jews as a Soviet nationality had a place in the future in the Soviet “Friendship of Peoples” was a separate and large question for Soviet
nationality policies. The Leningrad exhibit materials demonstrated, though, that Jews had no collective future in the new Soviet regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

Jews of the city of Chernivtsi, it seems, were also completely denied their past because they represented a danger in the eyes of the Soviet authorities and ideologues not only as a reminder of a distinct Jewish identity (as revealed in the preserved communal institutions, religion, and language) but also as a large and integrated community of bearers of German-language “bourgeois culture” as opposed to the “proletarian” Yiddish culture that was deemed to be “sovietizable.” The authors of the exhibit, otherwise specific about the “nationality” of

26 Soviet nationality policies were initially designed with “developed” nationalities in mind. In the view of Soviet leadership, these nationalities—Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars—possessed their “national” cultures, languages, and, most importantly, territories. They were “backward” in comparison with Russians, but this backwardness could be easily eliminated: their territories had to be legally guaranteed, their languages provided opportunities for free usage and development, their cultures supported, their elites promoted, and the bourgeois, “rotten” elements of their national bodies and minds regularly purged. However, once trapped in their ontological understanding of nationalities, the party and the Soviet state found themselves in trouble with nationalities which differed from the standard paradigm. With some of these nationalities, it was not clear if they were nationalities at all or parts of larger, often religious communities; others were too small and heavily assimilated into the Russian language and culture; still others did not have a (written) language at all and had primitive tribal social structures. Yet probably the most “different” Soviet nationality were Jews, who had a distinct culture (but often preferred Russian culture) and language (but mostly spoke Russian), as well as a developed intelligentsia and working class (who, again, most often considered themselves Russian), but did not have their own territory. Common sense and existing research suggest that it was to a large degree these “bizarre” nationalities that caused the extreme complexity of the Soviet nationalities policies and practices. Jews seemed to be the potential “best Soviets”, but there was no “soviet nationality” in the Soviet Union, hence the attempts to settle Jews in the failed Jewish National Region of Birobidzhan and to develop Yiddish education and literature. The growing and institutionalized ethnicization of the Soviet state during the socialist offensive turned the “perfect Soviets” back into Jews; World War II and the Holocaust made this ethnicization ultimate and irreversible. See Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton University Press, 2004). Ultimately, as a result of the interwar nationality policies and the wartime catastrophe, Russian Jews in the Soviet Union found themselves in a situation which permitted them to be neither Russians nor Jewish, but “forced into the situation of forced inferiority.” Benjamin Pinkus and Jonathan Frankel, *The Soviet Government and the Jews, 1948–1967: A Documented Study*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 6.

their subjects, represented the residents of Chernivtsi with images either of generic city dwellers marching happily toward their future, or of Hutsuls in folk dress reading the first Soviet newspaper on the streets of the liberated city.

Was it a deliberate strategy on the part of the central Soviet ethnographers and authorities who used their knowledge to “hide” the city of Chernivtsi, a city that did not fit into the seamless narrative about Ukrainian dominance and national-social liberation? Or was it the genuine lack of detailed local knowledge, due to the short period of Soviet rule in the region, in combination with a denial of the problems that local authorities in Chernivtsi were expected to sort out? Chernivtsi also appeared only briefly in the first Soviet documentary about the incorporation of the two regions in 1940, On the Danube. Already on 25 August 1940, Izvestiia advertised this “beautifully, smartly made film” that “truthfully depicts the liberation of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia,” as a movie “about human happiness.” The film was in Russian, making it suitable for audiences throughout the Soviet state.

More of a newsreel than a documentary, this production was filmed during and immediately after the annexation campaign and, indeed, concentrated on the present moment; its tone was glorious and informative. Against the changing backgrounds of the map of the regions and contrasting landscapes of happy Soviet Moldavia as opposed to the beautiful by nature but wretched reunited regions, the narrator told the Soviet people about the “predatory capture” of these lands, the forceful separation of the Moldavian people, and the resulting misery that

28 K. M. Kazanskii, Bessarabiiia i Severnaia Bukovina, 17.

29 The documentary was a joint production of the Ukrainian and central studios of newsreels and documentaries. TsDAKFFU, item 132, ark.1.
reigned in these territories. Like other early Soviet narratives about the regions, the authors made Bessarabia the major scene and subject of the film, mentioning and showing Bukovina occasionally but making the main argument about the fate of Moldavian people, the “Russian connection” of Bessarabia, and the beauty and strategic meaning of the Danube.

Two central themes of this “chronicle” are the happiness of the moment of liberation by the Red Army and the misery of the population caused by the horrific oppression by “Romanian lords.” The cities—Kishinev and Chernivtsi—fitted more into the latter theme. The two cities were almost blended together by means of changing shots without exact references; a brief general view of downtown Chernivtsi was followed by a longer view of the poor quarters of Kishinev, characterized with strong language of social and national injustice, from purely descriptive phrases such as “Horrific contrasts of the cities. The glitter of central streets and the destitution of the suburbs. … Miserable plants and factories…” to statistical quotes of infant mortality against a background shot of poor urban children. The theme of urban misery was also emphasized by an Izvestia reviewer Evgeniia Kriger.30 The narrative then turned from documenting local misery to exhibiting the joy of liberation and the gratitude of the locals to the Red Army. Along with shots of people fleeing from Romania to the Soviet Union, liberated prisoners, glorified deserters from Romanian army, the entrance of the Red Army to Chernivtsi, and a parade in Kishinev, the film repeatedly presented the haunting images of “Bukovinian youth” in Hutsul folk dress, including the most typical symbol of reunification: local girls and women throwing flowers and greeting Soviet soldiers.

*On the Danube* was shown widely to the Soviet public, including the residents of the new regions. “Cinefication”—the development and procurement of a rich network of cinemas and mobile screening teams—was one of the first cultural priorities for the newly annexed territories. Before the “most important art” could be brought to the Bukovinian peasants and the exotic Hutsuls in their remote settlements, it was tried out first in the numerous modern cinemas of Chernivtsi.  

Ukrainian authorities did realize, however, that there was a need for more specific narratives about Bukovina and a stronger argument about its “Ukrainian connection”; after all, as the question about the creation of the Moldavian republic was being settled, it became obvious that Bukovina, now turned into Chernivtsi province with a smaller part of Bessarabia attached to it, should be at the centre of the republican—specifically Ukrainian vs. all-union—narrative about reunification. The Russian connection did not appeal to Ukrainian authorities; in their minds, it would not appeal to the locals of Bukovina either: while *On the Danube* was being shipped to Kiev to be screened for the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee, and, upon its approval, released to the Ukrainian public, the head of the Ukrainian Cinematography department Bol’shakov was ordering another, and more specific, “educational” production about Bukovina to which he “assigned big significance.”

31 The head of the Ukrainian department of news films (*Kinokhronika*), Khmel’nyts’kyi, personally informed Chernivtsi party chief Ivan Grushets’kyi about the release of the film on 25 August, citing the review in *Izvestiia*. He promised to arrange for a copy to be sent to Chernivtsi immediately once it had been reviewed by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. DACHO, f. 1, op. 11, spr. 40, ark. 5. Interestingly, newly appointed cultural authorities of Chernivtsi engaged in fierce competition with Stanislaviv province in Galicia for the right to be the home of the chief inter-oblast (regional) office of film distribution and exhibition system (*Kinoprokat*), referring to the city’s rich infrastructure base, including six cinemas in the city. DACHO, f. 1, op. 11, spr. 40, ark. 6

32 DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 40, ark. 5 It seems that this project was different from the one mentioned immediately below in the text which became the only prewar cinematic production dedicated to Bukovina. Apparently, the project ordered by the Kiev head of the cinematographic department Bol’shakov was not realized before the war, as the next film about Bukovina appeared only in 1945, but was authored and produced by individuals other than those suggested by Bol’shakov in 1940.
The narratives that appeared in late 1940 and in 1941 became an important base for the successful cultural colonization of Chernivtsi. Produced between Kiev and Chernivtsi, these narratives were closer to the actual physical space of Bukovina and its major city and thus provided some answers to the many questions that probably puzzled the journalists of Soviet Bukovina and other local ideologues of reunification in the first months of Soviet rule. By the end of 1940, the Kiev Film Studios, headed by Olexandr Dovzhenko, finished the documentary with the telling title, “Bukovina is a Ukrainian land.” The film was directed not by Dovzhenko himself but by his wife, the Russian actress and film-maker Yulia Solntseva, who also was Dovzhenko’s devoted professional partner, admirer, and ally in the complicated world of Stalin-era cultural politics.33

Understanding the role and position of this artistic couple in the Ukrainian cultural establishment of the era is illuminating for reconstructing the image-making of Bukovina and Chernivtsi in 1940. A product of the “Ukrainian cultural renaissance” spurred by the Ukrainianization policies of the late 1920s-early 1930s, Dovzhenko survived the purges of the party and cultural establishment of the late 1930s and, apparently, mastered the “double-speak”

33 In fact, even before On the Danube came out in the first days of July, the local newspaper of Chernivtsi province announced that “Soviet cultural forces arrived in Chernivtsi … to create a documentary-fiction film about the establishment of Soviet power in Bukovina.” As Ukraine’s party leader Nikita Khrushchev was visiting the city, a group from the Kiev studio of feature films was working in the city under the direction of Olexandr Dovzhenko and his wife Yulia Solntseva. Constructed initially in 1927, this Film studio was at the time the largest in the Ukrainian SSR. It was headed by Olexandr Dovzhenko for a long time and was named after him in 1957. Dovzhenko was a Ukrainian screenwriter, producer and director of films, and is often cited as one of the most important early Soviet filmmakers, alongside Sergei Eisenstein and Vsevolod Pudovkin.
of Stalinist ideology. Dovzhenko eventually made an important contribution to the construction of the Soviet Ukrainian ethos and master narrative.\(^{34}\) Not only did he produce strong cinematographic images that reached millions, but he also was a member of many institutions such as the committee editing the 1937 Soviet Ukrainian constitution and the Kiev city council. Mastering “Bolshevik speak” in its Ukrainian variation was made easier for the filmmaker by his artistic ability to “live on two levels,” the real and the imaginary, as he explained in his apologetic and ritualistic autobiography from 1939: he did not give much importance to “ordinary words, daily motions, probable details” but searched for “just the clean golden truth”—the master narrative—for the sake of which the details could be “thrown out.”\(^{35}\)

Dovzhenko never fully came to terms with Soviet ideology based on the construct of friendship of peoples; he struggled, it seems, to reconcile the integrationist and internationalist elements of the Soviet ideological system with his exclusivist ethnic nationalism. Dovzhenko’s deeply romanticized, primordial, and gendered notions of native “folk” are revealed in his personal documents and diaries. His ethnic nationalism became especially vivid in his powerfully artistic writings about wartime Ukraine: his banned *Ukraine in Flames* and his

\(^{34}\) Dovzhenko started his cinematographic career as a sincere national communist who believed in the advancement of Ukrainian culture that would be completely independent from Russian influences. He had been closely linked to the artistic circles that would later become known as the “executed renaissance.” Although he was spared the tragic fate of, for example, the writer Mykola Khvylyiovyi, with whom the filmmaker used to be rather close, or the old Bolshevik Mykola Skrypnyk (both committed suicide), Dovzhenko lost his party membership, fell into long-lasting disgrace with the authorities, and was forced to abandon Ukrainian themes in his films and Ukraine itself. He had been fiercely criticized for nationalism before he proved his “worth” with his 1934 film *Aerograd* and confirmed his loyalty to Stalin and Moscow’s interpretation of Ukrainian history with his 1939 film *Shchors* that became imperative for the re-invention of Ukraine’s role in the Revolution of 1917. *Shchors* provided the long-needed icon of the ultimate Ukrainian revolutionary hero. A formerly suspect nationalist, Dovzhenko helped to “fix” one of the most controversial pages of Soviet Ukrainian historical narrative by Ukrainianizing the revolution of 1917 for Ukrainians.

Dovzhenko depicted exclusively Ukrainian national suffering, often using the phrase nation-martyr (narod-muchenyk), denying any recognition to the collective (or even individual) suffering of Jews in Ukraine. In his diaries he wrote, for example: “When I read that Germans took to Germany 50,000 Ukrainian girls and women, I cried. But I do not know if I would cry if I read about the deportation of women in general.”37 His sketches and diary entries are dominated by the theme of a Ukrainian female who is either physically violated by the “other”—most often a German soldier—or is willingly “selling herself” by marrying or mating with a German occupant. Dovzhenko was outraged by the allegedly mass character of such instances, and reflected on the reasons of what he saw as a shameful disgrace and “national untidiness.” He blamed the prewar public education system, material poverty, and the ethos that produced a masculine woman, or a woman deprived of her allegedly natural and traditional gender characteristics of a sense of beauty, tenderness, and modesty. Time and again, Dovzhenko drew an image of a female connected to the artistic metaphor of Ukraine, who has been violently deprived of her nature, equated with (national) tradition, culture, and honour. He often connected this violation, overtly or covertly, with the actual sexual violation or the moral degradation revealed in intimate relations with the enemy. The highly romanticized idea of ethnic purity is very vivid in a long and detailed account—obviously a sketch for a future story or script—of a girl who is offering her “virginity” to a Ukrainian soldier whose name she does not even know so that he, by “taking her,” saves her from violation by the enemy. The connection between the actual women he met or imagined with the image of violated Ukraine

36 Oleksandr Dovzhenko, Україна в огні. Кіноповіст, щоденник (Kiev: Radians’kyi pys’mennyk, 1990).
37 Ibid., 146.
can be supported by his occasional outbursts of national self-hatred and self-criticism for the lack of the national pride, distinctiveness, and other honourable characteristics.\(^{38}\)

If his anti-Russian sentiments were muffled by the untouchable position of the Russian people in Soviet ideology, his love-hate attitude to Stalin, and his personal relationship with Solntseva (who was a Russian “convert” into Ukrainian patriotism), Dovzhenko’s exclusivist understanding of the Ukrainian nation (narod) were best demonstrated in his anti-Jewish sentiments. Whether he was generally antisemitic or not, Dovzhenko felt that Jews did not belong in Ukraine or at least among its cultural elite. As an artist, he concentrated on the beauty and suffering of “his own” people and, when it was possible, ignored the Jewish presence among this people. As a cultural authority, Dovzhenko exhibited strictly negative feelings toward Jews who occupied positions of authority and, according to him, “infiltrated Ukrainian culture.” He wanted to develop Ukrainian culture and believed that only ethnic Ukrainians and their close Slavic brethren could make truly Ukrainian films.\(^{39}\) Before he was eventually denounced by Stalin in 1944 and turned into a half-disgraced writer, Dovzhenko, together with

\(^{38}\) In the context of this self-criticism, one may wonder if Dovzhenko also applied, if subconsciously, his accusation of “national untidiness” to himself in relation to his marriage to Yulia Solntseva, and perhaps also his metaphoric marriage to the Soviet empire and Russian culture. For several examples of such ideas, Dovzhenko, *Ukraiïna v ohni*, 1990, 129, 142-43, 144, 145-46, 188, 191, 192. Dovzhenko’s ethnic understanding of Ukrainian culture and nation (narod) and obsession about working with and creating about ethnic Ukrainians was also revealed in his earlier work and personal documents. See Liber, *Alexander Dovzhenko*, 162-63.

\(^{39}\) For more on Dovzhenko’s antisemitism, see Liber, *Alexander Dovzhenko*, 171-77. Essentializing ethnicity without claiming other nationalities to be inferior and asserting a strong link between national territory and ethnic “spirit” or culture were two crucial aspects of the Soviet and post-Soviet understanding of ethnicity and/or nationality. See Bassin, “Nurter Is Nature”: 872-97. This “ecological” approach to ethnicity resulted in producing and popularizing official and popular discourses akin to the “racial thinking” of Nazism and other fascist regimes, although the concept of biological race was openly denied by Soviet ethnologists in all periods of Soviet history. Weitz, “Racial Politics”: 1-29.
Solntseva, who shared his anti-Jewish prejudice, made their contribution to the construction of the exclusivist, irredentist, and ethnicity-based master narrative of a reunited Ukraine. 40

A year before Dovzhenko arrived in Chernivtsi in early July of 1940, he had already served as a vanguard messenger of Ukrainian culture in the newly annexed Galicia and Volhynia. In 1940, Dovzhenko produced, on the orders of Ukraine’s highest ideological authorities, his first documentary, the film Liberation, about the “reunification” of Western Ukrainian lands in 1939, co-directed by his wife, who at the same time made a film about Bukovina sub-titled “A sketch from the history and ethnography of the region.” 41 Dovzhenko’s Liberation was characterized by a post-Soviet Ukrainian critic as the filmmaker’s artistic fiasco where for the first time he failed to combine the powerful art of a talented director with the required ideological message, letting the latter prevail. 42

Like On the Danube, Liberation is full of the glory of the Red Army, the might of the Soviet state, and the happiness of the miserable but liberated Ukrainians. Its central theme, which seems to be Dovzhenko’s “golden truth” of this film, was “finishing up” with “provincial life,” the life of the small Galician town (inconceivable without its Jewish population) chosen by

40 Solntseva’s antisemitic prejudices were revealed in a lengthy letter to the then deputy People’s commissar of education of Ukraine Fedir Red’ko in which she complained of the politics and actions of the Ukrainian Cinematography department’s head Bol’shakov and his client Liniichuk who succeeded Dovzhenko in the position of the director of Kiev Film Studios (in evacuation in Central Asia). Solntseva drew a picture of the allegedly anti-Ukrainian politics of these leaders and, in this connection, made negative comments about several people with Jewish last names, pointing to or hinting at their alleged anti-Ukrainian sentiments and personal hatred of Dovzhenko. She depicted Dovzhenko, who was fighting to re-install the fired “Ukrainian cadres” who were needed for his work, as the victim of anti-Ukrainian “conspiracy” orchestrated by the Jewish workers of the studio. The text of the letter is published in full in Roman Korohodskyi, Dovzhenko v poloni: rozvidky ta eseï pro Maistra (Kyïv, Helikon: 2000), 206-14.

41 TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 522 (editing script of “Bukovina—zemlia ukrainskaia.”)

42 Korogods’kyi, Dovzhenko v poloni, 225-27.
Dovzhenko to depict the miserable past of the land.\footnote{On “Dovzhenko’s own theme” of finishing up with small-town life, R. Sobolev, \textit{Aleksandr Dovzhenko} (Moscow: Isskusstvo, 1980), 193.} Solntseva’s \textit{Bukovina} was both similar to and different from \textit{Liberation}. Reflecting the gap in public and scholarly knowledge about Northern Bukovina in Soviet Ukraine, and probably Solntseva’s own attitude to this region as to a newly discovered remote national space, her film is informative and observational. Along with the orthodox Soviet narrative of glorious liberation from misery and reunification, its main theme is Bukovina’s ethnography, and its main point—as suggested in the title—is the very assertion of this region’s belonging to Ukrainian historical polity and ethnic culture.

Solntseva painted a quintessentially positive colonialist picture of the exotic “younger brothers” who were close by blood but had to be redeemed from their frightening backwardness. Not surprisingly, the film concentrates heavily on the Hutsuls, whose life scenes open and close the documentary. Solntseva included lengthy footages of folk customs and everyday rural life, largely without commentary. The narrative of oppression and that of historical continuity of belonging to the “Ukrainian domain,” along with further heavy victimization at the hands of an array of foreign oppressors, are artfully intertwined with the ethnographic background. Romanian rule is characterized in the sharp, even demonizing language of national abduction and domination. Solntseva called the period the “black Romanian night” that covered Bukovina and branded Romania “the hell of Europe.”

Solntseva did not “hide” Chernivtsi behind the scenes but rather displayed it as an alien, de-nationalized space and as a nest of foreign exploiters. Against the backdrop of Chernivtsi’s downtown view, the narrator informs the viewers that among the 125,000 residents of this city,
there were 10,000 unemployed, tens of industrial enterprises closed, and no Ukrainian school. Instead, according to the film, there were 4,000 shops and 20,000 markets. “The face of the city,” remarks the narrator with an obviously ironic intonation, “can be recognized by its best buildings,” while the camera shows the residence of Bukovinian metropolitans, hinting at the exploiting role of the church. As the camera moves to the reformist Jewish Temple, the narrator remarks that “capitalists spared no expense on the construction of the synagogue,” before the next frame shows the faces of obviously Jewish men meant to represent the exploiters “sucking the blood of the working Bukovinians.” The next shot shows the city theatre, with a comment: “this beautiful building is a legacy of Austrian rule; nobody remembers what it looks like inside since there was no theatrical company in Chernivtsi.” The only way this statement can be interpreted other than as an obvious lie was that it actually implied the absence of a professional Ukrainian theatrical company in the city. The viewer is also informed that—“incredibly!”—Chernivtsi had 3,000 prostitutes and 100 brothels. The statement is illustrated by a shot of a frivolous-looking woman fixing her stocking in a stereotypically seductive movement. If one considers Dovzhenko’s strong influence on his wife’s work, in the context of his obsession with the image of a violated or disgraced female, who for him represented the raped body national of Ukraine, this image of a prostitute likely signified a strong gendered metaphor of oppressed Bukovina.

44 Note how the false statement about the absence of Ukrainian schools in Chernivtsi traveled between early Soviet narratives about the city, such as the architects’ sketches and the documentary. Private Ukrainian schools did exist in interwar Chernivtsi. See Mariia Mandryk, Ukrains’kyi Natsionalizm, 295-312; Livezeanu, Cultural Politics of Greater Romania; Kvitkov’s’kyi et al, eds. Bukovyna: di mynule i suchasne.

45 TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 522, ark. 5-8.
Next, the narrative turns to the fierce Romanianization policies, urban misery, and the joy of the liberation already familiar from *On the Danube* and earlier printed materials. When later in the film the narrative returns to the city again, Solntseva uses an exotic (“you can only see this in Chernivtsi and nowhere else in the world!”) image of the allegedly legitimate and historical master of this urban space, a Bukovinian peasant in folk costume working as a traffic-controller, followed by a story of the “return” of cultural and educational institutions to Ukrainians. But a female image is used once again, quite powerfully, before Solntseva finally turns to another series of ethnographic observations of the backward branch of the Ukrainian nation in the Carpathians. It is an image of Hutsul women embroidering a red banner with a greeting to Stalin, which became another symbol recurrent in the cultural and historical productions of a later time. Around the time of the film production, a literary sketch connected this image to a real person, a local “folk poetess” Paraska Ambrosii who composed patriotic poems expressing Bukovinians’ love of Ukraine, Soviet Power, and Stalin, and would become a living icon of local “popular creativity” in postwar Bukovina.46

And yet, the main message of the film is not about the liberation; the “golden truth” of this documentary, undoubtedly strongly influenced by Dovzhenko, was proving that Bukovina was a branch of the Ukrainian people and that, by extension, its redemption from backwardness

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46 Ie. Zhurakhovych, Ie. Ratner, “Iak haptuvaly prapor,” in *Na onovlenii zemli. Shcho dala radians’ka vlada trudiaishchym Pivnichnoi Bukovyny* (Chernivtsi: Viddil propahandy i ahitatsii, 1941). The sketch told a romantic story of three sisters, one of whom was handicapped Paraska Ambrosii, who were secretly embroidering a red banner in expectation of the Red Army. This story-image was later repeated in numerous publications, in exhibits of local museums, in the press, and in cinematic productions.
was only possible within the Ukrainian culture and polity, while this backward-thus-primordial-thus-beautiful branch had a redemptive potential for the entire nation:47

For almost 600 years the Ukrainian nation was divided and Bukovina was under the rule of five states. And yet, when you look at any Bukovinian village you will say: this is Ukraine! The oppressors changed… but the people preserved its culture, language, architecture, costume.48

The final part of the film is fully dedicated to this precious preserved culture: the particular form of the archaic hut transferred to church architecture; rural self-taught artists painting portraits of Shevchenko, Franko, and Fed’kovych; the beautiful folk embroidery and wood-carving, the distinct national garb, described in detail and made all by hand and from scratch due to poverty and backwardness described as the “synthesis of all folk art and the art itself,” “worn by a Bukovinian as a banner of protest against the oppressors, just as a soldier wears his arms,” and the “entire ritual of the ancient Ukrainian wedding” that was “fully preserved in Bukovina” and is the subject of the entire fourth part of the film.

The cinematographic genre allowed the filmmaker to emphasize what she and Dovzhenko understood as the major, beautiful “truth” about Bukovina while fully omitting the “details” about the presence of minorities in the region, and even dropping “northern” from the region’s name.49 If ethnographic exhibits and popular texts that claimed scientific accuracy had to mention, in one way or another, the diversity of Bukovina’s population, the film distilled its

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47 Remote borderlands are often constructed by nation-building intellectuals in a twofold manner: as backward parts of the nation in need of elevation to the level of national modernity, and as sites where the unspoiled, original, and primordial national traditions and features are preserved and should be thus cherished and used for the emotional and spiritual development of modern intellectuals and urbanites. See Kürti, *The Remote Borderland.*

48 TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 522, ark. 17

49 Ibid., part 4, ark.22-28.
convenient “truth” from all the information available about the newly annexed region. Moreover, using the powerful combination of narrative and visual material, Solntseva delivered a strong sub-message that could never be uttered in the written language lest Soviet Ukrainian ideology were to sound openly chauvinistic: the national “others” of Bukovina, primarily represented by Jews and Romanians, were conceptualized collectively as the oppressors, enemies, and bloodsuckers.

3. Developing the Details: Published Popular Narratives

One particular feature of Soviet intellectual culture was that there were no distinct boundaries between scholarship, ideology, and even (ideologically correct) fiction, especially in the fields directly related to the construction of historical consciousness. Both scholarship and ideology were understood as flawless and ultimately truthful. These characteristics were usually extended to all kinds of narratives auxiliary to scholarship-ideology, such as popular literature and documentary films, exhibits and journalistic accounts, etc. Statements, messages, and images travelled between various narratives regardless of their official genre, drawing on the same set of ultimate, officially approved sources. Even unquestionably “scholarly” works and official reports often, overtly or covertly, referred to popular works as legitimate sources. For example, an informational report on Chernivtsi’s geography, history, and statistics collected for the “urban passport” required by the Soviet system of central planning stated that “wearing the national costume of Hutsuls was regarded as Bolshevik propaganda” under Romanian rule. It is difficult to think of any other source of such a ridiculous statement but Solntseva’s
comparison of wearing national garb as a “banner of protest against the oppressors.”\textsuperscript{50} The films, particularly when authored by the renowned Dovzhenko or made with his participation, had obviously the widest audiences, and were the most accessible to the masses.\textsuperscript{51} Published works, on the other hand, developed the film’s powerful messages, provided more details, and had more potential usages.

In January 1941, an enthusiastic teacher from Moscow allegedly read an article about Bukovina in the major Soviet newspaper \textit{Pravda} and learned about the newly published brochure \textit{On the Rejuvenated Land}. She immediately wrote to comrade Luchyts’kyi, the head of the propaganda department in Chernivtsi province, asking him to mail her a copy so that she could use it for her lessons on the Soviet constitution. Luchyts’kyi gladly satisfied her request.\textsuperscript{52}

Information that some Moscow school students probably learned as a result of this correspondence was very similar to what other Soviet citizens could gather from Solntseva’s film. The book, however, was authored by less prominent people and consisted of a popular historical sketch, several literary sketches, and an article by Chernivtsi communist party leader Grushet’s’kyi, summarizing the official picture of the allegedly glorious transformation in Bukovina.\textsuperscript{53} His article was illustrated with a familiar image of a Hutsul in folk garb in front of

\textsuperscript{50} DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 165; f.1, op.5, spr.396; f.1, op.9, spr.155 (combined file), ark 8.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Bukovina is Ukrainian Land} was among the “must” cinematographic materials that were being shipped from Kiev to provinces, including Chernivtsi, in 1941. The newly incorporated provinces were undergoing the process of rapid “cinefication” since film was regarded as the ultimate source of delivering the “correct” cultural and ideological messages to the population. DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr.40, ark.12.

\textsuperscript{52} DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr.39, 45, 79, 81, 82, 87, 90, ark. 69-70.

\textsuperscript{53} Grushet’s’kyi noted in his article that under Romanian rule “there were no schools with Ukrainian, Jewish, or Polish language; now there [were] [in the entire province] 458 Ukrainian, 149 Moldavian, 15 Russian, 12 Yiddish, and 2 Polish schools. He wrote that “[in the past] 90% of university students had been sons of Romanian lords” while under Soviet rule the student body supposedly included the children of Ukrainian, Jewish, and Moldavian
the university, surrounded by more urban-looking students, and a formal photograph of a local
worker I. F. Kozachuk who would appear in 1945 in another popular book in the status of a
Hero of the Soviet Union.54

A historical sketch that was included in the brochure tackled the most vulnerable part of
the reunification narrative, asserting, in fierce, almost aggressive language, the historical
belonging of Bukovina to the Ukrainian polity, through linking Bukovina’s history to the major
moments of national historical development accepted by the then official Ukrainian
historiography.55 The author of the sketch, one of the young Soviet missionaries of Ukrainian
culture in Chernivtsi, Dmytro Kosaryk, wrote a history of the suffering of this “sweet piece of
land” constantly desired and claimed by various invaders. Condemning Romanian historians
who had been hiding the true history, he established that “Bukovinians for 1.5 hundred years
(original emphasis) lived together with their brothers Russyn-Ukrainians, creating with them a
single culture, a single state.”56 This glorious “state-building process” was interrupted,
according to the book, by “Turkish imprisonment,” “a great disaster for our land that fell on the
heads of our ancestors.” It was, however, the villain Moldavian princes who really abducted
Bukovina under the cover of the Ottoman Empire. Later, Poles and Turks continuously burned

54 Almanakh Vilna Bukovyna (Chernivtsi, 1945): 49.

55 The founder of modern Ukrainian historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, was banned from the national
pantheon as a bourgeois nationalist. His argument about the continuity of (proto)Ukrainian statehood from Kievan
Rus’ to the Galician-Volhynian principality rather than the Muscovite state and later the Russian Empire, was
rejected by official Soviet historiography. However, Hrushevs’kyi’s premise of basing the history of Ukraine on the
wider masses of people rather than elites and political institutions thus allowing the legitimization of the Ukrainian
nation was transferred to the Soviet variant of Ukrainian historical narrative. For more, see Yekelchyk, Empire of
Memory; Tymothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 125-32.

56 Dmytro Kosaryk, “Na perekhresnykh shliakhах історiї” in Na onovlenii zemli, 7.
villages and cities, including Chernivtsi… “in such conditions culture could not develop. … Bukovinians connected all their happy memories about the past and all the hopes for a [better] future only with Rus’ky people, with what they called Great Ukraine…” 57 The perceived great gatherer of Ukrainian lands, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, and his Cossacks had allegedly made several attempts to reunite the severed Bukovina with the Ukrainian people; thereafter, under Austrian nationality policy, “Polish landlords were sucking the blood of Ukrainians.” 58 The worst, of course, came with Romanian rule, wrote Kosaryk. Romanians established an oppressive regime and wanted to erase the name Bukovina which Kosaryk fully appropriated for the Soviet Ukrainian narrative. Romanians were assisted, according to the sketch, by the traitors of their own people, Ukrainian “bourgeois-nationalists,” who sold their souls to the phony Romanian democracy. 59

Along with connecting the history of Bukovina to that of mother-Ukraine, Kosaryk’s important mission was to establish appropriate local heroes. Accordingly, the book proclaimed Lukian Kobylytsia, the leader of a local revolt during the revolution of 1848-1849, “the legendary hero, the leader of freedom-loving and freedom-fighting, courageous Hutsuls” (as opposed to the backward, naïve peasants brainwashed by monarchical propaganda). 60 The scarcity of militant heroes was compensated for by cultural activists who were developing the culture in the impossible conditions of oppression: responding to the call of Ukrainian national

57 Na onovlenii zemli, 8-9.

58 Ibid., 10.

59 Note that the appropriation of the regional designation “Bukovina” by Soviet Ukrainian cultural authorities was in contrast with Romanian authorities’ fierce attack on “bukovinism” in the interwar years and almost complete erasure of this regional name in the postwar Romania.

60 Na onovlenii zemli, 13-14.
bards such as Kotliarevsky and Shevchenko, local apostle Yuri Fed’kovych who allegedly rose from the mass of heroic Hutsuls. He was followed by several others, including the rising star, “the mountain she-eagle” Ol’ha Kobylians’ka who “raised highly the honour of the toiling women and toilers in general …” 61

Kosaryk explained the discrepancy between the ethnographic claims for Bukovina and the non-Ukrainian character of its capital:

Especially strong were traces of Romanian lordship in Chernivtsi. This is an ancient Ukrainian town whose belonging to Ukraine is proved by its very name. Romanian boyars began to call it differently—Cernăuți, although 95% of the Bukovinian population called it Chernivtsi. Occupiers changed street names, built monuments to some activists Bukovinians had not even heard of. The Ukrainian word was totally pushed away from the city. In the theatre, in meetings, in cinemas, in the press, in libraries, everywhere, one could hear only the Romanian and German languages. A Ukrainian arriving to this city would feel as if he were abroad, although this city stayed on Ukrainian land.

The city had luxury for the bourgeoisie, prisons for political prisoners, and great unemployment. Nobody cared about the unemployed. 62

Thus, Romania was held responsible for de-Ukrainianizing the “ancient Ukrainian town” of Chernivtsi, and its Jewish-German character could be considered dropped into an Orwellian black hole if not for the brief slip about the German language.

Other prewar publications replicated the interpretation advanced in the brochure On the Rejuvenated Land with little variation. 63 Party authorities in Kiev orchestrated and controlled

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61 Ibid., 15, 26.
62 Ibid., 26-27. This was one of the rare references to spoken German in early Soviet publications about Chernivtsi.
63 For a survey of these publications, see Frunchak, Studying the Land.
the creation of these detailed narratives about the newly incorporated Chernivtsi province. For example, spurred by the need for the local knowledge deemed necessary to make their representations more convincing, Kiev propaganda authorities requested in April of 1941 that the Chernivtsi party committee create a commission to gather materials for a two-volume upcoming publication called “Prominent Places of Ukraine.” The commission had to include locals “who [knew] well the past of the region” and had to prepare, in the short span of five days, a list of cities, villages, and places according to the following criteria: 1. places important for general history; 2. the history of the revolutionary movement; 3. the history of the civil war; 4. the history of culture; 5. art monuments; and 6. places connected with the residence of prominent people. As they selected dead and living heroes as well as useful fellow-travellers among local Ukrainians, Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi had to decide what was appropriate (or appropriable) and useful (or usable) from what already was a rather selective Ukrainian representation of the locale. Most of the written sources accessible to the Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi were the Ukrainian-language products of the local “conscious Ukrainians” that represented a specific Bukovinian nationalist narrative about the region.

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64 DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr.39, 45, 79, 81, 82, 87, 90, ark.51

65 One of the most representative collections of sources about Bukovina and Chernivtsi, compiled by Soviet authorities in 1940–1941, consisted mostly of Romanian editions of the interwar period, including writings of local Rusyn-Ukrainian activist Ie. Vorobkevych who ultimately did not get onto the list of accepted progressive local Ukrainians. The file contained considerably fewer materials dating from Austrian period, and was supplemented by freshly collected statistics provided by the Provincial Department of People’s Economy and the Land Department. The narrative prepared for the reports to the centre represented a geographical description infused with Soviet Ukrainian ideology; it outlined Romanians’ “violent” exploitation of natural resources and population and fierce Romanianization and oppression of Ukrainians. Nationality statistics distinguished between Romanians and Moldavians, according to the newly updated Soviet hierarchy of nationalities that now included the Soviet nationality of Moldavians who had been granted their own Union Republic. DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 165; f.1, op.5, spr.396; f.1, op.9, spr.155 (combined file), ark. 1-8.
The general claim and theme of this local Ukrainian narrative could be and was appropriated for Soviet cultural constructs, but this appropriation was a complicated process full of dangers posed by “nationalist-bourgeois” traps fraught with repressive consequences for both the local candidates for promotion and Soviet cultural missionaries. Selecting data was closely related to selecting people. Local officials chose to promote El’pidefor Panchuk, the son-in-law of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka, from his modest position of library assistant to the position of the director of Chernivtsi University research library. They also included him in the delegation of workers from Bukovina sent to Moscow in August 1940, and actively involved him in the creation of the official narrative about Bukovina, although his nationalist convictions were probably strong enough for Stalinist authorities to have him denounced as a bourgeois nationalist, as were many others from his former social circle. However, although Panchuk’s convictions and connections did cause doubts and suspicions on several occasions, it seems that he was never arrested or otherwise persecuted.

How the need to collaborate with local Ukrainian activists intersected with the lack of trust in and even respect for these people can be observed from the following case. Sometime during the “first Soviet year,” a cultural specialist from Kiev, Orest Rovinsky, received an assignment to publish a popular book about Northern Bukovina. He allegedly began to conduct research and collect materials in collaboration with Panchuk, who claimed to have previously written a draft of such an educational publication which the co-authors planned to adjust to the new Soviet needs. Later on, Rovinsky—according to his interpretation of the case—became disappointed with Panchuk’s manuscript which looked to him like mere translations of Kaindl
and other German-language authors. Rovinsky allegedly broke his agreement with Panchuk and went to the Lviv archives to conduct research.

In spring 1941, Rovinsky, it seems, submitted his book for publication. According to Panchuk, however, Rovinski obtained from him the manuscript that Panchuk had translated especially for publication, disappeared with it, and used the manuscript without citing Panchuk as a co-author, a matter about which the new director of the Chernivtsi library complained to the provincial party leadership. A lengthy correspondence that followed reveals modest attempts by the Chernivtsi party leadership to advocate for “their” local activist, and a strongly-worded defence by Rovinsky who criticized Panchuk’s sources and methods of research. Rovinski claimed to base most of his book not on historical material but on oral conversations and newspaper articles that he collected in the villages.66

In the end, the Soviet authorities accepted local Ukrainian knowledge about the region, amended with ideologically correct Stalinist structures, into the Soviet narrative to a much larger degree than they accepted the few local bearers of this knowledge into the new cultural, and even less so, political establishment. Soviet Ukrainian nationalism had limits, and its most rigid limit was the condition of the full acceptance of Ukraine’s loyalty to the USSR and the concept of the friendship of peoples. Very few local Ukrainians complied with this condition. Exception was made for the living icon of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka, whose actual position did not matter, or for living “ethnographic artifacts” like Hutsuls whose generic image was exhibited in Moscow and Leningrad, on the screen, and in numerous published materials: their political “immaturity” was

66 The fate of the publication is not clear; most probably it never came out because the war broke out in June 1941. DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr. 39, 45, 79, 81, 82, 87, 90 (combined), ark.53-62. For more on Panchuk’s position and attitudes to the local activists, see chapter three.
excused on the grounds of their extreme backwardness.\textsuperscript{67} Fulfilling the dream of a handful of Ukrainian nationalists in Bukovina, Nosenko, Kosaryk, Solntseva, and other authors of the early Soviet narratives created, with the modest participation of selected locals, popular representations that promoted Ukrainian culture in Chernivtsi province to the position of absolute domination, established the importance of Bukovina for the unity and national consolidation of Ukraine, and launched the marginalization of the region’s previously dominant German-language culture that was to be realized, to the point of full eradication, in the postwar era.

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Soviet narratives about Bukovina constructed and promoted in 1940-1941 were consumed not only by Soviet activists and some segments of the wider Soviet population but also—voluntarily or not—by the residents of Chernivtsi. For many of them, the idea of Bukovina, and particularly Chernivtsi, as a Ukrainian national space was even more novel than the notion of their alleged “brethren” in the rest of Ukraine. The difference between the consumers of these exhibits inside and outside of Chernivtsi province was the ability of the former to compare the official narratives with reality, as they saw it. The following chapter examines the relationship between the dynamic and liminal urban structure of Chernivtsi and a new myth created for it—a myth that had a pretence of dominance and ultimate knowledge, a

\textsuperscript{67} Interest in symbolic representations of Hutsul art was very high among the central authorities and their representatives in Chernivtsi. In the fall of 1940, Moscow requested that local authorities sell a set of Hutsul costumes to the representative of the USSR state ensemble of song and dance who was preparing Hutsul dance performances. DACHo, f.1, op.11, spr. 79, ark 37. The director of Chernivtsi House of People’s Arts was himself entrusted with preparing a show of Bukovinian art at the All-Union Exhibition of People’s Economy in Moscow. Ibid, ark.38. The House of People’s Arts also regularly staged folk dance and music concerts in city parks and other public spaces, and initiated the opening performances for provincial Party conferences Ibid., akr. 38, 42.
myth that was Manichean and incompatible with a multiplicity of already existing interpretations.
Chapter Three

Cultural Revolution

Interpreted as the reunification of Northern Bukovina with Soviet Ukraine, the sovietization of the province in the 1940s was a particular type of colonization that used “cultural revolution”—an official term in party parlance and local Soviet historiography—as its primary tool. The process of sovietization of local society was inseparable from the reinterpretation and redistribution of local space in early Soviet Chernivtsi according to the new social and ethnic classifications of local society. This chapter examines how the actual colonization project—often perceived by the new rulers as penetration of the local urban structure—was implemented by the strong, repressive Soviet empire-state in the name of the Ukrainian nation, in the Ukrainian language, and more often than not by the hands of Ukrainians from Eastern and Central Ukraine.¹

One of the biggest challenges of the Stalinist state was reconciling the ideologies of state-sponsored nation-building with the new interpretation of socialist internationalism and universalism—the concept of the Soviet friendship of peoples. This controversy was partially

¹ The list of the highest communist authorities of Chernivtsi province who had access to secret documents was made up exclusively of individuals whose nationality was given as "Ukrainian" and whose names suggested Ukrainian background: Grushetskii Ivan Samoilovich, First Communist Party secretary; Zeleniuk Ivan Stepanovich, Second Communist Party secretary; Ocheretianyi Vladimir Trofimovich, Third Communist Party secretary; Luchytskyi Iosif Danylovich, Propaganda secretary; Fialkovskyi Vasili Andreevich, Cadre secretary; Trukhan Andrei Ostapovich, head of the special sector (osobyi sektor) (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.66); from 17 “responsible workers” of the province party committee, 15 were Ukrainians, 1 Russian, and 1 Belorussian (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.69, ark. 2).
resolved by the principle “national in form, socialist in content” which was implemented, by and large, in its reversed form: “Soviet socialist in form, national in content.” In Chernivtsi, which was a borderland and a largely cosmopolitan urban space, Stalinist Ukrainian sovietization was further challenged by the incongruence between the universal assumptions of the republican leaders about the project of Ukrainian sovietization and a complex local reality.

Instead of facing the challenging but straightforward task of “redeeming” the “progressive” Ukrainian elements from the dominance of their foreign oppressors and the infiltration by “alien” (but also Ukrainian) bourgeois nationalist elements, Soviet newcomers were perplexed by a knot of convoluted relations between various local social, economic, and ethnic/cultural communities and identifications that could not be easily aligned along the familiar “nationality” and “class” markers. The new leaders faced what Homi Bhabha called the “incommensurable contradictions” of a borderland zone. Gupta and Fergusson aptly noted that Marxist and other structuralist understandings of cultural change, in general, assume the existence of a primeval local community characterized by cultural and economic autonomy, later violated by world capitalism. The Soviet and particularly Stalinist ideology went far in imagining this primordial, pre-capitalist community as inherently “national” and characterized by a strong link between “culture” and territory. Soviet ideologues constructed the universal condition of progressive historical development in local terms that had to be national, that is, to belong to a particular national unit with its culture and territory.

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4 For more on the Soviet approach to nationalities and the role of nation-building in Soviet ideology, see works by Martin, Slezkine, Suny, Weitz, and Francine Hirsch quoted in the previous chapters.
For Soviet leaders, then, the transformation they were embarking on in Chernivtsi was a matter of finding contact with the allegedly native Ukrainian culture territorialized in the newly annexed province and city, and elevating it, through support and purification, to the level of mainstream Soviet Ukrainian culture and society. They had to work in conditions often described in anthropology and other social and medical sciences as liminal, understood as a transitional time or situation in which a person, group, or territory is not what it was and not what it will become, but something in between, marginal, vague, and flexible. Employing the notion of liminality bears the potential danger of misrepresenting societies and cultures as normally stable and homogeneous and only temporarily “disrupted” by cultural contacts and transition. However, without subscribing to the binary understanding of cultures and societies as universally “stable” vs. abnormally “transitory” but rather viewing them as universally interconnected hierarchically, “liminality” describes very aptly the perception of Chernivtsi by Soviet leaders in 1940-1941 and the attitudes, social relations, and everyday practices that Soviet newcomers developed as a result of their self-perceived liminal condition in the city.


6 For more on the usefulness of approaching cultural transformation and border zones as a universal condition of post-modern society, see Gupta and Fergusson, “Beyond “Culture”: 6-23.
1. Challenges and Opportunities of a Liminal City

Soviet officials referred to the transitory nature of the space they were in charge of as a “special condition,” stressing its temporary nature. The closeness of the physical border and the comparative autonomy of the society that had been left behind by one state power and not yet penetrated by the other created multiple possibilities and choices, or at least the illusion thereof, for both locals and newcomers. The borderland position of this space forged a sense, or an illusion, of exit, while the transitional atmosphere of the first months of Soviet rule provided opportunities that were unknown, limited, or strictly regulated in the Soviet “mainland.” These opportunities included “discovering” a better office or apartment for Soviet newcomers, engaging in multiple short-term personal relationships, claiming a convenient national or class identity before it was fixed in personal documents, and hiding the past in order to attain a better future.

These opportunities were often derived from manipulating the mutual ignorance of the locals and Soviet newcomers about each other’s worlds. This ignorance, though, bore unknown dangers along with potentially beneficial prospects for both groups. Locals often converted into power their knowledge of the urban space, infrastructure, or the German and Romanian languages, while the newcomers utilized their knowledge of the Soviet system, ideological twists (“double-speak,” vague ideological notions and messages), or the Ukrainian and Russian

\[\text{References to the “special conditions” of the city in connection to its recent “capitalist past” and the lack of knowledge about local population and institutions were typical in 1940–1941. For examples of references to “special conditions”, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.27, ark.4; DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.35, ark. 2-3.}\]
languages. Both groups, however, were fearful of the similar power of knowledge in the hands of “the other side.” For many locals the liminality of the first post-annexation months translated primarily into the notion of choice between staying under the new political regime or seeking one of the still available but slowly closing exit channels to “the other side of the border.” In Soviet party jargon, this twilight-zone quality of Chernivtsi was most frequently discussed in terms of the widespread diseases of opportunism and “liquidation moods” among Soviet newcomers as well as the issues of border and state security. The former was the result of the discomfort caused by the lack (real and perceived) of the latter.

Soviet authorities often had good reasons to feel uncomfortable, unsettled, and helpless in Chernivtsi province. The new Soviet-Romanian border was officially open for crossing for five days in 1940, from 28 June to 5 July. However, its official closure did not stop individual and mass border crossings in both directions, and this became one of the biggest problems in 1940-1941 for Chernivtsi Soviet leaders and their superiors in Kiev and Moscow. According to the calculations made by Chernivtsi-based historian Vasyli Kholodytskyi, 1,100 people had attempted to flee Northern Bukovina to Romania by December of 1940 and 7,000 did so by

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8 Many former residents of Chernivtsi remember the early months of Soviet rule in 1940 as a time of making extremely difficult choices about their future when available information was restricted and when opportunities were becoming increasingly limited as weeks and months passed. An excellent review of the perceptions and recollections of this time by former local Jews can be found in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 99-116.

9 The almost paranoid fear of capitalist encirclement among the Soviet leadership and wider society at the time added to the general atmosphere of mutual suspicion and the culture of widespread denunciations. This ethos was particularly strong in border regions and even more so in the new borderlands where leaders were restlessly reminding their subordinates and ordinary party flock to be extra vigilant in order to keep the province “locked.” (Good examples can be found in DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.27). The province’s party leader Gruchets’kyi noted in a typical speech: “We need to have the highest communist vigilance… Over a cup of tea, over a glass of wine these people [locals] try to influence our communists…” (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.30, 31,32, 33, ark.4.)

10 Passat, “Evakuatsiia nemetskikh kolonistov”: 89.
June of 1941. 11 Soviet reports claimed that during the first five months of Soviet rule, 471 people crossed the border from only three border districts of the province; 628 more left from non-border districts, including the city of Chernivtsi. 12 There was no correlation between the (presumed or claimed) nationality of the refugees and their numbers, Ukrainians deciding in favour of Romania as often as others. 13

Some cases took the form of organized mass marches led by local priests, in which women and children walked in front of large crowds of peasants to prevent border guards from shooting. Whether conceptualized as meaningful political resistance to Soviet power out of national conviction and desire for “freedom” or as a less politicized strategy of everyday survival, locals who chose to cross the borders in Chernivtsi province were certainly making choices that, to them, were important enough to risk their lives. 14 On 1 April 1941, such a


12 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark. 4, 94; f.1, op.1, spr. 28, ark. 114-16; f.1, op. 1, spr. 51, 52, ark. 1-3.

13 For example, all 61 members in a group of refugees from the mountainous district of Putyla were identified by Soviet officials as Ukrainians. See V. Kholodnyts’kyi, M. Zahainyi, and B. Bilets’kyi, “Represyvnі aktsiї Radians’koї vlady na teritorii Chernivets’koї ablasti v 1940–1941 rokakh,” Pytannia istorii Ukrainy 1 (Chernivtsi, 1997): 220. (According to pre-Soviet statistical reports and ethnographic studies of Bukovina, Putyla district was dominated by Ukrainians.)

14 This pattern of organized peasant resistance is similar to the typical reactions of peasants in other regions of the USSR to the collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s–early 1930s. The comparison becomes particularly meaningful in view of Lynne Viola’s understanding of collectivization as an internal colonization of peasant society and culture. See Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin. Sheila Fitzpatrick also argued that Soviet peasants never fully accepted collectivization, resisting it, mostly passively, during and after the collectivization campaign. See her Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). If the choices for peasants of the inner regions of the country were more limited and often lead to what scholars tend to identify as “passive resistance,” it seems that residents of the borderland regions viewed their location as an exit opportunity that gave them a chance to change their destinies in a more radical way. Mass border crossings also occurred during the collectivization campaign of the early 1930s, causing international embarrassment for Stalin and the ruling circle. For a recent summary, see Snyder, Bloodlands, 30 .

Note that politicization of the mass border crossing in national-patriotic terms is common in today’s local historiography of Chernivtsi province. The works of Vasyl’ Kholodnyts’kyi quoted above are good examples of such an approach.
march in the border village of Bila Krynysia ended with a massacre that took the lives of as many as 200 individuals.15

At the same time, refugees from Romania, who were trying to reunite with their families, hoping for a better future under the Soviet regime, or just desperate to escape the persecution of Jews and political “enemies,” continued to cross the border in the opposite direction. Although many of these refugees were arrested and sentenced for border violations, many did manage to arrive and remain in freedom during the early months of Soviet rule. Unlike the scenes from Solntseva’s documentary where Bukovinians returning from Romania to their liberated motherland were depicted as being warmly welcomed, these people, even if they were not considered “enemies” by default, presented a problem for the newly appointed communist leader of Chernivtsi province Ivan Grushets’kyi and his colleagues. In December of 1940, Chernivtsi province’s first party secretary wrote to the then Ukrainian party leader Khrushchev, based on a report of the local department of the Soviet secret police, Chernivtsi NKVD (NKVS in Ukrainian):

…every day 10-15 families of refugees arrive from Romania; some are Romanians but mostly they are Jews. They escape pogroms and discrimination; most of them with false papers

15 In Bila Krynysia, a group of 2,000 local residents asked for emigration documents and after being refused started moving toward the border, with priests and women with children ahead of the crowd. Up to 200 people died after border guards opened fire. Upon an NKVD-lead investigation, the initiators and leaders of this mass action were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Kholodnyts’kyi et al, “Represyvni aktsiï Radians’koï vlady,” 220-22. Grushets’kyi reported to Khrushchev about a similar mass border crossing in Hertsa district on 16 and 17 November of the same year, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 51, 52, ark. 1-3. “Pro-Romanian moods” and constant border crossings became an issue of particular importance for the provincial leadership and were discussed directly with Moscow. One party official noted during a working meeting in September: “I got a call from comrade Petrov from Moscow; he says that they have raised a big noise and there will be thunder and lightning. [They] need to finally agree among themselves whether we [Ukrainian SSR] are keeping the Romanian villages and build our work accordingly” (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31,32, 33, ark. 93.) He referred to the issue of the border between Moldavia and Ukraine that was still not finalized at the time of the meeting.
documenting birth in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina which can be easily obtained (bought) in Romania. There are revolutionaries among them but also suspicious people, possibly spies.

The provincial leader wondered where to locate them (he considered it dangerous to locate them in the border province) and asked Kiev for money to provide for them as they all arrived “with empty hands.” At the same time, he and his colleagues reproached border officials for “accepting” these people at the border given that “the transfer [of refugees] had been finished long ago.”

Although accustomed to being allegedly surrounded by hidden internal enemies under Stalin’s rule, Soviet newcomers found the liminal zone where they lived and tried to work to be especially dangerous. Here, potential enemies were constantly moving across the border, exiting and entering under various identities, possessing the power of local knowledge, and fully capable of damaging the image of Soviet power in the eyes of the real, open “enemies” abroad, and thus assisting in a possible violent invasion.

16 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.51, 52, ark. 6; Also, see “A list of persons who arrived by false documents from Romania and live in Chernivtsi,” with places of birth and other data. The list includes 38 persons, one identified as Greek and the rest as Jewish (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.134, ark. 33-8. These people arrived officially through the KPP (border control point) in November and December of 1940. A note accompanying the list said that their Romanian passports were false and that efforts were being made to find out if there were more such people in the city. Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied territories arrived in Chernivtsi by different routes. For example, one group arrived from the neighbouring Kamenets-Podoskyi province of Ukraine where they had previously arrived illegally by crossing the new Soviet-Polish (actually Soviet-German) border. During the investigation, party officials in Kam’ianets-Podil’skyi noted that these people “had compromised themselves and [later] got work in Chernivtsi without any appointing/reference documents” (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.134, ark.10-11.) These persons might have been trying to escape one of several Soviet mass deportation operations in 1940 that targeted specifically former Polish citizens from the newly annexed borderlands (see Snyder, Bloodlands, 151; Polian, Against Their Will). Contemporary Ukrainian historians largely agree that all refugees from Romania were automatically arrested and deported to Soviet labour camps. For example, see Kholodnyts’kyi, “Vplyv politychnykh protsesiv na demohrafichni vtraty”: 170. Archival materials that I studied indicate, though, that treatment of such refugees became harsher with time and the practice of arrests became standard only after the first months of Soviet power in the province passed. Note that Yulia Solntseva included in her documentary a view of a crowd carrying luggage moving toward the border, with a comment “These are our people, Bukovinians. Romanians took them away by force when they were leaving Bukovina, but these people returned to their motherland” (“Bukovina- zemlia Ukrainskaia,” TsDAKFFD Ukraine, file 522, scene 55-56).
Closely related to the issue of pathological insecurity of this borderland space was the problem of prostitution. Indicative of the transitory, non-transparent, and allegedly unhealthy society, the image of the prostitute was constantly on the mind of Soviet leaders in Chernivtsi. The “fallen” woman, depicted so graphically in Solntseva’s movie, was seen as the bearer of the double danger of connection with the bourgeois enemy as well as the more mundane problem of spreading sexually-transmitted diseases among the Soviet people. Therefore, the “liquidation” of the “remnants of prostitution” was among the first tasks of the Soviet leadership, a task identified as “sanitary-defensive work.”

The use of military terminology was not just a powerful rhetorical tool: Soviet military personnel were the most eager consumers of local sexual services. As a result, most of the sanitary-defensive projects were joint initiatives of the local Red Army leadership and health-care departments under strict guidance of the provincial, city, and district party committees. Red Army soldiers and local prostitutes, including those who “abandoned their old trade” and were mastering “honest” professions, became the patients of the new “skin and sexually-transmitted diseases hospital,” one of the first health-care institutions to be established in the challenging process of matching existing local facilities with general Soviet prescriptions.17 Local party

17 Grushets’kyi thought it was crucial to organize a “vendispenser,” a “skin and sexually-transmitted diseases hospital of a closed type.” In his correspondence with the healthcare department and his leaders in Kiev, he quoted available statistics: 40 percent of 6,750 Chernivtsi’s prostitutes fled to Romania, but from the remaining 60 percent, 40 percent were sick with STDs. In his mind, this represented a big danger for the Red Army soldiers. Grushets’kyi personally worked with different organizations to provide the STD hospital with an appropriate building. See DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.37 and f.1, op. 5, spr.89, 143 (a combined file containing 1940 materials on healthcare); Grushets’kyi’s report to Kiev in f.1, op.1, spr. 39, ark.9.

Other high-priority projects in the realm of health-care were organizing a TB hospital and a long-term care facility for mentally ill. The latter was envisioned by Grushets’kyi as a colony where the mentally ill could work “for the benefit of society since they are exceptionally able-bodied” (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 37 and f.1, op.5, spr.89, 143 [combined], ark. 2.) Decision-making about this facility is indicative of the vagueness of guidance that the local party leadership received from central (Kievan) institutions and the degree of freedom they had in the
leaders appealed to a wide range of organizations to mount a total war against prostitution and infection. The war involved traditional Stalinist methods: NKVD- and militia-led investigations based on surveillance and denunciations in order to “identify the sources of disease.”

Grushets’kyi also ordered the organization of several public “show trials” of the most stubborn prostitutes and pimps as well as their most persistent clients. At the same time, local leaders were reminded once again to conduct sufficient educational work among their rank-and-file to raise their consciousness about personal moral and physical hygiene.18

While working in these complex “special conditions” that were supposedly temporary, Soviet rulers in Chernivtsi had to embark on the long-term project of the Soviet Ukrainian transformation of local society.19 Soon, Soviet authorities realized that local social relations and networks were inseparable from local space. Together, urban space and local residents created an urban structure that Soviet rulers had to subjugate. For Grushets’kyi and his colleagues, altering the local population according to Soviet Ukrainian standards was an immense and vital task that included not only re-education and change of consciousness but also, if need be, resettlement and deportation. The space, and particularly urban space, was non-movable and too valuable to destroy. Indeed, both leaders and rank-and-file party officials understood that Soviet

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18 The provincial militia head, the chief provincial prosecutor, and the provincial NKVD department were all personally asked to unite in leading the fight against organized prostitution (DAChO, f.72, op.1, spr. 13, ark.2, 17-18, 20.)

19 In a typical pronouncement in this respect, Grushets’kyi said on 21 October 1940 at a joint provincial meeting of the Communist party and the Komsomol: “On the next tasks … in the mass work in the city and in villages: we need to re-construct (perebuduvaty) the ideology of a petty owner into a communist consciousness,” stressing “…the historical work of rebirth of a people with capitalist views into conscious poor people (bidniaky) with socialist views” (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.30, 31,32, 33, ark. 23, 4.)
power inherited “great,” “colossal” riches in Chernivtsi, including shops, storehouses full of goods, and buildings. To the Soviet leaders, the importance of the material and infrastructural value of the city was in contradiction to the city’s aesthetic incongruity with the principles of Soviet urbanism.

Before a proper Soviet redesign of this “bulwark of merchant capitalism and degenerate bourgeois culture”—to use a typical expression of the time—could be launched, the urban space in question had to be appropriated by the new authorities from the locals and redistributed among the official agencies and the city’s population, old and new. The population, in turn, had to be sorted out, identified, and assigned living and working space, be it in Chernivtsi or in Siberia (where many locals eventually ended up). People and space were inseparable. The Soviet regime, with its extensive apparatus of cadres, had to move in, literally and metaphorically, to Chernivtsi, and find a way to share the city with its locals. In a single but complex transformation, thus, Soviet power in Chernivtsi faced the tasks of “penetrating”—to use, again, an expression that party-state functionaries utilized frequently in the inner party and bureaucratic discussions in Chernivtsi—local space, ascribing new identities to existing people, buildings, and socio-economic structures, and making them operate in a new mode.

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20DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark.94; f.1, op.1, spr. 28, ark.81.
2. Locating Ukrainian Culture: “Cultural Revolution” and Symbolic Space Distribution

Theoretically, space redistribution was in accord with the official Soviet narratives of Ukrainian “reunification” based on the premise of emancipating local Ukrainian culture and its bearers from national and social oppression. By decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from 15 August 1940, land, big industry, banks, large trade enterprises, and railway transport in the regions of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and Izmail county were socialized (natsionalizovani). On 19 August, the Ukrainian Supreme Council issued a mirror decree, thus legitimizing the new regime and its major transformative act by means of a national institution and legal discourse. With the exception of the land, the largest parts of these riches—industrial enterprises, residential and public real estate, and the urban space as a symbolic representation of progressive civilization—were located in Chernivtsi and its immediate surroundings. The decree on socialization claimed urban space for the Soviet regime and, nominally, for the “people.” In reality, Soviet state still had to acquire and assimilate this space.

The immediate practical task of Grushets’kyi and his team was to allocate space to the organs of power such as party committees, local Soviets, and NKVD departments as well as

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21 According to the official reports, while implementing the decree, the Soviet power socialized 836,300 hectares of land, 318 industrial enterprises, 4 banks, 27 enterprises of communal services, 853 trade enterprises, 6,170 large real estate holdings, 5 transport depots, 46 railway stations with all transport, and 2,100 km of telephone and telegraph connections in Chernivtsi oblast. By the end of 1940, 318 industrial enterprises had supposedly been reorganized into 225 larger ones, including 8 of the central subordination, 150 of republican subordination, and 67 of local subordination. For example, see Dikusarov et al, eds., Narysy istoriï Chernivets’koiï oblasnoii partiinoii orhanizatsii, 31.

22 Decree of the Ukrainian Soviet of People’s Commissars (Radnarkom) # 1123 of 19 August 1940 on socialization of industrial enterprises, DACHO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 19; f.1, op. 5, spr. 137.
organizations in direct service to the party-state: newspapers, militia, and administrative organizations created right after or even before the incorporation of the region. Proper housing for the party-state and other official organs was a practical necessity but also a representational matter: it demonstrated who was in power and that power was real; it also illustrated, or translated into local space, the hierarchy of the Soviet power structure and its general ethos.

The distribution of buildings to the highest authorities in the city clearly followed the pattern of location of the earlier, Romanian (and Austrian) administration. The “real power”—initially povit, or county, and later oblast, or provincial committee, of the CP(b)U popularly known by the abbreviation Obkom—moved into the building of the former royal administration, the key authority in the region during centralized Romanian rule.23 The Obkom shared its building with the city party committee, Mis'vekkom, and the provincial committee of the communist youth organization, Komsomol. The more symbolic bodies of Soviet power inherited the locations of those local city and provincial government bodies that had played secondary roles: the provincial Soviet Executive Committee, Oblvykonkom, occupied the former Palace of Justice and the city Executive Committee, Mis'kvkonkom, was located in the historical city hall.24

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23 Between the annexation of Northern Bukovina and 7 August 1940, the old administrative division remained in place and the first Soviet organs and organizations were created within Chernivtsi and Khotyn counties. On 7 August, a decree of the Supreme Soviet’s executive committee created Chernivtsi and Akkerman (renamed Izmail in December 1940) provinces. See, for example Botushansky, 2005, 646-47 and 683-84 for abstracts of the relevant decrees. All the administrative units and organizations were restructured and renamed “provincial” accordingly.

24 On 4 July 1940 the Central Committee of the CP(b)Ukr SSR officially approved the bureaus of Chernivtsi and Khotyn county Party Committees, headed by first secretaries Ivan Grushets'kyi and V. Chuchukalo, respectively. On 20 August 1940, Grushets'kyi became the first secretary of the newly created Chernivtsi province in place of the two counties. Also, three town and nineteen district committees were established, three of them in Chernivtsi. The first primary party organizations in the province were created in July. According to the officially reported statistics, by 25 September there were 70 primary organizations in Chernivtsi with 819 communists; by the end of 1940, Chernivtsi had 1,408 communists (1,089 members and 319 candidates). By the end of November 1940, 216
The provincial NKVD, which was the last Soviet structure to be created in Chernivtsi, occupied the building of the Romanian state security police, Siguranța, among others, while its city department was given a former luxury apartment on the city’s central pedestrian street, the former Herrengasse and later Ianku Flondor Street. Residents of the apartment were relocated by a special order of the city Soviet. The newly arrived Soviet and party authorities certainly appreciated the lavish accommodations and other luxuries available in Chernivtsi.

The new authorities’ next urgent task was housing the major institutions of culture; educational, social, and health-care organizations were, it seems, last in line. Continuities in the allocation of space to educational organizations were nonetheless prescribed by the centre and demanded by local authorities, wherever and whenever possible. For example, by the end of 1940, primary party organizations officially existed in the entire province. Dikusarov et al, eds., Narysy istoriï Chernivs’koï oblasnoi partiinoï orhanizatsiï, 24-25.

I am thankful to Natalia Shevchenko who pointed to me the clear continuity in the distribution of “power space” in the city.

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25 The oblast NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) department was created only on 1 September 1941. Kholodnytskyi, Zahainyi, Biletskyi, “Represyvni aktsii radians’koi vlady”, 217.

26 DACHO, f.72, op.1, spr.2, ark.35. Provincial party committee leaders apparently found the building of the royal administration too spartan and ordered an elevator to be transferred to the building from one of the apartment houses on the central pedestrian street (Ianku Flondor, the former Herrenhasse) (DACHO, f.72, op.1, spr.2, ark.59). One can assume that the elevator was a necessity for the organization’s daily operations that demanded fast action, secrecy, and dealing with inmates weakened by the interrogations and possibly torture.

27 DACHO, f.1, op. 11, spr. 80, 31, 49, 52, 58, 130, 132, 147 (combined). For example, in August of 1940, the employment bureau still had no room, despite the loud rhetoric prioritizing struggle with unemployment in the official discourse. The specialists in unemployment reduction complained about working in a corner under stairs in the City Soviet building (ark.1-3).

28 The decree of the Ukrainian Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom, or Radnarkom in Ukrainian) “On reorganization of the popular education system in the newly organized Akkerman and Chernivtsi provinces” from 13 August 1940 prescribed the reorganization of local primary and secondary educational system into a Soviet network of schools. The four-year prymara (primary) schools were transformed into primary schools; the seven-year prymara schools to non-complete secondary schools; general and commercial “pro-gymnasiums” to non-complete secondary schools; gymnasiums to complete secondary schools. The first four classes of teachers’ seminaries were transformed to non-complete secondary schools; students of the last four classes of seminaries were moved to teachers’ schools. Theological seminaries were to be liquidated along with parochial schools and gymnasiums and their students were moved to non-complete secondary schools according to their places of
of September, most buildings of former state and private educational institutions in Chernivtsi
and the province were being used for 629 newly created Soviet schools.29

Decision-making about the organization of theatres in Chernivtsi is particularly revealing
about the early Soviet Cultural Revolution in the city. When a brigade from the Arts
Departments from Moscow and Kiev ordered the organization of three theatres in the city, the
Chernivtsi county executive committee decided to locate the Jewish theatre in one of the former
Jewish cultural institutions and the prospective Russian musical comedy (ultimately never
created) in the building of the former modern large cinema “Scala.” The major theatre building
of Bukovina (the city Opera under Austrian rule and the National theatre under the Romanians)
was given to the Ukrainian State Drama Theatre, signalling Ukrainian culture to be the new
dominant and official culture of the region and the city.30 This allocation of theatrical facilities,
however, reflected the official narrative about Chernivtsi region constructed between Kiev and
Moscow rather than the actual condition of local urban culture.

In late August of 1940, the Ukrainian Arts Department in Kiev sent a commission to
Chernivtsi to evaluate the condition of local culture. Together with the newly created local arts
and culture department, the commission was prepared to find “the miserable condition of
culture” that had to be freed from oppression, supported, and brought to full bloom by the new

29 By December 1940, 629 schools had been established in the province, including primary, non-complete
secondary, and complete secondary. Among them, 451 were Ukrainian, 15 Russian, 149 Moldavian, 12 Yiddish,
and 2 Polish. DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 28, ark. 25-29; f.72, op.1, spr.2, ark.52.

30 DAChO, f. 93/409, op.1, spr.10, ark 35-39.
power. Upon their investigation, the art workers wrote a report to the central and provincial party committees and to the Ukrainian Soviet government, opening with the following statement: “The city of Chernivtsi is dominated by its Ukrainian population.” This sentence was underlined by an unidentified hand with a red pencil and marked with a big question mark on the margins, as a symbol of astonishment and confusion probably experienced by the Soviet authorities who had to deal with the city. The question mark left future readers of the document with many points to ponder. Was it a typo, or a mechanical extension of the “ethnic argument” about Bukovina to Chernivtsi? Was it written by somebody fully ignorant and questioned by somebody less ignorant? Was it a denial of reality or an inability even to see this reality by the members of the commission who received special treatment within the walls of newly allocated central buildings of Chernivtsi?

According to the report, in Chernivtsi the commission found too many cultural institutions for the city to be described as really wretched, which made them repeat in their report the adjective “miserable” to drive their point home. The commission found a Ukrainian amateur theatre, a Jewish amateur theatre (“both in miserable condition”), a philharmonic society with an orchestra, a conservatory, a musical school (“all accessible only to the bourgeoisie and Romanian Boyars”), an arts college, and a society of artists. In addition, there were institutions that belonged to a culture that did not even exist in Bukovina according to the official narratives: a German cultural society in Roshosh/Rosha, that had been a compact German suburban settlement, a German theatre, a German children’s theatre, and other German cultural institutions that puzzled the commission.

31 DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr.27, 32, 35, ark. 8.
To replace such local cultural infrastructure with an appropriate Soviet alternative, the commission recommended a list of cultural institutions to be created in Chernivtsi that was truly impressive for a comparatively small Soviet city. The list included three theatres, a state conservatory, the provincial House of People’s Arts, and a philharmonic society. In the end, only a part of this ambitious plan was fulfilled. The House of Arts indeed became a very important centre for the development of folk culture and creativity. The philharmonic society was quite popular as well, often hosting guest performers of the highest calibre brought “to win over” the locals. A Jewish (Yiddish) theatre that was created as a mobile performance group “with a base in Chernivtsi” was a quite modest institution in 1940-1941. Even when it had a chance to perform in the city, it did not find wide support among local Jews most of whom were still longing for the German theatre of bygone Austrian days or at least the guest performances from Vienna of the interwar period. The musical comedy and the conservatory were never created, and only the Ukrainian theatre was ultimately to have a successful future in Chernivtsi.

This was not due to the strength of local Ukrainian talent—at least initially. The Soviet Ukrainian theatre in Chernivtsi was made up of the local amateur Ukrainian theatrical group that

32 Ibid., ark.8-11. The commission sent a request to central authorities asking what was to be done with the German organizations. The full list of proposed cultural institutions contained: a Ukrainian musical drama theatre; a Jewish drama theatre; a Russian Theatre of Musical Comedy; a Philharmonic society with a chorus and variety art department; a state conservatory with a musical college; musical district schools; an industrial arts college; a museum of “visual local lore arts;” an Oblast House of People Arts; and an art school. Ibid., ark. 8-11.

33 See, for example, Fichmann, Before Memories Fade, Chapter 4.

34 On the indifference of local German-speaking Jews to Ukrainian as well as Yiddish cultural developments and their difficulties with the Ukrainian, Russian, and Yiddish languages, see Hirsh and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 109-14; Fichmann, Before Memories Fade, Chapter 4. Jewish theatre would enjoy a period of bright but short success and popularity in Chernivtsi between 1945 and 1950 thanks to the transfer of the All-Ukrainian State Jewish Theatre (GOSET) formerly working in Kiev. Its history is discussed in chapter seven.
had been organized in the 1930s with the support of theatre activists from Lviv. Sometime in the early fall of 1940 it became obvious that local amateurs did not fill the elegant building of the Chernivtsi theatre with appropriate “content” that would reflect the status and alleged level of the development of Ukrainian culture in Chernivtsi. Therefore, the Soviet authorities decided to import a Ukrainian theatre to the city. The head of the Chernivtsi propaganda department Iosif Luchyts'kyi and other local leaders appealed to the Kiev Central Committee to expedite the decision on the question of a Ukrainian theatre for the province. Before a long-term solution was made, Chernivtsi leaders asked central republican leadership to organize a guest performance tour to the city. By December of 1940, the final decision was made: the Kharkiv Komsomol State Drama theatre would be transferred to Northern Bukovina.

The selected theatre was an important one in the Ukrainian SSR. Organized in 1931 as the Revolutionary Theatre and restructured into the Komsomol Theatre in 1937, it was highly acclaimed by critics and the public. Thanks to the talent, professionalism, and enthusiasm of its long-term director Vasyl’ Vasyl’ko and his group, the Kharkiv Komsomol theatre was destined to acquire great popularity in Chernivtsi over time. The transfer was an important state affair supervised directly from Moscow to ensure adequate transportation to resettle the theatrical

35 Radians’ka Bukovyna, 27 July 1940: 3.

36 For the correspondence between Chernivtsi, Kiev, and Lviv, DACHo, f.1, op.11, spr.27, 32, 35, ark.1-5. For a report about organization of the theatre, DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 46, 48, 49, 50, ark.30; f.1, op. 1, spr.28, ark.24.

37 The connection between the Kiev Franko theatre and the Chernivtsi theatre through their Kharkiv origins was emphasized by one of the most acclaimed Soviet Ukrainian actors, Gnat Iura. O.S Pulinets, O.Iu. Bykova, Chernivtsi’skyi Derzhavnyi Ukrains’kyi muzyczno-dramatychniy teatr i ioho mytsi (Kiev, 1968), 1-2, a manuscript available at the Archive of Chernivtsi Musical Drama Theatre named after O.Kobylians’ka (hereafter ChDUMDT Archive). The materials of the archive are not organized or classified. I was able to work with them and make digital photographs with the permission of the theatre administration in June of 2008.
company. Kievan authorities requested with an urgent telegram that Chernivtsi party leaders reserve appropriate apartments for the actors.\textsuperscript{38} As was noted in 1953 by a local researcher of the theatre’s history, “Bukovina was in need of a theatre that would be able to show on its stage the works of [Russian and Ukrainian] and foreign classics… One of the best Soviet Ukrainian theatres was sent to Bukovina.”\textsuperscript{39} Rebaptized the Chernivtsi Ukrainian Drama theatre (which would later be named after Ol’ha Kobylians’ka), the theatre incorporated several actors from the local amateur group, and gave its first performance on 14 January 1941.\textsuperscript{40} In a symbolic move, the new dominant culture that was supposedly local but in fact imported from Soviet Ukraine, was accommodated in the central location that was associated by the locals with the high culture of the city.

This new culture also literally filled the streets, parks, and halls of the city. During the first weeks of the Soviet regime in Chernivtsi, writers and other cultural figures from the Ukrainian establishment—Mykola Bazhan, V. Vyshnevs’kyi, Ie. Dolmatovs’kyi, Olexander Korniichuk, P. Panch, Konstantiy Symonov, and Iu. Ianovs’kyi—visited Chernivtsi province and gave public speeches and readings. Experienced professionals in the literary and journalistic fields such as Andrii Malyshko, H. Brezhnirov, M. Pryhara, and O. Nosenko were brought to the province to work in the press, temporarily or permanently. Other established literary authorities,

\textsuperscript{38} DACo, f.1, op.11, spr.27, 32, 35, ark. 1, 3.

\textsuperscript{39} E. S. Korobchynskyi, “Do istorii Chernivets’koho Ukraïns’koho dramatychnoho teatru (doivoiennyi period).” Specialist diploma thesis (Chernivtsi, 1953), 76. ChDUMDT Archive.

\textsuperscript{40} Radians’ka Bukovyna, 7 January 1941; 14 January 1941. The inclusion of local amateurs in the group was described by the late Taras Ridush during my conversation with him in July of 2008. Mr. Ridush was one of the local actors who later dedicated his entire career to the Chernivtsi theatre as an actor and later as an artistic director.
even if they did not visit Bukovina and the western provinces personally, created many poetic glorifications of the reunification.

Ukrainian folk art, wrapped in the package of the Friendship of Peoples in the form of highly stylized folk-style performances of other “peoples of the USSR” and generic “Soviet art” were brought to Chernivtsi by many performers, including the famous Moscow-based Moiseev folk singing and dancing ensemble and a similarly popular ensemble of the Red Army. More specifically Ukrainian art was delivered to Chernivtsi locals by actors and performers from Kiev and neighbouring Kamianets’-Podil’s’kyi.41 Although the non-stop festival of the first Soviet days was soon over and the grey reality filled with scarcity, uncertainty, and fear of spontaneous arrests quickly replaced the excitement of novelty brought by the annexation, it was precisely this public show of cultural “renaissance” that formed the basis for the later Soviet narratives about local history and culture. These new narratives would be implanted into the local space throughout Soviet history by means of museum exhibits, popular guides, and media references,

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41 For more details on the “cultural imports” from Ukraine and USSR, see Dikusarov et al, eds., Narysy istoriї Chernivets’koi oblasnoї partiinoї orhanizatsiї, 29. Radians’ka Bukovyna regularly reported as major news public speeches delivered by Ukrainian and, less frequently, other Soviet celebrities. For example, it followed closely the arrival and activities of the “Famous Ukrainian poets Bazhan and Korniichuk” (Radians’ka Bukovyna, 6 July 1940, 1; 18 July 1940, 1). Local cultural forces also worked actively to “fill” the urban space of Chernivtsi with Ukrainian culture: for example, on 17 July, a public lecture on “The Culture of Soviet Ukraine” was organized in the large hall of Chernivtsi University. The local press and other publications featured poetry and prose that famous writers dedicated to Bukovina. The already quoted brochure Na onovlenii zemli included poems by famous Soviet Ukrainian poets Andrii Malysheko (p. 22) and Maxym Ryl’s’kyi (p. 53), both dedicated to the “reunification” of Bukovina with Ukraine. See also N. I. Syrota, “Pershi kroky kul’turoho budivnyctva na radians’kii Bukovyni (1940–1941 rr.)” in Pytannia istoriї narodiv SRSR 2 (Kharkiv: Vyd-vo Kharkivs’koho universytetu, 1968), 46-51. It seems that such abundance of visual performances initially fascinated many locals of Chernivtsi; soon, however, disappointment began to overcome the positive emotions and curiosity of the first days and weeks. See Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 109.
turning a bright moment of Soviet cultural revolution into a new urban-regional myth of Chernivtsi.42

An organization that played a major role in the early phases of “locating” Ukrainian culture in the local space of Chernivtsi was the newly organized Provincial House of People’s Arts (the Arts house). Enthusiasts of Ukrainian culture among Soviet newcomers and locals who had advanced to lower-level positions in the cultural sphere wrote to this powerful cultural-propagandist agency and to provincial party organs, seeking support for the growth of their local talents. In response to these grass-roots initiatives as well as orders from provincial party authorities, the leadership of the Art House created numerous amateur ensembles and groups, organized regular shows in the city park, and initiated a grand performance in front of the delegates of the first provincial conference of party activists in December of 1940. The Arts House led the organization of the October celebrations, Constitution day, and “took an active part in the elections [in January of 1941],”43 all of which were important public rituals that connected the Soviet political and social transformation with the ideas of Ukrainian national unity and the predominance of Ukrainian culture in Chernivtsi.

The Art House also promoted Bukovinian folk art at the Moscow industrial and agricultural exhibits. Before the end of 1940, a representative of the USSR state ensemble of song and dance approached Chernivtsi provincial officials with a request to sell a set of original

42 Later official Soviet narratives of the cultural transformation in Chernivtsi cited “300 rural houses of culture, reading houses and ‘red corners’, about 300 libraries, cinemas, the provincial (Ukrainian) musical-drama theatre, and the House of People’s Arts as important achievements of the “Cultural Revolution” of 1940. The history of the Jewish theatre which was present in Chernivtsi, in one form or another, until 1950, was left out of these sanitized narratives of Soviet Ukrainian progress. See, for example, Dikusarov et al, eds., Narovy istorii Chernivets’koi oblasnoi partii no orhanizatsii, 42.

43 DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 46,49,50,56, ark.31.
Hutsul costumes for the ensemble’s new performance of a Hutsul dance. The “primordial Ukrainians” of Bukovina, thus, were officially included in the highest-level symbolic representation of the Soviet Friendship of Peoples; their art, refined and standardized on the Moscow central stage by stars of the Soviet school of folk dance, was ready to be brought “back” to the people, including the Hutsuls of Bukovina themselves.

Another allocation highly symbolic of the early attempts to match the official image with Chernivtsi reality was the organization of Chernivtsi State University in the buildings of the old Austrian university. For the new Soviet rulers, it was a matter of utmost importance to launch the process of Ukrainian-language social advancement and re-education of locals as soon as the new regime was established. Missing an academic year was out of the question. After the annexation in late June, Soviet leaders were extremely pressed to have the university start classes on 1 October 1940, only one month later than the traditional first day of classes. The new rector of the university and one of the most ardent missionaries of Soviet Ukrainian culture in the region, Shul’ha, embarked on a tough struggle to deliver a miracle of cultural and institutional transformation. In conditions of notorious Soviet scarcity, Shul’ha had to fight for everything, from Soviet professorial staff to replace nearly all of the old-regime professors who

44 DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 79, ark. 37-38, 41-44. It is not clear to what extent the active promotion of Bukovina’s art in Moscow and Kiev was encouraged or even ordered by the central authorities; local cultural authorities in Chernivtsi expressed a lot of enthusiasm about representing local talent and national culture in the capitals.

45 As in many other cases, the University had to share some of its historic space with other organizations, most often, Red Army detachments.
had left for Romania, to every square meter of space to locate offices, students, and newly arrived employees.\footnote{In late August of 1940, Shul’ha reported that of 104 “Romanian” professors only 8 remained in Chernivtsi DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 27, ark. 50. Only one of these professors was eventually employed by the Soviets in 1940-1941.}

With just the shell of a university, one local professor of Ukrainian linguistics, and a local newly promoted library director, Shul’ha and the reputation of the university depended on faculty sent by Kiev’s People’s Commissariat of Education. He complained, however, that the only staff he was receiving were recent doctoral graduates and doctoral candidates whose skills and knowledge left much to be desired.\footnote{DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7,11,14,19,21,24 (combined), ark.17.} Filling the pretentious architecture of an Austrian university with adequate content was a challenge yet to be overcome; but the symbolic opening of the university in October of 1940 represented the official vision of the Soviet transformation as an alleged marriage of cultural continuity (resurrecting and supporting Ukrainian culture) and political and social change (making the transition from capitalism to socialism).

This official vision of social and cultural transformation found no easy application in the “special condition” of the borderland city beyond the allocation of central buildings and the establishment of major cultural and political institutions. Many smaller social and cultural organizations ended up last on the long waiting list for buildings and facilities. Clubs,
kindergartens, library branches, and circles for children complained to party committees, newspapers, or even to “the centre” in Kiev and Moscow about their frustrating and vain wait for their portion of socialized space in Chernivtsi. Soviet Ukrainian cultural workers seem to have been outraged by the fact that what they viewed as non-Soviet, foreign, and thus alien urban culture was still occupying so much space that was so badly needed for the development of the new, progressive Soviet Ukrainian one.

In one case, the head of the city council executive committee Nikitin had first considered the second floor of a small synagogue redundant and ordered the transfer of this space to a children’s club. After a complaint and upon closer investigation, however, it was established that the second floor was used by women for prayers, and taking it away would definitely hurt the feelings of local religious Jews. To avoid controversy and bad publicity, provincial party leader Grushets’kyi also strictly forbade the standard Soviet practice of district and village officials using German churches (Kirchen), emptied after the transfer of Germans in October-November of 1940, for suburban and village clubs. “One should consider any suggestion about closing a church a counterrevolutionary act that has nothing in common with the actions

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48 The health-care department, for example, complained that there was no “doctors’ house” (budynok likaria) in the province and no space for a specialized medical library to house numerous “very valuable medical books” found in the city (DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr. 90,93, 94, ark.8.) Generally, health-care administrators, as many other Soviet cadres, had to rely almost exclusively on common sense and their own experience and expectations in the construction of the new Soviet system in Chernivtsi. Often, beyond the most general policies, there were no directions as to what organizations, in what quantities, etc. were to be opened. As late as January 1941 the director of the provincial children’s library and enthusiast of Ukrainian culture Kostovetska wrote a complaint in beautiful Ukrainian language describing in detail her attempts to get a decent building. She wrote: “Hundreds of thousands of new Soviet children who burn with the desire to learn about life in the Soviet Union… through books… cannot use the very valuable literature [we possess because the library, which is ready to function, cannot be open due to the absence of a building… ]” DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.171, ark 64, 123.

49 As late as 1944, there were 28 active synagogues in Chernivtsi. DAChO, F.623, Op.2, Sp.1, ark. 1-15.

50 DAChO, f.72, op.1, spr.12, ark.81.

51 On the transfer of Germans, see chapter five.
of Soviet Power,” said Grushets’kyi at a closed provincial party meeting. On the contrary, he ruled that the churches had to be protected so that “provocateurs do not use this to play their games.”52 This order was typical. According to Grushets’kyi, the “spiritual feelings” of locals had to be respected at least while these locals had active connections with the outer world.

Local vs Ukrainian: Affirmative Action and the Local Soviet Press

Before Soviet authorities could fully employ strong mechanisms of party-state control to subjugate society by penetrating it, and before the border could be closed in earnest, provincial leader Grushets’kyi and his apparatus had to protect the image of the new power to make it appealing to the locals.53 Quite possibly, the supervisor of Sovietization in the newly annexed territories, Khrushchev, his close associates in Kiev, and his superiors in Moscow saw no contradiction between this pacifying strategy, on the one hand, and the principle of promotion of socialist Ukrainian culture, on the other. After all, for Khrushchev, Northern Bukovina was a

52 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.10, 31, 32, 33, ark.17. On many other occasions during the first several months of Soviet rule, Grushets’kyi and other leaders stressed the need for a very sensitive attitude to the religious feelings and cultural practices of the locals. For example, even a question of “registering women by their husbands’ names,” as was customary in many local villages, rather than the patronymic, traditional in the USSR, was considered a “sensitive local question” connected to religious feelings (see DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 28). Later, in the second half of “the first Soviet year,” Grushets’kyi also argued for more “careful” materials on religion in general and particularly in the provincial Romanian-language newspaper, criticizing articles that were “too sharp” and written in “one’s own words;” Grushets’kyi suggested that communists needed “to push on religion but do so by means of scientific materials…otherwise we can provoke our enemies [to criticize our anti-religious rather than neutral attitude…].” To a remark by Soviet Bukovina’s editor Nosenko that “we had readers’ conferences and they always wanted more anti-religious materials…” Grushets’kyi responded: “I am sure there were no Hutsul peasants among those readers!” DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 127; f.1, op.11, spr. 77, ark. 9-10. Grushets’kyi had good reasons to demand patronizing, tolerant attitudes toward people whom he considered to be “the backward” and “the others” of Chernivtsi province: reports from rural districts demonstrated the strength of the popular image the Bolsheviks as “godless people” and “Russians led by the devil” (see DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 130).

53 For a typical example of Grushets’kyi’s speeches about the image of the new power, the treatment of locals, and their opinions about the new rulers, see minutes of the joint CP obkom and Komsomol obkom meetings 1940 (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.30, 31,32, 33, ark. 2.)
“Ukrainian land.” Party executives and Soviet cultural workers in Chernivtsi, though, faced the serious challenge of aligning the principles of Soviet Ukrainianization with those of constructing a positive local image of Soviet rule. Along with the policies of space distribution and cultural imports, the local Soviet press became an important arena where both principles had to be displayed.

Narrating Soviet life and Ukrainian culture was an important assignment for Grushets’kyi and his subordinates from the first days of their appointment in Chernivtsi. For this purpose, the new authorities organized a Ukrainian-language newspaper Soviet Bukovina (Radians’ka Bukovyna) when the Red Army was still on its way to Chernivtsi so that it could print its first issue already by the end of June. Later in the first year of Soviet rule, newly arrived officials created two more provincial newspapers—a Romanian-language replica of Soviet Bukovina and a local Komsomol paper. These newspapers, among which Soviet Bukovina was the most important organ of the new regime, undoubtedly shared the primary goal of all of the Soviet press: delivering the general messages of the centralized party-state and Stalinist interpretation of Communist ideology to the “masses.” Along with reprinting standard materials

54 Possessing probably rudimentary knowledge about the region in June of 1940 (see previous chapter), Khrushchev and his colleagues in Kiev exercised a learn-as-you-go approach to the new Ukrainian territories. The sources of their knowledge were limited and selective. Along with reading the official provincial-level reports that contained sanitized data tailored to fit the central requests and existing narratives already approved by the highest authorities, they occasionally investigated particular issues in more detail, as in the case of transforming the Romanian banking system into the Soviet one. In January of 1941, Grushets’kyi wrote to Khrushchev asking for advice regarding the transfer of pre-Soviet bank debts. Grushets’kyi relied on the information provided by the provincial head of the central planning agency (Gosplan) office, Shcherbakov. The latter accompanied his materials with a summary statement about the socialized Romanian banks in Bukovina, marked by his hand-written note: “… familiarizing yourself with it will not only be helpful for understanding of the former Romanian bank system but also [the banks’] predator’s role in the exploitation of the toilers of Bukovina” (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.161, ark.9; f.1, op.13, spr. 13, ark.3). The summary, apparently, was forwarded to Khrushchev, who probably “familiarized” himself with a generalized, ideologically correct narrative prepared for him, based on the central instruction he himself had previously endorsed. This narrative omitted an array of largely Chernivtsi-specific issues concerning the transformation of the banking system that involved interaction between locals and Soviet cadres, nationality policies, knowledge of languages and local conditions, and wide-spread corruption of Soviet authorities.
from the Moscow and Kiev press, the newspaper also regularly published large photographs of
Moscow as the ultimate example of Soviet urbanism, important industrial giants, and other
symbols of Soviet life and progress, apparently aiming to bring Soviet socialism to the home
and soul of every local resident. However, if Soviet journalists in Chernivtsi presented distant
Soviet life as a novelty, they had to narrate Ukrainian culture and local socialist transformations
as local reality. Headed by a fervent activist of Ukrainian national culture, Nosenko, *Soviet
Bukovina* became an important stage for the creation of the new official myth of Chernivtsi.  

Soviet ethnographers, film-makers, and journalists from the centre had established the
dominant paradigm that depicted Bukovina as a part of Ukraine, an entity that was closely and
intimately connected with Russia but was also a legitimately separate historical, ethnic, and
cultural unit. The creation of more concrete and detailed narratives as well as the collection and
selection of local information and artifacts to represent the region was delegated to the
authorities in Chernivtsi. Beyond the basic paradigm and the current, ever changing “party
lines” in the spheres of social, nationality, and security policies, local Soviet cultural authorities

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55 The first issue came out on 30 June 1940. According to the chief editor Nosenko, the newspaper was established
formally before the Red Army entered Bukovina, on the way to Chernivtsi, somewhere between the towns of
Kolomyia and Sniatyn in Galicia (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark. 108). Between early June 1940 and February
1941, it was transformed from a modest 3,000-copy free paper to an official daily with 23,000 (nominal)
subscribers. (Subscription was mandatory more often than voluntary; see next chapter for more on this.) The
newspaper’s chief editor reported to the first provincial party conference on 9 and 10 February 1941 that they had
received 1,300 letters from readers and 45 percent of them had been published; others were sent for investigation
[in the relevant organizations according to the situation]. DACHO, f.1,op.1, spr.77, ark.108. The second provincial
newspaper, the Ukrainian-language *Komsomolets’ Bukovyny* (“Bukovina’s Young Communist”), was organized in
August or early September and came out three times a week. DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 4, 5, 6, 8, 29, ark. 11. The
third provincial paper, the Romanian-language daily *Adevarul Bukovinei* (*Bukovinian truth*), was organized on 15
February 1941. DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 82, 39, 45, 79, 81, 87, 90, ark.1.
like Nosenko seem to have received little guidance from Moscow or Kiev. They were left to work “toward Stalin” according to the local context.\textsuperscript{56}

If materials reprinted from the Kiev press delivered the brief and ethnically exclusive narrative about the Ukrainian character of Bukovina and general educational articles about “Our Fatherland, Ukrainian SSR” strengthened the straightforward reunification myth, locally written \textit{Soviet Bukovina} materials from 1940 did not automatically reproduce the emerging central narrative.\textsuperscript{57} The newspaper displayed—or at least displays to the reader of today—many hints of the contradictions between the official narratives it was supposed to herald and the actual life, culture, and aspirations of this narrative’s alleged consumers. In other words, the 1940 local press reflected the bafflement of the cultural and political authorities who arrived to govern and transform this allegedly Ukrainian land. Even a reader totally ignorant of the city’s dominant German language, and its numerous German-language and less numerous Yiddish- and Romanian-language artistic and cultural establishments that were fully absent from the pages of Soviet Bukovina, could notice some contradictions.

\textsuperscript{56} This principle apparently also applied to the selection of members of the “delegation of toilers” from Bukovina. A Ukrainian worker was chosen to speak from the highest tribune in the Soviet state on 2 August 1940. The local Ukrainian activist Kvitkov’s’ky, who later co-authored a book about Bukovina in the western diaspora, was surprised that none of the “delegates” had any political experience of significance and the delegation did not represent any active communities or social networks of the city and the region. (See Kvitkovsky, \textit{Bukovyna: ii mynule i suchasne}.) All that mattered was the “right” nationality and class origin of the speaker. The delegation did include several Jewish workers but none of them was interviewed or had other chances to speak from the high tribunes of the Soviet capital; it was a Ukrainian representative who spoke in the name of the land.

\textsuperscript{57} The following analysis is based on the bulk of Soviet Bukovina materials from 1940; while direct quotations and specific examples are cited, general conclusions are based on a wider range of publications which are often repetitive and standard.
As a propaganda organ, *Soviet Bukovina* had to discuss widely local examples of intensified class struggle, social transformations, industrial progress, and shock production. Most of these phenomena could be found only in the provincial capital, as the countryside remained largely unchanged by the new rulers for the first several months after the annexation. Such concrete materials had to include names and numbers of local activists, communists, and shock workers. These names were predominantly German-sounding. To bring the “local conditions” in line with the reunification formula, Nosenko and other journalists dispatched to Chernivtsi from Kiev and other Soviet Ukrainian cities had to constantly play with the terms pertaining to the identity of locals. They often used “Ukrainians,” “Bukovinian toilers” and “Bukovinian people” interchangeably. As a result, *Soviet Bukovina* created a superficial impression that all “toilers” of Bukovina were Ukrainians.

Even if “national liberation” rhetoric was generic rather than openly attached to Ukrainian people in the same sentence, or accompanied by a list of all liberated nationalities, the general context made it clear that it was the Ukrainian nation that had been liberated and, by extension, made master of the land. General statements *à la* Molotov’s reunification formula were often followed by phrases such as, “soon schools will be opened with instruction in the native language”58 that could be interpreted in many ways depending on how informed the reader was of the local demographic situation; at the same time, they suggested as the most obvious assumption that the “native language” should be Ukrainian. One of the most telling examples of this linguistic strategy was the remark by Grushets’kyi himself: “Impressive changes [took place] in the sphere of culture … where there was no school with the Ukrainian

58 *Radians’ka Bukovyna*, 7 July 1940: 1.
language of instruction… [recently] there have been organized 338 schools with teaching in the native tongue…”

At the same time, local authorities and propagandists had to be more specific when it came to discussing national liberation and promotion of native cultures. In such cases, they followed the unwritten Soviet hierarchy of national identities adjusted to the local conditions. “For the first time in their lives, the toilers—Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans, Jews and other nationalities who live in Northern Bukovina—received their, truly people’s power…,” reported Soviet Bukovina in early July. When read against the central master narrative, the order in this list can be clearly explained: Ukrainians represent the new collective successor of the given space; Russians were the older brother and the best among the equals who dutifully gave the first place to the local masters in the Ukrainian republic; Moldavians were the neighbours and the legitimate minority (as opposed to Romanians, a term reserved for boyars, exploiters, and stories of the past); Jews were problematic and preferably to be omitted but had to be mentioned since the press was local and Jews were obviously very numerous in the locality in question.

In fact, Jews were so numerous in the locality covered by Soviet Bukovina, whose influence was largely limited to the city of Chernivtsi during the first months of Soviet rule, that their cultural needs had to be accommodated, a fact mentioned occasionally on the pages of the

59 Radians’ka Bukovyna, 30 July 1940, 1. Grushets’kyi referred to Northern Bukovina in its entirety and this number obviously included schools with language of instruction other than Ukrainian. No full statistics are available for the end of July; however, by December 1940 Chernivtsi province officially had 451 Ukrainian, 15 Russian, 149 Moldavian, 12 Yiddish, and 2 Polish schools (629 in total). DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 28, ark. 25-29. Note that private and public schools and classes with Ukrainian languages of instruction existed in Chernivtsi and Bukovina under Romanian rule. See Prologue for more on this.

60 Radians’ka Bukovyna, July 7 1940: 1.
Along with the glorious narrative about the opening of the Ukrainian drama theatre, for example, the newspaper reported the opening of the Jewish mobile theatre; articles about the advance of popular education revealed statistics about the schools’ languages, which, although far from reflecting the actual demographic profile of the province, still gave away the significant presence of Jews in Chernivtsi. Many shock-workers\footnote{The term shock-workers (Russ. \textit{udarniki}) refers to workers who participated in the movement to over-fulfill production quotas. The movement was initiated by a miner Alexei Stakhanov in the mid-1930s and was known as stakhanovite movement (\textit{stakhanovskoie dvizhenie}); it members were also known as stakhanovites (\textit{stakhanovtsy}).} glorified by the paper had clearly Jewish-German names; all factories of the city had advertised special language classes for workers who did not know Ukrainian and Russian. When the workers of a local factory endorsed the widely used statement that Romanian lords “silenced any initiative of worker’s creativity, especially in a national native tongue” the reader could guess from the names of the signatories—Leon Shpigel, Rashil Rainer, Bohdan Katsiuk, Leon Grosman, Hanna Klein, and Gina Handshil—that this time they probably did not mean “Ukrainian tongue.”\footnote{Radians’ka Bukovyna, July 28, 1940: 3. The names are transliterated from Ukrainian spelling. The attitudes of these Jews could also be occasionally seen through the thick curtain of the official ethnic-Ukrainian rhetoric, as in the case of the speech of some local activist Miller promoted to the newly organized trade-union (\textit{profsoiuz}) movement. Commenting on the grand reunification ritual in Moscow, Miller said: “We are accepted by the great motherland of the toilers of the entire world – the Soviet Union. From now on, we can say with pride: we are the citizens of the mighty USSR.” Published right next to the reprints of the Moscow speeches that emphasized the “ethnic argument” and Ukrainian nation-building rhetoric, this remark was inadvertently published by the editors too excited about the advancement of local supporters of Soviet power and indicated that many local supporters of Soviet power were more enthusiastic about \textit{Soviet life} than \textit{Ukrainian culture}.}

However visible they were on the pages of the Chernivtsi provincial newspaper, the mismatches and controversies between the master narrative and the local conditions were not
meant to be exhibited by Soviet Bukovina journalists. The major theme and subject of their exhibition was definitely Ukrainian culture. From the first day of Soviet rule, this theme was given centre stage, surrounded by the general Soviet narratives of social equality, patriotism and state security, and industrial progress. A standard technique of Soviet mass media, a “letter” from a worker from Chernivtsi to Stalin, was published on 8 July 1940, asserting the general importance of “culture” to the Soviet project and the synonymous meanings of “culture” and “Ukrainian culture” in the local official public discourse:

… Life was dark. The ghost of unemployment always stood behind our backs. Our children had no schools and education in their native language. … Hunger, lawlessness, poverty, disease reigned in the outskirts of Chernivtsi. … Ukrainian words, Ukrainian culture—oppressed up until just yesterday—under the mighty protection of Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy already begins to put down its first roots and will soon be in full bloom. We witnessed the great respect that the peoples of the Soviet Union give to culture. Together with the entire community of the city we honoured the memory of the great poet of Bukovina Yurii Fed’kovych. Today, culture became ours! University, schools, bookstores, newspapers. …”

This letter reflects the understanding of their mission by the Soviet Ukrainian cultural workers who arrived from eastern Ukraine, including the chief editor Nosenko. Nosenko and his fellow journalists most probably believed what they wrote or at least felt comfortable operating in this mode of double-speak and envisioning the desired national future as the imagined present. They probably felt that the cultural mission launched by Ukrainian Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi was fair and justified. It they did not see much Ukrainian culture in liberated Chernivtsi, they most likely believed that it just needed a little boost, in the form of active promotion and consistent affirmative action, to come into full bloom after liberation from foreign oppression.

64 Radians’ka Bukovyna, 8 July, 1940: 1
Therefore, Nosenko and those in the local party apparatus who shared his views felt that it was necessary to cherish the few bearers of Ukrainian culture they found among locals.

A small circle of local “conscious Ukrainians” decided to give Soviet power a chance rather than immediately vote with their feet while the borders were open. (Most of these people either did emigrate later or were repressed as bourgeois nationalists.) They were given an opportunity to speak from the pages of Soviet Bukovina. The story they told confirmed the official narrative and added the detail and legitimacy of a local voice. The future author of the impressive nationalist Ukrainian encyclopedia of Bukovina published in emigration complained, along with his fellows, from the pages of the Soviet newspaper that “…Cultural development [had been] totally halted…. Ukrainian theatrical performances and concerts [had been] prohibited.”

Before they sorted out which local “conscious Ukrainians” were unredeemable bourgeois nationalists and which ones were potential fellow travelers suitable for eventual conversion, local Soviet cultural workers were inheriting and appropriating their local nationalist narrative which offered the details, emotions, and examples so necessary to making the reunification myth more credible. Previously a weak voice in the diverse public sphere of the region, this nationalist narrative was receiving a powerful boost under the mighty protection of

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65 The article announced, for example, “the end of offense and distress… [under] Romanian boyars…” and the past “violation of rights of Ukrainian people under the boyar’s boot… [who] took our schools away from us.” The article was signed by Prof. Teofil Bryndzan (future emigrant and co-author of a large book about Bukovina, cited elsewhere in this dissertation), Prof. Nikolai Haras, electrical technician Antin Zavada, engineer Ivan Zhukovs’kyi, artisan Pavlo Kucheriavyi, attorney Mykola Vitan, school director (a former provincial school inspector and the proclaimed “father of Ukrainian education” in Bukovina) Ilarri Karbulyts’kyi, teacher Ivanna Gordiichuk, doctor Antin Kyryliv, musician Oles Mykytiuk, actor Ievhen Unhurian, and student Roman Shavlo. Radians’ka Bukovyna, 7 July 1940: 4.
the Soviet state. Although devoid of Stalinist ideological rhetoric, this “bourgeois nationalist”
interpretation of Bukovina’s past fit into the “general line” followed by Soviet Bukovina and
confirmed the silent formula that equated the “toilers” and the “people” of Bukovina with
“Ukrainians.”

Missionaries from Soviet Ukraine and local Ukrainian activists alike made no special
case for the city with its predominantly Jewish shock workers and trade union (profsoiuz)
activists. A young Soviet propagandist Demochko who would become an important contributor
to the creation of the local Soviet narrative about the city and the province, wrote on the
morning of 28 July, the first month “anniversary” of the liberation, that “[t]he ancient Ukrainian
town, Chernivtsi, [was] celebrating … an unforgettable event…” and described the happy,
celebrating Soviet city with “workers and Hutsuls in their national garb…” walking the streets
in a holiday mood.66 A reader who followed Soviet Bukovina regularly would make no mistake:
it was affirmative action in favour of Ukrainian culture, not Soviet class policies, which had the
highest priority for the local party authorities in the multiethnic, mostly German-speaking
Chernivtsi of 1940.67 An early, ad hoc solution to the Chernivtsi puzzle was to hide its Jewish
part behind the rhetoric of Ukrainian reunification and revival.

A very visible revelation of this affirmative action was the use and abuse of the two
personalities singled out as the symbols of “progressive” Ukrainian culture in Chernivtsi:
Fed’kovych and Kobylians’ka. Both were turned into the central figures of local cultural life.

66 Radians’ka Bukovyna, July 30, 1940: 2.

67 Personal accounts indicate that, indeed, local Jews tended to characterize the cultural policies of the first Soviet
year as a “Ukrainianization” campaign and pointed to the centrality of the newspaper in this campaign. See
Fichman, Before Memories Fade, under chapter 4; Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home.
The first commemoration of the long-deceased Fed’kovych—a mass meeting at his grave in early July—became an important milestone of the Soviet Ukrainian historiography of cultural transformation in Chernivtsi, marking the “resurrection” of Ukrainian culture in Bukovina. But it was Kobylians’ka who became the main target of Nosenko, his superiors, and his colleagues who were looking for a convenient and convincing connection between Bukovina’s “Ukrainian” past and its Soviet Ukrainian future. *Soviet Bukovina* published 54 publications about Kobylians’ka between June 1940 and June 1941.

The writer was mentioned not only in numerous pompous odes to the revival of Ukrainian culture but also in the Soviet version of society columns. Aged, seriously ill, immobilized, and quite poor, Ol’ha Kobylians’ka, or rather her name, respected among the local Ukrainian intelligentsia but hardly known beyond its circle, was put on the centre stage of the cultural transformation of Chernivtsi. At the openings of public party and activist meetings, local authorities in Chernivtsi composed and sent three telegrams of greeting: to Stalin, to

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68 For example, *Radians’ka Bukovyna*, 16 July 1940: 1 (editorial); 8 July 1940. The most extensive popular narrative about the city and the province of Chernivtsi that came out in 1969 depicted the commemoration of Fed’kovych as a major milestone in the cultural “resurrection” of Soviet Bukovina: V.M. Kurylo et al, ed. *Istoriia mist i sil Ukraїns’koї RSR. Chernivets’ka oblast’* (Kiev, Holovna redaktsiia Ukraïns’koї Radians’koї entsyklopedii AN URSR, 1969.) Eventually (in 1989), Chernivtsi State University was named after Yuri Fed’kovych (http://www.chnu.edu.ua/index.php?page=ua/geneinf/history, last accessed 2 June 2013.)


70 Ol’ha Kobylians’ka was highly respected and well known among the “conscious Ukrainians” of Chernivtsi in the interwar period, but hardly beyond this circle. For this information I am grateful to the late Taras Ridush, an actor and director at Chernivtsi State theatre and a local of Chernivtsi, with whom I had a long and rewarding conversation in June of 2008 in Chernivtsi. The family of the future writer Peter Demant, for example, lived near Kobylians’ka’s house in the prewar years, but he never realized she was a poet and a Ukrainian cultural activist. He remembered her as “an old lady” who used to sit on a bench all the time. Only when he returned to the city in the 1970s did Demant learn that it was the (now) famous poetess, Kobylians’ka, who he saw so often. Vernon Kres, *Moia pervaiia zhyzn’,* 209.
Khrushchev, and to Kobylians’ka.\textsuperscript{71} To create even wider publicity, Chernivtsi party leaders decreed the celebration of Kobylians’ka’s 55\textsuperscript{th} jubilee of creative activity two years prior to the actual date.\textsuperscript{72}

Local Ukrainian fellow travelers, including Kobylians’ka’s relative El’pidefor Panchuk who was a protégé of the newspaper editor Nosenko, had surely advised Soviet journalists about the writer’s creative heritage, helping present the moderately feminist, moderately nationalist, slightly left-leaning, and romantic writer as a supporter of Ukrainian reunification under Stalin’s socialism. Nosenko quoted Kobylians’ka by heart in his passionate speeches for his communist colleagues: “I wrote when I loved, I wrote when I suffered, I wrote when I saw people or animals, flowers, birds alike being hurt, I wrote when I was becoming fond of ideas of women’s liberation and socialism.”\textsuperscript{73} Soviet cultural missionaries in Chernivtsi realized, though, that citations of this type would not make for efficient Soviet propaganda and began the practice of writing “journalist prose” that appeared in the press under Kobylians’ka’s name. Forty articles and proclamations were published in the local, Ukrainian, and central union press under her name.

These publications, later known as the “late prose of Kobylians’ka,” glorified the reunification, liberation, and miraculous transformation of Bukovina under the wise leadership of Stalin. Whether the writer agreed to this “collaboration” or had no choice in the matter, or

\textsuperscript{71} For example, on 27 April 1941, a conference of “working rural correspondents” (robsel’kory) of the three provincial newspapers approved three such telegrams during the opening. DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr.78, ark.18.

\textsuperscript{72} Mel’nchuk, \textit{Na vechirniomu pruzi}, 89.

\textsuperscript{73} A quotation from Kobylians’ka’s autobiography made by Nosenko during a discussion at a party conference. DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr.78, ark.7.
was too weak and elderly to understand the situation in its entirety, it is clear that she was not the author of these journalistic accounts that were later proclaimed “the most mature” of her short works and the last sparkle of her literary talent after a long era of stagnation under oppressive Romanian rule. At the same time, Kobylians’ka’s late fiction of the “Romanian period,” in which she displayed more openly religious ideas than in her earlier writings, were de facto banned.\textsuperscript{74}

3. “Advancing Local Cadres” in the Jewish City

The local embodiment of the transition to socialism was, in principle, the advancement of progressive Ukrainians (i.e., non-bourgeois and not radically nationalist) and their culture. In practice, the premises of Ukrainianization and those of social justice with its most important populist aspect—the promotion of a positive image of the new regime—were often in conflict in the city where Ukrainians were a minority and the majority of Soviet supporters, workers, and professionals were Jews. With the constant influx of illegal immigrants from Romania and of poorer Jews from the smaller towns and villages of Bukovina and Bessarabia, the Jewish population of Chernivtsi was probably growing from a dominant plurality to a majority.\textsuperscript{75} Moreover, Jews historically represented the core of the inner city population, from the old “lower town” dominated by poorer residents to the modern town centre on the hills favoured by

\textsuperscript{74} For more on the false prose of Kobylians’ka in 1940-41, Mel’nychuk, \textit{Na vechirniomu pruzi}, 87-102.

\textsuperscript{75} Statistical data for this period can be estimated only approximately. The official percentage of Jews in Chernivtsi for 1930 (the last prewar Romanian census) was 38 percent; in 1941, the officially estimated number by Romanian officials after their return to Chernivtsi was 58.1 percent (Romanian census statistics quoted in Kvitkovs’kyi, Bryndzan, and Zhumovs’kyi, eds. \textit{Bukovyna – ïï mynule i suchasne}, 429 and 900). Undoubtedly, the Jewish population of Chernivtsi grew remarkably during early Soviet rule. Dov Levin estimates that number of Jews in the city rose to up to 60,000 (constituting 50 percent of the 110,000 total population) due to the influx from Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia (Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina”: 63).
the city’s middle class. The non-Jewish population—Germans, Ukrainians, Romanians—tended to live in the suburbs, nearby villages, and the newer affluent residential areas constructed during the Romanian era. The city centre represented the immediate social surroundings to the new local leaders who worked there daily and, in many cases, also lived within its limits. This concentration of Soviet newcomers in the centre with its mostly Jewish local population caused the new leaders concern about the city core as the most typical embodiment of the notion of “local population.”

The new Soviet geographical re-districting did not break up the traditional city structure. According to the decree of the provincial party committee and the city council’s executive from 10 October 1940, three urban districts were organized “for better management and timely decisions on questions of a cultural and economic nature as well as bringing the Soviet apparatus closer to working people.” The Stalin district comprised the central part of the city, including the commercial and administrative centre, all the major city squares, and major infrastructure, with a population of 44,600. The Lenin district included the western part of the city made up predominantly of residential areas and with a population of 37,000. The Shevchenko district, named after the most venerated Ukrainian poet, was composed of the eastern areas with a population of 42,000. Chernivtsi party executives realized that the Stalin district was not so named by chance. It was the largest of all the districts, with a total residential area that was twice as large as the Lenin district and 3.5 times as large as the Shevchenko district. The most important meaning of the Stalin district, of course, was defined by its

76 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 4, 5, 6, 8, 29, ark. 131.

77 DAChO, f.72, op.1, spr. 11, ark. 22.
central position: the district housed “the authorities” (*vlada*) and was the face and soul of the city and the province, reinforcing rather than breaking up the old, “bourgeois” layout of the city.  

It was this bourgeois-looking and predominantly Jewish inner town, reincarnated in the Stalin district, that was to become the vanguard springboard for the Ukrainian “cultural revolution” — the twofold process of advancement of progressive locals to positions of (limited) leadership and purging the local community of the “enemies” who were expected to be radical Ukrainian nationalists and foreign spies. The precondition for both processes was the registration of the local population of the entire province and the issuing of personal identification documents, launched and expected to be completed in a very short period, by October of 1940. The passportization was a potent tool in the hands of the Soviet regime, and served a double function: on the one hand, it allowed the counting of the population and the tracing of people’s movements; at the same time, it affixed personal identity to individuals. There were two major identification markers that mattered for Soviet power in the 1940s: nationality, which was recorded in the passport and could not be changed, and, especially in the case of the newly annexed territories, social background. The latter was marked by the so-called

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78 DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, ark. 11-12. It seems that, when making decisions about delineating administrative district and city borders, the Soviet leadership tried to include the most industrialized suburbs and adjoining villages within the city limits while excluding rural-looking outskirts that had historically belonged to the city. The bordering villages of Klokuchka, Kladbishche, Rososh, Monastyr’s’ka, Litovyshche, Kalichanka and the workers’ settlement Stara Zhuchka with a distillery, oil plant, sugar plant, a factory, and a plant of metal works, remained within the city limits. The settlements of Zhuchka, Horecha-Urbana, Horecha were excluded. The borders were established along the villages of Mamaïvsti and Bila from the south-western side, Nova Zhuchka on the Northern side; the river Prut on the eastern-northern side, Horecha-Monastyr’s’ka and Horecha-Urbana on the east, Chagor, Koroviia, Kuchuriv-Velykyi, and Kamina on the southern side, and Mihal’cha on the eastern-southern side.

79 See the provincial CP committee’s directives on passportization of the local population (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7,11,14,19,21,24, ark. 11-13 and 115-16). In the city proper, passportization was to be conducted between 11 and 16 October.
restricted passports that had “clause 39” and identified those individuals who were considered unreliable due to their social origin. These ultimately became the most obvious targets for repression. Locals deemed useful for the new regime as professionals and valuable specialists received another special mark, “clause 40.”

Registration, however, turned out to be an exceptionally challenging task: in spite of the initial ambitious plan to register the population of Chernivtsi in three days, the passportization was barely finished by the time of the first Soviet elections in the province in January 1941.

Even long before the registration was completed, party officials at all levels realized that their most important task in separating local “aliens” from local “activists” was to purge the former and advance the latter.

According to the unwritten rules of “positive Sovietization,” the affirmative action had to come first. Apart from the arrests of the most obvious “class and political enemies,” the

80 On the meaning of Soviet passports, in particular in relation to borderland regions, see Brown, A Biography of No Place; on clauses 39 and 40, Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 111.

81 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 (combined), ark.112.

82 This separation presented a tremendous problem. Strategies used by various party officials included choosing younger rather than older people, suggested by the provincial propaganda head Luchyts'kyi, “because the youth has cleaner souls than the elderly” (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.30, ark.47) or using the past membership of a local in “bourgeois” political parties as an indicator of this person’s “alien” status. For example, in an attempt to define who represented “enemies of the people” in Chernivtsi province “in concrete terms,” Grushetsk'yii named “cuzists” (members of National Christian Party), OUN and UNDO members, and “other scum” (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, ark.42). The “political affiliation” method soon proved not really helpful and was abandoned, since in some villages 75–80 percent of the population had previously belonged to various bourgeois parties; in suburban Roshosh, 90 percent of the population previously belonged to these parties. (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7,11,14,19,21,24 [combined], ark. 53). The vague term “other scum” remained very widespread, leaving officials of every position and level with the stressful task of making their own decisions every time they had to separate “scum” from “well-working locals.” One note on “passportization mistakes in Shevchenko district,” for example, mentioned that restricted passports (with clause 39) were given to sluzhashchie (civil servants) and workers who were wrongly considered owners/capitalists; on the other hand, 11 cases of “free passports” were given to people whose property was socialized (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.58, 59, ark. 8-9.) Such notes and references were numerous.
directives from Kiev in the early months called for the positive approach, pressing comrade Grushetsky to produce high numbers of locals “promoted to positions of leadership.” The central party leadership of the Ukrainian republic constantly reminded local party and administrative leaders of Chernivtsi about the need to advance locals to leadership. Reports sent from Chernivtsi to Kiev duly told a story of continuous progress. Often, but not always, these reports also included data on identifying and purging the “alien people” who “sneaked into” the positions of leadership using their power of local knowledge. The primacy of the positive aspect of sovietization was not only a matter of populism and state security: identifying hidden enemies was in practical terms much harder than promoting activists who declared their support and enthusiasm.

The Soviet authorities’ enthusiasm about promotions soon led to confusing results: by promoting locals in Chernivtsi, in most cases they were not advancing Ukrainians. As if sorting out reliable locals from hidden enemies was not hard enough, their mission of re-forging local society was complicated even further by balancing the advancement of the socially disadvantaged and politically loyal with that of the alleged national majority, Ukrainians. The lists of city locals promoted to leadership, local shock workers, and simply local employees were heavily dominated by Jews (see Table 1). While such a situation was, it seems, accepted as a given reality by lower-level officials within industries, organizations, and even at the district

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83 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.77, ark. 65; DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 42.

84 For example, a party official in Stalin district instructed his subordinates in the fall of 1940 to start with a positive action to make the cleansing a more manageable task: “along with unmasking we conduct work with local activists, promote them to leadership; they will help to locate the aliens as well as local unemployed whom we can give jobs.” (DAChO, f.4, op.1, apr.42, ark. 1-2).
level of city administration, the provincial leadership responsible for reporting to Kiev was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with existing nationality representation in the city centre. They had a reason to be concerned: what they had to report to the centre did not resemble the image of Bukovina created by the official narratives and cultural productions endorsed by the central authorities.

Most local communists—who often happened to be Jews—were ready and eager to work with Soviet power. In practical terms, local Jewish communists represented the most reliable group of supporters, and could not be suspected of Ukrainian nationalism or spying for Germany. Many of them were disillusioned and offended when the new authorities ignored them or even treated them with mistrust. The frustration of local supporters of Soviet power was well known to Soviet leaders. The chief of the provincial propaganda department Luchyts’kyi remarked, for example:

There are Ukrainians, Jews, and Moldavians who waited for the Soviet power. And we do not work with them, do not notice them. … Trade workers are often rude to locals while they are much nicer to the newcomers. Often a local would make a mistake [and get punished for it by being fired] but he does so only because he does not know Ukrainian and we do not understand German.85

At the same time, hundreds of shock-workers (aka stakhanovites) such as "Wainer, Tadres, and Shwarz from the 1st hosiery-knitting factory in Shevchenkivskyi district" were mentioned,

85 DACHo, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, ark. 85. The issue of “bad attitude” to former members of the Romanian communist party was often discussed in the provincial party committee. When the issue acquired proportions embarrassing for Soviet rulers, Grushets'kyi personally supervised “reconciliation” with some local communists, who more often than not were also Jews (for example, f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 [combined], ark. 23; f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31,32, 33 [combined], ark.15-18.) Some Jewish communists, however, were admitted to the Soviet apparatus soon after the annexation. For example, Sara Grinberg, the former political prisoner and regional secretary of the underground Communist party, became a member of the organizational bureau of the trade unions and local activist Goldshtein received a senior appointment in the state bank. Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina,” 55.
honoured, and venerated in the name of social and economic progress in Soviet Chernivtsi.

“Excellent local doctors, shock-workers Vyzhnitser, Landauer, Feldgamer, Druker, Finkler, Edelman, Godinger, Vildman, Krasnoselskyi, Ginzburg, Brakhfeld” who “gave their own blood to patients saving their lives…” signified the outstanding achievements of the Soviet health-care system. Such examples were necessary to represent the successes of Soviet transformation.

However, as Table 1 illustrates, the data that comrade Grushets’kyi and his colleagues collected from their subordinates were devastating for the image of Chernivtsi as an administrative and cultural centre of an allegedly primordially Ukrainian province.

Table 1: Local employees by nationality, based on organizational reports from 1940-1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Group of organizations/Category</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Nationality not indicated</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakhanovite youth of Stalin’s district</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of artels of provincial industrial union, Stalin’s district</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust of canteens and restaurants, candidates</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 4, 5, 6, 8, 29 (combined), ark. 90; for a similar case, f.1, op. 11, spr. 38, 46, 48, 49, 50, 56 (combined), ark. 40. On doctors: f.1, op.11, spr. 90, 93, 94 (combined), ark.8. These people could not possibly be ignored by Soviet leaders simply because the advance of health care was at the centre of social transformations and narratives thereof. For more references to cases of Chernivtsi Jews active as propagandists, activists, shock workers, and others who supported or Soviet rule or worked for the local Soviet government and industry, see Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina” : 56, 62.

87 Note that some categories’ totals include locals and newcomers, while others are specific counts of local employees proposed for advancement, advanced to leadership positions, or hired by an organization or department. Sources: DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14,19, 21, 24 (combined); f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 (combined); f.1, op.1, spr. 159, ark. 13; f.4, op.1, spr.235; f.4, op.1, spr. 234; f.4, op.1, apr.212; f.1, op.11, spr.46, 38, 48, 49, 50, 56 (combined).
To be sure, Soviet authorities were used to operating in the parallel worlds of reality and ideological narratives and were skilled in altering statistics for reports to the centre accordingly.
Chernivtsi, however, seemed to present a case of an extreme disparity between the two. This did worry the leadership, leading them to apply extra creativity to make the two ends meet. The case of the newly organized Chernivtsi University illustrates this disparity well. The university leadership and the provincial party authorities expected that the university would open a natural channel for affirmative action in favour of Ukrainians and the construction of the new Soviet Ukrainian culture. In his report in the fall of 1940, though, the university rector Shul’ha remarked that it was impossible in local conditions to comply with Soviet nationality and class policies, and described in great detail his tremendous effort to admit as many Ukrainians as possible using “the class principle.”

Most of the applications that they received were not from Ukrainian workers and peasants as the new educators had wished. Peasants, according to Shul’ha, were not even thinking about applying to the university, even though the condition that one needed to have completed secondary school to apply had been waived for applicants with the “correct” social and national background. The university leadership was trying hard to open the doors of the university to the children of local peasants, but during the entrance exams the imported educators realized that it was not only the lack of secondary education or general lack of awareness that was a problem: many young people, even those from supposedly Ukrainian villages, did not know the Ukrainian language (often as a result of Romanianization policies in education of the recent decades). Shul’ha lamented:

88 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.68, ark. ark. 3–4, 50.
89 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark. 17. Shul’ha remarked, for example: “in [present] conditions we cannot adhere to such [general Soviet] rules. We would be very narrow-minded people if we did.” He insisted on waiving entrance prerequisites for local peasants and workers and sent delegations to villages to
Youth come to the university and ask: what language will be used? [They receive the answer:] Ukrainian. This is very hard for them. Indeed, the youth do not know Ukrainian because under the Romanians it was only studied as a foreign language. So here we also need to violate the rule. We will allow an applicant to enter the university if he/she is [at least] able to listen to lectures in Ukrainian.90

Until the buildings of Chernivtsi University could be filled with students who really felt at home with its Ukrainian language curriculum, Soviet cultural authorities had to compromise and admit those who really strove for higher education in Chernivtsi and had nowhere else to go for it: local Jews of working, lower-middle, and middle-class background.91 Many of these Jewish young people—the future best-known German poet of the Holocaust, Paul Celan (Antshel) was among them—made it through the tough selection process based on social background and nationality and spent a year struggling with the Ukrainian and Russian languages and familiarizing themselves with various subjects of the Soviet curriculum, including the history of the Communist Party. While the latter was not popular at all, many local students enjoyed taking classes in Russian literature and making new acquaintances among “newcomer” students and instructors.92

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90 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 27, ark. 51.
91 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7,11,14,19,21,24 (combined), ark. 17.
92 On Paul Celan’s student year in Chernivtsi and his life in the city in general, see, for example, Amy Colin, Paul Celan. Holograms of Darkness (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991); Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 82, 97. On the perception of the Soviet curriculum and encounter with newcomers, see Pearl Fichmann, who described in detail her year as a Soviet student at the department of foreign languages in Chernivtsi in 1940-41. Among other things, she recalled being friends with Celan who was a student in the French department in 1940-1941. Fichmann, Before Memories Fade, Chapter 4. (http://www.ibiblio.org/yiddish/Places/Czernowitz/Fichman/).
It was a Jewish student who was selected, thanks to her outstanding record of “revolutionary activities,” to give a public speech during the grand opening of the university on 30 September 1940. A native of Bessarabia who had been imprisoned by the Romanians as a Marxist, Liuba Trofa thanked the Soviet power for the opportunity to study—an opportunity that, according to her speech, previously had been opened “to the rich only and mostly to Romanians” and had not been accessible to the poor, “especially Jews.”93 Did Liuba realize that she represented a temporary substitute for would-be Ukrainian students destined to inherit this temple of “popular enlightening” and, in the eyes of the university leadership, was seen as a second-choice applicant even with her experience of three years of political imprisonment?

To sort out urban applicants, the class principle was in most cases translated into the practice of rejecting applicants whose parents had used hired labour in the past. Shul’ha complained, though, that the applicants soon discovered this and started “hiding the facts;” Shul’ha thus recommended re-checking such applicants in order to “expel some students.”94 In the end, Shul’ha’s statistics still did not serve to support the official narrative about Northern Bukovina: of the 318 students who were initially admitted, 16 percent were workers’ children, 20 percent peasants’ children, 58 percent children of officials and small traders; by nationality,

93 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 68, ark. 19.

94 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark. 9-17. The rector tried hard to restrict access to the University and to financial support for urban applicants, most of whom were Jewish. For example, he consulted with provincial party leaders on a “special issue” regarding some nine students who nominally qualified for a stipend according to an order of the Soviet Government of 1 November 1940. Shul’ha wrote to the provincial CP committee: “I restrained from giving them a stipend as their parents recently used hired personnel (now they are Soviet workers).” Shul’ga though that it would be wrong to “approach the decree formally and give them a stipend” (DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr.19, 32, 39, 68, 90, ark .1-3).
60 percent Jews, 25 percent Ukrainians, and 15 percent “others.”⁹⁵ Only 10 to 12 percent knew the language of instruction, Ukrainian. Shul’ha considered the statistics satisfactory “for the time being” before the preparatory courses were organized, but even after such a compromise the university had great difficulties with enrollment in the first academic year. Grushets’kyi generally approved the university’s policies but ordered Shul’ha to improve the national composition of first-year students, “widening with Ukrainians” while organizing courses and circles to help those who did not know the language or had not mastered it.⁹⁶

Just like the local press, the university leaders’ public pronouncements occasionally attempted to bring together the official narrative with “local conditions,” depicting wonderful opportunities opened by Soviet power for “Ukrainians, Jews, Germans, Romanians, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Moldavians, Greeks … [in] their new Socialist fatherland.”⁹⁷ Indeed, local Jews, Moldavians, and even Poles (the latter had been widely treated an “enemy nationality” in other parts of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR in general in the 1940s) were allowed to pursue their primary and occasionally secondary education in, respectively, Yiddish, Moldavian, and Polish, in 1940-1941.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark. 16.
⁹⁶ DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark. 22.
⁹⁷ DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 68, ark. 3-4.
⁹⁸ Supplying Moldavian and Yiddish schools with textbooks and other literature presented a challenge that had been constantly discussed and reported by party officials (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 28, ark. 25.) Dov Levin noted that although the number of Yiddish schools did not reflect the actual number of Jews or even Yiddish-speakers in the province, the educational opportunities created by the Soviet regime in Northern Bukovina in 1940 in fact satisfied many Jews in the province. Many Yiddish schools had a very high number of students (school #26, for example, had 1,500). Levin, 64. Russian schools largely served the children of newcomers, turned into de-facto elite institutions for the power-bearing class (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark. 105-6).
Although the policy of so-called nativization (korenizatsiia) that defined Soviet cultural policies from the early 1920s had been recalled in the mid-1930s and thereafter continued in severely limited forms, the newly annexed territories were subject to unwritten special rules. Along with the promotion of the Ukrainian language, symbolic ethnic culture, and Ukrainian cadres, support was given to Yiddish-language culture and education that had been already halted in the USSR beyond the Birobidzhan Jewish Autonomous Province.\(^9\) However, non-

\(^9\) The policy of nativization was launched in March 1919 at the 8th Communist Party congress when the supporters of the “national determination approach” Lenin and Stalin won over the “internationalists” Georgii Piatakov and Nikolai Bukharin. Between 1919 and 1923, the Soviet leadership worked out the notion of Soviet “national self-determination.” It was based on granting “forms” of nationhood to disarm nationalism. National forms included development of education, culture, and scholarship in a national language and the promotion of “native” cadres (that is, individuals of the “correct” national background) to positions of leadership in a given national administrative unit. Implemented in various ways and with different focuses in different parts of the USSR, korenizatsia was nonetheless a universal policy that initially operated on the assumption (formulated by Lenin) that Russian chauvinism was a greater evil than any bourgeois nationalism of a formerly oppressed nationality. One of the striking features of the Soviet nationality policy of the era of korenizatsia was hostility to even voluntary assimilation (into Russian culture). Contrary to the formally prevailing view that nationalization was just a phony tactic reversed during the “great retreat” of the late 1930s, many recent studies of the subject demonstrate that the nativization approach was never abandoned by the Soviet government. It was redesigned in the mid-1930s, when Russian people and culture were granted a special status of “older brother” among Soviet nationalities and the hierarchy of “Soviet peoples” became more rigid; during the 1930s, the category of “enemy nationality” was also established de facto (although racial or openly nationalist policies were never proclaimed by Soviet leaders). See Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, for a comprehensive account of the development of Soviet nationality policies; Wietz, “Racial Politics Without the Concept of Race”: 1-29 for a case for Stalinist nationality policies as influenced profoundly by racial thinking; and Bassin “Nurter Is Nature”: 872-97 for the legacy of the Soviet approach to understanding ethnicity and nationality in the post-Soviet Societies.

The case of Jewish “nationality” was a special one according to the Soviet leaders. (See Yuri Slezkine for a survey of the Soviet “Jewish question” in the context of world Jewish history of the twentieth century). So-called yidishe arbet (“Jewish work”) was an important part of korenizatsia in the 1920s-mid 1930s, but the goals of korenizatsia among nationalities that had their “historic territories” were different: for Jews, they aimed at educating a new generation of Soviet Jews fluent in the Russian language and acculturated, at least partially, into Soviet Russian culture. By the mid-1930s, this objective was largely achieved. (On the creation of Soviet Jewish culture in the 1920s-1930s, see Shternshis, *Soviet and Kosher.*) At the same time, the Soviet state attempted to “normalize” Jewish “nationality” by granting Soviet Jews their own national territory in the form of a Jewish Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan founded in 1934 in the far east of the USSR not far from Soviet-Chinese border. Granted “their own” territory, on the one hand, and theoretically welcome to assimilate into Russian and other national cultures of their respective places of residence, on the other, Soviet Jews were largely deprived of Yiddish schools and cultural institutions throughout the USSR after the mid-1930s. Territories annexed to the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, and the Baltic republics in 1939-1945 became an exception to this rule. (Gennady Estraikh, “Razreshennaia ievreiskaia kul’tura v poslepalinskuiu “ottepel’””: formirovanie modeli,” in *Idish: lazjyk i kul’tura v Sovetskom Soiuz*, eds. L. Katsis, M.Kaspina, and D. Fishman [Moscow: Rossiski’ gos. gumanitarnyi universitet, 2009], 118).
Ukrainians had to realize their opportunities for higher education in Chernivtsi in Ukrainian (preferably) and Russian (due to scarcity of Ukrainian textbooks and professors fluent in Ukrainian), unlike the case for secondary education.

While Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi may have hoped for relatively quick results from their policies and strategies to “improve” the student body of the university, they probably realized that altering the entire city’s working class, petty traders, artisans, and, most importantly, badly needed professionals, would prove a much harder task. With time, though, Soviet leaders did learn to use the mechanisms designed for social and political purging to transform “nationality” representation in Chernivtsi.

In December of 1940, the province’s first party secretary sent a clear message to his subordinates to look for enemies especially thoroughly among urban Jews. He began by quoting the nationality representation of employees of the provincial executive committee, the provincial Arts department, and the City trade department, concluding that the majority of them “worked devotedly for the good of Soviet Power” but “some class-alien people got into these institutions.” “In some organizations,” continued Grushets’kyi in a more direct manner, “… not enough attention was paid to the nationality correlation and local conditions were not accounted for.” He deemed it unacceptable that in the provincial Communal Services department among 34 local cadres only 6 were Ukrainians; in the city musical school and college among 75 teachers only one was Ukrainian; and in the city food trade department among 322 local employees only 99 were Ukrainians (see Table 1). Grushets’kyi concluded that the heads of organizations “have not yet began to seriously study, select, and educate” local cadres and

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100 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 (combined), ark. 161
cleanse the Soviet apparatus of class-alien and random people. He ordered the “heads of organizations” to check the local cadres systematically, “cleanse” them, and promote only true activists. To those who did not get the hidden message, he recommended adhering to the nationality correlation according to the national composition of the province, rather than of the city, when selecting and distributing cadres.\footnote{Ibid, 161-3. The message seems to have been well received by many officials: on 4 February 1941, for example, Grushets'kyi received a note from the provincial NKVD department with a newly compiled list of “alien elements who work in the textile industry of the province,” or former owners and people close to them, as was explained in the document. All seven people on the list were Jewish (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.134, ark. 8-9). Often the term “alien elements” was used obviously in substitution for “Jews” in the context of the city (as in DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.27, ark.8, 44).}

Party functionaries admitted that these recommendations were particularly difficult to apply to the Stalin district.\footnote{DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark 108.} Inner party discussions in the district party organization, full of mixed messages, contrary opinions, and constant “criticism and self-criticism,” reveal a great deal of confusion and frustration among the leadership and party membership. On the one hand, it seemed fine for district-level promotions to reflect the fact that “the city has a greater Jewish population;” on the other hand, advancement in this district was to be taken under strict party control. District leaders, pressured by their provincial superiors, tried not to allow advancement without discussing individual cases in the district committee bureaus and were reminded that reporting the nationality of the advanced was a must.\footnote{DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark 54-55. On some occasions, communist authorities began the practice of indicating nationality and social origin only for Ukrainians and Romanians; for Poles, Jews and other ethnic groups, often only social origin was indicated (for example, DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 138, ark. 2).}

Many argued for a larger degree of accommodation to local conditions. The nationality of locals was at the centre of the debates, but it was not the only issue at stake. Communists who
advocated higher tolerance of local particularities argued that if 70 to 90 percent of locals in the city centre were members of or voted for bourgeois parties, this did not mean that they should be approached “formally” as “unreliable” since many of them had been forced to join or vote accordingly and worked well for the Soviet state after “reunification.”

The idea was, it seems, to apply Stalin’s “individual” approach to social origins in a way that would redeem a person from the wrong class background by taking into account his or her current positions and attitudes. Even when the hypocritical nature of this “forgiving” approach is disregarded, however, it is apparent that it was applied to social background or past political mistakes much more easily than to nationality. According to the then Soviet ethos, national identification belonged to the future rather than the past; it was permanent, fixed in passports, and thus inseparable from its bearer.

When Grushets’kyi tried to justify his reasoning for more open affirmative action in favour of Ukrainians, he stipulated that the predominance of Jews in urban state and commercial institutions could provoke Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalists” to accuse the Soviet regime of anti-Ukrainian policies. It is unlikely, however, that the fear of nationalist provocations (in the province where the presence of the OUN was insignificant in 1940-1941) was the only reason for his frustrations with the pace of local cadre advancement. Numerous remarks and pronouncements by Grushets’kyi and other local leaders point to a strong and widespread concern about the ethnic profile of the urban space that now supposedly belonged to Ukrainians

104 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark.55-56.

105 Some communist authorities called for the application of Stalin’s cadre policies in Chernivtsi in 1940 (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.27, ark. 5, 42). See transcript of Stalin’s talk on class policies at the enlarged session of the Military council at the Peoples Commissariat of Defence on 2 June 1937 published in Istochnik 3 (1994): 73-88.

106 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 (combined), ark. 161-63.
but did not look, feel, and speak Ukrainian. On the threshold of the elections in January of 1941, for example, the provincial leader claimed that city organizations neglected the question of nationality policies and hired for the party and state apparatus “whoever showed up”:

15% of Ukrainians are promoted to the provincial executive committee—the place where voters go; there are 70% of Ukrainians in the oblast; if they [voters] see that [only] Jews work in [the provincial government] they start finger-pointing at this. From forty-seven employees of the provincial economic department, thirty-four are Jews, six are Ukrainians, one is Russian, and one is Moldavian. If the head of the provincial executive committee, comrade Kolikov, managed this process, this would not happen…. From two thousand one hundred and fifty-eight employees of the province trade department, only three hundred and thirty (15.3%) are Ukrainians; most of the people they employed should not have been allowed within shooting range… We have great people from among the peasantry, why do we not advance them? The apparatus is trashed by alien elements. We looked upon the peasants as cattle and now the alien people look upon them this way also. … It would be great if there was a local comrade on the reception of the head of the executive committee.107

Many “local comrades,” apparently, got the message the party leadership was trying hard to send to its subordinates. The university rector Shul’ha, for example, reported that many local Ukrainians hired by the university as technical and low-level support staff abused their Ukrainian nationality “in an openly chauvinistic form” and employed the logic “he is a Ukrainian, that is enough” when recommending new candidates for a position.108

107 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark. 104-5. On another occasion, Grushets'kyi remarked: “I agree that there are many artistic people among Jews; but I do not agree that there are no Ukrainians familiar with art. Such mistakes provoke nationalists’ [criticism] and cause legitimate complaints from peasants and workers” (ibid., ark.105). Such opinion seems to have been widespread. The Chernivtsi provincial arts department, for example, received a letter of complaint from a Soviet worker about the “infestation” of the philharmonic society with “rich Jews.” (DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr. 79, ark. 5, 6). At the same time, however, the Arts department leadership complained to party authorities that local village cultural workers promoted to the positions of club directors were characterized as having low cultural and political levels that could not satisfy the demands of the Soviet cultural development. Ibid., ark 28.

108 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24 (combined), ark.20.
In the opinion of some party authorities of the Stalin district, it was not only Ukrainian peasants who were wrongly neglected by Soviet power. The editor of the provincial newspaper, Nosenko, was particularly concerned with the fate of the local Ukrainian intelligentsia. Nosenko realized that most of these people were still choosing between, on the one hand, the Soviet regime that claimed Ukrainian statehood and, on the other, Ukrainian nationalism. The chief editor was convinced, though, that it was necessary to fight actively for these people who represented the most valuable “human material” in the region before a new generation of Ukrainians could be forged from the illiterate, nationally-unconscious peasants. He praised the veneration of Yuri Fed’kovych and supported especially enthusiastically the popular promotion of the aging Kobylians’ka. Nosenko was concerned about the realpolitik of the complex relationship between Soviet power and the writer, as well as the wider circle of local cultural activists. He realized that Kobylians’ka had become the subject of a “class war” between the Soviet and “bourgeois nationalist” Ukrainian activists.

Although she remained openly apolitical herself, Kobylians’ka had become a living symbol of Rusyn/Ukrainian culture among a group of the local Ukrainian intelligentsia in the later period of Romanian rule in Chernivtsi. As a result, “appropriating” her as a symbol remained a challenging task for the Soviet leadership while she was alive and while some of the

109 DACChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33.
110 See DACChO, f. 1, op.1, spr.77; f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33.
111 FDACChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark. 109.
local Ukrainian activists who were opposed to Soviet regime remained in Chernivtsi. Cultural authorities in Nosenko’s camp were convinced that this “class war” should be won by any means, while more cautious party leaders urged Nosenko to be careful with “encouraging” Kobylians’ka to support Soviet rule, lest “nationalist enemies” accuse Soviet authorities of “bribing” the writer.

Nosenko, however, believed that many of these nationalists themselves were worth fighting for and winning over to the Soviet side. He noted “with pain” that even close relatives of Kobylians’ka were opting to emigrate from Bukovina and blamed “Soviet power” for failing to attract these people. During party meetings, Nosenko brought up numerous examples of local cultural activists mistreated or ignored by the new leadership: the “folk” painter Zvedenivts’kyi moved to Soviet Chernivtsi from Hungarian Transcarpathia and had “a golden idea to paint a picture of the Red Army’s march into Chernivtsi” but was still living in a damp

112 On the occasion of one of the propagandist actions in the form of an official visit by the newly appointed University rector Shul’ha, her son-in-law Panchuk cited Kobylians’ka as having allegedly said: “I lived for 70 years but I have not even dreamt about being visited by the university rector and that he would be a Ukrainian” (DAChO, f.1, op. 11, spr.78, ark.29). Kobylians’ka most probably was genuinely approving of and flattered by Soviet work in the advancement of Ukrainian culture. At the same time, she was clearly exposed to the anti-Soviet opinions of her friends and relatives, which fact was well known by Nosenko and other Soviet authorities (DAChO, f.4, op. 1, spr. 125, ark. 13). Incidents such as the attempt by several young Komsomols who “needed an apartment” to move into her residence clearly did not assist the Soviet regime’s struggle to win over the writer (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33; ark. 51).

113 Grushets’kyi criticized the editors of the almanac Vil’na Bukovyna who published, together with information about awarding the writer with a special distinction (hramota) of the Soviet government's supreme council’s presidium, a note that Kobylians’ka received a monetary prize of 10,000 rubles. The Chernivtsi party leader believed that such information could cause gossip among enemies that Soviet authorities are bribing the writer and urged the almanac’s editor Nosenko to establish better communication with the provincial party committee (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7,11,14,19,21,24 [combined], ark. 83). Kobylians'ka was nominally included in the editorial board of the literary almanac Vil’na Bukovyna upon Nosenko’s suggestion (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 4, 5, 6, 8, 29 [combined], ark.65). In October 1940, the provincial party committee created a commission to prepare the celebration of Kobylianska’s alleged 55th jubilee of publishing activity and in December of 1940, earmarked 7,000 rubles for the celebrations (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7,11,14,19,21,24, ark. 61; f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 [combined], ark. 98).

114 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.77, ark. 103-9.
cold urban basement and nobody cared for him. The “folk” poetess from a near-Carpathian town of Vyzhnytsia, Kostets’ka, was “wrongly” denounced as a socially unreliable element as a real estate owner, although she was a “daughter of a simple deacon,” had to keep a second cottage (the official reason for denunciation) to live off the rent, and wrote beautiful poems about comrade Stalin.\footnote{Ibid, 110-13.} Nosenko reminded his party comrades that the only local university professor, Vasilashko, and the local activist of Soviet Ukrainian culture, Panchuk, had not been invited to Lenin’s anniversary celebration, which made them feel neglected and distrusted and thus more vulnerable to the enemy agitation of bourgeois nationalists.\footnote{DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark. 12-13.}

By virtue of his position as the editor of the provincial newspaper and by his conviction, Nosenko became an important advocate for local creative and educated Ukrainians, redeeming many of them from neglect or even potential repression as bourgeois nationalists by emphasizing their “progressive” role as the bearers of Ukrainian culture.\footnote{The case of Kostets’ka, for example, received the highest attention; she was eventually “turned” from a kurkul’ (kulak) whose property was subject to socialization into a representative of local creative activists (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.102, 103, 104, ark. 28-29).}

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The early, affirmative stage of Sovietization in Chernivtsi, conceptualized by the Soviet rulers as the Ukrainian Cultural Revolution in Chernivtsi, was implemented via three important channels. These included 1) cultural imports from Soviet Ukraine, 2) redistribution of local public space according to the new official cultural outlook of the provincial capital, and 3) adherence to the principles of affirmative action in favour of Ukrainians and Ukrainian culture.
in education, employment, and advancement to leadership. The first two projects were comparatively successfully fulfilled by the centralized and authoritarian Soviet state within the first several months of Soviet rule, resulting in superficial change in the urban environment. The third project—the practical implementation of affirmative action principles according to the Soviet Ukrainian stratification of local society—turned out to be an almost complete failure after months of intensive work by Soviet leaders in the newly incorporated city.

Soviet leaders operated within the Soviet framework of understanding human society, in which the most basic, clear, and important social marker for every individual and society was the category of nationality. Therefore, Grushets’kyi, Luchyts’kyi, Nosenko, and other new political and cultural leaders of the city worked hard to elaborate a local hierarchy of nationalities according to the “special” conditions of Chernivtsi. This hierarchy was used as a framework for public and inner-party discourses about transforming local space and society. According to this hierarchy, Ukrainians were worth fighting for, giving second chances to, and being forgiven for past mistakes, not because they were considered better than others, but because they were the nationality to which, according to the official ethos, this land belonged. Germans were to be evacuated in a civilized manner according to the agreement with then “friendly” Nazi Germany. Romanians were to be protected (although officially re-baptized as the Soviet nationality of Moldavians) in view of the borderland position of the region, to support the good image of the Soviet state, and to avoid state security issues. Jews were to be tolerated, accommodated, and used as professionals or local Communists.

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118 The evacuation is discussed in chapter five.
However, it seems that, collectively, Jews became a source of frustration not because the Soviet state was antisemitic—it was not in 1940—but because, as a national group, in the view of the Soviet Ukrainian authorities, they did not belong in this space. At the same time, local Jews as a community were connected to this space more deeply and desperately than any other group of the city’s population in 1940, if only because most of them had nowhere to go in the contemporary international situation. According to their dubious position on the list of local nationalities, and due to their number and still dominant position in the city, Jewish communities came to be used as the most likely pool for finding and purging “alien elements.”

It was not only the predominance and influence of Jews in the city that constituted the major challenge for the new rulers. As the first months of Soviet transformation passed, authorities in Chernivtsi were realizing that the most important identity of the residents of Bukovina, and especially those of the urban space of Chernivtsi, was not their “nationality.” Chernivtsi residents were now defined and self-defined primarily as “local,” whether this identity was used before the Soviet annexation, or “invented” in response to the attempt at invasion of their urban space and social structure by the army of Soviet newcomers. In the eyes of the communist party and the Soviet state leadership, all locals were suspicious; they all possessed a bourgeois mentality and were in need of reforging, while Jews came to represent the quintessential “local” and the bearer of the “alien” culture.

119 Note that many Jews in pre-1940 Chernivtsi did not consider “Jewish” to be their nationality and identified rather as Germans of Judaic faith or background.

120 Counter-intuitively to the false logic of Ukrainian nationalists from Bukovina who often interpreted Soviet annexation in terms of Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy theory, the Soviet regime in Chernivtsi province was becoming de-facto anti-Jewish in the name of the Ukrainian nation and culture. (For an example of Ukrainian nationalist interpretation of Sovietization of Bukovina, see Kvitkovs’kyi, Bryndzan, and Zhukovs’kyi, eds. Bukovyna: ïïmynule i suchasne.)
Chapter Four

Everyday Encounters

In the process of public space redistribution, a museum of local lore was opened in two wings of the former residence of the Orthodox metropolitans. The newly created museum, however, did not display many of those fine pieces of Bukovinian folk art praised by Leningrad ethnographers and the filmmaker Yulia Solntseva. It was filled primarily with the existing displays inherited from Romanian-era museums and with artifacts collected in haste from abandoned Chernivtsi apartments and offices. These artifacts represented, by and large, material culture different from that of Hutsuls and devoid, apart from the Ukrainian language of its presentation, of strong messages about the Ukrainian nature of the region. In fact, the Metropolitans’ palace itself became the major artifact of the museum. Its artistic value was yet to be evaluated, but its historic meaning was utilized by the Soviet ideologues dispatched to Chernivtsi: the palace was interpreted as a perfect “residence of evil”—the bulwark of the leaders of the church which represented the great exploiter of the masses and an accomplice of the Romanian invaders. Soviet cultural authorities saw it as a ready-made visual aid for the re-education of the masses.  

1 Note that one wing of the residence was occupied by a military detachment throughout the first year of Soviet rule in 1940-1941.

2 Around the New Year’s Eve celebrations in winter of 1940-1941, important party functionaries and cultural authorities of Chernivtsi gathered to evaluate the exhibit and listen to the text of a sample guided tour. The tour, approved by the commission, started with a brief credit to the architectural virtues of the complex, but concentrated on the social standing and material riches of the Orthodox church and its role as the right hand of the imperial Austrian and later reactionary Romanian power in the region as well as a large landowner and exploiter who lived in blatant affluence while preaching to the toiling masses abstinence, patience, and obedience. Every image or object inside and outside the palace, be it a piece of furniture, a fresco, or a painting, was used to either reinforce
Soviet authorities tried to make the most of what they had at their disposal. According to a report from spring of 1941, the museum “had only 50 percent of the needed staff;” experienced a serious “lack of exhibit material” to create all the planned departments, and “badly needed the help of highly qualified museum workers” to make sense of the local lore of Chernivtsi province. Moreover, the museum had only 25 percent of the required heating fuel—tours took place in the freezing-cold stone-walled rooms of the palace. As if these problems were not enough to deal with, provincial party leaders also received an angry anonymous letter from a local of Chernivtsi that informed them, among many other “outrageous things,” that many of the exhibition materials previously collected throughout the city were not displayed to represent the lifestyle of yesterday’s bloodsuckers but had ended up in the private collections of Soviet museum workers, their friends, and their superiors.3 The problems experienced by the museum—general scarcity and shortage of fuel in particular, lack of professional cadres, opportunism, plunder, as well as antagonism and mistrust between locals and newcomers—were characteristic of the Soviet transformations in Chernivtsi in 1940-1941. But the overarching problem was lack of knowledge about the locality. Particularly embarrassing for the museum, whose function it was to represent this locality, this lack of knowledge became the most serious impediment in the multifaceted encounter between the Soviet state and the borderland space of the abovementioned message or “educate” visitors about the phony nature of the religion itself. The text of the tour was full of bitter irony and truth-revealing statistics called up to create an image of a blood-sucker and invoke the feelings of hatred and disgust. For the text of the tour, see DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.1a, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, ark.61–80. On the shortage of “highly qualified museum workers,” f.1, op.11, spr.46, 49, 50, 56, ark.31. The commission for the evaluation of the tour included representatives of the province, city, and district party committees, the provincial department of people’s education, and the museum itself.

3 Anonymous letter from a Chernivtsi local that was sent to the provincial party committee on 10 January 1941 contained many examples to testify to the failures of the Sovietization of the city. See a collection of group and anonymous letters in DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 174, ark. 33-35.
Chernivtsi and its surroundings. The ultimate goal of the Soviet regime in the new borderland was the destruction of what the Soviet authorities regarded as backward and corrupted “local ways” and what has been famously identified by James Scott as “mētis”—the local, practical, flexible knowledge connected to the concrete environment. However, to obliterate this local knowledge and substitute it with standardized structures and narratives considered progressive and modern, the Soviets needed first to appropriate at least parts of the local knowledge in Chernivtsi and Bukovina and make it universally legible for the Soviet state.⁴

### 1. Locals, Newcomers, and Private Space

Property ownership, along with the use of hired labour, became the most important technical marker for sorting out “class enemies” from “toiling people” in Chernivtsi.⁵ As a result, the process of socialization had enormous political importance both for the Soviet authorities and locals who were making their own sense of Soviet policies and practices. The decree about socialization of large property in Chernivtsi province provided only very general guidelines, leaving most decision-making to local officials. For example, while the majority of the rental apartment complexes in Chernivtsi qualified as large enterprises and thus were socialized, smaller houses presented a serious problem.⁶ Prewar Chernivtsi was a commercial center.

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⁵ For example, all the names on the list of business owners and large home owners, composed by the city executive committee probably in the late fall of 1940, were Jewish. The list was compiled in connection to the additional nationalization and purging campaigns launched in winter of 1940-1941 (DAChO, f.72, op. 1, spr. 11, ark. 593-597.)

⁶ Decree #523 of the Soviet Ukrainian government of 14 April 1941 “On the socialization of trade enterprises in Chernivtsi oblast,” based on the order of the presidium of the Soviet government from 15 August 1940 “On socialization of banks, industrial and trade enterprises, railway and water transport and means of communication of
city and there were only a few large enterprises which employed largely migrant workers from rural areas. Therefore, small business owners, often identified as “capitalists” or “burzhui” by the Soviet authorities, constituted a large sector of the locals who initially supported or were neutral to the Soviet regime.7

The association of private property ownership and hired labour with personal social/class identity was one important factor that added to the challenge of socialist redistribution of living space and property. The other factor was the vital task of organizing Soviet trade in the city.8 Managing goods distribution, procurement, and retail (all of which were to be placed under strict central control) in the city where newly created Soviet state trade organizations coexisted with numerous private shops turned out to be virtually impossible. The ongoing process of transfers, mergers, and acquisitions was performed by Soviet specialists in cooperation with local accountants, lawyers, and former business owners. The process was complicated by language and cultural barriers, personal conflicts, and omnipresent corruption and fraud. The highest provincial authorities constantly reminded the lower-ranking communists of Chernivtsi to perform routine administrative purges of “alien elements” among the local population as they

7 For example, in an anonymous letter to the Chernivtsi Obkom, a local resident of Chernivtsi remarked: “…of course…many fabricants have fled… but many petty traders stayed because they had nothing to flee from and they expected a better life from Soviet Power.” DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 171, ark.33.

8 Note that Soviet authorities, and above all the department of industrial goods trade—an organization directly responsible for the reorganization of trade—felt lost because of the incredible (by Soviet standards) number of stores in the city. DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.27, 72; DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 28, 81. On the political importance of distribution, Grushets’kyi remarked, for example: “goods distribution is by what the people judge the authority!” (f.1, op.1, spr.30,31,32,33, ark.18).
were working hard on promoting trustworthy locals. The “passportization” campaign remained the central avenue for this purge, implemented with the “correct” nationality policies in mind. Soviet authorities realized that not all Jews were “alien elements,” and not all “alien elements” happened to be Jewish. Most “aliens,” though, were found among the Jewish “nationality,” if only because it was Jews who owned the absolute majority of the city’s non-socialized private property and small enterprises.

Those owners who did have money and were lucky enough to avoid arrest as “especially major bourgeoisie” often used bribery in order to be left in peace by the new regime, at least for a time. While many of those who could pay and found connections purchased “non-restricted” passports (that is, free of “clause 39”), those of more modest means were often “punished” by “restricted passports,” for the sake of statistics.9 Such passports disenfranchised these locals, who were already in the most disadvantaged situation as they were losing their businesses in the new isolated economic system, did not have professions that would make them attractive for Soviet authorities, and were often the last in various distribution and admission lists due to their Jewish “nationality.” It was mostly among this group where the provincial authorities ordered the search for more individuals to “restrict.”

Soviet authorities were driven by the logic of connection between socialized urban space and its former, or current, local owners. In November of 1940, for example, Grushets’kyi urged

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9 Many personal accounts indicate that bribes were widespread in wartime Chernivtsi, under Soviet and later Romanian military rule. An anonymous letter from a local resident to the provincial party committee provided communist leaders with fascinating details about the process of bribing passport officials: “A militia commissar Finkelberg worked as a head of passport point #3; he joined forces with a former local advocate Tutnader and they issued passports of “the most proletarian background” to the big capitalists and speculators for bribes (1500–2000 rubles). But they also needed to have capitalists (burzhui) [for statistics] so the petty traders all received passports with clause #39 [limitation due to social origin]” (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 174). These practices were well-known to the highest Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi (for example, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark.106-107).
party functionaries to make sure that new passports consistently identified social origin, almost always detected by the status of a person in relation to property. Grushets’kyi used simple arithmetic: “220 landlords (pomishchycy) lived here; we socialized 660 apartments only though the provincial executive committee; 120 industrial enterprises were socialized. True, many [landlords] left; but smaller and middle owners are still here. There should be more restricted persons. …553 restricted persons are not enough for the city of Chernivtsi.”

The Marxist assumption made by Grushets’kyi and his colleagues about the importance of property relations to local urban structure was true on many levels. The local population seems to have been closely and intimately connected with its private space. Local urban structure, made up of the closely interconnected communities, spaces, and narratives (or myths), temporarily provided some degree of insulation from the intrusive power of the new homogenizing state. With time and certainly with some effort, however, the Soviet state was able to break that local structure. Separating locals, and especially small property owners, from private property—“their” space—was a potent tool for subjugating them, and the process often led to damaging and victimizing both the “stone heritage” and the residents of the city. What Soviet accountants saw as private property allegedly indicative of exploitation and the capitalist mode of life was often vital for Chernivtsi locals, not only providing living space but often also supporting their existence.

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10 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark. 106. On various occasions inner party investigations concluded openly that the nationalization of industry and trade was used as a pretext for liquidating the “rich;” this direct witch-hunt was often criticized as a “wrong” approach. See, for example, a letter of complaint, DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.171, ark. 27.

11 On the insulating quality of local structures, see Scott, Seeing Like a State, 54-55.
The case of Regina Rozenblat, a divorced self-employed photographer with serious heart disease, is a good illustration. When a photography trust occupied her little photo shop and expropriated all of her equipment and materials, Regina was paid close to nothing for her possessions and had to continue paying the rent for a studio that she in fact could no longer use under threat of arrest and deportation as an “anti-Soviet element” by two subsequent trust directors. Her case was discovered and investigated during the election campaign in January 1941 when Regina—unemployed, sick, and malnourished—complained to a Soviet agitator. It was typical in the Stalinist system for electoral agitators to play the role of advocate for citizens with whom they occasionally developed close and trust-based relations. As argued by Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalinist electoral campaigns were an important social practice of political participation, a moment of high politics translated into the everydayness of “communal citizenship.”¹² In Regina’s case, an investigation that followed the agitator’s report proved that there had been an obvious violation of Soviet policies and confirmed Regina’s right to retain her private business and to rent her own studio according to current Soviet law. It is unclear, though, if any action was taken to actually restore the woman to her position. Regina Rosenblatt was a typical victim of the early Soviet regime in Chernivtsi: she was protected neither by a “preferred” nationality nor by the universal power of money.¹³

Although locals were more likely to suffer personally from the process of property distribution, Soviet newcomers for their part were not necessarily the beneficiaries of this


¹³ DACHo, f.4, op.1, spr.233, ark.41. Multiple complaints and oral accounts quoted in this chapter demonstrate that this case was typical for Chernivtsi in 1940-1941. For a collection of complaint letters from citizens, DACHo, f.1, op.1, spr.171.
process. While vulnerable locals tended to see themselves as collective victims of the new power and the newcomers collectively as perpetrators of the abuse, Soviet cadres who found themselves in Chernivtsi often became victims themselves of the wars over property and living space that were endemic in Chernivtsi of 1940-1941. One of the most notorious cases was that of Soviet newcomer Pavel Potapov who worked as the director of a hotel trust in Chernivtsi. According to Potapov’s version of the story, when his severely and chronically ill child’s condition worsened in the local climate, and his appeal to be transferred to a different region was refused, he embarked on a long and frustrating struggle to move out of a hotel room into permanent accommodation. Unfortunately he happened to be in competition with a high official from the provincial prosecutor’s office in his attempts to receive an apartment suitable for his family. Potapov was meanwhile accused of tolerating “alien activities” among a group of local accountants whom he supervised in the hotel trust. Sympathetic to his local employees who had to work in a foreign language and were constantly intimidated by NKVD raids, and apparently not ready to employ the ruthless “survival” techniques often used by his fellow Soviet newcomers, Potapov eventually became suicidal.14

Potapov was one of thousands of Soviet cadres who, like the locals of Chernivtsi in their daily lives, were caught in between local structures, the homogenizing modernist state ideology, personal needs and desires, and the needs and desires of more powerful superiors. Most of these newcomers tended to be more successful in arranging their lives in their new home city than the unfortunate trust director. When a team of doctors was sent from Kiev to Chernivtsi to provide medical supervision of the evacuation of ethnic Germans from the region in October-November

14 For detailed correspondence and reports on Potapov’s case which eventually received attention by the prosecutor’s office, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.174, ark. 64-77; f.1, op.1, spr. 171, ark. 97-102.
of 1940, they were reproached by local authorities for their miserable appearance, which caused embarrassment before the German commission members. One of the doctors explained that they arrived in Chernivtsi wearing their worst clothes and with money in hand: they were hoping to “shop around for some clothing” in this city freshly annexed from a foreign country.\textsuperscript{15} Most Soviet newcomers felt the allure of this liminal space that offered opportunities unavailable almost anywhere else in the scarcity-ridden Soviet Union, and it was no secret among the newcomers that “many communists came … to Chernivtsi merely to get some goods and chattels” and live in nice apartments.\textsuperscript{16} It was hard to resist the temptation to “shop around.” For those who came to stay—at least for a while—shopping for a space to live became the most important concern.

At least two or three thousand newly arrived Soviet officials received living space in Chernivtsi, and only some of these accommodations had been abandoned by their former residents at the time of their occupation.\textsuperscript{17} Red Army and NKVD officers occupied numerous

\textsuperscript{15}See the Soviet report on the transfer of Germans, published in Osachuk, Zapolov’s’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!” Pereselennia nimtsiv z Pivnichnoi Bukovyny 1940 roku, 103-104.

\textsuperscript{16}Self-critical remarks about Soviet cadres going to Chernivtsi only to shop for things, have nicer lifestyles, and live in good apartments were very common at various party meetings. This was particularly noticeable in Stalin’s district which provided the best opportunities for a “bourgeois urban life.” For examples, DACHo, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.5, 27, 28, 86.

\textsuperscript{17}The number of civilians and especially Soviet military personnel that arrived in Chernivtsi province in 1940-1941 can only be estimated. Chernivtsi-based historian Kholodnyts’kyi uses the number of 5,000 but it is not clear what documents he relied on (Kholodnyts’kyi, “Vplyv politychnykh protsesiv na demohrafichni vtryt narodonaseleennia Chernivets’koї oblasti”: 171). It was mentioned at the first provincial party conference on 9-10 February 1941 that two or three thousand newcomers received apartments only by late winter (DACHo, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark. 103). At the same time, it became clear during the pre-election registration in January of 1941 that the party leadership of the province had even less control over the influx of “Soviet cadres” into Chernivtsi than over locals (see a shorthand report of a meeting dedicated to the preparations for elections to the supreme council of the Ukrainian SSR and USSR from 24 December 1940, DACHo, f.1, op.1, spr. 43, 44, ark. 62). As central authorities were becoming aware of this widespread problem in newly annexed western territories, they issued numerous written and oral directives and orders aimed at strengthening control over communists and other Soviet newcomers who arrived in the new provinces. See, for example, Khruschev’s “notes to all the western provinces from 30 May 1941 (in connection with Rovno gorkom mistakes),” DACHo, f.4, op.1, spr.144, ark. 29-30. Note that Chernivtsi
apartments, houses, and hotel rooms which they found uninhabited but often full of possessions left behind by their former owners and residents. This example was followed by the imported party and state personnel. Apartments occupied by the military, party, and NKVD staff during the quiet chaos of the first days tended to be among the best in the city, as the majority of the occupants who had vacated these dwellings belonged to the Romanian administration and elites. As more and more Soviet in-migrants arrived in the city and Soviet party-state organs began attempting to control redistribution of the accommodations, the material and social value of abandoned real estate became a subject of fierce contestation. By the time departing Bukovinian Germans vacated additional houses and apartments in late fall of 1940, the army of Soviet newcomers had grown much larger, creating demand that outstripped supply.

Grushets’kyi bitterly admitted that there were serious problems with accounting and transferring to state property of the “many material possessions” left behind by Romanians. In the provincial party leader’s view, the young Soviet province still functioned primarily according to its local system of knowledge, and was unprepared for the “sophistication” of the Soviet administrative system. But the most important impediment to establishing order with

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*povit* (as it was called for a short time before it was transformed into a province) was officially under military rule for about one month after the annexation (Zapolovs’kyi and Osachuk, eds., *Bukovyna: natsional’ni rukhy ta sotsial’no-politychni protsessy*, 206). The population movement into the region from Soviet interior seems to have been largely uncontrolled during military rule.

18 Cases of eviction of Red Army personnel from illegally occupied empty apartments, taken over sometimes to quarter their soldiers, but mostly as personal residences, started already from the first days of the Soviet rule. Cases of administrative evictions and court hearings were frequent throughout the first year of Soviet rule. See DACHO, f.72, op.1, spr.2, ark.33-34; f.1, op.1, spr.27, ark.41; f.1, op.1, spr. 4, 5, 6, 8, 29.

19 As a result of the *Volksdeutsche* repatriation campaign, Chernivtsi province’s officials received 7,261 residential single-family houses with adjunct buildings, 3,390 of which were located in the city of Chernivtsi. The majority of them were in the rural suburbs historically populated by German colonists who lived from farming. In addition, 346 larger houses and 25 enterprises with total value of 22,130,700 rubles were socialized (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.49, ark.27). For more on the repatriation of Bukovinian Germans, see chapter five.
respect to Chernivtsi’s material riches was the opportunity for corruption and personal
enrichment that existed within the multi-layered Soviet bureaucracy. These opportunities were
eagerly used by “some communists who became dizzy from the outer glitter around them” to
squander prospective socialist property.20 When socialization was officially launched,
abandoned dwellings and possessions were, in theory, made state property automatically and
were meant to be rented post factum to their de facto residents, or reassigned to others.
Numerous Soviet organizations responsible for residential funds and communal services
embarked on this after-the-fact accounting operation.21 New residents responded with routine
practices of writing fake receipts, deliberately lowering the value of possessions, bribing
evaluation officials from the district financial departments, and simply refusing to let in the state
evaluators and to pay the bills (the latter practice common among the military).22

The city’s executive committee initially had ambitious plans to complete the assessments
and the eviction of illegal occupants by 22 July 1940 and to put an end to the machinations with
residential orders.23 Plenty of reports were produced, but the city’s first party secretary comrade

20 From Grushets’kyi’s speech at the first oblast meeting of the party activists on 30 August 1940, DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.27, ark.41.

21 An organization primarily responsible for the distribution of living space was the department of residential affairs (zhylupravlinnia) while the department of communal services (komunkhoz) was mainly responsible for maintenance and procurement of services for buildings. The Soviet system was highly intricate, however, with many departments and bodies of the provincial, city, and even district and organization levels being responsible for providing their own employees with residences.

22 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.4, 5, 6, 8, 29, ark.49.

23 See a decree of the executive committee in DAChO, f.72, op.1, spr.2, ark.2. However, as of September 1940, the evaluation, registration, and redistribution of 500 apartments and “possessions” found in them had still not been carried out in the city, as reported at an Obkom bureau meeting. One can only imagine how many of the processed cases reflected the actual costs and facts. On 1 January 1941 Stalin district financial department reported that “abandoned possessions” were evaluated and accounted in 814 apartments; valuables from only 83 were taken to state storage while the remainder were left for the current occupants “for storage;” apartments with possessions that
Chalykh was not very optimistic about the level of knowledge about and control of the space that Soviet organs had. According to him, they “[d]id not know how many apartments [they had in the city],” while the residential housing department continued to give out the orders for already occupied apartments, many of which were acquired by means of abuse and eviction of locals.24 In February of 1941, Chalykh repeated the bitter truth at the First provincial party conference: Soviet power did not know how many vacant apartment they had in the city, nor how much and whom to charge for the rent.25 Under the layers of registrations, evaluations, and other administrative measures, the city, it seems, lived its own life after half-a-year of Soviet rule, demonstrating the temporary resilience of the “complex, functioning order”26 of local social systems to the formal schemes of the strong authoritarian state.

Dealing with abandoned, or otherwise empty, apartments and public buildings was probably the easiest part: though confusing and competitive, the process was basically about counting and distributing, and all the related conflicts were between “our own people”—the Soviet newcomers. The situation became much more complicated when the process of were not paid for were transferred to trade organizations. DACho, f.4, op.1, spr. 151, ark. 26. At the same time, 4166 vacant dwellings were reported in the city DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark.94.

24 DACho, f. 4, op.1, spr. 125, ark. 59.

25 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark. 98; f. 72, op.1, spr. 11, ark. 423. Only in April of 1941 did the provincial party committee and provincial executive committee issue a decree aimed at reducing the widespread unruly manipulations of urban space and bringing order to its exploitation. It was the first document to address comprehensively the major concerns regarding the province’s urban heritage. In relation to residential assets, the decree prohibited replanning and reconstruction of apartments as well as transforming storages and official buildings into dwellings and subletting them. It also defined superintendants’ responsibilities and attempted to reduce the level of corruption among other employees of the department of residential affairs. DAChO, f. 1, op.1, spr. 102, 103, 104, ark. 67-69. The April decree did provide a point of reference and some guidance in daily operations as well as some long-run directions. At the same time, though, it did not offer officials in charge of real estate assets much practical help. Most of the rules stipulated in the document were based on the generic orders from the center that were only slightly adjusted to local conditions. It seems that most of the difficulties encountered in urban development in Chernivtsi were not affected by the decree.

26 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 7.
acquisition included socialization of property that in practical and local terms meant taking possessions away from the locals and giving them, in most cases, to newcomers, whether organizations or individuals. Even according to the official data, which were probably inflated, only about 700 local working families received apartments in 1940-1941; in most cases, local residents had to diminish rather than upgrade their living standards as well as their social status. Frustrated victims of “incorrect socialization” who had enough trust in the Soviet system often fought to get back what they believed rightfully belonged to them by filing complaints with various organizations; at the same time, others used their power of local knowledge to claim real estate they never owned. Decisions on socialization were frequently reversed upon complaints and checks, adding to the challenges of evaluation and accounting. Victims of residential socialization and of the battles associated with it were not exclusively locals. In many cases Soviet employees dispatched to Chernivtsi by central authorities lived

27 On the 700 families, DACHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, ark. 50. Soviet historical works usually vaguely referred to “hundreds of workers” resettled “from damp basements to bright apartments.” For a typical example, see V. Demchenko and A. Sakundiak, Chernovtsi. Putevoditel. ’ (Uzhgorod: Karpaty, 1981), 18. Soviet leaders knew that their claims about fair distribution of housing were far removed from reality: city party leader Nikitin, for example, mentioned in a district-level discussion: “…we do not pay attention to people who live in basements… we [only] took several workers out of basements…” DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 125, ark 71. In many cases, the pre-election agitators served as advocates for the wretched and disadvantaged of the city (for example, DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 125, ark. 93).

28 It was often difficult for the Soviet officials in charge of residential asset evaluation to understand the status of property and real estate. For example, many owners of the rental apartment complexes had fled; the value or the size was estimated inaccurately; or cooperative and collectively-owned property was registered as privately owned, often due to the language barrier. In the first year of Soviet rule, a large number of complaints was satisfied upon checks and investigations ordered by the Obkom, resulting in return of residences to their prior owners. A spur of socialization revisions occurred during the preparations for the first Soviet elections in the region on 9 January 1941. At the same time, multiple campaigns of “additional socialization” followed the initial one. For the numerous cases of “additional socialization” and “de-socialization” of incorrectly socialized property see, for example, DACHO, f. 72, op. 1, spr. 11, ark. 101-3, 593b-597; f. 1, op. 1, spr. 28, ark. 19; f. 72, op. 1, spr. 12, ark. 16, 109, 565-7; f. 72, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 108-116; f. 1, op. 1, spr. 58, 59, ark. 7. Courts in Chernivtsi were overwhelmed by cases of similar “incorrect” appropriations. See Jurij Fedyns’kyj, “Sovietization of an Occupied Area through the Medium of the Courts (Northern Bukovina),” The American Slavic and East European Review 12 (New York, 1953): 44-56.
with their families in overcrowded apartments in highly uncomfortable living conditions, experiencing the darker side of Chernivtsi’s transitory condition.\textsuperscript{29}

The newcomers who did take occupancy of residences for themselves or their organizations, often having had enough of scarcity and communal living before their arrival in Chernivtsi, tended to resist when their new lavish apartments were taken away by the authorities. Soviet officials deemed the behaviour of Red Army squatters the most problematic in this respect. In many cases officers used force to open locked doors, move in, and protect their new accommodations from the authorities or other claimants of the residence. This abuse of their power, along with their status of liberators, gave rise to the popular view of the military as new lords. Soviet officials in charge of cultural and social affairs who had advocated a more careful and nuanced attitude toward the locals became frustrated with the situation.

When a couple of local teachers and agitators in the semi-rural outskirts of the city, Fishel and Frida Lupu, locked up their apartment for the summer and left to attend a summer requalification course for local teachers, colonel Danilov-Zverev from a tank detachment moved into one of their rooms. He located his office in the second room, placed a guard to protect his new “fortress,” appropriated the Lupus’ household items and personal things, and threw away everything he did not need, including their lesson plans, textbooks, propaganda materials, and

\textsuperscript{29} In an attempt to bring an order to the chaotic process of residential space distribution, on 23 September 1940 the Stalin district party committee issued a directive ordering party members to occupy apartments only on the orders of the department of residential affairs and only with its orders in hand. However, those who chose to comply and wait for the orders often lived in extremely uncomfortable conditions for long months, while their more enterprising colleagues moved into nice apartments by their own strategizing (\textit{samovol’no}). For a collection of complaints about accommodation difficulties, see DACHO, f.2, op.1, spr.18. Red Army personnel also complained about bad living conditions, accusing Soviet authorities of taking better care of locals than the “army-liberator”: DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125 ark.65-6. Most of the complaints that the provincial party committee was receiving in 1940-1941 were concerned with space distribution question in one way or another (DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 17; for a typical example of the abuse of power by a higher official to evict lower-level Soviet employees from apartments, ark. 185.
Marxist literature. When the Lupus returned at the end of their course, they stayed with their acquaintances and complained to a district prosecutor. The latter, however, was not even let into the apartment by Danilov’s soldiers.30 Such cases of obvious abuse of and discrimination against local supporters of Communism clearly did nothing to promote a positive image of the new regime. The complaint reached the highest provincial officials but, even if the Lupus were restored to their apartment or provided with another one, provincial party leaders had limited powers to call similar representatives of the “army-liberator” to order due to the special status of the military and special military justice in this borderland space.

This case was just one of hundreds of similar cases usually referred to in inner party circles as “outrages” (bezobrazia [Rus.] or bezchynstva [Ukr.]). Squatting in apartments and houses was among the most widespread kind of outrage perpetrated by Soviet newcomers. Moving in forcefully, with or without expelling the locals, at times uttering openly antisemitic comments, was commonplace in Chernivtsi, to the embarrassment of the “idealists” among the newcomers and to the frustration of Grushets’kyi and other high-level officials.31 Such abuse was not reserved for Jewish urbanites, of course: even the venerated Ol’ha Kobylians’ka almost became a victim of several aggressive and apparently ignorant young Komsomol members who intended to move into her apartment; she was saved by comrade Nosenko thanks to the advocacy of her relatives.32 Like the Red army personnel, NKVD officials pioneered squatting. Enjoying an almost untouchable status in Stalinist society and dealing directly with the arrests of

30 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.58, 59, on Lupu’s case: ark. 10-11.

31 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark.84 (a case where a Soviet driver evicted a local resident, calling him “a dirty kike”); DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.44 (a party official qualifying the widespread illegal occupation of apartments as a “guerilla method”); DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 233, ark. 52-54.

32 DACHO, f.1, op. 1, spr.30, 31, 32, 33, ark.51.
“alien elements” and “enemies,” they often exploited opportunities to get accommodations. However, abuses in the realm of housing were just one category of “outrages” that Grushets’kyi and his colleagues explained as side-effects of Chernivtsi’s “special” borderland condition.

2. Idealists, Opportunists, and Local Society

Disciplining the general party membership for the “outrages” became an everyday practice in Soviet Chernivtsi in 1940-1941. Countless times, in countless party meetings, from low-level organizations to the provincial CP committee, communists in Chernivtsi criticized various degrees of scandalous, “lord-like” attitudes of those bad sheep among their own flock toward local people and the local material space. It was assumed, and often stated, that the local environment had a kind of poisonous quality that influenced those who were weak of will and caused them to fall into the disgrace of bourgeois “ways.” Without proper, strict control by their superiors, remarked Grushets’kyi in October of 1940, “Communists forgot about the conditions

33 In October 1940, for example, an NKVD official (of unknown title) Pashchenko checked an apartment on the advice of his friend, the director of a Soviet trade organization. The three-bedroom apartment belonged to the Wender family which consisted of five people (an elderly couple Simon and Sabina, their two adult sons, and a daughter-in-law). The Wenders were required to show all their material values to Pashchenko. The latter arrested Simon Wender “as a former big trader and an active member of the liberal party” without an arrest order and ordered the family to move out within two weeks and to leave behind most of their furniture, carpets, and household belongings. When the Wenders refused to move out, Pashchenko forcibly took the keys from them, putting them out on the street. He immediately moved into the apartment, appropriating everything he found there, including clothes, with an exception of several pieces of furniture that he “graciously” allowed the young Wenders to keep. The motives of his actions could hardly be hidden behind the screen of the implementation of Soviet laws; at least, they seemed obvious to Sabina Wender who wrote a detailed letter of complaint in which she pointed out Pashchenko’s personal interest. An investigation ordered by the Obkom and performed by a special case prosecutor confirmed “some violations” and requested further exploration of the case by the NKVD itself. Whether Pashchenko’s dream of a fancy apartment in the centre of Chernivtsi was fulfilled, or in fact other newcomers, who had more power, occupied their residence, the Wenders received a dry reply from Grushets'kyi stating that the arrest and the eviction were “legal and according to the Soviet law.” With variations, this scenario was repeated very often in 1940-1941 and later after the war. DACHO, f.1, op. 1, spr.171, ark.92-97 for the Wenders’ case. The file contains several complaints about similar cases. My conversations with several elderly residents of Chernivtsi showed that local urban folklore contained oral accounts of the NKVD (and probably other) officials occupying apartments of the arrested immediately upon the eviction of the former owners.
around them… became dizzy and stepped on the road of outrage.”34 No matter how hard and how often leaders called upon their subordinates (in official meeting rooms) to strengthen their hearts and reveal truly communist characters, “their own people,” not excluding the leaders themselves, continued to fall into temptation (in their everyday lives). The major temptation was to abuse their power on various levels, branded most often as “rude behaviour with locals” and “moral degradation.”35 Pompous denunciations of unworthy behaviour and political mistakes at party meetings might have created an impression of the existence of two breeds of Soviet newcomers in Chernivtsi—“idealists” and “opportunists.” Everyday life, however, was more like a grey zone where very few communists behaved according to pure “types.”

Soviet officials, confused by the mixed messages about promoting locals and hunting for alien elements, very often unreasonably distrusted, abused, and intimidated locals. They could pay for goods in a private shop with expired state loan obligations presenting them as “Soviet money” to a naïve shopkeeper. They refused employment to or threatened with arrest for small-scale accounting mistakes local bank clerks for whom the Soviet accounting system, as well as the Ukrainian language they had to use, were totally foreign. Various revelations of “lord-like” attitudes “worthy of an occupant, not a liberator” were all too common.36

34 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 88, ark. 27. On another occasion, a young komsomol agitator remarked: “what a life they had here, and now we lack everything.” This exclamation was reported as a typical example at a party meeting (DACHO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 28, ark.118).

35 DACHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 9, 10, 12,13, 15,17, 18,19, 20, 23, 24, 25, ark.4.

36 For several examples, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark.108-9 (on “lord-like attitudes”); DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.84, ark.38-39 (on distrust); DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.174 (a collection of anonymous and signed complaints referring to various kinds of abuse); DACHO, f.4, op. 1, spr. 125, ark.52-56 (on drinking and abuse); DACHO, f. 4. op. 1. spr. 233, ark.55-56 (on discrimination against locals). A representative quote: “We demand from our comrades, communists and ordinary (bezpartyini) people, a cultured and polite attitude toward the local population. However, there are cases of outrageously rough treatment… (bezobrazno-grubogo obrashcheniia…)” DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark.18.
These lord-like attitudes were revealed probably in their most grotesque form among the children of Soviet newcomers in the city centre. These youngsters, largely concentrated in several central, informally elite schools (#1, 2, 3, and 4, #3 being especially infamous), became the subject of party discussion as often as their parents. “Communist kids” behaved like “hooligans,” showed very poor academic performance (especially in comparison with local students), and engaged in openly criminal activities like pick-pocketing. Moreover, they eagerly displayed the arrogance which they had probably picked up at home, threatening their classmates, teachers, and even principals with arrest and other problems, making reference to the high positions of their fathers.37 In spite of the common ideological expectation that the wives of communists would help advance the new Soviet culture, lifestyle, and morale, newcomers’ wives in Chernivtsi often became a source of embarrassment for their spouses: even if a Soviet employee had not been implicated in any outrageous behaviours, his wife most probably was partaking in the turmoil of buying, selling, arranging, and getting around in a less than “communist way.”38

At the same time, communists and other Soviet newcomers in Chernivtsi were prone to falling into another, more dangerous (in their leaders’ eyes) trap of getting “too close” to the locals and adopting “their ways.”39 As Soviet officials of lower ranks were getting lost between

37 For examples of “spoiled children” cases and references: DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark.25, 82; f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.10, 27-8, 30-33, 53-54.

38 DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.33; f.1, op.1, spr.101, 106, 113, ark.59-65; f.1, op.1, spr. 28, ark. 82. Note that many of these children, if their parents returned to Chernivtsi in 1944, grew up to become the new “local” elite of Soviet Ukrainian Chernivtsi. On the expected and actual patterns of behaviour and occupations among housewives and particularly communists’ wives in Stalinist Soviet cities, see for example Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 139-64.

39 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.101, ark. 60-65; DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark.118.
the official policies of promoting and purging locals, puzzled by the task of telling the trustworthy from the alien, they and their subordinates were finding solutions in their daily lives: they were exploiting opportunities offered by this twilight zone city, engaging in informal relations with locals who were themselves searching for opportunities to survive the new political regime or even benefit from it, adapting their social system to the new political circumstances. The most widespread type of “opportunism” was “speculation” (Soviet jargon for “illegal trade”) of all kinds: manipulating the new, higher Soviet prices, hiding and selling informally the stock of goods found in Chernivtsi’s numerous shops, warehouses, and stock exchanges, reselling, often after “shipping” them to Kiev and other Soviet cities, items looted in abandoned property and stolen from the arrested, mobilized (to the army and labour force), or emigrating residents of Chernivtsi. From ridiculous incidents to cases of large-scale financial fraud that involved collaboration between high-level Soviet officials and influential local businessmen, “speculation” was the recurrent nightmare of Grushets’kyi and his colleagues. Along with the procurement problem endemic to the Soviet system in general, “speculation” was proclaimed the major obstacle in “breaking the capitalist trade” in Chernivtsi.40

Getting “too close” to locals went far beyond the economic sphere. Undermining in an important way the core of their own official policies of social equality (advancement of the toiling and the needy), Soviet “opportunists” allied with local ones to use the registration campaign as a source for personal enrichment. Gossip had it, and the embarrassed officials certainly knew, that a passport free from the “social background” limitation could be purchased.

40 A quote from a speech by Grushets’kyi: DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.7, 11,14, 19, 21, 24, ark. 3. On large-scale “speculation” involving Communists: f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark. 28, 84, 100; f.1, op.1, spr.66, ark.6; f.1, op.1, spr.101, ark. 47-65; for cases of large fraud at the state department of trade, f.1, op.1, spr.96, ark.57-60; f.1, op.1, spr.101, 106, 113, ark.17-22.
quite easily if rather dearly, leaving hundreds of moneyless people like Regina Rosenblatt with
the damning “clause #39” in their Soviet documents.41 Likewise, the well-meaning Soviet
policy to free the city of the “capitalist curses” of prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases
was in fact largely the struggle with “their own people” who were too eager to take advantages
in this field, even if these opportunities were not actually on offer. Not only were Red Army
soldiers and officers the most persistent, constant, and numerous clientele of local illegal
brothels, but Soviet newcomers were well known for seducing and abusing local women who
had nothing to do with the proverbial prostitutes of Chernivtsi depicted in Solntseva’s movie.42

41 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 58, 59, ark.8-9 (a party discussion on violations during the passportization campaign). See
also an anonymous letter on violations during the passportization campaign quoted above, f.1, op.1, spr.174, ark.
33.

42 The problems of prostitution and STDs were most often discussed by Soviet health-care professionals and leaders
in two contexts: the very high rate of these diseases among the mountainous population of the province (60 to 80
percent, according to Soviet reports (provincial committee report for October 1940, f.1, op.1, spr. 39, ark.5), and the
“big danger” that the city’s prostitutes represented for the Red Army and the NKVD workers. The latter, urban
problem was treated by two methods of “redemption” of the prostitutes, who were seen as victims of the capitalist
regime, and punishment of the most persistent among the prostitutes and their clients. Redemptive work was largely
in the hands of the health-care department. (See the health-care materials, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.37 and f.1, op.5,
spr.89, 143 (combined), ark. 2–3; f.1, op.1, spr.57 (a report by Martynov, provincial NKVD leader, on population
movement and health-care); f.72, op.1, spr.13, ark 2). Grushets'kyi personally supervised the organization of an
STD clinic in Chernivtsi, were women were treated, in most cases forcibly, while they were being re-educated and
provided with training in “honest trades.” The clinic also served their unfortunate clients. The punishment was
reserved largely for the brothel owners and the perpetrators of serious “outrages” among the newcomers, as well as
the prostitutes who refused to “take the honest way” and were “prostituting out of lack of consciousness and even
with criminal purposes” (DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 90, 93, 94, ark.19). In April of 1941, for example, a special
meeting was held at one of the Chernivtsi military garrisons on the question of the struggle with prostitution and
STDs. The spread of STDs in the city was found to be still unacceptably high and provincial leaders ordered the
provincial prosecutor and militia head to organize serious raids on the brothels and show trials and court hearings
for the criminals, with wide newspaper coverage and identification of “those who knowingly spread STDs” (ibid,
20).

Different kinds of intimate relationships between (most often) male newcomers and female locals are often
mentioned in archival documents (see below in text) as well as memoirs of former Chernivtsi residents. One of the
numerous archival references to this phenomenon is a complaint about the head of the Chernivtsi provincial court
Bursa who allegedly “completely degenerated” and had “fun” with his female employees. One of them apparently
became pregnant. According to the complaint, Bursa fired (officially due to staff reduction) workers who did not
approve of his behaviour. Many of the fired “comrades” were locals and members or candidates of the Romanian
Communist Party. (All the names listed in the letter were German-Jewish.) Bursa “immediately appointed his
people” to the vacated positions. The author of the letter, Sydorenko, maintained that the situation was well known
in Stalin’s district party committee and provincial party committee (dated April 1941, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.171,
ark.190).
Provincial leaders seem to have treated intimacy of all kinds between locals and “their own” as suspicious and potentially politically dangerous. Granted, for higher-level Soviet officials, the case of “stealing a wife along with chickens” from a local German by a Soviet newcomer was definitely damaging to the image of the Soviet state and citizens in the eyes of foreigners and enemies; taking new wives, official and unofficial, among locals upon abandoning “Soviet” wives in their previous locations was a sign of “degradation” among communists; and widespread patronizing of prostitutes was not only morally wrong but also costly for the local health-care system. But even seemingly legitimate relationships and marriages among young communists and locals were considered undesirable at the very least.

Local party patriarchs condemned “komsomol members who were “marrying daughters of various scum,” but in wider party and Soviet circles the message was often interpreted more generally: it was frequently assumed that marrying local women, particularly Jewish ones, was inappropriate.\(^{43}\) It is not quite clear whether Soviet officials who despised legal relationships with local women considered such marriages ideologically incorrect, politically insecure, or just morally wrong.

Chernivtsi became a safe haven not only for forbidden relationships with locals. If liminal spaces tend to evoke desires and offer opportunities for short-term sexual relationships,
then Chernivtsi was no exception: Soviet newcomers often used their assignments in this new land as a new beginning, bringing along new partners and abandoning their unwanted spouses, often with children to care for. Likewise, realizing that “bourgeois” life in Chernivtsi was temporary (since their own official mission was to “break it”), many newcomers were eager to “live in style,” eating and drinking in restaurants, taking “exotic” Viennese-style horse-cabs, and drinking champagne on the way. More practical ones were engaging in “illegal business” to provide for themselves and their families for the future, whether they intended to stay in Chernivtsi or leave it for good. Such “opportunism” was prosecuted, but only a few “opportunists” were punished. One of them was Zuev, a “responsible party worker” who revealed extraordinary business vim in acquiring “things” for almost nothing and selling them or shipping them to Kiev, where he intended to return in the near future. Zuev was expelled from the party in March of 1941; Grushets’kyi widely discussed his case as a typical example and turned it into a disciplining inner-party show trial.

44 For example, DACHO, f.1, op.1, 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark. 92, 94; f.1, op.1, spr.66, ark.21-24; f.1, op.1, spr. 171, ark. 37; 206-7. Pearl Fischman wrote in her memoir: “Some young military men, some handsome officers, began to court Russian-speaking girls. Quite a number of Bessarabian Jews lived in Czernowitz, some were students at the university. They spoke Russian and had an easier time handling matters. It didn’t take long and a number of these men married local girls. Shortly after, it turned out that some had families: wives and children. They had been called on this assignment and left their homes. Some of them took advantage of the fact that we were ignorant of conditions in the Soviet Union. Some may have had their families thousands of miles away and figured that they may not see them in years. They had their mail sent to a post office box, not a private address and their families wouldn’t know where they lived, just the town. Deceit and lying had become second nature, a means for survival.” Fichmann, Before Memories Fade, under Russians Overnight, http://www.ibiblio.org/yiddish/Places/Czernowitz/Fichman/.

45 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 21,24, ark. 108-9; f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.27-28; 52; 55-56; 84-86; f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark.57; f.4, op.1, spr.43, ark. 1-4; f.4, op.1, spr.176. On Zuev’s case, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.85, 87, 89, 90, ark.59-60. Grushets’kyi, for example, remarked during the party discussion: “…the question is a clear one: the exotic period is over, the war is over and now [there is a right time to sneak out] …Why did your wife leave: you got some stuff (podbarakhollis’) and left, right? You bought furniture for reduced prices and sold it expensively… got the piano for 800 [rubles] and sold it for 2200” (DACHO , f.1, op. 1, spr.69.).
“Outrages” were not lost on locals who were becoming disappointed and disillusioned with the new power as time went by. Those locals who had the necessary language skills and some trust in Soviet power voiced their concerns and frustrations in letters to the highest district and provincial authorities. Some explained their own backgrounds, experiences, and convictions, persuading the new rulers to trust them, hire them, and use them for the transformations. Others painted a broader picture of the situation in the city, pointing to the mistakes and weak spots of Soviet rulers and their policies, and suggesting ways to run the province in a truly Marxist, socialist way. Still other letters were written as “sunshine reports” and denunciations, “informing” Soviet leaders of the outrages and opportunism of all sorts that was commonplace in Chernivtsi. Regardless of their general tone, these letters revealed the disappointment and frustration of locals with the new rule.46 3. The Everyday Politics of Language Usage and Toponymy

Most of the local urbanites, however, had neither the language skills to communicate their feelings nor much trust in Soviet power to begin with. The growing alienation and victimization of this category of Chernivtsi locals—mostly German- and to a lesser degree Romanian- and Yiddish-speakers—was no secret to the Soviet newcomers. Most of the missionaries of Soviet Ukrainian culture in Chernivtsi realized that the biggest problem of the Soviet officials in the city was their lack of relevant language knowledge. An official who understood this problem all too well was the propaganda department’s head Luchyts’kyi. In one

46 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.71, ark. 173, 184, 109, 190; f.1, op.1, spr. 174, ark 8; 33-35, 39-43, 47, 51; f.4, op.1, spr. 233, ark. 42-49 (a letter dated March 1941 from a Franz Ruzhynskyi, a socialist and a native of “Western Ukraine” who found himself in Chernivtsi in 1940, offering detailed analysis of Soviet policies and practices in Chernivtsi and a plan for improvements in all spheres). The general atmosphere of growing disillusionment and alienation among locals—especially non-Ukrainians—of Chernivtsi throughout 1940-1941 is confirmed in the memoirs of former urbanites (see Hirsh and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, Fichmann, Before Memories Fade).
of his inner party speeches he quoted a local communist supporter who wrote: “we waited for Soviet Power but the city rulers do not know us; when we come to them, they do not understand us and we do not understand them.” Luchyts’kyi’s pronouncement that followed—“[they] do not know Ukrainian and we do not understand German. We need to learn German!”—became the most common dictum of the city’s party officials and the worst kept secret of the city during the first year of the Soviet rule.

It was becoming obvious to the Soviet authorities that the penetration of local society they were struggling for could not happen as long as the locals and the newcomers continued speaking different languages. No matter how many newspapers they printed and how many locals were made to subscribe to them, no matter how many lectures they read and reported to Kiev, and even how many locals attended them, the city remained “an equation with multiple unknown variables” for Soviet officials. While Soviet workers on “the cultural and ideological front” worked hard to reach out to the villages, where some of the local population could understand and communicate in the official language, they “did not know what was going on in the political life of the city.” In October of 1940, the chief newspaper editor Nosenko asked desperately: “what do we do with the German language? We are not allowed to publish a newspaper in German; we need to publish [at least] brochures with 3,000 printed copies; it is not very hard… We have a situation in the city where the city intelligentsia is not reading anything. Locals do not understand the structure of the new power either.”

47 DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, spr. 85.
48 The quote: ibid; see also DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, ark. 56.
49 Nosenko’s quotes: DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark.53-54. According to their common knowledge, locals often assumed that there were multiple parties: that of Lenin, of Stalin, etc. (f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark.129); on occasion, they shouted “long live Stalin, long live the representative of the district committee comrade Roi!” at a
Nosenko was being or playing naïve, though: publishing in German was out of the question. Most publications, including textbooks, shipped to Chernivtsi were in Ukrainian and Russian; the Moldavian ones were available in very limited quantities, which was the subject of frequent complaints from the districts of dense Romanian settlements and from directors of Moldavian schools. As opposed to “Moldavians” who were recognized as a minority in the province and were granted a provincial-level newspaper, Germans were being “evacuated” (according to the official Soviet jargon) from Northern Bukovina and obviously did not need German editions of Soviet propaganda in Chernivtsi, in the view of central Ukrainian officials.

street meeting, to the embarrassment of the district leaders (f.1, op.1; spr.43,44, ark.73); they crossed out names from ballots (a practice strictly forbidden under the Soviet system); (f.1, op.1, spr.43,44, ark.74). To make the district leadership’s troubles even greater, locals were known to resist attempts to educate them about the culture of voting, claiming: “do not teach us how to vote, we know how and we know better,” asserting their confidence in their understanding of the principles of democratic governance (f.1, op.1, spr.130). While locals could not (or did not want to) understand the Soviet system, the newcomers repeatedly misspelled their names, made mistakes in place names, and otherwise demonstrated their ignorance of local matters. (DAChO, f.1; op.1, spr.43, 44, ark.73).

On newspaper subscriptions: the province’s official newspaper, Soviet Bukovina, was organized in late June 1940; the local komsomol newspaper, Komsomolets’ Bukovyny, was created on 3 September 1940; soon after Nosenko initiated the publication of a “literary-artistic” almanac “Free Bukovina” (Vil’na Bukovyna), with 1,500 copies, and appointed Ol’ha Kobylians’ka to its editorial board. The drive for “covering” as many locals as possible with the Soviet press was one of the major cultural and ideological tasks of the early months (for example, DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 4, 5, 6, 8, 29, ark.11, 47, 90). In February of 1941, Nosenko reported that the newspaper had progressed from 3,000 copies distributed free of charge to having 23,000 regular subscribers and that they had received 1,300 letters from the population (45 percent of them were published; others redirected to the relevant organizations according to the situation) (f.1, op.1, spr.77, ark.109). Chernivtsi had 16 kiosks of the state press distribution in early 1941, according to local reports (f.1, op.1, spr.165; f.1, op. 5, spr. 396, f.1, op.9, spr. 155, ark. 39). However, the party leadership in the province and Nosenko himself knew very well that these subscription figures did not signify engaging, winning, or interesting the population who subscribed only because they were forced to by various methods of encouragement and intimidation (on admitting low levels of interest in the Soviet press among locals, f.1, op.1, spr.127; f.1, op.11, spr.77, ark.8).

On public lectures: occasions when public and university lectures were read to audiences that did not understand a word of them were common (DACo, f.1, op.11, spr.12, ark.17, a report from the Chernivtsi leadership to Khrushchev). Pre-elections propaganda in Stalin’s district was very problematic as agitators’ speeches were not translated and fell on deaf years of the district’s locals who eventually had very basic understanding of the situation when the election day came (DACo, f.4, op. 1, spr.125, ark. 38).

Complaints about the lack of Moldavian and Yiddish textbooks and “ideologically correct” literature from educators in Chernivtsi province were common throughout the first year of Soviet rule. For example, DACo, f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark.25.

The Romanian-language newspaper, “Bolshevik truth” (Adevarul Bolshevik), became one of the painful issues of the “cultural and ideological front” in Chernivtsi. The language barrier prevented the provincial officials from being
Jews, according to the Soviet nationality policies, were supposed to read, speak, and study in Yiddish, for which Soviet power had indeed created certain conditions in Chernivtsi province. Along with the opening of the abovementioned dozen Yiddish schools in the province (four of which were located in Chernivtsi) and the creation of a Chernivtsi-based mobile Yiddish theatrical group, several local Yiddish writers deemed “progressive” such as Hirsch Leyb Kozhbar and Itsik Shwarts received positions in the local literary establishment, and Yiddish theatres from Kiev and Kishinev were invited for guest performances. The Kiev-based Yiddish newspaper *Shtern* was made available in the city. An attempt, although short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful, was made to publish a local Yiddish paper, *Der arbeter*. Although some Yiddish enthusiasts had higher hopes for Yiddish cultural developments in the city, many were satisfied with the available opportunities, which were indeed a step forward in comparison to the interwar conditions of local Yiddish culture.

Only a minority of Chernivtsi Jews spoke Yiddish, however, and even fewer wanted to educate their children in this language. Many children from local middle-class and working families who were sent to Yiddish schools were mastering this language for the first time in their lives. Yiddish was comparatively easy to master for German speakers, but their older siblings and parents who sought higher education and employment had to struggle with

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Ukrainian and Russian which was as big a challenge for most of them as understanding German was for the newcomers.  

For most urban locals, the Ukrainian and Russian languages represented not only the symbol but also the essence of the new regime whose messages and even actions seemed vague, unclear, and frightening behind the double-curtain of Soviet obscure, hypocritical policies and the unknown language in which they were delivered. One lower-class local urbanite was probably expressing a common emotion when he complained that “they came from Ukraine and broke our tongues,” making them speak “only Ukrainian” instead of German, Yiddish, and Romanian.  

Locals who attempted to cross the border illegally and flee to Romania often cited “learning Ukrainian” as the major oppression imposed on them by Soviet power. In one case, a

53 Levin suggests that left-wing party members, Yiddishists, and the lower classes of the local Jewish population took advantage of Soviet Yiddish-language education, but he provided no numbers (Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina,” 55). Overall, though, German was still a much preferred language of communication and education in Chernivtsi in 1940. As was noted by Norman Manea, a Romanian author and a native of Bukovina who had particular memories of Czernowitz as a city of Germanized Jews, only the Holocaust “abruptly erased the differences” between the Jews of Chernivtsi and their co-religionists from neighbouring regions who spoke Yiddish, Romanian, or Russian. Norman Manea, *The Hooligan’s Return: A Memoir* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 82.

Along with traditional widespread dislike of the Yiddish language, many German-speaking Jews of Chernivtsi were also probably guided by a different logic when refusing to send their children to Yiddish schools: they saw education in a language of a national minority as a potential limitation to their future educational and career opportunities. Similar logic did become widespread later, in the postwar period, in relation to Ukrainian schools, when many parents preferred to send their children to Russian schools to increase their fluency in the language that was essential for social advancement throughout the USSR. See Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1985). on this issue.

54 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark.106. Added to the association between the new languages and Soviet power was the fact that Ukrainian and Russian were the languages of the police and the army that recruited, often forcibly, the locals (f.1, op.1, spr.35, ark. 2-3).
peasant arrested on the border said that he would rather drown in the Prut than come back and learn the Ukrainian language.\textsuperscript{55}

Provincial and city leaders did not hide their frustration and feelings of helplessness when it came to delivering Soviet propaganda and ideologically infused culture to the local Romanian- and German-speaking population.\textsuperscript{56} That such important tasks had to be delegated to people with low educational levels, “weak” ideological preparation, and unreliable, unclear background only because they spoke the local languages resulted, in Grushets’kyi’s opinion, in the “incorrect perception” of the new rule.\textsuperscript{57} In this situation, individuals who knew the languages of both locals and newcomers found themselves at an advantage which they often eagerly used to find and seize additional “opportunities” of the transitional period.\textsuperscript{58} In every matter, from accounting in a small shop to personal identification to learning the history, geography, and local lore of the province, translators and interpreters acquired a powerful

\textsuperscript{55} A party official remarked in relation to the largely Romanian regions of Chernivtsi province “Our problem (beda) is that we do not know the language…we can ask the Central Committee to send us at least people from Moldavia…” DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark. 93; f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark.114-16.

\textsuperscript{56} See the report to Kiev from Grushets’kyi, DAChO,f.1, op.1, spr. 39, ark. 9: “propaganda is lagging behind in Moldavian villages… due to language problems… The same can be said about the work with the city population of which a considerable part uses the German language but we do not have any propagandists who know this language;” another report explained to Khrushchev that locals do not understand a word of Soviet propaganda (f.1, op.11, spr.12, ark 17.)

\textsuperscript{57} On the lack of prepared Moldavian-speaking cadres and the implications thereof: DАChO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 30, 31, ark. 15-18; on the lack of German-speaking cadres: f.4, op.1, spr.125.

\textsuperscript{58} Materials on the purging of organizations in Stalin’s district of alien people read: “using the knowledge of the language, the former fabricants and Russian white officers sneaked into leadership …” (DАChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 42, ark. 1-2). Using the lack of knowledge of Russian and Ukrainian among locals, a group of people, including a high provincial official’s personal driver, imitated arrests and searches using party cars and robbing locals (f.4, op.1, spr. 43, ark. 3-4).
agency thanks to their capacity to manipulate information and therefore influence the outcome of interactions between the local world and its new rulers.\(^{59}\)

Not only did the German and Romanian languages, or rather lack of knowledge thereof, impede interaction between these two worlds. The language of local Rusyns/Ukrainians differed substantially from the Ukrainian spoken by the Soviet newcomers, both the broken language of Russian-speakers who themselves were learning the official language to satisfy the “party line” or the language of native Ukrainian-speakers from central Ukraine.\(^{60}\) The language of the local intelligentsia varied according to cultural affiliation, political leaning, and educational level, and was strongly influenced by Polish, German, and local Slavic dialects.\(^{61}\) The language of peasants and Hutsuls resembled the standardized central Ukrainian idiom even less. As representatives of the homogenizing modern state, Nosenko and other Soviet cultural missionaries viewed themselves as the bearers of the pure and standard Ukrainian language, while considering local Ukrainian a dialect spoiled by foreign domination that had to be purified

\(^{59}\) An example of a translators’ key role in communicating with the local population and possible manipulation of information: DACHo, f.4, op.1, spr. 233, ark.49; f.1, op.1, spr.171, ark. 97-102; f.1, op.1, spr.174; a case when local employees were punished for making minor accounting mistakes due to the (alleged) lack of language knowledge: DACHo f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark. 85. Local translators were also essential in gathering scholarly and statistical information about the region; aware of the possibility of manipulations, Soviet officials tried hard to find trustworthy translators when preparing materials for publication and reports. For a controversy between the son-in-law of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka, Panchuk, and a Soviet author who worked on preparing a children’s book about Bukovina, over using local materials, f.1, op.11, spr. 39, 45, 79, 81, 82, 87, 90, ark. 53-62.

\(^{60}\) Language used by local Soviet officials, including those in the cultural sphere, was full of grammatical errors, Russian words, and style slips, as was sadly noted by many communists in Chernivtsi. For example, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.7,11,14,19,21,24, ark.11-13; all Soviet and party officials who did not speak Ukrainian were supposed to attend special courses (f.1, op.1, spr. 4,5,6,8,29, ark. 47).

\(^{61}\) The language of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka, for example, is characterized by linguists as a combination of the Western (Galician) variant of Ukrainian, German, Polish, and Romanian influences, and numerous elements of so-called “iazychiie” derived primarily from the Church-Slavonic language adapted for literary usage. Iaroslava Mel’nychuk, \textit{Na vechniyomu pruzi. Ol’ha Kobylians’ka v ostannii period tvorchosti} (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2006), 100.
and elevated to the level of the literary language. Therefore, local Ukrainians as well as their German- and Romanian-speaking neighbours needed to be taught the “Soviet” Ukrainian language—only for the former the task was less challenging.

Still, very few local “conscious” Ukrainians agreed that their language and culture had to be purified. The newly appointed head of the university library Panchuk was the exception rather than the rule when he identified the major task for the chair of Ukrainian language to be “helping students to learn a ‘purified’ Ukrainian language and get rid of the handicapped Ukrainian spoiled by German and Romanian domination.” Soviet cultural missionaries also were not unanimous regarding language policy; some newspaper correspondents, for example, suggested that it was necessary to be “democrats and humanists” and speak “the language of Hutsuls” in order to truly reach the hearts of the local population.

Soviet cultural authorities sought the cure for this language problem in the public education system, from primary and secondary schools to special groups, workshops, and courses for workers and state servants in every organization, to preparatory courses at the university. Many locals, however, did not see many benefits in learning the new official language. Not only were they not used to hearing, using, and respecting Ukrainian as the language of high culture in Chernivtsi, they also often did not see much respect for the

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63 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 54, 55, ark. 6. The chair, who was initially the only local professor employed by the Soviet university leadership in September, probably did not agree: he soon disappeared from the scene, either choosing to emirate as most his former colleagues did, or becoming an early victim of Soviet repressions.

64 DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 78, 27, ark. 30.

65 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr.27, ark. 63.
Ukrainian language among the newcomers themselves. While some lower-lever party and Soviet workers seem to have taken their mission of “promoting Ukrainian culture” seriously, most rank-and-file newcomers revealed their notorious “opportunism” and preferred to speak Russian and send their children to Russian schools, causing frustration among “conscious” Soviet and local Ukrainians.

Ironically, in 1940, the Ukrainian language promoted and enforced by the high party leadership and cultural missionaries among the Soviet elite in Chernivtsi as the official language of the republic and the alleged local vernacular was, in fact, spoken by very few individuals in the city. In their daily lives many newcomers spoke Russian, even though tremendous efforts were expended to make Ukrainian the language of the party and state bureaucracy, the university, the majority of secondary schools, the state theatre, the central provincial newspaper and radio, and other major cultural and propaganda institutions. Moreover, as was aptly remarked by one of the Soviet Ukrainian “true believers” in the Ukrainian cultural revolution, theatre employee Dombrovska, “when [Ukrainian] locals see [that newcomers speak Russian], they say: fine, if you prefer Russian, we in fact prefer German because we speak it better [than Ukrainian].” Those who did speak Ukrainian in their daily lives and “gave orders in

66 Note that all the party and state documentation from 1940 and 1941, with very few exceptions, is in the Ukrainian language. Very often the style, grammar, and vocabulary reveal that both speakers and note-takers were not native speakers of, or comfortable with, this language.

67 DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.31; also f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark. 64. At the same time, the rural population in the largely Ukrainian-speaking areas was often treated to Russian-language productions, due to the general scarcity of materials and chaos in the distribution system. For example, a functionary from the provincial “cineification” department, Rats, complained to the provincial propaganda leader, Luchytskyi (in Ukrainian heavily mixed with Russian words and structures): “…we got Ukrainian-made movies (Bukovyna-zemlia Ukraїns’ka, Makar Nechai, The Fifth Ocean) in Russian translation. The film Voice of Taras also arrived in a Russian version. We think this is not permissible; we think that people who are politically illiterate are distributing films in Golovkinoprokat. The villages in Bukovina have an exclusively Ukrainian population and they do not understand the Russian language. Please inform the CC of the CP of Ukraine and the central cinematography department that in the future it is necessary to deliver films made in Ukraine in the language of our Ukrainian republic.” DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr.40, 239
Ukrainian” (as well as Russian) were often “not setting good examples,” alienating locals from this language even more. Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking newcomers were often insensitive to local conditions, in spite of Grushets’kyi’s strict indications. Their frequent “outrageous behaviour” was associated with the languages they spoke. However ironic it may sound today, university rector Shul’ha got it right when he pronounced during the university’s grand opening: “not only did the Ukrainian language appear here, but also the new, Soviet person [and] Soviet culture.” Unfortunately for well-meaning Soviet officials, numerous personal accounts by former residents of the city demonstrate consistently that the negative perception of both this new Soviet culture and the official language was much stronger than the positive ones among the locals.

The connection between the “new, Soviet culture” and its official Ukrainian language was revealed visually, and obviously, in the appearance of the city centre, which largely coincided with the Stalin district. Neither locals nor newcomers could fail to notice that after several months of Soviet rule the city had deteriorated noticeably. Removed from the caring hands of their former owners or superficially “Sovietized” by those who still owned their

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68 Quotes from DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark. 30-56.

69 For a discussion of newcomers’ misspelling of local names and making other mistakes regarding sensitive issues, DAChO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 43,44, ark.73.

70 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 54, 55, ark. 4.
businesses, the commercial city centre soon became unattractive.\textsuperscript{71} This degradation contributed to the negative image of Soviet rule in the eyes of locals and, allegedly from the Soviet perspective, spies and enemies. Soviet authorities realized that the physical appearance of their city centre was a highly political matter.\textsuperscript{72}

One of the biggest advocates of promoting proper “culture” in the city was Nosenko. The chief newspaper editor believed that the Stalin district party organization, which comprised 35 percent of the entire provincial party membership, was responsible for “the centre of Chernivtsi, the centre of Bukovina, by appearance of [which] one can evaluate the work of our [party] organization.” The urban culture of this important centre seemed so important to Nosenko that he proposed making it the “central theme” of the district party organization.\textsuperscript{73}

Local party leaders agreed that every theatre, hairdressing salon, and shop had enormous importance in the borderland new Soviet city, and reproached their subordinates for poor management of the organizations entrusted to them.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{71} DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, ark. 59, 87.

\textsuperscript{72} As the city’s militia head Telegin remarked, “besides material values, politics play a certain role here” (DAChO f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark. 82.

\textsuperscript{73} DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark. 11-12. Nosenko was just one of the many officials who were rather frank when it came to the disturbing question of the city’s appearance. Many communists in Chernivtsi agreed that the bourgeois city they had inherited was clean and beautiful and that Soviet rule made it dirty and neglected. The organization of city maintenance and cleaning in the “old” Chernivtsi was also openly admired: it was remarked at a party meeting, for example, that Romanians kept the city centre immaculate with 20 horses and a “good” man who was in charge of the process but this could not be achieved by a dozen Soviet organizations in charge of city order, including militia, the departments of communal services and residence, and the city and district councils themselves. DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, ark.51; see also f.1, op.1, spr.77, ark.97; f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark. 81, 99; f.71, op.1, spr.11, ark. 22.

\textsuperscript{74} For example, the head of the provincial Soviet, Kolikov, maintained that the question of culture in trade was a political question (DAChO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark. 8); a member of the provincial party committee and the future (postwar) provincial party leader, Zeleniuk, stated that the city was the major weak spot in respect to trade (ibid., ark. 9). The great advocate of communist urban culture, Nosenko, remarked: “[locals] get an impression that Bolsheviks ‘can do big deals’ but are weak in trade. And, honestly, they are right. It is a historical moment; the breaking of capitalist trade; we need to make it ours… (ibid., 3). For other similar statements, DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.28, ark. 62-64, 82; f.1, op. 5, spr. 31, ark.1207.
Typically for East-central European urban centres, in pre-Soviet Czernowitz the character of the central streets was defined by their small shops and cafés whose owners, clients, and neighbours knew each other and formed local communities. Even if party and Soviet leaders (secretly) enjoyed this “foreign” city in their private lives, in their roles as the first de-facto urban planners in Chernivtsi they realized that this was not what a socialist city should look like—rather, it should be defined, in their minds, by industrial enterprises, large trade centres, canteens of “communal nutrition,” and organizations of public education and “enlightenment” promoting socialist Ukrainian culture. Lacking capacity to introduce the centrally planned, Soviet shopping patterns in the city, Soviet managers and party functionaries tried to give the socialized small enterprises and remaining private businesses a new, less bourgeois appearance. The outer window shades used to cover the shop windows at night were declared “ugly” bourgeois elements and were ordered removed. Replacing the signboards in the city was also understood to be “a most important political question.”

75 In Chernivtsi, the mass transfer of its trade organization had to be performed in conditions that were complicated to say the least. Facing the lack of clear communication with previous management (due to the latter’s absence or the language and cultural barrier), sabotage and resistance of the old owners (some of whom remained in charge of their former businesses as hired managers and employees), corruption among Soviet employees at all levels, and the challenges of creating organizational networks from scratch, Soviet authorities also had to keep trade up-and-running all the time to provide the population with basic goods and avoid mass dissatisfaction with the new regime. The highest provincial and city officials appealed to their subordinates to treat the organization of Soviet trade as (another) task of high political importance. For some time, the trade was rather lively in Chernivtsi, as the goods and products from local storage were sold, officially and through all kinds of “speculations.” Through the system of special trade (spetstorg) for party and high Soviet officials, the new elite of the city got access to the best of “material riches” of Chernivtsi. But the city’s old elites were not parting with its riches easily: on 9 September 1940, the city party committee “still [did] not know what enterprises were in the city and which of them were nationalized or not” (DACHO, f.2, op.1, spr.17, ark. 6). The district and city party committees were ordered by Obkom to present final lists of enterprises to be nationalized on their territory and to complete the transfers of the nationalized enterprises by 20 September 1940. They were also to speed up evaluation of stores and organization of trade as only 14 convenience (promtovary) stores were opened in September 1940 (DACHO, f.1, op.1, apr.4,5,6,8,9, ark. 49-50) as opposed to hundreds of shops that had operated in Chernivtsi before June 1940.

76 The initial decree of the city executive committee about the mandatory replacement of signboards was issued in August of 1940 and later replicated by other party and soviet organizations. For the decree, see DACHO, f.72, op.1,
Ukrainian, often came out “impossible to read” because of grammatical mistakes and slovenly design. As late as January 1940, the signboard on Chernivtsi city hall that now housed the city council was written with grammatical errors, outraging the few zealous proponents of the Ukrainian language in the city’s apparatus of power.\textsuperscript{77}

The matter was made even worse by the use of Bolshevik abbreviations and newly created jargon that were often incomprehensible to experienced Soviet citizens, let alone the locals.\textsuperscript{78} During the first several months of Soviet rule, the city was also freed from the monumental propaganda of the previous regime and adorned with a temporary Soviet version. However, one important monument of the “old regime” that had become an important landmark for the urban community was spared destruction in 1940: the “black eagle”—the monument to the fallen soldiers of the 41\textsuperscript{st} “Chernivtsi” regiment of the Austrian army.

In preparation for the elections, in January of 1941, local authorities also finally issued a decree about renaming the streets and squares of the city. The list of new street names included, in Soviet tradition, a good number of Soviet and foreign revolutionaries, the classics of Marxism, “progressive” personalities from many places and historical epochs, philosophers of antiquity, great Ukrainian icons such as Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and Taras Shevchenko, and many other Ukrainian and Russian writers. The list also had a decent number of geographical names. With the exception of the biggest local icons Fed’kovych and Kobylians’ka, each of

\textsuperscript{77} DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr.125, ark.11.

\textsuperscript{78} DAChO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, ark 7. Although the need for an advertising bureau to produce proper bulletins and sign boards was continuously discussed, it still had not been created as of February 1941. DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 77, ark.95-96.
whom gave their names to two streets, names of local celebrities were used sparingly and included a generic “Hutsul” street, Sydir (Isidor) Vorobkevych street, a street named after the semi-legendary Dovbush, and even a street named after a Jewish Marxist (Bundist) and cultural activist who had been killed by Romanian security police, Edi Wagner. The latter was destined to be removed from the list of approved local activists in the postwar period. Unification (Unirea) square along with the city hall was officially renamed Soviet Square. The new street names asserted the new multilayered official geopolitical status of the city, that of a Ukrainian urban centre, a provincial centre in the Soviet state dominated by the “great Russian people,” and a part of the international community of progressive humanity.

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If settling down in the city was a prolonged and problematic process for Soviet institutions, it was even more so for the thousands of individuals who relocated to Chernivtsi from various regions of the USSR. The complexity of transformations that resulted from Soviet attempts to “penetrate” local society was intensified at the lowest, most personal level of contacts between locals and newcomers. These contacts were only partially determined by the official policies of Sovietization and their major pillar, the Ukrainian “cultural revolution.” And yet, it was these private contacts that belonged to the realm of everyday life rather than state policies that usually defined human experiences of Sovietization. More often than not such personal contacts were built around the redistribution of private property and living space.

79 For the decree on street renaming and the list of old and corresponding new street and square names, see DAChO, f.72, op.1, spr.11, ark. 103 and 380-88.
Language barriers acquired an outstanding political significance in Chernivtsi province. While German was a problem of the city, Romanian became the curse of Soviet Ukrainian officials in many rural districts. On the one hand, these barriers slowed down the penetration and subjugation of the otherwise strong, repressive state into the local society; it temporarily empowered the population and served as the “weapons of the weak,” to use James Scott’s term. On the other hand, language barriers prevented the messages of “positive” Sovietization from reaching a significant part of the local population, creating the strong impression of a foreign invasive regime whose bearers were often engaged in “outrages,” resulting in the further alienation of locals who spoke neither Ukrainian nor Russian.

Despite the painful rupture in the urban economic structure and the resulting deterioration of living standards, a significant number of locals not only continued to cherish the traditional urban myth of their German-speaking European city, but also, it seems, reacted to the superficial imposition of the new official interpretation on their urban structure by idealizing the prewar myth and retreating from the new public life to their private worlds that occupied the space between their favourite urban markers, books, family traditions (although they often became too expensive or simply impossible to adhere to), and religious affiliations. Building on the collective memory of the Romanian takeover in 1918 and the largely failed attempt to Romanize the ethos of their city, many of them, it seems, were stubbornly clinging to the imagined European provincial modernity of Chernivtsi, despising the new power as barbaric and

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hoping for its temporality.81 Revealing the temporary resilience of local systems to the
simplifications and standardizations of a homogenizing highly modernist state, beneath the
seemingly all-pervasive cultural and social change, propaganda attack, and new urban official
topography, and in the face of fearsome signs of Soviet ruthless repressions, the core of the
city’s structure and myth were preserved as long as the majority of its pre-Soviet population and
books remained in the buildings and public spaces of Chernivtsi.

81 This conclusion is suggested by many memoirs and personal accounts left by Chernivtsi residents quoted in this dissertation.
Part II.

“The Purge”

The failure to maintain a basic level of urban hygiene, let alone turn Chernivtsi into an attractive socialist urban space, was only one of the many failures of the Soviet regime in the province in 1940-1941. As was bitterly acknowledged by party leaders on numerous occasions, neither the local space nor its population had been “penetrated.” The beginning of the year 1941 was marked by two important events in Chernivtsi province that revealed the full scale of problems encountered by the Soviet authorities in the region and the growing frustration among the party leadership and rank-and-file. The first was the election of people’s deputies to the Supreme Councils of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR in January of 1941; the second was the first provincial party conference in February of 1941. Traditionally for the Stalinist Soviet Union and especially important for the newly annexed northern Bukovina, the electoral campaign became a time of intensive propaganda and frequent direct encounters between the new Soviet state system and the local population.

In January of 1941, during the checking of the voters’ lists, one Rusak Karol Ivanovich declared that he and his wife would not vote and explained that he was a Romanian subject and was in Chernivtsi temporarily. When asked why he had a Soviet passport he said that during passportization he obtained one because he was told that it would be problematic to live in the city without it. A similar declaration was made by Evgenii Antonov who also possessed and openly presented to a Soviet official a Romanian passport under the name of Antonescu.1

1 DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr.416, ark.4.
Possessing multiple identification documents and using multiple identities by the locals were
typical and frustrating phenomena for the new leaders. Locals also routinely used the “wrong”
voting practices while assuring Soviet officials and agitators that they did not need to be
educated about the principles of democracy. Old Czernowitzers and Bukovinians not only
refused to understand that Soviet voting involved saying “yes” to the only candidate on each
level and did not offer any choice. They also insisted on their own practice of choosing one
candidate by crossing out the others—a practice unacceptable in Stalin’s Soviet Union. The
election day revealed a high degree of political and social tension between the two parallel
structures that coexisted in the city of Chernivtsi: the old, disintegrating, but still resilient pre-
Soviet urban structure, and the society of newcomers, nominally dominated by the repressive
party-state but ruled through a complex interplay of power relations. The February conference
became the tribune where party officials discussed their numerous concerns. After the cheerful
official reports on Soviet achievements were read and traditional telegrams to Stalin,
Khrushchev, and Kobylians’ka were sent, communists spoke most of the time about the general
mood of deterioration and alienation between locals and newcomers.

Both “idealists” and “opportunists” among the Soviet newcomers in Chernivtsi—
assuming that they existed as pure types—had reasons to be disappointed by early 1941. The
“idealists” were realizing that, beyond the official reports of the miraculous progress in the
economic, social, and cultural spheres that were used to support the official narratives about the
province and the city, Soviet power had failed to fully penetrate local society and acquire local

2 DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 43,44, ark. 73-90; f.1, op. 1, spr. 124, 126, ark. 3-5; f.1, op.1, spr. 130.
3 See DAChO, f.1. op. 1, spr. 77.

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space. The “opportunists” were disappointed because the bourgeois splendor that had fascinated them in summer of 1940 had been exhausted and was being replaced by the familiar conditions of scarcity, worsened by the feeling of extreme insecurity as the war scare was growing stronger. It was becoming clear that the policies of affirmative Sovietization conducted in foreign languages and combined with the Soviet newcomers’ widespread abuse of their knowledge and power did not appeal to many of the locals and soon disappointed those few who were initially attracted to Soviet power. In other words, the more positive side of Sovietization advocated by many party leaders in Chernivtsi in the first months after the annexation had not succeeded in subjugating even a significant part of local society.

It was the Jewish population of Chernivtsi, who constituted the majority of the local population, that still possessed, collectively, the key to the local knowledge necessary for the Soviet authorities to wield full power over the locality. Eventually, the Soviet authorities who operated with essentialized Stalinist categories of class and ethnicity came to see the Jewish population of the city as the most numerous and thus the most dangerous “aliens” and decided that they had to be purged from the local society. The last months of 1940 and the early months of 1941 marked a noticeable shift in local policies from an emphasis on the positive aspects of Sovietization to a stress on the repressive, purgatory mode of transition to Soviet socialism in Chernivtsi.
Chapter Five

Cleansing “Human Beings and Books”: Purges and the Holocaust, 1940-1944

Between autumn of 1940 and spring of 1944, the city of Chernivtsi and the surrounding region witnessed the resettlement of Bukovinian Germans, Soviet deportations and population movement campaigns, and the Holocaust. The local dynamics of population change, social transformation, and repressions suggest that the period between the Soviet incorporation of Chernivtsi in June of 1940 and the completion of the last mass population transfer—the evacuation of “Romanian citizens” in 1945-1946—can be viewed as a single era characterized by the violent purge of the city in accordance with the universally radicalized wartime ethos.

This purge resulted ultimately in a fundamental demographic change. The Jewish population of the city became the focus of most campaigns of resettlement and repression in the city during World War II, in spite of multiple changes of political regimes in the regions. Although Soviet purges had a universal rationale of cleansing the border regions of “enemies” and “unreliable elements” and were not directed specifically against a single ethnic group, they also had a very important local, contextual dimension determined to a large degree by local authorities who often associated “aliens” and “enemies” among locals with Jewish “nationality.”

Followed closely by popular acts of violence against the Jews (mostly but not exclusively in rural areas), Nazi mass killing Aktionen, and expulsion of local Jews to Transnistria by Romanian authorities, the experience of Soviet mass repressions blended into

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1 On the all-union dynamics of population movements and repression in the new borderland regions, see Polian, Against Their Will; Snyder, Bloodlands.
the single story of violence and brutality in the memories of Jewish survivors of the war from Chernivtsi.

1. Early Soviet “Purifying” Actions, 1940-1941

As the winter of 1940-1941 passed, more and more local party leaders in Chernivtsi were calling for stronger, more repressive action on the part of Soviet Power to “break” this capitalist space. Both aspects of the Soviet transformation—the positive tools of mass social advancement, affirmative action, and social welfare policies, on the one hand, and the repressive methods of intimidation, arrests, and deportations, on the other—were in action throughout the first year of Soviet rule in Chernivtsi. In the local context, however, the winter months marked roughly the shift from the time of humanists, who wanted to learn German to reach to, understand, penetrate, and reshape local society, to the era of radicals who preferred (or were obliged due to the nature of their positions) to terrorize, arrest, and deport en masse those who spoke German and did not want to speak Ukrainian and Russian. This shift involved reconceptualizing the daily routines of the locals—such as shopkeepers doing their business the way they were used to, or Jews not working on Saturdays—as acts of resistance that had to be punished. Soviet deportations from the city began an irreversible rupture in the urban social structure.

2 For example, in October of 1940 it was typical to consider “local conditions” of language differences and local economic practices as a norm requiring patient transformation. One party functionary remarked, for example: “…we cannot arrest all [locals] and this is not our job” (DAChO, f.1; op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark. 93). In winter, communist authorities were more prone to suggest using the “proven” tactics previously used in “Western Ukraine” (Galicia and Volhynnia): to consider “local ways” to be sabotage and equate them with struggle against Soviet rule. Criticisms of the “free interpretation” of Soviet labour legislation, and particularly the order from 26 June 1940 on strict adherence to labour discipline became frequent. In “local conditions,” violations of Soviet labour legislation were most often identified in relation to the refusal by local business owners and trade employees to work on
The powerful actions of the party-state that involved direct coercion, forced resettlement, and other forms of violence were practiced quite regularly, although not on a noticeable mass scale, from the first days of Soviet rule in Chernivtsi. Along with individual and family arrests that were often directly connected to the redistribution of property, the Soviet government employed the so-called “organized conscription” of locals to work in eastern regions such as Donbas for large industrial projects. Only in 1944, however, after the reestablishment of Soviet rule in the region, would work mobilization acquire a truly forced and mass character involving hunting down locals on the streets and forcefully relocating them to areas of the “labour front.”

While the façade of voluntarism in this mobilization was maintained more or less throughout the first Soviet year in Chernivtsi by means of intensive propaganda and encouragement, the popular perception of the mobilization as forced resettlement rather than job opportunity became widespread after several months.

Along with not-so-voluntary methods like intimidation and even physical coercion employed occasionally by local authorities, an important source of knowledge about the essence of the mobilization was the correspondence sent by disappointed repatriates to their families who stayed behind in Chernivtsi province. Party leaders stressed the need to intensify the mobilization to match the enrollment quotas that Kiev expected every province to fill. They instructed NKVD authorities and organization-instructional departments of party committees to use positive letters from the “labour front” as encouragement while withdrawing “unhealthy” Saturdays (due to Jewish religious laws). For numerous example of such notes, see protocols of various party meetings and conferences, DACHo, f.1, op.1, spr. 7, 11, 14, 19, 21, 24; f.1, op. 1, spr. 27; f.1, op. 1, spr. 77 (protocols from the February party conference, particularly ark. 127.).
letters that discouraged local youth from applying for labour mobilization.\(^3\) In the last months before the outbreak of the Soviet-German War in June of 1941, the work mobilization in fact was blended with mobilization to the Red Army in Chernivtsi province and other newly annexed western Soviet territories. By May, more than 27,000 people were registered in the local military committees as subject to immediate mobilization. Red Army and NKVD authorities were ordered to “study” the conscripts-to-be to determine their political reliability. Those deemed unreliable were sent to “working battalions” rather than active military detachments.\(^4\)

The border zone also constituted an area of concern. The resettlement of the population from the 800-metre border zone area was required by state security policies. The movement was seemingly peaceful and even, in some cases, potentially beneficial for the resettled peasants, who were provided with land and dwellings in other parts of the province. Resettlement of peasants from their villages, however, involved severing the strong connections to their immediate locality. Unwillingness to break these connections prompted them to organize quickly and efficiently acts of passive resistance to authorities, revealing the high degree of cohesiveness of their communities. Locals saw the resettlement as a violent intervention into their lives, often saying that they did not want to resettle to the “rear,” probably because of the potential advantage they saw to their immediate borderland location which would allow them to keep their options open, if only for a while. One village community, in fact, temporarily won a

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\(^3\) October 1940, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 30, 31, 32, 33, ark.57; January 1941, f.1, op.1, spr. 174, ark. 8. On 1944, see the next chapter. See also Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina,” 59. By 1 December 1940 Chernivtsi province had fulfilled almost 63 percent of its centrally-ordered plan to conscript 23,000 persons to work in the oil, coal, and construction industries. Iryna Musienko, “Politychni repressii na Pivnichnii Bukovyni ta Khotynshchyni u 1940-1941 rr.,” Z arkhiviv VUcHK/GPU/NKVD-KGB 1/2 (10/11) (Kiev, 1999): 475-76.

\(^4\) Musienko, “Politychni repressii na Pivnichnii Bukovyni,” 481-82.
small battle with the state when it refused to move to the designated district and was allowed to relocate instead to the neighbouring village where their relatives were willing to share accommodations and land with the settlers. This decision, however, was reversed in January of 1941, causing great dissatisfaction among the locals who were forcibly resettled to a more remote area.  

By January, local dissatisfaction with Soviet rule in Chernivtsi and the province alike had already become strong and widespread, as Soviet authorities learned during the electoral campaign. Together with a degree of popular discontent grew the liminal quality of the province as a physical space. NKVD surveillance reported that a considerable number of their sources (including perusal of letters, recording oral conversation, and interrogation reports) indicated the widespread perception of Soviet power as temporary, oppressive, and unable to resist the impending foreign attack. As opposed to the early months of Soviet rule, when state violence in response to “anti-Soviet propaganda” was rare and concealed, in April of 1941 it was typical for NKVD officials to report that “relevant operational measures [i.e., arrests] were taken with regard to material of a negative nature.” 6 Provincial authorities in general were turning from compiling lists and gathering information to taking an active part in the social “purge.” Possessing a Soviet passport, especially one with “clause #39,” already felt to some locals like

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5 DAChO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 137, ark. 1-10.

6 Quote from a report from 26 April 1941, “A collection of extracts from people’s letters screened by the NKVD in March 1941.” The report was accompanied by a note that, in the absolute majority of the documents, the writers speak against newly introduced collective farms, often resorting to “provocations and slanderous expressions and anti-Soviet proclamations.” Regardless of their nationality, locals were reported to often express the wish for the “old time/order” to return. DAChO, f.1, op. 1, spr. 138, ark. 141, 8.
imprisonment by the state.7 For many, their passports would indeed become “one-way tickets” to Soviet labour camps.

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7 This is noted, for example, by Pearl Fichmann in her memoir. See Fichman, Before Memories Fade [link], under Chapter 4.
2. ***Purging Local Books, 1941***

The mass purge of the local society by means of deportation to the remote regions of the USSR was preceded by another attempt to control and reshape the local population—the mass purge of literature in the province. When Paul Celan called Chernivtsi a place “where human beings and books used to live,” he was referring to the great significance of the print world to the educated part of local society for whom it served as a powerful connection between what they perceived as their own remote island of “European civilization” and the cultural mainland, even if that mainland itself was slowly sinking in the sea of terror brought by the Nazi takeover and accelerated by the onset of World War II. $^8$ The meaning of the printed word was well known to the Soviet authorities as well. Because they were creating new narratives about Bukovina and disseminating among the locals the Soviet interpretation of the history and structure of human civilization at large, they needed to limit access to alternative narratives in order to ensure the success of their cultural transformation. Controlling what people read in spaces like Chernivtsi, however, was not an easy task.

The new regime’s attitude to local books, as to the local people, was changing from cautious and respectful in the early months to purgative and repressive later in the “Soviet” year of 1940-1941. Like university libraries in Lviv and other large cultural centres in the newly annexed territories, Chernivtsi University and public libraries held large collections of literature. In March of 1941, university rector Shul’ha appealed to the provincial authorities regarding the literature assets that were inherited by Soviet power in Chernivtsi. He stated that the university

library had many rare editions (including incunabula and unique editions). He spoke about 700,000 volumes in 25 languages, primarily English, French, and German, as well as plenty of foreign language journals, pamphlets, dictionaries, and academic periodicals. Shul’ha noted that the library had an unsorted archive that “was probably the only source on the history of Bukovina.” The original letter to the provincial party committee signed by Shul’ha included the following sentence: “These books can certainly be opened for general use.” A hand-written correction in black ink made the suggestion more careful: “certainly” was crossed out and “Not all” was added to the beginning—local authorities were figuring out “on the go” how to deal with local information and knowledge. Shul’ha proposed to create a special collection in the library, following the practice of other scholarly libraries in the USSR, and asked for support for the university’s request to the “relevant organizations.” The head of the provincial department of propaganda, Luchyts’kyi, supported the request and forwarded it, accompanied by his own note, to the “relevant organizations” such as the department of literature.9

Dealing with the university and library collections was the easiest part of the story: these books could be (and were eventually) checked, moved to special collections, and restricted for use. Books that still “lived” in the city—in its numerous private bookstores, private homes, and flea markets—were much more difficult to control.10 Even literature that had been “socialized” together with bookshops and other “bourgeois possessions” had to be saved at least for a while lest “German firms” file any requests that had to be satisfied according to the agreement

9 DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr. 19, 32, 39, 68, 90, ark. 13-14.

10 Memoirs and personal accounts (cited in the prologue and elsewhere) indicate that private book trade was flourishing in the early months. Many bookstores were too small to be nationalized; state intervention in the book trade was also minimal because books did not represent commodities that were in high demand among Soviet newcomers. Top priority was given, officially and among the “opportunists” of the Soviet system, to food, clothing, and household items trade.
between the Third Reich and the USSR about the transfer of Germans. At the same time, positive action was emphasized: Soviet leaders worked hard on promoting the Ukrainian and Russian book by printing regularly reviews of new books and articles suggesting “reading lists” for good Soviet citizens.

Authorities in Chernivtsi understood that reading “books in German or Romanian that are soaked with bourgeois ideology,” which was commonplace in the city, did not aid the reshaping of local society. As would be noted in 1944 by some Stalin district party workers, “German books educated our citizens in a bourgeois spirit. Reading such books, willy-nilly, makes people want to be like the protagonists…” However, the ideologically correct books recommended by Nosenko and his colleagues could hardly compete for the hearts of the majority of local urban youth, largely fascinated by German literature and poetry. Therefore, from the early months of 1941 on, Soviet authorities launched an attack on the printed word in the province that intensified significantly in late winter and spring of that year.

The book purge took various forms. Traditional Soviet methods of dealing with unreliable literature included a variety of measures from changing covers and cutting out portraits of the “enemies of the people” to the recycling of “outdated” material and sending potentially “harmful” literature to higher authorities for investigation. Regardless of the

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11 DACo, f.1, op. 11, spr.19, 32, 39, 68, 90, ark. 15, 17. Such cases did happen and German requests were satisfied by shipping back printed materials ordered by local storekeepers prior to Soviet annexation.

12 Urged by the Ukrainian Communist Party's central commitee, the Chernivtsi provincial Communist Party's committee decreed on 15 January 1941 that chief editors of the provincial newspapers introduce permanent sections of literature critique and bibliography. Major publishing houses regularly published recommended reading lists and articles, reviews of all local publications, and surveys of literature in various scholarly and literary fields. DACo, f.1, op. 11, spr. 40, ark.7

13DACo, f.4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 29, 30.
historical specifics of Chernivtsi province, provincial ideological authorities distinguished between the literature of the pre-1917 era that was considered generally harmless and the post-1917 “bourgeois” literature that was to be purged thoroughly. In February of 1941, the propaganda secretary Luchyts’kyi ordered the establishment of purging commissions in all villages of the province. These commissions were to look specifically for “potboiler, pornographic, mystical, monarchical, nationalist, Menshevik, Trotskyite, etc.” books. Provincial cultural leaders, though, were not sure that commission members would always be able to tell genuine art from pornography, and instructed them specifically “not to remove books containing reproductions of artwork by Baroque, renaissance, and medieval masters.”¹⁴

“Urban” books represented both higher value and higher danger, as was noted by educated people like Shul’ha. Soviet cultural workers and party officials responsible for ideological issues considered any work published under “foreign” jurisdiction, especially in languages other than Ukrainian and Russian, to be highly suspicious to say the least. Most of the scant Ukrainian-language literature of local and “foreign” (i.e., published in countries other than Austria and Romania) origins was found to be nationalist-bourgeois and counter-revolutionary and therefore was to be included in special lists of “harmful and outdated local authors” to be removed from circulation.¹⁵ Hence, all literature found in Chernivtsi was suspect and ideally, to the zealous Communist ideologues of Soviet Ukraine, was to be destroyed and substituted by “healthy” published materials shipped from Soviet Ukraine.

¹⁴ DACHO, f.1, op. 11, spr. 45, ark. 6.

¹⁵ 13 March 1941, DACHO, f.1, op. 11, spr. 40, 41, 42, 44, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 86, ark. 18.
Such a project was of course unrealistic: it was prevented not only by scarcity but also by the fear of alienating the local Ukrainian population who were supposed to see Soviet power as the liberator and protector of their cultural heritage. Central cultural authorities found an alternative solution in shipping thousands of volumes from Chernivtsi libraries to higher educational institutions and libraries of Kiev. This not only reduced the volume of literature in foreign languages considered “dangerous and harmful” for the borderland population of Chernivtsi, it also alleviated the scarcity of foreign-language literature for the preparation of “Soviet cadres” in the more controlled and reliable environment of the national capital. Cultural authorities in Chernivtsi were not pleased with such “expropriations” sanctioned by the Central Literature Department (Glavlit,) the major republican agency in charge of publication and distribution of printed materials, and performed by the entrepreneurial representatives of Kiev institutions who were eager to enrich their own library assets. Reports and complaints sent to the Chernivtsi central party organs suggest that, as educators, scholars, and cultural workers, people like Shul’ha found it unfair that the capital libraries were enriching themselves at the expense of “their own” institutions.16

If only indirectly, the double process of promoting “correct” books and purging the “harmful” ones took place along “nationality” lines, like the double policy of advancement and purge of the local population. Intensive promotion of Ukrainian and Russian books targeted primarily those who were able or willing to understand these languages. (Romanians received special shipments of Moldavian literature, although it was scarce in the early Soviet period.) The purging of German literature influenced those who had been its major consumers in modern

16 DACHO, f.1, op. 11, spr. 19, 32, 39, 68, 90, ark. 15-17.
Chernivtsi, assimilated Jews. Just as throughout the Romanian period of 1918-1940, the most talented and active of them continued to write poetry in German and the majority of them spoke German in their daily lives. Under Soviet rule, they became isolated from the new public domain, and tended to live their spiritual lives in the world of German-language literature.\(^{17}\)

Even those Jews who were still Marxist believers in spring of 1941 preferred to read their classics in German.\(^ {18}\) By winter of that year, such people also tended to separate their Marxist beliefs from trust and support of Soviet regime.

Thus, Soviet authorities seemed to have arrived at a dead end in attempts to solve the cultural part of their “German question” in Chernivtsi. At the same time, they watched and assisted the efficient solution of the demographic, ethnic-German part of this “question” in the fall campaign of resettlement of the Bukovinian *volksdeutsche*. The resettlement of Bukovinian Germans deserves a detailed analysis as an important case of early mass population transfer and, as such, a large-scale “purgatory” action under Soviet rule in Bukovina. It was the first major step in the radical demographic transformation of the city and the painful rupture of local social networks that accompanied this transformation.


\(^{18}\) See for example materials of the First Stalin district party conference from 25 January 1941; DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 125, ark. 31-32.
3. “Evacuation of Germans,” September-November of 1940

By 1940, Stalin and the Soviet state machine had impressive experience in cleansing frontier zones and deporting their populations. Since 1934, the category of “enemy nation” had been de facto applied to Poles who were arrested and deported first from the prewar borderlands of the Ukrainian SSR and later, after the annexation of eastern Polish lands in 1939, from the new borderlands. Hence, the Soviet government in Moscow did not object to the deportation of Bukovinian (and Bessarabian) Germans; in fact, Stalin and his subordinates in Kiev were interested in getting rid of what they saw as a potential “fifth column” so close to the state border. The intention to be rid of the “German element” in the new regions was clear also from the official narratives that did not even mention Germans. In the eyes of Soviet officials, Germans did not belong to the body national of Soviet Ukraine. According to the Soviet worldview, they were a foreign, diaspora nationality, identified themselves as such, and ought to “go home.” Unlike the Volga Germans, however, who were obviously “punished” for their belonging to the enemy nationality when they were repressed and sent to the Soviet east in 1941, the Germans of the “western territories” were lucky (at least for a while). Not only were they sent “back home” while Soviet-German relationships were still formally friendly, but they

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19 Overall, more than three million people were deported during Stalin’s rule. N. F. Bugai, “40-50-ie gody: posledstviia deportatsii narodov (Svidetel'stvuiut arkhivy NKVD-MVD SSSR),” *Istoriiia SSSR* no. 1 (1992): 122.

20 Another ethnic group subject to deportation early on were Koreans. On prewar deportations see, for example, Polian, *Against Their Will*, 115-19; Brown, *A Biography of No Place*, 153-91.
were also evacuated in an orderly manner under the close supervision of the representatives of the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{21}

Therefore, days after the incorporation of the new territories in June of 1940, Germany initiated negotiations with Moscow about the process of evacuation. The Soviet side was generally cooperative. However, although Soviet statesmen were eager to part with Germans in their new territories, they were initially not ready to pay for their property and living space. The Germans insisted, and on 5 September 1940 the two empires signed an “agreement on evacuation” that prescribed joint evaluation of non-movable property left behind by the evacuees for which the USSR was to compensate Germany in the future.\textsuperscript{22} The actual evacuation lasted exactly two months, from 15 September through 15 November of 1940. Both delegations’ leaders agreed later that the operation turned out to be exceptionally well organized. As a result, 133,660 people were registered for evacuation from Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and 133,138 of them actually left. Of those evacuated, 44,557 were from Northern Bukovina. The German delegation, consisting of 600 representatives, was allowed to work freely on the territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina while its 17 high-level officials received the highest diplomatic privileges. The Soviet delegation, like the highest

\textsuperscript{21} Passat, “Evakuatsiia nemetskikh kolonistov s territorii Bessarabii i Severnoi Bukoviny:” 88-89.

\textsuperscript{22} The agreement was officially entitled “On the evacuation of persons of German nationality from the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the territory of Germany.” There were two serious disagreements between the two parties. The first concerned Germans who were in Soviet prisons, whom Soviets initially did not want to evacuate. The second related to the property of German colonists. Passat, “Evakuatsiia nemetskikh kolonistov s territorii Bessarabii i Severnoi Bukoviny:” 89-91. Simultaneously with the major agreement, the sides signed two documents that determined the terms, conditions, and procedures of the evacuation: “Additional protocol of the agreement…” and “Protocol of the final meeting of the joint Soviet-German commission for the evacuation…”. The central point for evacuation was located in Tarutino (Bessarabia) and the evacuation had to be organized in five districts. Chernivtsi was the centre of one of them. The Chernivtsi evacuation district had eleven sub-districts; five of them were located in and around the city of Chernivtsi. Osachuk, Zapolov’s’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!,” 32.
echelon of the Chernivtsi party leadership, was made up fully of Soviet Ukrainian personnel: 65 people were sent by the Ukrainian CP central committee; 100 were dispatched by the Kiev and Odessa military districts; and 30 were from the Ukrainian Soviet government.23

Soviet authorities did not expect significant difficulties with “sorting out” Germans from other nationalities in Chernivtsi for two reasons: first, selection and registration was performed by the German commission, and second, evacuation was largely voluntary.24 Rumours about future repatriation began to spread through Bukovina from the fall of 1939. Under the nationalist Romanian rule of 1918-1940, local Germans had become the targets of increasing Nazi propaganda. By 1940, many embraced this ideology while others realized that “repatriation” from this East European territory was inevitable, sooner or later.25 At the same time, Nazi racial scientists had already evaluated the “racial value” of the Bukovinian Volksdeutsche: rural Germans were considered good “in all respects,” while city Germans of the area were deemed problematic due to strong “contamination by the Jewish element.”26

When the mass flight from Northern Bukovina started in late June of 1940, Germans were commanded from Berlin to remain calmly in place. All German communal institutions

23 Passat, “Evakuatsiia nemetskikh kolonistov s territorii Bessarabii i Severnoi Bukoviny:” 91-100; Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, ‘Dodomu v raikh!,’ 42.

24 Local Germans did not really have a choice: most of them realized that they would be considered enemies by both sides if they stayed in Bukovina (Passat, “Evakuatsiia nemetskikh kolonistov s territorii Bessarabii i Severnoi Bukoviny:” 94).

25 On German communities in Chernivtsi, see chapter one.

26 The German consul in Chernivtsi Schelgorn wrote to Berlin in September of 1939 that Germans of Chernivtsi “did not always stand up to all the requirements…” which he explained by their lengthy association with neighbouring alien ethnic, and particularly Jewish, “elements” that had allegedly influenced them negatively. The living conditions of this ethnic group were found generally “hard” (cited in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, ‘Dodomu v raikh!,’ 27).
were allowed to continue their activities and indeed played an important role in the evacuation. Soviet authorities were aware of the active anti-Soviet and Nazi propaganda conducted through these organizations but closed their eyes to it deliberately. After all, both sides were interested in the evacuation. Theoretically, while Nazi ideology openly articulated the racial principles of social organization, Soviet official policies allowed for ethnic diversity of a sort in a society based on social justice. But the unwritten rules of the time—the ever-changing party line—dictated other principles. When speaking to the Chernivtsi provincial party activists’ meeting, the head of the Soviet evacuation delegation Vasiukov remarked: “We do not have a need to leave these people on our territory and you know why. That is why [the Germans’ agitation…] is not forbidden and we do not stay in their way.” Nationality did not matter in the USSR—theoretically—as long as it was a “good” Soviet nationality deemed legitimate for a given territory; belonging to a “diaspora” (often understood as synonymous with “enemy”) nationality was highly problematic for the individual while a concentrated group of “enemy” nationals in a border area had to be treated radically, according to Stalin’s unwritten policies. And yet, belonging to an “enemy” nationality did not necessarily bear tragic consequences for all so designated in Chernivtsi in 1940.

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28 Quoted in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!,” 42. In the inner party and NKVD documents, deportees from various parts of the USSR to the eastern and northern territories could be categorized by ethnicity (Tatars, Chechens, Germans) as well as by other identifications such as “former kulaks,” OUN members, German collaborators, “osadniki,” refugees, Volksdeutsche, or even “from Lithuanian SSR.” See Bugai, “40–50-ye gody: posledstviia deportatsii narodov:” 122-43.

29 By the end of the war, belonging to an “enemy” nationality could not be redeemed, in most cases, even by the highest levels of political loyalty, correct class origins, or ideological beliefs. For example, in March of 1949, the MVD SSSR issued an internal decree that clarified for the local MVD head the attitude toward former NKVD and MVD workers “who belonged to the nationalities re-settled forever during the Great Patriotic War.” They had to be
As organized, orderly, and “scientific” as it was (according to the codified Nazi racial science and the unwritten Soviet ethnographic rationale), the separation of Germans from Bukovina’s population, on the one hand, and the “cleansing” of the local population of its Germans, on the other, was not free of controversies and complications. Although farmers from compact rural and suburban settlements had largely preserved the distinct cultures of their localities of origin, rarely interacted with other local ethnic groups beyond business affairs, and were highly susceptible to Nazi propaganda, even they occasionally chose to use their official right to stay rather than leave. In the city, there were cosmopolitans, Marxists, and others not thrilled about the prospect of going “home” to Nazi Germany, even if their racial purity appeared crystal clear to the Reich ethnographers.  

Such was the case of Peter Demant, a future writer who spent his childhood and youth in Chernivtsi with his Austrian-born parents. He refused to take advantage of his “Aryan blood” and, before he was arrested and deported to Siberia, he worked for a while as an assistant in the museum of local lore located in the former Residence of Bukovinian Metropolitans, which fact registered at the “special settlements” in their current locations together with their families and become subject to special regime and administrative oversight. Bugai, “40-50-ie gody: posledstviia deportatsii narodov” (1992): 135. However, although the Soviet Stalinist attitude toward “enemy nationalities” was essentialized to a strong degree and was in some respects comparable to the Nazi and other radical approaches to “undesirables,” many scholars agree that it never reached the “irredeemable” quality of the latter. See for example Eric Weitz, “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race.”

30 Cases of Germans being elected to local Soviet organs are recorded in documents (Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!”, 35; among 2,912 locals employed by 3 Soviet organizations (combined data of the provincial Soviet’s executive committee, the arts department, and the city trade department), 11 officially declared German nationality (DAChO f.1. Op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, ark. 161); one German (out of 511) was admitted to Chernivtsi State University (DAChO f.1, op.11, spr. 46, 49, 50, 56, ark. 29). On mutual influences between Germans and other local Christians in religious and everyday practices, see Sophie A. Welisch, “Faith of Our Fathers: Ethnos and Popular Practices among the German Catholics of Bukovina in the Early Twentieth Century,” Journal of the American Historical Society of Germans from Russia 11, 2 (Summer) (1988): 21-28. According to the Soviet final report, 180 German families refused to be evacuated from Chernivtsi province (report published in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!”, 107).
was even documented in the local newspaper *Soviet Bukovina* where his photograph was published with a caption: “An assistant in the Chernivtsi local lore museum P. Demont examines the old Turkish carbine from the 17th century. Zaporizhzhia Cossacks had been armed with such guns.” An anti-Fascist Protestant pastor also chose to stay in Chernivtsi, survived the first Soviet rule and the following Romanian occupation, and wrote a letter to Stalin in 1944 in which he asked for monetary compensation and a permanent social pension. The pastor asserted his Soviet identity stating that he had been arrested by “German-Romanian occupational authorities” because of his possession of the works “by Stalin, Marx, and Lenin.” He justified his request by the fact that, after the German community of the region had been “repatriated,” he could no longer practice his profession.

The most problematic in the eyes of the German delegation were “half-Jews” and Jewish spouses of “pure” Germans who wanted to leave but were not allowed to do so. Although such cases were not numerous, they apparently became an issue for both German and Soviet evacuation officials. One can only speculate as to the reasons and motivations of Bukovinian Jews who sought evacuation to the Third Reich. Lack of full understanding of Nazi policies regarding Jews could be one of the reasons, although by the fall of 1940 most seemed to be informed about the persecution of Jews in Germany and on the occupied territories. The choices can perhaps also be explained by a hopeful plan to conceal their Jewish background upon arrival in the Reich, to be exempted from harsh treatment as spouses of ethnic Germans, by flexible and

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32 DAChO, f.623, op. 2, sp.4, ark. 6. The life of this German pastor and his acts to protect persecuted Jews are possibly described in a biographical novel by Blum, *The Walnut Tree*, cited earlier in this work.
cultural understanding of their identity, endemic to Chernivtsi, or simply by desire to remain with their families regardless of the consequences. Even the ultimate scientific authority responsible for saving his “race” in Bukovina, a former local scholar Rudolf Wagner, had disturbing moments such as the one when his roommate from student years, Schmerger, asked for help. The latter, who was an active member of the German community in Chernivtsi but also half-Jewish, had to remain in Chernivtsi while all his family left. Unable to help his old acquaintance, as a Nazi official and scholar, but realizing the absurdity of this situation, Wagner unofficially advised Schmerger to use the services of the widely known false document “agency” in Chernivtsi.33

Along with the few Germanized Jews who wanted to join their German relatives, there were all kinds of people who were eager to leave due to their political or personal beliefs. Most of the time the German commission did not object to taking them along, also due to political considerations, while the Soviet commission attempted to prevent their escape. This “escape” of non-Germans gave the German evacuation an important meaning for Chernivtsi province beyond “ethnic cleansing” and altering the demography of Northern Bukovina. The population transfer campaign temporarily reopened the border that had been officially “locked” on 3 July

33 Rudolf Wagner, a native of Bukovina who had worked at the Institute of Eastern Europe at Berlin Humboldt University, was employed by the Nazi government as a specialist on Bukovina’s ethnography. He later recalled that he often had to deal with cases when the applicants for emigration did not have German last names. According to him, German officials would be less troubled by leaving a German behind in Chernivtsi than by bringing a Jewish spouse of a German to the Reich. The head of the German Commission in Northern Bukovina, Miller, “had no idea about Bukovina at all” and left it to Wagner to sort out local Volksdeutsche from their Slavic and Romanian neighbours. Rudolf Wagner, “Moï spohady pro pereselennia Bukovyns’kykh nimtsiv iz Pivnichnoї Bukovyny u 1940 r. (translated from German),” in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!,” 68-69.
1940, creating another limited period of extreme liminality in Northern Bukovina.\textsuperscript{34} There were important differences between these two transitory moments. In late June and early July, choices about staying and leaving were often restricted more by the ability to board the train or secure another means of transportation than by any political restrictions. At the same time, making a choice was generally harder as one had to choose between two uncertainties.\textsuperscript{35} In the fall of 1940, however, it was easier for many people to make a choice as they now knew more about both Soviet rule (from their own experiences) and Nazi policies toward Jews and eastern Slavs (from media and gossip); their choices, though, were much more restricted. First, the border was open this time only in one direction; second, with very rare exceptions, there was practically no choice for Jews (not only were they not allowed to evacuate by Germans but very few of them opted to do so at that time); third, in many cases one had to pass the double control of the German and Soviet commissions in order to register for evacuation and board the train. And yet, it was a large-scale exit opportunity for a state as closed and authoritarian as Stalin’s USSR.

Moreover, the limitation of choices about the actual, physical “exit” seems to have loosened the shapes and limits of personal identity for many individuals. The transfer of Germans became, in a way, the last mass revolt against affixing of personal national identities to their bearers by means of Soviet internal passports, when the bulk of the population in this borderland region became empowered by its multilingualism and experience of political change to challenge the repressive and controlling machine of the Stalinist state. Some non-Germans

\textsuperscript{34} Although initially the evacuation of Romanian authorities (and, in fact, everybody who decided to leave with them) had to be completed within 24 hours, according to the Soviet ultimatum to the Romanian government. Molotov later officially extended the term of evacuation until 3 July 1940.

\textsuperscript{35} For an analysis of personal recollections on the difficult choices in 1940-1941, see Hirsch and Spitzer, \textit{Ghosts of Home}, 99-116.
were “smuggled” by the German delegation for purely political reasons (with the prospect of information gathering and using them as spies) while others, most probably, easily passed as ethnic Germans.\textsuperscript{36} Soviet repatriation officials were frustrated by this vagueness and flexibility of identities in the region as well as by the fact that the Germans were extremely vigilant in excluding Jews from evacuation lists while closing their eyes to many cases of other non-Germans who applied for evacuation.\textsuperscript{37} The Soviet team complained about such “violations of the agreement,” demanding on many occasions that the German delegation allow the evacuation of Jews who were entitled to leave as spouses of ethnic Germans; at the same time, they fought to keep in Chernivtsi other non-Germans (mostly Ukrainian nationalists or other anti-Soviet minded persons). After the evacuation, the head of the Soviet commission in Chernivtsi took the

\textsuperscript{36} Some Ukrainian historians claim that 4,000 Ukrainians left during the German transfer (Vasyl’ Kholodnyts’kyi, “\textit{Z i\textendash;storiї vzaiemovidnosyn mizh radians’kymy i nimets’kymy predstavnykamy v radians’ko-nimets’kii zmishanii komisiї po evakuatsiї bukovyns’kykh nimtsiv u Chernivtsiaх},” in \textit{Naukovyi visnyk Chernivets’koho universytetu: Zbirnyk naukovyh prats’}, 123/124, History [Chernivtsi: “Ruta,” 2002], 205; Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “\textit{Dodomu v raikh!},” 39). As demonstrated by Rudolf Wagner in his recollections, their racial policies apart, German officials associated local Jews with “real Soviets” while Ukrainians were associated with the Ukrainian nationalist movement which was deemed potentially useful in the German struggle against Bolshevism; therefore, several important Ukrainian nationalist activists were “smuggled” by the German commission. For such purposes, an underground centre for issuing false documents was located on one of the central streets of Chernivtsi. According to Wagner, having a non-German last name was not considered a big problem during the selection process. For example, it was enough for a Ukrainian (by later self-identification) illegal evacuee to claim German nationality, speak German, and decline any knowledge of Ukrainian language. Documents were checked only “when possible,” according to the agreement, and most of them where religious certificates which left space for manipulating with “nationality” (excepting Jews).

In 2001, a series of interviews was conducted with witnesses of the German repatriation by the Centre of Bukovina Studies at Chernivtsi University. Many of the respondents mentioned that it was generally easy to pass as a German by either marrying a German or just declaring oneself a German and it was not uncommon for Romanians and Ukrainians to leave the province in such manner. However, this was not a widespread practice. Some of the non-German families returned after realizing that they were going to face mobilization into the German army or life in the camps for a long time. See “\textit{Hovoriat’ svidky: Bukovyntsyi pro pereselennia susidiv nimets’koї national’nosti},” in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “\textit{Dodomu v raikh!},” 45-66.

\textsuperscript{37} The head of the Chernivtsi district commission, Moskalenko, took pride in preventing the “illegal” evacuation of 4,000 self-proclaimed Germans. He was frustrated by the fact that it was hard to check nationality and wanted clarity in this respect. In his final report, Moskalenko wrote: “It is desirable that in future possible evacuations the paragraph on nationality is specified in a clearer manner in the agreement.” See the official report of the Soviet evacuation commission from 19 November 1940, DACChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 49.
lists of persons who attempted “illegal” evacuation as well as Germans who refused to emigrate and handed them to the provincial NKVD department. 38

Besides the complexities of “nationality policies” in the evacuation, the Soviet delegation had issues when dealing with the real estate left behind by the evacuees. 39 The district representative of the Soviet delegation in Chernivtsi, Moskalenko, did his dutiful best to make the bill the Soviet government had to pay as low as possible. The German representative Müller had a directly opposite mission: to make sure that Volksdeutsche returning to the Reich brought along as much of their valuables as possible so that they would be able to provide for themselves. The result was a war over every house, barn, and piano as well as piles of complaints and correspondence between the delegations and their respective authorities. 40 In his report to Moscow, Moskalenko listed various measures he was taking to prevent Germans from overpricing the possessions, such as making sure that Soviet experts be present at every single

38 On illegal evacuation attempts, see cited works by Kholodnyts’kyi, Passat, and the collection “Dodomu v raikh!,” particularly p. 106. Letters from peasants to the provincial newspaper reveal that manipulating with political and national identities by the local population for purposes ranging from survival to economic benefits was a widespread practice in Northern Bukovina, as was the knowledge of how to do so. Peasants usually quickly realized which identity was convenient in new political situations. They also tended to imitate their local leaders and authorities who had better access to information. At the same time, peasants frequently denounced their former leaders in accordance with the new ruler’s identity politics. The “exploiter” Perz, for example, was said to have been “a Ukrainian under Austria and Romania” who had even opened a Ukrainian school which he later closed and sold; but “now he suddenly became a German” to evacuate to Germany. Other “exploiters” who often worked for Soviet organs were allegedly promoting “whisper policies” to identify not as Ukrainians but as politically active Romanians, expecting the return of Romanian rule. Some letters signed by self-identified “Romanians” were written in local Ukrainian. (DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr.174, ark. 39, 39a, 40.)

39 According to the agreement, “citizens of German nationality” were allowed to take along a very limited number of possessions and cattle; their remaining real estate and other items were to be evaluated and compensation paid to the German government by the USSR within ten years. Evacuees also had the right to sell their possessions after they were evaluated and registered by the commission. Items that could not be in private possession of individuals according to the Soviet law, such as factories, large equipment, or land, were subject to socialization without compensation. See “Soglashenie mezhdu pravitel’stvom SSSR i Pravitel’stvom Germanii ob evakuatsii lits nemetskoi natsional’nosti s territorii Bessarabii i Severnoi Bukoviny na territorii Germanii,” DAChO, f.1, op.1, spr. 47. Also published in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!, 71-93.

40 DAChO, f.3, op.1, spr. 32-33: a collection of letters of the German consul in Chernivtsi regarding the claims of German citizens.
As a result of this massive accounting operation, Chernivtsi oblast officials received 7,261 residential single-family houses with adjunct buildings, 3,390 of which were located in the city of Chernivtsi. Provincial and city officials were supposed to take all possible measures to protect this newly acquired socialist property from squatters and robbers (razbazarivanie). The immediate authorities—district party secretaries and the heads of village soviets—were directly responsible for the former German possessions until the latter were assigned and legally transferred to their new residents.

According to Soviet reports, in winter of 1940-1941, 2,494 of these houses with adjoining or distant plots were given to peasants from the same or neighbouring rural districts who had little or no land. More than 1,000 houses and 273 hectares of land were assigned to cultural and public institutions such as village clubs, reading houses, or schools. Land in the city outskirts and neighbouring villages was also used for the organization of auxiliary farms for the industrial enterprises and organizations of the city. Finally, 425 households were used to resettle peasants from the 800-meter border zone discussed earlier in this chapter. Thus, the city’s suburban “German” space was filled with the more suitable “human material” of local peasants, the group that was generally considered synonymous with “Ukrainians.”

41 Based on the results of the evaluation, the average household cost was 862 rubles in the oblast and 1,168 in the city of Chernivtsi. DACHO, f.1. op.1, spr. 49.

42 The majority of them were in the rural suburbs historically populated by German colonists who lived from farming. In addition, 346 larger houses and 25 enterprises with a total value of 22,130,700 rubles were socialized. DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 49, ark. 27.

43 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, ark. 115-16, ark. 177. Some tables of distribution of “German” property are also published in Osachuk, Zapolovsky, Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikhi!,” 113-14. Many properties left behind by Germans were eventually destroyed due to bad maintenance and deterioration without use.
In the context of the impending German occupation of the USSR, this “civilized” transfer of private space as well as the entire reconstructed everyday experience of the evacuation campaign look almost surreal. Chernivtsi and other territories subject to “repatriation” were physical spaces where the short-lived German-Soviet friendship—something that was never fully compatible with Soviet communist ideology generally—materialized in real, personal contacts between the representatives of the two state systems and ideologies of the twentieth century that were antagonistic but also similar in many respects. The extent to which such contact was unusual and unexpected by Soviet people can be imagined from the reaction of a doctor who was sent from Kiev to Chernivtsi to provide medical services to the evacuees. Upon seeing Nazi uniforms in Chernivtsi railway station, the woman panicked and started crying, wondering whether she could get back home “now that the Germans have already occupied the city.”

The Germans, for their part, were surprised by many things, including the miserable look of Soviet doctors. The latter, according to their descriptions, arrived in Chernivtsi with money in hand as if they thought of this as going “abroad” with the hope of “buying some clothing.” During the work of the commission, the German delegation not only attended official dinners in their honour and a folk dance concert but also stood, as special guests, on the tribune during the parade on the occasion of the October revolution celebrations which happened to be taking place

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44 DAChO, f.1. op.1, spr. 49; also in Osachuk, Zapolovs’kyi, and Kholodnyts’kyi, “Dodomu v raikh!, 103.

during the evacuation campaign. Long after the events of 1940, Rudolf Wagner wrote in his memoir that he had developed a close professional relationship with the head of the Chernivtsi district commission, NKVD officer Moskalenko, who appeared to him as a smart and strong-willed man capable of acting in critical situations. Wagner was saddened to learn after the war that Moskalenko had perished at the hands of an OUN member—ironically, given his hard work to assist in what had been in fact ethnic cleansing of Ukrainian territory.

4. Soviet Mass Deportations, Spring and Early Summer of 1941

The Soviet radical “solution” of the other, “Jewish,” part of the “German question” in Chernivtsi began with mass arrests. While the literature purge was in progress in spring of 1941, the first mass deportations were taking place in the province. The spring and summer waves of arrests and deportations were part of a larger campaign of cleansing the newly annexed western territories of the USSR from the “enemy and unreliable” population of all sorts, often targeting first and foremost local elites. The campaign lasted from the fall of 1939 until late June of 1941 and was interrupted only by the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. Stalin’s purging of the new territories was driven by the fear of internal enemies who would be turned into a fifth column in case of war. As an unwritten rule, representatives of diaspora nationalities—first and foremost


Poles—were considered *a priori* disloyal; thus, many deportations seemed to have a distinct
“national” character. Among the largest deportations of 1939-1941 were the first two targeting
mainly Poles; the third mainly Jews; the fourth mainly Ukrainians.48

Indicative of the controversial nature of Soviet nationality and class policies, repressive
operations were never officially articulated in national terms but often acquired an ethnic
character, as unofficial messages connecting certain nationalities with treason were conveyed
down to the localities. Lower-level functionaries used ethnic identity as a convenient—and often
the only clear—marker to find sufficient numbers of “enemies” to fill the constantly growing
quotas for arrests.49 About 30,000 people were deported to eastern Soviet territories from the
Moldavian Republic and the Chernivtsi and Izmail provinces of the Ukrainian SSR, combined;
between 10,000 and 11,000 of them were from Northern Bukovina.50 While in neighbouring
Galicia Polish nationality or citizenship had become, in practical terms, synonymous with the
term “enemy,” in the city of Chernivtsi the Soviet deportations of 1941 meant mass arrests,
evictions from their houses, and deportation predominantly of the Jewish population.

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49 Snyder notes that even at the height of the “Polish campaign” in the late 1930s, measures were taken to maintain
the class-based and political, rather than national, character of the purges. For example, in 1937, to counter the
internationalist, or self-preservationist, instincts of his Jewish officers (who constituted 40 percent of the entire
staff), the NKVD head Yezhov sent out a special circular assuring them that their task was to punish espionage
rather than ethnicity (Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 93).

50 The two largest categories of deportees from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR were ethnic Poles and
Polish citizens of Jewish nationality. Only in 1941, probably 275,000 of Polish citizens were deported by Soviet
authorities. On the deportations of 1939-1941, see Polian, *Against Their Will*, 117-123. Statistics for the Chernivtsi
region come from Kholodnyts’kyi, “Vplyv politychnykh protsesiv na demohraphichni vтрати”: 171; Musienko,
“Politychni repressii na Pivnichni Bukovyni”: 482; Botushans’kyi et al., *Bukovyna v kontekstі ievropejs’kykh
mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn*, 649. Data used by Ukrainian historians are based on the mass rehabilitation campaign
launched in Ukraine by the 1990 law “on the rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions in Ukraine.”
The first mass operations took place in April and May. Two deportation campaigns on 13 April and 13 May 1941 targeted almost exclusively Jewish locals, primarily those who were considered former Romanian state employees. Another deportation took place on 23 May, targeting primarily “traitors of the motherland.” This category included above all those who had attempted to cross the border. On that day, 306 persons were deported to the eastern regions. The operation was carried out by 724 NKVD workers and Soviet activists mobilized for the purpose. As was traditional in Stalin-era arrests, “traitors” and other “enemies” in Chernivtsi were visited, usually at night, and ordered to pack luggage in a matter of hours or even minutes. The largest and the best planned and organized wave of deportations happened on 13 June 1941. This time the targeted group included, along with “traitors,” so-called landlords, factory owners, large traders, activists of counter-revolutionary parties, and criminal elements. Such a wide range of targets allowed local executioners—primarily NKVD officials—a large scope of interpretation. Considering the demographic situation of the province and the city as well as the preceding developments in the sphere of local nationality and social policies, it is safe to conclude that most deported Chernivtsi residents were Jewish.

Of course the arrests did not affect Jews exclusively and were by no means part of an official racial policy; all kinds of politically suspicious or socially unreliable people could become the targets of NKVD raids. For example, along with the few remaining persons who (allegedly or actually) worked for the Romanian government, police, and state security,

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51 In addition to archival materials and personal accounts cited in the previous chapters, see Vasyl’ Kholodnyts’kyi, “Vplyv politychnykh protsesiv na demohraphichni vтраты”: 171; Musienko, “Politychni repressiі na Pivnichnii Bukovyni”: 479-81; Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina,” 59 and 69. On deportations of “traitors of the motherland” from rural districts of the province, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 114.
“Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” were among the first arrest victims in 1940-1941.52

Nevertheless, the number of Ukrainian nationalists in the province was low in comparison to neighbouring Galicia. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, although it formally existed in Bukovina from the 1930s, was inert and did not present a serious problem for the Soviet government in the province until 1944. Throughout the first year of Soviet rule, the NKVD of Chernivtsi province made 270 OUN-related arrests. Most of the arrested were local Ukrainian students fascinated by the ideas of romantic and radical nationalism. Many had been members of ethnic student organizations in the interwar period and had only a formal connection to the organized nationalist movement.53 At the same time, historians estimate that in 1940-1941, 3,500 to 4,000 Jews were deported from the city of Chernivtsi and surrounding villages only. If compared to the total estimated number of deportees from the province (10-11,000), this number indicates that Jews constituted a very high percentage of the deported.54 Even if one considers all data on the 1941 deportations to be fully unreliable, simple logic suggests that a large, and


53 Most of these arrests yielded plentiful additional information extracted from the intimidated youth during NKVD interrogations. On many occasions the accused nationalists agreed to work as NKVD informants. Most of the arrested were released upon investigations during 1940 and 1941. There were only a few cases of executions of “Ukrainian nationalists,” mostly OUN members with proven records of openly “anti-Soviet” and violent activities. Even between 22 and 30 June when, in the situation of total military mobilization, arrests were plentiful and often preventive, only 100 of the 553 people arrested for “counter-revolutionary, treacherous, and anti-Soviet actions” were alleged OUN members. See Ivan Fostii, “Diial’nist’ OUN na Bukovyni u 1940-1941 rr.,” Z arkhiviv VUchK/GPU/NKVD-KGB 2/4 (13/15) (2000): 462, 465. On later June arrests, see also DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 140, f.1, op.1, spr. 141, f.1, op.1, spr. 142.

54 Only approximate numbers are available; while Levin refers to 3,500 to 4,000 Jewish deportees from the city of Chernivtsi (Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina” : 59, 69), Hirsch and Spitzer write that about 80 percent of the 4,000 people arrested in Chernivtsi and immediate surroundings were Jews (Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 116).
most probably the largest, portion of the deportees from Chernivtsi must have been Jews due to their occupations and social background.\textsuperscript{55}

Memoirs of survivors of the Soviet deportations and the Holocaust also suggest that public perception of the spring-summer repressions was that of a largely anti-Jewish action, and many Jewish survivors considered these repressions to be the quintessence of Soviet rule.\textsuperscript{56} In the wider context of World War II, these arrests and deportations that followed a year of evictions, abuse, and discrimination of urban Jews—in the name of the promotion of Ukrainian culture or as a result of the personal opportunism of the new authorities or local neighbours—can be conceptualized as pre-Holocaust state-sponsored pogroms in an atmosphere of growing popular antisemitism. Although antisemitism was not institutionalized in the Soviet system and was officially condemned in 1941, non-Jewish locals of Chernivtsi, confused and frustrated after a year of convoluted Soviet class- and nationality politics, had been brainwashed with Romanian antisemitic propaganda for many years prior to 1940. During the year of Soviet rule, these locals watched the silent, overnight disappearance of their German-speaking, middle-class co-urbanites who had been collectively associated with the class of “lords.” They saw long cattle trains packed with mostly Jewish deportees, and watched while Slavic-speaking Soviet newcomers moved into the apartments of the arrested. Even if they were described by the official propaganda in the new terms of “punishing the enemies of the people,” in most cases such actions probably signified an antisemitic state policy in the eyes of the local non-Jewish

\textsuperscript{55} Even those Ukrainian historians who tend to deny the argument about the predominance of Jews among the deportees from the city in 1941 agree that the arrests “targeted people of upper and middle classes” (for example, Musienko, “Politychni repressii na Pivnichni Bukovyni,” 475).

population. The Soviet state’s actions only confirmed the conviction of many non-Jewish locals, developed over recent years, that “Jews did not rightfully belong” in the city.57 In spite of the fact that many local Jews initially benefited from the Soviet takeover in 1940, and that some were still employed by the Soviet state at the height of the deportation campaigns of 1941, in this historic context the June deportations might have made more sense to many non-Jewish locals than the earlier Soviet promotions of some Jewish locals.

This perception of Soviet class and nationality state policies as antisemitic was probably strengthened by the fact that the spring deportations occurred against the backdrop of strong Ukrainian-language propaganda dedicated to the upcoming first anniversary of the reunification of Northern Bukovina with Ukraine. Intensive preparations for the anniversary began in April, around the time of the first mass transports of deportees from Chernivtsi railway station.58 The plans were ambitious and included grand projects such as the publication of special brochures, the launch of a new documentary film reel, *On the Rejuvenated Land*, the issuing of the first volume of a scholarly collection of papers to be published by the university press, the mounting

57 For more on the growing antisemitism in Chernivtsi during the interwar period, see chapter one. Note that Jewish memoirs of the prewar years often attest to the widespread association between Jewish ethnicity/religion and the upper social standing of acculturated Jews who made up the largest group of employers in the city. These well-to-do and educated Jews often displayed paternalistic and pejorative attitudes toward Ukrainians and Romanians who were collectively associated in their eyes with the lower social groups such as peasants and servants. (On attitudes towards servants in Austrian and Romanian Czernowitz, see also John-Paul Himka, "The Snows of Yesteryear," *Cross Currents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, no. 10 (1991): 67-72). As nationalist propaganda intensified, the mutual collective perceptions of Jews and non-Jews in the centre of the city gradually became less matter-of-fact and neutral and more politicized in ethnic and/or class terms. This transformation is addressed in great detail in Blum’s novel *The Walnut Tree* and noted in many personal accounts cited in the introduction and the first chapter. Vernon Kres (Peter Demant), also quoted earlier in this dissertation, also observed that, by the end of the interwar period, nationalist rather than Marxist propaganda was all too often winning the souls of the less educated strata of the population (Vernon Kres, *Moia pervaia zhysn*’ [2001], 277.) Antisemitic comments by nationalist-minded Ukrainians in Chernivtsi were reported by the NKVD in spring and summer of 1941, as hopes for the end of the Soviet regime were mounting (for example, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 140, ark. 49-51).

58 DACHO, f.1, op.11, spr. 40, 41, 42, 44, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 86, ark. 19.
of relevant performances by all central theatres and artistic groups, and the scheduling of party
conferences and public meetings. Small-scale ventures included creating celebratory news
boards in every village and settlement, holding local mass meetings, readings, amateur
performances, and gatherings with Red Army soldiers. Ukrainian central radio was to broadcast
the speech of the Chernivtsi provincial party secretary on the achievements of the young
province as well as several literary sketches, including one entitled “The city of Chernivtsi is
revived by Bolsheviks.”59

Only some of these plans could be realized: just six days before the anniversary day, on
22 June, the Soviet-German, or the Great Patriotic War as it was known in the USSR, began. On
the same day, Romania entered the war as Hitler’s ally, not only because of its strong
dependence on the Third Reich but also for the possibility of regaining lost territories. The
Romanian leader Ion Antonescu and his influential relative Mihai Antonescu announced to their
citizens the beginning of a war for the “liberation of their brothers” and “Great Romania with all
its provinces.” Romanian agents in Berlin reported that Romania was “fighting this war as a
national revenge against Russia for the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.”60
Chernivtsi was to be “liberated” once more, just one year after the dubious Soviet “liberation.”

59 DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr. 49, 41, 42, 44, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 86, ark. 34-36. One of the sketches prepared for
the occasion featured Karol Illich Terletskyi, a local of Bukovina promoted to the position of Shevchenko district
secretary in the city of Chernivtsi. DAChO, f.1, op.11, spr. 85.

60 On the meaning of annexation and consequent ethnic cleansing of Bukovina and Bessarabia in wartime Romania,
Solonari, Purifying the Nation. Quotes from Botushanski et al, Bukovyna v kontekstі ievropeis’kyh
mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn, 650.
5. Interregnum, July 1941

Before Romanian rule was re-established in the city and the province, the area survived the agony of Soviet retreat and several days of the interregnum. The Kiev Special Military Department reported to Red Army headquarters in Moscow on 22 June that Chernivtsi was among the urban centres subject to the first heavy attacks by enemy forces, together with Stanislav, Luts’k, and Chuniv: 21 airplanes and important facilities were destroyed at the newly renovated Chernivtsi airport, while the local Red Army detachment shot down eight enemy planes.\textsuperscript{61} However, as the Romanian and German armies were rapidly advancing into Soviet territory, the city of Chernivtsi, located close to the border but far from major transportation routes leading to the interior, remained under Soviet control for several days. Of the large urban centres in postwar Ukraine, Chernivtsi would in fact suffer the least damage.

Between 22 June when the war began and 5 July when Romanian authorities entered the provincial capital, Chernivtsi represented an isolated island still under relative Soviet control, as the connection between provincial authorities and most of the province’s rural territories had been lost.\textsuperscript{62} Soviet authorities in fact abandoned most of the province with the exception of its urban centres (Chernivtsi, Khotyn, and several smaller towns) before the Red Army officially surrendered them, leaving most of the rural territory in a power vacuum for up to two weeks. Occasional reports from rural areas informed provincial leaders about the “outrages” and anti-
Soviet actions of some locals as well as cases of organized self-defence against the German and Romanian military and other agents. In the city and in the villages alike, the mood of the locals varied. Peasants and urbanites were choosing between welcoming back “the old rule,” supporting the retreating Soviet army in its defence, or possibly joining an independent Ukrainian state for which radical Ukrainian nationalists were still hoping in the late days of June. The majority, however, made the choice that became customary for this borderland area: to wait and see what happens. For most of local rural population, this was indeed the only possible mode of action.63

If bringing even a relative degree of “order” to the city had been a challenging task for the Soviet authorities in the preceding year, it proved nearly impossible in June and the early July days of 1941 when total panic gripped Soviet newcomers of all positions. In spite of Grushets’kyi’s numerous appeals to his subordinates to remain calm and act strictly on his and higher party officials’ orders, the local party and state apparatus was seized by gossip, “provocations,” and “cowardly behaviour.” Some workers of the provincial party committee moved their families and possessions to their offices in the building of the provincial party committee, guarded by the military, as if it were their fortress in the besieged city. Others did not have the nerve to wait, and “self-evacuated” with their families in spite of Grushets’kyi’s pleas to stop this “desertion” and his threats to punish the guilty. Grushets’kyi’s calls to “raise their heads” and declarations that the Red Army “kept the enemy at the gate” were hardly taken seriously.64 Ordinary communists, having been in Chernivtsi only a year and always with the

63 For reports and dispatches on the behaviour of locals, DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 142, ark. 5; f.1, op.1, spr.140.
64 Quotes from DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 140, ark. 1, 7.
sense that their stay was temporary, did their best to protect themselves and their families from possible retributions by the locals and enemy authorities. For this group, having now lost the powerful protection of their repressive state, the enemy was not only at the (fragile) gate, but also all around them as enemy armies were taking Bukovinian villages one by one, turning the rural districts into a war zone beyond the control of Soviet power. The streets of the city, although still officially “theirs,” were filled with locals who were perceived as alien and unknown.65

The provincial authorities intensified security measures, introducing martial law. Over 500 people were arrested in Chernivtsi province between 22 and 30 June for all kinds of “anti-Soviet” and “treacherous” acts, from “proclamations” during restaurant parties to street and roof-top shooting and signaling. To discourage the latter, it was announced among party workers that all residents of a building would be held responsible in cases of such actions. Radios were ordered to be surrendered under the threat of arrest. A building on Pochtovaia Street where all the radios were kept was set on fire by the retreating Soviet authorities, resulting in the burning of two neighbouring buildings on the street.66 A special provincial NKVD battalion was formed to eliminate paratroopers.67 Transports deporting political prisoners were still leaving Chernivtsi in the last days of June. As had become customary in the first phase of the war, prisoners who could not be evacuated to the interior were executed before Soviet retreat. A special NKVD officer was dispatched to Chernivtsi in early July to perform

65During our conversation in July of 2011, Liudmila Adamova remembers the panic at Chernivtsi railway station in early July 1941, where Soviet families often spent days waiting for an opportunity to board one of the overloaded trains heading east.

66 According to Liudmila Adamova, whose family lived in one of the burned buildings.

67 See DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 141.
executions. On 9 July he reported to the Ukrainian NKVD headquarters that all prisoners
sentenced to death, criminals who were sentenced or awaiting trials, sick prisoners who were
found in the prison hospital, two wounded deserters, and a German pilot had been executed in
Chernivtsi. 68

Collectively, the Jews of Chernivtsi faced the toughest choice during the July
interregnum. All the state security measures notwithstanding, most local Jews were well
informed by early July of 1941 about Hitler’s anti-Jewish politics. Other residents of the city,
including the highest party leaders, also heard or were informed about Antonescu’s radio speech
on 22 June in which Romanian leader Antonescu asserted:

Only one year has passed since the Bolsheviks made us surrender our primordially
Romanian lands of Bessarabia and Bukovina. We know how our brothers suffered
during this terrible year. But the hour has come when we are advancing to the lands of
Bessarabia and Bukovina. We should be thankful to Mussolini and Hitler who took upon
themselves the struggle against Jewish Bolshevism. Our struggle is the struggle for
civilization and God will help us... 69

However, in spite of their awareness of mortal danger, many Bukovinian Jews, particularly rural
dwellers or persons who fell into the category of “aliens” but had avoided deportation, had as
little choice as their non-Jewish neighbours. Those locals (Jews and non-Jews) who were

68 In total, it is estimated that 23,400 people were deported from western Ukrainian prisons after the outbreak of the
war. Kholodnyts’kyi, Zahainyi, and Bilets’kyi, “Represyvnî aktsiî radians’koî vlady na terytoriî Chernivets’koî
oblasti,” 222.

69 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 142, ark. 6.
employed by Soviet organizations or were activists for Soviet rule did have a choice in some cases: they could evacuate with their newcomer colleagues and superiors. Many who hoped to go this route were frustrated by cases of “self-evacuation”—newcomers who left their positions, enterprises, and organizations to flee with their families, abandoning their local employees.70

When organized evacuation was finally ordered by the provincial authorities, local employees were given an opportunity to leave. Some did, while others chose to stay with their relatives and families who either were not entitled to evacuation or simply refused to leave their homes. These decisions were made based largely on bits and pieces of information extracted from gossip, everyday life experience, and an occasional radio hidden from Soviet authorities. While some were ready to give up everything for the chance to “hang on to one of the [Soviet] tanks and go along with them,” and burned their Marxist university textbooks in bathtubs, others packed in panic, and still others rejected evacuation opportunities available to them. Many Chernivtsi locals were escaping the agony of having to make the choice between 22 June and 5 July of 1941 by reading classical German literature. In many cases, groups of evacuees were met by advancing German and Romanian armies, and forced to return home, which eventually meant a death sentence for many Jews.71

The Jews of rural areas of the province rarely had any choice in early July. In many cases, as soon as Soviet authorities retreated from rural districts, local Romanian and Ukrainian nationalists took power in their hands. Already on 25 June 1941 one of the few Soviet reports on the conditions in rural areas noted that “Ukrainian nationalists and Iron Guard members became

70 DACHO, f.1, op.1, spr. 140, ark. 68.
71 Six short accounts about decision-making by Chernivtsi Jews in early July are quoted in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 118-21.
‘especially insolent’ and organized shootings, rape, and other atrocities.’”\textsuperscript{72} The interregnum and the early days of the Romanian occupation in Chernivtsi province were marked by mass anti-Jewish violence in rural areas. At least 10,000 local Jews were killed in Chernivtsi province.\textsuperscript{73} Anti-Jewish violence was by no means exclusively connected to support of the Romanian regime. Patterns of violence differed from case to case and varied from clearly ideologically inspired mass executions organized and performed by radical nationalists to more “traditional” experiences of plundering, beating, and humiliating Jews by ideologically indifferent locals.

Available data about the summer killings come primarily from postwar Soviet investigations and some eyewitness accounts, and are thus very limited and often heavily biased. Although in some cases it is difficult to determine the national identity or even the names of the perpetrators, it is clear that locals participated widely, actively or passively, in the violence against Jews, both in Ukrainian- and Romanian-dominated regions.

As Vladimir Solonari recently showed, the early mass murders that took place before the Romanian military and gendarmerie arrived and before the fate of the region was clear tended to happen under the inspiration, leadership, and direct organization of OUN leaders and other Ukrainian nationalists, most of whom had moved to Bukovina from neighbouring Galicia after the retreat of the Red Army. These killings seem to have been driven by the desire to

\textsuperscript{72} See, for example, DACHO f.1, op.1, spr. 140.

\textsuperscript{73} According to the Soviet “extraordinary state commission for the investigation of atrocities of German fascists and their henchmen” (popularly known by the Russian abbreviation GChK), in July of 1941 alone, 11,347 Jews were killed in Chernivtsi province. (GChK statistics, available in the State Archive of Russian Federation [GARF], quoted in Ie. M. Finkel’, P. V. Rykhlo, eds. \textit{Liudi ostatutsia liud’ mi. Chernovitskoie obshechestvo ivreiskoi kul’tury im. Shteinbarga. Vestnik. Svidetel’ tsva uznikov fashystskikh lagerei-getto} Issue 5 [Chernivtsi, 1996], 62). While it is impossible to know the exact numbers, Jean Ancel estimates that the toll of the early July killings in Bukovina and Bessarabia was in the tens of thousands. Ancel, “The Romanian Way of Solving the ‘Jewish Problem’”: 187-233. It is estimated that 45,000 to 60,000 Jews perished in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in summer of 1941. Solonari, “Patterns of Violence”: 755.
demonstrate that Ukrainians were “in control” of a certain locality. However, killings of Jews often remained the only “state-building” projects performed by Ukrainian nationalists. A well-known OUN leader, Petro Voinovs'kyi, who would later become an active member of the Nazi “extermination” units in left-bank Ukraine, for example, together with his female “apprentice” Kindzirs’ka organized the murder of 120 Jews in the village of Milievo on 5 July, taking active part in the murder with knives, guns, and agricultural equipment. About ten similar executions were organized by Ukrainian nationalists in the province.

If Ukrainian nationalist leaders assumed temporary power in a locality, they usually did not confront the approaching Romanian forces, seeing Soviets and Jews as their major enemy and hoping that the German and, by extension, the Romanian military would support them as anti-Soviet allies. In fact, in many cases self-proclaimed Ukrainian leaders and newly arrived

74 Solonari, “Patterns of Violence”: 770.

75 Probably the only case when OUN “state-building” in Chernivtsi province went beyond the murder of Jews and Soviet activists was in the town of Vizhnitsa. Here the OUN leader Mychkovs’kyi organized a “temporary Ukrainian committee” to take power into their hands before Bukovina was united with the projected independent Ukrainian state. On 30 June 1941, the radical wing of the OUN lead by Stepan Bandera proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv, Galicia. Soon after the declaration, the OUN-b “government” was dismantled by Nazi authorities and its many members arrested. Many OUN members joined the “extermination battalions” which took active part in the extermination of Jews and former Soviet activists on the territory of Ukraine, as well as SS Galizien, which actively participated in atrocities against Poles. OUN units in Vizhnitsa districts and surrounding areas engaged in skirmishes with the retreating Red Army, “liquidation” of the Soviet organs of power (village councils), and putting up the symbols of Ukrainian state. (Botushanskyi et al, Bukovyna v konteksti ievropeis’kykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn, 651.)


77 Upon organizing several massacres, Voinovs'kyi allegedly received an order from OUN command to organize a volunteer detachment to fight for the Ukrainian state with the support of the German government. He actually received the approval of the Romanian and German administrations in Bukovina and by early August of 1941 had organized a 500-member military unit known as the “Bukovinian detachment.” Badly organized and torn by disagreement between the more radical “banderites” and the more conservative “melnykite” members, the detachment arrived in Kiev where it was divided into several parts by the Nazis. Some units became parts of the Nazi Ukrainian police and extermination battalions; others were sent to France to fight the French resistance movement. Some members of the “Bukovinian detachment” eventually joined the French Legion to avoid postwar repatriation to the USSR. Andrii Duda and Volodymyr Staryk, Bukovyns’kyi Kurin’ v boiakh za Ukrains’ku derzhavnist’ 1918, 1941, 1944 (Chernivtsi: Tovarystvo “Ukrains’kyi Narodnyi Dim u Chernivtsiaakh”, 1995).
Romanian authorities joined in the common “cause” of cleansing the territory of Jews. The association between Jewish nationality and direct involvement in (or active support of) the Soviet regime was, with very rare exceptions, ungrounded: Soviet rulers, as demonstrated above, almost never appointed Jews to state or party positions of authority, especially in rural areas. In the typical and comparatively well-researched case of the village of Nyzhni Stanivtsi (Stâneștii de Jos), Ukrainian nationalists pronounced “Ukrainian state power,” installed a blue and yellow banner on the central square, and organized a mass execution of local Jews. They gathered Jews at a local plant and began killing them with available arms, burning some of the bodies afterward. As the killers were “cleansing” the village of the remaining Jews, they were joined by the arriving Romanian military and gendarmerie, which intensified the violence. According to oral accounts of the local Ukrainians, one Jewish woman who managed to escape was caught and shot on the main street of the village. She was then buried on the spot which was easily found by locals years later during a criminal investigation led by Soviet prosecutors. Between 80 and 130 Jews were killed in the massacre.

While popular antisemitism was historically quite widespread in Chernivtsi province as well as in the wider East European region, the mass murder of Jews in this area was inspired in

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78 For more on motivations and ideological beliefs during the summer extermination, see Solonari, “Patterns of Violence.”

79 The main organizer of the murder in Nyzhni Stanivtsi was arrested in then Socialist Romania and extradited to the USSR (from an unpublished memoir by Mikhail Zhylin who participated in the investigation by the provincial prosecutor’s office in 1958). The murder in Nyzhni Stanivtsi was later widely popularized by the local newspaper Soviet Bukovina during the court trial of a group of OUN members. See “Rozplata,” Radians’ka Bukovyna, 27 March 1977, 3-4. Written in the midst of the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign, the article used the horrifying examples of violence against Jews and Soviet activists organized by OUN members Gulia, Gavdun, Kretskyi, and others to condemn “bestial” Ukrainian nationalism and Zionism alike. The case of Nyzhni Stanisvtsi is also discussed by Solonari in “Patterns of Violence” (see p.763).
most cases by modern nationalism that put the “cleansing of the nation” at the centre of its ideological system, and was further radicalized by war. One year of Soviet rule did not have a direct effect on the spread of antisemitism in Northern Bukovina: recent research indicates that the local population did not “buy” the argument about the Jewish-Soviet connection unless they had been antisemitic and/or radically nationalist before the Soviet annexation.\textsuperscript{80} If anything, Soviet demographic and social policies indirectly confirmed the existing antisemitic sentiments among some locals. Typically, the cases of nearly complete annihilation of local Jewish populations were encouraged by local Ukrainian or Romanian nationalists who became popular local leaders in rural areas. In other cases, anti-Jewish violence permitted and encouraged by Romanian authorities once they arrived took the form of violent pogroms. The goals of the latter, though, were usually plunder and other forms of material enrichment as well as humiliation of Jews rather than the obliteration of them as a national group.

Drawing a definitive conclusion about the nature of popular participation in anti-Jewish violence is still not possible (and may never be). Vladimir Solonari reasonably suggests that “ordinary,” unindoctrinated rural locals typically of low education levels and extreme poverty killed Jews out of personal opportunism justified by the “normalization” of violence through propaganda, encouragement by others, and the lack of accountability made possible by the overall radical ethos of World War II. However, the Holocaust in Northern Bukovina, although largely perpetrated with primitive arms and the horrifying intimacy of neighbours murdering their neighbours, would not have happened if not for the profoundly modern visions of a purified nation and racial politics that justified violence of unimaginable forms and

\textsuperscript{80} Solonari, “Patterns of Violence,” 779.
proportions. These visions of modernity were represented in Northern Bukovina by Romanian and Ukrainian radical nationalist ideologies.

In this context, without understating the repressive and violent character of Stalin’s Soviet state, the Soviet regime in Chernivtsi province in 1940-1941 appears, by and large, as a force that actually curbed the wave of anti-Jewish violence spreading across Europe. When a middle-class, left-leaning Chernivtsi Jew who had been moderately supportive of the Soviet regime in June of 1940 and profoundly disappointed by it in the summer of 1941, Carl Hirsch, saw the crowds of mostly Jewish deportees at the Chernivtsi railway station in June of 1941, he thought that he would never forget this lack of humanity. He admitted, however, that he quickly forgot it once the Romanian mass deportations of Jews started and the dimensions of the mass murder became clear. Indeed, while for many rural Jews the retreat of the Soviets marked a death sentence, evacuation with Soviet cadres and even earlier deportations to camps and eastern regions of the USSR became the only means of survival for many Jews of Chernivtsi and the neighbouring villages (areas from where most of the Jewish deportees of April-June came). Life in the rear of the USSR during the war, especially for a political prisoner, was hard, risky, and often unbearable. However, the death toll in what historian Jean Ancel calls the “organized phase” of the Romanian Holocaust was considerably higher.

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81 Ibid., 786-87. Similar arguments have been put forward by other scholars, in the context of other territories: the ways in which ethnic groups treated each other and local Jews was transformed by their contact with the practices of totalitarian rulers, Soviets and Nazis, both of whom classified individuals and deported or killed them based on this classification. Violent “cleansing” became a model suitable for achieving the desired ethnic purity. See for example Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations; Brown, A Biography of No Place; John-Paul Himka, “Krakivs’ki Visti and the Jews,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies (1996) 21, no. 1-2: 81-96.

82 Carl Hirsch quoted in Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 117.
6. **Romanian Rule: “Purifying” the Other Nation**

Romanian military rule over the territory was established (or restored, in the view of the Romanian government) between 3 and 7 July 1941. The Romanian army launched a mass offensive on 3 July and entered Chernivtsi on 5 July. On 8 July Antonescu declared to his government that he intended to “purify” Bessarabia and Bukovina of “foreigners.” On 9 July he established the death penalty for resisting the occupational regime on the annexed territories. A Manifesto about the unification of Northern Bukovina with Romania appeared on 19 July, and on 26 July the Romanian king Mihai visited Chernivtsi with Ion Antonescu. In early September of 1941, a decree created a governorship of Bukovina with the capital in Chernivtsi (renamed Cernauți again) along with two other governorships, Bessarabia with the capital in Chișinău and Transnistria with the centre in Tiraspol and later in Odessa.\(^{83}\)

Policies of radical Romanianization of the city reversed most of the Soviet Ukrainian transformations in administration, culture, and education. “Reliable” professionals, administrators, and educators were imported to the city from the central Romanian provinces. To many locals, the occupation meant a return of the “old power,” whether welcomed or not, but this time with harsher political repression, militarized government, and a strong emphasis on purifying the (Romanian) nation of national minorities. The “cleansing” of Bukovina of Ukrainians, although very much on the minds of many Romanian leaders, was recognized as an operation of enormous proportion that could only be (theoretically) realized in the distant future.

\(^{83}\) Botushans'kyi et al., *Bukovyna v konteksti ievropeis'kykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn*, 652-54.
Germans had already been removed from the territory by the Soviet and German governments. However, the group of “aliens” that the Romanian government saw as the biggest obstacle in the path to the “healthy” development of their nation and therefore singled out for immediate “purification” actions was present in Chernivtsi in large numbers. Bukovina and Bessarabia became the “model provinces” where the Romanian genocide against the Jews began (and, fortunately for the Jewish population of other Romanian territories, ended).  

Although all Romanian authorities were well informed about the Romanian government’s intention to cleanse this “national territory” of Jews and non-Jewish “traitors,” the implementation of the cleansing was largely communicated orally and was left to the discretion of local authorities. Hence, the scale and character of violence varied, depending on who the local popular leaders were, the inclination of local authorities, and other circumstances, blurring the line between the “spontaneous” and the “organized” phases of the Holocaust in the province. 

The killings of Jews in the urban centres of Bukovina, and particularly in Chernivtsi, took a form quite different from that in rural areas. The military force that occupied the “lost provinces” of Bukovina and Bessarabia, although they included German and Hungarian troops

84 On the development of the concept of “purification” in Romania, the attitude of Romanian leaders toward the Ukrainian minority, and the perception of Bukovina and Bessarabia as “model provinces” for the Romanian “final solution of the Jewish question,” see Solonari, Purifying the Nation; on the “Jewish question” in particular, Ancel, “The Romanian Way of Solving The ‘Jewish Problem’”; on Romanian administration and military rule in 1941-1944, P. V. Rekotov, “Orhany upravlinnia na okupovani terytorii Ukraïny (1941-1944) [v Chernivetskii oblasti],” Ukraïns’kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 3 (1997): 80-100; Ivan Fostii, “Okupatsiia Chernivetskoï oblasti rumuns’kymy viis’kamy v 1914-1944 rr. ta ïï naslidky,” in Pytannia istoriï Ukraïny. Zbirnyk naukovykh statei vol.6 (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2003), 263-75.

85 For example, the seventh infantry division that followed the first Romanian battalions into Bukovina were notorious for the highly organized, militarized mass executions in Gertsa, Hotyn, Lipkany, and Noua Sulită. Ancel, “The Romanian way of solving the ‘Jewish problem’”: 13.
along with the 3rd and the 4th Romanian armies, were officially placed under the command of General Antonescu. As the major urban centre, Chernivtsi was the focus of particular attention by the special detachments of the SS whose primary task in the Romanian-occupied territory was to establish the model for and show an example of the “extermination” of Jews and other “undesirables.” More than 2,000 Jews in Chernivtsi and its immediate surroundings were killed by Nazi and Romanian authorities in early July (more precise estimates are not available).

Late in the afternoon on 6 July 1941, SS Sonderkommando 10b arrived in Chernivtsi, established connections with the Romanian military administration, and “took care of the apartments,” locating themselves primarily in one of the city’s best hotels, The Black Eagle. On 9 July its commander, Aloiz Persterer, reported to his superiors:

Immediately upon arrival, a connection was established with a competent commandant general major Dlushanski as well as other local Romanian organs, and the cleansing of the city from politically suspicious elements began.

On the 7th of this month arrests of Jews and Communists began on the basis of the available search lists and the newly composed lists. On the 8th of this month a gross-action was held in the course of which the entire Jewish leading class, with a few exceptions, was captured. On the next day, the kommando shot approximately 100 Jewish communists. Together with the executions of Jews by the Romanian army and police, altogether on the 8th and 9th of this month more than 500 Jews were shot. A sub-division was sent to Hotyn to cleanse that point.

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86 Ibid., 9.


89 Ibid, 30.
Among the first victims were the rabbi Dr. Mark and choir members of the reformist Temple. Romanian military officials captured up to 2,000 victims, mostly Jews but also non-Jewish Soviet activists and communists, took them to the shore of the Prut River, made them dig graves, tortured some of them, and shot or drowned most of them. Romanian officials and Sonderkommando members killed many more Jews on the streets, in houses, apartments, basements, synagogues, and cemeteries of the city during these days.90

Survivors remember the period differently. Some city residents witnessed the killings, barely escaped death, and lost close relatives; they were hiding in basements or left the city for nearby villages.91 Others only remember being “cautious” and staying inside during the first days of the occupation and learning about the mass killings only after the fact, probably after seeing the corpses on the streets that were not removed until a week after the massacre, when they were taken away in garbage trucks.92 Along with the largest mass grave on the river bank, there are at least three collective graves of early July victims in the Jewish part of the Chernivtsi


91 A number of accounts about their war experiences in Bukovina and neighbouring regions were collected by the Chernivtsi Society of Jewish Culture and published in five issues of the “herald:” Chernovitskoie obschestvo ievreiskoi kul’tury im. Shteinbarga. Vestnik. Liudi ostaiutsia liud’mi. Svidetel’tsva ochevidtsev, published in Chernivtsi between 1991 and 1996. For example, Monfred Zonner remembers hiding in a basement for several days with his family who knew that Jews were being killed (Iosif Bursuk, G. L. Chabashkevich, et al, eds., Liudi ostaiutsia liud’mi. Chernovitskoie obschestvo ievreiskoi kul’tury im. Shteinbarga. Vestnik. Svidetel’tsva uznikov fashystskikh lagerei-getto issue 3 [1994]), 120). Jakob Birenbaum’s family intended to hide with their relatives but, after watching them getting shot by the Romanian gendarmerie, left the city and waited for several days in a village before returning home (Liudi ostaiutsia liud’mi, issue 1 [1991], 24).

92 For example, the account of Bursuk, Chabashkevich, et al, eds., Liudi ostaiutsia liud’mi issue 3 (1994), 117. On the corpses on the street, Paul Diner, ibid., survey article, p. 3.
As was common in the killing actions in occupied Eastern Europe, the SS also tried to destroy major objects of Jewish culture and religion. Therefore, they shelled and burned the reformist Temple, leaving its blackened ruin to stand on the hill for years to come. Legend has it that the humiliated and tortured rabbi Dr. Mark was made to watch the magnificent synagogue burn before he was taken to the site of his execution.

After the first days of Romanian military rule, life in the city returned to relative normalcy for about two months. Most Jews of Chernivtsi could remain in their houses and stay with their families, though not without the constant humiliation of wearing the yellow stars ordered by Romanian authorities, and the constant fear of being abused. However, if for many non-Jewish residents of the city the Romanian takeover meant only another change of political power and, in fact, the return of the “old rule,” for local Jews the change was much more dramatic: it was the beginning of the transformation from growing antisemitism to genocide. From July on, the Jews of Chernivtsi were used for forced labour within the city and in other locations. Romanian authorities regulated the Jewish labour force. They appointed local Jews to clean the apartments newly occupied by Romanian authorities and their families, sweep city streets, construct and repair roads, and work in coal mines and other industrial projects. The General-Governor of Bukovina Corneliu Calotescu issued a decree that regulated and

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94 Bursuk, Chabashkevich, et al., Liudi ostaiutsia liud’mi issue 3 (1994), 141. According to an evaluation by Soviet architects in June of 1958, the fire (dated 1944, not 1941 in the report) destroyed the overhead covers, roof, doors, internal walls, floors, and partially stairs of the building. DACHO, f.2418, op.1, spr.239, ark.15. The account of Dr. Mark’s death, circulated among the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust from Chernivtsi, became the basis for a literary sketch by Natalia Shevchenko who kindly presented me with a copy of her unpublished essay “Prizrak khrama.”
centralized the use of urban Jews as a labour force. Within the various organizations and businesses that used them, under the supervision of the Directorate of Labour and Social Insurance and, in some cases, the Romanian military, Jews often had to educate Romanian trainees to prepare a qualified Romanian labour force for the future.

Jewish workers were entitled to receive minimum compensation, although in many cases authorities decreased or withheld their payments. With the rationale that Chernivtsi Jews were being used for state labour projects, all of them were subject to mandatory registration by the Commission of Registration and Control of Jews. Working conditions of Jewish recruits were harsh and strictly regulated—minor disciplinary violations were punished by deportations. Romanian military laws also restricted mobility rights in the city: employed Jews needed special permission to be outside their homes. When Jews attempted to change Soviet currency in Romanian banks, the banks could confiscate their money. A special decree allowed Jews to stay in their own dwellings only if they could afford paying rent to the Romanian state. In many cases, authorities confiscated real estate from Jewish owners. Among Jewish professionals, only doctors were allowed to retain their practices but could treat only Jewish patients, with the exception of special cases of Romanian citizens who had obtained permission from their superiors to see a Jewish doctor.  

Romanian authorities worked hard to instruct Romanian citizens of Bukovina in the new attitudes to their Jewish neighbours. For example, special orders were issued by the Romanian and Nazi military command forbidding their officers to communicate with Jews or to rent rooms

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and apartments from them. The crisis and deterioration was palpable in the city as trade, dominated by Jews, came practically to a standstill after any remaining Jewish businesses were confiscated by the state and rented out to Romanians who often lacked the knowledge and skills to run the business. Rapidly finding themselves in dire straits, Jews established 20 Judenräte (Jewish councils) in Bukovina to serve as communication agencies between the authorities and the Jews. The Chernivtsi Judenräte succeeded in preserving in the city several Jewish institutions such as a hospital, a trade house, and asylums for orphans and the elderly.  

Even this meager semblance of normalcy was destroyed on 11 October when Colotescu ordered the creation of a ghetto in Chernivtsi. In the course of several hours, more than 50,000 urban Jews were forced to relocate into the indicated territory that had previously accommodated no more than 5,000. It was the first step in the organization of the mass deportations of Jews from the territory of Bukovina and other “recovered” Romanian provinces that Romanian dictator and self-proclaimed Conducător (“leader”) Ion Antonescu had been contemplating for a long time, as he dreamt of re-creating Greater Romania. On 1 September 1941 an opportunity finally presented itself. An administrative unit of Transnistria was created by Nazi rulers to compensate Romania for the regions of Transylvania and southern Dobrudja.

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98 Antonescu discussed and planned the eventual “cleansing” of Greater Romania, which he intended to create with Hitler’s help, in several documents and personal conversation. See Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 7-74.
which had been lost to Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively. A territory of approximately 40,000 kilometers situated between the Dniester and the Bug rivers, in the south corner of what is today Ukraine, Transnistria was used by the Romanian authorities for the expulsion, imprisonment, and occasional execution of Jews from Bukovina, Bessarabia, and nearby territories. By the most recent estimates, 154,000 to 170,000 Jews were sent to Transnistria. About 90,000 of them were Bukovinian Jews expelled in the fall of 1941.

Most of them had to walk hundreds of kilometers in the fall and winter of 1941 to what became the final destination for most of them. They could take only limited belongings with them, all of which were quickly used to barter for food with the local population. Jews were imprisoned in inhumane conditions in local settlements, woods, or fields, in improvised camps and ghettos. By November 1943, only 49,927 of the deported remained alive. Deportees to Transnistria died slowly from starvation, disease, malnutrition, and atrocities. A survivor of Transnistria from Southern Bukovina, the Jewish-Romanian writer Norman Manea, remarked sarcastically in his memoir: “Transnistria did not live up to [Antonescu’s] expectations and could only show a balance sheet of 50 per cent dead. In that respect, it could not compete with Auschwitz. Transnistria’s achievement remained ambiguous, as did most things Romanian…”

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99 In fact, only the Nazi government viewed the annexation as compensation, while the Romanian leader Antonescu resisted this act precisely because he was trying to retain the Romanian claim to Transylvania and never recognized its partial annexation to Hungary.

Ambiguity was closely tied to the experience of Transnistria from the beginning of the deportations. With no specifically constructed camps, no written orders of executions in many cases, and often even no transport to move the deportees who were sent on death marches on foot and often had themselves to pay for being transported to semi-organized camps where their chances for survival were nevertheless higher than along roads and in the fields in winter, Transnistria, by and large, became a forgotten hell. A catastrophe perpetrated by all available means, such as hunger, disease, exhaustion, and bullets, it was convenient for the perpetrators to deny and easy for witnesses to ignore. For its survivors—often tormented by feelings of shame and guilt over surviving what their loved ones could not endure or escaping the horrifying fate of Jews sent to Nazi death camps where survivors were less numerous—remembering Transnistria often became too painful. The fate of those sent to the Nazi camps seemed unreal to some survivors of Transnistria regardless of the degree of suffering they endured themselves.

7. Survival and Resistance in Chernivtsi

Deportations from Chernivtsi to Transnistria began in the days after the creation of the ghetto in October of 1941. And once again, many Jews of Chernivtsi were presented with a liminal moment when decisions as mundane as whether to turn a corner or walk straight ahead, to stay inside or venture out, to speak out or remain silent, could mean life or death. Amidst the chaos in the streets of the Chernivtsi ghetto as families loaded carts and departed, some Jews


heard and dared to believe rumours that the mayor of the city, Traian Popovici, had intervened in the course of deportations. Those who turned around, asked around, and returned home instead of going on in their sad departure did the right thing. Indeed, Popovici managed to obtain permission from his superiors, including Governor Calotescu, to exempt from deportation a number of categories of the Jewish population, primarily professionals. It will probably never become clear whether he was driven exclusively by human compassion or opportunism for enrichment. Later in his life, he described his thoughts about the deportations to Transnistria:

From across the millennia, a tragic destiny has united the Babylonian captivity with the inferno of starvation, disease, and death in Transnistria. The looting at the assembly points along the Dniester River of whatever personal possessions the deportees still had, the long marches, barefoot, in wind, rain, sleet, and mud, the hunger and thirst, could be from the pages of Dante’s Inferno. In one single transport, out of sixty babies only one survived. Those too tired or too disabled to walk were left behind on the roadsides, a prey to vultures and dogs. Those who made it to their destinations live in appallingly unsanitary conditions, with no proper accommodations, no firewood, no food and clothes, and are exposed to the harsh weather and the torments of their guards and of the camp’s administrators.104

Regardless of his motivations, Popovici (who would later be awarded the title of Righteous among the Nations) was what Marianne Hirsh called a “decent mayor” who did his best, according to his principles and values, for his city and the people he was assigned to rule. Interestingly, he seems to have always remained an ardent Romanian nationalist. One of the few representatives of the democratic camp among Romanian nationalists, he argued that it was not

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104 Quote from Traian Popovici, *Spovedania/Testimony* (Bucharest, 2000); parts of his Testimony are also available on [http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/](http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/) (go to Popovici memorial pages).
worthy of the great and noble Romanian people to perpetrate such atrocities against its national minorities. Indeed, Popovici’s actions saved thousands of human lives.\textsuperscript{105}

Mayor Popovici argued that these selected Jewish residents were essential for overcoming the economic crisis in which Chernivtsi was sinking. As a result of his initiative and advocacy, more than 16,000 Jewish residents initially ordered deported remained in the city in the fall of 1941, including representatives of a wide range of professionals, pregnant women in their third trimester, mothers with infants, state pensioners, and retired officers.\textsuperscript{106} Jewish residents had the opportunity to put their names on various lists in several waves of this registration campaign. Popovici himself later recalled the experience of compiling lists of those exempted from deportations to be complicated and frustrating.

Memories of the Jewish survivors confirm that the process was often arbitrary and that a large role in obtaining “authorizations” to stay in Chernivtsi was played by chance, bribes, connections, creativity, and other strategies of survival. Of course, those Jews who still possessed anything of material value often found themselves in advantageous positions, but money was no guarantee of survival, just as the absence thereof did not necessarily bring deportation. Saving one’s life was in many cases a matter of hiding a document, erasing a line from an identity card, hiding at the right time in the right place, giving birth, or formally


\textsuperscript{106} Surovtsev, \textit{Holokost u Pivnichnii Bukovyni i Khotynshchyni v roku druhoï svitovoï viini}, 91.
converting to Christianity, to name only a few. Many found the previous experience of surviving under Soviet rule helpful. Another important factor that determined the fate of Jewish residents was encountering well-meaning non-Jews or, on the contrary, falling victim to the authorities and co-urbanites who eagerly used the desperate position of Jews to collect their valuables in return for help promised but never intended to be delivered. Accounts collected from Bukovinian survivors and witnesses document cases of spectacular acts of humanity as well as terrifying stories of violence and indifference, not unlike elsewhere in wartime Eastern Europe.

The chaos that arose around authorizations for exemption from deportations also frustrated Romanian central authorities who were against them in the first place. Later in the fall of 1941, Calotescu organized a special commission to investigate the process of exemptions. As a result, a number of authorizations were annulled and their holders deported. After the fall commission, a new set of authorizations to stay in the city (around 5,000) was signed by Popovici. In June of 1942, Popovici was fired from the mayor’s position and the entire second wave of authorizations (the so-called “Popovici’s authorizations”), were annulled by the Romanian government.

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107 In addition to works cited above, on converting, Surovtsev, “Kreshchenie kak sposob spasenia bukovinskikh ievreev v gody Holokosta,” 68-71.

108 For example, Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 162-96.

109 Consider just one example of a survivor’s story by Sali Glaubach Regenstreif, recorded in April of 1998 (found on http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/). Sali tells about an SS officer who saved her live out of compassion, Romanian soldiers who killed children and adults on their way to Transnistria, “a Ukrainian woman who was Jewish” in a village along the road who helped them but also robbed them of their last possessions, Soviet military personnel who occupied their apartment in Chernivtsi upon their return, and her father who fought in the Red Army throughout the war. This story is one among many accounts that reveal the important role played by individual encounters, choices made by survivors, and decisions of low-level authorities in the wartime fates of Jews in Romania and in Chernivtsi in particular.
The deportations resumed, and, according to Romanian statistics, 4,790 Jews were sent to Transnistria between June and September of 1942, and many more later on during the war.110 Vladimir Solonari estimates that in February 1942 there were still more than 21,000 Jews in Chernivtsi; in the summer of 1942 when deportation resumed, 11,000 Jews were deported from the city.111 Chernivtsi became a place of survival for more than 800 Polish Jews who had fled Poland at the beginning of the German occupation in 1939 and chose to go to Chernivtsi, whether because they had relatives in the city or simply because they knew about the size and influence of the local Jewish community. A consul of Chile in Chernivtsi, Degozh Shymanovich, saved many Jews by issuing Chilean passports to them and assisting in their emigration until his activity was uncovered and the consulate liquidated by Romanian authorities.112

Those Jews who did stay in Chernivtsi throughout the war revealed a remarkable desire and made persistent attempts to continue living their “normal lives,” refusing to view themselves as victims. This desire, it seems, was strengthened by the fact that they remained in their home city and in many cases continued doing routine things. The case of Gella Suher who saved her German library, discussed in the prologue to this dissertation, is a good demonstration of this phenomenon, which in some cases was supported by non-Jews in Chernivtsi.

Local photographers, for example, continued to take informal pictures of nicely dressed Jews—complete with the yellow stars on their coats and dressy jackets—as they walked

110 Surovtsev, Holokost u Pivnichnii Bukovyny i Khotynshchyni v roku druhoï svitovoï viiny, 92; Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 171-82.

111 Solonari, Purifying the Nation, 218.

casually along the *Herrengasse* (which was possible before the organization of the ghetto and also after, for Jews who received permission to leave it for work assignments or on special occasions). It was not impossible for a Jewish couple to leave the ghetto, go to the mayor’s office, get married in a civilized and comparatively festive manner by well-meaning Romanian officiants who duly entered the act into the registration books and warmly congratulated the newlyweds, and celebrate the occasion in one of the fancy cafes with a Romanian officer appointed to guard them.\(^{113}\) Although the survivors themselves can see acts like posing for a photographer in a ghettoized city while wearing the humiliating yellow star, or getting married by the authorities that were organizing deportations of the Jewish community, as a form of compliance with the occupying regime, such actions can be viewed at the same time as a kind of passive resistance to the wartime brutalization of the human condition.\(^{114}\)

Resistance was not only passive in Chernivtsi. Jews played a major role in the organized anti-fascist underground organizations of the city. Initially, there was an official “underground party committee” dispatched by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian CP to Chernivtsi province in 1941. This official underground organization was headed by a former senior lecturer of the Chernivtsi provincial party committee, Oleksiy Boyarko, and the head of the military department of one of the village district party committees, Zakhar Gleb. Both, however, were arrested by *Siguranța* very soon upon their arrival, in November of 1941, and executed in the spring of 1942.\(^{115}\)

\(^{113}\) Hirsch and Spitzer, *Ghosts of Home*, 162-76 (on photographs); 177-78 (on the marriage).

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 178.

\(^{115}\) DAChO, f.1, op.2, spr. 69-72, ark. 3-4; f.1, op.2, spr. 61, 63, akr.43.
Soon after the German-Romanian military regime was established in Chernivtsi in 1941, local communists and socialists (mostly former members of the Romanian Communist Party and the Bund but also those without any political affiliation) who also happened to be mostly Jewish began their attempts to create an underground organization for resistance. An organization of young people, most of them members of the Komsomol, led by Martin Batero, Ianos Deutsch, and Leon Retter, later joined a group of older anti-fascists, led at different times by Bruno Wasserman, Willy Glesner, Stefan Laszlo, Bursch Shweifel, L. Engel, and L. Krakus. The group had about 150 members throughout the occupation period and was engaged in activities typical of occupied urban centres where police control was very strong and access to resources such as arms and technology limited. They organized anti-fascist agitation among workers, composed lists of victims of the German and Romanian terror, and led several acts of sabotage in Chernivtsi factories producing shoes and clothes for the Romanian army. They listened to the Soviet and allies’ radio broadcasts on a self-made receiver constructed by a member who was an engineer, translated reports into German or, vice versa, into (often very bad) Ukrainian, and spread leaflets in the city.116

Although many members were deported to Transnistria, the organization survived until the day of official liberation by the Red Army. The organization left several folders of documents about its actions. On the eve of the liberation, the group established radio connection

116 At least 135 sheets of the leaflets and transcripts of the Soviet and British radio broadcast, dated between July 1943 and 11 March 1944, were submitted by the group to the Soviet authorities along with other documents. DACHO, f.1, op.2, spr. 69-72. These documents were mentioned as “previously unclaimed” for the first time in 1996 in a publication by the director of the Chernivtsi state archives Yuri Liapunov. (Yuri Liapunov, “Slavim muzhestvo. Podpolie v Chernovtsakh,” in Ie. M. Finkel’, P. V. Rykhlo, eds., Liudi ostaiutsia liud’i, issue 5 [Chernivtsi, 1996], 7-11.)
with the approaching Red Army detachments and focused on protecting the “socialist property” of the city from “robbery” by the retreating Romanians. It was Batero, Engel, and four other resistance members who hoisted the red banner on the tower of Chernivtsi city hall on 29 March 1944 when the Red Army officially liberated the city.117

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The second half of the fateful “first Soviet year” in Chernivtsi (1940-1941), and particularly its final several months, marked the beginning of the end of the urban phenomenon of modern Czernowitz. Mass deportations from the city uprooted and exiled to the Soviet east thousands of urban residents who had constituted the economic and cultural backbone of the city, the majority of them acculturated Jews. After the chaos of the short power vacuum in late June and early July of 1941, the establishment of Romanian military rule brought political repression to its active political opponents and cultural and economic discrimination to all national minorities; however, the most radical political change in the city and the province was represented by the acts of the German and Romanian Holocaust. The latter resulted in the violent deaths of several thousands of local Jews (as well as a few active communist supporters identified by the new authorities) and deportations of tens of thousands of Jewish residents from the city and its suburbs. The war also brought the final collapse of the long-lasting “German-Jewish symbiosis” that was at the core of the phenomenon of modern Czernowitz. Chernivtsi

117 The reports can be found in DACH, f.1, op.2, spr. 69-72. When in the late 1960s the Chernivtsi state archive initiated a project to gather the recollections of anti-fascist resistance members in the province (in response to a campaign launched by the department of propaganda and agitation of the central committee of Ukrainian Communist Party to identify unknown resisters), Martin Batero was invited to Chernivtsi from Moscow and interviewed. His recollections were published in Ie. M. Finkel’, P. V. Rykhlo, eds., Liudi ostaiutsia liid’mi, issue 5 (Chernivtsi, 1996), 21-26.
was one of many cities of East-central Europe that lost significant parts of their populations to the camps, moving gas vans, and the killing fields of the Holocaust.

Chernivtsi also became a remarkable case of mass survival, where up to 20,000 Jewish urban residents were able to remain in, or shortly after deportations return to, their own city, and in some cases their own houses, throughout the war. This was possible thanks to a “decent mayor,” Traian Popovici, who was able to negotiate with the central Romanian government the right to grant to thousands of Jews authorizations to stay, which he claimed to be necessary for the survival and normal functioning of the city. This situation, however, was not simply a miracle granted by the power of a benevolent individual; it became possible because of the extraordinary role that the local Jewish community had played in the city’s development and was still playing in its life after a year of Soviet economic and cultural reforms and political repression. From the summer of 1943, Jews who survived the Holocaust in Cernăuți were joined by survivors who were being gradually allowed to return from Transnistria by the Romanian government as it reacted to the changing course of the war. The first returnees were joined by thousands of others after the liberation of Transnistria. When the Soviet authorities entered the

118 Although the figure of 20,000 Jewish survivors in Chernivtsi is often cited in popular discourses, it most probably comes from Popovici’s own estimation of the number of Jews he initially saved from deportations. (See his Testimony, http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/Bukowinabook/buk2_062.html last accessed on 18 April 2012, the last paragraph.) The final number of Jewish residents who survived the Holocaust in the city is harder to estimate. It is possible that up to 20,000 did remain in Chernivtsi if one takes into consideration cases of hidden identities, baptisms, and residents who were physically hiding and/or managed to avoid being registered as Jews.

119 Romania reacted to the changing course of the war differently from Nazi Germany; it gradually softened its policies toward Jews. By summer 1942, Romania effectively stopped deportations to Transnistria; it also refused to send its Jews to Hitler’s death facilities. Timothy Snyder noted in this respect that the year of 1942 was a crucial turning point when German and Romanian anti-Jewish policies turned in opposite directions. Snyder, Bloodlands, 218. On the details about the dynamics of deportations and the return from Transnistria, see Solonari, Purifying the Nation; Dalia Ofer, “The Holocaust in Transnistria: A Special Case of Genocide” in The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-1945 eds. Lucian Dobroszycki and Jeffrey Gurock (New York: Sharpe, 1993).
city of Chernivtsi in March 1944, they would be surprised to find out that about half of the urban population was Jewish.
Chapter Six
Completing the Wartime Purge, 1944-1946

Following the battle of Stalingrad and the consequent shift in the course of the Soviet-German war, the question of retaining the Soviet borders of 1941 was one of the most pressing points on the agenda of the ruling circle in Moscow in their negotiations with their Western allies. The question was decided in principle at the Yalta conference in February 1944 and confirmed during later negotiations. By the spring of 1944, when the Red Army approached Bukovina, the Romanian authorities abandoned all hope of retaining their wartime territorial gains in the east and were preparing for flight, taking along as many valuables as possible.

The territory of Chernivtsi province was taken during the spring offensive campaign, between mid-March and early April 1944, by the First and Second Ukrainian fronts of the Red Army. The twenty-ninth of March became the official day of liberation of Chernivtsi. To avoid tensions with its Western allies, the Soviet government declared on 2 April that it had no intentions of changing the Soviet-Romanian border of 1941 or altering the “Romanian socio-political order,” although the Red Army would continue its offensive until the full capitulation of the enemies. ¹ It was only on 23 August 1944, after a coup d’état (led by King Michael) that replaced Antonescu’s government with a new one headed by General Constantin Sănătescu, that Romania agreed to cease fighting with the allies and enter negotiations.

¹ Romania was seeking a separate agreement with Britain and the US in hope of restoring its wartime gains in Bukovina and Bessarabia. Both governments declined the Romanian approaches, offering instead to capitulate and enter the war against Hitler. Antonescu stubbornly continued his alliance with Hitler, after his offers to negotiate were declined by the Western allies and the USSR.
An armistice signed in Moscow in September of 1944 honoured the Soviet-Romanian border of 28 June 1940. Although the border became official only on 10 February 1947, on the basis of the peace treaty between Romania and eleven countries that had been at war with it, it was clear in the postwar political situation that Romania had no chance of territorial revisions. Stalin was entering Eastern Europe with confidence that he was respected by the world powers of the time, Britain and the US.²

From the local perspective, Stalin’s decision to maintain the prewar borders with Romania meant that the Sovietization of Northern Bukovina was to be repeated. Due to the changed international situation and newly acquired Soviet confidence, the Soviet takeover in 1944 was conceptualized and carried out by the Soviet leadership as the “liberation” of the region, just as had been the case in the many other Soviet territories freed by the Red Army from German (as well as Romanian and Hungarian) occupation in 1944-1945. In the official Soviet historical narrative, the 1944 liberation was to be blended with the original reunification of Bukovina with Ukraine, which erased from official collective memory the dubious conditions of the original annexation in 1940.

Although the re-Sovietization of Chernivtsi in 1944 resembled the first Sovietization in 1940-1941, one aspect was substantially different from the prewar situation. The city’s sizable population of largely German-speaking Jews who survived the occupation became a serious problem for the Soviet government, now motivated by an almost chauvinistic pride in the victory over Nazi Germany, a “holy” hatred of everything and everyone related to German culture, and disdain and suspicion of all those subject to German rule during the war.

² On the USSR in general, see for example Overy, Russia’s War; on Bukovina, Botushans’kyi et al, Bukovyna v konteksti ievropeis’kykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn, 656-58.
1. **Reunification, 1944: The Second Take**

Once again, the city of Chernivtsi was “liberated.” On 3 July 1944, Khrushchev presented for Stalin’s approval a list of “corrected” (Ukrainianized) names of localities in the western Ukrainian provinces. According to this document, the city’s prewar name Chernovitsy (a Slavic adaptation of Czernowitz) was officially renamed Chernivtsi, or Chernovtsy in Russian translation.³ Some Soviet authorities who had been originally appointed to Chernivtsi in 1940 returned to the city. Ivan Grushets’kyi was re-appointed to his position as the provincial party leader in Chernivtsi, but Kiev authorities later changed their minds and sent him instead to the same post in Lviv province. He was replaced by Ivan Zeleniuk who, in spite of numerous “compromising materials” about him collected by the Ukrainian Central Committee, ruled the province until the end of the 1940s. Another prominent political figure reinstalled in his position in 1944 was provincial propaganda secretary Luchyts’kyi, also to be removed after several years for “not fulfilling his duties.”⁴

There was a significant change in the local leadership team, primarily due to wartime human losses. Kiev party officials had difficulty finding enough reliable and trained personnel to send to their new provinces, considered so problematic given their borderland position and recent incorporation into the republic. During the first months of the liberation there was frequent turnover, creating chaos in the local organs of power. The provincial Soviet government was headed by a newcomer, Aleksei Kolikov, who was sent to Chernivtsi from

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³ TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr.709, ark. 1.

⁴ On party leadership, Dikusarov et al, eds., Narosy istorii Chernivets’koї oblasnoї partiinoї orhanizatsii, 119-26; on compromising materials, TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 3746.
Saratov, Russia, and would be relocated to Rivne in 1948. The city party committee was headed by S. Didyk, and the city executive committee—the Soviet government—by A. Koshovyi. Hundreds of newcomers of lesser importance arrived immediately after the liberation, and thousands would follow in the ensuing years.\(^5\)

In many respects, the second Soviet arrival was a repetition of the first in 1940, with the flight of panicky Romanian officials and abandoned fully furnished apartments. This time, however, the Soviet authorities and Red Army personnel perceived Romanians as the enemy and the occupier and were not concerned with demonstrating any formally civilized manner of takeover. Romanians, in their turn, tried their best to take along as many valuables as possible, and damage what they could not take. As a result, one wing of the former metropolitan’s Residence was damaged during the Romanian retreat and Soviet takeover. The standard Soviet organs of power and administration were re-established, and the process of physical settlement became the task of first priority.

In 1944, the restoration, registration, and beautification (blagoustroistvo), as well as renaming of the city’s buildings and public spaces proceeded faster and in a more organized manner than in 1940-1941.\(^6\) By the end of August of 1944, the major damaged communications were restored, the restoration of central buildings and the creation of small public gardens were

\(^5\) For all appointments in the province in 1944, see TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 830; f.1, op.3, spr. 3968; TsDAHO personal files: Kolikov; Botushans’ky et al, Chernivtsi. Istoriia i suchasnist’, 241.

\(^6\) As early as 24 August, 1944, streets and squares were officially renamed again. Many street names reverted back to their 1941 names but several were new (see DACHO, f.3, op. 2, spr. 714, 37). Detailed lists of Austrian, Romanian, and finally Soviet street names in Chernivtsi can also be found in Dovidnyk proizdu avtotransportnykh zasobiv do vulyts’ ta provulkiv mista (Chernivtsi, 2003).
under way, and the local population was being mobilized to clean the city.\textsuperscript{7} The process of accounting of residential assets also looked somewhat better than in 1940: the benefit of previous experience was apparent in all the actions related to reappropriation and redistribution of urban space.\textsuperscript{8}

The “outrages” and the chaotic war over living space of 1940-1941 did recur during the first postwar years.\textsuperscript{9} At the same time, reflecting the universal confidence of the victor, the postwar ethos and mood of the Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi was much more confident than in 1940-1941. Indicative of this confidence was the zeal of the Soviet commission working to find and return “Soviet” property taken to Romania from the territory of Northern Bukovina and neighbouring areas. A representative of the Soviet of People’s Commissars of the USSR working in Romania “to return Soviet property” complained about the resistance of the “Romanian side” in complying with the agreement on armistice between the two countries and, particularly, its Article No 12 regarding the return of property, and described complex

\textsuperscript{7} To liquidate the dirt and chaos of the move-in period, provincial authorities ordered all city and district party committees to mobilize the population in the order of work obligations. Communists themselves were also encouraged to participate, but, as one learns from party meeting protocols, they rarely participated in this work. DACHO, f.4, op. 1, spr.442, ark.21; f.3, op. 2, spr. 709, ark. 13.

\textsuperscript{8} In the city centre, 1,114 out of 1,350 socialized and 2,766 out of 6,053 non-socialized houses were reported vacant in August 1944. The city had 542 janitors on staff and only lacked 92 to be fully staffed; most of them (457) were concentrated in the central Stalin district. The authorities were very careful when issuing orders to occupy apartments; to avoid controversies and open conflicts, all 3,200 orders given out by August went to the “reliable newcomers from the east” and almost none to locals. Maintenance was also handled better than in the prewar years. By early February 1945, all 2,095 residential buildings in Stalin district were reported ready for winter thanks to the “big effort of the district [authorities];” the janitors and house superintendents were assigned to houses and it was prohibited to fire them; empty apartments were assigned to their neighbours to be taken care of; and street committees of resident-activists were created. DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 468.

\textsuperscript{9} Stalin district, recognized as the “face of the city and of the region,” was the leader in the areas of accounting, registration, and beautification of its architecture and urban space. It was also the leader in “outrages” within residential assets management as its apartments and other spaces were in high demand among city residents. DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 442, ark. 6, 8-10; f. 4, op. 1, spr. 579, ark. 14; For more examples of “outrages,” f.3, op. 2, spr. 714, ark. 39; f.4, op.1, spr. 468, ark. 21, 70; f. 4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 6, 36; f.4, op.1, spr.468, ark. 27; f.4, op.1, spr.490, ark. 17.
investigations they undertook to locate it in various regions of Romania, often employing “extraordinary measures.” A large portion of the “property” turned up as medical, laboratory, and dental equipment and medications that were returned to Chernivtsi.

In the fall of 1944, the Chernivtsi provincial party committee asked the Ukrainian government to open a medical institute in Chernivtsi, arguing that the city had all the necessary buildings and equipment. The request was deemed reasonable, and in October of 1944 the Kiev 2nd Medical Institute was transferred to Chernivtsi, providing, once again, proper—Soviet and Ukrainian—contents for the available physical space of Chernivtsi and its “material riches.”

Very few people among the leadership seriously doubted the longevity of Soviet rule in Northern Bukovina given the victorious movement of the Red Army to the west. The unconditional defeat of Hitler’s block, the prestige and power of the USSR in international relations, and the postwar formation of the “communist” block only confirmed the confidence of newcomers in Chernivtsi in the postwar years.

This is not to say that there were no personal frustrations among the Soviet and communist rank-and-file. Communists in Chernivtsi at times revealed general disillusionment and apathy that was often based on comparison of their life conditions with those abroad or even in wartime Romanian Chernivtsi. For example, a district party committee instructor and agitator Fingerova was overheard saying: “…[Locals] say that under miserable Romania, even during the war, there was everything in Chernivtsi: electricity, water, running streetcars, white bread;

10 For the report on property return (between October 1944 and June 1945), TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr.796, ark. 5-35 and 36–47. For the decision on the transfer of the medical institute, TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr.819, ark. 1-2.
everything was cheap, but when Soviet power came, everything disappeared in three days.”\textsuperscript{11} It was precisely their relationship with “locals” in different spheres that presented the biggest challenges in the postwar Sovietization for Soviet authorities in Moscow, Kiev, and the localities. Although this in itself was not much different from the situation in 1939-1940, the context of these relationships was changed dramatically by the war and the Holocaust.

In the case of Chernivtsi province, the “old” problems of Sovietization remained acute: promoting Ukrainian culture was difficult in a foreign environment, the policies of promoting local cadres contradicted the need to import reliable and trained Soviet personnel, and border security presented a continuous challenge.\textsuperscript{12} On 5 January 1945, a participant in a closed meeting of party activists of Stalin district, which was still regarded to be of paramount political importance as the heart of the provincial capital, remarked: “In our political work, we often took a generalizing approach to people. In everyday life there was a division of people into locals and newcomers. This created a gap between the communists and the local population, which was used by German and Jewish nationalists to alienate the population from our measures.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} For this and similar opinions, see a special report to the Ukrainian Communist Party central committee from the Chernivtsi NKVD head Reshetov, TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 3909, ark. 8-11.

\textsuperscript{12} Numerous protocols of party meetings in Stalin district are indicative of these issues. (For example, DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 442.) The lower-ranked party leadership in Stalin district resumed its prewar work with “the high concentration of Jewish population,” trying to win over their souls in the face of the “harmfulness of Zionism” by promoting Soviet film, theatre, and “developing love of the Russian and Ukrainian book” among them. Quotes from a resolution of the Stalin district committee meeting, f.4, op. 1, spr. 441, ark. 22-25.

\textsuperscript{13} DACHO, f. 4, op.1, spr. 471, ark.19. On the importance of Stalin district in the minds of party officials: provincial leader Zeleniuk noted that the district housed one-third of all the communists in the oblast and all central organs of power but was still a leader in terms of “outrages” performed by party leaders who “feel themselves as little gods whose behaviour is taken for granted.” DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 468, ark. 27.
Officially, the cure was still seen in advancing local cadres to positions of authority, which was duly reported to Kiev on a regular basis, but failed, by and large, in reality.\textsuperscript{14} To rule over the region and manage the daily operation of numerous organizations, the provincial authorities needed reliable and experienced Soviet cadres, who were scarce in the wake of a war that had taken the lives of twenty-seven million Soviet citizens. In the western provinces of Ukraine the problem was even more complicated: just as in 1940, the Soviet authorities needed specialists and political leaders who knew the Ukrainian language. A university lecturer and a party activist in Chernivtsi remarked: “the language question is very important. The language is the politics of our party. We need to speak to our population only in Ukrainian.”\textsuperscript{15} Provincial authorities kept requesting qualified cadres from Kiev. Khrushchev had to come up with creative solutions; for example, he pleaded with Georgii Malenkov, a candidate member of Politburo who was becoming one of the most powerful Soviet politicians at the time, to send him at least Russian-speaking reliable cadres from the eastern USSR so that he (Khrushchev) could send them to Donbas while transferring communists and Soviet employees who did know the national language to the western regions.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} The paramount importance of developing local cadres was stressed continuously (see, for example, the Chernivtsi party committee’s report, TsDAHO f.1, op.23, spr. 4455, ark. 29). On 26 June 1946, the Chernivtsi provincial party committee reported that 47.9 percent of all positions of leadership were filled by locals. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 3968. Two months later, a secretary of Ukrainian party's central committee, Korotchenko, who was sent to inspect the work of Chernivtsi party organizations, reported local party authorities speaking constantly about “big problems with advancement of local cadres,” who were “either not advanced or not provided with educational work and help.” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2667, ark. 120-23. Chernivtsi party leader Zeleniuk, when criticizing the Stalin district party organization, remarked in February of 1945: “we were very eager to change a local for a newcomer as soon as an opportunity emerged. We did not have enough patience to grow local cadres…” DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 468, ark. 65. This was the official line of criticism; in reality, less public party discussions were revealing that “growing local cadres” was far from a straightforward task for the Stalin district leadership. For a detailed discussion of this question see chapters three, four, and following sections in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{15} DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 442, ark. 17; for similar statements, f.4, op.1, spr. 441, ark. 23; f.4, op.1, spr. 468, ark. 71.
At the same time, as the war ended, the western provinces, including Chernivtsi, began receiving demobilized Red Army personnel. This group of newcomers officially held privileged status and was assigned first priority in employment, housing, and social support. As reported by 1 January 1946, 15,559 demobilized Red Army soldiers arrived in the province, 3,100 of them in Chernivtsi alone, and 300 more followed in February. Theoretically, demobilized personnel had to become part of the solution to the cadre problem, bringing their Soviet experience and reliability, proved by their service in the war, to the borderland province. In practice, though, they often became part of the problem for local leadership. Many of them were war invalids who required social support, special conditions of living, and medical treatment, putting additional pressure on the city’s developing infrastructure. Even more important, many used their status to demand high administrative positions connected to better opportunities in accommodation, access to goods, and social standing. The city’s party leadership complained to Kiev that these demands often could not be met: most of the vacant positions which Chernivtsi province wanted to fill with incoming Soviet specialists were in rural districts, while most Red Army officers wanted to remain in the city. The military department of the Chernivtsi provincial party committee particularly stressed “problems with providing them with apartments.”

16 TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 831, ark. 50.

17 TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 3058 (materials on employment of the demobilized in Chernivtsi province). On demobilized officers wanting to “receive only positions of leadership … and only in the city,” see ark. 44-46. A letter to Khrushchev from a demobilized officer which was forwarded to the Stalin district party committee in Chernivtsi for investigation, read: “I do not have any connections and do not have money so I cannot find a job in Chernivtsi. I do not have a profession.” Allegedly, Stalin district officials refused to register him as an unemployed person, saying: “we have thousands like you and we do not want to swell our unemployment database…” DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 551, ark. 906.
An even more frustrating problem was that of so-called “random people” (sluchainye liudi) migrating to the city. Along with party cadres assigned by the higher organs in Kiev and the demobilized military, the city’s railway station was receiving daily a crowd of specialists requested by particular enterprises as well as families and relatives of those who were lucky to be housed and employed in Chernivtsi and were relocating their next of kin to be reunited or simply help them escape worse conditions elsewhere. Acquaintances, more distant relatives, and simply people seeking opportunities flooded into the city. Numerous party notes and reports complained about the lack of control over incoming Soviet newcomers, quoting countless investigations that uncovered document fraud to escape punishment or hide misdeeds, or just adventurers who accepted invitations to a distant borderland city by some small Soviet trust desperately looking for employees.\(^\text{18}\)

If mass in-migration of demobilized soldiers can be interpreted as a deliberate policy of the Soviet state to alter the demographics of the city, the armies of “random people,” by contrast, were clearly seen as a problem by local authorities in the immediate postwar years.\(^\text{19}\)

All these newcomers entered the hunt for apartments which were indeed more abundant in Chernivtsi than in most other cities of postwar Ukraine. As remarked by the provincial party leader Zeleniuk in February of 1945, “the residential assets of [Stalin] district are equal to the

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\(^{18}\) On “random people,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2820, ark. 1-4; f.1, op.23, spr. 3745; f.1, op. 23, spr. 1559, ark. 35. The problem was well known in Kiev. In March of 1944, for example, Khrushchev appealed to Malenkov, asking to strengthen control over the process of appointments of party workers to western regions and make it mandatory for the organizations sending the cadres to provide them with appropriate documentation. In practice, the receiving provincial authorities often had to rely on oral reports about the newly arrived “responsible workers” (otvetstvennie rabotniki), which often resulted in employing so-called random people. TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 831, ark 32.

\(^{19}\) Explaining mass demobilization to the western regions as a deliberate policy of population change is logical and has been suggested by a number of researchers (for example, Altshuler: “The Soviet “Transfer”). I was not able to locate a document in which the explicit link would be made between the demobilization and the ethnic composition of the new borderlands.
value of many large cities, even those with the status of oblast centre, of eastern Ukraine.”

Moreover, a very large number of apartments in Chernivtsi stood empty for the first postwar months, and occasionally for years: as of the end of 1944, of all the socialized and registered buildings, 19.9 percent in Stalin district, 47.7 percent in Shevchenko district, and 60.5 percent in Lenin district were empty, unheated, continuously being robbed, and deteriorating often beyond repair. At the same time, it was very hard to obtain a livable apartment in Chernivtsi for newcomers who continued to arrive from the east, which resulted in the rapid growth in the number of notorious Soviet communal apartments where Soviet specialists and local residents alike were stuck for long years to come with their multiplying families. The residential assets of Chernivtsi were limited while the population of the city and the competition for the best apartments continued to grow. After all, deteriorating robbed vacant apartments were not as attractive as the marvelous “bourgeois” lofts just abandoned by their owners in June 1940. In 1944 and through the late 1940s, lavish accommodations were in shorter supply, which pushed

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20 DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 468, ark. 69.

21 DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 440, ark. 21; f.4, op.1, spr. 442, ark. 39; f. 3, op. 2, spr. 714, ark 4,6. In 1945, the province's modest plan for renovation, reconstruction, and new construction was fulfilled by only 20 percent vs. the average 38 percent for western provinces of Ukraine. Chernivtsi authorities justified their poor results by the shortage of labour (while forced recruitment of locals to Donbas was strictly controlled at the same time). A “sharp” lack of construction materials, technical equipment, and transport, as well as the lack of necessary basic documentation were also listed as reasons for poor results. TsDAHO, f.1, op.75, spr. 96, ark. 1-2.

22 Conditions of life in Chernivtsi communal apartments are described in the memoirs of children of newcomers to Chernivtsi: Sviatoslav Bakis, Prutskii mir (Kiev: Dukh I litera, 2006); M. Liadoskaia, G. Pepeliuk, Liudi iz goroda A (Novosibirsk: Geo, 2008). Eleonora Solovei, a well-known Ukrainian literary critic who grew up in postwar Chernivtsi, also described in detail the long life of her family in a packed apartment in the lower town of Chernivtsi, in our conversation in summer of 2008. For complaints about difficulties in getting rooms and about the conditions of communal apartments, see also DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 551, ark. 95-180; f.4. op.1, spr. 550, ark.2. 

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those who had access to information sources and power to engage in notorious speculative affairs around prestigious apartments.\textsuperscript{23}

Two major issues of postwar Sovietization in Chernivtsi were substantially different from 1940. The first was the spread of radical Ukrainian nationalism in Northern Bukovina that occurred during the war, resulting in the presence of the OUN-UPA that were now active in several Ukrainian-dominated districts bordering with Galicia. Clearing the region of “nationalist bandits,” or “Ukrainian-German nationalists,” as they were termed in Soviet party language, became one of the most frustrating assignments of provincial leaderships in the “western provinces” of Ukraine and one of the major headaches for the republican government. Chernivtsi authorities were luckier in this respect than those in the neighbouring provinces of Volyn’, Rivne, Ternopil’, Stanislav, and Lviv, where the OUN was much more numerous and active. And yet, Soviet leaders of Chernivtsi province had to continue their war with the Ukrainian nationalists until the late 1940s, long after the USSR had celebrated victory in the Great Patriotic War.\textsuperscript{24} The “struggle” of the Soviet government with the “nationalist bandits” was accompanied by a wave of repression against the western Ukrainian intelligentsia, clergy, and others suspected of Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism.” This repressive campaign was not

\textsuperscript{23} On speculations, affairs, and practical problems with apartment distributions, see DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 442.

\textsuperscript{24} The topic of the struggle between the Soviet authorities and the OUN, and of OUN activities in the region, deserves a separate study and is not the focus of this dissertation. Soviet documents on the OUN and related issues are well represented in Ukrainian archives. Specifically on this subject, for example, TsDAHO, f. 1, op.23, apr.1729; f.1, op.23, spr. 1681; f. 1, op.23, spr.2667 (in relation to the elections in 1946). The problem was often mentioned in the protocols of local party meetings and conferences, reports, and correspondence.
endemic to the Ukrainian SSR but touched many regions of the empire, including the Baltic republics, Belorussia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.25

The second issue was Chernivtsi’s Jewish population. The Holocaust had significantly changed the conditions of life and reduced the numbers of local Jewish communities. Now, the general Soviet attitude toward the “Jewish nationality” was beginning to undergo a dramatic change in the wake of the wartime catastrophe. Although some scholars place the origins of the robust postwar Soviet antisemitism in the 1930s, it seems more plausible that anti-Jewish sentiments among Soviet authorities increased significantly during and after World War II. Most scholars who support the latter argument connect the rise of Soviet official as well as popular antisemitism with reactions of the wider population, non-Jewish and Jewish alike, to the Holocaust. Popular “everyday” anti-Jewish attitudes were provoked by the prolonged witnessing of brutalities and murders of Jews accompanied by full-blown anti-Jewish propaganda, which often drew upon pre-existing antisemitic prejudices of the local population as well as the notorious “Judeo-communism” argument. Official Soviet antisemitism, though, was rather a reaction to the strengthened national identity of the Soviet Jews who survived the war and often responded to Nazi and other nationalist antisemitic ideologies and policies with a stronger sense of specifically Jewish rather than general Soviet self-identification. Such identity, together with the growth in feelings of solidarity with world Jewry and support for the cause of creating a Jewish national state, was universally regarded as an indication of bourgeois nationalism by

Soviet leaders. Although Soviet ideology continued to proclaim internationalism and condemn antisemitism, the USSR became much less hospitable to its Jewish residents after the war, as covert antisemitism, often coded as Soviet patriotism, spread through Soviet institutions and everyday life alike.26

The war also radically changed Soviet official attitudes toward German culture and everything else associated with Germany. If in 1940-1941 Soviet authorities in Chernivtsi could discuss re-education and reforging of local Jews who spoke German, read German books, and wrote German poetry, in 1944, all things German were anathema. Hatred of Germans was cultivated by the Soviet government along with love of the Soviet motherland and pride in the great victory. The communist authorities in Kiev and Chernivtsi had certainly read the famous calls by the Soviet propagandist and Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg to “kill the German,” published in the central Soviet newspapers and distributed among Red Army soldiers: “From now on the word German means to use the most terrible oath. ... We shall not speak any more. We shall not get excited. We shall kill. ... Do not count days. Do not count miles. Count one thing: Germans killed by you. Kill the German! ...”27


27 Ilya Ehrenburg’s article was published in several central Soviet newspapers. See for example Krasnaya Zvezda (No173 [5236]) 24 July 1942, p.1. Original Russian text is also available in Ilya Ehrenburg, Voina. 1941-1945 (Moscow: KRPA Olimp, 2004), available also online: http://militera.lib.ru/prose/russian/erenburg_ig3/091.html (last accessed on 6 August 2013). On the development of the civic emotions of love and hate in the late Stalin period in Soviet Ukraine, see Serhii Yekelchyk, “The Civic Duty to Hate: Stalinist Citizenship as Political Practice
Such calls were reaffirmed by the personal and horrifying experiences of millions of Soviet citizens at the fronts and under occupation. Although the Jews of Chernivtsi, including the later renowned Paul Celan, had developed a painful and problematic relationship with their native German tongue after the Holocaust, most of them continued to use it and cherish it as the only cultural environment where they felt “at home.”\(^\text{28}\) In this context, events in Chernivtsi of 1944-1946 became an important determinant in the formation of a new, covertly but strongly antisemitic Soviet nationality policy in the postwar decade.

2. Holocaust Survivors in the City

Thanks to the inconsistent Romanian policies on deportation and the activity of mayor Traian Popovici, a significant number of local Jewish residents survived the war in Chernivtsi. Some of them—mostly Jews who received “authorizations” to stay as “economically useful” for the city—continued to occupy their prewar apartments and houses. Establishing the numbers of those who stayed in Chernivtsi presents an even bigger statistical problem than evaluating the numbers of those deported to Transnistria. Taking into consideration the chaos surrounding the deportations and the array of survival strategies employed by the Jewish residents of Chernivtsi, including baptism and claiming non-Jewish identities (as well as the fact that most of the local survivors would leave the city by 1947), it is difficult to estimate how many Jews from Chernivtsi escaped deportation or returned to their homes before Soviet “liberation” in 1944.

\(^{28}\) On the evolving nature of Paul Celan’s relationship with the German language, for example, Colin, Paul Celan. Holograms of Darkness.
What we do have are the numbers produced by the Chernivtsi NKVD department that surveyed the province’s population in 1944. According to a report from the local party leader Ivan Zeleniuk to Kiev in April of 1944, the estimated number of Jews in Chernivtsi was 17,341, or 42 percent of the (again, estimated) entire city’s population. A report by Chernivtsi NKVD head Rudenko from 13 June 1944 gave the number of 23,213, or 53 percent of the total population. (Rudenko’s data on the national composition of the urban population is represented in Table 2.) Fifty percent of these Jews, according to Rudenko, arrived in Chernivtsi from Romania and the eastern provinces of the USSR. Those who were denied registration in the city “settled” throughout Chernivtsi province, which had at least 30,713 Jews in 1944 as far as the NKVD was informed. Even the lower number from April of 1944 was higher than the 1930 percentage of 38 percent, which is strikingly unusual for post-Holocaust Eastern Europe.

What Rudenko did not mention in his report was that a great many of these Jews were survivors returning from Transnistria; some of them were former residents of the city; while others, originally from various regions subject to deportation under Romanian rule, came to Chernivtsi to escape persecution in rural areas or simply to find ways to survive in the midst of wartime hunger and chaos. This fact, however, was well known to local party officials who were

Table 2. NKVD data on nationality composition of the population in Chernivtsi, 1944*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>17,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* TsDAHOU, f.1, op. 23, spr. 817, ark. 4; see also Altshuler, “The Soviet ‘Transfer’ of Jews from Chernovtsy Province to Romania,” 54-75.

30 Data from a report by the provincial NKVD head Rudenko (DACHO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 61, ark. 1-2). Most probably, many survivors were either unable or too frightened to return to the rural areas and smaller towns where their homes had for the most part been appropriated by others. In the atmosphere of postwar hunger, scarcity, and popular antisemitism, often encouraged by Ukrainian nationalists’ detachments active in many rural areas, they were attracted to Chernivtsi by rumours of possibilities to emigrate, better employment opportunities, and comparative safety.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>656.00</td>
<td>1.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>10,699.00</td>
<td>24.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>23,213.00</td>
<td>53.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>79.00</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>3,947.00</td>
<td>9.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>4,692.00</td>
<td>10.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>155.00</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrians</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43,530.00</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Order of listing and names of nationalities are as in original report. Note that originally the list had two groups, Hungarians and Magyars, which were united into one in pencil.

aware of the horrible experiences of the survivors and their problematic current condition.31

Chernivtsi also housed temporary camps for repatriates returning from Nazi camps

31 For example, in the second half of 1944, the secretary of the primary party organization of Chernivtsi city council spoke to the Stalin district party activists’ meeting about “the important question of registering the people who return to Chernivtsi [from Transnistria]: 6,000 people returned; most of them are still not registered; they have endured a lot [of suffering] under the Romanian-German occupants and need our care. Some of them are even stakhanovites.” DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 6. Note that the localized, human understanding of the suffering...
and forced labour to their home countries in Europe. Many of them were Jews. They established contacts with the local Jewish community and contributed to the development of local Jewish networks of communication. Many survivors who returned to Chernivtsi and often those local Jews who remained in the city throughout the war recalled the immediate two or three years after liberation as the darkest period of their survival stories. For many of them, the return home or the return of Soviet power—ironically, their true liberator from Romanian persecution—was associated with the disappointment of continuing poverty, hunger, homelessness, and constant fear of harassment.

The Moscow-based Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC)—one of the most visible Soviet Jewish institutions, created by the Soviet leadership to support the USSR’s war effort—actively advocated for aid for Jewish survivors of the enemy occupation on Soviet territories. The JAC was well informed about the large concentration of Jews in Northern Bukovina in 1944. The Committee sent two of its members to investigate the situation in Chernivtsi. Soviet Jewish writer Naftali Serf Kon, an old communist who immigrated to the USSR from interwar

of survivors, as opposed to the universal Soviet understanding of having been under occupation as a suspicious and potentially criminal experience, was quite common among communist personnel of lower positions, especially on the district level. Consider the following remark by another party worker: “…we still have bribes… and division between ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’… We also approach incorrectly those who were in Transnistria.” DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 21.

32 For memories of a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz about life in such a camp in Chernivtsi in 1944, Teréz Móses, Staying Human through the Holocaust (Calgary, Alta.: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 321-34.

33 Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 238-40.

34 For example, on 18 May 1944 the head of the JAC, S. Michoels, sent a letter to Molotov describing the miserable conditions of Jewish survivors and asking for help in organizing relief measures. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 3851, ark. 3-4. On the JAC’s activities regarding Northern Bukovina, see Mikhail Mitsel’, Evrei Ukrainy v 1943-1953 gg.: Ocherki dokumentirovannoi istorii, Biblioteka instytutu iudaïky (Kiev: Dukh i litera, 2004), 22.
Poland, and another Jewish Soviet writer, Riva Beliasnaia, shocked by what they observed in the city, compiled a report in Yiddish which Kon sent to the JAC.\textsuperscript{35}

According to the report, Jews constituted up to 70 percent of the city’s population in 1944—a number much higher than even the highest official Soviet estimates.\textsuperscript{36} Kon admitted that obtaining exact data was \textit{a priori} impossible since most Jews did not register with local militia departments either because they had no documents or out of fear of being drafted or deported. According to widespread rumours and Kon’s many oral conversations, survivors who were encouraged by Red Army officials and Soviet authorities to return from Transnistria to their places of origin were denied entry to the city and kept beyond the bridge on the other, north bank of the Prut river; they were frequently beaten and harassed by Soviet personnel and often were allowed into the city only after using their meager possessions for bribes. Kon reported that provincial party leader Zeleniuk confirmed that he had personally banned survivors from entering the city, justifying the ban by food shortages and fear of mass death resulting from aerial attacks. Upon entering the city (the ban was eventually lifted), survivors could not obtain registration without employment and vice versa.

But apparently their biggest nightmare was mobilization to Donbas and other industrial areas.\textsuperscript{37} Kon wrote:

\textsuperscript{35} On the work of the JAC’s representative in places of concentration of Jewish survivors, Shimon Redlich, \textit{War, Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documented Study of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR}, New History of Russia Series (Luxembourg: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995), 44.

\textsuperscript{36} Apparently, Beliasnaia attempted to obtain official data from the Chernivtsi provincial executive committee but her request was denied, according to the materials of her later trial as a Jewish nationalist in 1952. Kon used a roughly estimated number in his report. See Lev Drobiazko, “Repressirovannyie ievreiskie pisateli Ukrainy (dokumenty arkhiivno-sledstvennykh del i materialy chastnykh arkhivov). Naftali Serf-Kon,” \textit{Holokost i suchasnist}, no. 1(7) (2003): 7.

\textsuperscript{37} On “excesses” of labour mobilization in Chernivtsi, DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 440; f.4, op. 1, spr. 490 ark. 105.
Having survived three years of death camps and ghettos, having witnessed the death and murder of their loved ones, these suffering people, clad in rags and lice-infested, were highly susceptible to panic. And having endured the hostile reception and all kinds of obstructions on their return home, their mood was gloomy. And then suddenly, they were being seized on the street, or at night in their apartments, or near the police stations, where they stood in line to register, and taken to the county administration buildings, kept there as prisoners, with no food or adequate clothing, and then sent to the Urals and later on to Donbas.

The majority of the survivors were women. There were cases when these utterly worn-out women, barely recognizable as humans, were grabbed while standing outside a police station waiting to register, taken to a collection point, and then transported, hungry and clad in rags, to Sverdlovsk.

During the capture, people were treated brutally. Whether they were sick or old, or mothers with small children, or whether they had been in the workforce since the liberation, or whether, in the women’s cases, their husbands were in the Red Army, or on the labour front—it made no difference. There are in Czernovitsy infants whose mothers were sent away in this manner to the labour front [Kon’s emphasis]. When a woman presented a document certifying her employment, or a document of exemption from mobilization, the document was either confiscated or torn to pieces.38

Kon attributed the great desire of many Jews to leave for Romania to this all-pervasive fear of capture that was associated with further deportation and violent uprooting. He mentioned, though, that Jews who volunteered to join the Red Army were refused mobilization at a time of high demand; many, according to Kon, instead joined the 1st Czechoslovak detachment that was stationed in nearby Sadagora at the time. Others simply left for Romania using the opportunity that the Romanian-Ukrainian border was in fact not controlled between October of 1944 and February of 1945.39

Soviet documents about mobilization to the Red Army, on the contrary, reported “many cases” of Chernivtsi Jews escaping military mobilization by means of “bribes, fake documents, and … seeking employment with organizations that provided mobilization deferrals… after they received mobilization notes.” Both statements can be true: the question whether to join the Red Army was answered differently by Jews who found themselves in Chernivtsi based on their ideological convictions, prewar experience with the Soviet regime, or personal circumstances. Memoirs suggest that the local Jews of Chernivtsi who survived Sovietization and the Romanian Holocaust were very likely to be disappointed with and alienated from the Soviet state and thus avoided mobilization into the Red Army as desperately as they avoided going to Donbas and other places in the Soviet interior, pinning their hopes for the future on emigration. Whatever the primary reason may have been, mobilization reports from 1944 showed that very few Jews were mobilized from Chernivtsi province.

Kon also devoted much attention to rumours that raged through the city, analyzing the prevailing popular mood characterized by Zeleniuk in his conversations with the JAC investigators as “unhealthy.” People on the streets spoke about Jewish women being deported *en masse* in trains with inscriptions “prostitutes ride here,” provoking intensified and gender-specific antisemitic harassment of Jewish women by non-Jewish locals. The gossip was probably connected with offensive language used by officials in charge of labour mobilization

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40 DAChO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 74, 83, 84, 85, 92, ark. 1-2.


42 For example, in 1945, when citizens born in 1928 were drafted into the Red Army, the ethnic composition of the new conscripts broke down as follows: 120 Russians, 420 Ukrainians, 35 Jews, 21 Moldavian, 23 Poles, and 27 Romanians. DAChO, f. 1, op.8, spr. 74, 83, 84, 85, 92, ark. 9.
or the fact that female Jewish survivors who returned from Transnistria were often automatically put into the category of women who cohabited or had relationships with occupiers—one of the stigmas used widely and indiscriminately in postwar USSR.

Most important—and probably most harmful for him during his trial as a Jewish nationalist in 1949—was Kon’s analysis of the widespread attempts to avoid labour mobilization, in which he dared to suggest, quoting the reasoning of the “intelligentsia of the town,” that the actual aim of brutal mobilization was not to provide a labour force for the country (for, asked Kon, what kind of labourers was Chernivtsi sending to Soviet enterprises?—half-naked, malnourished, and seriously sick, who often did not survive their first winter) but to alter the city’s demographics. Otherwise, went the reasoning, why would the authorities bring to the city armies of unqualified and unskilled in-migrants along with scarce and badly needed educated Soviet personnel? 43

Many facts suggest that Kon’s reasoning was correct. After all, it is easy to see why the local leadership wanted to reduce the unusually high (for postwar Ukraine) percentage of Jews in the population of borderland Chernivtsi. To begin with, the story was a continuation from the prewar Soviet year: in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, the city was an anomaly in what was supposed to be “primordial Ukrainian land.” In 1944, though, Ukraine was characterized by widespread popular antisemitism which was often welcomed, if unofficially, by the

authorities. In February of 1945, for example, Zeleniuk told the Stalin district party conference that “there were separate but extant cases of antisemitism in our party… the former director of Factory #9 said: The [Communist] Party conducts a policy of settlement by nationality: Ukrainians will live in Ukraine, Poles in Poland, and Jews will be taken to Birobidzhan.” Zeleniuk remarked that the person mentioned had been fired but seemed to be “improving his judgment” and would probably be reinstated. Antisemitism was still officially criticized (as it would always be until the collapse of the USSR) but at the same time was being normalized as part of the overall Soviet ethos in the wake of the war. In Ukraine, popular antisemitism and state policies of discrimination against Jews reinforced each other.

Central Ukrainian authorities investigated cases of antisemitism in Ukraine as a negative phenomenon on multiple occasions; however, in the final analysis, Khrushchev and his subordinates saw “Jewish nationalism” and “provocative behaviour” as the primary reasons for the attraction of antisemitic views. Such “Jewish provocations” included the alleged mass refusal to serve in the Red Army or to go to Donbas and other labour front areas, as well as demands of Ukrainian Jews for the return of their dwellings and property looted during the war. The cure for Ukrainian antisemitism, consequently, was seen in fighting Zionism and “Jewish nationalism” rather than antisemitism per se. In Ukraine, generally, Soviet authorities viewed the survivors first and foremost as persons who remained on the occupied territories and did not

45 DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 468, akr. 49.
46 On Khrushchev’s antisemitism and its applications in state policies, Mittsel’, Evrei Ukrainy, 20-35.
perish while, according to the policies of the occupiers, they should have. This automatically led to suspicion of collaboration.47

In Chernivtsi, party officials found it particularly frustrating to locate the fine line between blatant antisemitism and “dealing strictly with the part of the Jewish population that is impeding our work”; in daily life, ethnic prejudices often replaced confusing and sophisticated “correct party approaches” toward the local population.48 To help his subordinates in their daily decision-making and judgment, the Stalin district party secretary Dolhyi even developed his own list of categories of local population. “Who are the local people who live in Chernivtsi?” he asked rhetorically, and provided an answer:

1. A larger part of [locals] bought the right to not be sent to Transnistria; they were the bourgeois elite of the local Jews.
2. Those former capitalists who were sent out from Chernivtsi by Soviet power and returned here under the Romanians as “the victims of Bolshevik terror”; these are the openly alien element.
3. Part of these people were left here as direct agents of the Gestapo and Siguranța.
4. A group of [Jewish] workers and clerks who were necessary for the municipal services; they are close to us and can be used in our work.
5. People who returned to Chernivtsi [from Transnistria] with the Red Army; these are victims of German-Romanian terror and are open supporters of Soviet power.

47 On the role of experience under occupation in the postwar identifications and self-identifications of Soviet Ukrainian citizens, Weiner, Making Sense of War. The head of a propagandist group at the central commitee of the Ukrainian Communist Party Voronovych explained the official “party line” to local authorities during his visit to Chernivtsi in 1944: “… Keep in mind that [locals] are from the capitalist society; that the USSR is ahead of the capitalist countries for the entire era… they also were on the occupied territories; they do not know the latest directives and decrees…..” (DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 18.)

48 Consider a quote from an inner party discussion in Stalin district: “[we should] watch for Jewish nationalism; but differentiate here: do not allow incorrect treatment of the Jewish population that is close to us. They consider it to be antisemitism. But the part of the Jewish population that is impeding our work should be dealt with strictly, according to the laws of wartime.” DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 441, ark. 15.
This is of course a very free and schematic classification… but I consider it correct.49

Compartmentalizing local Jews according to this categorization was difficult in practice, though. Dolhyi himself resorted to a generalization when he complained in October 1944 that local Jews “did not believe in our victory… Jewish nationalists …spread rumors that after the war Bukovina will come under Anglo-American influence and the population should not link their fate to Soviet power … children study at school in Russian or Ukrainian and then at home read books in German or Romanian that are soaked with bourgeois ideology…”50 Provincial NKVD head Rudenko closed his 1944 report about the national composition of the province’s population with an expression of surprise and frustration, it seems, noting that “[a]t the time of liberation of the city of Chernivtsi by the detachments of the Red Army, the best apartments, completely furnished, in the city centre as well as in its outskirts, were occupied by the Jewish population, comprising 1,360 apartments.”51

Inner-party discussions at the district and city level also reveal a widespread feeling of cultural inferiority among the Soviet newcomers who, in spite of the official presentation of Soviet culture as superior and dominant, were frustrated by the fact that locals still behaved, looked, and dressed in “more cultured ways,” outperformed “easterners” in university studies, and often openly disdained “Soviet ways.”52 It seems that, for many Soviet newcomers, the

49 DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr. 442, ark. 32.

50 Ibid., ark. 29.

51 Ibid., ark.12.
urban Jewish community became a constant source of irritating daily reminders about the deceitfulness of Soviet propaganda that condemned foreign capitalism. At the same time, Transnistria survivors, as revealed by Kon’s report, were mistreated on a mass scale, if not as Jews or survivors of the Romanian occupation, then as the most vulnerable group of the population who were not registered, often homeless and disoriented, frequently ending up as victims of the notorious mobilization to the labour front.

The large concentration of survivors in the city was also a highly political issue for communist leaders: unable to provide them with adequate support, Soviet authorities stood by as local rabbinical offices conducted an active relief campaign sponsored by Jewish international organizations. Local communists realized that this was not helping the image of Soviet power. It prevented “class stratification” according to the above-mentioned list compiled by Dolhyi, and instead united local Jews around ethnic identity.53

Provincial leader Zeleniuk had even less patience with the local Jewish community of Chernivtsi than his subordinates and reported to Kiev a simplified version of the local Soviet vision of the situation in the city:

52 Materials of the Stalin district party organizations have many references to such opinions. In some cases, party members either appealed to their colleagues in the form of “criticism and self-criticism,” calling upon them to stop the “outrages” that provoked locals to despise and distrust all things Soviet. On other occasions, party members accused locals of revealing dangerous “bourgeois” culture, trying to deceive Soviet leaders and hide their alien activities. For example, see DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 490, ark. 105, 107. Consider a typical remark by a low-level cultural official: “many responsible workers lack culture and cannot inoculate culture into others… They [also] did not take the local intelligentsia in hand. This intelligentsia, with their overly cultured behaviour, can lull our vigilance… We should not fall under their will.” DACHO, f.4, op.1, spr.442, 18.

53 DACHO, f.4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 32. Mittsel’s collection quoted above also contains many documents about the activities of Jewish networks and religious organizations in support of Holocaust survivors, and Soviet concerns about such activities.
According to all types of investigation [among the Jews] there remained [alive] mainly those who curried favour with the Romanian authorities; the rest were craftsmen and members of the free professions. The progressive part of the Jewish population was either killed off or exiled from Romanian territory. It is typical that all the Jews who previously worked in our Soviet institutions remained alive and unharmed, while this was absolutely not the case with other nationalities.\(^5\)

In a report that followed shortly after, Zeleniuk also assured Khrushchev that Chernivtsi Jews, who made up “over 50% of the total population of the city,” were becoming susceptible to religious beliefs and Zionism and were “engaged in private business speculation, riffling and pillaging of abandoned apartments, and houses, in every way possible avoiding socially useful labour.” Zeleniuk openly stated that “[The Jews] allege that the Soviet government has altered its attitudes toward the Jews and that today’s Soviets are not the same as those in 1940-1941,” which certainly reflected widespread opinion among local survivors.\(^5\)

What Zeleniuk was really arguing, though, was that the war had “sorted out” local Jews, killing the “good” among them, and that only the enemies and collaborators could have possibly survived. Using a typical postwar “litmus test for the soul” (to use Amir Weiner's expression), Zeleniuk was providing himself and his superiors in Kiev with a perfect justification as to why the same Jewish population that had been worth re-educating and Sovietizing in 1940 now had to be purged after the war.

\(^5\) Zeleniuk’s report to Khrushchev (30 April 30 1944), published in Altshuler, “Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of the Second World War,” 70.

\(^5\) Zeleniuk’s report to Khrushchev and Korotchenko (16 July 1944), published in ibid., 70-71.
Thus, Soviet officials in Chernivtsi—a new Soviet Ukrainian urban centre and a city located dangerously close to the state border—saw both the high concentration of Jews in the population and a community that had lived through Romanian oppression as extremely undesirable. It seems that the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR shared the opinion of local authorities in Chernivtsi that the urban space of the city had to be emptied of local Jews and filled with a more reliable and appropriate population (preferably ethnic Ukrainian).

Khrushchev, who visited the city in 1944 soon after liberation, became seriously concerned about the “Jewish nature” of this city. He later recalled:

When the town of Chernivtsi was liberated during the course of the Red Army offensive operations, it was extremely neglected and dirty. The task remained to clean the town. It should be mentioned that, during the occupation period, the Germans gave the town to Romanians, and that’s why its Jewish population escaped destruction. When we dealt with this issue, the town’s Jewish population declared to us that after the Red Army arrived all the Ukrainians left for the villages, and so, they said, there was no one to clean the city. Tell me, please—how should a Ukrainian feel when hearing this? In this case I speak about the negative, unhealthy occurrences, and do not want to say that this is a national feature of Jews, but let us look at things directly. Such occurrences in some degree play a role and make an influence.”56

What Khrushchev attributed to “typically Jewish” features was a reference to the historical urban social structure of Chernivtsi which he interpreted as Jewish arrogance toward the oppressed local population, Ukrainians.57 (The Jews of Chernivtsi could hardly afford to be

56 Khrushchev commented on his 1944 visit to Chernivtsi in 1956 during an interview about the conditions of the Jewish population in the USSR. See N. S. Khrushchev, “My svergli tsaria, a vy ispugalis’ Abramovicha” (a recording of the conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with the delegation from the Workers Progressive party of Canada that took place on 29 August 1956 in TsK KPSS), Istochnik 3 (1994): 98. See also Pinkus and Frankel, The Soviet Government and the Jews, 93, on this incident in relation to Khrushchev’s antisemitism.

57 On Khrushchev’s antisemitism and frustration about Jews returning to Ukraine, Mittsel’, Evrei Ukrainy, 22-35.
arrogant in 1944; after all, the sight of Jews being mobilized for forced labour on the streets of the town became common during the war.) The reference was to the fact that janitors and other manual city workers were in short supply and that the majority of these positions had historically been occupied by peasants from surrounding areas who moved back to their villages during the wartime turmoil as was common among temporary migrant workers. It is a matter of discourse and interpretation what to make of this fact. In prewar Bukovina, local peasants stricken with poverty and landlessness usually saw the chance to work for urban “lords,” who were often Jewish and almost always German-speaking, as an opportunity rather than as oppression. For the Soviet Ukrainian statesman, though, it was clearly a story of national and social oppression so vividly represented in the prewar popular narratives about the region. It also fit well into the general ethos of growing and all-pervasive antisemitism.58

3. The “Evacuation” of 1945-1946: The Solution of the Local “Jewish Question”

Thanks to the party, the NKVD, the JAC’s reports, and Khrushchev’s personal appeals, the highest Soviet leadership was aware of the situation in Chernivtsi and concerned enough to seek a radical solution.59 It was a time of transition from a terribly destructive war to peace and

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58 Memoirs and semi-fictional narratives about life in late Austrian and interwar Chernivtsi by Fichmann, Blum, von Rezzori, and others quoted earlier in this work mention that it was typical for Ukrainian women to be hired for manual labour by urban residents even if the employing families were comparatively poor and worked hard themselves. (A useful critique of Rezzori’s memoirs and his treatment of Ukrainian female servants, in particular, can be found in Himka, “The Snows of Yesteryear.”) These accounts also mention that it was common among richer, upper-middle class urbanites to hold arrogant and paternalistic attitudes toward their peasant, non-educated house servants, be they Romanians or Ukrainians. The cited accounts also often point to the fact that urban employment was often highly appreciated by peasants who came from surrounding rural areas characterized by overwhelming poverty. These same accounts also point to the existence of sentiments of ethnic inferiority and antisemitism, often reinforced by the spreading ideologies of nationalism and Marxism in prewar Bukovina. None of these sentiments, it seems, was widespread enough to dominate public opinion. See chapter one for more on this.

59 Chernivtsi was probably among the first on the list of locations that Soviet high authorities in Moscow connected to the notion of Jewish survivors. For example, in his “Instructions concerning Jewish survivors” (undated,
the new geopolitical order in Europe. As confirmed by the Yalta Conference, ethnic purity was universally seen as the only way to achieve long-lasting peace on the continent, preventing future irredentism of nation-states possessing sizable ethnic minorities or those with kin minorities in other states. Ethnic cleansing was a widespread violent practice which accompanied the liberation of Europe from German occupation; mass population transfers became the standard practice of postwar states.\(^{60}\) Stalin was the one leader who was probably prepared best of all to carry on postwar ethnic cleansing and population exchanges. In addition to the extraordinary Soviet experience of prewar mass deportation campaigns and the more “civilized” evacuation of ethnic minorities, primarily Germans, in 1939-1940, the NKVD-NKGB had deported various groups of “punished peoples” collectively accused of collaboration and treason during the war, including Russian-Germans and borderland Poles.

Ethnic-based mass deportations of Soviet Koreans, Poles, Germans, and other nationalities from the borderlands before the war, as well as the infamous removal of Chechens, Ingushes, and Crimean Tatars from their traditional territories during and after the war, all in the most inhumane manner, represented the perverse continuation of Soviet nation-building revealed in the policies of “affirmative action.” Scholars explain these Soviet ethnic cleansing campaigns by the following logic: as soon as nationality, together with other categories, such as social origin, was essentialized and institutionalized in the era of high Stalinism, the only way to

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deal with the danger of cross-border communication and espionage was through the physical removal of those whose unchangeable nationality “pulled” them abroad.  

The need to “cleanse” the new borderlands, acquired by the USSR during 1939-1941 and secured in 1944, was addressed in the postwar context in a more “civil” manner than during the first, prewar, wave of Sovietization: with the establishment of “friendly” Soviet-sponsored governments in Eastern and Central Europe, populations could be “exchanged” rather than sent to Siberia. Therefore, in September of 1944, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Polish Committee of National Liberation which allowed the repatriation from the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs of Poles and Jews who had been citizens of Poland prior to 17 September 1939; just some two weeks later, a similar agreement was signed between Poland and the Lithuanian SSR regarding the region of Vilna (now Vilnius); and in June of 1945, with Romania to repatriate several thousand ethnic Romanians from Chernivtsi province.

There was an important difference with respect to the ethnic identities of those repatriated from previously Polish Galicia and Northern Bukovina: most Polish Jews were assimilated into Polish culture, often self-identified as Poles, and were included within the repatriated group; most Bukovinian Jews, however, had historically dissociated from Romanian

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62 The initial agreement with the Polish Committee of National Liberation was later confirmed by the agreement signed in Moscow on 6 July 1945 between the USSR and the United People’s Government of Poland. See Altshuler, “The Soviet ‘Transfer’ of Jews from Chernovtsy Province to Romania,” 59-60.
identity and self-identified as Jews or (before the war) as Germans. In addition to this, most of them had lost their Romanian citizenship as a result of the Revision of Citizenship decree of 1938. Accordingly, the Jews of Chernivtsi could not be included in the summer repatriation of Romanians in 1945. In 1945, Jews themselves did not yet represent a “diaspora nationality” in the eyes of the Soviet leadership and thus could not be “repatriated” to a “home country.”

In this context, in June 1945 Khrushchev brought the situation to the attention of Molotov (the Soviet premier at the time) and Beriia (the Minister of Internal Affairs), who duly forwarded the letter of Soviet Ukraine’s leader to Stalin. In his letter Khrushchev noted the desire of many Jews of Chernivtsi to leave the country. Beriia suggested that these Jews be allowed to relinquish their Soviet citizenship and emigrate. Stalin approved this suggestion, and the resolution (No. 2026-525ss) of the Soviet government was issued on 8 August 1945. It allowed “persons of Jewish nationality who are residents of Northern Bukovina and were not Soviet citizens before 28 June 1940, according to documents presented by them” to emigrate to Romania.

Although it was just one of several similar acts of postwar “repatriations,” the resolution launched a unique Stalinist population movement campaign that, in fact, forced (given the conditions of life and local attitudes described above) a community of stateless people to leave

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63 Lichtblau, and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz.”

64 The resolution was soon mirrored in resolution # 66/2 of the Soviet of people’s commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the central committee of Ukrainian communist party of 26 February 1946, “On the evacuation from the territory of Chernovtsi province of the Ukrainian SSR to Romania of people of Jewish nationality who are residing in Northern Bukovina and were not Soviet citizens before June 28, 1940,” published in Altshuler, “The Soviet ‘Transfer’ of Jews from Chernovtsi Province to Romania,” 70-71.

65 Major original documents related to the transfer were published in full text with extensive commentaries by Mordechai Altshuler. See his work cited above. A summary of the evacuation and the full texts of several original documents are also included in the chapter “Resettlement of Jews from Northern Bukovina to Romania” in Mittel, Evrei Ukrainy, 70-85.
for Romania where Jews were hardly more welcome than in the USSR. Unlike the agreements with Poland and the earlier agreement with Romania concerning the resettlement of ethnic Romanians, the resolution of 8 August was a unilateral Soviet decision that did not take into consideration Romania’s opinion about the “transfer.” Kept in secrecy after the “transfer” was complete, the resolution openly violated the internationalist principle of Soviet nationality policy and, for the first time, openly targeted a Jewish community on the basis of its ethnicity.66

The transfer was officially branded an “evacuation” in the official resolutions and was clearly an initiative of the Ukrainian politicians, readily approved by Moscow’s ruling circle. In Ukraine, it was welcomed by Kiev as much as it was desired by local Soviet authorities who referred to it as an “eviction” or “kicking out (vydvorenie) of Jews” in secret inner NKVD/MVD and party correspondence.67 Initially coordinated directly by Moscow, the Chernivtsi evacuation campaign was eventually entrusted to local officials to expedite the process.68 Chernivtsi provincial leaders Zeleniuk and Kolikov were ordered to establish a commission to compile lists, approve preliminary appeals for emigration, and organize the process of evacuation. The commission included the deputy chairman of the executive committee of the provincial Soviet, deputy heads of the provincial NKVD and NKGB, and the deputy provincial procurator.

The registration for emigration of Jews in Chernivtsi province began in September of 1945; the actual evacuation lasted from February to April of 1946. It had two major waves: the

67 DACHo, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 61, ark. 3.
68 On 4 November 1945 the Soviet Commissariat of internal affairs transferred to the Ukrainian government the authority to make decisions on the requests to relinquish Soviet citizens and allow evacuation from Chernivtsi province; a special local commission was established during the winter of 1945-46 to expedite the process. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2619; Altshuler, “The Soviet ‘Transfer’ of Jews from Chernovtsy Province to Romania,” 62. See also original documents published by Altshuler, ibid. pp. 63-73.
first targeted primarily Transnistria survivors; the second one locals who survived the war in Chernivtsi. To transfer evacuees, by an order from Kiev, authorities provided five cargo trains. Local Jews refused, however, to board the trains, fearing a repetition of the 1941 scenario, when similar trains took local Jews (branded as the “trading element” by the NKVD) to Siberia. After the trains stood empty for several days, the evacuees were transported to the border by cars or secured their own means of transportation. This kind of transportation was not organized or even formally approved by the Soviet government on any level; it was an ad hoc solution carried out by various agents and organizations on different terms. As estimated by Mordechai Altshuler, about 22,000, or 40-45 percent, of Jews from Northern Bukovina left for Romania as a result of the entire operation. It seems that the Soviet leaders of Chernivtsi were readily giving up their frustrating prewar attempts to reconcile the existing demographic composition of the city with the Soviet Ukrainian ideology of nation-building and general class-based ideology of Soviet socialism. In the wake of the war they opted rather for creating a homogeneous urban population more compatible with Soviet belief systems.

Ideology was only one important dimension of the 1945-1946 “evacuation.” Another was the practical issue of expropriating the evacuees’ possessions. Although often impoverished and having been deprived of many of their belongings during the first Sovietization of 1940-1941, the Romanian occupation, and the second Sovietization of 1944-1945, many Jews who survived the Holocaust in the city still occupied prestigious apartments—a commodity that was

69 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23. apr. 3870, Ark. 97-98, 117. In most cases, Jewish families were paying for transportation in money or possessions. Arrangements were made with organizations or with drivers on a personal level.

becoming more and more precious with the continuous arrival of Soviet in-migrants. Special decrees of the provincial Soviet and party committee forbade departing Jews from selling or taking with them their possessions (as opposed to the evacuation of ethnic Germans in 1940, when the evacuees were able to sell their property or take a limited number of movable possessions with them).  

Managed and coordinated by local leaders, along with other tasks of immediate necessity, the evacuation became a part of the complex and rapid process of population change in the city. If Kiev leaders understood and described the campaign mostly in terms of “letting go” of the undesirable Jewish population that allegedly had insufficient loyalty to the state, Chernivtsi officials were making sure that as many Jews as possible left Chernivtsi. As the campaign was under way in 1946, all city organizations were conducting a “checking and accounting” of the unoccupied living quarters to provide the newly arrived demobilized soldiers with apartments. At the same time, the provincial party committee conducted comprehensive accounting (uchet) of employees in all urban organizations and enterprises in order to further “cleanse the organizations of class alien elements.” The accounting was performed by special commissions headed by city and district party and NKVD leaders and accompanied by closed meetings of primary party organizations that were oriented toward “disclosing and uncovering of … the elements.”

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71 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 11.

72 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, apr. 3058, ark. 44-46.

73 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2702. The operation was to be completed by April 1946, which was also the month of the completion of the mass evacuation of Jews.

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Not surprisingly, the best vacated apartments did not end up in the hands of demobilized soldiers, many of whom were indeed in need of accommodation. The evacuation of Chernivtsi Jews became a massive operation of personal enrichment of local NKVD/MVD officials and high-ranking communist leadership—the last big opportunity to indulge in the “bourgeois riches” of the town.74 Local Jews, who in most cases, did not see a future for themselves in their own city, were ready and eager to go. Some of them had now lost all hope of an eventual return to normalcy, having survived the war and the Holocaust.75 They quit jobs if they had them and sold whatever valuable possessions they had managed to keep. Until they crossed the border, though, and often even until the moment they left the territory of Romania (as most of them did within several years after the war), they were under the power of the MVD officials in charge of granting them exit documents. The officials used and abused their power as they wished, to maximize their “profit” from the operation. The MVD misdeeds in connection with the evacuation assumed such outstanding proportions that they eventually led to a special inner party investigation orchestrated by Kiev. The investigation led to the transfer and expulsion from the party of several MVD workers, while the affair itself resulted in a large-scale transfer of property from the city’s departing “old” residents to its new inhabitants as well as well-connected Soviet citizens elsewhere in the republic.

The investigation revealed that the Chernivtsi MVD was apparently under the informal control of Olga Koplan, the wife of the provincial MVD head Rudenko and a deputy head of an

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74 Note that in 1946 the NKVD was officially renamed the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), as a result of an administrative reform that abolished the people’s commissariats and established ministries. However, documents from 1946 and even 1947 often use the abbreviation “NKVD.”

75 For survivors' recollections of this period, see Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 241-42.
MVD department. Koplan was ultimately accused of corrupting the entire organization and turning the “evacuation” into her personal business. According to investigation materials, she and her sister Lidia Koplan, who headed another department of the Chernivtsi MVD, were accepting bribes from applicants for evacuation and processing them according to received compensation. They used employees of various organizations to personally move the departing families from their homes to the border. The most desirable “prey,” though, were the apartments. The Koplans, who apparently were used as scapegoats by the investigation, worked in cooperation (or, at times, in confrontation) with party and state organs to assign confiscated apartments to Soviet functionaries. At the same time, applicants for evacuation who had little to leave behind endured long waits for their approvals. Permits were regularly given out to persons who were not eligible for emigration.

Olga Koplan also made many trips to Kiev on state trucks fully loaded with furniture sets (apparently the ones her husband Mikhail Rudenko reported about earlier to Kiev authorities) and all kinds of “material evidence” collected from arrested locals. The “goods” from Chernivtsi were quickly sold or otherwise distributed in the Ukrainian capital and “different places of the Soviet Union.” A large portion of confiscated and abandoned possessions remained in Chernivtsi, though, in the apartments of its new residents, most of them well-connected party and state functionaries who had direct connections with MVD dealers or could afford buying at local bazaars where Lidia Koplan was a regular seller.77 Furniture was a

76 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 56.

77 The investigation also concerned multiple “violations of Soviet laws” in the struggle with Ukrainian nationalists: numerous cases of illegal executions, torture, and “extraordinary” methods such as disguises as OUN-UPA members to locate nationalists’ hiding places. The investigation also revealed serious violations in the use of agricultural plots assigned to the provincial MVD department (послобное хозяйство) that was meant to aid in providing employees with produce. The plots were apparently treated by Rudenko’s family as personal holdings.
highly valued acquisition. It was openly accumulated in the MVD office and the best items were
appropriated by Rudenko and the Koplan sisters. The provincial party leader Zeleniuk was well
informed about these affairs and apparently was one of the first in line to benefit from them.78
Rumour had it that Khrushchev, when he visited the city, stayed in a nice villa decorated with
the best carpets collected from all over the city.79

Chernivtsi became a “procurement centre of furniture to all ends of the Soviet Union,” to
use an expression from the inner party investigation report.80 The highest circles of the Soviet
Ukrainian leadership in Kiev were sending orders to local authorities to purchase sets of
furniture for them. The city also acquired a reputation as an escape hatch among Jewish
communities of the Soviet Union: the investigators were quoting letters sent to cities as distant
as Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan encouraging friends, families, and acquaintances to come to
Chernivtsi and “see” Koplan who was personally interested in emigrants.81 Manipulations of
personal identification and exit documents were taking place on a massive scale, due to the
mutual interests of officials and “evacuees.”82 At the same time, the evacuation, which allowed

See materials of the investigation in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870; also primary materials of investigation by
district party organization, DACHO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 585.

78 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 99-100 specifically on Zeleniuk’s continuous and close cooperation with
NKVD/MVD in terms of access to goods via the “special trade department,” illegal distribution, and exchange of
favours. Zeleniuk’s involvement in the affairs around the evacuation became one of the reasons that provoked
several anonymous denunciations to central organs of power in Kiev and a personal investigation which, however,
concluded that there were not enough compromising materials to apply strict measures to Zeleniuk. TsDAHO, f. 1,
op. 23, spr. 3746.

79 See Vernon Kres, Moia pervaia zhizn’, 130.

80 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 34, 128.

81 Quote from TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 85; on correspondence with Alma-Ata, DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr.
585, ark. 92.

82 As was acknowledged by Rudenko himself and many other party and NKVD workers, bribery was “the most
widespread form of violations” during the “transfer.” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 99.
a limited group of people—this time, MVD workers and party functionaries, including those from Kiev—to cross the border regularly, became the last opportunity for getting in touch with the outside world on a regular basis. Those Soviet urbanites who did not benefit from the evacuation in a “big way” at least used it as a shopping opportunity: they gave their orders to the Koplans who made frequent trips to Romania and brought them back high-quality coats and suits that had already become rare in Chernivtsi.83

The materials of the investigation (about 150 pages of typed text) convey a lively and disturbing picture of life in the city and the role of the MVD in the Sovietization process of Chernivtsi and the province. In an important sense, the MVD appears to represent a “perfect colonizer” of the borderland vis-à-vis “colonized” locals. As Koplan remarked during an interrogation, “here, it was not permitted to hire locals [to the NKVD].” MVD workers behaved like “little lords” and openly voiced their attitudes: they despised the locals and all too often ignored the party leadership, considering the NKVD/MVD to be the ultimate “master.” Party functionaries who had fewer opportunities to benefit from the “local situation” had to either confront the MVD openly and fear the consequences, or cooperate. Most of them, it seems, chose the latter.84 The Rudenko-Koplan family apparently set the tone of postwar power relations in the city, reaffirming the righteousness of the second Soviet annexation in the most

83 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 57, 63, 96.

84 As the subsequent investigation showed, few among the local party leadership dared to appeal to “the centre” even if they despised the “outrages” carried out by the Soviet secret police workers. Local party meetings, however, were abundant with remarks such as: “The NKVD and NKGB are occupying all the best apartments in the city; they do not fulfill the orders of the Soviet organs.” DACHo, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 490, ark. 105.
grotesque and shameless way. After arriving in Chernivtsi in spring 1940, they initially refused to move into an apartment, fearing the front line was still very close, and continued to live in the best hotel of the city, The Black Eagle. Only when the front moved far to the west did they agree to start looking for apartments. After seeing six of them, they settled on a house that was occupied by a nursery school. They had the nursery moved out and occupied the residence.

The rumours raged, but the pattern was followed regularly; those who were hesitant to use the opportunity presented by the evacuation campaign usually gave in eventually to what Koplan later called “an apartment exchange fever.” Soviet newcomers of high standing in Chernivtsi indulged in lawlessness; whoever could not get an apartment, grabbed a coat, a chair, or an accordion. One MVD worker explained: “so what? [The arrested] are enemies, and their possessions belong to the people.”

Nevertheless, categorizing the NKVD and the party leadership as collective perpetrators of violence against the locals, strong and uncontrolled in their power, would give a neatly simplified but distorted picture of the postwar urban transition in Chernivtsi. Inner party documents cited in this research, and the investigation materials in particular, reveal a great deal of doubt, confusion, fear, and human suffering among Soviet newcomers of various positions as well as among locals of different cultural and ethnic groups. By multiplying the cases of abuse and losing self-control, Soviet newcomers of high standing in Chernivtsi eventually grew more

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85 It is not clear what the ultimate consequences were of the investigation. In the Chernivtsi provincial party committee, the suggestion was made to expel Koplan from the party. I was not able to find out if this suggestion was implemented. The family was apparently transferred from Chernivtsi. Rudenko received a “severe reprimand with a note in his personal file.” Promising to “correct himself according to the indications,” Rudenko asked to be transferred “from Ukraine to a different place, perhaps… Lithuania or Latvia” because of the “stigma” he had acquired in the republic. Indeed, Rudenko acquired the reputation of a “big lord” in all of Ukraine and in Moscow. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark. 25-27; 105-6.

86 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, 108-16.
vulnerable and insecure, bound by a kind of collective responsibility for the mass violations and crimes.

Even those who had no intention of participating in the acts of expelling former urban residents and benefiting from them, became, in a way, accomplices by taking over rooms and apartments or buying used clothes, resold at the local bazaars. One wonders if the common knowledge of this fact contributed to the mutual desire of local Jews and the new urban residents to part company as soon as possible. The former could not help but feel insecure and unwelcomed as a group while the latter had reasons to sense the discomfort of guilt if only by association with the growing and very diversified army of newcomers. The entire Soviet population of Chernivtsi took part in “kicking out” the entire population of local Jews who, for their part, did feel that on the whole the best solution for them in the given situation was to use the opportunity and leave. As Paul Celan allegedly said to his friend, “[t]he main thing [was] to get away from here… [w]here one ends up is irrelevant, so long as there’s freedom there.”

Individual cases that did not fit into this paradigm could not change the general mood in the city. In one case, Soviet officers were waiting patiently as a Jewish family was loading an arranged truck at dawn to move into their apartment as soon as the last suitcase was moved out. The family happened to be leaving elderly parents behind, and the desperate Jewish man asked the Soviet officer to take care of his parents. He probably knew that the officer could easily have the parents kicked out of the apartment, but the officer in fact did share the apartment with the

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87 Celan continued, referring to the ultimate failure of Czernowitz Jews to preserve their cherished Jewish-German civilization in Eastern Europe: “How would it be, for instance, to arrive to Jerusalem, to go to Martin Buber and to say to him: ‘Uncle Buber, here I am, here you have me’” (Celan quoted in Hirsh and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 244). Celan was referring to the common prewar rejection of political Zionism and of ethnicity-based Jewish identity by educated Jews in Chernivtsi, acknowledging the virtual impossibility of his German-Jewish identity in the postwar world.
elderly couple and helped them until they left in the next wave of emigration eight months later. In other cases Soviet officers whispered advice to the evacuees to leave Romania as soon as possible for “[Soviet power] will soon be there too.” Watching their possessions being distributed among Soviet personnel, fearing arrests and interrogation on their way which could radically change their route from westward to eastward, and often feeling guilty leaving their families and friends behind, even if temporarily—for one had to take one’s chance—most local Jews were leaving in a state of terror, even if they were not necessarily terrorized personally or even if they had developed a human connection with some Soviet newcomers. Even those who initially decided to remain in the city often eventually gave in to the situation.

Some Jewish professionals were not to be issued exit permits if they were classified as “especially valuable specialists” “without whom the city could not function.” The city was not yet ready to function without its Jewish elite—ironically—again, as during the deportations to Transnistria. This time, however, professional credentials and experience became an obstacle rather than an advantage in the eyes of many Jews. In the frantic “fever” to receive the best apartments and furniture, party and NKVD officials were “providing” exit permits to these specialists, disregarding possible consequences. Such cases eventually attracted Kiev’s attention to Chernivtsi and triggered an investigation. On several occasions, NKVD/MVD and party authorities drove to Romania, chased down evacuees, and returned them to the city forcibly to avoid serious reprimands from Kiev. In most cases, these were medical doctors, such as the lung specialist Dr. Ginsburg who was essential for the work of the Chernivtsi tuberculosis

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88 For several personal accounts about the evacuation, see Hirsh and Spitzer, *Ghosts of Home*, 248-53.

89 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2870, ark.124-25.
hospital and who had distinguished himself as a military doctor during the war. The doctor had been essentially forced out of his apartment by a party functionary who liked his residence and obtained a permit for the Ginsburgs from Koplan. Although brought back to Chernivtsi by the NKVD, Ginsburg eventually did emigrate, despite his initial apparent desire to remain in the USSR.  

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90 Ibid., ark.10.
With very few exceptions, there was no way for the local Jews of Chernivtsi to remain at home in 1945-1946. In the wake of the horrifying destruction of European Jews, rather than celebrating the unique case of such a spectacular mass survival in Chernivtsi, the local Soviet government chose to complete the process of “cleansing” this city of its Jews—a process launched by the Soviet government itself in 1941, and continued on a terrifying scale and in the most violent manner by the Germans, the Romanian authorities, and the local Ukrainian and Romanian nationalist leaders. After the local experience of “national purification” in 1941-1944 and in conditions of widespread popular antisemitism and vigorously propagated hatred of all things German, the prospect of assimilating and Sovietizing the local German-speaking Jewish community, which had still been a feasible option in 1940, was out of question for the Soviet government in 1945. By virtue of being local, Jewish, and German-speakers, these people bore an irremovable stigma of being alien and untrustworthy in the eyes of Soviet officials. A party functionary in Stalin district summarized an emotion common among local authorities when he remarked in 1945: “the local people proved that earlier they were hiding their true faces under masks and now they revealed themselves… Please remember that those who will stay will undoubtedly remain in their souls the people who can be easily used by the enemies…” 91 It was clearly in the interest of the “Soviet power,” embodied in functionaries like the one quoted above, to remove as many of these unreliable locals as possible from the urban space under their rule.

Although ultimately approved and supported by Kiev and Moscow, the final ethnic “purge” of Chernivtsi was a local initiative; it was a solution proposed by local Soviet

91 DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 490, ark. 65.
authorities challenged with the practical and ideological tasks of building Ukrainian Socialism (and their personal lives) in the German-Jewish city. The usage of the universal campaign of labour mobilization to get rid of Jewish survivors failed as an inefficient, compromising, and thus “politically harmful” tool: the alleged mass avoidance among Chernivtsi Jews of mobilization to military and labour fronts became widely known in Ukraine and perceived by the authorities as one of the reasons for growing antisemitism in the republic.92 The intervention of Kiev officials ensured a more effective solution to the “Jewish question” in Chernivtsi—their “transfer.”

Although voluntary to a certain degree, the evacuation was a violent operation in which the evacuees in most cases had few or no choices and were subject to the arbitrary power of local MVD “lords” backed up by the official ethos and repressive machinery of the abusive authoritarian state. It was another efficient mass resettlement campaign taking place in the context of postwar ethnic cleansing (directed most often against ethnic Germans). At the same time, it was one of the many revelations of antisemitism in postwar East Central Europe.93 The Chernivtsi “transfer” was particularly ironic because it targeted a large local community as bearers of German culture and Jewish nationality, at the same time. As such, the “transfer” was only successful in one of its goals: removing the remnants of prewar German-language culture from the city. For at least one decade after (and, to a lesser extent, for even longer) the city was destined to remain one of the most “Jewish” urban centres of Soviet Ukraine.


93 On postwar antisemitism, see for example Jan Tomasz Gross, Fear: Antisemitism in Poland after Auschwitz; an Essay in Historical Interpretation (New York: Random House, 2006).
Chapter Seven

Jewish and Ukrainian: Postwar Stalinist Chernivtsi, 1945-1953

World War II resulted in unprecedented human and material loss, trauma, and destruction. Its impact was reinforced and prolonged by the meanings that the perceptions and memories of the war were taking on as time passed. The war came to represent a dividing line in Soviet history, infusing the Soviet state-building project with a new significance and replacing, in many ways, the revolution of 1917 as the foundation of Soviet historical myth. The official interpretation of the memory of the war would become, with time, sacred and strictly delineated as the central pillar of the collective Soviet historical consciousness. After all, every Soviet family was touched by the war in one way or another. At the same time, the experience of war, as diverse as it was for the millions of Soviet citizens, changed their lives in many ways that cannot be easily generalized. For the Soviet territories subject to direct occupation, the wartime experience of extreme brutality was intensified by radicalized memories of multiple wars between ethnic groups, races, religions, classes, and political affiliations.

As a whole, World War II marked the beginning of a new phase in the Soviet epoch. One important part of this change was the lasting transformation the war brought to places like Chernivtsi that were included in the Soviet geopolicy between 1939 and 1945. The war prompted the ultimate shift of Soviet nationality policy from an emphasis on internationalism to the promotion of national identities. The notion of “nationality” became essentialized and highly


symbolized in the official cultural system. Ukrainians occupied one of the highest levels in the postwar Soviet hierarchy of nationalities, which allowed for the development of a strong state-promoted Ukrainian national identity in the Ukrainian Republic.3

Although the prewar Jewish community of Chernivtsi had for the most part left by 1947, the city acquired, all the same, a reputation as an important Jewish centre. By the time of the first postwar Soviet census in 1959, Chernivtsi was the most Jewish among Ukrainian provincial centres: at least 20 percent of its population was Jewish, with a high probability that this percentage was significantly larger. By way of comparison, the next largest Jewish community (in relative terms) lived in Odessa (at least 15 percent) and in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev (15 percent).4 It was not an easy fate to be a centre of Jewish life in the postwar Soviet Union, especially for a city that had been recently proclaimed an historic Ukrainian urban centre and was, in fact, a Ukrainian city in the making.

The universal essentialization and radicalization of the Soviet understanding of nationality had a special meaning for Jews. Following the rise of Nazism, and especially after the Holocaust, a significant number of Soviet Jews responded to the wartime branding of an inescapable biological ethnicity by self-identifying in ethnic terms. After the war, the further ethnicization of the Soviet state and the nationalization of ethnic Jews seem to have reinforced

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4 The first postwar Soviet census of 1959 provided virtually no information about cities and towns in the USSR other than republican capitals and cities with special status. Therefore, the number of Jews living in Chernivtsi can only be estimated. According to Ivor. I. Millman, Chernivtsi had between 30,000 and 40,000 Jews in the late 1950s, while its total population, according to the census, was 146,000. These numbers, of course, do not account for Jews who preferred to identify as Russians or Ukrainians. On estimations of Jewish urban populations in Ukraine according to the census of 1959, Ivor I. Millman, “Major Centres of Jewish Population in the USSR and a Note on the 1970 Census,” Soviet Jewish Affairs 1.1 (1971): 13-18.
each other, making the relationships between Soviet Jews and the Soviet government (in its national incarnations) increasingly tense. The contradictions between the post-Holocaust Jewish collective trauma and the official Soviet interpretation of the wartime loss in terms of universal suffering; the creation of the state of Israel which in effect turned Soviet Jews into a “diaspora nationality” suspected of double loyalties; and the complex interplays of popular and official revelations of antisemitism—all of these elements blended into Stalin’s anti-Jewish campaign. The campaign would reach its apogee during the violent “Doctors’ Plot” in the early 1950s.  

1. The Jewish City: Religion, Accommodation, and Everyday Life

A special concern of Ukrainian authorities about the Jewish presence and influence in Chernivtsi can be read between the lines of many Soviet documents, particularly those of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Soviet government (Sovet po delam religioznykh kul'tov pri Sovnarkome SSSR v Ukrainskoi SSR; hereafter, CRA). In 1945-1946, the Ukrainian republic had 59 registered active synagogues; 24 of them were located in Chernivtsi province; 19 of these were in the city of Chernivtsi. By 1947, the number of urban synagogues in the city of Chernivtsi was reduced to 11. This quantity was still characterized as “exceptional density” by the Ukrainian leader of the CRA, Vil’khovyi: in the only other Ukrainian province with a high

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number of Jewish communities, Zakarpattia province, only one synagogue was located in the provincial centre, Uzhhorod. The number of registered Jewish communities in Chernivtsi province was reduced to 12 in 1948 and gradually to 5 by 1953; both numbers were the highest in Ukraine for their respective years. (In 1953, Zhytomyr province also had 5 registered communities.) The number of synagogues in the city proper was the highest in the USSR in the 1940s.

The high concentration of Jewish religious institutions in Chernivtsi troubled Kiev authorities as a sign of widespread religious (that is, backward and harmful) beliefs among its Jewish population and a network susceptible to potential Zionist propaganda. In addition, one of the biggest concerns, it seems, was that Jewish communities grouped around synagogues and illegal (non-registered and home-based) prayer houses in fact created an alternative network of social institutions parallel to the official Soviet ones. This network managed to carry on the traditional social life of Jewish communities (even if most of their members arrived in Chernivtsi after the war). The “Jewish network” also created a new phenomenon in the unique postwar and post-Holocaust conditions. Jewish communities played a major role in providing material relief to the Holocaust survivors, often distributing aid received from international Jewish organizations; they also apparently used their unofficial networks and connections to

7 Ibid, 225, 243; also the reports of the CRA representative in Chernivtsi, DACHO, f. 623, op. 2, spr. 58. According to Mordechai Altshuler, Chernivtsi had 12 synagogues at the time. The confusion in the reports is typical for the time; the authorities were also constantly working on reducing the number of registered synagogues so there could be 12 synagogues at some point in 1947 and 11 later. Altshuler, “The Story of Publication of a Jewish Calendar:” 89.

8 Altshuler, “The Story of Publication of a Jewish Calendar”: 89.

9 On similar processes in pre-war Soviet Union, and Jewish perceptions of Soviet nationality policies, see Shternshis, Soviet and Kosher.

10 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1640, ark. 176-180.
provide assistance in employment, housing, and education. Such “practical activities” were often accompanied by “speaking Bolshevik” to establish official association with the regime.

In one case, a representative of a Jewish religious committee in Chernivtsi requested that the local communist authorities grant additional days off to “the workers of Jewish nationality” on religious holidays. The appeal ended with a thankful prayer for the Soviet victory over Hitler and a long blessing for “the genius leader of our Mighty Motherland, Generalissimo and Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade I. V. Stalin.” A prayer for Stalin and Malenkov was included in regular religious services in local synagogues at least until 1953. Moreover, by utilizing traditional mutual aid tools, Jews were, in a way, challenging the Soviet denial of their special wartime suffering by organizing social support specific to Jewish survivors and locating it within the mainstream Soviet discourse. Soviet authorities found this fact particularly frustrating in the context of postwar scarcity and frequent failures of the Soviet social system to provide even the sector of the population most privileged (officially) by the state—the demobilized soldiers—with adequate support. At the same time, Jewish communities often attempted to voice their dissent from the official Soviet interpretation of the war. Reports of the CRA mentioned that the mass graves of civilians killed by Nazis were allegedly used for “Jewish nationalist ends…” and that Jewish communities “dared to claim that those are the

11 DAChO, f.623, op. 2, sp.4, ark.13.

12 The text of the prayer was on file in the local representative of CRA, DAChO, f. 623, op. 2, spr. 60, ark. 30-31.

13 For example, see documents published in Kilimnik et al, Kommunisticheskaia vlast' protiv Religii Moiseia, 171, 182, 186.

14 On the challenges in the work of Soviet social welfare (sotsialnoie obespechenie) in Chernivtsi, see, for example, DAChO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 981, ark. 192-193 (data from 1947).
graves of Jewish people killed by Nazis (although they know for sure that the graves contain all kinds of Soviet citizens)!”

In the eyes of Soviet officials, the special danger of Chernivtsi came not only from the fact that it had a large local Jewish population. The “evacuation” of 1946, after all, did reduce the numbers of Jews in Chernivtsi province by some 22,000; it had practically cleared the city centre of its prewar Jewish inhabitants. What worried Soviet specialists in religious affairs in Kiev was the fact that Chernivtsi attracted Jews from other regions of the USSR, primarily neighbouring Moldavia and Ukraine itself. It was estimated that about 40,000 Jews lived in the city in 1947. Whether it was due to the widespread reputation of the city as a centre of Jewish life, a traditional appeal of Chernivtsi to the Jews of Bessarabia, or simply opportunities for housing and employment so scarce in many other cities and often denied to Jews returning to Ukraine, the space vacated by Chernivtsi Jewish evacuees was occupied, to the disappointment of local authorities, not by Ukrainians or Russians but Jews, this time Soviet.

Postwar Jewish newcomers to Chernivtsi established various relations with the remaining local communities, cooperative in some cases and competitive, or even hostile, in others. Personal accounts indicate that Jewish newcomers, Yiddish- and Russian-speaking, often felt alienated from the resident local German-speaking Jews, calling them “deutschmerish,” while locals often displayed pejorative attitudes toward newcomers, Jews and non-Jews alike. The pride of their upper standing and high culture and even arrogant attitudes toward Jews from

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15 The reference is general for the Ukrainian republic; it is not clear how many such claims were made in Chernivtsi. Kilimnik et al, Kommunisticheskaia vlast’ protiv Religii Moiseia, 181.

surrounding areas had been traditionally common among Jews of prewar Czernowitz. It has been argued that the postwar ethnicization of Soviet Jews was caused, among other factors, by the impact of Soviet Jewry’s encounter with the Jewish communities in the areas annexed in 1939-1940, which had maintained traditional religious, national, and political institutions. Such encounters between local and newcomer Jews certainly played an important role in attracting Soviet Jews to Bukovina and their consequent self-perception. In the case of Chernivtsi, however, which had lost a significant part of its original, prewar Jewish population by the late 1940s, it seems that what Pinkus and Frankel call “links with the past otherwise lost” was provided by the myth of Chernivtsi as a “Jewish space” with an existing physical “infrastructure” of Jewish life (such as numerous synagogues, religious artifacts, and its historic Jewish cemetery) rather than the contacts with a living local Jewish community per se.

Together or apart, Jewish leaders of local and other origins were “persistent in [their] attempts to get the Jewish cemetery under their direction,” organize paid concerts in synagogues, paying special attention to the creation of the funds “to support the poor” in the communities, as well as organize commercial activities. This was one of the reasons that the Kiev authorities were working hard to reduce the number of active synagogues in Chernivtsi. They repeatedly ordered local representatives of the CRA in Chernivtsi to “meticulously analyze and study the activities of the communities, quantitative characteristics of true believers, how many city natives and newcomers from the eastern oblasts of the USSR [were] among them, the

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17 See Loiev, *Ukradennaia muza*, 124-127; memoirs about prewar Chernivtsi cited earlier in this work. Such attitudes were also mentioned during my conversations with Natalia Shevchenko (Chernivtsi, 2008), Marianne Hirsch (Dartmouth College, USA, 2010), Eleonora Solovei (Kiev, 2008). For a party discussion about mutual alienation between locals and newcomers in Stalin districts, DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 490, ark. 105.


19 From a report by the head of the Ukrainian department of the CRA Vil’khovy, TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4555, srk. 317-31.
territorial remoteness between the communities, large size of the synagogues etc.”20 Their practical goal, on the republican and all-union level, was to separate Jewish religion from Jewish (Soviet) life; to “cut short all the elements of non-religious activities in the communities, and try to ‘close’ their activities in the synagogue (zamknut’ na sinagoge), not allowing any manifestations outside it…” It was even suggested that the executive organs of the religious communities needed to change the text of their “round stamps” from “Jewish religious community” to “religious community of Judaic denomination.” The head of the Ukrainian department of the CRA Vil’khovyi suggested that it would be reasonable to establish such a designation for all the communities of Jewish religion in the USSR.21

Chernivtsi with its “high density” of Jewish communities demonstrated to Soviet officials that their work with the “Judaic religion” was exceptionally challenging. Jewish religion, ethnicity, and daily life were inseparable for many residents of Soviet Chernivtsi. The daily life of Chernivtsi residents, Jewish or not, came to be strongly influenced by Jewish traditions as well as anti-Jewish prejudice. Celebrating Bar Mitzvahs was routine, and local shops produced standard and custom-made invitations for children’s “13th birthdays.”22 As opposed to the prewar Chernivtsi, characterized by religious and ethnic tolerance but also a high degree of cultural autonomy of every ethnic community, Soviet Chernivtsi’s postwar overcrowded communal apartments and backyards housed people of any religion and prior

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20 Quote from Kilimnik et al, Kommunisticheskaia vlast’ protiv Religii Moiseia, 176 (from 1947); similar orders were given regularly to Chernivtsi representatives of the CRA. See DACHO, f. 623, op. 2, spr. 3; ark. 28, 34 (1945); f. 623, op. 2, spr. 8 (1946); f. 623, op. 2, spr. 23, ark. 1-2, 4-8, 10-14 (1948). In 1952, for example, a document from the CRA regarding “nationalist activities” in one of the three remaining urban synagogues clearly pointed to worries about the attractiveness of Chernivtsi to Jewish in-migrants. Kilimnik et al, Kommunisticheskaia vlast’ protiv Religii Moiseia, 246.

21 Ibid., 177-78.

22 Invitations can be found in the personal archive of Eleonora Solovei; copied in 2008.
social status, often bringing non-Jewish neighbours and friends close to the traditional rituals and celebrations that would have been limited to co-religionists in a more traditional society. While developing close relations with their Jewish co-residents and neighbours, non-Jewish urbanites in postwar Soviet Chernivtsi were also susceptible to antisemitic prejudice: small children often grew up terrified by the fear of being caught for “Jewish traditional slaughter” as they were playing with their Jewish classmates and neighbours every day.  

In 1947, in a case that later became notorious in both Kiev and Moscow governing circles, a local religious leader, Pecheniuk, who claimed to have arrived in Chernivtsi from Zaporizhzhia province specifically “to lead the Jewish religious movement,” succeeded in obtaining permission from the local representative of the CRA Burkin to publish a Jewish calendar. Jewish calendars, which had traditionally been important annual communal and religious publications, had been banned in the USSR since the early 1930s. Burkin, who developed close relations with Pecheniuk, permitted the publication of the calendar in a local state publishing house. As a result, the calendar was not only distributed among Chernivtsi Jews but also shipped to several other provinces, eventually leading to serious reprimands for Burkin who ended up confiscating the copies he could locate.  

In 1951, the head of Ukraine’s CRA Vil’khovyi reported to his boss in Moscow that the most gross violations of working discipline during the days of Jewish holidays were noted in Chernivtsi…. On October 10th, the city planning commission held a work attendance check-up…

It was established that 33 repair and service shops were closed completely, and in 50 other shops

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23 From the recollections of Eleonora Solovei, who spent her childhood and teenage years in postwar Chernivtsi, shared in a conversation in 2008 (Kiev).

24 For more on the case, see Altshuler, “The Story of Publication of a Jewish Calendar in Chernovtsy.”
attendance was partial and . . . the majority of the workers came dressed-up and frittered their time away… This issue was discussed at the bureau of the Chernivtsi provincial party committee.  

When in 1952 state and cooperative organizations refused to sign a contract to bake matzoth (apparently upon an order from local party leadership), an influential Chernivtsi rabbi declared to the commissioner of religious affairs: “Well, if the artel’ does not sign a contract because they need to fulfill their production plan, let the believers bake matzoth at home; there is no violation of the religious ritual in this action, and the believers are not going to suffer from this.”

Why did local authorities in Chernivtsi tolerate violations of Soviet policies and often develop close relations with Jewish community leaders—a phenomenon Altshuler called “the vagaries of the provincial Soviet bureaucracy far from Moscow”?

It seems that a combination of factors contributed to the atmosphere—unusual for Soviet Ukraine—of urban life that developed in postwar Chernivtsi. One such factor was the “live and let live” attitude adopted by various parties and communities of the city: after all, ideology and politics aside, practical opportunities created by the “illegal activities” of the local Jewish communities were just as interesting to the Jews as they were to the wider urban population and the authorities at various levels. It seems that in postwar Chernivtsi, both power abuse and mutual arrangements were common. For example, a letter sent in January of 1946 by a displaced person living in a camp in Germany to a New York-based Jewish annual journal, noted: “I know personally that aid parcels

25 Kilimnik et al, Kommunisticheskaia vlast’ protiv Religii Moiseia, 221.
26 Ibid., 229.
27 Altshuler, “The Story of Publication of a Jewish Calendar in Chernovtsy:” 89.
with American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee stickers were distributed among the functionaries of the [Chernivtsi] provincial and city party committees, who, due to their unlimited greed, took more than 50 meters of fabric. The Jews learned about it only when the fabric [with Joint stickers] appeared on black market and at tailors’ shops...”

Even when the aid received by local Jews was redistributed by more common and fair means—through trade and exchange—it was often to the benefit of all sides in a postwar Soviet city characterized by scarcity and widespread poverty, on the one hand, and the rampant opportunism of Soviet authorities, on the other.

2. The Ukrainian State Jewish Theatre and Soviet Jewish Culture in Chernivtsi

The Jewish character of Chernivtsi and its active grassroots Jewish life, already perplexing to local and central Ukrainian authorities, was strengthened even more in 1945 by the transfer of the Ukrainian state Jewish theatre (Ukrainskii gosudarstvennyi ievreiskii teatr, widely known by the abbreviation Ukrainian GOSET). A network of Jewish state theatres had been established in many centres of Jewish culture in the USSR prior to the war. Ukraine had several Jewish theatres, the largest and most prominent of them being the All-Ukrainian State Jewish theatre, created in 1925 in the then Ukrainian capital Kharkiv, and after the transfer of the capital to Kiev in 1934, merged with the Kiev state Jewish theatre. During the war, the theatre was evacuated from Kiev to the Soviet interior.

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28 A letter from Joint archives quoted in Mittsel’, Evrei Ukrainy, 66-67.

29 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, clandestine trade, exchange, nepotism, and bribery were endemic in postwar Chernivtsi. See also Hirsch and Spitzer, Ghosts of Home, 238-40. A Jewish survivor of Auschwitz who passed through a temporary repatriates’ camp in Chernivtsi in 1944 also attested to the important meaning of local bazaars for the survival of locals, newcomers, and transients in Chernivtsi. Môses, Staying Human through the Holocaust, 321-34.
When the war ended, the GOSET’s leaders began their long fight for the right to return home. Khrushchev and his subordinates in the Ukrainian government were not delighted with the prospect of the return of the Jewish evacuees and survivors to Ukraine; the return of the state Jewish theatre with its potential of promoting Jewish culture in what had become a much more homogeneous Ukrainian capital appealed to the Ukrainian leader even less. At a time when antisemitism was widespread but still only “quasi-official” in the Soviet Union, the theatre had to be preserved.\(^30\) Using the pretext of heavy destruction in Kiev and the availability of a vacant theatrical building in Chernivtsi, the All-Ukrainian GOSET was moved to the latter. Chernivtsi became the home of the theatre’s final stage between 1945 and 1950.\(^31\)

The theatrical group arrived in the city quietly, with little media coverage, and was located in the building of a former cinema “Scala,” previously assigned to a planned Russian musical theatre that was never created in the city. Local officials were challenged with the additional task of providing the actors with accommodations in Chernivtsi. However, when the theatre opened its season in March of 1945, it was met with a warm reception from locals. Together with the Chernivtsi Ukrainian Drama theatre, which also returned from the evacuation and reoccupied its previous location, the former city opera, the Jewish theatre set high standards for local cultural developments. Before long, Chernivtsi housed a large group of Jewish writers, journalists, and other cultural workers. For a short period of about five years, Chernivtsi became an important centre of Soviet Jewish high culture in Ukraine, enjoying the remoteness from the vigilant eyes of Kiev authorities who were eager to respond to the ever-louder “signals” of Moscow’s anti-Jewish campaign. Some of the Jewish activists and cultural workers moved to


\(^{31}\) DACHO, f. 133, op. 1, ark. 2; Mittel, *Evrei Ukrainy*, 29.
the city permanently; others visited Chernivtsi frequently. They organized literary events, concerts, and meetings, most held on the stage of the GOSET, and others organized in the more intimate atmosphere of private parties.\textsuperscript{32} 

Chernivtsi had its own special correspondent on the Yiddish newspaper \textit{Eynikeyt}, Hirsch Bloshtein, who was a well-known Jewish Soviet writer.\textsuperscript{33} The city also became the temporary home of Naftali-Serf Kon, a native of Bukovina and a Jewish writer and Soviet activist.\textsuperscript{34} Another local talent who grew famous in Ukraine and the USSR was Haim Melamud, a Soviet Jewish writer who wrote “Bukovinian novel,” an anti-Zionist novel in Yiddish (also published in the author’s Russian translation), which presented a simplified picture of the prewar coexistence of Jews and Ukrainians in Bukovina and the Romanian deportations to Transnistria.\textsuperscript{35} Many Jewish cultural activists demobilized from the Red Army found themselves in Chernivtsi after their former Kiev-based employers such as the newspapers \textit{Der Stern} and \textit{Junge Gvardie} were liquidated.\textsuperscript{36} Moscow-based Peretz Markish, one of the most famous Soviet Jewish writers whose works were often staged by the GOSET, and who would be among the 13 Jewish intellectuals executed in 1952, was a frequent visitor in the city.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{32} See Loiev, \textit{Ukradennaia muza}. 

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 161. 


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Der Stern} was temporarily re-opened in 1947. \textit{Z arkhiviv VUCHK, HPU, NKVD, KHB (Special issue)} 3-4 (8-9) (1998): 246.

\textsuperscript{37} Loiev, \textit{Ukradennaia muza}, 167-69.
Once again, several years after the Holocaust, Jewish culture and social life were blooming in the city. This time, however, the centre-stage belonged to a culture different from the one cherished by prewar Czernowitzers: it was a Yiddish-language culture, often in Russian translation. Thanks to numerous postwar Jewish newcomers who often originated from neighbouring rural regions, this culture found a receptive audience in the city.

Chernivtsi’s “Jewish renaissance” of the late 1940s honoured Jewish geniuses who contributed to this culture, including local Yiddishists. Numerous literary anniversaries and cultural events, while promoting Jewish culture, ironically helped to erase the memory of the particular urban culture of acculturated German-speaking Jews, replacing it with a perceptibly strong Yiddish tradition in the city.38 This Soviet Jewish culture was, for the most part, accessible to non-Jewish audiences: some theatrical plays were staged in Russian and Ukrainian translation, while artistic exhibits and musical performances—unencumbered by language restrictions—were popular in the city. Jewish musicians, only a few of them lucky enough to be employed in the short-lived Chernivtsi symphony orchestra, had their unofficial job centre in one of the city’s central squares and were hired regularly for all kinds of occasions celebrated in the city.39

Iliya Ehrenburg—one of the few Jewish writers who retained their positions as “establishment writers” by assuming, officially, the position of safeguarding the alleged absence of antisemitism and discrimination against Jewish culture in the USSR—knew about the special situation in Chernivtsi. When asked about the status of Yiddish culture in the country during a press conference in London in 1950, Ehrenburg said:

38 On the anniversaries of Yiddish classical writers, ibid., 173.

39 On Jewish artists and musicians in Chernivtsi, ibid., 182-83.

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[After the Nazi destruction of the majority of the large Jewish centres in the Soviet Union], a great part of the Jewish youth, scattered throughout the Soviet Union, has changed in character. This change, which occurred entirely by a social process without any outside force or imposition, consists of linguistic and cultural integration into national life generally. But in those places where large Jewish communities remain, as in Chernovtsy, an energetic Jewish cultural life continues. Yiddish is spoken, Jewish cultural life continues, etc. 40

Another Soviet establishment writer, Konstantin Simonov, represented postwar Chernivtsi in his memoirs as a significant centre of Jewish life largely destroyed by the war. The picture of the city he drew is that of a typical Ukrainian-Jewish town that had survived German occupation, with no references to the unusual circumstances of the Romanian occupation, German urban culture, or the unusually large postwar Jewish population in the city. 41 It is unclear whether Simonov knowingly misrepresented the reality of postwar Chernivtsi or the city really appeared to him as a characteristic Jewish Ukrainian town devastated by the war.

A personality that became phenomenal and even symbolic of Soviet Jewish cultural life in Chernivtsi was the performer and singer Sidi Tal’. The actress (her real name was Sora Birkenthal) was local to Chernivtsi only in part. She was born and spent her childhood in the “lower town” of Czernowitz that would later become the place of the Cernauți ghetto. However, as a teenager, the talented singer joined mobile amateur theatrical groups and spent her youth traveling all over Romania, working periodically in Bucharest and Iași theatres. During a guest performance in her home city, Sidi Tal’ met her future husband and lifetime manager Pinkus Falik, but declined his offer to join the local Jewish theatre. She was not a proud Czernowitzer,

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apparently; most probably, she associated the city with her poverty-ridden childhood. Her capital was Bucharest, where she returned with her new husband to continue her successful career. She moved back to Chernivtsi only in 1938, when antisemitism had made her life in Bucharest unbearable.

As soon as Chernivtsi was annexed to Ukraine in 1940, she and Falik moved to the Soviet Moldavian capital Kishinev, where they worked at the state philharmonic society. Evacuated to the Soviet east during the war, Sidi Tal’ and Falik organized a Jewish mobile performing brigade and gave more than a thousand concerts for Red Army front detachments during the war. It was only in 1946, in the conditions of growing antisemitism in Ukraine and the USSR in general, that Falik and Sidi Tal’ returned to Chernivtsi. Their “variety performance ensemble” joined the Chernivtsi philharmonic society, where they worked for several decades until Sidi Tal’s death in 1983. Praised highly by the leader and symbol of Soviet Jewish culture, Solomon Mokhoels, the actress’s performances achieved tremendous popularity among Chernivtsi audiences, regardless of nationality; she also became well known among Jews all over the Soviet Union. While the GOSET worked in the city, Sidi Tal’ cooperated with it and took part in several plays, adding to the vibrant “Jewish renaissance” in the city.42

3. **The Demise of the Chernivtsi Jewish Cultural Centre**

The year 1948 brought important changes to Soviet Jewish life. After the murder of Solomon Mikhoels, in January of 1948, organized by Stalin and his close associates, the attack on Jewish culture and its leaders was escalating in the USSR. The creation of Israel in May of

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1948 brought excitement to many Jewish communities, who were confused by the initial support Stalin gave to the emerging Jewish state. Festive services were held in several synagogues in Ukraine to celebrate the creation of the Jewish state. Some of the biggest ones took place in Chernivtsi, organized by the same Pecheniuk who stood behind the publication of the Jewish calendar in 1947. Traditionally, the congregation sent a telegram of greeting to Stalin, blessing him as the saviour of Jewish people. However, the hostile Soviet position toward Israel was made clear very soon, and from early fall of 1948, arrests of “Zionists” and “Jewish nationalists” began. From 1948 on, a quasi-official Soviet antisemitism became official state policy.

If the war made it possible, and probably unavoidable, for many Jews in the USSR to consider themselves first and foremost “Jewish by nationality” rather than Russians or Soviet citizens, the postwar escalation of ethnic-based Soviet patriotism and the strong feelings of collective victimization of the survivors turned many members of the Soviet intelligentsia into proud ethnic Jews. After the creation of Israel turned the Jews into a potentially dangerous diaspora nationality in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, the large presence of ethnic Jews among the Soviet intelligentsia became very problematic. The murder of Solomon Mikhoels marked a symbolic turn in the Soviet official attitude toward the Jews: for the first time, Jews were attacked on the basis of their ethnicity. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow was liquidated and its leaders—the elite of Soviet Jewish culture—arrested. Most of them (13 in total) would consequently be executed in 1952. The official language of the repressive campaign


44 See Mittsel,’ Evrei Ukrainy, 231-39.

was that of the struggle with “rootless cosmopolitans” (used as an antipode of “Soviet patriots”) among the cultural and intellectual activists and professionals. As a result of this open campaign against Jewish culture and the cultural elite, many loyal and patriotic Soviet Jews—also for the first time—doubted their faith in the Soviet project.\(^{46}\) The developments in Chernivtsi attest to such transformations in Soviet nationality policy and in the popular identifications of Soviet Jews.

The Ukrainian MGB had much work to do in Chernivtsi, “watching” its active Jewish cultural elite in preparation for arrests. Regular MGB reports to Ukraine’s highest party authorities described “reactions of the Jewish population” of the city to various “disclosures” of “anti-party groups of cosmopolitans,” a euphemism for “Jewish intellectuals.” Internal MGB reports used more straightforward language to describe the victims of arrests and investigations: “Jewish nationalists.” To the Jewish public, the reports triggered fear and frustration, and opened their eyes to the anti-Jewish nature of the “anti-cosmopolitan campaign.” Jews in Chernivtsi were reported speaking about a radical turn in Soviet nationality policy.\(^{47}\) As an important centre of Jewish culture, the All-Ukrainian GOSET required the special attention of the MGB. In preparation for the closing of the GOSET, special reports declared that the theatre was losing popularity and had a “difficult financial situation,” while its director and actors were accused of Jewish nationalism.\(^{48}\)

\(^{46}\) On the transformation of Soviet policies regarding Jewish culture and and the Jewish responses to it, Slezkine, *Jewish Century*, 295-310.


\(^{48}\) Ibid., 69-71.
Arrests of Jewish intellectual and cultural workers followed, and the MGB in Ukraine fabricated cases of so-called “Kiev” and “Chernivtsi” groups of Jewish writers accused of anti-Soviet Zionist activities allegedly under the guidance of the now disbanded JAC in Moscow. Along with state treason, Jewish intellectuals (many of whom lived in or frequently visited Chernivtsi) were accused of the “artificial cultivation of Jewish culture in Ukraine.”

Fabricated MGB interrogations placed the GOSET in Chernivtsi at the centre of the activities of the “Chernivtsi group” which was said to have strong ties with the Kiev centre of the “network.” The GOSET’s director Goldblat was accused of extreme Jewish nationalism and presented as the major “connection” between Moscow-based and Ukrainian Jewish nationalists. The fact that his theatre, located on “Ukrainian soil,” had not a single Ukrainian play in its repertoire, was proclaimed outrageous (in spite of the fact that the theatre worked literally across the street from its bigger and better supported neighbour, the Ukrainian drama theatre).

Eynikeyt’s Chernivtsi correspondent Hirsch Bloshtein was accused of supplying Jewish nationalists in Kiev with information about the “alleged role of Jews in the economy of Bukovina” to be further transmitted for publication in the US. The “Chernivtsi group” was also accused of supporting a local Jewish secondary school—the only one remaining in the city—and agitating for Jews to send their children there. The theatre, according to the MGB


50 According to the fabricated story, the Kiev Jewish nationalism centre was coordinated from the office of Jewish culture (Kabinet Evreistikoi kul’tury) while the Chernivtsi centre was located in the theatre. Ibid; “Zhaloba ot zakluchennoego Zabary Natana Illicha,” Z arkhiviv VUCHK, HPU, NKVD, KHB (Special issue) 3-4 (8-9) (1998): 244. Interrogations and sentences were later reviewed in the 1950s, resulting in the rehabilitation of many convicted persons, some of them posthumously. Re-evaluation of the investigations and acquisitions established their fabricated nature and the use of physical and psychological coercion. See Ibid., 287-335. See also V. Abakumov’s report on the JAC (26 March 1948) published in Redlich, War, Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documented Study of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, 451-64.

interpretation, saw as its main goal “trying to isolate the local population from the influence of Ukrainian culture… and cultivate the feeling of cultural superiority among Jews.”

The GOSET’s highly successful play “I am alive”—written by the Jewish poet Pinchevski who also lived in Chernivtsi—was proclaimed to be promoting “false statements about the special suffering” of Jews during the war. The play was eventually banned as harmful and nationalistic. The ban on the play was part of Stalin’s attack on the specifically Jewish memories of the Holocaust which, in his view, were harmful to the official interpretation of the war as a millennial struggle in which all Soviet citizens suffered equally while some of them (Russians as well as Ukrainians and Byelorussians) contributed more to the victory than others.

Of the more than three million Jewish citizens of the pre-1939 USSR almost half died in the Holocaust, while the percentage in the incorporated areas was even higher. Therefore, significantly more than half of the Jews who perished in the Holocaust came from the Soviet Union within its borders of 1940. Jewish Soviet elites realized the dimensions of the disaster and made several attempts to create an official Soviet record of the Soviet victims of Nazi killings and a detailed description thereof. Such a record would certainly contribute to the construction of a particularly Jewish narrative about the war. To prevent its emergence, Stalin stopped the proposed publications about the destruction of Soviet Jews, organized by Ilya Ehrenburg and Vassili Grossman. Soviet Jews could legitimately remember their collective suffering during the


53 Amir Weiner conceptualized Stalin’s interpretation of the war in relation to nationality policy as “hierarchical heroism vs. universal suffering.” Weiner, Making Sense of War, 208.
war only in terms of universal Soviet victimhood on the altar of the victory over fascism.  

Therefore, the GOSET’s addressing of the theme of the Holocaust experience and survival, as well as the obvious popularity of the play among Jewish audiences, could not but add to the list of the theatre’s “crimes” in the eyes of the MGB authorities.

Unlike several Jewish writers, most actors and directors of the Jewish theatre in Chernivtsi avoided arrest, but the GOSET itself was not to survive the anti-cosmopolitan campaign. One of the first signs of the attack on Jewish culture was the discrete policy of financial pressure on Jewish theatres and other creative groups. Their budgets were cut or discontinued. On 12 March 1948, the central Soviet Committee for Art Affairs at the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union cancelled its financial support of 646 theatres, including the State Jewish Theatre in Moscow. The subsequent cancellation of governmental subsidies to the remaining Jewish theatres—a measure not applied to other Soviet nationalities—was the first sign of the imminent liquidation. Formally, all Soviet theatres were transferred to financial “self-support” (samookupaiemost’), but most Soviet theatres continued receiving state subsidies, which was not the case for most Jewish theatres.

Although the MVD report about the financial hardships of the Chernivtsi GOSET contained exaggerations, the theatre did have difficulties as a result of the budget cuts.

Financial strain was intensified by ongoing mergers and theatre closures which resulted in a

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growing roster of actors the theatre had to support. In 1949, the Ukrainian GOSET in Chernivtsi was merged with the Baltic mobile Jewish theatrical group. The latter was a product of the earlier merger of the Kharkiv and Odessa Jewish theatres, both of which had not been allowed to return to their home cities from evacuation. Eventually, the Baltic theatre was liquidated. By the time of its liquidation, the GOSETs in Minsk (Belorussian SSR) and Birobidzhan had already been closed. Several months later, in November 1949, the Moscow GOSET was liquidated, leaving the Ukrainian GOSET in Chernivtsi the only active major state Jewish theatre in the USSR.57

Under constant accusation of Jewish nationalism and in a state of almost paranoiac fear, the theatre’s director Goldblat and his creative group continued to struggle for the theatre’s survival. The major condition was the dominance of Soviet plays in their repertoire and reduction of the “Jewish” elements of classic and foreign plays to the minimum allowed by the censorship. If in 1946 mentioning the words “Jews” and “Jewish” was highly problematic and was to be substituted by “people” and “popular,” in 1949 the staging of Sholom Aleichem’s works was in itself a challenge: to “rehabilitate itself” from staging too many works of Jewish classics, the theatre had to produce at least two or three Soviet plays before it could even begin thinking about a new piece with a Yiddish theme.58 However, the year 1949 saw the ceasing of all publications in Yiddish (allegedly due to the very low demand and shrinking insignificant readership) and arrests of a “group of antipatriotic theatre critics.” Hence, the chance to stage


58 DACHo, f. 133, op. 1, spr. 24, from an act of the censorship commission checking a new play based on Sholom-Aleichem’s “Rambling stars” in October of 1946; on repertoire discussion in the artistic council of the theatre in January 1949, f. 133, op. 1, spr. 59.
another Yiddish play never arrived for the Chernivtsi GOSET.\(^{59}\) It was officially liquidated due to its alleged inability to offer repertoire that would “meet the contemporary requirements of Soviet theatrical art” and to support itself financially. Most of its actors were left jobless and had to seek employment in various spheres, often only remotely if at all related to stage arts. The assets of the GOSET were transferred to its neighbour, the flourishing Ukrainian Drama Theatre, located across the street.\(^{60}\)

The late 1940s also witnessed the liquidation of the Chernivtsi symphony orchestra which had been functioning as a part of the local philharmonic society: most musicians of the orchestra were Jewish, which irritated the local authorities.\(^{61}\) The closure of the GOSET, the arrests of Jewish writers who frequented Chernivtsi, the liquidation of the Office of Jewish Culture in Kiev, and indeed the overall atmosphere of pervasive fear amongst Soviet Jews put an end to the “Jewish literary renaissance” in Chernivtsi. By the end of the 1940s, the city of

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\(^{60}\) Unlike other theatre closures of the time, the decree on liquidation was initially issued by the Soviet Ukrainian government and later mirrored by the Committee for the Arts at the Soviet of Ministers in Moscow. The Ukrainian Soviet of Ministers’ decree was issued on 31 January 1950; the Moscow decree followed on 4 February 1950. The theatre was liquidated from 15 February 1950. DAChO, f. 133, op. 1, spr. 69. A special liquidation committee was formed by the archival department of the local MVD to perform the liquidation and transfer. Apparently, the committee found the state of document preservation in the theatre to be chaotic and unsatisfactory and sorted the documentation, destroying a larger amount of documents found “useless,” before transferring the remaining files to the state archives of Chernivtsi province. As a result, very few posters and photographs are available in the archival fond of the theatre. DAChO, f.133, op.1, spr.78. Many visual materials, however, were preserved by former employees of the theatre. Many of them are available at the Institute of Jewish Studies (*Institut Iudaiki*) in Kiev; numerous photographs are published by Loiev in his memoir *Ukradennaia muza*, cited above. On the fate of the actors of the GOSET, see Loiev, *Ukradennaia muza*, 214-45; Vaisman, “Sidi Tal’ i ievreiskaia kul’tura v Chernovtsakh,” 304.

\(^{61}\) For example, the Chernivtsi arts department received a letter of complaint from a Soviet worker about the “infestation” of the philharmonic society with “rich Jews.” The arts department also refused to receive additional Jewish actors referred to the Chernivtsi mobile Jewish theatre by the Kiev cultural authorities, arguing that the given theatre was already overstaffed (DAChO, f.1, op. 11, spr. 79, ark. 5, 6). The orchestra was liquidated during 1947-48. See TsDAVO, f.2474, op.1, spr.11 (annual report of the Chernivtsi philharmonic society from 1949), ark. 1-3.
Chernivtsi had no Yiddish schools left. When the anti-cosmopolitan campaign was abruptly halted after Stalin’s death in March of 1953 and the pressure on Jewish culture was somewhat relaxed in the mid-1950s, there was only one significant connection to postwar Soviet Jewish life left in Chernivtsi: Sidi Tal’s ensemble.

The actress continued to work at the Chernivtsi philharmonic society while her husband, Pinkus Falik, remained its deputy director. While using his outstanding administrative talent and connections all over the USSR, Falik not only ensured protection of his wife’s artistic activities, but was also a shadow cultural leader of the province who made sure that for two decades the Chernivtsi philharmonic society was one of the, if not the, best in the republic. Thanks to her original talent but even more so—in the harsh conditions of Soviet censorship—to her husband’s safeguarding, Sidi Tal’ remained the only performer in Chernivtsi, and one of the few in the entire USSR, allowed to use Yiddish on the stage.

Quite possibly, Sidi Tal’s position was tolerated by the authorities because they valued Falik as an irreplaceable asset of the Chernivtsi philharmonic society and the province at large. Although he could never have been promoted to the position of philharmonic society director, Falik ensured that Chernivtsi was one of the first stops after Moscow for the most popular performers of the USSR. When, in 1949, the Chernivtsi philharmonic society engaged the most popular Soviet singer Utiosov for five concerts, the local department of art demanded that it give up two of these concerts to the Ukrainian Drama Theatre which, in spite of its high artistic level and significant popularity, was losing profits, unable to compete with the spectacles offered by


63 The last performance in Yiddish from the Stalin period seems to have been Sid Tal’s concert in Uzbekistan in 1951 and a vocal performance in 1951 in Belorussia. After the break, among the first performances again was Sidi Tal’s (with Shaul Liubimov) in 1955, in Moscow. Pinkus and Frankel, The Soviet Government and the Jews, 274.
the philharmonic society. Falik’s influence became legendary, his relationship with Sidi Tal’ was well known, and the Chernivtsi philharmonic society, although popular among urbanites of all backgrounds, was often regarded by the Jews of Soviet Chernivtsi as “their own” cultural centre. While at the peak of her popularity, Sidi Tal’ and her husband helped launch the career of Sofia Rotaru, a young performer of mostly Ukrainian folk songs who would later become a symbol of the Ukrainian national renaissance in late-Soviet Chernivtsi and eventually one of the most celebrated pop singers of Ukraine and Russia.

4. Exhibiting the National Past: Museums in Postwar Chernivtsi

Sponsoring the official Ukrainian culture was the primary cultural project for Chernivtsi officials as they worked on “transferring” the prewar Jewish urban culture away from the city, together with its bearers, in 1945-1946, and helped terminate the short-lived boom of the new, Soviet and Yiddish-based Jewish culture in the city in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The rationale for Soviet Ukrainianization—the standard narrative about local space and its distant past—and the methods of its delivery to “the masses” had changed very little since 1940. Between 1945 and 1955, the central republican studio for documentaries and newsreels produced a series of new cinematographic depictions of Soviet Bukovina that represented

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64 DAChO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 1059, ark 19-23, 25; TsDAVO, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 183 (annual report of the Chernivtsi philharmonic society from 1949); f.4763, op.1, spr.140 (same from 1948). The philharmonic society’s reports from the 1940s-1950s look consistently outstanding in terms of the size and significance of performances in comparison with the majority of philharmonic societies in other provinces. On the work and popularity of the Ukrainian drama theatre in Chernivtsi, O. S. Polynets,’ O. Iu. Bykova, “Chernivets’kyi Derzhavnyi Ukraїns’kyi muzuchno-dramatychnyi teatr imeni Ol’hy Kobylians’koї ta ioho mytis” (manuscript) (Kiev, 1968), Archive of Chernivtsi Ukrainian Drama Theatre.

65 In various capacities, Sidi Tal’ worked at the Chernivtsi philharmonic society until the late 1970s. TsDAVO, f. 2474, op. 1, spr. 11, ark. 1-3; Vaisman, “Sidi Tal’ i ievreiskaia kul’tura v Chernovtsakh,” 304.

beautiful green land, the charming folklore of local Ukrainians, and occasional panoramas of Chernivtsi, most often featuring the former Metropolitans’ Residence.67 All the cultural institutions created in 1940 refreshed their work, including the museum of local folklore.68 In 1944, Khrushchev ordered the opening in Chernivtsi of the memorial museum of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka who had died in 1942 under Romanian occupation.69 In 1945, they followed with the museum of Yurii Fed’kovych. Although struggling with endemic Soviet problems of scarcity, theft, and occasional “nationalist excesses,” the three museums commemorated the “holy trinity” of the Soviet interpretation of local culture: “the people” and the two “people’s poets” of Bukovina.

In 1947, the director of the Kobylians’ka memorial museum proposed to the provincial Soviet the organizing of a lavish public commemoration of the fifth anniversary of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka’s death, stressing the importance of the occasion by the fact that the writer had died “under German-Romanian occupation.” The celebrations included theatrical performances based on her works, the publication of the first collection of Kobylians’ka’s writings, numerous meetings, and “bringing to order” of the places connected with Ol’ha’s life in Bukovina.70

Although exceptionally elaborate, this was not the first and definitely not the last large-scale act to commemorate Kobylians’ka. Throughout the first postwar decade, the curators and

67 M. Iudin, Bukovyna. Cinematographic film in 2 parts. (Kiev, 1945) (editing script), TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 523; G. Tasin, M. Iudin, Novaia zhyn’, editing script for a film (Kiev, 1949), TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 681 in 3 parts; M. Shapsai, Ia. Miestiechkin, Universytet na Bukovyni, editing script for a film (Kiev, 1953), TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 968; M. Kononov, Na Bukovyni, Cinematographic film in 1 part. (Kiev, 1953) (editing script), TsDAKFFU, cinematographic collection, item 1191.

68 TsDAHO, f.1, op.23, spr. 4455, ark. 53-54.

69 Ibid.; DACHO, f.3, op.2, spr.902, ark. 37-40; for the text of the decree, DACHO, f.2583, op.1. spr. 1, ark.1.

70 On educational institutions, TsDAHO, op. 1, op. 23, spr. 2543; on Kobylians’ka’s anniversary, DACHO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 902, ark. 37-40; for reports on the celebrations, DACHO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 22; f. 2583, op.1, spr. 27.
researchers of the Kobylians’ka museum created a powerful myth about the life, work, and struggle of the writer. Already in 1945, only the third year since her death, the writer was celebrated in a conference and a public tour of the city highlighting places related to Kobylians’ka’s life. At that time, in addition to the major memorial museum in the city, a memorial site was opened in the village of Dymka (Hlyboka district) where Kobylians’ka had lived for a long period.71 A major role in this process was played by El’pidefor Panchuk, Kobylians’ka’s son-in-law, who had played an active role in the initial support of Kobylians’ka by the Soviet authorities in 1940-1941 as well as in establishing connections between the “progressive” local intelligentsia and Soviet power, more generally.72

The memorial museum published annual scholarly proceedings, and provided guided tours that were obligatory for all secondary school students of the city and recommended to the city’s guests.73 Distinguished visitors, such as those from the cultural establishment of Kiev and the highest party leadership, paid tribute to this shrine to local Ukrainian culture. Curators devoted special attention to the collection and popularization of correspondence between Kobylians’ka and other writers recognized as classics of Ukrainian literature, strengthening the connection between the Bukovinian and the greater Ukrainian body cultural. They organized the writer’s personal documents and library and gathered oral memories of the people who knew Kobylians’ka personally. The museum maintained active and far-reaching communication with

71 DAChO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 5.

72 On the appointments, DAChO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 26, ark. 2. Along with another relative of Kobylians’ka, Panchuk worked as a “senior scholarly worker” under the supervision of a Soviet newcomer, Olena Kovalenko, appointed to the position of the museum director. For some time, Panchuk retained most of Kobylians’ka’s family archive, which he sold to the museum in April of 1946 for 2,500 rubles. The museum also purchased private materials from other members of the Panchuk-Kobylians’kyi family and other persons. DAChO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 18, ark. 1, 3.

73 DAChO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 10 (for a guided tour of the museum from the mid-1940s); f. 2583, op.1, spr. 28 (for an example of museum’s scholarly research proceedings).
the research and cultural institutions of Ukraine, and occasionally of Moscow, for research and publication purposes. They also organized a large-scale campaign to locate and interview the prototypes of Kobylians’ka’s play “Land” in which she had described a real-life case of a family murder that had resulted from a conflict over a plot of land. The play “Land” became an irreplaceable part of the local official discourse about the Soviet transformation of agriculture and rural life.

In August of 1946, the then chairman of the Soviet of the Union, Andrei Zhdanov, issued his influential declaration about “ideological mistakes” in the journals Zvezda and Leningrad, attacking the authors Mikhail Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova as anti-Soviet, alien writers, and re-establishing the great political role of culture in the USSR. Zhdanov in fact demanded stricter censorship and greater control by the party over all cultural spheres. In response to Zhdanov’s decree, Ukrainian ideologues initiated a wave of critical articles in the central Ukrainian press, “uncovering and criticizing” their own mistakes. Reviews and criticism touched on the newly created museums in the western regions. The Kiev-based newspaper Pravda Ukrainy criticized the Kobylians’ka museum in Chernivtsi for an excessively strong focus on biography and personal materials and its lack of ties with the public and the intellectual community, urging it to use the exhibit to construct a wider narrative about the history of the

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74 For reports of research in the 1940s, DAChO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 9 (1945); f. 2583, op.1, spr. 29 (1947); for examples of correspondence with the Ukrainian academy of sciences, memorial museums, central libraries and other organizations, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 11; 18.

75 DAChO, f.2583, op.1, spr. 8, ark.9.

76 Zhdanov's decree was published in Pravda on 21 August, 1946. For the full text of the decree, see also A. N. Iakovlev, ed. Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia. Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b), VChK-OGPU-NKVD o kul'turnoi politike. 1917-1953 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratia,” 1999), 587-91. On the impact of the war on Soviet culture and its control by the state, see Clark and Dobrenko, eds. Soviet Culture and Power. A History in Documents.
region and its liberation. The museum leadership refuted the accusations in a detailed response, but it took the recommendations seriously.77 To “increase the artistic and ideological level” of the museum exhibition, the museum ordered numerous busts of Kobylians’ka and a number of oil paintings depicting her childhood, a search in her house by the Romanian Siguranța, and her meeting with Red Army Soldiers in 1940. Several portraits of Russian writers were also ordered to reinforce the message about the great influence of their works on Kobylians’ka.78

The popularization of Kobylians’ka as a symbol was not limited to the work of and within the museum. University professors in Ukrainian and Russian literature, secondary school teachers, and librarians received materials from the museum and were urged to discuss her life and work and promote her as a symbol of local Ukrainian culture. A monument to Kobylians’ka was constructed on her grave in the Chernivtsi historic cemetery and memorial plates placed on all the sites related to her life in the city.79 Meetings, conferences, and public speeches were regularly organized by the museum in cooperation with the university, the Ukrainian Drama Theatre (which frequently staged “Land”), secondary schools, and media.

In 1948, an updated text of the museum’s guided tour emphasized the connections between Kobylians’ka and “greater Ukraine” and her role in the history of “progressive” Ukrainian literature, as well as the narrative of the national and social liberation of Bukovina.80 The 1950 exhibit plan revealed an even heavier emphasis on the historical narrative of liberation and reunification. Exhibit plans and guided tour texts clearly shifted from their original goal of “commemoration of the memory of the writer” and using her image to cultivate love of the land.

77 For a detailed response to the article by the director of the museum, DACHO, f. 2583, op.1, spr. 27, ark. 14-18.
78 DACHO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 17, ark. 11.
79 DACHO, f. 2583, op. 1, spr. 8; spr. 17, ark.4.
80 DACHO, f. 2583, op.1, spr. 39.

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that is, Bukovina), to using Kobylians’ka as a tool, or a powerful image, to help deliver the
message about national unification wrapped in the generic rhetoric of the great role of the
Bolshevik party, Stalin, and the friendship of the great Russian people linked to the fate of the
Ukrainian people.81

Such gradual standardization and politicization of the presentation of the myth of
Kobylians’ka resulted in a dull Soviet ideological narrative overloaded with quotations from
Marx and Lenin, similar to thousands of other biographical storylines delivered all over the
USSR. During the last years of Soviet rule and during the “de-Sovietization” of independent
Ukraine, it would be the fruits of the intensive and enthusiastic work of the first Soviet years in
Chernivtsi—a cooperative effort of Soviet newcomers and locals among Soviet cultural
workers, denounced later as “purely biographical”—that would be rediscovered by Ukrainian
scholars, pushing them to research the life and work of Kobylians’ka further and establish her as
the symbol of Ukrainian (non-Soviet) Bukovina.82

The Kobylians’ka museum was not the only one in Chernivtsi participating in the
creation of a Soviet version of local historical myth. Reestablished in its prewar location—the
former Residence—in 1946, the museum of local history and lore (istoryko-kraieznavchyi
muzei) continued its work of connecting Chernivtsi province’s past, reinterpreted in ethnic
Ukrainian terms, with its Soviet Ukrainian future, narrated in the standard politicized language

81 For more examples of tour texts and lectures prepared by the museum, DAChO, f. 2583, op.1, spr. 59; 61; 97.

82 Very few works by Kobylians’ka had been published before the war in the form of books; most of her works had
been published in periodicals in the Romanian period. The museum workers estimated that no more than 15 books
(copies, not titles) by Kobylians’ka were available in Chernivtsi public libraries in 1946 (DAChO, f. 2583, op.1,
spr. 8, ark. 5). The publication of the collection in 1947 was a very important step in the promotion of
Kobylians’ka’s work (on the publication, f. 2583, op.1, spr. 15). Note that the museum was not spared the usual
Soviet conditions of scarcity; its director repeatedly complained of the lack of finances and other difficulties. Only
in 1946 did the family of Kobylians’ka’s adopted daughter move out from the two rooms it occupied in the building
of the museum. (f. 2583, op.1, spr. 27, ark. 9-11.)
of socialist progress and agricultural improvement. It initially had the following departments: “The history of Bukovina,” “The Great Patriotic War” “The Reunification of Bukovina in the single Soviet Ukrainian State” (later united with the War Department, and consequently separated from it once again and renamed “Soviet Bukovina”), “The Geography of Bukovina,” and “The Ethnography of Bukovina.” The Museum’s “scholarly council,” which included curators, researchers, and leading party functionaries of the province, realized that its major task was to elaborate a solid and convincing image of Bukovina in Ukrainian national terms.

The council took this task seriously. A party functionary, Chalyi, for example, criticized the work of the curators in the “Reunification” Department in 1946: “the guided tour…does not emphasize enough why, in particular, the people of Bukovina and Soviet Ukraine strove for reunification. They had been a single nation (narod) that constituted a part of Kievan Rus’ since the end of the ninth century and until the middle of the twelfth century, and were later divided by various invaders... You should not say ‘population of Bukovina during the war’ but ‘the people (narod) of Bukovina during the war’.” Chalyi was one of the many scholars and cultural authorities who were constantly reinforcing the notions of “narod,” or folk (associated with ethnic Ukrainians), and “invaders” (associated, in practice, with other ethnic groups that populated Bukovina). The museum’s researcher Petrychenko urged his guides to devote separate and greater attention to “the oppression of Bukovinian peasants and workers” by Romania.

The museum staff found the work of the ethnographic department to be the most challenging. The Department initially covered the Ukrainian population of the mountain and

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83 Although the museum was officially re-opened in 1944, the residence was occupied by the Carpathian military district until July of 1946. DAChO, f. 2342, op .1, spr. 7.

84 DAChO, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 10; Chalyi’s quote from ark 3.

85 Ibid., ark.4.
plain regions of Bukovina (*hutsuly* and *podoliany*) as well as generic exhibits of Ukrainian and Cossack folklore and daily life. The council members found some “serious mistakes” (not specified in the protocols of their meetings) and invited a specialist from the Lviv museum of local history and lore to consult them on Bukovina’s ethnography. They soon realized, however, that were mistaken in doing so. Zhdanov’s critique of *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* in the fall of 1946 and the purge (or rather, self-purge) that followed of cultural life in the USSR resulted in active public criticism of the work of the Lviv museum. The criticism was duly discussed by the Chernivtsi museum’s scholarly council.

Pronouncements made by Chernivtsi museum workers in October of 1946 clearly identified the current outline of the narrative about Bukovina they set out to create. Its three major pillars included, in order of significance: 1. the historic unity of all Ukrainian lands; 2. the closeness of the Ukrainian and Russian cultures and economies, narrated in the form of the historical narrative of Kievan Rus’ as the common cradle of eastern Slavs and the united struggle of princes Danylo Halystkyi and Alexandr Nevskii against foreign invaders; and 3. the outstanding improvement of life in Bukovina under Soviet rule. The direction of the ethnographic department was finally clarified: its exhibits had to demonstrate nothing but the unity of Bukovinian and Ukrainian cultures and the yearning of the Bukovinian people for reunification. Other ethnic groups were not even mentioned. Nevertheless, the museum lacked materials to fulfill its mission: researchers and curators spoke about the shortage of ethnographic and archeological artifacts to illustrate the new story convincingly.87

86 Ibid., ark. 6-10.
87 Ibid., 13-15.
Therefore, as early as 1946, the museum began conducting archaeological and ethnographic research in the province in order to supplement the scarce available knowledge about the region that fitted the grand narrative of the historic unity of all Ukrainian lands. The first works were conducted on the basis of the expedition of the Leningrad Institute of Material Culture which had shown a continued interest in Northern Bukovina. In 1946-1947, local researchers discovered materials from the Paleolithic era, the archaeological cultures of Shypyntsi-Trypillia, and launched a large-scale project to gather Ukrainian folkloric and material artifacts. Together with the architects of the province, they started listing and describing historical monuments of Bukovina. They showed a particular and continued interest in distinctly Slavic settlements. All the research, inner discussions, and most of the guided tours were conducted in Ukrainian.  

The origins of the city of Chernivtsi had never been clearly established in the local historiography of the Austrian and Romanian periods, while the question of the ethnic belonging of the first settlements on the territory of modern Chernivtsi had for a long time been a matter of dispute between the respective proponents of the Romanian and the Ukrainian national interpretations of Bukovina’s history in the pre-Soviet era. Although old-Slavic origins of the city had been suggested by some Austrian historians, including the most famous of them, Kaindl, this theory had never been confirmed by archaeologists who usually have the last say in such questions.

In the 1950s, the Old-Rus’ origins of Chernivtsi’s original settlements were finally established by a local archaeologist who would later become very prominent in the study of Old

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88 On the expeditions of 1946-1947, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 9. On later materials, f. 2342, op. 1, apr. 26 (report for 1948); spr. 28 (Dniestr expedition); spr. 36, 37, 38 (1949 reports and protocols); spr. 48, 49 (1951) and other files in fond 2342.
A young “scholarly worker” at the museum of local history and lore, Tymoshchuk had become fascinated by his participation in 1951 in an excavation in Halych, a medieval town located in today’s Lviv province. Looking for proof of connections between Bukovina and Galicia, in 1952 he examined the remnants of the fortifications on the left bank of the Prut River that had been previously dated to the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. The daring young scholar was rewarded by a discovery that would determine his tremendously successful career in Chernivtsi: he found ceramics similar to those he had seen in Halych, dating from the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, and claimed that Lenkivtsi (the place of his excavations) was the place of the earliest, Old Slavic settlement that was a part of the Kievan Rus’ and later the medieval principalities of Galicia and Volhynnia.

Tymoshchuk’s bold claim, published in a small article in the local paper Radians’ka Bukovyna in 1952, was originally challenged by the established authorities from Chernivtsi museum as lacking scholarly evidence. However, by 1953, older archeologists either gave in to the persistence of the young talent, who continued his study of the left-bank settlements, or sensed that it was an “ideologically correct” argument. In the following years, the interest of the provincial party leadership in the excavations confirmed the scholar’s way of thinking, and the local press widely promoted the new discovery. The same museum authority who had shamed Tymoshchuk for an unsupported claim in 1952 declared in 1953 that the museum workers “have

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discovered [in Lenkivtsi] material artifacts that testify that the town had been a significant economic and cultural centre of Old Rus’ in the 12th and 13th centuries.” The article also stated that these discoveries “refute the anti-scientific statement of bourgeois historians about the non-Slavic origins of Chernivtsi.” Chernivtsi’s origins were thus legitimately established, through scholarly approval, as “an ancient Ukrainian town.”

At their regular scholarly-methodological council meetings in the late 1940s and early 1950s, museum workers in Chernivtsi often repeated the mantra of their major task: to deliver a straightforward historical narrative (chitka istorychnist’) and refute the harmful bourgeois nationalist school in Ukrainian historiography. The ideologues among them also urged the curators to avoid the “pseudo-historical” idealization of some cultural figures of Bukovina, which, according to the official line of local cultural politics, is what had happened with the image of Fed’kovych, who emerged from the productions of local cultural workers as “Bukovina’s nightingale,” the great revolutionary Hutsul poet, and the founder of the literary Ukrainian language in the western Ukrainian region. Criticism of the manipulation of the image of Fed’kovych was hardly caused by a (legitimate) concern with the distortions of facts in

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90 Article in Radians’ka Bukovyna from 1953 by Kulish, deputy director of the museum, quoted in Alexandr Masan, “Križ terny Shantsiv” (an article manuscript that i obtained from the author in 2008). According to Masan, who was a student and later a colleague of Tymoshchuk, the latter had been seriously challenged and his employment in the museum was jeopardized in 1952. The 1952 museum report mentions a finding of several artifacts of Old-Rus’ type in Lenkivtsi only briefly, with no interpretation. DAChO, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 71, ark. 3. Tymoshchuk’s work was also listed as the one that “suggests a new dating of Chernivtsi’s origins.” Ibid., ark. 8. The change in the official interpretation of the city’s past caused by Tymoshchuk’s contributions becomes evident when one compares two “Historical notes about the city of Chernivtsi” prepared by the museum in 1952 and 1954. The “notes” were used for all kinds of popular texts about the urban past prepared on the official level. The 1952 note mentioned in one sentence “the origins of the city in the 12th century as a part of Galician-Volhynian principality,” without references to the Old Rus’, and focused on the first written record of the city’s name in 1408. The 1954 note described in detail the origins of the ancient Chernivtsi on the left bank, and did not even mention the record from 1408. DAChO, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 76 for 1952, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 104, ark.1 for 1954.

91 DAChO, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 15.
his biography, which were massive. Rather, it came from the idea that local examples had to serve the narrative of Ukrainian unity, but not forge excessive “localism” in culture and self-consciousness of Bukovinians.

The memorial museum of Yuri Fed’kovych was established in 1945 but opened in 1947, in one of the wings of the former Residence of Orthodox Metropolitans. Its curators participated in a process of myth-making similar to that of the Kobylians’ka museum, and were challenged with similar problems: they were urged by their superiors and critics to say more on the role of Fed’kovych in the general development of progressive Ukrainian literature; re-emphasize his connections with Dnieper Ukraine; and stress the alleged influence of Russian literature and Russian revolutionary-democratic thought on the writer. Initially founded as a generic museum of the history of literature (istoryko-literaturnyi muzei), due to the lack of materials it presented an obviously exaggerated role of Fed’kovych in Ukrainian literature, and was re-organized in 1949 as a memorial museum for Fed’kovych. At the time of restructuring, its exhibit was amended with another powerful and politically appropriate narrative: the myth of the participation of Fed’kovych’s family in the popular revolt led by Lukian Kobylytsia in the nineteenth century.

All three museums of Chernivtsi spent the first postwar decade conducting active research, gathering artifacts, and—the most important of all tasks—creating stories and images.

92 On the life of Fed’kovych, see chapter one.
93 Later in the postwar period, local scholars of Fed’kovych’s work advocated for the naming of Chernivtsi University after Fed’kovych, but the authorities seem to have been resisting it. The name was adopted, finally, only in 1989. http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/featuredentry.asp; last accessed 19 March 2010.
94 DACHO, f. 2341, op. 1, spr. 6, ark. 1.
95 DACHO, f. 2341, op. 1, spr. 24.
96 On reorganization, DACHO, f. 2341, op. 1, spr. 14; on Lukian Kobylytsia, spr.19.
The work of all of them was clearly directed toward illustrating, reinforcing, and purifying or strengthening the narrative about Chernivtsi and Bukovina that had been outlined back in 1940. Local cultural workers created their own interpretations of messages sent by the highest cultural authorities in Moscow, and used the more concrete indications received from the Kiev authorities to direct their search for relevant local folklore and archaeological artifacts in order to finalize the narrative about Bukovina’s past and align this narrative with the Soviet Ukrainian historical myth of Old Slavic origins, eternal friendship with Russian folk, and the ethnic unity of the Ukrainian people.

5. *Speaking and Reading Soviet Ukrainian: Forging the New Local Elite*

In January of 1946, while the NKVD and the Ukrainian leadership were working out the logistics of “evacuating” the Holocaust survivors from Chernivtsi, and party authorities were preparing for the first postwar civic ritual of Soviet elections the following month, the provincial leadership held a grand meeting of the province’s intelligentsia. This conference, attended by the most “reliable” representatives of the educated stratum, including locals, became a tribute to the practice of “speaking Soviet Ukrainian” in postwar Northern Bukovina. Although the narratives created in 1940-1941 were easily recognizable in the speeches and comments uttered at the meeting, the discourse became much more radicalized and exclusivist, reflecting important changes the war had brought to Soviet ethos and ideology. Ukrainian nationalism was no longer an irritation legacy that local Ukrainians could bring along from their pre-Soviet pasts; it was condemned as the ideology of the OUN and identified by the standard oxymoron “German-Ukrainian nationalist.”97 Establishing a full break from the local past, a representative of the scholarly community located progressive Ukrainian culture in the future (in terms of the

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97 DACHO, f.3, op.2, spr.766, ark. 45-64.
need to educate Ukrainian youth) and in folk traditions.98 Excepted from this unwritten rule were the figures of Fed’kovych and Kobylians’ka, whose commemoration in the newly opened museums was praised by many members of the Soviet intelligentsia.99

In their prepared and spontaneous speeches, “progressive” representatives of the intelligentsia in Chernivtsi province repeated many times the historical narrative about the “oppression of the Ukrainian peasant… in the long-suffering Bukovina…under the yoke of Moldavian, Turkish, Polish, German, Romanian exploiters”; they called for the need to broadcast Kiev radio in Chernivtsi, to renew the publication of the almanac “Free Bukovina,” to “write the big book about Bukovina,” to rename all rivers, villages, and towns, and to “write the history of the struggle of the Ukrainian people.”100 The war was narrated as a part of this struggle, in the context of the oppression of Ukrainians under Romanian power, when “… a great many peaceful citizens, including innocent women and children, were shot, while others were sent on a cruel expulsion.” Along with this covert reference to the Holocaust, several hidden mentions of the killings of local Jews slipped from the tongues of a number of medical specialists who were concerned about the many doctors who had perished at the hands of the Germans and many others who had survived the camps but could not find their families or return to their homes.101

The wider public was regularly exposed to an even more cleansed and polished discourse about the region’s past and future from the 4,609 radio speakers that were installed in

98 Ibid., ark. 104-17.
99 Ibid., ark. 129, for example.
100 Ibid., ark. 75, 129, 130. Only one postwar issue of Vil’na Bukovyna was eventually published, in 1945: L. Tereshchenko et al, ed., Vil’na Bukovyna. Vydannia viddilu propahandy i ahitatsii Chernivets’koho obkomu KB(b)U (Chernivtsi: Vydavnytstvo hazety “Radians’ka Bukovyna,” 1945).
101 Ibid., 71, 120.
the province by 1947. The education of future leaders and professionals with appropriate
backgrounds was also under way in the late 1940s: the city housed a university, a teachers’
institute, a medical institute, an inter-provincial higher party school, and plenty of professional
colleges. Their diplomas would be granted to many of the children of the first Soviet newcomers
who were infamous for their “outrages” toward locals, as well as the enthusiasts of Soviet
Ukrainian culture, and locals themselves.

In comparison to 1940-1941, when local urban Jewish youth were considered to be an
acceptable temporary substitute for a desired Ukrainian student body, in the late 1940s only
Soviet newcomers and local Ukrainians (with rare exceptions of non-Ukrainian locals) were
considered acceptable. For example, in the 1945-1946 academic year, the university leadership
decided to enroll very few local students (23 out of 560), in spite of the official policy of
affirmative action. The new requirement was that university applicants had to have finished a
Soviet secondary school. Such a requirement automatically made most locals ineligible,
precluding applications from local urban Jews and educated “aliens” of other backgrounds. As
stated by a university official, they practised “a differentiated approach to an applicant from
western/occupied areas and one who protected our fatherland.” Soviet authorities decided to
wait for a new generation of local Ukrainian applicants, rather than fill their classrooms, once
again, with foreign-language-speaking students. This policy became one more reason why most
local Jews did not see a future for themselves in Chernivtsi and opted to make use of the
opportunity for “evacuation.”

102 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4455, ark. 55-57.
103 DAChO, f.4, op.1, spr. 490, ark. 13-19; quote from 13.
In the consequent years, the pool of applicants from among locals was growing steadily, as the new generation of children with Soviet secondary education was growing up in the cities and—increasingly—villages of Northern Bukovina and the western Ukrainian regions. As a result of investment favouring the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and active promotion of Soviet Ukrainian identity in cultural and educational spheres, the social basis of Ukrainian identity in Chernivtsi was steadily expanding throughout the first postwar decade, and the university was the major vehicle for preparing the generation of the educated strata that would gradually come to be dominated by ethnic Ukrainians.  

In 1947-1948, the Soviet government launched another country-wide “total check of book collections,” purging the country from the “harmful literature” that the population had allegedly accumulated through the turbulent years of the war and postwar chaos. Detailed instructions and reports about the operation revealed that Soviet authorities reasonably treated the book bazaars and second-hand stores as loci for materialization of alternative discourses in the state that aspired to total control—a logic that was captured famously in George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984. In Ukraine, the western provinces turned out to be the most problematic

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104 On social change, urbanization, and the growth of Ukrainian identity in postwar Ukraine, see Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine. When in June of 1953, after Stalin’s death, Lavrentii Beria launched a short-lived campaign to improve the promotion of local cadres according to the nationalities of the local population, Chernivtsi party leaders responded with intense discussions of the situation in the city and the province. They duly criticized themselves and their subordinates for neglecting the “correct party policies regarding the promotion of local cadres” and listed the following facts: (in 1953) there was no local present in the provincial party leadership, only three locals in the Soviet leadership, no local in the city soviet leadership, but there were 104 deputies in the city soviet who were local residents of the city. There were no locals among the city technical intelligentsia, since everybody who had been educated under Soviet rule had been sent elsewhere for employment. There were 33 (out of 600) local teachers and three (out of 240) local doctors (including those coming from neighbouring western Ukrainian provinces). The University rector Leuts’kyi gave the statistics of enrollment: in 1944-1945, the University accepted 54 locals among 954 new students; in 1947-1948, 17 percent of the students were locals, in 1950-1951, 36 percent were locals, in 1951-1952, 43 percent were locals, and in 1953-1954, 50 percent were locals. However, in 1953, of the 42 graduate students at the University only 8 were locals. See the party protocols of discussions published in Halachak, Luts’kyi, ed., Kul’turne zhyttia, 698-706.
areas, with “huge collections of unsorted and uninventoried literature.” The MVD/MGB was to ban private book sales and closely watch markets and second-hand stores, while local authorities were to complete the checking and sorting of books under their control.

Chernivtsi represented one of the most complicated cases, where the book purge was long and frustrating, leading to the eventual closure of the “special collection” at the university library, proudly opened by the university leadership in 1940. Along with the other western provinces of Ukraine, Chernivtsi received special shipments of carefully selected literature and films including Ukrainian and Russian classics and suitable Soviet authors. In 1949, local cultural authorities also fulfilled instructions from Kiev and organized a wide celebration of the 150th anniversary of Alexander Pushkin, recognized as one of the most important geniuses of the Russian literature. Under the supervision of Kiev authorities, the public libraries of Chernivtsi, as well as the personal libraries of its new growing elites, were being filled with new books considered helpful for the formation of their Soviet and Ukrainian consciousness. On the urban level, the local space of Chernivtsi continued to be filled with Ukrainian culture which was distilled from “harmful elements” and duly aligned with the friendly “great Russian culture.”

The replacement of local culture with the standard Soviet Ukrainian one was not a process orchestrated exclusively from the centre. Grassroots initiatives, coming from patriotic newcomers and “reliable” locals alike, were important in this process. As the Jewish theatre was

105 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4501, ark. 51-52; f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2410, ark.13-15.

106 TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 53, ark. 6, 18.

107 TsDAHO, f.1, op.75, spr. 75 (instructions for Ukrainian party leaders on the improvement of work in the western provinces), ark. 164; f.1, op. 23, spr. 2412; f. 1, op.23, spr. 1945).

108 DACHO, f.3, op. 2, spr. 1059, ark. 41-44.
giving its final performances in 1949, the provincial Arts Department proposed to the provincial
Soviet and party leaders that it organize a Provincial Festival of Song and Dance, and developed
a detailed plan of the proposed event. The proposal stated: “The specific character of
Bukovinian folklore, both old and contemporary, [will] make the festival particularly colourful
and somewhat different…” The arts department proposed to hold the festival in a grand manner
in the city stadium, with specially invited guests from other provinces, so that it would become a
model initiative to be followed in the future by a regularly held republic-wide folk festival.\textsuperscript{109}

As is often the case with national unification projects, the new local cultural elite was eagerly
joining the national—in the Soviet case, republican-level—drive to promote standard national
culture even if in its local variation.

As the future local elite—the postwar mixed student body—filled the classrooms of
Chernivtsi’s higher and professional educational institutions, they were gradually making the
city their own. As everywhere in the USSR, these young people, referred to by Elena Zubkova
as the “postwar generation,” was growing up and forming its worldview with no, or only vague,
living memories of the prewar purges, rooting their identities within the Soviet mentality and
ethos which was now largely based on the black-and-white, Manichean myth of the Great
Patriotic War. In the context of Chernivtsi, most of them did not remember the phenomenon of
German-Jewish Czernowitz which ceased to exist not long before they arrived in the city or
started their studies.

With the confidence of the heroes who brought about the great Victory, or with the
developing “class consciousness” of the liberated workers of the land, many of these young
people were outspoken in their views that were based, to a large degree, on the appropriated

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., ark.1.
official discourse of the time. They created student organizations and wrote proclamations to reaffirm their status as active and patriotic citizens, within the official communist framework and often with antisemitic components, mixing the all-pervasive antisemitic ethos of the time with the sense of their own new Soviet Ukrainian identity reaffirmed by the recent wartime Soviet propaganda and postwar promotion of the national Ukrainian interpretation of their urban space. They were provided with many tools to help them imagine a better, improved Soviet Ukraine, rid of the “antipatriotic” intellectuals and professionals and based on the “truly people’s socialist government” made up of liberated, educated, and advanced Ukrainian peasants and workers.110

In 1947, a group of students at Chernivtsi State University sent a letter to Stalin asking him to “help them study in their native Ukrainian language.” They expressed their disappointment that most of their professors lectured in Russian—a situation they explained by the alleged fear of being arrested for “Ukrainian nationalism,” referring to the ongoing repressive campaign against “bourgeois nationalism” that was accompanied by a strong, almost demonizing discourse in the mass media and propaganda. They were only partially correct in their explanation of what they saw as a violation of Stalin’s nationality policy at Chernivtsi State University: the major reason for lectures in Russian was the endemic lack of reliable teachers with an adequate knowledge of the Ukrainian language. It was more likely for a professor in Chernivtsi to be charged as a “rootless cosmopolitan” than accused of Ukrainian nationalism in the late 1940s and early 1950s, due to the lack of local ethnic Ukrainians among the university’s

teachers. The students, however, demanded what they were promised by the all-pervasive narrative of Soviet patriotic “ethnic particularism,” that is, the usage and promotion of the Ukrainian language.

It is surprising that Prague University has a chair of Ukrainian language with an established professor while Chernivtsi University does not have one but only an inexperienced teacher from a secondary school (who has no authority). The old generation of [Ukrainian] Bukovinian intelligentsia makes fun of us, saying: “You will learn nothing there. Under Romania, this university was a centre of Romanianization and now it has become a centre of Russification.” It is hard to refute such statements for us, young students, since such opinions have a big grain of truth. Ukrainian-German nationalists use these mistakes to cultivate hatred toward Russians. This is the result of the fact that party leaders in Chernivtsi forgot Your works and speeches at party congresses on the nationality question. Here, all Bukovinians are being branded by a pejorative name: “Banderites.” Is this correct? Why, until recently, is Russian used for the legislature, lectures, correspondence etc, while the local population, 80% of which is illiterate, does not understand it. This is not [serving well] the understanding of Bolshevik propaganda.

In the first postwar decade, the usage of the Russian language in western Ukrainian regions was not an intentional policy of the Soviet government but was caused primarily by the

111 The problem of excessive usage of Russian in Chernivtsi University was discussed by the Chernivtsi provincial Party Committee and linked directly to the problem of lack of local educated cadres and the poor effort in promoting locals. Interestingly, in such discussions of the postwar period the term “local,” when mentioned in Chernivtsi, tended to mean a person from the wider “western region” rather than the city of Chernivtsi or even from Bukovina, as was the case in 1940-1941. See the protocols of party discussions published in Halachak, Luts’kyi, ed., Kul’turne zhyttia, 698-706.

112 The term was suggested by Yuri Slezkine in his article “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism.”

113 (27 May 1947) TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 5007, ark. 2-3.
lack of textbooks and qualified cadres as well as the personal choices of many authorities who perceived Russian as a more useful and advanced “imperial” language. As remarked by the Stalin district party secretary Dolgyi in 1944, the party’s official goal was to Ukrainianize the city, but some of the Soviet newcomers impeded the process of cultivating a Ukrainian culture and urban atmosphere by choosing to speak Russian. Dolgyi was concerned that such behaviour of irresponsible communists resulted in replacing the gap between the German-speaking city and the Ukrainian-speaking village with a similar gap but with a Russian-speaking provincial centre.114

Later, in the post-Stalin era, linguistic Russification would become even more noticeable in the urban centres of Ukraine, including Chernivtsi, where an important role in the popularity of the Russian language would be played by the Jewish population who tended to feel excluded from the emerging Ukrainian ethnic-based collective identity and identified instead with the “Great Russian Culture.”115 However, this partial linguistic Russification did not preclude the development, solidification, and deep internalization of Ukrainian identity constructed by means of Soviet narratives about the local and national past and present in Ukrainian Chernivtsi.

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Postwar Chernivtsi remained an unusually “Jewish” city for Soviet Ukraine in the demographic sense. In the wake of the Holocaust, between 50 and 70 percent of its population was Jewish. By 1959, at least 20 percent of Chernivtsi urbanites were Jewish, while in the

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114 Dolgyi appealed to his colleagues: “We have many comrades who speak Russian as [illiterate peasants] (iak Poltaws’kyi diad’ko) but still try to speak Russian. We need to be closer to people; to speak Ukrainian.” DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 30.

115 On the coexistence of linguistic Russification and Ukrainian identity in postwar Ukrainian SSR, Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine.
Ukrainian SSR, Jews constituted only 2 percent of the population, and the next largest (in relative terms) Jewish communities lived in the bigger cities of Odessa and Kiev. Chernivtsi was widely known as a lively centre of Jewish life in the first postwar decade. The city’s remaining local Jewish community and a large number of material markers of Jewish culture and religion attracted Jewish in-migrants from surrounding as well as distant Soviet regions. Even more important, the transfer of the State Ukrainian Jewish Theatre, previously located in Kiev, to Chernivtsi in 1945 created a powerful magnet which attracted cultural forces to the city, resulting in a “Jewish cultural renaissance.”

This short-lived boom of Jewish social life and culture in the city, curtailed in the late 1940s and early 1950s with the intensification of Stalin’s antisemitic campaign, popularized a Soviet Jewish culture based on the Yiddish language and often closely connected to the Russian language, which had become the second language of Soviet Jewish creative life. However, if the development of Ukrainian culture and identity in Chernivtsi was the major cultural investment of the Soviet Ukrainian government, the Soviet state’s attitude toward the Jewish cultural renaissance in the city was the opposite: it was governed by strong state-sponsored antisemitism.

The combination of Soviet policies of anti-Jewish discrimination with the continued, even if somewhat curtailed, policy of affirmative action toward ethnic Ukrainians in education, employment, and career advancement, resulted in a noticeable change in the urban social profile less than two decades after the war. Of the new generation of educated urbanites who dominated the culture of the city, a large percentage were ethnic Ukrainians. Even more important, regardless of their spoken languages and their ethnic backgrounds, the self-perception, or

historical consciousness, of this new generation of the local elite and of the wider educated
groups in the population was strongly influenced by the official Soviet Ukrainian interpretation
of their immediate environment, their history, as well as their wider worldview. This worldview
was rooted in ethnic and territorial Ukrainian nationalism even more than it was related to the
abstract and politicized ideology of Soviet socialism and Friendship of Peoples. The emerging
Soviet Ukrainian worldview was also reinforced by the state’s open anti-Jewish discrimination
and the demonization of the recent Romanian occupation of the city, which, it seems, tended to
be internalized in the form of pejorative attitudes toward local Romanians.

The process of the Soviet construction of a mass Ukrainian identity went hand-in-hand
with the repression of Ukrainian nationalists accompanied by pervasive propaganda that
promoted hatred toward “Ukrainian-German bandits”—very often, ironically, by publicizing
their actual crimes against Jews who could not be called anything else but “peaceful Soviet
citizens.”¹¹⁷ This propaganda campaign played a role in the symbolic purging of Ukrainian
culture and ethos from “internal enemies” and helped create a circumscribed version of
Ukrainian nationalism. It also promoted a black-and-white, Manichean understanding of
personal and collective identities within the framework of ethnic nationalism: the OUN and
UPA were condemned, while more distant history was populated with heroes (democratic,
revolutionary, and friendly to Russia) and villains (bourgeois-nationalist, imperialist, and in the
service of foreign invaders). The sacred goal of Ukrainian radical nationalists—the unification

¹¹⁷ For example, in 1977 local authorities organized a public trial of several Ukrainian nationalists involved in a
mass murder of Jews in the village of Nyzhni Stanivsti of Kitsman’ district. The trial was widely covered in the
local press which used strong and graphic language to describe the gruesome killings and linked the cruelty of the
murderers to the ideologies of Ukrainian nationalism, fascism, and Zionism (interpreted as a form of Fascism),
while avoiding to identify the victims of the murder as Jews. V. Pelekh, “Rozplata. Natsionalistychni vbyvtsi ne
of all Ukrainian people in a single state—was achieved by the Soviet Ukrainian state-builders and cultural authorities.

The resulting exclusivist Soviet Ukrainian ethos created a solid base for the later crystallization of Ukrainian national identity among the majority of the local population in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The (new) local Jews of Chernivtsi tended to feel excluded from the national community associated with their semi-polity, the Ukrainian republic. They usually saw better opportunities in the association with the “imperial” culture of the USSR and generally dominated the Russian-speaking sector of Chernivtsi’s local elites. Local Jews, therefore, would make a noticeable contribution to the partial Russification of the city throughout the Soviet period. Meanwhile, the first postwar decade saw only the beginning of the long task of silencing the recently purged and reconstructing the local past as a national Ukrainian narrative. Some of this work was performed by the newcomers to Chernivtsi who happened to be Jewish.
Chapter Eight:
Building Chernivtsi? Planning and Preservation, 1944-1956

Those Soviet cadres who arrived in Chernivtsi for the first time in 1944 were amazed to see a fully preserved and functioning city. After seeing miles of scorched ruins and dozens of destroyed cities on their way, Chernivtsi indeed appeared surreal with its luxurious hotels, glass front windows, richly decorated interiors, restaurants with snow-white tablecloths, and comparatively abundant residential assets. For many newcomers, it looked like “a real abroad” and a “miracle city” where buildings were well maintained, people were dressed nicely, and stores had goods on their shelves. ¹ Indeed, however catastrophic the wartime destruction of the social structure and urban culture in Chernivtsi may have been, its architectural heritage remained almost intact by post-World War II standards. The landmarks of Chernivtsi were untouched by war: all the administrative buildings, the theatre, the railway station, squares and parks, all its churches and cathedrals, and even 28 (officially active) synagogues were still there in 1944. ² The two most noticeable changes were the damaged left wing of the Metropolitans’

¹ Quoted from Natalia Shevchenko, Chernovitskaia Atlantida, 3. During my personal conversation with Natalia Shevchenko in summer 2008 she confirmed that the impression of a “miracle” city (her term) was deep and widespread among the newcomers. Liudmila Adamova, who returned to Chernivtsi in 1944 as a child with her family, also recalled her impression of a nicely maintained city with an atmosphere of a peaceful and normal life and even soda water sold on the streets—something inconceivable for a wartime child in the USSR (from my conversation with Adamova in summer 2010). However, Chernivtsi seems to have made a gloomier impression on Teréz Móses, who spent some time in a transit camp near the city on her way from Auschwitz to Hungary in 1944. Although admitting that “Chernivtsi was not directly affected by the war,” she also remembered dirty streets, derelict buildings, and unhappy people. Móses, Staying Human through the Holocaust, 326. The difference in impressions can be explained by the different ages and previous experiences of the memoirists. Shevchenko and Adamova were children who survived the war in the USSR and saw hunger, scarcity, and cities and villages erased from the earth before arriving in Chernivtsi. Mozes, who was returning from Nazi camps that in her mind represented hell, was probably comparing Chernivtsi to Hungarian cities and towns untouched by war and occupation. In comparison to most Soviet cities, Chernivtsi would have looked quite cheerful in 1944. This impression can be also inferred from the desire of the Soviet in-migrants to indulge in the “riches” of the city.

² DACHO, f. 623, op. 2, spr. 8, ark. 76. For more on synagogues, see chapter 7.
Residence and the ruin of the reformed Jewish Temple right in the heart of the city, steps from the city hall and the major square.

Compared to the 40 percent of housing assets completely lost by the Ukrainian republic, the destruction of only 2.3 percent of the housing stock in Chernivtsi was quite miraculous, seconded only by Lviv where 9 percent of the housing was in ruins. Since the Soviet state placed great importance on central planning and especially on industrial—and, therefore, urban—development, new Soviet cities in western Ukraine were assessed and evaluated soon after Soviet liberation. In 1946, many western cities looked considerably better to the central planners in Kiev than did the urban centres of eastern Ukraine, almost fully destroyed during the war. Size and “character” considered in combination determined the direction of a city’s future development, to be prescribed by its general plan (heneral’nyi plan) and followed by detailed planning.

3 TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 101. In the first Ukrainian postwar investment distribution for reconstruction purposes, Chernivtsi was the only city in the western regions to receive no funds: it was deemed ready to move into and function. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 75, spr. 98, ark. 12-13. Although 442 houses were reported by the Chernivtsi city council as “completely ruined” and 1,040 as “considerably damaged” by German-Romanian occupants, the majority of them were small, often wooden private houses that had little value to begin with in the eyes of Soviet authorities. Only a few of the ruined buildings were multi-storeyed apartment complexes in the centre of the city. DACHO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 714, ark. 37. Non-residential losses were more noticeable: in the central (Stalin) district alone, three factories were destroyed; possessions of 21 small enterprises and 120 were burned; a telephone station was lost to fire; the equipment of the autobus and trolleybus parks had been taken away by the Romanians; one street car was broken; the equipment and other possessions from many organizations and private apartments were missing (DACHO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 442, ark. 8). For additional data on the destruction and reconstruction of communal and residential assets in 1946, see TsDAVO f. 582, op. 12, spr. 128, ark. 25; for 1947, f. 528, op. 12, apr. 166, ark. 49-54; f. 582, op. 12, spr. 167, ark. 1, 28; for 1950, f. 582, op. 12, spr. 294, ark. 61-63.

4 By 1946, local economists had collected voluminous amounts of data and the Kiev-based central urban planning authorities analyzed them. Analysts in the institute of urban construction in Kiev used this data to produce a Classification of Ukrainian Cities to “ensure the most rapid and efficient reconstruction” which was recognized as the biggest task of the first postwar five-year plan. See “Klassifikatsiia gorodov USSR. Akademia Arkhitektury USSR. Institut gradostroitel'stvva. 1946.” Performed by economists N. Vasiutinskii and N. Dybovskii, TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 36.

5 In 1946, the notion of Western Ukraine included areas historically known as Galicia, Volhynia, Northern Bukovina, Transcarpathia, and several neighbouring territories. The last of the western annexations was the incorporation of Transcarpathia with its regional centre Uzhhorod and another historic town, Mukacheve. Nine provinces were organized on the territories incorporated in the Ukrainian SSR after 1939.
The “western” cities had not yet been classified according to character by 1946; they were still the capitalist, alien cities whose character was to be transformed.\(^6\) Statistics indicated, though, that the economic potential of the western cities was truly significant against the background of the postwar devastation of Soviet Ukraine proper.\(^7\) Lviv and Chernivtsi were the only two western cities with electric public transportation systems; Chernivtsi was also the only western city with a trolleybus line, deemed by Soviet urban engineers the most progressive type of city transport.\(^8\) At the same time, two other western Ukrainian provincial centres, Ternopol and Stanislaviv, had, respectively, no sewerage and no running water at all in 1946.\(^9\) What to make of the quite sophisticated urban infrastructure and foreign-looking heritage of Chernivtsi, and how to plan its Soviet future, became a challenge for both the local and central architectural and general authorities in the Ukrainian SSR for most of the first postwar decade.

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\(^6\) First, the economists of the Kiev urban planning institute classified all the cities of the republic by size. According to this classification, category 6— that of “the biggest” cities in Ukraine (over 300,000 people)— had six urban centres and included only one western city, Lviv. The next category, “big” cities (100,000-300,000 people), had 12 items and also included only one city of “western Ukraine,” Chernivtsi. The rest of the western cities were considerably smaller and belonged to categories 4, 3, 2, and 1. Second, eastern Ukrainian cities were also classified by “character” as industrial, transportation, transportation-industrial, administrative-industrial, administrative-industrial centres of rural areas, and resort-administrative centres. TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 31, 47, 69.

\(^7\) The share of high-rise buildings was considerably higher than the Ukrainian average (50 percent in western regions compared to 1.3 percent in Ukraine); 96 percent and 69 percent, respectively, of residential buildings had running water vs. the Ukrainian average of 46 percent; 95 percent and 69 percent, respectively, had sewerage as compared to the Ukrainian average of 41 percent. Ibid., ark.116,145,163.

\(^8\) The other three cities equipped with trolleys in 1946 were the biggest industrial centres of Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa. Ibid., ark. 205.

\(^9\) Ibid., ark.160.
1. Urban Planning and Architectural Preservation in Postwar Soviet Ukraine

According to the official Soviet interpretation, building socialism generally meant a radical transition to “a superior form of modernity” that was centred on a broad concept of social welfare and social justice.\(^\text{10}\) Beyond this declared general ethos, however, the techniques and principles of Soviet urban planning were far from engraved in stone. In fact, on the practical level and in the context of a specific project, it was rarely clear to the planners, architects, and administrators what it meant to make a project socialist (or “un-capitalist”). Members of the professions involved in urban development such as architects, planners, artists, and engineers, as well as local bureaucrats, played active and important roles in shaping the experience of socialism and Soviet urban planning. This shaping was also an ongoing process, as urban planning “reflect[ed] changing trends and ideologies of the government and the party.”\(^\text{11}\)

An overarching blueprint that was used as a point of reference by planners throughout the country had been created already in the mid-1930s, when the general plan was elaborated for the Soviet capital, Moscow.\(^\text{12}\) From this point on, major principles of prewar Soviet urban planning included thorough, comprehensive planning on all levels, from the general plan to the individual planning of construction objects, stressing community services and regard for national traditions and historical heritage in city planning. The latter principle was related to the rejection of earlier radical ideas of urbanism, connecting them to the “harmful foreign trends of

\(^{10}\) Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 358.


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functionalism and constructivism.”  

As a result, from the mid-1930s on, the preservation of “the monuments of the past” became an inseparable part of Soviet cultural policy. To prevent instances of mass destruction of monuments such as those that had occurred in the upheaval of the first five-year plan, already in 1932 the central Soviet authorities created an “Interdepartmental Committee for the Protection of Monuments of the Revolution, Art, and Culture.” In 1933, the Soviet government issued a law that called for better protection of “buildings with historical significance.” Later on, the state tried to centralize and strengthen control over historical preservation activities. The physical embodiment of history was pronounced to be under state protection, making urban planners and others in charge of urban development look into the past when building a socialist and modern urban future. The prewar Soviet preservation system, however, existed only in the form of general prescriptions.

In Ukraine, the 1930s became a time of elaboration of the pantheon of national culture that was based on the pre-existing national mythology, re-conceptualized according to the idea of close connections and eternal friendship with the Russian people. The elaboration of this cultural system involved the active participation of the Soviet Ukrainian cultural elite, many of whom were preservation enthusiasts. As key figures of the Ukrainian national myth such as the

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13 For a brief survey of early Soviet urban planning ideas, A. Stanislavskyi, Planirovka i zastroika gorodov Ukrainy (Kiev: Budivelnyk, 1971), 104-11; Parkins, City planning in Soviet Russia, 109.

14 Steven Maddox, “Healing the Wounds: Commemorations, Myths, and the Restoration of Leningrad’s Imperial Heritage” (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2008), 52-54.

15 For more on this, Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory.
poet Taras Shevchenko and the military leader Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi were appropriated by the official Stalinist Ukrainian culture, preservationists, museum specialists, and other cultural activists embarked on dozens of archaeological excavation projects, created nine state architectural conservation areas, and established hundreds of museums in the cities and towns of the Ukrainian SSR. Monuments of the past that fell under state protection included memorial museums of the national bards and heroes, objects from the pre-historic and old-Russian periods, remnants of the Greek colonies on Black Sea shore, and medieval Orthodox Churches and castles.16

At the same time, Ukrainian cultural activists received many signals from Moscow authorities and their Kiev counterparts that seriously limited their search for a national past. Many preservation enthusiasts were repressed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The so-called Ukrainian Baroque style strongly associated with the Cossack era and Bohdan Khmeln’ytiskyi’s “war for liberation” of 1648-1657 fell into disgrace toward the late 1930s, resulting in the destruction of thirty churches in Kiev, including the famous St. Michael’s cathedral (Mykhailivs’kyi sobor). Most of the wooden churches of eastern Ukraine met a similar fate.17 Those who survived the repression of the 1930s and remained in their professions learned the lesson: one had to exercise extra caution when dealing with Ukrainian culture and historical

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heritage. As a result, Ukrainian urban planners did not in fact incorporate the principle of basing the city plan on its historical structure until World War II.¹⁸

During the first years after World War II, the “Ukrainian people” firmly occupied one of the highest levels in the hierarchy of Soviet nationalities. Soviet Ukrainian authorities became seriously engaged in the development and promotion of a strong Ukrainian identity for political and cultural institutions and “the masses” of the Ukrainian Republic.¹⁹ Black-and-white versions of national history became an inseparable part of the official ethos of the Ukrainian SSR and other Soviet republics. Ukrainian urban planners finally received the chance to incorporate the preservationist principle into Ukrainian urban planning. Capitalizing on the wave of popular patriotism, enthusiasts of historical preservation embarked on protecting the heritage that had escaped wartime destruction. Similarly to the Moscow plan of 1935 that became the all-union planning template, a Ukrainian model for basing urban planning and reconstruction on the historical structure of the city was provided by the city plan of the historic town of Chernihiv in 1944-1945.

As the liberation of Ukrainian territory proceeded, immediate measures were taken to account for, preserve, and reconstruct architectural and other material objects of historical value.²⁰ Practical preservation work was divided between multiple entities. In some cases, but

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¹⁸ Horbyk et al, eds., Istoryko-kulturna spadshchyna Ukraїny, 28-32.

¹⁹ For more on the construction of Ukrainian national identity by the Ukrainian Soviet leadership and elites in the context of Stalinist ideology, Weiner, Making Sense of War; Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory. For the argument that postwar Soviet Ukrainian propaganda extensively used nationalist symbols and sentiments usually fully devoid of class rhetoric, Weiner, Making Sense of War, 352-56.

²⁰ V. Akulenko, “Zberezhennia ta vidbudova istorychnykh pamiatok na Ukraїni v roky Velykoї Vitchyznianoї viiny,” Ukraїns’kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal 5 (1973), 111. According to Soviet statistics, 1,000 monuments were destroyed in Ukraine, 347 of them beyond reconstruction. See Pamiatniki gradostroitel’stva i arkhitektury Ukraїnskoi SSR: Spravochnik-katalog. 4 vol. (Kiev, 1983). In fact, more valuable architectural items were ruined,
not universally, monument protection divisions were created in the relevant departments of local
governments (provincial, city, and district Soviets). Monuments were categorized as
architectural, artistic, and cultural. The proverbial scarcity of cadres and resources—the biggest
obstacle for all the Soviet initiatives—precluded the government from creating special
centralized departments of monument protection at the provincial or city levels.21 And yet, in
spite of all the difficulties, the 1940s and 1950s were marked by intensive restoration work all
around Ukraine.

The first priority was given to two groups of monuments. The first group commemorated
the revolution, the war, and achievements of the Soviet state. The second, initially more
numerous, group represented the official grand narrative of Ukrainian national history and its
pantheon of “saints”—a product of negotiation between the central (Moscow) authorities and
the Ukrainian establishment elites before, during, and after the war. Such items included
important old Orthodox churches and monasteries such as Saint-Sophia Cathedral and the Kiev

including 476 eastern rite churches, 53 Catholic Churches, 159 synagogues, and thousands of buildings dating from
zberezhennia (Kiev, 1998), 35.

21 Largely, in places that were not recognized as important centres of history and culture of Ukraine and the entire
Soviet Union, most of the preservationist activities were entrusted to museums of history and local lore. A series of
the Communist party central committee and government decrees institutionalized the new policies of heritage
preservation: they ordered mandatory registration of local monuments and prescribed the creation of relevant
divisions at local governments. See “Postanova RNK USSR Pro povernennia muzeinykh eksponativ” from 10
November 1944; “Postanova Rady Ministriv USSR Pro zakhody do polispennia akhronony pam’iatok kul’tury na
terytorii USSR” from 30 December 1948; “Korotka instruktsiia pro poriadok obliku, reiestratsii i utrymnannya
pam’iatnikiv mystetstva” from 2 March 1949; “Instruktsiia pro poriadok obliku, reiestratsii, utrymnannya ta
restavratsii pam’iatnikiv arkhitektury, shcho perebuvaiut’ pid derzhavnoiu okhoronoiu” from 8 April 1949 in O.
lakymenko, ed., Zakonodavstvo pro pam’iatnyky istoriï ta kul’tury (Zbirnyk normatyvnykh aktiv) (Kiev:
Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1970), 401-03; 37-46; 121-39; 335-97. For more on central and local
structure of preservationist organizations and their evolution, see also V. Horbyk et al, eds., Istoriiko-kul’turna
spadshchyna, 34–45; V. Horbyk et al., eds., Pam’iatnoznavchi studii v Ukraïni: teoriia i praktyka (Kiev, 2007), 66-
83. On 14 October 1948, the Soviet government issued a decree in an attempt to centralize and simplify protection
of monuments. The decree was mirrored in a Ukrainian government decree from 30 December 1948 “On measures
of improvement of the protection…”. According to the new decree, governments of the republics, and
administrations (Soviets) of regions, cities, and districts (or their special unified committees for monument
protection, where they existed) were directly responsible for preservation activities. See Zakonodavstvo pro
pamiatnyky istoriï ta kul’tury (zbirnyk normatyvnykh aktiv) (Kiev: Polityvdav, 1970), 37-46; also following
instructions on pp.121-45; 335-85. During the subsequent administrative reforms of the 1950s, monuments were
classified and “assigned” to different ministries.
Pechers'k Monastery of the Caves as well as the largest civic buildings of Ukraine’s capital. Apart from Kiev, the “hetman capital” Baturyn in Chernihiv region, the old-Rus city centre of Chernihiv, and several other former centres of Kievan Rus were reconstructed immediately after the war. Other objects of first-hand reconstruction were memorial museums—the “shrines” of the national bards of various calibres, including, first and foremost, the Shevchenko memorial in the place of his burial, Kaniv.22

The list of widely recognized and universally confirmed “monuments of culture and the past” was limited, but the preservationist movement and the new principle of urban planning were to be applied all around the republic. According to the new message from the highest party authorities, standard monumental propaganda, replicated throughout the Soviet Union from the capitals to remote villages, and used for routine public rituals, was no longer enough: urban planning, architectural preservation, and public culture in general had to be based on the local heritage.23 What constituted valuable and politically appropriate cultural-historical heritage in post-World War II Soviet Ukraine? This was apparently a tough question to answer for the multiple central authorities and organizations who found themselves in charge of monument preservation in postwar Ukraine, as they did not come up with an official list of monuments and

22 Other memorial museums reconstructed during and immediately after the war included memorial museums of Ivan Franko in Lviv, of Mykhalio Kotsubynskyi in Chernihiv, and of Vladimir Korolenko in Poltava. Several new museums were organized in this period, including that of Ivan Franko in Drohobych oblast, Mykola Pyrogov in Vinnitsia, and Ivan Repin in Chuguiev.

23 For recent developments of the argument that Soviet, and Stalinist in particular, urban spaces were planned, developed, and represented as local as well as Soviet and Socialist, see Dehaan, “From Nizhnii to Gor’kii: The Reconstruction of a Russian Provincial City in the Stalinist 1930s,” Karl D. Qualls, “Accommodation and agitation in Sevastopol: redefining socialist space in the postwar ‘city of glory’,” in David Crowley and Susan Emily Reid, eds., Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc (Oxford, UK. ; New York, NY: Berg Publishers, 2002); Maddox, “Healing the Wounds: Commemorations, Myths, and the Restoration of Leningrad’s Imperial Heritage.”
conservation areas subject to state protection until 1956.\textsuperscript{24} The immediate postwar decade became a time of active search for the new canons of Ukrainian urban design as well as for the overarching conceptualization of what had to be an inseparable part of it, the history of Ukrainian architecture and city building.\textsuperscript{25} Incorporating the new borderland spaces like Chernivtsi with their diverse and foreign-looking architecture was an important additional challenge in this search.

The inclusion of the heritage of the western regions in the general narrative of Ukraine’s architectural history was essential according to the postwar ideological paradigm of reunification as the ultimate historical justice acquired by the Ukrainian people. Ukrainian historians and theorists of architecture had limited knowledge of the architecture of the areas newly included into the Ukrainian body cultural—the historical regions of Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia—and were not prepared to produce “ideologically correct” interpretations of this heritage. Contemporary Ukrainian art historians were used to dealing with the three recognized pillars of Ukrainian architectural history: the Kievan Rus heritage, the recently rehabilitated Ukrainian Baroque, and the wooden “people’s architecture,” all of which

\textsuperscript{24} Pam’iatnyky arkhitektury Ukraïnskoї RSR, shcho perebuvaiut’ pid derzhavnoiu okhoronoiu (Kiev, 1956). A preliminary list of “Historical cities and populated places” in Ukraine of all-union and republican significance was created for restricted circulation. It included the cities of Kiev, Chernihiv, Lviv, Poltava, Lutsk, Volodymyr-Volynsk, Odesa, and Kamianets-Podilskyi, as well as 27 smaller towns with large numbers of architectural monuments: Batyrn, Vinnytsia, Dubno, Kozelets’, Kremenets’, Pereiaslav-Khmel’nits’kyi, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Ostroh, Khotyn, Pochaïv, and others. Chernivtsi was not included in this early list. TSDAVO, f. 4906, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 53-57; see also Horbyk et al., Istoryko-kulturna spadshchyna, 39-40.

\textsuperscript{25} Already between 1945 and 1949, the Ukrainian institute of history and theory of Aarchitecture, and P. Karchenko in particular, had worked on a project “To the question of the peculiarities of the architecture of Soviet Ukraine (theoretical research based on studying the objects and literature);” the institute of city construction in Kiev developed the project “Architecture and planning of burial places for populated places of the Ukrainian SSR;” the institute of the architecture of buildings worked on the project “Residential sections for cities of the Ukrainian SSR (classification and description with analysis and innovations…).” In cooperation, various institutions were also working on a fundamental survey of the history of architecture of the Ukrainian SSR and produced various technical instructions for the restoration of cities. Manuscripts of these projects can be found, for example, in TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 81; f. 4802, op.1, spr. 137; f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 34.
fit nicely into the concept of the strong connections and common roots of the Ukrainian and Russian cultures. The cities of the western provinces, developed under strong West European influences, did not belong to this schema. The initial reaction of many architects who worked in the late 1940s on the grand history of Ukrainian architecture, prepared under the coordination of the Ukrainian Academy of Architecture, was to reduce the architectural heritage of the western regions to the status of backward, provincial, and insignificant.

Some specialists who reviewed the collective work strongly disagreed with this approach. It is likely that they simply realized that such alterations would be too radical and obvious even for the stretched Stalinist limits of reality representation: after all, the architecture of entire cities could not be removed from museums, edited, or banned from viewing. At the same time, many of these people—representative of the intellectual elite of the Ukrainian republic—were true believers in the officially promoted idea of the unity and uniqueness of the Ukrainian nation and hence considered the heritage of their motherland to be incomplete without its western part. Whatever his underlying logic may have been, a professor of art Tsapenko, for example, argued that Marxist-Leninist methodology required a strictly scholarly and objective approach to research and that one could not freely interpret history, beautify it, and “see it as what one wants to see.” Outraged by the simplification of the Ukrainian

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26 For a Stalin-era interpretation of the wooden architecture of Ukraine, see P. H. Yurchenko, *Narodnoie zhylishche Ukrainy* (Moscow, 1941). Postwar works on Ukrainian art conceptualized the “Ukrainian Baroque” style as the potent expression of vitality of the Ukrainian people that came to Ukrainian lands in the time of the active struggle of the people for its social and national liberation and for its unique national identity. See G. Logvin, *Ukrainskoie iskusstvo* (Moscow, 1963), 201 and 235.

27 A draft of *A Survey of the History of Literature of Ukrainian SSR*. Part 2—a joint project coordinated by the Academy of Architecture of Ukrainian SSR—with some reviews and authors’ responses to reviews can be found in TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, apr. 137. The reviewed draft is dated 1951 but the work, apparently, was performed in the preceding year(s).
architectural past, he wrote in his review of a prospective chapter on the architecture of “right-bank Ukraine” (pravoberezhna Ukraїna):

One should note … an erroneous tendency of the authors of this chapter to downgrade the architecture of the right-bank and near-Carpathian Ukraine in all possible ways (since these regions were under Polish and other lordship for a long time) and, to counterbalance it, beyond the limits of scholarly objectivity, to exaggerate the significance of the left-bank architecture. Everybody knows that on the right bank—in Lviv, Kamenets-Podolsk, etc.—there are many remarkable monuments of architecture, undoubtedly more than there are on the left bank.28

Several other reviewers seemed to be in agreement with Tsapenko’s impression that, not only were the obvious connections of western Ukrainian urban architecture with Polish and “other” nations being ignored, but its ties with Russian architecture were very schematic and declarative. The critics also found it surprising that the section on wooden architecture entirely ignored numerous valuable examples of wooden churches and houses of the Carpathian region, suggesting that the methods and styles of this architecture had been developed in the forestless left-bank regions and later spread from there to the right-bank provinces. They concluded that, since scholarly literature on western Ukrainian architecture was absent, it was necessary to conduct original field research, including in this research the monuments of architecture that “were brought to Ukraine by other peoples” such as Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish religious buildings.29 Both camps of this dispute around the “western heritage” agreed on one point: they lacked knowledge of the new lands and needed new field studies of western Ukrainian architecture. It was the local architectural and urban planning authorities “in the west” who were

28 Ibid., 103. “Right and left bank” refers to the Dnieper river, considered a major historical dividing line.

29 Ibid., 5, 103-11.
expected to provide expertise and available information about the historical heritage in their regions.

2. Making Sense of Local Heritage

In Chernivtsi, the most important urban planning agents were O. Golius and Moisei Ashkinazi who initially occupied the positions of, respectively, the head and the deputy head of the newly created provincial department of architectural affairs. In October of 1945, following the creation of the republican committee of architectural affairs, the executive committee of the Chernivtsi provincial Soviet created an architectural-artistic council at the provincial architectural department. Apart from Golius and Ashkinazi, the council had nine members, including the head of the provincial arts department, the chief engineer of the provincial department of communal services, the chief artist of the local newspapers, and other authorities in the fields of art and urban development. The wide range of tasks of the council included the planning and design of streets, squares, buildings, monuments, parks, small architectural forms, and the interiors of buildings, evaluation of works of arts, protection of monuments of architecture, and urban gardening. At the same time, two more entities—the provincial architectural commission and an expert bureau—were created at the architectural department. In 1944, there also existed a position of chief architect of Chernivtsi province. It was soon done

30 DAChO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 714, ark. 1; f. 932, op. 1, spr. 347, ark. 1; f. 1245, op.1, spr.1, ark.1-3. Both Golius and Ashkinazi, incidentally, were among the important newcomers who had arrived in Chernivtsi in 1944 and received high priority in the distribution of apartments according to a “high order.” DAChO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 714, ark. 1.

31 DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 347, ark. 1.
away with and, in fact, replaced by the position of the chief city architect who supervised another planning organization, the chief architect’s administration.32

It was the chief architect’s administration that was directly responsible for the supervision of reconstruction and urban planning in the city of Chernivtsi, until the organization was abolished in 1955 during the all-Union administrative reform.33 After a succession of acting chief architects, Moisei Ashkinazi was appointed the acting (13 March 1945) and ultimately the actual (20 January 1949) chief architect of the city.34 On 24 January 1945, “in connection with the large volume of architectural planning works in the city,” an architectural planning workshop was created under the administration of the chief architect, with Golius in the role of its head engineer.35 All the listed institutions were closely connected not only because they dealt with the same or related projects, but also because many of them shared members and even leaders. In addition, a number of entities were, in one way or another, in charge of the city’s and the province’s architecture and cultural heritage, including the provincial department of communal services, the provincial department of housing, the healthcare department, the

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32 DAChO, f. 1245, op.1, spr.1, ark.1-3. The position of the chief architect of Chernivtsi is never mentioned after October 1944. Possibly, it was a misnomer initially used for the chief architect of the city of Chernivtsi which was a standard position in the USSR.

33 In January of 1955, most administrations of chief city architects (excepting capitals and cities of extraordinary importance) were liquidated as redundant by a decree of the republican department of architecture. The position of chief city architect was transferred to provincial departments of architecture affiliated with provincial Soviets. Where they existed, the positions of inspectors of monument protection were also liquidated. Therefore, in 1955 Ashkinazi remained the chief architect but reported directly to the head of the provincial architectural department. DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 119, ark. 7, 2, 3, 4. At the same time, the department of architecture itself was renamed the department of construction and architectural affairs DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 120, ark. 42.

34 It seems that finding a suitable candidate for the position of Chief Architect was a complicated task. The last acting chief architect before Ashkinazi was Golius who had to temporarily give up his work as the head of the provincial Architectural Department. DAChO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 9-10. It took four years for Ashkinazi to be appointed the actual Chief Architect. The decree about his appointment was issued in Moscow and signed by the head of the all-union committee of architectural affairs. DAChO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 38, ark. 1. It could be Ashkinazi’s Jewish background that delayed his appointment, given the general context of postwar antisemitism as well as the specific demographic situation in postwar Chernivtsi.

35 DAChO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 3.
department of arts, and multiple smaller entities such as construction and restoration bureaus. (An important share of construction and restorative work in the USSR was conducted by separate enterprises or industrial clusters, *vedomstva*, in addition to state construction.) Together with several local museums, they constituted an impressive team of preservation and urban planning professionals in the general conditions of the postwar shortage of cadres.

The major tasks of all these officials included daily maintenance of the city, defining its future development, and evaluating and preserving its local heritage. The latter was the foundation for the first two; it was necessary in order to decide what to keep and use for daily life and socialist progress, what to protect as precious monuments of the past, and what to destroy for future urban development. These were not easy questions in Stalin’s era when people’s positions, and sometimes even lives, could depend on their ability to read and interpret blurred messages from the centre.

The first local postwar vision of Chernivtsi’s urban development, produced by the city’s chief architect in the form of a working plan for 1945, still reflected the prewar approach to urban planning, which presented the city as a typical capitalist “city of contrasts” characterized by the outer glitter of its bourgeois appearance and the rotten essence of degeneration and social ills. The working plan of 1945 was quite ambitious and definitely oriented toward extensive reconstruction according to ideal Soviet urban standards; it was all about reducing the “chaos” of its capitalist structure and beautifying the city. These tasks were supposed to be the first step in the process of the development of the ultimate blueprint—the general city plan—and included

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exploration, accounting, and measurements in the short term in order to produce a general plan for the proper, structured and socially oriented, development of the city in the long term. Quite soon, however, Soviet planners in Chernivtsi must have realized that acting according to the plan was a challenging task in postwar Soviet reality.

With so many agents and institutions involved in urban development, communication between Chernivtsi and Kiev planners was complicated and often influenced by personal relationships between particular agents as much as it reflected the general characteristics of the “Soviet administrative system.” One can trace reasonably accurately how general messages and concrete information travelled between the centre and the regions, influencing and transforming each other, in the example of discussions about urban gardening in Chernivtsi. Because the importance of sufficient green areas in Soviet cities was one of the central premises of Soviet urban planning, verdurization of newly incorporated “capitalist and unhealthy” urban spaces was a necessity.

Data initially submitted by Chernivtsi statisticians suggested that the number of green areas in the city core was suspiciously high for a “capitalist” city of western Ukraine. Kiev ordered a rechecking of the data and attached detailed instructions that could be used to correct—or manipulate—the quantity of green zones in Chernivtsi. I was not able to locate a response to this particular request, but the message about “greening inferiority” was clearly

37 Upon completing the geological and seismic exploration, local specialists were expected to prepare the basic plan (opornyi plan) of the city. This plan was to determine destroyed and damaged objects to be reconstructed or restored, “systematize certain districts,” re-design several major streets, and suggest areas for new construction. The plan also had to set strict requirements and norms as to beautification of the city. The working plan can be found in DACHO, f.1245, op.1, spr.2.

38 See explanatory note and correspondence with Chernivtsi Gosplan representative P. Grinenko TsDAVO, f. 582, op. 12, spr. 128, ark. 212.
internalized by local city planners, at least on the level of ritualized bureaucratic “Bolshevik speak.” Even if they continued to consider their city the greenest corner of Soviet Ukraine when they took their children for walks in local parks, they made greening the number one priority of city beautification—and a comparatively easy way to report steady progress in Sovietization in the future, too.39

The city central park, renamed after the official head of the Soviet state, Mikhail Kalinin, became a subject of particular attention and, eventually, of pride for Chernivtsi city planners and authorities. Chernivtsi-based planners adapted the requirement of “greening” to the conditions of their already green city by interpreting it to themselves and to the public as civilizing or culturing of the green space and thus “turning it into a real place of cultural recreation,” connecting the tasks of urban gardening and the mission of Sovietization of Chernivtsi both literally and metaphorically, helping bring the city closer to the image of “green” and primordial Ukrainian Bukovina.40 Ultimately, a pervasive myth was created that attributed the “greening” of Chernivtsi to its Sovietization, based on the messages exchanged between authorities in Kiev and the Chernivtsi urban planning teams.41 Whether they believed in their own new language or

39 For example, see a report in DAChO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 4. The perception of postwar Chernivtsi as a very green city was mentioned in my conversations with several former and current residents of the city, including Mikhail Zhylin, Eleonora Solovei, and Natalia Shevchenko, all cited earlier in this work.

40 Quote from DAChO, f. 932, op. 1367, ark. 12. Also, see DAChO, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 902, ark. 202, 203, 204-5, 275-6 on staffing, beautification of the city park, and assigning it to the first category of parks of Ukraine; f. 3, op. 2, spr. 982, ark. 94-97. For a report from1947-1948 from the director of the park Ia. Sabranskii on the improvements in the park’s work and its influence on the “cultural upbringing of citizens” and propaganda, f. 3, op. 2, spr. 1059, ark. 24.

41 Memoirs and photographs of late Romanian Chernivtsi attest to the fact that it was a very green city; early Soviet reports quoted above confirm this. A working survey of Chernivtsi architecture by the Architectural Department from the early 1950s concedes the high number of green areas to be one of the best features of the city but characterizes them as wild and chaotic (DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 367, ark. 9); finally, a published history of Chernivtsi’s architecture from the 1960s totally ignores the “green” part of pre-Soviet Chernivtsi, stating only that “a characteristic feature of [the central districts] is almost a complete absence of green plantation.” Iu. F. Khokhol, Iu. S. Kovaliov, Chernivtsi. Istoryko-arkhitekturnyi narys (Kiev: Budivel’nyk, 1966), 28, 48.
not, the urban planners of Chernivtsi were gradually learning to speak Bolshevik, which in the context of postwar Chernivtsi was to speak Soviet Ukrainian, at least to the wider and official audiences. 42

At the same time, routine internal documents suggest that in more intimate situations such as closed-door professional discussions Chernivtsi’s architectural and planning specialists allowed themselves to talk plainly and to use professional language when evaluating the city’s heritage and their attitudes toward it. On 29 June 1948 the architectural commission of the architectural department met to discuss a purely professional matter: the painting of an ordinary building in the city centre. The façade of the building—the central filial of the state savings bank—was painted with a regular paint of a colour that was available at the moment. The fact was noticed by the department’s head Golius who was outraged by the tastelessness and lack of professionalism of the person who ordered the painting: the bank had been initially finished with a special, expensive type of stucco that could be simply washed to restore its initial look and colour. Golius and many other urban designers were convinced that painting a beautiful example of public architecture spoiled it.

The situation was complicated even more by the fact that the person who ordered the controversial act of “beautification” was discovered to be Ashkinazi. The city’s chief architect was rather confident, blatant, and even rude (in Golius’s opinion) in defending his position. The members of the commission also seemed frank and emotional when criticizing Ashkinazi’s

42 The concept of “Bolshevik speak” was proposed by Stephen Kotkin to describe the obligatory official language for self-identification and self-expression in Stalinist society (see Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain) Even earlier, Jan Gross conceptualized the Stalinist regime as one that depended largely on the “destruction of language” (along with the destruction of communities) so that “the structure of language was radically modified, the speech was ritualized, and there was no more lapse in time between naming and judging.” Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 237, and elsewhere in the book.
approach. Architect Stanitskii who performed duties related to monument protection noted that the case with the savings bank was quite typical, as “[i]n a number of cases newly painted buildings of the city lose their architectural value.” Stanitskii continued: “…a lack of serious attitude to the choice of colour, to its relation with the character of the architecture and the [concrete] ensemble leads to the degradation of the outer appearance of many important areas of squares and major streets of the city.” The engineer Matisanov also remarked: “…we came to a beautiful and well-maintained city; its buildings were decorated with great taste, and we start to reveal a cheap painting (maliarnyi) approach. I am outraged by the painting of the bank building and spoiling of the marble-based stucco.”

The commission unanimously recognized Ashkinazi’s colossal misjudgment and decided to inform the city council and the republican architectural department in Kiev about the worrisome trend. The architects also considered it necessary to remove the paint from the building. This and similar cases suggest that many architects were able and willing to “read” the city according to their tastes and universal professional standards rather than according to state ideology and policies of urban planning dictated by the authorities in various forms. For these specialists, the city in its entirety rather than a restricted list of politically meaningful monuments seemed to have had high material and aesthetic value.

43 DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, srp. 359, ark. 45.

44 In addition to the quoted and similar criticisms of Ashkinazi’s allegedly negligent attitude to the city’s architecture, the file contains a numbers of notes concerning similar cases of this “cheap painting approach.” The cases were made known by the local and Kiev authorities; however, Ashkinazi’s career did not seem to suffer as a result. Golius, on the contrary, surrendered his position as head of the provincial architectural department in 1952. It must be noted that in some instances the choice of colour, painting materials, and even the decision to paint were made by construction workers themselves. In a situation of scarcity of materials and complicated bureaucracy of construction works, it was hard to control the execution. See DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 359, ark. 45, 49.
One more aspect of the bank stucco case should be noted: in this conflict, Ashkinazi represented not only an architect but also a bureaucrat and an administrator who tried to balance his various tasks and roles. Additional challenges probably resulted from the complexity and controversy of his position: not only was he caught between Chernivtsi and Kiev, professionalism and bureaucracy, but probably also caught between his identities as a Jew and a Soviet citizen in an atmosphere of fear during Stalin’s antisemitic campaign.45 One of his major challenges at this stressful time was evaluating the architectural heritage of Chernivtsi and creating a list of protected monuments, as requested by the republican centre.

The only object of architecture in Chernivtsi that had already been recognized as a monument of high value worthy of reconstruction and preservation for future generations was the former residence of the Orthodox Metropolitans. In fact, the residence was the only urban monument in Chernivtsi that ever appeared on the list of architectural monuments of republican significance. The damage of the residence was quite serious: its most beautiful interiors (the marble hall, the blue salon, and the refectory) were completely ruined. As early as August of 1945, the initial reconstruction of the palaces was already in process and would last throughout the first postwar decade and beyond, resulting eventually in the full reconstruction, as accurately and precisely as possible, of the palace complex.46

45 For example, in November of 1948 city council pressed the chief city architect and the head of a beautification trust on a better fulfillment of plans, keeping up with deadlines, paying more attention to road construction and greening. At the same time, city authorities ordered to strengthen control over the outer design of streets, buildings, squares “in strict accordance with the architectural-planning principles of the city’s development,” clearly referring to the “cheap painting” cases. DACHO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 9.

46 M. Ashkinazi authored the initial reconstruction project (DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 350, ark. 12-14.) The reconstruction was completed in 1957-1958 under the supervision of another local architect Shevchenko who later occupied the position of the chief architect of Chernivtsi. (DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 191, ark.6.)
At the same time, work on the presentation of the palace complex as a masterpiece of architectural art was in process. The eventual interpretation of the residence that became an inseparable part of all the introductions to Chernivtsi of Soviet times differed significantly from the initial “reading” of the residence in 1940. If the 1940 version stressed the social oppression and reactionary role of the church in a drive to awaken class identity in the palace’s visitors, the postwar interpretation, repeated in the local press, popular literature, and film, was all about the national heritage of Bukovinian Ukrainians revealed in the spirit of the “people’s masters” who created the palace under the guidance of a fellow Slav, the well-known Czech Joseph Hlávka.47

The only monument of architecture of “local significance” that local architects recognized already in 1945—based on its age and “folk” character—was the wooden church of Saint Nicholas dating from 1607.48 Its value was established in the light of the prewar reviews of Bukovinian and western Ukrainian architecture by central Ukrainian architectural

47For example, a survey of Chernivtsi architecture by a Kiev architect written in 1940 mentioned the residence as “one of the monuments that deserve serious attention” and only briefly pointed to the commonalities between the residence’s décor and “Hutsul ornaments.” (Povstenko, “Chernivtsi [Z vrazhen’ uchasnyka ekskursii kyiv’skykh architektoriv po pivnichnii Bukovyni]”: 21-22). The postwar architectural analyses of the complex developed the argument about the presence of truly Ukrainian art in the forms and décor of the residence. See I. Vynokur, B. Tymoshchuk, Istoryko-architekturnyi pam’iatnyk v Chernivtsiakh – kolyshnia resydentsiia Bukovyns’kyi mytropolytiv (korotkyi dovidnyk) (Chernivtsi, 1958); Obzor po istorii arkhitektury goroda Chernnovtsy, DACHo, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 367, ark. 11; Khokhol, Chernivtsi, 31-33; Moisei Ashkinazi, Svít dyvnoi starovyny (Užhorod: Karpaty, 1969), 102-7. The Residence was featured as the architectural symbol of the city. It often appeared as the only urban landscape in postwar film chronicles and documentaries dedicated to Northern Bukovina and the western Ukrainian regions in general: M. Yudin, “Bukovyna. In two parts.” USSR: Ukrains’ka studiia dokumental’nykh fil’miv, 1945; G. Tasin, “Novaia zhyn’.” USSR: Ukrains’ka studiia kinokhroniki, 1949; M. Shapsai, “Universytet na Bukovyni.” USSR: Ukrains’ka studiia khronikal’no-dokumental’nykh fil’miv, 1953; M. Kononov, “Na Bukovyni (do 15-richchia voz’iednannia).” USSR: Ukrains’ka studiia khronikal’no-dokumental’nykh fil’miv, 1955. The role of the residence in postwar popular narratives about the city is also discussed in the next chapter.

48The Saint Nicholas Orthodox church was the only monument mentioned in the section dealing with monument preservation of the 1945 working plan developed by the chief architect’s administration. DACHo, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 3.
authorities.\(^{49}\) Sorting out and classifying the rest of the stone heritage of the city turned into one of the major challenges for the urban planning specialists and local authorities responsible for cultural affairs. Central guidelines, even when they were issued, were of little help.\(^{50}\) The usual candidates for most-valuable-monuments-status, such as items representing Kievan Rus architecture, Ukrainian baroque, and artifacts from the time of the war of liberation of the seventeenth century, or even the less-valued large late medieval and early modern military fortifications, were absent from the city.

At the same time, the “miracle city” looked too pretty and tasteful to many architects dispatched by the Soviet government to Chernivtsi to be declared absolutely worthless in terms of architectural heritage, regardless of the generally negative urban characteristics that haunted Chernivtsi from 1940 until the collapse of the Soviet system. Pressed by Kiev for information, architectural authorities in Chernivtsi looked for clues to the initial evaluation of their city’s heritage in the sources they could locate and access. When no information about an architectural item or a memorial was found, they used a combination of general guidelines, professional judgment, and simple logic, all three of which were at times in conflict with one another.

Between 1947 and 1949, the Chernivtsi architectural authorities produced several drafts of an official registry of “monuments of culture and the past of local significance” of Chernivtsi


\(^{50}\) In October of 1948, Golius, Ashkinazi, and other specialists received and read a Soviet government decree “On the measures of improvement of protection of monuments of architecture.” It probably was disappointing in terms of practical help. For the text of the 1948 decree, see *Zakonodavstvo pro pam’iatnyky*, 37-38; DACHO, f. 932, op.1, spr. 363, ark. 20-21.
Each consecutive draft was slimmer than the prior one. None of the architectural items eventually remaining on the list were deemed to be of significance beyond the “local”—in other words, none of them, allegedly, added significant value to the body cultural of Ukraine. It is important to note that monuments of local significance, as opposed to those of republican significance that were funded by the republican centre, were a heavy burden for local budgets, which led local party and state officials to resist adding any new item to the “local” list while they welcomed any opportunity to shorten this registry. At the same time, four “cultural-educational” (as opposed to architectural) monuments of republican significance were identified in Chernivtsi province. These included the newly created memorial museums of Yuri Fed’kovych and Ol’ha Kobylians’ka; remnants of a settlement belonging to the Neolithic Trypillia culture that would later acquire importance for the grand historical narrative of the Ukrainian people; and the fortress of Khotyn, the second largest urban centre of Chernivtsi province that historically had belonged to Bessarabia. These four “cultural” monuments were identified already in 1940-1941 with the active participation of politically reliable local Ukrainians and according to the strict scale of values provided by Kiev.

In 1947, these monuments were considered to be pre-approved valuable “cultural landmarks” which entered the annals of Ukrainian history. 

Easily interpreted in national Ukrainian terms, these monuments marked the borders of the Ukrainian polity that was defined, in the absence of political independence, largely in ethnic and cultural language. In the “local” category, the list of “cultural monuments” included a set of natural sites “covered with folk

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51 DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 363; f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 15.

52 See chapter two on the initial process of identifying valuable historic sites and monuments in Chernivtsi and the province.
legends” that promoted the image of a charming and romantic but backward mountain-dwelling population, the Hutsuls.53

When the final registry of monuments of Chernivtsi province was produced in 1949, it was missing an item that had been previously questioned but kept on the list—the Jewish Reformist Temple. The process of decision-making about the Temple can be followed by noting the red underlining and a question mark written by an unknown official who was reading one of the preliminary drafts of the list, and its eventual exclusion from the final list.54 Silently and anonymously, whether by order of a local authority or directive from the centre, or by collective oral decision, the fate of the only half-destroyed important architectural landmark of Chernivtsi was decided: it was not to be restored in its original form and protected, as the Residence of the Bukovinian and Dalmatian Metropolitans had been. What to do with the ruin was still an open question, though.

When guidelines from the centre were not expressed explicitly in memoranda and decrees, they could be received, in more stressful circumstances, directly from the highest Soviet authorities who were much better at identifying the “mistakes” of their subordinates than providing them with clear proactive directions. Such was the case with another pre-Soviet urban site in Chernivtsi, the monument to the fallen soldiers of the “Chernivtsi regiment” in the Habsburg imperial army, known as the “Black Eagle.” The monument, initially evaluated by local Soviet architects as one with neutral political meaning and high aesthetic quality, was included initially in the 1949 registry. When later in the same year Ukraine’s first party

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53 An example of such popular and natural memorial sites was a cave where a half-mythical figure, the local Robin Hood-type character Oleksa Dovbush, allegedly hid from imperial authorities. DACH, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 363, ark. 2.

54 For the list draft with handwritten underlining, DACH, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 363, ark. 2.
secretary and at the time the most fervent champion of Soviet Ukrainian nation-building, Nikita Khrushchev, visited Chernivtsi, he allegedly was infuriated by such a politically inappropriate monument in the centre of the city. Either upon his direct order or as an act of precaution, the monument was hastily blown up, which event was justified post factum in a local decree on the aesthetic improvement of the intersection.\textsuperscript{55}

The exclusion of the Temple from the list of local monuments and the demise of the “Black Eagle” memorial—both objects that were associated with local multiculturalism—were strongly influenced by the “anti-cosmopolitan campaign” of the late 1940s-early 1950s. However, none of the decisions that had been made about the historical heritage of Chernivtsi during Stalin’s raging antisemitic campaign was reversed after its final act, the “Doctors’ Plot,” was over and Stalin was dead in 1953. On the contrary, when around the mid-1950s the new official vision of Chernivtsi urban development began acquiring delineated forms, it was based on an ethnicity-based and exclusivist understanding of Ukrainian culture that did not accommodate any “monuments brought by other peoples” that were discussed as potentially valuable by some Kiev architects in 1951.

In July of 1953, after years of vague messages between Chernivtsi and Kiev regarding the composition of the local registry of monuments of culture and the past, a specialist equipped with the “correct” approach arrived to assess the city’s heritage. The task of the researcher from the Kiev institute of history and theory of architecture, Iu. Khokhol, was to document and photograph those buildings deemed “most characteristic of the city” and to study all the

\textsuperscript{55} DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 363, ark. 10. After the demolition of the monument, a brass container with a founding document was discovered under the pedestal. The note, which was apparently transferred to the archive upon discovery, could finally shed light on the date and details of the erection of the monument, provided the investigators had the necessary linguistic skills. At that point, however, the details hardly mattered as the department of architecture was relieved from investigating and taking care of this troublesome item. The document was finally investigated in the 1990s by Chernivtsi archivist Maria Nykyrsa.
available planning documents. This material was needed for *A History of the Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR* that was being prepared by the institute.\(^5^6\) The work of academic architects and preservationists in Chernivtsi province continued for the next several years.\(^5^7\)

This research work and similar activities all over Ukraine bore fruit in 1956. A Soviet Ukrainian government decree of 23 March 1956 launched a new round of inspection and documentation of monuments of culture and the past.\(^5^8\) This time, local specialists were provided with a clear guide: the first postwar officially published registry of monuments of the Ukrainian SSR under state protection.\(^5^9\) After the much anticipated registry arrived in the offices of the chief city architect Ashkinazi and the new head of the provincial architectural department Korablin in July of 1956, and the architects were relieved of the responsibility of continuous decision-making about local architecture, the inspections of local monuments began without delay and were completed by the end of the month. Of the province’s 64 approved monuments, 52 were active religious institutions, in which case religious communities were responsible for their maintenance. The majority of the remaining 12 objects were officially “transferred to the budgets of the local Soviets.”\(^6^0\)

The only major question concerning monument preservation in Chernivtsi was the ruin of the Jewish Temple located in the core of the city. It was a source of embarrassment for local

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\(^5^6\) DAChO, f.932, op.1, spr.86, ark. 16.

\(^5^7\) In July 1956, Khokhol was followed by a scholarly-research architectural expedition headed by architect Rudnitskyi from Lviv polytechnic institute. The Lviv team conducted investigation of “village buildings of personal and public usage.” DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 170, ark. 21-22, 23, 24.

\(^5^8\) Ibid., ark. 3.

\(^5^9\) See *Pam’iatnyky arkhitektury Ukraïns’koï RSR, shcho perebuvaiut’ pid derzhavnoiu okhoronoiu.*

\(^6^0\) These items included four churches that were closed and already under protection of local Soviets; four rural buildings were transferred to the balance of local Soviets who were to restore them and were allowed to use them without harming the architectural properties; one was a residential house in the possession of a *kolkhoz* member.
authorities, visitors, and local residents. This is how Natalia Shevchenko, who came to
Chernivtsi in the 1940s as a child, described the ruin much later:

[Chernivtsi] was spared by the war, but when one turned toward the then Officers’
House on the Theatre square, one faced a huge carcass of a building with black
eyeholes of arched windows. The skeleton of the dome was clearly defined against
the background of the sky.

We children explored these ruins, slightly scared but mostly curious. ... Piles of fallen
stucco on the floor, burned wooden poles, blackened walls, bright sky instead of a
roof, deformed wire sticking out from all corners, and thin and high, surprisingly
well-preserved cast iron columns that supported the dome—this is how the ruin
looked. The silent remains were revolting but simultaneously irresistibly attractive.61

In October of 1956, the issue reached a high-level Moscow-based periodical, The
Literary Paper (Literaturnaia gazeta), thanks to a letter written by a group of Chernivtsi
students who complained about the condition of some of the architectural monuments in
Chernivtsi, including the Temple. In the course of the ensuing investigation launched by local
authorities, the then head of the provincial architectural department, Korablin, remarked: “The
building of the former synagogue on University Street constructed in pseudo-Moresque style is
not an architectural monument. The frame of the building cannot be used for any public
institution due to technical reasons.” Moreover, added Korablin, the reconstruction of the
complex street intersection required that the half-ruined building be demolished.62 The students
who wrote the letter were confused about the ruined Temple: they interpreted the long presence

(Translation from Russian is mine; cited with the author’s permission.)

62 DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 170, ark. 37.
of its frame in the centre of the city as a sign of its architectural and cultural value rather than what it was, a symbol of the long-lasting helpless confusion of Chernivtsi’s architectural authorities about the ruin of the Temple and the past Jewish urban culture of the city. By the time Korablin received their letter, the situation had been clarified: the remnants were to be demolished rather than reconstructed.

3. Planning and Building for the Future

While dealing with the challenges of sorting out the historical heritage of the town, the chief architect Ashkinazi was also preoccupied with the development of the scheme for the general city plan—an intermediary stage in the process of urban planning—as prescribed by his working plan prepared in 1945. After several years of work, much of which consisted of a struggle with various organizations to have them perform the necessary preparatory work such as geological and geodetic examinations, he completed an initial draft of the scheme and submitted it to the Chernivtsi architectural department and to the city and provincial Soviets. The draft provoked fierce criticism on a range of matters, from the technicalities of sewerage planning to heritage preservation and design of the major public spaces. The major problem that the extended community of local city planners found in Ashkinazi’s work was his “modest scope” of planning.

The “modest scope” of Ashkinazi’s proposal seemed to be in accordance with the already mentioned Classification of Cities produced in Kiev in 1946. A close reading of the

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63 See DACHO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 39, ark. 4; TsDAVO, f. 4906, op .1, spr. 642, ark. 89-92.

64 DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 356, ark. 14.

65 Klassifikatsiia gorodov USSR, TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 36.
Classification suggests that politics rather than the simple logic of economic numbers was at play: the characterizations of certain cities start in the present tense and move into the future, while the descriptions of others begin in the past and end in the present. Between the lines one can read the predetermination to push Lviv, Stanislaviv, and eventually Uzhgorod forward, while “slowing down” the projected development of Chernivtsi. The Classification demonstrated the outstanding potential of both Chernivtsi and Lviv against the background of urban devastation characteristic of most Ukrainian cities. The city of Lviv, in spite of its remarkable prior diversity, offered significant symbolic meaning for the mythology of Ukrainian nation-building. It also had lost most of its Jewish population in the Holocaust. Both conditions allowed Soviet planners to embark on the successful re-conceptualization of Lviv from a capitalist and foreign city into an important centre of Ukrainian industry as well as culture and “the third city [in Ukraine] after Kyiv and Chernihiv,” a long process that would last into the 1980s.

The Classification predicted a rather pessimistic future for Chernivtsi: a city with “comparatively weakly developed industry.” Chernivtsi was to “continue to be first of all an administrative and cultural centre.” One reason for the marginal position of Chernivtsi in the emerging official narrative of ultimate reunification of all Ukrainian lands (and cities) could be the city’s proximity to the state border, unusual for a large Soviet urban centre. In the context of

66 For more on this, see Svitlana Frunchak, “Tvorennia ‘davnioho ukraïns’koho mista’: zberezhnennia spadshchyny ta konstruiuvannia mis’koï identychnosti u povoiennykh Chernivtsiah” (translated from English by Iryna Sklokina), Skhid/Zakhid. Istoryko-kul’turolohichni zbirnyk 15: Problemy istorychnoi urbanistyky (Kharkiv: NTMT, 2011): 175-204.


68 Klassifikatsiia gorodov USSR, TsDAVO, f. 4802., op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 189-92.
postwar Soviet Ukraine, however, the dead-end position of Chernivtsi became an issue not only of state security but also of a national cultural system. Just as the frontier location of a comparatively large city was not desirable for the political map of the Soviet Union, the contents of the city’s urban space did not fit well into the imagined map of Ukrainian national culture. Postwar Chernivtsi was still strongly dominated by Jewish cultural and social life, could not claim any significant place in the national mythology of Ukrainian people, and was devoid of architectural monuments that could be easily branded “national Ukrainian.” An urban planner of Stalin’s era had enough reasons to “hide” such a city behind the tags of provinciality and mediocre architectural significance.

Unlike Ashkinazi, the rest of the local urban planners in Chernivtsi seemed to be in agreement to reject such a restricted scheme for the development of their city.\(^{69}\) They put forward three serious arguments. The first, major one, went directly against Kiev’s claim about the purely cultural and administrative nature of the city and its limited industrial base. As the head of the provincial general planning department, Aleksandrov, summarized it, the city had “rather solid prospects of industrial development as a major city-forming factor.”\(^{70}\) This claim was based on the expectation, widely popularized in the USSR, of rapid industrial growth in the country over the next 15 to 20 years.\(^{71}\) The second criticism followed from the first one: the

\(^{69}\) A major discussion took place at the joint meeting of the provincial architectural and planning commissions between 6 and 8 January 1948. Protocols of the meeting and additional materials can be found in DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 356.

\(^{70}\) DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 356, ark. 16.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., ark.6, 14.
city’s territory had to be expanded to accommodate the forthcoming intensive industrial development.72

The third critical argument concerned Ashkinazi’s number for predicted population growth—114,000 by the end of the fourth five-year plan. The historical method of prediction used by Ashkinazi was criticized as inadequate for a city that was being turned from a capitalist into a socialist one, which, it was believed, changed the pattern of its development. Based on a combination of available data such as election lists and materials of the state registration organs, most of the planners came up with a projected population of 200,000.73

Although various local architects and planners of Chernivtsi had very different ideas about the particular details of Chernivtsi’s landscape, it seems that most of them wanted a more grandiose future for their city. Moreover, they already saw a strong foundation for such a grandiose future. They praised the abundance of spacious and beautiful public and administrative buildings and noted that there was no need to waste the state’s budget on construction of new quarters for local government organs, as was suggested in Ashkinazi’s

72 In fact, the provincial Soviet had issued a decree in November of 1949 that required the architectural department to develop schemes of planning for Sadgora and Chernivtsi as a single urban centre, predetermining the merger of the industrial area on the left bank of Prut with the city. Ibid., ark.15; 19; 6.

73 In 1945, the central Ukrainian statistical department estimated the population of Chernivtsi at 112,400 as of 1 January 1944 (apparently, according to Romanian sources) and at 40,486 at the time of “liberation,” 29 March 1944. The latter number was probably very approximate. See *Svodnyie raboty. Ekonomicheskaia kharakteristika Chernovitskoi oblasti Ukrainskoi SSR posle osvobozhdeniia. 1945g.*, TsDAVO, f. 582, op. 2, spr. 73, ark. 2. When arguing for the considerably higher number of 200,000 (others suggested numbers between 150,000 and 300,000), Chernivtsi Gosplan representative Aleksandrov used data from local police and administrative organs, primarily ZAGS (Registry of acts of civic status) to demonstrate that the pre-1944 size of the population had probably been already surpassed by 1948. DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 356, ark.15; 6; 7. Most of the immediate population growth is explained by the mass return of Jews from Transnistria and an influx of Jewish survivors from other regions of eastern Europe and the USSR as well as mass in-migration of Soviet cadres, followed by a wave of demobilized soldiers. The issue of predicted population growth for Chernivtsi was forwarded to Kiev. Eventually, Kiev statisticians agreed on the updated methodology and the larger number of 150,000. TsDAVO, f. 4906, op. 1, spr. 642, ark. 100-4; f.1245, op.1, spr.28, ark.1-2.
scheme. “Not many oblast centres in the Soviet Union”— argued the same Aleksandrov—“have their provincial Soviet’s executive committees in such buildings as we do in Chernivtsi.”

Of course, Chernivtsi planners expressed their visions of a bright urban future for their home city in the only language available for public discussion—the official Soviet discourse—suggesting that Chernivtsi should be fully reconceived, in terms of its cityscape, as a big, beautiful Soviet city. “The author [that is, Ashkinazi] did not allow himself enough courage,” suggested Golius. He continued: “[n]ow, in the time of the city’s second birth, we need to be courageous; there will be no other time.” Golius was annoyed, for example, by the fact that the city silhouette was largely determined by pediments and cathedrals and insisted on the need to create a new silhouette for the city. He also proposed getting rid of the “yard constructions”—the outhouses and side wings—to “space out” the city centre. Another worker of the provincial planning department was concerned with the preserved pre-Soviet patterns of urban behaviour: “Kobylianskaia street [formerly Herrengasse] should not be the place for masses of people to be walking in the Chernivtsi of the future.” In his opinion, a wide boulevard, more appropriate for a Soviet city, had to be planned.

At the same time, the commission of experts recommended excluding from Ashkinazi’s list of first-priority plans as unrealistic his project to get rid of the Soviet square that was the highest and the newest square of the city, the former Austria Platz, and to organize three district

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74 DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 356, ark. 16.
75 Ibid., ark. 5.
76 Ibid., ark. 6.
77 Ibid., ark. 7.
squares instead.\textsuperscript{78} One can only speculate whether it was due to banal scarcity, planners’
common sense, respect for the local past, or affection toward their city disguised as rational
budget planning, that the historic structure of Chernivtsi’s centre was saved.

Upon the recommendation of the commission planners in Chernivtsi province,
Ashkinazi’s scheme was not approved. Golius was to update it, taking into account the above
criticisms. The new recommended predicted population was 200,000.\textsuperscript{79} A year later, in
December of 1948, the conclusions of the commission together with the scheme were sent to
Kiev for final consideration. After discussion at the republican department of architecture, a
group of central experts concluded that the scheme needed more work. Most important, they
were convinced of “favourable conditions for the location of new enterprises in the city due to
the existence of considerable housing stock and the possibility of reasonable dislocation of
industrial zones.” It was also deemed necessary to inform the central planning agencies of the
republic and the USSR about the city’s urban and industrial capacity.\textsuperscript{80} Ashkinazi was sent back
to Chernivtsi with more homework. Local city designers, it seemed, had won one battle with
central planners: their city could, in the end, have a greater Soviet future based on industrial
progress.

As he continued his work sorting out local architectural monuments and developing the
ill-starred scheme of the general plan, Ashkinazi also had to supervise the current work on the

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., ark.4.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., ark.19. It is not clear for what period this population growth was predicted; Chernivtsi planners also argued
over the planning period. Usually, general plans were written for periods between 10 to 20 years.
\textsuperscript{80} DACHO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 28, ark.1-2; TsDAVO, f.4906, op. 1, spr. 642, ark. 105.
“beautification and improvement of the architectural appearance of the city.”\textsuperscript{81} It was not an easy task with no official plan in hand to consult or justify one’s decisions, no clear official vision of the city’s heritage to use as a guide, and a number of controversial assignments from different agencies.\textsuperscript{82} Construction projects of the late 1940s and early 1950s that were quoted in official reports included the restoration of the ruined wing of the former Metropolitans’ Residence, construction of a new department store and a multi-storeyed warehouse attached to the university library, and reconstruction of several plants that allegedly turned them from “dwarf” enterprises into “new industrial objects of state significance.”\textsuperscript{83}

The year 1949 was also marked by the emerging of the city’s major “palace of culture” (officially designated for Chernivtsi’s then most typical proletariat, the textile workers).\textsuperscript{84} Full of details about upgrading washrooms and the heating system and the construction of a stage for mass performances, architectural reports of course did not mention how at the height of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign all the overtly Judaic symbols had been removed from the former “Jewish national house.” Even the corners of countless stars of David, entwined into the banisters of this impressive stone achievement of the city’s Jewish community, were neatly cut

\textsuperscript{81} See a survey on Chernivtsi architecture for internal use, dating from the early 1950s, DACH, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 367, ark. 11. One of the city architects, Stanitskyi, also wrote in a report to Kiev that in 1953 “measures on city planning currently [we]re limited to the general beautification and organization of the administrative centres and park zones.” DACH, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 95, ark. 2.

\textsuperscript{82} For example, provincial architectural authorities were given a task to compose a complex scheme of agricultural construction within city limits. The new head of the provincial architectural department, Korablin, considered this Ashkinazi’s job. The latter did not fulfill the assignment and blamed the chronic and severe lack of human resources and basic materials (such as the general plan or at least geological data) that he did not control. The resulting strong rivalry between the two was ultimately taken to the republican department of architecture where Ashkinazi was eventually relieved from his “mission impossible” for the time being. Available correspondence suggests that Ashkinazi had a very strong, if not arrogant, personality and was confident (or defensive?) in his position as the highest architectural authority of the city, especially vis-a-vis Korablin who was new to his job. TsDAVO, f. 4906, op. 16, spr. 42, ark. 89-92.

\textsuperscript{83} DACH, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 367, ark. 12.

\textsuperscript{84} DACH, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 362, ark. 38.
off all four storeys of the neo-renaissance building known thereafter as the “textile-house” (tekstilka). Multiple six-corner stars were also removed from the façade and the roof of the building. Still, the architecture of the house contains numerous symbolic references to Jewish religious tradition as well as the complex Jewish politics of the early twentieth century. Most of these elements were either impossible to remove without major reconstruction or, most likely, simply overlooked by the Soviet architects of Stalin-era Chernivtsi.85

Other projects that were only marginally mentioned in the sanitized architectural reports were individual constructions of several residential houses in the city centre.86 Some of them were “transfer” projects involving completion of unfinished construction abandoned by the Romanians; others involved patching the few wartime gaps in the street lines. In both cases, these Soviet insertions into the text of the city’s architecture were actually translated quite well into the local architectural language. Ashkinazi and other local architects took pride in the fact that their constructions “create[d] a unified whole with the architectural vision of the streets....”87 However, this approach—which, in fact, was well in line with the general requirement to respect the historical structure of Ukrainian cities—required individual planning of every building and therefore spoiled the statistics on use of the typical projects and new materials such as iron-concrete blocks, which was the emerging new powerful trend in Soviet architecture.

85 For details and interpretation of the building’s décor, see Shevchenko, Chernovitskaia atlantida, 43-46.
86 See DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 366, ark.1-4, 36; for the discussions in the architectural commission of the extension of the university; finishing projects that were started under Romanian rule (on Darvin street; Kobylians’ka street; Repin street; Pochtovaia street); entirely new houses (on Vatutin and Lenin streets).
87 See a local report in DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 366, ark. 38. The architect and historian of Chernivtsi architecture Iryna Korotun argued that “the few buildings of socialist realism … were written into the fabric of the city with great tact.” Iryna Korotun, “Zhylishche – arkhitekturnaia tkan’ istoricheskogo iadra Chernovit,” Perspektyvni napriamky proektauvannia zhyltsivkh ta hromads’kykh budivel. ‘Spetsial’nyi vypusk. Suchasni tendentsii v arkhitekturi ta budivnytstvi . Zbirnyk naukovykh prats’ (Kiev, 2003), 126.
Reports, correspondence, and technical and financial documents demonstrate the tension between the centrally prescribed new mass construction methods and the small-scale, individualized techniques and approaches that dominated construction work in Chernivtsi until the late 1950s. The reasons for this preference were many, from the necessity to procure building materials available locally, often from private and co-operative rather than large industrial producers, to the real-life requirement to use more sensitive practices and trial-and-error methods to accommodate projects that were closely connected to the surrounding architecture.88

Since mass construction in Chernivtsi was not yet approved by the central planning agencies, the majority of construction projects in the city of this period were financed by industrial enterprises (and their respective industrial departments on the republican level) rather than from the state budget. The motivation for enterprises’ construction was in providing accommodation for their managerial employees. This situation added players and thus complexity to the local politics of construction projects. In addition, usage of new materials was problematic as urgent deadlines did not allow waiting for the scarce and expensive new materials that often were nearly impossible to deliver.89

Understandably, as the official representative of the local urban architects before the republican professional authorities, Ashkinazi was not very eager to showcase Chernivtsi’s residential construction of the late 1940s-early 1950s before his Kiev superiors, although he and his team seemed quite attached to their work in this field. Once again, local architectural authorities happened to make decisions that defined the city’s future—this time, the appearance

88 See DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 85; f. 932, op. 1, spr. 84; f. 932, op. 1, spr. 98, ark. 3; f.932, op.1, spr. 89, 90; f. 932, op. 1, spr. 79, ark. 26–8; f. 1245, op. 1, spr.75.

89 See DAChO, f. 932, op. 1. op. 96, ark. 6.
of several streets at the city’s historic core. They sorted out the contradiction between mixed central messages about the preservation of (still undefined) local historical heritage, the introduction of innovative mass construction methods, the interests of local enterprises which financed many construction projects, and the need to keep up with central planners’ numbers and deadlines in state-sponsored construction.

The determining factors in their decision-making were their personal preferences and the everyday scarcity that haunted the Soviet periphery, and especially the city of Chernivtsi which was deprived of the strong state support for urban development enjoyed by its western Ukrainian “older brother,” Lviv.90 Ultimately, the practical urban design of this transitional period secured the preservation of Chernivtsi’s centre, which had been far from guaranteed by the prescriptions of central and local authorities, given the ambiguity of the city’s heritage.

In 1956 urban planners in Kharkiv—one of the largest Ukrainian industrial and scientific centres—completed a general plan for Chernivtsi, based on the updated scheme developed on the basis of multiple discussions and preparatory work in Chernivtsi. It was approved by the Chernivtsi planning commission and the Ukrainian department of architecture in Kiev, and submitted to Chernivtsi’s provincial department of architecture in 1957.91 If one conceptualized the process of transformation of Chernivtsi’s urban space as a battle between local and central visions and forces—which would be a simplification—one could conclude that the local came

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90 Central capital construction investment in four western provinces—Drohobych, Lviv, Stanislaviv, and Chernivtsi—was growing steadily between 1944 and 1948. However, the share of Chernivtsi province was the smallest of the four; as seen from the local construction documents cited above, the city itself received almost nothing of the province’s money that went primarily toward rural and suburban construction of social infrastructure (schools, daycares, and day clinics). At the same time, the second “miracle city” of Western Ukraine, Lviv, received more than one billion rubles for capital construction in the province and the city proper between 1944 and 1948. Between 1946 and 1949 alone, the city of Lviv received 660 million rubles. TsDAVO, f. 582, op. 2, spr. 384, ark. 2; 18.

91 DAChO, f.932, op.1, spr.176.
out the winner. Indeed, rather than limiting the city’s industrial development, confining it within its 1940 borders, or radically reconstructing its core, all of which were the initial central or centrally-inspired ideas, its historical structure was preserved for the most part (although deprived of its obviously Jewish landmarks), its territory significantly increased, and its substantial industrial growth—the major prerequisite of urban growth in the USSR—was guaranteed.

The plan envisioned the city’s development over a twenty-five year period. It located three major industrial zones of the city along the Prut River, on both its banks. The plan also rejected any individual construction projects and select buildings on small lots. The downtown individual projects of the late 1940s and early 1950s were proclaimed the “transitional type” of urban construction. All the new construction was to be mass and typical of that prescribed by contemporary Soviet norms. Accordingly, the city’s expansion was expected in the south and south-west, taking the place of waste and agricultural land plots and small neighbouring villages.\(^92\) The practical, materialist value of the dense and well-preserved downtown districts saved the “historical heritage” of Chernivtsi, redirecting new Khrushchev-style mass construction from the centre to the city’s outskirts.

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Victory in the Soviet-German war finally shifted urban development in Ukraine in the direction of preservation of architectural heritage and respect for the city’s historical structure. Still, although Chernivtsi was Ukraine’s “miracle city” with the largest percentage of preserved prewar architecture, the position of the city in the all-republican plan of projected urban

\(^92\) For a synopsis of the 1956 general plan, see Khokhol, Chernivtsi. Istoryko-arkhitekturnyi narys, 51-55.
development seems to have been marginalized by central Ukrainian urban planners. At the same
time, and probably reflecting the low esteem of the city’s urban value in the eyes of the central
planning authorities, the first postwar outline of Chernivtsi’s development prepared in
Chernivtsi reflected little interest in preserving the city’s historical structure and envisioned its
future as a typical reconstructed postwar Soviet socialist provincial centre with little value
beyond administrative function.

Ultimately, the future of Soviet Chernivtsi’s urban structure and development was
determined on the ground, in the processes of elaboration of the general plan as well as daily
urban maintenance and construction. Both of these processes depended on multiple local agents
and policies, official and unofficial. Both planning and practical reconstruction were impacted
by interpretations by the local planners and authorities of the vague messages from the centre
about the evaluation and preservation of local monuments of the past, the implementation of
central prescriptions and methods, and the fulfillment of all-union and republican plans. An
important role was also played by endemic Soviet scarcity and the simple logic that dictated the
usage of the existing, comparatively new, and well-preserved urban infrastructure, instead of
costly re-construction of the city according to vague Soviet standards.

Planning on the ground involved a great deal of negotiation between multiple
professionals and authorities, each of whom often had to combine various, and at times
controversial, roles. In general, though, local urban planners and architects tended to reject the
marginalization of Chernivtsi and aspired for a more ambitious Soviet future for their home city,
often demonstrating professional and simply human appreciation of the city’s attractive
architecture.
The year 1956 marked the completion of the postwar evaluation of the architectural heritage and urban value of Chernivtsi. The final list of its official monuments designated for preservation and protection was significantly shorter than its early drafts of the late 1940s. It included only one architectural item worthy of direct governmental funding, a higher level of maintenance and protection, and the occasional mention in the annals of Ukrainian architectural history: the former Residence of Orthodox Metropolitans of Bukovina, turned into a museum and later into one of the numerous buildings of Chernivtsi University. The city’s second significant landmark—the “Jewish temple”—was not only removed from the list of monuments but also destined for final destruction, after prolonged considerations by various authorities, in the same year. The lack of important architectural objects was compensated for by creating several new “monuments of culture” of republican significance, including the museums to honour Fed’kovych and Kobylians’ka, venerated as local progressive Ukrainian writers.

With the approval of the general plan of Chernivtsi, also in 1956, the blueprint for further urban development was in hand, the city’s shape and borders were delineated, and its future was defined. In fact, the future of Chernivtsi architecture began in 1956, with the completion of the first typical blocks, the first Soviet-type micro-district, and the first large urban-style school built according to a typical Soviet blueprint.93 This future, though, changed little about the physical appearance of the city’s core, which continued to exist in the local space as “the city” (gorod/misto) in spite of the changed appearance of its outskirts, or “new neighbourhoods.” However, the largely preserved historical core of Chernivtsi, so recently dominated by its middle-class Jewish culture, had to be translated into the official cultural language of the unified Soviet Ukrainian nation.

93 Khokhol, Chernivtsi. Istoryko-arkhitekturnyi narys, 55-59.
The ruins of the Jewish reformist Temple in Chernivtsi, ordered to be demolished in 1956, were in fact never completely torn down. Instead, in 1959 the frame of the Temple was reconstructed into a cinema named October. After a lengthy bureaucratic process, it was decided that the ruin would be turned into a panoramic and wide-screen cinema of a new type, one of the very first ones in Ukraine and one of the few in the USSR. A letter was sent from the Chernivtsi provincial Party Committee to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR in Moscow to seek support in the construction of such a technically advanced cinema. The letter read:

With the goal of further improvement of cinematographic service and satisfying the increased cultural needs of the population of the City of Chernivtsi and the province, the Provincial Party Committee bureau and the Executive Committee of the provincial Soviet decided to reconstruct the building of a former synagogue into a wide-screen cinema. The indicated building is located in the centre of the city and has not been used in the course of many years, attracting attention not only of the residents of the province but of numerous tourists that come to visit us from foreign countries.

In this connection, there arose a paramount necessity (krainaia neobkhodimost’) to construct such a theatre that will be financed by a state bank loan according to a decree of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR.¹

Moscow granted its support, and, from 1959, the official physical space of Chernivtsi was fully adjusted to its urban future, a future primordial Ukrainian city. “A Jewish synagogue” in the centre would no longer contradict city guides that described “the modest beauty of this

¹ DAChO, f. 4218, op. 1, spr. 237, ark. 3. On the construction of the cinema, also DAChO, f. 4218, op. 1, spr. 238, f. 2418, op. 1, spr. 239, f. 2418, op. 1, spr. 235.
ancient Ukrainian city…, the city of warm rains…, kind winds and gentle sun.”\(^2\) No alien temple of “pseudo-Moorish style” would spoil the silhouette of the “old Slavic city of Chernivtsi, today a provincial centre of Soviet Ukraine” that would remain, despite ideas of radical modernization once advocated by some Chernivtsi architects, dominated by the domes of its various—but only Christian—religious buildings.\(^3\) In addition to the city’s modest list of appropriate architectural monuments, which included a wooden church from 1607 and the former residence of Orthodox metropolitans constructed allegedly in accordance with folk Ukrainian traditions, Chernivtsi now had a super-modern cinema to promote the “most important art” among its residents.

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If the official technical registry of recognized monuments of architecture in Chernivtsi was not very long, the wider public was influenced by popular literature about an even more limited number of architectural objects and cultural sites, as well as more general narratives that mentioned the image of the city. One of the best examples of standard narratives about the architecture of Chernivtsi was one created by the former city chief architect Ashkinazi himself. In his survey of the “best architectural monuments” of three western provinces—Transcarpathia, Ivano-Frankivsk (formerly Stanislaviv), and Chernivtsi—the architectural world of Bukovina and Chernivtsi was conceptualized in the context of the folk art of the Carpathian mountains, charmingly backward and wonderfully green. Ashkinazi inseparably connected the “modest, simple, naïve” architecture of his city and province with nature—the “queen” of this region.

\(^2\) A. Komarnytskyi et al., Chernivtsi (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1965), 3.
\(^3\) Quote from V. Demchenko and A. Sanduliak, Chernovtsy. Putevoditel’ (Uzhgorod: Karpaty, 1981), 4.
And yet, Ashkinazi began his narrative on Bukovina’s architecture with the Residence, easily fitting the palace into his rural and romantic context: “There are many Ukrainian folk ornamental motives in the carving and paintings of the ceilings. This is not surprising: the work was carried out by Bukovinian masters.” Without even a hint of the early class-theory narrative about the reactionary role of the church and social injustice captured in the forms of such lavish palaces, Ashkinazi concluded: “Notwithstanding Romanesque and Byzantinesque forms, this complex is a creation of the Ukrainian people’s artists. They incorporated the best elements, characteristic of Ukrainian people’s art, into separate details and entire compositions.”

Ashkinazi chose another architectural object in Chernivtsi province as Bukovina’s monument of the past *par excellence*: the fortress of Khotyn, classified as a monument of the architecture and history of *all-Union*—the highest—significance. He alluded to the possible Old Rus’ connection in the fortress’s obscured origins. He also remarked that the “walls and towers are decorated with a geometrical ornament made from red brick that resembles the pattern of Ukrainian folk embroidery,” although he admitted that the fortress had been constructed and occupied by many owners, primarily Moldavian princes. The major importance of the fortress, though, was attributed to its alleged occasional usage by the peasant–Cossack detachments of

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5 Ibid., 106. This statement was also quoted, almost word by word, in Khokhol, Kovaliov, *Chernivtsi. Istoryko-arkhitekturnyi narys*, 35.

6 Ibid., 111.

7 The fortifications that exist today date primarily from the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries with many later updates; therefore, if any, the fortress bears signs of Moldavian and Turkish military architectural art. At the time of Ashkinazi’s research, the arguments about the Old Rus’ origins of Khotyn fortress and other places in Chernivtsi oblast were still “in construction.” Ashkinazi limited his argument to claiming that there was an Old Rus’ settlement on the place of the current fortress in the tenth through thirteenth centuries, discovered in 1961-62. (Ashkinazi, *Svit dyvnoii starovyny*, 108.) Years later, the fortress would be described as “constructed by the prince Vladimir Sviatoslavovich as one of the border fortifications of southwestern Kiev Rus’ after he added the land of present-day Bukovina to his control. (See, for example, the popular version of the fortress’s history on Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khotyn_Fortress#cite_ref-0](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khotyn_Fortress#cite_ref-0), accessed on 7 July 2013.)
Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi who was located high up in the pantheon of historical Ukrainian state-builders, as well as its alleged utilization for weapons storage by the participants in the social revolt in Bessarabia in 1919, and the Soviet underground resistance during World War II. With a large provincial centre largely spared the destruction of war, Chernivtsi province received its “perfect Ukrainian monument of architecture” thanks to a strip of a neighbouring region, Bessarabia, attached to Northern Bukovina in 1940. It was a monument that allowed the combination of all the features Ukrainian preservationists considered highly valuable: anti-fascist resistance, revolutionary movement, historical ties with the Russian people, the Ukrainian war of liberation of the seventeenth century, and even—although somewhat vaguely—Kievan Rus’ origins. In addition, its half-faded red brick ornaments could be interpreted in ethnic Ukrainian terms.

Ashkinazi employed—or perhaps helped develop—a strategy used by other Ukrainian architectural and cultural authorities to deal with Chernivtsi: to “hide” the city behind the image of green Bukovina and the monuments of the surrounding regions. If locally published city guides and sets of travel postcards had to include multiple views of Chernivtsi’s historic downtown, such images were identified only vaguely and neutrally as “one of the city’s palaces of culture,” “an old street,” “ancient meets the new” or “one of the best complexes of the city.” However, general publications about Ukrainian urban and architectural heritage treated Chernivtsi as almost a non-existent entity.9

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8 Askinazi, Svit dyvnoї starovyny, 114.

9 The most commonly used images included the theatre square, often with the former “Jewish national house” (now “the palace of culture and recreation for textile workers,” popularly known as “textile house”), Kobylianskaia street (formerly Herrengasse) which remained the favourite promenade avenue despite the ambitions of the early Soviet city designers to replace this bourgeois space with an appropriate Soviet boulevard, and the Central (Red, in the early Soviet years) square with the city hall. This set of images was also prioritized in popular city guides: A. Komarnytskyi, Chernivtsi (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1965); V. Demchenko, A. Sanduliak, Chernovtsy. Putevoditel’
During the second half of the 1950s, the Academy of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR published a number of illustrated popular books and albums about the architecture of Ukraine. These publications—the result of the energetic work of numerous Ukrainian research institutions in various architecture-related areas—announced the new, postwar official interpretation of Ukrainian urbanism and architecture to the wider public. As most of them were published around the time of the 300th anniversary of “reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” they clearly celebrated the eternal connections between the two peoples. But they also celebrated the unity and separateness of the Ukrainian people, categories that would become sacred premises of post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism.

For example, a 1954 architectural survey covered periods from Kievan Rus’ to October 1917 and concentrated on public architecture. The introductory article outlined the most important examples of the art of building from old Rus’ and later medieval principalities, including the Galician-Volhynian one that covered most of the territory of the so-called western provinces. Although its 205-item list of illustrations was heavily dominated by Kiev, the architecture of western Ukraine was well represented. Among 66 examples from the “west,” very many represented the urban landscape of the city of Lviv. The list contained quite a number of wooden churches but none of them was located in Bukovina. The only three illustrations from Chernivtsi province were those depicting the Bessarabian fortress of Khotyn, leaving the historic region of Northern Bukovina proper completely out of the grand picture of Ukrainian history of architecture.\(^\text{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) *Arkhitektura Ukrainskoi SSR*. Vol. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo literatury po stroitel’stvu i arkhitekture, 1954). Note how this corresponds with the tendency to discuss the “reunification” of Northern Bukovina together with that of
Similarly, in the album *Monuments of Architecture of the Ukrainian SSR* (1954), which was published to illustrate the best examples of Ukrainian national architectural heritage, drawings of several small details of Khotyn fortress were the only representation of architectural monuments from Chernivtsi province, while the urban space of Lviv was widely covered and other western cities were included. Even wooden churches—recognized in 1940 as the “specialty” of Northern Bukovina—were represented in the album by examples from Transcarpathian and Lviv rather than Chernivtsi province. ¹¹

There was no winner in the dispute that arose in the late 1940s among Ukrainian architectural elites over the issue of appreciating the architectural heritage of western Ukraine. In the final product of their search for “objective history”—the general picture of the past and present of Ukrainian architecture that emerged at the end of the 1950s and laid a solid foundation for later Ukrainian cultural narratives—the western part was not only included but assigned an important place. This inclusion, though, was very selective. In the new official cultural geopolitics of “reunified” Ukraine, Lviv was selected to represent the historical urban world of the western regions, while newly arisen cities such as Ternopol represented Soviet Ukrainian progress in the west. The role of the westernmost urban frontier was assigned to Uzhhorod, the centre of Transcarpathian province which was the last non-Soviet territory “reunited” with Ukraine in 1945. Kiev-Lviv-Uzhgorod became the urban triad that defined the important cultural centres of the reunification narrative based on common ethnic roots and historical connections.

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The year of annexation of the Transcarpathian region—1945—was accepted as the official date of the ultimate reunification of all Ukrainian lands. A central plan of celebration of the tenth anniversary of reunification in 1955 suggested the construction of monuments to the reunification in Kiev, Lviv, and Uzhhorod. An architectural exhibit in Kiev organized on the occasion of the anniversary focused on the established core of Ukrainian architecture, the central Ukrainian monuments of Kievan Rus’ origins, and the architecture of Transcarpathia that was supposed to delineate the border—physical and metaphorical—of Ukrainian material culture. Almost no place in this schematic picture of Ukrainian architecture was found for Chernivtsi which, apparently, looked to many Ukrainian cultural authorities like a “monument brought by other peoples”—a phrase once used by Kiev architects to refer to western Ukraine’s diversity—in its entirety.

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While Chernivtsi was being virtually erased from the schematic map of Ukrainian architectural and urban history, local authorities at different levels in the city were contributing to the gradual erasure of the Jewish past from the collective memories, or historical consciousness, of local Soviet citizens throughout the Soviet period. For example, it was not Nazi officials or Romanian wartime rulers who were responsible for the destruction of the oldest urban Jewish cemetery, located in the “lower town.” The cemetery, which had not been used for many preceding decades, was bulldozed by Soviet construction workers in 1946, and a textile

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12 TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 89, ark. 62.

13 See the project of the exhibit in TsDAVO, f. 4802, op. 1, spr. 89, ark.13-22. On the centrality of Lviv and Uzhhorod in all-Ukrainian narrative of the national reunification, see also Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory.
factory was constructed on its site. The decision-making process regarding this liquidation, it seems, left no traces in the local archives.14

Similarly unnoticed was the transformation of the grave of Edi Wagner, a socialist and popular musician, who died during his imprisonment by the Siguranța in 1936 and was initially recognized by the Soviet authorities as one of the local revolutionaries worthy of commemoration (by naming one of the city’s smaller streets after him, for a short time). With the development of state antisemitism and the intensification of ethnicization of the local past, Edi Wagner’s grave became another example of a deliberate erasure of specific references to the Jewish urban past: in the 1960s, two blessing hands engraved on the top of his tomb, signifying his belonging to the Kohanim caste according to Jewish tradition, were removed. The tomb was marked instead by a Ukrainian-language inscription identifying Edi as “a member of the underground revolutionary-liberation movement in Bukovina tortured to death by the Siguranța in 1936.”15 Wagner was probably saved from being fully erased from local historical narrative because his name had been already “engraved in stone,” but his image was “neutralized” by the cleansing of its Jewish identity—as much as was possible given the fact that his grave was located in a Jewish cemetery.

The cemetery itself was neglected and forgotten: no public commemorative events brought the city’s residents to it, and very few graves were visited by relatives and friends after

14 Alti Rodal, “Bukovina Cemeteries, Archives and Oral History,” Avotaynu 18/3 (Fall 2002): 9; the fact of the liquidation and factory construction was mentioned in a newspaper article “Fabryka vidrodzhuiet’sia” published in Radians’ka Bukovyna in 1946 (cited in Chuchko, Mykhaliunio, Siomochkin, Chernivets’ki nekropoli, 66.

15 For the story of Edi Wagner’s death, see chapter one. I am grateful to Charles Rosner, Edi Wagner’s nephew, who shared with me parts of the manuscript of his book about Edi and the two photographs of his gravestone, one from 1937 and another one from 2001. Both Jewish and Orthodox historic cemeteries were used for routine burials in the earlier Soviet period. When a new municipal cemetery was opened in 1976, routine burials were banned in both parts of the historic cemetery. However, some burials were (and are still) conducted, more often in the Christian part, which was better maintained, by special permission.
the evacuation of 1946. This newer Jewish cemetery was not bulldozed probably because of its central location, large size, and immediate proximity to the Christian part of the major historic cemetery of Chernivtsi. The latter had been used by various Christian denominations but was historically known as the “Rus’ke” cemetery, referring to the self-identification of the local Slavic population, a name that with time would be incorrectly translated into the Russian and standard Ukrainian languages as “Russian cemetery.” This cemetery became an important site of commemoration of the recognized local cultural symbols, Ol’ha Kobylians’ka and Yurii Fed’kovych, and, most of all, the fallen heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

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World War Two became the major historical “moment” in the history of Chernivtsi province according to the official historical scholarship and ideology of Soviet Ukraine. It was conceptualized as the “liberation” and ultimate “reunification” of long-suffering Bukovina with its Ukrainian brethren in the friendly family of Soviet nations under the leadership of the heroic Russian people. Commemoration of the war and the victory was ordered as the first priority for Soviet Ukrainian local architects, planners, and administrative authorities. Therefore, soon

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17 See the decree of the council of people’s commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the central comittee of CP(b)Ukr SSR of 1 April 1944 “On beautification of the graves and commemoration of the memory of soldiers who perished in the struggle for the liberation and independence of the Soviet motherland” in Iakymenko, ed., Zakonodavstvo pro pam’iatnyky istorii ta kul’turu, 220-21. The decree was widely communicated and its fulfillment re-enforced through numerous letters, inquiries, and memos from Kiev to local administrations as well as planning organizations. As a result, at the end of the 1940s, 90 percent of all monuments in most provinces of Ukraine were dedicated to the events of the revolution of 1917 and World War II. By the end of the 1950s, fewer than two percent of all registered monuments were “pre-October.” See Kot, ed., Istoryko-kul’turna spadshchyna, 40.
after Soviet rule was re-established in 1944, the architectural authorities of Chernivtsi began planning a grand memorial to the victory and reunification, inseparably connecting and eventually merging these two events into a single historical concept. A simple obelisk-stele was designed and erected in a great hurry, without approval from Kiev, resulting in a piece of monumental “art” so outrageous in its ugliness and poor quality that it was mentioned at a national conference of Soviet architects of Ukraine in Kiev as an example of how the war should not be commemorated. The bent stele was quietly removed from the square in front of the city hall.

The Chernivtsi architectural commission announced a competition for the best plan of an appropriate memorial. After vigorous discussions among local architects, artists, and ideologues, and due approval by Kiev specialists, a new memorial was constructed in 1946 on a different site, on the former Austria Platz, in front of the regional Communist Party committee building, in the place of an unfinished Romanian memorial to an unknown soldier. The monument that exists today became one of the very few “monuments of architecture and history” from Chernivtsi province to be widely mentioned and quoted in Ukrainian popular literature, although it does have its own ridiculous issues that did not escape the attention of locals and visitors. The memorial depicts the standard, several-meters-high figure of a Soviet soldier holding a banner in one hand (that, if unbent, could reach at least to his knee). The monument’s base was designed as a tribune, making it the place of all official public events and commemorations in the city, related to the war or not.

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18 On the construction of the monument, DACHO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 347, ark. 1.

19 Tvorchi zavdannia arkhitektoriv Ukraїny u vidbudovi mist i sil (Kiev-Lviv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo tekhnichnoї literature Ukrainy, 1946), 44-45.

The victory, the liberation, and the reunification of Bukovina with Ukraine were made, visually, literally, and quite materially, the heart and the central pillar of the city’s and the region’s identity that, even more than the Soviet Ukrainian postwar identity in general, depended on the war as the new beginning of history. This was an objective of core and radical memorial politics that sent a direct and strong message from the Ukrainian centre, dictating the official Ukrainian interpretation of the war and the entire history of the region, superimposing it on any local interpretations of the past, and ordering its internalization through mandatory and frequent public ceremonies. Strong but general monumental messages like the Liberation monument were not enough, though. The Ukrainian government urged local administrations to commemorate the war locally, through concrete and familiar events, narratives, and heroes.21

Decrees and letters to regional party committees called for the beautification of war tombs, better maintenance of cemeteries, conservation of places of battles and acts of resistance, and commemoration of local heroes. In Chernivtsi, this requirement presented a problem.

As in the first wave of Sovietization in 1940-1941, the two-sided task of localizing Ukrainian socialism and Ukrainianizing concrete structures of urban life was highly challenging: even after the “evacuation” of Jews in 1946, the city remained an important centre of Jewish life in the USSR. The official Soviet interpretation of the war did not recognize “exclusive suffering” by any particular groups among the Soviet population although it was in fact based on the notion of the “exclusive heroism” of the Russian people and other nationalities.

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21 For example, in August of 1947, a letter from the central commitee of the CP(b)Ukr SSR to all provincial party committees called for more attention to be paid to monuments and commemorations related to the revolution and World War II (Kot, ed., Istoryko-kul’turna spadshchyna Ukrainy, 40). In May of the same year, a directive followed that required completion of the necessary work, criticizing particularly Lviv and Chernivtsi for dragging behind in this important political task. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4929, ark. 5-6; DACHO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 674.
that were acknowledged as important and valiant contributors to the victory over Nazism. Ukrainians were on this list.

The local authorities of Chernivtsi had a hard time reconciling this framework of equal suffering and hierarchical heroism (to use Amir Weiner’s expression) with the demand to commemorate the war locally. In Chernivtsi, there were still survivors of specifically anti-Jewish violence, and there were places of mass shootings of Jews by the Nazis in July of 1941 that were widely known by locals. At least this aspect of the Jewish catastrophe had to be acknowledged, but in a Soviet way, obviously. In 1945, the Chernivtsi architectural commission planned a commemorative plaque to be placed by the Prut river at the place of the largest mass shootings, as well as monuments at different cemeteries (five in total) “to the victims of mass executions and torture by the German-Romanian occupiers.” These projects, however, were either never realized or neglected rather soon after their construction. For example, a common grave of at least 900 victims of the Holocaust in the Jewish cemetery in Chernivtsi was slowly deteriorating, together with the cemetery itself, throughout the Soviet era.

For more open, grandiose, and widely popularized stone commemorations, the authorities chose local events that were not related to the touchy issues of anti-Jewish

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22 A report of the Chernivtsi provincial commission for the accounting of crimes and losses carried out by Fascist occupants from summer 1944 asserted: “Fascists murderers… tried to cover up the traces of their crimes. [F]or example, the bodies of the murdered peaceful citizens, according to multiple witnesses of the residents of the city of Chernivtsi, were thrown into the Prut River. [Others] were buried in mass graves of up to 300 bodies; the excavations showed that some people were buried alive.” (DAChO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 61, 65, 84, 77, 80, 87, ark.17-18.) According to the unwritten rule of Soviet official communication, the report did not mention that the same local informants were also aware of the fact that the absolute majority of the victims were Jews.

23 DAChO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 3.

violence. In accordance with widespread Soviet practice, local authorities had the tank of the Red Army Guards lieutenant Pavel Nikitin who first entered Chernivtsi on 25 March of 1944 installed on a pedestal in the Central Train Station square in 1946. In the same year, a memorial to General Bobrov and other high-ranking officers who participated in the liberation of the province and later perished elsewhere was installed in the city’s central park. Local architects had planned initially to combine this memorial with the Liberation/Victory monument, but Kiev officials insisted that “these two themes … be elaborated in two separate monuments.”

A monument to the fallen soldiers was constructed near the main entrance to the historic Christian (Rus’ke) cemetery in 1948 and 1949. In front of the monument, a field of Soviet officers’ graves covered with solemn black marble gravestones was arranged. Thereafter, the Christian cemetery became the usual place of commemoration and celebration of all the victory and war-specific events. Chernivtsi architects also worked hard on a project to commemorate the fallen soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak detachment that fought on the Soviet side on the territory of Bukovina. The discussions were long, and the competition for the best project had to be extended. The winning project was characterized by the commission as simple and

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25 The commemoration projects were outlined in a decree issued on 23 May 1944 by the provincial party committee and government “On the maintenance [of tombs] and the commemoration of the memory of soldiers who perished in the struggle for liberation and independence of the Soviet motherland.” DAChO, f. 4, op. 1, spr. 440, ark. 109.

26 Osachuk, Zapolov’s’kyi, Shevchenko, Pam’iatnyky Chernivtsiv, 37.

27 DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 350; f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 2; TsDAVO, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 1780, ark. 108.

28 DAChO, f. 1245, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 36. The memorial was reconstructed in 1974-1976. V. Shupenia et al., Chernivets’ki nekropoli, 48.

29 Ironically, if one trusts the account by Naphtali Kon, some local Jews could be among the fallen soldiers of the Czechoslovak detachment. See chapter five on local Jews and the detachment.
tranquil as appropriate for a tomb monument; it also “reveal[ed] clearly the particular Czech artistic forms” to appeal to Czech visitors. All of these “localized” memorials were used to evoke feelings of deep gratitude for liberation and eternal remembrance in the local population. As required by Kiev, they were rather specific monuments. However, they were local only in terms of the location of the events they commemorated. The heroes they honoured were newcomers, or even passers-by, in Chernivtsi.

One important element was still missing in this emerging picture of World War II commemoration in the city of Chernivtsi: the local resistance movement. In 1952, this gap was finally filled. On the occasion of the forthcoming 10th anniversary of the death of a group of Komsomol members from Khotyn, the second-largest urban centre of the province, the Chernivtsi provincial government ordered the commemoration of the young fallen heroes with a “solid” memorial on their grave in Chernivtsi. The authorities also decreed the renaming of Khotyn street in Chernivtsi to Khotyn Komsomoltsi Street, and the opening of permanent exhibits dedicated to the resistance fighters in Chernivtsi (based in the museum of local history and lore) and in Khotyn. Constant public references to and numerous commemoration ceremonies in front of the memorial quickly made the phrase “Khotyn Komsomoltsi” synonymous with “anti-fascist resistance in Chernivtsi.” The group of 15 young people,

30 In the opinion of the Chernivtsi architects, Czech peculiarities were represented by the combination of stern Middle Ages and early northern Renaissance elements and even a cross engraved on the tomb stone. DAChO, f. 932, op. 1, spr. 359, ark. 2-10.

31 The commemoration of the Khotyn Komsomols was in fact discussed by the museum’s scholarly council as early as 1946. Their memory, though, did not become symbolic of the wartime local resistance until the early 1950s. A council member mentioned the “komsomols from Khotyn” in the general context of the need to strengthen the representation of the war in local history: “…you need to emphasize in a stronger manner the black, terrible date for our state—22 June of 1941… You did not mention the Khotyn underground komsomol organization whose members gave their lives for the happiness of the Bukovinian people. But this is an important moment for the museum. You need to find the pictures of those komsomols from Khotyn who remained alive, find out their addresses.” DAChO, f. 2342, op. 1, spr. 10, ark. 4.
“primarily Ukrainians from Khotyn,” whose activities were uncovered one year after their commencement, and five of whom were executed by Romanian authorities in 1942, became the official local wartime heroes of Chernivtsi. What of the underground group that operated in the city of Chernivtsi throughout the war and greeted the approaching Red Army on the liberation day of 29 March?

In the specific context of the city of Chernivtsi, these people’s foreign-sounding names could not be put in the same sentence with the “heroic fighters against the fascist invaders of the Soviet Ukrainian city of Chernivtsi.” It was not only because most of them were so-called “local communists,” people deemed by Soviet statesmen as potentially useful but suspect. There are fair reasons to argue that—again, in the specific context of Chernivtsi region, which had been ruled by the Soviets for only one year prior to the war—this group could theoretically pass the tough, complex, and politically loaded process of “verification” of their claimed status as partisans and underground resistance fighters. This bureaucratic but often arbitrary verification

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32 Examples of fiction about the Khotyn resistance include V. Petliovannyi Khotynets (Kiev, 1965); M. Kaniuka, A. Nabatchikov, Krest' (Moscow, 1958); S. Snihur, Polum'iani sertsia (Chernivtsi, 1958); I. Kurlat, Kaz'ma Gal'kin (Chernivtsi, 1958); M. Il'inskii, Gorodok na Dnestre (Moscow, 1970); S. Snigur, Al'pic'ki troiany (Uzhhorod, 1973); O. Chernushenko, Borot'ba khotyn's'kykh komsomol'ts' tsv-pidpil'nyk' proty nimets'ko-fashists'kykh zaharbnykiv (Stanislaviv, 1961). References to the Khotyn young communists were included in a collection of letters of Soviet resistance fighters, Govoriat pogibshyie geroi. Predsmertnyie pis'ma sovetskikh bortsov protiv nemetsko-fashistskikh zaharbnykiv (Moscow, 1975) and a book on anti-fascist resistance in the western provinces of Ukraine, V. Zamlins'kyi, Z viroiu v peremoahu. Komunistychna partitia na choli partyzans'koї borot'by proty nimets'ko-fashists'kykh zaharbnykiv u zakhidnykh oblastakh Ukrainy. 1941-1944 (Kiev, 1976). Scholarly work, however, was less plentiful (for example, I. Slyn'ko, “Khotyns'ke pidpillia i partyzani u borot'bi proty nimets'ko-fashists'kykh i rumuns'kykh zaharbnykiv,” in Heroїchna Khotynshchyna (Lviv, 1972), 92-115.

33 DAChO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 69-72, ark.4-5; f. 1, op. 2, spr. 61, 63, ark. 1.

34 For a telling example of historical narrative in a specialized work, Komarnyts'kyi, Radians'ka Bukovyna v roky Velykoї Vitichynianoї viiny, 54-67; for references in popular literature, I. Minakov, V. Onykiienko, Chernivets'ka oblast' (Chernivtsi: Obyvdyav, 1958), 35; Khokhol, Kovaliov, Chernivtsi. Istoriyko-arkhitekturnyi narys, 49-50; Kostyshyn et al., Bukovyna: Istoriychnyi narys, 262.

35 In his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote about the complex decisions on whether to trust communists and their supporters of other political orientations from the newly incorporated western regions, remarking that very many of them ended up in Soviet prisons. Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 1, 234-35.
process was conducted by various parties such as Communist Party officials, the secret police, and Partisan Staffs. Generally, the verification was inseparably connected to the general purge of the society of Soviet Ukraine based on the behaviour and choices that its citizens, and particularly communists, had made during the war and occupation. This verification also became the major venue of negotiation of one’s political identity that left some space for manipulation both for the state (to a larger degree) and its subjects under scrutiny (to a lesser degree).

In the verification process in the immediate postwar years, in practice the major criterion for recognition as a resistance fighter or partisan was acting on the orders of the official party committees rather than actual acts of resistance. Another important issue for the investigators was identifying “false partisans” who claimed alleged resistance activities only to conceal their actual collaboration with the occupiers or other “treacherous” activities. In the case of Chernivtsi region, it was officially recognized by the party authorities and later in official historiography that local party committees had failed to establish official underground organizations before they evacuated the province. The only officially appointed resistance leaders, Boyarko and Gleb, did not have a chance to conduct any organizational or actual subversive activity before they lost their lives. Thus, postwar Soviet officials (and

36 The argument about the meaning and importance of the verification process is one of the central arguments made by Amir Weiner in his book *Making Sense of War.*


propagandists) in Chernivtsi province had to deal with the so-called “spontaneous” organizations in order to be able to report any resistance at all.

This was not unique to Chernivtsi and indeed there were ways to “legitimize” such spontaneous organizations in Stalinist terms. The most typical way was to “create” the appropriate party leadership and guidance where it did not exist by means of shifting around archival documents and simply creating narratives as needed. 39 According to the available original reports, with respect to the official connection to party organs, the situation was similar in the cases of the Khotyn and Chernivtsi underground groups. In fact, the initial report of the organization-instructional department (OIV) of the Chernivtsi provincial party committee that was directly responsible for the resistance verification clearly indicated that neither of these organizations had been connected to or guided by the Communist Party of Ukraine. According to the report, their activities were similar in scope and none of them was doubted as unreliable or potentially false. 40

Both the organizations of Martin Batero (in Chernivtsi) and Kuz’ma Galkin (in Khotyn) were branded as Komsomol and youth organizations, which allegedly made it easier to legitimize them in the absence of any connection to official party organs. Both Batero and Galkin, as well as most of their immediate colleagues, had joined Komsomol during the preceding year and were too young to have had any previous party membership or political experience. The organization in Chernivtsi led by the older anti-Fascists, including Engel, was mentioned in the OIV report as separate from Batero’s group and branded as a “Jewish anti-

39 Melnyk, “And You Bastards Are Calling Yourself Partisans?!”

40 DAChO, f. 1, op. 2, spr.69-72, ark. 4-7.
Interestingly, the actual reports on the Batero-Engel group (which, according to these reports, acted as a single organization rather than two separate groups) did claim that “before the retreat of the Red Army, comrades Batero and Reter received from the secretary of the Stalin district committee of the Komsomol organization [of the city of Chernivtsi] the task to stay in the city and organize an underground Komsomol organization.”

In his interview, Batero asserted the same. This statement, however, was omitted from the official OIV report. In terms of membership, the Khotyn group was much smaller than the Chernivtsi group, according to the reports. Although the leaders of the Chernivtsi group did survive, unlike the leaders of the Khotyn group, a substantial number of the members of both groups were deported to Transnistria and died (as mentioned in the report and later in Batero’s interview), thus also perishing at the hands of the Romanian authorities.

Theoretically, both groups were candidates for recognition as resistance fighters and for local commemoration, for lack of official organizations in newly incorporated Chernivtsi. None of the groups could be suspected of having collaborated with the enemy. In the case of the Khotyn komsomoltsi, they had been executed by Romanian authorities as rebels. In the case of the Chernivtsi resistance fighters, the communist authorities in Chernivtsi were well aware of the “special treatment” that Jews had received at the hands of the German and Romanian authorities, in spite of the official rhetoric that denied any specifically “national” suffering.

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41 Ibid., ark.7.

42 Ibid., ark. 3.


44 This is well demonstrated, for example, in the sections of the materials of the Chernivtsi province GChK that describe mass extermination of Jews in the province. DAChO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 62, 79, 84, op.5, spr.480 (combined), ark.20-22; 50.
And yet, Khotyn *Komsomol* members were chosen to be the venerated heroes, while the Chernivtsi group was subject to further scrutiny by a special provincial commission organized by the provincial party committee in the fall of 1945.

Upon investigation, the commission concluded that “the practical activity of this organization was extremely limited …, [it] did not preclude the oppressors from fulfilling their plans in Chernivtsi province … [and it] was not truly a communist organization.” By comparison, based on the initial reports, the same conclusion could have been made about the Khotyn organization. Probably to make the case stronger, most of the acts of resistance declared by the members of the Chernivtsi organization (treated here as a single entity rather than two separate groups) were classified as “legends” and “fiction.” Actions of sabotage that were recognized as real were declared “crimes” that in fact had benefited the Romanians rather than the USSR. Engel and other leaders of the organization were also accused of harbouring anti-Soviet sentiments, the desire to emigrate, and the intention to “ascribe to themselves merits before the Soviet power and by this means acquire the confidence of the Soviet and party organs.”

Was it their nationality that made the Engel-Batero group unsuitable for veneration in monumental propaganda or at least modest recognition in the official popular discourse of World War II in Chernivtsi? This suggestion does not assume that it was, technically and literally, the nationality of these people that did not allow them to “pass” verification as

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45 DAChO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 69-72, ark.44, 47.
46 Ibid., ark. 45-47.
47 Ibid., ark.48.
resistance fighters, or that it was a priori impossible for a Jew to be recognized as a hero in the USSR. In fact, some of the group members were “promoted to leading positions” after the war. (Interestingly, though, Martin Batero, who was “sent to Moscow to study,” 48 was actually listed as French by nationality in the special commission report quoted above.) These people could not be recognized as heroes in postwar Chernivtsi because some of them were leaving the city together with their synagogue-attending, German-speaking parents; because many of them and their relatives were witnesses to the specifically Jewish tragedy that was not officially recognized by the Soviet myth of the war; because their names sounded foreign to the Ukrainian and Russian languages and revealed their “different” identity; because they were hated by many Slavs who had been bombarded with fierce antisemitic propaganda during the war;49 because they were allegedly (or actually) disloyal to the Soviet state and often fought against fascism but not for Soviet power. In short, they could not be heroes because they were not wanted in Soviet Ukrainian Chernivtsi to begin with and therefore were being evicted as a national or cultural group. They did not belong to the Ukrainian nation that was proclaimed the official master of Northern Bukovina and Chernivtsi. This Soviet Ukrainian nation could accommodate minorities but needed heroes from its own people.

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48 An official note prepared by the Chernivtsi communist party organization included information on the Chernivtsi “Jewish komsomoltsi resistance group.” However, the document also mentioned that some of the Jewish young communists left the country together with their parents. DACHO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 69-72, ark.6-7; 32-43.

49 For example, a report from Chernivtsi provincial party committee secretary Zeleniuk to Khrushchev from 1944 asserted: “Jews constitute the majority of the city’s population. It is characteristic that many Jews were shot and deported to concentration camps. … A substantial part of the Ukrainian population has alien attitudes toward Jews who live in the city. You can often hear: “We will not go to Chernivtsi while Jews are there.” DACHO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 62,79, 84, op.5, spr.480 (combined), ark.49-50.
As time passed, the written record of the “ideologically aligned” local historiography was elaborated and rigidified. The story of wartime resistance that had been already “carved in stone” in local commemoration was outlined by the late 1970s in detail in a manner that left no space for doubt and alternative interpretation. Published after the era of extreme late-Stalinist antisemitism and after the initiative by the central Ukrainian propaganda and agitation department to identify “unknown resisters” that led to the recognition of many among those who did not pass the verification process in the 1940s, the most authoritative local book on the history of the war made sense of the abrupt narratives from the postwar resistance reports in Chernivtsi according to the prevailing ideology of the Ukrainian SSR of the time. Obsessed with ethnic identities and focused on Ukrainian national suffering, its author S. Komarnyts’kyi nonetheless made sure to use the word “Jewish” as seldom as possible in a history of a heavily Jewish region and city, substituting it with the terms “peaceful residents” and “Soviet citizens” according to the context. He amended the embarrassingly short story of Gleb and Boyarko with emotional descriptions of their last days and a detailed account of their alleged organization of an underground network while in Romanian prison. He described the detailed story of the Khotyn Komsomoltsi as “the bright page in the struggle against fascist occupants,” paying great attention to the biographies of the group members and mentioning their Ukrainian and occasionally Russian nationalities. He even recognized the contribution of Romanian communists to the cause of the liberation of Bukovina.

50 For a fuller survey of the Soviet historiography of Bukovina, see Frunchak, “Studying the Land.”

51 Komarnyts’kyi, Radians’ka Bukovyna v roky Velykoï Vitchyznianoï viiny, 48-53.

52 Ibid., 54-66. Komarnyts’kyi also criticized numerous fictional and scholarly accounts about the Khotyn heroes which allegedly misrepresented the facts. Ibid., 7.

53 Ibid., 66-68.
When discussing numerous cases of resistance in the province, he mentioned the acts of “various groups in the city of Chernivtsi” and listed actions mentioned in the original reports from 1944 without mentioning any names but that of Batero and some Martiuk, one of the few members of the Chernivtsi group with Slavic last names. Batero himself was mentioned as “komsomolets’ Baterro, a German by nationality.”\textsuperscript{54} None of Batero’s group resisters, though, made their way to the wider popular discourse on World War II in Bukovina. If the Jews of Chernivtsi could be occasionally, and randomly, recognized as victims, they could by no means pass as heroes.

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The Jews of Chernivtsi, including victims, fighters, rabbis and communists, businessmen and poor shoemakers, were eagerly forgotten, it seems, as they were leaving the city for good throughout the Soviet period. The act of forgetting the Jews was sponsored by the Soviet Ukrainian authorities who worked in the many spheres and organizations directly or indirectly handling the interpretation of the past. The results of this state-sponsored forgetting were not always straightforward, though: for several decades the city retained a Jewish population and thus, to a certain extent, the living memories of the wartime experiences and occasionally prewar life of local Jews. For many years following the reconstruction and conversion of the Temple into the cinema it would be popularly known as “kinogoga” – a humourous combination of \textit{kino} (cinema) and \textit{sinagoga} (synagogue).

In spite of their profound linguistic Russification (or, less commonly, Ukrainianization), and acculturation into the Soviet culture(s) and mode of life, the Jews of Chernivtsi carried some

\textsuperscript{54} Spelled as in the original. Ibid., 53, 75.
traces of the prewar myth of the city, as well as a (fragmented) collective memory of the Holocaust and the postwar boom of Jewish life in the city. The younger generations of Jews in Chernivtsi tended to identify with the amorphous “Great Russian Culture.” Stanislav Bakis, who grew up in one of the thousands of families of Soviet Jewish newcomers to postwar Chernivtsi, reflected in his memoir on the role of “Russian culture” in the formation of his identity: “Who is my Russian People (narod)? Where is it? Where did I meet it in my Jewish-Ukrainian childhood? Nowhere. To be precise, I only met it [that is, the Russian people] in the dark hall of the cinema, on the black-and-white screen that was becoming coloured as years passed.”

The generation of his parents, though, did identify with other cultural phenomena, including specifically Jewish ones, transferring some knowledge of and interest in them to their children. They identified with Sidi Tal’s performances and the philharmonic society, more generally, taking extreme pride in “their own” stars of the stage. Some of them maintained relations with their relatives and Jewish organizations abroad throughout the Soviet period, spreading the quiet word about Jewish life “over there” and life beyond the border, in general. Soon after Gorbachev’s perestroika began, several democratically-minded Jews in Chernivtsi organized a “Jewish society” which, among other issues, discussed the questions of

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55 The ambiguous attitudes among Jewish children toward the Ukrainian language is aptly described in a memoir by Sviatoslav Bakis. Bakis, as well as other residents of Chernivtsi of the postwar generation with whom I spoke on various occasions, suggest that Jewish students tended to treat the Ukrainian language and literature as an unnecessary discipline; this did not mean, however, that many of them did not do well in these subjects. See Bakis, Prutskii mir.

56 Ibid., 76.

57 Noted by Natalia Shevchenko in our conversation in 2008.

58 On maintenance of such relations, and the alleged secrecy of the matter, see a memoir by Marina Liadovskaia, Galina Pelepiuk, Liudi is goroda A, 19.
commemoration of victims of the Holocaust and the need to clean up the neglected Jewish cemetery.⁵⁹

Beyond nicknaming their favourite panoramic cinema Kinogoga, which, it seems, lost its ironic sense and became no more than a humourous local place marker, Soviet residents of Chernivtsi—non-Jews and Jews alike—usually did not identify with the specific, local Jewish past of the city. True, the city was filled with artifacts that had the potential to tell many stories from the prewar era. Numerous downtown apartments still had mezuzot on their entrance doors, their residents often not knowing the meaning of this traditional object. A former resident of Soviet Chernivtsi reflected many years after she left the city about the “Viennese chairs” and other antique furniture that “were present in almost every apartment in Chernivtsi.” She admitted that it had never occurred to her to ask where this furniture came from: she was assuming that it had belonged to her family who had in-migrated to the city after the war. It was only many years later that she realized the degree to which the city of her Soviet childhood had been filled with the objects of its non-Soviet, “other” past.⁶⁰ Only rarely did such objects acquire a meaning related to the pre-Soviet life of the city, either due to their size and location, as in the cases of Kinogoga and the Jewish cemetery, or in cases when these artifacts still belonged to their old owners, very few of whom lived in the city in the Soviet period. In most cases, though, such material objects from pre-Soviet life remained mute against the background of loud noises about the Ukrainian past and the progressive Soviet future of the city, made by Soviet-era books, films, and monuments, and reinforced by public commemorations.

⁵⁹ Bakis, Prutskii mir, 127.
⁶⁰ Liadovskaia, Pelepiuk, Liudi is goroda A, 40-41.
With time, those monuments seemed to acquire lives of their own, continuously expressing the desire for the future that would resemble the recent past that they (mis)represented—the past of Ukrainian pre-Soviet Chernivtsi and Bukovina. This future was transformed into the present as Chernivtsi residents were “pragmatically” remembering the Ukrainian national experience in their city in order to legitimize and localize their Soviet Ukrainian identities.61 In the late Soviet decades when antisemitism was no longer an acute political issue and certain channels for constructing alternative public memories began to open, the future-past once fabricated by the monuments had become an entrenched demographic and cultural reality of the city. Any alternative narrative of Chernivtsi’s past, if told in this Ukrainian city, sounded surreal and triggered or implied feelings of uneasiness, discomfort, or even guilt.62 If in the postwar decade the imagined past was used to project the desirable future, in the late Soviet period a more convincing project was at work: the real present was being projected back into history. Forgetting became the most comforting way of “remembering” the city’s Jewish past. In almost an Orwellian development, the latter was sent to the black hole of history while the new scenario of history was internalized by locals.

Another seemingly enormous legacy of the Sovietization of Chernivtsi and the half-century of Soviet rule was the significant linguistic Russification of the city, strongly criticized by the majority of local historians in Chernivtsi today. The widespread use of Russian in the

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62 Sviatoslav Bakis reflects on the uneasiness he noticed among the remaining Jewish community in the later Soviet period regarding the revival of the Jewish history and culture in the city, probably implying that the activists of the “Jewish Society” in late Soviet Chernivtsi not only understood the limits of such a potential revival but also probably felt that they had become participants, and not (only) victims of, the Soviet cultural project of re-imagining and re-constructing the city’s past and future. Bakis, Prutskii mir, 127-29.

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city, and even partial state-enforced Russification in education and administration, did not hinder the profound, long-lasting, and rather consistent process of constructing the past of the city in ethnically exclusive Ukrainian terms.63 Neither was this construction seriously obstructed by the omnipresence in Soviet public discourse of the concept of the deep, eternal, and unbreakable friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

Often it was the same historians, propagandists, and politicians who had worked hard to instil the narrative of Russian-Ukrainian closeness into local historical myth, who eagerly and successfully worked in the first post-independence years to remove this aspect of the Soviet interpretation of the past, distilling the “pure” history of national reunification and ethnic unity of Bukovina with Ukraine.64 Ukrainian scholars of literature, for example, have revisited the heritage of Ol’ha Kobylians’ka after 1991, successfully redeeming from oblivion several of her works banned in Soviet times as “excessively nationalist,” and proving the falsification of the late journalistic work ascribed to the aging author.65 They have ignored, however, the impressive work that was done by Soviet Ukrainian cultural enthusiasts and party authorities to

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63 The 1958 school reform in the Ukrainian SSR allowed the parents of school children to choose the language of education for their children. Many historians interpret this reform as aiming directly at deepening the Russification of Ukraine. See for example Viktor Danylenko, “Politychni zminy v SSSR i Ukraini v period Khrushchovs’koї “Vidlyhy,” Ukraina XX stolittia: Kul turá, ideolohiia, polityka 14 (Kiev, 2008): 11-12.

64 For more on this aspect of post-1991 historiography of Bukovina, Frunchak, Studying the Land. I experienced such a shift firsthand when I returned to my secondary school after the summer when Ukraine acquired its independence in 1991. My history teacher, who had remained an ardent propagandist of the communist “friendship of peoples” until the end of May 1991, was almost fanatically delivering the anti-Soviet narrative based on ethnic Ukrainian history on September 1 of the same year.

promote the humble writer and raise her name to the position it occupies today—that of the
major literary symbol of Bukovina and an important figure among the Ukrainian classics.

If other aspects of the Soviet construction of collective historical consciousness were
successfully altered, the forgetting of the non-Ukrainian past travelled, almost unchanged, from
the Soviet to the post-Soviet narrative about Ukrainian history and culture.66 If the rhetoric of
“past multiculturalism” is employed in present-day Chernivtsi, it is mostly to flirt with the city’s
visitors and foreigners. Lately, there has been an increased interest in the city on the part of
tourists and international researchers who often bring their own memories and post-memories
(as well as money to invest) with them as they return, physically or metaphorically, to the
birthplace of their families and ancestors. These sons and daughters, but more often grandsons
and granddaughters, of prewar Chernivtsi mostly rely on the alternative image of the city, that of
a lost multicultural world which was, or seems to have been, too appealing to be lost forever—
the world where, according to Paul Celan, “human beings and books used to live.” 67

66 The most significant difference between the Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian interpretations of the local past is
the introduction to the latter of critical discussions of Soviet repressive, administrative, and planning policies,
presented as centrally-coordinated actions aiming at the oppression and eventual destruction of the Ukrainian
nation. When studying the postwar period, Ukrainian professional and amateur historians focus on the hunger of
1946-1947, the resettlements of Ukrainians from Bukovyna to the east of Ukraine, and the activities and the
liquidation of the OUN-UPA. In addition to scholarly publications in this field, see for example newspaper articles:
zamovchuvaly, ale ne pryspaly: pro shcho svidchat’ arkhivni dokumenty,” Bukovyna’ske viche, 26 February (1997):
2; Petro Beisiuk, “Stoialy na strazhi voli,” Bukovyna, 15 October (1997): 2; V. Kostash, “Iak pereselialy
bukovyntsiv… Pro prymusove pereselennia v skhidni oblasti Ukraїny, zselennia z khutoriv,” Bukovyna’ske viche,

67 The most recent book dedicated to such returns and memory is a rich monograph by Marianne Hirsch and Leo
Spitzer, a hybrid study that combines a personal memoir, a historical study, and a theory of memory: Ghosts of
Home. On the same theme, Florence Heymann, Le Crépuscule des lieux. Identités juives de Czernowitz (Paris:
European/American perspectives II (Winter 1996): 659-86; Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography,
Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Rodal, “Bukovina Cemeteries,
Archives and Oral History.”
Today this image of the non-existent Czernowitz “lives” in a virtual space on the World Wide Web.68 Visitors to the real Chernivtsi find it to be populated not only by other people but also by very different books. Until recently, the vocabulary of multiculturalism in Ukrainian Chernivtsi remained in most instances a political tool and a cultural cliché as the intellectual and public discourses and their visual representations are dominated by the Ukrainian nationalist narrative about the city’s past. The narrowness of the alleged Ukrainian reconciliation with past diversity is not lost on the Jewish “pilgrims” to the city of their origin. Describing the experience of their research in Chernivtsi, Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer remarked, with a degree of (expected) disappointment, that “the memorial debates [they] engaged in only served to demonstrate how fraught the politics of memory are, and are likely to be in the foreseeable future, in Ukraine.”69 Even Ukrainian intellectuals who are fascinated by the “historical phenomenon of multiculturalism” in Chernivtsi find it hard to reconcile the idealization, and perceived resurrection, of past “ethnic tolerance” with the overarching ethos of Ukrainian ethnic-based nationalism and state-building. The following two examples from Chernivtsi illustrate this point well.

68 A rich source of information about pre-Soviet Chernivtsi and memory about it can be found on http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/ which has become a venue of communication between those who identify themselves with Jewish Czernowitz (rather than contemporary Chernivtsi) and, as such, a site of a virtual existence of the image of the prewar city.

In 1991, a group of historical preservation activists organized a commemoration of the Austrian-era “Black Eagle” memorial destroyed by Soviet authorities in 1949. Local preservationists interpreted the monument as a symbol of tolerance and multiculturalism and organized a mass commemorative ceremony that involved Orthodox, Eastern Catholic, Roman Catholic, and Jewish religious services. However, the “monument to the monument” installed in the former place of the Black Eagle was a wooden Orthodox Christian cross,\footnote{Chekhovs’ky, Chernivtsi – kovcheg pid vitrylamy tolerantnosti, 72.} a symbol that speaks volumes to the relation between quickly passing moments of oral expressions of remembering “others” and the incessant monumental embodiments of the Ukrainian (Slavic, Christian, Orthodox) identity of Chernivtsi.

In 2008, after several years of work by an activist of the Jewish revival in Chernivtsi, Natalia Shevchenko, and with reluctant and modest support of local government, a museum of “Jewish culture” was opened in Chernivtsi, in two rooms of the grandiose four-storey building of the former Jewish national house. To the great surprise and disappointment of many Jews of Czernowitz background who watched the development closely, the museum represented Jewish life in the city until 1940 and had not even a single reference of the Holocaust. In response to a query about this lacuna, Chernivtsi authorities replied that they wanted the museum to be about life, not about death.\footnote{I am grateful to Natalia Shevchenko who shared her experience of the museum organization during our meeting in summer of 2008. Numerous posts regarding the museum can be found on http://czernowitz.ehpes.com/ (go to Cz-L Archives) (last accessed on 7 June 2013). Another example of a similar attitude is a publication by a group of local archivists and historians of a voluminous collection of documents concerning the Jewish population of the region coming from the period between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, although a number of detailed documents concerning life and destruction of the Jewish communities in the twentieth century are also available and have been published in various collections and articles by Jewish historians (some of them cited above). Dobzhans’kyi, Kushner, Nikirsa, eds., Ievreis’ke naseleminia ta rozytток ievreiskooho natsional’noho rukhu na Bukovyni.} This case testifies to the way the contemporary Ukrainian intellectual
elite tends to treat the Holocaust: by partial recognition of somebody else’s faults, remaining silent about participation of “their own” people in the “harvest of despair”\textsuperscript{72} that devastated Ukrainian lands in 1939-1945. They recognize Jews as their former neighbours, but not as neighbors-turned-victims.

Continuity in commemorating the war and using it as an apocalyptic moment in history is not as obvious in Ukraine as it is in Russia where the Victory continues to be the major pillar of popular national identity. For Ukraine, the war is a much more “difficult moment.” On the one hand, events, notions, and personalities not related to the Ukrainian territory or ethnically defined “people” were omitted from post-Soviet Ukraine’s official war myth. On the other hand, elements of the alternative, non-Soviet, or, in Soviet parlance, bourgeois nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian history were added. These add-ons to the superficially revised Soviet narrative result in many painful and politicized controversies that are difficult to reconcile in post-independence Ukraine, such as the simultaneous veneration of Soviet and OUN veterans as heroes insisted on by President Yushchenko, or the introduction of red Soviet flags as mandatory during commemoration of Victory Day under the rule of Victor Yanukovich. It is quite possible that the war as the major event will slowly recede from the pantheon of popular memory and culture in Ukraine.

However, the way in which Ukraine, its culture, and its society were imagined and reconstructed after the war and, importantly, after the Holocaust, continues to be imperative to the contemporary state of affairs. Ukraine without its Jews, or at least without the Holocaust as it happened in Ukraine—with the participation of and mass witnessing by locals—is much more

\textsuperscript{72} The term belongs to the historian Karel Berkhoff (see his \textit{Harvest of Despair}); for a more recent account see Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, \textit{The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
convenient, or comfortable, for its elites and, largely, the wider masses of the population.

Although radical Ukrainian nationalism was (and still is, for it by no means is consigned to history) openly antisemitic, the paradigm of Ukraine without Jews (and particularly, Chernivtsi without Jews) was firmly established among intellectual circles and the public throughout the years of Soviet Ukrainian education, propaganda, and popular culture.
Conclusion

In 1940, Soviet society and the Soviet state were at the peak of the prewar essentialization of their ideology and general ethos. The populist ideology of the mid-1930s was closely related to the state-building and popular mobilization during Stalin’s “socialist offensive.” Mass purges, arrests, and deportations raged across the country in the 1930s, beginning with the first forced resettlement of “kulaks” in the late 1920s and culminating in the Great Purge of 1937-1938. Stalinist purges reached deeply into various strata of Soviet society. The purge, the growing anxiety about “capitalist encirclement” and the fear of war, the collectivization of peasants accompanied by mass deportations and demonizing views of kulaks and “traitors,” as well as other destructive elements of the “offensive” helped promote the Manichean worldview based on the notions of heroes vs. enemies and (socialist) progress vs. (capitalist) degradation.1 The destructive element of the Stalinist state reached enormous proportions by the late 1930s. Millions of people were arrested and deported, and at least 700,000 were executed during the Great Purge alone.2

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1 On the meaning and scale of controlling and purging in Stalin’s USSR, see, for example, Peter Holquist, “To Count, To Extract, To Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial Russia and Soviet Russia,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, eds. Ronald Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 111-45. Many scholars, including Stephen Kotkin, Peter Holquist, Amir Weiner, Terry Martin, and Francine Hirsch, argue that Stalinism represented a variant of modernity, sharing many features with other modern regimes and states.

2 Estimates vary significantly. Robert Conquest, for example, believes that the numbers based on Soviet NKVD/KGB records, used for their statistics by the Memorial Society dealing with Soviet repressions and their memory, are significantly understated, and should be doubled at least. See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Norman Naimark, too, argues that historians should not use the NKVD numbers as reliable estimates of the number of victims of Stalin’s crimes, and comes up with (much higher) estimates: Norman Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Timothy Snyder, on the contrary, uses more conservative numbers which, in the Soviet case, come primarily from NKVD and party documents (see Snyder, Bloodlands, for example).
The purge—through identifying the “enemy” and the “cleansing” of society—was not the only central driving force in the Stalinist transformation. The other one was construction, the creative drive of progress and moving forward. After the first Five-Year Plan was announced in 1928, the vocabulary of industrial growth and, more generally, construction, became all-pervasive in Soviet official life. As Stakhanovite shock workers became venerated as examples of enthusiastic work as well as the new Soviet lifestyle, the rebuilding of Moscow—including the triumphant launch of the magnificent Moscow subway system—exemplified Soviet advancement in planning, industrial construction, and general transformation. This constructive transformation went beyond industrial projects. The new Soviet culture was “under construction,” as was the new Soviet person and society.

On many different levels, the two central elements of the Stalinist ethos—the purgative and the constructive—were closely interconnected. Forced labour of undesirables purged from Soviet society was used to construct the Soviet industrial giants. Mass deportations of “kulaks” were driven by the need to colonize the empty lands of the Soviet east and north as well as the desire to break the passive resistance of peasantry to collectivization. Every Soviet person was

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3 The beginning of the mass repressions was closely related to the collectivization of agriculture, one of the two major components of Stalin’s socialist offensive (the other being forced industrialization). By 1928, only 1.2 percent of the land was collectivized, which makes it clear that the peasantry would not voluntarily participate in the transformation. At the end of 1929, Stalin announced forced collectivization which also marked the launch of mass “dekulakization” and the cleansing of the border regions of “unreliable” elements, particularly Poles and other bearers of “foreign” nationalities. Cleansed territories were often re-populated with “red army collective farms” staffed with demobilized soldiers. In 1932-1933, as a result of forced collectivization and crop confiscation, Ukraine, Central Volga, Kazakhstan, and North Caucasus were devastated by catastrophic famine. However, the Soviet government began attempting to use mass resettlement to reach various political and economic goals even before forced collectivization began, and used it to target various population groups and meet various ends throughout its history. As early as 1920, Cossacks were encouraged to re-settle from North Caucasus and other regions; in 1922, a large group of intellectuals were shipped in a “philosophers’ ship” from Petrograd to Germany. From 1927, the Soviet government gradually moved from voluntary to involuntary resettlement and increasingly used prisoners’ labour. From January of 1930, the colonization of under-populated territories became a parallel objective to the one of cleansing of western territories and urban communities and easing the collectivization in rural areas. From 1931, the economic objective of kulak deportations outweighed the needs of collectivization. From 1933, the cleansing of “socially dangerous elements” in the cities becomes another important focus of
expected to purge the remnants of his/her bourgeois worldviews to construct the new Soviet consciousness and, on the level of society, the new proletarian culture, accessible and enlightening to one and all. The two pillars of (repressive) purging and (progressive) advancement supported the entire Stalinist state-building project.⁴

In Stalinist Soviet Ukraine, these twin principles of purging and advancement were implemented within the terms of the national Ukrainian framework. In the Ukrainian context, Stalinist social and cultural advancement took the form primarily of affirmative action in support of Ukrainian culture and national identity and bearers thereof.⁵ The degree to which Ukrainian culture and “nationality” were independent of and different from the Russian was defined in the prewar Stalinist years in the process of negotiation and collaboration between Ukrainian and Moscow-based political and cultural authorities. It has also been argued recently that Stalin-era intellectuals were not free to manipulate national traditions, and had to use available cultural symbols and images, being “limited by the history, which is not plastic and repressive forced population movement. Between 1934 and 1937, with the growing political isolation of the USSR, ethnic cleansing intensified. In 1939-1941, the last prewar mass deportation campaign targeted the newly incorporated regions of western Ukraine, western Belorussia, the Baltic republics, as well as Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. For an excellent survey of forced migration in the USSR, see Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR (Budapest - New York: Central European University Press, 2004).


⁵ The term “affirmative action” was first applied to Soviet nationality policy by Terry Martin in his book Affirmative Action Empire.
has boundaries.”

This study argues that World War II helped make history much more pliable in the hands of intellectuals and cultural authorities, primarily by allowing them to narrow the symbolic Ukrainian national territory, making it less inclusive and directly connected to Ukrainian ethnicity. The multifaceted process of wartime incorporation of “western regions” with their legacy of cultural diversity and local loyalties was imperative for the creation of the modern Ukrainian nation characterized by the dominance of ethnic cultural nationalism and limited inclusiveness of other cultures.

A critical element of this Soviet Ukrainian nation-building was the official Soviet historical and cultural narrative that represented Stalin’s annexations of Western Ukraine, Northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia as the “reunification” of Ukraine. This grand narrative in fact constructed and popularized, in the form of state legislation and policies, ethnographic and historical scholarship, and cultural productions, a new concept of the “historical Ukrainian lands” that had never been fully elaborated by Ukrainian nationalists before the war. This Stalinist concept of “reunification” tied ethnically-defined Ukrainian culture to a strictly delineated national territory and elevated this culture to the status of native, dominant, and the only legitimate culture in the territories that had until the outbreak of the war been distinguished by diversity and multiple loyalties.

This concept of historical “reunification” became a blueprint for Soviet colonization of the western borderlands in the name of the Ukrainian nation, a process that initially emphasized the advancing, affirmative aspect of Ukrainian Sovietization, or Soviet Ukrainianization, of the new territories. With time, the Soviet state did apply all of its purgatory, repressive tools to the

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6 On the negotiation of Ukrainian identity and culture in prewar Soviet Ukraine see Yekelchyk, *Stalin’s Empire of Memory*; quotation from p. 7.
newly incorporated territories. When viewed retrospectively and against the background of the well established “reunification” narrative, the repressive function of the Soviet state in the new western borderlands can be easily mistaken for primary and dominant and directed against a culture that was native and Ukrainian. Such a retrospective approach leads to a simplifying representation of the annexations of 1939-1940 as a Russian-Soviet colonization of Ukrainian lands, a mere replication and extension of such colonization of the entire Ukraine. This dissertation attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the more complex history of the war and its legacies in Eastern Europe.

In 1940-1941, the Soviet incorporation of multiethnic, still largely German-Jewish, Chernivtsi was planned around the tasks of subjugating and homogenizing the local societies and re-organizing the local economic structures around the new state/imperial centre. However, the annexation of Northern Bukovina was not simply an imperialistic act of the Moscow-based Soviet government with a side-effect of “reuniting” this region with the rest of Ukraine. The incorporation of the city and the region is best understood as a double-colonization of this borderland area. Although the status of the Ukrainian SSR was that of a semi-colony whose independence was nominal in most respects, Northern Bukovina was absorbed by Stalin’s strong, repressive USSR in the name, and as part, of the Ukrainian nation. The cultural colonization of Chernivtsi and its region, sponsored by the Soviet government, had a long-lasting effect, eventually turning the city into a Ukrainian urban centre.

In its “first Soviet year” of 1940-1941, Chernivtsi survived the encounter between the new power and the locals which took place simultaneously in many spheres and on many levels.

7 Such an approach is well represented in Ukrainian historical studies of Chernivtsi province, authored or edited by Kostyshyn, Botushans’kyi, Hackman, Makar, Masan, Piddubnyi, and Skoreiko. Their studies are cited in the prologue and elsewhere in this dissertation and listed in the bibliography. For more about recent Ukrainian historiography of Soviet rule, see Marples, *Heroes and Villains.*
One of the two major elements of this encounter was the development of a new myth, or image, of the city by means of historical narratives, exhibits, and rituals, and the universal formulas that ran through all of them. An image of Northern Bukovina created in Soviet Ukraine in 1940-1941 was that of “our” land saved from foreign oppression but still in need of redemption from its backwardness. Depictions of the misery of foreign exploitation created initially in the form of a narrative of social oppression were soon transformed into a story of national-social subjugation. The latter would later be easily stripped of the “social” element and re-read as a narrative of purely national enslavement in late Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine.

Simultaneously with the imaginary, myth-making aspect of “reunification,” the sovietization of Chernivtsi was achieved in the course of on-the-ground encounters between the Soviet and the local. The sovietization of the province in the early 1940s was a particular type of colonization that used “cultural revolution”—an official term in party parlance and local Soviet historiography—as its primary tool. “Cultural revolution” involved, among other things, cultural imports from Soviet Ukraine, redistribution of local public space, and adherence to the principles of affirmative action in favour of Ukrainians and Ukrainian culture. If the first two elements of the “revolution” were somewhat successful after several months of Soviet rule, new authorities evidently failed in the practical implementation of affirmative action principles according to the Soviet Ukrainian stratification of local society.

Soviet leaders operated within the Soviet understanding of human society, in which the most basic, clear, and important social marker for every individual was the category of nationality. If, as argued by Jan T. Gross, the aim of the Soviet regime in 1939-1940 was to completely subjugate the local communities of the annexed territories, and if its wisdom was
that the communities must subdue themselves, with some “encouragement.” \(^8\) then its methodology was to use ethnic sentiments and nation-building appeal to reach its goal. The new political and cultural leaders of Chernivtsi worked hard to elaborate a local hierarchy of nationalities according to the “special” conditions of the city. According to this local hierarchy, Ukrainians were the implied collective masters of the newly annexed land, whereas Jews, in the view of the Soviet Ukrainian rulers, did not belong in this space as a national group. Therefore, the authorities often sought “aliens” for arrests and deportations among the Jewish population of the city. To the communist party and Soviet state leadership, all locals were suspicious, but Jews came to represent the quintessential “local” and the bearer of the “alien” culture.

The complexity of transformations that resulted from Soviet attempts to control local society was intensified by the personal level of contacts between the locals and newcomers. It was these private contacts, which belonged to the realm of everyday life, rather than state policies that usually defined human experiences of sovietization. One aspect of interaction between locals and newcomers that acquired outstanding political significance was language barriers. They gave the local population temporarily power tools of resistance but also weakened the messages of “positive” sovietization. Many locals reacted to the superficial imposition of the new official interpretation of their space by idealizing the prewar urban myth and retreating to their private worlds based on German language and culture.

The softer, positive side of sovietization advocated by many party leaders in Chernivtsi in the first months after the annexation had been ineffective. The last months of 1940 and the early months of 1941 marked a noticeable shift in local policies from an emphasis on these positive aspects to a reliance on the repressive, purgatory mode of transition to Soviet socialism.

\(^8\) For Gross’s argument, see Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 67.
in Chernivtsi. Between autumn of 1940 and spring of 1944, Soviet deportations and population movement campaigns, and the Holocaust. The period between the Soviet incorporation of Chernivtsi in June of 1940 and the completion of the last mass population transfer—the evacuation of “Romanian citizens” in 1945-1946—became a continuous purge that resulted ultimately in a fundamental demographic change. The Jews of Chernivtsi were the target of most of the resettlements and repressive campaigns during World War II. Still, up to 20,000 Jewish urban residents of Chernivtsi survived, resulting in an unusual, for the region, situation in which about half of the urban population in the postwar provincial centre was Jewish.

In official Soviet historical narratives, the 1944 liberation would later be blended with the original reunification of Bukovina with Ukraine, which erased from the official collective memory the dubious conditions of the original annexation in 1940 of a foreign city and region. Although the re-sovietization of Chernivtsi in 1944 resembled the original sovietization in 1940-1941, one aspect was substantially different. The city’s sizable population of largely German-speaking Jews who had survived the occupation became a serious problem for the Soviet government, now motivated by their pride in the victory over Germany, hatred of everything related to German culture, and disdain of people who had survived enemy occupation. In such atmosphere, Soviet Ukrainian authorities did not see sovietizing the local German-speaking Jewish community as a realistic option. Stigmatized as alien and untrustworthy as a group, most local Jews were “evacuated” in 1945-1946 to Romania—technically the country of their pre-Soviet citizenship. In an unprecedented Soviet population transfer, a national group that did not have a state of its own at the moment was sent to a country that had not formally agreed to accept the evacuees in question. In the wake of the destruction of European Jews, rather than celebrating the unique case of such spectacular mass survival in Chernivtsi, the Soviet
government chose to complete the process of “cleansing” of the city of its Jews—a process launched by the very same Soviet government in 1941, and continued on a terrifying scale and in the most violent manner by the Nazis, the Romanian authorities, and the local Ukrainian and Romanian nationalist leaders.

Although ultimately approved and supported by Kiev and Moscow, the final ethnic “purge” of Chernivtsi was a local initiative; it was a solution proposed by the local Soviet authorities challenged with the practical and ideological tasks of building Ukrainian socialism (and their personal lives) in a German-Jewish city. One of many cases of mass resettlement campaigns in postwar East Central Europe, the Chernivtsi “transfer” was also unique because it targeted a large local community as bearers of German culture and Jewish nationality at the same time. Although the Chernivtsi campaign did remove all the significant remnants of the prewar German-language culture from the city, Chernivtsi was destined to remain an important centre of Jewish life and culture in Ukraine and the entire USSR.

The city’s remaining local Jewish community and numerous urban sites associated with Jewish traditions and religion attracted Jewish in-migrants to the city. The State Ukrainian Jewish Theatre, transferred from Kiev to Chernivtsi in 1945, also drew cultural forces to the city, resulting in a “Jewish cultural renaissance.” This short-lived boom of Jewish social life and culture in the city, curtailed in the late 1940s and early 1950s with the intensification of Stalin’s antisemitic campaign, popularized a Soviet Jewish culture which was based on the Yiddish language and often closely connected to the Russian language that had become the second language of Soviet Jewish creative life. If the development of Ukrainian culture and identity in Chernivtsi was the major cultural investment of the Soviet Ukrainian government, the Soviet state’s attitude toward the phenomenon of the Jewish cultural renaissance in the city was the
opposite: it was determined by the strong state-sponsored antisemitism. The combination of the Soviet policies of anti-Jewish discrimination with the continuing—if curtailed—policy of affirmative action toward ethnic Ukrainians in education, employment, and career advancement, resulted in a noticeable change in the urban social profile within less than two decades after the war. The new generation of educated urbanites who shaped the dominant culture of the city included a large percentage of ethnic Ukrainians and had historical consciousness heavily influenced by the official Soviet Ukrainian ideology.

As catastrophic as the wartime destruction of the social structure and urban culture in Chernivtsi was, its architectural heritage remained almost intact by post-World War Two standards. What to make of the quite sophisticated urban infrastructure and foreign-looking heritage of Chernivtsi and how to plan its Soviet future became a challenge for architectural and general authorities in the Ukrainian SSR. In the process of interpreting the past and future of many provincial urban centres, they gradually elaborated a general scale of values for monument preservation and urban construction in Soviet Ukraine. The most active phase of this process lasted between the end of the war and the late 1950s, a period when Soviet rulers and specialists assessed Chernivtsi and other newly-incorporated western “cultural heritage.” The place of historic Chernivtsi in the all-Ukrainian heritage was not simply a result of the failure of Soviet Ukrainian architects to “read” and appreciate the unusual structure of the charming city, as argued by Viktor Vechers'kyi, a Kiev-based architect and historian of architecture who pioneered the reevaluation of Chernivtsi’s urban heritage in recent years.9 To Soviet planners and architects—I argue—the heritage of Chernivtsi did not suggest any obvious Ukrainian historical background or strong connections with the material culture of Eastern Ukraine.

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Moreover, this heritage was probably too “Jewish” to the minds of the Soviet Ukrainian authorities, as was the population of Chernivtsi until the late 1970s, when the mass emigration of Jews from the USSR completed the transformation of this city into an almost homogeneously Ukrainian city.

Either by direct party-state orders or on their own, based on the general and professional ethos of their time, rather than launching intensive industrial and urban growth in the city that had miraculously survived the war with minimal architectural destruction, Soviet planners and preservationists embarked on transforming Chernivtsi into a peripheral Ukrainian urban centre. They projected limited growth opportunities but a profoundly Ukrainian urban myth and culture, cutting all connections with the city’s non-Ukrainian past. As they were working on the incorporation of the newly acquired borderland cities such as Chernivtsi and Uzhgorod into the Ukrainian body cultural, the Ukrainian cultural authorities were elaborating the contents and defining the borders of inclusiveness of the modern ethnicity-based Ukrainian national culture.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the cultural and historical popular narrative created from 1940 and internalized by several generations of Soviet urbanites, underwent some changes that might seem radical but were in fact superficial. The Austrian government was no longer interpreted as an evil oppressor but rather as a benevolent and enlightening foreign colonizer; the Romanian question was resurrected from the realm of historical studies by a few Romanian politicians who attempted (and failed) to play an irredentist card in the early years of Ukrainian independence. But the bulk of the story about the national liberation of primordially Ukrainian Bukovina and its long-desired reunification with mother-Ukraine,

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cleansed moderately of its undesirable social aspects and radically stripped of Soviet ideological rhetoric, was transferred to the annals of the history of independent Ukraine.

This continuity in interpretations of the past of the nation, rather than an alleged radical break from the Soviet past as is often declared by Ukrainian elites, seems to define today’s dominant popular culture and state ideology in Ukraine. In other words, contemporary Ukrainian state nationalism is an heir primarily to Soviet Ukrainian cultural policies rather than the radical nationalism of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and other extremist organizations, remolded and developed after World War II by some scholars and amateurs in the Ukrainian diaspora in the West, and widely promoted by many educational and cultural institutions in post-Soviet Ukraine. The longest-lived legacy of the Soviet Ukrainian nation-building project, the concept of “reunification,” remained at the core of the post-Soviet Ukrainian “national idea.” As the war itself becomes a more problematic subject of memory in connection with the controversies around OUN-UPA activities during the Holocaust and ethnic cleansing campaigns, the narrative of the allegedly historically justified and long-deserved “reunification” remains imperative in Ukrainian historical memory.

11 This is not to deny the important impact of the ethnic-based violence and nationalist propaganda by the OUN during World War II which contributed, together with other instances of ethnic violence and the Holocaust, to radicalization and ethnicization of the general ethos and national identities of the masses and the elites alike in Ukraine and Poland. See, for example, Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 154–214.

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