Resort Urbanism: Understanding the Power, Planning and Politics of Urban Development in Bávaro-Punta Cana, Dominican Republic.

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy
Department of Geography and Program in Planning
University of Toronto

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2014

ABSTRACT

In many developing countries, particularly Small Island Developing States (SIDS), coastal tourism impacts local economies and societies in significant ways, and plays an important role in transforming the environment. Rather than simply interpreting the changes that occur around coastal tourist enclaves as impacts, I argue that it is important to recognize the urban nature of spaces proliferating around these enclaves and to understand the role of the actors of coastal tourism in the production of these spaces.

Utilizing a case study (Bávaro-Punta Cana, Dominican Republic), my research draws from over one year of fieldwork, including 97 semi-structured interviews with local residents, researchers, and various stakeholders. I examine the power relations between the private sector, local residents, and different levels and sectors of the State in the area’s urban development process.

The context of Bávaro-Punta Cana is characterized by the following three issues. First, the newly established local government is generally impotent vis-á-vis other State actors and powerful private sector interests, and is unable to ensure the public good for its citizens. Second, many
local residents live in conditions that are worse than traditional urban areas in the country. Third, the private sector has inserted itself as pivotal actor in the development and governance of the newly urbanizing area through practices of corporate social responsibility.

Based on my analysis, I refer to the realities of Bávaro-Punta Cana as ‘resort urbanism.’ I utilize this term to illustrate the manifestations of tourism-related urbanization. Drawing from planning concepts, namely splintering urbanism, informality and citizenship, I analyze the physicality and spatiality of urbanization, the processes of urban development, and the rights of citizens and the relations between actors in the production of this new urban space. First, I argue that urban space in Bávaro-Punta Cana is produced as a form of ‘splintered urbanism.’ Second, this space is materially shaped by practices of informality or what is known locally as arrabalización. Last, the area lacks a local governance structure through which residents can adequately make claims to fulfill their basic needs, raising important questions regarding the rights and responsibilities of different actors in urban development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support from a large group of people. First and foremost, I would like to extend my thanks and sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Amrita Daniere, whose encouragement and guidance was never-ending throughout the course of my PhD. I am very grateful for her time and dedication to each and every revision of my thesis, as well as her support while I was out in the field. I am also indebted to my committee members, Prof. Alana Boland and Prof. Michael Bunce who provided me with much needed guidance, feedback and intellectual support over the past five years.

I would like to thank my fellow graduate students, especially those who took part in our monthly graduate seminars; their feedback and intellectual conversations were always helpful and inspiring for me. In particular, I am forever indebted to Luisa Sotomayor for her friendship, listening ear and incredible ability to help me think through ideas. I would also like to thank my friends, colleagues, and professors at the Department of Geography for their friendship and support, which has strongly shaped my experience at the University, particularly my office mate, Sally Turner; the Department Staff; and Prof. Joe Leydon.

I would equally like to extend my thanks to all those of who helped me in the Dominican Republic, starting with the local residents in Bávaro-Punta Cana and Boca Chica. I cannot begin to express the appreciation I have for those who opened their hearts and took the time from their busy lives to share their stories with me.

I am grateful for all the help I received from the numerous researchers, academics, activists, in Bávaro-Punta Cana and the capital, who took part in this research project. Thanks in particular to Dr. Yolanda Leon from the Santo Domingo Institute of Technology (INTEC), for her guidance and for sharing her amazing wealth of knowledge and wisdom. I am also deeply grateful for her friendship, generosity, and hospitality during my stays in the capital. Yolanda put me in touch with my research assistant, Ambar Then Gúzman. Ambar helped in the transcribing of my interviews, among other things, and her hard work was invaluable for my research. Without these incredible women, this thesis would not have been possible.

Further, I would like to express my appreciation to: Santos de la Cruz, from the Centro Montalvo, who gave me an interesting perspective into the difficulties faced by the urban poor in
the Dominican Republic and the possibilities of collective mobilization; Yasmin Castillo, who at the time, was the manager of the local planning office (DPP) of the Ministry of Tourism in Verón, for her help, candid conversations, and friendship; Ben Hulefeld at the PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation, who provided me with access to the Foundation’s library and gave me support throughout my time in the field; and Carsten Gopfert, the Director of International Relations at the Municipal District of Verón-Punta Cana, who provided me with invaluable insight into the difficulties faced by the newly established local government.

I am also grateful to Canada’s Social Science and Humanities Research Council’s (SSHRC) Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship Programme and the International Development Research Centre’s Doctoral Research Award Programme for their generous financial support. This project was also made possible by numerous research, travel and conference grants from the University of Toronto’s School of Graduate Studies and Department of Geography, as well as those from the University of Toronto Mississauga’s Department of Geography.

Lastly, but most importantly, I would like to thank my loving parents, Sabina and Josef, for teaching me to never give up and for pushing me to do my best, as well as my family and friends for their emotional support throughout the years.
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<tr>
<td>ADETI</td>
<td>Asociación Dominicana de Empresas Turísticas Inmobiliarias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRD</td>
<td>Asociación de Industrias de la República Dominicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHLB</td>
<td>Asociación de Hoteles de La Romana y Bayahibe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBHA</td>
<td>La Romana-Bayahibe Hotel Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHPTZE</td>
<td>Asociación de Hoteles y Proyectos Turísticos de la Zona Este</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASONAHORES</td>
<td>Asociación de Hoteles y Turismo de la República Dominicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCRD</td>
<td>Banco Central de la República Dominicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCT</td>
<td>Consorcio Dominicano de Competitividad Turística</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEIZTUR</td>
<td>Comité Ejecutor de Infraestructuras de Zonas Turística</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPM</td>
<td>Consorcio Energético Punta Cana-Macao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONARE</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Reforma del Estado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
<td>Caribbean Tourism Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGII</td>
<td>Dirección General de Impuestos Internos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGODT</td>
<td>Dirección General de Ordenamiento y Desarrollo Territorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Departamento de Planificación y Proyectos (Department of Planning and Projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTA</td>
<td>Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| EQUIS-INTEC | Social Research Team, INTEC  
Equipo de Investigación Social, INTEC |
| FDI     | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FEDOMU  | Federación Dominicana de Municipios (Dominican Federation of Municipalities) |
| FLACSO  | Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social Science) |
| FONDOMICRO | El Fondo para el Financiamiento de la Microempresa  
Fund for Micro-Enterprise Financing |
| HURD    | Haitianos Unidos en la República Dominicana (United Haitians in the Dominican Republic) |
| INFOTEP | Instituto Nacional de Formación Técnico Profesional (National Institute for Professional Development) |
| INFRATUR | Departamento para el Desarrollo de la Infraestructura Turística  
Department for the Development of Tourism Infrastructure |
| INTEC   | Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo  
Santo Domingo Institute of Technology |
| IRS     | Internal Revenue Service |
| ISR     | Impuesto Sobre la Renta (Income Tax) |
| ITBIS   | Impuesto sobre la Transferencia de Bienes Industrializados y Servicios  
Tax on the Transfer of Industrialized Goods and Services |
| LAC     | Latin America and the Caribbean |
| Liga Municipal | Municipal League |
| MMARENA | Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales  
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources |
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| MOPC      | Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones
Ministry of Public Works and Communication |
| MEPyD     | Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo
Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development |
| NGO       | Non-Governmental Organization                                             |
| OBMICA    | Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe (at UNIBE and FLACSO)
Caribbean Migration Observatory |
| ONE       | Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas
National Statistics Office |
| OPP       | Orangi Pilot Project                                                      |
| PLD       | Partido de la Liberación Dominicana
Dominican Liberation Party |
| PNUD/UNDP | Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
United Nations Development Programme |
| POLITUR   | Policía Turística
Tourism Police |
| POT       | Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial
Land-use Plan |
| PRD       | Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
Dominican Revolutionary Party |
| PRSC      | Partido Reformista Social Cristiano
Christian Social Reform Party |
| SIDS      | Small Island Developing States                                           |
| UNEP      | United Nations Environment Programme                                      |
| UDO&M     | Universidad Dominicana O&M
Dominican O&M University |
| UASD      | Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo
Santo Domingo Autonomous University |
| UCSD      | Universidad Católica de Santo Domingo
Santo Domingo Catholic University |
UGAM  
La Unidad de Gestión Ambiental
Environmental Management Unit

UNIBE  
Universidad Iberoamericana
Ibero-American University

USAID  
United State Agency for International Development
Map 1-1: Settlements in Bávaro-Punta Cana
1 Introduction

Coastal tourism is now one of the fastest growing sectors globally, and has been adopted by many countries in the global South as a development strategy. Indeed, tourism is often praised for its success in contributing to national economies. The promotion of tourism, however, is not ipso facto a guarantee for 'development.' What may be considered a success for a nation's GDP, does not necessarily translate into a success for the local economy, society or environment. In the Caribbean, the 'sun, sand, and sea' tourist model has been widely criticized for its failure to economically benefit local populations as well as create a range of social impacts (Pattullo 1996, Cabezas 2008). Further, while tourism was previously touted as the 'smokeless industry,' coastal tourism has directly and indirectly resulted in a range of environmental problems as a result of its strategic location in areas of ecological fragility (Wilkinson and Brodie 2011).

Coastal tourism is also a driver of migration. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), globally, there are 105 million migrant workers in the tourism industry, and their share is increasing rapidly (Joppe 2012). Due to the creation of employment opportunities in coastal areas, intra-national and/or trans-national migrant labourers relocate to tourist locations in search of work in the industry itself or in related sectors, such as construction, or indirectly to service the growing local population. Coastal tourism, which is often located in remote, rural, 'pristine', 'natural' areas, is increasingly and fundamentally implicated in a process of urban expansion, urbanization\(^1\) and urban development. Due to its location, coastal tourism thus also has strong implications for the ecological integrity of the environment, and the environmental conditions in which local residents are living.

Given the significance of coastal tourism to some nations, particularly Small Island Developing States (SIDS), towns or cities whose economies are intricately tied or directly related to tourism are becoming the permanent and temporary homes of rapidly growing populations. Bávaro-Punta Cana in the Dominican Republic (DR) is one such example.

\(^1\) Urbanization is an increase in the proportion of people living in urban areas in any given political or geographical area.
Bávaro-Punta Cana was defined as a tourism pole in 1986 by the Dominican government, after the opening of the first hotel of the area, the Club Méditerranée in 1980, and the opening of the Punta Cana International Airport in 1984 (PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation 2011). Since then, the number of hotels has expanded to a current total of 67 hotels, and in 2012, the Punta Cana International Airport had almost 2.5 million non-resident arrivals (BCRD-SECTUR-ASONAHORES 2011).

The growth of nearby small towns and cities, such as La Otra Banda and the provincial capital, Higüey, accompanied the expansion of tourism in the area. Migration also resulted in the urbanization of the formerly rural area. By 2007, the municipality of Higüey was subdivided, and the general area of Bávaro-Punta Cana became the municipal district of Verón-Punta Cana, with its own local government. The local population of this municipal district grew from one in the hundreds in the early 1980s, to approximately 15,000 in 2002, and over 43,000 in 2010. The majority of this population is housed in informal settlements and has inadequate access to basic infrastructure and services.

Yasmin Castillo, the former manager of the local office of the Department of Projects and Planning (DPP) of the Ministry of Tourism, describes the area as both unique and complicated:

This area [Bávaro-Punta Cana] is so intriguing for me, because settlements in the other areas are different. I mean, in other areas like Puerto Plata or in the North [in general], it seems to me that there was much more local participation than here in terms of what has been carried out. But this is like no-man’s land, you don’t know who it belongs to; the local authorities are sparse or are not as noticeable as in other areas. The East [or Bávaro-Punta Cana] as a case study is extremely complex, maybe that’s why it is so different. Imagine a place with so many hotels and without a water system, the fact that it is the most important tourism pole [in the DR] and brings the most money to the State and at the same time has the most problems to solve and the least local participation. And of all the places where the Ministry is intervening, it is the only place where locals do not want us to build sidewalks...2 (Yasmin Castillo, pers. comm., February 2, 2010).

This statement leaves us with many questions. Why would local residents not want sidewalks? Why is there little ‘local participation’?3 If Bávaro-Punta Cana is so successful economically, why are there ‘more problems’ here than in other places?

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2 Own translation.
3 Yasmin Castillo used this term to mean community action broadly, not necessarily in terms of participation in governance discussed by Fung and Wright (2003), for instance, to mean participatory budgeting or the establishment of participatory municipal governance bodies.
In a context where the state has historically taken a backseat in planning, regulation and development, certain groups in Bávaro-Punta Cana were able to benefit considerably from tourism expansion, while others have been less able to do so. In my discussions of the area and its unexpected paradoxes with academics, planners, private sector representatives, local residents and government officials, among others, questions of power, politics, and planning were unavoidable. Tourism has certainly impacted the local environment, economy and society. But more than that, politics and imbalances of power between the different stakeholders involved in tourism and governance in the area have fundamentally shaped urban environments and development. It has been argued elsewhere that tourism imposes 'new fractions of power over the production and reproduction of space' (Bunce 2008:977), however, what this means for the urban areas (and environments) surrounding coastal tourism, in terms of development and governance, has yet to be addressed.

The central objective of this thesis is to examine the power relations between the private sector, local residents, and government at different levels in the urban development process of coastal tourist areas. Using Bávaro-Punta Cana as a case study, my central research question asks: What are the power, planning and political implications of a global corporate tourism sector for the urban development and planning of coastal tourist areas?

This wider question is best addressed through the following specific questions:

1. How is planning implicated in the development of tourist areas in the DR?
2. What can account for the debility of planning of tourist areas in the DR?
3. How has tourism shaped the urban expansion of Bávaro-Punta Cana?
4. What is the role of the local government in the governance and planning of Verón-Punta Cana?
5. How is the private sector implicated in the ‘development’ and governance of the area?
6. How is the urban environment experienced by local residents living in conditions of poverty?

By answering these research questions, we are better able to understand how relationship between these three groups of actors can shape (new) urban spaces in the DR, but also further afield. Indeed, the lessons learned can give indication of the problems and possibilities that may
arise in a context where a global corporate tourism sector is inserting itself into new urban(izing) spaces.

The central argument put forth in my thesis is two-fold. Firstly, it is important to recognize the urban nature of spaces developing around coastal tourist enclaves. This is significant because urban space carries with it a particular set of implications, in terms of the built environment and basic services, the lived experience of residents, and governance processes and relationships. Indeed, the failure to recognize the urban nature of problems that arise in such areas could have serious consequences for the area’s development and the conditions in which its residents live. Secondly, these urban spaces must, in turn, be understood as produced by coastal tourism. That is, coastal tourism can play a crucial role in the configuring of urban space and development.

Thus, this thesis contributes to the study of tourism and planning in two ways. First, it examines the relationship between two phenomena often treated separately: coastal tourism and urban development. Second, it examines the particular practices, negotiations, and power dynamics between three groups of actors (local residents, government and the private sector) in the control of urban development in the context of a coastal tourist area.

In order to address the above research questions, this thesis is structured in eight chapters, six of which directly answer the questions posed above. Chapter 1 focuses on establishing the theoretical context for my research. I discuss the literature on coastal tourism and planning, and build a case for the need for tourism studies to draw from planning to learn from three particular areas of investigation, namely questions of urban citizenship, informality and splintering urbanism. Before I begin to discuss the Dominican context and my case study more specifically, I outline my research design in Chapter 2. There, I take the opportunity to reflect upon my position and on the many negotiations between the different sides of my positionality as a researcher undertaking fieldwork in a tourist area.

In Chapter 3, I set the context for my case study and address the first research question, which asks how planning is implicated in the development of tourist areas in the DR. The chapter aims to highlight the policy-based nature of tourism planning on the part of the State. I argue that while the government has facilitated the expansion of tourism development and the investment
by the private sector, it has done very little planning at the local level to mediate the impacts of tourism and support urban development.

Chapter 4 focuses on the institutional weaknesses of the Dominican ‘State.’ It addresses the second research question, asking: ‘What can account for the debility of planning of tourist areas in the DR?’ and outlines some of the difficulties that underline the possibilities for more effective planning in places such as Bávaro-Punta Cana, where different and sometimes opposing entities of the state have interests in planning and regulation.

Then, in Chapter 5, I narrow my focus to my case study, Bávaro-Punta Cana. In this chapter, I address the third research question by illustrating the growth in tourism and tracing the urbanization process that accompanied it. I discuss the fragmented character of urban development and describe the landscape as ‘splintered urbanism.’ Then, in Chapter 6, I address the fourth research question: What is the role of the local government in the governance and planning of Verón-Punta Cana? I highlight some of the many challenges faced by a new local government in a context that has historically been highly unregulated. In Chapter 7, I question the role of the private sector in the ‘development’ of Bávaro-Punta Cana, by trying to understand the logics of at play in the private sector’s practices of Corporate Social Responsibility.

The last substantive chapter of this thesis focuses on the experiences of local residents living in conditions of poverty. I break down the various deprivations that contribute to poverty in the area, and look at the ways that the discourse around informal practices of residents can have very material implications. Finally, in the final chapter, I aim to draw some broad conclusions from the experience of urban expansion in Bávaro-Punta Cana that can contribute to thinking about the way tourism is implicated in the production of urban space, and how planning is complicit in this process.
2 Coastal Tourism and the Configuring of Urban Space

2.1 Introduction

The economic, social and environmental impacts of coastal tourism have been well documented. It is also acknowledged that the production of tourism drives migration, both nationally and internationally, of workers in search of employment opportunities. Accordingly, coastal urban populations have increased, and in some cases, tourism has created wholly new urban settlements, contributing significantly to the urbanization of some areas, provinces, or even countries. Tourist areas, such as Cancún and Bávaro-Punta Cana are becoming sites of (generally rapid) urban expansion often without adequate necessary infrastructure or provision for basic services. Indeed, such tourist areas are exhibiting markedly urban problems that are social, environmental, physical, and political in nature. As these sites become the home of growing populations, the focus must shift away from planning destinations to finding ways to make these places liveable.

Surprisingly, there is little overlap in the literature between the fields of tourism studies and urban planning. Where planning literature does acknowledge the significance of tourism, this is generally limited to urban tourism. In the case of tourism studies literature, planning is discussed at various scales, from the destination to the national level, and is dealt with primarily in a normative sense; that is, destinations should be planned, policies implemented, impacts mitigated, through the use of a number of tools and regulations. What is lacking, however, is an understanding of the role of tourism in the production of (new) urban space, and how those involved in the production of tourism, namely, the private sector, the State (at all levels), and local residents, interact and contribute to urban development and governance.

The field of planning can contribute to understanding the realities of urban development in tourist areas. Not only is planning theory in general useful for drawing attention to power dynamics and politics in the urban setting, but its attention to, and consideration of, particular issues can provide valuable insight into how we understand particular urban phenomena and
dynamics in the context of tourism in developing⁴ countries. Three intellectual insights from the field of planning have a particular value for the examination of my case study: citizenship, informality, and ‘splintering urbanism.’

The purpose of this chapter is to set the context for this project. I elaborate on three key issues. First, I present the three groups of actors in the production of tourism mentioned above. Second, I illustrate the migration process associated with coastal mass tourism and elaborate on the increasingly urban nature of issues faced by local residents. Third, I draw from the aforementioned lenses through which to analyze the urban changes in coastal mass tourist areas.

I begin the chapter with an elucidation of the significance of coastal tourism. The next section focuses on global tourism capital and the proliferation of enclave tourism. In the third part of this chapter, I focus on the environmental, social and economic impacts of tourism, including a brief discussion of the urbanization process that accompanies mass tourism development. Next, I outline the role of the state in tourism planning, followed by a brief discussion of the role of local residents. The subsequent section addresses the literature on tourism and planning in coastal tourist areas, before concluding with an elaboration of the planning concepts that will be utilized in the remainder of this thesis: the notion of urban citizenship, informality, and splintering urbanism.

2.2 Context: Tourism and the Coast

The significance of tourism for the world's economy and society is undeniable. Since the 1950s, with the development of the jet airplane, travel and tourism⁵ have shifted into an era of mass

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⁴ While the terms ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries/world continue to be utilized by many academics and organizations, including the United Nations (e.g. UNDP), I must point out that I utilize these terms with hesitation, since they carry with them many assumptions and implications. For instance, ‘developing’ assumes that there is a particular path of industrialization that should be followed, and ‘developed’ implies that there is in fact one end goal that is to be achieved. Other terms have also been used to describe geopolitical imaginations, such as the Third World, which ‘is based on a geography of global politics divided into three camps – The United States and its allies, the Soviet Union and the Communist world and a ‘Third World’ of post-colonial states in Africa, Asia and Latin America’ (Dodds 2008:3). These camps, however, have less meaning in today’s world. The Global South is perhaps currently the preferred term utilized to describe the so-called developing world, but it is also problematic. For instance, the dividing line between the North and South is no longer as clear as it was in the 1980, when it was drawn. For the purpose of this thesis, I utilize the term ‘developing,’ since I make reference to many UN documents which make use of this particular terminology.
consumption (Theobald 2005). For the first time, on December 13th, 2012, the number of international tourists in one year has reached one billion (UNWTO 2012b). Tourism has been adopted as an economic and social development policy across the world (Sharpley and Telfer 2002). If we consider direct, indirect and induced contributions, travel and tourism contributes almost 9.1 percent of the global GDP, and 8.7 percent of all employment (WTTC 2013). According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO 2012a), one in every 12 formal sector jobs (or 235 million in total) is in tourism.

Many developing countries have implemented policies or programmes for the promotion of tourism to gain a portion of the pie. Moreover, tourism was characterized in the 1970s and 1980s as the 'smoke-less' industry that would help shift nations away from their dependence on more polluting (manufacturing) industries (Williams and Ponsford 2009, Davies and Cahill 2000). Tourism's potential to acquire foreign currency, increase employment and promote economic development through multiplier effects, make it an attractive strategy for economic development; development came to be seen as the 'raison d'être' for tourism (Sharpley 2002).

Thus, for developing regions, the significance of travel and tourism to countries' economies is even greater; the Caribbean is in first place, with travel and tourism's total contribution making up almost 14 percent of GDP (US$ 50 billion). Data also show that tourism, as well as the number of tourists arriving in these countries is on the increase. Furthermore, for twenty of the

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5 Travel and Tourism is understood as ‘[t]he activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not remunerated from within the place visited’ (WTTC/OE 2010:5).

6 Direct, indirect and induced contributions are considered the 'total' contributions, which amount to US$ 7,000 billion. Direct contributions reached around three percent of the world's GDP, which in absolute terms equates approximately US$ 2,000 billion. Travel and tourism also employs 100 million persons directly (3.3 of total employment), or 260 million in total (8.7 percent of employment) (WTTC 2013).

7 North Africa is in second with 12.4 percent, followed by SE Asia (10.9 percent), Oceania (10.7 percent), Latin America (8.6 percent), North America (8.5 percent), etc. Travel and tourism's direct contribution to the region's GDP is almost five percent of GDP, or US$ 16 billion. In terms of employment, travel and tourism contributed almost 12 percent of the region's employment in total, or almost 4 percent of the region's direct employment (WTTC 2013).

8 While the 'developed' world continues to receive the majority of tourism expenditure (almost 70 percent), the increase in tourism expenditure in developing countries between 1990 and 2000 was 133 percent, and in least developed countries was 154 percent (Pro-Poor Tourism 2004). In this period, arrivals in developing countries increased by almost 95 percent (UNWTO 2002). Emerging and developing countries have steadily increased their share of international tourist arrivals from 32 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 2010 (UNWTO 2011).
world's 28 least developed countries, tourism is either first or second in terms of export earnings (UNWTO 2012a). For Small Island Developing States\(^9\) (SIDS), tourism is even more significant; in Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba and Anguilla, three quarters of their national GDP and four fifths of employment can be attributed to tourism (UNEP 2009).

Tourism's largest market segment is coastal tourism, and it is projected to continue growing in the next two decades (UNEP 2012). According to the United Nations Environment Programme, coastal tourism is one of the fastest-growing forms of tourism – but there is no systematic analysis that has quantified its share of tourism globally, or its contribution to the economy (UNEP 2009, Hall 2001).

### 2.3 Global Tourism Capital and Resort Enclaves

The significance of the coast is particularly true for tourism in the developing countries, such as those found in the Caribbean. Land speculation along the coastline and concomitant inflated land prices has meant that mass tourism is generally the approach taken by tourism developers seeking to maximize profits (Honey and Krantz 2007). This is particularly true on the larger islands such as the DR, Jamaica and Cuba (Perelló 2007). While these countries have certainly made efforts to diversify their product (i.e. more niche types of tourism), the majority of their tourism is highly standardized, caters to the masses, and is strongly influenced by foreign tour operators (CEPAL 2008). Under this 'sun, sand and sea' model, tourists purchase their vacations from tour operators and stay in all-inclusive resorts.\(^10\) Given the volume of data and studies quantifying and qualifying tourism in developing and least developed countries, SIDS, and in the Caribbean, the significance of tourism for the 'development' of these countries comes as little surprise.

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\(^9\) Of the ten most tourism-dependent countries (in terms of contributions as a percentage of GDP), nine are SIDS, of which six are in the Caribbean (Scheyvens and Momsen 2008).

\(^10\) Smaller islands have been pursuing more exclusive and selective forms of tourism (CEPAL 2008). According to UNEP (n.d.a), in most all-inclusive packages ‘about 80 percent of travelers’ expenditures go to the airlines, hotels and other international companies (who often have their headquarters in the travelers’ home countries), and not to local businesses or workers.’ In a study performed by the Organization of American States of Jamaica’s tourism industry, it was established that while all-inclusive hotels produced the most revenue, their impact on the economy was less (per dollar) than other types of accommodations (UNEP n.d.).
A study shows that almost four fifths of the world’s mass tourism market is ‘somehow’ in the hands of transnational corporations (Schulte 2003). It is noteworthy that foreign direct investment (FDI) is not considered as significant in the tourism industry as in other sectors (due to other non-equity arrangements, e.g. management and leasing contracts or franchises). Within tourism itself, FDI is mostly limited to the hotel sector (as opposed to tour operators, booking systems and airlines) (Schulte 2003, UNCTAD 2007), and within the Caribbean, specifically, hotels are generally foreign-owned (UNCTAD 2004).

Globally, American hotel chains are the leaders in international expansion with ten of the largest hotel chains (based on number of rooms). The largest hotel chain is UK-based InterContinental Hotels Group with 585,094 rooms in 3949 hotels, followed by Wyndham, Marriot and Hilton of the United States. Many of these hotel chains are urban-based chains and historically gave little attention to the ‘sun, sand, and sea’ tourism. With the growth in mass tourism in the mid-20th Century, companies already pursuing the three ‘s’ model, such as those in Spain (in particular the Balearic Islands), expanded their international reach rapidly, particularly in Mexico and the Caribbean (CEPAL 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th># Rooms</th>
<th># Hotels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>InterContinental Hotels Group</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>585 094</td>
<td>3 949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyndham Hotel Group</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>550 576</td>
<td>6 544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriott International</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>537 249</td>
<td>2 999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilton Hotels Corp.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>502 116</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accor</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>461 698</td>
<td>3 871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2-1: World’s Largest Hotel Chains by Number of Rooms (2007)*
*Source: Taken from CEPAL (2008)*

The first Balearic chain to begin the internationalization process was Barceló Hotels and Resorts, which opened its first international hotel in 1985 in Bávaro-Punta Cana, the DR. Another Balearic chain, Sol Meliá, is in fifteenth place in terms of the world’s largest hotel chains, and is also the largest resort hotel chain globally (Álvarez, Cardoza and Díaz, 2005). The Spanish-based companies became the leaders in Spanish-speaking countries of LAC, namely the DR, Cuba and Mexico, managing over half the total hotel supply in the Caribbean (almost 70,000 rooms), or 70 percent of the total market in the DR (ECLAC 2008). The largest chains (in terms
of number of establishments) in LAC are Sol Meliá (265), Barceló (30), RIU Hotels and Resorts (30), and Iberostar (23), all Balearic chains (CEPAL 2008).

The ‘sun, sand, and sea’ model has been widely described as enclave tourism, which is created through ‘a process of the spatial and social segregation of tourists from residents’ (Schmid 2008: 105). It is also characterized by weak economic linkages at the community level (Freitag 1994). Enclaves are places where capital ‘jumps’ from one point to another, being highly integrated in the international corporate world, but are often walled off from local places (Ferguson 2005). In the words of a professor of tourism from the University of Havana, tourist enclaves represent ‘atoms of globalization implanted in underdeveloped nations’ (José Luis Perelló, pers. comm., Jan 08, 2010). Others (Shaw and Shaw 1999: 68) describe resort enclaves as inclusive and self-contained,

creating a totally controlled tourist environment. Such enclaves are operated by global capital and transnational organisations through a series of spatial networks, which unless they are strongly regulated by the local state, allow only limited economic benefits to accrue to the host communities.

While it has been noted by many that tourism in developing countries has an overwhelming tendency to occur in the form of enclave resorts (i.e. Oppermann 1993), none have quantified what proportion of tourism actually occurs in enclave form. Since ‘enclaves’ can incorporate a number of different characteristics – spatial or economic, for example – it can be difficult to quantify this form of tourism. However, one indicator of enclavity could be the ‘all-inclusiveness’ of tourism. To take the DR as an example, half of all hotels rooms are sold on an all-inclusive basis (Coles 2004).

The 'resort enclave' (or various derivatives of it, e.g. 'enclave tourist resort') is used to describe a range of forms, including the single self-contained resort (e.g. in Luperón, DR, Freitag 1994), or a town characterized by a number of resorts (e.g. Cancún, Mexico, Torres and Momsen 2005). This latter type is also referred to simply as a 'resort' or 'resort town' (e.g. Acapulco and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico López-López et al. 2006). Others use the term 'resort' (e.g. like Cabo del Sol in Los Cabos, Mexico, López-López et al. 2006) or 'resort complex' (e.g. Playa Dorada in the DR, Coles 2004) to refer to a mega-development with a number of hotels/resorts within an larger complex. Resort enclaves thus range in scale from the individual tourist development, to a group of them, to an entire town characterized by them.
Resorts, however, are not the only form of enclaves in these 'sun, sand and sea' localities. Second-home tourism, also known as residential tourism, now increasingly complements the traditional resort developments. Physically, this form of tourism is manifest as complexes of condominiums or villas, and are perhaps best described as a form of gated community. In some cases, these are stand-alone residential developments. Increasingly, residential projects are also included in mega-development projects: ‘The hottest trend in coastal development is for resort complexes to be all-inclusive 'villages', with their own spas, marinas, golf courses, shopping facilities, and vacation homes....There’s a move towards combining hotels and condos because the second home market is so strong’ (Honey and Krantz 2007). These are described as more sophisticated developments that integrate a large number of infrastructural elements. The premise of residential tourism is that tourists make a longer-term investment, thereby moving away from the low-cost, all-inclusive model in order to attract higher income clients and ‘limit some of the undesired effects of mass-tourism’ (CEPAL 2008).

For the sake of consistency in this thesis, I refer to tourist enclaves as the spaces of segregation between tourists and residents, whether individual resorts, a number of resorts within a larger complex, gated communities, complexes with golf courses or other recreational facilities for tourists, or mega-projects catered to tourists. I purposefully refrain from referring to an entire town or city where tourism is the dominant source of employment, as a resort or an enclave, since it ignores the extreme differences within it and the existence of a hinterland that is not part of the tourist's direct consumption.

2.4 Coastal Environments and the Impacts of Tourism

Coastal tourism involves a range of activities both on the coast and in/on its waters, and requires the development of direct (hotels, restaurants, second homes, resorts) and support infrastructure (marinas, dive shops, and so on) (UNEP 2009). While coastal tourism depends so strongly on its natural environment, it often concurrently destroys the very resources upon which it is reliant (Honey and Krantz 2007). Coastal tourism, by its very nature, places pressure on resources in a

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11 There are a number of types of residential tourism, from rentals, to complete ownership to timeshares, which have evolved to include other permutations, such as fractional ownership, condohotels, and private residential clubs (CEPAL 2008).
fragile ecological zone. The coastal zone holds biodiversity and encompasses numerous interconnected ecosystems such as ‘coral reefs, intertidal zones, estuaries, coastal aquaculture, and seagrass communities’ (MEA 2005a: 27). It represents the interface between land and oceans and its ecosystems include wetlands, coral reefs, mangrove forests, dune formations, and seagrass meadows. All of these play a vital role in the stabilization and nourishment necessary for the protection of the coast from hydro-meteorological events (UNEP 2009, MEA 2005b), but also create and protect the beaches so sought after by tourism developers. Coastal ecosystems are concurrently the most productive and most threatened ecosystems globally (MEA 2005b).

Coastal ecosystems face high demand from a range of potentially conflicting activities (Wong 1993: x). According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the destruction of coastal ecosystems is largely due to the ‘development-related conversion of coastal habitats such as forests, wetlands, and coral reefs through coastal urban sprawl, resort and port development, aquaculture, and industrialization’ (MEA 2005a:69).

There is a large quantity of literature listing the negative environmental impacts of coastal tourism. Table 2-2 below outlines some of coastal tourism's impacts, as well as their possible causes. The table is not comprehensive, but illustrates the most common environmental impacts from coastal tourism across the developed and developing worlds.

The possible environmental impacts range from water quality degradation to mangrove forest depletion and landscape change, and increased vulnerability to climate change-related events. Developing countries will likely be more affected by some problems over others, as would small and coral islands, which might suffer more severely from inadequate sewage and wastewater treatment, solid waste disposal issues, and insufficient potable water (Wong 1998).

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12 According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, coastal systems extend ‘seawards to about the middle of the continental shelf and inland to include all areas strongly influenced by proximity to the ocean’ (MEA 2005a: 27)

13 With particular focus on coastal wetlands, the direct and indirect forces of degradation are the conversion of land-uses and the effects of population and economic growth in coastal areas (MEA 2005b).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Impacts of Coastal Tourism</th>
<th>Possible Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solid waste pollution</td>
<td>Inadequate waste disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water quality degradation</td>
<td>Poor wastewater and solid waste disposal and treatment and coastal area's poor filtering capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh water degradation and aquifer depletion</td>
<td>Extraction of fresh water for human consumption and over-extraction of fresh water leads to aquifer salinization due to salt-water intrusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil erosion and reduced soil fertility</td>
<td>Clearing of vegetation for buildings and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedimentation</td>
<td>Digging and filling of land and landscaping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal erosion and beach degradation</td>
<td>Edification too close to shoreline and the consequent use of protective structures (e.g. sea walls), coral reef degradation, mangrove depletion, and coral mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral reef degradation</td>
<td>Poor wastewater and solid waste disposal and treatment (and coastal area's poor filtering capability) and sedimentation (which slows coral growth, eventually resulting in coral death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct human disturbance, which includes snorkeling and diving, tourists walking on reefs, boat anchors, motorized vehicles, and taking pieces as souvenirs; fishing, which affects reef food chains; oil spills from diving boats; littering; underwater mining for construction materials. In mountainous areas, shallow reef flats are reclaimed for land for construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landslides and flooding</td>
<td>Site preparation and construction which can affect landscape, soil, topography and drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangrove forest and marshland destruction</td>
<td>Reclaiming of mangrove forests for beaches, tourism infrastructure, and in some areas for fish ponds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased vulnerability to climate-related events</td>
<td>Coastal pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of biodiversity, animal and plant species and valuable habitat (e.g. sand dunes, mangrove forests, wetlands, coral reefs)</td>
<td>Mangrove and coral reef destruction devastates the habitat of different species</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourists trampling on rocky or sandy intertidal areas which destroys the habitat of many species</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The overturning of boulders, which have different fauna and flora on different surfaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased exploitation of marine resources for consumption by tourists and new populations concentrated in coastal areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tree removal and marshland infilling for construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape change, littoralisation and loss of coastal beauty</td>
<td>Visual and aesthetic pollution due to incompatible architecture and scattered development, ribbon development along the coast, and enclosure of previously open spaces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2-2: Environmental Impacts of Coastal Tourism**


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14 Coral reefs provide the habitat for a wide range of species (reef, algae, and crustaceans) whose remains form beach sand.

15 One source (Duvat 2010) argues that sand extraction is not limited to tourist areas, but also for the construction of local habitat, and that tourism cannot be considered a cause, but contributes to sand and coral mining.

16 Pollution from wastewater can cause eutrophication. The World Resources Institute defines eutrophication as 'the over-enrichment of water by nutrients such as nitrogen phosphorus,' which in turn can cause algal blooms, or a reduction in oxygen and thus suffocation of species (i.e. 'hypoxia') (WRI n.d.).
Given its location, coastal tourism is particularly vulnerable to climate change (IPCC 2007) and climate-related events, such as sea-level rise. One study that modeled a one meter sea level rise in 19 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries estimates that 29 percent of resort properties would be inundated (Scott et al. 2012). This vulnerability, however, is not limited to tourism:

Population centres and vulnerable communities, tourism, utility and other infrastructure located within narrow coastal zones, are part of the social fabric now at risk from elevated sea levels and more frequent tropical cyclones, from changing climates. Small island communities will struggle with limited options for alternative livelihoods, shelter and food supplies, or shortages in potable water, all of which can increase the cost of local industry operations (UNEP 2009: 10).

Indeed, this increased vulnerability also holds true for settlements in coastal (tourist) areas, despite attention often focusing on the former. For example, after two hurricanes (Hurricane Isidro, 2002 and Hurricane Wilma, 2005) affected the Yucatán coast in Mexico, significant international attention was concentrated on the tourists present in the area. In contrast, little attention was given to the local population residing in the urban areas such as Cancún and Playa del Carmen, which consisted of over 2 million affected by Isidro and Wilma (Redclift et al. 2011).

Not only are coastal settlements exposed to climate-change related hazards, but they, in turn, experience heightened exposure to hazards and vulnerability as a result of changes from urbanization and tourism development in their ecologically sensitive ecosystem (McGranahan et al. 2009). Indeed, altered or damaged coastal and marine ecosystems, whether damaged through clearance, unsustainable practices or chronic pollution, increase their vulnerability to climate-induced disasters. For instance, mangroves and coral reefs act as buffers to protect the coastline from erosion and storms; the destruction of mangroves and reefs as a result of tourism operates to the detriment of the coast (Honey and Krantz 2007). Often local activities and global environmental change work together to increase an area's vulnerability to environmental change. For instance, the combination of local mangrove destruction and coral bleaching from rises in water temperatures globally, increases a coastal area's exposure to flooding (IPCC 2007, Redclift et al. 2011).

The impacts of coastal tourism are not limited to environmental changes, but also affect populations economically and socially (Cabezas 2008 and Pattullo 1996). Many of the
environmental impacts of coastal tourism outlined in the table above also have economic and social consequences for local populations.

Economically, tourism is characterized by low levels of backward linkages to other sectors of the local economy (e.g. to local agriculture) (Dodman and Rhiney 2008). Consequently, tourism is often associated with high levels of economic leakage, ranging in the Caribbean from 22 percent in Trinidad and Tobago, to 85 percent in the Bahamas (Boxill et al. 2004).

Some of the social impacts of tourism include the enclosure of previously open spaces which were used for livestock grazing or agriculture, or health-related consequences due to inadequate wastewater treatment and disposal. As has been outlined by Hardoy et al. (2006), lower-income groups are more at risk of being affected by environmental hazards such as water contamination than their higher-income counterparts.

Tourism has been said to degrade socio-cultural values, threaten traditional architecture, and promote 'the demonstration effect', whereby local populations create a demand for Western lifestyles and attitudes as a result of exposure to tourists' hedonism (Pattullo 1996). Tourism is also associated with illicit economies, such as the sex trade (Kempadoo 1999) or more widely, sexual-affective relationships (Cabezas 2009); the drug trade; theft; and violence (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999).

Further, tourism has been characterized by a de jure apartheid in Cuba, and a 'de facto social and economic apartheid', in Mexico (Wilson 2008: 37). Often, previously open spaces and public lands, including beaches, have been privatized or informally encroached upon by private tourism developers. In some cases, developers have been able to acquire land titles for encroached land (UNESCAP 1995). There may be conflicting land-uses and activities between tourism and other sectors or groups, including local populations, and the displacement of local populations is also a common occurrence (Wilson 2008).

Of course, we cannot simply focus on the negative aspects of tourism development. Tourism can contribute to environmental conservation, through, enhanced environmental management and planning, protection and preservation, regulatory measures (e.g. establishing carrying capacities), direct and indirect financial contributions, environmental awareness raising, and creating
alternative employment (to say, slash-and-burn agriculture or unsustainable fishing) (UNEP n.d. b).

Local residents may benefit from coastal tourism through employment opportunities, revenue creation, infrastructure development, enhanced health and safety conditions, and improved aesthetic standards (UNEP 2009). The tourism sector is particularly attractive to women, often providing them with new opportunities for employment in both the formal and informal sectors17 (UNWTO and UN Women 2011). Employment opportunities, for women and men alike, are often seen as the most 'direct and beneficial impact of tourism' (Liu and Wall 2005: 691).

Labour migration occurs in areas where mass tourism grows rapidly and the services demanded by tourists cannot be met by local labour markets (Williams and Hall 2000). As tourism develops in rural coastal areas or villages, so do human settlements, which grow quickly into urban centres and create a demand for planning (UNESCAP 1995). Indeed, 'urbanization processes, especially those linked to global capital, are working with increasing intensity to draw in migrant labour (and temporary tourist) populations and capital in fixed physical investment to convert coastal locations into places of profit and risk' (Redclift et al. 2011: 17).

Migration for tourism has contributed to the urbanization of coastal areas globally, from the Mediterranean (Burak et al. 2004), to the Asia Pacific (Smith 1992), or the Caribbean (Potter 1993). Many of these areas developed spontaneously, without planning in largely 'natural' contexts (Burak et al. 2004, Smith 1992), and are evidenced by the littoralization of the coast (or ribbon/linear development, Wong 1998).

In many parts of the Caribbean, existing coastal towns or cities experienced explosions in their population. This occurred as nations' economic strategies increasingly shifted towards tourism,

17 In fact, the tourism sector employs almost twice as many women than other sectors. Feminist research, however, has criticized this supposed benefit for women, arguing that 'where women are heavily involved in tourism production, there is a clear segmentation of men's and women's work, with women's employment being concentrated in such low-paid, part-time and seasonal areas as hospitality, cleaning and retail work' (Tucker and Boonabaana 2012: 441). UNWTO and UN Women (2011) acknowledge the many gendered in inequalities in the tourism sector (e.g. that women generally earn 10 to 15 percent less than their male counterparts), but argue that if gender issues are taken seriously in the planning and implementation of tourism, planning can facilitate women's employment and gender equality.
as in the case of urban expansion in and around Castries in St. Lucia (Sahr 1998), or Montego Bay in Jamaica (Thraves 2003).

In Mexico, traditional tourist towns, such as Acapulco, experienced significant urban expansion. This is also true of new tourist poles planned by the state, which are characterized by rapid urbanization as a result of internal migration to coastal tourist towns, including Cancún, Los Cabos, Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo, and Huatulco (Brenner 2010). To take one of these examples, the entire population located in the Los Cabos Tourist Corridor (from Cabo San Lucas to San José del Cabo) exists either directly or indirectly as a result of tourism (López and Sánchez 2002). An informal settlement by the name of Colonia del Sol, did not exist in 1990, but now has over 10,000 inhabitants (López-López et al. 2006). A more acute case is the city of Cancún, México. In 1970, Cancún was a fishing village comprised of less than 500 inhabitants. By 2000, Cancún’s population reached just under half a million inhabitants (Domínguez Aguilar and García de Fuentes 2007).

2.5 The State: Tourism Planning

Given the significance of coastal tourism in developing countries; the ecological fragility of the zone wherein tourism occurs; and its ecological, social and economic impacts; planners have sought ways to redress some of the impacts of coastal mass tourism. Generally, the trends have been engaging in tourism planning, Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), and/or finding alternatives to mass tourism (e.g. promoting eco-tourism, adventure tourism). While each of these has its own strengths and weaknesses, I argue that they do not place urban development and planning at their core. This section focuses on tourism planning, in particular, however, a discussion on ICZM and alternative tourism can be found in Appendix A.

In the past half century, tourism planning has emerged in response to the problems caused by the expansion of mass tourism. However, tourism planning is inadequate for planning urban centres, since its focus lies on expanding or regulating tourism. While planning for tourism certainly has its place, it cannot be a substitute for local urban or development planning. Three issues must be taken into consideration: the kind of planning, who planning is for, and who is doing the planning.
Mass tourism planning that emerged following WWII was primarily guided by an economic rationale (Costa 2001). According to Getz (1987), mass tourism planning has long been characterized by ‘boosterism,’ the simplistic notion that tourism is inherently a positive thing (Hall 2008). In the period between 1950 and 1980, a study by the World Tourism Organization (WTO 1980) found that, 'planning was based on rudimentary market assessment to which a physical plan for equipment and infrastructures was added' (Costa 2001: 431), and did little to incorporate wider socioeconomic concerns. In this period, tourism planning was 'seen as a simplistic process of encouraging new hotels to open, making sure that there was transportation access to the area, and organizing a tourist promotion campaign' (Inskeep 1991:15). Planning in this period was primarily epitomized by policies that facilitated the proliferation of tourism development, through the establishment of fiscal incentives (e.g. in St. Lucia, Wilkinson 2003).

In response to this market-focused approach, tourism planning models in the 1980s epitomized a more integrated approach with considerably greater focus on socioeconomic and environmental issues. Integrated resorts involve careful planning to incorporate tourists' needs within one site, generally through a masterplan, and are considered self-contained enclaves. The premise of integrated resort planning is that they prevent unplanned coastal strip development (Wall 1997). However, while these resorts are termed integrated, they are often paradoxically exclusive and lack links with the local settlement and economy.

In Mexico, for example, coastal tourism was planned comprehensively by the State through FONATUR. These coastal tourist destinations (e.g. Cancún or Los Cabos), are referred to as Integrally Planned Centres (CIP, Centros Integralmente Planeados) (FONATUR 2010). Research suggests that centralized planning and the provision of (financial and physical) infrastructure has not prevented the negative impacts associated with coastal tourism (Murray 2007). Nor was the centralized planning able to create the backward linkages to other economic sectors for regional development, purported to be its justification (Brenner and Aguilar 2002, Torres and Momsen 2005).

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18 Although, earlier examples do exist. It is claimed that the first integrated resorts were found in Hawai’i in the 1950s (see Helber 1995)

19 The Mexican government created a National Tourism Fund (FONATUR), which facilitated tourism development in the country in general, but also the establishment of Integrally Planned Centres (Centro Integralmente Planeado, CIP), including Cancun, Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo, Los Cabos, Loreto, Huatulco, and Nayarit (FONATUR 2010).
Integrated tourism planning occurred in parallel with growing concerns over social and environmental issues that were increasingly brought to the fore with the notion of 'sustainable development'\(^{20}\) (Inskeep 1991) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since then, tourism planning began to encompass aspects of environmental planning. In order to limit tourism's potential environmental consequences, tourism planners have incorporated a number of tools in their planning process, such as determining carrying capacities and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). In the case of Brazil, for example, '[t]his shift in approach effectively brought tourism and environmental policy closer together, because until that point, the environment had been seen as a resource to be consumed in the development of tourism' (Medeiros de Araujo and Dredge 2012: 19).

A study by Costa (2001) on the relationship between town planning and tourism planning, makes the argument that tourism planning originates in town planning and has emerged as a specialization. Reality suggest, however, that this is context-dependent. In 'developed' countries, it is rare to find tourism plans all together. In contrast, tourism planning plays a significant role in many developing countries. Here, governments are often highly centralized, and tourism planning thus occurs through the central state or international consultants, often through incentives or infrastructure development (Wall 2007). In some countries, such as Brazil, where decentralization is more advanced, tourism planning has shifted away from central government control to the local scale, and involves more local participation and infrastructure development to attract investment (e.g. airports) (Medeiros de Araujo and Dredge 2012).

For Lew (2007), tourism planners are overly narrow in their focus, and do not adequately address the normative questions of how planners should plan and what issues should be their focus for planning. According to Gunn and Var (2002:25), urban planners have been primarily concerned with the needs of residents, and must therefore direct their plans to benefit both residents and visitors. While I do not disagree that residents and visitors must be dealt with together, I would argue instead that in the developing countries, it is tourism planners who inadequately focus their concerns on residents. According to Wall (2007), 'tourism planning should be as much about residents as visitors for sustainable development requires that tourism be considered in a broad

\(^{20}\) Defined as ‘Development that meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987: 45).
context for it competes with other sectors for the use of scarce resources' (393). It is argued elsewhere that the tendency of tourism planning is to maximize benefits for tourists and tourism businesses, as opposed to local residents (Moscardo 2011).

Given the far-reaching implications of tourism in other sectors, it is difficult to treat tourism as something to plan for on its own; indeed, single-sector approaches can never really be a basis from which to achieve sustainable development (Wall 1997). Since tourism does not occur in a vacuum outside of reality, tourism affects a whole host of stakeholders, including local residents, and should thus not be planned for in isolation, but as part of larger processes and diverse influences and interests. By treating tourism as a discrete issue, ‘plans often fail to address or give adequate consideration to all areas of concern affecting tourism’ (Liu and Wall 2006: 161).

Since tourism areas have become the new homes of many working directly and indirectly in tourism, the planning that ensues cannot simply be about planning destinations but planning liveable towns or cities for the current and future generations. Thus, in order to adequately deal with urbanization and new urban settlements, tourism must be part of comprehensive local urban and regional planning that places local residents at the centre of development. This further raises questions as to who should be planning. Bodies set up to further the development of tourism (Ministries of Tourism or tourism development funds (e.g. FONATUR)) view these areas as destinations, not places to live, and are thus not suitably positioned to address issues regarding urban development.

A report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) states that in tourist areas, ‘[n]egative impacts and conflicts are due mainly to ignorance of coastal environments and inadequate planning’ (UNEP 2009: 15). Indeed, governments in developing countries often fail to have the instruments in place to adequately regulate tourism development, particularly given their weak fiscal and planning frameworks (Ashley et al. 2000). However, we cannot simply and categorically state that a lack of planning has allowed for tourism's failures, but must look at the kind of planning that has occurred, who the planning is for, and who is doing the planning.
2.6 Local Residents

A number of researchers have pointed to the need to incorporate local residents into the tourism planning process in order to achieve a more sustainable form of tourism development (Tosun 2006, Matarrita-Cascante et al. 2010, Wray 2011, Mowforth and Munt 2009). The reality, however, is that the decision-making that impacts those living in tourist areas is determined by the private sector together with central governments, otherwise put: ‘local people and their communities have become the objects of development but not the subjects of it’ (Mitchell and Reid 2001:114). According to Moscardo (2011), local residents are generally excluded from planning processes for two reasons: ‘a lack of awareness of, and willingness to use, effective mechanisms for public participation and a dominant social representation of tourism development which incorporates beliefs and directives about what kind of tourism knowledge is held by which stakeholders’ (68).

As a result of imposing plans on the ‘powerless’ by the ‘powerful’, the planning process can easily marginalize those already vulnerable (Wall 2007), for example through displacement and resettlement (Mowforth and Munt 2009, Van Noorloos 2011). According to Bunce (2008), ‘[t]he challenge will be to find ways of empowering communities so that they can re-connect with their spaces and places and achieve some measure of influence over the management of their local environment’ (977).

2.7 The Literature on Tourism and Planning

Literature from both the tourism studies and planning perspectives has inadequately considered the urbanization process associated with coastal mass tourism development. This is evidenced firstly by the focus of tourism studies’ literature on the impacts of tourism and secondly, the dichotomous perception of coastal tourism as a rural issue and urban tourism as an urban issue. In terms of the planning literature, tourism has yet to be taken seriously as an object of study, particularly coastal tourism. Thus, neither field has sought to examine the role of coastal tourism in the process of urban development. As a result, there is a lack of understanding of tourism as it relates to planning, governance, power relations, and politics in the urban context. The implications of this in some contexts, such as the DR, is that the urban parts of tourism areas are
governed to a great extent by the Ministry of Tourism, whose mandate is to promote the competitiveness of tourist ‘destinations’, not the development and liveability of urban areas.

The growing importance of tourism globally has led to a growing interest in tourism research among academics and researchers. The creation of a number of journals such as the *Annals of Tourism Research*, the *Journal of Sustainable Tourism*, or the *International Journal of Tourism Research*, dedicated to the subject is evidence of this trend. The very fact that there is debate about whether tourism constitutes a field of study or a discipline (see for instance, Tribe 1997 and Coles et al. 2006) points to the prominence it has achieved in academic circles.

However, the field of tourism studies is critiqued for a number of reasons, particularly its over-descriptiveness. Cooper (2003), for example, claims that much of it is ‘often based upon one-off case studies, specific destinations or problems…. Attempts to build a core theory or to make generalizations are rare…’ (1). Of course, there is nothing innately wrong with case study research, as I discuss in my research design chapter. The problem arises, however, when these case studies fail to produce new knowledge or to push existing knowledge in new directions. This is echoed by Franklin and Crang (2001) who argue that part of the ‘trouble with tourism and travel theory’ lies in its attempts to ‘track and record this staggering expansion [of tourism itself], producing an enormous record of instances, case studies and variations’ (5). Perhaps their most interesting critique is that tourism came to be understood as ‘a series of discrete, localized, events where destinations, seen as bounded localities, are subject to external forces producing impacts’ (6). It is this focus on impacts (and also remedies) that is, in my opinion, the greatest weakness of tourism research. For example, a recent review of research on sustainable tourism by Buckley (2012) focuses on the impacts of tourism and the responses and indicators that have emerged.

The vast majority of research on coastal tourism also follows this trend. The body of literature on coastal tourism is constituted by innumerable case studies that outline its social, environmental and economic *impacts*. What remains under-researched, however, is the understanding of the role of coastal tourism in the *process* of urban development and planning, which is the focus of my own research. This brings me to my second critique of tourism studies.

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21 These are among the journals with the highest impact factors for 2011 in the category of Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management (SJR 2013).
Urban and rural issues (such as coastal tourism) have historically been treated separately in tourism studies, and continues to this day. In 2000, a book entitled *Developments in Urban and Rural Tourism* made the point that 'the distinctions between urban and rural areas have become less apparent' (Robinson et al. 2000:v), yet none of its chapters discuss the relationship between coastal tourism and urban expansion.

Over twenty years ago, Ashworth (1989) commented on tourism studies' neglect of cities, and of urban studies' neglect of tourism. In an updated article, this observation has not changed (Ashworth 2003). I would disagree to some extent with these claims in contemporary times. Urban tourism has become a distinct field of enquiry within tourism studies since the 1980s, and the body of literature is quickly growing on this subject (Edwards et al. 2008). The concern for tourism in urban studies is limited, but is a growing field; in the journal, *Urban Studies*, the majority of publications on tourism were published after 2000. In the field of planning, Ioannides (1995) pointed to a gap in the literature by urban and regional planners on tourism, with few exceptions (Gunn 1994 and Inskeep 1991). Today, similar observations can be made. For example, in the *Journal of the American Planning Association*, there are only 4 publications since 1996 with 'tourism' in their title.

However, where planners have focused their research on tourism, urban tourism has been the object of enquiry. According to Judd and Fainstein (1999) ‘urban tourism’ can be classified according to three separate categories: converted cities that are seeking to attract tourists for regeneration or growth, ‘tourist-historic’ cities, and ‘tourism urbanization’, which is understood as ‘specialized resorts which have been created, either planned or unplanned’ (Law 2002: 5). Patrick Mullins (1991: 326), who coined the term ‘tourism urbanization’ argues: ‘[t]ourist cities represent a new and extraordinary form of urbanization because they are cities built solely for consumption.’ This is a fundamental shift from cities or urban centres as centres of production to centres where the primary purpose is consumption.

While the notion of ‘tourism urbanization’ may be relevant for cases such as Las Vegas or Dubai, where the city itself is the object of consumption, I argue that this classification leaves out...)

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22 There were 29 publications (articles and book reviews) with the term 'tourism' in their title, of which 20 were published after 2000.
a particular manifestation of tourism development in coastal areas. In the latter, consumption occurs primarily within the confines of individual resorts and tourist networks (i.e. from the hotel to the airport or designated tour sites). The urbanization that occurs does so at the fringe of these tourism developments.

2.8 Planning Contributions: Citizenship, Informality, and ‘Splintering Urbanism’

Planning has the potential to contribute to understandings of the urban nature of development around coastal tourist areas. Three lenses are particularly helpful for thinking about the issues that arise in the urbanization process of the developing world setting, namely notions of citizenship, informality and splintering urbanism. This section outlines the key ideas each of these highlight.

2.8.1 The ‘Urban’ and the Notion of Citizenship

In coastal tourist areas experiencing the urbanization described earlier, the social, environmental, economic and political issues faced by inhabitants are increasingly urban in nature.23 There are a number of factors that make urban areas particular and complex; they are extremely dynamic and changing environments. Perhaps most obviously, urban areas are home to large populations and high densities.24 Urban dwellers are faced with costs that might not be necessary in rural areas (such as water or toilets, transport to work), but also urban areas are likely to have higher costs even for basic goods, particularly more prosperous cities25 (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013). In

23 The effects of tourism on an area are certainly not limited to urban areas, and can play an important role in regional development (Telfer 2002, Sharma 2004). The relationship between urban and rural livelihoods is intertwined, despite urban and rural areas having been historically understood as a dichotomy (Tacoli 1998). While there are many tensions between urban and rural areas, there are also synergies, and the rural-urban interface is constituted by two forms of linkage: across space (including people, goods, money, waste, information) and through sectoral interactions (rural activities in urban areas or vice versa) (Tacoli 2003). Thus my focus on urbanization and urban development does not disregard rural areas and people, but instead is a lens through which to understand change in a wider region.

24 The world's population is increasingly living in urban areas, which are now occupied by 52.1 percent of people. In developing countries (46.5 percent), this proportion is lower. Latin America and the Caribbean, however, is exceptionally urbanized with 79.1 percent of its population living in urban areas, comparable to more 'developed' regions (UN DESA, Population Division 2012).

25 Mitlin and Satterthwaite argue that as a result of national poverty lines that do not take into consideration the particularities of urban areas, urban poverty is often vastly under-calculated (2013).
the context of tourist areas, the costs of living for local residents can be even higher (Deery et al. 2012). However, urban areas also bring together a diversity of livelihoods and income-generating possibilities.

Urban dwellers also face a different set of environmental hazards (at different scales), such as overcrowding, inadequate waste collection or unsuitable living environments (i.e. floodplains or steep hillsides) (Hardoy et al. 2006). Previously considered rural phenomena, such as flooding, are now increasingly being associated with urban areas (Pelling 2003), as demonstrated by the extensive flooding in the city of Mumbai in 2005.

Urban areas house diverse nature, 'from semi-natural habitats to wastelands, parks and other highly human-influenced biotopes with their associated species assemblages' (Niemela 1999:119). However, as David Harvey has noted, there is nothing innately unnatural about urban areas (Harvey 1996). Urbanization cannot be seen as a process of human distancing from nature, but instead, 'a process by which new and more complex relationships of society and nature are created' (Keil 2003:729). Through these processes, new relations of power are formulated. According to Swyngedouw (1997), socioeconomic and political powers are deployed in the process of urbanization, with the transformation of nature at its core; the ‘urbanization process as a process of continuous socioecological and political economic transformation’ (312).

In tourist areas, nature plays an even more fundamental role. The quality of, and access to, 'nature' shapes the success of much tourism, and thus configures the power dynamics between actors in tourism itself and the urban centres supporting it.

Urban areas are also where possibilities exist for poverty reduction through local organizations, whether local governments, civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even private enterprises (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004). For Freire, '[c]ities and towns are marvelous and vital instruments of exchange, vital for the development of economic systems and social organizations' (Freire 2001: xvii). They are a place where political activity occurs, where, in democratic societies, citizens are able to make claims for basic services and resources (Freire 2001).

Indeed, the idea of citizenship is inherently political, which recognizes ‘(a) a territorial unit organized for a life in common – a political community; (b) the rights and obligations of
members of this polity – the citizens – and their claim, legitimated by democratic theory, to be
the sovereign of this polity to which the state must be accountable; and (c) the rights of citizens
to claim new rights for themselves’ (Friedmann and Douglass 1998: 2).

Ergo, urban areas are not just about people and money, but nature, power and politics. If tourist
areas, such as Cancún or Bávaro-Punta Cana, are becoming sites of (often rapid) urban
expansion and therefore the new homes of many people, it is important to comprehend how
urban centres are lived and experienced by local residents in order to adequately understand
tourism's role in the urbanization and urban development process. Understanding the urban
nature of development in such areas necessarily has implications for what is expected and what
claims can be made.

2.8.2 Informality

With rapid urbanization, cities in the developing world are often built by residents themselves;
housing is built through what many refer to as ‘auto-construction’ or ‘self-help.’ In LAC, this
represents ‘the major method through which a vast majority of families in the region build their
homes. Self-help housing became the norm for low and moderate income urban housing’ in the
latter half of the 20th Century (Irazábal 2009: 103). Where public provision for services does not
exist, services might be provided through a variety of private mechanisms characterized by
informality.

Recently, the notion of informality has received renewed interest in the study of urbanization in
the developing world. Urban centres in developing countries are characterized by informality, or
'a state of exception from the formal order of urbanization' (Roy 2005:147). Informality
represents 'an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban
transformation itself' (Roy and AlSayyad 2004). It can be understood in a number of different
ways. One of its newer conceptualizations is that of a 'negotiable value' (McFarlane and Waibel
2012). In other words, it can be a constantly shifting negotiation of what is allowed and what is
not, whether among the poor or within the state itself (Roy 2009). Or, drawing from Bayat
(1997), it can be described as 'modes of everyday sociality' (McFarlane and Waibel 2012).

Thus, urban dwellers rely on informality for housing or income generation, but are also affected
by the informal practices of those with political or economic power. Indeed, the key point I wish
to make here regarding informality is that investigation of informality must ‘show not only the ‘way of life’ arguments, but also the relations of urban development that shape and construct those ways of life.’ For research, this implies utilizing the notion to understand the activities and practices in the urbanization process and understanding how it is part of a system and ‘produced by formal structures and always intimately related to them’ (Porter 2011:116).

Beyond this, however, research of urbanization in the context of a developing country, must also look at how the notion of informality is itself mobilized to create certain material outcomes for particular groups. Indeed, the naming of a practice or settlement as ‘informal’ has a certain politics; ‘informality’ cannot simply be utilized as a static descriptor, but as as a dynamic and power-laden element in the shaping of social space.

2.8.3 Splintered Urbanism

Urban dynamics can be understood and analyzed by a multitude of perspectives. One of these takes the built environment and infrastructure as a starting point. With this lens, we are able to see the ways in which segregation is manifest in actuality. Infrastructure, for example, has traditionally been viewed as a binding agent that brings together a territorially defined space. If we take this as a point of departure, it is possible to see how its networks ‘define, shape and structure the very nature of cities’ (30). Indeed, urban areas, globally, have come to experience what Graham and Marvin (2001) refer to as a process of ‘splintering urbanism’ (Graham and Marvin 2001:33), whereby ‘infrastructure networks are being ‘unbundled’ in ways that help sustain the fragmentation of the social and material fabric of cities’ (33). This thesis has become rather influential, and has been a powerful way to interpret the territorial dynamics and logics of socio-spatial configuration in the urban context, globally (in the context of the global North and South alike).

However, as Coutard (2008) illustrates, the thesis can be critiqued on a number of fronts. These critiques were the subject of an entire special issue in Geoforum. The theory’s central claim that splintering urbanism represents a shift from the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ of integrated or ‘bundled’ infrastructure, is the subject of many critiques. One of these is presented by Kooy and Bakker (2008), who suggest that in Jakarta, the water supply system is ‘splintered’ rather than ‘splintering,’ and ‘was not caused by the rise (or fall) of the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’
This points to the need to truly look at the peculiarities of each place in order to understand the ways in which urban socio-space is shaped.

Coutard (2008), who wrote the introduction to the issue, does, however, conclude that the thesis of ‘splintering urbanism’ nonetheless make a number of key contributions. One of these is that it ‘right points to the context-shaped and context-shaping, dynamic interactions between infrastructure provision and urban socio-spatial configurations and functioning’ (1820).

2.8.4 Conclusion

Not only is coastal tourism responsible for changes in the environment, economy and society, but it is fundamentally implicated in a process of urbanization. The notions of citizenship, informality and splintered urbanism are concepts that have emerged throughout my research as central to understanding the dynamics of the urbanism in a coastal tourist area such as Bávaro-Punta Cana.

These concepts will be utilized in the next chapters to help understand the realities of the new urban space and dynamics produced in Bávaro-Punta Cana. Indeed, with urbanization comes a host of planning issues, particular to urban areas and related to questions of power and politics, and how they guide the direction of development and governance of towns and/or cities (not just rural communities or remote ‘natural’ areas). Before engaging with my case study, in the next chapter, I outline the various methods utilized to collect, record, and analyze data, as well as discuss my positionality vis-à-vis my research participants.
3 Research Design

3.1 Introduction

Understanding the realities of urban development and coastal tourism required the combined use of a number of methods at the different levels of research design. Primarily, this involved the selection and analysis of a case study, Bávaro-Punta Cana in the DR, as well as a number of sub-settings within it. The case study was conducted using a combination of primary data collection methods: semi-structured interviews, observation, informal conversations, transect walks, and photography. Interviews were held with a range of actors, from local residents to government officials, representatives from the private sector and some of its associations, non-governmental organizations, and researchers and academics. Secondary data, from aerial photographs, to census data, or studies on the environmental condition of Bávaro-Punta Cana, were also collected and analyzed. This chapter outlines the methods utilized, and illustrates my positionality in relation to my research participants, and the challenges that emerged from my negotiations between the various and sometimes contradictory positions I held in the field.

3.2 Qualitative Methods and the Case Study Approach

The research questions posed in my introduction naturally lend themselves to qualitative methods of inquiry. Qualitative methods seek to ‘delve… in depth into complexities and processes…,’ and ‘little-known phenomena…’ (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 53). Here, researchers are concerned not with testing variables, but finding new ones (Corbin and Strauss 2008:12). Qualitative inquiry ‘can be used to obtain the intricate details about phenomena such as feelings, thought processes, and emotions that are difficult to extract or learn about through more conventional research methods’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 11). Indeed, my own research focuses on the relationship between tourism, urbanism and the environment, as well as power dynamics between actors and institutions; such issues are inherently intangible and difficult to quantify, making quantitative methods therefore unsuitable. Within qualitative methods, I have ascribed both to the case study approach and grounded theory.
Case studies provide a ‘descriptive study, par excellence and in depth’ (Hamel et al. 1993: 33). From my experience in this fieldwork, a case study offers a localized lens through which to understand particular manifestations of larger processes and the ways in which such processes have been locally experienced and mediated in particular ways. The case study method was selected for my research, since it facilitates the answer of descriptive and explanatory research questions. According to Yin (2011), one of the three reasons for selecting the case study approach is related to the kind of questions the research is seeking to address, including descriptive questions: 'What is happening or has happened?', or exploratory questions: 'How or why did something happen?' (5). Case studies also generally combine a number of data collection methods, including archives, interviews, and observations (Eisenhardt 2002), all of which are utilized in my study.

3.3 Case Study Selection

Sampling in qualitative inquiry is generally purposive, as opposed to the probability sampling applied in quantitative methods. According to Patton (2002: 234), a case study can be chosen according to a number of different purposive sampling techniques. I selected my case study primarily according to intensity sampling techniques, where a case is chosen for being rich in information, but where it is generally not a highly unusual case. In essence, this type of case may be particularly valuable for understanding other situations and to gain a deep understanding of the kind of development that is prolific in many Caribbean areas, i.e. the mass, enclave tourism model.

I also aimed to base my research on a critical case, which is premised on the notion that: '[i]f this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases' (Flyvbjerg 2006). Thus, if tourism fails to bring development in a locality that accounts for half of the country’s tourism, then in which case is tourism supposed to bring about development?

Purposive sampling requires prior information in order to facilitate selection, and is best achieved through exploratory research (Mertens 2010). Thus, I undertook a scoping field visit in the months of January and February of 2010 to identify a case study. I pre-selected two countries pursuing the 'sun, sand, and sea' model, and ultimately selected Bávaro-Punta Cana, a relatively new tourist destination in the Caribbean, located on the Eastern coast of the DR. The
DR is the largest receiver of tourists in the Caribbean (including Cancún, México) (CTO 2011). Bávaro-Punta Cana, in turn, perhaps best epitomizes the mass tourism model. Bávaro-Punta Cana is what the Lonely Planet refers to as ‘[g]round zero of DR tourism. The epicentre of the all-inclusive resort’ (2010). This pole concentrates almost half of the country's total number of hotel rooms and tourist arrivals (BCRD-SECTUR-ASONAHORES 2011, BCRD 2012). Bávaro-Punta Cana is hugely significant for the country, economically, socially and politically, and clearly represents an intense and critical case for study.

### 3.4 Data Collection

In terms of data collection, I gathered both primary and secondary data. I utilized the same methods in my preliminary (or scoping) fieldtrip and extended fieldwork. The latter occurred over a period of one year, from September 2010 to August 2011, excluding a few short weeks abroad, in addition to follow-up trips in October 2011, and July 2012. The majority of my research was performed in Spanish, with the exception of a small number of interviews conducted in English. Some of my informal conversations were also in French, or a mix of Spanish and French, particularly with Haitian participants.

The primary method used for data collection was the semi-structured interview, which is considered a form of qualitative research that allows the interview to flow flexibly ‘in a conversational manner offering participants the chance to explore issues they feel are important’ (Longhurst 2003: 117, Dunn 2000). Given the exploratory nature of this research, I chose this method over structured interviews.

Semi-structured interviews were held with two broad groups of research participants. Although heterogeneous, the following constitute the first group: academics and researchers, representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foundations, members of local government and various bodies of the central government, and members of the private sector and their associations. Questions posed to representatives from these organizations were largely directed at interviewees in their professional capacity, focusing on their research, experience working for their respective organizations or companies, the challenges they faced and/or their perspective on tourism, development and planning. A sample interview guide (for researchers and academics) can be found in Appendix B.
Many of these interviews were carried out in the capital city, Santo Domingo, where the majority of universities and government buildings are located. The remaining interviews were largely held in Bávaro-Punta Cana, although I did interview a small number of people in Higüey and Boca Chica\textsuperscript{26} as well.

In total, I conducted 53 interviews with the first group of interviewees. A full list of participants and their organizations interviewed can be found in Appendix C. These research participants were sampled using the ‘snowball’ method. According to Patton (2002: 243), this involves ‘sampling people who know people who know people who know what cases are information rich, that is, good examples of study, good interview participants.’ This process began in December of 2009 prior to the scoping visit, and continued until nearly the end of my extended stay. Since the ‘ideal’ sample size for non-probabilistic studies is impossible to establish (Guest et al. 2006), I determined the number of participants according to theoretical saturation. Saturation is defined at the point at which ‘all the main variations of the phenomenon have been identified and incorporated into the emerging theory’ (65).

Just as overly small qualitative samples can prevent research from reaching a point of saturation, it is also important to acknowledge that too large samples fail ‘to permit the deep, case-oriented analysis that is the raison-d’être of qualitative inquiry’ (Sandelowski 1995: 179). According to Creswell (2002), the research should allow for fifteen to twenty participants for a study based on grounded theory.

I also conducted 44 semi-structured interviews with a second group of research participants, local residents, which in some cases involved more than one participant. Semi-structured interviews were also selected as the method of inquiry for these participants, since they ‘are useful for investigating complex behaviours, opinions and emotions and for collecting a diversity of experiences’ (Longhurst 2003: 128). The list of semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix D, and the interview guides, in Appendix E. In contrast with the first group of research participants, local residents were interviewed in a private capacity, and questions dealt

\textsuperscript{26} The interviewees in Higüey were all local representatives of sectoral bodies of the central government. I conducted two formal interviews in Boca Chica, a declining tourist destination outside Santo Domingo.
primarily with residents’ lived experiences in Bávaro-Punta Cana and the effects of tourism and urban development on their daily lives.

The majority of these interviews were around 30-40 minutes. Interviews in which it was evident that the participant was keen to share her or his thoughts were generally over one hour. These interviews were recorded, with the exception of one participant, who opted not to permit me to record our discussion.

Similar to all methods, there are a number of limitations associated with interviewing. Some of these include misinterpretation on behalf of the researcher or participant, the researcher may steer the interview in directions that suit the themes sought, the interviewee may be unwilling to divulge personal information or may distort her/his answers in line with what they think the researcher may want to hear (Jordan and Gibson 2004: 223). In my own experience, it became apparent that many residents of areas threatened with eviction (e.g. two settlements in particular, Haiti Chiquito and Nuevo Juanillo) were less willing to take part in my research. As a consequence, being accompanied by a gatekeeper proved essential to gaining local residents' trust.

In terms of the interview setting, Longhurst (2003) suggests locating a neutral, informal and easily accessible setting that is not overly noisy for interviewing. This, however, proved difficult to find, since the majority of local residents live in overly-crowded conditions with excessive noise pollution. Given the lack of community space in the area, it was also a challenge to find 'neutral' and quiet locations for interviews. Consequently, interviews were carried out in or near the homes of interviewees. In a way, this was helpful, since it provided me with opportunity to gain an understanding of the interviewee's living conditions, based on the quality of the house and its construction materials, its size, the number of rooms and stories, the number of occupants and/or families, the presence of a refrigerator, and access to electricity.

While Longhurst (2003) may outline an ideal space for interview, the reality, however, is often more complicated. I had to make do with the opportunities available. In Bávaro-Punta Cana, this was a significant challenge, as in a conversation or interview with one resident in the street which became a group discussion, resembling more a focus group discussion with his peers (Field Notes, November 1, 2010). To take another example, in an interview I conducted in Santo
Domingo, the capital, with a very prominent and busy researcher, the interview began in his office, continued in his car, and after I waited for him to attend a doctor's appointment at a clinic, the interview was completed in his home (Field Notes, March 22, 2011).

I was also aware that interviewing household members together or separately may produce different outcomes (Valentine 1999), as will the gender relations, between researcher and participant, or between different participants (Herod 1993). The majority of my interviews were carried out solely with one member of a household. However, at times, it was not possible to separate the interviewee from others, since the participants or gatekeeper sometimes placed a number of chairs together in a circle. In these instances, I was careful to focus the interview on the primary interviewee, but I did ask others if they had anything to add or were of a different opinion.

Given my interest in understanding the urban dynamics of Bávaro-Punta Cana and local residents' experience within its spaces, I also engaged in observation, informal conversations, and guided transect walks. Ethnographic methods such as observation have become prominent methods of inquiry in a number of disciplines, including development studies and geography (Watson and Till 2010). Ethnographic methods help ‘obtain a holistic picture of the subject of study with emphasis on portraying the everyday experiences of individuals…’ (Creswell 2003: 200).

Observation\(^\text{27}\) can be used for a number of reasons, including cross-checking findings from semi-structured interviews, or 'to generate on-the-spot questions to ask community members without preparing formal questionnaires beforehand' (Theis and Grady 1991: 49). Both of these were important for my own research, specifically, with local residents. Observations I made regarding the settlement conditions helped me direct interviews in particular directions. For example, in the case of one settlement, difficulties I experienced myself in accessing the settlement became a significant topic of discussion in my interviews with its residents.

\(^{27}\) Methods for observation include: measurement, the use of indicators, recording (e.g. notebooks, photographs), sites, checklists, the use of senses, the division of tasks with other observers for different viewpoints, and variations in dress (Theis and Grady 1991: 49).
Ethnographic methods have, however, been subject to post-structural critiques, which argue that ethnography can at best only conjure ‘partial truths,’ and that it ‘may construct the very materiality it attempts to represent’ (Britzman 1995: 230). It can be argued, however, that any form of research, whether ethnographic, ‘scientific,’ or emancipatory, has the potential to concretise dominant or exclusive perspectives into ‘reality.’ As Britzman does, we may take this as a challenge to the assertion that simply ‘being there’ is enough, and as confirmation that a single truth cannot exist. Thus in my fieldwork, I utilized a number of methods in order to triangulate the data collected, whether through observation, or interviews, transect walks, informal conversations, and the local newspaper.

Observation in itself offers a range of possibilities: observation or participant observation, covert or overt observation. However, as indicated by Patton (2002), it is helpful to think of observation as a continuum, particularly when assessing the level of ‘participation’ that will be used in a researcher’s fieldwork:

This involves more than a simple choice between participation and nonparticipation. The extent of participation is a continuum that varies from complete immersion in the setting as full participant to complete separation from the setting as spectator, with a great deal of variation along the continuum between these two end points (266).

A helpful way to think about the participant-observer continuum is offered by Gold (1958): complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant, and complete observer. I would argue that my time in the area was largely spent as the complete observer, but at times I negotiated the space between complete observer and observer-as-participant. Although I lived in the area, I did not live in the informal settlements upon which my research was focused, largely for security reasons. I did participate in the weekly meetings of a neighbourhood organization, as well as a community-based organization advocating for human rights. I was treated as 'an expert' and as a result of my position as an outsider, I felt it inappropriate to involve myself in their debates. I also acquired a position working in the tourism sector as a host on a catamaran, in order to gain a better understanding of tourists' experiences of the area. Unintentionally, I also found this an interesting place to engage in informal conversations with co-workers, the majority
of whom were Dominican or Haitian. In this sense, I became involved more as a participant in the production of Bávaro-Punta Cana as a residence for expatriates and upwardly mobile Dominicans.

According to Gold (1958), the researcher’s role may be more formal at times and less at other times. Informal conversations were an important source of information, since they occurred at any time of the day, in any context. According to Marshall and Rossman (2011: 144), '[t]he informal, conversational interview takes place on-the-spot, as casual conversation are entered into with individuals and/or small groups; it is spontaneous and serendipitous.' In this case, the 'talk time' was shared between myself and my interlocutor, allowing for a more free-flowing discussion or even debate, in contrast with the semi-structured interview, where I would limit my input. By living in the area, I found research participants (for informal or also, later, semi-structured interviews to some degree) organically, while purchasing fruit, photocopying documents, or eating fish from an informal 'restaurant' at Macao beach, to name a few examples.

In the context of Bávaro-Punta Cana, most residents are somehow involved in tourism, and I can agree with Brenner (2004) that 'my fieldwork did not stop' (49). Inevitably, I found the line between 'research participants' and friendships to be blurry. Although I had not explicitly sought information from friends, inevitably, their stories of daily life, corruption, and politics shaped my understanding of Bávaro-Punta Cana.

Further, it was in my more informal conversations with research participants, that I was easily able to learn about rumours and/or gossip, which in some cases helped me find directions to pursue in my research. This was certainly the case with stories of forced displacement. As very little documentation exists on the subject, displaced residents are difficult to locate, and not all parties are willing to discuss the issue. As Rangan and Gilmartin (2002) assert, 'rather than dismissing gossip and rumour as spurious or unreliable, it is far more worthwhile to see these as rich and versatile sources of information exchange' (644).

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28 Initially, I was concerned that taking a position on this catamaran would preclude a local resident from an opportunity for employment, however, I accepted the position only when it was evident that the company had difficulty filling the position with a host able to communicate in English, French, and occasionally, German.
In order to orient myself in each settlement studied, direct the semi-structured interview questions, and begin the process of observation, I supplemented my research with transect walks. A transect ‘is a diagram of main land-use zones. It compares the features, resources, uses and problems of different zones’ (Theis and Grady 1991: 87). This method has its origins in Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) techniques which were developed in the 1970s ‘as a better way for outsiders to learn’, enabling outsiders to learn from rural people29 (Chambers 1991a: 3). One of the methods of the RRA basket is the transect walk, which involves ‘systematically walking with key informants through an area, observing, asking, listening, discussing, identifying different zones...’ (Chambers 1991b: 8-9). In my first visit to most of my research sites, I was able to undertake a transect walk with a key informant in order to get a sense of the issues which might be worth discussing in future semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, or observations. Figure 3-1 (below) represents a scanned illustration of a transect walk in Friusa on my first visit in October 2010, based on my own observations and points raised by my gatekeeper.

Although I have outlined how the wider case was selected, each case may in turn have many ‘sub-settings’ (Miles and Huberman 1994: 27). Purposive sampling was key for identifying which of these sub-settings were to be analyzed. Choosing subsettings within the case study represents a form of stratified purposeful sampling, where the ‘[s]ampling frame is divided into strata to obtain relatively homogeneous sub-groups [with respect to one or more characteristics] and a purposeful sample is selected from each stratum’ (Onwuegbuzie and Collings 2007: 286).

After my scoping visit in the winter of 2010, I pre-selected two sites, Nuevo Juanillo, based on one account from a researcher who identified this village as a resettlement site from a forced eviction (Yolanda Leon, pers. comm., January 29, 2010), and El Hoyo de Friusa, based on my first interview with Yasmin Castillo, the director of the local office of the Ministry of Tourism’s Department of Planning and Projects (pers. comm., February 2, 2010). Since ‘[s]amples in qualitative studies are usually not wholly pre-specified, but can evolve once fieldwork begins’ (Miles and Huberman 1994: 27), I added to these sites, once more time was spent in the field. By

29 This has since developed into more participatory and emancipatory methods, placing people at the centre of their own knowledge production. These methods include: Participatory Rural Appraisal, Participatory Rapid Appraisal, and Participatory Action and Learning (Robers 1991).
the end of my fieldwork, semi-structured interviews were carried out with residents of Macao, Mata Mosquito, Friusa (particularly El Hoyo de Friusa and Detrás de Casabal), El Cortecito (particularly Haiti Chiquito, but also informal dwellers near Los Corales), Barrio Nuevo, Samaritano II, Cristinita, Villa Esperanza (also known as Villa Playwood), Ensanche Boulevard (also known as 'Kosovo'), Nuevo Juanillo, and former residents of Juanillo (see area map inserted after the table of contents).

Figure 3-1: Transect Walk with Gatekeeper, Friusa, October 23, 2010.

The primary form of gaining access to participants was via snowball sampling. Often this requires going through one or a number of gatekeepers, who can be viewed as 'helpful facilitators who provide access to and increase acceptance among research subjects and who help interpret cultural/political issues' (Campbell et al. 2006: 103). Gatekeepers come with their own set of advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, gatekeepers can provide access to people who would otherwise be unwilling to discuss their viewpoints with a (foreign) stranger. On the other hand, gatekeepers may: limit conditions of entry, define problem area of study, limit access to
data and respondents, restrict the scope of analysis, and retain prerogatives with respect to publication (Broadhead and Rist 1976). Since it is improbable that any one gatekeeper provides access to all groups of people or resources (Campbell et al. 2006), logically, I worked with a number of different gatekeepers, and in different contexts (both in my research area and in the capital). The use of several gatekeepers helped address some of the potential limitations of gatekeepers listed above. I also made 'cold calls' to households in some settlements to try to identify participants who did not see me as somehow related to my gatekeepers.

Finally, I also made use of photography. According to Pink (2006) a researcher may analyze photographs 'for both the visual information they provide and the meanings that are attached to them' (223). In my case, I use photographs primarily to supplement my writing and represent the findings of my work. I collected one photograph from the early 1990s from a research participant in El Cortecito in Bávaro-Punta Cana, which visually demonstrates the changing environment that I address in my writing. I primarily rely on my own photographs, however, to contextualize my work.30

Secondary data collection involved the collection of statistical data from National Statistics Office, aerial photographs from the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional), newspaper clippings, and available documentation of past and current plans by the Ministry of Tourism. In undertaking interviews with researchers and public servants in the capital, I also collected relevant published and unpublished material (including presentations) prepared by my research participants. I visited the Inter-American Development Bank for their documents on tourism-related projects throughout the country. Some data, such as historical census data, was obtained via email exchange with representatives of the National Statistics Office and the Dominican Republic Central Bank. I also searched bookstores, book fairs, and libraries for locally-published literature on tourism in the DR, as well as publications of relevant laws and the newly revised Dominican Constitution of 2010. In addition, The Punta Cana Ecological Foundation granted me access to their library. There, I had access to reports prepared by students of American universities that have developed field-study courses in cooperation with the Foundation. Prior to, during and after fieldwork, I reviewed available literature online and at

30 One observation that I would like to mention here is that the photographs taken disproportionately represent men and children. Often women were less willing to have their living conditions exposed in photographs.
the University of Toronto library on tourism in the DR, environmental issues, urbanism and planning. Throughout my time in Bávaro-Punta Cana, I collected relevant newspaper clippings from the local newspaper, Bávaro News, which was printed fortnightly at the time. I also conducted searches of key words online in reputable national newspapers, including El Listín Diario, El Diario Libre, and Hoy.

3.5 Informed Consent

In terms of acquiring informed consent, I sought written consent from the first group of interviewees listed above (academics, researchers, government officials), and oral consent from local residents. Through requiring informed consent, prospective participants are given accurate and sufficient information to decide whether or not they chose to participate, in an appropriate language and medium (i.e. oral, written), and they are ‘free and uncoerced choice’ to give or refuse consent (Polit and Hungler 1991: 2, Veal 2006).

The first group of interviewees was given the option to remain anonymous, to have me refer to their names, or to speak on behalf of their organization. In the case of local residents, I assured them that their interviews were to be kept confidential and anonymous and that I would not use their names in my work, unless they provided me with explicit permission to do so. For this group, oral consent was sought, due to the possibility that research participants may not be able to read or write\textsuperscript{31} and my own fears of creating an artificial barrier between myself and my interviewees. Please refer to Appendix F for a sample informed consent letter for academics, researchers, members of the public and private sectors and NGOs.

Based on my conversations with other PhD candidates working in similar contexts, I was not alone in this impression. The issue of informed consent in the international context is not a new one. Academic articles on the topic have appeared since the early 1990s, however, these are dominated by the field of medical and health science (i.e. Dawson and Kass 2005, Bhutta 2004, Sánchez et al. 2001). One article on health research in the context of developing countries

\textsuperscript{31} The literacy rate for the wider municipality of Higüey, is 90.8 percent. Data from the 2010 census at the municipal district level is not yet available. (Census 2010).
claims informed consent is challenging, particularly in the international sphere, 'where cultural perspectives may differ, and where education levels and language may be barriers to participant understanding' (Dawson and Kass 2005).

As I feared, such challenges were manifest in my first interview in Bávaro-Punta Cana when I interviewed a resident who had lived in the area for around 50 years; he is a well-respected member of the community, and lives on the second floor of a concrete block house on a main road. When it came to the consent form, the interviewee asked me to read it out loud, and after a few sentences, he waved and said 'ok, ok', and proceeded to speak for well over one hour as I posed questions (pers. comm., October 23, 2010). Based on this experience, I continued with verbal consent for all semi-structured interviews with local residents. Later, I also learned that written consent is not necessarily conducive to interviews with all public sector employees (Field Notes, May 17, 2011).

In some situations, I found I was able to have more open and honest conversations in informal settings without the use of a recorder and where I did not begin my data gathering with a rather rigid and scripted opening about my research and the interviewees rights as a participant. In these scenarios, where my interlocutor did not already know me, I explained my research more casually in the conversation, and as long as they appeared comfortable, we continued.

3.6 Data Recording

Field notes were one of my primary methods of data recording. They ‘consist of descriptions of what is being experienced and observed, quotations from the people observed, the observer’s feelings and reactions to what is observed, and field-generated insights and interpretations’ (Patton 2002:305). The note-taking process represents a translation of a researcher's experiences into a form of communication to others (Wolcott 2005). Although semi-structured interviews with almost all participants were digitally recorded, I marked down key thoughts in my notes afterwards. Since ‘[i]n some situations, even taking notes interferes with, inhibits, or in some way acts on the setting and the participants’ (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 152), I kept note-taking during interviews at a minimum.
3.7 Data Analysis

Case studies can be used to achieve a number of goals, such as description, theory testing or theory generation (Eisenhardt 2002). Given the exploratory nature of my research, my analysis of Bávaro-Punta Cana seeks to contribute to theory production, rather than the testing of it. However, questions of generalizability inevitably arise with the use of case studies. Such criticisms are tied to the exploratory nature of case study research, which makes it appear to be little more than a 'prelude' to further investigation (Yin 2011) or the 'first steps' of an entire research process (Flyvbjerg 2006). However, case studies which have been well-constructed are not singular.  

It is important to distinguish different kinds of generalizability, e.g., between statistical generalizations, analytic generalizations, and case-to-case transfer (Collins et al. 2007). These distinctions are significant, because while the former relates to representativeness, the latter two refer to possibilities for building concepts or theories (Miles and Huberman 1994).

Rather than defining a clear and predetermined theoretical framework prior to fieldwork, my research represents an effort to steer away from traditional forms of theory-then-proving research and towards grounded theory. The definition of my research problem began first as a reaction to the literature on both tourism and planning, but was fundamentally shaped by on-the-ground observation, conversations and interviews during my scoping visit in January and February 2010. Since this process has begun with readings of issues that I feel are relevant, this is not strictly grounded theory, but it draws heavily from this methodology, where ‘data collection and analysis occur in alternating sequences’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 42). I take from some of grounded theory’s advice on using literature, for example, to stimulate questions and as a stepping off point, as a source of comparison, as a secondary source of data, to push existing theories/issues, to enhance sensitivity to subtle issues/nuances, and to confirm findings (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 49).

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32 According to Bourdieu et al. (1968), Galileo did not have to repeat the 'falling bodies' experiment to disprove Aristotle's theory of gravity.

33 It is worth noting that generalization is not the sole purpose or utility of science. Rather, it is only one of the ways in which knowledge is achieved (Flyvbjerg 2006), and is not 'a useful or obtainable goal for any kind of research in the social sciences' (Schofield 2002: 179).
In the words of Strauss and Corbin (1998:55), ‘[w]hat we discover by doing research is just how complex the world is.’ Adopting a set of procedures through which to organize data and analyze is particularly helpful to deal with the complexities of the world, particularly if we are to attempt to communicate our findings and develop some form of theory from them. Strauss and Corbin argue that coding procedures are one way to achieve this, and Box 1 (below) lists some reasons for adopting these procedures.

1. Build rather than test theory
2. Provide researchers with analytic tools for handling masses of raw data
3. Help analysts to consider alternative meanings of phenomena
4. Be systematic and creative simultaneously
5. Identify, develop, and relate the concepts that are the building blocks of theory

**Box 3-1: Coding Procedures**
**Source:** Strauss and Corbin 1990: 13

Miles and Huberman (1994: 58) explain the coding process clearly:

Initial data are collected, written up, and reviewed line by line, typically within a paragraph. Beside or below the paragraph, categories or labels are generated, and a list of them grows. The labels are reviewed and, typically, a slightly more abstract category is attributed to several incidents or observations….

When codes are grouped, we are able to find emerging themes for analysis and are able to understand their relationships to one another in order to formulate theory. However, codes are far from static units of analysis. Since the codes are developed using the first set of data available, they must constantly be re-evaluated, and the research should not put coding off until the end of data collection, as the data collected and observations made from them are continuously meant to be informed by the research already done (Miles and Huberman 1994). The majority of my interviews were transcribed, almost exclusively by my research assistant in

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34 My research assistant, Ambar Then Guzman, is a former INTEC student who was recommended to me by a professor. She was primarily responsible for the transcribing of my interviews, and in some instances also helped me procure books/documents in Santo Domingo while I was in Bavaro-Punta Cana.
the DR. Based on these transcripts, I developed codes in a mixture of Spanish and English, and categorized them into wider themes.\textsuperscript{35}

### 3.8 Reflecting on Positionality

As we learn from Mullings (1999: 337), ‘[a] researcher’s knowledge is... always partial, because of his/her positionality (perspective shaped by his/her unique mix of race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality, and other identities), as well as location in time and space [which] will influence how the world is viewed and interpreted.’ Reflexivity is seen as a way to steer away from the belief that neutrality and universality in the development of academic knowledge is possible (Rose 1997).

Strongly rooted in feminist geography, reflexivity does not only mean that knowledge cannot have universal applicability between groups (such as women and men), but also within groups (such as women in the First World and those in the Third World) (Rose 1997). The researcher is ‘inextricably bound up with questions of authority, communication and representations, and the positions generated by such questions are inherently political’ (Radcliffe 1994: 28 in Rose 1997). It is therefore important to make claims to the positions that we as researchers occupy when undertaking fieldwork in a developing country.

One's positionality cannot be viewed as an assigned, fixed, monolithic and static notion, but as a changing and dynamic *negotiation* that varies according to situation, context, location, conversation, and even subject or issue being discussed. Being an insider/outsider and the powers associated with these positions are thus also contingent upon these variables, and may shift accordingly between the researcher and the ethnographic subject (Soni-Sinha 2008). Presenting different sides of my identity was certainly ‘a critical factor in framing social and professional relationships in the field; it sets the tone of the research, affecting its course and outcomes’ (Chacko 2004: 52). To be sure, my position shaped the power relations between myself and the research participants (who might have also been gatekeepers), and thus strongly

\textsuperscript{35} Since I spent one year speaking almost exclusively speaking in Spanish, I developed such a level of comfort with the language that it did not appear beneficial to translate my transcripts into English. Translation of text occurred only at the point at which I determined that a direct quotation would be included in my thesis.
molded the knowledge I was able to produce. I was constantly finding myself shifting between multiple and often contradictory positions.

As expected, I found that my background as a white, foreign researcher at a Canadian academic institution helped me gain the trust of Dominican researchers or experts. With local residents, the verdict was mixed. Being a white, Anglophone, female, young, Canadian; my colour, accent, gender, age and nationality (and by association, class) were all visible factors that played into my relationship with research participants. I did not share one part of my position which involved being raised in a small hotel in Ottawa, as I did not want to highlight the sense of difference between our socio-economic identities. Instead, sometimes, I talked about my own experience working in hotels and resorts. I also did not mention that I myself have stayed at the kinds of resorts at which some of my interviewees were employed, and aimed to distance myself from the possible position I sometimes encompass as a tourist myself. I made this conscious decision for a number of reasons I discuss below, not least in attempts to reduce the power differentials between myself and my research participants.

During my time in DR (but also during my scoping fieldwork in Cuba) I was constantly struggling with three interrelated elements of my position: my dual position as a researcher and a tourist; my position as an English-speaking foreigner; and my gender role as a female. I found myself trying to determine whether my relationship with research participants was construed by the participant as a professional one, and if not, which elements of social constructions and wider political-economic context were at play and fundamentally shaping the undertones of our interaction.

A number of concerns arose throughout my time in Punta Cana related to my position as a tourist. The researcher-tourist dialectic has long been a central concern to anthropologists, who 'might initially seek to distance themselves from the practice of tourism, claiming a privileged engagement with an authentic and authentically experienced cultural locale' (Radovic 2012). One of my personal issues in this regard was to differentiate myself as a person whose primary concern is with the development of the area, as opposed to leisure-related activities and the (licit and illicit) stereotypes associated with that, which represents a continual struggle throughout my research. A researcher undertaking fieldwork on sex tourism in Sosúa on the north coast of the country comments on the frustrations of her fieldwork in a tourist environment:
Turning down street vendors one after the other, every day, can be exhausting, as well as discouraging for the anthropologist who wants to be ‘in the field,’ not ‘on vacation.’ Perceived by some as a tourist, and by others as one more expatriate who has come to live in paradise, I could not get away from my own part in constructing this transnational space’ (Brenner 2004: 49).

The question of authenticity arose on a number of occasions in my own fieldwork. Local, Dominican residents in the urbanizing areas of Verón-Punta Cana often urged me to visit the ‘interior’ of the country, exclaiming ‘Eso no es Dominicana!’ (This is not Dominican Republic). However, my concern was not with ‘the real’ DR, as understood the perspective of these residents, but the real DR where the transnational tourist spaces and their environs have been transformed, appropriated, and negotiated by local residents.  Like Oakes (1998), I reject the notion of authenticity as a stable, distinct reality, but a constantly shifting negotiation. Authenticity, for me, was more about understanding the realities of the lives of local residents’ from a perspective that was not shown to tourists in their resorts, whether through the staged authenticity of evening ‘shows’ or through conversations between resort employees and tourists about their traditional family life in the countryside.  My concern was that in viewing me a tourist, research participants may be less inclined to describe the realities of their lives and paint their lives in such a way to encourage tourism.

Further, my position as an Anglophone foreigner shaped my relationships with interviewees and others with whom I conversed. This became more than apparent during an informal conversation after sunset when I visited a motorbike mechanic. I asked the family (primarily women) why there was electricity in the house but not outside behind the other building, where the mechanic was working who was using a flashlight. A male friend mine, whose native language is Spanish was able to gain the confidence of the mechanic, and learned that they had illegally tapped into the electric lines, and that the visibility of the lights outdoors would warrant suspicion from the inspectors from the electric company, CEPM.  My position as an outsider was made palpably obvious in this circumstance. Although at this point, my Spanish had reached fluency, it was evident that my status as an Anglophone foreigner automatically established a power dynamic in which local residents were untrusting and unwilling to 'let me in'.

Some research participants were highly guarded in their conversations with me, particularly in areas where tourism had directly impacted their settlement. Many often associated the foreigners with tourism developers, seeking new investment opportunities. This experience echoes
comments made by one of my research participants who completed her own PhD fieldwork on tourism in the country in 2004. Although Dominican, she experienced some hostility in areas where residents were evicted or were threatened with eviction, due to much of society's association of education and white skin with an elite and/or foreign class that is/may be involved in tourism development. Ultimately, she delegated increasing responsibility to one of her research assistants who 'appeared more Dominican' and was better able to gain the trust of participants (Yolanda Leon, pers. comm. June 15, 2011).

However, for those with whom I developed a more consistent relationship (e.g. the members of the human rights group and the neighbourhood organization whose meetings I attended), I feel I was able to move along the insider-outsider continuum. 36 Further, as my knowledge of the local context improved and I adopted the local idiom, I commonly heard ‘pero tu eres dominicana' ('but you are Dominican') in conversations with new acquaintances, and was quickly able to achieve some degree of trust.

The use of gatekeepers enabled me to find research participants who would be more open to communicate openly regarding their settlements. However, at times, I found difficulties in continuing a working relationship with some gatekeepers, who were generally male, as well as other research participants. These difficulties were related to challenges in negotiating my position as a researcher and my gender role as a female, but also in understanding how my research participant was formulating his position vis-à-vis myself. Although gender relations and roles are changing in the DR, there remains a thread of machismo 37 (USAID 2009), which inevitably underlined much of my interaction with male interviewees. This is further coupled with and complicated by a wider political-economic milieu in which affective relations between local residents and tourists or other foreigners are seen as a strategy to improve one's socio-economic position (Cabezas 2009, Yolanda Leon, pers. comm. June 25, 2011). For this reason,

36 Here, I am in line with some researchers who refute the clear distinction of insider (‘good but impossible’) and outsider (‘bad but inevitable’) (Crang 2003: 496, Soni-Sinha 2008).

37 Gender roles and relations in the Dominican Republic are transforming as a result of feminist movements in the 1980s and 1990s and a shifting economic structure from rural-based agriculture to the service and manufacturing industries in more urban areas. Consequently, women are finding new opportunities for employment, such as in the tourism sector. Simultaneously, women are also the head of households in approximately 35 percent of households. However, gender relations continue to be characterized by machismo, and women generally do not occupy the higher positions of authority in the private or public sectors (USAID 2009).
another researcher has described another tourist town in the north coast, as a 'way station to external migration' (Brennan 2004: 49).

Many researchers, from geographers to sociologists have avoided engaging with the role of gender dynamics in shaping the outcome of research (Sharp and Kremer 2006, Cupples 2002). Indeed, I myself have reservations in discussing these issues for fear of 'weakness' and delegitimizing my research; however, a discussion on reflexivity necessarily requires addressing the 'erotic dimension' of research, since 'it is impossible to escape our sexuality in the field and therefore it should be acknowledged' (Cupples 2002: 383). Although the researcher is in the position to manage the direction of an interview, male interviewees may challenge this process in order to gain more control (Sharp and Kremer 2006).

In my own experience, one question that shifted the dynamics in some of my interviews was in reference to my marital status, and, even, in one case the presence of a weapon was made visible (presumably to assert a sense of power). Indeed, it is not uncommon for female interviewers to be faced with safety issues, and feelings of unwanted behaviour and 'oversexualized' language (Hawkins 2010).

Where my relationship with research participants was unclear, I sought to maintain distance between myself and the participant(s), ultimately re-asserting my position as an outsider looking in. With regard to my research, I found that my gender role fundamentally shaped opportunities (I'm sure I was given some permissions that my male counterparts would be denied), but also limitations in my research. Although I would not say that I necessarily changed my data collection methods, in the context of working in local settlements and their residents, my gender undoubtedly shaped the depth of my relationships and thus interviews.

Women were often more reserved in our interactions than their male counterparts in the local settlements of Bávaro-Punta Cana. This was particularly true for younger women and Haitian women, who were often reluctant or unwilling to partake in my research, whether through interviews or photography. I found that older, single mothers were much more vocal about their opinions of development, and considerably more prepared to participate in my research.

38 'You can't leave this country without having a Dominican lover' (Field Notes, October 25, 2010).
However, fewer of these women had the same kind of relationships and/or positions in their communities as did some of the male participants who became my gatekeepers.

This being stated, however, as I write about my own reflexivity, it is increasingly evident that difficulties, if not an impossibility, arise in disentangling the different elements of my position from each other. Identities are, in essence, complex and various elements of social identity mediate each other. In the DR, my identity was continuously shaped through my interactions with research participants and the context more generally, and at times it was inadvertently performative. As Gillian Rose (1997) has argued, ‘[w]e cannot know everything, nor can we survey power as if we can fully understand, control or redistribute it’ (319). The various elements that I have mentioned in this chapter (with the multitude of other aspects of my positionality that shape my identity), have unquestionably impacted my research in different and often contradictory ways over time and in different contexts.
4 Context: Dominican Political Economy and Tourism

4.1 Introduction

The DR is one of the many Caribbean countries that has sought to develop their economy through tourism. Tourism was promoted heavily by the DR state, particularly since the late 1960s. It has since become a significant contributor to foreign exchange earnings as the role of its primary industry, sugar production, began to decrease drastically in the early 1980s. Despite the importance of the tourism sector, until very recently, the state has taken a backseat approach to planning for tourism, focusing largely on policy-making at the macro-scale to rapidly increase the investment in tourism and thus the influx of tourists and their spending.

The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, this chapter provides context for the deep changes that have occurred over the past half century and shape the current political-economic arena. Second, this chapter addresses my thesis’ first research question which examines how planning is implicated in the development of tourist areas in the DR. The argument made here is that the vast majority of planning that has developed around the tourism sector in the DR is largely policy-based in nature.

The first section of this chapter outlines the political and economic policies that the country has followed since the mid 20th Century to enhance the development of tourism and facilitate its growth. I then outline the growth of the sector, as well as summarize the literature on tourism in the DR. The last section describes the various planning structures established by the central government that have facilitated tourism’s growth.

4.2 Context: the DR’s Shifting Political Economy and State Reform

During the mid-1980s and early 1990s, both developing and developed countries underwent large-scale state reforms (Stren 2003 and 2000, Pierre 2000). In Latin America, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by processes of local democratization and state decentralization
(following a longer period of rapid urbanization\textsuperscript{39}) (McCarney 1996, Stren 2000), as well as a shift to neoliberal policies and the implementation of World Bank and IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programmes\textsuperscript{40} (SAPs) (Taylor and Vos 2002). In the DR, these processes contributed significantly to shaping the current economic policy and state apparatus.

Many of the region’s countries shifted from authoritarianism (largely military dictatorships) to democratic governance,\textsuperscript{41} particularly between 1978 and 1992 (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2005). In the DR, following the authoritarian rule of Rafael Trujillo from 1930-1961, the Dominican government began a gradual process toward democracy, starting with the country’s first democratic elections in 1978.\textsuperscript{42} While the DR was the first country in Latin America to begin the so-called third wave of democratization in 1978 (Cueto Villamán 2007), overall, researchers criticize the incomplete democratization process, and point to an existence of a weak civil society. Some studies even argue that the majority of Dominicans are more interested in order and stability than democracy, and would choose authoritarianism over democracy (Betances 2008, Duarte et al. 1995).\textsuperscript{43}

Throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, sugar was the mainstay of the Dominican economy. Between the 1960s and early 1980s, the DR government pursued industrialization through Import Substitution (ISI) of consumer goods,\textsuperscript{44} financed through the revenue earned from the export of sugar and

\textsuperscript{39} The rate of urbanization in Latin America was highest in the 1960s, and slowed in the 1970s and 1980s. The region has the highest regional proportion of its population living in urban centres, that is, almost 80 percent (Rodriguez and Martine 2008, UN DESA 2012).

\textsuperscript{40} SAPs generally involve a number of measures aiming to open markets, devalue currency, remove subsidies, encourage exports while removing import barriers, and reduce social spending (Greenberg 1997).

\textsuperscript{41} By 1990, all the countries of Latin America had transitioned to democracy, with the exceptions of Mexico and Cuba. What is most impressive for Grindle (2000), is that the transitions to democracy took place during a time of extended economic crisis and ‘disruptive and often conflict-ridden transitions to more market-oriented economies’ (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2005:5).

\textsuperscript{42} It has been well documented, however, that these elections were not without election fraud. In 1978, the then-in-power Balaguer government used tactics to stifle and intimidate the competition, as well as use and manipulate the Central Election Board where voters are registered (Kryzanek 1979, Hartlyn 1994).

\textsuperscript{43} Indeed, this is evident in the (re-)election of President Balaguer from 1986 to 1996, after his periods of dictatorship from 1960-62 and 1966-1978 (Betances 2008). Three key factors are said to impede democratic governance in the Dominican Republic: centralized political power, personalized leadership, and weak institutions (Choup 2003:29), which will be addressed in Chapter 4. Others blame the colonial past, political instability and a repressive dictatorship for the country’s difficulties in transitioning to democracy (Hartlyn 1998).

\textsuperscript{44} Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was pursued in many of Latin American countries in hopes of developing and protecting local industries (Prebisch 1950). The DR, along with other countries, like Costa Rica, pursued ISI policies somewhat later than the majority of other countries of Latin America, which began their industrialization policies in the 1930s and in particular after the end of World War II (Itzigsohn 2000).
other traditionally-exported primary commodities (Itzigsohn 2000). At this time, growth was also tied to public investment projects (e.g. roads, dams, and urban construction) (Hartlyn 1998). The Balaguer (successor to Trujillo) government (1966-78) engaged in developing infrastructure, increased the size of the State, and encouraged the diversification of the economy by channeling state credit and investment towards the local manufacture of consumer goods (Conaghan and Espinall 1990).

This model continued until the early 1980s when, during the global economic crisis, the global market for sugar fell and the United States’ preferential import quotas were reduced, leaving the Dominican economy in a severe debt crisis (Isa 2011, Itzigsohn 2000). In the 1980s, the DR experienced a period of increasing inflation and economic stagnation, with a 'combination of severe monetary and fiscal imbalance, pervasive price controls, financial sector rigidities, multiple currency practices, and an extremely restrictive trade regime' (IMF 1999:8).

Debt crisis and economic stagnation characterized much of Latin America in the 1980s, which is how the period came to be labeled as 'the lost decade' (Itzigsohn 2000). By the late 1980s and 1990s, ISI policies and neo-Keynesianism were replaced in favour of economic liberalization and adoption of neoliberal policies. These are characterized by a deepening of the role of markets, together with the 'logics of competitiveness', 'married with aggressive forms of state downsizing, austerity financing, and public-service 'reform'' (Peck and Tickell 2002: 381).

Evidence suggests that in the DR there was a continuous reduction in the role of the state in service provision, particularly in the areas of health and education (Itzigsohn 2000); while real income decreased in the 1980-1990 period, so too did public investment in social security, education and health care. For example, spending on education in 1990 amounted to only 45 percent of the 1980 figures (Gregory 2007). Currently, the DR is among the countries in LAC with the lowest spending (as a percentage of GDP) on education (CEPAL 2012) and below average in healthcare spending.46

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45 It is noteworthy, however, that the DR’s shift toward neoliberalism in the 1980s was more about changes in economic policies, and the relations between the state and primary economic sectors, than about the state apparatus per se (Itzigsohn 2000).

46 In 2007, the last year for which data is presented in the CEPAL on education, the Dominican Republic is in last place with only 2.2 percent of its GDP dedicated towards this end (CEPAL 2012). This figure increased only
Neoliberalism, however, cannot simply be equated with state withdrawal, since it fundamentally depends on particular kinds of intervention by the state. Indeed, neoliberalism cannot be thought of as an end in and of itself, but a process by which new configurations are formulated and altered, a process otherwise known as neoliberalization (Harvey 2005).

In the DR, neoliberalization was a fragmented process by which various governments ‘did not follow consistent structural adjustment policies’ (Itzigsohn 2000: 48). In the 1980s, the State, having come to agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), responded to the economic crisis with a number of piecemeal attempts at Structural Adjustment policies, such as currency devaluation and restrictions in public expenditure (Greenberg 1997). The 1990s, in contrast, saw the country experience healthy economic growth, rising employment, modest inflation, and ‘a generally manageable external position’ (IMF 1999: 8). Economic growth and stabilization was achieved through the full adoption of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by President Balaguer in 1990, known as the New Economic Program. In 1995, the DR created the Foreign Investment Law aimed at opening the country to foreign investment. With the Fernández administration, elected in 1996, neoliberalization deepened. Publicly-owned companies, such as sugar mills, mining, and service providers, including the state-owned Corporación Dominicana de Electricidad (CDE), were privatized (albeit recently re-nationalized) or distributed via management contracts to private (foreign) investors (Gregory 2007).

Then, in the early 2000s, the DR joined negotiations with the US and Central American countries to form DR-CAFTA, a free trade agreement based on the NAFTA model. The agreement marginally since 2000, when the percentage was 1.9. In that year, the Dominican Republic ranked second last in terms of spending on education.

47 Neoliberalism has been associated with 'rolling back the frontiers of the state' in order to enlarge the space for private enterprise, competition and individual liberty' (Peck and Tickell 2007:28). Evans (1995), however, points out that the question should not be about how much should the state be involved, but instead, since in our contemporary world, ‘[s]tate involvement is a given’, the question we pose should be ‘what kind’ of involvement (Evans 1995: 10). Rather than simply an alternative ideology to the previous Keynesian welfare state, neoliberalism can be thought of as 'restructuring strategy' (Brenner et al. 2005), and should be considered a 'roll-out of new state forms, new modes of regulation, new regimes of governance' (Peck and Tickell 2007: 33).

48 The measures taken involved decreasing borrowing and increasing tax revenues, lowered trade barriers and dismantled subsidies, and anti-inflation policies which included cutting government spending such as public sector wages and social services (Greenberg 1997). The new administration of President Fernandez of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD, Partido de la Liberación Dominicana) (1996-1999) continued these strategies, and again between 2004 and 2012 for the two terms in which he was President.
institutionalizes previous unilateral preferential access of Caribbean exports to the US from the Caribbean Basin Initiative instituted during Ronald Reagan’s Presidency. It reduces restrictions on imports of US goods into the DR, and provides protection of foreign investment in all member countries (Sánchez-Ancochea 2008). This is significant, since the US is the DR's primary import market, with 48.8 percent of the total in 2011 (followed by Haiti with 16.7 percent) (CIA n.d.). Essentially, DR-CAFTA 'should be primarily understood as deepening and 'locking in' the [n]eoliberal model' (Sánchez-Ancochea 2008).

As the role of agriculture in the Dominican economy decreased, emphasis was placed on other export industries. In 1970, agriculture (primarily in the form of sugarcane, but also cocoa, coffee and tobacco), was the largest industry in the DR, contributing 15.7 percent of GDP. In addition to this, the manufacturing of sugar (and sugar-related products) alone contributed another 5.1 percent. By 1990, agriculture’s contribution to GDP decreased by half and sugar manufacturing fell to only 1 percent (BCRD 2012). Sugar was replaced by an economy based on tourism, remittances, and Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which became the primary foreign exchange earners (in order of their contribution) (Isa 2011).

A number of factors created a favourable context for the expansion of tourism in the 1980s. One of these was the result of currency devaluation in the early 1980s (as part of a SAP), which increased the DR’s relative competitiveness as a tourist destination in terms of price. The others include: the expansion of public infrastructure works (in the 1970s and early 1980s), the creation of fiscal incentives for tourism development, and the global growth of tourism more generally (Isa 2011).

Remittances, as a result of the export of the labour force through migration to the US, have come to contribute significantly to the Dominican economy. Migration away from the DR is linked to both push and pull factors. More specifically, the economic situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s pushed many Dominicans to emigrate in search of better living conditions, and those migrants were concomitantly able to take advantage of the flexible immigration policies in the

49 It is worth noting that EPZs and tourism were both established prior to the export-oriented turn in the 1980s. Interestingly, they were considered 'exceptions' made during a period characterized by ISI in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it was not until the 1980s that they were strongly promoted, and became key growth sectors (Itzigsohn 2000).
US at the time (Isa 2011). Now, remittances from the US by Dominican migrants represent a key contributor to the Dominican economy (Itzigsohn 2000), comprising approximately 10 percent of the Dominican GDP today (CIA 2013).

The growth in EPZs, in turn, can be attributed to two factors. First, it is strongly tied to currency devaluation in 1983, and second, growth was driven by Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which involved the promotion of imports to the US from Caribbean countries (Itzigsohn 2000).

Both EPZs and tourism were key drivers of the geographic decentralization of the Dominican population. Prior to the 1980s, as a result of ISI, productive activities were concentrated in the capital city, Santo Domingo. With the shift toward export-oriented development, as well as President Balaguer’s tolerance of free trade zones in the 1970s, the previous urban primacy of Santo Domingo began to diminish. Other urban centres capitalized on this opportunity with the expansion of EPZs and tourism development (Lozano 1997, Goldfrank and Schrank 2009).

As in much of the Caribbean, the DR has also recently undergone a process of urbanization. In 1960, less than one third (or 30 percent) of the DR population lived in urban centres (ONE 2011). By now, this proportion has reached almost three quarters (74 percent) (ONE 2012).

Over the past few decades, the DR, similar to other countries in LAC, also began a process of gradual state decentralization as part of a larger project of state modernization and reform (Chona and Pineda 2009). Lenders, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID), pressured the state to decentralize in hopes of assisting or supporting the process of democratization (BID 2005). The double phenomenon of decentralization and democratization, came to be referred to as ‘the quiet revolution’ in Latin America (Campbell 2003), ascribing a new place for urban governance (Stren 2003).

Local government is only one (albeit important) element in the governing relationship since ‘the role of government in governance is not a dichotomous but a continuous variable’ (Pierre 2005: 453). Urban governments ‘are expected to create an ‘enabling environment’ and be facilitators rather than direct providers’ (Lindell 2008), and have off-loaded previous responsibilities onto the household, the voluntary sector, or the business sector (Healey 1997). Urban governance,
which has traditionally been associated solely with ‘government’, has come to encompass a larger array of actors, relations, practices, and modes of power at different sites and scales (Lindell 2008).

Indeed, in the DR, some of the few municipal services, such as waste collection, are subcontracted to the private-sector, civil society organizations have come in to fill the gap in un-serviced settlements (e.g. see Sletto 2012), and in some cases, such as Bávaro-Punta Cana, the private sector has even contributed to development through actions of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

4.3 Tourism in the DR

The DR straddles the Atlantic Ocean to the North, and the Caribbean Sea to the South. It is situated on the eastern two-thirds of the island of La Hispaniola which it shares with Haiti to the west, and occupies an area of 48,046km² (see Map 4-1: Map of the Caribbeanbelow). Its tropical maritime climate, with seasonal variation in rainfall, and very little change in annual temperature (CIA 2013), makes it ideal for international coastal tourism.

The DR is currently the largest receiver of tourists\(^{50}\) in the Caribbean. Figure 4-1 below illustrates the number and proportion of tourism in the DR, in comparison to the other Caribbean countries. In 1980, the country had only 383,280 non-resident arrivals (BCRD 2010a). Throughout the past three decades, this number has grown dramatically, and by 2010, reached over four million stop-over arrivals, which makes up over 20 percent\(^{51}\) of the region’s total, followed by Cuba; Cancún, México;\(^{52}\) and Jamaica (CTO 2011).

\(^{50}\) North America is the largest emitter of non-resident foreign visitors to the Dominican Republic with almost half the total non-resident arrivals, followed by Europe with just over one quarter (BCRD 2010a). Generally, the number of tourists is highest in the winter and summer months, while the months of May, September, October and November have the lowest number of arrivals (BCRD 2010a).

\(^{51}\) Own calculations based on CTO (2011).

\(^{52}\) The data for Cancún, México is based on Hotel Registrations only (as opposed to Tourist Stop-Over Arrivals) and does not include data for adjacent destinations (e.g. Playa del Carmen), which are on the same coast and also in the province of Quintana Roo. The inclusion of this data would place Cancún as the leader in arrivals.
The increase in the number of tourists visiting the DR occurred in parallel with an expansion of the hotel room supply, which grew rapidly since the late 1980s. From only 5,394 rooms in 1980, the number of hotel rooms in the DR reached 66,968 rooms by 2010 (ASONAHORES and BCRD 2011), with an average occupancy rate of 66.6 percent (ASONAHORES n.d.).
The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) calculates travel and tourism's contribution\textsuperscript{53} to DR’s gross domestic product (GDP) at over US$ 2.5 billion, or almost 5 percent of the GDP for 2010. In total – that is, direct, indirect and induced contributions – this percentage increases to almost 18 percent of the country’s GDP.\textsuperscript{54} In terms of the contributions of ‘Hotels, Bars, and Restaurants’ to GDP, this figure is calculated at RD$ 17,214.7 million (US$ 421.9 million\textsuperscript{55}), or 9.2 percent of the total GDP.

Data from the WTTC shows that ‘travel and tourism’ in the DR created 201,400 direct jobs (5 percent share) and 652,600 total jobs (16 percent share) in 2010 (WTTC 2010). The Dominican government calculates tourism-related employment using the number of jobs created in hotels, bars and restaurants. In 2010, this number was 55,820 direct jobs and 139,551 indirect jobs (totaling 195,371) – from only 6,796 direct and 13,592 indirect jobs in 1980.\textsuperscript{56} See Appendix G for more details.

4.4 Literature on Tourism in the DR

Despite tourism’s importance for the Dominican economy and the DR’s relative position in the Caribbean, there is a considerable gap in the literature on the country’s tourism and planning, and tourism’s role in development. Whereas an abundance of literature exists on tourism, development, and to some extent, policy in many other Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, such as Mexico or Jamaica, the same cannot be said for the DR generally, nor the subject of this study, Bávaro-Punta Cana, more specifically.

Key players in the country's tourism development and evolution have assembled books and/compilations (in Spanish) on the evolution and development of tourism in the DR (Lladó 2002, La Hoz 1995, and Miolán 1994). Some studies by organizations, such as the Inter-

\textsuperscript{53} Travel and Tourism is understood as ‘[t]he activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not remunerated from within the place visited’ (WTTC/OE 2010:5).

\textsuperscript{54} The figure for ‘direct’ impacts is based on the UN Statistics Division-approved Tourism Satellite Accounting methodology. The WTTC data is at current prices and exchange rates. The figures for direct and total contribution to GDP in the DR are significantly lower than some of the smallest developing countries (e.g. Maldives at …), but they are approximately double the global figures of 2.9 percent of direct contribution and 9.3 percent of total contribution to GDP.

\textsuperscript{55} Own calculation, using the current rate: RD$ 1=US$ 0.0245053, as at February 11, 2013.

\textsuperscript{56} See Appendix A for more data on tourism in the Dominican Republic.
American Development Bank (Agosin et al. 2009), Oxfam (López Gómez 2007), the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD 2005), and Programa EcoMar (Herrera and Betancourt 2007), on the impacts of tourism on the DR (in Spanish), are also noteworthy.


Geographically, these studies have largely focused on the north/northeast coast of the DR. The Oxfam (López Gómez 2007), PNUD 2005 and Programa EcoMar (Herrera and Betancourt 2007) studies and Scapaci et al. (2011), are the only ones to examine Bávaro-Punta Cana specifically.

The literature generally does not address questions of planning and development. Three texts are exceptional in this regard: Inskeep and Kallenberger 1992, PNUD 2005 (in Spanish), and Portoreal and Morales 2011 (in Spanish). The first focuses on the planning and development of Playa Dorada (in Puerto Plata), the only master-planned project in the country. PNUD (2005) dedicates one chapter of its 2005 Human Development Report for the DR to tourism, particularly in Puerto Plata and La Altagracia (the province of Bávaro-Punta Cana); it thoroughly addresses the institutional difficulties that prevent tourism from contributing more adequately to human development, pointing to the need for planning and regulation. Portoreal and Morales (2011),57 in turn, focus on the policy and legislative aspects of tourism development.

57 The chapter belongs to a compilation of studies of tourism in the Mediterranean, Mesoamerica and Caribbean (in Spanish), which includes three chapters on tourism in the DR. The other two are by Pavel Isis Contreras, who was a lead investigator for the aforementioned PNUD 2005 Human Development Report, and based the chapter on that
## 4.5 Policy-Oriented Tourism Planning

The promotion of tourism in the DR began during the Trujillo dictatorship era (1930-61), primarily in the capital city of Santo Domingo, as well as in a number of other localities throughout the country, including beaches or towns. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, that the country began to develop its international ‘sun, sand, and sea’ tourism market, and consider tourism as development strategy.

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Law/Decree/Resolution</th>
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<td>1. Explicitly Dealing with Tourism</td>
<td>The Statutory Tourism Law (Law 541-69)</td>
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<td>Tourism Promotion and Incentive (Law 153-71)</td>
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<td>Elevation of the National Directorate of Tourism to Secretariat (Law 84-79)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macao/Punta Cana Tourism Pole (Decree 1256-479-86)</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed Fund for the Promotion of Tourism (Decree 212-96)</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism Promotion and Development (Law 158-01)</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Indirectly Related to Tourism</td>
<td>Territorial Tourism Land-Use Plan for Punta Cana - Bávaro - Macao (Resolution 007-2012)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Laws Regulating Territory and the Environment</td>
<td>Foreign Investment Law (Law 16-95)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources (Law 64-00)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sectoral Law on Protected Areas (Law 202-04)</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4-1: Key Legislation Affecting Tourism**

Source: Own elaboration, based on categories by Portoreal and Morales (2011)

The planning of tourism in the DR to date has largely been limited to planning at the national level and what Inskeep (1998) refers to as tourism policy, which ‘relates particularly to the type and extent of tourism the country deems suitable and includes any special considerations the country recognizes as important’ (362). In the DR, policies are often formalized through study, as well as Yolanda Leon, whose chapter is based on her PhD research on the impacts of tourism on rural livelihoods in the Dominican Republic, as well as a published article in English (see Leon 2007).
legislation (in the creation of laws or decrees). It is thus useful to utilize a classification elaborated by Portoreal and Morales (2011) comprising four categories of legislation relevant to tourism development, listed in the left-hand column of Table 4-1 above.

The first category includes laws/decrees that explicitly and directly support tourism. In 1969, a series of tourism-related laws and bodies were created with the purpose of facilitating tourism development. This followed recommendations made by UNESCO after a nation-wide study was published in 1968, which declared sites of interest for development.

The UNESCO study began a process of defining wider areas to be exploited for the purposes of tourism development through the establishment of ‘tourism poles.’ It identified five general areas: Santo Domingo, which runs from the city eastwards along the beach; Playa Dorada, which includes the wider area of Puerto Plata; Macao, which refers to today’s area of Bávaro-Punta Cana; Barahona, along the south coast of the country; and finally, the ‘mountainous and central’ area, where it is said that tourism can be developed on a smaller scale.

As recommended in the UNESCO study, the Dominican government began establishing the necessary juridical framework for the promotion of tourism. In 1969, the Dominican government created the Statutory Tourism Law (or Ley Orgánica de Turismo, 541-69). Among many other ordinances, this law declared the promotion of tourism and related activities as being in the ‘interest of the nation and public utility,’ and established the National Directorate of Tourism (Law 541-1969). By 1979, the Directorate was elevated to the level of a Secretariat (which is today called a 'Ministry') (Law 84-1979).

In 1972, the government also created a financing body for tourism infrastructure development, INFRATUR, under the Dominican Central Bank. Although INFRATUR was established for the purpose of financing, it was also involved in the master-planning and management of the development of the Puerto Plata Tourism Pole (demarcated by Decree 2125 in 1972). It centered on two main projects: Playa Grande, a complex that resulted in little more than a hotel and golf course, and the Playa Dorada complex, which represents the majority of Puerto Plata's tourism in the north coast. This project, financed by the World Bank (and later, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)), included the construction and improvement of infrastructure, including the provision of an urban sanitation system, the planning and organization of the pole,
the construction of the Union airport and the establishment of hospitality training schools (Portoreal and Morales 2011).

Governments, of course, can ‘stimulate the private sector’ in a number of ways, ‘through grants, cheap loans, tax rebates and holidays’ (Qun Qin et al. 2013: 472). In the DR, support for the private sector took the form of fiscal incentive laws aimed at promoting external investment in the country’s tourism. Indeed, a key moment for tourism occurred in 1971, with the enactment of the Tourism Promotion and Incentive Law (Ley Sobre la Promoción e Incentivo del Desarrollo Turístico, 153-71), which remained valid until 1992. The law created a number of incentives to attract investment, including: complete exemptions on revenue taxes, national and local construction taxes, and taxes on the imports of goods. These exemptions were valid for a period of ten years, with possibilities for a renewal of 5 more years. Later, the old ideas of the original incentive law (153-71) were repackaged in 2001, to create the Law of Tourism Promotion and Development (Ley de Fomento al Desarrollo Turístico, 158-01 (modified in 2002 and 2004)), with the purpose of providing incentives only ‘for areas of limited development and new poles in provinces and localities of great potential.’

In 1996, the government also established a ‘Mixed Fund’ for the promotion of tourism in the Dominican Republic in the international arena (Decree 212-96). The mixed fund is administered by the State via the Ministry of Tourism, and the Dominican Hotel and Tourism Association (ASONAHORES).

More recently, the Ministry of Tourism began creating sectoral land-use plans for tourism poles (POTTs, Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial Turístico). A number of plans have been developed over the years in various tourism poles, however, their implementation is often limited, and, as I

58 It is worth mentioning that a study performed by the Dominican Internal Revenue Service (DGII, 2010) found that on average (in the 2005-2009 period), the all-inclusive hotel model accounts for 60.4 percent of total sales of Hotels, Bars and Restaurants, but only 50.7 percent of the taxes collected. It is also worth mentioning that the taxes collected by the central government and DGII for all-inclusive hotels have also demonstrated a decrease in the 2005-2009 period, from 1 percent to 0.9 percent of the central government’s total collections, and 2.3 percent to 2 percent of DGII’s collections. One of the explanations provided for the lack of contributions to government tax collection include the Tourism Incentive Law 158-01 and its modifications, which provide some tax incentives to attract foreign investment. Another explanation is that tourism wages are too low to be subject to taxation, and that many all-inclusive resorts were operating with losses in the period (DGII 2010).
elaborate in the next chapter, the implementation of plans and regulations is often subject to corruption.

The second category outlined by Portoreal and Morales (2011) includes legislation or regulation that is related to the sector, through, for instance, the regulation of hotels, restaurants, bars and casinos. For example, labour resolution 9-2011 outlines minimum wages for various sectors of the economy. Companies operating in the area of tourism and construction benefit from special minimum wages. As shown in Table 4-2, those working in the area of tourism earn approximately 25 percent less than their counterparts in other companies of similar sizes.

Moreover, those working in construction have daily minimum wages, depending on the level of skill. ‘Unqualified’ labour receives RD$ 433/day (or approx. US$ 11.39/day), while ‘qualified’ workers receive RD$ 474/day (US$ 12.47/day). According to a recent study by the Ministry of Labour (2012), the average monthly salary of a construction worker is RD$ 11,948 (US$ 314.42). It is noteworthy that there is a RD$ 6,283 (US$ 165.34) average differential between Dominican and Haitian construction workers, the latter earning less than two-thirds their Dominican counterparts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Size (based on earnings)</th>
<th>Monthly Minimum Wages (General)</th>
<th>Monthly Minimum Wages (Tourism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RD$</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>RD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;4 Million</td>
<td>&gt;100,000</td>
<td>9905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 Million</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>6810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 2 Million</td>
<td>≤50,000</td>
<td>6035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-2: Minimum Wages, DR
Source: Developed from Resolución 9-2011. Exchange rates calculated at RD$ 38: US$ 1

The third group of laws regulates areas of the economy that can affect tourism businesses (e.g. taxation laws and protections for foreign investors). In 1995, the Dominican State passed a Foreign Investment Law (16-95), which provided foreign companies the same rights and protections granted to domestic corporations. In effect, this law opened the Dominican economy to foreign investment, granted foreign corporations the same guarantees as domestic investors,

59 While Dominicans earn 16,244.70 on average, Haitians earn only 9,961.70. Further, while only 7.6 percent of Dominicans earn less than RD$ 5,000, 17.80 percent of Haitians earn less than this amount.
and eliminated limitations on the repatriation of capital and profit remittances (IMF 1999), benefiting a wide range of investors, not least those engaged in tourism.

Indeed, tourism has played a significant role in the total foreign direct investment in the country (see Figure 4-2). Between 1993 and June 2011, tourism was the sector with the highest contribution of FDI, and accounted for 17.8 percent of the total. During this period, the proportion of tourism to total FDI has been volatile, but has generally decreased, with the highest year in 1996 (63.4 percent) (BCRD 2012b), one year after the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law.

The last group includes laws that regulate or affect development in a territorial sense, for instance through land-use plans or the establishment of protected areas. According to Portoreal and Morales (2011), these laws ‘impose restrictions on touristic activities in the name of sustainability, but often, their applicability is limited’ (31). In 2000, The General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources (Law 64-00) was created, establishing a Ministry of Environment and bringing together a number of antecedents, many of which have a direct impact on tourism development, including requirements for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). Another law affecting tourism development is the Sectoral Law on Protected Areas (Law 202-04), which (at least in theory) is intended to define areas for conservation and limit development. Land-use plans or urban plans, however, generally cannot be considered limitations, since few exist in the DR.
4.6 Conclusion

Planning for tourism has thus been limited to the implementation of policies that facilitate its expansion. Last year, the National Development Strategy for 2010-2030 (Statutory Law 1-12) was published, the first of its kind for the DR, and highlights the role of tourism for contributing to the development of an ‘articulated, innovative and sustainable economy,’ that is competitive in the global economy. Tourism land-use plans (POTTs) by the Ministry of Tourism are currently in the process of being developed, however, despite the decentralization process, local governments have not been integrated into this process, nor have they developed their own land-use plans. Consequently, the State, at both levels (national and local), has not played a significant role in guiding and mediating the impacts of tourism in the country.
5 Institutional Deficiencies and Planning in the DR

5.1 Introduction

In 2005, the UNDP in Santo Domingo published a Human Development Report for the DR, in which an entire chapter is dedicated to the subject of tourism and its contributions (or lack thereof) to the country’s development. The chapter, entitled, ‘[t]ourism: If it does not change, it will exhaust itself,’\(^{60}\) was extremely critical of tourism and the form that it has taken in the country. According to lead editor of the report, Miguel Ceará-Hatton,\(^{61}\) very little research has taken a critical perspective on the implications of tourism for the country, as a result of tourism’s significance in the Dominican economy, and the sector’s ‘lobby power’ (pers. comm., March 22, 2011).

The aforementioned chapter attributes the failure of tourism to contribute to human development in a more meaningful way and the reinforcement of a wide range of negative ‘externalities’, to problems of institutionalism within the state (PNUD 2005). The document refers to the lack of institutionalism primarily as ‘the absence of a State with the capacity to regulate and establish rules and norms’ (80). A number of other issues related to this include the lack of continuity in national programmes and plans, particularly across changes in government; the lack of coordination between government bodies on issues related to tourism; a lack of participation by civil society due to the presence of clientelism; and with respect to the environmental issues, the lack of capacity and rigour in monitoring the adherence to environmental regulations (PNUD

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\(^{60}\) Own translation from Spanish: ‘El turismo: si no se modifica, se agota’.

\(^{61}\) At the time of the interview, Miguel Ceará-Hatton was the coordinator of the Human Development Office at the UNDP in the Dominican Republic. He and Pavel Isa were dismissed in June 2012. Significant controversy surrounded this event, particularly among academics and other ‘experts,’ and the circumstances of his removal from office are unclear. Ceará-Hatton’s letter of resignation (Diario Libre 2011) explains that the organization was dismantling the Human Development Office, despite the existence of funding, its adherence to the terms of reference, and is in the interest of many institutions of the Dominican State. A press release by PNUD clarifies that there was and will not be a closing of the Human Development Office, and that the contracts of the two coordinators would not be renewed for supposedly compromising the independence of the UNDP due to partiality in statements they made. They responded by claiming their work was ‘academic work that tried to contribute to the design of public policies and questioned the political, economic and social order...’ and they were dismissed because they refused to censure themselves (Diario Libre 2012).
Table 5-1 below outlines some of these institutional problems, organized according to the relevant sectoral bodies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Institution</th>
<th>Failures and Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Municipal Government                | • Does not involve itself in national or sectoral planning  
• Little responsibility in the execution of development plans  
• Does not have the capacity to improve the urban milieu  
• Does not have the capacity to revise damage or to object land-use and the height of buildings  
• Does not have the political or economic power to regulate  
• Clientelism                                                                                                                                 |
| Ministry of Tourism                 | • There is no continuity of plans and programmes  
• Does not have a land-use plan, nor is there planning for the capacity or demand of services  
• Does not apply existing regulations and, in many cases, permits violations of the regulations signed by the Executive Power [The President]  
• Allows tour-operators to control the country’s image and does not stipulate a marketing strategy to impede the homogenization of the image  
• Does not coordinate emergency plans for health and natural phenomena  
• No policy for the distribution of tourism and independent forms of transportation                                                                                                                                 |
| Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources | • Lack of enforcement of regulations  
• Little diffusion of information on the environment and sustainable tourism  
• Weaknesses in the planning and protection of the environment  
• Lack of mechanisms for monitoring the sector                                                                                                                                 |
| Ministry of Public Works            | • Priorities in infrastructure unlikely to contribute to development  
• Does not revise designs for architecture, structural designs and sanitary installations in buildings  
• Inadequate maintenance of infrastructure  
• Absence of consensus with municipalities                                                                                                                                 |

Table 5-1: ‘Problems of Institutionalism and their Impact on Tourism’
Source: Taken and translated from a larger table including 11 actors in total (PNUD 2005:80).

The PNUD document, however, does not adequately delve into the underlying issues that have resulted in some of these institutional deficiencies. For example, it does not explore the reasons behind the lack of capacity within the various institutions of the State, which must be understood in relation to more systemic problems.

I argue in this chapter that three key issues have hampered the possibilities for effective planning in tourist areas that face environmental concerns. They are an ineffective bureaucracy (at all levels of government), a strong central government unwilling to relinquish its power, and the lack of coordination and imbalances in power between various ministries and levels of government.

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62 ‘Cuadro III.15 El problema de la institucionalidad y su impacto en el sector turismo,’ my own translation. Note that a footnote in the original table states: ‘In general, all the institutions to a smaller or larger degree suffer from a lack of institutionalism, corruption, clientelism, a lack of ethics and professionalism and a lack of funds.’
government. As I will now demonstrate, the country’s lack of planning has both technocratic and political roots.

Since much of this chapter deals with legislative changes, Table 5-2 below outlines key laws addressed throughout this chapter that have played a role in shaping the DR’s institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Constitution (2010 Revision)                    | Revision of the Constitution (last revised in 2002)  
Some changes jeopardize the rights of children born to Haitian parents and the rights to public natural resources.  
Effectively elevates municipal districts to the same level as municipalities (in terms of responsibilities and mandate). |
| Law 17-97                                       | Transfer of four percent of public spending to local governments.                                                                                                                                          |
| Law 166-03                                      | Financial transfers from the central government to local governments increased to 8 percent in 2004, and 10 percent in 2005 – in theory.                                                                    |
| Law 14-91 of Civil Service and Administrative Careers | Aimed to establish stability in the public service. Created two streams: Civil service and administrative careers.                                                                                      |
| Law 41-08 of Public Service                     | Successor to Law 14-91. Includes municipal employees in the framework of ’civil service.’                                                                                                               |
| Law 176-07 of the National District and Municipalities | Innovative law guiding local governments: the National District, municipalities and municipal districts.                                                                                             |
| General Law 64-00 on the Environment and Natural Resources | Created the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MMARNA) and amalgamates previous environment-related laws into one framework.                                                      |
| Law 49-1938 the Municipal League                | Created the Municipal League, a body of the central government which (in theory) should provide technical assistance and build the capacity of local governments                                         |

Table 5-2: Key Legislative Changes

N.B. With respect to the laws, the numbers on the right of the hyphen indicate the year of legislation

Source: Own elaboration

5.2 Bureaucratic Weaknesses

An understanding of the failures of planning in the DR first requires an understanding of the bureaucratic structures of government agencies. Bureaucracy is, in essence, the internal organization of the state. The state is tasked with a range of responsibilities, some of which include nurturing economic growth and ‘guaranteeing minimal levels of welfare’ (Evans 1995:5), to varying degrees, depending on the context. In order for the state to achieve these ends, sociologist Max Weber argues that a bureaucratic state apparatus is necessary (Weber 1978). In his work, entitled *Economy and Society* published in the early 20th century, Max Weber dedicated one chapter to bureaucracies, which continues to be relevant to this day in discussions about state structures and public administration (i.e. Peters and Pierre 2012, Evans and Rauch 1999, and Evans 1995).
The fundamental assumption behind this Weberian perspective is that a ‘formulized structure would create predictable behaviors by the bureaucrats, and that the bureaucrats themselves would conform to the design imposed upon them’ (Peters 2012:7). In other words, this perspective, metaphorically referred to as ‘the machinery of government,’ stipulates that ‘if we get the structures right then the government will perform well’ (Peters 2012). Although he was not ‘overly optimistic’, Weber saw the bureaucracy as a challenge ‘to create a set of institutions that as far as possible could keep in check bureaucrats bent on usurping political power and a new class of professional politicians making a living off, rather than living for, politics’ (Christensen 2012: 103).

Weber argued that a functioning bureaucracy included six major interrelated principles: impersonal relations, meritocratic recruitment, predictable career ladders, a formal hierarchy of authority, rule-governed decision-making, and a division of labour by functional specialization (1978). Studies have since related one or more of these principles to various criteria. Parado and Salvador (2011), for example, outline research that links meritocratic recruitment to economic growth, better economic policy, and/or better organizational performance.

In Latin America, however, in general, the public sector is not characterized by meritocratic recruitment, but is instead dominated by patronage, ‘the discretionary allocation of public sector jobs to reward followers and to cement political and personal relationships’ (Grindle 2010:1). A 2006 study by the Inter-American Development Bank (BID 2006) classifies bureaucracies of LAC according to their level of development. It combined indices of merit and functional capacity to categorize the countries in three levels. The DR was placed in the last level, having one of the lowest levels of bureaucratic development among LAC countries included in the study (Longo 2008).

BID further categorized the types of bureaucracies along two axes: autonomy and capacity, as illustrated in Figure 5-1 below. The DR, along with Paraguay, and Central American countries (with the exception of Costa Rica), is considered a ‘clientelistic bureaucracy,’ having low levels of capacity as well as autonomy. Clientelistic bureaucracies are problematic because they ‘are related to their nature primarily as a political resource of the governing party to exchange jobs for votes or political support’ (BID 2006: 72).
The first principle elaborated by Weber (1978), impersonal relations, involves the strict separation between the public and private lives of civil servants: ‘[i]n principle, the modern organization of the civil service separates the bureau from the private domicile of the official, and, in general, bureaucracy segregates official activity as something distinct from the sphere of private life.’ The realities of Bávaro-Punta Cana, as in much of the rest of the DR and other countries as well, however, do not evidence this ideal, and point instead toward practices of corruption among public sector employees. The former Minister of Tourism, Félix (or Felucho) Jiménez, for example, was accused on a number of occasions of corruption and utilizing his position to benefit personally. During his time as Minister, allowable building densities were increased in parts of Bávaro-Punta Cana, to benefit his personal investments in Pueblo Bávaro (SECTUR 2011) and Stanza Mare (Delgado 2007), two residential developments in the Bávaro-Punta Cana area.

The line separating the public and private lives of bureaucrats is often rather diffuse and ambiguous. One public servant admitted that given the low salaries paid to public employees, the only reason for working in the public sector is to have the opportunity to gain insider information for advantageous real estate investment. Indeed, many public servants often wear two hats, begging the question to what degree private interests are directing the so-called ‘public interest.’
Two further principles, namely meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders, can be identified as clear issues that help explain some of the underlying problems in the state’s failure to plan in the DR. Meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders are intimately related. The recruitment of civil servants in the DR has been based largely on patronage, ‘relegating technical or merit-based considerations to second place (Iacoviello and Rodríguez-Gustá 2006: 453). Similarly, bureaucrats are also subject to significant job insecurity as a result of this culture of patronage, but also one of intense partisanship. In the 2010 Americas Barometer survey by the Latin Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), around half (52 percent) of those not employed in the public sector expressed sympathy for a political party. However, as many as four fifths (or 80 percent) of public employees identify with a political party (LAPOP 2010), and thus may be benefiting from relationships of patronage, swapping political support for employment (Morgan et al. 2011).

While partisanship is a common phenomenon globally, the extent to which it is prevalent in the DR is significant – regardless of employment in or out of the government. Among the countries included in the 2008 Barometer survey of Latin American and the Caribbean, the country had the highest rate of partisanship, with 70.3 percent, compared to the next highest, Paraguay with just under 60 percent, and the lowest, Guatemala, with a rate of 15.9 percent (LAPOP 2009).

Internationally, it is commonplace for political leaders and their cabinet Ministers to change with changes in elected governments. In the DR, however, these changes transcend the political representatives down to the bureaucratic structures of government; indeed, an election may result in the complete overhaul of the public administration. At the local level, Gómez-Sabaini (2010) argues that the ‘drastic’ change in workforce limits the professionalization of the administration and municipal management. A planner at the Ministry of Tourism explained: ‘[t]he Secretary [now considered Minister] has a work period of four years, so if those at the top change, that means at the end of those four years, he can say ‘OK, I want other people to manage this,

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63 The Dominican Republic also ranked first in 2006. In the 2010 study, however, this figure dropped to 54.4 percent, leaving the Dominican Republic in third place, regionally. Still, this is significantly higher than the rest of the countries which tend to sit between 25 and 45 percent. Generally, as it is explained by the authors of the study, sympathy for a party increases in election years; this is said to explain the slightly lower values for 2006 (60.4 percent) and 2010 (54.5 percent), which were not election years (LAPOP 2010).
including the director that we have now, and the team that is in place’ (pers. comm. February 02, 2010).

As a result, plans developed during one election period are often discarded and are replaced with new ones (Bolívar Troncoso, pers. comm., January 28, 2010). According to the former Director of the Department of Planning and Projects (DPP) at the Ministry of Tourism, Maribel Villalona, this problem was less of an issue recently, since the 2008 elections resulted in a re-election of the then-President (Leonel Fernández) and his political party, the Partido Liberal Democrático (PLD), and thus did not result in large-scale reshufflings. However, she acknowledged that the DPP was aiming to quickly complete the plans and pass them as legislation (by law or decree) such that should the government change, it can be guaranteed some continuity (even if only in theory) (Villalona 2010, pers. comm, Jan. 26, 2010).

The overall feeling, however, of instability in the civil service and thus continuity of plans, is echoed by others, including Dr. Amparo Chantada (pers. comm., March 15, 2011), an environmental activist and academic in Santo Domingo:

> The weakness of the Dominican State lies precisely in that it does not see the necessity... to create a stable and professional public organization. Therefore, every four years, a different party rises with different human resources and every four years, a short-term vision of four years is applied. Since there is no continuity, neither in the parties, nor in the projects of the nation, as each four years all of the nation’s personnel changes in order to replace them with militants of the party. They don’t take professional criteria into consideration. A country cannot develop like this.

More recently, attempts have been made to address some of the issues around the country’s weak bureaucracy, through the establishment of the Law of Civil Service and Administrative Careers in 1991 (Law 14-91), and its recent successor in 2008, the Law of Public Service (Law 41-08). The twin issues of meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders have been central themes in discussions of the weaknesses of government, permeating institutions of the central government (Iacoviello and Rodríguez-Gustá 2006), but also at the level of local government (Castillo Lugo 2002). Indeed, in the country’s first Congress of Municipal Affairs in September

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64 Former President Leonel Fernández of the PLD had been in office from 2004-2008 and was re-elected for the 2008-2012 period. The PLD recently won the elections again for the 2012-2016 period. This time, however, the PLD is headed by a new leader, Danilo Medina, since Presidents are ineligible to serve for more than two subsequent election periods.
2010, these principles were central themes throughout the conference and represented the topic of one of the six themes at the conference.

The Civil Service and Administrative Careers Law (14-91) aimed to establish a stable body of civil servants independent of political powers (Iacoviello and Rodrígues-Gustá 2006). Two entities were formulated under this Law. The ‘Civil Service’ regulated labour relations and provided benefits to public employees including the establishment of year-end bonuses, pay-in-lieu of vacation, or compensation for unfair dismissal, among others. ‘Administrative Careers’ represented the professional and specialized branch of the Civil Service that is selected according to merit. The purpose of this branch of employees is to provide employment stability, provide opportunities for professionalization, and create a career ladder within the government (Castillo Lugo 2002).

Despite the formulation and passing of this law, in the decade following the introduction of the Law 14-91 (1991-2001), only 1,291 public functionaries and employees were given employment security under the Administrative Career system; this represents less than 0.5 percent of approximately 200,000 public servants with recourse to it (Castillo Lugo 2002, Machado 2008). Between 2005 and 2008, this number has increased significantly, incorporating 7259 employees into the Public Administration (SEAP 2008), demonstrating, at the very least, gradual progress in the direction of meritocratic recruitment and employee security within the civil service.

One significant advancement of the Law of Public Service (41-08), passed in 2008, is the further inclusion of municipal employees in the ‘Administrative Careers’ programme. This is particularly important, since each time there is a municipal election, the new mayor typically discards the former employees and replaces with his/her own loyalists. This has meant that it is difficult to develop the capacity of municipal employees, given the low wages currently available

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65 Own translation from Municipalistas, which is a local term to describe a range of actors involved in municipal affairs to, representatives of municipal governments to ‘experts’ to representatives of NGOs.

66 Two major barriers to the functioning of this system include: the failure of the previous version of the constitution to recognize the need for merit as a requirement for entry into the public administration – although this was resolved in the 2010 constitutional revision – and the lack of political will to apply the Law, resulting in little economic and political support to the body responsible for its administration (Castillo Lugo 2002).
to civil servants at the local level and, thus, lack of qualifications for the positions they are given (Francis Jorge, pers. comm., March 23, 2011).

It is noteworthy that a significant limiting factor in the application of these laws regulating public administration is the constitution itself, which designates the President as the ultimate authority, and allows him/her to recruit or dismiss any public functionary\(^{67}\) (Iacoviello and Rodríguez-Gustá 2006, Machado 2008). Indeed, the office of the President has been said to have high discretionary power in various areas of government\(^{68}\) (Agosín et al. 2009, Iacoviello and Rodríguez-Gustá 2006, PNUD 2008). Strong presidentialism is considered to contribute to an environment of clientelism-based politics and has characterized the Dominican political system since the beginning of democracy in 1978 (Sánchez and Lozano 2012).

The establishment of a formal civil service structure is undoubtedly a continuous process, and it is the ‘implementation, not law, [which] determines the persistence of patronage and shapes the characteristics of emergent career services’ (Grindle 2010:2). For Parrado and Salvador (2011), the measures taken to professionalize the civil service in DR (as well as Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru) can be described as ‘failed attempts’.

### 5.3 Decentralization

Political and administrative centralization has had a long history among countries of LAC\(^{69}\) (LAPOP 2010). This legacy of centralization was ‘epitomized by a presidential system with strong executive powers over sub-national tiers of government’, and was reinforced during the 1970s and 80s in times of authoritarian rule in many of these countries (Nickson 2011:5).

Throughout the so-called developing world, decentralization came to be seen as the panacea for poverty reduction and problems of underdevelopment (Lopes 2009). It is also said to create ‘better governance and deeper democracy’ for increasing the direct accountability of public

\(^{67}\) I am referring to Art. 55 in the penultimate version, or Art. 128 in the current version of the Constitution.

\(^{68}\) Historically, the President has also had significant budgetary discretion, with recourse to a number of budgetary funds, including unused funds (resulting often from under-estimation of revenues), and the ability to ‘freely move resources between budget chapters by decree’ when Congress is not in session (BID 2006: 250).

\(^{69}\) This is true across both federal (the largest four nations, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela) and unitary nations (the remainder of region’s countries) (Nickson 2011).
officials and engaging citizens in local issues (Grindle 2007). The justification for the adoption of decentralization policies originated in three schools of thought: Reformists saw it as an opportunity for democratization (Stren 2003); neoliberals, for reducing the role of the state; and technocrats for improving service delivery (Nickson 2011). Much of the earlier work on the subject was directed at policy recommendations, usually promoting the need for its implementation (Falletti 2010).

Of course, the national state has a crucial role in differentiating patterns of governance at the local level in a number of ways, such as 'the historical development of the national state, the capacity of the local state apparatus, and its multi-scalar structure' (Guarneros-Meza and Geddes 2010: 119). The experiences of decentralization, however, have been varied. In LAC, while some countries’ subnational governments gained significant power (e.g. Brazil and Colombia), the results in other countries have been ‘moderate’ (e.g. Mexico), or indeed ‘insignificant’ (e.g. Argentina) (Falletti 2010, van Lindert and Verkoren 2001). Even within a single country, the experiences are mixed, and the proclaimed benefits of decentralization are by no means inevitable, as demonstrated in Grindle’s study of 30 municipalities in Mexico (Grindle 2007). This is certainly true for the DR.

In this section, I argue that while decentralization in the DR is ongoing, there are a number of problems that prevent the country from seeing the potential benefits for an enhanced democratic process, better accountability to citizens, and improved service delivery. I begin the discussion with an explication of the form decentralization has taken in the DR (deconcentration, delegation, and devolution), followed by an illustration of the types of decentralization (administrative, political, and fiscal) that have shaped the current government system. The last part of this section considers some of the key difficulties associated with the way in which decentralization has occurred in much of the DR.

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70 In most Africa countries, for example, decentralization has caused many problems for governance, ‘since the majority of national authorities have not yet integrated this major institutional change into their behaviour’ (Elong Mbassi 2009: 260, emphasis added).
5.4 Background on Decentralization in the DR

According to Ebel and Vaillancourt (2001), there are three models of decentralization. Any one country may implement any number of these at the same time. However, rather than representing them as a trichotomy, they can be placed along a continuum of levels of centralization (see figure below). On the one side, deconcentration represents a situation where the government’s central ministries create regional branches. On the other side, devolution represents the most complete form of decentralization. Here, ‘independently established subnational and local governments are given the responsibility for delivery of a set of public services, along with the authority to impose fees and taxes to finance them’ (156). Between these two extremes, there is delegation, where subnational or local governments are given some responsibility for service delivery but are supervised by the central government.

![Decentralization Continuum](image)

**Figure 5-2: The Decentralization Continuum**
*Source: Own elaboration, based on Ebel and Vaillancourt (2001)*

In addition to these three models of decentralization, others (i.e. Rondinelli and Nellis 2008) also include privatization or divestment as one of the models of decentralization. In the case of privatization, ‘some governments have divested themselves of responsibility for functions either by transferring them to voluntary organizations or by allowing them to be performed by private enterprises’ (Rondinelli and Nellis 2008: 9).

In the DR, decentralization is characterized both by deconcentration and something between delegation and devolution. One the one hand, various ministries of the central government have decentralized through the deconcentration of their central bodies in regional or provincial offices. Municipalities have also been subject to deconcentration through the increasing creation of municipal districts below them (Figueroa 2010). Until the most recent revision of the Constitution (2010), municipal districts were subordinate to municipalities (fiscally,
administratively and politically); the 2010 Constitution now gives the same autonomy to municipal districts and municipalities. On the other hand, there has also been an ongoing, albeit timid, process of devolution of power to subnational levels of government, specifically, to the local level, which is best demonstrated by a new law governing municipalities known as the Law of the National District and Municipalities (176-07), which was adopted in 2007, discussed shortly.

Efforts to decentralize the state began as early as the 1960s in the DR with the creation of ‘regions’ according to which sectoral bodies of the state (that is, different ministries or, at that time, secretariats) should decentralize. However, as I explain later in this chapter, this territorial division has not been respected by the different sectors. The country effectively operates with two levels – the central and the local (PNUD 2008). The province also exists as an intermediate level71, but is represented solely by a governor who is designated by the President, and is thus not directly elected. It has neither personnel, nor a structure, nor resources: ‘[i]t is simply a physical expression of the central’ powers (Juan Figueroa, pers. comm., March 22, 2011).

Part of the process of decentralization that began in the 1960s also involved the creation of a number of ‘decentralized’ institutions under the President. Interestingly, these took on functions that are markedly municipal in character. Some examples include the National Institute of Potable Water and Sewage Systems, INAPA, or the Metropolitan Transport Authority, AMET, among others. Paradoxically, the creation of such bodies was, in reality, another expression of centralized State power and bureaucracy (Figueroa 2010).

5.4.1 Administrative, Political and Fiscal Decentralization in the DR

Based on the notion that decentralization ‘is a process encompassing administrative, political, and fiscal types of reforms that must be studied together’ (Falletti 2010:16), I structure this part of the discussion of decentralization in the DR according to these three types.

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71 To clarify, governors are appointed by the President and are considered the representatives of the province (Constitution, Art. 197, 198). Senators, on the other hand, are elected (one per province). Senators are provided with 420,000 to 900,000 pesos (approx. 11,000 to 24,000 dollars) for arbitrary spending, inevitably delegitimizing the payment of taxes and endorsing clientelism with political parties (PNUD 2008).
Falletti (2010) describes administrative decentralization as ‘the set of policies that transfer the dispensation of social services (education, health, housing, etc.) to subnational governments’ (17). In the DR, this is effectively characterized by deconcentration. In terms of health care, the Ministry of Public Health is decentralized in Regional Health Services and Provincial Directorates of Health (PNUD 2008), which are responsible for the provision of healthcare, however, often international programmes, NGOs, or donor organizations are also involved. The aforementioned Law of the National District and Municipalities (176-07) establishes that four percent of municipal governments’ budget be allocated to the areas of health, education and poverty reduction, but these responsibilities have effectively not been transferred to the local level. In terms of tourism, each of the country’s main tourism poles has a representative from the Ministry of Tourism to represent the political leadership (Maribel Villalona, pers. comm., June 16, 2011). In the last government period (2008-2012), the Ministry has also established three local planning offices with technical expertise in Bávaro-Punta Cana, Cabarete, and Las Terrenas.

In Latin America, evidence of political decentralization – that is, ‘constitutional or electoral reforms designed to devolve political authority to subnational actors and to create or activate spaces for the political representation of subnational polities’ (Falletti 2010:17) – over the past few decades is strong. In 1980, only 3 countries of LAC directly elected mayors, and by 1996, this figure rose to 17 countries (IDB 1997). In the DR, political decentralization occurred in the early 1990s.

Since reforms in the 1990s, the DR made two significant changes in the electoral system that have facilitated political decentralization. First, it ‘changed the method of mayoral election from indirect to direct’, and second, it separated the timing of presidential and subnational elections (Lora 2007:27). Historically, local elections were effectively joined with national voting (until reforms in 1992-1994), but some suggest that municipal leaders were appointed by the President (Juan Figueroa, pers. comm., March 22, 2011). Since 1994, municipal (with

congressional elections) and presidential elections were staggered, occurring two years apart (every four years) (Mitchell 1998, IDB 1997, Tamara Sosa, pers. comm., March 23, 2011). The first separated elections occurred in 1998 (PNUD 2008).

Mitchell (1998) argues that the separation of voter ballots for municipal and central government has resulted in increased ‘ticket-splitting’, where votes were not necessarily for the same party at local and central levels. Indeed, this was certainly the case in the 2006 elections, where 22 of the 31 (or 71 percent) elected senators in Congress were of the leading party (PLD), but where only 68 of the 151 (or 45 percent) municipalities were of that party (PNUD 2008). It is argued that separated votes allows for the development of local leadership and citizen empowerment, and facilitates action based on the needs of the locality (PNUD 2008). Recently, however, this was reversed in order to reduce the impact of rather continuous political campaigning, and presidential and municipal (as well as congressional) elections will be reunited for the 2016-2020 period.

In 2007, the government passed new legislation, Law 176-07 of the National District and Municipalities, providing local governments with a comprehensive framework and renewing the significance of local government (as well as the role of participation) in debates on governance. The law mandates new responsibilities to local governments, which are categorized in terms of ‘own responsibilities’, ‘delegated responsibilities’, and ‘coordinated responsibilities’, the latter two which refer to responsibilities shared with other governmental institutions, which I explain in the next section. This law also gave new autonomy to municipal districts, allowing for their mayors to be elected, rather than simply designated by the mayor of the head municipality.

Fiscal decentralization followed political decentralization in the DR. The transfer of funds from the central government to municipalities was established under Law 17-97, transferring 4 percent of public spending to the local level. According to Law 166-03 passed in 2003, this percentage was meant to increase to 8 percent in 2004 and 10 percent in 2005 (Matías 2007). These funds are then distributed among local governments according to their population, based on the most recent census, which was until recently, in 2002. From there, each municipality is guaranteed a base of 1 million pesos, while each municipal district receives half that amount (Chona and Pineda 2009: 13).
In theory, the country’s fiscal decentralization appears to have made progress. In reality, however, it has been limited. First, the guaranteed 10 percent of state expenditure allocated to local governments has never reached 10 percent, instead hovering closer to 6 percent (Santos de la Cruz, pers. comm., March 14, 2011). Second, the central government has prevented the full fiscal autonomy of local governments, as I shall soon explain. And third, the ability of local governments to establish and collect their own sources of revenue has been rather limited. Indeed, the budgets of local governments have been described as ‘meager and subject to naked political manipulation by the president’ (Mitchell 1998:132). In a document prepared by the Ministry of Economics, Planning and Development, in preparation for the National Development Strategy, the state of local government’s financial autonomy has been described critically:

Local governments have low levels of financial autonomy, administering a fiscal system characterized by obsolete taxes, in many cases the lack of will and the inefficient implementation of charging mechanisms on behalf of local authorities, with little knowledge of the legislation, high levels of [tax] evasion, and defaulting on the payment for services on behalf of the population. Consequently, local governments have low levels of revenue generation, which increases the dependence of transfers from the central governments (MEPyD 2012:73)

For the past half century, the DR’s local governments have been operating under a framework (Law 3455) dating from 1952 in the era of the Trujillo dictatorship (1930-1961) (Matías 2007). Many of the laws that were passed between that period and the 1990s maintained a system of subjugation of municipal government under the central state. For example, a law passed in 1966 on the Establishment of Municipal Taxes (Law 180-66) maintains that taxes created by municipal government require the approval of the National Development Council through the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (Matías 2007). It was not until the municipal law 176-07, that this was revoked. Also, until the most recent revision of the Constitution in 2010, the President had the authority to revoke the creation of any municipal taxes by decree (under art. 55, paragraph 25, Constitution of 2002).

The fiscal operations of local governments have also been subject to intervention by a long-standing central institution, the Municipal League, until the municipal law 176-07. Transfers from the central government occurred through the Municipal League, which then divided funds among municipalities. The League threatened municipal autonomy by suspending transfers to

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73 See Table 5-2 for an outline of the purpose of the Municipal League. The subsequent section in this chapter elaborates more on its purpose *de jure* and its actual practices.
local governments for the failure to submit their financial reports (Matías 2007). The League also benefited from its role in the transfer of funds, receiving 5 percent of the total transferred from the central government (under Law 17-97). Given the increases in the number of municipalities and municipal districts, particularly in the past two decades (discussed shortly), and increases in the minimums transferred to them, the absolute quantity of funds going to the League increased significantly. The Law 176-07, however, establishes that funds no longer be transferred to local governments through the Municipal League, but directly from the National Treasury. It also states that the League is no longer allowed to regulate and intervene in decisions made by local governments (Art. 107) (Gómez-Sabaini 2010). Despite the revoking of such responsibilities, the League continues to exist to this day, given other significant responsibilities under its mandate, which I will discuss shortly.

However, the fiscal power of central government over municipalities and municipal districts remains, to a large extent. To this day, responsibilities which are internationally considered municipal functions occur through a number of central bodies. Despite the transfer of many responsibilities to local governments, many sources of revenue remain in the hands of central bodies, such as vehicular registration (Matías 2007), property tax and urban land registration (Gómez-Sabaini 2010, MEPyD 2012).

For example, Article 200 of the Constitution allows for local governments to establish local taxes, with the caveat that they do not conflict with national taxes, or inter-municipal or international trade. In 2011, the municipal government of Santo Domingo created a new tax levied on hotels in order to gain a share of the benefits from tourism. The nation and local hotel associations, ASONAHORES and the AHSD, respectively, challenged and managed to revoke the tax by the arguing it unconstitutional, since they are already taxed by the national government. While demonstrating the weakness of local governments (even that of the capital city, Santo Domingo) vis-à-vis the tourism sector (Yolanda León, pers. comm., June 15, 2011), this also shows that the ability of municipalities to collect taxes from tourism is limited vis-à-vis the central government.

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74 A similar example was given in the context of Bávaro-Punta Cana in Chapter 4.
As a result, the majority of local government revenue derives from transfers from the central government. An IDB study of the financing of 280 municipalities and municipal districts in 2004 demonstrates that 87.2 percent of all of the local governments’ total sources of revenue derive from transfers from central government. That is, only 12.8 percent of local governments’ funding is raised themselves. For the smallest municipalities with limited budgets,\textsuperscript{75} the percentage deriving from central government transfers rises to 93.8 percent, and for municipal districts alone, it is as high as 95.4 percent (Gómez-Sabaini 2010).

This funding system for local governments fails to create incentives for them to find their own sources of revenue (Chona and Pineda 2009, PNUD 2008). Further, evidence points to an understanding by many municipal authorities that taxing the local population will result in a political cost: ‘the preoccupation is in the next election, not good or bad management, but to stay in power’ (Juan Figueroa, pers. comm., March 22, 2011). Essentially, the lack of funds at the local level becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. A lack of funds results in the lack of services and development, which in turn leaves the local government with little legitimacy.

Given the novelty of local governments and the fact that until recently, local governments did not have their own budgets to manage, local residents expect very little of local governments, except to collect waste (Yolanda León, pers.comm., June 15, 2011). Ultimately, this has the effect of re-establishing the significance of the central government: ‘What happens is that for many services, they [the community] depend on the central government, waiting for the President to visit or the Ministry of Public Works, to ask them to make a water/sewage system, etc’ (Yolanda León, pers. comm., June 15, 2011).

5.4.2 Problems with Decentralization

As a result, many problems arise with the ways in which decentralization has occurred. The novelty of local government has meant that reliance on bodies of the central government for certain services remains. There is also a strong dependence on the central state for the transfer of resources to local governments as a result of the weak capacity to collect taxes at the local level as well as the systems in place which privilege central tax collection. However, there are a

\textsuperscript{75} That is, with annual budgets of under 25 million pesos, or approximately 660,000 dollars.
number of other issues which have not yet been mentioned that have come about from the way in which decentralization has occurred. Local governments have not benefited from capacity building in order to fulfill the role mandated to them through the municipal law (176-07) or the new Constitution. Rather, the funding structure has incentivized a process of fragmentation of the nation’s territory, which in turn has fortified a system of clientelism.

5.4.2.1 Little Capacity at the Local Level

Despite the gradual shift in many responsibilities, funds and political power, little support has been given to local authorities to develop their capacity to govern and manage a public administration. Under Law 49 of 1938, the Municipal League, which continues to function to this day, was created in order to build the capacity and provide technical assistance to municipal governments. As it was mentioned earlier, the role taken on by the League over the past 75 years has increasingly shifted away from these responsibilities toward the role of a go-between connecting the central government with local governments. It took on functions related to the regulation of municipal governments, the approval of municipal budgets, as well as the intermediary organization transferring funds from the central government (Francis Jorge, pers. comm., March 23, 2011), with the passing of a law in 1965. The municipal law 176-07 revoked the role of the League in the distribution of funds to local governments (which now receive funds directly from the treasury), and returned it to its original functions, adding to those, assistance in the area of urban planning (Tamara Sosa, pers. comm., March 23, 2011).

According economist Juan Figueroa, director of Decentralization and Local Development at CONARE, the National Council on State Reform,76 ‘from the beginning, the League did not do what it was supposed to be doing’ (Juan Figueroa, pers. comm., March 22, 2011). Many are also critical of the League’s capacity. César Pérez, a sociologist and specialist in decentralization at a local university, INTEC (the Santo Domingo Technical Institute), in response to a question on the League, claims: ‘[n]o I can’t talk about it, because the League does absolutely nothing’ (César Pérez, pers. comm., January 29, 2010).

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76 Own translation of Consejo Nacional de Reforma del Estado.
Santos de la Cruz, a community organizer with a prominent NGO, Centro Montalvo, explains that the League has been used as a *botín de guerra* or ‘spoils of war’. When one of the leading parties (the PLD or PRD) is unable to win an election on its own, coalitions were formed with the reformist party, PRSC (Amable Aristy Castro), and the leadership of the League was given to that party once the elections were won (Santos de la Cruz, pers. comm., March 14, 2011). It is noteworthy that the former leader of the Municipal League, Amable Aristy Castro (1999-2010, former Mayor of Higüey, now governor of the province) is also considered to epitomize clientelism and corruption. In 2011, the State auditor found that the Municipal League paid out around US$ 1.5 million for services not rendered during the period of Aristy’s leadership (Thomas 2011).

In recent years, there has been significant debate as to whether the Municipal League should remain as government body and in actuality return to its original functions, or whether it should be abolished altogether. The debate centres on two issues. First, whether the League actually has the ability to do what it was intended to do. And second, whether other institutions now exist that are fulfilling that function (Juan Figueroa, pers. comm., March 22, 2011). For the Centro Montalvo, among others (e.g. environmentalist and professor, Dr. Amparo Chantada), the League as it appears today should be dissolved, but a body should be established to provide support for the small municipalities with little capacity (Santos de la Cruz, pers. comm., March 14, 2011, and Amparo Chantada, pers. comm., March 15, 2011).

The League’s failure to defend the interests of local governments, build their capacity and provide them with technical support has left a gap in the support and development of local governments. Consequently, in the early 2000s, a federation of municipal governments in the country was formed, FEDOMU (the Dominican Federation of Municipalities) (Francis Jorge, pers. comm., March 23, 2011). According to a FEDOMU representative, Francis Jorge, not only does FEDOMU provide assistance and build the capacity of municipal governments, it also acts as a union that defends the needs and autonomy of local government. She explains that FEDOMU is important because it is not simply a state institution following directives, like the

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77 RD$55,294,862. To put this figure in perspective, the National District (Santo Domingo) relinquishes approximately RD$ 72 million to the League annually (Liriano 2010). According to Matías, the League has an annual budget of approximately RD$ 800 million (Matías 2009).
Municipal League, but a federation of entities that can make its own decisions to benefit each of those entities directly (pers. comm., March 23, 2011). For that reason, some, including Jorge, have argued that rather than debating the existence of the League, it is its leadership which should be debated, since both the League and FEDOMU support local governments in different ways.

5.4.2.2 Territorial Fragmentation

Two significant problems have arisen with DR’s fiscal decentralization; it has had the double effect of fragmenting the nation’s territory and of creating a culture of clientelistic relations. Indeed, the system that finances local governments has perversely incentivized the subdivision of jurisdictions across the DR in order to receive larger amounts of transfers from the central government per inhabitant (Gómez-Sabaini 2010). Guaranteed minimum amounts have meant that many municipalities have created municipal districts, or municipal districts have been elevated to municipalities in order to procure more funds per inhabitant from the central government.

The stated defense for the establishment of a new government is generally hinged on the idea that the area in question is in need of development, which can only be addressed with the creation of a new government. In reality, according to Figueroa (pers. comm., March 22, 2011), the creation of new municipalities or municipal districts is, on the one hand, an attempt to gain access to funds, and on the other hand, a question of politic gain. Generally, those who put forward the proposal for the creation of new municipalities are deputies78 who are interested in furthering the position of their political party.

In the period between 1995 and 2005, the number of municipalities increased by 40 percent, while municipal districts increased by 400 percent79 (Figueroa 2010). The municipal law (176-07) establishes minimum criteria for the creation of new municipalities and municipal districts,

78 Deputies are the equivalent of an MP (Member of Parliament) in Canada.
79 Other data shows slightly more conservative numbers, but great increases nonetheless. According to PNUD (2008) and Chona and Pineda (2009), based on data from the Municipal League, the number of municipalities increased from 108 in 1995 to 148 in 2005 (37 percent increase), and municipal districts from 47 to 167 in 2005 (255 percent increase) (Chona and Pineda 2009).
such as minimum populations, which are 10,000 inhabitants for a municipal districts, and 15,000 for municipalities. Until then, this process has been highly subjective.\textsuperscript{80}

As a result of territorial fragmentation, these new municipalities and municipal districts are often small in terms of population. Data from the 2002 census demonstrates that almost forty percent of the municipalities and municipal districts (that year totalling 225) had under 10,000 inhabitants (with an average population of 7,509), and fifteen percent had under 5,000 inhabitants (with an average population of 3,591) (PNUD 2008). Over eighty percent of the over 200 municipal districts in the country have populations under 10,000. They are thus left with very little capacity to govern, with only a minimum transferred amount, unable to fulfill their responsibilities under Law 176-07, which includes, for example, the establishment of a planning department (Figueroa 2010).

Furthermore, the current transfer of funds from the central government also fails to incentivize the local generation of revenue through, for example, municipal taxes, and favours municipalities with larger populations, since distribution is based solely on population, rather than other criteria, that correspond to demographic, economic, social and cultural conditions (Matías 2007) such as urban limits, rurality, poverty (D’Aza 2007), or fiscal or administrative efficiency (Figueroa 2010).

According to PNUD (2008) and Figueroa (pers. comm., March 22, 2011), the establishment of technical criteria for the creation of new municipalities and municipal districts through Law 176-07 has slowed the creation of new local subdivisions. However, fragmentation of the Dominican territory continues; from 154 municipalities and 226 municipal districts in 2007, there are now 155 municipalities and 232 municipal districts (Matías 2011). In 2011, the Dominican Federation of Municipalities (FEDOMU) asked that all initiatives to pass new Municipal Districts be halted (De la Cruz 2011). Many municipalistas (those working in the municipal affairs), generally protagonists of decentralization, argue that this territorial fragmentation is creating obstacles for good local governance, since it is debilitating existing local

\footnote{80 This occurs through the National Congress, which according to Article 93 of the Constitution, is responsible for determining political and administrative divisions of the territory.}
administrations, and creating new ones with little capacity to govern and develop independently (D’Aza 2007).

5.4.2.3 Clientelism

The decentralization process in the DR has also been associated with increased opportunities for patron-client relationships between political leaders (and ‘bureaucrats) and citizens (Sánchez and Lozano 2012). One of the lead editors of the UNDP Human Development reports (PNUD 2005 and PNUD 2008), Miguel Ceará-Hatton give the example that a municipal district may have a population of 5000 inhabitants, and have 300 or 400 employees on its payroll: votes are exchanged for employment. As such, the ways in which decentralization has occurred have provided politicians at the local level with more access to funds (Miguel Ceará-Hatton pers. comm., March 22, 2011).

Municipalities’ experience of decentralization, however, has been unequal across the country. In municipalities in the North, such as Villa González, it is argued that decentralization has facilitated the development of citizenship, where there is relatively more participation of community-based organizations in governance. Contrastingly, for the country’s Eastern region (the subject of my case study), in the municipality of Higüey for example, decentralization has cemented a tradition of ‘pure tyranny, dominated by traditional leadership and the usurping of public resources for political gain’ (Tejada Holguín 2007). According to the 2008 UNDP Human Development Report, the province of La Altagracia has the lowest level of political empowerment in the country81 (PNUD 2008).

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81 The UNDP Index of Political Empowerment is constituted by five variables: the number of candidates per mayoral position, voters as a percentage of registered voters, percentage of people in poor neighbourhoods with birth certificates, percentage of female councillors, percentage of population that lives in municipalities with participatory budgets. The data is based on values from 2006.
5.5 Inter-Institutional Power Dynamics

5.5.1 The State is not Monolithic

Throughout this chapter, I have referred to various manifestations of the state as bodies, institutions, sectors (in terms of various Ministries), and levels (in terms of the scale, from local to provincial to central government). For ease of discussion, I have used the term ‘state’ to describe or analyze the actions taken by members of these different institutions. What I now discuss, however, is that regardless of the existence of something termed ‘the state’, it is an amalgam of different entities and actors, which may have unclear or overlapping roles, and may easily be in contention with one another.

The emergence of the idea of ‘governance’, as opposed to ‘government’, has contributed to an understanding of the state as less of a monolithic, formal entity. Instead, it has shifted understandings of patterns of rule from a strict separation of society and state to one focusing on relationships and networks of different actors (Bevir 2011). The element of governance most relevant to my argument in this chapter, specifically, is the rejection of the state as a monolithic and integrated entity.

The project of one part of the state apparatus ‘may well be opposed by others elsewhere in the state and that the definition of what the state ‘wants’ is the result of internal political conflict and flux’ (Evans 1995:19). Indeed, the state is constitutive of power relations ‘articulated institutionally around the legitimate monopoly of force, the management of order and the production of a sense of identity around people/nation’ (Lozano 2010). It is precisely these power dynamics that I underline in this section. By combing out some of the tensions among different bodies of the state, we are better able to understand some of the difficulties that have arisen in the process of planning and policy making for tourism development.

5.5.2 A Lack of Inter-Institutional Collaboration

Given the number of institutions or bodies that make up the state, collaboration is key for planning and achieving any kind of development. This is true vertically, between central bodies of the state (i.e. Ministries, or the so-called ‘decentralized’ entities like the Municipal League),
but also horizontally, across the different sectors (e.g. the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of the Environment).

As I mentioned earlier, the municipal law 176-07 outlines three types of responsibilities for local governments: ‘own responsibilities’, ‘coordinated responsibilities’, and ‘delegated responsibilities’. The first refer to the tasks expected of local governments to carry out themselves, for example, urban planning (176-07, Art. 19, d) or street lighting and cleaning (k,l). ‘Coordinated responsibilities’ are those which can be shared with sectoral bodies of the central state, such as the coordination and management of the provision of basic health services (176-07, Art. 19, Paragraph 1, e), and the promotion and development of tourism (j). Finally, ‘delegated responsibilities’ are tasks that are passed down to local governments, and can be solicited by local governments.82

Coordination is fundamental to the achievement of planning in the short, medium and long term, and so that there is no duplication of services between different institutions of the state. However, despite the existence of ‘coordinated responsibilities,’ there does not appear to be coordination between Ministries and local governments (Santos de la Cruz, pers. comm., March 14, 2011).

Francis Jorge, of FEDOMU, explains the lack of coordination between these levels of government as part of the centralized structure of the state, ultimately demonstrating the lack of real devolution of responsibilities to lower levels. For instance, when a local government invites a representative of a sector (i.e. such as the Ministry of Environment) to discuss issues and future plans, the representative will likely be a representative at the regional level. Since the regional representative is often disconnected from any real decision-making (which occurs in the capital, Santo Domingo), she/he will inevitably act more out of protocol than out of the ability to coordinate plans and make decisions (pers. comm., March 23, 2011).

Another explanation is in the lack of capacity of local governments to undertake planning. A planner at the Ministry of Tourism sees territorial planning as a responsibility of local

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82 Law 176-07 does not provide examples of ‘delegated responsibilities,’ but does note that a local government can take on responsibilities from the central government if it can show that it is able to carry them out in a more ‘efficient, effective, transparent and participatory way’ (Art. 19).
governments, but ‘[h]ere they don’t do that. They don’t have the human capacity, nor the resources, so the Ministry, through this department has assumed that responsibility’ (Amin Serulle, pers. comm., March 23, 2011). Indeed, the Ministry of Tourism is the body responsible for the development and approval of tourism projects, since it does not lie in the local government’s authority. However, the local government ‘can collaborate and can participate with the Ministry of Tourism, but that is where the real headache lies, in the coordination’ (Tamara Sosa, pers. comm., March 23, 2011).

It is evident that local governments lack a certain amount of power to benefit from true autonomy and the ability to plan their territories. Historically, it is the sectoral bodies of the state that plan and they do not coordinate with local governments. According to a representative from the Directorate General of Territorial Ordinance and Planning (DGODT, Dirección General de Ordenamiento y Desarrollo Territorial), it is possible, even, that the Ministry of Public Works builds a road without ever consulting with the mayor of that municipality (Luz Patria Bonilla, pers. comm., June 16, 2011). As a result, it is obvious that municipal governments do not feel that they are part of the state bureaucratic structure (Juan Figueroa, pers. comm., March 22, 2011).

The lack of coordination between institutions of the state is not solely vertical, i.e., between the central Ministries and the local levels of government, but also horizontal, i.e., across sectors. Historically, the coordination between different Ministries has been lacking (Lozano and Baéz Evertsz 2008). Over the years, attempts have been made to facilitate the planning and coordination of these sectoral bodies (1981, 2000, 2004) through the establishment of ‘Regions of Development’. This was relevant, since the intermediate political-administrative level between the central state and local governments, the province, is effectively non-functional, without a government or resources.

However, in practice, the regional divisions established have not been respected (SEEPyD 2012, Luz Patria Bonilla, pers. comm., June 16, 2011). The body formerly known as CONAU (Consejo Nacional de Asuntos Urbanos), now part of the Ministry of Economy, Planning and

83 Through Decrees: 2465-81, 685-00, and 710-04.
Development, divided the territory in 10 regions by decree. In the words of environmentalist, Amparo Chantada ‘[t]hey don’t apply it. It is absolutely worthless’ (pers. comm., March 15, 2011). Bolívar Troncoso, the Director of the Tourism programme at O&M University in Santo Domingo explains the lack of coordination between the various sectors of the state: ‘Each Ministry has its own territorial planning. It is madness. The Ministry of Agriculture has its regions. The Ministry of Tourism has tourism poles, and within those tourism plans, there might be master plans for different tourism destinations’ (Bolivar Troncoso, pers. comm., January 28, 2010). Consequently, there are now 6 different regional divisions of the country (SEEPyD 2012). This has the effect of creating difficulties for the generation of data to facilitate planning. It also demonstrates a serious lack of coordination between these institutions and shortcomings in policy making across sectors. As a response to this, the state has attempted to create commissions and councils to unite these bodies, but they are generally criticised for being overlapping and redundant (SEEPyD 2012).

5.5.3 Tourism and the Environment

Inevitably, the problems of planning come down to a power struggle between upper levels of government and lower levels, but also between Tourism and other sectors, such as the Ministry of the Environment. The power of the Ministry of Tourism over local governments and other Ministries is a result of the importance of tourism for the Dominican economy, but is also backed by the culture of Presidentialism and the lobby power of the private tourism sector.

Indeed, a significant challenge of the Ministry of Tourism is to deal with pressures ‘from above’. According to the lead author of the UNDP Human Development Report (2005 and 2008), Miguel Ceará-Hatton, ‘[t]here is a perception here that nobody can question tourism.’ With reference to the pioneer of tourism in Punta Cana, Ceará-Hatton asks: ‘Which mayor would dare to say to Frank Rainieri, ‘You need to do this!’? All that he would have to do is call the President, which I’m sure he could find within the day.... It really is a difficult situation. The problem at the crux of this is the lack of institutionalism’ (Miguel Ceará-Hatton, pers. comm., March 22, 2011).

The power of the President also affects the successful implementation of environmental laws. It is difficult for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) to have real meaning when a tourism
project is inaugurated by the President. ‘When the EIA has to be passed, technicians will see that the President backs the project and will feel like their hands are tied’ (Yolanda Leon, pers. comm., April 9, 2011). According to environmentalist Yolanda Leon, ‘The law states that 60 metres of the coast are public, but one of the most common decrees in this country is to exonerate a hotel or property owner from abiding by that law. And decrees are signed by the President’ (pers. comm., June 15, 2011). This example was given by a number of research participants, making reference to a decree passed that allowed for increased densities for the personal benefit of the previous Minister of Tourism, Félix Jiménez (Bolívar Troncoso, pers. comm., January 28, 2010, Miguel Ceará-Hatton, pers. comm., March 22, 2011).

The success of the Minister of Tourism is measured by the growth in the number of rooms, annual tourist arrivals, and the revenue created by tourism. Given these criteria, it is, of course, not in the interest of the Tourism Ministry to limit the expansion of the industry. Rosa Urania Abreu (pers. comm., June 13, 2011), director of the Ventanilla Unica (the entity within the Ministry of Environment that coordinates the project approval process), argues that this has been a challenge for the Ministry of Environment:

> There is a political culture that sees progress in terms of investment, the portfolio of foreign investment, the number of hotels, quantitative indicators. We are the Ministry that takes a different position, saying: no, that is not possible, that hotel is not possible, because we have a different vision of development, and that has not been completely understood.

Incorporating environmental concerns into the approval process of tourist projects is stipulated under the landmark environmental law passed in 2000 (Law 64-00) that created the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MMARNa). Projects, depending on their impacts on the environment (A to D), must acquire different kinds of permission. High impact, A, requires a license; moderate, B, requires a permit; low, C, requires a certificate, and minimal, D, requires a registration. Environmental Impact Studies (EIAs) are outsourced to consultants, who often fail to provide the necessary information, slowing down the process (Rosa Urania Abreu, pers. comm., June 13, 2011). Either as a lack of capacity to monitor these projects, or as a result of corruption, what is presented in an EIA is not necessarily what the private sector then constructs in reality (Yolanda Leon, pers. comm., June 15, 2011).

Perhaps a major reason why there has not been adequate consistency in the allocation of environmental permits is the absence of a thorough study of the current environmental state (i.e.
of an ecosystem’s carrying capacity, the biodiversity, important ecological considerations) or a plan that designates areas that are acceptable for development. In terms of projects in tourist areas, each project is evaluated by itself through environmental impact assessments (if they are considered a high impact project). ‘If you take Bávaro... there were 53 hotels. One thing that I saw as a planner and then later as Minister: they did 53 environmental impact assessments. Wouldn’t it be better doing just one? The law doesn’t contemplate a strategic environmental assessment’ (Omar Ramirez, pers. comm., October 27, 2011). A strategic environmental assessment has the concomitant benefits of facilitating/expediting the approval process and increasing the consistency across projects. A key benefit not mentioned by the Minister, however, is the centrality of cumulative environmental impacts that are taken into consideration in strategic assessments, but are not part of individual project assessments (EIAs).

The environment law (64-00) also created a space for environmental considerations in the creation of a National Territorial Plan, which has as of yet to be developed. A body was created under this law, entitled the National Environment Council (El Consejo Nacional de Medio Ambiente, Art. 19), as a link between the National Planning System and institutions of the public and private sectors that have to do with environmental issues, and as a body responsible for policy making and evaluation. The significance of this body, as described by the former MMARNA Minister, Omar Ramirez, is that this council embodies the ‘transversal’ character of the environment, that is, that the environmental perspective has to be integral to all policies of the state, such as Health, or Agriculture (Omar Ramirez, pers. comm., October 27, 2011). This body, however, has never come to fruition, for two reasons described by Ramirez. First, because it is a ‘mini-council’, and second, because of the way in which issues like the environment are conceptualized:

Ministers never feel responsible toward their equals, but to their immediate superior, who in their case is the President of the Republic.... And from there arise problems of conceptualization, because we are sectoral bodies. As long as the environment, development, or institutional development – which are transversal lines – are seen as sectoral bodies, we will have problems in the state, because they will always be pigeonholed as a sector....No. The environmental theme transcends the institutional spheres of an organization, because you do environmental health, the regulation of work environments, etc.

84 Twelve Ministries sit on the Council (such as Education, Tourism, Labour, etc.), plus the National Institute for Water Resources, as well as one representative of each of the four regions, of environmental NGOs, a rural organization (campesina), two representatives from universities, one from the business sector (Art. 19).
That’s why the issue is transversal, however what should operationalize this doesn’t work. Nobody sees the environment as a transversal axis.

As it has been made clear in this section, there is an obvious divide between different bodies of the ‘state’, sometimes operating in opposition with each other. In the case of the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Tourism, although there has been significant progress in streamlining environmental concerns into the tourism project approval process (through the creation of the *Ventanilla Unica*), there continue to be tensions that will no doubt continue, given pressures to increase the number of annual tourists and the need to protect the environment from further damage in tourist areas and elsewhere.

### 5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I illustrate some of the key issues that impede the process of planning. First, problems associated with an underdeveloped bureaucracy have meant state bodies have operated with high levels of clientelism. Bureaucrats have lacked security in their positions, often being dismissed with changes in government. Hiring practices in the state have also been based on partisanship and patronage, meaning those hired often do not have the skills necessary to undertake their work.

Second, the process of decentralization has failed to create an intermediate level of government to facilitate any kind of regional planning, or even coordination of planning between different sectors at the regional level. Furthermore, decentralization to the local level has as of yet been able to provide local governments with the real power they require in order to carry out the tasks required of municipal governments, such as urban planning. The control over power by the central state is obvious in the failure to decentralize functions to the municipal levels, such as the collection of taxes from vehicle registration, or the provision for water services (currently through the National Institute of Water Resources).

Third, different bodies of the state have failed to adequately coordinate responsibilities. This effectively creates difficulties for the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development should it devise the National Territorial Plan. The lack of coordination between the Ministry of Tourism and local governments also demonstrates the power imbalances between the two. And finally, the imbalances of power between the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Environment are
close to inevitable. This imbalance has certainly been facilitated by the informality in the approval process prior to the creation of the *Ventanilla Unica*. However, until the Ministry of Environment begins to evaluate projects in a strategic way through SEAs, it is unlikely that the Ministry will have a stronger influence on the direction of tourism development nationally.
6    Fragmented Urbanization in Bávaro-Punta Cana

Figure 6-1: Don Ojito ⁸⁵
Source: Bávaro News (n.d.)

6.1 Introduction

Today, approximately half of all international tourists visiting the DR stay in Bávaro-Punta Cana, where tourism began to develop primarily in the 1980s. Between 2002 and 2010, as a consequence of migration from other parts of the province (La Altagracia), the DR and Haiti, the local population tripled, reaching around 43,000 official residents. Migration was not limited to simply Bávaro-Punta Cana, but affected La Altagracia as a whole. The population of the provincial capital, Higüey, located 30 kilometres from Bávaro-Punta Cana, increased dramatically as a result of tourism. The province underwent a dramatic shift in the proportion of its population living in urban areas; urban areas expanded and new urban centres were created.

⁸⁵ Own translation: Don Ojito: ‘Bavaro is the Walled City. There are walls everywhere.’ Greña (Locks) Boy: ‘You know, here, everyone can do whatever they want. There’s no control and we don’t even have a beach anymore.’
Bávaro-Punta Cana is becoming increasingly urban in character, with some areas of higher density occupied largely by residents of informal or semi-formal settlements. A large proportion of the territory is enclosed in enclaves dedicated to tourists, whether resorts or gated communities catered towards international tourists and foreign investors. Walls clearly define the spaces of inclusion and exclusion, as illustrated in the Don Ojito cartoon above found in the local newspaper, Bávaro News. The result is a highly fragmented urban landscape, or to borrow from Graham and Marvin (2001), a kind of ‘splintered urbanism,’ whereby infrastructure provision operates to link parts of the city, while by-passing others.

The prevalence of enclaves and gated communities is a ‘visible consequence of the deepening social disparities within Latin American societies and the resulting fragmentation of urban space’ (Coy 2006:121). Bávaro-Punta Cana is mimicking the socio-spatial fragmentation so widespread in many postmodern Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) cities (Irazábal 2009; and Jaffe and Aguiar (2012). What is unique about fragmentation here, in contrast to some other, less tourist-oriented urban centres of LAC, is that fragmentation has occurred from the outset of its development as a tourist destination. As a result, the fragmentation is more visible and ingrained in the process of Bávaro-Punta Cana’s spatial evolution, and is a strong reflection of its extreme social, economic and environmental disparities.

In this chapter, I directly address the third research question, which asks how tourism has shaped the urban expansion of Bávaro-Punta Cana. The first section of this chapter illustrates the expansion of Bávaro-Punta Cana's tourism, and highlights the corporate nature of tourist enclave development. Next, I describe the concomitant migration and process of urbanization that accompanied tourism’s expansion in the area. Following that, I briefly outline the settlement patterns of Bávaro-Punta Cana, as well as the proliferation of enclavistic developments. The last substantive section utilizes the lens of ‘splintering urbanism’ to interpret how infrastructure (in particular the road system) helps understand the spatiality of this burgeoning new urban settlement. I argue that Bávaro-Punta Cana is best described as an example of ‘splintered urbanism,’ since the area’s urban expansion is a direct result of individualized, enclave development in a context completely void of any prior infrastructure or support from the State.
6.2 Tourism in Bávaro-Punta Cana

Bávaro-Punta Cana is located in the province of La Altagracia, on the Eastern tip of the DR coast, as shown in Map 6-1. In 1960, Bávaro-Punta Cana did not exist as a tourist destination; instead, it was home to a number of relatively small fishermen’s villages along or near the coast, then known as El Cortecito, Punto Borrachón, Juanillo and Macao, as well as coal producers in Verón. At that time, the total population of these villages was no more than a few hundred inhabitants, their economy based on fishing, charcoal production, coconut plantations, and subsistence agriculture.

Map 6-1: DR Provinces - Highlighting La Altagracia

The seminal UNESCO study (Arespacochaga 1968) that put Bávaro-Punta Cana on the map describes the area: ‘This zone of Macao [referring to the zone analyzed in this study] is veritably exceptional and among the many touristic beaches that we know in almost the entire world, few offer cleaner water, finer and cleaner sands... It can be confirmed without a doubt that it is
among the world’s best beaches.... Near these beaches, there are no seaside resorts, nor is there housing, due to the large difficulty in access' (Arespacochaga 1968: 56-57).

Officially, Bávaro-Punta Cana was established as a priority tourism area in 1986, as the 'Macao/Punta Cana Tourism Pole' by Decree 1256-479-86. With a width of 5 kilometres, it spans the coast in the North from the town of Miches in the province of El Seibo, to Juanillo in the South in the province of La Altagracia (see Appendix H for an official map of the pole). To date, the expansion of international tourism has been limited to the latter province. Throughout my thesis, I refer to the area as Bávaro-Punta Cana, as this refers to the local nomenclature of the two general areas in which the majority of tourism is concentrated.

The province of La Altagracia comprises two areas of international recognition: the country's most important pole, Bávaro-Punta Cana, as well as a smaller 'destination', Bayahibe, which is in the vicinity of the La Romana International Airport. Hotels are also found in the provincial capital of Salvaleon de Higüey, located in the centre of the province. In 2005, ASONAHORES reported that the province of La Altagracia had 25,858 hotel rooms, or 43 percent of the country’s total (59,870) (ASONAHORES 2005). By 2010, the province contained 33,393 hotel rooms, or 50 percent of the country's total of 66,968 rooms (BCRD-SECTUR-ASONAHORES 2011).

In 2010, Bávaro-Punta Cana alone had 30,223 rooms in 67 hotels (BCRD-SECTUR-ASONAHORES 2011). As a previously scarcely inhabited area, the growth in the number of hotel rooms here is noteworthy. This number grew from only 89 hotel rooms in 1980 (refer to Figure 6-2 below for a graph of the growth in hotel rooms between 1980 and 2004). As the 'land of the all-inclusives' (Frommers 2006), it is unsurprising that the majority (85.7 percent) of hotels offer the all-inclusive plan, and the remaining 14.3 percent offer the 'Modified American Plan', which includes accommodations, breakfast and dinner (ASONAHORES 2006).

86 Translated by author.
87 Other data published by ONE (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas) – using data from the Ministry of Tourism – states that in the province of La Altagracia in 2010, there were 31,861 rooms in 87 hotels. Using this data and subtracting Higüey (271 rooms in 11 hotels) and Bayahibe (2893 rooms in 7 hotels) from the province’s total, the zone discussed in this paper has 28,697 rooms in 69 hotels.
88 Other data for 2010 by the internal revenue service (DGII) shows that Bávaro-Punta Cana accounts for 63 of the country’s total 105 all-inclusive hotels. This study shows that the next tourist pole with most all-inclusive hotels is
The over 30,000 hotel rooms represent 45 percent of all rooms in the country, and yet only 10 percent of the country's hotels, illustrating their expansiveness. Indeed, almost half (30 hotels) of these have over 500 rooms (BCRD-SECTUR-ASONAHORES 2011). The largest hotel in the area is Hotel Bahia Principe Bávaro (with 1,776 rooms), followed by one of the Barceló hotels (Barceló Bávaro Palace Deluxe with 1,600 rooms), and one of the Meliá hotels (Meliá Caribe Tropical, with 1,056 rooms).

The resort chains with the highest presence in terms of room numbers in the area are: RIU, Iberostar, Barceló, Meliá, Bahia Principe, and Fiesta/Palladium. Each of these has a number of hotels in the area which tend to cluster under larger complexes, as in the case of RIU, which has 5 hotels in one complex (Herrera Moreno 2007). It is noteworthy that these chains are all based in the Balearic Islands, and in total, these six chains alone comprise approximately half of all hotel rooms in the area (15,507 rooms) (refer to Table 6-1 below).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resort Chain</th>
<th>Hotel Name</th>
<th>Number of Rooms</th>
<th>Total Hotel Rooms</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Barceló</td>
<td>Barceló Bávaro Beach</td>
<td>432</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barceló Bávaro Palace Deluxe</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>3,561</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barceló Dominican Beach</td>
<td>731</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barceló Punta Cana</td>
<td>798</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahía Príncipe (Grupo Piñero)</td>
<td>Luxury Bahia Príncipe Esmeralda</td>
<td>510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxury Bahia Principe Ambar</td>
<td>528</td>
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<td>Grand Bahia Principe Punta Cana</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Club Hotel RIU Bambu</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>RIU Palace Macao</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meliá</td>
<td>Meliá Caribe Tropical</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Paradisus Punta Cana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Reserve at Paradisus Punta Cana</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paradisus Palma Real</td>
<td>554</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Reserve at Paradisus Palma Real</td>
<td>190</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iberostar</td>
<td>Iberostar Bávaro Suites</td>
<td>598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iberostar Dominicana</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>1,803</td>
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<td>Iberostar Grand Hotel Bávaro</td>
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<td>Iberostar Punta Cana</td>
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<td>Palladium</td>
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<td>1,823</td>
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<td>(Fiesta)</td>
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<td>Royal Suites Turquesa by Palladium</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>15,507</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-1: Largest Hotel Chains in Bávaro-Punta Cana
In 2010, there were 2,017,743 non-resident arrivals\(^{90}\) at the Punta Cana International Airport. The two million non-residents represent almost half of the country's total non-resident arrivals. They also correspond to almost double the arrivals at the capital’s Las Americas airport (see Map 6-2), which was in second place, with 1,099,128 non-resident arrivals, followed by Puerto Plata with only 428,563. These data represent a dramatic shift from 2000, when Punta Cana was in third place with only 865,540 passengers of the country’s total non-resident arrivals.\(^{91}\) The primary market (and largest growth) is from North America (Canada, the United States and Mexico) which makes up 54 percent of the total non-resident foreign arrivals in 2010, having grown from 37 percent in 2000 (BCRD 2012).

\(^{90}\) Of Punta Cana’s 2,017,743 non-resident visitors, 6,351 are Dominican and 2,011,392 are foreigners. The arrival of Dominican non-residents is likely because they are visiting family based in Santo Domingo or the rest of the country. Punta Cana also has very few residents (both Dominican and foreign) arriving through the airport – in 2010, Punta Cana received only 3,915 of the country’s 461,721 resident arrivals. It is common for many foreigners living in the Dominican Republic to be unofficial residents, arriving on a tourist card or visa.

\(^{91}\) In that year (2000), the capital’s airport was in first place with 1,147,442 non-resident arrivals, followed by Puerto Plata with 872,668 (which is almost double the current number).
Of the total non-resident arrivals at the Punta Cana airport, 99.57 percent of the passengers declared recreation as their reason for travel (compared to 91.50 percent at the country level). Almost all (99.73 percent) non-resident passengers arriving there stay in hotels, compared to the national average of 75.25 percent (BCRD 2012), which points to the enormous significance of tourism and recreation for the area.

The Dominican government collects a number of taxes from tourists at airports, including a US$10 tourist card, a US$20 departure tax, a US$5 CEIZTUR tax, as well as some other seat and general taxes, which have changed over the years. In 2007, the last year for which data were found, taxes at the Punta Cana International Airport resulted in earnings of US$106 million (Resumen Turismo 2008). Some claim that tourism in Punta Cana contributes approximately 9 percent of the country’s total real (direct and indirect) GDP (Hoy 2011). Further, according to ASONAHORES (n.d.a), tourism in DR in 2010 employed 195,371 people, directly and indirectly. Of this total, 43.71 percent, or 85,400 jobs are found in Bávaro-Punta Cana: 24,400 direct and 61,000 indirect.

### 6.3 Migration and Urbanization in La Altagracia

Tourism has contributed to the urbanization of the DR as well as urban-to-urban migration into smaller urban centres (as opposed to the capital city, Santo Domingo). Throughout the past three decades, the province of La Altagracia experienced large increases in its population. Between 1981 and 2010, it grew 2.73 times, from 100,112 residents to 273,210 residents. This is

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92 Percentages calculated by author. In terms of total (resident and non-resident) arrivals, these figures are similarly high. Nationally, 90.41 percent of all airport arrivals declare recreation as their motive for travel, while at the Punta Cana airport, this figure is 99.55 percent. Nationally, 67.89 percent of those (resident and non-resident) arriving in the Dominican Republic via air stay at hotels, while 99.66 percent of those arriving at the Punta Cana airport stay in hotels.

93 CEIZTUR is the Infrastructure Implementing Committee of Tourism Zones or Comité Ejecutor de Infraestructuras de Zonas Turísticas.

94 The first year of available data is 2002, where the total earnings in taxes at the Punta Cana International Airport were US$29 million (US$29,452,667).

95 Based on calculations in Hoy (2011) indicating that Bávaro-Punta produces 56 percent of the country’s tourism (in ‘every sense’ from rooms, to jobs, income, consumption of agricultural and industrial goods) of the approximate 16% of direct and indirect real GDP.

96 Of this total 195,371 jobs, 71.43 percent are indirect (or 139,551), and 28.57 percent are direct (or 55,820) – calculated by author.
significant, when compared to the nation's population growth; in the same period, DR's population grew only 1.67 times (or 3,797,304 residents).\textsuperscript{97}

In the intercensal periods, as illustrated in Figure 6-3, La Altagracia's population grew at an annual rate of 6.26 percent (2002-2010) and 6.37 (1993-2002), up from only 1.30 in the 1981-1993 period, when its growth was around half the country’s average growth rate. The figure illustrates the country’s first five provinces in terms of population growth (selection based on the most recent intercensal period, 2002-2010), including La Altagracia in first place, followed by the border province of Pedernales (6.12 percent), Santo Domingo including the National District (2.78), La Romana (1.46) and Samaná (1.31) (refer to Map 6-1). Figure 6-3 also shows the province of Puerto Plata, which dominated as the country’s premiere destination for international tourism in the 1980s and early 1990s. This illustrates Puerto Plata's gradual decline in population growth vis-à-vis the rest of the country. It is important to note that all of the provinces represented in this table are significant and/or emerging areas of coastal tourism development.

Figure 6-3 also demonstrates that during the past two intercensal periods (2002-2010 and 1993-2002), La Altagracia's average annual intercensal growth was significantly higher than the province of Santo Domingo (home to the country's capital city also by that name), which experienced an average annual growth rate of 2.73 in the earlier period and 2.78 in the later period, as well as that of the country’s average rate of 1.93 and 1.29 percent, respectively.\textsuperscript{98}

Inevitably, this has contributed to the densification of the province. The country's density increased from 116 persons/km\textsuperscript{2} to 195 persons/km\textsuperscript{2} between 1981 and 2010, while the province’s density increased from only 33 persons/km\textsuperscript{2} to 91 persons/km\textsuperscript{2}. Although it remains significantly lower than the national average, the density of La Altagracia tripled in this period (ONE 2012 census).

\textsuperscript{97} In other words, this is well over double the national growth of 1.67 times during this period, which increased from 5,647,977 inhabitants in 1981 to 9,445,281 in 2010, as calculated by the author using data from ONE (2009) and CityPopulation.de (2011). The actual population of La Altagracia exceeded government projections of 229,428 for 2010 (ONE n.d.).

\textsuperscript{98} Although in absolute terms, Santo Domingo (including the National District) has the largest provincial population with 3,339,410 inhabitants.
High levels of migration account for the increase in the growth rate of this province in the past two decades. Both interprovincial and international migration into the province play a role. In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, La Altagracia and Puerto Plata, the country’s primary ‘tourism provinces’, were both net population emitters. However, in the 1990s with the growth of tourism, they both became net receivers of people. By the end of that decade, one fourth of La Altagracia’s population was comprised of migrants (PNUD 2008).

A study by the National Statistics Office (ONE) demonstrates that in the period between 1997-2002, La Altagracia was the country’s largest annual net receiver of inter-provincial migrants, having a net migration rate of 13.10 (per thousand), which is more than double the next largest provincial receiver, Santo Domingo (with a rate of 5.68 per thousand) and the country’s National District (with a rate of 5.80 per thousand) (ONE 2009: 20). These numbers are illustrated in Figure 6-4.

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99 Average annual intercensal growth rates calculated using the basic (linear) equation: $r = \frac{(T2 - T1)}{T1}/n * 100$, $n =$number of years between censuses. Data from www.citypopulation.de and ONE (2009 and 2012) arrive at similar but different figures for these rates. The method of calculation, however, is unknown, and has therefore been calculated by this author for the sake of methodological continuity.

100 This is based on 16,442 immigrants and 7,198 emigrants. The annual in-migration rate is 23.30 per thousand, while the annual emigration rate is 10.20. The character of migration is slightly more feminine, following the national trend. The female migration rate in the period mentioned above was 13.19 per thousand, whereas the male rate was 13.01 per thousand (ONE 2009).
The province’s proportion of immigrants for this period of 1997-2002 to total population is 11.3 percent, which is the highest in the country, while those leaving represent only 5.3 percent of the population, which is on the lower end of the country’s provincial emigration. Indeed, it is one of eight of the 31 provinces and national district that has a positive net migration flow, and the only one whose rate is in the double digits. The study also demonstrates that those who arrived in La Altagracia in this period (1997-2002), were predominantly from neighbouring or nearby provinces – La Romana (21.0 percent), Santo Domingo (20.8 percent), El Seibo (10.3 percent), San Pedro de Macoris (9.1 percent) and Hato Mayor (6.3 percent), which is generally in agreement with my own observations.

The data presented in these studies on migration by PNUD (2008) and ONE (2009) express the significance of both population growth and interprovincial immigration for the province in La Altagracia since the 1990s. This focus on the ‘permanent’ movement of residents between provinces, however, wholly excludes temporary migrants as well as international migrants (the majority of whom are from Haiti) from the analysis. These populations have played a large role in the development of this tourism pole and new urban settlement as well.

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101 This is the ninth lowest rate in the country and lower than the average of 6.92 percent, calculated by author.
The aforementioned migration study by the National Statistics Office (ONE 2009) attributes migratory flows into the province in this five year period to the development of tourism. Undoubtedly, the resettlement pattern of residents throughout the country is ‘closely linked with the resources and forms of exploitation of natural resources, the distribution of the means of production, the type of commercial, industrial and service activity, the location and relationship with the internal and external markets and the absence of policies with respect to migration and spatial distribution’\(^{102}\) (ONE 2009: 35). Certainly, tourism has contributed to the geographic decentralization and urban-rural balance of the country, away from the large historically predominant cities (PNUD 2005:63 and IRG 2001).

This migration, of course, has had a profound effect on the country’s rural-urban composition (and distribution in regions), as well as the concentration and/or dispersion of urban population in places of different size (ONE 2009:10). The two ‘tourism provinces’ mentioned above are characterized by their strong urban nature, their urban populations having multiplied 7.2 times between 1960 and 2002, in comparison to the national average of 5.9 (PNUD 2008).

Indeed, La Altagracia’s urban-rural composition has been fundamentally shaped by processes of exploitation of its natural resource base. Its economy is now largely based on the presence and expansion of tourism on the coast. There has been a process of urbanization in the province of La Altagracia since the 1980s, as a result of migration into older, existing, settlements and their resulting expansion (such as Higüey and La Otra Banda), as well as the creation of new urban settlements where little population previously existed (as in the case of Verón and El Hoyo de Friusa). In the eight years between 2002 and 2010, the province's urban population increased from 63.21 percent to 77.84 percent (ONE 2002 and ONE 2012a).\(^{103}\)

The province of La Altagracia is divided into two municipalities: Higüey and San Rafael del Yuma\(^{104}\) (see Appendix J for La Altagracia's political subdivisions). The municipality of Higüey includes the provincial capital, Salvaleon de Higüey, and the 'sections' around it, as well as three

\(^{102}\) Own translation.
\(^{103}\) This compares to the nation's urbanization level of 62.64 to 74.25 percent.
\(^{104}\) The municipality of San Rafael de Yuma includes the urban area of San Rafael de Yuma and the 'sections' around it, as well as two municipal districts. These are Boca de Yuma and Bayahibe, which is a tourist area on the Caribbean coast, near La Romana.
municipal districts, namely Las Lagunas de Nisibon, La Otra Banda, and Verón-Punta Cana. The latter is the primary focus of my research, and is a newly established municipal district.

The provincial capital, Salvaleón de Higüey\(^{105}\) (henceforth simply Higüey), is the largest urban settlement in the province, located approximately 30 kilometres from the centre of the Bávaro-Punta Cana area. The centrality of Higüey for the development of the tourist destination of Bávaro-Punta Cana cannot be stressed enough. Verón-Punta Cana was not considered hospitable to many of those who had been living in more urban contexts until the early 2000s, and as such, the majority of those involved in tourism in the area (who did not live directly in hotel/resort compounds), lived in Higüey. This was true for two reasons. First, some original Higüeyanos found employment in Bávaro-Punta Cana. And second, Higüey represented the best option available to migrants from other parts of the country, with similar infrastructural amenities and the same types of problems and deficiencies as other cities within the DR.

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\(^{105}\) Higüey has a long history in pre-Columbian times as it was ruled by the Taíno aboriginal cacique (leader) Cayacoa and was the last region of the island to surrender last to the Spanish conquerors in 1503. It was founded by the Spanish in 1505 and given cultural importance as the resting place of the Virgin of La Altagracia painting, brought in by the Spanish in the late 15\(^{th}\) Century, now housed in the avant-garde modern Higüey Basilica (Oliver 2009). Higüey is also home to the Basílica Nuestra Señora de la Altagracia which has become part of the tourist circuit as part of a day excursion offered by resorts.
The expansion in Higüey’s population was also accompanied by a physical expansion of the city from 3.88 square kilometres in 1988 to 13.76 square kilometres in 2006 (ONE 2011). That is, in this period, the city’s urban area increased by 255 percent, the third highest growth of a provincial capital in the country. Among the characteristics of expanding urban centres are those bordering with Haiti, poles of economic growth (such as the capital), or those associated with tourism. Higüey’s is the fourth fastest consumer of its rural hinterland in the country. Indeed, excluding the two largest urban centres in the country, the fastest urban consumers of agricultural land are those which are most strongly associated with tourism in their area of influence, namely La Romana and Higüey, which are both found in eastern DR (ONE 2011).

The change in La Altagracia's urban composition is not only characterized by migration into existing urban settlements, but also by the creation of new urban settlements. Verón-Punta Cana is an example of such a new settlement, albeit one which is particularly significant in terms of the growth of its resident population as well as the number of those utilizing its spaces for either labour or leisure purposes (or temporary population).

In 2006, the paraje (neighbourhood) of Verón in the Municipality of Higüey was elevated to become the Touristic Municipal District of Verón-Punta Cana (Distrito Municipal Turístico Verón-Punta Cana). Utilizing the 2008 politico-administrative divisions on the census data from 2002, the population for Verón-Punta Cana is calculated at 15,241 for 2002 (ONE 2002). By the 2010 census, this figure reached 43,982 inhabitants (ONE 2012a). In 2002, the population of Verón-Punta Cana represented eight percent of the provincial population. By 2010, this figure increased to 16 percent of the provincial population. In the same period, the provincial population itself increased by 70 percent from 183,020 to 273,210 inhabitants.

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106 Higüey’s urban expansion occurred at a velocity of 0.55 square kilometres per year. This study projects the population to have increased in this period (1988-2006) from 39,103 to 135,646 inhabitants – 247 percent – and a slight decrease in density from 10,078 in 1988 to 9,858 inhabitants per square kilometre in 2006 (ONE 2011).
107 Verón-Punta Cana is the official politico-administrative name for Bávaro-Punta Cana.
108 Parajes are literally translated as ‘places’, while barrios are ‘neighbourhoods’. They both imply the same level of political subdivisions of territory, but the difference here is that a paraje is in a rural context, while a barrio is urban.
109 Recall that technically, a municipal district is a subdivision under a municipality, however, with its own government. Since the 2010 Constitutional changes, municipal districts’ and municipalities’ governments now (at least in theory) have the same rights, responsibilities and autonomy, such that their difference is largely a question of semantics.
110 Calculated based on census data from 2002 and 2010 (ONE 2020 and ONE 2012).
Popular estimates often claim the population to be closer to 100,000 (e.g. W. T. 2012; Mena 2010; Ernesto Veloz pers. comm., February 24, 2011) and, certainly, official data likely fails to account for the entire population residing in the area. Estimates, of course, do not count those considered as ‘temporary’ workers. According to ONE, the total population is defined by ‘all the usual residents of the country’, usual residents being those who ‘have lived in that housing for six months or more, or having had less, have the intention to settle in that housing’\(^\text{111}\) (ONE 2002).

Residents of hotel-provided employee accommodations are one example of temporary residents. Providing shared accommodations on hotel property to a portion of its employees is a strategy utilized by hotels to attract employees from distant provinces. According to a local journalist, when the new census was carried out in 2010, some of the hotels that provide employee accommodations were not visited altogether (as in the case of Bahia Principe\(^\text{112}\)) (pers. comm., January 8, 2011). The census was also criticized for its lack of rigour by the President of the Association of Hotels and Tourism Projects of the East (AHPTZE), Ernesto Veloz, who insists the census does not accurately reflect the number of inhabitants in the Municipal District because enumerators failed to visit many homes, including his own, but also because many residents refused to participate (pers. comm., February 24, 2011). People refused for security reasons, as well as fear of being deported for remaining illegally in the country. Data from the census of 2010 has yet to be fully published and has been subject to extensive criticism for its tardiness\(^\text{113}\) (Espinal n.d.).

In addition, while there are at least 43,982 residents in the area, this number does not include: those who are not considered permanent residents, such as expatriates living seasonally or staying on a short-term basis (for holidays) in their villas; international tourists; and domestic tourists and upper class Dominicans from other parts of the country who have second homes in the area. Indeed, there is a large (but unquantified) number of expatriates living in the area, who

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\(^{111}\) The 2010 census however has changed the definition for usual resident, now as a ‘person who normally lives in the house, that is: sleeps, prepares his/her food, protects him/herself from environmental risks and resides or plans on remaining for a period of six months or more’ (ONE 2012:16).

\(^{112}\) Bahia Principe operates four hotels in the eastern tourism pole in one large complex with 2628 rooms in total.

\(^{113}\) Financial problems, in particular, have been said to slow the process. To a large extent, the Census was carried out with a significant donation from the Taiwanese government (Espinal n.d.).
do not have residency, despite their long-term settlement.114 The official population also does not include the 2,017,743 non-resident arrivals at the Punta Cana International Airport in 2010 (BCRD 2012). With 30,223 rooms, and an average occupancy rate of 72.8 percent in 2010, there are approximately 22,002 rooms occupied in the area at any one time. In the high season, when occupancy reaches almost 90 percent (e.g. January 2010), this number is even more profound.

It is also noteworthy that the daytime population is also significantly higher, since many employed in tourism directly continue to reside in Higüey (but also in the Municipal District of La Otra Banda, located on the city's fringe), and are transported via bus by the hotels to work. Many other workers living in Higüey and La Otra Banda are involved with Bávaro-Punta Cana in a less formal way travel to the tourist area for their livelihood.

For example, in October 2010, I met a young man carrying baseball caps at the Bomba, the gas station and iconic centre of Friusa, a working-class area in Bávaro. In an informal conversation, he explained that he buys hats in bulk in Higüey, but makes the daily trip to and from Bávaro because he is able to make more money there. Later that week, I also engaged in a conversation with an older gentleman working at a garden centre in the centre of where many expatriates reside, El Cortecito/Los Corales in Bávaro. He told me that he works at the garden centre for ten consecutive days before going home to Higüey for his one day off, sleeping in what appears to be a shipping container in the interim with other co-workers.115

One population study that constitutes part of the 'Plan Valdez', a territorial plan commissioned by the Association of Hotels and Tourism Projects of the East (AHPTZE) calculates the population at 207,517 inhabitants, based on the resident population, visiting population, 'service' population, and 'floating' population (Valdez 2005). Regardless of the method of calculation, from the evidence presented above, it is undeniable that the population of Bávaro-Punta Cana and La Altagracia, more generally, is growing rapidly.

114 Acquiring residency is a complicated and bureaucratic process that essentially involves payment (approx. US$ 1,000) and the persistence of a lawyer who knows the ins and outs of the process. It is very common for foreigners to live in the Dominican Republic for many years without official residency, since the only consequence is the payment of fine upon exiting the country. The fine is based upon the time exceeded in the country. For one to three months, the fee is 800 pesos (approx. US$ 20).

115 If he is able to, he will hitch a ride, but otherwise, he takes the guagua (minibus) to Higüey. These examples show that there are clearly numerous formal and informal connections between Higüey and Bávaro-Punta Cana, including the networks of production of goods for sale or use (including souvenirs) in the tourist area.
As a result of Verón’s elevation to the level of municipal district, two important changes occurred. First, the area was given its own local government and was no longer completely dependent on Higüey for the provision of services, decision-making power, etc (although I question the real autonomy achieved, which I discuss in the next chapter). Second, an ‘urban’ area was officially defined.

The Dominican government defines the urban population as that ‘residing in the administrative centre of the municipalities and municipal districts of the country. The rural population is therefore that which inhabits the rest of the territory, that is, in the sections and neighbourhoods’116 (ONE 2012a:505). Hence, Verón-Punta Cana was officially ‘rural’ until 2008, when it was elevated to municipal district. It is now said to be 84.78 percent urbanized. However, given the administrative basis for determining what is ‘urban’, this percentage must be taken with some reservation. Indeed, the UN Statistics Division states that an urban area is defined by ‘Administrative centres of municipalities and municipal districts, some of which include suburban zones of rural character’ (UNSTAT 2012: 100, emphasis added).

Globally, ‘the urban’ is often defined according to population and density criteria. In Canada, for example, urban areas are essentially defined by a population of over 1000 inhabitants with a density over 400 inhabitants per square kilometre (Statistics Canada 2006). In some countries of the global South, these figures also depend on livelihoods, such as the increasing importance of non-agricultural economic activities, or the existence of particular kinds of infrastructure. Certainly, the definition of an ‘urban’ area is dependent on a number of factors, and differs greatly across contexts (see, for instance Satterthwaite 2006).

Academics often combine a number of criteria to define the ‘urban.’ Weeks (2010), for example, defines the ‘urban’ as a function of sheer population size, space (land area), population concentration or density, and economic and social organization. For the purposes of this thesis, and the lack of census data available at the micro-level, I utilize a number of indicators to determine the urban nature of Bávaro-Punta Cana: livelihoods, population, and the built

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environment. As noted by Weeks (2010), population sizes alone may obscure other features that may be indicative of urban lifestyle.

The majority of the residents in Bávaro-Punta Cana are involved in the service sector, either directly in tourism or in supporting industries. Local production of coconut and carbon, as well as fishing has decreased (especially in relative terms) and has been replaced by the tourism industry. The population is now almost 50,000 residents. The municipal district, however, has a rather low density for an urban area (92.53 pers/km²). This can be explained by two factors. First, a large proportion of the area in the municipal district is undeveloped, and second, where land is consumed by physical infrastructure, much of this is utilized by tourists who do not count towards the population.

The following map (Map 6-3) illustrates the area of developed land in Bávaro-Punta Cana, and demonstrates the large proportion of land occupied by tourist enclaves, in terms of their physical infrastructure (in red), but also in terms of land within their confines that has yet to be developed (orange). This sits in stark contrast with the ‘open’ space between enclaves where the majority of local residents lives (dark blue). Further, despite the large number of residents living in settlements characterized by informality (e.g. crowding and self-built housing), these places are very limited in terms of the space they occupy (light blue). Finally, this map also illustrates the expansion of the road network, which is the most visible form of infrastructure. It is evident that the majority of the roads end at the first line of development by the coast (in other words, at the entrances of enclaves). The roads that connect the informal spaces and other ‘open’ spaces with the regularized roads are unpaved and are thus not shown in this map. Finally, with this map, we are also able to see subdivisions (medium blue) which help identify areas that are expected to develop in the area’s ‘open’ spaces.
Map 6-3: Bávaro-Punta Cana’s Urban Space
6.4 Settlement Patterns in Bávaro-Punta Cana

Bávaro-Punta Cana is certainly undergoing a dramatic 'urban transition.' However, it is a rather difficult task to talk about Bávaro-Punta Cana as one settlement or a town. Many of the names used to talk about the area are informal and are not clearly defined, making it particularly confusing for those not familiar with the area. It is comprised of a number of nodes of expansion and range of different types of settlements, which embody a variety of characteristics, along a continuum from rural to urban, from lower-income to upper-income, less infrastructure to more, less permanent to more, tourist-oriented to resident-oriented, unplanned to planned, more Dominican, more Haitian or more international.

Strictly, 'Punta Cana' refers to the property purchased in the Southern section by a pioneering company from the late 1960s, but the name has been appropriated by tourist developers across the area for marketing purposes and is the name best known internationally. Locally, the name is colloquially used to express the general area near the initial property. Another name used is Bávaro, which generally refers to the tourist area north of ‘Punta Cana’, however, without any official demarcations. These names are further confused with the names of the primary settlements, such as Verón or Friusa, as well as beaches and their neighbouring settlements along the coast. The beaches and their surroundings referred to throughout this thesis include: Uvero Alto, Macao, Arena Gorda, El Cortecito, Los Corales, Cabeza de Toro, Cabo Engaño, Playa Blanca and Juanillo (these can be located on Map 1-1 on page xvi). Other names that complicate the appellation of local areas within the municipal district are those of private developments which market themselves as stand-alone destinations, irrespective of their locality, such as Cap Cana. This is, after all, how 'Punta Cana' became a place, not simply a company.

Indeed, the question of identity is a complicated one in Bávaro-Punta Cana. For example, residents from the low-income neighbourhoods of Verón are unlikely to refer themselves as living in Punta Cana, which is associated with wealth and exclusivity. As a local journalist asks: ‘So what are we? ¿Distritomunicipal-turisticoVerónpuntacanabávarouveroaltonenses?’ (Roberto Mena, pers. comm., January 08, 2011).
There are a number of tendencies in the settlement patterns that are worth highlighting. First, as it can be expected, by far, the majority of developments in Bávaro-Punta Cana are resorts, the majority of which operate almost entirely on an all-inclusive basis. As a result, the coastline is dominated by these resorts, from Uvero Alto in the north, to Juanillo in the south, reaching to Cabo San Rafael (see Map 6-4).

Second, many of these resorts now also include gated villa communities on their properties. The gated community has become a development trend, whether as part of a resort or as a stand-alone site. An example of the former is IFA Hotels and Resorts, where residents of its developments, Villas Bávaro and Costa Bávaro, are given access to the beach through the hotel. In this case, discounted day/night passes for access to the hotel’s amenities are also available to villa property owners. Some of the larger developments include Palma Real Villas by Sol Meliá Hotels and Resorts (the community is colloquially known as Cocotal, after the golf course by this name), El Ejecutivo, and White Sands. Third, these gated communities range in size and exclusivity from individual gated communities to the new elite mega-developments, such as PUNTACANA and Cap Cana (which I discuss later in this chapter).

PUNTACANA is a particular case. It is a large gated and enclosed property that includes four luxury communities,117 golf courses designed by Tom Fazio and P.B. Dye, beach clubs, a marina, and two hotels, Tortuga Bay and The PUNTACANA Hotel (PUNTACANA Resort and Club). Separately owned and operated, Club Mediterannée is also located in this compound. There is also PUNTACANA Village, located outside this project and the airport, which is not gated, but instead, segregated by distance from the lower-income or working class settlements, such as Verón. It is an upper-middle income residential settlement, with many expatriates and second home owners from the DR, and includes an outdoor shopping area, a large national grocery store, banks, international food chains and other restaurants. It is sometimes referred to as ‘the mother bubble.’118

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117 Corales (with properties owned by Julio Iglesias, designer Bunny Williams, Mikhail Baryshnikov and Dominican native Oscar de la Renta), Hacienda, Tortuga Bay, and Arrecife.  
118 ‘La Burbuja Madre’ (pers. comm. February 02, 2010).
The majority of the residents of the area, that is, the working class, live in two general poles of population growth: Verón, which is one of the original villages in the area (comprised a small number of houses of coal producers at the time when the pioneering Grupo PUNTACANA began investing in the area), and Friusa. These places have expanded informally as employees or informal trades-people settled in an attempt to build a home near their source of income. Increasingly residents are purchasing homes, but many rent from others who have settled earlier when the price of land was lower. There are, of course, a larger number of small settlements scattered throughout the area, and it is unclear where one ends and another begins. Some of the settlements to which I make considerable reference in this thesis are Mata Mosquito and Detrás de Casabal, near Friusa; and Haiti Chiquito, part of El Cortecito (see Map 1-1: Settlements in Bávaro-Punta Cana, before the Introduction). There is only one planned development in this entire area that is designed for the middle-class. It is targeted, generally, for mid-level management positions in the tourist sector, e.g. Pueblo Bávaro. Pueblo Bávaro claims to be ‘the first Planned City of the Dominican Republic, having a total infrastructure cost of 55 million dollars, complemented by cable television, telephone, security and private waste collection services’ (Pueblo Bávaro n.d.).

In addition, there are a couple of small settlements along the coast that are tightly nestled between the resorts. The first is Cabeza de Toro, originally settled by fishermen, but now also a low-income settlement situated between large resorts. The second is the Cortecito area, also a former fisherman’s village, now predominantly the site of excursion companies and souvenir shops, as well as a small, locally-owned and family-run hotel. Next to El Cortecito, Los Corales is also noteworthy, as it is, in principle, a gated beachfront community but it is also the name utilized for the general area, which consists of a series of upper-middle income developments (generally occupied by expatriates). These developments have security, but, generally, their gates are not as predominantly featured as in the case of Cocotal or Villas Bávaro, where entrances are more strictly regulated.

\[119\] The name Verón originates from the Vera tree, which was found in abundance in the area, now very much depleted, due to its use for the production of coal and furniture.
6.5 Enclaves and Segregation in Bávaro-Punta Cana

The developments in Bávaro-Punta Cana can be best described as fortified enclaves. These are defined by Teresa Caldeira as ‘privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work. They can be shopping malls, office complexes, or residential gated communities’ (Caldeira 1996: 303).120

Caldeira (1998, 2000) supplements her definition of the fortified enclave by outlining six general qualities, as demonstrated in the left-hand column of Table 6-2, below. These characteristics are clearly manifest in Bávaro-Punta Cana. The enclaves described here are private property that offer collective amenities, including gated communities, resorts, golf clubs (which are generally part of one of the former two), or even shopping centres. They are physically isolated, turned inwards and are controlled by security; generally lined by fences or walls, entrance through security controls is often allowed only with the provision of identification and/or a reservation, as well as subtler discriminatory tactics. The residents of gated communities and within resorts are generally of similar class and in search of similar amenities. Although they are certainly culturally heterogeneous, some enclaves have tendencies to market to targeted nationalities, i.e. in the case of Club Med (and its largely French clientele).

Perhaps one of the most interesting features of enclaves highlighted by Caldeira (1996, 2000) is that ‘they do not belong to their immediate surroundings but to largely invisible networks,’ so they can be found in rural areas or immediately next to settlements of auto-constructed homes (Caldeira 2000). There is very little that grounds these enclaves to their context, and they can, in geographers’ terms, be described as spaces of globalization with little sense of place, or what Relph refers to as ‘placelessness’ (1976).

In the words of Caldeira (2000), '[t]he fortified and private enclaves cultivate a relationship of rupture and denial with the rest of the city and with what can be called a modern style of public

120 Webster (2001) takes a more economic approach to understanding such enclaves, describing them as ‘club goods.’ He uses the term ‘proprietary urban communities’ to describe ‘a privately owned and privately governed estate in which a group of households or firms share certain communal facilities which they pay for via ground rent, service fee or some other device’ and classifies these as commercial (e.g. the private business park), retail (e.g. the shopping mall) or residential (e.g. the gated community) (149, emphasis in original).
space open to free circulation’ (258). She, among others, has labelled such urban settlements characterized by enclaves as fragmented or segregated (Caldeira 1996). For Peter Marcuse (1993), this is referred to as the ‘divided city’, while for Edward Soja (2000), it is the fractal city.’ Whatever the nomenclature or the explanation, it is incontrovertible that the postmodern city exemplifies new modalities in the urbanization process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Fortified Enclaves</th>
<th>Enclaves in Bávaro-Punta Cana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Property for Collective Use</strong></td>
<td>Gated communities include range: public space, swimming pools, roads, fitness centres, security, landscaping, golf courses/clubs, private beach clubs, lounging areas, running tracks, tennis courts, minimarkets, other sports facilities, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resorts with similar amenities, also restaurants, casinos, night clubs, conference facilities, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Golf clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shopping centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physically Isolated: by walls, empty spaces or design devices</strong></td>
<td>Usually peripheral walls or fences, in some cases also lined with vegetation (e.g. Barceló)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some segregated by distance, vegetation and access roads (e.g. Cap Cana and Punta Cana) but with guarded entrances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shopping Centre (e.g. Palma Real) isolated by design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turned inwards</strong></td>
<td>Walls, fences, high hedges lining the street, sometimes with informal settlements adjacent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shopping centres (e.g. Palma Real) open but turned inwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controlled by armed guards and security systems</strong></td>
<td>Guarded entrances with armed security (24hrs), often with separate entrances for guests and employees (less enclavic developments have night-time security only).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flexible - can be located almost anywhere, autonomous spaces</strong></td>
<td>Little relationship with the outside world, dependence almost solely on the natural environment (presence of beach, ocean, weather, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socially homogenous</strong></td>
<td>Homogeneity in terms of class within each enclave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural heterogeneity within enclaves due to international character of residents/users, but with similar expectations of amenities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-2: Characteristics of Fortified Enclaves
Source: Developed using Caldeira (1996, 2000) and my own observations in Bávaro-Punta Cana

It is commonly expressed that the presence of gated communities and other enclaves is a physical and more visible manifestation and crystallization of social disparities and the process of segregation in contemporary urbanism (Atkinson and Blandy 2005, Mycoo 2006, Soja 2000). Urban inequality and segregation is, of course, nothing new (Marcuse 1993). Inequality and segregation, have however, taken on many different forms (Mycoo 2006), instruments and rules (Caldeira 2000) throughout the history of cities.

The current form of urban segregation, however, represents a fundamental shift from previous decades in Latin America, when distance played a central role in the spatial separation of wealthier groups living in central parts of the city, away from the lower echelons of society.
living in the periphery (Janoschka and Borsdorf 2006). Indeed, by the 1990s, ‘the physical
distances separating rich and poor have decreased at the same time that the mechanisms to keep
them apart have become more obvious and more complex’ (Caldeira 1996:304). As Janoschka
and Borsdorf so aptly put it, gated communities ‘are homogeneous, highly segregated and
protected areas allowing the middle and upper classes to cohabit increasingly scarce space’
(2006:96) in the urban context. Borsdorf et al. (2007) explain that the structure of the Latin
American city has typically followed successive phases, whereby the city eventually came to
manifest processes of globalization and neoliberalism, generally transforming into ‘a city of
islands’ or ‘an urban archipelago’ (2007: 367).1

In Bávaro-Punta Cana, socio-spatial segregation is incontrovertible; the three images on the next
page illustrate segregation of middle-class developments in Friusa from El Hoyo de Friusa by a
large wall along its periphery (sometimes referred to as ‘the Wall of Shame’). However, in
Bávaro-Punta Cana, the progressive pattern of development described by Borsdorf et al. (2007)
does not hold; the fragmented character of this new urban settlement is the basis from which it
developed since the onset of tourism in that area. The general area of Bávaro-Punta Cana has not
developed with a general centre and periphery. Rather, it developed as a fragmented but also bi-
polar urban centre with two growing settlements characterized by informality, and scattered
individual developments lacking connectivity with their surroundings. The ‘centre’ is a
problematic reference point, differentially defined, depending on the respondent. Value is
determined by proximity to the beach, and to a lesser degree to the main roads, highway or
boulevard. Value is thus dispersed, is not based on the existence of any central core, and is
highly contingent on the exclusivity of any one development and the amenities it encompasses.

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121In the residential sense, segregation occurred in two ways, according to Coy and Pohler (2002): the inner-city
gated community, which is a fortified condominium complex; and the peripheral gated community, which is largely
residential, exclusive and highly secure. This classification is helpful in explaining the novelty factor in the current
urban segregation of cities globally.
Image 6-1: Residents of El Hoyo de Friusa Gathering on Rooftops
Photograph taken looking South from outside the wall.
Source: Own Photograph. Taken July 22, 2012.

Image 6-2: El Hoyo de Friusa
El Hoyo de Friusa is South of ‘The Wall of Shame’ traced in Black.
Source: Google Earth (2013)

Image 6-3: El Hoyo de Friusa, looking West along the wall.
Source: Own Photograph. Taken October 28, 2010.
Bávaro-Punta Cana cannot be considered an 'edge city' to Higüey, because the relationship is, in fact, the inverse: residents of Higüey seek employment in Bávaro-Punta Cana. The relationship between Bávaro-Punta Cana and Higüey is, thus, a curious one. Initially, Bávaro-Punta Cana was a peripheral space and largely uninhabited. Now, Higüey’s economy and development is intimately connected to (and also dependent on) Bávaro-Punta Cana. Following the construction of the main road linking Bávaro-Punta Cana to Higüey, electric infrastructure was developed. This fundamentally changed the possibilities for urbanization in what is referred to as ‘the open city’ (Roitman and Phelps 2011), the space between enclaves, where many basic needs have been unmet.

While the initial developers planned and began constructing their enclaves in the 1980s, their employees resorted to practices of informality for the construction of their homes and settlements. As investors gained interest in the area, developments began with resorts, and increasingly with residential projects, followed by megaprojects. All of these enclave developments arose in an area where the municipal services or infrastructure were non-existent. There were no roads, nor airport, provision for water, electricity, healthcare, education, or security.

According to a local resident and representative of the local government, Verón’s urban explosion is intrinsically related to the electrification of the neighbourhoods off the main road in Verón, which allowed for a shift in settlement from Higüey to Verón (and later Friusa):

I remember in 1995, there actually was no Verón. There were just a couple of houses on the main road and a police station – a little wooden building. And there were no lights. Not from Higüey, no private power company. There was a power company supplying to the hotels and that was it: a couple of people doing some business on the beach. Nobody actually thought about this little spot on the Earth. Somehow the boom, I would say, started like 6 years ago, when people started building more and more. Actually the power company which already by then had distribution of electricity on the main road, started to leave the main road and get into the little villages or little barrios coming up. People were buying pieces of land, some of the owners started to cut the land in little pieces, selling two, three, five hundred square metres so people would start building their own home or most of them built a little home and some rooms for rent. And that’s how the whole process started. More and more people were able to live here instead of taking the public or hotel transportation to Higüey which is an hour drive in the morning and an hour at night. So it was more comfortable for them to stay or live closer to their work. And this all began with the electrification. And there was light available here, especially because we have 24 hours available here, instead of having light every once in a while (Carsten Gopfert, pers. comm., April 08, 2011).
The development of megaprojects is a newer iteration of the gated enclave or community. Bávaro-Punta Cana is not immune to this trend; indeed, a new scale in tourist enclave developments is being pursued in the area. These developments are scattered throughout, from Roco Ki in Macao (North) to Cap Cana in Juanillo (South). They are characterized by their exclusivity, ‘natural’ environments, and extreme enclavity. The master plan for Cap Cana, for example includes: five golf courses (one designed by Jack Nicklaus), the largest deep-water marina in the Caribbean with capacity for 1000 vessels, seven luxury hotels, conservation areas, 5,000 residences, an educational district with a university, and commercial and entertainment facilities, including a cinema (ECLAC 2008), in addition to 44 km of paved roads, a 1.5 million gallon aqueduct (in terms of daily capacity) and a 5 Mega-Watt Electric Utility Plant (see Scarpaci et al. 2011). Not only have such projects altered the physical and natural environment (e.g. through coral reef dredging for a deep-sea marina in Cap Cana (Scarpaci et al. 2011) – see Image 9-5 showing the changes between 1984 and 2011), but, they have increased the scale at which development occurs in this context.

Elsewhere, it has been noted that ‘[t]oday, megaemprendimientos [Mega-developments] seem hugely oversized. Generally, it appears that there has been an over-production of gated developments and many plots will probably never be sold (Thuillier 2005: 262, and Roitman 2011). Mega-developments have certainly suffered as a result of current economic crisis in Bávaro-Punta Cana. Indeed, Cap Cana has also slowed its construction (and halted in many parts of the megaproject) and is now also near bankruptcy (again). Roco Ki is an elite development with 9 separate residential options, two resorts (Westin and Fairmont), a marina a (Nick Faldo-designed) golf course and 3.2 miles of beachfront. Its construction has been delayed since 2008.

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122 In addition to Coy and Pohler’s (2002) categorization of gated communities as either the inner-city or the peripheral complex, Janoschka and Borsdorf (2006) add a third classification, the megaproject, which integrates cultural and educational amenities, as ‘gated communities occupying a larger area and integrating more and more urban functions are becoming more common. Complexity and size of major gated communities are passing the level of small cities…, but [are appearing] also in smaller cities…” (99). In many Latin American cities, there are gated communities which ‘can no longer be called ‘gated communities’ but ‘gated cities.’” They provide housing for large residential populations (of up to 50,000 residences), have educational facilities, shopping centres, and sports facilities (i.e. golf courses, marinas, artificial lakes, etc.) (Borsdorf, Hidalgo and Sanchez 2007: 366).

123 Like with PUNTACANA, this has attracted internationally-renowned investors, such as the Trump Organization. Trump at Cap Cana includes a golf course, condo-hotel, beach club, golf lots, villas, and ocean-view houses and apartments (Cap Cana 2010).

124 The Lehmen Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 2008, preventing Cap Cana from receiving a $US 250 million loan (ECLAC 2008), and the project has been subject to rumours of bankruptcy many times since.
(see Image 6-4), and investors have recently taken the developers to court. The US recession and global financial crisis ended investments in the project, and it is long past the original expected inauguration, which was scheduled for November 2006 (Diario Libre 2005). Another master-planned megaproject involving a residential property and marina, Punta Perla, has also not materialized. Its developer is now undergoing court proceedings for fraud and misappropriation of funds (BBC 2011).

Image 6-4: Roco-Ki Deserted Mid-Construction.
Source: Own Photograph. Taken May 1, 2011.

6.6 Splintered Urbanism: Connectivity and Segregation

The emergence of fortified enclaves, as the new form of segregation in the Latin American (Caldeira 1998) or Caribbean city, has resulted in the production of visibly fragmented urban environments. The notion of splintering urbanism is a useful one to discuss Bávaro-Punta Cana, although in this case, ‘splintered urbanism’ may be a more appropriate designation, since development has gone hand-in-hand with individually produced built environments since tourism’s inception in the area, rather than a gradual ‘unbundling’ of infrastructure. With time, connections between enclaves began emerging with, for example, the establishment of a power company, CEPM (El Consorcio Energético Punta Cana-Macao). At first, CEPM provided energy exclusively to hotels, but later extended its service to the local settlements. By now,
networks have extended to the cyber-world and telecommunications, but water provision and sanitation continue to be managed on an individual basis.

Here, enclaves are not connected to their immediate surroundings, but belong, instead, to a network that is primarily invisible (Caldeira 2000:258). They create ‘a ‘weightless’ experience of the urban environment with elite fractions seamlessly moving between secure residential, workplace, education and leisure destinations’ (Atkinson and Blandy 2005). For Graham and Marvin (2001), the postmodern cities of today are assemblages of ‘what we might call hermetically sealed ‘secessionary networked spaces.’ Built spaces are united with networks of infrastructure, and the social and economic lives of the wealthy and the poor are carefully separated125 (Graham and Marvin 2001:222). Thus, while segregation is characteristic of enclaves, they are also about connectivity. Enclaves are fundamentally tied to distant spaces, people, resources, infrastructure and capital. Given its historical isolation from the rest of the country, it can certainly be stated that the destination has belonged more to an international network than to the the DR.

For enclaves to embody the sophisticated technologies, amenities, and environment that they advertise, they require networks of infrastructure that extend to other spaces at different scales. Improvements in transport were fundamental to this process. On the one hand, the creation of an access road to Higüey (begun in 1978 by the government, persuaded by the area’s pioneer, Frank Rainieri of Grupo PUNTACANA (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006)), allowed access for these enclaves to labour from and goods from Higüey and indeed the rest of the country to facilitate the building of these enclaves.

On the other hand, the construction of the airport in the 1980s created stronger connections internationally,126 facilitating access to tourist/second-home markets, investment by transnational hotel corporations, and the infiltration of international tour operators, ‘reconnecting and disconnecting the ‘developing’ and the ‘developed’ worlds in new ways while reinforcing existing patterns of unequal wealth distribution’ (Sheller 2009, emphasis in original). Following

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125 I would also add that there is a strongly environmental character to this segregation.
126 The importance of these global connections is increasingly obvious. For example, Cap Cana’s ‘Location and Access’ Map highlights its connections to other global spaces across the Americas and Europe rather than situating Cap Cana locally in Bávaro-Punta Cana, or the Dominican Republic. See Appendix L.
the completion of the airport and the construction of the Barceló Bávaro Beach Resort to its north, an ongoing process of road linkages, following the general line of the coast towards the north began, linking each new enclave to this network.

These networks will only continue to extend and deepen both connectivity and urban fragmentation with increases in tourism and further urban expansion. The Ministry of Public Works and Communication (MOPC), through Odebrecht, is now completing the construction of the The Coral Highway (Autopista del Coral), comprising 223 kilometres of highway from the Capital, Santo Domingo, and the The Eastern Boulevard (Bulevar del Este) which links the Punta Cana International Airport with resorts along the coast to the north to Uvero Alto (refer to Map 6-4 above).

The Coral Highway will firstly allow for easier and faster transportation between La Romana and Punta Cana, linking these ‘important tourist enclaves’ with Bayahibe, Higüey, Bávaro, Cap Cana, Macao, and Uvero Alto, which all together comprise approximately 60 percent of the country’s tourism supply (Vásquez 2011). Secondly, it will reduce travel times between Bávaro-Punta Cana and Santo Domingo, and their respective airports, from four hours to well under two hours. This will, on the one hand, integrate Bávaro-Punta Cana with the rest of the country (MOPC 2012) and increase mobility between the two, but on the other, consolidate and further stimulate development in the area.128

As it can be expected, the Autopista del Coral, has a particular geography of inclusion and exclusion, focusing firstly and primarily on facilitating transport between enclaves for tourists

127 This highway connects the Autopista de las Americas from Santo Domingo and its extension into the Autopista del Coral to La Romana with the Boulevard del Este.
128 MOPC claims this will provide ‘tourists, business people and residents... necessary basic infrastructure for the development of economic, social, commercial, recreational and cultural activities in the eastern corridor area of influence’ (MOPC 2012). Frank Rainieri, the pioneer of PUNTACANA, estimates that the highway will transport 600,000 tourists annually from Bávaro-Punta Cana to the capital’s Colonial Zone, creating an economic ‘deluge’ of 17 million dollars daily. He refers to it as the best investment ever made by the Dominican state, and promises it will bring sizeable returns (ASONAHORES 2011). An article in a national newspaper declared that since the opening of the Punta Cana International Airport (1984, ‘tourism in the country’s eastern zone has not received a thrust as significant as the construction of the Autopista del Coral’ (Vásquez 2011). Furthermore, the completion of the Boulevard del Este combined with the development of the Carretera Bávaro-Sabana de la Mar, 102.63 kilometres in the north will facilitate the expansion of tourism-related development in inaccessible and currently unexploited land along the coast (Calderon 2012).
129 MOPC now charges a toll of RD$ 150 (approximately US$ 4) for the highway.
and including the historic colonial zone of Santo Domingo in the excursions network controlled by tour operators. In the first place, it by-passes the city of Higüey, diverting potential sources of income generation away from the city. In second place, it also by-passes Verón, failing to make (economic or planning) provisions for a connection between the highway and the town. The development of Verón has been so closely tied to its strategic location as the gateway to tourism in the East, and has expanded extensively along the current highway, meaning the implications of the Autopista del Coral will be significant for the local economy. It will also have the social impacts associated with Verón's inability to benefit from improved infrastructure (W. T. 2012).

Thus, it is evident that local segregation occurs concomitantly with networks of physical and economic infrastructure that connect tourist facilities together within Bávaro-Punta Cana, further afield within the country (with the Autopista del Coral) as well as internationally through tour operators. According to Sassen (2002), ‘[n]ew articulations with global circuits and disarticulations inside the city are… produced’ as a result of the (intensity and complexity of the) global nature of contemporary systems.

When we utilize the lens of the built environment and infrastructure networks (and their uses and constructions) to examine a city or urban centre, we are able to see urbanism ‘as an extraordinarily complex and dynamic sociotechnical process’ (Graham and Marvin 2001:8, emphasis in original). Indeed, there is nothing static or fixed about modern urbanism – it is here that scaled layers of networks overlap, where distant places, resources or people are connected and at the same time changed, where 'nature' is transformed into 'city' (Kaika 2005, Graham and Marvin 2001).

6.7 Conclusion

Bávaro-Punta Cana is increasingly demonstrating characteristics of ‘urban-ness,’ according to its population, livelihoods and built environment. Not only does the area have a particular significance for those living outside tourist enclaves, but also for the many who contribute to the diurnal population by commuting from Higüey and La Otra Banda. The private sector has played a significant role in the configuring of the physical and natural landscape, transforming previously rural landscapes into sites of urban development characterized by large gated enclaves. Of course, the area cannot as of yet be deemed completely urban, but it is certainly
undergoing a gradual but rapid urban transition by which space is increasingly appropriated and enclosed by a largely international corporate tourism sector.

The walls circumscribing enclaves are significant because they epitomize the fragmented nature of the area in terms of society and space and determine where certain people belong and others do not. They are also a physical manifestation of wider policies pursued at the national level that benefit the corporate tourism sector, while failing to facilitate the inclusion of others.

Together, these enclaves represent part of an urban spatiality that is highly fragmented, or ‘splintered,’ whereby infrastructure, capital, and tourists move easily between individual, private, tourist sites, and where local residents and service workers, are able to penetrate these ‘bubbles’ in limited and particular ways, and live instead in conditions of dismal infrastructure and service provision.

Judd (2003), makes the claim that cities cannot be seen simply as ‘as little more than an assemblage of fortified spaces colonized by global capital and affluent residents and visitors’ (24), claiming such cities (e.g. Baltimore, Los Angeles, Las Vegas) are an exception, not the norm. The current state of development in Bávaro-Punta Cana points to a reality of this kind of assemblage, since Bávaro-Punta Cana has developed precisely for the purposes of tourism, through private corporate initiative. I caution, however, in contrast to Judd (2003), that given the persistence of the ‘sun, sand, and sea’ model, urbanization around coastal tourist areas characterized by this kind of segregation and enclavity might actually be the norm in contexts of the global South (including the Caribbean) pursuing this simplistic model.
7 Local Government: Establishing the Municipal District of Verón-Punta Cana

7.1 Introduction

Bávaro-Punta Cana lacks much of the infrastructure and services often associated with urban areas. This can be attributed to two key issues. First, many services and infrastructure remain centralized in the DR, including the provision for water and sanitation, road infrastructure, health care, and education. The likelihood of investment by the various sectors of the central government is strongly related to the number of registered voters in the area (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006). Since the local population has grown substantially only in the last decade, Bávaro-Punta Cana has long been off the map for public investment from the central State. Second, the local government in the area is entirely new, lacks the power, and the capacity to plan, regulate and make decisions over its territory.

The impotence of local government vis-à-vis the private sector, for example, is evident to the extent that the former has not yet been able to finalize place names within the municipal district, since many places are namely simply after the business located there (Carsten Gopfert pers. comm. November 4, 2011 and a representative from DPP pers. comm. October 29, 2010). For example, Friusa is named after a Mallorcan-based hotel and restaurant equipment company that accompanied the flux of big Mallorcan resort chains into the area. It is located at an important local intersection, and over time, this settlement has become known as Friusa, and the poorest area in the physical depression, El Hoyo de Friusa, or literally, ‘the Hole of Friusa.’

While in Chapter 5, I addressed some of the wider institutional deficiencies that characterize the public sector in the DR, in this chapter, I aim to narrow this to the local level, and answer the fourth research question: What is the role of the local government in the governance and planning of Verón-Punta Cana? Although the local government has as of yet been able to influence the direction of development in the area in a significant way, it is certainly important to

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130 Director of International Relations for the Municipal District of Verón-Punta Cana.
understand its role as well as the challenges it faces vis-à-vis other actors, particularly the Ministry of Tourism and private sector.

This chapter begins with a brief history of the establishment of the local government and outlines key challenges it faces, including difficulties in raising municipal revenue, regulating the environment, and leveraging planning gains from enclave developers. The chapter then goes onto discuss the roles of and tensions between the local government and the Ministry of Tourism in land-use planning. Finally, using an example of the de facto privatization of the beach, in the last section, I illustrate the some of the tensions between the various actors involved in regulating space.

7.2 The New Local Government of Verón-Punta Cana

Since ‘[t]he role of government in governance is an empirical question’ (Kjaer 2009: 148), this section aims to elucidate the extent of government presence in Bávaro-Punta Cana's development, specifically. By examining the gaps in government involvement, the discussion can then turn to understanding the role taken on by the private sector in the development process of Bávaro-Punta Cana.

Until 2007, the municipal government of Higüey was the local government managing the area of Bávaro-Punta Cana. The town hall was located in the city of Higüey and had very little (physical and political) presence in Bávaro-Punta Cana. In 2006, the municipality of Higüey was subdivided de jure, and the municipal district of Verón-Punta Cana was formed. In order for this become a reality, justifications for this elevation had to be made to Congress, which included population growth and the importance of the tourism pole in the country (see Box 7-1 below). By 2007, Verón-Punta Cana began operating de facto as a municipal district, with its own government. However, for the 2007-2010 period, the first mayor of Verón-Punta Cana[^1] was appointed by the then-mayor of Higüey, Amable Aristry Castro and did little in the way of governance.

[^1]: The first may was Saturina Leonarida Vasquez, better known as ‘María Verón’
Indeed, it was not until 2010 that Bávaro-Punta Cana was governed by a democratically-elected *local* government. As such, many departments, such as the planning department, the environmental management unit (known as UGAM – *La Unidad de Gestión Ambiental*) or the international relations department, did not come into existence until that year.

| The community of Verón-Punta Cana is located in the centre of the most important tourist pole in the country |
| More than fifty hotels and an international airport generate the most tourist activity in the Dominican Republic |
| Rapid population growth (as a product of the extraordinary economic growth, which resulted in the permanent migration of people from different parts of the country) must be attended to by providing goods and services to its residents |
| The community of Verón-Punta Cana has more than 15,000 residents, an international airport, 54 hotels, 7 bank branches, a private hospital and public polyclinics, secondary schools, public schools a power plant, churches, a police station, a POLITUR station, gas and propane stations, various supermarkets and tens of housing developments |

**Box 7-1: Justifications for the creation of the Touristic Municipal District of Verón-Punta Cana**  
**Source:** Law No. 386-06

Given the novelty of the government, it faces many challenges now in attempting to assert itself as an authority figure in guiding the development and planning of the area, and building its autonomy and decision-making clout. This is true in relation to a number of actors, including the private sector, the municipal government of Higuey, and the Ministry of Tourism; and, in relation to a range of issues, such as the regulation of public space, land-use planning, and the collection of taxes.

### 7.2.1 Raising Municipal Revenue

At the end of my fieldwork, the planning department was still in the process of establishing itself, and has been concerned primarily with finding ways to collect municipal taxes. According to the Mayor of Bávaro-Punta Cana, Radhamés Carpio, this is one of the principal problems faced by the local government since there is no history of local tax collection in the area (pers. comm., November 4, 2011).

For example, in efforts to generate much needed revenue, one of the actions taken by the government of Verón-Punta Cana was to pass Resolution 16/2011, which imposed taxes on the transport of goods through the municipality. However, ASONAHORES, AHPTZE, and the
Dominican Association of Industry (AIRD), reverted this resolution in provincial courts, making the claim that it impedes national production, inter-municipal trade, and is anti-constitutional because it overlaps with national taxes (Hoy 2012).

In the DR, local governments are highly dependent on the central government for transfers of funds. In Verón-Punta Cana, approximately one fourth\(^{132}\) of the local budget derives from direct transfers from the central government, which amount to approximately US$ 24,000 (920,000 pesos) per month. According to the 2012 budget, the monthly budget, including these transfers and other forms of revenue generation, amounts to approximately US$ 103,800 (almost 4 million pesos) (Ayuntamiento Distrito Municipal Turístico Verón-Punta Cana 2012).

Under the last revision of the Constitution (January 26th, 2010), municipalities and municipal districts were given the same powers and autonomy, thus relegating any conceptual differences between municipalities and municipal districts largely to semantics.\(^{133}\) Local governments receive a base sum, in addition to a figure based on the local population. Since the last census prior to 2010 was in 2002, Bávaro-Punta Cana was transferred funds from the central government according to a population of 15,241 inhabitants for a period of ten years (Mayor of Verón-Punta Cana, Radhamés Carpio, pers. comm., November 4, 2011, and Bávaro News 2012).

According to the Constitutional changes of 2010, Verón-Punta Cana should have the same autonomy as the municipality of Higüey. However, at the time of my fieldwork in 2011, the municipal district was still required to have its budgets approved by Higüey. Further, approximately 55 percent of the municipal taxes collected in Verón-Punta Cana are redirected to Higüey, truly calling into question the real autonomy of the municipal district (Lladó 2012b).

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\(^{132}\) The proportion of own forms of revenue generation in Verón-Punta Cana is significantly higher than other municipalities in the country, whose budgets rely (up to 95%) on transfers from the central state, as I explain in Chapter 6.

\(^{133}\) There are only two real differences. First, in order to create a new municipal district, there is a minimum population requirement of 10,000 inhabitants, in contrast to municipalities, which require 15,000 inhabitants. Second, the former receive a base transfer of half a million pesos (approx. US$ 13,000) from the central government, while the latter receive one million (approx. US$ 26,000) per month, in addition to a sum in proportion to the population.
7.2.2 Regulating the Environment

Waste collection is considered the most basic responsibility of local government in the DR, however, according to the 2002 census, coverage, nationally, was limited to little more than half of the population. The Human Development Report explains this as due to the reality that local governments limit their coverage to the urban areas within their municipalities (PNUD 2008). This is certainly true for the area of Bávaro-Punta Cana until 2007, when it was still considered ‘rural’ and the responsibility for waste collection lay with the municipality of Higüey. Indeed, until 2007, public waste collection in the area was non-existent.

Subsequently, when a collection system was put in place by the appointed government (2007-2010), it was ineffective and erratic (Yasmin Castillo, pers. comm., February 02, 2010). According to the local newspaper, Bávaro News, during this period, it was commented that ‘people resolve the problem as they can. In many cases, they live among garbage’ (Bávaro News 2009b). Image 7-1 below of Haiti Chiquito, clearly illustrates the lack of waste management in an informal settlement which is located directly outside the walls of the Palladium hotel complex.

![Image 7-1: Waste in Haiti Chiquito](source: Own photograph, taken July 6, 2011.)
Thus, waste collection and deposition also occurred informally. That is, waste was removed and transported to empty plots of land or abandoned mines, and/or was incinerated in the open. According to the UGAM director, Hochi Echevarria, in 2010 there were approximately twenty illegal dump sites; ‘[a]nybody could buy a truck, collect garbage and throw it on whichever property and burn it’ (Hochi Echavarria, pers. comm., April 14, 2011).

Currently, the municipal district is facing a number of challenges in attempting to formalize a waste collection system for the estimated 200-300 tons of daily waste, not including that of the hotels (Lladó 2010, Bávaro News 2011). The director of the provincial office of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MMARN, Julio Aramis Mora, explains that the province has only one landfill site, Gerom S.A., that fulfills environmental norms. This site, although open for years, only fulfilled the required norms a few months prior to my interview with him in early 2011. He explained, however, that there are two official sites at the moment, because of the difficulties associated with reducing from around twenty sites to only one, which Aramis Mora describes as a ‘rather abrupt change.’ Although the second site does not fulfil the necessary environment standards, he argues that it is necessary in order to begin to control the waste problem (Julio Aramis Mora, pers. comm., January 23, 2011). Jake Kheel, the director of the PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation, states that although not perfect, the Gerom landfill site is the only one in the DR with an environmental permit, which is certainly progress (pers. comm., January 17, 2011).

Hotel representatives and wealthier residents often blame local residents for the proliferation of waste and informality134 (arrabalización) (e.g. Ernesto Veloz, pers. comm., February 24, 2011). Ironically, however, as it was stated by Hochi Echevarria, the hotels themselves subcontract out their waste collection (to companies primarily based in Higüey). Often they turn a blind eye to

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134 The informal collectors in settlements such as Verón and El Hoyo de Friusa were certainly important for these areas particularly when the local government’s services were inadequate. At the weekly meeting of one of the civil society organizations in El Hoyo de Friusa, one resident explained that the municipal district banned him from collecting waste in the settlement (after picking him up and incarcerating him) (pers. comm., January 26, 2011). They made a very clear point at this meeting: ‘But if someone is collecting garbage, it’s because there is garbage to be collected’. Indeed, this occurred at a time when the local government had already begun to collect waste from the area, but as a community leader from this settlement explains, the trucks that arrived in the Hoyo were already full upon arrival and unable to collect waste from the settlement, having just collected from the wealthier priority areas (pers. comm., February 23, 2011). The director of the UGAM explains that this was related to the fact that many were throwing their waste in unauthorized areas, ‘creating chaos’, and that this was part of the process to control the waste issue (Hochi Echavarria, pers. comm., April 14, 2011).
its final destination and inadvertently contaminate the aquifers upon which they rely for water (Hochi Echavarria pers. comm., April 14, 2011, Bávaro News 2011, and Diario Libre 2010). Julio Aramis Mora echoes this observation:

*A fuerza de martillo* ['at the force of a hammer'], we now have one landfill site with these characteristics, [of] the rest, not a single one. Not even those which the municipalities use, the local governments, not those which service the hotels. That is to say that those companies which service the hotels, collect waste and bring it to the incorrect places. These are things that give us a lot of headaches in Bávaro. (Julio Aramis Mora, pers. comm., January 23, 2011).

In order to improve service, the local government has recently contracted out waste collection to a private company, Triplet (albeit without a public tender). The contract stipulates that the company must collect waste from the urban area and that forty percent of the profits after costs are to be shared with the local government. However, many companies (particularly hotels) are reluctant to renounce their contracts with private (unregulated and untaxed) waste collectors with whom they have been doing business for decades, arguing that the quality of the service provided by Triplet is poor and irregular. Since the hotel sector produces large quantities of waste, this means the company is not able to maximize its profits, but more importantly, this results in the inability of the local government to collect much needed revenue.

As one representative from the local government pointed out, ‘this is politics and business at its best. Who cares about the town?’ (pers. comm., January 9, 2012). There is now the added complication that the waste collection companies already servicing the hotels have created an association and have been given a temporary permit by the Ministry of the Environment (MMARN) and the municipality of Higüey, which raises even more questions regarding the autonomy of the municipal district.

### 7.2.3 Leveraging Planning Gains for Public Benefit

In a conversation with the director of planning, Roberto Scarfullery, the department is facing difficulties in finding ways to create public space in the area as a result of the enclave developments. 'Planning gain' is a provision made by developers to contribute to community or infrastructure development, and which may facilitate the approval of a project by local planners. Others refer to this negotiation between developers and planners as 'bargaining for benefits' (Diaz Orueta and Fainstein 2009: 765). A striking issue was raised by Scarfullery, regarding
planning gains: ‘We have a very big dilemma here. When there is a gated community, which law will allow me to tell the developer to make allocations for public space? We don't have the legislation for this... and here we are full of this kind of development’ (Roberto Scarfullery, pers. comm. April 14, 2011).

Scarfullery made the claim that, as it stands, it is very difficult to leverage planning gains from enclave developers, who often make the simple claim that they do not have the resources to contribute to public spaces. Indeed, the local reaction to enclave developments sits within the overarching neoliberal framework, which is about decentralized governance and the central State’s 'creation of the necessary framework (legal, political, economic, etc.) to facilitate and encourage big urban projects' (Diaz Orueta and Fainstein 2009:760). Large-scale developments (such as gated enclaves and their new form as mega-developments) have become accepted as an inevitable reality of urban life, and little is done to 'question the underlying logic' of these (765).

### 7.3 Tourism Planning vs. Local Planning

According to Law 176-07 (passed in 2007), which gives local governments a larger mandate in the governance of the Dominican territory, the governments of municipalities and municipal districts are required to establish a planning office to create a land-use plan (*Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (POT)) to direct development. While many governments have created planning offices, of all the municipalities of the country, not one has, as of yet, managed to create a land-use plan (César Perez, pers. comm. January 29, 2010). This is also true for Verón-Punta Cana.

Areas of tourism development, however, receive particular attention from the Ministry of Tourism. One branch of the Ministry of Tourism is the Department of Planning and Projects (DPP, Departamento de Planificación y Proyectos), whose primary objective is to 'identify, generate and conserve the physical and environmental conditions necessary for the healthy development of tourism in the territory' (DPP SECTUR 2013). Until 2008, very little appears to have come out of this body. With a change in government, however, the DPP has been creating land-use plans (POTs, *Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial*) for its tourism poles, and has focused on constructing sidewalks in tourist areas and regularizing beaches.
For the Bávaro-Punta Cana, the most recent plan was completed in 2012 (Resolution 007-12, Territorial Tourism Land-Use Plan for Punta Cana - Bávaro - Macao). This replaced a more basic land-use plan from 2005 which was limited to demarcating densities for development (Resolution 154-2005). The Ministry, through a system of approvals, including requirements for environmental impact assessments (EIAs), regulated the development of the area.

According to the Director of Planning for Verón-Punta Cana, the municipal district had little involvement in the production of the current POT (Resolution 007-12) that was formulated for the area by the Ministry of Tourism, in large part due to the fact that the municipal district had at that point only been operating for eight months.

In a meeting with the Director of International Relations, the UGAM director, and the Director of Planning for Verón-Punta Cana, it was stated that there is a need to respect the Municipal Law (176-07), and that the Ministry of Tourism should support the local government, rather than make the plan itself. The problem with this, according to Scarfullery (the Director of Planning for Verón-Punta Cana), is that the Ministry left the local government with a general plan, but without the necessary the details to implement the plan, nor capacity to specify it (pers. comm., July 25th, 2012). Amin Serulle, a planner who worked on the POT, acknowledges that generally the creation of such plans is the responsibility of local governments, but given the lack of capacity and resources, the Ministry of Tourism needed to fulfill this role (pers. comm., March 23, 2011).

Another issue that was noted by Scarfullery was that the plan fails to adequately consider the organizing and planning of the urban settlement:

It has been two years now that the Ministry is starting to understand this a little, but it seems to understand this superficially. Here we say, it’s like when you come to visit me at home, all I do is sweep the front of the house and the gallery. That is what’s happening here. A pretty road with sidewalks on both sides. They didn’t even try to extend the pavement into the side street, even just 100 feet… but now they’re going to do it because we asked them to. If you’re going to invest so much

135 Unlike a law that is passed through Congress, or a decree issued by the President, a resolution is passed by the Ministry of tourism, and can be easily changed by the Ministry at a later date.

136 The involvement of the Ministry of Environment, in turn, in the production of this new POT was principally limited to the designation of non-construction zones which coincide with protected areas (comprised of wetlands, lagunes and mangrove forests).
money, wouldn’t you try to widen the streets as much as possible? Not here. Here it was like ‘we’re just going to do it right here’… They forgot everything that has to do with the town, unfortunately. The new plan does address the issue, but they forgot to make norms at the most basic level so as to really be able to control development in the town.137

While Scarfullery acknowledges the need to begin creating integrated solutions to problems (e.g. a water treatment plant rather than individual plants at each hotel), he also places a particular importance on planning the local area (albeit with a particular concern that the arrabalización (informalization or slumification) would affect tourism). For him, there would need to be a hybrid solution to the lack of planning in the area; while the Ministry of Tourism regulates the tourism investments, it would be the responsibility of the local government to regulate the town. However, in order for this to be possible, the local government requires external support (pers. comm., April 14, 2011). According to the manager of the local office of the Ministry of Tourism’s DPP, Yasmin Castillo, a possible reason for the lack of power in the hands of the local government may in fact be this very reliance on external support (pers. comm., October 20, 2010):

The local government doesn’t have much decision making power. Either they were never given it, or they lost control of the territory because of the way that they have been operating as a result of not having the necessary resources and having to always depend on other institutions to do the work, for example in the paving of the sidewalks…. I think they do have it [the capacity to manage their territory], and if they don’t, it is assumed that that is what the Municipal League is for, to support local governments in areas they need help with.

7.4 Case Study: Regulating the Beach

A key issue that epitomizes the acquiescence of the local government to the Ministry of Tourism and private sector organizations relates to the use of and access to the beach. According to the DR Constitution (DR Const. Art. 15), the entirety of the country’s beaches is public de jure. The General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources (Ley General de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, Law 64-00, Art. 147138 stipulates that this applies to the sixty metres of the beach from the coastline. However, as a result of various practices of the private sector, facilitated by the State in regulating beach access, many beaches are no longer perceived as public.

137 Own translation.
138 Based on the original Law 305, April 30th 1968.
Hotels and other beachfront developments regulate those who frequent the beach with security at both ends of their property - even within the official sixty metres of public land - granting access only to those with hotel bracelets and ensuring that those who pass by the property do so near the waterline and do not remain on the beach.

The use of the beach is also impeded by the very few access points between hotels/developments that allow for an individual to pass from the road to the beach. In order to acquire the necessary permits from the Ministry of Tourism, each beach-front development must leave three metres between it and its neighbours to allow for passage to the beach, however, this is generally not respected (Roberto Scarfullery, pers. comm., April 14, 2011).

The local director of the DPP of the Ministry of Tourism admits, ‘there are only 5 access points to the beach on the coast: Macao, El Cortecito, Jellyfish, Cabeza de Toro, and Playa Blanca. And the last one is only semi-public because you have to leave identification’ at the PUNTACANNA entrance (Yasmin Castillo, pers. comm., Feb 02, 2010). For the latter, access to the beach is possible through a private restaurant which does not allow for food or drink to be carried to the beach, having obvious implications for poorer groups wanting to spend the day at the beach.139

The protection of private interests regarding public space is facilitated by the actions of a number of public bodies, particularly the tourism police (POLITUR), and the marine force in the monitoring of these spaces, but also by policies and laws regulating these spaces. Thus, there is a strong contradiction even within the state itself, between the laws that protect the beach from privatization, and the reality.

In conformity with private developers’ and hotels’ marketing strategies, the Ministry of Tourism’s own website created for the promotion of tourism in the DR (www.godominicanrepublic.com) runs contrary to the theoretical notion of public access: 'boasting a seemingly endless supply of the world's most pristine beaches, the East Coast region

139 From the point of view of the municipal district, the local planner, Roberto Scarfullery, ascertains that the Ministry of Tourism is planning to create four public beaches. The planner counts Cabo EnGaño in lieu of 'Jellyfish', which is in fact a restaurant; he says however, that difficulties arise at Cabo EnGaño because the owner of the land behind the beach will not allow for people to cross his property to reach the beach (pers. comm., April 14, 2011).
features the top hotel brands from around the world. Here, you can find private and secluded beaches that are limited to hotel guests' (Ministry of Tourism 2010).

This situation is now further complicated in yet another complete revision of the nation’s constitution (January 26, 2010). Here, Art. 15 (previously Art. 69), regarding access to public natural resources, underwent a change in its wording. According to Dr. Yolanda Leon, the article is now rather ambiguous, and can be interpreted to allow for the privatization of beaches (pers. comm. January 29, 2010), further consolidating the clout private investors carry with them in governing these spaces. With respect to rivers, lakes, lagoons, beaches and natural coasts, it states that these ‘belong to the public domain and are open access, always observing respect for the right to private property’ (emphasis added, translated by author, DR Const. Art. 15).

This controversial change was received with antagonism among active members of civil society, primarily among academics, social activists and environmentalists in the capital, Santo Domingo. ASONAHORES and Dominican Association of Dominican Tourism Businesses (ADETI), issued a press release in response to public complaints, and argued that this change allows for ‘a balance’ between the use of the national patrimony and the right to private property. Focusing on the first part of the quoted statement (above), they claim that rather than a setback, this revision is in fact a step forward ‘because previously the rights of ‘public domain’ and ‘free access’ were only earmarked in a law and now they are awarded a constitutional category.’ It is claimed that the reference to private property, on the other hand, is only to ‘safeguard’ rights to private property, not to privatize public space (Ortiz 2009), although the ambiguity of this statement certainly leaves room for manipulation.

According to the director of planning within the local government of Verón-Punta Cana, there is an informal understanding between hotels, the Ministry of Tourism and the President ‘to protect the tranquility’ of beaches in front of private property (pers. comm., April 14, 2011). He explains:

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140 Professor at INTEC and UASD, Researcher with Grupo Jaragua (an NGO focusing sustainable biodiversity management).

141 At the time of this press release, Haydée Rainieri of GRUPO PUNTACANA was the President of ASONAHORES, succeeded by hotelier, Julio Libre.

142 Translated by author.
If you are walking quietly and have a seat, there is no problem, but sometimes there is a violation of that right, and unfortunately you have nobody to appeal to. Why? Because they are the ones who support the country. And because of this problem, the Ministry of Tourism is creating four public beaches here.

The state, ranging from the local government to the Ministry of Tourism, has not been involved in the maintenance of the beach. Instead, each beachfront development has taken on the responsibility of clearing debris and providing security around its property, further complicating this sensitive issue (Lisette Gil,\textsuperscript{143} pers. comm., March 21, 2011 and Roberto Scarfullery, pers. comm., April 14, 2011). Thus it is clear that the State has taken an implicit step back regarding the issue of beach access. Since tourism corporations have taken responsibility for the maintenance of the beach, both local residents and various bodies of the state, particularly the local government, cede this space to the private developers.

### 7.5 Conclusion

While access to public space is certainly not on par with access to water and health care, the example of the privatization of the beach is a clear planning issue that points to the power of the private sector in determining area’s spatiality, but also the lack of power of the resource-poor local government in challenging that power. This issue is also evident in the inability of the planning department to negotiate planning gains from private enclave developers and to collected necessary taxes from the private sector more generally. Many researchers, such as Grant et al. (2004) have questioned whether gated developments are ‘a manifestation of ‘the public interest’ and ‘serve a greater good beyond the interests of those who live within them’ (81). For this to be possible, it is argued that local governments, particularly planners, certainly have a role to play and act as key players in ensuring spatial integration (Landman 2004). As I have shown in this chapter, the challenges faced by the local government, however, are not limited to its power-struggles with the private sector, but also with the Ministry of Tourism, and even the municipality of Higüey, which continues to usurp a large portion of the few taxes collected at the local level.

\textsuperscript{143} Senior Advisor at CDCT.
While the notion of governance has certainly gained significant currency, it is important to acknowledge that there remains a very particular role for local government. Local governments, it is argued, ‘have an enormous influence on how urban-environment relationships develop, and on how their cities interact with their hinterlands and with the wider global community’ (Cities Alliance 2007:11). Indeed, it is the local government agencies or local offices of more central bodies, which are responsible for the fulfillment of citizens’ rights and entitlements (Hasan et al. 2005), and have the potential to contribute to poverty reduction and environmental management in a number of ways (e.g. see Editorial of Environment and Urbanization (2000), vol. 12, no.1). They play a critical role in cities, as providers of services, community resource mobilizers, regulators, advocates, and strategic planners (Pelling 2003). However, as they are often limited by financial and human resources, their capacity must therefore be strengthened, and the range of actors in urban governance widened (Stren 1989, Pelling 2003).

In the case of Bávaro-Punta Cana, the planning department has yet to prove itself in terms of its contributions toward local development. It is, however, indisputable that the absence of government involvement and investment (at all levels) has limited the adequate development of the urban settlements, and has entrenched poverty in the area. This absence, in turn has facilitated the rapid expansion of tourism, and has allowed tourism corporations freedom to operate according to their own rules.
8 Development and Corporate Social Responsibility

8.1 Introduction

Cities and urban areas are shaped by governance relationships, both formal and informal. Indeed, ‘what actually happens in cities is determined by a multiplicity of informal decisions much more than by the formal decision-making processes of city government,’ which are permeated by differences in political power and influence (Devas 2004: 26). Bávaro-Punta Cana is perhaps an extreme example of the inadequacy of understanding development and urban change from the sole purview of the local government. Indeed, the contracting of services to the private sector, independent private sector investment, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and informality (in housing, livelihoods, service provision and decision-making), are key in explaining the development that has occurred outside the walls of the gated enclaves that characterize the local landscape.

Waste collection and disposal, the provision for water and sanitation, electricity, and security to name a few examples, have either been achieved through self provision and informal practices or the contracting out to private companies. For instance, municipal waste collection services were recently contracted out to a private company, Triplet, by the local government. In terms of electricity, a private energy company, the Punta Cana-Macao Energy Consortium (CEPM), was established in 1992 and given a forty year monopoly to service the growing area. Beyond this, however, the CSR policies and practices of many corporations and their associations have also contributed to improving the socio-environmental conditions in which many people live.

I argue in this chapter that, together, the local challenges faced by the government of Verón-Punta Cana, the DR’s institutional deficiencies experienced at all levels and sectors of the State (described in Chapter 5) and thus the overall the lack of provision for basic services and infrastructure, have created a development vacuum in which the private sector has moved through CSR. Consequently, private corporations, primarily hotel/resort companies, have come to play a much larger role than simply in the generation of employment; these companies, local and foreign, have not only developed the tourist market in Bávaro-Punta Cana, but they have
also effectively positioned themselves as powerful and pivotal actors in the development and governance of the newly urban space of Bávaro-Punta Cana.

While I do question the intentions and outcomes of CSR practices in Bávaro-Punta Cana, the aim here is not simply to point out that these practices are ‘defined by narrow business interests and serve to curtail interests of external stakeholders’ (Banerjee 2008: 51). Instead, I highlight two key issues. First, while members of the private sector may be fronting donations to Christmas dinners and funding the local schools and clinics, they concomitantly obfuscate the ways in which their practices exclude the very people who benefit from these donations and position themselves as the ‘agents of development.’ Second, I question, the extent to which these CSR practices contribute to ‘development.’ As I discuss at the end of this chapter, the answer to this question, however, remains rather ambiguous.

I begin this chapter with an overview of the notion of governance, followed by a brief review of the concept of CSR. The next section delves into the actual practices of CSR in Bávaro-Punta Cana, beginning first with the role of Grupo PUNTACANA in the pioneering of tourism in the area and its leadership in CSR practices, followed by the practices undertaken by other companies in the area. Next, I discuss the implications of CSR, namely the tokenistic nature of many of the initiatives and the influence gained by the private sector. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the notion of ‘development,’ and the role of CSR in this.

### 8.2 From Government to Governance

With growing dissatisfaction with government, the notion that the State represents the sole authority in shaping cities and that it has the sole capacity to govern, has been replaced with a more polycentric understanding (Shrestha 2010). That is, government has substituted with governance (Rakodi 2001, McCarney et al. 1995). The notion of governance is greatly broader than that of government, and involves 'the whole range of relationships between civil

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144 It is increasingly evident that the state is not the sole actor of concern for development. Jessop (1997) describes the movement from the official role of the state apparatus towards an emphasis on partnerships between the government with para- or non-governmental organizations as the 'destatization of the political system,' or a shift from government to governance (574). While it is certainly true that governments have long required the support of other agencies to achieve their objectives, Jessop argues this 'reliance has been reordered and increased' (575).
society and the state', including business, branches of different levels of government agencies, as well as a range of actors from civil society, such as community-based organizations, NGOs, trade unions, and religious organizations. According to Devas (2004), ‘it is the relationships and interactions between… [these actors] that determine what happens within the city’ (25). Indeed, a focus on ‘the relationship between civil society and the state, between the rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed’ is what differentiates governance from government (McCarney et al. 1995: 95, emphasis in original).

By taking a governance perspective, we are able to ‘move beyond the textbook assumption that these institutions are in full and exclusive control of urban governance and instead to think of the role of those institutions as a variable’ (Pierre 2005: 452), particularly where formal state structures are unable to deliver basic amenities (McCarney 1996). This is echoed by Stren (2003), who calls for an understanding of ‘[h]ow the poor and the groups that represent them connect with municipal government and elected officials’ (5). Not only does local (urban) governance play a key role in the city in general, but it has an effect on the scale, range and relative significance of environmental problems within it (Nunan and Satterthwaite 2001: 409).

However, it is not only poor groups that are of concern, but also the powerful interests of the private sector. The governance literature deals with the involvement of the private sector through the privatization of service provision, as well as the introduction of private sector business management within public services (Fuller and Geddes 2008). The former comprises a number of configurations, such as the direct privatization of public service provision (i.e. in the financing, construction and management of water supply infrastructure, Bakker 2003), the creation of ‘quangos’ (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations) or other hybrid institutions that blend public and private funds (Peters and Pierre 1998), or the establishment of public-private partnerships, in which the lines between the public and private sectors and organizations have become permeable (Stoker 1998). Another example of privatization is 'club goods' such as common interest developments (which may include gated communities).

8.3 Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship

In the context of the neoliberal 'rolling-out' of the state, corporations are increasingly occupying a new space within the shifting boundary between the public and private. This includes the
notion of CSR (Sadler and Lloyd 2009), which is broadly defined as 'a form of self-regulation to contribute to social (including environmental) welfare' (Moon 2007: 298). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) describe CSR as conduct that appears to advance social good that is not in itself in the interest of the firm or regulated by law. Over three decades ago, Carroll (1979), made the claim that CSR policies must address four key areas of business performance: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic (or humanitarian).

More recently, the notion of corporate citizenship (CC) has also come to conceptualize the business-society interface (Crane et al. 2008). However, like CSR, this term also has many meanings, three of which are discussed by Crane and Matten (2005) in relation to CSR. The more limited view of CC is akin to the philanthropic aspects of CSR, which are largely charitable donations and community service (Crane and Matten 2005). The 'equivalent' view of CC, is most analogous with CSR, as described by Carroll (1978) above, and is thus often understood interchangeably with CSR.

The third, ‘extended’ interpretation of CC is fundamentally linked to the processes of globalization, where corporations enter the world of citizenship, in situations where state actors fall short of being the ‘counterpart of citizenship’ (Matten and Crane 2005: 172). This view is thus fundamentally political (Matten et al. 2003). However, aspects of this view are similarly found in CSR literature, as in the study by Moon (2007), who claims that corporations increasingly play a role in the governance of societies. This is particularly true for the global South, where there is an enduring governance lacuna that derives from the unwillingness of governments to regulate and ensure the welfare of its citizens, or simply the lack of capacity for implementation.

Interestingly, the literature on governance and development is largely void of material on CSR and its role in the governance in developing countries, with the exception of Werna et al. (2009) and Utting and Marques (2010). A number of case studies presented in Werna et al. (2009)

145 The literature, however, has yet to reach consensus on the definition (McWilliams et al. 2006, Crane et al. 2008), given its variegated meanings and forms; according to Kitchin (2003), ‘[o]ne moment it seems to mean the engagement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the next it is all about charitable donations, and five minutes later it seems to mean the ethical treatment of employees. One minute the NGOs are calling the shots, the next the accountants are in on the act of selling 'reputation assurance'” (312).
illustrate the potential of CSR in partnership with other actors for achieving goals of sustainable development in urban contexts. According to Owusu (2009), one of the issues overlooked in the compendium of work presented in Werna et al. (2009), is the absence of appropriate public institutional support or promotion of CSR results in a situation 'whereby CSR becomes an ad hoc and even an 'afterthought' exercise' (448).

These issues are also addressed in the field of geography by Ite (2004) and Oglesby (2004). Ite (2004), focusing on CSR, reaches the conclusion that since the most rationale of corporations is the (economic) bottom line, there remains a crucial role for the government 'to represent society in the distribution of that wealth and in ensuring equitable treatment of the various groups involved in its creation' (9). Oglesby (2004) discusses CC, and argues that 'the turn to private-sector social institutions as 'agents of development' is a logical extension of the neoliberal policy repertoire, allowing capital to position itself as the key actor within the arena of civil society' (Oglesby 2004: 553).

It is not my aim to provide an evaluation of the operational practices of tourism corporations. Instead, I focus on the 'extended' understanding of CC or the political aspects of CSR, in particular, the role of the private sector in determining the direction of ‘development.’ In the remainder of this chapter, I seek to demonstrate how CSR/CC practices have become a significant part of the governance of Bávaro-Punta Cana, and tourism corporations, much like in the case of Oglesby (2004) where corporations have come to be seen as 'development agents.' The following section provides a brief outline of the Dominican political economic context, before I turn to my case study in greater detail.

8.4 Grupo PUNTACANA and CSR

Bávaro-Punta Cana as a tourist destination and an expanding urban area owes its history largely to a group of private American investors, including labour attorney-environmentalist Theodore Kheel. They formed CODDETREISA (Compañía de Desarrollo Turístico Residencial e

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146 CSR and CC may encompass a wide range of actions, and for the purposes of this thesis, I do not aim to engage in an in-depth discussion on the differences between them.
Industrial, S. A.), which was later succeeded by Grupo PUNTACANA. In 1969, the company purchased approximately 78 square kilometres of land on the DR’s East coast (PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation 2011), with around 10 kilometres along the coastline (PUNTACANA Resort and Club 2011).

A group of Dominican investors joined the venture, headed by Frank Rainieri, and began tourism development in the area in 1971. Ten exclusive, two-bedroom cabañas were constructed in 1971 along with a clubhouse at ‘The Punta Cana Club,’ as well as a power plant, a basic (grass) airplane runway and a small town for employees, in addition to a road that linked the area to the nearest town, Higüey (Ward 2008, PUNTA CANA International Airport 2013).

In the late 1970s, these cabañas were demolished in favour of expansion with collaboration of the Paris-based Club Mediterranée. The latter began construction in 1978 and has been operating the area’s first hotel with 350 rooms since 1980 (PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation 2011). While Frank Rainieri succeeded in convincing the government to invest in linking the area with the national road network in 1978 (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006), a road connecting Punta Cana to Higüey, the company made investments in access roads, security, water systems, electricity, waste collection and disposal, and, even, education.

The country’s first privately owned international airport was constructed without government capital. This occurred only ‘[a]fter an eight-year battle with three different governments’ at the national level for authorization (PUNTACANA Resort and Club 2011), due to dramatic changes in politics with the first democratic elections in 1978. The government claimed it did not have the funds to construct one itself, and thus the investment cost was equally shared by Club Med and Grupo PUNTACANA (PNUD 2005). It was completed in 1984 (PUNTACANA Resort and Club 2011), and underwent a number of expansions over the years. The construction of this airport is symbolic of the growth of tourism in the zone. The same year it was completed, the successive investments of Mallorca-based hotel chains began with the construction of Barceló Bávaro Beach Hotel (completed in 1985) twenty kilometres to the north in what is commonly

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147 The investment made by Club Mediterranée in the airport was later bought out by Grupo Punta Cana – whose owners are now Frank Rainieri, Theodore Kheel (who passed away in 2010), designer Oscar de la Renta and singer Julio Iglesias (PUNTACANA Resort and Club 2011).
known as the Bávaro area, followed by the construction of hotels by the Sol Meliá and RIU groups in 1990, also based in Mallorca, Spain.\textsuperscript{148}

According to Frank Rainieri, Grupo PUNTACANA is an example of the achievements that are possible by the private sector, in the absence of government assistance (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006: 21-22):

Do you know what the total investment of the government of the DR in those 20 miles [of developed coastline] in the last 34 years [is]? In the year 2004 alone, the government collected $[US] 70 million in taxes from us. Do you know how much the government has invested in 35 years? Five million and that includes roads, water and electricity. Everything has to be done by the private sector.

As the chief development engineer for Grupo PUNTACANA makes clear, government absence has allowed for flexibility in decisions regarding the development of the area. He contrasts this with the tourism pole’s former competitor in the DR, Puerto Plata, where tourism development was headed by a specially-formulated body within the country’s Central Bank, INFRATUR (with funds from the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank, and that was later dismantled as an institution). In Punta Cana, autonomy lies in the hands of the developers (Ward 2008: 175).

Grupo PUNTACANA was extremely successful in developing a brand, which resulted in the renaming of the area to ‘Punta Cana.’ Early on, in 1969, it was decided that its official name, Punta Borrachón (‘Drunken Point’), was not appropriate for tourism and commercial development, and the name was changed. This name was appropriated by most developments in the area for marketing purposes since the construction of the airport. However, in recent times, Grupo PUNTACANA has been careful to strategically brand itself as distinct from the remainder of the area by capitalizing PUNTACANA, given its particular vision for the development of the area, which sits in contrast to the lack of foresight throughout the rest of the area (PUNTACANA Resort and Club 2011).

Grupo PUNTACANA is careful because, since its inception, the company has been focused on a long-term vision for sustainable development. Jake Kheel, Director of the PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation (est. 1994), explains that this is largely due to the differing nature of the

\textsuperscript{148} It is noteworthy that two of these groups launched their first international hotels in the Bávaro-Punta Cana area: Barceló in 1985, and RIU in 1991 (RIU 2013).
developers in the area. Many of the larger developers in the Bávaro area are owned by multinational corporations with head offices in other countries and have a lesser attachment in the community, while Grupo PUNTACANA is Dominican (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006: 59) and is among the few companies that have a permanent local presence (Jake Kheel, pers. comm., January 2011).

Various publications and interviewees from Grupo PUNTACANA (including my own interviews with its representatives) stress the social and environmental consciousness of this organization, having ‘pursued a policy of sustainable tourism, including providing basic services for the community such as garbage collection, water, and electricity’ (Ward 2008: 176), particularly focusing on the dissimilarities between it and Bávaro, which was ‘developed by scores of unrelated hotel owners, [and] lacks many of the basic services, including garbage collection, which might be expected from the state’ (Ward 2008: 176).

Grupo PUNTACANA operates with a vision that sits in stark contrast with many other corporations and companies in the area. They have a real presence in social development projects in the area, having established two bodies of CSR, with the PUNTACANA Foundation and the PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation. The former undertakes projects related to education, health, sports, and culture in the nearby urban area of Verón. For example, in partnership with an American medical school and the Ministry of Public Health, it facilitated the rehabilitation and co-management of the Verón Rural Health Clinic in 2006, which is the only public health facility in the area, which had been abandoned previously due to lack of funds. It is free and open to all regardless of nationality and attends to 80-90 patients per day, approximately half of whom are Dominican and the other half of whom are Haitian (Paul Beswick, 149 pers. comm., January 31, 2012).

The Foundation’s other most significant projects to date include the creation of the PUNTACANA International School (in 2000, now with around 450 students from 22 countries and tuition fees for children of employees scaled according to the level of employment); the establishment of the only high school in the Bávaro-Punta Cana area in 2004, the Ted and Ana

149 Director of the PUNTACANA Foundation.
Kheel Polytechnic High School; and the renovation of the local police station in Verón. It has also established an annual cultural event, the Punta Cana Carnival for residents of the area.

The PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation focuses on experimenting and strategizing to transform the environmental practices of both the organization and tourism generally, but also in creating cross-institutional learning with partnerships and exchanges with a number of universities, particularly in the US. Its activities include conservation efforts (the country's largest privately-owned natural reserve), the creation of a partnership programme for integrated coastal management, a zero waste programme for the PUNTACANA premises, and sustainable agriculture. It has also established a Center for Biodiversity and Sustainability, where visiting students and teacher are able to engage in educational and research activities.

8.5 CSR in Bávaro-Punta Cana

Other companies have also been involved in CSR activities, albeit often on a more ad-hoc, individual, basis. One of the Mallorcan-based companies, Grupo Barceló, established a foundation, Fundación Barceló, in 1989 with a vision to 'contribute to improving the quality of life of people living in countries with high levels of poverty, with special attention to women, principally in Africa and Latin America' (own translation, Fundación Barceló n.d.: 5). It is one of the few companies operating in Bávaro-Punta that publishes reports on its social activities. In 2011, its involvement in the Bávaro-Punta Cana area and Higüey benefited 4,605 people. With 25,000 Euros (approx. US$ 35,000), the foundation made donations in medicine and provided direct medical assistance by an ophthalmologist for a period of 6 months Fundación Barceló (n.d.b).

In response to the lack of basic infrastructure and uncoordinated practices of tourism developers (primarily hotels and real estate developers), various tourism related companies in the area established a non-profit organization in 1992, the Association of Hotels and Tourism Projects of the Eastern Zone (AHPTZE). Its purpose is to group tourism developers ‘in a single institution and defend the interests of the destination’ (Ernesto Veloz, pers. comm., February 24, 2011,

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150 For a more comprehensive list, please refer to the CSR pages of the Grupo PUNTACANA website: grupopuntacana.com.do.
emphasis added), and to ‘promote, regulate and optimize tourism development in the Eastern zone’\textsuperscript{151} (AHPTZE 2008). AHPTZE was established through the efforts of Frank Rainieri, who was also its first President for a period of two years. The narrative that describes the lack of development by the government is also mimicked by the AHPTZE; its President, Ernesto Veloz expresses this clearly (pers. comm., February 24, 2011):

> All the public... institutions that have been built here, have had [our] support. For example, the POLITUR [Tourism Police] station was built by the Association of Hotels, the police stations were built by the Association of Hotels, the fire station that is now being built, is done by the Association of Hotels, parts of the schools that are here were built by the Association of Hotels, the management of the Bávaro lagoon for its preservation is the Association of Hotels.

The only public primary school\textsuperscript{152} in El Hoyo de Friusa, was accomplished through the efforts of one of El Hoyo de Friusa's neighbourhood organizations (or \textit{junta de vecinos}) with donations by AHPTZE and a number of other (international) donations. The school suffers from an extreme lack of capacity to accommodate all the children of El Hoyo de Friusa. In the academic year beginning in 2010, over 200 students were turned away. To date, the local government has been involved solely in supporting the wages of two teachers. As the organization’s leader explains (pers. comm. October 23, 2010), much of the physical infrastructure has been donated by AHPTZE:

> Now we are in conversation [with the local government] and they have very good intentions. The Mayor has said he would help us, but there is the hotel sector which has made good contributions for the school through the association of hotels... [they built] the peripheral fence..., a new extension, the office area, the water tank, the water pump, the fans of the school.

Recently, USAID, through the Consortium of Dominican Tourism Competitiveness (CDCT) has also become involved in establishing ‘tourism clusters’ in the DR, including the Tourism Cluster of La Altagracia.\textsuperscript{153} This is a newer organization uniting representatives from the gambit of

\textsuperscript{151} Own translation. The objectives of the AHPTZE are: ‘To undertake the proceedings that will be necessary to promote, regulate and optimize tourist development on the East coast of the Dominican Republic, predominantly including the Tourist destinations of Punta Cana-Bavaro-Macao-Juanillo; to develop and preserve the common interests of associates; to expand its relations and trade information of common interest; to adopt consensus policies and then apply them in relation to the community as well as public and private institutions’ (AHPTZE 2008).

\textsuperscript{152} While there are some colegios, primary schools which charge fees, the majority of families must send their children to escuelas, which are free of charge.

\textsuperscript{153} The Tourism Cluster of La Altagracia was founded by the AHPTZE in 2003. The President of AHPTZE, Ernesto Veloz, is thus also the President of the Tourism Cluster. The Cluster's Vice-President is Paul Beswick, the Director of the PUNTACANA Foundation. One of the Board directors, is Frank Rainieri from Grupo PUNTACANA. The
stakeholders in tourism in the province, with the task: ‘[t]o promote the integration of the socio-economic actors of the destination under the premise of competitiveness, value creation and wealth distribution’ (CDCT, n.d.). As such, it has a small full-time staff funded by USAID, but has voluntary membership, board members, and attendance in meetings by representatives of the tourism sector, the dioceses of La Altagracia, local government, PUNTACANANA Foundation, the Business Association of the Province of La Altagracia, and representatives of neighbourhood organizations, among others (CDCT n.d.). The CDCT has engaged in a number of social and environmental initiatives. Some examples include the implementation of the Blue Flag programme (a voluntary eco-label) at the Cabeza de Toro beach, and the establishment of an agreement with the National Institute for Professional Development (INFOTEP) for human resource training in hospitality and other tourism-related employment.

It is evident that tourism developers have played a significant role in the development of Bávaro-Punta Cana, beyond simply employment generation. Many of the social development projects have and continue to depend on private donations, either directly from the private sector, or channelled through particular organizations or associations, such as the Punta Cana Rotary Club (whose founder is Frank Rainieri), AHPTZE, or the Tourism Cluster.

8.6 Tokenism and Influence

In the literature, CSR, however, has been critiqued on numerous fronts, not least for the possibilities that corporations might simply use CSR policies as ‘window-dressing.’ Indeed, Johnson (1958) warned of two possible scenarios. First, corporations ‘may give funds to charitable or educational institutions and may argue for them as great humanitarian deeds, when in fact they are simply trying to buy community good will’ (72). Second, and more profoundly, corporations may claim that their strategies benefit society at large, but they may simply ‘be a

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Tourism Cluster of La Altagracia is one of country’s ten tourism Clusters in the Dominican Republic, grouped by the umbrella organization, the Consortium of Dominican Tourism Competitiveness (CDCT).

154 Own translation.

155 According to Banerjee (2007), the idea of CSR being a tokenistic gesture is, in the context of environmentalism, known as ‘greenwashing’ today. Greenwashing can be seen as a form of ‘corporate deception’ (Laufer 2003), or ‘when socially and environmentally destructive corporations attempt to preserve and expand their image and market base by posing as friends of the environment’ (Manteaw 2007: 434).
subtle device to maintain economic power in their own hands by extending their influence and decision-making power into so many non-business areas that they become benevolent dictators' (72).

Although I would not go so far as to equate tourism corporations with dictatorship, the issues highlighted by Johnson in 1958 resonate even today with the realities of Bávaro-Punta Cana, as I demonstrate in this section. In the first place, the private sector has, in many cases, done little more than make token gestures towards the local society. In some cases, these gestures have taken the attention away from some of the work of mobilized local residents engaged in collective action. In second place, the private sector appears to entrench its position of power by further inserting itself in the development and governance of Bávaro-Punta Cana. What is particular here, is that not only does the private sector dictate the urban landscape of the areas dedicated to tourism, but in the context of the ‘development vacuum,’ it is also able to influence the configuration of urban space more generally.

For example, charitable donations by the developers are often well publicized in the media. Indeed, ‘the control over the generation and dissemination of information is critical to the ability… to manipulate the public and contain opposition’ (Kuyek 2006: 211). The aforementioned primary school in El Hoyo de Friusa is the result of concerted efforts by members of one of the local neighbourhood organizations (junta de vecinos), and contributions from AHPTZE and other donors. The volunteers who run the school began an annual tradition of offering a free Christmas dinner for many of the under-privileged children in the municipal district, ranging from Friusa, to Mata Mosquito, Haiti Chiquito, Cabeza de Toro, to Cristinita in Verón. In December of 2011, the dinner was offered to 1200 children. The media made little reference to ‘the people, businesses and friends who contribute and help out’156 (Victoriano Guzman, pers. comm., October 23, 2010). Instead, newspaper headlines focused on the donors, celebrating their contributions toward the local community.157

156 Own translation.
157 In this case, the donor was Hospiten, a private medical facility. The headline read: ‘Hospiten Bávaro makes donations to children of Nazaret School’ (Acento 2012). The previous year, in 2010, Hospiten and a number of other donors distributed school materials to students at Nazaret and the headlines read similarly: ‘Hospiten carries out donations to Nazaret School in Hoyo de Friusa’ (Bávaro News n.d.). Other examples of donations include one by Hard Rock Hotel and Casino Punta Cana, who ran a food drive to the benefit 366 families in selected poor
In another case, a neighbourhood organization from Verón was planning on constructing a school on land that had already been purchased. Once a small donation was given from a member of the private sector, the group was excluded and the project was taken over by the company who then ‘put their name on it... [It was] a big publicity stunt’ (pers. comm., April 30, 2011).

One example involves the local electric company, CEPM. For the third consecutive year, in December 2012, CEPM, with the support of a number of other corporations,158 ‘filled Bávaro with magic,’ through the installation of Christmas lights throughout the zone and a Disney installation (Diario Libre 2012). Meanwhile, one of the only mass mobilizations in the area was in response to the price of electricity, which remains out of the reach of many of the poorest members of society. The local company is praised for the ability to provide constant energy, while the rest of the country is subject to frequent outages. For the remainder of the country, the majority of electricity is provided and managed by public companies, as well as some public-private partnerships. CEPM, on the other hand, was given an exclusive concession to operate in Bávaro-Punta Cana until 2032. In 2011, energy prices in Bávaro-Punta Cana reached over RD$ 13.00/kWh (US$ 0.34/kWh).159 Such prices generate difficulties for local residents, many of whom are often unable to pay and are disconnected from the network (e.g. resident of Mata Mosquito, pers. comm., October 25, 2010).

Perhaps one of the most interesting issues with respect to the configuration of urban space is the involvement of the private sector in attempts to find solutions to the problems associated with a lack of planning, including arrabalización (the proliferation of informality or the ‘slumification’

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158 They include: Barceló Hotels & Resorts, Bávaro News, Coca Cola, Complejo Grand Palladium, Mapfre BHD Seguros, Banco Popular, San Juan Shopping Center, Seguros Universal, Implementos y Maquinarias (IMCA), Cáceres & Asociados y Wartsila.
159 Prices for places serviced by EDESTE (one of the nationalized energy companies in the country, which services the East) are RS$ 4.44 (or US$ 0.12) for low usage, or RD$ 6.97 (US$ 0.18) for medium usage (www.edeeste.com.do). It is worth noting that in a high income country like Canada, the current prices in Ontario are CDN$ 0.07/kWh (Ontario Energy Board 2013).
of the area) which I discuss in the next chapter. Indeed, some key representatives from the private sector have been very vocal regarding the need for planning. Ernesto Veloz, the President of the AHPTZE, is one such figure, as is Frank Rainieri of Grupo PUNTACANA. Rainieri is considered the most active and vocal pursuer of sustainability and social development in the area – in terms of internal company practices and CSR endeavours to benefit the local society and environment – and is also a key player in the attempts of developing a Strategic Provincial Development Plan (2011) (Geraldo 2013).

In response to the lack of planning in the area, the private sector, through the AHPTZE and Tourism Cluster, sought to direct the organization of tourism and urban development by commissioning a private company to develop a land-use plan (POT) for the area, which has come to be known as the Plan Valdez, after the architect contracted for it. The plan was handed over to the Ministry of Tourism, as a kind of donation, but was never implemented directly.  

Planners at the DPP explained that the Plan Valdez was insufficient as a plan in itself. One planner explained that, technically, it was not created to scale in relation to the actually existing landscape, and implementing this plan would thus involve significant relocations and redevelopment (pers. comm. October 21, 2010). Another planner expressed that the plan was overly homogenous; it defined only three general zones for development, and these zones were drawn as strips in line with the coast, with urban areas furthest away from tourist areas (and thus the coast), consequently entrenching socio-spatial segregation. Further, it was mentioned that Plan Valdez also did not contemplate public spaces and access to the beach (pers. comm. March 23, 2011).

Certainly, it is unlikely that this kind of POT produced by the private (tourism) sector would be a supportive counterpart in contributing to an integrated urban setting. However, it is noteworthy that the Plan Valdez became one of the base plans from which the planning department (DPP) at the Ministry of Tourism elaborated its own POT for Bávaro-Punta Cana, completed in 2012.

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160 The local newspaper, Bávaro News, recently printed an article entitled: 'Bávaro, the city without a map.' It makes reference to the Plan Valdez 2008 that was commissioned by the AHPTZE and the Tourism Cluster. The article quotes Veloz, '[w]e would have to buy candles and a cake to celebrate five years,' that the plan was not implemented by government authorities (Geraldo 2013b). Own translation.
One last case is key for understanding the changing role and position of the private sector in shaping the urban context. While in the past, tourism companies and other supporting private initiatives might have been viewed solely as a source for employment, increasingly, the private sector has taken on a role that is referred to in the literature as ‘an agent of development.’

Local residents and their organizations (such as neighbourhood organizations), have begun to make claims directly to the private sector for basic services and/or infrastructure, such as the provision for water. Since Bávaro-Punta Cana does not have public provision for water and sanitation, or even a centralized water distribution system, individual entities have had to gain access to groundwater and dispose of wastewater independently.

Tourist facilities and other enclave developments (such as gated communities) are generally located on or near the ocean front, where water has higher levels of salinity. Consequently, these complexes are forced to pipe water from individual wells located further inland, many of which pass under poor settlements such as El Hoyo de Friusa, Mata Mosquito and Haiti Chiquito.

Seeing this as an opportunity to improve access to water, one neighbourhood organization in Friusa negotiated with the local hotel association (AHPTZE) to link the settlement into the pipes transporting water to nearby hotels. The neighbourhood organization’s leader argues that due to the high costs for electricity in the tourist zone, residents of the settlement were not able to self-finance the costs to pump water from a well. Instead, individuals were forced to purchase water from further away and transport it into the area. Thus, the organization approached AHPTZE, requesting that the hotels supply the area with a small portion of their water, since their tubes passed directly underneath the settlement. They were given access (primarily) to the pipes of the Occidental Grand Flamenco hotel, whose tubes pass through the middle of the settlement and is best located to supply the settlement. Other hotels, however, also supply the area.

161 It is important to note that the continuous over-extraction of water in the tourist zone has led to the depletion in the area’s aquifer due to its inability to recharge at the same rate as its extraction (El Vocero del Este 2009), and thus also saltwater intrusion (INDRHI 2011, Sepulveda 2006). Bávaro-Punta Cana is located on the Planicie Costera Oriental (Oriental Coastal Plain), which is characterized by karstic limestone, an extremely porous material that allows water to pass from surface water to ground water easily. ‘This rapid movement creates a high potential for surface contaminants to pollute large volumes of ground water in a short period of time’ as well as vulnerability to seawater intrusion from excessive abstraction (Karanjac 2002: 3). The National Institute of Water Resources (INDRHI 2011) points out that hotel wells were previously located two kilometres inland, and were forced to move their wells a further seven kilometres due to salt water intrusion as a result of over-exploitation of the resource.
The neighbourhood organization’s leader explains that they opted to negotiate directly with the hotel association, bypassing the government altogether, because ‘that other [or previous] government consulted very little’ with local residents, referring to the first local government in the area (2007-2010), that time appointed by the head Municipality of Higüey. Although, as the leader points out, the local government now appears more receptive to participation by the public in making claims, but has yet to demonstrate its responsiveness to demands made by local residents (pers. comm., Oct 28, 2010).

8.7 Discussion: Corporations as Agents of ‘D/development’?

Undoubtedly, CSR has the potential to achieve goals for social and environmental development (Utting and Marques 2010). While some organizations in Bávaro-Punta Cana have certainly played a large role in development, others have engaged in largely superficial gestures, echoing a cautionary note made by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, that corporate engagement in poverty reduction may result in little more than tokenism (UNRISD, 2010).

CSR can also have deeper consequences. For Ite (2004), there is the possibility that CRS could intentionally or unintentionally affect communities negatively, whether politically, socially or economically. Indeed, there is a danger that a corporation ‘could effectively be leading the pace of, and directing the paths to, socio-economic development’ (2). Oglesby (2004) warns that elite-funded social foundations allow ‘capital to set itself up as an increasingly influential actor within the arenas of ’civil society’, acting like other NGOs in peddling development projects, courting international donors, and, most significantly, pushing to set the terms of debate on key national issues’ (570). Indeed, the various private sector associations are certainly not on the same playing field as the rest of civil society in Bávaro-Punta Cana, or the DR more generally.162

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162 As early as 1978, Grupo PUNTACANA, succeeded in changing national policy by negotiating with the government to allow foreign companies in the Dominican Republic to lend to Club Mediterranée. At that time, the companies faced rather restrictive economic policies; foreign companies were allowed to repatriate only 18 percent of their profit returns and thus had funds locked up in the Dominican Republic. In effect, Grupo PUNTACANA was able to influence national economic policy to allow for equity swaps with foreign companies. In this case, Texaco, ARCO and Colgate-Palmolive were all involved in equity swaps for the construction of the Club Mediterranée resort (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006:24).
Can the private sector be said to be an agent of development? Gillian Hart (2001) provides a useful conceptualization of development, distinguishing between ‘Big D’ Development and ‘small d’ development. While the former is understood as a project of intervention (in the ‘Third World’ that began in the post-second world war era in the context of the Cold War and decolonization), the latter relates more to the ‘the development of capitalism as a geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical processes’ (650).

The answer to the question above is rather ambiguous. Through the examination of the CSR practices, and their largely tokenistic nature, it is evident that the practices of the private sector generally contribute to the furthering of ‘development’ (small ‘d’). The actions of Grupo PUNTACANA and the AHPTZE have, on the one hand, contributed to the improvement in social and environmental conditions for many local residents, however, they have also reaffirmed these organizations’ position in the eyes of local residents as a critical player in the development of the area, while simultaneously delegitimizing the role of the State in some ways.

I refer to many CSR activities as a form of tokenism because the reality is that many of the initiatives pursued by the private sector are piece-meal, often ad-hoc, and receive disproportionate attention in the media. Since there is no requirement for these corporations to guarantee their acts of charity to the local residents, they certainly cannot be held accountable for the failure to fulfill local residents’ needs, nor to ensure benefits are distributed in an equitable manner or guarantee the provision of basic services or infrastructure to the poorest of the poor.

This raises questions as to how donations are distributed and whether this contributes to the fragmented nature of urban development. While private donations have benefited some groups, these are often the more mobilized neighbourhood organizations in the area. For example, while those residing in Friusa are able to gain a steady flow of water from hotel pipes, those residing in another settlement (Mata Mosquito), who are considered to be living in the worst conditions and do not have a neighbourhood organization, are excluded from this system.

Thus, together with the absence of State involvement, it is increasingly clear that there is a vacuum in terms of agents involved in the project of Development, ‘Big D’, in Bávaro-Punta Cana. This is also clear in so much that there is only one charitable organization with a presence in Bávaro-Punta Cana and Higüey. The Save the Children Fund, is the only one I came across
that was not directly linked to private sector social development initiatives or branches of CSR. The Directory of Social Organizations of Development in the Dominican Republic lists 374 organizations across the DR. These include NGOs, foundations, federations, environmental groups, women’s organizations and farmers’ organizations. Only seven are based in the province of La Altagracia, all of which are based in the town of Higüey, and none claim to work in Bávaro-Punta Cana (PRIL n.d.).

Studying the impacts of CSR points to a need to shift from a short term focus on ‘doing good,’ to finding more long-term solutions to underdevelopment (UNRISD, 2010: 1026). This is coupled with the fact that international capital carries with it a particular risk in terms of the longevity of activities. It has been noted elsewhere that ‘[t]he price of failing to maintain ‘appropriate’ conditions for transnational investment is substantial and unambiguous: capital flight’ (Brenner et al. 2009:193), meaning there is no guarantee that the ‘socially responsible’ activities undertaken by the private sector in Bávaro-Punta Cana will be sustained in the long run, if/when international tourist corporations find more profitable or accommodating locations elsewhere in the Caribbean or further afield.

This relates to the quality of the practices of private international companies. According to Jake Kheel, the director of the PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation, hotels in the Bávaro area do not take a ‘proactive’ approach in engaging in more environmentally and socially sustainable practices, an issue which he attributes to their lack of local presence, given their international nature: ‘There isn’t an awareness or an interest. The hotels don’t see themselves as being responsible, or having a stake.’ (pers. comm., January 17, 2011).

As it was expressed in The Economist (2005), if business is to make a more meaningful contribution to the public good, public intervention is needed; CSR cannot substitute for taxation, public spending or regulation. For Kuyek (2006: 213), CSR is not a replacement for state regulation; it is a smokescreen.’ According to Blowfield (2005), CSR can even ‘be accused of being complicit with a de facto stifling of many spheres of regulation’ (517), and, it must be ensured that CSR does not define the responsibilities of corporations in some ways at the

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163 Save the Children was provided, however, with a local office by The PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation.
expense of others, such as paying taxes. What might be deemed socially or environmentally just by a corporation is not likely to be equated with what is acceptable for development organizations, non-profits, community-based organizations, etc, seeking to reduce poverty. Certainly, CSR ‘does not tackle or even acknowledge any structural dimensions to the business-poverty relationship’ (523). Thus, for meaningful assistance to occur, the private sector would have to engage in issues that may not be directly in their own interest.

We are also left with the question: What are the 'democratic credentials' of these private bodies involved in new forms of governance beyond the state (Swyngedouw 2005)? Although I do not agree with 'ready-made models of urban governance,' (McCarney 2003: 51), it is generally accepted that good governance come with some normative claims of accountability, democracy, and transparency. Of course, there is a long road ahead in the DR’s process of democratization. In Bávaro-Punta Cana, specifically, there remains a necessity for a representative, democratically-elected body to lead the governance of Bávaro-Punta Cana, and regulate the influence of the private sector.

Further, international corporations can easily depart, leaving local residents who depend on their support without recourse. Indeed, the fickle nature of international capital is evident in the very fact that hotels are often passed through the hands of a number of corporations, making it difficult to even know the current number of hotels operating at any one point in a place, as in the case of Bávaro-Punta Cana (Herrera Moreno 2007).

Indeed, for tourism to be pro-poor, we must ask ourselves how a local area can avoid 'elite capture' of decision-making power (Schilcher 2007). Swyngedouw (2005) raises a concern for the ways in which governance has at once empowered some actors, but disempowered others. Private corporations are not mandated to adhere to the norms of accountability, democracy, and transparency, and thus cannot be held accountable for development. Inevitably, they represent an elite, only a small minority of the population, and are accountable only to their shareholders.
9 The ‘Slumification’ of Tourist Areas and the Lived Urban Experiences of Local Residents

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I address the final research question, which asks how the urban environment of Bávaro-Punta Cana is experienced by local residents living in conditions of poverty. I argue that not only are local residents subject to a vast range of deprivations that define poverty, but, as in the private sector, they are also fundamentally implicated in the production of urban space through practices of informality.

I make a number of arguments throughout this chapter. First, the problems faced by residents of informal settlements are generally urban in nature. The ignorance of the very nature of these problems can have the added effect of creating living conditions that are often inferior to in other parts of the country. Second, the solutions to the various deprivations experienced by these residents are discursively vilified (and racialized) as contributing to the ‘slumification’ of the area, which is considered inherently detrimental to the development of tourism. This discrimination, in turn, also has very material consequences through practices of exclusion, eviction, and displacement.

9.1.1 Overview of Poverty Issues

Many local residents living in the ‘open’ spaces between enclaves live in conditions of poverty. It is now widely accepted that urban poverty cannot simply and necessarily be defined by inadequate income or consumption levels (Chambers 1997, Satterthwaite 2003). The notion of poverty is increasingly understood and accepted as a combination of a set of interrelated deprivations (listed in the left-hand column of Table 9-1, below), including lack of income; inadequate, unstable or risky asset base; inadequate shelter; inadequate provision of public infrastructure as well as basic services; a limited or no safety net; the inadequate protection of poorer groups via the law; and voicelessness and powerlessness (Satterthwaite 2003: 80).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deprivations</th>
<th>Experiences in Bávaro-Punta Cana</th>
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| 1. Inadequate income                            | High unemployment during economic crisis affecting the number of tourists  
Very low wages for the unskilled labourers, particularly Haitian migrant labourers  
Higher price of goods and services than rest of country, including food, rent, and gas |
| 2. Inadequate, unstable or risky asset base     | High proportion of renters rather than owners, particularly Haitian labourers  
Inadequate basic education (in terms of numbers of schools, classrooms, quality of teaching)  
Employment is often seasonal or informal, resulting in poor job security |
| 3. Inadequate shelter                            | Poor quality housing  
Poorest have roofing made of metal sheets thus insulating heat, others complain of leaks during rain and storms  
Some areas prone to flooding in and around the home (e.g. Haiti Chiquito)  
Over-crowding in low-income areas, particularly in *cuarterías*  
Many settlements have been subject to eviction or threat of eviction |
| 4. Inadequate provision of public infrastructure| Water is largely self-provided. There is no public provision for water. In some settlements, there are public taps either installed by the landlord of rental properties or by the municipal government in election times. In some settlements, there less than 1hr of access per day due to high costs of electricity needed to pump water. One settlement, El Hoyo de Friusa, has access to hotel water pipes.  
No public sanitation, wastewater directed back into freshwater source  
Main roads are paved. Those in informal settlements are to a large degree unpaved and are muddy after rains |
| 5. Inadequate provision of basic services        | Inadequate provision for basic education, not all children are able to attend schools  
No public hospitals in the area, only one public clinic (in Verón) |
| 6. Limited/no safety net                         | Many are temporary, migrant workers with friends and family elsewhere in the country or Haiti |
| 7. Inadequate protection of poorer groups via the law | Frequent discrimination of Haitians by POLITUR often resulting in unfair incarceration and extortion |
| 8. Voicelessness and powerlessness              | Clientelism and corruption  
Many are not registered to vote  
Many do not know their rights |

**Table 9-1: Interrelated Deprivations Resulting in Poverty**  
*Source: Categories based on Satterthwaite (2003). Data based on interviews and conversations with local residents, and observation.*

This categorization is particularly helpful in classifying the deprivations experienced in Bávaro-Punta Cana by a large proportion of the local population living outside the enclavistic developments. This wider definition of poverty allows us to see that ‘many of these deprivations have little or no direct link to income levels, while many relate much more to political systems and bureaucratic structures that are unwilling or unable to act effectively to address these deprivations’ (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004: 12). Table 9-1 summarizes the ways in which these
eight deprivations are experienced by local residents in Bávaro-Punta Cana. The following sections seek to elaborate on some of the key issues raised in Table 9-1.

9.1.2 Inadequate Income

Despite the employment opportunities created in this tourism pole, data on the socio-economic conditions in the province of La Altagracia demonstrate that the benefits to the local population have not been significant. In 2004, the per capita monthly income for the province was 5,688 pesos (CDN $150), which was 17 percent over the national average. However, La Altagracia also had a GINI coefficient (which measures income inequality) that was 6.5 percent higher than the national average, as well as a poverty rate 14 percent higher than the national average (PNUD 2008).

More than a lack of basic services and infrastructure, the dearth of jobs at the time of my fieldwork was the most common and serious concern among respondents. Construction is considered the primary source of dynamism for the local economy. However, with the economic crisis that began in 2008, many working in construction (who are primarily Haitian), had trouble finding opportunities for income generation (community leader in Ensanche Punta Cana, pers. comm., November 19, 2010). For example, with the economic downturn, Cap Cana made 500 employees redundant in October 2008 (Coto 2008), followed by another 1,000 in November (Resumen Turismo 2008). A local reporter estimated that this figure reached approximately 3,000 workers in total (Roberto Mena, pers. comm., January 8, 2011).

Consequently, many Haitians employed in construction relocated to Samaná (which is also developing tourism rapidly) in the North coast, in search of employment (resident near Mata Mosquito, pers. comm., November 2, 2010). Further, as a result of the seasonality of

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164 Because of changes in the geo-political divisions of the province in 2008, there is no data for the municipal district of Verón-Punta Cana for the 2002 census. While the 2010 census has been carried out, the data has yet to be fully processed by the National Statistics Office. The table is developed from observations in the field from October 2010 to August 2011 and July 2012, as well as informal or semi-structured interviews with local residents in those time periods.

165 This could account for a disproportionate number of males living in the municipal district (25,435) vs. females (18,547) (ONE 2012), since generally, in the DR, there is little difference in terms of the male-female ratio employed in tourism jobs. The difference lies more with the type of jobs (e.g. females work more as waitresses or room attendants, whereas males ten to work as bartenders, cooks, gardeners, or construction workers (PNUD 2005).

166 Journalist at Bávaro News.
employment in tourism, workers in hotels are often given unpaid holidays during the low seasons (spring and fall) (resident of Friusa, pers. comm., October 23, 2010), and others working informally, endure times of hardship by finding odd jobs (as ‘chiriperos’) (e.g. resident of Haiti Chiquito, pers. comm., November 16, 2010).

Inadequate income is also directly related to the cost of goods and services. Often the wages earned by those living in the most disadvantaged settlements are not sufficient to pay for consumables and other goods/services in the area, including food, rent, electricity, and transportation, which are charged at a premium in comparison to other parts of the DR. The price of electricity is particularly high. While the rest of the DR suffers from an energy crisis, with frequent power shortages, Bávaro-Punta Cana’s energy is available 24 hours per day, however, at prices that are often too high for the poorest members of society to afford. As a result, many have been disconnected and live without electricity (e.g. resident in Mata Mosquito, pers. comm., October 27, 2010).

9.1.3 Inadequate Provision for Public Infrastructure and Basic Services

The area of Bávaro-Punta Cana lacks much of the infrastructure and services commonly expected (to some degree) in urban settings. Since I have discussed some of these issues in previous chapters, I will touch on some concerns briefly, and dwell more on others.

9.1.3.1 Waste, Water, and Sanitation

Waste collection and disposal became a significant and increasingly large problem with the expansion of the urban population, as I elaborated in Chapter 7. The subject was a common theme at neighbourhood organization meetings in El Hoyo de Friusa, where it was made clear that the formal waste collectors were unable to service the callejones (small streets) within the settlements (Field notes, February 24, 2011). At another meeting in El Hoyo de Friusa, the leader of a neighbourhood organization explained that often the trucks entered the area after they had already been filled, unable to collect all the waste that had accumulated (Field notes, February 23, 2011). As had been the case for many years, informal waste collectors filled the void left by the government. However, despite their significant role in servicing local settlements, informal collectors are being prohibited from continuing their work, as in the instance of a resident of El
Hoyo de Friusa, who collected waste for three years with his own truck and was prohibited from continuing to do so (Field notes, February 24, 2011). This began with the new government, which is attempting to formalize waste collection and disposal by contracting-out to a private company (Triplet).

In terms of access to water, the census indicates that Bávaro-Punta Cana fares worse than the rest of the country. In the DR, the majority of the population has access to water from mains; almost half of the population has access to water from mains inside the home, and close to 20 percent has access to mains in the yard, whereas less than ten percent of the population gets its water from wells. In contrast, in the province of La Altagracia, almost 40 percent of households have access to water from a well, and in Verón-Punta Cana, this figure is almost 60 percent (ONE 2012c). This water, however, is utilized solely for bathing and cleaning. Drinking water is generally purchased at stores or from trucks.

In Verón-Punta Cana, residents generally acquire access to water informally through shallow bore wells, which are often shared between a number of houses. In many cases, owners do not have the funds to dig their own well, and are sometimes forced to purchase water from neighbours. For example, a grandmother living in Ensanche Boulevard (formerly known as Kosovo) owns her own well and sells water to some neighbours. She explains that one of her daughters who lives in the area does not have access to water at her own rented house, and hence collects water from her mother’s house (pers. comm., November 23, 2011). In another settlement in the Friusa area, Detrás de Casabal, the owner of the entire property of around 200 households/rooms, has dug a well to provide water to the entire settlement (pers. comm., July 6, 2011).

Residents of Friusa have gained access to the water piped to the hotels. Other settlements, such as Mata Mosquito, have attempted to tap into these lines informally, however, with less success. A mother living in Mata Mosquito since 2004 explains that when they were caught, their

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167 A national body, INDRHI, the National Institute for Water Resources, exists to regulate the drilling of wells. It charges a tax for the drilling of wells and pumping of water, but it is clear that INDRHI has not regulated activity in the poor settlements of Bávaro-Punta Cana.

168 The water here is stored in a large tank (tinaco) on the roof of one house, and is distributed (via gravity) to different parts of the settlement via shared outdoor taps.
connections were cut and they were forced to purchase water from a vendor who drew water from a well at three pesos (approx. US $0.08) per bucket (pers. comm., November 2, 2010). The residents of the settlement were able to negotiate with the local government during the first election campaign for a well and pump to distribute water. According to a resident of Mata Mosquito, however, there is only one hour of access to water per day: ‘Each resident has one bucket and sometimes when the water comes, everybody fills their bucket. But sometimes it comes at night, or it comes but just a little bit. The problem is that there are a lot of houses and the pump is very small and there isn’t enough power to get that much water’ (pers. comm., October 27, 2010).

It is also noteworthy that not all residents have been able to connect to this system, since each household was required to invest in its own pipes to channel water to the house, and are still required to purchase water from neighbours (resident of Mata Mosquito, pers. comm., November 2, 2010).

For sanitation, only large-scale tourism projects are required to implement wastewater treatment facilities. Residents living outside the enclaves, on the other hand, release wastewater directly into the ground from which they draw their water. Since the ground is characterized by karstic limestone, there is little natural filtration and thus high potential for contamination of ground water (Karanjac 2002). According to a Peace Corps volunteer working with the PUNTACANA Ecological Foundation on water and sanitation issues in Verón, approximately one third of all visits to the Rural Clinic of Verón are water-related illnesses (related to faecal contamination), including skin and vaginal infections, and diarrheal diseases (pers.comm. November 28, 2010).

9.1.3.2 Healthcare

The lack of healthcare facilities in the area and the costs associated with it is perhaps the prevailing issue among local residents with regard to their living conditions. There is no hospital in the local area, and the only public health care facility is the Verón Rural Health Clinic, which is supported by Grupo PUNTACANA and Virginia Tech. According to a resident of Haiti Chiquito, ‘[i]f someone gets sick in the middle of night, there is nowhere to take them here. So

169 The rural clinic does not have electronic records.
you have to pay for a taxi to take you to Higüey. If you don’t have the money, you die on the way’ (pers. comm., November 13, 2010). A community leader in El Hoyo de Friusa (pers. comm., October 28, 2010) explains that private clinics exist but are very expensive:

> If someone is very sick and has to go to one of the clinics here, they have to sell what they have, do whatever they can, get a loan, if it is very urgent, they have to go to a clinic here out of necessity. If it isn’t very serious, you take them to Higüey. But if it is urgent, you can’t go all the way to Higüey..., but many people have died on the way to Higüey because they don’t have the money or don’t have a way to borrow.

The last issue raised by this community leader points to another deprivation related to poverty, namely limited or no safety nets. These networks of support are clearly affected by the highly mobile nature of the area, where migrants are often in flux and maintain strong ties with their home town. This is an issue to which I return at the end of the chapter.

### 9.1.3.3 Education

Educational facilities in Verón-Punta Cana are also limited, and are currently unable to provide education to approximately 2,000 low-income children (Hernández 2013). In Friusa, specifically, the only ‘public’ school is the aforementioned, donations-funded, Nazaret. The remaining schools are private, which results in many students being unable to attend school (community leader in Friusa, pers. comm., October 21, 2010).

The only high school in the area is the private initiative by the Grupo PUNTACANA, the Ted and Ana Kheel Polytechnic High School, located in Verón. However, students from El Hoyo de Friusa are not often able to attend because their parents cannot afford the costs of transport, or, in many cases, males are more likely to attend since they are more likely to hitchhike (ibid., October 23, 2010, see Image 9-1). Other students are forced to travel large distances, to La Otra Banda to attend a public high school (resident near Mata Mosquito, pers. comm., November 2, 2010).

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170 I did not research social capital in depth, however, I found that many of those who moved to the area in search of employment, generally did so because of some kind of relationship with a person(s) of Bávaro-Punta Cana. However, the high levels of mobility also means residents quickly lose touch with those who leave.
9.1.3.4 Road and Sidewalk Infrastructure

The provision of road infrastructure is well established in areas traversed by tourism-related transportation. The infrastructure for local residents, however, is less developed. There are few paved roads that enter the informal settlements of Verón-Punta Cana, as is evident in Map 6-3 presented earlier), and unpaved roads pose difficulties for travel in times of rain.

At the time of research, the majority of roads did not have sidewalks (see, for instance, Image 9-1), and when they were constructed, this was often in areas where local residents did not live. For example, the road that descends into El Hoyo de Friusa and links it to the rest of the area at La Bomba (the gas station), does not have sidewalks and street curbs. According to one resident, ‘I see hundreds of motors and cars almost hitting everyone. What about the kids? This is the main road in the area!’ (Field notes, February 24, 2011).

9.1.3.5 Transportation

Transportation is also informal, but highly organized, through powerful associations of motoconchistas (motor-taxi drivers), guaguas (minibuses) locally, and buses (to Higüey and further afield). While many refer to these associations as unions, one motoconchista claims that
these unions are not set up for the purpose of creating communal benefits, but instead, act as networks of exclusion and inclusion (resident of Cristinita, pers. comm., November 16, 2010). The director of planning at the municipal district, Roberto Scarfullery explains the importance of the motoconcho: ‘The motoconcho fulfills a very important function, because of the incapacity to plan a transport system here. They come and provide the service of taking people from the main roads to the front of their house’ (pers. comm., April 14, 2011). Indeed, even the hotel buses which provide transportation to their employees stop, for instance at La Bomba, when dropping off employees after work.

9.1.3.6 Drainage

Finally, there is insufficient drainage which is a common problem in the rainy season. Not only does it affect the flow of traffic since rain floods the street, but it also impacts one settlement in particular, Haiti Chiquito. This settlement is subject to flooding during heavy rains and in the hurricane season, since it is located next to a wetland mangrove forest.¹⁷¹ The construction of the adjacent hotel has prevented the natural flow of water northwards. Indeed, many hotels were constructed directly on top of this natural drainage environment. One study of the central Bávaro area lined with 37 hotels, shows that, of the 18.15km² of basin mangrove forest, over 5km² have been directly affected by hotels alone, either by infilling or by confining the flow of water. Their walls, fences and roads confine the flow of water, which normally drains to the north in Macao, and destroy the continuity of the hydrological system¹⁷² (Herrera Moreno 2007, INDRHI 2007).

Residents of Haiti Chiquito explain that, in 2009, the settlement experienced one meter deep floods for almost one month, as a result of the impasse created by the construction of the neighbouring hotel. Consequently, residents were forced to leave the settlement, and sought

¹⁷¹ This wetland links a number of lagoons, and runs parallel to the ocean from just south of Cabeza de Toro to Macao, covering an approximate area of 21.38 square kilometres. The significance of this basin is due to its extension, distribution and biodiversity of land and coastal fauna, and is the only ecological corridor of this magnitude on the Eastern coastal plain of the DR. Although it plays a major role in the protection of the area against natural disasters, the wetland has also been one the principal victims of tourism expansion in Bávaro-Punta Cana, increasing the vulnerability of the area to natural disasters such as hurricanes and other extreme environmental changes associated with climate change.

¹⁷² These investments shift wetlands to areas that were previously arid, and kill coconut trees, which grow in arid land.
refuge in the neighbouring church. Before the flood had subsided, the residents were asked to return to their settlement (pers. comm. November 13, 2010 and November 15, 2010).

A study shows that in the case of the tropical storm, Jeanne, in 2004, hotels themselves were partly responsible for the damages to their establishments as a result of flooding. Even in places where provision was made for the flow of water between sites through tubes, these were highly inadequate (Herrera Moreno 2007 and CEPAL 2004). Tourist resorts and gated communities are able to better cope with flooding than poor residents of the area. For example, the study by CEPAL (2004) on tropical storm Jeanne states that between the 22 and 28th of August in 2004, 70 cases of malaria were reported. Almost all of these were experienced in the Bávaro area, 83 percent were experienced by construction workers of tourism projects, and 70 percent were Haitian.

9.1.4 Inadequate Housing and Unstable Asset Base

9.1.4.1 Housing

Housing is a critical issue in Bávaro-Punta Cana. Those living outside of enclaves often suffer from poor quality housing, over-crowding, and, in some cases, threats of eviction. Based on the latest census (2010), inhabitants of the province of La Altagracia have poorer quality housing (in terms of construction materials) and a much higher proportion of the population that rents rather than owns their home compared to the rest of the country, as demonstrated by the data in Table 9-2 below (ONE 2008).

While census data are not yet available for Verón-Punta Cana for housing materials, both block/concrete and wood are common, although the poorest generally live in wooden houses with zinc roofs, which insulate the heat and leak during rainfall. In terms of housing tenure, long-term residents of many local settlements in the area claim that the majority of the housing is rented. The renting market is dominated by those working in construction\(^{173}\) (e.g. resident of Ensanche Boulevard, pers. comm., November 30, 2010, and resident near Mata Mosquito, pers. comm., November 2, 2010). Part of the significance of rental housing is that residents rely on

\[^{173}\text{Meanwhile, those employed formally in tourism tend to live in Higüey or in hotel-provided accommodations.}\]
their landlords to make improvements to housing, but as one resident of Haiti Chiquito explains, she still suffers from leaks through the metal sheet roofing when it rains (pers. comm., November 13, 2010).

In terms of housing type, the province has over three times the proportion of people living in rooms in *cuarterías*\(^{174}\) (see Image 9-2 and Image 9-3), than the rest of the country. In the case of Verón-Punta Cana, this percentage is over four times the national average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Type</th>
<th>Verón-Punta Cana</th>
<th>La Altagracia</th>
<th>DR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent House</td>
<td>24.60</td>
<td>50.57</td>
<td>77.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment</td>
<td>41.72</td>
<td>22.59</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room in <em>cuartería</em> or behind house</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominant Construction Material for Walls</th>
<th>Verón-Punta Cana</th>
<th>La Altagracia</th>
<th>DR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block or concrete</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>66.62</td>
<td>74.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>24.39</td>
<td>18.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Tenure</th>
<th>Verón-Punta Cana</th>
<th>La Altagracia</th>
<th>DR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned, paid-off</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>33.91</td>
<td>54.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned, paying-off</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>48.66</td>
<td>32.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given or lent</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>9.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-2: Housing in La Altagracia (%) (2010)
Source: Developed using Census data 2010 (ONE 2012c)

La Altagracia also has the second highest level of crowding\(^{175}\) in the country with 45 percent of its residents living in crowded households, after Pedernales, a border province with Haiti (at 50 percent). In Verón-Punta Cana, this is even more intense with 53 percent of its population living in these conditions, with some neighbourhoods as high as 100 percent.

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\(^{174}\) Cuarterías are rooms of a building rented out individually, usually sharing common spaces, bathing and sanitation facilities.

\(^{175}\) Crowding is defined by more than 3 people per bedroom per housing unit.
9.1.4.2 Displacement and Eviction

In addition to the poor housing conditions, there is also instability in some of the areas studied, in terms of displacement\textsuperscript{176} and evictions. Previously, El Cortecito (see Image 9-4), for example, was a fishermen’s community, but is now one of the few small beach-front spaces that is not

\footnote{\textsuperscript{176} Of course, displacement is widespread in areas of tourism development, globally, and throughout the Dominican Republic (AGFE 2005).}
appropriated by resorts. Located between two resorts, here there are a number of smaller companies selling excursions, gift shops, and restaurants, and a handful of fishermen. However, the original inhabitants of the area have since left, as in the case of one resident in Friusa, who sold his property (pers. comm., October 23, 2010), and it is difficult to know exactly under what conditions other residents left.

The forced evictions that accompany development are the subject of extensive international literature, particular evictions for the purposes of providing public infrastructure (Brand 2001). It is argued that evictions are ‘the result of a planned political decision, reflecting state choices about who will ‘pay’ and who will benefit from development’ (962). This is reflected clearly in one settlement of Bávaro-Punta Cana, Detrás de Casabal. However, displacement or forced evictions in Bávaro-Punta Cana are also a result of private sector tourism development and, to some extent, the assistance of the state in this process (i.e. through the use of armed forces). Surprisingly, there is very little literature in the DR on forced evictions for development projects in general, or in tourist areas, in particular (Yolanda Leon, pers. comm., Jan. 29, 2010).

According to a Dominican environmentalist, Amparo Chantada, displacement and forced evictions are a common occurrence in the DR. The Centre for Rights to Housing and Against Evictions (COHRE 2006) estimates 1,430 people were affected by eviction between 2004-2006 in the DR. Of course, many factors contribute to this situation, but simply put, there is a large deficiency of housing for low-income groups, for whom neither the state nor developers make provision. As a result, land is commonly appropriated by the poor illegally and when the land
becomes of interest to developers, because of a lack of land titles, the informal dwellers are then evicted (Amparo Chantada pers. comm., March 15, 2011). AGFE attributes forced evictions to the lack of deeds and insecurity of tenure. In the Santo Domingo province, for example, 75 percent of the population does not have a deed (AGFE 2005).

Often, evictions occur as a result of a lack of titles (or titles for edifications rather than land), or falsified or duplicated land titles. A representative of the local government explained: ‘There were some difficulties in the past. Even today, you have to check very carefully on the title if there is only one owner on it. Some families are fighting about the land. You have to make sure that the person selling the land is the owner. Make sure you give the money to the one who has the right to sell it’ (pers. comm. April 08, 2011). As a result, it becomes difficult to write about displacement in the DR, since it often unknown whether or not titles are real, duplicated, who owns them, and how their access was granted.

Another factor contributing to this confusion is agrarian reform that began in the 1970s. A former resident of a displaced community, Juanillo, explained that residents were granted land from the country’s largest landholder, Central Romana (also owner of much of the land in Bávaro-Punta Cana). This occurred through the process of agrarian reform in the 1970s by former President, Joaquín Balaguer (pers. comm. January 16, 2011). My own interviews suggest, however, that it is unclear who received titles as a process of this reform and who did not.

Macao, celebrated as having ‘the last public beach’ in the area, is an exemplary settlement that has undergone significant controversy over the years with regards to land titles. A newspaper article from April 8, 1997, shows that some of those who benefited from agrarian reform in

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177 This is an enduring problem in the DR. According to UNCTAD, ‘The imprecision of property boundaries and the lack of control and safekeeping of documents in registries have led to disputes and over-reliance on the judiciary rather than administrative land procedures to achieve secure land transactions’ (52). In 1998, the DR (with IDB) began a process to modernize the property adjudication and registration system, although this has, to date, had limited results.

178 Central Romana (owned by American investors) is both the largest employer and landowner of the Dominican Republic, employing over 25,000 people and owning over 200,000 acres of land. It was established in 1912 as a producer of sugar cane, but has since diversified its products/services (and is involved in the tourism sector, among other things). In 1982, it had a world record for the largest sugar producer by a single sugar mill, and now remains the country’s largest sugar producer (Central Romana 2012).
Macao include close family members\textsuperscript{179} of the President of the Senate (Amable Aristy Castro, who later became Mayor of Higüey and is now the Provincial Governor), a former Senator of Higüey, and a former Provincial Governor, among others of this persuasion (\textit{Revista Rumbo} 1997).

A resident of Macao also explained that the original settlement was evicted from a previous site\textsuperscript{180}. Later, the community was threatened with eviction from its current location, where approximately 350 families now live. He explained that after settling for the second time:

\begin{quote}

nobody worried about chasing down any kinds of documents, because we didn’t have the possibility to do so. But the most powerful, with the most [read economic] resources began acquiring the land titles. And right here, there was a company [Dominican Caribbean Corp, an American company] that bought the land behind us, and after we were here, they took out a land title with the all of our plots within the demarcations\textsuperscript{181} (pers. comm. November 1, 2010).
\end{quote}

As this resident of Macao articulates, many poor families have had their land appropriated and have been disempowered by tourism developers. Indeed, in the tourist area studied here, there have been a number of forced evictions, as well as threats of eviction, as illustrated in Table 9-3, below.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Original Settlement & Eviction / Threat & Evicting/Threatening Entity & Comments \\
\hline
Mata Mosquito & Eviction & White Sands & Relocated to the new Mata Mosquito now also known as Monte Verde. Residents forced to sell. Land provided in new site. \\
\hline
Juanillo & Eviction & Cap Cana & Some now residing in Nuevo Juanillo, others were compensated and moved to Verón, Higüey or further. \\
\hline
Cabo San Rafael & Eviction & Cap Cana & Destination of evictees not known. Eviction recent December 16, 2011. \\
\hline
Verón-Punta Cana & Eviction & Grupo PUNTACANA & Relocated elsewhere in Verón \\
\hline
Haiti Chiquito & Threat & Fiesta Hotels (Gran Palladium) & Land was purchased, without titles \\
\hline
Macao & Threat & Dominican Caribbean & Some residents evicted in 1950s by Valdez family \\
\hline
Detrás de Casabak & Eviction imminent & State & Highway will pass over what is now a settlement \\
\hline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Evicted and/or Threatened Settlements Bávaro-Punta Cana. \textit{Source: Data collected during fieldwork.}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{179} This includes the sister of the President of the Senate, claiming to be a farmer as her occupation.

\textsuperscript{180} According to this resident, this occurred around 1956, and was undertaken by the Valdédz family, allies of the former dictator, Trujillo.

\textsuperscript{181} In order to take out a land title, a \textit{deslinde} or delineation of the land must first be done to demarcate the part of the parcel in question.
Juanillo was a coastal fishermen’s village of over 350 families (thousands of people) that was displaced for the construction of the mega-development, Cap Cana, in 1999 (see Image 9-5 below). There is now a ‘replacement’ town, Nuevo Juanillo (literally, New Juanillo) for those who opted for that compensation option, located within the compounds of Cap Cana, but removed by approximately 8 kilometres from the coastline (Leon pers. comm. June 15, 2011). In this case, some residents have even been displaced twice, the first time, from the construction of the airport by Grupo PUNTACANA, accepting Juanillo as the location for their first resettlement (Elio Payano, pers. comm. November 23, 2010, Dr. Yolanda Leon, pers. comm. June 15, 2011).

Image 9-5: Nuevo Juanillo and Cap Cana
Mata Mosquito (literally ‘Kill Mosquito’) was a small settlement located in what is now a large-scale residential project with a golf course known as White Sands. It has been relocated further inland, with difficult access on a long unpaved, unlit road, and does not have a school or church.

The most recent evictions occurred on December 16, 2011 in Cap Cana in Cabo San Rafael, where a settlement of approximately 100 family homes were demolished without warning and while many residents were at work (Bautista Rodríguez 2012). Evictions also occurred in the Verón area in 2000, where conflicts over legal land ownership occurred between cattle ranchers and community members, and Grupo PUNTACANA. Paul Beswick from PUNTACANA Foundation explains that the company’s lands were occupied illegally by a massive amount of people and the company sought to recover its land through the legal system, eventually conceding a part of its land for settlement. This story is certainly representative of many of the disputes, particularly since many poorer residents have not or are not able to pay to have their plots titled officially, despite having purchase contracts.

In addition to these actual evictions, there is the case mentioned above, in Macao, where some original settlers were evicted once, and then the entire community in the current location was threatened with eviction. Haiti Chiquito (part of El Cortecito), a small settlement located directly outside the walls of the Palladium complex, has long been threatened with eviction, with the apparent support of the Vice-Minister of Tourism. Its residents purchased the land from the Catholic Church next door, and have lived in the settlement for over forty years, decades before the arrival of the hotel.

And finally, Detrás de Casabal, a settlement of low-income renters located in the path of the expanding Eastern Boulevard (see Image 9-6 and Image 9-7), is now also facing eviction by the state. As the Eastern Boulevard nears its completion, both sides of the settlement have by now been asphalted. It is unknown when the evictions will occur, or whether the owner of the

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182 This displacement appears to have been quite messy. It involved a large number of people, including people who were employed in the area but not apparently ‘from Verón’. They tried to take advantage of the situation and claimed to be evicted residents in order to receive some of relocation benefits package provided by Grupo PUNTACANA (Elio Payano, November 23, 2010).

183 The land is owned by five families of around 8 people each. The entire settlement has 105 rooms, occupied by individuals or families (father and daughter residents, pers. comm. November 13, 2010). The name literally means ‘Small Haiti’, due to the high proportion of Haitian residents living there.
settlement will be able to provide alternative housing post-displacement (land owner, pers. comm., July 16, 2011, and a resident, pers. comm. July 06, 2011).

Image 9-6: Detrás de Casabal
Located within the white circle in the wider area of Friusa.
Source: Google Earth (2011)

Image 9-7: Residents in Detrás de Casabal
East to West perspective. The photograph is taken where the northern part of the Boulevard meets Detrás de Casabal.
Source: Own photograph
A number of tactics allow frequent displacement and evictions to occur and prevent these informal settlements from improving their conditions. Firstly, and most basically, many of the evictions were performed with the support of the state – either through military force or with the assistance of the police, or as in the case of threatened eviction in Haiti Chiquito, with support from the former Vice-Minister of Tourism, José Morillo.

Secondly, in most cases, displacement occurred with financial compensation or the provision of an alternative site, ‘a politically correct eviction’, to avoid casting a bad light on the image of the company, as expressed by some residents in Nuevo Juanillo. In that settlement, some residents, particularly those who were not involved in fishing, were generally satisfied with their relocation site. Interviews with those who were previously involved in fishing (i.e. pers. comm. January 28, 2011) or provided excursions for hotels to Juanillo beach (i.e. pers. comm. January 16, 2011), were significantly more critical. In the case of the latter resident, the option chosen was to take the financial compensation and not to accept the relocation to Nuevo Juanillo. He made this decision based on the assumption that Nuevo Juanillo will no longer exist once Cap Cana completes the development of its master plan, as is believed among many evictees. Cap Cana included a clause in its contracts with residents of Nuevo Juanillo that states that should residents of Nuevo Juanillo choose to sell their property, they may only do so to Cap Cana. This clearly limits the potential for residents to gain from increases in property value.

Thirdly, in order to avoid equity and transparency of the processes of eviction, at least in the cases of Mata Mosquito and Juanillo, the respective companies negotiated with residents on a one-on-one basis. Many residents had no prior experience with this kind of negotiation, allowing the companies to provide them with different compensation packages and making promises that were often not kept (pers. comm. November 2, 2010, Yolanda Leon, pers. comm. June 15, 2011).

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184 In the case of Haiti Chiquito, no compensation was ever offered; inhabitants simply received a letter requesting that the land be vacated (pers. comm., November 13, 2011).
185 There were some complaints related to broken promises of the building of a suitable church or other facilities, as was the case with one older lady interviewed (pers. comm. January 28, 2011). However, and as Dr. Yolanda Leon pointed out, women were particularly satisfied with their improved living conditions (pers. comm. June 15, 2011).
However, it must be noted that for many, the displacement of rural communities to new settlements cannot be simply or necessarily compensated by money. For example, a former Juanillo fisherman, who provided excursions to groups of tourists on Juanillo beach, now lives in urban Verón and earns a living as a motor-taxi driver and rents out a few rooms to survive. This represents a drastic change in livelihood (from land dependent to wage labourer) and quality of life: ‘I felt better living over there because here, nobody gets along, everybody pulls in their own direction, here there is no cohesion’ (pers. comm. January 16, 2011). For those who continue to live in their rural settlements, such as in Macao, ‘we don’t have the freedom we had before, when you could walk wherever you wanted and if you felt like it, you could just grab a mango’ (pers. comm. November 15, 2010). He adds that in Macao, it has become difficult to carry out a conversation because eight ‘buggy’ excursions now pass through the village three times a day.

Fourthly, developers also made life difficult for those living in these threatened settlements in order to ‘motivate’ voluntary displacement. The fishermen of Juanillo were displaced eight kilometres inland, making access to the coast difficult particularly since transportation is now necessary. Access to the coast is restricted, and only registered fishermen are allowed through one monitored entrance. Rumours that access to the coast will soon be completely prevented hold popular sway. Nearby Cabo San Rafael was subject to blocked access prior to and after its eviction and demolition by Cap Cana since its only access point is through the mega-development. Residents of both Cabo San Rafael and Nuevo Juanillo must pass through access points and undergo a search in order to pass through with a vehicle.

**9.1.5 Inadequate Protection of Poorer Groups via the Law**

While the issue of access to public space, and the beach in particular, was not a central concern of local residents in Bávaro-Punta Cana, it points to some crucial issues regarding the protection of poorer groups in terms of their rights and protection against discrimination. For this reason, I include a brief discussion of experiences of exclusion from the beach from the perspective of local residents here. I argue that the *de facto* privatization of the public beach does not factor into
the political consciousness\textsuperscript{186} of local residents.\textsuperscript{187} This may be so because access to the beach is not a direct day-to-day concern for those living in conditions of poverty, or because its privatization has been so normalized by local residents, which could point to a larger issue regarding the protection of rights in the DR. This is particularly true since exclusion from the beach (and other public spaces) is often identity-based and thus highly racialized, shaping the lived realities of Haitians, Dominicans of Haitian descent, and darker Dominicans (who may appear Haitian) (e.g. see Image 9-8).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Image_9-8.png}
\caption{POLITUR Regularizing the Beach}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Female of darker skin color approached by the tourism police, POLITUR, on beach.}
\textbf{Source: Own photograph, taken November 10, 2010.}

Despite the \textit{de jure} public nature of the beach, residents perceive them to be private. A group of four male Haitians in their mid-twenties living in El Hoyo de Friusa explained that they rarely go

\textsuperscript{186} I must, however, point out that the privatization of the beach was the subject of one episode of collective mobilization. In 2009, a range of actors demonstrated against beach privatization at Cabo Engaño. This occasion is described by \textit{Bávaro News} as 'one of the most unusual events in this touristic municipal district' (\textit{Bávaro News} 2009) whereby hundreds demonstrated to ensure that the beach nearest Verón, Cabo Engaño (also known as Punta Perla after the incomplete mega project) remain public. This was 'the first public uprising in the area against beach privatization,' and yet even at this event, security impeded passage to the beach (Carsten Gopfert, English, pers. comm., March 10, 2011).

\textsuperscript{187} However, this may also be true for the DR more generally. The local director of the DPP of the Ministry of Tourism, Yasmin Castillo explains that there has yet to develop an environmental consciousness in the country: ‘Nobody ever stops to ask themselves: ‘but the whole coast is mine as an inhabitant of the island. Why do I have to go to the beach through a different place?’ There are things that people have not learned to defend yet.... For example, they implement a big project and tell people how many jobs it will bring and motivate people this way, but they don’t see the secondary effects of this project’ (Yasmin Castillo, pers. comm., February 20, 2010).
to the beach, and that if they do, it would be to El Cortecito or Macao. One of them comments: ‘They’re the only public beaches. The other ones are occupied by the hotels, they are private.’ Another one says: ‘They don’t let us enter. There are public beaches and private ones’ (pers. comm. November 1, 2010).

A resident from Mata Mosquito explains: ‘I used to go to the beach, not anymore. Because, you know, the beach is completely private. Before when there weren’t any hotels, you went to the beach often….’ He defends this by claiming: ‘Well I think that we are not here to go to the beach. We came here to work. The beach is for those who came to enjoy their lives and relax, people on vacation’ (pers. comm., October 27, 2010). This is to a large extent echoed by many local residents and community leaders, including Victoriano Gúzman (pers. comm., October 23, 2010):

Now the hotels don’t give way to let me go with my family and use the beach. In that moment, I see it as negative but also you have to analyze it from the other point of view that the hotel needs security for its guests... and if the whole community has access to the beach, tourists won’t want to be there, think they will assault or rob or swindle them. I also think they should provide peace to the tourist.

Indeed, it is rare to see local residents challenge the status quo in Bávaro-Punta Cana regarding the beach, to the extent that many even appear to have appropriated the narrative propounded by the hotels regarding this issue. A Dominican gift shop manager at El Cortecito explains that in order to ensure that there are no problems, they do not allow Dominicans to share the waterfront with tourists: ‘This is all simply to protect you, the tourist.’ He explains that El Cortecito, on the other hand, is owned by Dominicans and anybody who wishes, can come to bathe there... but ‘the problem is that almost all this area that is available for Dominicans is lined with businesses. So if we have our business, we can’t allow this to be filled with people so when the tourists arrive, they can’t even walk or move’ (pers. comm., January 25, 2011).

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188 As a result, some local residents in the Bávaro area go to El Cortecito (which has suffered severe erosion and is currently a very narrow stretch of beach), but the majority of local residents living in Bávaro-Punta Cana go to the largest ‘public’ beach, Macao (Roberto Scarfullery, pers. comm., April 14, 2011). This beach is particularly significant for locals on weekends, and also in the province during Semana Santa (Holy Week), when thousands make use of the beach during their time off. Those who do or would go, however, comment that they do not go or do not go often because they cannot afford transportation to the beach located approximately twenty kilometres from Friusa. However, the construction of a new resort on the cliffs overlooking Macao has given the impression to locals that this beach too will lose its status as public. Although the government maintains that this beach will not be privatized, a community leader explains: ‘a tourism complex without a beach in Bávaro has problems; it is not attractive for tourists’ (Victoriano Guzman, pers. comm. October 28, 2010).
Perhaps this narrative of ‘the beach is not for us’ can best be described through Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. This idea helps explain how the poor learn to ‘refuse what they are refused’ (1984: 471). Hotels, tour operators, and even a supporting public sector thus hold what Bourdieu refers to as ‘symbolic’ power, ‘the power to define what is given as natural’ (Baiocchi et al. 2010: 22), thereby easily being able to exclude local residents from access to the beach.

9.2 The Invisibility and Discursive Denigration of Local Settlements

The problems faced by these residents by and large epitomize those experienced by informal settlements in urban areas across Latin America and the Caribbean. The solutions found by these residents in response to the many deprivations they experience locally are characterized by practices of informality. While I have addressed the majority of deprivations addressed by Satterthwaite (2003), I have yet to delve into the issue of voicelessness and powerlessness, which I reserve for the last part of this chapter. In the following section, I delve into the ways in which the practices and settlements of local residents living in conditions of poverty are villified, and how xenophobic discrimination plays into this denigration.

9.2.1 Concealing Poor Settlements in Bávaro-Punta Cana

While tourism is a central feature in the DR’s National Development Strategy, poor settlements in tourist areas such as Bávaro-Punta Cana are rendered invisible (discursively and physically). They are also denigrated for environmental degradation through overcrowding and what is locally referred to as arrabalización (perhaps best translated as ‘slumification’), which is associated with rapid, unplanned urbanization and overcrowding.

The discourse used to describe Bávaro-Punta Cana prior to tourism is filled with references to the area being little more than monte y culebra (literally, bush and snakes) (President of the Origin of the term arrabal is rooted in Arabic (from the Muslim rule over Spain over a number of periods during the Middle Ages) for arrabâd, or in classical Arabic, râbad, referring to the unplanned settlements outside town walls. According to the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, (RAE), it means a neighbourhood outside the precinct to which it belongs. Arrabales are described as unspeakable, disgraceful, or shameful, presumably for badly regarded ‘acts’ or the presence of dubious reputation, and represent the dichotomy between the city and the country, the urban and the rural (Salazar 2008).
AHPTZE, Ernesto Veloz, pers. comm. Feb. 24, 2011). In a promotional book for the pioneering tourist company in the area, Grupo PUNTACANA, current modern tourist facilities are juxtaposed with the previous backwardness of the area’s village(s): ‘Once a poor fishing community whose inhabitants burned wood to sell as charcoal, the Punta Cana area now boasts its own airport..., a commercial plaza, designer boutiques, schools, and a unique biodiversity laboratory...’ (Gupta and Zaborowsky 2006: 1). In a similar example found in the local newspaper, Bávaro News, the AHPTZE President described the area prior to tourism with a series of adjectives describing the backwardness of Bávaro-Punta Cana (emphasis added, my own translation):

The communities of Punta Cana-Bávaro were practically non-existent on the Dominican map, because they barely consisted of a small village with not much more than a dozen precarious dwellings, whose families barely subsisted from wood cutting for construction and charcoal; limited agriculture; primitive animal rearing and rudimentary fishing.

It must be noted as well that the depiction of the Eastern zone of the DR as an empty, backward landscape, also covers up a second history, this time, one that predates colonial times. The construction of some hotels in the Eastern zone (generally from Macao in the North, along the coast to La Romana further south) has resulted in the excavation of a number of indigenous settlements and plazas. These are generally located in areas with beach access, and some of the ‘discovered’ caves are now also used as excursion destinations. Interestingly, prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the Eastern part of the country (along the coastal plain) was the most densely populated of the entire island (Samson 2010).

The invisibility of local settlements in Bávaro-Punta Cana is statistical, political and symbolic. Until recently, the official population was based on the 2002 census of 15,241 inhabitants, whereas the new census puts this number at 43,982 (ONE 2012b). However, the original count for 2010 was well over 50,000, and decreased by approximately 10,000 residents in the subsequent publications and the current database online for unknown reasons (ONE 2012a).

Furthermore, local residents in many cases do not figure in maps of the local area, which are largely designed for tourists by tourism promoters. The official hotels map created by the Ministry of Tourism (2012, see Appendix K), for example, makes reference to Friusa in the same font size as a souvenir market, and is only marked by two icons – a large gas station and a taxi
stand. The study mentioned above commissioned by the AHPTZE estimates a population of 4,465 for El Hoyo de Friusa (Valdez 2008).

As David Satterthwaite has expressed, ‘to live in an informal settlement – a slum or a shanty town – is to be ignored and invisible’ (IIED 2012), making those living in some parts of Bávaro-Punta Cana and working certain kinds of jobs doubly invisible. According to UN-Habitat (2003), ‘[t]he urban poor are trapped in an informal and ‘illegal’ world – in slums that are not reflected on maps, where waste is not collected, where taxes are not paid and where public services are not provided. Officially, they do not exist’ (6).

In Bávaro-Punta Cana, the invisibility of poor, informal inhabitants, their settlements, and even labour is precisely that which has allowed for the discriminatory practices that have necessarily shaped the physical and spatial segregation of the area. In other words, this invisibility has played a central role in the nature of urbanism in Bávaro-Punta Cana, which I have described in Chapter 6 as fragmented and splintered.

9.2.2 Denigrating Informality

Concurrently, this historic ‘empty’ and backwards past has been accompanied by the narrative of arrabalización, which could be interpreted as the expansion of slums or slum-like qualities, which include the following five characteristics:

- inadequate access to safe water
- inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure
- poor structural quality of housing
- overcrowding
- insecure residential status (UN-Habitat 2003)

Indeed, underinvesting in urban enclaves repeats a pattern of viewing urbanization as something harmful among policymakers and scholars throughout the developing world; ‘[t]o them, the concentration of poverty, slum growth and environmental problems and manifold social disturbances in cities paint a menacing picture’ (Hardoy et al. 2006: 2).
Of course, environmental problems are not a necessary outcome of rapid urban change. They become an issue only if environmental change is ignored in the urbanization process, and when political and institutional frameworks in place are inadequate to address emerging problems as urban populations and production expand (Hardoy et al. 2006). As many planners are aware, while urbanization may often get blamed for environmental degradation, the relationship is often the inverse, and returns to scale can even make urban living efficient, particularly in terms of the provision for basic infrastructure (Martine et al. 2008, Hardoy et al. 2006).

Of the terms used to describe Bávaro-Punta Cana and its local settlements, ‘slumification’ is perhaps the most pervasive description of the changes in the area by all interviewees in my research, from members of the private sector, the state (and its heterogeneous entities), civil society and local residents themselves. ‘Slumification’ has been appropriated and used by both the private sector and local residents to place blame on the state for a lack of planning and regulation (i.e. President of the PUNTACANA Foundation, Paul Beswick pers. comm. Jan 31, 2011).

However, and more crucially, it has been used by the state and the private sector to blame the poor for environmental degradation in the area, particularly their appropriation and subdivision of land for the construction of low-income shelter. The focus is on the construction of shelter because, argue the state and market forces, of its impact on tourism. Consequently, this shifts the focus away from the exploitation of the natural resource base by tourism corporations, and onto the poor. An example of the form that blaming can take is provided by the following passage in a study on competitiveness by the Tourism Cluster of La Altagracia:

The view of housing in the worst conditions of poverty cannot in any way be attractive or picturesque, where the humility of housing is compounded by the total ignorance of its inhabitants. One can see mountains of debris, trash, weeds, farm animals, naked children playing in the dirt. All these elements clash with what the tourist sees in the destination’s advertising before his/her arrival, making every effort and investment in advertising a complete waste of resources. (Ojeda 2006, my own translation)

The idea that environmental degradation is strongly associated with poverty and a lack of education is broadly accepted, as demonstrated in one of the country’s primary newspapers, El Diario Libre, which expresses the view that while the majority of hotels send their waste to distant landfill sites without classification or treatment, ‘the surrounding population scatters its waste in the environment, because of a lack of civic education,’ (own translation, emphasis
added). According to this article, ‘slumification,’ is one of the biggest concerns of the national hotel association, ASONAHORES, due to the ways in which it affects the image for tourists (El Diario Libre 2010). Similar thoughts were expressed by a representative from the planning department (DPP) at the Ministry of Tourism, who stated that informal settlements put out an image of poverty, but also socially, they accompany an increase in delinquency, prostitution, drugs, as well as Haitian migration (pers. comm., March 23, 2011).

9.2.3 Racialized Discourse

The cultural discourse is, furthermore, highly racialized, often through the association of environmental degradation with Haitian migrants. Racist discourse is not exclusive to Bávaro-Punta Cana and occurs throughout the country, but it is particularly marked in this context as a result of the sheer number of Haitians who have sought employment in this economically dynamic area. Looking at the racialization of discourse and race in general is significant because ‘the particular situations and cultural contexts examined require an engagement with these politics and the forms of social inequality and marginalization that attend them’ (Dick and Wirtz 2011: E4). For this reason, some have sought to extend Marxist theory to incorporate questions of race, as Frantz Fanon has in The Wretched of the Earth (1963), ‘[w]hen you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to a given race, a given species’ (40).

The DR was ‘discovered’ in 1492 and was ruled in different periods by Spain, France, and Haiti. The DR was first colonized by the Spanish, while Haiti was occupied by the French. After Spain (re) claimed Santo Domingo from the French in 1808, the Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer annexed Santo Domingo. On February 27th, 1844, Boyer was overthrown, and Santo Domingo became the DR, after Haitian rule for 22 years. Indeed, it is the only country to

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190 The Dominican Republic is one of the three Spanish-speaking islands in the Caribbean. Prior to colonization by the Spanish, the island was home to the native Taínos. This society, however, was quickly eradicated with the onslaught of colonization, through violence, genocide, new diseases brought by the Europeans, and assimilation. In 1493, during his second voyage, Christopher Columbus established the New World’s first colonial settlement at La Isabela in Puerto Plata on the north coast. The fort was destroyed by the Taínos, and was replaced with Santo Domingo on the south coast. Santo Domingo became the first lasting European settlement, and eventually became what we know now as the capital of the DR. It was the first city to import slaves in the New World, only ten years after Columbus’ first arrival in 1492 (Gates 2011).
gain and celebrate its Independence from another former colony (Gates 2011), and in this case, a colony founded by former slaves (Howard 2001). It is also the only country to return to its colonial power, Spain, which occurred in the early 1860s (1860-1865).  

In the Dominican context, race is particularly significant, as it represents what Howard (2001) has referred to as ‘the cradle of blackness in the Americas’; this country received the continent’s first blacks, established the colonial plantation system and ‘New World African slavery’ (viii).

The construction of identity and nationalism has been fundamentally coupled with the manipulation of racial differences, in two ways. First, it is dependent on the unequal standing ascribed to European, African and indigenous descendent: ‘European and indigenous heritages in the Dominican Republic have been celebrated at the expense of an African past’ (Howard 2001:1). Indeed, it is rare that a Dominican will self-proclaim her/his self as black. Instead, the vast majority (82 percent to be specific, according to Gates (2011), based on the 2002 census) identify themselves as indio, or indigenous. Second, given the (uneasily) shared history and insularity of the DR and Haiti, Dominican identity is also constructed in direct opposition to that of Haiti (Howard 2001).

A number of researchers have examined anti-Haitianismo in the DR, which ‘is manifested largely in ‘othering’ of Haitians as African, black, poor and uncivilised in contrast to a European, white(r), developed civilised Dominican people’ (Holmes 2010: 633, see also Ferguson 1992, and Howard 2001). Indeed, this anti-Haitianismo is ‘not only rooted in a national conflict, but also in a racial articulation of what is best and preferable’ (Espinal 2003). The racialization of language defines what is considered normal and what is not, what should be and what should not be, who belongs and who dominates (Dick and Wirtz 2011). As noted by Frantz Fanon (1963), it is clear that colonialism has left its legacy in contemporary discourse through the drawing of divisions between ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’, the white and the black.

Anti-Haitianismo is strongly rooted in the 1822 Haitian invasion of Santo Domingo (Gregory 2007), which bred resentment among Dominican elites (Silié and Segura 2002). After regaining

191 In the last century, the DR was also occupied by US forces on two occasions, first in 1916-24, and later in 1965-1966 when the US was concerned with communist expansion.
independence in 1844, a national identity was formed ‘against the persisting Haitian threat - one that emphasized the new republic's Hispanic, rather than African, origins and its racial distinctiveness from black Haiti’ (Gregory 2007: 180).

In 1930, General Rafael Trujillo took power as dictator of the nation until his assassination in 1961. Dominican resentment and distrust increased as Haiti continued attempts to invade the the DR. During the Trujillo era, the entire border with Haiti was militarized to protect the country from a Haitian invasion, ultimately resulting in the massacre of 25,000 Haitians (Silié and Segura 2002). Anti-Haitianismo was revived in this period, and was also evident in the presidency of Trujillo’s protegé, Joaquin Balaguer (1960-62, 1966-78, 1986-1996), who expelled six thousand Haitian migrant workers and people of Haitian descent from the DR (Gregory 2007). In the words of Edward Paulino (2006:266),

Although anti-Haitianism has its historical roots in the early 1800s, Trujillo and his intellectuals would, in unprecedented fashion, crystallize a historic but diffuse anti-Haitian sentiment into official government discourse. Starting after the massacre in 1937 and lasting through 1946, this nationalistic state doctrine sought to erase the historic and collaborative history between the two peoples while promoting xenophobic government policies along the border.

Despite the mistreatment of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent, Dominicans have long relied on their labour, particularly in the sugar production industry, the country’s primary export industry. Migrant labour was contracted from Haiti, to the tune of approximately 20,000 seasonal workers until the mid-1980s (Gregory 2007).

It is unknown how many Haitians and Haitian-descended Dominicans currently work and reside in the DR, but estimates range from 500,000 to 1.5 million (Ferguson 2003). Haitians began migrating to the DR in search of employment in the early 20th Century, and became the source of labour for sugar cane plantations. Haitians worked for low wages and lived in poor conditions in bateyes, villages created by sugar refinery companies to house the temporary labourers near the sugar fields (Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004). Shifts in the global economy in the 1980s resulted in the fall of the sugar industry. Notwithstanding, migration continued from Haiti to DR, but now Haitians seek employment in new industries, including agriculture, construction, tourism, domestic labour, and various forms of informal trade.

Much less is known about these contemporary migrants, in a large part due to their illicit and undocumented nature. Of course, it is neither in the best interests of the workers nor the
employers soliciting their labour to draw attention to the informality that fundamentally supports the country’s formal economy (Ferguson 2003). ‘Businesses benefit from the cheap, docile labour whose vulnerability can be maintained because of the fact that many do not have documentation or written contracts. The workers benefit too in the sense that they can work, despite their vulnerability’ to possible exploitation (Bridget Wooding, pers. comm., May 11, 2011).

Academics describe Haitian labour in the DR as ‘needed but unwanted’ (e.g. Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004, Ferguson 2003). The government has been hesitant to make any clear policies regarding migrant labour in the country, but deportation of undocumented Haitians or even Dominican-born residents of Haitian-descent is common. Unlike many other countries, the DR does not grant residency or citizenship for those who have lived in it for numerous years (Ferguson 2003 and Bridget Wooding, pers. comm., May 11, 2011). According to Wooding (n.d.), ‘[m]ost political party leaders are reluctant to address the question and this is compounded by the attitudes of powerful groups in the private sector who have a vested interest in maintaining an unregulated flow of cheap and docile migrant labour in agriculture, construction and tourism’ (23).

Until the last revision of the constitution in 2010, all children born in the DR who were not children of diplomats or of people in transit (in the country for less than 10 days), were given Dominican birth certificates and nationality. However, this has now been reversed, leaving children of illegal migrants without birth certificates. Ultimately, this has created a class of statelessness for many without recourse to fulfil basic human rights or access to basic services (Bridget Wooding, pers. comm., May 11, 2011). This is echoed by Cañada (2011), who states that ‘[m]any migrants’ lack of documentation makes it difficult for them to have access to services and increases their vulnerability vis-à-vis the contractor’.

The ‘slumification’ discourse described earlier is thus complicated and deepened by racial discrimination and xenophobia against Haitians in the DR. The uneasy relationship between the DR and its neighbour to the west, Haiti, is manifested in the everyday lives of those living in

\[192\] Own translation.
Bávaro-Punta Cana. According to the leader of an informal civil society organization, United Haitians in the Dominican Republic (HURD), discrimination, in its various forms, is the biggest problem suffered by Haitians in the country (pers. comm. December 01, 2010).

First, Haitians are accused of taking jobs away from Dominicans since they represent a cheaper source of labour (e.g. resident of Haiti Chiquito, pers. comm. November 15, 2011; resident of Cristinita (in Verón), pers. comm. January 16, 2011; and President of ASONAHORES, Julio Llibre, in Castro Jimenez 2010). In the words of HURD’s leader, discrimination is felt in the sense that, with respect to the economic downturn and lack of employment possibilities, ‘there are many people, many Dominicans, who think that the problems they are facing have been brought on by Haitians, they don’t think that it is globalization, that what is happening here is happening around the world’ (pers. comm. December 01, 2010, own translation). Indeed, the presence of Haitians in the DR, but also more specifically, their concentration in Bávaro-Punta Cana, has come to be referred to as ‘a problem’ (i.e. Castro 2010).

Second, and more crucially for my point here, is that Haitians have also become analogous with arrabalización, being associated with violence (resident of Mata Mosquito, November 2, 2010), unsanitary living conditions, and illness (e.g. resident of El Hoyo de Friusa, pers. comm. October 23 and 28, 2010). This resident explains that Haitians are trying to ‘impose their culture,’ which includes littering and a lack of hygiene on their new homes, and many Dominicans are now copying this culture, throwing their waste on the street.

As Julio Llibre, expressed in the newspaper, Hoy, ‘the quality of life of tourists and Dominicans is put at risk because of the unsanitary living conditions of Haitians in the country’ (Castro 2010, emphasis added). Perhaps the most damning example of the discrimination faced by Haitians in Bávaro-Punta Cana is another article published in Hoy, entitled Slumified Bávaro: The streets are deteriorated, dusty and without sidewalks.193 Quoting an estimate by the AHPTZE of 20,000 Haitians in the area in 2007 and also one by a local resident exaggerating this figure to over 200,000 Haitians, the article allocates blame to Haitians for everything from over-population (an

193 Own translation. ‘Bávaro Arrabalizado: Calles deterioradas, polvorientas y sin aceras.’
‘avalanche of undocumented Haitians’), to the burning of waste, poor quality housing, and even the raping of tourists (Calderón 2009). The depiction of poverty is focused exclusively on Haitians, with little or no mention of Dominican poverty in the area:

Haitians live piled up. This promiscuity is typical of the Haitian people, especially those who emigrate to this country. These barracks are of poor quality. There is no space even to build latrines and relieve themselves. Some do it in plastic bags or are in the bushes nearby.

A recent article by tourism expert Juan Lladó, explains that while the 25,000 Haitians are not the ‘principal’ culprits of urban disorder, they certainly contribute to the ‘slumification’ and environmental degradation in the settlements that they are inhabiting, but also present health concerns due to the prevalence of malaria in Haiti and the constant migration of Haitians to and from their country (Lladó 2012).

9.3 Material Changes

By discursively vilifying informal settlements and their residents, more powerful actors are able to exert their control over society and nature. These narratives are used to separate the environments of international tourists and wealthier local groups from those of poor local residents. This occurs through the establishment of walls, the use of security and policing, the lack of adequate services provided to informal settlements, and the demarcation of visible and invisible boundaries between ‘tourist areas’ and those left for poor residents, to name a few examples.

Ideas hold important material implications (Bryant 1997), indeed, there is a certain politics associated with the naming of places. The various narratives of ‘slumification’ and discursive constructions that render informality invisible facilitate and provide a pretext for many environmental injustices carried out against Bávaro-Punta Cana’s poorer residents, including displacement, forced evictions, the segregation of spaces, the ‘regularizing’ of the beach and streetscapes, and/or discrimination against Haitians. It also affects the way local residents relate to different spaces (e.g. in the avoidance of the beach). Terminology, such as arrabalización, is mobilized in certain ways that allow for tourism corporations to reap the use and exchange

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194 This is one of the methods employed for eliminating waste when it accumulates (and is not collected by the state), not only by Haitians, but Dominicans alike.
values of areas for which they have interest for tourism development. Unquestionably, there are particular political geographies to displacement.

In early 2013, the local newspaper announced that the Ministry of Tourism began a process of ‘desarrabalización’ or (‘de-slumification’). The Ministry is said to have ‘caught’ twenty people ‘in the act of illegal activities,’ namely selling excursions and handicrafts within the sixty metres of the shoreline (Bávaro News 2013), effectively excluding informal vendors from the use of public space in the same way the private resort chains encroach on the border zone of the beach which is designated as ‘public.’

In the case of evicted settlements, tourism developers prevented residents from making any improvements to their houses in order to maintain the image of ‘slumification’ as a reason to potentially justify eviction. This was noted in Punta Cana (for two years prior to eviction), Haiti Chiquito (to this day), and Juanillo (for a period after Hurricane George in 1998, prior to evictions). An elder (owner) resident living in Haiti Chiquito for 43 years, made a very clear point regarding the hypocrisy of ‘slumification’ and the presence of Haitians:

If tourism needs this to ‘beautify’ [the area], and they buy it from me and give me what it is really worth, then I would collaborate because it’s good that tourism moves forward. But they don’t want anything but to get rid of us... And if they don’t want Haitians to come here, the government has to control it... but it is the hotels who are actually hiding Haitians in the bush when the bosses come, because they are the cheap source of labour (pers. comm., November 15, 2010).

Indeed, labour contracts are often temporary or seasonal to keep labour flexible and avoid paying out severance. In order to avoid abiding by labour laws, paying social security, pension, and health insurance. companies often employ Haitian labourers for low-skilled jobs, such as construction or landscaping (leader of neighbourhood organization in Ensanche Punta Cana, Verón, pers. comm., November 19, 2010). Hotels are able to by-pass problems with hiring undocumented workers by subcontracting work to construction or landscaping companies (resident of El Hoyo de Friusa, October 29, 2010 and Trucchi 2010). These companies petition the Directorate General of Migration for temporary work permits, and once approved, transport workers to their new temporary work places (Ministerio de Trabajo 2011). Often, their companies leave them without return transport, and inevitably, these labourers overstay their allowable work period (resident of Macao, November 15, 2010).
9.4 Discussion

The subject of the sidewalk has been a particular contentious issue in the development of urban space in Bávaro-Punta Cana, to which I alluded in the introduction of my thesis. Indeed, the sidewalk is in itself an interesting point of departure for thinking about planning issues and urban space, since it can be taken to symbolize the very essence of ‘the urban.’ In comparison to access to water and waste collection, which are certainly more pressing issues related to development and urban poverty, the sidewalk can be used as a lens for observing the tensions that are commonly found in urban settings.

According to representatives of the Ministry of Tourism, the local community protested the implementation of the sidewalk. Local residents and businesses were concerned with two issues; they worried that sidewalks would result in a the reduction in the speed of traffic due to the use of part of the road for the construction of sidewalks, or that sidewalks would take space away from the roadside used for parking. According to Yasmin Castillo, these concerns can attributed to the lack of permanence of residents of the area, giving preference to vehicles, not pedestrians (Yasmin Castillo, pers. communication, February 2, 2010).

Indeed, the majority of people who relocate to Bávaro-Punta Cana and live in the informal settlements do so with the primary aim of finding employment opportunities. A resident in Cristinita, Veron says: ‘If I had work at home in San Pedro, I would have stayed there’ (pers. comm., January 16, 2011). One mother from Mata Mosquito says: ‘[y]ou live here because you don’t have anywhere else to live, because if you did have somewhere else to live, you wouldn’t live here. You would move to a place where you can sign your kids up for school, live a little better, but here, a lot of things are missing.’ This is compounded by the transient nature of employment (e.g. contract work or seasonality), but also hotel-provided accommodations, where

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195 ‘Nobody is interested in the bigger picture, everybody is interested in themselves, but not what is happening outside [of their ‘bubble’].’
196 Many have similar opinions. For instance, a young Haitian man in El Hoyo de Friusa says: ‘If there was work, I would go back there [to Haiti] because it is my country, it is better.’ His friend explains, Haiti, ‘that is our home, we are here by necessity, by obligation’ (pers. comm. November 1, 2010). Perhaps most tellingly, many Haitians send their children to live with their grandparents in Haiti in order to have access to a decent education (resident of El Hoyo de Friusa, pers. comm., November 1, 2010).
families are separated for extended periods of time as one adult is accommodated on premises and the family remains in the hometown.

Migration for employment results in significant impermanence, and those with employment in Bávaro-Punta Cana normally utilize their holidays to return to their home towns, having little vested interest in the area or attachment to place. It appears to be a self-reinforcing cycle: the failure to develop infrastructure and services, makes people less likely to inhabit the space in a permanent way, and the failure to, say, register to vote in the area, makes it even less likely that infrastructure will eventually be provided for.

Often impermanence affects the ability to form neighbourhood organizations. In the cases of Mata Mosquito and Haiti Chiquito, two settlements with, arguably, the worst living conditions, neighbourhood organizations were dismantled due to the departure of key players in their organization. The transient nature of these communities appears to make it difficult to sustain any form of long-term organization.197

Discussions held at neighbourhood organizations’ meetings, however, challenge the perspective that local residents are not invested in their settlements or do not care about sidewalks. These residents have settled indefinitely, and have strong opinions on what kind of facilities they require to build a liveable urban space, not simply a temporary place to generate income. As this example suggests, as with any urban setting, multiple and often conflicting claims will often be made on urban space.

This relates to one remaining characteristic of poverty, voicelessness and powerlessness, which I have yet to discuss. I reserved this point to the end because it relates to the ways in which local residents make claims for better living environments.

The understanding of what a local government should do is limited in the local area. The overriding impression is that local residents understand it as a body responsible for waste collection, but road cleaning and maintenance, as well as lighting and safety provision have also

197 However, one former President of the neighbourhood organization in Villa Esperanza, Kelvin explains that ‘now, there is a new turn in things because before those who arrived here as immigrants were only interested in earning money and going back to their houses. And the neighbourhood organizations are helping to change that’ (pers. comm., November 12, 2010).
been mentioned. Ultimately, waste collection has become the accepted indicator that the local government functioning ‘properly’ among local residents. More basic than this, many residents often visit the mayor to ask for help in burying a family member or individual favours, and do so through neighbours who are also employed or affiliated with the local government, believing (possibly rightly so) that they can benefit from that relationship.

The historical lack of an absence of local government has also, to some extent, bred a distanced relationship between these civil society groups and the government. One resident of Macao explains: ‘At least the people here have become used to living with what they have, not to ask too much. If some help comes to benefit the poorest, then we see it as good. But it’s not that we are behind the government or demanding from institutions’ (pers. comm., November 15, 2010). This is echoed by the current Mayor of the Municipal District (Radhames Carpio, pers. comm., October 27, 2011):

> It has to be said also that people here are aware of the situation of the local government because you see, the local government barely receives 920,000 pesos [or approximately US$ 26,000]¹⁹⁸ per month… which really isn’t even enough to pay for the garbage [collection]. So, people understanding that this is a new local government that only recently started a year and a bit ago, and knowing how little the local government collects and the subsidy that is sent by the state, they don’t put that much pressure when they see that things haven’t been resolved. It has to be said that the people understand that they cannot yet attack.

Thus, rather than a state of voicelessness and powerlessness (although certain groups are certainly more disadvantaged than others, e.g. Haitians), it is safe to say that there is still no framework or structure in place which can provide the basic services that are required to adequately develop urban space.

¹⁹⁸ Calculated at an exchange rate of 38 pesos to the US dollar.
10 Conclusion: Planning Destinations or Urban Space?

The promotion of tourism has become an important part of national development strategies in the global South, particularly in SIDS. In the Caribbean, the DR, Jamaica, and Cuba (not to mention Cancún, if we count the Caribbean coast of Mexico) are leaders in tourism, much of which is manifest in the form of the enclave ‘sun, sand, and sea’ model. For many, particularly politicians, growth in tourism is a marker of success.

A press release in Jamaica in December 31, 2012 from the Minister of Tourism, Wykeham McNeill, for example, touts the sector's growth: ‘More visitors came to cavort in Jamaica's warm blue waters and spent more money this year than they did in the corresponding period last year’ (Walters 2012). In DR, the current President, Danilo Medina declared, in May 2012, that his goal is to work towards bringing 10 million tourists to the country within ten years (Lladó 2012). Certainly, if ‘success’ is premised on increases in the number of hotels rooms and the number of arrivals, then the development of a destination such as Bávaro-Punta Cana, with approximately 30,000 rooms to date and over 2 million arrivals annually, must be considered a success.

Those who have examined the impacts of tourism on local societies, economies and environments, on the other hand, are more critical of the purported benefits tourism is meant to bring. Throughout this thesis, however, it is evident that there is a need to understand more than simply impacts of tourism, but also the relationship between tourism and processes associated with urbanization, ‘development’ and governance. I did not aim to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of tourism development in Bávaro-Punta Cana and make some normative recommendations as to how best avoid the ‘black’ (or negative externalities associated with tourism), while promoting the ‘white’ (or benefits). I took the ‘grayness’ of tourism as a point of departure, aiming instead to understand the role of coastal tourism in the wider dynamics of urbanization and urban development.

10.1 Thesis Outline

I narrated the story of Bávaro-Punta Cana in eight substantive chapters, in addition to introductory and conclusion chapters. Following a brief introduction to my thesis in Chapter 1, I aimed to contextualize some of the issues that arose in my research and in the literature on
tourism and planning in Chapter 2. In the subsequent chapter, I set out the research design employed for the collection, recording and analysis of my data, and explored some of the tensions between various (often competing) aspects of my position as a researcher in the DR.

Chapter 4 is the first chapter that provides some context into the practice of tourism planning in the DR. Historically, tourism planning in the DR was largely characterized by and limited to the establishment of policies to galvanize private investment in the tourism sectors. This occurred primarily through the tourism incentive laws legislated in the 1970s for the first time and amended in the early 2000s. While tourism investment was promoted at the national level through the Ministry of Tourism (and its various predecessors), very little was accomplished in the way of regulation, planning or establishing mechanisms for local residents to benefit from the activity, particularly at the local level.

The next chapter then delves into some of the structural or institutional weaknesses that strongly shape the ways in which local governments can and do act, their ability to guide development in their territory and their power vis-à-vis other actors. Three issues are key to understanding the wider factors that have shaped Bávaro-Punta Cana’s lack of planning. First, state bureaucracies, at all levels, have yet to function in the ideal Weberian sense. The separation between the public and private lives of bureaucrats is not always clear, recruitment is not often based on merit, but instead on personal relationships, and there is little predictability in the careers of public servants, resulting in very little institutional continuity with changes in government.

Second, the legacy of centralization in the DR continues, despite reforms to decentralize power to the level of local government. Decentralization has resulted in the excessive fragmentation of the territory, disallowing many small local governments from benefiting from economies of scale, and furthering practices of clientelism in governance. Further, and perhaps most telling, many local governments have been formed or left without adequate capacity and support. Although a body to build the capacity of local governments (The Municipal League) was established in the 1930s, it has done little more than usurp funds dedicated to municipal and municipal district governments.

Third, the state is not a monolithic entity; many factions do not (or inadequately) collaborate with each other, and it is clear that some have significantly more influence than others, namely
the Ministry of Tourism and, of course, the President of the Republic, over local governments or the Ministry of Environment, for example. This, indeed, has a particular significance for areas of coastal tourism, such as Bávaro-Punta Cana.

With this context in mind, I began illustrating the ways in which private capital (much of which originates in Mallorca, Spain) began to invest in Bávaro-Punta Cana in the late 1960s and develop the tourism market, particularly since the 1980s when many international hotel chains began locating their investments in the tourism pole. With this, came a process of migration and urbanization, characterized by enclave developments that have stronger connections to their market countries than to the local context. I describe the newly established urban areas as representative of ‘splintered urbanism,’ for its network of integration of particular global spaces and dislocation or bypass over local places.

In Chapter 7, I focused largely on the unequal relations between the newly established and largely impotent local government of Verón-Punta Cana with other key actors in the area. Given the newness of the government, it has been unable to ensure the public good. Now, operating in a context where tourism has been functioning largely without regulation and planning, the local government is required to insert itself into a landscape of fragmentation and operate in a context of highly imbalanced relations with the private sector and the Ministry of Tourism, in particular.

The objective of Chapter 8, in turn, was to examine the role of the private sector in the ‘development’ of Bávaro-Punta Cana and its engagement with corporate social responsibility (CSR). Through donations and charitable practices towards the local communities, the private sector was able to demonstrate that it is doing ‘good’ for the local area, without changing the status quo. It is apparent that the private sector cannot simply be viewed as an economic actor, but a political actor, shaping urban space through its business activities but also through its acts of ‘D/development.’ The governance and development lacunae were, to some degree, filled by the private sector, which became more than simply a provider of employment. Private corporations, local and foreign, came to be seen as agents of development by local residents. Indeed, the private sector positioned itself as a powerful and pivotal agent vis-à-vis both the local community and government. The private sector, although laudable, in some cases, for its contributions to ‘D/development,’ cannot be a substitute for a locally and democratically elected, transparent, participatory, and accountable government, nor for the more (generally) long-term
nature of government institutions (v.s. unreliability of private capital investment). There also remains a central role for the State at the local level in attempting to achieve consistency of development across space, rather than simply pockets of individual, piece-meal attempts to contribute to ‘Development,’ (Big D).

Finally, in the last substantive chapter, I illustrated the conditions in which many living in the informal settlements surrounding tourist enclaves live. I argue that it is evident that the problems faced by local residents are inherently urban issues, as in the case of the disputes over the construction of the sidewalk. The failure to acknowledge the need for urban-type infrastructure can have very real implications for development, and indeed, can even create conditions of poverty that are inferior to other urban settings across the country.

I also made the claim that the practices that residents undertake in order to get by are disparaged and racially charged. This racialization of environmental issues involves placing the blame for environmental degradation on the very populations involved in the construction of the hotel industry. While this is not limited to Bávaro-Punta Cana, it is evident that the large Haitian population brings out a deeply-rooted national xenophobia. I further argue that the naming of places as characterized by arrabalización or ‘slumification’ can have very material impacts, on housing and settlement security and quality, livelihoods, physical segregation and access to space, which can have the effect of cementing the poverty experienced by those (Haitians and Dominicans alike) living in the more informal and semi-formal settlements of Bávaro-Punta Cana. Furthermore, attempts to mobilize around certain issues are often limited by the transient nature of much of the employment, as well as the lack of a structure with the capacity to facilitate the fulfillment of basic needs.

10.2 Power and Urban Space

Across the various chapters of my thesis, I have shown how tourism is fundamentally involved in the shaping and production of urban spaces inhabited by a range of residents and utilized by an even wider range of stakeholders. Understanding tourist areas cannot simply be about the positive and negative impacts of tourism. It must also acknowledge the role of tourism in the development and governance of urban areas, and in the shaping of power relations between and within the public and private sectors and their own internal heterogeneity. By examining the
actions of, and relationship between, three groups of actors, this case has brought to light a
number of issues and lessons that may be relevant for other places, with respect to power
relations and urban space.

Power dynamics work in such a way that the private sector plays an important role in the
configuring of urban and social space, by dictating the physical and cultural landscape, and
shaping local politics. Where the local government is largely impotent, the private sector plays a
key role in determining the expansion of tourism (and its form) and the local development of an
area through by-passing the authority of local government, or playing the role of ‘Development’
agent. In turn, the private sector reinforces its position of power over a less potent local
government, and it is certainly possible that these practices usurp the role of the local
government as the protector of the public good and render it redundant, at least in the eyes of
local residents.

While I would not conclude that it is contributing to ‘Development’ (big ‘D’), the private sector
makes three key contributions to the local society. First, it creates work opportunities for a large
number of people through ‘development’ (small ‘d’). Second, it does provide essential services
and infrastructure that contribute to the well-being of some residents in some respects. And third,
it draws attention to the need for ‘Development’ (big ‘D’), albeit often through the discourse of
arrabalización. Indeed, these benefits are generally counterbalanced with practices of
segregation and exclusion, eviction and eviction threats, low minimum wages, high job
seasonality, a failure to pay taxes to the local government, and even environmental change that
affects local residents directly (e.g. the displacement of water flow and flooding in Haiti
Chiquito).

It is important to note that the private sector is, in itself, very heterogeneous. While some make
few attempts to implement sustainable practices and contribute to the well-being of their
surroundings, others are more involved. One actor in particular, Grupo PUNTACANA, has done
impressive work for the local community and environment. However, this company also has the
power to direct and influence many outcomes in the area, and, arguably, in the country, for the
benefit of tourism (or other initiatives/pursuits).
The example of the *de facto* privatization of the beach clearly highlights the relations between and among the three groups of actors. The tacit acceptance that the main purpose of the beach is for the utilization of tourists epitomizes the lack of regulation, which comes down to a fear of disturbing capital and foreign investment. The case of Bávaro-Punta Cana shows the importance of researching not only planning (and the lack thereof), but also the often unspoken actions, understandings, and relations between actors that illustrate the power and politics that have real manifestations in space in many different contexts.

This research has shown that tourism can be implicated in the production of single-industry towns, particularly since coastal tourist destinations in SIDS and other developing countries emerge in rural areas of natural wealth. The significance of this is that those investing in tourism often play a large role in the urbanization process, and even in the direction of development and the governance of these new settlements. In some cases, prior to tourism, these places were of little interest to elites, foreign investors and politicians seeking voter support, because their populations were marginal. Power plays and dynamics are therefore not limited to the development of tourism and the local communities, but are deeply implicated in the politics and governance of newly urban areas and their liveability for a mass of temporary and permanent migrants.

Planning, of course, must always contend with unequal power relations and the relative dominance of private sector interests. However, in coastal tourist towns, where tourism is considered *the* driver of economic growth and where systems of (urban) governance were not yet established prior to tourism, power dynamics are highly imbalanced and intimately tied to one sector. Those with the most clout, and who are playing the largest role in the governance and planning of urban areas around coastal tourism, are not necessarily actors with a direct interest in the sustainability and development of the area outside of tourism itself, nor are they grounded in the local context.

First, the majority of the corporations that dominate the tourism industry, across developing countries, are international, with strategic decision-making located far from the tourist sites
themselves. In SIDS and other developing countries, to borrow from Scheyvens and Momsen (2008), this means ‘control over tourism and its benefits can end up in the hands of outsiders who do not have local or national interests at heart’ (29).

Second, the public bodies responsible for tourism development do not necessarily have a mandate to support adequate and liveable urban settlements. In the Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Tourism, for example, which plans largely from its offices in Santo Domingo, is responsible for ensuring appropriate tourism development, not planning the development of urban space and guaranteeing the public good. The urban nature of problems that arise in tourist areas in turn points to the need for a local government with the power to deal with the issues that can accompany rapid urbanization. In the case of Dominican Republic, this requires supporting municipal governments. Elsewhere, however, this role can be taken on by a range of actors, since planning and governance models in different country contexts vary significantly. Thus, this requires understanding which institutional bodies are responsible for urban development in each context and, for the most part, finding ways to push this development to the local level such that it is not solely in the hands of tourism development bodies (i.e. ministries of tourism), but also part of a local urban governance structure.

In my research, I have shown that the lack of provision for services and infrastructure has meant that, in many ways, parts of Bávaro-Punta Cana experience poverty in more acute ways than in the rest of the country more generally. Thus, poverty can be doubly visible in tourist areas because, despite the influx of capital into the area, it sits in stark contrast with the segregated enclaves that characterize the space. This contrast is evident globally. In the case of The Gambia, as one author explains, enclaves have a certain material significance: ‘Where poverty is evident in the vicinity of internationally-renowned buildings, e.g. hotels…, an enclave can reinforce power dynamics and impact on competition for resources and exclude residents through entry barriers and ownership of adjacent land’ (Carlisle and Jones 2012: 10).

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199 In Bávaro-Punta Cana, the majority of hotels/resorts are from the Balearic Islands, with the exception of Grupo PUNTACANA, which has a significantly stronger connection with the local environment and society than many other actors.
Since the built environment is a reflection of the power dynamics and inequalities present in the area and has a direct effect on everyday life, it also plays a crucial role in the long-term decisions made by those employed in tourism regarding their future in the area. One community leader in Cabeza de Toro clearly illustrates the relationship by stating that ‘the tendency [of local residents] now is towards more permanence. Why? Because they [the local government] are already talking about putting in a cemetery. A cemetery indicates that people will have roots in the area.’ Bávaro-Punta Cana can no longer be thought of as simply a tourism pole or a tourist destination, but as an urban area and home for a growing population. This is not limited to the Dominican Republic. The urban (and often rapid) expansion of tourist towns across the developing world, as in the case of Varadero, Cuba or Cancún, México, is necessarily tied to tourism development (González et al. 2013).

10.3 Resort Urbanism

The key contribution made by this study relates to the ‘urbanization’ of tourism research. As a starting point, I take the notion of ‘tourism urbanization,’ a term that has been coined and utilized to refer to ‘cities built for the consumption of pleasure’ (Mullins 1991: 340). In contrast, my own research in Bávaro-Punta Cana shows that where tourist enclaves characterize the urban landscape, consumption is limited to the spaces within enclaves and the networks (e.g. transportation) that channel tourists and their goods. The urban spaces inhabited by local residents, what others have referred to as ‘the open city’ (Roitman and Phelps 2011), remain, in large part, outside the movement of tourists and their consumptive patterns, and have (directly and indirectly) become spaces of production for tourism. For this reason alone, this form of urbanization warrants its own naming, what I refer to as ‘resort urbanism.’

Writing in the context of a developed country, Mullins (1991) described the cities and towns produced through tourism as significant for being characterized by ‘rapid population and labour force growth, a ‘flexible’ labour market, a different class structure, a different household and residential organization, somewhat more limited state intervention, and the large number of tourists who flock into these cities for fun’ (340). These conclusions are certainly true for Bávaro-Punta Cana, however, as I have illustrated throughout this thesis, the urban nature of development in resort areas carries with it some critical implications for planning and governance in developing countries such as Dominican Republic. Based on this case study, three
planning concepts – splintered urbanism, informality and differentiated citizenship – are key for understanding the dynamic realities that characterize resort urbanism, as illustrated in Figure 10-1 below.

![Figure 10-1: Resort Urbanism](image)

It is important to note that planners and politicians envision urban development in very particular ways, for instance, in the pursuit of creating a ‘world class city’ or an internationally renowned tourist destination. Such official pursuits, however, are only one of the multiple and overlapping urbanisms that shape the logics or mode of urban development and functioning, which Shatkin (2011) refers to as ‘actually existing urbanisms.’ While urban areas in general are characterized by a number of actually existing urbanisms, I argue that informality and splintered urbanism represent the principal logics of urbanization in coastal tourist areas. This is true for Bávaro-Punta Cana, but also other coastal tourist areas dominated by enclave development, particularly where formal provision for infrastructure is inadequate or uneven.

Informality refers to *social relations*, and, to borrow from Ananya Roy (2005), represents an organizing logic through which actors are able to get by and secure their interests. Splintered
urbanism, on the other hand, refers to *urban form*, and represents the spatial and material manifestations of urban development. It is a logic through which wealthier groups can shape urban space and even governance by seceding from the rest of the urban fabric. These two logics are closely related. Local residents, who are excluded from these premium networks, resort to informal practices of ensuring their basic needs are met. The aesthetics and negative associations that accompany informality then fortify, and indeed create a justification for, the secession of wealthier groups in enclaves.

These logics or modes of urbanization are, in turn, shaped by uneven or ‘differentiated citizenship’ (as shown by the arrow pointing left in Figure 10-1). For instance, tourist enclaves on the coast are able to appropriate and privatize public space on the beach, while such informal practices are criminalized for poor local residents. This means what is considered informal depends on what the State deems is in line with its visions for the world-class tourist destination. Indeed, urbanization in Bávaro-Punta Cana is characterized by processes of informality, not simply in poor settlements (e.g. Verón and El Hoyo de Friusa), but also in the practices of the private sector (in the sub-contracting of Haitian migrant labourers), as well as the state. For Roy (2009), informality is inextricably tied to the institution of planning, which ‘inscribes the informal by designating some activities as authorized and others as unauthorized’ (10).

The aforementioned relationship is also inversed, in that the informal and splintered logics of urbanization also shape citizenship (as shown by the arrow pointing right in Figure 10-1). When poor groups pursue informal practices to fulfill their basic needs, such as self-constructed housing, that shapes how they are seen by the State and rights that they are able to claim, in turn making them second-class citizens. Concurrently, actors involved in the production of enclave spaces are complicit in shaping citizenship for others. This is so, in the sense that, through actions of corporate citizenship and in the absence of the state, they distort the way poorer groups understand their own citizenship and what the state *should* provide. For instance, this is evident in the fact that claims are being made to the private sector for the provision of basic infrastructure and services, as in the case of water. In being seen this way, the private sector actors position themselves as first class citizens with more rights afforded to them.

I propose resort urbanism as a way to think about three logics that are at play in the urbanization process of coastal tourist areas, and how these contribute to particular realities in terms of their
social relations, spatial configuration and the uneven quality of citizenship in such localities. These logics are likely to be at play to varying degrees, where planning is largely absent or in contexts in which officials prioritize mass tourism planning over planning for urban development. Cancún, for instance, can be said to manifest these logics. In this case, the destination urban centre was planned, however, the landscape is highly segregated with enclaves of wealth (of tourists and local elites), informality (and squatter settlements) and highly uneven citizenship, characterized by migrant labourers, squatter citizens, and former ejidatarios (people with usufruct rights to communal land) whose rights are often threatened (see Torres and Momsen 2005).

10.3.1 Informality

Although the state has been largely absent in the area, state-supported evictions illustrate the allegiences taken by various bodies within the state, including the beach clearing practices that remove informal vendors from the public space. The discrimination against informality is further racialized, as many Haitians or Dominicans of Haitian descent are targeted and marginalized. While both the state and the formal housing market have been unable to support the urbanization process, informal practices in the production of housing have directly and fundamentally supported the proliferation of the tourism industry, as well as the goods and services offered to those working in the area indirectly. The use of the term arrabalización denigrates the organic urbanization process in the area, and has been politicized and utilized as a means to shape social space according to the needs of tourism’s capital expansion.

As stated by Ananya Roy (2005), there is resurging interest regarding the question of informality. A recent postcolonial critique by Ann Varley (2013) of the literature on informality problematizes homogeneous understandings of informality across the Global South. Often this colonial language characterizes, for instance, entire cities in the South as being informal or informal areas across Latin America as having undergone a process of ‘favelization,’ which is a form of informality that describes very particular contexts in urban areas of Brazil.

My own research contributes to this debate by looking at the ways in which informality is manifest in the Dominican Republic specifically. In this context, I characterize the local brand of informality as arrabalización. Here, race and class intersect in important ways, and informality
is closely tied not only to discourses of waste and lack of sanitation, but crucially, to an anti-Haitian sentiment that is omnipresent in the country. Thus in another sense, my research calls for a *racialization* of informality research in tourist areas, specifically, and urban areas, more generally, since racial divisions have and continue to play a large role in the lives of urban dwellers in Latin American (but elsewhere too), including in the criminalization of everyday life, and are often reinforced by socio-spatial segregation and territorial divisions (Angotti 2013). In line with Wacquant (2013) who studies the American ghetto, the objective here is to debunk simplistic and universal ways of talking and thinking about informality that obscure the historicity and racial meanings it actually holds. In approaching informality in this way, we are able to gain a deeper understanding of the realities that shape informality, as well as the connotations associated with it.

### 10.3.2 Splintered Urbanism

Splintered urbanism is another concept that contributes to understanding the realities of resort urbanism, and is mobilized in two ways in my thesis. First, it is utilized to illustrate a mode of urbanization that is characterized by secession. Second, it exceeds notions of socio-spatial fragmentation; it seeks to explain the material manifestations of inequality in the urban context. Specifically, it allows us to examine the ways that infrastructure is experienced by different groups, excluding some, while simultaneously connecting others through premium networks.

This study speaks to a growing body of postcolonial literature that seeks to understand urbanization processes in cities of the South, and which problematizes some of the postulations of the splintering urbanism thesis, which are largely grounded in experiences from the North. Indeed, in many Southern cities, there was never an integrated or comprehensive ideal for infrastructure provision. Instead, in many of these cities, there exists a history of fragmentation that pre-dates processes of liberalization, privatization, structural adjustment and financial speculation (Kooy and Bakker 2008). Thus, it becomes impossible to talk about a process of splintering urbanism but instead, one of splintered urbanism.

In the case of Bávaro-Punta Cana, I also refer to splintered urbanism. However, here, there is a different dynamic; rather than a question of colonial legacies, there is no prior settlement to speak of. As a consequence of Bávaro-Punta Cana’s existence being predicated upon enclave
tourism development, Bávaro-Punta Cana has been characterized by splintered urbanism from the outset. Thus, tourist areas are significant, not only because of the extent to which they manifest physical and spatial segregation, but also in the way that they are involved in the production of an inherently splintered space. This has implications for the cohesion and integration of urban space and environments, particularly as the local population grows, and can cause many challenges for planners now and in the future. 200

10.3.3 Differentiated Citizenship

In the DR, national citizenship is considered a very contentious issue. There, the government has made draconian changes with regard to national citizenship in its newest revision of its Constitution in 2010. With recent court rulings, it is currently stripping those borne of Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic of their Dominican nationality (Buschschluter 2013) and retroactively denying rights, such as education, to them. In Bávaro-Punta Cana this is an even more significant issue, given the large Haitian population.

In a democratic context, questions of citizenship are central concerns for urban development and planning. Indeed, today, there is a growing body of literature regarding ‘forms of citizenship that transcend the nation-state’ and increasingly, cities themselves are being seen as sites of citizenship (Alsayyad and Roy 2006), for instance in the (largely optimistic) literature of urban liveability and livelihoods. Echoing Holston and Appadurai (1996), Garcia (1996) claims ‘formal citizenship is neither ‘sufficient’ nor a ‘necessary’ condition for the practice of substantive citizenship’ (8). Substantive citizenship refers to the range of civil, political, and social rights available to people (Holston 1999).

Since urban areas carry with them a very particular set of issues (e.g. informality), the relationship between citizens and the state is crucial. In this particular context, there are certain expectations and claims that can be made of a local government, and building more equitable

200 It also does not help that even environmental concerns are dealt with on an individual basis, for instance, in the case of the Ministries of Tourism and Environment, through environmental impact assessments rather than strategic impact assessments that look at the cumulative effects of development and indeed, the urban environment (e.g. with the lack of sanitation).
citizenship at the local level can contribute to the well-being and sustainability of the urban fabric.

However, questions of national citizenship aside, forms of local citizenship are also highly uneven – what I refer to as ‘differentiated citizenship’ – particularly in a context such as Bávaro-Punta Cana, where power dynamics are highly imbalanced as a result of state-support of tourism development. Indeed, cities by their very nature have citizens, and they represent the locus of a diversity of competing claims. The notion of differentiated citizenship at the urban scale is significant because it calls in to question the rights of different actors in the production of space. I argue that by using the lens of differentiated citizenship, we are better able to understand how tourism can affect social relations and exclusions experienced in a splintered urban context.

If we take substantive citizenship to include protection through the rule of law, political representation, and the fulfillment of basic needs, it is evident that this citizenship is unevenly experienced in Bávaro-Punta Cana. For example, in the case of protection through rule of law, while tourist areas are invigilated by POLITUR, a special police unit that deals exclusively with tourist-related issues, the remainder of the area is patrolled by national police. In the case of El Hoyo de Friusa and Matamosquito, residents explained that it was only recently that the national police began entering those areas. It was evident in the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) meetings I attended that Dominicans or Haitians with legal papers to work in the DR were frequently stripped of their documents, incarcerated, and forced to pay for their freedom. This uneven access to rule of law is further illustrated in the examples I provided on evictions in the area, as well as the encroachment of resort developers on the beach (where these same actions are criminalized for the poor).

Corporations, through CSR and ‘corporate citizenship’ (CC), are increasingly being conceptualized as ‘citizens’ by corporations, consultants and scholars (Moon et al. 2005). If this is the case, then ‘there are certain conditions for them to respect, certain criteria to be fulfilled and certain obligations to be met’ (448). However, as highlighted by Moon et al., there are a number of factors that make corporations unlike other citizens, which should be noted here.

First, in contrast to pressure groups or social movements, for example, corporations are not representative of citizens themselves, but of special interests and resources. Second, they are not
accountable to constituencies. Third, there is generally overlap between public and private interests (e.g. corporations can pursue ‘societal demands in a fashion that is still compatible with their own corporate interests and goals’ (445)). And fourth, there is a large power differential between corporations and other ‘citizens,’ which is grounded, for instance, in the dependencies they create (e.g. in employment generation). This is crucial for areas such as Bávaro-Punta Cana, because, there, as evidenced throughout this thesis, urban space is embedded in capitalist relations of production, rather than constructed through the fulfillment of civic rights.

In Bávaro-Punta Cana, a sense of citizenship has yet to be fully appropriated by those who reside in the area, particularly in the areas characterized by the worst living conditions and highest rates of migration. This case study has illustrated that a particularly weak sense of place and stability accompanies urbanization by tourism. This is likely to be true for tourist destinations where there is significant population instability and in-and-out movement. Whose rights are fulfilled are then the outcome of politics and power dynamics. Thus, the next step in developing this kind of urban setting such that it becomes the home, not simply a source of employment, for its residents, requires understanding the divergent understandings of the city and transforming residents into citizens that are empowered to make claims for the rights they embody as urban citizens.

10.3.4 Planning in Areas of Tourism Development

What does this mean for planning in areas of tourism development in other parts of the Dominican Republic and further afield? The concept of resort urbanism can be used as a tool in understanding the logics of urban development in tourist areas across the developing world. In coastal tourist areas characterized by enclave development, the three logics discussed above appear to be good starting points for understanding the way in which urban space and power is mutually shaped: informality (i.e. looking at the ways in which certain types of social relations characterize development and the public/private responses to it), the material and spatial form of development and the extent to which citizenship is differentiated. In thinking about these concepts and how they relate, it becomes evident that planning in tourist areas much necessarily take into consideration a number of key issues.

First, tourism can be complicit in producing urban space. Urban space is complex. It is not simply characterized by the built environment and the presence of infrastructure, but involves
livelihoods that are service-related in nature, and complex layers of politics, planning, policy, and territory at different scales. Each of these issues make planning more intricate and complicated than planning in rural areas in general, and must be taken into consideration in the planning processes and outcomes being sought.

These urban spaces can mean the creation of single industry towns, particularly since resort tourism is generally located in areas of ‘natural’ wealth and away from large urban agglomerations. It is important to note that single-industry towns are particularly vulnerable to the whims of global capital (e.g. capital flight) and global economic crises. Tourism, especially, is also highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change which could change visitor patterns and tourists’ destination choice (Forster 2012), or cause sea level rise and coral bleaching (due to the increase in temperature) which could affect the attractiveness of a destination (Viner and Nicholls 2006). Climate change would have strong impacts on the local population as well, as it would affect their livelihoods and the local economy more broadly. Climate change can also affect residents directly because those most vulnerable to climate change are ‘those living in particularly dangerous locations (e.g. on floodplains), those living in settlements lacking protective infrastructure and those living in poor-quality housing’ (Satterthwaite et al. 2009: 20), which further calls for a need to develop a supportive governance structure.

Second, the urban nature of these new spaces has implications for who is doing the planning and the ways in which various bodies and institutions place their territorial claims on space. Often, tourist areas in developing countries are planned (if at all) by entities of the central state (i.e. ministries of tourism), not local governments. However, given the urban nature of the spaces that accompany tourism development, tourism planning in itself cannot be a sufficient condition for the development of the urban(izing) spaces around tourism poles. Allowing tourism ministries alone to determine the vision for development in tourist areas is, ultimately, very different from the same task being in the hands of (or involving) a functioning, democratic, local government accountable to its constituents for urban development and ensuring/facilitating the provision for public services and infrastructure.

Third, given the new influx of migrants, planning thus requires significant investment in infrastructure for new populations and support of informal processes of infrastructure and service provision. It also requires consideration regarding the ways in which the state can leverage
benefits from the private sector in such a way that development is not simply limited within the walls of enclaves, creating very obvious spaces of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, while enclaves (or club goods) are based on the ability to internalize benefits, ‘for the remaining public sector the result is a local government sector that looks a bit like Swiss cheese, where the clubs are the holes and the remaining public sector is the connective tissue that holds the system together’ (Warner 2011:157).

And lastly, related to this last point, tourist areas are spaces of constant flux. The high rates of migration from other parts of the country (but also potentially international migration) means citizenship at the local level may be weak and in need of support from external agencies to make claims to the government and finding collective means of fulfilling basic needs.

10.4 Governance and Planning Changes for Bávaro-Punta Cana

In the context of the Dominican Republic, a number of key changes would have to come about in order for tourism to contribute to ‘Development’ (Big ‘D’) and for the urban spaces it produces to become desirable and permanent places to live. Supporting the local government is central, in terms of its capacity, resources and eventually power. The Municipal League has a strong role to play in this regard, however, it must truly return to its originally intended function, which is to build the capacity of local governments. It can find ways to support a process of urban planning, which has yet to materialize in the DR. This is particularly important for tourist areas, given the complexity of the issues and relationships that arise in the process of urban change. The League can also strengthen the bureaucracy, support true decentralization (and avoid territorial fragmentation), and help strengthen the relationship between the Ministries of Tourism and Environment with local governments and their planning processes. With regards to the environment, while EIAs are certainly important, the Ministry of Environment must begin to think about development in a more integrated fashion and begin undertaking SEAs, as it was suggested by the former Minister of Environment (Omar Ramirez, pers. comm., October 27, 2011).

Pursuing the ideals of ‘good governance’ is important, where the government is democratic, accountable to its constituents, transparent, and participatory such that it creates a space for local
residents to become involved in the decision-making process regarding urban development. However, ‘good governance is deeply problematic,’ its agenda is ‘unrealistically long, and growing longer over time,’ (Grindle 2004: 525-6), and has the potential to paralyze change for the sake of poverty reduction and the development more generally. According to Grindle, we must begin to thinking about the particulars of what needs to change, for instance, determining priorities, or what can occur in the short term:

If more attention is given to sorting out these kinds of issues, the end point of the good governance imperative might be recast as ‘good enough governance’, that is, a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward.

In the case of Bávaro-Punta Cana, a number of changes can start the process of achieving ‘good enough governance.’ First, until the Municipal League changes in a real way, the Dominican Federation of Municipalities (FEDOMU) could support the local government in negotiating with the private sector to help assert the government’s authority over its territory, but also with other bodies of the central government, including the Ministry of Tourism. At the very least, this could help draw attention to the need for the State to support this part of the country (and not simply in facilitating the expansion of tourism through, for example, the construction of the Eastern Boulevard).

Third, the local government cannot simply wait for the State to transfer more resources down to the local government in Bávaro-Punta Cana. It is also problematic that a large proportion of the taxes collected is transferred to Higüey. As its mayor and director of planning have already acknowledged, the local government must find a way to improve its tax base and collection practices. According to one representative from the local government, of twenty taxes that can be collected at the local level by law, only three are applied (pers. comm., July 23, 2012).

Fourth, it is the local government which must take a lead role in filling the democratic deficit and creating a sense of stability in an area so permeated by constant change and mobility. According to Moscardo (2011: 424),

201 Although, I should point out that the local government has, since my fieldwork, begun a process of participatory budgeting.
destination residents are typically given very limited or no roles at all in the tourism planning and governance process and their lack of tourism knowledge and experience is used to support arguments that effective tourism development needs to be directed by external agents such as foreign tour operators, domestic but often distant government departments or foreign/domestic tourism destination.

This is certainly true for the residents of Bávaro-Punta Cana. This means the government has a crucial role to play in assuming and supporting a conceptualization of planning away from technocratic idealism that excludes local residents and supports their organization, to one that supports inclusive urban development for its citizens.

And last, but perhaps most importantly, my suggestion is that good enough governance must begin with finding ways to support local communities in building their capacity, organizing and mobilizing. This is particularly important in those settlements where there is no operating neighbourhood organization. This could involve support from civil society (e.g. local or international NGOs or community-based organizations from elsewhere in the country) or FEDOMU.

There is a significant body of evidence that illustrates the ways in which low-income groups can be empowered and contribute to poverty reduction (e.g. see Environment and Urbanization). It is possible to distinguish three stances that citizen action can take through collective processes: direct action, claim-making, and co-production (Satterthwaite 2008). Collective organization is often the only means through which local residents can increase their power, since the ‘urban poor groups have very little ‘market’ power, and often limited possibilities as individuals or households of getting state entitlements’ (310).

Direct community action involves action taken by citizens in supporting basic services/infrastructure or directly providing services in low-income communities, in a manner that remains autonomous from the state, e.g. through the collection of waste (e.g. Parizeau et al. 2008). The second mode through which needs can be addressed is via placing demands on the state: ‘when this is done by urban poor groups, sometimes it is to obtain something (new housing, support for upgrading existing housing with services, tenure of land they occupy), sometimes it is to prevent something (typically, eviction from their homes)’ (Satterthwaite 2008: 308). The third approach, co-production, relies on a blending of the first two modes: where organized groups demonstrate to state institutions and aid agencies what they are capable of
achieving, with the more political aims of working with state institutions and developing effective relations with the state (Mitlin 2008).

Examples of co-production include the establishment of community police stations in Mumbai’s (India) slums (Roy et al. 2004), and community management and financing as part of development of the municipality’s formal sanitation system in Karachi, Pakistan (the Orangi Pilot Project) (Mitlin 2008). Some of the benefits of this model are that it ensures development is more in line with the needs of the poor, and that it can bypass the need for expensive external funding which does not necessarily reach the poor anyway.

All of these approaches, however, require the building of citizenship. Indeed, ‘in many societies, citizens may be unaware of their rights, lack the knowledge to engage, or not see themselves as citizens with the agency, and power to act’ (Gaventa and Barrett 2012: 2402). Citizenship must be learned, practiced, and acted (Merrifield 2002), and involves ‘greater civic and political knowledge, and a greater sense of awareness of rights and empowered self-identity, which serve as a prerequisite to deepen action and participation’ (Gaventa and Barrett 2012: 2402, and Merrifield, 2002). In Bávaro-Punta Cana, this means creating a sense of citizenship that goes beyond simply making claims for the collection of waste, and also involves facilitating the bottom-up collective action that addresses the needs of local residents.

The examples provided above of community policing and community-managed sanitation are cases in which citizen groups are given support from local NGOs. In another example, a global federation of slum dwellers, Slum-Dwellers International (SDI), helps build the organizational capacity of the various national federations it brings together through community exchanges, where mobilized groups are able to learn from each other. It also relies on the support of NGOs, ‘who raise and manage funds, link to professionals within the state and other professional agencies, and support learning and documentation’ (Mitlin 2013: 487).

In Mumbai, Mahila Milan (literally, ‘Women Together’), which is supported by a local NGO, SPARC, is a collective of women pavement and slum dwellers with the aim of creating savings groups and providing credit. Beyond simply creating an opportunity for women to gain access to credit, this represents ‘a strategy to mobilize them towards taking a more proactive role in relation to addressing poverty’ (Patel et al. 2002: 163). It not only empowers women, but it is
also self-supporting in the sense that it conducts training and provides support activities to further build the capacity of other women. In Karachi, the Technical Training Resource Centre, an offspring organization of OPP, provides guidance to people self-building their homes, as well as training to the youth in construction, drafting and engineering, in ways that can effectively support the urban poor in fulfilling their shelter needs.

In the Dominican Republic, organizations working primarily in the province of Santo Domingo, including the Movimiento Urbano Popular (Urban Popular Movement), Centro Montalvo, and COOPHABITAT, have the experience in mobilizing local communities and building their capacity to make claims for basic rights, particularly in the areas of habitat and evictions. Areas where collective mobilization is weak such as Bávaro-Punta Cana can certainly benefit from support from such organizations. Perhaps a suitable first step is locating organizations in the Dominican Republic that are doing the kind of work similar to the organizations mentioned above, and finding ways to transfer skills and support to areas like Bávaro-Punta Cana that could deeply benefit from it.
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PRIL - Programa de Iniciativas Locales de la Sociedad Civil. (n.d.) *Directorio: Organizaciones Sociales de Desarrollo en La Republica Dominicana*. Santo Domingo, DR.


Appendix A: ICZM and Alternative Tourism

The condemnation of the dominant 'sun, sand, and sea' enclave tourism model for its 'unsustainability' has resulted in an emerging popularity for alternative tourism. This can be defined 'as a form of tourism that sets out to be consistent with natural, social, and community values and which allows both hosts and guests to enjoy positive and worthwhile interaction and shared experiences' (Wearing and Neil 2009:4). It is also characterized by higher spending patterns, fewer tourists and niche markets (Shaw and Agarwal 2007). Sustainable tourism, pro-poor tourism, eco-tourism are among the more popular modalities of alternative tourism.

There is nothing intrinsic to these forms of tourism, however, that make them inherently better or worse than the dominant model, if they are not regulated or planned. Sustainable tourism, for example, appeals to a range of tourism stakeholders, but can easily be critiqued for 'greenwashing,' that is marketing techniques that claim social and environmental responsibility (but do not necessarily do deliver) (Weaver 2006). Eco-tourism is based on the small-scale and is purported to have minimal impacts on the local environment, as well as strong linkages with local economic development. But inevitably, 'all forms of tourism tend towards mass tourism' (Oriade and Evans 2011). While I do not aim to provide a comprehensive critique of alternative tourism, I argue that our focus must not ignore the dominant model that pervades the development model of so many countries.

Alternative forms of tourism have been subject to significant interest by researchers and academics. However, alternative forms only account for a limited portion of all tourism (Jafari 2001, Scheyvens 2007), and the dominant ‘sun, sand, and sea’ holiday model paradoxically continues to expand (Aguiló et al. 2003). There is a two-part explanation for this. On the one hand, while more flexible forms of tourism now exist, there is no evidence to suggest that there has been or will be a decline in the demand for all-inclusive beach holidays. Instead, there are simply more specialized segments within the mass tourist market, such as luxury all-inclusive resorts or combination holidays in which the beach is one component of a package (6). On the other hand, the relative power and strong bargaining position of transnational tour operators vis-à-vis suppliers of tourism in developing countries means that large companies control many tourist destinations. These companies are responsible for intense competition between
destinations and the promotion of the three 's' model. Competition drives prices down and represents an important factor in the high price-sensitivity of the lower end of the market (Shaw and Agarwal 2007).

The dominant model, however, is neglected in academic circles, as it is considered 'an old', Fordist form of tourism (Simpson and Wall 1999, and Shaw and Agarwal 2007). Indeed, alternative tourism ‘has also been widely criticized for being just that: an alternative, rather than a solution, to the 'problem' of mass tourism' (Sharpley and Telfer 2008: 41). As Scheyvens (2010) points out, tourism that is meant to benefit the poor cannot simply be about finding alternatives, but must ‘transform mainstream tourism operations so they can deliver more benefits to the poor’ (292).

A second approach worth mentioning here is Integrated Coastal Zone Management\(^{202}\) (ICZM). ICZM was developed as a tool to achieve sustainable development in coastal areas. Its purpose is 'to ensure that the process of setting objectives, planning and implementation involves as broad a spectrum of interest groups as possible, so that the best possible compromise between different interests is found and a balance is achieved' (Govender and Trumbic 2011: 220).\(^{203}\) It reconciles various policies that affect the coast and builds a structure to facilitate the integration of responsibilities and interests related to coastal areas (D’A A. Le Tissier and Hills 2010).

A UNEP document on Sustainable Tourism (2009) has recognized the need for ICZM as an approach to deal with tourism and development in coastal environments. For UNEP, ICZM is 'based on principles such as holistic and ecosystem-based approach, good governance, inter and intra-generational solidarity, safeguarding the distinctiveness of coasts, precautionary and preventive principle, which give a context for achieving the aims of sustainable tourism' (3). There are a number of tools associated with ICZM that are available to policy makers and planners that can help integrate consideration for environmental issues into the planning process.

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\(^{202}\) This management process has its roots in the 1970s but its use expanded after the publication of Agenda 21, which emerged from the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the Earth Summit or simply 'Rio’) (Christie 2005).

\(^{203}\) According to Coral Reef Alliance, '[t]he goal of an ICZM strategy is to coordinate all coastal zone uses and activities, in both public and private sectors, according to an agreed upon set of resource management policies and practices' (2005).
These include Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), sustainability indicators, or Carrying Capacity Assessment (CCA) (UNEP 2009). Since I refer to the first two of these later in my case study, I introduce them in the box below.

The first, EIAs, are a rational tool that is utilized to evaluate the potential impacts of any one development or activity on the environment, economy or society (UNEP 2009). Often, EIAs are utilized as a tool in the approval process of individual projects (for instance by a Ministry of Environment or other regulatory body) to determine whether the project is acceptable for the context. While the benefits of this tool are obvious, the scientific quality of coastal tourism-related EIA processes is often extremely low due to time and funding constraints, and ineffective peer review (Davenport and Davenport 2006, Warnkern and Buckley 1998, Zubair et al. 2011).

The SEA goes beyond individual projects, and is ‘understood to be a process for identifying and addressing the environment (and also, increasingly, the associated social and economic) dimensions, effects and consequences of PPP [policies, plans and programmes] and other high-level initiatives’ (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005:10). Originally, the idea behind SEAs was to drive environmental considerations up the decision-making ladder, to the strategic level, beyond simply projects, as in the case of environmental impact assessments. However, now SEA’s increasingly encompass social issues and are used as diagnostic tools to incorporate these considerations in the formulation of PPP’s (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2005). One of the key issues covered by SEAs that is not in EIAs are the cumulative effects of development, or the harmful aggregate and often synergistic effects of a number of projects over space and time (Cooper 2004). ‘If an agency fails to adequately assess CIs [cumulative impacts] in a specific EA [environmental assessment], potentially significant impacts could be missed’ (Burris and Canter 1997: 6). For tools like SEA to be successful, they must be integrated into planning or other decision-making processes (Sheate 2011). Some of the key benefits of using SEAs in the planning and policy making process include:

- Integrate environmental concerns into a development strategy
- Create opportunities for local stakeholder involvement
- Contribute sustainable development
- Strengthen the planning framework within which strategic decisions are made
- Build environmental considerations into all levels of development decision-making, not just project approvals
- Establish an appropriate context for project EIA, including the pre-identification of issues and impacts that warrant detailed examination
- Form part of an iterative process that is carried out very much in parallel with the preparation of the CDS (City Development Strategy)
- Take into account the cumulative and/or synergistic effects of policies, plans or programmes

**EIAs and SEAs**

ICZM has been utilized as a panacea to deal with conflicts and interests between development and environmental protection in coastal areas (D’A A. Le Tissier and Hills 2010). There are, however, a number of weaknesses to ICZM that are noteworthy. While it relates to different forms of planning and the importance of local government (O’Hagan and Ballinger 2010), the literature does not deal with urban issues and planning in an explicit way. Furthermore, research shows that there are actually very few examples of successful ICZM, with the exception of project-specific cases (D’A A. Le Tissier and Hills 2010).
ICZM also makes a number of simplistic assumptions, including that round table discussions can solve any problem, coastal areas are managed by coastal managers, and is strongly positivist in its approach. For example, the ICZM template seems to believe that scientific knowledge (and thus rationality) is a sufficient condition for good governance (Billé 2008). This is evident in the UNEP document on Sustainable Tourism, which makes the claim that the various tools encompassed by ICZM, 'each applied at the proper stage of tourism development planning and within a well-defined regulatory and legislative framework, are a good guarantee of the sustainability of tourism activity and its harmonious coexistence with other activities in a well-preserved environment (UNEP 2009: 15, emphasis added). Many would question this assumption, particularly planners. Flyvbjerg (1998), for example, studied the role of power in shaping rationality itself, arguing: ‘[p]ower has a clear tendency to dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping relationship between the two’ (325).
Appendix B: Sample Interview Guide for Academics and Researchers

This guide was used as a base for semi-structured interviews for academics and researchers working on social/environmental issues in the Dominican Republic. N.B. For the majority of interviews, these questions were translated and posed in Spanish.

- What is the dominant form of tourism in the DR? Why do you think the all-inclusive beach tourism model is so prevalent in the DR?
- What in your opinion is the most successful tourism resort/development in the DR? Why?
- What do you think is the role of incentives for foreign corporations to invest in the DR?
- Who would you say holds the power in the tourism industry?
- What do you think about the regulation of tourism in the Dominican Republic? Who is responsible? Are they successful? Why/why not?
- How do you feel this model has affected society? How do you feel this has affected urban centres?
- How do you think the development of tourism in Punta Cana for example has affected urban development in the region? What kinds of settlements have been created as a result? Do you see this happening in other parts of the country?
- What is the role of local government in urban planning? tourism planning? What should the role be? What are the factors that have prevented local governments from having more power to influence the development of their municipality/municipal district?
- Would you say that there have been evictions related to tourism development in the DR? Do any specific cases come to mind? Have these issues been covered in the paper? Why/why not?
- How would you say Punta Cana differs from Puerto Plata? Which has benefited/produced more problems for local communities? Why?
- What kind of issues regarding tourism have been covered in the media/academia?
- What issues do you feel have been under-represented in the news/newspapers regarding tourism?
- Do you know of any scandals (of corruption) in the tourism industry that have been uncovered?
## Appendix C: List of Interviewees for members of the Public and Private Sectors, Academics, Researchers, and NGOs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Organization &amp; Capacity in which Interviewed</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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<td>Bolivar Troncoso</td>
<td>UDO&amp;M, Tourism Programme Director</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Santo Domingo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>29/01/2010</td>
<td>Cesar Perez</td>
<td>INTEC, Professor, Coordinator of EQUIS-INTEC</td>
<td>Academic</td>
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<td>POLITUR Zona del Este, Commander</td>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>Higüey</td>
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<td>USB, Professor and Environmental Activist</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>Carsten Gopfert (ENGLISH)</td>
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<td>Juan Carlos Sanchez Villa</td>
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<td>Public and Academic</td>
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<td>Radhames Carpio</td>
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- Please refer to the List of Acronyms and Translations for Clarification
- N.B. The views of participants do not necessarily reflect the views of their organization. A * marks those where this was expressed explicitly.
Appendix D: Semi-Structured Interviews with Local Residents

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Appendix E: Sample Interview Guide for Local Residents

*N.B. For the most part, these questions were translated and posed in Spanish.

**Opening Questions**
How long have you been living in this area?
What was your reason for moving here?
Have you lived in the same house since then?
Who do you live with and what is your relationship? Is it one family or more?
What is your age and those of your household?
How did you feel about your last home?

**Social Issues**
Do you work? Where? How do you get there? How long does it take?
Do you have children? Who normally takes care of the children? And when you are working?
How often do you take your children to the doctor? How far is it? How do you get there?
Normally, do your children accompany you when you run errands or go to work? What kind of errands?
Do you feel this community is safe for your children? Why/why not?
Are there spaces for your children to play in your community? How do they get there? How far are they?
How do you spend your time/days off? Do you stay in the area? Why/why not?
Do you feel that you have developed a relationship with this settlement? Do you feel that you are part of a community? Explain.
Where do you normally see your friends? And your spouse/children? How do you get there?
How do you feel about the route?
Do you and your family interact with tourists? In what capacity? How do you feel about this?
Who do you feel benefits most from tourism? Who benefits least from it?
Would you say there is a sense of community in your settlement?
If you needed to make improvements to your house or someone to take care of your children, is someone available to help you out?

**Environmental Issues**
Do you have access to water and sanitation? How do you access the water (i.e. piped in home, standpipe, covered/uncovered well, etc.)? How much do you pay monthly for this?
How do you dispose of solid waste? Do you pay any fees for this?
Do you have access to electricity? What is the source? Do you pay for it?
Who built your house? Did you have help? From whom? Any technical advice? Problems with it? Where did you get the materials from?
What kind of cooking fuel do you use? Where do you cook? Where does the fuel come from? Do you purchase it?
Is there adequate lighting at night-time for you to walk around and feel safe? Do you go outside at night?
How do you feel about transportation and getting around in the area?
How do you feel about the traffic in your area? And the speed of the cars?
How long does it take you to get to work? Is it long? Why/why not?
How could the area be planned differently to facilitate getting around?
How do you feel about the way tourism-related activities and developments are using space? The design of the hotels?
Do you feel your settlement has adequate green space, parks or public space for socialization, recreation, etc.?

**Economic Issues**
How does your family earn a living? What kind of work do you do?
What are any other sources of income? Do all family members work in paid jobs?
Do you own a bicycle, motorbike or car? Why have you chosen this mode of transportation?
What would work better?
How much do you spend a day on food? How much do you spend a day or a week on transportation?
Do you have to pay to send your children to school? How much does it cost? Uniforms, books, transportation, fees?
Do you have to pay for water? How much do you pay a day for drinking water? For washing water?
Do you pay for electricity?
Do you get paid regularly? Have you ever been laid off in low tourism seasons? Do you know anybody that has?
How does your housing compare to your previous house? Which works better for your family?
Do you feel the cost of living has changed over time in this area?
Overall, do you think your family is financially better off living in Punta Cana? Why/why not?

**Participation and Future Possibilities**
What is your opinion on tourism in general? How has it affected your life?
How do you feel about the spaces used by tourists (i.e. the beach, roads, etc…)?
How has this area, both your settlement and the tourist developments, have changed over time?
How does your settlement compare to your last settlement?
Have you in any way been consulted about tourism development and planning?
Do you feel you’ve been able to voice your opinion about development in the area – either about tourism or your settlement? Do you feel your opinion made a difference?
Do you want to contribute to the planning or development of this area? How would you like to be involved?
Can you recall any arguments or protests against the way that tourism is affecting local communities?
What do you feel are the most important issues that need to be dealt with/improved upon? How do you envision a better settlement or future for you and your family?
How do you feel a better sense of ‘community’ could be built?
Appendix F: Informed Consent Form for Interviews with Academics, Researchers, Members of the Public and Private Sectors and NGOs.

*N.B. This letter was translated and presented in Spanish.

Re-conceptualizing Resort Tourism: Relating Urban Development, Planning and Coastal Tourism

Dear _______________ (name of participant),

My name is Gabriela Sauter, and I am a PhD student in Planning at the University of Toronto, Canada. I am conducting research on urban settlements around tourist enclaves and the implications for planning. I would like to invite you to participate in this research through an interview, which should last approximately 1 hour. Your involvement in this research would be much appreciated and would help gain an understanding of the different actors involved in development and tourism. I hope that in the future, my research can help develop a better way to plan for tourism in coastal areas in the Dominican Republic.

Also, please note that you have the right to end your participation in the interview at any time without any negative consequences. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions. With your permission, I would like to use any information you provide me, including your name and position in your organization in my thesis, unless you indicate otherwise below. If you wish to keep your anonymity, please indicate so below. Also, I would like to audio record your interview, unless you indicate otherwise. I do not foresee any risks related to your participation in my research.

Please tick the applicable boxes below:

☐ I have been informed of the purpose of this project and use of the information I provide and agree to participate in this interview
☐ I consent to the use of my name and position in my organization
☐ I consent to the audio-recording of this session

Should you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at the details provided below, or the Ethics Review Office at the University of Toronto for information about your rights as a participant. When my research is completed, I will provide you with a summary of my results online.

Thank you very much for your time,

Gabriela Sauter,  
PhD Planning Candidate  
University of Toronto

Participant’s Name  Participant’s Signature  Researcher’s Signature  Date

________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________  ________________

Personal Contact  Supervisor’s Contact  Ethics Review Office
Gabriela Sauter  Prof. Amrita Daniere  Ethics Review Office  
g.sauter@utoronto.ca  amrita.danie@utoronto.ca  ethics.review@utoronto.ca  
+1 (647) 262-8620  +1 (416) 978-3236  +1 (416) 946-3273
Appendix G: Tourism Data for the DR

In the past three decades, the number of non-resident arrivals in the Dominican Republic has increased rapidly (see figure below). The average growth rates for the first two decades were 13.20 percent in the 1980s and 8.88 percent in the 1990s, as tourism began to develop as a sector. In the 2000-2010 period, the growth rate slowed to average 3.46 percent, largely affected by the global economic crises in 2001-2002 and 2007-2009.

The vast majority of non-resident visitors are foreign; in 2010, over 85 percent of non-resident arrivals in the Dominican Republic were foreign, while the remaining 15 percent were non-resident Dominicans (603,433). North America accounts for 46.12 percent of the total non-resident arrivals, while Europe has 27.67 percent. In terms of countries, the largest emitter is the United States with 1,219,563 (or 29.57 percent) non-resident foreign arrivals in the Dominican Republic. Canada is in second place with 662,058 (or 16.05 percent), followed by France with 230,975 (or 5.60 percent).204

For the North American Market, January, February and March have the largest number of non-resident foreign arrivals, with over 200,000 per month, contrasting strongly with September and October which have less than half the arrivals of these winter months. The European market, however, is the more consistent with figures remaining close to 100,000 arrivals per month throughout the year (BCRD 2012). Generally, for tourism in Dominican Republic, the low season occurs in the spring and fall, with the least arrivals during the months of May, September, October and November (BCRD 2012).

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204 Own calculations based on BCRD (2012).
The number of hotel rooms grew from only 5,394 rooms in 1980 to 66,968 rooms in 2010. This data is shown in the figure below, which illustrates the number of hotels rooms (as vertical bars), as well as the growth rates (as a line) in the hotel room supply for the 1980-2010 period. The figure shows positive growth between 1980 to 2010 in hotel room supply, with an evident spike in the growth rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s (ASONAHORES and BCRD 2011).

Hotel Room Capacity in the Dominican Republic (1980-2010)
Source: Developed with data from ASONAHORES and BCRD (2011) N.B. * = Preliminary data
The average annual hotel occupancy rates for the DR is shown in the figure below. In the aforementioned period, hotel occupancy rates began at 58.5 percent in 1980. Since 1985, occupancy rates did not fall below 60 percent, and in 1995, reached a peak at 76.8 percent. In 2010, this figure was 66.6 percent (BCRD 2012). In 2012, this figure reached 70.3 percent (BCRD 2012).

![Hotel Occupancy Rates](image)

*Hotel Occupancy Rates
Source: Developed with data from BCRD (2012)*

Difficulties arise in attempting to calculate tourism's contribution to an economy. Whether considered an industry or a sector (see for instance, Smith 1998), tourism cuts across a wide spectrum of industries, from transportation to agriculture, to construction, etc. Consequently, this makes it difficult to extrapolate its direct and indirect contributions to a nation's economy. This is particularly difficult when attempting to make cross-country comparisons, due to variance in government-established categories of analysis.

The World Travel and Tourism Council calculates travel and tourism's contribution\textsuperscript{205} to Dominican Republic's gross domestic product (GDP) at US$ 2.541 billion, or 4.9 percent of the

\textsuperscript{205}Travel and Tourism is understood as '[t]he activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not remunerated from within the place visited' (WTTC/OE 2010:5).
GDP for 2010. In total – that is, direct, indirect and induced contributions – this percentage increases to 17.5 percent of the country’s GDP.\(^{206}\)

In the DR, the government and the Dominican Hotel and Tourism Association (ASONAHORES) calculate tourism's contribution to the national economy with the use of three indicators. One of these is the contribution of 'Hotels, Bars and Restaurants' to GDP. In 2010, this figure was RD$ 17,214.7 million (US$ 421.9 million\(^{207}\)), or 9.2 percent of the country's GDP, although this does not differentiate between services utilized by tourists and residents. In 1991, this group of services made up only 4.7 percent of GDP (BCRD 2012).\(^{208}\) Another indicator utilized is 'Revenue from Tourism'. This figure is calculated using a range of inputs, including hotels rooms, occupancy rates, and average daily expenditure per tourist. In 1980, this figure was US$ 172.6 million, rose to US$ 840.4 million in 1991, and by 2010, reached US$ 4,209.1 million (ASONAHORES and BCRD 2011). This increase in revenue is illustrated in the Figure below. The third indicator utilized is 'Tourism-Related Fiscal Revenue', comprised of passenger exit taxes, airport taxes, and tourist cards. In 2010, this figure totaled RD$ 4,910.2 million (or US$ 120.6 million\(^{209}\)) (BCRD 2012).

\(^{206}\) The figure for 'direct' impacts is based on the UN Statistics Division-approved Tourism Satellite Accounting methodology. The WTTC data is at current prices and exchange rates.

\(^{207}\) Own calculation, using the current rate: RD$ 1=US$ 0.0245053, as at February 11, 2013.

\(^{208}\) The BCRD (2012) data for contributions to GDP is calculated at current prices. In terms of annual chain-linked data with a 1991 reference year, Hotels, Bars and Restaurants' contribution to GDP was 4.7 percent in 1991, and 6.1 percent in 2010.

\(^{209}\) Own calculation, using the current rate: RD$ 1=US$ 0.0245053, as at February 11, 2013.
Revenue from Tourism (1980-2010)
Source: Developed with data from BCRD (2012)

Tourism-Related Employment Generation (Direct, Indirect and Total)
Source: Developed with data from BCRD (2012)
Appendix H: Official Map of Macao/Punta Cana Tourism Pole

Decree 479 of 1986: Macao/Punta Cana
Source: DPP, Ministry of Tourism (2009)
Appendix I: Population Growth of La Altagracia

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Appendix J: La Altagracia: Politico-Administrative Subdivisions

Appendix K: Map of Hotels in Bávaro-Punta Cana

Source: Dominican Republic Ministry of Tourism (2010)
Appendix L: Cap Cana’s Location and Access Map

Cap Cana’s ‘Location and Access’ Map
Source: Cap Cana (2010)