Comparative Cases in Long-Distance Nationalism:
Explaining the Émigré, Exile, Diaspora and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars

By

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
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Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to explore the unexpected mobilization of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the recent decades. Why and how did the Crimean Tatar communities, all of which resided outside their homeland, develop a political identity and engage in nationalist mobilization in the 1990s? How did the communities, living apart from each other, in some cases for more than a century, mobilize simultaneously? What explains the variation in forms of mobilization among these communities? Does the transnational mobilization of the Crimean Tatars amount to an emergence of a transnational nation? I explore these questions by comparing the cases of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities, located in the former USSR, Romania, Turkey, and the United States across space and time.
This dissertation attempts to develop a dynamic theory of diaspora by demonstrating how recent unexpected mobilization was a consequence of the interaction of movement framing processes with discursive and political opportunity structures. I emphasize the unique set of political and discursive opportunities that emerged in the transnational political space due to new technologies of communication and ease of transportation that precipitated simultaneous mobilization of communities as well as the attempt for constructing a transnational nation. The thesis also introduces a typology long-distance nationalism which includes newly developed concepts of émigré, exile, diaspora and transnational nationalism to explain the variation in identities and mobilization of these communities. The theoretical framework developed in this study will be useful for studying and comparing other cases of diasporas.
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Any errors or mistakes I have made are of course my own.
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List of Acronyms:

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DKTK Dünya Küche Tatar Kongresi
DTHB Dobruca Türk Hars Birliği
KGPU Krymskovatsarskiy Gosudarstvennyy Pedagogicheskiy Universitet
KTMHT Kırmı Tatar Milli Hareket Teşkilatı
KTMM Kırmı Tatar Milli Meclisi
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
MVD Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del
NDKT Natsional'noe Dvizhenie Krymskikh Tatar
NKVD Narodnii Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del
OKND Organizatsiia Krimskotatarskogo Natsional'nogo Dvijenya
POW Prisoner of War
UDTTMR Unionea Democrata a Tatarilor Turco-Musulmani Din Romania
WCTC World Crimean Tatar Congress
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

My research emerged out of an autobiographical question. Growing up in Turkey in the beginning of the 1990s, I was surprised when foreigners from the collapsed Soviet Union - singers, dancers, politicians - suddenly began to pay our home frequent visits. These foreigners were the members of the Crimean Tatar community in the former USSR, who were deported by Stalin from their homeland Crimea in 1944, and who collectively returned to homeland Crimea in the beginning of the 1990s. I was puzzled why they were received as one of our own by my parents and the Crimean Tatar community in Polatlı (a district of Ankara, Turkey), despite their different ways of speaking, appearance, and mannerisms. I was also puzzled with the sudden transformation in our community. I knew since childhood that I was a Tatar, but now we had become the “Crimean Tatars”. Crimea had become the new center of our identity, and this had turned us into a “diaspora”. Suddenly the language that was taught to me by my grandmother had gained a new significance. Why was our community in such a hurry to adopt another flag, national anthem, homeland, and national cause, in addition to our previous Turkish ones?

In my master’s study, I noticed an increase in the number of people, people in Turkey, especially youth, who suddenly self-identified as Crimean Tatars. This fact called

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1“Crimean Tatar” is an ethnonym. According to recent interpretations (Williams 2000), the Crimean Tatars residing in the Crimean peninsula, having been separated from the rest of the Crimean Tatars residing in the Volga-Ural region in the 14th century, began to develop into a unique ethnic category under the rule of the Crimean Khanate by inter-mixing with the indigenous population of Crimea, i.e. Goths, Greeks, Italians, Armenians, Jews, and so on. Having said that, we cannot ignore the fact that the Crimean and Volga Tatars still speak the same language, share many ethnic traditions, and identify with each other in a loose sense.

2The small number of Crimean Tatar nationalists in Turkey preferred “muhajir” (“immigrant”) before the 1990s.

3The Crimean Tatar Associations popped out in places such as Nevşehir, Amasya, Yozgat, and Antalya, which were never associated before with the Crimean Tatar migrants.
into question the existing assumption that the Crimean Tatars had long ago assimilated in Turkey. But this phenomenon was not only local, but also transnational. The Crimean Tatar community in the former USSR returned en masse to their homeland in the early 1990s, and the Crimean Tatar communities within Romania, the United States, Bulgaria, Germany, and Canada remarkably rejuvenated. Cultural revival in diaspora settings was accompanied by increasing transborder mobility, flows and ties among diaspora and homeland communities.

This dissertation is an attempt to explore the unexpected mobilization of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the recent decades. Why and how did the Crimean Tatar communities, all of which resided outside their homeland, develop a political identity and engage in nationalist mobilization in the 1990s? How did the communities, living apart from each other, in some cases for more than a century, mobilize simultaneously? Does the transnational mobilization of the Crimean Tatars amount to an emergence of a transnational nation?

4 The main manifestation of rejuvenation was increasing the visibility of the blue Crimean Tatar flag (an imam in Romania put the flag inside praying room of his mosque) and other symbols such as pictures of “fathers” of the nation, such as İsmail Gasprinskiy, renaming themselves as “Crimean Tatars,” instead of other ethnonyms they have been using such as Tatar or Turk. Moreover, national ceremonies such as commemorating the fall of the Crimean Republic, the martyrdom of Çelebi Cihan and the deportation of co-ethnics, as well as rituals like the traditional spring festival, tepreş became increasingly commonplace. The national myths, such as "eternal flame" carried from Crimea to Romania, and Turkey began to be oft-cited and national historical narrations of many Crimean Tatars across the world. Individuals with Crimean Tatar roots, who were dispersed all around the world, connected to the movement because of the ease communication, especially through the internet. 

5 The diaspora communities began to contribute to the financing of various institutions in Crimea. A number of Crimean Tatars began to lobby to their governments for foreign aid and diplomatic support for their co-ethnics. Transnational conferences, festivals, youth conventions, and World Crimean Tatar Congress, newly emerged virtual community of the Crimean Tatars were evidence of cultural, and political organizing at the transnational level and an emerging transnational public sphere among the members of the homeland and diaspora. (Aydın 2000; Altan 2005; Altıntaş 2000)
The rise of transnational mobilization is not unique to the Crimean Tatars. In the recent decades, not only migrants but also the descendants of migrants began to “rejuvenate” their attachments to former “homelands”. Like the Crimean Tatars, these “communities of descendants of migrants” began to increasingly identify themselves as “diaspora”. This surprising phenomenon brought into mind many puzzling questions: Have diasporas always existed but remained latent, or did they emerge recently? How do diasporas relate to globalization? Do they constitute an ethnonational community or do they represent the transcendence of ethnicity? How are diasporas different than the territorial communities? What is the place of territory in the making of a diaspora identity? Do political projects within a diaspora necessarily involve re-territorialization? What will the consequences be of politicization of diaspora communities, especially for a nation-state system? Although this dissertation does not directly address all of these questions, it will cast light on the “diaspora phenomenon” by exploring the case of the Crimean Tatar diaspora.

The case of the Crimean Tatar diaspora constitutes a significant case. First, the Crimean Tatar case exhibits the features of traditional diasporas and “new diasporas”. On the one hand, the Crimean Tatar diaspora can be considered as a traditional diaspora because its dispersal goes back to the 18th century, and because evidence exists showing the maintenance of an attachment to the homeland, transnational ties and networks since dispersal. On the other hand, their long-distance nationalist movement began in the 20th century, making it a new diaspora. A longue durée study that includes the examination of a

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6 Refugees or immigrants to the industrialized states were generally depicted as “new diasporas” in the 1980s, as opposed to the “historical” ones whose dispersions could be traced to earlier centuries. These new diasporas are typically escaping from political and economic difficulties in the Third-World countries. Examples include Kurds, Somalis, Ethiopians, Mexicans, Dominicans, Turks, Caribbeans, Chinese, and Indians. (See Van Hear 1998)

7 Longue durée is a concept developed first by the French Annales school of history, and applied widely by F. Braudel. It emphasizes discovering long-term slowly-evolving historical structures over short-term events in
diaspora throughout a century will help to examine the question whether this diaspora is modern or not. Therefore, this case can contribute greatly towards the development of a general theory of diaspora mobilization.8

Second, there are not many ethnonational communities who have maintained a high attachment to their homeland after being exiled for a time period as long as fifty years and who have achieved a collective return, almost solely based on their own resources. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars achieved this by not falling into the trap of negative nationalist rhetoric or exerting violence towards other groups, remaining in the realm of a legitimate struggle for human rights. Despite previous studies on this case, the reasons for the return of this community after fifty years in exile, the mechanisms underlying the maintenance of their identity over the course of fifty years, and the purpose behind certain choices, styles and forms is still far from being completely explained. The Crimean Tatar case (I would state what this case is specifically (looking at the Crimean Tatars?) to make this final sentence stronger) enables examination of the relationship between territory and identity, by looking at the de-territorialization and re-territorialization on identity.

Third, the Crimean Tatar diaspora has several branches, though mobilized simultaneously, which demonstrate varying forms and levels of mobilization. While the community in the former USSR largely returned to homeland Crimea en masse after their 50 years of exile in Central Asia, the communities in Turkey, Romania, and the United States mobilized to support their co-ethnics without attempting a collective return themselves. Why

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8 Yin (1994) notes that one of the goals of a case-study is “to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” A good selection significantly contributes to this function.
did one community return while others did not? What explains the difference in forms of mobilization? Comparing cases enables us to produce generalizations.

Fourth, the Crimean Tatar diaspora branches lend themselves to longitudinal comparisons as well. The development of nationalism in these communities spans at least half a century, and in cases of Turkey and Romania, diaspora communities maintain a nationalist movement for a century. Each case study is divided into two or three eras, each of which constitutes a mini-case itself. 10 mini-cases appeared by a periodization of the cases. This relatively large number enables generalizations to be produced about the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization: its emergence, development and consequences. Through my research, I found that the answer to my initial question regarding the recent rejuvenation of the Crimean Tatar diaspora lies in understanding the general tendencies that affect the rise and fall of a diaspora. The historical-comparative method enabled me to trace other periods in history when the Crimean Tatar diaspora experienced “rejuvenation” as well as contributed to my understanding of transnationalism across time.

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In order to understand the significance of the Crimean Tatar case better, I provide historical background of the case in the following section. Next, I will state my research question and provide an overview of my thesis. In the last section, I will summarize the chapters, highlighting the main theoretical and empirical points.

**Introducing the case:**

**Historical Background:**

The Crimean Tatar diaspora began to form after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783. The Crimean Khanate was one of the successors of the Turko-Mongolian Golden Horde Empire, which conquered Eastern Europe and Russia in the 13th century. The Khanate was a vassal Muslim state under Ottoman protection and dominated Deşt-i Kıpçak (a steppe region north of the Black Sea) and Eastern Europe from their capital city in the Crimean peninsula for almost 500 years. However, after the annexation, Russia began to colonize Crimea and the social and economic life of the Crimean Tatars declined. As a result, most Crimean Tatars immigrated to the Ottoman Empire in the hope of a better life both in material and religious terms. The emigration began in 1783, but it reached its peak after the Crimean War (1854-1856), when the Tsar openly threatened to...

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9 The Golden Horde was founded by a grandson of Chingiz Khan, Batu. The noble ruling class was Mongolian from Chingizid lineage, but the citizen-soldiers of the army-empire were various Central Asian tribes of Turkic origin. The language of the empire was a dialect of Turkish language (today languages of Tatar, Nogay, Kazak, Kirghiz languages emerged from this dialect) “Tatar” is the general ethnonym given to the subjects of the Golden Horde by the Russians, the Ottoman Turks, and Arabs.
deport the Crimean Tatars if they did not leave. The immigrants were settled mostly in Dobruja (the Black Sea coastal region of today’s Romania and Bulgaria), which was in need of settlers, being devastated in the course of two centuries of Ottoman-Russian wars. With the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and the emergence of the new sovereign states of Romania (1878) and Bulgaria (1908), the great majority of Crimean Tatar settlers of Dobruja once again migrated to Anatolia, where the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. Emigrating was illegal in the Soviet period, but some still managed to escape before 1944. Thousands of Crimean Tatar war refugees were granted asylum by Turkey, the United States or some other Western countries soon after World War II (Fisher 1978; Karpat 1985).

Although there is no current census data available, today people of Crimean Tatar origin are thought to count between 3 and 5 million in Turkey\textsuperscript{10}, between 25 and 50 thousand in Romania and around 7000 in Bulgaria. The Crimean Tatars are well-incorporated citizens of Turkey and have contributed towards the emergence of a core Turkish ethno-national identity because of their Turkic ethnicity and cultural identity. In Romania and Bulgaria, however, the Crimean Tatars were marginalized in the nation-building processes. In Romania, they were treated relatively better than they were in Bulgaria, as Romania privileged the Crimean Tatars in comparison to Turks since the former did not have a kin-state. The Bulgarian government, on the other hand, discriminated against both as well as other Muslim communities. Consequently, the rate of intermixing between the Crimean Tatars and Turks has been higher in Bulgaria, though a distinct Crimean Tatar culture still survives (Karpat 1984; Eminov 1999). In the United States, the number of Crimean Tatars is estimated to be between 4000 and 7000 (Altan 2006), and the Crimean Tatar community underwent a segmented assimilation into the Turkish community in the United States.

\textsuperscript{10} On Tatar ethnicity in Turkey, see Andrews (1989), and Tatar émigrés in Turkey, see Bezanis (1994).
After the great exodus in the 1860s, roughly one third of the Crimean Tatars had remained in Crimea. By the 1880s, under the leadership of İsmail Bey Gasprinskiy, a Western-educated Crimean Tatar from a noble family, the Crimean Tatars began to reject emigration and initiated a nationalist movement. Gasprinskiy initiated a modernization movement not only in Crimea but among all the Turko-Muslim populations of the Russian Empire. He argued that modern ways and Islam were compatible through his education campaign and his newspaper, titled *Tercüman/Perevodchik* (Translator). He also propagated cultural and political unification of Turko-Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire, autonomous and equal status for the Muslims in the Russian Empire, and cooperation with the Russian majority in a restructured Russian state. In this introductory history, it is impossible to do justice to the significance of Gasprinskiy for the history of the Crimean Tatars and for the larger Turko-Muslim world, as he was one of the most significant theoreticians and practitioners of *jadidism*, the Islamic reform movement. Gasprinskiy’s thoughts should be conceptualized in the context of Western-Islamic relations since he aimed to find ways of fighting with Western colonization through reforming Islamic culture, he projected peaceful co-existence and collaboration with Western culture, and he aimed to establish Muslim minority rights in a non-Muslim dominated world (which was not adequately theorized in Islam before due to dominance of Islamic states over the non-Muslims in the previous era). The Islamic way of coping with non-Muslim domination to that point was *Hijra*, which meant emigration to a Muslim-dominated region rather than being subjugated to non-Muslims. This *Hijra* was significant justification for the Crimean

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11 300,000 Tatars left Crimea in a few years.
12 The concept of Hijra emerged when the Prophet Mohammed with his followers immigrated to Muslim-dominated Madina from Mecca, which was dominated by non-believers at the time.
Tatars for leaving their homeland and immigrating to the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{13} The Crimean Tatars immigrated in order to protect their Islamic identity, which was threatened under the Russian domination.\textsuperscript{14} Gasprinskiy rejected Hijra as a solution, and advocated staying at the homeland and struggling with Russian domination through modernization and development of national identity. For the purposes of this dissertation, he laid the foundations not only for future Crimean Tatar nationalism in Crimea but also in the diaspora contexts.

Mostly, as a result of Gasprinskiy’s reforms in Crimea, a nationalist-minded young generation emerged in Crimea at the turn of the century, and following the collapse of the Russian Empire, they proclaimed the Crimean Tatar Republic (1917), the first democratic republic in the Muslim world. According to Edige Kırımlı, the Crimean Tatar Republic constitutes a major milestone in the development of the Crimean Tatar national identity, which emerged through three steps of nationalist activism (Kırımlı 1996): Gasprinskiy’s modernization movement, the Yaş Tatarlar (Young Tatars) Movement in Crimea, and the émigré movement of the Fatherland Society (Vatan Cemiyeti). The émigré students from Crimea, primarily Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer], founded the Fatherland Society in Istanbul, only to transplant their organization later to Crimea. The Fatherland Society, played a major role in laying out the principles of the Crimean Tatar republic. The claim to a right to independent statehood was built on the history of Crimean Tatar Khanate which ruled justly for centuries, and which was unlawfully abolished by Russia through the violation of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. Russia can also have no claim on Crimea, as it infringed the social, economic, and religious

\textsuperscript{13} The exact meaning of the Crimean Tatar word “aqtopraqlar” is disputed. Ahmet Karakaya suggests that the phrase is the Crimean Tatar pronunciation of the Turkish/Arabic “Haq topraqlar” -Land of God/Dar-el Islam.

\textsuperscript{14} One thing most deplored was forceful conscription of Muslims, and possibility of having to fight against the other Muslims and having to go out of Islamic way of living.
rights of its Crimean Tatar subjects in the following period. This thesis will elaborate on the
contribution of the nationalist movements outside Crimea, such as émigré movement of the
Fatherland Society, to the development of Crimean Tatar nationalism, from the beginning of
the 20th century until the beginning of the 21st century.

The Crimean Tatar Republic (1917) survived for a very short period of time. After a
three year period of political turmoil, a Bolshevik political authority was decisively
established in Crimea by 1920, and the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
(ASSR) emerged. Ironically, in the first decade of Soviet rule, the Crimean Tatars for the
first time had the chance to build their national institutions under the president of the
Crimean ASSR Veli İbrahimov, a Crimean Tatar from the left wing of the Crimean Tatar
Milli Fırqa (National Party). The Crimean Tatars were accepted as a core (korenniy narod)
element of this republic, therefore in accordance with the institutional model of national
republics in the USSR. they were represented in governing institutions and in every aspect of
society with more than their percentage in the population. As Brubaker (1996) has noted, the
Soviet system of institutionalized nationality contributed greatly to the nation-building of
many people including the Crimean Tatars. According to Williams (2001), the national
concepts and institutions developed in this era were maintained and reproduced after the
Crimean Tatars were exiled from their homeland in 1944. The historical legacy of this era
was also shared by the Crimean Tatar refugees of the Second World War in Europe, Turkey
and the United States, while the diaspora communities who previously immigrated in
Romania and Turkey had little information about the national culture developed in Crimea in
the 1920s.
The “golden age” of the Crimean Tatars was soon reversed by a devastating attack on the Crimean Tatar nation by the Soviet government. After Stalin consolidated power towards the end of the 1920s, he purged all Crimean Tatar intelligentsia, the nationalist and religious leaders including Veli İbrahimov. Stalin also deported and murdered large segments of Crimean Tatar peasants in his campaign of “dekulakization.” This was just a prelude to his deportation of the whole Crimean Tatar nation to Central Asia and Siberia on May 18, 1944, on the pretext of collaboration with Nazis. Since then, the deportation is a major reference point of the modern Crimean Tatar nationalism in exile and diaspora, and is accepted by the Crimean Tatars as a form of genocide, which aimed to destroy the Crimean Tatar nationhood. The post-1944 Crimean Tatar long-distance nationalist movements aim to reverse the consequences of this tragic event, by returning the deportees and their descendants to their homeland and by re-building national sovereignty.

What really happened in Crimea during the Second World War is a contentious issue for historians. Like many other oppressed nationalities of the Soviet Union, for the Crimean Tatars both in the homeland and in the diaspora the Second World War was perceived as a significant window of opportunity for regaining national autonomy and breaking from Soviet domination. Crimea was occupied by the German army in 1941. The Germans permitted the Crimean Tatars to practice their religion and established their own Muslim committees and paramilitary forces. This policy conflicted with Nazi theory, which classified Crimean Tatars as *untermenschen* (subhumans). It appears that the real purpose of this move was to entice Turkey to join the war on Germany's side. Unaware of the true nature of the Nazi regime, some Crimean Tatars believed that they could rebuild their national autonomy. The ones who heavily suffered under the Soviet regime had thought
nothing could be worse than the Soviet’s treatment of them. It must be noted that the mature male population had already been conscripted to the Soviet army\textsuperscript{15} and was fighting against the Nazis. A part of the Crimean Tatar population joined the partisans fighting against the Nazi occupation in the mountains of Crimea. Soon, it became clear that the Nazis never really intended to provide the Crimean Tatars with real national rights, as they murdered large numbers of the Crimean Tatar population, burned more than a hundred of their villages, accusing them of collaboration with partisans, and deported youth between 14-18 years of age as \textit{Ostarbeiter} (“Eastern workers”, basically slave laborer) to Germany and Austria. Despite the Crimean Tatars’ immense suffering at the hands of Nazis, and the large numbers of war heroes and partisans among the Crimean Tatars, the Soviet regime, which reoccupied Crimea on May 9, 1944, deported the whole Crimean Tatar population on May 18. The Soviet archival documents demonstrate that the decision for their deportation was made in 1941 as Stalin planned to invade Turkey, and for this purpose he intended to remove the potential fifth column from the way. Stalin’s purely strategic motivations for deporting the Crimean Tatars can also become clear when we think of the similar deportations of Turkic-speaking nationalities, such as Karachais and Balkars in the Caucasus, a region that was not invaded by Nazis. To this day, major Soviet and post-Soviet Russian historiography and Russophone media continue to justify the deportation by referring to the alleged collaboration of the Crimean Tatars with the Nazis. The Crimean Tatar national movement does not deny some collaboration, which must be understood in the context of the previous unjust attack on the Crimean Tatar nationalists and people, and the lack of knowledge about the true nature of the Nazi regime. The Crimean Tatars were caught in the cross-fire, and

\textsuperscript{15}The number of Crimean Tatars serving in the Soviet Armed Forces while their families were being brutally deported is given as 56,000 (\textit{Yam Dünya}, 2004, 13).
aimed to stay alive under the rule of the two occupants. The Crimean Tatar historians point to the significant number of Crimean Tatars who fought on the Soviet side and joined the partisans, arguing that the “collaboration with Nazis” seems to be a pretext for deportation, which constituted a continuation of Russian policy of de-Tatarisation of Crimea since 1783.

In this context, this thesis will throw more light on the role of the diaspora in the development of the wartime Crimean Tatar nationalism. Despite the difficulty of contact with the local Muslim committees in Crimea, the Crimean Tatar émigrés in Turkey and Europe simultaneously lobbied the German authorities (sometimes via Turkish authorities) for greater autonomy for the Crimean Tatars. While this lobbying was not very successful in influencing the German policy-making, it played a significant role in saving many Crimean Tatar and other Turko-Muslim prisoners of war (POWs) from the Nazi camps, where death rates were very high. The émigrés also assisted in the escape of many members of the Muslim committees from the approaching Soviet army with the help of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Romania. After the war, émigrés, especially Cafer Seydahmet and Edige Kırımal, contributed to obtaining asylum and eventually citizenship for the Crimean Tatars, who were POWs, Ostarbeiter, and members of Muslim committees or religious leaders from Crimea.

In the process of deportation to Central Asia and Siberia and during the decade they spent in a “special settlement regime”, the Crimean Tatars lost more than one third of their population. Until 1957, the Crimean Tatars lived in the special settlement regime, basically an open air prison in which Tatars were forced to live in conditions of poverty, starvation, poor hygiene, difficult climate, and poor accommodation. They were also forced to work in back-breaking labor such as mining, timber production, factories, and cotton-harvesting. Escape from these ghettos was punished with a 10 year prison sentence. Meanwhile, the
Crimean ASSR was abolished, and the ethnic name “Crimean Tatar” was eradicated from all documents and historical textbooks in the USSR (Pohl 2000). Though the charges against the Crimean Tatars were revoked in 1967, they were not permitted to return to Crimea (Fisher 1978). This, however, did not prevent Tatars from creating the first, the longest and the largest human rights movement (almost all of the population participated) in the USSR, demanding the right to return to their homeland and to reestablish their autonomous republic.

This dissertation aims to provide an explanation of how and why the Crimean Tatars mobilized in exile settings, and how they have been managing to return collectively to their homeland since 1989.

I will also consider other consequences of the Crimean Tatar movement, such as the declaration of sovereignty in Crimea in 1991 (Williams 2001). Tatar declaration was soon eclipsed by a declaration of sovereignty by the Russian majority in the peninsula. However, Crimea could not become a sovereign state (and subsequently join Russia) but remained a part of the newly independent state of Ukraine. Because of their minority position, Tatar returnees did not have the power to resist these developments (Wilson 1998), so they developed a strategy of supporting Ukrainian power on Crimea vis-à-vis the option of Crimea’s unification with Russia. Today only half of the 500,000 Tatars have been able to return from their places of exile in the former Soviet Union. Though the rest of Tatars expressed their willingness to return, the window of opportunity was soon closed, as Uzbekistan and Ukraine controlled the population movements in and out of their countries more strictly. Moreover, their return was also slowed down by the problems Tatars faced in the process of settlement in the 1990s and 2000s. (Belitser 2000; Shevel, n.d.)
Today the Crimean Tatars constitute only 12% of the population of Crimea, and suffer from the lack of formal mechanisms of representation in regional (Crimean) and national (Ukrainian) representative and governmental bodies. Ukraine seeks to appease the separation-demanding Russian majority in the Crimean peninsula who are openly hostile to the return of more Tatars. Russians and Russophones are dominant in the government institutions in Crimea. Consequently, Tatars are treated unjustly in the redistribution of state-owned land and property. Because they did not live in Crimea, it is argued that they should not get a share of the land in the process of privatization. This argument is made when the Russians and Ukrainians actually live in the very houses of the Crimean Tatars and use their furniture. Tatars are refused employment in the bureaucracy, courts, police or army, or government institutions despite the majority of them being highly educated and professional people. Many educated Tatars are forced to work in the agricultural sector and settle in villages. The unemployment rate among the Crimean Tatars is disproportionally high. (UNPO, 2011) A significant number live in extreme poverty in the land they appropriated and squats they formed, lacking primary means of sustenance, such as water, electricity, sewage, and roads. They suffer discrimination in most spheres of life, including the media and the courts, and they are frequent victims of racist attacks and human right abuses by public and private security forces, russophone racist groups and skinheads. The Crimean Tatars' percentage of imprisonment is higher than other groups when compared to their population. There are only 18 Crimean Tatar schools in all of Crimea, and only one in ten

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16 None of their own national representative organs are recognized by Ukraine, despite their operation as a de facto national government.
17 Nationalists constitute a majority among the Russian population of Crimea, and after the proclamation of Ukrainian sovereignty, they sought separation from Ukraine and reunification with Russia. Crimea was part of Russia until Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine in 1957 as a gift “to mark the 300th anniversary of unification of Russia and Ukraine.” Belitser (2000) argues that the real reason for the gift was the devastation of the Crimean economy after the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, and the possibility of a regeneration of the peninsula only if economic resources were transferred from Ukraine.
Crimean Tatar children receives education in her own language. The Crimean Tatar culture and language is eroding under the hegemony of Russian, which is the language of the majority in the peninsula. Their current state of social, political and economic deprivation, added to the lack of compensation for past injustices, creates enormous resentment among the Crimean Tatar population. The voting turnout of the Crimean Tatars in peninsular and national elections continues to drop, which could be seen as a sign of increased alienation. Although Crimean Tatar leaders are committed to non-violent methods, the conflict between the ethnic Russians, who constitute 65% of the population of the peninsula, and the Crimean Tatars creates a serious risk of escalation (Williams 2001).

While the deported Crimean Tatars in the former Soviet Union mobilized for return to their homeland, a transformation has also taken place in the ethnic identity of the part of the Crimean Tatar diaspora who resided outside the Soviet Union. This was counter-intuitive because previously the Crimean Tatats who emigrated into welcoming hostlands such as Turkey and the United States were considered to have lost their attachment to their homeland. (Bezanis 1994; Eren 1998; Williams 2001). In this thesis, I will argue that the diaspora experience matters for understanding the Crimean Tatar situation today, and I will explain how the recent mobilization of the diaspora could be a possible game changer for the Crimean Tatar question. The most significant attempt to mobilize recently was the convention of World Crimean Tatar Congress, symbolizing the attempt to form a transnational nation, a political structure, stretching across borders but aiming to strengthen the Crimean Tatar power in the Crimean peninsula.

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18 Many Tatars emigrated from Romania and Bulgaria to Turkey after the fall of communism, as Turkey also considers Tatars belonging to Turkish ethnicity, and grants citizenship.
The deportation and the collective return of the Crimean Tatars in the USSR received considerable academic attention, but the diaspora outside the Soviet Union was generally ignored. (Uehling 2001, Chervonnaya 1990, Bekirova 2004) Other works who mentioned the diaspora communities (Williams 2000, Oberlander-Tarnaveanu and Volker 2005, Eminov 1997, 2000) generally viewed them as territorial minorities, ignoring the transnationalism of communities and the contributions of diaspora communities in the development of the Crimean Tatar nationalism. I aim to bring a transnational framework to Crimean Tatar studies by demonstrating the impossibility of studying one Crimean Tatar community as a nation while disregarding its relations with other parts of the “transnational nation.”

Focusing mainly on long-distance nationalism, this thesis does not provide a detailed account or analysis of the national movements of the Crimean Tatars developed in the homeland context. The national movements developed in the homeland are discussed mostly in relation to national movements outside the homeland. Certainly the institutions and the politics of the Russian Empire, subsequently the Soviet Union and Ukraine, must be taken into account for analysis of the Crimean Tatar homeland politics, but that is beyond the limits of this thesis. Moreover, nationalism in the homeland context has some different sources than in the diaspora contexts, which again will not be discussed here. This thesis aims to isolate the factors that play a role in determining deterritorialized and trans-territorial long-distance nationalism, rather than territorial nationalism.

**Research Question**

The question that inspired this work is what affected the simultaneous rise of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities in the recent decades. In order to provide an adequate
answer, this question is divided into the following research questions: (i) Which factors contribute to the emergence or revitalization of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities? (ii) What explains the development, dynamics, and trajectory of these communities? (iii) How can we explain differences in forms of nationalist mobilization across communities? (iv) How can we explain the variation in consequences of diaspora mobilization? Why did just one of the communities return? Why didn’t the others return? Why did all Crimean Tatar diaspora communities mobilize simultaneously? Does the rise of the diaspora movements lead to the emergence of a Crimean Tatar trans-border nation?

Sources and Research Methods:

I conducted field work in Crimea for two months (March-May 2006), in Turkey for six months (October 2005-May 2006), in Romania for a month (during September 2005, and July 2006), and in the United States for two weeks (during April 2002, and April 2008). In this field work, I first conducted a total of 36 key informant interviews with a wide spectrum of participants of national movements, as well as significant bystanders and observers. These interviews were mainly conducted in Crimean Tatar, supplemented by Turkish and Russian when needed. This dissertation demonstrates the possibility of using Crimean Tatar as a research language. At the time of the interviews, most of my interviewees were able to handle a conversation in Crimean Tatar.

Second, I conducted documentary research in major state and private archives, and libraries in the four countries mentioned above. I examined primary sources, such as movement documents, pamphlets, and periodicals, as well as secondary sources such as newspaper articles and books that describe the movement and situation of the Crimean Tatars throughout history in Crimean Tatar, Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian, and English.
Third, I conducted participant observation at major events of the Crimean Tatars such as exhibitions, conferences, festivals, Qurultay and Meclis sessions, election meetings, association meetings, rallies, protests, concerts, memorial days, performances, lectures, weddings, religious rituals, excursions, social events, balls, traditional festivals such as tepreş, hidirelle, navrez, and new cultural festivals. I stayed with Crimean Tatar families throughout my field work and interacted with community members of all ages. I also regularly participated in virtual community activities of the Crimean Tatars.

One thing to note in my research is the insider’s view and how to account for its possible disadvantages. I am a member of the Crimean Tatar community and have been an occasional participant of its cultural activities for a long time. While this could bring some bias to my research, I believe it is outweighed by the advantages brought by my in-depth knowledge of this community, including my knowledge of the Tatar language. Conducting interviews mainly in Crimean Tatar enabled me to reach a level of depth, specificity and nuance which would have been lost in translation since the pronunciation of certain words, word choice, or dialect choice or mix are significant symbols of identity in the Crimean Tatar culture. I am also sensitive to cultural traditions and rituals, allowing me to sense distinctions and hybridization across communities very easily, which would be lost to a scholar who is an outsider. The interviewees felt that I did not need an introduction to many aspects of the Crimean Tatar culture so they could focus on the details of the topic more easily. They also treated me as one of their own, which provided a comfort level that helped them open up. My capability to engage in ethnographic observation enabled richer textual description. Moreover, when researching a diaspora, it is not easy to say who is an insider and who is an outsider. When visiting communities other than my own, such as the communities in
Romania, in Crimea and in the United States, I was not completely an insider. There, my cultural distance to these communities enabled impartial observations of an outsider.

**Theoretical and empirical overview:**

My major contribution to the diaspora literature is to demonstrate that diasporas are nationalist communities constructed in the modern period. Second, I will develop the concept of long-distance nationalism suggested by Anderson. While I use long-distance nationalism as a generic form of nationalism across borders, I will also construct a typology of long-distance nationalism, which includes newly developed concepts of émigré, exile, diaspora and transnational nationalism. This typology provides clarifications to the conceptual confusions in diaspora literature. Diaspora literature has a difficulty in explaining empirical observation that not all “diasporas” or “transnational communities” want to return. My typology clarifies this, by classifying those migrants with a “return” goal in their frames as exile nationalists, and those with an ambivalent attitude towards return as diaspora nationalists. Similarly, diaspora literature is confused about the extent the diasporas are integrated in their host-states or whether they can be regarded as integrated at all. My typology also clarifies this issue by grouping those not willing to incorporate as exile nationalists, while those who are willing to incorporate at varying levels as diaspora nationalists.

The sociological literature on diasporas proposes that diasporas and transnationalism are caused by lack of incorporation into hostlands, but this literature has difficulties in explaining transnationalism when diaspora communities are well-incorporated. Well-incorporated communities such as the Crimean Tatars in Turkey may still need transnational
ties as they want to maintain their identity, without relinquishing the advantages of incorporation into their country of residence. My argument is that we cannot deduce whether transnationalism will emerge just from the level of incorporation into host-states. Sociological explanation fails because it is overly structuralist and statist, and because it neglects the diaspora agency. Transnationalism is contingent upon the specific framing processes mainly developed by actors. The actors may or may not choose to resort to various forms of transnationalism depending on how they interpret the context. The members of a diaspora accepted as agents are actively engaged in producing and maintaining meanings of their own nationalist discourse and ideology. I think a typology, while not providing clear causal arrows, best explicates the multifaceted phenomenon of the belonging of de-territorialized communities.

This study aims to demonstrate the interplay of structure and agency, rather than holding one above the other. This will be done mainly by focusing on mechanisms and processes, which are conceptualised as neither just structural nor just agential variables, but a combination of the two. Although frames are constructed through human agency, they become self-reproducing after a point, and constrain human behavior. However, a change in framing processes or frame transformation is also possible through individual initiative. Moreover, I emphasize that framing processes do not take place in a vacuum. They are embedded in political and discursive opportunity/threat structures that constrain or increase frame resonance. However, these structures are not conceptualized as stagnant, but rather they have to be interpreted in terms of framing processes. Therefore, discursive opportunity structures are held as important as the political ones. Moreover, frames can persist despite inefficiency as a consequence of certain ideational processes (such as alignment with certain
master frames). To be sure, the political and discursive opportunity structures influence but do not determine the framing processes.

My emphasis on agency of diaspora challenges Cohen’s influential analysis of structural conditions of dispersion as a factor that determines the form of diasporas. Looking at agency helps to explain political change better. Moreover, Robin Cohen, in the new edition of his 1997 book, suggests that social movement theory provides the best way for developing a dynamic study of diaspora and this is attempted in this thesis. The diaspora movements are taken not only as objects but also as subjects and determinants of their fate. Focusing on mobilization also renders the study of nationalism more dynamic. This study attempts to explain the emergence, development, consequences and forms of “diasporas”. This type of large-scale explanatory research on diaspora was not much undertaken by sociology or political science. I propose diaspora, viewed as transnational political communities, as a proper topic for comparative politics.19

My major contribution to nationalism literature is the suggestion that the study of diaspora must be located in nationalism literature, and new studies of nationalism must give due attention to the neglected but increasingly important topic of transnational ethno-national communities. To achieve this, the literature must rid itself of the bias that only territorial nations are important. In fact, long-distance nationalism presents a form that nationalism took in the global age, and it demonstrates that nationalism can be reproduced in a transnational context. Another contribution to nationalism literature is the elaboration of how stateless and minority communities construct their identities through social movements, mobilization and framing processes. While Brubaker (1996) underlined the institutional

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19 International relations has already taken diasporas seriously and has produced significant initial work, especially on the influence of diaspora on foreign policy.
factors in the construction of the national identity in the Soviet geography, mobilization and framing becomes more important for non-institutionalized communities deprived of their national institutions. This is also a critique of statist and institutionalist explanations, as well as the explanations that view identity as mainly defined by state context. In the global age, maintaining common identities across different contexts is possible. However, this is not because of the reproduction of a common culture but because of the political movements that utilize newly developed communication technologies which enable transnational imagination, and coordination of discourses and activities across diaspora communities.

This study also indirectly addresses the problem whether nations are “constructed or re-constructed” based on an “ethnic core”, which is maintained and transmitted by the repository of myths, symbols, traditions, and memories. A longue-duree examination of communities, which move to another territorial context, provides evidence for an ethno-symbolist interpretation of a nation. For a collective memory of homeland, exile process, and myths about the ethnic origins (Pan-Turkism ideology) influences the designers of the frames of long-distance identities. However, as Greta Uehling argues myths, symbols, traditions, and memories are not simply carried from a homeland and then transmitted, but they are continuously re-constructed by each generation (Uehling 2004). about the Soviet community Therefore, I prefer constructivism as it has a greater explanatory potential than ethno-symbolism in this case. However, I agree with ethno-symbolism that memories, myths, symbols and traditions matter, and differences in this symbolic baggage that emerged as a result of different diaspora experiences creates a significant obstacle against building the transnational nation.
This study constitutes one of the rare applications of framing processes theory to nationalism and diaspora.\textsuperscript{20} Just like nationalist literature did not make good use of the social movement theory, the social movement theory is weak in explaining national movements. I bridge the nationalism ethnicity and nationalism literature and social movements theory to produce rewarding results for both. With respect to the social movement theory, I propose a theoretical synthesis of the framing processes approach and the concept of political opportunities. While a synthesis of framing processes and political opportunities was offered before by McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly (2001), these theorists mostly privileged the political opportunities as a framework of explanation and the framing processes were treated as \textit{ad hoc} variables. Instead, I suggest the framing processes approach as a very promising venue on its own for the development of the social movement theory but I supplement this approach with the concept of political and discursive opportunity structures to account better for structural causes. However, it is still theoretically underdeveloped. In this work, I will construct a theoretical framework for studying nationalism by synthesizing several propositions of the framing processes approach.

This thesis contributes to the theorization of framing processes by emphasizing interaction of agents and opportunity structures; by demonstrating how frames are continuously constructed through the interaction of various agents, structures, and ideational processes; by presenting the significance of discursive opportunities and the necessity of conceiving political opportunities as more dynamic and filtered by agents’ perceptions; by elaborating relations between movement frames and master frames; by developing a model of frame resonance; by introducing learning and movement paths to the framing processes by

\footnote{\textsuperscript{20} Cohen (2008) suggested the incorporation of social movement theory for the development of diaspora theory in his review of the literature.}
studying them in *longue-duree*; and by highlighting the role of transnationalism in the framing processes. There is no need to say that many aspects of the framing approach waits to be theorized further. The discursive sources of frames such as discursive opportunity structures and master frames are neglected in the literature because many proponents of the framing approach do not give sufficient attention to the content of ideas and view frames as mainly strategic resources. The framing processes approach is weakest in explaining and predicting frame resonance. In this work, I will draw attention to different levels of resonance among the varying groups of participants, and how frame alignment takes place among those participants. The framing approach also does not link the framing processes of the movement with master-framing very well. This study will only elaborate on master frame extension among the four master frame alignment processes. What is not explored further in this thesis is how the movement organizations facilitate framing processes and how frame alignment processes could be made more effective by strong organizations. The relationship of framing processes and movement organizations needs to be researched further without reducing framing into a tool for ‘resource mobilization’ processes.

In terms of research methods, I will offer a theoretical framework that allows for a systematic comparison of diaspora communities across time. This theoretical framework also proposes a way of thinking about the emergence and development of transnational national movements, by focusing on transnational relations across communities, instead of studying each community in isolation as it was done up until now. The interaction of the diaspora and the homeland communities must be taken into account while studying one of the communities, and this means the communities must be located in a transnational framework. Indirectly, this speaks to the statist bias of existing political science. State institutions are not
major causal variables in the case of diasporas, which can transcend the states. This does not mean states can be ignored, but that the influence of the state political structures must be balanced with transnational influences.

This study uses Small-N research design, which enables in-depth examination of cases. This is important in exploring a lesser known phenomenon like diaspora and the Crimean Tatar cases, and identifying the relevant mechanisms and processes. Moreover, comparing this small number of cases enables me to explain and produce generalizations in addition to exploring. Explanations emerge as a result of a systematic analysis of processes and mechanisms across time in small number of cases (small-N). The result is admittedly not a parsimonious explanation but I side with Hall when he says “…parsimony is no longer seen as the key feature of explanation on political science.” (Hall 2003: 387)

I will try to demonstrate that causal processes must be traced through *longue durée* in- depth case studies for more qualified explanations. Historical context must be an important part of political explanations. (Hall 2003) Without studying the historical context, I will assume that the recent “rise” of the Crimean Tatar diaspora is completely new while in fact the Crimean Tatars national movement goes through significant periods of ‘rise” in the inter-war Romania and the USSR in the 1960s and 70s. Studying the historical context helps me to understand what is distinctive about the recent rise, and how the recent transnational relations differ from past ways of transnational way of organizing. Indeed, this study provides support to the historical literature that argues for the existence of transnationalism in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, this study emphasizes that humans are first of all learning and reflective beings. They learn from the past. Therefore,

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*Longue durée* is a concept first developed by the French of historical writing which emphasizes to long-term historical structures over events. In political science, it was first applied by Robert Putnam in his study of democracy in Italy.
movements of today carry the print of the past ideas and traditions. Furthermore, *longue durée* case studies enable me to trace movement paths. A *longue durée* study also enabled the study of large processes, such as the emergence, and development of national identity which generally unfolds in the course of decades.

In this study, I also make the significant introduction of the Crimean Tatar diaspora to the diaspora theory and political science. How this community maintained its national identity in exile for 50 years and achieved a collective return has not been yet studied by political science until now. While one purpose of this study is theoretical, the other is to contribute to the Crimean Tatar studies. I bring together vast historical and contemporary material on the Crimean Tatars based on extensive field work and built on more than a decade of ethnographic observation. Although I do not claim to have written an authoritative history of the Crimea Tatars, I provide a transnational framework to think about the Crimean Tatar nationalist experience, and point out relations between these communities. This suggests that the diaspora nations such as the Crimean Tatars cannot be studied without reference to their diaspora communities and transnational relations among them and the homeland. I will also suggest new ways of thinking about the Crimean Tatar first deported now repatriated community, which was previously researched in a limited way. More historical research needs to be conducted on many periods of diaspora history and diaspora-homeland relations. A united history of Crimean Tatar nationalist experience in the homeland and diaspora context still waits to be written.22

More empirical studies of changing diasporas in a comparative context are also necessary. These could develop and refine my theoretical framework. In fact, there are many

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22 Razmik Panossian provided such an example of nationalist historical analysis that unites diaspora and homeland communities for Armenians.
understudied diasporas in the post-Soviet and post-Ottoman geography due to historical high mobility of populations. There are not sufficient studies on the diasporic roots of modern Turkey, Romania, Ukraine and Uzbekistan either. Perhaps, this study will inspire such investigations of the diasporic roots of many “nation”-states.

Lastly, an empirical examination of diaspora also has significant theoretical implications for a normative study of diasporas. Political theory recently focused on multiculturalism and minority rights. I think we are not far from discussing the rights of diasporas in the international system. Diasporas themselves claim various rights, particularly the right to maintain identity across borders, the right for transnational citizenship and the right to return. This has significant repercussions for sending and receiving states. The discussion of obligations of diasporas must follow the discussion of rights. Recent literature raises questions about the damaging effects of diasporas on ethnic conflicts. Anderson explained in his account of long-distance nationalism that:

…today’s long-distance nationalism…creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable. The participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to the judicial system; he probably does not cast even an absentee vote in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he need not fear prison, torture or death nor need his immediate family. But well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations.  (Anderson 2002, 74)

Empirical literature is not sufficient to make final judgments on these issues or at least to develop a judgment when a diaspora community could be normatively right in interfering, when it is not.
CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction:

The research question of this dissertation can be divided into three parts:

1. Emergence: What explains the emergence of the Crimean Tatar diaspora?
2. Development: What explains the development of the diaspora in terms of
dynamics, ebb and flow, trajectory, and forms of mobilization?
3. Consequences: How can we explain the consequences of diaspora mobilization and
variation in consequences? Why did one of the communities return? Why didn’t the others
return? Why did they mobilize simultaneously? Does the rise of the diaspora movements
lead to the emergence of a transnational nation?

In this chapter, I will provide theoretical answers to these questions, which will be
utilized, elaborated, and supported by evidence in my case-studies in the rest of the
dissertation. I suggest that all three of these questions can be best explained through the
framing processes. The formation of frames by diaspora agents creates national movements.
Each historical period (or mini-case) is marked by a different dominant frame structure,
which I outline in my case-studies. Hence, each frame structure shapes a different
‘movement path’. Changes and continuity in frames influence movement dynamics. The
framing processes are themselves influenced by political and discursive opportunity
structures. The latter provides the context and means for the emergence or change of framing
processes, but they in turn are influenced by the framing processes in major ways.
Opportunities need to be identified as such and discursive context also provides opportunities
or limitations. In addition, the influence of opportunity structures is mitigated by
transnational influences, and learning across diaspora contexts. Finally, framing paths contribute greatly to movement consequences. In sum, my theoretical framework outlines how various framing processes interact with political and discursive opportunity structures and cause the creation, development and consequences of movements.

In this chapter, I first review the literature on diaspora, the literature on ethnicity and nationalism, and the literature on social movement theory in order to construct a theoretical framework to explain the research question. The literature rightly suggests that diaspora must be thought of within a transnational framework. However, the understanding of ethnicity underlying most accounts of diaspora is pre-political and static, hence quite problematic. In order to address this limitation, I incorporate a “constructivist” view of ethnicity utilizing the literature in ethnicity and nationalism. The resulting “constructivist view of diaspora” helps explain change and the political dimensions of the diaspora better. I mainly argue that diaspora communities are “constructed” through mobilization. I argue further that the formation of identities through mobilization is best explained by the social movement theory, particularly a “framing processes approach.” However, it is only through the aid of political and discursive opportunity/threat structures that framing processes explain the emergence, development and consequences of diaspora.

The outlined theoretical framework above is applied to the cases of the Crimean Tatar diaspora mobilization in the rest of this thesis. In each case-study, I identify main framing processes at play in mobilizing the communities, and the interaction of those processes with political and discursive opportunity structures over time. In this chapter, I provide sketches of how my theoretical framework is applied to my cases. I also develop a taxonomy of long-distance nationalism that emerges as a result of observation of various forms of mobilization.
across my cases, and that enables distinguishing the different ways in which the Crimean Tartars sought to maintain their membership in a national community when they did not live in the homeland.

2.2. Literature Review

2.2.1. Diaspora literature:

“Diaspora” in ancient Greek means “dispersal” or “scattering across” (dia) of “seeds” (spora). It was first employed to describe the Hellenic colonizers. Later, in the Greek translations of the Bible, it was utilized to describe the Jewish exile (Safran 1991; Cohen 1997). From antiquity until recently, it was used as a specific term to denote the dispersion of Jews around the world. However, from the 1970s on, the application of the term diaspora has been gradually extended to Armenians, Greeks, Africans, and Palestinians in the academy and the media (Cohen 1997). In the 1990s, thirty-five populations were characterized as diasporas in the journal Diaspora (Tölölyan 2002), and a simple Google search today yields hundreds of self-identifying diasporas. The mobilization of the Crimean Tatar diaspora must be understood within the context of a recent global diaspora mobilization.

There are two different approaches that attempt to explain the recent mobilization of diasporas. The first group of theorists (Gilroy 1995; Clifford 1994; Hall 1997; Bhabha 1990, 1994; Brah 1996; Basch et al. 1994), who can be called post-structuralists (Brubaker 2005) or transnationalists (Gold 2002), are found primarily in the disciplines of anthropology and cultural studies. These theorists point out that along with the unprecedented increase in migration, the developments in communication technologies and the ease of transportation prevent assimilation of migrants into society, and in some cases reverse the assimilation of
older migrants as they opt for maintaining their links with their former homelands and kin abroad. The sustainability of trans-border contacts enables migrants to live in more than one world simultaneously, renders nation-state borders less relevant, and paves the way for the emergence of “transnational communities.” (Portes et al 1999) These communities not only question the assumptions of homogeneity with respect to existing nations, but also reveal the hybrid, fluid, creol and syncretic nature of identity. (Brubaker 2005: 6) The “heterogeneity” of transnational communities makes them “anti-national,” which means that these communities resist nation-building processes. (Brubaker 2005: 8; Kearney 1991; Appadurai 1996)

These predictions of the post-structuralist school are not empirically sustainable (Kokot et al 2004: 1). For example, despite their immense increase, migrants still form only 2% of the world population (National Research Council 2000: 8). Nationalism is on the rise all around the world and the nation-state is still intact. Moreover, new migrants are observed to engage in “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson 1998), deploying the newly developed technologies of communication for nationalist purposes. Thus, migrants are not immune to nationalism.23 Also, scholars of the history of immigration challenge the “novelty” of the phenomenon of “transnationalism,” pointing to the widespread transnational activity of American immigrants at the end of the 19th century (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).

Still, the transnationalist/post-structuralist approaches offer significant insights. Although transnationalism defined as sustained trans-border networks is not something entirely new, it requires “a critical mass and complexity” necessary to speak of the

23In fact, the theoretical accounts of ethnicity and nationalism are also weak in this approach in the sense that they cannot escape implicit essentialism. These proponents of post-structuralism emphasize “hybridity.” However, for some identities to be hybrid, there must be others who are conceptualized as “pure” (Young 1996; Anthias 2001: 637).
emergence of a “transnational social field” (Portes et al. 1999 217). This space does not replace but “supplements” the sphere of nation-states (Faist 2000: 192). Moreover, it is true that internal homogeneity of nation-states is more often in question; therefore assimilation can no longer be taken for granted. Migration is no longer regarded as a transient phenomenon. Migrants are no longer just studied in relation to problems of incorporation in receiving states, but they became as a topic of investigation in themselves, having political agency.24 I adopt these premises of the transnationalist school, focusing on the agency of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities, and the transnational links and interactions across diaspora communities that change over time.

The other school of diaspora studies, represented by Safran (1991) and Cohen (1997) depart from the post-structuralist premises of the transnationalist approach by insisting on the “ethnonational” nature of diasporas. They agree that diasporas deconstruct national identity of the nation-state but this does not mean that they also deconstruct ethnicity. They rightly point out that diasporas reorganize ethnic and national identity across borders. Cohen (1997)25, by refining Safran’s previous definition (1991), lists several features of diaspora:

- dispersal or travel26 from an original homeland to two or more foreign regions,
- a collective memory of myth, an idealized homeland,
- a commitment to the maintenance of a homeland, including a movement for return,
- a strong, long-term group consciousness or identity, a belief in a shared fate,
- a range of possible relations (from troubled to enriching) with the host society,

24 These theoretical developments paved the way to the emergence of a “transnational lens” in migration studies. (Basch et al 1994, Portes et al 1999, Faist 2000).
25 Cohen published a second edition of his book in 2008, but as he stated, there are no major revisions to his main theory. Therefore, I continue to work with his first definition which I find somewhat more elegant.
26 Cohen (1997) also includes the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions as factors forming diasporas.
-a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnics in other places of settlement

(Cohen, 1996: 6)

According to Cohen (1997: 6), this is an ideal type category. Not all diaspora communities have all these aspects, but to qualify as a diaspora, a community must have a majority of them. By emphasizing the ethnonational aspects of diasporas, Cohen (1997) provides a useful corrective to the first approach, which situates diaspora in contradiction to ethnicity and nation. The main difficulty with this approach is that it cannot explain why diasporas began to mobilize in recent decades (Anthias 1998, Butler 2002). The explanation Cohen (1997) provides is that diasporas maintained their forms more or less intactly beneath the existing structures over centuries, and that they resurfaced whenever the nation-state began to retreat. On this view, post-structuralists interestingly concur with him.

Cohen’s definition of diaspora brings to mind many questions. First, is there really such a strong continuity of the diaspora collective identity? Second, it is very difficult to make a judgment about any diaspora with the criteria provided in Cohen’s (1997) definition. Do all types of migration from an original homeland create a diaspora? What does an “attachment to homeland” in Cohen’s definition entail? What exact kind of action is expected from a diaspora and what determines it? Do all diasporas demand self-determination? On which territory exactly do they demand self-determination? What

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27 Cohen’s definition is ‘objectivist’ as opposed to a ‘subjectivist’ definition, which is based on self-identification. Cohen’s (1997) definition can perhaps also be called inter-subjective, as he emphasizes many cultural variables, but conceptualizes them as things that can be objectively observed from outside, as things whose presence or absence can be determined for sure. He is also close to Anthony Smith’s (2009) ethno-symbolism in this sense.
28 “Globalization has enhanced the practical, economic, affective roles of diasporas, showing them to be particularly adaptive forms of social organization” (Cohen 1997, 177, xii)
29 Both approaches do not state precisely their conception of globalization, or the mechanisms of how globalization caused diaspora mobilization.
determines the borders of the homeland? What explains the different responses to displacement? Third, can such static definition of diasporas explain change and mobilization?

These problems stem from the fact that Cohen’s theory of diaspora suffers from a problematic account of the nature of ethnicity. In order to analyze Cohen’s arguments, it is imperative to bring in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism, which can help us to develop a more satisfactory understanding of diaspora ethnicity.

2.2.2. Ethnicity and nationalism literature

2.2.2.1. Ethno-symbolism and Cohen’s account of diaspora:

Ethnicity and nationalism literature can be divided into two schools: primordialist and instrumentalist. The primordialists (Geertz 1973; Shils 1957; van den Berghe 1981) argue that ethnicity is based on innate “primordial ties” that are fixed. The primordialists assert either a biological or psychological need for belonging to a group, and support their case by pointing to the endurance of family and kinship ties in human societies (van den Berghe 1981; Horowitz 2001; Connor 1993). The primordialists principally consider ethnicity as being of the same nature as these natural ties. The fact that many people change their ethnic and national identity and that many people assimilate suggests that ethnicity and nation are not fixed or natural. It is easily observed that shared traits (language, kinship, homeland, and so on) do not automatically create ethnic identity. Primordialism was later softened by adding various caveats to it.

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30 It must be noted that Geertz (1973) considers primordial ties as socially constructed in early history, but as transmitted more or less intact since then, thereby becoming almost natural to human societies.

31 For instance, perennialists do not argue that these ties are unchanging since time immemorial, but rather that they are enduring. They admit that some ethnic ties might fade away, but that they can also reemerge after
1993: 69) recognizes that structural changes, particularly modernization or globalization might affect the development of ethnicity and nation, but Smith does not agree that they change an underlying durable “ethnic core.” The “ethnic core”, composed of myths, symbols, values, and traditions, creates a strong continuity with a pre-existing ethnic community and contemporary nation. (Smith 1993: 39) As Cohen (1997) emphasizes similar features, his understanding of diaspora can be regarded as predominantly ethno-symbolist.

The ethno-symbolist account of diaspora is weak for the following reasons. First, more than for any other ethnic community, it is hard to imagine that diaspora branches immersed in different contexts can easily maintain a shared group identity. Empirical evidence demonstrates that culture is not stagnant and people reinterpret myths, values, symbols, and traditions in light of experience in a changing context. Therefore, diversity within diasporas, for example, the existence of various Jewish identities and conflicts between them, contradicts with Cohen's (1997) pre-political view of one Jewish diaspora identity.

With regards to the historical depth of the diaspora identity, we must consider the following. A historical examination demonstrates that most immigrant communities that are identified as “diasporas” today did not identify as a diaspora before the “era of globalization.” A few other long-term diasporas did not identify as such before the modern

long-periods (Armstrong 1982; Connor 1993). Armstrong (1982) points to a continuous existence of Jewish, Armenian, and Greek diasporas, perhaps not since the dawn of history, but at least since the 12th century. Anthony Smith (2000: 9) points out the continuity of “symbolic” factors, such as myths, values, symbols and traditions, in many diasporas such as Jews, Armenians, and, to a certain extent, Greeks.

32 Smith (1999) emphasizes symbolic phenomena, such as the myth of the Promised Land, the myth of chosen people, the myth of the golden age of history, and the myth of a common language, a common religion, and a sense of common fate, as mechanisms for providing continuity. “The spur to the formation of nations in Europe was provided, not only by the sanction that Christianity gave to vernaculars, but by the powerful biblical prototype of the ancient Jewish nation which Christianity carried...” (Smith, 2000: 10-11)
era. Even the “Jewish Diaspora” was used as a religious term for centuries, and it only gained a political meaning with the emergence of Zionism in the 19th century.

With regards to the existence of a premodern attachment to “homeland”, we could argue that attachment due to religious meaning and sacredness is not equivalent to the attachment to modern “homelands” of the diasporas, which has more commonality with the secular patrie. As Anderson points out, an attachment to a larger territory requires first the ability to imagine it, for instance, by viewing a map of the “homeland,” by traveling across it, perhaps by train or by getting information about places one never saw through modern communication such as a newspaper (Anderson 1983).33

The pre-political account of a diaspora ethnic community by Cohen cannot explain the diversity in political manifestations of a diaspora identity. Russian Jews, for example, expressed their discontent by joining the revolutionary movement or founding the Jewish Bund, an ethnic party aiming for self-determination within a united Russia. Many members of the African diaspora in the Americas did not demand return to their original homeland and did not proclaim their right to self-determination despite their enormous discontent. In the same way, many migrants or refugees in the world voluntarily assimilated. Claim for a similar level of empathy and solidarity among diaspora communities is not empirically sustainable. In the same way, claim for a similar level and type of attachment to the homeland is not realistic. While some diasporas have merely symbolic ties to homeland,

33 The Crimean Tatars in the 19th century had more commitment towards their home or village in or around Crimea (as the pre-modern Crimean Tatar state spread to an area beyond the peninsula, and in fact its borders were not clearly drawn but fluid as many states were in that era). (Williams 2001: 64, 216) Before the great migrations in the 19th centura, most Crimean Tatars never left their villages during their lifetime (Williams 2001, 329)
others have political solidarity with it. Many diasporas do not want to return due to economic reasons or political violence.

It is not clear how symbols, values, traditions and myths with significant levels of stagnancy can explain change, such as diaspora mobilization. Was the emergence of an Israeli nation a natural outcome of Jewish myths, tradition or religion, or were there other more important factors that made those myths, traditions and religion relevant? In order to develop the concept of diaspora further, I review theories of situationalism and constructivism.

2.2.2.2. Constructivism and framing processes approach:

Instrumentalism is divided into two schools: situationalism and constructivism. The situationalists outline various structural factors including social, economic and political processes that provide a comparative advantage to individuals in explaining nationalist mobilization. Processes of modernization such as industrialization, public education, urbanization, modern state-building, and mass communications facilitate and necessitate the emergence of a nation (Gellner 1983; Breuilly 1993; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Deutsch 1953; Kedourie 1960; Tilly 1975; Mann 1986). An alternative explanation of this approach is that uneven processes of modernization create inequalities among groups in society. Therefore, to both join an ethnic group and engage in an ethnic conflict becomes a rational decision for individuals who aim to maximize their individual interests (Nairn 1977; Hechter 1975; Brass 1985).

Constructivism agrees with situationalism that ethnicity, nation, and diaspora emerged as a response to modern political, social and economic processes. It is true that the
gradual crystallization of the Westphalia nation-state system and nation-building processes disrupted the communities and transformed the relations of states towards their minorities. (Gellner 1983). The major example is the Jewish diaspora which faced increasing discrimination, pogroms, and finally genocide in the modern era. In a way, the modern nation-state system created the pre-conditions for diaspora identity. Migrants adopted the hegemonic categories of race, ethnicity and nation in self-defense from persecution in host and homeland contexts (Gellner 1983; Naimark 2001). Diaspora identity is modern in another way too. Educational attainment and means of communication, at least among the elite of the migrant communities, are prerequisites to define and create a diaspora identity, and to organize a strong challenge against the central authority.  

Constructivism, however, criticizes several aspects of situationalism. First of all, situationalism argues that modernization, print capitalism, communication, and other macrosociological modern processes are the causes for the mobilization of ethnic communities, but this casts a very wide net and does not explain the causal chain of how these factors create mobilization. Constructivism criticizes the reduction of nationalism to modern processes, although it also argues that ethnonational identities emerged as a response to modern processes, or were facilitated by modern processes (see Calhoun 1997: 29). However, the significance of modern processes is explained differently. Anderson (1983), who contributed greatly to the constructivist explanation of ethnicity, argued that nation is

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34 The situationalist view of diaspora conflicts with the post-structuralist thesis that diasporas are immune to nationalism. However, with globalization, the situationalist approach took an interesting turn and argued that globalization of the economy makes national units less appropriate so as to weaken contemporary nation-states (Brown 2000: 13). As we move to the post-modern, the nation as a corollary of modernity will also be transcended. Thus, the interpretation of diaspora as more “fit” and more “functional” in the era of globalization interestingly concurs with the post-structuralist view. Situationalism does not really reject the existence of ethnicity in a primordial sense, but it argues that ethnicity becomes relevant and meaningful only if it is utilized to create ethnic and national mobilization by political actors within the modern processes. (Breuilly, 1993) This is in fact because both post-structuralism and situationalism (better word choice?) agree with the primordialist view of ethnicity as a natural form of human community, despite their view of nation as a construction.
first and foremost a response to the disappearance of face-to-face communities (which were
not primordial but imagined too), and their replacement by large-scale territorial societies is
organized around a state. The disruption of the social structure, including dislocation of
existing authority structures, disruptions of social cohesion, dislocations, and dis-
empowerment will cause individuals to face cognitive and moral dilemmas, stress and
humiliation. Nationalism is one possible response to this situation as nationalist imagination
sought harmony and security. A constructivist explanation of nationalism here confirms the
findings of the framing processes approach. According to the latter approach, grievances do
not automatically create mobilization; it is only when meanings are attributed to those
structures or grievances that mobilization occurs (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Therefore, stress
and humiliation caused by modern society, particularly genocide, forced migration, and
exploitation do not automatically create diaspora mobilization without “frames”, which
analyze who is culpable, what the root of the problem is, and what can be done.

Secondly, the weakness of the situationalist approach stems from its understanding of
human psychology. In the situationalist accounts of nationalism, individuals turn to
nationalism to serve their self-interests which are derived from the environmental structures
the individuals are embedded in. The individual interest of a diasporic person or the
collective interest of a diaspora are not easily readable from the structures, but rather they
have to be interpreted by human agency (cf Leroy Vail, in Yeros, 1999: 3-4). Instead of
rationally calculating their individual self-interest before every move, which is beyond the
cognitive capacity of human-beings, individuals rely on other sources, such as the elites or the

35 Also see Brown (2000: 152) : “…when aspiring political elites sought to legitimate the rise of the modern
state by employing the nationalist ideology, the disruptive impact of modernization processes upon face-to-face
communities of family and locality ensured the widespread appeal of the nation as a surrogate- mythical kinship
community.”
in institutional or ideological frameworks constructed by other agents to explain the situation and then project the best way of action. Brown (2000, 20) proposes that “national identity is constructed on the basis of institutional and ideological frameworks which offer simple and indeed simplistic formulas of identity and diagnoses of contemporary problems to otherwise confused and insecure individuals.” He also suggests that a “nationalist formula” offers “simplistic diagnosis and prescription” “to deal with complex social problems” (Brown 2000, 152) Thus, constructivism underlines how self-interests are socially, ideologically, and politically constructed. Various constructivist theories emphasize different ways of constructing identities, such as state and institutional frameworks, and discursive structures. I argue that the construction of the diaspora communities takes place in the course of mobilization. Mobilization is best explained by the framing processes approach in social movement theory, which emphasizes that humans rely on a schema of interpretation called “frames” to understand and interpret the complex world.36

Thirdly, situationalism takes for granted the existence of “diaspora” as a unitary collective actor ready to be mobilized in response to political opportunities and threats. Brubaker (2004a: 8) warns that we must not talk about ethnicity or nation as if they are real collectivities. Brubaker suggests treating diaspora as a category of practice, project, claim, and stance rather than a bounded group (Brubaker 2005: 13). It is the processes of defining borders, classification and categorization that make the nation (Brubaker 2004: 48).37

Brubaker views nation not “as a substance but as an institutionalised form; not as a

36 The constructivist approach to ethnicity and the framing processes approach both signify a cognitive turn in their fields. Cognitive research emphasized complex culturally and historically specific mental structures and processes as determinants of human behaviour (Brubaker 2004: 36). According to the cognitive approach, before individuals act, they have to attribute meaning to circumstances.

37 Diaspora communities are constructed in the processes of mobilization. The imagination of the Jewish diaspora mostly came about due to the efforts of the Zionist movement. Local Jewish communities did not necessarily share a collective ethnonational homeland-centric identity before then, though they could have shared a religious identity.
collectivity but as practical category, not as an entity, but as contingent event” (Brubaker 1996, 16). For Calhoun (1997: 3) ethnicity and nation are discursive formations. “Nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects…” (Calhoun 1997: 5).

For Cohen (1997), many transnational communities of today have not existed long, so they cannot be regarded as diasporas but as “embryonic diasporas” (Cohen 2008: 4), that must pass the test of time to prove to be diasporas. Brubaker (2005) conflicts with Cohen (1997), who wants to exclude certain groups who self-identify as diasporas, as they do not meet his objectivist criteria and time test. For Brubaker (2005) and Calhoun (1997), those claims, projects, efforts, mobilization to become a diaspora would be more interesting. Perhaps, instead of restricting communities, which are growing in number, from using this term for self-identification, we must view these very claims as data that need to be explained, and perhaps as data that necessitate rethinking the conceptualization of diaspora.38

In his account of diaspora, Sokefeld (2008), states that:

“As an emic concept, employed by the agents of society for particular purposes identity is therefore not a descriptive category. Identity is a project … As a project identity presupposes what it seeks to achieve. In the case of a nationalist movement, the unity and reality of the nation, expressed for instance in a long and detailed history, is considered a fact even if political reality denies its factuality. It is real in a higher kind of reality. The particulars of a political life have to be brought into line with that essential reality - not the other way around.” (Sökefeld 2008: 30)

38 The relations with the receiving societies do not matter for Cohen (1997), because diaspora is mainly motivated by its internal features and its own culture, such as belief in a shared fate, collective memory of myth of homeland and so on.
The proliferation of communities who claim to be diasporas draws our attention to ways of studying claim-making, mobilization, and collective projects of diasporas. This necessitates bringing in the framing processes approach once again.

If we apply the propositions developed by the framing processes approach and the constructivist approach to the case of diaspora, the following explanation emerges: Changes in international politics, mainly after Westphalia, created oppression for transnational migrants and their descendants, by displacing them in search for homogenization of nation-states or by forcing them to assimilate. This historical and/or continuing injustice was addressed by the emerging “long-distance nationalism frame”. This frame involved a diagnosis which identified a specific event or specific villains that caused forced migration or assimilation. It also constructed a prognosis which included plausible solutions such as a return to the homeland, or some other version of maintaining political ties to the homeland. That will help restoring some of what was lost in de-territorialization and fulfilling an aspiration to maintain identity in places of exile. The mobilizational aspect for diaspora frame underlined the danger of eternal loss of a homeland and hope for territorialization as well as assimilation. Therefore, the diaspora identity is produced by a nationalist frame that is invented39 by the elite as a remedy to the problems of their community that emerged in the modern context.

2.3. Theoretical Framework:

2.3.1. Main framing processes

The comparative politics literature demonstrates that collective action is not necessarily the most rational option given the possibility of free-riding (Olson 1965). Even if it was the most rational option, psychological research confirms that human beings do not

39 Once invented, frames can be learned and adopted by other elite, who then do not have to create frames.
stop and assess all their options before acting, as this would be impossible. Instead, they rely on previously constituted mental schemas, which Goffman (1974) calls “frames”. Frames help them to “locate, perceive, identify and label” (cf Snow et al 1986, 464) in order to make sense of the complex world around them, and thereby help individuals to figure out how to act. This is different than the previous ideational approach to mobilization which emphasized ideologies. Instead of the content of ideologies, “frames” says it is more important to look at what meanings are attributed to them, how they are perceived, and how they are adopted and attributed by human agents to understand their influence (Snow and Benford 1988). That is, the movements are not viewed as carriers of certain ideas but as “signifying agents” actively engaged in producing and maintaining meanings through their interaction with targets. (Snow and Benford 1988, 198) The targets involve the potential adherents, bystanders and antagonists in the ‘social movement field’, which are determined by the movement leaders, based on the “goal of the organization” and the targets’ “perceived influence” (Evans 1997: 453).

Framing processes are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, garner bystander support, and demobilize antagonists (Snow and Benford 1988, 198). The first two processes are conducted through the method of ‘frame alignment’ and the last one is done by ‘counter-framing.’

‘Frame alignment’ can be defined as a process in which individuals’ interpretations are linked to interpretations of organizations or elite activists such that “individual interests, values, and beliefs” and organization’s “activities, goals, and ideology” are “congruent and

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40 It is true that “the collective action frames can function to amplify, extend the existing ideologies, or provide innovative antidotes to [ideologies].” In a way, since a macro-transformation such as an ideological or consciousness transformation is hard to establish, Snow and Benford (1988) prefer to focus on the frame changes propagated by the intellectual leaders, which are easier to identify.
complementary” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). This is done through four major methods: frame transformation, frame extension, frame amplification, and frame bridging.

The most significant processes for our purposes are ‘frame transformation’ and ‘frame bridging.’ The first refers to a “reframing of some set of conditions” even though conditions may not have changed (Snow et al. 1986, 474). In other cases, “a domain previously taken as normative or acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change” (Snow et al. 1986, 474). In cases of diaspora, the elite problematize the identity of immigrants or immigrants of migrant origin. They find out past injustices, most notably forced population movement (such as ethnocide or genocide). They question forgetting past injustices and settling down with the current situation of dispersion and assimilation into a host-society. In cases of immediate grievances, they identify perpetrators, so that the grievances do not seem like a result of impersonal forces.

‘Frame bridging’ refers to “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). This contributes to the formation of alliances or coalitions, and recruitment of bystanders. Transnational bridging of frames among various diasporas is also possible. Frame-bridging is different than adaptation of another frame as two different frames continue to exist.41

The third most often used framing concept in this work is “counter-framing” which refers to “the attempt to undermine opponents' attempts of frame alignment with contested

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41 ‘Frame extension’ is “the extension of the primary framework so as to encompass interests, and points of view that are incidental to [organizations’] primary objectives, but of considerable salience to potential adherents.” (Snow et al. 1986, 467). The movement could extend to the various identities of the adherents such as ethnonational, religious, gender, occupational, and so on. ‘Frame extension’ can also operate on an upper level. ‘Frame amplification’ refers to “identification, idealizations, and elevation” of values and/or beliefs “that may not be especially salient and readily apparent to constituents to inspire collective action” (Snow et al. 1986, 472). This is done through identification and idealization of homeland, and elevation of patriotic values. Several aspects of ethnic identity such as myth of origins, myth of golden age, myth of chosen people, and historical heroes are identified, idealized, and elevated.
targets.” (Evans 1997, 452) This can involve attempts to “rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford 1987, 75).

The fourth major framing component of my framework is “master frames”. The world is replete with “master frames” through which people make sense of the world. Snow and Benford (1992) define the master frame as a “specific dominant representation of the political environment” or “general symbolic frames that are culturally resonant in their historical milieux” (Snow and Benford 1992, 151). Swart explains that “…to make their specific historical situation meaningful, movement actors 'keynote' (cf Turner and Killian, 1987) these master frames” (Swart 1995: 469) or “tap into” a master frame. (Swart 1995: 469). To clarify, the vocabulary of movement frames is heavily influenced by the resonant master frame of the context in which the movement operates. It must be also noted that there might be several master frames that relate to a certain context, and movement leaders might strategically shift between them.

Master frames have a close affinity with the concept of discursive opportunity structures. The latter is defined as “meaning-making institutions in a particular society” or “public discourse” (Ferree et al 2002, 62), and can refer to media, public opinion, and state or official ideology in totalitarian/authoritarian states that “channels and organizes discourse” (Ferree et al 2002, 62). Both master frames and discursive opportunity structures influence how movement frames are defined and worded.

Frame alignment processes can also take place between the master frame and movement frames. “Master frame alignment processes link the activities, goals, and ideology of a movement organization to those within the broader cultural and political context of the movement” in the form of master frame transformation, master frame extension, master
frame amplification, and master frame bridging (Swart 1995, 465) Master frame extension is the most often used one by the Crimean Tatars. “Master frame extension involves the adaptation or extension of the symbolic boundaries of the master frame in order to make it coincide with the movement's unique historical situation, interests, or objectives.” (Swart 1995, 472) I also demonstrate situations that a movement can also counter-frame against a master frame and expose inconsistencies in their frameworks gradually even if the master frame is hegemonic in the beginning. I suggest that this provides another source of master frame transformation. Frame transformation can take place at the level of master frame through “the influence of social movement sector on the cultural transformation of systems of meaning” (Swart 1995, 477)

2.3.2. Political and discursive opportunity structures

Political and discursive opportunity structures refer to both “institutional and cultural access points that actors can seize upon to attempt to bring their claims into the political forum” (Ferre et al 2002, 62). Political opportunity/threat structures are generally used to identify the frequency and timing of protest events, but I will interpret them as possible causes for change of the framing processes. Diaspora frames can be transformed when the political and discursive opportunity structures change, and new frames can emerge to address the new conditions. The political and discursive opportunities are theorized as transnational. Thus, in times of political threat, the movement centre may migrate to other diaspora contexts (which have more tolerance) where they rebuild a movement or strengthen an already initiated one. In the Crimean Tatar case, interwar national movement in Turkey
moved to Europe, and post war movement in Romania moved to Turkey. Some nationalists
carried their activities from Turkey and the USSR to the United States in the post-war era.\textsuperscript{42}

Even if the movement’s mobility is restricted, framing processes can still influence
strongly to determine the outcomes because the framing processes are necessary for
interpretation of structures as ‘opportunity’ or ‘threat’. What is threat in one context can be
interpreted as an opportunity in another. Koopmans (2005) points out that repression
sometimes ends movements and sometimes reinvigorates them, depending on the discursive
variables. (Koopmans 2005, 159). Framing processes are also key variables because when
movements are not successful in reaching their goals, they might change their frames into
those which interpret the political and discursive structures differently. For example, the
Crimean Tatar frame in the USSR was changed from one that seeks to utilize master frame
extension into one that counter-frames the master frame. One can delineate competing
discursive political opportunities in the international realm (Adamson 2005), thus some
movements may tap into other discursive opportunity structures that are more ‘enabling’ for
the movement. \textsuperscript{43}

However, the process is not completely malleable in the hands of framing agents. Not
all frames are successful in creating strong movements, or obtaining goals and inefficient
frames automatically change. Frames can survive due to lack of credible alternatives. This

\textsuperscript{42} The following examples can be given from my cases: Cafer Seydahmet moved his activity from Turkey to
Europe and Romania, Müstecip Ülküsal moved it from Romania to Turkey, and Ayşe Seytmuratova and WWII
refugees moved from respectively, the USSR and Turkey to the United States.

\textsuperscript{43} Steinberg (1998, 845) claims that framing theory neglects the role of discourse in constructing meanings: “the
discourse used in framing is taken to be a generally straight-forward bearer of meanings... [but] “actors cannot
make meanings just as they would wish, because discursive practices necessarily limit the vision of what is
necessarily plausible and justifiable” (Steinberg 2002, 213). Another significant criticism of framing theory is
that it does not address power inequalities. A potent idea does not always guarantee success due to structural
obstacles. These criticisms are addressed by incorporating political and discursive opportunity structures in the
theoretical framework.
was the case for the post-war frames in the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. This again means that we have to look at the nature of the framing processes in a context to explain the outcomes.

2.3.3. Identifying frames:

The main methodological problem with ideational research is identifying the ideational variables. I will discuss this issue in relation to the concept of “frame resonance”, which is considered to be the most problematic aspect of framing theory. The problem with the framing literature is that it generally speaks as if all frames are successful. It is important to “operationally define” framing “independently of the outcomes it is claimed to produce…” Most studies describe the frame and argue that the resonance of this framing contributed to its success, or that its failures can be explained by the shortcomings of the framing.” (Ferree 2003, 305). Thus frames are identified retrospectively.

I follow the following methodology in this dissertation. Even though framing is a process, for theoretical purposes, I will take a snapshot of this process by identifying frame structures at one moment. To ensure that frames are identified clearly and separately from the analysis of outcomes, frames are provided in schemas throughout this work. I constructed the schemas after inferring the frames from the various texts, from the interviews, and from various verbalized forms of movement events that were observed during field work. (conversations, speeches, songs, slogans, visual representation) (Johnston 2002: 67). It is important to verify frames by referring explicitly to observed behaviour. I took pains to analyze as many examples of movement texts, interviews and other evidence as the space permitted to confirm the frames I identified.
Taking frame snapshots not only enables me to trace continuities and differences in framing processes over time, it also helps me analyze the discursive strengths of the frames (i.e. structure and consistency) (Johnston 2002: 66). This allows me to be able to tell the difference between a good frame and a bad one in order not to speak of as if all frames I identified are successful. For Benford and Snow, various internal qualities of frames may help distinguish a potent frame from the ones who are not. They provide a long list of qualities that good frames have: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame articulators or claimmakers, centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000). Frames have various political and discursive challenges and this can influence their effectiveness. As frames try to align ‘best’ with the potential adherents and bystanders, and “the content which would most effectively counter-frame” against the opponents, according to the importance attributed to each of them (Evans 1997, 455), they might have different levels of internal consistency.

Non-resonant frames also matter, and thus need to be identified. I also distinguish between a resonant movement and a successful movement. Apart from increasing resonance

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44 Frames are both fixed cognitive structures and emergent cognitive processes. (Johnston 2002, 64)
45 Credibility is based on three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame articulators or claimmakers (Benford and Snow 2000, 619) The first and third features are straightforward. The second feature, empirical credibility means “apparent fit between the framings and events in the world.” (Benford and Snow 2000, 620) Can the claims be supported by evidence? Benford and Snow explain that the issue here is not actual validity and what constitutes evidence is subject to debate. They ask: “Is there something out there that can be pointed to as evidence of the claim embedded in the framing?” (Benford and Snow 2000, 620) Jasper and Poulsen criticize that “empirical credibility is in the eyes of the beholder.” (Jasper and Poulsen 1995, 496)
46 Salience is a function of centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000). The frame must be “central” to the “larger belief system.” (Snow and Benford 1988, 205). They explain that “greater correspondence between the values promoted by the movement and the potential constituents would increase mobilization”. Experiential commensurability denotes congruence of frames with “the personal, everyday experiences of the targets of mobilization”. (Benford and Snow 2000, 621) Narrative fidelity points out a fit with “cultural narrations” (Benford and Snow 2000, 622) These could be “the stories, myths and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage” (Snow and Benford 1988, 210)
47 If the targets are heterogenous, trying to appeal to different audiences can damage frames’ internal coherence and some frames might fail (Evans 1997: 467). When a new frame was “perceived to more effectively balance the targets”, frame transformation can take place. (Evans 1997, 456)
among its potential adherents, movement might also seek resonance among different and conflicting audiences, and a variety of bystanders, including foreign states. Sometimes movement leaders prefer to work with secret services or behind-the-door diplomacy, and a wide resonance might prevent from achieving the movement goals. Thus, movements can exist and succeed without a massive resonance or with different levels of resonance.

Resonance might be managed by the elite for strategic purposes. The elites might prefer recognition by bystanders, such as states or foreign publics than resonance with their own community, which could be deemed quite powerless. Moreover, the elite might not have a complete hold on the framing processes. The political and discursive context, which we call the opportunity/threat structures, limits the elites. Frames might continue due to lack of alternatives, despite ineffectiveness or low resonance. Therefore, I argue that we must look at the political context to understand what type of interaction took place between the ideational, strategic and structural variables.

In this thesis, instead of asking whether a frame is resonant for an entire of people, I try to unpack how different layers of the potential adherents react to frames and to what extent and in what ways they participate in frame alignment processes. I identify three levels of participation in my cases of diaspora mobilization. These three levels can be best thought of as a pyramid. While the top level, the movement elite or leaders, is the smallest, the number of people participating rises progressively as we go down. The pyramid generally coincides with sociological classes but some people of higher social standing can be classified at the lowest level of the pyramid, as their participation in the Crimean Tatar movement or their consciousness of the Crimean Tatar identity is low.
Figure 2. Pyramid of Frame Resonance

The first layer is divided into two: the movement leaders or elite who have the most influence in designing the frames \(^{48}\) and the intellectual or bureaucratic elite who are well-integrated into the political institutions of the host-states. The role of the intellectual and bureaucratic elite ranges from a mediating role between the community and the host-state, frame-bridging with the host-state, local political organizations, civil society, and the media (bystanders), and preparing the host-institutional environment for a diaspora movement. These were the intellectual elite who published the communist newspapers in the Crimean Tatar language in the USSR, and the artists who functioned in Soviet-founded cultural institutions. These were the Crimean Tatars who worked in the state bureaucracy or as professionals in Romania. In pre-1990 United States this elite did not exist, as we witnessed

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\(^{48}\) In the former Soviet Union, these were the communist elders who enjoyed more respect from the authorities and from the community. In Turkey and Romania, these were the *émigré* elite (who came together around Cafer Seydahmet) who worked for the self-determination of their nation by nurturing diplomatic relations with other states and acting as a government-in-exile. In the United States, these were the refugee elites, who participated in wartime and post-war refugee camp nationalist activities, mainly Mehmet Sevdiyar, who was involved in *Azat Qırım*, the newspaper published in Crimea during the war.
a segmented or even a downward assimilation of the Crimean Tatar society, in the sense that first and second-generation immigrants could not be very successfully integrated in American society.49

The second layer is neither the elite nor the masses but the middlemen between them. This layer is the key, as it mediates between the higher and lower levels of the community. These middlemen are educated and often well-versed in frames through their contact with the first level. They carry out wider frame alignment processes through organizing the less educated, lower-status groups. In the USSR, generally the students, university graduates, and technicians functioned at this level. In pre-war Romania, the students who worked in the preparation, publication and distribution of Emel, who organized local nationalist events and activities, and who formed local nationalist organizations, functioned at this level. This level did not exist in post-war Turkey, Romania or the United States, but did begin to grow in after 1990.

The lowest layer is more populated and provides funding for the organizations and activities of the movement. It involves population with more traditional attitudes, as well as some young village youth who are open to new ideas. These people participate in demonstrations and events so that the movement is able to exert pressure on authorities. The resonance was strong in this level only in pre-war Romanian and the post-deportation Soviet communities, and these communities projected return to homeland.

49 The closest to this profile was Fikret Yurter, a nuclear engineer active in civil society, who spoke four languages.
2.3.4. Summary of theoretical framework

I outline my theoretical framework as follows:

The movement emergence can be explained by the emergence of frames. Frames are constructed by the elite as a response to dislocations caused by modernization. The elite take into account the political and discursive opportunity structures, and utilize available master frames which provide a schema of interpretation when constructing frames. The construction of frames involves a diagnosis of a group of people's problems (as defined by the elite), and a prognosis and plan of action to remedy them. Frames mobilize people, and thus result in the formation of communities. In diaspora frames, the diagnosis would be the identification of the specific type of historical injustice, and the prognosis would be one that reconnects the community with the homeland in various ways.

Movements operate, develop and change through frame alignments with potential adherents and bystanders, and counter-framing with the opponents, and in response to changing political and discursive opportunity structures. Frame alignment might include frame transformation to address new political and discursive opportunity structures, frame bridging with changing allies, and alignment to different master frames. Generally each political and discursive opportunity structure helps shape a different movement path, wherein a certain way of frame alignment and counter-framing processes crystallizes for a period. A change in political and discursive opportunity structures might create different frame alignment and counter-framing processes, thus changing the movement path. While the role of political and discursive opportunity structures emerges as pivotal in movement change, there are various ways the agency of the diaspora actors can make a difference.
First of all, in times of repression (prevalence of political threat structures), a movement centre might be carried to other diaspora contexts (which have more tolerance) where the activists rebuild the movement or build onto an already initiated local one. Thus, the political and discursive opportunity/threat structures for diaspora communities must be viewed as transnational, rather than as state-bound. In a way, it is possible to say that states can constrain the strategies of the diaspora organization, but they do not determine them.

Second, when the political and discursive opportunity structures are not favorable, but transnational mobility is restricted, frames can be transformed to meet the movement goals better by aligning with different master frames; by following an alternative framing strategy, perhaps engaging in frame-bridging with other actors; and counter-framing with different targets. Generally, frame contests emerge within the movement to transform the frame. However, if there is a lack of credible contestation, inefficient frames can survive.

Movement consequences can be explained by movement paths that develop as a result of the interaction of framing processes with political and discursive opportunity structures. For example, some communities returned to their homeland because at the beginning they entered into a movement path that was targeted to return. After entering to a certain path they aligned in a particular way, and bridged frames with particular movements, and counter-framed with particular targets. In the Soviet case, bystanders and former opponents agreed and collaborated with their eventual goal of return after long decades of particular framing strategies. In contrast, the other movements ruled out return from the beginning or did not sustain the return goal in their movement paths. One major movement consequence is the formation of a common transnational frame across all dispersed communities, which paves the way for the construction of a transnational nation.
2.4. Application of the theoretical framework to the cases:


A. Movement emergence

1. The Soviet master frame (1917-1956) emerged and a discursive opportunity for the master frame extension appeared (1956-1967).

2. A Leninist collective return frame (1956-1960) was formed through frame amplification (of attachment to homeland) and the Crimean Tatars attempted to extend the Soviet master frame.


B. Movement development

4. The Crimean Tatar movement (1960-1967) underwent a frame transformation through amplification of the theme of “deportation” in addition to previous amplification of “attachment to homeland”. This new frame counter-framed the Soviet frame and sought extension of the democracy master frame.

5. This new “democratic” frame undertook a frame-bridging with the “democracy and human rights movement” in the USSR (1967-1991).


C. Movement consequences
7. The Soviet master frame was transformed and the Crimean Tatars returned to the homeland (1989-1994) as the new master frame supported the Crimean Tatar “democratic” frame.

8. Transnational nation-building was attempted in two steps: emergence of a *Meclis* (Crimean Tatar parliament in Crimea) frame and frame-bridging between the homeland *Meclis* frame and a particular diaspora frame. (examined in Chapter 6)

### 2.4.2. The Crimean Tatar community in Romania

**A. Movement Emergence**

1. Mehmet Niyazi played a significant role in creating the first long-distance nationalism frame around 1913 through frame amplification (of attachment to homeland) and seeking extension of the master frame of “pan-Turkism”.

2. The publishers of *Emel*, the Crimean Tatar journal, utilized Mehmet Niyazi’s frame and engaged in frame-bridging with Cafer Seydahmet Kırmır’s émigré nationalism frame developed in Turkey to form an exile nationalism movement, with a considerable level of resonance, with the aid of strong organization, and with a collective return goal.

**B. Movement Development**

3. The exile nationalism frame and movement in Romania suddenly ended due to radical change in political and discursive opportunity structures with the outbread of the Second World War. The new communist regime of Romania imposed a frame, based on an artificial Crimean Tatar identity, which did not resonate at all with the people.
4. The new leaders, educated in the communist regime, sought reconciliation with the communist master frame by creating a territorial, non-diasporic nationalism, based on a frame amplification of certain sub-ethnic features of Crimean Tatars in Romania. This frame could not achieve considerable resonance among the masses and remained an elite frame.

C. Movement consequences

5. Changes in political and discursive opportunities with transition to democracy created new frame contests between frames that were learned from the diaspora community in Turkey and path-dependent frames from earlier eras. A new frame that can be identified as ‘diaspora nationalism’ prevailed, as in Turkey and the United States.

6. The World Crimean Tatar Congress played a crucial role in transnational frame-bridging between the Romanian and other diaspora and homeland communities.

2.4.3. The Crimean Tatar diaspora community in Turkey (1908-1991)

A. Movement emergence

1. Pan-Turkism emerged as a master frame in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic (1908-1923).

2. The Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism frame (1908-1921) emerged through master frame extension, frame amplification (of attachment to homeland), counter-framing against Russian imperialism, and Bolshevism as its contemporary form.

B. Movement Development
3. The emergence of a Kemalist master frame based on Anatolian nationalism in Turkey in 1923 constrained the Crimean Tatar frame.

4. The transnational political and discursive opportunity structures in interwar Europe appeared with the organization of Promethean League supported by Poland and other European states.

5. The émigré nationalism frame from Turkey transferred to Europe and began to be active in the transnational space (1920s-1960).

4. The émigré nationalism frame bridged frames with other émigré movements in the Promethean League, and anti-Soviet states such as Poland and Germany, and the newly emerging Crimean Tatar movement in Romania.

5. The émigré nationalism movement counter-framed the Soviet frame. The discursive and political opportunity structures in Turkey changed very little. The inefficient, low-resonating émigré nationalism frame lingered on due to path-dependency (1960-1983).

7. A new wave of WWII refugees entered into frame contests to transform the frame, but they were unsuccessful due to a lack of sufficient political and discursive opportunities in Turkey and because their leaders left for the US and developed their frame there.

8. We take a detour to look at how the Crimean Tatar refugees who spent a few decades in Turkey and immigrated to the US fared. In the United States, this frame was bridged to the transformed frame of the Crimean Tatars as well as international and Soviet dissident movements. Frame contests continued in this community, as the first frame could not become resonant on lower levels. The Turkish émigré nationalism frame was learned and adopted by some part of the community.
C. Movement Consequences

9. The émigré nationalism frame transformed into a diaspora nationalism frame, through ‘learning’ the Crimean Tatar collective return frame in the USSR.

10. Frame resonance increased, as the new frame coincided with the rising liberalization pan-Turkism master frames.


12. In the late 1990s and 2000s, transnational frame-bridging and a frame transformation to form a transnational nation took place.

2.4.4. Cases and forms of long-distance nationalism

Patterns are identifiable in the interplay of framing processes in different contexts which then create varying forms of nationalist mobilization. I classify four types of long-distance nationalism according to the frame snapshots which I consider relatively stable for each selected historical period. The four types are émigré, exile, diaspora and transnational nationalism. The different forms of nationalism demonstrate different movement goals, levels of resonance, levels of incorporation to host-states, relations to homeland, and forms of organization.

The first form is exile nationalism, which can be identified in the post-1944 USSR and inter-war Romania. In this form, the frame resonance was high. The resonance reached all three levels of society. The reason for the high resonance among the community in the Soviet Union was empirical fidelity due to collective memory. In Romania, the collective memory of the homeland and the practicality of returning to Crimea was admittedly weaker,
thus the empirical fidelity was weaker, but this could have been overcome through intensive frame alignment programs conducted by the strong organization of the Crimean Tatars. In both cases, hostland environment threatened the maintenance of identity, and therefore the community refrained from integration because it envisioned itself in exile. Consequently, returning collectively to the homeland was the major purpose of this movement form. The USSR community was quite successful in reaching this goal while the community in Romania failed due to lack of political opportunities, or in other words the emergence of political threat structures. (WWII prevented the return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea, as Romania and the Soviet Union initially fought against each other, and later the Soviet Union occupied Romania.) Strong, grassroots based on coherent organizations are observed in both cases (though informal in the Soviet case). The relationship of community organizations and framing processes could be a topic of further inquiry in cases of diasporas.

The second form of nationalist mobilization is *émigré nationalism*, which was observed in the community in Turkey (1923-1980s) and the community that immigrated to the United States after a short (almost a decade) stay in Turkey (1960s). In this form of long-distance nationalism, frame alignment processes among the masses were not pursued because the hostland political structures were perceived to be intolerant towards both ethnic nationalism and transnational activism which strived to obtain a piece of land within another state’s territorial borders. This type of nationalism fit better in an age when diasporas were largely seen as suspect due to potential dual loyalties. Within these political opportunity structures, the *émigré* circle believed that involving the masses would be disadvantageous for the movement, and the limitation of participants was necessary to reach their goals. Their reasoning was that the movement would be best served by a small, coherent cadre.
Involving the masses would make things harder by making the movement less coherent and vulnerable to the host or other states’ intervention. The émigré nationalists tended to extend this elitist attitude to the homeland community, and assumed a supervisory role on the nation-building process carried out in the homeland, reserving the right to interfere if it went out of their suggested direction.

In Turkey, émigré nationalism developed because the political and ideological structure of the new Turkish state was not tolerant towards the formation of ethnic communities and the movement had to limit itself to a small circle of émigrés. In this circle, while only the natural leader Cafer Seydahmet was a true émigré, his émigré mentality was internalized by the small number of disciples born in the diaspora. In Turkey, the Crimean Tatar masses could engage in activities of cultural maintenance, but political activity was the domain of a closed circle of the elite. The elite engaged in behind-the-door negotiations with the host-state and security officials, and were also engaged in diplomatic relations with other states, both to work for the national self-determination of the homeland community, thus acting as a government-in-exile.

In the United States too, the political-discursive opportunities did not permit a mass nationalism. Their history of forced labour under the Nazis or their previous Soviet citizenship was not perceived to help the Crimean Tatar refugees advance in American society by the majority of the community, who preferred to identify themselves as Turks, causing the refugees to achieve a segmented integration into the Turkish community in the United States. Thus, only small elite was engaged in lobbying for a long-distance nationalism and in demonstrating on behalf of Crimea and the co-ethnics in the Soviet Union.
In émigré nationalism, the elites did not have to develop a strategy about what masses should do nor manage their identity. They did not treat them as either subject or object of framing and did not view them as a constituency to be mobilized for homeland-oriented action. As a result, the collective return of the community (as in exile nationalism) in the hostland was out of question. Thus, without reference to the context that the framing processes are embedded in, it is not possible to explain the frame resonance wholly. Frame resonance can sometimes be lacking because it is not desired, and no effort is shown to increase it.

When I started my dissertation research, my initial question was about why the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities simultaneously rose in the beginning of the 1990s. The Crimean Tatars developed the diaspora nationalism, a different form of long-distance nationalism than previously and this gave the impression of the “rising of the diaspora”. The factors that prompted this was (i) the increasing disruption of the traditional Crimean Tatar communities and threat to the maintenance of cultural identity due to pressures of modernization and globalization in host-lands and (ii) the development in communication technologies and ease of transportation, which enabled transnational flows from Crimea to Turkey. The collective return frame of the community repatriating to Crimea was learned in Turkey. The concern about the homeland’s well-being that was previously limited to émigré circles was now being spread to the masses (thus, frame resonance increased). The newly emerging leaders beyond the émigré circle mobilized the masses for supporting the homeland economically and advocating the Crimean Tatar cause politically. Unlike exile nationalism, this type of nationalism was not fixated on return. Return was not seen as a solution before ensuring the well-being of the homeland, and diaspora could do more service to the
homeland by lobbying in the hostland and transferring the resources from the hostland to homeland. Moreover, the masses were incorporated into the host society, and the goal of return would not resonate with them. Different than émigré nationalism, diaspora nationalism had a program for the masses, and aimed and viewed it possible to maintain identity as a community in diaspora settings. This again made return less necessary, unlike in exile nationalism. However, the hostland political structures, while not repressive, were not multiculturalist and more latent assimilatory forces were still at work. Transnational ties rejuvenated local communities and contributed the formation of translocal organizations, identities, frames. In the post-1990s, the levels of resonance in Turkey, Romania and the United States far surpassed the previous levels in the émigré and minority nationalism eras. However, the level of resonance (they only reached the first three levels) did not reach Soviet or pre-war Romanian levels. The reason could be weaker empirical fidelity due to even further weakened collective memory. The diaspora nationalism movement did not have coherent, sustained participation as in the exile nationalism, simply because the participants of the movement were more incorporated into the host society. They were only part-time long-distance nationalists, and participation was more fluid. In my cases, I observed regular participation down to the second level, but not in the lower level.

Not all Crimean Tatar communities engaged in long-distance nationalism. The fourth form of mobilization observed in one of my cases was ‘territorial’ minority nationalism. In cases of ‘political-discursive threat’, such as communist totalitarian regime in Romania, the community fell back to minority nationalism without implying any transnational links to

50 As Kymlicka argues even though the Western liberal state model is not outright oppressive, the assumption about state neutrality in fact conceals an assimilating policy tendency. No state is neutral, states need for instance an official language to function.
homeland. The community emphasized the links to the local territory and focused on maintenance of local culture and language.

The fifth form of mobilization is transnational nationalism. Transnational nationalism emerged in the last decade and required means and technologies of globalization as diaspora nationalism. The idea was that because distance and borders are assumed to lose significance, separate branches of diaspora merged into one united community in a “transnational social space”. This was reflected in the emergence of a division of labour between the members of the community residing in various countries worldwide. It was observed in the last decade in the Crimean Tatar community and can be regarded as related to the emergence of a sustainable transnational space for continuous frame-bridging with the community in the USSR. Indeed, finding frame-bridging not sufficient, the communities merged their frames under one frame of transnational nation. Thus, the diaspora nationalism began to develop into transnational nationalism. Like diaspora nationalism, this type of nationalism went beyond return, and other ways of service to the homeland were investigated. A permanent collective return was substituted with a temporary return to the homeland by frequent visits, or communication technologies that constantly updated those in the homeland processes in a transnational world. The transnational members of the nation accepted working for its maintenance and self-determination as a duty, even without the prospect of personal or collective return. In this thesis, I suggest that the formation of a transnational nationalism frame facilitated translocal framing processes and further rejuvenation of local communities. This was a project of formation of common identity, common goals, and common concerns for all Crimean Tatars wherever they were located. This was the only form of long-distance nationalism which the homeland community also
participated in, and the expatriate community actively participated in decision-making processes in the homeland. The responsibilities and rights of the diaspora were described more robustly: a diaspora taxation, diaspora citizenship, diaspora representation, and diaspora as embassy were on the agenda. Transnational nation frame alignment processes required strong organization to bring together diaspora communities more diverse than one would arguably find within territorial borders. The convention of the World Crimea Tatar Congress aimed to establish the permanent bodies for regular transnational of these communities. Thus, even at the transnational level, nation-building required unification of diverse interests, establishing hegemonies.

Under repressive conditions when the hostland did not permit long-distance nationalism, an expatriate community resorted to minority nationalism, without implying any attachment to the homeland. This happened in a form of minority nationalism without much resonance in communist Romania (although it is difficult to demonstrate the level of resonance for any idea in the totalitarian society). These models are summarized in the following table.
Level of Resonance | Movement Goal | Level of Incorporation to Host-state | Relation to Homeland | Nature of Participation | Clandestine, conspirational, formal elite organization, masses unorganized
---|---|---|---|---|---
Exile Nationalism | High (mass movement) | Return to Homeland | Discriminatory | Return to homeland and join homeland community | Mass, formal, coherent organization
Diaspora nationalism | Medium (fluid participation) | Support homeland community from outside, maintain identity in diaspora settings | Possible to maintain identity - multiculturalist | Supportive and secondary to homeland community | Fluid, informal organization
Transnational Nationalism | Medium (fluid participation) | Nation-building in transnational context | Transnational links reinforce maintaining identity | Homeland community included | Fluid, informal organization + Formal transnational organization of elites

Figure 3. Typology of long-distance nationalism

The community in the former USSR demonstrated exile nationalism in the post-1944 period until they began to return to Crimea. The community in Turkey manifested émigré nationalism between 1908 and the 1980s, and diaspora nationalism after that.

The community in Romania had a period of exile nationalism between the 1900s and 1945, a period of ‘territorial’ minority nationalism devoid of any symbolic connections to
homeland between 1945 and 1989, and a period of developing diaspora nationalism post 1989. The community in the United States demonstrated a different type of émigré nationalism, which was in conflict with the one in Turkey between 1960 and 1989. The majority of this community continued to act as a satellite of the Crimean Tatar community in Turkey because it followed their frames. The diaspora nationalism of this community was weaker. Only in the last decade or so have all communities, including the re-patriated community, begun to adopt a transnational nation frame. I summarized the classification of cases in the following of table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>The United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900s–1945</td>
<td>Exile Nationalism</td>
<td>1900s–1945</td>
<td>Émigré Nationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exile Nationalism</td>
<td>Minority (territorialized) Nationalism</td>
<td>Émigré nationalism(path-dependent)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989–</td>
<td>Diaspora nationalism</td>
<td>Diaspora nationalism</td>
<td>Diaspora nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Transnationalism</td>
<td>Transnationalism</td>
<td>Transnationalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 4. Types of long-distance nationalism applied to mini-cases
2.5. Conclusion:

In this chapter, I have offered a theoretical framework to explain the mobilization of diaspora communities. In this theoretical framework, I brought together the literature on the diaspora, ethnicity and nationalism, and social movement theory. The diaspora literature is divided as to whether the recent mobilization of diasporas constitutes a new phenomenon in itself. I suggested that recent and historical mobilization of diaspora communities has significant continuities, and I constructed a theoretical framework that explained both past and present mobilization. This was achieved with a constructivist interpretation of diaspora. Although most theorists now accept that ethnonational identities are constructed, the ways in which they are constructed are not completely explained. The theories of ethnicity and nationalism are generally designed for territorial, bounded communities and nation-states. I took the task of explaining how de-territorialized and trans-territorial communities constructed their identities through mobilization since other ways of construction were less available to them. This required bringing in the framing processes approach from the social movement theory. I used the concepts of political and discursive opportunities from the social movement literature to explain how framing processes change. Next I sketched how this theoretical framework applied to my cases. Finally, I presented a typology of long-distance nationalism that contributes understanding of the variation among the mobilization of the Crimean Tatar communities.
CHAPTER THREE
Crimean Tatar Diaspora Communities in the Former USSR

3.1. Introduction

After the exodus of a large part of the population from their ancestral homeland, the Crimean Tatars carried on their struggle for maintaining their identity under the Russian Empire and the subsequent Soviet Union. Under the rule of Stalin, the Crimean Tatar people were deported en masse from their homeland, Crimea between the 18th and 20th of May, 1944 on the pretext of collaboration with Germans, who invaded Crimea during the Second World War (Pohl 2000). The Crimean Tatars lost 46% of their population in the course of deportation, and those who were deported spent the next thirteen years in “the special settlement regime” (like a reservation, ruled by a police regime). This tragic event constitutes “genocide” according to Vozgrin (1994) and Pohl (2000), and “ethnic cleansing” or “ethnocide” according to Williams (2001). The unexpected resurgence of national identity and the emergence of a collective return movement among the Crimean Tatars in exile are notable. The Crimean Tatars maintained a demand for return to the homeland for more than fifty years in exile in the Soviet Union. In this chapter, after reviewing accounts of this unique phenomenon among historians and social scientists, I propose a political science explanation for the emergence, development and outcomes of the Crimean Tatar diaspora mobilization.

51 The Soviet sources argued that it was 20 %, but the only census of Crimean Tatars after the deportation was done by the Crimean Tatars themselves, and they found out that they lost 46 % of the population.
3.2. Literature Review:

The Crimean Tatars’ maintenance of homeland-centric identity in exile and the collective return to their homeland almost fifty years after their deportation has been a puzzle for various disciplines. In political science, we do not yet have a general theoretical framework explaining ethnic mobilization in the USSR, especially for non-territorial ethnic communities. Beissinger (2002)’s theory based on ‘movement cycles’ which attempts to explain ethnic mobilization with the emergence of “political opportunities” in the Gorbachev era overlooks the mobilization of national, and religious groups beginning from the late 1950s, when arguably there was less “political opportunity”.52 “Political opportunity” is not sufficient to explain nationalist mobilization, without reference to internal dynamics of movement. In their historical account of the internal dynamics of the Crimean Tatar movement, Guboglo and Chervonnaya (1992) focus on the resource mobilization, the organizational tactics and the strategies of Crimean Tatars. They suggest that the goal of the national movement was return to homeland due to the tragedy of deportation. According to Guboglo and Chervonnaya (1992), the successful rational action of the Crimean Tatars, which was reflected in well-chosen tactics and strategies towards the national goal and the gradual expansion of political opportunities, explained the outcome of collective return. While the structural and strategic factors are important, an explanation merely based on structural change (“political opportunities”), and structure-derived rational action suffers from an inherent determinism. Moreover, the “strategies” and “goals” of the movement should not be taken for granted but rather problematized. The fact that the Crimean Tatars preferred to “return to their homeland” and rejected other options such as “emigration to

52 See Reddaway (1998) and Zisserman-Brodsky (2003) about the existence of pre-Gorbachev nationalist mobilization.
Turkey”, “integration in Uzbekistan”, or “national autonomy outside Crimea” needs explanation.53 Tragedies such as deportation shape but do not determine strategies. None of the other deported peoples who had not been granted right to return in the Soviet Union focused so decisively on collective return as their main goal. To explain movement strategies, hence outcomes, we also need to look at factors other than rationality, and structure.

Historians Vozgrin (1992), and Williams (2001) explain the mobilization of the Crimean Tatars in exile as a function of their ethnonational identity. In a rich narrative analysis, they describe how, in time, nomadic Tatars from inner Asia adopted an identity as “indigenous people” of Crimea by intermixing with the ancient population of Crimea. The attachment to Crimea is the core of the Crimean Tatar identity, therefore when deported, the Crimean Tatars “as expected” mobilized to return to their homeland. Deportation functioned as a catalyst of ethnic mobilization. This approach, however, does not reflect the changes in Crimean Tatar identity over time especially in exile, and the extent to which it was constructed by human agency. As this literature assumes that identities are primordial, or ethno-symbolic, this approach has difficulty explaining how or why the Crimean Tatars mobilized, and the timing or forms of mobilization.

Uehling (2004), in her anthropological study, investigated the internal dynamics of the Crimean Tatar movement and identity of the Crimean Tatars. She argues that the Crimean Tatar identity was not primordial, but rather primarily a re-construction of the collective memory of homeland and deportation that occurred in places of exile. For

53 Other possible questions include where, how and why in Crimea they wanted to re-settle, why they insisted on some tactics despite inefficiency or why they proscribed some other tactics especially violence, why they did not focus the Islamic or pan-Turkic aspect of their identity, why they did or did not pursue with alliances with certain national, religious or dissident groups needs to be explained.
instance, those who were born in exile continued to regard Crimea as their homeland, and suffered from memories of deportation, even though they did not personally experience it. I agree with Uehling about the construction of diaspora identity in places of exile, but I suggest that the Crimean Tatar movement was mainly a political process. The Crimean Tatar diaspora identity was constructed through mobilization processes, which are particularly influenced by “framing processes”. Through framing processes, the Crimean Tatars attributed meaning to their condition, and developed goals and strategies, which played a significant role in the development and consequences of the movement.

3.3. Application of Theoretical Framework

The explanation presented in this chapter is as follows: Stalin’s successor Khrushchev, by calling for de-Stalinization and an alleged return to Leninism in his “secret speech” thereby created a discursive opportunity for dissent in the USSR. The regime signaled that it intended a master frame extension, i.e. reshaping the communist frame around Crimean Tatar grievances.54 The Crimean Tatar “collective return” frame emerged in these circumstances. Throughout the chapter, special care is given to provide evidence in the form of excerpts from Crimean Tatar samizdat; Soviet official and intelligence documents; interviews; participant observation information, and; secondary historical accounts of the movement (which will be provided within the text, citations and appendices). In this frame, the Crimean Tatars presented their two main goals that were consistent with the Soviet master frame, which promised a transformation to Leninism. They demanded undoing Stalin’s actions towards nationalities, mainly returning them to their homeland and restoring national autonomy as established by Lenin. The emergence of this frame contributed to the

54 For this interpretation of master frame extension, see Tarrow (1989, 36). (cf Swart 1995, 469)
emergence of the diaspora movement due to the *narrative fidelity* of the element of collective return (fit to the collective memory and emotional/cultural circumstances), and *empirical credibility* (consistency with master frame) in the late 1950s and 1960s.

The development of the diaspora movement can be further understood by more closely examining the changes in framing processes, and resulting degrees of frame resonance. It turned out that the regime did not really embark on full de-Stalinization and thus did not extend the Soviet master frame to the degree that the Crimean Tatar frame would also be acknowledged (insufficient *empirical credibility*). This became clearer after the 1967 Edict on the Crimean Tatars. Due to an inability to attain main goals, the resonance of the Crimean Tatar frame decreased in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The Crimean Tatars understood that the master frame needed to be transformed as it was too inflexible to be extended. For that, they transformed their own frame by aligning with a different master frame, the ‘democracy’ master frame, and this time sought to counter-frame against the Stalinist master frame. The Crimean Tatars formed alliances through frame-bridging with other dissident movements, mainly the democracy and human rights movement in the USSR which also aimed to transform the Soviet master frame. The resonance of the transformed frame increased despite heavy repression in the 1970s, and despite its inability to attain its main goals by transforming the Soviet frame in this period. The *narrative fidelity* (of the idea of collective return) continued. Lack of demanded outcomes does not mean the frame lacked *empirical credibility* (stronger diagnosis). In fact, the Soviet regime attempted to extend the master frame, incorporating elements of the Crimean Tatar frame, without fully acknowledging it, in order to thwart its increasing resonance among the Crimean Tatars and by-standers. In the Gorbachev era, with the removal of repression, the resonance of the
The democratic ‘collective return’ frame strengthened further. The Crimean Tatar frame, as other democracy, nationalist, religious and civil society frames flourished in this period, contributed to a master-frame transformation in the Soviet Union. In 1989, the Soviet authorities recognized the Crimean Tatar collective return frame, the Crimean Tatars were permitted to return to their homeland collectively, and state sponsorship and policies were envisaged to deal with potential problems of return and restoration of Crimean Tatar national-cultural rights. Though the Soviet Union could not live up to its promises and dissolved, the legitimacy of the collective return of the Crimean Tatars was recognized by the post-Soviet states despite their reluctance to take financial responsibility. The significant point here is that the existence of a well-maintained collective return frame, which has high empirical credibility, that is, fit to a newly emerging democracy master frame, mattered, and it enabled the Crimean Tatars to utilize this effectively as a window of opportunity. The other deported peoples without a clearly articulated, and highly resonant frame missed this window of opportunity. Hence, such framing processes contribute to our understanding of the consequences of movement processes by explaining movement strategies based on collective frames, and their interaction with discursive opportunity structures.

It is important to note that this chapter is not a history of ideas in the Crimean Tatar movement in the Soviet context, but rather an attempt to construct how the framing processes influence the behavior of individuals, and thereby greater movement actions.
3.4. The Case of the Crimean Tatars in the USSR

3.4.1. Soviet master frame and emergence of a discursive opportunity for master frame extension

At the end of a short, relatively liberal period under the New Economic Policy (1921-1928), totalitarianism was established in the USSR with Stalin’s ascendance to the leadership. Like several other nationalities in the USSR, the Crimean Tatars suffered from civil war, man-made famine, collectivization, purges, political repression, partial deportations, the Second World War, and German occupation of their homeland until 1944, but it was the deportation of all Crimean Tatars en masse on the 18th of May 1944, which brought the nation to the brink of dissolution.

In the Stalin era, the Soviet state sustained its hold on the society by a hegemonic master frame enforced by mass terror. Ethnic destruction of the Crimean Tatars was executed under the pretext of mass betrayal of the “fatherland” during the war. According to the Soviet historian P.N. Nadiinski, the reason for their betrayal was “the survival of capitalism in Crimean Tatar society” (cf Fisher 1978, 172). After the Crimean Tatars were deported, Fisher states that “the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1953) removed all traces of Crimean Tatars and their civilization save for the claim that they had been primarily brigands and raiders and an advance guard for Ottoman expansion into Slavic lands” (Fisher 1978, 172). “Crimea was demoted from the status of a republic into just an oblast” (Fisher 1978, 172) soon to be transferred from Russian SFSR to Ukrainian SSR. After the most prized valuables were taken to Moscow and St. Petersburg, Tatar houses and remaining belongings were given to the new Slavic settlers in Crimea. Most of the Crimean Tatar geographic names
were changed to Slavic ones. All references to Crimean Tatars in all Soviet publications were erased. All material in Crimean Tatar language was destroyed. By the 1950s, the guides in Crimean Khans’ palace museum were speaking of the Tatars as if they were an ancient tribe in Crimea, who lived in Crimea once upon a time, but were now extinct. The Stalinist master frame and this special narrative about the non-existence of the Crimean Tatars became part of official and “societal” discourses of the Soviet Union - established truths, which were impossible for the Crimean Tatars to challenge in an age of absolute totalitarianism, whereby hegemony was sustained by coercion.

After Stalin died in 1953, Khrushchev consolidated his power in 1956. In his “secret speech” at the 20th Party Congress (1956) in which he condemned “Stalinism” and the “cult of personality” and declared a return to “Leninism”, he also promised to establish “socialist legality” to prevent the reoccurrence of Stalin’s arbitrary, murderous rule” (Sakwa 1998, 214). Socialist legality binds authorities to observe their own law, or at least to not publicly override their own law (Hosking 1991, 44). Socialist legality also brought the end of mass terror and state security was subordinated to the Party (Cutler 1980, 20). According to Bukovskii, this means a small amount of freedom for the individual (Hosking 1991, 44), and thus created political and discursive opportunities for civil society and social movements.

Khrushchev’s secret speech involved special references to a nationality policy, and therefore implied master frame change specifically in this area:

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are crude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations, together with all Communists and Komsomols without any exception; this deportation action

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55 We must note that a very limited freedom exists in totalitarian society, as civil society is guided by the official discourse. (Arendt 2001)
was not dictated by any military considerations. Thus already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a permanent break-through at the fronts of the great patriotic war in favor of the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all Karachay from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944, all the Chechen and Ingush people were deported and Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated.

In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardine-Balkar autonomous republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardine republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have deported them also. (Laughter and animation in the hall.)

Not only Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons. (cf Conquest1970, 144)

This speech does not mention three deported nations: Volga Germans, Mesketian Turks, and the Crimean Tatars. After the speech, all deported nations that were recognized were returned to their homeland, leaving out these three. During the 28 April 1956 Edict, the Crimean Tatars were removed from the special settlement regime. However, they were not permitted to return their homeland, or take back their property and belongings, which had been appropriated in the course of deportation (Özcan 2002, 114). Obviously, this created an inconsistency with the master frame: The Crimean Tatars should have been returned when the other nationalities were returned to their homeland, and that created an opportunity for exposing inconsistency in treatment.
3.4.2. Formation of Crimean Tatar Leninist collective return frame (1956-1960) and attempts for Soviet master frame extension

In the first years after deportation, the Crimean Tatars were not sure what had happened to them and why. The deportation shuffled the population. The people who had never left their village for all their lives lost their immediate social circle, and became surrounded by the Crimean Tatars from other parts of the peninsula, and with different sub-ethnic identities. Up until the end of the special settlement regime, many families could not re-unite as they were prohibited to leave the reservation. Everybody witnessed the tragedy that befell them and those nearby, but it took the Crimean Tatars some time to become fully aware of what kind of tragedy befell them as a nation.\footnote{Narrated by many interviewees and my interlocutors during participant observation.} Mustafa Cemilev, who was a child during the special settlement regime, remembers that the Crimean Tatars used to come together in the evenings, and the topic of their conversations was always Crimea (Cemilev 2003, 14). Rıza Fazıl remembers that in the year 1952, the Crimean Tatar students in his institute came together to read nationalist poetry to each other and make a photograph together in front of a statue for liberty in their town as a sign of their determination to fight for their rights.\footnote{Rıza Fazıl, Interview by author, 5 May 2006. Simferopol.} In 1954, the Crimean Tatar elders (called \textit{aqsakals} or “white beards”), who were mostly Crimean Tatar members of the Communist Party, veterans of war and former partisans, began to meet regularly (Özcan 2002, 118). It was these elders who became instrumental in the emergence of the first collective return frames.

“In accordance with accepted Soviet practice, the government was supposed to accept and consider petitions from the Soviet citizens” (Fisher 1978, 177). Utilizing this “legal-
institutional channel”, the Crimean Tatar elders composed their first letters to the government in 1957, which articulated the Crimean Tatar collective return frame for the first time:

In accordance with the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, and principles of V. I. Lenin on the national question, which were published after the congress, and by understanding those as documents of outstanding political significance for the life of our nation, which also governs the activities of the party in the contemporary period, we one more time appeal to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU that in the period the liquidation of results of the cult of personality in relation to other questions, we plead that you resolve the important political question of the return of unjustly deported Crimean Tatar nation to its homeland- to Crimea, the re-establishment of Crimean ASSR within the Ukrainian SSR, which was founded by the decree of the Soviet government on 18 October 1921 signed by V. I. Lenin, the return of or compensation for property before the deportation, and the taking of measures for the people to return to normal life as soon as possible (7.9.1956) (cf Bekirova 2004, 71) [Translation mine].

As we can see, the Crimean Tatars expressed a naïve belief that if they properly explained to the upper echelons of the party how their deportation had been a mistake, it would be corrected. The petitions were to disprove the argument that Crimean Tatars defected in the war, and aimed to exemplify how they fought on the side of the communists. A major activism of the national movement consisted of trying to get into academic libraries of the USSR, which stored original historical documents of the Crimean Tatars and “smuggling” their content in order to buttress the Crimean Tatar frame with evidence. This was the reason Ayşe Seytmuratova, the first Crimean Tatar graduate student in history, was “invited” to the movement by the elders.58

58 Ayşe Seytmuratova, Interview by author, 18 April 2006. Simferopol.
The deportation of Crimean Tatars was a mistake, as they did not betray the fatherland and in fact served the fatherland more than other nations.

Crimean SSR was a “Crimean Tatar” national autonomy and was formed in accordance with “Lenin’s nationalities policy” and was enacted as law by Lenin. Thus the deportation and the destruction of Crimean SSR violated Lenin’s nationalities policy and Soviet law.

Khrushchev promised a return to “Leninism” and dismantling of Stalinism. Therefore Khrushchev is obligated to correct this big mistake and return the Crimean Tatars collectively to their homeland and re-establish Crimean ASSR, the national autonomy of the Crimean Tatars.

Figure 5. The “Leninist” collective return frame (The first exile nationalism frame in the USSR)

This same structure of frame was repeated in many appeals to the various organs of the Soviet government. Greta Uehling states that these letters and petitions followed the same pattern: “A typical appeal began with an historical account, followed by a detailed citation of Leninist nationality policy. This customarily led to the mention of the Crimean ASSR and the logic that they be returned to their homeland in an organized manner” (Uehling 2004, 141). These repetitive letters standardized diagnosis and prognosis of their problem, which contributed to the exceptional coherence of the movement. According to Reddaway (1998), the 1957 Edict (Ukaz):

“… brought Tatar movement quickly into being. Mass petitions and group lobbying... were its main tactics, the line being that the authorities must have made a mistake: Tatars had been overwhelmingly loyal in the war, the deportation of 1944 had been the work of malevolent forces in the security police, and there was no reason now not to exculpate the Crimean Tatars and allow them to return to Crimea” (Reddaway 1998, 226)

Cemilev observes that:

The tone of Crimean Tatar appeals, especially in the first years, was absolutely loyal and strictly in the communist spirit. As a rule, they contained numerous quotations from Lenin and renowned communist leaders. This allowed them to collect many signatures to their letters (Cemilev 2003, 12).
It is not surprising that the elders encouraged the young generation to join the
Communist Party, instead of opposing the party for what had been done. Timur Dağcı, who
joined the group of elders although he was in his 30s, explained the mindset and tactics of the
elders, which reflect their frame:

This government is not to joke. If we openly go against the authorities, they will
 crush us. The government has democratic laws. [We can utilize those laws.] All the
documents we prepare should not be against the government, they should be in a
praising language. We shouldn’t form secret organizations. Don’t involve the
intelligentsia. Involve whoever participated in the war and workers. If a worker is
fired, he can find a job easily in the next factory…Don’t write letters to the other
governments.

Dağcı adds “There were not any secret meetings…We did not have any protocols, or
documents of our meetings so that the KGB would not find any.”

3.4.3. Resonance of the first Crimean Tatar collective return frame increases:

Participation in frame alignment processes can be organized into five levels, though
not formally in the Crimean Tatar movement: (i) movement elite-leaders who collectively
created the frames having in mind their audience (potential adherents), and intellectual elite-
leaders who contributed and provided internal critiques to frame designs, (ii) professionals
and student youth who linked the leaders to masses and who made sure that the movement
frames and individual frames were congruent by methods of frame extension and frame
amplification through the collection of signatures for petitions, writing letters, visiting
houses, and organizing initiative group meetings, (iii) less or un-educated, lower class
masses, who participated in mass activities, such as meetings, rallies, protests, signing

59 Ayşe Seytmuratova, Interview by author, 18 April 2006, Simferopol.
60 Timur Dağcı, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, Simferopol.
petitions, and writing letters. For a movement to be highly resonant, reaching the last level was required.

A. First level: Movement leaders

The first level was the leadership stratum of the movement. This level was composed of the communist elders and former partisans or war heroes, who were the brains behind the frames. They met regularly and discussed the best way to present the issue to the Crimean Tatar people and to the authorities. In the mid-60s, these elders were replaced by a younger generation of leaders, who attempted to transform the elder frames. (This will be explained later.) There was dispute among leaders about various possible frames. Timur Dağcı states that Eşref Şemizade and some of the other elders decided at one point to frame the issue as one of return and not autonomy. They reasoned that after they returned, the next step would be demanding autonomy. Asking for autonomy and return at once might be too much to demand from the authorities and they might not agree. Timur Dağcı, then a 30-year-old journalist, stated that he communicated this message to the communist authorities and received a positive response. According to Dağcı, the authorities said, “if you put it that way, it is easier for us to consider it.” But, another elder and former partisan, Bekir Osmanov, got very angry and called to meet Timur Dağcı urgently. He said: “Who told you that we don’t need autonomy? We need autonomy!!” Then, Osmanov organized the collection of a large number of signatures under a letter that demanded autonomy in addition to return. The frame that involved return and autonomy together emerged victorious from these

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61 Relatives of veterans, and war heroes, who were sometimes uneducated but were selected to represent the Crimean Tatar frames to authorities due to their prestige also enter to this group.
62 Also see Idris Asanin (2005, 229-258) for an interpretation of the work of Timur Dağcı.
63 Timur Dağcı, Interview by author, 28 April 2006. Simferopol.
framecontests and became standard Crimean Tatar demands, as it was more resonant (i.e. could be measured by a large number of signatures).

In the second level, there were also writers, poets and artists, who were not leaders in the political sense but played a significant role in frame alignment processes, and master frame extension processes due to their influential work. Since this movement is relatively more coherent than other diaspora movements, these elites collaborated with the political elite of the movement in the first level largely, though they maintained a critical approach in some matters. An example of collaboration was mass concerts of famous Crimean Tatar singers. The artists participated in frame alignment processes by communicating certain messages to people through their art. İzzet Hayırov, my interviewee, remembered the emotional atmosphere after the mass concert of prominent Crimean Tatar singers in 1957. He said: “everybody left the concert with a determination that we will not dissolve, we will return to Crimea”64. According to Hayırov, the leaders organized the concert for this purpose. İsmail Kerimov, one of the teachers of the Department of Tatar Language and Literature founded in 1978 at Tashkent University, stated: “my national movement was learning Crimean Tatar”, and told of the difficulties he had to overcome in order to study the Crimean Tatar language academically. For instance, he could defend his dissertation only when perestroika came. The authorities did not permit him to use the word “Crimean Tatar” in his dissertation on Crimean Tatar literature.65

The Crimean Tatar writers helped sustain national identity through the maintenance of language and literature using only a small number of periodicals and books allowed by the regime, and thus indirectly strengthened the Crimean Tatar frame. On the other hand, in

64 İzzet Hayırov, Interview by author, 13 April 2006. Simferopol
order to enable that, they agreed to publish a newspaper, *Lenin Bayraği* which was designed to propagate the *Soviet* frame in the Crimean Tatar language, that is, to convince Tatars to lay roots in places of exile rather than asking for return. That was the reason authorities “allowed” this “cultural right”. This does not mean the newspaper only served for the purpose intended. Rıza Fazıl argued as follows:

> How did *Lenin Bayrağı* emerge?...[because] the Crimean Tatars kept writing letters pleading return. In order to distract them the regime allowed the *Kaytarma* Music Assembly, radio and newspaper. It was the regime’s goal, but it did not reach its goal.  

The newspaper *Lenin Bayrağı* strove to support the Crimean Tatar frame by discovering and identifying individual Crimean Tatars who served in the Soviet army or as partisans during the war, and by publishing the oral testaments of partisans and war heroes to disprove the claim that Crimean Tatars betrayed the homeland (Seutova 1991, and interview with Rıza Fazıl). This topic could not be censured as it was consistent with the communist frame. At the same time, this was an attempt for master frame extension, an attempt to “recontextualize” (Swart 1995, 469) the “communist” master frame as to integrate the “Crimean Tatar” concerns. The prominent Crimean Tatar writer and poet, Rıza Fazıl collected the memoirs of 54 Crimean Tatar women who participated in the war and published a biography of Ahmet Han Sultan, the Crimean Tatar war pilot who obtained the medal for hero of the Soviet Union twice. Rıza Fazıl stated: “I was trying to write in a national sentiment as much as possible...KGB dealt with me continuously. At the end they demoted me to a translator in the newspaper.” Despite that, he had a tense relationship with the first stratum, the political-elite leaders as follows:

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66 Rıza Fazıl, Interview by author, 5 May 2006, Simferopol.
67 Rıza Fazıl, Interview by author, 5 May 2006, Simferopol.
Cebbar Akim and people around him did not understand Lenin Bayrağı. I have never been a member of the Communist Party. There had been times I wanted to quit the newspaper. I was regularly donating to the national movement and bringing them information. But then those Crimean Tatars around him stopped subscribing. They said we don’t need it. They boycotted the newspaper...This damaged our nation...They said we would have newspapers after we returned to the homeland, but now everybody understands that this was not the case. They had a one-sided understanding of the national cause. We could not instill in our children the habit of reading in the mother tongue at home, and today our inter-generational links are beginning to shatter...That is our tragedy. A cultural genocide...68

Rıza Fazıl also wrote a letter to the Central Committee, in which after providing the numbers of the publication in Crimean Tatar language in Crimea, he complained about the lack of any Crimean Tatar publication in Central Asian exile. As a result, the Crimean Tatars were given a quota from the state publishing house to publish books in their own language. In the same way, the Crimean Tatar writers obtained the right to publish a Crimean Tatar academic literary journal, Yıldız. Rıza Fazıl adds that:

This does not mean our letter was the major cause of the publication of Yıldız. The real cause was our national movement, its continuous and collective pressure on the party and government organs, and its demands for homeland and nation (Rıza Fazıl 2005, 8).

Rıza Fazıl stated further that:

Before the war, they inserted many Russian words in our language. We cleaned them out...We cleaned them out and the authorities did not realize it...A whole new generation of young poets emerged. [The movement leaders] were also opposed to the Department of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature, or schools in the mother tongue. But these all helped. When we returned to Crimea, we did not come empty-handed. ..Isn’t this called a national movement?

He underlined that the national struggle has two fronts. “The first one is return to homeland. The second one is the maintenance of culture. These two cannot be separated from each other and we cannot do one and ignore the other. And each has different

68Rıza Fazıl, Interview by author, 5 May 2006. Simferopol.
methods.” İsmail Kerim, head of the Department of Crimean Tatar language and literature at KGPU in Simferopol, recognizes that the Crimean Tatar publications under communism were small in number and limited in content due to censure, but the published works still constitute a significant resource for academic studies today, and serve the purpose of maintenance of language and literature in exile if not development.

(ii) Professionals and students

In the mid-level of frame alignment processes, there were larger number of educated people, such as university graduates, students, and technicians who became familiar with the movement frame before everybody else as they had to type and copy the movement documents, and compile these *samizdat* documents. After learning the frames by-heart, these mid-level activists played a significant role in communicating the frames to the third level, the common people, who were the most numerous, and constituted the base of the movement. For this purpose mid-level activists went from door to door to explain the Crimean Tatar frame and collect signatures under letters which included that frame. The second level of the frame alignment processes was the key as it mediated between the elite and grassroots levels. The activists in the second level did the physical, organizational, secretarial work of the movement, which enabled the common frame to be widely accepted by the population. These involved organization of grass-roots initiative groups covering the whole population, mobilization of people through holding regular meetings, going from door to door, convincing people to sign petitions and donate, overseeing the election of representatives to Moscow, copying petitions, and information letters coming from Moscow and updating people about how their money was used and how the Crimean Tatar question

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69 Rıza Fazıl, Interview by author, 5 May 2006. Simferopol
stood as of the contemporary moment. The activists in the second and third levels could also be democratically elected as representatives of their own communities to Moscow to deliver petitions signed by members of the Tatar communities and present their case to Soviet authorities (Fisher 1978, 177). 71 They were generally elected to be rotating representatives to Moscow, as the officials would have to receive them due to their prestige. They learned the frames in the initiative group meetings. The Crimean Tatar representation in Moscow changed from 10 to 15 rotating people, and it reached up to 400 at the time of demonstrations. (Uehling 2004, 146). 72 It was permanent after 1964, but rotating, therefore many Crimean Tatars visited Moscow in turn and generally stayed one month, spending their yearly vacation from work. The delegates “regularly published leaflets about their activities in Moscow and disseminated typewritten copies to all major centers of deported Crimean Tatars,” where they were further duplicated and sent to all initiative groups (Cemilev 2003, 13). 73

For frame alignment processes, the mid-level activists also organized initiative group meetings. The initiative groups covered the whole population. Each Crimean Tatar was targeted, thanks to the compact settlement. In the words of Alan Fisher (1978, 177), “…between 1962 and 1966… in each Tatar settlement they organized committees whose aim was to instruct the Tatars about the truth of their past, the facts of life under the German occupation, and the injustices of their deportation and subsequent existence.”

71 This was perfectly legal both according to Soviet law and under the special provisions of the decision of 1956. (Fisher 1978, 177)
72 Their number increased in 1966-7 as for each Tatar arrested, the local communities sent three more so that but in mid-1967, there were over 400 Crimean Tatar delegates in Moscow, threatening to demonstrate in Red Square if necessary. (Fisher 1978, 178)
73 “These pieces of “information” from the Crimean Tatar representatives in Moscow became the first “samizdat” periodicals in the Soviet union”. (Jemilev 2003, 13) The information was put together by the representatives of Crimean Tatars in Moscow. From October 1964 to March 1979, 129 issues of “Information” were issued. (Seytmuratova 1998,179)
Cemilev (2003, 13) also pointed out that, “The task of these groups was to organize regular meetings of compatriots with the goal of explaining to them the goals and objectives of the national movement, informing them about events connected with the Crimean Tatar issue…”

“Communicating to people the truth about the past,” “injustices,” “goals and objectives” can be taken as communicating to people the movement frame. Guboglo and Chervonnaya (1992) point out the success of frame alignment processes by stating that common people among the Crimean Tatars could cite history a lot better than any other people in the Soviet Union, who had institutions to teach national history.

Petitioning served this purpose well and the Crimean Tatars continued to do this, even though it became clear that petitions are completely ineffective for influencing authorities as they simply ignore them. As the activists told me, the internal work was more important for them. They transformed the right to petition authorities into a tool to create and maintain national identity in the totalitarian state. Timur Dağcı is one of the actual writers of the petition to the Twenty-Third Party Congress, which had more than 120,000 signatures under it (virtually the whole adult population). He told me “when I wrote it, my first purpose was to have 120,000 of our people read it and understand their own condition”.74 Obviously, this is an attempt to transform and align frames of 120,000 Crimean Tatars to make the congruent with the frame in the petition.

The resonance of this frame increased gradually. A good way of understanding resonance is to compare the number of signatures under the letters, since petition writing was the main movement activity in this initial period. The Crimean Tatars petitioned with:

- 6,000 signatures to the Supreme Soviet in June 1957.
- 18,000 signatures to the 21st Party Congress in January 1959.

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74 Timur Dağcı, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, Simferopol.
25,000 signatures to the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 (Fisher 1978, 176). 120,000 signatures (i.e. virtually the whole adult population) and 14,284 letters to the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966. (Fisher ??)

Bekirova states that in total the Soviet central government received 53,000 letters and telegrams, many of them with 10, 100, and 1000 signatures (Bekirova 2004, 112). Uehling (2004), and Bekirova (2004) note that in total 4 million signatures were collected and this means on average 10 signatures per person. We must not forget that signing a petition requires a lot more courage in the Soviet Union than in a democratic state (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992). Therefore we can argue that the signers were well attentive of what they are doing. Cemilev points out that none of the other national, religious or human rights movements in the Soviet Union were so “massive” (Jemilev/Cemilev 2003, 13).

(iii) Third level: Masses:

At the third level, there were also less educated, mostly blue collar Crimean Tatars who donated money to representatives in Moscow, supported families of imprisoned activists, signed petitions, and showed up for mass demonstrations. The third level is the largest and therefore is very important. Without aligning the frames of the individuals at this level with the movement frame, the movement would be regarded as an elite one. The frame was communicated to the third level by the second level through conversations, meetings, and petitions, but also; weddings, religious rituals, concerts, newspapers, and so on. The individuals at this level contributed to the reproduction of the frame by acting it out in their lives, i.e. story-telling, educating their children at the dinner table, and transmitting a

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75 There were uneducated or less educated people who were nevertheless the veterans, war heroes or relatives of deceased war heroes and martyrs. They were selected to represent the movement in Moscow as they enjoyed prestige vis-à-vis the Soviet master frame, and could contribute to the inclusion of the Crimean Tatar frame in the extended Soviet frame. After all they constituted concrete living proof of Crimean Tatar service to the ‘fatherland’ in the war. It was also harder to arrest or harass them.
collective memory (Altan 1998). The Crimean Tatar movement in the USSR demonstrated a high level of resonance even among large number of people, which was evident in tangible activities such as a sustained and wide level of support not only for signing petitions, but also for donations of money and initiative group meetings. In the course of my participant observation, I did not meet a Crimean Tatar who did not donate money to the movement, or had not been in initiative group meeting at least once. Most reported regular donation and attendance at meetings. Timur Dağcı stated that, “our national movement was costly, our nation had to spend a lot of money”\textsuperscript{77}, and underlined the lack of corruption in the collection of donations for the full thirty years of mobilization, due to mechanisms of oversight but also the honesty of representatives.\textsuperscript{78}

Assessing the participation in mass demonstrations is another way of understanding resonance. Mass demonstrations were legal according to Soviet law, though not accepted practice (Fisher 1978, 187). On the 27\textsuperscript{th} of August, 1965 more than one thousand Crimean Tatars demonstrated in Bekabad.\textsuperscript{79} On the 8\textsuperscript{th} of October, 1966, for the 45\textsuperscript{th} year of establishment of the Crimean ASSR in several cities of Uzbekistan, meetings were organized, thousands were beaten, and hundreds were arrested over 15 days.\textsuperscript{80} On the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of April, 1967 in Andijan, Crimean Tatars including women and children from Andijan and Fergana oblasts demonstrated in front of Lenin’s statue (Bekirova 2004, 110).\textsuperscript{81} In the mid-1960s, the Uzbek government complained of frequent meetings in which 100 to 200 people

\textsuperscript{76}Milara Settarova, Interview by author, 31 March 2006, Simferopol.
\textsuperscript{77}An amount close to $250 was given to each representative for expenses in Moscow
\textsuperscript{78}According to Dağcı, there were limits to what representatives could buy in Moscow, i.e a box of candy for their children. One representative who bought a sofa when he was in Moscow was publicly shamed, and that was never repeated again. Timur Dağcı, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, Simferopol.
\textsuperscript{79}3 were arrested (Bekirova 2004, 110).
\textsuperscript{80}17 were there for longer periods. 18 Tatars received two-year sentences (Bekirova 2004, 110).
\textsuperscript{81}The women and children were in the front row. The authorities did not let them reach Lenin and again a few were arrested after a fight. Those arrested received 6 months to three year terms (Bekirova 2004, 110).
participated (Bekirova 2004, 111). In 1966-7 in Tashkent, Andijan and Bekabad, during several court processes, 766 activists were called by the police and received warnings (Bekirova 2004, 111). During the Crimean Tatar annual spring festival and celebrations of Lenin’s birthday in Chirchik on the 21st of April 1967, nearly 300 people were arrested (Bekirova 2004, 126).  

Immediately after the affair on the 17th of May, 1968 the massive demonstration of Crimean Tatars in Moscow took place, in which 800 participated. On the 18th of May, 1967 the Crimean Tatars demonstrated in all places of settlement.

In terms of intangible evidence, Uehling (2004) underlines the significance of widely shared emotions with respect to Crimea and the desire to return. In 1967, after another mass concert, Hayirov argued that all had the “national sentiment” even among those who did not participate actively in the national movement.  

This was the highest level of resonance among the Crimean Tatar diasporas as well. Most diaspora movements, including the Crimean Tatar diasporas (except the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Romania in the interwar period) could not go beyond the third level.

### 3.4.4. Transformation of the Crimean Tatar frame (1960-1967) and counter-framing against the Soviet frame

Crimean Tatar leaders structured frame alignment with Crimean Tatar people in the form of frame transformation, and master frame extension. Of course, master frame extension could only take place had the regime adopted the “Leninist” frame. In fact, it is

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82 Between 30 May and 2 June 1968, the court process of Refat İsmailov, Reşat Alimov, Sadi Abhairov, the Chirchik demonstrators was held. They were given 3, 2 and a half and 2 years respectively, and between 18-26 June the rest of the demonstrators were prosecuted, being accused of organizing demonstration in Chirchik on 24 March, 7 April, and finally 21 April. In the court Moscow “human rights advocate” lawyers defended for them, giving authorities small trouble. (Bekirova 2004, 126)  

83 İzzet Hayirov, Interview by author, 13 April 2006, Simferopol.
also debated whether “Leninism” can really be viewed as a type of Soviet ideology fundamentally different than Stalinism. Fainsod (1953) argues that Stalinism is a logical outcome of Lenin’s ideology and policies. Tucker also agrees that if Lenin had lived longer the Soviet Union would not be much different as the system was fundamentally doomed from the beginning and in its very nature. (Tucker 1999, 78). It is also true that Leninism remained an aspiration rather than a real policy guiding the Soviet state until the very end. Some scholars argued that a complete de-Stalinization would mean the collapse of totalitarianism, and would eventually cause the dissolution of the Soviet state, and this was foreseen by the Soviet leaders, so that they never completely reversed Stalin’s policies, and the state remained Stalinist at its core until ‘glasnost’. The 1967 Edict of the regime remained the ultimate document that proves that the Crimean Tatar case is not the only area that the Soviet Union would prefer to de-Stalinize. This means that Crimean Tatar leaders misdiagnosed the master frame, and aligned with the not-really-existing Leninist frame. The Soviet frame was still mainly a Stalinist frame. Moreover, it continued to counter-frame against the Crimean Tatar frame. This explains the limited positive outcomes attained after ten years of national movement, which is perhaps an exoneration of the Crimean Tatars in a limited manner.

When 400 Crimean Tatar representatives threatened to demonstrate in Red Square in 1967, the Crimean Tatars finally received promise from top ranking Soviet officials to bring the issue in front of the Central Committee (Fisher 1978, 178). Interestingly, the Uzbek authorities arrested all 130 of the representatives returning from Moscow for “organizing mass disorders and resisting authorities”, which demonstrated that the government’s attitude

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84Scholars with different ideologies and academic standpoints such as Pipes, Hobsbawn, and Fitzpatrick agree with this.
85Martin Malia concluded that “communism cannot be reformed” (1992, 57)
did not change much, despite promise (Fisher 1978, 178). On September 9, 1967 a decree was published in newspapers where Tatars resided proclaiming that:

…accusations of active collaboration of a section of the Tatar residents in the Crimea with the German usurpers were groundlessly leveled at the whole Tatar population of the Crimea. These indiscriminate accusations in respect of all the citizens of Tatar nationality who lived in Crimea must be withdrawn, the more so since a new generation of people has entered on its working and political life…the Tatars formerly living in Crimea have taken root in the territory of Uzbek and other Union republics; enjoy all the rights of the Soviet citizens, take part in public and political life…radiobroadcasts are made for them, a newspaper in their language is published, and other cultural measures are taken.86 With the aim of further developing areas with Tatar population, the councils of ministers of Union republics are instructed to continue rendering help and assistance to citizens of Tatar nationality in economic and cultural construction…(Fisher 1978, 179)

In relation to Edict, another decree was issued to explain that

…citizens of Tatar nationality who previously resided in Crimea and members of their families have a right, as all citizens of USSR, to live in all territory of the Soviet Union as long as they act within law and …within limitations of the passport regime (Guboglo and Chervonnaya, 2, 52)

The decree epitomizes the Soviet framing of the Crimean Tatar question, which was apparent before 1967, but was never clearly articulated as it was here. This framing also did not change until the Gorbachev period, but was modified or bolstered by administrative decrees. The major aspect of the frame is that it aimed to impede collective return by arguing that the Crimean Tatars “have taken root.” The evidence they show is that “the new generation of the Crimean Tatars grew up, who never lived in Crimea,” which involves the assumption that the new generation do not want to return (Bekirova 2004, 115). Although the

86 Other cultural measures refer to Crimean Tatar dance assembly which was founded in 1957. Unlike other nationalities the Crimean Tatars were deprived of right to study in their language at the pre-university or university level. Crimean Tatar newspaper is not permitted to publish any national content and heavily censured. (Rıza Fazıl, Interview with author, 5 May 2006, Simferopol.) Maintenance of national culture through these limited cultural rights is impossible in the Soviet Union of 1960s and 1970s in which the society is urbanized and Russian language increasingly became dominant in all spheres of life and national languages are retreated even in Union-republics.
related decree argued that the Crimean Tatars could live in any part of the Soviet Union, it became obvious from the first attempts to return to Crimea that Crimea was not meant.\textsuperscript{87} A passport regime was hastily established in Crimea, and the returning Crimean Tatars were refused registration as residents of Crimea, which was required to get a job, to buy a house and to register children in school. On 22 February 1974, and 1978, the regime issued further decrees named “additional measures for strengthening the passport regime in Crimea” to make the registration and resettlement of Crimean Tatars in Crimea almost impossible, and to enable re-deportation of those who attempted to return by the police.

The second major aspect of the framing was the “non-existence” of the Crimean Tatar nation. The language of the decree implicitly denied the existence of the Crimean Tatar nationality since it did not use their ethnonym “Crimean Tatar” and refers to them as “Tatars formerly living in Crimea”, “Tatar residents in Crimea”, and “citizens of Tatar nationality who lived in Crimea”. Calling them simply Tatars denied them a separate nationality as there were many other nationalities called Tatars in the Soviet Union (Volga Tatars, Astrakhan Tatars, etc). This would automatically remove demands tied to national identity, i.e. collective return to homeland, national autonomy, national-cultural rights, and an end to discrimination (Seytmuratova 1998, 165). In other words, “There could be no need to return to Crimea- a people without nationality has no homeland to which to return” (Fisher 1978, 180).\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{87} Cemilev states that after the publication of 1967 Edict, 10,000s of Crimean Tatars from Uzbekistan arrived in Crimea strive to register and get a job in Crimea for several months, suffered under the repression of authorities and had to once again leave the homeland. Hundred of them were deported by force. (\textit{Omskii Protsess} 2003, 62)

\textsuperscript{88} The mention of language meant the language spoken and read by the Crimean Tatars in general in the Soviet Union, not particularly that of the Crimean Tatars (Fisher 1978, 180).
“The exoneration of the Crimean Tatars” by this decree, in the beginning seemed like an attempt for master frame transformation. But it was not. For, the innocence of the Crimean Tatar people was not announced to the Soviet people. This “made it very difficult to persuade many non-Tatar Soviet citizens of the justness of their cause” (Fisher 1978, 180) and limited possibility of frame alignment with the general population (by-standers). The Crimean Tatars continued to be accused in press, radio, school curricula, literature, historical articles, and official documents, which demonstrated that the government still wanted to endorse the Stalinist master frame regarding the Crimean Tatars.

Rather than transforming the master frame, in fact, the regime counter-framed the Crimean Tatar frame in its own documents published as supplementary to this decree which “exonerated” the Crimean Tatars. The regime argued that the “Crimean ASSR” was not a “Crimean Tatar ASSR” as it was obvious in its name. The republic was never intended to be “nationally” autonomous but rather regionally autonomous. After all, the Russians were more populous than the Crimean Tatars in Crimea (Bekirova 2004, 114). In fact, this is not uncommon in almost half of the autonomous republics or regions in the USSR due to Russian/Slavic colonization and immigration to the periphery in the previous and contemporary periods.

Ultimately the regime relied on the excuse that even if the deportation was a mistake it was too late to redress it. Crimea was already populated by the Russians and Ukrainians, argued the regime, so that it could not take any more population, and the re-settlement of Crimean Tatars would simply disrupt the normal living of the local population (Bekirova
2004, 115). The claim of over-population contradicted the fact that continuous invitations of labor force in Crimea were published in Soviet newspapers (Bekirova 2004, 115).89

Evidence that the regime engaged in master frame alignment among the Crimean Tatar people is found in many internal administrative documents of the regime, such as the policy of “improving ideological work among citizens of Tatar nationality, especially youth …strengthening of legal propaganda and preventive-preemptive measures with the aim of inadmissible instigator activities of Crimean Tatar ‘autonomists’ among the Tatar population”.90

- Some Tatars definitely betrayed the homeland, which provides some justification for the deportation, and demonstrates that it was not a genocide aimed at the destruction of the whole Tatar nation.
- Although some of the Crimean Tatars definitely betrayed the fatherland, the deportation of all Tatars from Crimea was a punishment out of proportion, realized under the cult of personality of Stalin, and has nothing to do with the Communist Party.
- The majority of the deported people died, and therefore they cannot be returned. Their children do not have to return since they grew up in exiled places, and became well-integrated and prospering citizens. Moreover, they are provided with special rights to maintain their culture.
- Tatars cannot be regarded as indigenous to Crimea, as their ancestors settled in the peninsula as invaders. The Crimean ASSR was not a national autonomy in the first place. Therefore, the Crimean Tatars formerly resident in Crimea were not deprived of their national state or anything else.
- The return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea will not be expedient for the economy of Crimea, as Crimea is overpopulated with new settlers, who worked hard to salvage the Crimean economy after the Crimean Tatars left. The return of Tatars could create inter-ethnic tensions.

*Figure 6. The Soviet regime frame, with respect to the Crimean Tatar question*

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89 A secret document of the time reveals that according to the authorities, Crimea is an important strategic region as it is the strongest sea base in the country. It is a border zone and health resort. (Bekirova 2004, 141-2).
The 1967 decree rehabilitated the Crimean Tatars in theory, but it was meaningless in terms of reinstituting justice without removal of consequences of this unjust accusation, i.e. collective return, restoration of national autonomy, or the end of discrimination through publication of this decree widely across the Soviet Union (Fisher 1978, 180). In the words of Crimean Tatars, the edict of 5 September 1967 granted “Freedom to the dead and eternal exile to the living” (Seytmuratova 19, 165) This means that the 1967 edict as the outcome of the Crimean Tatar movement constituted a very limited success in terms of meeting the demands defined by the frame, and in fact could be considered as a counter-framing effort of the regime to oust the Crimean Tatar movement. The actions of the regime, such as brutal suppression of Chirchik and Moscow protests, supported the idea that the regime increasingly took an oppositional stance against the Crimean Tatars, not enabling them to use legal methods to defend their case. All of these factors demonstrated that the government did not intend to de-Stalinize with respect to the Crimean Tatar question. In other words, the master frame did not extend far enough to include the Crimean Tatar frame.

The inflexibility of the master frame and inability to attain their main goals did not end the Crimean Tatar movement as “even the small positive outcome (symbolic exoneration of the Crimean Tatars) attained was due to their demands and not due to self-criticism by the state” (Fisher 1978, 181) But the inability to attain satisfactory outcomes gave way to strengthened internal criticism. Frame contests within the movement accelerated, and a new generation of activists who were either small children during the deportation or born in the special settlement regime, began to differ in the way they framed the Crimean Tatar issue.

The frame transformation among the young generation seems to have taken place at various exile locations between 1960 and 1967. In the first court process against the
Crimean Tatars, the students were prosecuted for preparing letters in a language quite different than the pleading Leninist frame.

To communists: We have been patient and waited long enough…How long more can our insulting condition continue. In the 20th century this constitutes barbarism…We understand that your purpose is our nation’s dissolution in the midst of other nations…. We demand our nation to be recognized and to be given the possibility to return to the homeland. Crimea is our homeland and sooner or later you will recognize that. We have one purpose today: Homeland or Death… (The Union of Crimean Youth)(Bekirova 2004, 86,87).

Change in the frames is evident in a future leader, Ayşe Seytmurova’s behavior in 1964. For the first time, and out of wonder and coincidence Ayşe Seytmuratova, a university graduate in her early twenties joined the usual Crimean Tatar delegation in Moscow. In the office of the Soviet official, the delegation voiced several complaints of discrimination, and old women cried. The Soviet bureaucrats as usual found a way of silencing them by asking them to provide the names of the people who discriminated against them. To this ignorant question, Seytmuratova stood up from the remote corner from which she was listening to the conversation and said: “Write down that it is the Soviet government who discriminates against us.” Seytmuratova expressed to me how startled both the bureaucrats and Crimean Tatar delegates were, who were from the older generation and aligned with the previous frame. Seytmuratova emphasized that “Nobody could dare to accuse the Soviet government before.” This came as a shock even to the authorities, that they could not formulate a counter-frame right away. The Soviet bureaucrat was speechless and could only ask what her name was, and could not think of having her arrested at the moment.

After she was expelled from the university due to this act, Seytmuratova (1998, 162) “became actively involved in the national movement in Samarkand,” in her words. She said, “I went from house to house talking to the Crimean Tatars about the right to the homeland…I
held meetings…I explained the constitutional right of all people to have schools in their native language and their own press as well as the right to a national culture…” [Emphasis mine] (Seytmuratova 1998, 162). Instead of pleading, Seytmuratova became a Crimean Tatar who demanded her “rights”. Ayşe Seytmuratova counter-framed rather than attempted for master frame extension. She described her speaking with the regime in the course of her interrogations as such: “The bottom line was that their reasoning was on a lower level than mine.”

In her conversation with Greta Uehling, Ayşe Seytmuratova narrates that she beat, pounded the authorities to let her out and the Central Committee was “humbled” under her pressure and had to follow the law in her case of emigration (Uehling 2004, p.144). She claims citizenship, which by law the state must respect, and she has a right to hold the state accountable and responsive (Uehling 2004, 145).

A clear expression of confrontation with the regime reflecting a new frame was heard from Mustafa Cemilev who was tried for rejecting military service in Tashkent on May 1st, 1966. He took an oppositional stance after the Union of Crimean Youth, of which he was a member, was harshly suppressed by the authorities, though it only aimed to learn more about the Crimean Tatar culture and acted strictly within legal boundaries. In the court proceedings, he openly equated the deportation of the Crimean Tatars with the Nazi genocide and refused to serve in the military of a state, which committed genocide against its own people (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992).

Frame transformation was not limited to prominent activists. According to Bekirova (2004, 127-8), the brutal repression of the Chirchik and Moscow demonstrations displayed a different relationship between Crimean Tatars and the authorities, breaking the illusion of a peaceful solution to the Crimean Tatar problem. The interlocutor of Uehling who was a

\footnote{Ayşe Seytmuratova, Interview by author, 18 April 2006, Simferopol.}
demonstrator in Chirchik argued that this was a galvanizing moment which showed clearly that the politics of the Soviet state did not match its rhetoric (Uehling 2004, 161). According to the Soviet dissident General Pyotr Grigorenko, more people crossed over to the opposition after the spring of 1967 (Bekirova 2004, 128).

Cemilev who became the leader of the Crimean Tatars later, criticized the previous frame as such:

To justify the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Soviet propaganda, of course asserted that an overwhelming majority of the Crimean Tatars collaborated with the Nazis and betrayed their “Soviet motherland”. The Crimean Tatars, who were participants in the war and partisan movements, and some of whom had been activists of the nationalist movement during its initial period, tried to prove the contrary…They fell into the other extreme, asserting that, with the exception of an insignificant number of “traitors to the people,” almost all Crimean Tatars remained faithful to the “Soviet motherland”…the situation was not that simple…doubtless, some Crimean Tatars who were not sufficiently informed about the essence of German fascism entertained hopes, for a time, of deliverance from the hated Bolshevik regime which had succeeded in bringing so much suffering to their people within a short period of time…However, very soon…most of the Crimean Tatars came to realize that in principle there was no difference between German fascism and Russian Bolshevism…Therefore, most of the Crimean Tatars viewed the “Great Patriotic War” as no more than a skirmish between two villains, neither of which promised any kindness or relief. (Cemilev 2005, 56-57)

In this different account of history, Cemilev does not aim to be consistent with the Soviet master frame, or extend it to include the issue of collective return. In fact he rejected Soviet terms such as “Soviet fatherland” or “betrayal” to it. Proving how many Crimean Tatars were helpful to the Soviet authorities does not interest him. Loyalty to his own homeland is amplified as the most significant value. The attempt for national independence when opportunity allows is the right thing to do, since the Crimean Tatars did not willingly join the Soviet Union. According to Cemilev, the “Crimean Tatar national liberation movement…goes back to the period when the Crimean Khanate was liquidated and its
territory was annexed by the Russian Empire in April 1783” (Cemilev 2005, 50). Thus he casts the issue not one of a misunderstanding between the Soviet government and one of its nationalities, but a continuation of an age-old struggle between the Crimean Tatars and Russians, two equal enemies. For the old generation the state is mainly benevolent though ignorant in taking actions (Uehling 2004, 140-141). According to the new frame, the state is the main opponent. Cemilev explained the frame transformation process in which he took part:

Soon after 1965, a more radical wing began to split off and take the lead in the Crimean Tatar national movement. This wing opted for a different *strategy and attitude* [Italics mine] toward the prospect of restoring people’s rights…At the very beginning of the national movement, its leading authorities, the majority of whom were veterans of war and the partisan movement in Crimea and former party and administrative workers of the Crimean ASSR, proceeded from the notion that the problems of the return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea and the restoration of their autonomy could be decided only if the leadership of the USSR was convinced of their absolute loyalty to the Soviet state and the communist party and of the expediency of the Crimean Tatars’ return for Crimea’s economy. The advocates of the more radical wing considered such views to be illusory, lacking in perspective and humiliating to the Crimean Tatars …the understanding matured that a just solution of the problem could only be seriously expected under complete substitution of the Soviet totalitarian system with a democracy (which remained highly unlikely in the foreseeable future) or at least, transformation of the regime in a more democratic direction. *This concept dictated the necessity of consolidating the Crimean Tatar national movement with all other national-democratic, religious, human rights movements in the USSR that opposed the regime.* The appeals, informational bulletins, and other documents of the more radical wing were addressed primarily not to state officials but to broader society, including the international community…As a rule documents were redirected to the West through Moscow dissidents and foreign journalists and then “returned” to the USSR through the powerful transmitters of the radio stations …over the entire territory of the country. Obviously this was a most painful blow to a regime that spent huge amounts of money annually for propaganda both inside the country and abroad to create an attractive image. [Italics mine] (Cemilev 2005, 59-60)
According to Cemilev, Grigorenko’s speech, which was made into thousands of copies\textsuperscript{92}, and distributed among the Crimean Tatars to be recited in the meetings contributed greatly to the “radicalization” of the movement. Grigorenko stated:

...You were formerly subjected to repressions as Crimean Tatars, but, since, the “political rehabilitation,” it seems that there is not such nation. The nation disappeared but discrimination remains...you underestimate your enemy. You think that you are dealing only with honest people. This is not so...you address yourselves to the leadership of the party with meekly written pleas, which pass through the hands of those who are against your struggle for national equality...as long as you request...your case is not moving forward...what is prescribed by law should not be requested, it should be demanded! (cf Fisher 1978, 195)

Mustafa Cemilev states, “He advised for changing our strategy and tactic totally...Of course before his talk, there were radicals among us. They argued that instead of asking for sympathy from the Kremlin, the whole nation must mobilize... But after we met Pyotr Grigorenko and other dissidents, it is definite that the radicals began to dominate the movement.” (Kırımoğlu/Cemilev 1993, 5).

The new transformed Crimean Tatar frame did not attempt for a master frame extension, i.e. extending the present Soviet communism frame to include the Crimean Tatar view.\textsuperscript{93} Instead, it counter-framed against the Soviet frame. Instead of appealing to the authorities by letters or petitions, which the new generation of activists regarded as totally useless, they appealed to the by-standers such as the Soviet public, and international society as well as other dissident movements in order to transform their individual frames about the Crimean Tatar case, and counter-frame the Soviet master frame through petitions, letters, information bulletins (\textit{samizdat} and \textit{tamizdat}), and when possible mass demonstrations. These activities were harshly repressed by the state through house-search, appropriation of

\textsuperscript{92}If one of those copies is found on a person, s/he could be arrested. (Kırımoğlu/Cemilev 1993, 5)

\textsuperscript{93} For the interpretation of master frame extension utilized here, see Tarrow (1989, 36). (cf Swart)
documents, arrests, trials and penalties. The Crimean Tatars and other dissidents “did not plead guilty” and “turned the trials… into political demonstrations” (Reddaway 1998, 228). Their testimonies were published by *samizdat* and *tamizdat*, which forcefully counter-framed against the regime. The interrogations and court proceedings of activists were a battle of words, and a battle of minds between the Crimean Tatars and the representatives of the regime.

Here is one example of the battle of frames: The Crimean Tatar activists in Tashkent in 1969 claimed the deportation constituted a genocide based on the statistics they conducted, and asserted that between 1944 and 1945, 46 % of the Crimean Tatars had died. The Soviet prosecutors, however, argued that according to the Uzbekistan National Security Committee registers only 26,781 Crimean Tatars died in the first two years, which corresponds to less than 20% of the Crimean Tatars at that time. Rollan Kadiyev, however, argued that even this lower “20 %” is sufficient for the case to constitute “genocide” (Özcan 2002, 162).

Rollan Kadiyev, one of the ten Crimean Tatars tried in the famous Tashkent Trial in 1969, in his own defense, after paraphrasing the criticisms in the Soviet press of the treatment of the Xinkian Uighurs by PRC, pointed out the hypocrisy of the regime as it had been doing the same to the Crimean Tatars. Consequently, he stated, “I accepted as my duty to bring consciousness of each Crimean Tatar, that the political actions towards our people constitute genocide and discrimination” (*Tashkentskiy Protsess* 1976, 593) for “the Soviet government, starting from 1944, consistently followed this assimilation politics” (*Tashkentskiy Protses* 1976). He criticized the state policies:

“Haven’t we gotten kicked out of our homeland? … Does even one Crimean Tatar work in the police force, in the KGB, as a procurator. Is there a Crimean Tatar judge? Haven’t they stirred the other peoples against us? …Do the Soviet people know that
criminal charges of betrayal are removed from me?” (Tashkentskiy Protses 1976, 595).

I wonder if my people have history written so that we could learn about our past. Didn’t they burn our books after deportation? They burned them! The books do not exist anymore! ... Haven’t all out monuments and relics been destroyed? We appealed to competent organs to stop that barbarism, but this became one of the reasons we sit in this chair in trial... In Simferopol, in the city centre there is a monument of a tank, which entered the city first. Until unification with Ukraine, on this tank was written the name of the driver of the tank- Hero of the Soviet Union Abdulla Tevfik [a Crimean Tatar]. Today they erased that name from the monument... When the guides were asked who the driver of this tank was, they answered Petrenko, another time Arkhinenko, and a third time another surname. This is living falsification of history. ... Don’t they continue massive settlement of Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea until this very day? This is exactly one of the clearest demonstrations of assimilation conducted towards us... so that later they will tell us these settlers already laid roots, and we’d better leave Crimea to new settlers” (Tashkentskiy Protses 1976, 596-7).

Similarly, in both of his trials, another prominent young leader, Yuri Osmanov, made the case that Soviet political actions against the Crimean Tatars constituted genocide, (Asanin 2001, 371,373) and therefore he was sentenced first to labor and then imprisoned in a psychiatric institution.

Mustafa Cemilev:

Even if we agree with the data of MVD [Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del], which was announced in 1969, that the Crimean Tatars lost their lives in the amount of 38%, according to our census that number is around 45%. It is hard to find one Crimean Tatar family who did not lose their members, or close relatives, a lot of families died as a whole. This is perhaps more tragic for a people than even losing their homeland!(Omskii Protses 2003, 67)

“The reason for deportation was not the actions of the Crimean Tatars but the criminal policy of the Stalin government on the national question…”(Omskii Protses 2003, 60). “If until that time the Crimean Tatars had equal rights, one must ask why was the Edict of 1967 necessary?” (Omskii Protses 2003, 61)

Despite, it is well-known that the Crimean Tatars, who previously resided in Crimea have equal rights as other people... in the document [he prepared] ... I propose that the court conduct a legal investigation… Whether the Crimean Tatars have the same
rights as other nations to register and get employment in Crimea or do they face discrimination due to their nationality?” (Omskii Protbes 2003, 63) … One of the accusations concerns that… [I argued that] the young generations of Crimean Tatars do not have possibility to learn their own language, their own culture…. Since the moment of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, for the last thirty years there has not been one school teaching the Crimean Tatar language. How can we talk about learning national culture if one does not know one’s own language? (Omskii Protbes 2003, 65)

Another significant trial published under the title Shest Dnei (“Six Days”) were the trials of Mustafa Cemilev, and Jewish defendant of rights of the Crimean Tatars, Ilya Gabay. Ilya Gabay pointed out the continuing physical and emotional repression of the Crimean Tatars and the violation of their human rights and said, “I am happy to share a role in the just struggle of the Crimean Tatars against the Soviet government (Özcan 2002, 162). Cemilev had been arrested after he joined the protest of the invasion of Chechoslovakia and his trial was linked to the trial of Ilya Gabai. While answering the question whether he was tried before, Cemilev said: “Yes I was tried twice before. Once in …1966…and the other time was on 18 May 1944, when I was six months old, when I was deported from my homeland being accused of “betraying the fatherland”…(Shest Dnei 1980)

Although some of the young leaders of the Crimean Tatars mentioned the words “Soviet”, “communist”, or “Lenin”, these were for subversive purposes and not in the way the elders did. Viewing the regime not as a neutral target to be convinced but as an opponent who must be held accountable is evident in Reşat Cemilev’s letter to the KGB:

…Who, after all, in the given instance is the violator of the Soviet law? He who is pointing at the violations and asking them to be intercepted or they who have committed the named violations, who stubbornly refuse to investigate the given fact pertaining to the violation of the law? (cf Uehling 2004, 145)
Izzet Hayro'v’s testimony in the Tashkent Trial is very illustrative of how the new generation conceptualized their relationship with the Soviet master frame:

I have been a communist since 1962. For me, there was never a question about whether to join the national movement or not. The government, by deporting 14 nationalities from its territories, disrupted the Soviet laws and neglected its international responsibilities for the protection of the rights of national minorities. The Crimean Tatar national movement for obtaining rights is legal and substantiated. The goals directing the movement are legal and do not conflict with the program and the statutes of the party. As a communist, I accept as my duty to take the most active part in this movement. When asked who the “communist-Crimean Tatars” ought to be with, the chairman of the KGB, Andropov, accepting the representatives in Moscow in July 1967, recognized that communists of the Crimean Tatar nation ought to be with their own people (Tashkentskiy Protses 1976,397).

Similarly korenizatsiia, an originally Leninist concept, was reinterpreted in a way that the Crimean Tatars are “indigenous people” of Crimea, due to their historical linkage to the land of Crimea. This is how they have rights to national sovereignty in Crimea. The idea that the integral nature of the Crimean Tatar national culture was seriously damaged in exile, and that separation from and return to homeland are required to re-construct it, became significant themes of the diasporic national identity of the Crimean Tatars.

İsmail Yazıcıev:

“Those people with a human heart understand why our people for years strive for a positive resolution of our question-return to its own homeland…Those people like the prosecutor, intentionally ignore the sorrows of our nation and intentionally misinform administrative organs of our state…that our movement…is a movement of a few individuals, and not an all-nation movement…I believe…the sorrow of our nation and the …arbitrariness of Stalinism are due not only to those who conducted or permitted that arbitrariness but also to those until today who put obstacles in the way of resolution that was implemented by Lenin himself … (Tashkentskiy Protses 1976,581)

According to İsmail Kerimov, a Crimean Tatar who was born in exile in Uzbekistan and the current head of the Department of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature in the Crimean State Pedagogical University (KGPU), Simferopol:
Our tragedy is we lost our roots. Our thousand-year-traditions, historical manuscripts were lost...they destroyed our cemeteries, villages...In Bahçeşaray, there were many who continued to teach handicrafts within family over generations. Those ceased to teach the traditional handicrafts...there were those who looked after wells, who knew and controlled the groundwater ways. The wells are all lost...(Crimea now gets its water from Dnieper river)... There were 48 varieties of apples, fruit, and grapes. In the 19th century, the Crimean Tatars received medals in the Paris fair for their apples... It was the tradition of our forefathers to clean the fortress, take out the dry branches. Now it is hard to trek in Crimean mountains or fortresses. They were not looked after at all after Tatars left... Our forefathers were living in harmony with nature...It was difficult to maintain traditions in Uzbekistan. Most of them are lost.”

The new Crimean Tatar frame against the master frame, aligned with an alternative master frame of democracy and human rights. The Crimean Tatars often quote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Tashkentskiy Protses 1976, 328, 332)95. In the previous frame, the right to national sovereignty was justified under Soviet law, particularly Lenin’s policies and actions. The new frame did not recognize Lenin as the ultimate reference point.

Universal principles of liberty, equality, democracy and human rights emerged as the new justifications for a claim to national sovereignty in Crimea. These are the last words of Mustafa Cemilev in his trial in Tashkent on 19 January 1970:

Signing this or that document which demands just resolution of the Crimean Tatar national question, protesting the violation of human rights, and criticizing actions of the government- I of course wholly took part in these sort of activities for which I can be arrested again, and my freedom can be limited for a longer period...The prosecutor aimed to demonstrate that …we discredit our country. But, I hope, people understand rightly who really damages our country: those who engage in arbitrary rule and unlawfulness, or those in the name of all protest for the end of unlawfulness… I hope the government will understand meaninglessness…of fighting with opinions of people through these court interactions and will understand that the Crimean Tatar question can only be resolved by granting the demands of the people, not by repressing the activists of the national movement... [A]s a sign of protest against the brutal repression of the Crimean Tatar people...and against the violation of their right to... the homeland, and as a sign of protest against the violation of human rights in our country, I announce thirty days of hunger strike… hoping that

95 See Hayirov ’s speech.
this would “awaken the consciousness” of people…Homeland or Death! Long live freedom! (Shest Dnei 1980, 368-371)

- The deportation of Crimean Tatar was done on purpose, to annihilate the Crimean Tatars as a nation and “betrayal to the fatherland” was an excuse to justify that.
- The deportation is the last link in the chain of historical events through which Russia aimed to de-Tatarize Crimea and turn it into a Slavic territory. While the Tsars expelled the larger part of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, Stalin deported the rest and finished what the Tsars started. The Soviet state demonstrates a continuity with Russian colonial and imperialistic policies, not only towards the Crimean Tatars but also all non-Russian nationalities.
- The solution of the Crimean Tatar question is the collective return to the homeland, compact settlement in the southern and central regions of Crimea, where the Crimean Tatars resided before, re-establishment of national autonomy, and compensation for property lost.
- The collective return and re-establishment of national autonomy requires democratization of the Soviet Union by dismantling not only of Stalinism, but the whole totalitarian system of communism. The Crimean Tatars alone cannot achieve this purpose. They must ally with other dissident movements, particularly human rights, and democracy movements in the Soviet Union, and utilize tactics such as publishing samizdat and tamizdat to receive the support of the world and the Soviet public.
- The Crimean Tatars are the indigenous population of Crimea who has no other homeland.

Figure 7. The transformed collective return frame

3.4.5. Frame-bridging with the democracy and human rights movement in the USSR:

The Crimean Tatar movement bridged frames with the dissident and democracy movements in the USSR. The transformation of the Crimean Tatars frame, its alignment with the democracy master frame and frame bridging with the human rights and democracy movement in the USSR re-defined the “political field” in the sense that in addition to

96 In addition, the transformed frame was transferred to the US by the extradition of Ayşe Seytmuratova. The extradition of Ayşe Seytmuratova to the United States brought immense information about the situation of their co-ethnics and their struggle to the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities outside the Soviet Union. (Altan, 2005; Aydin, 2000).
Crimean Tatar people and the Soviet government, other movements and bystanders such as the Soviet public, international society and foreign governments also became part of the new framing processes. For instance, Seytmuratova visited schools and hung up clippings about Crimean Tatar heroes, partisans, war heroes in the classroom, and this way “not only the Crimean Tatar children were made aware of heroism of Crimean Tatars during the Second World War but also children of other nationalities” (Seytmuratova 1998, 163). Grigorenko also points out that in the post-edict years, the Crimean Tatars learned how to rally international support. The Crimean Tatars expanded the frame alignment processes from their own nation or Soviet citizens towards the world public. In the Crimean Tatars’ own information bulletin (1 January 1969) it is pointed out that: “The national consciousness of our people rose even more…National movement of the Crimean Tatars …passed to a new phase …Now we are not alone…1969 will be with even more political activism” (Bekirova 2004, 128). In 1969, the Crimean Tatars staged the first public demonstration in a Moscow square (Reddaway 1998, 228). In their appeal to the world society (in 1969), the representatives of the Crimean Tatars first summarize the history of injustices perpetrated against their nation beginning from 1944:

Spreading the rumours about us that we want to return to Crimea in order push out those who now live there - that is not true. We are a peaceful nation and have always lived and will live in friendship with the multi-national population of Crimea. We do not threaten anybody- they continuously make threats of our national dissolution …What they do to us has an entirely definite name- genocide. In the period of our struggle, it has been collected 3 million signatures under the letters sent by our people to the Soviet government... Not even one party-government organ even once replied to our letters...That is why we are applying to the world public... (signed by Z.

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97 Ayşe Seytmuratova argues that “We…were accused of treason against the motherland, and we needed fact, not only to rectify slander of the Soviet government but also to demonstrate to the peoples of the Soviet Union the hostility of authorities toward a relatively small group of people” (Seytmuratova 1998, 158).
A group of the young Crimean Tatar leaders, including Reşat Cemilev, made the decision “to relate their movement to the more general ‘democratic’ and ‘struggle for human rights’ movements among the Soviet intelligentsia” (Fisher 1978, 1994). For that purpose they mailed letters to Moscow members of the Writers’ Union and received a sympathetic response from an old writer Aleksei Kosterin, who proceeded to connect Tatar with the incipient human rights movement (Baraheni et al, 9). As a result, several important dissident leaders, such as Kosterin and Grigorenko, “adopted the Tatar cause as their own.”

In his letter written in February 1968, Kosterin points out a “policy of genocide towards a series of small nations” particularly the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars (Fisher 1978, 194). This is another letter addressed to the Presidium of the Consultative Conference of Communist Parties in Budapest (24 February 1968):

In recent years in our country, there has been a series of political trials…trials that were conducted with hard breach of legality, most importantly openness… in the labors and prisons thousands of political prisoners of whom almost nobody knows anything… In the same manner, we draw your attention to the fact of discrimination of small nations and political persecution of the individuals who fight for national equality, which especially clearly reveals itself on the question of Crimean Tatars… We apply for the participants of this consultative meeting to measure this danger which gives way to flouting of human rights in our country…” (signed by A. Kosterin, L. Bogoraz, P. Litvinov, Z. Asanova, Petr Yakir, V. Krasin, I. Gabay, B. Shragin, Levitin-Krasnov, Y. Kim, Y. Glazov, P. Grigorenko)

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99 According to Bekirova (2004), Cemilev and dissidents met in the following way: In the spring of 1968 when Resat Cemilev attempted to settle Crimea without success, he met dissidents General P. Grigorenko, Sergey Kosterin(?), Pavel Litvinov, and Petr Yakir. On 25 August 1968, with the request of Grigorenko, he was invited to present their case in one of the meetings of the defenders of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Apart from these signers, Sakharov, Y. Bonner, Franko, Lisenko, Volpin, S. Pisarev, A. Soljenitsin, A. Marchenko, Y. Orlov, M. Budenko, and I. Kandiba publicized the Crimean Tatars’ plight in the West, and in the Soviet Union (Fisher 1978, 194; Kırımoğlu/Cemilev 1993, 10) sent several appeals to the UN and other international bodies, as well as the Soviet government (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992; Fisher 1978, 194).

Thanks to the democracy and human rights movement, the Crimean Tatar movement became well known in the world. In the words of Grigorenko, the Crimean Tatar movement was known to the world after the Chirchik meeting. The day after a telegram on the event was sent to Grigorenko, he communicated the matter to foreign correspondents in a press conference held in Kosterin’s apartment (Bekirova 2004, 127; Guboglo and Chervonnaya, 1992). The Chronicle of Current Affairs (Khronika Tekushchikh Sobyty), the main samizdat periodical in the Soviet Union, published by the dissidents, in its first issue (1968) already had an article on the Crimean Tatar demands, and devoted a special issue on Crimean Tatars in 1973. In 1976, the Moscow “Helsinki Group” which monitored Soviet observance of human rights compiled detailed reports on the Crimean Tatars’ situation and delivered them to representatives of 35 signatory governments (Alexeeva 1985, 17). This was significant in a time when the Crimean Tatars were heavily repressed. The main samizdat of the Soviet Union, the Chronicle of Current affairs, recorded and publicized the human rights violations against the Crimean Tatars in Crimea in the course of the 1970-80s, which would otherwise be impossible to learn (Bekirova 1992, 188; Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 108). These examples of human rights abuses to Soviet citizens were useful for the dissidents to make their case about the poor human rights record of the Soviet Union and to shatter the Soviet master frame in a piecemeal process.
The Crimean Tatar political trials also turned into a mechanism to propagate their frame widely, as court records were smuggled and published by *tamizdat*. This was a strategy of the democracy movement. For the first time in 1965, the Daniel-Sinyavski trial gave dissidents a platform (Kenez 2006, 226), and dissidents compiled a record of the trial, distributed it among themselves and even sent it to authorities. Dissidents then took risks to maintain contacts with foreign journalists, so that their activities and the court processes against them would be broadcasted through Western media to the Soviet people (Kenez 2006, 226). One of the most prominent trials of the Crimean Tatar leaders was the trial of the “Tashkent Ten” between 1 July and 5 August 1969. The “Tashkent Ten” included prominent leaders Rollan Kadiyev, İsmail Yazıcıyev, Reşat Bayramov, Rıdvan Gafarov, and Izzet Khairov. Pyotr Grigorenko applied to defend them in the court, and the Crimean Tatars collected more than 3000 signatures for him to become their attorney. When he came to Tashkent, Grigorenko was arrested, and the dissidents found new lawyers. Grigorenko’s arrest and the court records published by Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam under the title, *Tashkentskii Protsess* (*Tashkent Trial*) further increased the publicity of the trial.101

The Soviet dissidents became influential in propagating the future Crimean Tatars’ leader Mustafa Cemilev’s struggle to the world. Cemilev after being tried in 1966 (for rejecting military service), and 1970 (with Ilya Gabai)102 and was sentenced to three years in heavy regime labor camps. Before his term ended in 1974, he was tried and sentenced to one more year for another accusation. When he was about to finish his term, he was sentenced again with a false witness. Therefore, Cemilev declared a hunger strike that continued for 303 days during which he fell to 30 kg. Consequently, Nobel Prize-winning physicist, Andrei

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101 The court records were generally recorded by hand by the Crimean Tatars who were permitted to attend the trials, who could be family members.

102 Published under the title of *Shest Dnei* (1980).
Sakharov and Grigorenko appealed to the world public and UN General Secretary, and “pleaded” the Soviet authorities for his life to be saved. Levitin-Krasnov appealed to the Muslim world. News about his death turned out to be false, and consequently the Soviet government decided to try him once again in Omsk (1976), which was very hard for foreign correspondents and dissidents to reach, and sentenced him once more to two and a half years in a labor camp. Sakharov and his wife managed to come to the trial, but they were harassed by the KGB. The harassment of the Nobel Laureate and his wife attracted attention in the West and this trial became well known and published by tamizdat as Omskii Protess (Omsk Trial). Cemilev was arrested again in November 1983 and sent to three years in a hard labor camp in Magadan for slandering the Soviet internal and external politics, being anti-Soviet, and publishing a protest against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. When he was about the finish his term, he was sentenced for another three years. But due to the great publicity of his case, in the first Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Reykjavik, his name was one of the five human rights defenders in prison, whom Reagan asked for a release.

As a result of frame-bridging with the democracy and human rights movement, a significant aspect of the transformed Crimean Tatar frame became anti-totalitarianism, and advocacy of democratization of the Soviet Union. On 20 May 1969, the Crimean Tatars wrote the first letter of the Crimean Tatar initiative groups on human rights in the USSR. Mustafa Cemilev joined the first formal Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the Soviet Union as one of 15 members (Reddaway 1998, 228). Reşat Cemilev and Mustafa Cemilev later were among the 8 people who protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia in Red

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103 When he was finally released he was under house arrest in Tashkent and later exiled to Yakutistan, and when he tried to return to Crimea he was put again under house arrest in Yangiyul. In 1979, he petitioned to relinquish Soviet citizenship.
Square, and this was added among Mustafa Cemilev’s crimes against the Soviet state in his 1970 trial (*Shest Dnei*, 1980). Mustafa Cemilev also protested the invasion of Afghanistan, and was tried for that in 1983.

The Crimean Tatar diaspora settled in New York, Turkey, West Germany, and other places contributed to the publicity of the case of the Crimean Tatars and Mustafa Cemilev, through their publications, lobbying and mass protests. The extradition of Ayşe Seytmuratova to the United States contributed to the revitalization of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities outside the Soviet Union, bringing them immense information about the situation of their co-ethnics and their struggle (Altan 2006; Aydın 2000).  

3.4.6. Resonance of the transformed frame:

Support for the Leninist Crimean Tatar frame and strategies declined as can be understood with the fall in the number of signatures under the petitions. While more than 120,000 signatures were sent to the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Union, only 60,000 signatures were sent to the Twenty-fourth, 20,000 were sent to the Twenty-fifth, and only 4,000 to the Twenty-sixth. Instead the Crimean Tatars concentrated their energies on attempting to return to Crimea and settling there despite the measures of authorities.

As explained above, the young generation of the Crimean Tatars emerged as the leadership stratum propagating a transformed frame. In the first level of frame *production*, this time, there was Reşat Cemilev, Ayşe Seytmuratova, Rollan Kadiyev, and Mustafa Cemilev. The elders, and former first strata, moved to the second strata with the writers and artists. The proponents of the transformed Crimean Tatar frame did not make a formal closed

104See Chapter 5.
clique. Most of them consulted often with the elders, and shielded them against government aggression by taking the responsibility for nationalist acts.

The elders sustained the first frame, which Uehling described as “a concern with continued Leninist nationalities policy” in the Crimean Tatar movement (Uehling, 2004, p.141). Therefore even in 1983, they were writing to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, in a manner close to their 1957 standpoint:

We listened with great satisfaction to your program speech at the November Plenym CC CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]... in the ceremonial meeting for the 60th anniversary of the foundation of USSR. All these are inspiring in us a great belief and hope for the triumph of justice, that is, our nation will be returned to its own national homeland-Crimea, and will be established with equal rights with all nations in the USSR. Lenin, the party and the Soviet government taught us not to reconcile with injustice... Our many applications to party...did not get attention. We are applying to you...with the request:
Return the Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland-Crimea. Establish national justice on the basis of the decree ...from 18 October 1921, signed by V.I. Lenin.105 (Deportavani 2004, 363)

Timur Dağcı, who contributed the creation of the first Crimean Tatar frame, stated that:

... if we joined with Mustafa and Reşat, we would all be against the government...Our hearts were always with them, but to their face we said ‘don’t behave this way’. The Soviet government also profiled us as ‘the Crimean Tatars who had a favorable opinion of the state’ and them as ‘the opponents of the government’. It was obvious that they wanted to destroy the regime. Our purpose was different although we also did not like the government. We said “don’t get us into trouble, don’t spoil our plan”. In the end, Mustafa and Reşat did good things, and contributed a lot. When Perestroika came, it became possible to work together.106

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106 Timur Dağcı, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, Simferopol.
There was not necessarily unanimity in everything. Mustafa Cemilev, Ayşe Seytmutatova, Eldar Sabanov, and Reşat Cemilev were close to human rights defenders in the Soviet Union. Refat Gocenov had a more flexible relationship with the government. Yurii Osmanov adapted the idea of fulfillment of historical injustice within the framework of Lenin’s national politics and Lenin’s autonomy (Bekirova 2004, 161). After all, individual frames are never completely identical. The difference between a frame and a formal organization is that a frame provides general guidelines for behavior, but does not have much control on individual behavior in the way a formal organization has. Although the tactics the movement privileged differed from leader to leader, all leaders were all able to agree on basic points in their common frame, such as return, sovereignty, and democracy for the most of the time.

What about the resonance of this frame at the grass-roots level? The following is an example of an ordinary Crimean Tatar appealing to bystander targets for frame alignment. As we learn from KGB information, in 1966, an ordinary Crimean Tatar named M. Osmanov wrote a letter, to famous Soviet writer B. Antonenko-Davidovich, in which he said:

…What did I get from life? What awaits my children? I have three sons. My children often come from school crying because they are called “traitors”. 22 years passed, and we are still traitors. Where are Lenin’s politics? And why did they talk about national rights in the 20th Congress? Dear Boris Dmitrievich, can you as a writer explain [me] anything about that? I heard how just and progressive a writer you are and that is why I am writing to you…

Although this Crimean Tatar still refer to the previous Leninist frame, he at the same time expressed that he lost his belief in that. He became cynical of the system, and that is

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107 İzzet Hayirov, Interview by author, 13 April 2006, Simferopol. He stated : “We, Tatars always argued fervently with each other, when we were in Central Asia, just like we do now. Don’t think it was a better time in terms of internal peace than today.”

why he appealed to an objective third party. The writer expressed his support and
couragement for the Crimean Tatars in his response. He characterized the Crimean Tatars
as “the real owners of the Crimea” It seems that the writer, as a member of the bystander
public (general population) also identified with the Crimean Tatar frame.

According to other information from the KGB, on 25 July 1967, on a touristic trip
between Yalta and Sivastopol, the guide Vorontsov was asked a question about the Crimean
Tatars, to which he answered that in the period of the Fatherland War, the Crimean Tatars
betrayed the fatherland, and for that they were exiled to Central Asia. In this trip, there were
also two Crimean Tatars who came to Yalta for their vacations. One of them named, who
identified himself as Azizov, interrupted and stated that on 21 July, the Crimean Tatar
representative in Moscow was received by Andropov and Georgadze, who announced that
the Crimean Tatars will be politically rehabilitated and a decree was under way, which
means that the return of the Crimean Tatars is still an open question. These two examples
from the non-leader Crimean Tatars’ actions demonstrated that the Crimean Tatar movement
was not directed by an organization, but that the internalization of frames turned each
Crimean Tatar into a participant of the movement through their micro-resistance to the
system, and micro attempts to counter-frame the regime while going about their lives. The
interrupting Crimean Tatars must have put in the minds of the participants of the trip an
alternative interpretation of the truth, though not necessarily persuading them on that point.

Alekseeva (1985), and Guboglo and Chervonnaya (1992) described the 1970s as a
decline in the movement as there were no longer any mass protests, mass signature
campaigns, or dynamic initiative group activities. Özcan (2002) noted that it was mostly

povernennia 2004,115)
elites through their continuous civil disobedience in preparing samizdat and resulting court processes that maintained the movement. He also underlined the sociological changes in the Crimean Tatar society, as settlements became less concentrated in urban centers close to the factories where they had worked, and they began to buy larger houses in the countryside as their economic situation gradually improved (Özcan 2002). Based on these observations I do not conclude that resonance of the transformed frame was low. Rüstem Hayali and Gülnara Bekirova (2004) pointed out the new forms the movement took. In accordance with the new frame instead of the older form of the movement such as mass demonstrations, newer forms such as individual returns to Crimea took place in the late 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, a more widespread example of resonance of the new frame among the lower strata of the Crimean Tatars was massively increased individual return to Crimea disobeying the state officials, rather than large demonstrations or the number of signatures collected.

After the 1967 edict, the Crimean Tatar families began to immigrate to Crimea. Bekir Osmanov, Muksim Osmanov, and Reşat Osmanov called for Tatars’ to re-settle Crimea by building tents if necessary (Bekirova 2004, 141). They planned to open Tatar national schools and mosques, and re-create their national autonomy. On 26 May 1968, 98 Crimean Tatars built tents in Marino, Simferopol. The regime applied certain bureaucratic tactics such as creating the requirement of “residence permits,” when Crimean Tatars attempted to settle in Crimea. The Crimean authorities were ordered not to issue “residence permits,” and the local authorities were ordered not to issue “passports” to make an exit from Uzbekistan for the Crimean Tatars. Those who violated this newly instituted Crimea “passport regime” were sent to court.110 As a result, on 26 June 1968, the repatriates approached Crimean authorities

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110 According to Cemilev, between 1967 and 1968 more than 300 Crimean Tatars were convicted for violating the passport regime. (Jemilev [Cemilev] 2003, 19)
protesting the government’s refusal to provide residence permits (*Propiska*). 11 people were arrested, the Crimean Tatars began a hunger strike and several Crimean Tatars in this period received terms of 1 to 3 years (Bekirova 2004, 121). Next, the regime promoted anti-Tatar attitudes among the local Crimeans by threatening them with punishment if they helped the Crimean Tatars. The authorities also ordered enterprises in Crimea not to offer jobs to Crimean Tatars. Finally, forceful eviction by the militia, fire brigades or local public order squads, who were sometimes composed of those convicted of minor crimes, began to be implemented to prevent Crimean Tatar repatriation. These re-deportations were sometimes carried out with cruelty, property was broken or stolen, and even children were injured (Cemilev, 18). According to Cemilev (19), in 1968 alone, over ten thousand Crimean Tatars who had returned were re-deported. Some families were re-deported several times but they returned each time and continued to struggle for the right to live in their homeland (Bekirova 2004, 121). Some of them did not return to the places of exile in Central Asia but rather settled close to Crimea in the Kherson and the Zaporozhia regions of Ukraine and Krasnodarskii Krai of the Russian Federation, where they also formed the very dynamic initiative groups (Cemilev, 20). Bekirova emphasizes that those who returned to Crimea are nameless heroes of Crimean Tatar history.\footnote{Dilara Seitvelieva’s story of attempts of resettling (Bekirova 2004, 189).} The extent of the tragedy of re-deportation was best appreciated by the event that Musa Mamut a 46 year-old Crimean Tatar to set himself on fire in front of his three children and the Soviet officials who came to evict his family once again after having re-deported them several times. Mamut had also been imprisoned for two years previously. The sight of Mamut in flames running after the Soviet officials in his garden had been an unforgettable image for the Crimean Tatars, which entrenched their anti-
Soviet frame. Later the account of Mamut’s death by Reşat Cemilev was published as *samizdat* and *tamizdat* under the title *Jivoi Fakel’* and in English, *Human Torch*.

The return accelerated in 1975, and 337 Crimean Tatars were sent to court (Özcan 2002, 180). However, by 1978, 10,000 Crimean Tatars managed to settle in Crimea. Consequently, with an unpublished decree in 1978, forcible re-deportations increased as the Crimean police were given the authority to deport Crimean Tatars. After 1978, Crimean Tatar return stopped, and the houses they bought but that could not be registered, were taken from the Crimean Tatars, and given to Kolkhozes (Özcan 2002, 188). Uzbekistan also did not erase the residence permits of the Crimean Tatars to make it impossible for them to get another one in Crimea (Özcan 2002, 189). Between November 1978 and February 1979, about 60 families were re-deported, and in 1980 there were only 60 families left of 700 who managed to return to Crimea between 1967 and 1978 (Reddaway 1998, 229). After 1979, in addition to the cessation of individual return to Crimea, less Crimean Tatars were imprisoned, which caused some to conclude that the movement entered into a quiet phase. In fact, in the late 1970s, the human rights movement also suffered under heavy repression, therefore it could not publicize the Crimean Tatar activities (Reddaway 1998, 229). In 1983, the Crimean Tatars published the information bulletin of the initiative group in the name of Musa Mamut. Also, the funerals of veterans Bekir Osmanov in Crimea (May 1983) and Cebbar Akimov in Uzbekistan (July 1983) turned into political demonstrations (Bekirova 2004, 163).

The Soviet regime not only attempted to stop individual returns to Crimea, and repress activists by keeping them continuously in prison in the 1970s, but also it attempted a limited master frame transformation. For the new Crimean Tatar frame was not as easily
ignored as the previous one, As the Crimean Tatar frame became increasingly resonant both among the Crimean Tatars and Soviet and Western general populations by its strong challenge to the master frame of Soviet communism. Maintaining an ideological hegemony was very important for the Soviet regime. The Soviet Union modified its master frame by incorporating elements of the Crimean Tatar frame, without accepting it as a whole.

The first modification of master frame was Organabor, or “organized selection.” According to this policy, the regime aimed to convince the Crimean Tatars that the state would return the Crimean Tatars in an organized manner, applying a yearly quota to ensure that the returning individuals were easily integrated into the economic system and society in Crimea. Therefore instead of trying to return under their own volition, they should wait for the state to return them patiently. This builds on the Soviet argument that collective return would not be expedient for the Crimean and Soviet economy and inter-ethnic peace and harmony, but also recognized that the deportation of most of the Crimean Tatars was unjust. Therefore, the Soviet state proposed to return the Crimean Tatars gradually, and individually instead of quickly and collectively as Crimean Tatars had demanded.

Organabor began in 1968, and at first it created great hope among the Crimean Tatars. Hayirov remembers many Crimean Tatars gathered to say farewell with traditional costumes, songs and dances to those families leaving Uzbekistan under Organabor.112 However, it soon became apparent that the authorities would only return uneducated, manual laborers, who did not participate in the national movement, sign the petitions or donate to representatives in Moscow (Özcan 2002, 145). Those types of Crimean Tatars were rare, and it meant that most could not hope to return according to this policy. Still, with Organabor by 1972 there were 3496 Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The status of Crimean Tatars who returned

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112 İzzet Hayirov, Interview by author, 13 April 2006, Simferopol.
by *Orgnabor* was recorded as “immigrant” in their passports and their children were registered in Russian schools (Özcan 2002, 146). This made it apparent that the government had a completely different conceptualization of the return of the Crimean Tatars, that is, the government hoped to assimilate them within the dominant Russian culture without providing national rights, let alone national autonomy. In their petitions to authorities, the Crimean Tatars argued that the collective return problem of Crimean Tatars could not be addressed with *Orgnabor*. They stated that in addition to manual laborers, they also wanted intellectuals, disabled people and pensioners to be returned to Crimea (Özcan 2002, 147). They also contacted Crimean Tatars who settled under *Orgnabor* and asked them to write petitions for collective settlement in Crimea, settlement of Tatars in the southern shore and the capital-city, and the right to bring their close relatives. Those “uneducated, un-political” Crimean Tatars complied, and actively supported the collective return of the rest of the Crimean Tatars (Bekirova 2004, Özcan 2002, 147). This demonstrated that even though they were not activists, they identified with the Crimean Tatar collective return frame. The regime did not achieve its goal of dividing the movement by creating status distinctions among the Crimean Tatars. It seems that the regime wanted to break frame *coherence* within the movement, by convincing some that *Orgnabor* was a more viable solution than immediate collective return. *Orgnabor* stopped in 1978, but the movement frame continued to be valid, as people resumed the return to Crimea in 1986 when Gorbachev announced his move to democratization, and the police stopped forcibly re-deporting those returning.\footnote{\textit{Orgnabor} was revived again in 1986, when the return to Crimea again went out of control of the authorities (Özcan 2002).}

Another modification of master frame was creating national autonomy for the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan. National autonomy in Crimea was the second major demand...
of the Crimean Tatars, and by creating autonomy for them in Uzbekistan, the regime aimed to weaken the charge that the Soviet regime intended to erode the Crimean Tatar national identity and assimilate them into Crimean society. “In this attempt…the authorities had shown that they accepted the wish for compact settlement” (Allworth 1998, 200). This attempt was also consistent with the Soviet frame of integrating the Crimean Tatars in places of exile.

The regime first attempted to strengthen the ties of Crimean Tatars to the places of exile by offering incentives. They placed the Crimean Tatars in higher status positions. They placed 128 Crimean Tatars in local government, 8 as deputies of the High Soviet, 861 as deputies of local Soviets, and more than 1800 in various party positions (Bekirova 2004, 153). In 1974, in Jizzax, oblast of Uzbekistan, the position of first secretary was given to Crimean Tatar Seytmemet Tairov and other important posts of the oblast were given to the Crimean Tatars as well. However, autonomy outside Crimea did not interest the Crimean Tatars, so Tairov was transferred to the Ministry of Forestry. The Crimean Tatars joked that since Tairov could not make the Crimean Tatars take root in Uzbekistan, now he was charged with making the plants take root (Bekirova 2004, 155).

In the early 1980s, the regime attempted to create a semi-autonomous region of Mubarek and later Baharistan (both rayons) in Qashkadarya oblast of Uzbekistan for the Crimean Tatars. In these regions, the Crimean Tatars would be in government positions, and they would have cultural and educational institutions, as in the former Crimean ASSR (Özcan 2002, 190). All subjects would be taught in the Crimean Tatar language (Allworth 1998, 200). All of the 1983 graduates of the Department of Tatar Language and Literature of Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical Institute were assigned to Mubarek and Baharistan. The
regime trusted their collaboration since there were no schools teaching the Crimean Tatar language in Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{114} The Crimean Tatar graduates of vocational schools and other universities were also directed to these underdeveloped, and under-populated regions of Uzbekistan. The authorities even began to publish two local newspapers in Crimean Tatar, \textit{Dostluq} and \textit{Baharistan Aqiqati} in Mubarek between 1980 and 1987, which wrote propaganda for moving Crimean Tatars into the region. (Kırımlı 1989) They planned to bring the national dance troupe, \textit{Lenin Bayrağı} to the region. However both Mubarek and Baharistan were practically desert (despite their refreshing names which mean “sacred” and “spring land”) and Mubarek was only one-fifth of the size of the Crimean peninsula (Özcan 2002, 190). They named the streets Yalta, Bahçesaray, and so on. İsmail Kerimov asks, “How convincing can a Yalta in the middle of a desert be?”\textsuperscript{115} Only 2000 Crimean Tatars were convinced to settle in the area. “In the face of great pressure openly and indirectly applied to them, the Crimean Tatar graduating students refused to become the vanguard of the resettlement project…the students explained that they meant to settle only in the Crimean homeland” (Allworth 1998, 200). According to Allworth, “this incident revealed very much about the coherence of the Crimean Tatar community.” (Allworth 1998, 200).

\textbf{3.4.7. Soviet master frame transformation and return:}

The last round of the Crimean Tatar struggle for return took place between 1985 and 1994, during which the resonance of their transformed frame increased among the Crimean

\textsuperscript{114}The department established in 1970 meant to educate teachers for Crimean Tatar classes in primary and secondary schools, but since there were not any such schools, they were compelled to teach Russian to earn their living (Allworth 1998, 199, and İsmail Kerimov, Interview by author, Simferopol, 15 May 2006 ). Five or six schools instituted optional Crimean Tatar classes, but lack of Crimean Tatar textbooks and other aids in their native language was a significant drawback (Allworth 1998, 199).

\textsuperscript{115}İsmail Kerimov. Interview by author, 15 May 2006, Simferopol.
Tatar people. The Crimean Tatars counter-framed effectively and actively against the weakened Soviet frame, and registered the support of not only the dissidents but also the general public and emerging civil society to their own frame. Eventually, the master framewas also transformed to recognize the Crimean Tatar frame. While the transformation of the Soviet master frame was due to many factors, the Crimean Tatar framing effort was effective in determining how the change in master frame would influence the Crimean Tatar case. The Crimean Tatars finally persuaded the Soviet state of their version of the truth, of the absolute necessity of their collective return, and re-building of their national autonomy. Unlike the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Meskhetian Turks and other deported small nationalities could not reach their desired outcomes due to their inability to maintain resonance of their own people and their inability to convince the Soviet state, public, and international society about their proposal of solutions, though they also faced injustices as great as the Crimean Tatars.

After Gorbachev announced glasnost’, the Soviet master frame began to be challenged widely. According to Suny:

Faith in the socialist project had been long eradicated among the educated people, but the subversive power of new criticism undermined what was left of the authority and influence of the party apparatus. Glasnost’ eliminated within a few years the privileged position of Marxism-Leninism and the rewriting of Soviet history moved back in time beyond the permitted critique of Stalinism into a fundamental rereading of Lenin’s revolution. (Suny 1993, 140)

Like Khrushchev, Gorbachev’s announced return to Lenin’s policy on the “national question,” signaled an emerging window of opportunity for national movements (Suny 1993, 155). After the surprisingly soft reaction of the regime to the Kazak riots in 1986, mass national movements emerged in Transcaucasia, the Baltics, Moldavia, Ukraine and
Belorussia (Suny 1993, 141). The Crimean Tatars already began to feel the restraint of “the kind of physical force that had forged the empire and preserved it for seven decades” (Suny 1993, 142). After the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, Mustafa Cemilev was finally released after 15 years of imprisonment (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 131). Yuri Osmanov, another leader was also released from the psychiatric hospital. The court processes against the Crimean Tatars decreased too, the last one being held in 1987.

To take the opportunity brought by *glasnost*’ and to further push democratization, the Crimean Tatars held the first all-union meetings of Crimean Tatar initiative groups on 11-12 April, 1987 in Tashkent (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 133). They composed a collective letter to Gorbachev repeating their *democratic collective return* frame and elected 16 representatives to meet him. The resonance of the movement greatly increased in this period. They once again collected large number of signatures and elected more than a thousand delegates to demonstrate in Moscow in the event that their attempt was ignored (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 133). The massive delegation of 800 people arrived in Moscow on June 20, 1987 and increased to 1500 by the end of July (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 134). Bekir Umerov and other Crimean Tatars began hunger strikes. They carried out the biggest meeting in Red Square in Soviet history. This was handled with surprising indulgence, and the demonstrations were also supported by some Muscovites. The regime seemed more flexible this time since the Gromyko Commission, the first official body to discuss minority demands, convened. The Crimean Tatars increased their pressure and they proclaimed 26 July as a deadline for the Commission to make a positive decision. They organized demonstrations in numerous locations, including Moscow, throughout the month, and held a twenty-four hour sit-in on 25 July asking to meet Gromyko.
In the era of *glasnost’*, Soviet civil society began to emerge. In their letter to Gorbachev, in addition to their usual demands, the Crimean Tatars demanded “permission to publish in central and local press letters and appeals of the Crimean Tatars and other citizens on the Crimean Tatar question, that is to observe in full measure the proclaimed principle of expansion of *glasnost’* also in relations to our national problems” (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 214-216). This way they aimed to propagate their frame to the general public and increase its resonance. More than one thousand Crimean Tatar delegates in Moscow were very active and visited newspapers, journals, artist unions, writers, famous intellectuals, and human rights defenders seeking to *transform* their individual frames with respect to the Crimean Tatar question and *align* with the Crimean Tatar collective return frame.

Consequently, the representatives of the newly emerging civil society, academics, Soviet intelligentsia, and even democratically inclined government officials, apart from dissidents, expressed the need to address the Crimean Tatar issue (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 131-132). Bystanders (the general public) increasingly identified with the Crimean Tatar frame, as would become clear from their support of demonstrations by Crimean Tatars in Moscow and the letters to the Soviet government. Here is one example:

I am aware that at the moment in the Presidium of High Soviet of USSR, considers the question of granting the Crimean Tatars right to peacefully live and work in the land of their fathers, grandfathers, great grandfathers in Crimea. The Crimean Tatars were deeply insulted with the unjust accusation…violently deported from their…land. This was done without taking into consideration that many Crimean Tatars heroically fought against fascism on the front while their …families nothing to be blamed for were kicked out of their born homes…not permitting Crimean Tatars to return constitutes violation of their constitutional rights and conflicts with humanitarian values… When individual families of the Crimean Tatars obtained permission to return, later they were again kicked out…we must from now on stop this anti-humanist relationship to our rightful members of our Soviet, and give them possibility to live and work where their hearts and memories of their hearts say. I think their

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116 The Crimean Tatars began to openly communicate with the embassies of several countries.
return will contribute flowering of Crimea and friendship of nations in our country. (8 Iyunya 1987, Evgenii Evtushenko) ¹¹⁷

Yet, the regime’s resistance was not broken yet. As a response to increased Crimean Tatar activism, the regime once again counter-framed with a TASS announcement in July 1987. The TASS announcement added more false accusations to the previous accusations of the Crimean Tatars. The regime argued that the deportation:

Was motivated by the collaboration of a part of the Tatar population with German fascist occupationists. Truly…Muslim congress was founded by which a Crimean government headed by Khan Bilal Asanov was formed…Crimean Tatar self-defense units were formed…attacked partisan bases…with the participation of the Crimean Tatar nationalists killed 86,000 peaceful residents of Crimea…Crimean Tatar battalions made stoves…in which they burned living people round-the-clock. It is hard to escape those facts.

After these new false accusations, the TASS Announcement repeats the Soviet frame crystallized in the 1967 edict:

However, unfortunately…the decision…about deportation of the Crimean Tatar population from Crimea involved not only the traitors …but all Crimean Tatar population. In any case…[this] is unjust, especially when thousands actively participated in warring situations against fascist occupationists…the decree on 5 September 1967, wholly established their constitutional rights…From then on more than a thousand Crimean Tatars were settled in Crimea…It must be taken into account that in Crimea a situation completely different than the pre-war situation was created. Therefore, the question at hand must be analyzed with an understanding of the real, more complex situation, in the interest of all nations of the country…attempts to fire up passions…hardly can help a solution…In these conditions, appeals to foreign public opinion does not look constructive-and such pressure is inappropriate … commission requires definite time for work, and its conclusions will be published.” (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 219-221)

The Crimean Tatars in return counter-framed in an open protest letter to TASS. The Crimean Tatars, first did not agree with the history presented by TASS, pointing out the disinformation, and provocative nature of the presentation. They argued that only a few members of the Muslim committees;

… cannot represent the Crimean Tatar people, who never elected them. There was not such a Khan Bilal Asanov or such a congress…not one resident of Crimea heard about this…which constitutes purposeful disinformation and crime against the whole Crimean Tatar nation…From which source, the population of Crimean Tatar voluntary battalions are learned …and that they were composed of Crimean Tatars? …these were composed of war captives…including various nationalities, which the living witnesses of those years among our representatives, who are in Moscow could ascertain…warring sections of volunteers were formed …under the administration of occupationist powers, and not by personalities of Crimean Tatar nationality…the most unbelievable accusation is holding the Crimean Tatars responsible for the annihilation of Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Greeks and Gypsies- those brotherly nations, with whom the Crimean Tatars lived in peace for centuries…Who wants this, and to which purpose does this accusation serve? What type of friendship of nations can we talk of after this kind of falsification of history?... TASS announcement does not only not answer the expectations of our people, but also makes its relation with other brotherly nations more difficult…We demand our open protest to be published in the newspaper, which published the TASS announcement.” (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 221-223)

They underlined that the Simferopol court on war crimes also concluded that there were only two Crimean Tatars among the criminals who were composed of different nationalities. “In the materials of that trial nobody mentioned any ‘stoves,’ “in which living people were burned round-the-clock.” They pointed out that while TASS gave the number of those citizens killed by the occupationists, it is silent about “the annihilation of 87 Crimean Tatar villages” by the Nazis. Most significantly, they protested the attempt to create a shadow of ambiguity as to who is responsible for the Crimean Tatar suffering: “If the ‘severe conditions of war, actual situation in Crimea, mood of those times’ were to blame, then what kind of mood prevents today to restore justice?” In a statement of the participants
of a following meeting in Yangiyul, participants emphasize “the attempt to vindicate what is perpetrated against our people” with the phrase of “severe conditions of war, actual situation in Crimea, mood of those times” and warn Gromyko commission not to take the “chauvinist position” of the TASS announcement, and call for “healthy powers” in the country to provide support against the “provocators” in TASS (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 223-224). The TASS Announcement caused the elder communists, who were loyal to a Leninist frame to openly criticize the communist regime as well:

In 1952, a decree was proclaimed…called for orders of Stalin to revise in historical “science” the role of Turkic and other non-Slavic nations in the history of “Russian steppes and Russian Black Sea region” That decree, until today remains fundamental document for the continuation of falsification of the history of Crimea and its indigenous (korenniy) population, the Crimean Tatars…they banned us to name ourselves Crimean Tatars, and did not recognize this ethnonym in the time of census of the population. And when new people entered into Politbureau…they let us to be called Crimean Tatars as before the war. We still have hope that we will get into the next census…In the 1926 census in our country there were 194 ethnonyms, in the 1979 census 101 nationalities were named. Where did 93, almost half of them go? One is found- the Crimean Tatars. What happened to the others? V.I. Lenin warned that “sliianie” should take place itself. One should not rush or force the process…The reason for Crimean Tatars’ not settling in Mubarek is “nothing ties us to that land. Beginning from 1944 they beat us…if we raised the question of homeland, not permitting us to cry, to mourn about that… We cannot explain the reaction of partisans of Crimea to TASS Announcement…” (Deportavani Krims’ki Tatari, Bolgari, Virmeni, Greki, Nimtsi (1917-1991) Dokumenti. Fakti. Svidcheniia. 2004, 401-402)

As it became obvious with the preceding TASS Announcement, the Gromyko Commission did not extend the master frame to include the key Crimean Tatar demands. “It failed to provide unequivocal condemnation of the 1944 deportation and made no mention of restoring the designation Crimean Tatar” either (Wilson 1998, 282) According to Lazzerini (1990) this time the regime was more afraid that granting the Crimean Tatar demands would produce an undesirable effect in other ethnically contested areas and that it could also cause
problems within Crimea itself. As a result, the Crimean Tatars continued to be penalized for the violation of the passport system still in 1988 in Crimea.

However, the authorities extended the master frame as before (i) by implementing slow, selective, and individual return by Orgnabor, instead of collective return and (ii) by multiplying cultural rights in the places of exile, and in Crimea instead of national autonomy in Crimea. The authorities rejuvenated Orgnabor again in 1988, and 300 families were settled to Crimea by the government (Bekirova 2004, 243). Courses teaching the Crimean Tatar language were instituted in Crimea in addition to schools in Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Teacher-training programs were designed. A Department of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature was established at the Simferopol State University in Crimea. Several textbooks were compiled in Tashkent and Kiev. Radio and television programmes expanded in Uzbekistan and were introduced in Tadzhikistan. The Dostluq newspaper in Crimean Tatar began as a supplement to the Krymskaya Pravda. A non-Tatar newspaper in Cankoy (a city in northern Crimea with dense Crimean Tatar population) began to publish excerpts from the Crimean Tatar newspaper, Lenin Bayrağı. Many Crimean Tatar figures were rehabilitated. ‘Crimean Tatar’ was again recognized as an ethnic identifier (Lazzerini 1990).

The modification of a master frame by these measures was not sufficient for the Crimean Tatars. They pushed for the transformation of the master frame to recognize their democratic collective return frame. Between January-April 1988 mass demonstrations of the Crimean Tatars continuously took place in Krasnodar Krai, Uzbekistan, Crimea, and Novorossisk. (Bekirova 2004, 243). The authorities tried to take measures against demonstration but in practice could not stop them (Bekirova 2004, 244). On 23-24 April 1988, in Tashkent, the 4th All-Union meeting of representatives of initiative groups took
place. In the words of Cemilev, they made decisions for applying tactics of meetings and
demonstrations instead of writing petitions (Bekirova 2004, 246). The Crimean Tatar
National Movement Organization (Qırım Milliy Areket Teşkilatı) emerged in the 5th All-
Union Congress of Crimean Tatar initiative groups on 20 April and 2 May 1989.
Cemilev was elected as the head of the organization. This organization was based on the
transformed frame, as it emphasized the significance of civil disobedience, and propagated
the Crimean Tatar cause domestically and internationally through a biweekly periodical of
the organization. The resonance of this new frame was apparent in the increase of the number
of people who returned to Crimea. In March 1988, only 1000 Crimean Tatars could register
in Crimea. In 1989, the number of Crimean Tatars reached 50,000 in Crimea.

The master frame transformation118 came with the semi-democratic elections to the
re-created Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, the representative and legislative organ of
the Soviet government, previously eliminated by Stalin. The Crimean Tatars applied to this
newly emerging parliament of the Soviet Union, which had several democrat members. On
14 November 1989, the new Soviet parliament formally condemned the deportation
declaring that:

\[
\text{... without condition, forceful exile of the nationalities is the heaviest crime against}
\text{international law and humanistic principle of socialist order. USSR High Soviet}
\text{guarantees that human rights and humanist principles of the state will not be repeated.}
\text{...USSR High Soviet declares it necessary to take the measures to return the rights of}
\text{the oppressed Soviet nationalities.}^{119}
\]

The Soviet of Nationalities of High Soviet of USSR also issued the decree that decided:

\footnotesize

118 The legacy of the dissident movement, including the Crimean Tatar movement played a significant role in
master frame transformation. (Horvath 2005, 5)

119 Vedomosti Verhovnovo Soveta SSSR. -1989.- no. 23.-S. 607. (Cf Krims’ki tatari: Shliakh do povernennia
2004, 165)
…To pay attention to central, republican, and local organs of power to undertake and determine work related to return of the Crimean Tatars to the Crimean oblast as soon as possible. Together with that, it should be gradually resolved the problems of apportionment for this purpose of financial means and material-technical resources, additional market funds for wood and construction materials…[It is ordered] to establish a state commission for the problem of the Crimean Tatars with Soviet ministers of the Ukraine, …in participation with representative of the Crimean Tatar nation to complete… preparation of a union-republican state program for return of the Crimean Tatars…the Crimean oblast Soviet of National Deputies and local Soviets of the oblast must continue work for determination of ..land grants for construction of houses, resolution of problems of registration, organization …of work places, construction of conditions for development of national-cultural aspects of the Crimean Tatar nation. … the Crimean oblast Soviet of National Deputies, with the help of societal organizations of Crimean Tatar people widely undertaking organizational and explanatory work so that the return of Crimean Tatars…will begin with good terms…It is recommended that… the organs of mass information regularly inform the public about the process… The Soviet of Nationalities of High Soviet of USSR appeal to the population of Crimea to demonstrate understanding and patience …resolve problems with good will and mutual respect…

The regime declared that the difficulties or complexity of the Crimean Tatar return cannot be reasons for rejecting their return. This means that all legal and bureaucratic obstacles against the return of the Crimean Tatars are removed. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya, 1992). According to Wilson (1998, 283), however, “by then Tatars were increasingly taking matters in their own hands as the declining powers of the Soviet state opened floodgates to mass return to Crimea.” Wilson provides a table showing how the number of new arrivals rose during 1990-1992, and he argues that the rapidly rising travel costs slowed the flow after 1993.

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120 Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR. -1990.- no. 46.- S. 1215-1216. (Cf Krims’ki Tatari: Shliakh do poverennia 2004, 166-167)
The Crimean Tatars could not attain the state sponsored collective return that they demanded, but this was mostly due to the unforeseen structural changes, such as the collapse of the authority of the Soviet state. The state formed a commission to provide limited material assistance to help the Crimean Tatars’ organized return (July 1991). According to the plan prepared by this commission, in the first stage the state will organize return by resolving the problems of infrastructure, accommodation, social-cultural environment, and economic development. In the second stage individuals will return by their own means, without state sponsorship. In the third stage, the collectivities will return and form villages or neighborhoods (Guboglo and Chervonnaya, 1992). According to Wilson, by the time a council of the minister’s decree was declared and a commission was convened to organize return to Crimea, the Soviet centre greatly lost its capabilities (Wilson 1998, 283) and in July 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR the commission also dissolved. This created a situation in which the Crimean Tatar return could not take a state organized and sponsored form.

The second Crimean Tatar demand, national autonomy in Crimea could not be attained due to dissolution of the Soviet Union, and emergence of a totally different geopolitical situation. Partly as a response to accelerating the Crimean Tatar return and re-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Census</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Month of Return</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979 (Soviet Census)</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>132,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1988</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>August 1991</td>
<td>142,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 (Soviet Census)</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1990</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>257,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1991</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Figure 8. The Number of Crimean Tatars in Crimea, 1979-1994 (Wilson 1998, 282)*
establishment of possible claims to Crimean Tatar sovereignty, after a referendum, the Ukrainian High Soviet approved re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR on 12 February 1991. After decades of lobbying for the establishment of the Crimean ASSR, the Crimean Tatars rejected this cynical move to establish this republic as a Russian-dominated one with no recognition whatsoever of Crimean Tatar national sovereignty. The returning Crimean Tatars boycotted the elections for the Crimean High Soviet on 22 March 1991 arguing that these developments were against the Ukrainian constitution. In August 1991 Gorbachev was toppled by a coup d’État and on 1 December 1991, Ukraine declared independence. 73,981 Crimean Tatars, who could receive Ukrainian citizenship with the law 13 November 1991 overwhelmingly voted for Ukrainian independence. (Their reasons will be discussed later.)

Despite the major structural changes which made obtaining their goals more difficult, the existence of the Crimean Tatar collective return frame enabled the Crimean Tatars to take the initiative in their hands completely, and return collectively, utilizing the void of authority in the political transition process, and to organize settlement. There were 157,862 Crimean Tatars by 1992. The decisions taken by the Soviet cabinet in 1989 were not implemented by the local Crimean authorities, who began to act independently of the Soviet centre. The Crimean Tatars were not given land plots or empty houses, as suggested by the government commission. They invaded the empty plots and established Tent Villages while Crimean security forces tried to prevent their squatting by brutal force. The Crimean Tatars continued to flow to their homeland and reached 250,000 people, that is, half of the Crimean Tatars in exile, by 1994. After 1994, the window of opportunity was closed in a way, and the Crimean Tatar return slowed down.
3.4.8. Movement consequences and conclusion:

This chapter studied how the Crimean Tatar movement emerged, and developed in exile and ended its phase of exile by returning to the homeland collectively and re-asserting national autonomy in the homeland. Can the Crimean Tatar movement in exile be regarded as successful in reaching its goals? The Crimean Tatar national movement had two major goals: return to the homeland and the restoration of national autonomy in Crimea. More than half of the population returned to the homeland, while return slowed down after 1994. The collective return was largely undertaken based on community resources, due to dissolution of the Soviet state and emergence of a completely different political context than the one the Crimean Tatars had operated under. The goal of restoration of territorial national autonomy was regarded as more difficult than return, but the authorities came to an understanding that the Crimean Tatars required at the least robust national-cultural rights that would ensure the perpetuation of their national identity, perhaps some form of non-territorial national autonomy. We do not know what could have happened on that front if the Soviet Union survived longer. Whether the post-Soviet context of democratic Ukraine offers a real potential for attainment of this goal of Crimean Tatars is the topic of another chapter, but definitely the Crimean Tatar movement cannot be viewed as having come to an end before the attainment of that goal. All things considered, the Crimean Tatar movement was partly successful in attaining the national goals and limitations were mostly due to unexpected, and grand political changes brought with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The different outcomes are best explained as being the result of divergent historical paths, which were shaped by different framing processes. This community met the goal of mainly because it had a collective return frame different than most of the other communities.
The émigré frames of Turkey and the United states, or territorial nationalism frame in communist Romania never had such a collective goal. In comparison to the sole other case of collective return movement, which was observed in inter-war Romania (examined in chapter 4), the Crimean Tatar movement in the former USSR was more successful in attaining the collective return goal because of the maintenance of collective return goal despite opposite master frame of the Soviet state through effective counter-framing epitomized in heroic struggles with the state authorities despite persecution. The Crimean Tatars were not scared to create an alignment with the democratization and human rights master frame despite this limited the effectiveness of their frame for decades. The survival of the frame until a suitable master frame emerged in the Soviet context, that is glasnost’ and democratization, enabled the collective return. Instead of opposing the Crimean Tatar frame, the new Soviet frame had to support the Crimean Tatar goals. This thesis rejects the simplistic view that the Crimean Tatar returned because the Soviet Union collapsed. The return began before the collapse, or before anyone could guess that the communist state is about to collapse. The discursive power of the Crimean Tatar frame continued even after the collapse as nobody could come up with a reason why the Crimean Tatars should not or ought not to return.

The Crimean Tatar movement in the USSR also had exceptional resonance over a longer period different than the movement in inter-war Romania. This could be explained by higher levels of modernization among the community which made the community more receptive to the nationalist discourse, strong collective memory of deportation which bestowed an empirical credibility on the prognosis and diagnosis of the frame, and cohesive organizational structure.
Although the Soviet state did not permit formal organizational structure, the informal networks and cell-type organizational units included almost all Crimean Tatar individuals. The Crimean Tatar could also organize a systematic self-return due to their cohesive organization, again maintained by highly resonant frame. This enabled the individual Crimean Tatar sacrifice greatly to leave a relatively comfortable, peaceful, and prosperous life in Central Asian settlements and migrate to an unknown life marked with poverty, loss of status, discrimination and physical violence in Crimea.

The push factors in contexts of exile were stronger than inter-war Romania and precipitated collective return. On the one hand, various attempts of the Soviet regime to frame the Crimean Tatars as “having taken root” in contexts of exile had unintended consequence of strengthening the will to return. On the other hand, the Soviet state also continued to discriminate heavily against the Crimean Tatars, not recognizing their ethnic identity, and not providing cultural and language rights in places of settlement, hence the Crimean Tatars became convinced that the maintenance of identity can only take place through collective return and re-establishment of autonomous institutions.

All these aspects underlined paves the way for the classification of this case as exile nationalism, different than diaspora or émigré movements of the Crimean Tatar communities. This issue will be elaborated further in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Crimean Tatar Diaspora Community in Romania

4.1. Introduction:

The Crimean Tatars began to immigrate to Dobruja (coastal region of today’s Romania) and Anatolia after the Russian annexation of Crimea (1783) and the emigration turned into an exodus between 1859 and 1861 when hundreds of thousands Crimean Tatars and Nogays left their homelands. (Kırımlı 2008, 767) The marginalization of the Crimean Tatars with respect to the social, economic, political realms in the Russian-ruled Crimea and the incompatibility of Crimean Tatar religious views with those of the ruling Christian monarch are cited as reasons for emigration. (Kırımlı 1996, Williams 2001) While the Russians did not physically deport the Crimean Tatars, historical sources support that Crimean Tatar emigration was not voluntary. After migrating, the Crimean Tatars did not engage in nationalist mobilization from exile in the Ottoman Empire, nor did they make any collective attempt to return to their ancestral homeland before the 20th century. While maintaining the language, traditions, values, myths, symbols, and memories of Crimea in their compact settlements in Dobruja, the Crimean Tatars were incorporated into the Ottoman system (indeed enjoyed many privileges as a Muslim and militarily well-trained community), enjoyed a degree of autonomy (used their own language, were ruled by their own ethnic leaders, maintained their cultural traditions, prayed in their own mosques) as other communities within the millet system, and developed cordial relations with fellow communities in the Balkans. Until 1878, the Crimean Tatars economically and socially prospered. After Dobruja separated from the Ottoman Empire and became part of newly independent Romania in 1878, the economic, social, political situation of the Crimean Tatars began to deteriorate and a large proportion emmigrated to Turkey. However, a small
percentage has remained in Dobruja until today.\textsuperscript{121} Between 1900 and 1940, this community demonstrated high level of nationalist activity, which I consider the second highest national activity among the diaspora or exile communites of the Crimean Tatars. Had the circumstances been different, this community would have prepared for a collective return to their homeland.

Why and how did nationalism emerge in the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Romania and why did the community mobilize so strongly? Why did this nationalist movement come to an end? The first part of this case study aims to answer that question. After the Second World War and the arrival of communist regime in Romania, the nationalist elites were purged or captured, and Crimean Tatar nationalism was repressed by the regime. However, overt pressures eventually subsided to an extent that provided the Crimean Tatars with adequate opportunity to develop a type of nationalism though without connection to the homeland. What explains the reemergence of nationalism under communist repression and why did it develop in this form? The second part of the case study aims to answer this question.

Another unexpected development of this community came after the dissolution of communism. The community, which was estimated to have assimilated, rejuvenated in the last two decades. Why did nationalism “rise” after the community was declared to have assimilated under communism? If Crimean Tatar nationalist sentiment increased after the fall of communism, why did the community not return to their homeland? Finally, what are the consequences of a century of the Crimean Tatar diaspora movement? The third part of the case study aims to answer these questions. In short, the emergence, development (changes in trajectory), and consequences of diaspora nationalism in Dobruja is the topic of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{121} According to 2002 census, the Crimean Tatars are 24137, and Turks are 32 596 people. However, Tatar organizations estimate the number is around 50, 000, as many Tatars identify themselves as Turks for various reasons.
4.2. Literature Review and Application of Theoretical Framework

4.2.1. Diaspora community before modernization:

The Crimean Tatar community in Romania in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries has been the subject of a relatively small amount of historical research (Karpat 1985, Iordachi, 2002). Karpat and Iordachi focused on the incorporation of Crimean Tatar community within the contemporary state and societal structures (Ottoman and Romanian). The Crimean Tatar migrants’ transnational relations do not figure significantly into these works.

Many Tatars from Crimea also came to Dobruja to visit their family, they sometimes participated in local wrestling tournaments. Ali Bekmambet reports his conversation with his father in 1926. His father said: “Our homeland Crimea is a paradise. Before the Bolshevik takeover, we used to have strong ties with our homeland just like we have ties with Turkey now. They visited us, we visited them. (katnâşmak) After the Bolsheviks came to power, the ways were closed. We became strangers to our kin there.” (Bekmambet, 2001: 26) It seems that until the emergence of the Soviet Union, Tatars community divided their lives among Dobruja, Crimea, and Anatolia. Families were divided among these three territories. The members of different diaspora communities intermarried through these transnational networks. They shared a common language and traditions although they were under the sovereignty of three different states, the Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Romanian Kingdom (and later also Bulgarian Kingdom).
Williams (2001), using Robin Cohen’s ethno-symbolist framework (1997) on
diaspora, suggests the existence of diasporic sentiment in the 19th century among the
Crimean Tatars in Dobruja. Firstly, the Crimean Tatars seemed to have kept their hopes of
re-conquering Crimea, portraying their migration as a temporary retreat. The members of the
Crimean Khans’ dynasty, the Gerays, constantly lobbied in the Ottoman court to start a war
with Russia in 1770s and 1780s. This can be regarded as the first émigré activity of the
Crimean Tatars.

The Crimean Tatars did not give up hope for return through the maintenance of a
myth of homeland, which is characterised as the Green Land, in the national imagination.
They expressed their longing, and their continuing love for their homeland in many songs
such as this:

Some was separated from their belongings some from their loved ones
Farewell, our homeland, we left you
In exile we suffer
We die while crying your name: Homeland, homeland!

The Crimean Tatars maintained the myth of the continuation of fire that families
brought from Crimea. Many families believe that they never let that fire die, symbolizing
the continued presence of the homeland despite their separation. Thirdly, the Crimean Tatar

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123 I thank Dr. Hakan Kırımlı for his comment on this issue.
124 Kimisi maldan ayrılgan hey yar kimisi de candan
Savlukman kal yurdumuz hey yar ayrıldık senden
Gurbet ilerige düşüp hey yar kıynanırımız
Vatan vatan diye biz hey yar can berirmiz (Özenbaşlı 1997)
125 According to Emin Bektöre, this myth emerged from a belief that it brings bad luck to kill the fire totally.
Therefore, the Crimean Tatars did not kill the fire even at night totally but enclosing the fire with dung cake
(“od bastırmak”) In the morning when one removes the dung cake the fire re-emerges as red. (Karakaş 1977: 8) This way it is believed that the fire from the ancestors still continued. (Bektöre 1966) The myth is such that
Crimean Tatars when immigrating from Crimea and then Rumelia, they put their fire in a metal container, and
continued to feed the fire to maintain it, and brought it up to Anatolia. “It is said that my grandmother brought
her Crimean fire to Anatolia. I also heard that Necmiye Arbatlı’s mother Zuleyha brought her own fire which
was given to her when she was married from Romania to Turkey and in 1926, she handed it to her daughter-in-
law.” (Karakaş 1977: 9-10) According to the oral history interviews Bektöre conducted, the tradesman
Abdusselam Bey’s mother was literally able to bring her “Crimean” fire to the village Çufutkuyusu in Dobruja
where she settled and the family continued to carry the fire up to Turkey. (Bektöre 1966: 20-22)
community in Dobruja maintained the involuntary nature of the Crimean Tatar emigration in their collective memory and the sorrows of separation from the homeland and loved ones.\textsuperscript{126}

This is one of many folksongs on this topic:

\begin{quote}
When I left Akyar(Sevastopol)
A full pot of food was left
My mother, father, siblings
They were left with eyes full of tears \textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

The ethno-symbolist interpretation of the Crimean Tatar diaspora points out the lack of complete assimilation in the host society. It is possible to make the case that the Crimean Tatars formed a distinct community in Dobruja, “Little Tatarstan”, not perfectly assimilating in the Ottoman society. The Ottoman \textit{millet} system was based on providing autonomy to the minorities as long as they fulfilled main duties, such as taxation and providing soldiers, in the case of Muslims. Major posts (\textit{kadıs}, \textit{kaymakams}) in Dobruja were inhabited by the Crimean Tatars, especially by the members of the former ruling dynasty of the Crimean Tatar, the Girays. They were permitted to have a certain level of authority amongst the Crimean Tatar community in Dobruja.\textsuperscript{128} These factors enabled the Crimean Tatars to re-create their communal life in Crimea without being forced to intermix with the local Muslim (mainly Turkish, and Circassian) society. The Crimean Tatars had their own mosques. Intermarriage with other Muslims was limited. Still, adapting to the new hostland had been difficult.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{126} Yalvarıp kralga dıştük figanga
Sözümüz geçmedi sari Ivan’ga
Bu hicret Resulden mirastr бизге
Fena müşkül oldu halı Kırım’ in
\textsuperscript{127} Men Akyar’dan ayrılıganda
Kazan tolu aş kaldı
Anam babam kardeşlerim
Gözleri tolu yaş kaldı (Ekrem 1981)
\textsuperscript{128} The Ottomans additionally accorded a certain degree of political autonomy for the Crimean Tatars who were allowed governance by their own \textit{kaymakam}, Khan Mirza, who is a member of the dynasty of the Crimean Khans. The Crimean Geray dynasty multiplied in Dobruja and maintained their respected position. (Williams 2001)
\end{flushright}
We are not wealthy enough to settle at the seacoast
The two oxes the Sultan gave us don’t want to walk
I could not figure out: where is the south, where is the north
My own homeland was sweeter than everywhere
When Crimea comes to my mind, my heart boils129

Williams argues that in time the Crimean Tatar language and the culture changed greatly in the diaspora settings in the sense that the strong tribal and class distinctions among the Crimean Tatars eroded, and the Dobrujan Tatars embraced a Crimean Tatar culture mainly based on the steppe traditions of Crimea. Their commonalities loomed larger while their previous differences lost significance.130 They began to distinguish themselves from others in the Balkans as merely Crimean, or Tatar, without providing the sub-ethnic or village identities, which were forgotten by the new generations, who developed attachment to their Dobrujan villages. Although Williams (2001) notes the rise in nationalist activity among Dobrujan Tatars in the beginning of the 20th century, he makes the case that in time the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja lost their collective memory of the homeland, ending the possibility of a diasporic politics. However, I would argue that in fact the nationalist activity in the inter-war period constituted “exile nationalism”, a type of long-distance nationalism. It influenced the reemergence of nationalism even in the communist era, and the “rise” of nationalism in the 1990s, though these later movements could never rise to as much high

129 Ak toprakın yalısı bizge tiymiy
Padişah Bergen iki öküz gah desem cürmiy
Bilalmadım men kıblamam sırtım
Her siyden de tatlı eken öz tuvgan curtum
Tüşe Kırım esime içim kaynay
Türül tarlık sıkıntı cüregim caynay (A. K. 1969: 38)

130 Diaspora experience also brought down social distinctions migrants had in their homes and attitudes of mind and actual economic conditions changes, traditional sources of authority eroded. According to Karpat, the “Nogay” social class of the Crimean society who were no longer willing to remain as a permanent underclass protested vehemently forcing the Ottoman government to accord at least symbolic recognition of their equality by giving them medals and salaries as it did to other Crimean leaders. The notables and leaders of their communities were presented special presents, or posts in the Ottoman elite to prevent them to assert parallel claims of power. (Karpat 1985: 140, 141) After Dobruja ceded to Romania in 1878, the social differences among the Nogay, Yalıboy and Kerish and other Crimean groups largely vanished as they amalgamated into one-single Muslim Tatar group.
level of activity as in the era of exile nationalism in Romania. The environmental factors (mainly communist repression and its end) played a role in this nationalist trajectory (both its emergence and weakening) in Dobruja, rather than loss of collective memory of the myth of homeland, or the erosion of traditional culture resulting in assimilation. While my explanation is not completely based on these factors, the very “rise” of the Tatar long-distance nationalism movement in Dobruja in the 1990s is a testimony that neither assimilation took place nor was collective memory of homeland forgotten.

In this chapter, in accordance with my theoretical framework, I argue that the disruption of the Crimean Tatar community by the changes in political structures after their incorporation into Romania in 1878 has been an initial cause for the emergence of nationalism in this community. The transnational relations between Dobruja and Turkey, and Crimea played a significant role in the emergence diaspora nationalism, not mainly because they maintained a shared culture, and ethnic symbols, but because nationalist ideas flowed from these communities to Dobruja. Under the influence of emergent Pan-Turkist master frame and the attachment of Crimean Tatar nationalism frame to it, a growing educated elite (a result of modernization) created the potent “exile nationalism” frame. Mehmet Niyazi, the father Crimean Tatar nationalism in Dobruja, connected popular dissatisfaction to the collective memory of diasporic sentiments, (i.e. involuntary migration, sorrow of separation from homeland, and difficulties of integration), which consequently encouraged the formation of diasporic frame of mind. In accordance with the typical exile nationalism frame, he proposed a return to Crimea, and participation in the national movement there. His frame became resonant (created a movement with high participation) only when *Emel* journal took it up and engaged in frame alignment processes. This constitutes a frame transformation
for the community, because the solutions preferred by the community before the framing processes was immigration to Turkey, isolation from Romanian community, which both would inevitably lead to dissolution of the Tatar community in Romania. Thus, without Mehmet Niyazi’s impetus, collective memory despite huge amount of historical dissatisfaction could not lead to Tatar nationalism in Romania.

4.2.2. Diaspora community under communism and in the post-1990s

In the literature, the contemporary Crimean Tatar community in Dobruja has been found interesting mostly from an anthropological standpoint (Andreascu et al 2005; Yelis Erolova) or within the growing research agenda about the small minorities and minority rights in the European Union, again without paying much attention to the transnational dimension (connection to Crimea). In the literature, communism and modernization processes are viewed as mainly assimilatory towards this ethnic community. While the Crimean Tatars lost most of their traditional culture due to modernization and communist repression, they also received education under communism which was utilized for maintaining their ethnic identity perhaps in a new form in the post-1990 period. After all, according to the modernist theory of nationalism, mass education is a basic requirement for nationalism to gain resonance. While the post-1990 diaspora nationalism has not spread to the fourth and fifth levels of society (mass level) yet, there is a rise in the spread of nationalism when compared to the communist period, which shows that communism was not able to assimilate the community totally. The Crimean Tatars claimed their identities to be “Tatar” in the national census, they have almost 30 local organizations and branches across Romania, and they began to engage in various forms of activities in order to maintain their culture and language.
Thanks to developing minority rights in Romania, the state provided 500,000 Euro to spend for cultural renewal, Tatars have an MP to represent their concerns in the parliament as well as various cultural rights. Connections with Crimea and other diaspora communities revived as in the pre-1940 period, and Romanian Tatar community has been an active participant in the commemorative meetings of 18 May, Day of Deportation meetings in Crimea, as well as the World Crimean Tatar Congress. Evidence shows that diasporic politics definitely has not ended, but has rejuvenated in recent years, even when the Crimean Tatars lost most of their collective memory and traditional culture, and to an extent, their mother language. This demonstrates the limits of primordialist and ethnosymbolist assumptions about ethnicity for understanding this case. In accordance with my theoretical framework, elaborated previously, I suggest the following explanation.

4.2. 3. Application of theoretical framework

This chapter is divided into three parts, each of which forms a mini-case. In the first part, I investigate the causes for the emergence of nationalism among the Crimean Tatar minority in Romania and its development until 1941. In 1941, Romania was occupied by Germany and subsequently joined the war against the Soviet Union, thus the movement had to end abruptly. The emergence of nationalism was precipitated by several factors. The modernization of the Crimean Tatar community and the emergence of an educated class fulfill the pre-requisites of nationalism. The emergence of Pan-Turkism as a master frame provided the ideational toolkit for the emergence of Crimean Tatar nationalism in Dobruja. It was the agency of Mehmet Niyazi(1878-1931), who became instrumental in the first formulation of the exile nationalism frame, an organization such as Emel, the journal, and its
related Dobruca Turkish cultural societies were needed for the engaging in widespread frame alignment and counter-framing campaigns for increasing resonance among the modernizing Tatar peasants. While the exile nationalism movement began to appear, this movement went to transnational frame-bridging with the Crimean Tatar émigré frame of Cafer Seydahmet, the Crimean Tatar émigré leader who led a transnational émigré movement between Turkey and Europe. The transnationally well-connected and highly resonant exile nationalism aimed for collective return to Crimea but this goal could not be met because of a great change in political and discursive opportunity structures as a result of the Second World War.

The second part of this chapter examines “elite minority nationalism” of the Crimean Tatars in the Communist Romania (1948-1989). The radical change in political and discursive opportunity structures after the war caused the destruction of elites disappearance of the exile nationalism frame and continuous repression of masses. (1941-1990s). Moreover, the regime also manufactured and tried to impose a frame (Kazan Tatar identity), which did not resonate among the population. Even under repression, the Crimean Tatar demonstrated agency by developing their own frames, but within the constraints of political and discursive structures of the era. They developed a “non-transnational”, “territorialized”, minority nationalism frame, which maintains an allegiance to Tatar ethnic identity, even though it had to take out the links to homeland. This frame could not build a movement due to lack of resonance and growing apathy among the population in the communist era.

The third part of this chapter focuses on the Crimean Tatars in the Post-Communist Romania and the emergence of the diaspora nationalism movement. Again, the radical changes in transnational political and discursive opportunities, and the re-emergence of a new pan-Turkist master frame paved way for a frame transformation. The influences of
weakened prewar exile nationalism frame and minority nationalism frame of the communist era combined with

Transnational learning of the frame of the Crimean Tatar repatriate community in Crimea. The community is Romania bridged frames with the growing diaspora nationalism movement in Turkey and re-framed their identities as diaspora. Although the resonance of the diaspora nationalism movement is not close to the resonance of the exile nationalism movement in the prewar era, it is steadily rising. Thus, the rise of mobilization in Crimean Tatar community in Romania can be explained by the emergence of diaspora nationalism. The latter was the result of changes in opportunity structures, transnational influences the rise of Crimean Tatar nationalist activism in the USSR and the emergence of a similar frame in Turkey transforming the existing strong roots of Crimean Tatar nationalism in Romania. The Crimean Tatars in Romania do not aim to return to homeland in the contemporary period, as they regard it possible to maintain their distinct identity in Romania as multiculturalist policies multiply. At the same time, they need the strong links to homeland to counteract the assimilationist tendencies created by the Romanian state or social forces.

4.2.4. Sources:

This case-study uses primary and secondary historical sources, interviews, oral history materials, and ethnographic data. The primary sources include periodicals, such as Mektep ve Aile (1915), Emel (1921-1940), Karadeniz (1990-), and Caş (1991-), as well as books published in Crimean Tatar, Turkish and Romanian (Romanian utilized through translation). I conducted field work and participant observation in nationalist activities conferences, speeches, meetings, festivals, and so on in several major localities in Dobruja.
such as Constanta, Tulcea, Medgidia, Mangalia, Cobadin, Valea Dacilor, Valu lui Traian, Ovidiu, Mihail Kogălniceanu (Constanta), and Lumina as well as among Crimean Tatar immigrants from Romania in Toronto. I interviewed Crimean Tatars from different levels of society, as well as the members of the Turkish Union in Romania, Turkish-Romanian academics, and teachers from Turkey who work in Romania. I conducted these interviews in the Crimean Tatar and Turkish languages. As part of my ethnographic research, I stayed with five different local families in different localities for a month. I also traveled daily to many surrounding villages to conduct ethnographic research on Crimean Tatar nationalist organizations, museums, neighbourhoods, mosques, cemeteries, schools, weddings, and daily life in search of signs of cultural maintenance, as well as cultural interaction with surrounding ethnic communities. I conducted oral history research with local people in Dobruja and immigrants from Dobruja in Turkey about the maintenance of culture. I also used my interviews in Turkey, Crimea, and the United States to understand how other Crimean Tatar communities perceived the Dobrujan community and the extent and types of transnational relations.

4.3. The Case of Crimean Tatars in Romania

4.3.1. Emergence and Development of Exile Nationalism in Dobruja (1900-1941)

The dissolution of the pre-modern community of Crimean Tatars in Dobruja by modern transformations, and the emergence of a class of teachers and imams with modern educations, provided the necessary background for the emergence of diaspora nationalism in Dobruja.
4.3.1.1. Pre-requisites of nationalism I: The Crimean Tatar community under modernization:

The Russian invasion of Dobruja and Bulgaria in 1877-8 was a second painful shock to the Crimean Tatars, who had escaped from Russian domination in great numbers between the years 1853-1878. The Russians forced large numbers of Crimean Tatars to migrate to the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire for the second time in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war. In 1878, about a million Muslims were forced out of the area that currently comprises Bulgaria and Romania by the Russian army and bands of armed Bulgarians, which according to the British embassy reports also killed 300,000 Muslims. (Karpat 1985) The Crimean Tatars lost their property, became refugees again. The trauma of the second migration on the diaspora in Turkey will be examined in the chapter on the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. The 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War changed the fate of Dobruja. The Berlin Treaty of July 1-13, 1878 confirmed the independence of Romania, and Romania received the Danube delta, the Snake Island and the largest part of Dobruja, including all the territory to the north of Mangalia, and the districts north-east of Silistre from Russia in exchange for Bessarabia. The great majority of Crimean Tatars were left in Romania, while some were left in southern Dobruja in Bulgaria After the Second Balkan War (1913), (confirmed once again after the First World War) Romania attained southern Dobruja (Silistre and Dobrich), and continued to rule this region until 1940.

The breakup of Dobruja, along with Romania from the Ottoman Empire, turned the Crimean Tatars into a Muslim minority in a predominantly non-Muslim society, and their social, political and economic situation deteriorated. In 1916, Romania entered the First World War and drafted Crimean Tatar young men. As the Ottoman Empire and Romania
fought, Crimean Tatar community’s communication with Turkey was cut. Prominent Crimean Tatars and Turks were deported from Dobruja to Moldova to live in camps and carry out forced labour. They were infected with typhus and Spanish flu epidemics in Moldova at the time, and very few could return to their villages. (Demiroğlu 1983, 33) After the war, however, King Carol recognized the loyalty of Muslims to Romania and awarded them with a mosque (*Kral Camii*) in Constanța.

Although Romania accepted the cultural rights of minorities as stipulated in the Treaty of Berlin, it did not provide political rights to Dobruja, which was populated mostly by Muslims when it acquired it. Until 1912, the local population of Dobruja did not have Romanian citizenship, therefore they had a second class status in society. Dobruja was considered politically immature and it was treated as a colony. Romania encouraged the colonization of Dobruja by the Romanians coming from inner territories of Romania or the Vlachs from Macedonia. The lands of Muslims began to pass to Christians through various measures, and the vakıf, lands which were used to operate the Muslim public institutions such as schools, mosques, and so on were largely nationalized. With the waqf land taken, the impoverished community could not sustain its schools and mosques, and pay the salaries of teachers and imams without state assistance. The state was not willing to assist in the maintenance of a Muslim identity, as it preferred for Muslims to gradually assimilate. Unlike Bulgaria, who forced many Muslims to leave, the Romanian national government did not apply pressure on the Muslims to leave. However, the local governments of Tulcea (Northern Dobruja) and Qadrilater (Southern Dobruja) successfully pursued a forced emigration policy and caused the Crimean Tatars to fall into minority numbers in these two regions. The Romanian national government did not take necessary measures for migrants to stay,
especially when a large number of Romanians populated Dobruja after 1900. Thus, after the
emigration between 1913 and 1930, there were 150,773 Turks and 22,092 Crimean Tatars
left in Romanian Dobruja. The Turkish–Romanian Convention in 1936 designed to regulate
emigration of Turks and Crimean Tatars to Turkey resulted in increased emigration of Turks
and Crimean Tatars. Between 1937 and 1939, 130,000 to 150,000 people emigrated to
Turkey. At the end of World War II, the Turkish and Crimean Tatar population of Romania
was about 55,000. The 1948 census under communism showed the combined population of
Turks and Crimean Tatars as 28,782. (Eminov 1998, 134)

Even by 1939, a Muslim could not buy property from a Christian; he could only
purchase it from another Muslim. The Muslims were not represented fairly at the local level
either. They did not have real religious autonomy\footnote{Romania did not legally incorporate the Muslim institutions such as Islam courts or muftiat, and did not let these institutions exert religious autonomy, either.}, and Muslim religious and educational
institutions were in ruins. The social, cultural, economic and political deprivation of the
Muslim community and the unequal treatment in the processes of Romanian nation-building
created resentment and prepared the preconditions for Crimean Tatar nationalism in Dobruja.

4.3.1.2. Pre-requisites of nationalism II: The emergence of modern education

Although Dobruja and the Crimean Tatars had been formally separate from the
Ottoman Empire since 1878, Romania could not integrate Dobruja and its Muslims until
WWII. The Muslims of Dobruja seemed to have lived under the Ottoman cultural and
political influence with the help of enormous amount of transnational ties and flows between
Dobruja and Istanbul, and even Crimea. As a traditional peasant community, the Turks and
Crimean Tatars in Dobruja continued to provide their children with traditional Muslim
educations, and avoided sending them to Romanian schools, due to religious concerns. The Muslims in Dobruja continued to invite teachers from Turkey, and the community tried to fund their own Muslim schools. For high school, medrese, and university education, they sent their children to Istanbul. The educated Crimean Tatars preferred to remain in the Ottoman Empire, as they had more chances for a career there. Since the educated did not return to the community, the community lacked intellectuals and leaders to defend its interests and rights.

The emergence of an educated class of Muslims who would initiate a nationalist movement took place as a result of modernization beginning at the turn of the 20th century. It was the Young Turks, figures such as Dr. İbrahim Temo and Kırmızade, who were exiled from Istanbul, who brought the first modern Muslim education, modern newspapers, and modern ideas such as pan-Turkism to Dobruja in the 1890s-1900s. Moreover, in the 1910s, a small number of Crimean Tatars began to take advantage of the scholarships offered to Muslim students for attendance of Romanian institutions. Later, Romania introduced a teacher’s college for Muslim students, based on the age-old medrese in Babadag. Medrese was carried to Medgidia, the center of Muslim life in Dobruja. Despite these efforts it must be noted that only ten percent of the teachers in Romania were Muslims, although they formed 24% of the population (of Dobruja in 1930). Nevertheless, in the first quarter of the 20th century, a small intelligentsia emerged among the Crimean Tatars, who became familiar with modernist, nationalist, jadidist, Ottomanist, pan-Turkist, and pan-Islamic ideologies by following the journals and newspapers reaching to Dobruja. The young generation of educated Crimean Tatars either joined the Young Turks or sympathised with their ideas. The young educated Muslims in Dobruja celebrated the 1908 revolution in Istanbul.
4.3.1.3. Mehmet Niyazi and the emergence of exile nationalism frame in Dobruja:

The exile nationalist frame in Dobruja emerged as a result of the extension of the pan-Turkist master frame to address the specific concerns of the Crimean Tatar community. Mehmet Niyazi created the outline for the exile nationalist frame by combining diasporic sentiments in folk memory with the ideas of Pan Turkism and Crimean Tatar nationalism. This frame envisaged a return of the community to the homeland; therefore it is called the “exile nationalist” frame. This frame crystallized and became widely resonant through the journal Emel and the organization it founded, “Dobruja Turkish Cultural Union” (“Dobruca Türk Hars Birliği”), who engaged in frame alignment processes, counter-framing and transnational frame-bridging with Cafer Seydahmet’s émigré frame in Turkey. The end of this frame came abruptly from outside when WWII started and the following communist government purged the elites and repressed the community. Since the community did not willingly abandon this frame, it was to an extent rejuvenated in the post-communist period, especially with respect to its emphasis on Crimea as the homeland of all Crimean Tatars.

A. Pan-Turkism as master frame: Pan-Turkism had several roots. Russian Muslims first developed it as a response to pan-Slavism. A Crimean Tatar bey (member of Crimean Tatar nobility), İsmail Gasprinskiy elaborated it as a cultural policy for the Muslims in Russia, through his writings, his widely circulated newspaper Tercuman/Perevodchik and his schools spread across Muslim regions of Russia. Gasprinskiy emphasized the need for modernization and enlightenment of Russian Muslims, if they wanted to avoid assimilation and to escape from underdevelopment. In fact, he advocated for Muslims to learn Russian language as a way of acquiring modern science and technology. In
order to counteract assimilation, he endorsed a cultural union among the Russian Muslims, rather than a political union. Since most Russian Muslims were of Turkic origin or Turkophones, he suggested the formation of a common Turkic language, which is based on the more developed literary language, Ottoman Turkish, but that would also be understandable to the Turks in Russia with the incorporation of local linguistic features, and words. For him common language was a requirement for the development of common thinking and action among the Turko-Muslims of Russia (and even beyond). He made advances towards developing a common language through his widely circulated newspaper, which was published for more than 30 years, a great accomplishment in itself, as no other Muslim periodical could escape Tsarist censure for so long. Gasprinskiy achieved this by publishing a Russian version of his newspaper. He also advocated development of cooperation between Russian and Muslim communities, portraying Russia as one of largest Muslim countries in the world because of large minority of Muslims. His next great achievement was perhaps the new generation of intellectuals educated in his modern schools, but with a national consciousness. It was this new generation who took advantage of the 1905 Revolution in Russia to organize a Muslim Fraction that will be elected to Duma. Thus, Gaspirinsky’s contribution to Russian Muslims’, including the Crimean Tatars’, awakening to a fight for equality instead of fatalistically immigrating to the Ottoman Empire is undeniable. Russia, however, was still far from democratic, and soon the Tsar dissolved the Duma and reasserted absolute rule. By 1908, a Revolution aimed at constitutional democracy happened in Turkey, which led many Russian Muslim intellectuals to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire in order to continue their liberation movement. Russian Muslim intellectuals had been influential among the Young Turk circles in the major Ottoman cities.
and pushed the Young Turks towards “Turkism” as a political project for transforming the Ottoman Empire. The manifesto of pan-Turkism was written by a Kazan Tatar intellectual, Yusuf Akçura in Cairo in 1905. Having a legacy of multicultural, multiethnic empire, the Young Turks were until then hesitant to single out the Turkish identity as the national identity of the state. The continuous separation of Christian minorities from the Empire, and finally the loss of the Arabs, the largest non-Turkic Muslim population, made the state more homogenous, and made Turkism a realistic option.

For the Turkic minorities left outside the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Ottoman Istanbul of the period, pan-Turkism constituted a master frame. An understanding of the remaining territory as part of pan-Turkic nation became increasingly prevalent, although the total extent of those Turkic holdings remained uncertain, for example, the status of Turkic Muslims in Russia, extraterritorial Turkic minorities, and non Turkic Muslims such as Circassians, Kurds, and Arabs. At the same time, through their transnational contacts with Crimea, more educated Crimean Tatars became aware of İsmail Gasprinskiy’s newspaper Tercuman, which circulated in Dobruja as well (Gasprinskiy visited Dobruja as well), and the budding national movement in Crimea. We know that some Dobrujan teachers of Crimean Tatar origin and educated in Istanbul applied or were invited to Crimea to teach. The tsarist police followed them closely, and extradited some of them when a law emerged that banned teaching of foreign citizens, but some of them managed to stay and contribute to the 1917 events. Mehmet Niyazi, Mufti Halil Fehim, and Dr. Mehmet Nuri visited Crimea a few times and seemed to have close contacts with the Crimean Tatar nationalists there. The Crimean Tatars from Dobruca participated and learned from the transnational Crimean Tatar national movement, which was organized by the transnational nationalist organization
between Istanbul, and Crimea. The Crimean Tatar national sovereignty movement recruited needed cadres from the diaspora who spoke the Crimean Tatar language, who were devoted nationalists, who were educated in the Ottoman high institutions, bringing knowledge and expertise needed for a new state, and who had the mobility and flexibility to carry the movement, valuables, and resources to Istanbul or Dobruja in case of increasing Tsarist oppression. The diaspora cadres, who were well-versed in the dominant Pan-Turkist master frame, refined their nationalist ideas by familiarizing Crimean Tatar nationalism with more specific goals such as reestablishing the Crimean Tatar state in Crimea. Thus, the pre-existence of pan-Turkism as a master frame prepared the diaspora for easily adopting and shaping the Crimean Tatar nationalism frame. It also provided a basis for diaspora nationalism, which strengthened after 1917, as it mediated the Ottoman/Turkish identity and Crimean Tatar identity. Müstecip Ülküsal, Cafer Seydahmet, Mehmet Niyazi, and all other diaspora nationalists cast Crimean Tatar nationalism as a version of pan Turkism.

B. Mehmet Niyazi first created the “exile nationalism” frame for Crimean Tatars in Dobruca (1878-1931): Mehmet Niyazi was the first intellectual to imagine the Crimean Tatars living in Dobruja, or diaspora as part of the Crimean Tatar nation, and a part of the national project, who are deemed to return to homeland. Mehmet Niyazi politically reconnected the Crimean Tatars living in Dobruja to the homeland. He was the first person to develop the “exile nationalism” frame, combining the diaspora sentiments in the folk memory with the ideas Pan Turkism and the Crimean Tatar nationalism.  

Mehmet Niyazi was born in 1878 in Aşçılar, a village in central Dobruca to a Crimean Tatar family, who emigrated from Crimea. Like many Crimean Tatar children of his

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132Altay Kerim (2003: 3) says that he “tied Dobruja for the first time to Crimea”
generation, he grew up hearing the memories and stories of Crimea, and Crimean Tatar oral literature. During his education in the Dar-ul Muallim in Istanbul, Young Turk ideas about modernization and pan-Turkism influenced his views. He achieved fluency in French, Arabic and Persian. After graduating as a teacher, he decided to settle in Crimea but he was successively extradited, in 1900, and again in 1901, by the Tsar’s police. When he returned to Istanbul, he was under scrutiny due to his ideas of liberty, forcing him to return to Dobruja. (Ergen 1997, 22) He married Şefika Abdulakim, the sister of Kazım Abdulakim (a Romanian Army officer and World War I hero) and of the politician Selim Abdulakim and chose to work for the enlightenment of his people. Niyazi was appointed as a teacher at the Constanta Turkish Secondary School (Köstence Türk Rüşdiyesi) in 1906, and became the headmaster between 1910 and 1914. After 1916, he was appointed headmaster of the Medgidia Muslim Seminary. The Seminary students adored him, recalling that he cited his Crimean Tatar poems in classes and explained the students his ideas and experiences of Crimean Tatar nationalism. He later established the Alumni Association of Medgidia Muslim Seminary (Mecidiye Müslüman Semineri Cemiyeti), which brought together the graduates of this school. The Association was able to influence the selection of Mufti in 1938, the leader of the Islamic community in Romania who was appointed by the Romanian state according to its own interests. (Ülküsal 1966, 138) Mehmet Niyazi became a member of the Young Turk organization "Menafii Dobruca Müslüman Tamimi Maarif Cemiyeti" (Societatea Generala de Invatamant din Dobrogea) which was founded in 1909 in Medgidia and Hrsova. Mehmet Niyazi published Dobruca Sedası, a cultural, scientific, and political journal for this organization with Süleyman Abdulhamit Efendi in Constanta (1910). (Ülküsal 1966: 158)

133 The Seminary was closed between 1916-1920 during the war.
He published a series of short-term journals\textsuperscript{134} to defend the rights of Muslims in Dobruja, and to work for the enlightenment and the development of his community.

He returned to Crimea again with Pazarcık Muftı Halil Fehim and Dr. Mehmet Nuri when the opportunity appeared in 1918 and participated in building the new Crimean Tatar state for a few years. In Crimea in 1918, Mehmet Niyazi published a newspaper, *Hakses* (The True Word) which enunciated mild opposition to the main actors of the movement. He developed a clear understanding of Crimean Tatar nationalism through his stays in Crimea and participation in the national movement there. His transnational contacts continued even after the Bolshevik takeover. The delegate of the Crimean Tatar communist government of Crimea, Bekir Sîtkî Odabaş visited Mehmet Niyazi in Constanta in 1918, to inquire whether the return of Dobrujan Tatars to Crimea is possible, as the new Crimean Tatar government needed population and cadres. The central Soviet government, however, did not permit such an attempt.

While he published his poems in Ottoman Turkish in Istanbul under the title İthafat, in 1912, he also wrote his major poetry in Crimean Tatar (perhaps being influenced by Tukay who wrote his poems in mother language, Volga Tatar) in the same period, which

\textsuperscript{134}The purpose of the Dobruca Sedası was “cultural activity among the Muslims.” It was a scientific and political journal. It was distributed in Bulgaria, Turkey and other parts of the Turkic people. It continued for 1 and half years. Then, came Teşvik, which also continued one and a half year. He published this with Abdulhakim Bekir. This was a sister journal of Dobruca Sedasi. It also aimed to do service to “vatan” and defend the rights of its people. The income of both newspapers would be sent to Muslim schools in villages. (Dobruca Sedası 3, 23 Nisan 1910 ) On the 1\textsuperscript{st} of February, 1914’in Medgidia he published the newspaper Işık with the financial support of Cevdet Kemal. The editor of this newspaper was Dr. İbrahim Temo. This newspaper also aimed to advocate for the rights of Muslims. It promised enlightenment, and emphasized the significance of science and education. Mehmet Niyazi, Halil Fehim and Omer Lutfi, the teacher of Medgidia Saminary supported this newspaper with their articles. In the İşık publishing house, in 1915 Mehmet Niyazi also published the journal Mektep ve Aile (School and Family). This also emphasized education and significance of teachers. After the war started, Halil Fehim published Dobruja, to which Mehmet Niyazi sent articles. Dobruca was closed in 1923. In 1921, Mehmet Niyazi published Tan newspaper in Pazarcık (Dobrich), which aimed to work towards the interests of Romania and all Dobrujan Muslims. Between 1920 and 1930, he published many articles in the newspapers in Silistre and Pazarcık (Dobrich). (Ülküsal 1966, 158-159)
involves his diaspora nationalist framing. Some of his poetry was published in Kök Kitap
Istanbul, 1919) In Romania his poetry was published only in 1931 under the name Sağış
(Longing), though he dictated them to his students, who spread them across Dobruja and
made them well-cited. Through his many published articles, poetry, teaching, political, and
social organizations he was involved in, he communicated his frame into a new generation,
who would later engage in frame alignment processes.

A cursory examination of his poetry can help us to understand how exactly he
connected the diaspora to Crimea. In his collection of poems, Sağış, his thought process
begins with problematizing the relationship of the place he lived and his identity in the poem
“How am I?” He forms the metaphor of an “orphan,” who “grew up in darkness,” “who does
not enjoy life in the real sense,” “whose laughers are superficial.” Moreover, he does not
understand the reason for his grief. He says “Where did I get this grief?” Then he realises
that he is an orphan because he does not have his homeland. He thinks of the homeland, and
he burns inside.135 He explains the process of how he developed an attachment towards the

135 Men Kaydayman
Bir karawda, oysiz öşgen balaman,
Bir karawda, oylana da kalamaman.
Balalığım tutsa, külüp caynayman
Kartlik eske tüşse, elden yalaman.
Kün oızgamsam, külüllermen diymen de,
Siyrek kethmíy, mugaya, toktalaman
Külgenim de şayna bir külüş. Kül bolsın!
Küle turup, cürekke ot salaman
Men omr ímdé az küldüüm, köp ciládam
Cilay cilay tábünde cal alaman
Halkını körgeñ künlerin biz körmedik
Körürmíz dep kímerde oylanaman
Küydi bawır, karalândı kaswetmen
Men de şaştım. Neçün dertli bolaman,
Bu derti men karydan aldım? Kaydayman?
Belki kurtsuz kalan óksz balaman.
Curt degende curegímden ot çağ
Derdím de şu: “Curt diý de kozgálam.” (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sağış, ed. by Saim Osman
Karahan, Constanta: Europolis, p. 25)
homeland. 136 “After I heard from my mother, I began to see and I loved my homeland. After I kissed its soil, I grieved.” These verses explain very well that this sorrow and love comes only after one learns about it. It does not emanate from the poet’s immediate situation, but an historical injustice.

He is differentiated from the Crimean Tatar poets of the time by his focus on the myth of the homeland. He used concepts like “Green Island” and “Green Homeland” to denote how Crimea is a mythical blessed paradise in the imagination of the diasporic Tatar.

“It is embroidered by the God” “The waves of the sea kiss its skirts.” (“Yeşil Ada”) He named the collection of his poetry he published in 1931, “Longing” (Şağış) [for the homeland]. He cites the legend that Crimean Tatars left the homeland by taking their hearth’s fire with them with a determination not to let it go forever. In another poem, he tells about a

(Bir qaravda oysız asker balaman,
Bir qaravda oylana da qalaman.
Balalığım tutsa, külip caynayman,
Qarlıq eske tüşse, elden yalaman.
Kūn ozgərsam külkilermen diymen de,
Sürek ketmi, muğaya toqtalaman.
Kūlgenim de çayna bir küliş, kūl bolsın.
Kūle turp kürekke ot salaman.
Men ömrümde az küldim, köp çıładım.
Cilay, cilay, tūbinde cal alaman.
Halqınıñ körɡen künlerin biz körmedik;
Körerimiz dep, kimerde oylanaman.
Kūydi bavur, qaralandi qasvetmen;
Men de şaştım, neqün dertli bolaman?
Bo dertni men qaydan aldım? Qaydaym an?
Belki, curtsiz qalğan qısız balaman!
Curt degende cüregimden ot çığa.
Dertim de şo: “Curt!” diye de qozğalam.)

136 “Anaydan eşitken soñ
Kördim curtuñna şeydim
Topraq koklap şəken kūn
Yazıq! Dep cândim küydim ” (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sağış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanta: Europolis, p.28)

(Anaydan eşitken soñ
Kördim curtuñna şeydim.
Topraq qoqlap şəken kūn,
Yazıq! – dep cândim küydim.)
Crimean Tatar girl who grew up in Istanbul and loves Crimea in her dreams and longs to see it. ("Curt Suygisi")

Another diasporic theme is nostalgia for “the happiness and glory of old days” in the homeland. He laments the parting from the homeland: “Despite the good days, why did

137 Neçin Süydüm

Kırım’ın şöl betinde
Azaw’ın bir çetinde,
Şırın atlı bir köyde
Belki cartı bir üyde
Babam tuvğan.

Kıpçaqta oynay, caynay
Ösken emiş kartanay:
Keten satkan, şal örgen,
Şay aruv künler körğen:
Başın cavlıkman buwgan...

Kızlar, çaşlar kuyaşlap
Künden alganlar savlıqnı:
Tañ cerine uşay dep,
Kullangan al cavlıkını...
Ton cabınıp kart çürgen
 Çaş kuşamp at sürgen
Tüye macar cekkenler
Töray geşip ketkenler.
Tördan toyga awuşqıp
Keday yarge kawuşqıp,
Oğanlikka dalğanlar
Yaşaw zevkin alganlar.. (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sagış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanta: Europolis, p. 27)

(Neçün Süydüm
Qırımnu şöl betinde,
Azavunu bir çetinde,
Şırını atlı bir köyde,
Belkini cartı bir üyde
Babam tuvğan.

Qıpçaqta oynay caynay,
Öşken emiş qartanay.
Keten soqkan, şal örgen,
Şay aruv künler körğen,
Başını cavlıkman buwğan.
Qızlar-caşlar kuvaşlap
Künden alğanlar savlıqını.
Tañ cerine uşay dep
Qullanğan al cavlıkını.
Ton cabınıp qart çürgen,
Çaş quşanıp at sürgen.

137 Neçin Süydüm

Kırım'ın şöl betinde
Azaw'ın bir çetinde,
Şırın atlı bir köyde
Belki cartı bir üyde
Babam tuvğan.

Kıpçakta oynay, caynay
Öşken emiş kartanay:
Keten satkan, şal örgen,
Şay aruv künler körğen:
Başın cavlıkman buwgan...

Kızlar, çaşlar kuyaşlap
Künden alganlar savlıqını:
Tañ cerine uşay dep,
Kullangan al cavlıkını...
Ton cabınıp kart çürgen
 Çaş kuşamp at sürgen
Tüye macar cekkenler
Töray geşip ketkenler.
Tördan toyga awuşqıp
Keday yarge kawuşqıp,
Oğanlikka dalğanlar
Yaşaw zevkin alganlar.. (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sagış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanta: Europolis, p. 27)
they leave poor Crimea? Why did they disperse? In a poem called “Kargış”, he criticises the historical mistakes which led the Crimean Tatars to leave their homeland. He states that they had to escape as the enemy attacked to their homeland, leaving no other option, and they simply could not bear anymore. They had to leave and they cried.” He summarises the dilemma of diaspora as such: “This is us: The people who worry about the homeland from outside the homeland, and probably will die as such.”

Tüye macar cekkenler,
Toylay çığıp ketkenler.
Toydan toyğa avuşup,
Keday yarge qavuşup
Oğlanlıqqa dalğanlar,
Yaşav zevqün alğanlar.

138 “Şay bolsa da Kırım’dan
Ot bastırıp çıkkanlar
Tuşüne kala insan
Neçün Curt’tan bıqkanlar?
Neçün, neçün çıqkanlar?
Taşlap zavallı cerni?

Ne bolup talk bolganlar?.” (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sagış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanța: Europolis, p. 28)

(“Şay bolsa da, Qırım’dan
Ot bastırıp çıqqanlar.
Tüşune qala insan,
Neçün curttan bıqqanlar?
Neçün, neçün çıqqanlar?
Taşlap zavallı cerni?
Ne bolup talq bolganlar?”)

139 “Biz şunlarmız: Tişlarda
Curt kayğısın çekem iz
İlerki soğuşlarda
Curt dep ölür m’ ekemiz?
Ana, şunday bir düşman
“Yeşil Curt” ni talagan
Dayanalmay biraz can
Tişka çıqıp cilagan.” (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sagış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanța: Europolis, p. 28)

(Biz şunlarmız: Tişlarda
Curt qayğısun çegemiz.
İlerki soğuşlarda
Curt dep ölür m’ekemniz?
Ana, şunday bir duşman

165
In another poem, he suggests a solution: “why don’t we return to Green Island earlier? Are our hands and feet tied?” He underlines that the Crimean Tatars of Dobruja (and indeed of the whole diaspora) are also “children of and part of the people of Crimea.” “It has been long that they left Crimea.” They are not “getting weary” in diaspora, and they “will return.” So that it will be understood that they were people of the same homeland. They will unite and the enemy will never be able to divide them again. But even after return, there are problems which emanate from captivity of the homeland: Crimea is expressed in the metaphor of a beautiful, sick, hopeless girl, who does not smile to the poet. Because of his love of the homeland, the poet returns, but he is still not happy because the homeland is

Yeşik Curtını talağan,  
Dayanalmay biraz can  
Tişqa çığıp cilağan.)

140 Telesüw

“...Biz keç kaldık. Ö ğmiy bizn iñ çolımız!  
Niçin Yeşil Curt’ka erte çetmiym iz?  
Baglı degil ayagımız kolumz...  
Tez çetmiymız! (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sağış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanta: Europolis, p. 15)

141 Dobruca’dan sizge selam ketirdim

...  
“Bız de Kırmı balaları, halkımız!  
Bek az evvel ayrılığınız Kırmı dan  
Tözalmayımız, kytacakımız... Artık siz  
Kurtarıız! A ñlasılsın, bir vatan  
Kardaşları bolgänımız kereçten.  
Birleşeyik! Biz olsek te, ömesin!  
“Tatar “ namı eşitilsın yüksekten!  
Endi den soñ düşmän bizn i bölmesin!...” (taken from Mehmet Niyazi, 2003, Sağış, ed. by Saim Osman Karahan, Constanta: Europolis, p.14)

(Bek az evvel ayrılığınız Qırımdan  
Tozalmayımız, qaytacaqımız, artıq biz  
Qurtarıız, analıslınsın bir vatan  
Qardeşleri bolğanımız çerçekten.  
Birleşiyik, biz olsek de ömesin  
“Tatar namı” eşitilsın yüksekten.  
Endiden soñ duşman bizni bölmesin.)
enduring many troubles. (Öz Curtımda Garıpmen) “I am not a stranger to you, I have never been. Even though I wandered outside, I missed you and I cried. I dreamed... I hoped. ..I made friends outside yet I feel as a stranger coming back to my own homeland. My people are lonely ... Please smile Green Homeland, please smile beautiful girl!”¹⁴²

Mehmet Niyazi created an original frame to think of the Crimean Tatar identity. It aimed to transform the worldviews of the immigrants from Crimea. Mehmet Niyazi insisted that they have a problem emanating from an historical injustice. The perpetrators were those who conquered Crimea, the Russians. Their longing for Crimea would never end, and they would have to be miserable in diaspora settings. The only solution was to return and save it from the strangers who had taken it from them.

4.3.1.4. Emel and frame alignment processes

Müstecip Haci Fazıl was the Crimean Tatar nationalist in Dobruca who became the leading figure in the publication of the Emel journal and the nationalist organization in Crimea. As other members of his generation he was influenced by Mehmet Niyazi, pan-Turkism, and Crimean Tatar nationalism, and with predominant number of articles he wrote

¹⁴² Öz curtımda garıpmen

Cat tuwulman men saga, cat kalmaidım bir zaman
Tiş yerlerde cürsem de, sagsuñman ciladım
Köp tentiydım, hayaliñ cırlarım karşısında karşılıdım
Cırtarqan üm itmen taptım tısta dost, tuvğan
Öz curtımda garıpmen, öz halkında kimsesiz

(Cat tuwulman men sağa, cat qalmadım bir zaman.
Tiş yerlerde cürsem de saqınıp da ciladım.
Köp tentiş kim, cırlanın karşılıdım.
Cırtarqan ümitmen taptım tısta dost, tuvğan.
Öz curtımda garıpmen. Öz halkında kimsesiz.
Açıl biraz Yeşil Curt, açıl biraz güzel kız! )
for Emel, as well as his political activism, he contributed to the crystallization of the “exile nationalist” frame.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, and the Bolshevik Revolution, the Crimean Tatars as other nationalities of the Russian Empire declared sovereignty. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl was one of the few youths who applied to go to Crimea to serve during the national movement, and since he was not given a visa, he entered Crimea illegally by hiding in a cargo ship. Though he was only 17, he became well-versed in the ideas of Crimean Tatar nationalism while served as a teacher during the revolution, but, like other members of the diaspora, he had to leave Crimea as the famine began towards 1920. (Dobrucaj 1963, 17).

Next, he visited his relatives and the Crimean Tatar communities in Central Anatolia, when the country was invaded by Western powers and War of Independence (1919-1923) began. While again volunteering to working as a teacher again in a Crimean Tatar village, he got acquainted with the political situation of new Turkey as well as the Crimean Tatar community. Since Turkey was undergoing turbulent times, he made up his mind that he must return to Romania and acquire a higher level of education there, even if it had to be in a Romanian institution. He began to study law in the Bucharest University, and began to promote the foundation of a Crimean national parliament, Qurultay among the young people

143 But, the Crimean Tatar officers and soldiers, among them Caliacra muftı Halil Fehmi in the Romanian army passed to Crimea during the war. He was elected to the Qurultayand became vice-president of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri). In 1918, 30 Tatar young men between 17-22 replied immediately to Bekir Odabas’ request of teachers to work in Crimea. Mehmet Niyazi, and Dr. Mehmet Nuri went to Crimea in 1917. Müstecip Ülküsal notes that in addition to himself, Mehmet Niyazi’s brother Faik, nephew Rıza and Çolak Faik also served as teachers in Qurultay period. (Ülküsal 2006) Abdurrezzak, Akif Tezcan’s grandfather met Celebi Cihan at Vefa High School (İdadi). He became a soldier in the Romanian army. After the Bolshevik takeover, by the aid of a Tatar he met in Russian army, he passed to Crimea and began to teach in Zincirli Medrese in Crimea. Many Tatars from the diaspora had to leave Crimea after the Bolshevik invasion and beginning of famine in 1919 and 1920.
in the Crimean Tatar villages in Dobruja.\textsuperscript{144} He founded Tonguç Cultural Association (Tonguç Kültür Cemiyeti) with the Crimean Tatar students of Romanian schools and Medgidia Seminary in his own village, Azaplar. In 1928 and 1929, his brother Necip Hacı Fazıl, a graduate of Medgidia Seminary, organized national theatres for tepreș and bayram festivals, which were received with great interest by the villagers in Azaplar. The teachers and imams who graduated from Medgidia Seminary organized similar activities in other localities.\textsuperscript{145} The desire to create a journal to deal with the social problems of Crimean Tatars was emerging among these educated elite. (Yurtsever 1983, 305-306)

Having annexed to Romania once again in 1918, the old city of Hacıoğlu Pazarcık (Dobrich) remained a lively center of Turkish-Crimean Tatar cultural life. The population of Crimean Tatars in Pazarcık was 20,000. (Dobrucalı 1963, 17) Müstecip Hacı Fazıl began to work as a young lawyer in Pazarcık in 1926. He contributed to various Turkish language periodicals, presented at conferences, and served in central committees of Turkish associations to propagate pan-Turkism and “Kırımçılık” (Crimean Tatar nationalism) as it was called by then. In November, 1929, 12 Crimean Tatar intellectuals came together\textsuperscript{146}, and published a journal called Emel on the first day of 1930. Musa Hacı Abdullah (Dericioğlu) supported them financially. (Emel 1974, 48) It seems that Müstecip Hacı Fazıl had contacts with Ayaz İshaki (a Kazan Tatar émigré leader) from the Promethean League. This was an organization of the émigré leaders of the “captive nations” of Soviet Union which was sponsored by Marshall Pilsudski of Poland. Pilsudski viewed the Soviet Union as the most

\textsuperscript{144} Dr. Ragıp Refik from Istanbul, and Safaaddin R. Karanakçı who also studied in Bucharest collaborated him in this period (Dobrucalı, 1963: 17)

\textsuperscript{145} Pazarcık youth staged “Şahingiray” “Bora” (Halil Kırmman), “Kurban Bayramı Gecesi” (Yurtsever 1983)

\textsuperscript{146} Emel had 12 founders. Reşiş Alıosman (1899-1967) after finishing Pazarcık Rüşdiyesi entered into trades. He joined Pazarcık Türk Kültür ve Spor Cemiyeti. He immigrated to Turkey during the WWII and settled in Polatlı. Other members were teacher Mehmet Vani, teacher Tahsin İbrahim, teacher Rifat Mithat, Necip Hacı Fazıl who graduated from Medgidia Seminary, Kâzım Seydahmet, tradesmen Emin ve Mehmet Zekeriya (Bektöre) brothers, Abdulhamit Hafiz Veli, terzi Huseyin Hacı Abdullah. (Müstecip Ülküsal)
immediate threat to Poland’s sovereignty, and openly supported large number of émigré nationalists until the German invasion of Poland 1939. Along with the main journal, which was called Promethee, and was published in French in Paris, each “national centre” within the League published their own national journals. It is likely that Müstecip Hacı Fazıl decided to publish a journal specializing on the Crimean Tatars in the spirit of the Promethean League after communicating with Ayaz İshaki.

Although Crimean Tatar nationalist political ideology was known in Dobruja, the Crimean Tatars of Dobruja, and even the Crimean Tatar intellectuals, did not necessarily view it as something relevant to them, since they no longer lived in Crimea. Mehmet Niyazi and then Müstecip Ülküsal’s Emel journal engaged in a frame transformation process—“radically re-constituting what is going on for people”—(Snow et al 1986: 473), making the following frame the worldview of Crimean Tatars beginning in the 1930s.

- The Crimean Tatars are a nation who emigrated from their homeland Crimea to the Ottoman state due to Russian imperialism.
- They are in a minority situation, and their economic and political situation worsens in Romania, who came to rule Dobruja since 1878.
- If the Crimean Tatars immigrate to Turkey, as others before them they will assimilate and they will lose their identity.
- For that reason, they have to join the national movement in Crimea (later national communist government), and mobilize the diaspora to return.

Figure 9. The exile nationalism frame in Romania (1913-1941) 147

147 “Crimean Turks wherever they are, they are in a struggle of life-and-death. In a way, this is beyond a struggle to preserve their spiritual existence, it is a struggle to maintain their physical existence...Crimean Turks were pieces that were torn and dispersed from a whole. All of them are linked to same root, culture and belief. They all suffered from the tyranny and tribulation of the same destructive, divisive power. Therefore, all of them must come together in the same ideal and walk together towards the goal of holy salvation and liberty.” “Kırım Türkları hangi meklekte olursa olsunlar var veya yok olma mücadelesi içindeşirler.Bu bir bakımdan manevi varlıklarını korumaktan öte cinsmini varlıklarını ayakta tutma savaşdır....Kırım Türkleri bir
The frame propagated by Emel involved many aspects which were proposed earlier by Mehmet Niyazi. Though most Crimean Tatars had been settled in Dobruja for two or three generations by the 1930s, the fact that their ancestors were migrants from Crimea was emphasized. (frame amplification) The involuntary aspects of migration were emphasized, and tied to the impoverishment of Crimean Tatars. (frame amplification-calling attention to injustice) Crimean homeland was pushed to the center of the Crimean Tatar identity. (frame amplification). Emel made the ancestral homeland the contemporary homeland for the Crimean Tatars. Cafer Seydahmet provided a good example of frame alignment activity by transforming myths, as well as explaining Emel’s role in frame alignment processes in his 1935 jubilee, when answering to the question “Where is the continuing fire really?” He replied, “It is everywhere, in every village of Dobruja, and in the hearts of Crimeans in Dobruja. If there was not such a fire, will this community come here today from hundreds of kilometres away leaving their own work...Emel journal is a holy torch of this fire. All the hearts receive the fire from it.”148 (Bektöre 1966, 21) According to Emin Bektöre, one of the 12 men who published Emel, “the Crimean Tatars will return the continuous fire and its soul to Crimea.” (Bektöre 1966, 22)

In the exile nationalist frame, the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja were imagined as part of a larger Crimean Tatar nation. They aimed to unify the population around the goal of an independent Crimea. They attempted to transform the identities of the population who viewed themselves as nothing other than Muslims, (or if it is considered ethnically, as

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Turkish, or from a sub-ethnic Crimean Tatar identity) into viewing themselves as “unsettled immigrants living in diaspora, but whose primary attachment is their homeland and who will return”. The Crimean Tatars before Emel did not imagine repatriation to Crimea, which was dominated by the Christian Tsar. They also shunned integration with the Romanian society, demonstrated by their complete isolation from Romanian institutions and society. Just like İsmail Gasprinskiy had 50 years before, a handful of intellectuals argued that a different attitude towards the miseries that befell on the Crimean Tatars was possible. The small circle of Dobrujan intellectuals around Müstecip Hacı Fazıl tried to stop migration from Romania to Turkey. They argued that if there were a place to migrate, it should be the homeland, Crimea. In the meantime, they struggled to attain minority rights from the Romanian government. They viewed the major problem to be the lack of modernization, particularly modern education among the population. For that purpose, they encouraged learning Romanian, and receiving education in Romanian institutions. (Hoping to assimilate its Muslims, Romania offered scholarships to Muslim students in its major educational institutions.) According to Mustecip Hacı Fazıl, utilizing these opportunities the Crimean Tatars must have aimed to prepare cadres to serve in Crimea at the day of independence. According to Servet Baubec, Hacı Fazıl did not consider opening Crimean Tatar schools in Dobruja, because he believed that the war would begin soon, and the Crimean Tatars would immigrate to Crimea. They also advocated cultural cooperation and political solidarity (and possibly frame-bridging) with the other Turko-Muslim populations in Romania, Russia and Turkey, and in the wider Islamic world to form a formidable power in international relations. The movement also entered counter-framing against the Soviet frame. (see Chapter 3)

149 Servet Baubec, Interview by author. 2 August 2006, Medgidia.
The only source of opposition to the movement was from an old generation of some conservative imams, some of whom collaborated with certain Romanian local leaders to weaken the movement, and some members of the Turkish community who competed with the successful Emel. The Crimean Tatar frame aimed to extend to Muslim, Turkish, Nogay and other sub-ethnic identities to widen its resonance.

4.3.1.5. Transnational frame-bridging: Frame-bridging with Cafer Seydahmet’s émigré frame:

Müstecip Hacı Fazıl did not meet Cafer Seydahmet, the former minister in the Crimean Tatar Republic in 1917, and later a prominent émigré leader, until after he published the first issue of Emel. Cafer Seydahmet escaped from the Bolsheviks, and mainly resided in Turkey after 1918, while he formed the “Crimean Tatar national centre” within the Promethean League. After the Turkish-Soviet Friendship Pact (1925), Turkey did not permit anti-Soviet, pan-Turkist activity. Cafer Seydahmet was in search of a base for his nationalist activity. Romania, having a tolerant regime and a compactly settled, traditional Crimean Tatar population, could enable him to mobilize mass support for his cause. On 28 January 1930, he met with several prominent Crimean Tatar intellectuals in Dobruca, and invited them to join the Crimean Tatar national movement. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl attended this meeting. Mehmet Niyazi mentioned Cafer Seydahmet to him before as a candidate who could undertake organization of the Crimean Tatar national movement in Romania, as Mehmet Niyazi was older and in poor health. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl was younger than these men. After getting to know Müstecip Hacı Fazıl and the Emel publishers, and sending a few articles to their journal, Cafer Seydahmet convinced the publishers of Emel that Emel should
be the official journal of the Crimean Tatar national independence cause within the Promethean League.

As Müstecip Hacı Fazıl recognized later in his memoirs until then “there has not been a journal like Emel devoted to the history, culture and politics of the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja before 1878 in the Ottoman era or after this date in the period of Romanian administration, and such a journal was never published by the Crimean Tatars in Turkey.”(Ülküsal 1999, 152-53) Emel was not only a journal on Crimean Tatar nationalism, but also a journal that dealt with the identity of the diasporic Crimean Tatar. According to Anderson, the newspaper and novel enabled the imagining of a community. In a place such as Dobruja, where various national imaginings are in conflict (Romanian, Turkish, pan-Turkist, local Tatar, Nogay), the aim of the Emel journal was to promote a framework in which people could imagine themselves as part of a transnational political community of the Crimean Tatars. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl wrote, “considering the effects of the newspapers on people, ... [Emel], by publishing articles from Crimea, Turkish and Islamic world, made the readers travel in the spiritual existence of these worlds.”(Ülküsal 1999)150

Emel could not grow and assume the importance it did if it was not legitimized by the support of Cafer Seydahmet. The movement in Romania could stay local if Cafer Seydahmet did not connect it to the transnational cause of the League Promethee. Emel became a transnational project of Crimean Tatars “an organ and centre that brings together for activity and struggle not only the Dobrujan Tatars but also of the Crimean Tatars of Poland, Turkey and Bulgaria” (Dobrucalı 1963b, 19) As pan-Turkist and diasporic organizations were prohibited in Turkey in the beginning of the 1930s (and the entry of Emel journal into Turkey

150 “Yazılı yayımların insanlar üstünde yaptığı etkiler bıraktığı izler gözönünde tutularak ... Kırmızıdan, Türk, İslam aleminden yazılar yayılmayarak okuyucuları bu alemlerin manevi varlığında gezdirmiştir.”
was banned in 1935\textsuperscript{151}) several Crimean Tatars with Turkish citizenship continued to function through \textit{Emel} and its organization.\textsuperscript{152} Not only did they contribute to the journal, they frequently traveled to Romania and visited Crimean Tatar villages to recruit participants. Edige Kırımal and Abdullah Zihni Soysal from Turkey even tried to enter Bulgaria to reach out to the Crimean Tatar villagers there, but they were not let in. The Crimean Tatars who were offered scholarship by Pilsudski to study in Poland tried to recruit participants among the Crimean Tatar Muslims who had settled in Poland 400 years ago.\textsuperscript{153}

The anniversaries of \textit{Qurultay} were celebrated in 1937 in Warsaw with conferences and ceremonies by visiting Crimean Tatars from Dobruja and Turkey. (Dobrucağı 1964a, 45) Another anniversary celebration was planned for Bucharest in 1938, and was cancelled only because Atatürk (widely revered by Crimean Tatar minority in Romania too) died shortly before the event.

Despite this transnational \textit{émigré} connection, \textit{Emel} was also a local diaspora journal, developing a close connection to the community from its first issue. It is obvious that Cafer Seydahmet could not build such a movement himself before the emergence of indigenous leaders such as the \textit{Emel} group. Cafer Seydahmet wrote extensively in the journal, and was

\textsuperscript{151} In the “\textit{Hakimiyet-i Milliye}” newspaper in Turkey, an article was published by Reşit Safvet dated 6 November 1930. In this article, it was reported that some Turks of Crimean origin conduct “Tatarlık” (Tatarism) and in these efforts, they were supported by the Romanian government and received funds from it. He argued that this is a harmful movement. Emel journal was declared to be totally alienated from the movement of Anatolian Turkism and even against it. “Romanya’daki Kırım asıllı Türklerden bazı kişilerin Tatarlık yaptıkları ve bu çalışmalarında Romen hükümetinden yardım gördükleri ve para aldıkları, bu hareketin zararladığı, bu gazetenin Anadolu türklüğü cereyanına büsbütün yabancı hatta aleyhdir olduğu yazılımıştı.” Cafer Seydahmet responded this criticism by an article published in Cumhuriyet on 12 November 1930.

\textsuperscript{152} Raşit Aşkı Özkırmızı sent articles, poems to Emel from Turkey.

\textsuperscript{153} The contacts with Tatar and Karaim communities of Poland was strengthened in this period. Tatar community was the descendants of the soldiers of the Golden Horde, who married and settled in Poland in the 14th century? Although the community lost its language completely, Islam became an important cause for the maintenance of identity for this community. The prominent activist, Edige Kırımal, who negotiated the Tatar interests with Germans during the WWII was a Polish Tatar. Many Crimean Tatar students studied in Poland in the interwar era. The gratitude of the Crimean Tatars was so much that small number of Tatars offered themselves as soldiers to Poland during the WWII as a symbol of fraternity.
introduced to the people of Dobruja by Emel. Later he spoke at many conferences in Dobruja, and he began to spend some time in Dobruja every year. His jubilee in 23 April 1933 became an important event, filling a hall for 2500 people with more standing outside. He was the recognized leader of the Crimean Tatars after Emel’s efforts.

4.3.1.6. The resonance of the exile nationalism frame increases:

Participation in frame alignment processes in the Crimean Tatar movement can be informally organized into three levels: (i) The elite level was composed of political elite-leaders who collectively created the frames having in mind their audience (potential adherents), and professionals and notables of the Crimean Tatar society who did not actively participate in the first level or central committee of nationalists, but who played significant role in establishing relations with the host state and society. (ii) The student youth, teachers, and imams formed the midlevel, linking the leaders to the masses and conducting the strenuous frame alignment processes. (iii) The mass level was composed of village youth who were often uneducated, but who actively participated in organizations and cultural activities and uneducated, peasant masses, who participated in mass activities, mainly by forming an audience, approving and providing material support. This movement was highly resonant, as it reached down to the lowest level. Below I explain my understanding of resonance in all these levels:

The movement leaders were small number of nationalists who devoted their lives to the movement. They published Emel, and related publications for the Crimean Tatar
nationalism. They also formed a transnational “national centre” with the Crimean Tatar leaders from the other diaspora settings and the homeland, and undertook certain underground operations for the benefit of the Crimean Tatar national cause. Emel’s publishers became the members of the transnational “national centre” within the League Promethee led by Cafer Seydahmet along with the members from Turkey and Poland. The national centre acted as a government-in–exile, and developed diplomatic relations with Poland, Romania, Germany and other European states, as well as with the members of other national centres in the League. The members of the “national centre” formed the key cadre preparing to take power when an opportunity appeared, especially in war or the collapse of the state power. The 1917 experience had showed that the Crimean Tatars did not have educated and professional cadres when they needed them. This experience affected the way Cafer Seydahmet directed his efforts in the ensuing period. We must not forget that many including the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the inter-war era did not predict that the Soviet Union would survive for long and expected its collapse soon. The national centre was not an official organization in any country, and countries such as Turkey, Poland, Germany, and Romania permitted or limited their activities depending on their national interest.

The opportunity for a national centre to work for the homeland emerged during WWII. Edige Kırımal and Müstecip Hacı Fazıl (now Ülküsal) went to Germany to lobby the German government for the national rights of the Crimean Tatars. They tried to negotiate with German authorities about the predicament of Crimean Tatar prisoners of war from the German camps. (Thes prisoners of war will be discussed in

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154 Sagış (Mehmet Niyazi, 1931), Tarih-i Tatar Han ve Dağistan ve Mosku Deşt-i Kapıçak ülkelerindir (Kefeli İbrahim, 1736), Kırım Halk Şiirleri, Kırım İstiklal Davası (Selim Ortay, 1939), Dobruca ve Türkler (Müstecip Ülküsal, 1940, Emel: Köstence)
the chapter on Crimean Tatar nationalism in Turkey.) However, in 1941, Müstecip Hacı Fazıl came to Constanța, and met with the Crimean Tatar nationalists to collect a list of volunteers who would be willing to go to Crimea to join the nationalist movement, and fight against the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁵ (Karahan 2008, 24)

Necip Hacı Fazıl, Müstecip Ülküsal’s brother, became the leader of the movement in Dobruja after his brother left. Before the Soviet army reoccupied the peninsula, he organized a committee composed of Mehmet Vani, Mufti Mustafa Ahmet, Tevfik İslâm, İbadula Abdula, Nazif Abdurahim, Fevzi İbrahim, Selim Ablakim, Kasap Kâzım, Kasap Şükri, and the lawyer and publisher of Halk Amdi Nusret, to smuggle and harbour the Crimean Tatars who acted in national committees from Crimea. Necip Hacı Fazıl had to go to Odessa to bring the Crimean Tatars who could not find transport to enter Romania. The committee of the Crimean Tatar nationalist intellectuals made sure that the refugees were hidden in several Crimean Tatar villages, and their needs were met. (Dobrucağı 1964b, 16) NKVD murdered Necip Hacı Fazıl in 1948, but members of the committee including Ali Bekmambet, Irsambet Yusuf, Eyup Menali, Ferat Faik, Mehmet Vani, and Müstecip Hüseyin continued to work clandestinely to hide Crimean Tatar refugees from the Soviets, and to provide them with food and money. Amdi Nusret (Orlu) escaped to Turkey to raise funds for the Crimean refugees, along with Müstecip Hacı Fazıl. (Karahan 2008, 24)

The elite level also included prominent Crimean Tatars who were not in the national centre, but who were part of the larger diasporic organization. Selim Abdülakim, for example, was the first Crimean Tatar lawyer elected MP, and served four terms in the Romanian parliament. His brother was an officer in the Romanian army. Selim Abdulakim was not particularly known for his Crimean Tatar nationalism, but he supported the cause.

¹⁵⁵ However, the Nazis never permitted that.
His major activism was establishing quotas for Muslim students to receive education in Romanian institutions and a scholarship fund for supporting these students, called as the Selim Abdulakim Fund. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl also engaged activities which are generally undertaken by the ethnic elites who are well-integrated in the host-state structures, which constitute the second level in pyramid of resonance. According to Livezeanu (1995, 4), the atmosphere of interwar Romania was marked by wide nationalist consensus, which included mainstream politicians and an extreme right. The legionnaires of the 1930s appeared because of the cultural policies of the Romanian state beginning from the 1920s. These policies pursued the ideal of a unitary ethnically pure polity Livezeanu (1995, 4) The government prioritized the establishment of Romanian presence in town and urban centres, which created a xenophobic, ultra-nationalist climate. (Livezeanu 1995, 18) The 1930s were openly dictatorial. It is significant that Emel was published without any disturbance. The Crimean Tatar nationalists kept good relations even with the Iron Guard. (Landau 1995, 112) Like İsmail Gaspiralı who translated his newspaper into Russian, Müstecip Hacı Fazıl supported publication of a weekly newspaper Halk in Romanian, in order to gain the Romanian public’s confidence and to answer criticisms. (1936) The editor of this newspaper was Amdi Nusret (Orlu), who could be viewed as one of the second layer (He escaped to Turkey in 1949 due to communist persecution.) Yıldırım was published in Turkish again to reply to critics, and to explain the Crimean Tatar cause by demonstrating that it meant harm neither to the Turkish minority, nor to the interests of Turkey, nor to the Turkish minority in Romania. The second level presented the movement in public sphere of the host-state, to neutralize the Romanian government and to garner the support of bystanders.

156 Landau however interprets the communication with Iron Guard as a cooperation without evidence, but this is not possible due to Iron Guard’s ideology.
In the second level, there were midlevel leaders such as Medgidia Seminary graduates, imams or teachers, or graduates of Romanian higher institutions. The Emel journal found the largest number of supporters among the students and graduates of the Medgidia Seminary. Medgidia Seminary was based on a centuries-old madrasah in the northern town of Babadag. Romania nationalised the madrasah’s vakif property, and the madrasah was carried to Medgidia where more Crimean Tatars lived. The Romanian government added Romanian classes, and recognized the equal status of the school to Romanian teachers’ colleges. The school aimed to educate the imams, the cadre of the muftiat, kadis, and teachers for Muslim institutions. The Young Turks, and other nationalist teachers, sometimes with Turkish citizenship who taught in the school already contributed to the spread of ideas of pan-Turkism. Madgidia Muslim Seminary Alumni Association (Madgidia Müslüman Seminarı Mezunları Cemiyeti/Asociația Absolventilor Seminarului Muslim din Medgidia) had around 200 members in 1938 (Ülküşal 1966, 166). The students and graduates of the Seminary followed Emel journal, and began contributing to the journal soon after it was published. They sent articles to Emel, collected regional folklore, and read the journal aloud to illiterate villagers in coffee-houses, in order to communicate Emel’s nationalist framework in their own villages. They also produced literary works that problematized their situation in the diaspora, featuring heroes experiencing a transformation of consciousness from being a mere Tatar into Crimean Tatar nationalists planning to return to Crimea. These works resonated with the population because they featured local language, values, and traditions.

This third level also implemented modern ideas, Pan-Turkism and Crimean Tatar nationalism

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157 Some examples of such works were Cavşılık ve Caş Fidanlar (Necip Hacı Fazıl, 1933), Kırım (Necip Hacı Fazıl), Bayram Şenliği (Müstecip Hacı Fazıl), Kartman Caş arasında (Mehmet Vani, 1934), Toy (Mehmet Vani, 1934), Ödelek (Mehmet Vani,1934), Kurtuluş Bayramı (Mehmet Vani, 1934), Kurban Bayram Gecesi (Mehmet Vani, 1938), Kökköz Bayar (Mehmet Vani), Büyüülü Cımırta (Mehmet Vani), Uyusmagan Eki Arkadaş (Mehmet Vani), Bora (Halil Abdülhakım Kırmman), Çora Batır (?).
in their village schools or mosques. They organized activities for students such as national anniversaries (with mini-conferences), and theatres in tepreș and bayram festivals in villages, and invited the villagers to watch and learn from them. Emin Bektöre learned Crimean folk dances from the Crimean Tatars visiting from Turkey in 1933, and taught them to Dobrujan youth. (Dobruçalı 1964a, 45) Müstecip Hacı Fazıl regarded this level as a cadre of the future, and cadre under training. He classified the leaders of the movement as follows: “The ones who earned the right to be called “idealists” despite their social position or occupation, and the ones who work towards adopting the ideal.” (Dobruçalı 1964a, 41) During WWII, Müstecip Hacı Fazıl decided to employ his trained cadre in Crimea, and requested permission for the imams and teachers to go to Crimea to serve, but unfortunately he was not able to get permission from the authorities, and was not able to attain this goal by other means.

In the fourth level, there were young peasant men and women who were less educated, but who took active part in theatre, dance, music activities organized by the third level and were more open to new ideas. The fifth level contained the rest of the population, who were middle-to old aged peasantry, who observed traditions, and had little modern education. They participated only by providing funds, as an audience for spectacles and activities, and by subscribing to the journal. Their support was critical, because they could create a power base, because of their sheer number and the resources they held. There are various ways to understand the level of resonance, which include looking at the circulation of Emel, organizational membership and participation, and depth of sacrifices made by ordinary

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158 “Emel bu yüklü programını gerçekleştirmek yolunda bilhassa şu unsurlara dayanıyordu. 1-Hangi bilim ortamında ve derecesinde, hangi sosyal durunda bulunrsa bulunsun, ....idealist denmeye hak kazanmış olanlar. Bunlar milli hareketin temeliniz be özünü meydana getiriyorlardı... 2-tahsili az olmakla beraber...ideali benimsemeye gayret gösteren idealist adayları.”
people for supporting the homeland co-ethnics as well conducting oral history and examining the written accounts of the living witnesses from this stratum of the society.

One way of deducing resonance of the nationalist frame is the circulation of the *Emel* journal. It was 1500 in 1930, which is a high number for the population of around 20,000. It must be noted that *Emel* was regularly published using only funding from its own community and donations, until it was closed due to the abolition of freedom of the press in Romania in 1941. The biggest limitation for nationalist mobilization was the low level of education. Therefore, the *Emel* journal preached modernization of the community in parallel to the nationalist awakening. It aimed to educate the masses on issues of health, modern agricultural methods, legal matters that could improve the state of the community and change its worldview. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl and other diaspora leaders took special care of this layer and continuously visited villages, collected subscription and donations, and met the peasants to ensure sustainable frame-alignment processes.

Another way of deducing resonance in the mass levels is observing the spread of organizations affiliated with *Emel*. These organizations, called Dobruja Turkish Cultural Unions (Dobruca Türk Hars Birliği-DTHB) appeared in almost all the villages and towns containing Crimean Tatars from 1933 on. (Dobruca 1964a, 44) DTHB at its peak was organized in 6 towns and 110 villages. (Dobruca 1964a, 44) Müstecip Hacı Fazıl founded these local organizations by writing letters to the subscribers, teachers, imams, or personally meeting them. The enlightened imams, or teachers, of these villages were in charge of the activities, such as preparing plays for *tepes* or *bayram*, anniversary ceremonies for the Crimean Tatar heroes, and major national events that relate to the Crimean Tatars and Turkey.
The organization spread quickly to most of Dobruja between 1933 and 1935. Numerical evidence demonstrates the breadth of the organization, and the resonance of the frame. On 29 May 1934, 500 delegates coming from 6 cities, and 67 of 85 Crimean Tatar villages, where a sub-organization participated in the General Congress of Dobruja Türk Hars Birliği. At its peak, DTHB existed in 6 towns and 110 villages (Dobrucalı 1964a, 44). In 1934, 400 religious ceremonies (hatim) for Çelebi Cihan’s martyrdom was organized. (Dobrucalı 1964a, 41) In February 1935, national events were organized during bayram in 65 villages. During 1936 Eid-al-Adha, nationalist events were organized in 100 villages. In February 1936, the people of 72 villages noted the anniversary of martyrdom of Çelebi Cihan and prayed for his soul (ruhu için mevlüt). (Ülküsal 1999: 189) If we assume that there were 120 villages with significant Crimean Tatar populations in Dobruja, this means that the great majority of the population was covered. These anniversaries and celebrations were repeated in subsequent years until the war. 26 November (9 December in Gregorian), the day of convention of Qurultay in Crimea and the day of the declaration of sovereignty and 23 November, the anniversary of martyrdom of Çelebi Cihan were the two most significant dates, when events were held. According to the memoirs of Müstecip Ülküsal, Ali Bekmambet, and Mehmet Vani, almost all educated young male and female Crimean Tatars in Dobruja participated in cultural activities (publications, theatre, teşreş, folk dances and music, conferences) of DTHB local organizations. Apart from DTHB, the Muslim civil society emerged with several other related organizations which shared the same frame, and contributed frame alignment processes: Mehmet Niyazi Cultural Association (Mehmet Niyazi Kültür Cemiyeti (1938), and Lt. Major Abdülakim Cultural and Sports Association- (Mülazimevvel Kazım Abdülakim Kültür ve Spor Cemiyeti, 1916), Islamic Community
Associations (*Pazarcık ve Silistre Tamimi Maarif Cemiyetleri*) (1908-1909), Turkish University Students Association (*Üniversiteli Türk Talebe Cemiyeti*, 1929), Turkish High School Student Association (*Liseli Türk Talebe Cemiyeti*), Medgidia Seminary Student Organization, (*Seminer Talebe Cemiyeti*, 1919) (*Ülküsal* 1966, 166-170)

In order to confirm the highness of the level of resonance, I conducted oral history interviews with women who were young at that time, it became apparent that almost everyone learned who Çelebi Cihan was by the second half of the 1930s, and he entered the folk imagination. People began to cite him in their daily prayers, and expressed respect for Müstecip Hacı Fazıl and Emel. According to a participant, the ceremony of the opening of Mehmet Niyazi’s tomb on 22 September 1935 brought together perhaps 4000 people. (Dobrucalı 1964a, 45)

A final way of understanding not only the level but also the nature of resonance of Emel movement was the heroic acts taken during the WWII when the homeland community came under great danger provide evidence for the strength of nationalism at this social level in Romania. The sudden change of political opportunity structures increased the level of mobilization and activity. In this period, Müstecip Hacı Fazıl also collected aid (60,000 lei and food) to be distributed to the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. However, neither Romanian nor German authorities in Romania let these Crimean Tatars enter Crimea. Although it was impossible to return to Crimea from Romania in great numbers during the war, Müstecip Ülküsal’s brother Necip H. Fazıl, and other younger members of the ‘national center’ who were isolated in Romania, continued to seek ways. Soon an opportunity for demonstrating

159 Şükürzade Güngören. Interview by author. August 2006, Polatlı. Conversations with elderly during participant observation at Kanara confirmed this observation.

160 His large-scale tomb was the first modern one with the tamgha, the Crimean Khanate's symbol, which appears on the blue flag as well. (Williams 2001)
transnational solidarity emerged for the Crimean Tatars in Romania. In 1943, Dr. Ahmet Özenbaşlı from Crimea contacted Necip H. Fazıl asking him to help the members of National Committee to escape from Crimea to Romania, as the Soviets were approaching. In October 1943, 150 people, including Ahmet Özenbaşlı came by train to Constanta through Odessa. Necip H. Fazıl went to Odessa to bring the second group. Some others, such as Dr. Omerov and his wife Dr. Hayriye, came with the retreating Germans. These Crimean Tatars from Crimea were hosted by the whole villages, such as Karamurat, Köstence, Perveli, Ömürşâ, Mankalye, Tatlıcak, Bayramdede, Azaplar, Kubadin, Musrat, Uzunlar, and others. Very few defected, most collaborated. Taking this risk demonstrated the high level of resonance and strong participation in the fifth layer.(the largest mass level)

4.3.1.7. The end and consequences of exile nationalism

In 1939, the Iron Guard’s coup in Romania ousted King Carol. Germany sent one million German soldiers under the auspice of military training to Romania to guarantee the

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161 Mehmet Vani, Selim Cafer, Ali Beknamber, Menali Eyüp, Fayık Ferat, Abdula Efendi and others (Ülküsal, 1966: 244) On 13 October 1944, Mehmet Vani hid Ahmet Özenbaşlı and family for 47 days. Then he was able to provide them with identity cards and sent them to Bucharest for safety. However, there two other Crimean refugees handed them in to Russians. Although his wife Hanife and his children were not arrested in the beginning, in 1952 they were also sent to Russia. (Yurtsever, 1983) Cevdet Turan’s father Cemal also assisted Ahmet Özenbaşlı in his stay in Romania. (Cevdet Turan, Interview by author, 17 September 2005, Constanta) According to my interviewee, Zemine Bektemir, 9 male Crimean Tatar refugees stayed in Karamurat. Every night they had dinner in another house. They remained probably one winter and then they left for Germany. (Raime Nasip Ali, Interview by author, 23 September 2005, Constanta) Altay Kerim has written a story about Söyin Akay from Crimea who stayed in Musrat. (Karadeniz: 2, 2000). The artists who staged the play Altın Beşik also took asylum in Romania. They probably taught music and dance to local Tatars. They stayed in Constanta some time during which they staged their plays and were applauded by the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja. In 1944, they were arrested by the soviet government and probably deported to Siberia. (Temircili, 1963, 9) The teacher, Sacit Muttalip also hosted Meryem and Seyit Halil, two Crimean Tatars. (Rubiyê Kurtamêt, Interview by author. 28 July 2006. Constanta.) In Bayramdede, Dr. Kemal, his wife Naciye, and retired Albay Muzekir Menlivuap were hosted. Mengazi Resid Muhsin hosted one Crimean Tatar. (Sena M. 2004: 4) The family of Seyitabla, Şükru Gazi and Ismail Mazlaf were able to escape from arrest by the Soviets. Nariman Ibraim knows that her village Uzunlar hosted Crimean refugees. (Nariman Ibraim Interview by author, 14 September 2005, Constanta) In Karamurat, 9 Crimean Tatars were hosted. Raime Nasip Ali remembered that his father sympathized deeply with these Crimean refugees, and his mother also cried for the songs she learned from the Crimean Tatars they hosted. This demonstrates strong devotion among the community for their transnational co-ethnics. (Raime Nasip Ali, Interview by author, 23 September 2005, Constanta)
territorial integrity of Romania. This meant Romania would side with Germany in the upcoming war against Soviets. In 1939, many Crimean Tatars were drafted, including Necip H. Fazıl and the workers of the Emel printing house. It became impossible to print Emel as the press began to be censured, the use of paper was limited, and a German officer was quartered in the Emel printing office. After paying off Emel’s debts for 1939 by his own income, and after consulting Cafer Seydaımet and the “national centre”, Müstecip Hacı Fazıl decided to immigrate to Turkey for his own personal security and the benefit of the Crimean Tatar cause. In case of a Soviet invasion of Romania, he would be the first person to be punished as the leader of the Crimean Tatar nationalism in Dobruja. He immigrated in the December of 1940162. The diaspora nationalist movement in Romania was carried to Turkey by Müstecip Hacı Fazıl as Emel began to be republished in Turkey in 1960; it became the longest periodical of Crimean Tatar diaspora, continuing until 1998 (and resumed again in 2010).

The diaspora national activism which peaked during the interwar years, successfully advocated the interests of the Turkish/Muslim community, re-established ties with Crimea, and Crimean Tatar nationalism, and reconnected the previously isolated community to other diaspora communities and states through the transnational links it fostered. Although communism rooted out this movement, the 1930s movement lived on in the collective memory through communism, and contributed the rejuvenation of nationalism in the 1990s. Müstecip Hacı Fazıl (Ülküsal) evaluated his work and concluded in his memoirs, “My work in Dobruja was able to organize and strengthen the nationalism and “Kırımculuk”

162 Between 1923 and 1949, from Romania 79,287 people migrated (iskanlı, agreed) from Turkey. 43,271 people migrated (“free migrant status”) Romanya left Southern Dobruja to Bulgarians in 1939 and 8000 Tatars and Turks were left to Turkey in 1952. (See Williams 2001, 281)
(Crimeanism, the way Crimean nationalism was customarily called in Dobruja) movement among the Crimean Tatars in this region”. This is not disputed by historians of today.163

4.3.2. Minority Nationalism in the Communist Era (1948-1989)

In September 1940, with the Craiova Agreement, Romania was forced to surrender Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, with its 5000 Crimean Tatars, and 130,000 Turks. (Eminov 2000: 133) After these territorial changes, Crimean Tatars became the most populous Muslim group in Romania.164 While before a very small number of Crimean Tatars had lived in Bulgaria, in the post-war era, 5000 Crimean Tatars, who were formerly Romanian citizens, became Bulgarian citizens. Therefore, in this section, comparisons of the developments of Bulgarian and Romanian parts of the Crimean Tatar community in Dobruca will be drawn where relevant.

The Soviet, Romanian and Bulgarian communities were all repressed by a communist totalitarian government. The significant question related to their circumstance: Why did the communities in Romania and Bulgaria not mobilize, creating an opposition movement to communism, and engage in a movement for collective return as the community in the USSR?

The following interaction of political opportunity structures with the framing processes explains this difference: First, in Romania, once the educated stratum was purged, sent to prison, and pressured by the secret police, the Crimean Tatar community, which had not completed its modernization and education process, could not produce elites who would re-create the former frame of exile nationalism. Although the Soviet Union destroyed the nationalist elites of Crimea, it could not succeed in destroying the communist Crimean Tatar

163 “...Dobruja’da çalışmalarım buradaki Kırım Türkleri arasında milliyetçilik ve Kırmızılık cereyanının doğuş teşkilatlanmasına ve kuvvetlenmesine amil olmuştur.” (Ülküsal, 1999: 10)
164 While a few hundred Tatars lived in Tulcea, most Tatars lived in Constanta county.
elites, who continued to guide the framing processes, even during the special settlement regime. Before the Soviet invasion of Romania, there were not any communist Crimean Tatar elites, as communism was generally unpopular. Opposition to the state frame was made impossible by Ceausescu, who consolidated power in the 1960s. No significant dissident movement emerged in Romania due to the security system he put into place, and the largest Security organization of the Eastern Europe, the Securitatae.\textsuperscript{165} Even the large Hungarian minority was successfully suppressed. Bulgaria did not have a credible opposition movement either. (Vachudova 2005) This created a situation wherein the Crimean Tatar leaders in Romania and Bulgaria could not take advantage of the social movement cycles (created by other movements), as in the USSR. Secondly, in this gap, Romania introduced an alternative identity frame for the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja by imposing Kazan Tatar language in "Tatar" schools opened under \textit{korenizatsiia} (indigenization) policy.\textsuperscript{166} The Soviet Union also tried to introduce an alternative identity by the policies of OrgNabor, and creating alternative homelands of Mubarek and Baharistan. Not only did this state project fail, it strengthened the Crimean Tatar collective return movement. In Romania, the Crimean Tatars thought that this policy was a conspiracy to keep them ignorant and uneducated, and they largely dropped demands for education in the mother language. Thirdly, the limited cultural opportunities provided by the regime, and the end of overt pressure caused the Crimean Tatar elite to

\textsuperscript{165}After he consolidated his power in the beginning of 1970s Ceauşescu reasserted Stalinist policy which did not change until the end of his regime. Romania virtually had no moderate, organized opposition to communism when compared to other East European States, mainly due to ruthless, extremely oppressive regime of Ceauşescu, and the strict surveillance and repressive measures of the internal security forces. Even Magyar dissidents, the most populated minority, which the regime particularly aimed to Romanize did not engage in a widespread movement against the authorities. Under Ceauşescu regime, intellectual dissidents were few and the creation of clandestine opposition organizations were impossible. Similarly Bulgaria also did not have a significant samizdat activity or organized opposition when compared to Czech Republic, Poland, or Hungary. (Vachudova, 2005)

\textsuperscript{166}In 1923, the Bolshevik Party “recognized distinct national cultures, and pledged central state support for their maximum development” (Martin 2001, 74) The long term goal was that “all-Union socialist culture” would “supercede” the”pre-existing national cultures”. (Martin 2001, 75)
create a "non-diasporic Tatar identity frame", attempting for extension of communist master frame. In this frame, no attachment to Crimea was implied. In the USSR, the Crimean Tatars sought the extension of the communist master frame only to strengthen their demand for return to homeland.

In Bulgaria, korenizatsia was short-lived, as in Romania, and the Crimean Tatars largely acted in conjunction with the populous Turkish minority, without developing a "Tatar minority identity frame".

4.3.2.1. The radical change in political and discursive opportunity structures:

The arrest, torture, sentence to hard labour, murder of nationalist elites, partial deportation of masses, and threats of mass deportation caused the sudden disappearance of the exile nationalism frame and movement among the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Dobruja.

In August 1944, after the Soviet Union invaded Romania, they asked the Romanian authorities to collaborate with them by arresting the Crimean Tatar nationalists. At the request of the Soviet Union, the Romanian authorities arrested more than 600 Soviet citizens (among them the Crimean Tatars) throughout the entire county until May 17-20, 1945. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005,126; Emel 146, 1985, 21) Some of the Crimean refugees escaped (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 126), and some of the refugees who were sent to Buzau by the Germans on 22-23 August were murdered by the Soviet forces who entered the city on the same day. (Bekmambet 2001, 49)

The Soviet Union was after not only the Soviet citizen Crimean Tatars who escaped to Romania, but also the members of the Crimean Tatar diaspora who helped them. Many Crimean Tatars from Dobruca who sheltered Crimean refugees were captured between 1944
and 1945 (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 126), and were accused most notably of “propagandising Crimea’s secession from the USSR, sheltering Crimean refugees, having provided money, voluntary labour, propaganda materials, to support Crimean liberation and the establishment of the Crimean state.”

Necip Hacı Fazıl was captured in October 1948; he was tortured and assassinated by the NKVD. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 127) After Necip Hacı Fazıl, the other leaders, who had formed a committee to smuggle the Crimean Tatars from Crimea to Romania, were arrested. In February of 1952, 15 Crimean Tatars (called Great Tatar Group case) were brought before the military court under charges of “having provided money, voluntary labour, propaganda materials, to support Crimean liberation and the establishment of the Crimean state, having collaborated with Germans, and sheltering Crimean refugees” (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127) as well as “spying for Turkey”, “having provided, information concerning Soviet and Romanian military objectives on fortification works in Dobruja, and Danube-Black Sea Channel”. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 127) On 11 March 1953, they received sentences ranging from to hard labour for life to a minimum of seven years in prison, as well as the confiscation of their property. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 127) When they were released at the end of 1960s, they were kept under constant scrutiny, and forced into blue-collar jobs and poverty. Their families were discriminated

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167 The teacher Sacit Ali Muttalip was sent to Gherla prison and died there. His family had to change their surname in order not to be discriminated against. (Ayhan Ali, Interview by author, 25 July 2006, Constanta)

168 See Karahan (2008)

169 In fact, some Tatars took part in anti-communist armed resistance between 1949 and 1953, in particular in actions of the Gogu Puiu group (Şerif Şerif), Dumitru Mihailescu group (Selim Rıza, Seyfullah Ömer, and Ekrem Mamut) or the organization Regionala Marea (Ali Osman Bekmambet and Refik Cumali). According to Güner Akmolla, Imam Müstecip Samedin, Imam Ablay, Bucharest Imam Sali Regep, Dr. Reşat Kamil, teacher Lütfi, lawyer Osman Nuri, School Inspector Sacit Ali Muttalip, Police Chief Şükrü İbrahim were also sentenced to hard labour with similar accusations. (Emel (Ideal))
against in school and the workplace. Mehmet Vani was kept in prison and tortured\textsuperscript{170} between 1952 and 1957, and after his release, he was permitted to be the imam of a small neighbourhood; his family also suffered discrimination. They finally migrated to Turkey in the 1970s. Necat Sali’s father had worked in the Omurşा branch of the Crimean Tatar committee, smuggling the co-ethnics during the war. In the communist era, he was accused of being a chiabur\textsuperscript{171} and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Not only did this impoverish his family, but his children were expelled from high school and university.\textsuperscript{172} In the case called Second Tatar Group,\textsuperscript{173} the members were sentenced to hard labour camps. Other nationalists such as teacher Tahsin İbrahim, doctor Eyüp Musa, Şevket Musa, Nuri Resul, Necip Resul, Ziya Resul, and dentist Memedemin Şükri were arrested individually. In addition to thousands affiliated with the national movement, the notables of the Crimean Tatar society were punished. Through a 1950 list of 4323 “undignifieds”, many Crimean Tatar citizens were accused of being chiabur, “tied to former exploiters”, “exploiting Russian prisoners”, “membership in a bourgeois political party”. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127) The list featured peasants who owned no more than 3 to 5 ha of land, which according to Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker suggests that the lists were used to “take revenge on personal enemies”. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127) In 1951-1952, hundreds of individuals (entire families) were deported from Dobruja to Baragan. As in the USSR, the deported included women, children, and the elderly, and they were given a very short time to prepare a small amount of belongings to take with them. After a difficult journey, they were forced to settle in places without accommodation and wells. (Oberländer-

\textsuperscript{170} “Memoirs from the Prison” ("Cezaevlerinden Hatıralar") of Mehmet Vani Yurtsever was published in \textit{Karadeniz} 48-54 in 1997.

\textsuperscript{171} Wealthy peasants, equivalent of kulaks in the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{172} Necat Sali, Interview by author. 17 September 2005, Constanta.

\textsuperscript{173} The Second Tatar Group included Salim Cafer, Abdula Ablay, Ablamit İzzet, Reşit Kadir, and Faik Ferhat.
Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127) The prominent family of Dobruja, the family of Selim Abdulakim, was destroyed in these years. (Geafar 2004: 6) According to Adam Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker (2005), intense military preparations in Dobruja between 1949 and 1953, and a highly suspicious census done among the Muslims during which the census-makers tried to identify who is a "Tatar" and who is a "Turk", and seemed to count only the Crimean Tatars could be the sign that “forced removal of the entire Muslim population...a scenario similar to that used by the Soviets in Crimea” was being prepared (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127). According to Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, the changes in Soviet foreign policy with the death of Stalin could have ended these plans.\footnote{174 Deportation was not uncommon practice of the era. Jews were deported during the war. After World War II, thousands of Romania's ethnic Germans were deported to the Soviet Union. The Romanian Communists later expropriated the ethnic Germans' land and forced them onto collective farms and into factories. Roma, and Yugoslavians were also deported.}

In the second half of the 1950s, the overt pressures on the Crimean Tatar minority decreased, while covert pressures for assimilation continued. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127)

Romanian and Soviet secret services arrested the Great Mufti of Romania, Sadık İbrahim was arrested in August 23rd, 1944, and sent to an internment camp. He was accused of “propagandising Crimea’s secession from the USSR, of defamation “to the highest degree” of the Soviet state and army, as well as collaboration with the Gestapo”.

(Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005: 127) The great muftiate and muftiates of the provinces were abolished and only one mufti was appointed for all Romania. The status of Muslim religious leadership in Romania deteriorated into a civil service position in the Ministry of Cults. (Aksu 2003: 110) Mehmet Yakup, who was appointed as the mufti in the communist era, served for 40 years, and was known to be a servant of the Communist Party

174 Deportation was not uncommon practice of the era. Jews were deported during the war. After World War II, thousands of Romania's ethnic Germans were deported to the Soviet Union. The Romanian Communists later expropriated the ethnic Germans' land and forced them onto collective farms and into factories. Roma, and Yugoslavians were also deported.
rather than an advocate of rights of Muslims in Romania. In his era, the mosques and Muslim cemeteries went to ruin\textsuperscript{175}, and the Medgidia Seminary, after losing its status as a pedagogical school in 1948, was reduced to an institution for training only imams. It was eventually closed “due to lack of interest among Tatars to be trained as imams” (Aksu 2003: 111)\textsuperscript{176} This was of course because there were no job opportunities (as very few operating mosques were left), and there was strong political pressure regarding imams. The right to pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) was granted only for carefully picked Muslims for propaganda purposes in developing relations and trade with Muslim countries, in parallel to Romania’s search for a more independent foreign policy.

In short, these drastic changes in political and discursive opportunity structures in the form of repressive measures effectively put an end to the interwar exile nationalist frame and the movement.

4.3.2.2. The imposition of a non-resonant frame by the regime:

With the Soviet occupation and the establishment of a communist regime in Romania, Romanian state aligned with the Soviet master frame regarding the Crimean Tatars in Romania.\textsuperscript{177} According to the Soviet master frame, the existence of Crimean Tatars as a separate nation was denied.

\textsuperscript{175} 80 mosques were left by 1989 out of 376 in 1906.

\textsuperscript{176} Several of my interviewees expressed the disgust of the previous state of muftiate. Indeed religious practice especially in the communal form (such as Hajj, praying in a mosque) drastically decreased under communism due to this controlled nature of Islam and risks of public participation in religious activity for the participants. Medet Nezir, imam of the Bucharest mosque in the communist era told that when he worked as the imam of the Bucharest Mosque, he did not have much Muslim cemaat, and mostly foreigners such as Arabs or members of the Turkish consulate attended the prayers. The Muslims continued their private praying, sacrifice rituals, and circumcision. (Medet Nezir, Interview by author, February 2007, Toronto)

\textsuperscript{177} See Chapter 3.
• The Crimean Tatars in Dobruja are part of the Volga Tatars and have the same language as them, therefore education ought to be in this language.

• The Crimean Tatars in Dobruja have no relation with Crimea, and have been in Dobruja at least since the 10th century.

Figure 10. The Soviet-Romanian frame of the Crimean Tatar identity

All the pre-WWII Crimean Tatar and Turkish literature in houses and mosques was destroyed as in the Soviet Union. But the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja continued to create a problem for the authorities, as the Soviets declared that no such nation existed. The solution was then found through their renaming as simply “Tatars” (and not Crimean Tatars), which meant Volga Tatars in the Soviet ethnic terminology. The utilization of the word “Crimea” in the historical narrations and literary works of Crimean Tatars was outlawed in Romania, as it was in the USSR. The two communities were not permitted to establish any transnational relations. The aim was that the new generations of the two communities would not have any knowledge of each other, their common history and language, and eventually they would be totally alienated. Accordingly, Crimean Tatar children began to be instructed in the Kazan Tatar language with textbooks imported from Kazan. (in the beginning in the Cyrillic alphabet, later transcribed into Latin.).\textsuperscript{178} The Medgidia Seminary served to educate teachers of this new Tatar language, and in 1948 the Romanian government opened the Tatar Pedagogical School for educating teachers and students.\textsuperscript{179} The teachers who worked in this period told me that they themselves had difficulty in understanding this language, let alone teaching the students. Although the Kazan and Crimean Tatar languages have the same root, they developed differently in morphology, syntax, lexicon, and pronunciation over the

\textsuperscript{178} The graduates of Medgidia Seminary were compelled to teach this subject. But they had also difficulty. \textsuperscript{179} Ali Ahmet Naci Cafer prepared the “Tatar” alphabet and opened the Pedagogical School. (Servet Baubec, Interview by author, 2 August 2006, Medgidia.)
thousand years during which the Crimean and Volga Tatars lived apart. Kazan Tatar sounded like a foreign language, and the Crimean Tatars rejected the imposition of this artificial identity by not sending their children to "Tatar schools", and sending them to Romanian schools instead. Even in the USSR, the state did not attempt to impose Kazan Tatar language on the Crimean Tatars, though it classified them all as simply "Tatars" in the census. Perhaps The Romanian State felt the need to design a new identity frame for the Crimean Tatars in place of the exile nationalist frame, still fresh in the minds of the population. This is similar to the attempt of the USSR to design identity frames through OrgNabor and to create the alternative homelands of Mubarek and Baharistan.\textsuperscript{180} When this attempt backfired, Romanian communist government ordered the graduates of the Seminary\textsuperscript{181} and the Tatar Pedagogy School to prepare books in the Crimean Tatar language used in Dobruja to be taught to students. According to Müstecip Ülküsal, when the regime realised there was little difference between the Crimean Tatar and Turkish books, it was again alarmed, as the communists also wanted to distance Crimean Tatars from Turkish language and culture. (Ülküsal 1961: 4; Eminov 2000) Soon the experiment with korenizatsii ended, as it had for the Soviet Union almost 30 years ago. In 1959, all "Tatar schools" turned into Romanian educational institutions. The Medgidia Seminary and the Tatar Language and Literature department in Ovidius University (Constanta) were closed in 1967 and 1972 respectively. Although this frame was not successful overall, it succeeded in alienating the Crimean Tatar people from the idea of education in mother language. Bulgaria also ended korenizatsii in 1955-6. It merged Turkish schools with Bulgarian.

\textsuperscript{180}See Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{181} Zeytula Mambet, Ahmet Naci Cafer Ali, İsmail Ziyaeddin, Mehmet Ablay, Muratça Seytabdula, Ekrem Menlibay Ömer Lütfü, Habib Hilmi, Mustafa Ahmet worked in this process of preparing a new alphabet and textbooks, as well as educating teachers. Tahsin İbrahim, Mehmet Vani, Mustafa Ahmet, Necip Resul were persecuted in this era.
4.3.2.3. The emergence of a "Tatar minority nationalism" frame

The Romanian communist repression of the Crimean Tatars changed from being overt to covert in the beginning of 1960s. The nationalists were deprived of jobs, school, communist party membership, and so on but ordinary Crimean Tatars were not unlawfully arrested and persecuted, as long as they followed the law. Unlike Bulgaria, the Romanian regime did not attempt to restrict religious rituals (circumcision, daily prayers, animal sacrifice), to prohibit the use of Turkish language, to change Muslim names, or to deny the ethnic identity of Crimean Tatars and Turks, arguing they are ethnic Romanians. They even permitted visits, or in a few case immigration, to Turkey, or annual pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj). For propaganda purposes, the Communist Party continued to employ Crimean Tatars, and sometimes raised them to local leadership positions. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 126) The Cauceascu regime discriminated against and weakened, but did not totally destroy minority institutions (It permitted a small number of Turkish schools, and publications in Crimean Tatar language.183). Wholly unlike circumstances in Bulgaria, Romania pursued a gradual assimilation for the Crimean Tatar identity.184 The new generation of Crimean Tatar elite produced a framing process that reflected the modifications to political opportunity structures. Under the communist regime, the Crimean Tatars continued to be socially, economically, and politically discriminated against, but they also

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182 Tatars were recruited to the village, town and city level organizations of PCR and the PSD in Constanta county between 1944 and 1948. PCR’s Constanta and Tulcea county branches established Sole Muslim Worker’s Front (FUMM) in 1945 to manipulate the Tatar and Turkish communities in the upcoming elections but Muslims voted for democratic parties. Later, this organization was purged. Until 1989 the representation of Tatars or Turkish party members in governing institutions was lower than their community’s percentage relative to the local population. (Oberländer-Târnoveanu and Volker 2005, 125, 126)

183 Emel Emin and Nihat Osman taught as Turkish teachers in the 1970s.

184 Similar policy of gradual assimilation can be observed even for the strongest and most populated minority: Ethnic Hungarians, initially predominant in the Communist Party, were increasingly excluded from the administrative apparatus of the regime, the officer corps, and economic management at the end of 1960s, and the Hungarian schools and teaching staff was Romanianized in a gradual process continuing until the mid-1980s.
developed into a modernized, urbanized, and highly educated community that produced nationalist minded elites as an ‘unintended consequence’ the korenizatsiia policies in Romania. Ironically there had never been education in the Crimean Tatar language in Romania, even during the Ottoman period, or the heydays of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism. In a rush to modernization in the pre-1940 era, the Crimean Tatar language was not regarded as an efficient literary language, even by the Crimean Tatar leaders. The development of a Crimean Tatar alphabet and schools were viewed unnecessary, as the leaders thought the community would return to their homeland. Under the pan-Turkist master frame, the creation of a common literary language based on “purified” Ottoman Turkish language was regarded as the ultimate goal. Continuing education in Turkish also served to unite the Turkish and Crimean Tatar minorities in Romania. Indeed, one motivation for the regime was to divide the Turkish and Crimean Tatar communities by enabling separate education for Crimean Tatars. (Eminov 2000)

Under the 5 August 1948 education reform law, the Romanian Crimean Tatars acquired for the first time in their history the right to primary and secondary education in their mother tongue. (In fact, many former Turkish schools were turned into "Tatar schools"). The number of "Tatar schools" rose to 150 primary schools in the localities between 1956 and 1958, and all Crimean Tatar children were registered in school. There was one secondary boarding school in Medgidia and two high schools in Medgidia and Constanta in "Tatar" language, a Tatar Pedagogical School for training teachers. A Tatar language and literature department in the Constanta Ovidius University was reopened. (Oberländer-
“Tatar” textbooks were prepared for the first time, along with an alphabet.\footnote{In 1974, the Department of Tatar language and literature was closed, and Prof.s. Nedret and Enver Mahmut lost their jobs. They joined the Turkology congresses in 1973, 1978-1979.} Almost ten years of education in Crimean Tatar language left a significant impact on the community. It codified the Crimean Tatar dialect spoken by the Crimean Tatars in Dobruca as a literary language, and education in Crimean Tatar language was proven possible. The Department of Tatar Language and Literature in the university collected Crimean Tatar folk literature. Though this department was closed in 1974, the scholars continued their work in other departments (Turkish or Oriental Studies), and several books and \textit{Renkler}, a literary journal were published, especially in the 1980s. Education in Crimean Tatar language contributed to differentiation from the Turkish community, along with the policies of Romania to separate these communities effectively such as differential treatment, and preference of the Crimean Tatars over Turks for Muslim posts such as mufti and imams. The Tatar Pedagogy School produced a new “movement elite” stratum, determined to maintain the "Tatar" identity. Several teachers were the former nationalists and graduates of Medgidia Seminary, which contributed to their distinctive approach to maintaining ethnic identity.

This newly organized nationalist elite designed new frames of identity. Operating under repression, they preferred a master frame extension, that is re-contextualizing the communist master frame to fit into their specific concerns. The Romanian communism allowed the “cultural” expression of ethnic identity, while suppressing the politicization of ethnic identities (sectarianism). Accordingly, Turkish schools were re-opened in the 1970s, \footnote{Ismail Ziyaeddin and Ahmel Ali Naci Cafer prepared the alphabet.}
even though for a few years. Crimean Tatar scholars continued to collect Crimean Tatar folklore and to publish a limited number of books in the 1980s, and Crimean Tatar music allowed to be broadcasted on state radio. However, the Romanian state ensured that "Tatar cultural identity" would not be expressed in the political sphere. For example, the use of the word “Crimea” was not allowed, even though it appeared in a legend. Along with the word “Crimea”, the parts of the folk legends which voiced hostility towards Russians were censured. In Romanian versions of the legend, the famous Crimean Tatar hero Çora Batır would not fight with Russians, but Kalmyks instead. The historical narrative connecting Crimea to the Crimean Khanate was prohibited. Therefore, the Crimean Tatars chose to emphasize an historical narrative focusing on the indigenous roots of Crimean Tatars in Dobruja, researching the Turkic origins of etymology of geographic names in Dobruja, and archaeological and historical traces of Turkic settlement in 12th century Dobruja, before the ancestors of Romanians settled in the area. They projected a direct connection with 12th century Turkic tribes (Cumans, Pechenegs, etcetera) and contemporary Crimean Tatars, bypassing the 800 years of the evolution of identity of Turkic tribes, (and intermixing with other ethnic groups) to form the Crimean Tatars.  

187 In 1972-3, the government permitted to study Turkish language in some villages. For this purpose, textbooks were prepared for classes I-VIII, with translations and poems of İsmail Ziyaeddin.

188 Russians as Çora Batır'senemy were not mentioned by Enver Mahmut, or it was argued to be Kalmyks instead. (Cafer, 2002: 2-4)

189 In the introduction of Boztorgay (ed.s., Ahmet Naci Ali, Mehmet Ablay, and Nuri Vuap. Kriterion, 1980), the author Mehmet Ablay under the title of “who are the Crimean Tatars? ” claimed that Dobruja Tatars belonged to one great tribe of Mongolians left after the Batuhan armies. Müstecip Ülküs (1981: 11) suggested that this was due to political repression. Servet Baubec (2001) observed that İsmail Ziyaeddin who wrote his major work in the communist era never used the word “Crimea” or sought a solution to problems of Crimea. He focused on the traditions of Tatar community in Romania. Baubec argued that his poetry before and after communism involved Crimea but the Russian oppression in Romania did not permit the use of word Crimea in the communist era. In 1981, Mehmet Ali Ekrem, a professor at the Department of Turkology, at the Bucharest University published Bülbül Sesi, a collection of Tatar folk literature. Tahsin Cemil published his doctoral thesis on Tatar history in 1979 by the Academy of Romania Socialist Republic. The Kriterion press continued to publish minority folkloric material. It published Boztorgay, Bülbül Sesi, Bozcigit, Ayuw Fulak Batur, Tepegöz- Dobruja masalları in Crimean Tatar.
We have some evidence that this frame was resonant and that people were enthusiastic about use of Crimean Tatar language. In 1956, a Romanian play was translated into Crimean Tatar and performed by the students of the Tatar Pedagogy School, and was applauded by a large Crimean Tatar audience in Constanta. (Abdullah Kerim, 2000: 11) Orhan İbraim, and Tahsin Cemil, who were university students in 1960s organized the Crimean Tatar spring festival, “tepreş” among Crimean Tatar students in Jassy.190 Thus, despite repressions, there were Crimean Tatars who attempted to maintain a separate identity from the Tatar Pedagogy School graduates. However, the community was never mobilized massively and this movement remained a form of elite activism.

- The Crimean Tatars are indigenous to Romania too. They were there as early as the 12th century.
- The Crimean Tatars in Romania have a distinct ethnic roots, language, and traditions compared to the Crimean Tatars in Crimea.
- Communism and cultural rights can be reconciled and the Crimean Tatars can achieve total equality in Romania.

Figure 11. “Elite” Minority Nationalism Frame in the Communist Era (1948-1989) 191

190 Orhan İbraim, Interview by author. 14 September 2005, Constanta.
191 The Crimean Tatar writer of the communist period, Açemin Baybek’s writing does not involve the theme of Crimea. Yusuf Nevzat Sargöl draws a historical image of Tatar-Turkish nomadic history coming from Central Asia, he does not focus on Crimea.
4.3.3. Diaspora nationalism of the Crimean Tatars in the Post-Communist Romania

Despite the suspicions of assimilation in the communist era, during which the Crimean Tatar identity was reduced to a “cultural minority”, with a low resonance among the population, the mobilization of the Crimean Tatar community in Romania dramatically increased in the 1990s. While civil society began to flourish across Romania, the Crimean Tatars also formed an organization, the Union of Democratic Muslim Turk-Tatars of Romania (UDTTMR) in Bucharest in April 1990 for the cultural renewal of their identity. Soon this organization moved its centre to Constanta, and formed branches across Dobruja and other places in Romania where Crimean Tatars resided. Books in Crimean Tatar language or on Crimean Tatar history proliferated beginning in the 1980s. \textit{Karadeniz} (1990-), a newspaper and \textit{Caş}, a newspaper for the youth, joined \textit{Renkler}, a literary journal which began to be published in 1987. The Tatar Union organized several regular events commemorating historical figures and “heroes” of Crimean Tatar nationalism in Crimea and Dobruja, whose names were forbidden to pronounce during the communist era. A series of conferences were organized in Constanta on “The Past, Today, and Future of Tatars”. The 2002 meeting discussed the unification of international Crimean Tatar associations under a federation, and the acceptance of a common Crimean Tatar language across diasporic and homeland communities with the involvement of more than 70 participants from outside Romania. The Tatar Union organized an annual festival of traditional attire, dance, and


\textsuperscript{193} In 1995, 1998, 2002, 2010 the series of conferences on Tatar past, today and futures was organized by the Tatar Union and conference presentations were published as books. Other conferences such as the International Conference on “Preserving the Diversity of Regional and Minority Languages in the Black Sea Region” was
music since 1995, to which they invite groups from Crimea, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. The adults began to recover their knowledge of Crimean Tatar and began to speak the ethnic language more in daily life. The Crimean Tatar language textbooks were recently prepared, and Crimean Tatar language classes began to be offered for the youth. The Crimean Tatar community began to restore and rebuild mosques and ancestral cemeteries, rejuvenate traditional Islamic practices, and renew their knowledge of Islam. Today there are 63 operating mosques in Dobruja from a few operating ones during communism. A reform in the institution of muftiate happened. A very young mufti, with a BA and an MA degree from a Turkish university was elected, as an intentional step away from the older generation of imams, who were criticized as conciliators of the communists. The Muftiate modernized its practices by preparing a website in English, publishing a journal to discuss the modern topics related to Islam and the problems of Muslims, and initiating a program to educate the people on observing religious practices. The muftiate continued to be controlled by the Crimean Tatars, and the Mufti himself stressed his attachment to the Crimean Tatar homeland and nationalism. He regarded that the strengthening of Islam in Romania contributes to the strengthening of the Crimean Tatar and Turkish identities in Romania. Museums of Crimean Tatar ethnography are now opened in

organized in Bucharest in December 2008. (Cemilev, Crimean Tatar participants from Crimea and Romania participated.) Conferences on Müstecip Ülküsal, İsmail Gasprinskiy, Hamdi Giraybay, Necip Hacı Fazıl were also organized.

195 I thank Nedret Mahmut for this information.
196 Nariman Ibrahim, Interview by author. 14 September, 2005. Many Tatars learned to read Qur’an in Arabic.
197 Mufti, Murat Yusuf, Interview by author. 5 August 2006, Constanta. There were 419 mosques in Dobruja in 1900s (Aksu 2003, 58) Only 2 of the 8 mosques survived in Constanta. (Aksu 2003, 60)
198 One of Mufti’s first actions in job was to ensure that Islamic call to pray was strictly observed five times a day by the imams (as it is required in the religion) instead of three as it became a custom in the communist era. Mufti Murat Yusuf, Interview by author, 5 August 2006, Constanta.

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many localities. Several dance ensembles emerged to perform Crimean Tatar traditional
dance. Traditional festivals such as tepreş, navrez, hidrellez, and eids (bayrams) began to
be celebrated with the involvement of large number of the Crimean Tatars all across
Romania. Almost a hundred representatives of the Romanian Crimean Tatars (more than
Crimean Tatars from Turkey, or the US) began to regularly join the 18 May Deportation
Day meetings in Crimea, and their representatives made public speeches since the early
1990s. In 1995, the Crimean Tatars in Romania organized an aid campaign for the
repatriates in Crimea. The visits, flows, and networks increased between the homeland
and Dobruja. The Crimean Tatar museum in Crimea collected a large number of traditional
Crimean Tatar handicrafts and embroidery from Romania. Since the traditional artwork and
belongings of the Crimean Tatars were stolen by the Soviet state or simply taken by the
people who moved into Crimean Tatar homes after the deportation, Romanian and Turkish
diaspora communities who maintained these traditional crafts became significant sources for
learning about this aspect of Crimean Tatar culture. An internet community of Romanian
Crimean Tatars emerged, and the Romanian Crimean Tatars actively participated in
worldwide Crimean Tatar lists, communicating in Crimean Tatar, Turkish, and English.
The linkages between Romanian community and Turkish, Bulgarian, American, and
Canadian diaspora communities also increased. The Crimean Tatars who emigrated in the
early 1990s from Romania formed the basis for the Canadian Crimean Tatar community,
and actively participated in the diasporic communities in the United States and Turkey. The

199 There is a three room- museum in Kobadin, and one room museums within several branches of the Tatar
Union.
200 This is a significant development since visitors from Romania reported no knowledge of Crimean Tatar
dance was left in their visits to Romania in 1990. (Hakan Kırımılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara)
201 With the initiative of Ali Osman Bekmambet. See his memoir Keçken Künler (2001) penned by Amed Aladin
and Guner Akmolla.
Romanian community also actively participated in the World Crimean Tatar Congress. All this evidence suggests that there is a “rise” in mobilization of the Crimean Tatar community.

Many of my interviewees observed a rejuvenation of Crimean Tatar culture in Dobruja in the 1990s. According to Eminov, the Turks and Crimean Tatars in Bulgaria “are more content about themselves and feel greater pride in who they are when compared with the recent past.” (Eminov 2000: 157) Thus, the perspectives asserting the assimilation of Crimean Tatars in Romanian diasporic setting, due to loss of traditional culture, language, and collective memory of the myth of homeland do not appear empirically valid. The evidence demonstrates that losses in cultural, and linguistic areas are compensated by significant political developments, which led to a cultural reawakening.

4.3.3.1. Changes in political and discursive opportunity structures:

The end of the Cold War, and economic globalization, created global structural changes that introduced liberalization of politics and democracy to the hostlands of the Crimean Tatars. Former inequalities and oppression suffered by the Crimean Tatar community in Romania wane, which was interpreted as the emergence of political opportunity by the Crimean Tatars and other minorities. Romania entered the European Union, which required the state to provide cultural rights to its minorities. Romania was also compelled to provide more robust minority rights due to the pressures of its powerful Hungarian minority; the Crimean Tatars and other minorities benefited from the concessions given to this larger minority. When compared to interwar Romania, expansion of democracy,

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202 In February 1993, Romania became an associate member of the European Community, recognizing human rights as part of its first principle. Romania also signed the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. A Council for National Minorities was created in Romania to implement those agreements. Next, Romania requested assistance of monitoring bodies, such as the OSCE on minority protection.
and equalities in the contemporary era, created a possibility of cultural existence for the Crimean Tatar community, without having to return to Crimea. Amed Aladin, the present Crimean Tatar MP in the Romanian parliament, expressed that the community does not plan to return to Crimea in the near future. Aladin is content with the tolerance and support Romania demonstrates towards the cultural, educational and religious affairs of Crimean Tatars. This has been an important factor in the re-emergence of a form of Crimean Tatar diasporic nationalism that varies from the older exile nationalism ideology. An exile nationalism, which emphasizes return, would no longer have high empirical fidelity among the Crimean Tatar population, who are enthusiastic to become EU citizens, and believe in prospects of prospering in Romania. Diaspora nationalism, which ensures the maintenance of identity in the diasporic setting, is seen as a real option. For Amed Aladin, assimilation in Crimea is as strong as a possibility as in Romania, given the small number of Crimean Tatar schools, and the accompanying difficulty of Crimean Tatar language in Crimea. Additionally, Romania’s toleration towards the Islamic community was noted by the Mufti of Muslims in Romania, Murat Yusuf. (Cihan Haber Ajansi, 6 June 2010)

203 Romania offered quotas of one parliamentary chair for each minority. Tatar and Turkish communities were given their separate chairs. The Tatar MP works in the minorities commission and Romania-Turkish friendship parliamentary commissions. (Amed Aladin and Necat Sali, Interviews by author, 17 September 2005, Constanta. Romania and the European Union also encouraged philanthropic foundations (wakf) and civil society activity for the development of minorities and maintenance of identity. İnsanlık Vakfı (Fundatia Humanist, Culturel, Scientifique) was operated by a Crimean Tatar woman. This foundation not only undertakes several projects for multiculturalism in Romania, but also projects such as publishing a journal, organizing activities for Tatar children in mother language, seminar for youth for starting a business, forming ethnographic museum for Tatar and other minorities, staging ethnic theatre, and commemorating the local important figures in the history of Romanian Tatars. Romania also provided funds amounting 300 000 Euros to Tatar Union beginning from 1996. In 1991, Turkish Language and Literature Department was opened in Constanta, Ovidius University. In 1994 religious education for Muslims began in Medgidia in Nicolae Balcescu High School. On 13 July 1995, with a Romanian-Turkish protocol Kemal Atatürk İlahiyat ve Pedagoji Lisesi (Kemal Atatürk Religious and Pedagogical High School) was opened in 1996 with 327 student capacity and 7 teachers from Turkey. It is half financed by the Turkish government and involves a dormitory. A three-year pedagogy college was added in 2001.

204 I sensed a general enthusiasm about Romania’s future in all my interviews.

205 Amed Aladin, Interview by author, 17 September 2005, Constanta.

206 Romania granted rights of education in mother tongue at primary and secondary levels to all minorities including Tatars and Turks. (Aksu, 2003: 92)
Bulgaria also recognized citizens of non-Bulgarian origin (not national minorities), and recognized their right to education in the mother tongue, as well as right to maintain cultural and religious as part of accession to the European Union. (Eminov 2000: 157) In that respect, both Romania and Bulgaria are more progressive than Greece, a longtime European Union member, where serious problems in minority education, government interference in Muslim religious affairs, and restrictions on freedom of expression exist. (Eminov 2000:158)

Romania did not become a multicultural society, which ensures the maintenance of their national identity by small minorities. Romania continues to be a ‘nationalizing’ state, in which assimilation is still a strong possibility, especially for small nationalities. Moreover, there are difficulties in implementation of minority rights. For example, during my interview Bektaş Behic explained that Romanian school principals in Medgidia are not willing to support Turkish language classes. The problem of implementation is also significant for minorities in Bulgaria. I argue that these negative factors prevent assimilation and create an incentive for the diaspora nationalist movement in the contemporary era.

4.3.3.2. The re-emergence of pan-Turkist master frame:

Previously, transnational links and flows between the Muslims in Romania and Turkey were purposefully limited by the communist government. With the developments in

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207 “Nationalizing states” defined as “ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation” by Brubaker. (1995, 109)
208 Romania did not permit the use of the same school textbooks as in Turkey beginning from 1995. Therefore, Tatar scholars Bektas Behic, Servet Baubec and Yaşar Memedemin prepared Turkish textbooks for Romanian schools. Turkish schools, which are operated and supported by Turkey are not still equivalent to Romanian schools with 10 years of compulsory education. For Turkish and Tatar children education in mother language (Turkish) is not compulsory but voluntary and depends on the certain legislature. There is not financial support for education mother-language. The government does not pay salaries of teachers instructing mother-language classes. Turkish language education is scheduled to Saturday or Sunday, or to an extra hour after school, which makes students reluctant to attend. (Bektaş Behiç, Interview by author, 3 August 2006, Medgidia)
209Bektaş Behiç, Interview by author, 3 August 2006, Medgidia
communication technologies in the global era, Turkey’s cultural influence and a master frame of pan-Turkism spread to Muslim minorities in the Balkans with satellite TV, radio, internet, and Turkish periodicals. With the ease of transportation in the global era, economic, touristic, family, and religious visits to Turkey became commonplace. The end of the Cold War coincided with the rise of pan-Turkist foreign policy in Turkey, during which Turkey tried to become a patron of Turkish/Muslim minorities abroad. (Kushner, 1987) The Crimean Tatars in Romania were officially designated as a Turkish minority (in addition to Turks in Romania), and this sanctioned the Turkish state and societal organizations to spread pan-Turkism through their activities in Romania. The Turkish embassy and the consulate in Constanța became involved in community matters, especially in urging for the unification of Turkish and Crimean Tatar community associations in Romania.210 The increase in Turkish investment in Romania, and the opening of Turkish

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210 Turcomans from Anatolia began to immigrate to the Balkans with the Ottoman expansion. Most Turks left Romania during the 1876-1877 Ottoman-Russian War, and by the 1990s, 30,000 Turks and 20,000 Tatars inhabited Romania. Some Tatars especially from mixed marriages in Tulcea were possibly identified as Turks. Competition between Turkish and Tatar elites for leadership in common Muslim institutions and benefits provided by Turkey existed since the beginning of the 20th century. But this competition was mostly in the elite level, and intermarriage was common between the Turks and Tatars, and a common Muslim identity (as opposed to Christian ethnic groups surrounding them) tied them more strongly. Today, several Tatars do not see a problem to register themselves as Turks. (Bektaş Behiç, Interview by author, 3 August 2006, Medgidia). It is possible to say that Tatars in Romania as in Turkey have a hybrid Turkish-Tatar identity and generally speak both languages. In 1990, Turks and Tatars formed a common organization, the Union of Democratic Tatar-Turk Muslims of Romania. (UDTTRM) However, in 1991 this organization was divided into Turkish and Tatar organizations due to conflict of interest among the elites. Turkish elites, who believed that they deserve a higher political power due their kin-state and who have more population than Tatars did not want to be dominated by Tatars who have comparatively higher social standing and traditionally dominated in Muslim and societal organizations in Romania. More importantly, if there were two separate ethnic organizations, they could each receive 300,000 Euros from Romania instead of sharing that money. Moreover, there is one Tatar and one Turkish parliamentarian in the parliament now, instead of one representing both communities. (Bectaş Behiç, Interview by author, 3 August 2006, Medgidia and Amed Aladin, Interview by author, 17 September 2006, Constanța) Recently elected mufti, who is a young Tatar, educated in Turkey, insisted that two organizations must share the same building and cooperate more. Turks can be member of Tatar Union (and many Turks in Tulcea are) This is most pronounced in the Tulcea Tatar Association. Four of the six members present in the association in my unannounced visit were Turks! They noted that all of them can speak Tatar language. This reality reflected in the name of the organization as it remains “Turk-Tatars,” also giving space to hybrid identities of some Tatars. (Mufti Murat Yusuf, Interview by author, 5 August 2006, Constanța.)
schools⁹¹, the offers of scholarships to study in Turkey, and the sending of religious personnel facilitated transnational cultural flows from Turkey to Muslim minorities in Romania (Turks, Crimean Tatars, and even to the Christian Turkic minorities such as Gagauz). Turkey also actively supported the Turkish-Crimean Tatar minority in Bulgaria, and hosted almost 300,000 Turks and Crimean Tatars, deported from Bulgaria in 1989.

In an attempt to develop their repressed identity, the Crimean Tatars and Turks in Romania and Bulgaria looked toward Turkey to provide discursive resources, such as a master frame of identity. Until 1995, they sent teachers to Turkey to learn Turkish, and Turkish school books could legally be taught and used in Romania. Until 2000, Karadeniz was mostly published in Turkish and Romanian, with a few articles in Crimean Tatar. Turkish language is still highly preferred as it enables to read the publications of Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey and various other publications with a pan-Turkist content.²¹² However, Crimean Tatar politicians occasionally conflict with Turkish embassy, consulate, or other representatives who do not appreciate the Crimean Tatars’ effort to maintain Crimean Tatar identity along with Turkish, and their aspiration to maintain an equivalent connection to both Crimea and Turkey. For instance, Turkish academician Ali Aksu (2003)

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²¹¹ In 1990, the UDTTMR decided to teach Turkish in schools to Tatar and Turkish children. By January 1998, 55 teachers teach Turkish in 43 schools. (Kerim, 1998: 1) 90 per cent of the Turkish teachers are Tatar (Necat Sali, Interview by author, 17 September 2005, Constanta.) There is also Mustafa Kemal Atatürk İlahiyat ve Pedagogy Lisesi (Turkish high school for educating religious personnel and teachers of Turkish language, a continuation of former Medgidia Seminary) in Mecidiye, who has many Tatar students and teachers. (Amed Aladin, Interview by author. 17 September 2005, Constanta) Turkey and Turkish businessmen also sponsor many cultural activities such as restoration of mosques, historical sites, and traditional wrestling tournaments. (Speech of Saladin Acakay, 6 September 2005) Apart from Turkish government sponsored schools, Turkish Islamic groups (Fethullah Gülen’s Lumina education Group involves five schools in Constanta and Bucharest and a university, and Suleymanis work in Cobadin, Medgidiaband other places.) also operate schools, dormitories, and now a university in Romania and teach in English, Turkish and Romanian, and accept both Turkish and Romanian students. (Zaman 2006)

²¹² The Romanian Tatars used Tatar language for communicating among each other but the utilized Turkish due to its value as a cultural resource. He argues that the Tatar language in Romania is not standardised and generally reflects the dialect of the author. According to the Eker, Romanian Tatar still needs to be standardized and the future of this language is not clear, the options being the preservation of language, adoption of Crimean Tatar, or adoption of Turkish. (Eker 2006, 96)
views “Tatar” identity as an unreal and unnecessary claim. (Aksu 2003: 45,49) However, Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists regard pan-Turkism as a useful master frame, which provides ideational tools for the development of a Crimean Tatar nationalist frame, and reject any attempt to assert power or domination over Crimean Tatars by Turks. According to Necat Sali, “We do not reject that we too are Turks, or Muslim. ...In Romania, we [Crimean] Tatars work more [than Turks themselves] to elevate Turkishness (Turkish identity), but when it is time reap the benefits of what we sowed, we are portrayed as non-Turks.... Being a [Crimean] Tatar means working for Turkishness (Türklük). But the meaning of our Turkishness [for us] is Crimean Tatar nationalism”213 According to Nihat Osman “Although the roots of Turks and [Crimean] Tatars are the same, it still means a lot to me to be able to say that I am a [Crimean] Tatar.” 214 We must note that not all Crimean Tatars agree on this issue and the “Crimean Tatar nationalist frame” is not uniformly resonant. Bektas Behic argues: “Some want to rejuvenate “Kırımcılık” (Crimeanism-the term for Crimean Tatar exile nationalism of the interwar period). It is Turkey who helps us now. We should not alienate Turkey.”215 Cenan Bolat and Leman Ali, who were selected to represent Crimean Tatars in the Romanian bureaucracy, endorse Turkish language rather than Crimean Tatar, finding it more practical and beneficial for the community.216

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213 “Türklüğü ve müslümanlığı inkar etmeyiz. ... Türklük adına iş yapanlar Tatarlar ama bu çalışmanın meyvelerini yemeye gelince Tatarlar Türk değilsiniz denerek dışlanmaya çalışılıyor. ... Tatarlık genel Türklik için çalışmaktır, ama bizim Tatarlığımızın bir manası da Kırımcılık, Kırım Türkliği’dür.” Necat Sali. Interview by author. 17 September 2005, Constanta.
215 Bektas Behic. Interview by author. 3 August 2006. Medgidia.
216 For these attitudes they began to be recently criticised by those with a “Crimean Tatar nationalist frame” in the Tatar Union. (Abdullah Kerim, 2000, 11)
4.3.3.3. The legacy of pre-war diaspora nationalism frame \(^{217}\)

The exile nationalist frame of the pre-WWII era, which was repressed by the communists, was maintained in the collective memory even during the communist era, and was rejuvenated through the activities of its few living survivors, the emergence of oral histories, and the discovery of publications belonging to that period. \(^{218}\) This frame was never willingly abandoned by the community, but it was repressed by communist regime. This case demonstrates that frames can re-emerge. In the 1990s, a few surviving students of the Medgidia Seminary, and later students educated by them in turn, were alive, though old. \(^{219}\)

The old generation, who were educated in the village schools of interwar Dobruja explained Kırımcılık they were taught. They have related the poems and songs they memorised in interviews, in Karadeniz, and in books. \(^{220}\) The Emel journals of the 1930s, which were mostly preserved in Turkey, were read again. The opening of the Securitatae archives revealed the extent of violence perpetrated against the Crimean Tatar nationalists in Romania. Extensive evidence for re-emerging interest in the pre-war Crimean Tatar exile nationalism frame exists. Ali Osman Bekmambet was given an award (seref plaketi onur diplomasi) for his work on 10 May 2002 in Constanta. Mustafa Cemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatars (in Romania?), recognized Ali Osman Bekmambet’s and Müstecip Hüseyin Samedin’s nationalist struggles, along with Müstecip Ülküsal, and Isa Yusuf Alptekin (diaspora leader of Eastern Turkestan/Xinjiang Uygur), by presenting them each with a traditional Crimean Tatar kalpak (traditional headwear) in a ceremony in February

\(^{217}\) The proponents of this frame are İsmail Ziyaeddin, Yaşar Memedemin, Altay Kerim, Nevzat Yusuf, Hagi Emin Bavbég, Kiyaseddin Uteu, Servet Bavbég.

\(^{218}\) Mehmet Niyazi’s, Mehmet Vani’s works could be published only after 1990. Niyazi continued to be an inspiration. İsmail Ziyaeddin, and Yaşar Memedemin narrated imaginary conversations with Mehmet Niyazi.

\(^{219}\) 100 graduates of Seminary were alive by 2001 and attended a meeting. (Bektaş Behic, Interview by author, Medgidia, 3 August 2006, Medgidia).

\(^{220}\) Conversations at Ovidiu (Kanara) Association.
1995. It is telling that a conference was convened on Mehmet Niyazi as early as in 1990. Mehmet Niyazi’s poetry is accepted to have influenced contemporary poet Yaşar Memedemin’s use of themes of homeland in his poetry. (Baubec 2001, 6) Even the statute of post-1990 Tatar Union was based on the statute of the interwar organization, “Dobruca Türk Hars Birliği”. A regular commemoration of 23 February, Çelebi Cihan’s death, was initiated, as it was before WWII. This excavated exile nationalism frame influenced the emergence of diaspora nationalism, particularly its devotion to an independent Crimea, and counter-framing against the Soviet Union and its legacy. However, the new frame of diaspora nationalism did not emphasize return.

4.3.3.4. The legacy of the "Tatar minority nationalism" frame:

It was thanks to the elite nationalism of the Crimean Tatar teachers and scholars during the communist era that some kind of Tatar national identity survived in Romania. A few publications about the history, ethnology, and folklore of the community in the 1980s became a medium to regenerate a Crimean Tatar cultural consciousness in the 1990s. Mainly, Nihat Osman criticised the use of resources to teach Turkish, impeding the efforts and capabilities of students to learn Crimean Tatar. For him language is what distinguishes Crimean Tatars, and the only feature remaining from traditional Crimean Tatar culture. Yaşar Memedemin, Nihat Osman and others founded Necip Hacı Fazıl Association for the development of Crimean Tatar language and literature in 1994. They were joined by Servet Baubec and Necat Sali, and cumulatively collected more than 200 signatures to begin Crimean Tatar classes in the associations in 1999. Under the influence of this frame, Karadeniz began to be published predominantly in Crimean Tatar since 2000. Several

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222 İsmail Kerimov from Crimea shares this view. Interview by author, 15 May 2006, Simferopol.
223 Servet Baubec, Interview by author. 2 August 2006. Medgidia
articles on the necessity to maintain the Crimean Tatar language were published in
Karadeniz.\textsuperscript{224} Textbooks in Crimean Tatar language were written, and Tatar classes for children in the community building were initiated. A Crimean Tatar daycare opened in Constanta.\textsuperscript{225} Peer pressure emerged to speak in Crimean Tatar in the meetings of associations.\textsuperscript{226} Those who could not speak Crimean Tatar were criticised. The Crimean Tatar language spoken in Dobruja was also endorsed by the large number of descendants of the Crimean Tatar immigrants from Dobruca to Turkey.\textsuperscript{227} In 2008, Crimean Tatar language began to be thought as a subject in Romanian schools and 5 May was declared as the "Tatar Language Day" by the Romanian Parliament in 2011.\textsuperscript{228}

This frame continued to focus on the idea that Crimean Tatars are indigenous to Dobruja, making both Crimea and Dobruja legitimate homelands for Crimean Tatars. They supported the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean homeland, but did not want to abandon Dobruja, or their sub-ethnic language. Whether the school texts would be written in Crimean Tatar dialect spoken in Dobruca, or the Crimean Tatar officially accepted by the Qurultay in Crimea became a heated debate, especially 2002 conference. They refuted allegations that the Crimean Tatar language in Dobruja is impure, mixed with Turkish, and based on a fringe

\textsuperscript{225} Nariman Ibrahim, Interview by author, 14 September 2005, Contanta
\textsuperscript{226} In all the meetings I was a participant observant, Tatar language was the main working language with occasional lapse into Romanian.
\textsuperscript{227} For example, a Tatar language journal, Emel (Ideal) was sponsored by an immigrant from Dobruja to Turkey, Nurettin Mahir Altuğ. Nedret and Enver Mahmut was also regular writers of the Crimean Tatar journal, Kirim (1992-) in Turkey.
dialect of the Crimean Tatar language. \(^{229}\) However, Nihat Osman and several other Crimean Tatar nationalists also understand the value of having a common language between Crimea and Dobruja. Crimean Tatar dialect spoken in Dobruca largely relies on Turkish today for linguistic support, and there is not yet a standardised version of this dialect. Moreover, the future of “Dobrujan Tatar” as a language is unclear, as young Tatar poets and writers use Romanian. \(^{230}\) It must be noted that difference of Crimean Tatar dialect spoken in Dobruca from the Crimean Tatar language presently spoken in Crimea is exaggerated, and conciliation is possible. I think that the Crimean Tatars in Dobruca want to be recognised for their experiences, suffering, and achievements, as well as a small number of certain unique words or concepts that they developed in their long course of diasporic history. They hope that a common Crimean Tatar language would take these factors into consideration.

4.3.3.5. Transnational frame-bridging with the Crimean Tatar repatriate community in Crimea and the diaspora community in Turkey

Previously, the Soviet and Romanian communist regimes blocked all connections to the homeland, or between their two Crimean Tatar communities. By deporting all remaining Crimean Tatars in 1944, and even repressing the Crimean Tatar nationalists in Romania during the 20 year occupation, the Soviet government aimed to dissolve the links between the Crimean Tatars and Crimea forever. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the transition to democracy in Romania and Ukraine, and the developments in communication


\(^{230}\) Aladin Amet, and Rüstem Seitabla are famous Crimean Tatar poets writing in Romanian. Rüstem Seitabla expressed that he touches diasporic themes, and attachment to Crimea in his poetry and this is what makes his poetry Tatar in my conversation during a conference (6 September 2005)
technologies, the transnational communication and relations between the homeland Crimea and the host-states of the Crimean Tatar diaspora rapidly developed. The Crimean Tatar *Meclis*, as well as the Crimean Tatar organizations in Turkey which adopted the frame of *Meclis*, attempted to bridge frames with the reemerging diaspora nationalism frame in Romania by forming official relations with the Tatar Union, and inviting Romanian representatives to the **Qurultay**, 18 May meetings, and the World Crimean Tatar Congress. The Tatar Union president is the official representative of *Meclis* in Romania, and the Tatar Union occasionally conducts official visits to the Ukrainian Embassy to advocate for the interests of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Communication between politicians, academicians, artists, youth, civil society organizations, exchange of periodicals, books, and other cultural material, visits to Crimea and Dobruja, conferences, seminars, and festivals created venues for transnational frame-bridging across the communities.

Amed Aladin pointed out links between the Crimean Tatar community in Romania and the Ankara and Istanbul Crimean Tatar Associations in Turkey. Kiyaseddin Uteu, Servet Baubec, and Yaşar Memedemin wrote several articles on their interactions with Crimean Tatars from Turkey and Crimea. Kiyaseddin Uteu admired the attachment of the Crimean Tatar nationalists visiting from Turkey. He said, “Since we have hibernated during communism, by communicating with Crimean Tatars from Turkish diaspora, we are going to learn and gain a lot” (Uteu 2001, 3). Nariman İbraim, a teacher visiting Turkey pointed out that the words of the head of Istanbul organization influenced Romanian Crimean Tatar women visiting Turkey. He says, “Ask yourselves: what did you do for Crimea?”233 In turn, the Romanian community attempted transnational frame-bridging to the Bulgarian Crimean

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231 In 1998, they visited Ukrainian embassy for the voting rights of the Crimean Tatars.
232 Amed Aladin, Interview by author, 17 Spetember 2005, Constanta.
Tatar community by encouraging, and occasionally financing, their participation in many nationalist events in Dobruja, and visiting their communities in Bulgaria. According to former Crimean Tatar MP in the Romanian parliament, Necat Sali, the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union means the reunification of Dobruja, hence the Crimean Tatar populations of northern and southern Dobruja.\footnote{Necat Sali, Interview by author, 17 September 2005, Constanta.}

4.3.3. 6. Frame transformation: Diaspora nationalism

The transition to democracy and acceptance of minority rights in the EU accession process in Romania provided opportunities for frame transformation for the Crimean Tatar community. The reemerging pan-Turkist master frame provided the discursive tools for the creation of a diaspora nationalism frame. The interwar Crimean Tatar nationalist frame involved themes that were not abandoned by the community itself, but by force. Similarly, minority nationalism created under communism also proved to be resilient. Transnational frame-bridging, with the collective return frame in the USSR, and diaspora nationalist frame in Turkey added a third contributing factor to the emergence of the diaspora nationalist frame in the 1990s. As a result of these three influences, the following diaspora nationalist frame emerged:
The Crimean Tatars lost their independence unjustly, when Russia violated of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between Russia and the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars were colonized in the following era, and their population was forced out, those who remained in Crimea were subjected to assimilation. This policy of gradual de-Tatarization of Crimea culminated in the deportation of the Crimean Tatars en masse from their homeland in 1944.

The Crimean Tatars in the USSR have a right to return to their homeland, and the successors of the Soviet Union have an obligation to facilitate this politically and financially.

Crimea is the homeland of all Crimean Tatars, and they are obligated to do their best to work for instituting sovereignty in Crimea.

The Crimean Tatars in Romania have a valuable tradition and language to maintain, and they have indigenous roots in Dobruja.

Figure 12. Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism frame in Romania

In his opening speech of the symposium on 6 September 2005, in which I participated, the president of UDTTMR, Saladin Acakay characterised Crimean Tatars in Romania as a “diaspora”.

Several literary works are on the themes related to longing for the homeland. The Crimean Tatar poet and politician Yaşar Memedemin narrated the history of forced migration, and the difficulty settling in diaspora in the 1990s. He writes:

“The Crimean Tatars could not bear the pressure
...They traveled and dispersed to farlands...
Our grandfather, grandmothers were left in cemeteries [in Crimea]
How can you start a new life when you miss [your homeland]?
...The lost hopes are expressed in songs...”

In another poem, he celebrated his and his people’s newly found attachment to homeland:

The complaints that we do not have a homeland have disturbed me all my life
The days are coming that I will say “here is our homeland, here is our people.”

235 “Bizlerde memleket yok degen şikayetler
Beni ömrümce raatszladilar
Mına memleket, Mına bayrak dep aytacak kunlerim yaklaşa”
Even such a firmly establishing homeland as Crimea is a big step when compared to the work created in the communist era. In the following poem, he brings forward the major diasporic sentiment of having transnational ties and dual attachments to more than one places:

Our roots are in Crimea, even though we are here  
...I divided my heart into two  
Half lives here, half is turned to Crimea  

Memedemin also provides a solution to the existential problem of diaspora, and states that it is possible to be ideologically united even if members of a people are geographically dispersed and do not reside in one homeland.

According to Servet Baubec, Yaşar Memedemin synthesizes Mehmet Niyazi, who lived with longing to Crimea, and the poems of İsmail Ziyaeddin, which express feelings of home for Dobruja. (Baubec, 2001: 6) However, in spite of the themes of his communist era texts, even İsmail Ziyaeddin began to freely express attachment to Crimea in the 1990s, portraying his imagined conversation with Mehmet Niyazi:

...That torch [nationalism] did not go away, it still burns in our hearts  
Your people do not forget ancestral homeland  
... We hope that that Crimean Tatar flag  
Will be waved in the Green Land’s sky (Ziyaeddin 2001, 6)  

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236 “Bizim tamir Kırım’da  
Biz mında tuvgan bolsak da  
Ecdatlarımız onda”

237 “Cılga boyuna yuva kurgan boztorgayımız  
Çıyılsak da er yerge toplımız biz”

238 “Sönmedi o meşale yüreklerde hep cana  
Unutmay halk ata curtun  
Kelecekke inana  
Rahmet sana ey Niyazi”
In the 4th Qurultay in Crimea, Necat Sali stated that the Crimean Tatars in Dobruja have always counted themselves as part of the Crimean Tatar society in the homeland, that their fathers and grandfathers helped the Crimean Tatars in Crimea in the difficult times during WWII, that they paid for this feeling of “blood brotherhood” with lengthy imprisonment, and untimely death. Necat Sali pointed out that there were three Crimean Tatar parliamentarians in the Romanian parliament, and that they understood their duty to communicate the struggle of the Crimean Tatars to the world. He advised that the 8-10 million Crimean Tatars in diaspora ought to find ways to move closer to Crimea, that they ought to look towards Crimea, and that the nationalists should struggle to make it happen. (Memedemin, 2001: 6) İrfan İsmail made the following statement that portrays the frame of the Crimean Tatars in Romania particularly well:

...Around 200, 000 Crimean Tatar-Turks who live in the Russian Federation and other Turkish-Tatar independent republics, if they have suitable conditions intend to return their own homeland and come together to establish Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic within Ukraine. Despite very difficult circumstances, all world Turk-Tatars, primarily those who live in Turkey and world democratic and Muslim publics support their pristine and humanly wish. We Romanian Turk- Tatars from the beginning tried to help our Crimean co-ethnics in all areas and we were with them in their struggles with however small power and capabilities we had, and we will always be. (İsmail 2001)

Today articles on contemporary and historical Crimean politics in accordance with the new frame regularly appear in Romanian periodicals. For example, in the pages of Karadeniz, several articles can be found on the atrocities of deportation (Karadeniz, 1990; Karadeniz, 1996; Karadeniz 99: 2001, Karadeniz, 2000; Karadeniz 87; Karadeniz, 2002; Karadeniz 111; Karadeniz 121: 2003); community support for Mustafa Cemilev (Karadeniz ,

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Emel umut kaynagi
Yeşil yurta dalgalansın
Özer Kırım bayrağı”

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2003: 1, Karadeniz 1998); return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea (Karadeniz October 2000, Karadeniz, June 2005. Karadeniz 147; Karadeniz 40); information about Qurultay (Karadeniz 41; Karadeniz November 2001, Karadeniz 105: 1); and impressions of Romanian Crimean Tatars who have visited Crimea recently (Yaşar Memedemin, Karadeniz September 1998, October 2000). Karadeniz presents the Crimean Tatar literature developed in the Soviet union, publishing series of life stories, and the works of several authors and poets, classifying them as “classical Crimean Tatar literature” (Karadeniz, June 2000; Karadeniz, October 2000). In accordance with the new frame, an aid campaign to Crimea was organized in 1995-1996 (organized by Ali Bekmambet). Karadeniz also published many articles on the national history of the Crimean Tatars. For example, many articles appeared on Numan Çelebi Cihan (Karadeniz, 60). A youth organization named after İsmail Gaspiralı emerged in the early 1990s, which showed alignment of young people to classical discourse of Crimean Tatar nationalism.

4.3.3.7. Frame resonance

The resonance of the new Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism frame is different for each level of society. The Crimean Tatar frame is more resonant on the first level: movement elites and ethnic elites co-opted in host-state structures as well as middle stratum of young professionals and students. It is not yet resonant in the third level, that is the masses.

With regards to the first level, educated Crimean Tatars took part in some of the political events in the country in the 1990s, and established their own ethnic organizations, for example, the Democratic Union of Muslim Tatar-Turks (Unionea Democrata a Tatarilor...
Among the founders of this organization Yaşar Memedemin was a poet; Ekrem Menlibay was an author; Necat Sali was the son of veteran of the interwar nationalist movement; Tahsin Cemil was a professor of Crimean Tatar history; Enver Mahmut is a graduate of Medgidia Seminary and Kazan University Department of Kazan Tatar Language; Nihat Osman was an instructor of Crimean Tatar language in the communist era. They all participated in the activities for the maintenance of national culture during communism. They were examples of the level who became the leaders of the diaspora nationalist movement due to their relationship with previous nationalist movements. In reality, previous frames influence the future ones through individuals who appropriate the past frames and carry elements of it for the reconstruction of new frames. In Romania, these leaders at the top level of pyramid devised the frames and did the main intellectual work.

Those Crimean Tatars who became respected businessmen, engineers, and bureaucrats of Romania are also considered to belong the first level. These are the newly emerging businessmen of capitalist economy who became well-off, prestigious, and well-connected in the post-communist era. Their organizational capabilities, and ability for fundraising make them leaders. Cenan Bolat, Leman Ali who worked in the Ministry of Culture and Education in Romania, the Mufti with his diplomatic position in Romanian and international society, the representatives of Crimean Tatars in municipalities, and the local

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239 The main purposes of the association is the recognition of the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic minority, maintenance of culture and tradition and transferring them to future generations, increase of opportunities of education in Turkish and tatar languages, and the approval if statute on minorities in Romania, which defines minorities, and provide them with cultural autonomy, and ethnic representation of Tatars in governing organs.

240 Necat Sali also founded Ömürşə and Hasana branches. He served as the president of the Tatar Union between 1997 and 2000.

241 Tahsin Cemil was born in 1943. He studied history at Bucharest “Nicolea Iorga” Romanian Academy and received his Ph.D. in 1976. He worked at the University of Constanta. He became an MP and represented the Tatar Union in the Romanian parliament.

242 Saladin Acakay, Ömer Kenan, Kerim Necadin, Tekin Amed, Naci Cafer are some of the Tatar businessmen.
government function at this level. These leaders play a role in maintaining the relations of the community with the host-state. These two leader groups cooperate for common purposes.\textsuperscript{243}

The midlevel activists are formed of retired and working teachers, imams, and women who work in the local associations and newspapers. They organize festivals, as well as youth, associational, and local activities, and are particularly active in leading the local framing processes.\textsuperscript{244} They could be heads of local branches. The younger activist can rise to a higher leadership level in the future. Amed Aladin who started to work in a youth organization in 1990 became a Crimean Tatar MP in the parliament in 2005.\textsuperscript{245} Between 260 and 300 people participate as delegates in the Congresses to elect the governing council of the Tatar Union.\textsuperscript{246} 100 representatives visiting Crimea annually on 18 May could be regarded as operating at this level. Until 1996, representatives from the Crimean Tatar community in Romania funded their participation in the 18 May Deportation Day in Crimea.\textsuperscript{247} Another member operating in this level teaches children traditional folklore, prepares a Crimean Tatar program for the radio, and writes for a Crimean Tatar newspaper, bulletin, and even a journal in Turkey, thus providing examples of how this level works.\textsuperscript{248} Youth and women who participate in dance troops, contests, expeditions, festivals, museums, and cooking contests, comprise the bulk of the fourth level. These are the people who participate in activities at the 28 local branches.

\textsuperscript{243} The presidents of the Tatar Union were Tahsin Cemil, Şükrü Bavbek, Menlibay Ekrem, Mambet Ünal, Sali Necat, Yusuf Temuçin, Acakay Seladin and Tatar MPs were Tahsin Cemil, Şaganay Nusret, Sali Necat, Amet Aladin. İzzet Menan, Mambet Ünal, Ekrem Gaffar, Menan Samir represented Tatar Union in the local governments.
\textsuperscript{244} Erol Menadil, and Mustafa Sevim are examples of such organizers.
\textsuperscript{245} Amed Aladin. Interview by author. 17 September 2005, Constanta.
\textsuperscript{246} Statute of the Tatar Union.
\textsuperscript{247} Tekin Amed. Interview by author. 20 September 2005, Kence Mah,
The third level generally forms the audience. The people from remote villages were sometimes transported to Constanta by bus to watch the spectacles in festivals. In 2003, 400 people, in 2006, 760 people participated in the annual Crimean Tatar festival.\textsuperscript{249} Every year, the festival troops visit Medgidia, Mankalye, Tekirgöl, Nurbat, and Tuzla to reach local people. The fifth level also contributed to aid campaigns for Crimea in 1995.\textsuperscript{250} The mobilization of this level is still low and has not reached the interwar level, especially if we take into consideration that almost all Crimean Tatars are now educated. I met many Crimean Tatars who are not very interested in associational activities, and told very little about Crimea or the Crimean Tatar identity, and only occasionally participate in ethnic activities. That is very different from the Crimean Tatar community Müstecip Hacı Fazıl described in the interwar era. Communism seems to have been effective in alienating this stratum of society from the Crimean Tatar identity. However, the frame alignment processes still continue and this frame could achieve higher resonance in the future.

4.3.4. Movement Consequences and Conclusion:

Despite the changes in transnational political opportunities (i.e. when the deported returned, and the Soviet Union collapsed), why didn’t the diaspora community in Romania return? Why, at the same time, did this community still experience a rise in nationalist mobilization? How can we identify this form of diasporic nationalist mobilization? The different outcomes are best explained as being the result of divergent historical paths, which were shaped by different framing processes. The community in Romania underwent different framing processes than the community in the USSR. This community had a

\textsuperscript{249} Karadeniz 3, September 2003, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{250} Nariman Ibraim remembers that $5000 was donated to a newspaper and some more funs to the mosques in Crimea in 2004. Interview by author, 14 September 2005, Constanta.
collective return frame in the interwar period and this period could be characterised as exile nationalism, equivalent to the type of nationalism developed in the USSR after deportation. However, the emergence of a new political threat structure with the establishment of communism in Romania caused the disappearance of that frame by force. The Crimean Tatar frame which emerged in the communist era emphasized the Dobrujan identity, and aligned to the communist \textit{master} frame (\textit{master} frame extension) and entered into a course of territorial nationalism no different than other minorities. The drastic changes in the transnational political opportunities (i.e. the end of communism) in the late 1990s unsettled the existing frame, and created a frame transformation. The post-1990s diasporic nationalist frame emerged as a result of negotiation of previous frames, and frames learned from the homeland and diasporic communities. Thus it was a negotiation of “local” and “transnational”.

Why didn’t this community return? For the diaspora nationalism frame does not involve a program for the return of the Dobrujan community and situates the Dobrujan community as a mere supporter of the Crimean Tatars’ struggle in Crimea. But, why has there been a “rise” in national mobilization? Unlike in the communist era, this new frame firmly connected the community to Crimea. The new diaspora nationalist frame underlined that it would be more realistic to work towards the return of the deported community to Crimea, rather than their own return. However, the role of the diaspora was more actively defined in the fate of the homeland in comparison to the minority nationalism frame in the communist era. With the emergence of more opportunities of transnationalism and the advance of minority rights in Romania, it seemed possible for the community to maintain its identity in diasporic settings and to support the homeland from outside. Nationalism and
especially transnational ties were viewed as necessary, because Romania, as other nation-states still invokes other policies and practices that threatened the maintenance of identity.

Most interestingly, the diaspora communities in Turkey, Romania, and the United States, along with the repatriates in Crimea, engaged in a totally new framing process to form a transnational nation. Both frame transformation within the community and influences from the homeland and other diaspora frames, especially attempts to form a transnational unity, increased resonance for the Crimean Tatar identity, and this paved the way for the observation of increased mobilization.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Crimean Tatar Diaspora Community in Turkey

5. 1. Introduction:

The Crimean Tatars in Turkey present a unique case of long-distance nationalism. The Crimean Tatars made approximately one–tenth of the population of Turkey in 1923, when this new state emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. “The word ‘assimilation’ does not sufficiently describe the incorporation of the Crimean Tatars into Turkey, because they, as many other Muslim ethnic groups such as Turkomans, Circassians, Laz and so on formed the fundamental stones in the formation of Turkish ethnic identity251. Therefore, according to many Crimean Tatars, it is problematic to conceive themselves as a diaspora, since Turkey is not just a receiving country. As one activist put it, Turkey is a "fatherland" while Crimea is the "motherland". This is reflected in the self-described ethnonym “Crimean Turks”. However, in the 1980s, new generations whose parents and grandparents viewed themselves unproblematically as “Crimean Turks” “began to reassert themselves as members of the "Crimean Tatar diaspora”. Today more than forty associations have emerged across Turkey which regard themselves as part of the “Crimean Tatar diaspora”, and have been trying to develop transnational relations with the Crimean Tatars in Crimea and other diaspora communities. It outwardly appears that “some Turks became Crimean Tatars” in the 1980s, when it was least expected, at a time when they had largely forgotten the language and traditional customs, as a consequence of intense modernization, urbanization, and the policies of the Turkish state. The branches of the Crimean Tatar

251 This non-ethnic conception of national identity derives from the millet system, in which each religious community formed an autonomous unit.
Associations, led by their General Center recently played an active part in the convening of World Congress of the Crimean Tatars (2009). The Crimean Tatar diaspora community has three to five million potential members, considerable wealth, political influence, and highly educated human resources. If they choose to take interest in Crimean politics and continue to mobilize with an increasing pace, they potentially could constitute the most influential factor in Crimean Tatar prospects of existence within the Crimea. This chapter traces the emergence, development, and outcomes of the Crimean Tatar nationalism in Turkey to investigate the causes and nature of the recent diaspora mobilization of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. This inquiry requires an examination of the movement throughout the 20th century. The Crimean Tatar movement will be divided into three periods, pre-World War II, 1945-1980s and more recent period beginning from the 1980s, which continues to the present.

5.2. Literature Review and Application of Theoretical Framework

5.2.1. Immigrants and modernization:

It is estimated that 1,800,000 Crimean Tatars emigrated to Turkey between 1783 and 1922. (Karpat1985, 66) This number represented one-tenth of Turkey’s population in the 1920s. Despite this great proportion, it is hard to say that the Crimean Tatars formed a distinct community in Turkey. Tatar emigrations spanned over 150 years, creating a margin for significant disparities among the cultural and ethnic identities of Tatar immigrants. Moreover, they did not occupy a specific ethnic space within Anatolia as they did in Dobruca. The Ottoman settlement policy aimed to intermix the population as much as

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252 In fact, the formal name, all but one association has the ethnonym “Crimean Turkish” in their titles. (Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Cemiyeti)
possible, especially in Anatolia. Either the Crimean Tatar villages were scattered among the local villages and villages of other immigrants, or the Crimean Tatar immigrants were settled inside the villages of locals and other newcomers. Without modern communication and transportation, familial ties, connections between migrants of the same wave, or of similar origin eroded. The local Turkish and Sunni Muslim-dominated Anatolian traditions were very close to those of the Crimean Tatars and therefore the ways of life of the locals did not threaten the survival and reproduction of Crimean Tatar traditional communities (perhaps they even guaranteed the survival of Crimean Tatar traditions). Except for certain places in Anatolia, many descendants of Crimean Tatars intermarried with the local population, began to speak local languages and acculturated into local ways. Until the end of the 1950s, the Crimean Tatars were mostly peasants and the level of education was low, as it was among most of Turkey’s population.

Based on a similar type of observation, Fisher (1978), Williams (2001), and Bezanis (1994) argue that we cannot talk about the Crimean Tatar identity or diaspora in the 19th or the 20th century Turkey. The descendants of the Crimean Tatar immigrants gradually lost their language, traditional culture, and collective memory of the homeland; thus they do not merit a study. However, the judgment that the descendants of immigrants from Crimea in Turkey assimilated could be too hasty. Firstly, there is not sufficient anthropological or historical research on the identities of the Crimean Tatar immigrants in Turkey in the 19th or the 20th century, so most judgments are based on anecdotal information. Considering my ethnographic expeditions, and oral history interviews, I am aware that the immigrants of larger waves such as 1860 immigrants from Crimea, or 1878 immigrants from Dobruca could be identified as to have formed certain ethnic spaces across Anatolia. Today Eskişehir and
its thirty-nine Crimean Tatar and Nogay villages Derince (İzmit), Şehremini, Taşlıtarla, Karagümruk of pre-1980s Istanbul, fourteen Nogay and Crimean Tatar villages in Konya, ten Crimean Tatar villages around Polatlı and the neighborhoods of Polatlı, fourteen Crimean Tatar and Nogay villages and neighbours in Adana and the town of Ceyhan, and numerous Crimean Tatar neighborhoods in various cities and towns (Kırımlı 2011, xiii-ix) can be identified as ethnic spaces where Crimean Tatars settled densely for decades, and maintained their language, culture and traditions through endogamy. Even though all Crimean Tatars do not form one unified community in Anatolia, mainly those Crimean Tatar families which stayed in Dobruca for decades before re-migrating to Anatolia were able to maintain Crimean Tatar customs, language and endogamy longer. Dobruja is remembered with nostalgia as much as (perhaps more than) Crimea by some of the Crimean Tatar migrants, therefore lack of a collective memory of former homelands and places one emigrated from is not completely true, even though it does not exactly belong to the original homeland. The collective memory of Crimea can also be observed in the folk literature. The ethnic spaces noted above began to change in the 1960s and 1970s with increasing urbanization and internal migration in Turkey, which then led to attempts of reproducing the Crimean Tatar identity in more modern forms in the urban areas.

The fact that Crimean Tatar nationalism had representatives in Turkey, throughout the 20th century, although the resonance was not always high, also challenges the ‘assimilation thesis’. In the words of Hakan Kırımlı “the fire of Crimean Tatar national idea never totally died

\[253\] Recently Tatars in Polatlı constructed Şekerevler, an apartment building bloc for primarily Tatar families ‘n order to live together while maintaining their traditional ties in an urban environment. A similar project was proposed by Fikret Yurter in Long Island in the 1970s. (Fikret Yurter showed me the architectural project of such a Tatar neighborhood plan in my interview with him in Long Island on 24 April 2009. )
in Turkey, even though it was sometimes as small as candlelight. The Crimean Tatar nationalists were not always émigrés, who carried nationalism in the homeland to diaspora. The descendants of immigrants who turned to diaspora nationalists later were born and raised in diaspora settings were raised by their uneducated peasant families, who considered themselves as Muslims rather than "Crimean Tatars". We can easily assume that they were not exposed to the ideas Crimean Tatar nationalism developing in the homeland. This thesis aims to investigate what made this diaspora members develop Crimean Tatar national identity despite the lack of above pre-conditions. First representatives of ‘diaspora originated’ nationalists were teachers descended from Crimean Tatar immigrants, who rushed to Crimea to teach in semi-secular schools for the Muslims in the beginning of the 20th century. Their speaking of the local Crimean Tatar language and being familiar with the Crimean Tatar customs proved to be an asset. (Kırımlı, 1996: 152) The teachers returned again in 1918. (Altuğ 2005, 29) While the Fatherland Society was composed of students from Crimea, Osman Kemal’s Crimean Muslims Association (Kırım Müslümanları Cemiyeti), Tatar Charitable Society (Tatar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi) and Cafer Seydahmet’s The National Party (Milli Fırqa) in Turkey in the post-1917 period had members born and raised in Ottoman/Turkish diaspora. We should not assume the non-existence of nationalism among the descendants of the Crimean Tatar immigrants, just because it has not been sufficiently researched. Ethnic politics in Turkey is an under-researched area, and many authors extrapolate the assimilation of ethnic groups from the assumption that the Turkish state as built on a Turkification ideology and policy. However in the last decades, not only Kurds, but also Caucasians, Laz, Bosniaks, Albanians, Arabs, Alevi走访的, Romans, Balkan Turks,  

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254 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara. 
255 Some of these teachers were Yusuf Ziya, Ömer Sami, Ethem Feyzi, Şevki Bektöre and Fevzi Altuğ.
Christians, Jews, and other groups engaged in identity politics in Turkey, which put into doubt the success of the Turkification project.

It is problematic to argue that the Crimean Tatars had assimilated, because if they did, how can we explain the increase in the number of people who identified themselves as “Crimean Tatars” “Crimean Tatar diaspora” or “Crimean Tatar nationalists,” beginning from the 1980s? Perhaps, the concept of “assimilation” must be reconsidered. Even if they have “assimilated”, “assimilation” may not be irreversible. While there were three Crimean Tatar associations in three big cities of Turkey before the 1980s, the number of associations gradually increased to almost 40 by the 2000s. While there was one journal published before the 1980s on Crimean Tatar politics and identity, four long-term journals and many bulletins and books were published after the 1980s. Beginning in the 1980s, the participants of the Crimean Tatar movement in Turkey multiplied; transnational flows, relations, and networks between Crimea and Turkey increased immensely; and the unofficial Crimean Tatar lobby in Turkey obtained significant gains on behalf of the Crimean Tatar repatriates from Turkey.

Third, the primordialist or ethno-symbolist assumptions behind these works are problematic. Only Williams provides a theoretical account of his assumptions, attributing to Cohen’s ethno-symbolist understanding of diaspora. Fisher and Bezanis too have implicitly ethno-symbolist assumptions. They imagine the Crimean Tatars as those immigrants or their descendants maintaining certain attributes of an ethnic culture such as language, traditions, collective memory of the myth of homeland. When these attributes are lost or when new attributes of Turkish nationality, such as the Turkish language, and traditions are gained, they cease to be a diaspora forever. This means that these immigrants have been irrevocably assimilated. However, according to constructivism, crudely speaking, ethnic identity can be
reclaimed politically despite the loss of these “sociological” or “objective” attributes. The language can be revived, and the myth of the homeland and ethnic culture can be reconstructed through human will. The very erosion of traditional communities could give rise to nationalism to maintain identity. This is what happened in the case of the Crimean Tatar immigrants' descendants in the 1980s.

A more important question is why these pre-1980 Crimean Tatar nationalists could not or did not choose to mobilize large number of descendants of the Crimean Tatar immigrants and left this great potential of human resources to be mobilized by the Turkish nationalist movement. This is a contrast to the interwar Crimean Tatar mobilization in Romania, especially since many Crimean Tatar immigrants in Turkey are very similar to those in Romania in their sub-ethnic, and cultural make-up and historical background.

The first reason is that modernization is a prerequisite for mass nationalism. The Crimean Tatar community was not massively modernized until the 1970s. Some communities express resentment through nationalism, if they have suffered uneven consequences of a modernization process in their host-state. This was the case for the Crimean Tatars in Romania. The Crimean Tatars were not structurally discriminated against in Turkey, moreover they were provided with empty Anatolian land and prospered using the superior agricultural techniques they brought from Romania and Crimea. With their higher educational levels, they were brought to significant positions in the Ottoman and Turkish army and bureaucracy. The new Turkish state and accompanying modernization did not disrupt the traditional Crimean Tatar communities in the beginning. They were free to maintain their language, traditions and culture in their private realms. Moreover, discursive opportunity structures in Turkey, which privileged the populations with Turkic ethnic roots,
contributed the acceptance of the Crimean Tatar language as a subject to be taught at universities\textsuperscript{256}. This made the masses less interested in pursuing Crimean Tatar identity politics.

The second reason for low resonance of the Crimean Tatar nationalism is that the émigrés consciously excluded the masses from participating in the Crimean Tatar politics. According to them, the ‘political and discursive opportunities’ in Turkey were such that mass participation of the descendants of the Crimean Tatar could ultimately end up damaging the Crimean Tatar cause. Crimean Tatar nationalism could not be openly mentioned because it could damage Russian-Ottoman or Turkish-Soviet relations. The Ottoman Unionist (Committee of Union and Progress) government preferred to support Crimean Tatar nationalism clandestinely. In this atmosphere, émigré nationalism was the most effective method to advance Crimean Tatar interests, as it involved tactics of working with a small, trustworthy and efficient group, secret negotiations, and lobbying. Mobilizing the masses would not have been useful under those circumstances, as Russia would have requested the suppression of the movement. Later, the emergence of better political and discursive opportunities in Europe with the organization of Promethean League in Poland prompted the émigré leaders to channel their efforts for recruitment toward these geographical locations, where they could be more effective. They also contributed to the emergence and development of ‘exile nationalism’ in Romania. Ultimately, the purpose of émigré nationalism was to prepare a cadre to take power whenever there was a collapse of authority in Crimea, and they managed to make best of the circumstances during the Second World War. They were largely unsuccessful in attaining their main goal because of circumstances

\textsuperscript{256}North Caucasian (‘Circassian’) languages were never accepted as a subject for academic study in Turkey. Most people argued that the regime did not allow for the propagation of the distinctiveness of this large population, as it would be a challenge to a “Turkish” identity.
beyond themselves, but they were able to save the lives of many Crimean Tatars, Karaims, and other Soviet Muslims.

5.2.2. Émigré and diaspora nationalism in the post-World War II era:

How can we explain the 1945-1980 period during which greater number of population with Crimean Tatar origins in Turkey became educated, modernized and urbanized, but did not mobilize towards Crimean Tatar nationalism? Several authors have concluded that the Crimean Tatars had assimilated by then based on this fact of their ethnic experience. I argue that between 1945 and 1980, the lack of participation in the Crimean Tatar national movement can be explained by a lack of alternative framing. The only challengers of this frame were the Crimean Tatar Second World War refugees who came to Turkey in the late 1940s. They were suppressed by the unfavorable political and discursive opportunity structures in Turkey, which were not tolerant towards ethnic distinctiveness, especially the distinctiveness of groups in conflict with the communist superpower neighboring Turkey. The refugees soon had to leave for the United States where they perceived more suitable political and discursive opportunities for the kind of Crimean Tatar nationalism they sought to pursue.

The 1970s could be regarded as a transitional period between non-resonant émigré nationalism and mass-based diaspora nationalism. The loss of language, culture and traditions provided reasons for nationalism among the Crimean Tatars beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. The educated Crimean Tatars, as well as members of other ethnic groups, began to view reproduction of the ethnic culture in an urban environment, and its recognition in the public realm, as necessary to thwart assimilation. This contributed to the emergence of the diaspora nationalism frame in pursuing the Crimean Tatar nationalism. Unlike émigré
nationalism, diaspora nationalism frame targeted the masses and participation multiplied for the first time in Turkey. This frame transformation explains why there was the perception of a revival of the Crimean Tatar diaspora beginning in the 1980s.

5.2.3. Application of Theoretical Framework

In the first part of my chapter, I will consider the emergence of Crimean Tatar long-distance nationalism in the pre-World War II era. The emergence of political and discursive opportunities in the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk Revolution enabled Crimean Tatar nationalist activity. However, these opportunities were still limited, and Crimean Tatar national activity was conducted in the form of émigré nationalism without being spread to the masses. The émigré frame emerged by the extension of pan-Turkism master frame, amplification of attachment to homeland, counter-framing against Russian imperialism (pan-Slavism), and later Bolshevism. The First World War and the collapse of the Tsarist Empire provided political opportunities for émigré nationalists, who transplanted their movement to Crimea beginning from 1910. It could be argued that a significant wave of movement that contributed to the declaration of Crimean Tatar sovereignty developed in the diaspora setting instead of the homeland. In this period, the expansion of transnational political and discursive opportunities in interwar Europe caused the centre of the émigré nationalism movement to transfer from Turkey to Europe. (1917-1960) In Europe, the Crimean Tatar émigrés counter-framed against the Soviet frame and bridged frames with all other Soviet nationalities counter-framing against the Soviet Union. The émigré nationalists also bridged frames with the exile frame of the community living in Romania, which provided better political opportunities for Crimean Tatar nationalism in the inter-war era (1917-1960). This
part ends with a focus on the activities of émigré nationalists during the First World War, which could be taken as evidence of their frames. In a way, the First World War provided opportunities for émigrés to deploy the alliances and talents which they invested during the interwar era.

In the second part, I focus on development of the movement between 1960 and 1983. In this era, the discursive and political opportunity opportunities in Europe mostly disappeared and in Turkey, they stayed the same. The Crimean Tatar émigré frame was reproduced in Turkey despite previously known ineffectiveness and irrelevance. This can be explained by path-dependency and lack of an alternative frame. The new coming the Second World War refugees entered into frame contests to transform this outmoded frame, and to rejuvenate the Crimean Tatar nationalism in Turkey but they became unsuccessful because of the political and discursive opportunity structures in Turkey. Consequently, their leaders left for the United States where they perceived more appropriate political and discursive opportunities for their frame.

The Crimean Tatar community in the United States could be viewed as an offshoot of the Crimean Tatar community in Turkey, as they originated from the 1930s immigrants and the Second World War refugees who settled in Turkey for 10 to 40 years before departing to the United States. I look at how this community fared in the United States, and observe that they formed another type of émigré nationalism. Different than the émigré nationalism in Turkey, this movement bridged frames with the collective return movement in the USSR. This frame also had low resonance, as it lacked a program for increasing resonance for the community by focusing on ways of maintaining identity in the United States as diaspora nationalists do or making a plan for this community to return as exile nationalists do.
sidetrack a little bit here to ask why Cengiz Dağcı, who could be considered the only representative of Crimean Tatar diaspora literature in the postwar era, outside the Iron Curtain, was neglected by the majority the United States and Turkish communities United States or Turkish community in the 1960s and 70s. I argue that the changes in political and discursive opportunities finally in the 1980s finally caused him to be embraced in the 1980s by the Crimean Tatar communities in Turkey and the United States.

Crimean Tatar nationalism began to rejuvenate in the 1980s. The emergence of a diaspora frame came in response to increasing modernization, and globalization, disrupting the traditional communities of the Crimean Tatars in Anatolia. A change in political and discursive opportunities in Turkey and in the transnational realm (pertaining the homeland of the Crimean Tatars) and learning of the collective return frame of the co-ethnics in the USSR precipitated a frame transformation. In this last part of the chapter, I examine various aspects of this frame transformation and compare this newly emerging “diaspora frame” with the previous “émigré frame.” Unlike the émigré frame, the diaspora frame by definition seeks high resonance. Unlike the exile frame, it emphasizes ways of maintaining identity in the host-society, not necessarily adopting return as a goal. The community also bridged frames with the emerging diaspora frame in Romania and to a lesser extent in the United States. The construction of a transnational nation through further frame transformation in the late 1990s and the 2000s is the topic of another chapter. Finally, I consider the consequences of the movement until 1990, and conclude.
5.2.4. Sources:

I conducted interviews with executives of the Crimean Tatar associations and prominent leaders of the movement in Ankara, Istanbul, Polatlı, Eskişehir, among which I decided focus on 10 of them. Bursa, Konya, Ceyhan, Nevşehir, and Kaman. I also conducted fieldwork and participant observation in Kocaeli, Polatlı, Eskişehir during tepreş (Crimean Tatar spring festival), and during associational activities in Ankara, Istanbul, Konya, Ceyhan, Eskişehir, and Bursa. Although I could not cover all the Crimean Tatar organizations, prominent individuals, and communities, I examined a representative sample of them, focusing mainly on Crimean Tatar ethnoscapes, and recently growing ones. I also worked in the Istanbul Association library for a collection of relevant movement documents and records.

5.3. The Case of Crimean Tatars in Turkey:

5.3.1. Emergence and development of emigré nationalism frame in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (1908-1945)

5.3.1.1. The emergence of political and discursive opportunity structures in the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk Revolution (1908):

At the time when the Tsar closed the Duma and rescinded public civil liberties the civil liberties of the population, a constitutional revolution happened in Turkey (1908). Turko-Muslim nationalists who were suppressed in Russia began to settle in Istanbul in order to develop their ideologies and nationalist movements in the liberalized atmosphere fostered by the Young Turk revolution. 257 During the same period, the prohibition of Muslim Turkic

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257 See Chapter 4 for the influence of pan-Turkism on Crimean Tatar nationalism.
schools in Crimea led the Crimean Tatars in Crimea like the Crimean Tatars in Romania to send their children to Turkey. In 1908, like other Muslim students from Russia, the Crimean Tatar students in Istanbul (approximately 250) established a “Crimean Students Association” for mutual solidarity and engaging in cultural and educational activities (Kırımlı 1996, 159).

However, the Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks was certainly not a democracy. Both the circumstances in Turkey and Russia’s demand to suppress the activities of its Muslim subjects in Istanbul provided limited opportunities for nationalist activity. For instance, when Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet wanted to introduce “the development of the civilization and social level of our people in Crimea and its self-determination”258 as a purpose of the association in their by-laws, several members objected, finding this purpose too political. This was the reason behind the foundation of the clandestine Fatherland Society (1909) with some “trusted” members of the Crimean Students Association (Otar 1960, 13; Kırımlı 1996, 169)259. Similarly, when the leaders of the Fatherland Society told Talat Pasha about their purpose, the prominent leader of the Young Turk Revolution supported them “not with his words but with his eyes” as Cafer Seydahmet wrote in his diary. Young Turk support to Crimean Tatars was covert. After Cafer Seydahmet wrote his manifesto on Russian imperialism, the Russian Embassy asked Ottoman officials to arrest him. He then fled to Paris. Therefore, the émigré movement was necessarily limited to a small circle in the diaspora setting. The émigré movement in Turkey had most of its grass-roots members in Crimea, rather than in diaspora settings. Instead of mass protests or campaigns in diaspora,

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258 “Kırım’daki halkın medeni ve içtimai seviyesini yükseltmek ve onun kendi mukadderatına sahib olması için çalışmak”

this movement focused on diplomacy, intelligence, and negotiations behind closed doors with officials of relevant states. The purpose was to secure necessary resources and favorable diplomatic relations for the right moment. A leader cadre was being trained in the diaspora setting to take power in case a moment, in which the fate of Crimea could be redefined, appeared. Both the First and Second World Wars were perceived as such windows of opportunity and the émigré nationalists adopted pro-active position to take advantage of these opportune periods.

The contribution of émigré nationalism to the national movement in the homeland was very significant. According to Kırımlı “[w]ell into the mid-1930s, a large proportion of the Crimean Tatar intellectuals who played prominent roles in political, social, cultural, and literary life were those who had their education in Istanbul prior to the First World War.” (Kırımlı 1996, 167) He also adds that “[a]t a time when the national reform movement [in Crimea]...reached the limits possible under the circumstances, they were complemented by a new source from Istanbul.” (Kırımlı 1996, 167-168) Edige Kırımal (1952) underlines that the final and the decisive stage of the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement was prepared and organized in the diaspora setting. This movement was then “transplanted later into the Crimea”. (Kırımlı, 1996: 167) Accordingly, the Crimean Tatar national parliament of 1917 was composed of largely Crimean Tatar students educated in Turkey and participated in the émigré movement. (Kırımlı, 1996: 167) Both the teachers from diaspora who came to Crimea after 1905 and Crimean Tatar émigrés who spent several years in Istanbul played important role in the development of Crimean nationalism (Kırımlı, 1996).
5.3.1.2. The emergence of “émigré nationalism frame”

A. Frame amplification: Emphasis on homeland Crimea as the centre of identity

The Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism frame (1908-1921) can be best understood in contrast with the frame of “Tatar Charitable Society” (*Tatar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi*), a Crimean Tatar association founded in Istanbul in 1909. Before comparing them, I would like to discuss a significant theoretical contribution to this issue by Kırmılı (1996). He points out the distinction between the immigrant minded Tatar Charitable Society and the émigré organization Fatherland Society as such:

Tatar Charitable Society…promoted a quasi-historical and cultural “Tatar” concept transplanted into contemporary Turkey…roughly the turn of the twentieth century constituted an intellectual turning point…the intellectuals…which came to Turkey prior to this time mostly considered themselves as immigrants in a new home, while those who had been acquainted with the intellectual reform drive in the Crimea and developing national consciousness were likely to consider themselves as émigrés in Turkey. (Kırmılı 1996, 164)

One critical point here is that the émigré consciousness cannot be explained only by the modernization of the Muslim community in Russia that were initiated by the Gasprinskiy reforms. While these are necessary causes for the emergence of any nationalism, territorial or émigré, they are insufficient. For example, another organization of more recent immigrants, the Mutual Aide Association of the Crimean Muslim Immigrants (1921) (*Kırım Müslüman Muhacirlerinin Teavün Cemiyeti*), which involved individuals from the upper strata of the Crimean Tatar society, emphasized their non-émigré identity: “[their] main concern was the welfare of their people in Turkey, not the politics of the country they left behind.” Hence, they were not involved in the political activities of the Crimean Tatar student organization, Fatherland Society during the first two decades of the twentieth century. (Altan 2007) Even in the 1930s, immigrants from Crimea did not demonstrate a strong nationalist
consciousness, apart from efforts to maintain solidaristic networks.\textsuperscript{260} I suggest that the “émigré consciousness” was rather a product of the diasporic experience. It is the Fatherland Society, and particularly Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet who came up with “the émigré nationalism frame” and hence émigré identity. After explaining that émigré identity is not just a consequence of macro-sociological changes in Crimean society, let us specify how émigré frame constitutes a transformation of the previous “immigrant” frame.

The Tatar Charitable Society was an apolitical immigrant association, engaging in philanthropy and aiming to maintain solidarity among the vaguely defined Tatar immigrants. The Fatherland Society did not deal with philanthropic activities related to the Crimean Tatar immigrants in Turkey. It was a clandestine political organization that aimed for national mobilization of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The émigré nationalists distributed their manifestos mainly in Crimea, less so among the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. (Otar 1991, 13; Kırımlı 1996, 175) When they perceived that political opportunities had ripened and the end of Tsarism would soon arrive, they carried their organization from Turkey to Crimea in the 1910s. In the words of Cafer Seydahmet:

In 1909 there were Arab, Kurdish, and Albanian Societies established. Some Crimean (Tatar) emigrants, who had emigrated here earlier, established Crimean Charity Organization [Tatar Charitable Society] and began to publish a newspaper entitled Tonguç. We investigated that Society and even registered as members; but we could not find anyone there to attract us intellectually. Also, they were interested neither in us nor in the Crimea. (cf Altan 2007)

The views of the Tatar Charitable Society were represented in the newspapers Tonguç and Çolpan. According to Kırımlı, they resembled ordinary Ottoman newspapers, but they occasionally published articles about Muslims in Russia, mostly excerpts from Tercüman and

\textsuperscript{260} Some of them seemed to have engaged nationalism but this mostly seems to be because of the influence Cafer Seydahmet rather than because of their nationalist upbringing. Altan considers immigrants of the 1930s less nationalist than refugees of the 1940s.
other Turkic papers from Russia. (Kırımlı 1996, 163) Only Abdürreşid İbrahim, a Siberian Tatar who contributed a few articles to Çolpan had direct connections with Russian Muslims.261 The members of Tatar Charitable Society had a vague idea about distinctiveness from the majority Ottoman society (Kırımlı 1996, 162, 163,165) They did not have “a territorial conception of Tatarness”, but they mostly underlined “dialect” and “folkways” as bases of identity. (Kırımlı 1996, 163) They applied the term “Tatar” to any Turkic-Muslim individual from the Russian Empire. (Kırımlı 1996, 163) In comparison, the émigré nationalists are clear of their own identity or the specific kind of people their activities target: the people in Crimea. The rest of Turko-Muslim peoples in Russia were beyond their purview. Cafer Seydahmet explained his and Çelebi Cihan’s process of creating the émigré frame before the foundation of the Fatherland Society as follows:

In 1908, in a quiet corner of Istanbul, in a small room two intellectuals were speaking to each other, being excited with the Young Turk revolution… They were thinking about Crimea, and wishing for a revolution in Russia, and thinking that the people in Crimea must be prepared for this. (Kırımer 1970, 19)262

It is not necessary to emphasize that by now Crimea had clearly become the fatherland in a nationalist sense, while the Tatar Charitable Society did not have such a conception. While Cafer Seydahmet mentions the possibility of national autonomy in a federated new Russian state in 1913, the purpose of the Fatherland Society evolved into national autonomy by 1917. (Otar 1991, 14)

261 I thank Dr. Hakan Kırımlı for this point.
262 “1908’de İstanbul’un sesiz bir köşesinde dar, küçük bir odada iki münevver genç, Türk inkılabının heyecanlandığı ateşle baş başa vermiş dertleşiyorlar…Bunları o zaman İstanbul’dan kurulmak istenen Tatar Cemiyeti-i Hayriyesi alakadar etmiyor…Bunlar Kırm’ı düşünyölorlar, Rusya’da ihtilalin canlanması diliyorlar, Kırm’da halkın buna hazırlanması zaruri buluyorlar..”
B. Pan-Turkism as a master frame:

The Fatherland Society was influenced by Pan-Turkism as a master frame and sought to reshape the master frame around their own grievances (master frame extension). The Crimean Tatars derive their emphasis on the dignity of the Turkic peoples, and their allegiance to the maintenance of Turkic language, culture, and political unity, from Pan-Turkism. They used pan-Turkism to supply necessary symbols for elaborating the Crimean Tatar identity.

“Whenever Crimean history’s symbols and traditions which would fit the contemporary needs were inaccessible or unavailable in purely Crimean sources, they could be substituted by borrowings from the repository of general Turkic history and mythology available in the Turkic sources in Istanbul.” (Kırımçı 1996, 196)

Examples include the azure flag, and the symbolic institution of Kurultay. Halim Giray Sultan’s Gülbün-üş Hanan, which was published in Ottoman Turkey, provided much needed material for a Crimean Tatar historical narrative. However, the influence of a master frame on a certain frame is not standard. Actors interpret master frame: They squared the emphasis on Crimean Tatar specific identity with the emphasis on Pan-Turkic brotherhood in the master frame.

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263 It was Muslims of Russia who first developed it as a response to pan-Slavism. One of the fathers of pan-Turkism in Russia was a Crimean Tatar, Ismail Gasprinskiy. The manifesto of pan-Turkism was written by a Russian Muslim, Yusuf Akçura in Cairo in 1905. Pan-Turkism soon became the dominant ideology which played a role in the transformation of the Ottoman Empire.(Landau 1995, 36; Hakimi 2001, 67; Georgeon 1986) The Crimean Tatar nationalism was influenced by Gasprinskiy’s pan-Turkism and the Crimean Tatar émigrés in Istanbul carried the new pan-Turkist ideas developed in the Ottoman Empire to Crimea. (Kırımçı 1996, 195)

264 One of the activities of the Crimean Tatar Students Association, which shows their spectrum of interest, is an aid campaign for the earthquake in Turkestan. (Otar 1991, 13) Even in 1943, Cafer Seydahmet [Kirimci] continued to seek for extension of the pan-Turkist master frame. (Karaoguz, 2007)
C. Counter-framing the Russian imperialism frame:

The struggle for the independence of Crimea must have been connected with struggle for the independence in all Turkic-Muslim nations in Russia and later in the Soviet Union. Frame-bridging with the struggles of those peoples was seen as significant for the weakening of the common enemy, Russia. For that purpose, the émigré nationalists also bridged frames with Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia, who recognized the national autonomy demands of minorities most. When Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] was in Paris between 1911 and 1913, he sought to contact with several anti-Tsarist circles. “All initiative damaging the Tsarism and which creates strong resistance against Tsarism was holy for me…The ones who work for this purpose were my allies.” (Otar 1991, 14) It is important to emphasize that many Pan-Turkists in this period had socialist economic programs. Not surprisingly, the émigré nationalists counter-frame the Russian imperialist/colonialist frame. In The Composition of the Tatar Nation in Twentieth Century\textsuperscript{265}, Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] calls for revolution, and the destruction of Tsarist government, in order for Tatars to develop their educational and civilizational institutions, to reform the religious institutions and to reclaim the waqf property.\textsuperscript{266} Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] also translated Seignobos’ Russian government or the Rule of Whip, and published it in Istanbul. (Otar 1991, 13) These words reflect Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer]’s frame well:

If the revolution occurred, there would be a democratic Russia, the national rights of the nationalities would be recognized, economic development would be strengthened, from now on neither Russification nor deportation would be a threat. Perhaps Russia would be re-constituted on the principle of federal states and Crimea would be accorded a territorial autonomy. For this to happen, first of all, Tsardom needed to

\textsuperscript{265} “Yirminci Asırda Tatar Milleti Manzumesi”

\textsuperscript{266} Russian ambassador asked for his arrest to Istanbul government as a result of this brochure, which caused Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] to escape to Paris. (Otar 1991, 13)
collapse. ...I was going to Crimea to become a worker in the revolution and struggle for rights... (cf Otar 1991, 14).

- The Crimean Tatars lost their independence unjustly, in violation of international treaty between Russia and Crimean Tatars and Crimean Tatars were colonized in the following era, and their population was forced out, or subjected to assimilation.
- This gives Crimean Tatars right to self-determination.
- The émigré Crimean Tatars must engage in national struggle to attain this right from outside and inside of Crimea.

Figure 13. The émigré nationalism frame in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey (1908-1980s)

5.3.1.3. Frame resonance of émigré nationalism:

Émigré nationalism became resonant among larger elite in Turkey, other than just émigré and students from Crimea between 1917 and 1920, when struggle for sovereignty in Crimea and later famine took place in Crimea.

By 1917, the Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism frame became known in Turkey and a limited number of immigrants event went to Crimea to participate and serve in the national movement. They were mostly teachers, and some of them had been in Crimea since the turn of the century. Yusuf Ziya, Ethem Feyzi, Ömer Sami, Fevzi Altuğ, Şevki Bektöre were among them.

The émigré nationalism frame affected former immigrants' organizations such as Tatar Charitable Society. Even though this association did not engage in politics, they have more specific idea who they were and the “Crimean” identity became entrenched by 1920s.
During the famine, Tatar Charitable Society demonstrated a strong attachment to their homeland. While most émigré nationalists left Turkey in this period, this association seemed to have the best communication with Crimea in Turkey, for example, informing the Turkish people about the extent and horrors of famine and starvation in Crimea (Kırımlı 2003, 54) It organized a campaign to collect aid for the starving Tatars in Crimea and applied to Ottoman Red Crescent for that purpose. Tatar Charitable Society also provided aid for a few thousand refugees, who attempted to escape the famine. (Kırımlı 2003, 55, 62) Hacı Mesud Efendi, the president of the Tatar Charitable Society, personally attended the distribution of aid in Crimea to make sure that aid reached the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars, who appreciated the gesture of solidarity, emotionally welcomed him. (Kırımlı 2003, 64)

5.3.1.4. The shrinking of political opportunity structures in Turkey

When political opportunities were perceived to emerge for the self-determination of the Crimean Tatars during the First World War, the émigré nationalists approached the Turkish public more openly. On 20 April 1918, Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] arrived in Turkey, as the Foreign and War Minister (Director) of the Crimean Tatar National Government to inform the Turkish government circles and the press about the nature of recent events (Kırımlı 1998b, 204-205). He also lobbied Enver Pasha to meet Hasan Sabri Ayvazov, the Chairman of the Qurultay. Ayvazov requested the recognition of the independence of Crimea (Kırımlı 1998b, 206).

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267 According to Müstecip Ülküsal (1979), not only Crimean Tatars themselves but whole Istanbul press was busy narrating the heroism and national revival of the Crimean Tatars in accordance with the foreign policy of the Unionist (CUP) government.
268 Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] also lobbied in this period in Berlin against the Ukrainian annexation of Crimea, with the support of Talat Pasha (Kırımlı 1998b, 207).

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Another émigré nationalist activity in this period was Osman Kemal Hatif’s founding of the *Kırım Müslümanları Cemiyeti* (Crimean Muslims Association) (Kırımer 1993, 312) in 1918 with approval of the Ottoman government (CUP) (Kırımlı 1998a, 10). Osman Kemal Hatif was a former member of the Crimean Tatar National Government (*Milli İdare*). This association formed an influential lobby in the Ottoman Empire and acted like a Crimean Tatar agency by informing the press well thanks its direct connection to Crimea. It also published *Kırım Mecmuası* (Journal of Crimea) between 1917 and 1918 as well as a book titled *Gök Bayrak altında Milli Faaliyet* (*National Movement under the Blue Flag*) to openly advocate for the Crimean Tatar cause to Ottoman public. (Kırımlı 1998a, 10)

After the Bolshevik destruction of the Crimean Tatar government by murdering Çelebi Cihan, Cafer Seydahmet [Kırımer] escaped to Istanbul (1919). He was assigned as the “fully empowered representative” by the falling Crimean Tatar parliament. (Kırımer 1993, 318) Since then, he represented the “right-wing of National Party” (anti-Bolshevik, and more sympathetic towards liberal democracy) continued in exile while the Bolshevik Party was accepted to have absorbed the “left-wing of National Party” in Crimea. The Crimean Tatars that remained in Crimea endeavored nation-building behind the socialist facade until Stalin purged them in the late 1920s and 1930s.

Between 1919 and 1923, Cafer Seydahmet attempted to rally support for the Crimean Tatars in Turkey and in Europe. Though the Ottoman Empire collapsed in October 1918, he continued to contact with the former members of the Ottoman government. However, he also

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269 The declaration of the organization was published in İkdam on 23 March 1918. The founders of the association were Osman Kemal, Bekirzade Hamdi, Mahmut Ekrem, Şevki Bektöre, Bekir Muhittin, Mehmet Kahraman. (Kırımer, 312) This organization later took the name Crimea and Kazan Aid Association (*Kırım ve Kazan Cemiyeti-i Hayriyesi*).

270 Members included Bekirzade Hamdi, Mahmut Ekrem, Şevki Bektöre, Bekir Muhittin, Feyzi, Sudi, Nurettin Hüsamettin, Mehmet Kahraman.
established communication with Mustafa Kemal’s rebellious Anatolian government, which formed the seed of modern Turkey. The British, who had occupied Istanbul, did not tolerate these activities, and Cafer Seydahmet was exiled by 1919. He settled in Geneva, Switzerland, where he continued lobbying European governments and informing the press. In 1922, Cafer Seydahmet once again came to Turkey to meet Turkish statesmen and publicize the famine in Crimea. (Kırımlı 2003, 55) According to Kırımlı, he “hoped to make use of the good relations of Ankara with Soviet Russia in order to obtain political concessions from the latter for the Muslims there, especially for the Crimean Tatars.” (Kırımlı 200, 56) Although Mustafa Kemal Pasha received the Crimean Tatar representatives who came from the Soviet Crimea at the same time warmly, he did not accept Cafer Seydahmet Kırımlı. Mustafa Kemal Pasha from the beginning made it clear that his government will not support an anti-Soviet Crimean Tatar independence movement. The Turkish government, who began to receive material and political support from the Soviet Union, would only be supportive of a Crimean Tatar national government within the Soviet state structure. (see Appendix G) According to Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the reason for that seems to be not only the political interests of Turkey, but also Turkish leaders’ view that an independent Crimean Tatar republic is unrealistic, especially since Turkey does not have the ability to support an independent Crimea. (Poslednyaya rukopis Sabri Ayvazova delo partii “Milli Firka”, 104-105, cited from Kırımlı, 943-944) After 1923, the leaders of the new Turkish republic, despite embracing “Turkish nationalism,” limited the purview of this ideology beyond

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271 He returned to Europe after two months and continued his efforts to find relief from international organizations and various states. During the Lausanne conference in 1922, he lobbied for both Crimea and Turkey. (Kırımlı 2003, 56)
Anatolia. Thus, the previous effort for extension of pan-Turkist master frame ceased. This discursive transformation translated into a change in political opportunity structures in Turkey. The concrete manifestation of this change was closing of Tatar Charitable Society (Tatar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi), prohibiting actions of all anti-Soviet émigré organizations after the new Turkish republic signed a Turkish-Soviet Friendship Pact in 1925. (Landau 1995, 93) Consequently, Cafer Seydahmet limited his public activities to the “cultural” and philanthropic sphere. He occasionally gave conferences at the National Turkish Student Union, but not on issues directly related to Crimea. (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği). In 1931, Cafer Seydahmet was permitted to publicize the second famine in Crimea, but that was all. Limited Crimean Tatar cultural activity was conducted in the framework of the “People’s Houses”, which were institutions for state-controlled civil society.

Still, Cafer Seydahmet was able to recruit and train a strong cadre of younger Crimean Tatar nationalists clandestinely, who were mostly the descendants of Crimean Tatar immigrants in Turkey. These “diaspora-originated” members enabled Crimean Tatar National Party (Milli Fırqa) to survive outside Crimea because, in the 1920s, Cafer

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272 The major pan-Turkist association, Türk Ocaklari was closed in 1927, and its journal Türk Yurdu also ended its publication in 1931. Renown pan-Turkists from the Russian Empire such as Zeki Velidi Togan, were insulted in the First Turkish Historical Congress (1932), while those “‘Turkists’ that emphasized an Anatolia-focused Turkish nationalism” such as Ziya Gökbal increased their influence. (Kushner 1997, 226) For Atatürk, “Pan-Turkism carried with it the danger of overstretched commitments to distant lands and what was more, it could annoy friendly Soviet Russia.” (Kushner 1997, 226) Publication of various émigré journals were banned in the beginning of the 1930s, and by 1935, Emel was prohibited to be imported from Romania to Turkey. “during the first two decades of the Republic, pan-Turk periodicals published … in Turkey prudently kept to the cultural level...”(Landau 1995, 80)

273 The local pan-Turkists of Turkey engaged in pan-Turkist activity in Turkey during the Second World War. Unlike émigré nationalists, Hitler influenced the Turkish pan-Turkists to develop an ultra-nationalist and fascist ideology. For a brief period, both pan-Turkist groups were tolerated by the Turkish government in case Germany wins and the First World War plans of Turkish expansion in the Soviet-dominated Turko-Muslim areas can be revived. The failure of Hitler brought persecution of all pan-Turkists in Turkey. Émigré nationalists including Cafer Seydahmet Kırımerwere also prosecuted although Kırımer was openly and strongly objected by Hitler because of his friendship with Marshall Pilsudski of conquered Poland.

274 I thank Hakan Kınımlı for his insights on the attitudes of the Turkish elite towards the Crimean issue during the initial decades of the Turkish Republic. Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer’s memoirs need to opened to public for a better understanding of this issue.
Seydahmet decided to transfer the center of his open activities to Europe. In the interwar period, some of this cadre under the initiative of Cafer Seydahmet, and using scholarship offered by Marshall Pilsudski, studied in Poland. A cadre was being prepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was perceived as imminent. This cadre included Abdullah Zihni Soysal, Edige Kırımal, Ibrahim and İsmail Otar, Ali Kemal Gökgiray, Sabri Arıkan, and Selim Ortay. The Turkish members of the Crimean Tatar National Party also formed close relationship with the Crimean Tatar movement in Romania, and participated in the publication of Emel, which could not even be imported to Turkey after 1935. They also toured Tatar villages in Romania and attempted to enter Bulgaria in order to mobilize Tatar people. However, they neither attempted to mobilize the Crimean Tatar villages in Turkey, nor did they attempt to publish a journal, or to found an association. After the Second World War

275 Abdullah Zihni Soysal was born in Kerç, Crimea in 1905. He immigrated to Turkey in 1920. After graduating from Istanbul University, he received his Ph. D. in Turkology from Karakow University, Poland. In 1941, he went to Berlin to work with Edige Kırımal and Hüseyin Baliç to find aid for Crimean Tatar prisoners of war (POWs). He died in Istanbul in 1983.

276 Edige Mustafa Kırımal was born in Bahçesaray in 1912. His family had moved from Poland to the Crimea. He finished Pedagogical Institute in Akmescit (Simferopol’), Crimea. He escaped to Turkey after the revolution. Cafer Seydahmet recruited him to his émigré nationalist circle and made him the representative of the Crimean Tatar National Center in Europe. He went to Poland, where his relatives lived and graduated this time from Vilnuius University School of Political Science in 1939. During the Second World War, he assisted the Crimean Tatar POWs. He settled in Germany after the war. In 1952, he wrote his doctoral thesis, which became the best accounts of the Crimean Tatar national movement, based on interviews with the participants of the national movement in 1917. He worked for the Institute for the Study of Soviet Union and became the editor of Dergi (Journal), a Turkish journal, published in Germany, specializing in Soviet studies. He wrote in German one of the best accounts of the Crimean Tatar national movement. He died in Munich in 1980.

277 Ibrahim (1913-86) and Ismail Otar (1911-2005) were sons of a Crimean Tatar who emigrated Turkey from Otar village of Bahçesaray, Crimea. They were born in Bursa. Ibrahim Otar completed his education in Poland and Turkey and became a lawyer. He was employed in Warsaw as a member of the Crimean Tatar National Center. He proposed a cultural foundation to collect the historical and ethnographic materials about the Crimea, which was realized with the founding of Emel Vakfı. After he died in 1986, his brother, Ismail Otar instituted a private library involving the valuable family collection on Crimean Tatar studies. Ali Kemal Gökgiray’s family had emigrated from Canköy, Crimea to Dobruja in 1833. They remigrated to Turkey in 1900, where Ali Kemal was born in 1914. He was a military officer and a graduate of Istanbul Law Faculty. He owned and directed Emel, and wrote many articles under the pseudonym, Kırımsar. He died in 1983.

278 Sabri Arıkan was born in Bursa in 1911. His articles appeared in Emel, published in Romania in the 1930s. He studied in Poland in 1935. His article continued to appear under the pseudonym, M. Alaç, in Emel, published in Turkey after 1960. He edited and contributed publishing the works of Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer and Edige Kırımal in Turkish. He translated and published Gasprinskiy’s articles from Tercüman. He lives in Istanbul.
War, Müstecip Ülküsal, Emin Bektöre, Yusuf Uralgiray, Muallim Tahsin who published Emel in Romania in the inter-war period immigrated to Turkey and joined this cadre. Yusuf Uralgiray studied in Egypt and became a representative of The National Party in the Middle East.

5.3.1.5. The enlargement of the transnational political and discursive opportunity structures in interwar Europe and frame-bridging with émigré movements in the Promethean League

In the 1930s, the émigrés moved their activities and focus to Europe. The émigré nationalists joined with the other émigré movements under the Promethean League, an allied political front of non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union in Europe. These nationalities already had already begun to bridge frames in 1916, when a conference was convened in Lausanne by the non-Russian members of the Duma (von zur Mühlen 1984, 20) and the League of Oppressed Nations of Russia was established. (Snyder 2005, 41-42) In the late 1920s, this league became known as the Promethean League, established “to free the non-Russian nationalities (“captive nations”) from the Soviet domination” and form “a federation of independent states” replacing the Soviet Union. (Levy 2006, 167) Several anti-Soviet governments in exile and the nationalist organizations for Ukraine, Georgia, the Don

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280 Emin Bektöre was born in Pazarcık (then part of Romania) in 1906. He organized several Crimean Tatar folk dance ensembles, wrote and staged didactic plays in Crimean Tatar. He immigrated to Turkey in 1940 and settled in Eskişehir. He continued teaching Crimean Tatar folk dance and songs until his death in 1995.

281 Yusuf Uralgiray was born in Topraisar village of Constanza, Romania. He graduated from Al-Azher University in Cairo. He worked in Ankara and Riyad Universities. He was the representative of Crimean Tatar National Centre to the Middle East. He wrote an Arabic book called Tragedy of Crimea. In 1970, he joined the Asian Muslims Congress in Pakistan to represent the Crimean Tatars. In 1978, he spoke at Luzern Conference on Crimean Tatars cause. He contributed to the establishment Emel Foundation. His several translations and articles were published in Emel. He died in 1986.

282 Muallim Tahsin was a teacher, journalist and author. He was in the founding cadre of Emel in 1930, and for his nationalist activity, he was sentenced to 4 years by the communist government in 1954. Later, his poetry and short stories entered into curriculum into the Crimean Tatar schools in the communist era.
and Kuban Cossacks, Ingushetia, Idil-Ural (Volga-Ural region), Azerbaijan, Yakutistan, Armenia, Crimea, Karelia, and Komi were united to form a unified resistance against the Soviet Union. Poland, which aimed to form a federalist structure in East Central Europe as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union became the major sponsor of the Promethean League. (Levy 2006, 168) Many members of these nationalities were incorporated into the Polish army. (Levy 2006, 172) The Promethean League formed relations with the British and French secret services, as well as the Czech and Weimar German governments, and received funding from these sources, who hoped to prevent the spread of communism. (Levy 2006, 169-170)

According to Levy, a neglected aspect of the Promethean League is its connection to Pan-Turkism. Several Muslim shadow governments (“National Centers”) in the League were financed by Poland. Crimean “National Center” was represented by Cafer Seydahmet. The Paris branch of the league published a journal named Promethee, which had a section on “Turkestan”. Other Promethean periodicals focused on Crimea, Volga-Ural, Kalmyks, and Azeris were financed by Poland. (Levy 2006, 174) The one that focused on Crimea was Emel, but articles on the Crimean Tatars appeared in sister journals as well. (Landau 1995, 81) The transnational network of Crimean Tatar nationalists in Turkey, Romania, and Poland published Emel. Emel was major tool of framing processes for the Crimean Tatars, and it

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283 The Promethean movement was mainly centred in Poland but it opened offices in Prague, Istanbul, Bucharest, Helsinki, and Paris.

284 12,000 Tatars lived in Belorussia, Lithuania, and Poland after the First World War. In 1925, the Crimean Tatars in Poland organized a conference in Vilno, and founded a muftiâte for their religious affairs. Dr. Yakup Sinkiewicz was elected mufti. They also established the governing committee for Cultural and Educational Society of Tatars of Poland. A national museum was founded in 1929; a national archive was founded in 1931. A youth association was founded in 1936 and began to teach folk dances and songs in 20 localities Tatar lived. They published several journals and books on their history in the 1930s. They joined the Polish army as a separate “Tatar battalion” in 1936, which was destroyed during the Second World War. Today the number of Tatars in Poland is 6000 and they live in Bialistok, Vilno, Novogredek, and Polesie districts. (M.Y., 1962, 11-15)
openly counter-framed the Soviet Union while presenting the case of the right Crimean Tatar to independent nationhood in various articles. The Oriental Institute in Cracow hosted Crimean Tatar cultural activities. The periodicals it published formed the centre of activities in Poland. (Palij 1995, 186) Their articles were also published in Emel and other promethean journals. In 1935, the celebration of the jubilee of Cafer Seydahmet in Cracow with activities organized by the Crimean Tatars from Turkey and Romania was a major statement about the level of organization, coordination and connectedness of the Crimean Tatar émigré movement. The Muslim Tatars of Poland, the members of the Promethean League and many diplomats were present at this jubilee.

The Promethean League sponsored various frame alignment activities, such as meetings, lectures, articles in the foreign press, and publishing books and periodicals. The Promethean League lobbied the League of Nations and individual Western governments intensively, protesting their inaction against the cruelties of the Soviet State in order to counter-frame. Many letters of this sort were published in the Crimean Tatar journal Emel in this period. Most importantly, the Promethean movement had a conspiratorial and underground dimension in order to prevent itself from Bolshevistic infiltration and provocation. This seems to have made Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism, even more closed to masses. As Fatherland Society, the National Party formed a mechanism for not easily accepting individuals into its close circle, and requiring them to pass trials to demonstrate their character. This tradition continued until the 1980s.
5.3.1.6. The rise of émigré nationalist activism during the Second World War:

Before accounting the ways in which émigré nationalism developed during the Second World War, it is necessary to provide an overview of the German occupation in Crimea, and its influence on the rejuvenation of the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement repressed by Stalin in the previous decades. After occupying Crimea, Germany granted the Crimean Tatars the right to establish national-local committees (“Muslim committees”) with authority over cultural and religious matters, and “protection squads” (their own militia), to publish the newspaper Free Crimea (*Azat Kırım*), the journal Homeland (*Anayurt*), to operate a theatre company, and to open fifty mosques. (Müller and Uberschari 2009, 227)

These developments seemed in conflict with the Nazi theory which considered Tatars untermenschen deserving no national autonomy according to Nazi theory. It also conflicts with the fact that Crimea and Baltics were designed to be Nazi settlement areas. (Müller and Uberschari 2009, 227) There were simply other strategic considerations involved that moved Germans to concede these rights to the Crimean Tatars. (von zur Mühlen 198,185)

… The German command believed that sufficient pressure could be brought upon the Turkish government to bring it into the war on the side of the Axis... this meant that the Germans had to handle the Crimean Tatar question in delicately, for of all the Soviet nationalities, the Crimean Tatars had excited the Turkish interest the most intensely. For this reason and no other, the German officials decided against the early transfer of the Crimean Tatars out of Crimea. In fact, Von Papen, the German ambassador in Ankara, pleased with his government after the completion of the Crimean campaign, to establish there an administration in which the Crimean Tatars would participate. This, he felt, would have a strong political effect in Turkey. (Fisher 1978, 152)

Soviet and Russian historians continue to blame the Crimean Tatars with collaboration in this period. The nature of the events was more complex than that. Unaware of the true nature of German regime, and thinking that nothing could surpass Bolshevik repression, most of the population did not revolt but continued with the day-to-day activities
of life. They also appreciated the reopening of their mosques and the ability to practice their religion. It must be noted that the Muslim committees were not given any political power, as they were supposed to focus on “cultural and religious affairs”. Even their cultural activities were initiated after their own efforts and without German encouragement. The committees did not have Crimea-wide authority either because the Nazi administration opposed Tatars’ forming a central political power in the peninsula.

Through their own initiative the Simferopol Muslim Committee achieved unofficial political power, and claimed to represent all Crimean Tatar interests and administered the publications, religious and cultural institutions and military units (von zur Mühlen 1984, 187). The strength of the 1917 nationalist legacy and continuity of allegiance to the National Party among the Crimean Tatar people were the main causes of the power of the Simferopol committee, manifested in opposition to German authority in important matters. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 187-188) In Crimea, Muslim Committees were largely the surviving members of the earlier intelligentsia. They had formerly been leaders in the National Party. Among them, there was Ahmet Özenbaşlı, who was elected Chairman of the Muslim Committee of Simferopol in mid-1942. He was a former member of Qurultay and the National Party. He was a strong opponent of the German occupation regime and used his position on the committee to work toward the goal of increased Tatar national and political rights. This can easily be observed with the rejuvenation of 1917 demands, such as the return of the rest of the Crimean Tatars, the return of the waqf property, and establishment of national and religious autonomy. (von zur Mühlen 1984,188)

During the Second World War, as Poland was occupied, Germany appropriated the Promethean coalition for use against the Soviet Union. (Levy 2006, 174) The Prometheans
had no choice but to agree as they did not want to be returned to the Soviet Union. Moreover, they saw cooperation with the Germans as their only chance to save their respective nationalities and perhaps to attain political autonomy.

The Prometheans established “national representations”, similar to Promethean units under German authority. These bodies later turned to “committees” but Germany never recognized them as governments-in-exile. They participated in the initiative of forming national regiments out of certain number of selected prisoners of war (POWs) of their own nationality (Eastern Legions). The national committees viewed the regiments as their national armies for emancipation of their homeland from the Soviet occupation, institutionalizing them with their symbols, flags and national congresses and publishing newspapers for propaganda among them. The Muslim soldiers responded to these calls only gradually and in the beginning the majority of them were mainly motivated to ensure their own well-being and to return home. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 60-61)

Von zur Mühlen argued that the national representations (later committees) “have earned significant, unforeseen and indispensable status due to pragmatic considerations. They acted as the spokesperson for the interests of Eastern nations in negotiations with Germany.” (Von zur Mühlen 1984, 88) They to an extent succeeded in exercising their independent will and affect decisions concerning their own nationalities due to clashes among state institutions, or vacillation. They lobbied to block or postpone certain

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285 These were 1.2 million Muslim or Caucasian captives in 1942. These legions are estimated to be composed of 275,000 to 350,000 of soldiers. (Altstadt 1992, 156-157) In 1944, the number of soldiers increased. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 55) Almost all POWs volunteered in order to escape the camps where death rate ranged from 30-95%. (Altstadt 1992, 157; von zur Mühlen 1984, 57) but not all POWs were found sufficiently fit to join. Although non-Germans can be officers in these legions, they have no authority over Germans of the lower rank. The non-Germans had special signs on their uniforms to distinguish them from German soldiers. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 54)
government decisions. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 131-132) Many lives would have been lost if émigrés did not engage with and seek a dialogue with the German authorities.

When Crimea was occupied by Germany, the Crimean National Center decided that a political and discursive political opportunity for Crimean Tatar autonomy had emerged. While Muslim committees were established in Crimea, the Crimean Tatar émigré nationalists provided as much support as possible to these committees for achieving the goals of autonomy. The Crimean Tatar émigrés connected with German orientalists such as Prof. Gerhard von Mende, Franz von Papen, Germany’s ambassador to Turkey, as well as several pan-Turkist military officials in Turkey who were in favor of rejuvenation of a pan-Turkist project of the First World War. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 81) During the First World War, Germany and Turkey implemented pan-Islamic, and pan-Turkic propaganda among the Muslim POWs and the Soviet Muslims (Cwiklinski 2008, 68) Through these connections, Cafer Seydahmet was able to send two Crimean Tatar representatives to Germany, Edige Kırımal and Müstecip Ülküsal (later replaced by Abdullah Zihni Soysal). He could not go himself because of his close relationship with Marshall Pilsudski, and his declared protest of the Nazi regime. Cafer Seydahmet did not change his position until the end of the war while his cadre negotiated with Germans. Similarly, von Papen viewed Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer as opponent of Germany and agent of Sikorski. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 67) Simultaneously, von Papen endeavored to compromise Turkish neutrality by offering autonomy to the Crimean Tatars. Eventually, Germany permitted two members of Seydahmet’s National Party, former Promethean member Edige Kırımal and the Emel publisher Müstecip Ülküsal to visit Germany to assist in the formulation of Nazi policy towards Crimea and the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 81, 119)
Until the second half of 1944, the Crimean Tatars could not form alternative official national committee, such as the Volga Tatars, or the Turkestanis because Germany had plans for Germanization of Crimea, whereas it did not for the homelands of other Turko-Muslim peoples. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 83-86) Prof. Gerhard von Mende, using his authority as the influential German expert on the Turko-Muslim peoples, enabled the Crimean Tatar struggle for autonomy as well as political activism for return of the scattered Crimean Tatars to Crimea. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 76) The émigré nationalists had several demands from the German authorities: collection of the Crimean Tatar POWs in the same camp (von zur Mühlen 1984, 119), their better treatment (von zur Mühlen 1984, 123), their permission for the “return” of the Crimean Tatars in Romania, in Lithuania and in Belarus to Crimea, in order to increase their percentage vis-à-vis the Russians and Ukrainians in the peninsula. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 123) The Crimean Tatar national representatives also asked permission to visit Crimea to coordinate with the Muslim Committees. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 123)

In November 1942, two Crimean Tatar national representatives, Edige Kırımal and Halim Baliç had a meeting with Ahmet Özenbaşlı and the members of the Simferopol Muslim committee in Crimea. The meeting took place in Russian and in the presence of SD officials. The émigré nationalists notified the Crimean Tatars in Crimea that 25,000 technically trained Tatars would return Crimea to settle.286 The Simferopol Committee agreed and elected Kırımal and Baliç to membership. This provided Crimean Tatars the quality other national representatives lacked: They represented not only the émigrés and party-in-exile, but also the Crimean Tatars in their homeland. Edige Kırımal became both a

286 I could not find information about the specifics of this plan and who these Tatars are or from where they were recruited. More could be learned, if Cafer Seydahmet’s letters and diaries were made available to researchers.
member of the National Party in exile and the unofficial National Party in Crimea. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 124) *Ostministerium* recognized Kırımal’s status and granted the Crimean Tatars their own national representation in 1943.

As the occupation progressed, German and Crimean Tatar interests appeared to be increasingly irreconcilable. Germans often brutally murdered Tatars, who were suspected of collaboration with the partisans. For this reason, they burned more than a hundred villages totally. Forcible transfer of children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen to be used as *Ostarbeiter* in Germany and Austria created great resentment among the people (von zur Mühlen 1984, 188). In 1943 Germans made one last attempt to gain the support of Muslim peoples, particularly those in Turkey and the Arab world, by reestablishing the Muslim position of mufti in the Crimea. The Crimean Tatars in Berlin were enthusiastic about this decision as they pressed the choice to be Özenbaşlı. But Özenbaşlı who understood long ago that Germans never intended the provide Tatars with their demands, began conflicting with the German orders openly by attempting to use the Muslim committee for political purposes. When he heard he would be arrested, fled to Romania with the help of the Crimean Tatars in Romania and the Romanian Secret Service. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 188-189).

At the end of 1943, Edige Kırımal facilitated the escape of hundreds of nationalist Crimean Tatars from the Soviet army by attaining permission papers from the *Ostministerium* and traveling to Odessa several times to enable their acceptance in vehicles. (Feyzi Yurter 2003, 176) This was a difficult task as the Germans were busy evacuating their own wounded soldiers. Twenty former Muslim committee members found employment in

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287 *Ostarbeiter* were to compensate the factory and farm workforce in Germany and Austria after the conscription of native German workers. Some of the Crimean Tatar *Ostarbeiter* also formed the *Arbeitsfront*, for constructing roads, helping in fires and emergencies, removing the wounded and dead bodies under the bombed buildings, and carrying the important documents to safer areas (Fevzi Yurter 2003, 233)
the Crimean Tatar National Representation in Berlin. Edige Kırımal also went to Bucharest and offered a position to Özenbaşlı, but his experience with the German invasion of the Crimea had made him resist any further cooperation with the Germans. He was arrested when the Red Army invaded Romania. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 127) Despite the people’s disillusionment with Germany, and despite the large number of Tatars who suffered under the German occupation, or fought for the Soviet regime in the army or as partisans, the Soviets deported the whole Tatar population nine days after they reoccupied Crimea, on the pretext that the Crimean Tatars had collaborated with the German regime.

Refugees in the post-war era:

When the war ended, large number of Crimean Tatar became refugees. The first major group of refugees among the Crimean Tatars were POWs, some of which were recruited to the Eastern legions and forced laborers. The second major group of refugees was the members of the Muslim committees and paramilitary organizations founded under the German occupation in Crimea. Between October 1943 and April 1944, the members of Muslim Committees began to escape as the Soviet army advanced to Crimea. Kırımal saved as many Crimean Tatars who worked in national committees as possible and brought them from Crimea to Germany. This last wave of Crimean Tatar refugees also served as Ostarbeiter or in the Arbeitsfront until the end of the war. (Yurter 2003, 203)

According to the Yalta agreement, all former Soviet citizens needed to be repatriated regardless of personal wishes. The repatriation took place throughout 1945 and 1946. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 230). By November 1945, 2,750,000 refugees had been forcibly returned to the Soviet Union. The members of the Eastern Legions and the members of the national committees were accused of betrayal by the Soviet Union. When they were returned, the
main figures were executed and lesser figures were sent to prison camps. In order not to be returned to the Soviet Union, many people escaped from the allied refugee camps, threw themselves from trains and ships, and one imam burned himself. Some legionnaires did not view themselves as traitors and voluntarily returned nevertheless they were often punished as well. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 230-231) Many Ostarbeiter teenagers returned to the Soviet Union to rejoin their families. They could meet them only after two years of interrogation. (Yurter 2003)

The members of the national committees lobbied to Allies and international organizations for Soviet citizens not to be returned. One-third of the Crimean Tatars claimed to be Turks and to have families in Turkey through false documentation provided by the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 231) Hamza Göktay and Cafer Gülumoğlu, who immigrated to Turkey in the 1930s, played a significant role by preparing a list of false relatives with signatures from Turkey for the Crimean Tatars in camps.

Both Edige Kırmal and Cafer Seydahmet Kırmal saved many Crimean Tatar refugees from being returned to the Soviet Union or secured their safe passage to a safe third country, preferably Turkey. Cafer Seydahmet Kırmal directed Edige Kırmal from Turkey through letters, and provided him funding from resources in Turkey to continue his international lobbying. By 1948 forcible repatriation stopped, and resettlement of refugees to several countries, including the United States, Canada, European, and South American countries began. (Isajiw and Palij 1992, xviii-xix) Between 1947 and 1951, 90 percent of the Crimean Tatars in refugee camps in Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland immigrated to Turkey. Some Crimean Tatars continued to live in Bavaria and other parts of Europe. A

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288 The Soviet Union declared a general amnesty in 1955, but people continued to be tried of betrayal until the 1970s. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 231-232)
smaller number immigrated to the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada and Brazil.  

5.3.1.7. Consequences of interwar and wartime émigré nationalism

Some argue that national committees constituted a case of mini-Quislings, but Von zur Mühlen (1984) argues that this is unjust for most of the refugees. Most Prometheans had social democratic or socialist views and this continued even when the war started (van zur Mühlen 1984, 21, 135,136) Most of the Prometheans did not have any sympathy with the Nazi regime, being aware of the imperialist ideas of the German government. Von zur Mühlen emphasizes that their periodicals exhibit an anti-Russian imperialist leaning, rather than an anti-communist one. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 135 136) However, it was impossible for national “representations” to save the POWs and their nationals under German occupation without cooperating with the German administration to some degree. For example, the Crimean Tatar National Committee was significant in saving the Karaims (indigenous people of Crimea who speak Tatar language but practice the Jewish religion) from the “final solution”. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 138) Edige Kırımalı achieved some success in saving small number of Crimean Tatars, who were members of the Muslim committees, imAMS, or soldiers of Tatar paramilitary from the approaching Soviet army. Considerable numbers of Crimean Tatars were saved from POW camps and a number of them were employed in the national representations. After the war, significant numbers of refugees were

289 Neşe Sarısoy Karatay documented the plight of Crimean Tatar and other Soviet Muslim POWs, Ostarbeiter, and refugees through oral history interviews with living members. (Karatay, Neşe Sarısoy. 2011. Gamali Haç ve Kızıl Yıldız Arasında Türkler. İstanbul: Sinemis Yayınları)

290 The exceptions were the non-Promethean North Caucasian Haydar Bammat’s group and some Armenian-Georgian religious groups. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 22, 25)
prevented from being returned to the Soviet Union and were successfully settled in Turkey and other countries. Despite these successes, the émigré nationalists were unsuccessful in attaining their main purpose of national autonomy for the Crimean Tatars in Crimea, mostly due to the circumstances beyond their control. They could not do anything to prevent or reverse the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944. Contrary to previous hopes of émigrés, it became clear that the Soviet Union would remain intact for the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union emerged from the war stronger and greatly advanced its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The international community, notably the UN, offered no protest to Soviet territorial advances. This showed that the discursive and political opportunity structures in Europe drastically changed, and Promethean-type anti-Soviet organizations of émigrés was no longer befitting with the new the post-Second World War structures. The Promethean League was briefly reactivated by a congress at the Hague in April 20, 1946. As they criticized the League of Nations before, they criticized the United Nations for its lack of action against Soviet injustices, warning of third, Soviet initiated, world war. In June 1946, the Prometheans sent an “open letter to the United Nations” to protest the deportations of the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Volga Germans, and the Karaims. The national organization of refugees in Europe continued until 1948 but by the 1950s most émigré leaders were very old and began to die. Cafer Seydahmet was personally devastated after learning about the deportation and his health worsened during the 1950s until his death in 1960. The remaining representatives of the Promethean League were

291 In 1948, Anti-Bolschewistisches Block Der Nation, an anti-Russian umbrella organization was founded and received support from the British. Americans formed Koodinationszentrum Des Anti-Bolschewistischen Kampfes (KZAK) but non-Russian groups protested the existence of Russian groups in this organization. They formed the oppositional Paris Bloc in 1952. The Paris Bloc mostly involved refugees of the First World War and the former members of the Promethean League, while KZAK involved mostly new generation of refugees from the Second World War. In order to force fractions to unite, the Americans stopped providing finances. This weakened these groups further. (von zur Mühlen 1984, 233-235)
employed by American supported think tank organizations such as Institute for Learning the Soviet Union in Munich. Edige Kırımal worked in this organization and published Dergi (Journal) on the politics of the Soviet Union.

5.3.2. Émigré nationalism (1945-early 1980s)

5.3.2.1. Refugees challenge the emigré frame:

From 1948 on, the refugees settled in major Turkish cities such as Ankara, Eskişehir, İzmir, Bursa, and Konya, as there were better opportunities of employment in these places. There were not many state resources to aid them in the beginning; the corrupt state offices failed to provide the $600 assigned to each refugee by the UN. (Yurter 2003, 8) The Crimean Tatar diaspora community did not sufficiently attend their needs. (Yurter 2003) There was no solidaristic or cultural association of the Crimean Tatars to help them. At that period, the Crimean Tatar culture was not perceived as something that required protection or threatened. Only the immigrants of 1930s had formed informal solidaristic networks in Istanbul, and they aided the newcomers most in the process of immigration and settlement.

Soon it became obvious that the newcomers had a different frame of Crimean Tatar identity. They desired a communal organization that would not only facilitate the settlement and adaptation process, but would also enable them to maintain their national identity in their new life in their forced exile. After all, they paid high prices for attempting to maintain their identity before and during the Second World War. The refugee camps also entrenched their identity as they founded many institutions and to maintain their identity and formed a community during the relatively long time they spent in the camps. In this period, Turkey democratized more by transiting to a multi-party regime, and the emergence of civil society

292 Isajiw and Palij noted the same phenomenon in Ukrainian refugee experience too (Isajiw and Palij 1992, 20).
became possible for the first time. In 1952, the refugees founded the Crimean Turkish Cultural Association (Kırım Türk Kültür Derneği) by convincing some émigré leaders of their need for communal solidarity. This association became a member of the Federation of Turkish Immigrant and Refugee Associations (Türk Göçmen ve Mülteci Dernekleri Federasyonu), founded in 1954. This institution was nothing more than an attempt of the Turkish state to control the immigrant political activism. In the 1950s, refugees organized tea parties in Istanbul and Eskişehir, as well as the Crimean Tatar traditional harvest festival, derviza, and the festival for the Crimean Tatar traditional wrestling, kureş. (Kırım 1957, 13). They invited Cafer Seydahmet to their events in Istanbul to make a speech as they respected Cafer Seydahmet for his role in enabling their immigration to Turkey. However some of the refugees still thought émigré nationalism of Kırımer as insufficient for their needs.

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293 Civil society is defined as the sphere of social interaction between economy and state. It involves intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. (Cohen and Arato, 1992)

294 Members included Şevket Mangut, İsmail Hakkı Okday (28.10.1881-10.10.1977), Ali Nuri Okday, Haydar Gasprinskiy, İsmail Noyan, Reşat Hayri Örlük, Aptyllah Corgunlu, Ali Uzar, Burhaneddin Güler, Çevher Çibiş, Enver Malcan, Ejder Varansu, Fazıl Özarna, Hamza Göktay, Hasan Maytapar, İsmail Güçlü, İsmail Otar, İbrahim Otar, Kemal Çelik, Mehmet Göktay, Reşat Akçura, Reşit Türker, Selim Ortay, Turgut Teberdar, Yusuf Büyük, Aziz Bozgöz, Sabri Cansever. According to İdil Noyan İzmirli, “The first address of Crimean Turkish Cultural Association was Karaman Street in Fatih, Istanbul, which was my father’s residence at that time. My father started the association from his home, and was organizing aid to new immigrants from this place.”

295 Federation of Turkish Immigrant and Refugee Associations (Türk Göçmen ve Mülteci Dernekleri Federasyonu) was founded in 1954 but ended in mid-1970s. The Federation was composed of associations of North Caucasian, Crimean, Idil-Ural, Azerbaijani, Turkistani, Kerkük, Cypriot, Bulgarian, and Bayr-Bucak (Syrian) ‘Turks.’ They were encouraged for complying with the state ideology through this organization. The biggest sin has been tribalism (kabilecilik) - emphasizing the distinctness of ethnic identities - because it was interpreted as dividing the great Turkish nation. This attempt was not successful in any sense, and even could not form a platform among the migrants. (Bezanis, 1994:81-82)

296 They had warm feelings for Cafer Seydahmet, who assisted them greatly in their struggle for settlement, as depicted in their card addressed to him in 1956. In his diary, Cafer Seydahmet states that he replied them pleasantly but also advised them about their conduct in Turkey. (3 January 1956.), (Kırımer 2003, 97).
In 1955, the refugees founded another association in Ankara.\(^2^9^7\) This association not only organized balls for the Crimean Tatars in Ankara, but also anniversaries for the martyrdom of Çelebi Cihan in 1917, demonstrating their intention to pursue Crimean Tatar nationalism openly.\(^2^9^8\) The newcomers also published a journal named Crimea (\(Kırı̄m\)) in 1957 and again in 1960.\(^2^9^9\) This elaborated a new frame for the Crimean Tatars in Turkey.\(^3^0^0\) Mehmet Sevdiyar edited and financed \(Kırı̄m\). He had worked in \(Azat Kırı̄m\) (Free Crimea), the newspaper in German-occupied Crimea, but escaped before the Soviets re-occupied Crimea. After residing in a refugee camp in Italy, Sevdiyar came to Ankara in the second half of the 1950s. He began to work as a Russian-Turkish translator for a state agency. The émigré group viewed Sevdiyar with suspicion because Edige Kırı̄mal obtained information that he had been a Soviet agent located in the \(Azat Kırı̄m\) newspaper. However this allegation was not confirmed until today.\(^3^0^1\)

The authors of \(Kırı̄m\) used frame amplification by focusing on the homeland Crimea as center of identity for the dispersed Tatars. This is evident in their publishing a map of Crimea in the eight issue, which was unimaginable for the Crimean Tatar émigrés in Turkey. The émigrés were careful not to face accusations of irredentism or singling out Crimea’s liberation, because a pan-Turkist is supposed to work for the overall emancipation of Turkic lands and people. The refugees openly published on purely “Crimean” topics, instead

\(^2^9^7\) Members included Mahmut Oktay, İsa Karaşay, Cafer Ortalan, Kemal Kuvat, Server Trupçu, Hediye Kırmımman, Kemal Ortaţ, Mehmet Çokaktaş ve Aziz Aktaş as founders, Niyazi Kırmımman, Mehmet Muhiddin Sevdiyar.

\(^2^9^8\) The association was headed by Halil Haksal in the 1950s. See the first issue of Kırmım in 1957.

\(^2^9^9\) Authors included Cafer Ortalan, Mehmet Sevdiyar, Mustafa Çorbaci, and Sermet Arsoy. In the first issue of the journal Server Kırmı̄, Halil İnalci̇k, Servet Arısoy contribute with articles. Kemal Kuvat, Rüstem Beşev, Halil Beşev, Mehmet Çokaktaş, Vehbi Öztekten,Nuri Akyar, İbrahim Dühlber, Raif Gence contribute money.

\(^3^0^0\) My anonymous interviewee, who was very close to the émigrés circle in the period, stated that the émigrés viewed that Kırmım had a different perspective on the Crimean Tatar cause and it did now follow the path of those established Qurultay. He added that this movement still continues in the United States. However, in 17th issue of Kırmım, they proclaim to Çelebi Cihan as their national hero.

\(^3^0^1\) According to Feyzi Yurter, this allegation was made by Mecit Sukuti and Bekir Adamović. (Yurter 2003, 209)
of packaging Crimean issues in a pan-Turkist cover. These included their historical experiences under the Crimean ASSR, and during the Second World War, the communist persecution, the themes of Crimean Tatar nationalism developed in the 1920s, 1930s, the Veli İbrahimov’s policies, the aid from Crimea to Turkey during the Balkan Wars, the legends of Crimea, and novels of Cengiz Dağcı, a refugee Crimean Tatar writer who wrote on themes of attachment to homeland. This was fresh information about Crimea, and therefore revitalized the attachment to Crimea in Turkey. The authors of Kırım wanted to construct an identity for all the descendants of the Crimean Tatars in the diasporic context. In the first issue of their journal Kırım, they presented their aim as “working in order not our brethren who are spread in the four corners of the world and foreign places to forget their national being, to preserve their national, culture, moral values, and traditions without change, and to look towards the future with optimism and belief” (“Kırım”, 1957a, 2)

This journal followed the Soviet newspapers and counter-framed against them. For example, in the 7th issue of Kırım, the authors defended Cafer Seydahmet against the accusation of being dictatorial. (Kırım 1957b, 198)

Kırım authors also criticized the obsolete émigré nationalism frame in Turkey. After Cafer Seydahmet’s death, they argued that Müstecip Ülküşal and the Crimean National Center (Kırım Milli Merkezi, the public name of Milli Fırqa in Turkey) under his leadership did not represent the Crimean Tatar cause. They asserted greater legitimacy of their own organization through continuity with the National Liberation Center (Milli Kurtuluş Merkezi), founded in Crimea in 1942. In the 17th issue of Kırım, they argued that

302 “Dünyanın dört bir tarafına ve yabancı muhitlere serpilmiş bulunan kardeşlerimizin milli varlıklarını unutmamaları, milli kültür ahlak ve geleneklerini aynı muhafaza etmeleri ve geleceğe tam bir nikbinlik ve imanla bakmaları için...yayınızla onların ruhlarnı tatmine uğraşacağız.”

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after the Soviet domination was established, the ones who belonged to the main political party of the Crimean Tatars, *Milli Fırqa* clandestinely continued their operations, and the ones who became successful to help the alleviate the pain of the bloody scars of people of the nation, by way of locating their own members to the key offices of the government [of the Crimean ASSR]… continued without dropping the flag of [national] struggle and consequently in 1942 founded National Liberation Centre…[This centre] for some time continued outside of the Iron Curtain, but after noticing that Cafer Seydahmet has been conducting the national struggle, remained silent for some more time, but this year [after Cafer Seydahmet died] increased the pace of the struggle by electing Şevki Bektöre as their leader. (Kırım Türkleri Milli Kurtuluş Merkezi, 1960, 92)

Accordingly, they rejected Müstecip Ülküsal and Edige Kırımalı’s representation of the Crimean Tatars in the conference of the Paris Bloc. (Kırım Türkleri Milli Kurtuluş Merkezi 1960, 92; Ortalan 1960, 7) They attempted frame alignment as Şevki Bektöre stated his purpose to be uniting two associations. (Bektöre 1960, 29)

The nationalist refugees could not engage in frame alignment processes due to the limited political and discursive opportunities in Turkey. The most vivid example is that Mehmet Sevdiyar preferred the ethnonym Crimean Tatar, but he was warned by a Turkish security official not to use that ethnonym in the name of the association and in the journal. The nationalist refugees soon left for the United States, where the political and discursive opportunity structures allowed the development of their own frame. Rival frames prevented any transnational connection between the nationalist refugees in the United States, and the *émigré* nationalists in Turkey.304

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303 Şevki Bektöre was a Crimean Tatar born in Romania and raised in Turkey, who migrated to Crimea to participate in the national struggle in 1917 and could only return to Turkey in 1957 using his Ottoman citizenship after twenty five years of imprisonment in the USSR.

304 In his diary, on 20 December 1958, Cafer Seydahmet implied that he was content that those with “the wrong ideas” went to the United States. (Kırımer 2003, 192)
5.3.2.2. The continuation of émigré nationalism frame:

The émigré nationalists engaged in frame struggle with the nationalist refugees until they left for the United States. The émigré nationalists achieved this purpose by frame alignment processes among the refugees. When the newcomer Crimean Tatar refugees expressed a need for an association, Cafer Seydahmet stated that newcomers must register with their frame: “I said that all the institutions related to Crimea must have definitely been tied to the National Center, if not there would be disunity in our front, and that would damage our cause” (Kırımer 2003, 3)\(^3\)

They argued that newcomers must follow Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer, as they knew little about the Turkish political context. They noted that had a special arrangement with the state to defend the Crimean Tatar national cause without damaging the interests of the Turkish state.\(^3\) This was a reproduction of the frame in the pre- Second World War era. The Crimean Tatar politics were regarded an elite endeavour, under the proviso of a national cadre.\(^3\) In the pre-war era, this was a necessity, while in the post-war era, it was more closely associated with lack of alternative frames.

In 1954, the émigrés founded an association titled Kırım Türkleri Yardımlaşma Birliği (Crimean Tatar Mutual Aid Union) to marginalize certain rebellious refugees who

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\(^3\) Cafer Seydahmet wrote this in his diary on 23 January 1954: “Kırım’a ait teşekkûllerin mutlaka merkeze bağlı bulunması ica ettiğini, aksi takdirde cephemizde ikilik olacağını, bunu işimize zarar vereceğini söyledi”.. One of the members of the National Center, Emin Bektöre wrote a piece entitled Mültecî (Refugee), criticizing newcomers. (Yurter 2003, 222)

\(^3\) The émigré leaders who live in Turkey have instituted a special structure for struggling against the Soviet Union more efficiently. (Kırımer 2003, 2, footnote 9) Note that footnotes were written by İsmail Otar. Though he had a first-hand knowledge of the matter, being a member of that structure, he cited Ablemitoğlu for this fact.

\(^3\) “Before 1960 Crimean Tatar political activities were more “privately” undertaken. Cafer Seydahmet’s main activity was delivering series of conferences about anti-communism in other associations, labour institutions, People’s Houses in Istanbul and in Eskişehir.” (Kazım Şalaş (pseud.), Interview by author, Istanbul, 2006.)
founded an association in 1952. Nevertheless, the nationalist refugees proved \textit{émigrés} that mobilizing larger number of people was possible using a new frame. Cafer Seydahmet demonstrated his leadership capacity once again, and admitted that \textit{émigré} movement was dying “not only for the Crimean Tatars but for also other Russian Muslim \textit{émigrés} due to lack of new blood, lack of former idealism, lack of financial or diplomatic support from other states” (13 August 1958) (Kırımer 2003, 191). Therefore, in 1960 he convinced both associations in Istanbul to unite, by using his strong authority among both \textit{émigré} nationalists and refugees. This happened with a symbolic handshake between Şevki Bektöre and Müstecip Ülküsal at Abdullah Efendi Hall in Beyazıt, Istanbul. İbrahim Otar, and Selim Ortay, the members of Cafer Seydahmet’s \textit{émigré} nationalist circle also endorsed compromise with refugees. The refugees demonstrated to the \textit{émigré} nationalists that greater activity could occur inside Turkey’s political and discursive opportunity structures. The \textit{émigrés} attempted to increase resonance during this brief period of frame competition by founding associations in Turkey and republishing the journal \textit{Emel}, to counter-frame Kırım, and organizing \textit{tepreş} in a modern setting. (in order to rival the \textit{derviza} of the refugees).

\begin{quote}
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(24 November 1954)(Kırımer 2003, 35)
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\begin{quote}
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According to my interview with Nurettin Mahir Altuğ, Cafer Seydahmet considered that the \textit{émigré} cadre was getting old, requiring the training of a new cadre, and an association could be an instrument to reach out the youth. (Nurettin Mahir Altuğ, Interview by author, Istanbul, 17 March 2006)
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Abdurrahman Benlioğlu, Nurettin Ağat, Ismail Hakki ve Ali Beyler also played an important part in uniting two associations. (Kırımer 2003, 53, 184)
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In 1971, 3000 people participated in \textit{tepreş} in Istanbul. (\textit{Emel} 1971, 46) \textit{Tepreş} was traditionally celebrated mostly by Tatars from the steppe region and they continued to celebrate it in their diaspora settings. \textit{Tepreş}
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The unintended consequences of these slight modifications in émigré frame would be the emergence of nationalists among the Crimean Tatar younger generation who would transform the émigré frame into a diaspora frame.

After the nationalist refugees left, frame competition ended. Most refugees in Turkey agreed with the cultural role given to them, leaving the politics of the issue to the émigré nationalists. The immigrants of 1930s, and the refugees of 1940s and 1950s were mostly contained through the “cultural” activities of these Crimean Tatar Associations.

Eskişehir, where Tatars compactly settled in the 1950s was selected as space where the Crimean Tatar culture could be cultivated. Emin Bektöre, an émigré nationalist settled in Eskişehir and initiated a tradition of diasporic Crimean Tatar folk music and dance teaching. He managed to register Crimean music, dance and folklore as one of Eskişehir local folklore, arguing that Tatars have lived here for 100 years, and their culture is part of Turkey’s local culture now. Emin Bektöre in his speech at the Eskişehir Folklore Ball (16 August 1968) said, “As no Crimean Tatar is left in Crimea today, we thought that Crimean Tatar dances, songs, and folklore now belongs to Eskişehir...Both to support our brethren, and to protect this valuable cultural treasure, we took Crimean dance and folk songs to Eskişehir’s repertory” (Emel 1968, 39-42)

He taught all children of Tatar and non-Tatar ancestry Tatar

coincided with late spring and summer where steppe crops are harvested while dervîza was traditionally celebrated in early fall, when vineyards are harvested by the Crimean Tatars from the central and coastal Crimea. Most Tatars had been left in the coastal Crimea after the great exodus from the Crimean steppes.

312 Feyzi Yurter, Fikret Yurter’s brother, led the attempts of some refugees to prepare claims of compensation from Germany and Austria for being Ostarbeiter. But mostly, as their fellow refugees who emigrated to the United States, most refugees in Turkey preferred to stay apolitical, and deemphasize their past.

313 Emin Bektöre was born in Dobruja. He was the youngest member of Emel movement in Romania. He learned Romanian folklore at high school. He learned Crimean Tatar dances from Crimean refugees in Romania such as pharmacist Bekir. He immigrated to Turkey in 1940. He was encouraged to settle in Eskişehir by Cafer Seydahmet, as this city has the largest Tatar population therefore most suitable for cultural and folkloric activities. He led the Crimean Tatar cultural activities in Eskişehir between 1940 and 1960. Later newcoming refugees, Halil Haksal, Cemalettin Tengiz also contributed the revival of Crimean Tatar folklore activities in Turkey. People’s houses hosted the earlier activities until Eskişehir Crimean Association is founded in 1972. Yalkın Bektöre, Interview by author, 26 December 2006, Eskişehir.
music and dance in People’s Houses in Eskişehir. Thus, Crimean Tatar “difference” was officially recognized by the state in a way. The refugees became active in the Crimean “Turk” Associations in Ankara, Istanbul, and Eskişehir (founded in 1971), revitalized the Crimean Tatar cultural life, with the new choreographies of the Crimean Tatar dances, and new music they brought of the interwar Crimea. As liberalization progressed in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, several Crimean Tatar books were published and Crimean Tatar plays were staged.314 Tatı̈rs demanded more cultural rights for radio and television, to reproduce Crimean Tatar identity inside urban areas, which tended to have a denser Tatar population. The unintended consequences of these “cultural” activities were the maintenance of certain level of frame resonance among the refugees, the 1930s- immigrants, and immigrants who came via Romania.

The departure of most refugees, and the 1930s-immigrants by 1960s and 1970s reduced the need for transformation in Crimean Tatar émigré frame. Even though the émigré nationalists began to publish the journal Emel in 1960, it did not play the same mobilizing role it played in Romania.315 Why did the journal presented as a continuation of the earlier one, still under the leadership of Müstecip Ülküsal, fail in creating an exile nationalist movement among the Crimean Tatar community in Turkey? It is because the movement in Turkey had been in the path of émigré nationalism different than the movement in Romania. When Müstecip Ülküsal immigrated to Turkey, he began to operate in the Turkish path, which precluded him from considering the applicability of exile nationalism in Turkey.

314 Istanbul Crimean Association’s young members staged Mehmet Vani Yurtsever’s “Eid Night” (“Kurban Bayramı Gecesi”) in Istanbul, Eskişehir and Polatlı and a large audience watched this play in the late 1970s. (Yurtsever 1983, 307)
315 First 11 issue of Emel was published in Ankara, by Niyazi Kırmman(1911Bulgary-1967Ankara) Halil Beşev (1896Crimea-1973Ankara) Mahmut Oktay(1912 İstanbul-1974 Ankara) in collaboration with the cadre of national center in Istanbul and it was financed by Kırmman. Later, it was transferred to Istanbul. (A.K. 1978, 5-8)
The majority of post-war Emel articles continue to address the events of 1917-1920. However, the events of 1917-1920 were no longer the main reference point for the Crimean Tatar politics. This showed that their frame was not updated according to the changing international context, particularly the deportation of the co-ethnics. Nor was the current situation, cultural production, or ethnographic condition of Crimean Tatars weighted heavily.

The journal did not aim to politically mobilize the Crimean Tatar public, nor did it aim to construct a Crimean Tatar collective identity in Turkey. The other theme of the articles in the journal are the contemporary events related to the “national centers of captive Turks”, a weaker extension of Promethean movement. The main function of Emel was publishing protest letters to certain international organizations (à la Promethean League), or Soviet officials rather than discussing the new challenges of Crimean Tatar politics.316 Unlike the co-ethnics in the Soviet Union, Emel authors did not seek alignment with the human rights master frame. It is true that it was challenging to form communication with the co-ethnics beyond the Iron Curtain in this period, however émigré nationalists did not overly exert themselves to form transnational relations with coethnics317 or update information about their contemporary situation through indirect sources. As I will discuss in the next part, the émigré nationalist movement of the refugees in the United States strove to keep contacts with the co-ethnics in the USSR despite hurdles. In the second half of the 1970s, Turkey received some information about the recent situation of the co-ethnics and that they had

316 Müstecip Ülküsal, in the name of Crimean National Center, sent a telegraph to Kosigin who visited Ankara: “The millions of Crimean Turks who live outside the homeland request the permission and support for the return of the Crimean Tatars whose innocence was accepted and declared.” (27 December 1975). (Ülküsal 1976, 7)
317 According to Dr. Hakan Kırmılı and Dr. Yalın Bektöre, there was no communication with the co-ethnics until 1979, they did not even follow the official, Soviet, Crimean Tatar newspaper, Lenin Bayrağı. Only Edige Kırmılı followed Soviet publications but they did not involve any information on the political movement. Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara. Yalın Bektöre, Interview by author, 26 December 2006, Eskişehir.
formed a national movement, but it was primarily the ultra-nationalist movement in Turkey who mobilized under the influence of such news. The Crimean Tatar émigré nationalists functioned under that movement and did not emphasize the human rights discourse of the movement in the USSR. With no transnational connections to Crimea, the émigré frame, which was relatively effective within the conditions before 1945, became detached from the reality of Crimea and became an obsolete ideology. By 1967, it was clear that the Crimean Tatars had formed a new nationalist movement in the USSR and the émigré movement in Turkey could not define its relationship to it, let alone bridge frames with this movement. Summarily, the émigré nationalism frame offered an inconsistent, unclear, and ineffective message, and no concrete plan for mobilization of Crimean Tatar masses participation, and these all contributed its low resonance in Turkey.

5.3.2.3. Frame-bridging with Turkish ultra-nationalism in the 1970s:

In the 1960s, the Crimean Tatar National Center was also unofficially established, along with the National Centers of other Turkic groups in Turkey. Müstecip Ülküsal noted that this move was heavily influenced by certain agents of the Turkish state. Müstecip Ülküsal confirmed that Turkish “deep state” played a role. After observing the trend of rise in the Crimean Tatar and other émigré movements in the 1950s, some agents of the state seemed to have decided to control these movements and use them for the interests of the Turkish state.

It is no secret that deep state involved many that belonged to the Turkish nationalists of the 1960s and 1970s, who began to identify themselves as pan-Turkists. In the same

318 This was confirmed by anonymous Crimean Tatar activist who had a conversation with Müstecip Ülküsal and his cadre.
period, the émigré nationalism frame continuously tried to “re-contextualize” (Swart 1995, 469) the pan-Turkist master frame to fit with their own Crimean Tatar frame; however, pan-
Turkism underwent gradual transformation beginning with the formation of the Turkish
Republic. Most pan-Turkists from Russia in the beginning of century, Prometheans and
émigrés in Turkey and Europe in the interwar era and even during the war had socialist or
social democratic leanings, and viewed their cooperation with Germany as simple
expediency. As émigrés mostly concentrated their activities in Europe, pan-Turkism
movement in Turkey was overtaken by the Anatolian pan-Turkists, who began to develop an
ultra-nationalist ideology, influenced by fascism in the interwar era and during the war. That
tradition continued in the post-World War II era and became a stronger element of Turkish
civil society beginning in the 1960s. The émigré nationalists bridged frames with the ultra-
nationalist movement against the Soviet frame. According to a Crimean Tatar leader:

Terminology derived from general nationalist [ultra-nationalist] movement in Turkey
began to be used for the issues, and themes of Crimean Tatar national movement. The
Crimean Tatar nationalists used the same discourse with the [ultra-]nationalists
although in fact they might not agree on everything.319

Accordingly, Crimea became just one of the “Turkish” lands among others which
need to be liberated. Mustafa Cemilev was presented as a pan-Turkist hero in Turkey,
because of his opposition to the Soviet Union. Mustafa Cemilev viewed himself as a
democrat and human rights activist. (unbeknownst to the Turkish public).320 A pan-Turkist

319 “Kırım milliyetçiliği adına Türkiye’deki genel milliyetçilikten alınan terimler kulanılıyordu. Sağcılarla aynı
şeyi söylüyorlardı, ama her konuda aynı fikirde olmayabilirlerdi Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1

320 First appearance of Cemilev was in the 90th issue of Emel in 1975. 93rd issue of Emel announced Cemilev’s
martyrdom, but he turned out to be alive. The false news of his death increased the support for the Crimean
Tatars, especially among the ultra-nationalists. Istanbul Ülkü Ocakları, an ultra-nationalist organization left
black wreath at the USSR consulate on 6 February 1976. Ülkcüler Derneği, another ultra-nationalist
organization organized a commemoration for Cemilev on 13 February 1976 in Ankara. Ahmet Demiryüce, a
Turkish senator, went on five days of hunger strike. A silent protest march took place in Adana. 1000
“nationalists” sent letters to the president and prime minister. Donations to Emel multiplied. Dr. Hakan Kırmılı
Crimean Tatar Necip Hablemitoglu published a journal Unity (*Birlik*) in the 1990s to propagate Mustafa Cemilev’s struggle. As a result, even the apolitical American Association of Crimean Turks\(^\text{321}\) demonstrated interest in the fate of Mustafa Cemilev. Şefik Gürdemir, the head of the Association in that period, said: “We heard that Mustafa Cemilev had died. Either we heard it here or from Istanbul. Ablemitoğlu was active at the period. He was disseminating news. We published his articles which narrated how the Crimean Tatars in Turkey left black wreath to the Russian consulate.” \(^\text{322}\) Many Crimean Tatars joined the Crimean Tatar movement through their initial participation in the ultra nationalist movement led by MÇP/MHP (Nationalist Task Party/Nationalist Movement Party). During the 1970s, this deterred the development of national movements or Crimean Tatar identity formation among many Tatars on the left of the political spectrum. One such individual said:

Müstecip Ülküsal was the head of the National Center. …He told us what they [the Soviet Union] have done to the Crimean Tatars but we didn’t believe … They played Tatar folklore in the Ankara People’s Houses. But there was the current of Anatolianism then. It was not appropriate to express ethnic identities. We were ashamed to say we were Tatars...Until the 1990s, we could not say it comfortably. Then Russia collapsed. Taboos collapsed. The ones who escaped[from Crimea] via Germany in 1952 [the refugees], they knew a little bit what was done to the Crimean Tatars [deportation], diaspora largely did not know. \(^\text{323}\)

5.3.2.4. The Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism in the United States:

We will now examine the status of the Tatar refugees who traveled from Turkey to the United States immigrated the United States after their decades of stay in Turkey. I consider the Crimean Tatars in the United States as an offshoot of the community in Turkey.

\(^{321}\) The “Turk” instead of Tatar in the name of the Association demonstrated alignment with the frame in Turkey in the same period.
\(^{322}\) Şefik Gürdemir, Interview by author, 14 April 2002, New York.
\(^{323}\) Ahmet Ural (pseud.), Interview by author, 18 November 2006, Ankara
For, the great majority of them arrived in the United States via Turkey. They had incorporated easily into the latter during several decades of stay in Turkey and maintained close ties even after immigrating to the United States. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars created another path of émigré nationalist movement in the United States, which constitutes a good case for comparison with the Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism in Turkey.

Between 1960 and 1970, eighty five percent of approximately 2,000 refugees, who had mostly settled in Turkey previously, went to the United States (Yurter 2003, 68) Ninety percent of these immigrants settled in New York, the rest in Detroit, Chicago, California, Florida, and District of Columbia.

Almost all of them had families left in the former Soviet Union; it was the only Crimean Tatar community with family ties to homeland. After 1965, the immigrants of 1930s also joined the refugees in the United States, and soon their numbers far surpassed the refugees. According to Mübeyyin Altan, the total population of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the United States is estimated to be seven thousand and many of the Crimean Tatars reside in the Brooklyn-Queens section of New York. (Altan 2006)

The first generation of immigrants and refugees could only attain blue-collar jobs due their lack of English language skills. Their segmented assimilation into the large and resourceful Turkish community postponed full integration into the American society by learning the language. Until the 1980s, marriages within community continued. Earlier immigrants assisted the later ones, and on 22 November 1961 the immigrants formed the American Association of Crimean Turks, Inc. (Kırım Türkleri Amerikan Birliği) for mutual help. İbrahim Dülber, and Mehmet Sevdiyar prepared the bylaws, but they were not yet

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324 Even those few Crimean Tatar refugees, who never came to Turkey had a strong identification with Turkey, exemplified in Cengiz Dağcı who wrote his novels in Turkey at his home in London.
325 Mübeyyin Altan. Interview by author, by letter. 15 April 2009.
American citizens, therefore the five Crimean Tatars who got the citizenship became the legal founders of the association. According to Mübeyyin Altan:

The American Crimean Tatars' involvement in the Crimean Tatar National movement began in 1969 when the details of the 'Tashkent Trials' became available to those Crimean Tatars who were concerned about their relatives in the Soviet Union. They wanted their organization, the American Association of Crimean Turks, Inc., to take a more active political role in helping their compatriots in Uzbekistan. (Altan 2006)

In 1970, when politically minded Fikret Yurter, Mehmet Sevdiyar and Mübeyyin Altan came together in the executive committee, the Crimean Association began to have a political role. “This created a friction within the community, because the majority of them believed that as a cultural organization the "Association" should not get involved in political activities.” Some of the refugees were apprehensive about retribution levied on family if they were affiliated with an anti-Soviet movement. Soon, Mehmet Sevdiyar, Fikret Yurter and Mübeyyin Altan officially established the alternative organization, National Center of Crimean Tatars -The Crimea Foundation in 1976. Mehmet Sevdiyar was the informal leader of such a movement, though officially Fikret Yurter was the head of this center. Fikret Yurter lived in Crimea until he was eleven years old. His father worked in a Muslim Committee in Crimea during the war. He grew up in refugee camps and in Turkey. He studied in Germany, and learned to speak German and Turkish fluently. He was dedicated to political activism, and had worked in several Turkish immigrant organizations prior to

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327 Supporters of the Crimea Foundation were around 15. These included İbrahim Altan, Abdulhakim Saraylı, Karaşay family, Yunus Molbaylı, Mustafa Altan, Yakup Çilen, Ramazan Aytan, Dursun Giray. (Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009.)

328 Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009.


founding the National Center. He remembered handing out pamphlets on the persecution of Crimean Tatar nationalists in the Soviet Union in Turkey in 1969. He immigrated to the United States in 1970. Mübeyyin Altan was a newborn when his family left Crimea, and studied in Turkey and the United States during the war. With his fluent English, and academic background, he formed links of the diasporic movement with the American and international society. Mehmet Sevdiyar contributed the most to the frame of this organization by publishing several books including his two volumes of *Ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars*. In this book, he elaborated the indigenous identity of the Crimean Tatars. Mübeyyin Altan states Mehmet Sevdiyar’s political purpose to be “the recognition of the national identity of the Crimean Tatars by the world society including the Soviet Union and the very Crimean Tatar diaspora itself.” He emphasized that the people’s ethnonym ought to be the “Crimean Tatar”. The members of Crimea Foundation, having spent time in Turkey were aware of the strength of the Pan-Turkism master frame and were not in fact in conflict with it ideologically. They also did not want to alienate Turkey, as Turkey was one of the states with the greatest interest in the Crimean Tatar well-being. (Yurter 2008) The Turkish Embassy occasionally, as in Romania, warned Crimea Foundation against using the ethnonym “Tatar,” to which Crimea Foundation skillfully responded that they did not want to endanger Turkey’s relation to the Soviet Union, by claiming they are Crimean “Turks” as they actively supported the dissidents in the Soviet Union.

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331 This seems to have relation with having the korenniy narod status under the Soviet Union, and indigenous identity was also endorsed by the deported community in the USSR.
332 Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter. 15 April 2009.
333 Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter. 15 April 2009.
334 Mübeyyin Altan notes that refugees and 1930 immigrants had a deep attachment for Turkey. (Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter. 15 April 2009.)
335 Altan states that because they used the name “Crimean Tatar”, unlike the American Association of Crimean “Turks”, the Crimean foundation was criticised by the former and the Federation of Turkish Associations in the United States. Altan says, ironically, in the 1990s, this association embraced the “Crimean Tatar” ethnonym. (Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter. 15 April 2009)
Frame-bridging with the collective return frame of the co-ethnics in the USSR:

From the very beginning, the Crimea Foundation bridged frames with the movement in the Soviet Union. The title of their organization was “The Committee for the Return of Exiled Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union”. They connected with the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union through letters and by telephone, and communicated sometimes with coded words in order to escape Soviet intelligence. They also followed their publication including their newspaper, Lenin Bayrağı (Lenin’s Flag). They occasionally distributed samizdat or contributed its publication or distribution. For instance, they resent the letter written by Reşat Cemilev to the King of Saudi Arabia, which could not be sent by him directly from the USSR. Indeed for Mübeyyin Altan, these activities give the Crimea Foundation a special place in diaspora communities, in the pre-internet era of the Crimean Tatar national movement, as only the Crimea Foundation had contact with the movement in the USSR and communicated fresh news to the rest. Mehmet Sevdiyar played a significant role as he translated samizdat documents, and taught Russian to the new generation in the United States to facilitate communication with the co-ethnics in Crimea.

336 Mübeyyin Altan says: “Members of the Crimean Tatar National Center gathered once a month, depending on the accessibility of the dissidents, to contact Mustafa Cemiloğu, Resat Cemiloğu, Fuat Ablamit and others via telephone to find out the status of the national movement. ...Since the telephones were tapped, and the KGB likely listened to conversations, special code words were used to find out how things were progressing. For example, "How are the carnations growing in your garden?" meant, "How is the national movement going?" Carnation symbolized the national movement.” He also adds that occasionally some Crimean Tatars were permitted to travel outside the Soviet Union, and the Crimea Foundation received information by secretly meeting them. (Altan 2006.)

337 The Crimea Foundation participated in the tamizdat activity: The Crimean Tatars in New York published the smuggled Crimean Tatar documents under the title Emel in 1978 and 1979, both in Russian and Turkish. Next, The Russian version was smuggled into the Soviet Union to be distributed there...The major tamizdat published by the Crimea foundation include: A Kogda Mi Vernemysya (And When We return, 1977) by Andre Grigorenko (in Russian), Shest Dnei-Belaya Kniga (Six Days-The White Book, 1980), by M. Serdar, editor (in Russian), Jivoi Fakel (Human Torch-1986), by Reshat Cemilev, editor (in Russian), Musa Mamut-Human Torch, 1986, by Reshat Cemilev, editor (in English). The Crimea Foundation also contributed the publication of the Taskentsky Prosess in 1976, one of the most extensive tamizdat compiled on the Crimean Tatar National Movement and mainly sponsored by the HERzan Foundation. (Altan, 2006)
Alignment with the human rights master frame: As the movement in the USSR, the émigré movement in the United States extended their frame towards the human rights frame. They believed that appeals for human rights, and democracy and abidance of international law were the most effective way to attain rights. This constituted the master frame in the American society and international society especially, after the Helsinki Accord. Their movement methods reflected their frame. They conducted hunger strikes to support hunger strikes in the USSR. (Sevdiyar 1974) They worked to save Mustafa Cemilev from Soviet persecution by aiding his emigration effort. Although they could not effectively lobby in the United States due to lack of funds and community support, they were able to inform American and world politicians, academics, civil society, media, and public opinion especially through publication of the samizdat and by forming an information agency. Mübeyyin Altan himself published the first English language journal with update information about the co-ethnics, entitled Crimean Review between 1986 and 1996. In 1986, the Crimean Foundation also erected “the first Crimean Tatar national monument honoring the Crimean Tatar martyrs who perished before, during and after the Sürgün” in Washington Memorial Park on Long Island, New York. Why was frame Resonance limited?

338 Yurter’s organization was classified as an anti-Soviet organization by the Soviet Union. Yurter’s invitations to Cemilev were accepted as evidence in the latter’s trial. (Emel 1984, 6)
339 They contacted with Peter Reddaway, Edward Allworth, Alan Fisher, Alexandre Bennigsen and Anne Sheehy.
340 “Under the normal circumstances all these activities enabled the Crimean Tatar Diaspora in New York to reach a small audience, 500 to 1,000 at the most.” (Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009)
341 They appealed to American presidents, State Department, congressmen, contacted to Chicago Tribune. Peter Reddaway considers the Crimean Tatars in America, the smallest but most vocal diaspora community. (Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009. İnci Bowman, Interview by author, by letter, 26 March 2009)
342 Mübeyyin Altan states that the Crimean Review appeared in Boston, on 18 May 1986. Its circulation increased to 500. “It was primarily mailed to members of the United States Congress who were involved in foreign affairs, the president of the United States, embassies of nations thought to be sympathetic to the Crimean Tatar cause, international organizations, such as the UN, major universities and individuals who requested it. It continued until December 1995, on the eve of Internet's arrival.” (Altan, 2011 )
Unlike National Center (Milli Merkez) in Turkey, the Crimea Foundation did not choose to be an exclusive organization. The refugees organized several demonstrations in front of the UN at New York between 1971 and 1989, to which they invited other community members. They also wrote letters to the political leaders and more signatures under these petitions could increase the success of such tactics. But the lack of resonance can largely be attributed to the perception of refugees that this frame fit poorly with political and discursive opportunity structures, and lacked empirical credibility. The refugees wanted to keep a low profile in order to integrate to the American society better.

They did not, for example, wish to be publicly exposed and misunderstood as compliant assitants of the Nazis, based on their forced labour during the war. Some Crimean Tatars rejected attempts of Crimea Foundation to demand compensation for their suffering and forced labour during the war in Germany and Austria, because they thought their relatives in the USSR might fall in danger. For the Crimean Tatars who emigrated from Crimea in the 1930s, this frame had little narrative fidelity as they did not experience war, rebirth of nationalism in Crimea, Ostarbeiter status, POW or refugee camps.

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343 Mübeeyin Altan provides details: “This event began in 1970 when the details of mass deportation were learned. A small group of Crimean Tatars launched a demonstration at Dag Hammarskjold Plaza near the United Nations in New York City, carrying placards denouncing the Soviet treatment of the Crimean Tatar people. "May 18, 1944 deportation, 46.2% of the total Crimean Tatar population perished;" and "Free Mustafa Dzhemilev and Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko," were some of the placards used during this demonstration. A small group of 10 to 15 dedicated people showed up for this event. Fliers indicating the importance of May 18, (a total of 150 fliers) were also distributed. After the demonstration, a brief ceremony was held in the Crimean Tatar Community center in Brooklyn, New York, where a religious service was also conducted for the Crimean Tatar martyrs.” (Altan 2006) 18 May Commemoration, at the community center and at the Crimean Tatar sürgün monument at Washington memorial Park became a tradition.

344 Mübeeyin Altan offers extensive detail on these correspondences: “Letters of appeal were sent to such individuals as Senator James Buckley of New York on January 17, 1976; Senator Edward M Kennedy of Massachusetts on December 16, 1986; Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin on December 16, 1986; King Khalid Ibn Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia on February 15, 1979; Chairman Egil Aarvik of the Nobel Peace Prize Selection Committee on January 22, 1986; President Ronald Reagan on October 21, 1985; President George Bush on October 1, 1989; and President Bill Clinton on April 25, 1998.”(Altan 2006)

345 After the collapse of the USSR, the struggle for attaining compensation from Austria became successful.

346 In a letter to the American Association of the Crimean Tatars Board of Executives, dated 5 May 1970, Fikret Yurter in the name of Crimean Foundation (Kırım Şehitlerini Anma Heyeti) protested commemorating
The limited resonance of the Crimea Foundation’s frame can also be attributed to the following fact. Though this group published several books on Crimean Tatar history, politics, and literature, they did not have a specific program for the identity-management of the Crimean Tatars in the United States, particularly concerning the maintenance and reproduction of the Crimean Tatar identity in the United States. It did not envision the return of the Crimean Tatar community to Crimea. It focused on representing the Crimean Tatars to the outside world, and playing the role of agency and advocacy. The Crimea Foundation was "founded solely to disseminate facts concerning the cruel and unjust deportation of Crimean Tatars and their continuous struggle to return to Crimea and to regain their human and national rights."\textsuperscript{347} In this manner, the Crimea Foundation remained as an elite movement, like the Emel movement in Turkey in the post war era.

The majority of the 1930s emigrants and refugees preferred to be identified as "Turks." This was the policy of the Crimean “Turk” associations in Turkey. Crimean Tatar society also achieved segmented assimilation into the Turkish community in the United States. The Crimean Tatar Association became a cherished member of Federation of Turkish Associations, celebrated national days of Turkey, and received support from the Turkish Embassy. The Ismail Gasprinskiy School within the Association taught in Turkish, teaching children in Tatar was never even an issue, unlike the Crimean Tatars in Romania, who went to, and still go to great pains, to teach in Tatar. This position was enforced by the Turkish Embassy, which has some power as to provide fiscal support and to offer diplomatic protection to the Tatar community. The American Association of the Crimean Tatars

\textsuperscript{347} Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009.
achieved frame-bridging with the émigré nationalism frame propagated by the Emel in Turkey.348 Thus, both the Crimean Tatar Association in the United States and Emel journal continued to criticize the Crimean Foundation’s frame, specifically their use of Tatar identification.

We must note that Ayşe Seytmuratova, a Crimean Tatar Soviet dissident who arrived in the United States, identifies herself as the major representative of the “American Diaspora of the Crimean Tatars” and a dissertation portrays her as such. As far as we are concerned in this dissertation, she constitutes a case of a Crimean Tatar exile nationalist migrating to a place where political and discursive opportunities are perceived to be more beneficial for her frame. She did not engage in frame alignment processes with the rest of the Crimean Tatars in the United States or Turkey, but remained as a part of the exile movement in the USSR. Seytmuratova worked for Radio Liberty and gave presentations at universities, media as the representative of the movement in the USSR. The Crimean Tatar communities in Turkey and the United States supported these activities, but she preferred to work separately from the Crimea Foundation349, or any other organization in the United States or Turkey. This forms the evidence that she did not perceive herself as part of any movements inside a diaspora setting. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, her activities are not considered as part of the American diaspora movement, but a part of the Crimean Tatar exile movement in the USSR.

348 Their journal Birlik donated to Emel 5000 Turkish Liras in November 1975.
349“We were glad that Ayşe Seytmuratova wished to come to America, and provided her the support she needed... We took her to Washington and joined the meetings together. We introduced her to Paul Goble, the political analyst at Carnegie Endowment. However, she preferred not to work within the framework of our institution, and represent the Crimean Tatar cause separately the Crimean Tatar cause in the United States.” Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter. 15 April 2009.
5.3.2.5. Cengiz Dağcı and “diaspora nationalism”

Among the refugees created by the Second World War, Cengiz Dağcı was distinctive as he created a diasporic identity frame through his literary production. He became a POW during the war, and later was recruited as an officer to the Eastern legions. After the war, he settled in London with his Polish wife whom he met during the war. While he operated a restaurant to earn his living, in the evenings he wrote his twenty-two novels, continuing his passion in literature which started during his youth in Crimea. He had strong diasporic themes, such as attachment to homeland and longing for the homeland in exile.

It was the beginning of 1936, I think, passport law emerged and I, after being checked by two doctors in Gorsovet building of Akmescit (today Simferopol): with my Cengiz Dağcı- 9 March, 1920, date of birth- passport, without any trial, was sentenced to forget Gurzuf and Kıızıltas, and leave forever for my infinite immigrant life, without Gurzuf and Kıızıltas…Gurzuf’s sea, and Kıızıltas’ vineyards had been the source of our life…for centuries…We were the nature of Kıızıltas: we were flowers and herbs, branches and leaves, air and water; we received our food from its soil and exist. We would dry off without Gurzuf and Kıızıltas. (Dağcı 1998, 14)

Another rare major example of this type of literature is Mehmet Niyazi. Unlike Niyazi, Dağcı never revisited Crimea, but stayed in exile in London all through the rest of his life. He opted not to write in English but Turkish. He claimed many times that diaspora was a prison but he also lamented that Crimea is no more the Crimea of yesterday. He preferred living with nostalgia for bygone days. Neither return nor forgetting was an option for him, in his words: “After his arm is amputated, one feels that his arm is still tied to his shoulder and from time to time he would look for his lost arm with his [other] hand. Crimea has been my amputated arm.” (Dağcı 1998, 258) In another text he clearly explains this feeling:

For fifty years, Crimea has been what makes my heart happy, what makes my heart suffer; and in some nights, with a pen in my hand, what makes me cry sitting on my desk. Crimea has been a scar for me. A scar that bleeds continuously. Now the scar is closed without healing. …I have consoled myself by the thought that I will explore other territories, and that I will find peace and tranquility in other climates…Why
can’t I write a novel without Crimea? …[however] the English story [I have written] [Mr. Markus Burton’s Dog] did not satisfy me. I could not find myself, really myself in it. [But] I needed to find it[myself] ..I could not look at future... I would only look at past… (Dağcı 1998, 9-10)

Another main theme in Dağcı is engaging in honest self-criticism in the name of the Crimean Tatars (and all Soviet Muslims) regarding their behavior, policies and strategies during the Second World War. While criticising, he provides the context for some of the mistakes done and underline how complicated this issue is. According to Dağcı, the story begins with the violation of rights of the Crimean Tatars by the communist regime. Mehmet Niyazi’s first few novels focus on that. Secondly, Dağcı explains how the Soviet oppression forced some Tatars to seek for national emancipation by cooperating with Nazis in several ways, such as Eastern legions. The Crimean Tatars had little choice but to cooperate, as in the case of the POWs, they faced a high probability of death if remained in camps or as slaves, like the Ostarbeiter. In Eastern Legions, Muslims endured the humiliation of German command based on hopes for the emancipation of Turkistan. Thirdly, Dağcı (1996) explains with grim detail, the consequent self-hate emerging in the souls of people who fell into this situation.350 As a whole, the Crimean Tatar situation during the war amounted to a tragedy.

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350 One of his heroes think: “We, the soldiers of freedom, with our rifles, as we carried the holy future of Turkistan in our shoulders...we followed the trails of those wild corporals who were not human anymore. We swiftly got used to their wildness. Just like those corporals, with whom we became drunk with the wild pleasures of life and made fun of the worries and fears of others. We stepped on with our Prussian boots all the beautiful and holy things the life and humanity gave us stupidly, and blindly. While we tried to reach our eternal purpose, holy Turkistan, we did very bad things. I am writing these words with a large feeling of responsibility, and I am afraid to mix my dear people’s clean soul to the bad things we have done. But i am not going to run away all the bad things we have done...These are our sins: While the mothers with white hair were crying in the dark corner, while we still had the trails of German whip on our back, we came together with German on basis, and had fun with the girls. Was that also for emancipation [of Turkestan], My God? (Dağcı 1996, 36-37)

...The [German] officers told us that Turkestan would be a great and strong state of Asia...I want to laugh while writing this...they slowly began to take us inside...They thought us how to behave in society, how to use fork and knife on the table, how to greet ladies...They wanted to make us civilized as them before we became officers...Could we find them bad after they gave us those ideals?...They talked about our Turkistan, they offered us freedom. When they speak this way, could we find them bad? (Dağcı 1996, 46)
Dağcı points himself out as the best person to write on the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars during the war as he personally suffered from it.

The tragedy of Crimea is the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. It is a real genocide; a tragedy of dissolution of a nation. To say just “rest in peace” to the death of a people, to forget the tragedy would be forgetting the possibility of repetition of similar tragedies in the future. For that reason, I am not only the writer of Crimea. However, it is only me who can write the tragedy of Crimea with all of its reality and sincerity. (Dağcı 1998, 250)

In the end, he is reconciled with his situation through developing a diasporic identity frame.

There are ways with no return. In a peaceful and humanistic world, ways should not be without return. I went out of Crimea 57 years ago; and once I went out, I found myself in the way of no return. I knew that the way [to Crimea] would not open for me…Therefore if I would return, I would return only through my dreams and thoughts. If I would not return with my thought, I would stay in prison in all through my life.

But I returned. Many times. Throughout the 60 years there has not been a day or night that I did not return to the land I was born and raised. ...My visits [to Crimea] were not imaginary. My visits never ceased to connect with reality. We had there villages and towns established by the hands of grandfathers of a thousand years ago; houses with whitewashed walls, red rooftops, patios and balconies full of flowers; vineyards and orchards which were planted by the hands of grandfathers of a thousand years ago. My people’s souls never left those houses and gardens. They would watch my every return there. (Dağcı 1998, 12-13)

This is not just a personal solution; Dağcı suggested this for the other Tatars in exile as well. “When I returned there, I wanted others to see and hear me.” (Dağcı 1998,12) That is why, he writes his novels. In another plays he says:

…with the publication of this work [Korkunç Yıllar] I felt that Gurzuf and Kızıltaş had born in my soul anew and (anew in my soul) I felt the happiness of living together with the people of Gurzuf and Kızıltaş who were thousands of kilometres far from me and from whom I was separated forever. (Dağcı 1998, 245)

Interestingly, refugees in the United States did not embrace Cengiz Dağcı’s diasporic frame. Although many of them had been with him in the legions or in the refugee camps, they seemed not to share similar diasporic feelings with him. Some of them preferred not to mention their past under Nazi occupation at all, despite eligibility of compensation for slave
labour. I argue that the refugees felt that Dağcı’s frame does not fit very well with the
discursive and political opportunity structures in the United States. Refugees did not
consider the Western post-war environment equipped to understand the complex human
tragedy which Soviet nationalities went through. Instead, the great majority of the Crimean
Tatars preferred a segmented assimilation to the Turkish diaspora in the United States, and
presented themselves as “Crimean Turks” just like the Crimean Tatars in Turkey did in the
same period.

Cengiz Dağcı wrote in Turkish, rather than Crimean Tatar, a language less
understood among the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. Regardless of his attempt to build a
readership in Turkey, where large number of descendants of the Crimean Tatars resided, the
latter did not appreciate him either, until the 1980s and 1990s. He has often stated his
disappointment in interviews and letters. I argue that the diasporic frame proposed by Dağcı
in his novels did not fit in the political and discursive opportunities in Turkey in the 1970s.
As a result, his novels could not create a diasporic movement until the 1980s. Their novels
were mostly read through a pan-Turkist filter by the ultra-nationalists in Turkey, which
includes émigré nationalists who aligned with Pan-Turkism of the era.

Still, a very small number of Crimean Tatar youth read his novels became genuinely
interested in Crimea. In the 1980s, a younger generation of Emel authors appeared to be
strongly influenced by the symbolism and attachment to Crimea described in his novels, and
furthermore began to utilize Cengiz Dagci’s ideas to formulate a diaspora nationalist
frame and use the power of his literary work to disseminate ideas of longing for the
homeland. After all, they had never been to Crimea, and Dağcı described the “Tatar Crimea”

letter. 15 April 2009.
352 I would like to thank Dr. Hakan Kırımlı for this point.
most vividly. As with Mehmet Niyazi, even the strongest diaspora frames need a diaspora nationalist organization to disseminate those frames through frame alignment processes. Cengiz Dağcı’s frame was disseminated only when the political and discursive opportunity structures changed, and frame transformation took place in the movement in the 1980s.

5.3.3. The diaspora nationalism (1980s-):

5.3.3.1. The emergence of transnational political and discursive opportunities

The diasporas before the 1980s were seen as suspicious by the nation-state. (Cohen, Tölölyan) In the 1980s, global interconnection, permeability of borders, and retreat of nation-state began to modify this paradigm. Many former and new migrants openly claimed loyalties or attachment beyond their host-state, and proudly identified themselves as “diasporas”, indicating a global master frame transformation. In addition to these global discursive changes, Turkey in the 1980s was characterized by increasing liberalization. This provided political and discursive opportunity structures for expressing ethnic identities in the political sphere. Alternative nationalist modes began to challenge the conventional type of Turkish nationalism “limited to Anatolia”, and allegiances displayed towards “outside Turks” ceased to be a taboo.\(^{353}\)

Additionally, the Crimean Tatar communities were compelled to take action for self-preservation in the face of intensifying globalization. The Crimean Tatar communities who had been able maintain their traditions, and language until the 1970s faced the emergent “problem of assimilation” introduced by modernization and urbanization.\(^{354}\) The following

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\(^{353}\)“Before 1990, it was regarded almost a crime to mention outside Turks. This was the psychology of the Crimean Tatars. Everybody was fearful of the Soviet Union. We did not guess that this country would collapse in the 1990s” Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author, Istanbul.

example is illustrative of this situation: In some villages in Polatlı in the 1950s, the teachers struggled to teach reading in Turkish, because the children could not speak Turkish. The teachers overcame this problem by persuading the parents to speak more Turkish at home. By the 1980s, however the rate of speaking Tatar among the new generation had greatly decreased, and the community leaders reemphasized speaking Tatar in household settings. Similarly, the first organization with “Tatar” in its name since Tatar Cemiyeti Hayriyesi was closed in 1923 emerged in the 2000s after all organizations had been named as “Crimean Turkish Association” for decades (even the one in the United States).

5.3.3.2. Frame transformation

According to Hakan Kırmılı, “the close cooperation with the Turkish state policies, and the policy of having narrow cadres began to be shaped in the 1950 and this “coma” state continued up until the 1970s.” He added that “the Crimean Tatar nationalism in this period developed in a sandbox circumscribed by the state, but had this sandbox not existed, we would not be who we are now.” 355 This happened as the unintended consequences of frame modification in competition with the nationalism of the refugees. Emel, due to its cautious attitude, had been the émigré journal which was published the longest in Turkey. It was permitted to be published even during the 1980 coup. Though limited in its appeals, it still served to reach the masses. We have information that it reached the Crimean Tatar villages in the 1970s,356 and continued to attract the young generation who discovered their roots when they are educated. “In 1982, I came to Ankara for university. Through a friend, I found the

355 Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
address of the journal *Emel*. I used to go to this office on Saturdays in the urban centers *Emel* and the Associations formed a platform to come together. The Crimean Tatar leaders of today tell me that their joining to the movement began with visits to the Association when they were university students in Ankara.

By the 1980s, most members of the small remaining émigré movement were in their 70s, and young people were needed to publish the journal *Emel*, and most importantly to carry on the informal émigré organization, the National Party. This organization’s functions were mostly lost due the disappearance of émigré networks and their supporters in Europe. Their journal *Emel* functioned as a recruitment tool. The personal qualities of young potential members were scrutinized during their internship in the journal, and those deemed to be trustworthy were taken into the inner circle. The unintended consequence of this necessary generational change in émigré cadres was a frame transformation in the movement beginning in the 1980s. The new generation reframed the relationship between homeland and homeland community.

The émigré frame lost *empirical credibility*. For the émigré nationalists, the émigré movement in Turkey constituted the “real” National Party, as it did not have to revise its principles under the communist regime, and was not affected by the communist experience in any way. According to the émigré nationalists, the co-ethnics in the Soviet Union could be well-meaning individuals but they could not be trusted with the national cause since they were educated by the communist system. Thus, the main agent of the national cause was asserted to be The National Party in Turkey, and all Crimean Tatars must have submitted to

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357 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara.
358 I interviewed with the three members of the National Center from the older generation (one died afterwards), however the two of them did not permit me to publish their words, reflecting the continuing tradition of utmost caution in displaying views in this generation.
its authority. Consequently, the émigré nationalists argued that the National Party had the most legitimate say in the fate of the homeland despite not living in the homeland.

The new generation of Crimean Tatar nationalists quickly learned the Crimean Tatar frame in the USSR and immediately recognized how much two paths of nationalism differed. “Here in Turkey there was a line of nationalism separate from the one developed in the Soviet Union. It was so difficult to find a common point.”359 By comparing both, the new generation ceased to believe in the frame in Turkey. The émigré nationalist frame did not reflect the truth anymore (lost empirical credibility). Despite the claims of émigré nationalists, the legitimacy of National Party to represent the Crimean Tatar national cause could not be compared to the legitimacy of the national movement in the Soviet Union. Many activists of the movement in the Soviet Union made a heroic struggle, and even died for their rights and the whole world including the former Soviet state recognized the legitimacy of this movement. Their legitimacy is further entrenched in the recent period, as unlike the National Party, the leaders of the movement in the USSR established representative institutions such as Qurultay and Meclis, and obtained their positions through democratic elections. Moreover, the movement in the former USSR was far more successful than the National Party: They declared their sovereignty in Crimea and their institutions of sovereignty are de facto recognized by Ukraine and the international society. The National Party could not achieve anything similar results during the Second World War. The successes of the repatriating Crimean Tatars were not recognized by émigré nationalists, who judge the collective return movement by the idealistic standard of complete national independence in the homeland. An activist from the younger generation criticizes: “At a time

359 Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
when not a single Crimean Tatar lived in the Crimea, it did not mean much to advocate the ‘cause of Crimean Tatar independence.’ Who is going to take you seriously if you ask for independence in that situation?” 360 This demonstrates lack of fit with empirical reality. Reading the new discursive opportunity structures better, the young generation (who lost their language, and traditions) reconstructed the Crimean Tatar identity in Turkey and built a “diaspora community”. Various aspects of frame transformation are described through a comparison of the émigré frame with the diaspora frame.

- The Crimean Tatars lost their independence unjustly, in violation of international treaty between Russia and Crimean Tatars, the latter were colonized in the following era, and their population was forced out, or subjected to assimilation. This policy of gradual de-Tatarization of Crimea culminated in the deportation of the Crimean Tatars en masse from their homeland in 1944.

- The Crimean Tatars in the USSR and in the world have a right to return to their homeland, and the successors of the Soviet Union has an obligation to facilitate this politically and financially.

- Crimea is the homeland of all Crimean Tatars, and they are obligated to do their best to work for instituting sovereignty in Crimea and ultimately, when conditions allow to return.

**Figure 14.** The transformed diaspora nationalism frame in Turkey (1980s)

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360 Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
5.3.3.3. Frame amplification: Renewed emphasis on homeland as the centre of identity

The émigré nationalists mostly concerned themselves with the past and the imagined future of Crimea. They had little understanding of the contemporary Crimea, and they did not seek knowledge about it. The new generation of activists attempted a frame amplification process, by emphasizing the “homeland” dimension of the Tatar identity in Turkey. Hakan Kırımlı, one of the prominent activists of the new generation, explains: “We wanted to say that there is also “there”, the homeland. It was forgotten in many senses.” He adds: “They were saying we were utopian.” From another perspective, he states “Crimea was not thought to have an existence independent of the “all-Turkic nation”…. When we came to the movement, this was an established school.” Another prominent activist emphasizes how centrality of Crimea is the focus of the new identity they were constructing: “We spoke at 2003 World Crimean Tatars Conference in Romania. They view themselves as Romanian Tatars, as an indigenous population. But our Mecca is Crimea.” The new generation of activists formed a logo “Homeland Crimea” ("Vatan Kırım") as a tool for building this consciousness in Turkey. The frame transformation was reflected in the journal Emel, which began to be published as a whole by the new generation after 1983. The cover of the journal henceforth presented the slogan: “The voice of the Crimean Tatars.” They put the Crimean Tatar flag and Crimean map on the cover. Older émigré nationalists, who have always been careful not to display publicly their ethnic identities or attachment to Crimea, protested vehemently.

361 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
362 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
364 Necdet Tekin (pseud.), Interview by author, 6 November 2006, Ankara.
365 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
The reconstruction of a relationship between homeland and diaspora followed the emphasis on attachment to Crimea. Because of its “stagnant” culture, the diaspora always depended on homeland and homeland community for existence.

Had the Crimean Tatars not returned, had our movement not been fed from the Crimean source, diaspora would have ceased. Diaspora was on the verge of assimilation. We would remain as a symbolic diaspora. Just like Irish in America. Our purpose was to revitalize the source of life. Without a functioning homeland, diaspora has no meaning…. The Crimean Tatar identity is lost in Romania and Turkey. Identity by nature can only be produced in the homeland, and later it can be canned and sent to diaspora. Therefore we need to make the homeland to continue to produce, it should not dry out. Then you can go and take from that source whatever culture you like. One can marry a Christian but one can still watch a Crimean Tatar movie. What is the best status you can get in Romania? It is minority status…Identity can disappear in the diaspora, that is not as important. The important thing is the survival of an idea like homeland.366

[After this frame transformation], now there is a future for us…Before Crimea was for most of us symbolic, now it became more concrete. …There is some kind of “Tatarness” that is perpetuated at some areas. They say Romanian Tatar, Eskişehir Tatar, Polatlı Tatar. This is a national identity gone wrong, it does not have a future. A nation needs a territory in order to root. Otherwise, it is just a flower in a vase. It assimilates very quickly.367

It [Homeland] is not going to adapt to you [diaspora], but you are going to adapt to it. Thus, our purpose is to pull diaspora under the influence of Crimea, and to make diaspora adopt the identification “Crimean Tatar”…Diaspora is cul-de-sac. It is doomed to vanish sociologically. The aim of diaspora nationalism is to re-connect with the culture diaspora was separated.368

Interestingly, they emphasized the return of co-ethnics, but not the return of the diaspora in Turkey. An activist argues that “return is not the solution. Diaspora must be the source that feeds the homeland. The Crimean Tatars have real power in Turkey. We need to use it…In any case, under the circumstances, any mass return to the Crimea from Turkey was simply, if not impossible.”369 However, return in temporary forms became almost

367 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006
368 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
369 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
obligatory for most Crimean Tatars in Turkey. Being a Crimean Tatar now also meant visiting Crimea at least once, and if your means allow, as many times as possible or for as long as possible. It is also praiseworthy to form and maintain relations with the members of community in Crimea. The new generation defined the role of the diaspora as supporting the homeland community in their struggle to return and attain their political, economic and cultural rights. “What could be done after return to homeland? That was our purpose. What preparations, what could we do?...[Starting] with bank and hospital, we planned to establish all the institutions a state needed.”370 The diasporic nationalists understood that their major contribution could be propagation of the just cause of the Crimean Tatars. “We wanted to help their voice to be heard.”371 They used Emel to disseminate the samizdat in Turkey by translating it into Turkish or Latinizing the original Tatar text. An activist who works for Radio Liberty in Germany during this period sent the articles from Lenin Bayrağı and Yıldız to be translated and published in Emel.372

A necessary consequence of the redefinition of the role of homeland in identity is the formation of transnational links with co-ethnics in the Soviet Union, who began to return by the late 1980s. The émigré nationalists did not seek to and could not establish regular communication with co-ethnics in the Soviet Union, because of their limited frame. The émigré nationalists thought that transnational communication might damage the Crimean Tatar cause, as the hostland Turkey would see this attempt as damaging to its relations with its Soviet neighbour.373 According to an activist, this was mostly a myth by the 1980s, as he

370 Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author, 21 September 2006, İstanbul.
372 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı , Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
373 “The only connection with Crimea was Ismail Otar’s conversation with Safter Nagayev in a meeting at Budapest in 1979. But the latter was not a member of the national movement, and this was not a critical connection. ...Ayşe Seytmuratova was exiled in 1979. She came to Ankara on 27 October 1980. It was an incredible event. For the first time, somebody could go out of the Soviet Union, moreover, a person from the
as a young student easily connected with Mustafa Cemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatar movement in the USSR by simply writing a letter to his official address.\textsuperscript{374} Perhaps before the 1980s, the Soviet officials made international communication more difficult. Nevertheless, it is clear that the émigré nationalists never attempted this simple act because of their self-censuring frame. Moreover, the Crimea Foundation in the United States was able to communicate with the co-ethnics in the USSR in the 1970s. The émigré nationalists were blocked by their own frame rather than the lack of political and discursive opportunity structures. “The ones in Istanbul [the émigré nationalists] were scared to give the impression that the Crimean Tatars in Turkey have outside connections.”\textsuperscript{375} The transformation of émigré nationalism gave rise to new types of behavior. The new generations regularly corresponded with the exiled co-ethnics in the Soviet Union, and were not scared to proudly display this in the journal \textit{Emel}, which they took over by 1983. Through Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, \textit{samizdat} and \textit{tamizdat} publication, direct connections through letters and through the telephone to activists and their reading the newspaper \textit{Lenin Bayrağı} and journal \textit{Yıldız} regularly, the new generation became knowledgeable about the national movement, cultural production, language use, and the literature of the co-ethnics in the USSR. One movement leader argues that “Our policy while publishing \textit{Emel} was such: To establish connection with the movement in the Soviet Union, in Crimea… The number of articles on contemporary Crimea increased after we entered in the editorial of the journal…We strengthened the cotton thread ties with Crimea” The new publishers turned \textit{Emel} into a translator and publisher of \textit{samizdat} in Turkish in 1984 and 1985. One of the leaders of the
movement in this period states that “Mustafa Aga [Cemilev] was sending information to Yelena, Sakharov’s wife, Yelena was sending to samizdat, and I was getting the information from samizdat…In 1984 and 1985 the samizdat began to be published in Emel.” He also provides another example. Sabriye Seutova transcribed a letter in Crimean Tatar into Arabic letters and gave it to an Arabic student in Tashkent. When this student went back to Jordan, he mailed the letter from Jordan to Turkey. They were the first in the world who published this samizdat. The first visit to the USSR became possible in 1989, which created organizational linkages between the (Cemilev’s) movement in the USSR and the movement in Turkey. It must be also noted that the new generation of Crimean Tatar activists reminded homeland activists of the Turkish diaspora, as well.

The first visit of Mustafa Cemilev to Turkey formed a crucial turn in the diaspora-relations, rendering the homeland less fictional and more real for the diaspora in Turkey. The head of the General Center of Crimean Tatar Associations, Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırmılı, played an immense role in Mustafa Cemilev’s reception as a state leader in Turkey, with his political connections in the Turkish elite. This contributed to the propagation of Cemilev’s cause in both Turkish and foreign publics, as well as among the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Cemilev visited many diaspora centers, and met leaders and common people from diaspora, creating a momentum for diaspora mobilization.

After Cemilev’s visit, philanthropy towards the homeland dominated diaspora activities. According to an activist, attachment to Crimea can be very concrete. He advises

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376 Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
377 Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara. Another activist states: “We [the new generation] did our homework about the Crimean cause. They [older émigré generation] did not have any fresh information.” Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author, 21 September 2001, Istanbul.
helping the nearest Crimean Tatars. There are many Crimean Tatar female temporary
domestic workers in Istanbul, so he enabled part of the association space to be used to
accommodate these women on weekends.  While several other associations were able to
aid the students from Crimea at varying levels, Bursa has been the most active association
in this area. An activist explains how he tried to connect with students coming from Crimea
to study in Turkey, and ensure their well-being:

Up until now, I worked with 367 students. I regard it a success if I could win over 5%
of the 600 students coming to Turkey from Crimea each year. I organize the students
and have them elect a leader. I meet the students when they first come to Bursa and
assist their accommodation. They can study, or engage in leisure activities in the
association building. The teachers in the Turkish classes in TOMER notify me about
their progress. I talk with students who do not follow the classes. Here, the female
students visit Crimean Tatar women at their homes. The families volunteer to host
students. …My philosophy is investing in people in the long run… My work is
cultural not political. …Currently I have 40 students. …These students are a part of
our national cause. …Ukraine is assimilating our youth. The students advocate
Ukraine as if it is homeland for centuries….My student … works in the Russian
consulate. I have students working in a Turkish company in Ukraine….I have not
been to Crimea since 1997, but I have the best contacts, news and information about
Crimea through my students. I talk on the phone with Crimea two or three times
every week. … The students who go to big cities such as Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul are
lost. When they were distributing students, I called Kredi ve Yurtlar Kurumu
(Institution of Credit for Students and Dormitories) and had students directed to
Bursa.

5.3.3.4. Frame-bridging with the collective return movement in the Soviet Union:

The frame transformation was taking place along with frame-bridging with the frame
developed in the Soviet Union. “We ... saw ourselves as natural branches of the movement
there.” Institutional bridges were also formed as Zafer Karatay became the representative

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378 Celal İçten, Interview by author, 31 January 2006, İstanbul.
379 The General Center aid to students are mentioned in list of activities. (KTKYD-Genel Merkez 2010)
380 In Eskişehir, each student had a foster Crimean Tatar family who provided them with scholarship. The 49
students of that period now returned to Crimea. They also found local Crimean Tatar teachers to tutor the
students from Crimea. Ferruh Ayhün, Interview by author, 27 December 2006, Eskişehir.
381 Adnan Süyen, Interview by author, 15 December 2006, Bursa.
of Meclis in Turkey. “I was sending articles from Yıldız and Lenin Bayrağı [to be published in Emel]. We were trying to adopt everything to theirs [the community in the Soviet Union]. We were trying to carry what is there to here.” 383

They aimed to create a unity in concepts.

It was hard to get people [in diaspora] to use the word “sürgün”. They rejected saying that this was politics and our journal, association is not political, it was merely cultural. It was not the lay person but the leaders who resisted. Now we have consensus at least in concepts, and ideas. The mindset has changed. 384

5.3.3.5. Relation with the host state/society re-defined:

As noted before, the émigré nationalists viewed the Crimean Tatar identity as a subset of Turkish national identity. The new frame emphasized the Crimean Tatar as a distinct political identity, demanding precedence over the Turkish identity.

It was us who took Ayşe Seytmutatova to Turkish National Assembly. …We contacted with political parties, Mesut Yılmaz and İnönü…some politicians stayed away from us because of our [false] image as an ülkücü (ultra-nationalist, MHP partisans). We talked to İnönü [who was the head of the social democratic party] 45 minutes instead of 5 minutes. The next day Erdal İnönü stated that what is done to Crimean Tatars is a crime against humanity. Our principle was beyond party differences. When you come to the Association, you must leave your party jacket in the entrance. Crimean Tatar cause ought not to be means [to other ends]. 385

One activist is very critical of those who viewed Crimea as a pass for their entrance into Turkish politics. “Is Crimea the means or the end? That is the question.” 386

“The Crimean Tatar card must not be used as a ticket of entrance into the Turkish political scene, but the opposite, the support of Turkish political leaders and organizations for the Crimean Tatar cause must be secured.” 387

383 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
385 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author, 27 February 2006, Ankara
386 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
387 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
The frame alignment processes with significant bystanders in Turkish politics is emphasized in the words of the following activists. An activist underlines that “left and right parties has to be on the same page when it comes to Crimea. We must achieve this.”

It is significant to have Tatars in political parties. We [as Bursa Association] had a member of Osmangazi and Yıldırım municipal councils to be elected. The idea is that the representatives of our associations must exist in political parties. We contributed the election of Osmangazi municipal councillor. We must have 40-50 MPs in the parliament if we think of our population.

The visits to newspapers every 18 May also part of frame alignment with the bystanders. Newspapers significantly aided publicization of the Crimean Tatar issue to the Turkish public. “We organized a letter campaign in 1984. The anniversary of sürgün made the first page in a [major Turkish] newspaper like Tercüman. This did not occur automatically. This never happened before. We did it. We worked for it.”

We organized a march with 50 people to Sıhhiye.” We contacted Mehmet Ali Birand. He published news about it in his column. Cengiz Çandar, Taha Akyol, Nevzat Yalçıntaş got interested in us. ...The ceremonies of anniversaries of deportation, internet, bulletins, tepreş worked well...After our activities in 1994, Süleyman Demirel spoke about the Crimean Tatars in the Turkish National Assembly. It became an official foreign policy of Turkey. Turkey promised to build 1000 houses for the Crimean Tatar-patriates.

Crimean Tatars preferred to invite politicians to tepreş to propagate their cause, culture, and electoral power. Governors, mayors, MPs even ministers were invited to these festivals, and were given opportunity to give speeches.

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388 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
389 Adnan Süyen, Interview by author, 15 December 2006, Bursa
392 Namık Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.
393 Namık Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.
It must be noted that a single person, Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırımlı has been especially influential not only in raising funds from the Turkish state resources for Crimea but also raising the profile of the movement within the Turkish political sphere.

5.3.3.6. Frame resonance:

The resonance can be examined by looking at the three levels of participants: The first level, political elites are mainly composed of the new young cadre who began to publish *Emel* in the early 1980s. They largely produced the main lines of the diaspora frame in articles and editorial policy of *Emel*. They also used the Crimean Tatar associations for their political purposes, for frame alignment processes. “The position of the Association today was shaped by [the new young cadre of] *Emel*…”

Unlike the émigré nationalist frame, the new frame emphasized frame alignment processes among the masses. The masses had considered the Crimean Tatar identity as a cultural identity limited to private domain, while their political identity was Turkish. The young elite now began to construct a political Crimean Tatar identity, which would stand equally to Turkish identity. In other words, the first attempt at constructing a diasporic community was made. It was understood that the Crimean Tatar movement could not have any power or resources if it continued as a small circle of nationalist leaders. It needed to become a diasporic movement, large enough participation to mobilize resources to aid the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the proponents of the new frame undertook several strategies to increase participation by propagating the Crimean Tatar identity to

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potential participants. An activist points out that the participants increased immensely when compared to the period before 1980.395

An activist from Eskişehir joined the Crimean Tatar Association to learn folk dance when he was a student in Istanbul in the 1970s. He explained the transformation which himself, the Crimean Tatar elite and community went through:

The change of mindset in Crimean Tatar community came in 1984-1985. Before them, çibörek,396 cultural activity, ball, tepreş,397 and people thought the problem was solved. There was not a dimension of Crimean national cause. We showed that there is much more beyond this circle......In those years, I understood in a real sense that I am a Crimean Tatar.... We wanted the Crimean Tatar Association to function as an embassy....Now the mindset has changed. The one who come to the Association already know about the national cause. Before they came for meeting people and cultural activities. [Now] the heads of the associations are obligated to work for the national cause. They are obligated to visit Crimea.”398

Defining obligations such as serving for the national cause, obligations demonstrating attachment to Crimea, and viewing associations as embassies of the Crimean Tatar cause all point to a frame transformation towards the construction of a diaspora identity.

The second level contributed greatly to the frame alignment processes among the masses as they formed a linkage between the leaders and the masses. After the 1980s, educated and professional participants who were not part of the small cadre of émigré nationalists (or the young cadre selected to replace them) began to participate in the movement. With the encouragement of the leaders of the movement, these played an active role in the newly politicized associations or in the preparation of journal Emel or associational bulletins. After training and service, the successful and interested members of this level could join the main leaders. A member of this level explains the particular frame

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396 Traditional Crimean Tatar food.
397 The Crimean Tatar spring festival, a traditional ritual.
alignment processes they engaged in. “We had our Thursday meetings at Emel. We have these meetings to educate the new participants. Everybody presents a topic, questions are asked and discussions take place.”399 Another member at this second level says: “On my second day of working in Emel, I learned how to read Cyrillic. We developed ourselves by reading Lenin Bayrağı and Yıldız.”400 Tepreş, the traditional Crimean Tatar spring festival, began to be utilized as a tool for frame alignment processes among the young, educated, and professional people of Crimean Tatar origin.

“Tepreş became different in the 1980s. It was mostly the youth who came. There were 100-150 people. ...We wanted people to get to know each other without alcohol. We wanted to explain new participants the Crimean Tatar national cause.”

They told us: “What kind of Tatar language do you speak? It does not sound Tatar. In fact, it was the literary language. They did not know it.” 401

The association organized tepreş at the village Lezgi (of Ankara). We sat around a circle. Everybody introduced themselves. We spoke all in Tatar. Then we had a remembrance moment for the holy martyrs. We played Kaytarma, Crimean songs, and did şınlaşma (traditional Tatar verse-citing competition) among youth in tepreş.402

After being subject to frame alignment processes by the elite at the first level, this group led frame alignment processes among the mass level, that is the third level. In this process, the Crimean Tatar associations gained new functions. An activist says “when we came to the leadership positions, we followed an open structure. We accepted anybody who wanted to help. There was not a hierarchical structure. Our names were not on the governing

399 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006. Ankara.
400 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author, 27 February 2006, Ankara
401 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author, 27 February 2006, Ankara
402 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author, 27 February 2006, Ankara
committees of the journal, or the association.”

Another activist explains that “the Crimean associations before did not organize the people much. This happened after 1980. This is because the associations were viewed as not political or social but folkloric...” This is because the émigré nationalists viewed the national cause as the prerogative of the National Party (Milli Fırqa), not the associations. However, with the frame transformation, associations began to engage in “politics” and increased participation in the movement.

The head of Istanbul Association in the late 1980s explained this matter as follows:

The ones who got used to the old system did not understand it. They did not think national cause as the responsibility of the Associations...In 1987, The Crimean Tatars held a great demonstration in Red Square. I was the head of the Association. Zafer[Karatay] and Hakan[Kırımlı] were in Germany. They called me. [They said] This has to be shown on Turkish TV to the Turkish people, but the TV does not show it. The people of old mindset in the Association did not care. I went to all newspapers, and the TV. Only one newspaper, Tercüman published it, others gave it as a side note. ..They [The émigré nationalists] criticized me saying that this is politics. But politics is our primary job as a Crimean Tatar Association, isn’t it?

Another activist noted: “Before even citing poetry was considered politics, thus off-limits.”

According to one activist, many new people were registered to the association in the 1980s. “I used to go to many Tatars’ houses and invite them to activities. We were trying to tell people about Crimea with the pictures, maps, brochures in our suitcases...”

New associations were opened in other cities and small towns of Anatolia with the initiative of these new groups of diaspora nationalists. An activist explains that he engaged in the trans-local frame alignment processes as such:

403 Zafer Karatay, Interview by author, 20 September 2006, Istanbul
404 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara
405 Niyazi Elitok, in my interview pointed out that “for Müstecip bey, and İsmail Otar [last surviving émigrés nationalist leaders he met] the association was always in the second place” Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author. Istanbul.
407 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author. 27 February 2006.
408 Nail Aytar, Interview by author. 2 March 2006. Ankara.
409 Nail Aytar, Interview by author. 2 March 2006. Ankara
I am the first person who went to Bursa. Konya and İzmit are the first communities which we invited to our movement. We agreed with Mesut Kırgız in Bursa, Fevzi Sankamış in Konya and Taner Tonguç in İzmit. We organized a ball [fundraising event] in Konya. We took there our Istanbul folklore assembly for a show.  

One of the founders of the Bursa Association narrates how Tatars in Bursa joined the Crimean Tatar movement.

We invited Zafer and Niyazi Elitok to Bursa. We copied their by-laws and founded an association. It was 1987. Before the Crimean Tatars in Yenimahalle wanted to found an association but they could not. Nail Yenice provided us space. We organized a ball and tepres festival. I typed the first bulletin of our association in the typewriter.  

Another activist narrates how they engaged in local frame alignment activities through association they founded in Konya and how frame resonance increased.

The associational activities contributed the popularization [of Crimean Tatar identity]. ...After 1989, the Crimean Tatars in Konya learned Crimean Tatar songs and şın. ...There were Tatars who visited Crimea or who went there for education. They sent money [to Crimea] for ceremonial sacrifices in Eid. The association has 15-20000 regular participants. The association bought a building...The Crimean Tatars materially helped the students from Romania and Crimea. ...some of the shows of theatre assemblies from Crimea were very crowded. The association also specially contributed [in ticket sales]...In 1993 we met with Cemiloğlu with kalpak [Crimean Tatar traditional headwear] and Kökbayrak [sky-blue Crimean Tatar flag] as 600-700 people. 

The Crimean Tatar Association became the most active civil society organization in Konya. An activist of the General Center (from the second level) explains how they recruited people to open branches in one location where Tatar immigrants settled but they did not previously opt to politicise their ethnic identity: “In Hamidiye, Aksaray, I visited all coffee houses all day long, and distributed our bylaws.”

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412 A poetic part of traditional Crimean Tatar oral literature.  
413 Giray Karalezli, Interview by author.  8 September 2006, Konya.  
414 Giray Karalezli, Interview by author, 8 September 2006, Konya.  
415 Ahmet Gökdemir, Interview by author, 3 March 2006, Ankara,
Another activist also notes similar activities in Eskişehir such as tepreş, çibörek feasts, Eid-sacrifice campaigns, and other Eid-related activities related to Crimea and Tatars in Eskişehir, bulletin publishing, transnational visits, hosting the students from Crimea, and the provision of scholarships. Three hundred and fifty cars full of people met with Cemiloğlu[Cemilev] when he came to visit Eskişehir.416

According to an activist in Ankara, “[t]his is a revolution in diaspora. We see the reappearance of a bond with Crimea in the remotest village in Turkey. In 1992, three thousand cars full of people welcomed Cemiloğlu in Kırıkkale.417 Cemiloğlu is well-known in Turkey thanks to our organization.”418 Bursa Association also began to publish a journal, Kalgay. According to the publisher, Adnan Süyen, the journal has three thousand subscriptions across Turkey and the world. He also points to increasing participation and how he managed to find time for the movement, which exemplifies how the frame is able to strongly mobilize people, who did not participate before the 1980s: “The reason for publishing the journal is that the periodicals of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey are insufficient…Media is important in publicizing or cause. After us, several associational bulletins emerged. .... I spend my time for the journal at home everyday after work.” 419 The Ankara Association also emphasized recruiting youth which could be considered as members of the third level. For that purpose, a youth bulletin was published:

416 Ferruh Ayhün, Interview by author. 27 December 2006, Eskişehir.
417 A city in Central Anatolia, which has not been traditionally known to be an ethnic Tatar space, or which does not have any history of the Crimean Tatar ethnic or national organizing.
418 Namık Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.
419 Adnan Süyen, Interview by author, 15 December 2006, Bursa
In 1993 we published *Kirım* [the bulletin of Ankara Association] with Ahmet Gökdemir, İsmet Yüksel, and Recep Aktaran. ... It was a sister to *Emel*. To prepare writer cadre for *Emel*. ... We prepared a column called “Our youth in Diaspora.”

This was one of the first attempts to frame their diasporic identity by the masses rather than elites. The activists also took tepreş, a traditional form of Crimean Tatar ritual, and utilized it for frame alignment processes among the youth in the beginning of the 1980s.

[At tepreş], [w]e had conversations about Crimea, we even had contests about that...We emphasized the national symbols. Before people drank and danced. There was no talk of Crimea. The concept was entertainment. We chose Crimean folk songs, national songs, and poems.

The Crimean Tatar masses were included mainly through re-definition of tepreş as an ethnic festival that thousands would participate in the late 1980s. I participated several of them in the 2000s. Tepreş provided ethnic time and space for the Crimean Tatars in diaspora. The Crimean Tatar flag was visible, Crimean Tatar anthem was played, and the Crimean Tatar cultural activities and traditional rituals were rejuvenated. In the mid-1990s, they had ten thousands of participants. Today thousands of people continue to participate in tepreş, though they rarely read the journals or participate in associational activities.

Another way to recruit the masses was organization of philanthropic campaigns to collect donations, led by the activists in the third level. An activist strategizes that for strengthening the national movement, “we need to make everybody at least a figurant as in

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420 Namık Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.
421 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author. 27 February 2006, Ankara
422 Tepreş was organized in Eskişehir, Bursa, various places around Ankara, Istanbul-Çatalca and later Polatlı, Kocaeli, İzmir, Ceyhan, Konya, various places at Eastern Thrace and so on.
423 30,000 people participated tepreş in Eskişehir in 1995. Ferruh Ayhün, Interview by author, Eskişehir.
424 Examples include “Give us Back our Home” (“Evimizi Geri Verin.”) “Do not let children die in Crimea.” (“Kırım’da çocuklar ölmesin.”).
the “Sponsor a Child’s Education” campaign. They must transform from audience to
figurant. No need for big role for anybody. Sister-schools project is also one such project.”

In the 1990s, the Crimean Tatar associations across Turkey proliferated and soon
united under a common structure, accepting the Ankara Association as the “General Center”. Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırmılı played a significant role in securing the “organization for public
good” status and, hence a regular state funding for the General Center. This funding
contributed to the upkeep and proliferation of its branches across Turkey. During the
leadership of Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırmılı, the number of branches reached to 25.

The Istanbul branch of this association has developed a large number of successful
programs as it has to respond to the needs of greater number of the Crimean Tatars coping
with the challenges of a metropolitan city, or the needs of the large number of Tatars from
Crimea who pass through Istanbul for purposes of work, education, and leisure. The Istanbul
association has a continuously open “cultural center.” The other branches of the General
center do not have continuous services, but organize regular meetings and activities,
including annual tepreş, annual fundraising balls, commemorations, folk dance and music
classes, daytrips for youth, youth conventions, conferences, feasts, and so on. These
branches played a significant role in frame alignment processes. The frame in concern is of
course the frame of diaspora nationalism advocated by the young cadre of Emel. I went to
Kaman, a remote town in Central Anatolia, to learn how a Crimean Tatar association, one of
the two civil society organizations emerged there. Kemal Seyitgazioğlu, after participating in

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426 Although the head of the General Center, Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırmılı belonged to the older generation, he is
the father of Dr. Hakan Kırmılı, who is a prominent activist of the Crimean Tatar diaspora movement in the last
decades. In my interview with Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırmılı, while he identified himself as a Turkish nationalist in
the general sense of covering both Turkey and Crimea in the way the emigre nationalists would propose, his
acts demonstrated that he was very much a part of new diaspora nationalism frame. (Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırmılı,
Interview by author, Ankara)
a *tepřeş* in Crimean Tatar village Darıözü by the association of the neighboring city of Kırıkkale, tried to found an association in 1995. He was able to found an association in 2001, largely done using signatures provided by his relatives. He could not form a successful strategy to incorporate Tatar villagers, but his association was sustained by support from the General Center until local people are mobilized at the time of my visit. This is an example of how frame alignment processes work at the micro level.427

Apart from this unified structure many independent associations emerged in several cities and towns of Turkey, who organized similar type of activities but independently, and finance them out of pocket.

**5.3.4. Movement Consequences and Conclusion:**

Despite the changes in transnational political opportunities (i.e. when the deported returned, and the Soviet Union collapsed), why didn’t the diaspora community in Turkey return? Why did this community still experience a rise in nationalist mobilization and what kind of nationalist mobilization is it?

The different outcomes are best explained by results of divergent historical paths which were shaped by variant framing processes. The communities in post-WWII Romania and Turkey experienced different framing processes to the ones in the USSR. Crimean Tatar nationalism in Turkey passed through three main stages. The first period, which covers the period from inception until the Second World War, can be identified as the active period of *émigré* nationalism. The *émigré* nationalism first emerged by the foundation of the Fatherland Society. The *émigré* nationalism frame was constructed by the following framing processes: (i) extension of pan-Turkism master frame,(ii) frame amplification (of

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427 Kemal Seyitgazioğlu, Interview by author, 9 September 2006, Kaman, Kırıkkale.
attachment to homeland), and (iii) counter-framing against Russian imperialism (pan-
Slavism). Because the ‘political and discursive opportunities’ in both the Ottoman Empire
and Turkey were interpreted to be limited by the émigré leaders, because of the tense
relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, and lack of democratic rights in Turkey, the
Crimean Tatar émigré leader, Cafer Seydahmet moved the centre of their movement to
Europe in the late 1920s and joined the Promethean League. In theoretical terms, this meant
engaging in frame-bridging with the other émigré movements in the Promethean League and
strongly counter-framing the Soviet frame. They also directed their mobilizational efforts
towards the Crimean Tatars residing in the Romanian Kingdom, through frame-bridging with
the emerging exile nationalism movement in this community. The émigré nationalism
contributed to saving lives, and defending the rights of the Crimean Tatars in occupied
Crimea, or the rights of the displaced Tatars and other Muslims from the Soviet Union during
and after the war. Émigré nationalists were also influential in the final settlement of refugees
in safe countries without being returned to the Soviet Union, where they would face a severe
punishment. Ultimately, they could not influence world public opinion and international
organizations enough to create effective pressure on the Soviet Union to prevent or undo the
deportation of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea.

Since its inception, émigré nationalism remained as an elite movement, and most of
the time voluntarily so. The small cadre of the movement viewed the participation of masses
as potentially counter productive, as the émigré nationalists operated most of the time in the
Cold War era transnational arenas of non-democratic states.

This necessitated movement techniques in the form of ‘behind the closed doors’
diplomacy rather than mass protests.
In the second period (between 1945 and 1980), émigré nationalism frame continued because of the lack of credible challenges to it. The only challengers of this frame, the Crimean Tatar refugees led by Mehmet Sevdiyar were suppressed by the Turkish state, which is not tolerant towards ethnic distinctiveness, especially those concerning the “sensitive” Turkish-Soviet relations. Due to this unfavorable political and discursive opportunity structures, the refugee nationalists decided to continue their nationalist movement in the United States, where more liberal political sphere could enable them to construct their own Crimean Tatar nationalism frame. This frame sought the extension of the human rights master frame to include the Crimean Tatar concerns. As most Crimean Tatar frames, this émigré frame counter-framed against the Soviet regime, and amplified the concept of homeland. While this movement was not intended to be an elite movement, it also resulted in émigré nationalism. The reason emanated from the Crimean Tatar people this time. The Crimean Tatar community in the United States did not prefer a diaspora nationalist movement, as it involved emphasizing their Soviet or refugee past. They reasoned that this past could prevent their integration in the American society. Instead they preferred a segmented assimilation into the Turkish diaspora in the United States, and frame-bridged with émigré nationalism in Turkey in this era. Both émigré nationalists in Turkey and the majority of the refugees who migrated to America agreed to represent the Crimean Tatar identity as a cultural identity, while assuming the Turkish identity in the political sphere. The proponents of this frame consistently preferred the ethnonym “Crimean Turk.” Similarly, a “diasporic” Crimean Tatar identity based on attachment to homeland developed in the novels of Cengiz Dağcı did not resonate among the Crimean Tatar communities in the United States or Turkey until the 1980s.
In the 1970s, the advance of modernization of Crimean Tatar peasant communities brought a loss of language, culture, and traditions and created the perception of assimilation. This provided reasons for diaspora nationalism among the Crimean Tatars beginning from the 1970s and 1980s. This third period begins in the 1980s and continues to the present day. In this period, the transnational political and discursive opportunities changed: Turkey, and the Soviet Union liberalized, free communication between the Crimean Tatars in Turkey and the Soviet Union emerged. Diaspora communities’ ‘learning’ the Crimean Tatar collective return frame in the USSR contributed the transformation of émigré nationalism frame into diaspora nationalism. Unlike émigré nationalism in Turkey, the diaspora nationalist frame targeted the masses, and created popular resonance. The fact that participation multiplied for the first time in Turkey was perceived as the “revival of Crimean Tatar diaspora”, the very observation that initiated this thesis project. This chapter provides an answer to the question why this community rejuvenated. It rejuvenated because of the frame transformation in the community, from émigré nationalism into diaspora nationalism. The diaspora frame emerged as a response to the increasing modernization and assimilation of communities in Turkey and has been used to maintain ethnic identity in diasporic setting. Unlike exile nationalism, it did not project a collective return to homeland, but it positioned the diaspora community as supporters of the co-ethnics’ return to Crimea and their construction of the national institutions there. This community also bridged frames with the community in Romania, and to a lesser extent in the United States, both of which developed various forms and degrees of diaspora nationalism, beginning in the 1990s.
6.1. Introduction:

Crimean Tatar nationalism after the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to transnationalism. In this section, I will explain how Crimean Tatar transnational nation-building processes emerged and developed in the late 1990s and 2000s. I will provide a review of the conceptual and theoretical literature on “transnational nationalism” and locate it in my theoretical framework, identified in Chapter 2. In the recent era, it is suggested that transnational nations which “bind together immigrants, their descendants and those who have remained in their homeland into a single transborder citizenry” have emerged (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, 20). I classify transnational nationalism as a type of long-distance nationalism that came into being as a response to developments in communications technology, and ease of transportation in the global era. It is constructed through a “frame of transnational nation”, which holds the co-ethnics in diaspora and homeland as equivalent to each other in many respects (status, vote, rights and duties, identity and so on), and recognizes them as citizens of a de-territorialized nation-state project. In the second part, I turn to apply my theoretical framework to the case of the Crimean Tatars in the late 1990s and 2000s. I argue that the changes in transnational political opportunities with globalization precipitated simultaneous frame transformations both in the homeland and diaspora towards “imagining the Crimean Tatars as a transnational nation”, and enhanced frame-bridging among the leading groups in the homeland and the diaspora. This mode of imagining the Crimean Tatar nation was contested by groups in the homeland and diaspora. In order to respond to the critics, recently Meclis in Crimea and its ally, the “General Center” from the
Turkish diaspora, produced renewed frame-alignment attempts through convening the World Crimean Tatar Congress. They attempted to address the concerns for representation, recognition, and meaningful participation of opposing Crimean and diaspora groups in this Congress. As arguments regarding the political saliency of diasporic movements gain resonance, stronger recognition of equivalency between diaspora and homeland seems indispensible to successful frame alignment processes.

6.2. Literature review and locating “transnational nationalism” in the theoretical framework.

The international system is built on the premise that national sovereignty is implicitly tied to territory. However, recent technological advancements enable long-distance nationalism questioning whether the intensity of transnational ties and networks facilitate the emergence of “transnational community”, or the “transnational nation-state”. As a result of global changes, economic, socio-cultural, and political activities of migrants, or concerning migrants, began to include the following activities crossing borders:

- mobilizing in country of residence for impact in country of origin (exemplified in the case of Filipinos, Indians, Salvadorans) to the degree of toppling home-country governments (as in the case of Haiti), providing ammunition for home-country civil war (as in the case of Tamils) or providing funds to buy weapons for cause of independence (as in the case of Sikhs)

- sending state’s creating laws and government agencies to make sure emigrants remain incorporated in the homeland through dual nationality, special diaspora ministeries, external voting, diaspora citizenship (as in the case of several Eastern European countries),

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special identity card functioning as citizenship card (as in the case of Turkey) and other institutions of extraterritorial participation.

- official recognition of diaspora community as part of the demos of state (i.e. Aristide identified the diaspora as the Tenth Department in addition to 9 regional departments. Similarly, Turkey’s prime minister asked the Turks in Germany to teach Turkish to their children before German).

- traveling of party leaders from the country of origin to country of residence in order to gather electoral and financial support, home parties organizing among the migrant communities (such as PKK in Germany, or Salvadoran parties and Indian Leftist Parties in North America)

- use of immigrants, and co-ethnic MPs as a resource to defend their interests by sending countries (as in the case of Turkey’s EU bid)

- contribution of remittances and investments made by migrants in the development of the country of origin (as in the case of Phillipino, Latin American, African, Indian and so on)

- diaspora civil society compensating for lack or suppression of civil society, or lack of political opportunities and resources at home. (as in the case of Alévís organizing in Germany rather than Turkey, demonstrations for democratization of Haiti, and Philippines in North America, and their significant influence in regime change especially in the case of Haiti)

A substantive definition of citizenship emphasizes participating in the political, economic and cultural life of the home country, which goes beyond the legal definition of
citizenship. In the substantive sense (Henders 2007: 42, 43), many communities became active participants in the lives of their home country despite residing abroad or perhaps not having the homeland citizenship. International law increasingly recognizes the cultural dimension of transnational nationalism. (Henders 2007: 53) Transnational nation was recognized in international law by the Balfour Declaration which declared Jews’ right to homeland despite their being a “deterritorialized nation” at the time.428 This can potentially form a precedent for any political claims for transnational nationhood in the future.

In the literature, “long distance nationalism”, “transnational nation-building” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001), “de-territorialized nation-state” (Basch et al 2003), “trans-nation” (Appadurai 2003), “transnational citizenship” (Baubeck 1994), and “diasporic citizenship” (Laguerre 1998) are suggested to depict cross-border political nationalism. “Transnational citizenship” is distinguished from the rest by its focus on the effects of transnational communities on the definitions of citizenship in homeland and host-states. “Diasporic citizenship” is less common than the others and does not have one standard meaning in the literature. Benedict Anderson (2002) coined the term “long-distance nationalism” to identify “a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country.” For Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001), “long-distance nationalism” means “a claim to membership in a political community that stretches beyond territorial borders of a homeland” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001: 4) Though Basch et al preferred the term “de-territorialized nation-state”, their definition also resembles the others: “citizens who live physically dispersed within the boundaries of many other states, but who remain socially, politically, culturally and often economically part of the nation-state of the ancestors” (Basch

428 The Balfour Declaration made public the British support of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. It was later incorporated to the Treaty of Sevres and the Mandate of Palestine.
et al 2003: 8) Glick Schiller and Fouron criticize the adjective “deterritorialized” as it “evokes an image of nation without borders or territory…” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003: 19) They also criticize Appadurai (2003)’s “transnation” as it “projects images of world nations without territorially-based states.” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003: 19) They suggest the term “transnational nation-state” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003: 20) and provide the most developed analysis of the nature of this phenomenon. According to Glick Schiller and Fouron, transnational nation model is different than post-national models because territoriality is still central. Basch et al also agree that “[T]he idiom of the autonomous nation-state remains intact” (Basch et al 2003, 260) “…[t]he concept of a territorial homeland governed by a state that represents the nation remain salient” (Glick Schiller 1999, 99) The only difference is that “the national borders are not thought to delimit membership in the nation” (Glick Schiller 1999, 99) “Long-distance nationalists” endorse the image of world divided into territorially based states “yet they contest the notion that relationships between citizens and their state are confined within that territory.” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003, 20-21) As Faist argues, newly emerged transnational social space does not replace but supplements nation-states. We must not forget that members of the transnational nation continue to operate in the “national arena of both their country of origin and country (or countries) of settlement” (Basch et al 2003, 8, 22) and the nation-states provide “the site and emotional vocabulary for many community forming practices, even if those practices are subsequently carried out in other sites…” (Basch et al 2003, 227)

While Glick Schiller and Fouron best elaborate the nature of transnational nationalism (2003), the causes for this phenomenon are best explained as an extension of Anderson’s theory of nationalism in *Imagined Communities* (Anderson 1991).
This book pointed out that print capitalism paved way to the creation of nations by developing a sense of simultaneity among individuals and communities. The increase in mass communications and ease of transportation in the global era can be argued to create a sense of simultaneity in communities of destination and origin by creating “institutions and practices” that manifest transnational membership. (Smith 1998, 198)

This explanation is powerful, but one major point is forgotten. As in the example of Zionists, Armenians, or the Crimean Tatars, diasporic nationalism existed before globalization. It is true that long-distance nationalism may have acquired a new intensity and extensiveness with globalization. I suggest the following terminological distinction: Long-distance nationalism can depict trans-border nationalism in any era while it is better to reserve the term “transnational nationalism” for manifestations of long-distance nationalism in the era of globalization. My thesis identifies varieties of long-distance nationalism: émigré nationalism, exile nationalism, diasporic nationalism, and finally transnational nationalism. I would argue that most transnational ethnic ties can be considered varieties of long-distance nationalism and can be classified according to my typology.

I would like to clarify the difference between diasporic nationalism and transnational nationalism according to my theoretical framework. Transnational nationalism is an offshoot of diasporic nationalism. Diasporic nationalism is a pre-condition for transnational nationalism, because the former increases resonance of homeland allegiance among the masses. Diasporic nationalism targets the individual diasporic community, and attempts to connect the community to homeland in various ways. In diasporic nationalism, the transnational links with homeland are still sporadic, while in the case of transnational nation, they are sustained, regular and institutionalized. Thus, the structural changes which occurred
with globalization made the transnational nation-building project more feasible and worthy of lengthy struggle for many diasporas.

Transnational nationalism constitutes a transformation of diasporic nationalism in the global age when massive political, economic and spatial transformations paved way to the possibility of (i) sustainable, active, transnational citizenship for diaspora populations, and (ii) the coordinated efforts of diaspora and homeland populations for common national purposes. In terms of my theoretical framework, transnational nationalism points to a simultaneous frame transformation in similar direction in the homeland and diaspora communities and/or a frame bridging between them.

A transnational nation frame also involves transformations in the frames of the homeland community. Glick, Schiller, and Fouron portrays this as such: “Political leaders and emigrants themselves are politically ready to see emigrants permanently settled abroad, but also continuing to be part of body politic of the homeland” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003, 19) Political leaders of transnational nations regard emigration as an asset rather than a liability, unlike before. Home governments claim to represent emigrants “no matter what legal citizenship they may hold”, while they maintain that emigrants continue “to be responsible for” the homeland and that their “actions abroad reflect on the future and reputation” of homeland (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2003, 20-21)

The return to homeland does not seem to be absolutely necessary in the transnational nation frame. Ex-migrants emphasize that they can provide better services through incorporation into host states, for example, the essentiality of the Jewish lobby in the United States for Israel. Indeed, the multiculturalism trend in many host-states enable ex-migrants
to function as nationals of their homelands. Dual nationality of ex-migrants is also increasing. Ease of transportation technology allows ex-patriates to “temporarily return” to homelands if not permanently, hence an individual can actually live in both places.

In the case of the Crimean Tatars, the changes in transnational political and discursive opportunities unsettled existing frames, and caused the emergence of diasporic nationalist frames. Certain homeland and diaspora elites who constructed a transnational nation frame regarded the efforts as insufficient. However, this process created framing contests across transnational space. Other excluded elites with different framing legacies, such as path-dependent émigré nationalism frames of Turkey and the United States, and the minority nationalism frames of Romania, suggested alternative framing processes. The opponents also engaged in frame-bridging across borders, between groups within the diasporic and homeland communities. The recently convened World Crimean Tatar Congress decided to extend the transnational nation frame to include the opponents. Summarily, like the territorial nation-building the transnational nation-building process is a contested process.

6.3. Changes in Transnational Political Opportunities:

Changes in transnational political structures, which included the changes in opportunity structures in relation to (i) the homeland, (ii) the hostlands, and (iii) the transnational social space (that emerged across the homeland and the diaspora settings), unsettled the existing frames of international Crimean Tatar communities.

(i) Homeland opportunities: The fall of communism, the collective return of the co-ethnics, and the establishment of the Crimean Tatar Meclis (National Assembly) created the
opportunity for re-claiming Crimean Tatar sovereignty in the homeland. Difficulties emerged in this process, as Ukraine was inclined to appease demands of the Russian “minority”, and the Russian minority levied claims on Crimea. This meant that political and economic support for re-building the Crimean Tatar nation would not come from Ukraine. As a result, the significance of diasporic activity to the future of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea increased. The frame of transnational nationality relates to this strategic use of the diaspora.

(ii) Hostland opportunities: The end of the Cold War, and economic globalization, created global structural changes, which politically liberalized the hostlands of the Crimean Tatars. Romania transitioned from communism to democracy, and Turkey, a NATO stronghold, experienced enlargement of political rights and freedoms. This created a shift towards diasporic nationalism among the diaspora communities.

(iii) The emergence of the transnational space: The fall of the Iron Curtain, political liberalization across the hostlands of the Crimean Tatars, as well as the developments in communication technologies ease of transportation in the 1990s, constructed a sustainable transnational social space between the homeland and diasporic communities. Although we could argue that transnational social space existed between the Crimean Tatar communities in interwar Romania, Turkey and Crimea, this was interrupted by political changes in the post-WWII era. In the 1990s, the Crimean Tatar ethnic politics began to be less determined by the political conditions in the host-states, and the Crimean Tatars began to invest their energies into building their transnational community.
6.4. The framing processes in the homeland Crimea in the post-1990s:

In the last two decades, the relations of the repatriated community with the other Crimean Tatar diaspora communities became more institutionalized with the convening of the first world congress of the Crimean Tatar community, which could be seen as a step towards constructing a transnational Crimean Tatar nation. Understanding this process requires investigation of the framing processes of the repatriating community in the post-Soviet era.

During the post-Soviet era, the Crimean Tatars created their own alternative government in Crimea, with which the authorities had to reconcile. In return, the Crimean Tatar legislative organ chose to cooperate with the authorities. The Crimean Tatar Meclis (National Assembly) joined the elections, negotiating alliances with Crimean and Ukrainian parties, organizing block vote, and providing candidates for Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments and local legislatures. A thorough analysis of post-Soviet Crimean Tatar politics in the context of Crimean and Ukrainian politics requires different methodology than would be used to analyze regional social movements. It requires examination of the institutional politics and a perspective of “multicultural” politics. This dissertation emphasizes a “transnational” perspective and studies non-institutional, and informal politics. It also focuses on the development of institutions designed to act in the Ukrainian and Crimean political arena, wherein the re-patriated community continued to act as a social movement in the newly emerging transnational social space of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities in

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429 Thus, I did not discuss the inter-ethnic relations in Crimea, the role of Crimean politics in Ukrainian nation-building, or the prospects of Crimean Tatar autonomy within Ukrainian and Crimean context. However, the scholars studying these topics need to understand the identities developed by the Crimean Tatars in exile in the former Soviet Union, as well as transnational relations between the diaspora and homeland. For the role of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean/Ukrainian politics see Izmirli (2008)
the 1990s and 2000s. The transnational perspective leads us to inquire about (i) the impact of pre-return, “exile nationalism” framing processes in the reproduction of new frames in the post-return era, (ii) the impact of these reproduced framing processes in the emergence of a transnational national community.

6.4.1. Legacy of pre-return framing processes

The frames that developed in the pre-return period survived in the post-return era. Once created, frames enter the movement repertoire, though their resonance might shrink or widen depending on structural conditions. These two frames are both exile frames, and distinguished by the “Leninist” and “democratic” approaches to the goal of collective return. The Leninist frame increasingly lost its resonance while the democratic collective return frame became increasingly dominant and resonant, and was adopted by Meclis, the current representative organ of the Crimean Tatars.

The frame struggle became apparent and institutionalized in the late 1980s. In April 1987, the “Central Initiative Group” was established as a formal united organization of Crimean Tatar informal initiative groups and held several All-Union Congresses. (Wilson 1998, 283; Abdulganiyev 2011) By May 1989, this organization was titled as the “Organization of Crimean Tatar National Movement” (OKND). (Guboglo and Chervonnaia 1992, 193-194) When the OKND separated itself from the movement by institutionalizing, the remaining members of the national movement, mainly Yuri Osmanov’s Ferghana-based group (Abdulganiyev 2011) was identified as National Movement of the Crimean Tatars (NDKT). The NDKT always rejected the foundation of a formal organization, operating

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430 According to Guboglo and Chervonnaia, “from the NDKT emerged OKND” (Guboglo and Chervonnaia 1992, 193)
under the nominal name of “committee for restitution of national integrity and justice of Crimean Tatar people” A leader of the NDKT argued “We are not a party, or an organization. We are a movement, and we do not have any special interest or goal different than the interests or goals of all Crimean Tatar people” (quoted in Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 191) The OKND had more members and increased its membership in the 1990s while the NDKT lost support. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 195) The leading members of the NDKT (Yuri Osmanov, Gomer Bayev, V. Abduraimov, Rüstem Cemilev, Şaban Halilov, M. Bekirov, and so on) were not elected while the OKND had more democratic internal structure, and had a developed division of labor. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992,198-199; Abdulganiyev 2011) I will review the frames of both movements in the beginning of the 1990s in order to demonstrate the continuing legacy of Soviet-era frames in the post-return period. We must note that not all Tatars subscribed to one of these frames, but these were the most prominent activators of post-return movements.

The NDKT frame is a continuation of the very first Crimean Tatar frame, the “Leninist” collective return frame. For example, in 9 July 1988, they still wrote “The political declaration of the Central Committee of CPSU, and resolution of XIC party-conference, created a meta-theoretical precondition for the Leninist resolution of the question (of Crimean Tatar fate) rejecting …chauvinist understanding of Gromyko commission…” (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 189) They approved the decisions of congresses of the CPSU and the congress of the People’s Deputies and High Soviet. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 189) Akseyit Mehmetov said, “Our national movement is based on the edicts and guarantees of revolution, on the law and constitutions of USSR”. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 186) The NDKT continued “policies of peaceful protest
and loyal petition to authorities” (Abdulganiyev 2011; Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 191) “NDKT in an orthodox way followed the tradition of the movement of 1950s and 1960s in both forms of activism and in preservation of peculiar archaic lexicon and specific phraseology.” (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 198) Guboglo and Chervonnaya claims this approach to be anachronistic and without perspective (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1991, 188). According to my theoretical framework, this constitutes alignment (master frame extension) with an increasingly anachronistic master frame, which would disappear with the fall of the Soviet Union.

The OKND was strictly anticommunist, and viewed the Communist Party as a criminal organization. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 188) Cemilev believed that aligning with the communist master frame to curry favor with the authorities had damaged the internalization of democracy among the Crimean Tatars. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 187) The OKND was pro-democracy, pro-Western, and envisioned a future for the Crimean Tatars within the liberal capitalist world. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 178) The OKND was also anti-Russian imperialism. It believed that a democratic Ukraine, rather than Soviet, or any other form of Russian dominated state, had a better chance to provide the Crimean Tatars with adequate civil rights.

The main distinction between the OKND and the NDKT rested on the collective return of the Crimean Tatars. The NDKT supported state attempts such as the formation of a state commission under the leadership of Dogujiyev (6 March 1990), which planned an annual repatriation quota, and Tatar re-settlement exclusively in the northern part of Crimea. The OKND did not support the discriminatory limitations of repatriation of willing Tatars through the state, protested what they viewed as “reserves” for the Crimean Tatars, and
advocated resettlement in all parts of Crimea, especially in the coastal region where 80% of
the Crimean Tatars lived before deportation. The OKND also advocated self-organized
collective return of the Crimean Tatars, based on their own community resources. Since the
Crimean authorities were not willing to accommodate the Crimean Tatars, they suggested
squatting on the empty land. The self-organized collective return, and squatting was viewed
as “extremism” by the NDKT who strove to remain within the legal boundaries of the Soviet
state. But the NDKT also blamed the local authorities in Crimea for poor implementation of
policies developed in the Soviet centre.

The NDKT viewed the Soviet Union as an “overarching institution preventing open
confrontation between the Slavs and the Crimean Tatars.” (Wilson 1998, 284) In the
Crimean ASSR they demanded “the national rights of the Crimean Tatar people will be
protected by the oversight of all-Soviet institutions”. (Wilson 1998, 284) Therefore, the
NDKT protested attempts of decentralization and breaking away of Soviet republics,
including Ukrainian independence. The NDKT also protested the declaration of Crimean
ASSR, long demanded by Crimean Tatars, because of its non-Tatar content, and embodiment
of the Russian autonomy in Crimea. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 190) After the
collapse of the USSR, and death of Yuri Osmanov, Vasfi Abdurraimov, his successor in
NDKT aligned with the “Eurasianist” ideology of Nikolai Trubetskoi, and Lev Gumilev,
arguing that “cooperation between Slavs and Turks had laid the basis for Russia’s unique
culture and foundations of its geopolitical strength.” (Wilson 1998, 284) As cited by Wilson,
Abdurraimov argued “In Crimea, the Slavo-Turks (Crimean Tatars, Russians, and
Ukrainians) have a real possibility to create and perfect a micro-model for a Slavo-Turkic
‘superunion’ (Wilson 1998, 284)
The OKND celebrated the dismantling of the totalitarian state, and supported the independence of several breakaway republics, such as the Baltic states, and Ukraine. The Baltic, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar nationalists were allies for a long time, and their leaders knew each other well while in prison. The OKND supported the Crimean Tatar alliance with the Ukrainian nationalist Rukh movement (an anti-Russian, pro-democracy movement), as this alliance could positively affect the Tatar struggle to attain national rights and sovereignty in Crimea. According to OKND, if Crimea belonged to any Russian dominated state, the policy of de-Tatarizing Crimea would continue, as history showed.

As the OKND openly expressed its dislike of communism in the Gorbachev era, it became more reluctant about the former Crimean Tatar demand for the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR. The OKND leaders had gradually educated themselves about the prerevolutionary Crimean Tatar past, studying the pre-Cyrillic Crimean Tatar alphabet (first Arabic, then Latin), and reading their prohibited literary heritage secretly in libraries. This reconnected them to the legacies of the Crimean Khanate, İsmail Gasprinskiy, pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, and the democratic Crimean Tatar republic in 1917.

Gasprinskiy’s vision provided them the ideological basis for the demands of Crimean Tatar national sovereignty: the Crimean Tatars should not struggle in isolation, but develop cultural bonds and political solidarity with the Turko-Muslim populations of Russian Empire, as well as with the Ottomans and the other Muslims in the world; renewed ethno-national identities were needed to be defined on the basis of modernized interpretation of Islam and common Turkic language.

Moreover, the Crimean Tatar right to self-determination was no longer based on Lenin’s grant, but on the recognition of the historical right of the Crimean Tatars by the
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires (1774), and Russia’s violation of this treaty in 1783, unlawfully annexing the Crimean Khanate. Furthermore, the national assembly of the Crimean Tatars convened in Crimea in 1991 was named as the Second Qurultay, the first being in 1917. All of these emphasized continuity with prerevolutionary nationalist ideals, which were also shared by the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey (and the US).

Parallel to these developments, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism were reemphasized as potential master frames to align with the democracy master frame. Since pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were vilified in Russian/Soviet historiography, only the most radical leaders openly expressed these ideologies, despite the continuing practice of religious rituals among the average Crimean Tatars. Cemilev emphasized his Islamic identity in his trials beginning from 1970. In 1978, Reşat Cemilev wrote a letter to Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia asking for help as a fellow Muslim. But in the late 1980s, the democratic collective return frame was supplemented with several demands forwarded to authorities such as the return of mosques, cemeteries, and other holy places of the Crimean Tatars, and funding of their religious education and personnel. The Leninist collective return frame during the Soviet era epitomized in the NDKT in the contemporary period tried to distance itself from Islam when articulating demands, in true communist form. They did not seek common action with the other Muslim peoples of the USSR, eschewing the accusation of “pan-Islamism” or “pan-Turkism” which were two evils according to both Russian and communist historiography.

The OKND also sought cultural and political cooperation with the Turko-Muslim populations of Russia as a result of the ideologies of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. The
OKND held the Soviet provocation responsible for the Fergana pogroms, not letting the events come between Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks on the one hand and fellow ‘Turkic’ Uzbek nation on the other, with whom Crimean Tatars generally developed warm relations and intermarried during their exile in Uzbekistan. The Crimean Tatars strongly supported the Chechen war against Russia, most visibly, by sending volunteers, and taking care of orphans; backed the ‘Muslim’ Abkhaz people, and the Meskhetian Turks against Georgia; and formed close relations with Kumuk, Uzbek, and Volga Tatar nationalist movements.

The OKND increasingly expressed the exclusive national rights of the “indigenous peoples”, the Crimean Tatars, the Karaims and Kırımcıları to Crimea, while the other “settler” peoples, including Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks (Urums), Armenians, Bulgarians and so on only have “ethnic” rights. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 186) The understanding of Crimean Tatars of themselves as “indigenous people” was partly derived from the Soviet classification as korennyi narod, which was entrenched in the national identity of the Crimean Tatars in the pre-1944 Soviet era. In the post-Soviet period, obtaining recognition as indigenous people of Crimea would mean Crimean Tatar entitlement to autonomy and self-government, as well as their language, cultural rights, and land claims. This part of the frame ran into difficulty while constructing the common frame for the transnational nation. While the WWII refugees in the United States are aware of this conceptualization, the diaspora in Turkey and Romania do not have this specific conceptualization of Crimean Tatar identity. Claiming that they are indigenous to Crimea, the Crimean Tatars in the USSR trace their origins to the first known ethnic communities of Crimea such as the Goths, the Taurians and the Sarmathians. However, the Crimean Tatar
diaspora in Turkey and Romania claimed stronger Turkic heritage, but the Turkic people are known to have migrated to Crimea from the Central Asia, even though as early as the 10th century. The common point is developed by arguing that the Crimean Tatars are a multi-ethnic nation composed of a mixture of both indigenous and Turkic roots.

The OKND initiated frame-alignment processes with bystanders in the international society, in accordance with the democratic collective return frame. For that purpose, it published regular periodicals, and appealed with letters to the world public, international organizations, other states, particularly the USA, but also European and Muslim states. The Crimean Tatars relied most heavily on Turkey for political, diplomatical, and economic support. The OKND became increasingly interested in the Crimean Tatar diaspora abroad, especially in Turkey, but also in Romania and the United States. In the early 1990s they entertained the idea of returning a million Crimean Tatars from abroad, but soon recognized the practical improbability of it. A more sober goal of establishing close relations with the diaspora communities, and enlisting their political, and economic support replaced repatriation. Modification to the OKND frame to include pan-Turkism, Islam, and the principles of 1917 form of Crimean Tatar nationalism contributed to the formation of common points of reference, mainly with the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. The OKND already shared many common reference points with the frame in the USA, as this frame belonged to refugees more recently departed from Crimea (during the WWII).

According to Guboglo and Chervonnaya (1992), the NDKT was more isolationist, and followed the Leninist collective return frame’s tactic of appealing only the Crimean Tatar people, and the Soviet centre, not to the third parties. The NDKT condemned the relationship of the OKND with the Helsinki Group, claiming that the Crimean Tatar people
never permitted such collaboration, or “speculative campaign about human rights” which “has provocationist purpose”. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 184) The NDKT did not even trust the Crimean Tatar diaspora, which they viewed as suspicious, due to the influence of democratic/anti-communist host states (thinking in a Cold War state of mind). Ironically, the émigré generation had felt the same way about the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union. For the NDKT, the pre-1917 Crimean Tatar national ideology that survived in the diaspora in Turkey and the post-1917 National Party (Milli Fırqa) ideology which flourished during the war and continued in the US were not approved, and consequently they did not trust the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey or in the US. (Guboglo and Chervonnaya 1992, 180)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OKND Frame</th>
<th>NDKT Frame</th>
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| • Pro-democracy  
• Possibility of national autonomy of indigenous people within Western nation-state system. Ukrainian independence was seen as a way to ensure that.  
• Recognizes pan-Turkic, Islamic dimension of identity  
• Crimean Tatar history as defined as gradually being pushed out of Crimea by the colonial Russian/Soviet state.  
• Distrustful of Soviet capabilities of sponsoring and organizing return, therefore the Crimean Tatars must rely on their own power to organize collective return, arrange settlement. | • Leninist, views Soviet Union as guarantor of rights of small nationalities  
• Pro-multi-national, multi-cultural Eurasian identity as a better was to protect the Crimean Tatar interests than Western nation-state system. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and emergence of independent nation-states such as Ukraine as regressive and detrimental for Crimean Tatar interests.  
• Unsympathetic towards Islam, and pan-Turkism, emphasizing commonalities with the nationalities whom the Crimean Tatars shared a Soviet past.  
• Collective return can take place under soviet state sponsorship and planning, otherwise it is impossible and potentially dangerous for Crimean Tatars’ safety and inter-ethnic peace. |

Figure 15. The comparison of two post-return frames in Crimea
6.4.2. The emergence of the Meclis frame (1994-2009)

The NDKT gradually lost resonance after 1994, while the OKND frame was increasingly represented by the new elite of the Qurultay/Meclis (national convention/assembly). The framing processes under Meclis guidance emphasized institutionalization rather than social activism. However, because Ukraine failed to formally recognize Crimean Tatar institutions, and to integrate the Crimean Tatar people, the Crimean Tatar national movement could not cease. The movement-style politics was strengthened by employing several elements of the former repertoire of the movement in claiming land and self-government. While Ukraine remained passive towards the Crimean Tatar issue, increasing Crimean Tatar activism created a counter-movement among the Russophone population of the peninsula, which motherland-Russia’s political support reinforced. Paramilitary groups and young Russophone mobs attacked the Crimean Tatar tent-cities, or squats. Consequent sporadic ethnic clashes occasionally resulted in Tatar casualties.

In this context, the former OKND, now Meclis frame\(^{431}\), could not develop a strategy to protect the rights of the Crimean Tatars. Its main tenets, such as being pro-democratic forces in Ukraine did not help with providing a solution to the new challenges posed by the changing context, and thus it began to be contested by different opponents, who are themselves still far from creating an alternative coherent frame.

After 1994, the return of the Crimean Tatars slowed down because of a number of factors, including the political difficulties in the attainment of land, and the increasing prices of residences.\(^{432}\) The Meclis were offered only de facto recognition in Ukraine, therefore it

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\(^{431}\) The OKND continued to exist as a weak political fraction, as most of their leaders were now acted within the Meclis framework.

\(^{432}\) The communal land in Crimea began to be privatized in the 1990s, but since the Crimean Tatars did not live in Crimea before 1990 and were not members of collective or state farms, they could not get any of the land re-
was not ensured representation in the Crimean or Ukrainian legislative system. Material compensation for deported nationalities became law in 2000, but Ukraine did not pass a bill on the status of indigenous people, preferring to treat them as one of the national minorities, with no special communal cultural rights, or right to autonomy.

Crimean Tatar land problems have not been resolved despite twenty years of repatriation. The Crimean Tatar land claims, and the demands for the return of cultural places and monuments were the major events of the 2000s. The samozahvats of the Crimean Tatars increasingly created a countermovement of Russophone groups who violently attacked the Crimean Tatars in many instances. The lack of punishment of the attackers constituted a human rights violation and decreased trust in the Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies.

While the Meclis aimed to convince the Crimean Tatars not to take the path of answering with violence, it failed to defend the rights of the Crimean Tatars. Many Tatars began to view the Meclis as a tool of the Ukrainian government, guilty of suppressing and pacifying the Crimean Tatars. Moreover, the Meclis could not respond to the urgent material needs of the Crimean Tatars, as it did not have a budget or source of funding other than donations. Frustrated by low quality of representation and a distinct lack of efficacy distributed among the members. The compensation of land, and property unjustly taken away from the Crimean Tatars at the time of deportation did not take place, since the Soviet Union does exist anymore as the perpetrator of this crime. One Crimean Tatar argument is that since Ukraine accepted to inherit part of the legacy of the Soviet Union, including the Crimean peninsula, which was not part of Ukraine before 1954, it must inherit its problems, such as the unresolved question of re-compensation of Crimean Tatar land, and property. (Nadir Bekirov, Interview by author, April 2006, Simferopol.) Meanwhile Russophone authorities of the peninsula continue to invite Slavic people to buy off all the land and houses in Crimea, sometimes as a cottage, if they do not need one. See “Russians start actively purchasing house in Crimea”, broadcasted by National Radio of Ukraine on 26 April 2010. http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=117129

In the first Crimean elections the Meclis was offered 20% quota in the Crimean Parliament just for one time. When it could not get sufficient Crimean Tatars elected in the second elections, two Crimean Tatars were elected to the Ukrainian parliament and Kuchma offered a status of advisory council for the Crimean Tatar Meclis.

According to some, the source of resentment was corruption scandals of Meclis representatives, inequalities or clientelistic attitudes of members of Meclis in distributing aid which was donated to Meclis Fund. Some complained lack of accountability, and suppression of opposition in Meclis meetings, problems with fair

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relative to community aspirations, the Crimean Tatar population began to disengage from the body. In each election, the Crimean Tatar voting turnout fell. Some Crimean Tatars felt the need to turn to religious, international, and diasporic organizations for support.

Under these circumstances, various representatives of the Crimean Tatar civil society criticized the frame represented by the Meclis from several angles. These included not only the weakened NDKT, but also the emergent radical Milli Firqa (National Party),\(^435\), the Islamist groups which had been outside the Qurultay–Meclis organization, the members of OKND, the veterans of the national movement, former Meclis members, and various academicians, and the media. These groups usually selected one aspect of the Meclis frame to emphatically criticize, and based suggested alternative paths on this aspect, instead of outlining a complete frame.

The veteran movement activists criticized their exclusion from the Meclis structures, citing the necessity and value of their experience to conducting the national movement.\(^436\) Cemilev himself views this as resentment for falling from the center of attention. According to him, those “national movement skills” are not contemporarily relevant. Cadres with skills in economic management, political negotiation, law, and administration are needed more. Unfortunately, those Crimean Tatars with administrative experience were mostly the Crimean Tatars who collaborated with the communists, many of whom proved less idealistic than corrupt, a quality that negatively influenced the reputation of Meclis.

\(^435\) This is the third political party in Crimean Tatar history, using the name of the National Party of 1917. Unlike other two examples in diaspora, who claims direct descendance, this party claims to embody the legacy of the ideas of 1917 Party.

\(^436\) İzzet Hayirov, Interview by author, 13 April 2006, Simferepol.
Another veteran activist criticized the deficits in electing representatives to Qurultay (in 1996) A former Meclis member called for the election of Qurultay members directly not by delegates.437 He also criticized the difficulties in voicing dissent in Meclis.

The most common criticism advanced by several activists was the cooptation by the Ukrainian establishment, through the election of the president and vice-president of Meclis in the Ukrainian parliament, and the alliance with the Ukrainian nationalist and pro-Western party formations in the tradition of Rukh. The critics argued that this distracted the Crimean Tatars from their national goals, and did not advance Crimean Tatar national rights in a significant way. They evaluated the existence of the Crimean Tatar parliamentarians in the Ukrainian or Crimean parliament as merely symbolic, and their performance practically ineffective in serving the interests of the Crimean Tatar people. They pointed out a possible conflict of interests when the head of the Meclis, who was supposed to serve the Crimean Tatar national interests, took an oath to ultimately serve the Ukrainian national interest.

Many Crimean Tatar intellectuals criticized the passing of Qurultay and Meclis debate time by focusing on what stance to take in Ukrainian and Crimean elections, which party Crimean Tatars ought to ally with, and how to organize a block vote in Ukrainian national or Crimean elections. A veteran and former opponent of OKND, who participated in Meclis sessions in 2005, complained that his proposal to focus on the issue of recognition of genocide, fighting against the results of genocide, such as assimilation, the redress of property loss, and civil rights were overlooked.438 He laments the fall of these issues from the agenda of the movement because it was considered to be unrealistic. He argued that the elected party in Crimea and Ukraine was ineffectual for the Crimean Tatars. Therefore, they should not tie

438 Timur Dağcı, Interview by author, 28 April 2006, Simferopol.
their hopes to a party, but should struggle through the methods of a social movement, and trust the power of their own people, instead of their Ukrainian allies. This was a familiar theme of the national movement in the Soviet period. In the Soviet Era, the Crimean Tatar Bekir Osmanov first defended such a strategy: Instead of allying with other dissident movements in the Soviet Union, and being distracted with larger agenda of the Soviet civil society, the Crimean Tatars ought to turn to their own people, and focus on their own national goals.

In this period, we observe the curbing of former traditions of samozahvat and squatting by Meclis. While Cemilev and the OKND, different from the NDKT, defended spontaneous samozahvat in the pre-1994 period, in the post-1994 period, Cemilev, as the president of the Meclis asked protestors to coordinate with the Meclis. The activist youth, however, viewed the Meclis as ineffective in responding to injustices against the Crimean Tatars and preferred to take the matter in their hands. When the activists organized independent protests, especially to claim land, Meclis was critical of the courses of action taken. In several cases, the Meclis used its power and prestige to help out some of the activists, who were arrested and discriminated against, even though it did not sanction the initial protest. It was also the case, when some of the activists attained their protest goals without the support of the Meclis, they began to develop self-confidence in their own power independent of the Meclis. An activist who participated in the Azatlıq movement and many other protests in the recent decades, independent of Meclis, underlined that the head of

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439 For example, in 2009, some Crimean Tatars conducted hunger strikes and protests in Kiev, in front of the Ukrainian parliament. While these were parts of Crimean Tatar movement repertoire, the protestors were criticized by the Meclis for damaging the Crimean Tatar case.
Meclis himself was the most radical in his fierce opposition to the establishment until the 1990s, but has since been co-opted. 440

Despite these criticisms, in accordance with his pro-Western democracy frame, Cemilev supported Ukraine’s acceptance into NATO and the EU as having the potential to create a more secure path towards attainment of rights. Cemilev and the Meclis strongly supported the Orange Revolution, though it did not meet their expectations. According to an activist, the pro-Ukrainian stance is damaging because it occludes the Crimean Tatars view of assimilatory politics in Ukraine, and Ukraine is not better than Russia.441 Crimean Tatars were harassed, discriminated against, and abused by the Ukrainian authorities. Vasfi Abdurraimov, a member of the Milli Fırqa oppositional party, went as far as seeking Russia’s assistance against Ukrainian discrimination. Less extreme critics preferred to increase their options by not readily supporting the Ukrainian nationalist parties, or not supporting Ukrainian acceptance to NATO or EU without an implicit recognition of Crimean Tatar rights. The Russian nationalists in Ukraine and Russia seized the opportunity to point out divisions among the Crimean Tatars. Cemilev claims that he has intelligence that they funded most opposition to Meclis.

These criticisms should not give the impression that the Meclis does not enjoy significant support among the Crimean Tatar people. Several civil society organizations work in close coordination with Meclis. There are also many other Crimean Tatar organizations that do not operate against the Meclis, but which have decided to take the matter in their own hands. The examples include Huquq qoruyucu Teşkilat (Organization for Protecting Rights),

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440 Rüstem Seydosmanov (pseud.), Interview by author, 17 April 2006. Simferopol.
Islamist organizations, the Ukrainian Muslim party and Islamic radicals, such as Hizbut Tahrir radically challenged the Crimean Tatar frame, privileging the Islamic identity over the national one. They argued that it did not matter whether you read the Quran, or practiced your religion in the vernacular or in Russian, as long as you did it. The Meclis responded that this only would pave the way for assimilation of the Crimean Tatars, while the radicals argued that Meclis was culpable of greater assimilation by maintaining attachments to secular and Western values.

This was the picture of Crimean Tatar framing processes in Crimea in the late 1990s and 2000s. A strong addition to this picture in the 1990s and 2000s was the attempt to form a Crimean Tatar transnational nation. In the early 1990s, the Meclis frame emphasized that the Crimean Tatar nation is composed of 5 million people instead 250,000 in Crimea. This creative way of thinking aimed to overcome the problem of being a minority in an environment where minority rights are not respected. But it became clear to the Crimean Tatars, as well as Russians in the peninsula that repatriation of the diaspora is highly unlikely. The return scenario gave its place to the scenario that the economic, political, and cultural infrastructure of the Crimean Tatars must be developed with diaspora support in

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442 Works for return of the Crimean Tatars holy sites and cemeteries.
order for the Crimean Tatars to survive as a group. Soon, increasing transnational networks, flows and relations demonstrated that existence of a multi-location Crimean Tatar nation would be as beneficial as return, if not more. Thus, the *Meclis* and the diaspora nationalist movement in Turkey (primarily led by the organization of General center) cooperated to create a project of forming a Crimean Tatar transnational nation as a solution to the intractable contemporary situation of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. As other homeland governments, Meclis carefully tries to control the development of diaspora-homeland relations in order for it to develop in the desired direction, though a lot of spontaneous connections and activities take place beyond Meclis’ control. For Nadir Bekirov, this means that Meclis plays the role of taming “radical” protests such as simultaneous demonstrations in front of the Ukrainian embassies, and pressures to own governments in the diaspora, and as a result, it prevents utilizing the diaspora more effectively for the Crimean Tatar cause.

| • Emphasizes the symbols of Crimean Tatar nationalism in 1917, and the Crimean Khanate, and claims Gasprinskiy’s legacy |
| • The deportation constitutes an unjust attack on the human rights and national identity of the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars are indigenous people, not a minority in Ukraine, therefore they deserve autonomy, land, the maintenance of culture, just compensation of all their losses in the course of deportation and preparation of conditions for the return of the remaining Crimean Tatars. |
| • Secular, pro-Western, pro-democracy |
| • Pan Turkist |
| • Frame-bridges with Ukrainophones, counter-frames the Russophones/Russian nationalists |
| • Favors formal organization and conventional methods such as elections over social movement methods |
| • Frame-bridges with the pro-Western, secular, and pan-Turkist organizations of the Crimean Tatar diaspora |

Figure 16. Meclis Frame
6.5. The framing processes of diaspora communities in the post-1990s

6.5.1. Frame transformation towards diaspora nationalism in the 1980s and late 1990s in Turkish, Romanian, and the US diasporas

Changes in transnational political structures created a “critical juncture” to break movement paths, as existing frames seemed dysfunctional or irrelevant in the new circumstances. Because of the changes towards liberalization in hostlands, maintaining identity in the diaspora settings became less challenging, creating less need for exile nationalism or émigré nationalism. Moreover, the end of communism and the increasing transnational links put an end to the localized nationalism developed in Romania which had to claim no links to homeland. Nationalist frames of the Crimean Tatar communities in Turkish, Romanian, and the US diasporas features frame amplification regarding the homeland. These frames also focused on the return of deported co-ethnics, and the establishment of sovereignty in the homeland. Unlike exile nationalism in the former USSR or interwar Romania, these communities do not envisage a return program for their own communities, but stress the maintenance of identity in diaspora settings. The maintenance of identity is reinforced by regular connection with the homeland facilitated by communication technologies. While this effectively ties homeland to diasporic communities, the diaspora maintains its distinct political movement, framing, and identity. This distance enables diasporic activists to take a critical stance towards homeland politics, and the diaspora enacts equivalent moral authority to judge what is best for the homeland. Each diaspora nationalist frame is the result of the previous framing path of the diaspora community, and its own framing processes. For example, the Tatar dialect of Dobruca, and identification with Dobruca, is part of the
diasporic nationalist frame in Romania, because of its previous framing processes. The
diasporic nationalist frame in Turkey seeks to extend the pan-Turkism master frame, in the
tradition of this movement.

6.5.2. Resonance of the diaspora nationalism frames

Diasporic nationalism is an advancement over émigré nationalism in Turkey and the
United States, and “elite minority nationalism” in Romania, which did not have much
resonance. An unprecedented number of new participants, especially youth, women, lower
classes, those with sub-ethnic, or hybrid identities, which were marginalized the prior to
globalized unification appeared. Groups, associations, foundations, initiatives mushroomed
all over Turkey, Romania, the US, Bulgaria, and even other places where the Crimean Tatars
migrated, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada. Publications, events, gatherings,
ceremonies, and rituals multiplied. The bounded, hierarchical, elitist, exclusionary, and
organization-based movement became transnational, decentralized, horizontal, mass-based,
and inclusive of various marginalized groups in the diaspora settings. Participation became
less regulated and informal. People easily came and went out of the movement. People began
to participate at several points in their lives in the movement and new venues of participation
emerged such as internet, transnational, translocal, and for youth and women. In this way,
participation became more individualistic, and people came up with creative ways of
participating. One can participate by preparing a dictionary, a website, and so on.
6.6. The emergence of ‘transnational nationalism’ frame

6.6.1. Frame-bridging between Cemilev’s Meclis frame and frame of General Center of Crimean Turkish Associations in Turkey

Homeland and diasporic elites collaborated to form the transnational frame. I already explained how the Meclis responded to some of the challenges in the Crimean context by developing the idea of the transnational nation. This idea also was shared by strong groups of diaspora nationalists in Turkey. The Meclis and the “General Center” group bridged frames in the late 1990s and constructed the “Crimean Tatar transnational nation” project.

- It re-emphasized Crimea as the basis of all their activities, and emphasizes Crimean Tatar identity.
- It called for adaptation of the contemporary Crimean Tatar national identity, culture and language in Crimea by the diaspora.
- The members of the diaspora, who are mostly assimilated, must spend all their energy reviving Crimean Tatarhood in the Crimean homeland. Diaspora should be subordinate to homeland.
- The Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists in Turkey have fulfilled their duty very well by transmitting national awareness until today. Now the Head of the Crimean Tatar Meclis in the Crimea, Mustafa Cemilev Kırmıoğlu, should be accepted as the sole leader of the national movement in the homeland and in the diaspora.

Figure 17. The transnational nation frame

I find evidence for a “transnational nation” in the “new” Emel published in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and my interviews with the authors of this journal. Although Emel has few opinion pieces in the 1990s, the transnational nation frame can be derived from the publishing policy of Emel. Emel is not different from any newspaper published in Crimea, focusing on Crimean political issues. According to the authors of Emel, the diaspora must
follow the lead of the homeland politically. The highest source of the legitimacy among the Crimean Tatars was participation in the collective return movement. The diaspora could not contribute to the movement for national autonomy much. It has been a free-rider as homeland was re-claimed by the Crimean Tatars who re-patriated on behalf of all the Crimean Tatars. The role of the diaspora must be to cherish the Meclis as an embodiment of this strong national will and support its decisions. The following statements from my interviews underline these:

“Before, we had formed a Coordination Council of the Crimean Tatars in Muhaceret (the immigration setting) which included Cengiz Kırgız and Adnan Süyen…But after the foundation of Crimean Tatar National Qurultay, it had to lose its function.”443

The person who has not filled his heart with this cause [Crimean Tatar cause] can find faults [in the Meclis], KTMM [Meclis] is holy for us. We know its past. We have to protect and cherish it because it is the seed of our future independent state. The ones who criticize the KTMM [Meclis] don’t know much about it. 444

There is also a further justification why the will of the Meclis must be superior:

While the diaspora contributes opinion and considers itself Tatar, it is the Crimean Tatars in Crimea who still endure the hardships associated with living in the Crimea. Moreover, to live in the homeland forces one to be more responsible while making decisions, since one would be directly influenced by the consequences of one’s decisions.

We have to obey Qurultay and Meclis decisions. Our fundamental organ of government is Qurultay. The ones who live in Crimea always know better [their issues, problems, solutions?]. Our role is just showing support to the decisions of Qurultay… [it is important to give] an impression of unity globally for the benefit of our cause, especially in a time when enemies of the Crimean Tatar nation are looking forward to possible divisions.445

Another activist contends that there will not be room for opposition until Crimean Tatar rights and autonomy have been achieved. The members of the General Center also pointed out the possibility of opposition within the Meclis, without challenging the whole institution. “It is necessary to become one heart in Crimean national cause. To support KTMM [Meclis]. Cemilev is more democratic [than others], he allows opposition.

In order to construct a transnational nation, the General Center bridged frames with the Meclis frame. In accordance with the pro-Ukrainian stance of the Meclis, the leaders of the General Center established diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian embassy, and founded the Turkish-Ukrainian Friendship Association. This also contributed toward Ukraine’s approval for the Crimean Tatar diaspora’s transnational relations with Crimea. Even when the Istanbul branch of the General Center wanted to protest the treatment of the Crimean Tatars, they requested an appointment from the consulate for a visit and expressed their opinion and demands through an officially recognized venue.

The transnational nation frame presupposes that the diaspora must adopt the ethnonym, language, identity, and culture of the homeland community. These are considered necessary to be a “nation” and diaspora by holding on to its own ethnyons, dialects, cultural traditions, and identities could damage this purpose. According to these activists, a nation is the one who shares a common ethnonym. The members of the General Center

446 Expressed by Erhan Yetişkul (pseudo.) in my conversation with him in Istanbul. Same view was expressed by Ümit Yüksel, Interview by author, 6 March 2006, Ankara.
448 “Ukraine must regard Turkey as an ally. Turkey has a large potential for trade with Turkey. Ukraine had technology and raw materials. Turkey had food and consumer good industry. The students who study in Ukraine will contribute Turkey in the future. Fevzi Sarıkamış (from the Crimean Association in Konya) organized the students go to Crimea for study. (Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara.) In 2001, at the 10th anniversary of independence of Ukraine, Ukrainian Embassy and our association organized a conference. A cocktail was organized on 18 May. A. İ. Kırımlı was honoured with Ukrainian state’s medal. We became a bridge between Ukraine and Turkey. (Namık Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.)
449 Celal İçten, Interview by author, 31 January 2006, Istanbul.
criticize other ethnonyms preferred by certain diaspora groups. One activist summarizes their position as such: “Why Crimean Tatar? 1) The Crimean Tatar is a sociological and historical reality. 2) If you say in diaspora “Crimean Turk” and the people in Crimea say “Crimean Tatar,” this is hypocrisy, inconsistency. 3) It is impossible for the people in Crimea to adopt “Crimea Turk” ethnonym.” Another activist warns against just using “Tatar”, instead of “Crimean Tatar” pointing out that it has a further significance as the Soviet regime denied this ethnonym to the Crimean Tatars, and the Turkish diaspora would certainly not want to confirm the Soviet regime. While the diaspora strove to approach the Tatar frame inside Crimea, a group of Crimean Tatars in Crimea moved further from the diaspora, by taking “Qırım”, the name of peninsula in Crimean Tatar language, as their ethnonym. This was done to emphasize indigeneity, and to stress identification with their territory, as well as to eliminate the very “Tatar” ethnonym, as Tatars involved some sub-ethnic groups not indigenous to Crimea. This modification was not approved, even by the General Center, in the diaspora.

The transnational nation frame emphasizes the need for a common language. The common language reference is justified based on the 1940 language congress in Crimea when the Crimean Tatar professors of language and literature decided on Bahçesaray dialect as the common language of the nation.

“Bahçesaray was the place where everything in the name of Crimean Tatarness emerged. Orta yolak [Bahçesaray dialect] was chosen as the literary language of the Crimean Tatars. This does not mean I am not for preserving all dialects of Crimean Tatar language wholeheartedly. But we need common values. When writing to each other, we must write in Bahçesaray dialect. Everybody must agree to use that. Our touchstone is Crimea.”

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450 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara
451 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author, 27 February 2006, Ankara
452 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Istanbul.
In addition to language, a common alphabet also needed to be accepted by all
diasporic communities. While the move away from Cyrillic has significant difficulties for the
homeland community, both the homeland and diaspora communities in principle agreed on
the Latin alphabet. However, which letters will constitute the Crimean Tatar alphabet became
a problem. Some Crimean Tatar groups in Turkey defended the adoption of the Turkish Latin
alphabet, which they viewed as the most developed (having most books published in). The
linguists in Crimea regarded a few additional letters important for preserving the uniqueness
of the Crimean Tatar spelling. The formerly addition of letters taken from the Romanian
Latin alphabet to written Tatar language by Tatar professors from Romania over the course
of the last half a century further complicates the issue. The Romanian authors suggest
different spelling and pronunciation for many common words across dialects, too.

“There is not a consensus among the linguists [about the original or best Crimean
Tatar dialect]. We obsess with which letters to use but we lose the real issue here. It is
hard to find an alphabet which everyone likes. English has various pronunciations but
it has one alphabet. The dialects are bound to be forgotten.”

Those attempting to construct the transnational frame mean that the Crimean Tatar
diaspora is an ethnic group with its largely oral and disappearing literary traditions and
under-developed dialect not suited to the needs of a modern nation. The formation of a
modern nation requires diasporic acceptance of the contemporary political authority,
adoption of the language, and the embracing of Crimean cultural institutions as its own.

The transnational nation frame emphasizes that a common Crimean Tatar identity can
be constructed. In the following words the Crimean Tatar activists make clear their
constructivist view of nation.

“The Crimean Tatar identity has gone through different stages and was influenced by Russian, Soviet, Uzbek, or Turkish cultures. There is not a Crimean Tatar who was not influenced by other cultures. We need to do a synthesis.”

“Of course there will be different experiences as we spread into a wide geography. The important thing is to agree on the same purposes on future of the nation and homeland.”

“The [national] cultures are not frozen. …Some people among the diaspora who know very little about the actual Crimean Tatar dances in the contemporary Crimea may not like the way Cemile Osman [the famous Crimean Tatar dancer in the Crimea]. After all, what they have seen so far as ‘Crimean Tatar folk dances’ were only those lamentably impoverished versions of certain dances which had survived in the diaspora…Is our purpose to revive the way we lived in past history, which is impossible, or to create a future for our nation? We criticize the purity of culture in Crimea from our seats in diaspora. The culture in Crimea is for sure not pure, but at the end of the day, that is the culture we have to adopt [not vice versa]. The no-so-pure in Crimea is more real than Turkified [in the sense, not of general Turkic, but Turkish issue, pertaining to Turkey.] Tatar culture in diaspora. …The culture in diaspora is dying as it is not fed…It is like frozen therefore it does not develop…”

This transnational nation frame is reflected in the activities of the General Center too. In other words, the activities can be taken as evidence of the frame that is guiding the behavior of this organization. “While the transnational organizations of migrants gained power by being autonomous from the political authority, by linking to political authority they may gain more power.” (Smith 1998, 230) The linking between diasporic organizations and the OKND took place not long after re-patriation. Mustafa Cemilev met the young activists of the Crimean Tatar diaspora (Zafer Karatay) in Simferopol, who visited Crimea with a tour. In this meeting, the first institutional links between the repatriated community and Turkish diaspora were formed, by declaring Zafer Karatay, a leader of diaspora organization (General Center) to be the official representative of OKND (later Meclis) in Turkey. The General Center began to act as an embassy of Meclis in Turkey. Though they could not be delegates, participation of expatriate Crimean Tatars in the Qurultay developed formal links between...

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454 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara
456 Dr. Hakan Kırımlı, Interview by author, 1 August 2000, Ankara.
the two bodies. The formal recognition of Cemilev by the 90-year-old leader of the Crimean Tatar diaspora, Müstecip Ülküsal as the contemporary leader of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey as well as in the world in a ceremony organized by the General Center acted as a symbolic frame-bridging event between the two communities.

Moreover, the General Center of the Crimean Tatar Associations began to act as consultants for the Crimean Tatar leadership in the Meclis (National Assembly) from the earliest times, especially regarding the Meclis’ relations with Turkey. Frame-bridging with the Turkish diaspora strengthened in 1992, when Mustafa Cemilev was invited to Turkey by the General Center, which managed to organize a high-level of diplomatic reception for him, taking advantage of its connections with the elite in power, and the rising tide of pan-Turkism in Turkish foreign policy.457

Transnational nation-building is apparent in the division of labor propagated by the General Center. The General Center defined the diaspora as the “feeding source” for the homeland while the homeland organizations and society had to bear the difficulties of establishing autonomy in the homeland. They organized several aid campaigns,458 and formed Kırım Foundation to centralize aid collection for Crimea and made the Meclis the main distributor of this aid.459 They also cooperated with state agencies to direct aid to

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458 “Tan Printing House is funded by Celal İçten [head of the İstanbul Association, businessman]. Since 1997, there are 3.5 million dollars of aid in our records, which was spent for the hospital, newspaper, press, Meclis building, house of Ismail Gaspıralı, house of Numan Çelebi Cihan, social aid, books) In addition, the association also contributed fundraising for library, national schools building, and restoration of Zincirli Medrese, and Gaspıralı’s tomb. Every Ramadan, 10 TIRs of food, blanket, medicine was sent. İsmet Yüksel have been conducting a campaign for funding the education of 500 children.” (Namık Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.) This is in addition to previous campaigns in the 1990s. See Chapter Five.
459 “Waqfs have a financial import. It is hard to raise fund or buy property through the association. During the 1980 coup, state nationalized all property of the associations. It is also possible to overthrow the board of trustees. The founder always have control in wakf. Kırım Foundation built the hospital [in Crimea]. It also contributed to national schools, and Meclis spending.” (Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara)
Crimea from Turkey, and lobbied for more aid. The Turkish International Cooperation Agency undertook several development projects for the Crimean Tatars. The Head of General Center, Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırımli was a minister in the former Cabinet and the deputy chairman of the Justice Party where Süleyman Demirel was the chairman for 14 years, and Demirel became the leader most interested in the Crimean Tatar cause, promising 1000 houses to be built in Crimea for repatriates. The Crimean Tatars from the diaspora tried to mediate between the Turkish bureaucratic personnel, who found it difficult to understand the community dynamics, and the Crimean Tatars, who struggled to understand the aid distribution process. To rejuvenate traditional culture and identity, the General Center contributed to buying Gasprinskiy’s printing house, Zircirli Medrese, reparation of Crimean Khanate documents, the Crimean Tatar library, and so on. There is still much to be done with aid efforts. Namık Kemal Bayar emphasizes that aid needs to be project-based, as this would be more attractive to wealthy Tatars. Another activist suggested that: “...There are almost 35 associations. Each association could finance a school in Crimea. We need good, profitable, professional projects. The Crimean Tatars cannot live with aid forever.” For another activist, the associations are not working professionally that would enable them to undertake such projects. “The associations and foundations must have representatives in Crimea. This is significant for the flow of information, and better understanding of the situation [in

460 “In the beginning of the 1990s, we took 40 important [Turkish] politicians and bureaucrats to Crimea. We toured the tent cities together. They received information about house prices. It was possible to buy an apartment for 2-3000 dollars. The village houses were around 500 dollars. If we had been prepared as a state, we could buy great amount of land in Crimea. We missed this opportunity. Demirel initiated a project for buying 1000 houses for the needy in Crimea. TIKA conducted this project in Crimea. The recent cost of the project was 80 million dollars. The project could only afford village houses.” (Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author, 21 September 2006, Istanbul.) 1000 houses-project came after two years of lobbying. ...We have 600-700 students from Crimea [in Turkey] (This pertains the project developed in the 1990s to enable education of 10,000 of students from Turkic states and communities of the former Soviet Union in Turkey). This number is great since Crimean Tatars have no state and only other states can sent as many students. ...Still we must try to increase students from Crimea and Romania. Namik Kemal Bayar, Interview by author, 1 March 2006, Ankara.
461 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara
462 Celal İçten, Interview by author, 31 January 2006, Istanbul.
Crimea. That person can stay for one year and later you can send another one.” 463

The General Centre also authorized various projects that could lay an infrastructure for an independent state through diaspora contribution. “Our thinking was to found all the institutions a state needed. (my emphasis) We started with bank, and hospital.”464 Similarly another activist suggests that: “In order for Crimean Tatar language to be preferable we need to increase the number of publications. It must be institutionalized, and it must become a state policy. It must be second language since kindergarten. We need almost 150 national schools [in Crimea]” 465 The diasporan Crimean Tatars initiated a printing house to publish material in the Latin Alphabet, and encourage the transition to this alphabet. Crimean News Agency (Qırım Haber Ajansı) was founded to provide sustained and regular venues of communication between the homeland and diaspora. Similarly television, newspapers, literary, and youth journals were the other projects the diaspora contributed to develop the Crimean Tatar culture.

One aspect of transnational nation-building was searching for ways to put the human potential of diaspora to the homeland’s service. An activist suggests: “We are scattered [around the world] but we can turn this into an advantage. …We have co-ethnics who were educated in Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, with best careers. Some of them are nationalists. They could help Meclis as cadres [consultants?] …We need to educate cadres in Turkey…”466 He also adds: “Both diaspora and homeland must invest in human resources.

463 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara
464 Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author, 21 September 2006, Istanbul
465 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara
We must educate writers, poets. We must take care of culture, language.” 467 Another activist suggests: “We need to struggle in every platform: Literature, culture, politics.” 468 A third activists argues that, “The diaspora in Turkey could play a more important role than other diaspora communities because it is more populated and Crimea is a part of Turkish foreign policy. 469

6.6.2. Resonance of transnational nation frame:

The next evidence of transnational nation-building was Cemilev’s gradually regularized visits to the localities around Turkey, just like a leader touring his constituency. This also had the effect of increasing the resonance of Crimean Tatar nationalism among the masses. Ceremonies were organized to mark his visit everywhere he went: Cemilev’s name was given to places. Several universities offered him honorary doctorates. Cemilev even made appearances at the remote Crimean Tatar village of Sulubük in Central Anatolia. He opened a fountain, named Kırkazizler, named after the place in Crimea. 470 The local Crimean Tatar communities across Turkey were encouraged by Cemilev’s frequent visits, and his high-level of reception was perceived as an endorsement of Crimean Tatar nationalism by the Turkish State. In other words, the transnational frame resulted in translocal ties, and intra-diasporic frame-bridging. 471 An activist states: “Cemilev’s visit to Turkey [in 1992]

468 Tuncer Kalkay, Interview by author, 27 February 2006, Ankara
469 Nail Aytar, Interview by author, 2 March 2006, Ankara
470 Ahmet Gökdemir, Interview by author, Ankara.
471 In 1992, we visited Özal and Mesut Yılmaz. In this year, Cemiloğlu came to Turkey for the first time. Bilal Şimşir was the ambassador. He organized Cemiloğlu’s reception through VIP.
gave a momentum to the movement. It was a new era for the Associations and pan-Turkists. They began to engage in politics. It became necessary for them to learn the national cause.\footnote{Niyazi Elitok, Interview by author, 21 September 2006, Istanbul}

In the late 1990s and 2000s, transnational activity began to be carried out with relative autonomy from the Meclis or the General Center, which would fit into the model of “transnationalism from below”. The activities of new participants in movements outside the nationalist organizations demonstrated that they operated in a transnational nation frame. Individual Crimean Tatars from the diaspora visited Crimea many times, met their relatives, or people who needed help, and provided them with financial relief, carried them medicine, clothing, books, Qur’ans, or left money as tourists. They donated their sacrificial animals to Crimean Tatars during \textit{Eid}, which created a significant business for the Crimean Tatar repatriates. The Crimean Tatars from diaspora invested in businesses, offered credit, or provided donations for repatriates to start their own small-businesses. Intermarriages took place between diaspora and homeland. More and more Crimean Tatars bought houses in Crimea for “temporary return” to homeland. The richer Crimean Tatars such as İbrahim Aracı engaged in wider charity work in Crimea (financing weddings, circumcision ceremonies, nursing homes for senior citizens, repairing and building Crimean Tatar schools, and so on)

Additionally, Crimean Tatars from the homeland began to visit diasporic centers. Folklore and theatre troupes toured the local communities. Artists, writers, politicians, professors, teachers, and students visited Turkey, usually staying in the homes of the diasporic Tatars. An artist from Crimea was invited and sponsored by the Ceyhan municipality. The associations played a role in increasing scholarships for Crimean Tatar
students studying in Turkey. Many associations supported the Crimean Tatar students in their city. Adnan Süyen in Bursa soon turned Bursa into a center for Crimean Tatar students by opening the Association building for their use, providing them with regular meals, and personally looking after their needs. The Crimean students in Ankara tried to bring the community in Turkey and Crimea closer through a website, through which they interviewed significant people from both places. (www.qirim.net) With the initiative of the General Center, youth conventions took place to develop communication, cooperation, and common consciousness among the new generation in Turkey and Crimea. In Crimea, the Meclis also spread propagated the diaspora organizations, mainly the General Center. When I was in Crimea, the head of the general Center, Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırımli’s birthday was noted by the Crimean Tatar library, and an exhibition of his pictures was organized. Articles about the diaspora frequently appears in Crimean newspapers.

The Meclis and the General Center conducted frame alignment among the Romanian and the American Tatar communities. Mustafa Cemilev visited the Romanian community for an international conference of the Crimean Tatar language, culture, and politics in 2002. The conference exposed a major disagreement about language and alphabet. However, the Romanian community gradually began to adopt the political orientation of Mustafa Cemilev and the Meclis. In Romania, the state recognized the Tatar Association as a cultural right. The association has branches across Dobruca. The leader of the Tatar association is appointed as the Meclis representative in Romania. The annual conferences on Tatar identity, and the annual festival with participants from Crimea, Turkey, and Bulgaria contribute the transnational identity frame. Similarly, both Cemilev and the General Center attempted to strengthen ties with the weak Crimean Tatar Association in New York, through mutual visits,
and appointing the head of the Crimean Tatar Association as the Meclis representative in the United States. The internet played a major role in frame alignment processes and fostering the transnational frame. Young members of the General Center founded and managed Crimea-L (list for Crimean Tatars who can speak English and specialists), and later Kirim Haber (list for Crimean Tatars who speak Turkish) groups were. These discussion lists have been very effective in recruiting younger and middle-aged Turks of Crimean Tatar ancestry. Association web pages, Crimean Tatar wikipedia, Fikird e Birlik (Unity in Thought) internet journal, campaigns for sponsoring schoolchildren in Crimea, and annual campaigns for sacrifices conducted through internet proves that publishing, producing ideas, and conducting projects is possible in this realm. However, in the opinion of some users, the internet is a legitimate means to converse, and encourage activity, but ought not to be regarded a space for conducting the national movement.

6.6.3. Framing contests and the convention of the World Crimean Tatar Congress

Basch et al recognize the efforts to construct a deterritorialized nation-state as a process of struggle to establish hegemony, and to organize inequalities and hierarchies (Basch et al 2003, 226). “To argue that such a sense of community exists is not to argue that equality reigns.” Consequently, there is “active hegemonic contestation for political loyalty of migrants” by homeland and diaspora agents organizations. (Basch et al 2003, 251) Moreover, contradictions also exist between those agents and organizations located in the diaspora and the homeland. But “a community can be said to exist because there is at least public agreement on the common responsibility to work for the good of the people” (Basch et al 2003, 226)
Similar observations emerged from my case studies. Located in my theoretical framework, this would correspond to the framing contest that takes place between the organizations in the diaspora and the homeland for the loyalty of the Crimean Tatar people. The elements of this Meclis-General center supported transnational frame is contested by several other groups, who have various and not necessarily consistent frames. It is also possible that the oppositional groups located in the diaspora and the homeland can bridge frames. The conflict thus transcends diaspora and homeland. These cross alliances demonstrate the integration of the Crimean Tatar transnational public space. Moreover, recent criticism of the more hegemonic Meclis-General center frame has been addressed through the convention of the World Crimean Tatar Congress.

The frames of alternative groups are not well articulated. One identifiable aspect of their frame communicated through the journal Kırım is the legacy of the earlier Emel, and émigré nationalism of the previous era. In style, Kırım also looks like a contemporary version of previous Emel in terms of content and style. Its editorial board includes older generation of émigré nationalists, followers of Cafer Seydahmet. Their frame alignment processes were directed by independent associations they founded in Polatlı, Eskişehir, and Düzce. In Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, and Konya, they formed alternative groupings. They also extended towards the newly rising pan-Turkist master frame for increasing resonance, 1970s. Mass publication of historical or sociological articles on Turkic groups, such as the Karachais, a small Turkic people in the Caucaus, due to their Pan-Turkic ideology. Since significant support of Karachais to the Crimean Tatar cause could not be expected, as one activist noted, this was an attempt to extend toward the Pan-Turkist frame.473 They also

473 Yalkın Bektöre, Interview by author, 26 December 2006, Eskişehir.
allied with the pan-Turkist Institute for Research on Crimea and Caucasus. This explains the volume of articles, unrelated to Crimea or Crimean Tatars, but related to the Turkish internal agenda. Heterogeneity of targets caused the movement difficulty when it opposed the Orange Revolution, because the pan-Turkists in Turkey maintained that Soros staged it to shape the region according to the American interests. Interestingly, this situated the group in opposition to the Crimean Tatar Meclis, and on the side of Viktor Yanukovich’s “Eurasianists”, who opposed the Crimean Tatar demands. Because of these inconsistencies, émigré nationalist frame resonance continued to fall, especially among the younger generation.

The discussion of ethnic identity and ethnonym among the Crimean Tatars is a good example of frame contests and integration of public space. Some Crimean Tatars in the Turkish and Romanian diasporas argue that what is presented as Crimean Tatar culture is actually the one sub-ethnic culture of the Crimean Tatars, that of the Tat. The Crimean Tatar identity does not seem genuine or authentic enough to some Crimean Tatars in Turkey and Romania. Some Turkish groups argued that they should constitute a separate nation, asserting Nogays and the North Caucasus as their homeland rather than Crimea. Separating from the “Crimean Turkish” (Tatar) Associations, the Nogays formed their own ethnic

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474 Kırım (Crimea) is a three monthly journal, which started to be published in Polatlı(Ankara) at the end of 1992. It has been owned by Ünsal Aktaş until December 1993 and after January 1996. In between, the publishing of Kırım was transferred to the “Crimean and Caucasian Research Institute.” After July 1999, Kırım is transferred to Crimean Development Foundation (Kırım Gelişim Vakfı), another new foundation. As Emel has quitted since 1999, the 28th issue (Kırım) assumed the name “Emel’miz Kırım” (Our ‘Aspiration’ is Crimea) which signaled Kırım asserted the legacy of Emel beginning from July-September issue. Its editorial board included some members of the old cadre, like Nurettin Mahir Altuğ, Sabri Arıkan, İsmail Otar. Crimean Development Foundation (Kırım Gelişim Vakfı) was officially founded on 21st of April, 1998. It mainly aims to improve education of the Crimean Tatars both in the homeland and in diaspora, and to accelerate the cooperation between the Crimea and Turkey. Another aim is form a trusted organization for the archives of Crimean Tatar national movement and culture. (Aydın 2001)

475 See Williams (2001) for a discussion of historical emergence of sub-ethnic cultures among the Crimean Tatars.

476 Ahmet Ural (pseud.), Interview by author, 18 November 2006, Ankara
associations in Turkey. In Romania, the Nogays are still part of the Crimean Tatar Association.

The General Center counters these sub-ethnic identity claims by questioning the genuineness of the identity of these groups, (which is supposedly based on steppe region of Crimea), as they changed immensely in the course of the time spent in diaspora settings. Instead of focusing on narrow sub-ethnic identities, the Crimean Tatar diaspora must “evolve into” a nation by accepting the most “authentic” ethnic identity. The “authenticity” is judged by being in the homeland the longest and accepting that the Crimean Tatars were able to maintain their culture better under the Russian and Soviet states than it was in the diaspora where welcoming Ottoman host-state and similar host society- culture made maintaining the identity more challenging. This is demonstrated by more developed cultural and political institutions as well as literary and art works among the re-patriated Tatars. This provides the Crimean Tatars in the homeland with a stronger case for nationhood and their claims to nation status have higher probability of being accepted by the international community.

An activist criticized that “diaspora representative of Meclis”, a position of possible authority among the diasporic peoples must be elected democratically by the diaspora, rather than being appointed by Meclis. Some diasporic groups also demanded representation in the Qurultay to represent diasporic perspectives, and allied with Erecep Hayreddinov, leader

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477 Yalkın Bektöre, Interview by author, 26 December 2006, Eskişehir. Zafer Karatay, who was appointed by Meclis explained how this happened to me as such: “On 11 May 1989, I met Kemal Akdağ at Yalta. In April, they had the central conference of initiative groups in Crimea. The KTMHT (Crimean Tatar National Movement Organization) was established. We could see each other only for one day. They offered me the position of representative of Meclis in Turkey. Since I was a civil servant, I hesitated; I wanted some time. I consulted with my friends on the ship on our way to return to Turkey. I could not oppose a person who spent his 16 years in prison. Niyazi Bey [Elitok] was also among us. While sailing from Yalta to Odesa, I wrote a letter. I suggested Emel, our journal to be the representative. They [the KTMHT] said that this was not possible according to by-laws.” (Zafer Karatay, Interview by author, 20 September 2006, Istanbul.)
of the weakened OKND. In both cases, the difficulty is identifying the Crimean Tatars in diasporic settings and holding an accurately representative election. Not all Crimean Tatars are interested in democratic enfranchisement or are sufficiently informed. Diasporic Tatars will not be directly affected by their choices. This is what Benedict Anderson calls lack of responsibility in long-distance nationalism. (Anderson 2001) If voters are only members of associations we could argue that they are relatively more interested and knowledgeable in Crimean Tatar politics and recent World Crimean Tatar Congress accepted representation based on membership in organization. But people are not elected to become members of an association, therefore it is not clear how legitimate their representation would be. Perhaps not through voting, but it is important for a consensual leader to emerge from the diaspora. An activist suggests that a leader representing the diaspora must be supported by all groups instead of just one fraction. If he is appointed by the Meclis, it gives the impression that the homeland favors one group over others in diaspora. Another activist argues “One of the peoples who cannot work effectively with their diaspora is unfortunately the Crimean Tatars. The reason for that is that the Meclisinsisted on working for only one part of the diaspora.”

A third activist asks why Cemilev did not go to the places where most Tatars live such as Eskişehir or Polatlı, but instead visited Kastamonu where few Tatars live. The demands for fair representation by other groups points to the demands for the recognition of entire diaspora community, instead of the convenient members of it. They aspire to be recognized as part of the Crimean Tatar people. They want their opinions and problems matter equally.

478 Erecep Hayreddinov, Interview by author, 28 March 2006, Simferopol.
479 Recep Şen, Interview by author, 27 December 2006, Eskişehir.
480 Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009 “Diyasporasi ile tam olarak calisamiyan milletlerden birisi maalesef Kıırım Tatar diyasporasidir. Kirimda Meclis’in sadece Türkiye diyasporasi (nin bir bolumu ile) calismada israr etmesi milli mucadelemize pek fayda getirmiyor.”
481 Adnan Süyen, Interview by author, 15 December 2006, Bursa.
with the members of the homeland, and the Meclis to take a real interest in who they are, and what they are saying.

An activist in the United States argues that:\textsuperscript{482}

As a person who was brought up in the American diaspora, I am sorry to say that up until now neither the diaspora in Turkey nor the politicians in Crimea took an interest in the American diaspora. I think they just view the American diaspora as a material resource and this makes me sad. Nobody tried to get to know us better...One of the most useful project could be Crimea and diaspora’s trying to learn more about each other in order to reach the truth. If we misunderstand each other, how can we struggle against others?

To his credit, Cemilev began to visit more diverse communities in diaspora in the recent years. However, since he does not really know these communites, he still relies on the guidance of the General Center. The General Center developed a new strategy of expanding Meclis supporters in more diverse communities, and preparing communities before Cemilev arrives.

The other significant criticism of the Meclis-General Center transnational frame by this activist is that the diaspora has a right for meaningful participation in the politics of homeland.

“I would like to see the people in the homeland and in the diaspora to be in a mutually respectful relationship. I am against that idea that “We suffered the most, therefore we have the final say.” I cannot speak conclusively about the ones in Turkey but we too, as refugees, suffered greatly, we tried to survive under the bombs, and suffered through great economic difficulties. Our bleeding scars have not been healed yet. Therefore, our closeness to the Crimean Tatar cause is more than other diasporas. It is my duty to criticize those in Crimea when they are not serving our people well enough as a refugee and as a person who worked for the Crimean Tatar cause since young age. I see no problem in the fact that the politicians in the homeland are criticized constructively by the ones in my situation or by other diasporas ... diaspora should not be under the control of Meclis or any other organization.”\textsuperscript{483}

\textsuperscript{482} Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009
\textsuperscript{483} Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009.
A Turkish activist points out the need for unity in the 1980s and 1990s, when the Crimean Tatars need to act swiftly in the face of fast changes in political opportunities, however, he also emphasizes the need for opposition for betterment of the community in recent years, when dissention is affordable. They believe that the diaspora must maintain a critical eye towards the Crimean Tatar political actors in the homeland, rather than taking the Meclis policies for granted. The homeland community might do the wrong thing for themselves and for the homeland, but it is not just the homeland of the community living there, but also homeland of the diaspora communities. 484

These criticisms were taken into account by the organizers of the World Crimean Tatar Congress. All Tatar groups were invited to the congress, provided that they recognize the Meclis as the ultimate representative institution of the Crimean Tatars. As the members of the diaspora are not represented in the Qurultay/Meclis, the World Crimean Tatar Congress aimed to provide the former with a platform for voicing their opinions about policy-making. The Congress hoped to address the problem of “actively attracting the Crimean Tatars into the internal issues of the homeland” according to an internal critic of General Center-Meclis frame. (Aytar 2010)

Until now the diaspora organizations have not been agenda-setter, decision-maker in Crimean Tatar politics. In the process of the convening of the first world Crimean Tatar Congress, the diaspora organizations are excited to be able to voice their opinions [at last]. Until now, the accepted policy was to agree with the decisions of the Crimean Tatar Qurultay/Meclis and implementing them. Indeed the idea was that

484 Examples include: Mübeyyin Altan criticized the passive attitude shown by Meclis leaders to Yushchenko’s comments when he asked Meclis and the Crimean Tatar leaders to give up the demand for autonomy. (Mübeyyin Altan, Interview by author, by letter, 15 April 2009) Another activist criticizes what he views as the co-optation of Crimean Tatar elites by the Ukrainian government, such as Cemilev’s being an MP in the Ukrainian parliament. According to him, this is a repetition of history when Crimean Tatar nobility was integrated into Russian nobility to colonize Crimea. He also criticizes Meclis as he thinks OKND was a better tool for conducting the national movement until the national sovereignty was established. (Ahmet Ural (pseud.), Interview by author, 18 November 2006, Ankara) Necdet Tekin(pseud.) believes there is room for the improvement of Meclis as an institution. OKND and its social movement methods such as mass protests needed to be revitalized. (Necedet Tekin (pseud.), Interview by author. 6 November 2006, Ankara )
we do not live in Crimea therefore we may not understand the realities of the homeland as well as those who live there. (Aytar 2009)

This signalled a transformation in the General Center-Meclis frame. According to the report on 11 December 2007 in Crimean News Agency, the WCTC was designed to be autonomous from the Meclis/Qurultay, without establishing it as an equal body, and without contradicting the authority of the Meclis. 485 Why the WCTC was needed if Meclis/Qurultay was supposed to be common institutions of all Crimea Tatars including the diaspora? We must point out that Meclis leaders view transnational nation project as a way of reinforcing Meclis’ central authority in leading the Crimean Tatar national cause and securing the resources of diaspora and homeland nationals. However, Meclis understood that this cannot realize without providing diaspora significant recognition and representation to diaspora, if not equal. World Crimean Tatar Congress functions as a mechanism for better incorporating the diaspora Tatars, providing them some autonomous power and representation, though not equal to the power of Meclis.

Some still doubted whether the WCTC provided real representation, recognition, and meaningful political participation is doubtful. According to Mübeyyn Altan,

“…the associations who did not participate in this congress on the pretext that “this is the congress of supporters of the Meclis” were mistaken according to me. At the same time, the organizers were also misguided in making the “recognition of the Meclis and agreement with its decisions” a prerequisite. Associations holding ideas and attitudes differing from Meclis should also have been allowed to participate, and we needed to discuss our problems together in a civilized manner. I hope that more people will participate in the next congress, and we will remedy this problem.” 486

If the aim of the Congress was not to air all relevant views, then what was the purpose of the congress? The WCTC put its own frame on the agenda of the congress:

485 Dünya Kırım Tatar Kongresi halkı koordine edecek. Crimean News Agency [QHA], 11 December 2007 (Reported by Server Mustafa. Translated by Lilya Emiruseinova.)
486 Mübeyyn Altan to Kırım-I, 6 August 2009.
“Topics included discussions on the restoration of the rights of the indigenous Crimean Tatars of Crimea with a keen focus in unifying the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Equally of concern within the discussions were the preservation of the Crimean Tatar identity, its indigenous language and culture as well as identifying access to land and housing as a human right.” (Bakkallı 2009)

The WCTC was successful in incorporating various oppositional organizations, or previously unincorporated, groups into its framework as it intended. The lack of opposition to the congress, except for Fikret Yurter, demonstrated that the idea of a transnational platform was recognized by a great majority of the Crimean Tatars. Cemilev suggested that:

“The conclusion of the Congress reflected the unification of the heads Crimean Tatar organizations worldwide to form constructive engagement on Crimean Tatar issues and collaborate within these frameworks to build consensus and unify on how it can address the issues facing the Crimean Tatar people and their communities in Crimea.”

He added “It was a start of unification of our diaspora.”

The real motivation for WCTC seems to be creating institutions that channel the benefits of it for the betterment of the homeland, and/or to control transnational activity, in order to prevent it from disrupting domestic politics, especially if diaspora groups have an oppositional stand. In informal conversations, Meclis leaders complained that some groups tend to bypass the Meclis while they donate to development projects, provide several services and engage in philanthropy in Crimea. The significance of such a congress for the study of nationalism is that diaspora can create a resource to increase the economic development and political power of a minority, especially when ethnocultural justice is not realized, and ethnocultural rights are not respected. A Crimean Tatar activist puts this forward as such:

“[because of WCTC] lobbying and support and aid to Crimea would be more planned…The organizations which will function as the Crimean Tatar lobby in the political, economic, cultural, and media spheres of the countries they lived will

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487 Kırmıoğlu: DKTK diaspora için birleşmenin başlangıcı oldu[Kırmıoğlu: WCTC became the beginning of unification for diaspora.], reported by Bayram Baybeke, Crimean News Agency [QHA], 25 May 2009.)

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contribute the development of our national cause and resolution of problems. …[this] can be organized only through Meclis.”(Aytar 2008)

The framing contests among the Crimean Tatars in the homeland and in the diaspora continue and probably they will do so in the future. These contests give way to recurring attempts of frame alignment by frame extension, i.e. including the concerns of the critics. In conclusion, a transnational Crimean Tatar nation can be said to be appearing as all diaspora and homeland community goes through a frame transformation, by accepting that Crimean Tatars are more than just the roughly 300 000 in the homeland, and by recognizing Meclis/Qurultay and now WCTC as the common institutions of the Crimean Tatar transnational nation.

6.7. Conclusion:

A transnational nation-building project emphasizes that “both nation and the authority of government it represents extend beyond the state’s territorial boundaries and incorporate dispersed populations.” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, 20) This phenomenon is closely related to global structural changes. While being transnational, this nation also has a strong allegiance to a territorial homeland. The unique feature of transnational nation is that participation in the homeland’s political, economic, and social life occurs from outside the homeland. A significant aspect of a transnational nation is the simultaneous engagement in the nation-state projects of host and home nation-states. The Crimean Tatars in the homeland and in the diaspora contexts, in the late 1990s, entered into a process of frame transformation, through which a transnational nation frame began to be constructed, and consecutively, frames in the homeland and the diaspora were bridged. The WCTC forms the recent attempt of frame alignment processes to include the opposition frames both in
diaspora and the homeland and reinforce its central authority in leading all Crimean Tatar people and the Crimean Tatar national cause. The construction of a transnational nation frame means that the Crimean Tatar diaspora takes a significant role in participating in the decision-making processes of the Crimean Tatars in the homeland. Furthermore, it means integration of Crimean Tatar public space. It empowers the Crimean Tatar on the international platform as well, by establishing a stronger lobbying and ambassadorial role for diasporas, and for the defense of Crimean Tatar rights. By establishing mechanisms for tapping the tangible and intangible resources from the diaspora more effectively, it reinvigorates the Crimean Tatar culture in the homeland. Similarly, by establishing a mechanism for symbolic and cultural goods from the homeland to the diaspora, it creates a local revival of diasporic identities, and trans-local community building in the diaspora setting. On the whole, the transnational nation-project was well managed by the Meclis, demonstrating the resourcefulness of its leaders when options for the Crimean Tatars decreased. When the inner sources of the homeland community deplete for re-building the national institutions, the transnational nation project offers a solution. While Ukraine is ignorant of the Crimean Tatar needs and demands and Crimean Russians actively oppose them, without constructing a transnational nation, the Crimean Tatars stand little chance for maintenance of national identity. Transnational nation-building provides them with an exit option (or perhaps a voice option through utilizing international pressure), which can influence Ukraine to take their demands seriously. In a larger sense, the project of a transnational nation is a result of deportation from the homeland, and inability to re-construct the national life before the deportation. It is a response to continuing consequences of genocide.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

In this last chapter, firstly, I will review the main findings of the case studies and secondly, I will compare the cases underlining various generalizations that are emerging. I will end the thesis with the concluding remarks on the present and future of Crimean Tatar national politics.

Review of cases

In the case-study of the Crimean Tatar community in the USSR, I identified the form of long-distance nationalism in the community in the former USSR as exile nationalism as the community was fixated on the collective return, was not oriented to integration in places of settlement. This movement emerged when the Crimean Tatars interpreted the newly emerging master frame of “de-Stalinization” as an opportunity to create their own movement frame towards the end of the 1950s. They explained that Lenin granted the Crimean Tatars their autonomous republic, and a return to Lenin’s policies would require the collective return of the Crimean Tatars and the reestablishment of their national autonomy. However, by 1967, it became clear that the regime never intended full de-Stalinization. The Crimean Tatars modified their frames because of this unfavourable political and discursive opportunity structures and began to counter-frame against the Soviet communist master frame, by aligning themselves with the rising international “democratization and human rights” master frames, which also brought close collaboration (frame-bridging) with the dissident movements in the USSR. I deny the argument that the Crimean Tatars returned because the Soviet state allowed them to return or because the Soviet state collapsed. My main argument was that when the Soviet frame transformed into a democratization frame in
the late 1980s, the Crimean Tatars already had a frame that fits with this frame well. As the Crimean Tatars suggested in the 1980s, if the Soviet Union would be democratized, democratization would require reversing the consequences of deportation through the collective return of Crimean Tatars and the establishment of national autonomy. In fact, Gorbachev and the regime took several steps in order to prepare for the state-sponsored collective return of Crimean Tatars but the Soviet Union collapsed abruptly. Still the collective return organized by the movement of the Crimean Tatars was viewed as their right by Soviet society and Ukraine, so their massive relocation did not produce much resistance. The self-organized collective return also demonstrated high resonance of their own frame for the members of this community, which was typical for the exile nationalist movement. None of the other deported peoples in the USSR could undertake a collective return, since, arguably none of them persistently had made a case of collective return as persistently for their own members and for Soviet society as the Crimean Tatars, and therefore when opportunities changed this was not an option on the table.\textsuperscript{488} I concluded that the collective return was the consequence of the framing path the Crimean Tatar movement entered once it defined its goal as such. The other Crimean Tatar diaspora communities did not define the goal of their movement as return to homeland for various reasons including the different opportunity structures.

The case study of the community in Romania was divided into three mini-cases. The first period continued from the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century until World War II. The marginalization of the Tatar community in the nation-building and modernization processes of Romania, and its reluctance to integrate in a non-Muslim society and culture precipitated

\textsuperscript{488}Although I do not compare with other communities, this was partly done by Greta Uehling (2004), who came to a similar conclusion.
the emergence of a nationalist movement in Romania. In the case of the Romanian community, framing was an elite invention, and the resonance of this idea among the rest of the community came later through organizational activities, but reached to remarkable levels in the inter-war era for a community who has been in diaspora setting for 50-100 years.\footnote{The migrants to Romania came in continous waves throughout the 19th century.} However, it was interesting that the national movement suggested a collective return to the “homeland Crimea”, part of the USSR as a solution to uneven consequences of modernization in Romania. All these factors contributed identifying the movement in this period as exile nationalism. Note that this was an earlier period than the period of the development in exile nationalism in the former USSR (post-1944). Lack of modern education prevented easy adoption of nationalist ideas. The movement in interwar Romania did not result in collective return, unlike the movement in the USSR because of the unexpected and grand changes in political opportunity structures, that was brought by World War II. The establishment of the communist regime in Romania prosecuted the major long-distance nationalists and their supporters in Romania and suppressed the movement. The communist regimes in fact established transnational ethnic oppression regimes in which the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the USSR brought the punishment of their coethnics in Romania as well.

The next mini-case took place under the communist regime (1945-1989) and was identified as minority nationalism, instead of a type of long-distance nationalism. The Crimean Tatar communities under the communist regimes of Romania and the USSR were interesting to compare. The community in Romania seemed to constrain itself mostly with a territorially rooted minority nationalism, seemingly breaking off their ties to homeland Crimea, as a way of maintaining their identity in the context of oppressive political structure.
Although such a framing attempt also emerged in the USSR, it was overtaken by the exile nationalism frame. The community in the USSR was more adamant towards the collective return solution compared to the community in Romania. This was because the elites of the previous era were not quite finished their frame alignment work with the population when the war came.

The third mini-case of the Romanian community began with the end of communism in Romania and transition to democracy which brought a change in the political opportunity structures. The tolerant minority policy in new Romania, the legacy of previous framing processes in addition to transnational influences contributed to a rising “diaspora” identity. Participants increased greatly compared to the previous level and links to Crimea were firmly established while return was not a preferred option unlike for the interwar “exile nationalism”. This is because opportunities of maintaining identity in democratic Romania are seen not entirely impossible and transnational links are utilized to combat with forces of assimilation in the host-context.

The case-study of the community in Turkey was also divided into four mini-case, one of which belongs to the part of the community that migrated to the United States. I began with noting how in the literature, it was declared that the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey ceased and this population was considered assimilated by many. Then, I pointed out the counter-intuitive rise of the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement in the 1980s. I provided an explanation for the lack of strong mobilization among the Crimean Tatars in Turkey before 1980, and why they mobilized in the 1980s. This was explained by the fact that the Crimean Tatar nationalism developed as an émigré nationalist movement before the Second World War in Turkey, mainly because the political and discursive opportunities in Turkey

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were interpreted to be limited by theémigréleaders. Unlike the Crimean Tatars in Romania, the Crimean Tatars were not structurally discriminated against in Turkey, thus the structural pre-conditions for exile nationalist mobilization did not exist. However, the community could not freely engage in Crimean Tatar nationalism because the Ottomans, and later Turkey strove to be on good terms with Russia/Soviet Union, and the only support the government could give to Crimean Tatar nationalism was clandestine one, as in the case of Committee of Union and Progress government of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the most effective method to advance the Crimean Tatar interests wasémigrénationalism, since mobilizing the masses would be counter-productive by provoking Russia to ask for the suppression of the movement from Turkey. In the interwar era, better political and discursive opportunities in Europe offered by the organization of Promethean League and the liberal regime of the Romanian Kingdom caused theémigréleaders to channel their recruitment work to these geographical locations. The opportunity windows continued to be open in Europe during the Second World War, since Germany permitted the Crimean Tatar and other anti-Russian national activity. Theémigréleaders formed a Crimean Tatar lobby in Berlin in order to influence German policy-making with regards to Crimea, andémigréleader Edige Kırımal was even permitted to go to German-occupied Crimea to meet with the Crimean Tatar nationalists. In the end, the Crimean Tatars failed to attain most of their goals, because of the circumstances beyond their control. Still, they contributed saving many Crimean Tatar nationalists from Crimea, POWs from camps, helpedOstarbeiterand nationalist refugees seek asylum in Turkey and the West.

The second mini-case of the Turkish community took place between the end of World War II and the beginning of the 1980s. Despite ineffectiveness and low resonance, the
éminéé nationalist frame survived until the 1980s, due to the lack of credible alternatives. Thus, the Crimean Tatar masses in Turkey had never politicized for the cause of Crimea either until 1980s, explaining why many scholars pronounced the Crimean Tatars as assimilated in Turkey. The masses agreed to leave Crimean Tatar politics to a small group of éminéé leaders. They were content with opportunities to maintain their language and folkways in their private spheres, while adopting a Turkish national identity in the public sphere, similar to what many other ethnic groups have done in Turkey.

The third mini-case is the long-distance nationalism of the WWII refugees, who immigrated to the United States after a few decades of residence in Turkey. In the 1950s, one group of the Crimean Tatar refugees challenged the long surviving éminéé nationalism frame in Turkey, but they were hampered by the existing political and discursive threat structures. The refugees soon left for the United States because they thought that a Western democracy must offer better political and discursive opportunities. Founding an organization, titled Crimean Foundation, they bridged frames with the movement in the Soviet Union. They framed the Crimean Tatar cause as a cause of human rights, focused on representing the Crimean Tatars to the outside world, and played the role of advocacy. The limitation was that the movement of these refugees (or had to be) took the shape of éminéé nationalism, because it largely remained as an elite movement with low resonance. The larger part of refugees preferred not to mention their past as forced labor under the Nazis as the postwar political environment in the United States was not perceived to be ready to capture the complex human tragedy the Soviet nationalities went through, and this past could possibly prevent their successful integration. They underwent a segmented assimilation into the Turkish community in the United States. Therefore, Cengiz Dağcı (a refugee himself), the
most significant, and perhaps the sole representative of diasporic literature, did not receive much attention from the Crimean Tatars in the United States because the author’s diaspora identity was embraced neither the Crimean Tatars in the United States or in Turkey. He was finally appreciated as an ideologue of diaspora nationalism in the 1980s because his ideas fit with the newly emerging political opportunities.

The last mini-case of the Crimean Tatar nationalism in Turkey corresponds to the post-1990s. The loss of language, culture and traditions by the 1970s, both due increased level of education, mobility, urbanization, and internal migration, created the perception of a danger of assimilation among the Crimean Tatar masses (even in their private spheres) and provided pre-conditions for nationalism. The educated Crimean Tatars, just like the members of other ethnic groups in Turkey, began to view recognition of the Crimean Tatar “diaspora” identity in the public realm as necessary in order to thwart assimilation. The political and discursive opportunity structures in Turkey and the emergence of a transnational space between the Crimean Tatars in Turkey and the Soviet Union after glasnost’ enabled the learning of the Crimean Tatar framing processes in the USSr. The diaspora frame targeted the masses unlike the previous émigré frame. My main question about the recent counter-intuitive “rise” in diaspora mobilization can be explained by the emergence of this diaspora frame. For the first time in Turkey, the Crimean Tatar masses were provided with roles in supporting the homeland and the national cause. However, unlike exile nationalist movements (in Romania and the USSR), it did not go as far as projecting a collective return to homeland, simply because the diaspora community still accepted maintenance of identity as possible in Turkey, since Turkey began to liberalize more.
Comparison of Cases and Theoretical Conclusions:

The comparative case-study research design was selected for this study. The case study presents us with opportunities to identify the significant causal processes and mechanisms in the exploratory stages of political phenomena, and comparison enables to determine patterns of interactions to explain the phenomena.

A. Movement Emergence

If movements emerge through frames, how frames are constructed became the major subject of my inquiry. First, I must answer the question who constructs the frames. Frames can be suggested by elites, leaders or intellectuals or they can emerge through a collective process. In the Soviet case and the recent case of the building of the Crimean Tatar transnational nation, the frame is more the outcome of collective production. In Romania Mehmet Niyazi, in Turkey Vatan Cemiyeti and primarily Celebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet and in the Turkish-American diaspora Mehmet Sevdiyar and Cengiz Dagci created long-distance nationalism frames. The frames suggested by individuals or groups of individuals may or may not gain resonance in the wider community, and this contributes determining the form of long-distance nationalism that would develop in a particular community. Certainly long-distance nationalism limited to small group of individuals is possible, and I identified this case as émigré nationalism. Frames with larger empirical credibility, and narrative fidelity had more resonance. I also identified some of the ways of increasing frame resonance which includes changing of frame, and changing the master frame that is referred. Certainly there is need for more research as to more dimensions of frame resonance.
I continued to research how frames are constructed by looking for the ideational sources of them. I was able to demonstrate my theoretical propositions that frames derive their ideational toolkit from the already available master frames. In the case of the USSR, I was able to identify two master frames that inspired the Crimean Tatar long-distance nationalism frame: first the Soviet communist frame, and later the human rights master frame. The frames in Romania and in Turkey were formulated basing on pan-Turkism, though the content of the master frame of pan-Turkism was not stagnant throughout the 20th century. One part of the Turkish–American diaspora of the Crimean Tatars also utilized the human rights master frame, while the other part utilized the pan-Turkist master frame.

Frames are constructed when relatively tolerant political conditions - political-discursive opportunities- exist or emerge in the places of settlements. The émigré nationalism frame emerged after the revolution of 1908 in Istanbul, when the Sultan accepted reforms towards liberalization, a constitution and a people’s elected assembly. Freedom of opinion, and organization for pan-Turkist and other groups are marked features of post-1908 Istanbul, especially when compared to Russia in the same period. This paved the way for the emergence of émigré nationalism in Ottoman Turkey. In the inter war era, the Romanian kingdom was quite tolerant and non-interfering towards minorities when compared to many other states in that period, certainly when compared to the following communist regime, and this is when long-distance nationalism flourished among the Tatar minority in Romania. In the Soviet Union, the relatively tolerant atmosphere of the Khrushchev thaw was quite a contrast with the previous heavy-handedness of Stalin era and provided the discursive-political opportunities for the emergence of long-distance nationalism in the Central Asian exile.
What is the relationship of long-distance nationalism frame with the territorial nationalist frames? Is long-distance nationalism discourse merely a reproduction of territorial nationalism discourse? According to Williams, the strong emphasis on the principle of *korenniy narod* in the Crimean ASSR forms the basis for the assertion to be recognized as the indigenous people (of Crimea) developed in the Central Asian exile. I will argue that long-distance nationalism discourse including the arguments about being indigenous to Crimea is mainly developed in exile as a result of peculiar framing processes, and this is corroborated by Greta Uehling as well. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the increasing discourse about the recognition of rights of the indigenous people in the international arena in consistency with the human rights master frame has been significant for the Crimean Tatars’ choosing this frame. One of the major points of this study is that peoples actually change through their experience of exile and nationalism can emerge as a result of these experiences in places of exile. Today the most significant justification for demands of Crimean Tatar national autonomy is the non-violent struggle for collective return and its achievement after 50 years which demonstrates remarkable attachment to homeland and national identity. Similarly, pan-Turkist, and pro-Turkey emphasis of the Crimean Tatar national identity would not be there if Cafer Seydahmet did not spend a long émigré life in Turkey or in connection with circles in Turkey. The major figure of the Crimean Tatar diaspora literature, Cengiz Dagci is in a way indebted his whole body of literary work to his distance from and longing for homeland. Unfortunately, the Crimean Tatars continue to be studied as if there is no diaspora, or as if its diaspora does not matter. Such studies will not be complete without paying attention to the long-distance nationalism of the diasporic
communities and their transnational links to the homeland and contributions to the development of nationalism there.

Having said that, this thesis paid attention to point out the legacies of previous nationalist frames in constructing the long-distance nationalism frames. Mehmet Niyazi was definitely influenced by the nationalists of the 1900s Crimea in constructing his long-distance nationalist frame in Romania. The nationalist discourses of the Crimean ASSR and the wartime nationalism in Crimea is also apparent in the themes focused by Mehmet Sevdiyar after he fled from Crimea and became a refugee in Turkey.\textsuperscript{490}

This thesis did not study in detail periods of Crimean Tatar history of nationalism, when parts of the community actually resided in the homeland and engaged in a territorial nation building process, such as the last quarter of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century or the period of the Crimea ASSR (1921-1944). One thing to point for future research is that the research on the pre-deportation nationalist movements in Crimea would largely benefit from a frame analysis, and significant attention to diaspora-homeland links.

\textbf{B. Movement Development}

To explain how diaspora movements change is among the purposes of this study. In order to answer this question, I conducted a \textit{longue durée} study of the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities. This enables comparison both across space and time. Therefore, it can be argued that we have definitely more than three cases to understand how frames transform. These mini-cases could be also regarded as “within case comparisons.” Movements enter into a path when a frame is chosen, and thus movement paths change as a result of changes

in frames. Thus, it is better to ask how frames change. I observed that what most often initiated the movement paths were a change in political-discursive opportunity structures. Opportunity structures involve both public discourses, and political conditions that are perceived or interpreted to be open by movement agents.

This study did not produce generalizations about diaspora mobilization regardless of the context. Instead it demonstrated how the interplay of similar processes and mechanisms produced different paths depending on the context. As a general tendency, when new windows are perceived to be opened in the hostland and/or homeland, frames tend to transform. However this does not mean that when political-discursive opportunity windows are not perceived to be open, diaspora movements cease. Depending on the context, diaspora movements can move to other hostlands, where they perceive better political and discursive opportunities. Therefore it is important to study diasporic movements in a transnational context. When Kemalist Turkey largely restricted pan-Turkist, irredentist, and transnational movements, Cafer Seydahmet decided to shift the base of his long-distance nationalism movement to Europe, mainly Romania and Poland. The contesters of the frame in Turkey, the WWII refugees also left for the United States, where they were more free to develop their own version of the long-distance nationalism. When Romania was invaded by Soviet Union, Müstecip Ülküsal emigrated to Turkey, where he continued his long-distance nationalism.

This thesis also demonstrates the role of agency and contingency, as well as limits of agency in determining outcomes. Frames by definition are social phenomena, and have a certain level of control on individual’s behavior. Frames are not transformed easily. This happens when opportunities change, credible alternative frames emerge and alignment with favourable and empowering master frames becomes possible. Note that not all inefficient
frames are changed automatically. Existing frames can survive due to lack of credible alternatives despite inefficiency and poor resonance. This happened in Turkey as next credible alternative framing emerged only in the 1980s under the influence of the Soviet case. In post-war Romania, there were no contests, because all indigenous sources of alternative framing were destroyed during the totalitarian hegemony.

Frames can also have unintended consequences. The frame propagated by the communist regime in Romania ended up creating a minority nationalism frame. If frames are not abandoned by the community but destroyed by other powers, they can re-emerge when political-discursive opportunity windows re-appear. This can happen when the written materials involving the frame survive and are recovered by new generations, or rarely when people who remember the frames survive and tell. Even though they lose resonance to another frame, frames do not necessarily disappear. They always have some supporters, and they linger on. Therefore, it is important to study previous framing processes to understand their influence on contemporary framing processes.

C. Movement Consequences

Variation in consequences of the movements can be understood as a function of the interaction of certain framing processes with political and discursive opportunity structures. Shortly, variation in movement consequences are the result of different movement paths.

The most important consequence of the Crimean Tatar long-distance nationalism is the collective return to the homeland. My initial question was why only one of the Crimean Tatar communities returned to the homeland even though many obstacles were removed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This thesis suggests that this cannot be just explained based
on the lack of political opportunities, weak will powers of the Crimean Tatars outside the Soviet Union, the fact that they have “forgotten” Crimea. The different outcomes are best explained as being the result of different frames. The “goal of return” is part of the exile nationalism frame. It simply does not exist among the goals of the movements in the content of frames of the communities in Turkey, Romania and the United States. We must look at the historical context and the dynamics of a movement in order to understand the reasons why return was not set as a goal, or could not be achieved. The community in Romania in the interwar period was identified as a case of exile nationalism, thus it had a collective return frame, but WWII and the establishment of a communist regime in Romania signalled an end to the period of exile nationalism. Limitations of political and discursive structures, influence of master frames or transnational frames, or legacy of earlier frames also may play a role in determination of goals as well as frames. The émigré nationalism movement in 20th century Turkey did not set collective return as a goal because it did not view itself as a collective movement, but an elite movement. Therefore it did not have collective projects. The reason for this is that the limitations of political and discursive opportunities in Turkey created the perception that an elite struggle for Crimea is the most effective option. The collective return of diasporan Tatars was seen impossible, unnecessary and damaging to the goal of establishing a Crimean Tatar autonomy with existing Tatars in the Soviet Union. The émigré nationalism movement in the United States could not achieve a higher resonance either. Thus, they did not focus on collective projects such as collective return. In the context of 1990s, the “diaspora nationalists” in Turkey, Romania and the United States again viewed return not as a primary task, because they perceived emerging opportunities of maintaining identity in the hostlands along with transnational ties. The denial of incorporation in
hostlands of the former Soviet Central Asia or interwar Romania also did not give the communities much of an option except for collective return. This contributed high cohesion, high resonance, and the strength of these, movement which involved deep sacrifices not in the higher two levels but also at mass levels. These diaspora nationalism movements now developed into transnational nationalism which also did not view return as an absolute necessity as it emphasizes membership of the nation regardless of where one is located.

The Soviet community returned because their long time movement frame ‘keyed’ so well into the emerging master frame of democracy and human rights in the USSR. The evidence that it fit so well to new master frame is that newly emerging post-Soviet political actors predominantly acknowledged the return of the Crimean Tatars as their right, and this helped the removal of obstacles for their self-organized return. Why did the Crimean Tatar frame fit so well into the newly emerging master frame of democracy in the USSR? It already linked itself to the international master frame of democracy and human rights in the 1960s, and began justifying its goals and mobilization by referring to this master frame.

My initial question about the simultaneous “rise” of the diaspora movements in recent decades is provided with a historical context by this thesis. The “diaspora” movements “rose” largely as a response to threats to their traditional identities, and diaspora nationalism became the language of a struggle of migrant communities to maintain their identities. A major way of maintaining identity is maintaining links to a territorial homeland. In this sense, the recent “rise” in diaspora nationalism constitutes a reproduction of discourse of territorial nationalism in a transnational context. However, it should be noted that the recent “rise” by no means corresponds to the emergence of diaspora phenomenon, as ex-migrant/diaspora communities mobilized quite strongly and demonstrate evidence of close transnational ties to
homeland in the past as well. But these ties did not prove to be very sustainable in history and with developments in communications technology and ease in transportation, diasporas began to construct transnational nations.

The simultaneous rise in overall long-distance nationalism among the Crimean Tatar communities outside the homeland seem to be influenced by the change of transnational political opportunities in the late 1980s, especially in the form of increasing opportunities of transnational communication. This enabled the communities outside the USSR to learn ‘collective return frame’ and change their own frames. This gave rise to the emergence of a new form of long-distance nationalism frame, ‘diaspora nationalism’. The new frame does not aim for return, but it acknowledges centrality of homeland. It has a project for masses and gives them a role by supporting the struggle of the re-patriated co-ethnics in the homeland. Accordingly, diaspora defines its role as primarily supportive. Because of this last concern and purpose of expanding resonance, diaspora nationalism created a rise in diaspora mobilization and the number of activists. Though the participation did not cover all of the diaspora members, it still constituted a significant rise after émigré nationalism in Turkey and the United States and non-resonant minority nationalism in Romania.

The communities in Turkey, former USSR and Romania, each previously having different movement paths, re-connected to construct a transnational nation, epitomised in the convention of the World Crimean Tatar Congress in 2009. The construction of the transnational nation was the result of the interaction of various framing processes interacting with discursive and political opportunity structures. While the emergence of the transnational nation was not possible before the technological development in the areas of communication and transportation in the global era, it is the legacy of the framing processes of diaspora
communities and the negotiation of identities that determines the shape transnational nation takes.

**Concluding Remarks on the Crimean Tatars**

The political significance of the recent attempts to construct the transnational Crimean Tatar nation can only be understood in the light of the recent stalemate in Crimea. The fact remains that the historical injustices perpetrated against the Crimean Tatars have not been redressed yet, and the situation is exacerbated by present injustices. When the Crimean Tatars were refused autonomy because of their minority position vis-a-vis the majority of 2 million Russians in the Crimean peninsula, they re-defined their community to include all diasporic Tatars whose number is estimated to be 5 million. They made a case that these Tatars’s ancestors were indigenous to Crimea, were forced out of it unjustly, and therefore the modern generations in the diaspora preserve their right to return, or at least right to have a say on the future of the homeland.\(^{491}\)\(^{491}\) (Cemilev 1994) Thus, the Crimean Tatars have begun to construct an identity which rejects the role of a small minority in Ukraine, substituting it with the role of a larger “trans-nation”. Thus, the recent nationalist mobilization in the homeland and diaspora contexts and attempts to form a transnational nation are attempts to defend the Crimean Tatar people against the continuing effects of genocide.\(^{492}\)

I also would like to make some assessments and policy suggestions about the construction of the Crimean Tatar nation. In an era when the territorial nation-building processes are deconstructed, and multiculturalism of existing nations are exposed, it is

\(^{491}\) The Crimean Tatars argue that the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 constituted a breach of Küçük Kaynarca Treaty (1774) between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Even though Ottomans had to acknowledge the annexation of Crimea to Russia after another war, Russia did not have the right to transfer Crimea to another state according to the Treaty of Jassy (1792). According to the Crimean Tatars, Khruschev’s presenting Crimea to Ukraine in 1953 constituted a breach of this treaty and thus providing the Crimean Tatars a justification to the claim of the right to independence.

\(^{492}\) Brian Williams (2001) suggested the case for diaspora studies in his recent book.
ultimately in vain to strive for a united, monolithic deterritorialized nation. The Crimean Tatar nation in a way is “diasporised” forever, that is, it is not possible to return its bygone “authenticity” when every member of the nation lived on the homeland. In fact, historical research demonstrates the multiplicity of belongings even within the Crimean Khanate, if that could be accepted as a previous form of the Crimean Tatar nation. İsmail Gaspirinsky’s famous motto, oft-quoted in everyday conversations of the Crimean Tatars, “Unity in Language, Idea, and Deeds” must be interpreted not as a lack of opposition or difference but as a search for commonalities among the Crimean Tatars in the homeland and diaspora.

Meclis/Qurultay and WCTC are unique achievements and institutions with great potential for that. I will caution the homeland and diaspora communities against entering into a race of authenticity and leadership. Instead, they must recognize all communities in the homeland or in the diaspora, asymmetrically located in terms of space, power, historical legacy, institutional density and culture, and find mechanisms of just representation and meaningful political participation for all. Several nations with diasporas at least have their own states. The challenge of the Crimean Tatars is to construct the transnational nation without having access to sovereign state institutions. Their greatest help is the multiculturalist institutions of the countries of residence and autonomous institutions provided to them in domestic and international politics. Another possible source of future power is recognition of rights of the diasporic populations in the international law. Ultimately, the Crimean Tatars must rely on their own power, and the support of their own people for changing their fate.
Appendices

Appendix A:

Petro Grigorenko's speech:

A nationality has disappeared. But discrimination has remained. You did not commit the crimes for which you were expelled from the Crimea, but you are not permitted to return there now.

Why have your people been so discriminated against? Section 123 of the Soviet Constitution reads: 'Any direct or indirect limitation on rights... of citizens because of their racial or national membership... is punishable by law.'

Thus the law is on your side. [Stormy applause]

But still your rights are being flouted. Why?

We believe that the main reason behind this is the fact that you underestimate your enemy. You think that you are dealing with honest people. But this is not so! What has been done to your people was not done by Stalin alone. And his accomplices are not only alive—but they occupy responsible positions. You are appealing to the leadership of the party and the state with conciliatory written requests. But that which belongs to you by right should not be asked for but demanded. [Stormy applause and cries of agreement]

So begin to demand. And demand not just parts, pieces, but all that was taken from you unlawfully—demand the reestablishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic! [Stormy applause and cries of "Hail the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic"]

Don't limit your actions to the writing of petitions. Fortify them with all of those means which the Constitution provides you—the freedom of speech and of the press, of meetings, assemblies, of street marches and demonstrations.

A newspaper is published for you in Moscow. But the people behind that newspaper do not support your movement. Take the newspaper away from them. Elect your own editorial board. And if people hinder you in doing this, boycot that newspaper and create another one—your own! A movement cannot develop normally without its own press.

And in your struggle do not shut yourselves in a narrow nationalist shell. Establish contacts with all the progressive people of other nationalities of the Soviet Union. Do not consider your cause to be solely an internal Soviet matter. Appeal for help to the world progressive public and to international organizations. What was done to you in 1944 has a name. It was genocide.
The agreement adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1948, referred to genocide as follows: '...actions carried out with the intent of destroying fully or in part some national, ethnic, racial or religious group...' by various means and in particular by intentional establishment 'for them of conditions of life which have as their purpose its complete or partial physical extermination' [of the group]. Such actions, that is, genocide, 'from the point of view of international law are a crime which is to be condemned by the civilized world and for committing which the principal persons guilty and their accomplices are subject to punishment.' As you can see, international law is also on your side. [Stormy applause]

And if you fail to solve this question inside the country you have the right to appeal to the U. N. and to the International Court.

Stop asking! Get back that which belongs to you by right but was unlawfully taken from you! [Stormy applause. People jumped up and cried: "The Crimean ASSR! The Crimean ASSR!"

And remember: In this just and noble struggle you must not allow the enemy to seize with impunity the warriors who are marching in the first ranks of your movement.

In Central Asia there has already been a whole series of trials at which fighters for the national equality of the Crimean Tatars have been illegally convicted of false charges. Right now in Tashkent a trial of the same stature is being prepared against Enver Mametov, Yuri and Sabri Osmanov, and others. Do not permit them to be judicially repressed. Demand that the trial be public in accordance with the law. Demand and get a public trial, go to it en masse, and do not permit the courtroom to be packed with a specially chosen audience. Courtroom representatives of the Crimean Tatar people must be seated in the courtroom.

To the brave and unbending fighters for national equality, to Alexei Kostyorin, to the successes of the Crimean Tatar people, and to a reunion in the Crimea, in the reestablished Crimean Autonomous Republic!493

Appendix B:

Letter of 17 (March 1968)

Dear our citizens! Vatandaslar!

In May, it will be 24 years that our nation is on the soil of brotherly Uzbekistan.

You know that the re-location of Tatars from Crimea was not done by the hands of the party, but it was one of the most terrible events of the period of cult of personality. It is necessary to note that we the Crimean Tatars, having been in Uzbekistan, from the first day met with the warmest attitude from the heart on the part of the local population. The Uzbek nation treated us with understanding and sincere feelings towards a brother or a friend who fell in trouble. The workers of Uzbekistan demonstrated great magnanimity and nobility, for which we are immensely grateful. Our nation feels itself equally treated and beloved member of hospitable and friendly family of nations of Uzbekistan.

….However among us, there are other elements according to whom Uzbekistan for the Crimean Tatars represent …a foreign land. This…group of irresponsible people, under the pretense of “advocates of Tatar people”...shamelessly accused of our party and its Central committee with different crimes…These…adventurists and politicians..strive to demonstrate allegedly the culture of Tatar nation cannot develop in Uzbek Republic.

…Vatandaslar! Don’t believe in renegades! The interests of those adventurists are different than the interests of our nation.

…In economic, cultural respects Soviet Uzbekistan constitutes one of the most powerful, prospering republics of soviet East.

…We got used to Uzbekistan and its honorable people. Spiritual and natural beauty of this wonderful republic fascinates us.

Leaving Uzbekistan and relocating massively to Crimea would be a new tragedy for our nation, especially for the people of middle and old ages. To leave that was earned with a lot of work in the course of 40 years and relocate another place for some part of the population for example the youth could be …romantic. But for the nation that “romanticism” could turn out to be very difficult.

Do not believe in those…who does not understand the real conditions of returning to Crimea…who strive to create separation for for existing undamageable friendship between Uzbek and Tatars, between nationalists of republic. Don’t give them money for their provocations…

Central Committee of Communist Party of Uzbekistan and administration of the republic strives for further development of culture of the Tatar people.
In 1957, the Crimean Tatar ensemble of song and dance was founded. From May 1957, the newspaper “Lenin Bayrağı” in Crimean Tatar language is published (an organ of Central Committee of Communist Party of Uzbekistan Presidium of High Soviet and soviet Ministers) Among the Writers’ Union of Uzbekistan, there is a section of Crimean Tatar literatures. Important measures are taken in public education to teach Tatar children their mother tongue.

In relation to that course books are being prepared. In the pedagogical institute of Tashkent a special department for preparation pedagogical cadres for teaching Tatar language and literature is being founded. …

……Novels, poetry of Crimean Tatars writers and poets was published. It was planned to enlarge the member of ensemble to 70 people in order to form a national theatre. In universities and high education thousands of Crimean Tatar young boys and girls exist.

……All these facts demonstrate that Tatar nation integrated to the life of the republic and everyday strengthens its friendship with many other nationalities settled in Uzbekistan…September Edict (1967) Pres…resolved the question decisively, cleaned the accusations of Crimean Tatars and opened new wide perspectives for further development of national culture…
Appendix C:
Open Letter of Russian Friends of Crimean Tatars

The Crimean Tatars are judged. In Uzbekistan one lawsuit follows another. They judge the Crimean Tatars. For what they judge them? Let's remember how the Crimean tatars came to be in Central Asia.

In April 1944, Soviet Army liberated Crimea from Germans. In the night of 18th of May the Crimean Tatars, in cities and villages each in their homes met with automatic weapons. “15 minutes for packing. Only take those which you can carry”

This is how the expelling of the Crimean Tatars began from Crimea…

…This was a way towards slow death in baggage train. …This roadtrip took 3-4 weeks…They carried red partisans of Crimea, fighters of Bolshevik underground…

…They brought the Crimean Tatars in reservations in Ural, Kazakhstan and mainly in Uzbekistan. This is how these people emerged in Uzbekistan. The deportation ended but the extermination of nation just began.

Local population which received propaganda from the authorities welcomed the new settlers with sullen estrangement. The foreign land welcomed them with burning sun, malaria, and dirty water, which after freshest Crimean water created in hungry and weakened people diseases. After living in barracks…more humane life strted. Later with a lot of work they built new homes. However this all happened later. And in 1944-1945 many died in exile settlements. …

…As such in one and a half year, less than half of the Crimean tatars dies often corpses lying among the living.

This was a genocide, nation-killing. Genocide! The death among the Crimean Tatars reached to 46%.

In the year 1956…Edict of the Presidium of High Soviet of USSR appeared with regards to the Crimean Tatars and several other nationalitiesrecognizing genocide. In the first part…

“special settlers to be liberated from administrative obligations of the organs of MVD”

In the second part…

“…the removal of limitations from special settlers …does not involve return of property, confiscated before relocation and they do not have right to return to places where they were departed from”

At that time the struggle of the Crimean Tatar people for full rehabilitation …and right to return to homeland began.
'everything was done to eradicate all traces of the national life of the Crimean Tatars and even memory of their existence. Their houses were demolished and their vines and orchards allowed to become wild and overgrown. The Crimean Tatars’ cemeteries were ploughed up and their ancestors’ remain torn out of the ground…Everything written and printed in the Crimean tatar language was burned, from ancient manuscripts to the classics of Marxism-Leninism. The history of the Crimea was falsified by hacks with diplomas’ (translated by Robert Conquest, p. 107, Nation killers)

But the Crimean Tatar movement for national rebirth enlarged everyday.

Edict of the Presidium of High Soviet of USSR on 5 September 1967 rehabilitated, finally the Crimean tatar nation removing the hardest accusation of betrayal. But in that the question of return was avoided.

…it is as if the Crimean Tatar people have never existed with its territory, language, culture and statehood.

In thousands and thousands of letters to authorities …there is one wish: “Return us to homeland!”

Organized return to Crimea (in the course of few years) compact settlement and rise of autonomy – these are most just demands of the Crimean Tatars who “laid roots in Uzbekistan.”

Those whom those demands are directed, apparently decided the restless people to “lay roots” that is in fact cutting their roots as a nation. What they mean is not physically cutting roots just as in Stalin’s period, but cutting roots ethnically, strong assimilation and artificial preservation of conditions through which the national language, national culture and national traditions die.

….All documents which include information about natural movement of the Crimean Tatars …is regarded by local authorities as document of anti-soviet content and including criminal nature and those who prepare and keep those documents are adjudicated ….Peaceful demonstrations and meetings of the Crimean Tatars are regarded as “massive disorder” …they disperse them, beat them …and put in vans [to take to headquarters]

And anew arrests and courts after courts…

Moscow, January 1969.
Appendix D:
Letter of A.D. Saharov to Brezhnev about self-immolation of Crimean Tatar Musa Mamut

4 July 1978

“Crimean Tatar Cemilev spent many years of his life for the struggle for the restoration of civil rights of the Crimean Tatar people and their return to the historical homeland, to Crimea...now, after at the end of expired period in prison, he was anew sent to the court due to the accusation of anti-Soviet propaganda...It is clear that they are scared of letting Cemilev to freedom....I apply, first of all, my colleagues, historians in the USSR and in other countries, to the historians due to their professional obligation who ought to support the fire of truth, which was lit by Prometheus...Let’s rise to support Cemilev, Bukovski, Superfin, Kovaliev and others...” (April 1976, Aleksandr Nekrich) (Nakazannye narody, 1976, Khrinika. New York, S. 169)

Only with this feeling [Ukrainian nationalism] can we explain [Khrushchev’s] arbitrary decision to give Crimea to Ukraine... It is known that Crimea in fact voluntarily joined with Russia and its indigenous people—the Crimean Tatars more than 200 years ago chose to be together with the fate of Russian people...need to correct Khrushchev’s mistake…” (Deportavani, 401-402)

During the ten years the Crimean Tatars were under a special settlement regime, no collective dissent was observed, for dissent is impossible in absolute totalitarianism. The Crimean Tatar and other dissident movements budded only when the absolute hegemony of Stalinism began to be challenged by the formerly Stalinist actors themselves three years after Stalin’s death. Khrushchev who succeeded Stalin, denounced Stalin’s deportation of small nationalities, and proclaimed an attempt to “return” to a Leninist master frame with respect to nationalities policy, as well as other areas during his “secret speech” in the 20th Party Congress (1956):

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are crude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations, together with all Communists and Komsomols without any exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations. (Conquest 1970, 144)

This created a discursive opportunity for dissent, thereby the emergence of alternative frames which attempt to extend the master frame. The Crimean Tatar collective return frame was one of the frames that emerged, which aimed to extend the communist frame. The Crimean Tatars suggested a “Leninist” interpretation of communism, which recognized the “rights of self-determination.” This frame contributed to the emergence of the diaspora movement.

There were differences in emphases, or the strategies, sometimes depending on the personal circumstances, and KGB’s pressure on a certain leader. KGB not only openly repressed the leaders through prison and lager terms but also psychologically examined them, found their personal weaknesses, and tried every way to break them.

494 See chapter 3 for master frame extension
A few thousands of Crimean Tatars remained in the foreign countries after the Second World War. Most of them were the forced labourer brought by the Germans to Germany and the prisoners of war. Some of them were given to the Sviets after the War and were sent to Soviet extermination camps.

Our diaspora in the United States of America and in a few other American states were our people who went there from Germany, Austria and Turkey after the Second World War. The fact that they were dispersed, they did not have any schools in mother-tongue, mixed marriages caused assimilation and their melting in other nations. However, despite all these situations, despite their separation from their own people by the 'iron curtain' our diaspora contributed significantly to our National Cause.

Many novels of Cengiz Dağcı who lives in London, the active work of Crimean Tatar representatives in the 'Promethean' organization founded in Paris, and later in Antibolshevik Nations Union centred in Munich, the movements of the 'Crimean National Center' led by Cafer Seydahmet, ten years of publication of Emel first in Romania and then in Turkey, years of publication of 'Dergi' edited by Edige Kırmal and his book 'Der Nationale Kampf Der Kırımataren' ('The National Moment of the Crimean Tatars') and his many articles, the many years of publication of 'Crimean Review' by Mübeyyin Batu Altan in the United States, the movement of Crimean Tatar National Center in New York led by Fikret Yurter and rahmetli Mehmet Sevdiyar, the movements of political and cultural organizations founded by the Crimean Tatars in many countries, many journals publishd by them –all these, certainly, contributed greatly to the maintenance of at least part of our cultural properties, and national civilization, and maintenance of national identity of at least part of our diaspora, and communication of our national problem to the world. We are, of course, very grateful all these co-ethnics…”

mcemilev(Mübeyyin Altan to Kırım, show details 6/8/09)
Appendix F:

The Declaration of the World Crimean Tatar Congress (22 May 2009, Simferopol)

We, as the representatives of the 162 civil society and social political organizations in 1 countries of the world of the World Crimean Tatar Congress, came together in Crimea, the historical homeland of the Crimean Tatar people.

Based on the following:

- The rights of the Crimean Tatar people to fully realize the rights and freedoms recognized by the Statute of United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the norms of the international law related to peoples’ and human rights
- Expressing incredible worry because of the lack of robust change in a positive direction on the subject of the return of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people on their own land Crimea
- Being aware of the direct danger of prolonging the acceptance of immediate and efficient solutions for the political, economic and cultural development of the Crimean Tatar people
- Being sure of the fact that the return of the Crimean Tatars people's rights will contribute the development of harmonious relations between Ukraine and Crimea's local people which will be founded on cooperation and based on the principle of justice, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and honesty.
- Understanding that the removal of the consequences of the genocide committed against the Crimean Tatar people on 18 May 1944, and the exile continued for tens of years is not possible only by Ukraine's efforts, and therefore this must be the topic of special attention and guardianship of the UN, European Council, European Union and other international organizations
- Carrying great will for providing greatest help for the strengthening of peace and understanding among the world peoples and nations, and the development of mutual understanding, cooperation and friendship between Ukraine and the countries where the civil society organizations of the Crimean Tatars operate.
- Aiming for the goal of directing all power, energy and knowledge for the benefit of Crimea and for Crimean Tatar people's freely determination of its own political status and freey realization of its won economic, social and cultural development.

WE DECLARE THE BELOW:

- The establishment of "World Crimean Tatar Congress" organization as the organ unifying the Crimean Tatar organizations which were founded in various countries and declared their will to mutually cooperate on the basis of the principles, goals and duties expressed in this declaration.
- The location of the central organs of the World Crimean Tatar Congress is Crimea, Ukraine.

WE STATE:
• The Crimean Tatar Qurultay and its organs are the highest authorized representative organ of the Crimean tatar people for the World Crimean Tatar Congress and the Crimean Tatar organizations that joined the World Crimean Tatar Congress with the principle of equality and respect regardless of their numbers or the country or region where they operate.
• The Crimean Tatar Qurultay and its organs, and authorized personnel develop relations based on principle of equality and respect with the Crimean Tatar organizations that joined the World Crimean Tatar Congress regardless of their numbers or the country or region where they operate.

WE ACKNOWLEDGE:

• Our all efforts that we show for the benefit of the Crimean Tatar People is based on the principle of non-violence, justice, democracy, and strict observation of the economic, cultural, religious and other legal rights of all people regardless of their nationality.

Accepted in on 22 May 2009 in Akmescit [Simferopol] Crimea.
Appendix G: Mustafa Kemal’s conversation with Hasan Sabri Ayvazov

The following is an excerpt from Hakan Kırmılı’s article “Kırım’da ve İdil-Ural bölgesinde açık ve Türkiye’den giden yardım (1921-1922)” (Kırmılı 2011, 940-941): “The third meeting of Ayvazov and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was held at Mr. Midhat’s home. Yunus Nadi Bey [Abalıoğlu], the owner of Anadoluda Yenigün (The New Day at Anatolia) and the poet Aka Gündüz were at this meeting. At this meeting where political matters were discussed, Ayvazov was asked by the Head of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, to provide information about the importance of the Crimean Tatar national independence movement between 1917 and 1918. Mustafa Kemal Pasha who listened to what Ayvazov had told said that:

Your leaders, who had been influenced by the Tsarist officers, made a big mistake to fight against the Bolsheviks. This mistake should be a great lesson for the leaders who had precipitated the unfortunate Tatar into a war against the Bolsheviks. Four years have passed since this mistake was made in 1918 and two years have passed since the foundation of Soviet administration in Crimea. I thought that, in the meantime, unexperienced leaders of the previous era had had opportunity to examine the Bolshevik nationalities policy and to work together with them. As far as I know, the Bolshevik plan has a very wide range, and in the terms of nationality policy, they have enabled all national minorities to develop their own culture and literature, to improve the economy, and etc. I believed that in Crimea, peaceful common working life was established. In Crimea, with the Communist Party and under the Soviet administration, all nationalities gained stability. I believe that the Crimean Tatars forgot tyranny of the Tsarist era, economical deprivation and other hardships and all of them are satisfied thanks to these opportunities given by the Soviet administration. But, according the information I received, among Tatar leaders, some, whom I call as little people, don’t approve of the Soviet rule, they emigrate from the country and make propaganda against the Soviet rule. Among these dissident emigrants, there is one Crimean delegate who was given very important duties between 1917-18, and caused the destruction of the Tatar people. This delegate, whose name I don’t want to tell, (Hasan Sabri Ayvazov denotes that the name is Cafer Seydahmet) dreams that new young Turkey would ask the Soviet Government to grant Crimea full autonomy and make it one of Soviet Union republics. On the one hand, it is a utopia and it means destruction of Tatar people, on the other hand, New Turkey’s demanding from the Soviet Union to give Crimea something would definitely destroy the friendship and relationships with the Soviet Union. This little group of dissidents should understand that the old Russia or the Turkey of Sultans does not exist anymore. The new Turkey and the new Russia signed a friendship pact. We followed a policy to protect the friendship forever and we will continue doing this. We are going to take all steps to make the friendship between Russia and Turkey more powerful and deep. The opponents of Soviet government should give up and leave their dream which is utopian, impossible and at this period very harmful! These dissidents don’t approve the New Turkey either, actually nobody flirts with them, except the representatives of the Old Turkey. For now, we don’t make any attempts towards these emigrants, but they are not going to find any hospitality in Ankara. In Istanbul they feel free. However, as soon as we send the Allies from our capital city, which will happen soon, we will deal with both our and your dissidents. We know how to handle our dissidents; as for the emigrants, we will ask them to act thoughtfully and
rationally and offer them to become Turkish citizens and give them a short time to do it, otherwise we will ask them to leave Turkey.”
Sources:

1. Fieldwork in Crimea:

Interviews:

Participants of the national movement:
Mustafa Cemilev (Kırımoglu) Meclis president and the leader of the Crimean Tatar people
Timur Dağcı
Aydıne Seytmuratova
İzzet Khairov
Erecep Hayreddinov
İdris Asanin
Cemile Şamilova
Milara Settarova
İsmail Kerimov (Head of the Dept of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature at the “Crimean Tatar University” KGPU)
Rıza Fazıl (former writer of Lenin Bayrağı and Yıldız, Crimean Tatar periodicals in the Soviet era)
Adile Emirova (scholar in language and literature)

Shorter interviews in the course of participant observation:

Seyran Suleyman (youngest accomplished writer using Crimean Tatar language)
Rustem Khayali (historian)
Rustem Eminov (artist)
Servet Kakura (Head of Kaytarma, the Crimean Tatar Dance and Music Ansamble)
Dilaver Bekirov (Musician)
Refat Kurtiyev (Historian, anthropologist)
Mehmet Kangiyev (Head of formerly Turkish-Crimean Tatar high school)
Eldar Seytbekirov (Editor and publisher of Golos Kryma),
İsmet Yüksel (Unofficial representative of diaspora in Crimea, consultant to Mustafa Cemilev)
İsmet Şeyhzade (Artist)
Aydıne Şemizade (writer, son of Crimean Tatar prominent writer Esref Semizade)
Muniver Useinova (Koshkeldi)
Esma Hayreddinova
Gaffur Topuz
Kurtcemil Suleymanov
Valeriy Vozgrin (2001, St Petersburg)

Participant Observation:

- Stayed in Simferopol and Bağçasaray
Simferopol:

- 2006 national elections were upcoming. Visit to electoral office(shtab) Nariman Habibullayev, visiting Simferopol reporting back from local electoral region
- Visited the demonstrators for land demands in Alushta region in Lenin square
- Attended Ukrainian multiculturalism commission’s poetry day, listened late Crimean Tatar poet Yunus Kandim’s poetry
- Visit to the OKND office
- Visit to the government office for Deported Nationalities at Lenin Square
- Visit to TIKA, Turkish government’s aid office. Had conversation with Tatars from diaspora, who “returned” and tried to settle in Crimea
- Attended Navrez (national holiday)celebrations at Khoskeldi, a new Crimean Tatar settlement at Simferopol region. Fevzi Aliyev and sons, prominent musicians performed. Remzi İlyasov, a member of the Meclis gave a speech on upcoming elections
- Attended several Qurultay-Meclis evaluation and discussion sessions after elections open to citizens
- Visited the Crimean Tatar Meclis, including the Meclis leader at his office, and head of its economic department (Crimean Fund) and its library and newspaper, Avdet.
- Went to the Crimean Tatar concert of modern music at the Lenin Square
- Went to Crimean Tatar play “Milletim” (My nation) “Dubaralı Toy” in the Crimean Tatar National Theatre
- Visited KGPU, Dept of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature and Dept of Turkish Language and Literature several times and had conversations with professors Dilara Abibulllayeva, Nariman Abdulvahap, R. Kurtseitov, Nariman Seytyahya, Enver Özenbaşlı, worked in the library, presented in a conference (5-7 May) on Crimean Tatar language and history; presented on my research topic on the 28 April to the students of the Dept, answered questions, and met Enise Abibullayeva, Ulker Musayeva, and Ph.D students Eldar Seydahmet, Uriye Kadir, and Ediye Kangiyeva
- Visit to Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea, and interview with Nadir Bekirov
- Visited village Ukromnoye and observed a picket for land (uchastka) between Simferopol and Ukromnoye
- Visited historical Kebir Mosque and spoke with the imam
- Attended the memorial for the anniversary of İsmail Gasprinskiy’s 155th birthday in front of his statue at Salgir
- Visited the “Ukrainian” Vernadskiy Tavricheskiy National University
- Visited “Maarifci”, the Association of Crimean Tatar Teachers, and interviewed with Safure Kadzametova
- Visited newspapers Yani Dunya, Golos Krima, Kirim, Crimean news agency and spoke with Seyran Suleyman, Eldar Seytbekirov, Bekir Mamutov, and
- Attended Namus organization meeting, and conversation with Meryem Özenbaşlı
- Visited the tent of Azatlıq demonstrators at Lenin Square and attended Azatlıq meeting with Nadir Bekirov, Sinaver Qadirov, Ayder Mustafaev and Eskender Bariyev
• Worked in the İsmail Gasprinskiy Crimean Tatar Library; attended to a launch of the book “Deportatsiya” at Crimean Tatar library, listened Ayshe Seytmuratova; saw an exhibition on A.Ihsan Kırmılı, the diaspora leader.
• Visited Ayshe Seytmuratova’s Merhamet Evi, nursing home for Crimean Tatar elderly.
• Attended Seydahmet Seydahmetov remembrance day and listened Nadir Bekirov, prof. Şefika Abdurrahmanova and veterans of national movement.
• Attended Zamfira Hasanova, movement veteran’s jubilee
• Attended meetings of Qardashlıq, youth organization for rejuvenation of Crimean Tatar culture. Met Erik Kudusov
• Visited the temporary building of the Crimean Tatar museum, interviewed shortly with its officials and saw its new site.
• Visited art exhibition of Rustem Eminov, interviewed with the artist, and observed the reactions of visitors, including the Russians
• Observed 9 May celebrations by the Ukrainian and Crimean organizations at Lenin Square
• Attended Mustafa Cemilev’s meeting with youth and answering their questions at KGPU
• Participated in 18 May- Day of Deportation march, made a short speech, met Şefika Konsul, a prominent veteran of the national movement
• Listened speeches at the Lenin Square, including that of Cemilev, Mufti, Gülnara Bekirova, Celal İçten from diaspora.
• Visited Ocaq Crimean Tatar Latin alphabet publication house
• Visited Crimean Tatar Women’s League (Kırım Tatar Hanimlar Ligası)
• Listened Ablaziz Veliyev’s speech on Ahmet Khan Sultan Day at KGPU. Had conversation with Mustafa Mustafaev
• Visited Bizimqırım recruitment meeting led by Hasan Egizov
• Visited Crimean ethnographic museum (Kraevedcheskii) and spoke to a main official (Laptov) with Ulker Musayeva
• Visited Crimean Tatar settlements Marino, Fontana (Borcokrak), Kamenka, and Koshgeldi. Short interviews with the veterans of the national movement who gave me tour of Fontana, explained its history and showed personal archives: Kazım Cebbarov, Muslim Seydahmet, Seyityahya Bilalov, Rasim Bekirov, Arsen Alcikov
• Conversations in marketplace where Tatars work
• Lived with Crimean Tatar families in Simferopol and Bağçasaray. Was invited to several Crimean Tatar homes for informal gatherings and had conversations about the memories of deportation.
• Watched two Crimean Tatar elementary school students compete in Crimea-wide gymnastics competition

Bağçasaray
• Ceremony in front of the Gasprinskiy Monument at the entrance of Bağçasaray, listened İlmi Umerov give a speech.
• Visited Zincirli Medrasah and Gasprinskiy’s and Khans’ tombs in its yard
• Attended a conference for 155th year of birth of Gasprinskiy at his restorated publishing house, listened Gankevich, Mueddinov, Kerimov present, saw exhibition of Crimean Tatar artist Ramiz Netovkin
• Visited Khan’s Palace, and its archive
• Visited the Rebirth of Crimea Foundation, a civil society initiative of rejuvenating Crimean Tatar culture, with projects such as language, journalism and traditional crafts and interviewed its head, Lutfi Osman.
• Visited village Fotisala, and several Crimean Tatar homes, interviewed national movement participant Cemile Şamilova
• Visited Russian-English high school at Tankovoe village with Tatar headmaster, teachers and students (previously Fethullah Gülen’s)
• Visited the Crimean Tatar house-museum at Kokulus village operated by Renat Seranayev
• Research for three days at Cemilev’s private archive with guidance of Elvedin Chubarov

Yevpatoria (Gözleve)
• Visited Cuma Camii
• Visited and ethnic festival and exhibition on Crimean Tatar, Karaim and Kirimchak culture at the Yevpatoriya Museum
• Visited a Crimean Tatar home, and had interviews about the memories of deportation

Alushta
• Opening of the Crimean Tatar Deportation Museum –Conversation with visitors Dilaver Şabanov, Ayşe Dibartsieva, Muniver Useyinova Nariman Habibullaev
• Visited a local mosque
• Participated in Hıdırellez (national holidays) in a “sacred place” at the Korbek village near Alushta, and listened speeches of Muhtar Ibrahim, Zamfıra Asanova, and İzzet Khairov. Had conversations with participants, and Bizimqirim organization leader, Abdurrahman Egiz.

Eskikırım
• Visited a Crimean Tatar home, and life history interviews
• Visited the Crimean Tatar school and ethnographic museum
• Visited the Crimean Khanate and Golden Horde historical remnants

Sudak
• Visited the Crimean Tatar school
• Visited Karakaplan, the Crimean Tatar national sport society and spoke with Timur Mansurov
• Visited a project site for Crimean Tatar children’s summer camp
Cankoy

- Visited the Crimean Tatar school at Kalay (Azovskoe) and interviewed with Nariman Reşitov, its headmaster. Participated in a class in Crimean Tatar. Watched the spectacle of primary school students in Crimean Tatar at Cankoy.
- Interviewed with former national movement participants Hasan Bekirov, and Fahri İlyasov at Suleyman Café, a Crimean Tatar restaurant. Also life history interviews with Fatma İbrahimova, Yunus Yusupov, Naile Osmanova, Hanefi Abkerimov, Söyün Süleyman.

Yalta

- Visited marketplace where Tatar worked.

Sevastopol

- Visited Second World War monuments
- Observed that there is no Tatar presence felt in the city.

2. Fieldwork in Romania:

Interviews:

Enver Mahmut (Professor of Tatar Language and Literature since the communist era, graduate of Madgidia Seminary)
Nihat Osman (teacher, graduate of Tatar language and literature)
Necat Sali (former MP)
Amet Aladin (MP)
Orhan İbraim (one of the founders of Tatar Union)
Nariman İbraim (editor of women’s supplement of Karadeniz)
Mustafa Sevim (Head of women’s organizations)
Menan Samir (member of Madgidia city council representing Tatar Association)
Zulfiye Seydali
Bebin Bektaş (teacher)
Server Bavbek
Ekrem Gaffar
Müftü Murat Yusuf
Hagi Mehmet Chemaleddin
Tekin Amet
Cemak Boşnag
Zemine Bektemir
Raime Nasip Ali
Cevdet Turan
Suat Kerim Ali (Second World War veteran)

Life history interviews:
Cheane Menisa
Aziz Seydali
Zekiye Emurla
Rubiye Kurtamet
Ali Aihan
İzzet Kocaahmet
Medet Nezir (former Bucharest Mosque imam, took asylum in Canada, living in Toronto)
Sali and Bedriye Canbek (oldest couple in Romania at the time, born in 1914 at Karaibil village at the Danube Delta)

Romania- Part I.

- Stayed in Agigea and Constanza with Tatar families
- Visited Tatar settlements around Mankalia and Cobadin, visited former and present Tatar villages. (Keraci, Deldiruj, Kacamak, Kastel, Asagi Bulbul, Calmagea, Kacamak, Bayramdede and Topraisar)
- Visited Tatar Union, listened Saladin Acakay’s speech, participated in the sessions for speeches for the election of Tatar Union leaders, shortly interviewed with the staff of Karadeniz and Caş newspapers, read Union bylaws and documents by assistance of Hagi Mehmet Chemaleddin. Met Altay Kerim, writer and Ali Bekmambet, veteran of the pre-WWII and WWII national movement at the Tatar Union, and Cevdet Celal whose family was persecuted in the communist era, and Cemal Boşnag, a Tatar historian.
  - Met Tatars from Turkey and Canada visiting the Tatar Union
  - Participated in Tatar Union’s guided tour of the branches at Hasancea, Besarabi, Vala Dacilor, Valula Traian, M. Kogolniceau and Eforie Nord and Sud and Mankalia. Conversation with several members of the Tatar branch at Hasancea including Leula Emurla, Naide Emurla, Remziye Asan, Aïşe Abibula. Conversation with Uruziye Boşnag at Valea Dacilor branch. Conversation with Urfet Nubin, Remziye Bektaş, Bünyan Şakir, Samir Menan, Ghiulsen İsmail, Ghiulsen Salami at Medgidia Branch.
  - Attended a conference on “The thraces of Turkish culture in Romania” organized by Turkish Folkloric research Institution (6-0 September, 2005) Met, and listened speeches of Nedret and Enver Mahmut, Rustem Seita, Emel Emin, Ekrem Gaffar, Mustafâ Memet
  - Attended a festival of Crimean Music, Dance, and National Costume, and participated in the youth meetings at Mamaia. Conversation with Tatars from Bulgaria, especially Hoshgun Ahmed Nasuf the president of the Bulgarian Tatars, as well as several Tatar youth
  - Visited Kral Camii, the mosque built by the Romanian king for Tatars and other Muslims
  - Visited Constanța branch, and conversation with the president Ablez Aydın and members
  - Observed a Crimean Tatar wedding
  - Research at Biblioteca Județeană I.N. Roman in Romanian sources by assistance of Denis Mologani.
  - Visit Tatar villages around Eforie sud and Eforie Nord, Mankalia, Keraci, Deldiruj, Kacamak, Castel, Bulbul, former Calmagea, Kacamak, Bayramdede and Topraisar, and Visited historical Esma Sultan Mosque
  - Visited Crimean Tatar restaurant Kırmı and museum
• Attended a Crimean Tatar wedding at Taiba organization, funded by Arab states to propagate their view of Islam
• Life history interview with elderly Crimean Tatar family from village Alakapı, a teacher couple in the communist times. Murvet and Fikriye Omer
• Attended a regular meeting of the members of the Constanta Branch. Ablez Aydın, Mustafa Sevim, Hacı Memet Chemaleddin, Kurtnoyan Varol, Ömer Erol, Erol Menadil, Denis Mologani, Lahme Geamil, Melek Osman, Denisa Menasan, Dinçer Geafer.

Romania II

• Stayed with Tatar families at Cobadin, Valea Dacilor, Lumina, Tulcea and Madgidia.
• Joined tour of the branches with Sevim Mustafa in her organizational work. Conversation with Guler Borumbay, Melahat Cumay and Mübliye Derşamet at Kanara; Seicahmet Umirah, Coçşura Vaspie, Azis Zulpie, Seicahment Munire, Riza Aerie, Mamut Sera, Becemir Genan, Seicahmet Ferida, Seicahmet Vildan at Kogolniceau (Karamurat) Kokoy Niran, Rozakay Neriman, Koşay Kadir, Kurtnazaz Sadiye, Molagazi Evel at Lumina (Kocalı).
• Visited several Tatar homes in Constanta, Medgidiya, ValaDacilor
• Research at the Tatar Union Branch at Medgidia
• Visit to newly built mosque in Tatar district and historical Abdulmecid Mosque at Medgidia
• Visited Crimean Tatar businesses
• Visited Tuna Vakfı for education of Muslims that belongs to Fethullah Gülen.
• Research in the Biblioteca Municipală Medgidia with assistance of Belghin İbram.
• Visited Kemal Atatürk Lisesi
• Visited ruins of historical Medgidia Seminary
• Visited Cobadin mosque and public library
• Visit to Cobadin Tatar cemetery and Casa tradițională „Zulfie Totay“ ethnographic museum
• Visited Mustafa Memet, the leader of Turkish Association at Cobadin
• Attended a Crimean Tatar wedding at Cobadin
• Attended a Tatar national sport “Kureş” festival at Eforie Nord Beach.

Visited Turkish Union Ervin İbrahim Constanta Turkish Association
• Visited Tatar and Turkish associations at Tulcea
• Visited Turkish Union at Constanta
• Attended Tatar Union meetings

3. Fieldwork in Turkey:

Interviews:

Prof. Halil İnalcık
General Center Members:
Zafer Karatay
Nail Aytar
Namık Kemal Bayar
Ümit Yüksel
Tuncer Kalkay
Niyazi Altıok (İstanbul)
Ahmet Gökdemir
Ertugrul Karaş
Ertuğrul (Ceyhan)
(Kaman)
Celal İçten (İstanbul)
Saim Osman Karahan (scholar, 60s immigrant from Romania)

Members of Independent Associations:
Ünsal Aktaş (Ankara)
Muzaffer Akçora
Adnan Süyen
Cengiz Kırgız
Giray Karalezli (Konya)
Ferruh Ayhün
Kemal Capraz

Life history interviews:
Sukurzade Gungorem
Cudi Ağıral
İhsan Tekin
Servet Yüksel
Yüksel Sönmez
Osman Nuri Çaglar
Adeviye Oral
Sabri Arıkan
Nurettin Mahir Altuğ
Yetkin Tetik
Mesut Ör
Recep Şen
Yalkın Bektöre

Previously
Hakan Kırımlı
Zuhal Yüksel
Ahmet İhsan Kırımlı
Necip Ablemitoğlu
İsmail Otar
Sami Nogay

- Stayed with my own Crimean Tatar family in Polatlı, hosted two Crimean Tatar students visiting from Crimea shortly
- Visited Crimean Associations in Polatlı, Ankara, Eskişehir, İzmit, Bursa, Konya, Kaman, Ceyhan, İstanbul, and Nevşehir, conversations with members and participated in various events, Ankara Association youth
- Traveled to several Crimean Tatar villages in Polatlı, and Eskişehir, and researched their population records, and conducted life history interviews accompanying Dr. Hakan Kırmızı. Traveled to several villages at Ceyhan and conducted life history interviews.
- Participated in tepreş in Polatlı (Eskipolatlı), Toydemir, Karakaya (Eskişehir), İzmit
- Visit to “İsmail Gaspıralsı” monument in Eskişehir
- Visited “Çiborek Evi”, Crimean Tatar restaurant-museum in Eskişehir
- Conducted research at the İstanbul Association Library donated mainly by Müstecip Ülküsal and Ali Kemal Gökgiray, and participated in the launch of Crimean Tatar documentary and Friday conferences at the association. Met Crimean Tatar female domestic workers who stayed in the hostel of the association. Interviewed Celal İçten. Had conversations with Özgür Karahan and Timur Berk, who published Bahçesaray, organized the youth, and prepared the internet pages.
- Conducted research at the İsmail Otar private library, and interviewed İsmail Otar (earlier)
- Visited to Turkish National Library, TTK, Bilkent and Gazi University Libraries at Ankara
- Visited KÖK Social and Strategic Research Foundation, which published Kırım for a certain period (earlier)
- Visited İsmail and Aysegul Aydıngün, who wrote a book on the Crimean Tatars and Kürtşat Çağiltay about a project on Crimean Tatar digital archives
- Visited Emel Foundation building.
- Presented at a conference on the Crimean Tatar identity organized by Ceyhan Crimean Tatars at Ceyhan. Traveled several Tatar villages around Ceyhan. Visited Ceyhan Crimean Tatar association and interviewed with members Ertuşğul. Had conversations with Murat Kandemir, İsmail Taymaç, Dr. Fatih Karayandi and young members. Visited Tatar homes in the Tatar neighborhoods of Ceyhan and made life history interviews with the elderly.

4. Fieldwork in the USA:

Interviews:
Fikret Yurter
Mübeyyin Altan
İnci Bowman
Seytahmet Kırmızı
Sefik Gurdemir
Süleyman Sarana

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USA I
- Stayed in Tatar home at Brooklyn
- Visited Crimean Tatar neighborhood in Brooklyn, visited Crimean Tatar homes and conducted life history interviews with elderly
- Visited Crimean Tatar Association. Conversation with Rustem Borluca and members and helped them prepare invitations for upcoming holiday celebration
- Observed Crimean Tatar praying

USA II
- Stayed in Tatar home at Long Island
- Visited Crimean Tatar neighborhood at Queens, and Brooklyn. Conducted life history interview with İbrahim Altan, who were born in Crimea, participated in nationalist movement during the WWII, became Ostarbeiter and finally immigrated to the United States.
- Visit to Crimean Tatar cemetery and monument for Crimean Tatar deportation at Long Island
- Visit to New York Public Library for Prof. Edward Allworth’s donated documents
- Conducted research for two days at Fikret Yurter’s private archive

Other
- Email to Rafet Karanlık, West Europe Crimean Tatar association (Bati Avrupa Kirim Tatar Dayanisma ve Kultur Merkezi) at Giessen, Germany.
- Participation in Crimean Tatar Society’s activities at Toronto
- Interviews with the members of Nogay Association in Turkey. (previously collected data)

5. Periodicals:
Avdet  http://www.avdet.org/tr
Bahçesaray
Birlik 1999-2004 (USA)
Birlik (Ankara)
Birlik (Konya)
Bizimkırım (2003-) http://www.bizimkirim.com/
Crimean News agency  http://qha.com.ua/
Çaş
Çolpan
Dergi
Emel (1930-1939)
Emel (1960-1989)
Emel (Ideal)
Fikirde Birlik
6. Email lists
Crimea-List
Kırımhaber-list [Crimea news list in Turkish]
Yasqirim [Crimean Tatar Youth]
Tatar-List [List of all Tatars in the world]
Icc-List [International Committee of Crimea List]

7. Websites:
http://www.qurultay.org/eng/default.asp (Crimean Tatar Qurultay)
http://qtmm.org/en (Crimean Tatar Meclis)
http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/mustafa.html (On Crimean Tatar culture by SOTA Institute)
http://www.iccrimea.org/ (International Committee of Crimea)
http://www.vatankirim.net/ (On Crimean Tatar history, politics and culture )
http://www.surgun.org/ (On memories and facts of deportation)
http://www.facia.qirimlar.com/ (On Crimean Tatar National Movement)
http://www.ismailgaspirali.org/ (On İsmail Gasprinskiy’s life and works)
http://www.qirim.net/ (Crimean students in Turkey)
http://www.bizimqirim.org/ (Transnational Bizimqirim Association)
www.crimean.org (Youth in Crimea)
http://www.undp.crimea.ua/
http://www.unpo.org/members/7871 (Unrepresented People’s Organization)
http://www.women.qirim.org/start.htm
http://www.hansaray.org.ua/ Khans’ Palace Museum
http://crimeantatarlibrary.blogspot.com/
http://milli-firka.org/language/russian
http://www.qirimmuftiyat.org.ua/ Crimean Muftiate
http://www.qardasliq.org/ Qardasliq Youth Organization
http://www.qirim.kiev.ua/qt/haberler/ Crimean Tatars in Kiev
http://www.tatars-bg.org/ Crimean Tatars in Bulgaria
http://www.tatarworld.com/ Crimean Tatars in Canada
http://www.tatarlar.de/ Crimean Tatars in Germany
http://www.tatar.ro/ Crimean Tatars in Romania
http://www.kirimtatar.com/ Crimean Tatars in Moscow
http://www.kirimdernegi.org.tr/ AND http://www.kirim.net/kn/git.asp?SiteNo=6 General Center of Crimean Tatar Associations (General Center of Crimean Tatar Associations)
http://www.kirimturkleriistanbul.com/ Istanbul Association
www.eskişehirkirimdernegi.com.tr Eskişehir Association
http://www.ceyhankirimturkleri.com/ Ceyhan Association
http://www.polatlikirimdernegi.org/ Polatlı Association
http://kirimny.org/ Crimean Tatars in New York
http://www.kirimavrupa.org/ Crimean Tatars in Europe
http://www.dostkirim.org/ New York Crimean Tatar Charity
http://www.meydan-fm.com/ Crimean Tatar Radio Meydan

http://kelecek-ankara.blogspot.com/ Crimean Tatar youth
Reference List:

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Resmi Materiallardan [From Official Documents], YanıDunya, May 15, 2004:13


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Fatih Karayandı. 2010. Nogay Înce Ali Müfrezesi

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Memedemin, Yaşar. 2001. Karadeniz 105, 6


Menlibay, Ekrem. 1991. Karadeniz 2 (7) :1


Sources in Turkish:


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Kırım Türkleri Milli Kurtuluş Merkezi, 1960, Kırım 17 (5): 92

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Sources in Russian:


Osmanov, O. (‘?). *Musa Mamut: Samosozhzenie- Kak eto bylo? Dokumental'naia Povest'. Simferopol’: Odjak’*


Sources in Bulgarian:


Sources in English:


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