The Muslim Brotherhood in Power: Ideology and Governance in Post-Arab Spring Egypt

by

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Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations
University of Toronto

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Abstract

How does the political ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood evolve prior to reaching power and during Mohammad Morsi’s presidency in Egypt? Questions abound on the nature of the events that led to the uprisings of June 30th, the military coup of July 4th and the vast popular resentment against what was still in 2012 the most popular political movement in Egypt. Critics of the Muslim Brotherhood have mainly accused the movement of pursuing a "hidden agenda" while faking an ideological change oriented toward “moderation”. Nevertheless, my research shows that the EMB’s behaviour during Morsi’s presidency was consistent with the general evolution of the movement’s ideology aimed toward integration in the Egyptian political system.
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Introduction

On July 4th 2013, the Egyptian military and its leader General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi deposed Mohamed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of Egyptian history, after five days of unrests called for by the grass-root movement tamparrud (تامرود, Arabic for “rebel”). The popular unrest that brought about Morsi’s deposition was aimed against his whole government merely a year after he won the presidential election as the candidate sponsored by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) through its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Ironically, the military coup of 2013 outlawed the entire movement after the Arab spring had granted it with the first considerable opportunity to seize power democratically and become a full actor of Egyptian politics in its eighty four years of existence. The EMB hence fell in a political situation reminiscent of the days in which it was violently repressed by the governments of Egypt's autocrats, as it was dragged into violent –and often armed– confrontations with the military regime.

Much debate was raised regarding the manner in which the EMB acted when its candidates were in power through the FJP, and as to the reasons for the popular unrest that ended the EMB's year

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in power\(^2\). At the same time, the EMB has been both vehemently critiqued and praised on national and international levels for some of its political actions, decisions and stances while being a leader of government\(^3\). The movement’s political ideology was one such target of staunch criticism as some considered that the movement had a “hidden agenda” and was pragmatically hiding its true ideology by acting more “moderate” than its political goals truly were\(^4\). Its political practices were also criticized, as the EMB faced such accusations as that of leading a non-inclusive government through abusing the power granted by the urns, for becoming


growingly authoritarian, and for trying to implement Islamist legislations in a non-consultative manner.

In parallel to severe critiques, the EMB was highly praised on many grounds. As such, many commended the EMB for having implemented what they considered to be a genuine ideological change—sometimes called “metamorphosis”—stemmed in part by its inclusion in Egyptian participatory politics and which oriented the group toward a more “moderate” ideology. Many others expressed admiration as they considered it went the democratic way through its embrace of the electoral process and respected the value of equal citizenship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Egypt.


Questions abound on the nature of the events that led to the uprisings of June 30th, the military coup of July 4th and the vast popular resentment against what was still in 2012 the most popular party in Egypt, yet still very little academic literature is available to account of these events. Even though the literature pertaining to the EMB's ideological evolution as an opposition movement is quite abundant, little has been published on the way its political thinking and its political line of action evolve when it becomes a ruling actor of Egyptian politics. As the EMB has been both in and out of power for the first time of its history, it would be more than relevant to shed light on these very issues. Indeed, studying the evolution and interplay of the EMB's political ideology and its political actions as a ruling actor in Egypt would be an important step toward updating academic understandings of the movement itself. To a certain extent, it would also contribute to a better understanding of the many political movements based on its model in Muslim majority societies.


How does the EMB’s political ideology evolve prior to reaching power and during its year in power in Egypt? Is there a continuum between the EMB's political ideology and its political decisions while in power or does the movement act in a manner that hints at a "hidden agenda" and/or at a "fake" ideological change? What are the movement’s ideological and empirical reactions while in power in regard to the political goals it previously stated? What can be considered to have been the challenges faced by the Morsi government in Egypt? How do these challenges compare to the EMB’s political ideology and what was their role in the popular resentment that led to the toppling of Morsi's government by the military in July 2013? What does it teach us concerning Islamist movements modelled on the EMB in Muslim majority societies and the way we can expect them to evolve and act both ideologically and politically when they are granted power through the ballot box? In other words, are there theoretical lines to be drawn regarding the evolution and development of the EMB's political ideology when in a situation of political power such as the one it enjoys through Morsi's presidency from June 2012 to July 2014?

Critics of the Muslim Brotherhood have mainly accused the movement of pursuing a "hidden agenda" while faking an ideological change oriented toward “moderation”. Nevertheless, my research shows that the EMB’s behaviour during Morsi's presidency was consistent with the general evolution of the movement’s ideology aimed toward integration in the Egyptian political system. In this thesis paper, I argue that the EMB's political ideology went through a change of “ideological line” from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” between a first and second ideological trend in the decades prior to the post-Arab spring elections, something noticeable through five important ideological aspects (I). I also argue that the movement's actions while in power hint at
a consistency with such change as the EMB's political ideology does not evolve on these five important aspects during the movement's leadership of government and has little to do with the socio-political unrest that put an end to Morsi’s government (II). I advocate for the theory that such events are rather reliant on the important political challenges faced by the Brotherhood from the context in which it assumed power, and from its many political opponents whose opposition took shape as both anti-Brotherhood propaganda and contentious actions (III).

In order to make these arguments, I start by establishing the evolution of the EMB's political ideology through the shift of “ideological line” from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” that matches two ideological trends, marked by four historical phases of the movement's history, and noticeable on five important aspects (I). This being done, I analyze some of the EMB's most important political actions as implemented both in order to reach power and when in power, while looking at their official rationale and the criticism they met from proponents of the theory of the “hidden agenda” (II.1.). This allows me to outline such a theory as fallacious of criticism addressed at the EMB as I emphasize the way in which the movement remained consistent with the five important aspects of its political ideology previously discussed (II.2). As I establish that the EMB's political ideology evolves very little while in power, closer analysis also shows that the toppling of the Morsi led government was more reliant on the important political challenges imposed on the Brotherhood in its post-revolutionary position of power in Egypt (III). The vast literature on the EMB's political ideology will be the principal basis of this thesis's first part while newspaper articles and other types of primary sources will form the principal base of this thesis's second part given the recent nature of the events it deals with.
I. The Political Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: From “Anti-Systemism” to “Systemism”

What is the EMB's political ideology and how does it evolve throughout the movement's history? I start by outlining general trends in the movement's ideological evolution by focusing on emphasizing the shift from an “ideological line” of “anti-systemism” to one of “systemism”, noticeable through the two ideological trends and the four historical phases of the EMB's history (1.A). I then analyze the way in which the academic literature has looked at the evolution of the EMB’s political ideology through the main scholarly approach of post-Orientalism studies known as the "participation-moderation" theory and its most recent criticism in what I have called the theory of “influences” (1.B). Following this discussion I outline five important aspects of the EMB's political ideology that outline the gradual shift from an “ideological line” of “anti-systemism” to “systemism” which is noticeable between first and second ideological trends (2).

1. General Trends in the Evolution and Discussion of the EMB’s Political Ideology

A. Generational Ideological and Political Evolution: Two Important Ideological Trends, Four Historical Phases

General trends in the evolution and academic discussion of the EMB's political ideology revolve around the many factors that influenced its development by as early as the group's inception in 1928\(^{10}\). Fitting with what has been called the “first and second generations of Muslim Brothers” in the movement's history are two important ideological trends and four important historical

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\(^{10}\) These are general ideological trends based on the movement's official ideology, even though many of its the ranks and files can often be found to diverge with it more or less openly in words or actions. This does not necessarily mean that the EMB has a "hidden agenda" like what has been claimed by many scholars or observers of the movement and its history but rather that it lacks ideological cohesiveness/homogeneity throughout all its ranks, something which has been pointed at by recent scholarships and recent developments. For the ideological heterogeneity of the movement, see: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013).
phases that follow a shift of “ideological line” from “anti-systemism” to “systemism”. Finally, two important trends can be outlined in the academic discussion of the EMB's political ideology – namely the "participation/moderation" theory and what I have called the theory of “influences”.

The first ideological trend and the two first historical phases of the EMB fit with the prevalence of the first generation of Muslim Brothers at the forefront of the movement in Egyptian society and politics. About this trend, Saad Eddin Ebrahim notes the following:

“Extending from 1928 to the late 1940s, the first phase was one of advocacy and organization-building as the EMB remained fairly small, making it such that only in the 1940s would its membership grow phenomenally thanks to the socioeconomic strains that accompanied the Second World War”¹¹.

It was a time of reflection where the young organization was developing its future ideals, goals, and concentrated mostly on increasing its membership.

Created in 1928 by school professor Hassan al Banna, the Society of the Muslim Brothers was built as an answer to Muslims' torment at the abolition of the Caliphate and the growing replacement of Islamic concepts in Egyptian society by Western type political, educational, and societal precepts. As such, Al Banna stressed the need to build an association aimed at educating the youth about their Islamic culture as he saw the spread of Western educational systems in the Arab world as bound to elude Islamic religious education – something which could in the long run erase their Islamic identity if nothing was done. In a manner very reminiscent of revivalist Islamic movements of the time, he often greatly complained and deplored “the low level of Islamic praxis among the masses and emphasized the need to work for a purer Islam”¹². As such,

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the first works of the organization were aimed at filling "the void caused by the absence of religious education in Western-style schools", something many appreciated as proved by its growing membership at the time\(^\text{13}\).

Following al Banna’s appointment to Cairo, the association moved there with him and started attracting more and more followers while its goals were still to educate young Egyptians about Islam and to provide them with a strong sense of Islamic identity in a context of deep Westernization. The political situation changed quickly after relocating to Cairo as the people’s growing discontent toward the monarchy and the influence of World War II led the Muslim Brotherhood to implement a critical change in its work by gradually moving toward becoming a political movement. Even though al Banna founded it by explicitly declaring it not to be a political party the EMB had already started transforming into a political party at the time\(^\text{14}\). The first period ended with the first strong political involvements in Egyptian politics –which took place under the monarchy and were perpetuated under Nasser– in addition to a strong opposition to ruling powers\(^\text{15}\).

The EMB’s second historical phase was one of frequent and violent confrontations between the young organization and the state that started under the monarchy (1946-50) and extended to Nasser’s revolutionary regime (1954-66)\(^\text{16}\). Even though quite close to Abd-el-Nasser’s original


ideals and even though the Free Officers’ Movement who seized power in 1952 was influenced by the Brotherhood and shared many of its concerns, Nasser’s regime did not support the Ikhwan’s call for sharia rule and viewed the group as a potential rival. The confrontation that ensued were so harsh that many of the EMB leaders were killed, assassinated, or executed in these confrontations, while many more of its members were jailed or imprisoned. These were hard times for the Muslim Brotherhood as it experienced its first failures mixed with a difficult involvement in politics. This is in light of such difficulties that the EMB started resorting to political assassinations – with the assassination of high figures such Prime Minister Muhamad al Nuqrashi– shortly before al-Banna was himself assassinated in 1949; a practice it would abandon only later in the 20th century. Such practices only led to the implementation of an even more virulent program of suppression as the EMB missed an assassination attempt against Nasser and as the later set to decapitate the movement once and for all. He did so by confiscating the EMB’s assets, executing six of its leaders and arresting, imprisoning and torturing many of its members with or without open trials. This period ended with Nasser’s death and Sadat’s interested reinsertion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian society, at which time the first generation of Muslim Brothers would be joined –but also ideologically challenged and influenced– by a new generation of Brothers.


18 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, (Cairo: American University in Cairo, 2002), 56-7.


The first generation, the generation in power until now, is the generation from which belonged every “guide”. Xavier Ternisien noted that “it started militating since the 1940s […], lived the persecutions under Nasser and Sadat […], and does not trust the ruling power21.” In sum, it adopts a very defensive stance and is still strongly marked by feelings of resentment over the forced dissolution of the movement mixed with years of repression by Nasser’s regime. Moreover, it has been noted to be the generation of Brothers who are the most engaged in the ideal of Islamizing society “from the bottom” before ever attempting to take over power “from the top”22. It hence idealizes the idea of a religious state.

The first generations of Muslim Brothers is one whose political ideology greatly defined the movement's history by being predominantly influent on its political ideology from its beginning to the early 1990s23. Being marked first by an important Sufi influence mixed with a brief period of apoliticism during the early years of the movement and under al-Banna's leadership, it is later predominantly influenced by Islamic revivalism. The political ideology of the first generation of Muslim Brothers was first influenced by Sufi Islam—as al Banna was himself a Sufi, a path that he partially gave up in order to focus on leading the Brothers' education. Indeed, al Banna established the EMB not as a political party but rather as a “da‘wa” (religious outreach) association that aimed to cultivate pious and committed Muslims through preaching, social services, and the encouragement of religious commitment and integrity in a struggle against


British colonialism and the Westernization of Egyptian society\(^{24}\). This is only later that the EMB would become involved in Egyptian politics and even much later that it would start to get deeply involved in participatory politics of civil society and government\(^{25}\). As such, the Sufi influence on the EMB's ideology was both overshadowed and complemented by the influence of an Islamic ideology already in growing popularity at the time, "Islamic revivalism".

The first generations of Muslim Brothers is one whose ideology is most importantly marked by the influence of "Islamic revivalism", something which more decisively affected the first generation of Brothers and the political direction they gave to the movement from the 1930s to the 1970s\(^{26}\). This shift has been attributed firstly to the gradual ideological maturation of al-Banna and other Brotherhood ideologues\(^{27}\), and secondly –but most importantly– to Sayyid Qutb’s works\(^{28}\). Indeed, the revivalist influence on the first generation of Brothers is already found in the "puritanical" thought of Hassan al-Banna, with his desire to revive the flame of Islam and bring the people back to the religion and its teachings against the moral decay brought by the West in his country, Egypt\(^{29}\). Nevertheless, the revivalist influence is more strongly


materialized through the writings of Sayyid Qutb, whose thought became central to the political ideology of the first generation of Muslim Brothers to the extent of overshadowing that of Hassan al-Banna himself\textsuperscript{30}. Through him, the movement embraced many concepts of modern politics, such as that of the sovereignty of the people—as opposed to theocracy—, the obligation of consultation between ruler and ruled, the necessity for the ruler to be chosen through elections and the equal citizenship of Muslims and Christians—among other things\textsuperscript{31}. This was done through an argumentation based on Islamic narratives which claimed these concepts to be not only in tune but even central to Islamic politics despite their shared centrality with “Liberal” conceptions of politics encountered by Egyptians through the West at the time\textsuperscript{32}. Moreover, it was the society and the state's lack of "Islamic values" that were to be the main target of the EMB through its work, making it such that the movement's attempt to Islamize society led it to “anti-systemism”\textsuperscript{33}.

The political ideology of the first generation of Muslim Brothers remained relatively vague and was most importantly "anti-system" –in the sense that it opposed the current system of politics and culture which it conceived to be a largely Western construct despite agreeing with some of


its aspects. The political ideology of EMB’s first generation hence revolved around a call for the replacement of this system with one they sought to be in tune with their conception of Islam, something which had to be done first and foremost through the (re)-Islamization of society in the face of Britain's colonial influence in Egypt. This is due to this emphasis on the (re)-Islamization of society that ambiguity and vagueness dominated the political ideology of the first generation of ikhwan, as the establishment of an "Islamic state" was conceived to be only secondary to such an objective at the time. This first ideological trend and its association with the first generation of Muslim Brothers would fit with the first two historical phases of the EMB, while the second ideological trend itself follows the two last phases of the movement's evolution and is associated with the second generation of Muslim Brothers.

The second ideological trend and the two last phases of the EMB's historical evolution fit with the rise of the second generation of Muslim brothers at the forefront of the movement's involvement in Egyptian society and politics. The third historical phase of the EMB's historical evolution, "extending from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, is one of nonviolent struggle under President Sadat (1970-81) and Mubarak (1981-90)" as the Ikhwan’s leadership made the important decision to give up on the violence it previously used in order to oppose power. This move led to an important schism inside the movement, as splinter groups were to extend and perpetuate the violent confrontations the EMB experienced with the state and society under

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37 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, (Cairo: American University in Cairo, 2002), 57.
Nasser’s regime. Moreover, this period was a crucial one as it saw the reemergence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the scene of the civil society through a growing involvement in parliamentary politics, social works and service institutions. Indeed, the Brotherhood started running candidates in 1984 for boards of Egypt’s professional syndicates and for seats in parliaments, first as junior partners to legal parties and later as independents. This trend was to be further developed in the fourth and present periods while being mixed with increased recruitment of young Egyptian elites.

This fourth historical phase extends from the late 1990s to 2012. It is marked by a strong involvement of the EMB in civil society –as the continuation of a trend started during the third historical phase– and by a crucial change in both the Ikhwan’s political ideology and its network of members. Indeed, this is during this phase that the second generation the Brotherhood had started recruiting in the 1970s came to materialize and specify the shift in the movement’s political ideology through a number of publications, position papers and party platforms. These very changes would be crucial in making Egyptians trust the EMB with political power in the elections of 2012, just months after they succeeded in ending the despotic rule of Hosni Mubarak.

38 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy*, (Cairo: American University in Cairo, 2002), 57.


The second generation of Muslim Brothers fits with the third and fourth historical phases of the EMB's historical evolution, while being the second important side in the history of the movement's political ideology as it deeply marked its development from the 1970s to the elections of 2012. This generation is also an important focus in the academic literature which considers it as triggering an important development in the EMB’s ideological evolution by starting an ideological and political "metamorphosis" of the movement through their encouraging and accelerating the joining of new Brothers\textsuperscript{41}. They came from different backgrounds and brought new perspectives with them, something which could be seen in the many aspects of participatory politics in which they got the EMB increasingly involved\textsuperscript{42}. As such, they have been described as "young cadres" who lead the Brotherhood toward increasing participation and influence over the very professional organizations and higher ranks of society to which these members belonged\textsuperscript{43}. As opposed to the first generation's strong orientation toward missionary activities (\textit{da’wa}), this generation of members would considerably focus the EMB on both political participation and pragmatism starting in the 1980s\textsuperscript{44}.


The second generation of Muslim Brothers is a generation that militated on campuses instead of the first generation’s focus on *da’wa*\textsuperscript{45}. Most of them were very educated and represented the first real change of politics inside the organization through the attempt to recruit Egyptian society’s next elites. Indeed, these Brothers were already experienced with many aspects of civil society as they had already worked with other parties, had won seats on professional boards in the 1980s\textsuperscript{46}. Moreover, they were the ones who brought the first experimentations with “changes in reaction to necessity” inside the movement by being more prone to a modernist vision of the relation between state and religion –as opposed to the revivalist tendencies of the first generation. In addition to its fairly strong democratic aspirations, this generation did not resent Western civilization as much as the first one but rather attempted to learn from some of its concepts and adapt them to the Islamic world in a manner reminiscent of the Islamist modernists of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries\textsuperscript{47}. As opposed to the majority of the first generation, most of the second generation was much more open to the world and often praised the advantages of technical and organizational modernizations, while being eager to get more involved in the movement’s decision making apparatus\textsuperscript{48}.

\textsuperscript{45} Mona El Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Muslim Brothers”, *Int. J. Of Middle East Studies*, 37(2005), 373-95.


\textsuperscript{47} For the Islamic modernists of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, see: Charles Kurzman ed., *Modernist Islam1840-1940: a Sourcebook*, (UK: Oxford University Press, 2002).; For the link between the Islamic modernist ideologies and that of the Arab Spring, see: Mohammad Fadel, "Modernist Islamic Political Thought and the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions of 2011," 3(2011), 94-104.

Since the 1970s, what became the "second generation" of Muslim Brothers gradually adopted positions at the forefront of the movement's involvement in all types of activities in the civil and political spheres and brought important changes to the EMB's political ideology\textsuperscript{49}. Comprehensively, the changes brought by the second generation to the political ideology of the EMB are mainly ones of commitment to the current system through the shift from an "anti-system" political movement toward a "systemic" one\textsuperscript{50}. Here, "systemic" can be understood as behaviours and ideological stances that are generally oriented toward a commitment to the furtherance of the current political system.

The "ideological change" toward systemism was concretized in large part by the pragmatism that evolved from the movement's successes and aspirations in the political system in which it was being included –that which it previously rejected– and in which it sought more gains\textsuperscript{51}. There was an important advantage for the EMB in the furtherance of the current system of politics as the EMB's political experience from the 1980s to the 2000s was one of political victories – mitigated by the regime's denial of the greater victory of ruling a government\textsuperscript{52}. Moreover, the movement's inclusion in the electoral politics of the 1980s put it into close contact and cooperation with the secular forces whose ideologies influenced its own political thinking and


\textsuperscript{52} Nathan J. Brown, \textit{When Victory is Not an Option : Islamist Movements in Arab Politics}, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).
led it to adopt in its own way many political concepts that have been called "moderate". These experiences and influences would lead the EMB to develop a conception of modern politics which does divide between religion and politics while remaining very inclusive of religion in the public political sphere. In a comparative perspective, this is something very reminiscent to contemporary developments led by the resurgence of religion in the public sphere in the Western world. Even as it falls short of advocating for secularism –as the word still has bad connotations in Egypt– what the EMB offers with its second generation's "systemic" ideology is nothing more than a renegotiated form of political secularism which is highly inclusive of religion in politics. These being the main features of the evolution of the EMB's political ideology into a "systemic" one through its second generation of members, the movement's ideology still goes with much criticism from observers and scholars of the EMB alike.

Even though the second generation pushed the EMB further into becoming a "systemic" political movement through the adoption of a modernist Islamic ideology and civil-political participation, many observers and scholars alike still see the movement’s political ideology with a wary eye.

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and warn of its "hidden agenda"56. The majority of these consider that the EMB has never completely committed to the "systemic" stances that have been brought forth with the entrance of the second generation of Brothers and hence offer many theories based on the idea of the movement's political pragmatism57. In making such a case, these voices quote many negative statements and declarations coming from members and/or leaders of the EMB and take them as markers of the movement's true intentions hidden under the covert "ideology" that is the second ideological trend and which is imposed by political pragmatism58. Nevertheless, these statements are often taken out of context, extrapolated, and/or used to "name-tag" the ikhwan as "radical Islamists," making use of little substance in order to concretely defend the accusations they make.

One explanation for such a trend in many academic analyses of the EMB's ideological change can be that these works often disregard and/or genuinely misunderstand the process of ideological change that took place within the Brotherhood's ranks. Indeed, Wickham's recent work on the process of ideological change amongst the Brotherhood's ranks explains that it is a gradual and uneven process and that the movement is not necessarily itself an ideological


monolith. Wickham's theory has been confirmed by the many corrections and explanations of the EMB's successive leaderships regarding the negative statements made by some predecessors which took place as the movement gradually transitioned ideologically toward the second ideological trend. Indeed, Supreme Leaders and other leaders of the movement have often corrected or positively explained some statements made by their predecessors in a variety of positions in the context of the 1990s and the 2000s, a process in which it remained under constant attacks regarding the genuineness of its ideological shift. As a movement such as the EMB gradually transitioned toward the second ideological trend, changes were bound to be met with some internal opposition—something which logically created departures from the movement—and an only gradual adoption of new political ideas. An explanation for the "alarming" dissensions, negative statements and dihcotomic views of the EMB that some critics outlined is that they were based in the process of gradual and often confrontational ideological transition which took place in the shift from anti-systemism to systemism. Interestingly, such an ideological transition has seen the important involvement of two generations of Muslim Brothers, while what has been termed to be the "third generation" has still played a very little role on ideological and leadership positions.

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According to Ternisien, the third generation is a numerous one whose members are still on the lower scales of the organization—as the youngest—but who could play an important role in the future. Such an important role is seen as potentially taking place in a manner reminiscent of what the second generation has done itself, namely opening the movement's ideology to new avenues. Moreover, the third generation played an important role during the unfolding of anti-Mubarak revolts earlier in 2011 and showed their engagement to the preservation of the democratic ideals that were defended during the anti-Mubarak revolts. Nevertheless, the third generation of Muslim Brothers is one that is still understudied and poorly understood in the academic literature pertaining to the movement, mainly due to the little role it played in the development of its political ideology by the time it accesses power in 2012. Despite these limitations, a better understanding of this generation of Brothers would allow for a better understanding of the historical phases in which the EMB enters after the third and fourth ones. Moreover, the third generation and its influence on the movement's political ideology is one that will need to be better understood in order to shed light on the recent events, which include the EMB’s reach of power and ouster from it. Nevertheless, in discussing such events and the role played in them by the EMB’s political ideology, much academic literature focusing on the ideological evolution of the movement can be taken into account.


B. Academic Approaches to the Ideological Evolution

The most influential way in which the academic literature has approached Islamists' ideological evolution—and that of the EMB—has been through the "participation-moderation" theory ever since the departure from paradigms influenced by "Orientalism" in the study of the Islamic world in general. As its name suggests, it emphasizes the moderating character of political participation among Islamist groups such as the EMB, from whose history scholars of the movement attempt to show the correlation between its inclusion in participatory politics and its ideological "moderation". The theory has given birth to much discussion over the evolution of the movement's ideology and has principally pinpointed the EMB's ideological change on its inclusion in participatory politics during the semiauthoritarian openings of Sadat and Mubarak.

Indeed, this is the theory that through inclusion in politics the, EMB—and Islamist political parties in general—will "moderate" through a pragmatic logic that necessitates from the group to seduce a maximum of potential voters in order to succeed in participatory politics. This being impossible with an "extreme" or "marginal" political ideology, the political group—such as the EMB—is expected to modify its ideology toward a relative "middle ground," making it more committed to the current political system and its specificities through both ideology and actions.

Only very recently has the "participation-moderation" theory been challenged in the academic literature, an endeavor often pursued by pointing at the lack of definition and liberal bias of the

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concept of "moderation" it adopts, or its omission of the many other factors that affect ideological evolution. In that scope, Nathan Brown and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham critique the theory on the grounds that it is too vague, unspecified and broadly defined, all the while encompassing hidden normative assumptions and lack of fixed meanings. They consider the idea of "moderation" as being poorly defined –if at all– leaving one wondering about what exactly can be considered to mark the evolution of Islamist political parties' ideologies –such as that of the EMB– as one of “moderation”. At the same time, the liberal bias of what is considered or indirectly suggested to be moderation is decried by them as they argue that Islamist ideologies evolve and change yet do not necessarily do so in a "liberal" perspective.

Despite these critiques of the "participation-moderation" theory, it needs to be noted that most of the literature dealing with the theory has focused on complementing the theory rather than completely refuting it, yet gave birth to specific types of theories.

The academic literature on the ideological evolution of the EMB has recently outline a type of theory that I hear call theory of “influences”. This was done through shedding light on new variables that affected the movement’s ideological evolution in many ways, namely found in the movement's external and internal influences on its interplay with different actors of participatory politics. According to Brown, such an external influence is to be found in the figure of the

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semiauthoritarian regime in which the EMB evolves, as he claims that EMB-modelled Islamists in the Arab world do not completely change ideologically even as they participate in participatory politics. He argues that this is because the limits imposed by semiauthoritarian regimes of the Arab world on the political opportunities of the opposition limit the commitment of EMB-modelled Islamists in the Arab world to change. These limits are the limits of a semiauthoritarian system where authoritarianism remains in power and forges elections, despite aspects of participatory politics where opposition is tolerated yet tightly monitored and regulated. Due to the limited electoral gains they can ultimately make and the limited room for contestation they are allowed, Islamists hence only partially commit to a "change" as it is only based on political openings that can be taken away anytime the regime feels threatened. Brown also argues for a specific aspect of the participation-moderation thesis, one where political movements on the edge of the political system who face substantial rewards for participation and substantial risks for other oppositional strategies will become more politicized and move towards securing their goals through legal and peaceful means.

On the other hand, Wickham sees external and internal influence on the EMB's ideological evolution –and that of EMB modelled Islamists in the Arab world– as incremental parts of the movements' ideological and organizational change. Indeed, according to Wickham, the


movement's political ideology and its evolution has often been portrayed by academic scholarships as a homogeneous, monolithic variable\textsuperscript{74}. Nevertheless, recent developments involving the EMB and its met recent studies point in a different direction, one which emphasizes the often deep divergences of political conceptions inside the movement's own ranks\textsuperscript{75}. She hence suggests that ideological influence on original Islamist ideas –caused by the group's involvement in participatory politics– allows for genuine ideological change among the group's membership and leadership but also allows for the creation of splinter groups who are more committed to change than the original group itself\textsuperscript{76}. In the EMB, this is the emergence of different generations of members and leaders with each of them being more committed to participatory politics than the earlier ones, along with the emergence of groups formed by ex-members of the EMB and whose commitment to such politics is similarly stronger\textsuperscript{77}. Indeed, as the second generation becomes gradually involved in civil and participatory politics while being recruited from such circles, the wasat party is one of the splinter groups created by EMB members who were more committed to specific types of change than the EMB itself. As such, both Brown and Wickham suggest that even though strategic thinking requires from the EMB and other Islamists to make trade-offs on their ideology in order to make political victories in the

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\textsuperscript{74} Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood : Evolution of an Islamist Movement}, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013), 2 and 268,


political system in which they are included, there are other important external and internal variables on the movement's ideological evolution.\(^78\)

The EMB's ideological evolution has been analyzed as following two general ideological trends and four historical phases and has been described as having been studied through two academic trends –namely the "participation-moderation" theory and the recent approaches complementing it. It is now to five important aspects of the EMB's political ideology that we must turn in order to clarify the matter of the movement's political beliefs while outline the shift of ideological line from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” that is noticeable between first and second ideological trends.

2. Evolution on five important aspects

The EMB’s conception of the ideal form of the state (A), the accession to power (B), the law (C), religious pluralism (D), and gender issues (E)– which I here call “five important aspects”– follow the same general trends in the evolution and discussion of the EMB's political ideology as those previously outlined. Indeed, the evolution of the movement’s conception of these five important aspects follow a gradual shift from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” since the entry of the second generation.\(^79\) At the same time, the very changes praised by the 1980s reveal to be


\(^79\) Just as much as the general ideological evolution of the EMB that has been discussed in I.2.A., the evolution of the EMB's political ideology on the five following aspects are to be considered as general and official ones which can be mitigated or even contradicted by the behaviour or statements of some of the movement's members throughout its history. This does not necessarily mean that the EMB has a "hidden agenda" like what has been claimed by many students or observers of the movement and its history but rather that it lacks ideological cohesiveness/homogeneity throughout all its ranks, something which has been pointed at by recent scholarships and recent developments. For the ideological heterogeneity of the movement, see: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood : Evolution of an Islamist Movement*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013).
mostly clarifications, re-framings and/or alterations of many concepts already embraced by the Brotherhood in the aim to answer the many accusations aimed at the movement by its detractors through a rhetoric of “systemism”. This is a process that fits with the EMB's move toward political "systemism" as the movement has to re-frame its political ideology in a way that sounds less "anti-systemic," less aggressive and less threatening to both regime and society but rather reassuring and, to a certain extent, even mainstream.

There is very little comparison in the academic literature on precise aspects of the aforementioned changes, something which creates a gap that needs to be addressed in order to properly evaluate the exact nature of the movement's change\textsuperscript{80}. In order to address the relative vagueness of the academic discussion of the EMB's ideological evolution, I compare here the movement's conception of five important aspects throughout its history, emphasizing how they were seen throughout the first important ideological trend and how this changes with the second one.

A. On the Ideal Form of the Political State

The EMB's conception of the ideal form of the political state throughout its history is one which is central to the understanding of the movement's political ideology, goals and actions. It is indeed in seeking the establishment –or getting closer to the establishment– of what it considers

to be the ideal form of state that the Brotherhood engages into political actions, whether it be in the form of uprisings or electoral campaigns, from its inception in 1928 to today. Moreover, its vision of the political state has remained in tune with what has been previously outlined to be the movement's gradual evolution on the side of its political ideology, between first and second ideological trends. As it was the main influence of the movement's first generation, Islamic revivalism's political philosophy played an important role on the movement's official conception of the ideal political state from the 1930s to the 1970s. On the other hand, the second generation's orientation toward participatory politics and its influence from outside the party gave the movement's conception of the ideal political state from the 1980s to 2012-2013 a note of "civil Islamism" or "parliamentarian Islamism". What comes out of this discussion is that the EMB's conception of the ideal state is rather "clarified" and "politically framed" than it is "changed".

From 1928 to the early 1990s the first generation drew its conception of the political state from Islamic political advocacies of the first part of the 20th century that called for the instatement of an "Islamic state" and which were very influenced by revivalist forms of Islamic political

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thought\textsuperscript{83}. Under al-Banna and during the early apolitical period, the movement's conception of the "Islamic state" was distinguished by its will to see Sharia law implemented, while not much importance was given about specific aspects of the state as very little was officially published by the organization about it\textsuperscript{84}. Indeed, what form would take the Islamic state did not seem to be a "burning question" for the Brotherhood, and al-Banna merely complemented the centrality of the implementation of the Sharia with mentions of a state based on Islam, ruled in accordance to the people's will and through the principle of consultation (\textit{shura})\textsuperscript{85}. It is important to note here that the Brotherhood's conception of the Islamic state as it was already stated by al-Banna early in its history is not one of a theocracy –because the authority of the ruler is conceived to derive from men who choose him, and not from God\textsuperscript{86}.

In the 1950s, Sayyid Qutb seeks to fill that gap by drawing "principles" for the Islamic state yet leaving the "specifics" to be set by the "time, place and needs of the people"\textsuperscript{87}. Just as al-Banna, he too put a strong accent on the compulsory character of consultation (\textit{shura}) between the ruler and the ruled, with the ruler being elected by the community and submitted to God in order to be


legitimate. Indeed, the concept of the ideal state remained vague outside of these few precisions and as the movement put the emphasis on its principal goal, that of the Islamization of society. Indeed, the movement's ultimate goal was the creation of the *nizam al-Islami* (النظام الإسلامي), the "Islamic system", and even though it was used to mean "Muslim state" in practice it was rather a set of legal (not political) principles that were considered as necessary in any political system.

One has to note that the EMB’s conception of the marker of the state's "Islamicity" was hence not a specific political system –such as monarchy, democracy, etc.— but rather the presence and implementation of what it conceived to be Sharia law. This is the important reason that explains the relative absence of strong discussions of the form of the state during most of the two first historical phases. This conception of the ideal state remained so up until the 1980s at which point it became much more specified and relatively modified by the second ideological trend through the ways, the political influences and experiences of the second generation of Muslim Brothers.

Through the second ideological trend, from the 1980s to the EMB's accession to power in 2012, the EMB's political ideology evolved into one which embraces the conception of the civil state as its ideal of the political state, which it called the "civil state with an Islamic reference." What it


89 The Islamization of society is discussed in greater details in I.2.C.


meant—and still means—by the civil state with an Islamic reference is a state run by civilians—

tune with Islamic Sharia and not in opposition to it. Many have argued that the EMB's call for
the "civil state with an Islamic reference" is a different way to call for a "secular state," only
without the use of the term "secular"—which is still considered negatively by many in Egypt due
to its alleged rejection of religion. As such, the call for a "civil state with an Islamic reference"
is a call for a form of "secular state" that is inclusive to Islam and does not reject its tenets as
found in Islamic law. As such, the EMB developed a conception of the secular state which does
divide between religion and politics all the while remaining very inclusive of religion in the
public political sphere; which it called the "civil state with an Islamic reference" in order to avoid
the word "secular state" which has bad connotations in Egypt. Indeed, the Egyptian Grand Mufti

Ali Gomaa described it exactly as such by stating the following:

"the concept of a civil state doesn’t contradict Islamic law, but conforms to it. In Egypt, a civil state
means a modern nationalist state that is compatible with Islamic provisions. Egypt did not import the
civil state model from the West [as] the model has existed for about 150 years. The state relies on its
constitution, institutions, parliament, and administrative and judicial systems—all consistent with
Islamic Sharia—to adopt the civil model."

In many ways, what the EMB has termed a "civil state with an Islamic reference" is nothing
more than a re-negotiation of "secularism," "secularization" and the secular state in a manner

93Amer Katbeh, "The Civil State: The New Political Term of the Arab World," Peace and Collaborative
Development Network, 1 June 2012, Available Online: http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/
the-civil-state-the-new-political-term-of-the-arab-world?xg_source=activity#.UyJfNBYd4yA (Last consulted 13th April 2014);

94Amer Katbeh, "The Civil State: The New Political Term of the Arab World," Peace and Collaborative
Development Network, 1 June 2012, Available Online: http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/
the-civil-state-the-new-political-term-of-the-arab-world?xg_source=activity#.UyJfNBYd4yA (Last consulted 13th April 2014);
fitting with the EMB's reviverist understanding of Islamic history and its legal legacy but also fitting with Egyptian culture and society.

This change in the EMB's conception of the ideal state is one of the many changes and influences brought back to the movement by its second generation of members\textsuperscript{95}, who interacted with a variety of actors in the participatory politics of civil and political spheres\textsuperscript{96}. Changes in the ideology of the EMB concerning the ideal state are hence found in the publications of its influential figures and members during the third and fourth historical phases of the movement's history—the historical phases that fit with the emergence of the second generation of Brothers. In "the state in Islamic jurisprudence" published in the late 1990s, Sheikh al-Qaradawi discusses the conception of the "civil state with an Islamic reference" and clearly explains such a conception of the state to be "the state in Islam," based on bay'ah (pledge of allegiance) and shura (consultation)\textsuperscript{97}. Another important marker of the shift in the political ideology of the EMB and the clarification of its concept of the civil state is found in the political platforms published by the movement in the early 1990s, in 2007 and finally in 2011 which officially stated many important political goals, among which the embrace of the civil state\textsuperscript{98}. This political platform

\textsuperscript{95} Who have been discussed in I.1.A.


clarifies the EMB's conception of the ideal political state sought for through the movement's political actions that have been called the civil state with an Islamic reference.

The "changes" in the political ideology of the EMB in regard to the ideal political state are hence more of the nature of "precisions" and "political framings" in a context of increased political participation and shift from "anti-systemism" to "systemism". Indeed, as the first generation's emphasis on sharia and shura is not lost but rather specified and complemented by the second generation which terms them to be found in the ideal of the "civil state with an Islamic reference." In the context of increased political participation and shift from "anti-systemism" to "systemism," these precisions came as "political framings" that would reassure the Egyptian society as to the political goals of the ikhwan and ultimately intended to get more votes from a wider array of the electorate. Many other concepts of the EMB's political ideology hence follow this similar dynamic of evolution, such as that of the accession to power.

B. On the Accession to Power: from Elections to Democracy

The EMB's conception of the accession to power follows the same line of clarification and political framing that is noticeable in the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" between the first and second ideological trends, yet is marked by the notable adoption of new concepts. The way in which the Brotherhood would access power has not been discussed in great details by the first ideological trend and before the 1980s, yet the movement's most preeminent figures in the pre-1980s –such as al-Banna and Qutb– spoke and wrote with great emphasis on the need for the rulers to be chosen by the people99. At the same time, the Brotherhood's practices at the time

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and throughout this first ideological trend went in the same direction as the movement was often involved in elections after the apolitical period. Indeed, al-Banna himself ran and lost in the parliamentary elections of 1942 and 1945\textsuperscript{100}, something which set a precedent for the Brotherhood's attitude toward power and politics as the EMB ran for elections when it was offered the chance to. Nevertheless, it sometimes resorted to the use of violence –officially or unofficially sanctioned by the movement's leadership– in order to oppose the regime when it thought itself to be in an unjust and oppressed position –while definitively abandoning such use of violence in the 1970s\textsuperscript{101}.

Despite its appreciation of elections, the EMB did reject the conception of political parties and the political pluralism of democratic politics before the 1980s\textsuperscript{102}. More specifically, al-Banna rejected political parties in the sense that he viewed them "as nothing more than vanity projects of warring political that diverted the country's energies from resisting the British\textsuperscript{103}." As such, even though the movement accepted the concept of elections as being based on the accepted practice of the people choosing its leader(s), it still rejected some aspects of what was already conceived to be major aspects of democratic politics and accession to power at the time. This is

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\textsuperscript{103} Mona el-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 37, 2005, 383.
only with the second ideological trend that the EMB would work on specifying its conception of
the accession to power and officially adopting the many aspects of democratic politics

Starting in the 1980s and all the way until its rise to power in 2012-2013, the EMB broke with
the relative vagueness with which it approached the conception of accession to power and fully
embraced democratic life. By 1981, the EMB started making pacts of cooperation with
secular forces in order to oppose Mubarak's regime, something which culminates with the
wasatiyya politics of the 1990s and 2000s and the full adoption of democracy. In the 1990s,
"the prominent Islamic scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, member of the EMB in the 1950s and
longtime sympathizer" justified the necessity for political parties and political pluralism, while
rationalizing al-Banna's stance against them by simply stating the difference of contexts. Indeed,
Qaradawi stressed the differences between his time (the 1990s) and al-Banna's, emphasizing the
fact that political parties once "divided the umma (sic)" against the colonial enemy and revolved
around individuals instead of clear goals and platforms. Qaradawi saw political parties as not
playing such a divisive role anymore nowadays, something which hence made them
acceptable.


This trend of justification and adoption of democratic politics is also noticeable in the EMB's official stances at the time of the second ideological trend. On March 3rd 2004, the EMB's Supreme Leader and General Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akif unveiled the movement's "Reform Initiative" in which he clarified and confirmed its support of a "republican, parliamentary, constitutional and democratic political order, in the framework of the principles of Islam."

The EMB's conception of the accession to power follows the line of clarification and political framing that is noticeable in the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" between the first and second ideological trends, yet is marked by the notable adoption of new concepts. Even though the focus on the people's choice of its leaders through elections is already an important part of the EMB's political ideology through its first ideological trend, the full adoption of the concept of democracy through its political pluralism and its political parties is a mark of the second ideological trend. In the context of increased political participation and shift from "anti-systemism" to "systemism," these additions come as an opening to the system that does not change much to the spirit of the movement's first conception of accession to power—as the people's choice of its leaders through elections was already emphasized. The EMB's conception of Sharia advocated for by the EMB would change in the same fashion between first and second ideological trends.

C. On the Law: the Call for "Sharia"

The EMB's conception of the Sharia follows the same line that is noticeable in the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" between the first and second ideological trends, being marked by an important emphasis on re-framing. The EMB's conception of Sharia law is perhaps one of the most discussed and written about by preeminent members of the movement ever since its creation in 1928 and it changes from the group's creation in 1928 to its rise to power in 2013. Indeed, a central aspect of its political ideology –as established by al-Banna in its earliest years– was already that of the importance of the implementation of "Shari'a" in order to properly (re)Islamize Egyptian and later achieve the ideal form of state\textsuperscript{110}. Nevertheless, al-Banna's definition of the Sharia remained vague, centred around generalities and avoiding the discussion of specific issues\textsuperscript{111}, just as was the EMB's political thought at the time of the first ideological trend. As such, al-Banna defined the EMB's conception of the Sharia as derivative of the Quran and the \textit{sunna} (Traditions) of the Prophet (SAW), all the while emphasizing the irrelevancy of Islamic jurisprudence of the four \textit{madhaheb} (schools of thought) to the reality of contemporary Muslims\textsuperscript{112}. In a manner indeed reminiscent of Islamic revivalist trends of the time, he hence called for a re-working of the two sources of the Sharia in order to make it more relevant to modern issues.

At the same time, leading legal scholars of the Brotherhood also considered that the law, as it was established in Egypt at the time, to be mainly in tune already with Sharia, yet the continued

\textsuperscript{110} Richard P. Mitchell, \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers}, (UK: Oxford University Press), 236-41.


insistence on its implementation is based on the conception that implementing it would bring about what the EMB pursued at the time\textsuperscript{113}. Indeed, the principal goal of the EMB at the time being that of the (re)Islamization of Egyptian society in the face of colonial and foreign cultural imports, the insistence on the implementation of Sharia is such because the movement conceived it to allow for just this. The Brothers of the time hence considered that implementing Sharia would allow for the stopping of the blind imitation of the West and the reaffirmation of Muslim identity; which would both allow for the higher goal that is the (re)Islamization of Egyptian society\textsuperscript{114}. As such, students of the Brotherhood's political ideology have noted that al-Banna's EMB –and that of the first generation of members– did not put the priority on obtaining a "Muslim state" in Egypt but rather prioritized the application of Shari'a and Islamization of society\textsuperscript{115}. Interestingly, this emphasis would be altered through the second ideological trend and the emergence of the second generation of Muslim Brothers.

The approach toward Sharia adopted by the EMB's second ideological trend is one based on the movement's shift from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" and the need for re-framing brought by the political pragmatism of this trend. Indeed, the second ideological trend of the EMB still called for implementation of the Shari'a yet makes more of a rapprochement between the movement's conception of the Shari'a and the current Egyptian law, while literally presenting its


\textsuperscript{115} Mona el-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 37, 2005, 376.; Richard P. Mitchell, \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers} ( ), 236 and 245.
vision of Sharia as a "moderate" one\textsuperscript{116}. An important aspect of this presentation of Sharia in a more "systemic" manner is that it emphasized the EMB's conception of the fit between Sharia law and the important aspects of democratic life in a system of participatory politics and civil rule\textsuperscript{117}. Moreover, Hamzawi, Ottaway and Brown argue that the EMB's shift in regard to its vision of Sharia during the second ideological trend has been a shift from stressing the "implementation of Sharia" toward stressing the idea of a "civil movement with an Islamic reference (marja'iyya)\textsuperscript{118}." This clear re-framing of the EMB's conception of the Sharia from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" through the second ideological trend is still limited by the movement's remaining vagueness on many issues related to the very concept, leaving many questions unanswered\textsuperscript{119}.

The EMB's conception of the Sharia follows the line that is noticeable in the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" between the first and second ideological trends, yet is marked by an important emphasis on re-framing. Even though the focus on the implementation of Sharia as a


system of legislations which already fit with many aspects of contemporary Egyptian law was already existent through the first ideological trend, the second ideological trend mainly re-framed and emphasized the EMB's conception and call for Sharia as non-confrontational and "systemist" ones. In the context of increased political participation and shift from "anti-systemism" to "systemism," these re-framings come as openings to the system through a political pragmatism that do not change much to the spirit of the movement's first conception of Sharia. The movement's conception of citizenship and religious pluralism would evolve in a similar manner between the first and second ideological trend.

D. On Citizenship and Religious Pluralism: the "Contract"

The EMB's conception of citizenship and religious pluralism follows the same line that is noticeable in the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" between the first and second ideological trends, being marked by an important emphasis on re-framing. One aspect on which the EMB remained the most consistent from its inception in 1928 to its election in power in 2012 is probably its conception of citizenship and religious pluralism in the Egyptian society. Hassan al-Banna put a strong emphasis on the "contractual" aspect of relationships between Egyptian Copts and Muslims, in that Copts were not to be treated like *dhimmi* – subject to *jizya*120. Moreover, the first ideological trend supported the idea that "Muslims and non-Muslims share equally in rights, duties and responsibility" in the Islamic state121. This was because they entered the state of Egypt with a contract of co-citizenship with Egyptian Muslims as opposed to do so through the mean of conquest in which Muslims would have imposed their statehood upon them

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in a manner reminiscent of the Middle Ages. Indeed, al-Banna famously said "they [the Copts] are entitled to what we are entitled and they owe what we owe [obliged to]."

With the second ideological trend, the EMB's position concerning Copts and religious minorities are further specified and reframed in a context of increased political participation that necessitates the reassurance of the Egyptian population in general, its religious minorities and the international community. In 1995, the *ikhwan* published a very significant document entitled "Statement on Democracy" in which it reiterates its views that Copts have the "same rights and duties as we [Egyptian and Arab Muslims] do" in the movement's conception of the ideal state.

Even though the EMB did not see it desirable that a non-Muslim be at the head of the state in Egypt, it still emphasized that Copts had full citizenship rights through a discourse relying heavily on pan-confessional concepts of citizenship such as the one developed by Islamist thinker and former judge Tariq al-Bishri. At the same time, some leading figures of the Brotherhood made statements reinforcing the movement's spirit of "justice and freedom for all," such as Abdul Monem Abul Futouh, Mohammed Mahdi Akef or even Mustapha Mashour. Indeed, Abdul Monem Abul Fotouh stated as a member of the Guidance bureau that “it is important to stress that Muslims cannot practice their beliefs except by protecting the non-


126 Esra Avsar, "The Transformation of the Political Ideology and the Democracy Discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," M.S. Thesis (Turkey: Middle East Technical University, 2008), 108.
Muslims among them and preserving their right to difference in religion. In 2005 and 2006 he further reinforced the egalitarian conception of religious pluralism and universal citizenship of the EMB by stating that Copts and Muslims are "equal partners in the Egyptian nation" with "equal rights and duties." At the same time, Mohammed Mahdi Akef stated that every party has a right to declare their doctrine, ideology and regulations in the context and limits of the Egyptian constitution. He was quoted to say the following:

"I would set no regulations for the formation of new parties. Every Egyptian would have the right to form a political party, even if it is a party for the Druze or for people who worship the sun. Whoever finds that this party contradicts the constitution can take that party to court. The courts will decide whether or not this party contradicts the constitution and the basic norms of the society.

Nevertheless, the EMB's conception of citizenship and religious pluralism has been much debated due to some controversy.

Statements made by high ranking EMB officials have raised controversy as to the real nature of the movements intentions regarding religious pluralism and citizenship of Copts in Egypt. Such individuals like Supreme Guide Muhammad Habib or and Supreme Guide Mustapha Mashour


129 Esra Avsar, "The Transformation of the Political Ideology and the Democracy Discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," M.S. Thesis (Turkey: Middle East Technical University, 2008), 108.

did indeed make statements that "openly called for the discrimination of Copts in public life." As such, Habib "stated in 2005 that Copts should be excluded from becoming presidential candidates—or even called into question their equal standing in society—"and he was even "quoted in an Egyptian daily arguing for the imposition of additional taxes on Copts." The most important of these controversial statements later came from Mashour, who was quoted in an interview with the *al-Ahram Weekly* to have answered the question of whether Copts should be allowed in the army with the negative, further arguing that they must pay *jizya* for not fighting.

It was critiqued by Brotherhood members, followed by many official messages “explaining the misunderstanding," and other statements reiterating the EMB's commitment to al-Banna's vision of equality between Egyptian Muslims and Copts along with many gestures of rapprochement by Mashour toward Egyptian Copts and their Pope. The explanation of the "misunderstanding" of the statement indicated that "it had been established that the interpretation of the Koranic ayat in Surat el Touba pertaining to the payment of *jizya* relates to those who fought Islam and the Muslims" and that "it did not apply to Coptic citizens [...] since they have fought the enemies of this nation." Nevertheless, the statements did reinforce strains between the EMB and the Copts; strains that were based on what Sheikh el Ghazali considered to be their "resistance to the

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notion of an Islamic government\textsuperscript{136}, even though a Brother was famously quoted to have said that "if Copts knew their rights in Islam they would seek the application of Islamic law\textsuperscript{137}."

The EMB's conception of citizenship and religious pluralism follows the line that is noticeable in the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism" between the first and second ideological trends, being marked by an emphasis on precisions and re-framing. Even though the conception of equal citizenship between Muslims and non-Muslims –specifically Copts– Egyptians did exist since the first ideological trend, the second ideological trend specifies the EMB's views and reframes them in a context of increased political participation. In the context of increased political participation and shift from "anti-systemism" to "systemism," these re-framings and precisions are aimed at reassuring the Egyptian population, non-Muslim Egyptians –specifically Copts– and the international community of the reasonableness of the EMB's objectives. The same logic of evolution is noticeable in the EMB's views regarding women and their evolution through the first and second ideological trends.

E. On Gender Issues: Women in Society and Politics

Conceptions of women in society and politics in the EMB's political ideology follows the trend from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” noticeable between first and second ideological trends all the while being marked by an important change that can be deemed to be a pragmatic re-reframing. Throughout the first ideological trend, the essential role of women in the “Islamic

\textsuperscript{136} Mariz Tadros, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Defined or Confined?}, (US: Routledge, 2012), 97; Mohammad el Ghazaly, \textit{Fanaticism and Tolerance between Christianity and Islam}, (Cairo, 1989), 389.

\textsuperscript{137} Mariz Tadros, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Defined or Confined?}, (US: Routledge, 2012), 86.
reformation” program was stressed through the endeavours of the movement’s founder himself, Hassan al-Banna, as he considered that for the reform to succeed it had to begin with the individual in the family context. Even though the EMB’s first ideological trend has emphasized the necessity to respect women's equality to men and their right to work, it has also pushed for a conception of women in society which preserves a status which is centred around the house and the family. Nevertheless, this conception of women in society but which is also considered as being “the most noble of tasks” by the Brotherhood’s leadership. Summing up the movement’s views on such a matter during the first ideological trend, Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi clearly stated that the women’s natural position in society was at home but that they also had the choice to make use of their spare time in whichever way they sought once home obligations were met. He even mentions that both his daughters had the choice to opt for the education they found fit for themselves, with them now working –one being a doctor and the other a teacher at the faculty of science– and living in line with the EMB’s teachings regarding women’s status in society.

On women’s role in politics, the “time dimension” is emphasized as the first ideological trend considered that society needed to be “purged of corruption” and the community should abide by


“religion and reason” before women’s political rights recognized by Islam would be fully granted\textsuperscript{143}. This is the idea that in “the current social and legislative circumstances,” women’s political rights should be left in suspension “until both men and women are more educated – intellectually and spiritually– and more faithful adherents of the principles and practices of faith\textsuperscript{144}.” Such conceptions would be modified with the second ideological trend.

With the second ideological trend, even though the EMB’s conception of the role of women in society seems to be unchanged, the movement’s conception of the role of women in politics undergoes important changes, reframing and clarifications that can be related to the movement’s political pragmatism in a time of rising political inclusion in the larger trend toward “systemism”. Starting in the 1990s, position papers and draft party platforms are published in order to restate the Brotherhood's view of women in a context of electoral contest and necessity to reassure the Egyptian population and the movement’s political opposition. Through such publications, the EMB stressed the general view that women have an equal place in politics as voters or candidates for public offices –except for the highest executive office of the country which some in the movement argue should be reserved to men while others argue is open to women too\textsuperscript{145}. This is in such a context of redefinition of the EMB’s conception of the place of women in politics that women candidates of the EMB such as Jihane al-Halafawi or Wafa' Ramadan ran for parliamentary and professional associations' elections in the 1990s and


\textsuperscript{144} Richard P. Mitchell, \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers}, (UK: Oxford University Press), 257.

\textsuperscript{145} Mona el-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 37, 2005, 382.
2000s\textsuperscript{146}. In many ways, it was argued by male and female members of the movement that this move was made in order to secure the critical status of women voters and their votes in a pragmatic political logic\textsuperscript{147}.

The EMB's conception of women’s role in society and politics follows the trend that is noticeable between the first and second ideological trends, that is the move from "anti-systemism" to "systemism", which translates into an emphasis on changes and re-framing on this particular subject. Indeed, as the movement’s conception of the role of women in society seems to remain similar throughout the two periods, its conception of women’s role in politics is changed from one which has important reservations to one which is more egalitarian and inclusive for women. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the EMB always considered that women had such rights in politics throughout its two ideological trends, yet opted to restrict them during the first ideological trend under the argument of the “nature and state of corruption of Egyptian society at the time”. The departure from such an argument is hence both a reframing and a change of the \textit{ikhwan’s} conception of the role of women in society, something which fit with their gradual inclusion in politics and the necessary shift from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” conditioned by such an inclusion. As such, the same ideological line is still noticeable here, yet it undergoes a change comparable to a re-framing that is most apparent when comparing the evolution of the


\textsuperscript{147} Mona el-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 37, 2005, 382-3.
EMB’s political ideology on this specific aspect—something which is also true when doing the same comparison on the other important aspects of this ideology.

The preceding discussion outlined that the EMB's political ideology can be divided in two ideological trends which are each influenced by one of the two generations of Muslim Brothers, each fitting with two of the movement's four historical phases\(^\text{148}\). Moreover, comparing the EMB's political ideology on five important aspects further reveals that the movement's "ideological change" did follow a line of gradual evolution in tune with the general developments brought by the second generation of Brothers. The most important process outlined by the comparison on the five important aspects of the EMB’s political ideology is that of a change of “ideological line,” consisting in the shift away from an “anti-systemic” ideological line toward a more "systemic" one. On the ground, this has translated into the shift from a political behaviour that rejected the system and worked on its margins toward a political behaviour that engaged and, to a certain extent, even embraced the system.

This is also a shift from practices where the Islamization of society was seen as the priority—in order to put into effect a *bottom-up* change, a change from the ground\(^\text{149}\)– toward new ones. These new practices are ones where the engagement with society “as it is” and in order to change

\(^{148}\) Throughout this part of the thesis are outlined general stances on specific aspects of the EMB's political ideology but it is necessary to take into account that the movement's members feature an important ideological heterogeneity in practice. The stances outlined here can hence be seen as the movement's official ones but this does not mean that all the ranks and file strictly adhere to them both in words in action, something which has been proven by the EMB's history and the many actions of its members that diverged from its official ideological positions and let many believe that the movement had a "hidden agenda". I here refer to Wickham's recent study on the heterogeneity of the movement and the way in which it contributes to its unequal ideological transformation. See: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood : Evolution of an Islamist Movement*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013).

\(^{149}\) On the prioritization of the Islamization of society and the steps in which the *bottom-up* change was considered by such preeminent members of the first generation of Muslim Brothers, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, (UK: Oxford University Press), 231-260.
it from a position of power—from “above”—has gained a much stronger role and potentially the movement's priority—in order to put into effect a top-bottom change. Indeed, throughout the first ideological trend and up until the 1980s, the Brotherhood focused its call for change on the “Islamization of society through implementation of Shari’a”, in parallel with strong criticism of the system as being “Western” and “un-Islamic”150. Starting in the 1980s and throughout the second ideological trend, the EMB seems to stop focusing politically on the "Islamization of society from the ground" and shifts its focus by altering its political practices through strong engagements with the civil society and political participation. Now focusing on winning elections in civil society, organizations and politics, the party strove to better tune its Islamic character with the civic, "republican, constitutional and democratic political order”151, something which created much confusion as to the movement's goals and their link with religion152.

Regarding the movement's political ideology, it needs to be noted that it does not "change" as much in content as it changes in the way it is politically framed toward Egyptian society and politics, giving a semblance of “metamorphosis” in the process. Both these alterations of content and framing in the EMB's political ideology follow a clear line of "systemism" in a context in which the movement becomes gradually involved in participatory politics—yet the movement cannot be said to genuinely "metamorphose". It changes its tactics, developing a religious


movement into a political party and changing both approaches and focuses of the change it seeks for Egyptian society from a *bottom/top* mechanism to a *top/bottom* one, something which requires re-framings and redefinitions of important ideological aspects. Indeed, the main objective becomes that of reaching power and then pursuing its policies, as opposed to what was once the attempt to bring about a change from the ground that would later catapult the movement into power.

This evolution of the EMB’s political ideology is hence to be understood in terms of changing political objectives and practices which influence the way in which the movement’s ideology is presented and framed to the Egyptian society. Neither in terms of a deep “metamorphosis” or a “hidden agenda,” this ideological evolution is based on many concepts which are already “acceptable” to a large part of Egyptian society and politics, reworking others into more “acceptable” ones. As I argue throughout this thesis paper, the short episode of EMB rule in Egypt confirms the argument of the movement’s ideological change as consisting mainly of a shift in “ideological line” from “anti-systemism” to “systemism” rather than that of a “metamorphosis” or a “hidden agenda”. Through the *ikhwan’s* political stances, decisions and actions while in power from 2012 to 2013 one can see such a shift being confirmed in the movement’s political ideology.

### II. The EMB’s Rule: Political Actions and Ideological Consistencies From 2012 to 2013

To what ideological direction points the EMB’s political stances, decisions and actions from 2012 to 2013? What has been done by the EMB while in power from 2012 to 2013 and how has it been met by the Egyptian society in general and critics of the movement in particular? Is
there a consistency between the EMB's political ideology and its political actions, decisions and stances while in power?

In this chapter of the thesis paper, I analyze some of the EMB's most important political actions, decisions and stances both upon reaching power and when in power, in light of their official rationale and the criticism they met. Namely, they are the presidential campaign (A), the break with the participation but not domination principle (B), the constitution of 2012 (C), and the presidential decree and other laws enacted by the Morsi-led government (D). I analyze them in order to emphasize what objectives and goals come out of the EMB's political actions, decisions and stances while in power, along with the way in which Egyptian society regarded them both through the lenses of opponents and supporters of the EMB-led government. This also allows us to better understand the interplay and evolution of the movement's politics and ideology while in power as it requires to establish the EMB's line of action on specific political aspects which can be later analyzed against its political ideology (1).

Analyzing political actions, decisions and stances of the EMB-led government from 2012 to 2013 outlines the Brotherhood's consistency with important aspects of the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of Brothers. Such consistency can best be assessed by analyzing the EMB’s respect of central components pertaining to the five important aspects of its political ideology that have been previously outlined153. In regard to the ideal state this is the respect of the civil state with an Islamic reference (A); in regard to the conception of accession of power this is the respect of democracy (B); in regard to the law this is the consistency on "moderate" Islamic law (C); in

153 The five important aspects outlined in I.2.
regard to citizenship and religious pluralism this is the respect of the equal citizenship of Copts and Muslims (D); and in regard to gender issues this is the inclusion of women in politics (E). Moreover, this analysis confirms the theory of a shift in “ideological line” from “anti-systemism” to “systemism,” rather than that of a “hidden agenda” (2).

As there is a gap in the academic literature pertaining to the EMB's political rule in that timeframe –mainly and understandably due to the recent nature of such events– it is necessary to work with primary sources in discussing what has been done by the movement on specific aspects related to its stay in power. These specific aspects are the EMB's presidential campaigns, its stances during the constitutional elections, the presidential decree and the laws it worked to enact in the parliament.

1. Political Actions

A. The Presidential campaign and the Break with the Principle of "Participation but Not Domination"

On 11th February 2011, the revolts of the Arab Spring led to the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt after thirty years in power and the establishment of the SCAF (Special Committee of the Armed Forces) as the transitional holder of power in the country. In addressing the protesters' demand for change, the military dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution, paving the way for parliamentary elections to take place between November 2011 and February 2012. During that period, multistage weeks long elections were held and concluded with the EMB's gain of nearly half the seats of the lawmaking lower house through its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), while the Salafis won a quarter of the seats. The remaining seats went to liberals, seculars and independent politicians who also only got around ten percent
of the seats of the largely powerless upper house while nearly ninety percents went to Islamists\textsuperscript{154}.

At the beginning of the revolution, the EMB stated that it would not run a candidate for the presidential election and only changed courses on April 2012 by first declaring Khairat al-Shater to be its candidate and then shifting for Mohammad Morsi\textsuperscript{155}. On May 23\textsuperscript{rd}-24\textsuperscript{th} 2012, the first round of voting revealed Morsi and Ahmad Shafiq –the last prime minister under Mubarak– as the two finalists out of thirteen candidates, and their face-off concluded with Morsi's victory on June 16\textsuperscript{th}-17\textsuperscript{th} with a little bit more than half of the votes\textsuperscript{156}. Throughout these rounds of votes, the EMB did face considerable challenges despite its large popularity and its being the most organized and prepared political movement in the country for these kind of elections. These challenges were strong as the EMB had to reassure its critics, its opponents and the Egyptian society of the nature of its political goals and ambitions in a situation where it was given a real chance to access power, something which the movement did throughout its candidate's presidential campaign.

\textsuperscript{154} "Timeline of Key Events in Egypt's Uprising and Unrest," The Daily Star, August 15\textsuperscript{th} 2013. (Available online: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-15/227427-timeline-of-key-events-in-egypts-uprising-and-unrest.ashx#axzz2v9gXH6Ew).


\textsuperscript{156} Timeline of Key Events in Egypt's Uprising and Unrest," The Daily Star, August 15\textsuperscript{th} 2013. (Available online: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-15/227427-timeline-of-key-events-in-egypts-uprising-and-unrest.ashx#axzz2v9gXH6Ew) (Last consulted May 21st 2014).
Throughout his presidential campaign, Mohamed Morsi and the EMB reaffirmed their commitment to all things that made up for the core of the movement's political ideology, namely the civic state with an Islamic reference, the inclusion of women and Christians, and the implementation of the movement's "moderate" vision of Islamic law. On his campaign kick-off at Mahalla al-Kubra on May 1st 2012, Morsi and official members/staff of his presidential campaign made multiple statements reminiscent of these commitments. On Islamic law, he reaffirmed the movement's commitment to its implementation in a manner that is "moderate" and repeated his commitment to moving away from authoritarianism, as he stated that: "the days of the one and only leader have gone, because now the nation is the source of authority, and moderate Islamic law is the only hope for the nation's revitalization." On the civic-republican state with an Islamic reference and its inclusion of all, Dr. Ragheb El-Sirgany, Member of the Islamic Legitimate Body for Rights and Reformation –an Islamic body which endorsed Morsi's candidacy in late April 2012 addresses the crowd in Morsi's name on that same day and stated that: “we are very near to a state with Islamic reference, in which everyone will get their rights, Copts and Muslims alike." At the same time, he also reaffirmed the EMB's commitment to the inclusion of men, women, Muslims and Copts around the figure of the nation through the description of his political project:


"[the] project aims to include the contributions of the young and old, men and women, and Muslims and Copts along with good intentions, a will, ethics, hard work, accuracy, patriotism, interaction, and keenness to please God, in setting out towards stability and true development […]"  

On women and Copts, Dr. Omaima Kamel –the Women Affairs spokesperson of Morsi’s Campaign– affirmed that Morsi pledged to:

"appoint a Copt and a woman as Vice Presidents, assigning to each important dossiers, tasks and powers; because the weight of responsibility is very heavy and their presence is not honorary but to carry forth the interests of the homeland."  

Finally, the party program of Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party the EMB makes it clear that it believes that the parliamentary system is the most suitable for Egypt by insisting on such a matter, refusing that politics is a dirty game, and committing to the tying of politics with Islamic values and principles.

During the presidential campaign's kick off and all the way through it, it is interesting to see that one of the most important and most redundant rallying call among EMB's partisans was centred around Morsi's aim to apply Islamic law to the country. As such, Egyptian soccer Captain Hady Khashaba, Secretary-General of the Board of Trustees of the Revolution Dr. Safwat Hegazy and Vice-President of the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (ILBRR) Sheikh Mohamed Abdel-Maksoud all stated to be partisans and supporters of Morsi's presidential campaign.


162 The detailed party program is not available anymore on the FJP’s website since the banning of the EMB by the Egyptian political regime of Sisi. For references to the party program, see Samuel Tadros, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 12(2011), 16.

campaign because of his aim to implement Islamic law\textsuperscript{164}. At the same time, Morsi's aim to implement the Islamic law has been propagated (through his presidential campaign and beyond) in a manner that puts a strong accent on the "moderate" aspect of the version of the Islamic law that he and his EMB affiliated political party have in mind\textsuperscript{165}. Nevertheless, many have critiqued the EMB, Morsi and the FJP during the presidential campaign despite the many statements issued by them in view of reassuring the Egyptian society and the movement's political opponents.

Critics of the EMB, Morsi and the FJP during the presidential campaign have mainly focused their critiques around the movement’s aim to implement Islamic law and voiced their fears that the nature of its political goals would lead to growing authoritarianism. The criticism of the EMB’s goal to implement Sharia came from secularists (liberal and leftist alike) in Egypt and abroad\textsuperscript{166}. On the other hand, those wary of Morsi's potential electoral victory warned that it would lead to the EMB's control over Egypt and its attempt to impose religious rule over society.


in a fashion often compared to Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{167}. At the same time, many others went all the way to argue that the movement would not step down from power if it ever accesses it, hence warning of potential authoritarian tendencies\textsuperscript{168}. Despite the negation of such arguments by many important scholars of the Brotherhood\textsuperscript{169}, they were an important part of the debate in both Egyptian and international medias and civil societies. Interestingly, such trends of criticism of the EMB had always existed ever since the movement got involved in the participatory politics of the semiauthoritarian regimes of Sadat and Mubarak. They were now aimed at Mohammad Morsi and the FJP in an increased manner and had bigger repercussions for the movement's criticism in Egyptian society due to the EMB's break of the "participation but not domination" principle it once held.

During its time as a political actor of the opposition under Sadat and Mubarak's semiauthoritarian regimes, the EMB established what was known as the principle of "participation but not domination" –according to which the movement sought participation in electoral activities yet never sought to dominate through them\textsuperscript{170}. This principle was first applied through


the participation in the elections of the professional organizations and civil associations in which the EMB's second generation of members sought to gain ground in order to spread the movement's influence in the Egyptian society of the semiauthoritarian regimes. Later, this principle was clearly aimed at reassuring the semiauthoritarian governments of Sadat and Mubarak that the EMB was not to be seen as a threat to their regime in order for their respective regimes to allow them to participate in the process of participatory politics that was emerging at the time. In a context of semi-authoritarianism, guarantees had to be indeed provided to the regime in order to compete in a kind of participatory politics in which victory was not an option yet political participation and opposition were somewhat tolerated. This principle made it such that the EMB's participation in participatory politics of the semi-authoritarian regimes and the civil organizations was always limited to a position in which they would not "dominate" the body for which they were running. Such a principle would remain at the centre of the EMB's political participation in Egyptian politics up until it would break with it in 2012 by having a presidential candidate run for elections and by seeking –and obtaining– a vast domination of Egypt's post-revolutionary representative institutions.

The EMB's break with its principle of "participation but not domination" through its decision to have of a presidential candidate for the presidential elections of 2012 took place after the important electoral victories gained by the group regarding the composition of post-revolutionary representative institutions.

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representative assemblies. After these victories the movement must have started questioning its old principle as it realized it was not anymore in a context in which too important victories and "domination" would bring about severe repression by the political regime. The movement hence decided to relinquish its old principle in a situation in which the option of victory became more real than ever\textsuperscript{174}, and in which important parliamentary victories already showed that the transitional government led by the military would respect the EMB's political victories. Indeed, the movement chose to seize what was the greatest opportunity to access full political power of its whole history; opportunity topped by a system in which it would have ample room to implement its ideological goals. In turn, such a break would bring in a quite difficult relationship between the EMB and what was to become the secularist-dominated political opposition of the post-revolutionary Egyptian state.

The EMB's political participation in search for domination of the governmental bodies of post-revolutionary Egypt following its run for the presidential elections would bring important difficulties between the movement and secularist forces of the political opposition. The EMB's difficulty to include liberal and leftist forces into its government can be seen as being based on the difficulty to achieve a middle ground between two sides of the political spectrums which both had strong and diverging objectives for post-revolutionary Egypt. Due to this difficulty to include the secularist-dominated political opposition after the break of the participation but not domination principle, lots of criticism of the EMB starts being based on its lack of "inclusion" of the opposition in political processes of reconstruction.

The EMB's lack of inclusion of the political opposition says a lot as to the logic the movement adopted with parties that were once its allies in the politics of *wasatiyya* under the semiauthoritarian regime of Mubarak. The EMB's behaviour means that the movement decided to fully exploit its electoral victories—which it saw as a popular warrant to apply its vision for Egypt—something which frustrated the secular opposition in a time where they would have also liked to see their ideology reflected in the new Egyptian state. Nevertheless, their poor electoral performances prevented them from doing so and the EMB did not give them a chance to have a stronger say in the post-revolutionary process than their poor electoral performances allowed them to.

The EMB's lack of inclusion of the secularists made it such that the EMB was highly criticized by its opponents in the civil society, the political opposition and the media for being non-inclusive or even authoritarian in its political practices. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that


some others considered it had a right to do so based on its electoral victories\textsuperscript{178}, something that criticisms based on ideological grounds cannot undermine as popular will trumps ideological pre-conceptions in a civil-democratic state. Indeed, because secularists do not appreciate the EMB's political ideology does not mean that they have a right to contravene its implementation in the Egyptian state's institution in a situation in which it was sanctioned by the people's direct vote\textsuperscript{179}. Nevertheless, a post-revolutionary situation such as the one in which Egypt found itself during the EMB's access to power could have used better political inclusion and cooperation between the political forces, something that was not the case and for which all political forces share a part of the blame for not easing a middle ground allowing concessions to be made.

Just as much as the EMB allowed for little concessions to the secularists' ideology and went on to establish the Egyptian state on the basis of its political ideology, the opposition offered much empty criticism and were themselves undemocratic in much of their political doings\textsuperscript{180}. They hence refused and contested the results of Morsi's election by offering weak proofs of "electoral fraud" all the while consistently boycotting the political process and offering little concessions to


the political forces that were elected by the majority of Egyptian voters. In a situation in which many of the political parties of the opposition were politically unpopular –based on their poor electoral performances– one could even question whether their expectations and demands on the EMB’s FJP dominated government weren’t exaggerated. At the same time, the criticism of the EMB’s FJP and its electoral victories offered by the opposition too often rejected the blame of their own deep mistakes –among which their important unpreparedness and internal divisions– on hypotheses of conspiracy and other exaggerations. Too often, this was a campaign of "name-tagging" revolving around the naming of the EMB’s endeavours as being "Islamists" rather than that of actually representing what was being done by the movement and engaging with its civil and democratic openings. For that indeed, these kinds of criticism of the movement is redundant during the writing of the constitution, the president's political decisions and the parliament-based legal process of the post-revolutionary state under Morsi.

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B. The Constitution of 2012

One of the main political developments of the EMB's rule in power revolved around the drafting and implementation of a new constitution –known as the Egyptian constitution of 2012– in order to replace the Provisional Constitution of Egypt adopted in 2011 following the Egyptian revolution. Hastily prepared by Mohammad Morsi's government, the constitution of 2012 was mainly drafted by Islamic leaning political actors –hence featuring many orientations to Islam in a manner that enshrined the religion in the country's legal system. It was adopted on December 26th 2012 as Egypt's first full constitution since the one of 1971, as opposed to the provisional one voted in 2011. Islamist forces had a strong impact on its drafting due to their strong electoral victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections that preceded the drafting of the constitution, while the secular forces –both liberals and leftists– suffered from their poor electoral gains and later boycotted its drafting by walking away from it. Indeed, this was yet another aspect on which the opposition criticized the EMB for "excluding it" and "not being inclusive to them", something which was followed by their contradictory stances toward it by first deciding to boycott it and then calling for participation in the vote toward the "no" for adoption of the draft.

Interestingly, the constitution of 2012 encompassed many elements of the EMB's political ideology in a fashion that established breaks and continuities with the constitution of 1971 –the


one in place ever since Sadat's rule— and the constitution of 2014—the one later adopted by the military regime that toppled Morsi's government. As opposed to the old constitution of 1971 and similarly with the constitution of 2014, the constitution of 2012 was in tune with the EMB's political ideology in that it embraced democracy and what can be considered to be some of its basic features in a political system. Indeed, in the paragraph two of its preamble, it stated its embrace of "a democratic system of government, establishing the grounds for peaceful transfer of power, supporting political pluralism, ensuring fair elections and the people's contribution in the decision-making process" as the basis of the new state\textsuperscript{186}. At the same time, it also established a stronger role for religion – more specifically Islam, Christianity and Judaism– in many aspects of Egyptian law and gave an important status to Al Azhar and its scholars in ways often dissimilar to both the constitution of 1971 and that of 2014. Indeed, in its second article the constitution of 2012 stated that "Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation," something which was in tune with both the constitution of 1971 and that of 2014\textsuperscript{187}.

The constitution of 2012 broke with that of 1971 in that it gave Christians and Jews the right to be ruled by their religious laws on some aspects as it stated in its Article three that "the canon


principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders. This aspect was kept by the constitution of 2014. On Al-Azhar, what was introduced by the constitution of 2012 was completely novel –as it was absent from the constitution of 1971 and was later watered down by that of 2014– as it stated in its fourth article that:

"Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law. The post of Al-Azhar Grand Sheikh is independent and cannot be dismissed. The method of appointing the Grand Sheikh from among members of the Senior Scholars is to be determined by law. The State shall ensure sufficient funds for Al-Azhar to achieve its objectives. All of the above is subject to law regulations."

Not only did it seriously acknowledge Al-Azhar and granted it important rights but it also established the necessity to consult its scholars when the state was to deal with Islamic law. Also in break with the constitution of 1971, it stressed Sunni Islam as the doctrinal interpretation of Islam to follow through its Article 219 (something later removed from the constitution of 2014):

"the principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of

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jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community."  

Finally, the constitution of 2012 acknowledged women in a manner peculiar and opposite to both that of 1971 and 2014 as it removed the mention of equality between men and women found in the constitution of 1971 and later re-introduced in that of 2014. Indeed, the constitution of 2012 did not go further than an acknowledgement of women's dignity and well being as necessary to be ensured, as it states the following in its preamble: "Further, there is no dignity for a country in which women are not honoured. Women are the sisters of men and hold the fort of motherhood; they are half of society and partners in all national gains and responsibilities," and the following in its Article 10:

"The state shall ensure maternal and child health services free of charge, and enable a balance between a woman's duties toward her family and her work. The state shall provide special care and protection to female breadwinners, divorced women and widows."  

Much debate revolved around the content of the constitution of 2012 as critics and proponents alike battled to make their voice heard in what would be post-revolutionary Egypt's first elected constitution. It was hence criticized in many ways, with the majority of critiques repeating the "Islamist" argument. According to them, the constitution was too Islamist in nature and Islamists—who held an important majority in the representative body that drafted the constitution as to

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their electoral victories—were said to have pushed their will on the drafting of the constitution without "including" secularists in an undemocratic fashion. At the same time, some ultra-conservative political forces critiqued the constitution for not having a strong enough Islamic character. Nevertheless, it was called "Islamist" as to the place it accords to Islam and Al-Azhar scholars regarding the state's law, but was also called "undemocratic" while being critiqued for removing the mention of equality between men and women and for "not doing enough to assure minority rights." As criticism of the constitution focused on naming it an "Islamist" document, others praised it for many different reasons.

Some noted that the constitution of 2012 was not much more “Islamist” than the preceding constitution as it merely added Al Azhar University’s “capacity to control the Sharia compliance of draft legislation” and made “blasphemy against all prophets an unconstitutional act.” At the same time, proponents of the constitution of 2012 saw it as abrogating once and for all the era of multiple presidential mandates. As Mubarak ruled for thirty years, the constitution of 2012 prevented a return to such developments in the future by limiting presidential rules to two


mandates of four years each and establishing the principle of democratic transition of power\textsuperscript{198}. Proponents of the constitution of 2012 being mostly from the EMB and Islamists' ranks, many of them also praised its strengthening of Islam and Islamic law in the state's central document all the while acclamining it for being "the constitution that would bring stability to Egypt"\textsuperscript{199}. This is with such a division between supporters and opponents of the constitutional draft of 2012 that it was presented to popular referendum through two rounds on December 15\textsuperscript{th} and 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2012\textsuperscript{200}.

The popular referendum on the constitution of 2012 resulted on December 23\textsuperscript{rd} in the latter's adoption through 63.83\% of votes for the "yes", 36.17\% of votes for the "no" and 1.78\% of invalid or blank votes on a voter turnout of only 32.86\%\textsuperscript{201}. The vote in itself was very much criticized for its low turnout, allegations of electoral frauds and abuses while proponents of the vote saw it as a milestone achievement of the goals of the revolution in that it established a constitution in order for the country to be stabilized\textsuperscript{202}. Just as much as the presidential election,
the constitution of 2012 would not be spared from further polarizing the Egyptian society between pro-EMB and anti-EMB, something which was perpetuated and even culminated with the presidential decree and the laws passed by the EMB-led government during Morsi’s year in power.

C. The Presidential Decree and Other Laws Enacted by the Morsi-led Government

The presidential decree and the variety of laws passed by Morsi’s government during its year in power in Egypt are two other important political actions that took place during the EMB’s rule in Egypt. They give a complementary perspective to the presidential campaign and the constitution of 2012 over the understanding of the EMB’s behaviour during this period in power and are crucial to a proper understanding of Morsi’s year in power. The presidential decree was put forth by Mohammed Morsi on November 22nd 2012 –some weeks before the passing of the constitutional draft into law– and established extraordinary rights and powers to the president of the republic in the laps of time that preceded the passing of a constitution203.

Decided unilaterally by Morsi, the decree made it such that all of the president's decisions would be immune from legal challenges up until a constitution was passed, hence subjugating the judiciary to Morsi's executive powers and creating a situation of presidential super-powers\textsuperscript{204}. Indeed, Morsi's statement as read by his personal spokesperson Yasser Ali stated that "the constitutional declarations, decisions and laws issued by the president are final and not subject to appeal\textsuperscript{205}.” At the same time, it prevented the judiciary from dissolving the upper house of parliament which held an Islamist majority and the constituent assembly that was drafting the constitution of 2012 at the time\textsuperscript{206}. Finally, it sacked then prosecutor-general Abdel-Meguid Mahmoud before retirement age and replaced him with Talaat Abdallah\textsuperscript{207}.

This was in a context of confrontation with a judiciary remaining largely in the hands of members of the Mubarak era that Morsi passed the presidential decree, as he clashed numerous times with them concerning the judging of Mubarak era officials –including Mubarak himself. Morsi also clashed with the judiciary in the functioning of his own government as it was putting obstacles to the work of the assembly tasked to draft the constitution –something that Morsi and his FJP saw as a threat from remnants of the "Ancien Regime" to undermine the post-


\textsuperscript{207} Nada Hussein Rashwan, “Morsi's first year: The costs, benefits of three controversial decrees,” \textit{Ahram Online}, 26th June 2013, Available online: \url{http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/152/74380/Egypt/Morsi,-one-year-on/Morsis-first-year-The-costs,-benefits-of-three-con.aspx} (Retrieved May 25th 2014).
revolutionary era\textsuperscript{208}. Indeed, Morsi was frustrated by the judiciary’s light sentences on Hosni Mubarak and officials of his era, while some members of the judiciary continuously interfered with the work of the assembly tasked to draft a constitution by questioning its legality and delaying its drafting\textsuperscript{209}. Finally, there were rumours that the High Constitutional Court was seeking to issue a decision that would declare the presidential elections illegitimate and that as Morsi was being informed of this he was left with no other choice but to establish the presidential decree in order to avoid the verdict and the return of executive power to the military\textsuperscript{210}. In order to counter the judiciary's work against him and his government, Morsi hence passed the decree and put himself above the judiciary, a move that completely backfired as reactions both from the political opposition and society were extremely negative\textsuperscript{211}.

Accusing him of having put in place an "absolute presidential tyranny"\textsuperscript{212}, the opposition worked really hard to counter Morsi's move regarding the presidential decree which it saw as vague enough to allow him unchecked and extensive powers\textsuperscript{213}. It stemmed mass anti-government


protests estimated to hundreds of thousands, which included opposition figures and members of the judiciary such as judges, making of the anti-presidential decree demonstrations the largest since Morsi assumed power\textsuperscript{214}.

Many members of the political opposition and commentators of Egyptian politics saw the decree as yet another marker of the EMB's lack of inclusion of the political opposition in the political process of post-revolutionary Egypt, while some even saw it as a marker of growing authoritarianism\textsuperscript{215}. Indeed, proponents of the "hidden agenda" argument saw it as the marker of the EMB's attempt to establish its own authoritarian state through strengthening Morsi's powers\textsuperscript{216}. Moreover, many observers called the presidential decree "Morsi's worst mistake" as it appeared like an "unabashed power grab," yet it still counted many supporters who saw it as the only way to defend the revolution and its aims\textsuperscript{217}.

There are important factors that hint at a positive explanation of Morsi's decision to introduce the presidential decree and these factors were emphasized by the EMB's supporters in the Egyptian society and some scholars during and after the unrest that followed the passing of the decree. Indeed, Islamists and EMB supporters had been calling for a purge of the judiciary for a long time as they saw many its members as remnants of the Mubarak era that would use all their


\textsuperscript{216} Muge Aknur, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Politics in Egypt: From Moderation to Authoritarianism?,” \textit{Uluslararas Hukuk ve Politika}, 9(33), 2013, 1-25.

power to reverse the revolution or ultimately limit its successes\textsuperscript{218}. At the same time, leaders of the EMB and the FJP explained the decree as necessary in order to defend the elected institutions against "Ancien Regime" figures, while Islamist parties distributed flyers defending the decree by arguing that it would defend the revolution by purging the judiciary of these figures\textsuperscript{219}. Such rhetorics have been defended by some scholars of the movement who outlined the sabotaging role played by the judiciary still loyal to the Ancien Regime and committed to undermine both revolutionary gains and the EMB’s FJP led government at all costs\textsuperscript{220}. Nevertheless, the polarization of society that resulted rendered the decree completely counter-productive as its official aim was entirely disregarded by what many saw as the potential onset of a new regime of authoritarianism\textsuperscript{221}. This made it such that Morsi had to abrogate the presidential decree a few weeks later, on December 8\textsuperscript{th} 2012\textsuperscript{222}. Interestingly, the presidential decree was to be Morsi's most controversial law, as many other new legislations would be criticized yet never reached this point of political polarization of the Egyptian society.

Many laws were passed during Morsi's presidency and it is important to note that as opposed to much of the warnings and criticism aimed at the EMB, these laws were mostly oriented toward


\textsuperscript{221} Muge Aknur, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Politics in Egypt: From Moderation to Authoritarianism?,” \textit{Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika}, 9(33), 2013, 1-25.

the economy or society and were not religiously conservative in nature. Indeed, the Salafis' attempts to pass into laws such things as the banning of ballet dancing or women's group were unsuccessful and the EMB's year in power did not mark the strong reorientation of Egypt toward more religiously dogmatic laws –something which even frustrated Salafis against the EMB. As such, predictions that Morsi's election would pave the way for a Saudi-style state in Egypt –one with radical laws that heavily curtail women's rights, ban alcohol and establish capital punishments for criminal offences– did not materialize.

Instead of fundamentally Islamizing society, laws passed –or planned to be passed– during Morsi's presidency focused –among others– on easing sectarian tensions, addressing income tax for the poorest, or even establishing "Sokouk" (Islamic financial bonds) as a new financial instrument. One of the most debated and criticized by far was the "NGO law" that would have placed limitations on NGOs' foreign funding as the Morsi government became wary that these

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funds would be used for political purposes in Egypt. Its critics argued that “it would allow the government and its security agencies to arbitrarily restrict the funding and operation of independent groups” all the while curtailing civil society. Nevertheless, the government denied these statements and even claimed that civil society would be represented on the committee that would review decisions on foreign funding. As the legal process under Morsi’s government did not follow the line of growing authoritarianism or radical Islamization of society, could it be said that the staunch criticism of his government’s actions were based on the Brotherhood’s break of the “participation but not domination” principle?

The EMB’s break with the practice of "participation but not domination” brought in much complications for the movement from the beginning of its accession to power with the parliamentary elections and the presidential campaign of 2012 to the military coup of July 2013. Indeed, the presidential decree, the laws enacted during the EMB’s rule and the constitution of 2012 are important examples of the way in which the the many political actions, decisions and stances of Morsi and the FJP were seen as authoritarian in aim or too religious in nature. This took place despite the official rationalizations offered by Morsi, his party and his supporters in order to such political actions, decisions and stances that were indeed sometimes ambiguous and questionable in nature in the context of high expectations of post-revolutionary Egypt.

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Strong criticism focused on outlining the EMB’s religious nature and religious aims were often aimed at the Morsi-led government throughout the timeframe of events that marked its one year in power. Nevertheless, the EMB's political actions, decisions and stances when in power do have a rationale that sets them apart from the theories of the "hidden agenda" of authoritarianism and/or radical Islamization of society that the movement's critiques often repeated, and this has been outlined by analyzing their context and aims. Indeed, as the presidential campaign repeated the aim for "moderation," the constitution of 2012 was far from being "radically Islamist,” and the presidential decree’s critical rationale was the defence of the elected government from the acts of sabotage of a judiciary dominated by the Ancien Regime. At the same time, the laws enacted by the EMB while in power stand in stark contrast with the "radical Islamization of society” that had been warned by proponents of the theory of the “hidden agenda”. Through its political actions, decisions and stances while in power and upon accessing it, the EMB hence gave signs of consistency with the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of *ikhwan*.

2. Consistencies

Through its political actions, decisions and stances while in power from 2012 to 2013, the EMB remained consistent with important aspects of the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of *ikhwan*. Such consistency can best be assessed by analyzing the EMB’s respect of central components pertaining to the five important aspects of its political ideology that have been previously outlined\(^{231}\). In regard to the ideal state this is the respect of the civil state with an Islamic reference (A); in regard to the

\(^{231}\) The five important aspects outlined in I.2.
conception of accession of power this is the respect of democracy (B); in regard to the law this is the consistency on "moderate" Islamic law (C); in regard to citizenship and religious pluralism this is the respect of the equal citizenship of Copts and Muslims (D); and in regard to gender issues this is the inclusion of women in politics (E).

A. Respect of the Civil State

The EMB's respect of the civil state with an Islamic reference from 2012 to 2013 revolves to a consistency in government with the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of ichwan. Indeed, this is the respect of a central component of the important aspect of the ideal political state that can be found in the EMB’s political ideology prior to reaching power in 2012, as the movement committed to the implementation of a "civil state with an Islamic reference”232. Such ideological consistency can be found in the political doings of the EMB from 2012 to 2013, namely the absence of mention theocratic systems while in power and the empowerment of civilians instead of clerics in the government while allowing some legal room to the Islamic clergy.

From 2012 to 2013, the EMB worked toward the implementation of the civil state with an Islamic reference while ignoring theocratic systems. This consistency can be seen as the EMB did not attempt to implement a "religious state" –such as a Caliphate or a theocracy– through its electoral mandates, as opposed to what some of its detractors claimed it would have attempted to

232 See I.2.A.
do after reaching power. As the EMB clearly stated that it did not pursue the implementation of any of these kinds of states but rather saw the "civil state with an Islamic reference" as the political model to pursue through its political endeavours in the country, it worked toward it by ignoring references and actions aimed toward constructing any other type of political state.

Indeed, the EMB remained faithful to its political ideology while in power as it never talked of appointing a “Caliph” or a cleric at the head of the state, while it did not encourage a theocracy through speeches or declarations when in power. One can hence conclude that discussions of the Caliphate in the EMB's political thought have been decisively abandoned ever since the 1950s and have not lived a resurgence despite the movement's access to power in 2012-2013, time at which it would have been in the best of positions to attempt the implementation of such a system.

Moreover, even though the EMB has sought to give more room to religion in the public sphere in a manner reminiscent to the open secularism of its conception of the "civil state with an Islamic reference," such room has not gone to the extent of the granting of executive powers.


Throughout its year in power, the EMB's respect of the civil state with an Islamic reference can be seen in the movement’s empowerment of civilians instead of clerics at the head of the government while allowing some legal room to the Islamic clergy. Even though the EMB sought to give more room to the Islamic scholars of al-Azhar by granting them a say in the legal affairs of the state through the constitution of 2012, it has never sought to grant them any type of executive or political power that would establish them as a political force. This is something that it has rather reserved to civilians all the while establishing Azhari scholars to a role in which they would advise the government and make sure that the state's laws would be in tune with Islamic law in a manner that in no way undermines the civilians' hold on the reins of power.

On the contrary, this move was rather a step toward securing what the EMB had termed to be the implementation of a "civil state with an Islamic reference" through its second ideological trend, something which makes the movement consistent with its political ideology while in power in Egypt.

While reinforcing the "Islamic reference" of the state, the EMB also reinforced its civil nature during its year in power—a move that stands in stark contradiction to what many of its detractors warned it would do upon reaching power. This has happened through securing and solidifying the rein of executive powers into the hands of civilians—first by taking them back from the military after securing the assumption of power of all those elected by the people, and secondly

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through keeping the executive powers away from both the military and the clerics. This reinforcement of the civil state through civil rule was most notable through the EMB's emphasis on democratic elections, something that also made it consistent with another important aspect of its political ideology, that of its engagement toward the democratic accession to power.

B. Respect of Democracy: the Focus on Elections

The EMB's focus on democracy outlines a second feature of the EMB's consistency in government with the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of *ikhwan*. Indeed, this is the respect of a central component of the important aspect of the accession to power that can be found in the EMB’s political ideology prior to reaching power in 2012, as the movement committed to a political system of democracy. Such ideological consistency can be found in the political doings of the EMB from 2012 to 2013, namely the emphasis on the people's choice of its leaders through democratic elections and the respect of the political opposition and the fair tenure of elections.

From 2012 to 2013, the EMB respected its commitment to democracy as it strove to win elections and, from there on, to materialize the important political room its electoral victories gave the movement in order to implement its own political goals in the country. Indeed, the respect of the civil state went through the respect of democracy as this is through elections that the EMB chose to run the country during its time in power –not through theocratic, military or...
authoritarian appointments—something which concretized through a democratically elected parliament, president and constitution\textsuperscript{241}. These elections show the EMB's engagement with democracy in the practice of political power, even though they were often tarnished by the low popular turnout—such as the 30\% turnout for the constitutional election—or the boycott by opposition figures\textsuperscript{242}. Nevertheless, it remains an important aspect of the EMB’s year in power that the movement did not attempt to grow into an authoritarian political actor by undermining the democratic process, but rather used democratic means to earn political room for implementation of its goals against an often extremely divided political opposition\textsuperscript{243}.

Throughout its year in power, the EMB's respect of democracy can be found in its respect of the political opposition and the fair tenure of elections. Indeed, upon its electoral victories in the country, the EMB did not attempt to shut the political system in a manner reminiscent of Arab authoritarian regimes—through banning opposing political parties or forging elections—but remained rather committed and respectful of democracy. Despite the high criticism addressed at the movement by its political detractors, it is important to note that claims of electoral forgery have never been confirmed but rather considered by some as a political tool used by the political opposition in order to challenge a political actors it was unable to compete with.

\textsuperscript{241} Timeline of Key Events in Egypt's Uprising and Unrest," \textit{The Daily Star}, August 15\textsuperscript{th} 2013. (Available online: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-15/227427-timeline-of-key-events-in-egypts-uprising-and-unrest.ashx#axzz2v9gXH6Ew).


democratically\textsuperscript{244}. At the same time, the EMB never banned any political party or political representative of the opposition despite the many demonstrations, accusations and boycotts that were aimed at the movement's FJP throughout its year in power in Egypt\textsuperscript{245}. In many ways, the EMB has rather been a better actor of democratic politics through its own unity in the face of the opposition's disunity, and its readiness for elections in which it fared very well in the post-revolutionary Egypt that preceded the military coup of July 2013\textsuperscript{246}. This respect and emphasis on free and fair elections made of the EMB's doings in government ones that were consistent with the important aspect of the movement's political ideology concerned with the accession to power; consistency which is also noticeable on its conception of the law.

C. Consistency on "Moderate" Islamic law

The EMB’s emphasis on a “moderate” conception of Islamic law is a third aspect of the movement’s consistency with the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of \textit{ikhwan} while in government. This is the respect of a central component of the important aspect of the law that can be found in the EMB’s political ideology prior to reaching power in 2012, as the movement committed to a moderate Islamic law. Such a consistency is noticeable principally through the EMB's emphasis on the tuning of Egyptian law with the \textit{ikhwan}'s "moderate" version of Sharia, all the while


remaining distant and cautious of the overtly conservative legal propositions made by Salafis in parliament.

The EMB has through its year in power focused on reinforcing the tuning of Egyptian law with the group's "moderate" conception of Sharia by delegating a role in the state's legal process to Azhari scholars; role focused on making sure that Egyptian law is in tune with Sharia\textsuperscript{247}. This was done through the passing of the constitution of 2012 in which the EMB enshrined the necessity of tuning Egyptian laws with "moderate" Sharia in the state's foundational legal document\textsuperscript{248}—something that fit the movement's conception of Sharia according to its second ideological trend. At the same time, such a consistency is further strengthened by the EMB's refraining from passing overtly conservative and restrictive laws in the name of Sharia by abusing its large position in power, as opposed to what its detractors often warned it would do if reaching power.

The EMB's tuning of Egyptian law with Sharia law in Egypt was not done through an ultra-conservative interpretation of the religious law reminiscent of Saudi Arabia but rather remained "moderate" and in tune with the movement's interpretations it. Indeed, despite the Salafis' attempts to pass restrictive legislations based on their ultra-conservative interpretations of Sharia on such issues as women's rights, the EMB opposed them and remained consistent with its


"moderate" version of Sharia. After less than a year in power, many voices in the Salafi and ultra-conservative ranks even started voicing frustration at the EMB's "moderate" stance on such issues as they were not seeing the implementation of what they considered to be Sharia law—as opposed to what the EMB considers it to be. This stands in stark opposition to what the EMB's critiques warned it would do once in power, as it appeared not to have a "hidden agenda" while remaining consistent with earlier statements regarding this religious law. The same opposition between facts of the Brotherhood’s rule in power and claims of proponents of the theory of the “hidden agenda” can be found regarding the EMB's conception of citizenship and religious pluralism.

D. Respect of the Equal Citizenship of Copts

Many have blamed the Morsi-led Egyptian government for being unable to stop anti-Coptic attacks or for other actions seen as inappropriate in regard to the Coptic community in Egypt. Some have hence criticized Morsi for inadvertently setting an election on the date of the Coptic Passover or for the surge of extremist attacks on Copts. Even though Morsi changed the date of the election after he was informed of its being set on the same date as the Coptic holiday and despite the proven absence of any role by the EMB and the effective measures taken against the attackers by the police, some critics still saw these events as proofs of the EMB’s disrespect of


Copts. On the other hand, some have denounced such analysis as exaggerated views of the treatment of the EMB’s interactions with Copts and other spheres of the society throughout Morsi’s rule in power, calling it “slander,” “vilification,” “propaganda” and “misinformation.”

Even though it can be debated whether or not the EMB did “enough” to protect and include the Coptic minority in its one year in power in the difficult and unstable context of post-revolutionary Egypt, the movement’s actions in power do point toward consistency with its conception of the equal citizenship of Christians stated through its second ideological trend.

The fourth reason why the EMB can be considered to remain consistent with the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of ikhwan throughout its year in power is due to its emphasis on equal citizenship between Muslims and Copts. This is the respect of a central component of the important aspect of the religious pluralism and citizenship that can be found in the EMB’s political ideology prior to reaching power in 2012, as the movement committed to equal citizenship between Muslims and Copts. Such a consistency is found in the EMB's emphasis on the religiously plural nature of the Egyptian society and the respect of Christians' equal citizenship throughout its year in power.

Throughout its year in power, the EMB emphasized its respect of the religiously plural nature of the Egyptian society and the respect of Christians' equal citizenship by attempting to bridge

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religious gaps and inter-confessional violence. Despite the many warnings and criticisms of the movement's detractors pointing to the risks posed to the Christian minority in Egypt in the case the EMB would access power, the movement consistently reiterated its objective to bridge religious gaps and tensions between Muslims and Christians throughout the lead up to its assumption of power. Moreover, the EMB’s actions also went in that direction throughout the year in power as it struggled to reassure Christian religious and political leaders that it was committed to dealing with religious tensions and gaps in a positive manner while reaffirming Christians' citizenship rights in the country through multiple speeches and political actions.

During its year in power, many considered that the EMB did not do enough for Copts even though the movement remained loyal to its engagement to treat Christian Egyptians as the


equals of Muslim ones and did not try to cancel any of their political rights in the country. At the same time, the movement did not take part or endorse the acts of violence that targeted Christians during its rule but rather condemned them and worked against them while repeatedly affirming its objective to bring an end to sectarian tensions and respect the equal citizenship of Christians. Despite being unable to completely stop the violence against them, the EMB-led government did take actions against these acts of violence, something which remains a reaffirmation of the movement's consistency regarding its conception of citizenship and religious


pluralism as found in its second ideological trend\textsuperscript{257}. Despite being similarly criticized regarding its conception of the inclusion of women in politics and their rights in society, the Brotherhood also remained consistent on that aspect.

E. Inclusion of Women in Politics and Women's Rights in Society

Throughout its year in power, the fifth reason why the EMB remained consistent with the second ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second generation of \textit{ikhwan} is because of its inclusion of women in politics. This is the respect of a central component of the important aspect of gender issues that can be found in the EMB’s political ideology prior to reaching power in 2012, as the movement committed to the inclusion of women in politics. Such a consistency can be found in the movement’s appointment of women in many political positions throughout its year in power.

In tune with its political ideology, the EMB did include women in Egyptian politics through its own political party, by creating committees and political positions fostering women's

participation both inside the party and in the country's politics\textsuperscript{258}. These are for instance the FJP's women's affair committee and the granting of a position of Vice President and that of Presidential Advisor specially to women\textsuperscript{259}. It also did so through its political stances regarding a few affairs in particular, such as Morsi's presidential statements regarding an initiative to support women's rights in Egypt against –among others– sexual harassment, unemployment, illiteracy and marital abuses\textsuperscript{260}. Morsi's presidential statements also offered stances toward political inclusion and fair representation in the country's senior leadership positions –among others\textsuperscript{261}. These actions toward better inclusions of women in politics and the respect of their rights in society are in tune with the conception of women as found in the second ideological trend of the EMB's political ideology, all the while contradicting many of the warnings, critiques and accusations of the movement's detractors.

The EMB's political doings regarding women's rights throughout the year in power are in stark contradiction with the criticism addressed at the movement by its political opponents and its


detractors both before the movement's accession to power and after it. Indeed, critiques directed
toward the movement before its accession to power warned that parts of its "hidden agenda" was
to completely undo achievements in women's rights in the country and bring them to a situation
similar to that of Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{262}. Nevertheless, these warnings have not been concretized and
have proven to be exaggerated, just as much as those that followed the movement's access to
power in 2012. Throughout the year in power many kept on criticizing the EMB for its stances
on women, such as those voiced in Morsi's "women initiative" and his views on women in
general as they were drawn from the EMB's political ideology\textsuperscript{263}. While many participated and
attempted to give a specific direction to Morsi's endeavours concerning women's rights in Egypt,
others boycotted and offered criticism from the sideline\textsuperscript{264}. Moreover, such criticisms of the
EMB and its political ideology regarding gender issues also revolved on a warning about a
"hidden agenda" and its radical goals that the movement was retaining from publicizing to the
public; criticisms that has been proved exaggerated by the EMB's doings while in power.

The previous discussion outlined the EMB's consistency with important aspects of the second
ideological trend and the ideological line of “systemism” that it adopted through the second

\textsuperscript{262} Mariz Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt, (USA: Routledge, 2012); Magdi Khalil,
"Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy Survive?" MERIA 10(1), 2006, 44-52.;
Thomas R. McCabe, "The Muslim Middle East: Is There a Democratic Option?" Orbis Summer 2007, 479-93.;
Samuel Tadros, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 12, 2011,
6.;

\textsuperscript{263} “Morsi’s Women Initiative Criticised,” Association for Women's Rights in Development, 26th March 2013,
Available online: http://www.awid.org/News-Analysis/Women-s-Rights-in-the-News2/Morsi-s-women-initiative-
criticised (Retrieved on May 28th 2014).

\textsuperscript{264} “Morsi’s Women Initiative Criticised,” Association for Women’s Rights in Development, 26th March 2013,
Available online: http://www.awid.org/News-Analysis/Women-s-Rights-in-the-News2/Morsi-s-women-initiative-
criticised (Retrieved on May 28th 2014); "Mohamed Morsi’s new women’s rights initiative decried as out of touch
by activist groups #egender," International Women's Development Agency, April 1st, 2013, Available online: https://
groups-egender/ (Retrieved on May 28th 2014).
generation of *ikhwan*. Such a consistency has been assessed on the ground of the EMB’s respect –through its political actions, decisions and stances while in power from 2012 to 2013– of central components pertaining to the five important aspects of its political ideology that have been previously outlined\textsuperscript{265}. Nevertheless, one important question remains. If the EMB’s political actions are oriented toward a consistency with the second ideological trend and its ideological line of systemism, and if there was accordingly no “hidden agenda,” then what is it that triggers the downfall of the EMB and its FJP only one year after reaching power? Indeed, if there was no hidden agenda, then the toppling of the Morsi led government along with the banning of the FJP and the EMB in its entirety did not take place because the Brotherhood was trying to implement a “hidden Islamist” agenda, and the answer to such a question has to be found somewhere else.

### III. Epilogue: Challenges and Limitations of the EMB-led Government

What can be considered to be the EMB’s challenges and limitations when in government in Egypt and how do they compare to the movement's political ideology? Given the recent nature of these events, it is still difficult to offer an exhaustive analysis of the reasons that led to the toppling of the EMB led government in July 2013. Nevertheless, closer scrutiny already exposes the very challenging nature of the context in which the EMB led government assumed power and its inability at addressing important challenges, hinting at a strong role in the Brotherhood’s demise from the political context in which the movement’s FJP assumes power and the very political mistakes of the Morsi government.

\textsuperscript{265} The five important aspects outlined in I.2.
The political context in which the EMB's FJP assumes power is a crucial component of the movement’s fall from power through popular uprisings and a military coup in June-July 2014. According to one scholar, one of the main challenges that the FJP and the EMB faced during Morsi’s rule was the legacy of antagonism toward the Muslim Brotherhood and what is referred to as “political Islam” or “Islamists” created by the successive dictatorial regimes against their strongest political opponents. According to her, it was emphasized and utilized "to the utmost by the secular and liberal groups since 2011 partly in order for them to gain greater ground [...] the level of misinformation that has been circulated in the mainstream media and social media is reminiscent of the worst anti-Islam and anti-Islamist voices in the West." Nevertheless, the fact is that the EMB’s FJP always go the endorsement of the majority of the participating electorate every time there were elections or referenda during its rule in power. Yet closer analysis also show that the downfall of the first democratically elected government of post-revolutionary Egypt was brought by many important practical limitations on the part of the EMB’s FJP, along with an important campaign of sabotaging and propaganda by actors opposing them. One such actor has been identified as being the “Judiciary,” still filled with figures of the Mubarak regime and bent on challenging and ultimately undoing the Morsi government with important politically oriented legal measures.

Another important difficulty of the Morsi led government while in power was that of fixing the dire economic situation of the country at the time of its assumption of political power through its


presidential candidate; economic situation which hence perdured from the uprisings of 2011 to
the military coup and beyond. The dire economic situation at the time of Morsi's assumption of
power is such that it played not only an important role in the Egyptians' decision to rise against
Mubarak in 2011 but also in their aspirations for Morsi's rule. Indeed, high unemployment, the
rise of the informal sectors of the economy and even revenues were already an important
problem at the time of Mubarak's ouster from power and remained so in large parts during
Morsi's presidency, leading to widespread dissatisfaction at his rule. This is not to say that
Morsi’s government had no positive influence on the economy as some today do point to an
appreciable amelioration of many aspects of the Egyptian economy under his government.269
Indeed, the economic situation was also “utilized” against the Morsi government by its political
opponents, as political analysts noticed the sudden shortage of gas and power cuts, along with
the sudden return of the police in the streets.270 In many ways, this is because of a sense of a
difficult economic situation and the failure of the EMB dominated government at prioritizing its
fixing –rather than dissatisfaction with the EMB's political ideology– that Egyptians massively

269 “Egypt's interim government recognises Morsi's economic achievements,” Middle East Monitor, 16th September
2013, Available online: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/7379-egypts-interim-government-
recognises-morsis-economic-achievements (Retrieved on June 1st 2014).

270 Harold Maas, “Did Egypt's military manufacture an economic crisis to sabotage Morsi?,” The Week, July 11th
2013, Available online: http://theweek.com/article/index/246770/did-egypts-military-manufacture-an-economic-
crisis-to-sabotage-morsi#axzz33Os7oGHR (Retrieved on June 1st 2014); Ben Hubbard, “Sudden Improvements in
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/middleeast/improvements-in-egypt-suggest-a-campaign-that-undermined-
morsi.html?pagewanted=all (Retrieved on June 1st 2014).
took to the street on June 30th 2013. Nevertheless, the EMB’s political mistakes are another major component of that led to the downfall of the Morsi-led government.

Political mistakes of the Morsi government and the EMB are major components that go out of the scope of contextual factors and that that led to public anger against the government and its toppling by the military. According to another scholar, the EMB’s fall from power was mainly reliant on its difficult relationship and deep mistakes with the main political rivals of post-revolutionary Egypt, namely the Military, the activists and the "Ancien Regime". In large part, this can be understood to be due to the EMB's lack of experience in such a situation despite its large experience as an opposition party and its development of important tools used in its interplay with political forces of the later context.

The EMB mastered opposition politics under the semiauthoritarian regimes of Sadat and Mubarak through developing such a tool as wasatiyya politics in order to survive and thrive in a political order in which "victory is not an option" and intense repression is never too far.

Wasatiyya politics is a political tool that was predominant between both Islamists and secularists


273 Michaeelle L. Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Nathan J. Brown, When Victory is Not an Option : Islamist Movements in Arab Politic, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012);
political parties and actors of the semiauthoritarian contexts of the Mubarak regime, in which it established a "middle ground politic" between political forces of the opposition against the ruling regime while disregarding ideological differences\textsuperscript{274}. Nevertheless, the context of post-revolutionary Egypt in which the EMB became itself the ruling regime made it such that the tool of wasatiyya politics became irrelevant while the movement was left to develop new political tools altogether in order to cope with the reality of being a ruling party.

In this new context, the EMB's strategy revolved around its decision to play between the different political forces instead of entirely co-opting a single one of them into its government, something that would ultimately spell its demise\textsuperscript{275}. Indeed, neither the Army nor the secular forces and the activists or even the Ancien Regime are entirely co-opted in the EMB's politics but they are rather constantly balanced one against another, in turn and in accordance to the movement's interests at the time\textsuperscript{276}. On the other hand, the EMB could have entirely sided with the military and crushed the Ancien Regime and the secular forces and their activists once and for all, just as much as it could have sided with the Ancien Regime in a situation where it was willing to concede a lot in order to secure its privileges –or at least parts of them\textsuperscript{277}. Finally, it could have sided with the secular forces and their activists in a manner reminiscent of wasatiyya.

\textsuperscript{274} Michaelle L. Browers, \textit{Political Ideology in the Arab World} (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), ix and 48–76.

\textsuperscript{275} Hazem Kandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood Failed in Egypt because it was Inept, Out of Touch and Incompetent," \textit{The Conversation} (UK), 27\textsuperscript{th} February 2014, Available online: \url{http://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738} (Consulted on April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2014).

\textsuperscript{276} Hazem Kandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood Failed in Egypt because it was Inept, Out of Touch and Incompetent," \textit{The Conversation} (UK), 27\textsuperscript{th} February 2014, Available online: \url{http://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738} (Consulted on April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2014).

\textsuperscript{277} Hazem Kandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood Failed in Egypt because it was Inept, Out of Touch and Incompetent," \textit{The Conversation} (UK), 27\textsuperscript{th} February 2014, Available online: \url{http://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738} (Consulted on April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2014).
politics and in order to offer a common front against both the Army and the Ancien Regime\textsuperscript{278}. Instead of doing so, it decided to constantly shift between each of them for reasons that were contextual.

The Army is considered by some scholars as an important actor of post-revolutionary Egyptian politics in that it was the very institution that allowed for the demise of Mubarak by deciding to not intervene against the protesters during the manifestations of the Arab Spring\textsuperscript{279}. It did so for many reasons, lying mainly in the Mubarak regime's denial of its functional privileges and the gradual threat it imposed upon its economic ones\textsuperscript{280}. Indeed, the Army considered that Mubarak's regime was denying it the possibilities to achieve its goals as an Army and to function properly\textsuperscript{281}, something that it was very eager to reverse under the post-Mubarak era. As such, it opted for transmitting the executive powers to the EMB and leaving politics to civilians entirely in order to focus on reconstructing itself in the face of the greatest opportunity it had to

\textsuperscript{278} Hazem Kandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood Failed in Egypt because it was Inept, Out of Touch and Incompetent," \textit{The Conversation}(UK), 27\textsuperscript{th} February 2014, Available online: \url{http://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738} (Consulted on April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2014).


\textsuperscript{280} See Kandil's explanation for such a phenomenon: Hazem Kandil, \textit{Soldiers, Spy and Statesmen: Egypt's road to Revolt}, (UK: Verso, 2012), 175-221.

\textsuperscript{281} Hazem Kandil, \textit{Soldiers, Spy and Statesmen: Egypt's road to Revolt}, (UK: Verso, 2012), 175-221. Kandil points at the authoritarian regimes’ attempts to co-opt the army through weakening it, rendering it unable to benefit from quality recruits, proper armaments, etc.
reconstruct in decades\textsuperscript{282}. Nevertheless, the EMB's inability at playing the political game effectively with the other political forces of Egyptian society made it such that it was forced to decisively intervene once again in the political process in July 2014, this time assuming the charge of politics and ousting the EMB-dominated government\textsuperscript{283}.

The Ancien Regime in post-revolutionary Egypt is considered by some scholars as another important actor of post-revolutionary politics in Egypt as it still maintained lots of economic, political and even social power in the politics of a country from which it was not entirely removed at the time of Morsi's rule\textsuperscript{284}. For the EMB to side with them, this would have meant the reduction of the Army to a co-opted institution of power –just like it was under Sadat and Mubarak– all the while crushing the secular forces and their activists in a manner that could have been threatening to the future of democracy in Egypt\textsuperscript{285}. Indeed, the Ancien Regime's objective in post-revolutionary Egypt is, logically, that of the maintaining of its past privileges –or at least

\textsuperscript{282} Hazem Kandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood Failed in Egypt because it was Inept, Out of Touch and Incompetent," \textit{The Conversation(UK)}, 27th February 2014, Available online: \url{http://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738} (Consulted on April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2014).

\textsuperscript{283} Hazem Kandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood Failed in Egypt because it was Inept, Out of Touch and Incompetent," \textit{The Conversation(UK)}, 27th February 2014, Available online: \url{http://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738} (Consulted on April 6\textsuperscript{th} 2014).


parts of them– in a context where its survival altogether is at risk as Egypt took the path of
democracy. In a context in which it risked losing everything, its path of action was to render
Egypt ungovernable for the EMB-dominated government through raising economic and
administrative obstacles to its rule, something rendered possible by its remaining post-
revolutionary presence in some echelons of power such as the judiciary\textsuperscript{286}. This sabotaging from
the old regime further increased the political polarization and the economic crisis the country
was living.

The secularists and their activists are considered by some scholars as the third important political
actor of the post-revolutionary politics of Egypt as they represent the political interests of the
EMB's main political opposition despite their lack of organization and relative weak unity as
opposed to the Army and the Ancien Regime\textsuperscript{287}. The case in which the EMB would have sided
with them entirely would have seen the gradual fostering of democratization in the country and
the greater inclusion of the secularists into the political process of reconstructing the bases of the


post-revolutionary Egyptian state according to Kandil. This would have been to the detriment of the Army—who the democratic government would have sought to entirely co-opt by disempowering what made it independent—and the Ancien Regime—whose privileges would have been completely revoked while its members would have been sent to the tribunals. This would have been the logical continuation of Egypt's wasatiyya politics yet the EMB's relationship with the secularists and their activists resulted in the latter's boycott, denunciation and propaganda of the former's political actions and stances in post-revolutionary Egypt. This further fuelled the rise of popular anger against the movement.

In the context in which it found itself after Morsi's election, the EMB became increasingly unable to balance between the three important political actors but still did not entirely side with one of them against the two other. Indeed, the EMB still attempted to nominally satisfy all three of them and play them against each other in a context in which it was still unwilling to

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completely take one side. For the EMB, this would ultimately lead to its ouster from power with the military coup of July 30th at the hands of what was a coalition of the secularists and their activists, the Army, and the Ancien Regime. Kandil argues that this coalition developed into an alliance of the Army and the Ancien Regime against the EMB and the secularists and their activists. Such a theory puts the emphasis on the important role played by political “intrigues” –rather than ideological implications– in the fall of the Morsi government in July 2013.

Despite the recent occurrence of the events, closer analysis already show that the EMB’s "political" –rather than ideological– difficulties once in power lead to the demonstrations of June 30th 2013 and the military’s toppling of the Morsi government a few days later. Rather than a potential problem emerging from its political ideology, this is its tactical inability to play the political role of the ruler that lead to such a turn of Egyptian society against the movement, leading to Morsi’s toppling and the movement's widespread repression by the military state while being resented by much of society. As a better academic understanding of the EMB’s experience and limitations while in power will require more research on the movement's political practices and their evolution during this timeframe, we can already draw some conclusions on the way the movement evolves ideologically in the same timeframe. Indeed, the fact that the EMB did not change ideologically during the time in power puts new limits to the "participation-moderation" theory as "moderation" is not parallel to "gradual liberalization," but rather the reaching of a certain cap of public acceptability.

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The EMB's experience in power should have important repercussions for the way scholars of the movement, look at its ideological evolution through the scope of the participation-moderation theory. Is there a limit to "moderation" even when Islamist political parties are "fully" offered participation –when they are allowed the possibility to win the elections? Indeed, the EMB did not change ideologically any further once it accessed power. Is it because there is a limit to the "moderation" stemmed by participation? Or can it be seen as a limit stemmed by the political and cultural context in which the Islamist political party evolves and engages into political action?

An important aspect of the way Islamists’ ideological change should be looked at in the future is one which takes into account the culture of the political context in which they evolve and in which they partake in political action. Just as much as democracy is an aspect that can be expected of them in a context where participatory politics is sought, can we really expect Islamists to evolve ideologically toward “liberalism” when there is little demand for these values on the ground? Indeed, democracy is an aspect of politics demanded by a large majority of Egyptians –as proved by their revolution against the Mubarak regime– yet can the same be said of liberal values?

The EMB’s short stay in power through the Morsi government has been marred with important criticism of many of its political endeavours under the rationale that they were “Islamist”. Nevertheless, as it has already been noted, Islamism is a political ideology with much demand in Arab political scenes such as Egypt295. Taking into account the EMB’s experience from 2012 to 2013, we should not expect Islamists to act in any different way than that of pushing for their

conceptions of Islamic values through democratic and pluralistic means due to their demand on
the political scenes where they evolve.

In light of my argument that the EMB did remain consistent with its second ideological trend and
that it did not show signs of ideological change through its year in power, along with the fact that
its expulsion from power has already been pinpointed by some scholars as being contingent on
challenges imposed by its political opponents, one question remains to be asked. If Islamists are
rejected by some for the same reasons that they are demanded by others –for the very Islamist
values they defend in politics– does this mean that the debate about Islamists in politics should
take a different strand? Indeed, in Egypt, the debate over the Muslim Brotherhood in post-
revolutionary politics did take important overtones of pro-Islamists vs. anti-Islamists stances as
the Morsi government was dominated by the former and the opposition was dominated by the
latter. At the same time, every doing of this Islamist-led government that was composed of some
Islamic rationale was denounced as “intrinsically Islamist,” as if it should come as a surprise that
in a Muslim majority society there would be regulations, passed or attempted to be passed, that
reflect the Islamic norms and values of the majority of the population. This really affects the
debate about Islamists’ inclusion in politics and such theories as the participation-moderation
one.

An important aspect of the Brotherhood’s rule from 2012 to 2013 is that despite the important
changes that Islamist groups might implement to their political ideologies, and the conceding
they could make to their political actions, non-Islamist political actors still seem unready to
respect them as full actors of democratic politics. The message sent to Islamist political
movements with the toppling of the Morsi government in Egypt is that non-Islamist political
actors –here found in the secularists, the Army and the Ancien Regime– are neither ready nor willing to share power with Islamists –such as the EMB. This unreadiness and unwillingness goes despite whatever ideological concessions Islamists may make in order to gain a share of power, or whatever democratic elections they may win in order to prove their popular legitimacy. Such a message might have important ramifications for the future of Sunni political Islam, as “moderation” did not secure full “participation”, even in a context where true democracy was attempted such as the post-revolutionary Egyptian context.

Does this mean that Islamists will not change ideologically anymore but will rather have to wait for the growth of a democratic culture where elected representatives are respected rather than overthrown in these countries? Or does this mean that Islamists will rather need to change even further, potentially engaging into “liberalism”, in order to attract a wider array of the population and in order to prevent being further overthrown from democratically won seats of power? In any case, this might very much mean that Islamists would not approach democracy in the same manner anymore.
Conclusion

In this thesis paper, I argued that the EMB's political ideology marked a genuine change between what I have termed to be the first ideological trend and the second ideological trend, from an “ideological line” of “anti-systemism” toward one of “systemism”. Indeed, this is in accordance to the second trend that the EMB has ruled in Egypt when in power from 2012 to 2013 as closer analysis of the Morsi government’s doings in power reveal. At the same time, its overthrow from power in July 2013 has already been pinpointed by many scholars and political analysts on variables that are contingent on the political context of post-revolutionary Egypt rather than specific aspects of the Brotherhood’s political ideology. Indeed, the Brotherhood was not banned from political power and civil society because it was too “Islamic” but rather because of variables such as the challenging context in which it assumed power and its inability at tactfully playing the important –and often undemocratic– political challenges opposed to it by its political opponents. In light of these political developments, this means that the demand for Islamism in Egyptian society and the already effected ideological change of the EMB cannot bring in political power as long as an important component is absent. This important component is a democratic culture where democratic elections and the elected representatives they bring in are respected for the duration of their term instead of being toppled by the street at every sign of popular discontent. Indeed, as ideological change was previously stemmed by the incentive of political power through democracy, change cannot take place anymore if the end goal is not respected anymore –if political power through democracy is simply not an option anymore.