EDUCATION AND (IN)SECURITY:
THE CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY’S EDUCATION SECTOR AID TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES: 2000-2013

by

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the relationship between education aid and security (goals, understandings, and discourses) in conflict-affected and post-conflict states, using Michel Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analytical methods. I used a comparative historical (archaeological) analysis to examine continuities and discontinuities in education reconstruction practices from 1945 to 2013, to develop a typology of education aid goals and practices comprising stabilization, protection, peacebuilding and statebuilding, and to identify historical trends and patterns in education aid to conflict-affected states. Next, I adopted a genealogical method to examine the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA’s) education sector aid to Afghanistan Colombia, and (South) Sudan from 2000 until 2013. This genealogy entailed identifying the multiple security apparatuses inclusive of discursive and non-discursive practices that construct and reify security threats and risks, and the relationship between dominant understandings of security and education aid practices. The genealogical analysis revealed how CIDA, and the Canadian government more broadly, linked Canada’s education aid with its foreign policy priorities through mechanisms ostensibly mandated to improve public sector accountability. In this context, accountability constituted a form governmentality—ways in which the government regulated the conduct of CIDA managers, and ensured domestic public support for Canada’s
development assistance program by shaping (through discourses) ways of thinking about aid, instead of employing directly coercive measures.

The findings indicate that, in each country case study, CIDA’s education aid practices were historically and contextually contingent, and embedded within a security apparatus. Broadly speaking, the security apparatus affected education aid in four main ways. First, the security apparatus produced subjectivities of at-risk (vulnerable) or risky (dangerous) populations which became the object of education sector interventions. Second, the security apparatus delimited the spatial dimension of Canada’s aid commitments by separating and isolating territories. In some instances the security apparatus precluded areas from CIDA aid; in other instances it concentrated aid on a specific border zone, province, or areas. Third, the security apparatus entailed the use of education aid as a mechanism to regulate or discipline the conduct of populations. Fourth, CIDA’s education sector aid divided the world into secure and insecure zones, particularly after 2005-2006. In secure zones, education contributes to a knowledge economy and continuous learning; in insecure, conflict-affected areas, education aid is used to manage populations perceived as at-risk and risky. Finally, the study draws attention to the possibility that, differently imagined and problematized, alternate understandings of security could support education reconstruction for transformative social change.
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This research developed over many years. It began from anecdotal evidence collected while I was living in the occupied Palestinian Territories. There, I was both an insider and outsider. As an insider I shared some of the day-to-day restrictions and hardships of living under military occupation, although my experiences rarely, if ever, matched those of citizens and refugees. As an outsider, I bore witness to the violence but always at a safe distance, sheltered by way of a foreign passport and exit strategy if and when needed. Over the years, I shared many meals with friends and strangers who were gracious and opened their homes and lives either for brief conversations or steadfast friendships. It was in Gaza where I glimpsed what it means to be occupied and stateless and the generational price this status exacts. It is also where I realized that borders extend well beyond the materiality of barbed wire and concrete barrier walls. They are (re)constituted through ideas, symbolism, everyday speech and practices found in school classrooms and beyond. Such bordering is neither fixed nor permanent, but it requires vision and courage to re-imagine people, spaces and government. For this reason, I owe a heartfelt debt to all those whose lives intersected with mine, whether by chance or choice.

This research would not have been possible without research participants who consented to interviews. These include staff at the former Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (combined into the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development as of 2013) the Canadian Forces, international organizations and non-governmental organizations and independent consultants. More often than not, they spoke candidly about the decision-making process, the considerations and constraints affecting the allocation and the delivery of foreign aid.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ ii

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iv

Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
  Purpose of the Research ........................................................................................................ 3
  Methodology and Conceptual Framework ........................................................................ 7
  Organization of the Study ..................................................................................................... 9
  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 12

Chapter Two Education, War and Security: Connecting the Dots ........................................ 13
  Education and Armed Conflict: Causal Theories ............................................................ 14
    Grievance-Based Explanations ......................................................................................... 15
    Greed/Opportunity-Based Explanations ........................................................................ 18
    Environment-Based Explanations .................................................................................... 19
  Implications for Education Aid ........................................................................................ 21
  Bringing Security Back In ................................................................................................. 23
  Education, Armed Conflict and Security .......................................................................... 31
  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 34

Chapter Three Methodology and Research Design ............................................................... 35
  Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 36
  Archaeology and Genealogy .............................................................................................. 38
    Archaeology .................................................................................................................. 38
    Genealogy ..................................................................................................................... 40
  Methodological Approach ................................................................................................ 42
    About CIDA .................................................................................................................. 45
  Case Study Selection: CIDA Education Aid Recipient Countries .................................. 48
  Data Collection and Analysis ........................................................................................... 49
  Situating Myself as Researcher ......................................................................................... 52
  Limitations of the Study .................................................................................................... 54
  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 56

Chapter Four An Archaeology of Education Aid in Conflict-affected States: 1944–2013 ........ 58
  US Postwar Reconstruction in Germany and Japan: “Re-Education” ................................ 59
  Education, Anti-Colonialism, and Counterinsurgencies (1950s–1970s) .......................... 64
Malaya (1948–1960): Winning “Hearts and Minds” ............................................................. 64
Liberal Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Period .............................................................. 73
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) .................. 75
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ............................................. 76
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) ........................................................................ 79
Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) ............................................ 79
Epistemic Shifts ...................................................................................................................... 82
A Typology of Education Reconstruction .......................................................................... 85
Education Aid as Stabilization ............................................................................................... 87
Education as Protection ........................................................................................................ 88
Education Aid as Peacebuilding ........................................................................................... 89
Education Aid as Statebuilding .............................................................................................. 90
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 90

Chapter Five CIDA’s Accountability Apparatus and Implications for Education Sector Aid ............................................................................................................................. 92
CIDA Disbursements in the Education Sector ..................................................................... 97
Aid by Recipients .................................................................................................................... 98
Effectiveness-Based Practices ................................................................................................. 99
Performance-Based Practices ............................................................................................... 104
Values-Based Practices ........................................................................................................ 112
Accountability as an Expression of Governmentality ............................................................. 114
Implications for Canada’s Education Sector Aid ................................................................. 116
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 118

Chapter Six Colombia ........................................................................................................ 120
Colombian Security Apparatuses .......................................................................................... 121
Background to the Conflict .................................................................................................... 121
Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs ................................................................................... 122
Democratic Security and Counterinsurgency ...................................................................... 124
Citizen Security ...................................................................................................................... 131
Canada’s Development Assistance: 2000–2013 ............................................................... 135
Canada’s Human Security Agenda ....................................................................................... 135
Trends in Aid Flows ............................................................................................................... 145
Afghanistan

Sudan and South Sudan

Question 2: Factors Affecting Similarities and Differences Across Case Studies.

Question 3: Historical Patterns in Education Aid and Security

Reflections on the Research Methodology and Recommendations for Future Research

Concluding Remarks

References
List of Tables

Table 1 Historical and Contemporary Illustrations of Education in Situations of Armed Conflict

Table 2 Distribution of Interviewees by Sector/Agency*

Table 3 Four Approaches in Education Reconstruction

Table 4 CIDA’s Geographic Focus

Table 5 The Spaces, Populations, and Technologies of Security

Table 6 Six Education-Specific Benchmarks

Table 7 CIDA Bilateral Disbursements in the Education Sector by Sub-Sector (SC millions)
List of Figures

Figure 1. Typology of education aid practices................................................................. 44
Figure 2. CIDA’s 2013 organizational structure............................................................ 48
Figure 3. Canada’s Official Development Assistance for 2000–2001.............................. 95
Figure 4. Canada’s Official Development Assistance by channel. ................................. 96
Figure 5. CIDA’s aid allocation by recipient countries..................................................... 97
Figure 6. CIDA’s education sector disbursements by region. ........................................ 98
Figure 7. Canada’s ODA by department and agency....................................................... 146
Figure 8. Canada’s bilateral education sector aid disbursements to Colombia.............. 147
Figure 9. Canada’s Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan by department. 172
Figure 10. Afghanistan Task Force spending from 2007–2011.* .................................. 177
Figure 11. CIDA’s bilateral education aid to Afghanistan............................................. 184
Figure 12. Canada’s Official Development Assistance to Sudan by department.......... 214
Figure 13. CIDA’s bilateral education aid disbursement to Sudan and South Sudan. 217
Figure 14. Mapping security discourses and education aid interventions....................... 235
List of Appendices

Appendix A Documents Related to Data Collection................................................................. 287

Appendix B CIDA’s Public Management Reforms and Education Sector Project Data by Country.................................................................................................................. 297
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine how various conceptions of international and national security affect donor aid practices over time and place using Canada’s education sector aid to Colombia, Afghanistan, and (South) Sudan as a case study. The study contributes to broadening and deepening the emergent field of education and conflict. By broadening, I mean giving serious consideration to dimensions of security in the study of education and conflict. By deepening, I mean developing a conceptual framework based on the work of Michel Foucault with which to interpret the relationships between education aid, armed conflict and conceptions of security.

It is hardly an exaggeration to claim that wars are a blight. They interrupt and irreversibly affect lives and generations in ways that cannot be captured remotely by statistical trends of out-of-school children, recruitment, forced displacement, schools damaged, destroyed, or closed, and so on. Wars separate families, and establish spatial and relational borders between groups and territory that can further perpetuate armed conflict. So, to think that education reconstruction could deliver some respite or, better still, help to avoid conflict traps altogether might seem utopian, misguided or even foolish. Yet this bewitching notion of education as Prometheus unbound is never far from the minds of education policymakers. Written at the end of the Second World War as allied powers prepared a massive reconstruction campaign including a re-education program, the preamble to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s constitution summoned this ideal. It begins, "Since wars begin in the minds of men [sic], it is in the minds of men [sic] that the defences of peace must be constructed". This grandiloquent rhetoric captures a specific historical moment in which education reconstruction was perceived by members of the commission entrusted with UNESCO’s constitution as a defensive bulwark against the onset and recurrence of inter-state war and essential dimension of post-war peacebuilding and international security (UNESCO, 1945).

The term peacebuilding post-dates the founding of UNESCO by several decades. Common to postwar reconstruction and liberal peacebuilding of the 1990s is the view that...
education can contribute to a positive peace, where injustice is redressed and parties to a conflict learn to coexist peaceably, beyond mere negative peace – the absence of war or other overt violence (Galtung, 1964). While this Galtungian differentiation between forms of peace has informed peace education scholarship since the 1960s, the broader comparative education scholarship seemed oddly disengaged from both war studies and security studies. One factor minimizing comparative education scholars’ attention to problems of security is disciplinary bordering within the academy. Another factor has been dominant conceptions of security during the Cold War years that emphasized military capabilities. Both factors contributed to the myth that, while education can contribute to peacebuilding, it was not in the business of war making. The “Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict” by Bush and Saltarelli (2000) was influential in shaping the emerging field of education and conflict partly because it exposed how education policies can lean a country closer towards war making or peacebuilding, depending on the nature of the intervention.

In the post-Cold War, security studies scholars have proposed new non-traditional forms of security human security, environmental and societal security that elevate non-military issues to the level of an existential threat including pandemics, global poverty, climate change and natural disasters. These emerging understandings disrupted the war-peace binary and contributed to the emergence of a new sub-field of knowledge – education in emergencies – promoted by networks such as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) through a program of activities, including norm setting, advocacy, capacity building, and knowledge creation. In reclassifying armed conflicts within a broader category of “emergencies” or “complex emergencies” the INEE conflates armed conflict with natural disasters and chronic poverty. Based on this new schema, the provision of education is potentially life saving and life sustaining: education is understood as having the power to ‘make live or let die’ by protecting and building resilient populations better able to cope with and adapt to situations of armed conflict and its collateral effects. In this way, the field of education in emergencies promotes activities designed to mitigate the effects of armed conflict or, in other words, support negative peace.
Purpose of the Research

This research attempts to understand how we arrived at this point, more than 60 years after UNESCO affirmed the transformational potential of education and how we might reclaim education once again to affirm not only its capacity to save lives but to enable these lives to flourish. It reviews the record of Canada’s education sector aid to selected conflict-affected states – including Afghanistan, Colombia, Sudan and South Sudan – through the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA was the main delivery channel for Canada’s Official Development Assistance from 1968 to 2013. In 2013, the Canadian government merged CIDA with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to form the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.¹

The case of Canada provides a useful starting point for an investigation of the relationship between education aid and security. Canada’s foreign aid motivations have been characterized as alternating between altruism and self-interest (Pratt, 2001, 2003). Unlike the US Agency for International Development, for example, which is mandated explicitly to advance US foreign policy interests, CIDA lacked a similar mandate and, until 2008, a legal framework to guide its programming. Successive Canadian governments have promoted aid as an extension and reflection of Canadian values including social justice, human rights, democracy and quality. These values inform Canada’s identity as a middle power state, which is characterized by a preference for multilateralism and non-violent conflict resolution (Welsh, 2010; Chapnik, 2005; Cooper, Higgott & Nossal, 1993). Canada’s middle power identity coexists alongside its identity as part of the North-Atlantic triangle comprising the United States and Great Britain, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance (Brebner, 1970; Haglund, 2000). Membership in these security communities has contributed to Canada’s security preferences (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Adler & Barnett, 1998). At times, the Canadian government adopted traditional, military- and economic centric concepts of

¹ The Canadian government announced that CIDA would be amalgamated with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in its federal budget tabled in Parliament on March 21, 2013. The merger came into force with the assent of Bill C-60 on June 26, 2013, which enacts the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, and establishes the powers, duties and functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International Trade and the Minister for International Development and provides for the amalgamation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency. Parliament of Canada. (2013). Statutes of Canada 2013: Chapter 33. Retrieved from http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/411/Government/C-60/C-60_4/C-60_4.PDF
security. At other times, it advocated for non-traditional forms of security including collective security as proposed by international commissions on international development issues (Thakur, Cooper & English, 2006) and human security under the leadership of prime ministers Chretien and Martin from the late 1990s until 2005 (MacLean, Black & Shaw, 2006; Bernard Jr., 2006; Axworthy, 1997, pp.183-196). This security potpourri makes Canada an appropriate case study for an analysis of the relationship between conceptions of security and education sector aid.

The main research question at the heart of this research and its three sub-questions are:

What is the relationship between education aid and conceptions of security and what is the role of power in shaping this relationship?

i) What types of education aid policies and practices did CIDA support in Afghanistan, Colombia, Sudan and South Sudan from 2000 to 2013, and how have these changed across time and place?

ii) What factors contribute to similarities and differences in CIDA’s patterns of educational aid within and between country case studies over time?

iii) How do recent trends in education aid practices in conflict and postconflict states fit into broader patterns and shifts in education reconstruction aid (1944-2013)?

The three case studies examine three dimensions of the education aid-security relationship. At one level, they look at the specific education sector projects funded by CIDA in select conflict-affected states to contribute to comparative education research on education and security (Novelli, 2011; Sobe, 2007), and the broader literature on education and conflict (Smith, 2014; Barakat et al., 2013; Mundy & Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Paulson, 2011; Tawil and Harley, 2004; Davies, 2004; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000).² At a second level, they focus on Canada’s aid program, including public sector management reforms that influenced where and how aid was channelled in the context of global power shifts. At a third level, they examine the relationships among armed conflict, security and foreign aid, using education

² Exemplars of research on the security-development nexus are found in the 2010 special issue of Security Dialogue, 41(1).
sector interventions as an example of foreign aid, and contribute to the scholarship on the so-called development-security nexus. Therefore, this study crosses disciplinary borders (comparative education policy, security studies, international development studies, and Canadian public policy) and skips back and forth across multiple scales (organizational, national, international and global). The inherent risk of this interdisciplinary approach is that it could fail to satisfy only one of its parent or foster disciplines. Its focus on education potentially dissuades security studies specialists from reading further. Conversely, its security-centric approach might put off educationalists inclined to put as much distance as possible between education and security. In order to minimize the risks and maximize the value of this interdisciplinary research I have tried to maintain a balance, giving due attention to both security discourses and education practices.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to state clearly what this research does not do. Recent academic and policy studies suggest that education aid prevents and mitigates armed conflict through multiple mechanisms under certain conditions. These include, but are not restricted to, reducing horizontal inequities among ethno-cultural groups (Brown, 2011), building resilience (Sisgaard, 2011; Tebbe, 2009), narrowing gender inequalities (Kirk, 2011), strengthening social cohesion (Tawil & Harley, 2004), teaching children non-violent conflict resolution skills, citizenship education (Davies. 2005), and increasing public sector capacity and legitimacy (Davies, 2011a). Contrary to these studies, the evidence presented here does not lend itself to such claims. I am agnostic as to whether education reconstruction affects the duration or intensity of armed conflict and withhold judgement on the “good” versus “evil” debate that has polarized development studies in recent times.3 This research also does not investigate how local development actors adapt top-down “borrowed” education policies from donor states (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006). I neither prescribe policies nor make recommendations on global educational ‘best practices’ which may

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3 Scholarship on the impact of foreign aid on poor communities spans a minimalist-consequentialist continuum. Some propose that the best we can hope for is to alleviate suffering and do no harm (Rieff, 2003; Anderson, 1999). Others propose that state building, understood broadly as institution and capacity building, can “fix” failed and “fragile” states (OECD 2010; Rotberg 2003; Fukuyama 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005; Scowcroft and Berger 2005; Ghani and Lockhart 2008). Still others believe that development assistance, at least as it is currently configured, cannot deliver on its promises. On the contrary, they claim western foreign aid undermines economic growth, reinforces corruption and clientelism, and enacts a mission civilitrice (Moyo 2009, Easterly 2006).
disappoint some readers. While such investigations and policy recommendations are eminently useful, they require field-based longitudinal impact evaluations beyond the scope of this study.

Instead, this research seeks to examine convergent and divergent education aid practices across different situational contexts by Canada’s bilateral aid agency and its implementing partners, and whether these practices are co-related to dominant conceptions of international and national security. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies perceived the dominant security threat in terms of Communist expansion. Successive US administrations supported policies intended to contain the spread of communism by maintaining a balance of power between the two blocs (western-capitalist and eastern-communist) through collective security arrangements and arms race (Gaddis. 1982). Security constructs in the post-Cold War period have been less stable. Since 1989, dominant frames for security have included democratization (Fukuyama, 1992), the global war on terrorism, human security (Martin & Owen 2014; Kaldor, 2007), fragile states (Carment, Prest, & Samy 2009) cosmopolitanism or world security (Booth, 2007), and climate change (Brown, Hammill & McLeman, 2007; US Department of Defence, 2014).

Each of these recent security frames has implications for donor aid (Hettne 2010) and, presumably, education sector aid. Although researchers have investigated the relationship between security and health issues (Elbe, 2010; Sjostedt, 2011), the environment (Trombetta, 2008, 2014), and gender (Hansen, 2000), education has been largely neglected in this literature, although exceptions include King (2014), Novelli (2011) and Collins (2005). Through this study, I address the gap in the comparative education literature with regards to the relationship between donor education aid, armed conflict, and security through an analysis of Canada’s education sector aid to Colombia, Afghanistan, and (South) Sudan. My goal is to understand how different perceptions of security threats and risks affect Canadian education aid policies and practices, and the mechanisms through which the effects are produced.
Methodology and Conceptual Framework

I adopt Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical methods: sociological historical approaches that examine continuities and discontinuities in discursive and non-discursive practices over time. Both approaches decentre the subject – they subordinate the role of individuals and their web of relations to uncovering how social understandings and practices change over time, and the conditions that render these changes possible. Whereas archaeology describes but skirts a discussion of the role of power relations, genealogy foregrounds it by bringing into focus both disciplining practices and different forms of power exercised by liberal states to manage the conduct of populations (Dean, 2010; Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1983; Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005).

I use these two methods in different ways. I use archaeology to examine shifts in education aid practices of a select group of state and non-state actors in conflict-affected states from 1945 to 2013 and the socio-political understandings within which they emerge. Through this historical narrative I develop a four-part typology for education practices comprising stabilization, protection, peacebuilding, and statebuilding. The typology is used as a heuristic device to compare education aid practices within and across the country case studies.

I use a genealogy to examine both public management reforms at CIDA from 2000 until 2013 (Chapter Five), and the relationship between CIDA’s education aid priorities and practices and conceptions of security in each of the three country case studies (Chapters Six to Eight). My data set consists of development policy documents and performance reports, international and national security and defense policy texts and official statements, aid statistics, and stakeholder interviews conducted with development officers and policymakers at CIDA, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of Defence/Canadian Forces, NGOs and academic institutions.

I draw from Foucault’s three concepts for this study: apparatus, security apparatus, and governmentality. An apparatus is a combination of tools – signs, rules, practices, and forms of knowledge – that regulate the behaviour of populations. I use this concept to
I understand how the Canadian government was able to subordinate CIDA’s aid program to its foreign policy priorities.

I draw on the concept of security apparatus (Foucault 2007, 11), which refers to strategies that enhance the security of a regime, to describe conceptions of security in Colombia, Afghanistan and (South Sudan). Foucault used security apparatus to understand how liberal governments ensure the compliance of their citizens to public policies and institutional practices without recourse to coercion. He understood security differently from traditional meanings that emphasize military dimensions and the phenomenon of war; security entailed practices for organizing the circulation of populations within a space, eliminating dangers, and maximizing good and eliminating or mitigating bad circulation (2007 18). Security apparatuses name a risk or threat, and rationalize a range of practices aimed at minimizing, preventing or eliminating danger with the consent of the population.

He described this form of power exercised over citizens by liberal governments as governmentality. Unlike disciplining power, which function to isolate, concentrate and enclose a space, and to monitor its population, governmentality functions by opening up space to facilitate the circulation of people and goods necessary for the maintenance of capitalist societies. Governmentality works by making policies and practices seem natural. It functions to regulate the conduct of a population through rationalities that provide a convincing reason for government policies, and technologies of power, which includes signs, rules, procedures and architectural forms.

Based on Foucault’s concepts of apparatus, security apparatus and governmentality, I make three assumptions. First, it is important to differentiate a security apparatus from a risk apparatus; the former defines the objects of security, the latter creates the objects of risk (Salter 2008, 249). Second, archival and contemporary security policy and strategy papers of state and intergovernmental actors such as the Canadian government, NATO and the United Nations can provide evidence of the emergence and transformation of a security or risk apparatus (Aradau and Blanke, 2010; Aradau and van Munster, 2007, 2008; Dillon 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). Third, a security apparatus entails the exercise of forms of power including disciplinary power and governmentality depending on the population(s) it targets. Additionally, I draw on Agamben’s notion of ‘states of exception – areas excluded
from normal rules and codes of conduct – to assume that a security apparatus can also delimit spaces where populations are denied the rights normally accorded to citizens (Agamben, 2005).

If a security or risk apparatus names a threat and provokes some form of action in response, then governmentality provides the Canadian government with tools for eliminating, neutralizing, mitigating or transforming a security risk or threat with the consent of the public. The impact of these practices, which may (or may not) include education sector interventions, can affect armed conflict-affected populations depending on the scope, scale and types of interventions naturalized by a particular security concept. Therefore, I examine how security apparatuses and governmentality cohere to produce different (or similar) Canadian education aid policies and practices across the three country case studies, and the implications of this aid for education systems in conflict-affected states in the short- and long-term in terms of sub-sector focus (primary, secondary, vocational, or post-secondary education), age group, channel of delivery (private/public), and local participation in decision making. I interpret these findings within a broader historical perspective to discuss the relationship between education sector aid and conceptions of security, and identity discontinuities in education sector practices and underlying forms of knowledge.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized into nine chapters. In Chapter Two, Education, Security and War, I defend my theoretical claim that security matters in donor education policies and programming in conflict-affected and post-conflict states. I suggest that understanding the role of education in the outbreak and duration of war is necessary but not sufficient to account for donor priorities and practices. The causes of war literature includes explanations foregrounding grievances, inequalities, rational calculations, and environmental and demographic factors. In theory, these explanations provide a positivist roadmap for ending armed conflict based on the assumption that if donors or implementing partners can identify cause-effect relationships they will be able to strategically design education reforms to help pre-empt, mitigate or reduce armed violence. In reality, the causes of war are interconnected
and complex, and education reforms are only one dimension of multi-dimensional reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies that includes security interests.

In Chapter Three, I outline my research design based on Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical methods, and concepts of an apparatus, and governmentality through an exegesis of some of his texts and lectures at the Collège de France. This discussion also examines Agamben’s notion of a state of exception, which denotes areas where the normal rules do not apply. I also detail the selection criteria for the three country case studies, specific data sources, and data collection methods, and the limitations of the study.

In Chapter Four, I adopt Foucault’s archaeological method to look for continuities and discontinuities in education aid practices by state actors and international organizations and education networks since 1945 in a select group of conflict-affected and postconflict states. From this analysis I derive a four-part typology of education interventions that scaffolds my subsequent comparative case study analysis of Canada’s education sector aid to Colombia, Afghanistan and (South) Sudan. I conclude that, since the late 20th century, when armed conflicts became characterized primarily by civil conflicts, civilian deaths, and non-state combatants, the role of education reconstruction shifted from preventing the onset and recurrence of wars and supporting positive peace to preparing for, reducing suffering, and recovering from wars as evidenced by the emergence of the field of education in emergencies.

In Chapter Five, I examine the tensions that arise from CIDA’s dual accountability. One the one hand as a government body responsible for Canada’s development assistance, CIDA is accountable to parliament and Canadian citizens. On the other hand, as a member of international and regional development networks governed by normative rules and practices, it is accountable to these communities of practice. Based on an analysis of CIDA’s policies and performance reports during the period under review, I argue that public sector management reforms ostensibly enacted to strengthen democratic accountability at CIDA, and federal government departments in general, constituted an accountability apparatus. This apparatus, ultimately, subordinated aid to Canadian foreign policy priorities, including security-, economic- and trade-driven priorities. This apparatus also influenced how civil servants and the public imagine foreign aid as a tool of the government to advance its
national interests. I describe how this apparatus was an expression of governmentality and made policy coherence across government departments seem desirable and natural, and paved the way for the amalgamation of CIDA under the Department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development.

In Chapters Six through Eight, I present three country case studies. For each of these cases, I divide the research into three sections. In the first section I show the main security apparatus based on an analysis of security texts. In the second section, I describe and analyze Canada’s bilateral relations with the country under review, including development, diplomatic and defence priorities. In the third section, I analyze Canada’s education sector aid using statistical trends in aid flows, project profiles, and interviews with stakeholders. For each case I suggest how a security apparatus creates and circumscribes the territory and population of security that become the objects of education aid, and how a security apparatus is used to regulate the conduct of the population, whether through overt or less overt measures.

Finally, Chapter Nine is a synthetic and concluding chapter in which I offer summative thoughts regarding the relationship between education aid and security as it pertains to Canada and donors more broadly. I argue that conceptions of security, including the global war on terrorism, citizen security, and human security, have implications for education aid in terms of the populations they include and exclude. Conceptions of security might also divide the world into two spheres comprising secure and insecure spaces, and normalize education sector interventions to shape the conduct of populations. In regulating the behaviour of populations in insecure zones, states in secure zones maximize the ‘good’ circulation of goods and capital across borders necessary for global, liberalized trade, and minimize ‘bad’ circulation, including the spill over of armed conflict and its collateral effects into secure territories. Moreover, the relationship between education aid and security or risk apparatus will be increasingly be difficult to decouple, block, or reverse. This is partly due to public sector management reforms that subordinate Canadian education aid to foreign policy priorities. It is also partly due to the closer ties between CIDA and large-scale international organizations and NGOs responsible educational services in conflict and postconflict states, which limits the role these organizations play in contesting Canada’s education aid policies.
Conclusion

In the post-Cold War period donor states, such as Canada, confront multiple security threats and risks – pandemics, climate change, terrorism, transnational crime, religious extremism. In response to these threats and risks, donor states mobilize resources, including education aid, in order to mitigate, prevent and eliminate danger. This study aims to understand the relationship between conceptions of security and education aid priorities and policies. Specifically, it looks at how different understandings of security support forms of education reconstruction that contribute to preventing or reducing armed violence (negative peace) or supporting more egalitarian societies and principles of social justice (positive peace) (Galtung, 1969).
CHAPTER TWO

EDUCATION, WAR AND SECURITY:
CONNECTING THE DOTS

New global education policy networks and coalitions, university courses, and academic research aiming to facilitate rebuilding in and after armed conflict are welcome additions to the emerging field of education and conflict (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 2002; Smith & Vaux, 2003; Davies, 2004; Buckland, 2005; Sobe, 2009; Paulson, 2011; UNESCO, 2011; Mundy & Dryden-Peterson, 2011). This body of work comprises theoretical, empirical and policy studies on the design and implementation of aid to the education sector in conflict-affected states. It differs from but overlaps with peace education scholarship with respect to human rights, citizenship and conflict-resolution education, which speaks to classroom, school and curricular reforms and practices (Salomon and Nevo, 2002; Bickmore, 2008; McGlynn et al., 2009). While the fields of peace education research and education and conflict offer important insights into education sector interventions in conflict and post-conflict states, most contributions fail to look at how particular understandings of security inform donor education aid levels and practices. This omission is puzzling given that security interests motivate military interventions, the deployment of international peacekeeping forces and donor aid spending both during and after armed conflict.4

I propose that understandings of security do matter for education aid policy makers, not least because these affect how education reconstruction in conflict and postconflict states is perceived by donors as enabling or diminishing security. This is a normative, theoretical and empirical claim that I attempt to defend in the following chapters. In this chapter, I review the literature on education’s relationship to the effects and causes of war with special attention to grievance-, opportunity- and environment-based approaches to understanding the outbreak, duration and intensity of war. I argue that understanding the relationship between education and armed conflict is necessary but not sufficient to account for donor priorities

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4 See for example the special issue on the security–development nexus in Security Dialogue (2010), 41(1).
and practices. No matter how much we aspire to design educational reforms that can pre-empt violence and mitigate harm, academic research on the relationship between education and armed conflict is not immune to the influence of security discourses, and aid donors are motivated by domestic and international factors that include security interests. In the second half of this chapter I review the security studies literature and ways international relations scholars define a security threat and risk, including securitization theory, and the Foucauldian concept of a security and risk apparatus (*dispositif*).

**Education and Armed Conflict: Causal Theories**

Two areas of scholarship related to the education–war relationship are emerging. One examines the impact of war on education enrolment and spending, and the other analyzes the effects of education systems on the onset of civil war. Recent empirical research on the relationship between armed conflict and enrolment levels is inconclusive, although much of the evidence supports the position that the presence of armed conflict lowers enrolment levels. Shields and Paulson (2014) find that armed conflict is associated with lower rates of growth in net enrolment rates at the primary and secondary levels. However, when they controlled for state fragility, they found that there was no statistically significant negative relationship between enrolment rates and armed conflict disappeared. In contrast, Gates et al. (2010, 2012) do not report a statistically significant relationship between armed conflict and education enrolment rates. However, they did find that a country neighbouring a state in which there has been five years of minor violent conflict in the preceding period is likely to experience a 1.3 percent drop in secondary completion rates. Using a dataset comprising civil conflicts from 1980-1997, Lai and Thyne (2007), confirm that civil wars are correlated with lower education expenditures and enrolment rates across all levels, and that male secondary enrolment levels are more affected than female levels. Akresh and de Walque (2008) examine pre- and post-war household survey data from Rwanda and conclude that war-exposed children attained lower levels of education. Murshed and Gates (2005) find lower levels of education in Nepal are associated with higher conflict intensity. Similarly, examining the case of Bosnia, Swee (2009) concludes that war significantly reduce the likelihood that a child will complete secondary schooling, but reports no noticeable effects on primary schooling completion. Looking at the effects of the civil war in Guatemala,
Chamarbagwala and Moraín (2011) report that rural Mayan students exposed to armed conflict completed fewer years of schooling than students more insulated from the violence. Using damage to household dwelling as a proxy for conflict intensity in Tajikistan, Shemyakina (2011) reports that exposure to violent conflict lowered the probability that girls would complete their primary and secondary education and the probability that boys would complete secondary schooling. Consistent with these findings, Sheyakina & Dabalen (2012) find that children exposed to armed conflict in Cote D’Ivoire attained 0.2 to 0.9 fewer years of education compared to a control group.

These studies suggest a correlation between exposure to armed conflict and enrolment in and completion of education, but one cannot infer from them either directionality or causality. On the one hand, armed conflict may contribute to lower enrolment through youth soldiering, damage to educational infrastructure, conflict-induced displacement, recruitment of or attacks on school staff, reductions in household income, and/or the restrictions on mobility due to landmine risk and other dangers (O’Malley, 2010). On the other hand, lower enrolment rates might contribute to the onset of armed conflict. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggests that expanding male secondary enrolment potentially lowers recruitment into armed groups. Several causal pathways to the onset of armed conflict are possible. As mentioned above, Shields and Paulson (2014) suggest that state fragility, broadly understood as states with weak institutional capacity, is correlated with both armed conflict and lower enrolment growth rates, which would suggest that even if armed conflict was to end, enrolment rates would not necessarily or automatically bounce back. Many of these causal pathways are described in the context of three dominant theoretical approaches to the causes of war, which can be summarized as grievance-, greed/opportunity-, and environment-based explanations.

**Grievance-Based Explanations**

The vast majority of the education literature uses a grievance-based theory to explain conflict outbreak. Proponents of this approach suggest that structural violence (Galtung, 1969), defined as the inequitable distribution of resources and income across states, regions or groups, creates or sustains socio-political grievances, which are determinants of war (Gurr 1970; Cederman et al., 2010). Adopting this approach, Stewart (2002) suggests that
horizontal inequalities among groups defined by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences and kinship networks reinforce asymmetric power relations and contribute to the onset of civil war.\(^5\) When applied to education systems, the argument goes as follows: discrimination and exclusionary educational practices restrict economic opportunities and perpetuate material inequalities among certain groups. This further strengthens and polarizes in-group/out-group identities, which can be exploited by “conflict entrepreneurs” or charismatic leaders to mobilize rebellion.

To test this thesis empirically, Østby (2007) measured horizontal inequalities in household assets and education level across ethnic, religious and regional groups. Østby concludes that differences in inter-regional education levels are positively correlated with the outbreak of war. Similarly, Obura (2003) and Mamdani (2002) argue that the privileged treatment of Tutsis over the Hutus by the Belgian colonial regime perpetuated by discriminatory policies and institutional arrangements hardened ethnic labels, which contributed to the Rwandan civil war and genocide in the 1990s. In her study of school access and pedagogical practices in post-genocide Rwanda, King (2014), argues that the education system contributed to harmful intergroup relations by reinforcing structural inequalities and cultural identities. Cross-cutting these studies is the notion that shared grievances reinforce cultural identities and foster solidarity within groups or, to use Putnam’s term, bonding social capital (Putnam 2000). These ties have affective as well as material benefits that help improve the probability of survival. But when combined with weak intergroup ties or insufficient bridging social capital, problems that might otherwise be resolved through political advocacy, negotiation and non-violent conflict resolution remain a source of tension and mistrust that can be exploited by conflict entrepreneurs.

Ross (2007) argues that structural factors and psycho-cultural based-identities contribute to ethnic conflict. Consistent with this position, several researchers have investigated the role of education in reinforcing exclusive and inclusive cultural identities. In her study of peace in the Jewish-Palestinian village of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam, Feuerverger (2001) shows how coexistence between Jews and Palestinians based on the

\(^5\) Horizontal inequalities are defined by Stewart as the unequal distribution of political, social, and cultural power among “culturally formed groups.” See also Langer et al. (2012). Horizontal inequalities and post-conflict development. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
recognition of differences, can be supported through a curriculum designed to impart knowledge of core subjects and to nurture each child’s cultural identity and their ability to recognize and value different perspectives. Milligan (2005), looking at armed conflict in the Moro Islands between Filipino Christians and Muslims, suggests that efforts by the central government to devolve administrative power in the education sector without decentralizing fiscal controls effectively reduced the participation of Muslim communities to tokenism and contributed to reinforcing inter-group conflict between Christians and Muslims. Colenso (2005) finds that schools segregated by ethnic or religious groups undermine social cohesion in Sri Lanka.

One of the challenges in understanding education’s role in building social cohesion is defining and measuring the term. Green, Janmaat and Han (2011, p. 19) assume the state as their unit of analysis and define social cohesion as “the property by which whole societies, and the individuals within them, are bound together through the action of specific attitudes, behaviours, rules and institutions which rely on consensus rather than pure coercion”. They create a composite indicator to measure and compare social cohesion in Western European and North American countries, and identify three main “regimes” of social cohesion constituted by distinctive attitudes and behaviours and institutional arrangements (Green et al., 2011, p. 130). Given that any measure of social cohesion needs to be sensitive to indicators that reflect the attitudes, behaviours and institutions of a state or region, it may be in inappropriate to apply an indicator devised for European sensibilities to other regions. Cross national comparisons across cultural groups may be problematic.

Grievance-based approaches suggest that expanding enrolment rate in conflict and postconflict states is necessary but not sufficient to support conditions for peace. Educational policy makers and practitioners need to attend to managing cultural identities through various channels mindful of a country’s or community’s institutional history and arrangements: i) forms of education administration and management that devolve education decision making to local communities; ii) issues of equity and equality of opportunity in order to address enrolment gaps based on residence, gender, ethnicity, religion and ability; ii) teaching and learning competencies that support peaceful coexistence, positive inter-group contact, trust building and social cohesion.
Greed/Oppportunity-Based Explanations

Alternatively, economists argue that armed conflict onset and duration depend upon rational decision-making, and thus cannot be fully explained by deprivation and inequality. Systemic discrimination may foster strong in-group/out-group identities, but a group's decision to resort to violence results from rational calculations of the costs and benefits of such an action (Tilly, 1978; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). They propose several factors that increase the likelihood of rebellion: external assistance, rents from, for example, natural resources or illegal drugs, external financial support, and even foreign aid (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010, pp. 419-421). Economic factors enter into the rational calculations of both political elites and rebels. State authorities may use revenues to expand economic infrastructure and entitlement programs in order to make the choice of rebellion less attractive. But, often the exploitation of natural resources by multinational corporations and state actors will set in motion a series of events that “trap” a country into cyclical conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Particularly, if a regime’s legitimacy can be called into question or its tenure is shaky, leaders may misuse public revenues and foreign aid to shore up their power base and increase their personal wealth by dispensing favours and awarding contracts to families, friends, and supporters without taking equity or efficiency into account. These actions have the effect of privileging certain groups based on ethnic, religious, kinship or regional ties at the expense of others. To remain in power, state authorities may strengthen their civil and security apparatus, but this can create a “resource defence dilemma” if fiscal constraints lead to a choice of “guns” over “butter.” In other words, increased defence spending leads to cuts in social programs that may further fuel grievances and social tensions (Le Billion, 2001, p. 567; Le Billion & International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005).

At least two factors influence rebel groups’ calculations of the costs and benefits of armed rebellion – the country’s topography, and availability of resources that they have the capacity to exploit. Remote mountainous and forested regions limit the territorial reach of the state’s security apparatus and provide rebels with supply lines and safe havens from which to launch offensives, recruit members, and conduct training. But even the most favourable of geographical conditions cannot sustain an insurgency in the absence of resources for
recruitment, weapons, and the creation of a shadow government capable of delivering social services. By providing schools and health clinics or administering justice in areas where the state’s presence is weak, insurgents build trust with these communities and gather intelligence. Since illicit activities such as the sale of illegal drugs can provide the revenue necessary to carry out armed conflict, rebel leaders often collude with criminal gangs and transnational criminal networks. In some cases greed overtakes the original motivations and transforms rebel groups into criminal gangs or “bandits.” Moreover, quasi criminal groups might form opportunistic alliances with corrupt officials in order to evade capture and prosecution, in effect blurring the distinctions between criminals, rebels and the state.

From this perspective, access to educational opportunities might decrease the likelihood that children and youth will engage in armed conflict voluntarily by increasing the opportunity costs of joining a rebel group or militia. Supporting this hypothesis, Thyne (2006) concludes that increases in male secondary enrolment and literacy rates decrease the probability of high levels of violence. However, Thyne’s results do not extend to post-secondary enrolment levels or situations of low intensity violence. Furthermore, Ishiyama and Breuning (2012) report that increases in enrolment in higher education within five years following the end of a conflict significantly reduce the likelihood of a recurrence. Opportunity-based approaches indicate a narrower range of education sector interventions focused mainly on expanding access to training and education programs that target out-of-school children and youth, and non-formal education and training for adults.

**Environment-Based Explanations**

Whereas greed/opportunity-based approaches pivot on resource abundance, a third approach centres on the environmental effects of climate change and demographic factors. According to proponents of “environmental security,” resource scarcity, rising sea levels, and more frequent and intense natural disasters are associated with an increased risk of conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Buhaug, Gleditsch, & Theisen, 2008, pp. 7-12; Buhaug & Theisen, 2012, Theisen, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). Affected populations may choose to remain in their regions, in which case there is increased competition for scarce resources, or they may move from the affected areas, and thereby increase population pressures in other areas. Migration may also contribute to reduced household income, food insecurity and increased
poverty levels, leaving affected populations more vulnerable to recruitment by rebel forces (Barnett & Adger, 2007). Empirical studies testing the climate change–instability thesis are inconclusive. Burke et al. (2009) report a strong statistical relationship between major civil war having more than 1,000 casualties per year and temperature in Africa. Buhaug (2010) identifies methodological problems with Burke et al. and concludes, from a regression analysis of civil wars and climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa, that climate variability is a poor predictor of armed conflict. Buhaug suggests that structural and contextual factors best explain the onset of civil war. Despite the lack of consensus, there is broad agreement that climate change may have an indirect effect on the risk for conflict.

Alternatively, a neo-Malthusian perspective (Urdal, 2005) on environmental causes of war focuses on global and national demographic shifts and their implications for political stability. First, the population in developed states is ageing as a result of medical technologies extending the average lifespan, and birth rates that are slightly above or below replacement levels. In Canada, for example, the population sixty years and older is projected to double from 2009 to 2050. At the same time, the population 15 to 60 years will increase only 6 percent. As a result, these governments will face increasing fiscal constraints as high health care costs mount while, at the same time, smaller youth cohorts will limit their capabilities to deploy expeditionary missions to stabilize countries.

Second, the population of developing areas including Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia is growing rapidly. High birth rates and improved maternal and child health care have reduced maternal and infant mortality rates, and other health technologies have increased average lifespan and lowered death rates. In many of these states, rapid population growth rates have outpaced the ability of governments to provide adequate infrastructure and public services including schooling. The OECD Development Assistance Committee estimates that the population 15 to 34 years in fragile states accounts for more than one-third of the population and, in most of these countries, and the proportion is not expected to drop in the next decade (DAC INCAF, 2013, pp. 99-100). Goldstone (2002) suggests that such states, characterized by youthful populations, or “youth bulge” constitute an “arc of instability” stretching from South Africa to the Middle East, and parts of Asia (Goldstone, 2002; Cincotta et al., 2003). Urdal (2006, p. 97) calculates the risk of
armed conflict is 150 percent higher in countries where the youth cohort comprises 35 percent of the population as compared with most developed countries. He suggests that low levels of education and high unemployment rates lower the opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement, and thus increase conflict risk. However, using on a different methodology, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) report no relationship between civil war onset and youth bulge.

Third, populations are increasingly urbanized as a result of migration from rural areas following climactic conditions, conflict-induced displacement, or economic reasons. Moreover, the rate of urbanization is more rapid than at any time in the past, adding to population pressures and the ability of governments to upgrade and expand infrastructure and services to accommodate urban growth, including policing, health, education and social welfare. Revenue shortfalls will make it more difficult for governments to subsidize staples such as wheat and rice and petroleum leading to shortages and potential riots and political unrest. According to Gladstone (2002), these trends suggest that instability will be chronic with acute episodes in countries with large youth cohorts and where state institutions are weak and resources are limited. Moreover, demographic conditions and fiscal constraints in the Global North, will diminish the ability of traditional donor states such as the US and Canada to deploy their militaries and expand foreign aid budgets. These scarcity-based approaches, like opportunity-based approaches, focus education aid on a narrow range of interventions designed to address a particular type of risk. They target youth specifically, and vulnerable populations broadly, by strengthening labour-market education linkages, and basic life skills that enable these populations to better cope with hardships.

**Implications for Education Aid**

Each of the three theoretical approaches to understanding main causes of armed conflict helps to build a case for different forms of overlapping educational aid policies and projects in support of either positive or negative peace (Galtung 1969, p. 183). Negative peace refers to the absence of direct physical violence; positive peace denotes the absence of structural violence – economic, political and socio-cultural structures that reinforce the unequal distribution of power. Grievance-based approaches seek to transform social relations
through constitutional, legislative and curricular reforms that expand access, redress inequities, improve inter-group relations and reduce discrimination and support more egalitarian structures. From this perspective, foreign aid programming might include: expanding educational access to females, and/or whole minority groups or regions in order to reduce enrolment gaps, supporting indigenous language policies, decentralizing fiscal and administrative educational authority by devolving power to local communities, school desegregation policies, and teaching and learning competencies that support peaceful coexistence and social cohesion. In contrast, opportunity- and scarcity- approaches, both assume rational decision making by armed actors, and seek to offset conflict drivers through, inter alia, improved opportunities for education, training and employment, particularly at the secondary level and for males. Scarcity-based approaches also lend support to building resilience through interventions that increase an individual’s chances for survival and adaptation, as well as educational programs designed to help affected communities plan for emergencies and mitigate their effects.

Therefore donors entertain innumerable intervention strategies in any number of hot spots. At last count in 2013, there were 33 armed conflicts of which seven rose to the threshold of a war (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014). Given their resource constraints, how do aid agencies decide where and how to allocate development assistance budgets from the range of possibilities set before them? One might reasonably assume that academic and policy research on the relationship between education and armed conflict provides donors with important cues for policy and programming. Yet, when considering the impact of knowledge on aid policy and practice, it is important be mindful that comparative education scholars coexist with other epistemic communities. For example, in all likelihood, Shields and Paulson (2014) would not have investigated the relationship between fragility, conflict and education enrolment mentioned above were it not for discourses on failed and fragile states that led to the development of an index the researchers used to measure fragility. Therefore, while donors might mobilize knowledge, knowledge is never created in a vacuum but reflects the priorities and ideas of a specific time and place.

Other factors influencing aid motivations include domestic and international conditions. Domestic factors include national debt and fiscal constraints, political parties and
ideological orientation of the ruling party, the strength of domestic advocacy groups, and the presence of diasporic communities (Noel & Therien, 1995; Fleck & Kilby, 2006). International factors comprise colonial ties and commercial and geostrategic interests (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Boone, 1996; McKinlay & Little 1977). In other words, donors governments may intervene when they perceive their national interests, security and otherwise, will be served using the various tools at their disposal including foreign aid allocations. At this point, it is important to bring security questions back into the discussion on education and armed conflict.

**Bringing Security Back In**

Before moving on to the relationship between education, armed conflict and security, security must first be defined. International relations scholars who curate security meanings are broadly identified with realist, constructivist and critical approaches. (Neo)Realists define a security threat mainly in terms of military and economic dangers within an international system characterized by anarchy (the absence of world government). During the Cold War years, security was believed possible only when the two superpowers were able to maintain a balance of power. Waltz’s (2010) theory of international relations emphasized the structure of the international system. He based his theory on two fundamental assumptions: in an international system characterized by anarchy – the absence of world government – the state is the fundamental organizational unit. From this starting point, Waltz developed a parsimonious theory based on rationalism. States will seek to protect and maximize their interests or, on other words, seek to increase their power. In a bipolar system where two superpowers were governed by competing ideological frameworks, actions that might upset the balance of military and economic power, either defensive or offensive, could escalate to produce catastrophic ends – thereby creating a security dilemma (Waltz, 2010). Balancing power relations entailed alliance building and deterrence policies (Gaddis, 1982). For example, the first major aid program of the Canadian government involved distributing food aid to South-East Asia as a deterrent for Communist expansionism in the region (Morrison, 2011).
While (neo)realism may have dominated Cold-War era security studies, it has proven a less compelling explanation for world politics when it comes to a unipolar or multipolar system that characterizes the post-Cold War period. Still, variants of realism remain alive and well, transformed from superpower competition to a civilizational clash. Scholars such as Huntington (1993, 1996) and Lewis (1993) have argued that while an unprecedented number of states have adopted democratic governance or are in transition, the Islamic world remains inherently inimical to democracy. From their perspective, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism does not reflect unequal socio-economic development, but the inherent incompatibility of Islam with democratic principles: it constitutes a clash of political cultures and, by extension, a security threat. This reinterpretation of a security threat from strictly military and economic threats to the balance of power in world politics to cultural struggles reflects the broadening of security studies to include non-military forms of security.

(Neo)realist approaches to security came under a frontal attack in the post-Cold War years, partly because of their failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union, and partly because of new, competing theoretical approaches based on social constructivism, which focus on the role of shared ideas in effecting social and political behaviour. In a groundbreaking book, *People, States, and Fear*, Buzan (1991) argued that security threats could take on traditional (i.e. military and economic) and non-traditional (societal, political, and environmental) forms.

This line of inquiry evolved into securitization theory (Buzan et al., 1998) identified with the Copenhagen School of security studies (Buzan et al., 1998; C.a.s.e., 2006). Securitization theory posits that a security threat need not be military; anything that can be constructed as dangerous or rogue can be constituted by security actors as a security threat. From this perspective security meanings are never fixed but arise from inter-subjective processes of meaning production. According to securitization theory, security threats are utterances that follow linguistic rules set forth in Austin’s speech act theory. Austin argued that statements do not merely ‘describe’ a situation or present a ‘statement of fact’. An utterance is performative – it leads to the performance of an act (Austin, 1962). According to Buzan et al. (1998) only security threats that rise to the level of imminent and existential dangers, and invoke emergency measures, are said to be securitised. Threats below this
threshold are dealt with through normal politics. Moreover, security threats need not be real in order to be actionable. They only have to be recognized and accepted as real by an audience in order to invoke a response (Balzaq, 2011). The inverse of securitization is also possible; phenomena, states or persons once identified as a security threat can divested of danger through desecuritization (Waever, 1995). By understanding a security threat as an utterance, securitization theory opens the space for the construction of non-military security threats such as climate change, immigration pandemics and education policy. It also means that security threats operate at different levels of analysis, based on the referent object of security: global, regional, national, sub-national or individual. The Cold War and the Global War on Terrorism are examples of higher order securitisations. The war on drugs is an example of middle level (regional) securitzation. The concept of human security operates at the individual level (Buzan & Waever, 2009). The referent object for security can influence education policy by focusing attention on state education policies and practices or individual learning and competencies.

A shortcoming of securitization theory is that it underspecifices power relations in the construction of a security threat. Not all actors have the power to speak. Women, for example, are often silenced through gendered practices that that “make speech impossible” (Hansen, 2000). Another shortcoming is the neglect of risks. Given that only threats that rise to the order of a perceived existential threat and cannot be managed through normal political processes (require emergency action) can be called security threats, securitization theory excludes global risks that involve the probability of danger but not necessarily existential harm. Corry (2012) suggests that security risks can be considered “second order security threats”: however this would dilute one of securitization theory’s main tenets. By bracketing any discussion of threats that do not rise to the level of existential threats, securitization theorists have attempted to preserve the disciplinary boundaries of their field of study.

By excluding any serious consideration of the ways security risks may provoke emergency measures, securitization theory flouts concerns about global risks that have come mainly from the field of sociology (Douglas, 1982; Beck, 1992; Luhmann, 1993; O’Malley, 2004; Lupton, 2013). Were these risks to materialize, including risks associated with global pandemics, terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, and climate change, they could be both
“catastrophic” and “incalculable” (Beck, 1992), and warrant an emergency response to prevent, manage and mitigate their effects. An emergency response might include interventions in education systems of developing countries to enable societies to prepare for or better cope with the certain eventualities.

Beck (1992) sees risks, vulnerability and contingency as moving to supplant security since late in the 20th century. For Beck, risk is the “anticipation of catastrophe”. Risks “are not “real,” they are “becoming real.” In other words, while risks are “real” insofar as they portend and produce effects in the real world, in order to be actionable they must arise from a shared consciousness. Actionable typically refers to leading to actions to manage, preempt and prevent harm. Risks are the unintended consequences of industrial modernization, scientific and technological progress in capitalist society and include ecological, terrorist, military, financial, biomedical and informational risks. They emerge in an age of “reflexive modernity” in which societies are increasingly confronted by the consequences of their own policies and actions rather than random acts of nature or the Divine. As a result, risk bureaucracies have sprung up to identify vulnerabilities to natural events and human action and calculate probabilities as a basis for risk management strategies. Like Luhmann (2005), Beck distinguishes between risk and danger by reference to decision-making: risks are dependent on human decision-making, whereas dangers are not decision-dependent (Beck, 1999, p. 31; 2009, p. 294).

The contributions from the field of sociology suggest that academics and public policymakers need to attend to both security threats and risks. This challenge is taken up by critical security studies researchers including those identified with the Paris School of security studies who do not necessarily accept the claim by Beck that global risks have replaced security threats in the late twentieth century. Drawing on Foucault’s concept of an apparatus (dispositif), these researchers, including Aradau & van Munster (2008), Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008), Lobo-Guerrero (2012), and Salter (2008), understand an apparatus as a constellation of practices including architectural forms, rules, laws, speech and text that affect how a population understands a particular problem and its solution. Like proponents of securitization theory, these critical security studies scholars adopt a constructivist epistemology and ontology that opens the space for a holistic understanding of security
inclusive of military and non-military threats that are not necessarily real in order to be actionable. But, unlike affiliates of the Copenhagen School, they neither limit their definition of a security threat to threats that rise to the level of existential, nor focus on linguistic structures in analyzing a securitizing move. Instead, researchers who use the concept of a security or risk apparatus analyze discourses and practices. They ask questions like, how do competing problematisations of security become real? What are the practices associated with this construction of security? How has quantification become a strategy to manage and control risks or threats (Salter, 2008, p. 253).

According to Foucault, four features characterize a social, institutional and discursive apparatus: a spatial dimension; uncertainty; a form of normalization (different from normalization associated with disciplinary techniques); and a population (2007, p. 11). Foucault understood security differently from traditional meanings that emphasize military dimensions and the phenomenon of war; security entailed practices for organizing the circulation of populations within a space, eliminating its dangers, differentiating between good and bad circulation, maximizing the former by eliminating the latter (2007, p. 18). In *Security, Territory, and Population*, his lectures delivered at the Collège de France in 1977-1978, he documents three examples of security apparatus: town planning, food scarcity, and vaccinations. In each instance, he relates security to territory (or government of a territory) to population, and to a set of practices. In town planning, government plans to integrate towns into larger territorial and political spaces helped to increase the circulation of goods and persons, expand economic development, and improve hygiene, ventilation, and population density. With regards to food scarcity, the government used methods to prevent scarcity and popular riots, including stockpiling wheat in order to address periods of shortage. Finally, in the instance of vaccination campaigns, he showed how government collection and dissemination of death and morbidity statistics convinced citizens to get vaccinated against the smallpox virus and to accept other preventative measures such as quarantines. Foucault argued that governments use security apparatuses in relation to territory (or government) and population.

Foucault defined an apparatus as “heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures,
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). An apparatus is formed in response to an urgent need, invested with power and linked with knowledge (Foucault, 1980, p. 196). In his essay, “What is an Apparatus,” Agamben (2009) defines an apparatus as anything with “the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living beings.” It is a “system of relations” between elements that function strategically in response to an “urgent need” and involves the interplay of power relations and knowledge. Examples include juridical measures, prisons, disciplinary fields, schools, confession, factories, literature, agriculture, cigarettes, computers, and cellular phones (Agamben, 2009, pp. 3-14). In short, an apparatus is an ensemble of discourses and practices based on social and scientific knowledge that perform a strategic function by securing thought and action at the level of the individual and the masses.

Foucault identifies a security apparatus with a space, population, and technologies of security. He states that security apparatuses “work, fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu.” Spaces of security involve the circulation of goods and persons (2007, p. 29). They comprise both the natural and physical environment, as well as the population that inhabits the space (Foucault, 2007, p. 21). A security apparatus involves technologies – ways in which the state normalizes practices. He differentiates these disciplinary normalizations in three ways. Discipline functions by isolating, concentrating, and enclosing a space; in contrast, a security apparatus expands and integrates spaces and allows for ever-wider circulation of goods and persons (Foucault, 2007, pp. 44-45, pp. 56-57). Discipline functions to control behaviour and processes whereas a security apparatus “lets things happen” in laissez-faire-like fashion (Foucault, 2007, p. 45). Discipline seeks to isolate, eliminate or eradicate a threat via overtly coercive measures by locating the problem with individuals, whereas the security apparatus tries to shape social understandings and regulate practices in order to attain an optimum level of security.

Further, Foucault argued that apparatuses are enmeshed with forms of power including governmentality, which he used to describe rationalities and practices that ensure the voluntary, discursively shaped, compliance of the citizens. During his lectures delivered at the Collège de France in 1977-1978 (Foucault, 2007), Foucault introduced the concept of
governmentality or “the conduct of conduct”. Governmentality was his response to the problematic of how liberal democracies manage their populations in ways that guarantee voluntary compliance in the absence of fear. Foucault defined governmentality as a set of “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2007). In other words, governmentality consists of a range of strategies and procedures through which a government ensures the compliance of its citizens by framing policies in ways that the majority of citizens find not only acceptable but also beneficial and desirable. It refers not only to state authorities, but to a range of groups, individuals, networks that interact to develop strategies and procedures and make “governing at a distance” possible – that is, influence the action of others in the absence of command and control structures (Rose et al., 2006, p. 89). Therefore, in these lectures Foucault analyzed the macro-power of the state rather than the micro-technologies of institutions such as asylums, clinics, and prisons that were the focus of his earlier work.

Foucault (2007) claimed that the principal obligation of state authority in modern times is to ensure the security of the population within its borders from internal and external threats by building the capacity to defend the territory against external threats with national armed forces, and protecting and enforcing the rights of citizens guaranteed in constitutional and legal frameworks with a civic police force and judiciary system charged with enforcing the rule of law. For Foucault this relationship between security, population and territory (or government) extends beyond guarantees of physical security to establishing the conditions and structures necessary for free trade and economic growth. This requires a conception of state–citizen relations that, according to Foucault, cannot be accounted for adequately by social contract theory that proposes a quid-pro-quo relationship, whether from a Hobbesian (realist) or a constructivist perspective. For Hobbes (1981), the power of the Leviathan derives from a social contract wherein citizens agreed to submit to the rule of the sovereign in exchange for security guarantees that would provide protection against a life that is “nasty, brutish, and short.” From a constructivist perspective – as proposed, for example, in Ruggie’s concept of postwar embedded liberalism (1982) – citizens defer to state authority provided the government is able to deliver adequate employment opportunities, public services (such
as schooling and health care) and social safety nets through income redistribution schemes. Foucault did not necessarily disagree with the notion of a social compact governing state–citizen relations as much as he saw these understandings as historically contingent, and embedded within broader political, economic and sociocultural conditions. Accordingly, through an historical analysis of the development of the contemporary liberal state, he suggested that democratic states manage their populations through practices in which specific forms of knowledge inhere that normalize public policies and programs in ways that manage their populations. Therefore citizens need not be mandated, coerced or induced to comply with norms, rules and laws; they comply because they believe that to do so is their best interests.

Miller and Rose (2008) state that governmentality comprises two elements: political rationalities and technologies of power. They are the intrinsic link between how an event, phenomenon or people is represented and the means by which it can be transformed. Rationalities are ways of thinking. They are representations of events, objects or peoples subject to both calculation and programming. Technologies refer to the devices, tools, techniques, personnel, materials and apparatuses that enable authorities to influence the conduct of persons and groups from a distance. They can include routinized practices such as monitoring surveys, benchmarking, standards, testing regimes, standard operating procedures, and architectural forms. Accordingly, governmentality studies in the field of public administration do not evaluate whether a particular policy or program has failed or succeeded to ascertain “best practices”; they examine shifts over time in policy discourses and practices to uncover the rationalities and technologies that shape the preferences and behaviour of individuals and groups.

It is important to keep in mind that Foucault’s work centered on liberal democracies and the security apparatuses that function to manage ‘free’ citizens. His writing pre-dated academic debates on multi-level and global governance and did not deal with populations in developing countries that might not share western sociocultural and political values and institutions. Yet, even in the absence of world government, global governmentality is plausible given the role of international organizations, intergovernmental and advocacy networks, private-public partnerships, and social movements in shaping the behaviours of
state and non-state actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Castells, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Slaughter, 2005). Networks link traditional vertical state structures with more open, horizontal, informal and flexible systems inclusive of state, corporate and voluntary organizations, blurring conventional lines that separate the private from the public spheres, and national from international governance. These networks exercise power by establishing rules governing membership, specifying in- and out-groups, setting agendas, that effect the behaviour of members within the network (Castells, 2011). But, to state that global governmentality exists by simply scaling up the concept of governmentality may be an overstretch not least because the one-to-one correspondence between government and population does not exist. Moreover, the power–knowledge relationship central to governmentality has been altered by the digital age. Technological advances have democratized access to information and the diffusion of ideas so that multiple actors, each armed with their competing or complementary truth claims, are capable of shaping the norms and behaviours of individuals and groups. Still, this is not the same as saying that all actors within a network have equal power. Some may be more powerful than others.

**Education, Armed Conflict and Security**

Both securitization theory and Foucauldian approaches to understanding security actions share characteristics of frame analysis, insofar as they interpret how security actors define a security problem, its solution and the intervention strategies that ensue from this problem definition (Watson, 2012). These two theoretical approaches also intuit a relationship between education, armed conflict, and security in different ways. By widening security to incorporate non-traditional threats, securitization theory suggests that state actors may construct populations as dangerous in order to legitimize policies and actions that include education sector interventions. In other words, education can be securitized. For example, Collins (2005) examines how the Chinese Malaysian minority in Malaysia perceived the government’s 2002 English language policies, which reintroduced English as the mandatory language of instruction in all primary schools, as a threat to their cultural identity and societal security. Chinese educationalists in Malaysia raised awareness among the ethnic Chinese community of the threat to their mother tongue, and thus an existential
threat. However, they did not call for extraordinary measures (i.e. an uprising), but sought to protect Chinese language rights through dialogue with government officials.

In contrast, the concept of a security or risk apparatus based on a Foucauldian approach conceives education aid and education reforms in conflict-affected and post-conflict states as part of the rationalities and technologies of power – cognitive frames and institutional mechanisms that enable powerful agents to control or manage a population and territory without resort to coercive power. From this perspective, Novelli (2013) argues that foreign education sector aid is impacted by the merger of development goals with security objectives; understandings of security, including human rights, and counter-terrorism, and the security of aid workers drive different forms of education aid practices and obscure tensions on how best to use education aid in conflict-affected states.

How might concepts of security and risk deepen an understanding of donor preferences and practices in education? Few, if any, researchers claim that education can end or prevent armed violence. Most would agree with the statement, to one extent or another, that education is a necessary but not sufficient element in enhancing security, ending armed conflict, restoring peace and supporting democratic outcomes (Berdal & Malone, 2000). Given fiscal constraints and the broad range of possible educational interventions, foreign aid policymakers must decide on priorities. These priorities might reflect historical institutional preferences (Mahoney, 2000) or the adoption of convergent practices across actors leading to policy borrowing and lending in education (Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012; Henry et al., 2001; Lechner & Boli, 2005) but at the same time take account of the dominant security and risk constructions of a particular temporal and situational context.

Let us consider what this might look like in practice, using a linear model beginning with the multiple causes of war, armed conflict, its impact on education systems, followed by education aid during and after armed conflict and its feedback loops. In reality the process is messy, reversible and often involves extra-territorial actors. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the linear model approximately reflects reality. As discussed above, understandings of the causes of war highlight conflict dimensions differently, and, by doing so, prioritize education reconstruction in different ways. A donor country’s framing of security taps into these cause-effect relationships to rationalize specific interventions.
For example, let us consider a hypothetical conflict-affected state in which there is inter-communal violence and drug cultivation and trafficking. A donor that frames security in terms of the ability of terrorists to exercise territorial control in a sovereign state might highlight the causes of armed conflict in terms of the opportunities for rebellion, and rationalize a military strategy. This might include a counterinsurgency campaign aimed at separating the population from insurgents in zones where stability is guaranteed by security forces and providing social services. A donor that problematizes security in terms of criminality would construct the threat by understanding rebels as bandits and thugs rather than freedom fighters, and would prescribe policies to manage armed conflict through the policing and judicial reforms rather than political dialogue and negotiation (Ballentine 2003, pp. 270-271). Security meanings which emphasize revenues from illicit activities used to fund rebellion reinforce interdiction campaigns and security sector reforms including human rights education for civilian security forces, juvenile rehabilitation programs, and so on. Alternatively, an understanding of security that focuses on the social dimension and horizontal inequalities might lead to a broad range of interventions including citizenship education, minority education, conflict-resolution education, reducing enrolment gaps, and increasing resources to education in underserved areas. Finally, risk-based approaches that highlight environmental phenomena such as climate change and demographic shifts would tend to support measures that reinforce coping and adaptive mechanisms such as formal and non-formal life skills programs and disaster mitigation education. Therefore threat and risk-based approaches to security differ in terms of their assumptions, warrants and desired end state, and these have different implications for education aid.

Therefore, security framings help donors to make sense of and manage their environment by defining security threats and risks and coming up with solutions and strategies. These framings, in turn, can inform preferences and priorities for education aid in conflict states. At the same time, it is important not to get too carried away with security framings and lose sight of other influences on education aid policies and practices. Security and risk logics cohabitate with global development and educational aid policy and national and bureaucratic discourses through policy and knowledge networks and civil society actors. One might conceptualize these relationships using a planetary analogy in which each field occupies a separate orbit but whose “wobble” is influenced by the other. Then the central
question would be how do bureaucratic, global education development, security and risk logics constitute and reconstitute subjectivities and influence education aid practice. This is the problematic at the centre of this research.

**Conclusion**

Based on the review of existing comparative education theory and research in the context of new theoretical approaches to security from the field of international relations, with few notable exceptions, education scholarship has been slow to examine the education aid-security relationship. While the literature includes the effects of armed conflict on education and the role of education in creating the conditions for peace, it has neglected how national and international security risks and threats influence education aid policies and practices. Further inquiry is needed to uncover the mechanisms that facilitate the linkage and the impact of this relationship on education systems in conflict-affected and postconflict states, as well as to contest and transform the education aid-security relationship to effect alternative educational outcomes.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Education reconstruction is characteristically weighted with ambitious goals and procedures that are revised frequently to address situational contexts and to incorporate learning from impact evaluations, policy studies, and lessons learned and best practice reports. Those charged with realizing goals through humanitarian and development projects in conflict-affected states view these procedures, which include the production of training modules, guidance notes, field manuals, minimum standards, and management tools, as necessary mechanisms to ensure better educational and socioeconomic outcomes. Rarely is the question “why support this and neglect that?” heard spoken above a whisper partly because of the sense of urgency that drives action taken in response to a security threat or risk, but also because rationalizations make certain solutions seem the most logical and appropriate course of action given the circumstances. Problematizing education aid strategies, discourse and practice is at the core of this research which draws on the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault.

This chapter outlines Foucault’s historical sociological methods and concepts that inform this research. I use Foucault’s archaeological method, a comparative historical approach that identifies continuities and discontinuities in social practice, to describe forms of education reconstruction since 1944 and to develop a four-part typology of education aid practices comprising statebuilding, peacebuilding, stabilization, and protection-based approaches. I apply this typology to a genealogical analysis of CIDA’s education sector aid to Afghanistan, Colombia, and (South Sudan) from 2000 until 2013. Genealogy entails problematizing the role of education aid by focusing on the forms of power exercised by the Canadian and other governments to advance its interests while maintaining the support of its citizens through the exercise of governmentality.

The chapter is organized in three parts. In the first section I outline the main research questions and underlying assumptions. Next, I summarize the main dimensions of Foucault’s research methods and interpretive framework from his archaeological and genealogical
periods. In the final section, I describe how I carried out my research in terms of selection criteria, data collection, and limitations of the study.

**Research Questions**

The main research question guiding this research and its three sub-components are:

What is the relationship between education aid and conceptions of security and what is the role of power in shaping this relationship?

i) What types of education aid policies and practices did CIDA support in Afghanistan, Colombia, Sudan and South Sudan from 2000 to 2013, and how have these changed across time and place?

ii) What factors contribute to similarities and differences in CIDA’s patterns of educational aid within and between country case studies over time?

iii) How do recent trends in education aid practices in conflict and postconflict states fit into broader patterns and shifts in education reconstruction aid (1944-2013)?

Three basic assumptions guide this research. First, in bracketing states such as Haiti that are affected by natural disasters, I assume that education reconstruction during or after situations of armed conflict is best understood separately from reconstruction following natural disasters. Following a natural disaster affected populations may blame public authorities for their lack of preparedness or the pace, scale and distribution of reconstruction and recovery efforts but, ultimately, they recognize that natural forces beyond the control of the state were in play. In contrast, in situations of war, populations find real and imagined heroes and villains to help sustain community solidarity against an actual or perceived threat. Also, wars reorder and transform physical and spatial arrangements in ways unlike natural disasters. Borders, barrier walls, safe havens, no-fly zones, humanitarian corridors, green zones, camps, and tented communities that result from conflict designate areas of safety and danger, influence the movement of people, and create new classifications and identities with material effects different from those of other “emergencies.”
Second, any discussion of security should include both threats and risks. Like threats, risks are social constructions; they need not be real in order to be actionable, but only need to be perceived as real through social agreement. As Castel states, “a risk does not arise from the presence of particular precise danger embodied in a concrete individual or group. It is the effect of a combination of abstract factors that render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour” (Castel, 1991, p. 287). Therefore, we need to attend to risks not so much because global risks displace security threats as Beck would have us believe but because, like threats, risks elicit a response from international donors under the banner of security. The responses might include preemption, precaution, prevention, mitigation or other strategies designed to manage risks. Even inaction is a response. Therefore, a theoretical framework has to be flexible enough to interpret both security threats and risks.

Securitisation theory, as discussed in Chapter 2, broadens the meaning of a “security threat” to include non-military threats, however, it restricts securitising moves to speech utterances that meet the threshold of an existential threat that invokes an emergency measure (all lesser threats are dealt with through “normal politics”) and thus lacks the elasticity to incorporate the notion of risk (for an exception see Corry, 2012). For this reason, I forgo adopting securitization theory in favour of the concept of a security or risk apparatus – an assemblage of discourses, epistemic knowledge, practices, spatial forms that shape social understandings of what constitutes a security threat or risk and guides action.

Third, by claiming that dominant security discourses such as the Cold War, collective security, human security and so on are social constructs, I assume that social reality and social knowledge are constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). What society counts as truth vis-à-vis national and international security threats and risks is influenced by both the structure of the international system and social constructions produced by academics, state and non-state actors and social movements. These constructions evolve from within a field of power relations that requires a theory of power to interpret social preferences and practices. Only when mechanisms through which power is exercised are identified and their effects laid bare, can those who are marginalized seek to resist and transform power relations.
Archaeology and Genealogy

Foucault’s work is divided into three phases: archaeological, genealogical, and ethics of care. I restrict my discussion to archaeological and genealogical analyses. I refer mainly to *Madness and Civilization* (1988), as representative of his archaeological phase. I cite *Discipline and Punish* (1995), as an exemplar of his genealogical period, for its discussion of disciplinary power relations and knowledge/power. In addition, I draw on his lectures published in *Security, Territory and Population* (2007) and *Society Must be Defended* (2003), and his research on sexual identity in the *History of Sexuality: Volume I* (1990).

Archaeology

In his archaeological period, Foucault referred to economic, social and scientific developments, illustrations, architectural forms, anecdotes, and literary and artistic references to develop a historical narrative. In *The Birth of the Clinic* (1994) he traces developments in medical knowledge and technologies that establish clinical practice. In *The Order of Things* (1970) he describes the linguistic systems and understandings that established three disciplines during the classical period (general grammar, natural history and analysis of wealth) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the disciplines that replaced them in the modern period (philosophy, biology, and economics) in the nineteenth century. In *Madness and Civilization* (1988) he explores shifts in attitudes, beliefs and practices related to madness. Specifically, he contrasts the period of the Great Confinement, beginning in the mid-1600s, when the state established special institutions to house and separate the insane such as the Hôpital Général in Paris and Bethlem in London with both the previous period, when the mentally ill were allowed to roam freely and the succeeding period when rehabilitation institutions were created based on knowledge in the emerging field of psychiatry. During the Great Confinement, the insane were housed and assimilated with the poor, vagabonds, and criminals into an undifferentiated mass characterized by “unreason.” These houses of confinement were economically significant. In the context of Europe’s economic crisis, which was characterized by low wages, unemployment and poverty, they

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6 The archaeological period is usually identified with *Madness and Civilization* (1965/1988), the *Birth of the Clinic* (1994) and the *Order of Things* in addition to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972/2002) in which Foucault describes his methodological approach.
confined the unemployed; in times of plenty, they provided a pool of cheap labour (Foucault, 1988, pp. 50-51). By contemporary standards, the treatment of the insane was nothing short of cruel and barbaric, but by the standards of the period it had an air of normality. Then late in the eighteenth century, in the context of the emergence of psychiatry, the insane were “liberated” as places such as Bethlem were emptied of their occupants or repurposed. The insane were placed in asylums under the care of reformers such as William Pinel in France and Samuel Tuke in Britain. Foucault argues that it is no coincidence that the “Great Confinement” ended when the field of medicine emerged and doctors began to frame mental illness as a medical problem.

Unlike conventional historians, Foucault decentres the subject, emphasizes the emergence of regimes of truth, and relates these with continuities and discontinuities in practice over time. In announcing the “death of the subject” he focuses on discursive and non-discursive social practices including institutional arrangements. Individuals such as Pinel and Tuke are only important insofar as they exist within an epistemic community that has influence well beyond its specialist members. Foucault emphasizes the authority with which they speak, whether it is based on specialized knowledge and certification, moral authority or other qualifications, and their place in the web of social relations. For example, in his study of the treatment of the insane, doctors were authoritative and central in the narrative by virtue of their specialized knowledge. Foucault writes, “it was in the esotericism of his [the doctor’s] knowledge, in some almost daemonic secret of knowledge, that the doctor had found the power to unravel insanity; and increasingly the patient would accept this self-surrender to a doctor both divine and satanic, beyond human measure in any case” (Foucault, 1988, p. 276). Therefore, the influence of Pinel and Tuke was evidence of the emergence of the field of psychiatry that contributed to the social re-imagination of insanity as a medical condition requiring specialized treatment.

I draw on this form of historical analysis to analyze education reconstruction and development in and after conflict from 1944 to 2013. I use this analysis to develop a typology of education aid practices and, in combination with the genealogical analysis of

7 For a discussion of how some groups are silenced see Lene Hansen (2000).
Canada’s education aid to conflict-affected states, to interpret the relationship between education, conflict and meanings of security, more broadly.

**Genealogy**

Foucault’s archaeological method is refined and deepened in his genealogical studies on the development of the penal system, sovereignty and contemporary liberal government, and modern sexuality that analyze what power is, how it is exercised, and what are its effects. He asserts that power is “not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” (Foucault 1990, p. 94). He claimed that he was not interested in developing a theory of power, but in investigating the analytics of power – how it is manifested and its effects. Foucault identifies different forms of power, including disciplinary power and governmentality.

In *Discipline and Punish* (1995/1978), the first of his genealogical studies, Foucault describes the emergence of the modern penal system, which he argues constitutes a disciplinary apparatus inclusive of specialized knowledge, architectural forms, and institutional practices. Through a historical analysis he shows how social knowledge and norms governing the treatment of criminals changed over time. In the classical period (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) criminals were publicly flogged, beaten and executed in grisly spectacles of brute power. Once delinquency was understood as a legal-juridical problem, these practices gave way to confining criminals in “reformatories,” precursors of modern penitentiaries, in accord with legal procedures and judgments. Prisons were designed to maximize surveillance as exemplified by Bentham’s blueprints for the Panopticon – a penal complex never constructed but which became the archetype for modern prisons. This disciplinary apparatus is based on a “cellular” organization, hierarchical observation, and normalizing judgment. It isolates, separates and excludes populations through institutional arrangements and norms that create self–other subjectivities that rationalize routines and procedures for detention and rehabilitation. In this way the prison, but also leper colonies, asylums, orphanages, factories, and elementary schools constituted a “carceral archipelago” – a space that functions to separate individuals and to produce “docile bodies,” by which he
meant bodies that may be “subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault, 1995/1978, p. 136, pp. 170-186).

Foucault’s carceral archipelago parallels Goffman’s concept of “total institutions”, which also included schools. For Goffman, these institutions routinize and circumscribe human thought and behaviour to render individuals both useful and docile (Goffman, 1962). Agamben (2005) takes this notion one step further by claiming that carceral institutions constitute “states of exception” – spaces in which the sovereign justifies suspending the rights and freedoms normally accorded to citizens in order to maintain public order and security. In these spaces, human existence is reduced to ‘bare life’ and subject to abuse and death as exemplified in Nazi concentration camps, and Soviet prison and work camps (Agamben, 1998). Controversially, Agamben extends this paradigm to spaces we intuitively understand as protective, such as refugee camps, and claims that these camps are also states of exception where human existence is reduced to bare life. “Humanitarian organizations,” he writes, “can only grasp human life in the figure of bare life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight” (Agamben, 1998, p. 133). Sobe (2007) draws on this concept of ‘bare life’ in his comparative study of two education policy networks: a partnership between three American faith-based organizations in the mid-twentieth century and the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) in the post 9/11 period (See Chapter 4). Sobe concludes that each of these networks created ‘states of exception’ that support “bare life” (Sobe, 2007, p. 52).

For the purpose of this research, the scholarship summarized above suggests that it necessary but not sufficient to understand how a security apparatus might identify a population as a foreign aid beneficiary. It is also important to analyze which populations are included and excluded from an aid regime and the social and institutional mechanisms used by donors to make inclusion/exclusion possible.

So far this methodological approach sounds very much like institutional analysis, which examines path-dependent institutions to explain state and organizational behaviour. Incremental change explains continuity and unpredictable shocks or events produce new normative and institutional practices (Mahoney, 2000). But a Foucauldian analysis goes beyond institutional analysis to include architectural forms, spatial dimensions, and forms of
knowledge based on power relations. For example, Foucault saw the prison as integral to the constitution of subjectivities of normal/deviant and not as an artefact of institutional processes. The prison not only confines criminals, it rolls into one architectural form a rationality based on knowledge from the fields of criminology, law, and psychiatry that prescribe the treatment of criminals as a juridical/legal and medical process including legal censure, separation from society, and rehabilitation. The prison instantiates new mores regarding the rights of prisoners and the right of citizens to feel secure.

I draw on a genealogical approach to interpret the relationship between Canada’s education sector interventions in conflict-affected states and understandings of security. I identify security apparatuses and how power is exercised through institutional arrangements, discourses and spatial forms to shape education aid priorities and practices through coercive and non-coercive ways, and to create a state of exception.

**Methodological Approach**

The thesis research to follow consists of two parts. In the first part, I develop an historical analysis, along the lines of Foucault’s archaeological method, to identify continuities and shifts in education reconstruction aid in the period 1944-2013. I focus on several state and non-state actors including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the INEE as shown in Table 1. I also sample a diverse country contexts including Malaya, Vietnam and Algeria, as well as issue specific programs such as refugee education, culture of peace, and education in emergencies. I rely on several primary sources as indicated in Table 1, including archival records of key policy makers and program administrators involved in education planning; organizational policy texts and program evaluations; and academic scholarship.
# Table 1

**Historical and Contemporary Illustrations of Education in Situations of Armed Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country/Program</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-war</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>US mission report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>US mission report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonial/Cold War</td>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Archival documents and secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Primary and secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Archival documents and secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold and Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Refugee education</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Executive committee conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Culture of peace</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11</td>
<td>Education in emergencies and post-conflict transition program (2006-2011)</td>
<td>UNICEF &amp; Government of the Netherlands</td>
<td>Project documents and program evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education in emergencies</td>
<td>INEE</td>
<td>INEE website and INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From this broad data (1944-2013), I develop a four-part typology of education aid practices for organizing data and reducing complexity as shown in Figure 1 (McDonell and Elmore, 1987).

![Figure 1. Typology of education aid practices.](image)

The different modes are organized along two axes, based on whether they support positive or negative peace, and whether the individual or the state is the referent object of security, with the understanding that the exercise of power influences preferences. The typology is used to facilitate within and cross-case analysis in the second half of the thesis research. Education sector aid projects by CIDA in Colombia, Afghanistan, and (South) Sudan are classified based on the four ideal types identified as statebuilding, peacebuilding, stabilization and protection-based approaches. While other salient examples of education aid in conflict states were omitted due to spatial and time constraints, and a more exhaustive historical analysis may have enriched the discussion, the fact that the analysis was limited in scope does not necessarily diminish its utility as a tool to facilitate comparative analysis across the country case studies that follow.

The second and main part of the thesis study, I turn to genealogy to analyse CIDA’s education sector aid in the selected countries over the period 2000-2013 and in the context of Canada’s bilateral relations and international security apparatuses. This case study of CIDA provides insights into the workings of a bilateral aid agency that may be generalizable to
other donor agencies (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5), and the embedded country case studies provide a diverse sampling of geographic areas and types of war, and levels of aid.

About CIDA

CIDA is the main governmental agency responsible for Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) as will be described in detail in Chapter 5. Canada’s aid program was launched after the Second World War in the context of the Cold War. Its first major aid program was the Colombo Plan, in which Canada provided capital and technical assistance to Sri Lanka to counter threat of communist expansion in Asia. The overall program was administered first by the Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance. Then, in 1951, the government delegated the functions related to international development to the International Economic and Technical Cooperation Unit under the Department of Trade and Commerce. By the late 1950s the assistance program had expanded to the Caribbean and Commonwealth Africa, and the Technical Cooperation Unit had expanded to form the Economic and Technical Assistance Branch, which was still formally under the jurisdiction of the Department of Trade and Commerce, but involved the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of Finance. As Canada’s ODA expanded, the three government departments arrived at an agreement in 1960 to create a new office responsible for Canada’s economic assistance programs – the External Aid Office – under the supervision and control of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Churchill et al. 1960). The government also established the External Aid Board to advise on policy and programming. In 1968, the government designated the office a department reporting to the Minister of External Affairs, and changed the names of the department and the board to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Canadian International Development Board respectively (Morrison, 2011).

Since 1968, the agency underwent a number of internal restructurings. The most recent decision came in March 2013 when the Harper government announced it would merge CIDA with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to create the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. According to the government, the merger is intended to improve policy coherence and aid effectiveness through more focused development assistance (Foster, 2013). It followed on the merger of the Foreign Affairs and
International Trade portfolios into a single department with two ministers by the Harper government in 2006.

CIDA’s organizational structure for the period prior to amalgamation is shown in the figure below. Policy making and evaluation is the ambit of the Strategic Policy and Performance Branch (SPPB). The Branch comprises three directorates: Policy Analysis and Development, Governance and Social Development, and Corporate Planning and Coordination. The Strategic Policy and Performance Branch also ensures coherence and alignment between corporate and program priorities and policy coherence between CIDA and government departments that manage non-aid policies such as international trade, investment, technology transfer, and immigration.

Country-level and regional programming is the combined responsibility of three operational branches: Geographic Programs, Multilateral and Global Partners, and Partnership with Canadians. The Geographic Programs Branch is the most influential of the three in terms of both its resources and staffing. It carries out its programming through four geographic branches (Africa, Americas, Asia, and a branch covering Europe, Middle East, Maghreb and Afghanistan) enabling the Government of Canada to plan and execute international cooperation projects through direct links with governments and organizations in developing countries. Core funding to multilateral institutions is the responsibility of the Multilateral and Global Partners Branch, which also manages the International Humanitarian Assistance Program (including humanitarian appeals), and activities related to the reduction of antipersonnel landmines such as demining activities, mine risk education and victim assistance, and support for peacebuilding activities. Responsive funding of NGOs is the purview of the Partnerships with Canadians Branch. This branch was originally named Canadian Partnership Branch then in 2010, following a program review, its title was changed to Partnerships with Canadians Branch. This titular change was more than cosmetic; it reflected a deeper institutional shift within the agency towards a more strategic, whole of government approach that tied Canada’s aid and non-aid programs more closely together. As a result, funding was no longer in response to unsolicited proposals, but depended on a competitive bidding process in response to the government’s request for proposals as part of
the agency’s “partnership modernization” (Brown, 2012). Its base funding remained unchanged, at least in the short term at $250 million annually. Half with half of Branch resources targeted CIDA’s 20 countries of focus and 80 percent of its resources was aligned with agency-wide thematic priorities.

Within the agency, education policy making and project design and implementation is a complex enterprise involving multiple programming branches and the executive branch. Education specialists are embedded within each of the programming branches. Specialists in the Strategic Policy and Performance Branch include early childhood education and education in fragile and conflict-affected states, basic education, and training and vocational education. Their role is to liaise with international education policy networks, think tanks and organizations such as the Global Partnership for Learning, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), the Brookings Institute, UN agencies and international NGOs and translate global education policies, prepare tip sheets and guidelines and advise staff as requested. Education specialists based within the operational branches submit projects for approval, and monitor implementation with partner organizations.

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Figure 2. CIDA’s 2013 organizational structure.

Case Study Selection: CIDA Education Aid Recipient Countries

The three country case studies were selected based on two criteria: countries must be conflict-affected; and 2) countries must a significant amount of education aid during the 13-year period under review. Whether a country fit the first criterion varied depending on the definition of armed conflict used. The academic literature provides alternative definitions based on the threshold and duration of violence. The Correlates of War project defines war as a conflict resulting in 1,000 battle-related deaths (BRD). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program differentiates war and minor armed conflict based on the number of BRD. Like the Correlates of War, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program sets the threshold for war at 1,000 BRD, and it defines a minor conflict as one resulting in 25 BRD. Strand and Dahl (2010) define an armed conflict as: i) internal armed conflict with more than 25 BRD during a
consecutive five-year period; ii) internal armed conflict with at least 1,000 BRD for any three consecutive years within a given ten-year period; iii) internal armed conflict with a cumulative total of at least 1,000 BRD over a 10-year period; and iv) armed conflict with at least one year of 1,000 BRD during a 10-year period. For the purpose of this research, I have adopted Strand and Dahl’s criteria for conflict-affected countries since this definition incorporates both protracted armed conflicts that have disruptive effects, and short, intense bursts of armed conflict that pose a significant danger (2010, pp. 10-11).

After identifying a set of countries affected by armed conflict according to Strand and Dahl’s criteria (see Appendix Table A-1), this set was reduced further using two additional criteria. I excluded countries receiving the lowest levels of aid from Canada in order to produce a list of CIDA’s top-ten aid recipients. From this point onward, case selection was guided by an interest in maintaining a diversity of cases based on geographic location, nature of the armed conflict, and level of assistance.

Afghanistan is an extreme outlier for a number of reasons. It was the first combat mission for the Canadian Forces since the Korean War and the highest recipient of CIDA aid between 2008 and 2011. Canada’s mission in Afghanistan was the Harper government’s foreign policy priority from at least 2008 until the end of the combat mission in Kandahar in 2011. The other two were selected from outside of Asia in order to maintain a geographical balance. Colombia was chosen not only because it is the only country on the list located in the Americas, but also because it received a modest amount of aid in comparison with either (South) Sudan or Afghanistan, and it the only one of the three countries where Canada has significant trade and commercial interests. (South) Sudan was selected as the third case study because of its location in Africa and because it is the only country during the period of data collection where partition was a genuine possibility following the 2005 peace agreement.

Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection for each case study focused on three issue areas: data on national and international security apparatuses, Canada’s bilateral relations, and CIDA’s education sector aid. For data on national and international apparatus I relied on different sources for each country given the availability of security and defence related policy texts as detailed in
Appendix A, Table A-3. For Colombia, I drew mainly on Colombian government security and defence policy and strategy papers. For Afghanistan I relied on American and NATO strategy documents including NATO summit declarations. For Sudan, I used US policy and the reports of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan and UN Security Council resolutions.

For data on Canada’s bilateral relations with each of the three countries I also relied on different sources due to the availability of data as indicated in Appendix A, Table A-4. For Colombia, I relied on Canadian government policy documents related to Latin America, and CIDA country strategy papers and programming frameworks. Country development programming frameworks are prepared for CIDA partner countries and constitute the key documents outlining the agency’s strategic purpose over a five- to ten-year period. According to CIDA, these documents orient corporate programming based on the partner’s plans and priorities for reducing poverty, CIDA’s relative strengths and accountability framework, and consultations with local (recipient country) and Canadian civil society organizations (CIDA, 2002, p. 4). According to agency guidelines, a framework must be consistent with partner priorities and donor coordinated approaches, prepared in a corporate manner, and focused on achieving results. While some country development programming frameworks are available online, the frameworks for the selected countries were not publically available.

In order to obtain these and other government departments, I submitted requests for information through Access to Information and Privacy procedures of the Federal Government. In total, 17 requests were submitted, including 14 formal and three informal requests as shown in Appendix A, Table A-5. Formal requests were self-initiated based on the identification of specific documents from interviews or the public record. Informal requests are requests made to the Office of Access to Information at government departments based on completed access to information requests posted monthly on government websites.

For data concerning CIDA’s education sector aid flows and practices, I relied on three main data sources for each case study: statistics on CIDA’s bilateral aid to education, a project database listing education sector projects funded by the three programming branches; and semi-structured interviews with former and current CIDA staff and other project stakeholders. Aid statistics were obtained in response to a request under the Access to
Information Act. Project-related data was collected from the CIDA project browser. The browser is an online database that facilitates searches of projects by country and sector. It gives a brief description of the project and its expected results in addition to the project number, maximum CIDA contribution, executing agency, and its start and end date. While useful, the database is incomplete, and information needs to be triangulated with other data sources, such as the Financial Tracking System, and stakeholder interviews. In the cases of Colombia and Afghanistan, CIDA personnel confirmed the final project lists. In the case of Afghanistan, CIDA staff suggested that I omit the names of the Afghan organizations from the charts as a precautionary measure – the implication being that their identification with a western donor might put them at risk. After careful consideration, I decided to use the names of the organizations as these were taken directly from public Canadian government sources.

Sixty-one persons were approached for interviews. Of these 47 agreed to participate in the research study, and a total of 50 interviews were conducted over the period January 2010 to December 2013 as detailed in Appendix A, Table A-1. Participants included current and former government personnel from CIDA, Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and IOs and NGOs associated with CIDA-funded projects. The breakdown of participants by sector and agency is shown in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIDA</th>
<th>DFAIT</th>
<th>DND/CIMIC</th>
<th>NGO/UN</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes current and former employees. “Other” includes other government representatives such as Members of Parliament, and members of academic institutions.

Almost half of the interviews involved current or former CIDA employees; 11 were DND/CF employees or consultants, and 8 were staff at UN agencies and NGOs. Only two interviewees represented DFAIT, and four were either cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament, or academics. Participants were identified based on their participation in CIDA country
programming and education sector projects. With respect to the selection of DND/Civil-
Military Coordination (CIMIC) officers participating in the study, the Field Force Support
Group at the Land Force Doctrine and Training Systems division of the Defence Department
provided a list of members willing to participate following an email request for assistance in
identifying CIMIC officers involved in the mission in Afghanistan. The development of the
list involved an email from DND to each of the four Land Forces Areas requesting volunteers
for the study. The email invited Civil-Military Coordination Operators employed as a Civil-
Military Coordination Project Officer or who worked extensively with projects in
Afghanistan, and who would be available for interviews between 18-31 August 2011 to
participate. Each of the Land Force Areas (the army is divided into four Land Force Areas -
Land Force Western Area, Land Forces Central Area, Land Force Quebec Area, and Land
Force Atlantic Area) was represented in the study.

The interviews averaged roughly one hour in duration. All interviews were conducted
by Skype or phone with the exception of interviews with participants residing in Toronto;
Toronto-based participants were interviewed in person. Prior to the interview, each
participant was given a summary of the purpose of the research, informed about the risks and
benefits and confidentiality provisions, and given an opportunity to ask questions and express
any concerns regarding the risks associated with their participation. Thirty-nine of the 47
participants consented to having their interview recorded. Those who provided consent were
given a copy of the transcript and ample opportunity to review the text and provide further
clarification, contest its content, or provide feedback. None of the individuals requested
substantive changes; two provided minor clarifications where the recording quality was poor
or inaudible, and one suggested more diplomatic language.

Situating Myself as Researcher

My interpretation of the data is influenced by my personal history and ideational
preferences. I came to the topic by way of personal experience in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. From 1993 to 2003, I witnessed what has come to be a familiar but tragic cycle of
reconstruction and destruction. The Oslo Accords opened the floodgates for aid. Projects
were quick to get off the ground in order to deliver a “peace dividend”. Organizations
divided the labour. UNESCO was responsible for curriculum development. UNICEF and Save the Children emphasized the children’s right to education, and local NGOs jockeyed for a slice of the action. Competition for English-speaking local staff intensified as international NGOs and IOs poached valuable human resources from the public and voluntary sectors, foreign technical advisors leapt into the capacity void – including foreign nationals returning home after years in exile creating tensions between “insiders” and “outsiders”, international schools established a presence, and shadow education and other private schools catered to wealthy families and senior government officials. The curricula was unified and newly printed textbooks were distributed with little teacher preparation. Each August/September, backpacks and school supplies were donated by well-meaning aid agencies. Then, ten years on, the bubble burst. Goodwill and optimism were replaced by a deep sense of abandonment as the “peace process” lay fallow, the borders were sealed, and the donors moved on to more urgent hotspots. In an almost predictable pattern Palestinian rocket attacks into Israel and Israeli government retaliation destroyed or damaged public infrastructure including UNRWA and public schools, and killed or injured civilians. Some if not all of these schools would be repaired, reinforcing a personal view that education reconstruction was part of a cycle of destruction and rebuilding.

This experience influenced my view of donor practices and my theoretical predisposition. My concept of power is more self-reflexive than the traditional definition of power, which understands power as “control over” as in Dahl’s definition: “power is the ability of A to get B do something that he would otherwise not do” (Dahl, 1957, 202). Dahl’s definition differs from a Marxian perspective that emphasizes the economic relations and control over the means of production “all the way down.” I suggest that economic relations are not necessarily deterministic; organizations and groups are able to exercise agency through other forms of power including normative power and moral suasion (Irwin 2001). However, they do so always within a field of power relations. Therefore, any discussion of the behaviour of actors, whether state or non-state, has to take into consideration forms of power and how power is exercised. This kind of critical approach does not necessarily frame education aid as an instrument of oppression, exploitation, or manipulation and self-interests. But it does suggest that power ought to be empirically studied and analyzed. So, to avoid criticism for theoretical determinism, I take seriously an obligation to manage these tensions
by practicing self-reflexivity, giving consideration to alternative explanations, and using multiple sources of data for cross-checking to defend my conclusions (Lakatos, 1970; Peshkin, 1988; Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Limitations of the Study

Several limitations are associated with this research. First, the development of the typology which provides a tool for comparison within and across case studies relies on a selective set of historical data. Although, both the geographic and the temporal dimensions of this analysis were intended to be as inclusive as possible, it may be that historical cases were omitted that would have produced a different typological framework. However, this typology also draws from concepts derived from the literature review on the causes of war (positive and negative peace), which strengthens the analytical power of this typology.

Second, difficulties in gaining access to information in terms of access to project documentation and unofficial policy texts was a constraining factor. The vast majority of policy texts, project documents, and quantitative data was obtained through Access to Information requests. Due to staff cutbacks at the Access to Information Office and the volume of requests, the turnaround time was characteristically lengthy, particularly for documents requiring third party consultation. Some requested documents were withheld for security reasons; others were released but were so heavily redacted that they provided little, if any, information. Moreover, if is unclear whether the redacted portions would have rendered a different interpretation.

Third, at least 10 senior-level bureaucrats at CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs declined my request for an interview either on or off the record. While time constraints may have been an issue, anecdotal evidence suggests that given public controversies over CIDA’s leadership and efforts by the federal government to control the message, senior staffers preferred to play it safe rather than be interviewed and risk controversial statements being made public and affecting their professional advancement. Programming staff made themselves available, but typically they worked on a file for only one or two years and therefore had limited corporate memory. In many cases, they were either unable or unwilling to discuss the motivations underlying project selection and country
strategy. Moreover, because CIDA rotates its human resources across geographical areas, their area of expertise revolved around thematic rather than area-specific knowledge. Invariably, program managers’ expertise was restricted to project management so while they were able to speak to the specific objectives, activities and challenges of a select number of projects, they were rarely prepared to venture beyond this technocratic sphere of authority. Due to staff turnover, particularly in the case of Afghanistan, where deployments in the field were usually one year in duration, program managers took over a portfolio of projects from their predecessors and focused mainly on ensuring that a project’s goals were achieved within the specified timeframe. In most cases, they had little information about why the projects were selected – leaving the front end, and often the back end, of these narratives a black box. Not surprising and with few exceptions, current CIDA staff eschewed any questions that could be remotely construed as political or controversial although some telling comments slipped out every now and then. Most persons interviewed from CIDA clearly preferred to err on the side of caution rather than to reveal anything that might be misinterpreted, particularly given the political sensitivity of the Afghanistan file, and cost-cutting measures in the public service after 2010.

Fourth, a further limitation revolved around a decision to exclude local aid recipients in Colombia, Afghanistan and (South) Sudan from the pool of interviewees. This decision was made in order to concentrate efforts on decision-making processes at CIDA that led up to the selection of education interventions rather than their impact in the field. In order to mitigate this shortcoming, participants included Canadian partners who worked closely with their local counterparts and could convey some of the dynamics of donor–client relations. Future research should include project officers operating in the field and representatives of the local population for a more fulsome enquiry.

Fifth, linguistic limitations affected the Colombia case study more than the analyses for either Afghanistan or Sudan/South Sudan since several Colombian government documents were accessible only in Spanish. That said, I tried to compensate for this by accessing English language summaries where available, or secondary sources that referred to these documents.
Finally, since several interviews were conducted by phone or Skype and some without the benefit of video, I could not observe non-verbal cues such as facial expressions and body language that otherwise have a role in guiding the line of questioning. This was partly overcome through follow-up email correspondence to clarify ambiguous statements or issues that required more elaboration.

In order to mitigate these limitations, I also interviewed former CIDA personnel. Those working outside the public service were very open and expressed the most independent positions. Individuals with ties to the agency in the form of consultancies were bound contractually through confidentiality clauses and could not speak on the record about specific activities, but they were able to discuss general issues. Case managers at NGOs partnering with CIDA were also interviewed and they provided important insights and helped address some informational gaps. But here again, their discussion revolved largely around project management rather than policy development. In the case of Afghanistan, interviews with Canadian Forces members deployed in Afghanistan provided a different perspective than interviews with CIDA personnel. Each of their “stories” represents a fragment of the truth, or at least the truth as each experienced and understood it. By piecing enough of these together, I was better able to obtain a more fulsome sense of what happened. Written evaluation reports on CIDA funded education projects provided an accessible source of information on initiatives, although they focused on evaluating actual outcomes against planned outcomes, and rarely mentioned aid motivations. Nevertheless, these reports often filled a gap.

Conclusion

This is a two-part study: an archaeological analysis of education reconstruction practices from 1945 until 2013 to formulate a typology of education aid practices in conflict and post-conflict states; and a genealogical analysis that examines the correlation between CIDA’s education aid in Colombia, Afghanistan, and (South) Sudan and international and national security and risk apparatuses. In the final synoptic chapter, I link these two parts by analysing shifts in education aid practices over time. I discuss how these shifts align with
conceptions of security that establish the spaces and populations in each context differently and rationalize practice.

I look at how security actors space is organized to confine, separate, and isolate in ways that include and exclude populations from education aid. I examine how conceptions of security create contingent labels for groups of states and people to signal who is at-risk and vulnerable and warrants protection, and who is risky and dangerous. I also discuss the knowledge and practices enacted by the Canadian government that make education aid practices seem logical, desirable and natural while, at the same time, reproduce power relations and crowd out alternative, potentially transformative education aid practices.

A problem in Foucault’s work, and to some extent my own, is that power is everywhere and cannot be isolated. This is partly because Foucault (and myself) decentre the subject. However, I am not convinced that because Foucauldian analysis does not pinpoint the centre of power with a specific actor or person it denies individuals or groups agency and brackets transformational change. On the contrary, by showing how practices are contingent Foucauldian analysis suggests that they can be contested and transformed, although because practices emerge from within broader political, economic, and epistemic structures they are more stable than we might believe. By focusing on rationalities and technologies of power, Foucauldian analysis provides an entry point for contesting and reconstructing power relations. The purpose of this research on education aid and security is not to denunciate or delegitimize Canada’s education aid practices. Its purpose is to understand and uncover the way practices are constructed and made normal in order to begin to denaturalize them and open space for donors to conceive of alternative conceptions of security and education aid practice.
Aid agencies have had a surfeit of opportunities in conflict and postconflict states over the past 60 years to help reconstruct education systems in some form or another. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, as at 2013, there were 254 armed conflicts (114 wars) since 1946, and 144 armed conflicts (47 wars) since 1989 (Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). Some education reconstruction programs have been ambitious in scope and scale; others have been more modest with more immediate goals in mind. In this chapter I adopt an archaeological analysis to examine a select group of actors and their education aid practices since 1944. I begin with education reconstruction in postwar Germany and Japan, followed by interventions in the context of anti-colonial movements and counterinsurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, I shift my focus from state actors to UN agencies including United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), in addition to the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), a community of practice of academics, think tanks, bilateral aid agencies and UN agencies, and NGOs focused on education in situations of armed conflict, natural disasters, and chronic poverty. The purpose of this historical inquiry is twofold: to identify similarities and differences over time in education aid practices from 1944 until 2013 and the epistemic shifts that have accompanied changes in education aid practice; and, to develop a typology with which to analyze and compare the country case studies that follow in Chapters Six through Eight. I argue that education aid practices from 1944 to 2013 reflect shifting social understandings of war and armed conflict evolving from changes in the structure of the international system and dominant understandings of security and development. While some of these practices potentially lean societies to a state of positive peace, others reinforce negative peace.
US Postwar Reconstruction in Germany and Japan: “Re-Education”

In the case of postwar Japan and Germany, the problem of warring nations was constructed by the US as a democracy deficit: in Japan, militarism resulted from an overly centralized education bureaucracy and a cultural code that perpetuated submissiveness; in Germany, fascism was the product of social training enabled by an education system that streamed children from an early age reinforcing hierarchical, class-based social structures.

With regards to Germany, the solution was conceived broadly as “re-education” – a term borrowed from American psychologists, among them neuropsychiatrist Richard Brickner. In *Is Germany Incurable?* Brickner (1942, 1943) proposed that “German aggression” resulted from cultural paranoia. He claimed that German society promoted the same attitudes and dispositions found in paranoid individuals through codes of etiquette and of honour perpetuated by social institutions such as the police, schools, and marriage. Cultural paranoia was the effect of “social training” that made Germany “dangerous” to its neighbours. Rehabilitation required new forms of social training for which the education system would play an important role. The recommendations evolving from the proceedings of the Joint Committee on Postwar Planning held in 1944, included education aid to support relief and rehabilitation programs. The Committee members concluded that while the Germans were not “sick” they were “trained in a way of life that will not work”, by which they were referred to democracy (Joint Committee on Post War Planning, 1944, pp. 4-5).

At the Conferences of the Allied Ministers of Education from 1942 to 1945 European and American delegates discussed a range of issues requiring international cooperation. The US was a latecomer to the process, only sending a delegation to participate in the Conferences in 1944 after learning that Conference members were prepared to move ahead with postwar reconstruction in Axis countries without American input (Dorn, 2006, p. 300). The delegation proposed the establishment of an international education organization under the auspices of the UN, the UN Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction, the precursor to the UNESCO. This organization was to direct education reconstruction, promote international understanding through educational and intellectual exchange, rebuild education systems destroyed during the war in Axis countries, and vet these systems to eliminate fascist, militaristic, and totalitarian doctrines and adherents while supporting
democratic educational reforms. But, before it had an opportunity to flex its muscles, the US government delegated these functions to its national defence and foreign affairs departments as part of America’s Marshall Plan for postwar reconstruction estimated to cost $US 13.3 billion (Opocensky, 1949; Dorn, 2006, p. 298). Each of the Allies – Britain, France, the US and the USSR – was responsible for reconstruction in its respective occupation zone, as specified at the 1945 Potsdam Conference, and they shared control of Berlin through the Allied Control Council. In the initial “control” period, the four signatory powers agreed that “German education shall be so controlled as to completely eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.”

German re-education involved a two-part agenda beginning with the removal en masse of fascist sympathizers followed by structural and curricular reforms to “liberate” and “emancipate” citizens, to create “free” citizens by training them in concepts of democratic education including tolerance, human rights, and non-violent conflict resolution. The US military implemented a denazification policy that involved removing civil servants from positions that “mould public opinion” including teachers and other education personnel. Denazification was a blunt instrument that resulted in widespread shortages of education personnel at least in the short-term. In 1946, the US government fielded an education mission to assess education needs and develop a postwar education reconstruction strategy. According to the mission’s final report, the goal of reconstruction should be the “fundamental reorientation of the German educational program in the direction of democratic goals and procedures” (Zook, 1946, p. 32). The German system was already decentralized, and authority stayed at the level of the Länd (state). The main thrust of the report was the

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11 See also Allemann-Ghionda, C. (2000) on reconstruction in postwar reconstruction in Italy.

recommendation that the education system be reorganized in order to form a comprehensive school system including a common curriculum and free education up to the secondary level. This had been attempted by German reformers in the interwar years, but failed to gain any traction. American educationalists believed that the hierarchical nature of the system contributed to the rise of National Socialism, and by establishing a common curriculum they aimed to support social inclusion and democratic culture. They also supported the revision of the social sciences curriculum and the development of history textbooks that supported their version of democratic citizenship. As half the teachers were dismissed in the process of denazification, they recommended emergency teacher education programs to fast-track qualifying teachers. At the same time, the report’s contributors recognized the limits of education reconstruction and that “re-education” could be effective only insofar as the economy facilitated material security. Accordingly, they prescribed support for vocational training. Finally, the mission recommended a new coordinating mechanisms or the activities of private individuals and voluntary organizations, including exchange programs.

Re-education was one dimension of a broader restructuring of the international system in the postwar period based on North-Atlantic collective security arrangements formalized with the creation of NATO in 1947. The recurrence of a world war signalled to allied leaders that if they were to impose the kind of the humiliating and punitive measures on Germany similar to Treaty of Versailles following the end of WWI, they might further alienate the German population, which could lead to another world war. Allied leaders entertained an alternative strategy that would coopt rather than isolate Germany and Japan into a liberal democratic peace. That strategy was captured by the slogan of the Marshall Plan, ‘You too can be like us.’ Beyond its propaganda message, the slogan reflected a vision of a zone of peace among liberal-democratic, market-based states encompassing western Europe, North America and Japan.

In Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, delegated a US education mission under the authority of the US State Department to undertake a study postwar educational reforms. The mission’s final report made several wide-ranging recommendations aimed at promoting democratic ideals and integrating Japan into a “family of nations dedicated to world peace and respect for the fundamental human rights” (US State Department 1946, iii). The central pillar of the recommendations was that the administrative authority of the Department of Education be devolved to the prefectural and local levels (US State Department, 1946, p. 57). In order to expand access to education, the mission recommended structural changes and the adoption of a 6-3-3 system: six years of primary school, followed by three years of lower secondary school and then three years of upper secondary school. The first nine years were to be compulsory, tuition-free, and co-educational.

Unlike the situation in Germany, where teachers were terminated en masse, in Japan the focus was on the re-education of teachers (US State Department, 1946, pp. 35-36). The basic goal of the teacher training programs was the development of professional knowledge and skills necessary for teachers to assume greater responsibility in curriculum development for their classrooms (US State Department, 1946, p. 24). New textbooks in geography and history were necessary to replace texts censored and removed by the US military. As for texts in morals and ethics, the mission concluded that teaching morality in schools could promote “submissiveness” and therefore moral education should be conceived in broader terms to encourage “equality, the give-and-take of democratic government, the ideal of good workmanship in daily life.” It is arguably the recommendations for language reforms that were the most sensitive and objectionable, which was perhaps why MacArthur suggested that these recommendations should be understood as guides for long-term planning rather than directives for the immediate reconstruction period. Specifically, the mission recommended the formation of a committee to study the issue and prohibit the use of Kanji, to plan for the Romanization of school texts, and bring about “a more democratic form of the spoken

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The report’s authors also recommended increased support for adult education, including public libraries and museums but also community and professional societies, labour unions, and political groups, and for higher education in ways that promote principles of meritocracy and academic freedom (US State Department, 1946, p. 25).

The report of the second US education mission, sent in 1950 to monitor the progress of the implementation of the recommendations of the first report, had a slightly different tenor. Whereas the original report established the education philosophy and principles guiding postwar reconstruction, the second report emphasized the fiscal planning necessary to finance education activities. Therefore, whereas the first report was a “wish list” written almost as if funding was bottomless, the second report was pragmatic, conveying concern over financial shortfalls that could jeopardize Japan’s fledgling democratic education system. The report’s authors stressed that education is a national investment that contributes to economic growth by providing employment opportunities in school construction, manufacturing, selling, and distributing supplies and equipment. They wrote, “There is a definite relationship between the education level of the people and the purchasing power and high standards of living in a community” (US State Department, 1950, p. 2). The mission determined that more funding was needed in order to rebuild school infrastructure, expand access for students with special needs, raise teacher salaries, and offer scholarships for teacher education programs to address the teacher shortfall. At the same time, the mission expressed concern over waste, duplication, and inefficiency. It warned that without improved fiscal administration reduced services would lead to a loss of public confidence in the education system and more difficulty securing funding (US State Department, 1950, p. 4).

The main objective of US reeducation programs in postwar Germany and Japan was the reconstruction and reorganization of these education systems to reflect principles of democratic education. American policymakers saw schooling as a mechanism to (re)socialize teachers and students in order to prevent the resurgence of militarism and fascism and

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integrate former axis powers into the “family of nations”, particularly in light of superpower competition with the Soviet Union and the emergence of a Cold War in 1947. Democratic administrative structures and classroom practices advocated by American administrators were informed by the philosophy of John Dewey outlined in his seminal work *Democracy and Education* (1916), which foregrounds the importance of individual autonomy and creativity, and learning as social experience.

**Education, Anti-Colonialism, and Counterinsurgencies (1950s–1970s)**

As the perceived risk of the resurgence of fascism and militarism in the former Axis countries receded in the 1950s and 1960s, Western imperial powers identified and faced new security threats arising from what they viewed as the communist insurgencies and nationalist movements in Asia and Africa. In some cases, such as in Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam, Western powers supported counterinsurgency operations. Crosscutting these contexts was the view by strategic planners in foreign and defence ministries that military operations were necessary but not sufficient for defeating the rebels. Social and economic development, including expansion of access to schooling, was necessary to bolster the legitimacy of the ruling regime and, conversely, undermine popular support for the insurgency.

**Malaya (1948–1960): Winning “Hearts and Minds”**

The British campaign in Malaya between 1948 and 1960 against a Communist Chinese insurgency began with a search and destroy strategy then shifted to a more sophisticated counterinsurgency campaign designed to separate the population from the insurgents (Dixon 2009). Although Chinese guerrillas aided the British in rolling back the Japanese occupation of Malaya, about 3,000 of these Chinese fighters, who had not been demobilized at the end of the conflict turned their weapons against the British colonial administration of Malaya to redress political, economic and social grievances. In the sphere of education, for example, the British discriminated in their support of students based on race (Chinese, Malay and Indian). They paid for the education of Malays and made substantial contributions to the education of the Indians, but provided less assistance to Chinese students
The insurgency targeted rubber and tin production centres, which threatened the main source of export revenue for the colonial administration. It adopted guerrilla tactics, seeking shelter and food from Chinese squatters, many of whom were migrant workers in the tin mines, who lived in the forests effectively beyond the authority and control of the government.

At first, the British response was punitive: emergency laws were imposed giving the colonial administration discretionary powers to forcibly deport persons and resettle entire villages that were providing support to the insurgents. The Briggs Plan of 1950 forcibly resettled about one quarter of Malaya’s Chinese population, roughly 400,000–500,000 persons, from the jungle to internment camps described as “new villages.” This was calculated to deny rebels access to food, shelter, and information, effectively flushing them out of the forests. At the same time, the British also imposed harsh punishments on persons found carrying firearms or assisting the guerrillas, including deportation and detention for up to two years without trial, restrictions on movement. They also issued identity cards to Chinese Malays and imposed curfews, fines and other forms of collective punishment. These hardline policies, generally, did not involve a shift in education sector aid.

After Oliver Lyttelton was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1951 and Gerald Templer assumed the post of High Commissioner and Director of Operations in February 1952, British strategy shifted to a “hearts and minds” campaign which entailed expanding social services including access to primary schooling for the Chinese populations (Stubbs, 2008; Kromer, 1972, pp. 19-20). During an exchange in the British House of Commons in 1952, Lyttelton linked the expansion of access to education with the broader enterprise of nation-building. He believed that the British government had to rapidly expand access to compulsory primary education in order to socialize citizens into a national identity if it was to make any progress in the “war of ideas”. In other words, educational access was instrumental in teaching the population that they owe their allegiance first and foremost to

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the state, and not to the country of their parents’ origin. While Lyttleton understood that identity-building was a long-term project, he believed that schoolchildren would be “evangelists”, able to “convert their parents to our way of thinking…” and to provide a counterpoint to the “propaganda” of the insurgents in the short term (House of Commons, 1952).

According to development plans, each “new village” was to have a school staffed by English and vernacular teachers. Reporting on the situation in 1952, Lyttelton remarked, that, with few exceptions, the new villages each had their own schools or were within reach of one in a nearby town. The government allocated $6 million on school buildings and provided grants for equipment purchases and teacher salaries”. In a statement in the House of Commons in March 1953, Lyttelton reported with satisfaction on the expansion of access to education for Chinese children: 221,000 children attended 1,065 Chinese primary schools, and an additional 45,400 Chinese attended government or government-aided schools in which the medium of instruction was English, although he did not provide a baseline with which to compare these figures (House of Commons, 1953). He described the expansion of schooling; in six years, the total number of schools increased by almost 40 percent, student enrolment increased by more than 80 percent, and the number of teachers rose by almost 100 percent. He identified the shortage of teachers as the biggest barrier to further expansion of primary schooling. By supporting greater access to education, the British intended to signal to the Chinese community that their grievances, including their concern that their children be taught in Mandarin, were being addressed notwithstanding laws and policies which perpetuated discriminatory policies. At the same time, building schools and teaching children implied that progress was being made against the insurgency, which helped to justify the administration’s policies at Whitehall and to counter the public perception that Malaya was ungovernable (House of Commons, 1953).

In sum, the British government’s efforts to expand educational access for Chinese Malays was part of the colonial administration’s security and defence strategy aimed at weakening the Chinese nationalist insurgency by addressing some of the minority population’s grievances on the one hand, and socializing schoolchildren into a national identity on the other hand. It was also aimed at reassuring the domestic British public that the
insurgency was under control, and that British economic interests were secure. In order to gain public sanction of the mission, the government reframed its objectives to include improving educational outcomes for the Chinese minority.


Protests against in Algeria began in 1954 and expanded into a nationalist movement. The French military, which had just withdrawn from Indochina that year, was redeployed to Algeria to restore order. Two years later French prime minister Guy Mollet ordered a pacification campaign against Algeria's nationalists commonly referred to as “rebels,” “outlaws,” and “terrorists.”¹⁸ In the context of wide-reaching emergency laws, pacification amounted to exercising “an iron hand in a velvet glove” (The New York Times, 1956).

The French forces were divided into static and mobile units. Static units were Special Administrative Services units responsible for implementing pacification programs in their designated areas of responsibility; mobile units were used for conventional combat operations and cross-border infiltrations. Special Administrative Services units were formed comprising a commanding officer, his deputy, three civilian contractors, a security unit of between 30 to 50 men of Muslim and European origin, and, wherever possible, female assistants to manage family programs. Each was responsible for between 10,000 and 20,000 persons and guided by the principle that it was better to “convince rather than compel” (Centre for Force Employment Doctrine (CDEF), n.d., p. 49).

David Galula, a captain in the French army deployed in Greater Kabylia from 1956 to 1958, and a maven of counterinsurgency doctrine, recalls that the order to pacify was interpreted differently by different commanders, depending on whether the commander was biased toward a military solution or toward psychological/persuasive tactics, and improvised in response to the situation on the ground (Galula, 1963, p. xi). Galula favoured persuasion. “The population had to be protected, controlled, won over, and thus isolated” from the insurgency (Galula, 1963, p. 38). Once separated from the insurgency, public services could

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be provided in order to gain the support of the population. In his reflections on providing schooling for boys and girls, Galula recalls that the military organized two classes for boys aged between eight and 14 years, headed by French draftees – one a farmer and another a plumber. Galula gushes on how the results were impressive, and how surprised he was by how quickly the boys learned their lessons and were able to sing French children’s songs. The children were kept busy in schools and structured activities. When useful intelligence information slipped out in the course of interactions with the children, they used the information, but Galula reassures his reader that he discouraged the use of children as informants among those under his charge. Galula perceived village women as a potential ally, “given their subjugated conditions” and he ordered the villagers to send their girls aged 8 to 13 years to school in the afternoon, over protests from the population (Galula, 1963, pp. 176-178).

Expanding access to education constituted one of the core Special Administrative Services security through pacification activities and enrolment statistics suggest that these efforts were largely successful: more Muslims attended French schools in Algeria between 1958 and 1962 than between 1830 to 1958. This was possible despite shortages of civilian teachers because the Special Administrative Services recruited French soldiers as educators. By May 1959, 1,032 soldiers had taught 68,754 young Algerians in 796 primary schools opened or reopened by military command. Given that the total Algerian enrolment in primary grades was 619,474 in 1959, the military personnel taught over ten percent of students. By 1962 public school enrolment had increased to about 700,000 students. The Special Administrative Services also staffed 35 French army-built technical schools between 1958 and 1959. French authorities also established Centres Sociaux for high-risk groups such as school-aged children not in school and illiterate youth and adults that offered literacy and vocational training programs. Most of these centres were located in Special Administrative Services buildings, so the military had an indirect role in their operation. The army also ran residential training programs for unskilled and unemployed youth 14-18 years old, the Service de Formation des Jeunes en Algerie. Trainees were housed, supervised, and taught by soldiers. Still another program, the Formation Professionnelle des Adultes, provided non-formal education for adults. Although the Formation Professionnelle des Adultes was not a military program, the Special Administrative Services was very much involved in its
programming. These programs rarely led to long-term employment so, in order not to forfeit the goodwill presumably created by making this training available, these programs were aligned with short-term job creation programs supported by the military (Heggoy 1972, Chapter 12; Heggoy 1973, pp. 193-195).

French education sector interventions in Algeria in the context of military counterinsurgency were aimed at rapidly expanding access to schooling, and reinforcing French cultural identity among Algerians. It constituted an extension of French control mechanisms over Berber and Arab populations aimed at suppressing a popular uprising. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who was posted to Algeria for military service in 1955 and remained there to study social life in Kabyle as a self-taught ethnographer – the same area which Galula speaks about in his reflections on counterinsurgency operations – understood French educational practices in Algeria as a form of symbolic violence – violence that is 'misrecognized' as liberation and transformation but, in practice, helps to reproduce unequal power relations between the French and Algerians (Bourdieu, 1977). Ultimately, the French were unable to stem the nationalist tide. In 1962, the French government withdrew its forces and acquiesced to Algerian independence, but not without leaving a legacy with implications extending well beyond the withdrawal of its forces.

France’s education aid to Algeria reinforced military operations to suppress a popular nationalist movement. Education aid priorities and practices, including expanding educational access and providing vocational training for out-of-school youth, were intended to pacify the population. They neither recognized Algerian national identity nor devolved decision making powers in the sphere of education to the local population, reinforced existing non-egalitarian power relations.


Between 1967 and 1972, the US intervened militarily in Vietnam in an effort to repel an insurgency led by the Viet Cong and to contain communist expansion in South-east Asia. As American administrators and military forces intervened to fill the vacuum left by the French, they had to come to terms with the legacy of a colonial administration that had centralized authority and left indigenous institutions weak and ill-equipped for nation-
building, particularly in rural areas where the government’s reach was limited. Thus the Viet Cong insurgents were able to establish a foothold. To rebuff the VC, the government of Vietnam launched the Agroville Program, which ran from 1959 to 1961, with the objective of isolating rural populations from the Viet Cong and providing them with social services. This involved relocating Vietnamese peasants to secure areas controlled by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and providing social services and infrastructure such as schools, health clinics, and electricity. Many peasants objected to being resettled and financial incentives were often inadequate to induce voluntary compliance. Thus, many peasants were forcibly relocated to new Agroville communities, fuelling anti-government resentment and playing into the hands of the Viet Cong. William Colby, the regional Central Intelligence Agency chief from 1962-1967, and the Director of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support from 1968-1971, describes the program’s rationale as a means of organizing the population in order to provide social services more efficiently. Resettlement programs would move people close together to form Agrovilles that would retain their agricultural base, but would enable the government to have a presence and to provide social services, including public education (Transcript, 1981).

Villagers resisted leaving their homes and the government of Vietnam realized that forcibly resettlement would not win them friends. In 1962, the Vietnamese government announced the Strategic Hamlet Program, effectively replacing the Agroville program, as one of several pacification programs. The strategy remained consistent – to counter the appeal of the Viet Cong by proving that the Vietnamese government could provide physical security and deliver tangible benefits in order to convince rural populations that their interests lie with the government of Vietnam and the defeat of the Viet Cong. Tactically, however, the Strategic Hamlet Program differed from the Agroville program in that it focused on ensuring security in strategic hamlets as a precursor for national development programs. The Strategic Hamlet Program involved a series of events: clearing insurgents from an area, providing physical security to its population, establishing public infrastructure and services. However, each of the main participants – the US military, American political leadership and the Diem administration – held different views on how best to sequence and organize these activities (Vietnam Task Force, n.d., i-ii). In the context of the SHP, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the Hamlet Education Project in 1963-1968 in partnership
with the Ministry of Education. The goal was to expand access to education to children in secured hamlets by constructing 11,500 classrooms; improving educational quality through the provision of textbooks and mobile science units for elementary teacher education, and short-term pre- and in-service teacher training programs. According to a 1969 USAID and Ministry of Education report, primary enrolment increased rapidly as a result of the US pacification program. With the exception of its account of the causalities and the damage to infrastructure resulting from the Tet Offensive, the report paints an idyllic picture of progress with children going “happily” to school and studying “with enthusiasm” (USAID and Ministry of Education (Saigon), 1969; Normington, 1970, p. 71).

To enhance the effect of counterinsurgency operations, the US government sought ways to improve the effectiveness of civilian-military coordination among departments and agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and USAID. In 1966, it established the Office of Civil Operations on a trial basis. The Office of Civil Operations was the precursor to Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development. Support Program, which was put in place in 1967. CORDS differed from earlier pacification schemes in that it integrated civilian and military operations under a unified command structure. It was also better funded than earlier initiatives and it established a monthly and quarterly survey (the Hamlet Evaluation System) to measure progress using a battery of military and development indicators of the government’s control over the population (Sweetland, 1968: 14; Komer, 1970). The focus was no longer on national development plans but on identifying and addressing the needs of hamlets. Washington officials expected that once there was a policy in place to coordinate the various agencies and departments, they would see “movement at speeds beyond the capability of the Mission” and be able to report “visible progress” on the ground to Congress, the press, and the public. The US Mission in Saigon felt that, because they were on the ground, they were best placed to determine what might be reasonably

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19 The Tet Offensive involved a series of surprise attacks by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army against US and South Vietnamese forces in early 1968.

expected and resented the oversight from Washington (Vietnam Task Force, n.d., pp. 119-120). Therefore, as the military situation deteriorated, American priorities shifted from supporting national education sector planning and waiting for the effects to trickle down to the local level, to addressing the needs of villagers in order to separate insurgents from non-insurgents. At the same time, the US administration needed to maintain Congressional and public support for the Vietnam mission, and used expanding education enrolment rates, which provided a measurable and positive effect of US intervention, to help rationalize and mitigate the negative public relations effects of the rising human and material costs of the mission.

In hearings before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1970, Donald MacDonald, the Director of USAID in South Vietnam, indicated that education was not only a “vehicle of economic and social change” but also “visible evidence of government responsiveness to public demand, and … a force for national unity.” He presented statistics to support his claim that there had been a “revolution in education.” He reported that USAID’s education sector assistance to Vietnam from 1954 to 1970 totalled $62.2 million, which went primarily to technical assistance as well as construction materials and contractors’ fees. (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970, p. 583). He also reported that in the 16 years since independence in 1954, primary school enrolment had increased from about 400,000 to 2.3 million, and covered 82 percent of the school-age population. He went on to state that these children occupied 32,000 Vietnamese classrooms, used 16 million Vietnamese textbooks, and that roughly 2,000 student-parent associations with a total of half a million members had been formed since 1966.

In order to expedite progress in expanding schools, the US government had relied heavily on American technical assistance. At its peak, education sector aid involved 29 advisors with the Ministry of Education. This education “revolution” also involved decentralizing the education system by delegating the authority to administer primary and secondary schools to local communities, and allowing local communities to collect local taxes for educational purposes. However, MacDonald also conceded that the education system remained qualitatively weak, and drew parallels with late nineteenth century US schools where students were taught in multi-grade classrooms by recent primary school
graduates. The rapid expansion necessitated the recruitment of unqualified teachers. Almost 24,000 of the 40,000 teachers were what MacDonald termed “90-day wonders” – teachers who were fast-tracked rather than being required to complete the requisite two-year pre-service training (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970, pp. 588-589). By 1975, the US had withdrawn from Vietnam, putting an end to the so-called “revolution” in education.

In sum, US education aid to Vietnam during the Viet Cong insurgency in the 1960s was subordinate to the military objectives of the US combat mission, and the broader foreign policy interests in maintaining the balance of power in the international system. The expansion of access to schooling through new school construction and teacher training in hamlets and villages was part of a broader strategy to separate and isolate the population from the insurgency, and to extend the presence of government forces and services to insecure areas. Education sector aid also helped to gain public support for ongoing military intervention to members of Congress and an increasingly divided American public. Expanding access to schooling was a central dimension of Rostow’s modernization theory (Rostow, 1990; Lerner, 1964) which posited that developing countries progress in stages from traditional-agrarian based to modern, industrial-based societies. Reflecting this concept of development, aid administrators imputed social and economic transformation to the education “revolution”.

**Liberal Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Period**

In response to a rise in the number of armed conflicts and wars that immediately followed the end of the Cold War, the UN supported multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations in conflict-affected and postconflict states. They defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict,” understood as a complement to conventional forms of peacekeeping and peacemaking (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In his *Agenda for Peace*, the UN Secretary-General tasked UN agencies such as the World Bank and the UNDP with putting the concept into practice. Since peacebuilding did not emerge organically from a particular
political paradigm, scholars and practitioners applied different frameworks when theorizing or implementing the concept.

From the canon of political theory, Kant’s liberal peace thesis provided the dominant framework for peacebuilding as liberal institution-building. In Perpetual Peace (1943), Kant argued that states with the more states are inter-dependent the less likely they are to engage in armed violence with one another. Approached from this perspective, peacebuilding supplements the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and military/security measures of earlier peacekeeping and peacemaking models designed to support a cessation of violence. Peacebuilding supports and is supported by democratization and institution-building (Ottaway, 2003; Paris, 2004; Call & Cook, 2003; Newman et al., 2009).

The basic assumptions underpinning the UN peacebuilding model were as follows. Once a cessation of violence had been agreed upon, the international community would assist in the constitutional reforms and institution-building requisite for multi-party elections. The reforms included guarantees of free and fair elections to establish the legitimacy of the governing party in order to facilitate a partner for donor countries and an exit strategy for foreign peacekeepers. These constitutional reforms typically included provisions for recognition of a fundamental right to education, universal and free public education at the primary level, gender equality, and minority rights.

In order to finance development programs in support of peacebuilding, the international community mobilized and channelled donor commitments through donor conferences and multi-donor trust funds. These pooled funds supported reconstruction as a means as a means of strengthening public confidence in a democratically elected government. In order to ensure that newly elected governments would not revert to either authoritarianism or armed conflict, the donor community was committed to supporting public sector and civil society institution-building to strengthen government accountability and service delivery. This maximalist model presupposes that, while education may contribute to violence, it is also capable of fostering peaceful coexistence by supporting reconciliation and democratic processes (Tawil & Harley, 2004; Smith & Vaux, 2003; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). Therefore, the education–peacebuilding relationship pivots around democratization, and non-violent conflict resolution in postconflict states (Salmi, 2006).
The emergence of peacebuilding discourse coincided with growing attention by state and non-state actors to the concept of human security, defined by the Commission on Human Security (2002) as “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats. Several states, including Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia, advocated human security in both broad and narrow forms. Broad forms included nonviolent threats, whether due to war, communicable disease, natural disasters or chronic poverty; narrow forms, such as the type advocated by the Canadian government from the late 1990s until 2005, focused mainly on protecting populations from imminent harm due to wars and armed conflict. Given the confusion over the types of threats that the concept of human security included and excluded, whether critical threats that rise above a certain threshold or chronic poverty, education sector programming among UN agencies reflected heterogeneous approaches in making human security operational.

**United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)**

Focusing on the threat to human security posed by armed conflict, UNESCO took the lead in operationalizing the concept of a culture of peace, which was first described at the International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men, held in Yamoussokro, Côte d'Ivoire in 1989 (Mayor 1995). In 1995, UNESCO’s General Conference declared that the "the major challenge at the close of the 20th century is to begin the transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace" (UNESCO, 1995). It defined a culture of peace as “values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems ….” While the term “culture of war” was dropped from the final resolution, nevertheless there was an implicit understanding that achieving a culture of peace in armed conflict-affected states involved a cultural shift.

Education, for peace, democracy, recognition of human rights, and tolerance, was one of eight mechanisms identified to support this cultural shift (Programme of Culture of Peace
resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997 (UN A/RES/52/13). Following a request for proposals, UNESCO selected 17 projects totalling $1.2 million, a very modest sum compared with education budgets in counterinsurgency campaigns (UNESCO, 1998).

**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

UNHCR, the agency responsible for the protection of refugees worldwide, began to reconsider the aims of education for its target populations. UNHCR’s mandate is governed by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Originally the Convention covered only persons who had become displaced in Europe before January 1, 1951, but as a result of armed conflict in Asia and Africa in the 1960s, the UN expanded its remit, making it universal through the 1967 Protocol. In the 1990s, UNHCR was also given responsibility for the protection of Internally Displaced Persons.

Up until the 1980s, responsibility for education was largely considered the responsibility of the refugees and the host country, with UNHCR providing child friendly spaces and psychosocial support. In the 1990s, following the ratification of a number of international conventions, statutes, and standards, most importantly, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Education for All agenda (1990), UNHCR started to pay greater attention to primary education. In 1992 the UNHCR Executive Committee recommended that "the basic primary education needs of refugee children be better addressed and that, even in the early stages of emergencies, educational requirements be identified so that prompt attention may be given to such needs" (UNHCR, 2009, p. 31). Similarly, in its 1994 Conclusion on Refugee Children, the Executive Committee requested that the High Commissioner “give higher priority to the education of all refugee children, ensuring the equal access of girls, giving due regard to the curriculum of the country of origin”. Due to financial constraints at the agency, the achievement of this goal depended on cooperation

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21 UN General Assembly resolution 52/13 calls for the promotion of a culture of peace based on respect for human rights, democracy and tolerance, the promotion of development, education for peace, the free flow of information and the wider participation of women as an integral approach to preventing violence and conflicts, and efforts aimed at the creation of conditions for peace and its consolidation” [opening quotes missing] (Adams 2000) UN General Assembly Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: 52/13. Culture of peace20 http://www.un-documents.net/a52r13.htm

22 For historical reasons, the UNHCR does not administer Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. This diasporic population in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip falls under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).
between host governments and UN agencies, in particular UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to ensure arrangements for the immediate and long-term care of refugee children. Therefore ensuring that refugees and internally displaced persons have opportunities to access educational services was increasingly important for UNHCR although its financial constraints limited its ability to provide these services.

Then in the context of the United Nations Year for Tolerance, 1995, the Executive Committee’s 1995 Conclusions encouraged UNHCR to cooperate with other organizations and host country governments to adopt protection-based comprehensive approaches to ensure the access of refugees to education, including education promoting peace and human rights (p. 112). Similarly, the 1997 Conclusions reaffirmed the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; (UNHCR, 2009, pp. 125-126), and the 1998 Conclusions recognized the role of educational programs in combating racism, discrimination, and xenophobia, and in promoting tolerance and respect for human rights and the rule of law (UNHCR, 2009, p. 127). Pilot peace education programs were launched in 1997-1998 in Kenya and later expanded to Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire (Baxter, 2000; Obura, 2002; Milner, 2011; Lawson, 2012).

The emphasis on education for tolerance and respect for human rights took a back seat to protection issues. In 2003, UNHCR published Agenda for Protection comprising the Declaration of States of 2001 and a programme of action (UNHCR, 2003). The latter identified six goals comprising strengthening implementation of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, protecting refugees in the context of migration flows; burden sharing and capacity building to receive and protect refugees; addressing security related concerns, intensifying efforts towards durable solutions and meeting the protection needs of refugee women and children. The Agenda identified education as a “protection tool” and by ensuring access to education and vocational training, UNHCR can protect against recruitment and prevent age-based and sexual and gender-based violence (UNHCR, 2003).

This shift from education for peace and tolerance to education as a protection tool coincided with discussions at UNHCR around finding “durable solutions” and preventing the recurrence of armed conflict. UNHCR outlined its “4Rs” approach (Repatriation,
Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction) based on the recognition that repatriated refugees require additional support to help prevent the recurrence of war. These include community-based reconstruction and development programs and quick impact projects such as school construction and rehabilitation in cooperation with other international organizations and private organizations (UNHCR, 2003). In order to facilitate repatriation, in 2004 the Executive Committee noted that government ministries and agencies in countries of origin need to recognize the equivalency of academic, professional and vocational diplomas, certificates, primary and secondary education and degrees earned by refugee students and advised that education provided in host countries “pay due regard…to the cultural identity while facilitating a greater understanding of the country of asylum.” The 2005 Executive Committee Conclusions, recognized the link between education and durable solutions; and called for greater assistance for host countries to ensure refugee children's access to education (UNHCR, 2009, p. 181). At the same time, the Executive Committee recognized that there were cases in which repatriation was unlikely either because conditions were not conducive to return or because refugees had been stateless for a protracted period and had well-established social relations and livelihoods in the host country so were unlikely to return voluntarily even when hostilities ceased. In cases such as these, UNHCR encouraged host country governments to consider measures to allow the integration of such persons as permanent residents through, among other things, education programs in partnership with relevant United Nations agencies (UNHCR, 2009, p. 188). According to UNHCR, these refugees can make “positive contributions” provided that they have access to educational and employment opportunities that would allow them to become self-reliant (UNHCR, 2009, p. 198). This is in contrast with earlier sensitivity to host country fears that expanding educational access could deter refugees from voluntarily returning to their homeland thereby creating a “security burden” (Milner, 2011). From this perspective, not only do refugees constitute a burden on the physical and institutional infrastructure of the host country, but their presence threatens to expand armed violence as a result of cross-border raids and reprisals, and, in worst case scenarios, establish a state within a state eroding the authority of the host government.

The education “turn” was reinforced in 2006, when UNHCR named education as one of its five global priority issues, and allocated more funds to education sector programming
in its budget.\textsuperscript{23} This more muscular view conceived education as both protective and preventive. Education protected the most vulnerable, at-risk groups from harm, and had the potential to prevent the recurrence of spill-over violence by facilitating (re)integration process either with the host or home country.

**United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)**

In 2006, UNICEF launched the Education in Emergencies and Post-crisis Transition Programme (EECPT) (UNICEF, 2010).\textsuperscript{24} The goal of EECPT is “to put emergency and post-crisis countries ‘back on track’ to achieve quality basic education for all and development goals more generally.” (UNICEF, 2010, p. 7). The program’s education aims include: i) to improve the quality of education response in emergencies and post-crisis transition countries by creating child friendly and temporary learning spaces, building schools, providing school supplies including textbooks and school kits, training teachers, school administrators, government officials, parents, and community members; ii) to increase resilience of education sector service delivery by strengthening community-based schooling, home schooling, and alternative delivery models; iii) to better predict, prevent, and prepare for emergencies due to natural disasters and armed conflict by establishing school-based disaster risk reduction and preparedness plans, and building codes and standards for disaster resilient school construction, putting in place early warning systems, implementing peace education, collecting data and analyzing risk, training educational staff and community members on disaster risk reduction and basic first aid; and iv) to encourage evidence-based policy making, improved operational strategies, and more relevant financial mechanisms (UNICEF, 2010, p. 8).

**Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)**

These developments at UNICEF took place at a time when a new understanding around as ‘education in emergencies’ was evolving spurred by the Inter-Agency Network for

\textsuperscript{23} UNHCR’s (2007) five global priorities are: 1) the separation of girls and boys from their families and caregivers; 2) sexual exploitation, abuse and violence; 3) military recruitment; 4) education; and, 5) the specific needs of adolescents.

\textsuperscript{24} The Education in Emergencies and Post-crisis Transition Programme was established with a $US 201 million grant from the government of the Netherlands and an additional €4 million from the European Commission.
Education in Emergencies (INEE) established in 2000. This framework reconceptualized education as life-saving and life-sustaining and redefined the purpose of intervention from ending, preventing or transforming armed conflict to managing emergencies. This new emphasis on crisis management shifted the centre of gravity of education reconstruction from a war-peace axis to a preparedness-recovery continuum. In other words, the kinds of questions that began to occupy education aid workers was how to help children and their families prepare for, cope with and mitigate the impact of, and recover from emergencies.

The INEE, a network of international organizations, academics, bilateral aid agencies and NGOs involved in education in situations of armed conflict and natural disasters, was established originally as a Technical Working Group for inter-agency cooperation (UNESCO, 2000). It has advocated for education in emergencies through policy dialogue, the development of minimum standards in education and emergencies, and the delivery of training that have rendered an element of professionalization.

The development of standards by a desire among its core members to provide educational services to high-need populations and to link the fairly well defined activities that we now associate with humanitarian response with the longer-term development agenda. It modeled its Handbook on Minimum Standards on the Sphere Project, a coalition of humanitarian aid agencies formed after the 1995 genocide in Rwanda in order to improve aid coordination and effectiveness in emergencies (INEE 2010, p. 2). The use of the Sphere Project as a template for INEE’s Handbook on Minimum Standards had a critical impact on the retooling education with a new purpose. Sphere participants are concerned with how to meet a population’s survival needs through the timely provision of food aid, shelter, water, and sanitation, and this theme of survival was carried over into INEE advocacy and training. According to the INEE Handbook, education in emergencies is not only a right but “a necessity that can be life-saving and life-sustaining, providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection” [emphasis in original] (INEE, 2007, p. 3) Provided in safe spaces, education offers a sense of normalcy, psychosocial support and protection against exploitation and harm. In advancing the concept of education as life saving through policy, dialogue, and training, INEE successfully advocated for the integration of educational programming into humanitarian actions. Negotiations between INEE and Sphere Project
representatives resulted in a “companionship” agreement (2009), which prescribed the INEE minimum standards for service provision, but reaching this agreement was not a foregone conclusion. Recalling discussions on whether the provision of education constitutes a humanitarian response to an emergency, insiders Walker and Purdin (2004, p. 108) recall that UNHCR, UNICEF, and Save the Children summoned arguments for its inclusion of education on the grounds that providing education to refugees and internally displaced persons in conflict-affected areas constitutes a life-saving action, pointing out that the provision of temporary learning spaces can ensure children’s safety both physically and psychologically during times of crisis (Nicolai, 2003).

Education was also not among the original sectors identified by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the main mechanisms for coordinating humanitarian activities, in its cluster-based approach to humanitarian aid coordination until after INEE’s advocacy. Clusters are arranged in functional categories around humanitarian activities and include water and sanitation, camp management, child protection and so on. INEE advocacy ultimately resulted in the creation of education clusters as part of the UN’s humanitarian response in 2006 as a vehicle for aid actors to issue emergency appeals for education sector aid. Based on statistics from Financial Tracking Service database of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (May 2011), the proportion of donor humanitarian aid to the education sector has increased over the decade, but remains the smallest component of humanitarian aid. According to OCHA, aid to the education sector averaged 1.3 percent of total humanitarian aid between 2000 and 2010.

The concept of education in emergencies adopts the broad concept of human security that does not differentiate between wars and armed conflict, chronic poverty, and communicable diseases. These are all sources of threats to human security. By conflating situations of civil and inter-state war with natural disasters and other emergencies, the INEE undermines any serious attempt at understanding the causes of war and the role of education

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in reinforcing communal identities and horizontal inequalities. It requires external actors to apply a set of minimum standards that may or may not lead to the most appropriate set of actions given the situational context. At the same time, by identifying conflict-affected states as “emergency situations”, it justifies emergency measures to restore essential services and to protect the population.

**Epistemic Shifts**

I suggest that the frameworks donor states use to understand security, wars and armed conflict, and development have changed over times. With these changes, education aid practices have evolved. The discussion suggests at least four periods – the immediate postwar years, the Cold War, the immediate post-Cold War years, and the post-9/11 period.

In the immediate postwar years, “re-education” programs in Germany and Japan aimed at establishing the administrative structures and competencies necessary for building the capacity of students and these societies more broadly to practice democratic forms of citizenship, which they believed could be achieved through pedagogical and curricular reforms. US educationalists, influenced by American education reformists including Dewey (1916) and Taba (1932), sought to reform teaching and learning in ways that encouraged individual, autonomous, fostered empathy and tolerance for different cultures and perspectives, developed critical intelligence shared democratic values. These competencies would enable populations to contest public policies and statements that would improve inter-group relations and reduce the likelihood of resurgent militarism and ultranationalism. These educational reforms were advocated by American education advisors to US military and State Department personnel responsible for postwar reconstruction.

It should not be missed that re-education took place at a time just after the creation of the United Nations in 1945 to preserve international peace and security through collective security measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace, and to help resolve disputes and armed conflicts through mediation. Collective security arrangements are useful only insofar as the members party to the agreement see their interests as overlapping rather than competing or antagonistic to one another. Part of the postwar order, was ensuring that
Germany and Japan be brought into the “family of nations” implicitly understood as the family of democratic nations and part of the liberal economic order.

In reaffirming the principle of state sovereignty, nationalist rebellions by movements in places like Malaya and Algerian were not subject to collective security arrangements. On the contrary, state sovereignty undermined the position of imperial powers such as Britain and France. In both cases, British and French colonial administrators and militaries used education as part of their counterinsurgency toolkit, albeit in different ways. Both expanded educational access rapidly by constructing new schools and recruiting new teachers. But, whereas the British in Malaya affirmed a national identity as a mechanism to mitigate inter-ethnic tensions, the French socialized children in youth in French cultural identity in a failed attempt to assimilate Algerians and to maintain hierarchical relations between the metropole and the periphery.

The case of US education aid in Vietnam, particularly after it supported the Strategic Hamlet Program, shares many of the characteristics of British and French counterinsurgency operations in Malaya and Algeria, but it differs on one important point. American education aid to Vietnam in its early phase was less about identity building, and more about providing the knowledge and skills necessary to support industrialization and the transformation of an agrarian society to a industrial society integrated with the capitalist system. In this way, education aid was also part of containing the spread of communism in South-East Asia and central to Cold-War balance of power politics.

In the post-Cold War period alternative conceptions of war and security emerged. Kaldor has proposed that the nature and logic of civil wars has changed in terms of actors, goals, methods, and financing in the context of globalization and new technologies (Kaldor, 2013). “Old” wars of the 19th and 20th centuries were characterized by ideological struggles fought militarily by regular armed forces of states over territorial control. In contrast, “new” wars are fought over ethnic identity, involve non-state actors such as private armies, mercenaries, and paramilitaries, are driven by economic motives, and financed through criminal activities. They are differentiated from “old” war by a higher incidence of civil conflicts, fewer battle-related deaths, higher levels of civilian casualties, and greater levels of population displacement.
According to Kaldor, new wars typically take place among or within authoritarian states weakened by external relations and where binary distinctions between state and non-state actors, public and private sectors, economic and political, and even war and peace are blurred (2013, p. 2). In other words, globalization weakens state authority by creating an environment conducive to the formation of alliances, both legal and illegal. In this environment, the political elite might form partnerships with non-state actors involved in business and investments, and criminal or rebel networks in order to maintain their privileged position, both politically and financially. But, at the same time, these alliances erode the authority of the state by weakening its territorial control and its ability to maintain the rule of law, and manage its population.

Critics of Kaldor’s new war thesis argue that it stands up to neither empirical testing nor historical analysis (Newman, 2004, 2014; Berdal, 2003; Kalyvas, 2001). Melander et al. (2006) show that new wars are not any more atrocious than wars of previous decades, and Newman’s historical analysis indicates that the features that differentiate new from old wars are far from new and reflect “enduring patterns.” Newman raises a critical point. He suggests that it is important to understand whether our approach to war has changed or the social reality of war as borne out by historical evidence has changed, or both (Newman, 2004, p. 185).

I suggest that both donors’ particular social reality and their understanding of war has changed in the post-Cold War period. Donors do not experience war as they did in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, the Canadian public has a very low threshold for fatality rates associated with expeditionary missions. This means that when armed forces and civilian personnel are deployed, they remain within a secure ‘green zones’ when not engaged in patrols or special operations. It also means that while the government may elect to provide a country with material assistance and to deploy Canadian armed forces personnel as advisors to UN peacebuilding missions or other national armed forces for training missions, it sanctions the use of ground troops with extreme caution. Even when the country is engaged in armed conflict, as it was from 2001 until 2011 in Afghanistan, most Canadians do not feel its impact directly on their lives. In contrast with the Second World War, when the society was mobilized, whether in terms of purchasing war bonds, women’s participation in the
labour force, and the conversion of non-military factors for military purposes, most Canadians now experience war remotely through traditional and social media. In contrast, countries in the Global South experience armed conflict much differently, whether in terms of the destruction of infrastructure, dispossession and displacement, or future development levels.

At the same time, donors’ understanding of war has changed partly due to the concept of human security, which takes the individual as its referent object. Since states (or armed groups) but not individuals wage war or secure the peace, human security deemphasizes the causes of armed conflict and pathways to securing the peace, and instead draws attention to the effects of armed violence, deprivation and institutional weakness (as with the notion of failed and fragile states) on individual survival and wellbeing. Human security makes no distinction between insecurity caused directly by armed conflict or insecurity resultant from chronic poverty or natural disaster. So a multiplicity of insecurities comprise an undifferentiated category of “emergencies” that can evoke two strategies: protecting people from danger: and, building resilience enabling individuals to cope with danger. Therefore, human security, at least in its current formulation, does not promote strategies that address structural and socio-cultural factors believed to cause armed conflict.

**A Typology of Education Reconstruction**

The historical inquiry above helps to identify a four part typology – stabilization, protection, peacebuilding and statebuilding – differentiated by their theoretical and conceptual foundations, goals, overarching assumptions, and practices as summarized in Table 3. Each of these can also be positioned along a continuum based on whether or not they address structural and socio-cultural factors that contribute to armed conflict. Stabilization and social protection minimally address these factors, whereas peacebuilding and statebuilding involve practices that potentially reduce inequalities, improve inter-group relations, and transform state-society relations through multiple mechanisms.
Table 3

*Four Approaches in Education Reconstruction*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical/conceptual foundations</th>
<th>Does not attend to structural and socio-cultural factors</th>
<th>Attends to structural and socio-cultural factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency doctrine</td>
<td>Development ethics; international humanitarian and human rights law</td>
<td>Positive/negative peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Consolidate state control over its territory and the physical security of its population.</td>
<td>Preserve the safety, physical security and dignity of individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overarching assumption(s)</td>
<td>Separate the population from the insurgency</td>
<td>Children have a right to education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not attend to structural and socio-cultural factors</td>
<td>Attends to structural and socio-cultural factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilization</strong></td>
<td><strong>Protection</strong></td>
<td><strong>Peacebuilding</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• School construction/rehabilitation</td>
<td>• Back to school campaigns</td>
<td>• Peace education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fast tracking teacher training</td>
<td>• Monitoring and reporting mechanisms</td>
<td>• Conflict resolution and peace education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adult literacy programs</td>
<td>• Psychosocial services</td>
<td>• Citizenship education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vocational training for illiterate and out-of-school children and youth.</td>
<td>• School feeding programs</td>
<td>• Curricular and pedagogical reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Community-based education</td>
<td>• Alternative learning programs</td>
<td>• School desegregation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Landmine education</td>
<td>• Multicultural education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Disaster risk reduction education</td>
<td>• Character education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stockpiles of educational materials</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Community-based schools</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Adult literacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Child friendly spaces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Vocational training for youth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Alternative learning programs for adolescents</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Education Aid as Stabilization**

Stabilization missions, in practice, refer to missions in the aftermath of natural and man-made disasters such as civil and interstate wars. But, for the purposes of this study, I confine stabilization programmes to counterinsurgencies as described with regards to civil-
military operations in Malaya, Algeria and Vietnam as well as contemporary variants in post 9/11 Afghanistan (see case study Chapter 7) and Iraq.\textsuperscript{26} Despite case specificities, a number of crosscutting features characterize stabilization practices. Stabilization-based education aid practices are based on counterinsurgency doctrine, which assumes that the population must be separated from the insurgency by concentrating resources on key sectors or zones enabling the government’s armed forces to provide security and deliver social services. Practices characteristic of stabilization approaches include close civil-military coordination; an emphasis on quick impact and infrastructure projects such as school rehabilitation and construction; and fast-tracking teacher training to facilitate the expansion of education. The ultimate goal is to weaken sufficiently the insurgency in order to bring the parties to the negotiating table and manage any residual violence through the civil security apparatus. This is an iterative process involving processes of destruction followed by reconstruction. Too much destruction will alienate the population and make reconstruction ever more costly. Too much reconstruction aid, can create or reinforce regional disparities, corruption, and the inefficient use of resources.

\textbf{Education as Protection}

Protection is the most inclusive and broad ranging of the four categories. It amounts to the default setting for education practice in conflict and post-conflict states, and is the equivalent of stem cells. From this state, interventions can be redesigned and resourced for stabilization, peacebuilding and statebuilding depending on conditions on the ground and donor preferences. Social protection-based approaches are based on the broad range of international human rights and development laws pertaining to the provision of education in situations of armed conflict. These include, but are not restricted to, the Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their additional protocols (1977), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000).

Protection-based approaches comprise two different forms – preventative and remedial. Preventative forms of protection-based approaches aim to eliminate or mitigate

\footnotesize {\textsuperscript{26} An insurgency is defined as forms of asymmetric warfare between states and rebels.}
exposure to potential risks. They include legal and normative frameworks as codified in human rights instruments and successive UN resolutions on children and armed conflict in addition to earlier international humanitarian legal instruments. They also include monitoring and reporting mechanisms on children and armed conflict that name and shame state and non-state actors who fail to comply with international norms and standards. Other preventative practices include demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation programs involving former child soldiers and vocational training for youth that insure against adverse outcomes in the future through proactive measures. Rehabilitation and vocational training increase chances for employment and raise the opportunity costs for (re)joining an armed group. However, advocates of rehabilitation and vocational training programs make several assumptions which might not necessarily hold true. First, they assume that training will address market demands. Second, they assume that youth are drawn into the armed conflict by economic incentives rather than ideological or other forces. Third, they assume that in the absence of employment, youth will choose fight over flight.

Remedial forms of protection-based approaches aim to help individuals and communities adapt, cope with, recover from exposure to violence, and facilitate a return to normalcy by providing educational services in situations of armed conflict. Remedial practices include supporting alternative learning programs and community-based education, creating child and youth-friendly spaces, providing psychosocial support, play therapy, and school feeding programs, disaster risk reduction education, and mine risk education.

**Education Aid as Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding approaches are based on the concept of negative/positive peace (Galtung, 1969) and assume that the establishment of inclusive, equitable relations and teaching and learning cognitive and communicative skills can support peaceful coexistence and non-violent conflict resolution. Practices include human rights education, conflict resolution education, citizenship education (including multicultural education), desegregation policies. These practices improve the quality of inter-communal and inter-personnel relationships, and promote civic identities and public engagement (Harris, 2004; Davies, 2004; Bickmore, 2008; Torney Purta et al., 2001; Nussbaum, 1994). They emphasize a
repertoire of learned competencies necessary for reconciliation and democratic processes including listening, reflexivity, empathy, argumentation, and deliberation.

**Education Aid as Statebuilding**

A fourth mode of education aid classified as state-building, is driven first and foremost by political imagination regarding what constitutes being modern. Eisentadt (2000) reminds us that the history of modernity is an iterative process wherein social actors (re)constitute cultural programs based on historically contingent ideas of what is means to be modern. In post-industrial countries, we think of a modern education system as characterized by the expansion of public education under the authority of the ministry of education, a set of constitutional and legislative frameworks that foreground the right to education and gender equality, and the provision of free education, at least at the primary level. But, even this model that has spread throughout the world during the 20th century is never at a standstill (Meyer et al., 1977). It is constantly being revised, updated in ways that accommodate new learning and socio-economic and political conditions. But there are other possible expressions of modernity which the vast majority of the population in the Global North would likely reject and may even find offensive and reactionary, yet nevertheless constitute forms of statebuilding. For example, the Taliban from 1996 until 2001 sought to establish an Afghan state based on its particular interpretation of Islamic society, which severely curtailed the provision of secular education, and education in general for girls. The Islamic State of Syria and Iraq, the armed movement challenging the authority of the Syrian and Iraqi governments in 2013-2014 for territorial control understands modernity as a neo-caliphate, but how this might translate into education sector policies remains unclear.

**Conclusion**

Each of the four types of education sector practices in the above analysis aligns with either positive or negative peace (Galtung, 1969). Stabilization and protection aim primarily at terminating armed conflict or mitigating its effects on the population, and lean toward negative peace. In contrast, peacebuilding and statebuilding change the structural and socio-cultural relations of societies, and potentially support positive peace. Conceivably, education reforms under a statebuilding approach can reinforce grievances depending on the nature of
the state envisioned – democratic autocratic, or alternative form. In this research, when I refer to statebuilding approaches, I will assume democratic forms of statebuilding based on principles of human rights and freedoms and political pluralism.
CHAPTER FIVE
CIDA’S ACCOUNTABILITY APPARATUS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION SECTOR AID

Media reports in recent years have inserted CIDA into the ongoing narrative of public accountability that has involved Canada’s Senate Chamber, cabinet ministers, and public sector managers. In 2012, the minister of International Cooperation at the time, Bev Oda, stepped down after reports of misspending (Globe and Mail, 2012). Had spending peccadilloes been the only sign of misconduct a public apology and repayment might have sufficed. But, this revelation followed a string of reports indicating that the minister demonstrated politicized decision making at CIDA, and her actions were damaging to the Conservative brand and the reputation of a government that made accountability a pillar of its policy platform.

It is not too surprising that media reports tend to fixate on accountability as it pertains to the actions of individuals. Individuals behaving badly make far more captivating news than the dryly worded and technocratic language of public sector management reform documents that modify institutional mechanisms – another dimension of public accountability (Bovens, 2006). These reforms do not possess the jaw-dropping qualities that citizens as media consumers have come to expect. Partly for this reason, they rarely attract the public’s attention and operate under the radar of public scrutiny. Nevertheless, they institutionalize relations between different line departments and the central government, and between different levels of government. These relations have changed over time. However, governments continue to exhibit hierarchical forms of bureaucratic control and accountability relations organized by a chain of principal-agent relations. They are also characterized by non-vertical forms of accountability. Mechanisms of accountability such as the Office of the Ombudsman and audit and evaluation committees that oversee departmental policies and procedures and lack powers to enforce compliance, nevertheless they are able to exercise influence and inform the behaviour of public managers. Similarly, intergovernmental networks and transnational advocacy networks inform departmental priorities through the dissemination of ideas and best practices. Public sector managers must mediate two forms of
public accountability – external accountability that derives from international commitments and internal accountability to domestic publics (Skogstad, 2013).

Accordingly, CIDA could be understood as a public agency managing the bulk of Canada’s development assistance consistent with Canadian interests based on principal-agent relations. As part of the machinery of government, CIDA was internally accountable to the central government and by extension the Canadian public for whom it was expected to ably demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency in delivering results. CIDA was also a networked actor obligated to fulfil international commitments such as pledges made at G8 and UN Summits, ministerial meetings on aid effectiveness, donor pledging conferences, and issue-specific commitments arising from its participation in international development networks. These commitments are evaluated regularly by multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) to monitor progress and induce greater compliance with international norms and standards, and financial commitments made by member states.27

This chapter provides the organizational context for the case studies that follow. It examines tensions that arise from this dual accountability to domestic and international commitments, and the implications of these arrangements for development aid, and education sector aid. I argue that, during the reporting period from 2000 to 2013, CIDA underwent a metamorphosis that affected both the agency’s relations with other government departments and its relation to the public by influencing how foreign aid is performed and imagined. I suggest that in order to understand how this metamorphosis evolved, it is necessary to identify the policies and practices enacted to strengthen CIDA’s accountability to the central government and to Canadians.

The Treasury Board Secretariat defines accountability as “the obligation to demonstrate that responsibility is being taken both for the means used and the results achieved in light of agreed expectations.” Romzek and Dubnik (1987, p. 230) understand

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accountability as a strategy for managing expectations and differentiate four types of accountability: bureaucratic (auditors, inspectors, controllers), legal (courts), professional (professional peers), and political (elected leaders). Bovens understands accountability as a social relation involving an actor who is obliged to explain and justify his or her conduct in a forum in which questions can be posed and judgment passed, and to accept the consequences, both positive and negative (2006, p. 12). Cutting across these understandings is the view that one party is required to explain and justify its actions (or lack thereof) to another party based on a set of expectations. Therefore, definitions of public accountability inhere notions of responsibility, performance, effectiveness, and consequences.

In this chapter, I understand accountability in Canada’s development assistance as an apparatus and an expression of governmentality involving multiple discourses and practices that cohere the disparate organizational cultures of government departments in order to enforce a degree of inter-departmental discipline around a set of high-level government goals. In this way, education aid is subordinated to Canadian foreign policy interests, and Canada’s national security interests, or the security interests of its allies.

The chapter is organized into three sections. In the first section, I examine trends in CIDA’s aid flows, including education sector disbursements. In the second section, I analyze CIDA’s annual Departmental Performance Reports from 2000 to 2013 to identify the policy, structural and procedural reforms that have affected aid practice. In the final section, I argue that since 2000 until the time CIDA was amalgamated into the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, CIDA underwent a gradual metamorphosis as a result of government-wide public sector management reforms shepherded by Canada’s Treasury Board and rationalized as strengthening public accountability. This metamorphosis shaped the way aid was performed at CIDA and, ultimately, Canadians’ expectations of Canada’s aid program as an instrument to advance foreign policy priorities.


Canada’s aid flows from all sources (including CIDA) are shown in Figure 3.
Aid almost doubled from $2.9 billion in 2001 to almost $5.7 billion in 2012, fulfilling the government’s 2002 pledge to double its international assistance by 2010. The government had made provisions for an annual growth rate of 8 percent, but as the chart shows, the increase in aid was more erratic, with most of the increases taking place in 2005 and 2009, coinciding with the 2005 International Policy Statement and increased Canadian government commitments to the missions in Afghanistan, and other fragile and crisis-affected states. After 2010, aid spending leveled off in the context of the 2008–2009 recession that led the government to freeze all departmental operating budgets for two years and to impose cost-saving measures (CIDA, 2010).

The bulk of CIDA-managed Official Development Assistance was mainly channelled through both the Geographic Programs Branch and the Multilateral Programs Branch from 2000 to 2013 as shown in Figure 4.
Geographic Programs Branch accounted for 39 percent of CIDA’s total 2000 aid, growing to 48 percent by 2010. Likewise, an increasing proportion of aid was channelled through the Multilateral Programs Branch. By 2010 (41 percent of CIDA’s aid up from 29 percent in 2000). Therefore, by 2010, aid through Geographic and Multilateral Branch combined accounted for almost 90 percent of CIDA’s aid. In contrast with these trends, aid through Canadian Partnership Branch (renamed Partnership with Canadians) slowly eroded, dropping from 15 percent to 7 percent just prior to the branch’s restructuring in 2010. Similarly, aid channelled through other sources including United Nations Relief and Works Agency core funding, Canada Fund, and other bilateral aid, fell fourfold to 4 percent of total aid in 2010 from 16 percent at the beginning of the decade. These trends indicate that CIDA sought to better control the flow of its aid by channelling more of its funds through Geographic and Multilateral Programs.

Figure 4. Canada’s Official Development Assistance by channel.

Note. Data excludes UNRWA core funding, other bilateral aid, and Canada Fund channelled through Canadian embassies abroad.

When the government introduced its classification of fragile states in its 2005 *International Policy Statement* (Canada, 2005) there was some ambiguity regarding which countries were to be included within this group. Over time, CIDA settled on Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan/South Sudan, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Over the second half of the decade, the proportion of aid to these states increased, reaching a peak level of 18.6 percent of total aid in 2009, up from 12.5 percent in 2005. In problematizing fragile states as a threat to international security, the government prioritized a select group of countries based on its whole-of-government priorities. Once identified, these countries were integrated within CIDA’s programming framework and allocated resources in accordance with the high profile of these states.

**CIDA Disbursements in the Education Sector**

CIDA bilateral disbursements in the education sector follow roughly the same trend lines as its aggregate aid statistics. Annual disbursements peaked in 2010 at $414.3 million,
then dropped in the following two years in the context of the global financial crisis and recession in Western states. Overall, aid to education from 2000 to 2012 totalled $3,826 million. More than half of this (56 percent) was allocated to Africa, followed by 26 percent to Asia and 15 percent to the Americas as shown in Figure 6.

![Figure 6. CIDA’s education sector disbursements by region.](image)

*Note.* Figures exclude $16.44 million to Oceania and $0.77 million not allocated by continent. Source: Information disclosed under Access to Information and Privacy Act.

**Aid by Recipients**

The total number of Canadian bilateral aid recipients dropped very slightly from 51 in 2000 to 49 in 2012. Tunisia, Iraq and Bhutan were dropped, and South Sudan was added to CIDA’s list of education aid recipients. Nevertheless, as with the trend in CIDA’s overall aid concentration described above, the top 15 aid recipients accounted for an ever greater share of total bilateral disbursements in the education sector.

Again, reflecting CIDA’s over-all disbursement trends, bilateral education sector aid to states and territories categorized as fragile and crisis-affected states (Afghanistan, Haiti, South Sudan, Sudan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip) also accounted for an increasing share of the disbursements in the education sector, as shown in the chart below. This trend was driven mainly by the mission in Afghanistan and reconstruction efforts in Haiti in the
aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. These two countries combined accounted for 92 percent of CIDA’s education aid to fragile and crisis-affected states in 2012. In contrast, bilateral education sector aid to the Palestinian Territories dropped to $0.26 million in 2012 compared with $1.71 million at the beginning of the decade.

These aid statistics indicate two characteristics of CIDA’s development assistance. First, over-all aid levels increased from 2000 to 2012 and held steady after 2010 despite fiscal constraints after 2009. Second, country concentration became an important feature of Canada’s aid allocations since 2005 in terms of both overall aid spending and education sector disbursements. CIDA’s education aid focused on countries of concentration and designated fragile and crisis-affected states selected at the senior-most levels of government in a non-transparent process. The following section provides the context and practices that contributed to these trends in education aid flows.

**Analysis of CIDA Departmental Performance Reports: 2000–2013**

The following section summarizes an analysis of CIDA *Departmental Performance Reports* from 2000 to 2013. These annual reports compare the agency’s achievements with its reported plans and priorities. They convey a story of continuous, almost frenetic, public policy reforms, including structural, policy, and procedural reforms, collectively self-described as “transformation,” “modernization,” “rebuilding” and “revitalizing”. I differentiate three types of reform practices. First, effectiveness-based reforms advance whole-of-government objectives. Second, a performance-based aim at better measuring and achieving results. Third, a values-based reforms establish principles that guide practice. I will show that these practices collectively comprise an apparatus of accountability that has further centralized power at the executive levels of government, and subordinated CIDA education aid to Canadian foreign policy interests.

**Effectiveness-Based Practices**

As of 2000, CIDA supported six priorities as mandated in *Canada in the World* (1995), the Chrétien government’s foreign policy statement. These were basic human needs, women in development, infrastructure services, human rights, democracy and good
governance, private sector development, and environmental issues. In addition, CIDA committed $2.8 billion from existing budgets over a five-year period to implementing its new policy framework, *CIDA’s Social Development Priorities: A Framework for Action* (2000). These priorities comprised four program areas: basic education, health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, and child protection, each with corresponding action plans, expected results and specific indicators (CIDA, 2003, p. 44; CIDA, 2001, p. 28).\(^{28}\)

CIDA’s first “landmark” policy on aid effectiveness, *Canada Making a Difference in the World: Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness* (2002b) and its follow-up, the *Action Plan to Promote Harmonization* (2004), overlapped with the rollout of CIDA’s social development priorities. Both texts placed a premium on achieving results, donor coordination, harmonization with aid recipients, and the adoption of new aid modalities such as comprehensive development frameworks, poverty reduction strategy papers, program-based approaches and sector-wide approaches. These modalities were considered by CIDA as innovative mechanisms for reducing duplicated effort among donors and improving development outcomes (CIDA, 2001, p. 44; 2001, p. 8). General budgetary support was piloted in the Primary Education Pooled Fund in Tanzania and the Multi-donor Budgetary Support Facility in Ghana, and once the Treasury Board was satisfied that the necessary checks and balances were in place, it approved the agency’s engagement in the funding of support initiatives (CIDA, 2004, 23). At the core of this agenda was the view that it was necessary but not sufficient to shore up donor aid flow to meet the Millennium Development Goals. They also needed to work in a coordinated fashion with both aid recipients and other donors to support state institution-building to achieve desired goals (e.g., fewer drop outs, lower repetition rates, higher literacy rates). These new aid modalities required bilateral aid agencies to abandon convention and relinquish their direct control over aid allocations and instead channel aid through multilateral institutions without specifying geographic preferences, that is to untie aid. Canada pledged to untie its aid in 2002 with an agreement reached at the OECD-DAC on the mandatory untying of most aid to less developed

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countries. The proportion of CIDA’s untied aid increased incrementally over the years. Food aid was fully untied in 2008, and by March 2013, 99.9 percent of aid was untied, up from 32 percent in 2001 (CIDA, 2007; CIDA, 2013, p. 1).

With the publication of the 2005 *International Policy Statement* (Canada, 2005), the first foreign policy statement since *Canada in the World* published ten years earlier, the federal government mandated what they called a whole-of-government approach – understood as improved coordination between defence, foreign affairs and international trade and development policies. Although Departmental Performance Reports mention a whole-of-government approach intended to achieve “coherence” across government departments involving international affairs as early as 2003, it was only after 2005 that the government introduced new mechanisms to reduce the number of bureaucratic stovepipes and deepen interdepartmental coordination in planning, budgeting and reporting. The Canadian government restructured the International Assistance Envelope into five pools (development, international financial institutions, peace and security, crisis, and development research) to facilitate a coordinated, “flexible and quick-disbursing” mechanism. CIDA managed the development pool and co-managed the crisis pool with DFAIT in consultation with the Department of Finance, Office of the Privy Council, and the Treasury Board Secretariat (CIDA, 2005, p. 15).

*Departmental Performance Reports* describe the Afghanistan program at CIDA’s Geographic Program Branch as “probably the most advanced cross-government approach to any fragile state”. CIDA’s bilateral programming in Afghanistan was a sub-component of CIDA’s fragile states and crisis-affected states program. It demonstrated, from CIDA’s perspective, “the relevance of development to global peace and security” (CIDA, 2006). Canada was among the top-five ranked donors to Afghanistan (CIDA, 2008, pp. 1 & 40). Afghanistan programs required civil-military coordination in the field and new institutional structures were created in Kandahar and Ottawa to facilitate interdepartmental coordination (CIDA, 2007; CIDA, 2009, p. 12). Following the handover of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team to the US in 2011, aid to Afghanistan dropped to $92.3 million in 2012-13 from a high of $224 million in 2008-2009 (CIDA, 2009; CIDA, 2013, p. 19).
Along with development and reconstruction in Afghanistan using a whole-of-government approach, between 2007 and 2012, CIDA prioritized what they called aid effectiveness – a fuzzy term that captures notions of policy coherence at multiple levels including coherence between donors and aid recipients, amongst donors, and within a donor government. The agency released the third iteration of its aid effectiveness policy – the *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan* – in 2009. The *Action Plan* (CIDA, 2009c) addressed some criticisms levelled against CIDA by the Office of the Auditor General’s evaluation report in that same on the implementation of its 2002 *Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness*. The Auditor General concluded that CIDA should reduce the time required to obtain project approval and funding, and focus its resources on fewer priorities. It criticized the agency’s priorities for being too vague and recommended that it put into place a long-term plan. In response, CIDA’s *Action Plan* combined commitments to aid effectiveness consistent with the Canadian government’s three-point program to strengthen the focus, improve the efficiency, and increase the accountability of Canada’s aid program as outlined in the 2007 federal budget. It linked increased focus – sectoral and geographic – across CIDA branches with improved efficiency and stronger accountability.

In response to the criticisms of the Auditor General, the Canadian federal Minister of International Cooperation announced five thematic priorities in fall 2009 to guide programming priorities:

- Increasing food security (sustainable agricultural development, food assistance and nutrition, and research and development);
- Securing the future of children and youth (child survival, including maternal health; access to quality education; and safe and secure futures for children and youth);
- Stimulating sustainable growth (building economic foundations, growing businesses, and investing in people);
- Advancing democracy; and
- Ensuring security and stability.
Gender equality and governance were crosscutting themes. Of the five, three, food security, sustainable growth, and children and youth, were designated priority sectors (CIDA, 2010, pp. 6-7).

In 2011–2012, CIDA focused on natural resource governance with the creation of the Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development through funding channeled through Partnership with Canadian Branch. During this period, CIDA was actively promoting corporate social responsibility projects in the extractive sector in several countries, mainly in Latin America and Africa. Finally, by 2013, a new priority was designated: achieving management and program delivery efficiency as part of its Business Modernization Initiative. In practice, this meant standardizing and streamlining programming processes to ensure uniformity across operational branches and to reduce the time it took for projects to be approved, decentralizing operations, developing a code of values and ethics, and using evaluations to improve performance (CIDA, 2013, p. 8).

CIDA also supported projects in the other countries of the Americas as part of the government’s reengagement with the Americas following the release of its Americas Strategy (Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007). CIDA funded Haiti, as well as middle income countries such Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Peru and the Caribbean, which are defined by the World Bank as countries with a Gross National Income per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,746 (CIDA, 2011, p. 27). These middle income countries were states that had either concluded or were in negotiations with Canada over trade and investment agreements. Aid was focused on strengthening economic growth, improving the delivery of social services, reinforcing citizen participation and increasing the accountability and effectiveness of the public sector and civil society organizations (CIDA, 2012, pp. 26-27).

Effectiveness-based reforms reinterpreted the aid effectiveness agenda of the OECD Development Assistance Committee beginning with Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation (1996), followed by declarations at Monterrey (2002), Paris (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and Busan Partnership for Effective Development (2011). These declarations pulled CIDA towards greater policy coherence by harmonizing aid with recipient priorities and coordinating allocations with donors, including
the private sector. Effectiveness-based practices amounted to the reassertion of Canada’s control over its foreign aid.

**Performance-Based Practices**

*Departmental Performance Reports* indicate two inter-related shifts in CIDA’s management practices detailed in Table B-1 in Appendix B: a shift from reporting on achievements based on project results to one based on organization-wide results; and, a shift from a results-based to a performance-management approach. These occurred gradually with the introduction of new operational procedures and tools and greater geographic focus.

In 2001–2002, CIDA took steps to apply results-based management practices at the program and institutional levels in order to be able to demonstrate the overall effect of CIDA’s programming more clearly (2001, p. 9). Although results-based management was introduced in 1994 and adopted formally as the main management tool two years later, CIDA’s reporting on results had been largely restricted to the project level in this period. CIDA’s goal in 2001–2002 was to adopt results-based management for programming at both the country and program levels and agency-wide. The *Sustainable Development Strategy* for 2001–2003 (CIDA, 2001b), CIDA’s business plan, introduced new management objectives designed to promote programming that met agency-wide objectives. To meet these goals, CIDA developed a set of Key Agency Results as the foundation for planning and reporting. The previous Key Results Commitments, in place since 1996, focused on six priority areas identified in the federal *Canada in the World* foreign policy statement. The purpose of the Key Agency Results was to shift results reporting from the project level to the program level and require CIDA to report on aid allocations and results in each of its four programming areas (social development, economic well-being, governance, and environmental sustainability). This required program officers to identify medium- and long-term outcome results aligned with national development plans and international development goals and corresponding indicators (CIDA, 2003, p. 53). Whereas in the past, projects were developed mainly focused on activities and outputs, project managers were now expected to identify immediate and intermediate outcomes aligned with national (aid recipient) plans and global development priorities such as the Millennium Development Goals.
Also in 2002, CIDA developed its Results-Based Management Accountability Framework (RMAF) following directives from the Treasury Board established in 2000 to modernize management practices. The framework committed federal departments and agencies to deliver services that were citizen-focused [Canadian], results-oriented, and reflected public service values. It constituted one of three elements in the corporate performance management and reporting system alongside internal audits and external reviews by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada and the OECD-Development Assistance Committee peer review process (CIDA, 2002, p. 58). In 2003, the agency introduced costed work planning, which itemized costs per activity and assigned a total cost for achieving program results (CIDA, 2004, p. 14).

The 2001 review process of CIDA’s management practices was shepherded by Performance Review Branch with the Office of the Auditor General and Treasury Board Secretariat, and this branch assessment provided advice to program branches on the development of result statements and tracking mechanisms, results frameworks and indicators, cost-effectiveness, partnership arrangements and delivery systems (2001, p. 63).

In 2005, the Treasury Board Secretariat introduced a policy mandating departments and agencies to apply new planning and performance measurement tools, as part of developing a common, government-wide approach to identifying, managing and reporting program information. The purpose of this policy was to leverage the assets of the government by developing a coherent framework for financial and non-financial reporting to guide both departmental priorities and expenditures. The centrepiece of this policy was the Program Activity Architecture, which replaced CIDA’s Key Agency Results framework. The Program Activity Architecture was intended to link CIDA’s resource allocations with measurable results and high-level Government of Canada priorities (CIDA, 2005, p. 18). Treasury Board collected and synthesized CIDA’s reports to ensure that CIDA’s strategic objectives were aligned with Government of Canada’s priorities in international affairs, and that CIDA was successful in reducing poverty in countries where it was engaged. CIDA’s whole-of-government priorities were linked with ensuring both a safe and secure world

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through international cooperation and a prosperous Canada through global commerce, and provided the foundation for horizontal coordination with other government departments. Multi-stakeholder task forces and interdepartmental committees brought together departments and ministries including the Privy Council Office, National Defence, the Department of Finance, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada in high priority areas such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (CIDA, 2005, p. 66).

The Program Activity Architecture underwent three iterations prior to CIDA’s amalgamation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2013. Revisions in 2007 introduced new program activities in line with government policy to support the countries of concentration, fragile states, countries in crisis, and selected countries and regions. Then, in 2010, while CIDA retained its focus on fragile countries and crisis-affected communities, it classified recipients into low- and middle-income countries. Finally, in 2012, CIDA revised the Program Alignment Architecture nominally to reflect the importance of alignment with government-wide objectives. The new framework retained the same program activities as its predecessor but nominally underscored the primacy of alignment with government-wide objectives (CIDA, 2013, p. 4). Therefore, shifts in CIDA’s corporate framework reoriented programming around groups of countries (fragile, lower, and middle income states) from an earlier focus on sectors. This helped to reduce the geographic distribution of Canada’s aid.

With the shift in its reporting to the Program Activity Architecture, CIDA identified countries and regions it believed merited greater attention. As shown in table 5.1 below, CIDA’s list of aid recipient countries changed over time. The 2005 International Policy Statement identified 25 development partners, including nine countries selected in 2002 for enhanced partnership based on need, and their assessed capacity to use aid effectively (CIDA, 2003, p. 3; CIDA, 2004, p. 5). CIDA planned to allocate two thirds of bilateral aid to these “countries of concentration” by 2010 (CIDA, 2005, p. 12). This geographic focus was

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30 The four outcome areas: a safe and secure world through international cooperation; global poverty reduction through sustainable development; a strong and mutually beneficial North American Partnership; and a prosperous Canada through global commerce.
made possible by terminating bilateral aid to Central and Eastern European countries (with the exception of Ukraine) and other recipients and reallocating funding from other country programs. CIDA identified “fragile states” and countries in “crisis” (Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Sudan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip) to receive the remaining one-third of bilateral aid (CIDA, 2005, p. 120). The assumption underlying these actions was that focus on fewer aid recipients would enable CIDA to become a major aid player in those countries and enjoy greater visibility and influence (CIDA, 2008, p. 48). According to the 2007 federal budget, the government aimed to become one of the largest five donors in core countries of interest (CIDA, 2007, p. 60).

In 2009, the focus was further narrowed when International Cooperation Minister Oda identified 20 countries, listed in Table 4, as priorities.

Table 4

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<th>CIDA’s Geographic Focus</th>
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<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2005 Countries of concentration</strong></td>
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By 2012–2013, 80 percent of CIDA’s bilateral assistance was focused on 20 countries (CIDA, 2013, p. 1). For each country of focus, CIDA program officers were required to develop Country Development Programming Frameworks, which are strategy papers outlining planned priorities and activities and how these align with broad Canadian whole-of-government, global development targets, and the aid recipient’s national development plans.

CIDA’s attention to improving assessed performance extended to its choice of implementation partners. In order to ensure that all programming branches (Geographic, Multilateral and Partnership) were operating in line with government-wide priorities, CIDA revised its procedures for channelling aid through Canadian voluntary and multilateral organizations. In 2009–2010, CIDA restructured its Canadian Partnership Branch. This branch provided a mechanism for NGOs and for-profit organizations to obtain CIDA grants for solicited and unsolicited project proposals, and a channel for more in-depth consultations between NGOs and CIDA on specific development problems and proposed solutions.

In July 2010, CIDA renamed its Canadian Partnership Branch to Partnerships with Canadians ostensibly to reflect a more citizen-focused brand. More importantly, it revised procedures for project funding. Under CIDA’s new guidelines, applicants were required to compete for contracts following a request for proposal issued by CIDA aligned with whole-of-government priorities. These procedures reflected CIDA’s confidence that private sector bidding processes would produce more efficient proposals in terms of so-called quality and pricing. Applicants were also required to raise directly from Canadians at least 25 percent of the resources required for their projects (CIDA, 2010, p. 36). The new rules of engagement with the voluntary sector also reflected CIDA’s desire to exercise greater control over partner organizations by dictating sectoral focus, and vetting applications based on criteria such as the capacity to deliver results, and alignment with CIDA’s thematic priorities and countries of concentration (2007, p. 50; 2010, p. 35). Half of Partnership with Canadians Branch funds targeted the 20 countries of focus; the balance went to other countries eligible for official development assistance. Since the new rules were instituted, CIDA supported initiatives such as the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, and the Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and Development (CIDA, 2013, pp. 6-7).
Likewise, CIDA revamped its strategy with multilateral agencies. A 2009 evaluation led to CIDA’s Multilateral Effectiveness Strategy in 2010–2011, which identified 18 multilateral organizations for increased partnership focus in order to improve CIDA’s performance measurement and evaluations. In 2012–13, more than 90 percent of the agency’s multilateral funding went to these 18 partners (CIDA, 2013, p. 55). These recipients included the World Bank, regional development banks, UN organizations, and cultural organizations such as La Francophonie and the Commonwealth.

Combined, these reforms affecting CIDA’s aid channels to the Canadian voluntary sector and multilaterals make it more difficult for new or small NGOs and multilateral organizations to compete with well-established, large-scale international organizations and NGOs that have the institutional capacity to develop proposals that conform to CIDA eligibility criteria, to raise sufficient contributing funds, and to manage multi-million dollar development projects using performance-based management tools. The potential bias at CIDA for funding larger scale organizations has several implications for education aid. With fewer organizations competing for CIDA funds, the average grant value per project may increase. Organizations responsible for sizable investments may be less inclined to implement experimental projects or projects that entail high levels of risk. As organizations expand in size in order to implement ever-larger projects, they may become less connected to their grass roots constituents and, conversely, more dependent and sensitive to donor interests and priorities. If this were to happen, then the space for local partners to contest donor-driven educational priorities and activities could narrow.

*Departmental Performance Reports* also consistently reflected CIDA’s aspiration to become a knowledge-based organization, although what this meant changed from 2000 to 2013. Originally, when CIDA established the Knowledge Management Initiative in 2000, under the authority of its Policy Branch, the Initiative was mandated to build networks involving CIDA personnel, other government departments and civil society organizations in order to create and exchange new knowledge and to apply this learning to new programs and

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to promote a corporate culture that attaches greater value to learning, knowledge sharing, research and development (CIDA, 2000). CIDA established intranets and hosted extranets including discussions on program-based approaches, trade and development, water, child protection and human rights, democratization and good governance (CIDA, 2001, p. 33; CIDA, 2002, p. 56). CIDA’s Performance Review Branch helped these networks adopt action plans and establish targets and monitoring systems (CIDA, 2001, p. 35). Then, after a program review in 2004, CIDA transferred the Knowledge Management Initiative from Policy Branch to form the Performance and Knowledge Management Branch (CIDA, 2005, p. 88). This transplant effectively put knowledge mobilization in the service of continual performance improvement by building CIDA’s capacity to apply results-based management tools.

Therefore, at the outset, CIDA’s Knowledge Management Initiative provided a mechanism for staff to explore and develop interests on a diverse range of issue areas internally and externally. Mid-way through the decade, CIDA reined in these disparate networks in order to retool the unit in ways that supported the development a technocratic cadre capable of using a results-based management approach more effectively. The emphasis on the use of standardized results-based management tools as a corporate reporting tool reduced education sector projects to a technical exercise, wherein project “success” was judged by whether managers complied with government procedural rules and were able to achieve planned outcomes. In effect, CIDA equated project “success” with project management success. While these forms of success may overlap but they differ. Project management success, typically refers to whether a project was implemented on time and on budget, and rendered the expected deliverables. It can be reinforced by professionalizing project managers through training and certification schemes. Project management success assumes that project management tools provide rational, universal and objective technologies for achieving success. In contrast, project success fundamentally depends on how a development problem was framed and designed, and whether the solutions that evolved from a particular framing effectively contributed to a positive change. These are processes that are values-based and power-infused. By equating techniques of measuring and monitoring

performance with project success, CIDA deflects a critical inquiry into its programming priorities and practices.

Since 2000, CIDA has developed more sophisticated instruments for managing risks in inherent development activities in contexts affected by armed conflict, natural disasters, corruption and political and economic instability (CIDA, 2002, p. 15). CIDA developed a model for integrated risk management in 2001 that required project officers to identify, prioritize and mitigate risks at the project, country, and agency levels (CIDA, 2003, p. 21). By 2007, CIDA introduced a new corporate Results and Risk Management Accountability Framework, which identifies expected results, anticipated risks, and actions to mitigate and manage the risks, and assigns accountabilities and responsibilities for mitigating risks. In 2010, CIDA developed its first ten-year corporate risk management strategy with the stated purpose of better managing all kinds of risks in order to improve results. Managing risks became a central dimension of planning, at all levels – agency-wide, program, and project levels – in order to increase the probability of achieving results.

CIDA created new specialized control mechanisms that ensure input other government departments and the private sector, including audit and evaluation committees. CIDA’s Office of Chief of Audit Executive was established in 2007 to ensure that management and operational controls were in place, and CIDA complied with the terms and conditions of its agreements, monitored and evaluated projects and managed risks and reported to Parliament (CIDA, 2007, p. 68). An independent Audit Committee was established in May 2009 chaired by CIDA’s President, which provided independent and objective advice on accountability process to CIDA’s president, advised deputy heads of departments, and worked with the Office of the Chief Audit Executive. The Audit Committee had five members, four appointed by the Treasury Board from outside the federal public administration.

CIDA placed greater importance on evaluation, framed as a “learning tool” that would contribute to achieving program results, corporate objectives, accountability, reporting, and better decision making (CIDA, 2005, p. 122). A new Treasury Board Evaluation Policy in 2009 mandated government departments and agencies to evaluate all direct program spending (excluding ongoing programs of grants and contributions) over a
five-year period. These new expectations contributed to the expansion of the budget for Performance and Knowledge Branch, which had authority over these evaluations. A new Evaluation Committee was established, comprised of 11 members, five from CIDA and six externals from Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Treasury Board Secretariat and Canadian civil society, academia, and the private sector. The Committee was charged to report directly to CIDA’s President and to convene quarterly to review work plans and evaluation reports (CIDA, 2011, p. 11).

Overall, performance-based practices oriented CIDA assets to advance whole-of-government priorities, including security and trade and commercial interests, and to focus on delivering results. Through a series of management reforms the government aligned development aid with Canada’s defence and foreign policy policies by mobilizing knowledge for performance measurement, restructuring programs with multilateral agencies and voluntary organizations, and expanding control mechanisms through new risk mitigation strategies, and evaluation, and audit policies and committees. Collectively, these management reforms strengthened CIDA’s relations with large NGOs and international organizations, and created opportunities for other government departments and private corporations to directly influence the selection of country partners and education aid priorities, such training and vocational education in the extractive sector to support Canadian mining companies operating in CIDA countries of focus.

Values-Based Practices

Nuanced changes in the expression of CIDA’s mandate suggest a cultural shift. At the outset of 2000, CIDA’s mandate continued to be informed by the Liberal government’s 1995 foreign policy statement (Canada, 1995). The statement outlined three foreign policy objectives: to promote prosperity and employment; to protect “our own security including economic security” and “our shared security” against traditional and non-traditional security threats such as transnational crime, social inequity, disease, environmental degradation, overpopulation and underdevelopment; and to project Canadian values and culture including respect for democracy, human rights, the rules-based international system, of law and the environment. The statement was framed in terms of Canada’s human security agenda and incorporated notions of universal values and global citizenship. In this spirit, CIDA’s
objective was to help people in developing countries and countries in transition to achieve sustainable economic and social development through humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, and to contribute to Canada’s national interests abroad in promoting social justice, and international stability for the “benefit of the global community” (CIDA, 2000, p. 63).

Contrast this with CIDA’s mission statement of 2013. CIDA’s purpose was to help people living in poverty in ways consistent with Canadian foreign policy priorities, to manage its resources effectively and accountably in order to achieve results, and to participate in Canadian and international policy development to realize its objectives (CIDA, 2013, p. 3). Therefore, while CIDA continued to emphasize Canadian foreign policy interests, it dropped any mention of projecting Canadian values abroad. This does not imply that values were now absent from CIDA programming. On the contrary, values continued to be important, but the emphasis was on open government and transparency to Canadian taxpayers rather than a commitment to social justice and equity. This new set of values infused the organization from the top down and refocused CIDA programming on achieving cost-effective results. Depending on the nature of these results, CIDA’s education aid can mitigate or reinforce inequality within and between states.

With the exception of CIDA’s final report in 2013, Departmental Performance Reports consistently reflected a view that Canada had a “moral obligation” to help less privileged countries and populations (CIDA, 2004, p. 19). In other words, development assistance was framed as an expression of Canadian values including charity, compassion, generosity, humanitarianism, peace, fairness, social justice, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law (e.g., CIDA, 2009, p. 2; CIDA, 2010, p. 3; CIDA, 2011, p. 3). Reports claimed that values manifest in CIDA programming related to environmental standards, disaster relief for refugees, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, health, good governance, private sector support and child protection (CIDA, 2003, p. 8; CIDA, 2004, p. 19).

By 2012-13, this previously obligatory nod to Canadian values was notably absent in CIDA’s mandate. The articulation of new values crept steadily into CIDA reports. As early as 2003, reports mentioned value for money (CIDA, 2003, p. 2; CIDA, 2004, p. 84) as one of one of four key dimensions of CIDA’s effectiveness agenda. Transparency was also
mentioned more frequently after 2010 and almost always found conjointly with accountability. Throughout this period, CIDA made reference to helping developing country partners improve transparency, particularly in democratic governance and electoral procedures. It funded the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Open Aid Partnership, both World Bank initiatives. The former advocated voluntary public reporting on royalties by corporations to governments, ostensibly as a means of making governments in the Global South more accountable to their citizens; the latter supported capacity building in developing countries to use geographic information for development results. Since 2010, CIDA began to ramp up its commitments to transparency and improved public access to data, as evidenced in a number of actions. CIDA contributed to the Canadian government’s Development for Results annual reports that amalgamate development expenditures of the various public sector departments and agencies. In 2010, CIDA began to share information with G8 partners as part of an annual accountability report. In 2010-2011, CIDA overhauled its online Project Browser to include more information on its projects such as project numbers, the value of its contribution, and targeted sectors (2011, p. 13). Then in 2011, it launched its Open Data portal as part of the government’s Open Government Action Plan (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2012), providing public access to CIDA financial and project datasets, and joined a consortium of donors sharing project and program aid data. Collectively, these actions were intended by CIDA to reduce reputational risks and to maintain stakeholder and public confidence in Canada’s foreign aid program.

Accountability as an Expression of Governmentality

Based on the evidence from Departmental Performance Reports summarized, I argue that through an accountability apparatus the Canadian government used foreign aid in ways that advanced Canadian economic and security interests with the public’s sanction. This apparatus is an assemblage of discourses and technologies including programs, documents, and procedures that enables the government to govern from a distance (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). As international development networks tugged CIDA in directions that reduced the government’s ability to exercise control over its aid program by recommending Canada adopt

33 G8 Accountability Reports began at the Muskoka G8 Summit in 2010 and continued at Deauville (2011), Camp David (2012), and Lough Erne (2013).
new modalities, Liberal and Conservative governments enacted policies to counter these centrifugal forces, to pull CIDA back and keep it from straying too far from the government’s sphere of authority. This apparatus enabled CIDA to enact selectively international aid effectiveness practices. On the one hand, CIDA protected its *bona fides* as a member in good standing within the OECD Development Assistance Committee while, on the other hand, it implemented public sector management reforms that resulted in a closer alignment between Canada’s aid and non-aid priorities. In turn, the performance of aid effectiveness shaped social understandings among Canadian citizens of what constitutes good development practice by normalizing aid as an instrument for advancing Canadian foreign policy interests while downgrading considerations of equity and social justice.

I argue that CIDA’s management reforms cannot be understood solely as forms of bureaucratic control characteristic of a Weberian state. Nor do I believe that they reflect convergent institutional practices resulting from Canada’s membership in intergovernmental and development policy networks. Collectively, the practices described above point to an emergent understanding of democratic governance in which the state is neither hollowed out as a result of new forms of networked power nor does it encourage deep democracy in which citizens actively participate in policy making regarding foreign aid. Instead, the evidence summarized above suggests that Canadian democracy, as instituted in CIDA’s education sector policies, shifted form a democratic system in which citizens render judgment on Canada’s foreign aid programs and priorities through deliberation and thoughtful discussions between civil society organizations and state actors to casting judgment on whether the government achieved its targets. In other words, the performance of aid shaped public expectations of the legitimate role for education aid to advance Canadian foreign policy interests.

Through this accountability apparatus, CIDA reduced education aid to a technical exercise aimed at delivering results through “effective partnerships” with multilateral, NGOs and private corporations. Since achieving results became paramount, it is incidental whether they are reported for fragile or crisis-affected states or middle-income states. This freed the government to select aid recipients based on government-wide objectives rather than recipient need. Public engagement with Canadians became less about raising public
awareness of development issues and protecting the space for genuine consultations, and more about communicating development results. By managing the public’s expectations about what development should look like, the Canadian government was able to reorient CIDA’s programs towards government-wide objectives without serious public objections, and to amalgamate CIDA with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, while barely raising an eyebrow.

Implications for Canada’s Education Sector Aid

The accountability apparatus described has several implications for Canada’s education sector aid. First, policy coherence across government departments align its education aid, specifically with whole-of-government priorities, including security and trade and commercial priorities. Coherence across government departments could affect the selection of countries receiving education aid based on their strategic importance to Canada. Coherence could also influence whether education is a sector of focus depending on the direction of Canada’s foreign policy in a country. For example, Canada’s trade and commercial opportunities might lean program managers to focus on education-labour market links. In the prologue of the 2012-2013 Departmental Performance Report, incoming Minister of International Development Christian Paradis writes that Canada’s focus on “growing economies” involved exploring partnerships with the private sector to achieve better development results for the poor. He assumes a virtuous cycle in which private sector investment yields more opportunities for education and training, and better health outcomes and a greater likelihood of “overcoming poverty (CIDA, 2013, p. 1). This opens the door for public-private partnerships that put education aid in the service of Canadian corporations with overseas holdings. For example, education aid aimed at supporting Canadian foreign direct investment in countries of the Global South might involve vocational training in fields that Canadian corporations have encountered shortages of skilled workers, or targeting local communities involved in the extractive sector as part of Canadian corporate social responsibility programs.

Second, statistics have been important technologies of education governance (Lingard, 2011, p. 359). Since what is measured matters, establishing the metrics for
assessing project outcomes becomes the \textit{sine qua non} for success goals. CIDA identified several education-related performance indicators to monitor progress on its thematic priorities. This list included quantitative indicators such as sex disaggregated enrolment rates, out-of-school population, education completion rates, transition rates from primary to secondary level, youth literacy rates by region, the number of schools built or rehabilitated, textbook-to-pupil ratio, the number and percent of trained teachers, and pupil-to-teacher ratio. The list of indicators also included qualitative measures such as the existence of education annual plans, gender equality strategies, and regional/local planning processes involving civil society organizations. These indicators reflected CIDA’s international commitments to the Education for All agenda and the Millennium Development Goals, which identify the universal primary education and the elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education as global development targets, as well as the international aid effectiveness agenda of OECD Development Assistance Committee members. The indicators suggest that CIDA perceived education aid primarily as a mechanism to facilitate the expansion of educational services and to restore a sense of normalcy. CIDA’s education aid indicators reveal little about the teaching and learning that happens in classrooms and how these processes contribute, in both positive and negative ways, to social cohesion, citizenship identities, and inter-group relations. Indicators to measure concepts such as social cohesion would require customized tools and timeframes exceeding the three to five year project cycle and, in all likelihood, would be prohibitive in terms of cost and time.

Third, development by numbers places pressure on education authorities in conflict-affected states to demonstrate results, particularly where project financing is conditional on achieving milestones. There are several reasons why achieving development targets may be difficult. The capacity to collect data may be limited due to infrastructure and human resource constraints, and the institutional arrangements that facilitate inter-departmental coordination across levels of government may be weak. Armed conflict complicates the collection of education statistics by reducing the mobility of educational authorities necessary for school inspection and supervision beyond urban centres, and interrupting communication between levels of government. Armed conflict results in unpredictable population flows internally and across borders. Some schools or districts may under- or over-report their statistics based on the incentives for misreporting and education authorities may
be reluctant to publish data that may be politically sensitive and therefore estimates may misrepresent enrolment levels and gaps based on gender, region, or cultural identity for political reasons.

Fourth, performance and risk management require specialized training that only certain organizations or individuals possess. In other words, as CIDA instituted a competitive bidding process and new eligibility criteria for accessing aid, it became more difficult for small-scale organizations to compete with large-scale organizations for potential partnerships as evidenced by CIDA’s decision to focus multilateral aid on 18 multilateral organizations with a proven track record in performance measurement. This organizational concentration has several potential consequences. It may enable CIDA to exercise greater leverage on partner organizations because its funding levels are concentrated on fewer actors. Conversely, organizational concentration may reinforce self-censorship among partners because going “rogue” may entail future project agreements. In other words, there may be a division of “haves” and “have nots.” The “haves” are large-scale multilateral organizations and NGOs – titans such as UNICEF, Plan, and Save the Children, possibly in partnership with private corporations that are able to exercise influence on education aid policies. The “have nots” are small-scale NGOs that may fold, merge with either like-minded organizations or the “titans”, or reinvent themselves in order to survive.

Fifth, given that projects are constantly monitored and evaluated, and given that the trajectory of civil servant careers depend partly on performance reviews, there may be incentives for project managers to establish development targets that are easily achievable and to select projects that entail low levels of risk. Most importantly, reporting mechanisms establish a vertical line of accountability, upward to senior management and Parliament, and downward to Canadian citizens. Implementation partners were accountable to CIDA, which was then accountable to the government and Canadians. Local populations, presumably the beneficiaries of Canada’s aid, were marginalized in this chain of accountability.

Conclusion

Pratt (2001) has argued that Canadian aid motivations shifted over time since CIDA was first established in the 1960s. In some periods, aid allocations coincided with the
government foreign policy priorities and reflected Canadian self-interests; in alternating periods, aid was guided by recipient needs and motivated by altruism rather than self-help. Evidence from the above analysis of trends in Canada’s aid flows and corporate reports suggests that effectiveness, performance, and values-based practices implemented by the government centralized decision making at the senior-most management levels at CIDA, and put education aid in the service of Canada’s foreign policy priorities. By 2013, policy coherence across development, defence, foreign affairs and international trade departments was undergird by institutional arrangements that affected how CIDA staff understood, enacted, and monitored accountable governance. In turn, the performance of accountability shaped public perceptions on the role of foreign aid, which was understood broadly as advancing Canadian interests and demonstrating results in a world with a surfeit of security threats and risks.
CHAPTER SIX
COLOMBIA

In recent years in Colombia, the homicide and kidnapping rates have dropped, the government has recovered control over much of its territory and it has entered into negotiations with the main leftist rebel group from a position of relative strength. In order to bring about these changes, the government abandoned peacemaking efforts in favour of a hard-line, militarized approach that has undergone multiple iterations from 2000 until 2013. These include counter-narcotics strategies, democratic security, consolidation, comprehensive security, and citizen security.

Over this period, CIDA responded to evolving security apparatuses in terms of the spaces, population and technologies of education sector programming (Wichum, 2013; Bottelo, 2011). I argue that these apparatuses affected CIDA education sector priorities and programming from 2000 to 2013. Specifically, I propose that three apparatuses shaped CIDA preferences and behaviours. Guided by the concept of human security from 2000 until 2006, CIDA aimed to protect children from recruitment by channelling aid to conflict resolution and peace education programs for adolescents. It broadened and deepened this protection-based approach in 2007 with the integration of a normative, rights-based framework that prescribed support for the building of state institutions designed to protect the right of education. This, combined with securitizing moves on the part of the Colombian government backed by its US allies in support of counterinsurgency, influenced the space for CIDA projects and particularly its geographic focus on the region of Nariño. Then in 2010, with the rise of citizen security, CIDA leaned toward a preference for vocational education and training targeting displaced youth of 18-35 years of age as a way of increasing the opportunity costs of involvement in criminal activities.

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section provides background to the conflict through a discussion of Colombian security apparatuses. The second section contextualizes CIDA’s development assistance to Colombia in relation to Canada’s relations with Colombia. The third section classifies CIDA’s education sector projects in Colombia using the typology of education aid approaches developed in Chapter Three. In the final
section, I discuss the relationship between security apparatuses and education sector aid in Colombia.

**Colombian Security Apparatuses**

Since the late 20th century, the Colombian government has made several securitizing moves. In the 1980s and 1990s it adopted the war on drugs entailing discourses and practices to curb the production and export of illegal drugs through fumigation and interdiction campaigns. In the post-9-11 period it drew on the global war on terrorism to justify a hardline policy against illegal armed groups. As it regained more control over its territory, the government introduced new security policies including democratic security, consolidation, and comprehensive security – all variants of counterinsurgency strategies. Most recently, in 2012, the Colombian government adopted citizen security as its conceptual frame for security and development policies. Each of these securitizing moves was part of a broader security apparatus inclusive of discourses, practices, geographic areas, and target populations. Each apparatus problematized security threats and solutions in different but overlapping ways. The Colombian government’s ‘war on drugs’ during the 1980s and 1990s asserted the state’s territorial sovereignty through disciplining power that separated and isolated both territory and population, neglecting education aid practices for the most part. Then, in the following decade, the global war on terrorism took on greater relevance and justified new forms of security and defence strategies based counterinsurgency doctrine. These policies created new spatialities such as consolidation zones designed to separate the population from ‘narco-terrorists’, and entailed increased education sector support to control the population in these areas. By 2012, the government enacted citizen security. Unlike earlier strategies which exercised disciplinary power through the security forces of the state, citizen security was a form of governmentality that enabled the government to assert its sovereignty over its territory and not just specific zones, and advance its neoliberal trade agenda, while regulating the behaviour of the population through non-coercive mechanisms.

**Background to the Conflict**

In 1958, the National Front ended *La Violencia*, an exceptionally brutal period in Colombia’s modern history, on the heels of a Conservative electoral victory after 16 years of
Liberal rule. Supporters of the two major political parties had sought to secure their privileged positions militarily, but neither was able to secure a clear victory (Bailey, 1967; Roldan, 2002, Rojas & Tubb, 2013). The National Front, a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, was the way out of the morass: the two major parties agreed to alternate their accession to political power (thereby denying third parties entry into the political system). This political arrangement helped to contain armed violence, partly because the US and the Soviet Union chose to abstain from intervening in any substantive way, but at the cost of political pluralism (Robinson, 2013). Not only did the arrangements institutionalized with the National Front deny the space for third party candidates to contest the monopoly over power exercised by the Conservative and Liberal parties, it also denied the population a free vote. The National Front, while securing the peace, did not address the grievances of rural and indigenous populations over the inequitable distribution of land and resources. This resulted in the emergence of leftist armed groups during the 1960s, such as the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC, its Spanish acronym) and the smaller National Liberation Army. From this point on, the Colombian government treated armed conflict as an infringement of its sovereignty. But, as long as leftist rebel groups found sanctuary in remote rural areas where they could rely on villagers for logistical support and intelligence, they were able to evade capture. To compensate for the imbalance of military power between the rebel groups and the government, the rebels resorted to guerrilla warfare tactics such as attacks on public infrastructure, intimidation, hostage-taking, and extortion.

**Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs**

Partly due to the government's inability to reassert its territorial control and protect the population against land expropriation and intimidation by illegal armed groups, right-wing paramilitary groups, so-called "self-defence” groups formed during the 1980s and expanded during the 1990s under an umbrella alliance (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) with, it is alleged, the complicity of the political elite (Avilés, 2006). Moreover, as coca production shifted to Colombia from Bolivia and Peru, where the US had supported aggressive interdiction and eradication campaigns in the context of US President Reagan’s “war on drugs,” and as cartel leaders in Colombia were either imprisoned or assassinated, both left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups became involved in the drug
So, while the conflict was rooted in political/ideological differences and split along rural/urban lines, as armed groups became increasingly involved in the narcotics trade, the material incentives for maintaining these groups made it increasingly difficult for the government to negotiate a settlement with them.

In the early 1990s, the Colombian government enacted a constitutional reform process and an administrative decentralization of public services that transferred responsibility for some services, including the administration of education, to sub-national levels of government. These reforms were intended to address inequitable access to public services, based on the view that decentralization might improve service delivery, and thereby mitigate the grievances motivating armed conflict. In 1998, presidential candidate Andres Pastrana campaigned on a platform of ending conflict through a negotiated settlement. Once elected (1998–2002), he unilaterally established a demilitarized zone in the region where the FARC had established a foothold, and withdrew government security forces from five municipalities for a period of 90 days (renewable). By doing so, he signalled the government’s readiness to negotiate in good faith based on an agenda of political, economic, and social reforms. As a confidence-building measure, in 1999, Pastrana also announced Plan Colombia, a three-year program that was modeled after the post-war Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of former Axis powers and developed in close coordination with the US. It had four components: combating illegal drugs trade and organized crime; supporting socioeconomic development; strengthening democratic institutions; and implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. Plan Colombia was estimated later to cost $US 10.7 billion between 1999 and 2005, of which the Colombian and US governments accounted for $6.9 billion and $3.8 billion, respectively. (National Planning Department (DNP) - Department of Justice and Security (Government of Colombia, 2006, p. 9). Like the Marshall Plan, Plan Colombia had both military and civil dimensions. However, in practice, financing was clearly biased toward the military component. About 60 percent of the total investment was allocated to counter-narcotics programs and the fight against

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organized crime, 27 percent went to the building of democratic institutions, and 16 percent went to socioeconomic development (Government of Colombia, 2009, p. 9).

As conceived and supported by the US Clinton administration, Plan Colombia was fundamentally an anti-narcotics program focused on interdiction, eradication, and fumigation campaigns, and crop diversification. Eradicating coca crops would deny FARC the revenue required to sustain rebellion and force the “narco-guerillas” to the negotiating table (Gutiérrez and Rincón, 2008). While supported by Jan Egeland, then Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General, Plan Colombia was rejected by several EU states on the grounds that it failed to address the root causes of the armed conflict. Instead, EU countries supported the creation of peace laboratories, multidimensional programs designed to promote a culture of peace, sustainable farming practices, and improved social services (Roy, 2003; Henriques, 2007; 2013). The EU eschewed a partnership with the Colombian government and a sector-wide approach, on the basis that the prerequisite conditions for such an approach (sound policy framework, effective institutions, monitoring and evaluation systems indicators) were still not in place in Colombia. It partnered mainly with civil society organizations to address poverty, marginality, inequality, and social exclusion, and distanced itself from the government, whose forces were implicated in human rights violations (European Commission, 2001; Gutiérrez and Rincón, 2008, p. 87). At the same time, EU member states pursued a trade agenda focused on expanding Europe's trade and investment in Colombia and the Andean region through multilateral and bilateral channels.

**Democratic Security and Counterinsurgency**

The collapse of peace negotiations between the Pastrana government and the FARC in 2002 lead to the reestablishment of government control in the demilitarized zone and justified Pastrana’s successor, President Álvaro Uribe Velez (2002–2010), taking a more hard-line approach. Uribe was elected on a platform that guerrillas must renounce violence before negotiations would take place. He tapped into the global war on terrorism discourse to foreground the security threat posed by “narco-terrorists” despite the absence of evidence

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that conflict in Colombia was in any way influenced by transnational terrorism. All allies such as the US had already added the FARC and ELN to its list of foreign terrorist organizations in 1997 and the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia in 2001. The Canadian government added all three to its listing of terrorist organizations in 2003.

In 2003, Uribe announced the Democratic Security and Defence Policy, described by his government as “a political instrument designed to protect and guarantee the rights of Colombians and to neutralize the threat of terrorism against the Colombian people.” The policy was, in short, a policy for the protection of the population. It identified several threats: terrorism; the illegal drug trade; illicit finance; arms trafficking; kidnapping and extortion; and homicide. Terrorism and the illegal drug trade were ranked the two main threats to Colombia’s democracy (Government of Colombia, 2003, pp. 19-20). Both threats are transnational in character and therefore any strategy must include a multilateral effort to curtail financing and disrupt supply chains, money laundering, the mobility of terrorists and their use of third countries as bases (Government of Colombia, 2003, p. 20). The first order was to strengthen the judicial system and the rule of law in order to protect the democratic rights of citizens. But for this to happen, the state needed to reassert its territorial control and restore the presence of the Colombian military and civil security forces in all municipalities, strengthen the judicial system, and reduce human rights violations by illegal armed groups. Other objectives included: protecting civilians from kidnappings, homicides, and displacement, and reintegrating members of non-state armed groups who denounce the use of violence; eliminating the illegal drug trade; strengthening control over the borders; and improving the efficiency and transparency of the government’s management systems (Government of Colombia, 2003, pp. 31-32). The policy also recognized that in addition to physical security, citizens needed greater access to education in order to enjoy their rights and freedoms.

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In a nod to Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach (2000), in which the Harvard economist argued that populations in developing countries make the best choices regarding their development but require capabilities that would expand the choices available, Colombia’s 2003 Democratic Security and Defence Policy affirmed the role of education in fostering capabilities, a culture of non-violence, citizenship identity, and economic growth. It pledged to “revolutionize” education by creating 1.5 million new school places (Government of Colombia 2003, p. 22).

In effect, the Democratic Security and Defence Policy was a counterinsurgency strategy framed in terms of protecting Colombia's democratic institutions. At its core was the goal of consolidating the government’s control over its territory through the coordinated action of the Colombian armed forces and police. Once an area was cleared of insurgents, professional soldiers, “home guards” or local forces, and police, would hold the area and protect the civilian population, enabling state organizations to provide legal and social services. With US government support, Uribe increased defence spending enabling the military to expand its territorial control.

The demobilization of more than 30,000 members of right-wing paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006 was central to the government’s maintaining legitimacy and its monopoly over the use of force. Through the 2005 Justice and Peace Law, the government offered amnesty and reintegration programs for those who voluntarily turned in their weapons. As the government asserted its territorial control over areas either cleared of leftist forces or formerly under the control of AUC groups, it instituted legislative reforms aimed at encouraging foreign investment particularly in the extractive sector. Rising GDP, reflected increased government revenues from taxes and royalties which, in turn, facilitated central transfers to departments, and the pacification of urban centres such as Medellín and Bogotá. While urban centres were pacified as government gained the upper hand, leftist guerrillas shifted tactics and began to expand coca production into remote arable lands in the


Coastal Pacific and Amazon where the state’s presence remained weak. This had the greatest effect on indigenous and Afro-Colombian minorities, whose rates of internal displacement and recruitment into illegal armed groups had been higher than the national average (see Ibanez 2009 regarding displacement).

In 2007, the Colombian government adopted the Consolidation of Democratic Security Policy “to recover state control over the majority of the national territory, particularly areas affected by the activity of illegal armed groups and drug traffickers” (Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Colombia, 2007, p. 9), and to build the capacity of local governments to deliver social services through “integrated state action.” According to the policy, “We [the Government of Colombia] have already gained control of the vast majority of our national territory. Now we must consolidate that control, meaning that, in addition to the presence of the public security forces, we must bring in the diverse institutions and agencies that provide every type of government service. A return of institutionality will bring a definitive end to the isolation to which many zones of the country had been condemned by the violence they have experienced (DCSD, 2007, p. 11).

The strategy conforms to an approach to stabilization involving close civil-military coordination. It is based on the assumption that in order to pacify a territory under the control of insurgent forces, the population must experience tangible progress in their living conditions and to associate this with state institutions. Like the previous policy, the Consolidation Policy involved first extending the government’s territorial control into zones where illegal armed groups, criminal groups and drug trafficking structures were active, then stabilizing the area with the support of civil and military security apparatus, while providing public services and expanding state authority in the build phase. (DCSD, 2007, pp. 31-32). Central to this third phase was the Integrated Action Doctrine, a whole-of-government approach to Colombia’s delivery of basic services to its population. With increasing levels of US government support, the Colombian government strengthened and expanded the Centres for the Coordination of Integrated Action. These were first established in 2004 with US support in consolidation zones under the Office of the President of the Republic to facilitate coordination across government agencies. The purpose of the Centres for the Coordination of

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40 Rojas (2009) calls this "securitization by dispossession."
Integrated Action, like that of the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Chapter 7), was to facilitate whole-of-government planning and programming, and to mobilize aid in a flexible and timely manner to address the immediate needs of local communities.

At around this time, the Colombian government also became a signatory to the Paris Declarations for Aid Effectiveness (2007) and established Acción Social, the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (precursor to the Presidential Agency of International Cooperation), to better align and harmonize development aid with national priorities. It developed its first international cooperation strategy (2007–2010), with an estimated budget of US$ 89 billion, in consultation with state and civil society actors. The strategy outlined three priority areas: 1) to meet the Millennium Development Goals, a set of eight goals and development targets agreed upon by major donors as a means to reduce global poverty, with an emphasis on geographic regions and population groups that do not have the same access to public services as the general population; 2) to combat the illegal trade in drugs and arms, and to support environmental protection; and 3) to support governance and reconciliation processes including community-based reintegration, regional development and peace programs, assistance to internally displaced persons and victims of armed violence, and support for the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation. In other words, foreign aid provided an additional income stream that enabled the government to increase social spending in consolidation zones without having to redistribute resources from elsewhere. By adopting aid development discourse and accountability and transparency tools, the Colombian government was signalling to donors previously reluctant to provide direct government-to-government aid because of human rights and humanitarian issues in the country that it was now open for business on terms the donor community sanctioned. By signing the Paris Declaration, the government used the language of aid effectiveness to bolster its legitimacy among foreign donors, increase the flow of aid into the country, and increase its control over how aid dollars are used (McGee and Heredia, 2012, p. 125). It also positioned itself as a potential partner in South-South and cooperation as it became a donor as well as aid recipient.
Uribe’s policies (2002-2010) contributed to an improved security environment characterized by negative peace as evidenced by lower homicide and kidnapping rates. By 2010, the number of homicides fell to 37.7 per 100,000 persons from a high of 67.7 per 100,000 persons in 2002. In 2011, his successor and former defence minister, President Juan Manuel Santos, responded to an emergent threat of new illegal armed groups with a new security and defense policy, with six objectives:

1. to further reduce narcotics production and dismantle organized criminal groups;
2. to create the security conditions necessary for consolidation of the government’s authority in specified areas;
3. to create the security conditions necessary for peaceful coexistence by strengthening the role of the national police;
4. to support integrated capacity across government departments;
5. to respond in a timely manner to natural disasters and catastrophes;
6. to build the institutions of the defence and security sector.41

The government’s plan reflected both continuity and change. Like preceding security policies, the Comprehensive Security and Defense Policy for Prosperity entailed both military and socioeconomic dimensions. Unlike either of the preceding policies, it emphasized the “soft” aspects of security, such as capacity building for local governance and delivering social services, as opposed to a focus on intelligence gathering and military action. This policy addressed the changing security context and specifically the fragmentation of illegal armed groups described by the government as criminal bands, economically motivated and not terrorists.42 In 2011, the Colombian National Police Chief, General Oscar Naranjo,


42 Crandall argues that the FARC is so weak that it no longer poses an imminent threat to the state. The government’s operations and targeted killings of its leadership have weakened its military capabilities, and popular support for the movement has declined as a result of its tactics and criminal activities. See Crandall, R. (2011). Requiem for the FARC? Survival, 53(4), 233-240. The assessment that bacrim constitute a new security threat has been challenged by some analysts who suggest that these are neo-paramilitary groups that emerged following the incomplete demobilization of self-defence forces. See, for example, Hristov, J. (2010). Self-defense forces, warlords, or criminal gangs? Toward a new conceptualization of paramilitarism in Colombia. Labour, Capital and Society, 43(2), 14-56.
described criminal bands as “the most serious threat national security.” Criminal bands operate with impunity as a result of their ties to government authorities including police. They are linked with murder, forcible displacement of persons, extortion, threats, beatings and targeted killings (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

The Comprehensive Security and Defense Policy for Prosperity (2011) reflects a discursive shift from framing the problem as (narco)-terrorists to emphasis on criminal bands and a more explicit emphasis on citizen security, crime, and violence than was seen in previous security frameworks. This shift took place in the context of drug policy and social reforms among Organization of American States member states that problematize the drug trade as a matter of health policy rather than solely a criminal justice issue, and the emergence of citizen security policies in response to crime and violence in democratic states in Latin America.

Therefore, from 2005 until 2011, the Colombian government enacted multiple iterations of counterinsurgency doctrine that created new spaces designed to separate the population from insurgents labelled as narco-guerillas or narco-terrorists. Despite titular variations, Colombia’s security and defense policies enabled the government to exercise disciplinary power over its population – forms of coercive control made possible by the state’s monopoly of the use of force. By organizing space in ways that isolated the population from the insurgency, the government was able to monitor and control the flow of goods and people moving in and out of these zones thereby denying insurgents logistical and popular support of the population and new recruits to sustain the armed conflict. For the most part, education sector support was peripheral to these military-centric policies, with the exception of the latest iteration – comprehensive security. While a reinvention of previous policies,

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comprehensive security required the government to expand access to education and other forms of social services as a means to pacify the population and restore confidence in the state’s capacity to protect rights of citizens. Colombia’s 2011 comprehensive security policy bridged the government’s use of coercive with its increasing reliance on non-coercive forms of power, or governmentality, following the adoption of citizen security in 2012.

Citizen Security

The concept of citizen security involves an individual rights-based response to crime and violence. In this understanding ensuring the right of the individual to personal security is an obligation of governments to their citizens, based on their commitments to international and human rights laws and standards such as the rights to life, liberty and security of persons, physical integrity, freedom, due process, and property. In contrast with concepts such as national security or public security, in which the referent object for security is the state, citizen security refers to the security of individuals or social groups (Organization of American States, 2009).

In May 2011, the Colombian government passed the Citizen Security Law, to address public safety issues such as violence, hooliganism, gang activity by imposing tougher penalties on minors found guilty of criminal actions. In 2012 the government issued the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy following consultations between the President, Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the National Police, the National Planning Department, and other entities at the national and territorial levels. The main objective of the 2012 policy was to protect the rights to life, liberty, and economic assets of Colombian and foreign nationals, through crime reduction and better enforcement, and promoting coexistence, which it understood “as the promotion of attachment and support among citizens of a citizen culture based on respect for the law, for others, and for basic norms of social behavior and coexistence”. Specific 2012 policy goals were to:

- prevent persons from engaging into criminal behaviour and reduce recidivism rates;
- improve policing;
• strengthen the judicial system and rehabilitation services, and assistance to victims of serious crimes;
• strengthen public adherence to laws, social coexistence and the non-violent conflict resolution;
• raise awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens in the fight against crime and of their active role within the community;
• improve the collection of data on national crimes and policy evaluations; and
• adapt criminal legislation and the regulations regarding citizen coexistence.

The 2012 policy prioritized at-risk populations and recommended measures to prevent the recruitment of children and youth between 12 and 26 years into criminal activities, and to re-socialize and re-integrate those who commit offences through socioeconomic programs. Some of the interventions proposed by the 2012 security policy include the expansion of early childhood education programs, parental education, family therapy, conflict resolution education, knowledge and skills training to prevent sexually transmitted diseases and addiction, expansion of schooling and the adoption of alternative models, extracurricular activities and remedial education, and vocational education and training for high-risk youth (PNSCC, pp. 2-14) Jorge Enrique Bedoya, Vice Minister of Defense for Policy and International Affairs, concludes, the best way to prevent narco-trafficking, illicit mining, and other sources of criminality is to build educational opportunities that promote economic growth. “So as a country becomes safer, you can have greater prosperity, foreign direct investment and employment opportunities, enhancing well-being for citizens” (Ince, 2013). Bedoya’s statement inherently mirrors the basic assumptions of neoliberalism: schooling provides the employable skills and knowledge requisite for economic productivity based on capitalist modes of production; and, economic growth enables the government to redistribute wealth through expanded social services for the benefit of all.

This discursive shift to citizen security is also reflected in the Colombian government’s International Cooperation Strategy for 2012–2014. The strategy is part of a whole-of-government approach to public sector programming aligned with Colombia’s National Development Plan, “Prosperity for All” (Spanish acronym, ENCI). According to the plan, international cooperation was “a foreign policy tool” that would advance the strategic
priorities of achieving “democratic prosperity and building a new Colombia” (Government of Colombia, 2011, p. 23). It identifies six key priorities:

1. strengthening national capabilities to manage and recover from natural disasters;
2. democratic prosperity inclusive of a broad range of social services and immigration interventions;
3. supporting economic growth and competitiveness particularly in the fields of agriculture, science and technology, mining and energy, through, inter alia, support for the private and “solidarity” sectors, and providing employment opportunities with the provision technical and vocational education;
4. environmental management;
5. governance through more effective public sector management, citizen participation, reparation; and

With citizen security the Colombian government shifted the centre of gravity for the country’s security from territorial control to prosperity (2012). This latest turn to citizen security is aligned with domestic conditions and regional economic integration trends. At the domestic level, as the government demobilized right-wing paramilitary groups and gained a measure of territorial control, it identified criminal gangs as security threats. No longer was the discursive threat confined to a political or ideological group or cartel-like organization. It was diffuse and fragmented, and extended potentially to all strata of society, from the displaced person and unemployed adolescent, to the magistrate. So, even if renewed negotiations with the FARC that began in November 2012 were to eventually end the armed conflict and demobilize FARC and ELN members, the perceived security threat has transcended these armed groups.

At the regional level, the Colombian government has aggressively negotiated free trade agreements, and reformed regulatory and banking structures in order to attract foreign, private investment, particularly in the extractive industry. The government’s motto, “Prosperity for All” reflects its attempt to revitalize the social contract governing relations
between the Colombian state and its citizens. As with any contractual agreement, this involves quid pro quo arrangements. The government commits to protecting the fundamental rights of citizens, foremost of which are the rights to life, freedom, personal safety and property, and to provide the conditions requisite for “prosperity for all.” In exchange, citizens were expected to commit to respect and adhere to normative codes of behaviour and the rule of law in their families, workplaces and communities. Implicit in this citizen- and rights-centred apparatus is the assumption that stability and prosperity depend on the ability of individuals and groups to self-regulate. The focus is squarely on citizens and the personal choices of individuals and social groups in their day-to-day lives. From this perspective, the role of the state is both to censure “bad” or harmful behaviours through enforcement of civil and criminal laws, and to steer citizens into making “good” choices by, for example, building citizenship competencies and providing educational opportunities.

Citizen security, unlike previous security policies, constitutes a form of neoliberal governmentality – rationalities and technologies enacted by the government that regulate the conduct of its citizens through non-coercive mechanisms and enable the government to advance its liberalized trade agenda. Education practices play a central role in this security apparatus by socializing citizens into what constitutes “good” citizenship vis-à-vis their family, communities, and the state. The message for the population inherent in the concept of citizen security can be reduced to: if the country is to become prosperous you will share in its prosperity, and in order for this to take place citizens need to play their role, follow the rule of law, and abstain from criminal activities. In other words, citizenship security amounts to pacification through the front door – through the willing consent of the society. From this perspective, education amounts to a technology of power exercised by the state to advance its neoliberal policies by preparing students to support productive sectors such as the oil and gas industry. In this context, foreign education sector aid to Colombia aligned with the Colombian government’s priorities amount to a form of governmentality – practices designed to secure the population’s support for the influx of foreign direct investment and resource-based economic growth.
Canada’s Development Assistance: 2000–2013

In this section I contextualize three major development frameworks and strategy papers developed by CIDA from 2000 to 2013: the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) for 2002–2006, the Strategic Framework on Rights and Protection (2008–2013), and the country development programming framework for 2010–2015. These documents suggest that neither Colombia’s war on drugs nor the global war on terrorism was salient for Canadian development policy makers, except as a foil for a human security-based counter-narrative. That counter-narrative determined CIDA’s preference for child protection programs from 2002 until 2009. However, after the Canadian government prioritized relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in 2007, launched bilateral trade negotiations with Colombia, and strengthened its policy coherence across government departments, it signalled a new trade-centric agenda that channelled Kant’s perpetual peace thesis. Kant proposed that when countries trade with one another and become more interdependent, the likelihood of inter-state violence decreases and a zone of peace is established. The Kantian thesis refers to inter-state and not intra-state war. Nevertheless its assumptions about liberalized trade informed the liberal democratic peace thesis in modern times and Canada’s post-2007 foreign relations with Colombia. The reasoning went as follows: Prosperity, democracy and security are possible if Colombia integrates its economy regionally and globally by reducing trade barriers, creating a financial and regulatory environment conducive to private sector investment, and redistributing national income to vulnerable populations. Stability was central for this prosperity turn to take hold. Therefore, the Government of Colombia adopted citizen security as a way to shape the behaviour of its citizens and reduce the incidence of crime and violence by, inter alia, using foreign education sector aid to expand training opportunities and develop a more skilled workforce in sectors that drive national economic growth.

Canada’s Human Security Agenda

Peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC between 1999 and 2002 led Canada to reconsider bilateral relations with Colombia in ways that would support peacemaking. Canadian government officials indicated that they “very sceptical” about the militarization of the conflict that was taking place as a result of the US-Colombia bilateral
Plan Colombia with its emphasis on counter-narcotics. At the same time, they were careful not to ruffle feathers in the US administration because they needed their support in the negotiations for a free trade agreement for the Americas (House of Commons, 2002, pp. 12-13). Canada adopted a holistic approach to the analysis of the armed conflict based on the concept of human security that had guided Canadian foreign policy in this period. It put forward the view that the illicit drug trade should be considered both a health-related priority and a transnational criminal threat. Canada’s Ambassador to Colombia, Guillermo Rishchynski (1999–2002), advocated more demand-side policies on the part of Western countries to reduce the consumption of illegal drugs among their citizens in addition to supply-side eradication and interdiction practices. He urged the international community to support institution-building – particularly to meet humanitarian needs and guarantee human rights – and third-party mediation of the bilateral peace talks through the Group of 10 in order to exercise moral suasion to increase the likelihood that a settlement would be reached. (Rishchynski, 2002, p. 54; Interview with government official, July 26, 2011).

These priorities were formalized in a bilateral Canada-Colombia Declaration of Objectives in 2000. The agreement committed the Canadian government to increase cooperation in niche areas consistent with a narrow form of human security advocated by the Department of Foreign Affairs. These included reducing the demand for illegal drugs, supporting non-governmental initiatives in conflict resolution and human rights targeting women, children, and indigenous and displaced populations, implementing the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Convention, reducing the flow of small arms into the region, strengthening democratic institutions, and strengthening bilateral trade and investment by negotiating a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) and a double tax agreement (CIDA, 2002). Likewise, CIDA adopted the concept of human security, also in a narrow

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45 Five of the G-10 members, including Canada, were selected by the Colombian government and five were proposed by the FARC. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence, Tuesday, December 7, 1999. Accessed December 29, 2011 from http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1039946&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=2

46 DFAIT’s Freedom From Fear policy paper published in 2002 identified several issue areas including: the protection of civilians, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the universalization and implementation of the Landmine Treaty, trade in "conflict" diamonds, humanitarian intervention, the universal ratification and implementation of the Rome Statue of the ICC, and support for tribunals, in addition to the Responsibility to Protect.
form. The agency’s *Social Development Priorities: A Framework for Action* (2000) committed new funding for basic education, health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, and child protection. The agency’s Child Protection Action Plan (2001) focused on, inter alia, children in armed conflict, including the use of child soldiers under 18 years and educational strategies to protect children from recruitment. Therefore, there was a degree of synergy between CIDA and DFAIT on the issue of child protection in situations of armed conflict, which was also reflected in their co-sponsorship of the 2000 UN Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg, Canada, following the seminal report of Graca Machel, *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (UN, 1996).

As the government prepared to scale up Canada’s aid commitments to Colombia in support of peace negotiations, Senate sub-committee hearings in 2001–2002 reflected a concern that Canada’s commitments would become burdensome. Transcripts indicate that committee members sought assurances that any new pledges would not overextend the government at a time when the so-called "war on terrorism" had made Afghanistan and Pakistan Canadian government priorities. Bob Johnson, CIDA’s Vice President for the Americas Branch, defended CIDA’s position saying that the situation in Colombia had changed over the past five years and, most importantly, that the Colombian government was pursuing peace as a central goal. Johnson argued that in order for CIDA to remain relevant, it needed to rethink its assistance in response to the country’s human rights and security situation. Joanne Goulet, Director of Brazil, Southern Cone, Colombia, South America Division at CIDA added that CIDA would not be able to have a significant effect due to budget constraints. In order for the agency to be visible and exercise modest influence it needed to identify niche areas (Parliament of Canada, 1999).

CIDA engaged with stakeholders within Canada and abroad to update its country development programming framework. As one insider I interviewed recalled, the Europeans had an explicit focus on peace-building, and the Swedes were helping lay the groundwork for peace and a negotiated settlement in Colombia. The Americans, in contrast, were invested in a counter-narcotics strategy based on the assumption that drug rents contributed to the intensity and duration of the armed conflict. CIDA staff felt that neither of those foci were not areas of strength for Canada. Instead, managers identified human rights and a focus
mitigating the effects of the conflict on vulnerable groups as areas in which Canada had prior expertise. “At that time human security was a dominant theme of Canada’s foreign policy, so there was a level of consistency across government departments in its strategic focus on child protection” (Interview with government official, September 13, 2011). Human security provided a framework for establishing priorities and the fact that both CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade were on the same page with respect the situation of children in armed conflict simply lent CIDA’s Colombia program’s child protection focus greater credibility.

The new country development programming framework reflected a multidimensional analysis of the causes of armed conflict in Colombia. These included the concentration of wealth and property among a privileged elite, social and political stratification, corruption and a lack of transparency in governance, drug production and trafficking (CIDA, 2003b, 2003). The main stated goal of the bilateral program strategy (2002–2006) was “building peace and enhancing human security.” Its purpose was threefold: to increase Colombian capacity to meet basic human needs and protect the rights of people affected by armed conflict; to support equitable participation of civil society organizations in peace-building initiatives; and to address some of the causes of violence by deepening citizen participation and improving government transparency (CIDA, 2003b, p. 8). A local Fund for Governance and Human Security was established to “improve the Colombian government’s and civil society’s knowledge of governance and human security, in order to support human development in Colombia.”

The new framework represented a shift from an earlier emphasis on technical assistance to the extractive and telecommunications sectors to a niche program supporting human rights, good governance and environmental management (CIDA, 2003b; Interview with former CIDA program officer, date). It was informed by the agency’s Action Plan for Child Protection (2001–2005) and policy advisors in the newly established Child Protection Unit within the Human Rights and Participation Division in Policy Branch whose role it was
to help managers in programming branches operationalize the principles and priorities set forth in the *Action Plan*.\(^{47}\)

This framework continued to guide CIDA well after the collapse of the peace talks conducted by the Pastrana government (1998-2002) and the adoption of a hard-line approach by his successor, President Uribe (2002-2010). In defending a request to increase the Colombia program’s budget in 2003, CIDA’s Program Manager for Colombia stated that with the election of Uribe in 2002, donors had a “strong, committed, credible and competent partner,” and that “strong donor support, accompanied by monitoring of and quick reaction to the human rights situation” was the most appropriate action under the circumstances particularly given the potential for negative spillover effects in the region if the situation in Colombia were to deteriorate (CIDA, 2003).

In late 2007, CIDA updated its programming with the Strategic Framework on Rights and Protection (2008–2012) (CIDA, 2008b).\(^{48}\) The framework speaks to the causes and consequences of violence, whether ideological, criminally motivated, or domestic, rather than a singular emphasis on the armed conflict. It identifies an “endemic culture of crime and violence” as responsible for a “widespread sense of fear, impunity, and resignation,” and links poverty, exclusion and the sociopsychological conditions created by the prolonged armed conflict and the illicit drug trade with sexual exploitation, the abandonment of children to the streets, and the “voluntary” recruitment of children as soldiers (CIDA, 2008b, pp. 5-6). From this perspective, education is both a child’s right and a key protection measure, and a potent means of breaking the cycle of lack of opportunity, poverty, employment, armed conflict and drug trafficking that often lead children and adolescents into a lifetime of crime and violence (CIDA, 2008b, p. 17). Therefore, the framework reached beyond politically motivated violence at the regional and national levels to other forms of societal violence including crime, sexual exploitation, and domestic abuse at the community and household levels.


\(^{48}\) These reports include the Guidance Paper on Children and Their Rights at CIDA, *Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Country Program Assessment of CIDA’s Thematic Focus on Children and Adolescents*. 
The framework designated 65 percent of CIDA’s country programming for investments in children’s rights and protection. It identified several objectives:

- support for capacity building at the departmental, municipal and community levels to uphold children’s rights and protection;
- expansion of access to “relevant and quality” education at various stages of the life cycle;
- promotion of children’s right to participate in decision making;
- development of successful models in Nariño that can be transferred to other high-risk regions;
- building of the capacity of CIDA partners to integrate a gender-sensitive perspective in program design and implementation (CIDA, 2008b).

To support these objectives, CIDA established the Local Fund for Governance, Children’s Rights and Protection as the Local Fund for Governance and Human Security came to a close. In addition to these programming objectives, it identified as a management goal the strengthening of the ability of CIDA partners to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate projects.

The effect of this framework was to broaden and deepen CIDA’s program’s child protection approach in several important ways. It broadened the target population by adopting a life-cycle approach. It also deepened the concept of child protection by integrating human rights despite the dissolution of CIDA’s Child Protection Unit, and the termination of the Action Plan for Child Protection after 2005. As one former CIDA staffer interviewed recalled, the Colombia program’s child protection strategy was institutionalized and perceived by senior agency managers as innovative. So, while other bilateral aid country programs avoided explicit mention of children’s rights because of potential pushback from the office of the Minister of International Cooperation, the Colombia program continued to use this language and their programs were approved (Interview with former CIDA officer, April 12, 2011).

The framework placed the Colombian government at the front and centre of its development as the entity obligated to protect and enforce rights. While it formally adopted progressive constitutional laws and ratified international human rights conventions, implementation and enforcement remained spotty. Whereas in the previous program framework, the onus was on individuals to protect themselves against danger through peace education and conflict resolution skills, with the adoption of a rights-based approach, responsibility for security migrated from the individual to the state.

The rollout of the Strategic Framework on Rights and Protection coincided with the Harper government’s announcement of a new Americas Strategy and a new cabinet position, Minister for the Americas.\textsuperscript{50} The strategy outlined three pillars for Canada’s engagement in the Americas: strengthening democratic institutions; building growing economies and enhancing regional stability and security by reducing the threats posed by transnational criminal networks, health pandemics and natural disasters (GOC, 2008).

Taken together, the three pillars represent a triadic relationship between democracy, prosperity and security. It also intimated the reorientation of education aid programming in Latin American countries, including Colombia, from social development priorities and child rights and protection, toward neoliberal education models focused on developing knowledge and skills for the labour market.

Most of the Canadian government’s efforts in the years immediately following the launch of the strategy were focused on negotiating “hub and spoke” bilateral agreements with Latin American states and impacted the Colombian aid program only marginally. Canada’s trade agenda was spurred by a sense of urgency as the US and the EU were each seeking more favourable terms of entry for their exports and investments.\textsuperscript{51} The Canadian government feared that Canadian corporations might be disadvantaged if the US and EU were to finalize a free trade agreement before Canada with Latin American countries,

\textsuperscript{50} For example, according to the Americas Strategy. "Canada’s economic engagement in the region is also based on the premise that increasing trade with countries in the Americas can have a positive impact on democratic reforms and security issues Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2009). Americas: Priorities and progress. Ottawa: DFAIT. p. 5.

\textsuperscript{51} The government of Colombia signed free trade agreements (FTA) with the United States, the European Union and South Korea between 2006 and 2009.
particularly given the US’s market size and the regions cultural links with the EU. The government’s greatest concern was how this would affect the agriculture and extractive sectors, which it identified as having the greatest potential for growth.

Negotiations proved fruitful: in 2008 Canada concluded negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement with Colombia. The Canadian government acted to pre-empt and contain domestic opposition based on concerns over human rights, labour rights, and environmental issues relating to Canada’s trade and investments, particularly in the extractive sector in Colombia, that might derail or delay the bill’s ratification by Parliament. It launched bilateral consultations over human rights in 2009 and offered the Colombian government its support to implement the recommendations of the Universal Human Rights periodic review. It also made it incumbent upon the Colombian government to produce a report annually on the effect of the Canada–Colombia Free Trade Agreement on human rights in Colombia to gain the support of the Liberal party. Between 2010 and 2013, Canada’s trade balance went from a deficit of $55 million to a surplus of almost $26 million.

With the free trade agreement ratified, the government of Canada strengthened its whole-of-government approach to Colombia. The government began contributing to Operation Martillo, a US-led multilateral operation to intercept and confiscate illegal drugs in the Pacific Ocean (DND, n.d.), and in 2011 invited the Colombian armed forces to participate in DND/CAF’s Military Training and Cooperation Program. In 2012 the government signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation with Colombia. (DND, 2012).

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52 Between 2006 and January 2010, Canada signed four FTAs with Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru. As of this writing, Canada was negotiating FTAs with Panama, Dominican Republic, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Central America Four (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador).


With respect to Canada’s foreign aid, in 2009 CIDA included Colombia among its 20 countries of focus, along with other Latin America and Caribbean countries such as Peru, Honduras, Haiti, and Bolivia. The classification was followed by an increase in foreign aid to $29 and $27 million in 2010 and 2011, respectively, despite government-wide fiscal constraints, compared with $20.6 million in 2009. The classification also meant that the country program would come under greater scrutiny in terms of its effectiveness, performance measurement and coherence with the goals of other government departments.

The new country development programming framework (2010-2015) reflected a whole-of-government approach. The programming strategy maintained CIDA’s commitment under its Rights and Protection Framework, to spend two-thirds of its aid on children and youth, making Canada the lead donor in the area of rights and protection. It aligned programming with CIDA’s corporate thematic priorities announced by the Canadian Minister of International Cooperation in 2009 (food security, children and youth, and sustainable economic growth). In keeping with the spirit of previous country strategy papers, it identified the ultimate outcome as improving respect of human rights and helping to reducing inequality and poverty of the most vulnerable groups. However, unlike earlier frameworks, the 2009 strategy dropped any mention of human security and peacebuilding, presumably to align with the agency’s corporate outcomes of reducing poverty for those living in countries where CIDA engages. The new strategy identified two intermediate goals. Under “securing the future of children and youth,” the plan supported the rights of vulnerable populations and efforts to prevent their exposure to and involvement in illicit activities and illegal armed groups by expanding their access to education. Under its economic growth and sustainability strategy, it supported corporate social responsibility and trade-related technical assistance linked with Canada’s bilateral trade agreement (CIDA, 2009e).

These moves partly reoriented CIDA from a protection- to a prosperity-based development agenda,. They are best understood within the broader regional and global context. At the onset of the decade, the Canadian government was committed to a human security agenda through both CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This translated into a programming framework focused on child protection, consistent with the CIDA’s Action Plan on Child Protection (2001). This niche provided CIDA with
influence and expertise on child protection issues as it was perceived as a leader in the field. In order to maximize this position, CIDA committed two-thirds of its aid to protection-based programming. This enabled CIDA to deepen and broaden its approach to child protection in Colombia in 2007, with the Strategic Framework on Rights and Protection, despite the Harper government’s decision to abandon human security in favour of a trade and commercial agenda in the Americas.

CIDA’s child rights and protection focus was partially undermined by the Canadian government’s drive to diversify trade relations in the context of emerging economic powers in Latin America and parts of Asia at a time when slow economic growth rates were projected in the United States, Canada’s primary export market. As the Harper government pushed to open new markets in Colombia for Canadian corporations, it needed to do two things. First, it needed to reach an agreement with its Colombian counterpart to liberalize trade. On this point there was a convergence of interests. The Colombian government was keen to attract foreign direct investment and technical assistance to support economic growth, particularly in the extractive sector. Its National Development Plan (2010–2014) understands growth and competitiveness, equality of opportunities, and the consolidation of peace as a virtuous cycle. In other words, more security leads to greater investments, increased employment opportunities, and lower poverty levels – assumptions consistent with Canada’s Americas Strategy. In order to achieve an agreement, the Canadian government leveraged its capabilities through a whole-of-government approach and increased its aid budget for Colombia.

Second, the Canadian government also needed to address potential domestic resistance to the trade deal whether from opposition parties or transnational human rights, labour, and environmental advocacy groups. For this, the government recognized that it had to demonstrate that the Colombian government was making efforts to improve its human rights record by establishing mechanisms for monitoring and reporting human rights violations, and it had to show support for corporate social responsibility projects.55

55 An example of a corporate social responsibility project is CIDA’s Andean Regional Initiative – Promoting Effective Partnerships for Local Development. The project dedicated $20 million over five years for projects in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. Under this initiative, CIDA committed $580,000, channelled through the
Therefore, at some level, the Canadian government had to address human rights concerns of civil society actors in order for the Colombian government to be considered a legitimate partner willing and capable of assuming its role as state duty bearer and to protect the rights of social groups and individuals, including rights that support a liberal economic order. But, the establishment and protection of rights does not necessarily promote development in the absence of interventions that address inequality and social justice issues (Grugel and Piper, 2009). Both governments acknowledged inequalities exist within and between regions in Colombia and is a source of the armed conflict and criminality. Colombia is one of the most unequal societies in the world; in 2010 it had a Gini coefficient of 55.9 (World Bank). In that year, the top 1 percent accounted for 20.4 percent of total gross income and the top income recipients are mainly owners of capital (Alvaredo and Vélez, 2013, p. 4). Neither a protection- nor a prosperity-based development agenda address horizontal inequalities. The former asks how to protect children and youth in order to mitigate harm from threats such as recruitment into illegal armed groups or criminal gangs; the latter asks how to ensure that marginalized youth are not left behind in the context of resource-led growth. Each has implications for education sector interventions.

**Trends in Aid Flows**

Trends in Canada’s overall aid to Colombia suggest that bilateral relations were prioritized from 2000 to 2012, and particularly from 2008 onwards. Aid levels increased incrementally from 2000 and peaked in 2011 at $36 million. CIDA’s share of Canada’s total aid to Colombia dropped over time from 91 percent in 2000 to 75 percent in 2011. Conversely, DFAIT’s share of total aid increased from 0.2 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2011 through the department’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Team (START) contributions to peace-building, stabilization, and transitional justice efforts. Other government departments and agencies also contributed aid. These included the Ministry of Finance, Rights and Democracy, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and provinces and municipalities. Contributions from Rights and Democracy ceased after 2008 and aid from the provinces and municipalities only began in 2004.
Figure 7. Canada’s ODA by department and agency.

These aid flows indicate two shifts: a modest and incremental rise from 2000 until 2007, and a surge from 2008 onwards. The shifts coincide roughly with two different conceptual frameworks guiding Canada’s aid program as the context evolved: from a human security to a prosperity-driven agenda.
CIDA’s Education Sector Policies and Practices

Bilateral education sector aid data follow roughly these trend lines as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Canada’s bilateral education sector aid disbursements to Colombia.

Aid to education projects totalled $0.57 million in 2000, peaked at $6.06 million in 2010, then dipped to $4.96 million in 2011 in the context of recession and spending cuts at federal departments and agencies. Education aid as a percentage of total bilateral aid increased over the period under review from about 6 percent in 2000 to 21 percent by 2011.

Trends in Project Profiles

Analysis of CIDA’s education sector projects (see Appendix A: Table 1), and interview transcripts, trends in aid flows to Colombia coincided with three distinct but overlapping modes of education sector programming. In the first phase, from 2000 to 2006,
CIDA focused on peacebuilding that emphasized conflict resolution education for youth in urban areas. In the second phase, from 2007 to 2009, CIDA adopted a normative protection-based approach by integrating a human rights more explicitly in its programming framework and projects. In the third phase, from 2010 to 2013, CIDA continued to support protection-based education projects, but introduced projects that supported new vocational training targeting youth and adults aimed at reducing societal violence.

**Peacebuilding: 2000–2006**

In total, nine education bilateral projects were funded from 2000 to 2006 involving mainly peace education and conflict resolution and the reintegration of former combatants. These were justified in terms of preventing armed conflict and recruitment. The projects were conducted in partnership with Save the Children, Plan Canada, UNICEF, IOM, and YMCA. The majority of beneficiaries were children aged between 10 and 18 years, with the exception of projects funded through International Organization for Migration and YMCA, which included children as young as 5 to 9 years and youth over 18 years. The locations varied by executing agency. Plan’s project operated out of the organization’s program support offices in high-risk areas such as Cali, and areas where there is a high concentration of internally displaced persons. Save the Children’s programming was restricted mainly to urban areas, with the exception of activities in rural Meta – an area of active armed conflict. UNICEF and International Organization for Migration operated in Eastern Antioquia, in both urban and rural areas. And the YMCA targeted urban Bogota and Medellin.

The projects that involved SCF and Plan during this period were pilot projects developed in consultation with CIDA’s Child Protection Unit (CPU). Both projects were funded at modest levels through Canadian Partnership Branch. Save the Children partnered with local non-governmental organizations and the National Ombudsman Office of the Ministry of Education of Colombia for its $2.5 million project. The project targeted youth aged 10 to 18 years. Its stated goals were to promote non-violent conflict resolution through non-formal education, to improve access to non-formal education for children displaced and affected by armed conflict, and to strengthen the protection of the right to education. Activities included capacity building of NGO partners and networks, training youth in
communication skills, publishing resources, and studying different pedagogical approaches to teaching children and youth about their rights. (CIDA, n.d.)

The Plan project targeted mainly Grade 8 youth, but also worked with out-of-school youth through community centres. It provided training for youth, their caregivers and teachers in peacebuilding, including citizenship education, equality, rights, and civic participation. The project adopted a youth-to-youth approach whereby youth would share their newly acquired knowledge and skills with peers. In 2005, CIDA signed a contribution agreement committing the agency to a second phase, with an additional $2.3 million over four years (2005-2009) while Plan contributed $1.04 million. In this new phase, Plan expanded its youth-to-youth methodology to schools and centres in new areas, and strengthened relations with local governments to promote the use of its approach and education materials in the public education systems (CIDA, n.d.).

IOM/UNICEF’s CIDA-funded projects focused on preventing the recruitment of child soldiers, and reintegration of former child soldiers. The YMCA projects involved children outside the school system, providing and leadership training for children at risk of leaving home, and citizenship and peace education workshops for children at risk of recruitment into armed groups.


In total three projects were funded by CIDA from 2007 to 2009, all dedicated to protecting the right to education and focused on expanding educational access. These totalled almost $27 million and included funding to UNICEF, a consortium of Save the Children (Canada) and Norwegian Refugee Council Colombia, and for Save the Children’s Rewrite the Future campaign, which advocated increased donor aid to conflict-affected states.

Both UNICEF and Save the Children/Norwegian Refugee Council projects were located in the department of Nariño. This geographic focus required CIDA to exercise its leverage with implementing partners. In the spirit of the Paris Declaration and the principle of donor coordination, CIDA agreed to fund Save the Children and Norwegian Refugee Council on the condition that they relocate their respective projects and work jointly with one another, and demonstrate how their projects align with the Department of Nariño’s
Development Plan, and the National Ministry of Education’s Ten-Year National Education Plan (Interview with NGO worker, February 25, 2010; Capra International). The project that evolved from these negotiations, Right to Education and Participation for Children and Youth in Nariño (2008–2012) totalled almost $10 million. The stated goal of the project was to ensure respect for children’s rights and protection of those rights through expanding access to and improving the quality of education, and increasing the participation of children, youth, and communities in the construction of a culture of peace. It was located in six municipalities of Nariño in which there were displaced, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous populations. Its direct beneficiaries included out-of-school children and in-school urban and rural children at a ratio of about 1:18, with a focus on indigenous, Afro-Colombian, displaced and generally vulnerable children and youth. The project comprised two components: providing out-of-school children with access to flexible education models implemented by Norwegian Refugee Council; and support for public schools and a teacher training school implemented by Save the Children using an inclusive education model designed to help schools develop educational improvement plans with community involvement (Capra International, n.d. p. 15).

UNICEF’s $17 million project, Achieving the Rights of Children and Adolescents, targeted 11 departments with disproportionately high numbers of vulnerable population groups (Afro-Colombians, indigenous peoples and populations affected by violence). It comprised capacity building of government departments and civil society organizations, the provision of early childhood education, basic life skills for youths and adults, and the prevention of recruitment.

Preventative, protection-based approaches: 2010–2013

Between 2010 and 2013, CIDA funded seven projects. Two of these specifically targeted Nariño: UNDP’s Sustainable Development for Rural Youth and Save the Children’s Protecting Children’s Education in South-West Colombia (in addition to Cauca). The remaining five projects were located in other departments including Cauca in the southwest,

Caldas, Risaralda and Quindio, and Meta in the central region, and Cartagena and the Montes de Maria zone in the north.

Three of the seven continued to focus on rights and protection. These included extensions for projects with Plan and Save the Children and a third, small-scale project of $200,000 implemented by the Canadian NGO Youth as Peacebuilders from funds channelled through Canadian Partnership Branch with the goal of preventing the recruitment of children and youth.

The remaining four projects involved forms of vocational training and entrepreneurship and were coded by CIDA as private sector development rather than education sector projects reflecting the subordination of education support to neoliberal economic interests. UNDP’s $10 million project, Sustainable Development for Rural Youth in Nariño (2010–2013) targeted “vulnerable and at-risk youth” in nine municipalities. The project’s objective was to increase opportunities for licit livelihoods through training and technical assistance by expanding access to subsidies and credit to support income-generating projects. The project also provided training and technical assistance to help strengthen families and prevent recruitment of children and youth by illegal armed groups, and capacity building for public sector agencies and civil society organizations.

The $4.6 million Education for Employment Project (2012–2017) implemented by the Association of Canadian Community Colleges aimed to modernize delivery systems for vocational education. It formed part of a multi-country commitment, the Andean Regional Education for Employment Initiative, which is a $20 million program comprising projects in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Canadian contributions include setting up institutional partnerships with Canadian colleges and the National Training Services (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje or SENA), which offers Colombian students training and vocational education outside the secondary school system and the Ministry of Education. The project targeted “youth within reach of state institutions for the first time; at risk of recruitment into illegal activities if not provided with sustainable livelihood” (ATIP A201303226, p. 67). It aimed to improve the capacity of the National Training Service to deliver training programs and employment support services for disadvantaged Colombian youth. According to CIDA, the project targeted three areas, Pacific coast, Montes de Maria, and Macarena. Both the Pacific
coast and Montes de Maria are priority zones for the government’s Consolidation Plan, and areas where new paramilitary groups, such as the Rastrojos and Urabeños, have established a foothold. Montes de Maria is also an area in which more displaced persons are expected to be returning to their homes as a result of the government’s Land Restitution Program. At the time of data collection, the specific projects had not been determined, but correspondence between Canada’s Embassy in Bogota and CIDA suggest sectoral support under consideration included the mining and oil and gas sectors that would meet the needs of employers, an initiative targeting poor, displaced women, and an initiative involving the reintegration of demobilized combatants, building on CIDA’s previous project with International Organization for Migration (ATIP A201303226, p. 155).

UNHCR’s Sustainable Solutions for Displaced Populations (2013–2016) targets displaced populations and falls within CIDA’s remit of finding durable solutions for Internally displaced persons. The goal of the project is to increase the economic participation of this segment of the population by providing vocational training in addition to other, non-educational services.

At $616,000, the Sustainable Entrepreneurship Development Project implemented by Service d’Aide aux Jeunes Entreprises du Montreal Centre was the smallest of the four vocational training and education projects. Unlike the other three, which were funded through the Geographic Programs Branch, this project was funded through Canadian Partnership Branch. It targeted three departments in central-west Colombia that are important centres for coffee production: Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío.

Discussion

The data suggest that CIDA’s education aid and underlying conceptions of security shifted over time. At the start of CIDA’s education aid projects in 2002, projects focused on peacebuilding for children 10-18 years, through teaching and learning cognitive and communicative skills for active citizenship and non-violent conflict resolution. Roughly midway, in 2006-2007, CIDA expended funding for protection-based approaches with a geographic focus on the Department of Nariño. At the end of the reporting period in 2013, projects emphasized training and vocational education for youth 18-25 years and older to
prevent their entry into criminal activities. These shifts corresponded with Canadian and Colombian security discourses and practices, including human security, democratic security or consolidation, and citizen security. I argue that successive security apparatuses delimited the spaces and populations, and technologies of power that informed Canada’s education aid preferences and priorities as summarized Table 5. Human security offered a counter-narrative to the disciplinary power of apparatuses either of the war on drugs or democratic security/consolidation, that both enclosed space, and tried to create docile bodies. In contrast, citizen security represents a form of neoliberal governmentality exercised by the Colombian and Canadian governments. It opens up space for the circulation of goods and materials, including foreign trade and investment, not through repression, but by the regulating the conduct of citizens in order to minimize the risks of crime and violence.

Table 5
The Spaces, Populations, and Technologies of Security

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<td>Population</td>
<td>In-school/out-of-school children 10-18 years</td>
<td>All age groups Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations</td>
<td>Youth 18-35 years Focus on displaced persons including Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Mainly urban</td>
<td>Nariño, particularly rural areas</td>
<td>Areas where large numbers of displaced are returning or are present and where criminal groups are active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technologies</td>
<td>Conflict resolution and peace education and human rights education</td>
<td>Capacity building of state institutions to deliver services and protect the right to education</td>
<td>Vocational education and training, and basic life skills</td>
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Canada’s human security agenda was a foil against the Colombian government’s war on drugs security apparatus. By claiming it was waging a war on drugs, the Colombian government problematized insecurity in narrow terms: guerrillas financed their rebellion through the illicit revenues from drug trafficking, so by cutting off their sources of financing,
the government would degrade their capabilities and force them either to the negotiating table from a position of weakness or to surrender. This particular problematization of Colombia’s civil conflict had two effects. In labelling guerrillas as “narco-guerillas”, the Colombian government achieved two goals simultaneously. It criminalized guerrilla groups, thereby undermining the legitimacy of their political grievances. It also rationalized military policies to fumigate tracts of land used for coca production in order to force the guerrillas out from their safe havens in the bush into the open where they could be captured. There was very little room for educational reforms in this militarized conception of security, which eschewed any role for education in conflict resolution, for example, by addressing distributional inequalities of public goods such as access to public schooling, by recognizing cultural differences, or supporting forms of restorative justice in curricular pedagogy and classroom practice.

Human Security

The Canadian government, however, rejected this security apparatus. It understood the conflict from a human security perspective that sensitized CIDA to the link between inequality, poverty, and armed conflict. But, Canada’s human security was narrow in form, centred on “freedom from fear” or how to provide people affected by armed conflict with the competencies to protect themselves against threats such as child recruitment. Its aid program reflected this narrow interpretation in its Action Plan for Child Protection (2001), which was focused on a select group of issue areas including the situation of children in armed conflict. The Action Plan, and CIDA policy advisors appointed to the Child Protection Unit provided the institutional support for the Colombia program through consultations and training. The projects funded focused squarely on how to prevent recruitment not just retroactively through the rehabilitation of child soldiers, but proactively by teaching and learning peace education, conflict resolution and citizenship practices. One of the core pillars of these programs was the active “participation” of youth in decision-making, although it remains unclear what character or how successful CIDA partners were in achieving this outcome.

Human security was less successful as a counter-narrative in opposition to democratic security and consolidation. The Colombian government framed what was essentially a counterinsurgency campaign as democratic security. This conception of security was
nominally democratic and constituted, like the war on drugs, a form of disciplinary power exercised by the Colombian government that enabled it to aggressively pursue a military solution to the armed conflict under the banner of protecting Colombia’s democratic institutions. Democratic security (and successive security and defense policies including consolidation and comprehensive security) enclosed space by identifying zones for special military (and later social development) attention. Its purpose was to separate the population from the insurgency in order to create docile bodies. But, because it was framed as “democratic” and because human security discourse had all but disappeared from Canadian government foreign policy statements, although it remained salient for individuals at CIDA, education projects at CIDA begin to shift concurrent with the rollout of the Uribe government’s counterinsurgency plans. In particular, CIDA began to focus its resources on the Department of Nariño, the site of a disproportionate number of internally displaced persons, and the home of a significant population of “vulnerable” Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations. It is also at this point where we begin to see the project profile change, from a clear emphasis on peacebuilding approaches, to more protection-based programming through projects that build life skills and support alternative learning programs.

Although CIDA staff who were interviewed eschewed a link between the selection of Nariño and the government’s so-called democratic security and consolidation policies, CIDA’s Framework on Rights and Protection makes reference to border security which is an important dimension of counterinsurgency doctrine (2008). The evidence linking Canada’s focus on Nariño with Colombia’s counterinsurgency operations is thin. From as early on as 2002, CIDA had discussed concentrating its resources on a specific geographic area (House of Commons, 2002) and having broadened its target population in 2007-2008 to include much younger as well as older youth, CIDA might have, reasonably, sought ways to re-scope its programs to achieve better development results by concentrating resources on a smaller geographic area and replicating the experience elsewhere in Colombia if results warranted (Interview with CIDA staff, May 12, 2010). This would have followed in the footsteps of the European Union’s peacebuilding labs, which were concentrated in specific areas. Moreover, CIDA managers were confident that elected officials in Nariño at multiple levels of government were committed to socioeconomic reforms and had the institutional capacity necessary for delivering development results (Interview with CIDA staff, May 12, 2010). In
other words, Nariño presented CIDA with a test case of how cooperation could achieve results in a very complex environment where coca was produced and shipped to foreign markets, and non-state actors such as the FARC, paramilitary and emerging criminal actors operated with impunity. Therefore, while the selection of Nariño may have been in response to requests from the Colombian government or even pressure from the US to support democratic security and consolidation zones, it might also reflect pressure within CIDA to manage projects in ways that deliver better results, or a combination of these two factors.

Citizen Security

Citizen security constitutes a form of neoliberal governmentality exercised by the Colombian government in order to advance its liberalized trade agenda and economic integration with the Andes, the hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific region, while regulating the conduct of its citizens and minimizing the risks of crime and violence.

The reorientation of Canada’s education aid towards preventive, protection-based approaches focused on expanding training and vocational opportunities for older youth from 2010 to 2013 suggests that CIDA sanctioned the particular problematization of security inherent in the Colombian government’s concept of citizen security – namely that the threat to Colombia’s security was no longer viewed as being from armed conflict, but emanated from crime and violence perpetuated by criminal gangs. Citizen security made sense for Canada in several ways. Canada signed a bilateral trade agreement with Colombia signed in 2008. The following year, CIDA named Colombia as one of Canada’s 20 countries of focus, which was a significant event because it signalled a political commitment with implications for aid levels and greater inter-departmental coordination between aid and non-aid programs (Interview with CIDA staff person, September 13, 2011). The Colombian government was interested in implementing its Land Restitution Program, and attracting private sector investments in areas that had been stabilized, particularly investments in the extractive sector. These policies, however, were fraught with serious risks. As areas were stabilized and displaced persons felt secure enough to return to their homes, many found that their land had been confiscated through land grabs or illegal sales. In the context of new illegal armed

57 The Canada–Colombia Free Trade Agreement was signed in November 2008 and came into force August 2011.
groups, doubly dispossessed peasants might be forcibly recruited or voluntarily enlist in
criminal gangs simply to survive. Pressure was on the Colombian government to manage
these population flows. Vocational training that aimed at helping displaced persons and
demobilized soldiers to (re)integrate into their communities by expanding opportunities for
employment was an important dimension of citizen security that linked technologies of the
self with technologies of power. In other words, education was a mechanisms through which
the government the government was able to transmit notions of what constitutes a “good”
citizen and, at the same time, legitimizing penalties for those that “choose” to contravene
social and legal rules of conduct.

In the absence of human security, and the Child Protection Action Plan, CIDA had no
counter-narrative with which to resist citizen security. Whereas human security places the
onus on state and non-state actors to protect citizens and non-citizens. Citizen security, while
assuming a role for the state in terms of supporting legal, judicial and penal systems,
evertheless places the burden of responsibility for protection mainly on individuals. The
role of the state is to create an environment that supports the rule of law, but it is up to “free”
citizens to comply with the rule of law. In this way, citizen security recognizes individual
free will, but it leaves neoliberal economic policies that contribute to inequality unchallenged
by suggesting that the problem of societal violence is best addressed by economic growth led
by private and foreign investment that expands employment opportunities. In this framing,
citizens are either lawful or unlawful, and because youth constitute the cohort most likely to
engage in gang-related violence they are perceived as prone to risky behaviours. To ensure
against rising crime and violence, the Colombian government requested donor assistance
from CIDA in expanding vocational training opportunities. As a whole-of-government
partner in the implementation of the Harper government’s Americas Strategy, CIDA had a
role to play in strengthening bilateral ties in quid pro quo arrangements of the bargaining
process. Not only did the Canadian government increase its country programming budget for
Colombia, as one government representative explained, CIDA’s education for employment
project in partnership with the Association of Canadian Community Colleges, and other
training and vocational education programs was in response to the Colombia government
request for support in the training and vocational education sector (Interview with CIDA
officer, May 12, 2010).
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion regarding the education aid-security relationship. First, multiple security apparatuses can coexist at any time and place. Some are global in scale such as the global war on terrorism, while others functions at the regional level such as the war on drugs, citizen security and human security. Each of these apparatuses has implications for education aid, whether marginalizing a role for education, as with the war on drugs, or focusing on a specific target group and/or sub-sector as was the case of human security and citizen security.

Second, security apparatuses delimit populations of security in ways that influence education sector aid as summarized in the table above. In all three periods differentiated in this analysis, the focus continued to be children and youth, although the age range varied. Yet, there was a qualitative difference in subjectivities of youth. At the beginning, under a human security framework when CIDA pursued peacebuilding-based approaches, CIDA perceived youth as an at-risk group yet still agential citizens. This orientation brought into focus how education sector aid could enable youth to reject and resist advances by armed groups but also the importance of youth participation in decision-making processes. In the transition period from 2008-2009 that bridged peacebuilding and protection-based approaches, and in the context of the Uribe government’s counterinsurgency campaign, CIDA began to focus its aid geographically on the Department of Nariño, to mitigate the effects of armed conflict on vulnerable populations, particularly indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. In other words, in both periods, the danger was presumed to be external to children and youth and sourced within the illegal armed groups. But whereas peacebuilding-based approaches recognized a degree of agency exercised by children and youth, protection-based programming refocused attention on child and youth vulnerability. In contrast, by 2013 and in the shadow of citizen security, unemployed youth were perceived as a potential risk factor for crime and violence that threatened to dampen economic growth rates and investor confidence in Colombia. CIDA’s increased funding to vocational education and training programs from 2010 to 2013 was aimed at protecting older youth from poor choices that might lead them to participate in criminal and violent activities, while advancing a bilateral trade relations. The emphasis was on individual choices rather than the structural or socio-cultural factors that might lean youth, one way or another, towards engaging in violence and criminal activities.
Third, security apparatuses create spaces of security and circumscribe areas targeted by CIDA. The Colombian government’s democratic security and consolidation policies narrowed the territorial space for development mainly to remote and rural areas hitherto outside the territorial control of the state in order to separate the population from insurgents. Within these enclosed spaces, so-called consolidation zones including the Department of Nariño, the expansion of educational access through, for example, flexible models of education for out-of-school children was a form of disciplining power that controlled the movements of people in these zones. With citizen security, the area of security was scaled up from zones to the state to enable the expansion of liberalized trade and foreign direct investment, particularly in the extractive sector. In this context, the Colombia government’s request to Canada to increase CIDA’s support for training and vocational education programs constituted a form of governmentality linked with citizen security – a social contract between the Colombian state and its citizens which promises national prosperity in exchange for compliance to public law, rules and social norms. From this perspective, education is perceived as a driver for economic growth and a mechanism for social understandings of accountable or “good” citizenship understood in narrow terms of responsible, rule-abiding citizens. The inherent weakness of this new risk apparatus is twofold: liberalized economic growth may further exacerbate income inequality, whether across regions, rural/urban divide, or ethnic groups, and motivate armed violence and crime; the concept of “good” citizenship may be too narrow to thwart the aspirations of some Colombians for greater political pluralism and deeper forms of democratic citizenship.
Chapter Seven

Afghanistan

Arguably, no other conflict in recent history raised as much attention to the security-development “nexus” as international military intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The nature and duration of Canada’s engagement was partly accidental. It began in 2001 as part of Canada’s obligation to North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states under Article 5 of the organization’s Charter, and evolved into a test case for Canada’s whole-of-government programming in a fragile state after 2008. From that point forward, Canada’s education sector aid was yoked partly with the Canadian Forces counterinsurgency campaign in Kandahar Province in the south and partly to Canada’s priorities in Afghanistan. Much was riding on the mission’s success or the perception of success including Canada’s influence in NATO, Conservative leadership at the federal level, the “transformation” of the Canadian military, and public servant careers.

Canada’s role in education reconstruction and development in Afghanistan both helped to rationalize Canada’s involvement in NATO’s mission and to measure its “success” by recourse to the expansion of educational access to basic education, particularly for girls. As much as the rapid and dramatic rise in CIDA’s education aid levels after 2005 and the high-level political commitment to educational expansion were notable, it was the taciturn stance of the Canadian government once the combat mission ended in July 2011 that was telling. Virtually in a blink of an eye, the cherubic images of young girls and boys clutching notebooks that had enabled the Canadian government to claim with a measure of self-importance that Afghan children were attending school in record numbers, disappeared. Observers were left scratching their heads and wondering what was Canada’s education aid all about?

In this chapter I attempt to answer this question by suggesting that CIDA’s education sector aid can be understood fully only in relation to the security apparatus spun around global war on terrorism and its sub-theme – fragile and failed states. This apparatus rationalized Canadian (and western) intervention and constituted an epistemic regime that established the spaces, population and technologies of security, and had three effects. First,
education sector aid, and particularly Canada’s focus on expanding educational access for Afghan girls was a technology of power exercised by the Canadian government to maintain domestic support for the combat mission. Second, in Kandahar province, Canada’s education aid separated the population from the insurgency and constituted a form of disciplining power to monitor the circulation of people and goods in and out of the Canadian military’s area of operations. Third, also in Kandahar, Canada’s aid created zones of exception where education aid was excluded and the population was reduced to ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 2005).

This narrative proceeds over four sections. The first section doubles as both historical background and an analysis of two security apparatuses that rationalized foreign engagement in Afghanistan since 2001: the war/fight on terrorism and Afghanistan as the “Heart of Asia”. It is based on an analysis of NATO’s summit communiqués and Parliamentary Assembly resolutions, and US national security strategy texts and Afghanistan specific security documents listed in Appendix A, Table A-3. The second section describes and analyzes Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan and the critical junctures that shaped CIDA’s aid levels and programming priorities. It suggests that stabilization operations in Kandahar amounted to an exercise in disciplinary power for managing the population in Kandahar province. The third section describes evolution of Canada’s education aid using the typology developed in Chapter 4 based on statistical trends in aid flows, project profiles, and interview transcripts. The fourth and final section synthesizes these findings to draw conclusions on the relationship between security apparatuses and education aid.

**International Security Apparatuses**

In the period under review from 2000 until 2013, three security apparatuses dominated US and NATO policy discourses: the global war on terrorism (and its sub-themes of fragile and failed states, and counterinsurgency), transition, and Afghanistan as the “Heart of Asia”. Over this period, concepts of security shifted from a military-centric approach to a military-economic understanding of security. The object of security also changed, from the state to the individual.
Background to the Conflict

Between 1979 and 2001, the dominant security apparatus pivoted from containing Soviet expansionism and supporting a “free” Afghanistan in the context of Cold War balance of power politics to the global war on terrorism in the context of the threat posed by failing and fragile states. In 1979, the Soviets occupied Afghanistan at the invitation of the leftist government that had come to power through a coup d’état and ended monarchical rule. In an effort to prevent Soviet expansion eastward and to expedite its withdrawal, the US, and other countries including Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and China, provided military and humanitarian aid to a fragmented mujahedeen movement. The Soviet government eventually withdrew its forces in 1989, leaving the UN to mediate a settlement and support reconstruction in so-called ‘zones of tranquility’. Negotiations failed to deliver a permanent political settlement. An opportunistic alliance between Pashtun tribes and the Taliban brought the Taliban regime to power in 1996. Renewed negotiations in 1996-97, the so-called 6 plus 2 process, were convened under the auspices of the UN to negotiate an end to the ongoing conflict between the United Front and the Taliban. 58 Although the US Administration recognized that the Taliban was a destabilizing force that undermined US interests in the region by its support of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, it believed that America’s strategic interests would be best served by a broader peace process inclusive of the Taliban, Northern Alliance and other parties. The US administration was prepared to recognize the Taliban government conditional on its agreement to end its support for terrorist networks, to curb opium cultivation and to improve its human rights record and the treatment of women and girls. However, administration officials also recognized that the US had few levers to influence the Taliban, and might have to contend with a “pariah state”. One lever was the prospect of increased donor aid facilitated by a donors’ meeting that would be “a centerpiece of [US] efforts” aimed at showcasing “rewards that would stem from peace” (United States Department of State, n.d.).

58 The six plus two members comprised China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia and the United States.
9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, all cards were off the table. NATO reaffirmed its declaration at the 1999 Washington Summit that identified terrorism as a threat to the security and stability of the Alliance and international security. NATO members endorsed military action against Al Qaeda training camps, and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a safe haven and to diminish the military capability of the Taliban regime.59

Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, which began on October 7, 2001, militarized the “war on terrorism” in which terrorism was understood by US foreign policy makers as an illegitimate form of premeditated, politically motivated violence that targeted innocents, and not dissimilar from piracy, slavery and genocide. This “war” pitted two groups against each other. On the one hand, there were the civilized masses aligned with modernity, democracy, open societies, freedom, free markets and free trade. On the other hand, there were “enemies of civilization” (White House, 2002, p. 7). From this perspective, it was not sufficient to remove the Taliban from power in 2001 and to “liberate” Afghanistan. Neither was it adequate to “hunt down” remaining Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces and to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and deny them sources of financing (White House, 2002, 5). The war on terrorism was a war of ideas that required spreading democratic capitalism.60 The Bush administration publicly eschewed the essentialist argument popularized in Huntington’s “clash of civilization” thesis, which imputed that Islam was irreconcilable with democratic governance. Concerned that such a polarizing position might push “moderate Muslims” into the arms of extremists, the Administration asserted that the war on terrorism was a “clash inside a civilization [emphasis added]” and “a battle for the

59 Operation Enduring Freedom was sanctioned under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Article 24 of the NATO Strategic Concept, Article 5 of the NATO Charter, and UNSC 1368, which sanctioned a response by the US and its allies to the 9/11 attacks against Al Qaeda forces and states that harbour terrorists. Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for the right of individual or collective to take actions to that threaten the security of a member state, Article of the North Atlantic Treaty that provides for the collective defence if the security of a member state is threatened. UNSCR 1368 expressed a “readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.” Article 24 of the NATO Strategic Concept endorsed at the Washington Summit (1999) sanctions collective defence in response to a terrorism act that constitutes a threat to the security and stability of the Alliance

60 US foreign policy has long been associated with exporting democracy and free markets. But, in the aftermath of military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, New York Times editorial writer David Brooks claims that America is experiencing a “spiritual recession” after abandoning its historic mission to spread democracy.
future of the Muslim world” involving the forces of “freedom and fear” (White House, 2002).

Having set the stage for a historic showdown, the Bush Administration identified two principal antagonists – terrorists and rogue states. Terrorists targeted civilians, caused wanton destruction, and found sanctuary in weak states where poverty, ineffective public sector institutions and corruption enabled them to operate with impunity, often with the sanction of state authorities. Rogue states comprised countries governed by leaders who brutalized their populations, used the country’s wealth to bankroll patronage networks and personal excesses, threatened their neighbours, sponsored terrorism, and disregarded international laws and standards. These two threats were often conjoined by reference to their mutual contempt for the US and a desire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Given this existential threat posed by terrorists in Afghanistan, the US government justified preemptive action based on its right to self-defence, including military intervention, extending foreign aid to weak states and promoting free trade and free markets to reduce poverty.

NATO engaged in much the same discourse. The organization called the attacks of 9/11 “barbaric” and terrorists a “malevolent threat” to universal values of civilized societies and constitutive of a “new security environment” characterized by a “fight against terrorism” and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that dictated a reconsideration of the meaning of security and the role of NATO (NATO, 2002). The purpose of the mission was broad and ambitious: to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorist attacks, and also to “assist in the emergence of a secure and stable Afghanistan, with a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, integrated into the international community and cooperating with its neighbours” (NATO, 2004).

NATO’s role expanded incrementally following the 2001 Bonn Conference that established the governance framework for the post-Taliban regime and a UN-mandated force to assist in ensuring the security of Kabul and its environs, and possibly other areas of the country (Bonn Conference, 2001, Annex 1). In August 2003, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at request of the UN and Government of the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Later in October 2003, UN Security Council Resolution 1510 extended NATO/ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for the establishment of new Provincial Reconstruction Teams (NATO, 2004). These Provincial Reconstruction Teams under the national authority of contributing states, were to facilitate an enabling environment for reconstruction and development activities and security sector reforms by controlling opium production and trafficking, containing in the power of important regional strongmen and Taliban regime “remnants” (NATO 2004). The basic assumption underlying these efforts was, as NATO put it, “there can be no security without development and no development without security” (NATO, 2004).

By 2006, this link between security and development was recast as “winning the hearts and minds” of the Afghan population by improving donor aid coordination and building the operational capacity of public institutions to deliver services, particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the country. NATO believed that poorly coordinated and inadequate aid reduces the impact of development, weakened the Afghan state and made stabilization more difficult (NATO, 2008). But, because NATO had neither the mandate nor the capacity to fund and implement development reconstruction and development projects, it repeated calls for better coordination among the state actors responsible for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, European Union member states and UN agencies through a “comprehensive approach”. The basic assumption of this approach was that better civil-military coordination efforts between and within state and non-state actors would enable the Afghan authorities to deliver basic services at all levels of government. 62

Participating ISAF/NATO members adapted various forms of a comprehensive approach. Canada mandated a whole-of-government approach among government departments and agencies. The Obama Administration outlined its new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy in March 2009, the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan (Eikenberry &

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62 In terms of supporting local ownership, the purpose of NATO’s Afghan First Policy issued April 2010 was to increase local procurement of goods and services whenever the acceptable standards for security, quality, price and reliable supply are met; including the use of Afghan contractors and the employment of Afghan labour for works and jobs in Afghanistan.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-BF6A3963-402643FF/natolive/official_texts_62851.htm?mode=pressrelease
McChrystal, 2009). The core U.S. goal remained unchanged – “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan”. The plan envisioned a tactical shift to population-centric counterinsurgency to enable a “more focused and effective assistance effort” and to protect the Afghan population from armed conflict. This new approach was based on four key assumptions. First, job creation programs increase the opportunity costs for rebellion, making it more difficult for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to recruit members. Second, alternative livelihoods programs that help farmers to shift from growing poppies to high-value licit crops deny insurgents an important revenue stream. Third, high impact projects identified closely with state authorities increase popular support for the Afghan government and help curb popular support for the insurgency. Fourth, reconstruction and development results can be best achieved through civil-military coordination (Eikenberry & McChrystal, 2009).

The new Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy (Eikenberry & McChrystal, 2009) also entailed a regional strategic partnership with Pakistan and dialogue and reconciliation with insurgents willing to renounce Al Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution. According to US National Security Strategy (White House, 2010), Afghanistan and Pakistan are at the epicentre for violent extremism, and it goes on to predict the “danger” would spread if security deteriorates and the Taliban regain control of large areas of Afghanistan enabling Al Qaeda to operate freely. The US government made the case for building the capacity of the Afghan national security forces in order to facilitate “transition” to Afghan responsibility and to support the drawdown of American troops, and deepening cooperation with Pakistan in order to address the threat from violent extremists (White House, 2010, p. 21).

**Transition**

Transition required both security and prosperity. While the security dimension was addressed by US/NATO training missions and bilateral cooperation with Pakistan, the US government unveiled the framework for prosperity with the New Silk Road Initiative in 2011. The Initiative supported a vision for Afghanistan as a land-bridge between South and Central Asia, resurrecting its historic transit role in East-West trade routes. The aim of the initiative was to support regional integration in four key areas: regional energy markets, trade and transport, customs and border operations, and business and people-to-people contacts.
This initiative was endorsed by regional leaders at an inter-governmental summit hosted by the Government of Turkey in January 2010 who declared Afghanistan is the “Heart of Asia”, and regional peace and stability is premised on a safe, secure stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Participants identified multiple security threats including terrorism, the production and trade of illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, cross-border flows of weapons, and human trafficking. They agreed that enhanced cooperation in trade and transit, transport and energy would benefit Afghanistan and the region, and made commitments on a number of actions to support peace, security and prosperity such as capacity building of senior government managers, disaster response simulation exercises, job creation and infrastructure building projects, and information and cultural exchanges. In the field of education, they supported regional educational exchange programs, expanding links between governmental and non-governmental organizations that deliver educational services, reforming curricula to eliminate images and texts that promote discrimination and extremism, and establishing a technical training center in Tajikistan to prepare train civilian specialists (NATO, 2011).

Transition was also a common theme at NATO Summits from 2010 onwards. At its Lisbon Summit (2010) the Alliance acknowledged that it had entered a “new phase” with the process of transition toward full Afghan security responsibility and leadership by December 2014 at which time NATO ends its combat mission. At the same time, NATO acknowledged that transition would bring with it more risks to civilians. And expressed concern over the range of threats to children including recruitment, sexual violence, and targeted attacks. In its Chicago Summit Declaration (2012), NATO recognized the need to protect gains that had been made in women’s rights, and for the protection of children from armed conflict. It affirmed its commitment to implement UNSC 1612 and resolutions related to the protection of children affected by armed conflict, and endorsed the appointment of a NATO focal point for children and armed conflict in charge of maintaining a close dialogue with UN, NATO, UN.

63 In attendance were leaders and representatives from Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Central Caucus Republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan represented at the meeting. Observers included representatives from the US, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the UN, the EU, and NATO.
Conclusion

From 2000 until 2013, the global war on terrorism was the dominant security apparatus guiding US and foreign military and development interventions in post 9/11 Afghanistan. The spaces and populations of security circumscribed by this apparatus changed over the course of 13 years. At first, immediately after the attacks on 9/11, Al Qaeda and “fragile and failing” states that sanction the presence of terrorist cells presented a threat to western publics and infrastructure. The population to be secured was located mainly in the Global North.

By 2005, after NATO member states assumed responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout Afghanistan, the spaces and populations of security changed. From this point until about 2011, foreign military and development aid was concentrated in areas under the jurisdiction of Provincial Reconstruction Team countries and their armed forces, and aimed at securing the Afghan population in their respective areas of operations by separating them from insurgents and delivering social services through improved civil-military coordination.

From 2011, and in the context of the aftermath of the global recession in 2008-2009, and low economic growth rates in Europe and North America, and troop contributing nations eager to formulate an exit strategy, the space and population of security once again changed. This time, the space was reformulated to include Turkey, the Soviet Union and the Central Caucus Republics, cut across Afghanistan, and extend to South-East Asian countries. The population of security was reoriented to women and children. Discourse on Afghanistan as the heart of Asia amounted to a way countries that had borne the greatest burden to date in terms of troop and aid commitments, shifted responsibility for security to a regional “constellation” of actors rationalized by the potential for economic gains of maintaining a pacific zone that facilitates “good” circulation, such as the trade in licit materials, and controls “bad” circulation, such as human trafficking, weapons smuggling, refugee flows, and drug trafficking (Buzan and Waever, 2003). In short, western donor states, including Canada, were manoeuvring to reduce their commitments in Afghanistan by reframing the insurgency as a regional security issue, effectively say to neighbouring governments directly impacted and implicated in the ongoing armed conflict, that it was their responsibility to
contain the violence. The next section examines how these three shifts affected Canada’s foreign aid policies and development priorities.

**Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan: 2000–2013**

Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was characterized by mission creep. Critical events steered the mission in ways that led to its expansion in scope and scale. These include the initial deployment of troops in October 2001 as part of Canada’s collective security arrangements with NATO allies as part of its contribution to the war on terrorism; the decision by prime minister Paul Martin to assume responsibility of Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar Province in 2005; the report and recommendations of the Independent Panel on the Mission in Afghanistan (hereinafter referred to as the Manley Report) and the 2008 parliamentary motion that extended the mission to 2011; horizontal coordination across government departments and agencies as part of a whole of government approach to the mission; and finally, the decision to transform the mission to a training mission following withdrawal of Canadian combat troops and the handover of Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team to US authority in 2011.

At the outset when the Liberal government of Jean Chretien deployed Canadian troops in Afghanistan in 2001 there was little indication that Afghanistan would become Canada’s principal foreign policy priority for the next ten years, and one of its top aid recipients. Prime Minister Chrétien committed 100 CF troops on September 20, 2001. In October, Canada’s military contribution expanded with over 1700 armed forces personnel, and equipment after the US invoked Article five of the NATO Charter on October 4, 2001. Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced in January 2002 that Canada would send an additional 750 soldiers in Kandahar. According to the Department of National Defence

(DND), the immediate objectives of Operation Apollo was to isolate the Taleban from international support, to bring Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda leaders to justice, to eliminate Al Qaeda as a terrorist threat, to take military, diplomatic and economic action to force the Taleban to end its support for Al Qaeda, and to address the humanitarian needs of the population. Its medium term objective was to assist in reconstruction efforts (ATIP/DFAIT, A201100105)

Chretien’s successor, Prime Minister Paul Martin expanded the mission with his 2005 decision to assume responsibility for security for Kandahar (Martin, 2009). While NATO allies were negotiating the division of labour, Canadian government officials weighed the choice between Herat or Kandahar, not fully realizing that the selection of Kandahar would place Canadian military and civilian officers at the heart of the Taliban insurgency. CIDA advisors in the field recommended Kandahar based on its level of development and their belief that aid would have an impact on development indicators (Interview with former CIDA officer, September 8, 2011). Canada’s Department of National Defense also recommended Kandahar, but for different reasons. Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier saw the mission as a vehicle for a more robust military role for Canadian Forces in the post-Cold War era, effectively reversing decades of underinvestment. He shared Martin’s worldview insofar as he saw Afghanistan and other fragile and failed states as one of multiple risks of the post-Cold War world that required a military role different from traditional peacekeeping and dictated a “transformation” of the Canadian Forces (Hillier, 2009; Dorn & Varey, 2009).

In the 2005 International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (GoC, 2005), the Martin government charted a whole-of-government approach for Canada’s government cooperation in order to ensure coherence between aid and non-aid policies among failed and fragile states. These were countries “emerging from crisis and of overriding strategic importance”, which included Afghanistan (Canada, 2005, p. 24). Hillier shared Martin’s vision of a whole of government approach (also known as a 3-D or comprehensive approach) that required deepening horizontal coordination across government departments. Hillier’s vision of the Afghan campaign involved three stages – fighting, training, and development – each comprising three pillars – military, development and
governance. In order to support Afghan ministries, Hillier formed the Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan in 2005 at the request of the Karzai government to advise and support program development at Afghan Ministries, including the Ministry of Education, at a time when CIDA and DFAIT had a limited presence at Kabul. Inter-departmental tensions arose over the role of the military in civilian technical assistance. The Department of Foreign Affairs believed capacity building should be under the remit of civilian personnel and lobbied the government to replace the Strategic Advisory Team with civilian advisors, and by 2008, the CIDA-funded Canadian Governance Support Office assumed responsibility for technical assistance to Afghan ministries (Interview with former military consultant, June 27, 2011).

At CIDA, the goal of the Afghanistan Program was “to support the efforts of the Afghan government, the Afghan people and the international community in stabilizing Afghanistan through the consolidation of the GoA’s [Government of Afghanistan’s] authority and legitimacy across the nation, and through improvements in the people’s well being”. In May 2006, the strategy was revised. The new strategic framework focused on Democratic Development and Effective Governance; the role of women and girls, sustainable rural livelihoods, and state building and stabilization, with a focus on Kandahar (CIDA, 2007b, pp. vii, p. 57). Official Development Assistance increased after 2005 as shown in Figure 9, reflecting the importance of the mission for Canadian foreign policy.

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65 CANADEM maintains a database of Canadian civilian experts and consultants which it draws upon when recruiting for international programs. http://www.canadem.ca/home/.
Figure 9. Canada’s Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan by department.

The annual figures are for the fiscal-year basis adopted by the Government of Canada (April 1 to March 31). Data includes both ODA and non-ODA.
Other government departments include the Ministry of Finance, Public Works and Government Services Canada, IDRC, Environment Canada, Rights and Democracy, Heritage Canada, Canada Post, Provinces and Municipalities.

Transformation: Canada’s Comprehensive Approach to Security

These developments foreshadowed a much broader transformation in Canada’s mission after 2008 by the Conservative government, led by Prime Minister Harper. Harper was inclined to extend the mission beyond the February 2009 deadline for troop withdrawal approved by Parliament in May 2006. But, because the Conservatives held a minority in Parliament, they needed the opposition’s support to avoid a non-confidence vote in Parliament that would trigger a new election. Under such circumstances, any new election would effectively amount to a referendum on Canada’s role in Afghanistan. In order to avoid the possibility of a new election, Harper established an independent five-member panel led by former Liberal minister John Manley. Manley and his team were mandated to review a full range of options before the issue of Canada’s post-2009 role was brought before Parliament for a vote. While not excluding other possibilities, the panel was asked to assess
four options: 1) a training mission to build the capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes the armed forces and the national police; 2) a focus on development and governance and sufficient force protection to ensure the safety of civilian personnel; 3) a shift in geographic focus from Kandahar; 4) complete withdrawal of military forces with the exception of those necessary to ensure the safety of civilian employees (Canada, 2008a, pp. 30-31).

In its final report, the Panel acknowledged that the Taliban insurgency had made gains in 2007 over the previous years, and attributed its strength partly on its access to safe havens inside Pakistan. It made a clear distinction between Canada's troop deployment in Afghanistan under a UNSC umbrella and at the request of the Afghan government and the US-led coalition in Iraq which operated in the absence of a UN mandate. In doing so, it reassured the public that Canadian Forces were not occupying a sovereign nation but engaged in peacebuilding upon request of an elected government consistent with a Pearsonian tradition of multilateralism. The Panel recommended the extension of mission until 2011 conditional on NATO’s commitment to supply reinforcements of about an additional 1,000 soldiers to Kandahar and to accelerate ANSF training. The Panel indicated that the 2011 deadline for a troop withdrawal coincided with the end of the Afghan Compact (2006-2011), which provided a framework for Afghan governance and development endorsed by international donors.

The Panel also recognized the “clear, hold and develop” counterinsurgency strategy adopted by Canada and its NATO allies was making progress. It recommended restructuring the mission based on a “comprehensive Canadian strategy” that “would commit Canada to a more coherent engagement that integrates security, governance and development. (Independent Panel, pp. 33-34). These three pillars were inter-related in a virtuous cycle. “Security enables development; effective governance enhances security; development creates opportunities, and multiplies the rewards, of improved security and good governance. In this virtuous circle of cause and effect, security is an essential condition of good governance and lasting development” (Canada, 2008a, p. 11). The Panel also criticized the absence of reliable indicators to monitor and measure progress. It concluded that without systematic performance-based measures the government could not justify claims of success and
recommended establishing verifiable criteria to measure progress (Canada, 2008a, pp. 12-13).

The Parliamentary motion of March 13, 2008 that considered the recommendations of the Manley Report extended Canada’s military presence until July 2011. The House of Commons approved a military mission which would provide an enabling environment for reconstruction and development in Kandahar. It required Canada’s reconstruction and development program to be revamped and expanded to achieve a better balance civilian and military efforts, and to focus on “traditional strengths” such as security sector reform, institutional capacity building, addressing problems of water shortages and drug trafficking, and ensuring accountability mechanisms are in place so that the Canadian public is informed of the mission’s progress.

The outcome of the Manley Report and the Parliamentary motion amounted to a “transformation” in Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. From this point moving forward, government departments and agencies including CIDA were guided by six priorities formalized by the House of Commons. Four priorities were specific to Kandahar; two were national-level priorities. These comprised:

1. Enabling the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order.
2. Strengthening Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government
3. Providing humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.
4. Enhancing border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.
5. Helping advance Afghanistan’s capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes.
6. Facilitating Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation (Canada, 2008c).

Foreign Affairs took the lead on three of the six priorities – capacity building of the Afghan National Police, justice and corrections in Kandahar province including securing Sarpoza in
the Kandahar City, Afghanistan-Pakistan border management, support for Afghan-led reconciliation. CIDA’s remit covered humanitarian aid and strengthening the delivery of basic services and supporting economic growth and it created a branch dedicated the Afghanistan (and later Pakistan) country program. National Defense was responsible for military operations and training of Afghan security forces.

Pursuant to the parliamentary motion, the government released 14 quarterly reports on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan from June 2008 until June 2012, each an artefact of the mission’s evolution. At the outset, the government acknowledged the threat to international peace from the dangers posed by failed states (Canada, 2008c, p. 12) as well as the challenges of operating in a complex environment characterized by poverty and recovering from “catastrophic failure” (Canada, 2008c, p. 4). It went on to state that the purpose of the mission was to “…to make measurable progress between now and 2011 toward building a more secure Kandahar that is better governed and can deliver basic services to its citizens, supported by a more capable national government that can better manage Afghanistan’s borders and sustain stability and reconstruction gains over the longer term [emphasis added] (Canada, 2008c, p. 6).

In the following 13 reports, the government laid out the steps it had taken to fulfill its mandate. This included rebalancing military and civilian activities by increasing development aid to Afghanistan and expanding the number of civilian personnel at Kabul and Kandahar. It increased aid spending, bringing the total to $1.9 billion from 2001 through 2011 as shown in figure x below. It established an Afghanistan Task Force at CIDA to manage the country program. In 2009 CIDA expanded the task force to include the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas following on the heels of the government’s endorsement of the US Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.66 The number of staff members in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force at CIDA increased to 115 employees in 2009 from 65 in 2007. After 2010, the number dropped to 110 in 2010 and 80 in 2011.

66 International Development Minister Oda stated that the government "recognize[s] the importance of the border situation" and Canada shares the American view that Pakistan is important to achieving Canadian objectives in Afghanistan. Canadian and Pakistani officials agreed to improving cooperation in five spheres of activity including measures to improve citizen-state relations through the provision of social services. The other areas include: 1) customs; 2) counter-narcotics; 3) managing the movement of people; and 4) law enforcement. http://www.embassymag.ca/page/printpage/pakistan-9-23-2009.
In order to ensure coherence across government departments and agencies the
government established new governance structures following the recommendations of the
Manley Report including a cabinet-level committee, the Afghanistan Task Force at the Privy
Council Office, and a new civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar with authority
equal to the Canadian military commander in theatre. The formation of the Task Force was a
political decision designed to enforce horizontal coordination between civilian and military
departments which had not been the case prior to Privy Council playing a very heavy role. At
first, the Privy Council Office’s influence was over bearing but as inter-departmental
coordination was institutionalized its role became more loose and, as political interest in the
mission declined over time, the Privy Council did not play such a heavy handed role
(Interview with former Foreign Affairs staff, June 22, 2011) After 2008, Joint Task Force
Kandahar became a civil military organization led jointly by the Representative of Canada in
Kandahar and the Brigadier General. Prior to this, the Joint Task Force under exclusive
military control was the main decision-making body in Kandahar. The Provincial
Reconstruction Team was subordinate to this joint civil-military headquarters. In practice,
this meant that the Canada’s Representative in Kandahar and Brigadier General worked side-
by side and integrated their staff as much as possible, although the civil and military
personnel each had separate chains of command. Moving forward, “the civilian and military
were essentially joined at the hip” (Interview with former government official, June 22,
2011). These institutional arrangements are reflected the Task Force’s spending as shown in
Figure 10. Spending increased corresponding with the number of employees, which peaked
in 2009 at 115 employees.
Figure 10. Afghanistan Task Force spending from 2007–2011.*

Notes. Salary and wages do not include 20 percent of employee fringes and benefits. Operations & Maintenance expenses include expenses such as travel, professional services. Employee: number of Full Time Equivalent employee
*2011 expenses from 2011/04/02 to 2011/10/24 preliminary.
Source: ATIP Request A0031768_1-00036

New quarterly reporting requirements mandated by Parliament obligated government departments to monitor progress in achieving benchmarks and targets. By tracking and reporting on development progress, the government was better able to measure “success” and to demonstrate accountability to Canadians. CIDA identified three “signature projects”. These were large scale projects that clearly showcased Canada’s contribution. CIDA pledged to support three signature projects: the $50 million rehabilitation of Dahla and irrigation system; support for national immunization programs to eradicate polio by 2009; and the construction of 50 schools in Kandahar province.

Education-specific measures of progress included progress on the construction of the schools in CIDA’s signature project, teacher training in Kandahar in subjects such as math
and sciences, literacy training classes, and vocational training. (Canada, 2010d) as shown in Table 6.  

Table 6

**Six Education-Specific Benchmarks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Progress indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Target by 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A total of 50 schools built, expanded or repaired in Kandahar (Canadian Signature Project).</td>
<td>Number of school projects (built, expanded or repaired) in key districts.</td>
<td>19 school projects contracted and one school project completed (June 2008).</td>
<td>50 schools built, expanded or repaired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and provincial institutions able to meet and implement the objectives of the National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Number of teachers trained in Kandahar.</td>
<td>No teachers trained as yet through Canadian programming (June 2008).</td>
<td>3,000 trained teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of people receiving literacy training, vocational education and skills development.</td>
<td>More than 5,000 individuals have received literacy training. Some 735 individuals have received vocational training (2007).</td>
<td>20,000 additional individuals to receive literacy training. 1,070 additional individuals to receive vocational training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For each of these benchmarks, specific quantitative indicators and targets for 2011 were established and monitored in successive quarterly reports. CIDA’s signature education sector project managed by the World Bank amounted to an off-label use of national investments already in the works when post-2008 planning took place (Interview with CIDA staff, August 29, 2011). In establishing these metrics, the Canadian government was able to tally its achievements against targets and to assess whether the mission was successful. By its final report, it claimed that of the 44 targets announced in 2008, 33 targets were fully achieved or surpassed, five targets were partially achieved by the date of the report, and six targets would not be achieved at all (Canada, 2012, p. 1).

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The Parliamentary motion mandated that half of all aid should be allocated to Kandahar province where Canadian Forces were engaged with a “tenacious insurgency” as part of NATO’s counterinsurgency campaign. As a result reconstruction and development projects were focused on six key districts based on the Kandahar Action Plan developed among whole-of-government partners (Zhari, Arghandab, Panjwai, Dand, Maywand, Kandahar City). The Plan’s objectives were to build a more secure Kandahar that is better governed and able to deliver basic services, and to reinforce the Afghan national government so it can effectively manage Afghanistan’s border and sustain gains in stability and reconstruction in the long-term (ATIP A0032805, p. 2). The main objective was to ensure that Kandaharis can “touch, taste and feel “ development by the Afghan government (ATIP A00032805). The logic underpinning plan went as follows; as key districts become more secure and better governed, and as Afghan public sector institutions are able to deliver more services and administer justice, then the population will learn to trust their government more and assume greater responsibility for their own development (Interview with former government official, June 22, 2011).

A new flexible funding channel was established in 2007 – Kandahar Local Initiatives Program – for quick impact, Kandahar-specific projects. Spending totalled almost $20 million through 2011, with the bulk of the spending in 2010-2011 as shown in the chart below. Initially, projects were capped at $100,000 and limited to one-year in duration. But at the end of 2008, guidelines were modified enabling projects in excess of $100,000 and requiring more than one year to complete.68

The Canadian Forces had its own team of civil-military liaison officers whose main responsibility was to identify quick impact projects that they could fund through the Commander’s Contingency Fund. Canadian soldiers identified local priorities in partnership with village residents and whole-of-government partners, to help “foster a relationship of trust between the Afghan people and their government representatives, and to reinforce security within specific areas.” Projects were assessed based on whether they contributed to

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68 Correspondence with CIDA regarding AO33737 KLIP, start date May 18, 2008, end date December 30, 2011.
the desired effects. In order to measure effects, Kandaharis were polled regularly to survey how they felt about their government, the Taliban and whether they felt more (or less) secure than the previous reporting period. The polling was intended to provide an indicator of whether the strategy was having an effect and to make adjustments accordingly.

As more US troops fanned into the southern region after 2009, Canadian Forces shifted its focus from disrupting the insurgency in the six key districts to protecting the population as part of a retooled counterinsurgency strategy in a much smaller area of responsibility that included Kandahar City and surrounding areas including Dand, and the eastern parts of Zhari and Panjwayi Districts. (Canada, 2009cd). Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, Commander of Joint Task Force Kandahar introduced the Key Village Approach in 2009. It involved integrating security, governance, and development activities on the assumption that a large hostile region can be subdued with a relatively small military force by first establishing a small number of safe areas and then pushing outward and extending control until only a few pockets of resistance remain. It superseded the original clear-hold build strategy as the need to build local governance capacity was prioritized. Up until the Key Village Approach the military was playing ‘whack a mole’. It pacified a region then moved on to find that the area that had been cleared had been retaken because Afghan security forces were unable to hold the area and development projects were slow to come on-stream. In general, the civilian personnel at Kandahar did not warm to this new approach. While there might have been consultation with CIDA in Ottawa, representatives in Kandahar were caught off guard and did not know what was coming down the pipeline (Interview with Civil-Military Liaison Officer, August 15, 2011). Nevertheless, they had to accept it as the military was, de facto, the lead agency in Kandahar.

The Canadian Forces piloted and refined the approach with successive operations. The objective was to help Afghans “implement their own solutions” and to deliver “visible and effective results” (Interview with former government official, June 22, 2011). In general,

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69 The CF COIN Manual B-GL-323-004/FP-003 makes several references to education and schools. It suggests that the role of CIMIC officers is to help villagers achieve their objectives rather than to impose their own cultural preferences. The manual also suggests that standing patrols at school may provide the security necessary for parents to send their children to school despite intimidation and threats. However, this potentially puts the CF at odds with normative appeals for parties to a conflict to respect the neutrality of schools (6-2) advocated by the Global Coalition Against Attacks on Education.
it comprised four evolutions – shape, clear, hold and build. First, Canadians consulted with village, district and provincial leaders to select villages where the approach could be adopted. Then Canadian Forces partnered with the Afghan and American security forces to clear the area from insurgents in order to separate the population of villages from the insurgency and secure village boundaries. Once cleared, stabilization teams entered to address immediate needs of the population and assess medium- and long-term needs while military and police forces worked to secure the population and prevent insurgent forces from controlling the area. Once secure, Canadian development and reconstruction teams began to implement projects based on a consultative process with village elders.70 (Canada, 2009cd). This last build phase hinged on two factors: the presence of a sufficient number of civilian stabilization officers to liaise with the community leaders and participate in local meetings and to monitor reconstruction and development projects; and, adequate force protection to ensure the safety of Canada’s civilian personnel given the Canadian government’s sensitivity to civilian casualties.

With the surge of US troops and civilian personnel in the second quarter of 2010, the Canadian military transferred control of part of its area of operations to U.S. forces, reducing the territory under control mainly to Kandahar City and its environs. This enabled the military to focus on extending and consolidating the Afghan government’s presence in more secure areas and to better provide essential services. Canada’s strategy was part of a broader strategy ostensibly to transition to Afghan-led ownership of security and governance.

The transition process was formally launched in March 2011. In practice transition has two effects. First, it changed the nature of Canada’s military contribution from a combat mission to a training mission. About 950 trainers and support personnel based in Kabul with two satellite sites in Herat and Mazar-el-Sharif were deployed in Operation Attention. Their mission was to help build the capabilities of Afghan security forces as part of NATO’s National Training and Mentoring mission in preparation for the withdrawal of foreign troops

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in 2014. Second, CIDA began to shift from a Kandahar-centric to a more nationally focused role as the security transition progressed, and responsibility for stabilization fell to the US military and their civilian counterparts. (Canada, 2011b). CIDA wrapped up its projects in Kandahar, although some were extended beyond 2011 and inter-agency coordination prior to the handover facilitated the transfer of responsibility for some ongoing projects to American aid workers. Development priorities for 2011-2014 aligned with CIDA’s thematic priorities. They focused on four key aims: 1) investing in children and youth through support to health and education sectors; 2) advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including the provision of 950 trainers for the Afghan security forces; 3) promoting regional integration through enhanced bilateral Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation on border issues and the Afghan-Pakistan Border Prosperity Initiative endorsed by the G8; and 4) humanitarian assistance. (ATIP A201200210; ATIP A-2012-00107).

By mid-2011 Afghanistan was virtually in the rear mirror, overtaken by domestic and global economic concerns. The final quarterly report that provided a rudimentary audit of actual versus planned achievements the government could exhale. Fiscal constraints led to budget cuts in government departments. Planned spending for CIDA’s Afghanistan program from 2011 to 2014 totalled $250 million, with $100, $80, and $75 million for each successive year. This drop in aid levels signalled the loss in political interest. Civilian staff in Kandahar were relocated, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force at Geographic Programs Branch was disbanded in 2013.

Conclusion

While the global war on terrorism framed Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, the concept of fragile and failed states provided the rationale for CIDA’s aid program and helped to maintain a degree of separation between military and reconstruction and development efforts. However, the 2008 Manley Report and parliamentary motion that mandated CIDA to coordinate closely with its whole-of-government partners, was a game changer. From this point onward, at least at Kandahar, humanitarian and reconstruction aid...
co-evolved with Canada’s counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency enabled the Canadian government to exercise disciplinary power over the population in Canada’s area of operations by separating populations from insurgents and providing them with basic needs. Separation, in turn, meant that villagers could be subject to a monitoring system that regularly surveyed their access to services and opinions on the Taliban, NATO, and the Afghan government.

Civilian aid workers never warmed to this approach and they pushed for greater attention to institution building at the provincial and district levels. The key village approach to counterinsurgency operations in 2009-2010 that emphasized Afghan-led development attempted to reconcile civilian and military preferences. Rather than exercising disciplinary power, the mission tried to convince Afghans to commit to their government by channelling services through state institutions. But, this never got off the ground in a serious way partly due to the brief window for implementation before transition made it necessary for Canadian Forces and CIDA aid workers to pull up stakes and relocate staff to Kabul or Ottawa, and partly due to weak capacity of government institutions particularly at the provincial and district levels. But there was also something more substantial in play. Stabilization was based on hierarchical relations of power. Those populations that acceded to Canada’s force protection understood that there were both benefits and risks to accepting foreign aid. It was an opportunistic rather than an organic relationship, that could be annulled at any time as loyalties shifted. By the time regional security became a dominant theme in NATO and US policy texts, Canada had its foot half-way out the door and, in the absence of any compelling economic rationale, there would be no turning back.

**Trends in Canada’s Education Aid to Afghanistan**

Trends in education sector aid and project profiles indicate four evolutions from 2001 until 2013. In the first phase from 2000-2005, CIDA showed very little interest in the education sector as political and bureaucratic structures were under construction following the removal of the Taliban regime and presidential and parliamentary elections. In the second phase between 2006-2007, coinciding with the start-up of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, education sector aid levels increase. CIDA-funded projects aim mainly
at expanding girls’ access to primary education through the public and private sectors. In the third phase from 2008-2011, CIDA programming starts to diverge. At Kabul, projects continued to focus expanding educational access at the primary level in addition to providing technical assistance to the education ministry. At Kandahar, projects supported counterinsurgency operations of the Canadian Forces. They prioritized infrastructure building and rehabilitation projects and short-term non-formal education programs that can deliver quick, visible results. In the fourth stage from 2012 to 2013, CIDA expanded its support for community-based education.

**Trends in Education Sector Spending**

Between 2000 and 2012, CIDA disbursed almost $183.5 million in bilateral education aid as shown in Figure 11. Almost 96 percent of this was disbursed from 2007-2012 mainly through the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force. Approximately 20 percent of CIDA’s education aid to Asia was allocated to Afghanistan from 2000 to 2012; between 2007 and 2012, the proportion rises to a maximum of 45 percent in 2012.

*Figure 11. CIDA’s bilateral education aid to Afghanistan.*

Source: Document released under the Access to Information Act.
Education Sector Project Profiles

An analysis of CIDA’s projects indicates four phases over time comprising all four modes of education sector aid, but funding was predominantly allocated to stabilization and protection-based approaches.


From 2003 to 2005, CIDA’s program priorities comprised core budgetary support to the Government of Afghanistan through the World Bank, rural livelihoods and increased access to social services, security sector reform, and sustainable agriculture (CIDA, 2007b, p. 4). Education was not a priority in this time period. Education sector support was limited to three projects focused on delivering humanitarian relief. All were funded through either Partnership with Canadians or the International Humanitarian Branch. These included projects implemented by CARE (Kabul widows humanitarian project), War Child, and Islamic Development and Refugee Foundation.

Mixed statebuilding and protection-based approaches: 2006–2007

After 2006, education sector aid levels begins to rise sharply coinciding with the period after Canada assumed responsibility for Kandahar in August 2005. Between 2006 and 2007, five new projects were initiated, all with funding channelled through Geographic Programs Branch, and the majority aimed at expanding access to girls’ education. The largest of the five commitments was for World Bank-managed Education Quality Improvement Program totalling $64.5 million and co-financed by the Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. While CIDA desired to support institution building at the Ministry of Education, it made a decision early on that it would not provide direct budget support for the Government of Afghanistan over concerns that adequate accountability mechanisms were still not in place. Instead, it channelled aid through the World Bank as a “safe way” to invest in educational expansion (Interview with CIDA officer, April 22, 2010). The Education Quality Improvement Program aimed to increase access to basic education, particularly for girls. The project comprised four main components: school construction and rehabilitation; school improvement grants to communities for the purchase of school supplies and laboratory equipment; in-service training for teachers and principals; and support for policy
development and monitoring and evaluation including technical assistance to develop the National Education Strategic Plan (World Bank, 2004, 2009).

CIDA also supported community-based education – typically one or two-room schools located in areas where public schools are not available. It contributed $15 million to BRAC for the Girls Primary Education Project implemented from 2006 to 2010. BRAC was among the first organizations to approach CIDA for funding at a time when unsolicited proposals were infrequent and few Canadian NGOs had a presence in Afghanistan. BRAC had previous experience in Afghanistan in the health and micro-finance sectors and, in 2004 established a community-based education project in northern Afghanistan with the support of the Swedish International Cooperation Agency (Interview with CIDA officers, date). BRAC offered two programs: three-year accelerated learning programs for out-of-school girls from 10 to 15 years; and Feeder Schools for younger out-of-school children enabling them to catch up and to enter the public school system. Canadian funding facilitated the expansion of the project to 11 provinces (including Kandahar). The planned objectives were to establish schools providing educational services for students, of whom 85 percent were to be girls, and to train teachers with focus on female teachers. CIDA envisioned that the programs would be eventually transferred to the Ministry of Education and in order to facilitate the transfer, BRAC applied the government curriculum in its schools. By the end of the first phase in 2010, schools remained under BRAC’s authority.

CIDA funded three other smaller projects including literacy training through UNICEF, vocational training/micro-business development for women through CARE and World University Services Canada jointly, and a small-scale teacher training project in partnership with Canadian Women for Afghanistan, a Calgary-based NGO.

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72 Since March 2006, Sweden commanded the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, contributing about 365 military personnel. Prior to this, Sweden contributed an intelligence unit to ISAF and a civil-military cooperation unit which ended in spring 2004. See http://www.mil.se/en/Forces-abroad/Afghanistan/.


From 2008 until the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Kandahar in 2011, CIDA’s education sector programming reflected tensions from balancing top-down institution building prescribed by development best practices with bottom-up service delivery through projects with quick, visible results. Since 2006, the Canadian military had been engaged in a counterinsurgency in Kandahar. As the number of insurgent attacks increased during the intervening years attacks, the military chaffed at the slow flow of aid from the central government to the districts where the insurgency was most intense. Some donors began to advocate the devolution of greater authority to the provincial and district line ministries in an effort to circumvent Kabul by creating separate funding channels for local governance with a new Office for Local Governance. CIDA chose not to support these initiatives partly because it lacked the resources, but also because it was more interested in developing the capacity of the education ministry rather than create new institutional structures as a matter of expedience.74 Moreover, district development plans formulated and approved by the District Governor’s office, were not necessarily the answer since, from a governance perspective, the district governor had no jurisdiction in the sphere of education.75 As a result, while CIDA continued to support statebuilding through Kabul-based programming, however, in Kandahar province its programming reflected unambiguously a stabilization approach.

Kabul-based programming

Kabul-based programming focused coordinating donor aid, providing technical assistance, supporting teacher certification and accreditation schemes, and expanding support for community-based education programs. At request of the Minister of Education, CIDA assumed the role of a lead donor nation in 2008. At the time, Ministry officials approached CIDA believing that Canada could play a niche role to help strengthen the sector. The ministry viewed Canada as a competent, reliable partner to assume the lead in the education

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74 For example, the Performance-Based Governors’ Fund funded by USAID, DFID, and Belgium enables provincial governors to access approximately 300,000 USD per year (10.2 million USD for all the 34 provinces of Afghanistan during one year) for six spending categories. The Fund was used for repairing schools, new classroom construction, literacy and sewing programs for women See Performance-Based Governors’ Fund, Independent Directorate for Local Governance website, 15 February 2010 Accessed July 5, 2011 from http://www.pbgf.gov.af/en/home.html.
75 The District Governor is appointed by the President and not elected by the population of the district.
sector and to reign in the influence of more heavy-handed donors. As lead donor, CIDA established the Education Development Board – a forum to facilitate dialogue between donors and the Afghan Ministry of Education as a mechanism to reduce aid fragmentation and duplication, to align donor support with the ministry’s strategic plan, and to moderate a donor-driven agenda. The role of the Board was to act as a consultative and monitoring body in all education programs and activities undertaken by the Ministry and other stakeholders. (Interview with consultant to CIDA, September 16, 2011). In 2010, the Education Development Board expanded into the Human Resources Development Board (HRDB) after the Afghan government decided to form clusters, including the human resource development cluster. The cluster is led by the Ministry of Education and comprises five other ministries including Higher Education, Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Women, and Public Health. With the exception of the Ministry of Public Health, these ministries make up the Human Resources Development Board, diluting attention to basic education. CIDA co-chaired the Teacher Training and Education Management Working Groups, one of five working groups in the Human Resources Development Board (Interview with CIDA development officer, July 2011), reflecting CIDA’s niche interest in teacher professionalization. In 2011, CIDA funded a three-year, $10 million program implemented jointly by World University Services Canada and the University of Prince Edward Island to develop certification and accreditation guidelines for teacher training institutions in an attempt to address the fragmentation of teacher training programs across the country by establishing common standards for the ministry’s 42 teacher training colleges and satellite centers (Interview with NGO staff, July 11, 2012).

CIDA funded other statebuilding projects including technical assistance to explore the feasibility of EFA-FTI, and strengthening accountability and transparency mechanisms at the Ministry to reduce corruption. At the same time, CIDA also continued to support protection-based approaches. It expanded its support for community-based education by funding the Aga Khan’s alternative learning programs through Aga Khan Foundation ($8 million) for
girls and boys in the northeast where there is a sizable Ismaili population.\textsuperscript{76} CIDA also funded training in INEE minimum standards.

\textbf{Kandahar programming: 2008–2011}

From 2008, CIDA’s education sector spending in Kandahar increased, although the proportion of its education sector aid never reached the 50 percent target set by Canada’s Parliament. In 2008, roughly 30 percent of the total education budget spending in Afghanistan was allocated to Kandahar, as compared with 40 percent in 2009. By 2010, the proportion of CIDA’s education sector aid allocated to Kandahar dropped to 10 percent as the mission transitioned to a national development program ahead of the 2011 withdrawal of Canada’s combat forces.\textsuperscript{77}

Kandahar-based projects fell into three main categories: construction and rehabilitation of schools and classrooms, community-based education, and vocational training and life skills building projects. The centrepiece was one of the Canadian government’s signature projects on which it reported quarterly to parliament and the public, namely the construction and rehabilitation of 50 schools in the province. In reality, the project was in the pipeline prior to the parliamentary motion that established Canada’s priorities in Afghanistan. It was simply retooled to fit the government’s reporting requirements to Canadians. CIDA allocated $12 million of its $64.5 million commitment to the Education Quality Improvement Program managed by the World Bank. Since donor geographic preferences are not permitted under the terms and conditions of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund because they risk the introduction of political agendas into what is designed to be a technical and developmental fund, CIDA signed a geographical earmarking agreement with the Ministry of Education to 50 build/rehabilitate schools and classrooms in Kandahar (Correspondence with World Bank August 3, 2011; Interview with CIDA staff,


\textsuperscript{77} Correspondence with CIDA, September 1, 2011. Note, these are estimates as some of CIDA’s national investments will have activities in Kandahar but this information is too difficult to isolate. In these national cases, the investments are not expected to significantly affect the percentages. For example, BRAC has more than 4,000 community-based schools nationally and 96 of them are in Kandahar.
According to CIDA, the schools built and repaired were in response to the needs identified by the Afghan Education Department at the national and provincial levels and conditional on community support for the school, community contributions, and commitments by parents that they would send their children to the school once it was built or repaired. Unless these commitments were in place, as expressed by the Afghan government, CIDA claimed that it would not force a school on the community (Interview with CIDA staff, December 6, 2011).

Progress on the 50 schools was slow and depended in large part on the security situation as well as leadership at the district and local levels. While CIDA was relatively successful in Dand district where the local government opened “many” schools for girls and boys, other more remote districts and Taliban strongholds had less success. One of the factors in Dand’s favour was its proximity to Kandahar City (Interview with Canadian Forces personnel, August 15, 2011).

CIDA contributed funds to several other infrastructure building and quick impact projects. These included the expansion of Kandahar Teacher Training College totalling $3 million, curriculum reform at Kandahar Technical School in partnership with the German Society for International Cooperation and two separate alternative learning programs in remote areas where government schools are either unavailable or inadequate with UNICEF ($6.45 million) and Save the Children, Netherlands ($4 million). While the number of education sector projects funded through Kandahar Local Initiatives Project remains unclear, exemplars include construction of a perimeter wall at Kandahar University to address the issue of squatters and security threats, construction of a women’s lounge at Kandahar University, provision of new equipment for classrooms, literacy classes for Kuchi children;

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78 According to the World Bank, the rules are as follows: "1. The ARTF will not accept preferencing in excess of 50 percent of a donor’s contribution in a solar year. 2. This rule is lifted for all donors once sufficient un-preferreded funds have been paid in to ARTF to cover the ARTF Recurrent Cost window obligation. Once the rule is lifted, donors can make further preferred contributions if they wish. 3. Geographic preferencing is not accepted by the ARTF. 4. Preferences must be for ongoing, on-budget, national priority programs, that have a clear funding gap. See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf"
and computer and vocational training at the Afghanistan-Canadian Community Centre in Kandahar City.\textsuperscript{79}

Programming in Kandahar involved coordination with a range of stakeholders including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian Forces, education line ministries at the district and provincial levels, district governors, and USAID. CIDA personnel located in Kandahar City were subject to mobility restrictions that limited their ability to venture outside of the green zone, a perimeter protected by Canadian Forces. For monitoring education projects outside of Kandahar City, CIDA education officers relied on Afghan staff or Canadian military personnel to be their eyes and ears on the ground. When CIDA personnel ventured outside the wire, they required force protection and this created some tension. The military recognized that the political price on a CIDA representative was extremely high and that for every civilian that is on the convoy there is one less person to provide security should something happen. So there was pushback from force protection for visits outside the wire to monitor projects. At times CIDA members would call upon Canadian Forces members to monitor ongoing projects (Interview with Canadian Forces personnel, September 15, 2011).

Were it not for the seriousness of the issue, one might find this passage comical. It reflects the fact that CIDA was learning on the spot because it had no comparable experience on which to draw upon. It also shows the challenges CIDA faced in simply counting the number of schools built and repaired for the Canadian government’s quarterly reports on the mission in Afghanistan, and suggests that CIDA was likely unaware of the teaching and learning that took place within the walls of these classrooms.

Differences between CIDA and Canadian Forces personnel ran deeper than such awkward exchanges and reflected a lack of consensus on the importance of institution-building for sustainable development and whether schools constituted a humanitarian space. Although some CIDA staff welcomed the military’s bottom-up approach that prioritized the timely delivery of social, many CIDA personnel considered institution building as the key to development. They considered the military’s clear-hold-build strategy was flawed because it

meant that development was being dictated by military priorities. The military would decide where to deploy troops and civilian aid workers were expected to follow. Civilian staff resisted this approach because they felt it was a neither a recipe for local ownership nor sustainability – two cardinal principles of aid effectiveness. The adoption of an Afghan-led, population-centric counterinsurgency campaign aligned the military more closely with many development workers (Interview with former Foreign Affairs officer, June 22, 2011). The centre of gravity was the population so Canada’s whole-of-government partners wanted to demonstrate that the Afghan government was delivering basic services. Like the earlier counterinsurgency strategy, the basic strategy was based on addressing the grievances of the population. The key difference, was the linkage with Afghan government departments, and in the case of education, the Department of Education at the provincial and district levels.

By 2010, as CIDA stabilization officers were co-located with civil-military coordination officers of the Canadian Forces in the district centers. This proximate relationship contributed to greater synergy between the civilian and military stabilization efforts. Although the mobility of the civilians was more restricted than their military counterparts, nevertheless they had a presence in the district and direct access to district leaders with whom they could exercise some influence or call upon to assist in trouble shooting if the need arose. (Interview with Canadian Forces officer, August 24, 2011). The assumption was that planning processes should involve the Afghan government at the provincial and district levels. The goal for CIDA was for Afghan officials and Afghan people take the responsibility for the projects.

In practice, this process was complex and exposed principled differences and divergent interests among Canadian government partners. It was not unusual, for example, that military personnel would inform CIDA partners that a certain community expressed interest in building a new school. CIDA would respond encouragingly and consult with the Provincial Director of Education on the matter. If the Director was familiar with the village, he would indicate whether he believed the village was ready for a school. Otherwise, CIDA expected that he would take it upon himself to visit the village in order to better assess the situation. Sometimes CIDA would go to the community and advise its representatives to speak with the District Education Department. If the community had already gone that route
without success, then CIDA would bring the matter to the attention of the Provincial Director of Education, who would usually delegate an employee to look into the matter. CIDA’s role in this complex back-and-forth was to facilitate communications with the education department so that schools were built in cooperation with the ministry to ensure their sustainability in the long-run (Interview with CIDA staff person, December 6, 2011). This was a time-consuming process and did not lend itself to the military’s timelines and effects-based strategies, which measured results in months rather than years.

CIDA took the position that schools were part of a humanitarian space and expressed concern when Canadian Forces personnel entered schools either to distribute supplies or to make repairs. CIDA instructed the military to avoid entering schools. But, the military did not always comply. The problem for some military personnel was that representatives of the Department of Education were rarely seen in the areas they patrolled, either because a location was too remote and/or too dangerous. Sometimes a Canadian Forces office might take matters into his/her hands and expedite school repairs using Commander Contingency Funds – a pool of funds available for the purpose of implementing civil-military activities in order to build trust with the population (Interview with Canadian Forces Officer, August 26, 2011). 80 The distribution of school supplies donated by Canadians was also a flashpoint for similar reasons. CIDA expressed concern over Canada’s military presence in schools and advised Canadian Forces members to leave school supplies with Department of Education for distribution. The belief was that if the insurgency saw the military enter a school, that community might be subject to intimidation or threats. Canadian Forces officers did not always see eye-to-eye with CIDA on this issue. If an officer was unable to provide a school with protection then he might stay clear of the building. If the school was near an outpost or a village where the Canadian Forces regularly visit and was able to provide protection then a CIMIC officer might be more inclined to enter the building and distribute supplies directly to children. Alternatively, to help foster relations between the Afghan national army, the Canadian Forces might have an army unit visit the school to hand out the supplies to the children (Interview with Canadian Forces officer, September 12, 2011). Ultimately, CIDA believed it resolved this problem by asking the Provincial or Director of Education take the

80 While CIMIC projects require separate nomination forms in order to obtain project approval, below a certain limit, this requirement is waived.
supplies from Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team headquarters to the ministry’s warehouse (Interview with CIDA staff, September 22, 2011).

The surge of American troops and civilian aid workers in southern Afghanistan in 2010 added an extra layer of complications. Although CIDA and USAID shared an understanding of counterinsurgency strategy, and were committed to working together in order to avoid duplication, nevertheless this relationship was not without competition (Interview with former foreign affairs officer, June 22, 2011; Interview with CIDA officer, December 6, 2011). In one instance, for example, a Canadian Forces officer approached CIDA for funding to repair a school near a Canadian base in the district centre that was relatively secure. At first, CIDA declined because it was not on the list of 50 schools. “They didn’t want anything to do with it even though they were banging their head against the wall trying to get schools built or refurbished in insecure areas. Meanwhile, we had one that was fledgling and in a relative secure area,” recalled a Canadian Forces officer who later secured funding from USAID. “[USAID] was far more flexible and far more helpful, and just had a far bigger purse to spend which it came to just about anything,” he said. When CIDA heard that USAID agreed to fund the project, they reversed their position. According to an observer, “When we [Canadian Forces] went to USAID, all the sudden turf politics came in and they [CIDA] decided to get on board” (Interview with Canadian Forces, September 15, 2011).

Closer coordination inevitably involved tensions as organizational cultures came head-to-head. CIDA staff were used to working with three- to five-year timelines, and they were now thrust into a situation where there was political pressure from the senior-most levels of government to demonstrate results and to coordinate with other government departments in Kandahar in order to stabilize parts of the province. It retooled its strategy to adapt to the shorter timelines of a counterinsurgency campaign by prioritizing quick impact projects such as construction and rehabilitation projects and short-term training and literacy classes in order to meet the government’s benchmarks and targets established in quarterly reports to Parliament. Education aid was reduced to counting, whether the number of schools built or rehabilitated, the number of students trained and women graduating from literacy classes.
Protection: 2012–2013

The transition of the mission from a combat to a training mission in 2011 and the transfer of authority for KPRT to the United States dictated adjustments in Canada’s education sector aid programming. CIDA continued to manage legacy projects including UNICEF’s basic education program in Kandahar and the World Bank’s EQUIP, but staff signalled to partners that the agency planned to focus on national-level programs (Interview with NGO representative, April 8, 2013). Education sector projects that were completed were not renewed with one exception; funding for the Afghan-Canadian Community Centre was extended until 2013 under the new project title Kandahar Sustainable Skills Program.

CIDA’s education sector priorities for 2012-2013 comprised: 1) expanding access to education including formal and community-based education, 2) improving education quality through teacher training and standardized teacher certification and accreditation system, 3) strengthening participation through community-based education accountability mechanisms and Ministry reforms that enhance education governance. CIDA signed an agreement committing $20 million for a community-based program with the Basic Education for Afghanistan Consortium (BEACON) in partnership with four international NGOs: CARE Canada, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The goal of the project titled Increasing Access to Quality Basic Education (2012-2015), is to support community-based primary schools in rural areas, accelerated learning programs, and adult literacy classes. It plans to target 25,000 students, among which 60 percent are girls, and 800 teachers, of whom 40 per cent are women.

Discussion: Education aid, power, and a state of exception

Three conclusions can be drawn from the data regarding Canada’s education aid in Afghanistan. First, Canada’s development assistance constituted a form of governmentality – power exercised by the government to maintain the support of the Canadian public by suggesting that education aid could transform Afghan society. Second, education aid was a form of disciplining power aimed at creating docile bodies – an Afghan population that accepted Canadian/NATO protection against a growing insurgency. Third, education aid
created states of exception – areas where aid was denied reducing populations in these exclusion zones to ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 2005).

Canada’s development assistance constituted a form of governmentality that ensured the majority of Canadians approved and supported the government’s mission in Afghanistan. By attributing gains in basic enrolment levels to Canadian investments, the government was able to carefully crafted narrative and communication strategy that selectively disclosed information on Canada’s education sector projects through its website, cross-country speaking tours by Canadian government representatives, and quarterly reports on progress written in an accessible style accompanied with endearing images of children reading and writing. Specifically, the government relied on three technologies of power – the notion of liberating and saving Afghan girls, Canada’s whole-of-government approach, and accountability mechanisms.

The Afghan girl was central to the narrative of this “success story” – a modern day Pygmalian (Shaw, 1914). In emphasizing girls’ education, CIDA helped to remake the mission from a military campaign against an enemy which few Canadians understood into a philanthropic mission characterized by a “liberation and saviour trope” (Fluri, 2009) that promised protection and emancipation for Afghan women and girls.

The Canadian government ensured that its policies (development, governance and defense) were coherent across government departments by adopting a whole-of-government approach and establishing oversight and inter-departmental coordination mechanisms to ensure that CIDA and other government departments would closely adhere to the government’s six priorities. These included a cabinet level committee, a Privy Council Office Task Force, an Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force at CIDA, and the Representative of Canada in Kandahar. The effect of these institutional policies and structures was to subordinate education aid programming to political and military agendas and timelines. Education aid to Kandahar province effectively began and ended with Canada’s role in Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team from 2005 to 2011.

The Canadian government also established education-specific indicators and targets to monitor progress on achieving goals and assure citizens that aid was effective, accountable
and transparent. Education sector performance indicators and targets had two important effects: they provided a mechanism to hold education project managers accountable and therefore, staff could neither contest nor replace these targets with other, more appropriate or sensitive indicators of change; and because indicators were mainly quantitative in nature (i.e., the number of schools built/rehabilitated, the number of teachers trained, the number of students enrolled in schools, and so on) they reduced complex political, economic and socio-cultural processes inherent in delivering educational services to a simple counting exercise that could be communicated to Canadians who would be asking serious questions about how the government was investing taxpayer dollars.

As much as CIDA communicated this selective narrative (girls’ education, coherence, and accountability), it also minimized or remained silent on a number of other dimensions and the tradeoffs inherent in devoting a disproportionate amount of its resources to widening educational access. Educational expansion entailed the recruitment of unqualified and under-qualified teachers with only the benefit of and short-term pre-service and in-service teacher training reminiscent of US programs that produced “90-day wonders” during the Vietnam war in the late 1960s (see Chapter 4). New teacher recruitment and training in Afghanistan raise concerns about educational quality given that research shows teacher quality is important for educational outcomes (Darling-Hammond 1999). While CIDA clearly understood these concerns and supported technical assistance to the ministry to standardize teacher training programs, it remained unclear how top-down processes could effectively change practices far afield from Kabul, many funded independently of the ministry. Moreover, while CIDA funded school construction and rehabilitation, it was unclear whether these structures were used for educational or other purposes. If, as evidence suggests, CIDA encountered challenges in locating and visiting the 50 schools in its signature projects due to security reasons, then it is reasonable to assume that they had little, if any, knowledge about the types of teaching and learning that took place in these schools and the forms of identities (political, religious, militaristic, gendered) they promoted. Nor did CIDA suggest how the Afghan government would be able to sustain and grow enrolment levels in the context of the imminent withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan in late 2014 and declining foreign aid levels since 2010. By concentrating strictly on quantitative educational outputs, CIDA eschewed a serious and sustained attempt at managing issues such as education quality,
sustainability, identity building and, instead, stuck to a very simple message that enabled it to claim a measure of success at the end of the day.

In Kandahar, CIDA’s education aid constituted a form of disciplining power. By restricting aid mainly to Kandahar City and its environs, CIDA’s education aid enclosed the space for educational activities to key districts. The purpose of Canada’s insurgency operations was to separate the population from insurgents, to provide social services to these populations, and to support state-society relations. CIDA worked to ensure that new schools built by the Canadian military would be coordinated with the provincial and district education departments by exercising its leverage with the Afghan Ministry of Education at all levels. CIDA was less successful at institutionalizing communication and procedural mechanisms that facilitate inter-departmental coordination and exchange across levels of the Afghan government. These new schools and community relations established as a result of civil-military coordination activities were intended to create ‘docile’ bodies. Villages were patrolled and secured, and monitored for signs of insurgents by Canadian Forces. But, the Canadian government never problematized exactly who were insurgents and how they differed from the population beyond equating insurgents with the Taleban in order to differentiate friend from foe.

Working in partnership with and under the protection of the Canadian Forces, CIDA’s programming in Kandahar province was focused on six key districts corresponding with the CF’s area of responsibility. Many CIDA education projects were located in Kandahar City and Dand. Villages in other key districts such as Zhari, Panjwai and Maywand, benefited much less from Canada’s aid, and non-key districts hardly benefited, if at all. These areas were ‘states of exception’ (Agamben, 2005), spaces where the population was excluded from Canada’s aid regime and reduced to ‘bare life’.

Canada’s education aid functioned in different ways depending on the audience. Toward Canadians, CIDA’s widening access to education, particularly for girls, framed the mission in ways that Canadians could support. Toward Afghans, education aid was either part of a broader disciplining apparatus aimed at obtaining their support for NATO and weakening the insurgency or, for those excluded from the aid regime, whether by choice or default, signalled that their lives were less worthy and even dispensable.
When the combat mission ended in 2011, CIDA focused mainly on supporting community-based education. There were a number of reasons why community-based schools made sense in Afghanistan. Community-based schools are often located in remote and underserviced areas. They overcome transportation hurdles that may prevent children from attending school. They also provide an alternative channel for donor aid that addresses problems in service delivery associated with a very centralized education administration in a demographically and topographically diverse country such as Afghanistan. But, aside from these reasons, CIDA was both looking ahead and back. It was looking ahead with the view that community-based schools offered a safety net for the Afghan population in the event of further insecurity or regime change. It was also looking back to the post-Soviet period and Taliban years, when community-based education was the main vehicle for donor education aid. The more things changed, the more they stayed the same.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

Canada’s education aid from 2000 to 2013 evolved with peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts characterized by: constructive engagement in order to negotiate a settlement to the civil war; maintaining the peace and facilitating the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord governing relations between north and south Sudan and arrangements for a referendum on southern secession; and protecting civilians in the post-referendum period. Canada’s education aid shifted with evolving political-military conditions. In 2000, CIDA’s education sector aid was minimal as it focused its assistance on traditional humanitarian needs (food, shelter, water and sanitation). Once the peace accord was inked, education aid shifted to a mix of statebuilding and stabilization-lite approaches. Ostensibly, the aim of development assistance in the interim period was to “make unity attractive”, but, for all practical purposes, it was to ensure a modicum of stability necessary implement the referendum in 2011 on partition – the central pillar of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. Then, after creation of an independent South Sudan in July 2011, projects focused mainly on protecting civilians through both remedial and preventative initiatives that identified women and children as vulnerable, and youth as highly risky.

This chapter is organized into four sections. In the first section, I describe the three main security apparatuses coinciding with the pre-peace agreement, post-peace agreement and post-secession periods based on a review of US policy documents and UN Secretary General reports from 2002 until 2013. With each successive phase, I argue that the space for security shrinks from the state, to hotspots, and then to protection of civilian sites. In the second section, I review the record of Canada’s bilateral relations with Sudan to show that education aid was subordinated to Canada’s foreign policy interests and, by extension to US policy in Sudan. In the third section, I describe trends in CIDA’s education aid levels to Sudan and South Sudan. I argue that while CIDA first concentrated on the spaces of security by focusing on potential flashpoints that might undermine stability, it then shifted to the population of security when it refocused programming on youth. Youth were seen as a risky
group that had to be managed, partly through educational and training programs intended to steer them into paid work and away from armed groups and other violent activities.

**International Security Apparatuses**

Three main security apparatuses governed relations between western donor states and (South) Sudan from 2000 until 2013, corresponding with the pre-Comprehensive Peace Agreement, transition, and post-independence periods. In the period leading up to the signing of the peace accord, constructive engagement was the buzzword driving support for the peace process under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development. In the transition period from 2005 until 2011, and in the context of US counter-terrorism policies and attention to failed and fragile states, the focus shifted to “making unity attractive” – code for using all means necessary to implement the referendum on separation on schedule. Then, following the creation of the new, independent state of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011, security centered on the protection of civilians by demarcating sites under the force protection of UN peacekeepers. As a result, international attention and resources focused on the north-south dimension of the Sudan conflict, at the expense of armed conflicts in Darfur and the Eastern region.

**Background to the Conflict**

The civil war in Sudan from 1983 until 2005 is attributed to both historical antecedents that affected Sudanese cultural identities and inter-group relations, and competition over the country’s resources including oil and water (Young, 2012; Johnson, 2004). Therefore, Sudan manifests elements of each of the conflict theories described in Chapter Two: opportunities-based, grievance-based, and scarcity-based approaches. First, oil revenues from fields located mainly in the south provided Sudan with its largest single source of national revenue since the 1990s and continues to be a source of ongoing tension between the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan. But, since the pipelines for transporting the oil and ports are located in the Sudan, the countries have a reason to cooperate with one another. Second, the armed conflict also involves grievances-based causes. Since at least the British colonial administration, power has been vested with the Muslim political elite in the North. The British reinforced this asymmetrical power relations and Christian-Muslim cultural
identities through their colonial education policies. In the north, they supported educational expansion and instruction in Arabic language and Muslim education. In the south, partly as a cost-saving measure, the British gave a free hand to Christian missionary societies of various denominations to provide educational services. These societies used faith-based schools as a means to convert South Sudanese to Christianity through instruction in vernacular languages and English (Sharkey, 2012). The southern region remained under-developed in comparison with the north. The quality of schooling varied in accordance with the resources of each of the service providers and contributed with divergent cultural identities between the Arab-Muslim north and the African-Christian south (Mamdani, 2010). Third, scarcity-based issues, such as drought, affected relations between nomadic groups and settled population along tribal lines.


Complicating the situation further, after 9/11, Sudan became part of the narrative of the global war on terrorism, and an impassioned debate around humanitarian intervention. Just six days before the attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Centre on 9/11, the Bush Administration appointed former Senator John Danforth Special Envoy to Sudan. Danforth’s mandate was to determine whether the parties to the conflict were committed to peace and to recommend whether the US Administration should support negotiations to end the war. In his report, Danforth concluded that the combatants could not win a clear military victory, and that only a negotiated settlement would bring an end the armed conflict. He recommended a “catalytic” approach that would engage countries in the region including Kenya and Egypt, as well as interested countries such as Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and EU members to harmonize existing initiatives. The role of the US and certain EU countries would be to help existing plans gain traction and to ensure monitoring and verification mechanisms were in place in a common effort in peacemaking (Danforth, 2002, p. 2). Danforth argued that the Sudanese government would strongly oppose secession and suggested that southerners should settle for united, democratic government that respected the rights of the people of southern Sudan including freedom of religion. Danforth asserted that any agreement must include a formula for allocating equitably oil revenues between the government and Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the main southern-based opposition group. He recommended that
the State Department should coordinate activities with USAID to demonstrate to the Sudanese that progress in the peace talks will be rewarded in terms of humanitarian relief and development aid.81

The Danforth report shaped America’s policy toward Sudan. From 2002 until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the US government prioritized achieving a comprehensive peace agreement that would end the armed conflict, ensuring the full cooperation of the Sudanese government against terrorism and unrestricted humanitarian access, and protection of human rights including freedom of religion (US State Department, Sudan: US Policy Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, which authorized the US Administration to exercise its influence and facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Sudan, building on the 1994 Declaration of Principles and the Machakos Protocol of July 2002. The law authorized the President to increase assistance to areas beyond the control of the Sudanese government in order to “to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture”, and to provide $100 million annually from 2003 to 2005. The Administration was also authorized to report biannually on developments, including crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law such as slavery, rape, and aerial bombardment of civilian targets. The Administration established Civilian Protection Monitoring Team and Verification Monitoring Team to monitor and report on human rights violations including forcible displacement, rape, slavery, aerial bombardment, and to verify violations of the cease-fire agreement from the parties, respectively. Therefore, the US government’s Sudan policy was mobilized partly by a transnational coalition of Church-based organizations and NGOs around an anti-slavery movement and, later the crisis in Darfur (US Government, 2002).

The US formed the troika alongside Norway and the UK to support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-mediated peace process, which became the fulcrum of international peacemaking efforts. When the Darfur conflict flared in 2004-2005,

81 Both the Sudanese government and supporters of the SPLA rejected Danforth’s recommendations, albeit for different reasons. Sudan asserted that the government is solely responsible for managing the country’s resources. The SPLA rejected the link between revenue sharing and the cessation of hostilities between the government and the SPLA in the absence of comprehensive political settlement. It argued that abandoning its armed struggle would weaken its hand in negotiations with the government.
the EU and US continued to support engagement rather than to invoke the responsibility-to-protect principle (Williams and Bellamy, 2005) and to justify humanitarian intervention based on three assumptions. First, any move against the Sudanese government would jeopardize bilateral coordination on counterterrorism, which had improved since 9/11. Second, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-mediated peace progress was achieving tangible results and military intervention would inevitably roll back progress on security arrangements during an interim period and power and wealth sharing agreements. Third, US and western militaries were engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and opening a third front in Africa against a Muslim population would not only stretch western military capabilities, but also it would reinforce anti-western Islamic fundamentalism. That said, inaction and business as usual was not an option. Much of the controversy regarding humanitarian intervention and the use of force swirled around questions whether the mass killings in Darfur constituted the threshold of genocide and whether the Sudanese government was culpable. In the context of a strong Save Darfur transnational coalition advocating for military intervention and domestic publics who perceived the war as, fundamentally, a Muslim-Christian conflict, western governments could not afford to be seen dragging their feet and providing a permissive environment for genocide to unfold. In order to address the humanitarian crisis in the interim, western donor states supported the expansion of the African Union peacekeeping mission, while leaving the conclusions as to whether the conflict met the to threshold of genocide to the International Criminal Court. Although the US government asserted that Sudanese government and its proxy, the Janjaweed militia, had committed genocide, the Bush Administration backed down from direct military involvement, and opted for to let the Intergovernmental Authority and Development mediated peace process take its course. It continued with economic sanctions against President Bashir, and support a African Union peacekeeping mission to protect civilians in Darfur.


Diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development culminated with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 signed by representatives of the Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement,
member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) and Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK and US). The accord recognized the right of southern Sudanese to self-determination and outlined the framework for security arrangements, power and wealth sharing. Its centrepiece was an agreement for an interim period of six years, ending 2011, when an internationally monitored referendum would be held to vote on whether the south region should secede and become an independent nation. During this interim period, a Government of National Unity would be established as would a Government of South Sudan. International donors would support development and reconstruction activities in ways that would not prejudice the outcome of the referendum but would make remaining within a unified state attractive. The peace agreement left several key issues for future negotiations including agreements on wealth-sharing agreement over natural resources, debt reduction and rescheduling, the status of the Three Areas (Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Abyei), where oil reserves are located, and the demarcation of 1956 boundaries dividing northern and southern regions. These issues were further complicated by the decision of the International Criminal Court in 2008 to accuse Sudanese President Bashir and members of his government for alleged crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur in 2008 and to issue a warrant for his arrest the following year (International Criminal Court, 2008, 2009).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement collapsed complex socio-political processes into a six-year transition period. The scope of the development enterprise was made difficult by the relative neglect of the southern region that went as far back as the period of the British Condominium since the late 19th century. Preparations for the referendum involved conducting a population census, establishing an electoral commission, supporting voter education and monitoring mechanisms to ensure a free and fair vote. It also entailed agreement on criteria for citizenship and voter eligibility. In order to achieve this culminating task the signatories to the agreement had to make progress on a number of key areas. They had to manage cross-border and trans-border population flows of internally displaced persons and refugees and to provide basic services to returnees. They also had to establish the political, constitutional, infrastructural and institutional structures to support the transformation of the Sudanese People Liberation Army from a guerrilla movement to government-in-waiting.
These political and institutional dimensions of state-building hinged on maintaining a modicum of stability. This, in turn, depended on managing and mitigating localized conflicts such as fighting associated with seasonal movement of people and cattle, and tit-for-tat reprisals. Stability also depended on the ability to control the influence of external actors, such as the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which was responsible for threatening civilians, abductions, looting, raiding cattle, and raping women in southern states, and impeding access of humanitarian aid. Most importantly, stability hinged on progress in redeploying and downsizing forces by integrating armed groups into the ranks of either Sudanese Armed forces or the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programs. While some leaders of armed groups were offered government positions in the Government of South Sudan, others were left out. Similarly, while members of armed groups declared their alignment with either Sudanese Armed Forces or Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, many others remained outside the “incorporation” process and constituted a disaffected pool of fighters that could be mobilized to rebel under the right conditions (UN, 2008b, 2008c, 2006a, 2006b).

The goal in the transition period was to “make unity attractive”. UNSC Resolution 1590 (2005) established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to create a supportive environment and to prepare for the referendum. Providing the physical security to facilitate implementation of the peace accord was necessary but not sufficient. The accord raised popular expectations that (negative) peace would deliver a peace dividend. Since UNMIS did not have the mandate to fund and implement humanitarian and development projects beyond quick impact projects, the responsibility for fostering a peace dividend fell upon international donors to support recovery and development activities.

Donor aid increased in the years leading up to the referendum but dropped thereafter. According to the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS database, 2014), disbursements to Sudan from Development Assistance Committee countries was almost $US 800 million in 2004. The amount more than doubled by 2009 at $US 1.9 billion, before falling to $478 million in 2012. Likewise, education sector aid disbursements increased, but the increase was more than fourfold from 2004 to 2009 (from $US 18.5 million to $US 83 million) before dropping to $US 21 million in 2012. Donors channelled some of this aid through pooled
funds managed through third parties. These included two World Bank-managed Multi-Donor Trust Funds (one in the north and one in the south), the Common Humanitarian Fund, the Common Emergency Response Fund, and the Sudan Recovery Fund, and the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (UNSC, 2006a, 2006b, 2008a, 2008c). The majority of this aid was allocated to relief activities, and humanitarian aid continued to outpace recovery and development funds well into the implementation process. For example, in the UN and partner work plan for 2008, 50 percent of commitments funded humanitarian activities, 30 percent supported early recovery, and only 20 percent were earmarked for development activities (UNSC, 2008a).

In the final push toward the referendum, North-South tensions rose and conflicts threatened to escalate and expand and to derail the implementation process. In response, the Obama Administration released its policy statement on Sudan, reaffirming its commitment to facilitate the CPA and outlining a mix of “incentives and pressures” to achieve three main priorities: ending the conflict, human rights abuses and genocide in Darfur, implementing the North-South peace agreement, and ensuring that Sudan is not used by terrorists as a safe haven (2009). Roughly at the same time, UNMIS adopted a protection strategy in 2009. The aim of the strategy was to ensure the physical security of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, to secure access for the delivery of humanitarian and development aid, and to deter and enhance the state’s capacity to protect civilians through conflict prevention and management. In implementing the strategy, UNMIS reinforced its capacity to manage and mitigate conflicts by expanding its pre-emptive patrols, established early warning systems, and training personnel on the protection of civilians. It also increased coordination mechanisms with international aid organizations operating in the field by adopting adopted a joined-up approach that links these early warning systems with the protection activities of UN agencies, and coordinating its Protection Task Forces with humanitarian country team protection clusters (UNSC, 2010b, 2011c).

**Post-Referendum: Protection of Civilians**

Ninety-eight percent of the electorate voted in favour of separation in the 2011 referendum. The National Congress Party, the ruling party in Sudan, accepted the results and the UN recognized the new state, the Republic of South Sudan. However, outstanding issues
on Abyei, elections in South Kordofan, revenue sharing and border demarcation, and non-state armed groups threatened to escalate into a civil war in South Sudan, and inter-state armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. In response to the ongoing violence, the UN established the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) by resolution 1966 (2011). The original mandate for UNMISS involved three fundamental objectives: to support the government in peace consolidation and fostering long-term statebuilding and economic development; to help the government in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and the protection of civilians; and to support security sector reforms and state capacity building by providing security, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors. UNMISS force levels were set at a maximum of 7,000 military personnel, and 900 civilian police personnel, in addition to civilian staff including human rights investigators (UNSC, 2014).

As the security situation deteriorated, the UN revised upward mission force levels in order to enable UNMISS to fulfill its Protection of Civilians mandate. Resolution 2132 (2013) sanctioned up to 12,500 military personnel and 1323 police and Resolution 2155 (2014) shifted the focus from peace consolidation to the protection of civilians: monitoring and investigating human rights, establishing the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance, and supporting the Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

According to the mission’s Protection of Civilians Strategy (UNMISS, 2012), protection of civilians is a cross-cutting dimension and a whole-of-mission responsibility. It entailed the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and gives UNMISS forces the mandate to exercise force and to provide physical protection, and to engage with the GRSS on its protection responsibilities. These threats include aerial bombardments, land mines, forced repatriation, forced recruitment, arbitrary killing, abuse, prolonged detention, and recruitment of child soldiers, conflict-related sexual violence, attacks on schools and the destruction of property. Therefore, the mission’s protection of civilian role extends to tasks other than physical security and includes conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, human rights, security sector reform and rule of law, child protection, mine action, and sexual violence (2012, pp. 5-6). However, given the mission’s
limited resources, UNMISS coordinated with faith-based organizations and other civil society actors, and coordinates with UN country teams and protection clusters.

**Conclusion: Shrinking Spaces of Security**

Three security apparatuses between 2000 and 2013 successively reduced the size of the secure territory in Sudan and South Sudan and narrowed population of security. Between 2000 and 2005, security was understood in terms improving relations with the Sudanese government in order to enhance inter-governmental cooperation on counter-terrorism and to prevent the country from being used as a safe haven for terrorist organizations. Restoring security did not extend beyond the limited goals of preventing the recurrence of civil war and mitigating the armed violence. At the same time, human security of Sudanese civilians, and particularly the population in Darfur loomed largely in understandings of security but clearly not enough to catalyze humanitarian intervention under the principle of the responsibility-to-protect. In order to address the threat posed by terrorist networks, US and EU policy in Sudan prioritized engagement under the umbrella of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development peacemaking process. Using carrots and sticks, western governments supported negotiations shepherded by the troika, and extended humanitarian aid and the prospect of lifting economic sanctions and normalizing relations with the Sudanese government as incentives toward an agreement. Mediation eventually produced an accord and separate agreements on Darfur and Eastern Sudan. These agreements effectively regionalized the war by establishing three enclaves to be dealt as if they were separate but related armed conflicts comprising the western (Darfur), central (North/South) and eastern (Beja) regions. This cantonization, in turn, reinforced communal identities while undermining allegiance to a national identity.

Between 2005 and 2011, the security apparatus shifted to “making unity attractive” – or stabilizing the situation in order to facilitate the implementation of the agreement on the referendum. The size and population of security narrowed even further to potential hotspots, as efforts were focused on expanding access to services to support the return of internally displace persons and refugees. While it was necessary to provide support the three Transitional Areas so as not to disaffect either the government or the Arab-Muslim
population in the northern region, reconstruction and development assistance was focused mainly on delivering humanitarian relief and recovery to the southern states.

In the third, post-independence phase, from 2012 until 2013, the main security apparatus was characterized by the protection of civilians. Relief and agencies began to fan out to Protection of Civilian areas under the force protection of the UN peace support mission as civilians increasingly came under threat from non-state armed groups. The space for security was now the narrowest since 2000—confined to sectors where the physical threats to the population in South Sudan could be managed by the use or threat of use of force. These spaces and populations of security had implications for Canada’s development aid, and education sector aid.

**Canada-Sudan Foreign Relations**

Historically, Canada’s bilateral relations with Sudan have been limited. In the late 1990s, controversy over the role of the Alberta-based Talisman Energy in human rights violations was considered serious enough to attract the prime minister’s attention. Briefly, in 1998 Talisman, the largest independent oil and gas producer in Canada, bought a 25 percent stake of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) from Arakis Energy, another Canadian independent. Its investment comprised oil-producing fields in the areas of South Kordofan and Western Upper Nile or Unity State, a refinery, pipeline to Port Sudan and a maritime oil terminal. Oil output from its concessions in Sudan accounted for 12 percent of the company’s production. A vocal lobby involving the American Anti-Slavery Group, Amnesty International, the Canadian Inter-Church Coalition, and others, launched a very public campaign against Talisman oil mining company claiming that the company’s actions contributed to grave human rights violations (Kobrin, 2004). The goal of the campaign was to pressure the Canadian government to impose sanctions against the Government of Sudan and Talisman, and to convince corporate shareholders to divest in the company based on ethical grounds. Under pressure from the Clinton Administration and growing public attention, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy commissioned an assessment mission and appointed a Special Envoy to Sudan, John Harker, to monitor and report on the situation.
Harker’s mandate was twofold: to undertake an independent investigation of human rights violations, particularly with respect to allegations of slavery and slavery-like practices; and to assess the validity of claims regarding the forcible displacement of communities in areas of oil concessions and the link between oil development and armed violence. In his report, Harker concluded that there was a causal relationship between oil development and the exacerbation of the violent conflict. He criticized Talisman oil mining company for not fully investigating allegations of human rights violations, discriminatory employment practices, and the allowing government forces to use company facilities. However, he stopped short of recommending sanctions against Talisman, and urged the Canadian government to support constructive engagement with the government of Sudan following in the footsteps of the EU’s “political dialogue”. He also recommended that the government monitor Talisman in order to order to ensure that it complies with international humanitarian and human rights law (Harker, 2000, pp. 1, 15-18).

The Harker Report dovetailed with a more energetic Sudan policy in the US as well as some European capitals described in the previous section. Parallel with the EU’s political dialogue and the Bush Administration’s catalytic approach, Canada supported a policy of constructive engagement. The government delegated a Special Envoy to Sudan to represent Canada at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum to monitor the human rights situation, to maintain a dialogue with Canadian civil society actors including NGOs, academics, business interests on the Sudanese peace process and to forward their recommendations to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and CIDA for appropriate action. The Canadian government also increased its diplomatic presence by

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82 Matthews (2005) suggests that the Canadian government’s decision was informed by two factors. It did not wish to set a precedent that would dampen Canadian foreign direct investment abroad. Plus, it had no legal jurisdiction over private companies operating in outside of the territorial boundaries of Canada. Talisman continued to litigate its case in US courts where the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and others filed a lawsuit in November 2001 alleging that the Company conspired with, or aided and abetted, the Government of Sudan to commit violations of international law in connection with the Company’s now disposed of interest in oil operations in Sudan. In 1999, Talisman sold its share of the petroleum consortium to India’s (ONGC) Company after a campaign against the company threatened to prevent it from entering American stock market.

83 IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) included 20 countries, the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union. It consists of two committees: the Somalia and the Sudan Committees. The main purpose of the Sudan Committee was to establish a unified policy around peace negotiations under IGAD’s leadership and to prepare for international assistance in implementing an accord. The Special Envoy position was first held by Senator Lois Wilson (1999-2002) and then Senator Mobina Jaffer until 2006. See the statements of International Cooperation Minister Whelan in the hearings of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International
establishing a mission in Sudan in 2000, as a sub-office of its embassy in Ethiopia, and increased CIDA’s bilateral assistance, which was channelled through faith based organizations such as the Mennonite Central Committee, multilateral and UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme, as well as through non-governmental organizations, such as CARE and World Vision.  

The government adopted a three-track policy in 2002. Track 1 supported the formal peace process through funding to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Talks Secretariat in Nairobi, and supporting the work of the Secretariat and the Troika. Track 2 supported unofficial initiatives in support of this peace process and conflict resolution through CIDA’s Peacebuilding Unit such as project funding to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and to support monitoring and verification systems. Track 3 involved community-based projects complementary to the peace processes in northern and southern Sudan. CIDA’s objectives for its Sudan programming were to reduce human suffering, advance peace negotiations and strengthen reconciliation processes, establish the basis for socio-economic development, and prevent new conflicts in the long term (Sub-Committee on Human Rights and Development, 2002).

New institutional structures were established at CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs to manage the expanding country program Following prime minister’s visit to Sudan in November 2004, an advisory team was formed comprising the Prime Minister's Personal Representative for Africa Ambassador Robert Fowler, Canada's Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan Senator Mobina Jaffer, and Senator Roméo Dallaire. The team was mandated to work with the Sudanese government, the AU and the international community to monitor and support the peace process in Darfur, and to report back to the prime minister. Although some initial thought was given to deploying Canadian troops in a UN peacekeeping mission for Darfur, President Bashir’s opposition to the presence of western forces on Sudanese territory

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84 In 1992, Canada suspended bilateral aid to Sudan due to concerns over alleged human rights violations by the Government of Sudan. As a result, CIDA’s aid program focused on emergency humanitarian assistance channelled through IOs such as UNICEF, the World Food Programme, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and NGOs through its Partnership Branch.
meant that any peacekeeping force had to be under an AU umbrella. As a result, the Canadian government provided only financial and material support for African Union-led peace support operation in Darfur. Then, in September 2004, the Sudan Country Program was established as a separate section within Africa Branch. Staff was responsible initially for managing the large African Union project funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade from July 2005 to April 2007 and to implement projects in Sudan. Since 2007 the Sudan Country Program had its own operational and aid budget.

In 2005, Martin identified Sudan as a fragile country warranting special bilateral programming and a whole-of-government approach. An inter-departmental Sudan Task Force was formed with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade assigned as the lead agency (CIDA 2008b, p. 5). The role of the Task Force was to coordinate Canada’s whole-of-government programming including political, humanitarian, peacekeeping and reconstruction activities in Sudan carried out by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, CIDA, National Defence, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force under the Department of Foreign Affairs. In 2007, Canada joined the Joint Donor Team in Juba, a mechanism for donor coordination on reconstruction and development projects in South Sudan.85

Once the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was finalized, the emphasis shifted from political engagement to supporting the implementation process through a whole-of-Sudan policy. Trends in CIDA’s aid to (South) Sudan are shown in Figure 12. They indicate that CIDA increased its aid to Sudan after 2004 then lowered levels in 2008, coinciding with a sharp increase in aid by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. CIDA aid levels recovered in 2009 and remained relatively stable, fluctuating around $100 million until 2012. In 2009, CIDA named Sudan one of its 20 countries of focus, which was, arguably, a factor that prevented further declines.

By 2010, the Parliamentary Secretary described Canada’s three track policies: Track 1 focused on containing the spread of violence and improving security through the deployment of Canadian Forces personnel with the UN mission in Sudan, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers in training positions, disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programming and community safety and arms control initiatives. Track 2 involved humanitarian assistance for Sudanese within the country as well as refugees in Chad and for post-conflict reconstruction. Track 3 supported long-term “stability and resilience” including access to basic services such as education and health care for children and youth (Obhrai, 2010). Compared with an earlier articulation of Canada’s three track policy, the 2010 iteration downgraded Canada’s role in the control of small arms and light weapons that was consistent with the concept of human security as framed by Department of Foreign Affairs. Instead, it reinforced security sector reforms, including training civilian security forces and support for UN peace support operations. Also noteworthy was Canada’s adoption of “resilience” as a frame of reference for its 2010 policy in Sudan and its implications for

Figure 12. Canada’s Official Development Assistance to Sudan by department.  
Note. 2012 includes Sudan and South Sudan  
education, namely that expanded access to schooling would help build resilience among children and youth.

In the post-independence period (after 2011), Canada moved in ways that signalled its political support Sudan. A corporate review of the agency’s bilateral engagement in 2013 concluded that Sudan was ”not of strategic importance to Canada” and recommended that the government downgrade or terminate the program. In contrast, the report indicated that “there is a high return on development investments” in South Sudan and Canada’s development assistance, “improves the lives of many per dollar spent”. It recommended maintaining the South Sudan development program “to build stability and mitigate the risk of future, more costly interventions” (ATIP A0043241, p. 33). In March 2013, the interdepartmental Sudan Task Force that coordinated Canada’s whole-of-government programming was disbanded and, henceforth, bilateral relations would be the responsibility of officials at Africa program. Canada’s Head of Aid in Khartoum (Sudan) left the country and was not replaced. At the end of 2013, the government relocated Juba-based staff to Nairobi due to the unpredictable security environment. Finally, in 2014, Development Minister Paradis issued an expanded list of Canada’s countries of concentration, which included South Sudan but excluded Sudan (Globe and Mail, October 10, 2013, Globe and Mail, December 27, 2013; Globe and Mail, January 10, 2014).

**Conclusion**

Canada’s bilateral relations with Sudan were aligned closely with US foreign policy in Sudan while, at the same time, remaining sensitive to Canadian public opinion. In 2000-2003, the Canadian government became involved in Sudan in the context of increased public criticism over the role of Talisman Energy in the armed conflict. It balanced an interest in supporting Canadian investments in Sudan, with increasing public criticism over the inaction of the Canadian government in Darfur. The global war on terrorism added a new dimension to Canada’s foreign policy as it aligned its Sudan policy closely with the US policy, appointing a Special Envoy, and supporting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-led negotiations. Even at the height of public concern over the killings in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, the Canadian government followed US policy, which assumed that it was necessary to co-opt the Bashir government as an ally in the fight against
terrorism. In order to sell this alliance of convenience to its public, the Canadian (and US) government needed to ensure progress on peace talks. US and troika members used their leverage including the promise of future aid flows, and the end of sanctions to arrive at an agreement, and to ensure that the referendum would be held on time and be declared free and fair. Security in Sudan was understood in very narrow terms of preventing the return to violence and ensuring the referendum stays on schedule by addressing the basic needs of the population through support for multilateral organizations.

**CIDA’s Education Sector Aid: 2000–2013**

Analysis of trends in CIDA’s education sector aid flows and project lists indicates that CIDA pursued three different approaches from 2000 to 2013. Prior to 2005, CIDA’s support to education sector projects was limited to a $150,000 grant to a small NGO, Canadian Aid to South Sudan, to implement school construction, skills training, conflict resolution and literacy classes. Aid levels increased after the parties to the conflict signed the peace agreement and donors convened their first conference at Oslo to mobilize aid. Between 2005 and 2009, education sector projects reflected a stabilization-lite approach. Like stabilization, they focused on high-risk areas and short-term infrastructure building and teacher training projects in order to rapidly expand educational access. But unlike full-blown stabilization operations, civic-military coordination was not a characteristic feature – hence the ‘lite’ qualifier. After 2010, education sector project beneficiaries and activities shifted to emphasize a protection-based approach that conceived youth as a potential risk factor for the escalation of armed violence that needed to be managed.

**Trends in Aid Flows**

Figure 13 shows CIDA’s bilateral education sector disbursements. Between 2000 and 2012, CIDA disbursed almost $35 million to education sector projects in Sudan and South Sudan, combined. Bilateral education aid to Sudan in 2000 was $0.12 million. Levels increased in 2005 ($2.52 million) and peaked in 2008 at $6.7 million. Thereafter bilateral education aid levels decreased incrementally to reach a nadir in 2012 at $0.71 million. Conversely, bilateral education aid to South Sudan began in 2007 at almost $1 million and increased to a high of $2.89 million in 2012.
Table 7 shows CIDA’s bilateral disbursements in the education sector by sub-sector in Sudan and South Sudan. In Sudan, CIDA funded mainly primary education, education policy and administrative management and facilities and teacher training between 2005 and 2009. After 2010, the proportion of aid to basic life skills and vocational training, and advanced technical and managerial training increased and accounted for an average of 98 percent of total education sector aid between 2011 and 2012. In South Sudan, a similar pattern holds. Between 2007 and 2010, the bulk of education sector aid was allocated to education policy and administrative management and primary education. From 2010 onwards, the greatest proportion of aid went to basic life skills, vocational training and managerial training. These three subsectors combined accounted for an average of 79 percent in the last two reported years.
Table 7

*CIDA Bilateral Disbursements in the Education Sector by Sub-Sector ($C millions)*

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| South Sudan                        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Education policy and administrative management | 0.05   | 0.33   | 0.55   | 0.2    | 0.04   | 0      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Teacher training                   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Primary education                  | 0.94   | 0.21   | 0.04   | 0.12   | 0.09   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Basic life skills for youth and adults | 0.21   | 0.74   | 0.82   | 0.56   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Vocational training                | 0.18   | 1      | 1.12   | 1.73   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Advanced technical and managerial training | 0      | 0.18   | 0.18   | 0.08   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Total                              | 0.99   | 0.33   | 1.2    | 2.37   | 2.88   | 2.89   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
CIDA’s Education Sector Projects

The project profile summarized in Appendix B, Table B-4, shows education sector projects by aid channel, implementing agent, location, budget and main activities. Here again, the data indicates two distinct phases corresponding with stabilization-lite approach between 2005 and 2009 and a protection-based approach from 2010 to 2013.

Stabilization-lite: 2005-2009

Between 2005 and 2009 CIDA supported six education sector projects, in addition to a research study on gender and peacebuilding supported by CIDA’s Multilateral Program Branch. By far, its largest commitment was to the Multi-donor Trust Fund managed by the World Bank, a multi-sector project that include the Basic Education Project (2009-2013) in the north and the Education Rehabilitation Project (2006-2012) in the south. The Basic Education Project involved mainly school construction, teacher training, and the development of a new basic education curriculum framework. It aimed to expand access to basic education in four states (Red Sea, South Kordofan, North Kordofan, Blue Nile), of which two were Transition Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile).86 The Education Rehabilitation Project covered all ten southern states. Its goal was to expand educational access through school construction and alternative learning programs, life skills and basic occupational skill training to primary school students, internally displaced persons, demobilized soldiers, and other non-traditional learners. More than half of the Bank’s total grant was allocated to the construction and rehabilitation of primary schools, with the balance budgeted for 14 County Education Centers, English-language training courses for teachers, fast-track training pre-service teacher training, and pilot pastoralist education for youth and adults, and training alternative education teachers.87 Due to the limited capacity of the Government of South Sudan, the World Bank contracted third parties to implement some of

these activities such as teacher training, classroom construction and textbook production and distribution (Davies 2009, 7)

When the Multi-Donor Trust Fund encountered procurement delays, CIDA allocated aid to the Basic Services Fund (BSF) in 2009 – a pooled fund established by UK Department for International Development in 2005 and managed by the private consulting firm Mott MacDonald. It draws on a network of 11 NGOs to fast track the delivery of educational and other social services, through the construction and rehabilitation of primary schools and classrooms, the provision of schoolbooks, new furniture, school management and teacher training (Morton et al., 2009).

In addition to these projects linked with pooled funds, CIDA supported three other projects managed by UNICEF, Plan Canada and Save the Children. The UNICEF project focused on delivering basic education to the three transition areas of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The Plan project was implemented in Kassala and Central Equatoria. In Kassala state, the site of armed conflict between Beja peoples and the Sudanese government, the project supported a child rights promotion campaign and a children’s parliament, child protection training, teacher training in Arabic language, training for TVET teachers, support for Parent-Teacher Associations, small business skills and leadership training to women, training police in child rights and protection norms and standards, delivering three-month vocational and training a courses for youth. In Central Equatoria (South Sudan), the project rehabilitated and equipped schools, and provided technical and vocational education for youth. Save the Children’s project in Abyei, North Kordofan, West Kordofan and South Kordofan created child friendly spaces with the construction of classrooms, the provision of school supplies and basic training for teachers.


89 Completion Report, Southern Sudan: Fund Management of the Basic Services Fund Phase 2, 2009-2010. September 2010 Department for International Development (DFID) http://www.bsf-southsudan.org/sites/default/files/BSF-2%20COMPLETION%20Final%20Draft.pdf, p. 8 & 43-44). Implementing agencies include World Vision (UK), World Relief, Oxfam/Novib, the Association of Volunteers of International Service (AVSI), CMS (Ireland), Diocese of Rumbek, Hope Agency for Relief and Development (HARD), Assistance Mission for Africa, and United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) and International Relief and Development.
Several features of cross-cut these projects. First, the vast majority these projects were funded through the Geographic Program Branch. Second, although the Canadian government purported to support a whole-of-Sudan strategy, education sector projects focused geographically on potential flashpoints that might trigger renewed or more intense major armed violence. These included the three transition areas of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei as well as regions in southern Sudan with high concentrations of internally displaced persons and repatriated refugees. This funding was designed to manage popular expectations and rising demand for education as displaced southern Sudanese returned to their homes. In most of these projects, the bulk of expenditures was allocated to new school/class construction or rehabilitation and teacher training in order to rapidly expanding access to basic education. Due to Canada’s light footprint on the ground, the limited capacity of the nascent Government of South Sudan and a lack of confidence in the Sudanese government, CIDA channelled the bulk of its education sector support in this period via two pooled funds – the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the Basic Services Fund. In the context of the deployment of the UN peacekeepers, these projects aimed at stabilizing the situation and loosely conform to a stabilization approach or, more appropriately, stabilization-lite.

**Protection-based approach: 2010-2013**

The project profile begins to shift towards a protection-based approach leading up to the 2011 referendum. In 2010, CIDA began to expand its support for vocational training and skills building for older children and youth from 10 to 25 years. Skills building includes a range of life skills such as basic numeracy and literacy education through alternative learning programs in the non-formal sector, and technical and vocational education as evidence in the four projects funded in this period. In the period from 2010 to 2013, CIDA funded four projects varying in budgets and activities but converging around the protection of civilians in South Sudan and the three transition areas in Sudan.

These included two UNICEF projects, Protection of Children Associated with Armed Groups and Other Conflict-Affected Children and Youth Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development, otherwise known as Youth LEAD. The former involved providing children with psychosocial support and training of commanders and officers on child rights and protection, distributing copies of the Child Act of 2010 to lawmakers, judges
and lawyers, and mine risk education. These activities were designed to strengthen child protection norms, to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, and to better equip children “to protect themselves, cope with their vulnerability, and make productive contributions to their society,” as well as to build the capacity of state and non-state actors on issues related to child protection (CIDA Project Browser, July 29, 2014).

The Youth LEAD project from 2011 to 2015 targets youth between 10-24 years and comprises five main components: i) supporting youth-friendly spaces/centers and services; ii) supporting an alternative learning program for out-of-school youth in partnership with the Ministry of Education; iii) a campaign advocating peaceful coexistence; iv) capacity building in policy and advocacy; and institution capacity building of the Ministry of Youth and Sports and civil society organizations (Forcier Consulting, 2012).

CIDA also funded World University Services Canada/Norwegian Refugee Council’s youth education and training project from 2010 to 2013 with a $3.1 million contribution. The project comprises two components. The first, with the British NGO Windle Trust International, supports English-language teacher training for about 400 primary level teachers in Upper Nile and Unity states to strengthen English language instruction. When planning their Sudan activities, World University Services Canada drew on its joint programming in Kenya with Windle Trust where they support refugee children access educational services. Originally, the project was planned for Jonglei and Upper Nile states but due to security considerations in Jonglei, WUSC relocated part of its project to Unity state. The second component, in partnership with Norwegian Refugee Council, involves delivering basic literacy classes for women and employment skills for youth. Here, too, adjustments had to be made after the Sudanese government expelled NRC immediately following the decision of the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir in 2009. Consequently, the project was relocated to Northern Bahr Ghazal from South Kordofan The aim is to deliver vocational training for 70 youth aged 14-25 years in agriculture, carpentry, tailoring bakery science, and masonry. Selection criteria for participants included vulnerability, low literacy and numeracy skills, and a willingness to commit to one year of training, youths heading households, internally displaced persons and returnees. The project recruited local instructors and provides a training of trainers’
workshops. World University Services used an underutilized women’s centre built originally with CIDA assistance in exchange for adult literacy classes for women. Youth received a half-day for literacy and numeracy courses and a half-day of vocational training (Personal Correspondence with WUSC/NRC, August 9, 2012).

UNICEF’s Youth Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD) was implemented several states including South Kordofan, Blue Nile, South Darfur, Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria. The project aimed at helping youth transition to the workplace, strengthen youth networks and the development of youth-centered policies, strategies and services. Programming activities included a baseline survey of youth needs, establishing youth-friendly spaces and services, alternative learning programmes, linking employment with entrepreneurship schemes, life-skills building and civic engagement. The project also included a capacity-building component for state and non-state actors serving youth to implement and advocate for effective, youth-centered policies, programs and services through training on core management, administrative and programming functions (UNICEF 2012).

War Child’s South Sudan Youth Development Project was the only project funded through Partnership with Canadians Branch from 2000 to 2013. It was implemented in partnership with South Sudan Youth Participation Agency – a network of 47 youth organizations in South Sudan – and aimed to strengthen mine-risk education, HIV/AIDS education, psychosocial support programs, community peacebuilding and reconciliation and skills training programs in Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal (Juba).

In addition, CIDA supported a number of other projects focused on vocational training and skills building under its sustainable and economic growth strategy and coded as private sector development rather than education. These included technical training program for youth 15-28 years at Lire Secondary School implemented by Chakam School of the Bible in Central Equatoria from 2009 to 2012, a World Vision project to deliver of basic services in Warrap state, and Canadian Red Cross-led project “Building Community Resilience in Eastern Equatoria that involved literacy and numeracy classes for youth volunteers and skills training in agriculture.
Discussion

The data strongly suggest that CIDA’s education sector programming in Sudan and South Sudan shifted from negligible attention, to stabilization-lite from 2005 to 2009, then to a protection-based approach just prior to secession, with a geographic concentration on states in South Sudan and the three transition areas in both active periods.

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, preventing the recurrence of armed conflict was the dominant security apparatus from 2005 until 2011 under the banner “make unity attractive”. In order to stabilize Sudan, CIDA focused on potential hotspots where armed violence might escalate and roll back negotiations on outstanding issues, and delay implementation of the referendum. Stabilization involved expanding educational access, particularly for internally displaced persons who relocated to southern states. In order to rapidly expand educational access, CIDA relied on pooled funds and a handful of NGOs and international organizations to deliver services, including Save the Children, UNICEF, World University Services, Norwegian Refugee Council, and Plan. The rapid expansion of educational access, including the use of NGOs was associated with poor construction quality (Morton et al., 2009) and, potentially poor teaching quality and fragmentation and quality differences across service providers.

Several reasons might account for CIDA’s shift toward youth and vocational training in 2010-2013. CIDA’s Children and Youth Strategy introduced in 2009 prioritized the safety and security of children and youth by creating opportunities for at-risk youth to find alternatives to violence and crime and become engaged as positive members of their societies (CIDA, 2009b, pp. 6-7). The strategy presents a menu of protection measures and cannot, in isolation of other factors, explain why CIDA chose to focus on vocational training. In the years leading up to the 2011 referendum donors foresaw the potential for increased instability in the post-secession period from two main sources: escalating armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, potentially through proxies; and 2) communal conflict within South Sudan (USAID, 2011). Looking ahead to the post-independence period they understood the probability of a humanitarian crisis was high given the lack of progress on a wealth sharing agreement and border demarcation, and interruptions in the flow of exports that affect Sudanese and South Sudanese government revenue. This crystal ball gazing may have
Another factor may be demographic. While this cannot explain the timing, it can help to understand the nature of the shift toward a youth cohort. Youth (15-24 years) comprise 19.6 percent of the population of Sudan (UNICEF, 2012, p. 9). Given limited employment opportunities, and low literacy rates, CIDA identified youth in Sudan and South Sudan as a vulnerable group. One of its objectives was to provide youth with an alternative vocation and to enable youth “to support themselves and their families in a way that allows them to be separated and protected as much as possible from armed conflict” [emphasis added] (Interview with CIDA staff person, August 2, 2012).

This notion of separation and protection is worth exploring further. Just as the creation of child-friendly spaces helps to separate children from potential threats in the environment, vocational training is assumed to help separate youth from state and non-state armed groups. But, whereas child (or youth)-friendly spaces emphasize the spatial dimension, vocational training interventions emphasize the demographic and occupational dimension. Youth are homogenized into a single category. Differences based on class, gender, religion, ethnicity, and area of residence are effaced based on the youth bulge and instability thesis outlined in Chapter Two (Barakat & Urdal, 2009). Low-education youth become part of an ahistorical group, or lumpen youth, divorced from family, identity, and culture. In assuming that youth would be less inclined to join a rebel group if training and vocational educational opportunities and credit were made available, CIDA reduced the will to rebel to a set of rational calculations and neglected other plausible reasons for individual and collective violence.90

Conclusion

CIDA’s education sector projects in Sudan and South Sudan involved a mixture of stabilization and protection-based approaches. There was never a serious attempt at addressing extant socio-cultural and structural issues that had contributed to the North-South civil war, and ongoing tensions within South Sudan. CIDA’s education sector support aimed at reducing or mitigating armed violence, first in order to implement the referendum on separation on schedule and, after secession, to prevent further escalation of the armed violence. In other words, CIDA’s education sector projects supported negative peace in (South) Sudan.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION:

EDUCATION AID, POWER, AND CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Despite the cascade of security threats and risks since the end of the Cold War, security is a relatively neglected subject in comparative education literature. This study suggests that it is time to bring security back into the conversation after its long hiatus stretching back to the end of the Second World War. This time, however, security may be best conceived as a research project rather than an aspirational goal of education policy in conflict-affected and postconflict states.

In this summative chapter I substantiate my claim that security matters for education reconstruction in conflict-affected and post-conflict states based on evidence from Canada’s education sector aid to Colombia, Afghanistan and (South) Sudan. I argue that a security or risk apparatus subordinated Canada’s education aid priorities to national and international security interests, affecting aid levels, target beneficiaries, and sub-sector focus. In naming a security threat or risk the Canadian government was able to create and transform subjects and spaces. Populations become perceived as at-risk (vulnerable) and risky (dangerous); spaces were either opened up to facilitate the circulation of goods and people, enclosed to monitor and control a population, or excluded altogether to create a state of exception.

I suggest that security and risk apparatuses since 2000 divided the world into two spaces comprising secure and insecure zones. These zones did not necessarily conform to the territorial borders of a state – insecure and secure zones can exist side-by-side within a state as much as they can between states. In secure zones, education sector support was a mechanism for socio-economic mobility and social cohesion, and contributed to positive peace. In insecure zones, education aid was mainly used by the Canadian government as a stabilizing and protective tool to eliminate and mitigate dangers, and to reinforce negative peace (cessation of overt violence). From a historical perspective, the security and risk apparatuses documented in this study, and their effects on Canada’s education aid, signalled a transformation in the way education reconstruction and development aid had been conceived, managed and performed in comparison with both colonial and postwar periods.
I elaborate on this argument over four sections. The first three parts revisit and answer the three sub-questions guiding this research: The first question on the types of education aid policies and practices that CIDA supported in each of the three country case studies leads into a discussion of how Canada’s education aid mainly reinforced negative peace. The second question on the factors that contributed to similarities and differences within and across case studies provides an entry point for a discussion of security apparatuses rationalized and normalized different forms of education sector interventions. The third question regarding trends and patterns in education aid to conflict-affected states more broadly segues into a discussion of three transformations from the colonial period until the present day. In the final section, I turn my attention to issues of methodology and recommendations for policy and academic research.

Question 1: CIDA’s Education Aid Practices in Colombia, Afghanistan and (South) Sudan

Given their vastly different contexts, there is no recurring pattern across the three aid recipient cases studied in terms of either CIDA’s project profiles or sequence of education interventions. Nevertheless, case study evidence suggests that security and risk apparatuses, with few exceptions, were correlated with education aid interventions that aimed at reducing or eliminating a security threat or risk, and at reinforcing negative peace.

Colombia

In Colombia, CIDA began in 2000 with minimal support to the education sector. In the context of peacemaking efforts between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC), and the Canadian government’s human security agenda, CIDA increased its aid budget and began to support a peacebuilding-based activities that recognized the agency of children and youth. These activities included teaching non-violent conflict resolution and communication skills. In contradistinction to the US Administration’s ‘war on drugs’ and an emphasis on drug interdiction and eradication campaigns, CIDA’s new programming framework in 2002-2003 was informed by the Child Protection Unit established to make operational its social protection agenda.
As the Colombian government launched a counterinsurgency campaign to assert its control over national territory to deter and defeat ‘narco-terrorists’ in so-called consolidation zones – zones with active illegal armed groups designated by the security forces as priority areas for stabilization operations involving Colombian military and security apparatus in coordination with social ministries and welfare agencies – CIDA’s education sector projects did not change dramatically, with two exceptions. CIDA maintained its focus on internally displaced persons but expanded its program beneficiaries to incorporate both younger and older children under a child rights and protection framework. CIDA narrowed its geographic focus to the department of Nariño, one the Colombian government’s consolidation zones. The expansion of CIDA’s target beneficiaries reflected Canada’s renewed confidence in the Government of Colombia to fulfil its obligations under international and national human rights laws and norms and to expand access to educational services, including early childhood education. The selection of Nariño is subject to interpretation. It can be seen as a means by which Canada focused its resources in order to deliver improved results, and/or it can be interpreted as indirect support for the Colombian government’s counterinsurgency campaign against the FARC and other illegal armed groups.

Later, in 2009, in the context of Canada’s engagement with Latin America and expanded trade relations with Colombia, CIDA shifted its programming beneficiaries to older (between 18 and 25 years) youth-centred, protection-based approaches through vocational training and entrepreneurship from youth 10-18 years. This shift overlapped with the rollout of the Canadian government’s foreign policy strategy in Latin America that prioritized expanding bilateral trade relations with countries in the hemisphere and strengthening inter-governmental relations with Andean countries and members of the Pacific Alliance. These moves were part of a broader strategy to expand Canadian foreign direct investment in the Asia-Pacific region. This protection-based approach also coincided with the emergence of new, illegal armed groups in Colombia following the incomplete demobilization process of right-wing paramilitary groups in 2003-2006. The rise of new illegal armed groups engaged in criminal and violent acts and linked to gangs and criminal networks is considered the principal security threat to Colombia’s security.
In response, the Colombian government adopted the concept of citizen security to address the problem of societal violence. Citizen security is part of a regional security apparatus that has superseded the ‘war on drugs’ and entails law and order issues including relations between police forces and communities and prevention programs targeting groups such as poorly educated youth with few employment opportunities. Citizen security identifies male youth as a potentially dangerous demographic and, conversely, young women as potential victims of gender-based sexual violence. The turn to citizen security reframed young males from youth at-risk under a human security agenda to risky youth – youth primed to engage in violent crime and abusive behaviour in the absence of job opportunities, vocational training and educational programs. Within this apparatus, young men constituted a population that needed to be managed and controlled through less coercive means. CIDA’s programming shifted partially to reflect these new problematization of security with new funding allocated for vocational training programs aimed at preventing crime and violence.

**Afghanistan**

Prior to 2001, CIDA supported humanitarian and relief efforts in Afghanistan and minimally supported education sector projects. Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 until 2005 its education aid was limited in terms of both levels and partners. CIDA ramped up its education sector programming only after 2005 under the twin banner of the Canada’s contribution to fighting the global war on terrorism and addressing the risk posed by fragile states. CIDA again increased its commitments after 2008 when the Canadian government was politically invested in the combat mission. Programming between 2005 and 2008 focused mainly on statebuilding and protection-based approaches. CIDA’s statebuilding interventions involved indirect and direct support to the Ministry of Education through technical assistance, capacity building, and school infrastructure projects; protection-based approaches comprised mainly support for community-based education for girls at the primary level channelled through NGOs.

After 2008, there was a clear differentiation between CIDA programming based in Kabul and Kandahar provinces. At Kabul, CIDA personnel interfaced regularly with donors and ministry officials as the lead donor agent in the education sector. Programming was focused on capacity building of the Ministry of Education to expand access to public
education, donor aid coordination, improved planning and administration, and teacher certification schemes.

At Kandahar, where the Canadian government assumed responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2005-06, CIDA staff coordinated with Canada’s military, the department of Foreign Affairs, and other government partners in a whole-of-government approach. CIDA programming focused on stabilization-based education sector projects to support counterinsurgency operations in Canada’s area of operations mainly through quick impact projects, mainly school construction and repairs and short-term, non-formal training and teacher education, in addition to community-based education. Unlike villages that accepted Canadian Forces protection, villages beyond Canada’s area of operations were largely excluded from education aid. In these spaces, it is unclear whether children received any education through informal community networks or even the Taliban’s shadow government. In these areas of exclusion, the population was reduced to ‘bare life’ – life in which the to education was denied as part of Canada’s (and NATO’s) strategic objective to degrade the insurgency’s popular support by separating the population from the insurgency.

As Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan became the centrepiece of the Harper government’s foreign policy from 2008-2011, the government was under pressure to maintain public support for the combat mission. This entailed a skilful communication campaign that showcased Canada’s commitment to expanding educational access, and reassurances that CIDA was accountable to taxpayers by reporting regularly on its progress in achieving targets. In order to ensure that government departments do not go rogue but strictly adhere to Canada’s priorities, benchmarks and targets, the Harper government established new institutional mechanisms to enforce greater compliance and inter-departmental coordination.

When Canada’s combat mission neared its end date in 2011, buzz around “transition” – understood mainly as coalition efforts to build the capacity of Afghan national security forces to assume greater control for the country’s security, and to reconcile with “moderate” Taliban in the context of the drawdown of foreign troops – superseded either global war on terrorism or fragility discourses. From this point forward, CIDA’s education sector projects in Afghanistan focused on secure areas of the country such as Kabul and protection-based
interventions, mainly through community-based education targeting primary school-aged children, especially girls. Paradoxically, after more than 10 years in Afghanistan, CIDA (and donor partners) seemed to have come full circle in relying on NGOs for education service delivery.

**Sudan and South Sudan**

In Sudan, CIDA first supported minimalist protection-based approaches with very low aid levels. Then, following the signing of the 2005 peace accords between the Government of Sudan and representative of armed groups in the south of the country CIDA switched to stabilization-lite in order to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as part of its international commitments. Education sector projects from 2005 until 2009 focused mainly on expanding educational access at the primary level in potential hotspots such as the three Transition Areas as well as population centres in the southern region. I characterized these efforts as stabilization-lite because they were aimed at preventing the recurrence of civil war and reducing violence which might prevent or delay the 2011 referendum on separation.

Just prior to the referendum, CIDA adopted a protection-based, preventative approach that emphasized vocational training and entrepreneurship targeting youth to prevent the expansion of armed conflict between Sudan and the new state of South Sudan, and to mitigate the potential for civil war in South Sudan. This coincided with increased attention to the protection of civilians among UN agencies, and deployment of peacekeepers as violence and armed conflict escalated. Agreement on outstanding issues remained problematic and South Sudan seemed to be on the cusp of civil war.

**Question 2: Factors Affecting Similarities and Differences Across Case Studies**

In Chapter 4, I developed a typology of education aid practices: stabilization, protection, peacebuilding and statebuilding. I suggested that stabilization and protection-based practices reinforced negative peace because they aimed at minimizing harm and reducing or preventing the recurrence of armed violence. I also proposed that peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions supported positive peace insofar as they affected structural
and socio-cultural factors that contribute to non-egalitarian relations and the onset of armed conflict.

Based on this typology, three patterns emerged from an analysis of Canada’s education aid practices in Colombia, Afghanistan and (South) Sudan. First, CIDA’s education sector aid focused mainly on stabilization and protection-based approaches, although it supported projects that aimed at peacebuilding and statebuilding in Colombia and Afghanistan, respectively. Second, CIDA focused its aid on specific regions such as Nariño (Colombia), Kandahar (Afghanistan), and Transition Areas (Sudan). Third, CIDA targeted mainly on primary-aged children and youth; secondary-school aged children were consistently the most neglected age group.

Possible factors that might contribute to these results include an aid recipient’s level of socio-economic development, situational factors, education enrolment levels, and Canadian public opinion. Based on trends in education aid flows, the level of economic and social development was not an important factor for Canada’s aid allocations, at least at the outset. In all three countries examined, CIDA’s education aid hovered at very low levels prior to significant events that shaped Canadian and international understandings of security. For Colombia, the government’s engagement in a peacemaking process with the FARC from 1999 to 2002 led the Canadian government to increase its education aid as part of a broader development package in support of negotiations. For Afghanistan, Al Qaeda-led attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001 heightened the perceived threat of transnational terrorism against western citizens and critical infrastructure, but increased aid levels followed after Canada’s decision to assume responsibility for Kandahar. For Sudan, the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord rallied western donors, including Canada, to support the implementation process by expanding educational access at the primary level in order to demonstrate a peace dividend.

Education enrolment levels, similarly, may have contributed to CIDA’s priority sub-sectors. In both Afghanistan and Sudan, which have low education enrolment rates at all levels, Canada focused its efforts on expanding primary school enrolment. In Colombia, where net primary and secondary enrolment rates are high, averaging 84 and 74 percent (2012) respectively (World Bank n.d.), CIDA supported non-formal education, early
childhood education, and training and vocational education. However, enrolment deficits neither explain changes in the levels of CIDA’s aid nor shifts in target beneficiaries (i.e. from children to youth 18-25 years) and sub-sectors.

Canadian public opinion may have also shaped Canada’s education sector commitments. For example, the Canadian public’s concern over the Colombian government’s human rights record and alleged complicity in abuses perpetrated by right-wing paramilitary groups provided a powerful rationale for CIDA to channel its aid through international organizations and Canadian NGOs. Likewise, concern among the Canadian (and international) public over the Sudanese government’s responsibility for mass killings in Darfur made direct government-to-government aid inconceivable. But, while Canadian public opinion may have influenced CIDA’s preference for channeling its aid through NGOs, it does not adequately explain either the choice of subsector or aid levels.

Global education policies are another factor that may have contributed to CIDA’s programming choices including the 2000 Millennium Development Goals and targets associated with achieving universal primary education and reducing the gender enrolment gap, as well as more recent attention to vocational education and training. Global education policies may help to explain shifts in CIDA’s Colombia and Sudan education sector programming after 2011 in support of training and vocational education for youth 18 to 25 years from younger children and youth. But, it does not explain why training and vocational education had risen on the agenda of donors at that time.

I contend that (unlike recipient need, education enrolment levels, Canadian public opinion, and global education policies) understandings of security best explain patterns in CIDA’s education aid flows and education sector interventions across the three countries. As discussed in Chapter Two, security discourses have different referent objects (individuals versus states) (Buzan et al. 1998). In this thesis research, I identified several security discourses: the war on drugs, the war on terrorism and its sub-theme, fragile and crisis-affected states, citizen security, human security, protection of civilians, and “Afghanistan as heart of Asia”. Four of these have the state as their referent object (war on drugs, fragile and crisis affected states, democratic security, and “Afghanistan as heart of Asia”). Three take the
individual as their referent object (human security, citizen security, and the protection of civilians).

I argue that CIDA’s education aid priorities across the three countries were correlated with security apparatuses. As shown in Figure 14, apparatuses with the state as the referent object predisposed CIDA toward stabilization or statebuilding approaches; security apparatuses in which the individual as the referent object predisposed CIDA to protection- or peacebuilding-based approaches. It is important to keep in mind that an apparatus is not a force independent of the actors who utter security statements, create knowledge, establish spatial boundaries, or mandate management reforms. A security apparatus functions in the interest of actors and is located within a network of power relations. But, at some point in the evolution of this apparatus, these actors are backgrounded and understandings and practices assume a taken for granted nature.

Figure 14. Mapping security discourses and education aid interventions.
In each country examined, this process was evident. It was, arguably, most clear in Afghanistan. The Canadian government constructed Afghanistan as a fragile state that Canada could neither ignore nor neglect through a diverse set of statements and institutional arrangements. These included classifying fragile states as priority countries in CIDA’s programming framework, new government structures for inter-departmental coordination, reports to Parliament on CIDA’s progress in achieving development targets such as building 50 schools in Kandahar, the formation of Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar and security statements on counterinsurgency. These elements combined to subordinate Canada’s development aid to its military interests, and to shape education sector projects in Kandahar, and to a lesser degree elsewhere in the country. Once Canada’s combat mission ended – the principal element that had tied together the dimensions of this security apparatus was now missing. The emergent discourse on “heart of Asia” was not salient for Canadian policy makers given Canada’s limited balance of trade with Afghanistan. In the absence of a security apparatus to supersede state fragility discourses and to reinforce statebuilding processes, Canadian education sector aid focused mainly on protection-based interventions.

Sudan was also classified as a fragile state. But, CIDA’s education aid profile there was different from its aid profile in Afghanistan both in absolute aid levels and in the types of projects funded, which suggests that security discourses are contextually contingent. Differentiated education sector programming despite a shared security discourses can be attributed to dissimilar security apparatuses. CIDA incorporated Sudan in its programming framework, but the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade took the lead in inter-departmental coordination. Foreign Affairs was invested in the peace process as a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum, and Canada’s priority was to ensure the referendum on separation takes place on schedule in order to avoid a new civil war. Therefore, Canada’s programming objectives were limited in scope and stabilization-based interventions were expedient in pushing the implementation process forward. Once separation was complete, Canadian policy makers adopted the emergent UN discourse of protection of civilians, with protection-based education sector interventions in tow.
The security apparatuses governing Canada’s intervention in Colombia differed from those pertaining to either Afghanistan or Sudan. At first, the concept of human security, which took the individual as its referent object, provided the overarching framework, in combination with CIDA’s Child Protection Action Plan, and the Department of Foreign Affairs’s commitment to non-violent conflict resolution. Together, these elements leaned CIDA towards a peacebuilding-based approach to its education sector programming. But, as citizen security emerged at the tail end of the decade as a regional security apparatus among Latin American countries (Muggah & Aguirre, 2013), and as the Canadian government launched into bilateral trade negotiations with its counterpart in Colombia, and CIDA named Colombia as a country of focus. These elements in the new apparatus were bound together by neoliberalism, and a shared bilateral interests in expanding trade and investment relations, particularly in the extractive sector. Under this security apparatus, the focus shifted to preventing or mitigating crime and violence in order to secure the conditions necessary for liberalized trade through preventative, protection-based approaches such as providing vocational training for youth.

In sum, the cases studied indicate three main conclusions. First, security apparatuses were productive. They produced the spaces for security, either by opening up or enclosing a space. American postwar education reconstruction in Germany aimed at creating a “family of nations” founded on democratic liberalism. In contrast, foreign intervention can enclose, isolate, and cantonize a space or territory such as a hamlet (Vietnam), key village (Afghanistan), consolidation zone (Colombia), Transition Area (Sudan) and Protection sites (South Sudan). A security apparatus also created state of exception – an area excluded from an aid regime and education reconstruction such as areas beyond the CIDA’s territorial remit in Kandahar province. Security apparatuses also produced contingent populations by identifying groups as either at-risk (vulnerable) or risky (dangerous). Under Canada’s human security agenda, displaced youth were considered an at-risk group, but under Colombia’s citizen security, they became risky. In Afghanistan, women and girls were considered at-risk and vulnerable, while those communities aligned with the Taliban, whether by choice or by force, were risky. In Sudan, children and youth, and particularly internally displaced persons, were considered vulnerable; after secession, youth were framed as dangerous demographic...
“bulge”. Education aid practices thus differed depending on whether a group is constructed as at-risk or dangerous.

Second, CIDA’s education sector aid priorities and practices were linked with a security apparatus. The apparatus delimited the territory, population, and mechanisms of CIDA’s education aid to some degree or another. This linkage is tighter now than earlier in the decade because of a battery of management reforms mandated by the Canadian government ostensibly to ensure greater accountability to Canadian taxpayers and enacted through new aid modalities designed to increase effectiveness, performance, and transparency. In practice, these reforms enabled the executive branch of Canada’s government (the cabinet and Prime Minister’s Office) to exercise control over CIDA’s programming through a range of monitoring and surveillance mechanisms of the day-to-day operations at CIDA’s programming branches. On their own, none of these reforms would raise an eyebrow. They would pass as part of the bureaucratic machinery of a Weberian state. But, I suggest that these reforms function are more than bureaucratic control mechanisms. They are performative in the sense that in performing aid in this way and in the service of Canada’s security interests (including military and economic security), management reforms were both a panoptic structure as well as an expression of governmentality. By virtue of the fact that project and program officers reported regularly on performance against expected outcomes and benchmarks, were grilled on how programs align with whole-of-government priorities, and were subject to various forms of oversight and evaluation, management reforms represented a panoptic structure that limited the scope for innovation, risk-taking and contestation of public policies by civil servants at CIDA. Management reforms at CIDA were also an expression of governmentality framed in terms of strengthening public accountability to Canadian taxpayers. In this vein, the Canadian public may come to view the development-security “nexus” and the education aid-security link both as natural and desirable, thereby co-opting civil society actors and limiting the scope for contestation.

Third, the majority of projects funded by CIDA conform to either stabilization or protection-based approaches, with the exception of projects in Colombia from 2002 to 2008 and brief forays in statebuilding in both Sudan and Afghanistan. In other words, education shelters under an arc of insecurity that extends from situations of armed conflict and violence
to negative peace, as shown in Figure 14 (p. 236). This arc captures the notion that armed conflict spans crime-terror continuum making conflict resolution increasingly problematic (Felbab-Brown, 2013). As transnational terrorist networks and illegal armed groups link with transnational criminal groups, these opportunistic alliances create incentives for perpetuating conflict while, at the same time, they undermine state authority. Illicit activities such as the extraction of natural resources, extortion, and drug trafficking, generate financial resources necessary to fund rebellion and establish shadow governments that compete with the state. All three country case studies straddled this crime-terror continuum and clearly fall under the arc of insecurity. The purpose of CIDA’s education aid was focused mainly on stabilizing the territory and protecting the population in order to reduce and mitigate the risks of ongoing and escalating armed conflict. In other words, with the exception of education peacebuilding projects in Colombia from 2002-2008 and an aborted attempt at statebuilding in Afghanistan, Canada’s sector education aid from 2000 until 2013 supported negative peace.

**Question 3: Historical Patterns in Education Aid and Security**

At the outset of this study in Chapter One, I contrasted the soaring rhetoric of UNESCO’s constitution with the more circumscribed goals of the Inter-Agency Network for Education’s minimum standards, and posed the question how did we arrive at this point. This query is also at the heart of the third sub-question guiding this research. ‘How do recent trends in Canada’s education aid practices in conflict and postconflict states fit into broader patterns and shifts in education reconstruction aid (1944-2013)?’

It is instructive to adopt a historical perspective in order to contextualize the findings reported in this study of Canada’s education aid to conflict-affected states against transformations in the education aid-security relationship documented in the comparative education literature. I propose that western donors have participated in three transformations since the early 20th century corresponding with colonialism (early 20th century until 1945), the post-war period until 2000, and post-2000 until the present.

Under colonialism, education aid was instrumental in developing a technical cadre capable for supporting the colonial administration necessary for the extraction of natural and human resources. It included some populations, while excluding others (i.e. slaves), often
creating or reinforcing divisive, ethnic-based identities. But beyond this, imperial powers deferred to Christian missionary societies as a way of managing the conduct of colonized populations, as well as reducing the costs on the state. These societies aimed at saving souls through schooling that proselytized and expanded the community of believers (Sharkey, 2008). Colonial education sector was as much about the afterlife as it was about life itself. It also revolved around “self” and “other” constructions (Said, 1978), which territorialized the world into “Orient” and the “Occident” and rationalized the conversion of peoples as a path for civilizational progress.

From the postwar period until roughly 2000, the education aid-security relationship revolved around the principle of sovereignty, support for mass public education as part of the state’s responsibility to recognize and protect the right to education as formalized in international human rights laws and conventions. This period was bookended by the reconstruction of postwar Europe and Japan at one end, and liberal peacebuilding at the other end. The state was the fundamental organizing unit for education expansion as it was the “duty bearer” under international law responsible for recognizing and protecting the right to education. At the same time, the state also managed economic growth and modernization processes, which prioritized technical progress and industrialization in order to expand a middle class. In this context, the field education economics developed that promoted education sector aid as an investment necessary for national economic growth (Psacharopoulos, 1973, 1985; Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985; Bennell, 1996; Barro, 1997; Becker, 1991). Refugee populations that were not under protection of a state as a result of war and dispossession, relied on UN and charitable organizations or the goodwill of a host country. In this period, the world was divided into modern and backward, and its variant at the end of the Cold War – democratic versus non-democratic.

In its current iteration, as represented by the findings of this study, the education-aid security relationship (de)territorializes the world into secure and insecure spaces. In secure spaces, characterized by stable, institutionalized governance systems, education supports the knowledge economy and continuous learning (Robertson, 2014; Dale, 2005; Peters, 2005); in insecure areas, characterized by weak institutions, social fragmentation, and inequality, education aid is used to manage at-risk and risky populations, either by separating and
isolating dangerous spaces and populations, or drawing them into the global, liberal trading system. The Canadian government contracts a handful of UN and international NGOs to provide educational services in conflict and post-conflict states. In other words, these organizations have become titans and include World Bank, UNICEF, Save the Children, and Plan, as well as demi-titans such as Norwegian Refugee Council, the Aga Khan and BRAC. These non-state actors exercise power through their resources and their membership in knowledge and policy advocacy networks and coalitions, by setting agendas, creating and disseminating knowledge, developing standards, training professionals, and coordinating aid. The rise of these titans correspond with the emergence of project management ‘science’, which establishes technical procedures ‘necessary’ to ensure accountability. Their prominence also coincides with the emergence of inter-agency networks and global coalitions in which they are central nodes when it comes to global education policies and policies specific to conflict-affected states. As a result, I suggest that the line between governmental and nongovernmental is increasingly blurred and the space for contesting global development discourses on education policies in conflict-affected states is diminishing.

Reflections on the Research Methodology and Recommendations for Future Research

Despite sharing more information online than it has in the past, CIDA’s internal documents remain difficult to obtain for programs involving third parties such as the Privy Council Office or the Department of National Defense. While CIDA provided access to successive programming frameworks for the Colombia program, it was not forthcoming with regards to either Afghanistan and Sudan even through Access to Information requests. While interviews helped mitigate this problem, informants from CIDA were often guarded and revealed very little beyond the public record. Further research on the relationship between education aid and conceptions of security might consider an alternative donor or multilateral organization that is more transparent and supports open access.

The findings and limitations of this research suggests several directions for future research. First, in this study I have documented very little evidence of statebuilding-based
education aid practices. Therefore, it might be instructive to examine potential instances of statebuilding-based approaches to education reconstruction and reforms. For example, case of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its role in education reconstruction and reform in post-war (1995) Bosnia might provide useful insights into the practices and forms of power exercised by OSCE member states in Bosnia’s reconstruction and state (re)building.

Second, further research is also needed to test and validate the conceptual frame presented above in Figure 14, and whether it can predict if a conception of security aligns with specific set of donor education sector practices in conflict and postconflict states. For example, the US Pentagon released a report in October 2014 identifying climate change as an immediate threat to national security, with increased risks from terrorism, infectious disease, global poverty and food shortages. It also suggested that the demand for military intervention in disaster responses will increase as extreme weather creates more global humanitarian crises (Davenport, 2014). The notion that climate change affects developing countries is not new. However, this report signals a shift in the Pentagon’s position on climate change. In previous reports, climate change was represented as a future risk. It is now characterized as an immediate threat (Davenport, 2014). This shift provides an opportunity to validate the conclusions of this study. Since the threat of climate change takes the individual as the referent object of security, according to Figure 14, this security discourse supports protection-based approaches or peacebuilding-based education interventions. Two hypothesis might be tested: donors will allocate more education aid to countries that are more considered at greater risk of the adverse effects of climate change as compared with other states; and, more aid will be allocated to mitigating the risks associated with climate change by supporting disaster risk reduction education, stockpiling educational materials, developing preparedness plans, and establishing a rapid response force for education recovery.

Third, further empirical research is also necessary to test and validate my conclusion that new titans have emerged as powerful players in the field of education and conflict. For example, this might involve a quantitative analysis of the proportion of bilateral donor aid to conflict-affected states that is channelled to large scale NGOs and UN agencies such as Plan
and Save the Children, the World Bank, and UNICEF from 2000-2010 and compare this with the period from 1990-2000, or earlier.

Fourth, this research also points to the importance for empirical studies on the impact of education policy networks on donor aid programs, and whether and through what mechanisms do networks, such as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies and the Network on International Policies and Cooperation in Education and Training, contribute to convergent policies among donors. This research could examine the structure of the network and power relations among the various nodes as the assumptions about education, conflict, violence, the role of the state and private sector actors in its advocacy and programming.

Fifth, policy research is required to examine the short- and long-term impact of community-based education programs in terms of its effectiveness as alternative channel for public sector expansion, governance structures, language and curricula in use, quality of training and learning, relations with state education authorities, physical premises, pedagogy and teacher qualifications, and sustainability.\textsuperscript{91} Very little academic and policy research is available on community-based education in conflict-affected states. While these programs may involve only a small fraction of children enrolled in schools, as in the case of Afghanistan, because many are implemented by international organizations and NGOs, they might be able to exercise greater leverage on education policy and practices than their numbers might suggest. Moreover, because they might apply different curricula, languages and training materials, both the content and quality of education may vary between CBE-programs and the public sector education system, and within community-based programs. This cantonization of education could potentially reinforce regionalism and horizontal inequalities based on differential access and curricular bias, both formal and hidden. More research is needed on these programs within and across country contexts using a conflict-analytic framework in order to understand how these programming choices may contribute to or mitigate the causes of armed conflict.

Sixth, this thesis project also points to country-specific research. In Colombia, more research is needed on how discourses and practices associated with citizen security affect education policy at the national and departmental levels, as well as how they produce differential effects in Latin American countries. The Afghanistan case study points to a gap in the literature in terms of how civil-military coordination may impact education aid decision-making. All western governments supported civil-military coordination in their areas of responsibility in one way or another. Yet, there is very available research on civil-military coordination specific to the education reconstruction. Quantitative and qualitative research are needed to address this gap. Quantitative research could involve compiling data on the value and type of education related projects supported by the military (e.g. through the Commander’s Emergency Fund) as well as more detailed investigation in the education sector dimension of quick impact projects. Qualitative research could include interviews with representatives from donor aid agencies such as USAID, military commanders and civil-military officers as well as civilian personnel embedded with joint units. These results could be used to inform practice through updating counterinsurgency manuals or to critique practices and provide alternative ways of understanding the role of education.

This research finds that a more holistic approach to education reconstruction and development in conflict and postconflict states is past due. The evidence shows that security risks and threats affect donor aid by prioritizing specific forms of interventions while neglecting others. It also shows that these effects are transitory, leading to shifts in aid practices averaging three times in the 13 year period under review for each of the countries examined. Combined, a donor’s narrow focus and repeated shifts in focus will be unlikely to contribute to long-term systemic improvements in a country’s education system, and may even be detrimental. Therefore, I propose that donors consider a more holistic approach that is not characterized by unsustainable knee-jerk reactions to emerging conceptions of security threats and risks. This approach does not necessarily have to entail an increase in absolute aid levels to a country. It might involve a change in the distribution of aid flows over time in order to ensure more even funding levels over an extended period of time and to avoid fluctuations in aid levels that were observed in Afghanistan and Sudan. Longer-term planning and more evenly calibrated aid flows would also better align with the institutional
capacities of education systems. A more holistic approach might also involve a functional division of labour among donors.

This results of this research also caution against acting on incentives to securitize education aid programming as a means of increasing donor aid for reconstruction and development. Instead, it supports a gradualist approach to social transformation based on a clear understanding of the historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural factors that contribute to armed conflict.

**Concluding Remarks**

This study contributes to the emergent scholarship in the sub-field education and conflict by introducing conceptions of security into the conversation. It provides empirical evidence of a relationship between donor education aid and understandings of security, and maps out dimensions of this relationship. This research also provides a preliminary step in contesting taken for granted practices in education reconstruction and development in conflict-affected states that are framed in terms of building resilience, stabilizing fragile states, or other buzzwords central to a security apparatus (Cornwall and Eade, 2010). The conclusions I draw from this study are threefold. Academics and practitioners should pull back the curtain to see whether a dominant conception of security is driving a particular understanding among donors of what constitute the ‘best’ forms of education sector interventions. Educationalists should exercise prudence when it comes to securitizing education aid in order to mobilize donor funding to a particular country or population. While the aid may be forthcoming, it comes rarely, if ever, without strings attached. Finally, since the field of international relations studies no longer has a monopoly over speaking about security, it is time for education policy scholars and activists to start reimagining security in ways that promote alternative forms of education aid practices, by drawing on the rich and diverse literature from comparative education and peace education research that captures the complexity of inter-personal, inter-group and state-society relations central to reconstruction, reconciliation, and nation (re)building.
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CIDA. (2009c). *CIDA’s aid effectiveness action plan (2009-2012).* Gatineau, Quebec: CIDA.

CIDA. (2009e). Colombia program country development programming framework (CDPF) 2010-2015: Final version for President’s approval. Gatineau, Quebec: CIDA.


## Appendix A

### Documents Related to Data Collection

Table A-1: List of Interview Participants by Case Study and Organizational Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government</td>
<td>Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. NGO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CIDA</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CIDA</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CIDA</td>
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</tr>
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<td>7. CIDA</td>
<td>CIDA, Afghanistan</td>
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<td>8. DFAIT</td>
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<td>9. CIDA</td>
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<td>10. DFAIT</td>
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<td>11. UN</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>12. NGO</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. CANADEM</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. SAT-A</td>
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<td>June 27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. CIDA</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. NGO</td>
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<td>August 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>18. CIDA</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>July 28</td>
<td>Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Transcript</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>23. Academic</td>
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<td>Aug 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>28. NGO</td>
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<td>August 17, 2011</td>
<td>Transcript</td>
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<td>August 17, 2011</td>
<td>No transcript</td>
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<td>Transcript</td>
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<td>31. CIMIC</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Aug 24 at 10 am</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Aug 15</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>41. CIDA/SPPB</td>
<td>Policy</td>
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<td>120412_002</td>
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*Two interviews
Note: #26 & 27 conducted jointly
Table A-2: Criteria for Case Selection

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Countries affected by armed conflict 2000-2010</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Most recent consecutive years</th>
<th>CIDA maintains a significant development assistance program</th>
<th>Total CIDA aid disbursements 2009-10 ($ millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2005-10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2002-2004</td>
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<tr>
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<td>War (2)</td>
<td>1996-2006</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>21.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>143.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1993-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2007-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2007-10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2000-03</td>
<td></td>
<td>87.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries affected by armed conflict 2000-2010</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>Most recent consecutive years</td>
<td>CIDA maintains a significant development assistance program2</td>
<td>Total CIDA aid disbursements 2009-10 ($ millions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2005-09</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/South Sudan</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1983-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>98.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2003-10</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1984-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>1979-2010</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>24.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>War (2)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>No</td>
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2As identified by CIDA on www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
2 Figures are 2010-2011.
Table A-3: List of Documents Used for Analysis of Security Apparatuses by Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Title of document</th>
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<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>Title of document</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Declaration 392 on Supporting Transition in Afghanistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 395 on Afghanistan: Ensuring a Successful Transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Istanbul Statement on Friendship and Cooperation in the “Heart of Asia”, 26 October 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Reports of UN Secretary-General on Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>Title of document</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary-General’s reports of 28 September 2004 (S/2004/763) and 2 November 2004 (S/2004/881),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, (S/2012/820) of 8 November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (S/2013/140) of 8 March 2013</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table A-4: List of Access to Information Requests

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>File number</th>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Date request sent</th>
<th>Date request/response received</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A-2011-00135</td>
<td>Sudan CDPF, Afghanistan CDPF, List of education sector projects in Afghanistan 1995-2011 (Date implementing partner, value, branch, geographic area and brief description)</td>
<td>11 July 2011</td>
<td>22 December 2011</td>
<td>Afghanistan-related documents mainly print outs from CIDA website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A-2011-01260</td>
<td>All reports of Senator Lois Wilson submitted in her capacity as Special Envoy to Sudan 1999-2002 All records of Senator Mobina Jaffer submitted in her capacity as Special Envoy to Sudan 2002-2006. The latter was rescoped for the year 2002 only</td>
<td>24 October 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 pages received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File number</td>
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<td>Date request/response received</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. A-2013-00158</td>
<td>All Colombia country development programming frameworks from 2005-2012. Colombia’s country program’s logic model and performance measurement frameworks</td>
<td>18 June 2013</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. A-2013-02602</td>
<td>Statistics from 2000-2013 (or latest available) on: i) total education sector aid (annual); ii) total education sector aid by country (annual); iii) total education sector and disaggregated by sub-sector (annual); iv) education sector aid disaggregated by sub-sector for Afghanistan, Sudan and Colombia; v) education sector aid disaggregated by region (annual)</td>
<td>14 January 2014</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. A-2013-00082</td>
<td>Actual spending of Strategic Policy and Performance Branch by directorate from 2000 to 2011. For the yrs when Policy and Performance Review Branch (under Corporate Services) were separate, please provide the spending data for each.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>29 May 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. A-2013-03226</td>
<td>All planning documents, correspondence related to the Skills for Employment Program</td>
<td>31 March 2013</td>
<td>3 September 2014</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>File number</td>
<td>Request</td>
<td>Date request sent</td>
<td>Date request/response received</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Colombia implemented in partnership with ACCC (Association of Canadian Community Colleges) from April 1 2009 to September 30, 2009. Please exclude draft documents and possible cabinet confidence</td>
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## Appendix B

CIDA’s Public Management Reforms and Education Sector Project Data by Country

### Table B-1: Public Management Reforms at CIDA

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Key Results Commitments</td>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>MDGs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Agency Results</td>
<td>• Economic well-being</td>
<td>• Economic well-being</td>
<td>• Economic well-being</td>
<td>• Economic well-being</td>
<td>• Economic well-being</td>
<td>• Economic well-being</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Social development</td>
<td>• Social development</td>
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<td>• Social development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Environmental sustainability and regeneration</td>
<td>• Environmental sustainability and regeneration</td>
<td>• Environmental sustainability and regeneration</td>
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<td>• Environmental sustainability and regeneration</td>
<td>• Environmental sustainability and regeneration</td>
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<td>• Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic outcome</td>
<td>Sustainable development to reduce poverty in the poorest countries, measured through progress on the development goals of economic well-being, social development, environmental sustainability, and governance</td>
<td>Increased achievement of development goals consistent with Canadian foreign policy objectives. Sustained and informed action by Canadians in international development.</td>
<td>Reduction in poverty for those living in countries where the Canadian International Development Agency engages in international development.</td>
<td>Reduction in poverty for those living in countries in which CIDA engages in international development.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities</td>
<td>• Basic human needs improved access for the poor to health, education, shelter, food and nutrition, sanitation and pure-water-supply services improved in-country institutional capacity for human sustainable development improved ability of vulnerable groups to increase their productive activities to meet their basic needs</td>
<td>• Strengthen investments in agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>• Support private sector development</td>
<td>• Build capacity to negotiate strong trade partnerships and agreements</td>
<td>• Foster an enabling environment for economic growth</td>
<td>• Strengthen its programming in basic education, increasing Aid Effectiveness Gender equality and Environmental Sustainability Programming in Support of CIDA’s Priorities (health, basic education, governance, private sector development, tsunami relief and construction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasing Aid Effectiveness Gender equality and Environmental Sustainability Programming in Support of CIDA’s Priorities (health, basic education, governance, private sector development, tsunami relief and construction)</td>
<td>• Increasing Aid Effectiveness Gender equality and Environmental Sustainability Programming in Support of CIDA’s Priorities (health, basic education, governance, private sector development, tsunami relief and construction)</td>
<td>• Increasing Aid Effectiveness Gender equality and Environmental Sustainability Programming in Support of CIDA’s Priorities (health, basic education, governance, private sector development, tsunami relief and construction)</td>
<td>• Increasing Aid Effectiveness Gender equality and Environmental Sustainability Programming in Support of CIDA’s Priorities (health, basic education, governance, private sector development, tsunami relief and construction)</td>
<td>• Increasing Aid Effectiveness Gender equality and Environmental Sustainability Programming in Support of CIDA’s Priorities (health, basic education, governance, private sector development, tsunami relief and construction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Effectiveness of Canada’s aid program</td>
<td>2) Development and reconstruction of Afghanistan</td>
<td>3) Implementing the Americas strategy</td>
<td>4) Meeting the Africa commitment to Africa</td>
<td>5) Canada’s focus on democracy support in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>human needs timely, effective and appropriate emergency assistance improved in-country capacities to mitigate disaster impacts • Gender equality • Infrastructure services • Human rights, democracy, good governance • Private sector development • Environment • Countries in transition</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS, health and child protection - Promote gender equality with partners in all development programming - Build partners' capacities to address global, regional and national environmental issues such as natural-resource management, desertification, biodiversity and climate change - Support and promote environmental and broader socio-economic policy dialogue and programming that directly address environmental issues - Increase integration of human rights principles in development programming - Continue to strengthen democratic institutions - Increase attention to conflict prevention,</td>
<td>technical and vocational education and training 7) Renewing private sector development</td>
<td>Haiti, and other fragile states 4) Support the government’s commitment to the Americas 5) Implement CIDA’s Public Service Renewal action plan</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-conflict reconciliation, peacebuilding and security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program activities</td>
<td>•Geographic Programs •Countries in Transition •Multilateral Programs •Canadian Partnership •Policy •Communication •Corporate Services</td>
<td>•Geographic Program •Canadian Partnership •Multilateral Programs •Policy Coherence •Engaging Canadians •Corporate Services</td>
<td>•Countries of Concentration •Fragile States and Countries in Crisis •Selected Countries and Regions •Multilateral International and Canadian Institutions •Engaging Canadian Citizens •Internal Services</td>
<td>•Fragile countries and crisis-affected communities •Low-income countries •Middle-income countries •Global engagement and strategic policy •Canadian engagement •Internal services</td>
<td>•Fragile states and crisis-affected communities •Low-income countries •Middle-income countries •Global engagement strategic policy •Canadian engagement for development Internal Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B-2: List of CIDA Bilateral Education Sector Projects in Colombia: 2003-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Project number</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>CIDA Contribution (Cdn)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Geographic focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>A-031260-001</td>
<td>Education and peace-building for children affected by conflict</td>
<td>Save the Children Canada</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>Protect the right to education by: improving access to formal education for children affected by armed conflict; providing non-formal education; promoting rights awareness, self expression, non-violent conflict resolution skills and student participation in school management.</td>
<td>Soacha, Meta, and Comuna16 of Medellin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>A-032339-001 A-032339-002</td>
<td>Prevention and assistance to minors, victims of armed conflict in Colombia</td>
<td>UNICEF &amp; International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Prevent the recruitment of minors through the promotion and protection of children’s rights, elimination of child labour, protection of victims of enslavement.</td>
<td>3 departments (Antioquia, Cauca and Magdalena Medio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>A-032839-001</td>
<td>Prevention of the recruitment of youth in armed groups. child soldiers</td>
<td>UNICEF Canada</td>
<td>1.15 million</td>
<td>Prevent the recruitment of indigenous and rural minors.</td>
<td>Cauca and western Antioquia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Project number</td>
<td>Project name</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>CIDA Contribution (SCdn)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Geographic focus</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>A-032841-001</td>
<td>Prevention and assistance to minors, victims of armed conflict in Colombia</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>Support the social reintegration of ex-combatants who graduated from the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF) child ex-combatant program in and prevent the recruitment of urban youth.</td>
<td>Cauca and Antioquia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth as peacebuilders</td>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>73,030</td>
<td>Reduce risk of recruitment by providing youth with citizenship and peace workshops and prevent recruitment in urban areas.</td>
<td>Antioquia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>A032670-001</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution for Adolescents in Colombia (Phase II)</td>
<td>Plan Canada</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
<td>Prevent child recruitment through basic life skills training for youth and adults; support conflict resolution activities within schools; build the capacity of youth organizations and networks to contribute toward peaceful coexistence; integrate conflict resolution materials into curricula.</td>
<td>6 regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Project number</td>
<td>Project name</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>CIDA Contribution ($Cdn)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Geographic focus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Addendum to CIDA’s support for SCF’s Rewrite the Future Program</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor rights violations in displaced communities around Bogota and Medellin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>A033951-001</td>
<td>Right to Education and Participation of Children and Youth in Nariño</td>
<td>Consortium Save the Children &amp; Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>9.7 million</td>
<td>Expansion of access to alternative education for conflict-affected and vulnerable children and youth, and adults; and teacher training.</td>
<td>Nariño Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>A034106-001</td>
<td>Achieving the Rights of Children and Adolescents</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>17 million</td>
<td>Provide technical and financial support to implement the government’s early childhood strategy “From Zero to Always”; strengthen the monitoring and reporting mechanism related to situations of children in armed conflict (UNSC Resolution 1612); train youth and adults in basic life skills; demobilize child soldiers; and promote the implementation of the Child and Adolescent Code at the national level.</td>
<td>11 departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>S064722-001</td>
<td>Youth Action to Prevent Sexual Violence</td>
<td>Children/Youth as Peacebuilders</td>
<td>200,284</td>
<td>Train youth 14-25 in basic life skills; build the capacity of youth to develop youth-led education programs to raise awareness and prevent sexual violence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Project number</td>
<td>Project name</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>CIDA Contribution ($Cdn)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Geographic focus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>A034843-001</td>
<td>Sustainable Development for Youth in Rural Nariño</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>Provide parenting skills to parents, training for teachers on reporting human rights abuses; provide youth with gender equality; offer youth vocational training and access to credit to help them access markets, and support income-generating projects to prevent recruitment into armed groups and gangs.</td>
<td>9 municipalities in Nariño</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>A034477-001</td>
<td>Protecting the Rights of Conflict-Affected and Vulnerable Children and Youth</td>
<td>Plan Canada</td>
<td>13.5 million</td>
<td>Capacity building of government and NGO actors to promote and protect the rights of children and youth through training on issues including: maternal and reproductive health, civil registration, early childhood education, and primary education; the participation of youth in decision making, and awareness and prevention of child abuse and exploitation. In Cartagena, the project focuses on capacity building of governmental and non-governmental actors to prevent commercial sexual exploitation.</td>
<td>Tumaco and Cartagena regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2017</td>
<td>A034525-002</td>
<td>Education for Employment-Economic and Social Development in Colombia*</td>
<td>Association of Canadian Community Colleges</td>
<td>4,674,135</td>
<td>Reform and modernize the model and delivery of technical and vocational education and training model.</td>
<td>Nariño, Meta and Montes de Maria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>S-065495-001</td>
<td>Sustainable Entrepreneurship Development**</td>
<td>Service d’aide aux jeunes entreprises du Montreal Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide coaching on counselling, mentoring, training, and monitoring entrepreneurs.</td>
<td>Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Project number</td>
<td>Project name</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>CIDA Contribution (Cdn)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Geographic focus</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013-2016</td>
<td>A035501-001</td>
<td>Sustainable Solutions for Displaced Persons*</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>Support the integration of displaced persons through increased opportunities for vocational training (25 percent of total cost) and the provision of social services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2018</td>
<td>A035469-001</td>
<td>Protecting Children's Education in South-West Colombia</td>
<td>Save the Children and Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
<td>Supports the reintegration of out-of-school children and youth using a flexible education model, and the development of education improvement plans for schools in 21 municipalities.</td>
<td>Cauca and Nariño</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIDA Project Browser, Country Program Assessment of CIDA’s Thematic Focus on Children and Adolescents in Colombia.

Note: This table does not include local funds such as the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, the Fund for Governance and Human Security, or the Fund for Governance and Children’s Rights managed by the Embassy of Canada in Bogota, nor does it include grants to Canadian organizations for internships.

*Coded by CIDA as private sector development

**Coded as private sector development (60 percent) and multi-sector education/training (40 percent)
**Table B-3: List of CIDA Bilateral Education Sector Projects in Afghanistan: 2000-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Funding Branch</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Geographic location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>M011176001</td>
<td>Basic education of out-of-school girls, COPE Phase IV</td>
<td>PWCB</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>Provide technical assistance to government for policy development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>S062274001</td>
<td>Afghan Women Community Support Services</td>
<td>PWCB</td>
<td>War Child Canada</td>
<td>2,703,238</td>
<td>Provide women with literacy training, health education, parenting skills, conflict resolution. Offer child care services, psychosocial support, food and other basic needs, and access to financial services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>S062327001</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>PWCB</td>
<td>International Development and Refugee Foundation</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>142,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2012</td>
<td>A033096001</td>
<td>Girls' Primary Education</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>19,500,000</td>
<td>Promote gender equality by providing community-based schools for girls and training for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Implementing Agency</td>
<td>Additional Agencies</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2007</td>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,393,657</td>
<td>Provide 10-month adult literacy training to 4600 individuals, of which 80 percent are women, and construction of Dept of Literacy Office (MOE).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>Education Quality Improvement Program</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>World Bank (ARTF)</td>
<td>64,500,000</td>
<td>Build/repair physical education infrastructure; train teachers; establish EMIS capacity at the MOE; support school management committees and school improvement plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>CARE &amp;</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>Support skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Program Description</td>
<td>Organization(s)</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>Girls' Education Support Program</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>Badakhshan, Bamiyan, and Baghlan</td>
<td>8,300,000</td>
<td>Establish early childhood development centres; rehabilitate schools; provide accelerated learning programs, teacher training and management and leadership training; support parent-teacher associations and community education committees; provide women's literacy classes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>Quality primary education in south,</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>Kandahar City and surrounding</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>Improve access to basic education,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>Networked villages</td>
<td>Out-of-town out-of-school children.</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE)</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Education Envoys Project</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>MOE/Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan (WADAN)</td>
<td>Kandahar, Khost and Logar</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>Enlist the support of 8 tribal elders and religious leaders to promote schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Kandahar Teacher Training College rehabilitation</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>Afghan companies identified through competitive process</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>Fund building expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Capacity Building Initiative for Rolling-out the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Balkh, Khost, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar and Day Kundi</td>
<td>671,000</td>
<td>Support workshops for officials at the education ministry and the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), and humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Project/Activity</td>
<td>Implementor</td>
<td>Funding Agency</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td>Accountability and Transparency Project*</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Kabul/Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

workers in the INEE Minimum Standards. Provide training of trainers workshops on the INEE minimum standards for education in emergencies.

Strengthen the institutional mechanisms to ensure greater transparency and accountability at the MOE. CIDA’s contribution supports Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCAs), technical assistance, complaints and investigation capacity-building, and an Integrity Promotion Office within the Ministry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Implementing Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td><strong>Afghanistan Challenge: Build a school project/Canadian Rotary Collaboration for International Development</strong></td>
<td>APTF Rotary</td>
<td>Jalabad City, Nangarhar</td>
<td>518,000</td>
<td>Construct 20 one room schools to accommodate up to 4,000 students between Grades 1-12, of whom two thirds will be female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td><strong>Skills for Employment Kandahar Technical School</strong></td>
<td>German Society for International Cooperation (GTZ)</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>Update MOE’s curriculum for vocational education and technical training to help youth develop market-relevant job skills to increase employment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td><strong>Education for All – Fast Track Initiative</strong></td>
<td>Government of Denmark</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>Support research consultancy to assess whether the Ministry of Education is prepared to engage with the EFA-FTI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td><strong>Basic Education and Gender Equality Training of Teachers</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
<td>Train 2800 primary and secondary teachers in psycho-social support and language enrichment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Program Description</td>
<td>Implementor</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>A035266001</td>
<td>Kandahar Sustainable Skills Program</td>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2014</td>
<td>A034216001</td>
<td>Teacher Certification and Accreditation of Teacher Training Institutions in Afghanistan (TCAP)</td>
<td>WUSC/MOE</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>10,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Range</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Implementers</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>A035398-001</td>
<td>Basic Education Consortium of Afghanistan (BEACON): Increasing Access to Quality Basic Education</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee, Aga Khan, CARE, Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>12 provinces (Badakshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Ghor, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktya, and Parwan)</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>A035397-001</td>
<td>Community-Based Girls Education</td>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,750,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increase equity, raise primary completion rates and secondary enrolment, and contribute to greater access.

Establish community-based schools, accelerated learning programmes, and adult literacy classes; recruit and train teachers; strengthen the capacity of the MOE to deliver and support community-based education; and promote community mobilization to support education.

Provide community-based classes for 120,000 students, of which 80 percent are girls Construct Ministry of Education schools, and
| 2012-2016 | A035397-002 | Community-based Girls Education-Monitoring | Consultants | 250,000 | Monitoring and evaluation consultant |

*Coded as democratic governance and not education.

Excludes 2002 project titled People in Need project totalling $20,000 identified in OCHA’s FTS.
http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq100712165609j1ezinI41u
Table B-4: List of CIDA Bilateral Education Sector Projects in Sudan and South Sudan: 2000-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Funding Branch</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Geographic focus</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>S062692001</td>
<td>Education and Community Development Project</td>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Canadian Aid to South Sudan</td>
<td>151,568</td>
<td>Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>Provide skills training for former child soldiers, youth leadership and conflict resolution training, women’s literacy classes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>M012108001</td>
<td>Gender and Conflict Sudan and Uganda</td>
<td>MPB</td>
<td>Tufts University</td>
<td>315,190</td>
<td>Sudan and Uganda</td>
<td>Support research on gender and peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>A033384002</td>
<td>Basic Education in Transitional Areas</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>UNICEF, UNMAS, Sim Canada, ODI</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>5 former SPLM-controlled areas in the states of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei</td>
<td>Improve access to basic education for disadvantaged children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-donor Trust Fund</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>National, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Red Sea</td>
<td>Education Reconstruction Project &amp; Education Rehabilitation Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>A033982001</td>
<td>Education for Conflict Affected Children</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>1,931,441</td>
<td>Abyei. West Kordofan, North Kordofan and South Kordofan.</td>
<td>Assist in the long-term reintegration of returnees through increased access to basic education, and improve educational quality in targeted communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>A034521001</td>
<td>Basic Services Fund</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Education component includes school/class construction and in-service and pre-service teacher training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>A033984001</td>
<td>Recovery and Reintegration</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>Plan Canada</td>
<td>4,070,000</td>
<td>Kassala, Central</td>
<td>Multi-dimensional project involving: birth registration campaign and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Project Number</td>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Funding Branch</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Geographic focus</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>A034577001</td>
<td>Building the Future through Education and Training</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>WUSC &amp; Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>3.1 million</td>
<td>Southern Sudan and transition areas</td>
<td>Improving human resource capacity through skills building and education. Main activities include vocational skills training in agriculture, masonry, bakery science, for youth 14-25 years and gender-sensitive teacher training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>A034993001</td>
<td>Protection of Children Associated with Armed Groups and Other Conflict-Affected Children</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>30,000,000 Project browser indicates only 15 million; percentages from 27 percent to South Sudan 73 percent to Sudan</td>
<td>Strengthen protection and basic services for children 10-18 years including psychosocial support through recreational activities, child friendly spaces, and training security sector actors in child rights and supporting DDR activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Training, child rights campaign, children’s parliament, child protection groups refreshment training, Arabic language teacher training, technical education teachers training, parent teachers association training, women’s training on gender planning and leadership, and small business skills, training on conflict resolution, police training on child protection, female genital cutting TOT training, youth capacity building on communications, radio and television programming targeting youth, youth technical and vocational, the construction of a girls’ khawla (religious school), girls’ school uniforms. In Southern Sudan – support technical training by rehabilitating and equipping facilities and providing teacher training.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Funding Branch</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Geographic focus</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>A035101001</td>
<td>Youth Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (Youth LEAD)</td>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
<td>S. Kordofan, Blue Nile, South Darfur, Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria.</td>
<td>Help at risk youth between 10-24 years become productive members of their communities and reduce conflict-related vulnerabilities by providing access to youth-friendly services, education and life skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>S065401-001</td>
<td>A Better Future for Youth in the Upper Nile Region of South Sudan</td>
<td>PWCB</td>
<td>War Child</td>
<td>1,699,614</td>
<td>Malakal, Upper Nile state, and Juba.</td>
<td>Deliver life skills training, literacy and numeracy classes for out of school youth living in fishing and pastoral camps to reduce violence, gender-based discrimination and exploitation, and support vocational skills building and business development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: