The idea that there is an epistemological or substantive distinction between indigenous knowledge and other kinds of knowledge (western, scientific, non-indigenous) has been, quite rightly, debunked (Agrawal 1995). Everyone has practical, usually tacit knowledge of their social and physical environment, a competence reflected in ‘knowing how to go on’ in the routine activities of everyday life, and the capacity to improvise and innovate when necessary (Giddens 1979). This is the kind of knowledge or disposition Bourdieu (1977) refers to as ‘habitus’. If such knowledge exists everywhere, in city and country, west and east, then the distinctive feature of ‘indigenous environmental knowledge’ is not its content but rather its location in particular agendas. As Gray (1995) argues, the term ‘indigenous’ is more imperative than descriptive, referring to a quality that emerges in the course of struggles over rights to territories, resources and cultural respect. Typically, these struggles pit local groups against encompassing nation states. It is in the context of such struggles that the concept of ‘indigenous environmental knowledge’ takes on meaning and relevance. International and national NGOs, donors, officials from various government departments, academics and tourist promoters have particular interests in supporting (or rejecting) the idea that ‘indigenous people’ have important knowledge. The diversity of agendas surrounding the concept of indigenous environmental knowledge forms a field of power within which alliances may be formed, struggles waged, claims made and rights asserted (or denied).

In this chapter I examine the field of power surrounding the concept of indigenous environmental knowledge in Indonesia and explore its strengths and limitations as a vehicle for advancing claims to resources. First, I outline some of the positions taken by the Indonesian government, itself a complex formation in which there are varied interests in
acknowledging, or rejecting, claims about indigenous knowledge. Next, I discuss Indonesian NGOs, exploring the different ways in which claims about indigenous knowledge have figured in their arguments and campaigns and in their relationship to the state and to donors. Then I examine two contrasting sites in central Sulawesi, identifying the characteristics of local conjunctures at which claims about indigenous knowledge have (or have not) been made. Finally, I consider both the tactical benefits and the risks associated with attaching a political agenda about the rights of indigenous people to claims about indigenous knowledge and practice.

STATEMENTS: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, KNOWLEDGE AND RIGHTS

The official position of Indonesia’s Department of Social Affairs is that Indonesia has no indigenous people, although it still has some communities which are, due to accidents of history or geography, isolated and alienated from society at large. Such people are designated *masyarakat terasing* and are estimated to number about one million (Departmen Sosial 1994a: 1). The mandate of the department is to re-locate, re-form and re-educate these people (Departmen Sosial 1994b), bringing them closer into line with an imagined category of ‘ordinary, average, Indonesian persons’ (Koentjaraningrat 1993). The very category *masyarakat terasing* and the programme designed for people so classified are antithetical to the concept of indigenous knowledge. All that is unique about *masyarakat terasing*, bar a few songs and dances, is regarded as evidence of deficiency, to be rectified by ‘development’. The Department’s programme exemplifies, in extreme form, the overall logic of ‘development’ in Indonesia, which assumes that subalterns know nothing of value and must be instructed, guided, administered and changed according to state-defined models (Dove 1983). Those who obstruct ‘development’ are deemed to lack the necessary knowledge and understanding, and they must therefore be re-educated to the point where they do understand (Dove 1999).

The potential usefulness of traditional environmental knowledge has been recognized by other branches of the state apparatus, but not in ways which concede much on the issue of rights. Speaking at an NGO forum on indigenous people and customary land rights, Minister of State for Environment Sarwono Kusumaatmadja informed activists that Indonesia ‘is a country of indigenous people, run and governed by and for indigenous people’ (1993: 12). Therefore, he argued, the term ‘indigenous’ as used in the west is inappropriate for Indonesia. The relevant term for Indonesia is ‘vulnerable population groups’, which includes tribal people and others who depend on natural resources, as well as the urban poor. He warned the activist community against the risk of cultural relativism in view of Indonesia’s attempt to balance diversity with national unity. He argued against the assumption that indigenous cultures should be preserved at all costs and noted that indigenous resource management institutions are not necessarily relevant to today’s conditions. He also warned against romantic and patronizing views which emanate from an imported environmentalism without a community-based constituency. The Minister’s statement was well crafted. That he attended and spoke at such an event sent a message that he acknowledged the significance of the issues and the national and international constituency formed around them. He conceded arguments about poverty and vulnerability while suggesting that the state, through its new legislation, had matters under control. He conceded that traditional or local knowledge might be practically useful, but made this claim subject to empirical verification. He firmly rejected the concept of indigenous identity, dismissing it as a western import and/or a recipe for national disintegration.

The Department of Forestry has taken a hard line on rights and stepped up its efforts to remove people from the vast areas (75% of the nation’s territory) that are officially classified as state forest land (Departmen Kehutanan 1994). At the same time, responding to international criticism, NGO campaigns and the threatened disruption of timber exports, the Minister has acknowledged that forest-dwelling communities which have customary conservation practices and local capacities for collective organization and discipline may be able to play a role in forest management. The Department has therefore conceded the issue of knowledge (subject, again, to verification) and accepted the rhetoric of ‘participation’, but rejected the discourse that presents forest dwellers as ‘indigenous peoples’ with traditional and enduring rights to the land currently under Forestry control. Those who are permitted to remain on land officially classified as state forest land must do so on terms defined by the Forest Department.

Two official documents prepared in the past few years confirm that the ecological soundness of ‘traditional knowledge’ is increasingly accepted by (some parts of) Indonesia’s ruling regime. One document is the Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (Bappenas 1993). This Plan was prepared as part of a pitch for donor funds to support conservation...
activities. It does not start from the premise that rural people (including those who might be called indigenous) have rights to their resources, but focuses rather upon the need for the participation of traditional resource users if conservation objectives are to be met. It recognizes that such people possess relevant knowledge (Bappenas 1993: 29, 37, 44). It also recognizes, possibly for the first time in an official document, that there are forty million people living in or dependent upon resources in the public forest estate, and that these people are the effective resource managers (ibid.: 43). It notes that insecure land tenure has had deleterious effects on sound land management (ibid.: 15) and calls for a revision to the 1967 Basic Forestry Law to accommodate customary (adat) rights to land (ibid.: 19, 25, 38). It seems to assume that ‘traditional’ people are naturally inclined to conserve biodiversity, although it notes that the compatibility of ‘traditional’ uses and conservation goals still needs to be assessed (ibid.: 36–8). Not surprisingly, given the direction of its argument (from conservation goals, to a recognition of traditional knowledge, and to an enhancement of rights), the report begs the question of how ‘traditional resource users’ are to be identified, or by whose criteria the sustainability of their resource use and management systems should be assessed. New respect for traditional or tribal environmental knowledge has had positive implications for rights, but the argument for rights is instrumental and framed as an adjunct to a conservation agenda. The term ‘indigenous’ is not used.

The second document which highlights indigenous environmental knowledge is Indonesia’s national strategy for implementing Agenda 21 (KLH/UNDP 1997). This is a six-hundred-page document resulting from a consultative process involving over a thousand participants (government, non-government and academic). It contains, therefore, some unevenness in terminology and approach. The chapter on poverty notes the need for continued transmigration to make use of ‘unproductive’ lands in the outer islands (ibid.: 28), and the chapter on agriculture observes that low returns to ‘slash-and-burn’ farming force its practitioners to ‘become nomads, so that they simply leave their farms when the land is no longer productive’ (ibid.: 29). In contrast, the chapters on forestry and on biodiversity refer strongly and repeatedly to both the knowledge and the rights of people called, at various times, indigenous, traditional, local, forest-dwelling or tribal. As in the biodiversity document discussed above, the argument generally moves from a recognition of indigenous knowledge and conservation-related practices to the need for enhanced rights. For example:

Many of the diverse cultures among indigenous groups in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya and Maluku have a special affinity with the forests. With this cultural development, knowledge about the ecology and sustainable use of the forest is generated, and is of high value today in terms of biodiversity management. For instance, at least 6,000 indigenous plants and animal species are used on a daily basis by Indonesians for food, medicine, dyes and many other purposes. (Bappenas 1991)

Equitable sharing of benefits would ensure the preservation of this knowledge which would, in turn, help to ensure sustainable forest management. (KLH/UNDP 1997: 365)

More remarkably, the conservation agenda has opened up space for a recognition that existing forest policies and practices are contrary to the interests of communities and that locals are acting rationally when they resist them:

In places where government-designated forest land overlaps with areas in which forest-dependent communities farm, hunt, fish and gather non-timber forest products, serious adverse impacts on local communities occur. Modern functional classification and development of the forestry sector is often in conflict with the community’s customary rights and tenure over land and forest resources. This stems from lack of recognition of customary (adat) laws and the boundaries separating logging concessions or other forestry operations from community forests on the outer islands. In the inner islands, the reason is the insecurity of land tenure as well as competition for land and resources. This leads to loss of economic and socio-cultural access to forest resources, and to conflicts between forestry companies and the communities as well as between forestry officials and the communities. These conflicts sometimes lead to community protests that create physical and ecological damage, and to non-cooperation on the part of the communities towards new schemes of sustainable forest management. The final result is erosion of local customary institutions which might otherwise offer a mechanism for increased sustainable forest management. (KLH/UNDP 1997: 389)

In the same vein, and also contrary to the normal direction of instruction presupposed by the logic of ‘development’, the report observes that there is a need to ‘improve the capacity of local government officials to understand the ecological, economic and cultural value of the forests to the community’ (ibid.: 92). From the recognition of the capacities of forest-dwelling people stems the need to ‘set-up a legal mechanism which protects traditional knowledge, territories, cultural practices and which also guarantees the genuine participation of traditional communities by recognizing their traditional laws and incorporating them into the national laws’ (ibid.: 401).
Despite the rhetoric, the legal mechanisms proposed for forestdwellers communities fall short of full recognition of their rights to occupy, much less farm, state-defined forest land. The report calls for clarification of the legal status of traditional communities vis-à-vis concessionaires; the development of a legal framework for ‘community forestry’ as an official state program; a review of the regulations on participation in forestry programmes; systematic mapping and inventory of forest dwelling communities; consultation and equitable sharing of benefits; documentation of sustainable techniques; and the revival and adaptation of traditional resource management institutions (ibid.: 390). The emphasis is, again, on conservation within a forestry framework, for which the participation of traditional communities and the strengthening of their rights is a prerequisite.

Mild as they are, the discussions of traditional knowledge and the rights of ‘traditional’ communities in these documents put the state institutions that prepared them significantly at odds with others which continue to deny the existence of indigenous knowledge (e.g. the Department of Social Affairs), or which have a mandate to intensify state territorial control or to bring large scale ‘development’ programmes into areas in which traditional resource-users are located (e.g. transmigration, forestry, estate-crops, mining and energy). Claims about knowledge and struggles over rights take shape in relation to the constraints and opportunities set up by this complex, differentiated field of power.

LOCATING POLITICS IN KNOWLEDGE: NGO AND DONOR AGENDAS

The activities and agendas of Indonesian NGOs both shape and are shaped by state policies and donor priorities. Similarly, international donors adjust their agendas to accommodate, while also attempting to reform, the policies and programmes of particular state agencies and NGOs. Both donors and NGOs participated in the production of the two documents mentioned earlier, making it difficult to separate or clearly distinguish ‘government’, ‘non-government’ and ‘donor’ positions. Donors acknowledge the sensitivity of the issue of ‘indigenous people’ to the ruling regime and have avoided becoming directly involved in struggles over land. The conservation and biodiversity agenda offers a compromise, an agenda upon which state, donors and NGOs can agree. It is significant that the word ‘consensus’ is mentioned in the foreword to the biodiversity document, and also in the introduction to Agenda 21. Around the edges of this compromise,

Support for ‘indigenous people’ is widespread in the activist community. The green claim that ‘indigenous people’ derive ecologically sound livelihoods from their ancestral lands and possess forms of knowledge and wisdom which are unique and valuable has provided a common platform for many Jakarta-based NGOs. But for many activists, the political significance of ‘indigenous people’ goes beyond green arguments. For some, the plight of indigenous people is taken to indicate one among many ways in which the promises of Indonesian democracy and nationhood remain unfulfilled. For others, ‘indigenous people’ have come to hold a special place as the representatives of diverse but pure forms of Indonesian cultural heritage unsullied by encounters with colonialism, westernization and modernity.5

There is some difference among NGOs in the nature and extent of the population group that is envisaged to fit within the category of ‘indigenous people’.6 Some focus their concern upon relatively more isolated or exotic people, those the state would readily classify as masyarakat terasing. They seek to reverse the negative valorization placed upon the knowledge and practices of such groups and to defend their right to maintain distinctive ways of life, contrary to the state logic of ‘development’. For other activists the classification ‘indigenous people’ properly applies not only to a few especially isolated groups, but to the majority of Indonesia’s rural citizens outside Java. Their goal is to secure land rights for the millions who are currently deemed to be ‘squatters’ on state land and who are subject to displacement in the course of state-defined ‘development’ imperatives. Their legal arguments refer to the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 which recognizes customary (adat) rights so long as these are not in conflict with the national interest.7 According to legal activists, a customary tenure system can be seen to exist when people manage their land and resources in an orderly way. It is not necessary for customary knowledge and practice of this kind to be written down or formulated in explicit rules and regulations: it is enough that people ‘know how to go on’, making everyday decisions, resolving disputes and adapting to new conditions as required. Neither ‘traditional’ life-styles nor a conservation orientation are prerequisites for the applicability of law recognizing customary rights.

The implication of a broad definition of customary knowledge and practice is that millions of Indonesian citizens could make claims for
security of tenure under the Basic Agrarian Law. It is a scenario that has provoked a response from the National Land Board (BPN) and led to an attempt to limit the scope of the term ‘customary’. The head of the BPN has accused unnamed parties of attempting to reactivate traditional rights where ‘in fact, they no longer exist’ in order to seek political or personal gain (Kepala BPN akan Matikan Hukum Adat, Forum Keadilan 22, 18 February 1993). He has also suggested that such rights will disappear because they are not properly documented (Eksistensi Hukum Dewasa Ini, Kompas, 27 March 1996). The identification of what, precisely, will count as evidence of 'customary knowledge and practice' has therefore become a crucial issue in the struggle over rights. For NGOs, their participation in the documentation of 'traditional environmental knowledge' in support of conservation agendas is also an opportunity to help communities strengthen their legal position vis-à-vis agencies such as the BPN, which deny the existence of customary knowledge and rights in the modern era. NGOs have worked with communities to prepare documents, lists, rules and regulations as well as maps showing territorial boundaries and land-use zones, all of which help to make the idea of a community with customary practices and rights more visible to the state.8

The shifting definition of who counts as ‘indigenous’ or traditional people in Indonesia has provided some room for manoeuvre in the relationship between donors and NGOs.9 When the international environmental lobby and donors connect biodiversity with indigenous people, they probably have in mind some famous exemplars, mostly based in the Amazon (cf. Stearman 1994). Their images and expectations resonate readily with NGO support for especially remote and exotic people, who, it is assumed, have large and unique reservoirs of biodiversity knowledge. They resonate less readily with the millions of rather ordinary farmers whose customary resource-management practices could also be framed in terms of ‘indigenous environmental knowledge’. Yet, so long as definitions remain vague and the compromise agenda focused on conservation can be invoked, support for the latter is not ruled out. Donor agendas and budget lines, together with the opportunities and constraints presented by different state agencies, are important in shaping the work that NGOs do and, more significantly, in shaping the ways their work is framed and presented.

Within the contested array of state and activist positions, there are many criteria for specifying who qualifies as ‘indigenous’ in Indonesia. Rural people also have ‘room for manoeuvre’ as they situate themselves in relation to the images, discourses and agendas that others produce for or about them, although, under some conditions, the room may be quite limited. Struggles over resources, which are simultaneously struggles over meaning, tend to invoke simplified symbols fashioned through processes of opposition and dialogue which narrow the gaze to certain well-established signifiers and traits. Those who are to fit the preconfigured space of ‘indigenous people’ must be ready and able to articulate their identity in terms of a set of characteristics recognized by the government agencies that might support them, by NGOs and by the media that presents their case to the public. Agency is involved in the selection and combination of elements that form a recognizably ‘indigenous’ identity, as well as in the production of a reified body of ‘indigenous environmental knowledge’ from the pool of everyday local knowledge and practice.

The repertoire of images and arguments surrounding indigenous environmental knowledge offers one framework within which alliances can be made and struggles configured. But it is not the only possible repertoire, nor is it necessarily one which is available or relevant to all rural people who might potentially fall within its scope. The constraints and opportunities presented by international and national images, agendas and debates resonate differently with the sedimented histories and landscapes, as well as the current concerns, of particular groups in the Indonesian countryside. In the next section I turn to two contrasting sites in the hills of central Sulawesi, seeking to account for the factors that led struggles to be focused around the issue of indigenous identity and environmental knowledge in one case but not the other.

CONDITIONS AND CONJUNCTURES: INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN CENTRAL SULAWESI

Sulawesi Tribe Opposes Lake Lindu Dam Project

So stated a headline in the Jakarta Post (an English language daily) on 11 September 1994. The article quoted Gesadombu, ‘Tribal Chief of the Lindu plains’, on the centrality of the lake to the Lindu tribe’s livelihood; the ‘strong traditional and practical ties the Lindu people had with the land they live on'; and the certain loss of traditional values should the reservoir be constructed and the people moved out. Accompanying the Chief were 23 other fellow Lindu indigenous people, non-governmental activists, students and nature-lovers from...
Central Sulawesi'. They were visiting Jakarta to meet with state officials and present their case against the construction of a hydroelectric plant at the lake. The article also quoted activists on the ecological soundness of the Lindu people's traditional resource-management practices, on the need for the government to learn about land and water management from the people and on the right of the Lindu people to express their culture.

Every component of this news story is familiar: the presence of tribes, tribal leaders, tribal ecological wisdom and a specific tribal place central to the group's identity and culture, plus the presence of allies and sympathizers, and of a massive external force poised for destruction. It is a story for which the conceptual space already exists and for which the intended readership has been prepared. Nevertheless, the telling of this story in relation to Lindu or any other place in Indonesia has to be regarded as an accomplishment, a outcome of the power-laden processes through which indigenous knowledge and identity are made explicit, alliances formed, and media attention appropriately focused.

The historical preconditions for this situation were established at Lindu at the turn of the century, when, according to Acciaioli (1989) the area was subjugated by the Dutch and the scattered hill farmers (numbering about six hundred) were forced to form three concentrated settlements beside the lake. There, they were converted to Christianity by the Salvation Army mission, educated in mission schools and encouraged to view 'custom' as matter for display at celebrations overseen by an officially recognized 'customary' leadership, the adat council. Subsequently, the arrival of migrants from neighbouring districts and of Bugis from the south gave the Lindu people some (often bitter) experience in articulating claims to their 'ancestral, customary or village land' (ibid.: 151). Resource struggles provided the stimulus to articulate (select, formulate and convey) a set of Lindu adat rules which ought to be acknowledged by outsiders, a process which in turn reworked the significance and substance of Lindu knowledge and identity. The mission-educated, literate middle class of Lindu village officials, school teachers and prosperous farmers participated in the process of articulating Lindu identity, rights and claims.

The identity of the Lindu as an indigenous people with valuable knowledge and with rights to their ancestral land was firmly established in the context of opposition to the hydroelectric plan and the threat of forced resettlement. According to Sangadji's account (1996), the campaign involved confrontational encounters with the authorities, media attention, collaboration with national and international NGOs and activities organized by Lindu leaders to heighten awareness within the community. NGO campaigning and support began in 1988. In 1992, at a dialogue with NGOs in Palu, a local leader stated that the people of Lindu would rather die than be removed from their ancestral lands. A youth group formed at Lindu to research Lindu tradition and work for its preservation. Many journalists and officials visited the site, and adat leaders reiterated their preference to die rather than lose their culture. Security forces warned the people against activists who were misleading them, whose values were western and contrary to national ideals (pancasila). An environmental assessment was carried out by consultants in 1993, but invited no public input. The delegation which visited Jakarta and met with top-level officials was told that plans had changed and resettlement would no longer be necessary. However, there are concerns that the requirement for a 'green belt' around the lake will restrict access both to fisheries and to farmland, and opposition to the project continues.¹⁰

The scale of the threat to local lives and livelihoods, the dramatic nature of a dam as a stage for NGO action, the location of the dam within a national park, and the massive economic implications of the project, explain why Lindu attracted the attention it did. But it remains to be explained how and why the Lindu have come to articulate their identity, present themselves and be represented by their supporters in terms consistent with both national and international expectations concerning 'indigenous people' or tribes.

The news coverage and documents prepared in the course of the campaign shed some light on the 'how' question. Various documents were written by members of the NGO coalition (with Lindu leaders as key informants) to inform the public and policy-makers about the Lindu people and the negative impacts of the dam. These documents present Lindu as a unique, tribal place, its integrity basically intact. They note that the Lindu are the only speakers of the Tado language (related to Kaili) and that they are an autonomous group that have managed their own affairs (hidup mandiri) for hundreds of years (Sangadji 1996: 19; Laudjeng 1994: 150–2). There is little mention of the impact of Dutch rule or the presence of Bugis and other non-Lindu at the lake. The documents focus upon cultural features which confirm
the uniqueness of the Lindu people, their environmental wisdom and their spiritual attachment to the landscape. Culture is substantivized through a focus upon ‘traditional’ costumes, major annual feasts and marriage arrangements. Lindu capacities for environmental management are demonstrated through the existence of the *adat* council, said to have jurisdiction over the Lindu people’s collective territory, an area which extends to the peaks of all the mountains surrounding the lake. Management rules include the exclusion of outsiders from the use of Lindu resources (except with the permission of the *adat* chiefs) and the zoning of land according to specified uses. The documents pay considerable attention to the existence of named zones for farming, hunting and grazing, and sacred sites in which all forms of activity (tree-cutting, gathering, etc.) are strictly forbidden (Laudjeng 1994: 155–60). They also state that each clan and, within the clan, each household has fishing rights over specific portions of the lake. Filtered and interpreted through a ‘green lens’ (Zerner 1994), these land-use categories are presented as similar to, but more efficient than, the land-use zones imposed by the state through its forest and national park regulations (Sangadji 1996: 26–8). Finally, the documents emphasise Lindu people’s attachment to their place by naming features of the landscape: hills, sacred spots, grazing areas and, most especially, the sacred island in the lake associated with the magical culture hero Maradindo. Although they mean nothing to a reader without a map, these place names assert and confirm that the Lindu are thoroughly familiar with their territory. Between the named zones and the specific named places, the point is made that there is no undifferentiated or unclaimed space, but rather, an orderly system of land-use designed and managed by the ‘indigenous people’ of Lindu.

A finer reading reveals many subtleties in these accounts. They present a selective picture, but one which is complex rather than simple, positioning the Lindu in relation to multiple fields of power. They emphasise that the Lindu are ‘traditional’ people, but in no sense are they primitive. The mention of Christianity confirms their nationally acceptable religious standing, yet little is made of the influence of ninety years of missionary work upon their ‘traditional’ rituals and practices. They are shown to be in touch with nature and the bearers of tribal wisdom, but by emphasising the orderliness of the Lindu land-use system it is made clear that there is nothing wild about this scene. The accounts emphasise subsistence uses of the forest, such as building materials and medicinal plants (Sangadji 1996: 44). They make less of the presence within these forests of the hill-side coffee-groves that provide the Lindu people with a significant source of cash. It is noted that the Lindu people are not poor: they have an adequate standard of living, though not luxurious, and they are satisfied with their lot. Thus they are sufficiently similar to ‘ordinary rural people’ not to be in need of drastic changes or improvements framed as ‘development’, still less the civilizing projects directed at masyarakat *terasing*. Yet they are unlike ‘ordinary rural people’ in their uniqueness, their special knowledge and their attachment to place.

The efficacy of framing the position of the Lindu people in terms of the arguments and images associated with ‘indigenous people’ was not guaranteed. It was effective in the NGO campaign, as activists were able to use the case of the ‘green’ Lindu to argue against the dam and also to support their arguments on behalf of other ‘indigenous people’ in Indonesia. In activist circles, Lindu became an exemplary case, which was both framed within, and helped to frame, broader struggles. But not all NGOs recognized the tribal uniqueness of Lindu. In 1992, while the Lindu campaign was underway, a parks-focused international conservation NGO described the population in the many villages bordering the national park as ethnically diverse, with a mix of ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ people and newcomers. It observed that they were subsistence farmers, only weakly integrated into markets, and often exploited and displaced by aggressive newcomers. It also noted that they were rather lacking in handicrafts with a tourist potential (Schweithelm et al. 1992: 39–47). Thus described, they fit the state category of ‘ordinary villagers’. But the NGO’s report contains no suggestion that the border villages in general, or Lindu in particular, are populated by tribal people who have ancient ties to the forest or who possess unique environmental wisdom.

Media receptiveness to the idea of the Lindu as an indigenous people was also mixed. The English-language news coverage cited earlier picked up the tribal angle, as the headline clearly shows. The coverage of opposition to the dam in a major Indonesian language newspaper (*Kompas*) was more equivocal. An article (Masyarakat Lindu Menolak Rencana Pembangunan PLTA, *Kompas* 11 September 1993) described the Lindu people not as a tribe but as ‘a sub-group of Kaili’. It acknowledged their environmental wisdom, but observed that, the satisfaction expressed by residents notwithstanding, the area does suffer from a development deficit, signaled by the seventeen-kilometre hike from the nearest road, the
muddy village paths and the incomplete electricity service. Most of the media coverage skilfully analysed by Sangadji (1996) supported the hydroelectric plan on the grounds of ‘development’ and did not address the issue of ‘indigenous people’.

Throughout the campaign, the government agencies promoting the power plant neither accepted nor rejected the notion that the Lindu are ‘indigenous people’: they simply did not engage with it. Refusing, or not recognizing, the discursive terrain developed by the Lindu people and their allies, officials maintained their focus upon the need for electricity to promote modernization and industrial development in the Palu valley (Sangadji ibid.: 54). They also made the argument that the resettlement of the Lindu would make them more developed, but this was difficult to justify. It was an argument consistently rejected by Lindu spokesmen. Indeed, it was their overt rejection of the idea that they were in need of state-directed ‘development’, as much as their emphasis upon the unique character of their tribal place, that was notable in their campaign.

In view of the weak case made by the state, various approaches could have been used to frame opposition to the project. A materialist case focusing upon the loss of good livelihoods and a political case focusing upon the rights of the Lindu people to fair treatment as citizens were indeed argued. But the most prominent argument focused upon the loss of a unique tribal identity and way of life. The reasons for this had to do with the fields of power and opportunity surrounding the concept of indigenous people at that conjuncture. The possibility of articulating local concerns with national and international agendas was clearly present. Situations which set indigenous people up against big projects and the state are guaranteed attention, and they set up predictable alliances (Sangadji ibid.: 13, 16). Also significant is the way in which an indigenous or tribal identity asserts the unity of people and place, addressing an issue at the heart of state-society relations in the Indonesian countryside. According to the state model which sees rural people as ‘ordinary villagers’, those that must be moved can be compensated in cash or given new land to replace the old. If the Lindu people were simply villagers, their livelihoods could, in theory, be re-created elsewhere. Indeed, the state’s plan for them was that they would join the (technically troubled) transmigration scheme at Lalundu (ibid.: 20), thus becoming homogenized quota-fillers, names on a list. Only ‘indigenous people’ can claim that their very culture, identity and existence are tied up in the

unique space that they occupy (Cohen 1993). There can be no compensation. This was the point argued repeatedly by the Lindu and their supporters (Sangadji ibid.: 16).

Finally, the concept of indigenous people, especially when they are shown to be ecologically wise, opens up some ‘room for manoeuvre’ unavailable to ordinary villagers. Obstinate peasants can be labelled communists, as they often are in Java (Sangadji ibid.: 15), but communist tribesmen are somehow less plausible. Their concerns seem to be somewhat different from those of the mass of rural people reacting to the contempt and arrogance with which they are treated by their government. Indigenous people, and their nature-and-culture loving supporters, are differently positioned in relation to the field of power. The sacred shrine of the Lindu’s heroic and supernatural ancestor Maradindo is located on an island in the lake. When Maradindo is angered, he causes accidents, bizarre events, of which the Lindu can cite recent examples (Sangadji ibid.: 32, 41–2). The Lindu tell a powerful story: ignore Maradindo at your peril.13

Lauje Hill Farmers Get By Without Anyone Paying Much Attention to Their Knowledge

This is not a plausible newspaper headline, not because the statement is untrue, but because it posits an unlikely scenario of media attention becoming focused on a place where nothing much (of interest to outsiders) is happening. The Lauje people, currently numbering about 30,000, occupy the hilly interior and the narrow coastal strip of the peninsula to the north of Tomini Bay and are concentrated in the present-day districts of Tomini and Tinombo. Their language (Lauje) shades gradually into Tiaolo and Tajio, the languages of their neighbours. Besides language, there are no ethnicizing or demarcating signs that mark the borders of the Lauje domain. The Lauje hills are fairly densely settled and cultivated but not especially fertile, so they have not attracted outsiders. Unlike the Lindu, the Lauje have not therefore been provoked into articulating collective identities and associated boundaries in order to claim or defend their territory (Li 1996).

According to Nourse’s (1989) account of local history, in pre-colonial times most Lauje kept to the hills for fear of slave-raiders and pirates, although they traded jungle produce. Those occupying the drier, lower slopes produced tobacco for regional markets. Lauje who moved down to the coast during the nineteenth century constituted
themselves as a class of aristocrats, converted to Islam, and intermarried with incoming Bugis, Mandar and Gorontalo traders. The Lauje area was of only peripheral interest to the Dutch. It contained little natural wealth, and the coastal lords were quiescent and easily co-opted, posing no threat to Dutch authority. A half-hearted attempt was made early this century to move the interior population to the coast, but it was clear that they could not survive on the resources of the narrow coastal strip, and they were soon allowed to return to their scattered and rather anarchic hillside hamlets. Some performed occasional corvée duty, working on the construction of the coast road and bridges, while others moved further inland to evade such obligations. Dutch revenues from the area, such as they were, came from taxing the owners of coconut groves planted along the coast at Dutch insistence.

The minimal obligation of the coastal chiefs toward their Dutch overlords was to keep peace in the interior and prevent feuding and bloodshed. Their model of governance was to select highlanders of renown, people who appeared to command respect, and make them responsible for maintaining order over ‘their’ people. Since the expectations associated with rule over the interior were relatively light, they had no need to discover, constitute or record Lauje customary practices or traditional law (adat). The mechanisms for accomplishing rule in the post-colonial period became somewhat more systematic but did not fundamentally change. Since the borders of administrative village units (desa) were defined to cross-cut the terrain from the coast to the hills, the coast-based village heads continued the practice of appointing local leaders to be responsible for the maintenance of order in their part of the hillside terrain. Today these leaders occupy the official positions of hamlet chief (kepala RT) and chief of customary affairs (kepala adat). The task of the latter is to adjudicate marriage arrangements and local disputes in the vicinity of the hillside hamlets to which they belong.

According to several of those holding responsibility for ‘customary affairs’, the procedures, rules and fines they administer in their hillside hamlets were not handed down by the ancestors but rather established by the coastal authorities in order to overcome the anarchy and feuding that previously prevailed in the area. Similarly, they consider their own authority to settle disputes to be a power granted by the village administration, ultimately backed by the civil, police and military authorities of the district. They do not articulate a sense of adat or tradition as something distinctive, autochthonous, locally derived or essential to Lauje identity. There are, of course, many beliefs and practices of a spiritual nature relating to ancestors as well as to features of the landscape, but these are described as matters of personal, family or at most hamlet-wide conviction rather than pan-Lauje tradition. Village officials regard the hill people and their farming practices as backward and show no interest in them at all. The coastal Lauje elite seldom if ever hike into the hills and know little about the everyday lives or concerns of the hill farmers. Although they have to acknowledge that they speak a common language, most coastal Lauje regard their shared ancestry with the hill people as a source of embarrassment. Officials from the Ministry of Education and Culture bemoan their assignment to an area of Indonesia patently lacking in the kinds of songs, dances and handicrafts that they are expected to identify and turn into emblems of the local for display in provincial or national fora. No sympathetic outsiders have yet come looking for indigenous people or environmental knowledge.

Engagements between the state and the Lauje people have been framed within, rather than outside or in opposition to, the state’s discourse of development. This does not mean that there is any consensus on who or what needs to be developed, or how development should be accomplished (Li 1997). But there is no suggestion, for now at least, that the Lauje are an ‘indigenous people’ for whom, or by whom, an alternative agenda should be proposed. In general, coastal officials ignore the hills. Village maps show the hills in spatially compressed form, while showing the houses and public facilities on the narrow coastal strip in minute detail. Some officials describe the hills as ‘empty’, even when more than half the village population lives up above (see Li 1996). When pressed to discuss the mountain population, they emphasise their primitive, unruly nature and their status not as noble savages but as awkward and annoying ones. Officials sometimes refer to the mountain dwellers as orang dayak, a term they have picked up through media exposure to the apparently wild and primitive people of the Kalimantan interior, and which they have chosen to extend in order to label and characterize their own ‘backwoods’.

Village officials readily classify the mountain Lauje as masyarakat terasing. In so doing, they seek to absolve themselves of responsibility for the onerous task of trying to count, monitor or control, let alone provide services to, a population which, they stress, is continuously on the move. They also hope to attract resettlement projects to their village, massive
deployments of state attention and expenditure which would help to resolve the difficulties they face in administering the hills, as well as boost the local economy. An official document of the Department of Social Affairs (Departemen Sosial 1994a: 89-93) has it on record that there are 612 Lauje families in Tinombo and Tomini that fall into the category of masyarakat terasing in addition to 130 households that have already been resettled under the department's programme. But the department receives many more requests for resettlement programmes than it can handle. Numbers alone do not make a compelling case. The department has already been exposed to embarrassment when all the Lauje abandoned a resettlement site and returned to the hills within a year. Moreover, the Lauje are considered rather dull folk, lacking in the paint and feathers expected of true primitives. As one senior official observed in an interview, 'sometimes we look at them and say these are not indigenous people, they are village people'. There are other groups in Central Sulawesi, such as the Wana, who better fit the bill. The mountain Lauje, who are not especially exotic and have no serious competitors for their hilly terrain, have therefore been left pretty much to their own devices.

The hill people potentially classified as masyarakat terasing are, to my knowledge, unaware of the assumptions about primitives embedded in the official programme description and therefore have not addressed the issue of whether or not this classification should be applied to themselves. Their concerns are practical ones. Those who have heard about the resettlement programme are quite afraid that they will be forced to move out of the hills against their will. While they would be happy to receive new houses and rice rations as gifts from the government, they are rightly skeptical about livelihood prospects on the coast and insist that any seedlings offered to them will probably be of poor quality or purloined by coastal elites, and make their own arrangements. Some pay land taxes, others claim they are too poor to pay and count on officials to be lenient. In general, they bring a well-honed cynicism to these everyday encounters. They have learned the parameters of what can be requested from the government, the list of things (schools, seedlings, roads or footpaths) that fit within the official purview of what 'development' entails. These are indeed things they feel they want and need, although they do not define their lives as chronically deficient due to their absence, nor do they sit passively waiting for 'the state' to secure their futures. They are willing to adopt the position of supplicants in the hope that some of the desired things will come their way. To this end, some highlanders have begun to consolidate their hamlets, fixing their corporate positions on the landscape in ways that will attract development resources (Li 1996).

So far, there has been no conjuncture, no context, site, event or encounter, in which the mountain Lauje have articulated a collective position as 'indigenous people'. No hillside leaders have emerged interested in, or capable of, articulating territorial claims beyond the level of their own hamlet, still less a generic Lauje identity. There are respected shamanic living both in the hills and on the coast, but their agendas do not appear to be political. The pretensions of coastal Lauje 'aristocrats' are largely unheard or ignored. The main authority hill folk acknowledge is that of village officials, but, as noted above, they are rightly suspicious of the motives of this group and resent the unfair treatment they receive at their hands. They are not anti-development. Indeed, they are taking their own initiatives to improve their chances of being included in state development agendas which have hitherto passed them by (cf. Schuurman 1993). They engage with the state in a discourse consistent with their knowledge of themselves, their needs and aspirations, and their understanding of what it is possible to demand and expect in that relationship. The concept of 'indigenous people' has not taken hold in the Lauje hills because, under current conditions, it would not help people to make sense of their situation, nor would it help them to improve it.
The contrast between my two examples highlights some of the conditions under which 'indigenous environmental knowledge' has (or has not) been located in contemporary Indonesia. A summary of the factors present at Lindu, but not in the Lauje case, includes the following: competition for resources, in the context of which group boundaries were rendered explicit and cultural differences entrenched; the existence of a hierarchical political structure which included individuals (elders, leaders, tribal councils) mandated to speak on behalf of the group; a capacity to present cultural identity and local knowledge in forms intelligible to outsiders, an activity undertaken in this case by a literate elite or 'middle class' of teachers, local officials, prosperous farmers and entrepreneurs; an interest on the part of urban activists in discovering and supporting exemplary indigenous subjects and documenting 'indigenous knowledge' which fit the niche pre-constituted through national and international environmental debates; and, finally, heightened interest in a particular place, arising from a conflict which pits locals against the state or state-sponsored corporations.

Two further brief examples confirm the significance of these conditions, even though each conjuncture has its own unique characteristics. In a subtle account which is full of surprises, Tsing (1999) shows how Meratus village leaders in Kalimantan have been able to construct a 'tribal situation' which accurately plays up to the expectations of environmentalists seeking tribal wisdom while making use of the attention accorded to their village to make development claims upon the state. In her example, indigenous identity and development 'longing' have been creatively combined, not opposed. The leaders articulating Meratus identity in terms of this delicate balance occupy positions as village officials. Their status as 'tribal elders' is less than apparent to their local constituency, although readily apparent to outsiders. That outsiders showed any interest in them was the result of a conflict that erupted between villagers and a logging company over forest resources. Such conflicts are common enough, but this particular one coincided with an international conference on tropical forests in a nearby city hosted by two national NGOs. As part of the programme, the NGOs wished to expose the participants to a 'case study' of a conflict between a timber company and 'a local indigenous community' (Hafild 1997). This initial contact lead to some (successful) campaign activities by the NGO in defence of the villager's resource rights. It also led to the village becoming marked by other NGOs, journalists and nature-lovers as a 'tribal place', offering village leaders the multiple opportunities for developing the 'tribal situation' described in Tsing's account.

Back again in central Sulawesi, a study of a group known as the Da’a reveals the difficult position of people who might be expected to possess indigenous ecological wisdom, but who are found deficient according to green-standards or fail to articulate their knowledge in forms intelligible to outsiders. The Da’a are usually seen as the hillbillies of the Kaili and they are officially classified as masyarakat terasing. They were the subject of a research project by two university-based anthropologists (Mamar and Nur Ali 1990), who had been prepared by their reading of the 'indigenous environmental knowledge' literature to look out for, and indeed to give credit to, the ecological wisdom in swidden practices normally dismissed as primitive. The exemplary case they cite is that of the Kantu Dayak of Kalimantan described by Michael Dove. But in the case of the Da’a the researchers were, sadly, disappointed. They encountered no informant or spokesman able or willing to explain Da’a practices in the 'indigenous knowledge' framework they were expecting. The only explanation they were able to elicit was that the Da’a simply carried on doing what their ancestors had done before them, even though they did not really know why things should be done that way. This was a 'normal' explanation—normal or commonsensical for the Da’a. It was also 'normal' for educated Indonesians, who generally do not expect much from primitives. There was a failure to connect, and stereotypes re-emerged to fill the space where recognition and respect for 'indigenous knowledge' might have been. The researchers concluded that the Da’a are in urgent need of state guidance to improve their agricultural practices and increase their understanding of the problems of erosion and the ecological function of forests.

Where 'indigenous environmental knowledge' might be expected, but the necessary processes of selection, filtering and articulation have not occurred, the application of a green lens presents a double burden. Those who are apprehended as failed or rather unsatisfactory primitives, like the Da’a, would not please environmentalists and would therefore miss out on a potentially positive niche. Others fail to meet expectations for different reasons. The majority of Indonesia’s swidden farmers have long been committed to producing for the market, and many are more interested in expanding commercially oriented agriculture than in conserving forests.18 Some are interested
in profits from the sale of timber, and not just from the 'non-timber forest products' usually deemed appropriate for them. Dove (1993) has critiqued the logic he dubs 'rain forest crunch', which assumes that forest-dwelling people will be satisfied with the marginal economic niche to which they have been assigned. Neither good tribes nor good peasants, many rural Indonesians are in an ambiguous position which, rather than allowing them 'room for manoeuvre', may instead restrict their scope and make it difficult to locate opponents, allies or arenas for action.

Environmentalists, journalists and other social and political activists searching for 'indigenous knowledge' find it more easily in some places than others, as the contrast between Lauje and Lindu clearly reveals. For people in a hurry, it is easier to seek out conjunctures at which the 'indigenous people' scenario is already established and connections easily made. Such places then become exemplars, visited by many people, and increasingly reified as they are written about, quoted and cited in ever-broadening circuits of knowledge and action. The process at work has some similarities to that described by Chambers as 'rural development tourism' (1983). The circumstances of my own very brief visit to Lindu can usefully illustrate this point. It was NGO friends in Jakarta active in the campaign against the hydroelectric project who suggested I should visit Lindu and put me in touch with their partner NGO in Palu. With such smooth connections, I was able to make a two-day visit to Lindu at the end of a five-week stint in the Lauje hills. When I arrived at Lindu, an articulate group of educated, Indonesian-speaking community leaders gathered to talk to me, and the NGO presented me with a set of documents and press clippings. Connecting with the hillside Lauje is much more difficult. Very few people speak Indonesian, illiteracy is almost total, and there are precious few documentary sources. The hillside population has no obvious spatial or social centre, no hierarchy of leadership that would suggest to a visitor where they should go or who they should talk to. There is no individual or group able or willing to pontificate on Lauje identity, culture and tradition. My accounts about the Lauje are therefore more nuanced, but also fuzzier, more equivocal, less easily picked up and read by outsiders in search of exemplary indigenous people bearing tribal wisdom. The reasons for this are deep but contingent, as I have shown. The process of locating 'indigenous environmental knowledge' in contemporary Indonesia is therefore uneven, but it is not random. It has less to do with the innate qualities or wisdom of particular groups than with the power-laden processes through which knowledge and identity are formulated, communicated and brought to bear at particular conjunctures.

The issue which tends to draw NGOs to a particular scene is conflict, especially when it pits locals against the state. The identification of indigenous environmental knowledge and the presentation of that knowledge as part of the struggle occur subsequently. This scenario might change as NGOs become involved in community mapping and other activities designed to render indigenous identity and knowledge visible and explicit before conflicts arise. As the Da'a and Lauje cases both suggest, however, local enthusiasm for this kind of exercise might be hard to generate if the group in question has not already experienced resource pressure and seen the relevance of writing down or telling outsiders about what they know and do.

Government agencies with a stake in proving that the state both recognizes and supports the traditional ecological wisdom of some of its people are not drawn by conflict, since they are likely to find themselves confronting their counterparts in other government agencies. Like NGOs, however, they are on the look-out for 'case studies' or exemplary places that illustrate the concept of indigenous environmental knowledge. As Zerner (1994) reports, officials from the Ministry of State for Environment played a role in the 'discovery' of the indigenous institution known as sasi in Maluku and its green reconstruction. Other participants in this process were local officials, scholars of Maluku culture and history, NGOs and donors, each with their own agendas but able to find common cause in the identification of 'indigenous environmental knowledge' at that conjuncture. Interestingly, Zerner observes that the new sasi was initially of little interest to villagers. He suggests that this situation will begin to change as villagers find it necessary to oppose sasi when it is deployed by local officials to increase their control over coastal resources or, alternatively, when they find that they can themselves deploy sasi to reinforce local control threatened by state and market intrusions (ibid.: 1109-14). The complex array of interests, risks and opportunities surrounding sasi are characteristic of the conjunctures at which 'indigenous environmental knowledge' is formulated and deployed.

In Indonesia, the concept of 'indigenous environmental knowledge' is associated with an apparently non-political niche, characterized by a scientific language (biodiversity), an attractive set of images
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(communities with ecology and culture intact), the approval of the international environmental lobby and donor support. The same features which make the concept acceptable (in at least some government circles) also make it both weak and risky. The problems relate to the expectations set up by romanticized green images about 'indigenous people'. Exaggerated claims make it possible for government agencies to agree to the rhetoric but then to find very few cases which meet the criteria in practice. They also legitimate the restriction of rights to those who practice 'traditional, sustainable' resource management. Whereas large-scale resource-users (timber concessionaires, mine operators, plantations) are routinely excused for the environmental ruin they cause, the activities of 'indigenous people' granted resource rights on the basis of their ecological wisdom are severely monitored. The array of new government regulations and reporting requirements surrounding sasi are a case in point (Zerner ibid.). Land and resource rights made contingent upon stewardship are a pale version of the rights that other citizens effectively enjoy. Backlash is another risk, one that has already arisen in Amazonia, where Kayapó have experienced disastrous consequences from the exaggerated claims made by outsiders on their behalf (Stearman 1994). In Indonesia as elsewhere, the field of power within which the concept of 'indigenous environmental knowledge' is deployed remains stacked against the people likely to be deemed its subjects. Nevertheless, it is a concept which does offer some 'room for manoeuvre', and it provides, for the moment at least, a relatively safe and productive location for the advance of projects which are, at heart, about rights to resources, democracy and citizenship.

NOTES

1. Since the Indonesian government does not acknowledge the existence of indigenous people, it does not consider itself bound by pronouncements on their rights in international law and conventions such as that of the ILO (see Posey, Chapter 1). Nevertheless, developments in the international legal sphere do enter into the changing meanings of the term 'indigenous people' as deployed in different discourses and struggles in Indonesia.

2. Act Number 10 of 1992 concerning Population Development and Development of Prosperous Family (Ministry of State for Population and the Environment 1992) includes provisions in Article 5b and 6c which confirm the rights of tribal people and others who depend upon natural resources to their customary lands (wilayah warisan adat). This is potentially a very strong law, since it makes rights contingent upon occupation and use and makes no reference to ecological knowledge or conservation outcomes. However, there are still no implementing regulations for the Law, so there is no clarification of what it will take for a group to qualify for the enjoyment of rights to customary land.

3. The context of some of these remarks was the Asia Region Public Hearing on Forests and Sustainable Development attended by international commissioners. According to media reports, this event was 'dominated' by representations by and on behalf of Indonesia's 'indigenous people' about loss of forest land, livelihoods and other rights abuses. See WCED: Hargai Hak Masyarakat Tradisional, Kompas, 3 March 1996 (Anon); Sidang WCSED Didominasi Perdebatan Pengusahaan dan Masyarakat Tradisional, Kompas, 5 March 1996 (Anon); Kelentarian Hutang Berkait dengan Masa Depan Masyarakat Tradisional Medan Indonesia, 4 March 1996 (Anon); Locals want more say, Jakarta Post, 4 March 1996 (Anon).

4. See Li (1999) for an extended discussion of the tensions between Forestry and other departments over control of population and resources on the nation's frontiers.

5. See, for example, Moniaga (1995a); Ekstrasi Hukum Adat Dewasa Ini, Kompas, 27 March 1996 (Achyad Sodikii).

6. I am drawing here upon a set of interviews with Jakarta NGOs in 1996 as well as upon their published documents. Where the subject matter might be sensitive, I do not identify the organizations to which I am referring in my discussion.

7. See critiques of the government for its refusal to recognize customary land rights in Moniga 1993a, 1993b; Skephi and Kiddell-Monroe 1993; Semoga Hak Ulayat Dibahagi, Kompas, 29 March 1993 (Marsi Singarimbun); 'Indigenous Peoples' dan Pengusahaan atas Tanah, Kompas, 29 April 1993 (Tim Babcock and Maria Ruwiasatu); and Ekstrasi Hukum Adat Dewasa Ini, Kompas, 27 March 1996 (Achyad Sodikii). For an overview of the legal status of customary land rights, the difficulties of specifying who should be included in the category of 'indigenous people' in Indonesia and an attempt to reconcile these questions with World Bank policies, see Evers 1995. For a discussion of the difference between the Dutch colonial concept of a traditional-law society (masyarakat hukum adat) and the broader internationally recognized concept of 'indigenous people', as well as the lack of resonance of these concepts with forestry law, see Saffari 1995.

8. Peluso discusses the implications of mapping and notes the romanticism of activists and villagers alike who view adat unproblematically as the way local resources were managed prior to the 1960s, when foreign investment and intensive logging increased in frontier lands off Java (1993: 399).

9. For an elucidation of the phrase 'room for manoeuvre', see Tsing 1999; also Coombe 1989.

10. Sangadji (1996) states that the seven Lindu subgroups (descended from the seven original hillside hamlets) each have their own points of access to the lake and their own specific fishing grounds. Therefore, even if the Lindu were still allowed to fish after the power plant was constructed, they would not be able to do so according to their own traditions, and their cultural integrity would therefore be jeopardized. Sangadji's research continues to highlight the ways in which the Lindu are, and must remain, anchored to very specific spots on the landscape.

11. When I visited Lindu, a 'community mapping' process facilitated by an NGO was underway. The Lindu leaders who had travelled to Jakarta were key participants. They had been informed directly by the Minister of State for Environment that their case would be strengthened by representing their customary zones and places on maps which outsiders could read. On the politics of mapping (or counter-mapping) by the state, donors, NGOs and communities, and the implications of adopting a territorialized framework for describing and asserting resource rights, see Peluso 1995.

12. For green readings of Lindu used to support broader arguments, see Moniga 1993a, 1993b and Kearifan Masyarakat Adat dalam Konservasi Alam Sangat Tinggi, Kompas 13 September 1993 (Anon). The Institute of Dayakology also presents generic 'Dayak' as environmentalists (Bambu 1993). For critiques of the claim that natives are naturally nurturant of nature, see Hens 1986, Stearaman 1994.

13. Opposition to the hydroelectric project at Lindu was widespread in the community, so there was a common interest in the success of the campaign. On other matters, including the relevance of indigenous environmental knowledge to everyday lives and practices and the role of the adat council in controlling resources, there are bound to be differences of opinion among people differently situated by class, gender and ethnic origins. Since I have not carried out field research at Lindu I am not in a position to discuss these. On the class and gender inequities of adat systems, see von Benda-Beckman and von Benda-Beckman 1994; on 'lairdism' or the risks associ
I am grateful for access to transcripts of interviews with provincial officials carried out by Dan Paradis in 1994. Because the transcripts had been translated, I do not know which Indonesian expression was being translated here as 'indigenous people'.

To illustrate his point, the official showed photos of a Wana medicine man conducting a ritual. Prominently displayed in the Palu office are 'before and after' pictures of near-naked Wana who had subsequently been clothed, revealing the contradictory impulses of nostalgia and 'development'.

This situation has changed in the past five years as coastal elites have begun to plant, or buy up, cocoa and clove gardens. For discussions of the local and regional class dimensions of this process, see Li 1996, 1997.

Many people were reluctant to talk to me when I first started fieldwork in the Lauje hills because they feared that my research would lead to their resettlement. They were especially nervous about anything that looked like a list of names.

For an extended discussion of the implications of attributing a conservation ethic and subsistence motivations to upland farmers in Indonesia, see Li 1999; for a perspective on similar issues in the Philippines, see Li forthcoming. In the Amazon, Steward (1994) notes the outrage of environmentalists when the Kayapó sought to profit from the mineral resources within their territory.

Keck (1995) describes how particular places and events become efficacious in the articulation of political causes and the formation of alliances as they are re-interpreted through ever-widening frames of meaning. Her case concerns Brazilian rubber-tappers fighting labour battles being reframed as saviours of the tropical rainforest. A similar dynamic within India is documented by Sinha et al. 1997 and Rangan 1993. For a close reading of the textual embellishments and communicative processes through which environmental rhetorics are inflated, circulated and infused back into their 'original' sites, see Brosius 1997, Ch. 10 this volume.

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