CANADIAN ARCTIC POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND INUIT RECOGNITION:
A NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY ANALYSIS OF CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY AND THE “MISSING PIECE”

by

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Abstract

In 2007, the Canadian government announced its commitment to the development of the Canadian North through launching Canada’s Northern Strategy. The purpose of the Strategy was to address the issue of climate change and its associated effects of increased natural resource extraction and shipping activity in the Canadian Arctic region. Different from past federal government policy and program development initiatives in the Canadian Arctic, this Strategy appeared to make central Inuit voices by way of involving them in the four pillars that constituted the Strategy: Exercising our Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting our environmental heritage, and improving and devolving northern governance. As the Strategy began to unfold, however, responses from Inuit communities suggested otherwise. Current literature in regards to this issue agrees that Inuit have been placed on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy. Instead of asking how this took place, focus has been placed on ways to better insert Inuit voices into the Strategy as it moves forward. As a consequence, this issue does not get fully resolved. My dissertation examines the question: How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy in the first place? I posit that it is in illuminating the political rationale that underpins the Strategy where this question can be addressed. Using a neoliberal governmentality framework, I examine three case
studies from Canada’s Northern Strategy that are all in their beginning stages of
development, in order to reveal how a neoliberal political rationale is operating within
each of these projects and, consequently, how it defines the way in which Inuit
communities are able to participate. The intention of this analysis is to illuminate both the
objective and associated technologies that are responsible for placing Inuit communities
on the periphery, in order to be able to reconsider how these aspects influence the
Strategy and its relationship with Inuit communities moving forward.
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Canada’s Northern Strategy and “The Missing Piece”

I came to this dissertation initially from an experience I had in 2003. It was an experiential education program run through the University of Manitoba. Through the program, I spent a summer living in Pangnirtung, Nunavut, a predominantly Inuit-based community of approximately 1,425 people on the southeastern part of Baffin Island. While there, I lived out on the land, took part in community feasts, learned basic Inuktitut, and learned about the history and politics of the people and the region. The experience was eye-opening for many reasons: but one reason in particular was that nothing about what I was learning was adequately represented in the media, in politics, or in the educational system.

Four years later, I was watching a documentary about the history of the Northwest Passage. Throughout the documentary, I was hoping to hear a few interviews with people I had met from Pangnirtung, or, at least with people from the region in general. Though I learned a lot about the harsh conditions of the Arctic environment, the shipping routes, and the international interest in the area, there were no interviews with people from the region. In fact, there was no mention of people living there at all. In the following years, as I circulated through the many conferences, talks, and documentary viewings in Southern Canada, this erasure of Northern Inuit communities from “Arctic dialogues” became a common experience for me - sometimes it was explicit as described above, other times, it was not.

Shortly after I saw the documentary on the Northwest Passage, Canada’s Northern Strategy was announced: a Strategy that not only reflected the federal government’s commitment to northern development but also appeared to equally involve northern communities in the development and implementation of the Strategy for the Canadian Arctic. Given my experiences discussed above, I was interested to follow this Strategy. I wanted to see if, in fact, northern Inuit
communities would be equally involved. As the projects began to unfold, however, responses from the communities signaled that such involvement was not taking place. It was then that I decided to conduct a dissertation project on Canada’s Northern Strategy and Inuit recognition.

This dissertation addresses the issue of Inuit recognition in Canada’s Northern Strategy. Current literature on the topic acknowledges that Inuit are missing from the Strategy, and that better “insertion” tactics need to be developed in order to address the issue. Though I agree with the fact that Inuit voices are missing from the Strategy, my dissertation departs from the discussion on developing better “insertion” tactics. Instead, I ask the question: How have Inuit been placed on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy in the first place? I posit that it is due to a neoliberal political rationale that underpins the Strategy, which positions Inuit communities on the periphery. And that, the issue of Inuit participation in Canada’s Northern Strategy will not be adequately addressed, until the workings of this political rationale and its associated techniques are understood.

In order to illuminate this, I first historically situate the development of a neoliberal political rationale in the relationship between Canada’s Northern Strategy and Inuit recognition. I do so by tracing the development of a liberal political rationale in Sarah Bonesteel’s (2006) document, Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development, followed by tracing the development of a neoliberal political rationale in Coates and Poelzers’ (2010) On the Front Lines of Canada’s Northern Strategy. In Bonesteel’s document, I examine how the liberal concepts of economy, security, citizenship and representational democracy, and law are produced, and show the way in which this production positions Inuit communities on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development. In Coates and Poelzer’s document, I examine how the neoliberal concepts of value, expertise, and freedom and/or choice

develop from these earlier liberal concepts, and show the way in which this production continues to position Inuit communities on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development, although in different ways. The purpose of this examination is to show the historical connection between the production of a political rationale within Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition.

Following this, I examine how the neoliberal political rationale within Canada’s Northern Strategy produces itself on the ground. I do so by conducting a neoliberal governmentality analysis of three case studies connected to Canada’s Northern Strategy: a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound; an army-training base and a deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively; and a Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay. Within each case study, I reveal how a neoliberal political rationale underpins the project, as well as the workings of three associated techniques (the new prudentialism, technologies of contract and citizenship, technologies of performance) that justify and normalize this rationale. The purpose of this examination is to achieve an understanding of the nuanced ways in which this rationale works at present, in the realm of the day-to-day life of all of those involved in Canada’s Northern Strategy, so to produce the issue of Inuit recognition. I use a methodological combination of snowball sampling, semi-structured qualitative interviews, and access to information requests to collect my data. I then use the technique of close reading to select the most appropriate material from which to conduct my analysis.

There are four main contributions of this research: primarily, it adds a different set of questions to the general literature concerning Canada’s Northern Strategy and Inuit recognition by way of asking the question of how Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy instead of asking questions around better “insertion” practices; it expands on the already
existing critical literature on Canada’s Northern Strategy and Inuit recognition by documenting concrete ways in which the issue of Inuit recognition is currently taking place; it contributes to the literature on neoliberal governmentality by illuminating another example from which this logic is operating; and, it acts as a supporting document for advocates doing work on centralizing Inuit in policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic, as well as acts as a tool for those involved in policy and program development to use as a guide to think through questions of what recognition actually means.

Following, I lay out the foundations to the context of this dissertation. First, I detail Canada’s Northern Strategy. Second, I explore three literature sets related to the question of Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition, and situate my research within these literature sets. And, finally, I conclude with detailing the contributions of this research and providing a summary of chapters to follow.

Before I begin however, I would like to make a note that though this thesis focuses on Inuit recognition as an issue within Canadian Arctic policy and program development, it is not meant to preclude the significant achievements that have taken place (see Abele & Rodon, 2007 for an excellent detailing of such achievements). The focus on Inuit recognition as an issue in this dissertation is done in the spirit of contributing to what Abele (1987) describes as a consciousness of history. She states:

History never really repeats itself, because what has gone before limits and shapes the changes that come after, and because human beings are capable of acting in awareness of their history. Sometimes, of course, people act as if they were unconscious of prior experience: this is the lesson of recurring National Policy dream … Not all northern history has been lived unconsciously, however. Native people’s consciousness of their own history shaped and strengthened their political projects to decolonize and to protect their collectivities. (p.319)
This dissertation then, seeks to illuminate that which can still remain unconscious, with the belief that once made conscious, “human beings are capable of acting in awareness of their history.” (p.319)
CHAPTER 1

The Context

Canada’s Northern Strategy

In 2007, the Canadian Federal government announced its commitment to the development of the Canadian North through Canada’s Northern Strategy. The purpose of this Strategy was to address the issue of increased interest in the Canadian Arctic region, due to the effects of climate change. The document states:

Canada’s far North is a fundamental part of Canada – it is part of our heritage, our future and our identity as a country. The North is undergoing rapid changes, from the impacts of climate change to the growth of Northern and Aboriginal governments and institutions. At the same time, domestic and international interest in the Arctic region is rising. This growing interest underscores the importance of Canada to exert effective leadership both at home and abroad in order to promote a prosperous and stable region responsive to Canadian interests and values. (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 1)

Building on this commitment, the government developed a vision for the region. The vision included “self-reliant individuals,” a “northern tradition of respect for the land,” “accountable government,” and protection of the territory. This vision laid the foundation for the four pillars that constitute Canada’s Northern Strategy: exercising arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting environmental heritage, and improving and devolving northern governance.

Of most interest to me in this Strategy is the commitment to making Inuit central players in the development of the region. This is evident within the four pillars and throughout the Strategy, where a snapshot of such commitments can be seen:
Canada’s North is first and foremost about people – the Inuit, other Aboriginal peoples and Northerners who have made the North their home … (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 3)

Inuit – which means “people” in Inuktitut – have occupied Canada’s Arctic lands and waterways for millennia. Long before the arrival of Europeans, Inuit hunters, fishers and their families moved with the seasons and developed a unique culture and way of life deeply rooted in the vast land. Our nation’s strong presence in the Arctic today is due in large part to the contributions of Inuit, who continue to inhabit the North. (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 3)

Aboriginal people throughout the North have negotiated land claim and self-government agreements that give them the institutions and resources to achieve greater self-sufficiency … (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 4)

Therefore, the Strategy appears to recognize Inuit as central to the development of the Canadian north, as well as essential to the implementation of the Strategy in the region.

A Shift from History

One would think, given these statements, that the kind of relationship taking place between the federal government and Northern Inuit communities, in context of the development and implementation of this Strategy, is one of equanimity. After all, the acknowledgement of the North being first and foremost the home of Inuit is quite different from the lack of recognition of Inuit existence in past policy and program development initiatives (Abele, 2011; Dodds, 2011; Abele & Rodon, 2007). Specifically, a look at Sarah Bonesteel’s (2006) document entitled Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development, which traces key policy and program development initiatives between the federal government and Inuit communities from 1939 to present in the Canadian Arctic, makes evident how real this lack of recognition actually was (see Chapter 3 of this dissertation). For example, the “Re: 1939 Eskimo
Decision” discusses the question of who has responsibility for Inuit (and as such, treats Inuit as a burden to the federal government instead of as a group of empowered people who already have their own way of doing things, and who could be given support to continue building on this) (for further reading, see Backhouse, 1999). Similarly, another section in Bonesteel’s document that follows the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision” called “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations” reveals the ways in which Inuit were moved around the Arctic, without being given an adequate voice in the decision making, and without adequate follow-through on promises made in context of these moves (for further reading, see Kulchyski & Tester, 1994). Following this, in the sections entitled “The Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations” and “Comprehensive Claim Agreements,” the struggle for Inuit just to be acknowledged as equal citizens who have rights to their space is evident in the fact that they are not given such rights initially; rather, having rights is something they have to fight to attain as opposed to something they already have (for further reading, see Henderson, 2008).

In light of these kinds of examples, where Inuit have clearly been positioned on the outside of policy and program development initiatives, the acknowledgement that the Canadian Arctic is first and foremost the home of Inuit, and that the goal is to support and facilitate the growth and development of these communities, appears to mark a significant shift in the relationship between the federal government and Inuit communities, in context of policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic.

**A Deeper Look into Canada’s Northern Strategy**

A deeper look into this shift, however, raises significant questions about how Canada’s Northern Strategy has actually learned from history. Before the Strategy began to unfold, there
were other statements made, which indicated such a shift was not all that it appeared to be. For example, the Strategy states:

The increasing political maturity and certainty in the North are helping to encourage private sector companies to explore and develop the region’s vast natural resources and to diversify the region’s economies.

From the development of world-class diamond mines and massive oil and gas reserves, to the growth of commercial fisheries, to a thriving tourism industry that attracts visitors from around the globe, the enormous economic potential of the North is being unlocked. Areas that require urgent attention – such as infrastructure, housing and education – are being addressed to help ensure Northerners are positioned to seize these unprecedented opportunities. (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, pp. 4-5)

Here, it is evident that Inuit interests and values have already been defined for them through the emphasis on specific kinds of industry, and following this, on housing and educational opportunities. Yet, is this coming from Inuit, or is it being imposed upon them?

As the Strategy began to unfold, with announcements of various projects that were to be developed and implemented in the region, responses from Inuit communities indicated that the centralizing of Inuit in the Strategy might not be the kind of centralizing that began with Inuit interests and values. For example, the announcement to create a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound brought with it a seismic testing project in the region, which Inuit were neither informed about, nor in agreement with (see Chapter 4 of this dissertation). The announcement of creating an army-training base and a deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively, evoked responses that indicated the choice of the location for such projects did not centrally involve the communities who actually live in the region (see Chapter 5 of this dissertation). Similarly, the announcement of the creation of a Canadian High Arctic Research Station to be located in Cambridge Bay evoked questions about the decision-making process in choosing the location, and an obvious lack of central participation from Inuit in the process (see
Chapter 6 of this dissertation). These kinds of incidents raise alarming questions around what is actually taking place in the North, as the Strategy appears to be saying one thing, yet in practice doing something different.

Responses

There is a growing literature that addresses the problem of Inuit recognition within Arctic policy and program development. This literature spans across disciplines, from political science, to geography, to Native studies, to environmental science, to education, and to sociology (to name a few). Across these disciplines, I have chosen to focus on three main approaches taken to address the problem of Inuit recognition within Canadian Arctic policy and program development: the insertion approach, the critical approach, and the local approach.

The Insertion Approach

The first approach addresses the issue from the perspective of what I call the “insertion” approach. Here, the problem of Inuit recognition within Canadian Arctic policy and program development is identified, and the focus is placed on finding better strategies to insert Inuit into the already existing framework from which Canadian Arctic policy and program development is understood (see Byers, 2009; Huebert, 2009; Grant, 2010; Shadian, 2006; Coates & Poelzer, 2010). An example of this in the more general literature of Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition, can be seen in Dr. Jessica Shadian’s (2006) From States to Polities: Reconceptualizing Sovereignty through Inuit Governance. As she tells a story about her experiences at the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) executive meeting in New York City in June 2005, which also included a meeting at the Second Annual UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues the following day, she articulates arriving at the following question: “How can IR
[international relations] theory sufficiently take into account these ‘other’ political actors [referring here to Inuit], which are neither NGOs nor states and cannot so easily be categorized according to traditional dichotomies?” (Shadian, 2006, p. 46). Though an important question to examine in the realm of IR theory, the question resides in a call to explore better insertion strategies within the central framework, that being IR theory. In doing so, Inuit perspectives must fit themselves into the IR framework, instead of being acknowledged as whole in themselves.

Specific to Canada’s Northern Strategy, there is a notable example of this approach written by Dr. Ken Coates & Dr. Greg Poelzer (2010) in their publication On the Front Lines of Canada’s Northern Strategy. In this document, they acknowledge that a “missing piece” exists, which is that of Inuit participation in the Strategy. Instead of asking how this came to be, they provide different kinds of suggestions around ways to better incorporate Inuit voices into the Strategy as it moves forward. Similar to Shadian (2006), the authors do not question the framework of Canada’s Northern Strategy, placing focus instead on enabling Inuit perspectives to better fit into the already existing framework.

This kind of approach is also evident in the literature on the various themes that encompass the Strategy. For example, in the literature on marine conservation areas in the Canadian Arctic, focus is placed on “best management” practices of conservation areas and identifying more areas that are in need of them. Inuit participation is not even mentioned; rather, there is the assumption that Inuit can be inserted into the establishment of marine conservation areas (see Fast, Chiperzak, Cott, & Elliot, 2005; Berkes, Berkes, & Fast, 2007; Guenette & Alder 2007; Daoust, Haider, & Jesson, 2010). In the literature on security in the Arctic, a similar kind of approach is seen whereby “better security tactics” for the North are explored rather than exploring what Inuit might consider “better security tactics” and how they might participate in
such a project. (Huebert, 2009; Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrion, & Poelzer, 2008; Griffiths, Huebert, & Lackenbauer, 2011). It is inferred here, then, that “best security tactics” would include everyone, and that Inuit communities would be inserted into that framework. Again, this approach is seen in the literature on science and technology research in the Arctic in which authors are discussing the “complementary” nature of Indigenous knowledge systems with western science, and not addressing the fact that the projects themselves are based on western scientific frameworks, where Indigenous knowledge can be inserted when helpful or productive (Laidler, 2006; Huntington, Gearheard, Mahoney, & Salomon, 2011; Pierotti & Wildcat, 2000), but not ultimately driving the project.

Though these perspectives provide short-term strategies to the issue of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development by way of treating the issue as an inclusion issue, the longer-term issue of how Inuit communities get placed on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development remains unaddressed. Given this, what concerns me about this approach is the fact that the framework from which the issue is understood is not reflected upon and, as a result, the question does not get asked around how this Strategy (and Canadian Arctic policy and program development more generally) comes to exclude them in the first place.

The Critical Approach

The second approach I call the “critical” approach. Similar to the “insertion” approach, this perspective acknowledges the problem of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development. However, instead of focusing on questions concerning best “insertion” strategies, this perspective critically engages with the framework by which the problem is being seen and asks how this framework is central to the issue at hand (see Abele, 2011; Abele, 2009;
Abele & Rodon, 2007; Dodds, 2011). A good example of this approach can be seen in Dr. Frances Abele’s (2011) “Use It or Lose It? The Conservatives’ Northern Strategy,” where she assesses the Conservative government’s “vision for northern Canada” (p.219) through an examination of what is “expressed in Throne and other speeches, their northern policy statements (the Northern Strategy and the Statement on Northern Foreign Policy) and selected social, economic, environmental and political measures.” (p.219) Though Abele (2011) acknowledges that there have been some significant moves in terms of “infrastructure, knowledge about the North and foreign policy” (p. 219) from the Strategy, she identifies “deeply important policy challenges [which] have been virtually ignored” (p. 219) – one of which, is “the need for … measures to sustain social and political development and democratization in northern institutions …” (p. 219). By this, Abele is referring to the already existing framework of political and social life in the North that deserves to be honoured and maintained in the process of planning a Northern Strategy for the region. She states that this process of ignoring takes place due to an imposing Conservative government’s framework that does not align with the already existing Northern political and social life.

To a degree not seen since the 1950s, the Conservative government claims the North as a territory to be developed in the national interest, defining that interest, and consequently federal policy, almost entirely in terms of defense and economic development. With this stance, the federal power is poised to override – or at best ignore – the process of political and social development that reflects the purpose of northerners themselves, and of other Canadians who support them, in building the basis for a just society in the territorial North. (Abele, 2011, p. 219)

Here, the framework Abele (2011) identifies is one centred on defense and economic development. She identifies the fact that there is more than one framework operating (suggesting that the Northern framework is whole in itself), and that an “overriding” of the Northern framework by the Conservative government’s framework is what is taking place. Instead of
asking how Inuit voices could be better inserted into the Conservative government’s framework, Abele suggests what is needed is an acknowledgement of the already existing political and social framework operating in the North, and a support for building on this framework that already exists.

Another example of this approach can be seen in Dr. Klaus Dodds’s (2011) “We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic.” In this article, Dodds seeks to show how “Harper mobilizes domestic political support” (p.371) towards his approach for the Arctic through analyzing “Two Canadian Speeches from the Throne [2007, 2010].” (p.371) In this article, Dodds addresses the issue of Harper’s approach to Inuit recognition in Canada’s Northern Strategy. He does so firstly by illuminating the fact that there is indeed a framework that underpins the Strategy, through showing linkages between specific events in the Arctic to government announcements. For example, Dodds situates how the 2007 announcement came in the wake of the Arktika expedition, during which the planting of the Russian flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean floor took place. Dodds (2011) links this background to one of the Strategy’s focus on mapping the seabed floor, which he states is “a more assertive approach towards sovereignty” (p. 372). The article weaves together these kinds of connections throughout, which brings to light the fact that the announcements (and the Strategy itself) are located in a particular context (in other words, a framework), with its own set of intentions – a point in need of considering when trying to understand how an issue such as Inuit recognition could come about.

Dodds directly addresses the issue of Inuit recognition by way of discussing the link between the announcement’s commitment to resource extraction and northern development and the Strategy’s commitment to northerners. He cites that the commitment to development for northerners is of a specific kind, that of resource extraction, and not necessarily what northerners
themselves are asking for. He states: “It makes no reference to the social conditions facing Indigenous communities, such as cost of living, social deprivation not to mention inadequate housing (compare Simon, 2009) [emphasis added]” (Dodds, 2011, p. 372). Here, Dodds’s is pointing to the fact that there is indeed, a particular framework that is operating within the Strategy, and similar to what Abele (2011) discusses, that it is one based on a specific kind of economic development that does not necessarily align with Northern priorities. More importantly, Dodds suggests that there is a framework already existing in the North by way of making reference to Simon (2009). Simon, who was Canada’s first Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, among many other things, delivered a speech in 2009 at the University of Waterloo where she clearly articulated what is meant by development from the perspective of Inuit. This move on Dodds’s (2011) part is to show that there is an independent framework already operating in the North. Similar to what Abele was doing, Dodds does not ask how Inuit voices could be better inserted into the Strategy’s framework, but rather suggests that acknowledging, and beginning to listen to a framework that is already being articulated in the North, should be the place to start from.

In terms of the more specific themes within the Strategy that I deal with in this dissertation – a marine conservation area, an army-training base and deep-water port, and a High Arctic Research Station – critical approaches have yet to be explored (this dissertation acts as a starting point). However, there is critical literature beginning to take shape within more generalized themes found in the Strategy – specifically, environment and resource development (Cameron & Levitan, 2014; Cameron, 2012; Scobie & Rodgers, 2013), and security and sovereignty (Weber & Shields, 2011). None directly deal with the three case studies that I examine in this dissertation.
The Local Approach

The third approach, the “local” approach, is directly connected to Dodds’ (2011) reference of Simon. A growing amount of literature is being produced by Inuit themselves on the issue of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development. Similar to the other two approaches, this approach acknowledges the issue of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development. Where the critical approach illuminates the framework responsible for the issue of Inuit recognition, the local approach describes the framework by which recognition can begin to take place. Most notably are four key documents that outline Inuit perspectives of the Arctic region in detail (see Qikiqtani Inuit Association, 2012; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2013; Simon, 2009; Watt-Cloutier, 2009). Throughout these documents, three key themes emerge (though it is important to note that they do not necessarily correlate with the themes produced in Canada’s Northern Strategy, as they are produced from the perspective of those living in the area). The first theme sheds light on the fact that the Arctic is not an empty space in need of being used, but rather, it is an already occupied space and is used as the home of Inuit. In Mary Simon’s (2009) speech, she states,

During four visits to the Arctic since being elected prime minister, Mr. Harper has announced plans for a deep water port at Nanisivik and an army training base at Resolute Bay, pledged to spend millions of dollars to improve the Port of Churchill rail connection, and committed millions to extending our geoscience and ocean floor mapping, as well as strengthening broadband capacity. The prime minister has promoted, in his words, a “use it or lose it” strategy with respect to Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. Inuit view these comments with a certain level of irony. Inuit have been living in ... and using ... the Arctic for millennia, and we have no intention of “losing it.” We welcome the enhanced attention on the Arctic, and since it is our home, we have a perspective on how sovereignty should be promoted. (p. 252)

What is important to point out in this quote is the shift Simon makes in terms of how Inuit are positioned in relationship to the Arctic space. As people who are already occupying and using
the space, she says “We welcome the enhanced attention.” This subtle comment brings people living in the Arctic into the centre of the discussion on Canadian Arctic policy and program development. Here, the Arctic is no longer an empty space that outside perspectives can define; rather, it is a space occupied by people who are there to *receive* these perspectives and ultimately decide how useful they are in context of their knowledge of the region.

The second theme provides detailed information on how the Arctic space is currently used and conceptualized. Specifically, the focus is on wildlife and their patterns of migration, and the associated hunting activity. In a document produced by the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA) (2012) entitled *Tallurutiup Tariunga Inulik: Inuit Participation in Determining the Future of Lancaster Sound*, conceptualizations of the Arctic space are defined through wildlife and their patterns of migration. Figure 1 is a map of one community’s use of the land in terms of the hunting of ringed seal.
Not only is there a map that shows the migration routes of ringed seal, and the associated hunting grounds, there is also a map that shows the way in which Inuit set up their hunting grounds around this context (see Figure 2).
What is important about these maps is not so much the fact that there is wildlife in the area, knowledge around their migration, and that hunting takes place around this value, but that there is already an identified value in the region around which people in the region have structured their lives. Therefore, in context of creating Canada’s Northern Strategy, this kind of information should act as the starting point in terms of development in the region.
The third theme focuses on the idea of security. In 2013, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) put together a document entitled *Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty*, a collection of Inuit perspectives on Arctic security and sovereignty. Most notably, Udloriak Hanson, co-chair of the Arctic Peoples and Security Research Pillar with the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, states in the foreword:

> What does security mean to Inuit? Security doesn’t come from the comfort that some find in icebreakers, sonar detectors and Arctic military capabilities. Security from our societal perspective comes from access to the basic essentials of life – food, shelter and water. (ITK, 2013, p. 2)

Here again an Inuit perspective is provided on where to begin with developing a Northern Strategy on the issue of security. A shift is made from security being about icebreakers and sonar detectors to being about the basic life needs of Inuit. Of course, these three themes are the ones that I have chosen to highlight from among many that are found within the documents written and lectures given by Inuit. Nonetheless they show how much is documented already in terms of Inuit knowledge about the region and, more importantly, act as a productive starting point from which to begin developing a Northern Strategy with Inuit at the centre.

**A Research Project**

**My Dissertation Project**

My dissertation project focuses specifically on the relationship between Canada’s Northern Strategy and Inuit recognition. Departing from Coates and Poelzer’s (2010) insertion approach, my core research question for this dissertation is as follows: How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy? Building on the critical approach to Canada’s Northern Strategy used by Abele (2011) and Dodds (2011), I reflect on the framework
from which the Strategy is based, and posit that it is in identifying the political rationale that
underpins Canada’s Northern Strategy, as well as the specific techniques that support this
rationale, where we can come to see how this situation takes place. Specifically, I suggest that it
is through a neoliberal political rationale whereby problems are produced to justify the
development of a program based on neoliberal objectives, and strategies are produced to justify
and normalize these programs, such as the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and
citizenship, and technologies of performance. Throughout this process, Inuit are positioned on
the periphery of policy and program development. Without identifying the fact that a neoliberal
political rationale is steering the Strategy, the problem of Inuit recognition within Canada’s
Northern Strategy cannot be adequately addressed. My dissertation will examine how this
neoliberal political rationale is at the centre of the Strategy, and it will illuminate the ways in
which this political rationale is responsible for positioning Inuit communities on the periphery of
the Strategy.

**Contributions of Research**

There are four key contributions of this research. Primarily, this research departs from the
kinds of questions that are taking place within the academic environment around policy and
program development in the Canadian Arctic and Inuit recognition. As I show in the dissertation,
the dominant questions being asked at present tend to support the reproduction of the
circumstances of misrecognition (though not intentionally). The literature does this through
focusing on examining ways to better “insert” Inuit voices into the Strategy. My research works
with “the critical approach” literature, by acknowledging that a framework is responsible for a
“missing piece” from Canada’s Northern Strategy. And that, it is in acknowledging this
framework, and the nuanced ways in which it works, that will shift the way in which the problem of Inuit recognition in Canada’s Northern Strategy can be thought about, and addressed.

Secondly, this research builds on the “critical approach” on Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition. It does so by building on illuminating the problem of the Strategy’s imposing framework on a framework already existing in the North. As Abele (2011) and Dodds (2011) identify a framework that underpins the Strategy and a framework that exists within the North, my research builds on this to detail the specific techniques that are used to normalize and justify the overriding of a Northern framework by the Strategy’s framework. My research also acts as a beginning point for critical research in the three specific themes found in the Strategy: a marine conservation area, an army-training base and deep-water port, and a Canadian High Arctic Research Station.

Thirdly, this research aspires to use Dean’s (2010) rich analytical framework of liberal and neoliberal governmentality, based on Foucault’s (2003, 2007, & 2008) original work on governmentality, in the context of policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic. There have been many kinds of analyses conducted using Dean’s (2010) framework, and so my hope is that this research will offer yet another example of the way in which this framework can be useful to reveal the “constitute(ion of) the intrinsic logic or strategy of a regime of practices that cannot be simply read off particular programmes, theories and policies of reform” (Dean, 2010, p. 32). In this case, it is to understand the logic that exists within the lack of recognition of Inuit communities in Strategy making. As Dean (2010) states, “The strategic logic of a regime of practices can only be constructed through understanding its operation as an intentional but non-subjective assemblage of all its elements …. That is to say that regimes of practices possess a logic that is irreducible to the explicit intentions of any one actor but yet evinces an orientation
toward a particular matrix of ends and purposes” (p. 32). To that end, I wish to suggest that this lack of recognition actually takes shape unintentionally through all of those participating, both through their individual thoughts around the projects and through their day-to-day mutual interactions that build on these thoughts.

Fourthly, and perhaps more broadly, this dissertation aims to act as a supporting document for those advocating for centralizing Inuit involvement in policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic. It aims to provide support for what Inuit communities have been communicating for years regarding their right to be central in the decision-making process for the development of their region, and yet not being given this right even if it appears as though that is what is taking place. My hope is that this research gives evidence to the nuanced ways in which Inuit are not being recognized, and that it can be used as a tool to support changing this circumstance going forward, in the many places, and in the many ways, that it seems to show up.

In tandem with this, the research also aims to act as a tool for all of those involved in the development of policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic. Mainly, it aims to engage people in a conversation in which recognition is not seen as something static, that can be addressed by a set of insertion protocols, but as an ongoing conversation whereby those needing to be recognized are continually asked whether each step of development along the way is meeting that need, and adjusting/making changes as needed, in order to ensure such recognition is taking place. From the interviews that I conducted, it was clear that everyone acknowledged the importance of this recognition. My hope is that my research will show the importance of shifting the way in which we think about recognition.

Summary of Chapters

I have organized the dissertation into six chapters, which follow this introduction:
Chapter 2, entitled “Conceptual Framework, Methodology, and Technique,” details the conceptual framework from which I address the central research question throughout the dissertation. It also outlines the methodological approaches used to collect the data, and the technique used to select the data and apply the conceptual framework to the data collected.

Chapter 3, entitled “The Emergence of a Neoliberal Political Rationale in Canada’s Arctic”, conducts an examination of the emergence of a neoliberal political rationale within the relationship between Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition. It does so through re-reading the key events of “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”, “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations”, “The Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations”, and “Comprehensive Claim Agreements” from Bonesteel’s (2006) document, followed by a re-reading of “Canada’s Northern Strategy” from Coates and Poelzer’s (2010) document. This analysis reveals how the produced problems and solutions associated with these political rationales ensure the development of liberal and neoliberal political objectives in the region, and position Inuit communities on the outside of the development process. I chose to focus on a series of events in the history of this relationship, instead of on past Northern Strategies, in order to place a focus on the relationship itself, and not necessarily just the Strategy.

Chapters 4 through 6 examine the specific techniques that are used to justify and normalize the establishment of a neoliberal political rationale through three case studies from Canada’s Northern Strategy, all in their beginning phases: a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, an army-training base and a deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively, and a Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay. Within each of these projects, I examine how neoliberal techniques of the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance are used to justify and
normalize the development of neoliberal objectives in the region, and how these techniques work to position Inuit communities on the periphery of policy and program development in the region.

Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the answer to the question: How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy? Specifically, it summarizes the ways in which the emergence of a neoliberal political rationale takes place within Canadian Arctic policy and program development, and how this rationale effects Inuit recognition. It then summarizes the different techniques used to normalize and justify a neoliberal political rationale within the current Canada’s Northern Strategy, which enables the exclusion of Inuit communities from this process. Given this analysis, I then conclude with a set of recommendations for people working with Canadian Arctic policy and program development to consider, as well as future questions and/or research projects that could be developed based on these findings.
CHAPTER 2: Conceptual Framework, Methodology, and Technique

In Barry Brummett’s (2010) *Techniques of Close Reading*, he likens the organizing of the research process to that of a travel metaphor. He describes the process of preparing for a trip as constituting three key factors: choosing a map that can show where to go, choosing a method of transportation to help see the sites while there, and acquiring techniques that can help steer the chosen method most effectively. Similarly, the research process also constitutes these three key factors: the map is the conceptual framework – it provides a framework from which to enter the material that is gathered; the method of transportation is the methodological approach chosen – it dictates how to gather the information needed for the project; and finally, the techniques for steering are the techniques of pulling out the appropriate material from the data gathered, which define the most productive way in which to see what is needed within the data gathered. This chapter details the conceptual framework, methodologies, and technique that I chose to address my central research question: How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy? The chapter is divided into the three sections accordingly.

**Conceptual Framework**

**Theories of Neoliberalism**

In the early 2000s, a number of authors were producing articles that provided literature reviews and theoretical critiques on the question of what is neoliberalism (see Harvey, 2003; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2001; Jessop, 2002; Hindess, 2002; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Bourdieu, 1998; Castree, 2008; Larner, 2000; Barnett, 2010; Springer, 2012). Much of this literature is based on key theoretical texts from Karl Marx (1977) and Michel Foucault (2003, 2007, & 2008), and the location of the authors span the social sciences, including sociology,
political science, anthropology, and geography. In this chapter, I focus on three locations of neoliberalism that are explored within the literature: policy, ideology, and governmentality.

**Policy.** The first framework is neoliberalism as policy, where the values that underpin a neoliberal framework are not questioned. Larner (2000) cites these values as “the individual, freedom of choice, market security, laissez faire, and minimal government” (p. 7). These values are assumed to be universal values, and focus is placed on how to best develop projects based around them. For example, Larner (2000) discusses the acceptance of projects created to provide solutions, which support neoliberal values: a focus on managerialism, and a re-entry of the state in particular kinds of ways. This acceptance frames the conversation in “success” terms, meaning, how can the policy be more successful at reaching values, instead of questioning whether such values are what should be upheld in the context of policy and program development in the region in the first place. Larner (2000) states,

> In these analyses the response to neo-liberalism tends to take the form of arguments over the success, or otherwise, of policy programmes …. The most common response to the shift to a minimalist non-interventionist state is an argument for the reintroduction of forms of state control that will attenuate the power of the market and prioritize the re-establishment of national control. Thus a change in the policy agenda, involving a return to the more protectionist stance associated with Keynesian welfarism, is seen as the primary solution to the problems generated by neo-liberalism. (p. 8)

To the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy?” this framework would answer: this is not the appropriate question to ask. Given the fact that this approach accepts the underlying values of the Strategy without question, and would assume any problem that comes up could be dealt with through a “win-win” approach, the question to be asked is: How could Inuit be better included in the current Strategy? This approach obscures the fact that Inuit values are not equally a part of the Strategy and policy
process. Inuit are invited to participate in the process under the conditions of neoliberal values, while appearing as though they are equally a part of the process. This approach is the most currently used in terms of dealing with the relationship between Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition.

**Ideology.** The second framework is neoliberalism as ideology and/or accumulation by dispossession, as defined by David Harvey (2003). Harvey marks this time period as gaining clarity in the 1970s, where accumulation practices of liberalism that took place in many parts of the world during the 1960s and 1970s, changed markedly to accumulation by dispossession practices (Durand & Boulet, 2013). Instead of conceptualizing neoliberalism as a generative project that embodies accumulation, neoliberalism is a project of redistribution, whereby the “accumulation strategy [is] aimed at restoring class power” (Barnett, 2010, p. 4). Harvey (2003) draws on the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony in order to explain how a project that appears to be a generative one is actually one of redistribution. Barnett (2010) explains this as follows:

Neoliberalism ends up being legitimated “ideologically” by manipulating the representational content that people carry around in their heads. Hegemony is presented as a cultural process of constructing common sense that is misleading, obfuscatory, and disguises real problems. (p. 4)

In addition to this, Barnett (2010) also details the way in which Harvey discusses a key feature of accumulation which involves “fragmenting and particularizing social conflicts” (Barnett, 2010, p. 4) in the process of redistribution. Barnett (2010) states,

In Harvey’s analysis, accumulation by dispossession has the effect of fragmenting and particularizing social conflicts, in contrast to strategies that sustain accumulation through transformations to the labour process based on extended wage-labour, which have a universalizing effect in so far as they render transparent their own class content. (p. 4)
To the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy?” this framework would answer that this takes place through redistributive objectives (instead of generative ones), though appearing as though it is generative. And, the associated technique of hegemony and the effect of fragmentation would be used to establish such objectives in a justified and normalized way.

This approach is different from the policy approach in two ways: firstly, instead of accepting the values of the Strategy as is, it questions whether the values actually represent the needs of those it appears to represent. Looking at the Strategy through this lens, any ideological neoliberal approach would suggest that the generative appearance of the Strategy is actually one of redistribution; secondly, it would explain the positioning of Inuit communities on the periphery of the Strategy as the outcome of a redistributive approach. In order to address the problem of redistribution, which from this perspective causes the situation of Inuit being placed on the periphery, focus would be placed upon exposing the redistributive values of the Strategy, and its associated consequences of further reproducing economic inequality.

**Governmentality.** The third framework is neoliberalism as governmentality, which analyzes the knowledge that makes objects possible to govern and, in that sense, extends the exercise of power beyond the state to all areas of social life. Barnett (2010) writes,

The concept of “governmentality” … is a term that combines “government” and “rationality,” suggesting a form of political analysis that focuses on the forms of knowledge that make objects visible and available for governing. In Foucault’s terms, governmentality refers to a distinctive modality of exercising power, one which is not reducible to “the state.” Governmentality is understood to work “at a distance” by seeking to shape “the conduct of conduct”. This in turn implies that governmentality refers to a wide range of options of application. (p. 12)
Specifically, this framework focuses on the crux of “knowledge-strategies of power-technologies of the self,” instead of the issue of class. The meaning of this is that the social becomes the site of economics, and is then linked to particular forms of governing that take place to manage the exchange. In this sense, economics is not considered the centre of analysis as seen in the ideological approach. Rather, the centre of analysis is the strategies of power that operate within the social (between and within subjects) to produce knowledge that then forms what is come to be known as economics and particular forms of governance.

Foucault’s work on governmentality provides a means of understanding the relationships between knowledge, strategies of power and technologies of the self that can usefully augment narratives of neoliberalism. From this perspective, neoliberalism is understood as “a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic and link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-care’”. (Barnett, 2010, p. 12)

To the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy?” this framework would suggest that it is through the relationship of power and knowledge production that this situation takes place. Specifically, it would examine what kind of knowledge gets produced within the social sphere that justifies and normalizes the Strategy. It would then examine how this form of knowledge production values certain kinds of knowledge while obscuring other forms of knowledge. Identifying the kind of knowledge that is valued and obscured then explains why, and how, Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy.

This approach is different from the first two in three ways: firstly, similar to the ideology approach, this approach questions the fundamental values of the Strategy; secondly, different from the ideology approach, it questions the fundamental values by asking how such knowledge came to be produced, not hypothesizing that such values are based upon economic redistribution.
objectives; and thirdly, this approach uses discourse instead of representation, and productive power instead of repressive power as its form of analytics. This is different from the ideology approach, which uses the analytics of representation and repressive power.

**Neoliberal Governmentality**

Neoliberal governmentality is a term rooted in Foucault’s lecture series at the Collège de France in the 1970s (see Foucault, 2003, 2007, 2008). The term neoliberal governmentality has (and is) being used by authors across the social sciences (see Gordon, 1991; Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1996; Lemke, 2001). In this dissertation, I use Mitchell Dean’s (2010) framework of liberal and neoliberal governmentality, for which he provides a detailed analysis in his book, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, exemplifying the framework of governmentality in both liberal and neoliberal contexts.

**Liberalism.** Using a governmentality framework, Dean (2010) defines liberalism within four categories: economy, security, citizenship and representational democracy, and law.

**Liberal economy and liberal security.** In the context of a governmentality approach, Dean (2010) identifies what is meant by a liberal economy:

The classical political economy of the early nineteenth century is continuous with the broad bio-political field that is its condition in at least two ways. First, government will entail the making of regulations that need to take into account the natural and necessary processes that are exterior to it. Second, like bio-politics, it relies on processes that are to be found at the level of population as an organic living entity. Where it differs from other versions of biopolitics is that it will not be content to derive norms of the optimal conditions for the population to expand and prosper. It will balance these considerations against another set of norms, those derived from the delicate, unstable disequilibrium between the population and the resources necessary for its maintenance. The discovery of the ontological reality of scarcity means that the administration of life must take into account the means of production for the subsistence of that life. (p. 137)
Following this, Dean (2010) defines what is meant by liberal security in the context of a governmentality approach. He states,

… the relation between security and subsistence. In general, the provision of subsistence could only be provided for by the security of property in law and was not an activity of government. This is the case with one notable exception: the relief of the indigent poor. Subsistence must be provided for this category in order to prevent dangers to the security of the state, life and property. Of course, relief to the indigent should be granted in such a way as not to impede the mechanisms that produce abundance, or individuals’ preference for labour over state poor relief … In the first instance, then, the regulation made in the service of security has to be structured in such a way as to lead the indigent to prefer to exercise their responsibilities to sell their labour in the market and to provide for their family … the liberal problematic advises that security can be best attained by creating the conditions under which individuals can exercise various liberties. However, where the exercise of liberty might undermine the security of property or of the state, liberalism remains continuous with police in recommending detailed regulation of particular populations. (p. 138)

Therefore, a liberal economy involves identifying the main economy, and following this, producing the reality of scarcity within this economy. Liberal security involves naming a form of governance over a particular space, and then creating and caring for an indigent poor that inevitably is produced from this process: on the one hand, enticing them into participating in this particular framework, and on the other, ensuring that it is only just enough so that they remain dependent within this form of governance.

**Liberal citizenship and representational democracy.** Following the categories of liberal economy and liberal security, is the category Dean (2010) refers to as liberal citizenship and representational democracy. From the perspective of the governmentality framework, Dean (2010) defines liberal citizenship as follows:

Liberalism seeks to establish norms of government derived from the population in its concrete economic relations with the processes that will lead to the production of the resources necessary for its sustenance and prosperity … it employs these norms to limit the bio-political imperative to create the optimal conditions of the life of the population ….
Foucault noted the duality of the political individual as a subject shaped through normalizing practices and as a citizen with rights and liberties. The relation of liberalism to government can be thought about through each of these perspectives on the political subject. Examined through the notion of the citizen, the question for liberalism is to define a form of state compatible with her or his rights and liberties and to establish a political form that allows the aggregation of citizens’ diverse interests. (p. 144)

Furthermore, a liberal political rationale needs to establish what Dean (2010) calls a representational democracy:

We should not, however, think that representative democratic institutions less than fundamentally helped to reshape liberal-democratic societies over the course of the twentieth century. The critical review of government and its officials by representative institutions opens up a new space of politics. This is one of a mobilization of those concerns and aspirations that are fostered by and come to compose social government …. The wants and desires shaped by interventions in health, education, and social provision are translated into the political programmes of mass labour and social-democratic parties. One of the effects of representative institutions has been to convert diverse social interventions into mass political demands.

On the other hand, representative democracy is also one means by which the participation of the governed in the operation of government can itself be limited and regulated … “one of the merits of representation … is precisely that it secures a form of popular government in which ‘the people, in their collective form’ are excluded from any part in their government” …. Representative institutions, in this sense, are a governmental response to the democratization of sovereignty, a way of managing the effects of faction among the people and ensuring the strict separation of the governed from their governors. The problem of the management of the exercise of political activities that might corrupt the operation of government is then displaced onto the elected representatives and those who control the administration of the institutional design, which also includes the doctrine of the separation of powers and political non-interference in the judiciary and the broader principles of the rule of law. (pp. 143–144)

Therefore, liberal citizenship involves producing a liberal citizen through means of norms around leadership, political organizations, and institutional forms. Within these norms, the citizen will then be enabled to have choices around rights and interests. Representational democracy interconnects with liberal citizenship, as it focuses on establishing specific organizations from the groups being managed. This technique seeks to transfer the social needs that exist in the
group into political needs, and appears to provide a forum for such needs to actually be addressed. This process obscures already existing leadership and organizing that could be taking place within the groups.

_liberal law._ Building on his key terms of liberal citizenship and representational democracy, Dean (2010) outlines four key functions of liberal law within a liberal political rationality. The first function, he states, is about the way in which law is integral to the establishment of the nation-state, replacing that of localism:

First, law was historically an instrument for the construction of large-scale administrative monarchies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries …. It was thus a crucial means of overcoming localism and central to the establishment of constitutional nation-states. (Dean, 2010, p. 145)

The second function is to produce a general framework that establishes rules, which naturalize government intervention in the economy:

Second, law provides a general framework for governmental interventions which can ensure that such interventions set the rules for a form of government through the economy as quasi-natural reality. Law, or so it is claimed, permits the operation of exchanges, free from corruption, nepotism and partiality. (Dean, 2010, p. 145)

The third function involves enabling the participation of those who are being governed:

Third, law and more generally the democratization of sovereignty, permit the participation of the governed in the governmental economy. The parliamentary form allows each citizen a choice of how best to ensure the workings of the laws of the economy, but not whether such laws should govern him or her. It also limits the involvement of the governed in the activity of their government and displaces the problem of the management of political activity onto a range of actors, including politicians, public servants and the judiciary. (Dean, 2010, p. 145)

The fourth function is to produce “coordinating points,” such as institutions and agents, which are connected to the rules and ensure the proper functioning of these rules:
Fourth, law and juridical institutions and agents, particularly the courts, act as coordinating points for normalizing powers and governmental regulations. The juvenile justice system, family law and its administration, and even the criminal justice system themselves become invested with a multiplicity of agents (psychologists, psychiatrists, criminologists, social workers, doctors) and associated with a myriad of regulatory practices (counseling, therapy, rehabilitation, advice). (Dean, 2010, p. 145)

The fifth function is to use the practices of law itself to conduct reviews and methods of accountability, all of which enables a further production and normalization of liberal law:

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, liberalism retains and transforms the institutions and practices of law as the instruments of review and mechanisms of accountability of government. It establishes various tribunals, commissions and inquiries that operationalize the language and procedures of law against abuses found in governmental mechanisms such as bureaucratic decision-making or in the exercise of regimes of discipline in various institutions from schools to asylums to prisons. Further, the language of rights and liberties consequent upon the juridification and democratization of sovereignty is the means by which liberalism seeks to check the appearance of authoritarian forms of government that follow on from certain bio-political imperatives. (Dean, 2010, p. 145)

Therefore, the production of liberal law takes place through five functions: (1) through working with the objective of centralizing nation-state building over localism; (2) through establishing rules that can be used to ensure the productive operation of governance and economic processes; (3) through ensuring the participation of active subjects who have choices on how they would like to best govern; (4) through producing a central point of coordinating, such as political organizations and institutions, that can carry out the rules established, as well as provide a space for subjects to participate; and (5) through providing mechanisms of review to ensure that this specific process is built upon.

**Neoliberalism.** Using a governmentality framework, Dean (2010) defines neoliberalism as being made up of an objective constituted by three key features: value, expertise, and freedom. He defines a neoliberal objective as follows:
… a certain art of national government becomes available when society is regarded less as a source of needs that are individually distributed and collectively borne and more as a source of energies contained within individuals’ exercise of freedom and self-responsibility … If society is to be viewed as a source of energies consequent upon autonomous action and association, it is at best something to be facilitated and cultivated rather than a problematic and unstable domain to be regulated. (p. 179)

Within this definition, Dean (2010) identifies three techniques that are used in order to establish such objectives: the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenships, and technologies of performance.

**The new prudentialism.** The new prudentialism is a neoliberal technology first coined by O’Malley (1992) in his article entitled, “Risk, Power and Crime Prevention”. O’Malley (1992) defines prudentialism as follows:

prudentialism …. is a construct of governance which removes the key conception of regulating individuals by collectivist risk management, and throws back upon the individual the responsibility for managing risk. This may be advocated by its supporters as 'efficient', for individuals will be driven to greater exertion and enterprise by the need to insure against adverse circumstances and the more enterprising they are, the better the safety net they can construct. (p. 261)

To further elaborate on this, Dean (2010) states,

… the point of coupling risk technologies with contemporary formulas of rule might be described, after Pat O’Malley (1992), as the “new prudentialism.” Here, we witness the multiple “responsibilization” of individuals, families, households, and communities for their own risks … all instances of contriving practices of liberty in which the responsibilities for risk minimization become a feature of the choices that are made by individuals, households and communities as the consumers, clients and users of services …. It first of all (has) multiple domains to be monitored and prudently managed …. Further, what is calculated is not the dangerousness of certain activities, places and populations but the risks that traverse each and every member of the population and which it is their individual and collective duty to control …. Risk is a continuum rather than a clear break. Risk, in this sense, never completely evaporates. It can be minimized, localized and avoided, but never dissipated. There are, it is true, subpopulations to be targeted, but the entire population will remain the primary locus of risk. (pp. 194–195)
Therefore, the risk experienced by society is transferred from the government onto the individual, and becomes the individual’s responsibility instead of that of the government. Within this transfer there are multiple domains to monitor, and the kind of risk that is monitored does not pertain to particular activities but to risk that will never “evaporate,” thus the risk must be minimized. Given this, the entire population, instead of one subgroup, is the target of risk.

*Technologies of contracts and citizenship.* Connected to the new prudentialism are the technologies of agency, which encompass both what are called technologies of contracts and citizenship as well as technologies of performance. These technologies enable the story of risk to become justified and normalized through the production of subjects that have roles and responsibilities within the story, as well as subjects that have parameters by which to measure these roles and responsibilities. Dean (2010) states: “The calculations of risk are intertwined with two different types of technology. One is deployed from below [technologies of agency]. The other, as it were, is utilized from above [technologies of performance]” (pp. 195–196).

Technologies of agency are defined as follows:

> These are technologies of government that seek to enhance or deploy our possibilities of agency. There are two broad types of technologies of agency. The first comprises the extra-juridical and quasi-juridical proliferation of contract evidenced in the “contracting-out” of formerly public services to private and community agencies, agreements made by unemployed persons, the learning contracts of schoolchildren, performance contracts between ministers and senior public servants, enterprise agreements and so on. This proliferation of contracts has been termed the “new contractualism” …. One of the key features of the logic of contractualization is that once its ethos of negotiated intersubjectivity is accepted, then all criticism becomes simply a means to retooling and expanding the logic of contract. (Dean, 2010, p. 196)

The second type of technology of agency, that being citizenship, is defined as follows:

> As technologies of citizenship, political relations that entail empowerment have four features according to Cruikshank [1994] …. First, they are established by a definite, if
contested, form of expertise. The notion of empowerment is thus a component in a particular type of rationality of government …. It involves a knowledge of the powerlessness of the poor, and of the means for getting the powerless to participate …. Second, empowerment entails … “a democratically unaccountable use of power” in that one party initiates it …. Third, such relations depend upon a knowledge of those to be empowered …. Fourth, these relations of empowerment involve … a “voluntary and coercive exercise of power upon the subjectivity of those to be empowered” … require[ing] that the poor should act so that government might become effective. (Dean, 2010, pp. 83–84)

Therefore, technologies of contract involve establishing a particular position associated with the project that determines the base from which criticism can take place – in this sense, criticism becomes an act of rebuilding and expanding on the initial contract, not questioning the contract itself. Secondly, citizenship involves developing an expertise (based from the contract) that is initiated from outside of the community, gathering knowledge about the “powerless” group from which the contract and citizenship is being established, and using voluntary and coercive forms of power to incentivize the powerless group to participate in these technologies.

Technologies of performance. Technologies of performance develop in relationship with the technologies of contract and citizenship whereby particular processes, rules, and procedures specifically frame how particular subjects participate in a project within neoliberal objectives. As a result of this, the kinds of questions that can be asked reside within certain parameters. These technologies establish parameters of thought and discussion regarding the project. Dean (2010) defines technologies of performance as:

…the plural technologies of government designed to penetrate the enclosures of expertise fostered under the welfare state and to subsume the substantive domains of expertise … to new formal calculative regimes …. Here, the devolution of budgets, the setting of performance indicators, “benchmarking,” the establishment of “quasi-markets” in expertise and service provision, the “corporatization” and “privatization” of formerly public services, and the contracting-out of services, are all more or less technical means for locking the moral and political requirements of the shaping of conduct into the optimization of performance. These technologies of performance, then, are utilized from
above, as an indirect means of regulating agencies, of transforming professionals into “calculating individuals” within “calculable spaces,” subject to particular “calculative regimes.” (p. 197)

Therefore, technologies of performance are evident when the new domains of expertise created under technologies of contract and citizenship establish specific formal calculative systems. As mentioned above, examples would be systems such as budgets, performance measures, and benchmarking. The point of this technology is to filter the moral and political requirements associated with neoliberal objectives into conduct that ensures the production of such performance.

**Methodology**

**Case Study**

I chose to use a case study method over other qualitative field research methods such as naturalism, grounded theory, institutional ethnography, and participatory action research (there is a broader literature set that situates qualitative field research within other forms of research methods, such as experiments, survey research, unobtrusive research, and evaluation research, to name a few [for further details, see Babbie, 2008; Yin, 2009]). The case study method suited my research project for two reasons: firstly, my research question was seeking an explanation, instead of simply describing or detailing an event, which is mainly the job of ethnographical methods (see Babbie, 2008). The case study approach not only allowed me to go into depth on this one particular issue but also allowed me to analyze this depth across three case studies at the same time and then compare these case studies to historical events. This in-depth cross-comparison approach enabled me to develop an in-depth explanation to my research question. Secondly, I chose the case study approach to further build on the already existing literature on
Canadian Arctic sovereignty and Inuit recognition. This approach is different from the grounded theory method, which seeks to enter the field with no prior knowledge of what has already been said about the research question at hand. I wanted to build dialogically but critically on the already existing literature through asking a different set of questions in order to see what kind of different understanding could be attained.

Therefore, the three case studies that I use are three projects from the Strategy: a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, an army-training base and deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively, and a Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay. I chose these specific case studies because they were projects from Canada’s Northern Strategy that had produced responses from Inuit communities that were in need of being addressed.

**Snowball Sampling**

Within the case study approach, I used the snowball method as my beginning point to attain original data. I chose this method specifically because the three case studies were each in their beginning phases, and so, clearly identifying (as well as contacting) those who were involved in the projects would be a difficult task. As Babbie (2008) states,

> This procedure is appropriate when the members of a special population are difficult to locate …. In snowball sampling, the researcher collects data on the few members of the target population he or she can locate, then asks those individuals to provide the information needed to locate other members of that population whom they happen to know. “Snowball” refers to the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects. (p. 205)

The snowball method is a non-probability sampling technique (see Babbie, 2008, for more detail on other kinds of probability and non-probability techniques in social science research). In the
situation of my three case studies, I carried out a detailed web-based search on each project, and printed out all of the main media documents that were available. Within each of these media documents, I highlighted the names that were mentioned. I used these names as my starting point for establishing my samples, and then built from there.

**Semi-Structured Qualitative Interviews**

In addition to snowball-sampling, I conducted semi-structured, qualitative interviews with all of the participants. Babbie (2008) defines qualitative interviews as follows:

> …. an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry including the topics to be covered, but not a set of questions that must be asked with particular words and in a particular order …. A qualitative interview is essentially a conversation in which the interviewer establishes a general direction for the conversation and pursues specific topics raised by the respondent. (p. 336)

Once I gathered enough names from the media articles, I identified a pattern of four different groups involved in the Strategy: government representatives, industry representatives, Inuit political organizations, and academics. My goal was to conduct an interview with at least one representative from each category of informants within each case study.

Given the fact that I was using a neoliberal governmentality lens to analyze the Strategy, my questions were organized around this theoretical framework. I used four specific questions with each participant. The four questions were as follows:

1. What is your relationship to the project? (neoliberal subjectivity)
2. How do you understand the need for the project? (neoliberal objective)
3. How has the process unfolded so far? (neoliberal technologies used)
4. What have the challenges/limitations been, now and future? (neoliberal reflections)
Each of these questions is rooted within the neoliberal governmentality framework: question one refers to the kind of neoliberal subject that is produced; question two refers to the relationship between the project and neoliberal objectives; question three refers to the kinds of technologies that are used to justify and normalize the project to the subjects; and, question four reveals the ways in which the subjects are able to see their own implication in the projects, as well as their own understandings to the historical connection between the current Strategy and past projects, and the relationship between the federal government and Inuit communities. I ended each interview by asking if there was anything else the participants wanted to share that wasn’t covered by the initial questions. By doing this, I wanted to ensure that my research was open to ideas that were not necessarily introduced by the questions.

All of my interviews took place over the phone and through visits to Ottawa. There were a few reasons for this: firstly, as I documented the names of those involved in the projects, I found that many of those that I was to interview were not located in one place but in different regions of Canada. This makes sense, given the fact that my project includes a variety of individuals involved in the making of the Strategy for the Canadian Arctic, from community members to members of the federal government, industry, and academia. Secondly, the projects were at their beginning phases, meaning that most of the information in regards to the projects were located in Ottawa; in fact, much of the information about the projects had not yet reached the communities. When I inquired about visiting a community in Nunavut to conduct interviews with local members, I was asked to wait until the community members had been consulted about the project, of which the dates were not concretely set (and, throughout the year of my research, were continually pushed back). Though this was interesting in itself – for example, that a Strategy for the communities clearly wasn’t coming from the communities given the fact that I
had more information on the projects than the communities themselves had – I honoured this request by conducting phone interviews only with select community representatives who had been specifically assigned to work on the projects. Given my experience with this, it would be interesting to conduct follow-up research that focuses specifically on the consultations the federal government holds with all three communities. Specifically, I would be interested in examining when the consultations actually took place in relationship to when the announcement of the projects was made, who was chosen to conduct the interviews, how the consultations were framed, and what kind of participation was and/or wasn’t encouraged within these meetings.

**Access to Information Requests**

Finally, in addition to these phone interviews and visits to Ottawa, I submitted an access to information request for each case study, in order to get a fuller understanding of the projects. I also asked participants for any kind of documents they might have had that they thought would be helpful and/or informative. I also used additional web-based searches to retrieve documents that discussed the history of Canadian Arctic policy and program development more broadly. Once I had collected all of the data (both through interviews and through the access to information requests), I used a “close reading” methodology to illuminate the analytical framework of neoliberal governmentality within Canada’s Northern Strategy. This meant that I chose only a few specific interviews and documents from the large collection of data that I had, in order to best illuminate my position.

**Close Reading Technique**

In Bass and Linkon’s (2008) article, “On the Evidence of Theory: Close Reading as a Disciplinary Model for Writing about Teaching and Learning,” close reading is defined as being
based upon four key tenets: “inquiry, texts, theory, and argument” (p. 249). Instead of beginning with a clear central question, inquiry is based upon patterns found over time within multiple texts. In the case of my research project, the central question is: “How do Inuit communities get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy?” This question is based on a pattern I found among several media articles and academic literature reviews, which discuss the Strategy and its relationship to Inuit communities as it unfolded over a specific period of time.

The second tenet, attention to text, is at the heart of close reading. Bass and Linkon (2008) state that text can take many forms: “an existing body of critical ideas … or a particular … practice … or a detailed description of a[n] … approach” (p. 249). In the case of my research project, I use multiple forms of text. This includes academic texts from a variety of disciplines (Canadian Arctic policy and program development, marine conservation areas in the Arctic, Canadian Arctic security, Canadian Arctic science), interview texts from different subjects (Inuit political representatives, government representatives, industry representatives, and academics), and access to information requests from different departments (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Ministry of Defence, and Parks Canada).

The third tenet of close reading, theory, is in direct relationship to text. Bass and Linkon (2008) state that “the partner of the text is theory …. Theory is invoked in presenting the analysis of a text as well as in arguing for the significance of that analysis … theory is embedded in the discipline’s habits of mind, [and] its assumptions” (pp. 249–250). The fourth tenet is also mentioned here, that being the argument. In the case of my research project, I read the text through, and in partnership with, Dean’s (2010) liberal and neoliberal governmentality theory (as discussed above), which enabled me to develop a framework from which to choose the texts I focus on, as well as choosing how I read them. It also justifies my argument that Inuit are
positioned on the periphery of the Strategy due to the Strategy being based upon a neoliberal objective.

I would like to note here that in conducting my close reading of each of the interviews, I referred to each of the interviewees by either “the subject”, or with the ascribed title that they were given in relationship to the project. I did not do this for the sake of anonymity. After all, in my interviews, I began by stating that the interview was considered a public conversation, and so if anything came up that the interviewee wanted to keep private, to let me know and I would take it off the record. My intention in using “the subject”, or the ascribed title used to describe them within the project, is to engage the reader in connecting with the subject, both as they are understood within the realm of the project, as well as how they understand themselves in relationship to the project - not necessarily by any other identifiers (such as gender, or their specific name). This reveals the way in which a subject is truly produced within the project – both through the title they are given, as well as the way in which they choose to take it up.

Similarly, the Strategy refers to people living in Nunavut as on the one hand, “… the Inuit, other Aboriginal Peoples, and Northerners” (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009: p.3), and on the other hand, as “Northerners” (p.5). In this thesis, I orient primarily to the term Inuit in the analysis. Having said that however, I note that in several contexts, it seems that certain uses of the term Northerner are warranted (for example, when making reference to Canada’s Northern Strategy; when speaking to material in which other people are using the term; and so on). In this way, my approach is meant to be systematic, despite its apparent flexibility. The challenges associated with this make it clear that, in fact, the matter requires further examination that is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this thesis. In my present view, such an examination would
make a significant contribution (both to the literature and interpretation of my analysis),
particularly in context of the question of Inuit recognition in Canada’s Northern Strategy.
CHAPTER 3: The Emergence of a Neoliberal Political Rationale in Canada’s Arctic

In 2006, Sarah Bonesteel of Public History Inc. produced a document entitled *Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development*. Bonesteel’s document traces the federal government’s rationale in terms of key historical events that took place in the Canadian Arctic, in order to explain the relationship between Inuit communities and the federal government. Similarly, in 2010, Dr. Ken Coates and Dr. Greg Poelzer produced a document entitled *On the Front Lines of Canada’s Northern Strategy*, in order to address the rationale of Canada’s Northern Strategy, and in effect, its relationship with Inuit communities. In tandem with much of the literature on the history of Canadian Arctic Development and Inuit recognition (see Byers, 2009; Griffiths, 1987; Grant, 2010), both documents address the problem of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development from a policy-based perspective (see Larner, 2000; Springer, 2012; Barnett, 2010). This perspective identifies the issue of Inuit recognition in policy and program development, by way of exploring better incorporation strategies. How Inuit come to be dismissed within policy and program development in the first place, however, remains a question. I posit that it is in identifying the political rationale that constitutes policy and program development where the answer to this question resides. In this chapter, I trace the emergence of a liberal and neoliberal political rationale within Canadian Arctic policy and program development, through conducting a re-reading of four key events from Bonesteel’s document *Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development* (“Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”, “Arctic Sovereignty & Inuit Relocations”, “The Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations”, and “Comprehensive Claim Agreements”) and the key event of Canada’s Northern Strategy from Coates and Poelzer’s
I analyze both the policy-based readings of each event followed by the governmentality readings of each event. My intention is to show how a shift in analysis, from a policy-based perspective to a governmentality perspective, can offer a different point to think through approaches to deal with the problem of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development.

Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision

A Policy-Based Perspective on the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”

Bonesteel (2006) describes the cause of the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision” as originating from the collapse of fox pelt prices and the scarcity of caribou, which caused widespread starvation among Inuit. She states,

In the early 1930s, the collapse of fox pelt prices and scarcity of caribou resources created wide-spread starvation for Inuit in Labrador, northern Quebec and across the Arctic. The federal government issued relief to Inuit, as it did for First Nations throughout Canada, even though Inuit status and federal responsibility for the administration of their affairs was not clearly defined. (p. 5)

Given this cause and effect, the problem became whether Inuit were Canadian citizens, or like First Nations, wards of the state. She writes, “Various levels of government were uncertain if Inuit were Canadian citizens or if they were wards of the state, like First Nations” (Bonesteel,

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1 As mentioned, there are a number of authors who discuss the history of the Canadian Arctic and Inuit recognition. Both Bonesteel’s document, Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development, and Coate and Poelzer’s document, On the Front Line’s of Canada’s Northern Strategy, are reports produced specifically for governing bodies (the Government of Canada and the Federation of Canadian municipalities), which illuminates the general narrative around how this relationship is understood and discussed. Also, both focus on the issue of Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition, though within different time periods. For both of these reasons, I chose these two documents on which to focus my analysis.
Thus, the problem that the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision” was founded upon was who had responsibility for taking care of Inuit communities.

In order to address the problem of who Inuit were in relationship to the Canadian government, two strategizing events took place. The first involved addressing the question of whether Inuit were the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior or the Department of Indian Affairs. Bonesteel (2006) states,

In 1924, the Minister of the Interior proposed a bill to amend the 1876 Indian Act, specifically recognizing Inuit in Canadian legislation for the first time, and assigning responsibility for Inuit to the Department of Indian Affairs. Despite dissent from opposition members of Parliament, the bill passed with the caveat that Inuit were Canadian citizens and would not become wards of the state under the bill. In 1928, however, an order in council transferred authority for Inuit from Indian Affairs to the Northwest Territories (NWT) Council, which operated within the Department of the Interior. In 1930, the Canadian Government repealed the 1924 amendment to the Indian Act. Inuit administration, however, continued under the NWT Council in Ottawa and by the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) in northern Canada. (p. 6)

Therefore, Inuit were assigned the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs, and later were transferred back to the Department of the Interior through the Northwest Territories Council.

The second event was when Quebec took the question of who has responsibility for Inuit to the Supreme Court. Even though the Department of Interior was responsible for Inuit, they expected refunds from Quebec on the relief they were providing for Inuit living in Quebec, as Quebec was the only province that had Inuit living there. By 1932, the relief payments were deemed too much, and Quebec refused to pay, stating that Inuit should be a federal government responsibility. Bonesteel (2006) states,

As the Indian Act no longer applied to Inuit, and it was unclear if Inuit were classified as Indians in the 1763 Royal Proclamation and the Constitution Act, 1867, Quebec brought
the question of responsibility for Inuit to the Supreme Court in 1935. Here, Quebec argued that Inuit were Indians under Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. On 5 April 1939, the Supreme Court pronounced their judgement on Re Eskimo in agreement with Quebec. The Supreme Court stated that, constitutionally, Inuit were classified as Indians in Canada. The decision was based on the historic description of “Esquimaux” [Inuit] as an “Indian tribe” in numerous documents dating from 1760 to Confederation. Through this decision, the Canadian Government became legally responsible for Inuit. (p. 6)

Therefore, the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision” marked the occasion of Inuit officially becoming the responsibility of the federal government.

Given this policy-based analysis, Bonesteel (2006) identifies ongoing concerns as being the still unfinished question of the federal government’s responsibility for Inuit. She states,

*Re Eskimo* continued to remind Canada of its obligation to Inuit, yet Canada sought to ensure that Inuit remained distinct from First Nations in legislation and governance. Although the Indian Act continues to outline federal responsibility for First Nations in Canada, there is no corresponding legislation or policy for Inuit …. According to Inuit, however, the *Re Eskimo* decision entitles them to specific federal programming for relevant issues, such as healthcare. (p. 7)

From this policy-based perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development?” is not addressed. Rather, the issue of Inuit recognition is acknowledged, and focus is placed on best strategies to deal with the issue, given the circumstances. In this case, best strategies include further clarifying the obligations of Canada towards Inuit. This approach is helpful for temporarily dealing with the issue of federal responsibility for Inuit; however, the question of how Inuit became an obligation to Canada in the first place, instead of equal partners in the process of northern development, remains.
A Liberal Political Governmentality Perspective on the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”

In “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”, the emergence of a liberal political rationale can be seen through the development of two concepts: liberal economy and liberal security. As described in Chapter 2, a liberal economy involves identifying the main economy and, following this, producing the reality of scarcity within this economy. Liberal security involves naming a form of governance over a particular space, and then creating and caring for an indigent poor that inevitably is produced from this process: on the one hand, to interest them into participating in this particular framework, and on the other, ensuring that it is only just enough so that they remain dependent within this form of governance.

In the case of the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”, both of these concepts of economy and security are evident. The production of economy takes place through firstly identifying fox pelts and caribou as the main economy, and secondly through producing forms of scarcity through identifying starvation as a result of the drop in this type of economy. The production of security takes place through asserting one form of governing over that space, that being the federal government, and then placing Inuit into a category of “indigent poor” that need a particular kind of care. Neither of these forms of economy, nor security, account for the kind of economy that Inuit may prefer to engage in. Nor do they account for what security would mean for Inuit who are living in that space.

Given this, the problem that is created is who has responsibility for Inuit, which frames the way in which the situation is thought about. It does so by establishing a framework based upon liberal values of economy and security, from which particular ideas and questions can be thought and discussed, while others cannot. For example, the question of “Who has responsibility for Inuit?” generates a focus on various strategies around which government
departments have responsibility for Inuit, excluding the question of whether Inuit have responsibility for Inuit, and what kind of legislations or policies could be produced to resolve the issue from these government departments. What is not discussed are questions around how Inuit themselves would like to proceed with an economy in the area, how they might define security, and how these kinds of questions might create a very different problem in the region. For example, a problem that is not about giving the federal government the function of caretaking for Inuit communities but about recognizing what already exists there and finding ways to support it.

From a liberal governmentality perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development?” is directly addressed. The development of liberal economy and security defines what is to be governed, and how this governing should take place. In this case, Inuit notions of economy and security are not a part of liberal economy and security as seen in “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”. The result of this is a dismissal of Inuit knowledge and/or practices of economy and security, and an inviting of Inuit into the process of development on the terms of liberal forms of economy and security. This inevitably results in the issue of Inuit recognition, and solutions such as better incorporation strategies.

**Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations**

**A Policy-Based Perspective on “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations”**

Bonesteel (2006) describes the cause of “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations,” as originating from political and international conflicts in the Arctic region, with the associated effect of Canada losing sovereignty over the region:
Sovereignty over the Arctic and the associated Archipelago did not become a concern for Canada until late in the nineteenth century, when political issues and international conflicts caused the Canadian Government to assert a presence in the region. (p. 27)

Given this stated cause and effect, the problem that “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations” deals with is the problem of ensuring Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic region.

In order to address this problem of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic region, a number of different strategies were used (see Bonesteel, 2006, pp. 25–31), and in particular, two key events that involved Inuit communities: Inuit relocations in the 1920s, and Inuit relocations in the 1950s.

Bonesteel (2006) states that the 1920s Inuit relocations were motivated by both sovereignty concerns and subsistence needs:

Beginning in 1920, the Canadian Government facilitated Inuit relocations. These relocations were primarily motivated by subsistence needs, and moved Inuit to regions, sometimes successfully, with reported better natural resource yields to prevent starvation within Inuit communities. On several occasions, however, Inuit relocations were motivated by sovereignty concerns. The HBC also proposed relocation projects to the federal government that would assist them in opening posts across the Arctic. To ensure success of the HBC’s business venture, Inuit trappers were needed. In 1934 for example, Inuit from Cape Dorset were relocated to Devon Island when the HBC re-opened a post that had closed several years earlier. Some Inuit were relocated seasonally, such as those in the western Arctic who were encouraged to winter at Banks Island and Herschel Island during the 1950s, with both the assertion of sovereignty and the fear of starvation as motivating concerns. (p. 29)

Therefore, the first set of relocations, as identified by Bonesteel, were motivated by sovereignty concerns as well as the prevention of starvation. Reflections on the government’s decisions around these concerns were deemed appropriate for the most part. Bonesteel (2006) states,

According to the Royal Commission Report on Aboriginal Peoples, in most cases with early relocations, Inuit were satisfied with their new surroundings or were assisted in returning to their original territory if they were unhappy. Although relocations of Inuit families were supposedly conducted to areas of resource abundance where Inuit could live
self-sufficiently, the federal government also had a *de facto* concern for sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic. (p. 29)

Therefore, from Bonesteel’s (2006) perspective, the government did a good enough job at addressing the concerns of sovereignty and starvation, as the relocations enabled Inuit to have a more resource-abundant life while meeting the sovereignty concerns of the government.

The second relocation event that took place was in 1953. Bonesteel (2006) states,

The 1953 relocations of Inuit families from Port Harrison (Inukjuak) and Pond Inlet to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord (Craig Harbour), however, were controversial. Government motivations for the relocation were not clearly conveyed to the Inuit involved or to the Canadian public, and Inuit were moved from northern Quebec to the High Arctic, which involved adaptations to a colder climate and longer periods of total light or darkness. Additionally, it is unclear if the government made or honoured promises to return Inuit to northern Quebec if and when requests to return were made. In 1993, the Royal Commission investigated claims against the government made by Inuit who participated in the relocation and their descendants. A presentation to the Commission by then-President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Rosemarie Kuptana, focused on the cultural and historical context of relations between Inuit and non-Inuit in northern Quebec during the 1950s, and in particular the concept of “ilira.” According to Kuptana, “Inuit use ilira to refer to a great fear or awe, such as the awe a strong father inspires in his children.” The growth of the fur trade and disease epidemics combined to increase Inuit dependency on non-Inuit, including Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Hudson Bay Company staff and missionaries, producing a feeling of ilira among Inuit in their relations with non-Inuit. As Kuptana stated to the Commission, real consultation of potential relocations was not possible with Inuit, as a “challenge to the authority of the Qallunaat [white people] or defiance of their requests was almost unthinkable.” (p. 29)

Therefore, the second set of relocations, as identified by Bonesteel (2006), did not display the same kind of clear motivations by the federal government as seen articulated in the 1920s.

Though the government’s decision to relocate Inuit communities was questionable, it was still justified within the realm of “they did what they thought was best at the time.” Bonesteel (2006) states,

The Commission published their report in 1994, concluding that the relocation “place was inherently unsound, it was misrepresented to Inuit to gain their concurrence, and the means
adopted to carry out the plan were equally unsound.” The report went on to state that, however inappropriate the project, “the Government did what it believed to be best for the Inukjuak Inuit in the institutional context of the time.” (p. 29)

When asked to give Inuit communities the recognition they deserved, in their role of enabling Canada sovereignty in the region, such recognition was not granted.

Bonesteel (2006) cites ongoing concerns as involving the need for a strategy to ensure appropriate management of increased activity and sovereignty concerns in the area. She states,

To protect its sovereignty, Canada also seeks to maintain a military presence and its military capability in the North, which continues to be supported by the Northern Rangers program. As ice in the Northwest Passage melts, Canada requires a comprehensive strategy that balances the management of potential increases in international water traffic and expansion of Arctic ports, with the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and environmental stewardship of the North. (p. 35)

From this policy-based perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development?” is not addressed. Rather, the issue of Inuit recognition is acknowledged, and focus is placed on best strategies to address the issue. In this case, strategies that deal with the issue of Inuit recognition must work around Canada’s need to ensure sovereignty over the region. If, upon reflection, relocation was not an effective strategy, another strategy could be developed. This approach provides temporary strategies to address the issue of Inuit recognition; however, the question of how Inuit become possible subjects for relocation in the first place, instead of subjects who define for themselves what will take place in the region, remains.
A Liberal Political Governmentality Perspective on “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations”

Similar to the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision”, the concepts of liberal economy and liberal security underpin the production of “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocation.” The production of economy takes place through the identification of trapping and resource yields as the main form of economy, closely associated with the concept of starvation, which in turn presents the logic of scarcity. The production of security takes place through a more intensified form of governance over the Arctic region by way of needing to establish sovereignty in the area and positioning Inuit in the place of “indigent poor,” who can be relocated to serve economic and security purposes and who will eventually begin participating in the economy. Again, what remains significant is the fact that neither of these forms of economy and security account for the way in which Inuit may already be participating in their own forms of economy and security; neither does it account for the way in which they would like to be supported in those directions.

Given this, the problem becomes how to establish sovereignty in the region, which frames the discussion in a particular way. It does so by establishing specific ways of thinking and posing specific questions to be considered. For example, questions such as how to establish sovereignty in the region, how to generate resource yields, and where to relocate Inuit communities, are the kinds of questions that inform the strategies that can be imagined or discussed. What cannot be thought about includes why the certain forms of economy and security are being supported, how there may be different forms of economy and security that could be supported, that relocating Inuit communities may not be needed at all, and that in fact an entirely different set of problems may need to be strategized if discussions are to begin with the needs of Inuit communities.
From a liberal governmentality perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development?” is directly addressed. The development of a liberal economy and security defines what is to be governed and who is to be governed. The consequences of this are that values that do not align with liberal economy and security are not made visible to govern, nor are they given value to govern. In this case, Inuit forms of economy and security are not made visible. The result is a dismissal of their forms of knowledge, and an inviting of Inuit into the process of development that is based on liberal forms of economy and security. Inevitably, this process results in the issue of Inuit recognition, and a focus on strategies to better incorporate them into the process of liberal political rationalities in the region.

The Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations

A Policy-Based Perspective on the “Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations”

Bonesteel (2006) describes the development of Inuit political organizations as being caused by the development of communication and increased transport technology in the Arctic region. The effect of this was making, on the one hand, the Canadian Arctic a place for greater settlement, and on the other, making it a place of devalued Inuit knowledge concerning leadership and organization. Bonesteel (2006) states,

Before contact with Europeans, Inuit selected community leaders for their superior survival skills and made decisions based on group consensus. European explorers, whalers and fur traders often respected Inuit community leaders for their knowledge of the land and ability to survive. Throughout the twentieth century, however, communication and transport technology steadily improved the quality and quantity of imported goods available in the North …. The availability of consumer goods made traditional Inuit skills and knowledge
less necessary for non-Inuit survival. The ability of non-Inuit to communicate, to transport people over long distances quickly, to construct large buildings and community infrastructure, and to implement resource development projects for the extraction of natural gas, oil and minerals, all contributed to create circumstances of social and economic inequality between Inuit and non-Inuit in northern communities. (p. 41)

Therefore, the cause of the need for the development of Inuit political organizations was the development of communication and increased technology that supported European structures of living. The effect was a devaluing of Inuit forms of leadership and organization that was already taking place in the region.

Given the identified cause and effect, the problem Bonesteel (2006) identifies is the concern over the lack of autonomy for Inuit. She states,

Inuit concerns about their lack of autonomy were supported by the Indian-Eskimo Association (IEA), an organization established in 1955 by educators, church leaders, and public servants from southern Canada who were concerned about the circumstances of Inuit and First Nations. (p. 42)

Therefore, the problem being dealt with was a concern for the lack of Inuit autonomy for Inuit communities.

In order to deal with this problem, three main developments took place. The first was the establishment of the Indian-Eskimo Association (IEA), which was formally committed to enabling First Nations and Inuit to have their own voice in the development of the region. Bonesteel (2006) states,

… (IEA), an organization established in 1955 by educators, church leaders, and public servants from southern Canada who were concerned about the circumstances of Inuit and First Nations. The IEA promoted issues including cultural expression and political organization among Aboriginal groups, sponsored conferences, worked with government agencies, researched treaty and Aboriginal rights, and provided educational and consultative services to Aboriginal peoples. Rather than acting on behalf of Aboriginal peoples, the IEA was committed to enabling First Nations and Inuit to work publicly towards their own goals. (p. 42)
Following the creation of the IEA was the establishment of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) and the launching of the 1969 Tundra Conference in Edmonton, which enabled Inuit to develop a national public voice as well as providing them with a gathering space to discuss common issues and strategies. Bonesteel (2006) states,

The IEA had national public support and funding, which it used to facilitate communication and assist Inuit in launching their own national political organization, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), in 1971. Inuit established ITC primarily to lobby the federal government for claims to northern land from the western Arctic to Labrador. At the October 1969 Tundra Conference in Edmonton, which was attended by delegates from western Arctic communities, the IEA was asked to assist the delegates in planning a conference of Arctic Aboriginal peoples. As a result, in July 1970, the IEA sponsored a conference at Coppermine, which was attended by 33 delegates from 22 communities in the eastern and western Arctic and in Nunavik. The conference was intended as a forum for Inuit from across the Arctic to discuss issues of mutual concern, including oil and gas exploration, hunting and trapping quotas, and educational policies. Coppermine Conference delegates also created and submitted a telegram to Prime Minister Trudeau, requesting the recognition of Aboriginal peoples’ land rights in the North. This was the first time Inuit had addressed the Government of Canada through a collective message. (p. 43)

The third development involved the creation of regional associations to provide for local Inuit voices. Bonesteel (2006) states,

Subsequent to the development of ITC, regional associations were established to provide local representation for Inuit. These organizations included the Northern Quebec Inuit Association (NQIA), which was founded in 1971; the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA), which was founded in 1973; and three organizations in the eastern Arctic, which were established in the mid-1970s: the Kitikmeot Inuit Association, the Keewatin (now Kivalliq) Inuit Association, and the Baffin Regional (now Qikiqtani) Inuit Association. ITC changed its name to Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) in 2001. Inuit political organizations across the North have shared some general objectives including respect for the natural environment and maintain its sustainability; ensuring that Inuit received infrastructural benefits from economic development occurring in their communities, such as roads, improvements to housing, and pipeline links; and creating local control over resource development projects, including job creation for Inuit. (p. 43)
Given the development of these Inuit organizations, the ongoing struggle evolved as one that revolved around the federal budget’s support of these organizations.

Bonesteel (2006) identifies ongoing concerns as involving federal budget cuts, as well as federal recognition of Inuit priorities. She states,

> Inuit organizations, however, are negatively affected by federal budget cuts to their core funding, which reduce their capacity to conduct research and initiate projects. As well as core funding to support their organizations' daily operations and basic programming, ... seek greater federal recognition of Inuit priorities as distinct from those of other Aboriginal peoples, and have requested that the federal government develop Inuit-specific programs and policies to meet these needs. (p. 50)

From this policy-based perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development?” is not addressed. Instead, the issue of Inuit recognition is acknowledged and better incorporation strategies are discussed. In this case, strategies to address federal budget cuts as well as federal recognition are suggested as productive next steps. Though this approach provides temporary strategies to addressing the issue of Inuit recognition, the question of how Inuit became reliant on federal funding and recognition in the first place, remains.

**A Liberal Political Governmentality Perspective on the “Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations”**

Two key concepts based on Dean’s (2010) framework of liberal governmentality are evident in the “Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations” event: liberal citizenship and representational democracy. As described in Chapter 2, liberal citizenship involves producing a liberal citizen through means of norms around leadership, political organizations, and institutional forms. Within these norms, the citizen will then be enabled to have choices
around rights and interests. Representational democracy interconnects with liberal citizenship, as it focuses on establishing specific organizations from the groups being managed. This technique seeks to transfer the social needs that exist in the group into political needs, and appears to provide a forum for such needs to actually be addressed. This process obscures already existing leadership and organizing that could be taking place within the groups.

In the case of the historical development of Inuit political organizations, such factors are evident. The production of a liberal citizen takes place through the production of norms around leadership, political organizing, and institutional forms, all of which may be centred on European rather than Inuit lifestyles. Within the production of these norms, there is an “enabling” of Inuit to have rights and liberties with a diverse set of interests. And the production of representational democracy takes place through establishing Inuit-specific organizations that can transform social needs into political ones, such as the IEA, ITK, and regional associations. The consequences of such organizations are that they obscure already existing forms of Inuit leadership and organizing. They do so by appearing to adequately represent a diverse set of voices, while failing to mention the underlying connection between themselves and economic relations and processes. As both of these forms of citizenship and representational democracy are defined, already existing forms of norms and governance within Inuit communities are obscured. This renders Inuit as disempowered subjects that need to be taken into a liberal democratic society through these particular concepts, neither of which accounts for Inuit versions of citizenship and democracy.

Given this, the focus on the problem of “Inuit autonomy” frames the situation such that the above production of citizenship and democracy will not be questioned, but instead the focus will be on how to build a liberal citizen and representational democracy within the confines of a
liberal political objective in the Canadian Arctic region. The questions that can be asked within this framework include how an organization and/or association that will be recognized by European lifestyles can be developed in order to enable Inuit to attain autonomy, and what kinds of tools can Inuit groups be given that enable them to learn how to access, and create, these resources. Questions that become difficult to imagine include why Inuit must develop a whole new approach to political organizing and leading, when in fact they have had their own ways of doing these things prior to the development of communications and increased technology? As well, why are those forms of organization and leadership not made the starting point for the question of Inuit autonomy? These kinds of questions, if asked, would develop a very different set of problems, and a very different way of thinking about the area.

From a liberal governmentality perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development in the first place?” is directly addressed. Through the production of the concepts of liberal citizenship and representational democracy, a particular kind of knowledge about what is to be governed, who is to be governed, and how it is to be governed is produced. The fact that this knowledge is specific to a liberal political rationality, and not necessarily Inuit objectives, creates the issue of Inuit recognition in development of these objectives. Inuit, then, are invited into the process on the terms of a liberal political rationale, and strategies are developed to help better incorporate them.

**Comprehensive Claim Agreements**

**A Policy-Based Perspective on “Comprehensive Claim Agreements”**

Due to defence concerns, increased settlement and resource development during the time of World War II, clear regulations were needed in the Arctic. Bonesteel (2006) states,
For most of the twentieth century, the federal government did not consider it necessary to secure treaties surrendering Arctic land used and occupied by Inuit. The Inuit population was small compared to the large size of the territory that they inhabited and the rate of non-Inuit settlement in many parts of the North was very low. Starting with World War II, however, continental defence concerns, and increased settlement and resource development, required clear regulations regarding the stewardship and ownership of northern land and resources. (p. 52)

Therefore, the cause for needing to secure treaties to “surrender Arctic land” was due to World War II and the onset of defence concerns, increased settlement, and resource development. The effects were as follows,

A number of factors encouraged the federal government to create policies for negotiating comprehensive and specific claims with Aboriginal peoples. These factors included the outrage expressed by Aboriginal peoples towards the Canadian Government’s 1969 White Paper, the formation of elected Aboriginal political organizations to represent specific constituents, and the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1973 Calder decision. (Bonesteel, 2006, p. 52)

Therefore, the effects were the potential consequences that the federal government might face from Inuit organizations, now that Inuit political organizations were being created.

Given this, the problem became one of solving the issue of ambiguity around ownership of resource use and development, as well as social programs and services in the Arctic.

Bonesteel (2006) states,

As well as forms of compensation, such as money and land, comprehensive land claim settlements have included legal guarantees regarding resource use and protection, and administration of local social programs and services, including school boards. (p. 53)

Therefore, there was a need to move from developing Inuit political organizations to actual land claim agreements. There were four claim agreements that took place in order to address the problem of ambiguity over resource development and the development of social programs and
services in the Canadian Arctic. I focus specifically on the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, where three key strategies took place.

The first strategy that took place in the formulation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement was the rejection of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) regional government model, and the initiation of the Milton Freeman Research study, which established the geographical basis for the Land Claim to be negotiated. Bonesteel (2006) states,

In proposing a system of governance for Nunavut, ITK rejected the regional government model used in the JBNQA because it ascribed Inuit only limited administrative authority. ITK wanted to create a political system for the territory that included rights and responsibilities similar to those possessed by the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) and within the federal system.

In 1972, ITK initiated a study to determine the history of land and resource use in the North. The objective of the study was to demonstrate the potential scope of Aboriginal title to land in the western and eastern Arctic. In 1976, Milton Freeman Research completed the three volume report which was funded by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, and monitored by ITK. As well as demonstrating long-term Inuit land use across the North, the study’s conclusions formed the geographic basis for the new territory’s boundaries. (p. 56)

Therefore, the initiative of the Milton Freeman research study established the geographical space from which the claim could be negotiated.

The next strategy was the Nunavut proposal. It was submitted by ITK under the terms established from the Milton Freeman research report. Bonesteel (2006) states,

In 1976, ITK submitted a comprehensive land claim proposing to divide the NWT and create a territory called Nunavut, which means “Our Land” in Inuktitut. This proposal involved a region two million square kilometres in size, with Inuit proposed to own surface rights to over 650,000 square kilometres, and collecting royalties on subsurface extractions over the whole region. Initially, the proposal included land well into the western Arctic. Development projects in the Beaufort Sea and the possibility of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline construction, however, caused the Inuvialuit to launch a separate claim in the western Arctic, which was negotiated by COPE. Consequently, ITK withdrew and then
resubmitted its land claim in 1977, after further consultation with northern communities. Under the revised proposal, Nunavut would be an eastern Arctic territory. (p. 56)

Therefore, the proposition for the territory of Nunavut took place, which resulted in it being an eastern Arctic territory.

Finally, Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) was created, in order to negotiate the Nunavut land claim on behalf of three eastern Arctic regional Inuit organizations. Bonesteel (2006) states,

Rather than negotiating the Nunavut land claim, ITK encouraged the three eastern Arctic regional Inuit associations, the Kivalliq, Qikitani and Kitikmeot Inuit Associations, to create a representative organization authorized to negotiate a comprehensive land claim agreement on their behalf. Subsequently, the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) was created in 1982 with the specific mandate to negotiate the Nunavut land claim. The same year, Inuit in the Northwest Territories voted on the proposal to divide the territory and create Nunavut …. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement-in-Principle was signed in 1990, and the Final Agreement was signed and adopted by parliament in 1993. To administer the terms of the settlement on behalf of 17,500 Inuit in the eastern Arctic, the TFN became Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated. The Nunavut Territory and Government of Nunavut came into official existence on 1 April 1999. (p. 56)

Thus, the TFN became the representative organization to negotiate the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. The ongoing concern that Bonesteel (2006) identifies in terms of future problems with the comprehensive land claim involves mainly, the opinion that the federal government is in a position of conflict of interest. Bonesteel (2006) states,

Aboriginal peoples have identified several concerns with the comprehensive land claims process, including … the belief that the federal government is in a conflict of interest position by conducting negotiations which they are themselves a party. Aboriginal peoples have requested that management of the comprehensive land claims process be transferred to a body independent from the government, if not completely, at least for monitoring purposes …. Nunavut’s concerns about federal implementation funds, continue to occupy comprehensive claims negotiators. (pp. 57–58)
Consequently, the federal government’s conflict of interest appears to be the central concern going forward for Inuit communities.

From this policy-based perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development in the first place?” is not addressed. Instead, the issue of Inuit recognition is acknowledged, and focus is placed on strategies to address the issue. In this case, the focus on strategies will address the conflict of interest position that the federal government is seen to have in the comprehensive land claims process. While such a strategy is useful for temporarily addressing Inuit recognition, the question of how Inuit became vulnerable to this conflict of interest position in the first place, remains.

**A Liberal Political Governmentality Perspective on “Comprehensive Claim Agreements”**

Building on his key terms of liberal citizenship and representational democracy, Dean (2010) outlines four key functions of liberal law within a liberal political rationality. As detailed in Chapter 2, the production of liberal law takes place through five functions: (1) through working with the objective of centralizing nation-state building over localism; (2) through establishing rules that can be used to ensure the productive operation of governance and economic processes; (3) through ensuring the participation of active subjects who have choices on how they would like to best govern; (4) through producing central points of coordinating, such as political organizations and institutions, that can carry out the rules established, as well as provide a space for subjects to participate; and (5) through providing mechanisms of review to ensure that this specific process is built upon.

In the case of the Comprehensive Claim Agreements, such factors are evident. The production of law takes place in the following ways: (1) developing an agreement within a legal
system that supports the production of the nation-state by way of establishing forms of ownership in the area within this framework; (2) creating rules around governing that are tied to a liberal economy such as focuses on access to and use of resources; (3) encouraging the participation of legal subjects through producing Inuit as legal participants; (4) developing Inuit institutional agencies as central regulating mechanisms; and (5) establishing processes of review on the kind of governing that will take place. None of these aspects account for Inuit forms of governance and/or law, and result in producing Inuit subjects that can only participate, and be empowered, in a particular way.

The identification of the problem of ownership over land and resources in the Canadian Arctic frames the dialogue, such that certain questions can be asked while others cannot. For example, the focus of the strategies is on who has ownership over what, in what ways, and for how much, instead of asking what underpins the need for ownership, and how other forms of ownership and usage of land and resources get obscured within this framing. Again, if the objective that underpinned the claim had started with Inuit communities, perhaps a very different set of problems would have been produced.

From a liberal governmentality perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development in the first place?” is directly addressed. The development of liberal law defines what is to be governed and how it is to be governed. In this case, Inuit perspectives of law are not made visible, as they do not fall within the values of liberal law. As a result, Inuit are invited into the process on the terms of liberal forms of law. This inevitably results in the issue of Inuit recognition and a focus on strategies that deal with problems such as the federal government’s conflict of interest in comprehensive claim agreements.
Canada’s Northern Strategy

A Policy-Based Perspective on Canada’s Northern Strategy

In Coates and Poelzer’s *On the Front Lines of Canada’s Northern Strategy* (2010), they describe the context from which Canada’s Northern Strategy came about. They state,

Canada’s North is back in the spotlight. The impact of climate change and the growing desire of countries to access the North’s key trade routes and untapped natural resources have fueled an international debate about the North’s future. In Ottawa, parties across the political spectrum have made northern issues a priority, and there is broad support across the political spectrum for a robust northern agenda. As well, the current federal government has put more emphasis on the North than any other in recent memory. (p. 1)

Therefore, the cause of climate change and the associated effects of increased interest from other countries in the region, as well as increased access to trade routes and natural resources, create the problem of “What is the North’s future?”

In order to deal with this problem, the Canadian government developed Canada’s Northern Strategy. Coates and Poelzer (2010) define this as follows:

In July 2009, the Government of Canada released *Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, to address the social, economic and environmental challenges facing Northern Canada. The strategy articulates and delineates an unprecedented commitment by the federal government to help the North become “a healthy, prosperous and secure region within a strong and sovereign Canada.”

The Strategy envisions four key outcomes for Canada’s North:

- Self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies.

- The northern tradition of respect for the land and the environment is paramount and the principles of responsible and sustainable development anchor all decision-making and action.

- Strong, responsible, accountable governments work together for a vibrant, prosperous future for all – a place whose people and governments are significant
contributing partners to a dynamic, secure Canadian federation.

- The government patrols and protects our territory through enhanced presence on the land, in the sea and over the skies of the Arctic.

This vision is conveyed through the Northern Strategy in several priorities including exercising Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, which is defined as:

1. maintaining a strong military presence in the North,

2. enhancing the stewardship through stronger regulations and,

3. advancing the geographic and geological knowledge of the region.

The other priorities are listed as promoting social and economic development, protecting our environmental heritage, and improving and devolving northern governance. (p. 5)

Though this Strategy appears to be quite thorough, Coates and Poelzer (2010) cite significant concerns that are in need of consideration. They state,

Although Canada’s Northern Strategy is one of the most comprehensive federal northern plans ever presented to Canadians, there is more to be done to align resources and achieve greater gains for the benefit of northern citizens and Canada’s claim on Arctic sovereignty. The strategy fails to incorporate northern provinces, lacks sufficient detail to provide the guidance for sustained resources Canada’s military needs to make a long-term coordinated commitment with local communities, and for the most part does not lay out a clear plan for expanding or renewing core public infrastructure in the North to support other sovereignty-related activities. (p. 5)

Therefore, a misalignment of resources and gains for northern citizens simultaneous to Canada’s claim on Arctic sovereignty is considered a key concern moving forward.

From this policy-based perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development?” is not addressed. Rather, the issue of Inuit recognition is acknowledged, and focus is placed on best strategies to deal with the issue. In this case, best strategies means finding ways to better incorporate Inuit into the Strategy, a Strategy not of their own making or desire. This approach is helpful in terms of
providing temporary solutions to the issue of Inuit recognition, but the question of how they were not “incorporated” into the process from the beginning, remains.

A Neoliberal Governmentality Perspective on Canada’s Northern Strategy

In Dean’s *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (2010), as outlined in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, a neoliberal objective encompasses three key features: a focus on producing energies and/or value in the space, expertise revolving around that value, and freedom and/or choice that is produced from the development of that value.

The emergence of a neoliberal political rationality can be seen through Canada’s Northern Strategy. Primarily, the value of the North is articulated in Coates and Poelzer’s (2010) document as a space with key trading routes and untapped natural resources. There are a number of places from which expertise can be developed to ensure the production of this value. A glance at the Strategy’s priorities within Coates and Poelzer’s (2010) document suggest a few: self-governance/northern governance experts, environmental and/or stewardship experts, security/military experts, geographical experts, social experts, and economic experts. The purpose for establishing a series of experts to produce and manage the value of trading routes and untapped natural resources in the region is to attain particular kinds of freedoms and/or choices. This is evident in Coates and Poelzer’s (2010) citing of the vision for the North as “a healthy, prosperous and secure region within a strong and sovereign Canada” (p. 5). Thus, health, prosperity, and security are the freedoms and/or choices that will be available with the production of neoliberal values and expertise in the North.

The identification of the problem of “What is the future of the North?” frames the dialogue, in such a way that certain ideas can be thought about, while others cannot. For
example, the focus of building on the value of shipping routes and natural resources in the area preclude value that already exists for Inuit and may benefit more from building upon, such as hunting practices. The focus on experts brings attention to the importance of the themes of governance, environmental sustainability, security, society and economics, yet it obscures already existing expertise in the area, and the kinds of categories that would be created from there (which may not be of the same categories found in the Strategy). Finally, the freedoms and/or choices promised through investing in the value of shipping routes and natural resources, and the associated expertise, obscures the fact that there could be other kinds of freedoms and choices that may exist in the area. For example, the freedom to hunt, by way of investing in hunting as a central economic activity may not be a freedom associated with neoliberal values.

From a neoliberal governmentality perspective, then, the question of “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development in the first place?” is directly addressed. The development of neoliberal objectives in the region through defining value, expertise, and freedom and/or choice establishes what should be governed and how it should be governed. In this case, Inuit perspectives on value, expertise, and freedom and/or choice are not a part of a neoliberal political rationale in Canada’s Northern Strategy. The result of this is a dismissal of Inuit knowledge in favour of neoliberal forms of knowledge, and an inviting of Inuit into the process of development on the terms of a neoliberal rationale. This inevitably results in the issue of Inuit recognition, and a focus on strategies that address better incorporation practices.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the persistent issue of Inuit recognition in Canadian Arctic policy and program development is in need of further examination. Though the issue of Inuit recognition is identified within a policy-based perspective, the significant question still remains: “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canadian Arctic policy and program development in the first place?” This chapter offers one way of addressing the question, by conducting a liberal and neoliberal governmentality analysis of five key events in Canadian Arctic policy and program development as cited in Bonesteel’s (2006) and Coates and Poelzers’ (2010) documents. I found that, within each event, the policy-based analysis used in the documents acknowledges the issue of Inuit recognition and focuses on “incorporation” type strategies. Though this approach offers temporary solutions to address the issue of Inuit recognition, the question of how the issue of Inuit recognition takes place remains. Alternatively, I found within each event, that the liberal and neoliberal governmentality analysis provided a clear understanding of how this issue unfolds. Through identifying the political rationale within each event (in this case a liberal and neoliberal political rationale), it becomes evident that such rationales define what is of value, and how such value should be developed and governed. As a result, that which does not align with the rationale ends up not becoming visible, and issues of recognition are bound to arise. This chapter shows the importance of illuminating how the political rationale that constitutes policy and program development itself influences the way in which the issue of Inuit recognition persists in Canadian Arctic policy and program development.
In 2009, the Governments of Canada and Nunavut and the Qikiqtani Inuit Association signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a feasibility study on establishing a national marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, Nunavut. The objective of this national marine conservation area is stated as protecting the environment and securing sovereignty in the region which were necessary as a result of the uncertainties associated with climate change. Such an objective meets the twin pillars of environment and sovereignty within Canada’s Northern Strategy. In August 2010, however, Inuit communities discovered a proposal submitted by the Geological Survey of Canada to the Nunavut Impact Review Board seeking permission to conduct seismic testing in the same vicinity where the marine conservation area was being proposed. Inevitably, the event caused great confusion, and concern, among community members. It was unclear as to how a region that was being proposed for a marine conservation area could be simultaneously tested and prepared for resource extraction and development.

In this context, I ask the questions: “What is a conservation area in Lancaster Sound really intended to do?” And, “What are the implications of this intention on Inuit communities living in the area?” Tyson Daoust, Wolfgang Haider, and Sabine Jessen (2010), resource and environmental management researchers, address the issue of marine conservation areas in Nunavut. However, instead of addressing the conflicting responses, they assume that marine conservation areas are inherently about protection and sovereignty and focus their analysis almost exclusively on best management practices to implement a marine conservation area in the region. Departing from Daoust et al.’s (2010) assumptions and associated forms of analysis, I address the conflicting responses associated with the marine conservation area and seismic
testing activity. I posit that the problem of climate change, in this case, is a discursively manufactured one that justifies and normalizes the need for a marine conservation area in Nunavut, positioning Inuit communities on the periphery of such plans. I use a neoliberal governmentality framework to analyze this study, and put forward the argument that the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound is not organized around the issues of protection and sovereignty; rather, it uses the issues of protection and sovereignty to establish a more highly regulated form of resource extraction and development in the region, with significant implications for Inuit communities living in the area.

I have divided the chapter into three sections. The first section contextualizes national marine conservation areas in Canada and the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, Nunavut. The second section details Daoust et al.’s (2010) analysis on marine conservation areas in the Arctic. The third section departs from Daoust et al.’s (2010) analysis, to conduct a neoliberal governmentality analysis on the marine conservation area project in Lancaster Sound. Specifically, I illuminate how the marine conservation area project is underpinned by a neoliberal objective, through examining how the three concepts of energy/value, expertise, and freedom are operating within the project. And, I detail the various technologies used to justify and normalize this objective, specifically the technologies of prudentialism, technologies of contract and citizenship, and technologies of performance. In doing so, I reveal how the marine conservation area project in Lancaster Sound is not in fact about protection and sovereignty but rather about creating a more highly regulated form of resource extraction and development in the region, with significant impacts on Inuit communities living in the area. Each of the following sections revolves around an application of the neoliberal governmentality conceptual framework through the methodological approach of close reading (Bass & Linkon, 2008), with data from
interviews, and with material collected from access to information requests specifically for this dissertation.

The Context

Protecting Our Environmental Heritage

Within Canada’s Northern Strategy, under the pillar of “Protecting Our Environmental Heritage” (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 24), is a commitment to developing marine protection initiatives. The Strategy states,

The North also benefits from Canada’s Health of the Oceans initiative, which strengthens the ability of Northern communities to respond to pollution and fosters greater cooperation with domestic and global partners for integrated ecosystems-based oceans management. One important marine protection initiative is our work towards the establishment of a national marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, one of the most ecologically significant marine areas in the circumpolar Arctic. (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 27)

In the federal government’s report entitled “Parks Canada to Launch Feasibility Study for National Marine Conservation Area in Lancaster Sound” (Canada, Parks Canada, Access to information request), a national marine conservation area is defined as follows:

National marine conservation areas are marine protected areas managed for ecologically sustainable use, under the Canada National Marine Conservation Area Act. They include the seabed, the water above it and all living resources. They may also take in wetlands, estuaries, islands and other coastal lands. National marine conservation areas focus on ecologically sustainable use, which means harmonizing conservation practices with human activities such as fishing, shipping and recreation. Waste dumping, mining, and oil and gas exploration and exploitation are prohibited throughout these special areas. This approach involves working closely with others who use the lands, waters, and living resources striving to reach common goals – most importantly a healthy, sustainable ecosystem. (Canada, Parks Canada, Access to information request)
In order for an area to officially be considered a marine conservation area, it must qualify according to five assessment criteria, outlined by Parks Canada’s National Marine Conservation Areas of Canada (2010). The first set of criteria is to identify whether the area has the appropriate features for a marine conservation area. The Parks Canada official website states the features as follows:

- Geological features (such as cliffs, beaches, and islands on the coast; and shoals, basins, troughs and shelves on the seabed)
- Marine features (tides, ice, water masses, currents, salinity, freshwater influences)
- Marine and coastal habitats (wetlands, tidal flats, estuaries, high current areas, protected areas, inshore and offshore areas, shallow and deep water areas)
- Biology (plants, plankton, invertebrates, fish, seabirds and marine mammals)
- Archaeological and historical features. (Parks Canada, 2010, para. 8)

Once an area has qualified within the appropriate features, the next step is to choose which of those areas would best make for a marine conservation area. This is done through exploring each one of the above features in greater detail. For example, there are 10 categories under which this is assessed:

- quality of regional representation
- relative importance for maintaining biodiversity
- protecting critical habitats of endangered species
- exceptional natural and cultural features
- existing or planned marine protected areas
- minimizing conflict with resource users
- threats to the sustainability of marine ecosystems
- implications of Aboriginal claims and treaties
- potential for education and enjoyment
- value for ecological research and monitoring (Parks Canada, 2010, para. 9)

Once a site has been chosen, based on the above criteria, the next step involves assessing the cooperation and support of the people involved. This includes “federal departments and provincial or territorial governments … local communities, regional stakeholders and Aboriginal peoples” (Parks Canada, 2010, para. 10).
Once consultations and negotiations have taken place with all of the different groups, the final two steps involve negotiating an agreement to “set out the terms and conditions under which the NMCA will be established and managed” (Parks Canada, 2010, para. 12). And following this, officially establish a national marine conservation area under the “Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act” (Parks Canada, 2010, para. 13).

**Marine Conservation Area in Lancaster Sound**

The stated purpose of establishing a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound at present is to protect the environment and secure sovereignty in the region, due to uncertainties related to climate change. A background report entitled “Government of Canada Presents Boundary Proposal for Lancaster Sound National Marine Conservation Area” (Canada, Parks Canada, Access to information request) states, Lancaster Sound is the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, the legendary corridor through Canada’s Arctic Archipelago. It is an area of critical ecological importance to marine mammals, including seals, narwhal, beluga and bowhead whales, as well as walrus and polar bears, and it is bordered by some of the most important seabird breeding colonies in the Arctic, with populations totaling in the hundreds of thousands ….

As climate change continues and year-round marine transport through the Northwest Passage becomes increasingly likely, it is important to take appropriate protective measures to safeguard this significant and diverse region in the Canadian Arctic. (paras.1&4)

In order for a marine conservation area to be established in Nunavut, there are three phases that must be completed: “a feasibility study, an interim management plan development and Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement Negotiations” (QIA, 2012, pp. 2-4). Currently, the project is in the first phase, that being the feasibility study.
Protection and Security, or Highly Regulated Development?

On December 18, 2009, 10 days after the memorandum agreement was signed, a proposal was submitted by the Geological Survey of Canada entitled “Eastern Canadian Arctic Seismic Experiment (ECASE)” (Nature Canada, 2010), to conduct seismic surveying in the region. This proposal was part of a project connected to the “Promoting Social and Economic Development” (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 14) pillar in Canada’s Northern Strategy, within the specific theme of economic development. The project was called “Geo-mapping for Energy & Minerals” (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 16). This project specifically stated its support for private sector exploration and investment in the Arctic Archipelago, the same Archipelago that is in need of having its environment and sovereignty protected in the region.

Canada’s Northern Strategy document states,

The large-scale projects already underway barely scratch the surface of the North’s immense store of mineral, petroleum, hydro and ocean resources. However, the full extent of the natural resources potential in the Arctic is still unknown. The Government of Canada announced a significant new geo-mapping effort – Geo-Mapping for energy and Minerals – that will combine the latest technology and geoscientific analysis methods to build our understanding of the geology of Canada’s North, including in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The results of this work will highlight areas of mineral and petroleum potential, lead to more effective private sector exploration investment and create employment opportunities in the North. (Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, p. 16)

The appearance of this project has produced a significant contradiction given that the stated objective of the marine conservation area is to protect the environment and securing sovereignty in the region.
There were several responses from Inuit communities in the area, in regards to this contradiction. The first concern involves wildlife:

Seismic blasts carry through the water for hundreds of kilometres and have been known to cause permanent hearing loss and disrupt feeding, migration, social bonding, reproductive success, and predator avoidance, and have been associated with whale strandings ….

The testing could cause marine mammal populations to divert their course, interfering with their all-important migratory patterns, Debicki (projects director for Oceans North Canada) told The Epoch Times. With Lancaster Sound being the only eastern entrance to the Arctic Archipelago, this could cause problems for the mammals ….

Hunters’ and trappers’ organizations in the region are worried the tests will scare off the wildlife they depend on for a living. (Delaney, 2010, Powerful Sound Waves section)

In addition to this concern, there is confusion around understanding the intention of what is actually going on. Okalik Eegeesiak, president of the Baffin Island-area Inuit organization, told CBC News:

We don't understand what seismic testing means …. It comes across as, “The communities really need this” …. The bottom line is for potential oil and gas. (CBC News, 2010b)

Another community member states:

“One hand is doing the one thing, while the other hand is just doing the opposite thing. That’s of concern for sure,” said Marty Kuluguqtuaq, the senior administrative officer in Grise Fiord, Nunavut. (CBC News, 2010a)

The response to such confusion around the intention of seismic testing is that the seismic testing activity is not about natural resource extraction but about creating greater knowledge to inform decisions, as James Donald, geologist on the project states:

It’s our intent that this data is going to help governments and communities, people and resource companies, to make better decisions with respect to land use, as well as for making better decisions with respect to exploration in searching for minerals and energy. (CBC News, 2010b)
Whether such knowledge can inform better decisions or not, the bottom line is that those living in the area have been very clear on how they feel about this kind of activity in their space, whether it is just to become more informed about plans for the project, or to confirm if in fact there are intentions for natural resource extraction and development in the region. John Amagoalik, who works in the Lands Department at the Qikiqtani Inuit Association, states, 

"Seismic exploration is one of the last things we want," Amagoalik said. "This is Lancaster Sound, and a national marine conservation area project was announced by the prime minister. (CBC News, 2010b)

While the head of the Baffin Island area Inuit organization we heard from above (Eegeesiak) adds that the more appropriate question to be asking is, “What is useful for the individual Inuk? …. What is useful for the Inuit communities?” (CBC News, 2010b). Given this situation, Inuit have been very clear about how they feel in regards to the contradictions that have emerged. They have concerns over the wildlife which they depend upon for survival, they have no clear explanation concerning the seismic testing and marine conservation area projects taking place simultaneously, and they have expressed a need to not have seismic testing activity take place in the area but rather have the activity that takes place focus on the question of their own stated needs. It is clear that Inuit communities have not been participating as equal partners in the development and implementation of the marine conservation area, given the geo-mapping project that has been implemented without their knowledge and consent. Given all of this, I ask: What is a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound really intended to do in context of the seismic testing activity taking place alongside? And, how do these intentions obscure the needs that are being expressed very clearly by Inuit communities who live in the region?
Marine Conservation Areas and Best Management Practices

To my knowledge, to date there is no academic literature dealing with the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound. However, there is literature on other similar marine conservation areas in the Arctic region (see Fast, Chiperzak, Cott, & Elliott, 2005; Berkes F., Berkes M.K., & Fast, 2007; Guenette & Alder, 2007; Daoust, Haider, & Jesson, 2010). Daoust et al. (2010) produced an article on the topic of marine conservation areas in Nunavut entitled “Institutional Arrangements Governing Marine Conservation Planning in the Canadian Arctic: The Case of Nunavut, Canada.” I chose their article to conduct a more specific analysis, given the fact that they are the only authors who address marine conservation areas in the region of Nunavut specifically. In this article, they attempt to make sense of best management practices for the development of marine conservation areas in Nunavut. Daoust et al. (2010) use a policy-based approach whereby they use climate change and its associated challenges as twin discourses to justify and normalize the need for, and development of, a marine conservation area in the region. They do this by first articulating the twin discourses as cause and effect in context of marine conservation area projects, followed by fact-building to support the twin discourses, and then develop a position based on these assumptions. This kind of approach organizes and structures the way in which marine conservation areas in the region can be thought about, and, in doing so, it enables the failure of acknowledging and addressing the contradictions taking place.

The cause and effect Daoust et al. (2010) assume involves climate change as cause and the associated uncertainties as effect. They state, that the “Arctic sea-ice is melting at unprecedented rates … bringing dramatic change and uncertainty to northern peoples” (Daoust et al., 2010, p. 74). They then build facts to support this cause and effect:
As the ice continues to melt, new shipping routes, fisheries and offshore non-renewable resource deposits are becoming more accessible to development. At the same time climate change is rapidly altering ecosystems and food webs …. These ecological changes, in combination with increasing human activity, will have profound impacts on coastal indigenous peoples throughout the Arctic. (Daoust et al., 2010, p. 74)

Given these facts, Daoust et al. (2010) take a position that supports marine conservation planning as an effective solution:

These mounting pressures have brought to the forefront the need to prepare the region for the uncertain future it faces. Marine spatial planning and marine conservation planning are tools that can help coastal dependent regions adapt to change. (p. 74)

This position is then situated within the greater literature on marine conservation area projects in the Arctic, and functions as an organizing principle for a diverse set of information:

While much has been written about marine planning efforts in the western Arctic … very little has focused on the status of marine planning in the rest of the Canadian Arctic, and specifically Nunavut. This paper will explore the progress of marine planning – and the complex institutional arrangements that govern it – in the western Arctic and in Nunavut. (Daoust et al., 2010, p. 75)

Therefore, what they have done is, primarily, used climate change and its associated challenges to justify the need for a marine conservation area project in the Nunavut region. They do this through asserting it as an unquestionable cause and effect, producing facts to support this cause and effect, and then, based upon all of this, develop their own solution and/or strategy to contribute to the existing literature. What is interesting about this approach is that the contradictions embedded in the marine conservation area project systematically fail to be addressed (or even raised). Instead, the focus is securely maintained on how to best implement and manage marine conservation area projects in a different region of the Arctic. The contradictions continue to take place, and the time spent on the solution and/or strategy does not
change the situation. My analysis will depart from this literature and break out of this discursive stream, in order to address the contradictions of the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound more broadly.

**The Marine Conservation Area in Lancaster Sound as a Neoliberal Project**

The questions that remain are, “Why, and how, did the need for a marine conservation area come about? And, how in addressing these questions, can Inuit responses to the project be better understood?”

**A Neoliberal Project**

I argue that the marine conservation area did not come about due to climate change and its associated effects. If this were the case, the idea of a marine conservation area would have come up much earlier. As well, if the associated challenges for “coastal indigenous peoples” (Daoust et al., 2010, p. 74) throughout the Arctic is really the issue, then the kind of project needed in that area may not be a marine conservation area but a project that would start with the needs of Inuit, as articulated multiple times by northern leaders (see Simon, 2009).

It seems, then, that there is another objective at work, other than addressing the problem of climate change and its associated challenges for “coastal indigenous peoples” (Daoust, Haider, & Jesson, 2010, p. 74), an objective that I argue is a neoliberal one. As referred to in Chapter 2, a neoliberal objective is made up of three key features: a focus on producing energies and/or value in the space, expertise revolving around that value, and freedom and/or choice produced from the development of that value. This kind of approach is evident in the stated objective of the marine conservation area, which I received through an access to information request document. Adding to the already provided description from the Parks Canada (2010) website in part one of this
chapter, the website goes on to describe Lancaster Sound as being the entrance to the Northwest Passage and a critical ecological area:

Lancaster Sound is … bordered by some of the most important seabird breeding colonies in the Arctic, with populations totaling in the hundreds of thousands.

Several fjords border Lancaster Sound and its adjacent waterways, and tidewaters glaciers reach the ocean along the northeastern coast. The dynamic oceanography of the area ensures that portions of Lancaster Sound remain comparatively ice free throughout the year, providing critical habitat for large concentrations of birds and mammals, as well as crucial feeding areas when access to ice-covered waters to the west is impossible.

Human occupation and use of the Lancaster Sound region can be traced back to the Dorset and Thule cultures that preceded Inuit for whom the region is now home. European exploration of the Northwest Passage brought several expeditions to the region, including the fabled Franklin expedition. Remnants of whaling and trading posts at a number of locations along the shores of the region are evidence of later whaling and trading activities.

As climate change continues and year-round marine transport through the Northwest Passage becomes increasingly likely, it is important to take appropriate protective measures to safeguard this significant and diverse region in the Canadian Arctic. Working with other federal departments, the Government of Nunavut, Qikiqtani Inuit Association, and local communities, Parks Canada has undertaken an assessment of the feasibility of establishing a national marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound.

The announced federal position on a potential future boundary for a marine conservation area confirms the Government of Canada’s intent to protect Lancaster Sound. Work is underway to update an ecological overview of Lancaster Sound and an assessment of non-renewable resource potential, using existing information, but enough is known presently to enable announcing a federal position that will lead to discussion with the Government of Nunavut and consultations with local communities to proceed.

National marine conservation areas are marine protected areas managed for ecologically sustainable use. They include the seabed, the water above it and all living resources. They may also take in wetlands, estuaries, islands and other coastal lands.

National marine conservation areas focus on ecologically sustainable use, which means harmonizing conservation practices with human activities such as fishing, shipping and recreation. Waste dumping, mining, and oil and gas exploration and exploitation are prohibited throughout these special areas.
This approach involves working closely with others who use the lands, waters and living resources striving to reach common goals – most importantly a healthy, sustainable ecosystem. (p.30)

Firstly, the space is described as having value, based on its location and access for shipping routes, exploration and development, and different kinds of human activity that can take place within the region, including fishing, shipping, and recreation. These forms of value creation are connected to neoliberal objectives, as the focus of cultivating and facilitating are values that can be recognized by a neoliberal marketplace. Alternatively, the space could have been described from an Inuit community perspective, such as a hunting space that would support the survival of Inuit cultural activity. This would identify actual needed value from the people living there that is not being met. An example of the space being defined from the perspective of Inuit communities who have defined what is of value to them, and wanting support for it, can be seen through a map produced by the QIA (see figure 3).
**Figure 3**: Lancaster Sound High Value Hunting Areas, Narwhal-Beluga, Whale-Walrus.

Adapted from (QIA, 2012, p.17)

Here, the key value of the space from the perspective of the Inuit communities who live in the area is that of the animals for hunting. The entire space is conceptualized around the way in which the animals travel: above are the routes that the animals take, and based on this, camp sites are set up around the region, and different kinds of activities are organized seasonally around the animals’ movements. Therefore, describing the space as having value based on, for
example, a transportation route for mineral and oil products and services rather than Inuit hunting practices ensures the establishment of neoliberal objectives in the region.

Secondly, the kind of individuals that are conceptualized within this marine conservation area are neither a collective group of people who may need help supporting their lifestyle (as would be seen with a welfare-state objective) nor individual hunters who may have their own needs in terms of producing value in the space (as would be seen in a liberal-democratic objective). Instead, the kinds of individuals imagined in this space are individuals who are experts in both sustainability and business activities in the region. Therefore, the kind of subjectivity that is available to Inuit is that of the “sustainability” expert who partakes in activities – specifically those based upon neoliberal values – that can simultaneously justify sustainability and economic exploitation within the same space. This kind of subjectivity plays a major role in enabling the development and unfolding of neoliberal objectives in the region.

Thirdly, the kind of “freedom” and/or “choice” available to those living in the area, due to the marine conservation area program, is freedom from ecological destruction simultaneous to producing neoliberal value in the space. Interestingly, the marine conservation area project normalizes ecological destruction, in the sense that it creates an arbitrary boundary in the water, which permits certain activities to take place within and outside of the boundary; activities that prior to establishing such a project would not have been welcome at all. The project only gives choice, in other words, within a neoliberal-based framework such that the kind of activities and production of specific forms of value that can take place in the region reside within a neoliberal framework. Subsequently, there is no choice and/or freedom available to build on already existing needs and/or practices in the region.
The Production of a Neoliberal Project

Given the fact the objective of the project is a neoliberal one, the question that remains is, “How does this objective get justified and normalized such that the responses from Inuit communities fail to get addressed?” Following, I explore three technologies at work that show how neoliberal objectives get justified and normalized: the new prudentialism, technologies of contract and citizenship, and technologies of performance.

The new prudentialism. As discussed in Chapter 2, the new prudentialism can be defined as the production of risks experienced by society that are transferred from government responsibility onto the individuals and become the individuals’ responsibility, instead of that of the government. Within this transfer there are multiple domains to monitor, and the kinds of risks that are monitored are not pertaining to particular activities but rather to the risk that will never “evaporate” so must be minimized. Given this, the entire population, instead of one subgroup, is the target of risk.

In the case of the development and implementation of the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, I found that this kind of shift in regards to how risk is conceptualized and monitored takes place through a “buy into,”² that is, the individuals involved and/or affected by the project

² Throughout much of the dissertation I use the term “buy into” to describe the way in which the subjects that I interviewed within the three case studies, appeared to believe the stated objective and/or value of each of the projects. My usage of the term “buy into” is intended to build directly from the way that Dean (2010) articulates the governmentality approach to power:

… a new conceptual architecture of power. In Foucault’s late work the notion of government is elaborated within a kind of typology of forms of power that seeks to displace the immediate identification of power with domination. Government comes to be viewed as a kind of intermediate region which is not purely one of either freedom or domination, consent or coercion. It is located by Foucault (1988a) between a primary type of power as an open, strategic and reversible set of relations between liberties, and domination as the fixing and blocking of these relations into permanent, hierarchical distributions. Government is between these two in that it involves a form of power over others that is made operable through the liberties of those over whom it is exercised. (Dean, 2010, p.58, emphasis in original)
buy into a particular kind of story around risk. Among approximately 15 interviews that I conducted on the project (see Chapter 1 for a description of methodology), three specifically reflect this “buy into,” which establishes both the justified and normalized story of the need for a marine conservation area while ensuring the establishment of neoliberal objectives in the region.

The first interview was with a government representative from Parks Canada. In response to the question, “How do you understand the need for a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound?” the research subject replied:

Lancaster Sound itself, the area we are focusing our work on, has been identified in numerous ways and by numerous studies as being a particularly ecologically important and sensitive area, not only in the context of the Canadian Arctic but in the circumpolar context. It truly is a world scale in the sense of it, and ecologically significant, and so because our program, the marine conservation areas program, requires us to set aside marine conservation areas that are highly representative of the marine regions that have high ecological importance, that have high importance or relevance rather to, and potential to be, places that will invite visitation and from that generate awareness of and appropriate visitor experience opportunities and ultimately engagement in stewardship of the area .... This is an area that is of very high importance for large seabird colonies that exist on both sides of Lancaster Sound, foraging habitat for hundreds of thousands of breeding pairs of seeding seabirds that utilize this area. Each summer is also the primary migratory corridor for narwhal and beluga, on their twice annual migration to and from their destination further west in the central Arctic, and some of those destinations are in fact within the proposed marine conservation area itself. There are resident walrus populations with known haul out sites, there certainly are large populations of other pinniped seals in this area, bowhead whales utilize this area. It really is the doorway into the central Arctic for a large and diverse array of marine mammals and birds, that depend on the Arctic on an annual basis as places of habitat but also migratory corridors and places where they feed on their way through … or because they are resident in the area at the time. Lancaster Sound is also a place where there are places of open water particularly in eastern Lancaster Sound, and those coastal open water areas called galineas are highly important to the survivability

In this way, it is important to make clear that my usage of the term “buy into” is not done in the context of a dichotomous use of the term; but rather, meant to stand in for the non-dichotomous complex processes involved in consent/coercion. In doing so, it shows one way of interpreting how knowledge can govern the way in which people think about, and act within, such projects, whilst also leaving room for alternative analysis on the many other ways in which the exchange could be interpreted and/or taken up.
of marine mammal populations over the winter months. And so for all of those reasons it has very high ecological significance. (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

Therefore, the subject establishes a “buy into” risk, through establishing that the need for a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound is due to its ecological sensitivity. There are a number of factors that support this risk, for example, the subject draws on numerous studies that have been conducted to support this fact, as well as discussing how marine mammals and birds depend on the area for places of habitat, migratory corridors, and for feeding. What is interesting about this “buy into” risk of ecological sensitivity is that the subject does not ask any questions around how believing it to be ecologically sensitive (and therefore in need of a marine conservation area) may support valuing the area in specific ways that could be more detrimental to this ecological sensitivity instead of helping it. For example, questions about how a marine conservation area could enable the development of a transport route – for extraction products and services, a place for exploration and development, a place for the development of tourism, and so on – establish neoliberal objectives in the region. The “buy into” risk of ecological sensitivity also inhibits the subject from asking questions about the kind of subjectivity that is needed in the area. For example, if the area is ecologically sensitive, the kinds of subjects that are needed in the area would be those who conceptualize the environment in that way (for example, from the vantage point of the environmental expert, whether the person is such an expert or not). And with those experts comes along the kind of neoliberal market-based environmental initiatives that can take place in the region. The ways in which the environment would be conceptualized from Inuit perspectives are not even considered, nor are the risks that they might think about in relationship to the space. Finally, given the risk that the subject “buys into,” the need for a marine conservation area promises to free the ecology from its sensitivity through protection and/or
conservation. What does not get explored is the kinds of freedoms and/or choices that are obscured due to the development of such a project. In particular, we should ask, “How does establishing a marine conservation area in the region change the way in which hunting can take place in the area?”

The second interview was with a representative from an Inuit political organization. In response to the question, “How do you understand the need for a marine conservation area?” the subject states,

Well, the idea of creating a conservation area around Lancaster Sound has been around for a long time, for 30 (or) 40 years. Because biologists, well life scientists, have known that it has a diverse species of animals and it’s a very important migration route for many species of marine mammals. So, the idea of creating a conservation area has been around for a long time. As a matter of fact, a lot of people have been saying that it should become an international heritage site so the idea is not new. It sort of got a breath of life when the prime minister made a campaign promise about five or six years ago, to create a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound ….

… but under the Act that creates a [marine conservation area], oil drilling is not allowed and so in that sense this is one of the reasons why the communities are so anxious to establish this park … as I said, this issue has been around for a long time. The communities have been extremely concerned about things like seismic activity in that area, which happened around the 60s and 70s and the local people could see that this activity was creating all kinds of problems for the marine population. And so, they very much want to put in protections before oil and gas exploration comes to the High Arctic which we are [hoping] to happen in the coming years. (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012)

Interestingly, this subject identifies the risk of the ecologically sensitive environment, which is supported by biologists and life scientists. Different from the first subject interviewed, this subject discusses the additional risk of oil drilling in the area. Clearly, the “buy into” risk of a sensitive environment and the consequences of oil and gas drilling make the marine conservation area a solution to such risks. The kinds of questions that fail to get asked due to this “buy into,”
however, are similar to what was seen in the first subject interviewed. For example, though the subject states that oil drilling is not allowed in the marine conservation area, the fact that oil drilling could take place just outside of that area is not addressed. If the area is, indeed, a migration route for marine mammals, then an arbitrary boundary in the water would not prevent this migration route from being affected if oil drilling were to take place. In fact, establishing a marine conservation area in the region could act as an enabler for such drilling, as it appears as though care has been given to the risks of a sensitive ecology and a marine population. Indeed, it could also promote the development of other kinds of neoliberal-based objectives, such as tourism and shipping. The kinds of subjectivities associated with such neoliberal objectives that are produced in the area do not include supporting and promoting hunting-based practices. They also infringe on the kinds of freedom and/or choices available to those in the area around hunting practices. For example, if boundaries are set up, the choice will be around where drilling can take place in the region, instead of having the choice of no drilling at all.

My third interview for this case study was with a representative from the Government of Nunavut. In response to the question, “How do you understand the need for a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound?” the subject states:

Yeah, I mean Parks Canada would be the best people to speak to that. But it’s an astounding area in terms of its birdlife, the bird clips on violet island, and uh nesting … ivory gulls. The main migration route for beluga narwhal walrus and bowhead whale pass through there. There’s a lot of natural, you know, and it’s the main gateway into the Northwest Passage. But I guess there are some other undertones that make it important in terms of sovereignty – controlling access to the Northwest Passage – although those aren’t the main drivers behind it, but one could see exactly how it could help Canada in terms of its sovereignty …. 

And, of course, I should mention the Inuit and their relationship with that marine environment. Specifically, Pond Inlet, Resolute Bay, Arctic Bay, and associated communities there, seems to be quite a bit of natural and cultural history attached to it that
make it an attractive place, a natural fit. (Representative for Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)

Similar to the first two interviews, the subject discusses the ecological sensitivity of the area, including its wildlife and migration route. Similar to the second interview, the subject discusses Inuit relationships to the space, though raises it in the context of its cultural and historical connection versus concerns around oil drilling. Additionally, this subject discusses the risk of Canadian sovereignty, and the strategic political location of the space. For all of these three risks, a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound is needed. Again, what is interesting here are the kinds of questions that are systematically made unaskable due to the belief that the marine conservation area will be the solution to the stated risks. For example, the question of whether a marine conservation area enables the risks of ecological sensitivity, or how it relates to the disruption of Inuit attachments to the space, is not posed. If the marine conservation area were really to enable the supporting of Inuit attachments to the space, more than just their cultural and historical relationship to the space would have been discussed. The kinds of subjectivities imagined in the region for the development of a marine conservation area, again, do not speak to the already existing subjectivities in the space, and the kind of freedoms and/or choices that get produced in context of creating such a project obscure other forms of freedoms and/or choices for those already living in the space. It becomes clear that the kinds of risks identified do not emerge directly (if at all) from those already living in the area.

Therefore, in all three interviews, a “buy into” the project is evident through particular kinds of beliefs around risk in the area that set a series of boundaries around thought and discussion. The risks that the project promises to address include protection of the ecologically sensitive environment, the risk of Canadian sovereignty, as well as preservation of Inuit history
and culture. In identification of these risks, however, questions fail to get asked around how the project may actually be supporting these risks, such as enabling oil drilling to take place due to “protecting” certain aspects of the space (even though migration routes do not have the same boundaries as a marine conservation area), and obscuring Inuit forms of subjectivity and freedom in the area, such as enabling them to define the kinds of risks that exist for them and how they might like to address these risks.

**Technologies of contract and citizenship.** Connected to the new prudentialism are the technologies of agency, which encompass both what are called technologies of contract and citizenship as well as technologies of performance. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these technologies enable the story of risk to become justified and normalized through the production of subjects that have roles and responsibilities within the story, as well as subjects that have parameters by which to measure these roles and responsibilities.

Technologies of contract and citizenship are evident in further examination of the same three interviews just discussed in the section on the new prudentialism. In the first interview with the government representative from Parks Canada, I asked: “What is your relationship to the project of the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound?” The subject responded:

I’m the national coordinator of the marine conservation area’s program for Parks Canada and at the core of that is work to establish new national marine conservation areas. And so for now, I am in essence I guess leading that project. Pending engagement of a dedicated project manager my own interest and involvement I guess sprang from this initiative first having gone forward in the late 1980s as a proposed national marine park, which was the name at the time of what is now the national marine conservation area’s program. And I was central to it at that time. I went into the area a number of times and was extremely pleased when the opportunity to resurrect it as a new project emerged about three years ago with the support of the Inuit. (Government Representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)
Here, the contract that has been produced is a national coordinator for the marine conservation areas program. The role of this subject is to establish marine conservation areas across the country. The mention of Inuit as being further subjects that are a part of the project indicates that an ethos of negotiated subjectivity is possible, whereby the national coordinator contract establishes a further contract for those living in the area to participate in the project. Of course, this contract would more deeply reflect the already existing parameters evident in the national coordinator contract established.

Technologies of citizenship are produced in connection with this contract. When asked what kinds of limitations and possibilities the project may have, the subject responds as follows:

Well, I would say that Parks Canada generally speaking in the work we do to establish new areas has a pretty strong record of engaging with local communities, obtaining the perspectives of local people and that certainly is the intent here. We are very mindful of needing to work with all of the involved parties to achieve consensus on [firstly] the feasibility of establishing a protected area, and secondly whatever terms and conditions including boundaries should be part and parcel of the end result. And so that is the approach being taken here, and it is certainly working well. As I’ve said we have yet to get to the communities, but in the very constructive dialogue that is underway at the level of the steering committee I feel very confident that we’re certainly on the right track and onward to that consultation process. (Government Representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

I argue that this response from the subject reveals the four key aspects of technologies of citizenship at work. To begin with, the subject’s expertise is established through using Parks Canada (expertise of Parks in Canada) as the place from which the question will be addressed. Secondly, the project is clearly initiated from one party, that being Parks Canada. This is evident through the fact that it is the mandate of Parks Canada, and not the communities that “work … to establish new areas.” It is also evident through the fact that even though the communities have still to be visited, the development of the project is already underway. Thirdly, the gathering of
knowledge about the “powerless” takes place through establishing consultations with the communities, for example, through “obtaining the perspectives of local people.” And, finally, in how these consultations are structured, a voluntary/coercive form of power is established. This revolves around intending to figure out “[firstly] the feasibility of establishing a protected area, and secondly whatever terms and conditions including boundaries should be a part and parcel of the end result.” This structure puts the communities in a position whereby they must articulate their needs based on a pre-established structure not coming from them which, in turn, creates particular needs from them. The result is the creation of a situation whereby community members become individual participants in the development of this project, while also giving the government a role to fulfill in the project. It is in this way that neoliberal objectives get justified and normalized in the region.

The technologies of contract and citizenship are also evident in my second interview with the same Inuit political representative that was discussed in the first part of this section. In response to the question, “What is your relationship to the project?” the subject states:

… a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Parks Canada and QIA was signed about three years ago to begin the negotiating process so … this is where we are now, we are meeting regularly with Parks Canada to … study creating … a marine area. So, the negotiations are ongoing at this time and we’re hoping to have a report about 12 months from now. So the actual creation of the conservation area will probably take a few more years ….

Yes, the consultation process will involve five communities including Grise Fiord, Resolute Bay, Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, and Clyde River. Those are the five communities that we consider will be most affected by a conservation area. So, we will be consulting with those premiers – communities in the coming months to make sure they understand what is going on, and to have their input in the whole process. So … we will be visiting those communities in the coming months ….
Well, every community has what we call the local lands and resources committee. So, we’ll consult with them and the hunters—the local hunters and trappers organizations—are also involved, and of course the municipal government will be included in these consultations. (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012)

Here, the technology of contract is evident. The contract of an Inuit political representative (for example, this subject is part of the QIA) was developed in order to enable the signing of an MOU. The MOU is an agreement that allows for the further development of the project, which explains why an Inuit political representative was not needed in the development of the project until the stage of needing to seek knowledge about the communities that are affected by the project came about. In establishing this contract position, this subject will then take part in the ethos of negotiated subjectivity, through contacting the affected communities and arranging on their ends the contracts that can then set up consultations for the project. This is most obvious in the way the subject alludes to the “local hunters and trappers organizations … and of course the municipal government.”

The technology of citizenship is further evident later on in my interview with this same subject, the Inuit political representative. In response to my question, “What are the limitations and possibilities that you see have been and/or will be a part of this project?” the subject states:

Well … we’re still not 100% convinced that the federal government is serious about this because they’ve been dragging their feet over the past couple of years. But, the government seems to be committed to doing this. They have shown much more commitment in the past couple of months. But at the moment we don’t see too many obstacles, except perhaps there’s some oil companies who have interest in that area. I don’t know if they’re going to be in the way or not but at the moment, everyone seems to agree that this is a good project ….

Well, I’m not that familiar with the one in the west as I understand it’s a very small area and I don’t know what kind of management regime is there. But, Lancaster Sound—we are looking at a much larger area involving more communities. As we understand it right now, no oil exploration or building is allowed in a mca. There could be some exceptions if the
QIA and communities were to agree to such a special arrangement. But, under the act that creates a [marine conservation area] oil drilling is not allowed, and so in that sense this is one of the reasons why the communities are so anxious to establish this park ….

Well, as I said this issue has been around for a long time. The communities have been extremely concerned about things like seismic activity in that area, which happened around the 60s and 70s. And, the local people could see that this activity was creating all kinds of problems for the marine population. And so, they very much want to put in protections before oil and gas exploration comes to the High Arctic, which we are [hoping] to happen in the coming years. (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012)

Firstly, expertise is established through the subject’s representation of Inuit communities’ needs. This is evident in the subject detailing the experience of communities with the government. For example, the subject identifies how the government has been “dragging their feet over the past couple of years,” and expresses the anxiety that resides in the communities and points out that this is “one of the reasons why the communities are so anxious to establish this park.” Furthermore, the subject details the historical experiences of the communities with government initiatives in this area by saying “this issue has been around for a long time. The communities have been extremely concerned about things like seismic activity in that area.” (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012).

Secondly, the project is clearly initiated from one party, that being the federal government. This is most evident in the subject’s statement, “we’re still not 100% convinced that the federal government is serious.” Such a statement indicates that the heart of the project is controlled by the federal government, and that all others involved are involved through the federal government’s initiative. Additionally, it is evident that the subject engages in empowerment through the gathering of knowledge when stating, “but the government seems to be committed to doing this. They have shown much more commitment in the past couple of months.” Though the
kinds of commitments being shown are not explicitly stated, my concern here is with what is systematically underpinning the comments. There is evidence of an important conclusion that the commitments are about interacting with the communities in some way to gather specific forms of knowledge. Finally, coercive forms of power are evident in the subject’s statement around why the communities think the project is a good one. The subject states that “they very much want to put in protections before oil and gas exploration comes to the High Arctic, which we are [hoping] to happen in the coming years” (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012). This comment indicates that the communities have been asked to articulate particular needs that make them active citizens in the management of their own risks, while articulating a role for the government to address such risks.

Finally, the technologies of contract and citizenship are evident in the interview with the government representative of Nunavut interviewed in the section on the new prudentialism. In response to the question, “What is your relationship to the project?” the subject states:

… well as you know we are the Department of Environment … there’s a number of files [that] really rest with the federal government, federal responsibilities. Obviously waters, the marine environment is a federal responsibility, it is not a territorial responsibility, so things like marine mammals and marine protected areas, migration birds, these are all under the federal jurisdiction. Mainly the Department of Environment or Department of Fisheries and Oceans … do work up here …. There’s talk of establishing a national park or national [marine conservation area]. They obviously seek input from the Government of Nunavut in that process. So, while I’m not the lead government department of the establishment of say the Lancaster Sound [marine conservation area], I do represent the Government of Nunavut’s interests, recognizing that the federal government has the ultimate say in the jurisdiction. It’s their program. (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)

Here, the kind of contract that is produced is based on the interests of a representative of the Government of Nunavut. Interestingly, the subject identifies the ethos of negotiation through discussing the centralized contract of the federal government, who then produced the contract of
the representative for the Government of Nunavut’s interests, along with other contracts. The subject states that “the federal government has the ultimate say in the jurisdiction. It’s their program,” while also referring to other kinds of contracts that have been created in relationship to the project, for example, “the marine environment is a federal responsibility, it is not a territorial responsibility” and “there’s talk of establishing a national park or national [marine conservation area]. They obviously seek input from the government of Nunavut in that process” (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012). Given the fact that such contracts have already been established, firstly through the federal government, the contract of representing the Government of Nunavut’s interests would likely produce further contracts within the same kind of framework created by the federal government.

Technologies of citizenship became evident when I asked the same subject “What are the limitations and possibilities that you see have been a part of and/or will be a part of the development and implementation of this project?” The subject states:

So far things have proceeded quite smoothly. There seems to be a willingness from all sides for this to proceed. I guess any barrier that might jump out will be dependent on the MERA (Mineral and Energy Resource Assessment) exercise. It usually, if it turns out that there’s significant oil and gas potential within an area of interest within the area of interest, than obviously the decision at that point will need to be made in terms of: do we exclude those areas from the proposed boundary to allow mineral rather oil and gas extraction to take place, or do we say you know the conservation trumps development in this particular case? So, we need to kind of make those discussions. And, what happens if there’s just one little kind of node within the area of interest that has high potential but surrounding it there doesn’t appear to be that much potential, so those are the kind of potential obstacles that the area of concern, that the steering committee is going to have to deal with. But, the MERA is basically an update of all the older information that took place years ago … they’ve now potential resource, natural resources Canada has updated their system and have more information in analyzing that information and the suggestion so far have been that the boundary has been adjusted to exclude areas of high potential that are known areas. … [There] were some leases in the area of interest but they’ve been given up or they’ve
lapsed but I think you know any potential obstacles would … primarily come from the release of the MERA, the new MERA files that have just been completed, and how the industry reacts to that, and from the community perspective, there seems to be undoubtedly, its more we want to protect it. No question about that we haven’t heard anything … (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)

When I asked him if there was no outcry from the communities, he responded:

So far that hasn’t happened but it may be premature to say that since the steering committee has yet to go out to the communities its … for those meetings but certainly the meetings took place preceding the establishment of the steering committee indicators support for the idea of a national marine conservation area and QIA had been quite supportive of that as well. The government if anything is more conservative of the organizations, [they] are simply saying we don’t want to make a decision either way, whether it should or shouldn’t be, we need to first of all do a … study and analysis to look at what are the implications of establishment of a MCA specifically as it relates to tourism, cause then communities are expected to get some benefits out of this … MCA’s and what are the potential ramifications of development taking place and increasing tanker traffic going through there opening up the Northwest Passage climate change what have you …. (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)

Technologies of citizenship are evident in these comments. Firstly, the subject’s expertise is established through discussion of participation in the critical issues that may come up as the project unfolds. For example, the subject states: “… or do we say you know the conservation trumps development in this particular case? So, we need to kind of make those discussions.”

Secondly, the project is clearly initiated from the federal government, as evident in the subject’s first quote, stating that the federal government is the central representative in the project.

Thirdly, the comments above speak to a number of different ways in which knowledge is to be collected about the communities and their region. For starters, discussing the need to collect knowledge around things that could be issues and stating that the steering committee will be responsible for that. The subject states: “… so those are the kind of potential obstacles that the
area of concern, that the steering committee is going to have to deal with.” There is also mention of the MERA report which is another way of gathering knowledge about the region: “I guess any barrier that might jump out will be dependent on the MERA exercise … But, the MERA is basically an update of all the older information that took place years ago … they’ve now potential resource, natural resources Canada has updated their system and have more information in analyzing that information.” Likewise we see the mention of consultations as a form of knowledge gathering. For example, “So far that hasn’t happened but it may be premature to say that since the steering committee has yet to go out to the communities its … for those meetings but certainly the meetings took place preceding the establishment of the steering committee indicators support for the idea of a national marine conservation area.” Finally, forms of voluntary coercive power are at work. This is particularly evident in how consultations are discussed. The creation and development of the project has already taken place before consulting with the community, and as the subject states in regards to the consultations, “So far that hasn’t happened” (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012). This indicates that once the consultations actually take place, the kind of knowledge that will be produced within the meetings will be framed in such a way as to ask Inuit communities to identify their needs within the framework of participating in the project while simultaneously producing a purpose for the government in implementing neoliberal objectives.

Therefore, in all three interviews, it is evident that the technologies of contract and citizenship are operating. A contract has been created for each of the subjects interviewed, and they include a national coordinator for a marine conservation area program, an Inuit political representative, and a representative for the Government of Nunavut. Each of these contracts has
been produced from the federal government, and will in turn produce more contracts in different spaces that are situated within the same kind of framework, thereby enacting the “ethos of negotiated subjectivity.” Technologies of citizenship were evident in that each subject exhibited an expertise in relationship to the specific contract, whether it be in the form of environmental issues, Inuit issues, or territorial issues; that the program was coming from one party, which was the federal government; that various activities were developed to attain knowledge of the communities, mainly through consultation; and finally, that coercive forms of power were operating, through positioning communities to articulate their needs within the framework given to them, such that a role is produced for Inuit on the one hand, to encourage them to participate in their own neoliberal development, and for the government on the other hand, to fulfill establishment of a neoliberal project in the region.

**Technologies of performance.** The activation of technologies of performance is also evident in the marine conservation area project. As stated in Chapter 2, technologies of performance develop in relationship with the technologies of contract and citizenship whereby particular processes, rules, and procedures specifically frame how particular subjects participate in a project within neoliberal objectives. As a result of this, the kinds of questions that can be asked reside within certain parameters. These technologies establish parameters of thought and discussion regarding the project.

Technologies of performance can be seen in the three interviews previously mentioned. In the first interview, as cited in the previous two parts of this section with the government representative of Parks Canada, the subject articulates the particular kind of parameters, procedures and processes that are involved in creating a marine conservation area project in the region, in response to the question, “What has been the process for the unfolding of the project
so far?” Specifically, the subject identifies nine procedures that have taken place. The first is the announcement of the project:

The process itself or the study itself was endorsed and announced in the Speech from the Throne in 2007. (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

Next, the subject identifies the associated funding:

The necessary funding was confirmed for a project of this kind, [it] was confirmed in the budget of 2007. (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

Following the funding, were meetings that were set up:

Initial meetings with the government of Nunavut and the Inuit Associations took place in the autumn of 2007. There was very quickly consensus among all participating that, yes, we should move forward with this work and at that time QIA was confirmed as the organization within the array of government authority that the Inuit have … land claim identified as the responsible party with whom we should work. (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

From the meetings came the signing of an MOU:

… after negotiation of an MOU amongst the three parties it was signed in December of 2009 by the federal minister of the environment. The territorial minister of the environment and the acting president of QIA. (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

The feasibility assessment followed the MOU:

It formally launched the feasibility assessment the seismic proposal that you referred to earlier became a significant consideration during the summer months of 2010 and led particularly the Inuit associations but also the Government of Canada to do some necessary work internally within their own processes with respect to the Government of Canada. (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)
A boundary proposal came next, along with the plan to conduct consultations, establish a steering committee, and a confirmation of the decision to have no seismic testing activity take place in the area.

It led to our announcing in December of 2010 the Governments of Canada proposed our position with respect to our proposed boundary for a marine conservation area. A boundary that would enclose an area of just over 43,000 square kilometres, which would make it much larger than any existing marine protected area in Canada. And, in making that announcement, the government also indicated a number of other things. First of all, it said that this was a proposal requiring further consultation, particularly with communities, but also with other interests. Secondly, it confirmed that as had been done in the MOU, there would be a steering committee established to guide the project. That steering committee now has … been established and has met four times. Now it confirmed as well that there would be no seismic exploration within the proposed study area and that following designation of a marine conservation area there would … in fact is set out in our legislation be no exploration for our development of mineral and energy resources. So, all of those things were confirmed last December. The steering committee has met a number of times and we are presently working towards initial information meetings taking place in all likelihood in the autumn of this year, and so in essence, that is the process and the sense of where we are … (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

The process concluded with a mineral and energy assessment review:

The announcement of last year also confirmed that there would be a review of previously conducted mineral and energy assessment work which is a standard requirement of how we proceed in establishing protected areas, and that work is nearing completion … (Government representative, Parks Canada, personal communication, July 2011)

Therefore, the subject has articulated a number of steps that have been taken to establish the specific parameters and processes that will enable the establishment of the project. These include the following: a speech from the throne, confirmation of funding, initial meeting and confirmation of QIA as Inuit representation, MOU signing, a feasibility assessment, establishing a boundary position, conducting consultations, forming a steering committee, and conducting a review of mineral and energy assessment work. Each of these parameters and processes are
indicative of “performance standards,” “benchmarking,” and contracting out of services. Establishing such technologies of performance define the ways in which the project can be both thought about and discussed, and it is within this kind of framing that neoliberal objectives are implemented, with no questions asked.

The consequences of this framing are most evident in how the subject addresses the topic of consultation and Inuit communities in context of the processes that have unfolded for the project so far. For example, the subject appears to believe that the fact that consultations with Inuit communities after the project has already been created, and partly developed, is adequate. There are no questions around why, if a project is to be created in that area, that the starting point for the project would not begin with consultations with the communities, given the fact that it is the space in which they live. Furthermore, though the subject discusses the importance of attaining Inuit knowledge and concerns about the area, such knowledge seems to be gathered only in context of helping the already developed project that will be implemented in the region. For example, what if Inuit communities said that they did not want the project to go ahead? There would be no room for this kind of question in a consultation that is about telling the communities what kind of project will be implemented in their region, and asking for them to share their knowledge and concerns in relationship only to that project. It appears as though they are never asked about whether they, in fact, actually need such a project in the first place.

While the first subject, the government representative of Parks Canada, discusses the step-by-step process, starting from the creation of the project into its development phases, the second subject, the Inuit political representative, only speaks of the process beginning with the MOU, which is when Inuit representation was brought into the project. In response to the
question, “What has been the process that has unfolded so far for the creation and development of the project?” the Inuit political representative states:

… a memorandum of understanding between Parks Canada and QIA was signed about three years ago to begin the negotiating process so … this is where we are now we are meeting regularly with Parks Canada to … study creating … marine areas so the negotiations are ongoing at this time and we’re hoping to have … [a] report about 12 months from now so the actual creation of the conservation area will probably take a few more years ….

Yes, the consultation process will involve five communities including Gris Fiord, Resolute Bay, Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, and Clyde River those are the five communities that we consider will be most affect[ed] by a conservation area, so we will be consulting with those premiers … communities in the coming months to make sure they understand what is going on and to have their input in the whole process, so … we will be visiting those communities in the coming months.” (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012)

Therefore, the subject discusses the particular processes and parameters that have been established for the project, starting with the signing of the MOU. From this point onwards, the subject discusses the feasibility study (the report) that follows, and the consultation process that will take place. Again, each of these aspects indicates a particular form of setting performance indicators, benchmarking, and contracting out of services. Within these parameters, then, only particular ways of thinking about and discussing the project can be considered. These kinds of parameters ensure the establishment of neoliberal objectives in the region without any questions around how and/or why these processes are taking place in such particular ways.

The consequences of these kinds of unspoken parameters can be seen in how the subject can think and/or speak about the way in which Inuit communities are involved in the project. To begin with, the subject – the Inuit political representative – makes no mention of the fact that the process began with the MOU instead of before the MOU. What kinds of parameters were already
in place by the time the subject was invited into the MOU negotiation process? And, how do these parameters influence the way in which the subject can appropriately advocate for Inuit communities? Secondly, the Inuit political representative discusses how consultations will take place with the communities, first so “they understand what is going on,” meaning that their input has not been a part of the creation and development of this project from the beginning, but rather, they are now being informed as to what will take place in their space. The subject also mentions the importance of getting “their input in the whole process,” (Inuit political representative, personal communication, February 2012), yet the question of how this input is collected, for example, in such a way that it is framed within the parameters of the already decided project, is not questioned. Given this, the question of whether Inuit communities actually have the chance to share their own authentic input is never asked.

Interestingly, in my interview with the third subject – the representative for the Government of Nunavut – as discussed in the previous parts of this section, a similar kind of involvement with the process is seen as with the representative from Parks Canada. In response to the question, “How has the process unfolded so far with the project?” the representative for the Government of Nunavut states:

Yep, there was announcement back in … Dec. 3. Minister Baird and Aglukik [stated] that Canada will be providing – no – it was 2009, the Government of Nunavut (GN), QIA and NTI signed an MOU with Parks Canada to undertake the feasibility study for the proposed study of a MCA near Lancaster’s Sound. The GN position was clear that supporting the feasibility study did not mean support of the establishment. The GN supported the idea of a feasibility study to be undertaken for the look at the possibility of having a [marine conservation area] … the MOU was signed with Canada and it included the formation of a steering committee to oversee the feasibility study. Parks Canada had five million dollars for a project over five years to determine the feasibility of a [marine conservation area] and as well to determine the area of potential interest for potential boundaries for the conservation area. The initiative was expected to be undertaken in close collaboration with the steering committee and local communities, along with other federal departments … I
believe the steering committee has met five times … (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)

I asked who is on the steering committee, to which the subject responded:

Parks Canada … Government of Nunavut … Q.I.A. … so that’s the committee and then we recently got the request of steering committee … project manager … to keep the steering committee [to] inform them of what is happening based out of Baffin … we just had our first meeting with him a few weeks back. The committee has had about four meetings, primarily [it] provides Parks Canada an opportunity to explain what is a marine conservation area, what is the legislation in place, what is it you can and can’t do … to review the process for parks establishment … and specifically the involvement of the mineral assessment …

It helps define … the boundaries based on known oil and gas potential that might exist, but we had an area of interest that was provided to the steering committee in 19 rather in 2010 sort of on the dotted line that had to complete south course of Devon Island up to the broader Peninsula and east of similar national park and Pond Inlet. So, that was the area of interest as the MERA exercising supposed to help refine that area of interest based on any potential oil and gas that might exist and any new information that might appear as it related to archeological sites or marine mammals movements and bird life ….

So far my understanding is that the MERA has been completed and the results of the MERA will be released to the … respective ministers and the results will be brought to the steering committee for its inputs …. (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)

I then asked if it would be after that point that they would set up consultations with the community, to which the subject responded:

Yes, absolutely. So essentially we don’t want to go into the community with nothing other than the communities are aware of that there will be conservation area there and there seems to be significant support from the communities when I say … we go back and say then we now understand what is a marine conservation its purpose its objectives, we’ve used the process from the idea stage to possibility of establishment and the implications on the IIDA under Article 8 or 9 of the land claim agreement. And also … Gwaii Haanas – that marine conservation area – and to talk to, to have Aboriginal groups that were involved in that establishment, to seek their input as well. (Representative from the Government of Nunavut, Department of Environment, personal communication, February 2012)
Here, the kinds of parameters and processes that are mentioned include the announcement, the MOU, the feasibility study, the steering committee, the financial amount allocated to the project within a particular time period, participation of local communities, the mineral energy assessment, consultations, and IIDA and Articles 8 and 9. Similar to the representative for Parks Canada, this subject was involved in the process from the announcement stage. Different from both the representative for Parks Canada and the Inuit political representative, this subject discusses the legal aspects involved in the process, with specific mention of IIDA and Articles 8 and 9. Again, this process reveals a setting of performance standards, benchmarking, and the contracting out of services, all of which support the development and implementation of neoliberal objectives in the region.

Similar to the other two subjects, the implications of these processes frame what can be thought and/or discussed. This, again, is most evident in how the subject considers Inuit communities in context of the process. Though the subject makes clear that permission to conduct a feasibility study does not mean that the Government of Nunavut is giving permission to establish and develop a marine conservation area, the Inuit communities themselves are not a part of defining what a marine conservation area is. It is only after the fact that consultations take place, and that such processes of defining are shared with the communities. As well, even though the subject makes reference to IIDA and Articles 8 and 9, these aspects of Inuit rights are not considered until after the marine conservation area has been defined, both in terms of its purpose and objectives. The kinds of questions that can be thought about and/or asked in terms of participation from Inuit communities in the process are framed within the parameters established by the process. As a result, such parameters work to support the establishment of neoliberal objectives, instead of beginning with objectives that come from Inuit communities themselves.
In all three interviews, particular parameters and processes have been put into place, in order to ensure the establishment of the marine conservation area project in the region. These parameters and processes were reflections of technologies of performance, as they represented different kinds of setting of performance standards, benchmarking, and the contracting out of services. Interestingly, depending on whom the subject is representing, each is brought into the process at different times. Through the technologies of performance, particular ways of thinking about and/or discussing aspects of the project are limited in the sense that questions are focused more on completing the tasks that make up the process to complete the project, versus understanding how the process structures the very way in which the project and its implementation are thought about, and how this may affect Inuit communities in the area. The focus on completing the performance standards supports the development and implementation of neoliberal objectives in the region.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examines the questions: “What is a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound really intended to do? And, what are the implications of this on Inuit communities in the area?” In order to get at these questions, I conducted an examination of Daoust et al. (2010) to see how their research addressed this question. Though their research points to the lack of attention paid to the development of marine conservation areas in the eastern part of the Arctic and the need for an examination of best management practices, it fails to address the problem of the conflicting responses coming from communities in the area and what this may mean in regards to the purpose and need for such projects in the region.
In this chapter, I used a neoliberal governmentality framework to examine how in fact the objective of the project is that of a neoliberal one, whereby the problem of climate change and the solution of a marine conservation area are produced to justify neoliberal objectives in the region. Through examining materials collected through access to information requests, it was clear that neoliberal objectives underpinned the project through establishing neoliberal values and/or energies, through the production of individual expertise connected to neoliberal market-based development, and through the production of individual freedoms and/or choices specific to neoliberal objectives. I then used three different concepts of neoliberal governmentality in order to address the question of how a neoliberal objective could be justified and normalized among the subjects participating in the project: the new prudentialism, technologies of contract and citizenship, and technologies of performance. Through this analysis, I showed how the “buy into” of the story of risk justifying the project actually supports neoliberal objectives; how particular contracts and forms of citizenship are created in order to produce particular kinds of subjects that will participate in the production of neoliberal objectives; and, finally, how specific parameters are established in order to define how the project is thought about, and discussed, so to support the implementation of neoliberal objectives in the region. It is in identifying the neoliberal objectives of the project, and the particular forms of technologies that support these objectives, where the reason for the conflicting responses from Inuit communities, as well as the lack of engagement around these conflicting responses, can be understood.
CHAPTER 5: Case Study #2, Army-Training Base and Deep-Water Port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik

In August 2007, the federal government announced that it would be implementing an army-training base and deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively. The objectives of the projects were to ensure security and sovereignty in the region, given the stated legal uncertainties associated with climate change. In response to the announcement, CBC News produced a report entitled “Northerners Divided Over Proposed Arctic Military Facilities” (2007). The report noted that although the purpose of the projects were to ensure security and sovereignty in the region, responses from Inuit community members indicated that there are questions about whether these projects would actually provide the kind of security and sovereignty as defined by Inuit. Given the fact that these have been the kinds of responses taking place in relationship to the projects, several questions arise: What are security and sovereignty projects actually about if not to provide the kind of security and sovereignty defined by those living in the area? And, what are the implications of this for the communities?

Within the diverse literature written about Arctic sovereignty and security issues (see Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, & Poelzer, 2008; Griffiths, Huebert, & Lackenbauer, 2011; Huebert, 2009), Dr. Rob Huebert (2009), an Arctic security studies expert, has produced a report that addresses the issue of security and sovereignty in the Arctic from a neoliberal-based state perspective. He assumes that the army-training base and a deep-water port are projects that will provide security and sovereignty in the region, and based on such assumptions, he focuses his analysis on best practices that will ensure the establishment of these kinds of projects. Though he gives an excellent analysis on best practices for security and sovereignty projects in the region, what does not get addressed within this perspective is the contradiction illuminated by the
responses to the projects from those living in the area, and given such responses, an examination into what the purpose of such projects of security and sovereignty are really about. Using a neoliberal governmentality approach, I depart from the state-based perspective to address the processes of such contradictions. In doing so, I explore what these sovereignty and security projects are doing if not providing the promised sovereignty and security. To do so I examine the ways in which the assumptions used to support the projects are normalized and justified, so that such contradictions necessarily remain unaddressed.

I have divided the chapter into three sections: the first section contextualizes the army-training base and deep-water port projects in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively; the second section details Huebert’s (2009) state-based analysis on security and sovereignty in the Arctic and articulates my departure from this perspective; the third section conducts a neoliberal governmentality analysis of the projects, in order to address the questions of why and how there are contradictory responses around projects that claim to be establishing security and sovereignty in the region.

**The Context**

**Exercising Our Sovereignty**

As discussed in Chapter 3, in Canada’s Northern Strategy, “Exercising Our Sovereignty” is one of the four main pillars that constitute the Strategy. Within the section discussing this pillar, the Government of Canada’s (2013) website states:

> With 40% of our landmass in the territories, 162,000 kilometres of Arctic coastline and 25% of the global Arctic – Canada is undeniably an Arctic nation. The Government is firmly exercising our sovereignty over our Arctic lands and waters – sovereignty that is long-standing, well-established and based on historic title, international law and the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples for thousands of years.
At the same time, international interest in the Arctic region is growing, in part as a result of possibilities for resource development, climate change and new or longer access to transportation routes. Canada is demonstrating effective stewardship and leadership internationally, to promote a stable, rules-based Arctic region where the rights of sovereign states are respected in accordance with international law and diplomacy. Canada has long been working with its international Arctic neighbours in areas such as search and rescue, icebreaker operations, fish and wildlife conservation, transportation, research, energy and environment. The Government will continue to strengthen this cooperation, while advancing our priorities for the Arctic region. (paras.1-3)

Therefore, this pillar illuminates the Canadian Arctic as a space that needs control and management to ensure that Canadian sovereignty prevails, particularly in context of a growing international interest in the region’s resource development, climate change, and increasing transport routes. In order to address this need, there are a number of projects that have been developed, two of which are an army-training base and deep-water port. (The deep-water port project is also a project that is connected to the Arctic Offshore Patrol Shipping [AOPS] program, while the army-training base project is not connected to any other national project.)

**Army-Training Base and Deep-Water Port**

In August 2007, the federal government announced its plans for the implementation of an army-training base and deep-water port in Canada’s Arctic. In a news release entitled “Prime Minister Announces Expansion of Canadian Forces Facilities and Operations in the Arctic” (Prime Minister of Canada, 2007), the joint function of the projects, along with their purposes, are articulated:

The Training Centre will be a year-round multi-purpose facility supporting Arctic training and operations, accommodating up to 100 personnel. Training equipment and vehicles stationed at the site will also provide an increased capability and faster response time in support of regional military or civilian emergency operations.
The expansion of the Rangers by 900 members will enable more and larger Ranger patrols. The Rangers are the "eyes and ears" of the Canadian Forces in remote regions across northern Canada. They also assist and train Southern-based soldiers, sailors and airmen deployed in the provinces and territories where they are based.

Establishing a deep-water port in Nanisivik will extend the operational range of the Navy in the Arctic. Ships will be able to re-supply, refuel, embark equipment and supplies, and transfer personnel there. The location is strategically sited inside the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage and it is equipped with docking infrastructure. The port’s main purpose will be military, but it will also have important civilian applications.

“Taken together, the creation of the Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre, the expansion and modernization of the Canadian Rangers and the development of Port Nanisivik will significantly strengthen Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic,” said the Prime Minister. “These initiatives will also benefit communities throughout the region by creating jobs and opportunities and enhancing the safety and security of the people who live here.” (paras. 3-6)

The army-training base, then, establishes a presence in terms of people occupying the space, while the deep-water port can function as a mobilizing station, to bring people in and out of the area, along with other necessities that need to be transported. These purposes for the projects will ensure security and sovereignty in the region, not just to control possible non-Canadian activity in the region but also to protect those living in the area.

The sites chosen for each of these projects are significant given the fact that they are both located in the High Arctic along the Northwest Passage: Resolute Bay for the army-training base, and Nanisivik for the deep-water port. Figure 4 shows a map of the area and the two sites.
Figure 4: Key Points on the Northwest Passage. Adapted from (CASR, 2007)

The geographical locations of these sites, where the projects are to be implemented, function as one entry point of seven (the eastern entry point) to the Northwest Passage. Figure 5 shows a drawing of the same map with the route of this entry point.

Figure 5: Routes of the Northwest Passage. Adapted from (Geology.com)
The Northwest Passage is significant for the purpose of shipping between Europe and Asia. If in fact, climate change melts the ice within the Passage for a long enough period of time, the Passage could become a more efficient shipping route than the ones currently being used, that is, the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal. The possibility of a more efficient shipping route being created as a result of melting ice, raises the legal question of who has rights over the area. In 2008, Cote and Dufresne published a report entitled *The Arctic: Canada’s Legal Claims*. In their report, they discuss the question of whether Canada has a legitimate argument for sovereignty over the area, if in fact sovereignty becomes an issue. They state that Canada does claim sovereignty over the area on the grounds of what is called “internal waters.” There are two arguments that support this position: historic title and straight baselines. Historic title refers to a state’s ability to bypass the rules in relationship to territorial seas, based upon the presence of the country’s own citizens within the area over a long period of time. Cote and Dufresne (2008) state,

… historic title enables a state to supersede purely geographical considerations in claiming sovereignty and to prevent the application of the rules and principles concerning the territorial sea, the EEZ or the high seas that would otherwise negatively affect its consideration of the maritime area in question as being entirely within its domestic jurisdiction. Three conditions must be present for historic title to exist: (1) exclusive exercise of state jurisdiction; (2) a long lapse of time; and (3) acquiescence by foreign states. (p. 4)

A subsequent article written by Dufresne in 2008 entitled “Controversial Canadian Claims over Arctic Waters and Maritime Zones,” further elaborates on the argument Canada makes in claiming historic title:

Canada claims that the Arctic waters of the Northwest Passage constitute internal waters under historic title, and thus fall under full Canadian sovereignty. The first clear statement
of the Canadian position to that effect was made in 1973 by the Bureau of Legal Affairs and read as follows:

Canada also claims that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on a historical basis, although they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any legislation ....

In 2002, officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade continued to use the argument, though it was framed in the following way:

Canada’s full sovereignty over these waters, including the Northwest Passage, is based on historic title and no right of passage is therefore recognized. Further strengthening Canada’s sovereignty position is the ongoing use and occupation of the covering ice by its Inuit people “from time immemorial.” (paras.6-7)

Therefore, within its claim to historic title, Canada uses Inuit occupancy of the land as a qualifier. Even though this argument may work, Cote and Dufresne (2008) believe that the historic title claim is actually considered a weak argument and that the straight baselines argument provides more reliable grounds for establishing sovereignty over the area. The straight baselines argument is as follows:

Canada’s characterization of the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal waters is contested. The United States considers that the Passage qualifies as an international strait. Under international law, a strait must meet a geographical and a functional requirement to be considered international. The geographical requirement is that it must be a water corridor between adjacent land masses that links two bodies of the high seas or other waters. The functional requirement is that it be used as a route for international maritime traffic. If a strait meets these two requirements and is thus international in the legal sense, foreign states have navigation rights, or right of transit, through the strait – which means that they do not have to request permission to navigate through it.

Some observers consider the US argument to be weak, given that the Passage has seldom been used for international traffic. However, maritime traffic through the Passage is predicted to increase as it becomes more accessible as a result of climate change and the melting of the Arctic sea-ice (Cote & Dufresne, 2008, Under Northwest Passage Section, paras. 4-5).³

³ For a more detailed description on this issue, please see Robert Dufresne, 2008, “Controversial Canadian Claims over Arctic Waters and Maritime Zones.”
Therefore, given the possible legal issue associated with the Northwest Passage, establishing security and sovereignty in the area through projects such as a military base and a deep-water port, and in the specific locations of Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, appear to be a justifiable solution.

**Security and Sovereignty for Inuit?**

Although the projects claim to be ensuring security and sovereignty in the area, there were mixed responses from Inuit communities concerning whether security and sovereignty, as they understood it, would be achieved through these projects. For example, though the projects’ objective is to ensure security and sovereignty over legal issues around the Passage, in fact the issues of security around wildlife and hunting grounds appear to be the core elements of security and sovereignty concerns for the communities living in the area. CBC News states:

… Canadian Ranger Sgt. Manasie Kilukishak said he is worried about the impact the port could have on wildlife in the area, which provides important hunting grounds for seals and other mammals. Kilukishak also raised concerns about noise pollution all that marine traffic could make. (CBC News, 2007)

In a document published by Nickels, Kelley, Grable, Loughheed, and Kuptana (2013) entitled “Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty,” this distinction between the Inuit understanding of security and sovereignty and the federal government’s understanding is more deeply articulated. For example, Udloriak Hanson who is a contributing author to the document (2013) states,

What does security mean to Inuit? Security doesn’t come from the comfort that some find in icebreakers, sonar detectors and Arctic military capabilities. Security from our societal perspective comes from access to the basic essentials of life – food, shelter and water. (p. 2)
Another contributing author to the document, Myrna Pokiak (2013), maps out what exactly is meant by food, shelter, and water. She states,

Figure 1 [Figure 6] illustrates one of the first maps created to demonstrate the use of the land and sea in some areas of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region. The dots indicate the areas used by many individuals and families prior to 1975 and my Grandfather was a part of this documentation.

To show the continuation of land and water use today, I have illustrated my own personal map showing my cultural trails and trips of importance in Figure 2 [Figure 7] and Figure 3 [Figure 8]. Figure 2 illustrates both trails that I have traveled on once and areas that my family continues to use year after year like Husky Lakes, Anderson River, Toker Point, Hendrickson Island, and Baillie Island. Figure 3 illustrates the Inuvialuit Settlement Region and the areas I have been to within, including Aulavik National Park on Banks Island, Ulukhaktok on Victoria Island, and Tuktut Nogait National Park near Paulatuk. (pp. 55-56)
**Figure 6:** Land Use and Occupancy Map Created by Peter Usher and Bertam Pokiak. Adapted from (Nickels, Kelley, Grable, Loughheed, & Kuptuna, 2013, p.55)

**Figure 7:** Myrna Pokiak Trails with Family, All Locations from One Week to Ten Months Duration. Adapted from (Nickels, Kelley, Grable, Loughheed, & Kuptuna, 2013, p.56)
Clare Kines (resident of Arctic Bay) put it well when addressing this contradictory situation that is taking place with the projects and the responses from the community members. He states (cited by CASR), in his article entitled “Of Ships and Sovereignty”:

Nanisivik is the smart choice if you're needing a base for Arctic Patrol vessels. The only problem is the new scheme... is the wrong approach to sovereignty”. The real answer, Mr. Kines says, lies in the people of the North – living on the land establishes sovereignty far more dramatically than a modest military presence. Were the government to 'make the
In this quote, Kines is clarifying the difference between what sovereignty (and security) means for those living in the area as opposed to government interpretations of sovereignty and security that underpin the projects being implemented. Given the differences in approaches to sovereignty, the questions that arise are: “What is the objective of an army-training base and a deep-water port, if not to provide the promised security? And, what are the implications of this objective?”

**Security Projects and Best Implementation Practices**

Similar to the marine conservation area case study discussed in Chapter 4, there is no academic literature directly addressing the army-training base and deep-water port. However, there is literature that addresses the issue of security and sovereignty in the Arctic more generally (see Huebert 2009; Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrion, & Poelzer 2008; Griffiths, Huebert, & Lackenbauer, 2011). Specifically, I focus on the work of Huebert (2009), a political scientist and associate director for the Centre for Military and Strategy Studies, who published an article in July 2009 entitled “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” I chose this article to focus on because it provides the most extensive detail on the issue. In the article, Huebert attempts to make sense of best implementation practices for security and sovereignty projects in the Arctic. Similar to the state-based approach discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Huebert assumes a cause and effect in context of security and sovereignty projects, builds facts around the cause and effect, and develops a position based on these assumptions. Though the analysis provides excellent detail on the current literature on Canadian Arctic security and
sovereignty, it fails to address the inherent contradictions that arise from differing community responses in regards to the projects.

The cause and effect in Huebert’s (2009) article involves climate change as the cause, and economic and legal issues as the effects. He discusses climate change as the cause as follows:

Climate change is warming the Arctic at a considerable rate, which has garnered the attention of the Arctic states’ leaders, their public and the world. It was only as recently as the 1990s that few even knew of climate change, let alone understood its magnitude. Amongst the many changes taking place, the most important impact of climate change in the Arctic is melting of sea ice, which is receding at an accelerated and unprecedented rate.

The melting ice means that Canadian Arctic waters will be more open and therefore more accessible. This accessibility has led most observers to predict the entry of an increasing array of interests into the region. The Canadian government’s ability to control what happens in its Arctic region will be tested with this entry of newcomers into the Canadian Arctic who will seek to exploit and benefit from a more accessible Arctic. Thus the melting of the sea ice will be at the root of the challenges to Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security.” (p. 10)

Huebert (2009) then discusses the effects of this cause, this being economic and legal issues. He states,

Melting sea ice allows for greater accessibility to and exploitation of the Arctic’s marine resources. In terms of oil and gas, the Arctic is estimated to contain approximately 25 percent of the world’s remaining undiscovered oil and gas deposits. A study by the US Geological survey is the most commonly cited study and it suggests that 13 percent of oil and 30 percent of natural gas remains in the Arctic. If correct, the Arctic is the world’s last major source of oil and gas.

The potential riches of the Arctic continue substantially beyond oil and gas. There is growing recognition that another source of energy, known as gas hydrates, is found in Arctic waters. Located in either very deep or very cold (or both) ocean waters, scientists have discovered a jelly-like substance that is actually a source of gas. (pp. 12-13)
The pursuit of resources will be the incentive for outside interests to enter the Canadian Arctic. However, international law gives Canada the sovereign right to control the development of these resources. UNCLOS gives coastal states the sovereign right to control the resources within 200 miles of their coast line. Thus the Canadian government has the right to control all shipping that comes into Canadian Arctic waters for the purpose of resources, if it chooses to do so. If Canada loses it dispute with Americans and Europeans as to the international legal status of the Passage, then they will not be able to unilaterally control these vessels. On the other hand, if the Canadian position that these waters are internal Canadian waters perseveres, then it will also be able to control that shipping. (pp. 15-16)

Therefore, Huebert identifies climate change as the cause with both economic and legal risks as the effects.

In order to support the establishment of these cause and effects as central to the issue, Huebert (2009) produces facts that support both the problem of climate change and the effects of economic and legal issues. In regards to climate change, he discusses various experts and documents that have been produced to justify that climate change is a problem. In his article, he cites nine key facts of climate change which are based on research documents produced by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). Huebert (2009) states, “The ACIA study remains the definitive work on the subject, although it will soon require an update” (p. 10). The ACIA report involved work done by a number of working groups from the Arctic Council: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), and the International Arctic Science Committee (ISAC). Based on these experts, Huebert (2009) concludes: “Perhaps the most important finding of the ACIA is the magnitude of the problem. Their assessment brought together the world’s leading experts who produced a peer-reviewed, scientific document and a more concise document” (pp.10-11).
In addition to the facts built around climate change, Huebert (2009) also expands on the associated risks of economic and legal issues. First, Huebert (2009) cites the various companies that have taken initiative to invest in these resources in some capacity. He states,

In 2007, Exxon and several partners made a successful bid of over $585 million for a five year exploration program in the MacKenzie Delta and Beaufort Sea…. As much as this figure astonished observers, British Petroleum (BP) shocked the industry the following year when it made a successful bid of $1.2 billion, also for a five year exploration program in the same region ….

Several land-based projects are also now underway. One of the largest deposits of iron ore has been discovered in Mary River on Baffin Island; plans are now in place to develop this site. By taking advantage of new technology in building ice-capable ships, it is anticipated that the product can be shipped during much of the year by ice-reinforced bulk carriers. …

On the other side of the Yukon-Alaska border, since 2007 Shell has attempted to begin a $44 million exploration process. However, this process has been held up by a court challenge brought about by a coalition of community and environmental groups. In November 2008, the Ninth District Appeal Court ruled that the American federal government has not required strong enough environmental standards. This ruling meant that Shell could not proceed. However in a surprise move, the Court subsequently voided its decision.

It is not clear what will happen next. Shell has stated that it intends to proceed with its offshore exploration program in the summer of 2010 …. 

Even if the Arctic projects are put on hold in the foreseeable future, there is little doubt that they will eventually go forward. Given China’s growth in the last decade and the growth that India is expected to experience in the coming years, these states’ demand for oil alone will likely aid in the recovery of the price of oil. When that occurs, the north will be one of the main areas of new oil resource exploration and development. Thus the question is not if oil and gas will be developed in the Arctic, but when. (pp. 13-14)

Huebert (2009) expands on this reality by developing a section about the Northwest Passage where he details the possible controversies that might take place given the above information:

The other issue that has perplexed Canadians in the Arctic is the issue of sovereignty and the Northwest Passage. As discussed earlier, this has been one of the major irritants in Canada-US relations since 1969. The sovereignty issue in the context of the Northwest
Passage is about control of international shipping in the Northwest Passage, nothing more and nothing less.

The Canadian position is that the passage is internal Canadian waters, which gives Canada absolute control over all activities within it. The American position is that the passage is a strait used for international navigation. If the Canadian position is correct, then Canada has the right to control all elements of shipping in the passage, including the right of controlling who comes into the passage and who cannot. If the American position is correct then Canada only has the right to control international shipping in regards to international rules and standards, and has a limited ability to stop shipping …

A recent proliferation of articles by Canadian scholars suggests that it may, or even should, be possible to work out a deal with the United States on this issue. Some articles have suggested that it should be feasible to work out a deal similar to the St. Lawrence Seaway Agreement in which both states arrange for the joint management of the passage. Others have suggested that as long as Canada can show that it is serious about asserting proper control and therefore maintaining the security of the region, the Americans should respond by not overly asserting its position. In other words, American agreement not to challenge Canada would be exchanged for Canadian protection of the region. (pp. 24-25)

In summary, the risks of natural resource extraction and disputes over internal versus international ownership of the Northwest Passage become facts on which Huebert (2009) builds his argument in order to justify the need for security and sovereignty that are caused by climate change. More importantly, these facts establish the foundation from which to begin discussing “best management strategies” to implement the army-training base and deep-water port.

Drawing on the above facts that Huebert (2009) organizes and describes, he then develops a set of recommendations and/or strategies to ensure best control and protection for the region. He states:

The challenges of the Arctic require government action that transcends any one department. It is currently trendy to use terms such as ‘whole of government’ when talking about efforts to break down departmental silos. The Arctic definitely requires that such silos be broken down …
The territorial governments must be included, as well as the various northern aboriginal peoples organizations … this process must have direct access to the Prime Minister. Canadian Arctic policy develops when the Prime Minister is interested. (p. 34)

Huebert (2009) furthers these strategies by outlining three major sets of actions that the government should follow in order to establish and then maintain control:

1) Know what is happening in the Canadian North;
2) Enforce Canadian rules and laws
3) Cooperate with Canada’s circumpolar neighbours. (p. 35)

Therefore, Huebert (2009) contributes to the greater literature on Arctic sovereignty and security, through expanding on the framework of sovereignty and security, as being about control and protection and proposing a particular set of strategies to ensure such control and protection of the Arctic takes place. This analysis is reliant on the problem of climate change and the associated economic and legal risks as being the real issues that need to be addressed in the region. Though this analysis is excellent in detailing, and adding to, the literature on Arctic sovereignty and security, what remains still to be addressed is the question of why projects such as an army-training base and a deep-water port, both projects of which claim to establish such sovereignty and security, would have contradictory reactions from Inuit communities in the region.

The Army-Training Base and a Deep-Water Port as Neoliberal Projects

Given the limitations of the above policy-based approach, the question still remains, “Why and how do these projects come about, and what are the implications of these kinds of projects on the communities actually being impacted?”
A Neoliberal Project

Similar to the marine conservation area project, if climate change were an issue, then the need for an army-training base and deep-water port project would have come about long ago. As well, if the associated challenges to climate change created the need to help Inuit communities deal with such challenges, there has been much discussed on where this could begin, of which an army-training base and deep-water port are not among the first on the list. Given the fact that climate change and the associated challenges are not the real objectives to be addressed with these projects, another objective is at work, which I argue is a neoliberal one.

As mentioned in previous chapters, there are three aspects of neoliberal objectives (energies and/or values, expertise, and freedom and/or choice), which can be seen operating within the stated objective of the army-training base and deep-water port projects. On the federal government’s website, the prime minister’s announcement of the projects is stated as follows:

“Canada’s New Government understands that the first principle of Arctic sovereignty is use it or lose it,” Prime Minister Harper said. “Today’s announcements tell the world that Canada has a real, growing, long-term presence in the Arctic.”

The Training Centre will be a year-round multi-purpose facility supporting Arctic training and operations, accommodating up to 100 personnel. Training equipment and vehicles stationed at the site will also provide an increased capability and faster response time in support of regional military or civilian emergency operations.

The expansion of the Rangers by 900 members will enable more and larger Ranger patrols. The Rangers are the “eyes and ears” of the Canadian Forces in remote regions across northern Canada. They also assist and train Southern-based soldiers, sailors and airmen deployed in the provinces and territories where they are based.

Establishing a deep water port in Nanisivik will extend the operational range of the Navy in the Arctic. Ships will be able to re-supply, refuel, embark equipment and supplies, and transfer personnel there. The location is strategically sited inside the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage and it is equipped with docking infrastructure. The port’s main purpose will be military, but it will also have important civilian applications.
“Taken together, the creation of the Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre, the expansion and modernization of the Canadian Rangers and the development of Port Nanisivik will significantly strengthen Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic,” said the Prime Minister. “These initiatives will also benefit communities throughout the region by creating jobs and opportunities and enhancing the safety and security of the people who live here.” (Prime Minister of Canada, 2007, paras. 2–6)

Firstly, instead of imagining the space as a place in need of social welfare assistance (as would be evident from a welfare state), or as a place consisting of honouring individual needs (as would be evident in a liberal democratic state), the space is imagined as being of value to a particular form of use, which I argue is a neoliberal one. The statement “Use it or lose it” indicates that already existing forms of usage that do not align with neoliberal objectives do not have value. For example, in the “Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty” (Nickels, Kelley, Grable, Loughheed, & Kuptana, 2013) document that I cited at the beginning of this chapter, one Inuk perspective on how the land is perceived and used through hunting and animal/wildlife is presented. The three maps (in Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5) show extensive usage of the space; therefore, this notion of “Use it or Lose it” seems unrelated to what is actually going on in the Arctic region. Fenge (2013) expresses this well:

It is, perhaps, this misperception and misunderstanding of the very nature of northern Canada that enabled Prime Minister Harper in 2007 to say:

“Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty in the Arctic: either we use it or we lose it,” (Byers, 2009, p. 109)

This quite extraordinary statement repeated by the Prime Minister and his ministers over the next two years provided a political justification for a “hardware” and “military investment” approach to sovereignty assertion. In so doing, the Prime Minister stepped back from the long-standing sovereignty supporting “historic title” position of previous federal governments. Some commentators suggested that the “use it or lose it” aphorism actually weakened rather than strengthened Canada’s Arctic sovereignty (Fenge, 2011, pp. 17–22). After all, what other leader of a G8 country would suggest or admit that how territory is used has any bearing on the position of other states about sovereignty over that same territory? Does the Prime Minister truly believe — and does he expect the Canadian
public to believe — that minerals and hydrocarbons in the Canadian Arctic have to be developed in order to ensure that other countries will acknowledge our Arctic sovereignty and jurisdiction? (pp. 52-53)

Though Inuit usage of the space is not attributed value, value is given to a particular form of usage that aligns with neoliberal objectives. This is evident in the kind of structures that are being set up to support particular forms of the “Use it or lose it” principle. For example, the deep-water port is set up conveniently at the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage. The quote states, “The location is strategically sited inside the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage” (Prime Minister of Canada, 2007, para. 5). This indicates that the kind of value being supported by the projects is value that would come from transport and/or shipping through that area, whether it be in relation to carrying cargo, oil and gas exploration and development, or tourism.

The kind of “experts” that are to be produced in relationship to these projects, and in support of neoliberal objectives, are emergency operators who can carry out surveillance of the space to protect the kind of value that will be produced through the infrastructure being built. These emergency operators, also called Rangers, will then train southern-based workers to carry out the responsibilities of surveillance of the space. Again, these experts are specific to neoliberal objectives as they support the flow and development of capital in the region, and they obscure already existing forms of expertise in the area, such as hunters from the communities and their hunting practices.

The kind of “freedom” and/or “choice” that is given to those living in the area is freedom and/or choice that is particular to neoliberal objectives. For example, the quote states, “These initiatives will also benefit communities throughout the region by creating jobs and opportunities and enhancing the safety and security of the people who live here” (Prime Minister of Canada,
2007, para.6). This quote indicates that Inuit who live in the area will have the freedom and/or choice to participate in new jobs and opportunities that will be created as a result of the projects, as well as freedom from insecurity and unsafe situations. These freedoms and/or choices, however, are only freedoms and choices in the framework of neoliberal objectives. For example, if the objectives of the projects were not situated within neoliberal objectives, perhaps job choices and opportunities would involve those within locally based practices such as hunting. As well, freedom from insecurity would mean more than just insecurity in regards to sovereignty issues. In “Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty” (Nickels, Kelley, Grable, Loughheed, & Kuptana, 2013), Inuit communities outline for themselves what security would mean. Specific articulations as mentioned in this chapter include “food, shelter and water” (Hanson, 2013, p. 2). Therefore, given this difference in considering what security means, it does not necessarily offer choices and/or freedoms to Inuit communities but rather are produced choices and/or freedoms that work to establish neoliberal objectives in the region.

The Production of Neoliberal Projects

Similar to the marine conservation area project, the way in which neoliberal objectives become justified and normalized within these projects takes place through specific kinds of technologies. As stated in the previous chapters, these technologies include: the new prudentialism, technologies of agency, and technologies of performance.

The new prudentialism. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the new prudentialism is a neoliberal technology that deals with the issue of risk. In context of the army-training base and deep-water port projects, this “buy into” risk is evident through three interviews that I conducted with subjects specifically participating in the project: a community member and economic
development officer, an Inuit community member and mayor, and a community member and co-inn-owner. In each of the interviews, the subjects reflect on a “buy into” climate change as a risk, the value of sovereignty and potential loss of sovereignty due to this risk, and the need for an army-training base and deep-water port as a solution to the risk.

In the first interview, with the community member and economic development officer, I asked the question, “What do you see the need being for these projects … so would you say that this need has come up more recently because of the melting of the ice, that there would be more activity going on in the area?” The subject responded as follows:

Well, that’s brought the sovereignty issue more in place. As the climate warms up and the route is becoming more viable as commercial now there’s more up in dispute about who controls it whose sovereignty it belongs to. (personal communication, July 2011)

Here the subject articulates climate change as the issue that has created the risk of the potential loss for sovereignty. The subject then articulates a “buy into” to the role that the military base and deep-water port will fill, in order to address this risk. In response to the question, “How do you understand the need for an army-training base in the area?” the same subject responded:

Well the military … is up in Resolute Bay and I don’t have as good a handle on that, you know, my understanding of the military base is going to be kind of a training base to prepare troops for operating in the Arctic that sort of thing … and the deep-water port was part of the infrastructure that is going to be in place with the new Arctic patrol vessels and the port already exists in terms of the actual I mean it’s going to be getting significant upgrade now … three or four ships a year just for that purpose, so now it’s going to [be] used as a little base of operations mostly for refueling and resupplying things like that for both the coastguard and the Arctic patrol vessels. (personal communication, July 2011)

In this response, the subject reflects a “buy into” the story of what the military base and deep-water port are believed to do, in terms of addressing the risk of sovereignty due to climate change in the region.
A similar kind of “buy into” can be seen in the second interview. In response to the question, “What is the need for a military base and deep-water port?” the subject, an Inuit community member and mayor states, “… all this talk of Arctic Sovereignty in Ottawa we thought this was a good opportunity” (personal communication, July 2011). This statement alone indicates a “buy into” on the issue of climate change and sovereignty as a risk in the region. The subject continues: “I mean strategically for them I guess it makes sense for them Nanisivik is in the High Arctic which is closer to NWP” (Inuit community member, mayor, personal communication, July 2011). Here, the subject indicates a “buy into” in terms of what the deep-water port promises to fulfill, which is the risk of the loss of sovereignty through establishing a presence at the politically strategic eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage.

This kind of “buy into” can be seen again in my third interview. In response to the question, “What do you see the need being for the military base and deep-water port?” the subject, community member and co-inn owner, makes no mention of climate change, and instead launches directly into how implementing the project in the community would benefit people:

I would assume that what they [the army] were doing is providing survival training and Arctic winter warfare training for the troops so in order to do that they would have to do have a facility in the Arctic which would support all their needs they need to implement their program … from a community point of view it’s good for the community because one it creates more infrastructure; it brings more people in and out of Resolute; the … benefits are quite a bit for the community in terms of business being supported construction being done planes flying in and out bringing people in and out so overall the impact on the community is a lot greater by having a training facility in Resolute than not having one. (personal communication, August 2011)

Here, the subject speaks to both how the projects will meet the needs of the sovereignty risk and how they will bring productive business into the community. Though climate change is not
mentioned, it underpins the needs identified through implicitly justifying and framing what can and cannot be questioned.

Thus, in all three interviews, the problem of climate change is assumed, the risk of sovereignty is bought into, and the solution that the military base and deep-water port offer in terms of dealing with the risk of sovereignty is also bought into. The “buy into” of this story reflects a support for the development and implementation of neoliberal objectives, as it enables the justification and normalization of the implementation of these projects. Furthermore, it does so without raising questions around whether in fact this story obscures other kinds of risks defined by those living in the area, and the kinds of needs that may not have to do with such objectives.

Technologies of contracts and citizenship. As seen in the previous chapter, the second kind of technology that is used to justify and normalize the projects is technologies of agency. These technologies of agency are evident in the three interviews discussed above. In the interview with the Inuit community member and mayor, the subject responded to the question “What is your relationship to the project?” by stating:

Sure, actually we tapped into some funding from Churchill government to do a study on a deep-sea port that was in August the report that came out in August 2005 now typically a deep-sea port is not a municipal infrastructure mandate but on the other hand as a mayor I heard so often the need for this infrastructure not just for annual sealifts but just even for hunters it’s very expensive up here and sometimes … I felt something that we don’t do enough of collaboration as a group so as the mayor I decided to put together the key stakeholders that would be impacted or benefit. I should say from such an infrastructure we had everybody from the dry cargo industry petroleum products position fishery and tourism coast guard our … land claims organization corporation was involved and just had a group of people get together and talk about the need and how we envision what kind of a real need do we have we need try to incorporate dry cargo but also our hunters like I said they don’t always have insurance and when we have high winds in the summer some of them are tipped over and their lost safety for me was another issue I can’t remember what year it
was but one of the heavy equipment operators on a cargo ship backed up too far and actually passed away so safety and Iqaluit. (personal communication, July 2011)

Here, the subject position that is produced as contract is that of mayor. The mayor identifies needs for the community in context of what is being expressed as a possible government initiative, for example, in this case, the need for infrastructure. The identification of the need for infrastructure supports the neoliberal objectives of the Strategy, as the mayor brings it to the forefront even though it is not a municipal infrastructure, in this way creating the need for those in the region. From these needs, the subject participates in the “ethos of negotiated subjectivity,” by way of producing further contracts (stakeholders) based on the framework from which the mayor as contract is situated within. These contracts further produce the need for a deep-sea port in the region, without questioning why such an infrastructure has become a need in the first place.

Technologies of citizenship are also evident in this interview. The subject takes up the position of “expert” of community needs as the mayor. The project of a deep-sea port is clearly initiated from outside of the community, as the mayor states that the deep-sea port as infrastructure is not usually a municipal responsibility. Knowledge gathering takes place through the subject’s initiative to bring together different stakeholders involved with the development and implementation of a deep-sea port. And, finally, forms of voluntary and/or coercive power are evident, in the fact that the mayor is holding informal consultations about the deep-sea port, to articulate the needs of the people in the region, to give both the community members the incentive to participate in the development of the project, as well as to give the government a role to fulfill in the development and implementation of the project. These technologies of citizenship reveal the way in which neoliberal objectives are justified and normalized in the
region through the production of particular kind of subjects, and the responsibilities associated
with them.

In my interview with the community member and co-owner of the inn, it became evident
that the subject was not participating in a contract specific to the projects, but rather resided in
Resolute because of a previous work-related contract. In response to the question, “What is your
relationship to the project?” the subject responds:

My wife and I are owners of the South Camp Inn and both of us have been mayors of
Resolute Bay … I’ve been here 33 years now … I’m a mechanic by trade and I came to
work. (personal communication, August 2011)

Here, the contract position is different from that seen in the first interview. A contract left over
from a previous project is what brought this community member to Resolute Bay, as seen from
the statement “I’m a mechanic by trade and I came to work.” Interestingly, this subject who has
lived in the community for 33 years is not specifically contracted into the projects.

Technologies of citizenship were also evident with this same subject when re-reading the
quote from the new prudentialism, in the context of the now claimed contract the subject holds.
To re-quote:

… I would assume that what they [the army] were doing is providing survival training and
Arctic winter warfare training for the troops so in order to do that they would have to do
have a facility in the Arctic which would support all their needs they need to implement
their program … from a community point of view it’s good for the community because one
it creates more infrastructure; it brings more people in and out of Resolute; the … benefits
are quite a bit for the community in terms of business being supported construction being
done planes flying in and out bringing people in and out so overall the impact on the
community is a lot greater by having a training facility in Resolute than not having one.”
(personal communication, August 2011).

Here, the strategies of technologies of citizenship are evident. From the perspective of this long-
time resident, there is clearly an “expert” in the initial response to the question, “… what the
purpose of (the army-training base) … is or the need for it would be …?” The quote itself
demonstrates what kind of knowledge would be collected from the experts, including the need
for infrastructure, business, and the flow of people and resources. The project is clearly coming
from outside of the subject, given the fact that the subject has no particular role in the project and
discusses the premise of it from a non-community perspective. Finally, coercive forms of power
are evident in this subject’s quote whereby the framing of how the subject understands the
project is situated within economic value. From there, the subject evaluates the impact of the
project, what the need of the community would be from the project, and in doing so, create active
agents from the community in the development of this project, as well as a purpose for the
government to develop and implement the project. This process justifies, and normalizes, the
development and implementation of neoliberal objectives in the region.

Finally, in my interview with the community member and economic development officer,
a particular kind of contract situated within neoliberal values became evident. In response to the
question, “What is your relationship to the project?” the subject states:

… sure, I came here in ’99 I was transferred here I am a retired member of the RCMP so I
was posted here in 1999 in August and I worked at the detachment I was in charge of the
detachment here in Nanisivik Arctic Bay … now Nanisivik as a community doesn’t exist
anymore but when I came here it was a community that’s where our office was and we
lived in Arctic Bay … and then the detachment was moved over here in late 2000 and then
we still policed both communities and now Nanisivik is just a gravel pad. But, while I was
here I met my wife and … married so this [is] home now this is … where I live I retired in
2003 and … we had a business for a while and I am currently the economic development
officer for Arctic Bay. (Community member, economic development officer, July 2011)

The contract position produced in this case is that of the economic development officer of
Arctic Bay. Interestingly, similar to the owner of the inn, this subject has not been directly
contracted into the project itself, yet is a full-time resident in the community. Also, similar to the
second interview subject, the reason for this subject’s presence in the North began with an earlier contract with the RCMP, and since then he has held multiple positions in the area as a member of the RCMP in charge of the detachment in Nanisivik, as a business owner, and now as an economic development officer.

Therefore, in all three cases there were particular contracts developed, though only one was specific to the projects. This absence of producing contracts with community members indicates the neoliberal objectives of the project. For example, if the objectives of the project were about meeting the needs of the community members, then the members who have been living there since the creation of the community would be the first to be contracted in, in order to define the needs and develop the projects for the community. Instead, only one of the three interviewees was contracted in relationship to the projects, and the other two remained detached from it until aspects of the project began to unfold in the space.

**Technologies of performance.** As mentioned in previous chapter, the third strategy that can be seen operating in the development and implementation of the projects is technologies of performance. In the interview with the community member and mayor, the following response was given after being asked about how the process of developing and implementing the projects has gone so far. The subject states:

Well, ultimately at the municipal level I certainly made the decision to try to move this forward because I heard too many sectors talk about the need our hunters and of course even when it comes to dry cargo we have really high tides and low tides a ship will sit here for 5 days offloading periodically using barges if we had a deep-sea port it would take 2 days as opposed to 5 and as I understand it’s thousands of dollars a day to run a ship so the savings we felt there would be significant savings on our dry cargo with the deep sea port automatically you would have gained you know three extra days of expenses because the stuff on that ship for five days it’s all you know three extra days of expenses because the stuff on that ship for five days it’s all you know the same amount same product sitting on that ship if you we had a deep-sea port if we only have it two days we will only be charged
two days for it instead of the five days that happens now so the significance savings cause it’s so expensive here like looking at 15 dollar are three litres of milk so just give you an example so yah this would have been very significant that’s one and then of course the fishing industry has really grown here since I’ve been mayor we’ve gotten more quotas in our area our land claims corporation has actually invested in a vessel and they go fishing for shrimp scallops but unfortunately they have to offload to Greenland and nfi because of the lack of infrastructure now things might have changed since cause they other thing they did do a small craft … I don’t know it’s not the magnitude that we wanted to see but they did put a harbor … structure in Pang. Because they have a fish plant there but I don’t think it’s big enough it’s not the full fledge deep-sea port that we had wanted. (personal communication, July 2011)

What is of interest in this quote is the fact that the only part of the process that this subject could speak to was trying to move the project forward. Aside from that, discussing the various justifications for needing to move the project forward became the most important aspect to discuss.

The next interview with the community member and co-owner of the Inn, when asked the same question around the process, responds with the following statement:

Well, first of all Resolute has been a primary training facility for the search and rescue technicians in the north for the last 40 years or more they run survival training programs here every year for all us Arctic’s that fly out of c130s and anyone else who is flying up north goes through the training process so it is already somewhat of a training area. The training school starts to take it to a bigger vision when there was talk of setting up a training facility several communities I believe did presentations to the military when they were doing their visit to tell them why their community would be better than others and I guess in the end Resolute was picked predominantly because of the location and everything else that is available and all of the support that is here compared to others. I don’t know if that answers what you want or not ….

Well, it would have been the hamlet met with the military and gave their bits our selves as business people met with them and tried to convince them why Resolute would be a good choice so I guess it would be a selling on everybody’s part. (personal communication, August 2011)

This subject goes through the various steps perceived to be a part of developing and implementing the project: the training school and presentations around setting up training
facilities in several communities. After this, the only process the subject is aware of is the meeting with the hamlet and the military and other business people.

Finally, the third interview with the community member and economic development officer, responds to the same questions as follows:

Yeah, the Department of Defence has been fairly good at consultation they are up on a regular basis at least twice a year type thing to discuss that they were up you know this past winter/spring type thing to do a community presentation to show the plans that they put in place and when they’re you know planning to start construction and in terms of what I do for a living now economic development officer I’m in contact with them on a regular basis the project team because there is Inuit impact agreements that have to be made and you know they want to ensure that the community benefits as much as it can from the port in terms of jobs and construction in place it’s a fairly slow process it’s the federal government you know type thing since the announcement I can’t remember when it was 2007, August 2007 you know there doing work up there in terms of env. studies in terms of things they need to move forward type thing but I, you know, construction isn’t until 2012 2013 to put their stuff in place so its extremely slow process type thing but that also you know enables us from a community to work on our capacity to take advantage of the jobs that are in place or that will be in place for that.

…

Pretty much for any major project up here because of the NLCA and everything like that the whole purpose of sections of that was to ensure that Inuit are included and that uh um the impacts on them are looked at so there are whether it’s a mine or an environmental process or a project a federal project or something like that there has to be an Inuit impact agreement kind of thing so you know how many people percentage of the work force should be Inuit what are the social impacts of a project supposed to be or are going to be type thing so it’s a long involvement project but the idea of it is to ensure that negative impacts of it are lower and the positive impacts are also higher so you know they aren’t necessarily just bringing these people in to work in a mine or construction project if you could hire those same people local. (personal communication, July 2011)

This subject discusses the process as involving consultations twice a year with the community about the project, involving a community presentation to show details around the plans. The subject, as the economic development officer, is in touch with the project staff on a regular basis.
He mentions the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement as a way in which to ensure Inuit needs are ‘included’ as the planning and implementing of the projects take place.

Therefore, technologies of performance are evident in these beginning stages of the project: one interviewee identifies the need to have the project move forward; another interviewee discusses the training school and facilities, community presentations; and a third interviewee discusses presentations, consultations, and the impact benefit agreement. These kinds of processes frame how the subjects can think and ask questions about the projects. They no longer question why the projects are needed in the first place, and/or whether they actually came from the communities themselves, but rather focus on the importance of moving forward with the projects and whether the projects have followed through with the promised benchmarks and/or indicators that have been proposed.

**Conclusion**

Based on a neoliberal governmentality analysis, the contradictions of government and Inuit responses can be made sense of through revealing the way in which the objective of these projects is a neoliberal one, and that specific technologies are used to justify and normalize this objective, while positioning Inuit perspectives on the periphery of the development of the project. The neoliberal objectives were evident through how the space is discussed as unused and in need of being used through the implementation of an army-training based and a deep-water port, the need for specific kinds of experts that will support these kinds of projects, such as emergency operators and/or Rangers, and the kind of freedom promised from these projects, which is safety and security not necessarily from Inuit perspectives but from monitoring and surveillancing the environment. The kinds of technologies used to normalize and justify this
objective were seen through three specific set of interviews and involved the new prudentialism, where climate change was bought into, the value of sovereignty and the potential loss, and the need for an army-training base and a deep-water port was assumed; technologies of contract and citizenship, where it was evident that community members were not necessarily included in the beginning stages of this project but the economic development officer was; and, finally, technologies of performance, which were at work through performance standards such as community visits, presentations, consultations, training facilities, and impact and benefit agreements. As a result of these technologies, Inuit perspectives are obscured in favour of trying to best implement the army-training base and a deep-water port.
CHAPTER 6: Case Study #3, Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS),

Cambridge Bay

In 2010, the Canadian government announced plans to implement a Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. The purpose of this research station, it stated, would be to establish “a world-class hub for science and technology in Canada’s North” (Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014, para. 1). According to the Prime Minister’s Office, the station would support “advancing Canada’s knowledge of the Arctic’s resources and climate while at the same time ensuring that Northern communities are prosperous, vibrant and secure” (Prime Minister of Canada, 2010, para. 2). The Northern News Service produced an article shortly thereafter which illuminated contradictory responses from Inuit communities around whether such a research station would provide the kind of prosperity and security needed by Inuit. Such contradictions raised several questions. What is a “world-class hub for science and technology” (Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2014, para. 1) really doing, if not enabling the promised prosperity, vibrancy, and security as stated for northern Inuit communities? And, what impacts does this have on Inuit communities?

In Dr. Gita Laidler’s article entitled “Inuit and Scientific Perspectives on the Relationship between Sea Ice and Climate Change: The Ideal Complement?” (2006), the issue of scientific research and Inuit voices is addressed. In the article, Laidler assumes scientific research to provide protection, prosperity, and security, and as a result, focuses her analysis primarily on the incorporation/complementary possibilities of Inuit traditional knowledge in the context of scientific research. Though this kind of analysis addresses the absence of Inuit knowledge within scientific research, it fails to address the more fundamental questions of why and how such
knowledge goes missing from projects of scientific research in the first place.

Using a neoliberal governmentality framework, I explore why and how this absence takes place within the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS), and how it has produced such contradictory responses. More specifically, I will argue that CHARS is underpinned by neoliberal objectives, whereby it produces a focus on a value aligning with the market, establishes the value of certain individuals and their expertise specific to this market-aligned value, and celebrates choice and freedom for these individuals, again only within the framework of this market-aligned value. What we will see is that this kind of objective is produced and normalized through specific strategies such as the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance. At the same time, it obscures and fails to build on already existing forms of value, expertise, and freedom and choice that do not align with neoliberal objectives.

I have divided the chapter into three sections: the first section contextualizes the Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay; the second section details Laidler’s (2006) examination of scientific research and Inuit traditional knowledge, as well as articulates my departure from her position; and, the third section conducts a neoliberal governmentality analysis of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station to address the contradictory responses taking place.

The Context

Canadian Arctic Science and Technology

Although Canada’s Northern Strategy has four pillars that constitute the themes of sovereignty, environment, social and economic development, and northern governance, it is
actually science and technology that underpin these four themes. The website for Canada’s Northern Strategy states,

To meet the challenges and opportunities of a changing North, the Government has established a comprehensive Northern Strategy and is taking concrete action in four priority areas:

• Exercising our Arctic sovereignty

• Protecting our environmental heritage

• Promoting social and economic development

• Improving and devolving Northern governance

World-leading Arctic science and technology underpin the Northern Strategy and help ensure sound decision-making. (Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy, 2012, para. 3)

Given the fact that science and technology underpin the four pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy, the question of what is meant by science and technology becomes paramount. Canada’s Northern Strategy defines science and technology as follows:

Science and technology form an important foundation for Canada's Northern Strategy and provide the knowledge necessary for sound policy and decision-making. Canada made one of the largest single contributions of any country to International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2008, a global program dedicated to polar research. Aboriginal peoples and Northerners played a significant role in the planning, coordination and implementation of IPY and were actively engaged in science and research activities. Canada’s IPY investments helped mobilize the participation of hundreds of new researchers, including 90 from Canada's North. Training the next generation of specialists is a key legacy of IPY, so that we can build on the world-class science being conducted today and secure expertise for the Arctic of tomorrow.

Through scientific collaboration with organizations such as the United Nations, World Meteorological Organization, International Maritime Organization and the Arctic Council, Canada is building the baseline of knowledge on the Arctic environment and forming important partnerships around the world.
To ensure Canada remains a global leader in Arctic science, the Government has committed funds for the Canadian High Arctic research station, which will provide a year-round world-class hub for science and technology in Canada's North. (Canada, Minister of Indians Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, 2009, pp. 24-25)

Here, science and technology are not necessarily defined, but the organizations and events that produce the definition of them are identified. The International Polar Year (IPY) is mentioned within this description, which essentially defines what science and technology is, and what its experts will look like, for the North. The kinds of organizations that support this development of expertise include the United Nations, WMO, IMO, and the Arctic Council. Given the fact that these specific organizations define what science and technology is in the Arctic, and the fact that they are what constitute the Canadian High Arctic Research Station, the research station itself will be where both science and technology are defined, as well as where much of the production and development of science and technology will take place. As well, CHARS will be the underpinning project on which the rest of Canada’s Northern Strategy projects are based, due to its focus on science and technology.

**Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS), Cambridge Bay**

The Canadian High Arctic Research Station project was first announced in 2007. The stated need for a science and technology research station is addressed in a 2010 article in the *Toronto Star*. Entitled “Arctic Research Station Will Study Climate Change,” it claims that climate change is the central cause for such a station:

> Canada’s new Arctic research station will turn a spotlight on the environmental challenge that is transforming vast regions of the north: climate change …. “I anticipate that the high Arctic research station will become a hub on climate change, as well as a wide range of other issues,” he [Prime Minister Stephen Harper] told reporters. “ …. It will be a large-scale, world-class centre that will be looking at all aspects of northern science and northern
environment,” Harper said. The government’s own Arctic Policy statement, released last week, concedes that climate change is having a significant impact on the region’s unique and fragile environment. The reduction in sea ice will have “profound consequences” for the people and environment across the Arctic … (Campion-Smith, 2010, paras. 1, 3–6)

Given the need to address the problem of climate change, the purpose of the project, described by the Government of Canada’s science website, is as follows:

The Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) will provide a world-class hub for science and technology in Canada's North that complements and anchors the network of smaller regional facilities across the North. The new Station will provide a suite of services for science and technology in Canada's North including a technology development centre, traditional knowledge centre, and advanced laboratories.

The Station will attract international scientists to work in Canada and will strengthen Canada's leadership position in Arctic research. Northerners are engaging in cutting-edge science and technology to address their needs in a changing North. This Station will be built by Canadians, in Canada's Arctic, and will be there to serve the world. The Canadian High Arctic Research Station will be located in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. (Canada, Government of Canada, Science.gc.ca, 2014a, paras. 1-2)

Therefore, the purpose of the research station is to act as a connector for all science and technology research and expertise that is taking place in the Arctic. It will also provide its own set of science and technology services to contribute to the world-class research. CHARS will focus on four main research priorities: resource development, exercising sovereignty, environmental stewardship and climate change, and strong and healthy communities. In a different section within the same website, these CHARS priorities are described as follows:

**Resource Development**

- Resource development that is economically and environmentally sound and promotes social development;
- Renewable resources and unconventional energy sources that contribute to greater energy security and sustainability.

**Exercising Sovereignty**
• Efficient and effective monitoring and surveillance of Canada's vast Arctic;
• Effective management of Canada's Arctic waters under changing conditions;
• Improved response to, and mitigation of, environmental and other disasters.

**Environmental Stewardship & Climate Change**

• Effective environmental stewardship through greater knowledge of natural and human systems and their interconnections;
• Strengthened mitigation efforts through greater understanding of changes in the Arctic climate and the links to global systems, and increased capacity to adapt.

**Strong & Healthy Communities**

• Improved infrastructure and diversified economic opportunities;
  Improved health outcomes and community wellness and resiliency.
  (Canada, Government of Canada, Science.gc.ca, 2014b, paras. 2-5)

In addition to these research priorities, developing and implementing the research station is also a process, which involves four key steps: (1) defining what the vision of the project is; (2) conducting a feasibility study; (3) putting together the design; and (4) putting the station into operationalization. Currently, the project is in the design phase.

**Prosperity, Protection, and Security for Inuit?**

While the idea of a science and technology research station is being developed and implemented, responses from those living in the area indicate that they have not been a part of the decision-making process around the project, specifically in choosing the location of the station. Mike Richards, the senior administrative officer for Pond Inlet (which was one of the three communities considered for the station), was quoted in an article posted on *Northern News Service ONLINE* as saying:

“We have a much more diversified geography and areas that would be studied for scientific research but unfortunately, there was a choice of three and the government has made their
choice,” he said. “It’s another bad decision by the government but it’s their decision. We’re happy that they considered Pond. We wish Cambridge Bay all the success in the world. But I think it’s going to be interesting in that they’re going to have troubles with logistics and everything that they wouldn’t have in Pond.” (Gagnon, 2010, paras. 11-12)

Though one could say that this comment is just a reflection of Richard’s disappointment of losing the opportunity to have the research station in Pond Inlet, the reasons articulated by him – both a diversified geography and easier logistics – speak to something deeper. If the central objective of CHARS is to provide world-class science and technology research, a community with a more diversified geography, and easier logistics as confirmed by someone who lives there and knows the area, would seem to make a better choice for the location. In addition to this, attention must also be given to the part of Richards statement that says “… the government has made their choice … it’s their decision” (Gagnon, 2010). Though subtle, this comment points to the issue of what role community members actually have in the decision-making process about a project being implemented in their region by the government.

Another indication that something deeper is going on with the High Arctic Research Station than is actually being articulated can be seen through a comment made by Syd Glawson, the mayor of Cambridge Bay, to the *Northern News Service ONLINE*. When asked why Cambridge Bay was chosen, Glawson offers this reason:

> The three communities that were finally short-listed – Cambridge Bay, Resolute and Pond Inlet – they all deserved to be short-listed and to be in the running …. The thinking that the prime minister had and his people – we’ll never find out why. (Gagnon, 2010, para. 5)

Again, this comment reflects the question of where the communities are in the decision-making process around a project that is being implemented in their region. Why does this community member have no idea why his community was chosen, and why does he accept the fact that such
a reason will never be available to them? If such a research station is to provide prosperity, protection, and security for Inuit communities, then why do these above two community members not have an understanding of why Cambridge Bay was the chosen location, and why were neither of them involved in the decision-making? This kind of question raises concerns about whether the objective of the project – that being providing prosperity, protection, and security for northerners through science and technology research – is actually the objective taking place, or whether a different objective is at work in the development and implementation of this project.

“Complementing Knowledges”

Though much has been written on the implications of knowledge production within the field of western scientific knowledge and traditional Indigenous knowledge (see Agrawal, 1995; Nadasdy, 1999; Ingold & Kurttila, 2000), studies continue to be produced in the context of science and technology in the Arctic that attempt to address the possibility of the two knowledge systems as being complementary (Laidler, 2006; Huntington, Gearheard, Mahoney, & Salomon, 2011; Pierotti & Wildcat, 2000). Ingold and Kurttila (2000) state it best:

The literature is replete with dichotomies of one kind and another, all of which aim to adumbrate the particular character of the local, the non-Western and the traditional against the background of a uniform and generally characterless global, Western modernity … the construction of “indigenous knowledge” (MTK), through its opposition to modern science, implies a sense of what it means to know that dis-places the knower, and that is incompatible with ways of knowing (LTK) that are constitutive of locality. (p. 184)

Though most of these studies exhibit a similar format in terms of their approach to examining the relationship between western scientific knowledge and traditional Indigenous knowledge, I focus here on Laidler’s 2006 article entitled “Inuit and Scientific perspectives on the relationship
between Sea Ice and Climate Change: The Ideal Complement?” My reason for doing so is because of her direct usage of the discourse of “complementary knowledges” as well as her specific focus on Nunavut.

Laidler’s (2006) article explores the relationship between sea ice and climate change from both scientific and Inuit perspectives with the goal of illuminating how these knowledges “complement” one another. This discourse of complementing knowledges is used to define a problem, organize the way in which knowledge is produced around the problem, and steer the dialogue in such a way that only particular kinds of strategizing can be produced around the problem. Laidler (2006) defines the problem as follows:

Dealing with climate variability has always been a reality for arctic [sic] societies, and yet the real and perceived consequences of a changing global climate have only begun to come to the forefront of scientific and public consciousness over the past few decades. (p. 407)

The organization and production of knowledge, then, takes place through producing facts about the problem. Laidler (2006) states,

Because sea ice plays a complex role in influencing ocean and atmospheric systems, considerable scientific attention has been focused on determining the potential feedback mechanisms (e.g. surface albedo, and thermohaline circulation) that may be triggered by climate/cryosphere interactions. Specifically, feedback mechanisms related to changes in sea ice extent, distribution, and thickness contribute to the projected amplification of warming trends – and thus environmental sensitivity – at high latitudes … (p. 407)

Given the defined problem, and produced forms of knowledge around the problem, Laidler (2006) establishes her strategizing position, allowing a further form of knowledge production to take place within the specific parameters of complementing knowledges. She states,

While this type of research has raised the global profile of circumpolar regions, it has also sparked investigations into the human dimensions of climate change …. Comparatively little is known about the vitality of sea ice extent, distribution, and thickness to daily life in
arctic [sic] communities, much less how community members perceive climate change as it relates to their local environs. Therefore, it is important to understand the links between potential climate change impacts and arctic [sic] sea ice patterns, as well as the related consequences for northern coastal populations. To realize such a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between sea ice and climate change, it is essential to characterize these notions from both scientific and Inuit perspectives.

This paper is the first step in a long process of drawing together different conceptions of sea ice conditions and dynamics. (pp. 407-408)

What is interesting about the above quote is that it produces the idea that Inuit voices are being addressed through suggesting that bringing together scientific research and Inuit knowledge within the field of sea ice and climate change will do so, when, in fact, “complementary” actually means Inuit voices are merely being included as objects (rather than subjects) of scientific research, and thus are not equally involved. Understanding the idea of “complementary” as equally representing Inuit voices with western scientific knowledge, instead of understanding it as Inuit voices being treated as objects within western scientific knowledge, will continue to be the case as long as the problem that justifies the need for scientific research remains unaddressed. For example, if the question was focused not on how to address the issue of climate change and melting sea ice but rather on the issue of who claims climate change and melting sea ice to be an issue, such a focus would open up space for Inuit to define what issues actually exist for them and what kinds of effects such issues may have. Whether these issues and interests would be climate change and sea ice or not, remains a question. However, defining climate change and sea ice as an issue, and then asking for Inuit perspectives on this pre-defined issue maintains their positioning as objects outside of the discussion, instead of active subjects within the discussion. Given this approach to Inuit recognition, the mixed responses that have been expressed by Inuit communities living in the area where the Canadian High Arctic Research Station will be located remain unaddressed.
Canadian High Arctic Research Station as a Neoliberal Project

Given all of this, the questions that remain are, “Why, and how, did the cause and effect that justify the need for a scientific research station come about? And, how can addressing these questions help address the responses from northern communities that indicate a lack of central involvement in the decision making process, and an understanding of why the Canadian High Arctic research station was chosen to be located in Cambridge Bay?”

A Neoliberal Project

The Canadian High Arctic research station did not just come about on the basis that, all of a sudden, climate change became a problem that has real effects generating “arctic challenges” in need of addressing. If this were the case, climate change and its associated challenges would have become an issue long ago. As well, if “arctic challenges” were really the problem, then the needs of those living in the North would be the starting point from which such challenges would be addressed. After all, there have been countless speeches given from people in the North that articulate these very starting points (see Simon, 2009).

Given the fact that neither of these has taken place, again as seen in the previous case study chapters, it is clear that there is another objective to the development and implementation of a research station, an objective that I argue, is a neoliberal one. This kind of approach is evident in the stated objective of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station. To re-quote, the objective states:

The Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) will provide a world-class hub for science and technology in Canada's North that complements and anchors the network of smaller regional facilities across the North. The new Station will provide a suite of services for science and technology in Canada’s North including a technology development centre, traditional knowledge centre, and advanced laboratories.
The Station will attract international scientists to work in Canada and will strengthen Canada's leadership position in Arctic research. Northerners are engaging in cutting-edge science and technology to address their needs in a changing North. This Station will be built by Canadians, in Canada's Arctic, and will be there to serve the world. The Canadian High Arctic Research Station will be located in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. (Canada, Government of Canada, Science.gc.ca, 2014a, paras. 1-2)

Firstly, the space is deemed to express value through its potential for producing state and market-driven science and technology research. Given that there are other ways this space could have been described – for example, a space in need of social services (which would have been evident from a welfare state objective), or a space promoting the lifestyle of hunting (which would have been evident from a liberal democratic objective) – the project intentionally focuses instead on a specific type of science and technology as expressing value. It also takes a particular stance on the kind of science and technology it will support. For example, while scientific research stations are being shut down across the North (see Globe Editorial, 2013) that may not take a particular focus on resource development, the research station intends to provide the space from which a specific kind of science and technology can take place, such as research and resource development, which aligns with market-based values.

Secondly, the way in which individual citizens are conceptualized is characteristic of a neoliberal approach. Individuals are neither seen as a group/society in need of being taken care of (evident in a welfare state objective), nor do they get to independently choose their own authentic needs (as evident within a liberal democratic objective); rather, the kind of individuals that are conceptualized for the research station are “experts” that have expertise in the fields of science and technology specifically. Therefore, the kind of subjectivity that is available to Inuit in order to participate in the development, and implementation of the research centre, is that of the science and technology expert. This kind of subjectivity ensures that neoliberal objectives are
implemented in the region, and also ensures that northern needs for the region, if not compatible with these objectives, will be obscured.

Finally, within this framework, individuals have the freedom of choice and interests, but it must exist only within the framework of the subject who is the expert in science and technology. Given the creation of the station, the freedom to do whatever kind of scientific research is desired is now a possibility, the freedom to collaborate with international researchers is now a possibility, and the freedom to take care of Inuit needs is now a possibility. Interestingly, these freedoms are underpinned by the framework of science and technology specific to market-based values. Freedoms that don’t fit within this framework, such as hunters who may want to collaborate with other hunters, or educational and social services that may want to collaborate, join, or re-direct resources, will not be within the choices and interests of this particular construction of freedom of the individual. This further produces, and entrenches, science and technology research, and the production of the expert subjects and knowledges associated.

**The Production of a Neoliberal Project**

In order to get at the question of how the production of this neoliberal project takes place, I interviewed approximately 10 people involved with the project: government workers, industry, community members, and representatives from Inuit political organizations. It was clear from these interviews that specific technologies of neoliberal governmentality were being used in order to justify and normalize the project in light of the contradictory responses that arise. As with the case studies presented in chapters 4 and 5, here I also explore how the concepts of the
new prudentialism, technologies of contacts and citizenship, and technologies of performance deepen our understanding of the dynamics involved.

**The new prudentialism.** As seen in the previous chapters, the new prudentialism is a neoliberal technology that deals with the issue of risk. This “buy into” the risk was evident in each of my interviews, specifically three interviews which exemplify the “buy into” in three different ways: the risk of climate change, the key value in the North being rich in natural resources, and the associated need for a science and technology research station.

My first interview question illuminated the “buy into” on the risk of climate change. I asked all three subjects: “From your perspective, what is the need for a Canadian High Arctic Research Station?” Climate change was a key feature throughout each of the interviews. The responses consistently showed a “buy into” the risk that was being produced that was, in turn, used to justify the research station. For example, the three subjects state:

… with all the climate changes and climate change in the worlds it’s coming and anybody that doesn’t believe that climate change is taking place they’ve got their head in the sand. (Cambridge Bay community member, personal communication, January 2012)

… Cambridge Bay is going to be a hotspot or just outside the mainland for species turnover due to climate change … (Government representative, personal communication, July 2011)

… we need to understand how [the climate] … is changing because that affects every country in the world … the world is repositioning … the world is reconfiguring in response to changing climate, the opening up of the Arctic Ocean … and now of course we are suddenly moving into this phase of accelerated warming, we saw in northern Quebec and the sub-arctic region of Nunavik a rate of warming the most recent data seven times the global average of warming, incredible warming, and so suddenly that rock is actually ice and the problem with ice is that it has another phase it will turn into water and at that point everything falls …. The other question is now climate change and change in snow permafrost, we are going to see very different communities …. How will this affect the biology, how will that affect sociology? What does it mean in terms of communication in
terms of the community? It’s all connected …. (Academic expert, personal communication, January, 2012)

All three interviewees discuss the risk of climate change unquestionably. There are no other explanatory factors for what they are talking about, and no questions remain about the associated risks of climate change. This indicates that the “risk” – risk that is formulated by the neoliberal objective which justifies the Canadian High Arctic Research Station specifically – has largely become embodied by the subjects. It is through this embodiment of risk by the subject where the implementation of neoliberal objectives are normalized and justified. Alongside such normalization and justification, willing subjects can be produced who fail to see their own implication in the development and implementation of these objectives in the region.

The second “buy into”, which involved believing that the key value in the North is its natural resources, was also evident in each of the interviews. The subjects state the following in this regard:

These are a time of austerity … and it’s going to take a while for them to get things sorted out. But, it will happen, because you know, ever since I go back to the Trudeau days – and Trudeau, he loved the North, and he talked a lot about [how] he would do anything for it really – … but everyone from there, from Trudeau on, all the prime ministers no matter what colour jacket or shirt they were wearing, red or blue or green or whatever, it was they all professed the High Arctic should be developed because people like yourself who are down in the south really don’t believe what is up here, [and have] no idea what is available up here, and we found or I found that Harper, the first one all he would talk about is he is doing something about this. He is putting money in the North and he’s put every community a little bit, it just so happened that CHARS … it’s Cambridge Bay’s time to get something, [a] gift, and when it happens it’s going to be such a boom for this reason, for this area it’s going to be hard for people in the south. So a lot of people say why should we spend 91 million dollars of our tax money to support some little community of 1,800 people? Why should we do that? Well, that’s not the idea, the idea is to protect and develop what is up here …. Goodness gracious, my dear, what is up here is infamous. Mix it around and have everything down there north of Ontario look sick, there’s diamonds, there gold, there’s … you name it, it’s here. You know fisheries on the east coast [and] on the west coast are having trouble – [the] west coast the sailors are disappearing – … up here it’s just developing, it’s just developing the fisheries, and the mining, I’m saying it’s just going to
go ridiculous, so yah, it can be a big boom, and if the conservatives want to do it, I’m all for them. (Cambridge Bay community member, personal communication, January 2012)

… so there is a recognized need for science that is there to support sound stewardship, [and] resource development. I mean very much this government is interested in having the North open up more the territories, you know, um, particularly Nunavut and NWT. [There are] still negotiations, you know on revenue sharing around economic development, but I mean they need money in order to deliver on their program, so … on the territorial level there’s an interest in economic development, but I mean they need money in order to deliver on their program, so there’s on the territorial level there’s an interest in economic development but also equally balanced with social development and environmental stewardship. So science is fundamental to negotiating those tradeoffs, and so the station will play a role in those conversations by providing information and analysis through science … (Government representative, personal communication, July 2011)

… a lot of what we’re seeing in way of development in the Arctic and what we’ll see in the future is being dictated by stock exchanges and by industrial interests and by geopolitical interests well outside that circumpolar… everyone wants a piece of the pie and it is being talked about. It was an element in the CHARS in terms of development of northern resources in Canada, and I think it’s important in terms of employment opportunities for [the] Canadian North. As I see it, there are far more important economic reasons for Canadians to be investing in a High Arctic research station and High Arctic research relative to this development, and that is that as Canadians we have a vested interest in the long term around the northern environment. Other nations do not and the companies that are coming in … you’ll see the latest news was China [who] has just bought the first of its companies in the oil sands in Alberta in Athabaskan and eventually into the Arctic Ocean and this is an incredible precedence … the State Oil Company has bought the first oil sands company that opens the way for other chinese purchases. India Tata Steel purchased big Steel Works in Labradors largest car companies based in India for Indians. That’s great to have these relations with China and India but when it comes to the environmental consequences and economic consequences, you need Canadians with a long-term investment on the ground, and we need the new knowledge to be able to ask questions: “Well, OK what does it mean if Imperial Oil or BP develop in the Beaufort Sea, what are the implications of that for us? Economically? In terms of sea ice? Ecosystems? …. Infrastructures? Societal impacts? On our communities?” And, those are questions that CHARS can deal with because it is being eased in a multidisciplinary context. (Academic expert, personal communication, January 2012)

Therefore, in each of these quotes, the “buy into” of natural resources as value is evident. The first quote identifies natural resources as the central value in the North, the second quote addresses “science” as pivotal to natural resource development in the North, and the third
discusses natural resources as shaping the whole environment, both imaginary and physical, of
the North. As a result, in all three quotes, other forms of value are not considered; instead, all
unquestionably discuss natural resources as the central issue, and all see focusing on natural
resources as beneficial. Again, this “buy into” of natural resources as the key value – a value
defined by the neoliberal state – is central for the technique of new prudentialism, as it reflects
the subject’s embodiment of the unquestionable belief that there is a risk that such a value could
be lost, with no questions around whether this value is in fact the central value of the space, and
with no questions about who has defined that value as most central, and why. It is through this
embodiment, where the implementation of neoliberal objectives takes place as normal and
justified, while simultaneously producing subjects that are implicit to such objectives, even if
such objectives do not align with their own values.

The third “buy into” has to do with the perceived need for a High Arctic Research
Station. Within the same three interviews, an unquestionable belief is given to the promises that
the research station appears to fulfill. Across these excerpts, the subjects identify four main
promises of the station: it will complement hunting, it will be a long-term investment, it will
benefit Nunavut and Canada as a whole, and it will be a year-round multi-purpose station.

The first subject, the Cambridge Bay community member, responds to each point as follows:

[In regards to hunting:] It won’t hinder it, it definitely won’t because some of the research
done on this type of endeavour, they’ll be looking for information on what happens. [For
example,] how the herds of caribou or how the polar bear and seal adapt and change and
how will it affect the local economy, hunting economy they call it, the country food
economy where you know, Harper says there’s a lot of hunters out here and a lot of people
out here who still rely on their daily bread, it’s just another form of research. It fits the
package. (personal communication, January 2012)
[In regards to long-term investment:] I don’t think it will because the idea behind the High Arctic Research Station is to make it a world research station, where scientists no matter what their choice is of scientific research, anybody around the world can use the High Arctic. So, they hope to develop gradually and universally in that matter. It’s not going to die unless scientific research dies. (personal communication, January 2012)

[In regards to local and national benefits:] Yes, it’s surprising what’s going to happen to Cambridge Bay. And, what happens to Cambridge Bay will happen to other communities in the K. region. Everybody’s going to benefit from it, including you from the University of Toronto, because some of your researchers are going to look at it and say, “Hey, look at that, they’ve got a research group from South Korea, they’ve got [a] research group from … Australia. Why isn’t the University of Toronto there?” You’ll be here, University of Alberta … Dalhousie in Halifax, they’ve all shown interest here, there is no reason why U of T can’t be. (personal communication, January 2012)

[In regards to a year-round multi-purpose research station:] Resolute has an Arctic [research station] its … a Nunavut research station with the polar shelf, and like I say, the community in Resolute is about 300 people, the research station, the polar shelf and that is a station that is separated from the community and I think its … operated, I can’t speak for sure on that, but uh, that’s what I understand … CHARS is going to be a year round in development and of course it will work with the polar shelf and the Arctic research station that is in or near Resolute and along with any other development, Pond or any other research area … historical research … I just saw a program the other day on one of the ships they hadn’t seen for years and years and years. It was found. They finally found it, there’s going to be a lot of research like that. (personal communication, January 2012)

The second subject, the government representative, also articulates a “buy into” in terms of what the research station promises to do. Here, the subject believes the station will be a focal point for science and technology research, that it will act as a central hub, and that it will be a multi-purpose station. The subject states:

[In regards to focal point for science and technology:] … a northern strategy, are you familiar with that? So CHARS is what gets called a signature initiative under that northern strategy and there are four pillars for the northern strategy. And, so similar there … [is] actually the mandate for CHARS, [it] was released last December … In that there are priorities on which the station is going to focus and outcomes that we’ll be working towards over the next 20, 25, 30 years, and they align with the northern strategy. Right, so very much CHARS is seen as part of the delivery mechanism for the knowledge to support the northern strategy, not the only one because clearly there are lots of players in Arctic
entity in Canada and internationally, but we will become the focal point for s&t for the Arctic in Canada. (personal communication, July 2011)

[In regards to the central hub:] … so an important role for CHARS then is not to supplant what is already going on, but to complement it, so we essentially become the hub and the network and the existing infrastructure and will be the spokes. And part of our role will probably be a leadership role, sharing practices, linking across protocols and standards, information management, so we will be that hub for that existing network … (personal communication, July 2011)

[In regards to a multi-purpose station:] … Cambridge Bay is going to be a hotspot or just outside the mainland for species turnover due to climate change, so it will be interesting to see whether or not things can make it across the strait and up to the Arctic Archipelago or if we’re going to see a total barrier from the straight. So there are a lot of science questions we can ask there; there is a whole mining development, gold mines and others just south around Bathurst Inlet, so there’s a lot of potential for cooperation with industry. Although on Baffin we probably would have maybe been working with Mary River if that was going ahead, so I think it would have worked with all three. I think Cambridge Bay and the town … is ecstatic (personal communication, July 2011)

And again, the third subject, the academic expert I interviewed conveyed a similar “buy into” what the research station promises to do. In this interview, the subject sees the station as finally enabling Canada to act as both a central hub and an international presence in the Arctic:

… it was always argued when discussed in Ottawa, well Canada has this Arctic we have to put all of our effort in the Arctic science stations. The terrible thing, there was no Canadian Arctic stations, and so whenever we get with people from around the world who talk about their huge … program with 3,500 people total, 1,800 in the summer, they say, “Oh yeah, Canada station building here well of course Canada has the Arctic, I guess you were putting all of your resources in the Arctic,” but we weren’t, and it became embarrassing and … what came to the fore, people started asking who owns the Arctic, and given Canada’s lack of interest in a whole variety of ways, including in terms of generating new information and knowledge, stewardship in the Arctic, we were really serious about the Arctic in the same ways as the Russians ice breaker research the … research station in Greenland, as the Americans scaling up research activities in Alaska and the Arctic shoreline, the Norwegians and beautifully High Arctic research station, and India has opened its High Arctic research station before Canada, and China has been there for a while …. (personal communication, January 2012)
This subject believes that the Canadian High Arctic Research Station will finally place Canada on adequate ground with all of these other countries that have prioritized research stations in the Arctic, specifically through becoming a central hub for science and technology research.

All three of these subjects reveal a “buy into” for the promises of a High Arctic Research Station in the North: supporting Inuit cultural life, providing long-term development, benefiting Nunavut and Canada, being multi-purpose, acting as a central hub for science and technology, and establishing Canada’s international presence. This “buy into” for the promises of the CHARS is central to the technique of the new prudentialism, as it establishes the focus of the conversation around risk (that being on solutions to the risk that is identified by the neoliberal state), while not considering whether in fact the risks that the research station promise to alleviate are actually real risks to begin with. The beliefs around what the research station promise to do are unquestionably embodied by the subjects interviewed, enabling the establishment of neoliberal objectives to take place as both normal and justified, while producing willing subjects that support the development of a project that may not align with their own values.

Each of these aspects of the technology of the new prudentialism is directly connected to a neoliberal approach to governmentality. Specifically, it works around the identified “energies” or value of natural resources, by producing a risk (climate change) and solution (High Arctic Research Station), both of which work together to justify developing these energies in the region. This leads to the next question: How have these individual subjects become unquestionably engaged in the building and development of this research station?
Technologies of contracts and citizenship. Also as mentioned in previous chapters, connected to the new prudentialism, in which the story of risk is established and normalized, are two additional technologies: contracts and citizenship.

The technology of contracting out can be seen within the same three interviews with the Cambridge Bay community member, the government representative, and the academic expert. In the first interview, the Cambridge Bay community member is contracted into engaging the local community to participate in the “opportunities” and/or “potential” of the project. The subject states,

I mean … when it was announced that CHARS was coming to Cambridge Bay, very soon, I mean very soon after that a committee was formed in the community [and] I got the local contractors together to see what they would do and could do … and they were 150% behind the whole thing. They knew as they know now, what can happen. We’ve to get them out of the idea of sticking their hand out and asking for money from the government first before they commit to anything, and that’s slowly being changed but we’ve got to get them developing their own market for the product that they have and they have many products …. When they realize that they’ve got to invest in order to receive a return on that investment, its slow but this committee, its open to every member of the community and people outside the community. [For example,] the other five communities in our region … and of course Cambridge Bay. All of them will develop and increase their economic development. CHARS, they’ll all benefit from it, and that’s just our regions. Of course, Nunavut has two more regions - the Rankin region and the Iqaluit region - everyone’s going to benefit from it, [it] can happen. (personal communication, January 2012)

Here, the contract is established with the “local” contractor, who then establishes additional contracts in the community. This contract establishes an “ethos of negotiated subjectivity” whereby the frame of neoliberalism has been formed from which the contractor can enter and negotiate, and therefore further produce, such objectives.

Technologies of citizenship are also evident in the above interview with the Cambridge Bay community member. This subject was the local “expert” in the community that would teach the community how to engage in the project. The subject might also play the role of collecting
knowledge for the government program, to help them learn more about the population/community. The project itself was initiated directly from one party, that being the government. It is clear that this project did not come from the community. Finally, there is a voluntary and coercive aspect of power that is playing out, where the subject believes that if the community can engage with the “opportunities” from the project, then the possibilities and/or government support will be more effective.

This kind of contractualism and citizenship also frames the way in which the Cambridge Bay community member can think about, and understand, the question of Inuit voices in the context of the project. When asked about whether this project has accounted for local community members in a different way than in the past, the community member states:

Yep, the communities in between the government and the communities the government has … they are now asking those pertinent questions that you are and getting answers from the community. The community - I should say communities - are all involved. It’s Mr. Harper, he’s taken a different approach, he’s really showing his interest not only to the newspapers, to the public and TV, he’s shown it to the guy on the street here in Cambridge Bay and Iqaluit and …. Rankin. He’s showing his interest to them because he’s asking for their input, not just saying this is the way it will be and that’s it; it’s how do you think we should proceed? He get’s answers from the people and carries that through. It’s a big difference. (personal communication, January 2012)

It is clear that this subject, based on the contract and form of citizenship produced, is working within a framework that restricts a number of aspects: the subject does not question the project, and conceptualizes Harper’s participation as positive and/or beneficial; the subject uses evidence to justify the beneficial position (for example, Harper asking for input); the subject fails to ask how the questions from Harper himself limit what can be thought. Therefore, based on this, the subject sees the approach as helpful and/or beneficial to the community.
These technologies of the contractualism and citizenship can be seen in the second interview as well. In terms of the contract, the government representative states:

OK … so the CHARS was announced in the speech for the throne in October 2007. At that time I was working for Environment Canada and … INAC was designated as the lead for delivering what is now called CHARS, but it was recognized from the get go that it was a multistakeholder, multijurisdictional file. And, in particular, INAC has been working to be the coordinator across the federal family because there are a lot of departments that play in the North, and so in terms of Environment Canada’s participation, it had been happening mostly on the policy side …. Environment Canada built … they have a policy branch, s&t branch, and they barely talk to each other. But, I happen to know the folks on the policy side who were tracking this file and they recognize that it had a s&t component. And, the only s&t person they knew was me, so it was serendipity. So, they tried to break into the st branch and bring this file to that side of the departments attention by calling me. So, one of my colleagues in ec had actually done work in the arctic. The two of us became the point person within the department for this file, and tried to sort of rally particularly the s&t folks to what we saw as a significant opportunity. In doing that I got involved in all the interdepartmental work and was actually hired by INAC to come over and be one of the senior analysts of the file. So, that was February 2008. Since then, I’ve been one of these analysts shaping the program, leading the consultations, and now we’ve … so originally there were two of us and now we’re slightly a bigger shop and little more division of labour. So, what I’m doing now is focusing on the s&t program and articulating what that’s going to look like … you know, making a pitch to the government in terms of, you know, if you want us to be world class these are the kinds of things we …. should work on and this is what a s&t program should look like. So, that has been the evolution over the three, three and a half years that I’ve worked on the project now. (personal communication, July 2011)

Here, the contract is to produce a subject that bridges the science and technology fields together. This contract establishes the framework for negotiations; therefore, the subject is only able to think within the confines of the necessity for science and technology research. Technologies of citizenship are also evident. The subject is established as an “expert” in bridging science and technology. Again, the project is initiated from outside of the subject. The subject is knowledge collecting about what a world-class research station would look like, as well as the kinds of subjects that would be needed to support such a station. Again, there is a voluntary/coercive form of power taking place, whereby the subject willingly takes on the role of bridging science and
technology to form a world-class research station, in the name of enabling the government to be more effective in working in the North. The core framework of the program is never up for negotiation.

The way in which the government representative thinks about Inuit communities in context of the program is also within this framework. For example:

I think we are being recognized for the consultative approach we are taking, the inclusive approach we are taking with CHARS. It has been slow, there are always more people you can talk to but we are very much trying to hit a wide array of people from the different stakeholder groups. And so, I think that that will be core to the success of the station because it needs to be useful for the users and we are engaging the users now. And really, I think what we are hearing is going to be significant about CHARS. If we can actually operationalize that is how it works that is science that is engaged, and to have science …. that it is respectful of northerners and Aboriginal views and they can integrate or bring together traditional knowledge and western science …. and by engaging all the players as we go forward in designing and defining the station, I think we are setting the stage for, you know, a better chance for success … (personal communication, July 2011)

Here, consultation is seen as a good thing, as though it is something different from what has taken place before. And, secondly, there are no questions of science being a problem and/or a barrier to Inuit voices.

These technologies can be seen once again in the interview with the academic expert:

… then there were these various user and expert committees and we met several times in Ottawa over a couple of years, and that involved – you probably have a list of members [and] you’ll see it’s a nice illustration of the multiple stakeholders involved in such a project. And so of course there’s a very strong representation of Indigenous communities on a whole variety of levels, including ITK and the Nunavut Research Institute …. And there was industry representation …. 

And then there was Health Canada [that got] involved, Natural Resources Canada, different universities, so I was there representing the centre for northern studies, which I’m director of as you know …. (personal communication, January 2012)
Contractualism is seen through the user and expert committee, as this committee enters the contract of creating the High Arctic Research Station and produces the direction of negotiation within that framing. The four aspects of technologies of citizenship are also evident: the subject is an “expert” of academic interests/knowledge, the initiation of the project comes from outside of the subject, the subject is empowered as an “academic representative” to effectively represent this “need” within the creation of the station, and finally, the subject voluntarily gets involved with the project, believing that participation from all stakeholders will enable the government to launch the most effective research station it can (comparatively speaking) in the Canadian Arctic.

What the academic representative had to say about Inuit communities also operates within this framework.

… I think the changes have been huge. I’ve been working in the North for just over 20 years, and even over that period of time I’ve seen huge changes in respect to the interaction with the Inuit communities, and the exchange of knowledge in both directions, including with Inuit traditional knowledge … Over the past few decades, there have been a lot of attempts to improve consultation, and a two way knowledge exchange with northern communities. I’m part of founding an organization called arcticnet. Its interests were represented from the beginning in terms of the first year arcticnet objectives. Do you know that regional advisors from each of the four regions …. they’re funded by arcticnet? We have a whole Inuit regional advisory coordinator which is based in Inuit Kanatami … this started about 8 years ago and the aim was to foster a lot more interaction right about the same time there was a … permit requirement [to] get a license to work in the north. That also increased in exchanges with northern communities, so a part of this is arcticnet, you have to show each year to what extent you … with northern communities, knowledge exchange, in both directions, to what extent you may have incorporated local knowledge … There are a couple of other things that help this through arcticnet and our centre. With arcticnet we developed a new knowledge transfer tool and resource, its called the polar data catalogue …. What you do to get into the web, there is a mpa of Canada … then you go in and see a mpa. You can see four corners of [a] box in the area you’re interest[ed] in [in] Canada, and there will be data that is being collected on that area, and you can find who is collecting that and how to contact that person. One reason we put it together is that people had access to this information nationally and internationally, and to address this question for the Inuit – what data are you collecting, how do we get a hold of it. And, so now that a facility, we are putting a new version together … a funding requirement for arcticnet. Every scientist has to show how they have contributed to this resource, and we
are building a thing called polar data catalogue … which will load faster in the north so northern communities can see it much faster … (personal communication, January 2012)

This subject is able to see changes in terms of how “knowledge exchange from both directions” takes place, for example, with the polar data catalogue or an advisory board, yet the fundamental question of the fact that the “exchange” terrain already is uneven and that “equal” wouldn’t be possible without re-engaging with the central objective of the agenda. These kinds of questions get left out in light of working within the framing of “equal knowledge exchange.”

Therefore, with each of the three subjects, the technologies of contracts and citizenship are evident. These technologies enable the actualization of neoliberal objectives and the production of neoliberal subjects. Through establishing the framework by which negotiation and knowledge can be produced, and by actively engaging such participation through creating various forms of expertise and responsibility, the result is an established idea from which relationships with Inuit communities can be thought.

Technologies of performance. Again, as mentioned in previous chapters, technologies of performance establish performance measures by which the subjects can both engage and go deeper into the framing developed within the contracts and citizenship.

Within the interviews, it was the subjects who were a part of the government and/or experts and user groups that appeared to be participating in various technologies of performance implemented by the government. These technologies of performance were seen within the interview with the government representative:

We had a bunch of international and national benchmarking in terms of what makes a world class research institute … The first recommendation was actually … to make sure we put CHARS in a community which isn’t the case with the Antarctic research station, because no one lives down there and isn’t always the case with the European polar stations. So, just because logistics are 60% of your budget in doing Arctic science, the point was if
you can put yourself in a community, you don’t have to build waste water, you may have to augment what is in the community but you know mcmurdo, which is the US main Antarctic station, is essentially a town of 1500 people and they have to essentially build it from scratch and water infrastructure, fire, waste water, heating, you know everything, you know they have a police service right? And so the first recommendation was we could put it anywhere, right? I mean, there was some interest in putting it in the middle of nowhere, and so the first recommendation was, well for god sakes, don’t do that your costs are just going to be untenable. And so the next place was High Arctic, and the government’s direction was that they wanted to be in the High Arctic, so we needed to figure out what that meant. So we chose north of the arctic circle, there’s some discussion as to whether that is actually high compared to Ottawa that’s high, and it gets you essentially the 26 or whatever 26 north of the arctic circle. And then we did some more work in terms of transportation, you know logistics are everything, can you get in, can you get out, can you get your gear in and out, can you get there from east to west of Canada. I don’t know if you know flights in the Arctic, they go north south. Flying across the Arctic is very difficult, so you know, looking at those kinds of things. We’re on the NWP cause there’s sort of a sovereignty aspect to this …. what the ecosystems, what is the science potential around the different communities in terms of how diverse they are both marine and terrestrially. And so, we did an analysis like that and boiled it down to Pond Inlet, Resolute Bay, and Cambridge Bay, and then one of my colleagues worked with the towns to really develop a profile with each community in terms of what kind of s&t have gone on there before, cause the licenses all indicate that - what's the demographics, what the labour market availability, more detail on the transportation logistics logistics logistics logistics, what kind of bases are available, what the communities interests [are]. So, she built all that information and was interacting with the communities in terms of the senior administrator official and that kind of thing throughout. And then, once she had finished her report she sent each community the profile that she had built of that community and said, ok anything that you want to, or let me know that I’ve got everything right, so they were given the opportunity before it went up to the prime minister to say, yeah or neah, you know, did we get it right, did we give an accurate and honest picture of your community and the potential that it offers for Cambridge Bay. And, there were visits to each of the three candidate towns …. each of the three communities about what we’re seeing or foreseeing for CHARS, in terms of how we see it rolling out, what it might be to each town, and similarly they could ask questions. (personal communication, July 2011)

This quote reveals the particular benchmarks that were put in place in order to fully cultivate the “expert” in the field of science and technology. Specifically, the subject articulates location, the High Arctic, logistics, and community involvement as the key benchmarks.

Similar kinds of benchmarks can be seen in the interview with the academic expert:
The final choice was made internally by INAC, and that was in close consultation with the prime ministers office. That was at a high level where the decision was made, our committee was not asked to pick a particular site. Our committee was asked to identify strengths and weaknesses of those three sites, which we did actually. Then we were asked to do a lot of things: what kinds of facilities would be required for the north, what kind of data management requirements would there be, what sort of the lengths be with northern communities …. etc. So, we were asked to define/address pretty broad level questions. Another question was what sort of research programs might be undertaken and what sort of research themes would potentially lead to collaborative work and closer directions with the communities. And of course, we had Aboriginal representatives there as well, who could contribute towards that discussion. And, our committee did not come up with a decision as to where the funds should be, but we did provide a lot of material to allow that decision to be made by government ….

It wasn’t a formal report. It was information that was then passed from our committee from INAC, who then would have worked mostly with the Prime Minister’s Office, and maybe it could have been through one of the inter-ministerial committees. There was the joint science and technology committee that brings together ADM’s deputy ministers of different government departments, and I’m sure that they would have examined this question of siting and high arctic research station but our understanding was that the final decision was to be prime ministerial decision. (personal communication, January 2012)

Here, various forms of benchmarking are evident: identifying strengths of the site, facilities, data management, northern communities (length), and research programs and themes. What they couldn’t do was make the final decision and have a say in where funds should be put.

Therefore, in both circumstances, the interviews reveal how neoliberal governance extends itself through creating benchmarks and performance standards for the subjects, who are then responsible for governing themselves and their environment to best manage risk, which is primarily based on neoliberal objectives.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to address the mixed responses from northern community members that were arising from the Canadian High Arctic Research Station project. Literature on the topic of scientific research and Inuit knowledge revealed an “incorporation” type approach,
where further listening and adding northern voices to the already existing research was recommended, yet the problem of how these voices become absent in the first place remained unaddressed. Using a neoliberal governmentality approach, I examined how the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) is actually a project used to establish neoliberal objectives in the North, and I illuminate through three key interviews – from a Cambridge Bay community member, a government representative, and an academic expert – how these objectives are carried out on the ground, using various strategies such as the new prudentialism, contracts and citizenship, and performance indicators. This analysis illuminates how such practices explain the limitations by which we can come to address the problem of the contradictions that are taking place around the project, as they both normalize and justify the way in which the project and associated contradictions are understood.
CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

This dissertation set out to examine the question: “How do Inuit get positioned on the periphery of Canada’s Northern Strategy?” I posit in this thesis that a neoliberal political rationale is at work to produce the situation of Inuit being systematically placed on the outside of policy and program development in the Arctic. And that the specific strategies of the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance are used to justify and normalize this process. I suggest that all of this takes place instead of a political rationale that has been renegotiated in equanimity between the federal government and Inuit communities, based on past historical experiences.

Histories of Canadian Arctic Policy and Program Development and Inuit Recognition

Through a rereading of five events in the context of policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic, I demonstrated the relationship between the emergence of a liberal and neoliberal political rationale and the way in which Inuit communities are positioned within Canadian Arctic policy and program development. For example, in the “Re: 1939 Eskimo Decision,” the problem of scarcity was provided as the rationale for the development of the decision. This allowed specific liberal economic and security objectives to take shape, while Inuit notions of economy and security were obscured. In the case of the “Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit Relocations,” the problems of scarcity and sovereignty were provided as the rationale for the relocation program. Again, this allowed liberal economic and security objectives to be further entrenched, and Inuit notions of economy and security to again be obscured. In the case of “The Historical Development of Inuit Political Organizations,” the problem of Inuit autonomy was provided as the rationale for Inuit political organizations. This allowed for liberal objectives of
citizenship and representational democracy to take shape, and Inuit systems of citizenship and representational democracy to be obscured once again. In the case of “Comprehensive Claim Agreements,” the problem of land and resource ownership was provided as the rationale for claim agreements. This allowed for the establishment of liberal objectives of law and the obscuring of Inuit formulations of law in yet another way. With the onset of Canada’s Northern Strategy, the problem of climate change and increased international interest in the region has produced the need for such a Strategy. This has allowed for the establishment of neoliberal values, expertise, and notions of freedom, while positioning Inuit communities on the periphery of planning and development.

Following this, I conducted an examination of three case studies from Canada’s Northern Strategy, to see how this dynamic unfolds on the ground. Specifically, I examined a marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, an army-training base and a deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, respectively, and a Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay. Within each case study, I found that the emergence of a neoliberal political rationale through the production of a problem (that being climate change), and the solution (case study project), enabled the establishment of neoliberal values to take hold in the North. In the case of the marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, the coupling is that of climate change and a marine conservation area, whereby protecting the location of the space is of most value, sustainability experts will be needed, and freedom from ecological destruction was promised. This is in stark contrast to Inuit objectives, notably hunting as the most valuable aspect of the space, in which hunting experts are needed along with a promise of protection of broader cultural activities. In the case of the army-training base and the deep-water port in Resolute Bay and Nanisivik, the coupling is that of climate change and an army-training base and deep-water port,
whereby securing the location of the space is of most value, emergency operator experts are needed, and freedom from job insecurity and unsafe situations are promised. This is in stark contrast to valuing how the space is already being used, hunting experts being what is needed, and a promise to ensure security as defined from Inuit perspectives. Finally, in the case of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station, the coupling is that of climate change and a Canadian High Arctic Research Station, whereby producing specific kinds of science and technology in the area is of most value, science and technology experts are needed, and freedom to produce specific kinds of science and technology research and to collaborate on an international basis is promised. Again, this is in stark contrast to valuing how the space is already being used, hunting experts being what is needed, and a promise to support Inuit knowledge in the region.

The way in which this neoliberal political rationale is justified and normalized in the region is through the use of three key strategies: the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance. In the new prudentialism, a specific story around risk is produced and bought into by participants, which establishes the need for the project while framing the kinds of questions and ideas that can be thought about in regards to the projects. In the case of the marine conservation area, participants mainly discussed the risks of ecological sensitivity, oil drilling in the area, the risk of the loss of Inuit cultural and historical connection to the space, and Canadian sovereignty. Underlying these forms of “buy into” risks is the assumption that a marine conservation area will solve such issues. Similarly, in the case of the army-training base and deep-water port, the kinds of risks that are bought into include climate change, the loss of sovereignty, and the need for military and port security, all of which an army-training base and deep-water port promise to solve. Finally, in the case of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station, the kinds of risks bought into include climate change, loss of
access to natural resources, and a need for science and technology research, all of which a
Canadian High Arctic Research Station will address. All three of these cases reveal the ways in
which a “buy into” risk frames the kinds of questions and thoughts that can be realized around
the projects, as questions and thoughts would be directed towards building the projects, instead
of questioning whether the risks that establish the needs for the projects are actually real and/or
legitimate risks.

The next tactic that is used is the technology of contracts and citizenship, whereby
particular roles and responsibilities are produced that ensure the participation of subjects within
the projects, and specific parameters are placed upon the subject to create legitimacy for the role.
In the case of the marine conservation area, there is a national coordinator, an Inuit political
representative, and a government representative of Nunavut. Within each of these roles,
particular parameters were established, through the establishment of an expertise in connection
with an institution, initiation about the project coming from one party, the gathering of
knowledge about the communities, and coercive relationships being produced through inviting
communities to articulate their needs through the framework of the project, instead of through
their own framework. This tactic is seen again in the army-training base and deep-water port
projects, whereby the roles produced include a mayor, a local community member who is co-
owner of an inn, and an economic development officer. In all three cases, there is an expression
of an “expertise,” the projects are clearly initiated from one party, there is collecting of
knowledge that takes place, and forms of coercive power are evident. Finally, in the Canadian
High Arctic Research Station, the same kind of tactic is operating through the production of
contracts: a Cambridge Bay community member, a government representative, and an academic
expert. Within each of these contracts, parameters are formed through the production of
expertise, the collection of knowledge, the project being initiated by one party, and relationships based on coercive forms of power.

Finally, the tactics of technologies of performance are evident in all three projects. In the case of the marine conservation area, this is seen through identifying the speech from the throne, confirmation of funding, initial meeting and confirmation of the Qikiqtaani Inuit Association (QIA) as Inuit representation, a signing of a memorandum of agreement, a feasibility assessment, establishing a boundary position, conducting consultations, forming a steering committee, and conducting a review of mineral and energy assessments work. The creation of these performance standards block questions that may need to be asked in regards to how the communities are engaging with the project. Similarly, in the army-training base and deep-water port projects, the kinds of parameters defined include the training school, presentations around setting up training facilities in several communities, and consultations. Again, these kinds of parameters block the kinds of questions that may need to be asked in regards to the relationship between the projects and the needs of the communities. Finally, in the case of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station, the kinds of parameters that are used include the choice of the location, the High Arctic, and community involvement, facilities, data management, northern communities, and research programs and themes. Again, these kinds of parameters block other kinds of questions that may need to be addressed involving the project and community needs.

Therefore, it is evident that the way in which Canada’s Northern Strategy positions Inuit communities on the periphery of policy and program development is through the establishment of a neoliberal political rationale. This rationale is justified and normalized through the use of three strategies: the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance. This similar pattern is seen historically with the emergence of a
liberal and neoliberal political rationale in earlier Canadian Arctic policy and program development.

**Recommendations**

What does this research mean for the future of Canada’s Northern Strategy and Inuit recognition? First, in order to capture this, I revisit the four contributions of this research that I discuss in the introduction. The first three contributions I mention deal with the academic literature on Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition (“the insertion approach” and “the critical approach”), as well as Dean’s (2010) liberal and neoliberal governmentality framework. In using Dean’s (2010) framework to reconsider the issue of Inuit recognition in Canada’s Northern Strategy, it is evident that the discussion on “insertion” practices is no longer enough. When there is a “missing piece,” such as Inuit voices, from the Strategy that deals with the development of their very home environment, the question of how, and in what ways, such an omission came to be provides for a longer-term understanding of how to address the situation. It is no longer adequate to only be discussing “best insertion” practices to address this issue, when there are other forms of analysis that offer a different understanding and addressing of the situation. Given this, it is essential that the discussion within this literature focus more on “the critical approach”, and begin to examine questions of what kinds of political rationales are steering policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic, and how such rationales are responsible for producing the situation of a “missing piece.” Given the history of the relationship between Canadian Arctic policy and program development and Inuit recognition, and the analytical resources at hand, there is no reason for this kind of situation to continue being produced moving forward.
The fourth contribution I discuss involves providing evidence for those that work directly on developing policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic, on the nuanced ways in which Canada’s Northern Strategy fails to recognize Inuit communities. My research shows that a political rationale that is not developed in equanimity can be responsible for defining how development is understood for the region. And, in effect, it can be responsible for obscuring the voices of others who may be participating in the development of the region. Given this, one recommendation would be to have equal representation from northern and southern Canada, at the very beginning stages of policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic. Another recommendation would be to begin the process of policy and program development based on recommendations given by those living in the Canadian Arctic (this information is not hard to come by, as documented in Chapter One under “The Local Approach” where I discuss Inuit perspectives of Canadian Arctic policy and program development).

Secondly, my research shows the subtle ways in which an unquestioned political rationale defines the ways in which people understand how development can take place in the region, as well as the ways in which they can think of themselves as active subjects in relationship to that development. In my interviews, it was clear that through the use of the strategies of the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance, a neoliberal political rationale both defined how the situation was understood and how the subjects understood their roles within the situation. For example, the subjects had a specific role in the context of the projects (reflecting a neoliberal subjectivity), there was a “buy into” the purpose of the project (reflecting the new prudentialism at work), and the way in which the subjects could evaluate themselves within the project, as well as the project itself, was framed within how it was understood (technologies of performance). In context of this
relationship between a political rationale and the way in which people understand how development can take place in their region, and their understanding of their own agency within the relationship to this development, I put forward three key questions to consider for anyone working on the ground in policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic: “Who are you being asked to be in this project, and how does that influence the way in which you can see the project? What is the story being told to you about the purpose of the project, and what evidence is it based upon? What kinds of questions are you able to ask in terms of evaluating the project, and in contrast to this, what kinds of questions are you not able to ask in terms of evaluation?”

**Further Research Questions**

This research evokes key questions that need further consideration as Canada’s Northern Strategy moves forward. The first question involves how to generate more academic research that takes a critical approach to Canadian Arctic policy and program development. This is an important question to consider, as more critical approaches taken on this topic enable the opening up of space for Inuit knowledge that is already being documented about the region. Specifically, I am interested in identifying both the resistance that exists in doing so and the spaces where this could be built upon. The second question involves how collaborating across disciplines with other researchers who are using Dean’s (2010) framework may deepen this analysis and critical inquiry more generally on the issue. Specifically, I would be interested in collaborating with other researchers on the specific themes of political rationalities, and the three specific strategies of the new prudentialism, technologies of contracts and citizenship, and technologies of performance.
The next two questions build on the recommendations for Canadian Arctic policy and program development workers. I am interested in examining what the obstacles and openings might be for establishing equal representation at the table from the very beginning phases of Canadian Arctic policy and program development. In addition to this, even if there is equal representation at the table, I am interested in the question of what mechanisms of power are operating to shape what can be said and not said. I am also interested in examining how the three questions I put forward for policy and program development workers to consider, actually affect their agency within the project and shape the way in which the project unfolds. For example, can asking the simple question of what is not allowed to be thought about and/or asked change the direction of how a subject participates in the project? Or, are there still further barriers to consider in order to see action associated with a change in thought about the project?

Finally, and perhaps of most importance, is the question of how Inuit consider this research project to be of use. My central interest in doing the project was to illuminate how Inuit are excluded from the process of Canadian Arctic policy and program development from the beginning: primarily, I wanted to show how this takes place through not enabling Inuit themselves to define the problems that policy and program development are intended to address; and secondly, I wanted to show how this takes place through not addressing this aspect of the relationship but instead focusing on better “insertion” practices. An important question, then, would be whether Inuit are able to use this analysis to support a shift in how policy and program development in the Canadian Arctic is done? For example, can this research be used to support a kind of policy and program development that begins with community needs instead of a set of produced needs that come from outside the communities?
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