Guardians Entrapped:

The Demise of the Turkish Armed Forces as a Veto-Player

Tuba Eldem

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Abstract: Guardians Entrapped: The Demise of the Turkish Armed Forces as a Veto-Player

Tuba Eldem
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This study examines how and why Turkey’s civil-military relations regime transformed since the soft coup of 28 February 1997. It argues that major changes in the international security structure – the renaissance of democratic control of armed forces, the change of US foreign policy in the Broader Middle East, and the process of Europeanization – opened a window of opportunity for demilitarization in Turkey. The recognition of Turkey’s EU membership candidacy at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 and the required alignment of Turkey’s civil-military relations with that of EU best practices were the most important external factors that altered Turkey’s domestic political opportunity structure in favor of change. Voter realignment in the November 2002 elections, the emergence of a single-party government with a strong will to change the domestic balance of power in its own favor, and the domestic mobilization of opposition to the military mediated between the EU’s external pressure and domestic change. The military, in turn, failed to veto reforms that targeted its own prerogatives as such an action would generate substantial cost to its ideational interests including loss of prestige, credibility, and legitimacy as a result of being perceived as obstructing Turkey’s century-old Westernization-cum-modernization process.

An analysis of the behavioral, attitudinal, and institutional dimensions of democratic control shows that in the post-Helsinki period Turkey has not attained democratic control of the armed forces, but instead has shifted from the tutelary regime category to the defective democratic control category. Regarding the implications of this institutional change for the trajectory of Turkey’s democratization, the study does not provide as optimistic a view as those advanced by the country’s liberal and Muslim intellectuals. By conceptually differentiating between civilianization and democratization, this study argues that although the Turkish regime has become substantially civilianized in the last decade – i.e., political power has shifted markedly into the hands of civilians – the extent of the regime’s democratization failed to match this level of civilianization.
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Abbreviations

Political Parties

Center Right

DP: Democrat Party (1946-1960)
ANAP: Motherland Party (1983-present)

Center Left

SODEP: Social Democracy Party: (center left, 1983-1985)
DSP: Democratic Left Party (center-left to nationalist, 1985-present)

Islamist

FP: Virtue Party (Islamist, 1997-2001)
SP: Felicity Party (Islamist, 2001-present)
AKP: Justice and Development Party (ex-Islamist, 2001-present; also AK Party)

Nationalist Right

BBP: Great Unity Party (religious nationalist right, 1993-present)

Socialist Left

DTP: Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) 2003-present; descendant of HADEP)

Armed Political Groups

Dev-Sol: Revolutionary Left
IBDA-C: Islamic Great East Raiders Front
PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party

Associations, Foundations, and Other Institutions

DISK: Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions (Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu)
Hak-IS: Confederation of Real Worker Unions
IHL: High Schools for Imams and Preachers (Imam Hatip Liseleri)
MUSIAD: Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
TURK-IS: Confederation of Worker Unions of Turkey
TUSIAD: Association of Industrialists and Businessmen of Turkey
OYAK: Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu)
DISF: Defense Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayi Destekleme Fonu)
UDI: Undersecretariat of Defense Industry (Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi)
TOBB: Union of Chambers of Trade, Commerce, Industry and Commercial Exchanges of Turkey
TSK: Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri)
TSKGV: Foundation for Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces
TGS: Turkish General Staff (Turkiye Genelkurmay Baskanligi)
NSC: National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu)
GM: Gulen Movement
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Question

Turkey, a “second-wave” democracy, made the transition to competitive politics in the late 1940s (Huntington, 1991). While demonstrating a long history of competitive multi-party politics, Turkey’s regime in the beginning of the new century, has been variously described as being “contradictory” and “uncertain” (Clarke, 2000, pp. 168, 170), and conceptually labeled as an “imperfect democracy” (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003, p. 26), a “pseudo-democracy” (Frank, 2002, p. 66), and an “ambiguous regime” (Diamond, 2002, p. 26). This ambiguity is commonly reflected in observations of both domestic and foreign observers of Turkish governance. For example, the United States Department of State Country Report of 2002 (p. 1) described Turkey as “a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament,” but qualifies this immediately by noting that the military exercises “indirect control over government policy and actions in the belief that it is the constitutional protector of the State”.

Indeed, the nature of civil military relations (CMR) has constituted one of the major problems of Turkish democracy. Enjoying a high degree of autonomy, the Turkish Armed Forces has served not only as a security institution but also as a “core element of Turkey’s political system”. There have been two coup d’états since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923; the 1960 and 1980 coups lasted for nearly 1.5 and 3 years respectively. Further, two National Security Council decisions in the form of memorandums to civilian governments occurred in 1971 and 1997. Nearly two years of technocratic rule supervised by the military resulted from the first memorandum, while the second ended with a governmental change. Following each intervention, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) gained important prerogatives through the constitution-making process and further consolidated its guardianship role within the Turkish political system.

The Turkish military has considered itself as the ultimate guardian of the secular, democratic Republic and its foundational Kemalist principles vis-à-vis both internal and external threats. In fact, civilians have traditionally felt obliged to obtain the military’s approval when

1 Sakallioglu 1997; Salt 1999; Demirel, 2003.
2 Kramer 2000, p. 30. Also see: Ahmad, 1993, pp. 12-14; Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 151; Cizre, 2004b, p. 113; Yavuz, 2000, p. 34.
making crucial political decisions regarding both domestic and external matters (Ozbudun and Yazici, 2004, p. 32). As a result, Turkey has been characterized as a “military democracy” (Salt 1999).

The “post-modern coup” of 28 February 1997 directed against the Islamist Welfare Party-dominated coalition government clearly demonstrated not only the distinctiveness of Turkish civil-military relations from the liberal democratic model but also the limits of military’s tolerance of political Islam. What makes this coup “post-modern” was the distinctive nature of pressure the military utilized. After identifying the Islamist fundamentalism as the number one threat, the Turkish military, first used the channel of National Security Council (NSC) to pressure the government by requesting it to implement a list of 18 specific, concrete measures against Islamist fundamentalism. When the government failed to implement them due to its fear of alienating its grassroots support, the Turkish military initiated an unprecedented public campaign, including briefings, conferences, and regular public announcements to mobilize the “unarmed forces of republic” to overthrow the Welfare Party-led government. This intense political, social, and military pressure that forced the Erbakan government to resign is referred to as a "post-modern coup" by its critics, and the events that followed the 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC is referred to as the “February 28 Process” (Candar, 1997, June 27), considered to be a process of the “securitization of Islam” (Yavuz, 2003, 2006, 2009). It was during this period that “Islamic capital” was displayed, boycotted, and prosecuted; the political leaders of Islamist movements and their representatives in the media were put under stricter control. On 17 January 1998 the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) was dissolved, and Erbakan and five other leadership figures were banned from politics for five years for “using religion as a tool” in the political arena (Yavuz, 2003). The State Security Courts (SSC), which deal with crimes against the state, imprisoned Istanbul mayor and later Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the charges of violating Article 312 of the Turkish Constitution, which refers to the crime of “inciting people to hatred and enmity on the basis of ethnic, religious, regional, and sectarian differences” and opened an investigation against Fetullah Gulen, a popular preacher with more than seven million followers, for systematically trying to penetrate into the “most vital points” of the secular state including the army. In 1998, after an apparently successful movement by the armed forces, Chief of Staff General Ismail Karadayi predicted that the Islamist movement would take “at least 10 years to recover” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 346). In August 1998 General Karadayi left his post to General Kivrikoglu, who vowed to make the armed forces
“more powerful and vigilant than ever against problems such as radical Islam”⁴, an idea reinforced in September 1999 when the Chief of Staff was quoted as saying that the February 28 Process would “go on for 100 years, 1,000 years if necessary”.⁵ Furthermore, the 1999 general election results seemed to give credence to that calculation considering that RP’s successor, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP), came in third. In terms of the civil-military relations regime, the most explicit result of the February 28 Process was considered to be the “reaffirmation of the army’s legitimacy in interfering in politics whenever tenets as laicism, modern lifestyle and national unity, solidarity and coherence were considered to be threatened and whenever these tenets were ineffectively protected by policy makers” (Seufert, 2000, p. 33). Gareth Jenkins expected this pattern to continue for the foreseeable future: “If the Islamist movement is able to reunite and once again pose a threat to the regime, there is little doubt that civilian Kemalists will expect the military to safeguard, or at least take the lead in protecting, secularism rather than taking on the responsibility themselves” (2001, p. 67).

Less than a decade later, however, and quite unexpectedly from a historical institutionalist point of view, positions of power and influence in the Turkish political system have been almost completely reversed. Not only have Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Gulen community become the most important political and social actors but also Turkey has moved from military domination to “civilian supremacy” in just a few years. Terms such as “drastic transformation” (Kirisci, 2005), “momentous shift” (Magen, 2003, p. 31), “revolutionary” (Diez 2005, p. 168), “profound” (Onis 2003, p. 13), “sweeping” (Muftuler-Bac, 2005, p.27), impressive (Aydin and Keyman, 2004, p. 1), “unprecedented” (Tocci, 2005, p. 73), “unthinkable” (Kubicek, 2005, p. 362), and “courageous” (quoted in Sarigil, 2007, p. 217) have been used in the Turkish literature to describe this political change process. This study aims to explain this observable puzzle of how the balance of power considerably shifted in favour of moderate Islamists since the post-modern coup of 28 February 1997. Phrased differently, how has the Turkish Armed Forces, the staunch guardian of secularism and a veto player in the regime, failed to preserve the institutional status quo? This study is driven by this puzzle.

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1.2 Putting the Turkish Puzzle into Context (or Why the Turkish Case Puzzling for the CMR Literature?)

Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess arms... The wonder, therefore, is not why the military rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them (Finer, 1962, p.5, Emphasis added)

Conventional wisdom of the regime transition literature considers the military’s institutional powers at the outset of civilian rule as an impenetrable shield against civilian supremacy. The literature considers the power relations during the regime transition process as a critical juncture for the trajectory of civil-military relations under democratic regimes. According to this view, the asymmetries of power between civilian and military leaders when substantial institutional change takes place would create a path-dependent development of civil-military relations continuing to effect subsequent decision-making and institution-building episodes. As Terry Lynn Karl (1990, p. 8) asserts:

The arrangements made by key political actors during a regime transition establish new rules, roles, and behavioral patterns, which may or may not represent an important rupture with the past.... Accords between political parties and the armed forces set out the initial parameters of civilian and military spheres. Thus, what at the time may appear to be temporary agreements often become persistent barriers to change, barriers that can even scar a new regime with a permanent ‘birth defect’.

Therefore, the historical institutionalist/process-oriented approaches studying CMR emphasizes the way in which the transition process from a military to a competitive civilian electoral regime shaped the country’s CMR in the post-transition period. It argues that civilian-led transitions (Spain) or transition through the collapse of the authoritarian regime (Greece, Portugal, Argentine) in which the military has little agenda-setting or decision-making power would likely to lead to a new, post-authoritarian settlement that initially assigns fewer military prerogatives and thus less military restrictions on civilian supremacy. On the other hand, transitions controlled by a unified military conducting its own withdrawal from office (Chile, Brazil, Peru,) are likely to result in arrangements allowing for more military prerogatives, such as extensive representation in national security councils and other decision-making bodies with broad political responsibilities, giving the military a strong and indefinite foundation of political leverage. This variance is due to the higher institutionalization of military regimes (such as
adoption of new constitution in Brazil in 1967-69, Chile in 1980) and higher military unity and assertiveness vis-à-vis civilians at the outset of transition process.

According to the mode of transition thesis, the Turkish armed forces should have been able to preserve its power, since the transition to electoral politics in 1983 was completely controlled by a unified military and resulted in extensive privileges for the Turkish military. Ergun Ozbudun stated the 1983 Turkish transition was “almost a textbook example of the degree to which a departing military regime can dictate the conditions of its departure” (2000, p. 117). The transition from military rule to competitive elections was also carried out under the tutelage of the military. The institutions, rules, and procedures that were created by the military regime were carried over to the civilian regime. Therefore, although military rule lasted for a relatively short time, the institutionalization of tutelary democracy restricted the inclusive and participatory features of the civilian regime. Furthermore, Turkey’s three military interventions (1960-1, 1971-3, and 1980-3) did not seem to produce intense anti-military feedback among civilians (Demirel, 2004, pp. 140-41; Kinzer, 2001, pp. 69-80; Varoglu and Bicaksiz, 2005, pp. 583-598). Despite these unfavorable initial conditions, however, civilians have succeeded in subordinating the military under their authorities in the last decade. From historical institutionalist point of view, the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces, which was positioned as a strong veto-player, has indeed failed to preserve the institutional status quo makes this study even more puzzling.

From the structuralist perspective, Turkey’s internal and external security atmosphere has deteriorated in the post-Cold War era offering unfavorable environment for civilian control of the military (Desch, 1999, pp. 15-17). Michael Desch (1999), in his study entitled “Civilian Control of the Military”, argues that the international environment and threats that a nation confronts shape the patterns of civil-military relations. Primarily external threats are argued to be more conducive to producing civilian control of the military, while internal threats make civilian control of the military more difficult. According Desch’s argument, civilian authorities would tend to be less fractious and more likely to adopt objective control mechanisms with respect to the military in countries that are confronting a clear external threat. For its part, the military would be focused on this external threat and dependent on the civilian leadership for support in mobilizing human and material resources. Civilian leaders would then grant the military substantial autonomy in making combat-related decisions in return for the its political loyalty. In contrast, the lowest level of civilian control would be found in countries facing significant internal threats. In such cases civilian authorities would likely be split along factional lines, using
the military to settle domestic political disputes.\(^6\)

**Table 1: Desch’s Models of Civilian Control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High internal threats</th>
<th>High external threats</th>
<th>Low external threats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor civilian control</td>
<td>Worst civilian control</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good civilian control</td>
<td>Mixed civilian control</td>
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</table>

In brief, according to Desch’s perspective civilian control is stronger when there are fewer or weaker internal threats. However, while Turkey’s internal threat perceptions in the past decade have remained much the same, if not increased, civilian control has been strengthened considerably. Since the 1990s, Turkey experienced a resurgence of ethnic separatist terror and political Islam. The National Security Policy Document (NSPD) of 1992 had singled out internal threats, i.e. Kurdish terrorist acts, as the number one security threat to the state; the 1997 NSPD identified Kurdish separatist terror and religious fundamentalism/reactionarism (*irtica*) as the paramount security threats surpassing external ones. These two internal threats were kept on top of “principal threat” lists in the NSPDs of 1999, 2002, and 2005. Only in November 2010 did the AKP government remove Islamic reactionarism from the threat list of the new NSPD. Although this signifies increasing civilian assertiveness in definition of threats and formulation of security policy, it is nevertheless difficult to argue that Turkey experienced a decline in its internal or external threat perceptions, at least until November 2010. While the level of terror decreased for a few years following Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan’s capture in 1999, Kurdish separatism never ceased to be a security threat; in fact, in 2006 the level of PKK terror reached the same level as in 1999.\(^7\) After the 2003 Iraq War strengthened Kurdish autonomy within Iraqi borders, the PKK resumed operations against Turkish targets by using safe havens in northern Iraq.\(^8\) Turkish perceptions of the rising PKK threat were reinforced by the U.S. and Iraqi efforts preventing Turkey from stationing troops in northern Iraq during and

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6 Finally, Desch argues that if domestic and international threats are both high, civilian control will be poor, and if both of them are low, the level of civilian control will be mixed/indeterminate. In these cases the prevailing ideas about national security would directly influence the country’s military doctrine and hence the nature of civil-military relations.

7 Estimates of casualties from Turkey-PKK violence since 1984 range from 32,000 to 45,000 (including armed combatants and civilians on both sides).

after the 2003 War to monitor developments, control refugee flows, and protect Turkoman minorities (especially in Mosul and Kirkuk). As General Ozkok (2005) declared, Turkey, due to its “difficult geography”, has experienced an increase in both “asymmetric risks and threats, such as separatist and reactionary activities”, as well as in “symmetric risks and threats that might have adverse effects upon Turkey’s security and that might create an intensive conflict atmosphere due to accidental engagements, such as instabilities in neighbouring countries [and] undesired developments in the north of Iraq”.9 According to then Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit, Turkey had “never been under so many simultaneous threats in its entire history” as it was in 2008.10 Yet, despite these strong threat perceptions of the military, civilian control over military was established in Turkey in the last decade making the Turkish case more puzzling.

In her study “The Erosion of Military Influence in Brazil”, Wendy Hunter argues that transition to democracy and particularly electoral competition creates pragmatic and programmatic incentives to reduce the military’s institutional powers, and electoral victory enhances their capacity to do so (1997, p. 2).11 While its straightforwardness is attractive, this rational-choice institutionalist approach also fails to explain the timing of military reform process in Turkey and account for the trajectory of Turkish civil-military relations. First, if electoral competition creates incentive for politicians to reduce the role of military, why didn’t political leaders in historically electorally competitive Turkey move to reduce military powers earlier? According to Hunter’s thesis, we should expect to see more frequent instances of civilian challenge to the military throughout the Republic’s history, as Turkey had 16 free and competitive general elections for national parliament between 1950 and 2011. Indeed, as noted above, Turkey is not a “third-wave” but a “second-wave” democracy, having made a transition from a one-party regime to competitive politics in the late 1940s. Despite this tradition of electoral competition, until recently there has been little attempt to challenge the military’s vast scope of powers. Political leaders in Turkey have often endorsed the military’s decisions and, to varying degrees, maintained the military elite’s definition of the “enemy” and the strategies to

9 Annual Evaluation Speech of the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok at the Staff Academies, 2005, April 20.
10 Speech delivered by chief of general staff Yasar Buyukanit during the handover ceremony at the General Staff Headquarters, 2008, Aug. 28.
11 Wendy Hunter substantiates this argument by showing the military’s declining effectiveness in influencing the federal budget allocations, determining labour policy, and formulating Amazonia policy. She argues that military autonomy remains strong mainly over issues judged to interfere less or not at all with the electoral motivations of politicians, such as military recruitment and promotion and education and training.
fight against it. This suggests that electoral competition in itself does not open a path to increasing civilian supremacy and/or to a decline in military prerogatives.

Secondly, a civilian government’s opposition toward its country’s military does not automatically translate into votes as Hunter posits. In Turkey, for example, a particular configuration of historical legacies and cultural understandings constituted the Turkish army as a distinguished institution in the eyes of Turkish society. For many civilians, the military has been “the most egalitarian, non-politicized, and professional public institution compared with the political class that was often unstable, corrupt and unreliable” (Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyaz, 2006, pp. 78-79). According to Nilufer Narli, “most citizens accepted the military’s political involvement because of society’s deep confidence in the army and its role as an organic part of society” (2000, p. 120). According to Yavuz, the Turkish military traditionally had a high level of public love and respect that engender trust; the nation is traditionally defined as being a “soldier nation”, while the military headquarters are described as the “Prophet’s hearth” (2003, p. 49). The military’s high levels of legitimacy and credibility traditionally left politicians with little incentive to restrict the scope of military’s influence in politics.

Thirdly, Hunter’s theoretical assumptions seem to ignore the possibility that politicians, motivated chiefly by holding power (or part of it), may simply concur with the tutelage of the military for their own self-interests. For example, in the face of strong opposition to her governments (1993-1995), Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, for instance, gave the military “virtually a free hand in dealing with the Kurdish separatist movement” to take the army on her side” (Demirel, 2004, p. 135). Similarly, during the February 28 Process, the main opposition parties objected very little when military officers’ threatened the government. It might be suggested that these parties acted in this manner largely because they were the primary candidates to form government if the Islamic-led coalition dissolved. To advance party or personal interests, civilian politicians might thus even commit to policies that are guaranteed to increase military leverage. In Turkey, the modus vivendi between the military and civilians, which derives partially from the

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12 The popularity of the military in Turkey has been much higher than militaries in some other countries. For instance, 61% of Turkish respondents have a “great deal of confidence” in the military, while this rate is 33% in the United States, 17% in Canada, and only 7% in Spain (World values survey 2000). In “The Turks Today”, Andrew Mango (2004, p. 139) defines Turkey’s generals as “conservative modernizers” and cites a 2003 opinion poll showing that 88% of the respondents considered the armed forces the most trustworthy institution in the country (pp. 137-138).

diagnosis of the political elite that there is little demand for reduced military autonomy at the societal level and partially from their own beliefs and interests that favor extended military role, has, for instance, traditionally impeded civilians’ incentives to curb military autonomy.

Finally, Hunter’s electoral incentives approach, which focuses on the civilian side of the equation, fails to provide a clear account of why and how militaries in different parts of the world tend to comply with civilian directives that threaten their own interests without much overt contestation or intervention. Starting at the end of Cold War, the military’s political capacity and autonomy in different countries began weakening rapidly, and its prerogatives have since been reduced by civilian governments worldwide. Most studies of political regimes show that, after more than three decades of the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991), few states remain under direct military rule (Siaroff, 2009, pp. 92–93). Moreover, the number of military coup d’états has dramatically diminished since the 1980s (Clark, 2007; Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers and Wolf, 2011). What, then, has happened? Did political leaders’ effective strategies triumphantly assert civilian supremacy worldwide, or did militaries undergo a mysterious collective political evolution? As another alternative, did increasing civilian supremacy result largely from broader systemic changes at the global level following the end of Cold War and the threat of communism? Hunter herself admits without much elaboration that the structural changes at the global level restricted the bargaining power of military leaders by imposing higher costs on their assertiveness. Hunter (1998, pp. 297-98) posits:

In the current era of democratization and post–Cold War politics, the armed forces do not have as much bargaining power as initial appearances might suggest. The costs of employing coercive tactics have risen. Most officers are acutely aware that authoritarian solutions—such as military coups—would now be condemned by wide-ranging sectors of society as well as the international community.

This passage thus raises questions about the real causes of declining military power, the subject of focus for this dissertation. The above discussion illuminates the fact that it is not the electoral incentives per se that seems to affect the balance of power between the civilian and military leaders, but rather international incentives and societal constraints. The following section therefore lays out main argument this dissertation advances for the shift in balance of power between Turkey’s military and its civilians in the last decade.
1.3 The Argument

Countries with oppressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbours, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control, or with closed economic systems...need not apply.

President Bill Clinton (Emphasis added).

This thesis argues that the change observed in Turkey’s civil-military power balance was a process triggered by a shift in the international security structure. I consider the international security structure as the international context of struggles constituted and reproduced by the dynamic interaction between military, politico-economic, and societal/ideational sectors. Bob Jessop (1999, p. 52; 2001) and Colin Hay (2002, p. 127) describe this interaction as “discursively” and “structurally inscribed strategic selectivity” that favors certain strategies over others as a means to realize a given set of preferences. During the cold war, international security structure was defined by the bipolar division of the world, containment and deterrence of hard security threats and ideological competition. In this bipolar world, world politics was defined by an ideological-military struggle between two centers of power controlled by two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. As a result, civil-military relations were mainly considered from the perspective of national security concerns and the need for military effectiveness (Volten, 2002, p. 314; Cottey, Edmunds, Forster, 1999).

The post-Cold War international environment undermined military’s political activism and created an unfavourable context for military coups both ideationally and materially. Three interrelated, but distinct international developments constrain the military’s political activism in Turkey and also in much of the developing world: The demise of threat of communism and ideological hegemony of liberal democracy; shift of security strategy of the Trans-Atlantic community from support of authoritarian countries to promotion of (neo)liberal democracy;

15 One major exception to this pattern was concern about inflated expenditure on the military and the resulting diversion of resources meant for development, an issue primarily championed by the United Nations and one that remains a concern today (Law, 2004, 22)
16 A security community is made up of states that rule out war as an instrument of resolving their conflicts. As opposed to seeking to defend members against outside threats (as in the case of collective defense organizations such as NATO ), a security community seeks to create a zone of peace within its geographical confines (as with the European Union). It is envisaged that the creation of expectations of peaceful change among members would also render the community more secure against external threats, for this would minimize the grounds for external intervention (Bilgin, 2007, p. 898). Also see: Adler, E., & Barnett, M. (Eds.). (1998). Security communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Deutsch, K. W., Burrell, S. A., Kann, R. A., Lee, M., Jr., Lichterman,
and development and promotion of the norms of democratic control of the armed forces by the IGOs.

These developments dramatically increased the cost of maintaining openly non-democratic civil-military regimes and created a strong incentive for the elites in candidate countries to subordinate the military under civilian democratic control. The literature on external mechanisms of domestic change emphasizes democratic conditionality and socialization with international norms and rules as two powerful mechanisms that lead to institutional and normative changes at the domestic level.\(^{17}\) For some, democratic conditionality disturbs the domestic equilibrium by offering actors additional resources and incentives to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals. Domestic change, in this view, is facilitated if conditionality has a “consistent” and “credible” application and if the domestic institutions do not allow domestic actors to block adaptation to external requirements through veto points or if, on the contrary, they empower domestic reform coalitions by providing them with additional resources to exploit opportunities offered by these external factors.\(^{18}\)

For constructivists and sociological institutionalists, processes of socialization with Western actors and ideas facilitate a process of social learning during which democratic norms among domestic elites are diffused (Checkel 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Borzel and Risse, 2000). In this perspective, the international community “creates and legitimates the social entities that are seen as actors” (Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994, p. 9). According to this view, international communities are defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms; this norms and values set affects not only formal domestic structures but also influences the values, norms, and discourses prevalent in member and candidate states. Whether a non-member state adopts international rules depends on the degree to which it regards international rules and its own demands for rule adoption as “appropriate” in light of these collective identities, values, and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2003, pp. 83-90). From this

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perspective the growing relevance and visibility of well-defined international guidelines in the area of civil-military relations combined with the socialization of domestic elites into international norms – via praise or ridicule and censure (Waltz 1979, pp. 75-76) or via pressure and monitoring (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 889) – motivate domestic actors to comply with international standards. Thus, international norms trigger domestic change when the degree of misfit between domestic conduct and an external norm is high and when the domestic or transitional groups mobilize to expose the contradictions. From this perspective, domestic change is thus understood as a process of international socialization, entailing the internalization of constitutive beliefs and practices in a state’s international environment (Schimmelfennig, 2000, p. 111).

Table 2: External Drivers of Domestic Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rational Choice Institutionalism</th>
<th>Sociological Institutionalism/ Constructivism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main causal/ independent variable</strong></td>
<td>Democratic conditionality</td>
<td>Well-defined international norms in the area of civil-military relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervening variables</strong></td>
<td>Supporting formal institutions and the low number of veto players</td>
<td>Change agents/norm entrepreneurs and political culture/informal institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanism of change</strong></td>
<td>Changing opportunity structure via differential empowerment of domestic actors</td>
<td>Socialization with Western norms and ideas via international praise or ridicule and censure pressure and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic of Change</strong></td>
<td>Logic of consequences</td>
<td>Logic of appropriateness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of Change</strong></td>
<td>Instrumental adaptation/ strategic bargaining</td>
<td>Norm guided action/ changing belief patterns/culture, learning, Institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main incentives</strong></td>
<td>Material incentives: financial and technical assistance, close institutional links with the IGOs</td>
<td>Ideational incentives: Recognition, international image, legitimacy, credibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study argues that these two logics of decision-making behind domestic change are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.¹⁹ For example, within the context of Turkish civil-

¹⁹ This argument follows recent attempts to bridge the so-called 'rationalist-constructivist divide' by such scholars as Ian Hurd (2008) and Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004).
military relations, although the EU conditionality triggered the initial phase of the institutional reform process by increasing the costs of maintaining institutional equilibrium, the mobilization of norm entrepreneurs and opportunists changed societal understandings about the proper role of military in a democracy, not only creating additional social constraints for military behaviour but also facilitating changes within the military.

Eschewing monocausal and otherwise narrow (if also somewhat simpler) explanations of institutional change, this thesis, therefore, utilizes Risse and Sikkink (1999) spiral model to explain the impact of external pressures on Turkey’s civil-military relations regime. According to this model, a different set of actors and different logics of social action drive the different phases of domestic regime change. International actors and external pressures drive the initial phases of socialization-induced regime change, forcing domestic actors to make concessions in order to gain external incentives. Here, domestic political elites are driven by the logic of consequences and make cosmetic changes for purely instrumental reasons. This logic of consequences was at work in the first phase of the shift in Turkey’s civil military relations as outlined below.

Once these elites make initial concessions, however, domestic political and societal opposition gains the courage and space to mount its own campaign of criticisms beyond the expectations of the norm-violating institution – in this case, the Turkish military. As domestic opposition becomes increasingly powerful, the target institution begins to be subjected to double pressure from above and from below, and enters a process of argumentative action to convince its critics about the appropriateness of its point of view. Once the norm-violating institution fails to persuade its critics to accept its own point of view, the institution understands that it is left with little option but to act in accordance with the norm in question. This marks the beginning of the institutionalization and habituation phase of norm socialization. In this phase, the norm in question gains prescriptive status in the public sphere, and the logic of appropriateness becomes the dominant mode of social behavior.

From this perspective, this study argues that the transformation of Turkey’s CMR regime is process of “socialization” and “institutional learning”, triggered by external pressures and then driven by the interaction of the domestic and organizational developments that reinforce each other. Putting events in historical perspective, the first phase of the process of change in Turkey’s civil-military regime – lasting from December 1999 to December 2005 – was one of strategic adaptation driven by external pressures of conditionality. The formation of a single-party pro-
change AKP government in November 2002 following eleven years of coalition governments and the ascendency of new Euro-Atlanticist military leader Hilmi Ozkok in August 2002 reinforced the window of opportunity for change that was initially opened by external pressures. During this period, both the government and the General Staff were eager to begin accession negotiations with the EU and, therefore, were extra careful not to risk this chance at the EU summit in Brussels in December 2005. In this heady atmosphere of EU dynamism, the Euro-Atlanticist General Staff – despite the opposition of military hardliners – never questioned the government’s legitimacy and its ultimate right to determine policy even on those issues that targeted its own prerogatives.

The second phase – lasting from 2006 to 2008– was mostly driven by domestic factors. Although European norms of civil-military relations were often present in public discourse, the EU’s ambiguous attitude towards Turkish membership, particularly since late 2005, had damaged the EU’s credibility and thus its policy of democracy promotion. Despite this declining influence of the EU, the process of change in Turkey’s civil-military relations regime continued even at a stronger pace for three main reasons: 1) the failed April 2007 “e-memorandum” against Abdullah Gul’s Presidency and the weakening TAF’s deterrence capacity; 2) the electoral victory of AKP and the election of its second-in-command Abdullah Gul to the presidency; and 3) the effective mobilization of the domestic opposition. The presidential crisis of 2007 should be considered as a path-breaking development that forcefully taught the military leaders the public’s new preferences and new institutional constraints against its political activism.

The third phase of institutional transformation -lasting from 2008 to 2012- was again mostly driven by domestic factors. As Sikkink and Risse’s (1999) spiral model predicts, a domestic anti-military alliance, empowered by concessions of the military institution at the initial stage of EU-triggered domestic change, mounted its own campaign of delegitimation through widespread media coverage of alleged military scandals, leaked documents and wiretappings, and politically motivated court-cases. Under an organized campaign of a fully mobilized domestic opposition since early 2008, it became increasingly difficult for military authorities to put political pressure on the government.

The ongoing process of the institutional change in Turkish civil-military relations (CMR) regime can be, thus, best explained by the interaction between external, domestic and organizational factors, whereby external factors opened a macro window of opportunity for institutional change. The recognition of Turkey’s EU membership candidacy at the Helsinki
Summit of December 1999 and the required alignment of Turkey’s civil-military relations with that of EU best practices were the most important external factors that enabled pro-change civilian actors to advance their reform agenda, while severely constraining the ability of military leaders to resist. Europeanization of Turkey’s CMR problematique changed the strategic context in favour of civilians by impacting Turkey’s political opportunity structure in four distinct but interrelated ways: 1) compulsory impact at the state level, 2) enabling/constraining impact at the domestic institutional level; 3) connective impact at the societal coalition-building level; 4) constructive impact at the cultural level.

Table 3: Pathways of EU Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target of EU impact</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State (Formal impact)</td>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Compulsory Increased the costs of maintaining institutional equilibrium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional (Indirect Impact)</td>
<td>Monitoring Negative Feedbacks Shaming Definition of appropriate norms of CMR</td>
<td>Enabling/Constraining Differential empowerment of civilians over the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Legitimation Focal Point for Coalition Building</td>
<td>Connective Empowerment of civil society Emergence of Pro-EU coalitions Indirect Empowerment of the political capacity of the pro-EU/pro-change policy makers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>Socialization The diffusion of the norm of civilian supremacy</td>
<td>Constructive Change in national security culture Declining Societal Legitimacy of Military’s Political Activism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Firstly, the EU conditionality of harmonization Turkish civil-military relations with European best practices for membership has changed the cost/benefit structures of maintaining institutional equilibrium. Since its first Progress Report on Turkey in 1998, the European Commission strongly criticized the army’s powerful role in Turkish politics and demanded an institutional revision of Turkish civil-military relations. After the recognition of Turkey’s membership candidacy at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the credibility and thus impact of EU demands have strengthened at the domestic level. By the early 2000s, most Turks had developed a positive image of the EU; the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey 2001 indicated that 77% of the Turkish electorate would vote for EU membership during a
possible referendum. Such strong public support for EU membership increased costs of maintaining the institutional status-quo, including the existing state of CMR.

In the case of Turkey the incentive of membership was strong enough to enable the downplaying of adaptation costs related to reforms. The attractiveness of EU membership for Turkey stemmed largely from the widely-held view of Turkish accession as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996) following deteriorating relations with the US in the wake of the Turkish parliament’s refusal to grant the US access to its military bases in the 2003 Iraq War. This strong desire to accede to the EU created strong incentives to comply with the EU’s requirements. These incentives can be conceptualized as the “compulsory impact” of EU conditionality, which directly changes the cost/benefit structures faced by political and military elites.

Secondly, EU membership prospects not only increased the costs of maintaining the institutional status quo but also differentially empowered civilians over the military. The EU altered the balance of power between civilian and military authorities by directly defining its own parameters for civil-military reform in accession partnerships and by providing negative feedback to unacceptable behavior by the military. Umit Cizre Sakallioglu observed “the major factor contributing to the difficulty in establishing civilian control over the military is the failure of the civilian forces to question the prevailing power confrontation” (1997, p. 162). As a result of this sense of powerlessness, civilians failed to subordinate the military under their control during most of Turkey’s competitive politics. The EU benchmark of accession conditionality and negative feedback removed this sense of powerlessness felt by civilians to a large extent and increased the constraints on the military’s veto-powers. By creating quite detailed negative feedback in its yearly progress reports, the EU drew the boundaries of appropriateness and provided new legitimization resources for civilian policy-makers to tackle military issues. Official EU reports, accession partnership documents of the EU, as well as speeches and press declarations of EU officials were effectively used as legitimization resources by those who were discontent with the status quo. The military, which had expressed its commitment to further integration with the EU on several previous occasions, found itself “rhetorically trapped” (Schimmelfenning, 2001, p. 73; Sarigil 2007a, p.154). If the military objects to EU-harmonization laws that target its own prerogatives, not only would it damage its institutional identity as vanguard of the Republic’s Westernization, but it would also incur blame for blocking Turkey’s EU membership and thus lose public support. This dynamic can be conceptualized as
the enabling/constraining impact of the EU.

Thirdly, a credible EU membership perspective facilitated the development of a powerful pro-EU coalition by bringing ideologically diverse social groups together for domestic political and institutional reform. Within the Turkish context, this pro-EU coalition included two groups of change entrepreneurs. The change entrepreneurs included big business and their media holdings, which strongly supported Turkey’s EU membership bid for its economic benefits, as well as “intellectual” ideologues, who propagated the notion of a liberal society based on “free market, internationally competitive economy, minimal state, individualization, pluralism and human rights” (Erdogan and Ustuner, 2004, p. 511). Business associations not only published several democratization reports, involving many reform proposals concerning Turkey’s civil-military regime, but also put their weight behind the pro-EU parties. Business elites and their media holdings, by withdrawing their support from the Turkish military, played a pivotal role, particularly up until 2007. They successfully campaigned for Turkey’s EU membership as the national goal that would benefit the population as a whole and put Turkey’s EU membership and democratization at the center of the political agenda, a campaign that further empowered the political capacity of the pro-EU/pro-change policy makers. This societal mechanism of EU influence can be conceptualized as “connective impact”, which refers to convergence of the political agenda of civil society organizations to the European Union, detaching them from domestic power centers.

Finally, Turkey’s Europeanization and globalization processes have also affected Turkey’s national security culture. The Europeanization of Turkey’s civil-military problématique and the diffusion of the norm of civilian supremacy challenged the societal legitimacy of the military’s guardianship role and slowly altered societal assumptions about the proper role of the military in a democratic regime. Furthermore, the EU’s critical reports about Turkey’s domestic politics not only helped to pressure the elite but also informed the Turkish public about the serious shortcomings of Turkish semi-democracy, naming Turkey’s “dual-track government” as the obstacle blocking the country’s path to both genuine democratization and eventual EU membership (Yavuz, 2003, p. 255).

Europeanization of the Cyprus problem, for example, “encouraged the public to begin a

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20 By legitimacy, I refer to “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995; p. 574).
genuine debate on questions of what constitutes Turkey’s national security, who should make
decisions involving it, and what should be the relationship between security and democracy”
(Cizre, 2011, p.70). Political statements by the Chief of Staff and the Force Commanders
sparked heated critical debates in the media, with many columnists and academics severely
criticize the military’s statements as unjustifiable interference with public affairs. Liberal writers
and commentators especially intensified their criticisms of the military's role in politics and
human rights violations, and have begun to question the utility of ambitious defense projects
(Uzgel, 2003, p. 209).

Alongside the public debate on Turkey’s national security culture, Turkish academics
began researching and publishing articles on civil-military relations in scholarly journals. Never
before has this issue received such wide attention focusing on CMR as a problematic element of
Turkey’s democratization (Karaosmanoglu, 2009, p. 39). As the constructivists/sociological
institutionalists predicted, increasing interaction with regional/global actors and their
intersubjectively held norms has not only created new actors, alliances, and debates in the
Turkish public sphere but has also affected Turkish political culture, further shifting the strategic
context in favor of pro-democratic and anti-military discourses and identities. This reconstruction
of new societal norms, discourses, and identities at the domestic level can be conceptualized as
the “constructive impact”21 of the globalization/Europeanization processes.

The Turkish military, under pressure from above and below, has first increasingly found
itself on the defensive. As Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model predicts, however, once it fails to
persuade the public to accept its point of view, they gave up their habit of giving public
statements to the press especially in the post-2010 period. When they have to, they started to put
more emphasis on norms of democratic control and actually acted in line with these norms
suggesting the institutionalization and habitualization phase of norm-socialization as predicted
by Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model. But how do we know whether sustainable democratic
control of the armed forces has been achieved in Turkey? To what extent is the Turkish military
subordinated to the civilian authorities? To provide answers to these questions, the section
below offers an analytical model to measure the extent to which the shift in the balance of power
in Turkey’s CMR has come in terms of achieving democratic civil-military relations.

21 In conceptualizing these four mechanisms of EU impact, I have made use of the work of Diez, Stetter, and Albert
(2006) who borrowed from Barnett and Duvall’s different categories of power in international politics to explain the
impact of the European Union on border conflicts.
1.4 Methodology

Let it be stressed therefore, that long before having data, which can speak for themselves, the fundamental articulation of language and of thinking is obtained logically – by cumulative conceptual refinement and chains of coordinated definitions – not by measurement. Measurement of what? We cannot measure unless we first know what it is that we are measuring (Sartori, 1970, p. 1038).

This study is driven by two objectives. First, it aims to explain the observable puzzle of how the balance of power considerably shifted in favour of civilian authority during the past decade (2001-2011). The second objective is to assess the extent to which the Turkish civil-military relations democratized.

In answering the first question, this study focuses on three main factors: 1) the military establishment’s position in domestic society and its ties to influential constituencies; 2) its senior officers’ internal unity; and 3) the expansiveness of the political leaders’ own base of civilian support. To evaluate the military’s standing in society and therefore assess the influence it gains from these ties, the study looks for evidence of links between the military, the mass population and key social constituencies as reported in interviews, newspapers, surveys, historical studies, and other documents and analyses during the period of 1997-2012. To measure the degree of unity in the military’s leadership, the study examines relations between commanders occupying top position in the military establishment, as well as relationships between commanders and lower-ranked officers when evidence is available. The study aimed to delineate and differentiate their role beliefs as well as positions regarding the main issues under consideration. Finally, to identify political leaders’ social allies, the study again draws on the judgments and analyses of scholars, participants, and other observers (as well as primary sources in some cases) about political leaders’ position in civilian society and support bases among key constituencies. In this regard public opinion polls, votes won in elections, and events such as mass demonstrations to indicate the support or opposition of a particular political leader are examined. The study also focuses on the specific policies a leader pursues as indication of his or her support base.

To assess the extent to which Turkish civil-military relations democratized and thus fulfill the second objective of this thesis, a multi-level analysis that includes institutional, behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of democratic control was conducted. In the absence of a commonly-agreed set of standards, this study assumes that democratic control of the armed forces is consolidated institutionally when the military is politically subordinated to the constitutionally designated civilian authorities. Behaviorally, it is consolidated when the military complies with
democratic norms in practice. Democratic control is attitudinally consolidated when military officers accept the “democracy as the only game in town” in principle.

Based on these assumptions, this study measures institutional aspects of democratic control by utilizing Alfred Stepan’s widely used military prerogatives indicators with an alternative measurement system recently designed by Samuel Fitch. Stepan (1989) developed his prerogatives approach in the late 1980s in his seminal study of post-transition regimes in Brazil and the Southern cone. In this study, he identified 11 indicators to measure the extent to which “the military as an institution assumes it has an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance… extra-military areas within the state apparatus . . . or relationships between the state and political or civil society” (Ibid, p. 93). Fitch’s measurement system – which divides military prerogatives into three broad categories of political, professional, and judicial prerogatives – is used for examining the institutional aspects of democratic control outlined by Alfred Stepan. The reason for such a division stemmed from the repercussions of weighting all military prerogatives equally. As Fitch convincingly argues that prerogatives through which the military exerts political influence or control over civilian leaders – such as the presence of active duty officers as voting members of the National Security Council – are much more important than those with which the military insulates itself from government control of its internal activities – such as the absence of a civilian Minister of Defense or military officers’ monopoly of this ministry’s positions (2001, p. 62). This difference in weighted importance of prerogatives exists simply because, while the military’s professional autonomy from governmental supervision may weaken democratic regimes, the military’s political authority and autonomy over an elected government calls into question the very nature of the regime. Therefore, in order to measure the extent of military’s political capacity and autonomy in extra-military areas within the state apparatus, this study utilizes 6 of Alfred Stepan’s 11 indictors (1988, pp. 94-97): 1) the military’s constitutional role; 2) its relationship to the chief executive; 3) its role in the cabinet; 4) its role in the intelligence sector; 5) its relationship with the police; and 6) its relationship with state enterprises. In assessing the degree of the military’s professional autonomy and capacity four more of Stepan’s indicators are examined: 1) coordination of the defense sector; 2) the legislative oversight defense policies; 3) the role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees in the defense sector; and 4) the role of the military in its promotion system. Finally, to analyze the extent of the military’s judicial subordination, the study examines its privileges in the legal system.
Following Stepan, military prerogatives in each area are ranked as “low”, “moderate”, and “high/strong”. When a military prerogative is classified as low, it is because both in law and in practice effective control over the prerogative is exercised by the officials, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the democratic regime. In cases where the military has formally denied a prerogative but in practice acts to fulfill this prerogative, such prerogatives are classified as moderate. In cases where the military has asserted both de jure and de facto effective control over a prerogative, this is classified as a strong prerogative.

Table 4: Measuring Democratic Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION</th>
<th>Stepan’s Military Prerogatives Indicators Reorganized by Fitch Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Autonomy and Influence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Role</td>
<td>Coordination of the Defense Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scope of Military Courts’ Jurisdiction (on Civilians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to the Chief Executive</td>
<td>Role of Legislature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability of Military Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Participation</td>
<td>Role of Civilians in the Defense Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomy of Military Courts in the Legal System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Intelligence</td>
<td>Role in Military Promotions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role in Police</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Role in State Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEHAVIORAL DIMENSION</td>
<td>Military Compliance with Civilian directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTITUDINAL DIMENSION</td>
<td>Military Role Beliefs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In addition to institutional aspects of political control, behavioural aspects of democratic control are also analyzed. While institutional aspects may serve well for establishing the direction of change—that is, increasing or decreasing powers exercised by the military—democratic control of armed forces cannot simply be defined as the absence of military
prerogatives. Therefore, it is essential to analyze military behavior and assess whether the armed forces comply with democratic norms in practice. To measure the extent of civilian control, the “who prevails” approach is used by identifying whether civilians or the military triumphs when their preferences diverge (Kemp & Hudlin 1992; Kohn 1994; Desch 1999; Feaver 1998). Civilian control is weak when military preferences prevail most of the time; the most extreme cases of this are states of military rule or incidents of military coups in which the military either prefers its own rule to civilian rule or supports one group of civilians over another. When military preferences prevail some of the time, civilian control is still not firm but such cases pose a less serious problem for CMR. Finally, civilian control is firm when civilian preferences prevail most of the time (Desch, 1999, p. 5).

For measuring the behavioral aspects of democratic control, five important cases that involve a degree of conflict between the government and the military or heightened political sensitivities are identified during the three AKP governments, covering the period from November 2002 – when AKP government came to power – until December 2012 – when this study was concluded. In each case, the following five questions are addressed:

1) How does the military present their preferences to the civilian elites? What types of activities do they engage in to present these preferences?
2) Whose preferences prevailed – those of civilian or military actors?
3) How did one party in the conflict prevail over the other? What types of strategies or networks of actors were involved?
4) How did the conflict influence future relations between the political and military establishments?
5) What are the implications of the findings of this study for theories of civilian control of armed forces and for democratic consolidation in practice more broadly?

As informal interactions between members of government and the military are difficult to quantify, the study uses official speeches, press briefings, and other public statements in order to assess the degree and nature of congruence between policy positions of the government and the Turkish General Staff (TGS). The TGS is the leading player in the Turkish military and can, therefore, legitimately be posited as reflecting the positions of the Turkish military.

Finally, to clarify what these behaviors mean to the officers involved and to assess the extent to which democratic norms of CMR are internalized or rejected the study analyzes military role beliefs – the culture of the armed forces and the norms and beliefs held by officers about their proper role in the state – based on the data that gathered from in-depth interviews, surveys, and content analysis of military press briefings and speeches. This analysis will yield
insight not only into the Turkish Armed Forces’ institutional culture, but also into the extent to which it accepts the democratic norms of CMR. If there is a collectively shared understanding of civilian supremacy within the officer corps, then there is likely a greater chance for the institutionalization of democratic CMR in Turkey. If the military officers reject civilian supremacy and adopt an extended guardianship role, then we can doubt the effectiveness of civilianization reforms and prospects for democratic control of armed forces in Turkey.

This study began in January 2006 and involved several extended trips to Turkey between May 2006 and January 2013. The first part of the research for the study involved the review of literature on Turkish politics with the objective of understanding historical and structural factors that led to the engagement of the military in politics. The study employs academic and journalistic resources written in Turkish and English. The second part of the research, which focused on analyzing the process of institutional change, included the tracking of all the military-related legislation and events in Turkey from 1999 when Turkey’s EU candidacy was recognized, thus initiating the Europeanization of Turkey’s civil-military problematic, up until December 2012. Such events included any action that policy-makers or institutions took on the issue, the minutes of sessions of parliament, statements by domestic and international actors on the issue, the military-related news in the media, and reports from various monitoring organizations (particularly from the EU, OECD, and CoE). Speeches, public statements, and press releases made by senior TAF members, the TGS, and the Secretariat General of National Security Council during the period of January 1999-January 2012 were also analyzed in order to shed light on the military’s behavior and ideas as well as to illuminate civil-military friction during and after the reform process.

To obtain information on the views and attitudes of politicians towards the military’s role in the political regime and state structure, in-depth interviews with 21 members of the major political parties in Turkey were conducted. Interviewees were selected from among those deputies (or ex-deputies) who have relevant expertise in civil-military relations, have played important roles in the parties, are members of a relevant parliamentary commission, are close to the party leadership, and are participants in the policy-formation phases of their parties. In addition, three retired ambassadors were interviewed in order to learn the views and attitudes of civilian bureaucrats; two of the most prominent professors specializing in Turkish civil-military relations to obtain an academic perspective.

To understand military officers’ attitudes, to clarify the thinking and perceptions behind
their official statements, and to provide a deeper understanding of preferences of the actors involved in this study interviews were conducted with eleven generals, one military judge, and 28 military officers with the rank of major or above. The interviewees were selected from senior officers who recently retired (between 2000 and 2007), as retired officers have fewer institutional restrictions from speaking about politically sensitive questions. Even though opinions of the military quoted throughout this dissertation are personal views and do not bind the TAF, they help to establish the perceptions of the officers, which is the main goal of this work. The interviews were semi-structured and open-ended, and were conducted with a snowball sample. This permitted the interviewees to bring up issues that are not included in the preliminary question list. The interviews lasted approximately two hours each.

As a final note, it is important to emphasize that due to the present-day nature of the study, judgments and conclusions rely on current data and information. While the Author tried sincerely to account for potential bias, the ongoing and politically sensitive nature of the issues discussed in this study mean that some of the information contained herein might be potentially politicized or partial.

1.5 Roadmap

This study is laid out in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literatures on civil-military relations (CMR), political transition, and external mechanisms of regime change with the aim of obtaining insight into the process of transformation that Turkish CMR are undergoing. The literature review is organized according to the international, domestic and organizational variables most emphasized in explaining the military’s withdrawal to its barracks.

Chapter 3 examines the historical process of the formation of legacies and alliances within and through which military elites are politicized. This chapter argues that the emergence of dynamically autonomous civil and military bureaucrats in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century laid the groundwork for the military’s political activism in the following century. It argues that the Turkish army’s active contribution to the Turkish revolution during the nation-state building period and the subsequent institutionalization of the military’s guardianship role has led to a “self-reinforcing, path-dependent” development of the military’s role in politics. Adopting Mustafa Kemal’s modernizing public philosophy and socialized into considering itself the guardian of the Republic, the Turkish military felt morally and legally obligated to intervene several times when the country seemed to be undergoing a democratic governability crisis.

The second part of Chapter 3 demonstrates that Turkey’s military coups have typically
occurred during political crises, with the support of various segments of civil and political society. By investigating the strategic relationship between the military and bourgeoisie during each military intervention, the chapter refutes the hegemonic center-periphery thesis explaining each military intervention as an attempt by the military to preserve or increase its political power vis-à-vis the emerging bourgeoisie/periphery. Finally, focusing on Turkey’s mode of transition to competitive politics in 1983, chapter argues that both the terms upon which power was transferred from military to civilian hands and developments subsequent to this transfer resulted in the establishment of national security state under the tutelage of military. While the military regime’s performance, cohesion, and the transitional path to democratic rule conferred substantial prestige and autonomy upon the TAF, the policies pursued by the military regime and the civilian government that followed created new opportunities for Islamic groups to mobilize in social, political, and economic areas in the 1990s. One of the main arguments of this chapter is thus that, contrary to prevalent perceptions, the TAF has not always maintained an “assertive secularist” position (Kuru 2005). Its promotion of a “Turkish-Islam synthesis” in the 1980s was one of the factors that empowered political Islam a decade later.

Chapter 4 argues that no major element of Turkish politics can be understood without reference to the February 28 Process, and defends this argument with an examination of the causes and implications of the military’s soft coup of 28 February 1997. This chapter discusses how developments in the 1990s – the ascendancy of internal threats and the low legitimacy and capacity of civilian governments – resulted in the enhancement of the Turkish military’s political role. It suggests, however, that the military-orchestrated securitization of Islam in the second half of the 1990s proved to be counterproductive as it exacerbated an organic crisis and victimized Islamic identities, which created both the motivation and the opportunity to attack official state ideology and its representatives a decade later.

Chapter 5 analyses the domestic and international developments at the eve of the new century that reversed the trend of the previous decade. It considers the transformation of Turkish civil-military relations as a process of socialization and institutional learning that is triggered by external pressures and then driven by the interaction of the domestic and international developments that reinforce each other. It argues that the Europeanization of Turkey’s civil-military problematique opened a window of opportunity for civil-military reform and the emergence of a single-party government with a strong will for change and domestic mobilization against militarism mediated between external pressure and domestic change.
Chapters 6-8 engage in a behavioral analysis with the aim of providing a clearer picture of the extent to which the Turkish military is politically subordinated to democratically elected civilians in practice. Chapter 6 focuses specifically on the period from November 2002 until 2006, claiming that this period was one of civilian empowerment driven by the interaction of domestic and external developments. The formation of a single-party, pro-change (AKP) government after 11 years of coalition government and the ascendancy of new Euro-Atlanticist military leader Hilmi Ozkok reinforced the opportunity for change that was initially opened by external pressures. The chapter substantiates this argument by analyzing the relationship between political and military authorities on three crucial cases in which their preferences diverged. These cases are: reform in NSC and its Secretariat General, which took place in 2003 and reduced the political powers of the military; Turkey’s foreign security policy-making on Iraq during the onset of the Iraq War of 2003; and its policy-making on Cyprus during the process of the adoption of the Annan Plan in 2004. This chapter shows that the military’s role in national security and foreign policy-making was reduced considerably due to international, national, and institutional contingencies.

Chapter 7 analyzes patterns of CMR during the period of 2006-2008, and argues that the presidential crisis of 2007 was the path-breaking development that forcefully taught the military leaders the public’s new preferences and new institutional constraints against its political activism. During this phase of institutional learning, the dynamism of the EU process was largely subdued; despite this, the process of change in Turkey’s civil-military relations regime continued even at a stronger pace because of the AKP’s effective strategies and loss of the TAF’s deterrence capability.

Under the rising costs of being a veto-player in this new strategic context, Chapter 8 shows how it became increasingly difficult for military authorities to put political pressure on the government. It also shows how the TAF, under an organized campaign of a fully mobilized domestic opposition since early 2008, became defensive. During this period of 2008-2012 norm opportunists, e.g. the Islamist media, openly engaged in delegitimizing and discrediting the military and the power structure on which its authority and legitimacy is based. This organized campaign engendered politically motivated court cases that not only overshadowed the TAF’s image and weakened its role but also undermined the consensual basis of Kemalist hegemony within civil society, thus eroding the military’s social bases of power.

Chapter 9 examines the institutional dimensions of democratic control. An analysis of the
changes in the institutional framework of civil-military relations in Turkey shows that after the recent EU-triggered reforms the Turkish military enjoys high prerogatives only in the area of defense coordination and internal functioning. The military’s attitudes also show an increasing internalization of norm of civilian supremacy. The chapter therefore concludes that in the past decade the Turkish civil-military regime shifted from the tutelary regime category to defective democratic control. In the current configuration, the risk of praetorian military intervention in politics is low. While the military broadly accepts its role in domestic politics as an apolitical servant of elected authorities, it lacks effective democratic governance of the defense and security sector.

The final chapter serves to sum up the findings of this study, discussing the impact of this institutional change on the civil-military relations regime and on the prospects of the country’s democratic consolidation. Its main conclusion is that in the past decade the Turkish civil-military regime shifted from the tutelary regime category to that of defective democratic control. By conceptually differentiating civilianization from democratization, the chapter argues that the AKP government’s trajectory is leading Turkey not toward democratic consolidation but competitive neo-conservative authoritarianism, posing risks not only for the subordination of the military but also for the identity and stability of the regime in general. This final chapter also aims to broaden the findings of this study by comparing the Turkish case with Latin American and South and Eastern European countries.
It is important to begin this chapter’s examination of the relevant literature with a conceptual clarification. In civil-military relations literature, withdrawal signifies a more complete, abrupt, and voluntary return to the barracks based on a calculated decision made by the military or forced upon them by defeats in war, a sharp decline in popularity, or a foreign intervention. Disengagement, on the other hand, implies a slow and deliberate process of reducing military influence in political decision-making. The essence of the military’s disengagement from politics consists of the depoliticization of the military, that is, their neutrality vis-à-vis domestic politics and the subordination of the military to the legitimate civilian authority representing the institutionalized expression of political will. Demilitarization, on the other hand, refers to the process of deconstructing the ideological and institutional structures of militarism and authoritarian ethos, and the reassertion of civil control and democratic culture over the organs of the state, economy, and civil society (Adejumobi 1999; Houngnikpo, 2010). In this study, military’s withdrawal and disengagement from military will be used to point the process of declining military’s political activism and influence.

Another distinction needs to be made between the concepts of civilization, democratization, and democratic control of armed forces. While the concept of civilianization refers to the process of replacement of military personnel and institutions (including laws, legal regulations, constitutions) in extra-military areas of the state apparatus with their civilian counterparts, democratization refers to the transformation from authoritarianism to democratic forms of governance in which basic liberal freedoms and rights are protected. Although discussions of democracy have traditionally revolved around “minimalist” or “procedural” definitions – commonly referred as “Schumpeterian democracy” – and substantive definitions, recent work defines democracy in such a manner that political liberties are sine qua non for a democratic regime (Collier and Levitsky, 1997, pp. 433-4). This means that the guarantee of civil and political rights is more than a mere component of democracy; it is an essential foundation for all the other dimensions of democracy.

Scholars describe democratic civil-military relations and measure the extent of democratic control in a variety of ways, which differ from each other in the objects of observation and in the causal assumptions upon which they rely. To measure the extent of
democratization of CMR, some researchers examine the military's behaviour, others their attitudes, and still others their institutional environment. While an institutional approach may serve well for establishing the direction of change – that is, increasing or decreasing powers exercised by the military – democratic control of the armed forces cannot simply be defined as the absence of military prerogatives. Such a narrow focus could easily underestimate military influence.

Therefore, it is essential to analyze military behaviour and assess whether the armed forces comply with democratic norms in practice. Despite its empirical advantage of varying across different democracies and different periods, the behavioural approach has its own shortcomings. One of the important problems of this approach is the prevalence of double standards. Some scholars of CMR hold military officers in new democracies to higher standards of democratic behaviour than those enforced in established democracies (Cizre, 2006; 2008; 2011; Bayramoglu 2004; Bayramoglu and Insel 2009; Bilgic 2009). Often military declarations and/or attempts to influence policies inimical to the military’s professional interests are interpreted as a lack of military subordination to democratically elected authorities. This is problematic, since "in all countries ruled by civilians, the armed forces.... are in no better, but certainly no worse a moral position than any [other] departments of civil administration....to persuade the government to their point of view" (Finer, 1962, p.141). Even in consolidated liberal democracies, the armed forces are never totally removed from politics given their role in national defense and security and their quest for professional autonomy and budget resources. The armed forces exercise varying degrees of political influence; in some instances, military preferences even prevail over those of civilians. Indeed, recent studies of American CMR highlight the growing influence of the American military “to the point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and decisions” (Desch, 1999; Feaver, 2001; Kohn, 2002). Kohn, for example, asserts:

If one measures civilian control not by the superficial standard of who signs the papers and passes the laws but by the relative influence of the uniformed military and civilian policy makers in the two great areas of concern in military affairs—national security policy, and the use of force to protect the country and project power abroad—then civilian control has deteriorated significantly in the last generation. In theory, civilians have the authority to issue virtually any order and organize the military in any fashion they choose. But in practice, the relationship is far more complex (2002, p. 16).

In sum, the armed forces are never totally apolitical. It is, therefore, unfair and
academically problematic to expect higher standards in the developing world. These high standards sometimes reach the point that “the only fully convincing proof of civilian control would be to abolish the military and to see if the officers went home without complaint” (Fitch, 2001, p. 65). This often leads to standards of democratic control consisting of ideal-types “which, at present, no country anywhere in the world is able to match in their entirety” (Hanggi, 2003, p. 17). Based on the literature on democratic control, this study offers five essential attributes of civil-military relations in a democracy.

2.1 Conceptualization of Democratic Control of Armed Forces

A. Political control of the military by the constitutionally designated authorities

The first and most important requirement of democratic civil-military relations is the unequivocal supremacy of democratically-elected civilians in national politics and a constitutional and legal framework that both defines clear lines of responsibility between the military and the government and limits the role of the former to external threats (Born and Lazzarini, 2006; Bland, 2001; Cottey et al, 2002). Civilian authorities should be able to act autonomously from the armed forces without fear of military disloyalty to the regime (Welch, 1987, p. 13, Fitch 1998, p. 37).

B. Civilian management of the security sector

In a democratic CMR regime, the military is subordinated to democratically elected civilians even in its professional arena. For most experts, the most effective way of subordinating the military to civilian command lies in the establishment of a strong, well-staffed, civilian-led ministry of defense that devises, advises, and manages defense policies and oversees military operations (Huntington, 1957, pp. 428-455; Aguero, 1995, p. 197; Stepan 1988; Berlin 1998; 2009, p. 563, Greenwood). Democratic management of the security sector does not only entail the military’s implementation of executive decisions, even when it believes those decisions are wrong, but also a professional civilian cadre that is knowledgeable about military affairs. “A basic effectiveness in the functioning of civilian government; the courage to tackle military issues seriously; and expert and informed decision making that does not treat the military institution as a political pawn but as an executive agency with legitimate professional interests in its delivery of public good” are crucial for the civilian management of the security sector (Born et al, 2006, p. 7).

C. Legislative oversight of the security sector

Democratic control not only requires the military’s subordination to the executive, but
also its subjection to legislative oversight. In its fullest sense, “democratic control of armed forces” requires that all decisions regarding the defense and security of the country – the organization, deployment, and use of armed forces; the setting of military priorities and requirements and the allocation of necessary resources; military promotions; and a definition of security threats – are taken by democratic leadership and scrutinized by the legislature in order to ensure popular support and legitimacy (Lunn, 2003, p. 13; Born, 2003, p. 39; Born, Fluri and Johnsson, 2003, p. 6; Hanggi, 2003, p. 16; Stepan, 1988). It is the legislative body that “keeps the government accountable and secures a balance between the security policy and society by aligning the goals, policies, and procedures of the military and political leaders” (Born, 2003, p. 39). The legislatures in advanced democracies perform such a role through the help of an independent and respected audit bureau and competent and suitably supported specialist committees (Greenwood, 2006, p. 31).

D. Judicial control of the security sector

In liberal democracies, the military is also subject to the civilian justice system and, ideally, there are no military courts (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Austria, and Germany). If military courts do exist, they have almost no legal jurisdiction outside of narrowly defined internal breaches of military discipline (Stephan, 1988, p. 97; Fitch 1998, 2001). The members of the armed forces are not granted special legal privileges by law or by actual practice.

E. Public control of the security sector/military

“Public control” of the military refers to the existence of a well-developed political culture that ensures the military’s subordination to civilians and of a security community representing civil society (NGOs, independent media, specialized think tanks, university institutions, etc.) that nurtures an informed national debate on security issues (Hanggi, 2003, p. 17; Born 2003; Born et al., 2004; 2006).

Measured against these five criteria, democracies are characterized by significant differences in the relationship between the armed forces, executive government, the legislature, and society. These varying patterns of CMR entail significant differences in the rules of the game for national politics. The formal laws, rules, and practices as well as widely-shared norms, values, and understandings that govern the relationship between government and military and between military and society differ from one regime to another. Based on the degree to which the
above-mentioned criteria are satisfied, this study proposes a typology that classifies Civil-Military Relations Regimes (CMRR) into one of five categories.\textsuperscript{22} Such a typology would not only help us to understand the trajectory of Turkish CMRR in the longue durée, but also offer to the reader a better understanding of civil-military relations in general. Developing a typology offers a heuristic tool for empirically assessing the concrete state of civil-military relations at one point in time and for longitudinal, cross-sectional, and combined longitudinal/cross-sectional comparisons. It also helps us to understand the varying nature and extent of military involvement in politics. The study therefore proposes the following typology with a “liberal democratic” model on one side of a continuum and “military-controlled” models on the other.

2.2 Typology of Civil-Military Relations Regimes

Liberal democratic control

All five above-mentioned criteria are satisfied. In regimes with consolidated liberal democratic control, institutionally subordinate armed forces comply with civilian directives without contestation because they have internalized democratic norms. Military role beliefs stressing political and professional subordination are considered legitimate and binding; anti-democratic role beliefs are marginalized or nonexistent among military officers. To put it succinctly, in a liberal democratic control regime military leaders are politically subordinate to the constitutionally designated civilian authorities, they comply with the decisions made by the legitimate civilian authorities, and view democracy as the “only game in town”, in principle.

Defective democratic control

Defective democratic control refers to those regimes in which the risk of praetorian military intervention in politics is low. In these regimes, the military broadly accepts its role in domestic politics as an apolitical servant of the elected authorities, but lacks effective democratic

\textsuperscript{22} Janowitz (1977, p. 81) identifies five types of civil-military relations in developing nations: (1) authoritarian-personal control, (2) authoritarian-mass party, (3) democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems, (4) civil-military coalition, and (5) military oligarchy...the first three differ markedly in the form of internal political control; they have the common feature that the military's involvement in domestic politics is at the minimal level”. Welch (1976) and Luckham (1971) employ a continuum to illustrate the three major relationships that exist between a civilian government and its armed forces. Nordlinger (1977, pp. 21-27) offers another a typology of Praetorianism, where officers act either as: 1) “Moderators” who exercise a veto power without taking the control of the government themselves; 2) “Guardians” who overthrow the government and retain governmental power in their hands for usually a few years in order to correct the deficiencies of the outgoing incumbents; or 3) “Rulers” who not only control the government but also dominate the regime attempting to control large parts of political, economic and social life. Fitch (1998, pp. 37-40) provides a more nuanced typology on which this study’s model is developed.
governance of the defense and security sectors. In this model, civilians are supreme decision-makers in extra-military areas, but civilian control of one or more of the other four areas (professional, judicial, public, or legislative), for a variety of reasons, is not firm. For example, in much of post-communist CCE, the “first generation” issues including the founding of institutions such as constitutional structures and the development of clear lines of responsibility between the military and the government are resolved, but they face “second generation” problems of building effective defense policy-making structures, establishing legislative oversight, and developing wider civil society input into defense and security debates (Cotter, Edmunds, Forster 2002, pp. 32-42). In combination, these problems make the democratic control of defense policy and armed forces defective (Ibid, p. 45).

Defective democratic control also refers to those regimes in which the armed forces is professionally and politically subordinate to the civilian authorities, but is weakly subordinated to civilian rule of law. David Pion-Berlin (1992), for example, identifies the failure of the government to bring officers to justice for human rights violations as one of the most serious obstacles to full democratic consolidation. In his analysis of military autonomy in five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru), Pion-Berlin showed that in four of the five states the military continued to enjoy high levels of autonomy over human rights, insulating itself “from judicial prosecution for past human rights offenses” (p. 97).

**Conditional subordination regime**

In regimes with conditional military subordination, under normal circumstances the armed forces abstain from overt intervention in political questions, although military commanders publicly deliberate about national security issues. The armed forces, therefore, exert indirect political influence – though typically not a veto – on non-military policies. Still, the military reserves its “right” to intervene when the security and continuity of the nation are in danger. Both government and opposition forces are aware that the military’s loyalty to the civilian regime is conditional. Hence, civilian governments generally defer to military preferences on issues that might provoke military discontent (Fitch 1998, pp. 39-40; 2001).

The armed forces in such regimes enjoy high institutional autonomy in their professional arena. The executive and legislature set the military budget, usually with only limited debate. There may be no ministerial control over the general staff, the minister of defense may be a military officer, or service commanders may be selected by the executive within limits set by military regulations (Fitch, 1998, p. 40). The military high command plays a key role in the
formulation of defense policy and budget, the determination of strategy and doctrine, and training and education. Although military promotions and appointments are the formally prerogative of the executive, in practice it is the chief of general staff that determines these. In short, the armed forces enjoy a high degree of institutional autonomy and a quasi-monopoly on security policy (Fitch 1998, p. 40). The primary problem in regimes with conditional military subordination is not a desire by the military to intervene in domestic politics, but rather the danger that general political and socio-economic instability, deep political cleavages, and new – and hence weak or contested – political institutions will create circumstances that might draw the military into domestic politics (Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Bolivia).

Protected democracies

A military tutelary or protected democracy regime refers to an electorally democratic regime in which the military acts as the guardian through its formal tutelary powers, which include having a constitutionally-sanctioned independent role and controlling extra-military areas of state apparatus such as the police, intelligence, and state agencies. In tutelary regimes, the armed forces participate in domestic politics through both direct and indirect ways and exercise oversight over democratically-elected civilian authorities. In such a regime, the implicit or explicit threat of a coup or the military’s veto powers place severe limits on civilians and their scope of action, undermining the free exercise of democratic authority. The military’s share of power within such regimes may vary, although its implicit veto power is usually respected when the issue involves intense and widespread military pressure. The further removed the issue is from the military’s “natural” concerns, the more likely the outcome will depend on whether the military’s position is supported by important civilian groups. In this regime, the military does not govern but is highly politicized. Military leaders speak publicly on a wide range of national policy issues relevant to national security (Fitch, 1998, pp. 38-39). Civilian leadership may require the support of the military to bolster its power and, therefore, capitulates easily to the demands of the military’s institutions. In tutelary regimes, the armed forces enjoy complete institutional autonomy in their professional matters. They have policy autonomy and decision-making powers in their professional domain.

Many third-wave democracies of Latin America were, in fact, tutelary regimes for at least the first 10 to 20 years of their transition to democracy. The transition constitutions of the 1970s and 1980s not only recognized a legitimate political role for the military but also expanded it, justifying military participation at all levels of policy-making and administration (Valenzuela,
1992, p. 63). Frequently, the armed forces were assigned the mission of protecting the constitutional order and serving as “guarantors” of the constitution. Article 90 of the 1980 Chilean constitution, for example, stipulates that the armed forces should “guarantee the institutional order of the Republic”. Article 142 of the 1988 Brazilian constitution similarly states “the armed forces purpose is to defend the Nation, guarantee the constitutional branches of government and, on the initiative of any of these branches, law and order” (Stepan, 1988, p. 75). Furthermore, in many post-transition countries of the region the military was directly involved in politics as members of cabinet (Brazil, Chile), internal security, and the top intelligence agencies (Stepan, 1988). According to Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán:

In Latin America examples abound of freely elected governments constrained by a military “guardianship”. In Argentina from 1955 to 1973 certain electoral outcomes were ruled out a priori because the military proscribed the party that enjoyed most popular support. Guatemala’s military played a de facto guardian role in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nearly two years after winning in the largely free and fair 1985 elections, President Cerezo admitted that at the time he took office, the military permitted him to exercise only an estimated 30% of his constitutional powers. He claimed that the situation improved thereafter, while another local observer estimated that the percentage of power he was permitted to exercise actually decreased to 10% or 15% by 1988. A similar situation prevailed in El Salvador from 1982 until shortly before the 1994 elections…

Governments in these countries were chosen in elections that were reasonably though not completely free and fair. But the military and paramilitary controlled a wide range of policy choices including the range of permissible political opinion (the military violently repressed the left), human rights policy, the means to be employed in fighting civil wars, important aspects of labour policy (labour unions were brutally repressed), agrarian policy, and many others ((2001, pp.44-45). Under these conditions the governments chosen by the people did not effectively govern in important policy areas. To call such a government “democratic”, therefore, does not do justice to the word (Ibid, Karl 1986; Valenzuela 1992).

Military-controlled regimes

Military-controlled regimes, the fifth and final in this study’s typology, are characterized by the de facto political subordination of nominally civilian governments to effective military control. Despite the predominance of civilians in positions of formal authority, in practice civilian leaders are largely figureheads, governing at the sufferance of the military commander (Fitch, 1998, p.38). Panama, under General Manuel Noriega, along with Haiti, Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan are all military-dominated states, though not military dictatorships such as in North Korea, Fiji, or Burma.

This thesis argues that in the last decade Turkey’s civil-military regime shifted from the
tutelary regime category to being a defective democratic model. What explains this transformation? How has the Turkish Armed Forces, a strong veto player in the regime, failed to preserve the institutional status quo? To facilitate the examination of this puzzle, the following section offers a review of literature, positing that a combination of international, structural and military organizational variables increases the likelihood of military’s disengagement from politics. While international and structural variables open a window of opportunity for the military’s disengagement from politics, organizational variables such as military role beliefs and cohesion drive the military out of politics by providing them with particular predispositions and motives.

2.3 Review of the Literature and the Analytical Framework

Coups pose perhaps the intriguing and pressing questions of civil-military relations literature. More than 350 attempted military coups took place between 1945 and 1985 (David, 1987, pp. 1–2). Coups alone have accounted for nearly 200 regime changes in the developing world, making it the most common method of regime change in the post-World War II era (David, 1991, pp. 238-39). By the end of 1980s, therefore, an enormous body of literature on the causes of military coups had already been generated in the hopes of shedding light on the dynamics surrounding this strikingly frequent phenomenon.

Broadly speaking, students of civil-military relations (CMR) have advanced two general explanations regarding the causes of military coups, one organizational, and the other structural. Those situating their explanations at the analytical level of the military organization underlined the variables endogenous to the military such as military role beliefs, degree of professionalism, corporate interests, and internal unity that “motivate” officers to become involved in politics. Those that focus on conditions present in international and domestic structures argue that factors such as the superpower rivalry of the Cold War, low levels of socio-economic and political

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23 Approximately half of all developing states in Latin America, Asia and Africa experienced a coup attempt during the Cold War period. According to Ruth Leger Sivard’s study (1986, p. 24) a majority of third world countries were characterized by military controlled governments in 1985, nearly half of them in Africa which recently freed from West’s colonial rule. William Thompson (1978, p.7) looking at the 1946-70 period, found 274 coups d’état in 59 states, while Samuel Finer (1978, p. 66) counted 157 successful and unsuccessful coup attempts between 1958 and 1977, six of them in Europe and the remainder were in 55 countries of the third world. Between 1945 and 1976, Nordlinger (1977, p. xi) estimated, more than two thirds of the countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East had experienced varying levels of military intervention. Of these attempts, 183 coups (or 51%) were successful (David, 1985, 1987; Finer, 1983). During the 1950s and 1960s a coup or attempted coup occurred every 4 months in Latin America, every 7 months in Asia, every 3 months in the Middle East, and every 55 days in Africa (Bertsch, Clark, and Wood, 1978).
development, weak political leadership, and political culture create the “opportunity” for the military to intervene. Arguably the most well-developed explanation of military’s political activism that combines both organizational and structural variables is offered by Samuel Finer in his seminal work “The Man on Horseback” (1962). Finer argues that not only is a predisposition within the military to intervene in politics (stemming from military role beliefs legitimizing a supra-political status and/or threat to national, corporate, or individual interests) a necessary component in explaining coups, but that an opportunity to do so (e.g. the perceived legitimacy of such an action) is also required for intervention to succeed. It is now generally accepted that a military’s political activism depends not only on the intrinsic nature of a political army but also on its relationship with civilian actors, the broader international context, and various kinds of social contradictions and struggles (Koonings and Krujit, 2002; Lowenthal 1986, p.15; O’Donnell, 1976). In brief, “[u]nicausal explanation of coups, whether focusing on factors endogenous or exogenous to the military” are therefore “unconvincing” (Sundhaussen, 1984, p. 545).

As Robin Luckham acknowledges, the conditions favoring military disengagement are simply the reverse of those that triggered coups in the first place (1991, p. 16). Military disengagement is, therefore, considered as a kind of "intervention in reverse" (Maniruzzaman, 1987, p. 29; Finer 1985, p. 23). Needler in his analysis of the military’s withdrawal in Latin America, similarly points out that “the factors motivating the phase two coup are not unlike those, or at least are drawn from the same list as those, motivating the phase one coup. Stated more generally, the reasons for returning power to civilian hands resemble those for taking it from those hands in the first place” (1980, p. 622). A military’s return to its barracks requires both willingness on the part of the military to leave or lessen its participation in government (motivation) and the existence of societal and political forces both to urge them out and take their place (opportunity) (Sundhaussen, 1984, p. 550; Barkey 1990, pp. 169-192)

It can therefore be argued that endogenous variables shape the disposition and capability of the military to disengage, while exogenous variables form favorable or unfavorable opportunity structures for military disengagement. The combination of endogenous factors and extraneous opportunity structures creates four possible scenarios:

1) Neither predisposition nor opportunity to withdraw: no withdrawal will occur;
2) Both predisposition and opportunity to withdraw: withdrawal will occur;
3) No predisposition to withdraw but the opportunity structure pushes the military to
withdraw: The military may resist but ultimately it will be pushed out of political power.

4) Predisposition to withdraw, but opportunity structure pulls the military into political arena: The military intervention usually leads to a failed coup.

Having outlined the four possible scenarios generated by combination of endogenous and exogenous variables discussed above, the following section first discusses how international variables shape domestic opportunity structures, then elaborates on those structural factors that pull the armies either toward power or back to the barracks. The final section discusses the organizational motives that provide motivation and predisposition for a military’s intervention or disengagement.

2.3.1 International Opportunity Structure

This thesis suggests that post-cold war change in the international security structure and the new security regime that followed constrained military’s political activism both materially and ideationally. The role of the international state system in shaping domestic political outcomes is well acknowledged.24 Since 1945, the dynamics behind military coup d’etats developed in a world in which the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union pervaded nearly every corner of the globe. Anti-democratic influences generated by the international state system are therefore often considered as an important variable in the weak performance of democracy in the 20th century. The external involvement and/or endorsement of military coups as well as the military assistance and training provided by the superpowers are viewed as powerful international variables that affect civil-military relations during the Cold War era (Huber, 1988, p. 70; Stepan 1976).

Far from being isolated internal events, coups are considered as “instruments of foreign policy for outside states seeking to expand or preserve their interests” (David, 1987, p. 1). Coups taking place during the Cold War were “too important” for external powers “to leave their occurrence to chance or simply to hope they will produce a favorable result” (David, 1986, pp. 4-5). David (1986) has found evidence of external participation in either the encouragement or suppression of 38 coups that took place between 1945 and 1985. David (1987) reached the conclusion that foreign powers have had "extraordinary success" in thwarting attempts at coups against friendly governments, while experiencing somewhat less success in assisting coups

against non-friendly governments.

For the Soviet Union, it seems that “coup were often the best way to install communist or otherwise friendly regimes” (David, 1986, p. 29; Ciment and Hill, 2012, p. 39). There were 13 pro-Soviet coups during the Cold War period, but many were more closely connected with religious or other ideologies than with societal communism. While the degree and significance of the pro-Soviet alignment differed markedly across these cases (David, 1986), each coup placed a regime in power that proved more supportive of Soviet interests than its predecessor (Ciment and Hill, 2012, p. 39).

During the Cold War, the United States similarly assisted coups and rebellions in an attempt “to prevent countries with left-leaning regimes from moving definitively into the Soviet Union’s orbit”, backed resistance movements, and attempted to generate rebellions in Third World states already ruled by Marxist-Leninist governments (Hosmer, 2001, pp. 49-50, also see: LaFeber 1993; Kornbluh 1999; Zimmermann 1983). In some cases, the US played a determinative role in deposing a regime, such as in the overthrow of nationalist/reformist Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and leftist President Jacob Arbenz of Guatemala in 1964. The US also provided funding, arms, and other supplies to “resistance movements” and “rebel organizations” in order to “encourage foreign decision-makers to abandon policies and behavior considered inimical to U.S. interests and to create bargaining leverage for negotiations” (Hosmer, 2001, p. 82). Such motives were underlying the covert U.S. support to the Polish Freedom and Independence Movement during the 1950s, the anti-Chinese resistance in Tibet (the 1950s to 1960s) and many other similar movements.

As Huber Stephens explains in the case of South America, the U.S. pressures exercised through economic means and diplomatic channels also contributed to the undermining of the

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27 Others include the Hmong and other tribal groups fighting the communist forces in Laos (1962 to 1973); the Kurds battling Baghdad government forces in Iraq (1972 to 1975); the colonel’s revolt in Indonesia (1957-1958); the non-communist factions in Cambodia and in Angola (1975, 1985-1990); the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan (1979-1992); and the Contras in Nicaragua (1982–1990). See: Hosmer, 2010, pp. 81-92; Kinzer, 2006, pp. 98-100; 260-280; Dreyfuss 2005; David 2006; Prados 2006; Conboy and Morrison 2002.
legitimacy of incumbent governments and thus to the critical weakening of democratic systems:

U.S. pressures induced many governments to outlaw communist parties and thus to allow at best for restricted democracy, even where these parties clearly played by the democratic rules of the game. Military assistance... strengthened the military as an institution and thus its potential to act autonomously not only from the incumbent government but from civil society and political institutions in general (1988, p. 64).

Huber’s argument is supported by the statistically significant and quite strong negative correlation between U.S. military aid per soldier received in the period 1953-1963 and subsequent democratic political stability during the Johnson and Nixon administrations (Muller, 1985, p. 461). Although the American military aid and training fails to account the erosion of democracy when considered on its own, it seems that this assistance was a factor in the growth of politically autonomous pro-US militaries in the Third World.

Alfred Stepan (1973) argues, for example, that US promotion of a new military doctrine based on counterinsurgency, civic action, and military “nation-building” contributed to the emergence of a new model of military professionalism in Latin American armies. This “new professionalism of internal security”, replacing Huntington's ideal type of “old professionalism of external warfare”, contributed to a deep politicization of the military and often to an authoritarian military role expansion and rule. The military's role was redefined to include "national security" rather than simply "national defense", since the enemy included subversive elements (Stepan 1973). The consequence was to erase "most of the boundary between civilian and military spheres of competence" (Fitch, 1989, p. 107). Thus, the military's role during the Cold War expanded to include national security and development functions. This enlargement, combined with external military assistance and training, increased its strength, size, and importance. The military's expanded role in turn not only validated its self-image as the most vital element for both the historic continuity of the nation and the survival of the state, but also boosted its position relative to other state elements. In many countries, the military became so strong that it became, in effect, "a state-within-a-state" (Yawnghwe, 1997, p. 15).

The external developments since the end of Cold War, however, encouraged just the opposite. Three interrelated, but distinct international developments constrain the military’s

28 Whether Soviet military assistance policies have affected the likelihood of coups is not proven. “It is noteworthy, however, that of the fifteen major recipients of Soviet bloc military aid (those countries receiving over $400 million of military assistance from the USSR and its allies), only in Indonesia was a pro-Soviet regime replaced by a pro-Western government”(David, 1986, p.7).
political activism in much of the developing world. Firstly, the end of the Cold War dramatically reduced Western security threats in much of the world, which fostered the prospect of the ideological hegemony of liberal democracy over other competing ideological foundations and thus weakened militaries’ abilities to justify and legitimate their privileges within a framework of nationalist ideologies. “The disappearance of internationally legitimate regime alternatives led to the emergence of a ‘global democratic ‘zeitgeist’ of unprecedented scope and intensity” (Diamond 1993, p. 53), which created a “global normative climate inhospitable to authoritarian rule” (Diamond, 1995, p. 55; quoted in Levitsky and Way, 2003, p. 3). This negative climate has been particularly strong for unconstitutional seizures of executive power and for ensuring democratic civilian control for armed forces. International actors agreed to condemn coups, eventually fostering the development and spread of an anti-coup norm (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Several regional and international organizations have accepted a variety of such “democracy clauses” in international legal, political, trade, and economic agreements, thereby creating a web of overlapping instruments that could be deployed depending on the circumstances. This marked a strong contrast to the 1960-1970s era in which superpowers and their allies were willing to support military struggle against civilian governments in the name of ideology. Since, 1993 the United States explicitly forbade U.S. funds from being “expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected Head of Government is deposed by military coup or decree”.29 The EU had made a comparable commitment in 1991, suspending aid after coups in Haiti (1991), Burundi (1993), Comoros (1995), Niger (1996), Gambia (1997), Sierra Leone (1997), and Pakistan (1999) (2003, pp. 205-208). Shannon et. al’s study (2012, p.13) shows a 173.8% increase in responses from all foreign actors and a 139.2% increase for International Organizations’ (IOs) reactions to military coups during the post-Cold War period. The diffusion of an anti-coup norm and its integration in the charters of regional organizations make clear to military officers that they will be punished politically and economically for taking power by force, thus significantly increasing the cost of an illegal disruption of democratic rule.

A second post-Cold War development that constrains military’s political activism in the developing world was the shift of the security strategy of the Trans-Atlantic community30 from

30 A security community is made up of states that rule out war as an instrument of resolving their conflicts. As opposed to seeking to defend members against outside threats (as in the case of collective defense organizations
the support of authoritarian countries to the promotion of (neo)liberal democracy. In the bipolar Cold War security structure, the division of the world into Western and Soviet camps had reduced a number of issues to the more central question of whether a government was a “friend” or “foe”. During the Cold War, Western governments provided a significant amount of aid to allies without paying much attention to whether its civil-military relations were based on democratic principles or how its security sectors were structured and governed (Ball, 2001, p. 46; Cottey, Edmunds Forster, 1999). The West, therefore, was willing to accept military rule in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Africa in order to support allies in the fight against the spread of communism. In fact, from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, the consensus was that Western states’ security interests could be best guaranteed by authoritarian regimes, which could provide both political stability and openness to a capitalist-like economy (Lucarelli, 2002, p.20; Zielonka, 2001). For example, while outwardly resembling an alliance of democracies, NATO did not impose significant consequences when Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Turkey wavered between authoritarian regimes and democracy; democratization was simply not its main priority (Cizre, 2004a, p. 112; Magstadt, 1998, p. 112). Indeed, for non-democratic Portugal to join NATO in 1949 it was sufficient for Lisbon to simply sign a protocol stating it would “defend Western democratic ideals” (Thomas, 2005, p. 30). Similarly, none of the military interventions in Turkey was strongly criticized abroad (Pevehouse, 2005; Aydin and Gursoy, 2008; Jackson, 2009).

With the end of the Cold War, however, all actors of the so-called Trans-Atlantic and European security architecture engaged in the construction of a liberal democratic Euro-Atlantic security community to underpin international peace and stability. Defining security as closely linked to free markets and democracy, Western powers and international organizations promoted liberal democracy to reinforce their own identity, legitimize their post-Cold War foreign and security policies, and finally to create a democratic peace community to safeguard their security pro-actively and pre-emptively.

In the United States, the Clinton administration announced that the foreign policy doctrine of containment would be replaced with a doctrine of “enlargement” (Lake 1993; such as NATO), a security community seeks to create a zone of peace within its geographical confines (as with the European Union). It is envisaged that the creation of expectations of peaceful change among members would also render the community more secure against external threats, for this would minimize the grounds for external intervention (Bilgin, 2007, p. 898). Also see: Adler, E., & Barnett, M. (Eds.). (1998). Security communities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bloomfield 1994; Smith 1994; Wiarda 1997; Pevehouse 2005). The promotion of freedom and democracy had become a central pillar of U.S. security policy, a pillar derived from the principle outlined in The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSSEE, 1995, p. i): “democratic states are less likely to threaten [US] interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development” (quoted in Rose, 2001, p. 189). The NSS 2000 also made it abundantly clear that the US would “shape the world” (Also see NSSEE 1994; 1995; 1996) through “adapting alliances; encouraging the reorientation of other states – including former adversaries; encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development; preventing conflict; countering potential regional aggressors; confronting new threats; and steering international peace and stability operations” (The US National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000, p. 8).

Democracy promotion is thus pursued not only as a means to international stability and peace in general, but also to secure particular American interests including increasing her global economic hegemony. A similar position was taken by George W. Bush, who has cited the spread of freedom as a “vital interest” of the US. Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy prioritised the promotion of democracy, stating that the US would make “freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future”. 31 President Bush reiterated in 2005 that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”. 32 The US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) “Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework” similarly considers the promotion of democracy as “central to [US] national security” because “countries that lack political freedom, accountability, and avenues for redress can also breed internal instability and threaten regional and international security” (2005, p. 5). The US National Academy of Sciences estimated that between 1990 and 2005 USAID spent $8.47 billion

in 120 countries on the promotion of democracy and governance assistance.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus, American national security in the post-Cold War era is no longer defined purely in military terms; it was broadened to include political, technological, cultural and economic power that serve to secure her long-term global hegemony. In line with this strategy, the US initiated the design of a new international security architecture “organized around American hegemonic authority, and open markets, cooperative security, multilateral institutions, social bargains, and democratic community” (Ikenberry, 2012, p. 334). This new structure included agreement on GATT trade accords and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO); signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and the formation and extension of security assurances eastward into Central Europe by the NATO’s Partners for Peace program and the use of democratic conditionality, specifically democratic control of armed forces for aspiring NATO members. These and other similar initiatives were implemented as a result of this new strategy of "collective engagement" on a regional basis, and were implicitly legitimized by the “democratic peace” thesis.\textsuperscript{34}

The EU was quick to join the United States’ endeavor of building a new security structure based on norms of liberal democracy. In June 1991, the European Union asserted that the promotion of democracy and human rights is an essential element of its foreign policy and a “cornerstone” of European cooperation. In the same year the European Commission also gained the mandate to coordinate aid for the Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEE) transition to a market-based economy; transition to democracy became a condition for receiving EU assistance. In the following year the European Council laid out a liberal democratic conditionality criterion for aspiring members. According to the Copenhagen Criteria, countries seeking EU membership would have to “achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. \textsuperscript{35} From this point onward, the European Union insisted on the inclusion of a standard democracy and human rights clause in all new agreements with third countries, specifically providing for the


\textsuperscript{34}See, for instance: Russett 1993; Christopher, 1995; Albright, 1997; Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, 1993; Yost, 1998, Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, 2000; Lucerelli, 2002; Pevehouse, 2005, Ikenberry, 2012.

suspension of trade and aid provisions where democratic principles were not upheld.

This shift in the Western security regime from realpolitik to liberal institutionalism in the post-Cold War order brought the promotion of democratic control of armed forces to the forefront. The democratic control of armed forces in particular, and security sector reform in general, are now considered “an integral part of the transition from one-party to pluralist political systems, from centrally planned to market economies, and from armed conflict to peace” (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002, p. 175; Genschel 2003, p. 101). Several international organizations have made membership benefits dependent upon respect for democratic control. These IOs not only passed provisions promising comprehensive punishment to any regime born through a coup but also performed an important norm-setting function in the area of civil-military relations.

Indeed, it is widely observed that the democratic control of military is undergoing a “renaissance” due to the gradually evolving acceptance of the right to democracy or democratic governance within the international community (Born, Haltiner, and Malesic, 2004, p. 1). Although not all are legally binding, a set of norms and principles relating to sector governance has emerged in the post-Cold War Trans-Atlantic security community. This link between democracy building and security was first made explicit by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As Emanuel Adler effectively demonstrates (1997, 1998), the OSCE was able to develop innovative security community-building processes and practices according to a new comprehensive concept of security within which the basic principles of liberal democracy apply (Also see: Lucarelli 2002). The OSCE’s Politico-Military Code of Conduct, adopted by members’ heads of state in December 1994, was a landmark international agreement that includes norms and standards specifically addressing democratic oversight and control of key elements of the security sector – particularly the armed forces.

The norms of behavior stipulated in the Code of Conduct later became a reference regarding the democratic reform and good governance of security-sector institutions in the Euro-Atlantic security community, including NATO and the EU. The OSCE, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe all provide frameworks of effective complementary incentives for the new democracies in Europe to make progress in implementing democratic civilian control in security sector reform programs. As pointed out by Heinz Vetschera, the principle of democratic control of armed forces thus “transcends the area of domestic politics and becomes an element of international security policy” (1997, p. 16).
A third parallel development that contributed to the development of the norms of democratic control at the international level is the attachment of “security sector reform” to agendas of development, good-governance, and peace-building (Edmunds 2001; Lambert 2011, p. 164). In the 1990s, a human-centric understanding of security and good governance of the security sector came to be considered as essential precursors for effective development and post-conflict reconstruction (Edmunds 2001; Lambert 2011, p. 164). International efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s and Kosovo toward the end of that decade made it clear to the peace-building community that a comprehensive approach to reconstruction was required if countries in conflict were to be stabilized and a subsequent return to conflict prevented (Law, 2007, p. 8; Bryden and Hanggi, 2005).

Initially concentrating on the reduction of excessive military expenditures, the development community also began to use security sector reform in the late 1990s as a political conditionality for the provision of development assistance. Since then the norms of good governance of security sector, including the democratic control of armed forces, have gained much wider recognition, particularly in debate regarding increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance (Hanggi, 2004, pp.11-12; Karkoszka, 2003, pp. 10-11). In 1997 the UK Department for International Development linked its aid provisions to security sector reform (Edmunds, 2001, p. 3). The subsequent adoption of “security sector reform” by those leading aid organizations focused solely on economic development including the World Bank, the OECD, and the UN Development Fund (UNDP) reflects an emerging consensus within the international development community regarding the so-called security-development nexus (Lambert, 2011, pp. 163-164).

As Levitsky and Way (2003) assert “Western efforts to encourage democratic control of armed forces, often via conditionality, dramatically increased the cost of sustaining openly authoritarian regimes and created a strong incentive for peripheral elites to adopt formal democratic institutions” (p. 3). The enlargements of the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe and their respective democratic control-related admission requirements have been the important drivers of military reform in candidate countries. Indeed, the literature on the CEE underlines the predominant position of the Western “security community” as the single greatest external
factor shaping patterns of civil-military relations in the region. The West’s political, economic and military power, and the desire of candidates for integration with the West, provided Western organizations with enormous influence and leverage in these countries. It was NATO however that played a decisive role in “promoting civilian control of armed forces” and in “setting the agenda for structural reform across the military organizations” in the CEE (Edmunds, 2003, p. 145). “NATO has acted as a major catalyst in advancing democratic direction of the military in the region” because it “serves as a model; it creates incentives for reforms because democratic control of the military is an explicit condition for admission; and it also provides material assistance and advice to new or aspiring members through NATO’s partnership for peace (PfP) program and, more recently, its Membership Action Plan (MAP)” (Mychajlyszyn and Riekhoff, 2004, p. 14). These programs have helped not only to promote the civil-military reform agenda in the region but also to socialize participants into complying with NATO standards.

The Council of Europe (CoE) has also been an important setter of standards for the security sector. In 1993, the CoE coined the expression “democratic security” to underscore the idea that without democracy there could be no security in Europe. In 1999, the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) passed a recommendation on “Control of internal security services in Council of Europe member States”. The Council’s most important norm-setting exercise over militaries came in 2005 with the recommendation of its parliamentary assembly on the “Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States”. In its Recommendation 1713(2005), PACE suggested that the Committee of Ministers prepare guidelines regarding political rules, standards, and practical approaches to democratic oversight of the security sector, calling on the member states to adhere to those guidelines. In addition, the Council’s European Court of Human Rights has been instrumental in administering justice in several incidents of human rights abuses by security sector personnel in cases where national courts would not become involved or where options for appealing their decisions were exhausted.

37 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Control of internal security services in Council of Europe member states’, Recommendation 1402 (1999). In 2001, PACE also passed its Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics, which sets out the rules of behavior for police and law enforcement bodies in accordance with the principles of democratic governance. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Committee of Ministers draft recommendation on the European code of police ethics’, Opinion No. 223 (14 March 2001).
In another institutional example, democratic control of the armed forces eventually became an integral part of the EU’s enlargement policy, even though this principle was not specifically stated in the “Copenhagen Criteria”\(^{39}\) accession requirements in 1993. The European Parliament, in endorsing the Copenhagen Criteria, specified in the “Agenda 2000” resolution that candidate countries are required to establish “legal accountability of police, military and secret services […] and acceptance of the principle of conscientious objection to military service” (Hanggi, 2003, p. 13).\(^{40}\) In the case of Turkey, the EU had insisted that it would not open talks on accession until Turkey aligns its patterns of CMR with European best standard practices (Progress Report, 2005, p. 14).

To conclude, the international \textit{zeitgeist} of the post-Cold War era has not only triggered increased international reaction to coups but also endorsed the importance of democratic civilian control over armed forces. The broadening and deepening of international security understandings; the changing nature of conflict, such as intrastate wars and the dynamics of fragile and failed states; the use of democratic control norms as interstate confidence-building measures, such as in the case of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security; the enlargements of the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe, with their respective democratic control-related admission requirements; and the transformation of NATO and national militaries from conventional war fighters to peace building and peace-keeping actors all highlighted the importance of security sector governance to the Euro-Atlantic security community and brought democratic-control norms to the forefront.

On the global scale, Huntington (1991) argues that “demonstration effects” largely influenced the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and had an impact on democratizing efforts in Asia and Africa. This wave of democracy, which had its beginning in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, provides evidence of the significant impact communication has across state borders. A “snowball” effect occurs as a function of transnational influences or interactions and of geographical proximity. On the whole, the international context of

\(^{39}\) The conditions set out at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 include: “1-Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. 2-Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 3-Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”.

\(^{40}\) Commission’s final document: Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, can be found at: http://aei.pitt.edu/3137/1/3137.pdf
democratization in South America is considered much less auspicious than it has been in Europe. International condemnation of the military regimes and support for the democratic opposition from West have nevertheless played an important, albeit secondary, role in the demilitarization process of South and Central America (Aguero, 1995, p. 244). Scott Mainwaring and Anibal Perez-Linan’s forthcoming study presented statistical analysis showing the important influence of transnational effects on the rise and fall of regimes in Latin America over the period of 1900-2010.

Regional political factors had the most powerful influence but US foreign policy also played a role (quoted in Kellogg Institute, 2012, p. 9). When US policy was favorable toward democracy, the likelihood of transitions increased and the likelihood of breakdowns in democratic transition decreased. The military’s declining political engagement in El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, and Guatemala, for example, is explained on the basis of President Carter’s human rights policy and his willingness to use military and economic assistance as levers to pressure the militaries of these countries to withdraw to the barracks (Danopoulos, 1988, p. 16; Sundhaussen, 1984, p. 547). Needler similarly underlines “the critical importance of the international climate of opinion” in promoting military withdrawal in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil (1980, p. 623). Further, “a large part of this climate of opinion is determined by the attitude of the US government. The pro-constitutional position of the US government encourages civilian opponent of military regimes and causes military officers themselves to question their continuance in power” (Ibid.).

The diminishing hegemonic role of the Soviet Union in the satellite countries and the increasing role of the EU were the most important variables in determining the outcomes of regional democratization in West European periphery. Geographic proximity to West (Kopstein and Reilly 2000), or more broadly linkage to the West (Levitsky and Way, 2005), is often considered to have played an important and even decisive role in shaping post-Cold War regime trajectories in Europe. In essence, it is argued that external actors exert strong influence only if an asymmetrical power-relationship and a high degree of interdependence are in place – that is, if leverage is high, and linkages are dense. As a result, military political activism faced a particularly unfavorable atmosphere in Europe. The dense ties stemming from regional proximity, shared histories or socio-economic development, (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) raised the costs of authoritarian behaviour in West Europe’s periphery. The literature suggests that Western linkage is most effective when combined with extensive leverage as in the case of most
CEE, as well as Turkey (Levitsky and Way, 2005, pp. 26-27).

Mechanisms of leverage and linkage have found to be far more strongly institutionalized in the Trans-Atlantic security community than in other multilateral institutions, such as the OAS and AU. The democratic control conditionality of the EU and NATO, along with their monitoring and sanctioning capacities, reinforced external pressure on civil-military reform in trans-Atlantic security community. Detailed annual reviews of compliance with democratic conditionality are also reinforced in the Trans-Atlantic security community by a dense network of regional and international organizations, including the OSCE, and the CoE. Thus, "political monitoring of applicant countries is really perpetual" (Pridham, 2002, p. 207). The EU in particular is considered to have “transformative power” over potential applicant states (Grabbe, 2006). Its active leverage over candidate states has been the “causal behemoth” of transnational influence on the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe (Vachudova, 2008, p.19). The enhanced Western linkage and leverage in Central Europe and the (real and perceived) benefits of EU membership created strong incentives to democratize and pursue reform.

H1: Post-cold war transatlantic security structure creates a favorable opportunity structure for civilian governments to exert greater influence over military through mechanisms of power shifts and negative feedbacks.

2.3.2 Domestic Opportunity Structure

The section above discussed the various international factors that open a window of opportunity for military’s political participation or disengagement. The present section now turns to focus on those domestic structural factors, which shape the motivations and behaviour of military. Conditions advantageous to democratic consolidation such as high socio-economic development, strong civil society, and socio-political stability are also conditions favoring the military’s disengagement from politics. The literature suggests that the armed forces are more likely to disengage from politics when strong political leadership emerges, economic conditions improve, a government enjoys popular support, and civilian support for the military declines (Thompson, 1975a, p. 471). We can therefore argue that the strength of civilian leadership, the nature of civil-military alliances, and the level of military’s popular support partially determine domestic political opportunity structures (Huntington, 1968; Finer, 1988). The section below elaborates each factor.

Socio-political Instability and Weak Political Leadership

Traditionally, the problem of the coup d’état has been viewed as a weakness of
governmental institutions and leadership (Thompson 1975). Military interventions tend to occur when democratic institutions fail to settle political crises, cope with security threats, and address major social and economic concerns. The military enters the resulting "political vacuum" in order either to force a popularly desired change of government or to save a crisis-ridden political system (Danopoulos, 1992, pp. 4-5; Thompson 1975). According to the theory of praetorian politics developed by Huntington, coup-proneness typically is the result of “political systems with low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation” (1968, p. 80). Military coups, in other words, often reflect the failure of political institutions to channel participation into nonviolent patterns (Belkin 2005, p. 18).

Huntington elaborates on this idea in his seminal study of “Political Order in Changing Societies”. Huntington holds that "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society” (1968, p. 194). Huntington considers the military’s political activism as characteristic of the weak, institutionalized praetorian polities in which not only the military but all sorts of social forces such as labor unions, businessman, clergy, and universities engage in politics. “Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, and political corporations” (Ibid). What causes such groups to become politicized is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating political action. In the absence of effective political institutions “each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, mobs demonstrate, and the military coup” (p. 196). Military interventions are therefore nothing but a “specific manifestation” of “systemic frustration” (p. 55) that stems from “the general politicization of social forces and institutions” (p. 194). In sum, an absence of political institutions and leaders capable of ameliorating conflict between various social forces creates favorable conditions for a military intervention.

Civilian leadership and performance is, therefore, considered central in the establishment of civilian supremacy in third-wave democracies (Fitch, 1998 p. 75). It is often argued that military intervention in politics only takes place when civilian governments prove unable to govern effectively. Even when officers are politically ambitious, military intervention normally follows the failure of civilian governments to preserve political stability and achieve satisfactory growth. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s statements support this: “If politics voluntarily leaves
an opening, someone will fill it. In this regard, the strongest one [to fill the gap] is the Armed Forces.” He went on to say that the TAF’s informal involvement in Turkish politics was not a problem residing in the military, but rather demonstrated the weakness of politics (Quoted in Yildiz, 2007 p. 54).

This failure leads to a loss of legitimacy, which makes governments susceptible to forceful change. The failure of civilian regimes thus provides not only a motive for intervention but also the opportunity, and therefore fits explicitly into this section’s discussion of structural factors creating conditions pulling the military into engagement. Conversely, an effective civilian government that successfully controls security threats, manages the economy, and maintains its legitimacy constrains the military’s room to maneuver. The following hypothesis can be then offered:

\[ H2: \text{Strong civilian leadership increases the likelihood of military’s disengagement from politics.} \]

**Socio-economic Development Path and Economic Crises**

Another relatively consistent finding to emerge from several decades of scholarly studies of militarism is its association with economic crises and dependent development. Huber Stephens outlines the effects of dependent development on class structure, and on the power balance both within civil society itself and between civil society and the state.

First, its effects on the class structure produced a smaller and weaker working class and thus cast the middle classes into a more prominent role among the subordinate classes. This meant weaker pressures for full democratization, as the middle classes primarily sought their own inclusion…. Second, high vulnerability to external shocks and limited control over the domestic economy afforded only small room for manoeuvre to any government, but the lack of options to deal with economic problems was particularly damaging to the legitimacy of democratic governments. …Third, alliances of elites, or sectors of elites, with foreign economic interests, and strong dependence of the state on foreign support in the form of military and economic aid gave these foreign actors significant influence on domestic politics. The effects of this were primarily negative for democracy because for these foreign actors, like for their domestic allies, their own economic and political interests clearly outweighed any interest in promoting democracy (1988, pp. 70-71).

In most cases, the breakdowns of democratic regimes occurred in situations of acute economic problems and were clearly related to the problems of dependent development. This was the case in Chile 1924 and 1973; Argentina in 1930, 1951, 1966, and 1976; Uruguay in 1933 and 1973; Bolivia in 1964 and Brazil in 1964 (Huber, 1988, p. 56). O’Donnell (1975) similarly
argues it was an acute socio-economic crisis that triggered the military-controlled bureaucratic authoritarian state in Argentina (1966-73 and 1976-83), Brazil (1964-85), Chile (1973-1990), and Uruguay (1973-1985). According to O’Donnell, several key factors paved the way for the formation of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime with the dual objectives of "normalizing" the economy and "neutralizing" the political threat. These factors include: 1) an economic crisis, originating from the exhaustion of the "easy" stage of the import-substitute industrialization; 2) a socio-political crisis, associated with the increased "level of threat" posed by the politically activated urban popular sector, and 3) the formation of informal alliances composed of civilian technocrats, internationalized bourgeoisie, exporting groups, and foreign capital to counter the popular mobilization. Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes are, therefore, distinguished by the severe repression of opposition, particularly of the labour movement, social-democratic/leftist parties, and other social sectors whose prior mobilization seemed to threaten the existing political and economic system. Other distinctive traits of this regime type are the rule of military as an institution – in contrast to the personalistic rule of individual officers – its technocratic nature of policy-making, and a shift generated by those in power toward a neo-liberal economic regime.

The implications of these findings outlined above suggest that systems with low levels of socio-economic development and system experiencing socio-economic crises and economic deterioration are more prone to coups. Conversely, good economic performance and sustainable development are more likely to generate forces for the military to withdraw from politics. These ideas regarding levels and nature of economic development therefore lead us to suggest that:

\[H3: \text{Strong economic performance of civilian administrations increases the likelihood of the military’s disengagement from politics}\]

**Civilian Support, Civil-Military Coalitions and Political Culture**

Closely related to O’Donnell and Huber’s emphasis on the formation of civil-military alliances, several scholars have underlined the importance of civilian appeals to the military for the formation of a coup coalition and the actual execution of coups in Latin America (Stepan 1971; O’Donnell 1975). Such appeals to the military were frequent during the period of restricted democracy in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru where various elite sectors lacked strong parties as instruments to protect their interests (Huber, 1988, p. 48). The Brazilian coup was, similarly “enthusiastically supported by most of the Brazilian media”, as well as by bar associations and religious organizations (Skidmore, 1988, p. 27).

Despite the common perception of the bourgeoisie as a democratizing force (Moore,
the empirical research on late-industrialized countries show that authoritarian military regimes have often been established with the support of bourgeoisie (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens; 1992, p. 271). As O'Donnell (1973) explains, the perceived threat from the left – coupled with the economic crisis associated with the exhaustion of the initial/"easy" stage of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and the need to control labor in order to permit greater accumulation for a capital goods sector – led business elites to support the formation of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes coups in much of Latin America. The position of business elites was similar in Central America (Howard, 2002). Huber argues:

Intra-elite struggles and the weakness of civil society caused civilian groups to appeal to factions of the military for intervention on their behalf. Dissident elite sectors and the emerging middle classes appealed for military support in their efforts to gain a share of political power, and the ruling groups frequently relied on the military to squash such challenges. Consequently, the anti-oligarchic democratizing alliance often included military officers. (1988, p.45-46)

Many scholars recognize that the military’s decision to intervene in politics is a function of the military’s ability to justify the action, and thus depend on popular support for a military action (Wiking 1983; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Finer 1988, Powell 2012). The relevant literature posits that when civil society is weak, and when neither the public and nor the elites believe that the state is legitimate, there may be little to deter the armed forces from staging a coup (Hibbs, 1973; Huntington, 1968; Finer, 1988; Luttwak, 1968). In his analysis of 108 countries between 1948 and 1967, Hibbs reaches the conclusion that “institutionalization alone has a negative impact on coups…. Weakly institutionalized societies, then, are far more likely than those with highly developed institutions to suffer . . . political interventions by the military” (1973, p. 102).

Samuel Finer (1962) in his seminal work “The Man on Horseback” argued that the non-military roles adopted by militaries were not solely based on the military internal factors, but equally on the broader political culture, which provides varying levels of legitimacy to the military’s political activism. Finer outlines four types of political culture – mature, developed, low, and minimal – distinguished by varying degrees of the public’s acceptance and participation to civilian institutions. The level of political culture is considered “mature” when: 1) the political formula justifying the ruler's right to rule is widely accepted; 2) the political system's civil procedures and organs are widely recognized as worthy of authority; and 3) the public's participation and loyalty to the political system's institutions are intense and widespread (p. 87).
In Finer’s scheme, military coups are only characteristic of “low” and “minimal” level political cultures where the three conditions listed above prevail in a weak or extremely weak fashion.

All of these suggest that countries with weakly organized societies in which civilian appeals to the military are often, tend to be more prone to military coups. A military finds it more difficult to push for non-democratic prerogatives and to resist government polices when the government is visibly backed by a wide array of electorally strong political forces (Aguero, 1995, p. 236; 1997, p. 192). The above discussion of civilian support leads to the suggestion that:

\[ H4: \text{Low popular support for military action increases the likelihood of military's disengagement from politics} \]

2.3.3 Organizational Motives

The sections above discussed the various international and domestic opportunity structures that serve to “pull” the military into or out of politics. This section now turns to a discussion of organizational variables that predispose the military to act in particular directions by creating motivations to either engage or disengage. The review of literature of CMR shows that military role beliefs conducive to civilian supremacy and a lack of institutional unity regarding a military’s corporate interests, mission, and role form the military motives that predispose the military to either return to its barracks or stage an intervention. The section below reviews each variable.

Military Role Beliefs

Military role beliefs are generally considered to be the most important organizational factor shaping officer corps’ predisposition to intervene. Narrowly speaking, role beliefs refer to “military conceptions of their role in politics”; broadly, they include “the entire complex of attitudes that define officers’ normative models of civil-military relations” (Fitch, 1998, p. 61). Samuel Huntington’s (1957) theory of military professionalism is the most well-known work in CMR theory that stresses the cultural/ethical code of the military as a key variable in shaping a military’s propensity to intervene in politics. According to Huntington, an ethical code defines the military’s responsibilities toward and its relationship with other elements of society; the essence of this code is its insistence on individual and collective subordination to higher authority and its opposition to intervention in matters outside its sphere of professional expertise. “Military ethics….holds that war is the instrument of politics, that the military are the instrument of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism” (Huntington, 1957, p. 79). According to Huntington, a professional military is apolitical with respect to the
question of who rules, and “stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state” (1957, pp. 83-84).

Although empirical evidence of professional officer corps’ political activism conflicted with Huntington’s straightforward and somewhat tautological association of military professionalism with apolitical military, his emphasis on “the ethic that governs the relationship between civilians and the military” is considered to be the basis of the military’s disposition to intervene (Bland, 2004, p. 30; Feaver, 1999, p. 226; Fitch 1977; 1998; Nunn, 1976, 1983, 1995). Finer, for example, argued that “the firm acceptance of civil supremacy, not just professionalism, is the truly effective check” of a military’s subordination to political authority (1962, p. 30). Similarly, Robert Dahl finds military role beliefs as key to establishing polyarchy:

Where the military is relatively large, centralized, and hierarchical, as it is in most countries today, polyarchy is of course impossible unless the military is sufficiently depoliticized to permit civilian rule… the crucial intervening factor, clearly, is one of beliefs… the point to be made here is simple and obvious: the chances for polyarchy today are directly dependent on the strength of certain beliefs, not only among civilians, but among all ranks of the military [Emphasis added] (1971, p. 50)

Students of civil-military relations in Latin America argue that “the professionalization of many South American armies at the beginning of the twentieth century helped the military institutions to elaborate the idea that they constituted not only the main defense of national territorial integrity, but were the main protectors of inalienable national values” (Silva, 2001, p. 4). These historical role beliefs of defending “la patria” (the nation or fatherland) against both internal and external threats motivate militaries to participate in politics when they perceive that governments have put la patria in risk (Loveman, 1999). Loveman argues that this military role belief, which is also shared by large segment of society, provides an immutable mission for the armed forces as the guardians of la patria, despite the international and domestic “democratization fad” that slowly whittled away other prerogatives and economic privileges. According to Loveman (1999, pp. 258-281), while international circumstances, particularly the apparent widely shared consensus on democracy and the lack of internal support for renewed military government, prevent the armed forces from direct intervention, the continuity of military role beliefs as well as normative and legal foundations for protected democracy and military guardianship enable the military to remain a political actor.

Huntington argues, however, that the norms of military professionalism and civilian control are increasingly being accepted worldwide (1995, pp. 12-13). Political and military
leaders have come to recognize that the institutionalization of what Huntington calls “objective civilian control” serves the interests of both sets of actors. Military officials, having learned through their experience in power that many economic, social, and political problems have no easy solution, understand that the demands of political involvement have undermined the military’s own coherence, efficiency, and discipline. In Stepan's (1989) terms, sustained involvement in politics sacrifices the military-as-institution to the military-as-government, which is, according to Huntington, one reason why so many military regimes in Latin America voluntarily surrendered power.

Although the extent to which officer corps in different parts of the world changed their role beliefs remains contested, there is a scholarly consensus that the internalization of the norm of civilian supremacy by military officers decreases the likelihood of the military’s political activism. Sundhaussen expresses this widely accepted assumption: “military leaders may be favorably disposed toward withdrawing because they believe that a democratic order, which invariably includes the principle of civilian supremacy over the military, is basically desirable” (1984, p. 548). Finer concurs that “armed forces may favor abdication because they subscribe to the doctrine of civil supremacy”, as was the case for the Ghanaian military in 1966 and the Turkish military in 1961 (Finer 1985, p. 23). Based on the literature reviewed thus far, the following hypothesis can then be generated:

H5: Military role beliefs conducive to civilian supremacy create motives for military’s disengagement in politics.

Organizational Unity and Internal Cohesion

According to Finer (1962), the political strength of the military derives from its capacity for organizational cohesion. Cohesion, “the bonding together of members of a unit or organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission”, affects the ability of officer to intervene in domestic politics and to produce stable leadership (Lee, 2005, p. 84). Unity as political resource is measured in the military by the extent to which definitions of institutional interests, mission, and role are shared by the officer corps and particularly by the top hierarchies. Actors’ perceptions about their own relative capacities are strongly influenced by the extent of their internal unity. If the military wants to pursue a more assertive strategy it needs to cultivate internal consensus. It can be then concluded “perceived threat to the cohesion” or “the existence of political and ideological difference into the armed forces can impede their cohesiveness and capacity to carry a successful take-over and may
provide another motivation for disengagement” (Finer, 1975).

Armies with high internal cohesion generally have a greater capacity to organize and are therefore more likely to intervene (Janowitz, 1964, p. 29; 1977, p. 105; also see Taylor, 2003, pp. 13-14; Aguero 1995, pp.12-13; Welch and Smith, 1974, p. 14). Some, however, have argued in contrast that factionalized militaries are more prone to coups, at least in Africa (Kposowa and Jenkins, 1993). These scholars argue that the growth of internal cleavages, inter-service rivalries, training school loyalties, and ethnic tensions stemming from colonial staffing policies have created tensions within military establishments and increased the coup frequency in Africa.

As demonstrated above the relationship between cohesion and likelihood of military intervention is clearly contested in the literature. There is, however, scholarly consensus regarding the negative relationship between cohesion and military withdrawal from politics. One of the most widely accepted generalizations about transitions in Latin America was that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 19). Detailed case studies of several early Latin American transitions from military rule in particular demonstrate that these transitions also usually begin with splits within the ruling elite – in this case the military elite (Geddes, 1999, p. 120). Insoo Kim’s 2012 study on the South Korean military similarly demonstrates how the lack of intra-military cohesion resulted in the military’s inability to block the transition to democracy. A highly politicized system of military reshuffling under South Korea’s military rule (1979-1993) had created discontented officers who came to see political transition to democracy as a viable means of replacing those in power.

The literature on CMR, therefore, suggests that the military’s inherent power as an armed forces institution is vastly deflated politically unless it is able to display high levels of unity and internal consensus regarding institutional interests, mission, and role. A politician’s capacity to undertake measures detrimental to the armed forces’ relative power politics is, therefore, enhanced to the extent that the military does not form a united front opposing the measures in question (Hunter, 1997, p. 12; Augero 1995, pp. 12-13). It may plausibly be concluded then that a highly cohesive military will have greater success in carrying out a successful coup d’état and consequently less motivation to disengage from politics out of a fear of coup failure (Hunter, 1997, p. 12; Augero 1995, pp. 12-13). The following hypothesis thus derives from the discussion presented above:

H6: Lack of institutional cohesion regarding the military’s interests and role creates


motives for the military’s disengagement from politics.

Corporate interests

Corporate interests – i.e., the desire to protect or enhance the armed forces’ resources or position” – is often considered as another motivation for the military’s involvement in politics (Needler 1987, Nordlinger 1977, Perlmutter 1977). Nordlinger argues, for instance, “the great majority of coups, are partly, primarily, or entirely motivated by the defense or enactment of the military’s corporate interests” (1977, p. 78). Colton agrees that officers in Soviet Union “intervene against civilian authorities when their perceived interests are being denied or threatened by civilian policy” (1979, p. 240). The empirical evidence, however, suggests otherwise. William Thompson’s extensive statistical study encompassing 274 military coups that took place in 59 states between 1946 and 1970, for example, shows that corporate grievances played a role only about 43% of the coups (1973, pp. 50-51). Thompson also showed that the types of military grievances present in the instances of coups are also evident in states that do not experience military interventions; grievances alone, therefore, cannot explain a military’s propensity for undertaking a coup. In his survey of Ecuadorian coup participants, Fitch (1977) similarly demonstrated that the interests of the military constitute neither constant nor unanimous factors in coup decisions. Indeed, if threats to the armed forces’ institutional interests were a sufficient condition for military intervention, coups would occur all the time in all parts of the world.

There is also a weak relationship between a military’s material corporate interests and coups. Gary Zuk and William Thompson (1982) found that military regimes do not increase the size of their budgets following a coup. Growth in military spending of military regimes is not distinctive compared with that of mixed and civilian regimes. Even more interestingly, “the greatest decline in proportional military spending took place within the military regime group” (Zuk and Thompson, 1982, p. 66). As a result, Zuk and Thompson concluded that there was little support for the hypothesis that military coups accelerated the growth of military expenditures and, consequently, little empirical evidence to support a theory positing that militaries sought primarily to defend and advance their material corporate interests (pp.71-72).

The literature on CMR suggests instead that most professional officers place a higher value on the survival and effectiveness of the military itself than on anything else (Janowitz 1960 and 1977; Finer 1975; Geddes, 1999, p. 126). Officers also value the territorial integrity of their
nations and internal order, but the effective pursuit of these goals requires unity, discipline, and sufficient resources (Stepan 1971; Nordlinger 1977). In cases where military coups produce military regimes, Barbara Geddes (1999) has argued that corporate interests push the military back to the barracks, creating factions and splits within the leadership. Danopoulos (1988, 1992) also maintains that if circumstances render it more beneficial to the corporate interests of the organization, i.e. maintenance of power and autonomy, the military would opt to withdraw from politics. According to Danopoulos, (1992, p. 13) two related institutional concerns seem to predispose the military to withdraw: 1) extended direct rule/political engagement of the military can damage its prestige, social standing, and internal cohesion; and 2) the armed forces can best protect their corporate interests from the barracks by acting as a respected institutional actor rather than a political actor. The Brazilian, Peruvian, and Panamanian military regimes, for example, disengaged in the 1980s to protect the image of the military institution in their respective countries. The officers in these militaries felt that prolonging their stay in power through the use of brute force would harm the interests and image of the armed forces and therefore pushed for withdrawal and restoration of civilian rule (Danopoulos, 1988, pp. 18-19).

Based on the above discussion of the role of corporate interests in militaries’ decision to engage in or disengage from politics, the following hypothesis is therefore suggested:

\[ H7: \text{Corporate interests create motives for the military’s disengagement from politics when the military leadership realizes that it can best protect its corporate interests from the barracks by acting as a respected institutional actor rather than a political actor.} \]

To conclude so far, the review of literature of civil-military relations shows that military role beliefs conducive to civilian supremacy and a lack of institutional unity regarding a military’s corporate interests, mission, and role form the military motives that predispose the military to either return to its barracks or stage an intervention. These predispositions are then shaped by political opportunity structures. Conditions advantageous to democratic consolidation are also conditions favoring the military’s disengagement from politics. The literature suggests that the armed forces are more likely to disengage from politics when strong political leadership emerges, economic conditions improve, and civilian support for the military declines. We can therefore conclude that the strength of political leadership and the level of military’s popular support partially determine domestic political opportunity structures.

However, domestic political opportunity structures are also impacted by factors present in the structure of the international state system. The proliferation of new nations and ideologies in
the 20th century combined with the superpower rivalry of the Cold War had created a favorable atmosphere for militaries to intervene without international sanction. In contrast, the 21st century witnesses the rise of discourse of liberal democracy and the emergence of norms of democratic control of armed forces. Combining with international conditionality of reform, this changes the domestic balance of power in favor of civilians and thereby creates a favorable atmosphere for military’s disengagement from politics in the post-Cold War era.

Having completed this chapter’s review of the organizational and structural factors shaping militaries’ decisions either to intervene in politics or return to their barracks, the following chapter examines the historically-constructed, path-dependent development of Turkey’s civil-military relations from the 1920s until the end of 1980s. To provide an understanding of the Turkish military’s institutional culture, Chapter 3 first discusses the formation and impact of historical/cultural legacies on the military and public’s mindset. The second part of the chapter analyzes the reasons, processes, and outcomes of Turkish military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, concluding that from a historical institutionalist perspective the Turkish armed forces was well positioned to shape Turkish politics the post-transition (1983) period.
HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND THE GUARDIANS OF THE REPUBLIC

The previous chapter reviewed the literature relevant to understanding shifts in civil-military relations in general and advanced an explanation accounting for both the internal organizational factors providing the military with motivation to intervene in politics as well as the structural and international factors that provide windows of opportunity conducive for doing so. This section applies this organizational-structural approach to explain the Turkish military’s political engagement during the Cold War era.

This chapter argues that the emergence of dynamically autonomous civil and military bureaucrats in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century laid the groundwork for the establishment of Modern Turkish Republic in the beginning of the 20th century. It argues that the Turkish army’s active contribution to the Turkish revolution during the nation-state building period and the subsequent institutionalization of the military’s guardianship role has led to “self-reinforcing, path-dependent” development of the military’s role in politics. Adopting Mustafa Kemal’s modernizing public philosophy and socialized into considering itself the guardian of the Republic, the Turkish military felt legally obligated to intervene several times when the country seemed to be undergoing a democratic governability crisis. After each intervention, the generals restructured state-society relation and enhanced their institutional autonomy and political influence. The military’s power, however, derived not only from the formal prerogatives that it maintained, but even more so from its strong bond with society, which is legitimated and reproduced by two important historical/cultural legacies. These legacies not only reinforce the privileged status of Turkish military in the public’s mind, but shape military identity, and thus, behavior.

The first section discusses these legacies and their impact on military and public mindset. The second part of the chapter demonstrates that Turkey’s military coups have typically occurred during a political crisis and enjoyed the support of different segments of civil and political society. The nature of the crises, the alliances that made the military intervention possible, the fraction of the military that intervened and the outcomes of military rule all varied considerably, however. The military interventions in Turkey, this chapter argues, were driven by the struggle of socio-political actors in a process over-determined by the dominant international security regime, which includes not only hard security but also soft security structures, i.e. industrialization/accumulation regimes dominant in the capitalist-world. The chapter shows that
the coups in 1971 and 1980 received not only approval but also active support from all segments of the bourgeoisie and Islamists, while the economically and politically strongest capitalist faction and secularists/modernists supported the 1960 and 1997 interventions. The military’s changing policies and allies, demonstrating the embedding of the military institution into domestic and international power structures, refutes the common wisdom of a center-periphery thesis that views the Turkish military as a static institution that stands above society and acts independently of it (Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1973). The chapter concludes by arguing that Turkey’s mode of transition in the 1980s positioned the armed forces to remain a decisive actor in Turkish politics the post-transition (1983) period.

**Deconstructing the Guardians of the Turkish Republic**

This study considers the Turkish military as a purposive, bureaucratic, and hierarchical organization acting under structural and cultural constraints. It argues that the military’s preferences and strategies are context-dependent, shaped not only by international and domestic contextual factors, but also by its internal organizational culture. This study contends that organizational beliefs and norms not only constrain the Turkish Armed Forces’ behavior, but also define its self-image and preferences by providing “moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action” (Hall and Taylor, 2001, p.939). This means that the Turkish Armed Forces, as any other organizational actor, responds to objective conditions through the mediation of institutional orientations including normative, cognitive, and evaluative elements (Almond and Verba 1963, Eckstein 1988). This study therefore adheres to the view that organizational behavior is driven not simply by narrowly-defined material self interests but also by belief systems and normative ideas that “define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations” (March and Olsen 1989, 1998). In deciding what kind of action to take, institutional actors determine what the situation is, what institutional role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role are in the given situation (Ibid). Explaining military behavior therefore requires not only an understanding of the context of action but also the military’s institutional culture, and more specifically the institutional role beliefs and norms that motivate it to act in certain ways. Based on these considerations, this chapter begins with an analysis of the historically and culturally constructed military norms and role beliefs shaping the Turkish

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41 In this study organizational culture refers to the set of “central, enduring, and distinctive” beliefs and normative ideas held by an institution that help its members make sense of the world and orient their choices. See: Albert and Whetten, 1985; March and Olsen, 1989; 1998.
military’s political and ideational preferences.

### 3.1 Historical Legacies and Path-dependent Development of Turkey’s CMR

A review of Turkish literature and military discourses suggests that Turkish military embodies two widely-shared but contradictory role beliefs: the legacy of the military as a “modernizer” and the military's self-perception as “the guardian of the state”. These two legacies derive from the Turkish Revolution and the extraordinary leadership of Commander Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1923-1938). It was during this nation-building process that the military’s organizational culture, institutional identity and interests took shape. This process of identity-building evolved in three distinct ways. First, the leadership role that the military officers played during the nation-building process caused the officer corps to identify themselves as the guardians of the Republic and its core principles and values. Their active politico-military role made the Turkish officers see themselves as the fundamental nucleus of the state that was responsible to protect the Republic that their predecessors had created. This prevalent role belief was expressed by General Tuncer Kilinc:

> The Turkish Republic was established with a revolution. The revolutionary cadre was predominantly composed of military officers led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends. Although the civilian wing contributed to the revolution, generally the armed forces was the leading force. The TAF, therefore, has always felt obliged to look after the Turkish Republic, which was formed by its predecessors as a revolution (Author’s interview, Ankara, 2008).

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The military officers were the central agents in the establishment and institutionalization of the modern Turkish Republic, not only as the guardians of the Turkish Revolution but also politically via the parliament. When the General National Assembly (GNA) opened on 23 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal was its speaker and the military was the largest single occupational or interest group with 56 seats, constituting 15% of the elected deputies (Frey, 1965, p. 181). From the Second through the Seventh Assemblies, a period of some thirty years, retired military officers consistently held 20% of the seats (Frey, 1965, p. 181). Moreover the military was in most cases the largest occupational contingent at the top leadership level and was more over-represented at that level than any comparable group (Frey, 1965, p. 261). The military thus actively contributed to the Turkish Revolution not only as the coercive arm of the newly establishing state, but, with Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, as the force institutionalizing the modern Turkish Republic with an aim “to reach contemporary levels of civilization”.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as the President of the Republic, granted several privileges to
serving officers in order to avert their counter-revolutionary potential and make them subordinate to his radical reform agenda. Already during the National Independence War, four senior commanders\textsuperscript{42} had indicated that although they wholeheartedly supported the independence struggle, they did not always agree with Mustafa Kemal’s radical Westernization and secularization agenda. Some less prominent military officers had openly opposed Mustafa Kemal and joined the so-called “Second Group”, which had been organized in parliament to oppose the former’s predominance. Under such growing opposition, Mustafa Kemal opted to get the support of the serving officers by conducting two-months of intensive contact with the Chief of the General Staff and other key military officers in the Izmir War Games of 1924. Only after obtaining the consent of the military High Command, Mustafa Kemal abolished the religious office of the caliphate and removed the Chief of the General Staff from the Cabinet, appointing him the head of a General Directorate attached directly to the presidential office.

The establishment of a General Directorate was therefore a result of a tacit agreement made between political and military leaders (Harris, 1965; Rustow, 1964). The two most important commanders of the Independence War, Mustafa Kemal and Fevzi Cakmak (then the chief of the General Staff), agreed on the separation of military and political matters. The armed forces would be the sole authority in defense and military matters in exchange for its political subordination to Mustafa Kemal’s radical reform agenda. In the words of Rustow “the withdrawal of the military from politics was archived by command of general headquarters in return for a reciprocal withdrawal of politicians from military affairs” (1964, p. 381).

The subordination of the Military High Command was put to the test in the fall of 1924, when Atatürk confronted his military opponents during the conflict between Britain and Turkey over the Mosul question. Parliamentary opposition, gathered around the above-mentioned Commanders of the Independence War, favored a hard line approach over Mosul. The possibility of dissemination of this resentment within the officer corps motivated M. Kemal to request a review of the status of commanders who had not resigned from parliament in the hopes of ending their dual role (Harris, 1965, pp. 58-59). The generals who sided with M. Kemal, including Marshal Cakmak and other senior commanders, left parliament and retained their military assignments. The dissidents, who preferred to retain their legislative seats, resigned from their

\textsuperscript{42} These senior commanders included the Commander of Eastern Army of the Ottoman Empire, Kazim Karabekir, Commander of Land Forces, Ali Fuat Cebeşoy Southwestern Front Commander Refet Bele, and Naval Forces Commander Rauf Orbay.
army command and formed the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) in November 1924, the first organized opposition under the Republic.

In the new party, the commanders of the National Independence War maintained the central posts.\(^{43}\) The new party criticized M. Kemal's increasing tendency toward authoritarian leadership and opposed the abolition of the caliphate.\(^{44}\) The PRP soon became a strong voice for the opposition supported by the conservative-Islamist and pro-status-quo parts of society.

This growing military-associated opposition raised concerns within Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). Soon thereafter, the PRP was closed under the pretext of the Kurdish-Islamist Seyh Sait rebellion that erupted in eastern Anatolia in February 1925. A final blow to this military-associated opposition came in June 1926 with the discovery of an attempt on Ataturk’s life in Izmir. 22 former members of the PRP were arrested, including the most important four generals, on charges of planning to assassinate Ataturk in Izmir on 15 June 1926. Although the generals were quickly released, this incident had the effect of removing from the political scene nearly all military leaders whose personal and political stature could have enabled them to influence serving officers. The commanders from the National Independence War never again openly challenged the president (Hale, 1994, p. 76), demonstrating the lasting effect of the Kemalist regime’s consolidation and the total loyalty of the army to Mustafa Kemal’s rule and his radical reform agenda.

Thus far, this section has demonstrated that during the formative years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal wanted to curtail the potential of the military as a rival source of power to challenge his reformist agenda. By barring serving army officers from parliament, Mustafa Kemal ensured that the army would not participate in the daily political affairs of the state. This did not mean, however, that civilian democratic control over the armed forces was established. At the regional level in particular the military continued to play an important role, combining its military posts with the governorship of frontier provinces, much as it had in Ottoman days. The proclamation of states of siege for important regions and prolonged periods (e.g., the Kurdish

\(^{43}\) Kazim Karabekir took his place as chairman, Ali Fuat Cebesoy as secretary-general, Rauf Orbay as vice-chairman, and Refer Bele and Cafer Egilmez as members of the new party.
\(^{44}\) The PRP accepted the Republican form government, liberalism, and democracy as its basic principles (Articles 1,2). The PRP’s liberalism aimed particularly at protecting religion from the interference of a government (Karpat, 1959, p.46). The founders of the party were against the closing of religious schools and the abolition of caliphate For them, the timing of the abolition of the caliphate was improper. They believed that it should not be abolished before solving the problem of Mosul (Ozdag, 2006).
provinces after the uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s and Istanbul during WWII) similarly put regional army commanders in charge of civil administration. Perhaps most importantly, the constitutional and legal arrangements made in the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions granted the Turkish military bureaucracy a privileged status within the state structure that shaped the path-dependent development of the military as an institution.

The establishment of the General Directorate of General Staff on 3 March 1924 constituted the first step of the establishment of the autonomy of the armed forces. One of the most significant prerogatives of the Turkish Armed Forces at the eve of the new century is the Chief of General Staff’s privileged status within the state structure and substantial authority in the defense area. A detailed historical analysis shows that the roots of this prerogative go back to Law No. 429, which was adopted immediately after Ataturk’s two-months of intensive contact with the military leaders in the Izmir War Games of 1924 (Harris 1965; Rustow 1964). This law transforming the Minister of General Staff into the Chief of General Staff was supposed to remove the army from politics. In actuality, however, this change made the military establishment directly responsible to Ataturk alone, largely bypassing the Minister of Defense, who, rather than exercising authority over the armed forces, was to serve principally as a channel for the communication of the military’s views to the government and the parliament. While the General Staff was authorized to determine the programs, principles and priorities related to military policies and budget, the Minister of Defense, who had no authority to question the allocation of resources within the defense ministry, was designated as responsible to the parliament for the military budget (Bayramoglu, 2005, pp. 68-69). In many respects, this new arrangement to create a military establishment directly responsible to the President rested on the personality of Marshal Fevzi Cakmak and was maintained only through his 20-year tour as Chief of the General Staff (Ozdag, 1991, p. 58). The appointment of Cakmak, whose loyalty to Ataturk was unquestioned, added confidence that the armed forces would not use their independence to challenge Ataturk’s supremacy (Ibid).

The second regulation that significantly reinforced the army’s autonomous and powerful

45 Under 1921 constitution, when Turkey’s was having its War of Independence, the Chief of General Staff was holding a ministry post in the Cabinet. There was no hierarchy existed between the Ministry of National Defense and the Chief of General Staff; both were ministers in the Grand National Assembly. This continued for nearly four years, beginning with the formation of the First Cabinet Council (the Republic’s first government, established May 3, 1920) and ending with establishment of the 1924 Constitution by the Sixth Cabinet Council (October 29, 1923 – March 6, 1924). Harris 1965; Rustow 1964.
decision-making position within the defense structure was the Law of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) No. 638, passed on 26 February 1925. With this law the Supreme Military Council, which was predominantly composed of military members, would be able to discuss and make national defense decisions within the political, administrative, financial and military fields. It would appoint and promote all high ranked commanders and examine the national defense budget and all military laws and proposals related to important army matters before they were sent to Parliament (Article 1). The delegation of such broad responsibilities warranted a consultative function to the Council, further enhancing the military’s institutional autonomy in the defense sector. The foundation of the Supreme Military Council can therefore be considered as the genesis of the tendency to leave coordination of national defense services and preparation of defense and military policies to the military bureaucracy (Bayramoglu, 2004, p. 72).

The most important legislation that facilitated the institutionalization of the military’s guardianship role was the TAF’s Internal Service Law No. 211 (ISL), passed on 10 June 1935. Article 34 of this law established “the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces” as the “protection and defense of the Turkish Homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution”. The Turkish Constitution at the time of this law’s adoption defined the Turkish state as a republic. However, only with the amendments made in 1937 did the six main principles of the Republican People’s Party program – republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and reformism – become enshrined in the constitution as basic qualities of the State. As a result, since the early years of nation-building the Turkish Armed Forces has considered itself responsible not only for the protection of the State but also for these founding principles of the Republican State. Orhan Erkanli, a member of the 1960 junta, expressed this idea:

“If the administration in the country fails to provide leadership, if there is not a constitutional court, a senate, who is going to defend the Republic? Naturally the army. Those who established the first Republic thought of the army as its sole guarantor, and expressed this idea in Article 34 of the military internal organizational code.”

Such a strong moral and legal identification of the military with the foundation of the Republic therefore not only constitutes the military’s core identity but also makes the preservation of the Republic’s founding principles its core interest. On important occasions, the Chiefs of General Staff have found it necessary to underline precisely this point. Chief of

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General Staff Hilmi Ozkok (2002-2006), in his annual evaluation speech of 2005, asserted that:

The matter that the TAF has always been a party and will continue to be so is the eternal protection and preservation of the general characteristics of the Turkish Republic, which are democracy, secularism, a social state governed by the rule of law and the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation. The main principles that will carry the Turkish Republic into the future and make it progress are secularism and modernism. Nobody should expect the TAF to be impartial on these matters. The determination and sensitivity of the TAF to these matters will continue with the same strength.

A year later, in his farewell speech, General Ozkok (2006) once more asserted:

The TAF has played a very important role in the modernization of the Turkish nation. Despite all the initiatives directed against the TAF to wear it down, it will continue to play this role and will never move away from modern values. It will never give up its legitimate role in society’s internalization of Ataturk’s principles and reforms and in the preservation and protection of the indivisibility of the nation, state, and secular democratic Republican regime. 47

Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug (2008) expressed similar views within minutes of assuming command:

The establishment and development of the Turkish Republic was at the same time a revolution and a miracle achieved by the founder of our Republic, M. Kemal Ataturk. The founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic is based on a unitary and secular nation-state. The Turkish Armed Forces is always a party in safeguarding and preserving the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic, as drawn by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 48

While the military’s guardianship perceptions render it difficult for soldiers to fully accept the principle of civilian supremacy, the legacy of modernization and officers’ ideational commitment to Ataturkist/Kemalist system of thought restrains them from seeking to hold power for a long time. Phrased differently, officers’ internalization of M. Kemal Ataturk’s ideal of making the Turkish Republic a respectable member of contemporary civilization makes the ideal of modernization via Westernization both a constitutive element of the Turkish military identity and the second highly salient interest. The following statement of retired General Yasar Karagoz (2008) is illustrative in this sense:

In order to understand the TAF’s behaviour, you need to understand the way the officers

47 Speech delivered by the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok during the hand-over ceremony at the General Staff Headquarters, August 28, 2006.
48 Speech delivered by Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug during the hand-over ceremony at the General Staff Headquarters, August 28, 2008. Available at: http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2008/org_ilkerbasbug_dvrtsilkon usmasi_28082008.html
are educated. Our education system emphasizes the protection of the Republic. What does the Republic represent? The Republic represents a commitment to Ataturk’s principles, which includes democracy, science and enlightenment, respect for human rights, modernity, economic development, respect for women’s rights, educational development… To summarize, the Republic represents the ideal of reaching the level of contemporary Western civilization. If you look at history, you will see that the TAF has always been the vanguard in the attainment of these goals (Author’s interview, Ankara, 2008).

The Turkish officers endowed by this Kemalist thought thus consider “democracy” the only viable regime, recognizing democracy as an integral part of Western civilization (Karaosmanoglu, 1994, p. 125; Heper, 1988). While Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s ideas have been interpreted a variety of ways, ranging from “a set of attitudes and opinions which were never rooted in any detail” (Zucker, 1993, p. 189) to the claim that it is “a specific variant of corporatist ideology” (Parla and Davidson, 2004), contemporary military officers consider Kemalism as a world-view that prescribes reasoning based on science and circumstances as the “guide for life,” rather than religious or other forms of a priori ideational thinking and reforms”.

This broader interpretation of Kemalism, however, entails the introduction and dissemination of Western reason and rationality with an aim to reach the level of contemporary civilization. In this sense, military officers consider Kemalism as “the birth of humanism” and “enlightenment in Turkey,” associating it with the “belief” in and the “hope” of “rational democracy” (Kili 1984, 1996, Kislali 1996, Heper 2000). Barbara Ward writes:

It is important to understand from the start what Mustafa Kemal meant by ‘Westernization’ and modernization’. His training and mental formation belonged to the period of liberal enlightenment, he believed… that the Western world, through science and industrialism, has discovered the key to this progress, and that if Turkey were to benefit from it, then the Turks too would have to apply rational and scientific methods to every sphere of their national life. He believed that “irrational beliefs” – which virtually meant processes of thought not amenable to scientific proof – were in almost every case hostile to his ideal of progress (1942, p. 51).

It might be therefore suggested that this tradition of rational democracy and withdrawal to the barracks has been inspired by Mustafa Kemal’s legacy of creating a modern civilized state that is on par with contemporary civilization (muhasir medeniyet). According to Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug: “For the Republic to achieve the goal of transcending contemporary civilization, the political governing system naturally would need to be democratic, since a modern republic could only be realized with democracy” (2009, April 14). The military’s commitment to the republican project of catching up with the West and its 200 years old role as
the vanguard of modernization, therefore, not only makes Turkish officers respectful to
democratic regimes but also Turkey’s Westernization as its core ideal as well as second highly
interest.

Due at least partly to this ideal of being a member of contemporary civilization, Turkey
had, in fact, made moves to liberalize and democratize its regime immediately after WWII.49
During the second half of the 1940s, for example, state control over the economy was gradually
relaxed; freedom of the press and freedom of association were recognized; universities achieved
autonomy in their administration and internal affairs; new civil society organizations, including
business chambers, labor unions, and township associations were founded; an opposition party
was formed by the dissident members of the CHP; and liberal democratic control over the armed
forces was established (Toksoz, 1983, p. 373).

Most importantly, however, between 1949 and 1960 Turkey came closest in its history to
a regime of democratic civilian control in which the armed forces were subordinate to the
civilian government. The first institutional change in the defense structure that expanded civilian
control was made in 1944 following the forced retirement of Chief of General Staff, Marshall
Fevzi Cakmak on the grounds that he reached the statutory retirement age of 68. Although
President Inonu’s initial goal was to subordinate the office of TGS to the Ministry of Defense,
the stiff opposition of the High Command to this proposal resulted in the former’s subordination
to the prime minister on June 13, 1944.50 This law restricted the autonomous status of the Chief
of the General Staff by making him responsible to the prime minister and by abolishing its
authority to directly communicate with institutional organs. The Prime Minister, not the Chief of
General Staff, was authorized for communication of the military with other ministries (Article 3).

Although in this re-organization the autonomous status of the Chief of the General Staff
was curtailed to a certain extent, the Office of Chief of the General Staff retained the authority to
determine defense principles, programs and policies. A few years later, with the impact of
rapidly developing US-Turkey relations and the formation of NATO, the CHP government took
additional measures to restrict this authority. The first measure was the enactment of the Law

49 This does not, however, mean that domestic factors were completely irrelevant in the process. The strains of
discontent at home, stemming from various political, social and economic measures taken during the war, had also
contributed to the liberalization of the regime. See Erogul, 1990.
50 See Law No: 4580, Ozdag, 2005, p. 143 ; Hale, 1995, p. 83
No: 5396 on the Establishment and Duties of the Ministry of National Defense in 1949,\textsuperscript{51} which subordinated the Chief of the General Staff to the MND (Article 1) and authorized the Ministry to carry out all army business affecting personnel, intelligence, operation, training and education, mobilization and supplies through the Chief of the General Staff (Article 2).\textsuperscript{52} In brief, as the Chief of General Staff lost its supra-minister status and became a department under the Ministry of National Defense, this reorganization significantly decreased the military’s institutional autonomy.

The second institutional change that diminished the military’s monopoly on defense matters came with the establishment of the National Defense Supreme Council in 1949. The Council was largely designed in tandem with the American National Security Council, established two years earlier.\textsuperscript{53} Its aim was to coordinate all defense matters, thereby solving defense problems and organizational flaws encountered during WWII.\textsuperscript{54} The establishment of such an organization facilitated the transfer of authority for national defense from the Chief of General Staff to the Supreme National Defense Council. The General Staff, crucially, was no longer the sole authority in the determination of defense policy. The Chief of General Staff was also a member, but he was the only military representative in a civilian-dominated council. The Council was headed by the prime minister and consisted of total of 11 ministers and one military representative – the Chief of the General Staff. These institutional changes harmonized Turkey’s defense structure with American standards and established institutional control over the Turkish Armed Forces for the first time in the history of the Republic. This new system encompassing all of the institutional changes outlined above, however, failed to deliver its desired outcome of constraining the involvement of the military in politics. Just ten years after Council’s establishment, the Turkish military changed the rules of the game by overthrowing an elected civilian government in 1960. Why this was the case? Why did the new institutional rules designed in tandem with liberal democratic principles fail to preserve the status-quo?

\textsuperscript{52} Article 3 of this law gave the appointment of Chief of General Staff to the Cabinet upon the proposal of the MND. Article 4 stipulated that the Cabinet was to appoint force and army commanders, as well as full generals and full admirals on the recommendation of the Ministry of National Defense and the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff.
\textsuperscript{54} See Article 3 of Law No: 5399. Available at: www.NSC.gov.tr
3.2 Review of the Literature on Turkish Military Interventions

Having a political regime interrupted by four military coups, Turkey’s unhappy marriage with democracy has drawn the attention of many scholars with diverse interests. Regardless of this diversity, students of the Turkish political regime usually share one of two complementary assumptions. Firstly, in the spirit of Huntington, mainstream literature on Turkish politics argues that it is “the failure of the civilian mechanism rather than the military” that drives the military to intervene. Ozbudun states explicitly “none of the breakdowns of democracy in Turkey seems to be the inevitable outcome of deep-seated structural or sociological causes. In all cases, the behavior of leaders of political parties looms large as a factor leading to breakdown” (2000, p. 43). Secondly, the military as a quasi-omnipotent subject acts above and outside the social and international power relationships and processes (for the critique see: Akca, 2006). According to mainstream literature, the Turkish military never entered into an alliance with a political party, social group, or class in any of the three interventions (Guney, 2002, p. 164) and, unlike in bureaucratic authoritarianism regimes of Latin America, the military is above and outside politics.

Heper argues that the military has been autonomous or even independent from social forces, including the dominant classes and class fractions (1985, pp. 83, 126). In these accounts, the Turkish bourgeoisie is considered as dependent and subordinate to the state (Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1973). Behind this idea of the dependency of the Turkish bourgeoisie lies an idealist conceptualization of the bourgeoisie as a progressive democratic actor (Moore, 1966) that acts as the main force for democratization once it gains its autonomy from the tutelage of the bureaucracy and the state. Despite the fact that a bourgeois democratic state form has been historically established and that the bourgeoisie has been reluctant to adopt democratic reforms and to extend democratic rights to the working classes (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Huber and Stephens, 1999), a progressive role is nevertheless assigned to the bourgeoisie by these scholars. Once the bourgeoisie fails to act in actual historical processes as a progressive democratic force and instead collaborates with military and the state, this is interpreted as its passive position vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. It is contended that state elites governed despite the demands of the bourgeoisie (Heper, 1976, pp. 489, 495; Karpat, 1970; Frey, 1965, p. 38); accordingly, the military interventions were the “attempt by Kemalist bureaucratic center to restore its hegemony… in the absence of an aristocracy or a bourgeoisie-as-public that would have exercised a moderating influence” (Heper, 1985, pp. 87-88). According to this statist
reading, the “strong state” tradition in Turkey impeded the development of national capital in the country (Keyder, 1987) and “did not persuade the state elites of the necessity of forming organic links with civil society elements. The state continued to act “without any allies in civil society” (Heper, 1991, pp. 14, 20) and there were no common interests “between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie” (Heper, 1985, p. 101; 1976, p. 495). Hence, the developments strategies were initiated by the political and bureaucratic elites in way that would increase and/or consolidate the state elites’ own interests, either at the expense of bourgeoisie’s demands and interests (late Ottoman-early Republican periods) or in a coalition with the bourgeoisie as the dependent ally (Etatist and ISI periods) (Akca, 2006, p. 187; Also see: Insel, 1996; Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987, p. 109; 1988, p. 197).

This study, however, argues that the very autonomy of the capitalist state with respect to the rest of society is highly contested in the literature on political economy, and that the Turkish military is far from being an autonomous institution above and outside of societal, ideational, and international processes and struggles. Since the late 19th century, the Turkish military has been driven by an ideational struggle against Islamism/Ottomanism; since 1952, it has been integrated into the Trans-Atlantic security structure. In 1961 it entered into a capitalist economy through the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu – OYAK) and, therefore, its autonomy at best can be considered to be an “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995). To reemphasize, the existence of the military as a collective capitalist group through OYAK, which has become one of the largest holding companies of the country, has been the very proof of the embedding of the military within capitalist social power relations (Akca 2006). Certainly, the army cannot be reduced into a capitalist faction, whose actions are guided by purely economic cost-benefit calculations. Neither can it be considered an omnipotent force that acts independently autonomously from social and international processes. The section below refutes such passive-bourgeoisie and autonomous and omnipotent military arguments by showing the strategic relationship of military with different political and societal groups. It shows how socio-political instability, civil-military coalitions, and high public support for military activism created an opportunity for the Turkish military to intervene in politics in 1960

and how the lack of international sanctions reinforced the military’s and public beliefs about the appropriate role of military in a democracy.

3.3 The 27 May 1960 Intervention

The 1960 coup, executed by 38 junior officers mostly at the level of colonel, brought down the Menderes government, arrested the Chief of the General Staff who had opposed the intervention, and formed a 17-month military government with a civilian partnership. Interviews conducted by Walter Weiker (1963) with members of Committee of National Union (CNU) clearly indicate that it was neither corporate interests nor Menderes’ exploitation of religion but his authoritarianism and economic mismanagement, as outlined below, that pulled the officers into politics.

3.3.1 Socio-political and socio-economic instability

The military’s decision to seize power in 1960 was prompted primarily by the growing polarization between the government and the opposition. This intense intra-elite conflict was accompanied by the governing Democratic Party’s (DP) efforts to coerce the opposition led by the CHP into submission, undermining the legitimacy of democratic politics. By the mid-1950s, economic troubles had also begun to replace the economic growth of the initial years of the Republic. Low agricultural exports gave rise to growing fiscal disequilibrium, rising prices, spiraling inflation, shortages of goods, and black-marketing. In 1960, the cost of living was approximately 11 times what it had been in 1950-53 while salaries had barely doubled, causing hardship for not only the military and civilian bureaucracy but also the general population (Karpat, 1970; Ozbudun, 2000).

The collapse in the economic realm was accompanied by increasingly authoritarian polices by the DP, particularly after the 1957 elections. In the absence of effective constitutional

56 Broadly speaking, there were two factions in the CNU: moderates and radicals. The moderates, including General Gursel, constituted the majority representing the liberal and democratic wing that wanted to restore power to civilians within a short time. They supported the Onar Commission's proposals for a liberal and democratic Turkey. The radicals, mainly junior officers under Colonel Alparslan Turkes, wanted to retain power for a longer time to carry out a more thorough institutional restructuring than that envisaged by the intellectuals. These radicals were especially against the CNU's close relationship with or support of the CHP. Following a protracted power struggle, the fourteen radicals were purged from the CNU, allowing the moderates to carry out their program (Ahmad, 2008, pp. 240-41; Goktepe, 2000, p. 164).

57 Only 4 of the 37 members considered religion a problem.

58 While export levels increased from 738 million Turkish lira in 1950 to 1,110 million in 1953, imports also increased, resulting in a trade deficit of 516 million lira in 1955 (Jacoby, 2004, p. 108). As a result, Turkey’s national debt grew from 775 million lira in 1950 to over 5 billion in 1960, which was worsened by the government’s policy of printing more and more currency; devaluation of the lira resulted in high domestic inflation and a doubling of the cost of living (Jacoby, 2004, p. 108).
checks and balances and legal guarantees of basic rights, the DP government passed a series of laws that severely restricted civil and political activity. These measures included confiscating CHP property, tightening press laws, forbidding university professors from participating in politics, jailing journalists, declaring martial law in Turkey’s main cities, and demoting the province of Kirsehir for voting for the opposition Republican National Party in the 1954 elections. To further maintain control, the DP government used state radio for its own purposes, banned political meetings and demonstrations except during election campaigns, barred judicial review of acts, and changed regulations of the Assembly and of the press law. According to Feroz Ahmad, after these repressive measures “political activity outside the Assembly…virtually became impossible” (1978, p. 55). Political discussion was only free in the Assembly, but eventually even this was restricted by governmental pressure on the press to stop publishing reports of the Assembly.

The last straw in this long chain of contested measures came in April 1960, when the ruling party established a parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate “subversive” activities of the CHP and some of the press. The committee was given extraordinary judicial and administrative powers. Many opposition members were now convinced that the Turkish political system had reached an irreparable state and that the channels of democratic change had been blocked (Ozbudun, 2000, p. 31).

3.3.2 Public legitimacy of the 1960 intervention and civil-military coalitions

The military intervention was largely supported by the Turkish society. Then US Ambassador wrote in an 11 August 1960 letter to US Assistant Secretary of State Lewis Jones “when the PGOT [provisional government of Turkey] came to power, the press, the intellectuals, the teachers, the students and the Army hailed the accomplishment of the coup d’état. There was nothing but admiration for the 38 members that made up the CNU. They were all heroes, patriots”.

In fact, civilian support was so strong that within a few days the coup was transformed into a revolution. It was “center of left” intellectuals who legitimized the coup by justifying it on the grounds of unconstitutional acts committed by the DP government (Zurcher, 2004, p. 254). A committee of professors of political science and law legitimized the coup by declaring:

60 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/d376
It is not right to regard the situation in which we find ourselves today as an ordinary political coup d’état. The political power, which should represent the conception of state, law, justice, morality, public interests and public service and should protect public interests, had for months, even years, lost this character, and become a material force representing personal power and ambition and class interests. The state, which before all else should be a social power bound by law, was transformed into an instrument of this ambition and power.\(^{61}\)

The support that the military officers received was not limited to elite intellectuals. For instance, students who had already engaged in street protests in the months preceding the coup actively supported the coup by organizing public demonstrations.\(^{62}\) Similarly, the press ardently supported the coup by declaring it an action on behalf of freedom and liberties by the military as the representative of the nation, against the corrupt authoritarian regime of Menderes (Mazici, 1989, pp. 156-163; Tek, 2007). The biggest working class organization (Turk-Is) held an extraordinary meeting in which the military intervention was warmly welcomed (Akca, 2006), further demonstrating broad societal support for the military’s actions.

### 3.3.3 International factors and responses

The lack of international sanction or criticism against the 1960 military coup positively conditioned the military officers’ engagement in politics. Although the 1960 coup d’état came as a complete surprise to the United States (Weiker, 1963, p. 160; Goktepe, 2000, 171), British Ambassador Bernard Burrows was quite aware of the internal situation in Turkey. Burrows, in his regular dispatches, pointed out the possibility of a potentially “revolutionary situation” and underlined the trend towards repressive action against the opposition and the press. This was particularly evident in his dispatch dated 22 April 1960: “The Commission has already banned all party political activities and meetings in the country. Future developments are uncertain. There is a potentially revolutionary situation.”\(^{63}\)

After hearing of the coup d’état, Britain described the situation as an internal affair for Turkey and refrained to comment (The Times, 1960, May 28). Britain, as well as the US, was content to hear the first public announcement of the new government reiterating Turkey’s alliance with NATO and CENTO, and its allegiance to other existing international settlements

\(^{61}\) Quoted from Ahmad 1977, p. 162-163.

\(^{62}\) The day after the coup, the students of the Faculties of Political Sciences, Law, and Medicine organized demonstrations in support of the military. On 4 June 1960, a meeting was called: “Gratitude to the Turkish Military” (Turk Ordusuna Minnet ve Sukran Mitingi). See Mazici 1989, pp. 93-94; Akca, 2006, p. 286

\(^{63}\) FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10, Burrows to FO (Selwyn Lloyd), Ankara, 22 April 1960.

Criticism in the European media of the Menderes government for its attempts to repress the opposition had left its mark, and there was not yet any liberal campaign in Europe against the military government such as the one that started when the colonels seized power in Greece in 1967 (Mango, 2004, p.57; Ganser, 2005, p. 227). There was indeed very little European pressure “to the effect that the 27 May coup had violated democratic principles” (Ozdemir, 2000, p. 176; Hale, 1994, p. 120).

Americans, on the other hand, seemed to be concerned with the amount of aid that would be sufficient enough to enable this “Provisional Government to hold the line”. As noted above, the US Ambassador described the overthrow as welcomed in Turkey in a diplomatic cable. He added however that while the military regime had proven itself to be pragmatic in its actions, the military government had more pressing problems than did the Menderes regime and thus would require outside assistance. Warren’s concern seemed focused on the sufficiency of US assistance needed to keep Turkey out of Soviet Union’s orbit.

If the Gursel Government finds, as I am afraid it will, that it must have more aid than we are prepared to give, what can it do? We know that the Soviet Government is ready to supply and is urging the Gursel Government to accept as much as 500 million dollars at three percent interest per year. How long can a Provisional Government whose origin is a coup d’état, a Government feeling the stresses and strains that exist in the Turkish economy today, resist the tempting offer of the Soviets. We know from experience that, once it does accept such aid, the bars will be down. The United States and the Western World will have suffered a major and tragic defeat (Ibid.).

Ambassador Warren concluded that while he did “not like course of events”, US interests dictated working with the military government “just as loyally and faithfully as we did with the Menderes Regime… to continue to assist in any way we can”.

It is therefore plausible to suggest that lack of international sanctions on the military’s behaviour set a favourable precedent for military re-engagement in politics in the following three decades. Enforcing conditions of membership set by IOs is an important aspect of creating an externally supported commitment to democracy as well as a deterrent to anti-democratic forces.

64 See Ambassador Warren’s letter at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/d376#fnref-source
When conditions are not enforced as in the case of NATO in Turkey, this sets dangerous precedents for future threats to democracy in other states. As the case of Turkey illustrates, overlooking antidemocratic behavior is more likely to lead to assumptions on the part of coup perpetrators that similar behavior in the future will lead to a similar response. The next section elaborates the way the 1960 coup and the military regime shaped the path-dependent development of Turkey’s CMR regime culminating in change of government in 1971 through a military memorandum.

3.3.4 Coup outcomes

Largely responding to abuses of power by a parliamentary majority, military rulers introduced a multiparty parliamentary system, a strong check and balance system, an independent judiciary, civil rights and liberties, a free press and autonomous universities. Although characterized by some as a “modernizing/reform coup” because the overall framework was to support “a modernizing and democratizing society under the rule of civilian supremacy”, 21 the 1960 coup failed to set a new status quo in which the army would return to its normal functions. The military’s political influence and institutional autonomy has also been aided and enhanced by the prerogatives and exit guarantees the outgoing military regime obtained. The 23 members of the military junta were made senators; junta leader Cemal Gursel was elected president; the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) was subordinated to the prime minister instead of Defense Minister turning back to the 1944 model; the military High Command obtained an institutional organ to influence national security policy (the NSC and its Secretariat); the autonomy and authority of military courts were enhanced by broadening the jurisdiction their to civilians and by establishing a Military High Court of Appeals; and the creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) brought the military directly into the sphere of business and industry.


The 1971 intervention by memorandum that toppled the center-right coalition government led by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was a pre-emptive move by senior conservative generals designed to forestall a possible coup by a group of radical anti-US officers with socialist tendencies. The upsurge of student political violence between the militants of the extreme left and right, the government’s inability to control terrorist incidents, and the infiltration of Marxists in the ranks of the military exacerbated tensions in CMR and intensified factional
conflicts within the armed forces.

3.4.1 Socio-political instability: Rise of popular activism in the Second Turkish Republic: 1961-1971

In the new democratic political environment that the 1960 intervention provided, anti-US movements and socialist and communist ideas flourished for the first time in Turkey, along with Islamism and pan-Turkism. The changes in the legal-constitutional framework of party politics and the partial lifting of the legal restrictions on the formation of religious, sectarian, socialist, and far-right parties led to the formation and rise of new parties. The Marxist Turkish Workers’ Party (*Turkiye Isci Partisi*–TIP), the extreme right-wing Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetci Hareket Partisi*–MHP), the Islamist National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*–MNP) and its successor the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*–MSP) were representative of the expanding ideological spectrum of political society in the 1960s and 1970s (Sayari, 2002, p. 13). While secularist republicans continued to be represented by the CHP in the political system, the centre right was now represented by the AP, the successor of the outlawed DP.

Representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie drew upon the governing Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*–AP), which claimed the legacy of the DP, to unite the ruling classes under its leadership but failed in their efforts to do so (Schick and Tonak, 1980, p.16; Oncu, 2003, p. 319). New right-wing parties such as a new Democratic Party and the MNP emerged from the power struggles within the AP, preventing the industrial bourgeoisie from establishing its dominance (Oncu, 2003, p. 319). The formation of the MNP thus critically “deprived the AP of a strong social base in fighting the militant working-class and democratic movements, therefore rendering the civilian government ineffective and powerless” (Oncu, 2003, p. 320).

During this period, a significant convergence began to take place between the Kemalists and the Socialists, producing a type of Kemalist Socialism. *YON* magazine, launched in 1961 became the main intellectual platform of this convergence. Kemalist Socialists stressed the anti-imperialist, egalitarian, and statist aspects of Kemal’s legacy while seeking “to consolidate state power against bourgeoisie” (Akcali and Perincek, 2009, p. 555). Revolutionary fervor, stirred up by the 1960 coup and finding a source of foreign inspiration from the 1968 students’ movements in France, increased among leftist/Kemalist intellectuals, workers, and university

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66 *YON* was founded by prominent intellectuals and academicians such as Dogan Avcioglu, Mumtaz Soysal, and Cemal Resit Eyuboglu (Akcali and Perincek, 2009, p. 555; Zurcher, 2004, p. 254).
students. Although the TIP was marginal in Parliament, its ideas were highly prevalent among these groups (Ahmad 1993, p.142). Universities, professional associations of doctors, economists, engineers, technicians, lawyers, and the mass media – that is, the realm of petty bourgeois intellectuals – acquired a degree of autonomy from government, becoming sites of new political and social projects based primarily on progressive ideals and spheres of opposition to violations of the public interest by those abusing governmental power (Oncu. 2003, p. 318). During these years, democracy rallies organized by this movement attracted tens of thousands.

As a result of rapid industrialization and the existence of constitutionally guaranteed rights, the working class also transformed itself from a "young and inexperienced" social group into "a very militant and highly organized sector" under The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey (Turkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikaları Konfederasyonu—DISK) (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1984, p. 16; Ahmad 1993, pp. 142-145). DISK was formed as a counter-part to the right-wing Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turkiye Isci Sendikaları Konfederasyonu—Turk-Is). DISK soon became a well-mobilized group organizing highly vocal strikes and demonstrations. Just a year after DISK’s formation in 1967, the number of strikes totaled 54; by 1970 the figure was 112 and included a coordinated walkout of over 100,000 workers in Kocaeli and Istanbul (Jacoby, 2004, p. 138). Groups such as the National Democratic Movement (Milli Demokratik Hareket—NDM) and the Federation of Revolutionary Youth in Turkey (Turkiye Deverimci Genclik Federasyonu—Dev Genc), which profited from the growth in trade unionism and in higher education enrolment, emerged as significant social movements in the late 1960s (Jacoby, 2004, p. 137).

Concerned with the rising power of the left, the Turkish parliament annulled the “national remainder system” in 1968, effectively reducing TIP representation in parliament in 1969, and in 1970 passed a new trade union law favoring the pro-government TURK-IS over DISK. Workers responded to this law by staging a vast and largely spontaneous demonstration on 15-16 June 1970 and succeeded in completely paralyzing the entire Istanbul-Marmara region” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 146). Following a change in electoral laws that diminished the TIP’s representation, university students who had formed a federation of “thought clubs” and had supported the TIP initiated staging boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, and demonstrations advocating direct action through Dev-Genc (Jacoby, 2004, p. 137).

Protests were increasingly directed at Turkey’s military and its economic ties to the West. Critics were particularly concerned with the issue of a non-aligned Turkey, independent of
NATO and the United States. This sentiment manifested itself in the armed forces. The leaflets issued by “the Committee of Free Officers” (January 1966) and “National Liberation Committee” (March 1966) called for unity and action against “this anti-national government policy” and against the US, which was viewed as trying to turn Turkey into its “satellite” (Ahmad, 1977, p. 195).

The political agitation and factionalism felt in all corners of society would have a bearing on the TAF, which became restless about the events and resentful of the attacks it was subjected to by the Kemalist left (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 203-204). The growing pressure within the armed forces and rumors of radical plots from below on compelled the military commanders to issue an ultimatum on 12 March 1971.67

3.4.2 International response to the military’s interim regime (1971-73)

Like the 1960 coup, the 1971 coup by memorandum evoked little response from the international community (Thomas, 2005, p. 32; Jackson 2009). While closely following the developments in Turkey68 the US, for example, evidently did not seem to consider the takeover as a major concern for US interests. Indeed, the Nixon Administration seemed more concerned with Turkey’s non-compliance with a US request to end opium cultivation,69 which made up approximately 80% of the opium products that made their way into the US.70 Considering the economic losses that Turkey would suffer, both Prime Minister Demirel and opposition leader Ecevit objected to a ban on poppy cultivation. When Demirel’s government was forcefully replaced by Nihat Erim’s interim government, the Nixon administration was happy to inform Erim in a 7 April 1971 letter that he enjoyed Washington’s backing.

Less than two weeks after the takeover, a CIA analysis reported that: “Conscious of being under the watchful eye of the military, [Turkish] Parliament may now move ahead on the opium bill with far less debate than was the case while Demirel was in office”.71 On 19 June 1971, the

70 Ibid., 1061-1062.
Department of State sent a cable to the US Ambassador in Turkey to pressure the interim government to pass the legislation. President Nixon was “deeply concerned that the problem of opium is casting a pall over our entire relationship” and wished “to avoid jeopardizing [the two countries’] close relations”. If Ankara failed to cooperate with US wishes, however, the United States would be “compelled to take whatever action was necessary to protect the health of its people” (Ibid.). Despite protests in Turkey claiming the semi-military regime submitted to US pressure, the Erim government agreed to phase out the production of opium-related crops and the issue died down considerably thereafter (Hale 1994, p. 154; Jackson, 2009, p. 81).

The criticism from Europe was insignificant at most; an additional Protocol with the EEC entered into force on 1 January 1973 under the military-controlled interim government.  

**3.4.3 Outcomes of the March 12 memorandum and the military regime**

The technocratic governments working under the supervision of the military until the general elections of October 1973 had two basic convictions that shaped their policies. The first conviction was that the liberties and rights that the 1960 constitution had guaranteed provided a favorable atmosphere for a rising spiral of protests and unconventional political participation. Military leaders, as well as parties of the right therefore concluded that stable law and order should prevail over rights and freedoms. In order to establish such law and order, the interim government revised the liberal 1961 Constitution extensively. The changes that were made in 1971 and 1973 not only strengthened executive authority over universities and the press and limited certain civil liberties such as freedom of association, but also enhanced military autonomy within the state apparatus. The influence of the NSC’s decisions over the Council of Ministers – and thus the military’s influence in national security and foreign policy-making – was strengthened while the military’s professional, financial, administrative, and judicial autonomy were increased. Promotions, retirement, and disciplinary measures regarding Turkish Armed Forces personnel would now be decided a military-dominated Supreme Military Council (SMC) and military-owned state property would be exempt from audit by the Court of Accounts. The scope of military jurisdiction and military martial laws courts over civilians was broadened, and the Supreme Military Administrative Court (SMAC), which was authorized to resolve

73 For the full text of the Additional Protocol please visit <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/Document2.pdf>
administrative disputes concerned with the military authorities or military matters, was established.

The second conviction that shapes the interim-government’s policy was that the restoration of law and order was only possible with the repression of “communist” ideas, organizations, and actors. In line with these two convictions, the transitional government applied harsh measures against the left. The government imposed martial law; suppressed the press; outlawed strikes; and the formation of union federations; changed the liberal 1963 Unions Law; arrested hundreds of leftist activists including academics, intellectuals, and trade union leaders; and dissolved the leftist TIP and the pro-Islamist MNP (Ahmad, 1977, p. 290). Mass arrests and torture of leftist intellectuals, members of labor unions, and students sympathetic to left undermined the belief – held by many who had supported the 1960 coup – that the Turkish military would always be on the side of liberal democracy.

While the political left and all its organizations such as Dev-Genc, the thought clubs in universities, branches of the Union of Teachers, and DISK were all eliminated, “the so-called Idealist Hearths, the youth organization of the Nationalist Action Party, were given free rein to act as vigilantes against their ideological rivals” (Ahmad, 2008, p. 250).

The March 12 memorandum and the results of the interim regime that followed indicate a significant turning point both in civil-military coalitions and military’s organizational political ideology. First of all, this period entailed the purge of officers who favored a statist developmental model and a foreign policy more independent from the US. In this sense, the events sparked by March 12 showed that TAF “would not allow officers or ideas that criticize capitalist economic regime and pro-US foreign policy” (Demirel, 2004, pp. 66-7). In line with the purge of this faction, the military’s relationship with the CHP as well as with those civilians who defined themselves as progressives deteriorated. The rise of Bulent Ecevit to the leadership of the CHP transformed the party, moving it away from its former pro-military stance. Ecevit not only repeatedly emphasized the negative impact of the military coup on Turkey’s democratization but also resigned from the CHP soon after the appointment of the Erim government, arguing that the March 12 memorandum had been issued against his own rise in the party (Demirel, 1998, pp. 189-190).

This thesis suggests that change in the military’s intellectual partners after the 1971
intervention contributed to the creation of the conditions for its loss of hegemony at the eve of new century. By repressing leftist movements and cutting their links with republican/Kemalist left of center intellectuals, and by promoting nationalized Islam as a bulwark to leftist movements, the once “progressive” TAF dug its own proverbial graveyard. The 1980 military coup d’état, discussed below, would reinforce this progression of events by laying out the basis of a new historical bloc (Gramsci, 1971), composed of the conservative pro-US military, the neo-liberal bourgeoisie and Turkish-Islamist intellectuals. Turkey’s integration into a “neo-liberal world economy” under military tutelage as per the “Washington Consensus” and the ascendancy of the economically liberal, culturally conservative Turgut Ozal administration created new opportunities for the Islamist counter-elites to expand in economic, civil, and political dimensions of society. To summarize, suppression of the left, promotion of moderate Islamism, and liberalization of the Turkish economy in the 1980s led to a shift in the country’s state-society relationship whereby previously marginalized groups took advantage of opportunities in the market to patiently penetrate the hierarchy of Turkish institutions.

3.5 The 12 September 1980 Coup and September 12 Regime

The conditions that brought about the Turkish military regime in 1980 were strikingly similar to those experienced by Brazil in 1964, by Chile and Uruguay in 1973, and by Argentina in 1976. In the late 1970s Turkey, like many Latin American countries, had fallen victim to a combination of crises: a political paralysis resulting from increasing ideological polarization in the party system; rapid escalation of violence by terrorist groups; growing militancy of extremist parties and radical unions at the both ends of the political spectrum; rising ministerial instability with short-lived coalition or minority governments; frequent lapses into parliamentary deadlock, and a severe economic crisis.

3.5.1 Socio-political instability: 1973-1980

The 1971 intervention and resultant technocratic government, like its predecessor, failed to lay the foundations for either good governance or political stability. After the military returned Parliament to civilian control, Turkish politics continued to be characterized by fragmentation

75 The concept of elite is used here to refer to those new social groups such as intellectuals and the technical intelligentsia (engineers and technicians), who, through secular and modern education, have acquired a "cultural capital", namely, a universal scientific language and professional skills. "Islamism" indicates the re-appropriation of a Muslim identity and values as the basis of an alternative social and political agenda (to that of the state). Accordingly, Islamist counter-elites can be both actors in the Islamist movements and professionals and intellectuals aspiring for political power (Gole, 1997, pp. 46-47).
and polarization and by a lack of decisive authority on the part of the successive governments. During this period, as the economic crisis deepened alongside the escalation of political violence and terrorism, the party system moved – in Sartori’s (1976) terms – from moderate to polarized pluralism. While switching the electoral system from plurality to proportional representation in 1961 facilitated the rise of fragmentation in Turkey’s party system, low political institutionalization and the effects of Cold War tensions generated growing ideological polarization between left and right.

Between 1976 and 1980 “political parties, state bureaucracy, labor unions, student organizations, and other interest groups were thoroughly politicized and ideologically factionalized” and violent clashes between leftist and rightist movements were often carried into the streets (Ozbudun, 2000). Groups from the left and the right – some with armed wings and commandos – turned neighborhoods, work places and universities into politically demarcated areas and even conflict zones. Sectarian and ethnic division was also particularly widespread in this period. Several provincial cities saw a massive outbreak of communal conflict marked by an ominous emergence of inter-ethnic (i.e. Kurdish-Turkish) and inter-sectarian (i.e. Sunni-Alevi) cleavages. Likewise, political polarization penetrated the police, with the creation of a left-wing organization Pol-Der, and its right-wing rival Pol-Bir (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 175-176). Despite the declaration of martial law in 13 provinces in December 1978 following a massacre of members of the Alevi community, violence nevertheless continued to escalate to exceptionally high levels (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 172-173).

In the months leading up to the military takeover, political assassinations escalated and included members of parliament, an ex-prime minister, prominent journalists, and university professors. While some of the victims were extremists, others, particularly among targeted journalists and professors, were moderates (Ozbudun, 2000). By September 1980 the country faced conditions close to civil war. Rough estimates of death from political violence grew as follows: 1975: 35; 1976: 90; 1977: 260, 1978: 800; 1979: 1500, and 1980: 3500 (Yesilada, 1988, p. 351). By the summer of 1980 the rate of political killings in Turkey averaged over 20 per day.76

76 The number of people that lost their lives because of political violence between 1975 and 1980 were the equivalent of Turkish losses in the War of Independence (Ozbudun, 2000, p. 35).
3.5.2 Socio-economic instability

The factional violence between leftists and rightists in Turkey was further exacerbated by severe economic difficulties resulting from the country’s foreign exchange crisis, which was manifested in a combination of payment difficulties, high inflation, high unemployment, serious industrial slowdowns, and shortages of consumer and import goods (Onder, 1998, p. 45, Ozbudun 2000). The severe conditions of the crisis forced the left-wing CHP government to sign a standby agreement with the IMF in 1979. However, the CHP government under Bulent Ecevit’s leadership was not willing to implement the austerity program as it was prescribed by the IMF agreement. This hesitance of the government attracted criticisms from big, industry-oriented Turkish businesses (Manisali, 2003). Due to the strong press campaign that TUSIAD organized, in fact, the government had to resign.

The Ecevit government was replaced with a right-wing minority government that agreed to implement the IMF’s standby agreement through its economic program known as “24 January Decisions” (Onder, 1998, p. 47). The reform package targeted at integrating Turkey into world markets was prepared by Turgut Ozal, a technocrat from the DPT and a strong admirer of the US (Boratav et al., 2000, p. 4). This suggests that industrial capital, represented by TUSIAD, played a key political role in the initial moment of the restructuring and “opening up” process (Onder, 1998, p. 46). The consent of the dominant Turkish bourgeoisie, however, was not enough to open up the Turkish market to the outside world completely. State elites and other social forces led by workers also had to be convinced before implementing the measures of an economic program that would bring austerity for low-income groups. Under the strong reaction of labor, the minority government could not maintain political stability or proceed with the reforms (Senalp, 2007). The coup in 1980 created the much-needed climate for the launching of the reform package.

The 1980 military coup was, therefore, a response both to economic impasse and to political crisis. Plagued by deadlocks on multiple issues, Parliament stopped functioning (Ahmad, 1993, p. 179; Zurcher, 2004, p. 263; Hale, 1994, p. 236). Prime Minister Erbakan’s refusal to support AP anti-insurgency measures to increase the power of the executive and his organization of a rally in which his supporters proclaimed “today Iran—tomorrow Turkey” was the last straw for the military’s patience (Harris, 1988, p. 192). Within a week of this rally, Erbakan, Demirel, Turkes, and Ecevit were all under arrest.
3.5.3 International responses to the military regime (1980-1983)

Like the takeover in 1971, the 1980 was expected by the US Ambassador: “Most of us believed... that the situation had deteriorated too far either to continue indefinitely or to be reversed by conventional political maneuvering....the real question was what was going to happen and when”.77 Similarly Paul Henze wrote to the National Security Council on 25 July 1980 that if the civilians in Ankara were unable to put their partisan differences behind them and take the necessary corrective measures to deal with the country’s problems, a situation could be created in which “the military would have to take over the government temporarily”.78 According to Henze “this would not necessarily be bad... If the military intervenes, it will be to restore democracy and make it more viable, not to disrupt it. Turkey is not Korea”.79

Also as in 1971, the US was again primarily concerned with the Turkish government’s unwillingness to comply with US demands. Demirel’s refusal to permit NATO’s use of Turkish bases and his reluctance to make any concession to Greece’s return to NATO before the recognition of Turkey’s rights in the Aegean further displeased the US administration (Ahmad, 1993, p. 174). “There was also the problem of Erbakan’s hostility towards Washington and Demirel’s dependence on him for the cabinet’s survival” (Ibid). State Department official Matthew Nimetz had concluded by January 1980 “Turkey under her existing government was incapable of playing the regional role that Washington had assigned her” (Ibid, pp. 174-175).

Like other international organizations dominated by the US, NATO similarly did not exert pressure over the military government in Turkey. On the day of the coup, a NATO spokesperson made a declaration that “designate[d] Turkey’s coup as an internal matter” and underlined that “a strong, stable and violence free Turkey [was] vital to the Western alliance” (Aydin and Gursoy, 2008, p.21). Despite NATO’s democratic credentials and the frustration of some European members with Turkish military rule, there were no discussions of expelling Turkey from NATO or any substantial pressure for democratization resulting from the military takeover. As a matter of fact, official NATO documents contain no formal decision or statement about Turkey between 1977 and 1983. It seems that the geo-strategic importance of Turkish

79 Ibid. Given the arguments Henze puts forth in this memorandum, it is odd that he also concludes that the United States should be "skeptical" of any report claiming that a military intervention is imminent.
membership kept NATO from attempting to intervene in Turkey’s “internal” matters (Karaosmanoglu, 1994, p. 130; Pevehouse 2005).

Washington remained committed to its aid promises to Turkey. US military and economic assistance to Turkey skyrocketed from $250 in 1979, to $406 in 1980; $453 million in 1981, $704 million in 1982, and $688 million in 1983. Not only the US but also other international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF provided support to the military government through economic assistance. Indeed, these IOs’ loans increased considerably after military coup (Aydin and Gursoy 2008, p. 24). Celasun and Rodrik (1989) also show that net transfers to Turkey in the period of 1980-85 were much more substantial than were corresponding transfers to other debtors after 1982. “Debt relief granted to Turkey through the OECD Aid Consortium reached $4.6 billion in 1980-85… During the difficult stage of 1980-83, the cumulative net resource transfer was nearly $2 billion” (Ibid., pp. 664-65).

The generous spirit of the OECD governments was also reflected in the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions. From 1980 on, Turkey became the recipient of “exceptional” flows from the World Bank and the IMF (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989, pp. 757). In addition to its regular project credits, the World Bank granted “five consecutive structural adjustment loans totaling $1.6 billion, the largest number of such loans ever made to a single country” (Ibid; Haggard and Kaufman, 1989, pp. 215-16). “The IMF entered into a three-year standby arrangement in June 1980 for a total of SDR [special drawing rights] 1.25 billion. This amounted to 625% of Turkey’s IMF quota at the time, and together with previous purchases brought total IMF commitments to Turkey to 870 percent of quota, the largest multiple awarded by the IMF until


81 Before the coup, US military aid to Turkey was on average approximately $165 million each year from 1950 until 1974. During the embargo years, the amount of military assistance decreased to around $130 million. In economic aid, the US provided to Turkey on average $128 million annually between 1953 and 1974. The embargo affected economic assistance substantially since it was reduced to $2.5 million annually and Turkey did not receive any economic assistance in fiscal year 1976. US Agency for International Development (USAID) Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations (Greenbook) : http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/
then” (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989, p. 758). This was followed by a one-year standby in June 1983 (SDR 225 million), which was later cancelled and replaced by a final one-year arrangement with the Ozal government in April 1984 (Ibid, p. 671). It seems that the presence of Turgut Ozal, a former employee of World Bank, in the military cabinet combined with Turkey’s geostrategic importance persuaded the IMF and the World Bank to support the military government’s liberalization program.

According to Haggard and Kaufman, “Turkey provides an example of how geo-strategic concerns influence official assistance” (1989, p. 215). Foreign assistance in Turkey was much more substantial than other that given to debtors because, “positioned on NATO’s southern flank, Turkey’s political significance to the Western alliance grew in the wake of the Iranian revolution” (Ibid.) 1979’s overthrow of the Shah's pro-Western regime in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did, indeed, enhance Turkey’s geo-strategic value for the Trans-Atlantic powers (Timmerman 1991; Brzezinski, 1983). As a “strong and stable Turkey” was thus very much “in America's own vital interest”, the US supported Turkey not only financially but through acts of public solidarity. In speeches and visits to Turkey, US officials vocally approved actions of military leaders and sometimes even found themselves defending Turkish generals over objections from their European counterparts.

The reaction from Europe was, indeed, mixed. On the day the coup took place, the Commission issued a statement indicating that “it is following with grave concern the course of events in Turkey” and expressing its “hope” that human rights would be respected and that democratic institutions would be quickly restored. The Commission also officially maintained that contractual commitments to Turkey, namely the Third Financial Protocol and the Special Aid Package, would be honored (Aydin and Gursoy, 2008, p. 36). The Fourth Financial Protocol of $625 million was also later approved by the Council of Ministers in May 1981. This decision, however, was highly contested by the socialist, communist and liberal groups in the European Parliament who maintained that the Community had to freeze the Association Agreement with Turkey, just as it had done with Greece in May 1967 (Ibid, p. 37). These initiatives were realized on 10 April 1981 when the European Parliament requested that the EC freeze economic aid to

the Turks unless the latter were willing to “present without delay a list of measures to introduce democratic liberties, giving specific deadlines for implementation”. The resolution requested that the EC give the military rulers no more than two months to reinstall “democratic institutions and practices”.

When the military regime declared the dissolution of all political parties on 15 October 1981, the European Commission – in conjunction with the Greek veto – decided to delay the Fourth Financial Protocol of $625 (Aybey, 2004, p. 25). On 22 January 1982 the European Parliament suspended the Joint Parliamentary Committee,

No EC member state, however, suspended bilateral political relations with Turkey and most Western European governments publicly said very little about the 1980 coup (Ibid, p. 35). Germany, as the second biggest supplier of military and economic assistance to Turkey after the US, continued to provide aid despite the objection of German parliamentarians. In fact, Germany was even reported to undertake the residual financing of some selected Turkish national projects that were to be funded under the Fourth Financial Protocol (Ibid, p. 40).

The Council of Europe (CoE), in which Turkey has been a member since 1947, seemed to be most pro-active and influential organization in pressuring the Turkish military government after the coup. As early as February 1981, the CoE issued a resolution citing allegations of torture, press censorship, arrests, and other violations of democratic rights and liberties. Its Parliamentary Assembly decided in May 1981 that there could be no Turkish delegation in the Assembly until such a delegation was “elected and properly constituted”. A joint sub-committee of the Political and Legal Committees was also established to monitor developments in Turkey and to deliver regular reports on the political situation in the country. In the immediate aftermath of the January 1982 visit of the parliamentary delegation to Turkey, the CoE also took an “unprecedented step” by adopting a resolution calling on member states to invoke Article 24 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the mechanism of inter-state complaint, to “verify the extent to which the allegations of torture and other violations of human rights in Turkey are

In line with this resolution, on 1 July 1982 five Member States of the CoE – France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark – filed a case against Turkey in the European Commission of Human Rights on grounds of continuing political repression, violation of human rights and trade union rights, and the torture of prisoners. Despite the strong pressure of leftists and Greeks, the Council did not suspend Turkey’s membership.

Civil society organizations, led by Amnesty International, actively campaigned against the policies of the military regime. The main issues raised and followed by Amnesty were torture cases, prison conditions, prisoners of conscience, treatment of Kurdish activists, and the use of the death penalty. Amnesty International contributed to the Political Affairs and Legal Affairs Committees in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and to the European Parliament. The organization was particularly effective in keeping human rights issues in Turkey on the agenda of European organizations. Helsinki Rights Watch (which evolved into Human Rights Watch in 1988) and International Human Rights Law Group were similarly active in promoting awareness of Turkey’s human rights abuses in the US.

3.6 Comparison of military coups in Turkey

Like their counterparts in Latin America, the Turkish military devised a bureaucratic authoritarian regime that privileged law and order over freedom and liberty, depoliticized its masses, and restructured its economy in line with neo-liberal principles. The military regime not only strengthened the TAF’s previous prerogatives but also granted additional ones that further institutionalized its autonomy and authority in the state structure after the transition to democracy in 1983.

Like the coup in 1960, the 1980 takeover was bloodless and the military government was established without much confrontation. It was, nevertheless, different from the previous interventions in three important respects that merit discussion: 1) its organizational structure; 2) the civilian political support and alliances the military could rely on; and 3) the level of repression that the military governments employed. Firstly and in contrast to the 1960 intervention, which was carried out by junior officers without much planning, the 1980 coup’s meticulous planning was begun in early 1979 by a team attached to the Turkish General Staff.

More importantly, for the first time the intervention did not originate from a faction within the military but rather involved the entire military as an institution. The National Security Council (NSC), composed of the five highest-ranking generals and led by Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, took over the administration of the country on 12 September 1980.

The second difference between the coups in 1960 and 1980 was the civilian political support and alliances on which the military government could rely. Although the military government of 1960 had been popular within the left-wing republican cadres, the government of 1980 was popular among the business community and the Turkish-Islamists led by the Gulen community. Understanding that the military was taking power not to implement an ambiguous reform project with étatist or socialist overtones but simply to follow an IMF-sponsored pro-market stability program, economic elites led by TUSIAD immediately endorsed the 1980 intervention (Bugra, 1994, p. 142). Business support for the military regime stemmed from the perception that the military was “a reliable guard to protect property rights which had been perceived as at risk in the late 1970s” (Gursoy, 2008; Ozel 2012, p. 10). Prominent business leaders expressed their gratitude for the Turkish military, and sent congratulatory messages to the armed forces stating that they had done the right thing given the chaos in Turkish politics that followed the 12 September 1980 coup. This support was particularly clear in a letter from honorary president of Koc Holding Vehbi Koc to Kenan Evren on 3 October 1980 in which he noted “actions taken by the Turkish army are entirely rightful”:

You may be exhausted, but do not avoid exhausting tasks. If the army is worn out by poor decisions, dictatorship followed by communism, could take hold in this country...the trials of the anarchists [therefore] must not be prolonged one moment, laws to punish them must be crafted swiftly, and the police corps’ facilities must be improved. Whatever can be done to this effect must be done as quickly as possible. Otherwise, propaganda declaring that ‘the fascist army has come to power, uniting with the capitalists to exploit the Turkish workers’ will be produced. To prevent this slander, laws to sort out business-labor relations must be designed as soon as possible....In order for the movement to be successful, bear in mind the continued malevolent efforts of communist parties, leftist organizations, Kurds, Armenians, and a number of politicians; stay alert and obstruct their enterprises (quoted in Sonmez, 1992).

93 See the memoirs of Vehbi Koc (1996) and Sakip Sabanci (1985).
Two years after the coup, Vehbi Koc’s son Rahmi Koc summed up the appreciation of the 1980 military coup within business circles:

The difference is this: before September 12, we were forced to do everything in a democratic system... That meant it was difficult and time-consuming to get anything done, and everything was looked at from a political angle. The difference under the military government is that there is no longer the difficulty of getting decisions passed by parliament (quoted in Leicht, 2000).

In addition to the business community, the military regime following the 1980 coup also enjoyed support from both nationalists and Islamists, stemming from the military’s institutionalization of the “Turkish-Islamist synthesis” as a state ideology and its elimination of all forms of leftist thought from public life. This new cultural policy was based on an idea introduced in 1971 by the conservative elites of the “intellectuals’ hearth” (aydinar ocağı) who had close relationships with the MHP cadres.\footnote{Birtek and Toprak, 1993; Yavuz, 1997, pp. 67-68; Tursan, 2004, p. 183; Karmon, 1997, pp. 41-42.} According to the intellectuals’ hearth, in order to steer Turkey towards a national consensus, the ruling elite should replace the “outdated” articulation of secular and civic Turkish nationalism with a more carefully constructed “state-centered Turkish-Islamic consciousness”. The State Planning Organization (SPO), which introduced its National Culture Plan in 1983, endorsed the idea of a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" with the justification that “all cultures have an unalterable, unalienable core which is religion”.\footnote{Guvenc et al. (1991) tried to expose the fallacy of this deceptive premise.}

To expand the hegemonic reach of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the military government appointed conservative bureaucrats to key positions in the state's cultural and educational establishment such as in the Turkish Radio and Television authority, the Board of Higher Education Council, and the Education Ministry (Waxman 2000, pp. 18-19). They government made instruction in religion and moral education compulsory in primary and secondary schools, which directly contrasted with the previous constitution’s recognition of the freedom not to worship as an absolute right. Fethullah Gulen, whose community had by this point become the apostles of democracy and waged a passive war of movement against the Turkish military, endorsed the coup by openly expressing his support and praise: “We offer our wishes to Mehmetcik [soldiers] who like Khidr came to rescue us where we lost all hope, to reach their final stage of metamorphosis”.\footnote{Gulen, F. (1980, Nov.). Son karakol [Last patrol]. Sizinti, 21. Available at: http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/son-karakol.html} The neo-Nurcu Fetullah Gulen community played a crucial role...
in the implementation of state-promoted Turkish-Islamic synthesis. As Agai states, Gulen’s “nationalist, pro-junta state, anti-leftist and anti-Iranian discourse was completely in line with the Turkish Islamic thesis promoted by the state after 1980” (2005, p. 3). The neo-Nurcu Gulen movement, which has grown at an unprecedented rate since the 1980s, has also been quite active in changing the society from within through education and media. Taner Edis claims in the “Illusion of Harmony: Science and Religion in Islam” that the Nurcu community played an important role in the development of Islamic creationism in Turkey:

In the 1980s, a creationist pseudoscience began in Turkey that went beyond simple religiously based rejection of evolution. The Nur [Gulen] movement was instrumental in this transformation, connecting anti-evolutionary views with the same habits of thought that found science all over the Qur’an. In the 1980s, Turkey would take the next step, becoming the center for an aggressive Islamic creationism that enjoyed influence throughout the Muslim world (2007, p. 125).

The final difference of the 1980 coup from previous interventions was its level of repression. The 1980-83 period represents Turkey’s most repressive rule since the establishment of the Republic. Within a very short time, 650,000 people – out of a population of 45,000,000 – were detained. Among the detainees 230,000 were tried in military courts; 98,500 of those were tried simply because of their "thoughts". As a result of these trials, 21,764 people were sentenced to heavy prison terms, 14,000 were stripped of citizenship, and 50 were executed.

Hundreds of thousands of people were tortured; according to official records 171 people lost their lives as a result of this torture. Another 300 people died under “suspicious circumstances”. Furthermore, 1,630,000 people were blacklisted; 388,000 people were denied passports, and 30,000 people went abroad seeking political asylum. Another 30,000 were dismissed from their jobs. As mentioned previously, all political parties were closed down. The activities of 23,667 associations were halted. The press was censored; 303 cases were opened against the 13 largest newspapers; 39 tons of books, newspapers, and magazines were demolished and 937 movies were banned. In addition, 2,792 authors, translators, and journalists were tried and were sentenced to a total imprisonment of over 3,315 years (Cumhuriyet Daily, September 12, 2000). This combination of the severe military repression of civil society,

97 Twenty-six were executed for political convictions, 23 for judicial convictions; one of the executed was a member of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).
98 Out of those dismissed, 3,854 were teachers, 120 of them were academicians at universities, and 47 of them were judges.
institutionalization of a tutelary regime, and relative success in economic spheres set the stage for Turkey to once again move towards civilian government.

3.7 The military-controlled transition to democracy and the Establishment of the Third Turkish Republic (1983-1991)

The transition to multi-party politics was made under military tutelage in which the military maintained control over participation in the electoral regime. In an attempt to prevent a return to the chaos of the previous decade, the military regime replaced the liberal 1961 constitution with a conservative 1982 constitution, enacting 669 new laws that completely restructured the political and social arena. The new constitution banned virtually all officials who had belonged to a political party prior to the September 1980 coup from being active in politics for a period of ten years. Politics was now restricted to new politicians – and only to politicians. Members of the bureaucracy, labour unions, universities, cooperatives, and professional organizations were all banned from having any ties with political parties. Political parties could neither form youth or women’s branches nor advance the opinion that there were cultures or languages other than Turkish and thus potentially create support for minority identification (Article 81). Finally, with an aim to reduce potential fragmentation in the party system and avoid the formation of weak coalition governments, the military government introduced a 10% threshold of national votes for entrance into parliament.

Following the lifting of the ban on political activity in May 1983, 15 parties were formed for participation in the first post-transition elections of October 1983. Of these parties, only three survived the scrutiny of the military. Of the prospective parliamentary candidates, 719 of them and 12 parties were vetoed (Jacoby, 2004, p. 147). The only parties allowed to contest were the center-right National Democracy Party, led by a retired army general; a center-left People’s Party, led by a former bureaucrat; and a catch-all Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* – ANAP), led by Turgut Ozal.

Therefore, the first post-coup elections were held under circumstances that could hardly be qualified as completely free and competitive. In addition to these restrictions on participation, the military regime also returned to its barracks only after gaining important tutelary powers and exit guarantees. To prevent excessive politicization of the bureaucracy and polarization of political parties, the new constitution gave important tutelary powers to the presidency and the military. In this new system, the president, representing the “locus of stateness” would have strong veto-powers over legislation as well as decision-making power in the appointment of all
high-ranking bureaucrats. The power of the parliament was further weakened. A highly centralized decision-making mechanism was established by enlarging the power of the prime minister and by empowering the cabinet to issue decrees having the force of law. The autonomy of universities and radio television broadcasting was restricted, and the powers of local governments were weakened.

The military government, in short, designed a national security state and a tutelary regime par excellence. Some of the tutelary powers were designed to ensure that President Evren and others on the National Security Council would be in a position from which they could watch over political processes. This included the automatic election of General Kenan Evren as president upon the passage of the 1982 constitution via referendum, the provision of a qualified veto power for the president over constitutional amendments for a six-year term, and the formation of a presidential council composed of five generals of the junta as a consultative organ for six years (Ozbudun 2000). With the inclusion of these transitional articles, the military retained a prominent presence at the highest level of decision-making.

The 1982 constitution also aimed at increasing the military’s tutelary powers in politics by changing the formation and authority of the NSC. Under Article 118 of the constitution, the number of military members was increased at the expense of civilians, and the authority of the council in national security policy-making was strengthened by requiring the Council of Ministers to give priority consideration to the recommendation of the NSC. Moreover, the National Security Council Law of 1983 defined national security in very broad terms, allowing the military greater scope of intervention – both internally and externally – and regulated the post of Secretary General of the NSC, which would be occupied by a full general, thus tipping the power balance inside the Council in favor of the military. In this context, the NSC’s agenda included any matter that was perceived to be relevant to national security (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997). Matters that were discussed in the NSC thus covered a wide spectrum including school curriculum, regulation of television stations' broadcasting hours, and abolition of the penal immunity of Members of Parliament from the (Kurdish) Democracy Party (Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 158).

Taken together, it is plausible to conclude that the 1982 constitution and subsequent legislation created a double-headed political system, in which the executive powers were shared between the government and the NSC (Gurbey, 1996, p. 13; Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 158; Sarigil, 2007, p. 134). In addition to these powers, the 1982 Constitution provided permanent military
presence in several civilian boards and agencies including the Council of Higher Education (YOK), the Higher Education Supervisory Board (YDK), and the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video, and Music (SVMDK). The military used these boards as useful platforms for controlling the universities, communications, and media as well as for ensuring that “national security” was correctly taken into account.

The new constitution also provided exit guarantees to the members of the military government by exempting them from judicial investigation and prosecution, and extended the military’s privileges in the legal system. State Security Courts consisting of one military and two civilian judges were constitutionally authorized to try cases involving crimes against the security of the state. The establishment of such an extraordinary judicial body not only conflicted with the principle of “natural judge”, but also provided the military judiciary a permanent role in the judicial process during the period of civilian government (Ozbudun and Yazici, 2004, p. 33). Finally, the exclusion of the decisions of the Supreme Military Council from the legality review of the judiciary increased the military’s autonomy in its internal affairs relating to matters of personnel (Ozbudun and Yazici, 2004, pp. 36-37). In short, the 1982 Constitution not only strengthened the TAF’s previous prerogatives but also granted additional ones that further institutionalized the military’s high level of autonomy and authority in the state structure.

Despite the TAF’s efforts to institutionalize its power, on 6 November 1983 the electorate contravened expectations of military leaders by voting for Ozal’s Motherland Party (41%), which formed the majority government by receiving 53% of the seats in the parliament.

Table 5: Election Results of 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November 6, 1983</th>
<th>ELECTIONS</th>
<th>TURNOUT</th>
<th>92.30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL PARTY</td>
<td>LEADER</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
<td>No. of MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>Turgut Ozal</td>
<td>45.14</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party</td>
<td>Necdet Calp</td>
<td>30.46</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Democracy Party</td>
<td>Turgut Sunalp</td>
<td>23.27</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANAP was formed by Turgut Ozal just before the 1983 elections as a leader-dominated, catch-all, center-right party. It featured all four tendencies of the political right: the conservatism of the Justice Party (AP), the Ottomanism/Islamism of the National Salvation Party (MSP), the nationalism of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the neo-liberalism advocated by the Republican Party in the United States and the Conservative Party in the UK. Turgut Ozal, along with his brothers Korkut and Yusuf and his son Ahmet, handpicked the majority of the parliamentarians, most of whom had “never dreamed of entering politics had the junta not
created a political vacuum by disqualifying hundreds of established politicians and opening the door to these outsiders” (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 207-208). Korkut, a well-known member of the Naqshbandi tariqa and ex-member of Erbakan’s MSP, recruited conservatives into the party while younger brother Yusuf and son Ahmet used their World Bank and US connections to recruit liberals and so-called “princes” (Onis, 2004). These “princes” were “bright young men” who had studied in the United States and were brought back to Turkey to oversee the economic liberalization program.99

Ozal’s program accelerated market reform, which had already been initiated in agreement with the IMF during military rule in 1980-83. Ozal, under the influence of the “Washington Consensus” followed a stabilization-cum-structural adjustment program supported by the key international institutions of the IMF and the World Bank. The macro-economic policy package included the devaluation of the Turkish lira and institution of flexible exchange rates, the maintenance of positive real interest rates and tight control of the money supply and credit, the elimination of most subsidies and the freeing of prices charged by state enterprises, reform of the tax system, and the encouragement of foreign investment. National production, distribution, and accumulation processes were opened to foreign actors.

Ozal also liberalized Turkey’s import regime, abolishing the protection walls around the internal market and letting external capital penetrate Turkish markets (Boratav et. al. 2000, p. 11). Parallel to this liberalization, Ozal promoted an export-oriented developmental model, liberalized capital accounts, privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and adopted fiscal austerity measures (Onis, 1991). The latter included the freezing of wages and salaries; the reduction in state expenditures for welfare, health, and education; and the introduction of a value-added tax. As the state internationalized through these processes, an internationally-oriented, primarily Islamist capital group in the domestic economy simultaneously emerged (Senalp 2007; Yeldan 2006).100

99 On Ozal’s princes, see Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalcin, Ozal Bir Davanin Oykusu (Istanbul: Dogan kitapcilik, 2001), pp. 304-306. Prominent examples of such “princes” included Rusdu Saracoglu, as the Governor of the Central Bank and Bulent Gultekin and Cengiz Israf, as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Privatization Administration, respectively, among others.
100 For example, right after the coup and for the first time in the history of the modern Turkish Republic, 14 multinational companies established an interest organization, Foreign Capital Association (YASED) (Senalp, 2007, p. 20). Although the new constitution did not let any public organization become member of any foreign peak organization (until decades later), the foreign capital could establish its own interest organization. This can be,
In keeping with the new hegemonic project of Islamic capitalism, ANAP pursued a dual policy of promoting a pro-Western economic discourse along with a pro-Islamic cultural discourse (Jacoby, 2004, p. 148). This combination of religiosity and export-orientated economics gave rise to a new group as the primary base of a neo-liberal/neo-conservative coalition: the Anatolian petite bourgeoisie, many of whom formed pro-Islamic, co-operative firms with considerable success (Jacoby, 2004, p. 149). Ozal’s government and key agencies belonging to the prime minister’s office played a central role in the redistribution of resources in a way that favored transnational capital and the emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie (Onder, 1998, p. 64).

While Turkish big industrial capital actors such as the Koc and Sabanci groups had the advantage of scale and infrastructure (i.e., an existing nationwide distribution network), the government used its strong position to transfer a great amount of internal and external resources in the form of IMF and World Bank credits to newly rising and export-oriented capital groups such as small- and medium-sized Islamic businesses (Boratav, 2005, p. 96). These enterprises, exploiting non-unionized workforces in which households could be incorporated in subcontracting deals, were able to capture the benefits of globalization and emerge as new regional industrial centers often referred to as the “Anatolian tigers” (Keyder, 2004). The owners of Islamic firms organized their own interest group, the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Mustakil Sanayici ve İsadamları Dernegi – MUSİAD), in 1990. MUSİAD and its constituency of Islamic entrepreneurs became economically empowered and independent as the state lost control of local capital and as the globalization process deepened (Bugra 1994; Hendrick 2009; Ozbudun and Keyman 2002; Yavuz 2006). Moreover, as Ozcan and Cokgezceen explain, “the spread of Islamic companies and their promised moral economic revival took root in social institutions often under the guiding leadership of a paternal figure who had indisputable authority and recognition” (2006, p. 147; quoted in Hendrick, 2009, p. 350). By the early 1990s, it became clear that Fethullah Gulen, who would build and expand his financial and cultural empire under the AKP government in 2000s, enjoyed just such authority and recognition. The result was that, under state tutelage, certain sections of the Islamist movement were able to move from the political periphery to the center (Gole, 1997).

according to Onder, considered as “an indicator of the class bias of the state and its changing nature” (1998, pp. 61-62).
To summarize, the military coup of 1980 was (ironically) instrumental in the Islamicization of society, which has grown in tandem with a rise of new counter-elite whose identity was mainly shaped by Islam (Heper 1991, p. 50; Robins, 1996, pp. 61-87). Those historically excluded Islamist movements such as Naqshbandis and the Nurcus/Gulenists activated their religious networks to seize the material and cultural rewards of these new policies and grew further under the Ozal administration (Kuru, 2005). In short, economic liberalization and cultural conservatism of the military and Ozal’s government facilitated the emergence of Islamists as the "best organized of the new publics" in the Third Turkish Republic (Kuru, 2005).

On the political front, Ozal’s government made no dramatic changes in the area of civil and political liberties and did not seem to be in favor of major democratization reforms. Ozal was primarily concerned with neo-liberal economic restructuring, which would be more difficult to implement under a liberal democratic regime. Nevertheless, there were some positive democratic developments during this period, including the partial liberalization of the freedom of press, the breaking of state monopoly over radio and television broadcasts, the repeal of martial law decrees in most of Turkey except in Istanbul and in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of the Southeast, and the adoption of the right to individual application to the European Commission of Human Rights.

The most important democratic change, however, concerned lifting the ban on the political party activity of pre-coup leaders. Although this constitutional amendment was implemented rather unwillingly by the Ozal government under pressure from pre-coup political leaders and the public, it was significant as it abolished the military’s control over the electoral process. The repeal of this article by a referendum enabled Turkey's best-known politicians including Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit, Alparslan Turkes, and Necmettin Erbakan to participate openly in the electoral process. Consequently, the early elections held in November 1987 constituted the first genuinely free balloting in the country since the 1980 coup. Thanks to the government’s manipulation of electoral law prior to the elections, however, the votes were disproportionately translated into representation. The double threshold and the creation of bonus seats by the Ozal’s Motherland Party (ANAP) government resulted in ANAP receiving 28.6% more seats in parliament than their share of votes in the electorate (Tursan, 2004). Holding 292 of 450 seats, Ozal headed the majority government until he was elected president in 1989. The table below outlines the differences between votes received and seats won by parties contesting the 1987 election.
Table 6: Election Results 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>No. of MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>Turgut Ozal</td>
<td>36.31</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrat People’s Party</td>
<td>Erdal Inonu</td>
<td>24.74</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Path Party</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>19.14</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
<td>Bulent Ecevit</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
<td>Necmettin Erbakan</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Action Party</td>
<td>Alparslan Turkay</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformist Democrat Party</td>
<td>Ayut Edabali</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In his relations with the military, Ozal followed a pragmatic policy. Although he did not make any legal changes in the institutional framework of Turkey’s CMR, Ozal was largely successful in establishing civilian supremacy over policy-making. Ozal's successful economic reforms, his high political capital arising from his strong leadership skills, his parliamentary majority, and his “willingness to take the lead in determining the security and defense policy” contributed to his success in establishing de facto political control over the armed forces (Kuloglu and Sahin, 2006, p. 97; Aknur 2005). Ozal’s 1987 appointment of his own candidate for Chief of General Staff, bypassing the military's preferred candidate, and more importantly his election to the presidency were milestones in the process of establishing civilian supremacy. From the establishment of the Republic until Ozal entered the office, all presidents except for one had been retired senior military commanders, and tradition held that the president should be a neutral, non-partisan figure (Hale, 1994, p. 282). Ozal’s election to the presidency was therefore a radical departure of the custom and a significant step towards the civilianization of Turkey’s political system.

Under Ozal’s presidency, the military’s role and influence in the national intelligence organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati – MIT) was largely eroded; up until the early 1990s, the military had enjoyed closed relations with MIT. Hiram Abas, the first civilian appointed as deputy undersecretary, stressed this in a letter to President Ozal:

In democracies, since the duty of protecting the regime against the population is not performed by the [secret] services, the military and the intelligence service need to not be too close. In democracies, because the mission of the intelligence is mainly focused on

101 Commenting on his decision to appoint General Necip Torumtay to be the General Chief of Staff, Ozal said, "Since 1960, no civilian government has appointed the General Chief of Staff itself. The position has been filled by automatic succession. From now on, this is going to be normalized. Governments should appoint the General Chief of Staff themselves according to merit". (Quoted in Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 162).
102 The only civilian President was Celal Bayar, the third President of the Republic.
other countries and because intelligence is considered a specialization, intelligence officers who have had on-the-job training and hands-on experience are preferred for the high ranks of the [intelligence] organizations. In our state, it is not yet clear which office MIT is attached to (quoted in Unlu, 2006, p. 161).

Shortly after Abas’ letter, Ozal approved the appointment of the first civilian undersecretary in November 1992. Since then, civilians have been appointed as undersecretaries and MIT gradually has been transformed into a more transparent, civilian-run institution, leaving behind its organic ties with the military.103

As president, Ozal also took the lead in a growing number of security and foreign affairs decisions. In particular, he played an active (albeit unconstitutional) role in formulating foreign and security policy during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 (Ozbudun, 1996, p. 131). His handling of this affair led the Chief of the General Staff, Necip Torumtay, to resign. The resignation of Torumtay stemmed from several factors. To start with, at the outset of the crisis when former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein launched an invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the General Staff took measures against both a possible Iraqi infringement of Turkish territory and a possible refugee crisis by moving a portion of land and air forces to the Southeast region.104 The appropriate stance against the invasion was discussed at the NSC on August 3, in which the NSC decided that Turkey would not close down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline or takes any steps against Iraq (Hale, 1992, p. 683). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 passed on August 6 to impose an economic embargo on Iraq brought the first challenge to Turkish decision-makers. Ozal, notwithstanding the reticence of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, parliament and the public toward becoming involved in the war, ordered closure of the pipeline unilaterally. Torumtay criticized the manner in which the decision was taken rather than the content of the policy in his memoirs. He was anxious about the possible tensions the decision might cause with Iraq, and the necessity of taking appropriate border monitoring, intelligence, and extra security measures. “I, as the Chief of Staff responsible to the Prime Minister for defense of borders, was not notified of the decision. I learned it from TRT” (Torumtay, 1994, p. 102). Foreign Minister Ali Bozer resigned on 10 October 1990 in protest of his scandalous exclusion from the Ozal-Bush meeting in Washington D.C; Defense Minister Sef’a Giray

103 After Koksal, Senkal Atasagun was appointed in 1998 and became the first civilian undersecretary to come from MIT ranks.
104 Troop levels were increased to 120,000 on the Iraqi border, pinning eight Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq.
followed with his own resignation on October 16. In his memoirs, Torumtay severely criticizes Ozal for his unilateral decision that bypassed what Torumtay described as “the established rules of the Turkish state tradition” (1993, pp.102-3). The trigger for Torumtay’s resignation came a day after a high-level meeting on 2 December 1990 between the president, prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister. The General Staff had prepared a plan of action for Turkish policy in the Gulf Crisis that had been accepted by the NSC and the Cabinet but then altered in their absence at this meeting (Hale, 1994, p. 292). An unsigned Council of Ministers decision to implement further security measures was sent to Torumtay after the meeting. Torumtay submitted his resignation the next day, citing “irregularities in the decision-making process” (quoted in Oguz, 2009, p. 95).

The Torumtay affair was important not just because it suggested that there were important differences in the views in Ankara on policy towards Iraq, but because its handling also indicated the supremacy of civilian power, even within the military’s own domain of professional expertise. As many observers noted, in the past, a chief of staff who strongly disagreed with the government would have issued a warning or even staged a coup instead of resigning (Ozbudun, 2000, p.119; Hale, 1994; Birand, 1991). Commenting on Torumtay’s resignation, however, Turgut Ozal argued that “it should be regarded as a generally normal incident and procedure, as in other advanced democratic countries, and it is significant in that it shows the distance Turkey has traveled along this road since 1980” (quoted in Hale, 1994, p. 293).

The cumulative developments in the dynamics of Turkey’s civil-military relations as outlined in this chapter led many students of Turkish politics to conclude that a satisfactory degree of civilian control over the military had been achieved and that Turkey was no longer fundamentally different from established Western democracies in that respect. For example, in Turkish Politics and the Military William Hale argues:

By the beginning of the 1990s it was apparent that the armed forces chiefs were beginning to abandon their traditional position of semi-autonomy within the state structure, in which defense policy was regarded as their private sphere, outside the control of the elected politicians….The Turkish Army’s political role was now weaker than any time since 1950s (1994, pp. 288-290).

Based on their study of the memoirs and public statements of three recent Chiefs of the General Staff, Metin Heper and Aylin Guney reached a similar conclusion: “as the Third Turkish Republic entered its second decade, civil-military relations came close to the liberal democratic

As the following chapter argues, however, a number of specific developments in the 1990s including the end of the Cold War, the rise of Islamist movements and ethnic separatist terrorism, and the weak multi-party coalition governments that followed Turgut Ozal’s sudden death enhanced the Turkish military’s political activism as the guardian of the country's territorial integrity and secular nature. The next chapter focuses specifically on this period, analyzing how domestic and international movements, actors, and processes in the immediate post-Cold War period enhanced the political status of Turkish military in relation to civilian actors.
4 THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND ORGANIC CRISIS IN TURKEY

Systemic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectively could undermine their legitimacy...[S]ustained inability to provide welfare, prosperity, equity, justice, domestic order, or external security could over time undermine the legitimacy even of democratic governments Huntington, 1996, p. 10.

The end of the Cold War and thus the urgent need for alliances upon which its bipolar structure was based had an important effect on civil-military relations throughout the world (Nye 1996, p. 151; Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2002, p. 13 and 2006, p. 12). Huntington observes that there has since been a broad diffusion and acceptance of the norms of military professionalism and civilian control by militaries around the world (1995, pp. 12-13). In addition, former members of the communist bloc pursued the goal of joining Western institutions such as the EU and NATO. Membership requirements stipulated by these institutions thus also helped the demilitarization process in these countries, which sought to return to democratic Europe (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002, p. 13-254; Keiswetter, 1997, pp. 3-7). For instance, NATO’s Partnership for Peace programs were able to diffuse the norms of civilian supremacy in candidate states (Nye 1996, pp. 154-155; Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. XXXIII). All these developments led to a global reduction in military size and expenditures as well as an increase in civilian control of militaries (Diamond and Plattner, 1996, p. IX).

One could justifiably expect these global developments to lead to the same outcome in Turkey, a Cold War ally of the Western bloc. This thesis argues, however, that the end of the Cold War failed to generate the same impact in the Turkish context due to the rise of threat perceptions and the low legitimacy and poor performance of civilian governments. This chapter, analyzing the period between 1991 and 2002, will begin by discussing how external threat perceptions of the Turkish Armed Forces affected patterns of civil-military relations in Turkey. The second section turns the focus to the domestic political context, emphasizing political fragmentation and declining legitimacy of political parties arising from electoral alienation. The final section discusses how the internal threats perceptions, i.e. the rise of Kurdish ethnic separatist and the Islamist movements, made the TAF once more the central institutional actor in Turkey’s political regime.

4.1 The End of the Cold War and the Changing External Security Environment

From the military’s perspective, rather than changing for the better as was hoped upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s security atmosphere has deteriorated in the post-Cold
War era. During the Cold War, Turkish security strategies paralleled those of NATO, and were mostly shaped by its location as a neighbour of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{105} Also a flank country on the European periphery, Turkey was well integrated into NATO’s structure largely because she was perceived as a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, as well as a contributor to the security of Europe. By the end of the Cold War, however, all these positive qualities were altered not only by the appearance of new zones of conflict on three sides of the country, but also by its perceived loss of strategic importance for the West. 13 of the 16 “instable” and “risky” regions identified in NATO’s MC 161 Document were in Turkey’s neighborhood.\textsuperscript{106} The crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo; the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Abkhazia; and the Iran-Iraq and the Gulf War all took place within the immediate vicinity of the Turkey. The dangers of involvement in such regional conflicts presented real and difficult security problems. The perceived claims of Russia, Greece, Iraq, Iran, and Syria on Turkish territory and the regional support for the PKK in fact further securitized the political atmosphere of the 1990s. Parallel to these developments, as the figures below clearly show, Turkish defense expenditure steadily increased in that period, while other NATO members decreased their military expenditures.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact, Turkey does not find itself in a secure environment. On the contrary, both the definition and the parameters of security have changed in Turkey, perhaps more than any for other NATO member. The Cold War had given structure and meaning to Turkish security for decades, and this structure and meaning defined what constituted a threat. With the end of Cold War, however, threats became asymmetric, unpredictable, and highly fluid. When these perceptions of internal and external threats are combined, it is clear that the end of the Cold War did not lead to softer security perceptions and a less securitized domestic agenda in Turkey.

In addressing the National Defense University in 1997, then-Deputy Chief of General Staff Cevik Bir gave a good example of this new security discourse. In accusing European

\textsuperscript{105} The sole exception to this was Turkey's conflict with Cyprus and Greece. Since 1974, Turkey developed security policies independent of NATO at the expense of straining the cohesion of NATO's southern flank.
\textsuperscript{106} Notably, the EU also considers 16 potential crisis regions likely to affect European security, selected by the ESDI rapid reaction force and NATO, as its areas of intervention. These regions are Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabagh, Georgia-Ossetia, Georgia-Abkhazia, Kosova, Sandjak, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Macedonian-Albanian border, Syria, Northern Iraq, Iran, and Belarus. The EU has also included Cyprus within the scope of possible peace-making and humanitarian assistance operations. See: Sermes Mat, “AGSK’nin Gelecegi” (The Future of ESDI), Ulusal Strateji, March 2003, p. 100.
politicians of having a “fairly narrow-minded strategic concept” and a rather “short-sighted approach when determining the new security borders of Europe”, Bir stressed Turkey’s geo-strategic location at “the epicenter of tension, unresolved conflicts and wars” of an area comprising the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East (February 1998). In line with this view, Hikmet Cetin, a former foreign minister and speaker of parliament, stated in a speech given at the Washington Institute that “Turkey is in the neighborhood of the most unstable, uncertain and unpredictable region of the world”, and that since the end of the Cold War the country “has turned into a frontline state faced with multiple fronts” (quoted in Mufti, 1998, p. 33). Even more drastic was the picture painted by Turkey’s former Minister of Defense, Hikmet Sami Turk: “In the midst of destruction and reconstruction, Turkey stood and continues to stand as an anchor of stability in its region. Geographic destiny placed Turkey in the virtual epicenter of a ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East encircling us” (quoted in Jung 2003, para.8).

**Map 1: State of Peace in the World 2010 (Source: Economist Intelligence Unit)**

Turkish security officers’ threat perceptions arising from these lingering uncertainties regarding its immediate neighborhood reached their peak when the relevance of NATO in the post-cold war era was opened up to discussion by Western Europeans. Perceiving its Western security connection and the anchor of its European vocation under threat, Turkish policy-makers immediately began searching for new strategies to offset the consequences of the end of the Cold

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107 The Economist Intelligence Unit has released its new “Global Peace Index,” which ranks 120 nations according to their relative peacefulness. The organization based the rankings on 24 peacefulness indicators, divided into three categories: (1) measures of ongoing domestic and international conflict, such as the number of external and internal conflicts fought between 2000 and 2005, the estimated number of deaths from external and internal conflicts, and relations with neighboring countries; (2) measures of societal safety and security, ranging from the level of distrust in other citizens to the level of respect for human rights and the rate of homicides and violent crimes; and (3) measures of militarization, such as military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people.
A previous attempt in this direction was President Ozal’s decision to participate in the Gulf War. Ozal believed that taking sides with the US in the Middle East would highlight Turkey’s potential strategic role in the emerging world order and help to re-anchor Turkey in the Western security structure. Turkey’s contribution to the Gulf War did not pay off as Ozal had hoped, however. Before the war, Turkey amongst all its neighbors had enjoyed strongest political and economic relations with Iraq. Thanks to a security cooperation scheme signed with Baghdad, the Turkish military was able to enter northern Iraq in its pursuit of Kurdish secessionist guerrillas of the PKK. Economically, in addition to the twin pipelines carrying Iraqi petroleum to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean, Turkey's exports to Iraq in the late 1980s had increased substantially, and the two countries became major trading partners. The Iraq War, however, completely reversed this trend. Sanctions and the war with Iraq not only resulted in substantial financial losses for Turkey, but negatively affected Turkey’s struggle against the PKK via the creation of a safe haven in northern Iraq and a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel (Jenkins, 2009, p. 13). Furthermore, Turkey’s political relations with Arab countries deteriorated, as Turkey's role in expelling Iraq from Kuwait was not viewed favourably by the Arab world.

Turkey’s relations with Syria became particularly tense following the Gulf War due to Syrian support of the PKK, opposition to Turkey’s construction of dams on the Euphrates River, and irredentist claims over Hatay province in south-central Turkey. Reports of close Greek-Syrian defense cooperation, including Syria’s granting of landing rights to Greek military planes, further alarmed the Turkish security establishment. In addition to Syria and Greece, Turkey’s relations with Iran, which had been contentious since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, further deteriorated due to Iran’s support of political Islam and the PKK. In light of these heightened concerns and deteriorating relations, it is plausible to

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108 Snyder (1996, p. 179) argued, for example, that "a reduced US presence in and commitment to Europe's security, lack of Western resolve in addressing the Balkan crisis, and an increasingly visible and aggressive Russian military presence in the Caucasus region, suggest to Turkey that its iron-clad links to NATO and the west are more fragile than they have been in several decades".
109 These included decreased tourism revenues, fees from transit trade and of Iraqi oil through the Turkish pipeline, remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq and Kuwait, suspension of construction contracts, and increased oil prices (Kirisci, 1997).
110 Turkish authorities frequently accused Iran of giving the PKK logistic support and encouraging its attacks inside Turkey. Iran rejected these accusations, but persistent PKK attacks in areas adjacent to the border have frequently brought tensions between the two countries. In 1997, the NSC had openly accused Iran of "supporting the PKK" which resulted in "security negotiations" (possibly containing the mutual return of political prisoners and refugees) between Iran and Turkey. However, the tension continued until the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in late 1998.

109
conclude that the end of Cold War posed higher security threats to Turkey. Assessing Turkey’s security situation at that point in time is particularly relevant for this study’s analysis of Turkish civil-military relations. As Desch notes, high levels of external threat, such as that experienced by Turkey following the Cold War, when combined with high internal threats, such as that posed to Turkey by the PKK, offers the least favorable environment for civilian control of the military (1999, pp. 15-17).

The exclusion of Turkey from the EU’s Southern and Eastern enlargement processes further increased the threat perceptions discussed above by creating within Turkey a strong sense of abandonment by her European partners. Turkey, once a major security contributor for Europe, had become a security burden for the EU. Turkey’s proximity to instabilities and threats, unstable economy, unconsolidated democracy, and Muslim identity were all perceived as burdens to the overall security and stability of the EU (Muftuler-Bac, 2000, p. 490; Bagci and Yildiz, 2004, p. 92). European perception of Turks as barbarian “others” also played an important role in Western European opposition to Turkey’s EU accession in the 1990s (Neumann, 1999).111 This historical European identification of Turks as “others”, gradually shaped since the 11th century, is still evident nine centuries later. As early as 4 March 1997, the Christian Democrat parties of Europe made their position on Turkish accession clear by declaring "the European Union [EU] is a civilization project and within this civilization project, Turkey has no place".112

The EU’s exclusion of Turkey from EU enlargement and its proposal of developing “a special relationship” in lieu of full membership reinforced Turks’ feelings of discrimination. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, comparing Germany’s policy of European enlargement with Adolf Hitler's "Lebensraum" policy for the German settlement of Eastern Europe, 113 claimed


112 The declaration was made by the European People’s Party, which is an EU-wide Christian Democrat Group. Chris Nuttall and Ian Traynor, "Kohl tries to cool row with Ankara", Guardian, March 7, 1997.

Turkey received discriminatory treatment. Yilmaz declared that Turkey would not accept anything that fell short of membership and would no longer participate in the European Conference process (Buzan and Diez 1999; Muftuler-Bac 1998). By the end of 1997, Turkey had cut off its political dialogue with the EU.

Another problem that chilled EU-Turkey relations and securitized Turkey’s Europeanization process during the 1990s arose from some European countries’ perceived support of the PKK, an internationally recognized terrorist organization. This perceived covert support of the separatist PKK heightened the Turkish public’s already-pervasive fear of loss of territory. This existential fear stems in great part from the historical legacy of the Treaty of Sèvres, which foresaw the creation of a Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey (Articles 62 and 64). Although the Treaty was never enforced, thanks to the successful national resistance movement against occupying Allied powers (1919-1922), it left its mark on Turkish authorities and the public (Jung, 2003). European support of the PKK was interpreted as an attempt to bring the boundaries outlined in Sèvres into force and thus substantially raised Turks’ threat perceptions.

Additionally, European support of PKK founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan further increased tensions between Turkey and her European partners. These tensions reached crisis-level when Ocalan was apprehended in Italy on 12 November 1998. Refusing to prosecute or extradite him to Turkey, Italy allowed Ocalan to fly to Greece after hosting him for two months. Although Ocalan was eventually captured in Kenya’s Greek embassy on 16 February 1999, the Turkish foreign and security bureaucracy was immensely frustrated with its European allies.

In a somewhat counterintuitive manner, Europe’s uncooperative approach actually served to reinforce the conviction of Turks that their security could be ensured only by fully integrating.
into the Western state system. This notion was reflected in Turkey’s national security policy document of 1997: “Turkey must maintain its target of full European Union membership. However, negative attitudes of some European countries should not be ignored… For Turkey's international integration, including privatization, all economic efforts must be accelerated” (Hurriyet, November 4, 1997). EU accession became perceived as a necessity by Turkey with the formation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which was comprehensively linked to the Atlantic Alliance at the NATO Atlantic Council of 23-25 April 1999 in Washington. This development affected Turkish strategic thinking in two distinct ways. First, it became clear that Turkey’s preferential strategic and military ties with the United States – cultivated after the end of the Cold War as a basis for its autonomy from the EU – were threatened by the US-EU convergence produced by NATO’s revision of its strategic doctrine (Aliboni and Pioppi, 2000, p 44). Second, Turkey’s exclusion from the decision-making procedures of the ESDI, despite Turkey’s associate membership in the Western European Union (the precursor of the ESDI), made Turkey’s entry into the EU vital, both economically and in terms of state security (Ibid, pp. 44-45). Turkish foreign and security establishments were also concerned with the country’s exclusion from the European Defense Agency, when it was the case that a non-EU country (Norway) could hold membership. These kinds of perceived European double standards aggravated the Turkish military’s security concerns.

In sum, rather than improving as many had hoped, Turkey’s security atmosphere deteriorated in the immediate post-Cold War period of 1990-1999. The securitization of Turkey’s political challenges would combine with the low capacity of civilian governments to cope with these challenges – discussed in detail in the next section – to result in the military’s political activism in the post-Cold War era.

The loss of public confidence in civilian governments, or what Gramsci refers to as “organic crisis”, would bolster the already substantial level of approval and trust in the military. This study suggests, however, that this political activism by the military in the 1990s proved to be counterproductive since it exacerbated the organic crisis and facilitated the strategic moderation of Islamists to overcome institutional constraints. The Gramscian concept of “organic crisis” is useful in capturing the nature of Turkish politics in the 1990s. The concept of

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117 Turkey wanted full and equal participation in decision-making processes of EU-led operations and on the usage of NATO assets in general (Bagcı and Yildiz, 2004, p. 82).
“organic crisis” refers to the national environment when “the existing options of articulation can no longer hold society together, and which will fall apart if a new agent (and model) of integration does not arise” (Tugal, 2009, p.24). Gramsci developed this concept in his analysis of the inter-war period, in which conditions involved not only a crisis of political economy but also a crisis of civilization involving a struggle between the old and the new. The organic crisis involved an attempt to put order into chaos: dialectic between reactionary and progressive forces in search of a solution in the form of a new order. A “crisis of authority is spoken of… this is precisely …a general crisis of the state” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210).

According to Gramsci, in times of organic crises the unity of the state and society and of structure and superstructure becomes looser; conventional cultural patterns no longer appear natural and even become unsatisfactory for large sections of the population. If the ruling power (in this case Kemalist elites) cannot deliver on the promise of unity, it leaves itself open to attacks from both inside and outside the state. At such a crisis point a power vacuum emerges in which the discredited moral and intellectual leadership of the hegemon (Kemalist elites) leads to a loss of consent, and erosion of support, from the subordinate classes (Butko, 2004, p. 59). It is also at such a moment that the counter-hegemonic force (in this case Islamist movements) is afforded its most favorable, and perhaps only, opportunity to replace the dominant ideology of the time that has become secondary, if not irrelevant, to the real needs of the people. It is at this juncture that the ruling class, although still dominant (i.e., force and coercion), is no longer hegemonic and open to counter-attacks (i.e., ideas and consent). “It is when this break between structure and superstructure occurs, when the ideas and beliefs used to garner the support and consent of the masses seem void and meaningless, that the counter-hegemonic force –if one is present – is allotted its best and perhaps only opportunity to supplant the current hegemon” (Butko, 2004, p. 48). This thesis suggests that Turkey was entrapped into such an organic crisis in the 1990s and that both Turkish moderate Islam and the transformation of Turkish civil-military relations emerged from this context.


During the 1990s, the Turkish state and political parties turned out to be too weak to cope effectively with the external and internal challenges and govern its society democratically and efficiently (Kramer 2000; Keyman and Onis, 2007, p. 18). The high political stability of the 1980s, which was largely a result of comfortable parliamentary majorities, was reversed in the 1990s with the fragmentation of the political center and the re-emergence of coalition
governments. The imposed one-party domination in the parliamentary sphere and the majority government it produced survived only as long as the pre-coup political parties were excluded from the political scene. When the previously excluded parties reentered electoral competition in 1987, the Turkish party system fragmented once more, resulting in the formation of eleven different governments between 1989 and 2002. The rise and fall of successive coalition governments during the 1990s underscored the rise of electoral volatility and political fragmentation in Turkey. With the exception of the 1991-95 period, most of the coalitions displayed in the table below were short-lived and failed to provide Turkey with stable and effective governance.

### Table 7: Turkish Governments 1989-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Gov.</th>
<th>Government Members</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Yildirim Akbulut</td>
<td>Nov. 9, 1989-June 23, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>DYP-SHP</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>Nov. 20, 1991-May 16, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHP-DYP</td>
<td>Erdal Inonu</td>
<td>May 16, 1993-June 25, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>ANAP-DYP</td>
<td>Mesut Yilmaz</td>
<td>March 6, 1996-June 28, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>ANAP-DSP-DTP</td>
<td>Mesut Yilmaz</td>
<td>June 30, 1997-Jan/ 11, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>DSP-MHP-ANAP</td>
<td>Bulent Ecevit</td>
<td>May 28, 1999-Nov. 18, 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The legitimacy and popular support of the center-left and center-right parties were also substantially weakened as a result of their poor political and economic performance. Turgut Ozal’s unexpected death in 1993 not only weakened his own ANAP, but also its main rival party when DYP leader Suleyman Demirel left the party to become president. Tansu Ciller, who replaced Demirel in 1993 as prime minister, failed to provide the strong leadership desperately needed in the economic difficulties Turkey faced.

In early 1994, soon after Ozal’s death and the reshuffling of Turkey’s political personalities, a huge budget deficit threw the Turkish economy into another serious economic crisis. Annual economic growth fell by 13 percentage points to -5.5% in 1994. Real wages for employees fell by 30% between 1990 and 1994, while inflation grew to more than 100%. The inability of the state to act as a “transformative” and “regulatory” agent worsened the already painful distributional consequences of neoliberal integration into global economic structures. Unsuccessful management of the migration flows from rural to metropolitan areas further
exacerbated social inequalities. Migration from East to West created millions that were “alienated, weakly integrated, resentful, and struggling to survive on a daily basis” (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan, 2000, p. 492).

Political parties were also damaged by widespread perceptions regarding their involvement in a number of major corruption scandals and extrajudicial (deep state) activities. Since the 1980s, in tandem with privatization and economic liberalization, a corrupt relationship between political and economic elites has developed. The shift of power from traditional bureaucracy to political elites and the latter’s formation of a vast system of extra-parliamentary funds provided a tremendous source of political patronage. As Gulalp explains “during the ISI period, the state intervened through routine bureaucratic procedures, and ‘rents’ arising from government policy were distributed to businesses on the basis of relatively impersonal criteria. In the post-1980 period, however, even the distribution of ‘rents’ was done highly selectively, on the basis of personalized criteria” (2001, p. 438). The ministries used these extra-parliamentary funds to distribute patronage and as a means of buying elections (Ayan and Aydin, 1987). Ozal’s foundation of new layers of bureaucracy such as the Privatization Administration and the Under-Secretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade – utilized to implement key economic reforms such as privatization and trade liberalization – further contributed to personalistic- and patronage-based rent distribution. As Ziya Onis asserts, this bureaucratic restructuring, lacking “proper bureaucratic tradition and culture” and combined with “Ozal’s weak commitment to legal norms and rule of law”, paved the way for recurrent corruption, notably in the subsequent decade of Turkey’s economic liberalization (2004, pp. 113-114).

In the 1990s, Turkey suffered not only from economic but also political corruption. Under Ciller’s premiership, Turkey witnessed its nadir in human rights practices, as she called for the implementation of “all possible measures” to end the Kurdish separatist terror. As a result, during the period of 1993-1996 extrajudicial killings, massacres, and village evacuations became commonplace. While such actions greatly increased Kurdish grievances, the state’s failure to hold those responsible for these crimes further weakened public trust in the state and existing political parties. The erosion of popular support for the center-right and center-left

118 The notion of deep state refers to a group of influential anti-democratic coalitions within the Turkish political system, composed of high-level elements within the intelligence services (domestic and foreign), Turkish military, security, judiciary, and mafia that that antagonistically work behind the scenes. For a more extensive discussion of the notion, see, pp. 290-337.
119 The Basbaglar massacre of 1993 was one of these incidents: Jenkins, 2008; 2009.
parties was clearly evident in the 1994 local elections and 1995 national elections in which the Islamist RP emerged as the winner. In the 1994 municipal elections, the Islamists took control of the two most important cities in Turkey (Istanbul and Ankara) as well as many other municipalities, averaging over 19% nationwide. Their electoral gains were extended the following year as the RP secured 21.4% of the vote and emerged from the December 1995 elections as the largest party in a fragmented parliament despite strong opposition from secular elites, particularly the media.

**Table 8: Elections Results 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>December, 24 1995</th>
<th>LEADER</th>
<th>% of VOTES</th>
<th>No. of MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
<td>Necmettin Erbakan</td>
<td>21.38</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>Mesut Yılmaz</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Path Party</td>
<td>Tansu Ciller</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
<td>Bulent Ecevit</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Deniz Baykal</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Action Party</td>
<td>Alparslan Turkes</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Rise of Political Islam

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Islamist movements proved to be the most instrumental actor in exploiting the new opportunity structures that emerged with cultural Islamicization and economic liberalization. As Sydney Tarrow asserts “state structures create stable opportunities, but it is changing opportunities within states that provide the openings that resource-poor groups can use to create new movements” (1994, p. 18). Islamic communities took advantage of such changing opportunities as neo-liberal restructuring, the introduction of Islamist interest-free global financing, and the country’s integration into the global economy to mount a (thus far) successful campaign, intellectually and culturally preparing the ground for a passive counter-revolution (Tugal, 2009).

From a political standpoint, Islamists have steadily increased their share of the vote since the mid-1980s. Under Necmettin Erbakan’s leadership, the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) won 8% in 1987, 16% in 1991, and 21% in 1995. The RP, the successor of the National Order and National Salvation parties (which were closed in 1971 and in 1980 respectively), was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1983 as the third party generated out of the National View Movement (*Milli Gorus Hareketi* – MGH) tradition. The National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP), formed in 1970 by Erbakan with the help of renowned Naqshbandi leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku, was the first political party that explicitly articulated Islamic identity in the political domain. The
party’s charter identified imitative Westernization and disestablishment of Turkey’s Ottoman Islamic heritage as the root cause of the country’s problems and offered a new identity respecting Ottoman-Islamic history and the development of technology and industrialization as a cure. The Constitutional Court, however, closed the party a year after its formation on the grounds of its anti-secularism. The members of the MGH were quick to reorganize, forming the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP) in 1973, again under Erbakan’s leadership. During the 1970s, despite its marginal vote, the MSP succeeded in participating in the governing of the country as the small coalition partner of the “National Front” governments of Suleyman Demirel. While doing so, they began staffing bureaucracies of national education and justice with like-minded individuals.

The 1980 coup was the critical turning point in Turkey’s new economic strategy and in the rise of political Islam as a populist movement. Under the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" ideology in the state structure, the definition of nationhood shifted to an Islamic conception that had its origins in the Ottoman Empire. In the post-1983 regime, political elites led by civilian Prime Minister Turgut Ozal increasingly made references to the significance of the Islamic identity of the Turks, and Islamicization gradually extended to national education. Although such a shift was probably “prompted by an urge to fight communism rather than by a genuine renewed interest in Turkish identity, it led to a legitimation of the ‘cause of the just’ represented by the Islamic periphery” (Kedourie, 1996, p. 190). Islam had finally been brought from the periphery to the center of Turkish politics as the antidote for communism, not only ideologically, but also practically via large waves of internal migration. Rural lifestyles, sets of values, preferences, and cultural codes not only burst into the metropolitan arena but were also poised to take over the values hitherto dominant in that urban environment (Kahraman, 2008, p. 27).

The RP succeeded in exploiting people’s alienation from the political system by redefining itself as a party for radical change as opposed to the National Salvation Party’s “conservative" religious movement of the 1970s. As an ideology blending Ottomanism, nationalism, modernism, and Islamism, the MGH’s original emphasis on ethics and industrialization shifted to a focus on identity and justice in the 1980s (Yavuz, 2000). The MGH-based new party’s name, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), clearly conveys Erbakan’s pragmatic embrace of the equal distribution of income as an objective within the discourse of the Just Order (Akman, 2010, p. 3). In addition to its emphasis on Muslim identity claims, its strong commitment to social justice, and the doctrinal articulation of the quest by conservative-
peripheral groups to receive their share of the benefits gained from modernization and development helped the RP to increase its vote share. In addition to an ideological appeal, the RP’s highly active grassroots mobilization and its superb organization substantially contributed to its success (Ozbudun, 2000; White 2002, p. 274). Unlike mainstream Turkish parties, which are notably elite in their orientation and lack substantive organic ties with their voting base, the RP was able to develop massive support at the grassroots level through an extensive organizational structure.\(^{120}\)

Although the RP was hardly a militant Islamist organization, it was clearly an anti-system party strongly against what it considered “Western imperialism”. The RP rejected the founding principles of the Republican regime: civic Turkish nationalism, secularism, and its Western vocation. Erbakan described Welfare’s ideology as one with a national view (\textit{milli gorus}), dismissing all the other parties as simply imitations of the West. The RP, however, was very critical of Turkish nationalism due to the perception that it undermined Muslim identity and generated superfluous and artificial ethnic grievances. Erbakan therefore favored the renewal of Muslim solidarity and \textit{tariqas} (religious brotherhoods), which were for him the only means to ameliorate ethnic tensions. Erbakan’s 1994 speech in the predominantly Kurdish city of Bingol is illustrative in this sense:

All parties except RP are parties of falsehood. They are all almost same. They are \textit{minions of the infidel powers}. What did they say to the people of this country? Follow us and give up your religion. They harmed both religion and nation. When starting school in the morning assembly, the children of this country used to begin with “in the name of God”. You changed them and made them say “I am Turk, I am brave, I am hardworking”. On the other hand, when you said that, as Muslim of the Kurdish origin may feel it is within his right to say: “really, in this case I am a Kurd, I am more brave, I am more hardworking. \textit{In the near future, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly is controlled by the Muslims, everyone will get his equal right without any bloodshed}” (Quoted in Cook, 2007, p. 112, emphasis added).

According to Erbakan, the Westernization program of the Republic stemmed, in fact, from a “defeatist psychology” and was “an insult to the Turkish nation” (Quoted in Cook, 2007, p. 113). The elite’s drive for Westernization had sacrificed key aspects of Turkish culture and the

\(^{120}\) For example, 16 provincial organizational committees were further divided into district committees, which reviewed neighborhood organization through periodic inspections. Neighborhood organizers appointed street representatives that represented Welfare’s presence at ground level, even in the poorest neighborhoods. Party representatives were also careful to attend communal events, often distributing municipal welfare services in visible but very local forums.
sacred responsibility to fellow Muslims. Erbakan also criticized Turkey’s economic integration into the West, which he argued brought Turks very little in terms of material benefits. Turkey’s financial relations with Western countries and institutions had undermined Turkish industry, forcing the country to purchase expensive imports and accumulate crippling debt. Erbakan, therefore, proposed a loosening of relations with the US, Europe, and Israel in favour of stronger ties with Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Iran, which were considered to be Turkey’s natural partners. This neo-Ottoman policy of Muslim solidarity, Erbakan believed, would resolve Turkey’s humiliating position “at the gates of Vienna” and would place Turkey in a position of international leadership.

The RP was also a firm opponent of Turkish secularism. In a speech to the National Assembly on 23 March 1993, Erbakan openly advocated for a “plurality of legal systems”, going so far as to ask RP deputies on 13 April 1994 to consider whether the change in the political system sought by the party would be “peaceful or violent”. Another RP deputy, Sevki Yilmaz, openly described the party’s goal as establishing an Islamist state:

Our mission is not to talk but to implement the war plan as a soldier in the army… The question Allah will ask you is this: Why, in the time of the blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction of an Islamic State? Erbakan and his friends want to bring Islam to this country in the form of a political party”.

Kayseri mayor Sukru Karatepe expressed similar thinking as he declared on 10 November 1996:

This system must change. We have waited; we will wait a little longer. Let us see what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive their resentment, rancor, and hatred that they feel in their hearts.

This anti-Western and anti-secular stance of the RP created an informal secularist opposition bloc led by Istanbul-based big businesses and their media holdings, the military, the labor unions, and several other civil society organizations. In the lead-up to the 24 December 1995 elections, center-oriented media including Hurriyet, Milliyet and Sabah began a strong anti-

121 Erbakan’s view of the Customs Union was not much different; according to his opinion, which seems to reflect at least a bit of truth, “Turkey’s entry to the Customs Union without being a member of the EU would amount to accepting to live in servants’ quarters next to the doghouse in the garden of a manor”: Gumruk birligi anlasmasini yirtariz [We will tear off the agreement of customs union]. (1995, Dec. 18). Sabah, p. 21
123 Ibid
124 Ibid.
RP campaign. As Ahmet Uysal’s (2003) Ph.D study of media coverage of December 1995 elections shows, the news and opinion columns devoted a great deal of coverage to how the way of life advocated by the RP would harm the modern way of life that Turkey had acquired since the establishment of the Republic. While Milliyet claimed, for instance, that the RP would reverse the gains of Ataturk’s reforms \(^{125}\), Hurriyet wrote that “in this election people will decide whether to be modern, contemporary and a part of Europe, or to adopt a way of life similar to the one in Iran”.\(^{126}\) Opinion columnists also widely condemned the RP for exploiting religious sentiments for political gain.

Political leaders opposing the RP defined it as an anti-system party, criticizing its anti-Westernism, perceived insincerity, and anti-secularism at every opportunity. DYP leader Tansu Ciller, for example, argued that the RP “want[ed] to take the country backward”\(^{127}\) and lobbied in Western capitals by showing herself as the modern face of Turkey. Former CHP leader and then-Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP) leader Bulent Ecevit claimed that it had become obvious that the RP was a party of takiyye (dissimulation)\(^{128}\), condemning the party for provoking “discrimination between the Alevi and Sunni sects” and “trying to take back the women’s rights that Ataturk gave them years ago”.\(^{129}\) Ecevit added that the “DSP has not left the arena for backward-minded ones that try to destroy the republic under the mask of ‘just order’; they want to drive the country into the darkness of the Middle Ages and try to exclude women from politics.”\(^{130}\) ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz criticized the RP for dividing people as “Muslims voting for the RP vs. disbelievers voting for others”.\(^{131}\)

Business elites and their media holdings also tried hard to prevent the RP from coming to power. TUSIAD, the main representative of the bourgeoisie in Turkey, used tactics similar to those employed in 1979 against the Ecevit government, posting advertisements in the media inviting the two secular center right parties to cooperate against the RP (Ozel, 1997). Prominent civil society organizations also expressed their discontent with RP rule, called on DYP deputies to vote “no” to a coalition with the RP. They argued that those deputies “have a historical

\(^{127}\) Uc yilda AB uyesiyiz [We will be an EU member in three years]. (1995, Dec. 16). Sabah, p. 19.
\(^{130}\) Ibid.
opportunity” to “not take the country into darkness”. Some women organizations and feminist intellectuals declare that they would “sue Mrs. Ciller, if she makes a coalition government with RP”. Indicative of the volatility and personal interest-based nature of politics of the time, Ciller, despite her harsh condemnation of Erbakan’s party, would in fact form a coalition with the RP a few months later in exchange for Erbakan’s closure of her corruption dossiers.


Despite the above-mentioned strong opposition of secular elites and attempts by other parties and civil society groups to arrange a coalition that would exclude the RP from power, Ciller’s agreement to form a coalition government with the RP brought Necmettin Erbakan to power as Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister on 28 June 1996. While the military remained silent both before and after the formation of the RP-DYP government, the media continued its pressure, accusing Ciller of undermining secularism for her own personal interests. It was argued that the RP-DYP government “does not have a moral basis”, given the corruption allegations that led Ciller to agree to the RP-DYP coalition. Others described the formation of this government as blackmail, a partnership of shame, and an immoral alliance.

The military eventually joined the anti-government camp, however, as the RP-led coalition government initiated certain actions and policies that created unease within the secularist establishment. These actions included Erbakan’s early foreign policy activism, such as state visits to Iran and Libya and efforts to establish an economic bloc of Muslim countries (the D-8 – sometimes referred to as Muslim Eight – compromised of Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Egypt, and Nigeria as an alternative to the G-7 of leading industrial countries). Erbakan also proposed the formation of an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic Common Market, an Islamic Single Currency, the integration of Islamic defense arrangements, and an organization dedicated to Islamic cultural cooperation. Erbakan further established close

132 Sabah, 1996, July 2, p. 11.
135 Toker, M. (1996, June 30). Boylesi ne dunya gordu ne Turkiye [Neither world nor Turkey has seen such as this]. Milliyet, p. 13.
138 In October 1996, at a development conference held in Istanbul, Erbakan proposed the establishment of the D-8. The foreign ministers of these eight countries met in January 1997 in Istanbul to formalize its establishment.
relations with radical, violent Islamic opposition groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, Palestinian Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah.

Each of these proposals created domestic and international concerns. In particular, when Erbakan sat silently in Muammar Kaddafi’s tent as the Libyan leader accused Turkey of being virtually “under occupation” by NATO and the United States and called for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, the secularist establishment became wary along with Washington observers. On the domestic level, the concerns of secularists were further increased by certain practices and discourses of the members of the RP. These included the RP’s proposals of lifting the ban on headscarves in public institutions, changing working hours during Ramadan to bring them more into line with religious requirements, and the perceived partisan staffing of the civil service by pious functionaries. At the municipal level, RP mayors who came to power in 1994 demonstrated their ability to provide better municipal services than their predecessors, but also attracted controversy of their own (Mecham, 2004, p. 343). Popular increases in the provision of local services were accompanied by new restrictions on the sale of alcohol, a surge in mosque construction, and changes in local symbols and landmarks to reflect a religious tone. A plan to build an imposing mosque in the heart of modern Istanbul while Tayyip Erdogan was mayor of the city, for example, led to outrage among the secular establishment. Controversy also erupted when leaders of religious brotherhoods (tarikat) were invited to participate in a Ramadan dinner at the prime minister’s residence, opening Erbakan up to accusations that the seat of government had been overrun with clerics.

The military establishment was particularly discontent with the prime minister’s ostentatious disregard of the formally illegal status of these orders and his allowance of them to enter one of the highest public institutions with their religious attire. Perceiving the reception as official recognition and support of these religious orders, military leaders immediately took action. On 17 January 1997, the Chief of General Staff Hakki Karadayi invited President Suleyman Demirel to TGS headquarters to brief the president on the state of political Islam in Turkey. As Commander of Naval Forces Dervisoglu later stated, it was this briefing that initiated the February 28 Process (Cevizoglu, 2001, p. 62). The TGS Chief enumerated 55 items he

deemed to be "reactionary". Demirel declared that half of these items were based on hearsay, encouraging Karadayi to communicate with the government and soften the memorandum's wording (Heper and Gunev, 2000). Ten days later, during the 27 January 1997 meeting of the NSC, President Demirel accepted the military commanders’ proposal to include Islamic reactionarism\(^{140}\) in the agenda of next meeting that would be held on 28 February 1997.

The month of February opened with an episode that further convinced the TAF leadership that the threat of Turkey going “backward” was real and that they needed to take matters into their own hands. On 31 January 1997 the RP-governed Sincan municipality organized a night of “Al-Quds” [Kudus] in Ankara under posters of Hamas and Hezbollah, ignoring the increasing tension both in state and public institutions. One of the speakers was the Iranian ambassador who called for Sharia rule in Turkey and asked Turks to obey the “precepts of Islam”.\(^{141}\) The organizer of the convention, Mayor Bekri Yildiz, strongly criticized the ban on headscarves, which he defined as “their flag of honor”, and announced that they would bring Sharia to Turkey “if necessary by force”.\(^{142}\) The event and the speeches made by both the RP’s municipal leaders and the Iranian ambassador were sensationally covered in headlines. The next day, when reporters flooded to Sincan to cover municipal events, a female reporter was beaten by a group of religious fundamentalists. The media elites reacted furiously, empowering and even provoking the military to react.\(^{143}\)

Encouraged by these calls, the Land Forces Command reacted the next day by sending a column of tanks through Sincan, declaring it as a part of a “pre-planned” military exercise. From this point on, the military’s influence in Turkish politics increased due to the support of media elites. Uysal’s (2003) study of media coverage of the tanks’ march shows that only 23% of the news accounts showed opposition to military involvement in politics. Pro-military frames were dominant in the mainstream press with a total of 77% of the related frames. All of these

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\(^{140}\) The reactionarism is considered to be a political ideology that aims to restructure the state administration of Turkish republic according to Islamic principles’ (Sabah, Feb. 9, 1997). It is also seen as a counterrevolution (Gulalp 1995; 1999) against Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s wholesale cultural westernization project (Yavuz 2000, Atasy 2000, Kadioglu 1998).

\(^{141}\) Iran’in Ankara Buyukelcisi Sincan Belediyesi’nin duranteligi Kudus gecesinde serayi cagrisi yapti. [Iran’s Ankara Ambassador called for Seriat at the Kudus night organized by Sincan Governor] . (1997, Feb. 2). Sabah. Also see: TBMM, 2012, p. 54.


\(^{143}\) Ali Sirmen from Milliyet, for example, openly called upon state institutions (i.e., the military) to react to this open challenge to the secular regime: Sirmen, A. (1997, February 3). Baska ne olsun? [What else should happen?]. Milliyet.
developments not only accelerated the February 28 Process but also demonstrated how the media and the Turkish middle-class privileged secularism over democracy. The senior journalist and an important opinion-maker Hasan Cemal from Milliyet, now the military’s most fervent critic, welcomed the tanks at the time. He argued women worried more about “Sharia’s sound” than that of “tanks… because they feel threatened directly. Because they think that an authoritarian regime like Iran may one day force them into black burkas, slavery, inferior class”.

It was not only the military officers, media elites and civil society organizations that reacted against the RP’s actions (Heper and Guney, 2000, p. 641). President Demirel also sent four different letters to Erbakan warning him about anti-secular practices, including the Islamicization of the Ministry of National Education, the judiciary, and the Ministry of Justice. President Demirel wrote to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan on 4 February 1997:

The characteristic of the Turkish republic is defined by the Article 2 of the Constitution as ‘democratic, secular, and social state based on the rule of law’. Article 4 of the constitution writes that these could not be altered or proposed to be altered. Articles 120, 121 and 122 stipulate the provisions regarding the protection of the state. As a response to the rise of serious concern both in public and in the state institutions about the threats and risks directed against the founding principles of the Republic and the foundation of the State, I would like to bring to your attention the need to implement “intact” those laws enacted to safeguard secularism.

As stipulated by Article 174 of the constitution, the revolution laws should be implemented. Penetration of fundamentalism into state institutions; schools, local governments, universities, the judiciary and the military; should be prevented.

Kindly submitted for necessary action
Suleyman Demirel
Head of the State” (Hurriyet, 1997, Aug. 25).

A few days earlier, on 1 February 1 1997, Turkish civil society initiated the country’s biggest collective action protest against the government’s interaction with elements of Turkey’s “deep state” and illegal activities, a relationship that had become evident with a car accident in Susurluk on 3 November 1996. The car accident was scandalous, because the passengers included the former deputy chief of the Istanbul police; a parliament deputy of Ciller’s DYP who

144 The columnist Rauf Tamer, from Sabah, for example, wrote “our principle of secularism is bigger than our love for democracy…we are pleased even by the tank sound. The reason why we give in to compromises of democracy is that we can find democracy again but we cannot find secularism once we lose it”. Tamer, R. (1997, February 5). O ses [That sound]. Sabah.
146 By deep relations, I refer to all those political practices and arrangements between state authorities and criminal bodies, deliberate or not, which are usually repressed rather than acknowledged.
led a powerful Kurdish clan; and Abdullah Catli, a criminal on the Interpol's red list, a wanted Mafia hitman a convicted heroin smuggler, and an accomplice of Mehmet Ali Agca in the assassination attempt of the Pope John Paul II.147 Catli was found dead at the scene of the accident possessing an official VIP passport and six different sets of identity documents.148 Furthermore, Catli was apparently on his way to an assassination campaign located in a seaside resort where all three passengers were residing along with then-Interior minister and ex-chief of the national police force Mehmet Agar.

The Susurluk incident, by revealing the extent of corruption within the state mechanism, created public outrage and rift. Although the opposition and large sections of public opinion pressured the Islamist RP and the DYP coalition government for a deep investigation, Prime Minister Erbakan tried to cover up the incident by calling the allegations concerning the deep state “nonsense” and humiliating the protestors by calling them “gulu gulu dancers”.149 Former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, who was suspected of managing the gang, included Catli in her embrace of both "those who died for the state and those who killed for the state" as heroes. As a reaction to the government’s inaction in the face of this scandal, millions began to turn off their lights for one minute every evening at 9:00, in what was called “one minute of darkness for enlightenment”.150 It is estimated that on 15 February 1997 approximately 30 million people participated in this signal of protest.151

The National Security Council (NSC) met on 28 February 1997 in the wake of these developments. It was during this nine-and-a-half hour meeting that the members of the NSC unanimously agreed that “Groups aiming to create an Islamic republic based on Sharia law in Turkey constitute a multi-directional threat to the democratic, secular social-law state as defined by the Constitution” (Gunay, 2001, p. 17).

The military High Command then presented a list of 18 specific, concrete measures to the

http://haber.gazetevatan.com/hocanin-hafizalara-kazinan-sozleri/362134/1/Haber
151 Aktan, H. (2004, October 26). Zalimin zulmu varsa mazlumun taktigi var [If the tyranny has the oppression, the oppressed has the tactic]. Birgum.
government to fight against this threat.\textsuperscript{152} The essence of the NSC’s measures was the elimination of Islamic influence and sympathizers within the state and the placement of restrictions on religion-based “civil society”. These measures included: stricter enforcement of laws concerning Islamist organizations and Sufi religious orders; extension of compulsory education from five to eight years, re-establishment of state control over Quran courses, and prevention of Islamist infiltration in state bureaucracies including universities and the judiciary; non-employment of Islamist personnel expelled from the military by other public agencies and prevention of the initiatives that aimed at solving the country's problems on the basis of "ummah" (religious community) rather than "nation".

Erbakan unwillingly signed NSC Decision No: 406 and sent it to the Council of Ministers for ratification, with little apparent interest in enforcing it. Civil society organizations mobilized to pressure the Council of Ministers for the ratification of the NSC’s measures. The chairs of the two largest trade union confederations (TURK-IS and DISK), the chair of the Turkish Confederation of Small Traders and Artisans (TISK), and TUSIAD jointly declared their full support of the NSC resolutions on 5 March 1997.\textsuperscript{153} In the following days, the Chairman of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) said that the TOBB would be “the pursuer of the implementation of the NSC resolutions” and that its members would “openly express their uneasiness with the government in every platform”.\textsuperscript{154}

Under this intense pressure, the Council of the Minister ratified NSC Decision No: 406 on 13 March 1997. However, nothing was done to implement this decision, as RP officials privately insisted that the party could not afford to implement the measures without alienating its grassroots support.\textsuperscript{155} Following this stagnation, in April the military changed its National Military Strategic Concept (\textit{Milli Askeri Strateji Konsepti} – MASK) from targeting the Kurdish separatist and external threats of interstate war to defining “reactionary Islam” as the number one enemy to the country’s founding ideology and unity. On 29 April 1997, the NSC finally adopted

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[152] The list can be found in Appendix. It was prepared by the Undersecretariat of the NSC and the Western Working Group (\textit{Bati Calisma Grubu}– BCG), an intelligence-gathering unit on Islamic fundamentalism founded by Guven Erkaya within the Naval Forces Command.
\item[153] \textit{Hurriyet}, 1997, Mar. 5.
\item[154] \textit{Hurriyet}, 1997, Apr.1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
a new National Security Policy Document (Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi – NSPD) that identified Islamic fundamentalism and separatist terror as the primary security threats. The repression of anti-secular movements, believed to be trying “to infiltrate the army”, had become “first priority”.

The day after the adoption of the new NSPD, the Office of the TGS began giving briefings about Islamic fundamentalism to the members of the Constitutional Court, Court of Appeals, Council of State, university rectors, and journalists. The media covered the military’s briefings with a strong pro-military attitude. The daily Sabah even carried the headline “Turkey is Proud of You” (1997, June 11). In these briefings, military leaders shared their concerns about the economic, social, and political rise of Islamic reactionarism, which is defined as “defending a project of state and society that is based on religion” (Savas, 2001, p. 95).

The increasing number of students graduating from the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (Imam Hatip Okullari) were particularly emphasized as an important source of concern in these briefings. According to military intelligence, even though the annual need for clerics in the late 1990s was around 3,000, every year more than 50,000 students were graduating from these schools. In 1980, there were 588 imam hatip schools; by 1986 this figure increased by 22% to 717. The number of students enrolled in these schools also increased by 34%, from 178,000 to 240,000. The ratio of imam hatip students to general high school students increased from 1 in 37 in the 1965-66 academic year to 1 in 10 by 1985-86 (Atasoy, 2005, pp. 155-156).

The vast majority of the graduates of these schools did not go on to become preachers or prayer leaders; instead, many went on to study at university in fields other than religious studies. The parallel expansion of higher education during this time thus produced increasing numbers of religiously-oriented university students, especially in the fields of political science and public administration (Waxman, 2000, p. 15). For instance, in 1987 40% of Ankara University intakes for the public administration department were graduates from imam-hatip schools (Ibid).

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157 Likewise, numerous independent courses of religious instruction had begun to emerge in contravention of both Turkish law and the constitution itself, which required state control of religious education. According to a military intelligence report, 1,685,000 students attended the illegally offered Koran courses in the 1996-97 academic year; this number had been doubling every year during the 1990s (Heper and Guney, 2000, p. 640). Independent mosques beyond state control were also increasing in number. Since the 1980s, more than 2000 Qur’an schools and 15,000 mosques were opened, and the share of public money going to the Directorate of Religious Affairs was increased from 59.4 billion Turkish liras in 1986 to 950.8 billion in 1990 (Tursan, 2004, p. 228; Ayata, 1996, pp. 44-45).
1992, this figure had risen to an astonishing 60% (Salt, 1995, p. 19).

Graduates of *imam hatip* schools, most of whom came from middle or lower class families, were thus increasingly well-placed to enter the state bureaucracy. Many graduates went on to attain significant political power (Waxman, 2000, p. 15; Yavuz, 1998, p. 32). Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s such as Tayyip Erdogan entered the RP, while others entered the officially secular ANAP and DYP. *Imam hatip*-educated Turks also entered the ranks of business, becoming the so-called "Anatolian tigers" of the late 1980s and 1990s discussed in the previous chapter.

In addition to the *imam hatip* schools’ increasing presence, the rise of green capital was also one of the major concerns expressed in the military briefings. A military intelligence report drafted by the Western Study Group (*Bati Calisma Grubu* – WSG) claimed that, by 1997, 20 Islamist brotherhoods controlled 4,000 businesses, including four holding companies and 11 financial institutions worth $540 million. Furthermore, this report declared that Islamic holding companies in Turkey held funds from Turkish workers abroad collected by radical Turkish Islamic organizations supporting the cause of political Islam in Turkey.

These briefings were welcomed by many social and political actors including political parties, the media, and CSOs. According to CHP leader Deniz Baykal, the military had “helped to unmask RP by working like a democratic mass organization…by creating a public opinion pressure without interrupting the democratic regime”. On May 21, the chairs of Turkey’s five largest CSOs – TURK-IS, DISK, TOBB, TISK and TESK – issued an unprecedented joint statement declaring:

Democratization had been stopped. The fundamental institutions of democracy are being eroded. The freedom of the press is faced with armed and economic assaults….The modern secular Republic founded by Ataturk is under threat. The fundamental characteristics of the Turkish Republic are being eroded, reactionary movements are supported, and our country is pushed into darkness. Today religious reaction had become a major danger.

The next day, the public prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the RP on charges of acting against Article 24 of the constitution that prohibits the following: “to

exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets”.

The Military Commanders also continued to work behind the scenes, discreetly lobbying members of the DYP in an attempt to persuade them to withdraw from the coalition with the RP.

This process of intense political, social, and military pressure that eventually forced the RP-DYP coalition government to resign is referred to as a “post-modern coup”, while the events that followed the 28 February 1997 NSC meeting are referred to as the “February 28 Process”, as noted above. This can be considered a process of securitization, during which “Islamic capital” was boycotted and prosecuted in order to eliminate financial sources for Islamic movements and the political leaders of Islamist movements and their representatives in the media were put under stricter control.

On 17 January 1998, the RP was closed and Erbakan along with five other leadership figures were banned from politics for a period of five years “because of evidence confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic”. The dissolution of the RP, rapidly replaced by the similarly-oriented Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP), was not the end of difficulties for Islamists. Despite its majority in parliament, in the absence of Erbakan the FP was overwhelmed by internal disputes about leadership and ideological positioning, and quite justifiably feared facing the same fate as the RP. In addition, one of the leading figures of what was labeled the “‘pro-change’ younger generation” of the new party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was sentenced in April 1998 to a ten-month prison term for “inciting hatred”. On 10 March 2000, Erbakan was convicted under Article 312 of the Penal Code for “promoting enmity” along religious lines, a charge stemming from the aforementioned 1994 speech in which he referred to parliamentarians as "infidels".

On 22 June 2001, the Constitutional Court closed the FP on the

166Erbakan’1 312 vurdu [Erbakan is knocked on by 312]_.(2000, Mar. 11). Radikal
grounds that it was a continuation of the RP and was committed to undermining secularism.\textsuperscript{167}

Islamists also continued to be objects of critical scrutiny outside of the explicitly political sphere. In 1999, Islamist neo-Nurcu Movement leader Fetullah Gulen came under intense media attention. Until that point, Gulen had close maintained a relationship with the political leadership, including Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, Tansu Ciller and Bulent Ecevit, who helped Gulenist schools to get international permissions. The activities of the Gulen community became an object of suspicion and fear, however, after Turkish TV channel ATV aired footage taken in Gulen’s sermons on 18 June 1999. The recordings are perceived to articulate Gulen’s aspirations for an Islamist regime as well as the methods that should be used to attain that goal. In the sermons, Gulen seems to imply the idea that “without prior successes in what Gramsci calls the war of position on the cultural front, a seizure of state power would only prove transitory if not disastrous” (Butko, 2004, p. 57):

You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers ... until the conditions are ripe... The time is not yet right. You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey... The work to be done is [in] confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all in confidence... trusting your loyalty and secrecy. I know that when you leave here [just] as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must discard the thoughts and the feelings that I expressed here...\textsuperscript{168}

Gulen responded to these videotape broadcasts with articles published in Aksiyon magazine (owned by the Gulen movement) and in a TV interview with Show TV anchor Reha Muhtar on 22 June 1999. Gulen denied all allegations that he was aiming to take over the government, and suggested that his comments were taken out of context. Despite these denials, on 31 August 2000 the Ankara SSC prosecutor filed a formal lawsuit against Gulen, charging that Gulen and his sympathizers had organized a gang to turn the secular government into a theocratic state.\textsuperscript{169}

Of Turkey’s Islamists it was not only the Gulen movement that came under judicial

\textsuperscript{167} See the ruling of the Constitutional Court at its formal website: http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2167&content
\textsuperscript{168} Turkish channel ATV, June 18, 1999. Also quoted in Sharon-Krespin, 2009, pp. 55-66.
\textsuperscript{169} The trial began on October 16, 2000. After years of bickering and delays, the case against Gulen was finally dismissed by the state security court on May 5, 2006; and Gulen was cleared of any wrong doing. The appeal by the prosecutors was rejected by the 9th Chamber of the Supreme Court of Appeals who voted unanimously to clear Gulen of all accusations against him in July 2008.
scrutiny. The judiciary also more critically investigated Islamist media outlets and the political representatives of the National View Movement. The judiciary ordered the confiscation of the June 28 issue of the anti-Semitic newspaper *Akit* and the June 23-29 edition of its related weekly publication *Cuma* for "inciting religious hatred" in its treatment of the death of a prominent military official known for his secular views. *Akit* had reported in its coverage that it "did not forgive" the official for his actions against *imam hatip* schools, Koran courses, and students who wear headscarves. In May 2001, prominent Nurcu community figure and owner of the newspaper *Yeni Asya* Mehmet Kutlular began serving a 2-year prison sentence also for the crime of "inciting religious hatred"; Kutlular argued in his newspaper that the devastating 1999 earthquake was "divine retribution" for laws banning headscarves in state buildings and universities. In September 2001, a trial began against senior columnist for the Islamist newspaper *Yeni Safak* Fehmi Koru on charges of "inciting religious hatred" in an October 1999 television broadcast upholding Kutlular's right to make such a claim.

This virtual declaration of "war" against a broad section of Islamic groups extended to "private business competitors of the state-supported conglomerates connected with TUSIAD" (Yavuz, 2003). Nearly 100 major Turkish companies along with "19 newspapers, 20 television stations, 51 radio stations, 110 magazines, 800 schools, 1,200 student hostels and 2,500 associations" were considered as part of reactionary political Islam (Yavuz, 2003). Neither TUSIAD nor any other actor opposed active state repression when the activities of business establishments with close links to MUSIAD came under the increasing scrutiny of state agencies in the late 1990s (Onis and Turem 2002, p. 448). TUSIAD, for instance, did not publicly dissent "when the military officers prepared a list of business firms suspected of helping what it called 'reactionary' movements and called everybody to boycott products of those firms" (Demirel, 2004, p. 136; Onis and Turem 2002, p. 449.)

Turkey, therefore, entered the new century with an Islamist camp that had suffered a serious blow. In the 1999 general election, the RP’s successor FP came in third. By the time the

172 Ibid.
EU re-entered the Turkish agenda in December 1999, therefore, not only had Islam been effectively securitized but the military had also reaffirmed its legitimacy in interfering in domestic politics. In less than a decade, however, the tables would be completely turned. Not only would Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Gulen community become the most important political and social actors, but the military would also completely withdraw from politics. What explains this drastic transformation in such a short amount of time? The following chapter answers this question by highlighting how three system-transforming developments at the international level provided an opportunity to reverse his trend at eve of the new century and how the emergence of strong single-party government and domestic mobilization against military’s political activism enabled civilians to capitalize on this opportunity.
Modern Turkey, like a transgendered body with the soul of one gender in the body of another, is in constant tension. White Turks regard themselves as Western souls in the body of a foreign socio-political landscape. Its body is native to the land, but its soul is alien (Yavuz, 2000. p.21).

This chapter argues that in the first decade of the 21st century the institutional framework of Turkish civil-military relations (CMR) underwent a transformation largely because of the systemic changes in the domestic and international contexts. The supportive signals increasingly sent to the AKP government by Western actors constrained the military’s previous ability to challenge civilian control over politics. In the 1990s, the crisis in the global political economy coincided with the legitimacy crisis of the state at the domestic level. While there were calls for the democratization of state-society relations in Turkey during this period, as outlined in the last chapter the Turkish state and its political parties faced a serious legitimacy crisis, the economic realm experienced a serious financial and governing crisis, and the cultural realm was confronted by religious and ethnic-based conflict. Political parties accused of “deep” relations with the mafia and gangs were perceived to be highly corrupt and ineffective. The financial crisis of 2001 struck the Turkish economy seriously, severely damaging the legitimacy of the coalition government formed by the center-left, center-right and nationalist wings. The electorate’s resentment of the status quo resulted in the elimination of all political parties in Parliament from the political scene in the 22 November 2002 elections, thus enlarging the window of opportunity for domestic change opened by external developments.

This chapter argues that three major international developments provided an opportunity for the Turkish government to institutionalize its power over the military. Firstly, the end of the Cold War fostered the prospect of the ideological dominance of liberal democracy over other competing ideological foundations and thus weakened the legitimacy of Kemalism as the national ideology and guiding light of military. Secondly, the increasing civilizational value of Turkey for the United States’ New Middle East Policy enabled Turkey’s moderately Islamist government to receive crucial US support. Thirdly, EU conditionality regarding the harmonization of Turkey’s civil-military relations regime with “European best practices” provided incentives and resources to civilian leaders to tackle military’s privileges.
5.1 Emergence of Unfavorable International Opportunity Structure for Military’s Political Activism

5.1.1 Ideological and discursive trump of “liberal democracy”

The end of the Cold War and its ideological struggle facilitated the rise of liberal democracy, surpassing other competing ideologies in its global spread. Some scholars even postulated that Western democracy was the end of human search for an ideal political system (Fukuyama, 1992). Others, rejecting this “end of history” thesis, nevertheless underlined the unfavorable ideational environment for military coups in this era (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 74), due partly to an increasingly global commitment to democracy. As McFaul argues, “democracy as an international norm is stronger today than ever, and democracy itself is widely regarded as an ideal system of government” (2004, p. 148). After the end of the Cold War, new norms and practices of international intervention emerged which made obsolete the classical Westphalian concept of a system of sovereign states with inviolable borders. Regional integration, globalization, and the diffusion of the norms of human rights and democracy weakened the legitimacy of state sovereignty. It is suggested that the triumph of liberal democracy and international norms such as “responsibility to protect”, and “democratic control of armed forces” is part of a broader shift towards a new “standard of civilization” that modern and especially Western states are expected to meet.

The pressure to meet this standard of civilization is widespread in Turkey, and was felt to a particularly high degree following her official award of EU candidate status in 1999. The legitimacy of the concept of an entirely sovereign nation-state for Turkey has been increasingly questioned by the EU and neo-liberalist globalization trends from above, and by ethnic and religious movements from below. As Gulalp states, “the rise of postmodernist ideas advocating a vaguely defined civil society against modernism, statism, and Turkish nationalism, has taken the form of an attack against Kemalism” (1995, p. 181). The strong confrontation of Kemalist understandings in Turkey weakened the military’s legitimizing collective identity rooted in on Kemalism and its claims to represent the Turkish nation.

5.1.2 The US’ New Middle East Policy and Turkey’s Increasing Civilizational Value in the Era of “Clash of Civilizations”

In addition to the ideological diffusion of liberal democracy, the rise in Turkey’s civilization value for the US would also lead to constraints on the Turkish military’s political activism. The end of the Cold War not only “transformed the European landscape, altered the
whole shape of the international system, and led to a profound reconfiguration of the geography of the world system”, but also “changed the ideological ways in which politics were conducted” (Cox, 2003, p. 470). The initiative that Thomas Carothers (1999) termed “political democracy promotion” has begun to inform and define much of the activities of Trans-Atlantic alliance in general and the US in particular in the post-Cold War era. This Trans-Atlantic security regime was built on a “new ‘comprehensive’ concept of security that professed to go beyond policies of containment and deterrence against direct threats to the national interest, to attack the perceived roots of international instability” (Youngs, 2004, p. 27).

According to many observers, normative liberalism and power politics are mutually conditioning. Put differently, although democracy promotion is often presented as part of a new post-Cold War normative dimension of foreign policy, it is also considered to be the advancement of strategic Western self-interest. After 11 September 2001, this link was presented by many policy-makers in even more directly instrumental terms, citing a commonly held belief that terrorism’s roots lie in the lack of democratic openness across the Islamic world (Youngs 2004). Neo-Gramscian and other critical theoretical approaches argue that the true aim of Western democracy promotion is an attempt by transnational capitalist elites to avoid excessive coercion and instead establish global consent to secure the hegemony of neo-liberal forms of economic and political globalisation. William Robinson, for example, argues persuasively that strategies of “democracy promotion” constitute “an attempt at political engineering, at tinkering with the political mechanisms of social control, while simultaneously leaving the socioeconomic basis of political instability intact, and even aggravating that basis through the liberation of capital from any constraints to its operation” (1996, p. 344).

Despite the controversy surrounding the underlying motives of democracy promotion, it seems certain that the shift of US policy in the Middle East from supporting old authoritarian allies to advocating a more pro-democratic discourse changed the domestic balance of power in Turkey in favor of the civilian political leadership. Since the US placed the region at the top of its democratization agenda after 11 September 2001, Turkey’s civilizational value has increased in American foreign policy calculations and the AKP – as “authentic representative” of Muslim Turkey – replaced the Turkish military as US’ main ally. As Graham Fuller (2008) maintains, it is in the interests of the US for Turkey to play an active role in the Middle East, exercising both

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ideological and economic influence over Arab states and Iran. Turkey could thus act as a useful “intermediary” between the Middle East and the West, and could be a shining model of democracy and moderate Islam that Muslim states could follow.

Before the events of 11 September, the US had responded to new threats that emerged in the Middle East with a hard security-centric approach, supporting authoritarian political regimes in the region for the sake of stability (Yesilyurt and Akdevelioglu, 2009, p. 48). In this setting, political Islam, which had already begun its rise in the 1970s, emerged as the most well organized anti-systemic movement in the region. When political Islam’s increasing salience combined with the permanent military presence of the US in the Persian Gulf following the 1991 Gulf War, the activities of radical Islamic movements against the US and its allies in the region escalated immensely. In this sense, the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 represented both the climax of anti-systemic Islamic movements and the failure of the US policy of “stability versus democracy” in the region. These attacks not only showed the necessity for change in US Middle East policy, but also set the ground for the implementation of a more assertive American policy in the region.

Following the September 11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration reformulated the previous defense doctrine of 1992 along three main pillars: “pre-emptive strike”, “unilateral action if necessary”, and “political engagement”. This new formulation served to shift from former President Bill Clinton’s emphasis on “soft engagement” to a policy of “aggressive engagement”. The US grand strategy for the new century is neatly outlined by US Naval War College professor Thomas Barnett in an essay entitled “Pentagon’s New Map” (2003) and then in a book based on it. Barnett’s strategic vision was based on two premises: 1) increased trade and international investment under global rule reduces conflict; and 2) disconnection from globalization creates risk for American leadership.

Barnett divides the world into two camps: the Functioning Core and the Disintegrated Gap. The former is composed of those nations that have integrated into the global economy – including the old core of North America, the EU, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – and the new core of China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Russia. Together these countries account for roughly four billion people out of a global population of six billion. The Disconnected Gap, including “the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia” constitutes a threat due to its inability to “harmonize” its “internal rule sets” with an “emerging
On the borders between the Core and Gap states are the so-called Seam states, which include Turkey along with “Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia”. The Seam states would be used by the core “to suppress bad things coming out of the Gap” (Barnett 2003) and “to promote the use of pre-emptive US military might across a huge swath of the globe” (Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003, p. 893). Turkey, as a Seam state with a strong military and a “dual identity” (Keyman, 2009b, p. 38), emerged as a significant ally for the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Turkey’s unique geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and Asia provides it with easy access to strategically important regions and major energy resources. Turkey’s vigorous market economy, well-established tradition of co-operating with the West, large armed forces, and historical experience of the coexistence of Islam and with modern secular democracy increased its importance in the eyes of US administration (Keyman 2009b).

With several challenges to U.S. national security emanating from the greater Middle East, the United States demonstrated that it seeks to use Turkey’s geographic location and Muslim identity to its own advantage. “Given Turkey’s location near several global hotspots, the availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel” is considered “valuable for the United States and NATO” (Zanotti, 2011, p. 4). In addition, the US considered Turkey among the strongest military powers in its region and expected it to play “major role in regional security for years to come” (Ibid). According to US Congressional Research Service, “as Turkey’s regional influence expands through economic, political, and cultural means, its importance has arguably increased for the United States on issues of global significance that include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Israeli-Palestinian issues” (Zanotti, 2011, pp. 4-5).

Moreover, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s pivotal role in Central Asia and the Caucasus – an aggregate area accounting for about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources – became more important. Turkey today has the potential to become an important hub for oil and gas transported through pipelines, including the Blue Stream for Russian gas, the Nabucco pipeline, the BTC for Caspian oil and gas, the interconnector to Greece, and links to Iran and Iraq. According to “Turkey’s growing importance as a regional energy transport hub whose supply sources are not limited to (even though they include) Russia and Iran elevates the continued importance of Turkey’s security for world energy markets”
In addition to its geo-strategic significance as an East-West energy link, Turkey's experience with the coexistence of Islam with modernity and democracy in a generally peaceful manner has also been central to Turkish-American relations in recent years. In its unilateral act to restructure the Middle East through war and occupation, the Bush Administration approached Turkey and its experience of modernity as a "model" for the region. Within such a context, the AKP as representative of moderate Islam is viewed by the US as a great asset in the construction of the “New Middle East”. US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz underlined this reasoning at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy on 15 March 2002:

To win the war against terrorism we have to reach out to the hundred of millions of moderate and tolerant people in the Muslim world, regardless of where they live…. Turkey is crucial in bridging the dangerous gap between the West and the Muslim world. In the United States we understand that Turkey is a model for those in the Muslim world who have aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity. Turkey gives us an example of the reconciliation of religious belief with modern secular democratic institutions.

Similar beliefs were voiced throughout the Bush administration. For example National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice called Turkey “an excellent model, a 99% Muslim country that has great importance as an alternative to radical Islam”.176 Perhaps most importantly, President Bush stated that Turkey “provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy”.177

The US’ forward strategy in the Middle East converged well with the AKP’s willingness to play an exemplar role for the region. Before assuming the post of prime minister, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Washington to discuss a variety of issues such as Iraq, Cyprus, and bilateral military cooperation in certain spheres.178 Erdogan repeatedly underlined that Turkey, with its predominantly Muslim population and democratic regime, remained ready and competent to serve an active role in its region and do its share to help establish a harmony of civilizations.

Turkish leaders have used the importance the United States confers upon Turkey’s role

175 For a map of various existing and proposed pipelines and energy transit routes through and near Turkey, please see: Apendix
177 Ibid.
both to seek benefits from the US and to elevate its prestige in dealings with other countries. This American sympathy and support for the government, combined with the weakening of Turkish military leaders’ US ties following Turkey’s refusal to allow US troops to use Turkey’s Iraqi border in the 2003 War, reduced the High Command’s ability to challenge the government. The military understood that it could no longer rely on close ties with the US military to bolster its political power.

The supportive signals\(^\text{179}\) sent to Turkish government by the US seemed to constrain the military’s room for maneuver. The relevant literature demonstrates that the likelihood of military intervention decreases as external signals become more supportive of government and increases as they become more hostile. Signals from external actors are considered important for the military’s political involvement because they indicate support for either political change (if hostile) or the continuation of the government (if supportive). A large body of qualitative literature suggests that pressure from the US plays a key role in stabilizing favored leaders and destabilizing unfavorable ones. Thyne’s quantitative study also provides evidence demonstrating that hostile US signals increase the likelihood of coups, while supportive signals have a stabilizing effect (2010, p. 452). It is, therefore, plausible to suggest that supportive US signals toward the Turkish government as a role model of democracy played an important role in the decline of the military’s political activism.

Turkey’s role as a model for building democracies was in fact perceived by the military High Command as an opportunity to revitalize its partnership with the West, and thus contributed to shifts in the military’s discourse regarding democracy. From the military’s perspective, a Turkey that acts in unison with the West to foster democracy and the rule of law in the Arab world would certainly provide the ultimate proof that the secular Turkish/Muslim model is not only relevant to policy in the region but serves as a lasting success story. Therefore, it is possible to argue that US democracy promotion within the broader Middle East emphasizing Turkey’s democracy as a strategic asset changed military leaders’ conception of democracy from a normative ideal to a strategic value, and thus played an important role in the change of military discourse and political behavior. The Turkish military grasped the importance of democratic institutions as a strategic resource in the newly emerging world order and gradually adapted itself

\(^{179}\) Signals can be considered as ‘actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor’ Gartzke, E. (2003). Signaling and the Liberal Peace. Columbia University
to changing external selectivities of the global order. This adaptation will be the subject of final section of this chapter. In sum, this section concludes that the supportive signals of the US to the AKP government and its policies of democracy promotion in Middle East in general constrained the military’s ability to challenge government and thereby created a favorable environment for increasing civilian supremacy and control.

5.1.3 Europeanization of Turkey’s CMR Problematique

There is only one way to escape these dangers, which is to emulate the progress of the Europeans in science, industry and military and legal organization, in other words to equal them in civilization. And the only way to do this is to enter European civilization completely (Ziya Gokalp, 1876-1924). 180

These words of Ziya Gokalp, the most prominent nationalist intellectual of the late Ottoman Empire, whom Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself called the “intellectual father of the new Republic”, effectively reveal the historical paradox behind Turkish-European relations (Jung, 2001, p. 4). Historically, the founding cadre of the Turkish Republic viewed the Europeanization process both as a “path of internal modernization and as foreign and security policy strategy” (Oguzlu and Ozpetek, 2008, p. 996). The assumption was that Turkey would rid itself of its image as a potential enemy of the West once it joined Europe as an equal member of the Western international community and was recognized as European by Europeans themselves (Ibid). As Tarik Oguzlu and Ugur Gungor (2006) explain: “Turkey’s most important security interest since the foundation of the Republic has been to gain Western identity… While this was relatively easy during the Cold War era, the credentials of Turkey’s Western identity began to be seriously questioned in the 1990s” (p. 472). Not only did the removal of the Soviet threat help dilute Turkey’s security role in the context of continental Europe, but the increasing importance of the Middle East in global power politics has resulted in a reluctant European attitude towards Turkey’s possible EU membership. According to Oguzlu and Ozpetek “Turkey’s proximity to the Hobbesian security environment in the Middle East has resulted in European public opinion’s reluctance to see Turkey as part of the EU’s Kantian security environment” (2008, p. 997).

Since the EU’s inception, however, Turkey has shown a keen interest in the integration process in Europe, considering EU membership to be a logical consequence of its modernization and Westernization policies (Arikan, 2006, p. 1). At least as important as its perceived security benefits, EU membership was perceived as vital proof of Turkey’s European and civilized

identity and the successful completion of Ataturk’s Westernizing revolution (Aydin and Keyman 2004). As David Kushner (1997) describes, “Turkish public figures of the mainstream have been united in the view that Turkey is European and Western and this cannot simply be attributed to political expediency, expecting Western political or economic support. For the Turks, belonging to Europe or the West is really belonging to the civilized world” (p. 232, emphasis added). Barry Rubin expresses a similar idea: “Dozens of countries in the last century have joined many international organizations without this issue becoming a focal point of their identity or the key political controversy of the date for them. In fact, it could be argued that the question of Turkish membership in the EU is proportionately the most important issue of this type for any state in history” (2003, p. 1, emphasis added). According to Irzik and Guzeldere, the West is a “permanent signifier in the language” of the Turkish “public sphere, and it exerts a powerful pressure on the imagining of modern Turkish identity... as a developmental ideal... there is no corresponding presence of something called the ‘East’ as an alternative paradigm of identity… Turkey is… a country in which many of the fundamental social divisions have been experienced, articulated, concealed, or displaced in a cultural/ideological vocabulary mobilizing the ‘West’ in different power and justification strategies” (2003, p. 285).

Given the importance of the ideational value Turkey attached to the West, the recognition of Turkey’s EU membership bid on the eve of the 21st century was the most significant development in transforming the Turkish political opportunity structure to date. The Helsinki decision dramatically increased the credibility of the EU and its demands at the domestic level (Onis 2003, p.13; Ugur 2003; Muftuler-Bac 2005). Duman and Tsarouhas specifically emphasize the relevance of “EU factor” for civil-military relations, underlining it as the most important independent variable to shape CMR in Turkey in the last decade. They argue that EU acted as “a commitment device for civilians to undertake necessary democratic reforms” and also “limited the span of the military’s influence with its ‘hands-tying’ effects on political involvement” (2006, p. 407). According to Cizre and Walker, since the 1999 EU Helsinki Summit’s decision to extend candidate status to Turkey, “EU accession has become the main driving force for democratic reforms in civil-military relations in Turkey” (2010, p. 91).

This thesis argues that the EU’s recognition of Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 changed the strategic context in favor of civilians by impacting Turkey’s political opportunity structure in four distinct but interrelated ways: 1) compulsory impact at the state level 2-) enabling/constraining impacts at the domestic institutional level; 3-) connective impact at the
First, the EU conditionality of harmonization of domestic institutional and rules with that of Europe changed the balance of power in favor of civilian authorities by increasing the costs of maintaining the institutional status quo. As mentioned above, Turkey’s strong desire to accede to the EU created strong incentives to comply with the EU requirements. One of the EU’s requirements for Turkey to start to negotiations was to reform the role of Turkish military in political life. The EU, since its first Progress Report on Turkey in 1998, strongly criticized the army’s powerful role in Turkish politics and demanded an institutional revision of Turkish civil-military relations. The military reform attached to Turkey’s negotiations with the EU directly changed the cost/benefit structures of maintaining military prerogatives. This can be conceptualized as the compulsory impact of external factors.

Accession partnerships and progress reports have been the most important mechanisms of EU influence in this sense. While “Accession Partnership” agreements strengthened the position of pro-reform politicians by directly defining the EU’s own parameters for reform, progress reports constrained the veto power of status-quo actors by providing negative feedback in response to observed behavior (Sarigil, 2007a, 2007b). For example, the European Commission strongly criticized the military’s powerful role in Turkish politics beginning with its first report on Turkey in October 1998 that described Turkey as a “constitutional republic, which has a multiparty Parliament, a President, a government, a public administration and a judicial system, and a National Security Council” (p. 10). Turkey’s NSC was depicted as one of the country’s most important political institutions in Turkey and its role was explained in the following way: “The recommendations of the NSC are not legally binding, but have a strong influence on government policy. The existence of this body shows that, despite a basic democratic structure, the Turkish constitution allows the Army to play a civil role and to intervene in every area of political life” (EU Progress Report 1998, p. 10). Two subsequent EU regular reports criticized Turkey for its lack of movement toward achieving civilian control of the armed forces. The 1999 Regular Report on Turkey (p. 10) echoed the same critiques:

Through the National Security Council, the Military continues to have an important influence in many areas of political life….While the emergency courts system remains in place, the replacement of the military judge by a civilian one in State Security Courts, represents a clear improvement in terms of independence of the judiciary.

The 2000 Progress Report reiterated the EU’s worries about the NSC’s role:
There has been no change in the role played by the National Security Council in Turkish political life. Its conclusions, statements, or recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process, as witnessed in the recent debate over the dismissing of civil servants suspected of links with radical Islamic and separatist movements. In addition, it appears that at present the views of the National Security Council in practice seriously limit the role played by the government (p. 14).

Besides the role of the NSC, the 2000 Regular Report also raised its concerns over the status of the Chief of General Staff, the composition and functioning of the State Security Courts, and the existence of military representatives on public boards such as the Council of Higher Education. Although this negative feedback has been quite influential in constraining the veto-power of military in Turkish politics, until March 2001 the EU reports were non-binding. With the EU Council of Minister’s decision at the Nice summit in December 2000 [revised in 2003], civilian control of the military became a formal precondition for Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The Accession Partnership document adopted on 8 March 2001 determined short- and medium-term priorities for Turkish accession to the EU, with the restriction of the role of military as one of these priorities. The first accession partnership document required the alignment of the functioning of State Security Courts according to international standards as a short-term priority; the alignment of the “constitutional role of the NSC as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU member states” was deemed a medium term priority. 181

As part of the negotiation process for accession, the tripartite coalition DSP-MHP-ANAP government complied with most of the recommendations. In September 2001, the Turkish Parliament amended 34 articles of the constitution in order to adapt them to the Copenhagen criteria of the EU. Among other things, the amendments abolished the death penalty during peacetime, made the dissolution of political parties more difficult, paved the way for the teaching of and broadcasting in Kurdish, and restructured the NSC. 182 The abolition of the death penalty was a particularly controversial issue as PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan had been sentenced to death for treason two years earlier. Many anticipated strong opposition from the TAF; in surprising contrast, however, the military’s leadership stated that it would not express an opinion.

181 Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, p. 7.
182 4709 Sayılı Kanun’ [Law No.4709]
but would leave the decision to civilians. Further, the High Command raised no objections to the legal amendments that would directly affect it such as the restructuring of the NSC, an issue which will be discussed below.

In terms of altering civil-military relations, the coalition government removed the military judge from the three-person judicial panels in the State Security Courts (SSCs) in 1999, changed the composition and role of the NSC in October 2001, opened the legislation passed by the 1980-1983 military government to constitutional review also in October 2001, and removed emergency rule in four cities in south-eastern Turkey in June 2002. The removal of the military judge from the SSCs was a particularly important step for civilianizing the legal system. After all, SSCs had become instrumental in checking political dissent under the provisions of the illiberal Turkish Penal code, another product of the previous military regime. Moreover, the existence of a military judge in these courts had provided the military with a permanent role in the judicial process during the period of civilian governments. Similarly, the removal of emergency rule reduced the role of the military in southeastern Turkey and, thereby, contributed to the civilianization of social and political life in the region. However, the most important institutional change that was directly related to the military’s tutelary powers concerned an amendment made to Article 118 of the constitution. This amendment increased the number of civilian members in the NSC to a majority voting position and removed the priority of NSC decisions. The EU 2001 Report welcomed these changes, but added a cautionary note: “The extent to which the constitutional amendment will enhance de facto civilian control over the military will need to be monitored” (p. 19).

In March 2003, Dutch Christian Democrat and European Parliament rapporteur on Turkey Arie Oostlander emphasized the incompatibility of the military’s role with democracy in Turkey. The Explanatory Statement of Oostlander’s report, adopted by the European

183 Later, PM Ecevit would confirm that the leadership did not convey any discontent about the abolishment of the death penalty. *Hurriyê*, 26 Feb. 2002.
184 The ECHR ruled in 1998 that the sitting of a military judge was against the European conventions. Following the repeated recommendations of The EU Commission's Progress Reports to further harmonize the powers and responsibilities and the proceedings of these courts with the EU standards, several amendments passed on the law on state security courts with an aim to harmonize its procedures with the civilian code of criminal procedure. Finally, during AKP leadership, on June 18, 2004, State Security Courts were replaced by the Special heavy penal courts.
http://www.oostlander.net/rapporten/030314e.html
Parliament on 20 May 2003, underlined the role of the armed forces as “the most obvious point on which reform is needed”. The report highlighted the military’s role as barrier for Turkey’s Europeanization and identified a broad range of areas in which reforms were needed. Most strikingly, Oostlander’s draft report explicitly linked the Turkish military with the “deep state”: “the army's role slows down Turkey’s development towards a democratic and pluralist system, and therefore calls for the political decision-making power to be allocated entirely to the civilian authorities, based on the confidence of citizens and democratically elected, so that the traditional power of the bureaucracy and the army (the ‘deep state’) can resume the forms which are normal in the Member States” (Article 7). To further move towards the European Union the EP also proposed the adoption of a new constitution based on EU regulations rather than on Kemalism. Oostlander’s draft report also provided crucial external support to Turkish government by declaring that it “rejects the rigid secularism which gives rise to antidemocratic reactions such as intolerant Islamism”; by calling on the Turkish government “to deal in a relaxed manner with Islam and with religion in general”; (Article 10); and by identifying Kemalism as the real obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the EU (Article F).

Such external criticisms created an opportunity for the AKP to ally with EU actors and to use EU norms and demands as a legitimization resource. The AKP leadership capitalized on this opportunity in an astonishing manner by radically altering its anti-West, anti-EU position. This newfound pro-EU identity not only increased its domestic and international legitimacy, but also its political capacity by permitting it to frame its reforms that targeted the military’s prerogatives as requirements for Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization. This successful framing constrained the military’s veto powers, as the officers did not want to lose ground vis-à-vis the Islamists in Turkey’s Westernization process. If Islamists were to supplant the officers as the perceived agents of Westernization, this would represent a tremendous irony for the Kemalist republic and its guardians as the Turkish Armed Forces has consistently constructed its identity around being a vanguard of country’s modernization. This can be conceptualized as constraining/enabling impact of the EU.

The third impact of Turkey’s EU candidacy was indirect but determinative: Turkey’s EU candidacy created an opportunity for the AKP to ally with EU actors and to use EU norms and demands as a legitimization resource. The AKP leadership capitalized on this opportunity in an astonishing manner by radically altering its anti-West, anti-EU position. This newfound pro-EU identity not only increased its domestic and international legitimacy, but also its political capacity by permitting it to frame its reforms that targeted the military’s prerogatives as requirements for Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization. This successful framing constrained the military’s veto powers, as the officers did not want to lose ground vis-à-vis the Islamists in Turkey’s Westernization process. If Islamists were to supplant the officers as the perceived agents of Westernization, this would represent a tremendous irony for the Kemalist republic and its guardians as the Turkish Armed Forces has consistently constructed its identity around being a vanguard of country’s modernization. This can be conceptualized as constraining/enabling impact of the EU.

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accession process transformed the socio-political context in favor of political reform by opening opportunities for new political coalitions. Turkey’s Europeanization and globalization processes resulted in change within the ruling bloc and laid the foundations of new hegemonic alliance. Business elites and their media holdings, which traditionally had been a part of country’s ruling elite and a strong ally of the military, upon perceiving EU membership to be beneficial for their long-term economic interests became the most vocal supporters of political change. These business actors then allied with the AKP and other peripheral actors to implement EU requirements and materialize the neo-liberal governance project.

TUSIAD’s emergence as a major force within the pro-democratization coalition in the 1990s is usually explained by reference to the instrumental role that democracy can play in capitalizing on the potential economic benefits of globalization and EU membership (Onis and Turem, 2002, p. 450). Turkey’s ongoing integration into global markets since 1980s and its membership in the European Customs Union in 1995 increased the costs involved in failure to comply with the new rules of the Trans-Atlantic security community (Barnett 2003). Business elites realized that the economic costs of not conforming to global norms of democracy would be quite considerable, in contrast to the situation during the Cold War order (Onis and Turem, 2002, p. 442). As Ozel aptly describes: “a deficient democracy would aggravate uncertainties at the national level, endanger its international competitiveness, diminish the credibility of the country, obstruct capital inflows and thwart potential opportunities for collaboration with foreign capital” (2012, p. 26). Failure to conform with the new rules would meant “isolation, insecurity, and inability to capitalize on economic benefits such as large-scale investment by transnational capital and membership in supranational organizations such as the European Union” (Turem and Onis, 2002, p. 440).

As previously mentioned, TUSIAD’s pro-democratic stance was therefore bolstered after the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which Turkey’s candidacy for the EU was announced (Ozel, 2012, p. 24; Onis, 2004a.) Literature suggests that “prospective material interests out of a potential EU membership were significant because big business perceived the EU as a powerful anchor which would ‘tie the state’s hands’, hence, increase credibility, entailing sound economic policies and improved business environment” (Ozel, 2012, p. 24). The “maturity of capital” thesis also assumes relevance in this context: “As capital accumulation reaches a certain threshold and business becomes internationally competitive, it becomes less dependent on state resources in a more open and liberal environment where direct access to international finance is possible
through borrowing from international banks or by entering into strategic partnerships with transnational corporations” (Onis and Turem, 2010, p. 97). Consequently, reduced economic dependence on the state creates pressure for greater democratization, which is “synonymous with a project of reducing the size of the state and hence putting an end to the political terms of the dependence relationship” (Onis and Turem 2002, p. 444). Although business actors prospered under the direct assistance of the state throughout the Republican era, by the end of 1990s big business had become highly internationalized through “various channels including foreign trade, investment and partnerships such as joint ventures, franchise and distribution network deals” (Ozel, 2012, p. 11). As a result, not only had its dependence on the state become significantly reduced, but its interest in a predictable economic and legal environment had also increased (Ibid). As a result, this interest further consolidated business elites’ pro-EU, pro-change position.

Not content to leave the fate of Turkey-EU relations to the government, the business community strengthened its presence in Brussels. TUSIAD opened its Brussels office in 1995, and was followed by TOBB and ITKIB (which represents textile and clothing exporters). Having learned the sophistications of Brussels policy-making and established good links with the Commission and other EU institutions, TUSIAD subsequently opened offices in Paris and in Berlin (Ozel 2012). From 1997 onward, the linkage between EU membership and TUSIAD’s campaign of political reform became more evident as reflected in TUSIAD’s highly controversial and influential report published in January 1997. Its report titled “Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey” proposed a wide range of legislative and constitutional reforms, including the abolition of the National Security Council and State Security Courts as well as the subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense. Although the content of the report disturbed the military, and some members objected that they had not been asked about the content of the report and did not agree on what was written therein, the leadership of TUSIAD legitimized these reform proposals on the basis of EU membership bid.

Since 2001, TUSIAD has annually updated this report in light of the European Commission’s annual progress reports on Turkey and the NPAA. In addition, TUSIAD scrutinized each aspect of the reforms undertaken in a series of reports on political parties, freedom of expression, capital punishment, and cultural rights and individual liberties. After the publication of each report, TUSIAD called on the government, opposition parties, and relevant ministries and committees to maintain the reform’s momentum.

TUSIAD was not alone in its democratization endeavours. Several civil-society
organizations (CSOs) representing economic interests such as the Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey (TESEV), the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV), and the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) also emerged as increasingly vocal advocates of democratization and Europeanization in the late 1990s. For instance, before the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, İKV headed a broad-based ad hoc movement of 175 civil society organizations called “Movement for Europe 2002” to pressure the government to ratify the legal changes necessary to obtain a date from the EU for negotiations at Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002. Among the founding fathers of this movement were neo-liberals and what are called in Turkey “second Republicans”, such as Cengiz Aktar, Cengiz Candar, Mehmet Altan and Erol Katircioglu, who managed to collect approximately 1000 signatures for the acceleration of reform process from prominent figures of the Turkish elite before the issue of the declaration presented below (Aktar, 2002; Alpan 2010, p. 251). The following text of the signature campaign by Movement for Europe 2002, circulated on 9 May 2002 (European Day), indicates how the Turkish capital groups consider “Europe”:

If Turkey is looking for freedom instead of pressure, for affluence instead of poverty, and for trust instead of fear, its road passes through the EU. Europe is the direction Turkey has moved towards for centuries. ‘Europe’ is ‘contemporary civilization’- it is investment; it is employment. It is the profit. It is interdependence. It is science and technology. It is social security. The EU is not the minimization of Turkey but the latter’s enlargement as to include Europe… The Turkish people’s future lies with the EU. (Movement for Europe 2002).

In addition to changing the domestic political opportunity structure in favor of civilian authorities, Europeanization and globalization processes affected Turkish political culture, an outcome that can be conceptualized as “constructive impact” referring to the construction of new societal norms, discourses, and identities at the domestic level. Following the intensification of EU-Turkey negotiations, Turkey's civil and bureaucratic cadres and the public were exposed to new perspectives on the role of the military in a democratic regime and began questioning the prevalent power configuration in the Turkish regime. Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s contentious speech on the Congress of the Motherland Party (ANAP) on 4 August 2001 is a good indicator of this newly developing sensitivity in some civilian circles about the democratic control of the armed forces. In this unprecedented speech, Yılmaz criticized the expansion of the military’s role via the securitization of internal politics and claimed that Turkish politics was afflicted by a “national security syndrome” that, Yılmaz claimed, only served to frustrate the
reforms necessary to democratize and integrate the Turkish political system into the European Union (EU). Yilmaz declared:

On the matter of obstructing work to integrate with the European Union there is one taboo that everybody knows about more or less yet about which they play three wise monkeys… national security facts. To be more precise, we can call it a national security syndrome… Thanks to the excuse of national security, it has become practically impossible to take those steps that would improve our state's outlook and that would bring comfort and contentment to our nation. If Turkey wants to take even one step forward, it has to be cured of this syndrome.187

Yilmaz’s statement was important for being the first of its kind, demonstrating signs of a fundamental attitudinal shift on such a sacrosanct issue (Cizre and Cinar 2003). In fact, Yilmaz’s speech sparked a lively debate about national security policy and the role of the military within, leading the office of the TGS to respond. It issued a four-page press release on 7 August 2001 declaring that the comments of a “certain party leader” were “unfortunate” and “baseless” and that “a party convention was an unserious, inappropriate platform tainted by political interests for the discussion of a sensitive issue”.188 The statement rejecting Yilmaz’s argument declared:

If the Turkish Republic's economy has come to the point of bankruptcy, if nothing is being done to those who brought the economy to this point, if corruption has become an accepted behaviour (and) if political stability cannot be achieved because of personal ambitions... to blame all of the problems on a 'concept of national security' is unreasonable and unjust. At the same time it is dangerous.189

This dispute between military leaders and Yilmaz gave rise to an unprecedented public debate about the role of military in Turkish politics in general and on the formulation of national security policy in particular. The other political parties, including Yilmaz’s coalition partners, did not back him in this issue. While MHP leader and Deputy Prime Minister Bahceli said this kind of a discussion was a “waste of time”, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit declared that he had difficulty understanding why his junior coalition partner opened such a debate, as Yilmaz was aware of the new national security policy document revised in 1999 that refocused on internal threats. Ecevit also expressed his discontent with the military’s generalization admonishing politicians as the main cause of Turkey’s economic downfall and for losing out on globalization.

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188 Rare and harsh reaction from TAF against Yilmaz. (2001, Aug. 9). Turkish Daily News.
189 Ibid.
True Path Party (DYP) leader Tansu Ciller also criticized Yılmaz’s opinions, finding them controversial, not serious, and subjective. Former President Süleyman Demirel, noting that he chaired 260 national security meetings during the course of his presidency, argued “Turkey has never been harmed because of its national security concept; nor is there a problem with the military.”

While the military and political leaders including the president did not back him on this issue, Yılmaz was supported by pro-change actors that included business elites and Islamists. Relying on the support he received from these groups, Yılmaz defended his move on television on 9 August 2001, arguing “there is an understanding in Turkey that interprets national security in a wider meaning and this narrows down the concept of freedom and prevents our integration into the EU”. Yılmaz contended that unless these obstacles to EU accession were removed by the upcoming review of Turkey’s reform efforts in October, the country would miss the EU train. Arguing that Turkey was going through the most important kind of change in its history since its founding, Yılmaz once more emphasized: "national security is not an issue that should be left only to the military...in democracies national security is the job of the politicians".

Backed by these business elites, the media and the press became the most important change agents in liberalizing Turkey’s national security strategy and in diffusing the norm of civilian supremacy. The most vocal and effective medium of diffusion of new ideas were TV channels, which widely targeted the middle class. Beginning in the late 1990s, television provided a platform on which political and social problems were widely discussed. Sociopolitical topics that had recently arrived on the agenda such as the role of the military were debated on shows that ran all night, providing intellectuals and media representatives with asymmetrical power to change common understandings. Journalists and academicians, particularly in the mid-2000s, began to criticize the Turkish military for its involvement in politics and its behaving as a political actor. As journalist and military expert Mehmet Ali Birand declared this was a new phase in Turkish civilian-military relationships: “The media used to be afraid of criticizing the military, it was very careful not to do that. Now it is just the contrary. We have never seen

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190 *Turkish Daily News*, 2001, Aug. 11.
193 TV interview with Mesut Yılmaz on Kanal D, 2001, Aug. 9.
criticism like this before. It’s a new era”.194 This era was based on a discourse of civilian supremacy and apolitical military.

Like television’s new role, numerous new civil-society organizations and movements were established that also served directly to confront the military’s political activism. These highly vocal groups include “Young Civilians”, "70 Million Steps Against Coups", the “Common Mind Movement”, and anti-militarist organizations and movements such as the “War Resisters Organization” and “Conscientious Objection Movement”. The idea of being a conscientious objector, which challenges the prevalent legacy that every male Turk is born a soldier, has become increasingly pronounced (Sayan, 2007).

Similarly, for the first time in Turkish history, several independent internal and foreign think tanks have prepared reports and conducted studies on civil-military relations in Turkey. In the past, scholarly research on the topics of national security, defense, and the military were highly limited. During Turkey’s Europeanization process, however, there has been an unprecedented increase both in scholarly and policy-oriented studies on Turkish CMR. The Netherlands-based Center for European Security Studies (CESS)195 conducts a highly influential program in cooperation with the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM, Turkey) and the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC, Turkey) to “contribute to an increased understanding in Turkey of the appropriate role of the armed forces in a democracy and thereby to help the country to come closer to complying with the political EU (Copenhagen) criteria for membership”.196 With this aim in mind, they collaboratively published two specific studies on Turkish CMR. 197 CESS organized several events including workshops, conferences, study trips, and MA level courses that aimed to help Turkey enhance its capacities for good governance in the defense sector. Similarly, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), in collaboration with

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195 The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) is an independent institute based in the Netherlands. Its aim is to promote transparent, accountable, and effective governance of the security sector, broadly defined. It seeks to advance democracy and the rule of law, help governments and civil society face their security challenges, and further the civilized and lawful resolution of conflict.
196 See program websites at : http://www.cess.org/programmes/view/?id=4
http://www.cess.org/programmes/view/?id=10
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/project/1011/
197 The first study, entitled Governance and the Military: Perspective for Change in Turkey, was published in May 2006, and the second, called Perceptions and Misperception in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession, was introduced in 2009.
the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF – of which Turkey is a founding member), began to conduct studies related to the security sector aiming “to promote transparency and accountability in all agencies of the security sector and provide information regarding the importance of this to policy makers, the media, civil society and the general public.” Almanac Turkey: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, published in May 2006, was the first-ever reference book on security sector reform in Turkey. This publication provided information about Turkey’s security sector agencies in an analytic format, covering discussions and events with regard to the organizational structure, activities, legal framework, principles, and perceptions of security sector institutions in Turkey. This was followed by a second and a third Almanac. TESEV and DCAF also organized several national and international symposia at the Special Commissions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to discuss the democratization of the Turkish security sector. Their reports are discussed on TV channels and in newspapers, serving to socialize the public into norms of the democratic control of armed forces.

Another effective medium for this socialization was comprised of widely watched TV serials (soap operas) and movies that questioned Turkey’s recent history, particularly the military interventions of 1960 and 1980. The visual arts have also become an important area of the production of a specific performance related to military interventions in the Europeanization era. Since the mid-2000s, the number of works in the art world in Turkey related to military interventions has increased dramatically. Several exhibitions featuring artists addressing their witnessing of the coup in a generally sarcastic way were showcased in biennial exhibitions and art centers.

All of these developments opened new debates in the Turkish public sphere and

198 See: www.tesev.org.tr
199 Some popular movies on military interventions: Coup/Darbe—A Documentary History of the Turkish Military Interventions (Belgesel, Elif Savas Felsen, 2000); Eylul Firtinasi (Atif Yilmaz, 2000); Vizonteles Tuuba (Yilmaz Erdogan, 2004); Baham ve Ogum (Cagan Irmak, 2005); Beynenmilet Sirri (Sureyya Onder ve Muharrem Gulmez, 2006 ); Eve Donus (Omer Ugrur, 2006); Zincirbozan (Atil Inanc, 2007); O... Cocuklari (Murat Saracoglu, 2008); Bu Son Olsun (Engin Altan Duzyatan, 2011); and Devrim Arabalari (Tolga Ornek, 2008). Some popular TV soap operas: Cemberimde Gul Oya (2004); Hatirla Sevgili (2007); Bu Kalp Seni Unutur mu? (2009-2010)

200 Among the works featured are a newspaper recounting the day of the coup and recordings from a “collective memory group” established at Istanbul’s Mimar Sinan University. For the study of the coup, the group interviewed around 150 people from a wide range of people, including members of different political and income groups in order to transmit individual experiences to the new generation”. To help people remember the details, the group prepared a newspaper featuring photographs of the important happenings related to the coup between 1978 and 1983. This newspaper was showcased in the show together with five recordings of the interviewees focusing on how the curator continues. Another video work from Ozlem Kulak, titled “12 September,” recounted how 13 people, including a
nurtured a new security culture in Turkey in which the military was no longer seen as the sole protector of the democracy and secularism.201

The launch of investigations into alleged military coup attempts also decreased public trust of the TAF. The 2010 Turkey Values Survey showed that 75% of Turks trusted the Turkish Armed Forces, a 15% drop in trust compared to the survey conducted in 2008 (Hurriyet Daily News, July 21, 2011). It is therefore plausible to argue that Turkey’s increased interaction with the EU and the European norms has not only sparked new debates in the Turkish public sphere, but also has shifted the strategic context in favor of pro-democratic and anti-military discourses and identities.

5.2 Emergence of Favorable Domestic Opportunity Structure

In the first decade of the 21st century, not only the international but also the domestic opportunity structure has been favorable for the institutionalization of civilian control over the military. As Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu noted, “the unsatisfactory level of democratic control over the military results, stems not only from the assertiveness of the military, but also, and probably more, from the general circumstances of Turkish politics” (2003, pp. 1-2). For Heper, it is the irresponsibility of political elites that pushes the military to “rationalize politics and democracy” (1985, pp. 83-84). According to Heper and Guney, the lack of consolidation of democracy in Turkey was the result of “no prudent” political leadership (2000, p. 650). Guney and Karatekioglu concur with the idea that “civil-military relations in Turkey are determined, to a great extent, by the role played by the civilians. The military has intervened mostly because of the weaknesses of the Turkish political system and poor political leadership” (2005, p. 457). Similarly, Jenkins underlines that “the role of the military in Turkey is the result of a combination of context and circumstance, a symptom rather than a cause of the failure of parliamentary democracy in Turkey to provide stability, prosperity or good governance” (2001, p. 83). This brief review of the literature on causes of military’s political activism in Turkey suggests, therefore, that under strong and stable single-party government, the military’s political

baker and he owner of a printing house that publishes Marxist books, spent the entire day on Sept. 12, 1980. The exhibition explores the aftermath of Turkey’s 1980 military coup. See: Today’s Zaman, September 12, 2010. 201 A survey conducted in November 2006 showed that Turkish political culture regarding the CMR was indeed changing: 58% of the respondents did not approve of the military intervening in civilian politics, while 14.5% approved of it, and 13.8% claimed that the military could intervene if “necessary” Hurriyet, (2006, Nov., 15). ‘Anket: Asker siyasete karismasin.’ (‘Survey: Military should not Intervene’) Available from:

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influence in Turkey will be considerably curtailed.

Since the 22 November 2002 elections this curtailment has, indeed, been widely observed. The formation of a strong single party government after 11 years of weak coalition governments reinforced the favorable window of opportunity opened by international developments. In its first term in power the AKP, whose leadership comes from the anti-western Islamist National View Movement, successfully exploited this opening. The AKP’s strategic moderation and commitment to the EU and the US/West increased not only its electoral capacity but also its political legitimacy. Robust institutional constraints on political Islam (judicial, military, civil society, media) and incentives for the movement to support Turkey’s Europeanization (its perception of European institutions as allies vis-à-vis these strictly secular domestic actors, especially the military; high public and elite support for EU membership) motivated the AKP leadership to de-emphasize its Islamist and historically anti-Western agenda and to adopt pro-democratic discourse for the very pragmatic reason of political survival. The AKP leadership successfully used the EU carrot to erase its Islamist past and to reconstruct its identity as a pro-EU/pro-Western democratic reformer, an identity that is both attractive to broad sectors of the Turkish public and also something to which neither the military nor the international community could object. This pro-EU/pro-US identity not only increased AKP’s domestic and international legitimacy but also its political capacity by providing new legitimization resources for framing its contentious policies and institutional reforms.

The strong political leadership of the AKP government not only increased its popularity in society but also weakened military’s opportunity to intervene in politics. A World Values Survey (WVS) shows that confidence in the government has substantially increased since the AKP came to power in 2002. In 1990, those that said they trust government “a great deal” and “quite a lot” totaled 43.4 %; in 2007, this figure increased to 60.8%. These numbers indicate that the AKP government has earned a greater level of societal trust than is reflected in its vote share in the 2007 (around 47%) and 2011 (around 50%) general elections. The increase in the level of confidence in the government reflects its successful political performance, particularly the reforms that enacted on the democratization front. For example, those who think that Turkey does not respect human rights at all decreased from 53% in 2001 to 16% in 2011.

The AKP government’s impressive economic performance also contributed to its domestic support. In the beginning of the new century, the liberalized market economy in Turkey had produced a major crisis bearing all the marks of a full-scale integration with global
capitalism (Irzik and Guzeldere, 2003, p. 283). The AKP’s broad commitment to the IMF program helped the process of recovery from the deep economic crisis that Turkey experienced in 2000 and 2001, with inflation rates falling to their lowest level since the early 1970s. The AKP government accelerated the integration of the Turkish economy with the global markets through a series of substantial privatizations and legal reforms (Cinar, 2011, p. 13). The impressive economic performance and political reforms realized under the AKP government’s leadership earned it a significant amount of support from a wide section of Turkey’s domestic public.

This support in and of itself, however, is in sufficient in explaining how the balance of power has shifted from the military to the civilian government under AKP rule. Most important in understanding this shift is an examination of the societal changes that have taken place in Turkey – i.e. the military’s loss of its traditional allies and support and development of new adversaries – that deprived the armed forces of much needed domestic support.

The TAF’s role in politics traditionally had not been questioned or criticized until the beginning of the 2000s; on the contrary, this role had been widely sanctioned by the Turkish public (Uzgel 2003; Demirel 2005). According to Ahmet Kuru, for example, the military’s “ideological allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and the media, in addition to some segments of society, provided the Turkish military with the necessary political power and encouragement. These influential civilians embraced assertive secularist, Turkish nationalist, and anti-communist ideologies, which made them worried about ‘Islamic reactionary’, ‘Kurdish separatist’, and ‘communist’ threats. They regarded the military’s oversight of politics as the most effective way of avoiding these threats” (2012, p. 38).

In the first decade of the 21st century, however, the Turkish military began to lose its domestic support as well. Big business supported the military's active role in politics until the late 1990s, but upon realizing that Turkey’s semi-democracy was impeding its economic interests in the global and regional economy, powerful business actors set themselves the task of redesigning Turkish society and its political system, including obtaining objective civilian control of the military. The military’s relations with business have, therefore, deteriorated, as the latter’s regime preferences evolved from pro-authoritarian to pro-democratic since the late 1990s.

The Turkish military lost not only business elites but also the media as an ally during the 2000s. In the first decade of the 21st century, two overlapping developments changed the military’s “comfortable modus vivendi” with the media. First, the landscape of national media
spaces has been affected by Turkey’s shifting political and economic conditions. Particularly after the two financial crashes in 2000 and 2001, Turkey’s media experienced a restructuring that placed substantial ownership and control in the hands of Islamist AKP supporters.

In a second overlapping development, the military’s influence was indirectly weakened when its traditional allies in the media turned to support AKP in its first term in power and were then forced not to criticize the AKP during its second term in power (2007). As most of the owners of formerly pro-military media outlets are also members of TUSIAD, these sources provided much needed support to the AKP government in its implementation of EU harmonization laws until the end of 2006. They hailed the reforms made in the area of civil-military relations as a revolution, continually sending pro-governmental signals when there appeared to be a conflict of opinion between the AKP and the military. Although government’s relations with traditionally militarily-friendly media began to deteriorate in late 2007, the increasing governmental pressure on the media combined with a strong anti-military editorial line of partisan media to constrain military-friendly media’s support of the military.

The Turkish military not only lost its allies but also acquired new enemies beginning in the 2000s. Victimization of Islamic identities during the February 28 Process created both a motivation and an opportunity for Islamic communities to attack official state ideology and its representatives a decade later. In 1998 the military identified numerous associations, foundations, newspapers, TV and radio stations, magazines, schools, and student hostels as elements of reactionary political Islam and demanded their closure (Yavuz 2003). Determined to protect the republican regime, the military launched a campaign that incorporated elements of psychological warfare aimed at securing as much popular support as possible against Islamic fundamentalism. The depiction of Islamic groups as “dangerous” and “backward” in the mainstream media fuelled societal alienation and prompted the unification of these groups against their secular “oppressors” led by the military (Ozcan and Turunc, 2011, p. 76).

The Gulen community, which refers to a network-type of organization centered on the famous preacher Fetullah Gulen, also received its fair share of harassment during the late 1990s. The Gulen community particularly came into the spotlight on 18 June 1999 when the Turkish TV channel ATV aired voice-recordings made during Gulen’s sermons. This recording was perceived as the confirmation of Gulen’s aspirations for an Islamist regime as well as an articulation of the methods that should be used to attain that goal. General Kivrikoglu, then Chief of the General Staff, said publicly that Gulen “plans to undermine the State” and that he
had supporters in the civil service, even in the judiciary. On August 31, Gulen was charged with systematically trying to penetrate the most vital points of the secular state, including the army and with founding a gang that sought to change the secular government into a theocratic state.202

The Gulen movement is of great significance not only because it contributes to the military’s withdrawal from politics, but also because it “takes the initiative to mold minds and hearths through the movement’s financial, educational and media empires” both in Turkey and abroad (Yavuz, 2003, p. 185). The community, involving 7 to 10 million followers, owns vast media, financial, and business empires; thousands of schools, universities, and student residences (tüşkeviler); plus many associations and foundations worldwide. In the 1990s, it established hundreds of high schools and universities in 110 countries on five continents and is estimated to be in control of an unregulated and opaque budget of $25 billion. While in past years the international press has covered the community positively, the optimistic liberal face that the international press has presented is highly contested in Turkey. Alongside the problems of lack of transparency and accountability in the Gulen movement’s financial activities, there is a growing skepticism in Turkey about its role in the judiciary and national police. Many believed that criminal investigations against the secularist opposition to the AKP were masterminded by the Gulen community, which now controls a specially authorized judiciary and the police. Although it is impossible to prove these allegations, it is at least certain that the Gulen community played a strong, if perhaps indirect, role in reducing the military’s popular support by adopting a sensationalist and often biased editorial line in their media outlets.

Whoever is behind the public campaign to delegitimize the role of the military in Turkish politics, it is clear that this campaign has been effective. Public opinion polls indicated a fundamental drop in confidence in the military since late 2008. The most significant finding of the WVS was the decline in the military’s popular trust. In 1996, the proportion of respondents who completely or fairly trusted military was 94%; by 2011 the number had dropped to 75%. Specifically, allegations concerning the military’s involvement in coup plans seem to have reduced public trust from 90% in 2008 to 75% in 2011.203 These data show that the public’s trust

202 The trial began on October 16, 2000. After years of bickering and delays, the case against Gulen was finally dismissed by the state security court on May 5, 2006, and Gulen was cleared of any wrong doing. The appeal by the prosecutors was rejected by the 9th Chamber of the Supreme Court of Appeals, who voted unanimously to clear Gulen of all accusations against him, in July 2008.
203 There are significant regional variations, with support above 90% in the western parts of the country [western Marmara (94%), west black sea (92%) and central Anatolia (90%)], but only 43% in Kurdish populated South-
in the military weakened significantly after the Ergenekon trials that began in 2008.

**Figure 1: Level of confidence in Turkish Military (WWS)**

This delegitimization of the military’s political activism first by the EU and then by domestic change agents outlined above\(^{204}\) has also triggered a process of internal/organizational transformation within the Turkish Armed Forces. This can be conceptualized as the constructive impact of the EU at the organizational level. If the TAF wants to protect its institutional legitimacy and credibility, then it would need to adapt the changing external conditions. An important part of the management of the organization’s environment is to “alter or design its actions so that they fit a concept of established legitimacy” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p. 196). This alteration is crucial because organizations that maintain low levels of legitimacy may face serious threats to freedom of action, power, influence, and resources. Ultimately, a lack of legitimacy is considered as an existential threat to an organization.

Drawing from these theoretical foundations to understand the puzzle of the rapid shift in Turkey’s civil-military power balance, this thesis suggests that the declining legitimacy of Turkish military’s political activism, brought about via the diffusion of norms of civilian supremacy, facilitated an internal change process within the Turkish Armed Forces. In the wake of eastern Anatolia which has witnessed the brunt of the military's efforts to combat the PKK. It should be also noted that the level of confidence in the military recently determined by other pollsters, like ANAR, Pollmark, Konda or GENAR is even less than 70%. In addition to charges of conspiracies the perceived incompetence in the war against the PKK seems to have led to the military's declining popularity in the last decade.

\(^{204}\) By change agents, I refer to norm entrepreneurs, norm opportunists and opinion leaders who work to persuade actors to accept their ideas about appropriate behavior and begin to act in a manner that is compliant with the new ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 896-901).
of a new ideational climate privileging civilian control over the military and delegitimizing military interventions in politics, Turkish Armed Forces thus experienced an incremental adaptive transformation driven by not only instrumental calculations but also by norms associated with a logic of appropriateness that prescribe and proscribe particular behaviors. This will be discussed in the next section.

5.3 Organizational Variables that Predispose the Military to Withdraw from Politics

An important factor that affects the military’s influence in politics is the cohesion of the top military leadership (Janowitz, 1977, pp. 143-150; Welch and Smith 1974, p. 14; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). There is a scholarly consensus on the intuition that the more united a front military leaders can present, the more pressure they can exert in the leaders’ ruling coalition (Brooks, 2008, p. 31). “While not all must be allied for an influential group to be present, for unity to be high, the chiefs in key command and position should share a common bond, based on branch of service, ideological belief systems, corporate interests, or other related issues” (Brooks, 2008, pp. 31-32). Relations in the leadership core are divided when there is evidence of clear internal rivalries or factions within the top leadership (Brooks, 2008, p. 32).

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Turkish Armed Forces found itself organizationally divided at a critical juncture. As the guardians of a Kemalist Turkish Republic with an economy in severe crisis, a state-centric political system in a legitimacy crisis, and societal relations generating a number of identity-based conflicts, the military appeared internally divided about the appropriate role to play during this critical time. Although the TAF played an aggressive role during the power vacuum of the 1990s, by the end of the 2000s a strong majority government and growing domestic demand for political reform of CMR coupled with external reform pressures reduced the ability of the military to exert influence over politics.

Before Turkey officially became a candidate for EU membership in 1999, military commanders had frequently made statements supporting the membership bid. In the official declaration of the NSC’s historic 28 February 1997 meeting, the High Command upheld Turkey’s commitment to full EU membership. Chief of General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu declared that membership was a geopolitical imperative (Hurriyet, 2000, May 12), and the NSC

205 The term cohesion as used here refers to “the degree to which the military leadership unified around a person, position or ideology either within a dominant single service (often the army) or across services”. See: Brooks, 2008, p. 31.
called on the EU many times not to exclude Turkey. An EU section was established in the Plans and Principles Department of General Staff, and former head of the EU department General Ali Esener stated that “there was great hope and enthusiasm within the military when the process was initiated” (Bilgic, 2009, p. 808). As early as November 1999, Commander of the Navy Vice Admiral Salim Dervisoglu declared in an interview that “the TAF had no problem with the Copenhagen criteria and that every single soldier in the TAF was in favor of membership of the EU”.  

While internal discontent abounded regarding the perceived double standards of the EU – and was brought to a peak when the European Parliament approved a report recommending that preconditions should include Turkey’s official recognition of the events of 1915 as an “Armenian genocide” – this discontent was not made public and the TAF never considered withdrawing from the accession process. Following the approval of the report the Public Relations Department at the General Staff issued a statement declaring that “by no means was Ataturk’s army, the TAF, against the EU or Western values” and that the TAF wholeheartedly supported Turkey’s becoming a full member in an “equitable and honorable manner”. Then Chief of TGS Kivrikoglu urged civilians “to keep the defensive line intact, and not to concede a goal.” According to then-Land Forces Commander Hikmet Bayar, “conducting a cost–benefit analysis, the balance still tilted towards EU membership”. Indeed, the NSC meeting in May 2002 not only proposed that the government hasten up the reform process to fulfill Turkey’s outstanding obligations as outlined in the NPAA but also called upon the EU to give Turkey a date to open negotiations by the end of the year. Before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, as Tuba Bilgic observes, the military was supportive of Turkey’s Europeanization process “even with regard to the reforms directly affecting their corporate interests”:

The high command carefully avoided being seen as an obstruction to EU membership. Especially when people had high hopes concerning the prospect of membership, the military could not risk losing popular support by destroying that prospect, the symbol of a better life for the majority…. Beyond being hopeful, they strongly believed that Turkey

deserved EU membership, as reforms implemented so far had already fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria” (2009, p. 812).

The EU, however, did not share the military’s view; reforms undertaken to that point were not sufficient for accession talks to begin. The EU Progress Report of 2002 concluded that despite the change in the composition of the NSC, there has been “little sign of increased civilian control over the military” (pp. 24-25), causing many officers to question the utility of its own concessions in the reform process.

In brief, the election of the AKP as a single-party government in November 2002, the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok’s cooperative approach to EU accession, and the widespread perception of US and EU support for Turkey’s moderately Islamist government not only alienated many officers from the Europeanization process but also deepened divisions, thus eroding cohesion among them. Those with stronger guardianship perceptions, who may be categorized as hardliners, wanted the military institution to be more assertive in its relations with the political leadership.

Ozkok’s cooperative stance with the government raised concerns among these military hardliners. There was widespread suspicion among the force commanders not only of the AKP government and its perceived long-term radical Islamist agenda, but also of General Ozkok as a puppet of the government. Even before Ozkok’s appointment, there was considerable debate among the Turkish General Staff about whether or not he would be a suitable candidate. Chief of General Staff Kivrikoglu, finding Ozkok “too soft on Islamism”, had tried to persuade President Sezer to force Ozkok into early retirement in early 2002 (Berkan, 2011, p. 7). When Sezer rejected this, Kivrikoglu ensured that three known hardliners – Generals Aytac Yalman, Sener Eruygur, and Yasar Buyukanit – were appointed as the Commander of Land Forces, Commander of Gendarmerie, and Deputy Chief of General Staff, respectively. The period between August 2002 and August 2004 was therefore marked by concealed friction both among the commanders and between the hardliners and the government. Ozkok, believing that the actions of the AKP should be interpreted within a framework of democratic and constitutional provisions but that its Islamist roots should not be forgotten, preferred to wait and see how the AKP would behave.

For the hardliners, however, the unprecedented political, social, and financial

211 For example, General Secretary of the NSC, Tuncer Kilinc; Commander of the Land Forces, Aytac Yalman; Commander of the Air Force, Ibrahim Firtina; Commander of the Gendarmerie, General Sener Eruygur;
empowerment of political Islam posed an immediate and vital risk for the continuity of the Republican regime that therefore needed to be dealt with more actively. For these officers, the moderation of the AKP’s discourse and its commitment to the EU was merely a dissimulation tactic (takiyye) to avoid electoral and state constraints. According to hardliners the AKP knew very well that the EU would never give full membership to Turkey. From this perspective, the AKP’s aim was to use EU’s political conditionality to further its domestic interests while following a foreign policy formulation that envisaged close ties with the Muslim world once the EU as an alternative was diminished in the eyes of the public.

The hardliners were also highly skeptical about the EU’s true intentions regarding Turkey. EU member states’ covert support of the PKK, the EU’s imposition of the recognition of minority rights, its criticisms of Kemalism for obstructing Turkey’s democratization, its perceived attempts to dilute Turkish secularism, its insistence of the reform of Turkey’s national security structure, and the perceived double standards in the EU’s treatment of Turkey in relation to other aspirants have revitalized what is called “the Sevres-syndrome” among hardliners. Hardliners perceived the demands of the EU, particularly the dilution of secularism and the recognition of minority rights, as a high threat for Turkey's national and territorial integrity. According to hardliners, adhering to such demands would aggravate ethnic, religious, and sectarian differences. The recognition of cultural rights for Kurds, for example, would lead to the granting of political rights and eventually to an independent Kurdish state, as was envisioned in the Treaty of Sèvres (Gunter 1997, p. 80). In a 2005 interview, former Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu (2000-2002) voiced the more cautious perspective of the hardliners concerning the EU’s approach to Turkey’s Kurdish issue:

The EU always says ‘Kurd, Kurdish… education in Kurdish.’ If Kurdish becomes the medium of education, what shall be the unifying structure, the national integrity? Turkey’s structure would disintegrate… there is no end to these demands. When one step is made, another demand comes… Today they also say that Kurds should be counted as a constituent nation in the Constitution. Then they will ask for autonomy, a federative

Commander of the First Army, General Cetin Dogan; General Commander of the Aegean Army, Hursit Tolon; and Commander of Naval Forces, Ozden Ornek.

212 The Ottoman Empire, as it is well known, had come to an end at the hands of the European powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Turkish nationalism inherited this threat perception from the destructive Ottoman predicament in the European power struggle and related to it an obsession with matters of military security. This led to the historical construction of Sèvres Syndrome” which perceives Europe as a threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish state.
General Tuncer Kilinc, the former General Secretariat of the NSC who has been a suspect in the Ergenekon case since 2009, expresses a widely-shared position among hardliners in the following quote:

I support EU membership but I do not have any hope for it. The EU would never open the door to us. Since the conquest of Istanbul, Europe has always viewed us as an enemy. The EU is never warm enough to hug you. It would never include the Turks, who are the continuation of a people who came up to the Viennese gates. The EU has never supported Turkey. This is due to cultural or religious factors. Europe mentioned the Armenian issue in the 1850s. After the First World War, Europe paved the way to many incidents by rendering us and the Armenians enemies. The PKK has been facilitated by the EU. The EU is responsible for the death of 33,000 people. The EU has supported terrorist organizations in Turkey overtly or covertly. The EU is afraid that Turkey will flourish again and be the next Ottoman Empire (Radikal, April 26, 2003).

Yener Karahanoglu, the Commander of Naval Forces, expressed the widespread perception of insensitivity on the part of Europe towards the Republic’s founding principles in the 2006-07 opening ceremony at Tuzla Navy War School:

Contemporary Turkey is the Turkey of Ataturk… It should be noted that the Turkish Armed Forces cannot sacrifice and tolerate the erosion of constitutionally defined basic values of the Republic of Turkey for the sake of EU ideals and the EU accession process. I am leaving to our beloved people’s discretion how much these should be taken seriously especially if those demands are ignoring our national pride; constitutional structure; our country’s land, sea and air security; foreign policy interests; our Republic’s establishment philosophy; and our historical facts while destroying our national unity (Radikal, September 30, 2006).

The chiefs of general staff since Ozkok, however, maintained a strong pro-EU position in opposition to such hardliners. According to moderates, who comprised most of the senior generals in the beginning of 2000s, Turkey’s EU accession would not only offer a way to respond to several challenges facing the country but also be “the crowning achievement of Turkey’s modernization”.213 Military moderates perceived Turkey’s membership not only as an anchor securing Turkish secularism and lessening Kurdish separatism, but also as a means to make Turkey a member of Western civilization. An anti-EU stance would, therefore, contradict the TAF’s role as the vanguard of modernism and Westernization, a mantle the military has

proudly carried since the Tanzimat reform era of the mid-nineteenth century. Maintaining its guardianship role serves as a powerful motive for supporting Turkey’s Western orientation and EU membership bid.

Additionally, the TAF did not want to be viewed by the public as an impediment to Turkey’s long-held goal of EU membership. The TAF’s bond with the Turkish people in general constitutes yet another crucial source of power. Therefore, the military could not afford to let this relationship become strained, as such an outcome could have more detrimental effects than any reforms aimed at curbing the TAF’s institutional power. This was because, for many sectors of society, Turkey’s accession to the EU meant the final stage of Turkey’s march towards the West, which was initiated in the early 1920s as a national project. The armed forces have traditionally legitimized its privileged status by presenting itself as the vanguard of this process of Westernization. Had the military objected to civilian directives that target its own prerogatives this would cause the military to lose its institutional legitimacy and credibility by being an obstacle to the Turks’ century-old efforts to be part of Europe.

General Hilmi Ozkok expressed this idea clearly in his annual speech at the Staff Academies: “The Turkish Armed Forces has always acted as the pioneer of modernization in Turkey. Turkey’s accession to the European Union will help finally realize that goal”. 214 Similar views were expressed by the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Yasar Buyukanit, at an international conference in Istanbul in May 2003: “I state once again the views of the Turkish Armed Forces on this issue [Turkey-EU relations]: The Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against the European Union because the European Union is the ultimate geo-political and geo-strategic imperative for the realization of the target of modernization which Mustafa Kemal Ataturk chose for the Turkish nation”. 215 Along the same lines, Army Chief General Aytac Yalman stated during his speech at the beginning of the 2003-2004 academic year of the Army War College that “the Turkish military, which is integrated with the Turkish nation, is the vanguard of modernization, and, thus, it can never place itself against democracy and the EU.” 216

The moderates’ desire to accede to the EU was also a rational strategy of becoming a member of an economically prosperous security community. Had they rejected the EU

214 Milliyet, (2003, January 10).Quoted in Heper,2005b, p.41
harmonization reforms that targeted their prerogatives, they would not only risk losing their institutional legitimacy and credibility as outlined above but also would leave Turkey open to greater security challenges. Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the US at the start of the Iraq War reinforced the General Staff’s willingness to accommodate the EU cause. For military officers, Turkey’s EU membership bid would anchor Turkey’s security in the face of a decreasing ability to rely on US support. As Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyaz (2006) maintain: “Turkey’s generals have adapted because they see EU membership as... the best means to confront key domestic challenges with which they have long struggled, such as Islamism and Kurdish separatism” (pp.77-78). As these domestic threats have their roots in economic unrest in large segments of Turkish society, there was very little that could be done militarily unless real economic prosperity and socio-economic guidance was provided for these hotspots in Turkey’s internal security. Economic prosperity, therefore, was seen as a sine qua non for effective security policy both in the country and in the region. The economic crisis of 2001 proved to the military that an irresponsible state-led economic policy ultimately bankrupted the Turkish economy, which chronically could not finance its own economic development.

Military moderates also expected that the EU’s tutelage would help them in their struggle not only against political Islam but also against separatist terror. Moderates expected that as Turkey progressed toward EU membership, European nations might grow less supportive of the PKK, in particular its armed wing. Without legitimacy and significant external support, it would be more difficult for the PKK to continue its armed struggle. General Edip Baser, who between September 2006 and May 2007 held the critical task of serving as a coordinator on the issue of PKK terrorism, claimed that he believed EU membership would constitute an anchor for Turkey’s internal and external security. 217 Hilmi Ozkok, similar to General Baser, claimed that conflicts such as that with Greece over the Aegean Sea could be resolved “in a week” and that “the societal support for the PKK would be reduced” if Turkey became an EU member. 218 Ozkok also believed that EU membership would strengthen state-society relations, accelerate economic development, and improve living standards and quality of life. 219

In brief, the EU’s perceived ideational and security benefits formed the backbone of military’s willing to accommodate the EU cause. As Hilmi Ozkok asserted in 2005:

219 Ibid.
The EU is a great commercial, economic, and military partner of Turkey. This has been so for many years. As a nation who regards Western values as coinciding with ours, we have always wanted to join them and act in accordance with the similar values from the beginning. We have, for a long time, aspired to the economic and political union that the West has set up through a long process. We are now observing the formation of the military union of the EU and desire to participate in it. Turkey’s interest lies in being a full member of this Union (emphasis added).\(^{220}\)

Due to all of these reasons, the General Staff was particularly cautious not to jeopardize Turkey’s chances of receiving a date for the opening of accession negotiations at the EU summit in Brussels on 16-17 December 2004. General Ozkok openly asserted that he was “prepared to accept the rearrangement of the relationship between the nation’s armed forces and the civilian administration in order to move towards conformity with EU standards” (Thomas, 2005, p. 49). The strong parliamentary majority of the single-party AKP government and its success in gathering the pro-Islamist popular forces firmly behind the EU cause helped maintain the momentum behind reformist forces and weakened the ability of Euroskeptic forces among military officers to resist reforms.

Besides their concerns about the implications of EU conditionality for Turkey’s borders, the developments in Northern Iraq have also contributed to military hardliners’ fear of territorial dismemberment. The existence of a de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, close relations between the US and Iraqi Kurds, the US’ perceived inaction against PKK camps in the region, and increasing terror activities and autonomy demands of the PKK-DTP reinforced the hardliners’ concerns over an independent Kurdistan. Additionally, the perception of the Turkish military as an NATO outsider has been reinforced by the reluctance of at least some European countries to consider enforcing Turkey’s Article 5 defense guarantees during the run-up to the US-led wars in Iraq in 1991 and 2003.\(^{221}\)

Even more serious damage to hardliners’s potential for trusting the West was inflicted with a deplorable incident in Suleymaniya. In what is referred to as the hood incident, US military officers detained and mistreated Turkish Special Forces officers in Northern Iraq by

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\(^{220}\) The speech given by the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), General Hilmi Ozkok at the Turkish War Colleges. April 20, 2005. Available at: http://www.tsk.tr/eng/konusma/harpakademisikonusma20Nisan.htm

\(^{221}\) Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO’s founding and governing charter) reads: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
handcuffing and hooding them. This incident not only convinced hardliners that they could not trust the US, but also created “a wound in Turkey’s military and national pride and with the Turkish public” that, according to the US Ambassador to Ankara, “will possibly take a generation to fully heal” (Wikileaks Cable, 2006). This incident along with US inaction against the PKK was considered confirmation of strong US relations with the Kurds, which could evolve into the foundation of an independent Kurdish state that would have serious repercussions for Turkey’s territorial integrity.

The hardliners’ sense of distrust towards the US then reached its peak with the presentation of a map of the “New Middle East” in NATO’s Military College in Rome, Italy. The presentation of a portioned and segmented Turkey along with an independent Kurdistan was met with outrage from Turkish officers. The map, originally drawn by Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters, seemed to receive some form of approval from the US National War Academy before it was unveiled in front of NATO officers in Rome. Although the Pentagon and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace later tried to assure Turkish General Staff that the map did not reflect official US policy and objectives in the region, the hardliners remained unconvinced.

The US presentation of Turkey as a model country for “moderate Islam” in the broader Middle East also created consternation among hardliners. These officers perceived the United States’ new Middle East policy as indirect support for the AKP and moderate Islam in Turkey, which could have serious repercussions for Turkey’s secular democratic identity. A gaffe of US Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2004 calling Turkey an “Islamic Republic” further agitated the suspicions of those who believed that the US wanted to transform Turkey from a secular state to a moderate Islamic one, a goal that was in line with the AKP’s perceived hidden agenda. Not only hardliners, but also 72% of Turkish society perceived US Middle East policy as dangerous for Turkey’s national security (Yeni Safak, July 25, 2004). Despite the references made to Turkey as a model for political reform in the Middle East, this argument was never clearly elaborated beyond stating that Turkey was an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The hardliners perceived this ambiguity as indirect support for moderate Islam in

223 The map can be found at the Appendix.
Turkey. In response to this, Hilmi Ozkok emphasized that the armed forces would never allow Turkey to be a moderate Islamic country in his speech at the War Academies in August 2005:

On the other hand, significant global actors, mainly the US, deem this region as the main source of international terror, attributing this to the absence of democratization in the region. Therefore, long term and comprehensive projects are being developed for the region. The “Broader Middle East and North Africa Project” is the most comprehensive one among those… Turkey is also mentioned together with this project due to her geopolitical position. Some circles wanted to define Turkey as a country that is a model for moderate Islam in this project. About 99% of Turkey’s population is Muslim; however, Turkey is a secular, democratic, and social state of law. Turkey is neither a state of Islam nor a country of Islam… It might be misleading to draw a conclusion that countries with large Muslim populations will easily be transformed into democratic structures by showing Turkey as a model. What is forgotten or neglected here is the fact that secularism is the main driving force in the development of Turkish democracy. The historical process that secularism experienced in Turkey must not be overlooked. It would be merely a claim to say that countries that have not passed through the process of secularism and which do not have this experience can easily attain a democratic structure. Secularism is the keystone of all values that constitute the Republic of Turkey. Turkey can be set as an example, as the “Republic of Turkey” along with her characteristics. However, it must never be neglected that, should it be desired that Turkey be transformed into a moderate state of Islam that other countries will accept, this approach will have nationwide objections” (2005).

Despite Ozkok’s attempts to reassure his subordinates and the public that the General Staff was alert and “on duty” in its protection and guardianship of the Republic, hardliners remained dissatisfied with Ozkok’s cooperation with the AKP. The alleged diaries of Commander of Naval Forces Ozden Ornek, which were first published by weekly magazine Nokta in April 2007, clearly illustrate this division within the military leadership during the period of 2002-2004. According to the diaries, the three force commanders led by Commander of the Gendarmerie Sener Eruygur were all frustrated with Hilmi Ozkok’s “passiveness” and

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225 Ozkok began his talk as follows: “The Middle East region has always been high on the global agenda. It should never be forgotten that in the region there will always be accumulations of tensions that will result in a fracture in the region. Despite some prevailing disagreements, there is a certain common approach among global actors concerning the Middle East. In the future there may emerge a global split on the issue of sharing energy resources since this region has 60% of the world’s energy resources”. He added that: “It might be misleading to draw a conclusion that countries with large Muslim populations will easily be transformed into democratic structures by showing Turkey as a model. What is forgotten or neglected here is the fact that secularism is the main driving force in the development of Turkish democracy. The historical process that secularism experienced in Turkey must not be overlooked. It would be merely a claim to say that countries that have not passed through the process of secularism and which do not have this experience can easily attain a democratic structure. Secularism is the keystone of all values that constitute the Republic of Turkey. Turkey can be set as an example, as the “Republic of Turkey” along with her characteristics”.

226 Ibrahim Firtina, the air force commander; Aytac Yalman, the commander of army; and Ozden Ornek, the commander of naval forces.
looked for alternative ways to show the government their uneasiness. Although Ornek denies that he was the author of the diary, regardless of whether the diaries are authentic or not the friction among the commanders was too obvious to ignore. For example, a few days before parliamentary voting on the war motions on Iraq in March 2003, some commanders implied that they were against Turkey’s involvement in war. This opposition was manifested in an unauthorized statement made by anonymous “military authorities” to the journalist Mustafa Balbay, who was jailed in 2008 in connection with the Ergenekon case, which was obviously intended to disadvantage the office of the TGS. The news report titled “The Military is Uncomfortable” (Cumhuriyet, February 26, 2003) gave the impression that the military was opposed to the motion. The office of the TGS immediately rejected such a report by a formal press statement issued on its website. On March 5, Ozkok himself reiterated that “the news report did not reflect the views of TAF” and that “the TAF holds only one opinion that is based on careful scrutiny of issues reflecting its collective wisdom” (Hurriyet, March 6, 2003).

Another public manifestation of the internal rift within the military was published by the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet on 23 May 2003 in a story allegedly leaked from intra-bureaucracy negotiations. Entitled “Young Officers Are Uneasy”, the article claimed that young officers had been displeased by the submissive stance of the military High Command against the AKP government’s staffing in the bureaucracy. Although Ozkok immediately refuted the news piece and continued to sustain an accommodating relationship with the government, hardliners openly expressed their criticisms in the handover ceremony of August 2003. In his farewell speech Commander of the First Army Cetin Dogan, who was jailed as the leader of Sledgehammer plot in 2010, highly criticized the government’s appointment of graduates of preacher schools and members of religious brotherhoods to important positions in state bureaucracy including the security sector. General Dogan stated:

Without a doubt, today the main duty in protecting national security is to prevent the erosion of the secular democratic republic. In an era in which attacks against secular republic continue to be carried out insidiously, in which the complacency and even treachery displayed are reminiscent of the armistice years [when Empire was under occupation], I believe that all those forces that are sincerely committed to the Republic should come forward and engage together”. 227

Upon receiving command of the First Army from Dogan, General Hursit Tolan declared

that the armed forces were aware of the “anti-secular activities that are insidiously carried out” (Radikal, August 21, 2003). General Tuncer Kilinc, the secretary-general of the NSC and an outspoken advocate of stronger Turkish ties to Russia, China and Iran claimed that “instead of carrying on the ideal of secular republic, one nation, one language, one flag, some people still call for caliphate and Sharia” and that “those who are at the top of state administration today cannot come together in social and public spheres” (Milliyet, August, 26, 2003). All of these hardliner commanders –as of mid-2013- are in jail accused of their involvement in either Ergenekon and Sledgehammer coup plots.

This study suggests that the chiefs of general staffs, have made public declarations, least partly as a response to internal divisions within the military, such as those presented above. This thesis argues that the hardliners’ strong perception of an unprecedented level of existential threat to the secular and unitary character of the Republic forced the general staff to communicate the TAF’s institutional concerns to the public and cadets. From the moderates’ perspective, Turkey’s location in a “geography of instability” in the volatile and unpredictable state of the international security environment, combined with growing internal restlessness in the military, required the TAF to act responsibly. Acting with an argumentative rationality, the Chiefs of General Staff – particularly since 2006 – engaged in communicative action to convince others both in and out of the organization about the legitimacy of republican principles and the armed forces’ commitment to these principles. As a response to the above-cited speeches of the hardliners, for instance, the General Staff found itself in a position to elaborate the idea of “institutional responsibility”.

Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok stated that:

At this time my co-commanders are disclosing their views on a number of issues. One should take those statements as their personal opinions. I am not saying that my co-commanders’ views are wrong. Nor am I saying that they are right. Let me, however, point out that it would have been better if they had made those views public after they had retired (Milliyet, 2003 Aug. 26, quoted in Heper, 2005b, p. 39).

Despite this strong criticism, up until 2010, the chiefs of the TGS engaged in deliberate

228 Commander of Air Forces General Cumhur Aspuruk stated in his own 27 August 2003 farewell speech that “while some nations control their supremacy from space, unfortunately, we as the Turkish nation in a vicious cycle are still occupied with the [subjects of] hundreds years back… [such as] imam hatip schools, headscarves and religious brotherhoods”. The Commander of Naval Forces, Bulent Alpkaya, stated in his farewell speech one day later that: “Those internal and external divisive and fundamentalist threats that target the indivisible integrity of our country and our secular and democratic nature unfortunately remain in existence in the 80th anniversary of our Republic”. Hurriyetim Almanak 2003 [http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/almanak2003/news_detail.asp?nid=122&sid=2](http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/almanak2003/news_detail.asp?nid=122&sid=2)
communication directly with the public about their perception of security threats and the methods they deemed appropriate to cope with them. One of the points emphasized most in these deliberations was the perceived threat directed against Turkey’s secular and democratic identity. According to the General Staff, secularism should not be seen as an impediment for democratic consolidation and Turkey cannot be an example of a moderate Islamic democratic state. Ilker Basbug’s annual evaluation speech on 14 April 2009 is illustrative in this sense:

There is a strong relationship between democracy and secularism. The argument that secularism clashes with democracy does not rest on a strong foundation. Quite the contrary, the principle of secularism has been the main driving force behind the development of Turkish democracy since it is at the same time the most important precondition of democracy… Secularism in Turkey not only separated religious and state affairs, but also solved the problem of sovereignty. The central principle that defines secularism is that sovereignty does not belong to the sacred; in other words, it does not belong to the Caliphate, but to the nation. The secular and democratic character of the Turkish state constitute each other… These two characteristics not only give Turkey a distinctive and powerful status in the world, but also constitute Turkey’s authentic character. For this reason, protection and maintenance of these characteristics are in fact a citizenship duty.229

The military leadership has thus engaged in direct communicative action with the public not only to protect the regime but also its own organizational unity. This thesis therefore suggests that this renewed emphasis on its guardianship role and the accompanying public speeches of Turkey’s Chiefs of General Staff should be understood within the context of the military’s attempt to act preemptively by reconfiguring itself as a “soft” deterrent force. By engaging in public discussion on the immutable constitutional principles of the modern Turkish Republic, the TAF employs argumentative action (Habermas, 1985) in trying to convince others, including military hardliners, and to shape public opinion. According to Aydinli, Ozcan, and Akyaz, within the Turkish military there is “no inherent block to further progress”:

Despite its staunch commitment to Kemalism, the army has proved remarkably flexible over the years. Although the ideology has sometimes been considered an obstacle to EU membership because it promotes sovereignty, statism, and nationalism, it has in fact been adapted very well to suit new situations. The Turkish military has repeatedly redefine Kemalism to synchronize itself with—or, if necessary, to counterbalance—its environment. If the EU process reaches a level at which the military no longer feels the need to preserve the ideology in its current form in order to meet Turkey’s security challenges, the TGS will redefine Kemalism again (2006, p. 89).

229 Basbug, April 14 2009 (Emphasis added).
As Chief of General Staff from September 2002 to 2006 and a pro-Atlanticist, Hilmi Ozkok played a crucial leadership role in this process of institutional transformation. As Commander of Land Forces General Aytac Yalman asserted in the coup diaries, General Ozkok regarded himself as tasked with a mission of bringing about change and opening a new era in the TAF. Ozkok’s vision was to create the modern armed forces of the 21st century by adapting the TAF’s historical role to global changes. This would entail giving greater trust to people and politics and “guarding the ongoing transformation and modernization of the nation”, even if this meant change within the army itself and its relationship with politics (Aydinli, 2009, p. 587). In Ozkok’s view the Turkish military, which had been the pioneer of Turkish/Ottoman modernization for the past 200 years, should continue to be so in the 21st century. Ozkok thus called for the widening of officers’ intellectual horizons that would enable them to read global developments and, if necessary, for the reinterpretation of Ataturkism, the guiding light of the military, in a more liberal direction:

The TAF is burdened with new and difficult tasks as a consequence of the fundamentalist and separatist movements that continue to become even more critical as time goes by. On the other hand, new democratic values and changing concepts of sovereignty make it necessary that we come up with new ideas and doctrines for the better fulfillment by the TAF of the arduous tasks in question….The Ataturkist way of thought, which is free from dogmas and based on reason and science, can and should be reinterpreted. Only then will Ataturkism continue to be a guiding light for the future generations too (Milliyet, August 31, 2003, quoted in Heper 2005b, p. 41).

This perspective was, in fact, widely shared among the senior generals. An overwhelming majority of the officers interviewed for this study define Kemalism in a much broader sense, which provides flexibility for the military’s institutional identity and, thus, its behavior. They see Kemalism as a worldview that undergoes “dynamic” developments based on the conditions of the time. Hence, Kemalism is not rigid in an ideological sense; it keeps changing in light of previous experience and pressing towards the “dynamic ideal”, which consists of “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations”. In this sense, the TAF rejects Kemalism as a guiding set of principles, since this implies an ideology, and prefer instead to refer to it as the “Ataturkist system of thought”. For example, Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug stated in his annual speech at the War Academies in April 2009 that “the Ataturkist system of thought is not a rigid

230 The “coup diaries” can be found at: http://www.samanyoluhaber.com/gundem/ISTE-DARBE-GUNLUKLERI-- -TAM-METIN/189735/
ideology. It is a worldview that shows how to act by relying on reason and science”. In another speech given to his American counterparts, Basbug identified the main essence of the Ataturkist thought system by quoting Ataturk: “I don’t leave any dogma or cliché to you. What I leave for you is science and reason. If those who would like to follow me adopt the guidance of science and reason then they will be my spiritual inheritors”.

For most of the generals, Ataturkist thought provides a dynamic ideal of helping Turkey achieve the contemporary level of civilization. For General Tuncer Kilinc, the former General Secretariat of NSC, Ataturkist thought is a “thought system that aims to transcend the contemporary level of civilization through continuous modernization” (Author’s interview, 2008). Such a broad understanding of Kemalism – or, from military’s perspective, Ataturkist thought – not only offers the military flexibility in adapting itself to changing conditions, but also makes the ideal of modernization a constitutive element of the Turkish military identity.

5.3.1  Political learning from past experiences

For most of the senior generals, an expanded role for the military – let alone military interventions in any form – proved unsuccessful in solving Turkey’s problems and in fact negatively affected the nation’s modernization. Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok stated in 2003 that:

The military intervened on May 27 [1960], March 12 [1971], and September 12 [1980]. Were these interventions successful? No! If they had been successful, those politicians who were banned from politics could not have returned to active politics. But they did return to active politics; they even became prime ministers and presidents. This means that military interventions should not be looked upon as panaceas for the ills Turkey faces. From now on, we should put greater trust in the people. The TAF should have a new vision. Otherwise, we cannot distinguish ourselves from those who only try to emulate the past (Hurriyet, August 27, 2003).

The overwhelming majority of the interviewees in this study underlined the belief that, although under the given circumstances military intervention was right thing to do, those interventions negatively affected Turkish political life and the development of democracy. Therefore, they emphasize that the TAF wants to remain outside of political debates and instead focus completely on its professional activities. As Nejat Eslen, a retired general and strategist

231 Annual evaluation Speech of chief of general staff İlker Babug at the War Academies on April 14, 2009. Available at:
http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerbasbug_harpak_konusma_14042009.html
232 Lucheon Remarks By General İlker BASBUG, Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, June 6, 2005.
working in the Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis states:

We wish that none of the coups had happened, that the conditions that paved the way for an intervention had never occurred. The TAF intervened and it suffered. Today the armed forces are under the command of generals who consider that a coup would be most harmful to the TAF and would not be of any use to the country. From now on, there will not be a coup; even the word coup is not pronounced. A coup will never become an item on the national agenda (32. Gun TV program, March 18, 2010).

Yasar Karagoz explains this changing attitude within the armed forces in terms of both socialization with the rules of Western democracies and learning from past experiences:

Military generals have all visited Western democracies and worked in different regions of the world. They understand and internalize the democratic norms that exist in these Western countries, and want a similar regime in Turkey. Military generals want Turkey to reach the level of the most advanced democratic countries. They sincerely believe in the supremacy of democratic norms, but are against those who try to break down democracy by using religion for their self-interest… Democracy is not an arbitrary regime, but a regime of rules. The Turkish Armed Forces abides by democratic rules and does whatever falls upon them to preserve the democratic secular regime. However, this would never be a direct intervention. The TAF has learned its own lessons from its past interventions. The interventions turned out to be detrimental for the Turkish military and for the Turkish nation. They negatively affected the image of Turkey in the world’s democratic nations (Author’s interview, 2008, Ankara).

General Alleattin Parmaksiz stated to the Author that:

I guess the nation is experiencing collective memory loss. While Mehmed the Conqueror was invading Constantinople, the priests in Hagia Sophia were discussing whether the angels were female or male. While Turkey has thousands of problems such as education and female illiteracy, and while 12 million people try to survive earning only a dollar a day, the nation’s agenda is determined by coup allegations. When they considered the military, they should have thought of the janissaries… What will the Turkish Armed Forces do? Will they rebel? There is no such thing. The coup era in Turkey is over. There will not be any coups Turkey anymore (2008, Ankara)

Riza Kucukoglu, President of the Retired Officers, explained this process of learning to the Author in the following words:

We are aware of the historical transformation that Turkey is undergoing. We cannot intervene on parliamentary will. We recognize the primacy of political parties in a democracy. However, we also believe in the significance of intermediary organizations that function between the governors and governed, such as civil-society organizations, labor unions, well-functioning political parties, free and independent media and an independent and impartial judiciary. We, therefore, as a civil-society organization representing the retired military officers, engage in peaceful civic actions with the goal of contributing to the healthy functioning of democracy. However, even our existence and activities are criticized in some quarters by those who define themselves as pro-EU. The
EU foresees the establishment of military associations. This means that those critics themselves did not internalize the European norms such as plurality and freedom of association” (2008, Ankara).

Similarly, Armagan Kuloglu argues that the predominance of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics was reduced not only by these legal arrangements, but also through the changes that occurred in the “institutional mentality” of the TAF (Author’s interview, Ankara, 2008). This change in mentality is most evident in the last annual evaluation speech that Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug delivered at the War Academies in April 2009. He asserted that he would “address the issues of civil-military relations, the fight against terrorism, democracy and secularism from an academic perspective”. He quoted from academics such as Samuel Huntington, Eliot Cohen, Max Weber and Montesquieu to support its views. In his discussion of CMR, Basbug pointed to Huntington’s norm of objective control to legitimize its high professional autonomy and stressed the norms of mutual trust and reliability in maintaining healthy civil-military relations. By citing Huntington, Basbug listed three main responsibilities of military leaders: “The determination of military security needs and communicating them to the relevant authorities; providing advice on security issues to civilian leaders in decision-making positions; implementing decisions made by the government.” After emphasizing that “the professional concerns and recommendations of the military should be taken into consideration by the civilian authorities”, Basbug nevertheless made it clear that “civilian authorities are the ultimate decision makers who carry political responsibility”:

Of course, the ultimate decision lies with the civilian administration. However, civilian authorities who are in decision-making positions would also be responsible for any outcomes that may emerge from a failure to consider honest, realistic, and professional recommendations made by the military.

As Huntington argues, Turkish military leaders seem to have internalized the norms of military professionalism and objective civilian control. Basbug re-stated in 2011 for instance that “the basic and universal rule of the civil-military relations in democracy” is “civilian control”. In democracies, according to Basbug, “the last word belongs to civilian authorities and there is no doubt about this rule. It is very clear that the executive function is to implement state decision with respect, [which might] sometimes even happen if civilian authorities’ decisions counter military proposals... Of course politics beyond the scope of military component and
participation of the military officers in politics undermines their professionalism and their institution”.

5.3.2 Learning through international socialization

In addition to this political learning from past experience, a close examination of military behavior and attitudes indicates a process of learning through socialization with their Western counterparts in NATO structures. Ersel Aydinli argues, for instance, that “Turkey’s rapid process of integration with transnational organizations and global markets and the EU accession process in particular, as well as the Turkish army’s close relationship with NATO and other Western security institutions” have changed military attitudes towards civilian authorities (2009, pp. 587-88). Umit Cizre seems to concur that “the new post–Cold War international policy wisdom about democracy, security, and defense…. has indirectly or directly affected Turkey’s own culture of security” (2011, pp. 68-69). According to Karaosmanoglu, “NATO membership has had a certain transformative effect on Turkey’s security culture”:

Most high-ranking military officers have either visited or served in various NATO headquarters and in the United States. Such experiences abroad have given them an international outlook. Regular discussions on national defense issues in international fora are likely to have moderated their conception of state sovereignty. Although their priorities are defense-oriented in dealing with their foreign colleagues, their commitment to maintaining their country’s ties with the West prevents them from overlooking Western views on political matters, including Turkey’s problems with democratization (2009, p. 36).

Turkish military officers, to a degree different from that of their counterparts in the developing world, have highly integrated with Western institutions. For instance, Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, and numerous high-ranking military officials have studied in US or European military academies and worked in NATO headquarters. Between 1984 and 1999, the US Pentagon's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program trained around 2,900 Turkish soldiers, navy officers and pilots (Uzgel, 2003, p. 197). The number of officers sent to the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School between 1997 and 2002 was the highest in comparison to other countries (Uyar and Varoglu, 2008, p.17). Similarly, the career paths of the last four Chiefs of General Staffs clearly demonstrate the integration of the military High

These interactions with Western colleagues and institutions further contributed to the military’s modern outlook and sense of professionalism. According to Karaosmanoglu, the TAF is “increasingly careful not to involve itself in politics in to obvious a manner” because “the military is aware that its involvement in politics undermines the professionalism of its officer core” (2009, p. 39). Guney and Heper agree that following Turkey’s entrance into NATO, the military progressively developed into a professional body (2000, p. 652). According to Pevehouse, the involvement of Turkish officers with other NATO officers, helped to socialize them into accepting civilian supremacy and their proper role in guaranteeing only the external security of the state (2005, p. 250).

This thesis supports the argument that Turkey’s membership in NATO as well as its participation in the Partnership for Peace program and humanitarian operations contributed to the Turkish officers’ socialization into the evolving post-Cold War security regime. NATO’s communicative networks serve as a vehicle to socialize Turkish military commanders into internalizing the rules and norms of post-Cold Euro-Atlantic security community. Hilmi Ozkok explained the change in military role beliefs by using the concept of “NATO-ism”:

The most important reason for the end of the era of coups is the intellectual progress of the military. The young generation in the TAF – and we should count the generation following us as young officers – thinks differently, thinks more democratically. This is because they receive an excellent education. They know languages very well. They observe the world very well. They know what happens where and in which direction. They serve in NATO. People used to call it ‘NATO-ism.’ They would treat those serving in NATO differently. However, serving in NATO broadens the horizon of the officers. It helps them understand the world better and observe events more clearly (Milliyet, March 24, 2009).

The main vehicle for NATO’s contribution to the officers’ socialization with the new

234 Chief of General Staff Isik Kosaner (2010-2011), for example, studied at the NATO Defense College and Royal College of Defense Studies in London and worked as a Staff Officer at Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples. Ilker Basbug similarly served as the Intelligence Plans Chief at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. Following his graduation from the Royal Military Academy in England and then the NATO Defense College, he was again appointed to the SHAPE, this time as the Chief of Logistics and Intelligence Department. Yasar Buyukanit (TGS Chief from 2006-2008), following his graduation from the Army Staff College in 1972, served as the Chief of the Intelligence Division at SHAPE. After graduating from the NATO Defense College he was appointed as Chief of Intelligence Department at AFSOUTH Headquarters in Italy. General Hilmi Ozkok (Chief of TGS from 2002-2006) graduated from the Army War College and then from the NATO Defense College before serving at the Special Weapons Branch of AFSOUTH and then at SHAPE. Between 1992 and 1995, he worked as the Chief of the Turkish Military Delegation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels; following his promotion to full general, he took charge of the NATO Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe.
norms and rules of the Trans-Atlantic security community was “the Partnership for Peace” Program, which considers the democratic control of armed forces as one of the constitutive pillars of cooperation between the Allies and the candidate states (PfP Framework Document, 1994). The program engages Allies and participating countries in concrete cooperation activities in order to enhance transparency, ensure democratic control of the armed forces, maintain the capability to contribute to UN or CSCE operations, strengthen the participants' capability of undertaking peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and enhance the compatibility of the Partners' and the Allies military forces (cf. PfP Invitation, NAC, 10-11/1/1994, Brussels). The biennial PfP Work Program contains more than 2,000 activities, which can vary considerably in type (seminar, lecture, workshop, conference, course, military exercise), length (from a few days to much longer periods), and areas of concern (from purely military to defense-related cooperation in fields such as crisis management, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, air traffic management and armaments cooperation).

Turkey in fact was the first country to establish a "PfP Training Center", following decisions taken in the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. Since its establishment the PfP Training Center has been actively contributing to PfP initiatives by conducting courses and seminars for NATO, PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries. The center has offered 330 courses, arranged 58 Mobile Training Team Activities and organized 14 seminars. 89 countries have participated in the center’s activities. These activities played a major role in the integration of several Eurasian, Balkan and Mediterranean nations into the broader Transatlantic security architecture. Launched in 2000 as one of these initiatives, the "Silk Road Flag Officers Seminars" aim to "to familiarize participants with NATO's global missions and developing role in collective security and the European security architecture". 235

These dense areas of communication not only facilitated the adaptation of Turkish officers to Western standards (as rationalists expect), but also provide the framework within which values norms and ideas are diffused (as social constructivists claim). This happens substantively in two distinct but interrelated ways: NATO PfP activities “provide an area in which “communication takes place within normatively-set boundaries that define what is appropriate and what is not”. Secondly, the PfP provides “a communicative framework in which

235 See: www.bioem.tsk.tr
the construction of a common interpretation of the same norm is developed through a process of communication (arguing)” (Lucarelli, 2002, pp. 34-35). Such intensive communication among the military commanders “especially in a framework where apparent conditions of equal-level-partnership are created, provide(s) greater space for the logic of argumentative rationality and for actual social learning” (Lucarelli, 2002, p. 38).

To summarize the arguments presented to this point, the TAF, as an institutional actor constrained by structural, normative, and cultural factors, has undergone an internal transformation. From an institutionalist point of view, the transformation of Turkish armed forces culture can indeed be considered to be a process of “socialization” and “institutional learning”, triggered by external pressures and then driven by the interaction of the organizational, domestic, international developments that reinforce each other. Expressed differently, this transformation has occurred over time through repeated interactions between political and military leaders, allowing actors to gather new information about public preferences and institutional constraints. Iterated periods of strategic interaction of the military with political leaders and the public taught the Chiefs of General Staff the failure of political activism in securing its objectives, which became particularly evident when Abdullah Gul was elected as the 11th president on 28 August 2007 despite the military’s expressed opposition.

The following chapters analyze the behavioral dimensions of democratic control in Turkey during the period of 2002 to 2012 to show the extent to which military authorities comply with the political executive’s decisions in those critical cases in which their preferences diverge. These chapters not only demonstrate how civil-military relations in Turkey play out in practice, but also shed light on the question of the extent of the military’s subordination to political authorities in political and organizational issues.
This chapter demonstrates the transformation of patterns of Turkish civil-military relations by analyzing the behavior of military leaders when their preferences diverged from those of political leaders during the period between November 2002 and December 2005. I have identified three important cases that triggered a substantial degree of conflict between the government and the military within which to analyze this behavior. These cases are: Turkey’s foreign security policy-making regarding Iraq during the onset of the Iraq War of 2003, institutional reforms that reduced the prerogatives of the military including the particularly scope-reducing seventh harmonization package of July 2003, and policy-making toward Cyprus during the process of the adoption of the Annan Plan in 2004. The first case of Turkey’s Iraq policy, and particularly Parliament’s March 1st decision refusing US troops permission to use Turkish soil for their operations in Iraq, demonstrates the military’s transformation from veto players into mostly observant players willing to comply with pro-EU initiatives. The second case, concerning the restructuring of the NSC and NSC Secretariat General, illuminates why the military accepted the removal of its own powers. The third case of Turkey’s Cyprus policy demonstrates the extent of change in military involvement in the foreign security policy-making structure.

This chapter argues that despite strong doubts on the part of many officers (and civilian secularists) concerning the “ulterior motives” of moderately Islamist AKP leaders, the relationship between the Chief of Staff and the AKP government developed harmoniously. Contributing factors here seem to be the emergence of a strong single-party government along with instrumental moderation of Islamist leaders, strong domestic support of Turkey’s EU membership bid, and the General Staff’s strategic commitment to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Before delving into these case studies, the following section provides an exploration of these factors that created an environment in AKP-General Staff relations developed less acrimoniously than one might expected between a ruling party with Islamist roots and a military that had declared the rise of political Islam as a threat to Turkey’s national security.

6.1 November 2002 Elections and the Emergence of a New Turkey

From now on, nothing will be the same in Turkey.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 22 November 2002

The elections on 3 November 2002 ushered in a major realignment of the Turkish political party system, eliminating from the political scene all major parties that had run the
country in the 1990s: the center-left Democratic Left Party (DSP) of outgoing Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit; the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the second big coalition partner of 1999-2002; and former President Turgut Özal’s centrist Motherland Party (ANAP). None of the incumbents was able to pass the 10% electoral threshold needed to enter parliament. The Islamist opposition Felicity Party (SP – formerly the Welfare Party before its forced closure in 1998) and former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller’s center-right True Path Party (DYP) were also unsuccessful in winning representation in the parliament. Of the 18 parties running in the elections, the social democrat Republican People’s Party (CHP), which was absent from parliament during the previous legislative period, was the only party other than the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to win parliamentary representation, garnering 19.4% of the vote and 178 seats. The AKP, founded only nine months prior to the elections, received 34.2% of the vote and thus due to Turkey’s disproportionate electoral system won 363 of the 550 seats in the Turkish parliament – just five seats short of the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. For the first time since the 1954 elections, Turkey had a two-party parliament and, after more than a decade of coalition governments, a majority government.

**Table 9: 22 November 2002 Election Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>No. of MPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdogan</td>
<td>34.29</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Deniz Baykal</td>
<td>19.38</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Path Party</td>
<td>Tansu Ciller</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party</td>
<td>Devlet Bahceli</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Party</td>
<td>Cem Uzan</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic people’s party</td>
<td>Mehmet Abbasoglu</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
<td>Mesut Yılmaz</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness Party</td>
<td>Recai Kutan</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
<td>Bülent Ecevit</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Turkey Party</td>
<td>Ismail Cem</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Unity Party</td>
<td>Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The puzzling question posed by these elections is how a new party, established shortly before the elections from a shut-down Islamist party, could rise so rapidly in such a short period of time. According to Hakan Yavuz, the AKP is an outcome of the transformation of liberal Islam, directed by four socio-political factors: “the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, the expansion of the public sphere and the new Muslim intellectuals, the Copenhagen criteria, and the February 28 Soft Coup” (2009, p. 78). This study, however, identifies four related but slightly different factors that contributed to the AKP’s extraordinary success: electoral alienation from established
parties, the AKP’s effective grassroots organization, cross-class alliances, and its ideological moderation. This alternative set of factors merits elaboration:

The AKP’s extraordinary success was partly the result of the frustration of the electorate with existing political parties, whose performance was far from remarkable. The three-party coalition government of 1999-2002, as discussed in Chapter 5, failed to respond not only the financial crises of November 2000 and February 2001 but also to Turkey’s urgent needs when two major earthquakes hit the country in 1999. The government’s failure in achieving “sustained and equitable growth, avoiding costly financial crises, and tackling the problem of pervasive corruption” (Onis, 2006, p. 207), coupled with a public perception of parliamentary deadlock particularly in times of emergency, provided strong incentives to vote for change.

Further, the end of the Cold War had destabilized “traditional-conservative” (right-wing) and “modern-progressive” (left-wing) politics. The popularity of traditional right-wing parties diminished throughout the 1990s, as they became embroiled in banking scandals, political sleaze, and the war with the PKK (Turunc 2011). The long period of rule by ANAP was marked by corruption scandals, while the image of ANAP’s rival, DYP leader Tansu Çiller, was also tainted by allegations of corruption. Public outrage over these scandals played a decisive role in the erosion of support for the center-right (Candar, 1999, p. 135). The biggest breakdown of the center-right alignment, however, came as a result of the February 28 post-modern coup. By targeting the manifestation of Islamic values in the public sphere, the February 28 coup attacked the traditional base of the center-right. The cooperation of political parties when Islamic brotherhoods such as the Gulen movement were harassed by the military and judiciary further alienated conservatives from the existing parties. The center-right parties were perceived not as popular representatives but simply as agents of an oppressive state.

In the political arena, left-wing parties failed to recover the ground they had lost after the purges following the 1980 military coup, the disintegration of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the USSR. The political left in Turkey lost further ground in the 1990s when it failed to develop a social democratic welfare state agenda against rising free-market rhetoric of the center-right (Cizre and Cinar, 2003, p. 316) Although to a lesser extent than center-right parties, the left-wing also suffered from a credibility crisis due to their involvement in corruption scandals. “The center-left CHP, which had won municipal elections in almost all of Turkey's major urban centers in 1989, went down in defeat in 1999, after being implicated in the corruption scandals that rocked the Istanbul city government in 1994 and led to
the conviction and imprisonment of several high-ranking officials” (Candar, 1999, p. 135).

Cooperation with the military during the February 28 Process also tarnished the left-wing parties’ reputation a decade later. According to Cizre and Cinar, since the 1997 intervention the two center-left parties DSP and CHP acted as “the agents and defenders of the reconsolidation of nation-state behind the totalizing language of secularism” (2003, p. 316). Moreover, Prime Minister and DSP leader Ecevit’s refusal to step down despite his deteriorating health and massive defections from his party in the summer of 2002 plunged the country into a state of political crisis and uncertainty.236 The government could survive only by calling for early elections on 3 November 2002, which brought the AKP to power. The AKP, as a new force in Turkish politics, capitalized on these failures of conventional political parties (Carkoglu, 2002, pp. 123-156; Mecham, 2004, p. 340).

The second factor contributing to the AKP’s success was its effective organizational skills and success in forming widespread alliances among different sectors of the population. The AKP inherited from the National View Movement (NVM) a formidable organization built on an extensive grassroots component with a focus on municipalities and neighborhoods. The AKP’s well-developed local infrastructure and social networks, many of which had been established by the Welfare Party, coupled with its positively perceived local governance performance to attract a wide range of groups to support the AKP. The welfare benefits provided by Islamist political parties at the municipal level played an important role in the public’s positive evaluation of these parties. Such benefits included helping residents to find jobs, providing hospital and health care, distributing free food, and providing other social amenities.237

The AKP’s success, however, cannot be explained only on the basis of the support that they received from the poor. The third factor in explaining this success, therefore, highlights the AKP’s ability to construct a broad-based interclass alliance that included not only the underprivileged section of society living on the margins of major metropolitan areas but also rural populations, the emerging Muslim bourgeoisie, and Istanbul-based business elites.

236 The political crisis deepened when Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, six other ministers, and about seventy defected deputies left Ecevit’s party to launch a new party on July 12, 2002 in defiance of Ecevit’s refusal to step aside and name a successor. Kemal Dervis, the former minister of state and the overseer of the ongoing IMF-designed stabilization program, was expected to join in the new movement, which later became the New Turkey Party. Until Dervis’s declaration in mid-August 2002 that he would not join the New Turkey Party, the initiative was hailed by Turkey’s secular establishment and business and international circles as potentially capable of stemming the tide of the AKP and speeding up the process of starting Turkey’s accession talks with the EU.

Although the small- and medium-sized businesses of rising Anatolian cities collected under the umbrella organization of MUSIAD supported the Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990s, this relationship soon began to unravel. The RP’s inability to address Turkey’s mounting domestic problems along with its polarizing policies during the February 28 Process pushed MUSIAD to seek new political alternatives that would advocate stability and moderation. Following the closure of the RP, therefore, these groups began to support the reformist movement within the NVM and played a key role in the formation of the AKP. Perhaps the most telling evidence of the role of newly rising business interests in the AKP’s formation is the election of 21 members of MUSIAD to the National Assembly from the ranks of the AKP (Taskin, 2008, p. 63). The AKP’s remarkable success was, therefore, at least partially a result of its ability “to cut across class cleavages and appeal to diverse segments of Turkish society using religion as an effective mechanism of mutual trust and bonding: (Onis, 2006, pp. 211-212).

Finally, the success of the AKP was a result of its strategic moderation. Robust institutional constraints on Islamist movements and incentives for movement toward the political center made the AKP’s moderation self-enforcing. This thesis identifies three developments that were instrumental in inducing the AKP to engineer this radical rupture: 1) the February 28 Process leading to the eventual closure of AKP predecessors RP and SP; 2) the prospect of EU membership provided by the Helsinki Decision of 1999; and 3) electoral incentives.

To begin, the identification of political Islam as a prime security threat and the dissolution of the Welfare and Virtue parties provided an imposing reference for AKP leaders in their attempts to reframe the movement as one within the acceptable boundaries of the political system. Phrased differently, the 28 February 1997 “post-modern coup” forcefully pushed Islamist movements towards embracing liberalism and democracy for the very pragmatic reasons of political survival. This change of position, or strategic moderation, was based on a conscious decision made by party leadership after iterated periods of political learning (Mecham, 2004, pp. 339-358). After an extended period of political learning, several members of the movement concluded that the only way Islamists could succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and deemphasizing the religious agenda. As Cakir rightly states, “with the February 28 Process, the National Vision Movement was pushed into a change and a transformation out of its will” (2004, p. 552). It was for this reason that the AKP leadership discarded much of Welfare’s ‘just order’ (adil duzen) and ‘national view’ (milli gorus) discourse, and emphasized that it was a new party with an essentially democratic agenda. Accordingly, the
party leadership abandoned any attempt to construct its own legitimacy standard based on Islamist values and instead framed its overall government program in the “legitimacy framework” of Western norms and conventions.

Secondly, while constrained domestically, these religious movements perceived international institutions and norms as opportunities for the recognition of their identity claims and the reduction of the role of military and civilian bureaucracy in the political system. The AKP’s support of Turkey’s EU membership thus appears to be more strategic than sincere, in the sense that the continuation of the EU accession process has been considered by the AKP leadership to be vital for the party’s ability to secure external and internal legitimacy (Oguzlu, and Bilgehan, 2008, p. 992). Many, in fact, consider this shift a survival tactic to form an alliance with liberal groups under military, legal, and economic pressures. Ihsan Dagi presents the AKP’s adoption of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield constructed by building a “liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors that recognize the AKP as a legitimate actor” (2006, p. 90). According to Cizre, the AKP’s “attack against the guardian role of the military is motivated more by the preconditions for further alignment with the EU than a democratic discourse that originated from the party itself” (2011b, p. 69). Its “military policy is contingent not on its intellectual commitment to full democracy but on its self-interest. The party feels forced to shore up its own political credentials free from the restraining and demeaning strategies and behavior of the military toward the party” (Ibid, p. 71).

Finally, the AKP was motivated to moderate itself by electoral incentives upon recognizing that a primary reliance on hard-core Islamist votes would condemn the party forever to minority status. At the same time, economic actors such as the highly influential TUSIAD began to campaign vehemently for Turkey’s EU accession (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008). The AKP leadership felt that a pro-EU position would provide not only an alternative standard of legitimacy and possible an external ally, but also a focal point for new electoral coalitions. As a result, EU accession was embraced as a guiding device and first priority for the AKP government. The AKP’s principal messages during election campaigns included the necessity of true democracy in Turkey, the importance of human rights, politics absent from corruption, a focus on expanding political liberties, the efficiency of a market economy, and the importance of Turkey’s relations with the EU. To consolidate its moderate image, almost immediately upon its

formation the party sent a public relations mission to the US and while declaring its firm commitment to ensuring Turkey’s fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria for entrance into the EU.

The AKP’s pro-West, neo-liberal policies were structured in large part toward reassuring international audiences. After the November 2002 elections, the AKP leadership not only made a broad tour of Western European countries to campaign for Turkey's entry into the EU, but also returned to Washington to establish a relationship for garnering the US’ tacit support in preventing the military from future actions against an Islamist-based party. Although the EU was concerned about this overwhelming victory by a party with Islamist roots, it nevertheless reiterated that a major requirement for Turkey's entry into the EU would be demilitarization. Washington, which had been the strongest ally of the military, seemed to be pleased with the electoral victory of the AKP. The US gave the AKP the tacit support it sought by presenting it as the new representative of moderate Islam – a model that could effectively bridge the perceived dangerous gap between the West and the Muslim world by reconciling religious belief with democracy.

Under these conditions Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok tried to develop a modus vivendi with Prime Minister Erdogan. Despite pressure from hardliners, Ozkok was reluctant to engage in open confrontation with the government. While Commander of the Land Forces (2000-2002), Ozkok rarely made public statements to journalists. After he became the Chief of General Staff (2002-2006), Ozkok consistently left final decisions to the government while working hard to keep hardliners in check. When journalists persistently asked the views of the military about issues on the national agenda, Ozkok refrained from disclosing his opinions, arguing that the military should remain out of politics. Tellingly, in a press briefing given during the Cyprus negotiations process (2004, Apr. 24), Ozkok kindly requested that the media not ask for the military’s institutional opinions about political issues, adding: “We feel that our society and media expects from us to share our opinion as way of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in all important issues. We of course respect this view. However, it is not appropriate for the TAF to be party in all important issues or share its view with the public.”

Whenever Ozkok appeared in public with Erdogan, the two seemed to have established a

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relaxed, even cordial relationship. During their weekly meetings, Ozkok’s preference to attend alone stood in direct contrast to previous practice in which commanders were usually accompanied by a junior officer responsible for taking minutes (Jenkins, 2007, p. 351). We can therefore conclude that during AKP rule relations between the government and the General Staff developed in a surprisingly harmonious manner given the history between Islamists and the military.

Having analyzed the foundations of the working relationship between the government and the military since the AKP came to power, the following section traces the shift in Turkey’s civil military relations toward a more liberal democratic model in three specific cases. These cases represent situations in which the Chief of General Staff complied with the governmental directives on critical issues in which its own preferences diverged from that of the government. The section begins with an analysis of the debate over Turkey’s position in the Iraq War of 2003.

6.2 The Iraq War and Turkey’s Position

When the war on Iraq began on 20 March 2003, the AKP had been in power for only four months and most of its deputies had never held public office before. As members of a newly constituted party they were amateurs in the business of politics; their newness was displayed in the weeks and days leading up to the March 1st parliamentary vote. The prime minister himself is included in this group of amateurs. While Erdogan had been a popular mayor of Istanbul, he had little experience with Turkish parliamentary procedure or diplomatic relations. This inexperience and the fear of alienating Islamist and Kurdish grassroots groups resulted in the rejection of the War Powers Motion on March 1, despite Erdogan’s personal assurance to American officials that it would pass.

This rejection not only resulted in the dramatic alteration of US war plans and Turkey’s position in relation to the attack; Turkey-US relations also reached their lowest historical point. Turkey’s rejection was especially surprising to American leaders given Turkey’s otherwise loyal support of US military actions since the Korean War. For most of the 1990s, the basing of British and American aircraft at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to enforce the northern no fly zone over Iraq

240 Around three- dozen American ships loaded with heavy weapons and thousands of soldiers that were waiting for the Turkish decision offshore changed their route to the Persian Gulf. Instead of attacking Iraq at two fronts that would divide Saddam’s troops, and would ensure a faster and more decisive victory, United States ground forces entered Iraq only from the south. As late as March 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that Turkey’s lack of cooperation on the second front increased the momentum of the insurgents against the US occupation and contributed to the high American casualties in Iraq. Tom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Faults Turkey for Barring Use of Its Land in ‘03 to Open Northern Front in Iraq”, New York Times, March 21, 2005.
was one of the major policy anchors designed to contain Saddam Hussein (Barkey, 2005, p. 16). At the time that the United States requested support for an Iraq War, Turkey was already providing significant military support to US-led efforts in Afghanistan. Turkey had sent a general officer to CENTCOM Headquarters and an additional liaison team to US European Command (EUCOM) Headquarters to coordinate efforts in the US-led war on terrorism. Moreover, Turkey sent 90 Special Forces troops to Afghanistan to train the Northern Alliance, while Turkish ships in the Mediterranean and Adriatic shadowed, interdicted, and boarded vessels suspected of supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda. After the fall of the Taliban, Turkey sent 1,500 troops to join and eventually command the 5,000-person NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Finally, Turkey froze al Qaeda assets and arrested al Qaeda operatives en route from Iran to instigate terrorist attacks on Israel (Baltrusaitis, 2008, p. 347).

In short, Turkey had proven to be a worthy supporter in the “War on Terrorism”, and the United States expected little resistance to its requests for troops from Turkish soil. Parliament’s refusal was especially surprising given that Washington and Ankara had negotiated a memorandum of agreement outlining Turkey’s support in any possible military operation against Iraq, and the Turkish Parliament had already approved a resolution on 6 February 2003 allowing US troops to modernize Turkish ports and airfields in anticipation of the upcoming invasion (Baltrusaitis 2008, p. 348). Unfortunately for US plans, Parliament failed to pass the resolution by a slim margin. Bush administration officials labeled the March 1st referendum as a “stab-in-the-back” (Menon and Wimbush, 2007).

US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz expressed the administration’s disappointment in harsh terms, claiming the Turkish military did not show sufficient leadership to assure the motion’s legislative support. According to the US administration, the TGS and NSC did not live up to their roles as supreme arbiters on matters of national security. In a broad interpretation of this perspective, if the Turkish military had truly wanted the motion to pass it would have been able to facilitate this by dictating that Parliament vote yes. 241

This section investigates the question of whether the premise of this perspective – i.e., that the military could enforce its preferences on the issue of US military access to Turkish soil had it chosen to do so – by first presenting the basic framework of the Turkish foreign security policy-making structure. It demonstrates that the military’s role is limited to providing advice to

the government through the National Security Council; the military can only influence agenda setting, not decision-making. The second section outlines the military’s preferences in the issue of the Iraq War, as well as how these preferences were presented to the civilian elites. The third section discusses how civilian preferences prevailed over those of the military, while the final section discusses the implications of this case for patterns of civil-military relations and Turkey-US relations.

6.2.1 Foreign policy decision-making structure in Turkey

The Turkish Constitution divides foreign security policy-making between two major bodies. The National Security Council – which includes the president, key members of the cabinet, and the commanding generals of the Turkish Armed Forces – sets the agenda for issues concerning national security. However, it is the Turkish Parliament that has the “the authority and the power to commit national resources to a particular course of action in foreign policy”, including “permitting foreign troops in Turkey, sending Turkish troops abroad, and declaring war”. Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution requires prior parliamentary authorization for sending troops abroad or permitting the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey, except in cases required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by international rules of courtesy. Therefore, the executive branch, which includes both civil and military wings, cannot act on behalf of Turkey without authorization from the legislative branch. Furthermore, as far as key foreign policy decisions related to Turkey’s military involvement are concerned, while the executive serves as the agenda-setter and thus constitutes a powerful domestic political actor, the Turkish Parliament is the authoritative decision-maker and the key veto-player.

6.2.2 Setting up the Turkish position on the Iraq War and the military’s preference

The previous section demonstrated that the Turkish military’s formal power to influence the direction of policy-making is limited to agenda-setting via the offering of advice to the government. Throughout the Iraq War process, however, the Turkish military assumed a more direct role in preparing the backbone of the Turkish position through its formal role in the Iraq Task Group. The Iraq Task Group, which was composed of representatives from the Foreign Ministry and Office of General Staff, was formed by the Bulent Ecevit government shortly after

242 The second paragraph of Article 92 adds: “If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces”.
Mr. Wolfowitz’s visit to Turkey on 16 July 2002. The main responsibility of this task group was to determine Turkey’s “red lines” in the Iraq conflict and work toward proposing what “Turkey could do to ensure realization of its interests and to prevent those developments against its interests.”

Turkey’s security priorities were protecting the political independence and territorial integrity of Iraq, preventing the conditions that would pave the way to an independent Kurdish state, protecting the rights of the Turcomans, ensuring that the central government would control Iraq’s natural resources, and deploying Turkish forces to Northern Iraq to fight against PKK militants.

During the negotiations, the most important point of controversy centered on the Turkish military’s right to carry out operations against the PKK during the war (Ozkaleli, 2006), to which the US was initially opposed. By the end of tedious negotiations, however, on February 22 Turkey and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding that led Turkish foreign and security bureaucrats to favor Turkey’s involvement in the Iraq War. Turkey also successfully negotiated to prevent the US from giving any heavy weaponry to the Kurds. A further American concession to Turkey was to allow Turkish forces to remain under the authority of their own national command. By 22 February 2003 the United States had yielded to nearly every demand made by the Turkish military as outlined in the Foreign Ministry Reports between July and October 2002. Furthermore, Turkey was able to document these concessions in a bilateral agreement as desired (Ozkaleli, 2006). In sum, when the motion was presented to Parliament, Turkey’s security concerns were almost completely met by the United States. The General Staff, therefore, was in favor of the passage of the War Powers Motion.

245 According to the plan outlined in this memorandum, US troops would first enter Iraq from the Habur border point, immediately establish “green lines” around Mosul and Kirkuk provinces to secure these cities against Kurdish incursions, and then progress deeper into Iraq. Although Turkish troops would not engage in any fighting against Iraqi Kurdish rebel groups or Iraqi armed forces, the Turkish military would be able to use force against the PKK. This point created a huge disagreement between the Turkish and the American negotiators, and the issue was resolved only after Ambassador Bolukbasi of Turkey left the negotiation table, saying to Ambassador Lino of the United States that “if Barzani were sitting at your place, he might have thought, though only thought because he could not dare to speak up, about what you are suggesting to me. After your suggestion [that Turkish forces could open fire only for the self-defence], there is no reason to continue these negotiations”. Sedat Ergin, “Turkiye Muzakereleri Kesince Amerika Geri Adim Attı”, Hurriyet, September 23, 2003.
The most important reason for the General Staff’s pro-war stance was related to its interests in influencing the post-Saddam security regime in northern Iraq. As expressed earlier, the Turkish military and Foreign Ministry saw the possible emergence of an independent Kurdish state as a major threat to national security. These institutions therefore believed that Turkey would be in a better position to influence developments in a post-Saddam Iraq according to their own interests if they contributed to the US-led campaign. A secret report prepared by the Iraq Task Group on 14 August 2002 entitled “Possibilities Regarding Iraq and Turkey’s Position” suggested Turkey’s support of the US and its involvement in the US-led intervention, as such support would increase Turkey’s influence after the invasion.246

The second reason for the General Staff’s interest in contributing to the intervention stemmed from the value that the TGS attached to its strategic partnership with the US. The US-Turkish military partnership had remained strong since World War II, forming the bedrock of the US-Turkish alliance. The Turkish military has historically viewed the US as a strong partner in the containing diverse security risks and has never forgotten American support during the Abdullah Ocalan incident. According to many officers this strategic partnership required active assistance, especially given US compliance following such long and tedious negotiations.

Furthermore, for military officers the passage of the first motion by Parliament on 2 February 2003 was an expression of intent and commitment that needed to be followed through. With this motion, which was supported by 308 legislators and opposed by 193, Parliament had delegated power to the government to open a number of Turkish bases to American specialists who would prepare these bases for war.247 Following the motion’s passage the US sent ships of supplies and material to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. After this point, according to the officers, Turkey should have honored its commitment. However, despite the pro-war stance of the General Staff, on 1 March 2003 the War Powers Motion to allow the deployment of up to 62,000 US troops in Turkish territory was defeated by the votes of the CHP and some pro-Kurdish, pro-Islamist AKP MPs. As a result, the Memorandum over which the Turks and the Americans struggled fiercely word by word was never carried out.

Many factors contributed to the failure of the War Powers Motion, including the lack of international legitimacy, strong public and political opposition to the war, insufficient information provided to MPs, and a division within the ruling AKP party. Head of the Turkish Parliament Human Rights Commission Mehmet Elkatmis, for example, accused the United States of conducting genocide in Iraq, while AKP deputy Faruk Abacioglu suggested dissolution of Turkish-American Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group. This division was evident days before the submission of the motion to Parliament. When the motion was first submitted to the Cabinet, it had encountered strong resistance from a group of ministers who threatened not to sign it. After a long debate, the motion was signed on 24 February 2003 with the understanding that the political responsibility of the Cabinet was limited only to the transmitting of the document to Parliament. The Cabinet essentially refused to bear any political responsibility for Turkey’s involvement in the war. While a parliamentary vote was nevertheless scheduled for the next day, it was first delayed until February 26 and then postponed to March 1, which was the day after the monthly meeting of the National Security Council. The justification given for the postponement by the AKP was the need to get a final endorsement from the NSC, which had in fact already issued its recommendation to the government at the end of January. It seems that the AKP wanted the NSC – i.e., the military – to take the responsibility of an unpopular and highly risky decision onto its shoulders. President Sezer, former head of the Constitutional Court and the head of the NSC, however, disappointed the government by rejecting Prime Minister Gul’s request of a strong communiqué on the grounds that the NSC had already issued a statement and that at this stage it was the responsibility of Parliament to act on the motion.

Under such conditions, Erdogan’s inexperience and his unusual call for a closed rather than open parliamentary vote opened the way for the abstaining of more AKP deputies than expected. Retired U.S. Ambassador Tom Weston correctly argues that “Erdogan basically mis-assessed the position he was in and made a mistake in the management of the vote in the Parliament. He actually thought he had enough party discipline to win” (quoted in Kapsis, 2006). Erdogan’s inability to take over the premiership due to a previous court verdict and his “secret” meetings with US officials weakened his position vis-à-vis MPs.248

248 A closed vote means that the parliament casts its votes confidentially. Deputies vote electronically in the chamber, but only the vote totals are made public. Therefore, deputies are not individually accountable for their votes, as their constituents do not know how they voted. The actual votes are not made public for ten years from the date of the vote.
Having briefly explored the reasons for the failure of the AKP to pass the War Powers Motion through Parliament, this section must now demonstrate that democratically elected civilians are, in fact, in a position to pursue a policy position that they know is contrary to the preferences of the military. To do so, this section now addresses the main question of whether the Turkish government and the parliament were aware of the military’s preference.

The AKP government was, in fact, quite aware of the military’s preference, as the Iraq Task Group was working directly under the authority of the Foreign Ministry and regularly reporting changes in the negotiation process to the political authorities. More importantly, these matters were discussed at National Security Council meetings. Particularly during the meeting held on 31 January 2003, Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok expressed to the AKP leadership the military’s preference that Turkey should cooperate militarily with the United States. Officials from the government and armed forces High Command interviewed for this study also confirmed that the views of the military were shared with political authorities. It should be underlined, however, that the Office of the Chief of General Staff refrained from talking publicly prior to the parliamentary vote, deliberately keeping a low profile during the authorization debate – a choice that was later criticized not only by American officials but also by Erdogan and his allies in the media.

The following section investigates the puzzle of why the military restrained itself as it did during this crucial period. In brief, solving this puzzle involves answering questions of why the military declined to come out publicly in support of a motion it favored and why it passed up the opportunity to cement security relations with the United States in a fashion that would guarantee increased military assistance and influence on the post-Saddam security regime in northern Iraq. The section concludes with reflections on the implications of this case for the role of the Turkish military in politics in the beginning of 21st century.

6.2.3 Diminishing military assertiveness during the authorization process

Examining the question of why the Turkish Chief of General Staff – despite fears of being abandoned in the United States’ Kurdish policy – refrained from openly supporting Turkey’s involvement in war illuminates at least three distinct but interrelated reasons. First, Ozkok’s basic respect for the principles of liberal democracy led him to leave the political responsibility of such an important decision to democratically elected civilian leaders. The EU’s criticisms of the military’s role in politics reinforced Ozkok’s predisposition to keep the military out of politics. Ozkok knew quite well that if he disclosed the TAF’s views to the public, not
only would the EU criticize this disclosure as an indirect intervention in politics but he would have also acted contrary to his own personal principles. To the greatest extent possible, Ozkok remained loyal to the same principle throughout his tenure; in his view, every public institution should attend to its own business (Heper, 2005a, 2005b). The NSC and the TAF were advisory institutions with no political responsibility or accountability and thus should leave final decisions to Parliament. Therefore, on the question of whether or not a second front should be opened in the impending Iraq War, Ozkok refrained from issuing a declaration that would have amounted to pressuring Parliament for the approval of the resolution. Responding to criticisms concerning the General Staff’s failure to take a clear position concerning the motion, Ozkok declared on 6 March 2003:

Taking a decision on such a vital issue requires the assessment of political, economic, social, and legal dimensions. We as soldiers do not consider ourselves as specialists on each and every issue. If we only expressed the security dimension, the public could misinterpret it… If the NSC had issued a new recommendation, it would have amounted to pressuring the parliament for the approval of the resolution. This would be unconstitutional” (Emphasis added).249

The military officers interviewed for this dissertation expressed similar views. According to General Alaettin Parmaksiz, the Turkish military expressed its views clearly to the government; however, since the decision was ultimately political in nature, it was up to the government and Parliament to decide to support the motion or not. Parmaksiz shared Ozkok’s views that it was not appropriate for the Chief of General Staff to express his views publicly prior to the parliamentary vote. Parmaksiz described his views as follows:

Turkey and the US had pursued long and tedious negotiations since July 2002... In February 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a motion to open several Turkish bases to American specialists. This was a critical turning point showing intent. However, as March 1 approached, the government started to act indecisively. Some cabinet members openly declared that they were signing this motion unwillingly, and within such a context the motion failed in the parliament. Some observers then accused the Turkish military, but what could the Turkish military do? It expressed its views to the government since the issue had a security dimension. But afterwards, it was the responsibility of the government to inform the parliamentarians about the costs and benefits of this motion. After all, this is a political issue. If the government had found the passage of the motion in Turkey’s interest, then it needed to inform the parliament better. The government could have invited some representatives from the TAF and foreign ministry to present their

views to the parliament. None of this happened, however, and the motion failed” (Author’s interview, 2008, Ankara).

The second reason for the military’s low profile during the authorization debate stemmed from its desire to preserve its public prestige. The overwhelming majority of the public, the opposition party, and President Ahmet Necdi Sezer were highly opposed to war in Iraq, and even the ruling party was not unanimously in favor of Turkey’s involvement in the war. Within this political and social context, the Turkish military hesitated to adopt a strong position that would possibly undermine the army’s prestige and its above-politics role. TGS Chief General Ozkok explained:

The TAF has a unique position; our nation supports and trusts us. In order to preserve this, I need to protect the TAF by performing my duties well, by remaining outside of controversies and by keeping the TAF out of institutional conflicts….Otherwise, it is easy to talk publicly; you can get applause from sectors of the media and society. However, you would have broken the law, and they would start to question your democratic credentials. They would claim that the armed forces exerted pressure on the parliament… Suppose I publicly declared a policy line and the parliament followed another policy, how would that affect the position of the armed forces and its relations with the government and the parliament? I cannot put the armed forces into a position of conflict with the other institutions. We always need to act with subsequent moves in mind… If the government had declared, however, that the Chief of General Staff wanted this motion to pass, then our position could have been better understood. Or if the government had adopted a party decision, the motion could have passed” (Milliyet, 2007, Oct. 1).

As General Ozkok’s statement illustrates, the General Staff was in fact in favor of cooperating with the US. As in any other democratic country, however, the Chief of General Staff expected governmental leaders to take responsibility and to inform parliamentarians and the public about the costs and benefits of war motions. This was not done, and the motion failed. The failure or unwillingness of the government to inform parliamentarians and society was not only criticized by the General Staff, but also strongly voiced by retired ambassador Deniz Bolukbasi, who headed the Iraq Task Group as the chief negotiator. Bolukbasi declared that he and another representative of the Foreign Ministry were at the Parliament on March 1 waiting for Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc to give them the floor to explain the memorandum of understanding signed between the US and Turkey. As the memorandum was only finalized on 22 February 2003, many parliamentarians were not well aware of its conditions. Despite this, Arinc did not yield the floor to the Foreign Ministry representatives. According to members of the security and foreign establishment, this lack of explanation of the US-Turkey memorandum of understanding played an important role in the defeat of the War Powers Motion.
After the defeat of the March 1 motion, Erdogan tried to submit the motion to the parliament to regain US credibility, while the responsibility of informing public about the bill fell on the shoulders of the TGS Chief. On March 6, 2003, Ozkok explained the benefits of cooperating with the US to public, but it was too late. Ozkok, made the position of the TAF crystal clear:

The Iraq issue is reduced to being pro-war or anti-war. It is said that 99 percent of the people say no to war. This is wrong. 100 percent of people have said no to war. If the war starts, no matter which course of action is taken, Turkey would suffer. Turkey does not have resources and capabilities to prevent that war….On this matter our choice is between the bad and worse, not between the good and bad….Even if we do not join the war, we would suffer the same loss. If we help the war, we could compensate some of our losses….If the northern front were opened, we would not fight (with the Iraqis) but help the refugees in Northern Iraq;…[thus] the losses would be less than expected. All of these were discussed and guaranteed in the document signed by the two sides [US and Turkey]….The financial aid was offered not for Turkey’s cooperation (with the US) but for the compensating some of Turkey’s losses due to war.250

Although the third motion – which allowed the US to use Turkish airspace – was passed by Parliament on March 20, Turkey had already missed its chance to influence US policies in northern Iraq in its favor. After President Bush declared an end to combat operations in May 2003, Turkey aggressively attempted to regain Washington’s favor. In October 2003, Parliament passed another motion giving the government power to deploy troops in Iraq as part of an international occupation force. In early November, however, the US withdrew its request, leading Ozkok to confess that Turkey had “lost its right to have a say in Iraq” (Sabah, 2003, Nov. 10).

These developments concerning Iraq, which set Turkish-American relations on a troubled path, ironically brought Turkey closer to the EU (Aydin and Carkoglu, 2006). The Turkish military, in a chaotic international environment in which reliable friends like the US could no longer be depended on, began to see Turkey’s accession to the EU as the only viable alternative to contain Islamists and secure the modernization of Turkish society. The further distancing of the country from either the US or the EU came to be seen as a serious blow to Turkey’s long-term commitment to the Western world. The lack of any credible alternatives to those offered by the reform process and the fact that the AKP stood as a single popularly elected government...
helped strengthen the inability of hardliners within the military to resist reforms. Another factor solidifying the push for reform initiatives was the high popular support for EU membership, which remained firmly above 70% well until the third year of the AKP’s tenure. This level of support for the EU cause helped sustain the momentum behind reformist forces and control the veto players’ resistance.

The following section investigates this process of EU reform as an additional case in which the preferences of the military and the civilian government diverged. The section focuses on the seventh harmonization package of reforms in line with EU conditionality in particular, as this package more than others led to the constriction of military’s political power. Tracing actions of both the civilians and the military during this critical process provides additional insight into the shift in Turkey’s civil-military relations under the AKP rule.

6.3 The seventh harmonization package and reform of Turkey’s national security structure (30 July 2003)

Given the favorable conditions for pursuing EU membership outlined above, the AKP was able to press ahead with EU-related reforms at full speed during the course of 2003. The most important reform package was referred to as “The Seventh Adjustment Package to EU’s Copenhagen Criteria”, which was ratified by the Turkish Parliament and went into effect on 8 August 2003. The changes brought about by this package significantly curbed the role of the military in politics. In brief, reforms limited the military’s role in national security policy-making and strengthened parliamentary control of military expenditures. The amendments on the Law of the NSC and the General Secretariat of the NSC Law No. 2945 defined the duties of the organizations in a more specific and limited way, reducing them to two advisory institutions; increased the period between NSC meetings from one to two months; and cancelled the prerogative of the Chief of General Staff to convene a meeting.251

Another important reform that the seventh harmonization package introduced concerns the changes in the structure and functioning of the NSC General Secretariat. The most important change was the abolishment of its executive and supervisory powers and the alignment of its duties and responsibilities with those of the Council. The General Secretariat’s authority to follow up – on behalf of the president and the prime minister – the implementation of any

251 The first subparagraph of Article 5 of Law No. 2945 has been amended to read as follows: “The Council shall convene once every two months. If necessary, the Council can convene upon the proposal of the Prime Minister or the direct call of the President.”
recommendation made by the NSC was transferred to the deputy prime minister. With these changes the General Secretariat thus became responsible for strictly administrative duties, which no longer included monitoring the implementation of government decisions on security issues. Article 15 requiring the Secretary General to be a full general/vice admiral was amended, allowing a civilian to serve in this office. The third important change was the repeal of Article 19 of the Law on NSC, which provided that “the Ministries, public institutions and organizations, and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the National Security Council”. With this change, the Secretariat General no longer had unlimited access to civilian institutions.252

By Turkey’s historical standards, these amendments were a distinct legislative accomplishment, as they were aimed directly at curbing the army’s influence in politics and transforming the NSC into a civilian-headed advisory body on defense and military issues (Cizre, Onis, and Yılmaz, 2005, p. 277). These changes, in fact, were effective not only in theory but also in practice. In August 2004, the NSC appointed its first civilian Secretary General, Yigit Alpogan, who was a career Turkish diplomat.253 Soon after accepting the post, Alpogan opened the doors of the Secretariat for the first time in the institution’s history to members of domestic and international media, civil society organizations, and embassy press secretaries.254 When considering that these two institutions were the main mechanisms through which the Turkish Armed Forces engaged in the political arena, the behaviour of the military bears importance for understanding changing patterns of civil-military relations and of military thinking. The following section investigates how these changes were perceived and responded to by the armed forces, the alleged veto player in the Turkish regime.

252 The reform package not only restricted the authority of the NSC General Secretariat but also lowered its budget, number of units, and staff. The total staff of the NSC decreased from 408 to 224 and the number of military personnel was reduced from 26 to 12. See: EU Progress Report, 2007, p. 9.
253 For a list appointees, see: http://www.mgk.gov.tr
254 He informed the guests about the status and functions of the secretariat and emphasized the transparency of the Secretariat’s activities (NSC kapilarini açtı. [NSC opened its doors]. 2004, Nov. 30. Sabah). New secretary general also emphasized the fact that the secretariat was not an executive, but a consultative organ and confirmed that it works as a think-tank (NSC’nin 71 yıllık kara kutusu açıldı. [71 year-long black box of NSC has opened]. 2004, Dec. 1. Hürriyet).
6.3.1  Military behaviour during the reform process

Of the reforms involved in the seventh harmonization package, Turkish military officers were particularly concerned about those reforms made in the structure and functioning of the NSC General Secretariat. They believed that these reforms would render the organization powerless and leave the country defenseless against internal and external threats. Several interviewees for this study contend that the changes made in the structure and functioning of the NSCSG created a security vacuum in the sense that such reform eliminated the power of the most significant institution able to deal with Turkey’s security problems. For example, General Tuncer Kilinc, the Secretariat General of the NSC (2001-2003) elaborated his concerns to the author in the following way:

The reforms abolished the Community Relations Presidency within the organization. The abolishment of that unit effectively prevented the state from utilizing preventive psychological operations to protect itself against internal and external threats. These divisive and Islamist forces, both internal and external, use the media to continue their divisive actions against our society. However, there is no organization left that would work against these forces and protect our society against these threats (Author’s Interview, 2008, Ankara)

Another concern of the military was related to the abolishment of the executive and supervisory functions of the secretariat. Kilinc explained this to the author in the following way:

The secretariat was authorized to follow and monitor the implementation of the decisions taken by the NSC and then to inform the members of the NSC about the course of such decisions. The secretariat would follow up, on behalf of the prime minister and president, the implementation of any recommendation made by the NSC and then report its findings to the NSC. No other function of the organization conflicted with the supremacy of the elected government. It has never been above the Council of Ministers as claimed by some observers. The recommendation of the NSC is formulated by taking the views of all members including not only military members but also the prime minister and relevant ministers, as well as the president (Author’s Interview, 2008, Ankara).

Although as the NSC General Secretary, Genera Kilinc actively opposed the reform proposals, the Office of Chief of General Staff (CGS) remained politically disengaged and expressed its preferences to the government only when the latter formally requested its opinion by sending the CGS the draft law on 11 June 2003. In its response five days later, the CGS expressed its concerns over the reform package by pointing out the threat that such reform might cause to “national security”. More specifically, the military raised the following points: 1) by underlining the existence of similar institutions in several European countries, the CGS argued that the executive and supervisory powers of the NSC General Secretariat should not be
abolished, particularly given the conditions Turkey faced (i.e., internal and external threats such as political Islam, Kurdish separatism, and regional instabilities); 2) on similar national security grounds, the military argued that the NSC meetings should not be reduced to once every two months; and 3) underlining that they were not against the civilianization of the NSC Secretariat General in principle, they demanded that if a military person were to be appointed the opinion of the office of the TGS should be sought in order to prevent the “politicization of the Turkish armed forces” (Radikal, 2003, July 19).

After receiving the views of the General Secretariat, the bureaucrats in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice completed the seventh harmonization package. The final draft of the reform package met with few objections from the CGS. The supervisory and executive functions of the NSCSG were abolished and the NSC meetings reduced to once every two months. The only area in which the CGS’s concerns were met related to the appointment of the Secretary General of the NSC.

Although the CGS remained silent after submitting its official views to the government, the NSCSG as an institution further attempted to prevent the enactment of the reform package. Just before parliamentary voting on the draft law, Secretary-General of the NSC General Tuncer Kilinc wrote a letter to the prime minister arguing that NSC reform rendered the Secretariat General functionless and was dangerous for national security (Milliyet, 2003, July 30). During the debates in the Parliament’s Constitutional Commission over the draft law, Mustafa Agaoglu, the Secretary’s representative in the Commission, further reflected the concerns of the Secretariat as follows:

[With the suggested reform]…the NSC Secretariat-General is effectively abolished. It will no longer be able to fulfill these three functions: It will not be able to devise psychological operation plans; it will not be able to influence National Security Policy; it will not be able to devise plans for mobilization and war preparations. The NSC Secretariat-General is attached to the prime minister's office. If the prime minister assigns it a task, the NSC will fulfill it. Other than that, it can never undertake its own tasks. How will decisions made at the NSC be followed up to ensure their implementation? (Turkish Daily News, 2003, Aug.1).

In this meeting, there was also an interesting exchange of words between Mustafa Agaoglu and Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, showing the changing patterns of civil-military relations in Turkey. When Agaoglu complained that the views of the Secretariat had not been sought during the preparation of the draft-law, Cicek responded that the “draft law was sent to
the office of Chief of General Staff and the office of TGS sent us a written response”.255 In response to this, Mustafa Agaoglu contended, “you might have received the approval of the office of the Chief of General Staff, but the General Secretariat of the NSC is an autonomous institution subordinated to the Prime Ministry and you did not seek our opinion.”256 Cicek emphasized that he did not say that the draft law was approved by the Chief of General Staff, but only that the government had asked the Chief of General Staff’s opinion.257 Despite the different preferences of the military the Turkish Parliament, along with the participation of the CHP opposition, adopted the government’s seventh harmonization package on 30 July 2003.

To sum up, although the military disagreed with the government over NSC reform, the military acquiesced to Parliament’s decision. The Office of the Chief of General Staff expressed its view through formal channels, abstaining from taking any informal action that would hamper the reform process. The view of Tuncer Kilinc did not enjoy any support with the Chief of Staff, who specifically attributed his statements to personal views of officers. The government’s successful framing of this reform as a necessary step in accession to the EU played an important role in diminishing the military’s assertiveness. The EU was used as an external reference point and as a legitimizer in Turkish domestic politics, empowering civilian rhetoric and increasing the political capacity of the government to change the prevailing power configuration (Diez, 2005, p. 177; Sarigil, 2007, p. 142).

Zeki Sarigil explains this military compliance on the basis of rhetorical entrapment, arguing that the military, which had expressed its commitment to further integration with the EU on several previous occasions, found itself rhetorically entrapped during this bargaining process on proposed changes (2007, pp. 155-160). This thesis also suggests that the military’s compliant behavior during this period should be seen as an indicator of a process of military adaptation to the changing standards of the Trans-Atlantic Security regime. The ascendancy of liberal democratic norms convinced the armed forces that while the military’s political activism may in the past enjoyed a justification of sorts, in the current world order such activism has high social and political costs. This realization has required the military to act strictly within the formal institutional framework and accept the supremacy of civilian authorities as the final authority in policy-making. Deputy Chief of Staff General Yasar Buyukanit reflected this attitude in the

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256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
During deliberations on the… [last] reform package, we conveyed our views to the government. Some were accepted, others were not. Now that Parliament enacted them into law, it is our duty to comply with them. We only hope that our concerns and worries prove to be groundless (Milliyet, 2003, Aug. 1).

This thesis therefore suggests that the military’s compliant behavior during the reform process should be interpreted as an indicator of the military’s changing mentality under the new strategic context. The Turkish General Staff understood the new rules of the game and adapted itself to this paradigmatic shift, not only to preserve its legitimacy but also to increase Turkey’s credibility in the eyes of Western civilization. Columnist Taha Akyol from Milliyet is accurate in asserting:

With the recently passed Seventh European Union Harmonization Package, Turkey has accomplished a radical reform. Now relations between our civil and military leadership are those of a modern, democratic country. The military took this great step towards modernization together with government leaders and the opposition. If the military had created problems by opposing the civilian leadership, would this reform have gone forward? The Chief of General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, played an important role in this achievement. However, the army accepted this change as well because in our age the power of nations does not come from money and weapons alone. The existence of the rule of law and democracy along with the army’s status under civilian command has become an element of ‘strategic power.’ In such a structure, nations are growing more stable. I have of late begun to respect our army much more (2005, Aug. 3).

6.4 Turkey’s Cyprus Policy under the AKP Government and the Annan Plan

The developments following the reform package confirmed the military’s disengagement from politics. This section examines debates involving the evolution in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the chapter’s final case study analysis of shifting civil-military relations in Turkey. The process of adopting the “Annan Plan” well illustrates the extent of change in the military’s role in foreign security policy-making. For decades, Cyprus had posed a hard security issue for Turkey and, consequently, security concerns and threat perceptions of the military shaped official Turkish discourse. The TAF considered Cyprus to be a geo-strategic asset for Turkey’s defense and security due to its proximity to the Anatolian heartland. Control of Turkey's western and southern coastal borders by the same “unfriendly” power such as Greece was considered to be a vital risk for national security (Kaliber, 2005, p. 325). The island has also increasingly been considered to be important for the protection of Caspian oil that was expected to flow through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for transport to Europe. Most importantly, Cyprus has been considered to be a “milli dava” (national cause) not only for Turkey, but also for Greece due to historical
legacies (Suvarierol, 2003). Therefore, until recently, the Cyprus issue was a matter “above politics”, and Cyprus policy was based on technical know-how and rather than daily political haggling.

Partly because it was considered to be a “national cause”, diplomatic efforts toward solving the Cyprus problem proved to be ineffective. The parties involved diverged primarily on the structure of a united Cyprus. Cypriot Greeks were in favor of a bi-communal federation, whereas Turkish Cypriots negotiated for a “confederation with two independent states”. After decades of failed negotiations, the Cyprus problem entered a new phase during the Helsinki Summit of 1999 when the EU abandoned the pre-condition of reunification for Cyprus’s accession, while simultaneously imposing one-sided conditionality on Turkey. The EU’s one-sided conditionality not only allowed Greek Cypriots to harden their bargaining position with impunity, but also resulted in hardening Turkey’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ position to match the rapprochement between Cyprus and the EU. Turkey rejected this conditionality, formulating in its place a new policy that would include concrete steps to be taken if the Greek Cypriots joined the EU. A written statement issued after the 27 November 2001 NSC meeting declared, for example, that “Turkey would not allow the Turkish Cypriots to become a minority under the rule of the Greek Cypriots” and that “Turkey supports Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas on the recent discussions concerning the Cyprus issue”. Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas had moved away from his bi-communal and bi-zonal federation thesis and begun to defend the recognition of two separate states as basis of any solution.

The sides of the Cyprus debate became even clearer in the course of time. On 13 December 2001 a group of intellectuals from the left including Kurthan Fisek and former Foreign Minister Mumtaz Soysal issued a declaration stating that they were “uncomfortable with the fact that a very limited yet powerful circle in Turkey initiated attempts on the Cyprus issue that were not in line with Turkey’s national interests… What the EU and Greece demand would result in nothing but the annexation of the island by Greece. We hereby declare that we condemn internal circles that help illegitimate and vicious attempts imposed on the Cyprus issue” (Cumhuriyet, 2001, Dec. 13). The MHP, the junior partner of the 1999-2002 coalition, was also critical of the conditions set out to resolve the Cyprus issue. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli, for

259 A map of Cyprus can be found at the Appendix.
instance, stated on 23 January 2002 that:

Cyprus, besides being a national issue for Turkey is a fiery issue in terms of relations with the EU. Greek Cyprus [Administration] is favoured within the EU’s reports. The misrepresentation and unpredictability of some circles’ approach to the Cyprus issue are reinforcing this kind of one-sided expectations and demands. We wish that the sovereignty and security of both communities be linked to concrete guarantees. The EU should adopt an attitude favouring a just and permanent solution (Radikal, 2002, Jan. 23.).

This hardliner position continued to dominate Turkish political discourse until the formation of the AKP government in November 2002. Soon after coming to power, the AKP gave strong signals of a shift from a hardline security stance by declaring that it did not consider the partition of the island as the solution to the Cyprus problem. Erdogan boldly declared that the Cyprus problem is not “Denktas’s private matter” and that he was “not in favor of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years”. Furthermore, by grasping the link between Turkey’s Cyprus policy and its EU aspirations – contrary to the prior official position – the AKP argued that Turkey’s bid for EU membership was dependent on a settlement in Cyprus. To that end, the AKP government declared its firm support for the UN’s Annan Plan as a basis for negotiation to achieve a settlement in Cyprus.

In February 2004, following intense negotiations, the Turkish government approved a three-stage peace plan to be finalized by two simultaneous referenda in Cyprus. The AKP government put considerable pressure on Denktas to accept the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiation. In March 2004, the Turkish government and Prime Minister of Turkish Cypriots Mehmet Ali Talat, but not Rauf Denktas, accepted the Annan Plan’s final version.

For many observers, this marked a drastic departure from Turkey’s former policy of passive support of negotiations towards a settlement in Cyprus (Suvarierol, 2003, p. 70); for some observers of Turkish politics, it was nothing less than a revolutionary move (Kirisci, 2004). This was because the plan, originally announced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in November 2002, envisaged the establishment of a federal state with two constituent states,

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261 Although the resolution of Cyprus is not a prerequisite in the sense that it is not part of the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Commission, EU governments, and the European Parliament have made it quite clear that Turkey is much more likely to receive a date for accession negotiations to start if the question is resolved. It is interesting to note the EU’s lack of such conditionality from the Cyprus government.
262 Just 8 days before the AKP came to the power, on November 11, 2002, the UN Secretary-general Kofi Annan has submitted his plan for Cyprus settlement.
conditions which opposed Turkey’s former official position. The AKP’s promotion of the Annan Plan immediately put the government and Rauf Denktas, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, at loggerheads. By accepting the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations, the AKP withdrew its support from the hardline Turkish Cypriot leader and pursued a policy that diverged from Turkey’s traditional security policy.

6.4.1 Military preference and position during the Annan Plan process

The military officers were, in fact, highly dissatisfied with the proposed Annan Plan and wanted the continuation of the hardliner policy in such an important matter of national cause. Their dissatisfaction, stemming from their security and geostrategic concerns, centered around three points. First, the Turkish military thought that the international community had unfairly permitted the Greek Cypriot side to realize its objectives unilaterally. The TAF was particularly concerned with the Greek Cypriot Government’s signing of the EU Accession Treaty, which claimed to be on behalf of the whole island. Without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot side, the EU’s acceptance of Greek Cyprus as representative of the whole island was considered to be a gross violation of the equal rights of the Turkish Cypriot people. Similarly, the one-sided conditionality imposed on Turkey in its accession negotiations was considered to be a clear indication of the EU’s double standards.

Second, as mentioned above, the military’s preferred option has long been the establishment of a new partnership state that would be constituted by two equal polities on the island and based on mutually agreed upon principles of bi-communality, bi-zonality, and the full political equality of the two parties. The members of the military interviewed for this study, however, argued that the Annan Plan did not adequately translate these mutually agreed upon principles into practical terms. They were particularly concerned with the proposed resettlement of a relatively large number of Greek Cypriots to the northern side of the island. For the military, this would de facto terminate the bi-zonality and bi-communality principles and could, in the end, plunge the island into violence again. In essence, one of the military’s main concerns regarding the plan was security related. The TAF evaluated the plan by the degree to which it could provide security to Turkish Cypriots. Although the leading actors in Cyprus might

not have even considered the possibility of constitutional breakdown and renewed ethnic conflict, an upsurge of inter-communal violence was a real threat for many members of the military. For example, Tuncer Kilinc expressed the military’s views on the Cyprus problem in the following terms:

For me, the Annan Plan is a complete zero. It fails to meet Turkey’s expectations. It forces two communities to live together; we want the two communities to live side by side, not together [bi-communality]. If you live side by side, the territory is definite and you can protect that territory easily. However, the Annan Plan presupposes migration from the south. This may cause conflict and put the Turkish population in a minority position again (Author’s Interview, 2008, Ankara).

Others interviewed expressed their concern over guardianship rights of the Republic of Turkey and the number and mandate of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus. They emphasized that the Republic of Turkey and the TAF have a security responsibility towards Cypriot kinsmen, given to them formally with the 1960 Guarantee Treaty. The Annan Plan, however, failed to meet Turkey’s security responsibilities and interests in their eyes. The gradual demilitarization of the island is believed to be an unreciprocated concession made by the Turkish side, as the plan did not change any provisions of the treaties of 1959-60 concerning British military bases in Cyprus. The military commanders argued that the only way to ensure the security of Turkish Cypriots was through Turkey’s undiminished role as a guarantor power with the right to intervene and the right to station Turkish troops permanently on the island. From the military’s perspective, the removal of the vast majority of Turkish troops would have left the Turkish Cypriots completely at the mercy of the Greek Cypriots. They argued that the contingent of 650 Turkish soldiers that would remain on the island after a transitional period of 14 years according to the Annan Plan is not a security guarantee. Sener Eruygur asserted:

Currently we are protecting the Turkish Cypriots through carefully drawn borders and providing them security by stationing our troops there. The Annan Plan, however, requires a gradual removal of our troops and de facto termination of bi-zonality and bi-communality. As Rauf Denktas emphasizes, this might result in the Greek-ization of the island… We should follow a policy that guarantees the security of Turkish Cypriots... Certainly there will be pressures, but representatives of the Turkish state should have resisted those (Author’s interview, 2008, Istanbul).

The Office of the Chief of General Staff, despite its reservations regarding the plan, adopted a conciliatory position during the entire process. Throughout the inter-communal talks

264 Currently, there are 3,275 military personnel in the British Sovereign Bases.
between 2002 and 2004, which led to a referendum for the solution of Cyprus on 24 April 2004, the General Staff refrained from any act that could be construed as an influence on policymakers. The hardliners, on the other hand, worked behind the scenes to delegitimize the government’s Cyprus policy. In January 2004 Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (Republic), traditionally known for its support for a hardline position on Cyprus, published a story allegedly leaked from the TAF by hardliner commanders. Entitled “Soldiers Submit Reservations, General Staff Announces Objections to Annan Plan”, the newspaper article claimed that the General Staff had been displeased by the submissive stance of the Foreign Ministry and that it had come up with an alternative plan for Cyprus that conflicted with the one prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.265 The TGS immediately declared the news inaccurate and requested that the Turkish nation give credit only to official statements:

The Turkish Armed Forces believe in the importance and necessity of finding a just and durable solution to the Cyprus problem through negotiations. In this context, efforts and talks among concerned institutions continue in order to harmonize and solidify the views. This process in Turkey continues in the democratic and modern countries.266

The Foreign Ministry issued its own official statement along similar lines:

The Ministry has continued necessary consultations and constructive evaluations with the Office of the Chief of General Staff since the launch of preparations to determine the position of Turkish side in a possible Cyprus talks process… These reports are damaging to the efforts being exerted to find a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem through negotiations, to Turkey's national interests, and to the unity and solidarity of the Turkish Cypriot people.267

Another incident that pushed the General Staff into the center of debates stemmed from a public statement by Hursit Tolon, a well-known hardliner in the military and the Commander of the Third Army. In an informal statement made in a coffeehouse in a village, Tolon told the crowd that those who advocated policies promoting the abandonment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“ver kurtul”) were simply “traitors” (Heper, 2005b, p. 42). His statements provoked a furor in the media and a public rebuke from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul. General Hursit Tolon subsequently declared that he had been misunderstood and that the media had typically twisted his words. After this incident, the hardliners in the military

266 The office of the chief of general staff, press statement No: BA-01/04 issued on January, 5 2004.
267 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement No: 1; 5 Ocak 2004, Kibris Sorunu hk (about the Cyprus problem).
largely acted in accordance with the directives and guidelines set by the Office of the General Chief of Staff (Heper, 2005b, p. 42).

The statement of the NSC regarding Cyprus on 5 April 2004 confirmed that, although military High Command had reservations about the Annan Plan, the military would not stand in the way of the referendum process. Quite tellingly, after mentioning the positive and negative aspects of the Annan Plan, the statement underlined that “the continuation of the peace process and the decision to hold the referendum on Annan’s Cyprus plan is under the government’s responsibility and discretion.” This statement confirms the tendency of the TAF to leave the last word to the elected politicians on a traditionally securitized policy issue. More fundamentally, this shows that the increased socialization of the rules and norms of political liberalization in the context of the Europeanization process has also affected the military and resulted in reassessment of its role in politics.

6.4.2 Implications of the Cyprus policy for the patterns of Turkish CMR

The changing orientation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the solution of the Cyprus problem, despite the objection of the military officers, constitutes a strong case demonstrating increasing civilian supremacy in foreign security policy. As Philip Robins (2007) rightly observes the AKP promoted a complete change of approach to the matter despite the different preferences of the military, much of the Foreign Affairs, and the presidency. The AKP government, by emphasizing the positive aspects of the plan for Turkish Cypriots, encouraged the latter to vote positively in the referendum on 24 April 2004. Civil society groups led by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), TUSIAD, and the media also helped the establishment of a new stance on Cyprus by publishing reports and position documents favoring the search for a solution to the issue. As a result, 64% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan Plan in their referendum. Greek Cypriots, aware of the fact that they would be an EU member country in a month’s time regardless of the result of the referendum, voted on nationalist grounds to reject the Annan Plan. Despite Turkish concessions, with the 75% “no” vote in the South of the island, the EU recognized the Greek Cypriot government as “the government of Cyprus” and penalized Turkish Cypriots.

268 For the text of the statement of the NSC, see: http://www.NSC.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2004/05nisan2004.html
In December 2006, the EU blocked eight of the 35 chapters of the negotiation process because Turkey refused to extend the Customs Union to Greek Cypriots and to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. This refusal stems from Turkey’s request that the de facto embargo on the self-declared Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus be lifted, which the EU promised to do following Turkish Cypriots’ approval of the Annan Plan. The EU’s rejection of Turkey’s proposition of a new plan asking for the isolation of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus be removed as a precondition for opening Turkish harbors to Greek Cypriots, along with its imposition of one-sided conditionality on Turkey, were perceived as clear manifestations of the EU’s double standards and weakened the credibility and legitimacy of EU conditionality. By mid-2011, no progress had been achieved, and Turkey’s Cyprus policy shifted back to its original stance, demonstrating the AKP’s waste of significant political capital.

To conclude thus far, this chapter argued that the dynamism of the EU, the AKP’s strategic moderation and commitment to the EU, and Hilmi Özkök’s leadership all worked to weaken the military’s political assertiveness by the end of 2005. By beginning of 2006, three important developments worked to change the newly emerging equilibrium: the decreasing credibility and legitimacy of the EU hinted at above, increasing social polarization, and the presidential election scheduled for 2007 all effectively brought the General Staff back into the political arena. The next chapter elaborates this view.

270 On 20 January 2006, Turkey proposed a new plan for the solution of the Cyprus issue to Kofi Annan, which demanded that if Turkey opens its harbors to Greek Cypriots, the isolations on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus must be removed.
Turkey is not an impotent country, which is submissive to Europe. We would not give up our national pride for EU membership.

Bulent Arinc, AKP member Parliament Speaker.  

The previous chapter argued that the dynamism of the EU, the AKP’s strategic moderation and commitment to the EU accession process, and the leadership of Hilmi Özkok all worked to weaken the military’s political assertiveness up until the end of 2005. Three developments that began to take shape during mid-2006, however, reversed this trend of political disengagement by the military. The loss of EU dynamism, Özkok’s retirement and the subsequent rise of Yasar Buyukanit as the Chief of General Staff, and the increasing socio-political polarization on the eve of the scheduled April 2007 presidential elections effectively brought the Turkish Armed Forces back into politics.

To begin with the issue of EU dynamism, the EU’s ambiguous attitude on Turkish membership in the mid-2000s damaged the EU’s credibility and therefore the legitimacy behind its policy of democracy promotion. Putting events into historical perspective, it is impossible to miss the differences observed before and after 2006. Concurrent with the declining credibility of the EU in the Turkish public’s view, Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization lost its momentum as the mood of the country changed from optimism to frustration. Understanding this rapid switch in Turkish popular opinion necessitates investigation of why EU credibility weakened in 2006 despite the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.

It seems that three interrelated but distinct factors worked to reduce the credibility and legitimacy of EU conditionality. These included: 1) the “open-ended” nature of Turkey’s accession, 2) the evolving nature of EU expectations, and 3) the growing opposition of some Western European countries against Turkey’s accession. As Franck (1990) and Schimmelfennig (2003; 2007) argue, if conditionality is based on clearly defined and coherently applied rules shared among EU member states, the compliance pull of this conditionality is high. By contrast, “double-standards” fail to exert the same compliance pull. Undoubtedly in the Turkish case, the open-ended nature of accession negotiations and the lack of a firm date for Turkey’s accession to the EU were perceived as strong evidence of European double-standards against Turkey.

membership of Cyprus in the EU – despite the Greek Cypriot rejection of an UN-sponsored unification plan as discussed in the previous chapter – and the one-sided EU conditionality imposed on Turkey aggravated these negative perceptions. When the EU Council refused both to open eight chapters in 2006 and to close any chapters until Turkey opened its harbors and airports to Southern Cyprus, Turkey’s accession process was effectively frozen.

The linkage of Turkey’s accession with Cyprus, despite the lack of such conditionality for Southern Cyprus, and the EU’s refusal of Turkey’s proposition for a new plan that asked for the removal of isolations on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a precondition for opening of Turkish harbors to Greek Cypriots, were perceived as unfair by Turkish society at large. The general public could not comprehend why Turkish Cypriots were penalized for having accepted the Annan Plan and why Cyprus succeeded in joining the EU without meeting the conditionality requirement of “peaceful settlement of disputes”. Many Turks perceive the EU’s upgrading of the Cyprus question to a membership prerequisite for Turkey as clear proof that the Union did not genuinely want Turkey’s negotiations to succeed.

The credibility and sincerity of the EU’s commitment was further weakened in Turks’ eyes by the growing number of anti-Turkish politicians and parties in Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel Germany and French President Nicholas Sarkozy espoused the idea that Turkey was not European; according to the views propagated in their election campaigns Turkey should therefore be offered not full membership but a privileged partnership. Sarkozy, for example, in comparing Turkey with Lebanon asserted that Lebanon possessed more European values than Turkey. Sarkozy then described Turkey as an “Asian country”, and thus objected to Turkey’s accession to the European Union (Turkish Weekly, 2006). Previous French President Jacques Chirac had also caused Turks to cast doubt on the EU’s sincerity, promising French voters that Turkish accession, if and when it came to pass, would be subject to a referendum among the French population (Benhabib, 2006).

The controversy over Turkey’s accession continued until the decision on 3 October 2005 to begin accession negotiations. The proposal of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Austria to give Turkey a “privileged partnership” instead of full membership forced the EU Council into last-minute negotiations before agreeing to “Negotiating Framework” and formally opening accession talks. This framework, however, included an understanding that negotiations would be open-ended, meaning that an eventual outcome of full membership could not be guaranteed. The questioning by eminent EU leaders about the very possibility of a "European future" for Turkey
not only further undermined the credibility of the EU among the Turkish public but also made it highly difficult for any Turkish political party to campaign on a platform that explicitly linked reforms in Turkey to demands coming from Brussels. As the Eurobarometer surveys indicate Turkish mass public support for EU accession subsequently declined from 70% in early 2004 to 42% in late 2008. According to Transatlantic Trends Survey 2007 conducted by German Marshall Fund, the percentage of Turkish respondents who view EU membership as a good thing also declined from 54% in 2006 to 40% in 2007 and only 26% of Turkish respondents believed that Turkey would ever be permitted to become a full member.

This declining credibility of the EU weakened the reform process in Turkey. In September 2006, the European Parliament’s Progress Report on Turkey’s accession criticized the Turkish government for this slowdown reforms and urged Turkey to move forward, especially in the areas of freedom of expression, protection of religious and minority rights, law enforcement, and independence of the judiciary. While the European Commission underlined the positive steps taken in the areas of jurisdiction of military courts, harmonization of military law with civilian law, and legislative oversight of defense expenditures, “overall… limited progress in aligning civil-military relations with EU practices” was observed (p.8). The Progress Report also criticized that “the Armed Forces have continued to exercise significant political influence. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues including Cyprus, secularism, the Kurdish issue, and on the indictment concerning the Semdinli bombing” (2006, p. 7). The Report added “statements by the military should only concern military, defense and security matters and should only be made under the authority of the government, while the civilian authorities should fully exercise their supervisory functions in particular as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its implementation, including with regard to relations with neighboring countries” (p. 8).

While the EC’s 2007 Report essentially repeated its 2006 concerns of only “limited progress” being made, in its 2008 Report the EU Commission concluded that “overall, no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian supervisory functions over the military and parliamentary oversight of defense expenditure” (p. 9, emphasis added). It also criticized public statements made by “senior members of the armed forces… on issues going beyond their remit”:

272 Eurobarometer 70, December 2008. First Results, Question Qa9a, p.32
273 Transatlantic Trends, Key findings 2007, the German Marshall Fund, p. 22. Available at: www.transatlantictrends.org
The armed forces have continued to exercise significant political influence via formal and informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond their remit, including on Cyprus, the South East, secularism, political parties and other non-military developments (Ibid.).

In the meantime, the European Council adopted the revised accession partnership with Turkey on 18 February 2008. Under the heading of the “civilian oversight of security forces” the Council asked Turkey to:

- strengthen efforts to align civilian control of the military in line with the practice in EU Member States;
- ensure that the military does not intervene in political issues and that civilian authorities fully exercise supervisory functions on security matters, including as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its implementation,
- take steps towards bringing about greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs,
- establish full parliamentary oversight of military and defence policy and all related expenditure, including by external audit,
- limit the jurisdiction of military courts to military duties of military personnel (p.7)

In March 2009, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on Turkey based on an enlargement report issued by special rapporteurs. In its resolution, the EP noted with concern the “continuous slowdown of the reform process” and called on Turkey “to prove its political will to continue the reform process”. On 15 October 2009 the European Commission issued its annual “Progress Report on Turkey” along with its report on “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010.” As expected, the 2009 Progress Report was full of familiar phrases ranging from “some progress” to “little progress” to “no progress” and stated that significant efforts were still needed in areas such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The report also noted that while Turkey has expressed public support for negotiations regarding a Cyprus solution, the Commission expected Turkey to actively support the ongoing negotiations. In terms of CMR, the report observed that “some progress has been made, in particular on limiting the jurisdiction of military courts”; it again criticized public statements made by senior officers, however. The report raised “concerns” not only about the alleged involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities that were disclosed during the Ergenekon investigation (p. 11), but also “about effective judicial guarantees for all the suspects” (pp. 6-7).

On 23 November 2009 the EP, after concluding debate on the Commission’s 2009 enlargement report adopted its own resolution regarding enlargement. This resolution was even more negative towards Turkey’s lack of progress on freedom of expression and freedom of the
press. In its 2010 resolution, the EP further criticized the Turkish government for a lack of
dialogue among political parties and a lack of press freedom. The tone of the resolution and
debate in the EP provoked the anger of Erdogan, who stated that “there was no balance in this
report” and suggested that the resolution was written by people who did not know Turkey. In
May 2011 Erdogan complained that France and Germany (among others) “are determined to
have Turkey give up its interest in joining the EU”.

Throughout 2011-2012, Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU remained in a
“virtual political and technical stalemate” (Morelli, 2013, p. 7). No new chapters of the acquis
were opened and very little progress had been achieved within the chapters already under
negotiation. Both the European Commission and Council in their annual assessment of Turkey’s
accession progress in 2011 stated that “with its dynamic economy, important regional role and its
contributions to EU’s foreign policy and energy security, Turkey is a key country for the security
and prosperity of the European Union... that was already well integrated into the EU in terms of
trade and foreign investment through the Customs Union”. On the positive side, both
institutions acknowledged that the changes proposed in the constitutional referendum of 12
September 2011 and the conduct of the June elections were positive signs and that Turkey had
made progress on a number of fronts including civilian control of the military, financial services,
competition policy, religious property and cultural rights, and the judiciary. The Commission’s
progress report of 2011 noted that, “overall, good progress has been made on consolidating the
principle of civilian oversight of security forces” (p. 14). On the negative side both reports
repeated concerns over a number of issues where both felt not enough progress had been made
including in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of the media, women’s rights, and
freedom of religion.

Concerning “the Ergenekon investigation and the investigations into
other alleged coup plans”, the Commission’s report noted that they are “an opportunity for
Turkey to shed light on alleged criminal activities against democracy and to strengthen
confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law”. On the
critical side, it raised concerns over “the handling of investigations, judicial proceedings and the

bid.
276 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and
278 Ibid
application of criminal procedures putting at risk the rights of the defence” (EC Progress Report, 2011, p. 7).

Not surprisingly, the Turkish government responded quite negatively to these criticisms. Erdogan in turn criticized the EU for “slinging mud”, claiming “the progress reports had once again shown the serious eclipse of reason at the EU” and added that the EU itself was “crumbling”.279 The CHP, on the other hand, praised the Commission’s report and stated that the “report shows democracy is not moving forward as the government claims”:280

In its 2012 report, the Commission, while offering a few positive conclusions, expressed its overall disappointment with Turkey’s progress on a number of issues leading the Turkish government to express its disappointment with the "biased" and "unbalanced" Report. Turkey’s continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, or to open Turkey’s sea and air ports to Cypriot shipping and commerce until a political settlement has been achieved on Cyprus as well as Turkey’s position on the Cyprus EU presidency were again cited as problematic. In terms of civil-military relations, the 2012 Report noted that “overall, there was further consolidation of civilian oversight of the security forces” and that “the General Staff generally refrained from exerting direct or indirect pressure on political issues. Several symbolic steps have been taken towards further democratization of civil-military relations” (pp. 12-13).

On the negative side, the Report raised concerns over “limited dialogue and frequent tensions” in political society and particularly over “insufficient preparation and consultation prior to the adoption of key legislation. This included the new education law, a law on caesarean section deliveries, a law granting immunity from judicial scrutiny to intelligence officers and public officials assigned specific tasks by the Prime Minister and the abolition of the Serious Crimes Courts” (p. 9). Concerning the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases, the Report adopted a more critical tone:

Concerns persisted over the rights of the defense, lengthy pre-trial detention and excessively long and catch-all indictments, leading to significantly enhanced public scrutiny of the legitimacy of these trials. Offering a chance to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of Turkey’s democratic institutions and the rule of law, these cases have been overshadowed by real concerns about their wide scope and the shortcomings in judicial proceedings. Moreover, they tend to contribute to the polarization of Turkish politics. Judicial proceedings need to be speeded up to ensure the rights of the defense

and to promote transparency in these cases. Investigations tend to expand rapidly; the judiciary accepts mainly evidence collected by the police only, or supplied by secret witnesses (2012, p.7)

On 11 December 2012, the European Council again listed several issues where the Turkey had made progress, but it nevertheless repeated the shortfalls outlined in the Commission’s earlier assessment. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, frustrated by what EU Minister Egemen Bagis has described as a “skewed mentality in Europe”, published its own first-ever progress report (Zanotti, 2013, p.12). The report was described as refuting many of the criticisms of Turkey’s reform process found in the EU Commission’s October progress report.

This continual decline in the credibility of the EU as a sincere actor committed to Turkey’s eventual full accession not only resulted in the AKP’s loss of enthusiasm in its pursuit of Europeanization and democratization reforms, but also exacerbated the tension between secularists and Islamists. The first signs of increasing political confrontation between Islamists and secularists occurred when the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declared its detailed decision on 10 November 2005 in the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.281 The ECHR’s decision upheld the headscarf ban on the grounds that “the impugned measure primarily pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order”.282 Although the court's decision was welcomed by secular circles in Turkey, it quite ironically pushed the AKP further from EU cause as the ECHR, on which AKP had pinned its hopes of getting headscarves to be recognized in line with the EU-endorsed principle of freedom of expression, failed to live up to AKP expectations. As Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kalacioglu argue:

A decision of the ECHR, which recognized the turban as an inalienable religious right would, has given the AKP great motivation to integrate with the EU to further buttress their legal victory with the adoption of the acquis. Hence not only Council of Europe but the EU would then come to their aid in promoting their brand of Islam in Turkey under the guise of freedom of conscience against the laicist parties, groups and organization. However, now that the ECHR helped to sever the tie between the turban and the freedom of conscience or freedom of expression, the EU could hardly be wielded as a shield against the enemies of political Islam in Turkey. Democracy and the rule of law that was to be erected by means of the EU acquis would not be providing opportunities

281 Available at:
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956#{"itemid":"001-70956"}
282 The ECHR’s decision demonstrated similar reasoning to that of the Turkish Constitutional Court Decision of 1989. See: http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/ChamberjudgmentsSahinandTekin.htm The Court’s judgments are accessible on its internet site: http://www.echr.coe.int
for freely proselytizing the brand of Islam that the political Islamists had envisaged (2009, p. 125).

Prime Minister Erdogan and almost all government ministers including President Abdullah Gul rejected the ECHR decision. More importantly, Erdogan rejected the authority of the ECHR by declaring: “The court has no right to speak on this issue. That right belongs to the ulama... It is wrong that those who have no connection to this field make such a decision without consulting the experts of Islam” (MEMRI, 2005, Dec.13, emphasis added).

Such a remark not only clashed with Erdogan’s pro-European attitude but also was perceived by skeptics as further confirmation of his insufficient democratic socialization and internalization of secular rule of law principles. After all, a major achievement of the Turkish Republic was the disestablishment of the religious clergy (ulama), which the Republic’s founders perceived as a conservative socio-political class resisting progress. Erdogan’s faith-based discourses and references such as the phrase “consulting the ulama” were perceived by skeptics as anti-secular and as a prelude to the construction of a society and a form of politics based on religion. The secular and liberal media, opposition parties, the Turkish High Education Council (YOK), the judiciary, and academics heavily criticized Erdogan’s statement.283 CHP leader Deniz Baykal, underlining that Erdogan's interpretation was against the constitutional principle of secularism, declared:

These words should not have come out of the mouth of a Prime Minister of a democratic, secular Turkish Republic. That we should ask the ulama! What kind of mentality is that? What else should we ask the ulama? Should we consult them on having four wives [as permitted by Islam]? About the inheritance law? Maybe on women's rights? And who shall we ask? The Shiite ulama in Iran? Or the Wahhabi ulama of Saudi Arabia? (quoted in MEMRI, 2005, Dec 13).

President Sezer reiterated that the Turkish Constitution has irreversible articles including the article on secularism, arguing that “nobody can change these articles”. Sezer declared:

There is no doubt whatsoever that this [headscarf] matter is over… It was over when Constitutional Court rendered its decision, which was based on the irreversible Article 2 of our constitution... The ECHR decided in accordance with our Constitutional Court, and this [decision] is binding. There is no doubt that, legally, the matter is closed (Ibid).

283 Here, it is worth quoting some of them: Court of Appeals President Judge Ender Cetinkaya said: "This issue is unquestionably a legal matter; therefore, it is under the responsibility of the courts...Judicial organs speak through their decisions. We spoke when we decided about the turban. The fact that such regulations are in the realm of law and the courts is not debatable".
While this headscarf controversy of 2005 constituted one of the initial steps in the increasing tension between secularists and the AKP, more challenging developments would follow. In early May 2006, the offices of the secularist, republican newspaper Cumhuriyet were bombed three times. Two weeks later five senior judges of the Council of State (Danistay) were targets of an assassination attempt protesting a ruling forbidding teachers to wear headscarves in public schools.

Given these increasing tensions, many critics of the AKP looked forward to the end of General Ozkok’s term in August 2006. Ozkok was expected to be succeeded by General Yasar Buyukanit, known to be a hardliner on the issues of secularism and Kurdish separatism. While those viewing Ozkok as too complacent in the wake of the AKP’s perceived attacks on secularism anxiously anticipated his retirement, a defamation campaign to discredit Buyukanit was initiated by those sympathetic to the AKP’s actions (Jenkins, 2009, p. 33; 2007, p. 353; Memri, 2006, Apr. 11).

In early March 2006 an indictment was issued against Buyukanit regarding the 9 November 2005 bombing of a bookshop in the town of Semdinli in Southeast Turkey. Although the incident itself was not unique in that similar occurrences had persisted across the Kurdish regions for the last 15 years, the fact that the suspects in this case were captured by the public and that two of them had military backgrounds provided a good test case for Turkey to prove its commitment to rule of law by holding members of the military accountable for their human rights violations (Jenkins, 2008, June 9). The press media gave wide coverage to the incident, and the government assured citizens that the Semdinli scandal would be investigated, and all its “dark” connections would be exposed, “no matter how high up [in the hierarchy] those links would lead” (Aytar, 2006 May, p. 7).

Much changed, however, with the publication of prosecutor Ferhat Sarikaya’s indictment on 6 March 2006. The Prosecutor was infamous for charging and incarcerating Professor Yucel Askin, the rector of Yuzuncu Yil University (YYU) in Van, who was known for stopping the Islamist activities in the university. Sarikaya implicated senior military authorities in the

284 The original indictment prepared by the public prosecutor Ferhat Sarikaya can be found at: www.sabah.com.tr/ozel/indir.php?f=semdinli_iddianame.pdf
285 The public prosecutor who carried out the onsite investigation maintained that the defendants were caught “red-handed”, and approximately fifty witnesses had testified to this.
286 The Prosecutor was infamous for charging and incarcerating Professor Yucel Askin, the rector of Yuzuncu Yil University (YYU) in Van, who was known for stopping the Islamist activities in the university.
design and co-ordination of the “Semdinli plot” and accused then-Commander of Land Forces Yasar Buyukanit of attempting to influence the judicial process based on a comment that Buyukanit made to a journalist shortly after the attack. 287 Buyukanit had stated that he had worked with Ali Kaya – one of the gendarmerie officers alleged to be involved in the attack – in the 1990s. Buyukanit added that he had known Kaya as a good soldier but that it was of course up to the judicial system to decide whether he was guilty or not. 288 As Jenkins observers the comment was immediately grabbed by Buyukanit’s opponents, particularly in the pro-AKP media not only as “an attempt to pressure the judge in a forthcoming trial to acquit Kaya but – through an extraordinary leap of logic – as proof of Buyukanit’s involvement in the Semdinli bombing itself” (2009, p. 34). Jenkins further notes “the normal method used by the Deep State to ensure immunity from prosecution was the discreet application of pressure behind the scenes, not a public statement” (Ibid). Similarly, it was difficult to understand how the Commander of the Land Forces could be micromanaging operations in the Gendarmerie, which had a completely separate chain of command (Ibid). The prosecutor, however, seemed to agree with the pro-AKP media as he called for Buyukanit to be prosecuted for trying to influence the judicial process.

The Semdinli indictment created an upsurge of tensions between the government and the military, and among the so-called “secularist establishment”, who argued that the Semdinli incident was used by “insidious forces” to discredit the Turkish Armed Forces and the secular roots of the Republic of Turkey (Aytar, 2006 March, p. 4). The main opposition party and some elements in the media speculated that the prosecutor acted under the influence of the Gulen Community to discredit the staunchly secularist general and expected Chief of Staff. 289 CHP leader Deniz Baykal claimed publicly that in a reversal of fortunes the indictment was a sign of a

287 Prosecutor also charged the three detainees with murder and attempted murder, conspiracy and forming a gang to commit these offences, and undertaking activities aimed at destroying the unity of the state and the territorial integrity of the country.


“coup attempt” against the TAF.\textsuperscript{290}

The government, however, strongly insisted “it is judicial matter that grows completely outside of [its] control”.\textsuperscript{291} The government’s declaration failed to convince the secular journalists of the centre and centre-left media, who continued to imply that members of Fetullah Gulen community and/or the AKP were in some way involved in the judicial process. Influential columnist Emin Colasan from \textit{Hurriyet} wrote:

In 1983, [then] Colonel Yasar Buyukanit was commander of the Kuleli Military High School. [At that time] the newly organized community of Fethullah [Gulen] - which is now very widespread - managed to infiltrate [the Kuleli School, enrolling] 80 of their students in it. These students would have become future commanders!.. A disciplinary committee, of five officers headed by Buyukanit, expelled all 80… Now, after the Van indictment, one cannot help asking: 'Is this retaliation [for Gen. Buyukanit's 1983 action], by some Fethullah followers who have been placed in high public positions by the AKP?'\textsuperscript{(2006, March 12)}.

Hikmet Cetinkaya, from centre-left \textit{Cumhuriyet} echoed Colasan’s opinions:

What could be the aim of the circles that want to wear down General Yasar Buyukanit? To create confusion in public opinion about Buyukanit, who is a follower of Ataturk and a patriotic soldier… The plot was led by Fethullah's daily newspaper \textit{Zaman}, and religionist and separatist websites… The Fethullahists have the political power to influence the judiciary, direct the media, and even intimidate bank owners by threatening that their followers might withdraw all their funds from their banks… It is a fact that Fethullahists know how to use their political and economic power very well. They are experts in inserting their influence into the judiciary, the police, politics, and the economy \textsuperscript{(2006, March 7)}.

Within this kind of highly polarized political atmosphere\textsuperscript{292}, Ozkok met with the prime minister on the day the indictment appeared in the press but made no declaration. Two days later Justice Minister Cemil Cicek ordered an investigation into the conduct of Prosecutor Sarikaya in drafting the indictment.\textsuperscript{293} When a Justice Ministry investigation of Prosecutor Sarikaya found


\textsuperscript{293} On 20 March 2006 the TGS stated that the prosecutor “exceeded his authority”, and that he prepared his “purposeful” indictment under the “influence of, and inspirations by other forces”. The Office of the Chief of General Staff decided not to allow Buyukanit to be tried for the allegations, requesting from the government that
that charges against General Buyukanit did not have "the required basis" for prosecution and Sarikaya was eventually disbarred, a storm of protest erupted among AKP supporters in the media. Many of these protests were based on the insistence that Buyukanit was guilty and that Sarikaya had been forced from his post by the nebulous “Deep State” (Jenkins, 2009, p.35). At the time, however, none of the conspiracy theorists and AKP supporters in the bureaucracy had the confidence to pursue their claims through official channels. Instead, those who were against Buyukanit’s leadership continued their smear campaign through emails, faxes, and stories planted in the Islamist press (Jenkins, 2007, p. 353). President Sezer, feeling obliged to intervene in the situation, Sezer wrote to Ozkok and Erdogan suggesting that they quell any speculation by immediately approving Buyukanit’s appointment. A few days later Buyukanit was appointed as the Chief of General Staff.

As a result of the events discussed above, by the time Buyukanit became the Chief of General Staff many secularists had grown increasingly distant from the AKP. Big business and its media holdings, which had initially provided the crucial support that the AKP needed, were particularly concerned with the loss of EU dynamism. Of particular concern was the AKP’s perceived reorientation of Turkey in the wake of declining support for EU membership toward the “Muslim world”, creating economic opportunities for the new Anatolian bourgeoisie. Hamas military leader Khaled Mash' al’s visit to Ankara on 16 February 2006 had heightened such suspicions and, as a result, exacerbated the rift between the government and secularists. Centrist media was highly critical of the visit, accusing the AKP government of undermining Turkey's relations with the Western world and its anti-terror position. The influential editor-in-chief of the secular Turkish daily Hurriyet, Ertugrul Ozkok, criticized the government quite harshly:

Who is the 'genius' who came up with the idea of bringing one of Hamas's most notorious names to Ankara? Isn't there any sensible person left in the Foreign Ministry who could have prevented this 'initiative'?… Foreign affairs officials to whom I spoke were in a state of panic… trying to convince journalists that the decision to invite [the delegation] was made by the party... [But] even if they could convince us, how are they going to convince the world?… What good could come of this visit? Yesterday, Ankara made the most unnecessary and ill-timed move in our diplomatic history (2006, Feb.17).

Columnist Cuneyt Arcayurek of the centre-left, secular Turkish daily Cumhuriyet was even harsher:

“those behind the allegations of the indictment be identified and punished”. The press statement is available at: http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSLIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2006/BA_07.html
The Foreign Ministry keeps telling foreign diplomats that it knew nothing about Khaled Mash'al's coming... The honour of the government, and that of the foreign minister, the party's number two man, is on the line....Why did [Erdogan] invite an organization that is on every terrorism list in the world, on the basis of unbelievable, nonsensical excuses? Simply because Hamas's goal – and ideal – is to build an Islamic state (February 19, 2006).

The Islamist media, on the other hand, supported the visit and instead attacked the secular media for its criticism and accused them of being "Americanists", "Israelists", and a "lobby of traitors" (MEMRI, 2006, March 14). Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul echoed similar views when they respectively accused "some media organs of being open to the influences of foreign agents and diplomats" (Ibid). Both comments provoked strong criticism by various press associations, which called on Gul and Erdogan to present evidence to support their statements. Gul withdrew his remark about "foreign agents" and said that his words had "gone beyond what he had intended to say" (Ibid).

The secularist establishment, however, was not only concerned with the AKP’s foreign policy. Secularists objected to further shifts in Turkish social and political life as well including the Islamicization of national education and state institutions such as Turkish radio and television and Turkey's national airline and the appointment of the graduates of religious schools (imams) and members of religious brotherhoods to official positions including the judiciary and police force (Turan, 2007). Furthermore, Erdogan had clearly revealed his religious conservative program by initiating a move in 2004 to criminalize adultery, a move that eventually failed under intense pressure from the secularist forces in the country and the European Union.

The sum of this mounting pressure from hardline secularists demonstrated above, coupled with the rise of nationalism as a response to the increased PKK terror, created the opportunity for the military to be more assertive. Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit in his first year in office (September 2006-September 2007) maintained a high profile by publicly expressing the military’s concerns about “the growing Islamist and Kurdish separatist terror”. The rift between Buyukanit and the government reached its peak during the presidential election process discussed below.

7.1 Presidential crisis of 2007: A religious or republican president?

The political tension in the country began escalating as the end of President Sezer’s seven-year term approached. The question of who would succeed Sezer emerged as the most contentious issue in Turkey. Given the AKP’s majority in the parliament (which elects the
president), it could effectively be able to appoint its own candidate. This would, according to
AKP critics, open the way for the AKP’s “capturing the state from within”, as it was President
Sezer who had served as a check against partisan appointments of the AKP government. The
possibility of losing such an important instrument to check power mobilized the secularist
establishment to increase its warnings about the threat of political Islam. Within minutes of
assuming command on 28 August 2006, General Buyukanit declared that “the founding
principles of Turkish republic and its territorial integrity had never been a subject of debate to
this extent and that the Turkish Republic has never confronted with so many threats since its
foundation” and made it clear that “protecting the republic is not political engagement, but a
duty.”

Buyukanit’s warnings were echoed by President Sezer. In his address at the opening of
the new session of Parliament, Sezer claimed “the danger of Islamist reaction is one of the threats
against our internal security. Those who cannot easily comprehend the Islamic reactionary threat
in Turkey should analyze developments in Turkey over the past 20 years and see how social and
personal life has evolved. It can be seen that the reactionary threat has not changed its objective
of altering the basic characteristics of the state” (October 1, 2006). Sezer’s unspoken message to
the AKP leadership was clear: “When you broke with Erbakan and his party and established the
AKP in 2001 you claimed you had changed and this new party would not be an Islamist party.
We have been watching you closely since November 2002 and now we have no doubt that you
have merely changed your tactics, while your main goal – i.e. transforming the secular republic
into an Islamic republic – remains the same.”

Marking the opening of the new academic year
at the War Academies the next day, General Buyukanit reiterated his own concerns about the rise
of political Islam. In the form of a response to Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent assertion that
there was no fundamentalist threat in Turkey, Buyukanit argued:

Are there not those who take every possible opportunity to cry out, 'Let us redefine
secularism'!? Don't these same people occupy the highest levels of government? Isn't [it
true that] the great founder of our republic, Ataturk, and the mindset he put into place, as
well as the basic principles of the regime of our republic, are under attack? Are there not
those who exploit every opportunity they get to damage and wear down the Turkish
Armed Forces? Are there not elements that want to destroy our societal structure, and

294 Speech delivered by chief of general staff Yasar Buyukanit during the handover ceremony at the General Staff
[Protecting the republic isn’t politics, it’s a duty]. (2006, August 29). Milliyet.
drag our people back into anachronistic ways? If you cannot answer all these questions with a 'no' and say 'these things do not happen in Turkey,' then yes, there is threat of religious fundamentalism in Turkey, and we must do everything we can to fight it.296

It was not only the military that was concerned with the ultimate aims of the government. In the months leading up to the official announcement of the AKP’s candidate, members of the opposition both inside and outside of Parliament stepped up their criticism against the government for undermining the founding principles of the Republic. This opposition included senior officials of YOK and universities, retired members of the high judiciary, parts of the media, secularist civil society organizations, retired commanders, and President Sezer himself. These groups were highly concerned, particularly with the official appointments made by the government. According to many observers, senior appointments were made on the basis of partisanship rather than merit.

As the AKP’s nominees were generally educated in training schools for preachers, many were rejected by President Sezer on the grounds that the nominees did not have the qualifications required by law for the position. One of the most important controversial cases was Erdogan’s nomination of Adnan Buyukdeniz – general manager of Islamic finance group Albaraka Turk and declared supporter of Islamic banking policies, which forbid the charging of interest – for the Head of the Central Bank. When prevented from installing its favored candidates, as in the case of Buyukdeniz, the AKP government retained its rejected nominees in an “acting” capacity (Turan, 2007, pp. 319-338). As disclosed in April 2007, 1,988 positions in the bureaucracy were filled by persons who had not been legally appointed, but were working in an “acting” capacity, a method intended to be used only on a short-term basis to ensure uninterrupted public service.297

The AKP also introduced a law forcing all civil servants over a certain age to retire, freeing up hundreds of positions for those lower down the ladder, and then transferred approximately 800 civil servants from the Directorate of Religious Affairs to the Ministry of Education.298 The teachers of religion in high schools were promoted to administrative positions, and thousands more teachers of religion were recruited. On 20 March 2007, for the first time in Turkey’s history, the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors held a press conference publicly

297 Sezer’li yedi yil [Seven years with Sezer]. (2007, Apr. 27). Radikal
protesting the government’s 10 month-long obstruction of the appointment of judges to the high courts in order to fill vacant posts with their own Islamist-minded appointees. This incident was interpreted by secularists as an attempt of the AKP government to postpone all important appointments until after the new president had taken office, thus avoiding the likely veto of its nominees by the outgoing, staunchly secular President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.

Within such a tense political context, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition, institutional actors, NGOs, business associations, bar associations, and media representatives called on the government to seek a consensus on a presidential candidate that would be acceptable to the whole nation. On 5 April 2007, the Committee of University Presidents, including representatives of 53 state universities and 25 private universities, unanimously signed a strong statement calling for the election of an impartial president through national consensus. The AKP, however, fearing of the impact of its nomination on the economy, refused to disclose its candidate until the day before the deadline. The secrecy surrounding the identity of the government candidate, the lack of initiative by the government to seek consensus with the opposition and civil society, and Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc’s call to elect a “religious President” (Milliyet, 2007, Apr. 16) greatly increased the sense of unease that had permeated Turkish political life for the last several years.

The state establishment tried every option to prevent the election of an Islamist sympathizer to the office of the Presidency. Main opposition party CHP suggested that unless a consensus could be reached among all parties regarding the presidential candidate, other political parties should boycott the vote in order to ensure that the 367-vote requirement would not be met during the first round of the presidential election. Inspired by honorary prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu, who had argued that under the constitution a quorum of 367 attendees was required for the first round to be valid, the CHP declared that if this quorum was not met, it would take the matter to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the vote and early general elections. TGS Chief Buyukanit claimed in response to a journalist’s question that “as a citizen and as a member of the armed forces” he hoped that “someone who is loyal to the principles of the

299 Turkish judiciary at war with AKP government to defend its independence. (2007, March 27). (The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Special Dispatch No. 1520).
300 Ibid.
republic—not just in words, but in essence—is elected president” (2007, Apr. 12). The following day President Sezer issued a less thinly-veiled warning against an Islamist president, arguing that the country’s secular system “faces its greatest threat since the founding of the Republic in 1923” and proclaimed that all state bodies had a duty to protect the system. 303 After criticizing the threat to Turkey’s secular regime by partisan appointments, President Sezer underlined that the next president should have no political tendencies apart from a commitment to the Constitution and the Republic's principles and values.

The day after Sezer’s speech, Ankara witnessed one of the largest demonstrations in Turkish history. Over half a million protesters marched through the centre of Ankara, chanting slogans such as “Turkey is secular, and will remain secular” and “We do not want an imam for President” to protest the possibility of Prime Minister Erdogan or another candidate with an Islamist background running in the presidential elections. 304 The rally was a landmark event, bringing more than 300 non-governmental organizations together under the leadership of the Association of Ataturkist Thought headed by retired General Eruygur, who would be arrested the following year on charges of being a member of the Ergenekon “terrorist organization”.

**Picture 1: Tandogan Demonstration, Ankara, 14 April 2007**

In the face of growing social and political pressure, Erdogan made a minor concession by nominating his close ally and important figure within the National View Movement, Foreign

Minister Abdullah Gul as presidential candidate on April 24, one day before the deadline. The fact that the candidate was not Erdogan but rather the foreign minister did not calm the suspicions of secularists. Although Gul was known to be more compromising and politically mature than Prime Minister Erdogan, who was viewed as more mercurial and polarizing, his Islamist National View Movement background caused this semi-conciliatory move by the AKP to fall short of bridging the political and social polarization of the period.

In this highly polarized atmosphere, opposition parties and some independent MPs who had called upon Erdogan to choose a consensus candidate for president and criticized him for not consulting them before nominating Gul boycotted the first round of presidential elections in order to render its outcome invalid. Immediately following the elections, the CHP petitioned the Constitutional Court to nullify the vote; as only 361 deputies were present, the number of votes cast fell short of what the CHP argued was the constitutional quorum of 367 attendees.

Hours after Gul’s failure to win enough votes in a first round of balloting in Parliament, at approximately 23.30 the Office of the Chief of Staff issued a two-page press statement on its official website to the surprise of many. The statement titled “Concerning some recent developments” expressed the TAF’s concerns over the spread of radical Islamic understanding and practices, implicitly criticizing the “concerned authorities” for being indifferent and even sometimes “encouraging” these anti-secular activities. The statement ended with what many viewed as a veiled threat:

The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on debates over secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces is concerned about this recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is a party in these debates, and absolute defender of secularism… It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly when it is necessary... The Turkish Armed Forces maintains its sound determination to carry out its duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Its loyalty to this determination is absolute.

The following day, the AKP government reacted strongly to the military’s statement. In a press briefing, government spokesman Cemil Cicek described the statement as an

305 Abdullah Gul was among the founders of the Justice and Development Party and had served as a member of parliament for the Welfare Party from 1991 to 1998. After the Welfare Party was outlawed by the Constitutional Court for its violation of the principle of secularism, Gul kept his seat as a member of the Virtue Party until that party was banned again, due to having an Islamic agenda.

306 The AKP held 353 seats; Gul received 357 votes with 361 deputies present.

307 Genelkurmay’dan çok sert açıklama. [A very strong declaration from General Staff]. Hurriyet (2007, Apr. 28). Also see formal statement at the TAF’s formal website”

http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html
“inappropriate” interference in the democratic arena, and declared “the General Staff is an establishment under the Prime Minister’s office. It would be inconceivable for the General Staff of a democracy upholding the rule of law to make a statement critical of the government about any issue” (Hurriyet, 2007, Apr. 28). The European Union also immediately intervened by declaring “it is important that the military leaves the remit of democracy to the democratically elected government and this is a test case if the Turkish armed forces respect democratic secularism” (Taylor, 2007, Apr. 18, emphasis added). The media, both the centre and “post-Islamist new right”, made it very clear that they did not want the army to interfere in the political arena. Political parties, on the other hand, called the government to immediately hold an early election (Hurriyet Daily News, 2007, Apr. 29). Civil society elements who had gathered to protest Gul’s candidacy also argued against a possible military intervention. About one and half million people, who came to Istanbul’s Caglayan Square on April 29 in the largest protest in Turkey’s history, while chanting the familiar slogans “Turkey is secular, and will remain secular”, “We don’t want a mullah in Cankaya!”, and “We are here! We are aware of the danger!” were now also chanting “Neither Sharia nor coup!”. 

Picture 2: Caglayan Demonstration, Istanbul, 29 April 2007

Within 48 hours the Constitutional Court approved the CHP’s petition to invalidate the first round of the presidential election, referring to the required quorum of 367 deputies needed in all proceedings. The opposition’s repeated boycott of a May 6 attempt led to the call of an

308 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602661.stm
309 Nine of the eleven members decided that parliament did lack the quorum needed to hold elections for president and declared the first round annulled. In its reasoning, the Court underlined “Consensus in the first two rounds of the presidential ballot is only possible if the necessary number of deputies, clearly stated in Article 102 of the
early general election scheduled for July 22.

**Picture 3: Izmir Demonstration, 13 May 2007**

### 7.1.1 Parliamentary election process following the presidential crisis

Following the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the presidential elections, the AKP depicted “the elite” – composed of the state establishment including the Constitutional Court, the army, the presidency, the Council of Higher Education, the CHP and NGOs organizing republican rallies – as “the enemies of the people”. In this discourse, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, the AKP candidate backed by the majority in the parliament represented “the people”. By forming an alliance, from this perspective, elites had tried to bloc “the will of the people”. According to Erdogan the Constitutional Court’s decision annulling the first round of the presidential elections was “a disaster, a shameful incident”, and a “bullet fired on democracy”. With this decision “the will of the majority was imprisoned by the will of the minority”. Erdogan repeated the populist discourse of the Turkish right, declaring that they would take their cause to the people by going to “the bosom of the nation” (*sine-i millet*). He further argued that the nation would provide the best answer to those who set conditions or placed barriers on national sovereignty. To this end, he called not only for a referendum but also for a general election. In line with this strategy Erdogan stated:

> It is very well understood that they could not put up with the national will, with the

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Constitution, is presented” and added “The article applies to both quorums and votes needed to pass legislation. Otherwise paragraph three of that article would be meaningless. Paragraph three says if a two-thirds majority of the total number of members cannot be obtained in the first two ballots, a third ballot shall be held and the candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes of the total number of members shall be elected”.

312 Ibid.
nation having the last word. When multi-party politics was first introduced, those [the Democrat Party] who said ‘enough, the nation has the last word’, came to power with huge support… We first started the process of ‘enough, the nation has the last word’, now we say ‘enough, the nation will make the decision’ and that is how we will proceed.\textsuperscript{313}

The AKP skillfully used the presidential crisis to victimize itself and popularize its cause by claiming that the state establishment and elites would not allow the election of a “religious” president. The AKP successfully billed itself as a party of the periphery against the centre, the party of civil society against the state, and the party of the oppressed against the elites. In this regard, the AKP employed populist propaganda by framing the issue as a matter of advantaged and disadvantaged. Social classes with identifiable (albeit incommensurable) grievances were successfully assimilated into a populist discourse siding with the disadvantaged.

The undemocratic interruption of the presidential election was definitely the centerpiece of the AKP’s campaign; in the many rallies. Foreign Minister Gul attended with Erdogan both gave speeches on the issue. In a dramatic fashion, they framed the issue as a matter of “unjust treatment” of “black Turks” by “white Turks”. They argued that state elites had disregarded the “will of nation”, preventing it from choosing its “true representatives” (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2007, p. 133). The AKP leadership asked the public for the correction of this unfairness by giving state elites a good “lesson of democracy”. Yavuz and Ozcan were therefore right in arguing:

Gul became as significant as Erdogan in the 2007 elections, since the AKP election platform was very much built around the Kemalist campaign against his presidency. The impact of the presidential election worked in favor of the AKP. The party's election platform was very much based on mazlum (wronged one) and the exclusion of the pious from the public sphere by the "white Turks." The Kemalist establishment was framed as "white Turks" and the supporters of the AKP as the "blacks" of Turkey, who have been marginalized by the system. This "framing" of the crisis was very successful among ordinary Turks. The framing mobilized Islamic networks, especially the Gulen community, which has an ongoing conflict with the military, in favor of the AKP (Ibid).

Erdogan’s electoral strategy paid off and the AKP emerged from the 22 July 2007 elections with an increase in its vote-share. Although controlling fewer seats in Parliament, the AKP increased its vote from 34.4% in 2002 to 46.5%, the largest share for a single party since the elections of 1957 (Karakaya Polat, 2009, p. 130). Four parties – AKP, CHP, MHP, and the pro-Kurdish DTP – achieved representation in Parliament and the AKP won 340 seats of the 550 seats, a number high enough to form a majority government. The secularist CHP and the

\textsuperscript{313} Office of the Prime Minister, press release, 16 May 2007.
nationalist MHP won 112 and 71 seats respectively. Independent candidates won 27 seats, including 20 Kurdish representatives, who merged under the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi—DTP). The distribution of seats resulting from the 2007 parliamentary elections is represented in the table below.

Table 10: Turkish Parliamentary Election Results, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number of Seats Won</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>15,641,382</td>
<td>45.49</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>61.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>6,974,598</td>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>20.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>4,842,024</td>
<td>14.28</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>13.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP/Ind.</td>
<td>1,713,769</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emerging from the general election with a strengthened electoral mandate in the general election, the AKP was in a better position to manage the presidential election. Some were hopeful that the party would not insist on the same candidate and would instead choose to compromise. Compromising after such an electoral victory, however, was out of the question for the AKP leadership, and Gul was promptly re-nominated as the party's candidate. The MHP shocked the military by declaring that it would not boycott the election process, ensuring that the quorum of 367 MPs would not become a binding concern this time. With the cooperation of the MHP, the AKP thus secured a majority in the parliament large enough to surpass the 367 threshold in the first two rounds, and on 28 August 2007 Abdullah Gul was finally elected as the 11th President of the Turkish Republic by a 339-vote majority in the third round of the election.

Following this victory, Erdogan proclaimed “those who do not recognize the president of the people should give up their citizenship”.

7.1.2 Analysis of Military Behavior during the Presidential Crisis

Following Gul’s election the General Staff had two alternatives: either respect the outcome of the election process or act upon the threat implied in its 27 April 2007 internet statement or “e-memorandum”. As the General Staff was well aware of the costs of a military intervention even on April 27, the reason for why it opted for a strongly worded military declaration in the first place, the second alternative was dismissed. Chief of General Staff Buyukanit knew that such an action would be condemned both domestically and internationally. He also knew, however, that the acceptance of Gul's ascendancy to the presidency – Ataturk's seat in Cankaya – would be very challenging for the rank and file. There were already many both

inside and outside the military making it clear that they wanted a more assertive General Staff at such a critical juncture. Those with such concerns had difficulty understanding why the guardians of the secular Turkish Republic were remaining silent while huge numbers of civilians were declaring their opposition – particularly when the TAF had fewer reasons to worry about alienating a now less-popular EU.

Buyukanit therefore issued a statement – reminiscent of Tsebelis’ simultaneous-move “nested” game strategy that aims to target multiple audiences – as much to reassure his subordinates in the TAF and its civilian supporters as to threaten the government. This was clear from the timing, style, and content of the statement. Instead of an officially-declared memorandum, Buyukanit opted for an electronic statement published on its website near midnight. While in the past the military had issued formal memoranda, presented their views in the NSC, or held press conferences in this case the General Staff chose the softest method possible to fulfill the obligations of its role as the guarantor of secularism. The choice of an unsigned, two-page, electronic statement issued at midnight implied that the General Staff did not want to create an impression that might be understood as a coup de communiqué or an attempt at a military takeover. It appears that Buyukanit issued such a declaration in order both to preserve the institutional identity of the TAF and to try his chances at preventing the ascendancy of Gul to the presidency without resorting to arms. Military specialist Metin Heper offered the Author a similar explanation:

For the military public opinion is very important. The more literate and informed public is very much concerned with the practices and actions of this government. It cannot be expected that the military be completely indifferent or neutral to this. The military expresses its position. It expresses that this kind of a development would be dangerous for the Turkish Republic, it expresses its uneasiness. It says that the transformation of the Turkish Republic to an Islamic state is unacceptable; it does not say that it is on the way to being transformed and that it would intervene. The military leaves the door open (Author’s Interview, 2008, Ankara).

According to the website Wikileaks, Deputy Chief of General Staff Ergin Saygun also told US Ambassador Wilson that the armed forces issued such a statement as a requirement of their duty.315 Saygun claimed that the military could easily have sent tanks rolling into the streets if they had wanted to, but they did not because “the military spoke out solely to ensure the

315 Cable Ref ID: 07ANKARA1258; created on May 23, 2007.
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07ANKARA1258.html
protection of Turkey's secular system”. 316 Saygun emphasized that this was the principle responsibility of the Turkish military, which it is both obligated and determined to fulfill.

Eight months after the end of his term in office, Buyukanit similarly declared that he had never thought of military coup but had been obliged to take such an action as it was the army’s duty to “protect the republic and its founding principles”. 317 The April 27 statement, according to Buyukanit, was not a memorandum or a threat of a coup, but rather a perceived necessity stemming from its social responsibilities. Buyukanit openly proclaimed: “The duty of the armed forces is given by law. We do not have the luxury to do or not to do the duties that are given to us by law. Issuing a statement is also a pre-emptive action; you can never take me to the coup stage”. 318 Buyukanit had previously expressed in his speech at the War Academies that he considers the guardianship of Republican principles as not an intervention into politics but as a matter of duty given by law:

The TAF does not have any interest in internal politics, and it should not have one. On this matter I always advise my fellow soldiers to examine the period of 1830-1918 of Ottoman history… According to both our understanding and laws, the armed forces have four main duties: First, to train and prepare the armed forces for war. Second, to protect the nation and national interests against external threats. Third, to fight against those forces who aim to abolish the unitary character of the state, including terrorists. Fourth, to protect the main principles of Republic, which are defined in the first three articles of the constitution. According to our understanding, none of these four matters are related to internal politics, and these duties are, in fact, given to us by law. The soldier does not have the option or the luxury of obeying or disobeying the duties that are given to him by law.”

Similarly, the commanders interviewed for this study argued that while the military wanted to remain outside of politics its perceived social responsibilities motivated the TAF to make its position clear. For example, former Commander of the First Army Edip Baser considered the statement to be unfortunate for democracy, but nevertheless underlined that the declaration stemmed from a conception of obligation rather than institutional preference:

316 Ibid.
The transcript of the full interview can be found at: http://www.tarafsizhaber.com/haber-32-G252n-tam-metin-179888
318 Ibid.
319 Speech delivered by the Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit during the hand-over ceremony at the General Staff Headquarters, August 28, 2006. Available at: http://www tsk . tr/10_ ARSIV/10_1_Blaisin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konumsular/2006/orgyasarbuyukanitdvtslko nusmasi-28082006.html Also see: Org. Buyukanit: Cumhuriyeti korumak siyaset degil gorev [Protecting the republic isn’t politics, it’s a duty]. (2006, August 29). Milliyet.
If the ruling party had not been indifferent to an issue to which the Turkish Armed Forces and a large part of society have a great sensitivity, then this statement might not have been issued. The Turkish Armed Forces has the constitutional duty of protecting and safeguarding the Republic and the basic constitutional principles that define the character of the Turkish Republic. While this role exists, if the ruling party insists on choosing a ‘religious’ president, then it would have created the atmosphere [for a military reaction]. The Turkish military reacted to this in order to protect its institutional identity... The public mood also plays a determinative role for the military. The public was very much concerned about the silence of the military. Still, today people that I talk with ask me: ‘Why do the armed forces keep silent?’ (Author’s interview, 2008, Istanbul).

Most of the moderates, including Edip Baser himself, consider the timing of the April 27 statement to be inappropriate. They emphasize, however, that the aim of the military was not to threaten the government by a coup but rather to make their position in clear. The military’s statement, moderates argue, should be interpreted as a reflection of the TAF’s institutional responsibility and work ethic. For example, Riza Kucukoglu, retired general and now President of the Retired Military Officers’ Association, told the Author that “the Turkish military wants to stay above and apart from politics more than anybody else, and if we look at it closely, the Turkish Armed Forces shows particular sensitivity on this issue... However, on April 27 the Armed Forces acted with a sense of responsibility and with concern as to whether the threat to the regime was understood sufficiently by all” (Author’s interview, 2008, Ankara).

For hardliners, however, the issue of timing was irrelevant as they believed that it was the right and duty of the armed forces to express its opinion whenever needed. For these officers, it was completely appropriate and in line with democratic norms for the General Staff to express its views to the public. The military acted as any other pressure group in a democracy by publicly declaring its views on key issues related to the continuity of the republican state. Associate Professor at Beykent University and retired Colonel Sait Yilmaz stated that:

The Turkish Armed Forces has the right to express its views just as any other organization. The Turkish Armed Forces is very sensitive about not intervening in the democratic system; however, it also acts with great sensitivity in order to prevent these matters from reaching an irreversible point... One should also remember that there was immense public expectation at that time... Most of the population continues to see the Turkish Armed Forces as the most important guarantee of a secular and unitary Turkish Republic (Author’s interview, 2008, Istanbul).

Former Commander of General Sener Eruygur, known as “the most fervent coup supporter” in the alleged “coup” diaries published by Nokta in 2007, expressed similar views:

I do not believe that the military’s deliberation on sensitive issues conflicts with the principles of democratic rule. Every other day the President of TUSIAD issues a
declaration and expresses her views on a wide range of issues including security. I am not against this, but why then are the military’s statements regarded to be at odds with democracy?... This stems from confusion about the position of our army with Western armies. In the Turkish Republic, the Turkish Armed Forces assumes the role of a guarantor of the republican democratic regime... Our democratic mass organizations have not yet developed sufficiently. Therefore, I think that we should not abolish these intermediary mechanisms that compensate for this deficiency (Author’s interview, 2008, Istanbul).

Although Eruygur along with other hardliners considered the April 27 statement to be a right and duty of the military, most of the public did not share the same opinion. In fact, the domestic and international reaction to the military created another breakthrough in Turkish civil-military relations. Immediately following the military’s internet statement, most of the politicians320, much of the media,321 a wide range of interest groups from intellectuals to artists;322 many civil-society organizations324, business circles, and EU representatives expressed strong disapproval of the military’s indirect intervention into politics. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “the military should be aware that it should not interfere in the democratic process in a country which desires to become an EU member”, adding that “it is important that the military respects the rules of democracy and its own role in that democratic regime.” 325 The EU Commission later elaborated: “the European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as the supremacy of democratic civilian power over the military. If a country wants to become a member of the Union it needs to respect these principles”.326

US government officials were also critical, though less so than their European counterparts. While early statements vaguely emphasized the need for Turkey to adhere to its constitution, later statements contained clearer warnings to the military to stay out of the political

321 The liberal and Islamist media were particularly loud in their criticism against the military’s statement. The mainstream newspapers such as Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Radikal also raised their voices.
process. The first official declaration after the military’s e-statement came from U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormick who stated on April 30 that the US has “real confidence in Turkey’s democracy… and... in their constitutional processes and that all the parties involved in the election of the new president will abide by those constitutional processes”.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried affirmed that the US hoped and expected that “the Turks will work out these political issues... in a way that’s consistent with their secular democracy and constitutional provisions”. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared “the United States fully supports Turkish democracy and its constitutional processes, and that means that the election, electoral system, and the results of the electoral system, and the results of the constitutional process have to be upheld”. She also agreed with the EU call for the military to stay out of the dispute. State Department spokesman Tom Casey later stated clearly that the US does not “want the military or anyone else interfering in the constitutional process or doing anything in an extra-constitutional way”.

Domestic criticism of the military’s interference was much stronger. Even participants in the demonstrations that were organized by Sener Eruygur expressed their ambivalence towards the military with the slogan: “Neither Sharia nor coup!” In previous interventions, most citizens had been comfortable with the military’s role as a guardian of democracy and secularism, and the military’s actions were regarded as legitimate in the eyes of the public. This time, however, both opponents and supporters of the AKP sent the message that the military needed to stay out of the presidential candidate debate. This was an important change in the sense that the public called into question the legitimacy of the military as an actor in the political realm, giving credence to civilian rule rather than the guardianship of the military.

The Turkish armed forces were naturally affected by these environmental changes and learned its lessons from this process. As Abrahamson stated, the military role beliefs are a function of both environmental and institutional processes. The officer corps, as any other institutional actor, is affected by the manifestations of environmental changes (1972, p. 16). The Turkish armed forces similarly learned that in the new domestic political structure, top-down military intervention into politics tends to be counter-productive. The public, political parties,

328 Quoted in Migdalovitz, 2007, p. 17
and the media were all changed. In the 1990s, the army leadership’s ties to the president, judiciary, and the media as well as and its influence over popular opinion interacted with weaknesses in Tansu Ciller and Necmettin Erbakan’s coalition governments to afford them substantial leverage in the change of government through a “post-modern coup” in 1997. During this period the military was also held in high public esteem. In 1995, for example, demonstrators in the Alevi-dominated Gazi neighborhood of Istanbul, who were protesting the killing of several residents by unidentified attackers, waited for the arrival of soldiers to end their violent demonstrations. Similarly, in November 1999 attendees at the funeral of the assassinated renowned secularist Professor Ahmet Taner Kislali booed the civilian leaders while applauding the soldiers.

A decade later, the Turkish military found itself in a less favorable position to influence government, at least partly because of its loss of popular esteem and the support of pivotal groups with which it allied. If the TAF had remained overtly politically active during the 2007 presidential crisis it would risk alienating not only AKP supporters, which made up 47% of the electorate, but also those AKP critics who remained equally skeptical of military intervention into politics. The Turkish military was aware that its ability to influence government policy ultimately depended more on public prestige than on its ability to put soldiers on the streets. Furthermore, the double electoral victory of the AKP had strengthened the mandate of the government vis-à-vis the military, despite the military’s open discontent with the government. On the other hand, the MHP’s participation in the elections, which made Gül’s presidency possible, demonstrated that the military could not rely on the cooperation of opposition parties. The CHP also had criticized the military for its role in the AKP’s electoral victory. Shortly after the ascendancy of Gül to the presidency, Baykal made it clear that the military was to leave the political sphere:

The latest experiences particularly have shown us that the law and public will are the sole authorities that can assure the survival of the secular republic and democratic Turkey; no other institution can do this. This is evident. Therefore, we do not expect anything from any institution except the law. Let no one overshadow us. This is all we expect (Hurriyet Daily News, 2008, Feb. 2).

For all of these reasons discussed above, a redefined military-civilian balance began to take shape at the end of 2007. The General Staff accepted Gül’s presidency without contestation and then deliberately maintained a low profile. The top military leadership avoided making comments on domestic political issues. This trend of keeping a low military profile continued
under the command of the successive Chiefs of General Staff Basbug, Kosaner, and Ozel. Even on sensitive issues such as military operations against the PKK, the TAF appeared willing to yield to the government’s decisions. The following statement of the TGS Chief Buyukanit made in the lead-up to the January 2008 military operation in northern Iraq is illustrative:

On October 24, 2007, the Prime Ministry asked our opinions about the operation covered in the resolution. We submitted our opinions on November 1, 2007. Thereby, we communicated our proposals to the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are currently working on these proposals. This will become a government directive and will be transmitted to us. Indeed, that is the normal planning procedure. Now the authority resides with the government. They will assess it. If they deem operations necessary, they will say “such operations should be made.” We now await the government directive. We will do what is necessary according to that directive (*Hurriyet*, 2007, Nov. 9).

After Erdogan ordered cross-border operations to begin, the relationship between the TAF and Erdogan improved. Cooperation between the TAF and the government was so strong that, for perhaps the first time in the history of the Republic, the army publicly quarreled with the leadership of the CHP and the nationalist MHP. Ironically, it was Prime Minister Erdogan who defended former hardliner Buyukanit against the secular political parties.

The military’s disengagement from politics, demonstrated to a significant extent during the presidential crisis, was furthered when the AKP government, with the support of the nationalist-right MHP, passed an amendment to the constitution that would ultimately allow the wearing of the headscarf in public institutions. The amendment escalated the tension characterized by a fierce battle of words between Islamists and secularists to levels close to the previous spring when the AKP appointed Gul as its presidential candidate. Following the passage of the contentious bill, *Hurriyet* (2008, Feb. 10) ran the headline “411 hands voted for chaos”, to which Gulenist-backed Today’s *Zaman* (2008, Feb. 11) responded with “Fascists’ imposition of chaos” – implying chaos was artificially created by those opposed the religious freedoms Islamists sought.331

While the battle of words continued between the two groups, some turned to President Gul in the hopes that he would act as a “responsible” President of the Republic and send the bill back to Parliament for reconsideration, since the main problem stemmed from the AKP’s refusal to add the phrase "this only applies to universities" to the bill. Secularists grew wary, however, as

the bill could subsequently result in the wearing headscarves in elementary schools and all other public institutions. Despite these concerns, Gül ratified the bill in February 2008. The CHP immediately applied to the Constitutional Court to annul the amendments contained in the bill.

In the midst of such a fierce debate, the Turkish military – for whom the headscarf is an anathema – remained silent. When journalists asked the Chief of General Staff’s opinion about the constitutional amendments, General Buyukanit only replied “There is not a person in any level of the Turkish society who doesn't know what the military's views are… To say anything would be nothing more than stating the obvious" (Hurriyet, 2008, Jan. 30). With this short and meaningful answer, General Buyukanit tried to remain out of the headscarf controversy. Similarly, retired military officers interviewed while the Constitutional Court was deliberating on the amendments underlined the military’s low profile as an indicator of the military’s desire to remain out of daily politics and its changing mentality resulting from political learning. General Armagan Kuloglu, the former Chair of the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, for example, asserted:

There has been a constitutional amendment concerning the use of the headscarf… The military did not say much. Why? I think that the Turkish Chief of General Staff realized that frequent statements and interventions turned to be ineffective and counter-productive. There are other actors, such as the Constitutional Court, civil-society and political parties and the process is still continuing (Author’s interview, 2008, Ankara).

More interestingly, Kuloglu argued that, although permitting the wearing of headscarves in universities is an anti-secularist move, it is not so serious action as to trigger a military response as is often claimed by some observers. He elaborated:

Yes, with the headscarf issue the principle of secularism is wounded, but it is not dissolved. The headscarf issue is one of the measures that will be used to dissolve the principle of secularism; however, it is only an elementary one. These [anti-secular] actions and practices might continue. However, now the process continues; the issue is up to the Constitutional Court. If the Constitutional Court does not overturn the constitutional amendments, will the military intervene? No. If the Constitutional Court does not ban the party, will it intervene? No. When would military intervene? If Islamization were vigorously promoted and institutionalized in high schools and in public bureaucracies, if the Islamic life style became the way of gaining power in the country, then the Turkish military might consider an intervention in order to prevent the complete Islamization of the country and the political system, as it has a duty of protecting and safeguarding the republican regime. However, the Turkish military does not want to be referred as an interventionary force for a piece of cloth, although we know very well that it is not only a piece of cloth (Author’s interview, Ankara, 2008).

In June 2008, the Constitutional Court effectively declared the amendments
unconstitutional. Although several observers considered the decision political, for others the decision followed the ruling of the ECHR, which upheld Turkey’s ban on the grounds that “the impugned measure primarily pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order”.

332 Citing the reasoning of the ECHR and its previous rulings, the Turkish Constitutional Court underlined that “the amendments in articles 10 and 42 are openly against the principle of secularism because, procedurally, they mean using religion as a tool in politics and breach other people’s rights and cause public disorder by content”.

333 In its detailed reasoning, the Court argued that the suggested amendment would “indirectly change and make non-functional the basic features of the Republic”. The court reiterated that the use of religious symbols in university settings would generate a vehicle of pressure upon individuals that have chosen a non-religious lifestyle or who have different political beliefs. Significantly, the court rejected the AKP’s attempt to introduce a libertarian definition of secularism. The AKP has long sought to recast secularism as an issue of individual freedom of religion, as opposed to the state’s traditional definition that emphasizes freedom from religion and attempts to ensure that both the state and individuals are protected from religious dogma. In its ruling, the Court engaged in a principal argument on how secularism should be defined.

Despite the annulment of the AKP-proposed constitutional amendments, the headscarf controversy had an important lasting effect: it consolidated the role of the judicial system as the last stronghold in the defense of secularism. It was not the military but rather the high judiciary that would keep the AKP within the accepted boundaries of the Republic. This idea was reinforced during the eruption of the second of the main controversies between secularists and Islamists highlighted in this section. In March 2008, the Chief Public Prosecutor initiated a process to close the ruling AKP and impose a five-year ban on 71 of its members, a case which the Constitutional Court agreed to hear. With this move, the guardianship of the secular Turkish Republic had effectively passed from the military to the high courts.

Using the ongoing headscarf debate and a number of other issues, the governing party was accused of violating the secular order of the country. With the Constitutional Court’s

332 Similar to the Turkish Constitutional Court’s reasoning in 1989, the ECHR summarized its reasoning. See “Press release issued by the Registrar Chamber Judgments in the cases of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 29.6.2004 available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/ChamberjudgmentsSahinandTekin.htm

333 Ibid

334 The ruling of the constitutional court can be found at: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/10/20081022-15.htm
acceptance of the indictment by a unanimous vote of 11-0, Turkey entered into one of the most dramatic episodes in its recent political history, and the Constitutional Court came under vicious attack from many sides. Some European and domestic pro-AKP media elements began to claim that the judicial process was entirely political and a mere formality. They argued that the secularist state establishment had decided to destroy the AKP; instead of doing so through a military intervention, it seemed to try closing the party through a judicial coup.

On 11 May 2008, while the case was under deliberation in the Constitutional Court, the president of the Council of State (Turkey’s supreme administrative court) Sumru Cortukoglu spoke at the 140th anniversary of the court’s founding, calling on European Union officials who had criticized the judiciary due to the AKP closure to respect judicial independence in Turkey. She asserted:

We consider the attempts from both national and international circles aimed at directing and influencing Turkish judicial institutions on issues already passed to the judiciary to be wrong... They should respect the independent Turkish judiciary, which makes decisions on behalf of the Turkish nation, as they respect the judicial institutions, their decisions, and the judicial process in their own countries. This is what democracy and judicial independence requires. 335

Ten days later the Supreme Court of Appeals, issued a harsh public statement attacking the government for interfering in the judiciary by exerting systematic pressure. The statement claimed that the government was seeking to create a “judiciary controlled by an executive body” and implied that this was a part of the AKP’s hidden agenda to wreck the so-called “secular” Republic. The statement reads:

For the past year, and especially recently, systematic attacks on the judiciary have undermined the Republic’s founding values. This is exactly the goal, but it must never be forgotten that human history never witnessed a nation and a state that was able to serve its people with such a controlled judiciary (Hurriyet Daily News, 2008, May 22).

The Court also criticized the government for seeking foreign support – in this case particularly from the European Union – against an indictment filed against the AKP at the

335 Ikinci, S. (2008, May 29). Turkey: Conflict escalates between government and judiciary. world socialist website, para.8. Available at: http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/05/turk-m29.html?view=print. Cortukoglu also indirectly criticized the government by emphasizing “judicial decisions should not be made a matter of political discussion and that it was in the wrong spirit to complain about the judiciary to the public by presenting judicial decisions as an adverse attitude against the government” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2008, May 12).
336 The Supreme Court (Yargıtay), which is the court in charge of reviewing the decisions and judgements given by courts of justice from point of conformity to law, is to ensure the unification in the legal practice and to enlighten the interpretation of provisions of codes.
Constitutional Court:

Instead of defending itself in accordance with the law, the government denounces the judiciary to the people; it assumes the right to shape everything according to its will and by the consent of people, and tries to influence the Turkish judiciary by garnering the support of foreign people and institutions, all to get a positive result in the closure case (Ibid).

The government immediately reacted to the Supreme Court’s statement. Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin told reporters that the statement was “political and unnecessary”, adding “I don’t see the logic here. I cannot understand why the Court released such a statement when there was no need for it. This statement has come out of the blue” (Hurriyet, 2008, May 21). On the same day, government spokesman and Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek organized a press briefing and declared that the Court’s statement was “illegitimate” and “unacceptable” (Ibid). The following day, Turkey’s Council of State posted a statement on its official website maintaining that the Chief Judges used their mandate under the constitution in issuing their statement and rejected claims that it was politically motivated.

Within this intense and polarized atmosphere, the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on 30 July 2008. Its reasoning, based to a large degree on European and international law, largely refuted the claims that the judicial process was about power rather than principle. The Court weighed competing legal and philosophical principles against one another and acknowledged the complex and, to some extent, contradictory nature of the AKP. On the one hand, the Court found the AKP guilty of conspiring against the Turkish state’s constitutionally-enshrined secularism and affirmed that the AKP had functioned as a focal point of anti-secular activities, citing the party’s systematic efforts to broaden religious education, partisan appointments in bureaucracy, governmental emphasis on celebration of religious holidays, and the recent headscarf amendments. At the same time, however, the Court found that the party’s activities did not warrant its closure and delivered the relatively mild punishment of cutting the AKP’s state financing by half. Here, the Court rested a solid portion of its reasoning

337 Hurriyet, May 22, 2008. The statement can be found at: http://www.danistay.gov.tr
339 For a similar opinion on the matter, see: Cornell, S. E. (2008). Turkish constitutional court sets the framework for politics. Turkey Analyst
340 The court noted the party’s aggressive efforts to lower the minimum age for children to be registered in Quranic courses and to facilitate the acceptance of graduates of religious high schools to universities.
341 The Court also noted the AKP government’s staffing policies, especially the fact that it has given precedence to religious views over merit-based criteria in appointments to high-level positions in the state bureaucracy.
on the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission’s principles, underlining that the prosecution failed to prove that the AKP had “encouraged the use of violence” to accomplish its aims.\textsuperscript{342} The Court’s reasoning also acknowledged AKP’s had implementation of serious human rights reforms in many areas including the abolition of the death penalty.

Therefore, the Court’s multifaceted and multi-targeted decision verdict constituted a significant gain for Turkish democracy and lay to rest conspiracy theories that were disseminated by the pro-government partisan media. Pro-AKP and Gulenist journalists’ claims that the judicial process was entirely political and that secularists had decided to close the party through judicial means rather than a military coup seemed unfounded. As \textit{Radikal} journalist Murat Yetkin acknowledged, if these claims had merit, the verdict should have indeed been different.

Despite its success in preventing the deepening of Turkey’s already critical institutional crisis, this decision failed to stabilize the political atmosphere. The June-July 2008 decisions of the Constitutional Court contributed to the AKP’s further emphasis on a majoritarian manner of behavior. The AKP engaged in questioning the democratic credentials of its main opponents, the CHP and the MHP, while its own secular credentials were called into question by the verdicts of the Constitutional Court. A \textit{kulturkampf} reinforcing the crisis of legitimacy, which in turn undermined the trust between the major actors in Turkish politics, had begun to define the political atmosphere of post-2007 Turkey (Kalaycioglu, 2010; 2012).

While the AKP had come under intense criticism from secularists for its increasing willingness to utilize the apparatus of the state to pursue its own ideological agenda, the tumultuous political milieu was also shaped by sweeping arrests of former military commanders, officers on duty, journalists, rectors and professors of universities, non-Muslim clerics, businesspersons, and trade union leaders. In more than 25 different indictments, “Specially Authorized” prosecutors charged more than 500 suspects for “aiming to overthrow a government of the Turkish Republic and to render it incapable of governing through the use of force and coercion”. Although the CHP and pro-secular business and labor associations supported similar initiatives against Turkey’s so-called “deep state” in 1996-97, in this case they were divided as some feared that the government might use these initiatives to pacify the pro-secular opposition.

Some regarded these investigations as revenge on the part of the government for the attempt to ban the AKP or as a deliberate attempt to weaken the pro-secular army and other pro-

\textsuperscript{342} Cornell, 2008.
secular actors as part of a long-term strategy to wrest the state away from its founding republican principles. Underlining the timing of the AKP closure case discussed above, which overlapped with the arrest of prominent members of the opposition, they consider the Ergenekon investigation to be the legal counter-attack of the AKP against the secularist establishment.

Irrespective of the motives behind the investigations, the number of armed forces personnel under prosecution in recent years is unparalleled in Turkish (and arguably in world) history. In waves of operations between 2008 and end of 2012, hundreds of active-duty and retired military officers, including 68 generals in duty were arrested as part of these investigations. By mid-2012, one-fifth of the Turkish Armed Forces’ generals and admirals were in prison. Quite ironically, these arrests occurred under the rule of a party that had been found guilty by the Constitutional Court for becoming the center of anti-constitutional activities. Therefore, investigating the military’s behavior during this process is crucial for understanding the extent of the military’s subordination to the rule of law. Before doing so, the next section briefly outlines main conclusion of this chapter.

7.2 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that second phase of institutional transformation of Turkey’s CMR regime – lasting from 2006 to 2008– was mostly driven by domestic factors. Although European norms of civil-military relations were often present in public discourse, the EU’s ambiguous attitude towards Turkish membership, particularly since late 2005, had damaged the EU’s credibility and thus its policy of democracy promotion. Despite this declining influence of the EU, the process of change in Turkey’s civil-military relations regime continued even at a stronger pace because of AKP’s effective strategies and loss of the TAF’s deterrence capability.

Among those, this thesis suggests, the failed April 27 e-memorandum was the most important factor in the military’s loss of deterrence capacity. Lebow and Stein note that deterrence “seeks to prevent undesired behaviour by convincing those who might contemplate such action that its costs would exceed its gains” (1990, p. 336). Defenders must “define the behaviour that is unacceptable, publicize the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and possess the capabilities to implement the threat” (Ibid). Although the Turkish military tried to prevent the election of Abdullah Gul by demonstrating its commitment to punish through an online statement on April 27, it failed to implement that threat.

upon the election of Gul later that year and thus suffered from loss of deterrence capability.

The second development that contributed to military’s disengagement from politics was the ability of AKP governments both to garner visible electoral and mass support and to take measures to stimulate this support when needed. Measures aimed at eliciting mass support serve to pre-empt or deter the military by signalling increased costs to insubordination. These measures include calls for elections or referenda and the timely publicizing of broad policy platforms that provide the government with initiatives (Aguero, 1995, p. 32). The AKP’s call for early elections after the military’s e-memorandum and its electoral victory in June elections deterred the military from contesting the election of Gul to presidency.

This chapter also demonstrated that the weakening of the military’s ties to domestic allies impeded its ability to influence mass opinion.\(^\text{344}\) After all, it is generally accepted that the military’s influence at any given time, depends on its ties to other politically salient constituencies for support from the masses. These ties to groups and masses provide an indirect channel of military influence in politics, as had been the case in the post-modern intervention of 1997. A decade later, the Turkish Armed Forces found itself in a less favorable position to shape public and elite opinion as manifested in failed 2007 e-memorandum. In Soldier and State, Huntington asserted that “the standing of the officer corps and its leaders with public opinion and the attitudes of broad section or categorical groups in society toward the military” are key elements in determining military influence (1957, p. 89). Thus, the military’s prestige and popularity in society are considered as “vital to its ability to exert political leverage” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 355). This is due to a high level of societal trust and public support contributes to the military’s ability to legitimize its political activism. Moreover, the military’s popularity and prestigious position may reinforce civilians’ sense of powerlessness, which in return provides more space for the military to maneuver when attempting to shape civilian politics. The Turkish military, which considers its social legitimacy and strong bond with the society to be its “biggest source of power”,\(^\text{345}\) realized during the presidential election process that its continuing

\(^{344}\) Many studies link relations between the military and key social groups to the military establishment’s power in the state (O’Donnell 1973; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead,1986; Remmer, 1989, pp.406). The military’s support from society is also seen as a key motivation and source of success (Luttwak 1968; Koonings and Krujtt 2002, p. 23; Perlmutter 1977, pp.100-2)

\(^{345}\) See: Annual evaluation Speech of chief of general staff Ilker Basbug at the War Academies on April 14, 2009. Available at: http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSVIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerbasbug_harpak_konusma_14042009.html
engagement in politics cost it substantial public support. The military, as a result, lost the motive – as well as the mood – to intervene against the civilian authorities. Manifest citizen support for the AKP and President Abdullah Gul acted as a strong deterrent to forceful action by the military against political executive, as officers realized the increased costs to intervention.
This chapter argues that the taming of the Turkish military’s assertiveness during the events of the 2007 presidential crisis analyzed in the last chapter was followed by a period characterized by intense secular-religious tension, even despite the restrained role of the military. During the second and third terms of AKP rule, the focal point of this tension involved the politicization of the judiciary. While the AKP and its supporters criticized the higher echelons of the judicial system for acting as the protectors of the state and the status quo, secularists criticized the politicization of the lower courts, particularly the “Specially Authorized Courts”, in which AKP appointees established a foothold. Three main cases played a central role in this process of politicization. The first controversy concerned the constitutional amendments made for removing of the ban on the wearing of headscarves in public universities in February 2008 and the annulments of these amendments by the Constitutional Court in June 2008. The second controversy concerned the initiation of a closure case against the AKP by the Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals in March 2008 and its rejection in July 2008, while the third centered on the investigations of a clandestine, ultra-nationalist organization referred to as Ergenekon in June 2007 and alleged coup-plots such as Sledgehammer began in February 2010. While the first two cases are cited by the AKP and its supporters as proof of the high judiciary’s political activism, giving rise to debates over “judicial guardianship”, the third case has increasingly been perceived as a political mechanism of the ruling AKP to intimidate its opponents by using the newly founded specially authorized heavy penal courts.346

The preceding chapter analyzed the patterns of civil-military relations during the first two controversial judicial processes, both viewed as judicial attempts constrain the power of the AKP. This chapter focuses on the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations, viewed as a judicial attempt in reverse – that is, an attempt on the part of the AKP to use the judiciary to delegitimize the role of the military and thus constrain its potential future power in the political

realm. It argues that despite the loss of an influential EU anchor, demilitarization continued during this period (2008-2012) at an even stronger pace mostly because of the effective mobilization of domestic opposition, which continued to use international norms to discredit the status quo and change societal understandings about the proper role of the military in a democracy. As Sikkink and Risse’s (1999) spiral model predicts, a domestic anti-military alliance, empowered by concessions of the military institution at the initial stage of EU-triggered domestic change, mounted its own campaign of delegitimation through widespread media coverage of alleged military scandals, leaked documents and wiretappings, and politically motivated court-cases. Under an organized campaign of a fully mobilized domestic opposition since early 2008, it became increasingly difficult for military authorities to put political pressure on the government. The Turkish military, under pressure from above and below, has, thus, increasingly found itself on the defensive.

**Figure 2: Double Pressure (Boomerang Effect)**

This chapter tries to show that the *societal changes* that have taken place in Turkey – i.e. the military’s loss of its traditional allies and development of new adversaries – deprived the armed forces of much needed domestic/social support and forced it further on the defensive side. As discussed in the previous chapters, the TAF’s role in politics traditionally had not been questioned or criticized until the beginning of the 2000s; on the contrary, this role had been widely sanctioned by the Turkish public, including the Turkish media (Uzgel 2003; Demirel 2005). Historically, media criticism of military has been weak; the Turkish press, in fact, has endorsed military interventions (Mazici 1989; Yildiz, 2007, pp. 259–270; Wuthrich 2012, Tek 2007). There have also been occasions where journalists have called for intervention by the
military or taken sides against politicians over political issues (Heper and Demirel, 1998). Several scholars have observed that the Turkish media has frequently “encouraged the military to get involved in social-political debates”, providing “implicit support to the view that the military had the last word in such matters” (Wuthrich, 2012, p. 255; Heper and Demirel, 1998, p. 113; Yildiz, 2007, p. 11). There have also been many times when media authorities act on the military’s behalf, “carrying out presumed wishes that were never communicated” (Wuthrich, 2012, p. 262).

In the late 2000s, however, the military’s “comfortable modus vivendi” with the media changed dramatically, largely as a result of three overlapping developments. First, the landscape of national media spaces has been restructured in terms of ownership and control. In April 2007, for example, the governmental Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) seized Sabah-ATV, Turkey's second largest media group. The TMSF, staffed by Erdogan appointees, then sold the group to Calik Holding, the CEO of which was Erdogan's son-in-law. 347 Not surprisingly, since their purchase by Calik, the newspapers and TV channels in the Sabah-ATV Group have all become outspoken supporters of the AKP (Sharon-Krespin, 2009, pp. 55-66).

Shortly after the formation of the second AKP government, several more important changes took place in the landscape of the media. In November 2007, a new newspaper employing a radically anti-army discourse named Taraf was established by some neo-liberal writers, allegedly using pro-Gulen capital. The ownership of the existing newspapers Star and Bugun also passed into the hands of new Islamist elites. These changes were important as these newspapers became principal proponents of the Ergenekon investigation in the media. These publications became major agenda-setters by releasing recordings of military personnel meetings and lectures; top secret military documents; strategic antiterrorism plans; private medical files of commanders; and contents of personal conversations of various public figures such as military leaders, politicians, and members of the judiciary and higher education council (YOK), some of whom were later investigated by the prosecutors of Ergenekon.

A similar reorganization also occurred in the visual media; several national channels, such as ATV, KanalTurk, and Cine 5 were first acquired by the government and then sold to its political allies. In addition, new national channels with pro-AKP ownership such as Bugun,

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347 Calik financed the purchase with public funds taken as loans from two state-owned banks. The loans, at $375 million each, were the largest ever granted by either bank (Jenkins, 2008b, p.11).
Beyaz, Kanal 24, Mehtap TV, and Ahaber were founded. Military-related documentaries, commentaries, TV serials, and debate programs were the major subject of these TV channels. Journalists and academics critical of the military were invited either to discuss the military’s role in the state structure or to comment on the recent developments in civil-military relations. Perhaps more importantly, for the first time in Turkish history, the media began airing debates on military performance and competence. For example, Taraf\(^{348}\) published a leaked intelligence report claiming that the General Staff had prior knowledge about the PKK attack in October 2007, in which twelve soldiers were killed and eight more were kidnapped (Taraf, June 25, 2008). In the days that followed, Turkey witnessed an almost unprecedented public questioning of the professionalism of the General Staff and even its integrity.

In a second overlapping development, the military’s influence on the public via the media was also hampered by the decline in circulation of the traditional press. During the 1990s, when the traditional media cooperated with the military they had relatively higher circulations in comparison to Islamist and/or neutral press. As Ahmet Kuru (2012, p. 51) points out, the circulations of military-friendly newspapers in 1998 – Hurriyet (613,000), Sabah (609,000), Milliyet (547,000), Radikal (183,000), and Cumhuriyet (46,000) – were much higher than those published by opponents of the military – Zaman (266,000) and Akit (30,000). The data from November 2012 indicate a transformation from 1998 to the present in terms of 1) the declining circulation of pro-military newspapers: Hurriyet (398,000), Milliyet (155,000), Cumhuriyet (50,000), and newly founded Vatan (109,000); 2) the shifting position of Radikal (26,000), which adopted a more critical editorial line in most of 2000s, and Sabah (311,000), which became more critical of the military after being sold to a pro-AKP businessman in 2007; and 3) the increasing circulation of newspapers which are critical of the military: Zaman (872,000), Akit (50,000), recently founded Star (136,000), Yeni Şafak (101,000),Bugun (101,000), and Taraf (51,000).\(^{349}\) In short, the military’s loss of media and business support weakened its capacity to influence politics.

\(^{348}\) Taraf began publication in November 2007. The newspaper defines itself as follows: “‘Taraf’ means ‘taking sides’ and we do take sides. We believe in the objectivity of journalism, going to several sources about a story, checking and verifying all the facts in a story. But we do not believe in not taking sides when it comes to issues of human rights, democracy and basic freedoms in Turkey or in the world, or war and peace questions. So we do take the side of democracy and human rights. It is very much of an opinionated paper and we don’t hide that and wanted it to be reflected in our name as well. One other thing we take a side on is nationalism. We are not nationalist, we are internationalist and we are very clear about that’.

Finally, the military’s influence was indirectly weakened when its traditional allies in the media were constrained and intimidated by the judiciary, government and pro-governmental media. Although, mainstream Istanbul-based media’s relationship with the government began to deteriorate in late 2007, the increasing governmental pressure on the media combined with a strong anti-military editorial line of partisan media have constrained traditional media’s support to military.

The Turkish military not only lost the support of its traditional allies but also acquired new enemies in the 2000s. Victimization of Islamic identities during the February 28 Process created both a motivation and an opportunity for Islamic communities to attack official state ideology and its representatives a decade later. The Gulen community, which received its fair share of harassment during the late 1990s, by the late 2000s, emerged as the most powerful anti-military opposition bloc. The arrest of Gulen’s critics such as, Police Intelligence Chief Hanefi Avci in September 2010 and journalists Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener in March 2011, strengthened the wide-spread perception that conspiracies of Ergenekon and Balyoz are nothing but blowback from the Gulen community, which was victimized by the secularist establishment a few years earlier. For example, Dani Rodrik from Harvard University, argues that:

For years, the AKP and the Gulenists have felt themselves persecuted by the military and hard-line secularists. The AKP and its predecessors have been traumatized by the constant threat that they might be closed….They have faced hostility from the constitutional court and other high courts. Now that these groups have managed to wrest control of the police force, large parts of the media, critical segments of the judiciary, and many other state institutions, it appears many among them feel it is their time for retribution (2011, p. 108).

For many, it is the GM that micromanages these operations through their members in police and judiciary. Gareth Jenkins from the Transatlantic Research and Policy Center argues that the arrest of Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug on “terrorist charges” demonstrates that “the Gulen Movement has the power to imprison whoever it likes, regardless of the law, due

350 Hanefi Avci, a right-wing police chief who had once been sympathetic to Gulen, was imprisoned a few days after the publication of his memoirs in August 2010. The book provides strong evidence about a network of Gulen’s supporters in the police intelligence that established an illegal wiretapping and surveillance center, fixed internal appointments and promotions, and fabricated evidence against perceived opponents of the movement.

351 Ahmet Sik, a socialist journalist known for his work on the Turkish Gladio and Ergenekon, was arrested on the same day with Sener. The reason for his detainment was an unpublished book entitled “Imamin Ordusu” (“The Preacher’s Army”) about the activities of the Gulen community in the police force.

352 On 3 March 2011, nine other journalists, who were known for their opposition to the Gulen community, were detained and subsequently charged with membership in Ergenekon.
process or the absurdity of the allegations; and further proof that in today’s Turkey it is not the military but the Gulen Movement that people need to fear” (2011, Jan. 9). Sami Faltas from Centre of European Security Studies similarly writes:

Despite the fact that Prime Minister Erdogan has defanged the army (as The Economist put it), he is now facing a growing challenge from the conservative Islamic movement led by the imam Fethullah Gulen. The question is no longer whether the Gulenists influence the police, the prosecutors and other state bodies behind the scenes. The relevant question now is how pervasive and strong their influence is (2012, p. 139).

Although it is impossible to prove these allegations, it is at least certain that the Gulen community played a strong, if perhaps indirect, role in reducing the military’s popular support by adopting a sensationalist and often biased editorial line in their media outlets. By the mid-2008, the pro-Gulen/AKP media outlets Zaman, Today’s Zaman, Taraf, Mehtap TV, and Samanyolu TV had already become the major players in the Ergenekon case, going as far as disseminating reams of leaked “evidence” related to Ergenekon, even before the prosecutor’s submission of the indictment to the court and defense lawyers.

This chapter analyzes the behavior of the Turkish military during this tense period of power struggle between the secularists and the AKP and its supporters, arguing that domestic mobilization against military’s political activism forced the chief of general staff to be defensive. Despite the frequent public statements, the tendency of the chief of general staffs during this period has been respectful to the rule of law demonstrating officers’ socialization and internalization of norms of democratic civilian control. Before doing so, the next section briefly outlines the controversy surrounding Ergenekon investigation.

8.1 Ergenekon: The Case of the Century or a neo-Islamist Revenge?

The Ergenekon investigation began on 12 June 2007 with the discovery of 27 hand grenades at an Umruniye, Istanbul. The investigation was widened and transformed into an operation to crackdown on the "Ergenekon Terror Organization", which allegedly aimed at paving the way for a military coup against the government. Between mid-2007 and end of 2012, 353

353 The alleged members of the criminal organization are said to refer to themselves as Ergenekon, means “steep mountain pass” and refers Ergenekon to the Turkish national myth: it was the route via which Turkish ancestors, following a gray wolf, escaped from Central Asia to freedom in Turkey to exact revenge on their enemies. 354 Investigation was conducted as a response to an anonymous call to the Trabzon gendarmerie. Although documents seized in 2001 referred to an organization called Ergenekon, the media started to widely use the Ergenekon name after the seizure of “Ergenekon bombs” in the Umruniye raid. Most of the evidence that the Ergenekon organization existed came, however, from a former journalist working in Gulenist media named Tuncay Guney (Jenkins, 2009, pp. 49-55). Guney’s testimony and documents taken from his apartment are the most fundamental pieces of evidence on which Ergenekon Specially Authorized Prosecutor Zekeriya Oz relied.
in several waves of operations a total of 275 people are taken into custody and hundreds of them are arrested, including academicians, journalists, lawyers, leaders of civil society organizations, politicians, and retired and active duty military officers from various ranks.

In the first waves- until mid-2008- the arrest of infamous individuals in the Ergenekon case – such as those associated with the mafia and with the Susurluk scandal discussed in Chapter 4 – led to positive perceptions of the Ergenekon investigation. Many initially considered the investigation to be an opportunity for the final eradication of the shadowy networks behind unsolved assassinations that seem to operate under the protection of state institutions. As there has never been a thorough investigation of what is referred to as the “deep state” and its extra-judicial activities, these trials were seen as a “historic opportunity” for Turkey to “hold the deep state accountable” (Sunday’s Zaman, 2009, Jan. 4), “to confront coup plotters”, “to install the rule of law” (Sariibrahimoglu, 2008, July 15), and “to deepen democracy” (Today’s Zaman, 2008, Aug. 15). The EU, similarly initially considered Ergenekon as “an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law” (EU Progress Report, 2009, p.7). As the investigatory trail broadened, however, skepticism over the Ergenekon investigation began to rise.

On 21 March 2008, in an early morning, police conducted operations in Istanbul and Ankara and arrested tens of prominent opposition figures, including senior journalist Ilhan Selcuk from Kemalist left Cumhuriyet, former rector of Istanbul University, Prof. Kemal Alemdaroglu, and Leader of fringe Labor Party, Dogu Perincek. On 1 July 2008, several other opposition figures including retired senior commanders Sener Eruygur and Hursit Tolan, as well Ankara representative of Cumhuriyet newspaper, journalist Mustafa Balbay who is known for their headlines exposing the divisions within the armed forces during the Cyprus and Iraq war negotiations, President of Ankara chamber of commerce, Sinan Aygun were arrested. By the time Istanbul’s 13th Heavy Penal Court have accepted the indictment prepared by a team of “specially authorized” prosecutors on 25 July 2008 and Ergenekon trials have formally started, there have been already seven waves of arrests.

The each wave of operation followed a similar pattern. Before the police operations, which were typically instigated by anonymous tip-offs, the pro-governmental and pro-Gulen

Operasyon terfi etti: Orgenekon![Operation is promoted: Orgenekon!] Radikal, 2008, July 2.
media engaged in a discrediting campaign against the suspects through the leak of some secret documents, wiretaps, etc. These “media trial” of the suspects were followed by highly publicized search, seizures and mass arrests by the police usually at early morning hours, in the presence of selective media organs. The arrests are typically continued by selective leaks to the media about the “evidence”, and a campaign by the pro-government media to discredit the suspects and shape public opinion about the case. The defendants, meanwhile, strongly denied the charges, any association to the evidence to which they had been linked by the police and prosecutor, and even they even refuted knowledge of each other.

From the outset, government and pro-government media, on the other hand, defined Ergenekon as the deep state derivative of NATO's "stay-behind" clandestine Gladio network\textsuperscript{357}, responsible for numerous unsolved acts of violence in the past 50 years and for the military coups of 1971 and 1980.\textsuperscript{358} Months before the prosecutor submitted his indictment to the court, defendants learned from \textit{Today’s Zaman} (January 23, 2008) that they were accused of being members of the Turkish Gladio:

The suspects are accused of many individual crimes, but what they have in common seems to be the links they have to clandestine gangs that function similarly to Operation Gladio -- a post-World War II NATO operation structured as "stay-behind" paramilitary organizations, with the official aim of countering a possible Soviet invasion through sabotage and clandestine operations. In fact, many analysts believe such networks of groups in Turkey today, sometimes referred to as the "deep state," are remnants of the Turkish leg of the actual Gladio.

A few days before the submission of the indictment to the court, Ekrem Dumanli, Editor-in-Chief of pro-Gulenist \textit{Zaman}, wrote another article (2008, July 10), in which he declared Ergenekon-skeptics as part of Gladio, and thereby effectively limited the boundaries of public discussion:

As the information leaks concerning the ongoing Ergenekon investigation continue, stunning details emerge. This is so even though the indictment has yet to be made


public... What we face is a devilish organization... What we see in this gang is a pack of reckless criminals who manipulate public opinion using psychological warfare, meet media bosses or journalists in their offices, have these meetings secretly recorded and even monitor their own top commander... Turkey will either confront these vigilantes who resort to illegal means for the sake of the state and their supporters or yield to social engineering by Gladio. This investigation will show who the supporters of the vigilantes are, as well as who the opponents of Gladio are.359

Prime Minister Erdogan used the "deep state" terminology to describe the police operation against Ergenekon. On the television show Iskele Sancak aired on January 27, 2007, Erdogan had already declared his belief in the existence of the deep state: "I don't agree with those who say the deep state does not exist. It does exist. It has always has.... It must be minimized, and if possible even annihiliated".360 Shortly after the Umraniye incident and months before the prosecutor prepared the indictment, Prime Minister Erdogan expressed his opinion that connections revealed by investigators working on the case are fairly descriptive of the Turkish concept of "deep state": "Just look where the links of the Umraniye incident led, whose behind it. These are very interesting. The bombs [that are discovered at Umraniye] belongs to whom? " he said in response to a journalist's question about his understanding of the deep state.361 Praising the police operation, Erdogan added: can you see mafia in the big cities as before? Can you see gangs? I can’t say they are completely dissolved, but there is a reduction. These gangs had taken their power from the deep state”.362 Then-leader of the main opposition CHP Deniz Baykal, on the other hand, described the investigation as a tool for the ruling AKP “to put pressure on the country’s respected figures” and to “construct its own deep state” (Hurriyet, 2008, Mar. 22).

The government and pro-government media, however, as briefly mentioned above, openly lent support and credibility to the Ergenekon charge enabling creating a picture of two completely different Turkeys. The government and its allies in the media presented the

investigation as launched against ‘the enemies of national sovereignty.’ In Erdogan’s rhetoric, the Ergenekon had become evidence of the obstruction of the national will by the elites in the old political establishment. The prime minister openly supported the investigation, stating he was the prosecutor behind this operation while the main opposition party advocated for the detainees.

During the operations, the pro-government media has played a crucial role to publicize and legitimize the investigation and intimidate the opposition. On July, 14, 2008- days before the first Ergenekon indictment was announced-, the pro-government Star newspaper, for instance, claimed on July 14, 2008 to have uncovered an action plan titled “Urgent and Synchronized Reaction Warning”. According to the newspaper, the plan was written by the enemies of the Ergenekon investigation to diminish the significance of the indictment and was sent to several opinion-makers including journalists, academics, parliamentarians, and retired bureaucrats. These opinion-makers were incited to use such critical arguments as “the indictment is full of baseless accusations” and/or “the indictment is a revenge for the closure case filed against the AKP” to manipulate the public opinion. Both liberal columnists and their Islamist counterparts used the plan supposedly uncovered by Star to accuse and intimidate skeptics for being part of the plot.

Under such an intimidating political atmosphere, the specially authorized prosecutor, Zekariya Oz, submitted his 2,455-page indictment to Istanbul’s 13th heavy penal court on July 25, 2008 a year after the first wave of arrests. The first hearing was held on October 20, 2008. The first indictment defined Ergenekon as an “armed terrorist organization” and charged 86 suspects with “establishing and directing” or being a “member of and aiding of” this organization. According to the indictment, Ergenekon was a part of Turkey’s undefined “deep state” and was responsible for “masterminding many bloody actions to create serious crisis, chaos, anarchy, terrorism and insecurity in the country” (p. 46). The organization aimed to “incite the people to armed rebellion against the government of the Turkish Republic” and

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366 Some Islamist and liberal columnists charged the Dogan Media Group with acting as a spokesman for the Ergenekon network and the CHP as being the lawyer of Ergenekon: Newspaper columns such as these have arguably been not only to criticize but to intimidate.
“attempt to overthrow the government and rendering it incapable of governing through the use of force and coercion”. To reach these aims, it has “tried to create an atmosphere of chaos and civil war in the country through the control of media and civil society organizations in which it did partially succeed”. Its eventual aim was “to overthrow the government through the help of military persons in the army”. According to the prosecutor, the organization was behind a series of political assassinations over the past two decades, including the attack on the Council of State in 2006. It also claimed that Ergenekon was planning several other assassinations including that of then-Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit, Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well as an attack on NATO facilities, all designed to force the military to take action.

The second indictment, accepted on 25 March 2009 and merged with the first one, was written nine months after the arrest of Generals Ergur, Tolon and others. It accused 56 suspects of membership in Ergenekon and of planning to stage a coup. The indictment alleged that Commander of the Gendarmerie Sener Erugur (2002-2004) founded the Pro-Republic Working Group within the Gendarmerie General Command in 2003 to prepare the ground for a military coup. The “Republican Rallies” of 2007, which were organized by then retired Erugur as the President of Ataturkist Thought Association, were attempts to overthrow the government using non-democratic means. Based on the testimonies of secret witnesses and police reports, the second indictment also claimed that Ergenekon had tried to use the militant Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), the fundamental Islamist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hizbut-Tahrir, and the Kurdish-separatist PKK terrorist organization in line with its goals. Diaries allegedly belonging to former Turkish Navy Commander Admiral Ozden Ornek is featured in this indictment.

The third indictment, which includes the testimony of the former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok, was accepted by the Court on August 5, 2009. The indictment accused 52 suspects with Ergenekon membership and with preparing the grounds for a coup and possessing

367 1. Ergenekon Indictment, 2008, p. 2455. The indictment can be found at: http://cm.ntvmsnbc.com/dl/ergenekon/iddianame_1/2uitjybi.jpg
371 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24989392/
weapons and munitions.\textsuperscript{372} After the merging of these three indictments together, 20 more indictments added to the Ergenekon case till the end of 2012 and more waves of arrests preceding these indictments were conducted.

The skeptical point of view about these operations seemed to gain credibility in 2009 as the operations broadened to include “civilian opposition” of the ruling party. In January 2009, police forces searched the house of Honorary Chief Public Prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu, who had captured the attention of government when he argued that Parliament needed a quorum of 367 members to elect the president. Former university rectors, academics and members of civil society organization were detained on 13 April 2009. The offices of the Association for Support of Modern Life (\textit{Cagdas yasami destekleme dernegi-CYDD}) and the Daddy, Send Me to School campaign (\textit{Baba beni okula gonder-BBOG}) were searched for hours at the same day, their computers were seized, and their staff – a large proportion of them women – taken into custody.

CYDD and BBOG were the only two large non-religious organizations that provided educational scholarships to enable young girls in the east of Turkey to attend school. In other words, they were the only secular competitors of the Islamic communities in the field of education. Few impartial observers genuinely believed that these two organizations were recruiting these children for a “terrorist organization”. When the police conducted a 7-hour search in the home of Professor Turkan Saylan, founder and president of the CYDD and a 74-year-old cancer patient, large sectors of society lost trust in the investigation. TUSIAD, for example, issued a strong declaration criticizing the way that the investigation was handled:

\begin{quote}
[TUSIAD has] been following the Ergenekon Investigation right from the beginning in the light of the principles of equality before law and respect to the rule of law and judicial organs. In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, everybody should be held accountable before the courts for their unlawful activities. However, to use procedural laws to their most oppressive extent, or to completely disregard these laws, is a violation of the right to a fair trial and of basic human rights… Once more, [TUSIAD] remind[s] the authorities to conduct the investigation with due diligence.\textsuperscript{373}
\end{quote}

Highly respected and beloved Turkan Saylan died a few days after the operation, the staffs of both CYDD and BBOG were held up to 60 hours in custody, and their computers were seized.


\raggedleft\textsuperscript{373} TUSIAD Press Center, TS/BAS-BUL/09-33, April 17, 2009.
given back by the police several months later, severely disrupting the ability of the organizations to function (Jenkins, 2009, p. 76). Finally, on March 18, 2011, the court began to prosecute seven executives from the CYDD on charges of recruiting students to Ergenekon and then using them to infiltrate and control terrorist organizations.

Even the Kurdish DTP, which was initially enthusiastic about the Ergenekon process – mostly because of its Kurdish constituency’s firsthand experience with the terrorizing behavior of now-under-investigation gendarmerie intelligence, (JITEM) – began to criticize the case. DTP Vice-President Selahattin Demirtas, in emphasizing that his party had supported the Ergenekon investigation in hopes of disclosing the unsolved murders in southeastern Turkey, proclaimed the party’s disappointment with the shift in focus of recent operations from unsolved murders and disappearances to the AKP’s own political opponents:

All of these people are the organizers or leaders of the republican rallies. The AKP directed the operations against its own opponents. With the last wave, this is clearer. Except for one or two symbolic arrests, they have done nothing for the unsolved murders in the southeast. All of opponents of the AKP, however, are investigated (Radikal, 2009, Apr. 14).

All of these actions made many people see the operations as a political purge mechanism. According to Gareth Jenkins “the main criterion for detention” was “an outspoken antipathy to the AKP” (2008, Oct. 3). According to Prof. Hakan Yavuz, “Islamic groups” used “abstracts charges” to “criminalize secular opposition”. For many, despite their mind-boggling length, the indictments lack specificity as to which suspects are charged with what crimes (Rubin, August 8, 2008). Almost three quarters of the indictments were composed of “a mixture of fact, unsubstantiated hearsay, disinformation, and contradiction” garnered from phone conversations, electoral surveillance transcripts, and testimonies of 20 secret witnesses (Jenkins 2009, p. 11; Also see: Park, 2008, Nov 2; Unver, 2009). According to legal experts, much of this evidence, collected through means illegal under Turkish Law, should not be presented in court (Unver, 2009). The inclusion of transcripts of tapped “private” telephone conversations completely

374 The report mentioned Gendarmerie intelligence, JITEM, in the following way: “JITEM was founded by the Staff President of the Gendarmerie General Command, Hulisi Sayin, during the period of 1981-1985 to manage the private task forces….It was packed with native speakers of the region and gradually grew stronger. However, it could never become as strong as MIT or military intelligence. There was no need for that anyways….The armed conflict created by the PKK during the 1980s gave rise to the establishment of Gendarmerie intelligence. Therefore, JITEM was developed contingent on the southeastern problem. The PKK confessors and local components who were employed in JITEM, however, eventually gained independence, and they themselves became the source of problem” Savas, Susurluk Report, pp.101-102. Translation is mine.
unrelated with the case signals the use of the case as an instrument of intimidation. Human Rights Association (IHD) President Husnu Ondul remarked that “without any evidence, the prosecutor calls someone and asks, ‘What do you think about this?’… Information that was obtained through illegal bugging and details of people’s private lives is being leaked to the press… Thus, we have a ‘parallel trial’”. (Bia News Centre, 2009, Mar. 20)

The secret witnesses also raised suspicions among the legal experts. According to Riza Turmen, a former Turkish judge at the ECHR, the proceedings in the case are indeed far from measuring up to the criteria set by the ECHR, and that there is consequently a strong case to be made for it to be declared a mistrial. Turmen, points out the fact that several of the suspects have been held in detention for a long period of time without any charges being brought against them, that wire-tapping has been indiscriminate and used without due consideration to the right of privacy of citizens, that the records of the wire-tapping have been disseminated in the media, and that the prosecution relies heavily on secret witnesses. In Turmen’s view, this adds up to making the Ergenekon trial a strong candidate for a declaration of mistrial by the European Court of Human Rights (Milliyet, January 30, 2009; Karaveli, October 24, 2008).

To conclude, concerns remain over the handling of these investigations and judicial proceedings. As the EU progress report states “the time lag between the arrests and presentation of indictments, the restricted access by the defence to evidence put forward by the prosecution and the secrecy of investigation orders fuelled concerns about effective judicial guarantees for all suspects” (2011, p.6, also see EU Progress Report, 2012, p. 7). The section below examines the military behavior in this tense period discussing its implications for the military’s subordination to civilian authorities.

8.2 Military Behavior during the Ergenekon Investigation

The Turkish Armed Forces is not a criminal organization.
Yasar Buyukanit, Chief of the Turkish General Staff,

Although political elites and members of civil society organizations increasingly commented on the way the Ergenekon investigation and trials were carried out, the military’s disengagement from politics continued during this period under the leadership of Ilker Basbug, who replaced Gen. Buyukanit on 31 August 2008. Gen. Basbug ascended to the top of military High Command when the TAF was already in an unfavourable position, as allegations had already put the TAF under unusual pressure. Since the Semdinli incident in late 2005, stories involving the Turkish military appeared regularly in the media, increasing public scrutiny of the
The tug of war between the military and Islamists began to escalate just a few weeks prior to the 2007 presidential election crisis, when a weekly magazine published extracts from what it claimed were diaries written by former Commander of the Turkish Navy Admiral Ozden Ornek (Nokta March 29-April 4, 2007). Excerpts from the diaries revealed the deep division within the armed forces, and according to Nokta and pro-government media, exposed “coup” plans. The diary included unsuccessful attempts by some former commanders led by Sener Eruygur to persuade other members of the Turkish High Command to engage in an action plan with the goal of eventually toppling the AKP government in 2004. The plan, which was code-named “Blonde Girl”, detailed a strategy of civil unrest in the hope of eventually toppling the AKP government in 2004. Under the plan, the generals hoped to win over the press to their side, then the university rectors, encouraging them to “pour their students out into street”, and then push labor unions and other civil society organizations “against the government”. The aim apparently was to manufacture an atmosphere of crisis, which would result in the collapse of the AKP government, possibly in 2004. The most explicit note of the diary concerning the alleged “coup” plan is dated December 6, 2003:

Upon the invitation of Gendarmerie Forces Commander General Sener Eruygur, we went to the social facilities of the gendarmerie....We decided to form an action plan on our own. We were first going to take control of the media, so I was going to invite M.O. for that purpose. We were going to keep in contact with rectors and arrange for students to engage in demonstrations. We intended to work with unions and have posters hung in the streets. We were going to contact associations and incite them against the government. We were to do all of this across the country, and it would have been known as Blonde Girl (Sarikiz).

The diaries also suggests that after failing to secure enough support for “Blonde Girl” within the TAF High Command, the then Gendarmerie Commander, Sener Eruygur, came up with a coup plan of his own, codenamed “Moonlight”. Ultimately, these plans failed, mostly because all other commanders but Sener Eruygur defected. What discouraged the generals were the opposition of moderates led by the chief of TGS Hilmi Ozkok, economic and social costs of a coup, and the attitude of the USA. In his diary on February 3, 2004, Ozden Ornek wrote why he was against a direct military intervention:

For a revolution to occur the soil should be ripe, in other words, the public should want a revolution. Like September 12, the headlines like ‘why does the army stand without doing anything’ ‘when will it intervene’ should come up in the press. Secondly, we are experiencing some characteristics that do not exist in the previous interventions. Our
economy is broken down and completely dependent on foreign sources. If we cannot obtain foreign credits our economy could collapse and our nation could be suffered. We are not ready to bear this responsibility. Another issue is the US. While US supported the previous interventions, now she is siding with AKP. It is very difficult to intervene or sustain a government without US support. Another issue is the internal unity of the TAF. If there is a fraction, then the outcome would be a disaster.

Although Ornek subsequently denied being the author of the diaries, neither the media nor the public was convinced. As influential journalist Mehmet Ali Birand suggested, despite Ornek’s denials “the public believes that a coup was planned during years 2002-2003… which had been called off either because Hilmi Ozkok, the chief of TGS of that time, did not approve it or due to lack of support among commanders of various sources”.

This increasing public scrutiny and the military’s resultant image crisis reached a peak when hundreds of military officers, including four-star generals, were arrested as a part of the Ergenekon investigation. With the operation conducted on July 1, 2008 retired commander of Gendarmerie forces, Sener Eruygur, and retired Commander of the first army, Hursit Tolon, for the first time senior military officers in the Turkish history had been arrested. When initial rumors emerged that some of the commanders under Hilmi Ozkok’s leadership were allegedly involved in coup preparations, ex-Chief of General Staff Ozkok and ex-Deputy Chief Buyukanit announced publicly that, if asked by the courts, they would be willing to testify in relation to allegations of coup plans. Shortly after this, on April 27, 2009 the Ergenekon prosecutor called upon Ozkok to testify regarding the coup attempt files. In his testimony, which constituted one of the most important parts of the third indictment, Ozkok told the prosecutors that he had heard about the action plans titled “Blonde Girl” and “Moonlight” in 2004, but could not take action, as there was no strong evidence. He also stated that after hearing about the action plans, he had questioned the Gendarmerie Force Commander General Sener Eruygur and warned him about possible misinterpretation of his habit of frequently inviting journalists and academics to the Gendarmerie command headquarters. General Ozkok, however, declared that he had never heard of the following allegations claimed by the prosecutor: an organization called Ergenekon; the third coup plan called “Glove”; “the Republican Work Group”, which the prosecution claimed

377 Bia News Center, 2009, Mar. 18.
378 Milliyet, 2009, Apr. 27.
379 Hilmi ozkok'ten 'ayışığı' ifadesi [Hilmi Ozkok’s testify about ‘moonlight’], Hurriyet, 2009, July 28.
had been formed in the Gendarmerie General Command to mastermind and oversee how the plans were being implemented; the proposal by the force commanders for issuing memoranda against the government; and the briefing given to the university rectors at the Gendarmerie General Command.

When Basbug began his term a month later in August 2008, the Turkish Armed Forces had thus already begun to lose its prestige in society. Although Basbug endeavored to convince the public that the Turkish military was committed to democracy and respectful of the rule of law, the domestic mobilization against targeting the TAF further pulled the General Staff into the center of controversy against its will and have forced it to retreat to a defensive position. On 3 October 2008, 17 soldiers were killed in a PKK attack on the Aktutun military outpost. Just two days after the attacks, the headline of neo-liberal/anti-militarist *Taraf* was “this time the Chief of Staff should must pay” suggesting that military command either by intention or negligence had allowed such a result to happen.\(^\text{380}\) The next day, the radical Islamist newspaper *Vakit* published a photo of Air Force Commander Aydogan Babaoglu playing golf the day after the bloody attack, seemingly oblivious to what had happened.\(^\text{381}\) Even the most military-friendly centrist media stepped up its criticism after this incident, calling on Babaoglu to resign.\(^\text{382}\)

This was an unprecedented development in Turkish political history: for the first time the TAF was being criticized, with all media organizations and opposition parties united in their questioning of its mistakes against the PKK.\(^\text{383}\) Although General Babaoglu did not resign, the General Staff felt obliged to issue a public declaration explaining that Babaoglu was not, in fact, aware of the attack at the time of the photo. A few days later, *Taraf* published a leaked military intelligence report and aerial images taken by an unmanned military aircraft that seemed to show PKK guerrillas preparing for their raid. Based on these images, the paper claimed the military had prior information of the PKK attack and re-raised the question of whether the deaths of the 17 soldiers were due to negligence (*Taraf*, 2008, Oct. 14-19).

The Office of the Chief of General Staff immediately ordered an investigation into the

Aktutun attack,\textsuperscript{384} and Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug released a statement on October 15 criticizing the actions of those whose words had “crossed the limits” and encouraging “everyone to be careful and to be on the right side.”\textsuperscript{385} *Taraf* responded using a direct and informal tone normally used for children or subordinates in its headline “Stop the threats and give an explanation.”\textsuperscript{386} A few weeks later, Commander of the Second Army Isik Kosaner announced there was no military neglect in the Aktutun assault, and rejected the accuracy of the pictures. The unmanned aerial vehicle, he stated, was in northern Iraq at the time of the attack; it was directed to the Aktutun region to deliver images of the scene only upon hearing of the attack.\textsuperscript{387}

On 12 June 2009 *Taraf* published another unclassified document putting the General Staff in an even more difficult situation. The four-page unclassified document entitled “Action Plan against Reactionarism (*Irtica*)” was supposedly prepared in April 2009 at the headquarters of the General Staff by Colonel Dursun Cicek of the Operations Command 3rd Support Unit, which replaced the Psychological Warfare Department some time ago. If the document was authentic, then a plot against Gulen and the AKP was actually tailored in the very centre of the General Staff. The document supposedly advocated a conspiracy against the Gulen movement and the AKP, and was apparently found during the police search of the office of the lawyer representing retired Colonel Levent Goktas, who was arrested as part of the Poyrazkoy investigation.\textsuperscript{388}

The day the news report hit the headlines, the General Staff announced that it had launched an investigation into all aspects of the affair, concerning both the existence of the document and how it ended up in the office of a former lieutenant who is now under arrest in the Ergenekon investigation. Three days later, on June 15, 2009, the General Staff issued another statement. The statement declared that, since they considered the news report serious, the Office of the Chief of General Staff ordered an investigation from the general staff prosecutor “without losing any time” and underlined that if the authenticity of the document was proven by the

\textsuperscript{384} Basbug claimed in the press conference that the “Turkish Armed Forces have full self-confidence” and "An investigation has started and like any institution which has self-confidence we will make the results of that probe public”. He also added that “those who present the actions of the separatist terrorist organization as successful acts are responsible for the blood that has been shed and will be shed. The systematic attacks that have increased in recent days would do nothing but increase the strength, determination and will of the Turkish Armed Forces". *Radikal Daily*, October 15, 2008.
\textsuperscript{385} “Org. Basbug’dan Sert Açıklama” [“A Harsh Declaration from General Basbug”], *Hurriyet*, October 15, 2008
\textsuperscript{386} “Tehdidi bırak, hesap ver” [“Stop Threatening and Give an Account”], *Taraf*, October 16, 2008.
\textsuperscript{387} Bia News Center, 2008, Oct. 27.
\textsuperscript{388} AKP ve Gulen’I Bitirme Plani [Plan to destroy AKP and Gulen], *Taraf*, June, 12, 2009.
military prosecutor, the perpetrators would be held accountable and penalized by the military justice. The statement also reiterated the TAF’s commitment to the principles of the rule of law and democracy and declared openly that it would not shelter personnel engaged in anti-democratic and illegal actions within its ranks. The statement also criticized "the written and verbal comments and declarations targeting the Turkish Armed Forces, both openly and implicitly, on the assumption that the allegations are true." It called on everyone to refrain from reaching any premature conclusions on the allegations before the legal inquiry had reached its judgment.389

After immediately launching an investigation into all aspects of the affair, the General Staff issued a statement urging all parties to refrain from reaching premature conclusions on the allegations before the prosecutor of the General Staff finished its investigation.390 The statement underlined the TAF’s commitment to the principles of the rule of law and democracy and claimed that “the General Staff would not shelter personnel engaged in anti-democratic activities, and if the authenticity of the document was proven by the military prosecutor, the perpetrators would be held accountable and penalized by the military justice”.391 A few days later, Basbug rejected allegations that he had issued the order for the preparation of such an action plan, declaring that he considered even such a question to be an insult (Hurriyet, June 17, 2009).

On 24 June 2009 the military prosecutor's office declared that its comprehensive investigation found no proof, no information, documents, commands, or evidence showing that the document in question was prepared at the Office of the General Staff. As only the photocopy existed, the document’s signature allegedly belonging to Navy Colonel Dursun Cicek, could not be tested.392 The military prosecutor, therefore, ruled that there was no cause for the prosecution of Cicek, as there was no evidence proving that he had prepared the plan at headquarters.

391 Ibid.
392 Bia News Center, June 24, 2009. They had examined 14 computers, including two used by the colonel (who was said to have signed the document), the colonel's cell phone and house; the prosecutor’s office declared that calligraphic examination of his signature on the photocopied version of the document was conducted by experts from the Gendarmerie, the Forensic Medicine Institution, and the Scientific Research Council (Tubitak). They could not, however, reach a conclusion, as the paper was a photocopy. On the basis of this evidence, the military prosecutor’s office concluded that the document had not been prepared at the General Staff headquarters and sent the dossier to the civil prosecutors to investigate who had produced this document and if the Turkish Armed Forces were being targeted on purpose.
Chief of TGS Basbug’s widely criticized press conference came two days after military court’s ruling and a day after Erdogan’s statements showing his dissatisfaction over the ruling. Basbug in the presence of 36 generals and admirals told "Turkey, for almost two weeks, has lost unnecessary energy over a document, which was not much more than mere piece of paper". Basbug also declared that the document was prepared as part of an asymmetrical psychological war and applied via the partisan media in order to tarnish the TAF.\textsuperscript{393} Emphasizing that the decision of the military prosecutor was not a final one and that the investigation could be reopened if new evidence is found, Basbug said that the investigation would stay in the hands of the military prosecutor unless a civilian dimension of the plan was found. PM Erdogan immediately responded Basbug’s remarks by underlining that "the process from now on belongs to the civilian prosecutor".\textsuperscript{394}

Erdogan’s intervention escalated debate over the military court system, and at 1:30 AM that night on June 27 2009, the parliament passed a surprise legislation. With last minute proposals by AKP deputies, an amendment was made to the Code on Criminal Procedure (CMK) with an aim to paving the way for the trial of military personnel in civil courts for attempts to topple the government, threats to national security, constitutional violations and organized crime.\textsuperscript{395} Opposition parties insisted in the following morning that such an amendment proposal was not included in the original draft legislation that was presented to the opposition parties before the parliamentary voting. They have also argued that the concerned amendment was in conflict with the Article 145 of the constitution, which clearly authorizes the military courts “to try military personnel for military offences, for offences committed by them against other military personnel or in military places, or for offences connected with military service and duties.”\textsuperscript{396}

The opposition parties accused the AKP of passing the legislation in a last minute operation in a manipulative move and objected it on the grounds of its technical and procedural

\textsuperscript{395} "Asker sivil mahkemede yargılanacak" [Military would be prosecuted under civilian courts], Cumhuriyet, June 27 2009.
\textsuperscript{396} The original reform package included only the amendment on Article 3 of code of criminal procedures, which transfers the power to prosecute civilians for offences outlined in the military penal code to civil courts. It did not include an amendment on the clause (a) of Article 250 of the Code on Criminal Procedures, which allows military personnel to be tried in civilian courts on certain occasions. See: “Last minute legislation sparks controversy”, Hurriyet daily news, June 28, 2009.
flawlessness and unconstitutionality. They also mentioned that the legislation for prosecuting the top military command lacked any safeguards, as a civil prosecutor could investigate the Chief of the General Staff without obtaining permission from a higher authority, although civil courts cannot launch an investigation against any other bureaucrat without receiving permission from a higher authority within the bureaucratic hierarchy. The leader of main opposition party, Deniz Baykal, characterizing the AKP's method of passing the legislation as a "midnight coup" declared that they would take the amendment to the constitutional court if President Gul approved it, since the legislation conflicted with Article 145 of the constitution. While, the Parliament Speaker, Koksal Toptan, as well as members of MHP also declared that they were not informed about the legislation, the secular media, bar associations and other CSOs applied intense pressure on President Gül to veto the bill for its unconstitutionality.

The Turkish military retained its non-interventionist and non-assertive stance throughout this process. The General Staff did not make any public declaration on the matter. The declaration of the NSC followed a critical eight-hour meeting on June 30 did not mention the alleged action plan or the controversial midnight legislation. It only contained a brief statement emphasizing the importance of refraining from statements and publications aimed at weakening Turkish institutions. This statement was interpreted as a reflection of the concerns of the General Staff, which perceives that the Turkish Armed Forces has become the target of a "growing and organized smear campaign". Nevertheless, the general staff found an opportunity to express its concerns on the legislation when the President formally requested the view of the relevant institutions regarding the legislation, including the General Staff and Ministry of Justice. On July 2, 2009, the legal advisory office of the General Staff and the representatives of the Ministry of National Defense submitted the armed forces’ formal view regarding the legislation to the Presidency’s legal department. The report prepared by legal advisory of General staff, objected to the legislation on four grounds:

1- The legislation conflicts with Article 145 of the Constitution regulating the functioning of the military judiciary. This article of the Constitution clearly states that the

397 Haberturk , June 30, 2009.
399 Timing can cause debate on legislation curbing authority of military courts, hurriyet daily news, june 3, 2009. However, it is important to underline that, despite their objection to the legislation, none of the political parties or CSOs was in favor of continuing the current judicial system, in which the military courts had broad jurisdiction. On the contrary, both the members of CHP and MHP emphasized that they were in favor of restricting military jurisdiction and changing the military court system.
military courts are obliged to deal with all of the crimes committed by military personnel in military zones.  

2- The amendment would infringe on the inviolability of military affairs, harm the immunity of the military zones, and have a negative impact on the chain of command of the Turkish Armed Forces and thereby politicize the army.

3- Legislation would cause a serious authority conflict between the military and civilian judiciary if the legislation were put into force.  

4- The representatives of the army also mentioned their unease with the legislative procedure. They underlined that the amendment was made by a motion presented to the Parliament after the representatives of the Ministry of National Defense had left at 23:00 PM, since the legislation concerning the military had formally finished at that time and no other legislation concerning the military was anticipated.

Despite urging from both the headquarters of the General Staff and the opposition leaders, on July 8, 2009, President Abdullah Gul approved the amendment, which went into effect immediately. The EU conditionality has once again played the role of “legitimiser” during this process. President Gül based the legal ground of its decision on Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. In the revised Accession Partnership Document of 2008, the EU had asked Turkey to limit the jurisdiction of military courts to military duties of military personnel as a short-term priority (p.7). The government and the President strategically used the EU conditionality in order to legitimize the controversal legislation, which clearly conflicts with the constitution. The government sent the president a 47-page report pointing out the criticisms directed at military tribunals by the EU and European Court of Human Rights to convince the President to approve the bill. Similarly, President Gul, in his statement concerning the legislation, stressed that the law was in line with the requirements for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union.

Although this decision was severely criticized by the main opposition parties, the military

400 To reiterate article 145 of the constitutions states that “Military justice shall be exercised by military courts and military disciplinary courts. These courts shall have jurisdiction to try military personnel for military offences, for offences committed by them against other military personnel or in military places, or for offences connected with military service and duties. Military courts also have jurisdiction to try non-military persons for military offences specified in the special law; and for offences committed while performing their duties specified by law, or against military personnel on military places specified by law”.


402 Ibid.

403 Turkish president approves military trial law, but urges more steps, Hurriyet Daily News, July 9, 2009. Also see: Milliyet, July 9, 2009.


405 Today’s Zaman, June 9, 2009.
kept its silence. The MHP argued that instead of asking the government to make additional amendments to the bill, the president should have sent the legislation back to parliament for deliberation. The spokesperson of the CHP, Mustafa Ozyurek, stated that President Gül had missed his chance to be "Turkey's president, and instead he chose to be the AKP’s president". Five days after the bill was approved, on July 13 2009, the CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for its annulment for unconstitutionality.

While the bill was waiting in front of the Constitutional Court, on November 4, 2009, an anonymous military officer sent the original copy of the “action plan against reactionarism” with Colonel Cicek’s *wet signature* to the Ergenekon prosecutors bringing back the issue and putting it high on the agenda. Following this, the General Staff's Military Prosecutor's Office reopened the investigation and requested the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s office to allow it to conduct a series of chemical tests on the document in order to check whether or not the fingerprints on the document actually matched those of a colonel. The civilian court, however, turned down this request on 16 March 2010 arguing that such tests would damage the document. Dursun Cicek has been in jail as part of Ergenekon operation since April 30, 2010.

The public image of the TAF was further tarnished when pro-Gulenist, pro-governmental media, which controls substantial part of Turkish media, including state broadcasting, carried military scandals or allegations with sensational coverage. Chief of General Staff, Ilker Basbug, has found himself issuing public declarations more than he anticipated. While media and public discussions have continued regarding the alleged Action Plan to Fight Reactionarism and whether Colonel Dursun Çiçek had signed the document or not, the November 19, 2009 edition of Taraf, for instance, published the news that prosecutors had found the Cage (Kafes) Coup Plan, allegedly prepared by the Naval Forces on March 2009. Taraf reported that the documents were found from those Ergenekon suspects associated with the ammunition found in the Poyrazkoy district of İstanbul in April 2009. These revelations have put the Chief of TGS, Ilker Basbug even in a more difficult position. This was because, in a press conference following the Poyrazkoy discovery, Chief of General Staff Basbug had declared that on April 29, 2009 that “to date, there has not been a single ‘weapon’ unearthed in Poyrazkoy or any other place that

407 The leader of the main opposition party and the military prosecutors insisted that the only way to authenticate the document was through conducting a series of additional tests ranging from determining the age of the ink and paper to fingerprint tests (*Today’s Zaman*, Online, March 18, 2010).
belongs to the TAF”. Taraf’s revelations not only disputed Basbug’s argument but also publicize the ‘cage plan’ which alleged that the junta in the Naval Forces wanted to destabilize the country and discredit the AKP in the eyes of the international community by killing members of non-Muslim minorities.

A month after Taraf’s publication of Cage plan, on December 17, 2009, the chief of TGS, Ilker Basbug organized another highly criticized press conference on board with the presence of all four star generals and admirals at the Oruç Reis Frigate in Trabzon and stressed that the armed forces was “disturbed” with the growing “asymmetrical psychological operation” against the TAF. Basbug underlined that particular media outlets had been attempting to make these connections:

The fundamental reason for the existence of one segment of the media is to keep the Turkish Armed Forces on the agenda everyday in an unfair way through prejudiced criticisms. Those criticisms have a special aim, are not based on truths, and are part of an anti-campaign against the TAF. These media outlets also present themselves as the defenders of democracy. For them, it seems, the only way to defend democracy is to be against the TAF. The TAF always says it takes sides with democracy and rule of law.

Gen, Basbug called on judicial authorities to be more sensitive and careful with anonymous letters and especially with the testimonies of confessors or secret witnesses. Basbug reiterated that the TAF always took the side of democracy and rule of law and that if there were any mistakes made by individual officers, they would be investigated and penalized within the

408 None of the 45 ‘handguns’ confiscated in Poyrazkoy were registered to the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces”. General Basbug underlined, however, that determining the origin of ammunition like L.A.W. and hand grenades was more complicated than weapons, as these only had a lot number printed on them, rather than a serial number and that the ammunition produced by Turkey's Machinery and Chemistry Institute (MKE) were allocated not only to the Turkish Armed Forces, but also to Turkey's Police Department. Basbug said that in 1988, 3300 hand grenades had been produced by the MKE, of which 3000 were allocated to the Police Department and only 300 to the Turkish Armed Forces. More strangely, five of the L.A.W.s buried in Poyrazkoy had already been detonated. This was strange, as neither L.A.W.s nor any other ammunition could be reused. Furthermore, not only was the volume of arms unsubstantial for a terror organization that had allegedly committed and planned to commit numerous plots, but also many of the small number of weapons that would have been genuinely useful—such as assault rifles—had been buried in damp soil wrapped only in newspaper. Basbug, therefore, underlined that the armed forces was also waiting for answers to these questions from intelligence, the police, and the judiciary. Neither the police department account about their inventory nor the judicial authorities asked for answers to these questions.

410 Başıbüş: Mesnetsiz suçlamalara sessiz kalmayacağız[ Basbug: We will not remain silent against unfounded allegations], Radikal, 2009, Dec. 17.
framework of the military judicial system.

Two days later than Basbug’s widely-criticizes press conference, another anonymous call resulted in the detainment of two officers from the Special Forces Command, which is directly subordinated to the office of TGS, near Bulent Arinc’s house under suspicion of planning to assassinate him. In the investigation of the suspects’ vehicle, house, and computers, police found no element of crime and released the officers the next day. Despite a statement released by the Office of the Chief of General Staff declaring that the two officers were collecting intelligence on another military officer suspected of leaking confidential information, the investigation continued and resulted in the detention of eight additional officers in custody for four days.

The government, by using the assassination allegations as a pretext, sent a civilian judge to the archives of the Mobilization Regional Presidency of the Ankara Special Forces Command, with which the suspects were affiliated. The archives of the Special Forces Command have been referred to as a “cosmic chamber”, which contains “top-secret” military and state documents, and allegedly no civilian had accessed it before. The investigation in the “cosmic chamber” lasted for 26 days, ending on January 20, 2010. The only formal declaration about the investigation came from the legal advisor of the office of the Chief of General Staff, Brigadier General Hifzi Cubuklu, who would be detained a year later as part of Ergenekon investigation. On January 22, 2010, during a press briefing, Cubuklu declared that the investigation had found no evidence of an assassination plot. Underlining that the TAF had confirmed its respect for the rule of law by opening the top-secret archives to the judiciary, Cubuklu declared “according to information written by the civilian judge in the search minutes, the Ankara Special Forces Command (the examined headquarters) has no other activity outside its duty and tasks”.411

8.3 Military behavior during the Sledgehammer Investigation

This incident, which had been sensationalized by the pro-governmental media for five weeks, suddenly lost its salience, when Mehmet Baransu from Taraf published another coup plan titled Balyoz (Sledgehammer) on January 20, 2010. Journalist Mehmet Baransu claimed that an anonymous member of the military had provided him with a suitcase full of documents and voice recordings that were taped at a seminar at the Turkish First Army Headquarters in Istanbul on 5-7 March 2003. Why these documents were given to Taraf instead of the judiciary remains unknown, but Taraf claimed that this 5000-page document and voice recordings detailed
a systematic coup plan called *Balyoz* that was purportedly meant to be staged in 2003, right after the AKP came to power. A series of provocations such as the bombing of mosques and museums, dressing military cadets and conscripts in religious attire, and crashing a Turkish Armed Forces jet would be allegedly staged to form the basis of a coup.

The publication of alleged plot increased the tension between the military and the civilian government arguably to its peak. The Office of the Chief of General Staff issued a public statement on its website declaring that the seminar plan was a war game used for as an educational tool for developing mobilization plans and strategies as part of the General Staff’s operations program for the years of 2003-2006. The public statement issued the next day after the news hit the headlines also explained that the scenario of the game was based on increasing domestic tension triggered by an external threat, and included discussion of the measures to be used in the case of martial law within a zone under the authority of the First Army Command. The TGS rejected claims of a coup plan, saying the documents cited by the paper referred to parts of a military-training seminar rather than a conspiracy.  

Despite the military’s rejection of *Taraf’s* allegations, Prime Minister Erdogan challenged the military and its supporters of having alleged coup plans, asking a crowd in the Southwestern province of Sakarya: “Do you want a coup or democracy? Nothing has been kept hidden any more. All plays and hidden plans are all disclosed… We wonder, what will be revealed next?” Several days later Erdogan seemed convinced of the authenticity of allegations, declaring that his government would not allow the realization of those “dirty plans”, and “dark scenarios”.  

In response Basbug declared in a press briefing that the allegations, which are under currently investigation by the General Staff, were “unconscionable”. As to the claims in the coup plan to organize bomb attacks on mosques in Istanbul, he reacted by saying, “How come a military which gives its soldiers assault by making them shout ‘God God!’ can think of bombing the house of God? It is not fair to accuse military in such a way. I damn the ones who claim these”. Emphasizing that the TAF was “of course, on the side of democracy”, Basbug added that:

> I feel ashamed even to pronounce this word, but I am obliged to… Unfortunately, during the recent period, the coup allegations dominated Turkey’s national agenda. I feel

412 Since the TAF’s institutional website has removed the public declaration made on 21 Jan. 2010, the statement can be found at CNNTurk:
http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/01/21/genelkurmaydan.balyoz.aciklamasi/560356.0/index.html
ashamed of these allegations. As the Turkish Armed Forces, we are extremely disturbed about these allegations. With regards to this matter, the position of the TAF is clear. I already declared this, but I feel the need to reiterate. Since the 1960s, Turkey has experienced several incidents [coup]. However, as the armed forces, we are declaring that these incidents are a matter of past. During this process, everyone has learned his own lesson. Today we are in 2010. From now on, we as the Turkish Armed Forces believe that our country and society needs peace and tranquility. Today, Turkish society, each and every one of our 72 million people, should believe us in this matter. We declare openly that the most important principle in democratic regimes is to change the government through democratic methods. We insist that everyone should sincerely believe our stance.

Basbug declared that the TAF had been under an asymmetric attack for a long time and that this might also be “part of a campaign of psychological warfare designed to undermine public trust in the armed forces”. The TAF, according to Basbug, was disturbed with these allegations and “as a top commander of a very disturbed army”, he had “the right to ask who benefits most from this talk”. Basbug called for a concerted action among state institutions to deal with these operations, as he believed that those who masterminded these operations had a collection of already leaked information, which was presented to the public with distortions when the timing was appropriate.

On 28 January 2010, retired Commander of the First Army and alleged leader of the Sledgehammer coup, Cetin Dogan claimed that the workshop he organized was an ordinary war-game exercise carried out to test the military’s preparedness in the face of a worst possible scenario. General Dogan admitted that the voice on the recordings from the three-day war simulation released by Taraf was his and that it was actually recorded under Dogan’s orders at the time. He argued, however, that the scenario was not titled “Sledgehammer” but “Sovereign”, and did not include a coup plan and or other provocations as claimed by Taraf. Chief of

415 Ibid.
416 Basbug said that the TGS had shared its thoughts and suggestions on the issue with both Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, as the struggle against such attacks could not be prevented solely through the military’s own efforts. Basbug informed the media that 61 cases had been launched concerning the leakage of the Balyoz documents, with nine people being taken to military courts and one being convicted to three years. Hurriyet Daily News, 2010, Jan. 25.
417 Cetin Dogan explained this to journalist Fikret Bila (Milliyet Daily, January 28, 2010) as follows: “In the scenario, a state of war is presumed and most of our troops are dispatched for the war. In this case, in Istanbul we are left with two regiments located on opposite sides of Istanbul to ensure public order and to control a hypothetical internal insurrection. Under this scenario, we were discussing what we could do with two regiments, which only

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General Staff at the time the voice recordings were made Hilmi Özkok confirmed to journalist Fikret Bila from Milliyet that he had approved the seminar:

Seminars, operation plans and war games are routine practices that are conducted every year. These practices are conducted for evaluation of the existing plans and to determine their defectiveness… These seminars are planned in advance; in other words, these are routine institutional activities. As claimed, matters such as bombing mosques or crashing our own planes do not take place in such war scenarios. None of the members of the TAF would write such a scenario. I personally do not believe the scenario that was published in the Taraf newspaper ever existed (2010, Feb. 2).

On 22 February 2010, 49 high-ranking retired and active duty members of the military forces including Cetin Dogan were arrested.\textsuperscript{418} The impact of the Sledgehammer investigation on the Turkish Armed Forces was so strong that Basbug abruptly called off a planned trip to Egypt and conducted an all-night meeting with all the four-star generals and admirals in order to “evaluate the serious situation that has the investigation being handled by the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s office”.\textsuperscript{419}

On February 25, at the suggestion of President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan and Chief of General Staff Basbug met with the President to discuss the issue. The only public statement made by the Office of the Presidency declared “during the meeting, the issues that are being discussed by the public were handled in depth. Our citizens should be confident that these issues will be solved within the constitutional order and within the framework of our laws, and in this process, everyone should act responsibly in order to not tarnish our institutions”.\textsuperscript{420}

On February 26, 2010, the military prosecutor’s office responded to the stories that had appeared in the media, claiming that a report by the military prosecutor’s office had reached an affirmative conclusion on the authenticity of the Sledgehammer Plan documents. The military prosecutor’s office refuted this by declaring “The investigations and research to date have yielded no confirmation on the part of the military prosecutor’s office that the said coup plan and

have limited power. According to the scenario, we demanded martial law, but the civilian government rejected this. Considering that rejection of martial law by the civilian government is a possibility, we reached the conclusion to increase the number of troops in the First Army”.

\textsuperscript{418} The retired commander of the first army, Cetin Dogan, like many others, such as former Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu, the founder of the CYDD Turkan Saylan, learned from the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) that the police would search their houses. See: Kanli, Y. (2010, Feb. 22) Hürriyet Daily News

\textsuperscript{419} Hurriyet Daily News, 2010, Feb. 22.

the action plans that support it are authentic. Therefore, it is not possible to state that the seminar activities constitute a coup plan.”

Even after these claims were publicly refuted, the pro-government media, including even the state channel, continued to follow a biased reporting line. Pro-government Sabah’s heading on February 26, 2010 -on the very same day the military prosecutor office denied the allegations that the documents have indeed show a coup plan-, for instance, was: “Office of military prosecutor: Sledgehammer is not a seminar, it is a coup plan”.422 Taraf, the newspaper that broke the Sledgehammer story, and the Gulen movement’s media flagship, Zaman, reported at various times that the infamous Sledgehammer CDs carried authenticated fingerprints, that civilian staff admitted preparing the coup documents, that military prosecutors certified the coup plans as genuine—all of which were later publicly refuted.423 On April 21, 2010, for instance, Today’s Zaman presented a highly distorted view:

Those coup plans have been proven by various investigations and former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Ozkok himself admitted that the generals who are now detained were in fact involved in such planning. Furthermore, former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanıt admitted in a TV interview that he is one of the victims of the Ergenekon criminal network….Expert witnesses who are members of the military still on active duty, in their reports for an investigation conducted by a military court, reported that the Sledgehammer coup plan documents indicate it was in fact an actual coup plan.

These distorted, one-sided or sensational news reports forced the General Staff to make public declarations more often than it desired. This, however, created a vicious cycle. As much as the General staff has tried to account for the news and developments that occurred concerning the military, it has more exposed the domestic and international criticisms. The EU in its 2009 Progress Report, particularly criticized Basbug’s April press statement responding the

423 Taraf claimed, for example, on March 15, 2010 that the 11-page document, the only hard evidence linking Cetin Dogan with the coup plans, carried the signature of Cetin Dogan (Taraf, January 20, 2010; March 15, 2010). Prof. Dani Rodrik and Prof. Pinar Dogan of Harvard University (Cetin Dogan’s son-in-law and daughter), declared later, however, that the document was neither signed nor independently authenticated.
widespread allegations:

The armed forces have continued to exercise undue political influence via formal and informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed on a large number of occasions their views on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond their remit…. On a number of occasions, the General Staff reacted publicly to politicians and media reports. During a press briefing in April, the Chief of General Staff made comments on the Ergenekon case and on the indictment, thus putting the judiciary under pressure. Some senior members of the armed forces lent support to military personnel standing trial (p.10).

In its 2010 progress report, the EU observed that “there is a decrease in the number of incidents where the armed forces exerted formal and informal influence on political issues beyond their remit” (p.11). The EU nonetheless, stated that “ on some occasions, the Chief of General Staff made comments about ongoing court cases and investigations” (Ibid).

After Ilker Basbug’s retirement, Isık Kosaner became Chief of TGS on August 27, 2010. Chief of TGS Kosaner did not make any statements about the policies of the government during his term of office. However, he showed his disapproval with the mass detention of active-duty military officers by resigning together with the force commanders on the eve of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of August 2011. The resignation of the military high command on 29 July 2011 in protest over the sweeping arrests of hundreds of military officers pending trial serve as proof of the system transformation which has taken place in Turkey over the past decade.

The resignation of chief of TGS and force commanders came just hours after the Ergenekon court issued an arrest warrant against 22 more military officers charged with carrying out an internet campaign to undermine the government.424 In his resignation letter to his “brothers-in-arms”, Kosaner complained about the investigations and their treatment by the media, which he believed depicted the Turkish army as a criminal organization. More importantly, Kosaner argued that the arrested high-ranking generals who were set to be promoted were “preemptively punished by not being considered at SMC”, despite the fact that no final verdict had been reached in their cases.425 General Kosaner declared that:

Currently, 173 active and 77 retired – a total of 250 – generals/admirals, officers, non-commissioned officers and special sergeants are behind bars in contravention of the values of justice and the universal principles of law… It is evident that one of the objectives of these investigations and long-detention periods is to keep the TAF

424 The suspects included Gen. Huseyin Nusret Tasdeler, the commander of the Aegean Army, who also served as Erdoğan’s military advisor in 2007-2008, and General Staff adviser on legal affairs Hifzi Cubuklu.
consistently on the agenda, to create an image that TAF is a crime organization… It is clear that the media in seizing on this opportunity tried to induce the noble Turkish nation to take a position against its own armed forces through all kinds of false reports, defamations, and allegations concerning the TAF. The fact that this situation could not be averted and that initiatives are disregarded by the concerned authorities prevents me, as the Chief of General Staff to fulfill my responsibility of protecting my personnel’s rights and law. These [developments] took away the opportunity for me to continue to serve in this high post.\textsuperscript{426}

Despite the unprecedented nature of this joint resignation in Turkey’s history, the officers’ departure from office elicited minimal reaction from the media, the general public, and the government; their story lost its headline status in newspapers within a few days. President Gul and government representatives downplayed the ramifications of this crisis. For them, this development was only a healthy sign of the normalization of Turkish politics, implying that the military was coming under the control of civilian government. Gul told reporters the day after the resignation "No one should see this as a crisis in Turkey… The developments were extraordinary within its scope, but as you see, everything is continuing on its own course. There is no [power] vacuum".\textsuperscript{427}

In stark contrast, the opposition CHP and MHP believed that the empty seats at the helm of the military unequivocally represented a political crisis that was triggered by the AKP’s efforts to undermine the status of the armed forces. Both parties argued that the continuation of coup investigations by the courts without any final verdict shows clearly that the government uses these legal charges to maintain pressure on the military.\textsuperscript{428} MHP leader Devlet Bahceli said that "recent efforts aimed at redesigning the Turkish military".\textsuperscript{429} CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, in highlighting the importance of civil authority over the military, added that no question should remain unanswered: “Resigning is not a method used often; it indicates an extraordinary period, and we must know the circumstances of this extraordinary period… We respect their democratic reaction. We would, however, like to know the reason behind it. What happened behind closed doors must be brought to light”.\textsuperscript{430} According to Kilicdaroglu, the developments leading to the resignation of the military High Command highlighted the fact “the

\textsuperscript{426} Milliyet, July 29, 2012.
\textsuperscript{427} Turkish government calls resignations 'normalization,' opposition deems them 'a crisis', Hurriyet Daily News, June 31, 2011.
\textsuperscript{428} www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 31, 2011.
\textsuperscript{429} Cumhuriyet, July 30, 2011.
\textsuperscript{430} Main opposition wants answers on resignations, Hurriyet Daily News, August 2, 2001.
judiciary is being used by the political authority. Before every SMC, there have been judicial decisions producing results that can be interpreted as direct intervention. This is not a coincidence”. 431

According to the Kurdish nationalist BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), developments following the resignation indicate that “army is now at the state's service”. In her statement about the resignation, BDP co-chair Filiz Kocali declared that “following the resignation of the generals... the Supreme Military Council Meeting has been gathered under the authority of the government, which thus ended the ‘anti-democratic autonomy’ of the army. The Turkish Armed Forces has now entered into the service and control of the Government of the Republic of Turkey and military tutelage has thus come to an end”. 432 Kocali underlined however that the question that now needs to be answered is what kind of a regime will follow:

The dilemma that Turkey is facing nowadays when generals are under inspection is either regression into a militarist-police state on the way of war and the lack of a solution or a turn towards democracy on the way of peace and solution... Democracy and war and the lack of a solution cannot exist side by side... The AKP can no longer forestall anyone with the demagogy that the army is an obstacle in front of the initiatives it will take for peace and solution. The army now means the AKP, which dominates all the institutions of the state, the judiciary, police, intelligence, and the army. The prime minister will either officially announce the policy of war and deadlock, thus declaring a regression into a militarist-police state or a turn to real democracy with the intention of peace and solution in a dialogue with all relevant subjects in the Kurdish issue. 433

Though the departing generals may have intended to show their resentment toward the AKP government by resigning, it seems that through this action the TAF slipped decisively under control of government. According to Henri Barkey, “it’s not a crisis, but it is a watershed event... People will look back and say this was the moment the Turkish military was finally civilianized”. 434 Soli Ozel of Haberturk believes the incident served to delimit the relevance of discussing the military’s influence over Turkish politics: “They have not been able to hold political influence for some time now, so who cares if they resign? Period, end of story”. 435 However, Gareth Jenkins, a military analyst with close contacts to the Turkish military, believes

431 Ibid.
432 Army is now at the state' service, says BDP co-chair (2011, August 1), Can be found at: http://www.infoturk.be/396.htm#Army
433 Ibid.
435 Ibid.
the underlying reason for the resignations – the arrest and detention of military officers – could risk provoking an operational crisis in the military.

One of the most extraordinary things about the media coverage of the past couple of days is that it has not been focusing on the underlying cause of these resignations, but on the effect of them… These arrests have had a devastating effect not only on morale but also on military capability. You’re getting an erosion not of the political influence of the Turkish military – which is already gone – but of their military capability.\(^{436}\)

Bonfield and Engel (2012) seem to concur with Jenkins’s argument about the weakening military capability of Turkey:

Particularly since the failed 2007 E-Coup, the civilian government has used the bifurcated nature of the military to pursue an aggressive strategy of dividing and conquering the military in order to subjugate it to civilian rule. Although civilian controlled militaries are a hallmark of democratic nations, the process of removing the military from politics is increasingly being defined by a number of worrying illiberal practices. Thus, at present, civil-military relations in Turkey are at an important crossroads: attempts to push the military from politics, ostensibly for democratic reasons, risk denigrating the institution to the point of ineffectiveness. Combined with the military’s divided nature, this creates a potential liability for Turkish national security (p. 6, emphasis added).

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the controversial investigations and trial of hundreds of military officers charged with planning coup plots against AKP government. It showed that military’s subordination to the rule of law continued when the hundreds of active-duty and retired military officers, including 68 generals in duty, arrested in waves of operations between mid-2007 to end of 2012. Despite the prevailing controversies over the political independence of judicial proceedings related to the alleged deep-state criminal network Ergenekon and an alleged coup plan Sledgehammer, the chiefs of general staff, Yasar Buyukanit (2006-2008), Ilker Basbug (2008-2010), Isik Kosaner (2010-2011) and Necati Ozel (2011-) put a great effort to refrain themselves from publicly involving the court-cases. The resignation of the military high command in July 2011 in protest over the sweeping arrests of hundreds of military officers pending trial serve as proof of the system transformation which has taken place in Turkey over the past decade.

The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer affairs have acted as a catalyst for greater public recognition of the military’s unjustified political activism and thus played an important role in

\(^{436}\) Ibid.
military’s loss of public trust, credibility and legitimacy. Public opinion polls indicated a fundamental drop in confidence in the military since the Ergenekon trials that began in 2008. According to World Values Survey, while the proportion of respondents who completely or fairly trusted military was 90% in 2008; by 2011 this number had dropped to 75%. This declining trust and legitimacy of Turkish military, in turn, not only created additional social constraints for military behavior but also reinforced the internal change process within the military. The Turkish military, under pressure from above and below, has first increasingly found itself on the defensive. As Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model predicts, once they fail to persuade the public to accept its point of view, chiefs of TGS gave up their habit of giving frequent statements to the press in informal and formal settings particularly in the post-2010 period. When they have to, they started to put more emphasis on norms of democratic control and actually acted in line with these norms suggesting the institutionalization and habitualization phase of norm-socialization as predicted by Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model. As EU progress report 2012 asserts “there was further consolidation of civilian oversight of the security forces, and the General Staff generally abstained from exerting direct or indirect pressure on political issues” (p. 12)

The cost-benefit calculation made by the Chiefs of General Staff has generally pointed in favor of accepting the civilian directives, rather than putting up resistance at the risk of losing their public credibility. The preferences of the civilian governments, therefore, prevailed on issues where military officers traditionally remained skeptic, such as the annulment of the regulations that were adopted during the February 28 process, i.e. the ban on wearing headscarves in universities, the extension of five-year compulsory education to eight years, and the application of a lower coefficient to calculate the university admission examination scores of graduates of imam-hatip (preacher) high schools. The inclusion of religion classes in primary schools and courses of Quran, the life of Prophet Mohammad, and basic religion into the secondary schools, -including military high schools- in 2012 and reorientation of Turkish foreign policy closer to Muslim states, were also proceeded without military contestation. The AKP government challenged the military and eventually redefined Turkey’s position on multiple cases such as Syria, Egypt and Israel. “How the West lost Turkey”,437 “What happens if Turkey leaves

the West”, “Turks’ Eastern turn”, “Turkey: An ally no more”, “A NATO without Turkey”, “NATO’s Islamists”, “Does Turkey Still Belong in NATO”, “An Islamist pivot to the East”, are only a few examples of headings used by Western observers to illustrate the paradigmatic change in Turkish foreign policy under AKP’s leadership particularly since its second term in power (mid-2007).

On the domestic level, as the EU progress report acknowledges, “several symbolic steps have been taken towards further democratization of civil-military relations” (2012, p.13). Victory Day celebrations on August 30, 2011 were hosted by President Gul instead of the chief of General Staff, in a move that defied a long-held military tradition and signaled shifting dynamics in the country toward increased civilian strength. In another symbolic gesture, the military unit that was stationed on the grounds of the parliament was removed in December 2011. The civilians had attempted to have it removed in 2005, but encountering fierce resistance from the military, the proposal was dropped. Upon learning of the proposal back in 2005, the General Staff condemned the AK Party and the bill, calling it an —attempt to banish the Turkish Armed Forces, first from sight and then from the heart of the Turkish nation. In December 2011, the military stayed silent as the unit was removed. Although inconsequential in terms of having a material effect on the military’s political power, the civilian’s ability to see the change through in 2011 is an indicator how their power had increased relative to the military’s. The military leaders are also in a weaker position to shape the civilian directives concerning their professional expertise area. For example, on November 30, 2011, a bill amending the law on military service was passed despite the objections of the departed general staff, Isik Kosaner. This new law enabled men aged 30 and over who have not completed their compulsory military service to

446 Normalization of civil-military relations dominates EU monthly report, Today’s Zaman (2011, Sep. 28).
exempt by paying $16,000. The general staff as well as the opposition parties, for long, objected to the law due to its implications it has for national unity, equality and the pace and structure of military reform. The chief of General Staff, Isik Kosaner, had emphasized in his speeches that there should be a single type of conscription that does not violate the principle of equality and disproportionately advantages one group over another. Another law that Isik Kosaner had objected on similar grounds concerned the exemption of police officers from military service passed in February 2011. Under the new law, police officers who have served at least 10 years in the department, will be exempt from mandatory military service. Although Kosaner and most of the senior generals objected these changes, new chief of TGS refused to comment and complied with political directives. In January 2012, the national security course given by military officers was removed from the secondary school curriculum without military contestation.

Military’s subordination to the rule of law continued when the armed forces’ former chief of staff, Ilker Basbug, was arrested in January 2012 on charges of attempting to overthrow the government and of membership of a terrorist organization. In April 2012, the start of a historic trial against the two surviving members of the 1980 military junta, made possible by amendments to the constitution in September 2010, and the arrests of retired generals implicated in the so-called postmodern coup of February 28, 1997 also proceeded without military contestation.

All of these suggest that changing external conditions and norms of legitimacy forced the TAF to alter its actions to protest its institutional legitimacy and credibility. This change in behavior on the part of the military supports Risse and Sikkink’s thesis (1999) that once a norm-violating actor fails to persuade the public to accept its point of view, the norm-violator understands that it is left with little option but to act in accordance with the norm in question. This marks the beginning of the institutionalization and habituation phase of norm socialization (p.34). If the pressure continues, international norms will be fully institutionalized domestically, and norm compliance becomes a habitual practice of the actors. The Turkish CMR regime, as of late 2012, seems to be at the final stage of socialized-induced democratization. But how do we know whether sustainable democratic control of the armed forces has been achieved in Turkey? To what extent is the democratic control is institutionalized Turkey? To provide answers to these

questions, the following chapter analyzes institutional dimensions of democratic control in Turkey by utilizing Alfred Stepan’s widely used military prerogatives indicators with an alternative measurement system recently designed by Samuel Fitch.
FROM MILITARY TUTELAGE TO DEFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL: TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF TURKEY’S CIVIL MILITARY REGIME

The level of control that a government exerts over its armed forces is a widely acknowledged key measure of democratic consolidation. Linz and Stepan offer a useful three-part definition of a consolidated democracy that sheds light on the importance of democratic control of the military for making democracy “only game in town”. The three attributes of a completed transition are defined by Linz and Stepan as follows: “first, that a government has to be in power as a result of a free and popular vote; second, that this government has authority to generate new policies; and, third, that the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the democracy do not have to share power with other bodies de jure” (1996, p. 207). Clearly an autonomous military – especially one that maintains significant influence on (and support from) the legislature – would place stringent limitations on the successful achievement of the second and third requirements at a minimum. Linz and Stepan (1996) further point out that the question of whether or not that consolidation is complete is neither trivial nor merely academic, as it points to the willingness of the participants in that state to act within the constraints and structures of democracy. Thus, in order to determine the extent to which Turkey has completed its democratic transition, one must include an assessment of how much influence and autonomy the armed forces retain in current institutional framework.

In order to carry out such an assessment, this chapter analyzes the evolution of the Turkish military’s prerogatives since the initiation of Turkey’s Europeanization process. It analyzes the military’s prerogatives under the three headings of political prerogatives, institutional prerogatives and judicial prerogatives. The first section analyzes six of Stepan’s indicators with an aim to evaluate the Turkish military’s political autonomy. This includes the military’s relationship to the chief executive, and its role in the constitution, cabinet, intelligence, police, and state enterprises. The second section analyzes the Turkish military’s institutional prerogatives by assessing the level of institutional autonomy the military wields in its professional area of expertise. This institutional assessment examines the military’s role in the coordination of the defense sector, defense ministry, and military promotions and discipline. This section also outlines the extent of legislative control in Turkey’s defense and security sector. The

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449 Institutional autonomy refers to the military professional independence and exclusivity.
third section analyzes the military’s judicial prerogatives in order to measure the level of the military’s subordination to the rule of law.

Following Stepan, the section ranks military prerogatives in various areas as “low”, “moderate”, and “high/strong”. When a military prerogative is classified as low, it is because both in practice and in law effective control over this prerogative is exercised by the officials and institutions sanctioned by the democratic regime. In cases in which the military has formally denied a prerogative but in practice attempts to exercise control in this area, this prerogative is classified as moderate. For cases in which the military is given both de jure and de facto control over a prerogative, this is classified as a strong prerogative. The final section summarizes the main findings of this part of the study.

9.1 Political Prerogatives (Moderate)

9.1.1 Constitutionally sanctioned independent role for the military in the political system (Low)

Contrary to a widely-held misperception, Turkey’s constitutions – including the 1982 Constitution that is currently in practice – do not proclaim any guardianship or political role for the military. While Article 118 of the current constitution, which established the NSC and its Secretariat General as constitutional organs, indirectly provided the Turkish Armed Forces with a constitutional mechanism of influence over security policy, since 2001 successive governments have curbed the powers of these organs. Today, the NSC and its secretariat are two civilian-dominated advisory institutions that assist the Cabinet in the formulation, determination, and implementation of national security policy.

In July 2013, Article 35 of the TAF’s Internal service law, which is believed to have provided historical legal justification for military coups d’état in the country, is amended. The former article stated “the duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution”. The amendments removed protection of the republic from the responsibilities of the Turkish military and put greater emphasis on protection against external threats. The new article states “the duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers to come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to fulfill the duties abroad with the decision of the Parliament and help maintain
international peace".\textsuperscript{450} Therefore, we can conclude that by the mid-2013 the TAF retains low prerogatives in the political system.

\textbf{9.1.2 Military relationship to the chief executive (Moderate)}

Democratic civil-military relations require a clear division of powers over control of the military. In many democratic countries, the chief executive is de jure and de facto Commander in Chief and is normally responsible for the decision to go to war. In most advanced democratic countries, the constitution provides this specification. In Turkey, the president is also the Commander in Chief, representing the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the parliament. The president has the constitutional authority to appoint the Chief of General Staff as well as force commanders and the members of the Supreme Military Administrative Court.\textsuperscript{451} The president also presides over the NSC, and has the authority to call the NSC to meet when deemed necessary. The authority for declaring war, sending the TAF abroad, and giving permission for foreign armed forces to come to Turkey belongs to the parliament.\textsuperscript{452} The power to declare martial rule or emergency rule in Turkey is vested in the “joint executive power”. In other words, the authority to declare martial law or a state of emergency is shared between the Council of Ministers and the president.\textsuperscript{453} Since the chief of TGS, is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister rather than the Defense Minister, we should, however, consider military’s privileges concerning its relationship with chief executive as moderate.

\textbf{9.1.3 Active duty military participation in the cabinet (Low)}

In contrast to Latin American\textsuperscript{454} and Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and

\textsuperscript{450} Turkish president approves removal of coup article, \textit{Hurriyet Daily News, July} 31, 2013.
\textsuperscript{451} The President is constitutionally authorized to appoint the Chief of the General Staff upon the Council of Ministers’ proposal. According to the TAF Personnel Law no: 926, the appointment of force commanders (army, navy, air), deputy chief of general staff, generals and admirals are made through a decree signed by the Prime Minister and approved by the President, upon a proposal by the Chief of Staff and recommendation by the Defense Minister.
\textsuperscript{452} However, under certain conditions the president can also decide on the use of armed forces. The second clause of Article 92 specify those conditions: “if the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces”.
\textsuperscript{453} According to Article 122 of the constitution, the Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, after consultation with the National Security Council, has the authority to declare martial law in one or more regions or throughout the country. On the other hand, Article 104 also grants authority to the President for proclaiming martial law or imposing state of emergency by decree to be decided by the Council of Ministers meeting under his Chairmanship.
\textsuperscript{454} For example, in Brazil, until the establishment of the unified ministry of defense in 1999, each of the three branches of the Brazilian armed forces held a ministry post allowing the military direct access to the President.
Indonesia – in which the military has been viewed as “a political machine with many senior military officers functioning as military politicos holding cabinet and bureaucratic positions – the TAF refrains from this form of direct involvement. Turkish officers consider such direct involvement to be contrary to their understanding of democracy and lethal to their professional cohesion. In the history of Turkish Republic, no active army personnel has held a position in the cabinet, except for a short period in the beginning of 1920's when the Chief of Staff was a member of the cabinet and army commanders of the border areas served also governors of those provinces.

Soon after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, legislation prohibiting serving officers from serving in parliament was passed. This was further underlined by Article 23 of the Constitution of April 1924, which stated that “no person may be a deputy and hold office in the government at the same time”; this, presumably, could be understood to include the tenure of a military commission. Since then, active-duty military personnel have been prohibited from holding any elected or appointed civil governmental posts. Currently, no military personnel serve in the Turkish cabinet. They are also forbidden to become a member of political party. Therefore, we can conclude that military prerogatives concerning its role in the cabinet are low in Turkey.

9.1.4 Role in intelligence (Moderate)

Another important step in ensuring civilian control over the armed forces is civilian control of the top intelligence agencies. In many South American countries, the top intelligence agencies were controlled by military officers who combined intelligence gathering and operations functions. For example, in his analysis of political transition in Brazil Alfred Stepan argued that the intelligence system had become "more autonomous than in any other modern authoritarian regime in Latin America" (1988, p. 13) and that it had become a key "military prerogative" to power (p. 106).

In Turkey, the intelligence sector has never achieved that degree of autonomy from civilian control, although the military and Turkey’s top national intelligence institution, MIT, had close relations until 1990s. The military’s influence was particularly strong during the National Security Service (Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Riyaseti – MEH/MAH) period, which preceded MIT. Seven of the eleven MEH chiefs prior to the establishment of MIT in 1965 had a military

455 The first secret service of the Republic, National Security Service (Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Riyaseti, MEH/MAH) was established on 16 December 1926 by a Council of Ministers Decision under President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Until 1943, MEH operated secretly and only on 29 June 1943 attached to the prime minister by means of a law.
The military’s influence over the intelligence sector has continued since the establishment of MIT in 1965. The new law that transformed the MEH/MAH into MIT founded a National Intelligence Coordination Committee under the MIT Undersecretary to coordinate with the National Security Council and the Turkish Armed Forces. The undersecretary and key cadres of MIT continued to be recruited from both active and retired military members. The military’s influence on MIT was so great that MIT did not even notify Turkey’s prime ministers of the military’s planned coups in 1971 and 1980.

In 1992 former Foreign Ministry official Sonmez Koksal was appointed Undersecretary of MIT as a result of the executive branch’s attempts to gain greater control over the organization. Following Koksal, Senkal Atasagun was appointed in 1998 to become the first civilian Undersecretary to come from MIT ranks. As a result, the current relationship between MIT and the General Staff is characterized by greater distance than is generally perceived by outsiders.

Although the military no longer exercises any prerogatives within the politics intelligence and MIT, the military continues to play an important role in domestic intelligence-gathering through the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Organization (Jandarma Istihbarat ve Terorle Mucadele – JITEM). JITEM is one of the most contested security organizations in Turkey, its very existence has been officially denied both by the Chief of the General Staff and the Gendarmerie High Command. Its existence has been proven, however, by certificates of appreciation, governmental salary rolls, Investigation Committee reports, and the depositions and confessions of those who worked for the organization (Bese, 2006, p. 176). These documents show that JITEM was initially tasked with gathering anti-terrorist intelligence; in time, however, it began to play an extrajudicial role in the fight against the PKK.

456 Sukru Ali Ogel, Mehmet Naci Perkel, Behcet Turkmen, Emin Cobanoglu, Ziya Selisik, Naci Askun, Mehmet Fuat Dogu had all been in the Turkish Armed Forces prior to assuming the role of Secret Service Chief whereas Huseyin Avni Gokturk, Ahmet Salih Korur and Ahmet Celâlettin Karasapan were civil servants who were appointed to lead the intelligence organization after working in various civil service posts.

457 The very first undersecretary, Avni Kantan graduated from a military academy. His successor Dogu was made undersecretary prior to his retirement from the army. Nurettin Ersin, undersecretary from 1971-73, also performed various duties in TAF. Bulent Turker who acted as Deputy Undersecretary from 1973-74 and undersecretary from 1980-81, was also a soldier. Bahattin Ozulker, who was appointed in the same year, Hamza Gurguc, the undersecretary from 1974-78, Adnan Eroş, who was Gurguc’s successor for a year, Burhanettin Bigal, who was on duty from 1981-86, Hayri Undul, who was the undersecretary from 1986-89 and Teoman Koman, who was in charge from 1986-89, were all members of the military. Most were appointed before their retirement from the TAF. In short, not a single civilian was appointed undersecretary until 1992.

What is problematic is that there was an institution that was not openly defined by relevant laws and regulations, whose activities and staff were kept secret and the institution to which it was accountable was unknown. This uncertainty continued until the legitimization of gendarmerie intelligence in the Law No. 5397, dated 3 July 2005. Considering the fact that JITEM was an informal or semi-formal part of the gendarmerie, the legitimization of its intelligence activities represents the most important development to date. However, the controversy around the gendarmerie’s intelligence function and the lack of efficient civilian control over its activities continues to-date.\(^{459}\) We can therefore conclude that the military enjoys moderate prerogatives in the area of intelligence-gathering.

9.1.5 Role in police (Moderate)

One of the most important steps in ensuring civilian control over the armed forces is the professionalization of a separate police institution in which the police are under the control of non-military ministry or local officials and no active-duty military member is allowed to command a police unit (Stepan, 1988, p. 96). Unlike in many Latin American countries where the military is extensively involved in the police force, the Turkish National Police Force is formally separate from the armed forces, and is operated under the Ministry of Internal Affairs as the Directorate General of Security. Despite this official separation, the dual allegiance of Gendarmerie both to the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief of General Staff has provided the military a moderate privilege in the former’s law enforcement activities.

The Gendarmerie General Command, which functions as a domestic security unit similar to those of the French Gendarmerie and the Italian Carabinieri, is responsible for maintaining public order in areas outside the municipal boundaries of the provinces and districts, which have no police organizations. This makes the Gendarmerie responsible for maintaining public order across 92% of Turkey’s land surface and for one third of the population (27 million). In addition to maintaining public order, the Gendarmerie has special responsibilities regarding smuggling, border control, corrections, conscription enforcement, and criminal investigations, as well as the capacity to perform duties as determined by the General Staff.\(^{460}\) As a law enforcement agency, the Turkish Gendarmerie falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and operates.

\(^{459}\) Most notably, the Semdinli incident on 9 November 2005 brought the Gendarmerie to the centre of attention once again.

\(^{460}\) See Article 7 of the Law on the Establishment, Duties and Jurisdiction of Gendarmerie No. 2803, dated 3 October 1983.
under the command and control of governors and district governors in the same way as the police force. However, in matters related to training and education, its promotion system, and in military duties, it is subordinated to the Turkish General Staff. The first-degree superior of the General Commander of the Gendarmerie is the Chief of Staff, playing the key role in the appointment of the former. Therefore, the Gendarmerie resides in a semi-military gray zone between the General Staff and the Ministry of the Interior.

As declared in the AKP’s General Assembly on 30 September 2012, however, the government plans to bring the Gendarmerie completely under Ministry of the Interior’s control in 2013. In March 2009, the government had already amended the Regulation on the Organization and Duties of the Gendarmerie. This new regulation, which clarifies the powers of the police and Gendarmerie in urban and rural areas, was implemented in 2010. Residential areas in 31 towns with a combined population of about one million civilians were transferred from the Gendarmerie’s jurisdiction to that of the civilian-controlled police. As of the end of 2012, however, “civilian oversight of the gendarmerie’s law enforcement activities” remained “insufficient” (The EU Progress Report, 2012, p.13). Based on the above we can thus conclude that Turkish military enjoys moderate prerogatives in Turkey’s law enforcement system.

9.1.6 Role in state enterprises (Low/Moderate)

Until very recently, military officers used to serve in a number of state enterprises. The EU harmonization reforms implemented between 2003 and 2004, however, removed military representatives from the Higher Education Council, the Radio and Television Supreme Council, the Board of Inspection of Cinema, Video and Musical Works, the Supreme Communication Board and the Prime Ministerial Board for the Protection of Minors against Harmful Publications.

Less auspicious for the transfer of political power from the military to civilians, however, is the case of the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation (OYAK). OYAK is an autonomous military-pension fund that continues to be headed by civilian and military personnel.

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461 See Article 4 of the Law No:2803. Also see: The rules concerning the employment, training, promotion, leave, enrolment and promotion of gendarmerie and petty officers are established in the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926.
463 In early 2010, in cooperation with the TGS, the AKP government also restricted the military’s internal security role by abolishing the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order, which under specific conditions permitted the implementation of military operations without prior authorization from civilian authorities (EU Progress Report, 2010, p.11).
with military directors in majority. OYAK is not only the largest pension fund in Turkey, overseeing the savings of about 235,000 serving and retired officers, but it also an insurance company, a credit union that offers personal and housing loans to its members, and, most significantly, a holding company with investments in more than 50 subsidiaries across various industrial sectors. OYAK engages in diverse sectors including iron & steel, cement, automotive, financial services, energy, insurance, logistics, food processing, construction, and technology. The number of OYAK’s subsidiaries has continuously risen, reaching more than fifty companies by 2007. As a capital group whose total net assets’ value increased from $4.871 in 1961 to $8 billion in 2008, OYAK is among the three biggest and most profitable holding companies in Turkey. OYAK therefore defines itself as “a social assistance institution that offers its services in an esprit of private company and recognizes its financial and industrial investments as a holding”.

Assessing the impact of military’s economic role on democratic control of armed forces is not an easy task; an examination of OYAK sheds useful light onto this potentially murky relationship. A 2004 draft report by the EU Parliament cited OYAK as an example of military influence in economy “which is not consistent with EU values in respect of the rule of law, democracy and market organization”. In its final version of the report, however, the Parliament dropped this reference to OYAK. OYAK CEO Coskun Ulusoy explained this reversal on the basis of the Foundation’s persuasion of EU officials that it was not a military front.

OYAK differs from military pension funds operating in other countries. Military pensions in China, the Congo, Indonesia, Russia and Vietnam, for example, provide off-budgetary sources of revenue for the armed forces, which makes the military more independent and less accountable to civilian governments (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003). Taking budgetary control away from civilian parliamentarians severely limits the influence of civilian institutions over the

464 The number of affiliated companies was 15 in 1971, 22 in 1978, 24 in 1982 and 25 in 1990, 36 in 2002. In most of these subsidiaries, OYAK possesses the majority of the shares and controls the decision-making process of these companies. OYAK has established organic links in its affiliated companies through partnerships and joint-ventures with world-wide foreign capital groups such as Renault, Axa, STEAG AG, Goodyear; with the biggest holding groups in Turkey like Koc, Sabanci, Eti, Yasar, Gama; and also with big state-owned enterprises and banks such as Halk Bankasi, Ziraat Bankasi, SSK. The list of partnerships with big capital groups and public ventures in the past 44 years may be extended to cover Elf (petroleum), Boston National Bank, Yapi Kredi Bankasi, Garanti Bankasi, Kutlutas Holding, Alarko Holding, Yasar Holding, Cerrahogullari, Lades and Pinar (food), TPAO, Petkim, Aselsan, Emlik Bankasi, Turkiye Cimento Sanayii


466 Holland, Ben. Turkish Army fund to invest $3 billion in Europe, International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2008
army forces. However, this is not the case for OYAK. The Foundation functions as a profit-oriented “private” capital fund and neither contributes to the military’s budget nor invests in the defense sector.

Secondly, unlike military businesses operating in the absence of transparent accounting and control systems for revenue stemming from commercial operations, OYAK adheres to high corporate standards and transparency. It has independent auditors and provides full disclosure of its activities. Since 2001 all of OYAK’s financial statements have been prepared and audited according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and the Foundation’s books rated by credit agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Deloitte. In 2007, OYAK became the first non-banking institution to receive a long-term “AAA” rating, the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s on the national scale. 467

Thirdly, military businesses in many countries enjoy privileged position vis-à-vis private enterprises, operating outside of normal market conditions. Such businesses enjoy not only preferential access to conscript labour and infrastructure but also to political protection. 468 Although OYAK does not enjoy such privileges, it enjoys a variety of tax exemptions at the level of the Foundation. While all of OYAK’s affiliated companies pay taxes regularly, as “a holding company” OYAK is exempt from taxes. 469

As powerful as it is, OYAK is not Turkey’s only military-controlled economic entity. The Turkish military also owns the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetlerini Guçlendirme Vakfı – TSKGV), which has 19 affiliated companies working in the defense sector. Similar to OYAK, the TSKGV enjoys a variety of tax exemptions at the level of foundation. TSKGV as a foundation is exempt from corporation tax, inheritance and transfer taxes concerning donations and assistance it receives and stamp tax concerning all of its

467 OYAK’s ratings were announced for the first time in 2005 by Moody’s Investors Service and by Standard & Poor’s and in both cases it became the first and only non-banking concern in Turkey to be awarded credit ratings that were equal to Turkey’s the sovereign. In July 2006, Moody’s confirmed the long-term foreign currency and local currency ratings that it had assigned to OYAK as “Ba2”, which is one grade higher than its “Ba3” country rating. It also announced a “stable” outlook for both ratings. In 2007, Standard & Poor's announced that it had raised OYAK's long-term rating to “BB”, which was higher than its “BB-” long-term foreign currency country rating, while its outlook remained “stable”. For details, See OYAK’s official website: www.oyak.com.tr

468 This happens to the case in many Central American countries as well as in China, Congo, Russia and Vietnam. For details see: Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003.

469 According to Article 35 of the Law no: 205, The Fund has the following exemptions: a) The Fund is exempt from taxes on Corporations. b) Donations made to the Fund and benefits of any kind provided by the Fund to its members or to their legal heirs are exempt from Income Tax and Inheritance Tax. c) The Fund is exempt from stamp duty in connection with its transactions. d) Dues collected from permanent and temporary members are exempt from Income Tax. e) All kinds of revenues of the Fund are exempt from Expenditure Tax.
transactions. The affiliated companies, however, pay taxes. Different from OYAK, however, the TSKGV provides off-budgetary sources of revenue for the armed forces. For the period of 1987-2000, 1% of the military expenditures were from the TSKGV.\textsuperscript{470} However, as an off-budgetary fund it was exempted from parliamentary control.

The above discussion demonstrates that the military as an institution enjoys legal privileges in its economic enterprises that create unfair advantages for military businesses over its civilian competitors. It can be, therefore, concluded that Turkish military enjoys low/moderate privileges in state enterprises.

\textbf{9.2 Institutional Prerogatives (High)}

The Turkish military still enjoys a high level of institutional autonomy in its professional sphere. The Chief of General Staff is the main authority in the country’s defense affairs and enjoys high autonomy in the formulation of military doctrine and in the determination budgetary priorities. In the last decade, however, its autonomy in terms of military education, promotion, and appointments was circumscribed due to greater governmental assertiveness. Military expenditure was also placed under greater civilian scrutiny by authorizing the Court of Audit to military spending. It seems, however, that the military’s institutional autonomy in the coordination of defense sector remains intact. The next section analyzes the level of the Turkish military’s institutional autonomy – which refers to military’s professional independence and exclusivity – by examining its role in coordination of the defense sector, in the Ministry of Defense and military promotions and internal discipline. It also reviews the extent of changes in legislative oversight of defense sector and military.

\textbf{9.2.1 Coordination of the defense sector (High)}

The existing setup of the defense sector in Turkey continues to differ from the “ideal” defense structure presented by Pion-Berlin (2009) in his article entitled “Defense Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America”. In this article, Pion-Berlin points out four important traits of a democratic defense organization: a strong civilian-led ministry of defense in the chain of operational command that is charged with key defense planning and strategy, a large number of civilian political appointees working in the defense sector, a low level of military expenditures for arms and military equipment’s form 26.7% of the total (budgetary plus non-budgetary sources) defense expenditures on the average for the period. 54% of total expenditures for arms procurement and production were from the budget whereas the remaining 44% from the SSDF, and 1.5% from TSKGV. Gunluk-Senesen, 2002a, pp. 76, 73.

\textsuperscript{470} 84 \% of the military expenditures were from the defense budget, 15 \% from SSDF, 1 \% from TSKGV. The expenditures for arms and military equipment’s form 26.7 \% of the total (budgetary plus non-budgetary sources) defense expenditures on the average for the period. 54 \% of total expenditures for arms procurement and production were from the budget whereas the remaining 44 \% from the SSDF, and 1.5 \% from TSKGV. Gunluk-Senesen, 2002a, pp. 76, 73.
vertical command authority, and divided military power – i.e., civilian commands sent directly to separate service branches.

The Turkish defense structure, which rests on a dual command structure consisting of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Turkish General Staff (TGS), does not satisfy any of the above criteria. Although the MND is led by a civilian minister, it does not incorporate the General Staff and has no authority over military command. Military power centers around the Chief of General Staff, who has a high level of vertical authority in being positioned one step below the prime minister in state protocol. The Office of General Staff determines defense plans and strategies as well as the requirements of the TAF, while the Ministry of National Defense carries out the administrative and financial services of the defense organization. The overall defense organization is thus described as a twin “stovepipe”, with extensive co-ordination and co-operation between the two elements – and even some collocation – but no direct connection (Greenwood, 2006, p. 51).

The MND works as the TGS’s support apparatus with two main functions: to secure funds required by the TAF and to conduct military procurement and domestic arms production in accordance with the long-term needs and operational requirements of the TAF. The MND carries out these duties through two undersecretaries; the Undersecretariat of the Ministry of National Defense (UMND) is headed by a military officer and the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (UDI) is headed by a civilian.

471 The TGS draws the strategic target plan in the direction of the targets envisaged by Turkey’s national military strategy and TAF joint operational concept. This strategic plan identifies the targets of the TAF aimed to be reached on the subjects of the force structure of the TAF in the medium and long-term, the main systems required for this structure, preparedness for war and maintaining operations and construction (Defense Ministry, White paper, 2000, pp. 84-85). On the basis of the STP, this time together with the Ministry of National Defense, the Turkish General Staff, prepare Ten Year Procurement Programs (TYPP) and ten year forward budget program and finally the Ministry of National Defense carries out the yearly budgeting and procurement services by taking these programs into consideration (Ibid.)

472 The chief of general staff establishes “the main programs, principles, and priorities regarding the personnel, intelligence, operation, organization, training, education and logistical services, preparing the armed forces to war, coordinating the Land, Naval, and Air Force Commands, as well as other departments under the office of the Chief of General Staff”. Having this prerogative, the office of chief of general staff determines the medium-term (10 years) and long-term (11-20 years) military strategy, strategic targets and force structure. The two foundational documents in these areas, Turkey’s National Military Strategy (TUNMS) and the TAF Joint Operational Concept, are formulated by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff in accordance with the National Security Policy Document and the "Force Proposals", prepared by the force commands.
9.2.2 Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees in the defense sector (Moderate)

The ability of the General Chief of Staff to influence the civilian bureaucracy in Turkey is facilitated by the lack of career civil servants specializing in military affairs who could provide a buffer between the military and society. While UDI is headed by a civilian undersecretariat and composed of civilians, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense (UMND) is a very large organization composed of predominantly military personnel. Since 2010 UMND has also recruited more civilian personnel, including nine civilian defense policy advisers, but the lack of civilian experts in this area remains a problem. As vice-undersecretary of UDI Faruk Ozlu stated that:

Defense spending is directly related to threats. Political authority has to decide who is a friend and who is an enemy. But the political authorities in Turkey, since they do not have sufficient knowledge in the area, cannot be influential. Politicians leave this area to the military, who is the determinant in this subject. Our Prime Minister does not have an expert body or institution that can help him on defense matters (quoted in Oguz, 2009, p. 74).


Figure 3: Coordination of Defense Structure in Turkey
UDI is a relatively compact organization composed of approximately 300 civilian personnel. Its main responsibilities are the procurement of major defense systems, research and development, and the establishment and implementation of strategy and procedures for development of the national defense industry. UDI works closely with the Defense Industry Executive Committee (DIEC), which is the main decision maker concerning weapons procurement in Turkey. The DIEC is chaired by the prime minister and includes the defense minister, the UDI undersecretary and the chief of TGS. The UDI is, thus charged with the execution of the decisions of DIEC and provided with its own “financial source”, the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF), to carry out modernization projects. The role of UDI in this regard is very much like its counterparts in Germany (BWB), Korea (DAPA), France (DGA) and the UK (DE&S).

Although the General Staff still maintains the majority of power in procurement decisions, its relations with UDI seemed to change under the administration of TGS Chief General Hilmi Ozkok. According to Oguz, General Ozkok gave more room to UDI to implement its domestic production plans (2009, p. 73). Vice-undersecretary of UDI Faruk Ozlu stated that:

The Turkish Military has been very receptive to our position over the last six years. The change is mainly due to the character of former Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok. His successor General Yasar Buyukanit was in office for too short of a period to change the course, and the current Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug has a similar approach to domestic production as Ozkok. The ATAK helicopter project is a case in point. Despite the fact that they need it urgently in the southeast, they did not insist on foreign procurement. They agreed to wait for the period of design (Ibid).

According to Ozlu, although UDI has now wide room to maneuver in determining defense procurement decisions, the final word still belongs to the armed forces:

The military is still conservative in that domain. It determines the type of weapons to be purchased. We need more experienced civilians in that domain, so that the military’s assessment of threats and determination of needs are based on a more comprehensive analysis. When the military sees a civilian as well informed as they are, they are willing to listen. There are project officers [from the military] in every UDI project. If the UDI officer knows what he speaks about, the military officer usually yields to his guidance (quoted in Oguz, 2009, p. 74).

Given the prominent role of General Staff in determining the needs of armed forces, we

474 UDI website. Available at: http://www.ssm.gov.tr/EN/kurumsal/organizasyon/mustesar/sbmdozelkalem/Pages/default.aspx
475 For more information about UDI See white Paper 2000, p. 42-43.
can say that Turkish military enjoys moderate prerogatives in the area of weapons procurement and overall, we can conclude that military officers continue to enjoy moderate prerogatives as career appointees in the Ministry of Defense.

9.2.3 Role in military promotions and internal discipline (Moderate)

Decisions regarding military promotions, retirement, and disciplinary measures are made at the Supreme Military Council (SMC), headed by prime minister and composed of National Defense Minister and all 15 four-star generals and admirals. In the SMC, retirement, extension of duty periods, and dismissal decisions are taken by open vote and by absolute majority. In appointments, however, the prime minister has been the key veto-player, having the authority to make any necessary changes in proposals before signing it. Despite this authority, until very recently it was rare that any recommendation of the SMC was amended or rejected by the government. the military High Command seemed to shape personnel decisions by taking the principle of seniority into consideration.

Force commanders, as mentioned before, are appointed by the president, who decides on a candidate from the joint list prepared by the chief of TGS, the prime minister, and the defense minister. The appointment of the Chief of TGS is also the prerogative of the president, who decides upon a proposal made by the Cabinet. Despite this formal rule, the post traditionally has been almost automatically filled by the most senior Commander of the Land Forces when the outgoing chief of the TGS is due to retire. Therefore, although promotions are the de jure prerogative of civilians, in practice promotions were made under the high influence of the Chief of TGS.

Governmental authority over senior promotions has been considerably strengthened, however, in particular since 2010. In the August 2010 SMC meeting, the issue of the promotion of several officers implicated in the ongoing investigations had been a matter of contention between the government and the military from which Prime Minister Erdogan emerged as

476 The Supreme Military Council was first established in 1925 and then reformed in 1972 during the period of the interim regime that was launched by the military memorandum of 12 March 1971. It meets twice a year and discussions are often lengthy, lasting from two to four days and including oral assessments by the commanders under whom the candidates have served. Law No. 1612 ; See Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette) dated 26 July 1972.
477 In 1976 and 1977 then-Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel attempted to surpass the military's monopoly in deciding on the promotions for the force commanders' positions. His first effort was overruled by the Supreme Military Administrative Court, while the second was rejected by President Fahri Koruturk, a former admiral. In 1987 then-Prime Minister Turgut Ozal bypassed the military’s candidate for chief of the General Staff, General Necdet Oztorun, and appointed his own choice, General Necip Torumtay. By doing so, Ozal undermined the established tradition of routine senior promotions within the army.
victorious. Preceding the meeting, the government had prepared a detailed study on the SMC. Although the report prepared by the MND suggested that arrest orders were not a barrier for promotions, the governmental report argued otherwise. The report also underlined that the “SMC is an advisory organization whose duty is to present its views to the executive. It is not a decisive organ in promotions and appointments. If no decision is reached in the SMC meetings then it is considered as no meeting taken place. In this case, every officer continues their current duty”.

Following this report, the government imposed its own list of promotions and retirements by vetoing the appointment of the land forces commander because of his alleged involvement in the Sledgehammer case.

The tension in the SMC resulted in meetings between president and prime minister as well as triple meeting including the chief of general staff. In the third day of SMC meeting, Erdogan did not go to military headquarters, meeting instead with Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, MIT undersecretary Hakan Fidan, Minister of Internal Affairs Besir Atalay, and National Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul. Although since taking office Erdogan had signed SMC decisions in military headquarters, this time he preferred chose his own office for the signing. The fact that the prime minister did not attend the third day of the meeting and go to military headquarters for authorization indicates not only the tension between the military and the government but also growing civilian assertiveness. The SMC meetings were finally completed after eight days when the government emerged victorious.

This development marks an important step towards greater civilian control over the military. Established traditions regarding the promotions and appointments in the Turkish military’s upper echelons, which are based on tenure and seniority, had been previously strictly implemented. Although the government and the president have the final say in appointment and promotion decisions, the civilian authorities traditionally merely endorsed the list suggested by the top military commanders. The AKP government’s active interference in appointments in 2010 was an important exception to the rule. In the words of Turkish security analyst and

478 *Vatan* (2010, Aug. 4). YAS maratonunda hukumetin dediği oldu [In the SMC race, the government thrives] http://haber.gazetevatan.com/yas-maratonunda-hukumetin-dedigi-oldu/321213/1/Haber
479 On August 9, 2010, Prime Minister Erdogan announced a breakthrough, saying that the government and military had reached an agreement. Following president Gul’s approval, the standoff over the new command structure ended. General Kosaner was appointed as Chief of Staff, while the current EDOM commander General Erdal Ceylanoglu, who was appointed as the Commander of the First Army in the SMC meeting, was appointed as the new commander of the armed forces. Ceylanoglu assumed the command of the armed forces, instead of the more senior General Ozel. Although this practice contravened the established rules, it secured Ozel’s path to become the CGS in 2013, replacing Kosaner (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 2010, Aug. 9).
military affairs observer Nihat Ali Ozcan, it was “the biggest crisis ever encountered by the Turkish Armed Forces in its history” (Hurriyet Daily News, August 4). Moreover, for the first time in the history of Republic, in 2010 a civilian administration suspended serving military figures of a very high rank by invoking provisions that the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law promulgated over half a century ago.480

In August 2011 the SMC convened just following the resignation of the military High Command, creating an important question about the appointments of force commanders. The problem stemmed mostly from the high number of generals in alleged coup plots; the continued detention of 173 senior military officers on coup-plot charges – 72 of whom would have been on the list for appointments in August 2011 meeting – was the primary reason behind the resignation en masse. Despite intensified contact between Kosaner and the country’s civilian leadership – including multiple meetings with the president, prime minister, and other ministers – the issue of detained officers being denied the opportunity to be considered for promotion proved irresolvable. While Kosaner advocated the implementation of TAF’s conventions unless there was a legal judgment concerning those commanders whose files were up for consideration, the government refused, resulting in Kosaner’s resignation. Kosaner stated in his resignation letter that “despite there being no definitive judicial ruling against them, 14 jailed generals and admirals and 58 colonels have been punished in advance and lost their right to be assessed at this year's Supreme Military Council”.481

President Gul made a statement just hours after the resignations indicating that he “will not sign any decree with [his] eyes closed”.482 Huseyin Celik, deputy leader of the ruling AKP, made a similar statement stressing that the final decision belongs to the prime minister when it comes to appointments.483 In a first for an SMC meeting, Prime Minister Erdogan sat alone at the head of the table, a symbol of civilian authority over the generals. The symbolism of the seating scheme delivered the message that Turkey’s military had lost another battle in a power struggle

with a government enjoying strong electoral support.\textsuperscript{484} The president also skipped hosting a luncheon that was customary in past years, since the August 2011 SMC meeting coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan during which Muslims fast during daylight hours. Instead, President Gul hosted an \textit{iftar} (fast-breaking dinner) for members of the SMC at the Cankaya Presidential Palace.\textsuperscript{485}

This trend of increasing civilian control over military promotions continued in 2012. Of the 68 officers that had been detained pending trial, 40 were forced to retire prior to the August 2012 SMC meeting in which their terms would expire. The expulsion of these detained generals and admirals before a court decision in their cases suggests the unwillingness of new Chief of General Staff Necdet Ozel to be associated with those officers implicated in coup allegations. President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan had long favored their expulsion, but in previous cases Chiefs of General Staff such as Ilker Basbug had resisted expelling these officers; Isik Kosaner even resigned in protest. This time, Chief of General Staff Necdet Ozel, unlike Basbug and Kosaner, implemented the political preferences without contestation. The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials have therefore, according to many, resulted in a resettlement of the military’s organization.\textsuperscript{486} Although it is too early to reach a definitive conclusion, it is plausible to suggest that Turkish military’s prerogatives in senior promotions have declined from high to moderate.

In addition to promotions and retirements, the SMC deals with disciplinary measures regarding the armed forces personnel, including the dismissal of personnel on the grounds of disciplinary infractions or Islamic reactionarism. Particularly since the mid-1990s, there has been considerable concern in the TAF that religious groups led by the Fethullah Gulen movement have been trying to infiltrate the officer corps. The perception of this threat reached its peak in 1997, resulting in the dismissal of 1700 officers from the military for disciplinary and reactionarism reasons. This high number of expulsions on the basis of religious beliefs created an upsurge in more conservative segments of society and was used in constructing an anti-Islam

\textsuperscript{484} EU documentation supports this view. The EU Progress Report of 2011 noted “the Supreme Military Council of August 2011 was a step towards greater civilian oversight of the armed forces” and “appointment of the force commanders in the Supreme Military Council meeting without any delay affirmed the government’s control over the appointment of top-level commanders” (pp. 13-14).
\textsuperscript{485} \textit{Today’s Zaman}, 2011, Aug. 1.
\textsuperscript{486} See for instance: Bila. F. (2012, Aug. 5). Buyuk tasfiye [great resettlement], \textit{Milliyet}. 
image of military. The judicial exemption of these decisions, in turn, gave the impression that the SMC was above the law.

Until September 2010, the decisions of the SMC were not open to judicial review. Article 125 of the 1982 Constitution, which subjects all acts and actions of the administration to judicial review, exempted the decisions of the SMC from the legal review of the judiciary. President of the Association of Law Defenders (ASDER), retired Brig. Gen. Adnan Tanriverdi, criticized Article 125 by arguing that “It is out of the question to allow those personnel who haven’t developed a culture of discipline to stay on in the TAF. Securing the culture of discipline is the first and minimal condition for the fighting efficiency of the armed forces. However, even this fact cannot justify divesting people, whether or not they are military personnel, of their right to a fair trial.”

This exemption has also been criticized by the higher judicial organs in Turkey. The chairmen of the High Court of Appeals, the Council of State, and the Constitutional Court have all stated that in light of the fact that SMC decisions are not subject to judicial monitoring, constitutional provisions stand in contradiction to the concept of a state based on the rule of law (Arslan, 2006, p. 30).

Since the AKP came to power in November 2002, it has frequently promised to amend the law to allow expelled officers to appeal their expulsion judgments. Just a month after forming the AKP government, in fact, a mini-crisis erupted in when SMC met to discuss winter promotions and expulsions from the military. Abdullah Gul, who attended the meeting as prime minister and former Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul objected to the expulsions, as those who were being forced out of office had no right to take the decisions to court. The government continued to express such reservations about expulsions until the 12 September 2010 referendum that facilitated the adoption of a constitutional amendment allowing expelled military personnel the opportunity to have their decisions annulled in court.

Following this referendum, the government announced in August 2011 that former military officers dismissed by the SMC would be reinstated. Labor and Social Security Minister Faruk Çelik, proclaiming a “new turn on our road to democracy”, declared “2,199 SMC victims have so far applied for their rights to be restored after constitutional changes and the state already opened 2,000 new positions for these

487 Quoted in Kenes, B.(2007, August 6). Supreme Military Council’s decisions should be subject to judicial review, Todays Zaman.
individuals”. Implementation of the law providing legal remedies to previous dismissals from the TAF continued throughout 2012 (EU Progress Report, 2012, p. 12). To conclude, we can suggest that the level of military discipline and promotions prerogatives has declined from high to moderate.

9.2.4 Military Prerogatives in Legislative Arena (Moderate)

9.2.4.1 Parliamentary oversight over military operations (Strong)

The question of who has the power to send troops abroad is fundamental to the democratic governance of the armed forces (Born and Lazzarini, 2006, p. 8). However, the level of parliamentary involvement in authorizing national participation in international missions before troops are deployed varies greatly from country to country. Only a few countries’ parliaments – namely Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Sweden – possess the unconditional power of prior approval in all situations. In some countries, legislation allows for exceptions from parliamentary approval. For example, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania, the decision to participate in operations that are legitimised by a treaty or an international organization of which the country is a member is considered an executive responsibility. At the other end of the spectrum – in countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom – parliamentary approval is not necessary for participation in any missions abroad.

In Turkey, the authority to send troops abroad rests with Parliament. The Turkish Constitution (Art. 92) requires prior parliamentary authorization for sending troops abroad or permitting the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey, except in cases required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by international rules of courtesy. Political control over military operations was in fact applied in the context of the deployment of troops to Iraq in 2003 and the military operations aimed at terrorist targets in northern Iraq in 2008. The military prerogatives concerning military operations abroad, therefore, are low.

9.2.4.2 Legislative oversight of defense policies and budget (moderate)

Defense laws, like any other piece of legislation, are adopted by Parliament, and a specialist National Defense Committee (NDC) is exclusively authorized to examine draft laws related to defense and security. Related draft laws and law proposals submitted to the Chairman

of the Parliament are first examined by the NDC and then conveyed to Parliament for further debate and final approval. Accordingly, both the NDC and Parliament have the formal authority to negotiate and accept or refuse draft laws that relate to the determination of the physical size of the military bureaucracy, remuneration policies, education level, or working and living conditions. The budget of the MND, as any other public budget, is similarly subjected to ex-ante legislative control: it is first discussed at the Plan and Budget Committee, and then presented to Parliament for approval.

Until the 2000s, defense was the largest category in the national budget, averaging in most years close to 15% of total government expenditures and 4 to 5% of the country's gross domestic product. The next largest budget category (education) commanded little more than half of the resources allocated for defense. Investment in developing the domestic defense industry, which had become an urgent necessity after the U.S. arms embargo between 1974 and 1978, further increased military spending in the post-1980 period.

Since 1999, however, military spending has declined. This decline is particularly significant considering that global military expenditures between the 2001-2009 period rose at an annual average rate of 5.1% in real terms. In contrast, in 2003 the share allotted for defense – historically the largest budgetary item – was exceeded for the first time by the share allotted for the Ministry of Education budget. The High Command complied with this reduction without contestation. The table below show declining military spending based on SIPRI data.

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490 Since the late 1980s the defense industry has been built up and now produces weapon systems including surface-to-air missiles, submarines and ships, tracked armored vehicles, transport and fighter planes including the F-16s. Since 1987, 199 units have been manufactured of which 46 were exported to Egypt. In 1996, Israel helped upgrade 54 F-4s in Israel and 34 F-5s in Turkey. Turkish Daily News, August 22, 1996.

491 Between 1982 and 1991, Turkish military spending rose by 4% while the average for European NATO states was only 0.6% (Senesen, 1994, p. 12). In the 1990s the Gulf War, instability in the Caucasus, the return of Russia's military to Turkey's border, the PKK insurgency, high spending by neighbors, and the acquisition by some neighbors of missiles and weapons of mass destruction reinforced a higher level of arms spending (Ozmucur, 1996, p. 218). In 1996, the General Staff estimated that the Turkish Armed Forces would need $150 billion for its weapon and modernization requirements in the next 25 years. Turkish Daily News, April 5, 1996; August 22, 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constant (2005) US $ (million)</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>7,245</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8,385</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>10,129</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10,405</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>10,956</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>12,106</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>11,839</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>12,162</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13,617</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>14,187</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14,865</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16,414</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15,885</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14,562</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13,752</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10,973</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10,301</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11,080</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite its de jure ex-ante oversight powers, until very recently the Turkish Parliament was unable to perform an effective ex-post oversight of military expenditures due to restrictions placed on the auditing scope of the Court of Accounts\textsuperscript{493} in this realm. Ex-post oversight of military expenditure was strengthened with reforms adopted throughout 2003-2004. The EU harmonization package adopted on 30 July 2003 enlarged the mandate of the Court of Accounts to inspect military-owned state property on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.\textsuperscript{494} In the same vein, in May 2004 Article 160 of the constitution, which had restricted the authority of the Court of Accounts to audit the military-owned state property, was repealed.\textsuperscript{495} With these amendments the Court of Accounts was thus given the constitutional right to inspect military-owned state property on behalf of Parliament.

The transparency and parliamentary oversight of military expenditure was further

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\textsuperscript{493} Under the Constitution and the Law on the Turkish Court of Accounts, the Court of Accounts is responsible for auditing on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Parliament) the revenues, expenditures and property of public administrations.

\textsuperscript{494} This new law added an additional clause (additional clause 12) to the Law No: 832 on Court of Accounts stipulating that the control of military-owned state property would be chaperoned by the Supreme Court of Accounts acting on behalf of parliament under the condition that it be kept secret. See Appended Article 12 of Law No. 832 on the Supreme Court of Accounts enacted on 30.07.2003 by the Article 7 of the law no: 4963.

\textsuperscript{495} This amendment went into effect following its publication in \textit{Resmi Gazete} (Official Gazette) on 22 May 2004. See : Narli, 2006, p.142/
improved with passage of the Law on Public Financial Management and Control No: 5018 on 10 December 2003. This law allowed for the inclusion of extra-budgetary funds in the budgets of the relevant administration, resulting in parliamentary oversight of the DISF as part of the Defense Ministry spending beginning 1 January 2005.\footnote{Article 81 (c) of this new law annulled all the provisions that exempts the application of the provisions of the law on Public Accounting no: 1050, Public Procurement law no: 2886, and law on Court of Accounts no: 832 to the acts and transactions of the DISF.} Further, as publicly declared by the General Assembly of Court of Accounts in its Decision No: 5225/1 on 24 June 2008, the Court of Accounts was in a position to audit all accounts related to the revenues and expenditures of the DISF, which up to that point had been an off-budget fund free from parliamentary control. The same law (Article 18) also required the inclusion in budget proposals of more information and documentary support as well as the introduction of a schedule for the parliamentary consideration of submissions allowing more time for debate and negotiation (Narli, 2006, p. 141). This increased Parliament’s voice and provided greater accountability, both ex ante and ex post.

The Turkish Parliament is, therefore, formally in a position to oversee the defense budget ex ante. The low capacity for comprehension and lack of interest demonstrated by Parliament, however, has hindered effective legislative oversight of this budget. For instance, during the debates on the defense budget for the fiscal years of 2006-2009, members of the Budget and Planning Committee neither requested further information nor proposed any changes in the defense budget proposals. Similarly, according to UDI Vice-Undersecretary Faruk Ozlu, although the UDI budget is presented by UDI officers at Parliament’s Budget and Planning Committee, “most of the time, the Committee does not direct questions on the individual items of the budget” (Oguz, 2009, p. 74). Due to both a lack of Committee members’ enthusiasm for making changes to national defense budget proposals given Turkey’s “high-risk” regional location and to a general lack of expertise and resources to make informed decisions on such issues, the Committee tends not to request budget reductions or comment on the allocation of funds.

This problem is compounded by the lack of expert research personnel to assist the members of the National Defense Committee in carrying out effective parliamentary control. There are only four personnel – an expert, a secretary, a clerk, and an assistant – allocated to the
Committee. When examining the practice of advanced democratic countries it is clear that, in addition to developing their personal expertise, committee members rely on a professional committee staff, congressional research services, and outside experts in independent or party think tanks for the expertise necessary to exercise their legislative and oversight tasks.

Such willingness and capacity to exercise oversight is not observed in Turkey, where there has been bureaucratic resistance to the involvement of civilians in defense policy. The tendency of Turkish politicians to leave defense policy as an exclusive zone of the military is particularly exacerbated in the fight against terrorism. Though the legal responsibility to fight terrorism was clearly given to civilian authorities, governments have privileged the role of the military in the struggle against terror. It is not the involvement of the Turkish military itself, which was only logical given the level of the threat to national security, but the apparent delegation of all relevant initiatives to the military that prevented accumulation of relevant knowledge and experience on counter-terrorism.

The new undersecretariat of the Ministry of the Interior seeks to remedy this problem. The necessity to establish an Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security stemmed from the “coordination problems between various institutions of the state tasked with counter terrorism”. However, the current structure of the undersecretariat contains certain elements that may hinder its effectiveness. The new undersecretariat will have no authority, for example, to direct the operations undertaken by security forces, but will be tasked to make and execute plans to ensure public support for the struggle against terrorism. The conduct of security forces on the ground, however, has an important impact on the perception of the public over counter terrorism operations of the state. Moreover, the law tasks the new undersecretariat with ensuring coordination of various state institutions responsible for the struggle against terrorism. Since the new organization is an undersecretariat and is run by the Ministry of the Interior, however, in practice it will have equal or even lesser status with other well-established organizations such as MIT and the General Staff, which each have their own intelligence sources. It is thus by no

497 Former Deputy Chief of TGS Necip Torumtay writes in his memoirs that at Annapolis Naval School in 1981 he met with civilian officers from the US State Department and other Departments who were taking courses on massive mobilization at various military institutions. In these courses, officials were conducting decision-making exercises on matters concerning their departments in the event of a total war (1994, p. 88). Torumtay complained that “despite the fact that similar exercises are organized in Turkey at the National Security Academy, and despite the fact that the General Staff requests high-level officers from ministries, the civilian personnel taking part in these courses are of low-level, some of them have no future in their relative ministries, or are waiting for retirement…. Most of the civilian personnel are then appointed to irrelevant positions” (quoted in Oguz, pp. 100-101).
means guaranteed that the new undersecretariat will be able to collect relevant intelligence from other state institutions. It is also not guaranteed that the advice of the new undersecretariat will have any influence over the conduct of security forces. Despite these potential disadvantages, the fact that the new undersecretariat will have the duty to collect data from domestic and foreign sources on terrorism promises to increase both civilian and military expertise in the area and hopefully provide continuity in political decisions.

All of this suggests that effective legislative oversight requires the Turkish Parliament to adopt capacity-building measures such as increasing resources for the specialist parliamentary committees; promoting specialization, expertise, and stability in the National Defense Committee; and extending its mandate to oversee the National Security Policy Document. To conclude thus far, in the area of legislative control of the military budget, the armed forces does enjoy strong formal prerogatives. While the Turkish Parliament has always formally been in a position to oversee the defense budget, defense laws, and military operations the EU harmonization laws have formally strengthened ex-post civilian oversight of military expenditures by widening the auditing scope of the Supreme Court of Accounts to military expenditures and military-held property.498 This section therefore concludes that the prerogatives of the military in legislature oversight of military expenditures have decreased from high/moderate to moderate/low.

9.2.4.3 Legislative oversight of military procurement (Low)

Whereas in many democratic countries the parliament reviews and/or approves major projects for the procurement of arms, the Turkish Parliament does not have much authority over this issue. The NDC can only examine draft laws and law proposals as noted above and therefore does not have input into the procurement of the arms, tools, and munitions required by the military. Likewise, the committee neither suggests alternatives nor voices objections over these issues.

Steps increasing parliamentary oversight are beginning to be taken, however. In 2003, for the first time Turkey's parliament demanded a role in the military's procurement program. The

498 The EU has taken note of this progress. In its 2012 Report, the European Commission noted that “progress was made regarding external audits of security institutions under the Turkish of Accounts Law, which provides for ex post auditing of military expenditure. A regulation adopted in August made publication of the TCA external audit reports related to security, defense and intelligence institutions subject to parliamentary approval. The regulation also introduces limitations for the publication of these reports on grounds of confidentiality. The Parliamentary Petition Commission requested a special commission of experts to inspect and audit the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Centre. The General Staff periodically published figures on staffing in the armed forces” (p. 12).
parliamentarians said they wanted oversight powers as well as the option to question senior officials and military commanders over Turkey's defense requirements. They raised questions regarding the Defense Ministry's $1.6 billion project for the purchase of up to six Airborne Warning and Control Systems from the United States. Officials have acknowledged that Parliament was never consulted on either the AWACS or any other deal. Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul has pledged to change this practice.499

In July 2008, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Adana deputy and retired general Kurşat Atilgan submitted a question motion to Parliament requesting that an investigative commission be set up to review a $3.4 billion attack helicopter tender, the second most expensive military tender in the country's history and one that was accepted under dubious circumstances.500 The MHP request for investigation was defeated, however, with the votes of AKP group on 5 May 2009. 501 The level of military procurement prerogatives at this point can be classified as moderate.

9.2.4.4 Legislative oversight of national security policy (low)

According to Article 117 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers is the ultimate authority in the formulation and implementation of national security policy. The main policy paper concerning national security is the national security policy document (NSPD), which is a document of the Council of Ministers. The NSPD includes “the essentials regarding internal and external security and defense policies to be pursued in accordance with the national interests and national objectives of the Turkish Republic”.502 The first NSPD was prepared in 1963 and is normally updated every five years; when necessary it can also be amended to accommodate urgent developments and shifts in main national security concerns.503 It has been revised eight times thus far, lastly in 2010.

Up until the constitutional and legislative changes of 2003, the military High Command

500 Among the two short-listed firms, Italian Agusta Westland and South African DENEL, Augusta Westland won Turkey's attack helicopter tender in March 2007 and started the co-production of 50 and an optional 40 attack helicopters with Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and Aselsan.500 However, in January 2007, Atilgan submitted a query to Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, claiming that there were too many dubious points in the tender process, including the fact that DENEL had mysteriously increased its offer during the last round of the tender process despite having presented the best offer in the previous round.
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil2/bas/b121m.htm
502 The official website of NSC. Available at: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/sss.html
503 Interviews. Also see: Jenkins, 2001, p. 47.
played an important role in the preparation of this document, as the Secretariat General of the NSC had been a military general. The most recent iteration the NSPD sets out the “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy defined by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu along with Turkey’s rising regional political and economic profile as explicit goals. Former "security threats" such as Russia and Iran are now regarded as regional partners, particularly in the sphere of energy cooperation. The most important change in the new NSPD is the removal of reactionarism from the list of internal security problems, which clearly demonstrates the growing authority of the AKP in threat assessment. The new NSPD specifies that the TAF is no longer the supreme actor in formulation of Turkey’s national security policy. Rather than the NSC, it is now Foreign Minister Davutoglu who guides Turkish foreign and security policy.

The parliament’s input concerning security policy is weak, which is generally seen throughout the Western world as a prerogative of the executive branch. In Turkey, however, while the executive has the authority to share the content of the National Policy Security Document with Parliament, until now this document has been kept out of parliamentary and public debate. The official website of the NSC clearly states that “the classification of the document as secret is not an obstacle for the Council of Ministers to inform the members of the parliament about the content of document”.504 However, several parliamentary requests to view the document’s content were rejected by the executive on the basis of its secret status.

The military officers interviewed for this study emphasized that they cannot object to legislative oversight, but that ultimately the formulation of security policy is the constitutional prerogative of the executive and any change in this area will ultimately depend on the latter’s own choice. Despite domestic and international criticism, the AKP government did not make any attempt to strengthen legislative oversight of national security policy until early 2013. As an EU Progress Report notes, “the transparency and accountability of the security sector remained limited” (2012, p.13). The absence of a transparent public inquiry into the events leading to the death of 34 civilians in Uludere (Şırnak) in a military air strike in December 2011 and of substantive discussion of political responsibility both indicate the lack of parliamentary oversight of security issues (EU Progress Report, 2012, p. 7).

504 See frequently asked questions, question 40. Available at: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/sss.html#soru_40
9.2.4.5 Legislative oversight of military personnel (low)

The parliament has also no authority over the appointment of top officials in the security sector – namely the Chief of General Staff, force commanders, police chiefs and chiefs of the intelligence agencies. Likewise, the role of the Defense Committee in relation to issues such as the determination of the physical size of the military bureaucracy, remuneration policies, education level, and working and living conditions is limited to negotiating and accepting or refusing drafts prepared by the government and submitted to Parliament; rarely, proposals are submitted by members.

To conclude, we can argue that although legislative control over defense and security is limited, this stems not from the military’s prerogatives but from the lack of interest and capacity on the part of the legislators. The three most important areas in which reform is needed concern legislative oversight of security policies, military promotions and military procurement. This study therefore suggests that the Turkish military enjoys only moderate prerogatives in the area of legislative oversight.

9.3 Judicial Prerogatives (Moderate)

Since Turkey initiated its EU harmonization process, there have been five major changes restricting the military’s privileges in the legal system. Firstly, the State Security Courts, which had provided the military a permanent role in the judicial process, were abolished. Following this several amendments were made to the law on State Security Courts with an aim to harmonize its procedures with the civilian code of criminal procedure. Finally, on 18 June 2004, in the context of a package of reforms to the constitution, State Security Courts were replaced by the Specially Authorized Heavy Penal Courts.

The second improvement concerned the harmonization of military criminal law with the civilian code. A reform package amending 58 articles of the law on military courts that removed 127 articles in their entirety and 9 articles in part was passed toward this end on 29 June 2006. Provisions in the code of criminal procedure would now be applied in place of the annulled provisions. Accordingly, if there was an ECHR decision in favor of military or civilian persons who had been tried before a military court, that person would be able to request a retrial.

The third improvement concerns the narrowing of scope of military jurisdiction over civilians. As a result of legislation passed since the Europeanization process began, for example, military courts no longer exercise any jurisdiction over civilians; these courts’ jurisdiction is now limited to “military service and military duties”. In the past, civilians were tried in military courts under military law for offenses against military institutions; for obstructing, intimidating and insulting soldiers on duty; and in relation to charges of fraud in avoiding military service.\textsuperscript{506}

While these amendments initiated by political elites for harmonizing the military court system with the civilian system, the military judiciary itself has also taken important steps toward strengthening the independence and impartiality of military court system. In 2005, the General Staff Military Court petitioned to the Constitutional Court for the removal of officer members from military courts with this goal in mind. On 7 May 2009, the Constitutional Court upheld the Military Court’s petition and annulled the first clause of Article 2 of Law No. 353, making the military courts consist of only members of the military’s legal service. Other important changes in this direction were the initiatives of the High Military Administrative Court (HMAC) that petitioned to the Constitutional Court in 2006 for the annulment of Clause B of Article 12 of Law No. 357, which made the members of the military legal system dependent on the assessment reports of military authorities for their promotion. The Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the HMAC on 8 October 2009, making the promotion and assignment of military judges dependent only on professional assessment reports provided by the Military Court of Appeals and Council of Chambers. These changes were important not only for strengthening the independence and impartiality of military justice system, but also in demonstrating the military judiciary’s internalization of essential principles of democratic rule of law. It is interesting to note that despite the criticisms of the ECHR, Parliament itself failed to make any changes in these areas; only with the initiative of the military judiciary were these changes enforced by the Constitutional Court.

Finally, the military’s remaining privileges in the judicial sphere were constrained to an even greater extent via a 12 September 2010 referendum. The constitutional amendments contained in the referendum opened the trial of the Chief of Staff and the Commanders of the Land, Air, and Naval forces for offences related to their duties by the Constitutional Court. More importantly the controversial Article 15, which had prevented the prosecution of officials

\textsuperscript{506} In 2001, 176 cases involving 358 civilians were, for instance, dealt with by military courts. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3f4f250d0.pdf
involved in the military coup of 1980, was removed. The amendment on Article 125 opened the
decisions of the Supreme Military Council regarding discharges of any kind to judicial review.
Finally, the constitutional amendments on Articles 145 and 156-157 further restricted the
military court system and limited its scope.507

Perhaps the most concrete indicator of the TAF’s subordination to the rule of law in
practice has been the approach taken by military commanders themselves during the
investigations of Ergenekon, Sledgehammer (Balyoz), the September 12 coup, and the February
28 post-modern coup. The military’s acceptance of the trial of numerous members of the armed
forces by the civilian judiciary for past interventions or planned ones best demonstrates the
TAF’s acceptance of the civilian prerogative to control the military. Therefore, it is plausible to
conclude that during the post-Helsinki period, military prerogatives in the legal system both de
jure and de facto have been reduced from high to moderate. The current system is classified as
moderate rather than low due to the preservation of military high courts, which creates a double-
headed judiciary in the country.

9.4 Conclusion

The analysis of the military’s formal prerogatives shows that the Turkish military does
not currently enjoy strong political prerogatives in any of Stepan’s six indicators. Until 1989, the
Turkish military had enjoyed a strong indirect prerogative through its relationship with the
Turkish Head of State. With Ozal’s election to president, military prerogatives vis-à-vis the chief
executives, promotions (de facto) and intelligence were reduced from high to low without open
contestation on the part of the TAF. However, from Ozal’s death in 1993 until 2001, military
prerogatives in other areas remained intact; moreover, de facto military control over promotions
has returned to high. Particularly during the second half of the 1990s, the escalation of PKK
terror and the rise of political Islam had effectively diverted attention from other important
issues, a situation to which political leaders adapted. We can therefore argue that during the
second half of the 1990s, Turkey had a regime of unequal civilian accommodation, in which
civilian political leaders did not openly challenge the military’s latent structural powers. One of

507 The amendment made to Article 145 limits the competence of the military judiciary to the handling of military
offences and explicitly authorizes a civil judiciary for the prosecution of criminal offences committed by military
members against state security and the constitutional order. With the amendments made to Articles 156 and 157, the
organization and functioning of military courts – i.e. the Military Court of Cassation (Askeri Yargıtay) and the High
Military Administrative Court of Appeals – their procedures, disciplinary affairs, and other matters relating to the
status of their members were further harmonized in accordance with the principles of independence of the courts and
security of judges’ tenure.
the most significant indications of the military’s structural power was evident during the 
February 28 process during which the military, backed by weighty allies in bureaucratic, civil 
and political society, utilized its many various prerogatives to urge a series of measures that 
leaders of the democratic regime had to accept in order to avoid a full militarized coup. 

In the last decade, however, as Stepan predicts as inherent in a pattern of “unequal 
civilian accommodation” the electoral process produced a pro-reform government that imposed a 
series of reforms challenging the military’s prerogatives. Affecting what Stepan calls the 
“restoration” path of democratization, the military accepted the removal of its own power 
without contestation, since such a pattern was seen by both the military and civilian leaders as an 
integral aspect of the overall model of governance in the changing world order. In the current 
configuration, civil-military relations in Turkey can no longer be characterized as “unequal 
civilian accommodation”, but have rather shifted towards defective democratic control given the 
high and moderate levels of military’s institutional prerogatives as analyzed in this chapter.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation emerged out of the intersection of an academic problematic and a political concern. The prevalent controversy over the role of the military in Turkish politics and concern about militarism as a significant obstacle for formal and substantive democratization constituted the initial interest for this study. When this study began in 2007, there was wide disagreement about the extent of change in Turkey’s civil-military regime. Although the pace and scope of EU-harmonization laws were often considered impressive, the extent to which these reforms have resulted in real political change was subject to heated debate both within and outside of Turkey. For some observers, these reforms constituted nothing less than a “quiet revolution”.

They stated that EU reforms brought fundamental changes to civil-military relations in Turkey and that real progress has been made in the subordination of the armed forces to civilian democratic control.

The opposing view contended that despite formal reforms, there has been almost no change in the way the armed forces operate. From this perspective, the military continues to influence and even dominate political affairs. Demirel, for instance, states that “the Turkish army likely to enjoy its special place in the Turkish democracy for the foreseeable future” and that “patterns of military involvement in politics cannot be speedily altered” (2004, p. 144). According to Tuba Bilgic, “the civil-military reforms implemented since 2001, albeit impressive given the previous Turkish record, have not produced a similarly impressive decrease in the military’s political influence” (2009, p. 807). The EU commission seemed to agree with this argument, as it has continually criticized the undue political influence of Turkish military. In its 2005 Progress Report, the Commission noted that

Since 2002, Turkey has made good progress in reforming CMRs… but the armed forces continue to exercise significant political influence… and Turkey should work towards greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs in line with member states’ “best practices” (p.14)

508 A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the EU. (2003, July 31). Financial Times, Editorial. Also see: Salmoni 2003; Onis 2003, p.13; Diez, 2005, p. 168. Some authors compared this reform process with the comprehensive Westernization process that took place in the early Republican era. For example, Oran argued that “Turkey has experienced two waves of cagdaslastirma [modernization as Westernization]. As it is well-known, the first one was achieved by the Kemalist movement, which aimed at total Westernization in 1920s and 1930s. The second one has been taking place in 2000s, which aims at accession to the EU.” Oran 2005, p.112.

Zeyno Baran from the Hudson Institute seemed to be even more pessimistic about the state of democratic control in Turkey, suggesting in 2006 that the likelihood for a coup in 2007 was “50-50”.  

These conflicting statements indicated that as the military’s withdrawal to barracks entered its second decade, intense disagreement about the military’s role in Turkish politics persisted surrounding questions of the extent to which democratic control of the armed forces was actually institutionalized through the legislative changes that have been made. Considering that the extent to which such changes have been achieved is critical to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, as well as to the country’s prospects for integration into Europe, this study was initially motivated to conduct a systematic analysis of the role of the Turkish military in contemporary Turkish politics. Given that the most of the disparity in the scholarly and policy debates noted above stemmed from the lack of agreement on what the standards of democratic control are and how they should be measured, this study assessed the progress towards democratic control along three separate dimensions: institutional, behavioral and attitudinal.

To measure the institutional dimension of democratic control, this study employed Alfred Stepan’s widely-used military prerogatives indicators with an alternative measurement system recently designed by Samuel Fitch. The use of Stepan's measures demonstrated that the Turkish armed forces still enjoy significant privileges in the areas of defense coordination and internal functioning. However, a reorganization of this data following Fitch's guidelines made clear that the military retains much greater prerogatives with respect to its wide de facto institutional autonomy than to its limited political influence in civilian governance. The analysis of the Turkish military’s formal privileges showed that the Turkish military enjoys low/moderate prerogatives in Stepan’s six indicators of political autonomy; moderate/high prerogatives in Stepan’s four indicators of professional autonomy and low/moderate prerogatives in Stepan’s indicator of judicial autonomy. Using Fitch's criteria for democratic civil-military relations, which weights military political influence as a much more negative factor than institutional autonomy, the Turkish case is classified as shifting from a tutelary control regime to a defective democratic control regime in the last decade because the Turkish military continues to enjoy high prerogatives in the area of defense coordination and internal functioning. While the executive

branch is the supreme decision-maker in extra-military areas, legislative and public control over security and defense policies fail to meet Western standards. Similar to post-communist Europe, “first generation” issues such as the establishment of constitutional structures and the development of clear lines of responsibility between the military and the government are resolved but Turkey faces “second generation” problems of building effective defense policy-making structures, establishing legislative oversight, and developing wider civil-society input into defense and security debates.

The behavioral analysis of the strategic interaction of political and military leaders during ten years of AKP rule (November 2002–November 2012) showed an increase in military compliance to civilian directives, even when their preferences diverged. This was reflected in concrete policy outcomes on many “high politics” issues such as the 2003 Iraq War, policies toward Cyprus, and the military’s budget. Despite the General Staff’s pro-stance toward participation in the Iraq War, the war motion failed in Parliament; at every stage the civilian authority played the main role in shaping of defense policy in a crisis situation. Despite the reservations of military officers, the civilian administration also reshaped Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy to boost Turkey’s EU accession process. The Chief of General Staff remained compliant with the civilian directives by publicly recognizing that the continuation of the peace process and the decision to hold the referendum on Annan’s Cyprus plan is under the government’s responsibility and discretion. The removal of military prerogatives, the reduction of the military’s budget and crucially the investigation of active and retired military officers by civilians were also undertaken without military contestation. The cost-benefit calculation made by the Chiefs of General Staff has generally pointed in favor of accepting these civilian directives, rather than putting up resistance at the risk of losing its public credibility.

Concerning the long-term disengagement of the military from politics, Fitch (1998) argues that change of attitude is necessary in the military’s institutional self-image from that of political guardians to servants of the government. According to Fitch “to the extent that military officers reject democratic civilian control in principle, even regimes that have temporarily reduced the military’s political power are likely to face strong military resentment and continuing efforts to establish the military’s traditional prerogatives” (1998, p. 61). This study’s attitudinal analysis, which is based on primary data obtained from in-depth interviews, surveys, and content analysis of military press briefings, public statements, and speeches showed that military officers have learned the costs of their political activism. The majority of the subjects interviewed for this
study underlined that, although under the given circumstances military intervention was right thing to do, Turkey’s military regimes have negatively affected political life and the development of democracy in the country. The commanders also seem to conclude that the political activism of the Turkish military is self-destructive for the military’s institutional popularity and prestige. They are aware of the fact that military interventions, though conducted with fairly broad public support at the time, nevertheless alienated certain societal sectors and cumulatively resulted in the loss of military allies. The 1960 coup and the execution of leaders of the Democrat Party caused an irreparable damage to military ties with rural sector; the 1971 intervention alienated the progressive sector comprised of academics, Kemalist intellectuals, and left-wing movements that had been allied with the military ten years ago; the 1980 coup crushed leftists, while also jailing nationalists; and finally the 1997 post-modern coup victimized Islamists and alienated even the moderately pious among Turkey’s 96% Muslim population. The military commanders interviewed recognize that the process of securitization and criminalization of alternative lifestyles and identities has not strengthened but on the contrary has undermined the legitimacy of the Kemalist state in general, and the military in particular. The military officers also know by experience, that their involvement in politics leads to an erosion of their professionalism as well as loss of their international prestige, particularly among their colleagues in NATO. Therefore, they emphasize that the TAF wants to be outside of political debates and completely focus on professional activities. For the officers, the “coup era in Turkey is over”.

In addition to lesson-drawing, the awareness of Turkish officers that the current domestic and international climate unsympathetic to military’s political activism tames their reactions to challenges that they view unfavorably. Traditionally derived its legitimacy from its mission of modernizing society, the armed forces find it too costly to remain insensitive to Western views about their perceived illegitimate role in politics. The widely-covered criticisms of the EU about military’s informal influence through public deliberations, for instance, forced the military commanders to give up their habit of giving frequent statements to the press in informal and formal settings particularly in the post-2010 period. When they had to speak, commanders started to put more emphasis on their normative commitment to the democratic principles of pluralism, rule of law, separation of powers, accountability and transparency, suggesting the institutionalization and habitualization phase of norm-socialization. NATO’s post-cold war era orientation and mission also impacted on the military attitudes. There is a widely accepted view among commanders that the function of the Partnership for Peace programs is to orient its
participants toward the core democratic values of the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey’s active participation in PfP programs and opening of a PFP training center in Ankara facilitated the attitudinal change among Turkish officers. If they were in a position to project western values to the newly independent states, then, first they have to comply with them. Hilmi Ozkok (*Milliyet*, March 24, 2009), the chief of Turkish general staff (2002-2006) expressed this idea through the term “NATO-ism”. According to Ozkok, the new generation of Turkish military officers thought more democratically than their predecessors, because of their involvement in NATO structures. It is therefore not wrong to suggest that the ascendancy of liberal democratic norms of civil-military relations in international and domestic environments forced Turkish armed forces to undergo an internal transformation. Today, the military is less oriented toward intervention and more preoccupied with protecting its professional autonomy and institutional credibility.

This paradigmatic shift in Turkey’s civil-military relations challenges the conventional wisdom of the regime transition literature, which regards the military’s institutional powers at the outset of civilian rule as a virtually impenetrable shield against civilian supremacy. According to the mode of transition thesis, the Turkish armed forces should be able to preserve its power since its transition to electoral politics in 1983 was completely controlled by a unified military and resulted in extensive privileges for the Turkish military. In Terry Lynn Karl’s words, for example, the Third Turkish Republic was born with a permanent “birth defect” that, according to mode of transition thesis, should impede the democratization of civil-military relations (1990, p. 8).

This study’s findings suggest, however, that countries that return to civilian rule through the military’s own extrication need not be constrained indefinitely by the balance of forces prevailing in the transition and the immediate post-transition period. Power structures and institutional mechanisms established or reaffirmed during regime transitions are not necessarily immutable; rather, they can be successfully challenged and modified by a pro-change civilian government with persistent and strong electoral support and international backing. Comparative democratization literature shows that where domestic pressures for democratization are strong, international pressures provided critical leverage; where domestic pressure is weak or divided, international pressures exert less influence (Kutz and Sikkink, 2001). The transition literature, therefore, needs to be adjusted to fit the altered nature of international-domestic linkages.

A new layer of CMR above the national level needs to be added to explain patterns of CMR in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, it is possible to generalize the results of this study to
construct a broader theory claiming that external pressures, if present along with a favorable domestic setting in which there is a unified civilian coalition/or strong government with pro-change preferences, can accelerate and, crucially, enable the smooth transition to democratic control of the armed forces. International pressure is especially important when the ideological make-up of the government collides with military views or when the government embarks on reforms strongly disliked by the military. In such cases, external pressures can play a critical role in changing the balance of power in favor of civilian actors by increasing the costs of maintaining military prerogatives and thus providing incentives for democratic behavior, offering an anchor of legitimacy for reform processes, and generating new opportunities for disadvantaged actors with scarce domestic power positions.

Through public delegitimization, political isolation, suspension of benefits, international actors can increase the costs of maintaining military prerogatives. In the face of international opposition, it is more likely that military authorities move to comply with civilian directives. In the case of democratic control’s conditionality, as in the EU accession process, any attempts by military authorities to shape domestic politics will be met with punishment from the organization. The potential cost of a suspension of the accession process or financial benefits therefore contributes to the military’s compliance with civilian directives targeting its own prerogatives.

Secondly, membership or accession in regional organizations can help to legitimize policy-makers’ efforts to ensure completion of the demilitarization process since these organizations provide an external “seal of approval” to the domestic reform process. Rather than mere external agents of change, regional organizations therefore function as a tool for domestic actors. In the Turkish case, during the Cold War regional and international organizations failed to deter the Turkish military’s involvement in politics due to the predominance of hard-security concerns. Trans-Atlantic and European institutions had done little to punish the Turkish military when it intervened in 1960 and then again in 1971. This lack of action to punish Turkey on the part of the EC, Council of Europe, or NATO set a favorable precedent for the military’s coup in 1980. In the absence of punitive action by the Western powers, the military’s perception of vulnerability to external pressure was lowered. In this sense, the Turkish case illustrates the importance of the enforcement issue in discussing the effectiveness of regional organizations to promote democratic control, particularly and democratic regime in general.

In the post-Cold War era, the specific EU conditionality of military reform strengthened
civilians’ bargaining position vis-à-vis the military by providing an explicit list of reforms to be pursued as a pre-condition for beginning accession negotiations. Here the Turkish case serves to underscore the power that international norms have in shaping civil-military relations – under that right conditions. While the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe cleared the way for new democratic regimes, this did not happen in Kemalist Turkey during the 1990s. NATO membership and close ties to the US and Europe failed to facilitate democratization of CMR in the first decade of the post-Cold War era. As a developing country at the Western periphery that had historically resisted liberal conceptions of civil-military relations, Turkey thus represented a hard case to test the normative effects of IOs.

This study, however, showed that recognition of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 increased the credibility of EU demands at the domestic level; the EU’s explicit conditionality of military reform for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey has been shown to be the primary trigger for military reform. As Schimmelfennig (2003, 2007) suggests, the valuable and credible incentives offered by the EU after Helsinki changed the domestic opportunity structure in favor of political reform and helped the international promotion of norms to succeed. In the absence of such incentives, however, external efforts had failed to produce democratic change in Turkey, even with Turkey’s high linkages with the West. This study showed that the EU process has also played an important role in terms of agenda-setting. The Europeanization of Turkey’s civil-military problematique made the military’s institutional prerogatives a central item in the domestic agenda. Even more crucially, however, this thesis argued that this Europeanization reduced the civilians’ sense of powerlessness and thereby created an opportunity to reduce the military’s political clout.

This study also showed that EU conditionality works indirectly, through the differential empowerment of domestic actors, by changing the domestic opportunity structure in favor of those actors who expect to benefit from EU rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 672; 2005, pp. 11-12; Borzel and Risse, 2003, pp. 63-43; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, pp. 268-71). EU accession negotiations provide actors opportunities to the “rhetorical use” of EU norms as strategic resources to foster political parties’ interests in the domestic context (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Political actors who are systematically disadvantaged by the well-entrenched domestic standard of legitimacy have strong incentives to embrace the European standard of legitimacy. In the Turkish case, the neo-Islamist government and its civil society allies had independent incentives to reduce the political role of the military that threatened their survival. In the absence
of an external legitimization benchmark the AKP government, regardless of its legislative power, did not have sufficient clout to reduce the military’s power. Only after gaining sufficient strength and credibility from an external EU anchor did the Turkish government proceed with reforms targeting military prerogatives.

The developments since 2007, for example, demonstrate that the AKP utilized the EU accession process as a shield against its domestic opposition, as a legitimization resource in policy-making, and as a focal point in political coalition-building. Embracing EU accession as an overarching policy aim provided the AKP with such valuable resources in the domestic arena that even despite growing Euroscepticism among the population the AKP used these resources in the domestic crisis of 2007–08 and in promoting constitutional changes in September 2010. The strong institutional incentives and anchor of legitimacy offered by EU accession enabled the government to silence the military as a potential domestic veto player during those periods.

Thirdly, this study showed that credible incentives alone were not sufficient to produce path-breaking changes. Such incentives need to be combined with other conditions such as strong governmental will. For an institutional change to occur, the government must not only have the capacity to act but have a preference for change. This argument is in fact in line with the literature on institutional change. As Cortell and Peterson (1999) contend institutions change when the existing institutional equilibrium is called into question by international and domestic events. Such events, including electoral landslides or international norms, organizations and treaties, may open what John W. Kingdon (2003) calls “windows of opportunity” that provide policy officials with the potential to transform existing institutions. The ability of government to deliver institutional change is determined by its preferences and institutional capacity. In the Turkish case only the parliamentary elections of November 2002, which brought a single-party government with a strong pro-change preference to power, resulted in compliance with EU demands.

As a check on the optimism the institutionalist literature offers for change in CMR, this study also showed that although the EU’s conditionality of Turkey’s CMR alignment with that of Europe triggered a change in Turkey’s civil-military institutional equilibrium, the EU’s impact has weakened since 2006. The evolving nature of EU expectations, the perceived double standards of the EU, and the growing opposition of some Western European countries to Turkey’s accession since 2005 decreased the credibility and legitimacy of the EU conditionality, which, in turn, weakened the EU’s normative power in democracy promotion. It is indeed
impossible to miss the differences before and after December 2005. Constitutional changes approved in 2001 and then in 2002-2003 saw broad coalitions emerge to support EU-driven reforms, including the main opposition party (CHP) and the Turkish General Staff. Since late 2005, however, Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization lost its momentum.

Despite this slowing of democratic reform in general, the demilitarization process itself continued at a stronger pace in Turkey, thanks to three main factors: The miscalculation of general staff and the weakening its deterrence capacity; increasing political assertiveness of the AKP governments and domestic social mobilization against military. The behavior of the Turkish General Staff during the 2007 presidential crisis process, for example, conflicted with the prevalent pattern of military subordination and opened a path-breaking change in the societal component of Turkey’s civil-military regime. The military’s e-memorandum against the government’s presidential candidate was met with not only strong governmental reaction but also unprecedented public and media reaction. The military’s failure to shape the presidential elections according to its own preferences strengthened the officer corps’ inhibitions against military involvement in politics. This miscalculation of the General Staff also resulted in loss of military’s deterrent capacity since the chief of General Staff, Yasar Buyukanit, has never carried out the implicit threat included in the e-memorandum. From then on, military attempts to influence policy-makers faced a fundamental constraint – without a credible coup threat, military leaders found themselves with little recourse when the government refuses to accede to the policy preferences of the military or when the media publishes stories about the armed forces’ failures, scandals, and blunders.

Secondly, the military’s leverage has also been weakened thanks to the strategies of the AKP government. The AKP’s move to call for early elections during the presidential crisis, its effective strategy of victimization and its ability to garner mass support during the 2007 elections was critical for establishing civilian supremacy. The high level of support that the AKP gained both in parliamentary and presidential elections served to deter military from contesting the election of Abdullah Gul to the presidency by signaling increased costs of its political assertiveness. Indeed, as Hunter notes “the greater the mandate a given government enjoys, the less likely military elites will aggressively counteract civilian attempts to diminish their political role” (1995, p. 430).

Thirdly, as Sikkink and Risse’s (1999) spiral model predicts, a domestic anti-military alliance, empowered by concessions of the military institution at the initial stage of EU-triggered
domestic change, mounted its own campaign of delegitimation through widespread media coverage of alleged military scandals, leaked documents and wiretappings, and politically motivated court-cases. These developments have contributed to the decline of the TAF’s organizational unity, credibility, and capacity to counteract civilian actions. The publication of military wrongdoings also alienated large sectors of society from the military, which, in turn, not only created additional social constraints for military behavior but also facilitated an internal change process within the military. The excessive scale and scope of allegations represented a critical setback for the military in terms of its political role and social prestige, and carried the potential radically to alter the contours of its existence. As a result, the Turkish military was impelled to define a new role for itself to preserve its unity and dignity.

Particularly after the failed 2007 e-memorandum, the Turkish military High Command learned by experience that large segments of Turkish elite and society including business actors, intellectuals, liberals and nationalists no longer support the idea of a politically active military. The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer affairs have acted as a catalyst for greater public recognition of the military’s unjustified political activism and thus played an important role in military’s loss of public trust, credibility and legitimacy. Despite the prevalent concerns about the nature of these trials, for most of the public these cases represented the intense animosity of the military toward the popularly elected government and the former’s determination to use extra-legal means against the latter if necessary. Since late 2007, for example, the military and its allies have been weakened primarily by the rising power of their traditional targets – conservative Muslims and liberal intellectuals. Conservative Muslims, including the movement led by Fethullah Gulen, took advantage of structural factors such as Turkey’s EU membership process and increased international trade to expand their influence in the Turkish economy, media, and politics (Kuru, 2012).

The dominant perspective considers the increasing inclusiveness of these social segments to be a positive step in the democratization process. This view presents the AKP and the Gulen movement as antidotes to Turkish authoritarianism, the champion of “civil” democracy fighting against the country’s old-guard secular institutions led by the military and presenting a model for Muslim democracy (Akyol 2011; White 2002; Yavuz 2003, 2006, Yilmaz 2010).

While the above position views the AKP as a medium through which the differences of ordinary people in Turkey can come to the forefront and contribute to the progress of Turkish democracy, skeptics consider the AKP itself to be a threat to secular democracy. There is a
growing concern therefore among skeptics that what was once a secular authoritarian Turkish state under the tutelage of the military is now in the process of transforming into a moderate Islamist authoritarian state under the tutelage of a neo-Islamist alliance.

The findings of this study tend to support the second view. By conceptually differentiating “civilianization” from democratization, this study concludes that the AKP government’s trajectory reflects not democratic consolidation but competitive neo-conservative authoritarianism, which poses risks for the stability of the Turkish model in general. As discussed in Chapter 2, while the concept of civilianization refers to the process of replacement of military personnel and institutions in extra-military areas of the state apparatus with their civilian counterparts, democratization refers to the transformation from authoritarianism to democratic forms of governance in which basic liberal freedoms and rights are protected. This thesis concludes that despite the initial momentum of democratization-cum-Europeanization, the AKP administration since late 2005 has violated formal democratic rules so often and to such an extent that the Turkish regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democratic institutionalization.

A review of the literature on Turkish politics as well as reports by international organizations indicates growing concern over the creeping autocratic tendencies of the ruling AKP (Fabbe 2011; Muftuler-Bac and Keyman 2012; Gumuscu and Sert 2010; Fchislett 2009). The AKP’s lack of willingness to engage the opposition in a genuine dialog regarding important matters of constitutional change, especially those related to individual rights and identity issues, is underlined as an important barrier for democratic consolidation. Even the optimists, admit that “under the AKP, Turkey is still not a liberal democracy, despite the pattern of multiparty elections” (Taspinar, April 2012).

The 2014 presidential elections and Prime Minister Erdogan’s determination to change Turkey’s parliamentary regime to a presidential one without strong checks and balances, against this backdrop of the AKP’s growing authoritarian tendencies, clearly pose problems for political stability in Turkey. As Trinkunas and Pion-Berlin (2010) note, for example, between 1990 and 2004; 15 Latin American leaders were overthrown. In only two of the cases (Haiti and Ecuador) the military took an active role; in all other cases the leader’s removal was accomplished by the masses. The question arises therefore as to whether these “civilian coups” indicate that in the developing world democratic norms are improving, or that coup d’états are simply being undertaken by different actors. If Huntington's intuitions about an impending reverse
(antidemocratic) wave are correct (1996, pp.3-13), at least some democracies in the developing world may be facing a problem more fundamental than inadequate institutional mechanisms for controlling the armed forces. Such mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient to preserve democracy. If institutional fixes involving the armed forces are to remain effective, then the overall political system itself must be stable.

**To what extent are the patterns of Turkish civil-military relations and Turkey’s process of civilianization comparable to other regions?**

This study argued that international environment favoring civilian control such as ideological norm diffusion and conditionality increased the constraints of the Turkish military’s political activism, while domestic developments such as emergence of single-party majority government with pro-change preferences and domestic mobilization enabled the civilians to change the balance of power in their power. It also underlined organizational variables such as political learning and lack of internal cohesion for creating motives for the military’s disengagement from politics in Turkey.

**Favorable International Environment for military’s disengagement from politics**

This thesis also suggests that CMR in many countries of the developing world in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe underwent a paradigmatic change since the end of the Cold War at least partly due to changes in international security structure. During the 1990s, at least two major developments at the international level combined to undermine the position of the armed forces not only in Turkey but also in other developing nations. Firstly, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism removed the principal threats to national security, internal and external that had served to “justify” the military's power and existence. The very existence of the state in its territorial-political aspect is often dependent on the military’s coercive function, on its role as a “protector”, and in containing or repressing (often with external assistance) "communist" and "secessionist" rebels. Taken together, these factors resulted in the political activism of the military during the Cold War era as the state’s highly privileged servants. The end of the Cold War, however, has deprived authoritarian regimes of the important legitimizing claim of being less vulnerable to communist subversion than democratic governments.

Secondly, the end of the Cold War also dramatically reduced Western security threats in much of the world, which allowed democracy promotion to emerge as an important foreign policy objective. Thirdly, as the right to democracy or democratic governance within the international community is gained currency, norms of democratic control of armed forces in
particular, and security sector reform in general, has undergone a “renaissance” (Born, Haltiner, 
and Malesic, 2004, p. 1). As a result, the US, the EU, and individual Western governments 
stpped up efforts to promote democracy abroad through “political conditionality” in which 
Western states and multilateral institutions began to condition loans, aid, and other forms of 
assistance on respect for human rights, the holding of elections, and “good governance” 
including that of the security sector. These efforts went furthest in Europe, where full democracy 
was an explicit requirement for membership in the EU (Baun 2000; Kubicek; Linden 2002; 
Zielonka and Pravda 2001).

It was NATO, however, that played the primary role in the establishment of democratic 
control over the military in Eastern European countries. When the Warsaw Pact disbanded in the 
early 1990s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations posed a different problem to 
NATO than those developing nations that had remained in the Western orbit during the Cold 
War. Although the militaries of post-communist countries were not praetorian in nature, the 
Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes had developed a particular model of civil-
military relations in which the armed forces were deeply penetrated by the communist party but 
retained significant autonomy in relation to military matters. While the militaries of post-
communist countries were accustomed to civilian control, they were not familiar with democratic 
control norms and procedures. Political control over defense policy was weak, with military 
staffs – rather than civilian ministries of defense – controlling the structure and organization of 
the military. The party cells were present in all military units, and military promotion depended 
on formal loyalty to the party. The armed forces of CEE had, therefore, been politicized and 
routinely acted as instruments of communist political parties.

After the fall of the communist regimes, to find a way to absorb its former enemies, 
NATO introduced democratic control of armed forces. NATO required CEE states to de-
 politicize their militaries and establish new structures for “democratic” political control of the 
ammed forces and the defense policy to accede to the organization. The candidates complied with 
democratic conditionality. As it prepared for entry into the alliance Poland, for instance, 
committed to the de-politicization of its armed forces along Western standards through 
legislation and several rounds of senior personnel reduction. The Polish government also created 
a civilian defense ministry and ensured civilian control over the military in the defense minister’s 
office. The transparency of the defense budget was increased. Parliamentary oversight and 
supervision were established through the Sejm commissions, although the level of civilian
expertise in foreign and security policy remained limited, as in the case of other CEE countries (Michta, 2002 p. 175). The key to the establishment of civilian democratic control over the military in Poland was the subordination of the general staff to the authority of the defense minister. In addition, the government limited the tenure in office of the senior officer corps and introduced periodic rotation of the chief of general staff. According to Micta, Polish civil-military relations underwent a revolution between 1991 and 1999, demonstrating that the norm-setting value of the Western standard is of utmost importance for democratizing polities that aspire to join Western security institutions (2002, p. 175).

In Hungary, policy makers similarly dealt with the integration of the military and the general staff into the defense ministry, only after experts from NATO countries declared it a necessity (Molnar, 2003, p. 85). In the Czech Republic, too, the requirements of NATO membership provided an incentive for comprehensive improvements in many aspects of defense, including budgeting, management, procurement, and personnel and social policy (Tuma, 2006, p. 55).

The impact of NATO was even more evident in its second post-Cold War enlargement round, due to the introduction of a clearer set of standards for candidate countries. The rejection of Romania’s accession to NATO in the Madrid Summit of 1997 and the introduction of MAP in April 1999, for instance, were important in accelerating the pace of defense reform in the country (Stan, 2007, p. 71). In 1999, Romanian decision makers asked Western advisers to become directly involved in identifying national priorities in the areas of defense and security and to formulate strategies for the achievement of these priorities (Gheciu, 2005, p. 185). Thus, in early 1999, a NATO associate-general became the de facto main author of the chapter on security issues in the Romanian Annual National Program. Moreover, he presented the program to NATO’s North Atlantic Council in the spring of 1999 and received feedback on behalf of Romania (Ibid). In brief, not only was the Romanian defense reform agenda composed by NATO and Romanian officials but, after 1999, NATO acquired the power to participate in crafting basic institutions of the Romanian state through Romania’s National Programs and security legislation. In line with this reform agenda the composition of the armed forces was readjusted, the conscription system in favor of volunteer forces was abandoned, and major steps were taken to implement the US’s planning, programming, and budgeting system. The ministries of defense and interior were civilianized, and the transparency and accountability of defense institutions were improved.
In Bulgaria, the actual progress of joining NATO was slow, due to a series of weak coalition governments that ruled from the end of the one-party rule until 1997. The formation of a strong, one-party government by the Union of Democratic Forces accelerated the process of the country’s accession to NATO as well as the reforms required for it. On 17 March 1997, Bulgaria adopted its national program for preparation and accession to NATO and set up an intergovernmental committee on NATO integration. In 1998, the UDF government implemented plans to reduce sharply the size of the Bulgarian army along with other steps to bring the army into line with NATO standards (Linden, 2002, p. 190).

The Baltic states and Slovenia also made progress in establishing national armed forces with a democratic, civilian control at the core as they prepared for the accession to NATO (Herd 2003; Zulean 2003). NATO membership was a badge of belonging and an eternal guarantee of stability against military threats to territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Particularly with the introduction of the Membership Action Plan in 1999, democratic civil-military relations became the focus of Baltic Security Policies (Herd, 2003, p. 127).

In short, as a political and military alliance, NATO played a decisive role both in “promoting civilian control of armed forces” and in “setting the agenda for structural reform across the military organizations” in the CEE (Edmunds, 2003, p. 145). The goal of returning to the West, an ultimate guarantee of the CEE countries’ continued independence, proved strong enough to eliminate their historical patterns of politicized militaries. External incentives such as membership to a security institution, however, were not the only reasons these countries complied with Western standards. Rather, they were involved in the process of transcending the stigma of communism and in building a liberal democratic identity. As part of this process, they accepted Western guidance regarding the appropriate normative content of liberal democracy and sought to learn and implement the corresponding norms (Gheciu, 2005, p. 82). Their identification with the Euro-Atlantic security community also played a positive role in the implementation of their military/defense reforms. With the majority of post-communist states seeking membership in the EU or NATO, the Western model of CMR acquired particular relevance and appeal.

While international organizations have acted as a major catalyst in advancing the democratic direction of the military in the CEE as well as in Turkey, their impact in South-European countries was secondary (Pridham 1991, Aguero 1995). While the foundations for successful civilianization of the military were being set as a result of factors outside the EU’s
competence and jurisdiction, the EU factor forced various interest groups including the military to comply with stringent membership conditions regarding their roles in public life (Messas, 1996, p. 166). According to Pridham, the desire in South European countries for EU membership exerted a powerful, though not always explicit, incentive for democratization. The degree of impact of the EU depended “partly on how much in practice external emphasis on this option… was transmitted into policy priority at home, and partly on whether, in turn, that influenced the wider political arena outside elite circles” (1991, pp. 226-7). According to Story and Pollack, “the international environment was a crucial conditioning factor” in Spain’s transition to democracy (1991, p. 152, emphasis added). Western European states’ central demand on Spain to join NATO and the EU would finally seal the country’s domestic transition (Ibid, p.133). The abolition of the separate ministries that each of the armed services held and the establishment of a unified defense ministry in 1977, along with the withdrawal of the military from judicial sphere by the Suarez administration, was facilitated by Spain’s desire to accede to NATO (Ibid, p. 136).

In Portugal the most important pressure for a liberal democratic state came from “institutional actors such as NATO, EFTA and the EC, which were able to influence domestic elites by promising give or withhold diplomatic, financial, and moral support unless progress toward the preferred outcome was visible” (Opello, 1991, p. 101). In Greece although the process of transition was triggered by the Cyprus debacle of July 1974 and the split in the anti-communist right-wing bloc that was followed, the EU played a significant role in undermining the credibility and international status of the colonels’ regime by freezing the 1962 Association Agreement (Verney and Couloumbis, 1991, p. 109). External disapproval also played an important role internally by reinforcing passive resistance to the Greek junta, never allowing it to develop a viable base (Ibid, p. 111).

On a more practical level, the European Union’s call for democratization as a precondition for membership strengthened the hand of civilian authorities over military wishes (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, p.414). The new democratic elite wisely used the EU factor to establish a hierarchical pattern of decision-making whereby the armed forces would be subordinate to civilian leadership (Ibid). The EU’s stringent rules on democratic government acted, for instance, as a powerful motivation for Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis to advance the elections in November 1974. “The fact the [European Union] had differentiated its attitude towards the military government from that of the US, together with its insistence that membership was open only to states with democratically elected governments led both the Right
... and the Centre to regard accession as the best safeguard for Greece’s fledgling democratic institutions” (Verney, 1987, p. 259). EU membership was therefore a safety valve for the irreversibility of democratic practices (Verney, 1990, p. 208). The military, faced with a new set of circumstances resulting from the popular government’s repeated calls for EU entry and its own reduced credibility, duly obliged. Furthermore, the “Europeanization of political perspectives” allowed Greek politicians, civil servants, and officials to internalize the norms and procedures of a democratically structured polity and transmit them to the wider public (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, p.414-5).

In Latin America, it seems that it was the change of US policy and democratic criteria institutionalized in regional organizations that externally provided an opportunity for civilian politicians to establish their supremacy. In 1995, for instance, Chile’s application for membership in NAFTA was undermined by military insubordination over an order by the Chilean Supreme Court to incarcerate a senior general who had served as chief of intelligence under the previous dictatorship. In this case, civil-military conflict was cited directly by US lawmakers in their decision to put off negotiations with this country on its entry into NAFTA (McFaul 1995). In October 1998 the former military dictator of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, was arrested in London and forced to face extradition proceedings to Spain, where a Spanish judge threatened to put him on trial for human rights violations. Pinochet's arrest in London opened the path for the subsequent reinvigoration of the issues of democratic control of armed forces, particularly the issue of amnesty of military personnel for human rights violations. Chile’s departure from the impunity of its military junta was, therefore, a consequence of actions taken by international actors (Evans 2006).

In Brazil, which is considered as a hard-case, President Cardoso created a unified ministry of defense in 1998. The commanders of the three armed services lost their status as ministers and came under the rule of a minister of defense (and, ultimately, of the president, who is constitutionally the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces). The Joint Chief of Staff became extinct, and the president’s top military adviser lost the status of minister as his duties were incorporated into an Institutional Security Office (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional), a civilian agency. Zaverucha argues that establishment of a defense ministry was “a political maneuver to strengthen the Brazilian candidacy for a seat on the UN Security Council, since it would be difficult to explain to the world how a country with a seat on that Council could aspire to participate in decisions regarding international security, having four military ministers
answering for the defense cabinet” (2006, p. 3). International factors such as conditionality and foreign policy thus play an important role in cases of shifting CMR in various regions in the post-Cold War era as they did in Turkey.

Unfavorable domestic environment for military’s political activism: Militaries’ loss of civilian support

Another exogenous – but in this case domestic – variable that created an opportunity for increasing civilian democratic control in Latin America, as in Turkey, came from changes that were occurring in the region’s once passive civil societies. During the 1980s the excesses of repression, corruption, and arrogance by the armed forces destroyed the rest of what institutional legitimacy had survived military reformism in the late 1970s (Ruhl, 1996, p. 42). For the most part, however, the citizens of Latin American countries did not begin to let their resentment of and contempt for the military show until a more open political climate began to emerge at the end of the Cold War. Emboldened by the new US position, in the 1990s a number of groups including students, unions, business associations, human rights organizations, and the Catholic Church combined to mount a unified political attack on the armed forces in much of Latin America (Ibid; Huber and Stephens, 1997, p. 7). As fears of military reprisals subsided, this antimilitary coalition gained strength with every concession by the high command. The mass media played a critical role in this process by providing a steady stream of fresh revelations about military wrongdoing and issuing derogatory editorials that combined to further undermine the institution's reputation and self-confidence (Ruhl, 1996, p. 43). Business associations, as the strongest organized groups in Latin American as well as in Turkish societies, were increasingly to be found in the ranks of the growing antimilitary movement (Ibid). The failure of many authoritarian regimes in Latin America and elsewhere “to create favorable conditions for economic growth and to provide a secure and predictable environment for capital accumulation has played a decisive role in the conversion of business to part of the pro-democratization coalition” (Onis and Turem, 2010). The participation of the business sector in the antimilitary coalition gave the movement unexpected breadth. Moreover, the broad consensus that was emerging from civil society on the need for redefining civil-military relations emboldened and encouraged politicians of both parties, traditionally reluctant in this area, to confront the military.

Organizational factors that dispose the militaries to remain in barracks: Political learning and lack of internal cohesion

South American cases support this study’s argument that political learning plays an
important role in military behavior in the post-Cold War era. Most militaries in South America, as in Turkey, came to the decision that authoritarian rule was not necessarily in the corporate interests of the armed forces (Hunter, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001; Huntington, 1995; Fitch 1998; 2001, Pion-Berlin 1992, Ruhl 1996). The failed policies and immoral practices of military governments in South America directly harmed the military institutions themselves. Many military officers thus preferred to dissociate themselves from authoritarian legacies. According Pion-Berlin, “military incompetence, self-aggrandizement, and repression while in office contributed not only to an unprecedented repudiation of the profession by civil society but also to a crisis of identity among many in the officer corps as well” (1992, p. 86). Consequently military stature, unity and self-confidence had declined measurably in countries like Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay by the time power was transferred to civilian hands. Anxious to protect themselves from the divisive and corrosive influences of political office, militaries have since practiced coup avoidance behavior.

Second, the ideological unity among officer corps seems to have dissolved since the end of Cold War not only in Turkey but also in different parts of the world. The armed forces no longer coalesce as easily around common ideological themes as they once did. Indeed, there is a greater diversity of positions within the officer corps about the proper function of the armed forces in society, as well as genuine uncertainty over the institution’s primary missions. As Pion-Berlin underlines “old security fears of communist subversion, which hitherto served as a focal point for military coalescence, have been rendered nearly obsolete by dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” (1992, p. 86). Officers are now more reticent to take on the dual role of soldier and politician and more likely to acknowledge that there are boundaries between professional and political conduct (Ibid).

Finally, military forces in even the most advanced democracies are also in a process of change. We are witnessing the emergence of a post-modern military confronted with five challenges (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 1999). First, the traditional values of honor and fatherland are increasingly challenged by universal values such as freedom, democracy, and justice. Second, although fighting capacities remain important, other tasks – so-called missions other than war – are gaining relevance. The postmodern soldier is “not only a fighter but also a peacekeeper, policeman, diplomat, social worker, and Peace Corps worker” (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006, p. 3). Third, the military is increasingly becoming internationalized. Multinational forces such as NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, the EU’s Eurocorps, and the UN Standby
High Readiness Brigade are examples of this process (Ibid). Fourth, an ongoing “revolution in military affairs” is changing the manner of waging war and intervention (Ibid, Metz and Kievit, 1995). Fifth, the dynamics of professional assertiveness and politicization of the military profession are widely debated in the officer corps of advanced as well as developing democracies.

In the last decade in the UK, for instance, “almost every aspect of the military justice system has also come under intense scrutiny from issues such as the independence from the chain of command, to the standard of proof used, and the quality of military investigations” (Forster, 2012, p. 181). In the UK, the military justice system emerged as a contentious issue, and the objection of senior British Army commanders against reform in this area raised questions of the extent of democratic civilian control of armed forces in peace-building operations (Ibid).

Many commentators have similarly argued that American civil-military relations have been under stress in recent years – described as being in “crisis” (Avant, 1998), or even “out of control” (Kohn, 1994). While some writers were quick to attribute the tensions to the particular character of President Bill Clinton’s policies, evidence of civil-military disagreements under President George W. Bush suggests deeper causes (Stevenson, 2006, p. 194). One concern is that the US military may be becoming an “interest group” with parochial concerns in tension with its role as guardian (Ibid, p. 195).

Further tensions in CMR in advanced democracies are examined in Born et al (2006), which demonstrates that military personnel have publicly criticized or disregarded decisions of the governments in France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Poland, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Switzerland. Case studies involving protesting French gendarmerie officers and the spouses of Irish military servicemen, for example, show that public criticisms were generated by a perceived imbalance in civil-military relations. In these cases, political masters were seen as profiting from the work of the military while not sufficiently compensating the latter for its work (Born et al 2006). The fact that the French and Irish governments accepted the demands of their respective protestors is de facto proof of the government’s acknowledgement of the military’s grievances (Born et al, p. 252). It would be an exaggeration to perceive these forms of protest as the default reply of the military every time it disagrees with political authorities (Ibid., p. 251). Indeed, disagreements between the military and political leaders happen frequently even in advanced liberal democracies, and should be viewed in defective democracies such as Turkey as part of the ordinary civil-military discourse rather than as an overt example of military non-
subordination.

To conclude, this study suggests that in the Trans-Atlantic security community, because the primacy of politics is an acknowledged principle not only in established but also in transitional and consolidating democracies, the main problem of civil-military relations is no longer how to avoid military coups. However, the absence of military coups does not imply the presence of harmony and an absence of tension. Tensions in civil-military relations in members of Trans-Atlantic security community have surfaced in the last two decades, a period in which the civilian leadership wanted to limit the autonomy and prerogatives that militaries enjoy, especially in post-authoritarian countries. As any other professional group pursuing its corporate interests, the military in turn tried to protect its interests from outside control. Armed forces all over the world seem to have had greater success in guarding core internal professional functions covering issues of operations budget planning, military justice, military education, and defense reform than those lying more on the periphery. Levels of military autonomy over functions perceived to be clearly internal to the profession are higher; levels are lower for functions that are situated either in a gray zone between professional and political spheres of influence or within the political sphere itself.

This study demonstrates the conditions under which substantial military reform can occur even when the military traditionally exerts a strong influence. Contrary to the modes of transition argument, which expects persistent military influence based on institutional structures that are frozen into place during the regime transition, the political clout of the military in Turkey has considerably weakened in the last decade. From 2002 to 2013, in an arguably difficult and often conflictual process, the AKP succeeded in gradually pushing the army out of civilian affairs. An important impetus for this shift was Turkey’s desire to join the EU, a goal which required such a shift in order to fulfill EU accession criteria. The Turkish case therefore proves that even a heavily influential army can be brought back to the barracks if civilians have enough legitimacy and domestic as well as international support to do so. As such, Turkey provides important lessons for today’s Middle Eastern countries in which future, predominantly Islamist-led governments will have to negotiate the gradual exit of their generals from civilian affairs.
APPENDIX A: A List of Interviews on Changes in Turkish Civil-Military Relations

Abdullatif Sener, Former Minister of Finance from AKP (Ankara, 2008).
Ali Riza Alaboyun, Deputy from AKP, Deputy chief of Turkey-EU mixed Parliamentary Commission and head of NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATOPA), Ankara 2008.
Armagan Kuloglu, Major Retired General, former President of ASAM (Euro-Asian Strategic Research Centre) (Ankara, 2008).
Cumhur Evcil, Retired Major General, President of Kadikoy Retired Officers’ Association (Istanbul, 2008).
Emre Gonensay, Former Foreign Minister from DYP (Istanbul, 2008).
Erdal Sipahi, Retired Major General, Deputy from MHP (Ankara, 2008).
Faruk Logoglu, Former Ambassador, Deputy from CHP (Ankara, 2008).
Fikri Saglar, Former Ministers of State and culture from CHP, Member of Susurluk Commission, (Ankara, 2008).
Gunduz Aktan, Former Ambassador and Deputy from MHP (Ankara, 2008).
Inal Batu, Former Ambassador, Former Deputy from CHP (Istanbul, 2008).
Kursat Atilgan, Retired Brigadier General, Deputy from MHP (Ankara, 2008).
Mehmet Dulger, Former Deputy from AKP, Former Head of Foreign Relations Commission (Ankara, 2008)
Murat Mercan, Deputy from AKP, Head of Parliamentary Foreign Relations Commission (Ankara, 2008)
Onur Oymen, Vice President of CHP, former Ambassador (Ankara, 2008; Istanbul, 2011).
Ozdem Sanberk, Former Ambassador, Former Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.
(Istanbul, 2008).

Prof. Metin Heper, Specialist on Turkish civil-military relations, Bilkent University (Ankara, 2008)

Prof. William Hale, Specialist on Turkish civil-military relations (Istanbul, 2008).

Reha Denemec, Deputy Chairman of AKP and Former Advisor of P. Minister Erdogan (Ankara, 2008).

Retired officers with the rank of colonel or below, from the Retired Officers’ Association (Ankara, Istanbul, Eskisehir, 2008).

Rıza Kucukoglu, Major Retired General, Head of Retired Officers’ Association (TESUD) (Ankara, 2008).

Saadettin Tantan, former director of National Police and Former Minister of Internal Affairs from ANAP (Istanbul, 2008)

Sadullah Ergin, Minister of Justice from AKP (Ankara, 2008)

Selahattin Aydin, Deputy from AKP (Ankara, 2008).

Sener Eruygur, Retired (full) General, Former Head of Gendarmerie (Istanbul, 2008)

Sirri Sakik, Deputy, Founder of BDP (Ankara, 2008).

Soli Ozel, columnist in Haberturk, expert on International Relations, Bilgi University (Istanbul, 2011).

Tuncer Kılınc, Retired General, Former Secretary General of NSC (Ankara, 2008).


Yasar Dedelek, Former Minister of State from DYP (Eskisehir, 2008).

Yasar Karagoz, Retired Major General (Ankara, 2008; 2010)

Yasar Yakis, Former Foreign Minister from AKP (Ankara, 2008).
APPENDIX B: Elections Results 1950-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>LEADER</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>No. of MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 1950</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 89.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
<td>Celal Bayar</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Ismet Inonu</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Party</td>
<td>Yusuf Hikmet Bayur</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2, 1954</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 89.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
<td>Adnan Menderes</td>
<td>57.61</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Ismet Inonu</td>
<td>35.36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Nation Party</td>
<td>Osman Bolukbasi</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 27, 1957</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 76.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
<td>Adnan Menderes</td>
<td>47.88</td>
<td>424</td>
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<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Ismet Inonu</td>
<td>41.09</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15, 1961</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 81.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Ismet Inonu</td>
<td>36.74</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>Ragip GumuspaIa</td>
<td>34.79</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10, 1965</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 71.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>52.87</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Ismet Inonu</td>
<td>28.75</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12, 1969</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 64.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>46.55</td>
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<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Ismet Inonu</td>
<td>27.37</td>
<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust Party</td>
<td>Turhan Feyzioglu</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1977</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 66.8</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
<td>185</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>149</td>
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<td>Republican Trust Party</td>
<td>Turhan Feyzioglu</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>TURNOUT 72.4</td>
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<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>Bulent Ecevit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>36.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
<td>Necmettin Erbakan</td>
<td>8.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist Action Party</td>
<td>Alparslan Turkse</td>
<td>6.42</td>
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<td>Republican Trust Party</td>
<td>Turhan Feyzioglu</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Ferruh Bozbeyli</td>
<td>1.85</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX C: Turkish Governments (1961-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Government</th>
<th>Government Members</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>Oct. 27, 1965-Nov. 3, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1969-March 6, 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>March 6, 1970-March 26, 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>CHP-MSP</td>
<td>Bulent Ecevit</td>
<td>Jan. 26, 1974-Nov. 1, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Above-Party Government</td>
<td>Mahmut Sadi Irmak</td>
<td>Nov. 17, 1974-Mar. 31, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>CHP-RTP-DP-Independents</td>
<td>Bulent Ecevit</td>
<td>Jan. 5, 1978-Nov. 12, 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>AP (Minority Government)</td>
<td>Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>Nov. 12, 1979-Sep. 12, 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council held its regular monthly meeting under the chairmanship of the President and with the participation of Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, Chiefs of Armed Forces, Chief of Gendarmerie, and the NSC secretary-general.

2. At this meeting, the council examined and evaluated the threat and dangers that result from destructive activities and statements aimed at tearing down the republican regime and the democratic, secular, and social state based on rule of law—which is committed to Ataturk nationalism and whose basis and characteristics are described by the Constitution—and replacing it with a political religious order.

3. As a result of this evaluation, it is unanimously agreed that
   a. Groups aiming to create an Islamic republic based on sharia law in Turkey constitute a multi-directional threat to the constitutionally defined democratic, secular, social state that is based on rule of law.
   b. Fundamentalist groups opposing the republic and the regime are trying to weaken the democratic, secular, social-law state by making secular and anti-secular distinctions.
   c. In Turkey, secularism is a guarantee not only for the regime but also for democracy and public peace, and it is also a way of life.
   d. The principles of the rule of law, social state and justice, which are the structural essence of the state, cannot be abandoned; failing to investigate the non-contemporary practices that disregard the law is incompatible with the principle of rule of law,

4. As a result of these views and evaluations, it is decided that
   a. The cabinet should be informed that it should take the measures listed in Annex A in the short, medium, and long term in order to prevent the multi-directional threat to our republic—a democratic, secular, social-law state—by groups aiming to create an Islamic republic based on sharia law in Turkey.
   b. The NSC General Secretariat, according to Article 9 of Law no. 2945 on the NSC and the NSC General Secretariat, should, at regular intervals, brief the Prime Minister, the President, and the NSC on the results of cabinet decisions pertaining to the measures listed in Annex A, as well as those measures that did not become cabinet decisions.
ANNEX A To NSC’s Decision No: 406: Necessary Measures to be Taken against Anti-Regime Fundamentalist Activities (The Eighteen Recommendations)

1- The principle of laicism which is one of the fundamental tenets of the Republic and which is guaranteed under Article 4 of the Constitution is to be safeguard meticulously. Existing laws safeguarding the principle of laicism is to be enforced efficiently. If existing laws are insufficient in practice, new arrangements must be made.

2- Private dormitories, foundations, schools, connected with religious sects must be inspected by the authorities and they must be subordinated to the Ministry of National Education in accordance with the Law on Unified Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu).

3- To make young generation conscious of Republic, Ataturk, homeland and Nation and the aim and ideal of raising Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization and to protect them from sphere of influence of the various quarters:
   a- 8 years uninterrupted education program is to be put into practice throughout the country.
   b- The necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Koran courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate only under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of National Education.

4- Our national education institutes charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the Republican regime and Ataturk's principles and reforms, must conform to the essence of the Law on Unified Education.

5- Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political exploitation to send messages to certain circles. If there is a need for such facilities, the Directorate of Religious Affairs should evaluate the need, and the facilities must be built in coordination with local governments and relevant authorities.

6- Activities of religious orders banned by Law no. 677, as well as all entities prohibited by said law, must be ended.

7- Media groups that oppose the TAF and its members should be brought under control. These [groups] try to depict the TAF as inimical to religion by exploiting the issue of personnel whose ties to the TAF have been severed by decisions of the Supreme Military Council based on their fundamentalist activities.

8- The personnel dismissed from Turkish Armed Forces due to their fundamentalist activities, disciplinary reasons or connection with illegal organizations must not be employed by
other public agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged.

9- The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration into the TAF by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other public institutions and establishments, particularly in universities and other educational institutions, at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments.

10- Iran's efforts to destabilize Turkey's regime should be closely watched. Policies that would prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey's internal affairs should be adopted.

11- Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the very dangerous activities of the extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarization in society by fanning sectarian differences.

12- Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that contravene the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, the Law on Political Parties, the Turkish Penal Code, and especially the Law on Municipalities should be concluded in a short period of time, and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow repetition of such incidents.

13- Practices that violate the attire law (headscarves, etc.) and that may give Turkey an anachronistic image must be prevented.

14- Licensing procedures for short and long barrel weapons, which have been issued for various reasons, must be reorganized on the basis of police and gendarmerie districts. Restrictions must be introduced on this issue, and the demand for pump-action rifles, in particular, must be evaluated carefully.

15- The collection of [animal] sacrifice hides by anti-regime and uncontrolled [unregulated] organizations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial resources should be prevented, and no collection of sacrifice hides should be allowed outside the authority recognized by law.

16- Legal proceedings against bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those responsible for them should be concluded speedily, and, taking into account the fact that such illegal practices might reach dangerous proportions, all private bodyguard units not envisaged by the law should be disbanded.

17- Initiatives that aim at solving the country's problems on the basis of "umma" [religious community] rather than "nation" and that encourage the separatist terror organization (Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) by approaching it on the same basis [i.e., as a part of the umma] should be prevented by legal and administrative means.
18- Law no. 5816, which defines crimes against the great savior Ataturk, including acts of disrespect, must be fully implemented".
APPENDIX E: Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Karar 406 (NSC Decision N0: 406, in Original Turkish)


2. Kurulun bu toplantısında, esasları ve nitelikleri Anayasada belirlenmiş, Ataturk milliyetciligine baglı, demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devletimizi ve cumhuriyet rejimimizi yıkmak, onun yerine bir siyasal dini düzen kurmak amaciyla yurutulen yıkıcı faliyetler ve yapılan beyanlar ile bunların olusturdugu tehdit ve tehlikeler gozden gecirilerek degerlendirilmiştir.

3. Yapılan bu degerlendirmeler sonucunda:
   a. Ulkemizde seriat hukukuna dayali bir İslam Cumhuriyeti kumrayi hedefleyen grupların, Anayasanın tanımladığı demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devletimize karsi çok yonlu bir tehdit oluşturduğu,
   b. Cumhuriyet ve rejim aleyhtari asiri dinci grupların laik ve anti-laik ayrımı ile demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devletini gúcüşüleştirmeye yeltendikleri,
   c. Türkiye'de laikliğin sadece rejimin değil, aynı zamanda demokrasinin ve toplum huzurunun da teminati ve bir yaşam tarzi oldugu
   d. Devletin yapisal ozunu olusturan sosyal hukuk devleti ve adalet ilkeleri anlayisindan vazgecilemiyecgi, yasalar göz ardi edilerek yapılan yasa disi uygulamaların takipsiz kilinmasının hukukun üstünüğü ilkesiyle bagdasmayacagi hususlarinda gorus birligine varilmistir.

4. Bu gorus ve degerlendirmeler sonucunda:
   a. Türkiye'de seriat hukukuna dayali bir İslam Cumhuriyeti kumrayi amaçlayan asiri dinci grupların demokratik, laik, ve sosyal hukuk devleti olan Cumhuriyetimize karsi olusturdukları çok yonlu tehditin onlenmesi amaciyla Ek-A’ daki tedbirlerin kısa, orta ve uzun vade icerisinde alınmasının Bakanlar Kuruluuna bildirilmesine,
   b. 2945 Sayili MGK ve MGK Genel Sekreterligi Kanunun 9. maddesine uygun olarak, MGK Genel Sekreterligi tarafından: Ek'te belirtilen tedbirlere iliskin Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları ile Bakanlar Kurulu Karan haline getirilmeyen uygulamaların, sonuclari hakkında beli sureler
icerisinde Basbakan, Cumhurbaskani ve MGK'na bilgi verilmesi kararlaştırılmştir.

Milli Guvenlik Kurulu’nun 28 Subat 1997 Tarih ve 406 Sayılı Kararına EK-A (Rejim Aleyhtari Irticai Faaliyetlere Karsı Alınması Gereken Tedbirler)

1. Anayasamızda Cumhuriyetin temel nitelikleri arasında yer alan ve yine anayasanın 4. maddesi ile teminat altına alınan laiklik ilkesi büyük bir titizlik ve hassasiyetle korunmalı bunun korunması için mevcut yasalar hiçbir ayrım gözmeteksizin uygulanmalı, mevcut yasalar uygulamada yetersiz kalıyorsa yeni düzenlemeler yapılmalıdır.

2. Tarikatlara bagıntılı özel yurt vakıflar devletin yetkili organlarca denetim altında alınarak Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu gereği Milli Egitim Bakanlığina devri sağlanmalıdır.

3. Genc nesillerin korpe dimağının oncelikle Cumhuriyet, Ataturk, Vatan ve Millet sevgisi, Türk Milleti cagdas uygurduygu düzeyine镯ma ulku ve amacı doğrultusunda bilincendirilmesi ve cesitli mhiyakların etkisinden korunması bakımından:
   a. 8 yıllık kesintisiz eğitim, tüm yurta uygulamaya konulmalı.
   b. Temel eğitimi alımcı çocukların, ailelerinin isteğine bağlı olarak, devam edebileceği kuran kurslarının Milli Egitim Bakanlığı sorumluluğu ve kontrolünde faaliyet getirmeleri için gerekli idari ve yasal düzenlemeler yapılmalıdır

4. Cumhuriyet rejimine ve Ataturk like ve inkilaplarca sadık aydın din adamları yetistirmekle yükümlü Milli Egitim kurumlarımız Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanununun özüne uygun ihtiyacı düzeyinde tutulmalıdır.

5. Yurdun cesitli yerlerinde yapılan dini tesisler belli çevrelere mesaj vermek amacıyla gündemde tutularak siyasi istismar konusu yapılmamalı, bu tislere ihtiyac varsa, bunlar Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığınca inceleme mahalli yönetimler ve ilgili makamlar arasında koordine edilerek gerçekleştirmelidir.

6. Mevcudiyetleri 677 Sayılı yasa ile men edilmiş tariktan ve bu kanunla belirtilen tüm unsurların faaliyetlerine son verilmesi, toplumun demokratik, siyasi ve sosyal hukuk duzeninin zedelenmesi onlenmalıdır.

7. Irticai faaliyetleri nedeniyle Yuksek Askeri Sura kararları ile Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK)’nden iliskileri kesilen personel konusu istismar edilerek TSK’ ni dine karşıtı gibi göstermeye calisan bazı medya gruplarının silahlı kuvvetler ve mensupları aleyhindeki yayınlar kontrol altında alınmalıdır.

8. irticai faaliyetleri disiplinsizlıklar veya yasadışı orgutlara irihatları nedeniyle TSK’den iliskileri kesilen personelin diğer kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarında istihdami ile tespik
unsuruna imkan verilmemelidir.

9. Turk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine asiri dinci kesimden sizmalari onleme ve mevcut mevzuat çerçevesinde alınan tedbirler; diger kamu kurum ve kuruluşlar ozellikle universite ve diger egitim kurumları ile bırokrasının her kademesinde ve yargı kuruluşlarında uygulanmalıdır.

10. Ulkemizı cag disi bir rejimden ve din istismarının sebebi olabileceğini muhtemel bir calismadan korumak için, Iran İslam Cumhuriyeti’ nin ulkemizdeki rejim aleyhi faaliyet, tutum ve davranışlarına mani olunmalı, bu maksatla Iran’a karşı komşuluk munasebetlerimizi ve ekonomik ilişkilerimizi bozmayacek fakat yıkıcı ve zararlı faaliyetleri önleyecek bir tedbirler paketi hazırlanmalı ve yürürlüğe konulmalıdır.

11. Asiri dinci kesimin Türkiye’de mezhep aynıklarını koruklemek suretiyle topluma kutuplasmalara neden olacak ve dolayısıyla milletimizin düşmanca kamplara ayrılmasına yol açacak çok tehlikeli faaliyetler yasal ve idari yollarla muttaka dinlenmelidir.

12. T.C. Anayasası, Siyasi Partiler Yasası, Türk Ceza Yasası ve bilhassa Belediyeler Yasasına ayardi olarak sergilenen olayların sorumluları hakkında gerekli yasal ve idari işlemleri kısa zamanda sonuclandırmalı ve bu tür olayların tekrarlanmaması için her kademe kesin önlemler alınmalıdır.

13. Kıyafete ilgili kanuna aykırı olarak ortaya çıkan ve Türkiye’yi çağdışı bir görünümne yol açacak uygulamaların manisalı olunmalı. bu konudaki kanun ve Anavasa Mahkemesi kararlarında taviz verilmelden öncecekle ve özellikle kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarında titizlikle uygulanmalıdır.

14. Çeşitli nedenlerle verilen, kısa ve uzun namlulu silahlar ait ruhsat işlemlerini polis ve iandarma bölgeleri esas alınarak yeniden düzenlenmel, bu konuda kısıtlamalar getirilmeli, özellikle pompalı tüfeklere olan talep dikkatle değerlendirilmelidir.

15. Kurban derilerinin, mail kaynak sağlamanın ve yine kanuna aykırı olarak ortaya çıkan ve Türkiye’yi çağdışı bir görünümne yol açacak uygulamaların manisalı olunmalıdır. bu konudaki kanun ve Anavasa Mahkemesi kararlarında taviz verilmelden öncecekle ve özellikle kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarında titizlikle uygulanmalıdır.

16. Özel uniforma giydirilen korumalar ve buna neden olan sorumlular hakkında yasal işlemleri ivedilerek sonuçlandırılmalıdır ve bu tür yasa dışı uygulamaların ulaşılaabeceğini vahim boyutlar dikkate alınarak, yasa ile ongörülmüş butun korumalar kaldırılmalıdır.

17. Ülke sorunlarının çözümünü "Millet Kavramı Yerine Ummet Kavramı" bazında ele alarak sonuçlandirmayı amaçlayan ve bolucu teror orgutune de aynı bazda yaklasarak onları cesaretlendiren girişimler yasal ve idari yollarдан onlenmelidir.

18. Büyük kurtarici Atatürk’e karşı yapılan saygınlıklar ve Atatürk aleyhine islenen
suclar hakkında 5816 sayılı kanunun istismar edilmesine fırsat verilmemelidir.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Role</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>↑ moderate/ high</td>
<td>↑ moderate/ high</td>
<td>moderate/ high</td>
<td>↓ moderate/ high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to the Chief Executive</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
<td>↑ high</td>
<td>↑ high</td>
<td>↓ moderate</td>
<td>↓ moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Participation</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Intelligence</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ moderate</td>
<td>↓ low/moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Internal Security</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ moderate</td>
<td>↓ low/moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in civilian boards/economy</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>↑ high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low/moderate: OYAK and TSKGV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of the Defense Sector</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
<td>↑ high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ high/moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Legislature</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Military Personnel in the Defense Sector</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ high/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Military Promotions</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>↑ high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ moderate</td>
<td>↓ low/moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Autonomy in the Legal System</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>↑ moderate</td>
<td>↑ moderate/ high</td>
<td>↑ high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low/moderate separate criminal and administrative courts for military officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Military Jurisdiction on Civilians</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate/high</td>
<td>↑ moderate/high</td>
<td>↑ moderate/high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↓ low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX G: Constitutional Changes in Turkey’s CMR Regime (1999-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 18, 1999</td>
<td>Article 143: Replaced the military judge in the State Security Courts with a civilian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| October 3, 2001    | Article 118: Annulled the priority of NSC decisions  
Emphasized the advisory nature of the NSC decision  
Increased the number of civilian members of the NSC (Three deputy prime ministers and minister of justice became new members; number of military members remained at five) |
| May 7, 2004        | Article 131: Removed the military member from the YOK  
Article 143: Eliminated the State Security Courts  
Article 160: Increased the oversight of military and defense expenditures by enabling the Court of Editors to audit them on behalf of the Turkish Parliament. |
| September 12, 2010 | Article 125: Allowed appeals of expulsion decisions of the Supreme Military Court.  
Article 145: Allowed civilian courts to try military officers accused of crimes against state security, the constitutional order and the functioning of this order; limited the jurisdiction of military courts to “military service and military duties”  
Provisional Article 15: Removed immunity for perpetrators of the 1980 military coup |
**APPENDIX H: Legal Reforms in Turkey’s CMR Regime (1999-2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>The 1913 Ottoman Civil Servants Law was annulled, ensuring that members of security forces would be held accountable for their involvement in human rights violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 19, 2003 (The Sixth Harmonization Package)</td>
<td>The NSC representative to the Board of Inspection of Cinema, Video and Music was removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 7, 2003 (The seventh Harmonization Package)</td>
<td>Several changes were made to the law of the NSC and the law of the secretary general of the NSC (Law No: 2945): The executive powers of the secretariat general of the NSC were annulled; the NSC was reduced to an “advisory body”. The main responsibilities of the secretary general was redefined as providing secretariat duties in the NSC. The unlimited access of the NSC to any public agency was eliminated. The new secretary would no longer be a military official, but a civilian, nominated by the prime minister and appointed by the president. The NSC meetings would be held once every two months rather than every month. The transparency of military and defense expenditures were enhanced. The Court of Auditors, upon the request of the Parliament, was authorized to audit accounts and transaction of all types of organizations including state properties controlled by the armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>An amendment to the Law on Public Financial Management and Control: Allowed the inclusion of extra-budgetary funds in the budgets of the relevant administrations (i.e., the defense ministry as of January 1, 2005) and the dissolution of these funds by December 31, 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14, 2004 (Eight Harmonization Package)</td>
<td>The right of the secretary general of the NSC to nominate one member of the RTUK was annulled (Law no: 2813, Article 6) Constitutional changes (May 7, 2004) related to the Higher Education Council were reflected in the law of the same name (Law No: 2547, Article 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 2006</td>
<td>With certain exceptions, the military courts could no longer prosecute civilians in peaceful times. (The establishment and trial Procedures of Military courts law, No: 353 The principle of retrial according to the decisions of the European court of human rights (ECHR) was introduced into military courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 4, 2010</td>
<td>The secret protocol on cooperation for security and public order (EMASYA) which allowed the army to conduct operations and intelligence gathering to quell unrest in cities without the approval or request of civilian or local authorities, was abolished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 2010</td>
<td>The power of the Courts of Accounts to oversee the defense and security sector were enhanced through a change to the law on the Court of Accounts (Law No: 6085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 2011</td>
<td>The military unit that was stationed on the grounds of Parliament was removed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I: Expertise of the Members of the National Defense Committee (2007-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Relevant education</th>
<th>Educational Details the degree achieved:</th>
<th>Relevant Experience</th>
<th>Career Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. Kemal Yardimci (Chairman)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Civil engineering</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Civil engineer, industrialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yilmaz Helvacioglu, vice chair</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Architecture degree</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Architect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurettin Akman (sozcu)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BA. in French MA., Ph.D. public administration</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Teaching army officer Taught in Gendarmerie Petty Officer School, Gendarmerie General Command Headquarters, and Ankara police academy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Goksel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Military academy, artillery and missile school; Law degree</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Military judge, military prosecutor, lawyer; teaching member at the Military College.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevket Gursoy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Business administration</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Business administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Hanifi Alir</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Civil engineering</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Civil engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Erdem</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Electrical engineering</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Tradesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Alp</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mechanical engineering</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Ihsan Arslan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Turkish literature</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Industrialist, journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya Dogan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BA. Political science, MA and Ph.D. in Public Administration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Professor. Vice chairman of international Board of Auditors for NATO and president of the NATO Headquarters budget and finance Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuat Bol</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Theology/Islam</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Journalist and writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reha Camuroglu</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Historian, writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erdal Kalkan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lawyer, painter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Buyukakkaslar</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mathematic</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Teacher, industrialist, manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuat Olmeztoprak</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabahattin Cevheri</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zekerya Akinci</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Maths and Physics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Tradesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman Kaptan,</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Education Institute, MA. In education, Ph.D. in public administration</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Education specialist and public administrator, worked in the ministry of education and tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensar Ogut</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Int. Economics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dervis Gunday,</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Petty officers military engineering school</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Heavy construction equipment operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erol Tinastepe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Education Institute</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Teacher, tradesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengi Yildiz</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lawyer and news reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. Tugrul Turkes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Economist and Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamil Erdal Sipahi,</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Military academy, armored command school, federal Germany operational control academy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabahattin Cakmakoglu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Political science and law degree, Ankara University; Studied in National Security Academy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, undersecretary of national police department, prime ministry, ministry of interior; Minister of National Defense (1999-2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX J: IGOs and Norms of Democratic Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Norm/Standard</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>“Ensuring that the military remains accountable to the democratically-elected</td>
<td>Resolution 2000/47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>civil government”.</td>
<td>(2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
<td>“Ensuring that the military remains accountable to the democratically elected civil government”.</td>
<td>Resolution 55/96 (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>“The democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police” (specified by a detailed set of provisions)”.</td>
<td>Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly)</td>
<td>“Control of internal security services in Council of Europe member states”.</td>
<td>Recommendation 1402 (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP)</td>
<td>“ensuring democratic control of defense forces (one of five objectives, specified in PfP programme)”.</td>
<td>Framework Document (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU European Parliament</td>
<td>“Specifying the “Copenhagen criteria” for accession to include “legal accountability of police military and secret services…and acceptance of the principle of conscientious objection to military service””.</td>
<td>Agenda 2000, § 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit of the Americas</td>
<td>“The constitutional subordination of armed forces and security forces to the legally constituted authorities of our states is fundamental democracy”.</td>
<td>Quebec Plan of Action (2001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community of Democracies</td>
<td>“That civilian, democratic control over the military be established and preserved”.</td>
<td>Warsaw Declaration (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club Of Madrid</td>
<td>“Civilian control over the military and defense policy, and a clear separation of the armed forces from police bodies and functions”.</td>
<td>Closing statement (2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX K: MAPS

The Map of Treaty of Sèvres (1920)

The Map of the New Middle East (Copyright Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters 2006)
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