Securitizing the Coast of Somalia: Political Geographies of Piracy

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Geography
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Abstract

This dissertation is an organizational ethnography about the process of securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia. Rather than assume an apolitical shift towards a security-development counter piracy framework, this research explores the relationship between the actors, motives, and contexts underlying efforts to securitize Somali piracy. It seeks to draw out commonly held assumptions about the causal link between security, development and piracy in Somalia. In an effort to disrupt these assumptions, it offers an alternative understanding that highlights the political geographies and economic motivations for securitizing piracy. Through an exploration of the discourse and practices of a United Nations’ messaging campaign it demonstrates the centrality of manufactured narratives, identity constructions, and gendered practices in efforts to securitize piracy. It also explores how securitizing piracy became institutionalized within participating sectors and enabled securitizing actors to rework the spatial and temporal geographies of combating piracy to gain institutional advantage. This dissertation argues that the process of securitizing piracy is a geopolitical project that reflects a wider, emerging trend of employing security-development technologies as disciplinary strategies for the prevention and containment of particular actions and bodies. It reveals that securitizing actors, including the
development sector, are complicit in (re)working territorial sovereignties and producing markets of security and development. As these markets are produced in Somalia, it demonstrates the specific local manifestations of broader global patterns of racialized incarceration and criminalization in contemporary millennial capitalist crisis/expansion at work in numerous other locations around the world.
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Abbreviations

AMISOM     African Union Mission in Somalia
EUNAVFOR   European Union Naval Force
IMO        International Maritime Organization
INTERPOL  International Criminal Police Organization
IOM        International Organization for Migration
NATO       North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PMPF       Puntland Maritime Police Force
PPTP       Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme (UNODC CPP programming)
RPG        Rocket propelled grenade
SCPCO      Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination Office
SOMFISH    Somaliland Fishing Association
UNDP       United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA-Somalia United Nations Department of Political Affairs for Somalia
UNODC      United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNODC CPP  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Counter Piracy Programme
UNODC ROEA United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office in Eastern Africa
UNOPS      United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM     United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS      United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSEMG     United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
Introduction

This dissertation is an organizational ethnography about the process of securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia. This research project demonstrates the increasing role of development organizations in (re)shaping political geographies of piracy as well how (re)constructed gendered and racialized identities are central to processes of securitizing the coast of Somalia. My initial motivation to investigate this issue stemmed from what I saw as a noticeable shift in the way piracy was framed in public discourse as well as the punitive responses an increase in piracy attacks provoked from various national governments and the United Nations. As I began researching this project I learned that combating piracy off the coast of Somalia was a far more complex issue than implementing rule of law institutions for the prosecution of apprehended piracy suspects. Despite the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Counter Piracy Programme’s (UNODC CPP) efforts to assist states in the Somali-basin region with combating piracy, piracy attacks continue to be a menace for the East African region and international community. Yet the negative impacts of piracy were experienced differently among different sectors and across distinct geographies: primary impacts were experienced most at the local level whereas secondary impacts were experienced most at the state, regional and international levels. Meanwhile, in adherence with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and international laws, counter piracy efforts were restricted to offshore military responses including disruption and deterrence.

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2 For the purposes of this dissertation I consider “primary impacts” as the negative effects of piracy experienced by individuals, families and communities (particularly within Somalia). These impacts are mostly experienced at the “local” level, in that they occur in close proximity to activities associated with piracy operations (e.g. hijackings, hostage taking, ransom exchange and business transactions involving ransom money). I consider “secondary impacts” as the negative effects of piracy experienced by states, regions and the international community. These impacts threaten the social values, economy, development and security at multiple levels (e.g. increase in prostitution, *khat* usage, gun use in Somalia, a decline in shipping business in Somali ports, an increase in the price of daily goods in Somalia, an increase in the costs of shipping insurance, etc.).
3 A brief overview of counter piracy military operations is provided in Chapter Two.
Given the geographic restrictions of traditional military and rule of law counter piracy approaches, various counter piracy actors turned to the UNODC CPP to facilitate a ‘comprehensive approach’ to combating piracy that included both at sea and onshore counter piracy strategies. This comprehensive approach was a product of the (re)framing of piracy from a criminal justice issue to that of a security-development issue in order to permit a close collaboration between UNODC CPP, international military operations (e.g., EUNAVFOR, NATO, etc.) foreign governments and the Somali government. This (re)framing suggested to me that in order to understand UNODC CPP’s strategic shift in counter piracy strategies I had to first position it within the context of broader socio-historical forces shaping relations between security and development. Second, I would have to position it within the broader context of the post-9/11 temporal shift from a post-crime to a pre-crime, security society.

The years 2008 and 2009 marked the height of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia. Since 2009 successful piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia have substantially dropped off (see Figures 1 and 2). Despite the decline in piracy attacks from 2010 to 2012 there has been

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4 The researcher acknowledges the multiple definitions of the term stakeholder and is aware of the politics underlying the term’s conceptualization and application. The UNDP provides the following definition of the term: “Stakeholders are the people who will benefit from the development activity or whose interests may be affected by that activity.” (See The UNDP “Stakeholder Engagement” in the Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Development Results (2013) www.undp.org.) Although stakeholder is utilized throughout the United Nations system, the researcher did not want to propagate the politics associated with this term. Because who has a “stake” in the process of securitizing piracy is not a social fact, but a process, instead of utilizing the term stakeholder throughout this dissertation I utilize the term actor (particularly, key counter piracy actor). Actor is meant to reflect the multiplicity of individuals who participated in the UNODC CPP-facilitated effort to securitize piracy, but who may not have been identified by the UNODC CPP as a stakeholder. The actors with interests in counter piracy expanded as the issue gained media attention, took on public salience, and was targeted for international funding. As a result, employment of the term actor (rather than stakeholder) aims to distance the research project from UN language and broaden understandings of who participated and/or shaped the messaging campaign.

5 A successful piracy attack occurs when a piracy operation successfully boards, takes control of, and holds a ship for ransom. An unsuccessful piracy attack is when a piracy operation does not successfully board, take control of, and hold a ship for ransom. However, even when these attacks are not successful, the ship targeted for the attack often suffers a large amount of damage resulting from gun fire, RPG’s, etc.
increasing international pressure from the public and private sectors to step up the fight against Somali piracy. Whereas in 2009 the majority of piracy-related popular, academic and political discourse depicted piracy as a militarized issue focusing on pirates as rogue actors, in 2010 and 2011 the discourse began to present piracy as an economic and security issue to be curbed through rule of law measures. During this period both international and domestic popular media highlighted the international community’s struggle with Somali piracy (see Plate 1). In late 2011 and early 2012, political and academic discourse began theorizing correlations between security and development as both a diagnosis and remedy for piracy. Counter piracy actors from foreign and domestic governments, international aid agencies, seafarer associations, and so forth began advocating that the root causes of piracy stemmed from Somalia’s unstable political, social and economic conditions and suggested piracy could be both combated and prevented by addressing these root causes. Echoing this sentiment, this mode of thinking was reflected in the way popular media framed the issue of piracy. Counter piracy actors from the development, military and security sectors converged around this thinking, rendering piracy an issue that should be addressed through military (disruption and deterrence), criminal justice (prosecution) and, now, through development. In other words, the crime of
piracy was also a problem of *underdevelopment* in Somalia. The diagnosis of this problem helped construct a range of possible remedies that lay at the intersection of security and

**Plate 1: "No stopping them" (The Economist 3 February 2011).**

development. Yet, the question of what development strategy would be most effective and who would deliver it in Somalia remained to be answered. Given the contentious history of international military interventions in Somalia, most notably the 1993 United States ‘black hawk down’ incident, governments were hesitant to risk sending anyone, either State aid workers or military personnel, onshore in Somalia to implement security or development work.\(^6\) According to every policy maker, military personnel and private security personnel I interviewed during this

\(^6\) The ‘black hawk down’ incident refers to a failed United States military raid conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. This incident will be further discussed in Chapter Two.
research, foreign governments will not put their personnel on the ground in Somalia prior to having ‘secured’ an area through military means. As one research participant put it:

Navy and coast guards are the red herring of the counter piracy movement…if you had a strong enough land force in Somalia then pirates wouldn’t be able to have bases on the coast. Land forces should be in Somalia. Somalis are xenophobic by nature and would have a hard time accepting foreign forces on the ground besides what’s already there with AMISOM, which is still an issue. Without land forces on the ground, no governments will send in their aid divisions. In the meantime, we have to contract out our development work to Somali NGOs, hope they implement what they say they will and that they won’t just run off with the money.⁷

Foreign governments’ hesitation to put personnel on the ground in Somalia suggested the need for an alternative method of implementing development for combating piracy. As a solution to this quagmire, governments and other counter piracy actors turned to a United Nations programme that was already established and working on the ground in Somalia to combat piracy—the UNODC CPP.

1 The UNODC CPP: Then and Now

The UNODC CPP was established in 2009 and is located in the UNODC Regional Office in Eastern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya (see Plate 2). The initial mandate of the UNODC CPP was to assist Kenya with the detainment and prosecution of piracy suspects according to international standards of rule of law and respect for human rights.⁸ When UNODC CPP operations commenced, neither Kenya nor any of the regional states in East Africa had legislation that permitted the prosecution and imprisonment of Somali pirates. As a result, the UNODC CPP was tasked with assisting Kenya, and later other regional states, with drafting and adopting legislation

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⁷ Personal interview KSG14, 2012.
that would enable the prosecution and imprisonment of Somali pirates within their respective countries. This mandate was in line with criminal justice counter piracy frameworks of the time that supported combating piracy through rule of law and military means. This framework was reflected in both academic and public discourse and evidenced in the way local, regional, and international popular media framed the issue of Somali piracy (see Plate 3).

In 2010, the work of the UNODC CPP was expanded to include assistance with the refurbishment and construction of prisons in Somalia, Seychelles, and Kenya. In addition, the UNODC CPP began assisting regional states with police and prison officer training to

Plate 2: Map of East Africa Region
complement the already existing judicial training programmes that were a cornerstone of the Programme’s initial mandate. In late 2011 the UNODC CPP began drafting a proposal for an anti-piracy advocacy campaign. The aim of the anti-piracy advocacy campaign was to deter individuals from becoming pirates by exposing the dangers associated with piracy through media messaging and education in Somalia. The military community, in particular the European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR), expressed interest in assisting the UNODC CPP with the design and implementation of the anti-piracy advocacy campaign messages. The UNODC CPP would become the vehicle utilized by securitizing actors to securitize piracy both within and outside of Somalia through the facilitation of the anti-piracy advocacy campaign.

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9 Details of the anti-piracy advocacy campaign discourse are further discussed in Chapters Three and Four.
In addition to media messaging, the initial anti-piracy advocacy campaign contained a small livelihoods development component. The livelihoods development component consisted of targeting potential pirates with existing United Nations- and NGO-facilitated economic development programmes. However, this small livelihoods development component later became the focus of an intra-agency struggle within the UNODC for ownership of the anti-piracy advocacy campaign. The UNODC Regional Office in Eastern Africa (ROEA) highlighted and drew upon the livelihoods development component in order to argue that its expertise were better suited than the CPP for managing the campaign. Consequently, the campaign (and its monies) was eventually moved out of the CPP and placed under the supervision of the ROEA. This intra-
agency struggle illustrates how policies and programmes developed at the security-development nexus often helps blur the boundaries between expertise and responsibilities.

2 Pre-crime, Post-crime and the Emerging Security Society

Spatial and temporal perspectives underpin the relationship between crime and security. Lucia Zedner’s analysis of the evolution in criminal justice approaches highlights the important temporal shift from traditional post-hoc methods of addressing instances of crime to current pre-crime methods of anticipating and forestalling crime that has not yet occurred. She suggests that the current temporal shift to pre-crime strategies signifies a larger move away from a post-crime criminal justice society to a pre-crime security society. This move, or (re)orientation, amplifies the rationalities applied to justify an expansion of security as both a means and a goal in the quest to create a society free of threats, risk and crime. This move also expands understandings of what constitutes a crime and who has the power to address issues of crime under the guise of security. According to Zedner, “A coincidental facet of the temporal shift to pre-crime is that responsibility for security against risk falls not only to the state but extends to a larger panoply of individual, communal and private agents. The shift is therefore not only temporal but also sectoral; spreading out from the State to embrace pre-emptive endeavors only remotely related to crime”.10

As this dissertation documents, the current temporal and spatial shift in criminal justice approaches is also reflected in the (re)framing of piracy and the responses to it. While piracy off the coast of Somalia was initially framed as a criminal justice issue, the persistence of the crime, the geographical limitations of traditional counter piracy strategies, and the emergence of a post-9/11 global security society, prompted counter piracy actors to rethink the existing counter piracy framework. Piracy off the coast of Somalia increasingly garnered global notice when piracy attacks peaked in 2008 and 2009. In 2011 piracy was launched further into the public’s eye when an American NGO, Oceans Beyond Piracy, released two extensive reports detailing estimates of

the human and economic costs associated with Somali Piracy.\textsuperscript{11} The economic report purported that Somali piracy cost the world between $6.6 - $12 billion per year for 2010 and 2011.\textsuperscript{12} These shocking statistics were given a human face when the second report described the treatment of hostages aboard ships hijacked by Somali pirates.\textsuperscript{13} These two widely circulated reports caught the attention of both the private and public sectors and launched discussions of economic and human security to the forefront of piracy-related discourse.

3 Securitization Theory and Radicalizing Development

The concept of ‘security’ has been widely discussed and theorized within and across many disciplines.\textsuperscript{14} Security theorists Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde propose a theory that understands security problems as a product of discourse. The process of labeling (or speaking) something a security issue is called securitization. Weaver, Buzan, and de Wilde’s post-structural theory of securitization is now widely referred to as the ‘Copenhagen School’ of thought. According to Weaver, Buzan, and de Wilde, the process of securitizing an issue involves securitizing actors, referent objects and securitizing moves. Securitizing actors are individuals or a group with the power to label something or someone, the referent object, as a threat to the existential existence of group of individuals.\textsuperscript{15} “The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure…the process of securitization is what in language

\textsuperscript{12} Oceans, Economic, 3.
\textsuperscript{13} Oceans, Human, 4.
\textsuperscript{14} Post-September 11th there has been a renewed multi-disciplinary interest in security studies. Disciplines such as international relations, political science, criminal justice, feminist studies, and legal studies have been at the forefront of theorizing ‘security’.
\textsuperscript{15} In this research on securitizing piracy, securitizing actor(s) are identified as the individuals or groups with the power to label piracy a threat, label who is in need of rescuing from this threat, and who is most capable of addressing this threat. Securitizing actor(s) are not synonymous with key counter piracy actor(s). Whereas key counter piracy actors are individuals who participated in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign design process, securitizing actors are the individuals/agencies who decides that piracy be handled as an existential threat.
theory is called a speech act…it is the utterance itself that is the act.”\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, securitizing actors utilize speech acts to speak security into existence.\textsuperscript{17} Securitizing actors do not necessarily say security in order to constitute a security act. Rather, a securitizing actor speaks security when his or her speech act takes the form of “‘politics of existential threats,’ with the argument that an issue takes priority over everything else and therefore allows for a breaking of the rules.”\textsuperscript{18} When a threat is spoken as a security issue, the issue is presented as a supreme priority, thus placing it above politics and enabling the employment of extraordinary measures to combat the threat.

The Cold War marked a rise in studies carried out within policy arenas and academic circles concerning the link between development and security. Throughout the evolution of security and development studies many scholarly publications centered on how security/insecurity impact development achievements, the way development affects security, and defining and mapping the concept of the security-development “nexus”.\textsuperscript{19} Peter Uvin traces three phases in the relations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p. 33.
\end{itemize}
between security and development. According to Uvin, the first phase lasted for three decades and was closely linked to Cold War agendas to combat communism. The second phase, from 1989 onward (post-Cold War) was heavily based upon development and conflict prevention. The third and current phase has occurred since 9/11 and is couched in assuring the security of rich countries against threats from ‘underdeveloped’ countries.\(^{20}\) Recently, there is a growing acceptance within security and development studies, and within policy arenas, that security and development are inextricably linked. This acceptance stems from political and academic arguments that 1) a more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given the opportunity to develop, and 2) poor and underdeveloped countries provide a breeding ground for insecurity in the form of civil conflict, terrorism, transnational crime and other threats. The normalization of the link between security and development challenged some critical security scholars to take a closer examination of the point of intersection between the two—the point of intersection commonly referred to as the security-development nexus.\(^{21}\) As Stern and Ojendal state, “The notion of a ‘nexus’ seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges of today”.\(^{22}\) They suggest the ever-growing amount of economic and political resources being “poured into the ‘security-development nexus’ is evidence of the normalization of the concept of the ‘nexus’ within national and international multilateral institutions.\(^{23}\)

The recent infusion of “development approaches” into counter piracy strategies suggests an emergent security-development nexus for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. This infusion may best be explained by 1) the theorized complexity of root causes underlying piracy and 2) the proposed multi-sectoral approach needed to combat this myriad of root causes. Highlighting the complexities of combating piracy, the United States Congressional Research Service declares, “A durable solution for ending piracy in the Horn of Africa will require

\(^{20}\) P. Uvin, Ibid., 2006.
\(^{22}\) M. Stern and J. Ojendal, Ibid., 6.
\(^{23}\) Stern and Ojendal, Ibid, 6.
improving security, stability, rule of law, and economic opportunity in Somalia, as well as solidifying political progress by forming a unity government and advancing the peace process.\textsuperscript{24} Somalia’s unstable political situation, the increasing human and economic costs of piracy, the ever-growing number and size of new international naval forces and UNSC resolutions for combatting piracy, the heightening humanitarian crisis in Somalia, and global economic interests coalesced to produce a demand for a security-development counter piracy framework.

4 Identities, Sovereignty and Histories of Intervention

Rather than assume an apolitical shift towards a security-development counter piracy framework, this research explores the relationship between the actors, contexts and motives underlying efforts to securitize piracy off the coast of Somalia. It argues that (re)framing piracy from a criminal justice issue to a security/development issue was motivated by political and economic desires to blur the boundaries between internal and external security in Somalia. Specifically, it asks: How and why did piracy become repositioned as a security/development issue rather than a criminal justice issue? What macro and micro-securitization practices resulted from this repositioning? What role does gender and social reproduction play in securitization processes? How are securitizing actors, particularly development institutions, impacting and impacted by securitization processes? What do securitization processes reveal about the political economy of combating piracy?

In answering these questions, my analysis seeks to draw out commonly held assumptions about the causal link between security, development and piracy in Somalia. In an effort to disrupt these assumptions, the dissertation offers an alternative understanding that highlights the political and economic motivations for securitizing piracy. Through exploring the macro- and micro practices of securitizing piracy this research situates the turn towards a security-development approach to combating piracy as part of wider global processes to prevent and contain particular racialized and gendered bodies and activities. It also opens discussions of how Somali identity is being produced through securitization processes; how sovereignty is entangled with territoriality.

\textsuperscript{24} Ploch, Blanchard, O’Rourke, Mason and King, Ibid.
geopolitics, and piratization; and how the messaging campaign fits into other histories of humanitarian aid, development, security, military intervention in Somalia.

4.1 Identities

Central to the messaging campaign discourse is the destruction and reconstruction of narratives, identities, and subjectivities. In order to successfully “sell” security and development to the Somali people counter piracy actors utilized the messaging campaign to (re)construct Somali identities into two categories: 1) developable (non-pirates) and 2) non-developable (pirates) subjects. Developable Somalis were deemed worthy of international aid and investment and non-developable Somalis were outcast as criminals in need of detention and containment. However, a closer examination of campaign discourse revealed that the negative construction of “pirates” and “piracy” was both productive and counter-productive to larger efforts to combat piracy and develop/secure Somalia.

The securitization processes of the messaging campaign also worked to (re)produce Somali identities along gendered and racial lines. The messaging campaign neglected to identify women as potential or active pirates. Rather, women were identified as security agents invested with the responsibilities of keeping girls, women and children safe from piracy. Somali women were not seen as part of the problem of piracy, but they were seen as part of the solution. Essentially, counter piracy actors understood pirates as an undifferentiated mass of male Somalis. This gendered view of piracy originated among Somali government officials, was taken up by staff members of the UNODC CPP, and was reproduced through the messaging campaign design and discourse.

This gendered view of Somali piracy also contributed to new technologies and expertise for “knowing” or “labeling” pirates before acts of piracy were committed. Under the new security-development counter piracy framework male, black Somalis were identified as potential pirates. The identity of “potential pirates” not only created challenges for Somali fishermen at sea, but it also enabled counter piracy actors to expand the spatial and temporal boundaries of counter piracy strategies to include preventing acts of piracy onshore in Somalia. Along with (re)producing Somali identities, the expansion of spatial and temporal boundaries also resulted in
the creation of new experts and a reshaping of the identities and mandates of participating organizations.

4.2 Sovereignty

Underlying efforts of counter piracy actors to “sell” security to Somalis is an entanglement of territoriality, geopolitics, and piratization. As this dissertation demonstrates, the advocacy campaign was employed as a tool for achieving important geopolitical moves both inside and outside of Somali national boundaries. Inside Somalia national boundaries Somali government officials aimed to secure their government positions, attract additional foreign aid and investment, and potentially increase personal profits through the securitization process. Outside Somalia national boundaries foreign governments, militaries, and international organizations sought to gain access onshore in Somalia, securitize the coastline by preventing the movement of male, black Somali bodies across the onshore/offshore boundary, and detain Somali bodies found at sea. Through an examination of the micro- and macro-practices of the advocacy campaign, this research project highlights the political projects of territorialization and reterritorialization that were produced and contested within and across different geographies of securitizing piracy.

This research also demonstrates a wider shift in security responsibilities from foreign bodies at sea—to Somali bodies on shore Somalia. The securitization process encouraged Somalis to take responsibilities for the prevention of piracy. However, even though preventing piracy became the informalized, security responsibility of the Somali people, facilitating and/or overseeing prevention remained the development responsibility of international counter piracy actors. This oversight not only enabled counter piracy actors to partake in information sharing and programme design, but it also reinforced the notion that the Somali people are not capable of managing their own security challenges without the guidance of the international community. Or, in other words, if the Somali people cannot prevent piracy themselves then the international community will step in and contain it from spreading.

4.3 Histories

The messiness relative to (and even within) particular expert visions of the need to at once both develop and secure Somalia has persisted across historical periods. After the fall of the Siad
Barre regime, throughout the Somalia Civil War, and post-9/11, Western governments have shown increasing interest in improving Somalia’s development and security situations in order to prevent it from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. As a result, Somalia has a long history of international involvement with development, politics, and security. The recent growth in piracy-mania can be attributed to Somalia’s location at the intersection of the second busiest shipping transit route in the world—the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. The strategic importance of ensuring the safe passage of shipping vessels transiting the waters off the coast of Somalia is vital to many Western governments and the greater global economy. However, the recent shift to a security-development counter piracy framework is more complex than simply the newest version of an old desire to “keep an eye on” Somalia and keep the waterways open.

What differs from previous expert visions of security and development in Somalia is the promotion of particular security-development technologies that contribute to producing a market demand for expertise in the prevention and containment of underdeveloped, criminal, black, male bodies. Paradoxically, efforts to securitize piracy also (re)produce the continuous, immanent threat of piracy that is co-constitutive of a continuous need for intervention. This paradox exposes the “messiness” (i.e., the limitations, contradictions and cyclical nature) underlying the new security-development counter piracy framework. Under this framework development organizations have an active role within the ad hoc institutional arrangement for combating piracy and the growing market for prevention and containment. Development organizations’ quest for institutional survival has made their participation in securitizing piracy instrumentalist, less for helping people who need development per se, and more for helping secure their mandates and jobs within a growing international investment-based prison industry.

5 Data and Methods

The methodological strength of my research is that it is grounded in fieldwork conducted in Somalia. Although this research draws upon other sources, it is one of the few scholarly publications on piracy grounded in data gathered first-hand in Somalia. Currently, the vast majority of Somali piracy-related academic research is based on secondary sources. Although these sources contribute to understandings of Somali piracy, the author is one person removed
from the data. My unique position as both a researcher and consultant with the UNODC CPP enabled me to remove this middle person and collect data directly on the ground in Somalia through first-hand participant observation and interviews. This research project is particularly academically relevant because it provides details of the day-to-day nuances of security-development counter piracy operations as they play out in the UNODC CPP office and at the local level in Somalia.

The methodology for this research examines the actors, contexts and political economy entangled in efforts to securitize piracy in Somalia. Specifically, it employs Balzacq’s sociological understanding of securitization to identify and explore the social, temporal, and spatial contexts of securitizing piracy (e.g., the narrative schema that organized discursive claims of the causal link between security and development and how securitizing actors, subjects and processes are co-constitutive of each other). Balzacq merges Waever and Buzan’s Derridean approach to securitization and speech acts with Bourdieu’s symbolic use of language and Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’. More specifically, he reads Bourdieu’s theory of speech acts as not only linguistic, but also social and dependent upon the social position of those speaking security. He argues that in order to understand the role of speech acts in securitization, we must also understand the political and social situations enabling those to speak security—the context. Balzacq also draws upon Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’, “a configuration of forces, practices and discourse, power and knowledge, that is both strategic and technical,” in order to ground securitization studies in context. He argues that discourse does not operate in a vacuum, thus making it vital to analyze the context in which securitization processes occur. In this sense, an

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25 Due to the high security risks associated with working in Somalia very few individuals are granted the opportunity to work in Somalia. The researcher fully acknowledged the safety and security risks of working in Somalia and acknowledges that the opportunity to work and conduct research on the ground in Somalia through her employment with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Counter Piracy Programme was a privilege.


examination of motives and actions can illustrate the political and economic motivations for identifying threats, promoting particular narratives, and (re)constructing institutional identities and mandates. This also helps reveal how securitizing actors both shape and are shaped by securitization processes.

The research takes an organizational ethnographic approach to studying the securitization of piracy. It utilizes the UNODC CPP as a point of entry because it is the only United Nations agency created specifically to combat Somali piracy. Its primary empirical focus is directed toward how the UNODC CPP’s partnerships, practices, identity, and mandate evolved to reflect the expanded spatial-temporal demands of the emergent security-development counter piracy framework. The research utilized textual analysis, key informant interviews, and participant observation to collect the material upon which the following four chapters are based. The appendix provides the specific data sources compiled throughout this research. Below are the details of the research methods of analysis utilized in this research.

5.1 Preliminary Research

The first stage of research had three objectives: 1) to develop a broad overview of the social, economic, and political context of piracy off the coast of Somalia as it was articulated in public, policy and academic discourse; 2) to develop a broad overview of the changing institutional, social, political and economic environments in relation to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia; and 3) to identify actors to participate in this research who would provide further context for institutional and policy developments for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. It relied on a review of national, international government, military, and development policy documents, recent legislative changes in piracy law, media coverage, attendance at counter piracy conferences and public workshops, participation in the design of an anti-piracy advocacy campaign, and secondary sources.

I conducted exploratory research on a wide range of private and public counter piracy approaches from 2011-2012 but prioritized those that occupied prominent positions in public and academic discourse and those that appeared to signal a shift in the larger counter piracy framework. The majority of this exploratory research was undertaken in Nairobi, Kenya.
Specifically, from September 2011 to April 2012 the UNODC CPP agreed to assist me with my research. In return, I agreed to assist the UNODC CPP with certain office-related tasks in exchange for them granting me access to program documents and allowing me to sit in the UNODC CPP office. During this time I observed the day-to-day operations of the UNODC CPP and attended office-related meetings and conferences when possible.

By April 2012 I identified the counter piracy strategies, key actors and institutions and socio-historical context for further research. Due in part to my familiarity with the daily operations of the UNODC CPP, as well as my particular interest in the budding Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign, in April 2012 I was also offered a six month renewable contract with the UNODC CPP. Under this contract I served as the Advocacy Researcher for the UNODC CPP Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign for a six month period from April 2012 to October 2012. During my employment with the UNODC CPP approximately seventy percent of my time was spent working in the UNODC CPP office in Nairobi, Kenya. The other thirty percent of my time I spent on missions in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia. I undertook one mission to the Seychelles to deliver welfare goods to and conduct Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign-related interviews with the Somali piracy prisoners held in the Montagne Posse Prison. In October 2012 I declined an offer to renew my contract in order to return to North America to write this dissertation.

5.2 Textual Analysis of Documentary Sources

My analysis of texts was guided by three primary lines of inquiry: 1) How did piracy become repositioned as a security/development issue; 2) What motivated securitizing actors to participate in securitizing piracy; and 3) What do the macro- and micro-practices reveal about the process of securitizing piracy? I drew on three types of policy texts: official governmental proceedings and legislation; United Nations resolutions, programme documents, and reports; and policies and

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28 The majority of my office-related tasks included making Power Point Presentations, proofreading presentations, and editing office documents. These tasks are normally assigned to UNODC CPP interns.
reports produced by non-profit/non-state actors. I initially analyzed media in order to identify key actors, organizations and counter piracy strategies. Media analysis later served as a source for identifying changes in how piracy was framed and resulting policy changes. The primary sources of international media texts were *BBC News, CNN, The Economist, Fox News, New York Times*, and *The Guardian*. The primary sources of Somali-basin national and regional media texts were *Somalia Report, The Somaliland Press, Garowe Online, BBC Somalia, Voice of America Somalia, The Daily Nation (Kenya), The Star (Kenya).*  

I created an archive of approximately 200 media articles pertaining to Somali piracy. This archive was generated through daily reading of the media sources from August 2011 through December 2012 and supplemented through keyword searches in the Factiva, Lexis-Nexus Academic and Proquest media databases (between 2008-2012). Keywords utilized during these searches were as follows: *piracy, pirates, shipping, hijackings, Puntland, Somaliland* and *Somalia*. The media articles were coded by employing a method similar to that utilized by Victoria Collins in her study titled ‘Dangerous Seas: Moral Panic and the Somali Pirate’. The media was coded by specific themes indicating how the issue of piracy was framed in the respective article in order to identify how the framing evolved from 2008-2012. The specific themes were: 1) individual actors (piracy is described in terms of as rogue actors, groups); 2) threat to trade (piracy is described as a threat to trade and economic security; 3) militarized issue (piracy is described in relation to a military counter piracy operation; 4) security issue (piracy is described as a threat to security; 5) development issue (piracy is described as stemming from and/or causing underdevelopment; 6) hostage-centered (pirates taking hostages or hostages being rescued from pirates); 7) legal issue (details of piracy laws and/or trials); and 8) development-security issue (piracy described as a both a cause of and solution to underdevelopment and insecurity).

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29 This list of media sources represents the most popular sources of daily news for Somalia and Kenya.
From July to December 2012 I conducted approximately 43 semi-structured and unstructured interviews with the following public counter piracy actors about their roles in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia: 1) UNODC Counter-Piracy Programme staff; 2) EUNAVFOR media officials; 3) Somalia government officials; and 4) UNODC Member State representatives. During this time period I also conducted interviews with approximately 42 members of the Somali public directly involved in the UNODC CPP anti-piracy advocacy campaign design process. In September 2012 I conducted semi-structured interviews with 36 convicted Somali pirates serving sentences in Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles to solicit their opinions on the design and effectiveness of an anti-piracy messaging campaign. All of these interviews helped contextualize my analysis of counter piracy-related texts within their social, spatial, temporal and institutional processes and politics. In July 2012 I began contacting individuals within or involved in the conception, design and/or implementation of counter piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. I contacted individuals via email and phone. The research participants also put me in contact with individuals and/or organizations they deemed relevant to my research project (see Appendix). The semi-structured interviews followed an interview script that included a base set of questions relating to piracy, security and development in Somalia. The questions were slightly altered depending upon the research participant. All research participants were guaranteed confidentiality. All participants were classified by their participation or classification in one of the following sectors: security, development, media, government, Somali public, piracy prisoner. Each interview was transcribed verbatim and coded according to the participants’ sector.

“Participant observation requires a peculiar state of mind on the side of researchers: to be able to give an account of the world from the standpoint of “insiders”; in short to have the capacity to participate. This method is appropriate for the study of daily manifestations of securitization or
what is often referred to as micro-practices of securitization”.31 I began the participant observation portion of my research in September 2011 when I was granted permission to observe the day-to-day operations of the UNODC CPP. During this time I also attended a number of counter piracy meetings and conferences. Between April 2012 and October 2012 I was employed as the Advocacy Researcher for the UNODC CPP and was tasked with conducting piracy-related research and assisting in the design and implementation of the UNODC CPP Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign. Through my position with the UNODC CPP I undertook monthly counter piracy-related missions to Somalia, conducted four counter piracy awareness workshops in Somalia, interviewed key counter piracy actors and members of the Somali public, and liaised with and interviewed members of the military, government and development sectors involved in counter piracy-related work. I recorded field notes during my missions and employment with the UNODC CPP to augment my textual and interview analyses. Specifically, the data derived from my participant observation substantiates this research by helping me forge connections with local Somali communities to understand the ways different identities, narratives, and contexts shaped and were shaped by the process of securitizing piracy.

5.5 Ethnography and Positionality

My role throughout this research project as somewhat of a double agent—both working for and researching the UNODC CPP—raises several questions about methods, modes of analysis and positionality embedded in organizational ethnographies. Several of these questions are raised in a Book Review Forum for Tania Li’s The Will to Improve.32 In particular, articles by Vicky Lawson and Anthony Bebbington critically engage with questions of betrayal, responsibility and trusteeship in ethnography.33

I began my working relationship with the UNODC CPP as a graduate student conducting research and then became a consultant. As a result, I became somewhat of a double-agent—I was researching the UN and a UN employee.\(^{34}\) When I began writing this dissertation I grappled with what I should include and omit out of respect for my colleagues. Or, I grappled with where my allegiances lie in the production of this knowledge. Vicky Lawson asks similar questions, “How might the role of the researcher be construed as betrayal, particularly by those who cooperated in the research and yet are the critical targets of analysis (developers and improvers)? What is the responsibility of the researcher to all those who shared time, information, and insights?”\(^{35}\)

My colleagues were well-informed of my dual role as a researcher and consultant. Throughout my time researching and working with the UNODC CPP I noticed two distinct responses to my role as a researcher. The responses aligned with whether the colleague was a consultant or a permanent employee.\(^{36}\) The consultants tended to conflate my position as a researcher with that of a whistle blower. The consultants in our office were the ones who spent the most time on the ground in Somalia. They would often come to me to vent their frustrations with the UN and challenges implementing and operationalizing projects in Somalia. They would also share with me stories and bits of information that they felt “the public should know.” The consultants’ candor may be attributed to a couple of factors. First, I was also a consultant, and therefore, the same rank as them. Second, as consultants we were limited term employees. The status of limited term employee at times left us feeling disposable and/or inferior to permanent level staff and served as a source of daily frustration. Lastly, because of our rank many of us knew our time with the UN was limited, which decreased our feelings of allegiance to the UN system.

The permanent employees treated me as a sounding board for different ideas. My status as a PhD candidate meant that I had the highest level of education in our office. As a result, most of my

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\(^{36}\) A more in-depth differentiation between the ranks at the UN is provided in Chapter One.
colleagues, and the permanent employees in particular, would jokingly ask “what would academia say about this?” in reference to their ideas, comments and actions. The permanent employees are the UN’s version of tenured. Our colleagues would often discuss how difficult it is to get fired from the UN if you are a permanent employee. Perhaps because of this perceived immunity, the permanent employees in my office were very candid about discussing inter- and intra-office politics, UN bureaucracy, Programme shortcomings, etc. A UNODC CPP consultant who was a former journalist also claimed he was writing a book about his experiences at the UN. With two researcher/writers in our office, when an issue or dispute occurred my colleagues would joke about whose book should document the incident.

Throughout my fieldwork I worked alongside the authors of the UNODC CPP Advocacy Campaign Project Document central to this research. I was able to observe and participate in the document creation process and revisit the authors with questions pertaining to the document as they arose. Anthony Bebbington’s thoughtful contribution to the Tania Li Book Forum Review raised concerns of the challenges of critique in/of development. One of his concerns was ethnographers reading off of actors’ intentions from institutional texts. I argue that my position with the UNODC CPP enabled me to mitigate this concern to the best of my ability. My unique access to and close working relationship with the authors of the Advocacy Campaign Project Document afforded me the opportunity to ask the authors of documents what their intentions were throughout the process of conducting fieldwork.

Throughout this research project I tried to give explicit treatment to all sectors involved in the advocacy campaign—development, military, government. In doing so, I aimed to demonstrate that not all “programmers” are one of a kind and aligned with institutional goals. For the majority of my colleagues it was more important that I record the challenges, politics, and power struggles of development as seen through the work of the UNODC CPP than to flaunt the UNODC CPP’s accomplishments (the UNODC CPP already does this in a quarterly brochure). Therefore, I see it as my responsibility to detail the messy, complex nature of development

projects. I also fully acknowledge that I was complicit in any programming short-coming and failings outlined in this dissertation. There were times when my feminist, critical development politics were screaming “no!” yet I continued forward with a particular programming design. I say this because despite having the best intentions, at some point or another many of my colleagues, including myself, momentarily sacrificed our politics to move a project forward. I should be included in any criticisms of development practice found in this dissertation.

This research project aims to bridge the divide between critical praxis on the inside and outside of academia in the following ways: 1) Direct policy engagement through my research contract with the UNODC CPP; 2) purposefully tailoring the research method to policymakers and development programmers; and 3) working directly with marginalized groups in the development of this research. Sarah Wakefield’s research on praxis in critical geography inside and outside of the academy also highlights the tensions of social positionality. 38 In addition to Wakefield’s research, there is a large feminist methodology discussion of reflexivity and positionality. 39 My position as a white, Western female affects both the way I see and am seen by others. As a female, Somali women were permitted to be in a closed room with me, which I would argue created a safer space for them to vocalize gender-related grievances. Being a Westerner both helped and hindered my research. While in Somalia, my American citizenship made members of the Somali public suspicious that I was a CIA operative. This suspicion not only deterred some Somalis from speaking with me but also put at least one of my Somali colleagues at risk. However, my American citizenship and University of Toronto enrollment gained me favorable attention among Somali government officials because the majority of them were returned expatriates who had been educated and living in Minneapolis, Minnesota or

My social positionality was carried with me throughout my fieldwork and into my writing of this dissertation.

6 Chapter Outline

Chapter One engages with critical development theory and securitization theory as a basis for grounding the analysis of securitizing piracy. The chapter begins by reviewing securitization theory and critical development theory literature. It then discusses how current theorizations of the security-development nexus draw from this literature and inform the theoretical framework employed throughout this research project. The chapter concludes by providing an overview of existing understandings of security and development in Somalia in order to illustrate the contextual framework informing current security-development counter piracy strategies.

Chapter Two builds upon the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter One by examining how securitizing actors drew upon existing understandings of Somalia's social, economic, and historical context to reinforce a discourse of causal linkage between security and development as both the reason for and solution to piracy. The chapter begins by briefly introducing traditional conceptualizations of piracy, particularly Somali piracy, as a criminal justice issue. It then provides an overview of the geography of Somali piracy and traditional counter piracy approaches and their geopolitical limitations. Next, it explores how piracy was (re)framed as a security and development issue within policy and academic circles and reinforced through popular media. This (re)framing led to the conceptualization and justification of an anti-piracy messaging campaign for securitizing and combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. The chapter concludes by arguing that this (re)framing and resultant shift in counter piracy frameworks has ramifications for the spatial-temporal geographies of current and future counter piracy policies and practices.

Chapter Three provides a contextual overview of the proposed UNODC CPP anti-piracy messaging campaign. Specifically, it analyzes how the (re)framing of piracy as a security-development issue enabled multiple sectors to jointly work on designing a messaging campaign(s) for securitizing piracy. It examines the macro-practices of securitization to explore how each sector’s profit motives were entangled in the process of designing the campaign
framework and messages. It also shows how institutional politics played a role in the creation of a second, Somaliland-centered messaging campaign. The chapter argues that securitizing actors’ participation in the construction of “pirates” and “piracy” is both productive and counter-productive to larger efforts to combat piracy and develop/secure Somalia. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the Puntland and Somaliland messaging campaigns demonstrate how institutional politics and geopolitical imaginaries shaped the macro-practices of securitizing piracy and become materialized in campaign discourse.

Chapter Four examines the micro-practices of securitizing piracy and exposes the gendered-nature of securitizing piracy. The chapter begins by reviewing the literature on feminist security studies and social reproduction as a lens through which to examine the micro-practices of securitizing piracy. Next, it explores the silencing, subsuming, and desecuritization of Somali women throughout the messaging campaign design process. It suggests that gendered practices of social reproduction are simultaneously drawn upon and reinforced as a strategy for creating and maintaining traditional, pirate-free Somali communities. The chapter concludes by arguing that the messaging campaign framework and discourse highlight the critical role gendered practices and social reproduction play in processes for securitizing and combating Somali piracy.

Chapter Five examines the institutionalization of securitizing piracy within the messaging campaign’s participating sectors—government, military and development. Specifically, it presents and explores the concept of piratization as an effect of this institutionalization. The chapter argues that piratization also reflects wider global political economic trends of “roll-out” neoliberalization. It also examines how the UNODC CPP’s role as a securitizing agent enabled both an expansion of the spatial-temporal geographies of its expertise as well as a transformation of its mandate. Through strategically invoking or revoking “security” the UNODC CPP was able to effectively bargain with security to gain institutional advantage. The concept of bargaining with security also works to demonstrate that the development sector is an active participant in the merging of security and development and the (re)shaping of markets of security and development. The chapter concludes by arguing that the political economy of combating piracy is produced by a broader demand for security-development strategies for prevention and containment.
I conclude by suggesting that the (re)framing of piracy as a security-development issue reshaped the institutional arrangements and spatial-temporal geographies for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Under the new security-development counter piracy framework, securitization processes created new *subjects*, new *experts* and new *knowledge*. An examination of the messaging campaign micro-practices reveals that securitizing piracy is a gendered and racialized process contingent upon the privatization of security responsibilities and the promotion of gendered practices of social reproduction. The processes of securitizing piracy also demonstrates that the profit motives of securitizing actors contribute to shaping markets of security and development that promote the prevention and containment of particular actions and bodies. As this market is produced in Somalia, it reflects the specific local manifestations of broader global patterns of racialized incarceration and criminalization in contemporary millennial capitalist crisis/expansion at work in numerous other locations around the world.
Chapter One
Security and Development Theory: A Framework for Analyzing Securitizing Somali Piracy

Before, long time, the local fishermen had a problem with the entire world because people used to come with their ships and take our fish and they would destroy ships. So the people one day decided to protect their own fish and fight against them. A while after that the criminals decided to start taking these ships hostage for money. Before, Europeans were the pirates, because they were stealing our property. They were coming from Europe and stealing our fish.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

When I was in Puntland I was a fisherman. I came from a rural area. This was the first time that I went to fish, so I don’t know anything about piracy. We were told that pirates were criminals and bad people. Because of what pirates were doing, I was detained. Now, all of the fishermen are mistaken as pirates. Because pirates come from Somalia, foreign navies pick up any one that is Somali and on the water. The best thing is that first, there should be a stable government in Somalia. Second, there needs to be more schools so that people can go to school. I will either go back to fishing or go back to my rural area and farm. I am illiterate and do not have any other skills.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

This chapter engages with critical development theory and securitization theory as a basis for grounding the analysis of securitizing piracy. The chapter begins by reviewing securitization theory and critical development theory literature. It then discusses how current theorizations of the security-development nexus draw from this literature and inform the theoretical framework employed throughout this research project. The chapter concludes by providing an overview of existing understandings of security and development in Somalia in order to illustrate the contextual framework informing current security-development counter piracy strategies.

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1 Personal Interview, KSPP4, 2012.
2 Personal Interview, KSPP20, 2012.
1 Security Studies Literature

Geographer Wendy Larner identifies three different interpretations of neo-liberalism. This research project approaches neoliberalism as an ideology, what Larner refers to as a “‘sociological’ approach to neo-liberalism in which a wider range of institutions, organizations and processes are considered,” in order to better understand the increasing global privatization and informalization of security practices and their impact on efforts to securitize piracy. Lucia Zedner argues that the post-9/11 shift to a security society, coupled with a neoliberal market economy, has resulted in the commodification of security and a burgeoning private security industry. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams also note that, “As security has become less tightly identified with the direct and exclusive authority of state officials and instead seen as service that can be bought and sold on a free market, it has been in a specific way de-politicized and partially transformed from a public problem requiring welfarist social policy and state intervention to a technical problem amenable to private solution…consumers are to a degree responsible for their own security, both in terms of their behavior and in terms of making provisions for their own protection”. Or, in other words, de-politicization occurs when states no longer claim responsibility (or accountability) for the provisioning of security. Rather, the responsibilization of security is passed down to the individuals. The application of private solutions to security problems is seen in Somalia’s contemporary struggles to combat crime, terrorism and piracy. For example, the Somali government’s limited ability to provide security has increased individual and community

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reliance upon more privatized, informal forms of security such as private police units, or “special police units” (SPUs).⁶

The neo-liberalization of security is also examined within post-structuralist security studies. Post-structuralist theorists Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde propose a theory that moves security beyond traditional, political understandings of security—their collective work theorizes security problems as a product of discourse.⁷ Weaver, Buzan and de Wilde’s post-structural theory of securitization, the process of labeling (or speaking) something a security issue, is now widely referred to as the ‘Copenhagen School’ of thought. In order to define securitization theory I quote at length:

The main argument of securitization theory is that security is a (illocutionary) speech act, that solely by uttering ‘security’ something is being done. ‘It is by labeling something a security issue that it becomes one’ (Wæver 2004: 13). By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object’s survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. For security this means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction. That is the meaning of security.⁸

According to this statement, securitization occurs when an issue is identified as a threat to a particular referent object and requiring immediate action. When an issue is declared a

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⁶ SPUs are directly contracted by government officials, individuals and development agencies, including the United Nations, to provide personal and institutional protection in Somalia (see also Menkhaus, 2004).
security issue it is moved outside the realm of ordinary politics and the normal rules and regulations of policy-making are superseded. Who decides what issues become securitized and how the security issues is declared is a politically charged process.

The process of securitizing an issue involves securitizing actors, referent objects and securitizing moves. Waever, Buzan and de Wilde argue that, “The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure…the process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act…it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done”. Securitizing actors utilize speech acts to speak security into existence. Through speaking security, they employ a specific rhetorical structure, or discourse, that (re)constructs a threat as a security issue. When an audience accepts the discourse, the issue becomes securitized. When an issue is effectively securitized it is presented as a supreme priority, thus placing it above politics and permitting the use of extraordinary means to address the threat.

Buzan and Waever broadened securitization studies to examine the scales at which securitization processes occur. Their scalar analysis of securitization processes suggests that the majority of successful securitizations happen at the “middle level”—states and nations. The middle level is more amenable to securitization than the individual and

universal levels because it is easier to invoke “we” as a referent object in need of protection from an identified threat. Although Buzan and Waever identify the middle level as the most common scale of successful securitizations, they argue that securitization does not take place in isolation. Rather, they introduce the concept of “security constellations” to highlight how securitization processes are linked across multiple levels and sectors within which securitization occurs. The concept of security constellations engages with the complex, relational nature of securitization processes by highlighting how social identities and political processes are co-constitutive of referent objects.

Buzan and Waever further expand upon their geographical approach to the study of securitization processes by introducing the concept of “macrosecuritisations” to explore constellations that form in the spaces above or below the middle level. They state, “To explore this area we also need an additional concept to cover securitisations that speak to referent objects broader than those at the middle level (for example, ‘universal’ religions or political ideologies; one or more of the primary institutions of international society) and which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations.” The concept of macrosecuritisations, then, works to expose the “permanent tensions across the levels” as securitizing actors attempt to blur the boundaries between securitizations and bundle them together into a larger, integrated security constellation. According to Buzan and Waever:

The ability to generate a successful macrosecuritisation depends not just on power, but on the construction of higher level referent objects capable of appealing to, and mobilizing, the identity politics of a range of actors within the system. This is partly about generating a unity of positives based on values shared across different actors and identities, and partly about generating a

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13 Ibid, p. 257
14 Ibid, p. 257.
unity of negatives where all the participants can agree on what they understand as threatening to them. Over time, it requires the ability to adjust and adapt the macrosecuritisation so that it stays in tune with whatever events and developments dominate the agenda of current affairs.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, the blurring of boundaries within macrosecuritisations is contingent upon grounding securitization processes in spatial-temporal socio-historical realities; it is a fluid, context-dependent process.

The Copenhagen School’s post-structural approach to security studies has expanded how security is understood and studied across disciplines. However, its theory of securitization has not gone without critique. Scholars demanding a more pragmatic approach to the study of securitization, or those calling for an approach grounded in empirical studies, have been at the forefront of (re)theorizing securitization studies. Central to these critiques is the heavy emphasis that the Copenhagen School places on the speech act. Thierry Balzacq argues, “A speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in ‘real situations.’”\textsuperscript{16} In order to more effectively study securitization in ‘real situations’ Balzacq insists upon a theory of securitization that is more audience-centered, context-dependent and attune to the power-dynamics involved in securitizing an issue.\textsuperscript{17} Feminist security studies scholars also critique the Copenhagen School’s speech-act-centered theory of securitization. Lene Hansen’s study of the international community’s failure to securitize honour killings in Pakistan highlights what she considers to be an absence of gender in Copenhagen School thought. She argues that the Copenhagen School’s speech act framework creates a ‘security silence’ and subsumes certain security problems.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p. 268.
This research project engages with security studies in order to expand upon understandings of how institutions, particularly development organizations, shape and are shaped by securitization practices. The UNODC CPP messaging campaign is approached as a form of neo-liberal privatized, informalized security for securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia. It concurrently examines how the messaging campaign is a materialization of the spatial-temporal shift from a post-crime, criminal justice counter piracy framework to a pre-crime, security-development counter piracy framework. It employs Buzan and Waever’s concept of securitization as a starting point for examining the actors, practices, and geographies involved in efforts to combat Somali piracy, and it utilizes Megan MacKenzie’s study of the desecuritization of female soldiers in post-conflict Sierra Leone to explore how current counter piracy measures employed in Somalia do not consider gender. The following section provides a literature review of critical development theory, highlighting its applicability in examining the UNODC CPP messaging campaign.

2 Critical Development Literature

Similar to securitization theorists’ approach to security studies, critical development theorists take a poststructuralist approach to critiques of development. Notable critical development theorists such as Escobar and Ferguson highlight the Northern-centric nature of ‘development’ and the power of particular forms of representation of the Global South. The following section discusses two main lines of critique in critical development theory—development as discourse and development as project. I will flesh out these critiques through recently proposed counter piracy strategies to delineate how pre-existing understandings of development in Somalia are used to justify incorporating a development aspect into strategies for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.

2.1 The Power of Discourse in Development

Arturo Escobar, James Ferguson, and Naila Kabeer are a few of the critical development theorists who critique the power of discourse in creating representations of conditions and individuals in the Global South as developable objects and subjects. Escobar claims that the Third World continues to be produced by development knowledge, discourse, and practices of development carried out by the Global North. These forms of knowledge, discourse, and practice are institutionalized and professionalized through the mechanisms of development, therefore, appearing as neutral rather than creating social and cultural orders based upon Northern-centric representations of the Global South.\(^{20}\) Escobar theorizes three axes that define development. These three axes are as follows: “the forms of knowledge that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those through which people come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped. The ensemble of forms found along these axes constitutes development as a discursive formation, giving rise to an efficient apparatus that systematically relates forms of knowledge and techniques of power”.\(^{21}\)

Ferguson contributes to Escobar’s critique of the power of development discourse to create representations that justify development intervention focusing on their necessary role in “moving the money”.\(^{22}\) Through examining World Bank initiatives in Lesotho, Ferguson exposes how development agencies created a representation of Lesotho as a rural agricultural economy in order to justify implementing a standardized World Bank development package. However, this representation of Lesotho as a rural agricultural economy does not match the historical and lived realities of the country; it ignores Lesotho’s economic ties with South Africa’s mining industries. Likewise, Ferguson critiques the World Bank’s portrayal of the people as an undifferentiated mass. The representations of Lesotho’s economy and peoples

\(^{20}\) A. Escobar, Ibid.
\(^{21}\) A. Escobar, Ibid, 10.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
created by the World Bank justified the implementation of development packages and ignored the underlying political and structural causes of poverty. These representations take the politics out of development—creating the appearance of an apolitical development approach.23

2.2 The Project of Creating Developable Objects and Subjects

Timothy Mitchell and Tania Li are two of the notable critical development theorists who critique “big D” Development as a project. Mitchell’s study of Egypt examines the ways the politics of development is based on a discourse of technical expertise. Mitchell states “The discourse of international development constitutes itself in this way as an expertise intelligence that stands completely apart from the country and the people it describes”.24 The politics of this is located in the reorganization of knowledge in a way that not only imagines countries as empirical objects—bounded and fit for development—but also as potential sites for projects requiring rational expertise that exist outside of its objects.25

Tania Li’s research on conservation development projects in Indonesia explicates how the will to improve is translated into programs by problematization and rendering technical.26 Problematization consists of identifying deficiencies or issues that need to be rectified through development projects. “Rendering technical’ is described as “a short-hand for what is actually a whole set of practices concerned with representing “the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics…defining boundaries, rendering that within them visible, assembling information about that which is included and devising techniques to mobilize the forces and entities thus revealed”.27 Li’s description of the process and goals of ‘rendering technical’ are similar to Mitchell’s

23 J. Ferguson, Ibid.
25 T. Mitchell, Ibid.
27 T. Murray Li, Ibid, 7.
examination of how technical expertise is utilized to create bounded imaginaries suitable for development. Through these processes Li argues that development projects shape the desires of developable subjects. However, as Li notes, the conduct of government officials, investors, donors, development agencies and the military are generally left unexamined and unimproved. This research will fill this gap by providing an institutional analysis, or studying up, of the actors and profit motives underlying current understandings of piracy and the counter piracy framework.

This research project engages with critical development theory to explore how piracy became “problematic” as a security-development issue. Entangled within this problematization is the creation of representations that justify security and development interventions for combating piracy. The UNODC CPP messaging campaign framework and discourse designates two undifferentiated masses within Somalia—pirates and non-pirates, and two undifferentiated masses outside of Somalia—proponents and opponents of Somalia’s development. This problematization also contributes to the “rendering technical” of security-development counter piracy strategies that demand new forms of knowledge, discourse and practices for combating piracy through security and development. The new forms of knowledge, discourse and practices led to the co-constitution of relevant “expertise” and the institutionalization of securitizing piracy within participating sectors. The following section introduces the security-development nexus concept and how it is useful in thinking through processes for securitizing piracy.

3 A Security-Development Approach

Recently, there is a growing acceptance within security and development studies, as well as within policy arenas, that security and development are inextricably linked. This acceptance

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, 267.
stems from political and academic arguments that 1) a more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given the opportunity to develop, and 2) poor and underdeveloped countries provide a breeding ground for insecurity in the form of civil conflict, terrorism, transnational crime and other threats. The normalization of the link between security and development challenged some scholars to take a closer examination of the point of intersection between the two—the point of intersection referred to as the security-development nexus. As Stern and Ojendal state, “The notion of a ‘nexus’ seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges of today”. They suggest the normalization of the notion of the ‘nexus’ is evidenced through an ever-growing amount of economic and political resources being “poured into the ‘security-development nexus’ and the attendant revamping of national and international multilateral institutions and actions designed to address it. Hence ‘the nexus’ matters”.

Mark Duffield’s research of the security development nexus specifically examines the post-Cold war reuniting of aid and politics. His research reconceives development and aid as a form of liberal governance concerned with “attempting to transform societies as a whole, reconstructing social relations anew and, especially, changing behavior and attitudes”. Duffield argues that the post-Cold War shift from a state-centric security approach to a human security approach signifies a merging of security and development where human security has become a tool used by the developed world to control and dominate the developing world. Duffield focuses on how contested states viewed as insecure, or within zones of insecurity, are increasingly subjected to forms of economic, social and political influence as a byproduct of accepting development aid. He labels this use of aid tools as a form of global liberal governances the radicalization of development. According to Duffield,

33 Ibid, p. 6.
the radicalization of development creates, “A new willingness to countenance a level of intrusion and degree of social engineering hitherto frowned upon by the international community…it is now explicitly argued that aid, including humanitarian assistance, is essentially political”.35

David Chandler’s research argues that policy created at the security-development nexus reflects a trend where Western states “use the international sphere as an arena for grand policy statements of mission and purpose”, but in practice, they devolve implementation and responsibilities to international organizations and NGOs.36 In doing so, Western states are able to promote an altruistic self-image while simultaneously disengaging from accountability.37 Chandler labels this separation between rhetoric and policy planning—“anti-foreign policy.”38 His discussion of “anti-foreign policy” specifically criticizes world leaders for using the United Nations as a stage for issuing sound bites while evading strategic policy planning. The increasingly overcrowded, market-driven development environment, the conflation of underdevelopment and security, the rhetorically heavy, strategically hollow policy approaches define the current political economy of the security-development nexus. Concurrently, it portrays the security-development nexus as becoming wider (à la Duffield) and shallower (à la Chandler) as more actors compete to do less in the name of security and development.

36 Ibid. p. 363.
38 Ibid.
This research project engages with the understandings of the security-development nexus of Duffield and Chandler to explore the general consequences of ad hoc institutional arrangements for combating piracy. I argue that the process of securitizing piracy can also be understood as a form of territorialization and reterritorialization that is enabled by the ad hoc institutional arrangement formed at intersection of security and development. Duffield’s theory of the radicalization of development is drawn upon to explore the “level of instruction and degree of social engineering” embedded in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign’s framework and discourse. It is also used to flesh out the potential re-politicization of aid and resulting ramifications of the UNODC CPP’s role as a securitizing actor for securitizing piracy. Chandler’s research is used in examining the UNODC CPP messaging campaign’s separation between rhetoric and planning. It is also used to push security development theories to include an analysis of how securitization processes impact the spatial-temporal geographies of sector’s engagement/disengagement in development responsibilities. This project is grounded in United Nations processes in order to identify gaps in current understandings of the operationalization of projects conceived at the security-development nexus. It intends to broaden academic understandings of security and development research by providing a Somali piracy case study. At the same time, it aims to inform security and development policy by illuminating how securitization processes enable a strategic fusion of security and development that has general consequences for marginalized populations and participating institutions.

Engaging with the aforementioned security, development and security-development nexus theories this research takes an ethnographic approach to exploring how identity politics, political economy, and socio-historical context are entangled in efforts to securitize piracy. Gillian Hart states that “…critical ethnographies offer vantage points for generating new understandings by illuminating power-laden processes of constitution, connection, and disconnection, along with slippages, opening, and contradictions, and possibilities for alliance within and across different spatial scales.”39 Therefore, a critical ethnography approach offers

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a vantage point for understanding the actors, constellations, and tensions occurring across the multiple levels and sectors in which securitization processes occur. This project utilizes ethnography to focus on the micro- and macro-practices of securitizing piracy. Drawing upon Buzan and Waever’s research concept of macrosecuritisations, I define micro-practices of securitization as those taking place within the slippages and openings between the individual and middle level. Macro-practices of securitization are those taking place within the slippages and openings between the middle, regional and universal level.

As Hart states, “A processual and relational understanding refuses to take as given discrete objects, identities, places and events; instead it attends to how they are produced and changed in practice in relation to one another. From this perspective, articulation can be seen both as a method for ‘advancing to the concrete’, and as a means for envisaging feasible alternatives and alliances that build on the grounds of specific but interconnected historical geographies, but seek to move in new directions.”

This ethnographic study intends to ‘advance to the concrete’ by providing a concrete level of specification of the micro- and macro-practices of the UNODC CPP messaging campaign to understand the complexities of securitization processes. Through grounding this research in descriptive ethnographic research, I aim to produce concrete concepts that seek to grapple with and fill the gap where current securitization and security-development theories may fall short. It aims to revisit critical development theory to untangle how securitizing actors, objects, and practices are co-constituted across time and space. It also engages with securitization and feminist security studies to (re)locate the production of security actors, objects and practices into a relational, empirically-grounded context. At the same time this project ‘advances to the concrete’, it also aims to advance from the concrete to the abstract. I approach securitization as an ongoing process with specific social forces and material conditions at play within local contexts and across multiple sectors and scales. I argue how these specific forces and

41 See Ferguson, Ibid; Mitchell, Ibid; Li, Ibid.
42 See Balzacq, Ibid; Buzan and Waever, Ibid, Zedner, Ibid.
conditions relate to one another and have general consequences for the identities, objects, practices shaping and shaped by securitization processes.

As Stuart Hall states, “…The goal [of research] is to understand the situation you started out with better than before.”43 I aim to engage with the messy politics of power and representation embedded in processes of securitizing piracy. At the same time, I intend to give a better theorized account of how understandings of security and development in Somalia are taken up, normalized and travel within and across institutions through securitization processes. I argue that securitization processes reinforce a discourse of causal linkages between security and development, contribute to the strategic fusion of security and development that has general consequences for both marginalized populations within Somalia and participating institutions. The remainder of this chapter outlines current understandings of security and development in Somalia.44 As discussed throughout the remainder of this dissertation, these understandings informed the conceptualization and design processes of the UNODC CPP messaging campaign for securitizing piracy.

4 Understandings of Security in Somalia

In 1991 the fall of Somali President Siad Barre brought on the beginning of the Somali civil war. The Somali civil war ended in 2004 with the implementation of a UN-led interim government—the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (see Plate 4). In August 2012 the mandate of the TFG concluded and ushered in the newly elected officials of the Federal Government of Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia is the first permanently elected central government in Somalia since the start of the Somali Civil War. Within the first three

44 The chapter explores pre-existing understandings of security and development in Somalia as they have been imagined since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The fall of the Siad Barre regime marked the beginning of an influx in international involvement and intervention in Somalia that persists today (humanitarian assistance, development assistance, governmental support, security provisions, etc.).
days of the transition from the TFG to the Federal Government of Somalia there was an assassination attempt on the newly elected Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. This type of political violence, coupled with the violence associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Shabaab, has plagued Somalia for the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{45} The Somali conflict has been internationalized for decades. For example, since the onset of the Somali Civil War, UN peacekeeping forces, UN agencies, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), regional and international foreign governments, and NGOs have all played a role in helping to establish security and governance in Somalia. The positive and negative impact of this international meddling on relieving the plight of the Somali people is highly contested.\textsuperscript{46}

Since the early 1990’s Somalia’s security situation has slowly declined. The geography of fighting within Somalia is associated with different clan communities and regions. As a result, rather than understanding Somalia as a single nation, many argue that it should be viewed as a confederate of different regions that reflects clans and politics. This view also recognizes the long, complex history of nation formation that underlies Somalia’s current struggles with defining sub-regional territories. Although the international community insists on recognizing Somalia as a single national entity, the “confederate of different regions” approach to Somalia is unofficially recognized and materialized through the investment and development intervention patterns of foreign governments, NGOs, and UN agencies.


\textsuperscript{46} B. Moller, Ibid.
At the end of 1995, both the International Red Cross and the UN completely withdrew from Somalia due to the volatile security situation.\textsuperscript{47} Both agencies have since returned to Somalia, but they are selective about the regions in which they allow their staff members to work. For example, UN staff members are not allowed to undertake overnight missions to any locations in the South Central region besides Mogadishu. Likewise, staff members are required to be accompanied by armed guards when traveling in Somalia, must adhere to a strict curfew, and are required to check-in with the local security office via nightly radio checks. Despite closely monitoring the security level of Somalia’s different regions, aid workers are still susceptible to violence. This was evidenced in 2008 when a suicide bomber

drove a truck carrying explosives into the UN Hargeisa Compound (see Plate 5). In 2008, two-thirds of all aid workers killed while on mission died in Somalia making Somalia one the most dangerous countries in the world for aid workers.\textsuperscript{48} In 2009 CARE and WFP withdrew their personnel from Somalia after they received word that their aid workers were considered legitimate targets in the conflict between Islamic militants and Western Governments.\textsuperscript{49} Although the overall security situation in Somalia is depicted as extremely volatile, an examination at the regional level of Somalia depicts a more complex situation.

What constitutes the different regions of Somalia is highly debated and fluid. For the purpose of this dissertation I will utilize the Somali regions identified for project implementation purposes by the UNODC CPP and their counter piracy partners: Somaliland, Puntland, Galmadug and South Central. These regions are also the four regions most often referenced when discussing the geography of Somali piracy (see Plate 6). When delineating the security situation in Somalia by region, the level of security is often associated with where the region is geographically located on the “seven”.\textsuperscript{50} Regions located at the top of the “seven” such as Somaliland and upper Puntland are said to be most secure. The security situation is said to become more volatile as you move down the seven towards the South Central region, the region most heavily impacted by al-Shabaab. A foreign diplomat assigned to the Somalia desk in his respective embassy describes the security situation in Somalia utilizing the “seven” reference stating:

The security situation in Somalia is consistently and constantly in flux. Places that are deemed safe and secure are Somaliland but if you peel it back there are a lot of underlying issues that have not been resolved from the split of Somalia. And if you travel down the seven it becomes much worse as you

\textsuperscript{50} The geography of Somalia is said to depict the number “seven”. Somaliland and Puntland make up the top of the “seven” and lower Puntland, Galmadug, and South Central make up the lower part of the “seven”.

travel south. It is still very interest and clan driven, and where there is some security/stability there are common interests uniting folks and they have found some common ground to keep a secure situation.\textsuperscript{51}

Plate 5: A memorial stands erected for staff killed during the bombing of the UN Hargeisa Compound in Hargeisa, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)

\textsuperscript{51} Personal interview, KSFG14, 2012.
Plate 6: Regions of Somalia: Regions identified by UNODC CPP and counter piracy partners in strategies for combating piracy (Wikipedia 2012). The Islamic Emirate of Somalia depicted is referred to by UNODC CPP and counter piracy partners as “South Central”.

This sentiment is echoed by a key counter piracy actor working with the United Nations:

The security situation in Somalia is unpredictable, volatile, and dynamic. South central is clearly experiencing akin to civil war, insurgency. Galmadug and Puntland are relatively stable but with regional confrontations particularly with Puntland and Somaliland. Puntland is becoming more secure with the beginnings of the necessary authorities and institutions in place. Somaliland is
most stable with the authorities and institutions more developed and matured but still with degrees of instability and insecurity. There is a real risk of conflict migrating from south central northwards. There is a real risk of something sparking off up there.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite regional differences in security, the overall security condition in Somalia remains volatile and in flux. Most regions lack a police force, rapes go unreported and unprosecuted, kidnappings of foreign aid workers are on the rise, bombings and shootings occur regularly, and guns are openly carried. One counter piracy actor who currently resides and works in Hargeisa, Somaliland (one of the more secure regions of Somalia) comments on the gun culture and personal feelings of security (see Plate 7):

I don’t like the gun culture here. Everyone has guns, people don’t know how to use them, and the guns aren’t in a fair condition, but they are very quick to use them. I don’t trust that the safety is on, and people are careless about where they point them. On the other hand, people walk through town with a wheelbarrow of money and no one touches them…probably because they know they’ll get shot.\textsuperscript{53} The United States Department of State further elaborates on the overall high security risks associated with travel and work in Somalia stating:

Terrorist attacks have occurred against international relief workers, including Westerners, throughout Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland. In every year since 2008, there have been violent kidnappings and assassinations, including by suicide bombing, of local and foreign staff working for international organizations. Additionally, there have been threats against Westerners in Somalia, including Somaliland. Terrorist operatives and armed groups in Somalia have demonstrated the intent to attack UN compounds and other places frequented by foreigners in Mogadishu, including Mogadishu International Airport. Additionally, al-Shabaab controls portions of southern

\textsuperscript{52} Personal interview, KSCP4, 2012.
\textsuperscript{53} Personal interview, KSCP8, 2012.
and central Somalia. Persons traveling to Somalia should be aware that incidents such as armed banditry, road assaults, kidnappings for ransom, shootings and grenade attacks on public markets, and detonations of anti-personnel and-vehicle land mines occur in most parts of the country, including the disputed regions of Sool, Sanag and Cayn in the north.54

As evidenced through personal testimony and government travel warnings, even in the “more secure” regions of Somalia, there are constant threats to the safety and security of Somali nationals and foreign nationals.

Plate 7: A man with a gun seated outside of a public building in Garowe, Somalia. (photograph by Johnny Skogstad)

5  Understandings of Development in Somalia

Similarly to the security situation in Somalia, the development situation in Somalia is often depicted in a negative, dismal manner. The more stable regions of Somalia have witnessed some level of development and international investment. However, the majority of Somalia remains too dangerous for international aid workers to work on the ground or attract international direct investment. As a result, the majority of development work in Somalia often occurs in a piecemeal manner that is geographically contingent upon a region’s security level (see Plate 8). A foreign national working for the United Nations Development Programme-Somalia (UNDP-Somalia) explains development in Somalia as it relates to particular regions stating:

On a macro scale, development is nonexistent in Somalia. Development is piecemeal, disjointed, stand alone and pointless at the micro level. The development situation is reasonably advanced in Somaliland, improving in Puntland, but not that good in south central. It all comes back to the security-development question of what drives what? In Somaliland people are starting to see the benefits of peace and security and, therefore, development is coming in. Puntland is also starting to see it. South Central is behind in development because basic services have been destroyed and they are living in fear. Through meetings, I detect that there is more development presence in Somaliland, a growing presence in Puntland, and a decline in South Central.


56 In July 2012, a $17m Coca-Cola bottling plant was opened in Hargeisa, Somaliland. The bottling plant is the largest private investment in Somalia. Hargeisa, Somaliland is often considered the most stable area in Somalia.
Although there is a desire to get back into South Central, there is a lack of trust between all parties because nobody knows who’s, who…aid workers, terrorists, pirates, spies, etc. Al-shabaab targets NGOs in South Central.  

In addition to understandings of development in Somalia as region-specific, there is also skepticism surrounding who is implementing the development. Due to a global decline in donor funding for international development programmes, many UN agencies are fighting among themselves for scarce resources. As a result, this inter-agency competition has resulted in a lack of coordination among UN agencies working in Somalia. Rather than working together, each agency is fighting for their piece of the money—and each individual is fighting for his or her job.

Plate 8: The United Nations Compound in Garowe, Somalia. (Photograph by Johnny Skogstad)

57 Personal interview, KSCP9, 2012.
58 M. Tran “Drop in Aid Shows Declining Will for Global Partnership on Development” The Guardian (September 20, 2012) www.guardian.co.uk.
To further complicate matters, because the UN is one of the few reputable agencies with the capacity to work on the ground in Somalia some UN agencies apply for and win grant money to implement projects for which they lack pertinent knowledge and implementation experience. One of the foreign diplomats I interviewed who oversees development projects in Somalia noted that poorly executed development projects are actually making the development situation in Somalia worse. He stated:

The development situation in Somalia is horrendously, absolutely, totally broken...ineffective, inefficient. You have international agencies driven by international agendas putting lots of money through organizations that cannot demonstrate anything on the ground. These actions have made the situation worse rather than making it better. Their presence has distorted the social fabric and economic situation of Somalia and has created larger economic gaps.... UN agencies are particularly guilty of this.\(^{59}\)

Lastly, because of the disjointed nature of development in Somalia, Somalis have assessment fatigue—meaning they have been surveyed, questionnaired, focus grouped and workshopped to the point of numbness by countless UN agencies and NGOs. I witnessed assessment fatigue first hand while during my missions in Somalia. On several occasions, Somali-based NGOs and organizations would list off the different UN agencies that had previously made promises to them and not followed through. They then asked me if I (i.e., the UNODC CPP) was going to do the same. As a result, I found myself apologizing on behalf of other organizations and agencies. In the end, the advocacy campaign that I worked on also failed to deliver many of the projects we discussed with our Somali partners. The UN and NGOs are not guilty of these shortcomings alone. The aid divisions of foreign governments also struggle to implement their programmes.

Despite the best intentions, the development situation in Somalia is dire and complicated. Its piecemeal, inefficient nature has created a cycle of broken promises with minimal results. However, despite the lack of results, exorbitant amounts of international aid money continue

\(^{59}\) Personal interview, KSFG3, 2012.
to be poured into Somalia in hopes of creating a more developed and secure nation for the Somali people. As a result, many of the current security and development projects underway are aimed at the creation and maintenance of effective rule of law, education, and health sectors within Somalia. The following chapter shows how piracy has become the latest *hot issue* reinforcing the link between security and development in Somalia.

### 6 Conclusions

This chapter provided the underlying theoretical framework to which this research project’s analysis of the micro- and macro-practices of securitizing piracy is anchored. It also presented a contextual framework of current understandings of security and development in Somalia. The next chapter examines how securitizing actors drew upon this contextual framework to justify and promote a UNODC CPP messaging campaign for securitizing piracy.
Chapter Two
Piracy: Somalia’s New Security-Development Issue

I am a very young person. I was born when there was no government in Somalia. All I knew was how to get a gun. I never knew anything else. This awareness campaign should take at least two years. Right now I am in prison; I now know what is right and what is wrong. Go to schools and teach the youth that the main problem facing Somalia is piracy and extremists. Piracy, even if you get millions of dollars, it will not help you—easy come, easy go. We are not going to become better through piracy. The other thing is that there is high poverty in Somalia. All of the youth are unemployed. If you can help the youth, it will help stop piracy. When I went to the sea, I had nowhere else to go. I needed money. All I had was a gun.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

The only way to overcome the problems of piracy is to create higher money jobs and provide health care. There are no jobs in Somalia that match the pay that a pirate makes. So a pirate will continue to go to sea unless there are jobs with equivalent pay in Somalia. They have to pay for their families’ wellbeing. In a day, a pirate can make $500-$1000 dollars. But if he has a job in Somalia, he won’t make that money in a year. So there is no incentive to take another job in Somalia that pays nothing compared to what a pirate can make off of one successfully ransomed shipped. Pirates need fuel, cars, pretty women, khat, and so forth, so in order to keep up this lifestyle that they’ve become accustomed to, they need to keep going back into piracy. Other jobs in Somalia cannot help him continue his lifestyle.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

This chapter builds upon the theoretical framework laid out in the previous chapter to examine how securitizing actors drew upon existing understandings of Somalia’s social, economic, and historical context to reinforce a discourse of causal linkage between security and development as both the cause of and solution to piracy. The chapter begins by briefly introducing traditional understandings of Somali piracy as a criminal justice issue. It then provides an overview of traditional rule of law counter piracy approaches, criticisms of these approaches, and why geography matters. Next, it explores how piracy was (re)framed as a security and development issue within policy and academic circles and reinforced through popular media. This (re)framing led to the conceptualization and justification of an anti-piracy messaging campaign for securitizing and combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. The chapter concludes by arguing

1 Personal Interview, KSPP34, 2012.
that this (re)framing, and the resultant shift in counter piracy frameworks, has general consequences for the spatial-temporal geographies of current and future counter piracy policies and practices.

1 Combating Piracy through Rule of Law

Why does piracy matter? Or more specifically, why does Somali piracy matter? According to a speech delivered by a Minister of the United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, piracy matters to the global economy because the shipping route through the Gulf of Aden and along the Somali coast is the second busiest international trade route. Approximately 23,000 ships, amounting to nearly one trillion dollars of trade, transit through the Gulf of Aden each year. The strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden shipping lane initially prompted traditional military and rule of law counter piracy strategies. However, whereas national courts establish laws with jurisdiction over their citizens and individuals who commit crimes within national territories, crimes committed on the high seas and outside of a nation’s territory creates a legal quagmire when attempting to prosecute acts of piracy. As a result, the international community has struggled to find a solution that bridges the legal gap between national and international territory enabling the prosecution of piracy crimes committed on the high seas.

1.1 Piracy as a Criminal Justice Issue

James Kraska’s book, Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy and Diplomacy at Sea, provides a history of the evolution of international law(s) for combating piracy. Although maritime piracy has been around for centuries, and many states have domestic

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laws outlining criminal proceedings against pirates, in 1958 the United Nations established the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as an international legal guideline relating to maritime security. UNCLOS serves as an international treaty designed to support the obtainment of maritime freedom. Under UNCLOS, treaty nations agree to collaborate and assist one another in ensuring the minimization of threats to the freedom of the seas, including piracy. Currently, Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed—

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) Against a ship, aircraft or persons or property in a place outside of the jurisdiction of any state;

(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of the facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) Any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).  

UNCLOS sets forth the international legal guidelines for the current counter piracy framework that sanctions a naval presence off the coast of Somalia coupled with arrests and domestic prosecution of pirate suspects. After declaring piracy a high crime and defining what constitutes an act of piracy, UNCLOS declares that “every State has universal jurisdiction to seize, arrest, confiscate and prosecute” piracy suspects and evidence related to piracy operations.

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Although piracy has existed worldwide over the centuries, since the early 1990’s the Gulf of Aden, particularly off the coast of Somalia, has become a major piracy hotspot. Somali piracy is a frequent topic of deliberation within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since 2007, the UNSC has passed a substantial number of resolutions relating to Somali piracy. For the most part, the impact of these resolutions has mostly been rhetorical—declaring piracy a crime and a threat to regional security. Recent years have also witnessed an increasing international naval presence off the coast of Somalia. This naval presence includes individual states such as Russia, Japan, and India, as well as internationally coordinated missions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Combined Task Forces, Operation Allied Provider, Allied Protector, and Ocean Shields) and the European Union-led operation (Operation Atalanta). The navies’ presence serve as a deterrence strategy; the purpose is to deter pirate attacks through the threat of military intervention, apprehension, and imprisonment, thus ensuring the safe passage of commercial freighters and humanitarian assistance missions.

In May 2009 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime established a Counter Piracy Programme (UNODC CPP) based in their Regional Office in Eastern African in Nairobi, Kenya. The UNODC CPP is the first and only programme within the United Nations system dedicated solely to combating piracy. UNODC CPP was initially conceived of to assist regional states in drafting piracy prosecution laws and enable the fair and efficient trial and imprisonment of pirates within the East African region. Prior to the establishment of the UNODC CPP, any piracy suspect apprehended by international navies would either have to be tried in the arresting ship’s country or released back on the shores of Somalia. At the time of writing this dissertation, the UNODC CPP continues to facilitate the trial and imprisonment of pirates in Kenya and the Seychelles, with Mauritius slated to begin accepting piracy suspects in late 2012. At present,

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10 Personal interview, KSCP1, 2012.
Kenya and Seychelles prisons are at capacity for receiving piracy suspects and detaining convicted piracy prisoners. In 2012 UNODC CPP began implementing the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme (PPTP) in order to ease Kenya and the Seychelles’ burden and deliver a long-term imprisonment solution for convicted Somali pirates. The PPTP involves the construction, refurbishment and expansion of prisons in Garowe, Bossaso, and Hargeisa, Somalia. When these Somali-based prisons are up to international standards, the PPTP will facilitate the repatriation of convicted pirates to Somalia where they will serve out the remainder of their sentences. March 2012 saw the first seventeen pirates repatriated from the Seychelles to Hargeisa Prison, Somaliland as part of the PPTP.\(^{11}\) However, the number of piracy suspects held by international navies and awaiting handover to Seychelles and Kenya far exceeds the frequency and number of piracy prisoners repatriated to Somalia.

1.2 The Role of Militaries and Geopolitical Limitations

Somalia has a long, complex history of engagements with international militaries. During the colonial period British and Italian forces fought over control of Somalia. Post-colonialism, international interest in Somalia grew substantially during the Cold War. During this time, Somalia found itself wedged between the competing interests of the East and West. Even though the Soviet Union was training the Somali military, the Soviet Union suspected the Somali Government of having a pro-West stance. By 1969 this suspicion was confirmed after several regime changes ushered in a government that aggressively pursued a pro-Western foreign policy. However, a military coup in late 1969 jeopardized the West’s influence in Somalia. Over the next twenty years the Soviets and Americans would switch sides, depending upon whether supporting Somalia at the time was favorable to their national interests, and foreign aid poured into Somalia. As the Cold War came to an end Somalia’s strategic interest diminished.\(^ {12}\) Conditions were placed on Western aid and the international community began to disengage

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from Somalia. As a result, scholars argue that the links between aid and violent warlord politics in Somalia were in place prior to the Somalia civil war.\(^{13}\)

After the fall of the Siad Barre regime, Somalia slid into civil war. The civil war reignited the international community’s interest in Somalia. Its failed government and increasing levels of insecurity not only created a humanitarian emergency, but also sparked fears that Somalia would become a safe haven for terrorists. In 1992 The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was created. It was one of the first internationally-managed, joint humanitarian peacekeeping missions. In their research on humanitarian action, Bradbury and Maletta argue that, “The “armed humanitarian intervention” was shaped by numerous interests and agendas. Somalia thus became a testing ground for international institutions and mechanisms for managing global crises.”\(^{14}\)

Shortly after the commencement of UNOSOM, the United States conducted a separate military raid in Mogadishu, Somali that would later be known as the “black hawk down” incident. The raid was an effort to capture Somali warlord Mohmeed Farrah Aidid. The failed mission resulted in a large number of troops’ deaths and an even larger number of Somali casualties. Since then, Somali remained a forbidden territory for Western troops. However, in 1998 terrorist bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were linked back to Somali nationals. These bombings, coupled with the post 9/11 War on Terror, reignited the West’s interest and involvement in Somali affairs.\(^{15}\) Despite this renewed interest, Somalia has remained forbidden territory for Western military operations. As a result, military counter piracy efforts have been restricted to at-sea naval operations and drone strikes on coastal pirate camps and pirate skiffs.\(^{16}\)

Naval strategies of disruption and deterrence were initially the only tools permitted by UNSCR 1838 to be utilized by naval vessels for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Disruption is an offensive response that renders a pirate group incapable of further pirate operations.

\(^{13}\) Bradbury, M. and R. Maletta, Ibid.
\(^{14}\) Bradbury, M. and R. Maletta, Ibid., 111.
\(^{15}\) Samatar, A. I., et al, Ibid.
Disruption may include the destruction of pirate vessels, confiscation of weapons, apprehension of pirate suspects, etc. Disruption onshore through the utilization of drones to destroy piracy bases began in 2012 by both United States and United Kingdom military forces. Deterrence is practiced through the patrolling of naval vessels off the coast of Somalia. The presence of the naval vessels is intended to deter piracy attacks through the assumption that Somali pirates are rational actors who will calculate the risk-reward ratio of successfully attacking shipping vessels versus being apprehended by a naval vessel and decide against attacking the shipping vessel.

1.3 Criticisms of Military and Rule of Law Counter Piracy Strategies

Three of the largest criticisms of the military-led counter piracy efforts are: 1) high cost; 2) not a long-term solution; and 3) catch-and-release. First, deterrence is expensive. According to a study published by the United States Institute of Peace, in 2009 it cost an estimated $1.3 million to deploy a naval warship for a month and approximately $200-350 million to sustain naval vessels off the coast of Somalia.17 Arguably, these costs have increased since 2009 with the increased the number of naval vessels deployed in the Gulf of Aden. The second criticism is that naval deterrence and disruption is only a short-term solution to piracy. The FOI Swedish Defense Research Agency claims that, “The drawback of naval operations directed against Somali piracy is that it has little chance of obtaining any long-term effects in itself. As long as incentives for the Somali pirates are not altered, it will, in all probability, reappear as soon as the pressure from naval operations is withdrawn.”18 Lastly, naval operations are accused of implementing counter-productive catch-and-release strategies. Naval operations catch pirates and release them back in the sea or on the shore for three reasons: practical difficulties, evidence, and inability to transfer. If a naval vessel apprehends pirates far out on the high seas, it may take the vessel days to reach the nearest country for prosecution. Arguably those days could be better spent deterring more pirate attacks. Next, there may not be sufficient evidence gathered to hand over for prosecution;

pirates are known to dump evidence overboard when they are apprehended. Finally, there may be
no regional state with prison space available to enable the transfer of pirates from vessel to
detainment.19

Military and rule of law counter piracy strategies underscore the importance of geography and
territory in the fight against Somali piracy. The international community’s history of failed
military interventions in Somalia has created geopolitical restrictions that, for the most part, still
exist today.20 As a result, the territory of international military and rule of law counter piracy
strategies remains outside Somalia’s border off the coast of Somalia. For this research project I
employ Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert’s definition of territory as follows: “Territory is thus
a spatial expression of power, while also crucial in constituting power relations. It is a bounded
space to which there is a compulsion to defend and secure—to claim a particular kind of
sovereignty—against infringements by others who are perceived not to belong.”21 Applying this
definition of territory to analyzing efforts to securitize piracy enables us to (re)think different
political claims to particular counter piracy spaces as acts of territorialization and
reterritorialization. Paasi states, “…The strands of power that constitute spatialities of
complicated boundary-producing practices make it increasingly difficult to think of certain
borders as local and of others as global.”22 In other words, border-producing practices of
territorialization and reterritorialization are exercises of power that occur across scale and space.
The remainder of this dissertation seeks to draw out instances of border-producing practices

19 “Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs” Tenth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2010-12
(Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by
20 The United States, in particular, refrains from discussing its small, intelligence-driven
presence on ground in Somalia. I became aware of such operations through discussions with
American military personnel in Nairobi, Kenya.
21 D. Cowen and E. Gilbert “Introduction” in War, Citizenship, Territory (Eds.) D. Cowen and E.
22 Paasi, Anssi “A Border Theory: An unattainable dream or a realistic aim for border scholars?”
in The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies (Ed.) Wastl-Walter, D. (London, UK:
Ashgate) 2011, 31.
entangled in efforts to securitize piracy within the security-development counter piracy framework.

2 Piracy becomes a Security Issue

Dr. Peter Pham, Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center in Washington, D.C. states, “No other manifestation of the disorder resulting from the collapse of the Somali state has perhaps received as much attention as the continued proliferation of acts of maritime piracy off the coasts of the benighted land as well as the increased geographical reach and enhanced operational capabilities which the marauders have shown.”\(^{23}\) Despite his view that the Somali militant Islamist group al-Shabaab is a greater risk to international security, he argues that Somali pirates have solicited a larger international response in the form of the unprecedented deployment of multi-national warships off the coast of Somalia.\(^{24}\) Several scholars argue that post 9/11 Western governments are concerned with the purported link between weak and failed states and the rise of terrorism.\(^{25}\) Since the end of the Somali civil war, policy makers, development organizations and scholars have classified Somalia as a failed state.\(^{26}\) Robert I. Rotberg, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution at Harvard

\(^{24}\) Ibid, 325.
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, labels Somalia the *only* collapsed state of this decade.  

Somalia’s classification as a failed (or collapsed) state provided a backdrop through which piracy was reframed from a criminal justice issue to a security issue. However, if Western governments view Somalia’s state of collapse as a threat, then why has piracy, operating only along the eastern border of Somalia, solicited such a large international response? I suggest that whereas the movement of Somali bodies across regional territorial borders (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti) seems to only moderately concern Western governments, piracy’s inherent movement of bodies across the onshore/offshore territorial boundary between the Somalia coastline and the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean poses a direct threat to Western interests (i.e., global trade routes, citizens, private shipping). For example, a peak in piracy attacks in 2008 and 2009, an increase in the number of ships and crews held hostage for ransom, and the increase in shipping costs associated with insurance premiums, fuel for rerouting, and private onboard security spurred conversations of the link between Somalia’s unstable security situation and global economic well-being (see Plate 9).  

Oceans Beyond Piracy’s 2011 release of two extensive reports with detailed estimates of the human and economic costs associated with Somali Piracy further heightened fears that Somalia’s instability was spreading beyond the shores of Somalia. The economic report purported that Somali piracy cost the world between $6.6 - $12 billion per year for 2010 and 2011. These shocking statistics were given a human face when the second report described the treatment of hostages aboard ships hijacked by Somali pirates. These two widely circulated reports caught

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27 Ibid.  
the attention of both the private and public sectors and launched discussions of ‘security’ (both state-centric and human-centric) to the forefront of piracy-related discourse.\textsuperscript{31}

Plate 9: One of the few shipping freighters seen docked at the Port of Berbera, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)

The Oceans Beyond Piracy reports reignited questions of whether the current criminal justice counter piracy framework was effective for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Foreign governments began to more closely examine the cost-benefit analysis of lengthy criminal proceedings for piracy suspects. At the same time, both foreign government officials and Somali government officials began rethinking the post-crime, reactionary criminal justice counter piracy framework. Or, rather than waiting to arrest piracy operations in action, they asked why not attempt to prevent the recruitment into and formation of piracy operations? It is this shift to prevention, or pre-crime, that criminologist Lucia Zedner defines as the pursuit of security. Zedner states, “Pre-crime, by contrast, shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so. In a pre-crime society, there is a calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all these there is the pursuit of security”.\textsuperscript{32} In the instance of Somali

\textsuperscript{31} Alana Boland’s research on food security in China reveals the important role played by both interstate and intrastate actors in shaping security threats. She argues for critical geopolitics to take a closer look at how particular texts are taken up by, circulated among, and shape the policy making of states. See: Boland, A. “Feeding Fears: Competing discourses of interdependency, sovereignty, and China’s food security” \textit{Political Geography} Vol. 19 (2000) 55-76.

piracy, the criminal justice counter piracy framework functioned post-crime, and the number of piracy attacks continued to rise, prompting counter piracy actors to consider a pre-crime security approach to combating piracy.\textsuperscript{33}

While working within the UNODC CPP office, I noticed an increase in discussions concerning surveillance, “tracking”, risk-calculation and prevention. For example, in consultation with several donors, particularly the United Kingdom, there were increased discussion about the UNODC CPP purchasing and implementing bio-metric kits for the Montagne Posse Prison in order to enable the identification and tracking of suspected and convicted Somali pirates as they move throughout the UNODC CPP facilitated process—arrest, transfer, prosecution, imprisonment, repatriation. It was suggested that this information be made available to Member States (i.e., donor countries) assisting and/or funding the UNODC CPP. In addition, there were discussions of creating a “database system” where Somalis could report missing loved ones that may have been arrested for piracy related activities. This database system would be maintained by the counter piracy focal point offices located in Hargeisa, Somaliland and Garowe and Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia. However, the UNODC CPP would be responsible for the overall management of the database system. Whereas the database system would be framed as a humanitarian effort to put Somalis in contact with their loved ones arrested and imprisoned abroad for piracy, donors were more interested in the database information for its surveillance and tracking potential pirate recruits, operations, and financing networks. As

Foreign government officials, Somali government officials, and the UN began drawing upon current understandings of security in Somalia to describe piracy’s threat to the well-being of the Somali public and larger international community. At the same time, discussions of strategies for combating piracy began to consider preventative aspects such as “surveillance”, “prevention”, and “moral hazard”—terms associated with pre-crime pursuits of security. For example, at the

Ninth Plenary Session of the CGPCS two of the agenda topics focused on pre-emptive counter piracy strategies:

3. The CGPCS established Working Group 5 to focus on and coordinate efforts to disrupt the pirate enterprise ashore, under the chairmanship of Italy;

4. To successfully eradicate piracy, the CGPSC emphasized the need for continued international efforts and coordinated and complimentary efforts to help address the root causes in Somalia.³⁴

Similarly, in September of 2011 the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the United Nations delivered a speech on piracy to the International Contact Group on Somalia. In the speech he directly associated combating piracy with an increase in the level of security in Somalia:

The problem [of piracy] is essentially criminal stemming from hardship and economic necessity. Stopping it has to be a combination of police capacity in the coastal area primarily but not limited to the land environment. And secondly offering an alternative...this could very well be training and employing local capacity as Maritime Police/Coastguards as an alternative to joining the pirate gangs. The local elders and leaders are warm to this idea and many of the communities recognize the evil that piracy brings to them – but they need something to replace the money that they currently get. Re-generating local industry and livelihoods can come later when we have a higher level of security.³⁵

As evidenced in the SRSG’s statement, an effective strategy for combating piracy necessitates addressing the root causes onshore in Somalia, including Somali communities recognizing the moral hazards of piracy. However, a higher level of security in Somalia (through the

employment of Maritime Police and Coastguards) must be attained before these root causes can be addressed. At the International Combating Piracy Week: Taking the Next Step conference held October 2011 in London, the President of the Puntland State of Somalia delivered a speech that included the following security-laden statement:

Piracy has contributed towards insecurity, such as buying weapons and committing various crimes including killings. This led to enormous increase of the security costs of the State to mount extensive security operations against piracy activities in Puntland, as well as prison services and prosecution costs.\(^{36}\)

These statements by various counter piracy actors demonstrate how pre-existing understandings of security in Somalia were drawn upon to explain both the root cause and solution to combating piracy—piracy results from a lack of security in Somalia and piracy can only be stopped by increasing security in Somalia. As a result, piracy becomes a security issue that creates a space for pre-crime strategies onshore Somalia. In other words, the movement of Somali bodies across the onshore/offshore territorial boundary between the Somalia coastline and the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean prompted a simultaneous blurring of territorial geographies for combating piracy. Philip Steinberg argues that the ocean has always been socially constructed as an external space in contrast to the insides of territorially bounded states.\(^{37}\) His study shows that the designation of some spaces as external spaces of mobility has played a key role in the ways in which we order our world, including the ways in which we bound and order the “inside” spaces in which mobility is purported to play only a secondary role”.\(^{38}\) Declaring Somali piracy a threat that needs to be combated both offshore and onshore Somalia enables counter piracy actors to expand the reach of their territorial sovereignty from the external space of the ocean to the internal space onshore Somalia. Securitizing Somali piracy is the first step in the process of

\(^{36}\) Speech of the President of Puntland State of Somalia, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Mahumud (Farole), Hanson Wade’s Combating Piracy Week Conference (20 October 2011) London, United Kingdom.


\(^{38}\) P. E. Steinberg, Ibid., 489.
(re)working these territorial sovereignties. The macro-practices involved in securitizing Somali piracy are more closely examined in Chapter Two.

3  Piracy becomes a Development Issue

The power of discourse plays a key role in the underlying processes of identifying piracy as a development issue. Utilizing the critical development critiques of Escobar, Ferguson and Li I argue that the geographical imaginaries surrounding the root causes of piracy spawned a distinct set of development knowledge associated with incorporating alternative livelihoods programmes as a tool for combating piracy, created a system of power that regulates its practice, and enabled the creation of a representation of Somalia as a developable object and non-pirate Somalis as developable subjects.

The geographical imaginaries surrounding the root causes of piracy are multi-scalar. At the regional scale, the root causes of piracy are imagined to be found on land, not at sea—a lack of economic alternatives, rule of law and a stable political structures in Somalia are said to have spawned the piracy phenomenon. At the state level, the geographical imaginaries are often associated with the different regions of Somalia. Puntland, Galmadug and South Central Somalia are imagined as the hotspots of piracy, while Somaliland is considered less of a threat for piracy-related activity. At the local level, most of the security and development communities and the Somali public believe that the majority of pirates are nomads who originated from the inland areas of Somalia and migrated to and are operating from the remote coastline of Somalia.39 However, the majority of detained piracy prisoners interviewed for this research claim to originate from the larger towns in Somalia, and although piracy attacks are launched from the coastlines, they claim the cores of the operations are also based in the larger towns.40 As a result of the uptake, circulation and deployment of these geographical imaginaries, alternative livelihood and development strategies for combating piracy have focused their efforts on improving economic opportunities in remote coastal villages and have neglected to focus on the

39 Personal interview, KSPP24, 2012.
40 Personal interview, KSPP16, 2012.
larger towns.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, the development interventions are operating based on a misunderstanding of the geographies of piracy operations as they currently exist in Somalia. The solution to this would be to target the towns where pirates are most heavily recruited for development interventions, rather than waiting for the operations to reach the coastal villages.

The vast majority of Somalia’s coastal villages are remote and cannot be reached by land due to a lack of transportation infrastructure. Likewise, because of geopolitical restrictions and a lack of security, most military personnel and foreign diplomats are rarely permitted to visit coastal villages. In most cases when foreign individuals do visit coastal villages (and these occasions are rare) generally they are United Nations staff members and/or NGO workers. Consequently, these individuals who manage to visit coastal villages are branded by militaries and foreign governments as possessing a unique, \textit{expert} knowledge on the security and development conditions of Somali coastal villages. In a similar vein, the counter piracy community identifies these individuals as possessing unique information relevant to combating piracy through alternative livelihoods.

Policy makers and military personnel are now looking to these individuals and their respective international agencies for their specialized \textit{knowledge} about Somalia and its coastal communities. Although it is yet to be determined whether the information gathered by these individuals is ultimately utilized to inform alternative livelihood strategies or military missions, the specialized \textit{knowledge} possessed by these \textit{experts} has drawn governments and naval operations into unlikely partnerships with international agencies founded upon a purported security-development link for combating piracy. The challenge associated with \textit{knowledge} gathered by these \textit{experts} is that the process of knowledge creation is tied to power. Somalis have the power to control the nature and amount of information provided to international \textit{experts}; this information may be laden with personal politics and personal agendas. Likewise, the \textit{knowledge} passed along by international \textit{experts} to policy makers and military personnel is

\textsuperscript{41} C. Bueger, “Drops in a Bucket?” 2012.
filtered through particular epistemological frameworks; the knowledge must fit within the political agendas and mission statements of the individuals’ respective agencies.\textsuperscript{42}

For example, I had several discussions with members of the UNDP who had conducted an assessment of the needs of coastal villages. According to the UNDP personnel, Somali coastal villages need to construct police stations and train police officers in order to combat piracy. Of course, the UNDP is the agency recognized for conducting similar work in other countries throughout East Africa. However, what the UNDP personnel did not discuss is that the reason the coastal villages do not already have said infrastructure and training is because their respective regional governments are not able to pay police salaries. Despite the situation, even though the sustainability of the proposed UNDP project is questionable, it meets the UNDP’s already established project implementation history and recognized area of expertise.

As a result, a system of knowledge and power is created by linking counter piracy efforts to alternative livelihoods development. Because foreign governments and naval operations rarely have the opportunity to speak directly with local Somalis, the power rests with the experts who have access to Somalia, and therefore, the power to shape the knowledge drawn upon to inform counter piracy efforts. Likewise, local Somalis have power over experts, foreign governments and naval operations because they are able to construct the lived or imagined realities of their development situation as it relates to piracy. Coastal residents (and Somalis in general) are aware of the ever-growing amount of money slated to combat piracy. As a result, they are able to shape the piracy-, security- and development-related knowledge in a way that maximizes monetary assistance earmarked for individuals and communities.

It is important to note that although the power is not equivalent in these examples many Somalis, particularly members of the Diaspora who have returned to Somalia, have made a lucrative

\textsuperscript{42} An example of this is evidenced through the different knowledge produced by UNODC CPP and UNDP Somalia. Information collected from each agency, including by the author, during their visits to Berbera and Eyl produced different knowledge about strategies for providing alternative livelihoods. In line with the missions of their respective agencies, the livelihood experts at UNODC CPP proposed infrastructure improvements for improving livelihoods, whereas UNDP Somalia proposed skills training.
business out of serving as liaisons between the local Somali level and the regional and international levels. My colleagues from various UN agencies used to regularly comment that the Somalis seemed to know the ins-and-outs of the UN bureaucracy better than those of us working for the UN. For example, one of my former UNODC CPP colleagues who spent a vast amount of time working in Somalia, including the remote coastal villages, elaborates on this situation stating:

What has developed in Somalia is a burgeoning cottage industry that the Somalis have caught onto quickly. People in Puntland, Galmadug, Somaliland and South Central get together and form NGOs and businesses to assist UN and other INGO’s in implementing programmes on the ground. They get very good money compared to other Somalis. These consists of workshops, training that goes nowhere because there are no jobs when they get out, and some of these people have even learned that they can provide reports in UN jargon that makes it look like things have been done, but in reality nothing has been done and they haven’t made an effort. But at the end of the day, their community will continue to receive money even though nothing is being done. The situation is dire.

In addition to identifying piracy as a development issue, key counter piracy actors draw upon pre-existing representations of Somalia as a developable object and highlight non-pirate Somalis as developable subjects. Discourse utilized by Somali government officials, media and the public depicts a country plagued by piracy as a result of a lack of economic alternatives. It presupposes that were Somalia provided with the development assistance needed, individuals would choose alternative livelihoods and refrain from piracy. This builds upon a pre-existing representation of Somalia as an underdeveloped object—whose underdevelopment breeds piracy. This representation is taken up by international agencies and policy makers to justify the

43 Personal interview, KSCP11, 2012.
44 Personal interview, KSSG1, 2012; Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs Address to President of the United Nations Security Council, 8 April 2011; Speech of the President of Puntland State of Somalia H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud (Farole) at Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, October 19, 2011.
incorporation of development strategies (in the form of alternative livelihoods) into counter piracy efforts. For example, the Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), consisting of over forty member states, supports creating alternative livelihoods in Somalia as a tool for combating piracy.\(^{45}\)

Portraying piracy as the antithesis to development (re)locates piracy from the security sector and places it at the security-development nexus. Locating piracy at the security-development nexus creates a quagmire where development agencies need governments and militaries to ensure their security while they conduct their work—and governments and militaries need development agencies to implement counter piracy alternative livelihoods development programs. Identifying Somalia as a developable object provides the development community with the license to implement development projects, and identifying pirates as the antithesis to development provides the security sector with the license to intervene in the name of keeping development missions safe and secure while combating piracy.

The other discourse utilized by Somali government officials, media and public depicts non-pirates as the victims of underdevelopment—a purported consequence of piracy. For example, Mohamed Omar, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Somaliland stated:

> I should also mention Somaliland’s wider needs which will help us serve as a more effective partner in the fight against piracy and terrorism. These are related to the root causes of terrorism and illustrate the critical link between security and development. …If we can help create alternative livelihoods we can reduce the possibility that our young people will be attracted to joining pirate groups or al-Shabaab.\(^{46}\)

Investing in non-pirates is represented as the key to successfully developing Somalia. Taking it one step further, non-pirate communities are represented as the key agents for successfully


\(^{46}\) Mohamed Omar, Foreign Minister, Republic of Somaliland, Letter to the President of the UN Security Council (8 April, 2011).
developing Somalia. These individuals and communities are targets of counter piracy alternative livelihoods development projects. For example, I met with the Somaliland Fishing Association (SOMFISH) on one of my missions to the coastal town of Berbera (see Plate 10). The members of SOMFISH expressed their desire to aid the international community in the fight against piracy. They proposed they could help in three ways. First, if the UN provides them with new fishing equipment (e.g., boats, fishing gear, etc.) then they would help train youth to fish, and therefore, deter them from becoming pirates. Second, they would travel to remote coastal villages and tell the youth not to become pirates. Lastly, if the international community provides them with guns they will patrol the waters off of Berbera and “kill pirates”.

Plate 10: A UNODC CPP meeting held in Berbera, Somalia with the Somaliland Fishing Association to discuss the impact of piracy on Somaliland’s fishing industry. (Author’s photograph)

Another example of investing in non-pirates is USAID’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TASIC-Somalia) program. TASIC is working with five coastal communities in Puntland that (self)-identified as anti-piracy communities to improve community infrastructure as a reward for
their efforts in deterring/resisting piracy.\textsuperscript{47} By rewarding individuals and communities that are identified as against piracy, development projects are shaping the desires and conducting the conduct of individuals; they are creating developable subjects. However, as Li notes, the conduct of government officials, investors, donors, development agencies and the military are generally left unexamined and unimproved.\textsuperscript{48} Consequently, piracy-related interests and the conduct of Somali local and national government officials is rarely questioned or, in some cases, overlooked in the name of development.

4 Reinforcing a Discourse of Causal Linkage

Key counter piracy actors draw upon pre-existing understandings of security and development in Somalia to argue that they are both the root causes and solution to combating Somali piracy. Popular media played a role in reinforcing this causal linkage among the international community by reframing piracy as a security-development issue within media coverage. However, in order to successfully securitize piracy, key counter piracy actors need to convince the Somali public of the causal linkage. As a result, a UNODC CPP messaging campaign was imagined as a tool for reinforcing a discourse of casual linkage, securitizing piracy, and gaining Somali acceptance for the employment of extraordinary counter piracy measures.

4.1 Media and Reframing Piracy

The popular media also played a key role in reframing piracy from a criminal justice issue to a security-development issue.\textsuperscript{49} For the purpose of this dissertation, a media analysis of primary sources of international, Somali basin region, and local Somali media texts were examined to delineate how the media framed piracy for public consumption.\textsuperscript{50} Over 200 media articles

\textsuperscript{47} Personal interview, KSFG13, 2012.
\textsuperscript{48} T. Murray Li, \textit{The Will to Improve}, 267.
\textsuperscript{49} The multi-directional influence of media’s role in reframing piracy as a security-development issue is not examined in depth in this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{50} The primary sources of international media texts were \textit{BBC News}, \textit{CNN}, \textit{The Economist}, \textit{Fox News}, \textit{New York Times}, \textit{The Guardian}, and \textit{Reuters}. The primary sources of Somali-basin
published between 2008 and 2013 were archived and coded. The media articles were coded by employing a method similar to that utilized by Victoria Collins in her study ‘Dangerous Seas: Moral Panic and the Somali Pirate’.\(^{51}\) Collins assigned each media article a coded theme based upon how piracy was framed in the article. She then utilized the coding to identify an evolution in the way piracy was framed. The specific coding themes I used were: 1) individual actors (rogue actors, groups); 2) threat to trade; 3) militarized issue; 4) security issue; 5) development issue; 6) hostage-centered; 7) legal issue; and 8) development-security issue. The purpose of this coding was to track if and how the media framed piracy evolved over the four year period from 2008-2012.\(^{52}\)

Each of the piracy related media articles was examined and coded for the general manner in which the article discussed piracy. Those articles that discussed piracy in terms of individual pirate attacks or hijackings were coded individual actors. Articles that highlighted the economic/financial impact of piracy, including ransoms, were coded threat to trade. Articles depicting specific naval operations against piracy were coded military. Articles that specifically mentioned the security impact of piracy (human, economic, national, etc.) were coded security. Articles were coded development when development was discussed as the symptom and/or solution to piracy. When the media article focused on the hostages of a piracy attack, the article was coded as hostage-centered. Articles that highlighted the criminal justice aspects of piracy (arrests, prosecution, and detainment) were coded legal issues. Lastly, articles that specifically made a link between security and development as a symptom and/or solution to piracy were coded security-development.

national, regional and local media texts were Somalia Report, The Somaliland Press, GaroweOnline, BBC Somalia, Voice of America Somalia, The Daily Nation (Kenya), The Star (Kenya).


\(^{52}\) The period of 2008-2012 was chosen because it corresponded with the 2008-2009 peak in piracy attacks and the 2009-onward conceptualization, commencement and operationalization period of the UNODC CPP, and the researcher’s fieldwork from 2011-2012.
Separating the coded articles by year revealed an evolution in the media’s framing of piracy-related articles. In 2008, one of the peak years of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, the majority of piracy-related articles framed piracy as a **militarized** issue (33%) or in terms of **individual actors** (27%). In 2009 and 2010, however, a shift took place. During these two years the media most often framed piracy articles in terms of **legal** issues (50%). Perhaps, this shift reflects the commencement of the UNODC CPP and academic discourse at the time. In 2009 the UNODC CPP commenced with the mandate to equip the Somali basin region with the judicial tools necessary to arrest, prosecute and detain piracy suspects and prisoners. Consequently, the commencement of the UNODC CPP created a buzz in the legal academic communities who heavily debated the ethics and morals of UNODC CPP piracy laws. All eyes were on the UNODC CPP and Somali basin regional states with freshly minted piracy laws. The popular media helped the international community keep a close watch on the first few sets of piracy trials in Kenya and later the Seychelles; all were curious if this could be the solution to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. The close monitoring of the nascent Somali basin region piracy laws and trials, along with international investment in the training of Somali basin region police, lawyers and judges, helped normalize the criminal justice counter piracy framework throughout 2009 and 2010.

The year 2011 evidenced another shift in media coverage of Somali piracy. In 2011, piracy-related media articles were most often framed as **legal** (32%) or **security** (26%) or issues. One may attribute the rise in security-related piracy articles to two different events which occurred in 2011. The first is the release of two extensive reports by Oceans Beyond Piracy with detailed

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estimates of the human and economic costs associated with Somali Piracy. These reports framed piracy as both a human security and economic security issue impacting the international community. As previously discussed, these reports were taken up and highly contested in academic, policy, and media circles. The second, separate but similar events were the kidnappings of American and Danish NGO workers in Somalia by Somali pirates and the kidnapping of a British woman from a vacation resort in Kenya by Somali pirates. These events not only added kidnapping to Somali pirates’ repertoire, but they also raised suspicions of a link between pirates and, al-Shabaab, the Somali-based cell of Islamist militant group al-Qaeda. The culmination of these events resulted in the renewal of discussions surrounding Somalia and security. This time, however, these discussions included piracy.

In 2012 security-development issues as a symptom of and solution to Somali piracy made their strongest debut in popular media. Piracy-related articles were most often framed as security-development (26%) issues and security (19%) issues. The remainder of this dissertation argues that the conversations within the government, military and international aid sectors converged in a manner that reframed piracy as a security-development issue. This reframing has materialized in the form of a UNODC CPP messaging campaign.

4.2 The Imagined Role of a Messaging Campaign in Combating Somali Piracy

Key counter piracy actors and the media draw upon pre-existing understandings of security and development in Somalia to (re)frame piracy as a security-development issue. However, according to securitization theory, in order to successfully securitize piracy an audience must accept the discourse presented. Further, when an audience accepts the discourse presented, it enables the securitizing actors to deal swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making in order to combat the threat. In other words, the main goal of

securitizing an issue is to let an audience tolerate violation of rules that normally would have been obeyed.\textsuperscript{56} According to Stritzel, “While the [securitizing] actor can only propose a certain recognition and representation, it is the audience which decides whether this proposal is accepted as a common narrative, i.e. whether the proposal will be intersubjectively held as real”.\textsuperscript{57} As a result, key counter piracy actors with vested interests in combating piracy needed to formulate a strategy for convincing a select audience that piracy is a threat in order to gain their acceptance of extraordinary measures. A multi-sectoral Counter Piracy Messaging Workshop was held in London in February 2012 in order to flesh out an agreed upon strategy for selling a security-development counter piracy framework to the Somali public and international community.

Examined through a securitization theory lens, the workshop was a meeting aimed at identifying an audience and strategy that would result in the audience accepting the discourse proposed by the actors seeking to securitize piracy—key counter piracy actors.\textsuperscript{58} According to UNODC CPP and EUNAVFOR representatives, there is a communication gap between international counter piracy efforts and the people of Somalia.\textsuperscript{59} Somalis think naval operations are only concerned with protecting illegal fishermen, and commercial tankers, foreign governments and naval operations think Somalis support piracy. The international community’s tendency to generalize pirates into one undifferentiated mass and non-pirates into another undifferentiated mass is further discussed in the next chapter. Somali’s tendency to associate counter-piracy naval operations with white, Western bodies is touched upon in Chapter Four. The workshop attendees focused upon selling the security-development counter piracy framework to two target audiences: the Somali public and the international community. Whereas, acceptance from the Somali public would potentially enable an increase in on-shore counter piracy interventions, acceptance from the international community would garner increased political and financial support for counter piracy efforts. In order to achieve both goals while also shrinking the

\textsuperscript{58} Key counter piracy actors are identified in Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{59} Personal interview, KSFM7, 2012.
communication gap between international counter piracy efforts and Somalis, the Workshop attendees agreed upon the need to create and implement a multi-directional counter piracy messaging campaign.

Despite the desired multi-directional nature of the messaging campaign, the portion of the campaign targeting the Somali public was given top priority and considered urgent. The Somali regions classified as piracy hot spots, Puntland and Galmadug, were chosen for the pilot phase of the messaging campaign. The aim of the counter piracy messaging campaign would be to increase the Somali public’s association of combating piracy with an increase in development assistance and a more secure Somalia. Ultimately, key counter piracy actors hoped this association would result in the audience accepting their discourse and permitting the employment of extraordinary measures in Somalia. Workshop attendees agreed that the counter piracy messaging campaign should be implemented through Somali partners, thus increasing the likelihood of the Somali public trusting and accepting the discourse. Or in other words, key counter piracy actors wanted to extend their territorial jurisdiction from at sea to onshore Somalia by employing a messaging campaign to create a homogenous “anti-piracy” sentiment throughout Somalia. In essence, key counter piracy stakeholders aimed to expand the territorial jurisdiction of international counter piracy efforts to include both outside and inside Somalia’s borders through securitizing piracy. Matthew Farish’s historical research of the American Government’s promotion of patriotism in post 9/11 America presents a similar case study of the importance of homogenous sentiments to geopolitical moves inside and outside of national boundaries.

5 Conclusions

This chapter utilized critical development theory and securitization theory to examine how piracy was (re)framed from a criminal justice issue to that of a security-development issue. This shift

60 Participant observation at the Counter Piracy Messaging Workshop, London, February 2012.  
underlined a temporal shift in the existing counter piracy framework from that of a post-crime criminal justice framework to pre-crime security framework. The temporal shift to a pre-crime, security-development counter piracy framework may be attributed to an increasing impatience with the existing counter piracy strategies and the political economy of the security-development nexus. However, pre-crime strategies for combating Somali piracy, identified by key counter piracy actors as increased security and development, require (re)locating the geographical center of counter piracy efforts from at sea to onshore Somalia. Hindered by existing geopolitical limitations, key counter piracy actors are forced to turn to Somalis and international organizations with operations on ground in Somalia as facilitation partners.

Under the criminal justice counter piracy framework the foreign military/government/legal sector held the power in combating piracy. As the individuals who arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned pirates, they had a monopoly on best practices, information databases, and knowledge creation. However, a (re)framing of piracy as a security-development issue also meant a geographical (re)mapping of counter piracy strategies (from offshore to onshore) as well as a (re)location of power from the foreign military/government/legal sector to the Somali government/international development sector. I argue that the (re)mapping of counter piracy strategies also signifies the desires of counter piracy actors to expand the reach of their territorial sovereignty from the external space of the ocean to the internal space onshore Somalia. The new security-development counter piracy framework and corresponding geographies also created new experts and new knowledge for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. The process of creating new experts and knowledge for combating piracy through security and development is also interrelated with the process of creating insecure and developable subjects in Somalia.

Key counter piracy actors and popular media played a role in reinforcing a discourse of casual linkage between security and development as both the cause and solution to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. However, in order to reinforce this discourse within Somalia, key counter piracy actors and international organizations with operations on ground in Somalia as facilitation partners.

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62 For a literature review on research trends in political geography pertaining to sovereignty see: A. Mountz “Political Geography I: Reconfiguring Geographies of Sovereignty” Progress in Human Geography (March 2013) 1-13.
piracy actors proposed a UNODC CPP messaging campaign as the solution. The UNODC CPP messaging campaign was imagined as a tool for reinforcing discourse, securitizing piracy, and thus, garnering Somali acceptance of the employment of extraordinary measures for combating piracy onshore in Somalia. Because of the complex set of issues surrounding piracy, it is difficult to differentiate whether the real concern fueling counter piracy efforts is domestic security, global economic well-being, or a combination thereof.
Chapter Three
Macro-Practices of Securitizing Piracy: Securitizing Actors, Identities and Narratives

Most of the Somalis think that Westerners are the enemy. The best thing is that you must have a good relationship with the Somalis. If you don’t integrate, then the Somalis won’t listen to what you say, they will continue to think that you are the enemy. The best thing is to approach the people, work with the people of Somalia and get them onboard with the awareness campaign. I support this idea of an awareness campaign. When you are speaking through the media, don’t use the word “fight” against piracy. Somalis don’t like the word “fight”. Instead, tell them what the pirates are doing are not good. You can change their mind and create jobs for them, but don’t talk about fighting; they want to hear about peace. Somalis need education and jobs. If you do these two things for Somalis, they will stop piracy.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

Those people, pirates, are crazy people. They are criminals. They bring bad things to Puntland and the world. All of these warships have arrived because of pirates. Now fisherman won’t go to sea because they fear they will be mistaken as pirates. The message that you should send is that the navies are detaining innocent fisherman instead of pirates. You need to tell the navies to not detain fishermen. Tell the youth that piracy is haram and that they shouldn’t try it. We people are imprisoned in a foreign prison because they thought we were pirates. Please stay away from pirates.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

The previous chapter utilizes post-development theory and securitization theory to examine how piracy was (re)framed from a criminal justice issue into a security-development issue. This (re)framing contributed to the conceptualization of and justification of an anti-piracy messaging campaign as a tool for securitizing piracy and combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. This chapter begins by providing the geographies of Somali piracy and the day-to-day operations of the UNODC CPP office. It then analyzes how the (re)framing of piracy as a security-development issue enabled multiple sectors to jointly work on designing a messaging campaign(s) for securitizing piracy. Next, it provides a contextual overview of the proposed UNODC CPP anti-piracy messaging campaign, examines the macro-practices of securitization,

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1 Personal Interview, KSPP29, 2012.
2 Personal Interview, KSPP22, 2012.
and explores how each sector’s motives were entangled in the process of designing the campaign framework and messages. It also shows how institutional politics played a role in the creation of a second, Somaliland-centered messaging campaign. The chapter argues that securitizing actors’ participation in the construction of “pirates” and “piracy” is both productive and counter-productive to larger efforts to combat piracy and develop/secure Somalia. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the Puntland and Somaliland messaging campaigns demonstrate how institutional politics and geopolitical imaginaries shaped the macro-practices of securitizing piracy and become materialized in campaign discourse.

1 Setting the Stage: Geographies of Somali Piracy

Despite the conceptual simplification of considering Somalia a single nation, the last two decades following Somalia’s Civil War suggest distinct regional divisions within Somalia. In order to implement more contextually appropriate development approaches, the United Nations, including the UNODC CPP, often sub-divide Somalia into regions. The number of sub-divided regions varies by United Nations agencies. The UNODC CPP recognizes three regions: Somaliland, Puntland and South Central (see Plate 11). The UNODC CPP and other counter piracy actors attribute the existence of and geographies of Somali piracy to the criminal justice and rule of law capacities and the level of economic development of these Somali regions. These geographies are then utilized to inform counter piracy strategies, and in particular, to inform the design of the UNODC CPP anti-piracy messaging campaign(s). The following sections provide a geographical overview of Somali piracy (see Plate 12).

3 The Galmadug region of Somalia is also referenced in the UNODC CPP’s programmes, including the messaging campaign. However, because the Galmadug region is continuously changing borders and political leadership, the UNODC CPP generally subsumes it under the Puntland region or South Central region for implementation purposes. As a result, the Galmadug region is not examined in depth in this dissertation and is only referred to briefly in discussions relating to the Puntland messaging campaign.

1.1 South Central and Piracy

The South Central region of Somalia is plagued with instability, insecurity, and a struggling economy. Constant fighting between Islamist factions (notably al-Shabaab), warlords, Ethiopian troops, Kenyan troops, AMISOM, TFG-loyalists, and others has resulted in a relatively lawless, ungovernable region and a humanitarian disaster. According to a report detailing state failure and piracy in Somalia, “The majority of the 2.6 million people estimated of being in acute humanitarian assistance need are located in Southern Somalia”.\footnote{G. R. Larson “Somali Piracy: An Age-Old Solution to a Modern Day Problem” \textit{School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College} (2010).} According to UNODC CPP statistics, since 2009 eighteen pirates have been apprehended off the coast of South Central, Somalia.\footnote{UNODC Counter Piracy Programme Brochure (February) 2012.} This low number may in part reflect South Central’s lack of policing and coast guard resources which impedes the apprehension, trying, conviction and imprisonment of pirates within the South Central region. Even though a substantial percentage of pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia originate from the South Central region, South Central pirates are generally recruited into Puntland-based piracy operations or launch their own piracy operations off the shores of Puntland.\footnote{Interviews conducted with Boyah, the father of piracy, by former UNODC CPP staff member, 2012; interviews conducted with convicted Somali pirates serving their sentences in the Seychelles Prison by UNODC CPP staff members, 2011-2012; and participant interviews conducted with convicted Somali pirates repatriated from the Seychelles to Hargeisa Prison, Somaliland, 2012.} Of the Somali pirates apprehended, tried, convicted and imprisoned with the assistance of the UNODC CPP, approximately forty percent claim to originate from the South Central region.\footnote{Information obtained from interviews with convicted pirates imprisoned in Kenya, the Seychelles, and Somaliland with the assistance of the UNODC CPP. Interviews were conducted by UNODC CPP staff members, 2011-2012.} At the time of writing this dissertation the UNODC CPP was not implementing any counter piracy programmes in South Central, Somalia.
1.2 Puntland and Piracy

The Puntland region is located north of South Central and east of Somaliland. Puntland has a higher level of security and stability than South Central, but falls well behind Somaliland in both categories. Puntland suffers from a shortage of policing and judiciary resources and struggles with high levels of criminality. Over the past two years the numbers of international aid workers and international and local journalists kidnapped and/or killed in Puntland has steadily increased. Most Somali piracy attacks occur off the coast of Puntland. According to UNODC CPP statistics, since 2009 two-hundred and forty pirates were apprehended off the coast of Puntland and two-hundred and nine were convicted of crimes of piracy. Of the pirates apprehended, tried, convicted and imprisoned with the assistance of the UNODC CPP, approximately forty-nine percent of them claim to originate from the Puntland region. The UNODC CPP currently is constructing and refurbishing prisons in Garowe and Bossaso, Puntland which will detain future repatriated piracy prisoners. In addition, with the assistance of UNODC CPP, the government of Puntland adopted Piracy Laws and Piracy Prisoner Transfer Laws that enable the region to prosecute, imprison and accept repatriated convicted piracy prisoners from the Seychelles.

1.3 Somaliland and Piracy

Somaliland is a relatively stable region in northwestern Somalia. However, recent clashes over a disputed region between Somaliland and Puntland, as well as reports of an increasing al-Shabaab presence are threatening the region’s stability. Somaliland unofficially seceded from Somalia in 1991 following the Somalia Civil War and considers itself a sovereign state—the Republic of Somaliland. However, Somaliland is not officially recognized as a sovereign state by either the Federal Government of Somalia or the international community. Somaliland does not struggle with the level of piracy attacks akin to Puntland and South Central. Rather, Somaliland mostly

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8 G. R. Larson “Somali Piracy: An Age-Old Solution to a Modern Day Problem” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College (2010).
9 UNODC Counter Piracy Programme Brochure (February) 2012.
10 Information obtained from interviews with convicted pirates imprisoned in Kenya, the Seychelles, and Somaliland with the assistance of the UNODC CPP staff members, 2011-2012.
struggles with secondary effects of piracy such as: 1) the international community depicting a picture of all Somali coastal waters being infested with pirates—which deters ships from docking in the Port of Berbera; 2) an increase in the prices of daily goods due to increased shipping and security costs associated with piracy; and 3) a fear of Somaliland youth being recruited into piracy organizations operating off the coast of Puntland.\(^{11}\) According to UNODC CPP statistics, since 2009 twenty-four pirates have been apprehended off the coast of Somaliland and all were convicted of crimes of piracy. Of the pirates apprehended, tried, convicted and imprisoned with the assistance of the UNODC CPP, approximately one percent claim to originate from the Somaliland region.\(^{12}\) In March 2011, the UNODC CPP handed over the newly refurbished Hargeisa Prison to Somaliland Officials. The UNODC CPP is currently constructing a new Ministry of Justice Building in Hargeisa and has placed a full-time UK prison advisor in Hargeisa Prison. In addition, with the assistance of UNODC CPP, the government of Somaliland adopted Piracy Laws and Piracy Prisoner Transfer Laws that enable them to prosecute, imprison and accept repatriated convicted piracy prisoners from the Seychelles.

1.4 The UNODC CPP Office

The UNODC CPP office sits in the back corner of the scenic United Nations Gigiri Compound in Nairobi, Kenya. The UNODC ROEA occupies the second floor of the X Block. The second floor consists mostly of single occupancy offices with the exception of the UNODC CPP office. The UNODC CPP office is a long, narrow open space office crowded with desks, a table and stacks of boxes. The UNODC CPP Programme Manager jokes that he enjoys the office space because it reminds him of being aboard a submarine during his days as a former Commander in the British Royal Navy. There are not enough desks for each UNODC CPP staff member, so it is regular practice for consultants to temporarily occupy a colleague’s desk when he or she is gone on mission. There is a conference table at the end of the office that is never large enough for the amount of meeting attendees. Hanging on the wall behind the conference table is a an oversized dry erase board that serves as an office calendar to keep track of staff missions, conferences, and

\(^{11}\) Personal interview, KSSG8, 2012.
\(^{12}\) Personal interviews, KSPP, 2012.
training seminars throughout the upcoming three months. Below the dry erase board and wrapped along the wall are stacks of boxes containing computers, brochures, Korans, and any other items procured for and waiting to be shipped to Somalia or the Seychelles.

The UNODC CPP office staff is a heterogeneous mixture of diverse professional, educational, and national backgrounds. There are three levels of UN staff represented in the UNODC CPP office: P level staff, G level staff and consultants. P level staff are “professional staff” members. P staff are tenured within the UN system, receive UN benefits (e.g. duty free, housing stipends, health insurance, etc.) and manage G level staff and consultants. G level staff are “general staff” members. G staff are administrative staff that are citizens of the nation in which the UN offices are located. In this case, all G staff are Kenyans. Lastly, consultants are temporary UN employees who are hired for specific contract periods to work on specific projects. Neither consultants nor G staff receive the UN benefits that P staff receive.

When I began conducting research with the UNODC CPP in late 2011, there were approximately four P level staff, four G level staff, and seven consultants in the office. At that time, all but one of the consultants were seconded from their respective governments to work for the UNODC CPP. The UN does not pay the salaries of seconded consultants. Rather, the respective governments of the seconded consultants pay their salaries. These consultants were former federal police officers, prison governors and prison staff seconded to UNODC CPP to contribute their professional experience and expertise to counter piracy rule of law efforts. Conveniently, the citizenship of the consultants and P staff members reflected the countries who are the biggest donors to the UNODC CPP: the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Denmark, Netherlands, Australia, and Norway. Although the UN hiring process is supposed to make an effort to be diverse and represent as many regions and countries as possible, this can be side-stepped through the seconding of staff members. Understandably, the UN is reluctant to turn

13 The United Nations system also has D staff, or “Directors”. Directors are the highest level staff members in the UN system and overseas P level, G level, and consultants. There were not any D level staff in the UNODC CPP office. Rather, there is one D level staff in the UNODC ROEA who is responsible for overseeing the work of the entire UNODC ROEA.
14 All seven consultants were citizens of the UNODC CPP donor countries.
down free, seconded labor. However, in doing so, a nation (or donor country) can increase its representation within a UN office by increasing the number of nationals it contributes. Ultimately, the UNODC Headquarters can decline a government’s offer to provide seconded personnel, but it is a politically charged process of balancing staffing needs, donor interests, and the “neutrality” of the UN.

I had come to the UN with the assumption that the individuals designing development projects and programmes were highly educated, degree-toting experts. However, I was surprised to find that in the case of the UNODC CPP office, this was not the case. The P staff had law degrees or master’s degrees, but the majority of the rule of the law consultants, although armed with decades of practical experience, had no college education. As a result, whereas the P staff were in charge of managing budgets and the work of consultants, the consultants with the high school level educations were the ones designing the rule of law projects, seminars, and learning exchanges. I am not implying that a college degree is necessary to design UN projects and programmes. Rather, I am noting that my preexisting perceptions about the qualifications of UN employees did not accurately reflect the realities of the UNODC CPP office.

The microgeography of the office reflected the UN staff “rank” and arguably the educational attainment level of the staff members. The P staff (who are higher ranking and have higher levels of educational attainment) were clustered together at one end of the office. The G staff (who did not necessarily have college educations but who did have job security) were located in the middle of the office. The consultants (who had limited term contracts and lower levels of education) were clustered together on the other end of the office. This layout was intended to keep the managers close together and the consultants close together for collaborative purposes. The G staff were located in the center of the office between the P staff and consultants because they were involved in overseeing the travel and accommodation bookings, procurement requests, and other office tasks of the entire office.

Despite the intended arrangement of the office, as previously mentioned the shortage of working space meant that consultants could be found working at anyone’s desk in any area of the room at any given time. Likewise, despite the diversity of education, experience, and citizenship, the UNODC CPP office was a very open and cohesive environment. All staff members joked openly
with each other and helped each other out when needed. It was common to hear light-hearted national stereotypes tossed back-and-forth around the office. It was also common to hear the English, Welsh, Australian, Canadian and American (myself) staff good-naturedly argue over who was using “proper English”. Staff members had a lot of respect for each other and particularly for the Programme Manager. When I asked Mr. Cole how he was able to foster such a respectful, cohesive office environment he stated, “Anyone can be a manager, it takes a lot of work to be a leader. I chose to be a leader.” Over the course of the next year new seconded staff would come in to replace those who had completed their designated service period, a few more consultants were hired (including myself), and the contracts of two individuals were not renewed. Overall, however, the office consisted mostly of the same personnel up until I concluded my contract and research in October 2012.

2 Securitizing Actors

Why securitize piracy? The goal of securitizing an issue is to enable securitizing actors to respond to a threat through the employment of extraordinary measures. A key aspect of the securitization process is identifying an issue as a threat. As previously noted, piracy has been around for centuries. However, over the past ten years the Horn of Africa has become a hot spot for piracy attacks. As discussed in the previous chapter, between 2008 and 2010 the number of piracy attacks rose, and a discourse emerged that frames Somalia as a place where piracy attacks are particularly widespread and frequent. With piracy attacks on the rise, and an emergent “Somalia-as-a-piracy-hot-bed” discourse, different sectors began insisting that piracy is a threat to both the international and Somali communities and called for an expansion of counter piracy strategies. These sectors include, but are not limited to: the military sector, the development sector, the government sector, the private sector (shipping industry) and the public sector (concerned citizens). Although the shipping industry has arguably suffered the highest direct costs (both human and economic) associated with piracy, the government, military and
development sectors were the most heavily involved in the design of the UNODC CPP messaging campaign for securitizing piracy.\textsuperscript{15}

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever identify macrosecuritisations as securitizations that occur on a larger scale than collectivities at the middle level (states and nations) to also include both higher (sectoral) and lower (individual) level securitizations.\textsuperscript{16} Securitizing piracy is a multi-scalar effort driven by securitizing actors at the higher and middle levels. The following section examines the securitizing actors and macro-practices involved in designing the UNODC CPP messaging campaign. Through this analysis, I underscore how securitizing actors’ participation seems to promote the development of an expanded security society for combating piracy—through an increase in police, coast guard, and military interventions. I argue that it is more useful to theorize “piracy” as not something that an expanded security society will “solve”, but rather a set of issues that the UN, politicians, and security companies are participating in producing.

2.1 The Government Sector

There are two groups representing the government sector involved in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign design process—Somali governments and foreign governments. The Federal Member States of Puntland and Somaliland are the key Somali governments working to combat Somali piracy at the regional level.\textsuperscript{17} The Puntland State of Somalia was the first region

\textsuperscript{15} As detailed in the Oceans Beyond Piracy report, \textit{The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011}, the shipping industry has suffered enormous financial costs associated with piracy. These costs include increased insurance premiums, the hiring of private, onboard security measures to protect their ships, and increased fuel costs to reroute ships away from areas that pose the threat of piracy attacks. In addition, it is their crew members, ships and cargo that come under direct assault from pirate attacks. The shipping industry has been a very vocal advocate for international support to combat piracy.


\textsuperscript{17} Due to the complex political situation in Somalia, the UNODC CPP and other counter piracy stakeholders work directly with the officially recognized Federal Member States of Puntland and Somaliland when implementing most counter piracy projects. However, both international
to become involved with the UNODC CPP. Upon being elected as President of Puntland in January 2009, and at the height of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, Abdirahman Farole, declared a new campaign to fight piracy in the region. Shortly after being elected, Farole declared, “We [government] wish to inform the public that we have began a direct campaign against pirate gangs and we urge everyone not to defend them [pirates]”.\(^1\) Farole added that pirates are “corrupting the culture” and that piracy has created many social problems in Puntland including alcohol consumption, \textit{khat} usage, adultery and fornication.\(^2\) Farole also enlisted the help of Imams to cite Islamic sources that explicitly prohibit criminal acts associated with piracy. Despite Farole’s declaration to fight piracy, he raised concerns about the counter piracy strategies proposed by the international community stating, “We learned on our trip to Nairobi [Kenya] that the international community is planning attacks on land and this is a big problem for Puntland”.\(^3\) Farole launched an anti-piracy awareness campaign that ran for approximately three months before being stopped due to a lack of funding. The campaign was described as an educational and spiritual campaign to discourage new recruits and offer amnesty to former pirates willing to give up the trade.\(^4\) The campaign was later temporarily reinstituted through

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organizations and the Federal Members States are subject to the authority of the nascent Federal Government of Somalia. These direct working relationships may change in the near future if and when there is an increase in the authority and stability of the Federal Government of Somalia.


\(^2\) \textit{Khat} is a flowering plant native to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Among communities from these areas, khat chewing has a long history as a social custom dating back thousands of years. Khat contains a monoamine alkaloid called cathinone, an amphetamine-like stimulant, which is said to cause excitement, loss of appetite and euphoria. In 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO) classified it as a drug of abuse that can produce mild to moderate psychological dependence (less than tobacco or alcohol), although the WHO does not consider khat to be seriously addictive.” www.wikipedia.org.


funding and support from the NGO Norwegian Church Aid. After Norwegian Church Aid could no longer financially support the messaging campaign, Farole approached staff members of the UNODC CPP asking for monetary and programming assistance.

On the surface, the Puntland government depicts its role in spearheading anti-piracy campaigns as a desire to save Somalia’s culture and values from the scourge of piracy. At the same time, it highlights the negative impacts of piracy on Puntland’s economy and security situation. If the international community is convinced of the Puntland government’s commitment to combat piracy it will be more likely to continue to provide funding and programming assistance to the region. The Puntland government’s desire to preserve Somalia’s culture and values and its need for financial and logistical support may be some of the motivating factors for its participation in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign. In addition, it is likely that two other motivating factors behind the government’s involvement is 1) President Farole’s desire to win over the Somali public in order to gain the support needed to remain president and 2) the need to obtain logistical and financial support for the continuation of Farole’s Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF).

It is a widely known, yet rarely discussed, fact among Somali peoples and counter piracy actors that Farole has himself had a hand in piracy. Despite his relatively recent public calls for combating piracy, Farole and his family members are suspected to have been involved in (and benefitted financially from) piracy operations preceding his election as President. Somalis do not generally openly discuss the historical links between Farole’s family and piracy, but the connection is talked about behind closed doors. These purported links were brought to my attention by members of the Somali public, Somali government officials, foreign diplomats, and convicted piracy prisoners during conversations and interviews. Therefore, perhaps Farole’s involvement in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign is aimed at projecting an image to the Somali public and international community that contradicts the backroom whispers. In order to win the public’s support for reelection, Farole wants to appear as though now he is acting in Puntland’s best interest.

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Another potential motivating factor for the Puntland government’s participation in the messaging campaign may stem from waning international support and financial commitments to Farole’s Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). The PMPF was established by President Farole in 2010 with financial support from the United Arab Emirates to fight piracy along the Puntland coastline. However, since its inception, the PMPF has been under close watch by the United Nations’ Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG) for human rights violations. In July 2012, SEMG released a report labeling the PMPF President’s “private army” and accusing it of “incidents of torture and allegedly murderous corporal punishment.”

Faiza Patel, Chairperson of the UN Working Group on the use of Mercenaries, echoed the SEMG’s concerns about the PMPF stating, “The PMPF operates outside the legal framework for security forces and reports only to the President. The authorities must integrate the force into the agreed-upon Somali national security structure and ensure that it is used strictly for the purposes which it is intended.” Shortly after the release of the SEMG report, the United Arab Emirates pulled their funding from the PMPF. With the future of the PMPF in jeopardy, the Puntland government was in dire need of regaining international support and funding for the continuation of the PMPF. Revisiting previous claims that PMPF was part of a “multi-pronged anti-piracy strategy” to “enhance security in the region and provide much-needed humanitarian support to the people of Puntland,” the Puntland government sought out ways to communicate the PMPF’s importance to

26 It is suggested that the United Nations Security Council threatened the United Arab Emirates with sanctions for violating arms embargos as a result of their sponsoring the PMPF. Sources estimate that the United Arab Emirates were providing $50 million per year to Puntland government to cover PMPF operation costs. Personal interview, KSCP16, 2012.
Puntland’s fight against piracy. The UNODC CPP messaging campaign presented the needed platform to communicate this message and re-center the PMPF within Puntland counter piracy security-development strategies.

The Puntland government and Farole in particular, expressed a strong desire to see the messaging campaign’s “Garowe Summit” take place before the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections slated for 8 January 2013. The Garowe Summit would provide an opportunity to publicly display the Puntland government’s commitment to combating piracy and the importance of the PMPF. According to the UNODC CPP “Anti-Piracy Campaign Concept Paper” (which informed the Anti-Piracy Campaign Project Document) the Garowe Summit was intended to kick-off the two-year long UNODC CPP messaging campaign. The Concept Paper, authored by the UNODC CPP, describes the Garowe Summit as follows:

A “summit” will be held in Garowe, to mark the start of the Puntland campaign. Puntland has already identified the highest “ranking” clerics and elders, appropriate community representatives and local officials from the eight districts and these people will all converge on Garowe to discuss problems their communities are facing due to piracy. They will also be proffering ideas on what they see as viable, long-term alternative livelihoods. This conference is likely to comprise several hundred representatives and may take several days. It will be covered by local and international media.

Puntland government officials continuously expressed anger and frustration about the Garowe Summit delay. Then, ostensibly due to logistical reasons, the UNODC CPP expressed a desire to shorten the time period and decrease the number of participants of the Garowe Summit. This suggestion was met with further outrage. The Puntland government wanted their Garowe

Summit, to be large, spanning multiple days, and to be covered by national and international media.

Although it was only a one-day event, the Puntland government eventually had their Garowe Summit. The Garowe Summit was held on Wednesday, 19 December 2012. According to GaroweOnline:

An opening ceremony for an anti-piracy advocacy campaign was held in the capital of Puntland, Garowe, and was attended by special guests from all over the Puntland regions, Garowe Online reports. Many government officials attended the event held on Wednesday including Puntland Vice President Abdisamad Ali Shire, Minister of Ports, Marine Transportation and Counter-Piracy Saeed Mohamed Rage, Minister of Justice Abdi Khalif Ajayo, Minister of Youth Abdiweli Indoguran, Director of the Counter-Piracy Directorate Abdirizak Mohamed Dirir, members of parliament, governors and other government officials.  

GaroweOnline also reported that during the Summit the government spoke of recent achievements, specifically those of the PMPF, and commended government officials for their role in fighting piracy. Two weeks after the government’s self-congratulatory summit, President Farole spoke at a ceremony in Bossaso, Somalia, declaring that the Presidential and Vice Presidential elections slated for January 2013 would be delayed until January 2014. According to GaroweOnline, during his address “Farole told that he did a lot for the better of Puntland he particularly stated that Puntland developed in the field of industries, businesses and the fight against piracy” (emphasis added). The Garowe Summit served as a platform for Farole and his government officials to profess their commitment to combating piracy and developing Puntland, particularly through the PMPF. Although one cannot measure the direct effects of the Garowe

Summit, the Garowe Summit (and, therefore, Farole’s messages) *did receive* media coverage by the Puntland and East African media.  

During a June 2012 mission to Hargeisa, Somaliland I was approached by the Director and Head of Operations of the Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination Office (SCPCO). He asked for UNODC CPP funding and programming support to implement an anti-piracy messaging campaign in Somaliland. In their request they stated that they wanted to raise public awareness about the negative impacts of piracy on Somaliland’s economic well-being and *national* security. However, within one month of the commencement of Somaliland’s messaging campaign, it became clear that additional factors were likely driving the government’s desire to raise awareness.

The UNODC CPP has been working closely with the Somaliland Minister of Justice since 2011. The UNODC CPP funded the refurbishment of the Hargeisa Prison as part of an agreement with the Somaliland government to accept repatriated convicted piracy prisoners. Also as part of the agreement, the UNODC CPP is building a new Ministry of Justice building in Hargeisa.  

Aware of the working agreements between the UNODC CPP and the Minister of Justice, the members of the SCPCO claimed that the only way they could successfully implement a UNODC CPP messaging campaign was if they had a new office and equipment (computers, office furniture, vehicles, etc.). In addition, the Director requested financial support from the UNODC CPP to attend multiple international counter piracy conferences—deeming it necessary to raising international awareness of Somaliland’s struggle with piracy. Although UNODC CPP was not able to provide the SCPCO with a new office and vehicles, they did provide them with office equipment and financial support to attend conferences.

It soon became apparent that the SCPCO were more concerned with the timely procurement of office items and the processing of their DSA than they were with implementing the messaging

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32 The UNODC CPP agreed to pay rent for the Ministry of Justice offices in their present location until the completion of the construction of the new Ministry of Justice building.
According to Mark Bradbury and Robert Maletta’s penetrating history of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, humanitarian assistance and foreign aid have long been a part of Somalia’s post-civil war political economy. They state:

Those in power in Somalia, whether the predatory military regime of Mohamed Siyd Barre, the “warlords” and military factions in the 1990s, Somali business people, the successive transitional governments since 2000, regional and district authorities, clan authorities, Somali NGOs and, most recently, militant Islamists have all sought to manipulate humanitarian assistance either to project their authority or to enrich themselves through multiple forms of taxation, direct diversion, and in some cases the creation of localized crises and “people farming” to attract assistance. International organizations are also far from blameless.

Examples of authority projection and self-enrichment occurred throughout the UNODC CPP Advocacy Campaign work in Somaliland and Puntland. One such example involved the kick-off event for the Somaliland Counter Piracy Awareness Campaign.

The Somaliland Counter Piracy Awareness Campaign kick-off event was a five day workshop series conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland. The SCPCO agreed that they should be the face of the Awareness Campaign, while I provide logistical support from the sideline. The workshop logistics and presentations were planned two months in advance. However, one day before I was to fly up to Somalia for the event I received an email from our Hargeisa-based interpreter informing me that the SCPCO Executive Director would not be attending. Rather, he was flying to London to attend a conference (through financial assistance provided by UNPOS). Likewise,

33 DSA is a term used by the United Nations that stands for “daily service allowance”. DSA is offered to UN employees and individuals assisting in the implementation of UN programmes to cover the cost of travel and expenses incurred during travel. DSA amounts vary depending upon the distances traveled. DSA amounts and processing procedures are well-known among members of the Somali government. Somali government officials can make up to ten times more money per year than their salaries in DSA if they travel abroad (i.e.: attend conferences).

the interpreter was told to ask me if UNODC CPP would pay for the SCPCO Head of Operations to attend the London conference as well. In other words, neither the SCPCO Executive Director nor Head of Operations felt the Somaliland Counter Piracy Awareness Campaign kick-off workshop series was a priority. In the end, the SCPCO Head of Operations did attend the workshop series. However, the SCPCO Executive Director did not brief him on the presentations. As a result, I ended up conducting the entire workshop series with the assistance of another one of my UNODC CPP colleagues and our interpreter.

Following the workshop series neither the SCPCO Executive Director nor the Head of Operations took interest in analyzing the workshop surveys. With the assistance of the UNODC CPP interpreter I compiled the workshop survey results into a report to inform the proposed upcoming workshop series in the coastal town of Berbera. Despite continuous reminders, the SCPCO never provided feedback on the report or expressed interest in moving forward with planning the Berbera workshops. Rather, the SCPCO insisted that I provide them with weekly updates regarding the payment of DSA monies and the procurement of their office supplies. In addition, the SCPCO Executive Director continued his regular solicitations to me and the UNODC CPP for monies to attend international conferences and for two new Land Rovers for him and the Head of Operations. The SCPCO Executive Director was particularly adamant about obtaining a new vehicle because he had recently become aware that the UNODC CPP was providing vehicles for Puntland government officials (see Plate 13). At the time of writing this dissertation the SCPCO had not received any additional conference monies or vehicles. Likewise, the SCPCO had not further implemented any Awareness Campaign-related activities.
2.2 The Military Sector

Since piracy off the coast of Somalia peaked in 2008 and 2009 the military sector has been heavily involved in deploying naval vessels to the area to deter and capture suspected pirates. However, it was not until the end of 2011 that they became interested in contributing their resources to an anti-piracy messaging campaign. In late 2011, when UNODC CPP began testing the waters for potential support for a messaging campaign, EUNAVFOR was the first naval operation to step forward and express interest. Others naval operations followed suit including NATO, the United States and the United Kingdom to name a few. As previously discussed, the military sector was limited to counter piracy operations at sea (with the exception of drone strikes on piracy bases along the coast). While discussing the proposed messaging campaign with
their respective communication teams, the military sector conveyed a desire to communicate to the Somali public what happens when pirates are apprehended while at sea.

The military sector wanted to dispel preexisting myths in Somalia surrounding counter piracy naval operations and to prove to the Somali public that they are there to protect Somali interests in addition to international interests. For example, the military sector wanted the Somali public to know that they have a duty to protect the ships carrying vital humanitarian aid to Somalia; they do not want to have to arrest or kill pirates but need to ensure that the aid reaches the Somali people. They also wanted to dispel the myth that they are protecting illegal fisherman and killing innocent Somali fishermen. Lastly, they wanted the Somali public to know that pirates are not tough heroes that prevent illegal fishermen from pillaging the waters off the coast of Somali. This misconception was heavily discussed at the CGPCS WG4 meeting in Copenhagen. One meeting participant later commented:

I believe that many who attended the WG4 Copenhagen workshop or have followed my several comments subsequently know of my strong views on the importance of addressing the perceptions around illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping, as well as the less frequently cited but nevertheless very negative/damaging rumours/reports of armed guards killing innocent Somali fishermen. I am therefore very much in favour of action on this front, (i) to dispel the perceptions locally and (ii) to provide briefs and supporting messages for the international community to use to rebut these reports.

To dispel this myth, the military sector wants the Somali public to know that they are not protecting illegal fishing or toxic dumping and killing innocent Somali fisherman. Likewise, pirates are not preventing illegal fishing or toxic dumping. Rather, pirates are criminals out for personal gain and that most surrender immediately when arrested.

35 Personal interview, KSFM2, KSFM3, KSFM6, KSFM7, KSFM8, KSFM13, KSFG3, KSFG11, 2012.
36 Personal interview, KSCP8, 2013.
Although several members of the military sector did express genuine interest in narrowing the communication gap between naval operations and the Somali public, there were other forces potentially driving their involvement in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign. As the design process of the messaging campaign progressed, various naval operations expressed interest in participating in campaign-related events that would take place in Somalia—notably the proposed Garowe Summit. One individual stated, “If we can justify how our role in the advocacy campaign can help stop piracy, then, perhaps, we will be granted waivers that would allow us to go onshore and attend campaign events. This will bring us closer to the Somalis and we can start talking to them and find out what’s really going on on land”. Participation in the messaging campaign, under the auspice of developmental assistance and bridging a communication gap, potentially opened the door for waivers for military personnel to come onshore. This individual’s aspirations to get “closer to the Somalis” and “find out what’s really going on land” sounds very close to a desire to establish a network of informants and collect intelligence for later use by their respective naval operations.

Essentially, the military personnel imagined that the messaging campaign would create a space where existing geopolitical military restrictions may be exempted (in the name of development and advocacy) and the Somali public would potentially accept an expansion of the current geographies of foreign counter piracy military operations to include territory within Somalia’s borders. In a sense, the messaging campaign becomes a tool for the

37 Personal interview, KSFM6, 2012.
38 There are currently foreign military personnel, members of AMISOM, on the ground in South Central, Somalia tasked with securing Mogadishu and to protect citizens, foreign aid workers and members of the newly elected Federal Government of Somalia. I emphasized open presence because there are foreign military personnel on ground in Somaliland, Puntland, and Galmadug—particularly US and UK military personnel. However, the presence, locations and operations of these foreign military personnel are meant to be secret and when questioned, their respective governments may deny their presence in Somalia. Despite their efforts to remain secretive, most Somalis know about their whereabouts, and their ghost-like presence has fueled the already high levels of distrust between Somalis and foreign military personnel. In addition, there was a recently publicized successful US military intervention in Somalia in February 2012 to rescue American Jessica Buchanan who was kidnapped by pirates while undertaking a mission for the Danish Demining Company in Galkayo, Somalia in late 2011. Details of Jessica’s
embodiment/disembodiment of the [foreign] military/state as a function of a larger project to combat piracy. In this example it is difficult to disentangle the [foreign] military sector from the [foreign] government sector. The majority of [foreign] governments participating in the messaging campaign also have naval operations deployed off the coast of Somalia. Therefore, the military personnel who participated in the messaging campaign adhered to higher orders/mandates from their respective governments, who were already assisting the UNODC CPP. As a result, it is difficult to separate the actions, identities, and embodiments of the military personnel from that of their respective governments. However, for this particular example I focus on the military sector, because the military desired to utilize the campaign as a tool for enabling the placement of “military bodies” on ground in Somalia (rather than “political bodies”). In other words, through its participation in the messaging campaign, the military sector is able to manage its image and appear transparent by communicating its “official counter piracy mission” to the Somalia public.

The military sector’s use of the messaging campaign as a tool of embodiment/disembodiment is similar to Alison Mountz’s analysis of refugee-receiving states and the politics of borders and migration. In her study, Mountz demonstrates how the [Canadian] nation-state exercised control around identity construction to “depict neat narratives about human smuggling and effective government responses”. In doing so, immigration bureaucrats became the embodiment of a secure, standardized, effective federal response to human smuggling and border control. Similarly, the military personnel’s participation in the messaging campaign could be viewed as a strategic political alternative to existing piracy narratives in Somalia that depict [foreign] military personnel as anti-Somali, pro-illegal fishermen and pro-toxic dumping. Participation in the messaging campaign enables military personnel to embody a pro-Somalia counter piracy

kidnapping and rescue are told in her recently released book: J. Buchanan, E. Landemalm, and A. Flacco Impossible Odds: The Kidnapping of Jessica Buchanan and Her Dramatic Rescue by SEAL Team Six (Simon and Schuster Publishing) 2013.

mission, and in doing so, they are able to control their image, manage information, and gain permission to go onshore in Somalia. Likewise, participation in the messaging campaign could also increase the military sector’s access to the experts and expert knowledge of development personnel working on ground in Somalia—another source of potential military intelligence.

2.3 The Development Sector

The development sector has been working to combat piracy through NGO work since Norwegian Church Aid picked up Farole’s messaging campaign in 2009. Since then other Somali- and international- NGOs have contributed to the fight against piracy. The commencement of the UNODC CPP signaled the first, and only, United Nations’ run counter piracy programme. In late 2011 the potential benefits of an anti-piracy messaging campaign began to circulate among counter piracy actors, and talks coalesced into the need to find an agency that could transform the messaging campaign from idea into action. Participants at the London Counter-Piracy Messaging Conference suggested that the UNODC CPP may be the obvious choice to implement the messaging campaign. They justified this suggestion by highlighting the UNODC CPP’s established history of implementing counter piracy work within Somalia and throughout the Somali-basin region.

Around this time, the Puntland government also began pressuring the UNODC CPP for assistance in implementing a messaging campaign. The UNODC CPP has long recognized the politically sensitive nature of working in Puntland. As a result, the UNODC CPP’s decision to take on the messaging campaign was more about keeping the Puntland government happy than it was about making the international community happy. After agreeing to assist with the


41 Multiple UNODC CPP staff members recalled several instances where Puntland authorities either threatened to kick them out of the State or ban UNODC CPP from entering Puntland if they were not granted their requests. I experienced a similar situation in Somaliland when Somaliland authorities threatened to kick out all UNODC staff members because one of my colleagues presented a letter to the Government that mentioned the TFG. At the time, Somaliland was refusing to be part of the TFG and insisting on becoming an independent country.
messaging campaign, the UNODC CPP tasked one staff member and one intern with designing the messaging campaign and implementation strategy. The limited amount of resources designated for the messaging campaign confirmed the UNODC CPP’s view that it would be a small, side project of the Programme rather than a central project. As will be discussed later, the messaging campaign became a point of contention within UNODC and among Programme donors. The following sections examine the design process for the messaging campaign(s).

3 The Proposed UNODC CPP “Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign”

In 2009 the Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) established Working Group 4 with aims of “raising awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlighting the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon”. Even though Working Group 4 has been advocating for raising awareness since 2009, because it is a think tank it relies on outside agencies for implementation. In 2011 Working Group 4 provided funds to the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to “operationalize” a counter piracy messaging project in Puntland. UNPOS implemented the messaging campaign from May 2011 to May 2012 by contracting the work out to a local Puntland NGO named the Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC). There were difficulties with both implementing and evaluating the impact of the UNPOS-facilitated messaging campaign. A final report submitted by PDRC to UNPOS stated:

The overall outcome was good, although we lagged behind on schedule due to budgetary limitations and delays in the transfer of the second installment, other constraints included the assassination of 2 key participants and an attack on a third one; the campaign monitor in PDRC Galkayo Satellite office and Radio

42 www.thecgpcs.org.
43 The successes and challenges of PDRC counter-piracy messaging campaign were recently published in a report titled, “Project Completion Report: Utilizing Media to Prevent and Combat Piracy (July, 2012).
Galkayo campaign journalist as well as the shooting of a female journalist in Galkayo.\textsuperscript{44}

An UNPOS staff member also expressed frustration with the messaging campaign stating, “UNPOS is a politics shop, we’re here to help with the political development of Somalia. We’re not here to implement programmes such as the media campaign against piracy. Nor do we have enough time and resources to effectively monitor the campaign. I’m glad the campaign is done with”.\textsuperscript{45} In 2012 the CGPCS granted UNPOS additional funds to implement another messaging campaign, this time in Galmadug and South Central.

As previously discussed, the UNODC CPP was initially hesitant to take on the work of designing and implementing a messaging campaign not only because its official mandate focused more on the legal aspects of combating piracy, but also because the Programme was already low on personnel and word was spreading of UNPOS’s struggles to implement their Puntland messaging campaign.\textsuperscript{46} After caving to pressure from the Puntland government and the international community, in late 2011 the UNODC CPP agreed to draft a concept paper for a UNODC CPP-facilitated messaging campaign. At the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 the messaging campaign concept paper was expanded to a draft programme document and submitted to the UNODC Headquarters in Vienna, Austria for feedback and approval. After multiple revisions, in April 2012 the UNODC Headquarters approved the UNODC CPP “Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign” Project Document permitting the commencement of the messaging campaign.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} Puntland Development Research Center, “Project Completion Report: Utilizing Media to Prevent and Combat Piracy (July 2012).
\textsuperscript{45} Personal interview, KSCP2, 2012.
\textsuperscript{46} Although the UNODC CPP budget expanded greatly in the few years since its 2009 commencement, the UNODC process of vetting and hiring personnel left the Programme seriously understaffed. As of 2011-2012 the office consisted of four general staff members, four permanent staff members, a handful of consultants and a handful of personnel seconded from their respective governments to assist the UNODC CPP. The majority of the UNODC CPP budget was spent on the four permanent staff members and the large prison and court construction projects undertaken by the Programme.
\textsuperscript{47} The revision process was undertaken at UNODC Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The purpose of the multiple revisions was to modify the UNODC Ant-Piracy Advocacy Campaign
The UNODC Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign was approved as a two year programme which, at the time of writing of this monograph, is funded by the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Oceans Beyond Piracy. The Programme’s commencement date coincided with the official release of funds from the UNODC Headquarters to the UNODC CPP in April, 2012. According to the Project Document, the Programme is to be implemented in the Puntland and Galmadug regions of Somalia and backstopped from the UNODC CPP office in Nairobi, Kenya. A “Brief Description” of the Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign is as follows:

To date, the international community has done much work to deter piracy by supporting naval operations and working with regional States and the Somali Government to increase prosecutions and detention capabilities. As recognized by the international community, however, the only true solution to piracy off the coast of Somalia is a land-based solution within Somalia itself. A core component of this long-term strategy to combating piracy is to increase the awareness among the Somali community of the dangers of piracy. This project aims to influence public opinion toward a negative view of pirates by beginning a widespread advocacy campaign in partnership with Somali elders, government and religious leaders and the media. By engaging in a dedicated media campaign to clearly illustrate the unappealing aspects of piracy, and highlighting that piracy is forbidden by Islam, UNODC aims to deter individuals who are potential pirate recruits from becoming pirates.

Although the messaging campaign was proposed for both the Puntland and Galmadug regions of Somalia, at the time of the programme’s commencement the high level of insecurity in the Galmadug region prevented implementation in Galmadug. As a result, Puntland became the focus of the campaign and implementation in Galmadug was sidelined until the security situation improved.

Key activities of the Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign include interviews and recordings with key stakeholders; a Garowe Summit; an Address to the Nation; production and broadcasting of anti-piracy messages via television and radio; creation and distribution of posters and brochures; six-part radio series on the dangers of piracy; advocacy caravans; and an educations packet for schools consisting of anti-piracy lessons plans.\(^5\)

Three sectors were heavily involved in the design process of the UNODC CPP messaging campaign: military, political, and development. The military sector assisted UNODC CPP by sharing the views and experiences of naval operations combating piracy. Within the political sector, several foreign governments played a key role in pressuring the UNODC Headquarters to approve the messaging campaign Project Document in a timely fashion, and the Somali governments provided UNODC CPP with access to key counter piracy actors and the Somali public. Within the development sector, UNODC CPP staff members liaised with the international community and the Somali community to gain a better understanding of what anti-piracy messages and delivering strategies would be most contextually appropriate. UNODC CPP staff members, with the assistance of Puntland Officials, elders and clan leaders, gathered and recorded the local realities and experiences of Somalis battling with the daily repercussions of piracy.\(^5\) The securitizing actors from each sector (those in positions of power to speak their opinion) shaped the overall design of the messaging campaign as well as the specific discourse to be delivered through the messaging campaign. Securitizing actors agreed that the target audience for the messaging campaign should be the Somali public.

The messaging campaign was designed to be delivered by influential members of the Somalia public. The reasoning behind this was that if the messaging campaign was rooted in Somali culture and included state-centric discourse, it would increase the likelihood that the Somali public would engage with the campaign.

\(^5\) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Counter Piracy Programme, Anti-Piracy Advocacy Campaign Project Document” (2012) 1. Although the term stakeholder is used in the original text, UNODC CPP does not define the term within the document.

\(^5\) A former UNODC CPP staff member spent extensive periods of time from 2011-2012 traveling throughout Puntland, particularly to coastal villages, obtaining Somali public opinion of piracy, how it impacts their daily lives, and what they see as the best strategy for combating piracy on shore in Somalia.
public would accept the move to securitize piracy. Alana Boland’s research on discourse and security in China also examines the role of state-centric discourse in shaping how security is defined and worked. She argues, “…state-centric discourses, including those born from interdependency arguments, provide meaning to support the rhetoric and policies that influence how security, even in its broadest definition, is understood and operationalized today.” In addition to having a Somali face, the messaging campaign also needed to counter-act existing piracy narratives circulating throughout Somalia. In order to construct acceptable anti-piracy narratives it was critical to first identify existing piracy-related narratives. Through researching Somali media and conducting meetings with Somali counter piracy actors and the Somali public, the following piracy-related narratives were identified as the most common narratives circulating throughout Puntland:

- Pirates are warriors/heroes who protect the Somali coastal waters and fishing industry from illegal fishing; or, piracy is a justified response to illegal fishing and toxic dumping;
- Piracy benefits Somalia by bringing money into the Somali economy; piracy money contributes to the development of Somalia;
- It only takes one successful piracy attack to make a pirate rich;
- Pirates, when caught by international navies, are released back on shore;
- The international community is more interested in protecting illegal fishers and Western interests through combating piracy than they are in protecting the well-being of Somalis;
- International navies shoot innocent Somali fishermen and accept bribes to release high-powered pirate leaders.

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53 Personal interview, KSCP3, 2012.
These piracy-related narratives informed the construction of four main counter-narratives for the messaging campaign: 1) Piracy is haram; 2) Piracy is ruining Somali culture and traditions; 3) Piracy is destroying Somalia’s international reputation; and 4) Pirates who go to sea are at risk of death and/or imprisonment. The following sections explore why securitizing actors chose these messages for securitizing piracy.  

3.1 “Piracy is Haram”

The centrality of Islam in Somali culture, as well as the critical role sheiks and clerics play in shaping individual and community behavior, made the Piracy is Haram message the cornerstone of the messaging campaign. The Puntland officials, clerics and elders envisioned the use of this message as a central tool for combating piracy. This message also enables the messaging campaign and its implementers to link teachings from the Koran to acts of piracy—highlighting how behaviors associated with piracy are haram. The message stresses that actions carried out by pirates such as robbery, kidnapping, violence, etc. is haram. In addition, the message also targets the behavior of non-pirates by emphasizing that accepting “pirate money” (money obtained from ransoms) during business transactions is also haram. As a result, invoking the words of the Koran in the messaging campaign enables securitizing actors to conduct the conduct of both pirates and non-pirates. Invoking the words of the Koran also increases the audiences’ association between combating piracy and living a proper Muslim life. This message constructs a representation of pirates and pirate supporters as bad Muslims while at the same time constructing a representation of non-pirates and those who assist in combating piracy as good

54 Puntland officials and key counter piracy actors initially presented the UNODC CPP with four key messages they felt would be the most likely to be accepted by a Somali audience, and therefore, is helpful in the attaining the goal of ending piracy. These four original messages became points of promotion and resistance as they were discussed and debated among all of the securitizing actors. How these messages were promoted and resisted among securitizing actors during the design phase and among the Somali public during the implementation process is further discussed in a later chapter.  

55 This message was also utilized by prior pilot messaging campaigns undertaken in Puntland by NCA and PDRC.  

56 See Tania Li’s The Will to Improve on the role of development projects as tools for conducting the conduct of developable subjects.
Muslims. Along these lines, this message also serves to counter the existing piracy-related narrative that pirates are warriors/heroes who protect the Somalia coastal waters and fishing industry from illegal fishing—a counter-narrative requested by the military sector. *Piracy is haram* means that even if pirates attempt to justify their actions under the auspices that they are protecting Somalia’s coastal resources, these justifications do not supersede the teachings of the Koran that prohibit piracy and piracy-related behavior. All securitizing actors supported the *piracy is haram* message as a means for couching the messaging campaign in Somali culture and religion.

### 3.2 “Piracy is ruining Somali culture and traditions”

This message emphasizes the negative secondary behaviors associated with piracy such as an increase in *khat* usage, prostitution, and the dissolution of *traditional* family structures and responsibilities. The message also aims to counter existing narratives: 1) piracy benefits Somalia by bringing money into the Somalia economy; 2) piracy money contributes to the development of Somalia; and 3) it only takes one successful piracy attack to make a pirate rich—counter-narratives important to the [Somali] government sector. Through this message, the securitizing actors sought to delineate several things. First, the majority of piracy money obtained through ransoms is skimmed off by overseas investors and piracy operation leaders; the actual percentage of the ransom money given to the pirates who carry out the attacks at sea and monitor the ship and crew members is minimal.\(^{57}\) Second, the piracy money that remains in Somalia is increasingly being spent on new cars, *khat*, or prostitution rather than community development—a counter-narrative important to the development sector.\(^{58}\) Lastly, Puntland officials, elders and clerics argue that an increase in *khat* usage and prostitution is linked to dissolution of traditional Somali family structures.

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\(^{58}\) Interview with Boyah, self-proclaimed father of Puntland piracy, conducted by former UNODC staff member, 2011. Boyah is currently serving a seven year sentence in Bossaso Prison, Puntland, Somalia.
3.3 “Piracy is destroying Somalia’s international reputation”

This message serves three purposes. The first is to garner an emotional response from Somalis. Somalis are very patriotic and proud of their Somali roots. By emphasizing that piracy is tarnishing the reputation of the Somali people, the messaging campaign hopes to rally the Somali public around the counter piracy cause to save their reputation worldwide. The second purpose is to draw the Somali Diaspora into the messaging campaign by encouraging financial investment in their homeland. The final purpose is to underline the link between Somalia’s international reputation and existing and potential foreign direct investment. The [foreign] government sector insisted on highlighting that as long as Somalia has a reputation for supporting criminal acts such as piracy (and more recently the purported link between piracy and terrorism) the international community will either pull out any existing investment and/or refrain from any new investment in Somalia. This message enables securitizing actors to describe the existing and potential impact of piracy on Somalia’s existing and future economic well-being.

3.4 “Pirates who go to sea are at risk of death or imprisonment”

This message is designed to highlight the direct dangers of piracy and to promote the work of naval operations and the UNODC CPP—the military and development sectors. It is also meant to counter the following existing narratives: 1) pirates, when caught by international navies, are released back on shore; 2) international navies shoot innocent fishermen and accept bribes to release high-powered pirate leaders; and 3) the international community is more interested in protecting illegal fishermen and Western interests than protecting the well-being of Somalis. Concerns over this last narrative are evidenced by a member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO):

I am not sure that actively seeking to dispel what remains the ground reality is going to help; if the illegal activities are actually taking place then we will look stupid and lose trust. We might be better to formally give feedback to WG1 and

59 Personal interview, KSSP11, 2012.
CGPCS, for the international navies and politicians that there remains a major sticking point in persuading Somalis that piracy is bad, and that this is the perception that illegal fishing and dumping is why people have turned to piracy (in effect a force for good). We need to get facts of what the fishing and dumping figures actually are…

To counter this existing narrative several naval operations (particularly EUNAVFOR) expressed interest in providing testimonials, photos and recorded interviews explaining the purpose of their missions. The UNODC CPP is also utilizing this message to inform the Somali public [and counter piracy actors] of their work constructing prisons, conducting prison officer training in Somalia, and facilitating prosecutions. Simultaneously, naval operations’ and UNODC CPP’s participation in this message enables them to (re)construct their images in a manner that portrays them as allies of the Somali public.

The messages chosen for the Puntland messaging campaign resulted from a collaboration between the government [Puntland and foreign] sector, military sector and development sector. These messages aimed to raise awareness about the negative impacts of piracy while, at the same time, bridging the communication gap between the international community and Somali public. However, deconstructing and reconstructing piracy narratives to create the messaging campaign discourse also resulted in the normalization of boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate conduct and the blurring of internal and external geopolitical boundaries.

The messages normalize boundaries by creating a dichotomy between certain appropriate and inappropriate behaviors. Pirates [and pirate supporters] displayed certain haram behaviors. The messages labeled those who commit inappropriate behaviors—acts of piracy or accept piracy money—as bad Muslims, bad Somalis and people who were against the growth and development of Somalia. Likewise, those who exhibited appropriate behaviors—those who refrain from acts of piracy and refuse to accept piracy money—are good Muslims, good Somalis and those who support the growth and development of Somalia. The creation of this dichotomy seeks to

60 Personal interview, KSCP8, 2013.
establish a universal boundary between good and bad conduct while at the same time elevating
the issue of piracy above clan politics. Associating non-piracy behavior with Muslim and Somali
identity enables securitizing actors to blur the existing internal political boundaries between clans
in order to reach a wider audience—all Somalis. At the same time, the messages blur internal
and external geopolitical boundaries by aligning the desires of the foreign government sector,
the military sector, and the development sector with those of Somalis who want to see the
successful growth and development of Somalia—the good Muslims and Somalis. The messages
encourage Somalis to view these sectors as allies in the fight against piracy and in the fight for
Somalia’s future.

4 Power Struggles: (Re)locating Expertise

The UNODC CPP messaging campaign was designed for implementation throughout the
Puntland and Galmadug regions of Somalia. However, the messaging campaign was sidelined in
Galmadug as a result of increasing insecurity in the region. Shortly thereafter, institutional
politics delayed the implementation of the messaging campaign in Puntland. As will be discussed
in the following sections, this delay resulted in the creation of a Somaliland messaging
campaign.

In late 2011 the ROEA underwent a restructuring that entailed reorganizing its existing
programmes under one of three new sub-programmes. The three current sub-programmes are:
Sub-Programme I: Countering illicit trafficking, organized crime and terrorism; Sub-Programme
II: Fighting corruption and promoting justice and integrity; and Sub-Programme III: Improving
health and human development. The UNODC CPP is now located under Sub-Programme I.
Within one month of the messaging campaign’s commencement it was relocated from the
UNODC CPP in Sub-Programme I to Sub-Programme III under the supervision of the Regional
HIV/AIDS Advisor. The relocation was justified by the UNODC ROEA for two reasons. The
first justification provided was that the UNODC CPP was already understaffed and the
recruitment processes of messaging campaign personnel would take time. Until then, the
Regional HIV/AIDS Advisor had the time and resources to supervise the messaging campaign.
In addition, the messaging campaign’s original Project Document included a section for the
promotion of alternative livelihoods activities, and the Regional HIV/AIDS Advisor was considered an expert in this area—justifying his qualifications to supervise the messaging campaign. The second justification provided was that the UNODC CPP was part of the ROEA, meaning that the management of the messaging campaign and its funds was ultimately granted to the ROEA, and it could do so as it sees fit.

The messaging campaign’s relocation out of the UNODC CPP and into a new Sub-Programme prompted a rewriting of the original Project Document. As a consequence of its new home in Sub-Programme III, the Project Document was rewritten to minimize the advocacy portion and maximize the livelihoods development portion of the messaging campaign. During the rewriting of the Project Document many of the funds for implementation were inaccessible. Further complicating matters, during the rewriting process a key UNODC CPP staff member (who spearheaded the messaging campaign’s conception and design processes) left the UNODC CPP. His departure left only one staff member assigned to work on the messaging campaign—myself.

The departure of the UNODC CPP staff member infuriated both Puntland officials and the Programme donors. Puntland officials were angry because they had been working closely with the UNODC CPP staff member on the design and implementation strategy of the messaging campaign since it was first conceived of in late 2011. Puntland officials also considered the UNODC CPP staff member the expert on Puntland piracy who best represented their interests at the UN. They were also upset that the messaging campaign’s new supervisor had not visited Puntland and was unfamiliar with Somali culture, piracy and the previous work done during the

61 Every Project Document has a corresponding budget. The budget is broken down into budget lines that correspond to particular activities delineated in the Project Document. The money located on each budget line can only be used for the designated activities; the money will not be released for activities that do not relate to those identified on the budget line. As a result, when a Project Document is being rewritten, funds can only be released from the budget lines of those activities that will be carried over into the new Project Document. Funds cannot be shifted from one budget line to another budget line (in this case moving money from advocacy budget lines to livelihoods budget lines) without the approval of the final Project Document revision from UNODC Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Project Document revisions are a very lengthy, bureaucratic process that can result in the delay of funds being released, and therefore project implementation.
nascent stages of designing the messaging campaign. Although I assisted the UNODC CPP staff member throughout the messaging campaign’s conceptualization and design processes, and was familiar to the Puntland officials through email and phone correspondence, I also had yet to visit Puntland. As a display of outrage, Puntland officials threatened to throw out all UNODC CPP staff members from Puntland and refused to grant any entry visas. In addition, they criticized the UNODC CPP at Puntland governmental meetings and called off the messaging campaign. As a result, the implementation of the Puntland messaging campaign was placed on hold until the Puntland officials had time to “cool off”.

The relocating of the messaging campaign from the UNODC CPP to the Sub-Programme III also infuriated the Programme donors. Similar to Puntland officials, many of the Programme donors worked closely with the UNODC CPP during the messaging campaign conceptualization and design processes. One donor country representative expressed his frustration with the messaging campaign’s move out of the UNODC CPP. He attributed his respective government’s willingness to fund the UNODC CPP project to its previously established, close working relationship the office. His government trusted the UNODC CPP’s expertise and capabilities to successfully implement the messaging campaign. The donors were also frustrated that no one explained to them why the messaging campaign was moved out of the UNODC CPP. Finally, the donors were infuriated when rumors started circulating that the messaging campaign was being turned from an advocacy programme into a livelihoods programme. A representative from one donor country stated, “We agreed to fund an advocacy programme, not a livelihoods programme. There are already enough failed livelihoods programmes in Somalia. We wouldn’t have wasted our money on that. We need an advocacy programme. We want to start seeing results soon.”

Backlash from the Puntland officials, a shortage of messaging campaign personnel, and the rewriting of the Project Document all contributed to delaying the implementation of the messaging campaign in Puntland and opened the door for a Somaliland messaging campaign.

63 Personal interview, KSFG4, 2012.
64 Personal interview, KSFG6, 2012.
5 Reinforcing Political Geographic Imaginaries: Somaliland’s Messaging Campaign

In May of 2012, Somaliland officials reached out to UNODC CPP asking for assistance in operationalizing an anti-piracy messaging campaign. As a result of heightened frustrations among the donors over the Puntland messaging campaign’s postponement, and the need to give Puntland authorities time to “cool off”, the ROEA permitted the UNODC CPP to immediately begin implementing a smaller-scale messaging campaign in Somaliland.\(^{65}\) The ROEA approved the small-scale, pilot Somaliland “Counter-Piracy Awareness Campaign” to commence in July 2012 and run until December 2012. The concept paper written by UNODC CPP in conjunction with the SCPCO included requests for assistance with conducting counter piracy awareness workshops, brochures, and producing and broadcasting messages.\(^{66}\)

The design process of the Somaliland messaging campaign was much faster than that of Puntland because it followed a framework similar to the Puntland messaging campaign and it drew from the same budget. The political sector was solely represented by the SCPCO. Neither the military nor [foreign] government sector played a role in designing the Somaliland messaging campaign. The limited number of sectors and securitizing actors involved in designing the Somaliland messaging campaign meant that those who were involved had more power to shape the messages to meet their specific agendas. As expressed by securitization theorist Stritzel, “…the better the positional power of securitizing actors, the easier it is for them to establish their preferred individual text as a dominant narrative for a larger collective”.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{65}\) Although the messaging campaign had been moved to the ROEA, because I was initially hired under a UNODC CPP contract to work on the messaging campaign, I fell under the co-supervision of the HIV/AIDS Advisor and UNODC CPP Programme Manager. In addition, because no other personnel had been hired for the messaging campaign, I had to ask the UNODC CPP permission to utilize their Somali interpreters when conducting missions in Somaliland and Puntland, Somalia.


Identifying the existing piracy-related narratives was much more difficult in Somaliland than Puntland. This may be because Somaliland is not considered a hot spot of piracy activity. As a result, the majority of existing piracy-related narratives in Somaliland are centered on the financial/economic impacts of piracy and the seventeen newly repatriated convicted pirates serving out their sentences in the Hargeisa Prison. Through research and conducting key counter piracy actor meetings, the following piracy-related narratives were identified as the most common narratives circulating throughout Somaliland:

- Fisherman who turn to piracy become rich;
- Piracy is not a Somaliland problem; it is a Puntland and South Central problem;
- Somaliland is becoming a dumping ground for convicted pirates originating from Puntland.

These piracy-related narratives informed the construction of counter-narratives for the messaging campaign. The three key messages chosen for the Somaliland messaging campaign were: 1) piracy is detrimental to Somaliland’s fishing industry and the Port of Berbera; 2) piracy is negatively impacting Somaliland’s economy; and 3) Somaliland has an international obligation to help in the fight against piracy.\(^{68}\) The following sections explore how securitizing actors agreed upon these messages for securitizing piracy.\(^{69}\)

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\(^{68}\) The third message, “Somaliland has an international obligation to help in the fight against piracy” was added by the UNODC CPP in hopes garnering support for /justifying the continuation of the PPTP.

\(^{69}\) Puntland officials and key counter piracy actors initially presented the UNODC CPP with four key messages they felt would be the most likely to be accepted by a Somali audience, and therefore, in helpful in the attaining the goal of ending piracy. These four original messages became points of promotion and resistance as they were discussed and debated among all of the securitizing actors. How these messages were promoted and resisted among securitizing actors during the design phase and among the Somali public during the implementation process is further discussed in a later chapter.
5.1 “Piracy is detrimental to Somaliland’s fishing industry and the Port of Berbera”

This message was designed to bring attention to the plight of Somaliland’s fishing industry, particularly around the Port of Berbera. The message is also meant to attract international funding support for improving the capabilities and resources of the Somaliland Coast Guard. At the same time, this narrative is meant to counter the existing narrative that piracy is not a Somaliland problem. The fishermen of Berbera, and in particular the Somaliland Fishing Association, had a vested interest in supporting this message. As part of the messaging campaign design strategy, I interviewed members of the Somaliland Fishing Association, Somaliland Coast Guard, Director of the Berbera Port Authority, and the Governor of Berbera about how piracy is negatively impacting coastal livelihoods. All counter piracy actors insisted that Puntland pirates were threatening the livelihoods of Somaliland fishermen and discouraging shipping companies from docking in the Port of Berbera. The Somaliland Coast Guard also utilized the interviews to express their need for additional resources (i.e.: boats, guns, fuel, training, etc.) that would enable to them continue keeping the coastal waters of Berbera free from pirates—Puntland pirates. Likewise, the Somaliland Fishing Association emphasized the need for cold storage units for storing fish (the previous cold storage units were destroyed during the Somalia civil war) in order to increase the capacity of the fishing industry and to provide youth with an alternative to piracy.

5.2 “Piracy is negatively impacting Somaliland’s economy”

This message was designed to gain support from members of the public living in the capital—Hargeisa, Somaliland. Because Hargeisa is geographically located in the inland area of Somaliland, the SCPCO argues that the majority of Somaliland’s government officials, media outlets, and public living in Hargeisa do not see the impacts of piracy first-hand. Further, the SCPCO argues that there is a large communication gap between the coastal communities and the inland communities of Somaliland, particularly Hargeisa, where national policy is made.70 This

70 Personal interview, KSSG11, KSSG12, 2012.
message aims to create awareness about the link between piracy activities and 1) the increase in shipping costs; 2) a decrease in the number of shipping companies willing to dock their ships at the Port of Berbera; and 3) an increase in the price of daily goods. It also highlights that Somaliland youth are being recruited into Puntland piracy operations which negatively impacts the Somaliland workforce. One Somaliland traditional elder stated, “There are no pirates in Somaliland because Somaliland is a government that is stable. Somaliland does not accept piracy. Puntland is more attracted to piracy. [Somaliland] coastal youth, if they join piracy, then they go to Puntland to work in piracy.”

This sentiment was echoed by members of the Somaliland Business Association who also commented that Somaliland youth would rather go to Puntland to join piracy than to work in Somaliland and contribute to the economy. The Somaliland Business Association has been vocally critical of the turn toward piracy. However, during my interviews with members of the Somali public, many mentioned that those businesses that do accept piracy money are getting rich. When I asked members of the Somaliland Business Association about this they were very adamant that no businesses accept money from pirates.

5.3 “Somaliland has an international obligation to help in the fight against piracy”

This message was designed to earn the support of the Somaliland public needed by the UNODC CPP to extend their agreement with the Somaliland government to accept additional repatriated convicted piracy prisoners. The repatriation of convicted piracy prisoners from the Montagne Posse Prison in the Seychelles’ to the Hargeisa Prison in Somaliland is part of the UNODC CPP Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme (PPTP) initiated in early 2012. The PPTP aims to repatriate all Somali pirates convicted and currently detained in Kenya and the Seychelles back to Somalia to serve out the remainder of their sentences. The PPTP also seeks to repatriate convicted pirates to Puntland prisons in Garowe and Bossaso, however, these prisons are not expected to be

71 Personal interview, KSSP2, 2012.
72 Personal interview, KSSP21, 2012.
73 The PPTP has invested more than $9 million USD in the building and reconstruction of prisons in Hargeisa, Somaliland and Garowe and Bossaso, Puntland as part of the agreement to accept repatriated convicted pirates.
fully (re)constructed to meet international standards (and, thus, able to accept pirates) until late 2013.

At the time of writing this dissertation Hargeisa Prison was the only prison in Somalia able to accept repatriated pirates. In March 2012, seventeen convicted piracy prisoners were successfully repatriated from the Seychelles to Hargeisa Prison. These were the first prisoners to be repatriated under the PPTP. Under the PPTP agreement, Somaliland is only willing to accept repatriated convicted pirates originating from Somaliland or South Central, Somalia. The Somaliland government will not accept the repatriation of convicted Puntland piracy prisoners. The Somaliland government claims it is because Puntland is already receiving assistance from UNODC CPP to construct and reconstruct their prisons, and because they do not want to escalate existing political tensions between the two regions. The PPTP has resulted in considerable backlash from the Somaliland public. The Somaliland public fears that Somaliland will become the dumping ground for convicted Puntland pirates and want the Government to stop accepting repatriated pirates.

As a result of the public’s dissatisfaction with the PPTP, the Somaliland government delayed the acceptance of additional repatriated pirates to Hargeisa prison. This situation presents a problem for both UNODC CPP and the international community. Currently, the Seychelles’ prison is at capacity. Consequently, the international navies who arrest piracy suspects at sea have nowhere to transfer them for prosecution. At present, any piracy suspects apprehended by international navies must either be tried in the navy’s respective countries or released back on shore in Somalia. In order to prevent either of these situations, it is imperative for the Somaliland

74 Political tensions are high between the Puntland and Somaliland as a result of ongoing disputes over control of the border region between the two regions. Both Puntland and Somaliland claim control of the disputed region and inter-clan fighting and violence persists in the disputed area.
75 An additional factor for the Somaliland Government refusing to accept additional repatriated pirates is that the Somaliland Minister of Justice is making the acceptance of additional pirates as conditional upon UNODC CPP fast-tracking the construction of a new Ministry of Justice building. The Minister of Justice has agreed to push the other members of the Somaliland Government to accept more pirates when he sees UNODC CPP make considerable process on the construction of the new Ministry of Justice Building.
government to continue accepting repatriated convicted pirates in order to free up space for newly apprehended piracy suspects in the Seychelles prison. For this reason, the UNODC CPP saw the messaging campaign as an opportunity to communicate the necessity of and benefits of Somaliland’s continued participation in the PPTP to the Somaliland public. Through the messaging campaign the UNODC CPP aims to not only dispel the myth that Puntland pirates are being “dumped” in Somaliland, but also to highlight that Somaliland’s willingness to accept additional repatriated convicted pirates proves their commitment to assisting the international community in the fight against piracy. The messaging campaign created a space for the UNODC CPP to promote the PPTP, which contributed to their willingness to assist in implementing the messaging campaign.

5.4 Constructions and Contradictions

The Somaliland messaging campaign, particularly the contention surrounding the PPTP, exposes an underlying contradiction of the way “piracy” is framed. Successfully securitizing piracy entails labeling piracy a threat. In order to do so, the messaging campaign narratives seek to highlight the dangers associated with piracy. “Pirates” are constructed as undesirable others who endanger the security and development of Somalia, rather than individuals who have been accused of participating in robberies at sea. In addition, participating securitizing actors further promotes the need for an increase in police, coast guard, and military interventions onshore in Somalia as a means for combating pirates.

The proposed need for additional security in piracy-heavy areas compounds the campaign’s construction of “pirates” as dangerous people who are a burden on their country. Paradoxically, the messaging campaign’s promotion of these negative connotations simultaneously works to undermine the long-term goals of the PPTP to repatriate piracy prisoners to Somalia. Specifically, whereas a successful securitization of piracy requires the Somalia public view pirates and piracy as an imminent threat, the PPTP requires the Somalia public to accept the repatriation of pirates and their future containment within Somalia. This demonstrates that how piracy (and pirates) is framed has implications for how the problem is addressed. The participation of securitizing actors in constructing pirates as a threat also enables them to promote piracy as an issue that can be “solved” through the expansion of security and
development in Somalia. However, this social construction also signifies the role of securitizing actors in the (re)production of a set of issues in Somalia—fear, marginalization, and inter-regional politics.

The messages chosen for Somaliland messaging campaign were directed at serving two stated purposes: 1) to raise awareness about the negative impact of piracy on Somaliland’s economy and security, and 2) to gain acceptance and support for the continuation of the PPTP. In addition, however, the campaign also served to reinforce the existing geopolitical imaginary that distinguishes Somaliland from Puntland. Somaliland has worked hard to distance and differentiate itself from the rest of Somalia, particularly Puntland, in an effort to gain international recognition as an independent nation state. Through the messaging campaign, Somaliland depicts itself as a victim of Puntland piracy. The messages normalize the idea that pirates operating off the coast of Somaliland originate from Puntland, not Somaliland. At the same time, the messages claim that Somalilanders are being recruited into Puntland piracy operations, rather than acknowledging that Somalilanders may have their own piracy operations. Together these messages feed upon existing geopolitical imaginaries dividing the two regions and construct an understanding that Somaliland needs to save its economy and youth from the vices of Puntland piracy.

In practice, the Somaliland-Puntland border is a contested region, and its boundaries are fluid because many of the Somalis living in this region have inter-clan linkages. Likewise, as expressed in many conversations with Somalis in Puntland and Somaliland, many Somalilanders and Puntlanders have migrated back-and-forth between the two regions during and after the Somali civil war and can trace their clan linkages to both areas. For example, while on mission in Hargeisa my colleague asked our driver and armed guard if they think Somaliland should support a unified nation of Somalia. Whereas the driver was adamant that Somaliland should be an independent nation, the armed guard was incredibly angry and insulted by the question. He vehemently disagreed with the driver saying, “We are all Somalis. We are not Puntlanders and Somalilanders. We are all Somalis. We are from all over Somalia.” This tension is also visually
expressed throughout Somalia (see Plate 14).\textsuperscript{76} Despite these inter-clan linkages, in practice the Somaliland government’s quest for international recognition as an independent nation state leads them to distance themselves from Puntland (and the rest of Somalia) whenever possible.

Plate 14: A sign outside of the Somaliland Fishing Association in Berbera, Somalia, with the word Somaliland crossed out serves as a reminder of the tension surrounding Somaliland’s desire to be recognized as an independent country. (Author’s photograph)

\textsuperscript{76} In another instance, during a meeting with government officials in Hargeisa my colleague grabbed some papers in front of me and shoved them in his briefcase. Later in the car on the drive back to the UN compound I asked him why he took my papers. He informed me that the papers I had brought along with me from the UNODC CPP office had the words \textit{Transitional Federal Government (TFG)} on them. According to my colleague, the Somaliland government officials are so opposed to a unified Somalia (under the leadership of the TFG), had they seen me with the papers, they would have kicked us out of the country.
The UNODC CPP’s campaign message for raising awareness about the PPTP and Somaliland’s international obligation to combat piracy also served as a tool to reinforce the Somaliland-Puntland geopolitical imaginary. Participants of the counter piracy awareness workshops held in Hargeisa, Somaliland voiced the public’s concerns that accepting repatriated Puntland pirates would increase the likelihood of kidnappings and ransoms. They feared that Puntland pirates may kidnap Somalilanders living in Puntland and hold them hostage until any Puntland pirates detained in Hargeisa prison were released. In order to appease the Somaliland public’s fear and gain their support for the PPTP, the UNODC CPP stressed that no Puntland pirates would be repatriated to Somaliland—only Somaliland and South Central pirates. Emphasizing these details was an effort to alleviate public concerns, but at the same time it also displayed a form of international support for the Somaliland-Puntland geopolitical imaginary.

6 Conclusions

This chapter provides a contextual overview of the Puntland and Somaliland messaging campaigns. Specifically, it analyzes how the (re)framing of piracy as a security-development issue enabled multiple sectors to jointly work on designing a messaging campaign(s) for securitizing piracy. It explores how each sector’s underlying agendas were entangled in the process of designing the messages for the messaging campaign and demonstrates how institutional politics played a role in the creation of a second, Somaliland-centered messaging campaign. The Puntland messaging campaign focuses on conducting the conduct of behaviors directly linked to piracy and is imbued with heavy religious/moral undertones. The Somaliland messaging campaign focuses on the secondary effects of piracy and their impact on Somaliland’s economic well-being. A closer examination of the discourse of each messaging campaign reveals how securitizing actors construct, and are constructed by, narratives and counter-narratives. It also reveals how securitizing actors’ participation in the construction of “pirates” and “piracy” is

77 These concerns stem from an incident that is purported to have occurred in 2010 when the Somaliland government arrested Puntland pirates operating off the coast of Somaliland. These pirates were then prosecuted and detained in the Hargeisa prison. It is rumored that Puntland pirates kidnapped Somalilanders in Puntland and held them hostage until the Government eventually released the Puntland pirates.
both productive and counter-productive to larger efforts to combat piracy and develop/secure Somalia. Ultimately, analyzing the Puntland and Somaliland messaging campaigns highlights how sectoral agendas, institutional politics and geopolitical imaginaries (re)shape the macro-practices of securitizing piracy and become materialized into the discourse selected for the campaigns.
Chapter Four

One day my son left home and he never returned. I did not know where he disappeared to. I never would have allowed him to go with pirates. Some people must have changed his mind and convinced him to go to sea. Now that he is home I will make him study the Koran so he will become a good man. I want to tell mothers to keep an eye on their children and to keep them away from pirates.

Mother of Repatriated Preteen Piracy Suspect, Garowe, Somalia

Sometimes what happens is that if you are in love with a lady, you don’t have money to marry. But a young man will go to sea to get a lot of money, and then he will buy a car, and he will call her and she will come to him. In Somalia, youth can’t marry a woman without money. But if they go into piracy and get that money, then they can afford to propose to a woman. Some men in Bossaso drive very nice cars and people can tell that they are pirates. They live in very nice houses with very pretty ladies. Many women and men come from Hargeisa to marry Puntland pirates.

Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles

The securitizing actors and macro-practices of securitizing piracy discussed in the previous chapter drove the messaging campaign design process and resulting framework. This chapter examines the micro-practices of securitizing piracy and exposes the gendered nature of securitizing piracy. The chapter begins by reviewing the literature on feminist security studies and social reproduction as a lens through which to examine the micro-practices of securitizing piracy. Next, it explores the silencing, subsuming, and desecuritization of Somali women throughout the messaging campaign design process. It suggests that gendered practices of social reproduction are simultaneously drawn upon and reinforced as a strategy for creating and maintaining traditional, pirate-free Somali communities. The chapter concludes by arguing that the messaging campaign framework and discourse highlight the critical role gendered practices and social reproduction play in processes for securitizing and combating Somali piracy.

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1 Personal interview, KSSP23, 2012.
2 Personal Interview, KSPP19, 2012.
1 Feminist Security Studies and Social Reproduction

The post 9/11 shift to a security society coupled with a neoliberal market economy has contributed to the increasing global privatization and informalization of security practices. As security becomes less associated with the state and more associated with individuals it becomes transformed into a technical problem amenable to private solutions. The application of private solutions to public security problems is seen in Somalia’s struggles to combat crime, terrorism and piracy. For example, the state’s limited ability to provide security has prompted individuals living and working in Somalia to rely upon more privatized and informal forms of security such as private police units, or “special police units” (SPUs). Although securitization theory tends to emphasize the acceptance of securitizing moves at the group (or audience) level, I argue that in a post 9/11 era of increasingly privatized and informalized security it is also important to acknowledge the acceptance of securitizing moves at the individual level.

Securitization theory has also provided fertile ground for feminist security studies critiques that question the location and absence of women in security studies theories. Feminist security studies theorists argue for gender as an analytical category in studies of security and

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securitization. As Laura Sjoberg challenges, “In many ways, the theory and practice of international security remain a man’s world. The material reality of this dynamic is that less than forty out of more than five thousand articles in the top five security journals over the last twenty years explicitly address gender issues as a major substantive theme.”\(^7\) Despite this material reality, feminist scholars continue to push forward and argue for recognizing the importance of gender in understandings of international security politics.\(^8\)

Sjoberg identifies four foundational arguments of feminist security theories.\(^9\) The first argument seeks to broaden what qualifies as a security issue to include not only war and international conflict but also to include domestic violence, rape, poverty, gender subordination and so forth.\(^10\) The second tenet challenges the association of those values prized in the realm of international security with masculinities.\(^11\) The third tenet calls for the recognition of the broad and diverse

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\(^11\) C. Hooper “Masculinist Practices and Gender Politics: The Operation of Multiple Masculinities in International Relations” in *The ‘Man’ Question* (2001) 31; C. Hooper *Many
roles gender plays in security theory and practice.\textsuperscript{12} Lastly, feminists question the politics of omitting gender from security studies and confront “the assumption that gendered security practices address only women.”\textsuperscript{13} This chapter engages with the critiques that women are omitted from security studies and recognizes the broad and diverse role gender plays in security theory and practice. As this chapter demonstrates, the securitization of piracy reveals the promotion of privatized security responsibilities rooted in gendered practices of social reproduction that are associated with female, black, Somali bodies.\textsuperscript{14} Throughout this chapter I use the term “privatized security” to signify the responsibilization of public security responsibilities to private actors. For example, in this study, individual Somalis are granted the responsibility for securing themselves, their families and their fellow communities from the dangers associated with piracy.

Cindi Katz defines social reproduction as “the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life.”\textsuperscript{15} Isabella Bakker and Rachel Silvey expand upon this definition stating that, “Social reproduction involves institutions, processes and social relations associated with the creation and maintenance of communities—upon which, ultimately, all production and exchange rests.”\textsuperscript{16} Bakker and Silvey further challenge academics to examine “the ways that responsibilities for

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\textsuperscript{14} The author recognizes the literature gap in security studies on men as a gendered category. The author’s intends to broaden her future research to examine how men are gendered through efforts to securitize piracy; specifically, how particular masculinities were promoted and resisted throughout the messaging campaign design process.  \\
\end{flushleft}
such fleshy, messy work are assigned to particular groups of people” and how recent reorganizations of governance at multiple levels impacts “dynamics of daily social reproduction practices and possibilities.”

Silvey’s independent research draws attention to the fact that “geographers have a long history of highlighting the social production (and reproduction) of space and place, as well as the spatial and place-based production of social relations (Mitchell et al. 2003). Rather than taking place as a container for social practices, geographers analyze the mutual constitution of the social and the spatial.” Specifically, feminist geographers examine the entanglement of race, ethnicity/nationality, gender and political economy in the mutual constitution of the social and spatial. Encouraging further academic cross-pollination, Leah F. Vosko argues that feminist political economists need to “engage more effectively in debate in applied contemporary feminist theory, particularly debates between feminist critical and post-structural theorists, and to deepen analyses of reprivatization, feminization and other consequences of neoliberal restructuring.”

Heeding this call, this chapter strives to open up a discussion of the linkages between securitization theory, feminist theory, and social reproduction by highlighting how the privatization and promotion of gendered security responsibilities mutually constitutes the social and spatial geographies of combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.

In order for the Somali public to accept securitizing piracy discourse, the messaging campaign needed to construct a rhetorical structure that both highlighted the immediate threat of piracy and counteracted existing piracy narratives circulating throughout Somalia. Through research, workshops, meetings and interviews the following piracy-related narratives were identified as the most common narratives circulating throughout Somalia:

- Pirates are warriors/heroes who protect the Somalia coastal waters and fishing industry from illegal fishing; or, piracy is a justified response to illegal fishing and toxic dumping;
- Piracy benefits Somalia by bringing money into the Somalia economy; piracy money contributes to the development of Somalia;
- It only takes one successful piracy attack to make a pirate rich;
- Pirates, when caught by international navies, are released back on shore;
- The international community is more interested in protecting illegal fishers and Western interests through combating piracy than they are in protecting the well-being of Somalis;
- International navies shoot innocent Somali fishermen and accept bribes to release high-powered pirate leaders.

These piracy-related narratives informed the construction of four main counter-narratives for the messaging campaign: 1) Piracy is haram; 2) Piracy is ruining Somali culture and traditions; 3) Piracy is destroying Somalia’s international reputation; and 4) Pirates who go to sea are at risk of death and/or imprisonment. These counter-narratives served as a general framework for the design of messaging campaign discourse as well as the construction and devolution of security responsibilities.

A close examination of the messaging campaign micro-practices exposes deeply embedded gendered and racialized understandings of Somali piracy. Geographers Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake argue that researchers need to open up categories of race and gender to analyze processes of social construction to “understand how concepts associated with ‘race’ and gender become naturalized, both in academic discourse and in society in general, that is, how they are
normalized and viewed as intrinsic to a universal order.\textsuperscript{21} Although piracy is depicted as having negative economic, social and security impacts on the wider international community, by reimaging underdevelopment and insecurity in Somalia as both a symptom and a remedy to piracy, piracy is simultaneously reframed (and naturalized) as a \textit{Somali} issue that can only be solved by the \textit{Somali} people. At sea, responsibilities for combating piracy are attached to foreign, white bodies. For example, through interviews and conversations undertaken in Somalia during this research I discovered that despite the multi-racial, multi-national constitution of counter piracy naval operations off the coast of Somalia, Somalis generally associate naval operations with \textit{white bodies}. This presents an interesting paradox because counter piracy naval vessels operating in the high seas cannot be \textit{seen} from the Somalia shore. Likewise, from conversations had with members of the Somaliland Fisherman’s Association, the majority of fishing off the coast of Somalia does not take place as far out as the high seas. Therefore, it is incredibly rare for Somali fisherman to \textit{see} a counter piracy naval vessel, let alone come in contact with the military personnel aboard the ships. I would argue that Somali’s association of naval operations with \textit{white bodies} may be a residual effect of colonial and post-colonial encounters with military personnel onshore in Somalia. Somalia experienced alternating periods of colonial rule under Italy and Britain and more recently has experienced sporadic encounters with British and American military personnel throughout the post-Independence period.

Although \textit{at sea} responsibilities for combating piracy are attached to foreign, white bodies, \textit{onshore} responsibilities for combating and preventing piracy are attached to female, black, Somali bodies. According to Kobayashi and Peake, “Racism and sexism are spatial/ideological practices, which \textit{embody} the codes through which spatial control is maintained. …To understand and resist sexism and racism, then, we need to unnaturalize the landscapes upon which gendered and racialized relations are played out”.\textsuperscript{22} Katherine McKittrick’s research also examines the social construction of boundaries that make certain spaces and places available to particular

\textsuperscript{21} A. Kobayashi and L. Peake “Unnatural Discourse: “Race” and Gender in Geography” \textit{Gender, Place and Culture} Vol. 1.2 (1994) 230.
\textsuperscript{22} Emphasis in original, Ibid, p. 239.
The following sections aim to “unnaturalize the landscape” of securitizing piracy, by exposing gendered (and racialized) micro-practices of securitizing piracy and illustrating how the messaging campaign (re)produces and promotes the notion that onshore responsibilities for combating and preventing piracy belong to female, black, Somali bodies.

2 The Silent Security Dilemma: Spaces of Marginalization in Securitizing Piracy

Lene Hansen’s study of the international community’s failure to securitize honour killings in Pakistan highlights the absence of gender in securitization theory. She argues that the Copenhagen School’s speech act framework, focusing solely on speaking security into existence, creates a ‘security silence’ and subsumes certain gender-related security problems. Hansen challenges this aspect of the Copenhagen School’s theory stating, “…their epistemological reliance on speech act theory presupposes the existence of a situation in which speech is indeed possible.” She fleshes out this criticism through an example of honor killings in Pakistan. She analyzes the complexities of gender insecurities associated with honor killings in Pakistan to illustrate two theoretical delineations for understanding the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization—security as silence and subsuming security. Collectively, she labels these two theoretical delineations as the silent security dilemma. The following subsections utilize security as silence and subsuming security to examine the silent security dilemma embedded within the messaging campaign design process.

2.1 Security as Silence

According to Hansen, “Security as silence’ occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being

Although women’s groups were enlisted to participate in the messaging campaign design process, I argue that their presence and participation did not equate to securitizing Somali women’s concerns. Whereas men’s piracy-related concerns focused on piracy’s impact on Somalia’s economy, security, and culture, the women raised concerns about how piracy specifically impacts Somali girls and women. The gendered contrast in these concerns became particularly clear during a UNODC CPP-facilitated counter piracy workshop series conducted in Somalia.

The UNODC CPP and Somali government officials invited women’s groups to participate in a five-day counter piracy workshop series in Hargeisa. The workshop series was intended to serve as a platform for discussing how piracy impacts Somalia, strategizing how to effectively combat piracy on ground in Somalia, and to inform the messaging campaign design and discourse. Due to the absence of certain Somali government officials, and because I helped coordinate the logistics of the workshop series, I was chosen to conduct the workshops with the assistance of a UNODC CPP translator. Each day of the workshop was tailored toward what the UNODC CPP and Somali Government identified as a group of key counter piracy stakeholders. For the purpose of the workshop series “key counter piracy stakeholders” were considered those most likely to influence public opinion that piracy is dangerous and hurting Somalia. The five groups of key counter piracy stakeholders were: government officials, religious leaders and traditional elders, women’s groups, business leaders, and the Somalia media. The members of the Somali government working in conjunction with the UNODC CPP invited the attendees for each session.

In addition to participant observation, I interviewed thirty Somali women who attended the workshop series. I conducted ten individual interviews and five small group interviews. Of the thirty women, twenty six attended the session designated for women’s groups and four attended the session designated for the Somalia media (see Plate 15). Women were not present at the sessions designated for government officials, religious leaders and traditional elders, or business

\[\text{\textsuperscript{25}}\text{ Ibid, p. 287.}\]
leaders. Women were not invited to the former two sessions, but two women were invited to the latter session and did not attend. The female workshop attendees were most vocal during the session designated for women’s groups. This may be due in part to the fact that they were the majority at the session. The women who attended the session designated for the media were less vocal, and when they did speak, they spoke to affirm comments made by their male colleagues. However, all of the women were very candid with me when they participated in individual interviews and small group discussions.

![Plate 15: Attendees of the media session of the counter piracy workshop series held in Hargeisa, Somalia pose for a group photo. (Author’s photograph)](image)

26 Although Somali women have served in government at the national level in Somalia, to my knowledge, at the time of writing this dissertation there was only one female local government official throughout the entire nation of Somalia—the mayor of South Galkayo. This may be a result of the patriarchal nature of Somali society. Whereas the international community, particularly the United Nations, has played an influential role in designing and overseeing governance structures at the national level in Somalia, they have been less influential at the regional and local levels.
The Somali women attending the workshop session for women’s groups were adamant about addressing the issue of young girls and women being lured into relationships with pirates. According to the women, whether for prostitution or marriage, young Somalia girls and women are increasingly attracted to pirates for their purported wealth. The promise of wealth is inciting women to migrate to coastal areas and urban areas known for piracy activity. During the workshop session one woman stated:

Young women think pirates have lots of money. There is a rumor that a minimum of $10,000-$20,000 is for girls who go with pirates. Many young women who leave to marry pirates are poor, on drugs, or desire to go to Europe through the money they receive from pirates. We need to tell these young women that they are not going to get married, instead they’ll probably be drugged, beaten and left broke. I knew of a girl who this happened to. Girls need to know the risks of being with pirates.\(^\text{27}\)

Married women are also being lured into relationships with pirates. Another woman spoke to the workshop group about a married woman in her community who left her family for a pirate:

Puntland pirates come to Somaliland and bring their ransom money. They come and marry Somaliland women and partake in soliciting prostitution. Piracy is bad for girls and women in Somaliland. One woman left her husband and children to go marry a pirate. Only the pirate didn’t end up marrying her and when she tried to return to her husband he would not take her back. Now she has no family and no money.\(^\text{28}\)

The women were unanimous in their calls for the messaging campaign to specifically address the issue of girls and women pursuing relationships with pirates. Some women even argued that piracy has more of an impact on young women than men. One woman argued to the other workshop session attendees that:

\(^{27}\) Personal Interview, KSSP21, 2012.
\(^{28}\) Personal Interview, KSSP19, 2012.
Most of the impact [of piracy] is on young women. People propagate that pirates are very rich. We need to focus on women and girls and make the international community aware of the impact of piracy on women and girls. An increase in successful ransoms leads to an increase in girls leaving for Puntland to be with pirates.  

As evidenced in this comment, women are not only concerned about raising awareness about the impact of piracy on girls and women within Somalia, but they also want the international community to understand their plight. Women also spoke of instances where clan elders went to retrieve their clan women from pirates and bring them back to their respective communities. Although male workshop participants acknowledged these realities, women were insistent upon the messaging campaign including discourse about the piracy-related risks facing Somali girls and women.

Despite being the top piracy-related concern raised by women, the issue of girls and women being lured into relationships with pirates was not incorporated into messaging campaign discourse. Rather, the issue was relegated to the “female sphere” for women to deal with within their women’s organizations and homes. As a result, Somali women were not successful in having their concerns recognized as a security issues. The concern of women and girls being lured into relationships with pirates is the “silent security” of securitizing piracy.

### 2.2 Subsuming Security

According to Hansen, the second aspect of the silent security dilemma, *subsuming security* ...“arises because gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject’s gendered identity and other aspects of the subject’s identity, for example national

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29 Personal Interview, KSSP25, 2012.

30 Because homosexuality is prohibited in Somalia, the problem of individuals being lured into relationships with pirates is classified as a “woman’s issue”. As will be discussed later, even though women are involved in piracy, the issue of men being lured into relationships with these women was not a concern raised by men who participated in the messaging campaign design process.
and religious.” In other words, *subsuming security* is a situation where gender is depoliticized into an individual, personal issue and is then subsumed under a more politicized collective, public issue. In Hansen’s research, she argues that gender-based security threats are often interlinked with “national” or “religious” security threats. As a result, gendered insecurity becomes subsumed under religious insecurity and prevents women from becoming a referent object. She states, “The construction of appropriated gendered norms of behavior within a highly religious discourse functions to link gender and religion in a way which prevents the articulation of ‘gender insecurity’.” This complex inter-linkage can result in silencing gender issues in return for preserving religious foundations.

Similar to Hansen’s findings, Somali women’s concern with the issue of girls and women being lured into relationships with pirates was subsumed under the greater risks piracy poses to Somalia’s cultural and religious foundations. Women’s concerns were subsumed under vices associated with piracy—*khat* usage, alcohol consumption, prostitution and infidelity—that are destroying Somalia’s cultural and traditional values. The messaging campaign enlists Somali religious leaders to address these vices, specifically prostitution and infidelity, from a male-centered perspective. The male-centered perspective aims to deter men from becoming pirates by highlighting how these vices are linked to piracy-related activities and lead to an anti-Islamic, anti-Somalia lifestyle—destroying Somali families, religion and nationhood. Rather than addressing the possibilities that women may choose to prostitute themselves to or marry pirates, the male-centered perspective presupposes that men are the only ones with agency and the ability to make culturally-appropriate choices. Instead of acknowledging women’s agency to *partake* or *not partake* in relationships with pirates, women are rendered without agency and men’s agency becomes the focus of messaging campaign design and discourse.

The exclusion of the female-centered perspective, one that recognizes women’s concerns and agency, allows the messaging campaign to avoid highlighting women’s potentially un-Islamic,

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31 Ibid, p. 287.
32 Ibid, p. 299.
33 Personal Interview, KSSP15, 2012.
un-Somali behaviors. As an alternative, the male-centered perspective addresses prostitution and infidelity, but does so in a way that preserves the religious integrity of Somali women—by taking away their agency. Feminist theorist Uma Narayan (1998) labels this practice “selective labeling” stating:

…Selective labeling,” whereby those with social power conveniently designate certain changes in values and practices as consonant with “cultural preservation” while designating other changes as “cultural loss” or “cultural betrayal.” The deployment of “selective labeling” plays a powerful role in the facilitation of essentialist notions of culture because it allows changes that are approved by socially dominant groups to appear consonant with the preservation of essential values or core practices of a culture, while depicting changes that challenge the status quo as threats to cultural preservation.34

The exclusion of the female-perspective from the messaging campaign not only reveals a practice of “selective labeling”, but it also evidences how gender issues were subsumed into wider cultural and religious issues for securitizing piracy.

3  (Re)locating Women: The Invisible Geographies of Piracy

The previous sections discuss how the messaging campaign design process marginalized women through micro-practices of security silences and subsuming security. In addition to marginalizing women, the messaging campaign perpetuates the assumption that piracy is a male enterprise. The following section draws upon Megan MacKenzie’s research to explore how women were desecuritized throughout the messaging campaign design process.35 Through this exploration it

also seeks to (re)locate women within the counter piracy framework by underscoring the existence and geographies of women’s active participation in piracy operations.

MacKenzie’s study examines the securitization of men and masculinities and the desecuritization of women in post-conflict policy making in Sierra Leone. She demonstrates that women’s active role in conflict is “effectively shuffled out of the public political sphere and into the domestic realm through post-conflict development policies.”

Through interviews with female soldiers in Sierra Leone, MacKenzie shows that despite women’s active participation in combat, post-conflict development programmes constructed titles in order to avoid labeling the women “soldiers”. She argues that refusing to recognize women as active participants in combat exposes the gender politics of identifying security concerns—male combatants are securitized while female combatants are marginalized. Through neglecting to recognize women’s active participation in combat, former Sierra Leonean soldiers were desecuritized.

Similar to the post-development programmes in MacKenzie’s study, the UNODC CPP messaging campaign design process neglected to recognize women’s active participation in piracy operations and avoids labeling women “pirates” in campaign discourse. Rather, the messaging campaigns’ framework was designed around the understanding that pirates and potential piracy recruits are male. The messaging campaign framework associates pirates and piracy-related activity with male, Somali bodies, thus, securitizing Somali males. Simultaneously, Somali females are desecuritized through the messaging campaign’s avoidance of associating pirates and piracy-related activities with female, Somali bodies. Despite avoiding this association, women’s active role in piracy operations was discussed during workshops and interviews. In the majority of cases, however, women were the ones raising the issue and providing examples. Their examples highlighted four prominent areas in which women are

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37 Amina Mahamoud Warsame’s (2004) research on the central role of Somali women in their family’s survival during the Somali Civil War highlights how many Somali women find opportunity in times of crisis by deriving sources of self-made income. Her collection of Somali women’s testimonials demonstrates that Somali women have a long history of seeking out financial opportunities during periods of economic collapse and conflict as tools of survival and economic autonomy.
actively participating in piracy: 1) facilitating “relationships” between women and pirates; 2) providing essential resources; 3) performing care work aboard hijacked vessels; and 4) investing in piracy operations.

3.1 “Relationship” Facilitators

One area where women are actively participating in piracy is what I label relationship facilitation. Relationship facilitation corresponds with the women’s top piracy-related concern—the luring of girls and women into relationships with pirates. Not only does the perpetuation of rumors that pirates are rich incite girls and women to seek out relationships with pirates, but women’s testimonials also revealed the existence of businesses facilitating such relationships. During an individual interview, one woman described these “businesses” and women’s specific role in them as follows:

People make a business out of putting girls in contact with pirates. When a successful ransom is brought in, women come from Puntland [to Somaliland] to spread rumors to girls to attract them to pirates. They come in person or make calls to contacts in Somaliland to tell them that pirates are looking to pay for women. Puntland women are helping pirates attract young women for prostitution and marriage.38

This testimonial claims that women are involved in relationship facilitation networks via phone and in person. The women interviewed further elaborated that these “relationships” are described as marriage arrangements when, in reality, most of them turn into prostitution arrangements. Whether women manage or only assist with these relationship facilitation businesses could not be verified. These businesses currently operate inter-regionally and intra-regionally; women are solicited within Puntland, and outside of Puntland in Somaliland and Ethiopia.

38 Personal Interview, KSSP29, 2012.
3.2 Resource Dealers

The next area of women’s active participation in piracy is what I label *resource dealing*. Women discussed knowing of women who left their businesses and families in urban areas to set up businesses along the coast close to piracy operation bases. Women who are resource dealers are described as those who collect and distribute resources at the request of pirates. For example, pirates request a list of items ranging from food and clothes to petrol and *khat*, and the women gather these items and deliver them to a piracy contact person for a small fee. Because women are neither suspected of piracy-related activities, nor labeled pirates, these agreements enable the pirates to obtain essential resources while minimizing their chances of being discovered or apprehended. During an individual interview one woman described an interesting example of resource dealing. She explains:

> Women are involved in piracy. I know of a woman that left Somaliland to go to Bossaso [Puntland]. She is selling/leasing weapons to pirates. The pirates rent or buy guns from her to use when they go out to sea. She makes a lot of money. She makes more money than she did in her business in Somaliland.\(^{39}\)

The woman could not say how or where the resource dealer initially came into possession of the weapons.

3.3 Care Workers

Women are also involved in piracy through what I label *care work*. In Somali culture care work is a social task delegated to females. Somali women describe care work as cooking, cleaning, and taking care of children and elders. It is against Somali customs for a man to partake in care work.\(^{40}\) The hijacking and ransoming of ships, and the need to care for piracy hostages, put male pirates at odds with this custom. Until recently, male pirates were forced to break Somali customs and perform care work to ensure the survival of the crew members while ships were...

\(^{39}\) Personal Interview, KSSP28, 2012.

\(^{40}\) Personal interview, KSSP24, 2012.
held for ransom. However, according to several small group interviews, pirates are recruiting women to relieve men of care work functions aboard hijacked vessels. During one small group interview one woman stated:

Women are pirates, too. It is against Somali culture for men to cook and care for someone. That is a woman’s job. Women are going to Puntland to work on the ships and cook for hostages. Women are working for pirates more and more.\(^{41}\)

It is unclear whether these women are also armed with weapons and given hostage monitoring duties or whether they are solely in charge of care work.

### 3.4 Piracy Investors

The last of the four main areas of women’s active involvement in piracy is what I label *piracy investing*. Piracy investors, also known as *financiers*, provide the seed money for commencing and maintaining piracy operations. Pirates need to be equipped with boats, weapons, petrol, and other supplies in order to carry out successful piracy operations. These supplies are expensive; particularly when a report by Geopolicity, a global security consulting firm, estimates that a Somali man earns approximately $500 annually working fulltime.\(^{42}\) Therefore, piracy investors cover the initial costs of piracy operation supplies in turn for a portion of ransom money. Geopolicity estimates that piracy investors retain approximately 50% of the ransom money (compared to 30% divided among pirates and 20% divided among government officials).\(^{43}\) Several interviewees claimed to know of women who are piracy investors. The notion of women piracy investors was further substantiated during an interview with a foreign diplomat when he stated, “We have intelligence that tells us that women are becoming more involved in piracy. One of the investors of the largest piracy operation based near Haradheere is a woman.”\(^{44}\) It was

\(^{41}\) Personal Interview, KSSP28, 2012.
\(^{43}\) Ibid, p. 11.
\(^{44}\) Personal interview, KSFG14, 2012.
unclear from workshop discussions or interviews how these women piracy investors obtained their initial seed money.

This section elaborates upon four main areas in which women are active participants in piracy operations. However, even though women’s active participation in piracy operations was discussed during workshops, the messaging campaign framework and discourse avoids labeling women “pirates” and associating female bodies with piracy-related activities. As one Somali government official highlights, “It is imperative that the messaging campaign targets Somali boys and men and deters them from becoming pirates.”\(^{45}\) As a result, the messaging campaign framework and discourse securitized Somali men while desecuritizing Somali women. The following section examines how the messaging campaign micro-practices of silencing, subsuming, and desecuritizing women and their concerns simultaneously draws upon and reinforces gendered practices of social reproduction in Somalia as a tool for combating piracy.


According to Sadia Musse Ahmed’s research on traditions of marriage and the household in Somalia, marriage and family are central to Somali culture. Within a Somali marriage a man is expected to provide for his family and the woman is expected to care for her husband and children. Ahmed states, “It [marriage] is an institution vital to the maintenance of the social, economic and political organization that underpins a nomadic pastoral society. It has developed, and is maintained through, strongly defined rules and customs.”\(^{46}\) Due to the reluctance of foreign governments to conduct traditional military-related counter piracy strategies onshore in Somalia, and the emergent security-development framework for combating piracy, the messaging campaign is meant to serve as an alternative tool for securitizing and combating piracy in Somalia. In order to successfully securitize piracy in Somalia, Somalis need to accept

\(^{45}\) Personal interview, KSSG6, 2012. (Emphasis added).
the campaign’s discourse that piracy is a threat to Somali culture and traditions and, thus, support and contribute to international efforts to combating piracy. As a result, the messaging campaign framework and discourse is rooted in Somali culture, particularly marriage and family, and promotes particular gendered practices of social reproduction that contribute to the creation and maintenance of traditional, pirate-free Somali communities. In other words, the messaging campaign acts as a form of privatized, informalized security by conflating social reproduction responsibilities with security responsibilities. Further, the messaging campaign devolves these responsibilities from the public sector into the home and onto Somali women (black, female bodies).

According to Ahmed, “Both [Somali] men and women gain merit and respect through the achievement of their social tasks and responsibilities, which they learn from childhood. Women’s work is seen as being crucial to society...”47 As previously discussed, the messaging campaign avoids recognizing women as active participants in piracy. Although the messaging campaign framework and discourse does not recognize Somali women as the subjects of security, it does regard them as agents of security. The messaging campaign enlists women as agents of security for combating piracy in two ways.

The first way women are enlisted as agents of security is through relegating responsibilities for raising awareness about the negative impacts of piracy on girls and women to women’s groups and the household. Somali women are tasked with securing girls and women from the risks associated with relationships with pirates. Through this task, Somali women become agents of security who are responsible for encouraging girls and women to refrain from relationships with pirates. Women and girls are encouraged to only partake in “proper Somali” courtship practices with non-pirates. Rather than carrying out this task in the messaging campaign’s public forums (e.g. media messaging, workshops, etc.), raising awareness about these concerns became the responsibility of women within women’s groups, among each other, and in their homes. I persistently advocated to the Somali government officials and my UNODC CPP managers for the inclusion of women’s concerns in the messaging campaign messages and discourse.

However, the Somali government officials told me that “the women’s groups will take care of these issues”. Likewise, the UNODC CPP managers told me that they did not want to lose sight of the “bigger picture” of Somali piracy and how it is affecting security and development. As a result, the UNODC CPP supported the Somali government official’s suggestion to leave the awareness-raising about women’s issues to the women.

The second way in which women are enlisted as security agents is through tasking them with preventing male children from becoming pirates. One key Somali counter piracy actor stated, “It is important that mothers tell their sons of the dangers of piracy and keep them away from pirates.”48 As evidenced in this example, Somali mothers are also tasked with raising sons that refrain from piracy (see Plate 16).49 As mothers, this security responsibility is meant to be carried out within the home. Women’s responsibility to secure girls, women and sons from piracy, not only contributes to the creation and maintenance of traditional Somali households and communities, but it also contributes to efforts to combat piracy. In essence, the messaging campaign framework and discourse merges responsibilities for cultural preservation with those of combating piracy. As a result, promoting adherence to these responsibilities simultaneously draws upon and reinforces the gendered daily dynamics of social reproduction in Somalia as a tool for securitizing and combating piracy.50

48 Personal interview, KSSG6, 2012.
Plate 16: A mother speaks to the local media about her preteen’s involvement in piracy in Garowe, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)

5 Conclusions

This chapter argues that although women were involved in the messaging campaign design process, they struggled to have their concerns materialized within the messaging campaign framework and discourse. Rather, women’s concerns and responsibilities for combating piracy were relegated from the public sphere to the household. Women, women’s organizations and their homes became agents and sites of security tasked with preventing females from forming relationships with pirates and preventing sons from becoming pirates. Through this study, an examination of the micro-practices of the message campaign design process reveals the gendered nature of securitizing piracy. It challenges scholars to rethink the centrality of gendered practices
and social reproduction in securitization processes. It also raises questions about the gendered and racialized assumptions underlying the new security-development counter piracy framework for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Chapter Five
Pirate Pie: Piratization and Institutional Survival

With so many people and entities personally benefitting from the issue of Somali piracy, it's no wonder it's a dirty little secret that a few nets and a water canon or two aboard ships transiting pirate waters would bring the whole affair to a close.

*United Nations Staff Member, Nairobi, Kenya.*

In Somalia, a lot of NGOs go to Somalia to try to help with employment. However, the senior people in Somalia will only recommend their family members for these jobs and training, so regular people like us do not get a chance to benefit from the NGOs’ work. One time in Somalia there was an NGO that gave skiffs and some fishing equipment to Somalis. One family ended up getting all of the skiffs. Another family used guns to kill some of them and took all of the skiffs and fishing equipment.

*Convicted Somali Piracy Prisoner, Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles*

Somalia’s unstable political situation, the increasing human and economic costs associated with piracy, the ever-growing number and size of international naval forces and UNSC resolutions to combat piracy, and the heightened humanitarian crisis in Somalia all contribute to an intensified demand for a security-development counter piracy approach to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. This chapter examines the institutionalization of securitizing piracy within the messaging campaign’s participating sectors—government, military and development. Specifically, it presents and explores the concept of piratization as an effect of this institutionalization. It also examines how the UNODC CPP’s role as a securitizing agent enabled both an expansion of the spatial-temporal geographies of its expertise as well as a transformation of its mandate. Through strategically invoking or revoking “security” the UNODC CPP was able to effectively bargain with security to gain institutional advantage. The concept of bargaining with security also works to demonstrate that the development sector is an active participant in the merging of security and development and the (re)shaping of markets of security and development. The chapter concludes by arguing that the political economy of combating piracy reflects a wider growth in global disciplinary strategies of prevention and containment. These

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1 Personal interview, KSCP15, 2013.
2 Personal Interview, KSPP7, 2012.
disciplinary strategies are illustrated through examples of counter piracy discourse and practice and highlight the profit motives underlying combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.

1 Post-Cold War Security and the Security-Development Nexus

Mark Duffield’s research examines the post-Cold war reuniting of aid and politics. His research argues that contemporary development and aid is a form of liberal governance that signals a merging of development and security. With this merging, development has become a tool used by developed nations to influence, transform and control the developing world. In particular, states considered weak or failed, such as Somalia, are increasingly subjected to forms of economic, social and political hitherto considered an unacceptable level of intrusion by the international community. He argues that this increasing level of control and acceptance of social engineering conducted through development aid indicates that aid is now essentially political.

Contrary to Duffield, Tara McCormack argues that with the end of the Cold War the shift to a human security framework signifies the separation of security and development. She views the shift from a state-centric to human- [individual] centric approach to security as evidence of the developed world’s disengagement with the developing world. Developing states are no longer viewed as threats to the developed world (as they had been during the height of the Cold War). McCormick supports her argument stating, “Thus it is of note that human security as a discourse arises exactly at the time in the early 1990s when aid from the developed world to the developing, representing material strategic involvement in developing countries by the West, drastically falls.” However, rather than indicating a separation of security and development, I argue that the simultaneous decrease in aid and increase in human security discourse is a reflection of the strategic fusion of the security and development sectors in line with current

political economies of security and aid. Put slightly differently, this dissertation offers an analysis of what I refer to as the political economy of the security-development nexus. I examine processes currently taking place within the security-development counter piracy framework—the multi-sectoral institutionalization of securitizing piracy and the UNODC CPP’s bargaining with security.

2 The Political Economy of the Security-Development Counter Piracy Framework

As the previous chapter discussed, this dissertation analyzes neoliberalism as an ideology. It adopts what Larner refers to as a “sociological’ approach to neo-liberalism in which a wider range of institutions, organizations and processes are considered,” to better understand the increasing global privatization and informalization of security practices. The global economic crisis, coupled with neo-liberal economic restructuring has prompted a decrease in state-sponsored security approaches and an increase in private, technical security solutions. At the same time, the development sector has also witnessed a shift from interventions focusing on state-centric development to interventions aiming to improve the lives of the individuals within states. Mark Duffield argues that in the post-Cold War period, securing the individual has become the aim of both the security and development sectors. He states, “With the ending of the Cold War, the increase in humanitarian intervention and the lifting of restrictions on the UN working in ongoing civil wars, the object of international security has shifted from states to the people living within them, especially weak or failing ones.” Critics argue that this shift has not

only altered the object of security and development (the individual versus the state), but it also changed the *where* and *how* of security and development interventions. As Peck and Tickell argue:

…a deeply interventionist agenda is emerging around “social” issues like crime, immigration, policing, welfare reform, urban order and surveillance, and community regeneration. In these latter spheres, in particular, new technologies of government are being designed and rolled out, new discourses of “reform” are being constructed (often around new policy objectives such as “welfare dependency”), new institutions and modes of delivery are being fashioned, and new social subjectivities are being fostered.8

According to Peck and Tickell, socializing subjects and disciplining the non-compliant are cornerstones of contemporary “roll-out” neoliberalism. This chapter seeks to examine the series of politically and institutionally driven motives for securitizing piracy that are (re)shaping the markets of security and development. The following sections explore the *where* and *how* of the roll-out of security and development technologies for combating piracy.

Post 9/11 many scholars have examined the changing landscape of war, security and development and how they are interlinked. These scholars argue that the shift in focus from states to bodies coupled with an increase in transnational migration has effectively blurred the territorial and biological boundaries of knowable and unknowable threats to human (and state) security and development. As a result, struggles for security are taking place in less geographically defined spaces. Geographer Derek Gregory classifies this phenomenon the “everywhere war.” Gregory states:

The conventional ties between war and geography have come undone…late modern war is being transformed by the slippery spaces within which and through

which it is conducted."9 ....resulting in the everywhere war. Concrete instances remind us that the everywhere war is always somewhere.10

The “slippery spaces” identified by Gregory signals a shift away from territorially-bound sites of intervention to what he labels “global borderlands.” According to Gregory, the global borderlands are the new multi-scalar, multi-dimensional spaces of military intervention. These new spaces have ‘no front or back’ and ‘everything becomes a site of permanent war’.11 These spaces transcend geopolitical boundaries to include the “bio-political and the geo-economic.”12 Mark Duffield further argues that the borderlands are often imagined as unstable zones in the global South where “social fabric is destroyed and developmental gains reversed, non-combatants killed, humanitarian assistance abused and all civility abandoned.”13

Similar to Gregory’s theorization of the new military geographies of the “everywhere war,” Duffield highlights that the normalization of the Global South’s “permanent emergency” has morphed into an “unending war” which links underdevelopment to global danger and insecurity.14 He argues that the North is becoming increasingly conditioned to expect high levels of political violence and insecurity in the Global South, particularly in the borderlands.15 The Global South is depicted in a state of “permanent emergency.” Consequently, “permanent emergency” becomes a site of maneuver where protection (i.e., security) and betterment (i.e., development) are “intrinsically interconnected and mutually conditioning.”16

12 Ibid, p. 239.
Duffield argues, “the association of conflict with underdevelopment, along with the propensity of instability (to communicate its effect more widely in an interconnected world), has served to blur security and development concerns.”\textsuperscript{17} In essence, the North’s “unending war” against the Global South’s “permanent emergency” mirrors Gregory’s “everywhere war” in that the slippery spaces and geographies of security and development interventions contribute to the evolution of ad hoc institutional arrangements.

As the new “everywhere wars” and “unending wars” are dislocated from sovereign territory and (re)located to the global borderlands (and their associated bodies and economies) states are facing increasingly complex potential threats to security and development. As Lucia Zedner points out, “Governments recognize that they have little control over major threats to individual and community security, such as global warming, economic instability, and long-term unemployment…By promising safety of the person and the home, governments hope to obfuscate larger sources of anxiety and thus conceal the limits to their powers of protection.”\textsuperscript{18} In accordance with this statement, Duffield argues that an increase in the number of policy instruments available to donors, coupled with the neo-liberalization of security and development, has “eroded the collective responsibility in international relations.”\textsuperscript{19} However, the emergence of a competitive NGO sector has helped donor governments offload some of this “collective responsibility” to the lowest bidder.

\section*{2.1 The Market-Driven Fight for Funding}

There is a growing body of research that questions the norms and values that motivate international NGOs’ actions in the context of an increasingly competitive aid market. The growing number of international organizations and NGOs, coupled with a cut back in donor spending, has created a highly competitive and insecure environment where organizations fight

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} M. Duffield \textit{Global Governance and the New Wars} (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2001) 37.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 1994.
\end{itemize}
over scarce resources. The market-based nature of today’s development sector requires organizations to issue competitive tenders in order to win development contracts. Alexander Cooley and James Ron’s research argues that as a result of this competitiveness, increasing numbers of development organizations are copying the “structures, interests, and procedures of their for-profit counterparts”. The United Nations system is not immune to this new competitive, market-based development environment. According to Cooley and Ron, “Competitiveness” is “built into the system” of war-related aid, while competition within the UN relief system, according to one senior UN official, is even fiercer than in the private sector. The results have been deeply corrosive. Examples of competition among (and within) UN agencies will be explored later in this chapter.

At the same time that international organizations and NGOs are battling for funding, materially constrained national governments (i.e., donors) are looking for ways to cost-effectively offload development responsibilities while maintaining their benevolent identities. David Chandler argues that policy created at the security-development nexus reflects a trend where Western states “use the international sphere as an arena for grand policy statements of mission and purpose”, but in practice, they devolve implementation and responsibilities to international organizations and NGOs. In doing so, Western states are able to promote an altruistic self-image while simultaneously disengaging from accountability. Chandler labels this separation between rhetoric and policy planning—“anti-foreign policy.” Chandler’s discussion of “anti-foreign policy” specifically criticizes world leaders for using the United Nations as a stage for issuing sound bites while evading strategic policy planning. The current political economy of the security-development nexus is defined by an increasingly overcrowded, market-driven development environment, the conflation of underdevelopment and security, and western states’ rhetorically heavy, strategically hollow policy approaches. This description of the political

23 Ibid, p. 362-386.
economy of the security-development nexus also depicts the nexus as becoming wider (à la Duffield) and shallower (à la Chandler) as more actors compete to do less in the name of security and development.

According to Chandler, “Rather than clarity, the security-development nexus sets up a framework where any external regulatory or interventionist initiative can be talked up by the proposing government or institution as being of vital importance.” How does this understanding of the security-development nexus speak to the current political economy of the security-development counter piracy? Within the current period of global economic crisis and neo-liberal economic restructuring counter piracy actors are seeking more privatized, technical solutions to addressing insecurity and underdevelopment in Somalia. The new security-development framework’s “holistic approach” to combating piracy has formalized previously ad hoc institutional arrangements between donor governments, private NGOs, international organizations, and the military sector while simultaneously informalizing security. This newly formalized institutional arrangement promotes an interventionist agenda for combating piracy that consolidates informalized technologies of security (discussed in Chapter Four) with development strategies. At the same time, it creates a space where securitizing actors can define and prioritize counter piracy subjects and strategies that enable them to achieve political and economic gain. I argue that the political and economic motives of securitizing actors contribute to the production of a counter piracy market of security and development that reflects emerging global disciplinary strategies of prevention and containment.

3 Piratization as Institutionalization

Securitizing piracy through the design and implementation of a UNODC CPP-facilitated messaging campaign was a strategy formulated under the new security-development counter piracy framework. The strategy aims to convince the Somali public that piracy is a threat in order

24 Ibid, p. 368.
to garner acceptance of onshore (internationally-led) counter piracy interventions. Although the Somali public was the intended audience, I argue that during the messaging campaign design process, piracy was also securitized within the campaign’s participating sectors. As the following sections will demonstrate, the attention (and money) gained by the UNODC CPP during the messaging campaign design process contributed to the further entrenchment of the imagined need for a security-development approach to combating piracy. Piracy as an imminent threat became institutionalized within and reshaped the institutional arrangements and programming approaches of participating sectors. I label this institutionalization of securitizing piracy—piratization. Effects of piratization include the creation of specific piracy-related programmes, office, and focus groups particularly aimed at combating piracy through messaging and development approaches.

3.1 Piratization in the Military and Government Sectors

Piratization occurred within the military sector during the messaging campaign design process. Although naval operations were already focused on combating Somali piracy (through patrolling the coastal waters off Somalia), during the messaging campaign design process one naval operation created a public relations task force for creating an anti-piracy messaging strategy.\(^{26}\) This task force was not only tasked with generating messages for the UNODC CPP messaging campaign, but also liaising with other naval operations to petition for the creation of a military-sector-facilitated messaging campaign. As evidenced in “hearts and minds” programmes for winning the “war on terror,” military involvement in development is not a new phenomenon. However, at the time of writing this dissertation, no military had facilitated its own piracy-related messaging campaign (and corresponding development projects). As a result, the aforementioned proposed military-facilitated messaging campaign would be the first of its kind.\(^{27}\) During this period there was also an increase in military personnel attendance at counter piracy messaging

\(^{26}\) Personal interview, KSFM4, 2012.
workshops which physically validated the sector’s commitment to the security-development counter piracy framework.\textsuperscript{28}

The government sector also experienced their share of piratization. Foreign governments began covering the costs of organizing, and facilitating counter piracy messaging workshops to discuss anti-piracy message content and best practices for delivering messages. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States co-sponsored a counter-piracy messaging workshop in London in February 2012. Later, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) adopted the workshop’s guidelines on “effective counter piracy messaging with Somali audiences.”\textsuperscript{29} Foreign government communications representatives also began soliciting feedback from members of the Somali-diaspora regarding messaging content and strategies. These government representatives also increased their involvement in monitoring the UNODC CPP messaging campaign by insisting upon periodic updates of the messaging campaign implementation schedule and progress. In addition to foreign governments, piratization also occurred within the Somali government. In addition to the governments of Puntland and Somaliland participating in the UNODC CPP messaging campaign, newly elected president of the Federal Government of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, requested the assistance of UNODC CPP in implementing an anti-piracy messaging campaign in the South Central region of Somalia.\textsuperscript{30}

3.2 \textit{Piratization in the Development Sector}

The development sector has seen the greatest extent of piratization since the inception of the UNODC CPP messaging campaign. As previously noted by Cooley and Ron, competition among development agencies and NGOs is fierce. However, whereas there has been a general decline in donor funds, UNODC CPP programme manager states, “Everyone knows that there is a lot of

\textsuperscript{28} The number of military personnel (e.g.: representatives from NATO, EUNAVFOR, etc.) attending counter piracy messaging workshops doubled in number from 2011 to 2012 as evidenced by workshop attendance lists and email communications.


\textsuperscript{30} Personal interview, KSCP3, 2012.
money out there for combating piracy." In order to gain access to some of this money, an increasing number of UN agencies and Somali-based NGOs began *piratizing* their projects. A UN staff member working on counter piracy-related projects elaborated on *piratization* in the development sector stating:

Even among international organizations, the novelty, publicity, and funding attached to Somali piracy has created an unprecedented level of jockeying. In a programmatic and policy arena that should objectively be relatively small and contained, nearly every organization and office has defined piracy as "cross-cutting," meaning they too should be able to stake a claim in the treasure and limelight that comes with being a pirate fighter in an era of pirate mania. By way of example, UNODC has become well known for its fierce in-fighting over which offices are allowed to cash in on pirate-fuelled funding, personnel, and media attention. And one needs to look no further than an UNPOS meeting list serve to see all the extraneous cooks in the galley-sized kitchen, clamoring for a piece of the pirate pie to make their work sound more sensational and glamorous.

This statement highlights the inter-agency power struggles to “cash in on” the influx of donor money ear-marked for piracy-related projects. An example of this is the bidding wars over CGCPS Trust Fund money. The CGPCS Trust Fund was established to support initiatives to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Each year they solicit bids from UN agencies to

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31 Personal interview, 2012. I would like to credit the members of the UNODC CPP staff for their assistance in elaborating upon the concept of *piratization*. The concept arose during our casual coffee breaks at work and was expanded upon as we witnessed more and more UN agencies and NGOs incorporating piracy into their programming.

32 Similar to *piratization*, Parrenas, Hwang and Lee’s study of human trafficking explores how issues become major international policy concern of the twenty first century. Also, similar to piracy, Parrenas, Hwang and Lee argue that the limited access to both perpetrators and victims of human trafficking results in confusion over what defines human trafficking. An absence of reliable data results in the creation of development solutions that are not based on the experiences or lived realities of those involved in or impacted by the issue. R. S. Parrenas, M. C. Hwang, and H. R. Lee “What is Human Trafficking? A Review Essay” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* Vol. 37.4 (2012) 1015-1029.

33 Personal interview, KSCP15, 2013.
implement counter piracy-related projects in Somalia.\(^{34}\) Historically, the UNODC CPP was the main recipient of these funds. However, recently, both the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) submitted piracy-related project proposals to the CGPCS Trust Fund.\(^ {35}\) Although both agencies have provided logistical support to UNODC CPP programming, neither agency has prior experience implementing their own piracy-related projects in Somalia.

In addition to the piracyization of UN agencies, new Somali NGOs came out of the wood work claiming to specialize in media and advocacy.\(^ {36}\) The Somalia Maritime Group (SMG), Somaliland Anti-Piracy Group (SAPG), and the Youth Organization Against Piracy (YOAP) are a few of the NGOs announcing their “specialization” in combating piracy. Likewise, several long-standing Somali-based NGOs have taken on “piracy work”. For example, the Bandar Beyla Women’s Organization, NGO DIAKONIA, and Il-Barwaaqo NGO have all recently incorporated “anti-piracy” foci into their community projects.\(^ {37}\) Former pirates are also hoping to utilize their knowledge of the inner-workings of piracy to grab a piece of the counter piracy money. Specifically, Puntland’s YOAP was formed by a group of former suspected pirates who were imprisoned abroad. Members of YOAP hope to utilize their experiences and influence among the piracy community to benefit the UNODC CPP’s messaging campaign.\(^ {38}\) In addition, in January 2013 former pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan, also known as Afweise (Somali for “Big Mouth”), renounced piracy and announced his intent to lead an anti-piracy campaign. Somali-based news source, Sabahi, reports, “One of Somalia's most notorious pirate leaders, known as Big Mouth, said he is retiring after years of terrorising the Indian Ocean… Hassan will

\(^{34}\) www.thecgpcs.org.

\(^{35}\) Prior to the their respective Trust Fund proposals both agencies had provided logistical support to UNODC CPP projects, but had never implemented their own piracy-related projects.

\(^{36}\) The Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC) was the only Somali NGO previously claiming a specialization in media and advocacy. In 2011, UNPOS contracted PDRC to facilitate a messaging campaign that ran for one year in Puntland.


direct a group of former pirates to encourage their colleagues to denounce piracy. The group will tour pirate-infested areas in Galgadud and Mudug, including Hobyo, Harardere and Gan, former pirate Diwan Abdullahi said. Abdullahi said he has *entered a new and better life* since his decision to give up piracy, hence his desire to encourage others to make the same choice."^{39}

The institutionalization of securitizing piracy is highlighted through the *piratization* of agencies, organizations, and offices within the military, government, and development sectors. As noted by Cooley and Ron, “Opportunism may be a rational response to institutional configurations of material interests…”^{40} The next section examines how the UNODC CPP’s participation in securitizing piracy has shaped *and* been shaped by the counter piracy landscape.

## 4 Expanding Spatial-Temporal Geographies of Expertise

As discussed in Chapter Two, the messaging campaign became a source of contention as it was relocated from the UNODC CPP and placed under the supervision of the UNODC Regional Office in Africa (ROEA). Despite its relocation, the UNODC CPP remained the point of contact for the messaging campaign. The UNODC CPP’s lingering involvement in the messaging campaign proved beneficial both in the short-term and long-term for the UNODC CPP. I argue that it was the UNODC CPP’s *role* as a securitizing actor, rather than the actual messaging campaign, that granted the UNODC CPP institutional advantage within the expanding security-development nexus for combating piracy. As a securitizing actor, the UNODC CPP was able to invoke “security” in order to formalize its location within the ad hoc counter piracy arrangement of donor governments, private NGOs, international organizations, and the military sector. Simultaneously, the UNODC CPP was able to expand the spatial-temporal geographies of its expertise and transform its mandate and name to ensure the Programme’s long-term institutional survival. The UNODC CPP reconstructed and reframed its expertise and knowledge to include combating piracy both *pre-crime* (through security and development) and *post-crime* (through

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rule of law). It also emphasized its capacity to implement counter piracy programming onshore Somalia (police and judicial training) and at sea (coast guard training). This coupled expansion of spatial-temporal expertise solidified the UNODC CPP’s position as the already-established, international counter piracy agency that was and is capable of implementing counter piracy strategies anytime and anywhere. This position of institutional advantage translated into a continuation of committed donor funding and partnership.

4.1 Securitizing Actors and Institutional Advantage

The UNODC CPP’s facilitation and operationalization of the messaging campaign defined their role as securitizing actors. As securitizing actors, the UNODC CPP was not only able to participate in the construction of piracy as a threat, but it was also able to participate in the construction of who is best capable of addressing the threat. In other words, the securitization processes involve the co-constitution of securitizing objects and securitizing actors. As discussed in Chapter One, securitizing piracy entailed key counter piracy actors drawing upon pre-existing representations of Somalia as a developable object and (re)constructing non-pirate Somalis as developable subjects in need of development. At the same time, these counter piracy actors sought out experts with the specialized knowledge required to implement security-development strategies for combating piracy. In line with Timothy Mitchell’s study of techno-politics, rather than introducing expertise where none had existed before, the UNODC CPP (re)constructed and reframed its expertise to reflect a concentration on security-development knowledge.41

In order to promote itself as the securitizing agent capable of implementing the messaging campaign, the UNODC CPP highlighted its existing synergies with other security-minded agencies and projects underway in Somalia. For example, it boasted that it was working closely with UNDP’s Rule of Law programming, the UN Department of Political Affairs for Somalia (UNDPA-Somalia), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), INTERPOL, and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, to name a few. In addition, the UNODC CPP emphasized

its desire to link with and promote the development opportunities provided through the work of Somalia-based NGOs as well as the Norwegian Church Aid NGO. Lastly, it underscored the existing working relationships with Somali government officials and comprehensive experience-based understanding of the political, economic, and social situations in Somalia. The UNODC CPP’s ability to emphasize its knowledge of both the security and development contexts of Somalia, coupled with its established operational capacity (access to security, accommodation, and mobility within Somalia) earned it the lead role of facilitating agency and securitizing agent. The UNODC CPP did not present any new expertise; rather it reorganized and reframed its expertise to reflect a security-development concentration. The UNODC CPP’s newfound role as messaging campaign facilitator helped formalize its place within the newly emergent ad hoc institutional arrangement for combating piracy.

4.2 Spaces of Interference within the Security-Development Nexus

Acting as a securitizing agent helped the UNODC CPP legitimize its role within the new ad hoc institutional arrangement for combating piracy. However, the UNODC CPP’s place in the new ad hoc institutional arrangement was challenged by an inter-agency struggle for the ownership of the messaging campaign. As previously discussed, the piratization of the development sector marked an increasing number of development agencies and NGOs vying for security-development counter piracy-related contract bids, even within the UN system. Likewise, an increasing number of Somali-based NGOs claimed to be implementing their own anti-piracy messaging campaigns. To further complicate matters, there was a struggle for ownership over the messaging campaign within the UNODC. Chapter Two examined the intra-agency struggle over the messaging campaign. In this chapter I aim to highlight how the struggle can be linked to current discussions of the materially constrained, highly competitive, and market-driven environment of the political economy of the security-development nexus.

The relocation of the messaging campaign from the UNODC CPP to the UNODC Regional Office in East Africa (ROEA) was justified under the pretenses of: 1) alleviating pressure from an under-staffed UNODC CPP; 2) providing the supervision of a UNODC development “expert”; and 3) arguing that the messaging campaign was always part of the ROEA. However,
the struggle for “ownership” of the messaging campaign may have been more about what the messaging campaign could do for the UNODC ROEA than what the UNODC ROEA could do for the messaging campaign. Two million dollars in programming funds is attached to the messaging campaign. The UNODC ROEA saw the messaging campaign as an opportunity to add two million dollars’ worth of Somali development to their list of accomplishments. In order to lay claim to the campaign, the UNODC ROEA honed in on the minor development aspect of the messaging campaign’s Project Document text.

The UNODC ROEA immediately went to work revising the Project Document to expand the money allocated to the development component of the messaging campaign. As the same time, the money allocated to the advocacy component was minimized. Although the revision did not change the messaging campaign strategy per se (the development and advocacy components remained the same, only the amount of money allocated to each changed), by shifting the money it rerouted the project’s emphasis from security to development. The Project Document revision exemplifies Duffield’s and Chandler’s arguments that policy and programmes developed at the security-development nexus not only blur the boundaries between security and development, but they also blur the responsibilities associated with their interventions. The security and development components within the messaging campaign strategy blurred the boundary between whether implementation responsibilities should lie with the UNODC CPP or UNODC ROEA. As the “regional office” their authority superseded that of the UNODC CPP (a sub-programme of the regional office). Namely, the UNODC ROEA pulled rank and invoked “development” to justify taking ownership of the messaging campaign. Likewise, the UNODC ROEA argued that they have more experience and expertise in development (the new focus of the messaging campaign) than the UNODC CPP.

\[42\] The two million dollars in funds was given to the UNODC by donor governments specifically for use in the messaging campaign. The money was to be distributed to the UNODC implementing office over a period of two years. The two million dollars was earmarked for particular activities, staff positions, and travel expenses as delineated in the Project Document.

5 Beyond Piracy: Bargaining with Security and Evolving Mandates

Initially, the blurred boundaries between security and development for combating piracy created a space where the UNODC CPP was able to invoke “security” in order to justify its role in efforts to securitize piracy. However, as with the case of the relocating the messaging campaign, the blurred boundaries between security and development created a space where “development” could also be invoked. The invoking of development led to intra-agency interference in operationalizing the messaging campaign. As a reaction to both intra- and inter-agency interference, the UNODC CPP strategically utilized its role as securitizing agent to bargain with security and transform its mandate. Bargaining with security occurs when development agencies strategically “invoke” and “revoke” security at the level of discourse and practice in order to gain an institutional advantage within the political-economy of the security-development nexus. The following sections examine how the UNODC CPP bargained with security to transform its mandate and demonstrate its expertise. First, however, we need to revisit the shift from a criminal justice counter piracy framework to a security-development counter piracy framework to better understand the context of this bargain.

As highlighted in the Introduction, spatial and temporal perspectives played a key role in initiating the budding relationship between crime and security. Lucia Zedner’s research traces the recent temporal shift in criminal justice approaches from traditional post-hoc methods of addressing instances of crime to current pre-crime methods of anticipating and forestalling crime that has not yet occurred. She suggests that the current temporal shift to pre-crime strategies signifies a larger move away from a post-crime criminal justice society to a pre-crime security society. This move, or (re)orientation, amplifies the rationalities applied to justify an expansion of security as both a means and a goal in the quest to create a society free of threats, risk and crime. This move also expands understandings of what constitutes a crime and who has the power to address issues of crime under the guise of security. According to Zedner, “A coincidental facet of the temporal shift to pre-crime is that responsibility for security against risk falls not only to the state but extends to a larger panoply of individual, communal and private
agents. The shift is therefore not only temporal but also sectoral; spreading out from the State to embrace pre-emptive endeavors only remotely related to crime”.

This temporal and spatial [sectoral] shift is evidenced in the shift from a criminal justice counter piracy framework to a security-development counter piracy framework. The current security-development counter piracy framework not only enables a new ad hoc institutional arrangement of partners for combating piracy (the military, government and development sectors), but it also creates a more holistic counter piracy approach. The involvement of the development sector, particularly the UNODC CPP, enables the expansion of counter piracy boundaries to include territories onshore in Somalia (in addition to traditional at sea territories). Likewise, through the UNODC CPP’s implementation of the messaging campaign, the temporal aspect of combating piracy has also been expanded. Complementing the traditional post-crime, at sea military and rule of law approach to combating piracy, the messaging campaign serves as a pre-crime tool for preventing [or deterring] piracy activity onshore. By invoking “security” the UNODC CPP effectively asserted security-related expertise and capabilities to implement onshore solutions to combating piracy. In doing so, the UNODC CPP not only expanded the physical boundaries of counter piracy interventions but also expanded the temporal boundaries of its expertise to also include pre-crime security measures.

This UNODC CPP’s expansion of temporal boundaries of expertise created a space of institutional advantage for the UNODC CPP that is materializing in the current transformation of its mandate and name. The UNODC CPP’s initial mandate was to help combat piracy through

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45 The spatial and temporal expansion of counter piracy measures, identified by counter piracy actors as a more “holistic approach” to combating piracy, could be understood as an example of Peck and Tickell’s conceptualization of roll-out neoliberalization. Peck and Tickell broadly define roll-out neoliberalization as “the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance and regulatory relations” (emphasis in original, p. 384). The formalization of ad hoc institutional arrangements for combating piracy across temporal and spatial geographies under the new security-development counter piracy framework could be viewed as an example of said construction and consolidation. See J. Peck and A. Tickell “Neoliberalizing Space” Antipode Vol. 34.3 (2002) 380-404.
supporting the arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonments of pirates within the East African region. However, as previously discussed in Chapter Two, the UNODC CPP began discussions of purchasing and implementing surveillance-oriented bio-metric kits and a piracy prisoner database system for monitoring and tracking potential pirates and convicted pirates. In addition by mid-2013 the UNODC CPP’s new mandate will be to build the capacity of the Somali Coast Guard through the provision of training, mentoring, logistics and engineering, construction, communications, and the procurement of vehicles and boats.\footnote{Personal interview, KSCP9, 2012. The UNODC CPP is also slated to expand the geographical scope of its work to include assist in building the capacity of the Yemenis Coast Guard.} This signifies the UNODC CPP’s desire to move \textit{beyond} the specific threat of piracy to address larger issues of maritime security both onshore Somalia and at sea. In addition to expanding the temporal geographies and focus of its expertise, under the new mandate the UNODC CPP will also be expanding the spatial geographies of its expertise. In conjunction with building the capacity of the Somali Coast Guard, the UNODC CPP will also begin capacity building programmes in Yemen. Adding Yemen to the reach of its operations widens the geographies of its programming from that of the Somali-basin (covered by the initial UNODC CPP mandate) to that of the Horn of Africa.

With a new mandate also comes a new name. The name of the UNODC CPP will be changing from the UNODC Counter Piracy Programme to the \textit{UNODC Maritime Crime Programme for Horn of Africa (MCPHA)}. The UNODC MCPHA has been approved by UNODC Headquarters and is slated to run from 2013 through 2016.\footnote{Although the UNODC MCPHA is set to commence in 2013 and run through 2016, the UNODC CPP will continue providing criminal justice support to regional states throughout the programming period indicated in each current programme’s Memorandum of Understanding.} Similar to \textit{invoking} security, while designing its new mandate [and name], UNODC CPP strategically, discursively \textit{revoked} security.\footnote{Although the UNODC CPP \textit{discursively} revoked “security”, I argue that the UNODC CPP did not \textit{materially} revoke security. Although the UNODC CPP avoided the inclusion of security at the level of rhetoric, their new mandate’s focus on pre-crime approach to combating piracy signifies the Programme’s intended commitment to implementing security-focused counter piracy strategies.} For example, it is fair to question why the pre-crime, security-focused UNODC MCPHA programme calls itself the Maritime \textit{Crime} Programme for Horn of Africa. In fact, “Maritime Security
Programme” was the originally proposed name to accompany the newly transformed UNODC CPP mandate.\(^49\) The UNODC CPP strategically revoked security and used *crime* rather than *security* for two reasons. The first reason for revoking security is attributed to the UNODC CPP’s previous struggle over ownership of the messaging campaign. The UNODC CPP feared that by labeling itself a “security” programme it would potentially be setting itself up for future intra-agency interference. The UNODC CPP wanted to prevent the ability of the UNODC ROEA invoking “development” (made possible within the blurred boundaries of the security-development nexus) and meddling in the operationalization of its new projects. Second, because “security” can be defined as both a state of being and a means to that end, it is difficult to measure the success of security interventions.\(^50\) Without being able to measure the success of project implementations, donors would have no way of holding the UNODC CPP accountable for their programming and the UNODC CPP would have a difficult time validating a project’s success. If the UNODC CPP is unable to validate their ability to *successfully* implement projects, it could deter donors from committing to future UNODC CPP programming funding requests.

In addition to the UNODC CPP’s transforming mandate (to a pre-crime, security focus), the continuation of committed donor funding to the Programme is a testimony to the institutional advantage gained by invoking security and serving as a securitizing agent. The donors for the new UNODC MCPHA are the same donors that supported and funded the UNODC CPP messaging campaign: the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Denmark, Netherlands, Australia, and Norway. Further, the MCPHA was designed *in consultation* with these donors. However, even though the UNODC CPP was able to invoke and revoke security to ensure institutional survival, *bargaining with security* also poses risks. First, the UNODC CPP’s strategy of invoking security runs the risk of associating its programming with technologies of security currently being implemented in Somalia by private security companies. Examples of these technologies of surveillance are: risk calculation, prudentialism, and governance through

\(^{49}\) Personal interview, KSCP8, 2012.

control, monitoring, and marginalization.\textsuperscript{51} Second, the UNODC CPP’s strategic invoking and revoking of security risks further compounding existing UNODC intra-agency politics which may damage both the UNODC CPP’s and UNODC ROEA’s credibility and their future relations with donors and implementing partners. Lastly, by designing its new mandate in close consultation with its donor countries the UNODC CPP risks a (re)politicization of aid that could have material consequences for its staff members who are implementing programmes on the ground in Somalia (see Plate 17).

Concerns of the material consequences of a (re)politicization of aid have been addressed in recent security and development research such as: the deliberate targeting of violence towards aid workers, an increase in the instrumental use of food assistance and other forms of aid in conflict, decreased access to areas in need of assistance as a result of political and/or national association, and so forth.\textsuperscript{52} One such example of this occurred in 2008 in Somalia when aid workers were accused of collaborating with foreign forces to orchestrate the US air strikes that killed al-Shabaab leader Aden Hashi “Ayro”. As a result of this suspected collaboration, aid workers were given notice that they were legitimate targets in the struggle between Islamic militants and Western governments.\textsuperscript{53} Another, more personal example, occurred when my UNODC CPP colleague in Garowe, Somalia informed me that some of the locals suspected I was a CIA operative undercover as a UN worker. He was concerned for both of our safety. Particularly, for fear of violent backlash, he did not want to be viewed by his peers as aiding a CIA operative.


Plate 17: A UNODC CPP donor country representative and a UNODC CPP Somali-based staff members give a thumbs up outside the entrance of Hargeisa Prison in Hargeisa, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)

6 Promoting Global Disciplinary Strategies

The piratization of the military, government and development sector, along with the development sector’s bargaining with security, illustrates how institutional identities and mandates are being reshaped in response to the demands of the current political economy of combating piracy. The security and development aspects of combating piracy are predicated on the notion that it is possible to “know” potential pirates before they commence piracy-related activities. The advocacy campaign’s guiding premise that insecurity and underdevelopment is both the cause of and solution to Somali piracy promotes an understanding that employed
Somalis are less likely to join piracy. This was further compounded by the advocacy campaign’s neglect to acknowledge women’s participation in piracy operations (see Chapter Four). As a result, through processes of securitizing piracy, securitizing actors identified male, unemployed, black (Somali) bodies as those posing the greatest threat for potential piracy-related activity.

The labeling of male, unemployed, black Somali bodies as “knowable” or potential pirates contributes to the construction of pirates as an undifferentiated mass. This construction enables counter piracy actors to justify the implementation of security/development projects that ignore the complex political and economic structural causes of piracy. Similar to James Ferguson’s research on World Bank development interventions in Lesotho, this representation takes the politics (geopolitical, racial and gender) out of development and creates the appearance of an apolitical security-development counter piracy framework. 54 The research of Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mahayni argues that there are actually four different types of pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. 55 They identify the following four categories of pirates: 1) political pirates that use piracy to weaken Somalia’s political regimes; 2) resource pirates that illegally extract fish resources; 3) defensive pirates that attempt to combat illegal fishing piracy attacks; and 4) ransom pirates that operate solely with the intentions of attacking ships for ransom. Not only do these categories work to deconstruct the totalizing notion of the pirate, they also acknowledge that piracy off the coast of Somalia is not a venture solely undertaken by male, Somali bodies. For example, Samatar et. al describe the category of resource pirates to “include companies from Asia, Europe and Africa who are driven by the lure of Somalia’s unprotected rich fish resources”. 56 Despite the variations in motives, operational styles, and bodies associated with piracy off the coast of Somalia, counter piracy discourse and practice continue to approach pirates as an undifferentiated mass of Somali male, bodies. Therefore, I argue that the current security-development strategies for combating piracy reflect

56 Ibid, 1385.
broader global patterns of racialized incarceration and criminalization in contemporary millennial capitalist crisis/expansion. Specifically, the messaging campaign design strategy seeks to combat piracy through disciplinary strategies of preventing and containing these particular bodies and activities.

The security aspect of combating piracy aims to contain male, black, Somali bodies onshore in Somalia while, at the same time, opening up the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean to trade. The closing of borders/containment of Somali bodies onshore in Somalia occurs through perceived indiscriminate naval patrol practices. For example, during a meeting with SOMFISH, the elder fisherman explained that rumors are circulating throughout the fishing community that naval patrols are picking up any Somalis they find on the water and arresting them for piracy. As a result, an increasing number of fishermen are afraid to go out on the water. In order to alleviate fishermen’s fear of being mistaken for pirates, the members of SOMFISH solicited the help of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in making fishermen identification cards (see Plate 18). The head of SOMFISH explained to me that each card identifies the card holder as a member of SOMFISH and included a name and photograph. The card is meant to differentiate legitimate fishermen from pirates posing as fishermen. SOMFISH encourages its members to have the cards with them while they are at sea so they are able to prove that they are non-pirates if they are ever confronted by coast guard or naval forces.

The fishermen identification cards illustrate several of the complexities and contestations surrounding the management of Somali’s coastal waters. First, the rumored indiscriminate naval patrol practices reinforce the notion that it is possible to “know” pirates prior to the commencement of piracy-related activities. In other words, any male, black (Somali) body on the water is a potential pirate, and therefore, is at risk of being arrested by naval patrols. Second,

naval patrols are inadvertently working as a tool for containing Somali bodies onshore in Somalia. Somali fishermen’s fear of being mistaken for pirates simultaneously keeps Somali bodies off the waters and within the borders of Somalia while opening up the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean to trade. Or in other words, Somalia’s coastline becomes permeable to foreign bodies (e.g., naval personnel and commercial shipping vessel companies) and impermeable to Somali bodies (both pirates and fishermen). At once, the securing of the Somalia coastline from piracy attacks means securing the movement of trade and global economic well-being. Emily Gilbert’s research on borders and security in North America also illustrates how security and economic mandates are entangled in the management of borders. Somalia’s coastline presents a similarly complicated and contradictory border management situation. This reinforces the earlier argument that the external space of the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean matters enough to the interests of Western governments to promote containing the movement of Somali bodies across the onshore/offshore coastal boundary of Somalia. As a result, whereas the terrestrial boundaries of Somali fall “outside” the space of securitizing efforts, the Somali coast is constructed as “inside” the space deemed suitable for securitizing because of the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean.

Lastly, the fishermen identification cards can be understood as a practice of reterritorialization. The fear instilled by naval patrols, whether intentional or not, symbolizes counter piracy actors’ territorialization of the waters off the coast of Somalia. Therefore, if naval patrols are understood as a tool for staking a territorial claim to the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean, then I argue that fishermen identification cards are a protest against this claim and a practice in reterritorializing Somali sovereignty. Philip Steinberg suggests that, “the ocean is continually reconstructed amidst competing and ever present tendencies toward territorialization and deterritorialization.” Although one could make the argument that fishermen identification cards

are a neo-colonial form of identity management, I argue that they are a form of resistance/protest against foreign naval vessels and pirates that seeks to reconstruct Somali territorial sovereignty. The identification cards are a Somali-invented and Somali-managed venture employed by Somali fishermen to re-stake a claim to the waters off the coast of Somalia. The creation of and carrying of the cards is a bordering-practice that enables members of SOMFISH to differentiate their bodies (and practices) from those of pirates. The ability to differentiate their bodies from those of pirates alleviates their fears of mistakenly being arrested—fears that were previously preventing them from going to sea. Armed with cards that legitimate their presence on the water, the members of SOMFISH are returning to the sea and reclaiming their fishing territories and Somalia’s territorial sovereignty.

Plate 18: A member of the Somaliland Fishing Association (SOMFISH) displays fishermen identification cards in Berbera, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)

The containment of Somali bodies and actions is also illustrated through the practices of moving and detaining piracy prisoners. For example, underscoring efforts to securitize piracy are the transfers of suspected pirates to East African prisons and the repatriation of convicted piracy prisoners to Somalia. These practices highlight the paradox of containing piracy prisoners through practices of mobility. Alison Mountz’s research on detention systems presents similar
findings of the paradoxes inherent in containing individual bodies. Mountz conceptualizes containment as a geographical process of detention that “remains intricately intertwined with mobile forces of capital and legitimating discourses…fixing identities while creating new ones, confining bodies while moving them around, or isolating individuals while mobilizing their collective, global threat.”

The containment of Somali pirates begins when they are arrested and detained aboard naval vessels. At this stage, pirates are identified as piracy suspects. Piracy suspects are detained aboard naval vessels for an indefinite period of time until they are either: 1) released back onto their skiffs or onshore in Somalia; 2) transferred to the arresting naval vessel’s host country for prosecution; or 3) transferred to a one of the states in the East Africa region who signed a memorandum to prosecute Somali piracy suspects. Interviews conducted with representatives of foreign governments and militaries revealed a strong preference for transferring piracy suspects to states in the East Africa region for prosecution. Interviewees cited the high costs associated with 1) transferring piracy prisoners to their host countries, and 2) the high costs (to tax payers) for prosecuting pirates through “their county’s legal systems” as reasons for their preference. Several military personnel also discussed a personal moral opposition to releasing piracy suspects back on their skiffs or back onshore Somalia. They described this practice as a sign of a failed mission.

60 Mountz, K. Coddington, R. Tina Catania, and J. M. Lloyd “Conceptualizing Detention: Mobility, Containment, Bordering and Exclusion” Progress in Human Geography (2012) 1-20
61 Personal interview, KSCP4, 2012.
62 At the time of writing this dissertation Kenya and Seychelles were the only states in the East Africa region that signed a memorandum to accept and prosecute pirates. Maldives, Mauritius and Tanzania were still in the process of finalizing a memorandum of understanding to accept and prosecute pirates. Even upon signing a memorandum of understanding, the receiving state can only receive piracy suspects if their prisons are deemed up to international human rights standards set forth by the United Nations. As a result, the UNODC PP is tasked with assisting states with the refurbishment of their prisons during the processes of facilitating and drafting memorandum agreements.
63 Personal interviews, KSFM, KSFG, 2012-2013.
64 KSFM3, KSFM6, KSFM7, KSFM8,
memorandums of understanding with the East African states receiving piracy prisoners for prosecution, the UNODC CPP assists with facilitating the logistics of the transfers. Facilitation can include, but is not limited to, providing Somali interpreters, overseeing evidence handover and storage, liaising with prison authorities to verify available space for detainment, etc.

When piracy suspects are transferred to a state in the East Africa region for prosecution they undergo another form of detainment. In the case of transfers to the Seychelles, piracy suspects are initially detained in the main police station in Mahe, Seychelles. Upon reaching the police station they are provided a UNODC CPP-contracted Somali interpreter to assist with translation services. The police station also serves as a holding cell while the staff at the Montagne Posse Prison prepare the prison cells for the piracy suspects. When the Montagne Posse Prison is ready to receive the piracy suspects they are transferred to the prison and detained there throughout their trials and/or sentences. The timeframe for this entire process varies greatly depending on the amount of time spent in each location of detainment (e.g. naval vessel, police station, prison). This process highlights the paradox that although counter piracy actors aim to contain Somali bodies, their containment is characterized by a high level of mobility across various geographic and institutional spaces.

The development aspect of combating piracy aims to prevent and contain male, black, Somali bodies by targeting potential pirates with awareness-raising and alternative livelihood programmes. In addition to the advocacy campaign, the UNODC CPP is also facilitating larger projects of prevention and containment on behalf of international counter piracy actors. Two examples are the construction of and refurbishment of prisons in Somalia and the aforementioned development of the Somali coast guard. According to UNODC CPP statistics, since the Programme’s inception in 2009 the office has refurbished and constructed nine

\[\text{\footnotesize 65 The overview of the piracy suspect transfer process provided was outlined by UNODC CPP staff members and corroborated by participant observation, interviews with military personnel, foreign government personnel, and Somali piracy prisoners detained in the Montagne Posse Prison in Mahe, Seychelles.} \]
prisons. Four of the nine construction projects are underway in Somalia: 1) the refurbishment of the Hargeisa Prison; 2) the refurbishment of the Quardo Prison; 3) the refurbishment of the Bossaso prison; and 4) the construction of a new Garowe Prison and Training Academy. The refurbishment projects include upgrades to infrastructure and the creation of additional prison cells. The Garowe construction project entails constructing a new prison, prison headquarter offices and a training academy for Puntland prison staff (see Plates 19 and 20). In 2011 the UNODC CPP estimated the costs of these construction projects to be $25USD million over three years.

Plate 19: A Somali man works on building a section of the Garowe Prison and Training Academy in Garowe, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)

The UNODC CPP-facilitated prison construction projects aim to create larger prisons to detain larger numbers of repatriated piracy prisoners. Larger prisons and more prisoners also translate into a need for additional prison staff (and prison staff training). Essentially, the development of Somalia’s correctional services and facilities not only creates more jobs (corrections and construction jobs) in Somalia, but it also creates more jobs for development agencies (e.g., UNODC CPP, UNDP, etc.) who oversee the implementation of construction and training. Paradoxically, the longevity of these construction, corrections, and development jobs is predicated on the continuation of piracy. Therefore, I argue that the development sector and the Somali government sector also have profit motives in the prevention and containment aspects of combating piracy. As long as there continues to be the “knowable” threat of potential pirates, the development sector can justify its continued involvement in implementing advocacy and development strategies for deterring pirates. The unending war against (or permanent emergency of) piracy translates into a steady flow of aid, programming support, and infrastructural investment into Somalia and the offices of the Somali government.

Plate 20: A sign displayed in front of the Garowe Prison and Training Academy construction denotes the presence of and work of United Nations agencies in Garowe, Somalia. (Author’s photograph)
Through the development of Somalia’s security sector, the boundaries of counter piracy strategies (and the geographies of expertise) shift from at sea to onshore Somalia. Traditional military and rule of law strategies for combating piracy are restricted to apprehending pirates at sea. However, by developing Somalia’s corrections services, police and maritime coast guard, increasing jobs and surveillance, and repatriating piracy prisoners to Somalia, counter piracy actors aim to both prevent and contain piracy within Somali territory. As demonstrated, the counter piracy actors involved in securitizing piracy also have profit motives at stake. One counter piracy actor stated:

As is arguably true in most situations, countries and organizations act strongly in self-interest, and Somali piracy is no exception. What sets the piracy epidemic apart is the extent to which smaller actors, even individuals, have been allowed to influence global perspectives and events for personal gain. From the relatively benign - UN employees collectively refusing to attend Somalia-focused meetings held anywhere but posh world capitals or resort destinations; to the unethical - seconded individuals creating high-ranking UN positions out of whole cloth to serve as a retirement golden parachute; to the egregious - UN officials actively advocating for policies and outcomes that would personally position them to benefit in the private sector. It’s impossible to say how events would have unfolded sans this personal profiteering, but there is no doubt that it has featured prominently and made its mark.68

This statement not only supports the idea that profit motives drive current counter piracy strategies, but it also highlights the impact that participating sectors, agencies, and individuals have on (re)shaping global perspectives of piracy and emergent markets for combating piracy through security and development. The disciplinary strategies underlying efforts to securitize piracy expose a contradictory set of temporal and spatial logics. Although securitizing actors are in the “business” of combating piracy, the profit motives driving their participation are dependent upon the continuous demand for the prevention and containment of racialized bodies.

68 Personal interview, KSCP15, 2013.
7 Conclusions

This chapter examined the institutionalization of securitizing piracy within the messaging campaign’s participating sectors—government, military and development. It argued that *piratization* reflects wider global political economic trends of “roll-out” neoliberalization. It introduced the concept of *bargaining with security* and demonstrated that the development sector is an active participant in the merging of security and development and producing the political economy of counter piracy. Specifically, it argued that securitizing actors’ motives and actions are contributing to the emergence of markets of security and development that reflect a wider growth in global disciplinary strategies of prevention and detainment. In particular, the process of securitizing piracy promotes the prevention and containment of male, unemployed, black [Somali] bodies while simultaneously reworking the boundaries of counter piracy interventions. However, the profit motives of securitizing actors, coupled with the contradictory spatial and temporal logics of containment, reveal that those participating in the process of securitizing piracy also have a vested interest in the *continuation of piracy off the coast of Somalia*. 
Conclusion: Preventing and Containing Pirates

**Pirate (n):** one who commits or practices piracy

**Prevent (v):** to be in readiness for; to act ahead of; to deprive of power or hope of acting or succeeding; to keep from happening or existing; to hold or keep back.

**Contain (v):** to keep within limits as: restrain, control, check, halt; to follow successfully a policy of containment toward; to prevent (as an enemy or opponent) from advancing or making a successful attack.¹

This dissertation situates the strategic shift in counter piracy strategies within a context of broader socio-historical forces shaping relations between security and development. Simultaneously, it situates this shift within a larger transition from a post-crime to a pre-crime, security society. It began with an overarching question: If the number of successful piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia has steadily decreased since 2008-2009, why were counter piracy actors insisting on increasing interventions and expanding the counter piracy framework to encompass a more “holistic” approach to combating piracy? In an effort to address this question, it became evident that combating piracy off the coast of Somalia was a far more complex issue than crime and punishment. Early research illustrated that (re)framing piracy as a security-development issue not only entailed drawing upon a set of existing understandings of security and development in Somalia, but also reproducing and promoting a discourse of casual linkage between the two. This discourse of casual linkage drew a parallel between underdevelopment and insecurity in Somalia as both the cause of and solution to Somali piracy. The research thus involved locating and examining discourses and practices that normalized and promoted these assumptions, and how these assumptions shaped and were shaped throughout the gendered/racialized macro- and micro-processes of the UNODC CPP messaging campaign.

The findings suggest that (re)framing piracy as a security-development issue played a role in its construction as an imminent threat and shaped responses to it. Piracy’s construction as an imminent threat helped normalize understandings of underdevelopment in Somalia as dangerous

to the Somali public and the international community. Specifically, inadequate development and inadequate security were thought to be both the roots causes of piracy, and improvements to security and development to be the necessary solutions. The discourse of casual linkage between security and development was taken up, reinforced and promoted through the UNODC CPP messaging campaign for securitizing piracy. Entangled within the campaign discourse is the destruction and reconstruction of narratives, identities, and subjectivities (e.g. Piracy is ruining Somali culture and traditions; piracy is destroying Somalia’s international reputation; pirates who go to sea are at risk of death or imprisonment, etc.). This dissertation further demonstrates how gender, race, and political economy are central to securitization processes and the expanding spatial-temporal geographies of the new security-development counter piracy framework. For example, although Somali women were not seen as part of the “piracy issue”, the messaging campaign viewed them as part of the “piracy solution”. Somali women were enlisted as security agents tasked with the [security] responsibilities to deter other women from partaking in relationships with pirates and to prevent their sons from becoming pirates. At the same time, the messaging campaign framework and corresponding discourse is predicated on the assumption that piracy activity is carried out by male, black [Somali] bodies. Correspondingly, whereas combating piracy at sea is associated with white [foreign] bodies, combating piracy onshore Somalia is the responsibility of black [Somali] bodies.

Initially, the popular and policy frameworks through which piracy was understood depicted piracy as an issue of crime and punishment. Piracy was framed as a criminal justice issue and responded to with rule of law and military strategies. Within this criminal justice framework pirates “became pirates” when they committed an act of robbery at sea. Or, the ability to “know” or “label” a pirate occurred post-crime. Likewise, piracy-related activities were geographically defined as taking place on the high seas. However, the criminal justice framework’s inability to put an end to Somali piracy prompted a rethinking and reframing of the issue of piracy. The solution imagined by counter piracy actors was a more “holistic” approach to combating piracy that included supplementing current rule of law and military measures with preventative measures. This new “holistic” approach shifted the prior criminal justice framework to that of a security-development counter piracy framework. Under this new framework, through technologies and expertise of security and development, it became possible to “know” or “label”
pirates before they committed acts of piracy. Likewise, the geography of “knowing” or “labeling” pirates shifted from at sea to onshore. Namely, it became possible to “know” pirates on shore before they committed “piracy activities” at sea. Consequently, the (re)framing of piracy as a security-development issue expanded both the spatial and temporal boundaries of counter piracy strategies, expertise and institutional arrangement of actors.

First, the new security-development counter piracy framework created new subjects, new experts and new knowledge for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. The process of creating new experts and knowledge (for combating piracy through security and development) was co-constitutive of creating at-risk and developable subjects in Somalia. It was first necessary to identify the experts with the knowledge necessary to design and implement a messaging campaign (within Somalia) for securitizing piracy. The UNODC CPP effectively (re)constructed and reframed its expertise to reflect a concentration on security-development knowledge. In doing so, counter piracy actors supported the UNODC CPP as lead securitizing actor/facilitator of the messaging campaign. A close examination of the macro-practices of the messaging campaign revealed how the process of securitizing piracy was centered on deconstructing and reconstructing existing narratives and identities. For instance, counter-narratives were created to delegitimize existing pro-piracy narratives circulating throughout Somalia. The counter-narratives not only labeled specific actions as “pirate-related”, but they also identified pirates as undesirable, dangerous individuals. However, a closer examination of campaign discourse revealed that the participation of securitizing actors in the negative construction of “pirates” and “piracy” was both productive and counter-productive to larger efforts to combat piracy and develop/secure Somalia. At the same time, securitizing actors utilized messaging campaign discourse to manage their image and appear transparent. As a result, the messaging campaign not only served as an instrument for creating new subjects of the security-development counter piracy framework, but it also served to construct the experts and knowledge necessary to “develop” those subjects.

Second, the findings of this dissertation research demonstrate that the new security-development counter piracy framework also reworked when it is possible to “know” or “label” pirates and where combating piracy takes place. The new counter piracy framework is predicated on the
assumption that it is possible to “know” potential pirates and therefore “prevent” piracy activities before they occur. An examination of the micro-practices of the messaging campaign highlighted the gendered and racialized nature of securitizing piracy that identifies unemployed, male, black [Somalis] as “knowable” potential pirates. The messaging campaign framework and discourse securitizes unemployed, male, black [Somali] bodies by labeling them “potential pirates.” Simultaneously, the messaging campaign framework and discourse securitizes male, Somali bodies and desecuritizes female, Somali bodies. Whereas Somali men are viewed as security subjects, Somali women are viewed as security agents. As a result, the spatial-temporal reworking of the new counter piracy framework has general gendered and racialized consequences for bodies and actions in Somalia.

Through the process of securitizing piracy preventing piracy also becomes the responsibilities of Somali bodies. For example, not only does the messaging campaign encourage Somali individuals to refrain from piracy-related activities, it also encourages individuals to deter others from doing so. Those that do refrain are constructed as “developable subjects” and targeted for livelihood development programmes. At the local scale, these security responsibilities rely upon the promotion of particular gendered practices of social reproduction in Somalia. At a larger scale, this demonstrates a wider shift in security responsibilities from foreign bodies at sea—to Somali bodies on shore Somalia. However, even though preventing piracy becomes the informalized, privatized security responsibility of the Somali people, facilitating and/or overseeing prevention remains the development responsibility of the UNODC CPP. This neopaternalistic approach to security-development reinforces social segmentation by suggesting that although Somali people have a role to play in combating piracy, they are not capable of doing so without the assistance and oversight of the international community. Or, in other words, if the Somali people cannot prevent piracy themselves then the international community will step in and contain it from spreading.

Paradoxically, the process of securitizing piracy also reshaped institutional identities and mandates. In the increasingly competitive, materially constrained aid environment, the UNODC CPP was able to gain institutional advantage through its role as a securitizing actor. As a securitizing actor, the UNODC CPP strategically invoked and revoked security to expand the
spatial-temporal boundaries of its expertise and transform its mandate in order to ensure institutional survival. Prior to its role as a securitizing actor, the UNODC CPP implemented post-crime counter piracy interventions onshore in Somalia and other East African regional states. However, through strategically *bargaining with security*, it was able to continue its existing development-oriented projects but also expand its mandate to include pre-crime, security-oriented projects. This expansion of temporal boundaries also enabled the UNODC CPP to widen the spatial boundaries of its expertise and operations to include coast guard training and Yemenese-based programming. Namely, the UNODC CPP’s new mandate relocates its expertise and sites of implementation into the gray area between security and development, pre-crime and post-crime, and land-based and sea-based counter piracy operations. Consequently, the new mandates also further blur the boundaries between the interests of the government, military, and development sectors.

The UNODC CPP’s *bargaining with security* also works to reveal that the development sector is an active participant in the merging of development and security—particularly through the participation of development agencies as securitizing actors. Acknowledging the development sector as an *active* participant places it back in the context of a broader political economic analysis of the institutional machinations at stake in securitizing piracy. I argued that an analysis of institutional machinations at stake, including those of the development sector, show how securitizing actors are complicit in (re)shaping the markets of security and development. This (re)shaping promotes new “roll-out” neoliberalization technologies of security and development for combating piracy. These new technologies coincided with institutions to rework the spatial-temporal geographies of expertise and reshape institutional identities and mandates. The *piratization* of participating sectors is an example of how institutions are reshaped in response to the demands of the current political economy of combating piracy.

Securitizing piracy can be understood as a politically and economically motivated process driven by the profit motives of securitizing actors. The process of securitizing piracy reflects a wider, global trend of employing disciplinary strategies for the prevention and containment of particular actions and bodies. The messaging campaign enabled securitizing actors to promote particular security-development technologies that contributed to producing a market demand for expertise
in the prevention and containment of underdeveloped, criminal, black, male bodies. The process of securitizing piracy constructed threats and subjects to justify intervention, correction, and the targeting of specific racialized and gendered populations in order to reroute funds to specific businesses, agencies and organizations. Specifically, securitizing actors were able to make “pirates” as security subjects (and “non-pirates” as development subjects)…a process that was tremendously beneficial to those who have an interest in “containing” them. At the same time, the process of securitizing piracy made development interventions instrumentalist, less for the people who need development per se, and more to quell the potential movement of Somali male, bodies at sea in order to protect the well-off.

To conclude, the new security-development counter piracy framework seeks to combat piracy through simultaneously preventing gendered and racialized bodies from partaking in piracy-related activities and containing these gendered and racialized bodies onshore in Somalia. Securitizing actors aim to prevent piracy by offering livelihood development incentives to unemployed, male, black [Somali] bodies that refrain from piracy-related activities. Concurrently, securitizing actors are developing Somalia’s security sector to be capable of containing bodies that exhibit (or have the potential to exhibit) piracy-related activities onshore in Somalia. Securitizing actors’ ability to “know” pirates prior to their involvement in piracy-related activities, coupled with their efforts to repatriate convicted pirates back to Somalia, effectively (re)produces a continuous, immanent threat of piracy. Consequently, the (re)production of this continuous, immanent threat is co-constitutive of the (re)production of the continuous need for intervention. This paradox exposes the “messiness” (i.e., the limitations, contradictions and cyclical nature) underlying the new security-development counter piracy framework.

The messiness relative to (and even within) particular expert visions of the need to at once both develop and secure Somalia has persisted across historical periods. Somalia’s geographic location at the intersection of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean means it has the longest coastline along an integral waterway to the world economy. As a result, the political maneuvering between foreign governments, militaries and the Somali government is akin to that during the Cold War. Those nations most favorable to the Somali Government can help secure a
part of Somalia’s geographical advantages for shipping. Likewise, the West’s concerns with the potential for Somalia to serve as a safe haven for terrorists and criminals have persisted since the fall of the Siad Barre regime. The West’s desire to “keep an eye on” Somalia and the Horn of Africa region under the guise of counter piracy programming is not a surprise. Nor is the UN’s desire to maintain their cornerstone on the development market in Somalia. The persistence of Somalia’s high level of underdevelopment and insecurity means only those development agencies able to cover the high costs of security, travel, housing, etc. associated with working in Somalia can implement programming on the ground. As a result, the UN is one of the few agencies able to work in Somalia, and when other agencies do send staff to Somalia, they pay to use UN resources. Essentially, those who have an interest in securitizing and combating piracy also stand to benefit or profit from its continuation.

What differs from previous expert visions of security and development in Somalia is the push for prevention and containment strategies as illustrated in current efforts to combat piracy. As markets of prevention and containment are produced in Somalia, it reflects the specific local manifestations of broader global patterns of racialized incarceration and criminalization in contemporary millennial capitalist crisis/expansion. Many of the same patterns evident in combating Somali piracy are at work in numerous other locations around the world as evidenced through a growing set of literature on the geographies of detention. These patterns beg the question, has the merging of security and development enabled First World countries to use

development aid as a tool to contain Third World bodies within Third World borders unless their movements benefit the security of the global political economy?
Appendix A: Data Sources, Limitations

Research Participants (N=139)

Counter piracy actors from foreign governments (diplomats): 18 (coded as KSFG in the text)

Counter piracy actors from the Somali government (Puntland State of Somalia and the Republic of Somaliland): 12 (coded as KSSG in the text)

Counter piracy actors from the international counter piracy community (i.e., international agencies, NGOs, private shipping companies, etc.): 16 (coded as KSCP in the text)

Members of the Somali public: 42 (coded as KSPP in the text)

Convicted Somali piracy prisoners (imprisoned in Montagne Posse Prison, Mahe, Seychelles): 36 (coded as KSPP in text)

Foreign military personnel (members of international counter piracy naval operations): 15 (coded as KSFM in text)

Participant Observation


Puntland Counter Piracy Stakeholders Coordination Meeting, 12 August 2012, Office of Ports and Aviation, Garowe, Puntland, Somalia. Sponsored by the Puntland Ministry of Maritime Transport, Ports and Counter Piracy.

**News media**

**International**
- BBC News
- CNN
- The Economist
- Fox News
- New York Times
- The Guardian
- Reuters

**Somalia/Kenya**
- Somalia Report
- The Somaliland Press
- GaroweOnline
- BBC Somalia
- Voice of America, Somalia
- The Daily Nation
- Sabahionline.com

**Policy Documents**

**Council of Europe**


**European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)**


**Federal Republic of Somalia**

International Maritime Organization (IMO)


Maritime Safety Committee


North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)


Republic of Kenya

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to Grant to Each Other No-Objection in Respect of Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (entry into force: 7 April 2009) Registration #: I-46230; registration date: 11 June 2009.


Republic of Seychelles


Republic of Somaliland

United Kingdom

“Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs” Tenth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2010-12 (Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty) March 2012.


United Nations


United Nations Security Council


Research Notes and Gaps in Data

This research attempted to construct a cohesive narrative of the process of securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia through an ethnographic study of the UNODC CPP, its messaging campaign design process, and the evolution of its mandate. One of the biggest challenges I faced was that the process of securitizing piracy and the evolution of the UNODC CPP mandate was unfolding while I embarked on this research. In order to overcome this challenge, I remained in frequent contact with research participants and updated my textual sources whenever possible. I was unsuccessful in recruiting research participants from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution. The perspective of this agency would have enhanced my analysis of the institutionalization of securitizing piracy at the international level.