Experiencing the State: The Making of Falangaw Amis Community in Taiwan

by

Chien-chang Feng

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Anthropology
University of Toronto

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Abstract

Seeing the state as an idea and as apparatus which intervenes in people’s lives, this thesis addresses how the Falangaw Amis people of Taiwan have experienced these two dimensions of the state since 1896. This thesis presents how the Amis reflexively use these experiences to fulfill their project of community construction when being in a situation of fragmentation and marginality.

After introducing Falangaw Amis people’s original and transformed concepts regarding historicity, the body/person/self, and different sorts of social relatedness, this thesis demonstrates how they have experienced the state in their ordinary daily life and on some extraordinary occasions such as stage performances, baseball games, and political festivals. Specifically, in response to the state idea and apparatus, Falangaw Amis people present a modern version of genesis that contains symbols of
the state; a new concept of the body that relates to the statist hierarical value system; and use *faki* (MB) to connect and maintain different sorts of social relatedness when facing state regulations.

This thesis emphasizes that to understand the interaction between the margin and the center from a bottom-up perspective, we need to examine Taiwan’s peculiar statehood and Falangaw Amis people’s being conditioned by it. However, even in such a disadvantaged situation, Falangaw Amis people still gain some knowledge of the state in their practices and experiences, and materialize the knowledge to fulfill the task of community construction.

Moreover, not only does the result of their community construction illustrate how the Falangaw Amis claim the indigenous citizenship after negotiating with the power of state idea and apparatus, it also reveals how they give positive feedback to the schismatic colonial state system and the country’s hardship in order to survive in global politics. In a word, when it comes to indigenous-state relation, the researcher should go beyond the rigid model of regulation from above and resistance from below. Instead, by taking the Falangaw Amis as an example, this thesis shows how complicated power relations sometimes counteract each other and sometimes connects things together in multi-dimensional ways and the surprising results of the connections and counteractions.
Acknowledgements

During the time of writing this dissertation thesis, I lost my mother and my first and best informant Palac, the two most important persons in my family and in the field. I still cannot figure out how it could be possible to complete this work without them. To this question, the only answer I have in mind is that benevolent and generous people have supported me and cheered me up. To whom I want to acknowledge and express my gratitude.

Professor Hy van Luong, my co-supervisor, has offered his time and knowledge to help solve all my problems about living, studying, and writing over these years. His suggestions are wise and practical, and I always feel calm and confident when working with him. Professor Tania Li, another co-supervisor, has urged me to do my work better. She has asked difficult questions and challenged my viewpoints, and the results of my replies to her questions and challenges are significant progress and improvements in my writing. Both of my supervisors have taught me how to think properly, which will be a lifelong benefit for my future learning.

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proposal committee. I took courses and learned useful research methods and theories of colonialism from them, which helped me a lot when I conducted my research and wrote my thesis. I also have benefited greatly from Professor Shuichi Nagata’s valuable suggestions and comments. He kindly took me to restaurants because he knew that I was a hungry international student living alone in Toronto. We always had good times and nice talks when we got together. Professor Scott Simon, my external examiner and a Taiwan expert, kindly gave me a detailed appraisal and offered appropriate comments at my dissertation defense. From his suggestions and critique, I see a clear path of improvement.

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I was granted a three-year scholarship from the Ministry of Education of the Government of Taiwan for my Ph.D. program. During my fieldwork, I was fully funded by the Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto. Without these sources of financial aid, this research would have been much more difficult to complete.

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### Glossary

#### Amis Glossary:

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<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>'adingo</td>
<td>human soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'amerek</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akawang</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aka</td>
<td>do not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ama</td>
<td>father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amoko’ay</td>
<td>short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awa</td>
<td>no, without</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caciaw</td>
<td>speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ciloma’ay</td>
<td>the family derived from <em>tatapangan</em> or natal family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coco</td>
<td>breasts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>depeng</td>
<td>the god of birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dipong</td>
<td>the Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dongi</td>
<td>the god of birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fafah</td>
<td>wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fafahiy'an</td>
<td>woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faki</td>
<td>originally means maternal uncle (MB), but gradually its meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>has been extended to male relatives one generation above ego,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including FB, FSH, and MSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finawlan</td>
<td>age-sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>futol</td>
<td>testicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ina</td>
<td>mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isefay</td>
<td>elderly men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaemangsray</td>
<td>children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kakita’an</td>
<td>headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kangodo</td>
<td>respect, embarrassment, politeness, and shame, or an euphemism of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>indirectness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kapah</td>
<td>young male adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaput</td>
<td>age-set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kawas</td>
<td>supernatural beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kiloma’an</td>
<td>harvest festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kosiki</td>
<td>household registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kuapin</td>
<td>Han Chinese, Chinese immigrants who came to Taiwan after 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lalon</td>
<td>tent</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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*xv*
| taay lalon       | the big tent                        |
| miningay lalon  | the small tent                      |
| limecedan       | maid or virgin                      |
| liteng          | old men or ancestors                |
| loma’           | house, family                       |
| maanga'ay       | witch                              |
| madipongay      | intellectuals, people of white-collar class, or people who behave like Japanese |
| malataw         | the god of war                      |
| malitengay      | the elderly                         |
| marininaay      | kinship (based on matrilocality)    |
| masakaputay     | age-sets                           |
| mata            | eyes                               |
| mie’daw         | bamboo divination                   |
| miki’           | sea ritual                          |
| miladiw         | singing songs in traditional way    |
| mipaliw         | helping each other by turn with field work, or the exchange of labor force |
| misakuli        | doing the coolie job                |
| misatofan       | offering service at school or teacher’s home |
| mitapi’         | groom-service                       |
| ngasaw          | kinship relationship one level higher than raloma’an |
| ngiha           | human voices                        |
| niyalo’         | community                           |
| pakarongay      | uninitiated young male teenagers    |
| panga           | penis                              |
| payrang         | Hoklo, or the Han Taiwanese         |
| pinangan        | temper                             |
| poki            | labia                              |
| raloma’an       | families of the same kinship origin, usually sharing the same Han surname |
| sahakoolon      | the soul of children                |
| sakaniw         | boastful, dishonest                 |
| sarawinawina    | kinship                            |
| sefi            | men’s house                         |
| sipalaay        | the gods of the soil                |
| tainangan       | sugarcane plantation               |
| tangal          | head                               |
tatangalan  religious leader in an age-set

tatapangan  the root of something, the natal family

tatasy  headscarf

tireng  body, person, and self

touban  duty(Japanese)

wa'ay  foot

wawa  baby and young kid

**Japanese and Chinese Glossary:**

ban nin  barbarians (蕃人)

buluo  community (部落)

**Hoklo and Hakka** (two dialect groups of Han Taiwanese):

Malan  馬蘭, Mandarin for Falangaw
Pronunciation Guide

Below is a list based on the pronunciation guide of The Amis-Dictionary (Fey 1986:20). The Amis alphabets used in this dissertation are also used in most academic writings in Amis studies. However, in Fey’s work, the letter g represents the ŋ sound, but today in most academic works the letter g is replaced by ng to denote the ŋ sound. In this thesis when ng appears it also pronounces like ŋ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>letter</th>
<th>Description of Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'</td>
<td>is a glottal stop, a stop of flow of air in the throat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>is pronounced like a in father.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>is pronounced ch before the vowel i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>is a alveolar fricative, half l, half s sound. No equivalent in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>is pronounced like e in often. It is the ə sound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng</td>
<td>is the ŋ sound, or ng in sing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>is similar to h in English, but has heavy breath sound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>is pronounced like i in fish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>is pronounced like k in king.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>is a flapped “l”, pronounced like “tt” in matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>is pronounced like m in meat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>is pronounced like n in noodle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>is pronounced like o in donut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>is pronounced like p in pie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>is a trilled r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>is pronounced like s in soup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>is pronounced like t in tea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>is pronounced like oo in food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>is pronounced like w in wine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>is a highly fricative sound in throat. No equivalent sound in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>is pronounced like y in yoke.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One: Introduction

“Our Bodies are the Wall of the Country”

I heard this sentence from Lamlo, a newly elected county councilor, just after I finished an interview and prepared to step out of his home. In that interview, he talked a lot about how the indigenous people of Taiwan have been bodily, mentally, and economically exploited by different government regimes. Lamlo quoted these words from a local Amis song. He tried to give me some backdrops about how the Amis, having lived under different government regimes, had been recruited into the armed forces—their bodies being used to defend the country. Nonetheless, the connotations of this sentence are actually much deeper than Lamlo’s interpretation.

Surely Lamlo’s statement can be taken at face value. The Amis have indeed sacrificed themselves to protect the country. But his statement can also be understood metaphorically, referring to a boundary, to marginality, and to a remote but crucial ingredient in the composition of the country, which both dissolves and constitutes the nation-state’s very kernel. What if the wall becomes porous? Under what circumstances and following what consequences might the “wall” get thicker, thinner, taller or weaker? When the state apparatus manages this wall of living flesh, what
does this “wall” think and do? Since the wall is part of the whole country, has the country changed its kernel?

When considering Taiwan’s peculiar statehood in the world’s *realpolitik*, I do not position the indigenous people opposite the state. Rather, I argue that we should analyze the tension and symbiosis between indigenous people and the state. From this perspective, it is possible to see how both indigenous people and the state have been mutually formed.

This thesis explores the relationship between state policies and the Falangaw Amis community. My argument is that state policies adopted by colonial and post-independence regimes have shaped the Falangaw Amis community in highly significant ways. The extent of state influence has been underestimated by scholars who assume that the institutions of the Falangaw Amis have remained relatively untouched until today (Shih 1976; Wei 1961, 1986). As I will show, different regimes have intervened extensively in many domains. Specifically, they have re-molded the Amis population in domains such as kinship (chapter 4), residence (chapters 4 and 5), ritual (chapters 2, 3, and 6), leisure (chapter 5), and community leadership (chapters 4 and 6). At the same time, the Falangaw Amis have responded to state intervention in creative ways, which is my topic in chapter 6. At its simplest, then, my thesis is a historical and ethnographic exploration of the effect of state intervention as it
intersects with the active appropriations and inventions of the Amis themselves.

This research explores Taiwan indigenes’ experiences of the state, showing how political economy and dialogic subjectivity are socio-culturally structured. However, this research avoids placing too much emphasis on ideologies and techniques. It sees experience and practice as mediators intervening in power relations between the state apparatus and local realities. In this research, I argue that modern governments in Taiwan after 1896 have significantly influenced local indigenous people’s ways of life. However, in the context of Taiwan, some indigenous people, such as the Falangaw Amis people, have also helped to re-shape the nation-state. Hence, the Falangaw Amis were not completely overwhelmed by state interventions. Rather, they connected the symbolic capital of the governing powers with their own cultural systems and utilized these governing powers as means to build up their community and identity.

**Taiwan: A Brief Political History**

The world knew little about Taiwan before the seventeenth century. It is said that in the fifteenth century some Portuguese sailors on the ocean had a glimpse of this island and called it *Illa Formosa*, the beautiful isle. Later in 1624, the Dutch built Fort Zeelandia in today’s Tainan City, a city which later became Taiwan’s first capital. The Dutch did not colonize the whole of Taiwan (only some parts of western Taiwan were under the Dutch’s effective governance), and its colonization did not last long (1624 -
1662). However, the period Dutch colonization brought Taiwan into a complicated web of global forces. This was the reason why those from other countries came to Taiwan to found settlements. Chinese immigrants, Japanese merchants, indigenous peoples and communities, and Spanish and Dutch soldiers allied with, and competed against, others in Taiwan in order to thrive and survive, even though Taiwan remained under Dutch control. Basically, Taiwan was in the condition of Dutch-Chinese co-colonization, and this condition of co-colonization paved the way for Taiwan’s future development (Andrade 2008).

Being defeated by the Qing (Ch’ing) Manchurians in China, Koxinga, the self-proclaimed loyalist of the Ming Chinese Dynasty, brought his fleet and troops to Taiwan and expelled the Dutch. Koxinga colonized only part of the island, and this partial colonization did not last long. His kingdom was replaced by the Qing dynasty in 1683. During the Qing Empire’s reign (1683-1895), a large number of Han immigrants, the Hoklo and the Hakka, moved to Taiwan. In the early stage of Han Chinese immigration during the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries, most Han immigrants were male. During that period of time there were cultural and inter-marriage at work, and the result was that Han identity gradually became common among indigenous communities of the plains (Brown 2004). In other words, nowadays many people who identify themselves as Han or Hoklo/Hakka are actually
of indigenous descent. Moreover, many cultural traits and practices that are considered Han or Chinese are in fact the results of indigenous cultural influence, as Melissa Brown (Ibid.) suggests. The descendants of those Han immigrants and local indigenous people have come to identify themselves as Taiwanese or *daiwanlang*, a political identity distinct from the post-1945 wave of Chinese immigrants to Taiwan (known as *waishengren*).

In addition, ever since the Qing dynasty, the official bureaucracies of the various regimes in Taiwan have had dual systems of governance to deal with indigenous and non-indigenous affairs. Rather than an exploitative relationship between indigenous people and the government, the Qing Chinese government took a “rationally calculated policy of indirect control and quarantine” to govern indigenous affairs in Taiwan, the Chinese empire’s new frontier (Shepherd 1993:21). This means that indigenous people were not completely exploited and marginalized. Systems of household registration, taxation, civil law, and public health imposed on the non-Sinicized indigenous peoples were different from the systems applied to other nationals. However, the state power of the Qing dynasty did not reach Falangaw until 1876, twenty years before China ceded Taiwan to Japan after the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895.

Japan was the first modern regime to govern Taiwan. The Japanese government
adopted a dualistic way of governance as well. But what distinguished the Japanese government from its predecessor was that, unlike Qing Chinese government’s governance by vassalage, the Japanese government sent policemen, officials, and teachers to almost every corner of Taiwan, including indigenous communities. The purpose of this was to establish a connected bureaucratic authority (Nagata 1995:78), which made the Japanese governance modern and effective. The Japanese government also spent time and resources on constructing colonial knowledge by conducting ethnological studies and physical assessments. The Japanese period was the first time a government regime in Taiwan had managed and exploited indigenous bodies. For example, the indigenous population was employed militarily as “a wall” to safeguard the empire, as Lamlo put it. Indigenous singing was used as a tool to consolidate peoples of different backgrounds in Japanese-controlled territories during wartime (Wang 2008:72). And baseball was promoted to tame the “barbarity” of the indigenes (Hsieh 2012: 182).

After World War Two, the Kuomingtang (KMT, or the Chinese Nationalist Party) government took over Taiwan from Japan. The KMT skillfully manipulated local social organizations like clans, local factions, and farmer and fishermen associations, as political means to control Taiwan (Bosco 1994; Tsai and Chang 1994). Moreover, the KMT government promoted its assimilation (Sinicization) policies zealously. For
example, the government forced indigenous schoolchildren to speak Mandarin, summoned indigenous adults to government offices, and gave them Chinese names and surnames based on the Chinese patrilineal descent principle. This latter intervention brought about a change in Falangaw Amis people’s matrilocal social structure.

In the late KMT period (1990-2000, 2008-present) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) period (2000-2008), indigenous people were incorporated into a new bureaucratic system. As I mentioned above, in both the Qing and Japanese colonial periods indigenes were governed under a dualistic system, in which they were called fan (番) or ban nin (蕃人), meaning barbarians. Later, after 1945, with the advent of the KMT government, indigenous people were called shandi tongbao (山地同胞) or “siblings living in the mountains.” Their indigenous status was not officially recognized until 1994.\(^1\) The constitution of the Republic of China was amended in 1994 and the term yuanzhumin (indigenes) replaced shandi tongbao in the constitution. Subsequently, the KMT and DPP governments founded two ministries for indigenous

\(^1\) The creation of 30 mountain townships, the quota for members of the provincial assembly, the separate land regime, etc., all indicate that their special legal status was not only recognized by, but in fact created by the state well before 1994. However, what I want to acknowledge here is that native people in Taiwan before 1994 were categorized as a branch of tongbao (sibling or fellow national) under the Chinese nation or zhonghua minzu (中華民族), not as indigenes genetically and culturally different from zhonghua minzu.
communities (1996) and the Hakka (2001) in the central government. The purpose of these ministries was to deal with minority affairs, cultural and economic developments, media, and human rights. Taiwan Indigenous Television, for example, was founded with government financial support after the establishment of these ministries of indigenous affairs. In 2005, the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law was promulgated. This law established a clear definition of indigenous peoples, guaranteed indigenous reserves, protected traditional indigenous territories and ways of life, provided for indigenous people’s right of access to the media and right to self-governance, and required the government to maintain agencies at the central and local government level that were in charge of indigenous people’s economic and cultural affairs. With the promulgation of this law, indigenous people’s legal status was further confirmed and an indigenous citizenship parallel to other nationals was established. Since this law has come into effect, indigenous people across Taiwan have developed a stronger indigenous consciousness.  

2 The 2005 Basic Law can be termed a milestone for indigenous rights in Taiwan. However, many things in Falangaw concerning the revitalization of culture and tradition, as presented in later chapters, happened before the promulgation of this law. Harvest festivals after 2005 did not change significantly. While I was conducting fieldwork in Falangaw, I rarely heard discussions about the influence of this law for the Amis. This was partly because very few Falangaw Amis were involved in movements for indigenous rights. They instead practiced traditional ways of life such as hunting, fishing, killing pigs and sharing pork in election campaigns. However, in early 2015, some of my informants began to pay
Yet, the most significant changes that differentiate these recent years from previous periods are democratization and privatization. After the death of Chiang Ching-guo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, Lee Teng-hui succeeded in the presidency in 1988 and later became Taiwan’s first popularly elected president in 1996. Lee lifted almost all bans on political affairs and privatized most government-run business, including those related to gasoline, steel, telecommunications, and the postal service. He also lifted certain restrictions on investment and natural resource exploitation. Despite having different political stances, Lee’s successors, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, have basically followed this same path of privatization. Thus, in the name of democracy and liberalization, successive governments have, since 1990, yielded some power to the market. This neoliberal transformation can also be seen in the Taiwan government’s culture policies. For example, the Integrated Community Construction Program or Shequ Zongti Yingzao (社區總體營造) was put to practice in 1994. Originally aimed at addressing the economic disparity between rural and urban areas and at helping communities integrate their people, culture, history, environment and economy, this plan has since been transformed into a project of neoliberalism (Hsiao attention to the issue of reclaiming traditional territory, which is a key issue in the 2005 Basic Law and has become important for most Taiwan’s indigenous communities (excluding Falangaw). In other words, the 2005 Basic Law is meaningful and its impact has been significant among indigenous Taiwan communities. In Falangaw, however, its influence is not yet obvious.
2012). By neoliberalism, I mean that the government has used this program to inculcate communities with the idea that happiness is best achieved as self-supporting actors operating in the context of a free market and a decentralized state. In practice, the state apparatus has delegated some of its power to local associations, whether organized by local people or (sometimes) by outsiders. The program has served to highlight certain indigenous cultural traits. Culture has become a business managed by private organizations, with government just watching and providing a minimum level of financial subsidization. The hope is that the affected communities will turn their cultures into commodities that they can then sell (Huang 2007:6). In later chapters, I will outline how some Falangaw Amis have become involved in this neoliberal trend, with different roles taken on by people of different social strata.

Taiwan is an island renowned for its economic and democratic achievements. There are, however, very few other countries in the world which have caused as much misunderstanding and confusion as has Taiwan. Being a mid-sized country, Taiwan’s population is now over 23 million. In 2013, the country had the twentieth largest economy in the world, with large-scale exports of computers and other high-tech electronics. Taiwan is democratic polity with its own president, but has been shunned

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3 The meaning of neoliberalism is also close to Nikolas Rose’s idea of “advanced liberal democracy” (Rose 2006).
for over 40 years by almost every major international institution, including the United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Internationally, the country is known as Taiwan, but its official name is the Republic of China (ROC). Few states have official diplomatic relations with the ROC, despite the fact that most of these states maintain (informal) political and economic relations with the country. After World War II, Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces, who then entrusted the Chiang Kai-shek government with political authority over the Taiwan. As a result, the Chinese re-asserted colonial authority over Taiwan beginning in 1945. In other words, Taiwan has never been part of People’s Republic of China (PRC). To most of the world, Taiwan remains in a liminal space—lacking de jure international status for over three decades, yet still operating as an independent state. “Few political entities,” Cooper (2009: 249) writes, “have ever been regarded simultaneously as a pariah and role model, a sovereign nation-state and a part of a major power.” Taiwan is a land of contradiction and an outcast in the global world.

To understand Taiwan’s international status, some major events after 1945 must be introduced. Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, and after World War II the Republic of China (not the People’s Republic of China founded on the mainland in 1949) took over control of Taiwan from Japan. Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government
waged a civil war against Mao Zedong’s CCP (Chinese Communist Party) troops. All China at the time, together with Taiwan, was in turmoil. Such chaos led to the tragic 228 Incident of 1947, and other subsequent events of state violence known collectively as the White Terror, including when the KMT government lost control of China and brought 2 million soldiers and civilians to Taiwan in 1949.\footnote{The 228 Incident occurred on February 28, 1947, in Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan. Two Chinese policemen banned smuggled cigarette vendors on that day, and a Taiwanese woman was arrested and hit violently by the policemen. People gathered to condemn the policemen. The policemen shot the crowd and caused one death. This accident escalated quickly and became island-wide protests against the KMT government and Chinese immigrants who came to Taiwan after 1945. From China the government dispatched regiments of soldiers to Taiwan and butchered some twenty thousand people in the following years because the government suspected that “the rioters” had connections with the Chinese Communist Party. This event became one of the most significant events in Taiwan’s modern history. Not only did it initiate a series of KMT government’s White Terror oppressions toward disobedient and suspected civilians. It also has become one of the sources of Taiwanese Independence. Although most of indigenous people were not involved in 228 Event, it did make the regime take some specific measures of governance toward all the peoples living in Taiwan. For example, martial law and curfew were put to practice from 1949 to 1987, indigenous people were forbidden to approach some mountain and seashore areas if they did not get the official approval in advance.} To put down popular Taiwanese resistance, the KMT government massacred 28 thousand people, on the grounds that they were communists or communist sympathizers, and implemented a 38-year-long period (1949-1987) of martial law. Hence, in the first three decades of KMT rule in Taiwan, the population was under heavy government surveillance. Later, in the 1970s, the international community officially recognized the
People’s Republic of China, while most countries and international organizations, including the United Nations, followed the One China Policy, and broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan (the Republic of China).

I argue that the KMT regime is essentially a polity of exiles. This means that it was initially composed of the massive immigrant population who fled from China in 1949. As a consequence, the KMT regime is not internally coherent and its deployment of power has been uneven. Only a few of the Chinese elite and state officials in Taipei held real power. Much of the rest were from the middle class, including government officials, teachers, military officers. Some members of these latter groups were marginalized politically, such as the veterans who were living in marginal regions close to indigenous communities. Furthermore, in order to cope with the Chinese civil war and the global cold war, the KMT regime operated under emergency conditions from 1949 to 1987. During that 38-year-long period of martial law, the longest period of martial law ever practiced in the world, the Constitution was suspended and, in its place, an illegal law, known as the *Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion*, which contradicted the constitution, was promulgated. Under these emergency conditions, the term *tongbao* (siblings) became widely used in KMT propaganda to unite the whole country. The government used this term in reference to the two-million Chinese
refugees who had gone into exile in Taiwan in 1949 (tongbao, siblings, 同胞), the Han Taiwanese (taiwan tongbao, siblings of Taiwan, 台灣同胞), the Chinese living under the rule of Mao’s regime talu tongbao (siblings of mainland China, 大陸同胞), and the indigenous people of Taiwan (shandi tongbao, siblings living in mountain, 山地同胞; or shanbao, 山胞). However, the terminological distinction between the racially and politically neutral tongbao and the special taiwan tongbao together with the shandi tongbao revealed the secret the regime was trying to hide: racial politics in Taiwan remained the same after the Chinese KMT government took over.

**Indigenous People and the State in Taiwan**

Based on the short introduction presented above, we know that Taiwan, an island little known to the world before the seventeenth century, was inhabited by indigenous (Austronesian) peoples. Since the advent of the various government regimes that have ruled Taiwan, conflicts between indigenous people and the colonizers have occurred frequently. Thus, the governance and management of the indigenes has always been an important issue to all of these government regimes, especially those of the Qing and the Japanese.

Indigenous peoples’ resistance to the colonial powers reached a climax in the Japanese period. Many indigenous peoples, including the Amis (but not the Falangaw Amis), engaged in armed struggles with Japanese policemen and troops and many of
these indigenous people were slaughtered. Such experiences were not rare for Taiwanese indigenes, and memories of such experiences have played a part in the flourishing of indigenous movements since the late 1980s. These movements have concerned many aspects of indigenous rights, including the Name-Correcting Movement (正名運動), the Request-of-Land-Return-to-Indigenous-People Movement (還我土地運動), and some movements concerning environmental protection. The Falangaw Amis, however, did not get involved in resistance to the state, and most of the Falangaw Amis have been absent from turbulent movements. While not all indigenous communities have had the same historical experiences, for most indigenous communities in Taiwan the state is perceived as alien and hostile. In this regard, Falangaw is an exception. As example of this exceptional attitude towards the state occurred when, in 2009, some filmmakers planned to produce a movie about the life history of Kulas Mahengheng, the legendary Amis headman (see chapter 5). At the time, the Mahengheng’s family stressed to the filmmakers that the film should not focus on the conflict between the regime and the indigenous people, but instead on Kulas Mahengheng’s contributions to peace between them. The unique political perspective of the Falangaw Amis, as compared to other indigenous communities in Taiwan, can here be glimpsed.

As to the issue of concrete civil rights, such as suffrage, in Taiwan, elections of
county councilors (in the local government) and legislators (in the central government) have quotas for indigenes. Indigenous peoples are classified into two categories, one being shandi yuanzhumin or Mountain Indigenes, the other being pingdi yuanzhumin or Plains Indigenes. The Amis Tribe belongs to the latter. There are some differences between the Mountain Indigene districts and the Plains Indigene districts. For example, in Mountain Indigenes townships, mayoral candidates must be indigenous, whereas in Plains Indigene districts Han candidates are allowed to contest this office. In Mountain Indigene districts and some of Plains Indigene districts (excluding urbanized districts) land cannot be freely transacted. This means that indigenous people are legally protected from losing their land to the Han. Falangaw, however, is one of the few exceptions to this, meaning that the Han can move into this indigenous territory and purchase real estates. The problem of land loss in Falangaw will be discussed in chapter 5.

**The Falangaw Amis**

Who are the Falangaw Amis? Let me begin by a song. *Enigma*, a German rock band, issued an album in 1993, which included the song *Return to Innocence*. To compose this song, the band made use of a recording of some indigenous peoples of Taiwan singing, but without informing any of the Amis singers whose voice was included on the recording. After its release, the song became very popular around the
world; it was ranked the fourth most popular song in 1994 by American Billboard Magazine. This recording that has been used had come from Falangaw.

The Amis people felt angry about the plagiarism and planned to sue this band. Two years later, when *Return to Innocence* was adopted as the theme song for the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, some of the Amis singers undertook legal proceedings to sue Electric and Musical Industries Ltd (EMI), which had produced the album. In the end, the Amis accepted a settlement out of court. After this event, Difang, the Amis singer of the original song, became a legendary figure in Taiwan. Many people in Taiwan treated him as an icon of Taiwan’s pristine culture and a bridge linking Taiwan with the rest of the world.

The Amis, an Austronesian speaking indigenous people or “Tribe,” live in eastern Taiwan. The Falangaw Amis, one of the biggest Amis communities, reside in Malan (Mandarin) or Falangaw (Amis), Taitung city, Taitung County. (Fig. 1.1)⁵

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⁵ All figures (maps, genealogies, and photographs) included in this dissertation have been drawn or taken by myself, unless otherwise specified.
Traditionally most Falangaw Amis people were farmers and fishermen growing rice and fishing for subsistence. The term the Amis people use for community is *niyaro’*, which means a social space within the confines of rail fences. The boundary between themselves and outsiders was obvious.

Since 1960, however, a large number of Han immigrants (Hoklo and Hakka) have moved into the Amis’ traditional territory, and gradually boundary between the Amis and others has become blurred. The meaning of *niyaro’* (*buluo* in Mandarin) has shifted from the confines of a certain social space to a noun denoting a group of people. Having no choice, many Amis sold their land to the intruders, and moved
outside of Falangaw. Some indigenous communities who had left Falangaw established themselves elsewhere. Some of them even exiled themselves to metropolises, like Taipei or Kaohsiung, and became wage laborers, or took work on ocean-going fishing vessels.

According to official statistics, the population in Taiwan is 23.3 million. Out of this total population, 2.26% (520,440 people) is indigenous. The Han (including the Han Chinese, or waishengren, and the Han Taiwanese, or daiwanlang) comprise 97.74% of the population. Another 81.1% is comprised of the so-called Taiwanese or daiwanlang (Hoklo 67.5%, Hakka 13.6%). The remaining 16.6% is waishengren, or Chinese immigrants who arrived in Taiwan during the civil war in China (1945-1949). The Amis, with a population of 191,399, is the largest indigenous group in Taiwan, and Falangaw is one of the largest Amis communities (Fig. 1.2).

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6 This statistic information can be found at: http://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.html?CID=940F9579765AC6A0&DID=0C3331F0EBD318C2EAD1674ED7694878

7 There are sixteen officially recognized Indigenous Tribes or 原住民族 in Taiwan. They are: Amis, Atayal, Paiwan, Bunun, Tsou, Rukai, Puyuma, Saisiyat, Yami, Thao, Kavalan, Truku, Sakizaya, Sediq, Hla'alua, and Kanakanavu. About the distribution of all the ethnic groups of Taiwan (some of them do not exist now), please see figure 1.2.
Falangaw is located in Taitung City, the capital city of Taitung County, which has a population of 107,027. Under the city government is an administrative unit called li (borough). The lizhang, or borough president, is the lowest-level elected official. There are 46 lis in Taitung City. Today there are two meanings for the name Falangaw. First, Falangaw, in a narrow sense, refers to the original niyaro' founded by Kulas Mahengheng in 1875, which now has a population of 2,262 who live mainly in Malan li, Zhongxin li, and Xinshen li. Second, Falangaw, in a broad sense, refers to a social group rather than a place, and includes all of the satellite communities living in most
of the city’s boroughs, and has a total a population of 11,330. This demographic information suggests that a huge social change has happened in Falangaw: over 90% of Falangaw people have moved into satellite communities during the past fifty years (Lee 2007:110).

Fig. 1.3  The locations of Falangaw and its satellite communities

The Amis were matrilocal before the 1970s, which means that a man moved out of his mother’s house and married into his wife’s. This does not mean that men were of low social status. On the contrary, all public and political affairs are carried out by men. This is because finawlan or masakaputay, the age-sets that deal with such affairs, are exclusively for men. In other words, marininaay, or matrilocal kinship,

8 Those satellite communities are Matang, Arapanay, Asiloay, Ining, Apapuro, Posong, Fukid, Ciodingan (Fig. 1.3). The unpublished demographic statistics about Falangaw and its surrounding communities were obtained from the Taitung city government in 2012.
operates outside of the public sphere and is opposite or complementary to men’s
*fina wlan* (Huang 1989). Within *marininaay*, the oldest woman is the head of the
household, but actually the faki or uncle (MB) holds the power to do rituals in the
house and make decisions for his nephews and nieces.

The working of the age-sets demonstrates the basic political structure of an Amis
community, and the names of age-sets reveal their perception of time, memory and
history (Huang 1999:486; 2004:322). Age-set names are given as means to record
the most important events happening during the preceding three years. Interpreting the
signifiers of the age-set system can shed light on Amis conceptions of time and history.
For example, the names given in more distant decades, or in the time before the
arrival of the modern state, all pertain to events related to community affairs, such as
“gamble,” “mountain,” and “bear”. The names of age-sets given in more recent years,
such as “railway,” “iron bridge,” “governor,” and “Tinko,” concern events that having
something to do with external (state, material, and global) forces. These names,

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9 Unlike Polynesian chiefs who succeed on the basis of ascribed status, an Amis headman achieved his
leadership or won public recognition because of his economic ability and capability of persuasion and

10 Names like “railway” and “iron bridge” mean modern traffic constructions completed and connected
Falangaw with the external world around the 1950s. “Governor”, as an age-set name, was given to
record the history of the Japanese governor’s inspection tour to Falangaw in 1905. “Tinko” was used in
1960 because the legendary athlete Tinko (楊傳廣, see below), the ROC’s first Olympic (silver) medal

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moreover, are not just terms. Every member of an age-set carries the history or the historical connotation of their age-set name until the end of his life.

Another problem worth mentioning concerns land and migration. All the ethnographic accounts published before 2000 say that the people of Falangaw originated from the place where they now live (Hsu 1956, Sayama 2000[1913], Utsurikawa, Miyamoto, Mabuchi 1935). However, my Falangaw Amis informants claimed that originally their ancestors came from elsewhere. In their new narrative of origin, their ancestors were from the southernmost point of Taiwan (Palidaw) and moved northward, step by step, they emphasized, until they arrived in Falangaw, where they now live. After arriving in Falangaw, some Amis people, according to this new narrative, kept moving northward and formed other Amis communities north of Falangaw (Feng 2000:135). It should be noted here that Falangaw is actually the southernmost and biggest Amis community in Taiwan, and the Falangaw Amis people believe that they are the most original, senior (oldest), and the purest, compared to other Amis communities. This southern origin narrative appeared for first time when the external state and global forces entered into their community.

As for their religious life, Falangaw Amis people have traditionally practiced animism. In this traditional religion, one of the major figures is dongi, the goddess of winner, was from Falangaw.
birth and procreation. The basic structure of their religious life did not change until the coming of the Japanese period.

During the late stage of the Japanese colonial period, the Amis were encouraged to practice Japanese Shintōism, the state religion of Japan, which functioned for political control during World War II. Although some Amis did practice Shintō rituals, this alien religion did not cause a significant change in their religious life. One reason for this is that, unlike Christian missions, Shintōism was not religiously autonomous. Instead, it was fully controlled by the government. This is the reason why the worship of Shintō disappeared as soon as the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945. However, being a ritual of the state, Shintōism did leave Falangaw with a legacy in the construction of their self-image, which will be discussed in chapter 3.

After 1945, some Falangaw people started to adopt from the Han the cult of Wangye (Royal Lord), Yuanshuai (Marshals or Generals), Taizi (Prince), and the belief in Jinmuniang (Golden Mother Queen). All of these cults are minor branches of Han Taoism (Daoism) which emphasizes a (female) shaman’s direct communication with Heaven through ecstatic trances (Fig.1.4). All the names of these deities, such as Wangye, Yuangshuai, Taizi, and Niangniang, are official titles from the Chinese imperial dynasties. Through these religious practices, the pre-modern Chinese state and traditional Chinese celestial order can be imagined.
Fig. 1.4 An Amis Taoist shaman and Amis Taoist believers

Most of indigenous people in Taiwan converted to Christianity and Catholicism after the Second World War. However, this is not the case in Falangaw. The majority of Falangaw Amis people practice Han Taoism, in which Wangye and Jinmuniang are the two main deities that they worship. The Taoist practices in Falangaw are in fact a form of religious syncretism. Although Amis believers and shamans wear Taoist costumes and speak Mandarin, they practice rituals using their mother tongue and view Jinmuniang as *dogi* in private. The reason of their unique conversion to Han Taoism is not yet clear, but one of the key persons of their conversion was Tinko, the legendary athlete and later a Taoist shaman. Tinko believed that it was the deity who chose him and made him the winner of the Olympic Games and the hero of both the Amis and the whole country.

A brief history of the Falangaw Amis’ encounter with different government regimes needs to be introduced here. Before 1875 or before the arrival of Qing Chinese and
Japanese colonialist powers, the Falangaw Amis were both culturally and politically autonomous, and their life experiences were confined to their own community. Informants recollected that their ancestors did not have to pay tax to the government and had no idea about *modern* ethnicity.\(^{11}\) After 1875, the Qing Chinese government only demanded that the Amis acknowledge the sovereignty of the Qing state. Aside from this, no modern state regulations were deployed at the time among the Amis. During the Qing Chinese period, Kulas Mahengheng, the great headman, was assigned the role of headman of all Amis communities. This was because Falangaw was the largest Amis community at that time and the government office was set just next to Falangaw (Wang 1998:71) (Fig. 1.5).

\(^{11}\) The central mountain range divides Taiwan into two parts. Unlike western Taiwan that has been controlled by different regimes for over four centuries, the eastern part was not penetrated by state powers before 1875. Before the advent of the Qing Chinese regime, the Amis had their own identity to distinguish themselves and other indigenous communities; such identity was different from the modern identity or ethnicity imposed upon by modern governments. Exploring the dialogical and negotiable processes and the results of the imposition is one of the aims of this research.
This was the first time that the Falangaw Amis experienced the state, and it shaped their basic mode of reaction to foreign state powers. At the time, the Falangaw Amis learned the necessity of connecting with bureaucratic institutions. This was the reason why, after China ceded Taiwan to Japan, Kulas Mahengheng and his fellows voluntarily led Japanese troops into Taitung and sent their men, together with Puyuma people, to attack Qing Chinese guerrilla forces.\textsuperscript{12} Given that in the periods of both the Qing Chinese (1875-1895) and the Japanese colonization (1896-1945) there was

\footnote{After being defeated by the Japanese, the Qing Chinese regular troops later became guerrilla forces fighting against the Japanese in Taitung (Wang 1998: 312, 444-448).}
scarcely any significant power, such as capitalist or religious institutions, mediating between local indigenous groups and the governmental institutions, state power directly penetrated into the locality of eastern Taiwan.\(^{13}\)

After 1895, the Japanese colonized and governed Taiwan more directly and effectively than did the Qing Chinese government. The most crucial difference between Qing Chinese and Japanese rule for indigenous people was the making of a modern ethnic identity, a specifically ethnic minority identity subjugated by the modern state. No sooner had the Japanese colonial regime occupied Taiwan than Japanese authorities began classifying indigenous peoples. As a consequence, Falangaw Amis have since that time been taught to regard themselves as *ban nin* (蕃人), a new political identity that was assigned by the state.

The tactics used by Japanese colonial authorities were not abstract. For example, forty years after the Japanese colonized Taiwan, the Japanese governor-general invited the country’s indigenous peoples, including the Falangaw Amis, to visit Taipei. There they were shown the things of colonial modernity, like naval vessels, modern

\(^{13}\) According to Shih’s studies (1976, 1986), the Falangaw Amis were highly Sinicized or enculturated by Han culture, which was why the Amis did not accept Christianity. However, Shih’s theory says little about why there were hardly any religious groups existing and mediating between the central government and the locality. The Falangaw Amis was one of the earliest indigenous peoples to make contact with the Han and to accept Han Taoism, and Christianity did not arrived in eastern Taiwan until the 1950s. This could be the main reason why today most Falangaw Amis are not Christians.
buildings, trains, and zoos. After returning to Falangaw, the eldest men decided to name the newest age-set “la Taypak”, meaning the Team of Taypak (Taipei), as a way to commemorate this extraordinary experience.

Moreover, to the Japanese colonizers the indigenous people of Taiwan were *ban nin* or “barbarians”. Barbarity here meant both uncivilized and energetic. Two plans were put to work to govern and utilize the physical power of the indigenous people and civilize their “barbarity”. One of these was to have young indigenous people, mostly males, conscripted or hired as coolies. Many infrastructure projects in eastern Taiwan were the results of indigenous labor during that time period, and this remains one of the most vivid memories that Amis people have about the Japanese. The other plan was to promote sports in school as a way to tame indigenous “barbarity”. The Falangaw Amis tradition of sports (especially baseball) can thus be traced back to the Japanese period.

After World War II, Taiwan became the Republic of China, controlled by the KMT. Unlike the Japanese, who divided and ruled the country’s ethnic groups and left the social structures of indigenous communities basically intact, the KMT government adopted an assimilationist policy. Under this policy, external political and economic forces entered some indigenous communities, resulting in the indigenous people of

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14 In Falangaw, there were two age-sets named la Kuli and la Tifu (*kuli* and *tifu* mean coolie and dike).
Falangaw losing their land and means of production. As noted earlier, after losing their land, many Falangaw people scattered and formed satellite communities around Falangaw or became wage laborers in big cities.

Affected by the currents of both alienation and global connection, some Amis came to think that they needed heroes. They found two. One of these was the legendary historical figure, Kulas Mahengheng, a headman who had cooperated with two colonial regimes (the Qing and the Japanese) in leading his followers on a march northward to other Amis communities in order to pacify riots.\textsuperscript{15} That is why in Falangaw, Mahengheng is regarded as the founding father of the Amis Tribe. My informants even argued that “We Falangaw people always think we are the leader among all the Amis communities because we are the most advanced and the strongest.”

\textsuperscript{15} Mahengheng and his entourage had marched northward to fulfill the task the Qing and the Japanese governments had entrusted to him. The first march happened during the 1880s, when the power of the Qing Empire was just entering eastern Taiwan. His last, and most significant, march was in 1900 (Wang 1998:414). This last march was significant because the Japanese magistrate accompanied him. Sagara Chotsuna (相良長綱), the newly arrived Japanese magistrate, sought to control other indigenous communities using Mahengheng’s reputation and influence. By so doing, the Amis communities, originally scattered and autonomous, were connected together and a common community of all the Amis became imaginable. After completing this task, Mahengheng and his followers returned to Falangaw. Today, in the memory of some Falangaw Amis people, it was because of Mahengheng’s marches that many other Amis communities and the modern Amis Tribe were founded.
The other hero of the Amis was the recently deceased legendary athlete, Tinko (Yang Chuan-guang or 楊傳廣, 1933-2007), who won the ROC’s first Olympic (silver) medal and broke the world record for the decathlon at the 1960 Summer Olympics in Rome. Both Mahengheng’s and Tinko’s achievements had been ignored in Falangaw for a long time, but today they are officially and openly commemorated.\(^\text{16}\) Outside of Falangaw, two new roads traversing the city are named Kulas Mahengheng’s great achievements had been forgotten by the Falangaw Amis because, according to some elderly informants, people were afraid of being haunted by land/space spirits. Falangaw Amis believe that, since historical events must have happened somewhere on the land, mentioning the names of the deceased or narrating historical events will summon unexpected spirits. This is why Falangaw Amis regard some things related to the land as taboo (Feng 2000). Today, however, Kulas Mahengheng and Tinko are openly commemorated. Mahengheng assumed the position of community leader when he was in his early twenties. An informant told me that Mahengheng’s taking of this position was exceptional because, according to the Amis cultural scheme, or their idea of hierarchy and seniority, a kapah, or a young man from the age of 18 to 40, cannot assume or would not be assigned the role of kakita’an (headman). I was told that Mahengheng’s inauguration in his early twenties was forgotten or seldom mentioned in Falangaw before the 1990s because it was a cultural exception to the Amis. Today, however, Falangaw Amis like to discuss all of the legendary events concerning Mahengheng. They explain that Mahengheng’s great achievements helped raise Falangaw’s global status in a newer and bigger hierarchical system. Here we see that cultural schemes are not fixed. Rather, they are negotiable products of social practice. As for Tinko, his achievements were “neglected” not “forgotten”. Tinko (1933-2007) died a few years ago. After retiring, he spent most of his time training athletes in the U.S., Taipei, and Kaohsiung, rather than practicing the activities as his age-set fellows in Falangaw. His achievements were not commonly mentioned to strangers. In Falangaw, too much indulgence in self-admiration is considered inappropriate. Such a mentality arguably has to do with Falangaw people’s concept of the person, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

\(^\text{16}\) Kulas Mahengheng’s great achievements had been forgotten by the Falangaw Amis because, according to some elderly informants, people were afraid of being haunted by land/space spirits.
after Kulas Mahengheng and Tinko. While inside Falangaw, Tinko and Mahengheng were adopted as the names of the newly initiated age-sets in 1961 and 2001, respectively (Fig. 1.6 and 1.7).

Fig. 1.6  Tinko’s house in Falangaw.

Fig. 1.7  Tinko and President Chiang Kai-shek. Courtesy of Informant Yang
Deng-shang.

In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election and became the ruling party of Taiwan until 2008.\textsuperscript{17} Declaring itself both Taiwanese and democratic, the DPP was eager to fully demonstrate its Taiwanese identity. The DPP initiated a program to enhance indigenous culture as a way to achieve the goal of state formation from the perspective of Taiwanese nationalism. The President and senior officials visited indigenous communities, including Falangaw, and indigenous dancing and singing could often be seen and heard quite in official celebrations and on TV programs. Old memories and anecdotes, such as those of Kulas Mehengheng, were resurrected and retold in Falangaw. Furthermore, President Chen Shui-bian’s birth year (1951) and that of la Contong\textsuperscript{18} Age-set members is the same. Chen was therefore invited to become a member of this age-set when visiting Taitung City.

\textbf{Amis Studies in Taiwan}

In Amis studies, there has not been much literature discussing the state and its

\textsuperscript{17} Unlike the KMT and other political parties in Taiwan, basically most members of the DPP are Taiwanese (the Hoklo and the Hakka), and this party promotes social welfare, multiculturalism and Taiwanese nationalism. Nonetheless, the KMT won the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012 and regained the power.

\textsuperscript{18} President Chiang Kai-shek inspected Taitung in 1965. To commemorate this event, the newest age-set of that year was named la Contong, or the Team of the President. Here la is a definite article to be put in front of age-set names.
effect. In Taiwan, scholars have traditionally understood indigenous communities as either being transformed by external forces or retaining a static cultural core. For example, in Lei Shih’s account, the Falangaw Amis people accepted Taoism, the Han religion, because they were Sinicized. He used the concept of acculturation to describe the process of social transformation (Shih 1976, 1989). From this viewpoint, the role of the state is very thin, and indigenous culture is unable to react to external forces. In other words, according to this viewpoint, indigenous people can do nothing but accept external forces in a process of acculturation.

Shiun-wey Huang’s ethnographic accounts (2005a, 2005b) of Iwan (or Sa’aniwan), an Amis community 60 kilometers north of Falangaw, describes how an indigenous community has been influenced by modern governing powers. In these accounts, Huang discusses crucial social and cultural changes that were caused by state regulations. These changes relate to the shift from millet cultivation to rice cultivation; the function of schools, police stations, and government-censored organizations like Seinenkai (the Youth’s Association) in the Japanese colonial period; important community leaders and their activities; and the government’s redrawing of administrative boundaries, which has influenced regional politics. Huang discusses government influence at length, but he takes both the state and the community for granted. He does not tell the reader how the state works in symbolic ways. In his work,
“the state” means the government or state apparatus. Huang sees things from a top-down perspective, and he discusses mostly state policy and regulation. Readers cannot find in his work much discussion about the symbolic power of the state and the connection between state regulation and local cultural logics. Huang takes the state for granted, without questioning its legitimacy or foundation.

**Kinship**

Most scholars have identified the Amis as matrilineal (Mabuchi 1974: 57-58; Shih 1976: 103; Wei 1986:118). However, some scholars have proposed that traditional Amis communities could not have been matrilineal and should instead be regarded as home-based societies practicing uxorilocal marriages (Chen 1986; Suenari 2007[1983]). Other scholars have argued that sibling relationships, especially the brother-sister dyad, could be the key idiom in Amis kinship, or at least a very crucial one in an Amis family (Chang 1987; Lo 2000).

Those scholars who have argued that the Amis should identified as matrilineal are in fact discussing the relationship between generations in a given family. Those scholars who have emphasized the importance of sibling relationships are actually highlighting power relations in the same generation in an Amis family. However, to better understand social change in Falangaw, it would be better to combine these two groups of analysis. Doing so helps explain the transformation in post-marital residence (from
uxorilocal to virilocal, which has misunderstood as a transformation from matrilineality to patrilineality) as well as the shift in power relations between brothers and sisters in Falangaw Amis families. In chapter 4, I build on the insights of these other scholars, using my own fieldwork to explore these transformations as an outcome of interactions between state regulation and the local kinship system.

Social Organizations

In some work within the field of Amis studies, scholars have discussed kinship, religion, and social organization separately, seeing each of these as functioning independently. For example, in Lei Shih’s account (Shih 1976), Falangaw Amis people were exposed to Han Taoism, which led to them abandoning their traditional religion and converting to Taoism. This analysis takes a top-down perspective to understand changes in the local community. Religion here seems to exist independently of other social relations.

In such a perspective—where social and cultural phenomena are treated as mutually independent—ethnographers have just described and labeled what they saw during their fieldwork. Hui-lin Wei (1986), for example, classifies Amis age-set systems into two types: the Nanshih type, which uses inherited age-set names, and the Malan type which uses created age-set names. Wen-te Chen (1990) presented the inner structure of the age-set system, showing how each part of an age-set system works, sometimes
in a struggle with other parts. Both Shiun-wei Huang (1989) and Shu-Ling Yeh (2009) have addressed the relationship between different aspects of Amis social organization. Huang argued that by observing the *kiloma’an* (harvest festival), the most important annual Amis ritual, two principal types of relationships buttressing an Amis community can be observed. These are the complementary (kinship) relationships and the hierarchical (age-set) relationships. Yeh argues that in Cidataya, an Amis community some sixty kilometers north of Falangaw, the age-set system should be regarded as part of the Amis kinship system, because in her ethnographic account the age-set system contains a strong image and ideal of *ama* (father).

While social change is the main topic of these works, forms of “social organization”, such as kinship, age-sets, and religion, are still presented as static. These works mention little about state power, thereby neglecting a crucial factor influencing social change. And the concept of “social organization” they employ hinders the demonstration of power relationships, because it treats kinship, religion, and politics separately. Due to this analytical separation, these scholars have difficulty analyzing how power relations connect different forms of social organization. Instead, I propose to use the concept of social relatedness, showing in several of the following chapters how different kinds of social relatedness work together and penetrate each other when faced with state regulation.
**The Harvest Festival**

The Amis are famous for their beautiful dancing and singing performances, which can be seen in the annual rituals and harvest festivals. In Amis studies, most ethnographies of the harvest festival discuss style and social change. Shiun-wei Huang’s account, for example, tells the reader that in annual Amis rituals, complimentary and hierarchical relationships existing in different social organizations, such as female-dominant kinship organization and men’s age-sets, are revealed (Huang 1989). Kuei-chao Huang (1994) classifies the harvest festivals of all Amis communities into five styles. Hui-tuan Chang (1995) argues that from the Japanese period to the post-war era, harvest festivals in Amis communities went through significant changes. These changes mainly involved shifting from an original religion in the early Japanese period to the contemporary expression of cultural and ethnic identity. In these works, the state is not a central concern. The authors have attributed social transformation to modernization, neglecting the crucial factor of state intervention, as well as local people’s responses to, and collaboration with such intervention.

In sum, in the works cited above, discussions of social transformation have either

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19 These five Harvest Festival styles are: the city style, the entertaining style, the joint style, the original style, and the synthetic style (Huang 1994).
neglected the state or have simplified it, treating the state synonymous with policy or regulation. What I seek to do in this dissertation is to take the state into account as a crucial element in explaining how a particular indigenous community has tackled the problems of modernity.

**Fieldwork Process, Strategies, and Content**

Fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted from March 2009 to April 2010. In the first four months of my fieldwork, I lived with na Fasaw, or the Fasaw family, in Fukid. For the remainder of the fieldwork period, I moved in with na Dihal, a family located in the center of Falangaw. As mentioned above, after the urbanization of Taitung City, many Falangaw Amis people were forced to move to satellite or derived communities surrounding Falangaw. Fukid is one of them. Occasionally I went to other derived communities with my informants. For the most of my fieldwork, however, I stayed at Falangaw and Fukid.

Na Fasaw is an ordinary Amis family, which means that no family members ever held important political positions. However, na Fasaw is still somewhat different from other common Amis families. In na Fasaw, Tenngo and Iciang, the couple, were singers who had performed traditional Amis songs in many foreign countries. Na

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20 To protect the privacy of some informants a pseudonym na Fasaw is used. In Amis *na* is a definite article to be put in front of the name of family.
Dihal, named after Dihal, a late kakita’an of Falangaw, is a kakita’an family. During my stay in na Dihal I often visited na Kakita’an (a kakita’an family named after the eminent kakita’an Kulas Mahengheng), who lived quite close to na Dihal. From na Dihal and na Kakita’an I heard kakita’an stories and was told about the connections between the kakita’an families and the governments of different eras. People of na Kakita’an told me how baseball had sprouted eighty years earlier in Falangaw. As both people of na Dihal and na Kakita’an were enthusiastic about politics, I also learned from them much about local politics.

When stepping outside of these families, I spent most of my time with men, especially middle-aged men, rather than women. The reason for this was that the male age-set system was one of the foci of my fieldwork. Female informants with whom I had contact were mostly the women of the three families mentioned above, and wives of the middle-aged men who I knew outside these families. Of all the age-sets, the people of la Congtong were my most frequent informants. La congtong members were born during 1949-1951, and held the most crucial position (itukalay) in the age-set system of Falangaw in 2009-2010.

This thesis is not one of political science or history, but is instead an anthropological study of the state. Instead of evading issues concerning history and the state, this research approaches these issues anthropologically.
Clifford Geertz (1980:5-6) argues that anthropology can offer an ethnographic approach that is different from, but complementary to, studies that employ period and developmental approaches to history.\textsuperscript{21} An ethnographic approach is useful to a study of history because people do not always locate events in the past according to the same sequential or developmental time frame as scholars. They interpret events based on political meanings these events hold for them, flattening the developmental time into synchronic “political time” (Spencer 2007:125). Understanding how contemporary Falangaw people make sense of and make use of the state and its effect is the main goal of this research. Tracing historical processes and reconstructing history are, by contrast, only minor concerns of my study.

Consequently, to employ an ethnographic approach in explaining what local people think about political events, we need to comprehend local cultural logics and socio-cultural structures. That is to say, distinguishing between structure and practice, or between the formal apparatus of power and the implicit structures of everyday practice, serves to clarify the mutually constructive relationships between the two (Comaroff 1984:44,260).

Having introduced above the political history of Taiwan, the relationships between

\textsuperscript{21} The period and developmental approach, to Geertz (1980:5-6), are research approaches dividing history into periods and studying the processive development of the periods. Simply put, these approaches are evolutionary and diachronic in comparison to Geertz’s ethnographic approach.
indigenous people in Taiwan, prior ethnographic studies, the Falangaw Amis, and the fieldwork process, I outline in the following sections the theories of the state and community that I have drawn upon in my research.

The State and its Work

In Chinese, as in English, the word for “state” (guojia) has multiple meanings: 1) the state-apparatus (bureaucracy, institutions, ruling regimes, laws and regulations); and 2) an abstract idea (the nation, country, or nation-state). This latter understanding of the state, as a transcendent and unified site of will and intention, Philip Abrams (1988:82) called the “state-idea”. Following Abrams, I use these two terms (state-apparatus and state-idea) wherever possible, in order to by clear as to which meaning of the state I am referring.

The distinction between the state-idea and the state-apparatus does not, however, contributes not much to an understanding of how the state works. What matters is not just separating the ideological from the real, but examining how the state-idea and the state-apparatus work together. By examining the mutual interaction of the state-idea and the state-apparatus, the meaning and the power of the state can be better grasped.

In the case of the Falangaw Amis, state idea usually means some concepts about the government, bureaucratic institutions, political leaders, officials, the country’s founding father, images of ruling and ruled people and colonial regimes, icons of the
governing power, the relationships between the ruler and the ruled, etc. State system or apparatus mostly means the county government and the city office, and sometimes means the Army, the police, school, the government-sponsored sugar plantation, and official institutions that supported baseball games and stage performance both in the local and central governments, according to various contexts in the following chapters.

In this research, I look at how the state works and influences with examples like genesis stories, baseball, stage performance, harvest festival, and education.

The Falangaw people at the center of my study have experienced the impacts of the state mainly in attempts by the state-apparatus to regulate and direct their daily lives. These are the kinds of interventions explored by James Scott (1990), intended to make populations legible to, and manageable by, the bureaucratic apparatus. As Scott recognizes (Ibid.), responses to these state practices range from resistance to creative adaptation, to deliberately forming connections with elements of the ruling regime. For Falangaw people, such connections have cultural (baseball, singing performance), political (through the headman system and in election campaigns), and social (the age-set system). The Falangaw Amis have also identified themselves with the country (recall Lamlo’s claim that Falangaw people are the wall of the country). And they have developed their own ways of understanding and relating to the state-idea, emulating some of its forms in their origin stories, forms of hierarchy, symbols and
ritual practices.

Indigenous people have occupied various positions in relation to modern nation-states. Indigenous peoples in the world are often classified, envisaged, stigmatized and standardized in hierarchical orders within nation-states (Blum 2001; Ching 2000; Keyes 2002). Indigenous peoples in Taiwan are no exception. When facing the nation-state, they have been targets of social reform. However, in the case of Falangaw, as I show later chapters, indigenous people were not simply targets of state intervention. They actively articulated elements of their own social and cultural life with the powers of the state, defining group boundaries, selecting cultural ideas and practices, and positioning themselves in complicated and provisional relations of powers (cf. Li 2000). In other words, tradition, identity, and indigeneity are not simply inventions; they can be understood as kinds of positioning, or the result contingent and provisional articulations (Ibid.: 152).

In some cases - including in other parts of Taiwan - indigenous people have resisted state projects and have sought to retain their autonomy and cultural distinction. In Falangaw, however, despite episodes of strong state intervention, including severe displacement and loss of land, resistance has not been prominent. The people of Falangaw have attempted to retain their cultural distinction through a different route. They have not claimed, nor aspire to be, an autonomous First Nation. Rather, they
have used state-like symbols to consolidate their own identity, integrate their community and situate themselves as integral parts of the nation-state. They have claimed that the path of harmony and co-existence they have pursued, beginning with their famous ancestor Kulas Mahengheng, offers an example for the integration of diverse peoples in the nation-state of Taiwan.

My main focus in this dissertation is on Falangaw peoples’ experiences of both the state idea and state apparatus in various dimensions, which I outline below. I discuss the design of state policies only briefly, focusing instead on how Falangaw people have experienced and reacted to various schemes that ruling regimes have imposed on them. In making my argument, I build on the work of other scholars who have examined practices of cultural appropriation by indigenous people, as they claim their own viewpoints on citizenship, actively destabilize the meaning of marginality, and ritually improvise their own version of history by using their cultural logic to negotiate with the governing powers and state apparatus (Tsing 1993; Linzinger 2000; Cheung 1996; Comaroff 1984; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993).

**Experiencing the State**

How do we make sense of people’s experiences of state interventions, and their understanding of the state idea? Presenting local people’s *experience* of the state can help make sense of cultural transformation without divorcing the cultural from the
political, the historical from the structural, and reality from imagination. But what is experience? To John Dewey (1938:35-6), experience means something emotional and intellectual, of bodily habit and attitude, which is relevant to the idea of “growing.” It has to be practiced and learned over again. Experience also has to do with social interaction, future imagination, and the construction of the self (Ibid.:44; James 1948:119). Put differently, practice is the bodily experience of the world. Some cognitive anthropologists have suggested that these bodily experiences can be understood as kinds of connection, which they call a cultural schema (Bloch 2002:172-175; D’Andrade 1995:137-141; Ortner 1989). In light of such cultural schemes, we find that human bodily experience, memories, emotions, and institutional or systematic power relations can sometimes connect together in wide-spreading networks. Studying how micro-level practices connect with political economy therefore become possible. For example, Sherry Ortner (1989) has examined how the Sherpa people’s habitual practices and cultural schemes (their kinship structure or competition between brothers) has been connected with the establishment of Buddhist monasteries and the integration of the Sherpas into the state-system of Nepal. In my case, I will show this possibility in chapter three.

When it comes to religious experience, people often feel something higher than themselves (James 1948:123,126), with which they also feel a need to have a sense of
union (Ibid.:139). Such experiences pave establish a foundation for both nationalism
and local people’s own community making. Religious experience (and nationalism),
are routinely expressed in material forms. The materialization of experience or
“structures of feeling” in novels, narratives, and traditional arts is highlight by
Raymond Williams. For Williams, these materializations extend social relations by
reproducing existing models and searching for new articulations (Williams
1977:207-210). The relationships thus created may be with a ruling regime and its
programs, or with the state idea, as displayed in state rituals or spectacles (Geertz
1980; 1983: 144,146). My interest is in how Falangaw people have experienced the
state in both of these aspects, and how they have sought to connect with these aspects
of the state. I build on the work of scholars such as Sharma and Gupta (2006:11), who
examine state spectacles and rituals in order to ask how they are perceived; how
people’s understandings of the state are shaped by their particular locations in respect
to, and encounters with, state processes; and how the seemingly invisible state
manifests itself in people’s lives in both routine and spectacular ways.

One type of experience to which I pay particular attention in this dissertation is the
special or marked event, such as a trip or stage performance. In his contribution to The
Anthropology of Experience, Roger Abrahams (1986) makes the distinction between
mere experience (mundane, everyday, unremarked) and “an” experience
(extraordinary, special, unusual). The latter is understood reflexively as the “experience of experience.” Extraordinary experiences frequently demand the exercise of power and the mobilization of resources. They provide opportunities for re-crafting the self. These two types of experience (ordinary and extraordinary) are in a dynamic relation (Ibid.: 68). When it comes to the state, everyday experience involves practices like mailing letters, paying taxes, applying for official documents, and receiving education. However, events such as performing on special occasions (like official celebrations) fall into the category of the extraordinary experience.

Thesis Outline

I begin this dissertation, in Part 1, “Anchoring the Amis,” by trying to pin down the Falangaw Amis. By pinning down the Amis I mean two things. First, ethnographically and metaphorically, although the Amis have been drifting into cities and other spaces, they have retain certain social activities and significant cultural ideas. These activities and ideas are what I seek to depict in Part 1. They are the foundation for subsequently discussing Amis people’s imaginations of, and experience with, the state idea and state apparatus. Second, I reject certain postmodern arguments that insist that culture is epistemologically unbounded, and thus cannot be studied empirically or represented (cf. Scott 1994:xvii-xxii). Some things that are bounded and crucial, in both the local “native’s” and the ethnographer’s opinion, must be pinned down or anchored.
In chapter 2, “Genesis and Baseball”, I introduce and compare two versions of the Falangaw Amis genesis narrative in order to examine Falangaw people’s basic ideas about originality, sociality, and historicity. Contextualizing and explaining discrepancies between these two genesis narratives sheds light on how modern practices like baseball, a sport promoted by the government, have influenced local people’s ideas about originality, sociality, and historicity. Subsequently, in chapter 3, “Body, Person, and Power”, I discuss Falangaw Amis people’s concept of personhood and power. Here I present the person as category, following the work of Durkheimian scholars (Carithers, Collins and Lukes 1985; Mauss 1985), and also consider how the person as a category has been formed in the process of experiencing the state power. Next, in chapter 4, “Raluma’an, Finawlan, and Niyarox”, forms of social relatedness—matrilocal families, men’s age-sets, and the community—are the protagonists. Based on the foundations laid in the previous two chapters, the practices, meanings, and changes related to these forms of relatedness are demonstrated and explained.

In part 2, “Diffusing the State”, I suggest that the state, seemingly un-penetrable and always trying to consolidate everything, is actually porous and diffuse. This section of the dissertation shows how diffuse different state regimes, like those of the Japanese and the KMT, have been. I do this by presenting Falangaw people’s conduct,
reactions, and feedback toward state regulations, both in their everyday lives and during extraordinary occasions. Not only has state regulation failed to achieve its expectations, but certain unexpected consequences of these failures have led state actors and indigenous people to conceptualize each other in particular ways. Through an examination of Falangaw people’s ordinary and extraordinary experiences, cases of the materialization of experience will be analyzed to demonstrate how local people can put to use dis-unified symbols, such as the state.

In chapter 5, “State of Regulation”, two main issues are covered. First, I explore the social and cultural impacts of state policies, which have altered traditional Falangaw Amis ways of life, and Amis’ responses to these impacts. Next, I discuss questions about how obligatory education, military service, agricultural policies, and hygiene and police intervention that have regulated the everyday life of Amis people in Falangaw.

In chapter 6, “State of Performance, State of Exodus” I address certain significant but extraordinary practices, which were originally promoted by the government for purposes of social management. These practices include baseball games, polyphonic singing performances, and local election campaigns, which have been appropriated by Falangaw Amis people for their own ends.

Finally, in chapter 7, “Beyond Domination and Resistance”, which concludes this
dissertation, I consolidate the analysis made thus far. I show that indigenous people and the state have been mutually constitutive since the moment they first met. Beyond (top-down) domination and (bottom-up) resistance, power relations and their influences are often interconnected. I have discovered some of these relations, while others await to be studied.
Chapter Two: Genesis and Baseball: the Making of New Historicity

“Origin is the Goal.”

—Karl Kraus, Worte in Versen

“The Great Revolution Introduced a New Calendar.”

—Walter Benjamin, Illuminations

There are two goals in this chapter. First, through an analysis of different genesis narratives among the Amis, I highlight how modernity offers the local people a framework for restructuring or retelling issues like origin and history. Second, I highlight the surprising results of using a narrative framework provided by the state. These results manifest in how local indigenous people appropriate this seemingly overwhelming state narrative in order to highlight key issues about their origin, locality and historicity, as these pertain to their own outlook on the future.

In his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin (1969: 261) provides the aphorism quoted above to describe the sense of homogeneous time in our modern world. Situated in that time, Benedict Anderson (1983: 24) makes a further argument about a sense of temporal simultaneity. According to this argument, time
measurable by common scales like clocks and calendars, which govern human
perception, create a sense of being in temporal simultaneity where every scale of
space and time is qualitatively equivalent. This latter sense of time, Anderson argues,
establishes the *modern* sense of community, which becomes not merely vividly
imaginable but also convincingly natural.

In this chapter, I use Benjamin’s insight as a tool to contextualize the conceptions
of originality, historicity, and sociality commonly that have come to be shared among
the Falangaw Amis community following the advent of modern regimes. However,
the ethnographic data presented in this chapter also demonstrates that the space-time
we inhabit now is not necessarily homogeneous. Some people, such as the Falangaw
Amis, are not yet fully subjugated by the sense of homogeneous time. They have
accepted the state-offered space-time framework, but put something of their own in it
for the purpose of both attaching themselves to the modern world and retaining their
singularity.

**The Question of the Arapanay Genesis**

The question of the Arapanay Genesis concerns the huge discrepancy between
existing ethnographic documents and local people’s negation of those documentations.
The first time I went to Falangaw to conduct my research was 1997, and before that
time I had read a lot of ethnographies and had some preliminary ideas about the
community I was to visit. All of the publications that I read were old-fashioned ethnographies which dutifully depicted Falangaw’s religion, kinship, political organization, myths, language, livelihoods, and so on. Although there were different interpretations, all of the ethnographic descriptions were quite consistent. With the information I had obtained from those ethnographies, I started my first fieldwork research. However, very soon my informants told me: “We Amis are not what the books document.”

An important difference between these ethnographic descriptions and reality pertains to the genesis of the Falangaw Amis. Regarding the origin of the southern (Falangaw) Amis people, *Taiwan Takasago-zoku Keit Shozoku no Kenky* [The Formosan Natives Tribes: A Genealogical and Classificatory Studies], an ethnographic account published in the Japanese colonial period (1935), says:

> From a stone at Arapanay both the Amis’s and the Puyuma’s ancestors were born. ...

> Once upon a time in Trirangasan, an old man and his two grandchildren, an elder brother and a younger sister, took a wooden mortar to escape from the flood and fled to Arapanay. The brother and sister, after escaping from the catastrophe, got married. Initially, their offspring were crabs, then came the stone, and later human beings were born out of the stone. The descendants of those human beings are the ancestors of both the Pangcah (Amis) and the Panapanayan (Puyuma) (quoted from Hsu 1956: 178).
There are different variants of the Falangaw Amis genesis that were published before the 1990s, such as the variant included in *The Collection of the Raw Barbarian Legends* (Chen 1964: 38-40). All of these variants, however, which were collected during that period of time, are structurally similar. All of these variants confirm that the Amis were from Trirangasan (or Cilakasan) and Arapanay, and the first generation of Amis were of stone-birth.22

Furthermore, all the documents mention a flood catastrophe and the Amis’ ancestors escaping on wooden mortars. Such flood legends are a common theme shared among almost all of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples (Basuya Boyizenu 1996; Hsu 1956; Li: 1998). The brother-sister dyad in this genesis story seems to suggest that the sibling/couple complex relationship makes sense (Headly 1987) and also confirms the sibling relationship as the most important idiom in Amis kinship (Chang 1987; Lo 2000).

In addition to the sibling/couple dyad, perhaps, what needs more attention is the appearance of the Other. When facing the question of genesis, the idea of the self always needs to be defined in reference to the Other so that questions like “Who are we?” and “Where we are from?” can hopefully be answered. In the Arapanay genesis,

22 In addition to Cilakasan and Arapanay, a minor branch of Amis people insist that Green Island, an island near Taitung City, is their place of origin. However, the latter is so minor that it is usually neglected.
we find that the Puyuma, the Amis’ neighbor and deadly rival, appear at the very beginning. The Han Chinese and the Japanese, the colonizers of two different eras, also appear in other versions of Arapanay narratives, suggesting that these Others were originally the same with the Falangaw Amis. Obviously, the Arapanay genesis discloses an important message: once being born, everything is created. In the genesis, the Amis were born in Arapanay, a place very close to Falangaw, and the Puyuma, the Japanese, and the Han (the so-called Taiwanese) were born there simultaneously. Space and time, or locality and historicity, are static in the Arapanay genesis; there and then in the Arapanay narrative mean here and now in the reality of today.

However, in today’s Falangaw, according to my informants, almost nobody would think this genesis is correct. It would be refuted as nonsense if the researcher tells it to an informant, and the informant would instead tell a true genesis, the Palidaw genesis, as a reply. Is just one of them the true genesis? What is the discrepancy between the two all about?

In the Japanese colonial period, official translators and policemen were always nearby when ethnographers were doing their jobs, and the informants were mostly local leaders like kakita’an, meaning that the Arapanay genesis could hardly be a mistake committed by the informants. Scholars classified all Amis communities into
five groups, and all the Amis geneses can be categorized into three types.\textsuperscript{23}

Nowadays none of Amis communities, except Falangaw, think that the Japanese documentation is totally different from what they have known. So, what happened? To shed some light on this question of discrepancy, I present below the Palidaw genesis, the genesis that is regarded as the traditional and only authentic account by today’s Falangaw Amis people.

\textbf{The Palidaw Genesis}\textsuperscript{24}

About the place of origin, Sawmah, my eighty-year-old informant, says:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In the beginning two people, the older sister Taluhaton and the younger brother Tafaafu, drifted to Palidaw, the southernmost point of Taiwan. To survive, they got married and twelve children were born. Years later, the twelve children (six males and six females) got married and became six couples, and that was how the Amis increased gradually in population.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} According to Japanese scholars, there are three main versions of genesis story prevailing in all Amis communities: Cilakasan Origin, Green Island Origin, and Arapanay Origin (Utsurikawa, Miyamoto, and Mabuchi 1935). Cilakasan (or Tsirangasan) is a place north of Falangaw, and both Arapanay and Green Island are near Falangaw. None of the origin stories mention Palidaw, a place very far away from these three places.

\textsuperscript{24} The source of this genesis is from my informant Sawmah. Sawmah was not the only one that could tell the Palidaw genesis. Many of my informants also narrated this story of origin to me, but in Falangaw people thought that Sawmah remembered the most details. Besides, Piya, Kulas Mahengheng’s great grandson, wrote down the genesis and published it in some guidebooks or pamphlets. However, all the Palidaw stories I have heard and read are structurally similar, although not exactly the same, indicating that this genesis narrated by Sawmah is not completely fixed or pure.
In the past, our ancestors always lived by the sea, and they slashed and burned to get a piece of land for growing millet. When the capacity of the land was not enough, the six couples and their offspring moved subsequently to Lalawdan, Tafali, Ngofola, and Mamura.

When all family members moved north from Palidaw, the parents were at the end of the line. When they were arriving in Mamura, in order to take a break, the father stuck his bamboo cane into the ground and did not take it out. Therefore, today in Mamura you can find a bamboo stalk in a bamboo bush that is weirdly standing upside down. The parents of the first generation did not keep going. They stayed in Mamura because they became stones. All of the family members could not help, but kept going northbound.

In Supayan, the next stop, two brothers were at odds with each other; the family split into two halves. The younger brother’s half became the mountain people, or today’s Tulumak Rukai people’s ancestors. And the older brother’s half kept moving to Sale’sen, Pakuluan, and Tiofok to find an ideal place to grow staples.

When they were in Tiofok, the size of the population increased a lot, and many of the clans that we see today were founded at that time. To facilitate agriculture, some religious practices were created to deal with droughts.

During that period, we Amis were living next to the Puyuma. One year, when it was a year of drought, some regular customs failed to be observed. For example, the Puyuma people were not invited to attend our harvest celebration; they were furious and banished the Amis. The Puyuma
could do that because at that time the Amis were the new comers or the land borrowers and the
Puyuma were the land owners. One significant thing also happened then: some Amis people,
mainly people of the Raranges families, along with their houses and other belongings, were
magically converted into stones. Of course it was the Puyuma who made this happen. Today, the
stone ruins at that place can still be recognized.

Later, our ancestors found a place near Tiofok, but they still had to solve the problem of drought.
Amis people, at that time, had six leaders. Those six leaders discussed how to solve the problem
every night. One day Tenged, one of the six leaders, dreamed of a unique bamboo tree in a bamboo
field. In the dream, rather than pointing to the south like all other bamboos do, the bamboo,
standing against the wind, was individually leaning toward the north, or toward Malataw (the
Tulan Mountain). After waking up, Tenged took this bamboo and used it to practice bamboo
divination. One of the results of this divination was that he found a finawlan (age-set system) to
service the community, and after founding it, the leaders, Paong, Tenged, and Calaw decided that
the finawlan needs a ritual, so now we have kiluma’an (harvest festival).

In the Tiofok period, there were always a lot of conflicts with the Puyuma. For example, Taki, a
Puyuma chief, came to flirt with an Amis woman and later was killed by her husband. For that
reason, the Puyuma, again, banished the Amis. The Amis argued that that was not all the Amis’s
fault and insisted that they should not move anywhere unless the Puyuma bestowed them with
living places and paddy fields. The conclusion of the negotiation was that a line connecting
Kanafalangaw (the Li-yu Mountain) and Fukid (the Maw Mountain) was demarcated as the border line to separate the east, where the Amis inhabited, from the west, which the Puyuma occupied.

After doing that, we Amis moved to a new place, a place called Sipaykio in the Japanese period.

Then a huge flood came, and we moved again to Kanafalangaw.

In Kanafanangay, our leader was Kulas Mahengheng. At that time, the Dutch tried to invade Taitung. Mahengheng knew it and tied his headscarf to a bamboo stick and went to the seashore, waving the bamboo stick to the Dutch vessels. Knowing that their whereabouts were exposed, the Dutch gave up the plan.

We Amis are from Palidaw, but some of the Palidaw Amis did not follow the first migration team. But during the period of Mahengheng’s leadership, many Palidaw Amis came to Taitung. The village was too crowded to accept them, so it was arranged for those people to live and cultivate in today’s Matang. But the Puyuma people also herded their cows there in Matang, and confrontations between the Amis and the Puyuma happened all the time. The three biggest Puyuma communities and other minor Puyuma communities secretly united together to attack the Amis. Fortunately, the plot was disclosed, and the Amis won the battle. After the battle, Kulas Mahengheng ordered seven age-sets to guard against the Puyuma.

After this event, the Amis found that there still were many floods there in Kanafanangaw, so our ancestors moved to the place we live now. Mahengheng prescribed that anyone who wanted to cultivate the field should do it southward, no other directions of cultivation were permitted.
Mahengheng, at that time, was not the only leader. In fact, there were two in Falangaw. Ka’at, the other leader, was jealous of Mahengheng’s reputation, so the whole Falangaw had two factions.

Two harvest festivals in summer were held in that period. Later, Mahengheng’s camp also split into two parts. Kenni was the leader of the new camp. Ka’at, Kenni, and Mahengheng all led their followers northward to clear and cultivate millet fields. Places like Likilit, Palayapay, Lakat, and Kafom were cultivated by our ancestors. Today, some northern Amis communities claim that Kulas Mahengheng was their ancestor. That is not the truth.

Later came the Qing dynasty. That is why we have an age-set called Lakuapin. Only a few years after the kuapin’s (the Chinese’s) arrival, the Dipon (Japanese) came. In the beginning the Dipon made a landing in Tiput and had fights with Kuapin. We Amis went to the seashore to greet the Dipon, but the Puyuma felt unhappy and they set traps on the shore. We Amis knew where the traps were and made a detour.

In the Dipon period, the Falangaw had seven sefis (men’s houses). Then there were attacks of malaria, and after that, only four of the seven remained. Before the malaria, usually an age-set, say la wusin, had one hundred and seventy members. After the disease, only some fifties remained.

We lost many people. Later, the Dipon did a house registration, and the final number of houses was 322. Several times Mahengheng led the Amis on a march northward along the coastline. Some places were named after the march. For example, a place now called Madawdaw was a swamp, and after walking through that place, people’s footprints were shining. The Amis put the dried
shining footprint mud into opened calabashes and found that the mud was burnable. Many of the place names that we see today have something to do with Mahengheng’s march. Following Kulas Mahengheng’s leadership, the Amis kept going northward and built the three earliest Amis communities: Toktok, Lidaw, and Sakirayak.

Today, the northern Amis people copy everything that the Dipon people have said; they say that the place of origin of the Amis is an island called Lakasan in Southeast Asia. Does this island really exist? Definitely not!

**Discussion**

The Palidaw genesis, narrated by most, if not all, Falangaw Amis, shows that the narrators think that Palidaw, the southernmost spot of Taiwan, is the place of their origin. Such a viewpoint is not esoteric knowledge held by only a few. Rather, it is a belief widely shared among today’s Falangaw. How is it possible that this genesis story can not be found in academic publications until 2000 (Feng 2000)? And what does the emergence of the Palidaw genesis story mean? Some older informants told me that the “old” genesis narrative is not totally unknown to them. When, some fifty years ago, my informants were quite young, the narratives about the Trirangasan/Arapanay origin, together with the accounts of the stone-births, were regarded as fairly tales or jokes. However, as I have shown above, one hundred years ago scholars, who were usually Japanese, recruited eminent or official figures such as
the kakita’an as their informants for ethnographic documentation. How could these important figures make jokes about this issue and under such circumstance? Furthermore, the problem remains the same: what does this Palidaw genesis narrative mean?

This problem could be tackled, first of all, by comparing the two genesis narratives. One of the most obvious differences between the two, of course, is the place of origin—the difference between the place (Arapanay) they inhabit now and the place (Palidaw) a hundred kilometers away. This discrepancy in place of origin indicates a process of migration, which is an issue of significant importance.

The older genesis narrative suggests that the place of origin is Arapanay, a place very close to Falangaw. Events in the older genesis narrative, such as the landing, the sister-brother marriage, and the stone-birth all occurred in Taitung or at places around Falangaw. By contrast, the newly-told or newly-found genesis narrative shows that the Amis, originating in Palidaw, kept migrating northward until they finally reached Taitung.

What this means is that a distinct sense of historical depth and a different idea of locality can be discerned in the new genesis narrative. In the Palidaw genesis, the Amis are always migrating, and the listener would feel the depth of history gradually accumulating and evolving as the individuals in the narrative move from place to
place. The Arapanay genesis narrative, by contrast, is ahistorical, leaving the listener with little information except that some events happened in remote antiquity. Such a “remote antiquity” suggests an absolute concept of the past and a sense of immutable locality. In a word, historical depth is unimaginable in the Arapanay genesis narrative.

It is also worth mentioning that structurally, the Arapanay genesis narrative is not a single case. The genesis narratives of other Amis communities and of the Puyuma are all structurally similar to that of the Arapanay. All of these genesis narratives start from the landing after the flood catastrophe and continue with events, such as the brother-sister marriage, the reproduction of offspring, and the confrontation with other ethnic groups at the place of origin or at the places where indigenous people now live. In other words, the Arapanay genesis narrative, like that of other indigenous communities, could be summarised as: “in the beginning there is everything,” or “we have had everything since the beginning.”

In order to account for differences between genesis narratives that are structurally similar or that share the same motifs, Edmund Leach (2000) argued that such variation is necessary because it produces redundancy, which, like the redundancy broadcast in radio transmissions, serves to prevail over noise while facilitating the dissemination of information to all receivers. Here, following Leach’s opinion, different Amis and Puyuma genesis narratives exist for the purpose of spreading
common motifs such as the flood catastrophe, sister-brother marriage, and self-other relationships.

In the newly-told genesis narrative, by contrast, things are quite different, thereby suggesting that this more recent account does not fit into the array of genesis narratives mentioned above. Instead, this more recent narrative serves to disseminate different messages, which cannot be found in the Arapanay genesis narrative. Although the Palidaw account shares with the other genesis narratives some common motifs, such as the flood catastrophe and sister-brother marriage, in the Palidaw narrative a sense of *singularity* can be discerned. In other words, this genesis narrative conveys an emphasis on, and an argument for, a singular origin. It suggests: “in the beginning, there was only one people, we Amis people. And after a certain period of time or after passing some definite stops, certain events, social institutions, and other ethnic groups, appeared or happened.” Now in this genesis narrative there is a sequence, and there is also a causal relationship between the before and the after.

I argue that the Palidaw genesis narrative has a sense of singularity because it allows the Falangaw Amis to differentiate themselves from both other Amis communities and from the Puyuma, and to claim the singularity of their origin. If such singularity has to be understood by employing the idea of seniority, the whole image implicit in it becomes transparent. The image can be depicted like this: in the
beginning there existed no other peoples living in or around Palidaw, the place of origin, so we had nothing to do with the Puyuma. Other ethnic groups, such as the Rukai, and other Amis communities, Toktok, Lidaw, and Sakirayak, for example, originated from us, the Falangaw Amis. Seniority matters because it props up the scaffold of singularity. And if we consider the principle of place as the metonymy or symbol to express the procession of time in the Palidaw genesis narrative (in contrast to the immutability of time/space to be found in the Arapanay genesis narrative), then the southernmost location means hardly anything aside from indicating which group is the oldest.

Furthermore, in the Arapanay genesis narrative, some events, such as the stone birth and the sticking of the bamboo cane in the earth, also appear in the Puyuma’s genesis narrative (Sayama 2007[1913]; Tseng 1998), which describes the moment of human genesis. However, in the Palidaw genesis narrative, the events of the stone-birth and the bamboo cane occur in the middle of the Amis’s migration, not at the very beginning of human genesis as is found both in the Arapanay narrative and in the genesis accounts of the Puyuma communities. This indicates that the Palidaw genesis narrative not merely demonstrates a singular genesis but also claims for this group a senior or advantageous status vis-a-vis both the Puyuma and other Amis communities.

I argue that this Palidaw account of their genesis is a modern narrative or an
account of modernity. It is modern because it demarcates a clear boundary around a
genesis narrative that belongs exclusively to the Falangaw Amis. Unlike the Arapanay
genesis narrative, which makes people feel mythical, this Palidaw narrative, with its
sense of movement and historical depth backed up by the idea of seniority, comes
across more convincingly. In other words, this Palidaw narrative possesses some sort
of historical consciousness and singularity/originality25 that is not present in the
Arapanay narrative.

My informants emphasized that, unlike the Arapanay genesis narrative, which they
regarded as a fairy tale, the Palidaw genesis narrative was the authentic history.
Raymond Williams (1976:146-7) suggests that the modern conception of history,
involving human self-development, conveys a new sense in which historical events
are seen as part of a connected process, connecting the past not merely to the present,
but also the future. History in this modern sense often conveys a sense of progress,
which shapes both the past and the future in knowable ways. To achieve this goal,
something original like a genesis must be kept within an inherently retrospective
frame, in which the idea of authenticity means something individual, singular, and

25 Originality, according to Raymond Williams (1976:230), means something singular or relates to
something new, which is always relevant to a retrospective sense. Williams further argued that
singularity, originality, and a retrospective sense under certain circumstances are synonymous, or
sometimes guarantee a sense of authenticity.

The Palidaw genesis narrative which implies a new imaginary of modernity, historicity, and locality is worthy of our investigation. One can easily find that in the new genesis narrative the Amis constantly migrated before arriving in Falangaw. I have talked about the places during the migration which give the reader a sense of historical depth. But the migration or movement itself needs more discussion. In the newly-found genesis narrative, movement can surely be understood as the dynamics of historical progress. Even after all the Amis people have settled down in Falangaw, the genesis narrative shows that Kulas Mahengheng continues to lead his people northward.

Another idea crystallized from this genesis narrative is the loss of land as the key impetus to historical progression, and that is why the Amis had to continuously move in search of an ideal place to inhabit and cultivate. Even after their arrival in Taitung, they were still forced to move because, in comparison with the Puyuma land owner, the Amis were land borrowers. Their efforts to establish themselves on the land are evident in the Palidaw genesis narrative. For example, almost all important social institutions and cultural practices, such as bamboo divination (mi’edaw) and age-sets (finawlan), were created to make strong connections with the land. Here an obsession with anchoring themselves on the land, which cannot be found in the Arapanay
genesis narrative, is apparent.

I am arguing against the Palidaw genesis narrative’s historical veracity when I call it a new invention. Rather, it is an expression of a mental truth appearing nowhere in the old genesis narrative. Historical accounts (Hsu, Liao, and Wu 2001) show that a branch of the Amis migrated to Falangaw from Palidaw some one hundred years ago, just the Palidaw genesis narrative recounts. All these testimonies show that the composition of Falangaw society is by no mean homogeneous. On the other hand, Arapanay as a place of origin could also be true because no historiography shows that all of the Falangaw Amis are from Palidaw. The question is still unsolved, but the question itself is not the point. What really matters is that the two genesis narratives represent two different kinds of cultural logic or paradigms about time and identity. The question following from this is: what occurred that brought about this paradigm shift?

The Background of the Emergence of the Palidaw Genesis

The first material to emerge regarding the Palidaw genesis is the 1981 *kiloma’an* guidebook. This book did not, however, attract much attention. Subsequently, the Palidaw genesis narrative went unreported until several years later when a guidebook for the Mahengheng Cup Baseball Invitational Tournament was published in 1987.26

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26 This tournament was held annually for three years (1987-1989) in order to commemorate Kulas
This baseball tournament was held again in 1988, and then in 1989, with a similar guidebook published on each occasion. As a consequence of these tournament publications, many Amis families in Falangaw kept the 1987, 1988 and 1989 guidebooks (Fig.2.1). I am not, however, saying that this genesis narrative did not exist or was not acknowledged prior to 1981 or 1987. According to my informants, the Palidaw genesis narrative is their history and they have known this account since their childhood. Despite the earlier knowledge of this account, the Palidaw genesis narrative was not published and publicly distributed in Falangaw before 1981. For a traditionally oral society like the Falangaw, published materials often signify a sense of authoritativeness, because variants caused by oral transmission may be minimized. This sense of authoritativeness could be further strengthened by including this genesis narrative in a publication of baseball rules and schedules, as was done with the guidebooks.
Fig. 2.1 The guide book of the 1987 Mahengheng Cup Baseball Tournament

The first page of the guidebook included a photograph of the legendary leader Kulas Mahengheng. The inclusion of this photograph was path-breaking because, only a few decades prior, it was taboo for non-relatives to see a photograph of the deceased. My informant Palac recollected that when he was young, na Kakita’an, the family that Mahengheng married into, did not show the photograph of Kulas Mahengheng to outsiders, so he was quite impressed when for the first time he saw
the photograph on the guidebook.\textsuperscript{27} What this means is that Kulas Mahengheng, despite having been famous for his accomplishments for decades, was not a public figure in Falangaw before the 1980s. Furthermore, in the guidebook there are a series of place names listed from Palidaw to Falangaw, indicating the route taken by the ancestors of the Falangaw Amis. In addition, some notes on the last pages of the guidebook express the author’s idea about how the Amis Tribe, not just only the Falangaw Amis but all the Amis, originated from Palidaw (a genesis narrative different from that which is told by other Amis communities). These end notes also highlight Kulas Mahengheng’s achievements, including negotiating with the Japanese and leading the Amis north. Finally, the most significant point in this guidebook is that the author emphasizes that all Amis groups should recover their traditional spirits and virtues by consolidating themselves into a single and united people, the Amis Tribe. How to achieve this goal? The Palidaw genesis narrative makes the Amis Tribe imaginable in today’s modern world.

In fact, such a viewpoint is not commonly recognized by all the Amis communities. Every Amis community, except for the Falangaw, has its own genesis narrative, and although all the Amis people are ethnically similar, if not identical, there are certain

\textsuperscript{27} In Amis, na is a definite article for family names. Here, for example, na Kakita’an, in English, means the Kakita’an family.
linguistic differences among Amis communities. Northern Amis call themselves Pangcah, not Amis. The implication is that the Amis as an ethnic group is heterogeneous. The Falangaw were the first Amis community which interacted closely with the government. The Qing Chinese government adopted the Falangaw people’s self-declaration and identified all the communities using a common language as Amis. Some twenty years later, the Japanese government followed this classification and further divided the Amis into five subgroups: Coast Amis, Nanshih Amis, Shoguruan Amis, Puyuma Amis, and Hengchun (Palidaw) Amis. The five-subgroup classification was based on both geographic distribution and cultural similarity. The Falangaw Amis, in this classificatory system, belongs to the Puyuma Amis because the Japanese scholars who developed this system believed that the Falangaw Amis had been subjugated under the control of the Puyuma before 1875. Interestingly, here we can find that, from the viewpoint of Japanese scholarship, the Palidaw Amis and the Falangaw Amis were regarded as two different subgroups. This viewpoint is different from what the Falangaw Amis claim today. Although my informants asserted that most of the Falangaw Amis did not have a clear historical and political consciousness, some people, such as Piya (see below), felt it necessary to claim a leading status for the Falangaw among all Amis communities.

Why should this genesis narrative appear in a guidebook for a baseball tournament?
The ways in which the Japanese government managed indigenous people’s bio-power by promoting certain sports, especially baseball, in educational institutions has attracted some discussion (Morris 2010). Informants who had experienced this period testified that their baseball teacher Piya always corrected their idleness, emphasizing important virtues such as discipline, endurance, and obedience.

Here we see how a former colonized people cleverly employed the ways in which the colonizer disciplined them in order to achieve their own goal of self-reconstruction. Baseball demands a spirit of discipline, including adherence to rules, punctuality, bravery, and orderliness. The colonizers believed that inculcating such a spirit would help in colonial governance. What they did not anticipate was that the indigenous people would appropriate this tool of colonial governance for their own ends. I juxtapose the newly-told genesis narrative with colonial baseball education not merely because both coincidentally appeared together in space and time. Rather, I suggest that this unique genesis narrative contains a rationale of colonial modernity, which can be discerned in the way that baseball education was employed by the colonial regime. That is the reason why the Palidaw genesis narrative comes across as like a reasonable story with a start, procedures and a destination. This genesis narrative is, in a word, like a task to achieve, or a game to score.

The second reason why baseball matters here is that the teams which attended the
Mahengheng Cup were all from Amis and Puyuma communities, while a sense of Falangaw leadership among Amis communities and a sense of parallel relationship with the Puyuma were proclaimed (at least such a proclamation can be read in the text of the genesis narrative printed in the baseball guidebooks). Furthermore, by hosting the games, an imagined indigenous community—the Amis Tribe—headed by Falangaw began emerging in the Falangaw Amis people’s minds. In the baseball game’s opening and award ceremonies, Kulas Mahengheng and the genesis were repeatedly ritualized, and the hegemonic image of the genesis, in which Mahengheng is a key figure, became stabilized. Later, in 1995, some crucial people urged the city government to hold the Amis Joint Harvest Festival (to be discussed in chapters 4 and 6). To do the job well, they edited a guidebook for this Joint Festival. Not surprisingly, the Palidaw genesis narrative, as included in the baseball tournament guidebook, also appeared in the Joint Harvest guidebook. Since its introduction at the first Joint Harvest festival, the guidebook has become standard feature at harvest festivals in Falangaw. Unlike the baseball tournament guidebook, which is now owned by only a few Amis people, almost every Falangaw Amis family that has participated in the kiloman’an (harvest festival) has at least a copy of this harvest festival guidebook.

The ritualization of the Palidaw genesis/Kulas Mahengheng did not stop at its inclusion in these guidebook. A few years later, the photograph of Kulas Mahengheng
was hung on the wall of the *sefi* (Men’s House). In addition, *The Song of the Amis*, a song standardizing the Palidaw genesis narrative and canonizing Kulas Mahengheng’s achievements, was sung at the *kiluma’an*’s opening ceremony. It has since been sung at many important formal congregations.

Later in 1999, in Falangaw, the Flag of the Amis was created to represent the Amis Tribe. This flag testifies to the fact that the Palidaw genesis narrative has now become canonical in contemporary Falangaw. This can be seen in the centre of the flag, where three key figures from the genesis narrative, Paong, Tenged, and Calaw, who established Amis social and cultural foundations, have been set (Fig. 2.2). The flag, song, and rituals have all been included in the opening and closing ceremonies of baseball games played by the Amis. These features have also been incorporated into traditional indigenous social organizations since the late 1990s, when the government converted them into officially-monitored corporations (discussed in chapters 5 and 6).
Who compiled this genesis narrative and put it in the guidebooks? The name of the guidebook editor/author is Piya na Kakita’an (aka. Guo Guang-ye or 郭光也).\(^{28}\) Piya, the great grandson of Kulas Mahengheng, was a distinguished student in the Japanese period. He was a member of the Chiayi Agriculture and Forestry Public School’s baseball team (or Kano baseball team). In 1936, his team won the Taiwan national baseball championship and went on to represent Taiwan at the National High School Baseball Championship, or the famous Koshien Competition, held in Hyōgo-ken,

\(^{28}\) Piya na Kakita’an (1919-1993) was born into an eminent family. Kakita’an, in Amis, means the community leader, and the Amis use na Kakita’an to denote the family that Kulas Mahengheng belonged to. Na Kakita’an was not Kulas Mahengheng’s natal family but his wife’s because traditionally in the matrilocal Amis society, a husband moved into his wife’s family and their children inherited their mother’s family name. However, Piya did not move into his wife’s family like other Amis men did at that time. Instead, he changed this custom and made his wife marry into na Kakita’an. In this way, na Kakita’an became one of the earliest Amis families to practice patrilocal marriage.

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That same year, when Emperor Shōwa’s father-in-law came to Taiwan (Taitung) for an inspection visit, Piya was appointed student representative to greet this high-ranking Japanese official. After World War II, regarding himself as an intellectual, he engaged in politics and was elected as a county councilor. He soon gave up politics, however, after he disappointedly found himself being discriminated against by the KMT regime for his Japanese educational background and his inability to speak Mandarin. Later, Piya returned to the baseball and trained many Amis students. In today’s Taiwanese Professional Baseball League, over one-third of players are indigenous (mostly Amis), and one half of indigenous players are related to Piya, his teammates, his students, and relatives.

Piya spent his last years documenting everything traditional. In fact, being an intellectual he had to some extent lost track of the traditional Amis way of life. He also did not have close relationships with his age-set fellows and relatives. The Falangaw Amis people around him were reluctant to tell him certain things about the past which might violate taboos. To get this information, Piya bought a small

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29 Although no Taiwanese teams ever won the national championship in the Japanese period, the bud of this sport germinated at that time. More details about the genealogical relationship between these Amis and Puyuma Kano members and today’s famous Amis professional baseball players will be discussed in chapter 6. For more about the location of Chiayi, see Fig. 1.1, chapter 1.

30 This belief, still prevalent in Falangaw today, has something to do with the Amis concept of the person, which I discuss further in chapter 3.
fishing boat and invited his informants to fish, dine, and drink with him on it. The result of his “fieldwork” is a 180-page notebook written in Japanese, in which he sequentially documents Taiwan’s natural scenes, geography, historical epochs (in progressive sequence from the Dutch period to the KMT regime), the Palidaw genesis, events concerning Kulas Mahengheng, Amis cultural practices, and baseball histories, games, and rules (Fig. 2.3). Piya regarded these things as a complete whole because he paginated his work, and sequentially, as illustrated in Fig 2.3, assigned a number to every item he documented.

Fig. 2.3  Piya’s notebook

It is Piya’s notebook that served as the source of the Palidaw genesis narrative,

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31 This notebook is not his only documentation. According to Panay, his daughter-in-law, after his death, his wife burnt almost everything he wrote because most Amis people of Piya’s generation believed that the deceased’s remaining possessions could be contagious and dangerous.
which was included in the baseball and the harvest festival guidebooks. The narrative included in the baseball competition guidebook is largely recreation from Piya’s notebook. I am not saying that everything concerning the Palidaw genesis narrative was Piya’s creation. Rather, based on the interviews he conducted, Piya’s work lay the foundation for the spread of the Palidaw genesis narrative. What I am arguing is that through his historical imagination, Piya reorganized or retold what he heard from his informants. In other words, history, as Piya put it, must have an origin, and the origin triggers historical evolution or direction, a direction toward a destination. Thus, the way Piya framed it, history must have a purpose, which implies that history must be starting from and going back toward the home base of the Amis Tribe. It runs only after identifying the origin and the direction of migration for future movements.32

Rethinking Indigenous Modernity

The content of Piya’s notebook was transferred to the guidebooks, the textbooks of Amis culture, disseminating the genesis narrative that we hear today. But what Piya could decide were only the form and the goal of the narrative; the content, effects, and the historicity of the genesis narratives are in fact independent of personal will. In this case, the sense of movement and the craving for connection with the land are two main motifs of the historicity hidden in the Palidaw genesis narrative and unable to be

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32 Run is a baseball vocabulary which means getting scores in a game.
decided by anyone.

The Palidaw genesis narrative is a complicated text. It borrows an expressive frame from the modern nation-state to make the narrative of time and space more tangible or imaginable in comparison to the Arapanay genesis narrative. But the sense of time in this new genesis narrative is actually not homogeneous; it has its own rhythm, tempo, and density, which is different from the universal time introduced by Walter Benjamin (1969) and Benedict Anderson (1983).

Re-examining the Palidaw genesis narrative, it is easy to find that it has a beginning and a destination. The sequence of places is also used as an index for historical depth. However, the density of the narrative in the course of historical development is not even and universal, and the speed of the historical process is not steady either. More specifically, more time is spent in the narrative describing some events like the Amis going through certain important places like Palidaw, Tiofok, Mamura, and Kanafangaw (places where the events that suggest the Falangaw Amis’ individuality and seniority occurred). The narrative only touches briefly on other places, such as Lalawdan, Tafali, Ngofola, and Supayang during the ancient Amis people’s journey from Palidaw to Falangaw.

This genesis also has an axis of time different from that of universal history. One obvious example is Kulas Mahengheng’s march north. From the viewpoint of the
government, the purpose of the march was to pacify riots by pressing Kulas Mahengheng’s reputation into service (Wang 1998:414). But to the Falangaw Amis, the march tells how the place names and communities along the way were created, and it implies Kulas Mahengheng’s role as the founding father of the modern Amis Tribe. No single line in this genesis narrative mentions the historical fact that Mahengheng’s march was due to his receiving the commission from the Qing and the Japanese governments. Moreover, the genesis narrative says that Kulas Mahengheng found the Dutch battleships and successfully prevented the Dutch from invading Taiwan.33 This is not actually true, but such un-truthfulness manifests one thing: the texture or density of time we find in the Palidaw genesis narrative is different from the one we perceive in the universal world history, the history in which crucial events are used as a reference for global space-time and are known to most of the world.

**Concluding Remarks**

In this chapter, I introduced two different genesis narratives that were compiled in two different eras. I do not think we should focus on asking which of these narratives is the historically correct version, or how the issue of their narrative differences might be resolved. More interestingly, by contextualizing the background of these genesis

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33 The Dutch colonized Taiwan for 38 years (1624-1662), and it is impossible for Kulas Mahengheng (1852-1911) to have witnessed any Dutch battleships during his lifetime.
narratives, we can better understand how the state, as both idea and apparatus, works together and causes changes and how local indigenous people experience and react to those impacts of state intervention.

Paul Ricoeur’s (2005: 194-5) philosophical treatment of the distinction between origin and beginning suggests that the significant difference between the two genesis narratives presented here is that one fixes at an idea of unfathomable origin, while the other possesses an idea of beginning and genealogical movement. With the idea of beginning, Ricoeur (2005:195) argues, one can escape the speculative vertigo of origin by replacing ourselves, our parents, and our descendants in the sequence of generations for the purpose of mutual recognition.

The Palidaw genesis narrative actually demonstrates the meaning suggested in Ricoeur’s analysis, except that it uses a sequence of place names as an alternative to genealogy. But Ricoeur’s ontological thesis cannot explain the problem concerning the politics of the genesis narrative. Every social memory concerning a genesis is in fact a historical rupture that provides us with a modern myth, a myth about a new origin denouncing everything old as the mythical remnant (Connerton 1989: 6-7). That is not enough, however. The scheme of the rupture and the materiality of the rupture still need to be offered. To describe the scheme and the materiality, in this chapter I have presented how the Palidaw genesis narrative was produced and
transformed in published texts, as well as the relationship between the Palidaw genesis narrative and the government-sponsored sport of baseball—that is, the issue of the politics of memory under colonization.

Scenarios do not, however, always follow what the governing power prescribes. It is partially right to say that the state is what local indigenes live by, as the state manufactures consent without coercion in the everyday experiences of subjected people. It is “partially” so because, in the case of the Falangaw Amis, while the state deploys symbolic capital to shape minds of its subjects, it does not necessarily succeed. The imagined community that the Falangaw Amis have shaped borrows the framework of rationality from the nation-state through some key local persons, such as Piya na Kakita’an, but the results of the borrowing are surprising. In this case, we see how the some Falangaw Amis people like Piya took the scaffold of colonial statecraft and used it to build a protective history of indigenous modernity.
Chapter Three: Body, Person, Self: the Construction and Transformation of the Relation of Power

In chapter two, I argued that the historicity shared among the Amis in Falangaw has developed out of a particular relationship with both the state idea and the state apparatus. In the present chapter, I expand on this relationship through an analysis of the concepts of body, person, and self, as they are shared in Falangaw. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the multivalent character of state relations in Falangaw. In other words, this chapter depicts how certain relations of power in Falangaw have paved the way for local social agents and cultural institutions, such as matrilocal families and age-sets, to articulate with both the state idea and the state system.

The Amis concept of the body varies with and between genders and ages. To grasp this particular Amis conception of the body, I provide below some accounts of Amis body images according to different genders and ages, showing how a traditional Amis conception of the body, as well as of personhood, have been formulated in everyday practice. I then show how the impact of the state has transformed Amis conceptions of the body.
Some Theoretical Considerations about Body, Person, Self and Power

In the anthropological literature, some scholars regard the terms person, self, and individual as interchangeable (Morris 1994; Rosaldo 1980, 1984). Other anthropologists have argued that person, self, and individual should be distinguished as three separated concepts (Dumont 1985; Harris 1989; Lindholm: 2001; LiPuma: 1998). Marcel Mauss (1985) argued that the concepts of the person and the self should be treated separately. His reason for this was that the concept of the reflective self or modern individuality, unlike the socially contextualized personne and persona, is the result of final human development in synchronically geographic scope as well as in diachronically evolutionary history. Although it is still controversial to consider the self or individuality as exclusive to the Western world, basically the distinction between the social person and the individual self is commonly acknowledged (Harris 1989). In other words, the concept of the person should be incommensurable, contextualized, and dividual. The idea of the self or individual, by contrast, suggests a sense of universality.

The dichotomy of the individual and the dividual is not, however, plausible in the real world. In all cultures, social agents have both individual and dividual aspects of personhood. The focus of our inquiry should therefore be on the tension between
these individual and dividual aspects of personhood (LiPuma 1998: 56-7). This tension provides a stage for dynamic, modern power relations to intervene and to be employed. Such an approach suggests that personhood cannot be understood merely by its categorical composition as in Durkheimian/Maussian scholarship. Some aspects of personhood, like emotions, desires, and experiences, cannot be neglected. This is because these aspects always contribute to social practice in everyday life. They manifest themselves in the tensions or power relations between the individual and dividual dimensions of personhood (cf. Rosaldo 1980, 1984).

To bridge this dichotomy of the individual and the dividual, something more basic needs to be discussed, and the body is the focus of investigation. Methodologically, by focusing on the embodiment of persons and the personification of bodies, we find core symbols, vehicles of identity, and loci of struggle (Lambek and Strathern 1998:6). The body is thus not just the foundation for structuring the dividual person and the individual self, but is also the point of convergence of the person and the self.

Some research in cognitive psychology also suggests that human cognition can be understood as a kind of connectionism. This understanding highlights how human cognitive processes happen synchronically and spread-out in networks of processing units (Bloch 1991; Westen 2001). Thus, everyday experiences make sense only after having gone through this spreading-out network. Culture, from this perspective, is
people’s shared experiences based on this networking process (Mathews and Moore 2001: 4).

Some scholars call this a “network schema” (Bloch 1991, 2002; D’Andrade 1995:137-141; Ortner 1989, 1990). As a cultural schema, rationalities, experiences, feelings, and memories are simultaneously integrated and connected when people deal with routine or novel affairs. Such parallel connections both confirm existing cultural schema and forecast certain cultural changes because the results of these connections cannot be guaranteed in advance. All we can do to understand a particular cultural schema is take the most relevant elements into account.

In this chapter, the relevant elements to consider are the concepts and practices of the body and person, colonial education, the everyday experience of bureaucratic administration, and certain historical memories about ethnic relationships. By following this approach, the dynamics of power—the relationship between state and culture—can be more fully comprehended, and the path of social/cultural change can be more clearly traced.

**The Amis Body/Person/Self**

In Amis, *tireng* means body, person, and self. When used as a verb it means to stand up. *Tireng* denotes not merely the human body. It also connotes the social person and the reflexive self (Fey 1986:331). Accordingly, it is not possible to introduce the Amis
concept of the body without mentioning the concepts of person and self. The body, person, and self are connected phenomenologically. To the Amis, the self is not an abstract idea but rather an embodied phenomenon contextualized in everyday life.

The Amis, like other peoples in the world, have their own symbolism of body/person/self. When conceiving the body, the two most crucial things that have to be presented here are the distinction between the interior and exterior perspectives of the body, and the relationship between tireng (the body) and kawas (the spirit).

The human body can be classified in two categories, one that is visible or exterior and one that is invisible or interior (Huang 1988). The visible part of the body, according to my informants, is natural, comprehensible and manageable. Nothing is forbidden in the discussion of this part of the body. Even male genitals (panga or penis, futol or testicles) or female breasts (coco) and genitals (poki or labia) are regarded as ordinary parts of the body, just like the nose, eyes, and arms. My informants sometimes made jokes about sexual organs in public, and I was no exception as a target of tease. In contrast to the external body, the invisible or interior parts of the body, such as blood, bone, and viscera, are considered as unknown, unaccountable, mysterious, and dangerous. Although the Amis were not interested in

34 For example, tangal or the head symbolizes a leader; wa’ay or feet symbolizes unmarried males who are supposed to run errands for their family; mata or eyes means the soul and the gate of the house (Huang 1988:39).
the anatomy of the human body, they had terms for inner organs and they used the bodies of the animals they hunted to infer the structure of the human body (Ibid.: 15). As the interior body is considered mysterious and dangerous, things that are considered to reside within, or emanate from, the interior body are likewise regarded as sacred or dangerous. This includes ngiha (human voice) and caciaw (speech), which come from the interior of the body. For this reason, voice or speech are considered to have supernatural powers. When one speaks, he or she is not just engaging in everyday communication in a social milieu, but is also connecting to the supernatural world. Saying the right things at the right times is crucial. That is why speech is an important means of manifesting one’s personality and capability.

It is believed that the world is animistic, and all that the supernatural beings are kawas (spirits).35 The interior body is the domain of kawas. This does not mean, however, that the soul inhabits the body. Informants explained that the ‘adingo (soul) exists a few inches above a person’s shoulders. ‘Adingo in the Amis language also means shadow. It is believed that everyone has his or her own ‘adingo. A woman has hers above her left shoulder and a male has his above his right shoulder. The difference between ‘adingo and kawas is that the latter is a general term denoting all

35 Some kinds of kawas have names, images, and characteristics, such as dongi and depeng (the gods of birth), and malataw (the god of war). However, others are just the names of general concepts like sipalay (the gods of land or soil).
supernatural beings, while the former refers specifically to personal human souls.

*Kawas* is not, however, an abstract religious idea. The personal *'adingo*, for example, ages as a result of an individual’s everyday actions throughout his or her life. Traditionally, an Amis infant is given his or her name fourteen or fifteen days after birth. Before being given a name, the infant does not have the status of complete personhood (Ibid.: 28). Thus, both *tireng* and *'adingo* cannot guarantee full personhood status. It takes time and certain social processes for Amis personhood to mature. Infants and children below five years of age are called *wawa*. Children between five to fifteen or sixteen years of age are called *kaemangay*, and are not considered mature enough to be deemed real persons. *Wawa* and *kaemangay* are not distinguished by gender. Children also have a special kind of *kawas*, known as *sahakoolon*, which is a qualitatively different from the adult Amis’ *'adingo* (Huang 1998: 97). In the past, all *wawa* and *kaemangay* were forbidden to wear beautiful dresses or to decorate themselves like adults. *Wawa* and *kaemangay* are thus considered socially incomplete persons. After reaching sixteen years of age, or more specifically, after the advent of puberty, unmarried women are called *limecedan* (virgins) and begin to be viewed as true *fafahiyan* (women). After getting married they become *fafahi* (wives), and they remain as such until the end of their lives. Finally, after death, the *'adingo* ascends to heaven to join the camp of *liteng*
(ancestors).

Men have a more complicated life process. After they turn sixteen, young men are initiated and arranged into finawlan/masakaputay (age-sets) and subsequently become pakarongay, kapah, mihiningay, miromomay, palawiday, ipara’ay, itukalay, and isefiay. Finally, when a man’s life ends, his ‘adingo, too, ascends to heaven to join the camp of liteng.

In order to clarify the Amis conception of the person, some further terminology needs to be explained. Pakarongay (age 16 to18), in the Amis language, means a messenger or one who runs errands. During this stage of life, pakarongay members are still apprentices serving all the older age-sets. The tasks of the pakarongay teenager are to run errands or follow the orders of the older age-set members. Kapah (age 18 to 45), originally meaning beautiful in Amis, especially the beauty of vegetation. Kapah has thus come to signify youthfulness and vitality. People in the Kapah age set undertake the largest portion of the work to serve the whole community. Those of the Miromromay age-set (age 48 to 50) take responsibility for commanding the kapah to complete unfinished tasks. It is for this reason that the miromomay are sometimes called wama no kapah (fathers of young men). Miromrom in Amis means to make something (like rice straw) into a bundle. Hence, miromomay people are those who gather people or resources together. Ipararay people (age 54 to 56) do nothing
but serve their superior age-set, *itukalay*. *Ipararay* means the ones (the suffix –ay) who are on (the prefix *i*) the table (*parar*). *Itukalay* (age 57 to 59) are the actual power holders in Falangaw. From the etymological point of view, *itukalay* signifies the people (–ay) who are on (*i*) the ladders or stairs (*tukar*). *Isefiay*, the men who are older than 60 or in the last stage of the life process, are the ones (–ay) who always stay in (*i*) the men’s house (*sefi*). The *sefi* is the place where the *liteng* or ancestors are worshiped and are offered sacrifices.

From this division of age-sets, a clear path in the life cycle of the Amis emerges. Ideally, young males should be errand runners or message carriers. Gradually they grow up beautifully and vitally like rice seedlings or other kinds of vegetation. Young men should be managed or put to use by their elders. As these youth age, their lives become more stable and they get closer to the *liteng* (ancestors).

The place of *parar* and *tukar* in the etymology of these age-set categories is significant. *Parar* (table) and *tukar* (ladder) signify an important difference in the practices of elder and younger males. Furthermore, *tukar*, as employed in the term *itukalay*, indicates in ladder on which these governors or power holders stand to oversee the community. However, since the status of *itukalay* is only one step away from *liteng* (if we take *sefi* as the symbol of the ancestral spirits), then *tukar* becomes a signifier of dynamism. The implication is that those who are on the stairs are in the
process of ascending upwards to the status of liteng/kawas. Indeed, Itukalay members are the real power holders in the community because they are closest to the ancestral spirits. Etymologically, the life course of the Amis can be summarized as moving from errand runners, to beautifully growing vegetation, to table sitters, to climbers of ladders, and finally to inhabitants of the house (sefi) of the ancestors.

Hence, there exists a qualitative differences between life stages, and every man is expected to behave according to his stage. The structure of the Amis life course is thus hierarchical: the labor provider (kapah), the manager (itukalay), and the living ancestor (isefiay). 36 This inviolable hierarchy relates to the Amis belief in kawas/’adingo. The Amis believe that the soul (’adingo) and the body (tireng) are two perspectives on a single thing. The soul and the body age together, and with the process of aging, a person is expected to undertake age-specific duties.

Finally, when death comes, the ’adingo proceeds to heaven, from where it watches over its living family members (Koono 2000[1915]:167). The dead body would be buried in the backyard of the natal house. 37 This return of the body to the natal family

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36 Interestingly, the Falangaw Amis use three courtesy names, wama(father), faki(uncle), and fafu (grandfather) to indicate miromromay (the head of kapah or the young men), itukalay (the head of the middle-age men), and isefiay (the elderly). More details about these three names will be provided in chapter 4.

37 Rather than being buried in their wives’ families, Amis males, after death, were sent back and buried in their natal families in traditional Amis communities or in the time before the advent of modern
after death symbolizes the ideal return of individual to the enclosure of the maternal body.

Based on the preceding discussion, an ambivalence regarding the self can be better grasped. On the one hand, in Falangaw, it is considered necessary and natural to demonstrate inner strength through verbal expressions. This means that the Amis self must be voluntarily asserted. On the other hand, a person’s inner strength, residing as it does in one’s sacred and mysterious body, can also be dangerous. Such inner strength can cause unexpected consequences and thus needs be constrained by collective or institutional regulations. Especially important among such regulatory institutions is the hierarchically structured aging system. I witnessed, for example, that when there were age-set meetings, some age-set members spoke in particular tones to express their opinions and demonstrate their oratory competence. They seldom used these tones outside of such meetings. However, when such verbal demonstrations went too far, those who spoke too much would be dissuaded from speaking. Others would desist from listening to these speakers. I was told that some old men who persisted in speaking their own opinions, in contravention to the collective decision of the age-set, later fell ill. Thus, in an age-set meeting there were often two extremes. On one extreme were those those who spoke a lot, trying their regimes.
best to express themselves. On the other extreme were those who spoke little. “I better keep my mouth shut in age-set meetings,” my landlord’s father Dipon said to me. This ambivalence opens space for governmental intervention and makes possible a certain relationship between local micro-politics and national or global political economy (to be discussed in chapter 6).

The Practice of the Body/Person/Self

Based on the concepts of the body, person and self that were introduced above, certain everyday practices among the Amis can be more fully comprehended. For example, in the early days of Japanese colonization, the posture for excreting attracted some ethnographic attention. Traditionally, in order to excrete, women stood up with their backs bent down slightly, while men squatted (Huang 1988: 14; Sayama 2007[1913]:188). Taking into account the preceding discussion regarding Amis conceptions of the body’s interior and exterior, these postures can now be more fully explained. Both the squatting of men and the standing of women were done for the purpose of avoiding overly exposing their genitals and anus—orifices connecting to their inner essence.

In addition to excreting, behaviors like sneezing and farting in public are considered inappropriate. In contemporary Falangaw, sneezing at the moment a person is leaving home is still considered taboo. As my landlord told me, repeating a
belief that he said was common in Falangaw, “If I sneeze before I step out of home to work, I will smoke a cigarette and take a five-minute break [before continuing to work].” Sneezing and farting are considered improper because something mysterious and unaccountable could spurt out of the body’s interior at such times. Based on these beliefs, it can be confirmed that the Amis consider the body’s interior, unlike its exterior, to be of kawas.

The image of the body is also one of the main sources of Amis personhood. The best example of this can be found in an ethnographic account published by the Taiwan Sotokufu (Governor General of Taiwan) in 1915 (Koono 2000[1915]:165). This text describes the Amis ways of naming. According to the author, one of the seven ways to name an infant is to base the name on an abnormal feature of the infant’s body. Examples of such names that remain in common use in Falangaw include piciw (harelip) and kangaroy (long chin). According to Lifok, an Amis ethnographer, the use of such physical characteristics to name an infant has a therapeutic and an educational purpose (Huang 1988:51). This is because such names teach an individual to accept his or her abnormality.

In contrast to this explanation of Amis naming conventions, some of my informants suggested that personal names drawn from physical characteristics are more specifically used to indicate someone’s personal qualities. The first time I visited
Tenngo’s home, for example, I was given the name Ngalay, which literally means saliva spraying out of mouth like fountain while speaking. At first, I thought the name was a tease. Later, however, I learned that the purpose of this name was not to describe my exterior appearance, but instead to highlight an inner quality that I was deemed to posses. “Ngalay,” Tenngo and Palace explained, “is a name that fits a person who is eloquent and has good oratory ability like you.”

It is such ideas about the body/person that establish the criteria on which a person is to be evaluated. When condemning someone, my informants told me, the words deemed to be that harshest are those like \textit{tayi’} (feces) and \textit{waco} (dog), which relate to bodily excretion. Dogs are included here because, my informants told me, “dogs smell, lick, and eat human stool.” These animals are for this reason not treated as pets or family members, as is common in Western households. Hence, feces and dogs are seen to violate the Amis concept of the body and personhood. For this reason, they are deemed suitably filthy for use as curse words.

These is, in addition, a sense of egalitarian personhood associated with the body. Such a personhood or selfhood is related to the strict Amis practice of monogamous marriage and the gendered division of labor. It is impossible to find polygamous marriages in Amis communities. Even cases of men with multiple girlfriends or woman with multiple boyfriends are rare. Households have traditionally practiced
uxorilocal marriage, and women/wives have held privileged status. While men have traditionally decided and arranged most everything in the public sphere, gender-specific tasks in the family sphere have been different but almost quantitatively equal (Koono 2000[1915]:162-3). A century ago, a married man who practiced uxorilocal residence always went back to his natal family to play the role of *faki* (MB or maternal uncle). When doing this, the uncle was (to his nieces and nephews) as authoritative as their mother. When this man finally died, he would be sent back and buried in his natal family house with his deceased family members. Moreover, when carrying out family rituals to commemorate deceased family members, it is usually the deceased’s *fakis*, rather than either the deceased’s female kin or the men who have married into the family, who are summoned.

Ideally, all Amis are considered equal since the time they are born. In an Amis community a person’s status is not ascribed. Instead, fame, privilege, and power must be achieved. Yet the one who achieves such fame, privilege, and power is considered to remain essentially the same as those who have not achieved such status. Pertinent here is Marshall Sahlin’s (1963) distinction between two types of political figures: the Melanesian Big-man and the Polynesian Chief. As the Amis society lacks ranked lineages, and as the power of *kakita’an* or headman is not ascribed but achieved on the basis of his personal charisma, the Amis are comparable to the egalitarian
Big-man society (Huang 1986; Wei 1986).

How does a person earn credibility? Or, how does an Amis do or manage power to become a “big man”? In addition to wealth, which is believed to signify competence, eloquence is highly regarded as marking a man as capable of holding the office of kakita’an. Every man older than the kapah is eligible to hold this office, and it is sometimes on the basis of eloquence that the office-holder is chosen. Speech, as explained above, is a human ability that is considered sacred and mysterious because it emanates from the sacred and mysterious interior of the body.

Not only were the kakita’ans elected in the niyaro’ on the basis of their eloquence, but so too were the leaders of the different age-sets. My informant Wupay, for example, told me that some forty years ago when, as a pakarongay (teenager), he was initiated to the kapah (adult) age-set, the leaders of this age-set were chosen on the basis of having won debates in which everyone from the age-set participated.

There are some rules and ethics of speech among the Amis that should be mentioned here. Although speech engenders, it can be dangerous if not properly practiced. All the ethical regulations dictate that individuals should be cautious and conservative in speech, no matter whether he or she is talking in public or private. At first, this may seems contrary to the principle that one should strive to orally express themselves as well as possible. It is, however, explainable.
First of all, in everyday life, when commenting on a person’s behavior my informants always said “aka sakaniw.” This meant that the person being commented on was honest, not to be boastful, and did not say big words. In Falangaw, this is a crucial criterion on which to judge a person. As such, it serves as a mechanism to constrain people’s self expression. When someone goes too far in speech, people would criticize this person by saying “akawang ko pinangan nira,” (her/his temper is highly posed, (s)he poses himself/herself so high) or “akawang ko ngoso’ nira,” (his/her nose is highly posed, (s)he looks down with his/her nose at everyone). The meaning of these phrases is that the speaker being commented on appears arrogant, proud, and elated.

Two points here need to be further discussed. One is that the concept of akawang (high) is used to describe something negative in personality or human temperament (pinangan). That is to say, ideally, when expressing oneself, a person should be ‘amerek (low), not akawang (high). Here is a cultural value cautioning self-expression from going too far beyond other people’s reach. This caution is expressed using images of bodily mannerisms, such as akawang and ‘amerek. The second point is the use of ngoso’ (nose). Of course, it seems quite common for people in the world to take the nose, especially a highly posed nose, as a symbol of arrogance and snobbishness. In Falangaw, however, there are some additional, deeper meanings to be explored.
Specifically, it is considered dangerous or malign when one raises one’s nose high because by doing so his or her interior body can easily be exposed. What kind of person would do such a thing when facing other people? To my informants, a person like this, if not idiotic, could very well be arrogant because he/she ignores the concerns of others and cares for no one but himself/herself.

Consequently, certain speech manners are observed in Falangaw. For instance, I often heard from my informants expressions like “aka po’i ko tamdaw,” meaning that one should not curse or blame others. This cautioning phrase has two layers of meaning. At face value, it indicates the importance of peaceful coexistence with others. At a second level, the words are powerful and magical, they could lead to both achievement and ruin. Here the self and the other have to be understood inter-contextually. If a person wants to achieve something, he or she must, in the meantime, take care of others. If he or she uses abusive verbal performances to ruin others the speak simultaneously destroys himself or herself.

It is for this reason that statements of caution concerning speech acts, such as “aka caciaw” or “do not speak”, “do not speak loudly,” “do not speak casually or at your own pleasure on public occasions,” could often be heard while I was in Falangaw. When attending kaput (age-set) meetings, I observed that generally it was the case that some specific persons did the talking while the others were usually silent and paid
attention to the speakers. Informants of different ages explained this scene to me and emphasized that those who were talkative, especially on official occasions, were always short-lived. They would either fall ill or experience some mishap, like a fatal traffic accident. Those informants, especially the elder ones, who remained silent in kaput meetings, used such words to convince me of the power of speech. They took their own longevity as the self-evident proof of that power.

Not only is speaking in a public space considered dangerous, but issues about ancestors and historical events must be spoken carefully. Take my own experience of doing interview in Falangaw as an example. In the early stage of my fieldwork, based on some informants’ recommendations, I visited some elders’ homes and tried to document their memories about historical events and the Palidaw genesis. All but one of elders refused my visit. Those who were reluctant to accept my request for an interview explained that they knew little about such matters or that their seniors never told them much about what had happened in the past. The one who did agree to talk with me required that I pay him some money in a red envelope. At first, I thought

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38 Taiwanese people put money into red envelopes and send it to others as a blessing gift on occasions like the lunar New Year, weddings, inauguration of a building, admissions to a good university or company, or a recovery from illness. In Taiwan, a red envelope, in addition to its economic value, has connotations of benediction and counteracting unluckiness. Of course, sometimes one sends a red envelope to a person whom she/he wants to please or bribe. That was why I misunderstood Sawmah, the informant, when he charged for a red envelope.
that this old man was treating my interview as a transaction, because usually the Amis people I met in Falangaw would feel embarrassed to ask for money from a stranger.

After receiving the red envelope and finishing the interview, Sawmah, the 80-year-old informant, told me that he thought he was risking his life by telling me about this history. The reason, he continued, was that every word he said would connect to all the kawas, or spirits, that inhabited the space of the historical events he mentioned. Ancestral spirits would therefore come to him in his sleep and cause him to dream something that could make him sick. Sawmah told me that those who refused my request for an interview did so for similar reasons. It was only in passing, or on special occasions, that such historical matters were considered safe to discuss.  

39 Only on a few occasions, such as funeral and saraowan, an annual community ritual held in the winter solstice, can Falangaw Amis people openly talk about events happening in the past. More details will be provided in later chapters when discussing the Amis family and the age-sets. Here one thing could be misunderstood. “Historical events” are not those of personal life experience and/or social history but events or figures relevant to collective or interpersonal affairs like the genesis of the Amis, maanga’ay’s (witches’) curing of patients, kakita’an’s great and bad doings, and tragic or significant disputes between individuals or warfare between the Amis and other ethnic groups which have shaped and changed Falangaw. These two different sorts of things (personal life experience and collective or interpersonal affairs) are actually not clear-cut; each informant has his or her own criterion to distinguish the two. And sometimes when a historical event, formerly thought as the unspeakable, was discussed in public and nothing malign happened afterward to the narrator, this event could come to be regarded as a safe issue that could be talked about openly. After my interview with Sawmah, some aged informants agreed to take the interviews because they heard that Sawmah was well after talking about these historical events.
Here the Amis concept of the past is clearly manifest: history and historical events never vanish or go away, but instead always remain around living people. Everything ends and everyone dies eventually, but the kawas last, and historical events and figures are resurrected whenever people say something relevant to summon them.

The manner of speech matters a lot as well. The most important guideline for speaking is never to get angry easily. If one does, he or she will be considered to have a “amoko’ay ko pinangan” (short temper). Obviously, to the Amis, arrogant people or the people with bad tempers are akawang and amoko’ay. When it comes to personality, akawang (high) and amoko’ay (short) are both malign values.

One implication of this is that it is ngaayay ko pinangan or good manner to express oneself by showing kangodo. Kangodo means respect, embarrassment, politeness, and shame (Fey 1986:106). I argue that sometimes when people feel kangodo it is simpler and more comprehensive to see this word as a euphemism for indirectness. Usually, my informants asked me and their juniors not to forget to be kangodo when doing or saying something, whether in front of the crowd and in face-to-face relationships. People in Falangaw use kangodo as a buffer to structure the distance between the self and the other, and protect oneself from harm. This buffer can be interpreted as politeness and respect when facing seniors, relatives, kaput members and unfamiliar people. It also can be employed as a weapon, by saying that someone is awa kangodo
or shameless. This is done to criticize those who are regarded as *sakaniway* (dishonest) and *akawang* (arrogant). Such criticisms are made to protect one’s domain of personhood from the intrusive assertions of others and to maintain public order.

How, then, is one to argue and assert themselves properly? Where is the balance between self-expression and being *kangodoay*? Or, how do we depict the tension between the individual and the dividual? Generally, a person argues or asserts something according to the context in which he or she is speaking. People of different ages and genders must speak differently when situated in different surroundings, like the age-sets and their family. Elders usually have the right to condemn those who are younger when things get off track, but elders who abuse their powers are regarded as *akawang*. In these cases, such elders would lose their legitimacy to speak from their social positions. As example of an *itukalay* leader fiercely scolding some younger men and thereby causing some unexpected setbacks will be presented in chapter 6.

Good oratory expressions also have to meet two requirements. They must be convincing or based on facts, and they must also be eloquent. However, no matter how successful the oration, or how charismatic the speaker, there is always criticism and gossip on the spot or behind the scene. Many informants enjoyed sharing anecdotes about how certain *kakita’ans* were, as a result of their behavior, unable to
enjoy longevity and beget their own children.\textsuperscript{40} To these misfortunes, my informant Futol, grandson of a kakita’an in the Japanese period, explained that those kakita’ans were obliged to get involved in too many things, and as a result they suffered from some malignity, including sterility.

What the informants meant was that in such cases those who took care of public affairs had to do a lot talking both to the liteng (ancestral spirits) and to living people in order to solve disputes. Usually, however, matters could not be considered from all perspectives. As a result, discontent, resentment, criticism, and gossip prevailed everywhere in Falangaw. My informants believed that such things would indeed do harm to those who held power in public. In Falangaw, tatangalan, the religious leader who contacts the tireng and the kawas in an age-set, is likewise considered to be in a dangerous position. Indeed, many tatangalans I knew, after unexpected accidents, fell ill or died. My informants attributed these mishaps both to the fact that these individuals had talked too much with supernatural beings and to their akawang position and attitudes.

Voluntarily expressing one’s oratory skills and abilities is the one extreme of the

\textsuperscript{40} Many kaktata’ans did not have any child, and they solved this problem by adopting children from other Amis families or even from families of other ethnic groups. More detailed discussions about this will be given in later chapters to show adoption as a strategy, employed by some kakita’an families some decades ago in Falangaw, to consolidate these families’ privileged status after the advent of modern regimes.
Amis spectrum of power. At the other extreme lies criticism and gossip, along with the concept and practice of *kangodo*. The whole structure of power can be described as follows. At one end is the individual selfhood, or the self-assertion to actualize the power of the body in the spirit of egalitarianism. At the other end is the dividual personhood situated within a social context, especially a context of hierarchically ordered age-sets. Between these two extremes—the individual and the dividual—all kinds of power, including governmental power, can intervene.

The following are some examples that demonstrate how Falangaw Amis people have engaged with the power relations between the individual and the dividual in order to beneficially position themselves in the world of modernity. I have already presented data (in chapter 2) to the effect that there are certain hidden dialogues between the Amis and the Puyuma in the Palidaw genesis narrative. For example, some Puyuma people consider the stories about the stone birth and about the place where the bamboos grow upside-down to belong exclusively belong to them, the Puyuma people. A story about how people were transformed into stones is prevailing in Puyuma communities as well. In Taiwan, the general public think that these stories, whether in the Amis or Puyuma communities, are Puyuma legends. Even some accounts published in the Japanese colonial period suggest that these legends are commonly shared by the Amis and the Puyuma (Sayama 2007[1913]: 214, 244).
In addition, Chen Jian-nien, the former county magistrate of Taitung County, is a Puyuma. The fact that Chen once held this office aroused some critical discussion in Falangaw. The reason for this was that, while the Amis outnumbered the Puyuma, no Amis had ever served in the post of county magistrate. Among my Amis informants, a sense of loss could be felt when this issue was discussed. To explain why the Puyuma got the upper hand in this case, my informants remarked that the Puyuma always took everything good away because they did not feel *kangodo* and dared to speak whatever they wished without hesitation.

The second example concerns the relationship between the Amis and the Hoklo, or the Han Taiwanese. The Amis have had friction with the Han Taiwanese who have lived around them for over a hundred years.\(^{41}\) Ethnic politics in Taiwan, however, makes issues such as indigenous people’s feeling about exploitation and discrimination unspeakable and unaccountable. Some hegemonic propaganda promoting so-called political correctness in Taiwan after 1949 has taught all the peoples of Taiwan some lessons about ethnic politics. In this hegemonic propaganda, one of the lessons is that the Chinese from Mainland China, along with the Hoklo, the

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\(^{41}\) The Hoklo and the Hakka are offspring of Chinese immigrants migrating from China in the last four centuries. The Hoklo and the Hakka, especially the Hoklo, call themselves the Taiwanese. To distinguish them from the Han Chinese who came to Taiwan after 1945, I call the Hoklo and the Hakka the Han Taiwanese. The Amis call the Hoklo *payrang*, the Hakka *ngayngay*, and the Han Chinese (*waishengren*) *kuapin* or *minko*.
Hakka, and the indigenous people, are members of one family. A further, related lesson, is that advocating a distinct sense of ethnicity is evil, because it dissolves the solidarity espoused by the country.

Being a Han Taiwanese, I felt that it was hard to discuss this issue because it was embarrassing both to myself and to my Amis informants. Gradually, however, some informants agreed to share their experiences and reflections on this issue. At first, I thought that the issues they wanted to talk about were about how their land was taken away by payrang or the Han Taiwanese. To my surprise, the focus lay elsewhere. The most uncomfortable issue for them to discuss was the payrang’s use of filthy expressions to them in everyday life. They thought that the most offensive or dirtiest Hoklo/Taiwanese smut was gan ningniaya (screw your mother) or gan ningniaya ji-mbai (screw your mother’s genital). Smut like that really irritated my informants.

Not only did the meaning of these expressions violate my informants’ conception of the body/person, but they also seriously harmed the addresser as well as the addressee. “How can you payrang talk like this? We Amis don’t talk that way,” Sawmah’s youngest son said.

Following this rationality, my informants commented that payrang are those who always like to loudly curse at others. Even when watching news on TV, my informants identified the on-screen politicians from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as
bad guys or as those who constantly scolded everyone and everything. As I stated in chapter one, one of the DPP’s most important political tasks has been to actualize Taiwan’s independent sovereignty and to oppose the KMT’s (Kuomintang’s/Chinese Nationalist Party’s) Chinese nationalism. To fulfill this goal, the local DPP, which is composed mostly of Taiwanese/Hoklo people (or payrang in Amis people’s word), adopted the strategy of attacking the KMT’s monopoly on political power. They did this using every means available, including physical and verbal confrontations with KMT counselors, until they became the elected government in 2000. Such political struggles, however, meant something else to the Amis. The Amis evaluated the world beyond their everyday life using the same criteria for measuring their body or personhood. Such criteria, moreover, also informed their negative experiences with payrang in their everyday life.

Understanding the Amis concept and practice of the body also helps shed light on social change among the Amis. The concept of being akawang (high), introduced above, but has changed in meaning in contemporary Falangaw. The nation-state, for example, has become a symbol that now arguably ranks among the highest in the Amis’ hierarchical cosmology. This change occurred when Falangaw Amis people encountered bureaucratic administration, military service, obligatory education, and police inspection and intervention. These everyday experiences soon connected to the
basic ways in which Falangaw Amis people have come to think about and practice the body and the person, as well as to new concepts and practices concerning akawang.

Age seniority and positions such as kakita’an and tatangalan are no longer the exclusive sources of power. The nation-state has gradually and partially, if not totally, replaced the status and the role of the liteng (ancestors). Both the Japanese, as well as the KMT in its early stage, can be identified as a sort of militarism. The cult of Shintō (in the Japanese period) and of the Revolution Martyrs (in the KMT period) were disseminated through educational institutions, although they not widely practiced in Falangaw. These cults presupposed that the spirits of the nation-state’s founding fathers inhabit heaven and watch over all subjects, thereby encouraging subjects to have a spirit of self-sacrifice for the nation. Some elderly informants recalled that, when they were elementary school students in the Japanese colonial period, the school arranged a hike for students every year to the Jinja (神社), or Shintō shrine, so that they would get a patriotic education. After World War Two, the KMT Chinese colonial government transformed the Jinja into a Martyrs’ Shrine (忠烈祠), commemorating the martyrs of the KMT regime.42 Unconsciously influenced or inspired by these

42 During the Japanese colonial period, the Japanese built Jinja almost everywhere in Taiwan. There was one located on the Li-yu Mountain, Taitung City, quite near Falangaw. After World War Two, the KMT government kept some Jinjas and transformed them into Martyrs’ Shrines worshipping the sacrificed souls of this newly founded nation-state. Every year on March 29, the Youth’s Day, the
cults of the nation-state, a new concept of a collective and abstract ancestral spirit of the Amis Tribe, which would not have made any sense in a traditional Amis community before the advent of the Japanese regime, appeared in the sefi or Men’s House. The Amis Tribe Flag and the Theme of the Amis also appeared as the concrete symbols of this newly created concept in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{43} The worship and remembrance of Kulas Mehengheng, “the father of the Amis Tribe” as the Falangaw Amis put it, can likewise be understood as similar to the worship of the Japanese Emperor and Chiang Kai-shek. Simply put, without the experience the Jinja and the Martyrs’ Shrine, the sefi of Falangaw would not be the way it is today.

In addition to renewing the concept of hierarchy, the Falangaw Amis also obtained from their experience of modern governance symbolic resources with which to claim an egalitarian spirit. The law is premised on the principle that every individual is equal. This proposition offers a foundation for the Amis to empower themselves and also to changes the balance between individual selfhood and dividual social contexts.

\textsuperscript{43} Informants confirmed that traditionally a sefi was a thatched cottage built mainly for those unmarried kapah to get rest. \textit{Rather than being religiously rigid like what we see today}, the atmosphere there was always free and relaxed. More details about the changes of sefi and some practices in it will be presented in chapter 4.
For example, forty years ago, after being beaten by his seniors, a kapah (a la Tinko member) decided to sue his superior age-set members.\textsuperscript{44} This legal case caused a big disturbance in Falangaw, and the previously permitted beating, claimed as a necessary means of punishment to disobedient juniors by senior males, has never again been put to use. What the government’s intervention offers is not just negative prohibitions. It also presents a variety of alternatives for the Amis to achieve the ideal of egalitarianism and empowerment of the self. Sportsman, singer, and politician (county councilor and city delegate) are different choices to such ends, in addition to the conventional ways, such as aging or being elected as a kakita’an or tatangalan. Although criticism, gossip, and even slanders about aggressive self-assertions are common in Falangaw, the ideal of egalitarianism, not just within peer groups but also between different ages, has become increasingly favorable.

Everyone in Falangaw wants to become some kind of “big man” in various ways, including the ways offered by the government. Power relations, or the balance between institutional constraints and individual manifestations, are gradually leaning towards the later. Such a change can be explained if we come back to the Amis concept of the body/person. Since the state has come to occupy the highest position in

\textsuperscript{44} La is the definite article in Amis for the age-set names. Here la Tinko means the team or age-set of Tinko.
the Amis cosmological order, striving for self-assertion in Falangaw has become less of a religious or sacred matter than before. The state now offers alternatives for today’s Amis people to achieve self-actualization—alternatives which are now safer and more secular. People in Falangaw now do not always think that their speech and conduct will necessarily cause damages or illness. This is because such value judgments have ceded to the secular state. More concrete examples about how Falangaw people assert themselves in their relations with the state will be offered in chapter 6.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I introduced some Falangaw Amis ideas of the supernatural, the life cycle of the body, how the ideas of the body, person, and self were conceptualized and practiced, and how some relations of power work in Falangaw. After introducing these Amis cultural conceptualizations, it becomes clear that people in Falangaw hold ambivalent attitudes toward social practice. They are sometimes eager to express their innerness. But at other times they think doing so would be pompous, arrogant and dangerous—behaviour deserving of blame and constraint. Both attitudes originate from the same idea about the body. I argue that this ambivalence arises from the cultural schema of the Amis in regards to the body/person/self complex. I have used this schema to illuminate how power works in Falangaw Amis people’s everyday
practice.

Nonetheless, the advent of the modern state system and its effects has brought about changes among the Amis. It has broken the equilibrium of personal agency and institutional sanction, because the idea of the state has become connected with existing cultural schema. In addition, some Falangaw people have been willing to connect with some new symbols of hierarchy offered by the state. The meaning of the person has thus changed from the bodily- or/and hierarchically-based personhood to the body with the imaginary of the state. The person is gaining an abstract existence. Nowadays in Falangaw, the person of Tribe/State is losing the sacredness that every person/self once possessed. Gradually, an Amis is becoming a person without ‘adingo but with the spirit of a collectively imagined being, like that of the state and of the Amis Tribe.

Such a change does not mean that the people of Falangaw have been totally emptied by sovereign power. Instead, when facing the advent of modern states they have broken away from the conventional frame of dividual and individual relationships and have gotten themselves involved in a new frame of power relations. Although some cultural practices have changed, the schema basically remains and the Falangaw Amis people have become “lighter,” freer, and more amerek to move. This has generated new concepts and practices with which to face the omnipresent
state and the global world. Describing this new frame of power relations from other perspectives is the goal of the coming chapters.
Chapter Four: *Loma’, Masakaputay, and Niyaro’: Some Forms of Social Relatedness and Their Transformation*

*Loma’, masakaputay, and niyaro’* in Amis mean respectively family or house, age-sets, and community. Usually scholars call them social and political organizations, treating them as if they have concrete boundaries and rigid rules of function. However, some researchers caution that the concepts of social organization in anthropological studies like kinship could be just a folk theory of the Western world (Schneider 1968, Yanagisako & Collier 2004). To avoid such epistemological misconstruction, Janet Carsten (2004) uses social relatedness to phrase the things anthropologists call kinship and social organizations.

Here I adopt Carsten’s claim and do not treat family, age-sets, and community as social organizations which have concrete boundaries and inner coherences, because there still exist some misunderstandings about *loma’, masakaputay, and niyaro’* in Amis studies. Following Schneider’s suggestion, I use local people’s own terms to conceptualize them rather than employing analytical concepts of social organization which many anthropologists have unconsciously muddled up. But such a Parsonsian
way of separating social organization from cultural pattern adopted by David Schneider holds a very limited view of culture. It should be expanded to integrate gender and kinship together and “to see how people use local ideas and practices of kinship to reinforce or challenge structures with their own societies” without losing the ground founded by Schneider’s critique (Stone 2004:247).

This chapter focuses on introducing three interrelated kinds of crucial social relatedness, and by so doing, in the second half of this chapter, I show how the relations of power in the local society connected to the governing power and how the connections led to social changes. In addition to suggesting that the former accounts about loma’, masakaputay, and niyaro’ could be misleading, my main argument is that faki (maternal uncle or FB) is the crucial role that links family, age-sets, and the community.

**Loma’**

Loma’ means both living house and family in Amis. When loma’ does not just denote a physical building, it needs to fulfill two conditions: having a hearth, and family members living in it (Huang 2008:32). Therefore family, to the Amis, signifies members who were born and live together within the same house.

Given the definition of the basic kinship unit, we can define paro no loma’ or members of a family as those who consume and undertake family business together,
including the spouse, traditionally a man, who marries into his wife’s family (Suenari 2007 [1983]:126). Most accounts, for decades, have suggested that the traditional Amis society was matrilineal (Mabuchi 1974: 57-8; Shih 1976:103; Wei 1986:118), in which a series of hierarchical ranking like *loma’* (family), *raloma’an* (lineage), and *ngasaw* (clan) can be identified and confirmed. However, some recent research questions this viewpoint of matrilineality and proposes *loma’* as the very basic unit of Amis kinship (Chen 1986; Suenari 2007[1983]). And it is not (matri)lineality but the house or social agents’ habitation that decides one’s membership and rights to inherit properties (Suenari 2007[1983]). Besides, *raloma’an* and *ngasaw* are but the congregations of the relationship between the natal family/house and the derived houses/families, which cannot be deemed as corporate groups like what the scholars of descent theory propose (Chen 1986; Suenari 2007[1983]).

Given the aforesaid counter-arguments regarding matrilineality and hierarchical corporate groups, Amis kinship can be more fruitful analyzed with a focus on uxorilocal residence. For decades scholars have questioned the descent theory that has been applied both in Africa and in other places such as New Guinea Highlands and Amerindian tribes (Barnes 1962; Kuper 1982; Rivière 2004). Furthermore, James Scott’s argument about legibility suggest that the obsession with the concept of lineal descent could be relevant to the colonial governance which
always seeks to confirm the subjects’ rights of office succession and property inheritance by resorting to the “genuine blood-ties,” and concrete data about population (Chiang 2009:205, 210).

Matrilineality is a descent principle that could operate without a corporate group. However, in Taiwan’s Amis studies, the dominant viewpoint about Amis kinship is a model that contains both matrilineality and hierarchical corporate groups. Discussing the appropriateness of such a dominant kinship model is one of the tasks in this chapter. Surely Falangaw was matrilineal before the 1960s, and some characteristics, such as the privileged status of maternal uncle and the rule of property inheritance, also seemed to fit matrilineality. Yet, after examining Amis kinship in Falangaw, I argue that matrilineality, like patrilineality practiced later in Falagnaw, was just one of exterior appearances, not the core of Amis kinship. Thus, the point is not to argue that whether Amis kinship is matrilineal or not, but to identify the core of Amis kinship and to demonstrate how this core works in different kinds social relatedness. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to reconsider the dominant Amis kinship model, matrilineality together with hierarchical corporate groups, in the Amis studies of Taiwan.

*Ngasaw* and *raloma’an* in Falangaw are not equal to corporate groups like clan and lineage. Most of Falangaw Amis people I knew did not use *ngasaw* to describe
kinship groups that go beyond the domain of *loma’* and *raloma’an*. When asking about *ngasaw*, usually my informants confused *ngasaw* with *raloma’an*. After the advent of the KMT regime, in the 1950s, every indigene in Taiwan was forced to bear a Han/Chinese surname, and people of the same *ngasaw* in Falangaw did not necessarily take the same surname. Only two of the twelve *ngasaws*, Raranges and

45 People of northern Amis communities have the concept of *ngasaw* and use it as a means of social differentiation in order to tell relatives from irrelevant others, while southern Amis people, including the Falangaw Amis, have and use the concept of *raloma’an* instead (Wei 1961:1). However, that does not mean that southern Amis have nothing to do with *ngasaw*. In Falangaw when asked about his/her, in addition to mentioning his or her own name, the informant would say that he or she belongs to Pawtawan or Ciwilian or Raranges. Pawtaw, Ciwilian, and Raranges, to north Amis people, are names of *ngasaw*, but most of the Falangaw people do not even understand what *ngasaw* means although they use it as a means of social classification in their daily life. Some elderly informants told me that in fact the meaning of *ngasaw* was not totally strange to them; most Falangaw people just forgot its meaning and confused it with *raloma’an*.

46 There are twelve “*ngasaws*” in Falangaw. They are: Pawtawan, Pacidal, Paanifong, Tadisakan, Talakopo, Ciwilian, Raranges, Olus, Fafukud, Fafuyud, Inalan, Kalapisay. I put *ngasaw* into quotation because, as I mentioned earlier, Falangaw Amis people do not use the term of *ngasaw* as northern Amis people do in daily life. However, they knew that there was a kinship group one-level higher than *raloma’an*, and in the past people of this kinship group (for example, the Pawtawan people across different Amis communities) gathered together to worship their ancestral spirits once every year. Northern Amis call this kinship group *ngasaw*, but Falangaw people do not call it this way. Some informants confusedly called it *raloma’an* while others just did not know how to call it. A few elderly informants indicated that *ngasaw* was an ancient word used to indicate the place where their ancestors came from in the remote past. Falangaw people also used the names of *raloma’an* for place names (the places where families of the same origin were located), and that was partially the reason why some Falangaw people conflated *ngasaw* with *raloma’an*. 
Pacidal, decided that all their people should bear the same Han surnames. Rather than top down, the Han surname taking was from bottom up, meaning that a family leader, usually a faki of the tatapangan (the natal family), went to the government office to do Han surname registration and, later, other ciloma’ay or families divided from the natal family registered the same surname. Some exceptions can also be found: when the relationship between the tatapangang and the ciloma’ay was not strong, a ciloma’ay faki could just register a different Han surname. This clearly demonstrates that the top-down scheme, or the sequence from clan, lineage, to family, makes little sense in Falangaw. For example, both na Kimmoy and na Kuakaulan are raloma’ans under Pawtawan, which means that these two raloma’ans are close relatives. In 1945, na Kimmoy people took Sun (孫) as their Han surname while na Kuakualan people took Guo (郭), a different Han surname, as theirs.

It is also problematic to see raloma’an as lineage. Raloma’an, to Falangaw Amis, is not a corporate group, and there are no subjugated relationships between the natal family and the derived families both in economy and religion. Simply put, rather than seeing is as lineage, raloma’an is at best to be identified as loosely connected relations between the original family and the derived families, just as what can be found in other Amis communities (Suenari 2007[1983]; Chen 1986).

Furthermore, most of my informants could only at best identify their kin members
who are two or three generations both higher and lower than their own. Some informants were not even quite sure about the details of their grandparents and grandchildren, but they were usually quite sure about their maternal uncles (MB), aunts (MS), their spouses, and their own siblings and siblings’ spouses. A recent research conducted in Atolan, an Amis village close to Falangaw, suggests that unlike the Han Taiwanese, it is mainly siblings, not the deceased’s children, who attend the ritual on the Tomb-sweeping Day (April 5) for deceased brothers and/or sisters (Lo 2000), and this is the case as well in Falangaw. This again shows that the basic structure of loma’ or raloma’an is not completely that of the lineal mother-daughter dyad. The lateral connection between siblings, especially the sister-brother dyad, if not totally dominating, should be deemed at least as important as the mother-daughter dyad. This essential sister-brother dyad can also be found in the genesis narratives that I have introduced in chapter two. And an old (and now obsolete) custom, introduced in chapter 3, about married men being sent back to their natal families after their death and being buried with their siblings and parents, not with their wives, confirms the importance of the sister-brother relationship. The Amis case is not unique: such ambiguity between sibling and spouse (for example, a man being buried after death with his sister, not with his wife) can also be found in some house societies of south-east Asian and Austronesian regions (Bloch 1995; Headly 1987). This matches
some accounts suggesting sibling relationship as the key idiom and the goal of the practice of Amis kinship (Chang 1987; Lo 2000), although they have never won enough attention. With the sister-brother dyad as the key idiom in mind, below I will further argue that faki (FB) as the key role to connect both loma’ and niyaro’ to the outside world.

The sister-brother dyad does not suffice to depict the core of Amis kinship, so the dynamics within loma’ need to be manifested. Concretely, I argue that, rather than just seeing it as matrilineal, it makes more sense to define Falangaw as a house-based society.

First of all, matrilineality traces descent only through matrilateral ancestors, and it does not matter where a couple’s post-marital residence is. Yet it is not the case in Amis communities. A research (Suenari 2007[1983]) conducted in 1971 suggests that in Pakara’ac, an Amis community eighty kilometers north of Falangaw, and in the 1960s when uxorilocal residence was still prevalent, women who practiced virilocal residence lost their membership and the right to inherit property in their natal families. According to my informants, it was also the case in Falangaw that a person whose post-marital residence was in her or his spouse’s house could not have a full membership in her or his natal family. For example, Dipon, my landlord’s father, an eighty-year-old informant who practiced uxorilocal residence, told me that he did not
have the right to inherit anything in his natal family. He even took his wife’s family’s Han surname, just as many Falangaw men at his age did.47 In other words, it is residence or the membership in the loma’, not (matri)lineality, that is more important than the rule of descent.

Secondly, in Falangaw, before the 1970s, although the eldest daughter inherited the house and the property from her mother, the loma’ or the house where women dominated and which was passed down generation after generation bore the name not of the first-generation (grand)mother but of her husband who married into the house. The nomenclature of Falangaw Amis is a house name following a personal name. For example, Nikar na Kuakualan, a woman named Nikar, is from a family named after a male ancestor Kuakualan, the first-generation male who married into his wife’s family. Naming is relevant to how personhood or the self is conceived, and here we see a Falangaw Amis identifies herself or himself not on the basis of matrilineal descent but with the house where he or she was born; and the name of house is begotten from the male ancestor who married into the family.

Thirdly, my informants told me that it was faki, not ina or mother, who came back to the natal family to preside at family rituals such as funerals and the congregation of raloma’an members (misaaifa’ no sarawinawina). Besides, traditionally it was

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47 The Han surname that Dipon took symbolized a family originated from a married-in male ancestor one or several generations above, not a family originated from one of his wife’s female ancestors.
deceased maternal uncles’ kawas, not deceased female ancestors’ kawas, that a faki summoned in the prayer, and commemorating deceased (grand)parents was personal and additional, not the main purpose in family rituals.

Moreover, inside a traditional Falangaw Amis house, some contradictions can be found. In an uxorilocal marriage, a man contributed his lifetime to his wife’s home. From the perspective of women’s side (the husband taker), the husband giver (men’s side) needs to be compensated. The concrete way to compensate was that a woman practiced mitapi’ or groom-service at her boyfriend’s house for months, even years, before wedding, doing almost everything to please her boyfriend’s parents. Thus, there was an unequal power relation between the husband-giver and the husband-taker, and it was unusual for a husband, the one who had no right at all to make a claim for the house either in his wife’s or in his natal family, to host rituals in his wife’s family.

To explain that incongruence, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s theory of “house societies” (1982, 1987) can shed some light. According to Lévi-Strauss, house can transcend or solidify contradictory and irreconcilable traits, such as patrilineal and matrilineal, descent and alliance, filiation and residence, hypergamy and hypogamy. If we take house society into account, all the conflicts and contradictions shown above seem accountable. For example, significant social disturbances were rarely heard during the 1970s when uxorilocal residence shifted to virilocal residence (Suenari
That would not have been the case if Amis kinship had been of lineality (Ibid.). The continuity of their loma’, the core unit of their kinship, remains intact and what have been altered are only post-marital residence (from uxorilocal to virilocal) and the role of house inheritor (from daughter to son).

Faki (MB) is a crucial role in Falangaw. Before the prevalence of modern virilocal marriage, although always being prudent and timid in his wife’s home, a man dominated almost everything as a faki in his natal family. Such a role helped Falangaw people get through the transition from the so-called matrilineal descent to patrilineal descent, in which the importance of faki is emphasized and the concept of faki becomes diffused and generalized. To fully understand this crucial role, some details about how a man is positioned in and outside of his natal family are provided here.

Inside the loma’, in the past, the head was the eldest woman. Under the rule of uxorilocal marriage, young men were expected to leave their natal families. Such a shallow-rooted relationship between natal families and Amis males can also be observed in the male-dominated age-sets.48 Before the mid-1970s, my informants recollected, every man between the age of initiation (16-18) and the time of their

48 In the old days, Amis men came back to their natal families for family rituals, but compared to the relation between women and their natal families, men’s relation with their natal families were more shallow.
uxorilocal marriage had to spend most of their time at the sefis (Men’s Houses) to offer services to the niyaro’. During this period of time, young men were much less at home than the days before initiation; they even had to sleep over night at the sefis.

All the ethnographic accounts presented above tell one thing: Amis men, after the age of initiation, had to leave their natal families and spend most of their time either in the Men’s House or in their wives’ families. Women, on the contrary, always stayed at the natal family.

This indicates that the distinction between two genders lies in women’s staying at loma’ and men’s leaving loma’ for connecting their natal families with the outside world. This distinction is apparent if some rituals observed some decades ago are taken into account. Traditionally, millet/rice was considered belonging to the female domain.49 For example, the head of the family or the eldest female was in charge of the rice granary, and men were forbidden to be near it. Instead, fish was considered belonging to the male domain, and women were not allowed to touch fishing nets

49 *Lamlo* (millet) was the main staple in Falangaw, but after the 1930s rice was introduced and became the most important crop. The shift in crop can be partially attributed to the Japanese colonial government’s promotion, but it also can be understood as a process of the Amis’s being integrated into the wider rice-eating Han Taiwanese (*payrang*) society. Some informants told me that, after shifting to rice, some rituals such as kiloma’an, practiced for begging a harvest, became simplified because “the kawas(spirits) are different.” Shifting the main staple to what the Han Taiwanese cultivated, more and more Amis peasants adopted the Han Taiwanese people’s annual rituals or accepted the Han cosmological order (using the same lunar calendar, for example).
(Huang 1989:94). The difference between rice and fish lies in that the former, one kind of flora, is motionless and rooted in the ground while the later, one kind of fauna, is mobile and has to be hunted outside of the house. The difference can be viewed as the very distinction between the two genders, which means that ideally women should inherit the house or stay in the private sphere and men should go outdoors to seek resources.

Under such a division of labor between genders, it is not difficult to see the reason why the uxorilocal marriage was practiced. My informant Hoki further argued that, unlike the stereotypical idea about uxorilocal marriage, which assumes men’s embarrassed and slavery-like status in their wives’ houses, being a delegate of his natal family providing services in his wife’s house was to help vitalize the family which he married into. Here we see that the Amis masculinity lies in stepping out of the natal family to contribute both to the private (wife’s family) and the public (age-sets).

Hence, the sister-brother dyad as the core of Amis kinship manifests that, rather than a lineal-like or vertical structure, Amis families before the 1960s look quite flat and horizontal.\footnote{Falangaw was matrilineal before the 1960s, although matrilineality was not the core of Amis kinship. However, in a matrilineal society, social emphasis could be either horizontal or vertical. Traditionally, or before the advent of the modern government, Amis kinship was matrilineal and the social emphasis
my informants could only identify their kinship relationships upwards two or three generations. This implies that what decides the boundary of kinsmen is not the abstract principle of vertical descent but concrete living experience in the same loma’ and the relations of different families.  

Besides, those married brothers shared rights in equal quantity with their sisters in family affairs, such as negotiating conflicts within the family and between the families, taking charge of family rituals on the occasions of weddings and funerals. It is not difficult to imagine that, in the past, faki (MB) was always authoritative and demanding to sister’s children, whereas father was always dear to children.

An Amis man had to play two different roles, faki (maternal uncle) and ama (father), and the two roles were played separately in the family in which he was born and in the other family into which he married. In other words, traditionally an Amis man could

was laid on the horizontal aspect, meaning that bonds between siblings were more emphasized. Later, between the Japanese government’s doing household registration in the 1920s and the coming of patrilocal residence in the late 1960s, Falangaw was still matrilineal, but the social emphasis shifted to the vertical aspect, i.e., the mother-daughter relationship concerning property inheritance. More details about Amis kinship in this period of time will be given in chapter 5 and the discussion of the Malan Maiden, in chapter 6.

51 For example, the boundary of the ban on kindred marriage, according to my informants, is not clear-cut. Some couples are from the same ngasaw, or the couple’s ancestors were from the same raloma’an. What really matters is not the distance of biological relations but the common living experience or the distance between the ancestral spirits of the two raloma’ans or two families (Chen 1986:54).
not be an uncle (MB) and a father in the same place/time; he was either an uncle in his natal family or a father in his wife’s. However, the two roles now unite together because of virilocal marriage practice in today’s Falangaw. Thus, new virilocal marriages and old-fashioned uxorilocal marriages oftentimes can be found in some Amis families (men practicing virilocal marriage and staying in their mothers’ home, but his sisters still practicing uxorilocal marriage), and the role of father and faki (maternal uncle) can coexist in the same place and time. And the meaning of faki is thus extended from maternal uncle to both maternal and paternal uncle.

As I have presented above, uxorilocal marriage together with a house or loma’ inherited by women but identified by the name of the founding father forms a contradictory combination, manifesting that Amis kinship cannot just be neatly termed as matrilineal. Although the father came from his mother’s home but the goal of the descent is to continue the family named after the first-generation father. Usually in Falangaw the father’s name was used as the name of a raloma’an not because he played the role of father well but because he was a respected man successfully playing the role of faki in his natal family or dealing with public affairs outside of his wife’s family.

Therefore I suggest we view faki, a neglected key figure in Amis studies, as the role connecting his natal family and the family he married into. Not only does such a
connection exist in the same generation (between \textit{faki} himself and his natal family), \textit{faki}'s sons and grandsons also are called \textit{faki} by his sisters’ children (Huang 2008:31 Suenari 2007[1983]:208-212, 334).\textsuperscript{52} Here we see how crucial the status of \textit{faki} is. Some ethnographic accounts published in the Japanese period even identify grandfather (MF, FF) and grandson (DS, SS) as \textit{faki} (Koono 2000[1915]:171; Sayama 2007 [1913]:223). Today in Falangaw people call grandfather and grandson \textit{fufu}, and think that those ethnographers must mistake \textit{faki} for \textit{fufu}. Obviously, these ethnographic accounts are incredible to my informants, but they can be explained and are relevant to the crucial status of \textit{faki}.\textsuperscript{53}

Usually in the case of uxorilocal residence, a grandfather is also a senior and respected \textit{faki} in his natal family; and sometimes the \textit{raloma’an} he marries into is named after his name only if he is an influential \textit{faki} in his natal family. That could be the reason why when the first group of the Japanese ethnographers came to document

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} In the past, the Amis used the same terms \textit{kaka} (senior siblings) and \textit{safa} (junior siblings) to denote both siblings and cousins of the same generation. However, as mentioned in the text, they also used the same term, \textit{faki}, to call mother’s brother and \textit{faki}'s sons and grandsons.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} In those ethnographic accounts, the kinship address of grandfather/grandson as \textit{faki}, and of the great grandfather/great grandson as \textit{fufu}, contradicts the Amis’ idea of kinship address as I have introduced in the text. However, two of my elderly informants, Tenngo and Wupay, confirmed that a very long time ago when they were very young their grandparents were called \textit{faki} and \textit{fayi}, and the grandsons were also called \textit{faki}. Therefore, the Japanese documentation is not simply mistakes. It is based on some ethnographic facts.
\end{itemize}
Amis kinship terminologies, they confused the roles of grandfather and maternal uncle. And, as I have introduced earlier, to the natal family, a *faki* himself not only has a privileged status, this status can also be inherited by his sons and grandsons. This is why a grandchild is also taken for *faki* in some Japanese ethnographies.\(^{54}\)

But *faki* is more a term of social position than a term of genealogical relation (Suenari 2007[1983]: 334). More specifically, although *faki* and *fayi* are formal terms for uncle and aunt (FB and FBW), the Amis call their parents *ama* (father) and *ina* (mother), and extend these two terms to all the relatives who are one generation older than ego such as uncle (FB, MB, FSH, MSH) and aunt (FS, MS, FBW, MBW). Thus, decades ago, Falangaw Amis people called most of their maternal uncles *ama*, and only reserved *faki* for those uncles who were really in charge of natal family affairs. But it is not the case nowadays in Falangaw: I have witnessed people of older generations still calling their fathers, and some of their paternal and maternal uncles *ama*, but people under fifty years old calling their maternal uncles exclusively *faki*, and even applying to address as *faki* all of their one-generation-above male relatives (not including father).

Such a transformation has something to do with marriage practice. Before 1945

\(^{54}\) In a traditional Amis society, after marrying into his wife’s family, a man/*faki* lost his rights to inherit the property of his natal family. However, when a married man became a *faki*, he had a privileged status in the rituals of his natal family and in the affairs of his sister’s children.
almost all the Amis practiced uxorilocal marriage. But after World War II, the KMT government promoted assimilation policies, and the result was Sinicization. For example, my informants complained that they were discriminated by Han classmates because teachers advocated patriarchal values in school. And when doing household registration, in all Amis communities, it was common for civil servants to suggest strongly them to register the husband as the head of the family (Suenari [1983]2007:128). Gradually virilocal residence has become dominant, and married Amis men have seldom moved into their wives’ homes ever since the late 1970s. This has changed family structure significantly. Why does this matter? In the past, a faki was the one who married into his wife’s family, and came back to perform his authority in his natal family. The point was not marrying into his wife’s family but coming back to his own. Since the post-marital residence has been shifted to the virilocal, men, not women, are those who have the right to inherit the house. And the meaning of faki now is extended to include both mother’s brothers and father’s brothers, because, under virilocal residence, a man does not need to be responsible for his sister’s children like before. Instead, his brothers’ children are those he also has to be responsible for and to take care of. Now faki becomes a generalized and respectful form of address to all the one-generation-above male relatives. Moreover, in Falangaw, I have witnessed that when people come across unfamiliar seniors whose ages are
slightly older or one-generation above themselves, those unfamiliar seniors are also called *faki*.

The practice of virilocal marriage cannot be totally attributed to the national policy; it is also relevant to Amis people’s conception of gender differences. Before the virilocal marriage became popular, men were expected to move out of their natal families after puberty, whereas women were expected to stay and work where they were born. My informant Daya recalled that girls had to work because they inherited the paddy fields and the house, and also had to help nursing babies at home, which made parents felt reluctant to let their daughters attend schools. When the government, no matter whether the Japanese government or the Chinese KMT government, needed to do population management, it was the educated ones, usually men, who went to the government office to do census and land registration. James Scott (1998: 68) suggests that the government imposes the surnames upon its subjects not only for the purpose of making a population fiscally legible but also creating bureaucratic fantasies of the social reality taken for granted by both the government and the subjects. In this case it was the *faki* who decided on the Han Chinese surname of the *raloma’an*. This indicates that the authority of the central government has to be embedded in a local cultural scheme and social milieu to create bureaucratic fantasies of the social reality, and the key role of this scheme and the connection between the central and the local is
not the *ina* or *ama* but the *faki*.

However, the transformation of *faki*’s status caused some conflicts because of the alteration of sibling relations between sister and brother. Some aged female informants like Tenngo and Nikar (Difang’s ex-wife) recalled that, during the 1950s, not only did their brothers or mother’s brothers decide upon the Chinese surname, but they also registered the land and the houses under their names. Suddenly those women realized that they had lost the privileged status that they used to have. During the Japanese period, it was the first time for the Amis to do *kosiki* (household registration) in the government office, and one of the registration items was to confirm who the head of household was. The registration implied a concept of right, i.e., that the head of family had the right to inherit all the properties (Huang 2008: 27), well matching the traditional concept about how a *loma*’ worked. But the compulsory education in the Japanese period also gave the Amis an idea that everyone, beneath the Japanese colonization or the law, was equal. As a result, conflicts between siblings, especially between brothers and sisters, have appeared in Falangaw since that time. To settle those conflicts and arguments, different families have taken different strategies. Some families have accepted the newly achieved status of *faki* and let the *fakis* decide everything, while some have refused to accept it and laid an accusation against their parents. Usually when the parents were still alive, there was no problem. However, when the parents passed away, the problem of inheritance emerged. For details on the conflict among siblings, see chapter 5.

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siblings.

Take na Fasaw as an example.\textsuperscript{56} Tenngo, an eighty-year-old lady, is the eldest sister in her family. After her parents died in her early adulthood, she was supposed to inherit all the properties of the family. However, Tenngo’s brothers and younger sister did not think so; they accused Tenngo of misappropriating the common property. Felt betrayed and hurt, Tenngo took legal proceedings and accused them of deception and misappropriation because she thought that they falsified some documents of land registration. Tenngo and her husband Iciang got elementary school education in the Japanese period, which made them realize that such a confrontation could be solved only via the means provided by the ruling institution, but they could not speak Mandarin and also did not know how to behave in the court. With the help from some friends, Iciang got a payrang (Taiwanese) lawyer, and he discussed the law case with the lawyer by using Japanese. To pay for the expensive counsel fees, Tenngo and Iciang sold almost all of their properties, including their land and house, to the payrang immigrants and moved to Kaohsiung, working there as fishing vessel laborers. Finally, Tenngo won the case, but she also lost both of her properties and the rapport with her siblings. Initially na Fasaw people were quite well-to-do, they even had servants hired from other indigenous communities, but after this law case they

\textsuperscript{56} In order to protect my informants’ privacy, all the names (na Fasaw, the name of a raloma’an, Tenngo, and Iciang) are pseudonyms.
lost everything.

Tenngo always emphasized how disappointed she was about her loss and how greedy her siblings were. She also told me that she had made up her mind not to contact them ever since the beginning of the law case. There are many stories very similar to Tenngo’s in Falangaw. Such a shift from uxorilocal residence to virilocal residence together with conflicts within the families changed the power equilibrium between sisters and brothers.

**Masakaputay and Niyaro’**

*Masakaputay* or *finawlan* (age-sets) and *niyaro’* (community) are two other important kinds of social relatedness. Both the kinship system and the age-sets can be treated as some sort of measured units of time (to be discussed below). However, some anthropological accounts of East African studies suggest that age-groups are not compatible with kinship system (Baxter and Almagor 1978:19; Kertzer and Keith 1984: 34).

To understand the relationship between age-groups and the kinship system, two basic principles in both kinship and age-set systems should be mentioned: the generation principle and the age principle (Baxter and Almagor 1978:5; Kertzer and Keith 1984: 45-46). In the private domestic sphere, the expression of the passage of time is primarily based on the principle of generation, while in public sphere or social
space outside of family, time is expressed by the principle of age (Fortes 1984). This complementary/contradictory relationship emerges when conflicts of authority and inheritance between generations go to the extreme. At that point, the egalitarian theme likely appears in age-groups, so that age-groups, based on the common experiences within cohort age-sets, can crosscut and integrate different families.

An example of Falangaw’s age-sets can illuminate the complementary/contradictory relationship between family and age-set. I am always told that two brothers of the same loma’ cannot be in the same age-set (they would be dispatched to different age-sets), no matter how close their ages are as in the case of twins. However, it is quite common to see an uncle and a nephew belonging to a same age-set, when they are close in age, said my informants. Uncles (fakis) and nephews belonging to different generations are integrated into the same age-set, according to the age principle. Family and its generation principle are flattened for the purpose of the development and existence of public institutions like masakauptay.

I put masakaputay and niyaro’ together not only because masakaputay is the epitome of or an essential part of the whole niyaro’ (Huang 2008:50), but because it also manages the conflicts of different families and unites the whole niyaro’. In addition to that, the most important thing is that the concept of faki plays a crucial role in both raloma’an and masakaputay.
To illustrate the key role of *faki*, some basic information about *masakaputay* has to be introduced. Amis age-sets, according to academic classification, can be roughly classified into two types: the Nanshih type of the north and the Malan (Falangaw) type of the south. In the communities where the Nanshih type is practiced, every age-set has a fixed name, which means that after all the members of the oldest age-set die, the newest age-set will inherit the name of this newly vanished age-set. The Malan type takes a different approach to face the problem of social renewal. It does not repeat the names, or there are no fixed names. On the contrary, based on what was regarded as the most significant event happening in the past three years, a new name was created for the newly initiated age-set which included men born in three consecutive years. Every community of the southern Amis area has its own *masakaputay* or *finawlan* and of course has different age-set names to reflect its unique local tradition or historical context. By examining all the names of *masakaputay*, local people’s idea of history can to some extent be pinned down.

According to the 2010 Handbook of Falangaw Amis Harvest Festival, the newest age-set was the 65th, and the initiation of the first age-set was in 1819. Before 1896 or before the arrival of the first modern regime, age-sets’ names were all about events

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57 Informants could not confirm whether the first age-set they were told was really the first Falangaw Amis age-set. Therefore, it should be noted that the first age-set mentioned here should be regarded as the oldest age-set that the Falangaw Amis can remember.
happening within or around the *niiyaro*. After 1895, things became quite different.

Below are some details of Falangaw Amis *masakaputay* after 1895:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name of Age-set</th>
<th>Connotation</th>
<th>Year of Initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Dipon</td>
<td>Nippon (Japan, the arrival of the Japanese)</td>
<td>1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Kuli</td>
<td>coolie (the Japanese recruited Amis coolie workers)</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Cimpin</td>
<td>guard (the Japanese recruited Falangaw Amis men as guards to defend and to expel disobedient indigenous tribes)</td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Samay</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Sonteyn</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Honti</td>
<td>emperor (Japanese high officials inspected Taitung)</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My informants told me that la Hongti was named after Japanese high ranking officials’ inspection in Taitung. However, according to Sayama, la Hongti, the name of a newly-initiated age-set, was named to record the death of the Japanese Emperor (Meiji tennō, 3 November 1852 – 30 July 1912) (Sayama [1913]2008:154). Here Sayama’s account may seem questionable because La Hongti was named in the July of 1911 (and was put to practice in 1912), a year before Meiji-tennō’s death (1912). However, I think that Sayama’s account still makes sense because honti, meaning emperor, is a loanword borrowed from the Han Taiwanese or the Hoklo. I speculate that if Sayama was correct then the age-set had a different original name and was renamed as la Hongti in 1912.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deceased</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Inpay</td>
<td>snap ring of coat</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Ckin</td>
<td>paillette of betel nut bag</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Wusin</td>
<td>copper coins of the Qing dynasty</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Payaw</td>
<td>Palidaw (Hengchun) plains indigenes</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>arriving in Taitung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Toing</td>
<td>weaving</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Kongkang</td>
<td>battleship (a Japanese battleship got near the Taitung coast)</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Sontok</td>
<td>governor-general (Japanese governor-general inspecting Taitung)</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Taypak</td>
<td>Taipei (the Japanese government arranged for Amis youth to make an one-week trip to Taipei)</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Keton</td>
<td>halt (the Japanese government declared to adopt the solar calendar and forbade the Amis to celebrate the Harvest Festival or the new year in July)</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceased</td>
<td>la Tingmok</td>
<td>empire or turning over (the Pacific War broke out, in the year a ship also turned over)</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
near the Taitung coast)

**Below are sefi (Men’s House) age-sets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>isefiay (isefiay of isefiay)</th>
<th>la Tifo</th>
<th>embankment (the Japanese government recruited the Amis to build the embankment to prevent US soldiers from landing) 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Minkok</td>
<td>The Republic of China (Japan lost the War, the KMT government took over Taiwan) 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Tankok</td>
<td>tank (KMT troops stationed at Hsing-sheng Elementary School, Taitung) 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Koleyn</td>
<td>military training (the beginning of the KMT government’s conscription) 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Kimmo</td>
<td>Kinmen (young Falangaw males took military service in Kinmen, one of the islands farthest from Taiwan) 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Taycio</td>
<td>Taizhung (young Falangaw males got military training in Taizhung county) 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Tinko</td>
<td>Tinkok won a silver medal in the 1960 Rome Olympic Games 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isefiay (kapah of isefiay)</td>
<td>la Ceyacey</td>
<td>bridge (the Taitung bridge was) 1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
destroyed by typhoon Dinah in 1965)

isefiay(pakarongay of isefiay) la Congtong

president (President Chiang Kai-shek 1969)

inspected Taitung )

Below are taay lalon (Big Tent) age-sets

Itukalay(isefiay of taay lalon) la Punsiat

jet plane (Zhi-Hang Air Force Base was founded 10 kilometers from Falangaw )

1972

ipaladay(kapah of taay lalon) la Cedas

Flood (Typhoon Thelma severely damaged Taitung )

1975

ipawayday( pakarongay

of taay lalon) la Taytosi

Taitung City (Taitung town got elevated status and became Taitung City in 1976)

1978

Below are mimingay lalon (Small Tent) age-sets

mirurumay or wama no kapah la Ponkan

tunnel (the tunnel construction for railway transportation completed)

1981

Mihimingay (kapah

no mimingay lalon) la Kulanto

sport ground (the reconstruction of the county sports ground completed)

1984

kapah la Sansian

the Mountain-line (the mountain line irrigation channel competed)

1987
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kapah</th>
<th>La</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conghua</td>
<td>Conghua bridge completed and started being used</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ciataw</td>
<td>train station (the inauguration of the new Taitung train station)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yancuming</td>
<td>indigene (the official term of reference for indigenous peoples was changed from Shanbao or mountain fellow countrymen to Yuancuming [indigene peoples])</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fayfay</td>
<td>flag (the Flag of the Amis was created and instituted)</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahengheng</td>
<td>the inauguration of Mahengheng Avenue</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sefi</td>
<td>Men’s House (the reconstruction of Falangaw Men’s House completed)</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tongta</td>
<td>National Taitung University (the construction of the university’s new campus completed)</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quan-guo</td>
<td>nation-wide (to memorize the victims dying in Typhoon Morakot, elder Amis in Falangaw in Falagaw thought that all people nation-wide)</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
should cooperate together)

kapah (pakarongay of

mimingay lalon) la Tinki electricification (the completion of 2014

railway electrification of eastern Taiwan)

pakarongay uninitiated boys

Masakaputay can be distinguished into three groups: isefiay (the elderly), kapah (the youth), and the group of the three middle-aged age-sets (itukalay, ipawiday, and ipawayday) between isefiay and kapah. As I have mentioned in chapter 3, these three groups are associated with three different buildings, sefi (the Men’s House), taay lalon (the Big Tent), and miningay lalon (the Small Tent), because during kiloma’an (the Harvest Festival), the isefiay people have to stay in Men’s House, and the middle-aged age-sets and the young age-sets have to stay in the Big Tent and the Small Tent.

It should be noted here that the structure of masakaputay looks seemingly lineal, which means that the elder are the more powerful. Nonetheless, each of these three groups has its own age hierarchy. Take the taay lalon or the Big Tent group for example. La Taytonsi is the youngest age-set in this group, and it is considered as the pakarongay (uninitiated youth) of this group. La Cedas is in the middle and has the status of kapah (youth), and la Punsiat possess the status of isefiay (the elderly).

Generally speaking, the isefiay group has the highest status, the taay lalon is in the
middle status, and the miningay lalon’s status is the lowest. But in some circumstances it is not the case. During the Harvest Festival, in each of these three groups, the “pakarongay” age-set has to offer services to satisfy the “kapah” and the “isefiay” age-sets. And when the oldest age-set of the Small Tent, la Ponkan, brings all the younger age-sets to visit the Big Tent, the “pakanogay” age-set of the Big Tent, la Taytongsi, has to serve the la Ponkan people and all the followers, although they (la Taytongsi) are older than their guests. In such a scenario, the la Taytongsi members have to kneel down and deliver rice wine and cigarettes and shout to their guests: “komaen to e’pah, faki! (enjoy the wine, faki),” and “komaen to tamako, faki! (enjoy the cigarettes, faki).” The same situation happens again when la Ponsiat, the eldest age-set of the Big Tent, brings all the younger age-sets of the Big Tent to visit the Men’s House age-set group. La Congtong members, the youngest age-set of Men’s House, would do the same thing to greet the la Ponsiat members and their followers. Thus, rather than purely lineal, the structure of Falangaw Amis masakaputay or the direction that the age-set system goes is helical, meaning that in general, this system goes forward, but from some perspectives the later phases overshadow the previous ones. What is worthy of our attention is that the concept of faki appears when such overshadowing happens in this helical structure.

The importance of faki can be illustrated better if we check the relationship among
the three groups. The head age-set of the Small Tent is called mirurumay or wama no kapah (father of youth), and usually people call the mirurumay members wama or ama (father) for short. And people also call the itukalay (head of the Big Tent) members and the isefiay people faki and fufu (grandfather) for short. Hence, the whole masakaputay can be simplified as three kinship characters, and the sequence of the ranking is fufu, faki, and (w)ama. The rank of faki is one level higher than ama, just exactly like what the Japanese ethnographers have documented in the 1910s (Koono 2000[1915]:171; Sayama2007 [1913]:223).

But what really matters is: which kinship role really dominates masakaputay? If the Amis really practice gerontocracy as some scholars suggest (Mabuchi 1986; Wei 1986), then the “fufu” group or the isefiay age-sets must control everything. But it is not the reality. It is “faki”, the itukalay age-set, not “fufu” or “wama”, who possesses the real power. Although the isefiay people have the right to name the newly initiated age-set, it is those itukalay people who do rituals to bless the entire niyaro’ in front of all the participants in kiloma’an (Harvest Festival) and command all the age-sets below them to complete all the tasks. (The isefiay leader also did rituals to bless the niyaro’, but just in Men’s House, not in front of all the people). In the opening ceremony of the annual Harvest Festival, sitting on the speech platform, all the itukalay members inspect all the age-sets, and the isefiay members representing all the
masakaputay members bow to the itukalay people. Simply put, neither “fufu” nor “wama” leads the masakaputay system; it is “faki” that really takes the pivotal position.

_Kakita’an_ was the political leader who arbitrated disputes and acted as the representative of Falangaw to negotiate with other communities and the government. But in 1961 a _kakita’an_ sold the last _sefi_, Amisay, to _payrang_ and profited from the trade without Falangaw people’s consent. After this event, Falangaw Amis people decided to abolish the position of _kakita’an_ and consolidated the collective leadership undertaken by the “faki” or the _itukalay_ members. Here I am not saying that it is the real _faki_ who dominates the masakaputay or that age-sets should be treated as some sort of kinship organization (cf. Yeh 2009). What I want to emphasize is that _faki_, be it a crucial kinship idea and/or a social role, mediates power relations in different kinds of social relatedness.

Probably Falangaw is now the only Amis community without _kakita’an_. Both in the Qing Chinese (1875-1895) and the Japanese (1896-1945) colonial periods, the governmental power did not completely penetrate Falangaw, and the Amis still retained some sort of autonomy. When there were confrontations within the _niyaro’_, people sought help from the conventional authority, _kakita’an_, not from the official agents, to solve their problems.
However, after 1945, Falangaw was incorporated into an urban planning project which led to the movement of a large number of Han immigrants to Falangaw. The Amis were forced to move to their paddy fields, and the physical boundary between the Amis and the Han immigrants also became blurred. Besides, under the KMT government’s assimilation policy, the conventional authority of kakita’an shrank. “Why bother consulting the kakita’an? Nothing he can do anyway,” said Wupay, a sixty-year-old informant. Before the doom of the kakita’an system, knowing that conventional authority could not function as well as it had been, some kakita’ans ran in local-level elections and were elected as lizhang (里長) or borough president. Being both kakita’an and borough president at the same time, they could do anything they wanted without worrying about the check and balance from niyaro’ members. Such a dictatorship violated the concept of the person and power as presented in chapter 3, and that was why Falangaw Amis abolished the position of kakita’an and entrusted the power to itukalay or the “faki” age-set. In fact, the faki age-set is not as authoritative as a kakitata’an was. As the official bureaucratic institutions have taken over almost everything that a kakita’an did for his Falangaw fellows, all itukalay or the faki age-set can do is to decide upon and to host the most important annual agrarian ritual, kiloma’an.
Before 1919 there were seven sefis in Falangaw (Fig. 4.1). Every sefi was independent, and the seven sefis were led by one or sometimes two kakita’ans. The boundary of Falangaw niyaro’ can be delineated by linking all these seven sefis. Outside of this boundary were Falangaw Amis people’s paddy fields which became their new homes after the 1960s. In other words, traditionally it was sefilmasakaputay that defines the boundary of the niyaro’.

![Map of Falangaw and Its Sefis](image)

**Fig.4.1  Map of Falangaw and its sefis**

Niyaro’ can be defined by masakaputay/sefi because originally the latter defended all the people living the community from their enemy, as Sawmah emphasized in the Palidaw genesis (chapter 2) that the founding of the seven sefis was to ward off the

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59 The information of Fig. 4.1 is based on Lee’s investigation (Lee: 2006:83).
Puyuma. And after the Japanese arrived, there were attacks of malaria in 1919, causing several hundred deaths, and three sefis became obsolete due to the decrease of the population, as mentioned in chapter 2. Years later, during World War Two, when young men were recruited by the Japanese government to fight the Pacific War, the population decreased again and three sefis fell into disuse. Only one, Amisay, located in the center of Falangaw, remained (Lee 2006:84). However, owing to Japanese government doing land ownership survey and land registration in indigenous communities, which made the land, originally owned by the public, privatized, all the sefis were registered under the names of kakita’ans and that was the reason the kakita’an could sell Amisay, the last remained sefi, to the payrang buyer in 1961 (Ibid.: 86).

Facing the serious problem of no place for young men to stay, the government offered Falangaw people financial support to build a new sefi, a modern concrete bungalow called Malan Shanbao Huodong Zhongxin (Malan Shanbao Activity Centre), near Amisay. Unlike the old sefis, in which beds were prepared for young men and firewood was burned for the whole year in the center of the sefis, inside this new and narrower sefi, the national flag and the pictures of Sun Yat-sen (the founding father of the Republic of China) and Chiang Kai-shek (the president) were hung on
Aura of the cult of the nation-state was pervasive in this space, just like in military camps and schools, and most traditional activities that Falangaw people did in old sefis, such as dancing and singing, could not be done in this narrow and somber space. Only some religious congregations of kiloma’an and official meetings were held here. And gradually some rituals of the nation-state, as discussed in chapter 2, appeared with the extinction of the old style sefi. This “new” sefi was rebuilt or expanded into a three-story building in 2005, in the era of democracy and neo-liberalism. On the wall of the newest sefi, a picture of Kulas Mahengheng, the founding father of The Amis Tribe, according to the Falangaw Amis, and the Flag of Amis replaced the pictures of Sun and Chiang and the national flag.

According to official statistical data from Taitung city, in Falangaw, in fifty years (1950-2000), the percentage of indigenous inhabitants dropped from 81.2% to 10.3% (Lee 2007:110), which shows the indigenous’s displacement in their homeland. Those who still stay in Falangaw, little by little, lose a sense of belonging because the •

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60 In Taiwan, the Community Activity Centre is an official building which can be found in every community. Usually a Community Activity Centre built before the 1990s was prescribed to have pictures of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the national flag hung on the walls of the assembly room. However, not every Amis community used the community activity centre as the Falangaw people did. Most Amis communities that I visited used the space of the Community Activity Centre for storage, that means, to store the public belongings of the community. Falangaw is the only case I know where some rituals memorizing the founding father and the collective soul of the Amis Tribe were performed in the Community Activity Centre.
landscape is totally different from what it was. The Amis of Falangaw have been dissolved in the ocean of a huge immigrant population. Compared to the life before the massive immigration of Han people, fewer connections among Amis people can be seen in the latter’s daily life. Only on some special occasions, such as marriage, funeral, and kiloma’an, the Amis wore their “ethnic uniform”, as my informants called it, and emerged from the ocean of immigrant population again.

This is the reality of today’s Falangaw: different Amis families live separately in highly developed urban areas, and Falangaw niyaro’ split up into a natal community (Falangaw) and some derived communities.

There exists a special relationship between Falangaw and the communities derived from Falangaw. To all Amis communities in Taitung City, Falangaw is tatapangang (the natal family) and other communities are ciloma’ay (derived families). Basically only Falangaw, the tatapangang, has the right to do misatola or the sacrifice for ancestral spirits in kiloma’an, and Falangaw also claims that only Falangaw has the right to name the newly initiated age-set for all Amis communities of Taitung City. In other words, Falangaw has a privileged status among all the Amis communities in Taitung City because of the principle of seniority.

But this principle is not unchallenged. Matang, the biggest derived community, has named her own age-sets and practice rituals for ancestral spirits several times in
*kiloma’an* for twenty years. This has caused a dispute about whether Falangaw can monopolize religious legitimacy. In fact such a dispute demonstrates that the composition and the boundary of the Falangaw Amis are changing. Furthermore, Matang’s practicing her own rituals just fits the Amis kinship introduced above: the subordinate relationship of derived families to the natal family is not emphasized and would not last long in Amis kinship. To unite the Amis communities again, the “*faki*” or the *itukalay* of Falangaw invited all the *itukalay* age-sets of *ciloma’ay* communities to dance together on the last day of the Joint Kiloma’an (see chapter 6). Subsequently the Association for Promoting the Culture of Falangaw Amis Age-sets was founded in 1995.

The founding of this association shows that *masakaputay* is different from what it was. Originally *masakaputay* was founded to defend the community from its foes, as mentioned in the Palidaw genesis (chapter 2). Now it becomes an officially registered corporation. *Itukalay* and *isefiay* members, in the framework of this county-government-monitored association, were transformed into Executive Committee members and supervisors.

This connection with the bureaucratic institutions indicates a significant shift towards horizontal connections with the world outside of Falangaw. Before 1896, in addition to reclaiming the wasteland for all Falangaw people, *masakaputay* was
responsible for the security of community, and to complete the tasks it was necessary
to emphasize the ethics of seniority and to integrate men from different families. And
to tightly integrate people from different families, close collaborative relations
between the age-sets had to be fortified. That is to say, unlike loma’ in which the
principle of generation is emphasized, the structure of masakaputay, based on the
principle of age, can be termed as vertical. Of course masakaputay also had horizontal
connection within every age set cohort in which different families were integrated, but
such horizontal connections among families were limited to a three-year span (the
interval between two age-sets) and to the boundary of Falangaw.

The vertical structure of masakaputay stands in contrast to raloma’an. As I have
earlier mentioned, usually my informants could not remember their ancestors three
generations above their own generation, but people knew well most names of working
age-sets. And the names are useful clues for understanding significant changes in the
community. The names of masakaputay before 1896 are about events happening
within Falangaw such as la Cokar (cane), la Tomay (bear), and la Kiyaw (gamble)
(Koono 2000[1915]:209), which can be interpreted as some sort of vertical connection
to the past, because when these things or events were mentioned, a sense of remote
past with layers of historical depth emerged. After 1896, with the advent of the
Japanese government, gradually affairs and events of the outside world were
incorporated into age-set names. From those age-set names that signify the regimes (la Dipon, la Minkok, la Hongti, la Contong), war (la Konkan), civil engineering constructions (la Tifo, la Ponkang), geopolitics and the sense of locality (la Taitongsi), globalization or cosmopolitanism (la Tingo), indigenism and self reflection (la Yuanchuming, la Sefi), and citizenship (la Qiungkuo), it is not difficult to find that through masakaputay, Amis people of Falangaw connect themselves both vertically to the past, and with different age-sets, horizontally and outwardly to the external world.

Let me repeat my argument. After 1896, masakaputay shifted from vertical traces of historical memory within the community to horizontal connections to the outside world because its mechanism of flattening differences among families in an age-set can be employed to connect with the world outside of Falangaw. Some adjustments have been made for this change. One of the most salient adjustments that show horizontal connection is the practice of mikaput (joining an age-set). Mikaput is not new. When moving to Falangaw from a different niyaro’, an Amis man would be invited to mikaput. But mikaput now has an expanded meaning. In today’s Falangaw when it comes to mikaput, it means giving a man of a different ethnic group (usually payrang) or a high-ranking official a masakaputay membership. Two presidents of Taiwan (Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou), county magistrate and councilors of Taitung County, and Taitung City mayor, to name just a few, are all members of
different age-sets according to their age. Many *masakaputay* members invited their
*payrang* classmates, friends, business partners, and bosses and colleagues to join their
age-sets. During my stay in Falangaw I was also invited to join an age-set. My
informants thought that by practicing *mikaput*, Falangaw can reach out to the
resources of the outside world. Therefore, instead of treating *masakaputay* as a
concrete social organization, I propose we consider it as some sort of social
relatedness, not merely between different age grades within Falangaw Amis people
themselves but also between the Amis and other ethnic groups and/or between the
indigenous and the official. Falangaw people did that because they needed a new kind
of social relatedness to tackle the problem of social dilution which needs to be
patched by seeking some resources outside the community. And when considering the
case of the Joint *Kiloma’an*, what is worthy of our attention is that *faki* undertakes the
key role to bring about the change probably because going out to get resources for the
family is a man’s role.

The adjustment also changed power relations between men and women. Before
the 1970s, women hardly had anything to do with *masakaputay*. Even during
*kiloma’an* women just danced and did nothing else. But in today’s Falangaw, wives of
*masakaputay* members in *kiloma’an* were arranged to wear the uniform of their
husbands’ age-sets and were expected to offer services, working as their husbands’
auxiliaries. This change is remarkable. Traditionally Amis women and men belonged respectively to the private sphere (family or *raloma’an*) and the public sphere (*masakaputay* or age-sets). However, after the fall of uxorilocal marriage, the distinction between the private and the public has been blurred: married men are no longer subjugated in family and women have been subsumed into *masakaputay*. (Fig. 4.2)

![Image](image.png)

Fig. 4.2  Women wearing the uniform of their husbands’ age-set in the opening ceremony of *kiloma’an*

**Conclusion**

In this chapter three different kinds of social relatedness, *loma’, masakaputay*, and *niyaro’,* are discussed to demonstrate the power relations within Falangaw and between Falangaw and the outside world. Rather than seeing family, age-sets, and community as fixed and clear-cut social organizations, I treat them as different kinds
of social relatedness, showing how power relations are formulated both in the past and the present to depict the dynamics of social reproduction and transformation.

To the Falangaw Amis, *faki* is a key role that connects family, age-sets, and community. After examining the role of *faki*, rather than seeing Amis kinship as pure matrilineality, I suggest we see *loma‘* as the core unit of Amis kinship. Moreover, I argue that the sister-brother dyad is the basic relationship of Amis kinship, demonstrating that in Amis kinship, the importance of horizontal connection between sister and brother is no less than the vertical connection between mother and daughter. But after the virilocal marriage became dominant, *fakis* do not have to move out, and the equilibrium between sister and brother gradually leans to the brother’s side. And a woman who marries into her husband’s family does not have rights to conduct religious practices both at her pre-marital and post-marital residences. Besides, after 1945 the Han surname and property registration have transformed the structure of Amis families from the horizontal sister-brother connection into an emphasis on the connection among different generations.

Such transformations happened when Falangaw Amis was experiencing a tremendous social change. The government used every means, such as education and administrative management, to persuade the Amis to give up the custom of uxorilocal marriage, leading to the break-up of the connection, originally bridged by *faki*. 
between the natal family and the wife’s family. And urban planning further forced many families move elsewhere and led to more dispersion and isolation among affinally related families and families of the same raloma’an. No longer being interconnected and horizontal, now loma’ in Falangaw develops individually and vertically. To save Falangaw from disassociation, masakaputay has to horizontally integrate families, genders, and different kinds of resources from the outside world.

To the Falangaw Amis, the so-called tamdaw no niyaro’ or the people of the community, is no longer “the people who live in the bamboo railing.” Niyaro’ nowadays to them becomes nothing but a state of virtual boundary constantly (re)formed and negotiated by both the top-down state intervention and Falangaw people’s down-to-earth daily practice. Now it is time to move on to the next chapter to discuss how the Amis people practice and experience their daily lives.
Chapter Five: State of Regulation: Ordinary Everyday-life Experiences

In part I Anchoring the Amis I have introduced the concepts of historicity, the self and the body, different kinds of social relatedness and their transformation. Here in part II Diffusing the State, I want to demonstrate Falangaw Amis people’s ordinary and extraordinary experiences of the state to present their practices from below. I begin by introducing three Amis families. Through their stories, I examine how families of different social positions in ordinary days experience the state regulation in their everyday life.

Specifically, I present how these three families worked, entertained, remembered and narrated the past, how interpersonal relationships were formed, and how official institutions such as police, education, political parties, and compulsory military service shaped their daily life. I also discuss how these three families adopted different strategies of marriage and converted to different religions.

I introduce these three families, two kakita’an families and an ordinary family, to present how different levels of social status were formed and demonstrate their everydayness under different social positions. In a word, by showing how the impact
of the state repartitioned symbolic social space I try to demonstrate their everyday life beyond official regulation.

**Na Fasaw**

**Family Members**

Na Fasaw was the first family I lived in and worked with during my fieldwork research. Na Fasaw is a *raloma’an* under Ciwili’an. Most of Ciwilia’an people adopted Lin as their Han surname in 1945, the year Japan lost the war and the Chinese KMT government took over Taiwan. Initially the family lived in Falangaw, but during the 1970s, Taitung city urbanized rapidly, Falangaw was incorporated into Taitung city’s urban planning and became a residential district. So na Fasaw was forced to move out of Falangaw because the location of their house was in the way of urban planning construction.

Tenngo, born in 1930, was the head and also the eldest female of the family. Tenngo and her husband Iciang (1927-2000), practiced traditional uxorilocal marriage.

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61 Ciwili’an is one of twelve “ngasaws” in Falangaw. To the Amis of the north, a social congregation one-level higher than *raloma’an* or extended family is called *ngasaw*. Falangaw Amis people agree that people who belong a social congregation one-level above *raloma’an* are all relatives and sometimes have the same surname, although they do not use *ngasaw* to call this congregation. For detailed information and definition about Falangaw’s “*ngasaw*”, see chapters 1 and 4.

62 To protect the informants’ privacy, here both the names of the *raloma’an* and its members are pseudonyms.
After moving out of Falangaw, they moved to Kaohsiung city because, as I noted in chapter 4, they lost almost all of their land and property in lawsuit cases. During their stay in Kaohsiung, Tenngo’s husband Iciang and her son Palac worked as fishing vessel laborers, and her daughters worked in Kaohsiung’s Export Processing Port.63 Tenngo had two sisters and three brothers, and all her siblings moved out of the original home soon after they got married (Fig.5.1). All Tenngo’s siblings, except Lalac, practiced uxorilocal marriage. All Tenngo’s children married in mid-1970s and the 1980s and practiced virilocal marriages. After their parents’ deaths, there were disputes in property inheritance, which was why Tenngo did not have contact with her siblings except her youngest sister Lalac. (Unlike her sisters, Lalac practiced virilocal marriage because her husband was a Puyuma. As a result, she did not get involved in family lawsuit cases.)

63 In the 1970s the founding of export processing zone had something to do with the origin of Taiwan’s economic takeoff. Export processing zones were designed by the government for the production of low-cost exports to foreign countries. To meet the requirement of labor-intensive production, the export processing zones recruited tens of thousands production line operators from the countryside. This was the first time in Taiwan young people from the remote countryside immigrated to big cities en masse to get employed.
Tenngo and Iciang moved back to Taitung City in the mid-1970s. Since they had lost all of their land in Falangaw, they moved to Fukid, a *ciloma’ay* or derived community of Falangaw (see Fig.1.3). Compared to Falangaw, the living space in Fukid is smaller. But what really distinguishes Fukid from urbanized Falangaw is that the former looks more like a rural village in which most of the inhabitants are Amis. Tenngo told me that they bought the land from the government to build their house. It seemed that Tenngo did not like this new hometown because when I lived there I saw very few interactions between Tenngo and her neighbors. Tenngo offered an explanation: “I did not know my neighbors very well when we all were in Falangaw, and they are not my relatives.”

Tenngo was not the only one who did not have good relations with neighbors. Alasis, Tenngo’s close friend, lived in Falangaw and his closest neighbor was his
sister. One day Tenngo and some singers needed to discuss the repertoire of their concert that would be given several months later in Taipei, “Why do you singers always gather at your home or at Fiik’s? Why don’t we go to Alasis’s place?” I asked. Tenngo just answered that Alasis’s place was too crowded and his sister would be displeased with the noise. That was why, Tenngo explained, Alasis seldom invited friends to his home. In Falangaw, cases like that were quite common, and they were common too even in an Amis community like Fukid. Tenngo always asked me not to speak and laugh loudly. “But all your neighbors here in Fukid are Amis, aren’t they?” I asked. “Of course they are. But people live closely, and today’s Amis people are different from what we were thirty years ago,” Tenngo replied.

Na Fasaw lived in a tile-roofed bungalow (Fig.5.2) which was built by using the money they earned in Kaohsiung.64 Walking into the na Fasaw’s living room, first of all, the visitor saw two big posters and some gratitude certificates and certificates of award put on the wall. Two certificates were awarded by the Council for Cultural

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64 Traditionally or one hundred years ago, all the Amis lived in thatch-roofed and earth-walled houses. Those traditional houses disappeared in the late 1960s. From the 1940s to the 1970s, one-story tile-roofed and brick-walled houses were popular in Taiwan. More and more Amis people moved into reinforced concrete houses in the 1980s. Today many Amis families in Falangaw still live in old-fashioned tile-roofed houses because they cannot afford the reinforced concrete houses. From the housing styles we can roughly tell their economic conditions. The difference between reinforced concrete houses and old-fashioned tile-roofed houses can be understood by comparing Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.8.
Affairs, a department in the central government, praising Tenngo and Iciang’s successful performance tour to European countries in 1988 (see chapter 6). Beside the two certificates were a miniature of Dutch windmill and a pair of sabots (Dutch wooden shoes) bought 22 years ago during their European travelling shows. One certificate of gratitude was awarded by the NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) for Iciang’s help with the work of video-taping *kiloma’an* in 1996. The other one was awarded by the KMT, praising the couple’s cooperation with the KMT’s election affairs (Fig.5.3). The couple’s grandchildren offered a few things to decorate the living room too. Futol, son of Tenngo’s eldest daughter, left a saber there. The saber was given by his colleagues as a souvenir when he retired from his soldier career. Palac’s daughters also contributed sports medals they got in high school. On the wall, two posters portraying Amis traditional singing and dancing performance could be found, one of which was an international program repertoire of native peoples’ dancing held in Paris, France, in 1988 (see chapter 6, also see Fig. 6.2). The other one was a poster made by the Taitung county government for promoting traditional Amis arts, in which Iciang stood in front of other Amis singers. Beside the TV set sat a wooden sculpture of an Amis old man made by Iciang. Some years ago the government promoted indigenous arts and wooden sculpture was a fashion in Taitung City’s indigenous communities. Outside of the living room, some bamboo utensils
such as baskets, plates, and sieves were hanging under the ceiling of the kitchen. All of them were made by Iciang, and some of them were used as stage props when Iciang and other Amis were invited to perform traditional Amis singing on stage.

Fig. 5.2  The bungalow of na Fasaw. Courtesy of Chun-yen Sun.

Fig. 5.3  The poster and official certificates of gratitude

Although na Fasaw lived in a modern style house, some old habits were still maintained. For example, during my stay (April 2009 to August 2009) I had never had
meals with family members in their dining room. They either had meals in the living room or outside of their house, usually in the front yard. Moreover, when having meals with Amis families, I found that they preferred to use disposable tableware (chopsticks and bowls). The use of disposable tableware is popular in Taiwan but generally Taiwanese people use it when eating in restaurant, not in home. It is popular because the government promoted its usage in the 1980s to prevent some contagious diseases like Hepatitis B (Lin 1998).

When Iciang was still alive, oftentimes, after lunch or dinner, the family would like to drink rice wine and sing songs together. Before Falangaw was urbanized, people always sang songs when working in the field, and after work, people dined, drank, and sang together again. Tenngo recalled that when she and her husband were young, her siblings and their spouses, and Iciang’s best friend Difang often worked and sang together in the paddy field. Before Difang became a nation-wide famous singer he came to Tenngo’s home to drink and sing almost every day. To the Amis, singing and drinking were part of their everyday life. However, the good old days did not last long, since their payrang neighbors often called the policemen to stop them from gathering and singing together, or their neighbors simply insulted them by using the filthiest swears, such as ganglînñìā jîbâi and huanna, meaning screwing your mother’s genital and the barbarian (see chapter 3). Gradually, singing in traditional style in Falangaw
became a special event for special occasions, not an everyday practice as it used to be some decades ago.

**Work Experiences on Fishing Trawlers**

Palac worked on a fishing trawler when the family was in Kaohsiung. He and many Amis men of his generation had the same experience of leaving Taitung and working as fishing vessel laborers or seamen. After World War Two, the first wave of Taiwan’s economic boom together with industrialization emerged in the 1970s, when Palac and his age-set fellows were in their twenties. Facing Han people’s immigration into Falangaw, many young Amis people left Falangaw to seek better jobs. Most Amis men chose jobs like Palac's. According to my own statistics, over one third of la Congtong (Palac’s age-set), la Ceyacey, and la Ponsiat members, or men were born during 1946-1954, had experiences of working on fishing trawlers.\(^{65}\)

After the family moved back to Taitung City (Fukid), Palac worked temporarily as a wage laborer in a Taitung sugarcane plantation. The plantation was founded under the Japanese government’s policy and later was taken over by the KMT government. A few years later he married a Falangaw woman but his marriage did not last long. He

\(^{65}\) Three reasons made them choose this job. First, the pay was high, which helped them solve their family economic problems. Second, bosses or fishing trawler owners agreed that the employees could draw salaries in advance. The last reason is that there was almost no industry in eastern Taiwan, which meant that it was difficult to get work if one was unwilling or unable to be a farmer due to lack of land.
broke up with his wife and went back to the ocean again. The first time when I met Palac he had just quit his job in the fishing trawler and was unemployed. During his thirty-year experience of sailing around the world, he had a lot of stories to tell. He told me what happened when they were in harbors like Cape Town, Trinidad, Mauritius, and the Maldives, how they survived when their fishing vessels entered the territorial waters of Burma and all of them were taken into custody by the Burmese government, how they witnessed the Vietnamese War (they saw U.S. weapons and equipment floating on the sea and helicopters hovering in the sky on their way to Burma), and what happened to him during his stay in the U.S. for two years (he fell in love with an American girl and almost married her).

Later, I found that the case of Palac was no exception. Palac was born in 1951, and he was a member of la Congtong. People of his age in Falangaw experienced the process of urban expansion and were forced to alienate themselves from the traditional way of life. La Contong was the last age-set whose unmarried members lived in sefi in the year of their initiation (1968). It was about this time that many Amis people left Falangaw to seek new ways of making their living. It is also since that period of time that many people in Falangaw have had marriage problems. Palac thought that he could not stay in his marriage because his wife was addicted to alcohol and gambling, but he neglected to mention a collective experience of alienation.
prevailing in the years of his young adulthood that caused husbands or fathers in Falangaw to be always absent.

In addition to the marriage problem, Palac’s other complaints had to do with social differentiation. After returning to Falangaw, Palac did not attend age-set meetings anymore and showed no enthusiasm in kinship affairs either. “People have changed a lot,” he told me. Many relatives, to Palac, became different. For example, Laway, one of Palac’s paternal cousins, now a county councilor, charged Iciang money when Iciang needed his service. Palac criticized the way that some special families, such as families of kakita’an and middle class families in Falangaw, set themselves apart from common families. “They think they are noble men. How akawang (arrogant) they are!” he said.

**Religion**

Kulas (the eldest daughter), Iciang, and Palac died respectively in 1998, 2000, and 2010. Tenngo’s other daughters Putal and Kiko lived in Taipei. Kiko came back to look after Tenngo after Palac died. When Iciang was still alive, they lived on the national pension and some remittances from their children. Occasionally, they also accepted invitations from Taipei, the capital city, and foreign countries to display traditional singing and dancing. Today Tenngo lives a simple life in Fukid, doing only

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66 In Taiwan the government-run National Pension Insurance is a compulsory social welfare plan. Every citizen above 65 (55 for every indigenous citizen) is eligible to receive the pension every month.
two things: attending the Catholic congregations and meeting friends.

Religion, to some Falangaw Amis people, was a personal affair. It was quite common to see that members of a family had different religious beliefs. Tenngo was the only Catholic in her family. She had converted to Catholicism ten years previously. In Tenngo’s house there was a Han style shrine next to the living room, in which there was a tablet inscribing “the Shrine of the ancestors of the Lins” and a tablet of Iciang. However, after Tenngo converted to Catholicism, a statue of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and portraits of Jesus and Virgin Maria were added to the shrine (Fig.5.4). Why Catholicism? Tenngo told me that it was not her decision but her husband’s. Before he passed away, Iciang worried that after his death Tenngo would be completely alone, so he encouraged Tenngo to convert to Catholicism. Although the Falangaw Catholic Church was founded in 1958, most Falangaw Amis people believed in a syncretic Taoism which combines polytheistic beliefs and ancestor worship. Compared with the diffused Taoism, Catholicism, as an institutionalized religion, fosters tight connections among church members, and perhaps that was why Iciang thought that Catholicism could help redeem alienated interpersonal relationships caused by urbanization.
During my stay in Tenngo’s home, I went to church with her and realized that in terms of background, Catholic Church members could be roughly divided into two groups. One was the Amis people who were intellectuals or who worked for the government, such as teachers, civil servants, and officials. The other one were people who were in marginal positions like Tenngo.

**Friends and Memories**

Tenngo introduced me to some Catholics and her elementary school classmates. Usually when getting together, they talked about the past events of the Japanese period. One thing Tenngo remembered most vividly about her elementary school life was *misatofan*. In the Japanese period, students had to go to their teacher’s home to offer *(misa)* services *(tofan)* such as cooking, cleaning, and sometimes looking after the teacher’s children. When doing *misatofan*, she had the chance to live with her
teacher’s (Nakashima’s) family. Tenngo did not think that the students were treated like servants as the critics of Japanese colonialism would say. Instead she told me that her teacher really liked her and she was educated to behave like a Japanese girl, and some valuables such as a watch, a kimono, and a Japanese name Akiko were given to her.

After Japan lost the war and when it was about the time for the Japanese to leave, Nakashima tried to take Tenngo to Japan, but Tenngo’s parents refused. Tenngo and her teacher still kept in touch after World War Two. She showed me some correspondences between Taiwan and Japan. The Nakashimas even went back to Taitung several times to visit Tenngo and Iciang.

Tenngo was not the only one holding a benign impression of the Japanese. One day in Tenngo’s friend Yoshiko’s home, we discussed what they had learned in the Japanese elementary school.67 Yoshiko, an eighty-year old woman, also a Catholic, recalled:

“I still remember very clearly the days when I was an elementary school student. To me, what means most is Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo.68 Every morning before the class began, we

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67 Both Kiko (Tenngo’s daughter) and Yoshiko are Japanese names. Many of my elderly informants bear names that are not Amis but Japanese. But many people of younger generations now only have Chinese names and do not have Amis names.

68 Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo or Imperial Rescript on Education (教育勅語) is an important document signed by Emperor Meiji of Japan in 1890. This document emphasizes that the Japanese rule
students had to gather in the playground, facing the direction of Tennou (the Japanese emperor) and chanting Kyōiku Chokugo. I still remember every word of Kyōiku Chokugo.”

Yoshiko continued that she had asked her children to put the copy of Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo onto her chest when she dies (Fig. 5.5). “I shall bring it with me when I lie in the coffin, because it means so much to me. It teaches me how to behave properly.” Yoshiko was one year senior to Tenngo. In that meeting they recollected many things happening some sixty years ago. Yoshiko said that when they learned that Japan had lost the war, the principal of Malan Elementary School and all his family members committed suicide. Peeping through the window and seeing all the family lying together on the bed after their death, all of the students cried because they thought that the principal treated them very well and they, the subjects of the Japanese empire, were about to be slain by the Americans.

is founded on the basis of benevolent rulers and loyal subjects. Therefore, not only does this text ask the students to obey the law and the state constitutional system, it inculcates some ethics like filial piety to the parents and loyalty to the country and the emperor.
Fig. 5.5 Copy of *Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo* in Yoshiko’s living room

But not every Amis held the same viewpoint toward the Japanese. Tenngo told me that her elder brother Laway hated the Japanese because he had been recruited by the Japanese Army and had difficult times during his military training. Fiik, Tenngo’s cousin, also criticized the Japanese. “The Japanese were really mean to us Amis. Everyone was afraid to bump into policemen on the road. My cousin was recruited by the Japanese government, and was dispatched to the Philippines to fight against the American troops and lost his life there,” Fiik said.

Tenngo nodded and also recalled some hard times during the Japanese period. Her most vivid memory about that period was that policemen seemed to be everywhere. Policemen often came to check census registrations, and the atmosphere suddenly became rigid. Children always tried to find a place to hide on such occasions.

Tenngo also thought that Japanese policemen changed their daily life with two
other things: the public lavatory and the cemetery. To Tenngo, the Japanese were extremely demanding in sanitation. She remembered that in school the teacher checked every student’s handkerchief and fingernails. I also noticed a habit prevalent in indigenous communities (including Falangaw): before entering the house people would take off their shoes and wear indoor slippers.69 “Does this habit have anything to do with the Japanese?” I asked. “I don’t know. But before getting into a Japanese house you must take off your shoes and your either wear the slippers or you get into the house barefoot. I remember when I was a child, every time when the Japanese policemen came they checked the census registrations, and in the meantime they examined the indoor sanitation as well. When the policemen found that the house was not clean, we had to take the blame,” Tenngo answered.

Entertainment

Tenngo lived with her daughter Kiko, spending most of her time at home. Apart

69 The Han Taiwanese, the Hoklo and the Hakka, were also colonized by the Japanese. My father is from a Hoklo family and my mother is from a Hakka family. Neither of their natal families nor my parents keep this habit. In my own observation, in Hoklo and Hakka communities, usually the more expensive the house is the more likely the inhabitants have this practice, because the degree of sanitation, to the Hoklo and Hakka, has to accord with the class of the house. But it is not the case in indigenous communities. It does not matter that how luxurious the house is, and it does not matter that this practice actually keeps the indoor space cleaner than the outdoor space as well (I saw too many indoor spaces in Falangaw not cleaned for a long time). For Falangaw Amis, the distinction between the indoor and outdoor per se is the purpose of this practice.
from attending the church congregation once a week, the other place Tenngo visited most frequently was Mali’s house. Mali, a sixty-year-old woman and a neighbor of Tenngo, was a Catholic and the head of the neighborhood. With this official position her house became the center for informal gatherings and official meetings. During my stay in Fukid, Tenngo attended *houliban* (活力班, the Vitality Class), a weekly meeting for elderly Amis, organized and supported by Taitung Catholic Hospital. Moreover, during my fieldwork there were county councilor and county magistrate election campaigns in 2009 (from September to November). Being a member of this interpersonal network, Tenngo was quite often motivated to attend election campaign gatherings in Mali’s house.

The interpersonal relationship of na Fasaw was quite simple. Since Iciang and Palac had passed away, only her youngest daughter Kiko lived with Tenngo. Tenngo at times sang with certain persons she met, suggesting that singing became a special event having something to do with special people on some special occasions.

Like all the Amis people, na Fasaw entertained themselves by singing. After the advent of urbanization, fewer and fewer young Amis people sang traditional Amis

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70 The Houli Ban was a social education group established for the elderly indigenes. Based on the model of an elementary school class (*ban*), this group had two instructors and one class leader, and members called the instructor “teacher”. The contents of the course are dancing, singing, and health education.
songs outdoors; they went to the karaoke and sang popular songs instead. Palac and I went to the karaoke a lot, where they all sang Mandarin popular songs of the 1970s, the years of both Taiwan’s economic takeoff and their young adulthood. Elderly people like Tenngo and Iciang never went to the karaoke because they could hardly speak Mandarin and sing Chinese popular songs. However, Iciang bought many phonograph records of Japanese popular songs. During my fieldwork, Tenngo always asked me to play Japanese popular songs of the 1950s and the 1960s for her on Youtube. Japanese singers like Misora Hibari, Kobayashi Akira, and Mori Shinichi and movie stars like Mifune Toshiro were familiar and dear to her. Iciang and Tenngo also recorded many Amis songs that they had sung some twenty years ago. Tenngo still kept those tapes well but seldom played them at home; instead she used her pocket cassette recorder to play the tapes outdoors.

**Na Dihal**

**Family Members**

Na Dihal, located in Falangaw, the urbanized area of Taitung City, was the second place I lived during my fieldwork (September 2009 to April 2010). Dihal (Futol) was the *kakita’an* of Falangaw from the 1920s to the 1940s (Fig.5.6). He was from one of the Pacidal *raloma’ans* and later married into his wife’s home. Since he was a *kakita’an*, a great and respected position in Falangaw, people called the family na
Dihal to commemorate the history of the family (Fig.5.7).

Fig.5.6 Futol’s official certificate of *kakita’an* bestowed by the Japanese government in 1927
Fig. 5.7 The genealogy of na Dihal

The houses of na Dihal were located in the very center of Falangaw. Four children of Afi (Dihal’s eldest adopted daughter) lived separately but close to one another. Each of them had a modern three-story reinforced concrete house. Although na Dihal lived at the center of Falangaw, most of their neighbors were not Amis. In other words, na Dihal was quite isolated. I never saw them having any interaction with their payrang (Hoklo) neighbors.

I lived in one of Simoy and Dipon’s houses. Opposite that house was Nikar and Oki’s house, and Futol and Amoy’s house was next to Simoy’s. As all na Dihal houses were so new and modern, it was difficult to tell them from other houses belonging to

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71 As Simoy was the eldest daughter of Afi and Payrang, she inherited the biggest parts of property after her parents died. Simoy had three modern reinforced concrete houses.
their *payrang* neighbors (Fig. 5.8). Today in Taitung City, most of the Amis still live in tile-roofed bungalows. When knowing where my residence was, the first thing my informants commented on was that na Dihal was quite well to do.

![Fig. 5.8 A na Dihal house. Courtesy of Chun-yen Sun.](image)

Futol had four children of whom the first two died very young. To continue the family, Simoy and Fotul adopted two girls from *payrang* communities, and the elder girl Afi and her four children inherited the house and property. It was in the late Japanese colonial period when Simoy and Futol adopted the two girls. During that period of time, the *kakita’an* families could be richer than common Han Taiwanese families, and many Han families at that period of time regarded girls worthless due to the practice of patrilineal Han kinship. That was why Simoy and Futol could adopt two
I found that Afi’s sons were quite unwilling to mention their blood relationship with the Han. On the contrary, na Dihal women told me something about their Han ancestry when answering my inquiries. Futol, the eldest grandson of Dihal and a retired civil servant, emphasized that when his grandfather was the *kakita’an*, Japanese policemen always visited their home, and sometimes his grandfather had to go to the government office. In the Japanese colonial period, *kakita’an* was an official position supervised by the police department. Before the advent of the Japanese regime, *kakita’an* had been a mouthpiece of the people, speaking for his folks, that means, on behalf of the *niyaro*’. In the Japanese period, the police department set an office in the *kakita’an*’s home, making the *kakita’an* execute orders from the government, so the *kakita’an* was transformed into an official agent. In the first half of the Japanese colonial period (1896-1920), generally speaking, in Taiwan the government authorized local chiefs to manage their own indigenous communities. But Taitung District, after 1904, was different because of its backwardness in the eye of Japanese colonizers. It was the police department not the general administrative department that directly governed Taitung District (Huang 2005a:35; Wen 1957:690,896).

Futol showed me a certificate of *kakita’an* conferred by the Japanese government and emphasized that for his grandfather being the *kakita’an* was not pleasant because
it attracted something harmful to his family (see Fig. 5.6). That was why, Futol explained, his grandparents lost two children and were forced to adopt two girls to maintain the continuity of the family. Futol’s mother Afi was one of the adopted children. And since Afi was born in a Han/Hoklo family, and since the connection between na Dihal and Afi’s natal family still existed, these provided na Dihal with more social resources and connections than most other Falangaw Amis families.

Futol’s father Payrang was a Falangaw Amis. Just like Dihal, he was from a Pacidal family, but he adopted the Han surname Wang(王) to lay the foundation for na Dihal/Wang. Payrang’s daughters still practiced uxorilocal marriages, but his sons practiced virilocal marriages. For example, Futol, a seventy-six-year-old man, practiced virilocal marriage, which was uncommon to the Amis of Futol’s age. Both Futol and his younger brother Laway practiced virilocal marriages, and they both had the opportunity to complete high school education and later worked for the government. The brothers seldom participated in local affairs. Many of my informants criticized them and even refused to regard them as Amis. Furthermore, Futol’s and Laway’s children did not take part in local Amis affairs either (for example their sons

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72 Both Dihal and Payrang were from the Pacidal raloma’ans. Cidal in Amis means the sun, and the sun in Mandarin sounds like Yang(陽). And in Falangaw, most people of Fafuyod raloma’ans adopted Yang(楊) as their Han surname. Dihal adopted Yang(陽), but his son Payrang adopted neither his natal family’s Yang(陽) nor his wife’s Yang (楊). Payrang adopted a new surname Wang(王) instead.
did not have age-set memberships). Their sons had moved out of Taitung for many years and married Han women.

Payrang’s daughters, Simoy and Nikar, were different. They still practiced uxorilocal marriage and behaved like common Amis women. Unlike their brothers, they seldom spoke Mandarin, and no one questioned their Amis identity even though they had non-Amis ancestry. Simoy, the eldest daughter of Payrang and Afí, died five years ago. Her husband Dipon was from a Pacidal *raloma’an* and adopted his wife’s Han surname Wang, which indicated their uxorilocal marriage. During my stay in his home, Dipon always looked quiet and shy, just like Oki, Nikar’s husband, another Amis man practicing traditional uxorilocal marriage and living opposite to his house. Both Payrang and Oki were old-fashioned Amis men who spent most of their time in the Men’s House before they got married. In fact both Dipon and Oki were humorous and cheery persons when with others, although they seemed shy in their wives’ houses. Oftentimes when I chatted with Dipon or shared some CDs with him, he asked me to lower the volume of my voice. Futol’s house was the only house that connected with Dipon’s (both of them being na Dihal houses). Dipon worried that our voices could disturb his wife’s brother, the eldest *faki* of na Dihal who stayed in his natal family and lived next door.

**Land Loss and Conflict between Brother and Sister**
Simoy and Dipon had five children, of whom three worked in Taipei during my fieldwork. Only Afi, the eldest daughter, and Laway, the eldest son, stayed in Taitung. The Simoy-Dipon branch of na Dihal was quite well to do, but after Simoy’s death the family had serious financial problems.

Before Simoy’s death, Afi and Laway, the eldest son of Simoy and Dipon, had a conflict over property inheritance. Afi emphasized that as the eldest daughter she should be the one to take the lion’s share of her parents’ property. Laway did not agree with his elder sister, emphasizing that according to the civil law the property should be divided and distributed equally to all the siblings. No sooner had Simoy died than Afi stealthily changed the registration of real estate to her name, and all three houses were mortgaged to the bank for ten million NTD (three hundred thousand USD). After getting the money, Afi ran away and disappeared. Civil law under the KMT and the DPP regime did not take all the indigenes’ customary practices, such as rules of inheritance, into account. However, the conflict between the siblings presented above was not mainly about the civil law but about the shift in post-marital residence. Given the fact that Amis kinship is based on the house as discussed in the previous chapter, the shift from the matrilocal to the partrilocal residence promotes men’s

73 After the promulgation of the Indigenous Peoples Law in 2005, the judges have been trained to take indigenous people’s customs into account. However, it was not case when na Dihal lost their land and houses in Falangaw.
status in the family. Men now become both the wife-takers and the house owners.

Some women, such as Afi, who practiced uxorilocal marriage and whose brothers practiced virilocal marriage, could not stand the result of their brothers’ taking a part or all of the property. Tragedies like this did not happen in the Japanese era because during that period of time Falangaw was still quite self-contained and virilocal marriages were quite rare.

Laway could not afford to keep all the houses, only doing his best to keep the one that he had built (also the one where I lived when doing my fieldwork). Two of the houses were auctioned off by the bank, and the buyers were payrang. “That’s why we Amis could not keep the property that our ancestors left for us, and that’s also how we Amis lost everything we had little by little,” Laway told me. Laway had a good job (house construction). He worked for one of his Han relatives and the pay was good. But after the family conflict, his relative’s business closed down and he lost his job. Laway had to make his living by being a betel leaf (piper betle) picker (see below). The pay of his new job was much lower than his old one (three to four hundred USD per month), because it was an odd job for day laborers. Laway and his wife did this work to feed their family and to pay the mortgage loan.

Life was really tough for Laway, and he relieved his stress by going to the karaoke with friends or just drinking at home. He drank rice wine almost every day, and every
time he drank with me, some specific issues were always mentioned. First of all he
would tell the family tragedy repeatedly, arguing that it was all Afi’s fault to make the
family get into such a plight. Secondly, he would tell me how much land na Dihal had
and how he built the house by himself. Finally, he would recollect how lucky and how
happy he was when he took his compulsory military service thirty years ago. The
main contents of his recollection were about the hardship of his military training, his
impressive physical competence, and his superiors’ appreciation of his performance in
the Army.

Unlike Laway, his father Dipon was always silent. Although his backache made
him seldom step out of his room, he burned incense and worshiped ancestors twice a
day (morning and evening) in front of the Han style altar. Sometimes he walked
across the street, chatting with Oki, Nikar’s husband, or visiting his friends. I never
saw him appear in his wife’s brothers’ houses.

**Amis Entrepreneurship**

Nikar and Oki had four children. Their eldest son died twenty years ago. To keep
their land and property from being lost to outsiders (especially the *payrang*), her
parents forced Simoy, the eldest daughter, to practice traditional uxorilocal marriage
with a local Amis man. Since it was a reluctant marriage, Simoy found that they did
not fit each other at all, and the couple divorced after their second son was born. It
was not just her own misfortune; she emphasized that divorce was still quite common in Falangaw during the late 1970s, the time when virilocal marriage began to prevail and fewer and fewer men agreed to practice uxorilocal marriage in Falangaw. Nikar, Simoy’s mother, insisted Simoy should bring a husband into their home instead of moving into her husband’s because Simoy was the eldest daughter, and, according to Simoy, that was one of the main reasons that destroyed her marriage.

After divorce, Simoy felt hurt and went to Taipei to run a business, but everything did not go very well in Taipei. Coming back to Taitung, Simoy decided to transform herself. She converted to Christianity, took courses at the National Open University, and opened a workshop exhibiting and selling traditional Amis clothing. Simoy kept claiming to me that na Dihal, a kakita’an family, lived in the center of Falangaw, and being the eldest daughter of the family she should undertake the responsibility to promote Amis culture.  

Simoy was very conscious about the role she tried to play, and did her best to manage social networks to promote her business. She applied for a subsidy from the government to run her workshop and established tight connections with the county magistrate, mayor, and county councilors. In her workshop a photograph of her with President Ying-jeou Ma was put on the wall. Simoy enthusiastically participated in

74 She has a blog and the blog address is at:
http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/mishelle9509/article?mid=-2&prev=5250&l=a&fid=26
politics. During the election campaigns of 2009 she was a volunteer running errands for some KMT candidates.

**Na Kakita’an**

**Family Members**

Na Kakita’an is one hundred meters away from na Dihal. The name of na Kakita’an comes from the legendary *kakita’an* Kulas Mahengheng, so it is the most famous *raloma’an* in Falangaw. Usually in Falangaw one *raloma’an* only lasts three or four generations because of the structure of the family (introduced in chapter 4), but na Kakita’an has descended for seven generations since Hongay and her husband Kulas Mahengheng.

In Falangaw, Kulas Mahengheng was the first *kakita’an* in the Japanese colonial period. Hongay and Mahengheng did not have a child, so the couple adopted two daughters: Kima, a girl from a Pinpu (plains indigene) community, and Fiik, a girl born in Falangaw. Kima did not get along with her step parents and left the family. Fiik had twelve children. Na Kakita’an is so huge, so here I only discuss the descent line of Fiik’s eldest daughter (Fig. 5.9).
Mahengheng’s first granddaughter Hongay had ten children and Piya was Hongay’s eldest son. Piya (1918-1993) practiced virilocal marriage, although most Amis people of his generation practiced uxorilocal marriage. Furthermore, almost all family members, both men and women, below his generation also practiced virilocal marriage.\(^7\) After graduating from junior high school in Taitung, Piya went to Chiayi (see Fig.1.1), the richer part of the island, to attend high school and had the opportunity to play baseball, a sport that changed the path of his life. After the advent

\(^7\) All Piya’s brothers practiced virilocal marriages and his sisters practiced uxorilocal marriages to consolidate na Kakita’an. The exception was Piya’s youngest sister Yinna, because Kuano, Yinna’s husband, was also a baseball player in the Japanese period.
of the KMT government, Piya was elected as a county councilor but he quit very soon due to his incompetence in speaking Mandarin and his Japanese education background. Later Piya founded a rice mill, but it did not last long. He spent his last years in two things: oral tradition documenting and baseball education. Almost all Piya’s sons, grandsons, and his sons’ friends were Piya’s students. Baseball was a part of everyday life to some Falangaw Amis people from the 1960s to the early 1990s.

School boys played and practiced baseball whenever they had time, hoping for the chance to defeat teams of foreign countries and glorify the nation.

Not every descendant of Kulas Mahengheng lived a life as Piya did. For example, Wucian, Piya’s youngest brother, a member of la Kimon (Team of Kinmen), was a rice grower just like other Amis farmers. Wuciang rented a piece of paddy field from the government because most Amis people’s paddy fields (including na Kakita’an’s) had been transformed into residential land under the government’s urban plan.

Tayo, Piya’s second son, was a baseball player and later taught baseball in high schools. After retiring from high school teaching, he undertook the position of the juluo zhuxi (聚落主席) or Tribal Chairman, mediating between the local society and the government.76 Besides, Tayo’s wife Panay, a teacher at National Junior College,

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76 Juluo zhuxi (聚落主席) is an official title conferred by the government since the 1990s for a chief or headman of an indigenous community. Owing to the abolishion of the kakitata’an election, Falangaw has to recommend a person to undertake this position. Usually juluo zhuxi would be selected from
Taitung City, founded Chuyin (杵音·the Sound of Pestle), a dance theatre specializing in indigenous dances of eastern Taiwan. Chuyin has released many CDs and brought Amis singers to foreign countries to perform dancing and singing several times.

**The Celebration of Kulas Mahengheng**

Every year in September, the na Kakita’an organizes a celebration for Kulas Mehengheng’s birthday. In 2009 the celebration was expanded from a family affair to a community-wide congregation. Age-set members of both Falangaw and other communities derived from Falangaw, county councilors, and civil officials were invited to celebrate Kulas Mahengheng’s 158th birthday. Led by the eldest *faki* of the family, the celebration began with paper money burning before the indoor altar and the tablet of ancestral spirits. Later, councilors, officials, and age-set representatives mounted the outdoor stage, burning the incense sticks and bowing to the photograph of Kulas Mahengheng. Finally, Chuyin dancers entertained all the people and in the meantime all the people enjoyed the atmosphere of conviviality, drinking rice wine and cuisine prepared by the family (Fig. 5.10).

*itukalay*, the age-set that commands everything. Tayo was recommended for this post because as a member of *itukalay* and given his background as a baseball teacher, to Falangaw people, he seemed suitable for mediating between Falangaw and the government. *Juluo zhuxi* is just a title. The one with this title does not have any privilege in law or special status in community. *Juluo zhuxi* is just the one who represents her or his people in official meetings.
Two important episodes happened in this celebration. A month before the celebration, Tayo asked me to give a talk at the celebration to introduce Kulas Mahengheheng’s life history and his great achievements. I declined his invitation with great courtesy by saying that it would violate the rules of research ethics I had to observe. Tayo did not give up. “People would believe your words much more than mine because they think you are a scholar, just like an official coming from the central government,” Tayo insisted. I suggested a compromise; I told him that I did not prepare to present myself in front of the crowd and would like to offer a chronicle of Mahengheheng’s life history instead, and he could put the chronicle on the program schedule distributed to all the guests. Tayo agreed. But, one month later he still introduced me and my contribution in front of all the guests.

The second episode was that the family’s expanded celebration included a plan for
a movie about Kulas Mahengheng’s life. The director of the movie and the sponsor, the TIA or Taiwan Indigenous People’s International Literacy Industry Exchange Association, were also invited. The family believed that this movie would help introduce Kulas Mahengheng’s great doings and, through this movie, a definition of the Amis Tribe that would make Falangaw the centre among all Amis communities and na Kakita’an the leader among Falangaw raloma’ans would be canonized.

However, the climax of the apotheosis of Kulas Mahengheng was yet to come. Typhoon Morakot attacked Taiwan in August 2009, causing 677 deaths and breaking the record of rainfall. Most of the victims were indigenes of different Tribes. Tayo’s nephew, a legislator’s assistant, organized a joint ceremony for the purpose of releasing the souls from Purgatory, and the ceremony was held in the Coast Park of Taitung City from December 25, 2009 to Jan 6, 2010. There were twelve tents. A main altar, a huge tablet, and some incense burners were put in the central tent. Every tent worshiped its own god or goddess, and people of the twelve tents were from different indigenous communities. Although it was a Taoist ceremony, most of the people wore their own indigenous clothing and practiced hybrid Taoist rites. The county magistrate and the mayor came to preside at the opening ceremony and gave talks.

Before 2000, Falangaw people did not do rituals like this. Besides, state officials would not be invited to attend their rituals, because neither the KMT nor the Japanese
governments encouraged anything relevant to local autonomy. However, after lifting martial law, Taiwan was democratized. Officials’ attendance at local people’s rituals, ceremonies, and celebrations became a way to win voters’ support, and to connect the central government with the people. Local people expected that officials would come to promise something. That was how they identified their position in the modern governance system, and it was also one of the ways they defined democracy.

Na Kakita’an also had a tent beside the central main tent, in which an altar, a tablet, incense burners, food and betel nuts, photos of Kulas Mahengheng, and some big posters with the chronicle documenting Mahengheng’s 158th birthday celebration were arranged. Since every tent, except na Kakita’an’s, worshiped a Taoist god or goddess, I was wondering why the tablet of Mahengheng should be presented there.

“It was my nephew’s idea. When he was preparing this joint ceremony, the tangki (Han shaman), the one who was in charge of the ritual of the central main tent, told him that a god-like figure had appeared in his dream. Suddenly an idea came to his mind and he showed the tangki the photo of Kulas Mahengheng. The tangaki said this was the man who came to his dream. My nephew thought that the tangki saw an epiphany in his dream, meaning that Mahengheng must have become a god. So he decided to set a tent for Mahengheng in this joint ceremony,” Tayo said.

During those days I witnessed many Amis attending the ceremony and worshipping
Mahengheng just like they worshipped other Han deities such as Jinmuniang, Wangye, and Santaizi in Taoist temples (Fig. 5.11). However, not everyone who came to worship Mahengheng was Taoist. Although Tayo was a Christian and his wife Panay was a Catholic, they attended the ceremony because they considered the ceremony more cultural than religious.

Fig. 5.11  The altar of Mahengheng in a joint ceremony

**Discussion: Everyday Life in Context**

**The Alienation of the Body, the House, and the Land**

“What do you want to know? I have nothing to tell. Our everyday life is repetitive and boring,” my landlord’s father Dipon complained. Surely he was right. Some rituals such as *pakaorad* (ritual of rain prayer), *pakacidal* (ritual of sunshine prayer), and *misaaqi* (annual ritual of *raloma’an*) could no longer be seen in Falangaw, and life could not go back to the past. But my informants neglected one thing: the past
Falangaw people yearned for was not as traditional as they thought. No matter how old they are, Falangaw Amis people have been under official regulation since they were born. In fact, some forms of their contemporary everyday life first appeared within the past eighty years. The changes brought by the public cemetery and lavatory are good examples that have altered the Amis’s daily experiences. Before the 1930s, Falangaw Amis people buried the deceased in their backyard (Koono 2000[1915]:167; Sayama 2007[1913]: 192), which indicated that the spirits of the ancestors were integral parts of the living loma’/house. What the Japanese government’s regulation of burial really affected was that the deceased and kawas (the ancestral spirits) can and should be alienated from the living loma’ (house) and should be gathered together for the convenience of governance. The separation of the kawas from loma’ not only secularized and individualized the loma’; the collective burial site also made the government-promoted concept of the national soul imaginable. As I demonstrated in chapter 2, the novel idea of the Amis Tribe and the concept of sefi which shift from the men’s house to the holy place enshrining the collective Amis souls, just like Japanese Shintō Shrine or Chinese Martyrs’ Shrine, have to do with some rituals of the state that form the space of symbolic power in public places like schools and military camps. When we examine such changes, the transformation of materiality, for example, the change of burial place, cannot be neglected, because it was that change
that offered a solid basis for the introduction of some senses of collectivity such as the collective soul of the Amis Tribe.

Another example of the transformation of materiality is the public lavatory. Traditional Amis houses did not have toilets. Before the introduction of the public lavatory (1920s), in Falangaw, human wastes were excreted outdoors, in places like ditches or bushes (Sayama 2007[1913]:188). Excretion, before the 1920s, was a personal affair and had nothing to do with the family. All the individual had to do, when excreting, was to keep her or his privacy and avoid being seen. The setting up of public lavatories, to the Japanese, was a public health policy that made the new colony cleaner, but to the Amis it meant a different thing. Tenngo recollected that when she was a little girl, adults were reluctant to go to the public lavatories because they thought the public lavatory unnecessary, inconvenient, and uncomfortable. Their reluctance and the feeling of inconvenience suggest one thing: the body was transformed into an issue of governance and policy. People had no right to control their living bodies, dead bodies, and their bodies’ excretion.

Later, to improve public health, the Japanese government encouraged Falangaw Amis to have their own toilets, and gradually people used their own family toilet instead of going to the public lavatories. However, Falangaw Amis people did not build their toilets in their houses; they built a hut outside as the toilet (usually in the
yard). Even in today’s Falangaw, this old-fashioned toilet is still working in some Amis families. The modern flush toilet built inside the modern house became popular since some 40 years ago in Falangaw, and excretion was transformed into an affair within the loma’.

Here the new boundary of loma’/family/house emerges. While the deceased body had to be excluded outside of the loma’/family/house, excretion was incorporated into the sphere of the loma’/family/house. Moreover, a new symbolic order that distinguishes the indoor and the outdoor was built and expressed in some practices like wearing indoor slippers when being in the house and being cautious not to disturb the neighbors, as demonstrated by Tenngo, Dipon, and Alasis. Some informants explained that they kept their voices down in the house because “your voice represents your kawas”, as discussed in chapter 3. Those changes are parts of a larger picture which we can see if we take some other things mentioned above into account.

Simply put, in Falangaw the house/loma’ has been atomized. Not only was the loma’ uprooted (the deceased no longer buried in the sphere of loma’). It also demarcated a clear boundary between the inside and the outside, and inside the boundary lives a nuclear family (adult siblings nowadays seldom live together under the same roof). Gradually the bonds between houses and siblings are weaker, because patrilocal marriage has prevailed and mipaliw (exchange of labor) between different
families has disappeared (see below). Moreover, loma’ has become detached from the land because the deceased has been forced to move out of the boundary of loma’ (family); subsequently no permanent memory firmly sticks to the spot of the loma’ (house).\textsuperscript{77} Thus, the physical house and the cultural house have become detachable from each other; the experience of moving, be it moving to derived communities around Falangaw, to Taipei, Kaohsiung, or sailing on the oceans and to the corners of the world, has prevailed everywhere in Falangaw. Now everyone closes the house doors and stays at home watching the TV after work and complains about the sameness of their everyday life to the researcher.

Not only did the atomization of family originate in the repartition of social space as presented above. It is relevant to Falangaw Amis people’s losing their real estate as well. The case of Afi’s selling the houses suggests one thing: although virilocal marriage has become popular and men or stay-home fakis dominate everything, different opinions toward property inheritance still exist. In fact Falangaw people’s loss of real estate is the result of the invasion of their everyday-life living space by Han people, and by the monetary economy. During the 1950s to 1960s, Afi

\textsuperscript{77} The custom that Falangaw Amis people have an altar in loma’ was borrowed from the Han. The Amis did not have an ancestral altar in their family until some sixty years ago. The prevalence of ancestral altar means one thing very important: house and land are detachable because their ancestors (ancestral altars) are portable and could be brought to anywhere they go.
recollected, Han immigrants flooded into Falangaw, and most of them conducted unfair transactions with the Amis, using simple things such as needles, scissors, cloth, and groceries to trade for rice or land. When getting involved in market and monetary systems, Falangaw Amis could no longer cover most of their living expenses by reciprocal exchanges as they had done in the Japanese period. As the Amis needed more money to pay taxes, utility bills, and children’s tuition, the Han immigrants made usurious loans to the Amis. Since the Amis did not have modern concepts of economy, gradually they got accustomed to solving their financial difficulties by selling their land to Han immigrants and became marginalized. My elderly informants did not like payrang, and I saw very few interactions between them and the Han in their daily life.

Yu-feng Lee (2006: 117-121) gives a vivid account about the process of this transformation, describing how the Han have outnumbered the Amis since 1959, and, from that time on, how the social relationship between the indigenous and the Han has turned upside down. In her work, however, Lee, as a cultural geographer, does not discuss the issue of feeling mangodo (feeling embarrassed and small) and its politics. The Amis started to feel small or mangodo in relation to payrang and no longer dared to do their daily practices such as singing and drinking with friends when near their payrang/Han neighbors. When we consider mangodo in this urbanized space,
mangodo towards payrang should be understood to involve the space of hegemony the government has formulated.

How to understand the space of hegemony? When discussing the genesis of the intellectual as a social group, Antonio Gramsci (2011[1929]:190-192) argues that the exercise of intellectual function is formed in connection with all social groups, especially with the dominant social group. The intellectuals, being the dominant group’s deputies, exercise “hegemony”, making the civil society accept what the political society demands via consent (for example, prestige) and coercion (legal penalties). Here two points are worth our consideration. On the one hand, the space of hegemony is achieved by the means of consent and coercion, and on the other hand, the connections of social strata with the dominant group appear.

The case of the Falangaw Amis can be seen as an example of hegemony. Urbanization to the Amis meant regulation. Immigrants flooded into Falangaw, forcing the Amis to accept rules which they had not paid attention to before urbanization. Furthermore, under the circumstance of alienation they internalized the regulation. Their mangodo towards payrang (feeling sorry or small when facing Han people) was a form of consent, showing their understanding of and their response to social change. The social space was repartitioned when the space of hegemony was created. Thus, the Amis as a whole were put into in the lower levels of social
stratification. Different families in different strata employed different survival strategies, including marriage, which I will discuss at length below.

**The Condition of Between and Betwixt**

To understand the problem of land loss and social stratification, the history of the combination of Amis people’s *yezhuquan* (業主權) or land ownership rights and uxorilocal marriage practice needs to be reviewed. Some one hundred years ago when Japan seized Taiwan, the government conducted an island-wide survey of land ownership rights and census registration. Unlike most indigenous areas, the areas the Amis and the Puyuma inhabited were categorized as general administrative areas, in which the land ownership rights were acknowledged by the government. Hence a survey of the land property rights in Falangaw was conducted from 1917 to 1919 (Lee 2006:82). The result of the survey was that the name of the eldest woman was registered and legalized as the head of the household (and the *sefis* registered under the name of *kakita’an*). The legalization of the head of household was new and impressive to the Amis, implying that the head of the family had the right granted by the government to inherit the property and to distribute it as she wished (Huang 2005a:103). This was not the case before the Japanese colonization; the eldest woman could not decide everything without discussing with the *fakis* (her maternal uncles or her brothers).

However, to fully explain the Amis’s losing their land, it is also necessary to
mention Falangaw Amis’s right of land ownership. Before the Japanese regime arrived, there was no concept of private land ownership in Falangaw. The Japanese government did the work of land registration during 1917-1919, which started the new era of private ownership of land, as land became a detachable commodity since then.

Both the Japanese government and the Chinese KMT government forbade the free trade of real estate in most indigenous communities. Such an exception safeguards indigenous people’s land property from plundering by the Han. But a few indigenous areas like Falangaw were exceptions to that exception. While free land transaction with the Han in most indigenous areas is not allowed, there is no such restriction in Taitung City, which means that the government tacitly agreed to lift the condition of exception. Indigenous people of Falangaw became a population in the condition of between and betwixt, difficult to be categorized.

**Regulation of Marriage, Stratification of Society**

The transformation of the Amis family did not totally homogenize all the Amis, it caused social stratification instead. In Falangaw common Amis families like na Fasaw were marginalized, losing their land and property and moving out of Falangaw to derived communities like Fukid. Meanwhile, some families like na Dihal and na Kakita’an underwent a different process of transformation. Many people in these families became what Amis people call *madipongay*. This word has multivalent meanings. The source of this word is *dipon* which means Japan (Nippon), and
madiponay originally means the one who behaves like Japanese or cooperates with the Japanese. Later, the meaning of this word was extended to denote the intellectual or the one who does not work in the field like other Amis. There are many madipongays in na Dihal and na Kakita’an: they were teachers or civil officials when they were alive and their offspring have inherited their jobs and their social positions.

To maintain their advantage, not only did these families comply with the regulations. They also had to maintain some traditional practices in order to prove their pure Amisness to their Amis folks. Here we see a sharp contrast between na Fasaw, a common Amis family, and na Dihal and na Kakita’an, two kakita’an families.

In na Fasaw, all Tenngo’s siblings practiced traditional uxorilocal marriages during the 1940s-1960s; and during the period of their children’s marriages (1970s-1980s), most of the marriages in this family were transformed into the virilocal style (or in the opinion of the government: transformation from the matrilineal to the patrilineal). Such a sharp break did not appear in families of madipongay. In na Dihal and na Kakita’an, we see some adaptations that tried to simultaneously cope with the regulation and to retain their traditional way of life. For example, in the earlier period of Japanese colonization both na Dihal and na Kakita’an did not have any daughters. They adopted little girls from other families, even from other ethnic groups, in order to maintain the existence of their uxorilocal families. However, after Mahengheng’s
death, he was not sent back to his natal family (na Pulin) but was buried in the yard of na Walaw (his wife’s *raloma’an*) instead (later, na Walaw renamed as na Kakita’an to remember Kulas Mahengheng’s great doings). Moreover, during the Japanese period and the early KMT government period, in these families men practiced virilocal marriages while at the same time women practiced uxorilocal marriages. Clearly, those adaptations indicate not only that the idea of the *loma’*, not matrilineality, was observed as the key principle of Amis kinship, but also that the regulation in kinship and family was flexibly adopted. By such flexible adaptations, the social emphasis of the family structure was transformed from the traditional horizontal connections between different *loma’s* or between sister and brother under the rule of uxorilocal marriage into vertical connections between different generations within the same *loma*. Furthermore, through such adaptations, these families could keep their symbolic goods, men’s social positions for example, from transferring to other *loma’s*. That was why we see in na Kakita’an and na Diha l men practicing

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78 Kulas Mahengheng was born in na Pulin, into which his father Canglah had married. Canglah, a former *kakita’an* before Kulas Mahengheng, was born in na Dilon, the family in which the legendary athlete Tinko or Yang Chuan-guang (see chapter 1 and chapter 6) was born. Some Falangaw Amis people would like to talk about the kinship relations between these two Amis heroes, but neither na Pulin nor na Dilon celebrated Kulas Mehengheng’s birthday and remembered his great doings on public occasions. To them, Kulas Mahengheng was not a member of their two families. In other words, it was the house or the post marital residence that mattered. Matrilineal or patrilineal descent was not the point.
virilocal marriages while their sisters still practiced uxorilocal marriages. The consequence of such an adaptation was that these families, in comparison to other common Amis families, found it easier to accumulate economic and symbolic capital, leading to stratification between themselves and other Amis families.

Stratification does not necessarily homogenize a family. My landlord Laway, Simoy and Dipon’s eldest son, often complained about his fakis’ indifferent attitude toward local affairs. The complaints can be understood as criticisms of different social statuses in a family. What Laway actually wanted to complain about was the fact that it was his mother’s brothers, not his mother and her sisters, who took all the advantages of having good education and decent jobs. Laway argued that, although his mother, the eldest sister among the siblings, held the right to inherit the house and the land, his stay-home uncles decided how the property was distributed and who could have good education. To Laway it was quite unfair, because, unlike what his uncles could give their children, his illiterate father, a man from another family who married into his mother’s home, left him nothing. Laway criticized the traditional uxorilocal marriage and the unevenness of social status among family members and

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79 It is not the case in the next generation. Uxorilocal marriage can rarely be seen in today’s Falangaw. Younger generations or people under 50 practice virilocal marriage. When asking people of na Kakita’an and na Dihal why both matrilocal and patrilocal marriages could simultaneously exist in their families some fifty years ago, they answered that they had just followed what their parents had asked them to do.
attributed his predicaments to the Amis tradition.

The Experience of Contacting State Apparatuses without Intermediaries

Traditionally all the Amis in Falangaw were farmers, growing rice for their own consumption. After 1914 farmers had to pay tax in kind for farmland, and after the 1930s they had to accept the guidance of some official organizations such as Seinenkai (Youth’s Association) and Farmland Irrigation Association, just like all the other farmers in Taiwan (Huang 2005a: 122; Irisawa 1925:123). As the KMT government followed the track of statecraft that Japan had prescribed, those official organizations still exerted control over the farmers after 1945. Becoming a member of these official organizations meant that the farmers became more dependent on the government and could not fully control their production. They got information and techniques of rice growing from the Farmer’s Association, and the irrigation of their paddy fields was determined by the Farmland Irrigation Association. Today the government entrusts these Associations to control the transportation, price, and marketing of rice. These associations even run businesses related to banking like deposits, loans and bank credit.80

80 Farmer’s Associations in Taiwan also have their own banks. Members deposit their savings and/or borrow the money at a special interest rate from the banks of Farmer’s Associations. Besides, indigenous members of Farmer’s Association who are above 55 years in age can get their pension of
Being incorporated into these official organizations means a lot to contemporary farmers, not only because indigenous farmers cannot be the real decision makers in rice production, but because they have to attend meetings of those organizations. Usually the leaders, staff, and clerks of the organizations are *payrang*. Amis farmers are only members, obeying decisions the leaders have made. Many leaders of Farmer’s Association and Farmland Irrigation Association nowadays play a role in local political affairs, especially in elections. The leaders of these organizations also always have KMT membership and often manipulate the elections by motivating their own members. On the wall of Tenngo’s living room there is a certificate of gratitude praising her and her husband Iciang’s participation in KMT’s election campaigns. Actually, the couple’s relations with the KMT started some forty years ago when they were farmers and members of those organizations.

In addition to being incorporated into government organizations, some agrarian practices have been changed as well. Tenngo often mentioned her experience of being a farmer, and one thing she liked to describe was *mipaliw* or labor exchange in farm work. The point she emphasized was the singing between friends who did *mipaliw* together in the field. The so-called Amis polyphonic singing, according to Tenngo, cannot be separated from Amis people’s exchange of labor when working in the field.

6,000 NTD (200 USD) per month, while a non-member can only have half of that amount, 3,000 NTD (100 USD) per month.
However, *mipaliw* also signified an ethical relationship of exchange between Amis households. It was ethical because they believed that the spirits of rice must be revered (rice was not fully commercialized at that time).

When growing cash crops like sugarcane, according to my informants, people did not *mipaliw* or exchange labor between households; they did the work on their own. *Mipaliw* now is disappearing in Falangaw, because rice growing has become individual work rather than the collaboration between households. Rice has been commercialized and the process of rice cultivation, harvesting, and marketing now are regulated by the government organizations such as the Farmer’s Association. In other words, the past ethical connections and mutual relationship between households, people, and rice now disappear and are replaced by individual relationships between every farmer and the state apparatus. Another thing that makes *mipaliw* disappear is urbanization. Urbanization has made the Amis lose their paddy fields. Most of the Amis farmers now grow their crops not in the field where their ancestors worked, but on the land they rent from the government. Wucian, Piya’s younger brother, rented a paddy field from the government which is located northwest of Taitung City, quite far away from Falangaw. Wucian’s case shows that nowadays Falangaw Amis farmers work separately and individually, which also renders *mipaliw* impossible.

Farmers in Falangaw today are individual producers working under the supervision
of the state apparatus and its agents. Their crops, to some extent, are alienated from their control. Rice has now become a cash crop; traditional rituals such as *misaorad* and *misapacidal* (rain and sunshine prayers) have not been practiced for thirty years. However, the story of commercialization in agriculture started not from rice growing but from another crop: sugarcane.

Taitung Sugar Refinery was founded in the Japanese period (1913) and closed in 1996. In the beginning, to encourage investment from Japan, Taiwan Sotokufu (the Governor General of Taiwan), in 1903 and 1905, issued decrees on subsidizing investments in founding sugar refineries and the monopoly of production and source purchase. Falangaw was incorporated into the area for sugarcane production. According to Tenngo and her cousin Anciw, the Japanese government forced the Amis to offer half of their paddy fields to grow sugarcane for the refinery. Amis farmers disliked growing sugarcane because it was a cash crop and there was no *malapaliw* (exchange of labor) in doing the work for *tainangan* (Taitung Sugarcane Plantation). The farmers were just selling their labor for money. They disliked doing the *tainangan* job because the sugarcane plantation hindered them from their rice production. For example, oftentimes people who worked in the sugarcane plantation’s fields diverted most of the water resources, leaving insufficient water for Amis farmers to grow their rice. Besides, occasionally the plantation fields were in the way
of Amis farmer’s paddy fields, which made Amis farmer’s fields wasted. Facing such a problem, the farmers dared not say anything; they knew who the real boss of the sugar refinery was.

Many informants recalled that the sugarcane plantation and refinery, a government-subsidized business located in an uncultivated area beside Falangaw, had its own land for growing sugarcanes too. The plantation hired local Amis workers to grow and harvest sugarcane. This remained the same after 1945, after the arrival of the KMT government. In the period from 1950s to 1980s, the plantation offered some odd-jobs for unemployed Amis. Palac went to the plantation to harvest sugarcanes when he just returned to Taitung. The Amis workers were employed with very low pay, but they did not think that they were exploited. Working for the refinery was one of the earliest experiences for the Amis as wage laborers. In other words, Amis people’s first experience of commoditization was mediated by the state apparatuses rather than by the market.

Amis people’s direct contact with the state apparatus is also related to the particular path of development in eastern Taiwan, which is located the margin of the country. Private enterprises with government-owned stock came to Taitung in the Japanese period, including the sugar refinery and the pineapple plantation. After World War Two, the KMT government took over and transformed all of them into
government-funded enterprises; thus few private sector intermediaries existed between the state and the indigenous people of this area.

My informants recollected how they took advantage of the sugarcane institution and turned their experiences of working in it into happy memories. Dipon told me that he and his companions did not care much about the pay they got because their aim was to get the sugarcane leaves, not money. Sugarcane leaves were useless to the plantation, but Amis people fed their cattle with leaves carried back from the plantation. So they thought that they went there to get the leaves, and regarded the money they got as an extra bonus. In addition to the leaves, they regarded the sugar refinery as their public bath. People went to the drains to take baths because they knew the sugar refinery used clean water to cool down the boilers, so they gathered there when used water was discharged into the drains.

Apart from the working experience in the sugarcane plantation, Falangaw Amis people had another experience of being wage laborers: misakuli. It is estimated that during the Japanese period, 10% of indigenous people’s labor force was employed by the Japanese government in civil construction projects like building railways, roads, harbors, and public buildings (Wang and Hsu 1999). Falangaw Amis people call this experience doing (misa) coolie (kuli) works. Now only very few Falangaw Amis people who have experienced misakuli are still alive. Nikar na Lacker, a friend of
Tenngo and the ex-wife of the legendary singer, Difang, told me how they were recruited to do the work of civil construction and how gender differentiation was formulated in pay. According to Nikar, it took ten days to complete a *misakuli* job. After finishing the job each man was given 10 Japanese Yen, but women only got 7. Before she did the *misakuli* she did not think that women’s labor and men’s should be paid differently.

Nikar said that the Japanese policemen did not treat them badly; they just stood and supervised the progress of the work. To my surprise, Nikar told me that she personally did not feel reluctant to do this mandatory work because it made money. Nikar did *misakuli* in 1943 when she was sixteen. Money was becoming important in everyday life in the 1940s, and that was partially why *misakuli* for her was not completely unpleasant in her memory. But it was not the case for my other informants. *Misakuli* caused many problems. It reduced the time farmers had available for taking care of their farmland. It also physically separated couples, causing conflicts between husband and wife and raising the divorce rate, according to some informants.

**Alcohol and Betel Nut Consumption**

What else can Falangaw people’s everyday practice tell, if not as worthless and boring as Dipon suggested? When mentioning indigenous people, there are two stereotypes that prevail in Taiwan: they are drunkards and they eat betel nuts all the
time. Alcohol abuse and betel nut consuming are not exclusive to the indigenes in
today’s Taiwan, but it is true that statistically speaking indigenous people consume
more alcohol and betel nuts than other ethnic groups in Taiwan. What does the
consumption indicate?

Many of my informants consumed rice wine and betel nuts every day, arguing that
that was how their ancestors had lived their daily life. Surely they were right, but that
was not the whole story. According to Tenngo, rice wine was a necessity for a family
in the past. Women were the wine makers in the family, undertaking this role as part
of their responsibility for keeping the family rice granary. Hence rice had a
connotation of gender difference in the past. Furthermore, it is commonly believed
that rice has *kawas* and the *kawas* of rice should be revered. Thus, rice wine drinking
is not just for having fun; it connects people together on the spiritual level and links
people with the supernatural world.

The first time I went to visit an informant in Falangaw, I brought a bottle of red
wine as gift. The informant refused to take it. Later, I was told that I made a wrong
decision; the informant did not want to mention anything happening in the past
without having rice wine on the table. When talking about events of the past, the
*kawas* of the protagonists would be summoned and could be harmful to the speaker if
rice wine was not presented. Hence, rice wine drinking should be considered under
the context of an integral whole: people grew rice in the field and after harvesting the rice, women made rice wine for family members and friends after work at home, when singing songs and talking about the past together or doing rituals to worship *kawas* and the ancestors. No one was too drunk to do her or his job well in the past, my informants said, because rice wine drinking was integrated with subsistence production, gender differentiation, social relationship, and religious beliefs.

However, things became different after the advent of the modern regimes. The whole process of rice production has been regulated by the government since the Japanese period, so farmers have produced rice mainly for the market, not solely for themselves. Furthermore, the Japanese government monopolized rice wine production, and rice wine gradually became a commodity.\textsuperscript{81} In other words, rice wine drinking was de-contextualized; the tradition of rice wine drinking remains the same but the links that connect subsistence production, social differentiation, and religious belief have disappeared.

A similar de-contextualization can be found in betel nut consumption.\textsuperscript{82} In the past

\textsuperscript{81} In Taiwan, the wine-making industry was totally monopolized by the government. Bootlegging was illegal and there was no legal private distillery in Taiwan before 2002.

\textsuperscript{82} In today’s Taiwan betel nuts are not consumed exclusively by the indigenous people. However, four centuries ago when the Han arrived in Taiwan they learned about betel nut from indigenous people. Just like cigarette vendors, betel nut street vendors now are everywhere in Taiwan, and oral cavity cancer that betel nut chewing causes is one of the main health risks that all the betel nuts consumers have to
betel nut chewing was part of social interaction. People of different ages and genders (especially unmarried young men and women) gave betel nuts as presents. Like rice wine drinking, betel nut chewing now carries a stigma because it does not look good and is harmful to health. In the Taiwan government’s public health propaganda, indigenous people are always the hidden target of alcohol and betel nut-chewing-quitting education. Every year in the opening and closing ceremonies of *kiloma’an*, some people from official institutions such as the department of health come to campaign against drinking and betel-nut chewing. Alcohol abuse and betel nut chewing are two negative stereotypes attached to indigenous people in Taiwan.

**Betel Leaf Production: a Case of non-Regulation**

Yet, even for Amis people, betal nut chewing today is different from what it was. Now betel nut is a commodity de-contextualized from Amis life: Amis people now regard it as a chewing gum-like thing for enjoyment. Betel nut production has become an industry because after Falangaw was urbanized all the betel nuts and the betel leaves are grown in commercial plantations and owned mostly by Han people. Falangaw Amis people like my landlord Laway made their living as paid betel leaf pickers.

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face today. There are many recipes for betel nut consuming, the easiest and the most popular way is to apply some lime on the betel nut and cover the betel nut with a betel leaf. The consumer chews the lime-smeared and betel leaf-covered betel nut and spits the blood-looking red juice out.
Betel leaf cultivating is a new trade; fewer people did this work for a living in Falangaw thirty years ago. In Taiwan, Taitung City provides 80% of the market’s need because of its special geographic location. Betel leaf demands a huge amount of labor, which Falangaw Amis people were prepared to supply after they lost their farmland. Since it was not an officially listed trade, there was no official population statistics on the number of betel leaf pickers. But according to my informants’ and my own preliminary estimates, in Falangaw, paddy rice farmers are outnumbered by betel leaf pickers.83 Most of the leaf pickers are odd-job workers working in betel leaf farms. Only a few Amis, such as my informant Liway, who borrowed money from the bank, rented a farm to grow the leaves and hired Amis people to work for them. However, all the wholesalers are payrang. The government does not intervene in this business, leaving the price to fluctuate drastically (Fig. 5.12).

83 According to my informant Liway, a mid-sized betel leaf farm owner, there were four to five thousand Amis people (from Falangaw and other satellite communities) doing this job.
Fig. 5.12  An Amis woman working in a betel leaf farm

When prices are low, farm owners call off the work, leaving the Amis betel leaf pickers to stay at home, drinking rice wine and chewing betel nuts all day. Hence income from this work is not guaranteed, and the workers’ casual status means they are not protected by the official Labor Insurance and Health Insurance schemes. 84

Here again, betel nut chewing, a trivial thing Falangaw people do in their everyday life, was de-contextualized, People became addicted without knowing the cultural connotations of betel nut chewing practiced in the past. Instead, some of the consumers were marginalized as trivial odd job takers, producing the commodity they needed most in their daily life. In this case, the government’s doing nothing in fact demonstrates an alternative state regulation: how the state regulates indigeneity by neglecting to ensure Falangaw Amis people’s rights to the mandatory national Health and Labor Insurance.

**Bureaucratic Experiences: Education**

How about other bureaucratic experiences in their everyday life? Here I discuss two important experiences: education and military service. In Amis, *pitilidan* can be

84 In Taiwan all the workers who work in registered companies are required to buy the Labor Insurance and the Health Insurance run by the government. The employers have to pay insurance premiums for the employees, the percentage shifting according to the employee’s income. Since betel leaf picking is an odd-job, the boss is not taxed and not required to pay the insurance premium for the employee. This is why the workers are not under the protection of the law.
translated as education, and *tilid* means book or writing. That is to say that to the Amis having education is tantamount to learning how to write.⁸⁵ Many of my middle-aged informants who were born after the Japanese period still use the Japanese Katakana alphabet to write Amis words in their daily life.⁸⁶

As noted above, Tenngo had a close relationship with her teachers. Such a close relationship has something to do with *misatofan*. *Tofan* is a loanword from a Japanese noun *touban* (当番) which signifies to be (misa) on duty (tofan). During the Japanese

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⁸⁵ There is a well-known Amis legend about how the Amis lost their writing system and became illiterate. The story says that originally both the Amis and the *payrang* were literate peoples. To keep their written words, the Amis carved all their words on stones, but the Han (*payrang*) inscribed the words on planks. Later, the flood came, the stones sank and the planks floated and remained. From this legend we understand that to the Amis the antagonist is not the Japanese but the Han, when the topic is competition over civilization. But what does writing mean to the Amis? According to Jack Goody (1977), writing domesticates the savage mind because writing abstracts speaking and produces self reflection which civilization relies upon. However, the consequence of writing is not always as expected. The introduction of writing should not be regarded as purely technological and intellectual; we should consider its cultural, political, and religious implications as something “intertwined with the constitution of the society” (Finnegan 1996:338). In this case we do not see any break between writing and speaking, instead writing is something added to speaking because the Amis use the Katakana spelling system not to develop their scientific logic or improve their daily life but to document their religious lyrics, myths, names of raloma’an and age-sets.

⁸⁶ Unlike the Amis, common *payrang* people of the same generation do not know Japanese and Japanese Katakana symbols, although their parents also attended elementary school in the Japanese colonial period. That is to say, compared to the Han, the Amis view Japanese, at least the Katakana alphabet, differently.
period (1896-1945), all the elementary schools in Japan and Taiwan practiced *touban*. The student who took his or her turn to do *touban* work had to clean the class room in school. In Taiwan, in schools exclusive for indigenous students, not only did students have to do their *touban/tofan* work in school, they also went to the teacher’s home to offer services. It was *misatofan* that gave Amis students opportunities to contact the Japanese directly in their daily life.

As I noted in chapter 1, the Japanese regime practiced a divide and rule policy, separating the Han and the indigenous, despite Japanese policemen and teachers living close to indigenous people. That was why in Falangaw the political structure and cultural tradition remained basically intact during the Japanese period. After World War Two, the KMT regime undertook the assimilation policy. The government tore down the barricades between the Han and indigenous people, allowing Han immigrants to move into some indigenous areas. Indigenous people were forced to take Chinese names, and there was no more distinction between the indigenous and the Han in civil administration and education as in the Japanese period. The only distinction the KMT regime preserved was that most of the land indigenous people inhabited was prescribed as Indigenous Reserve (原住民保留地). Land in an indigenous reserve cannot be transferred or sold to outsiders. However, as the places inhabited by the Amis and the Puyuma became urban areas, the Act of Native Reserve
did not apply to them. Of all the Amis and Puyuma communities Falangaw is arguably the most urbanized. I have argued that the land problem in Falangaw can be termed as the exception of the exception or the double exception.

An example of the divide and rule statecraft, like the land problem, could also be found in education. In the Japanese period, there were three different systems of elementary education in Taiwan. One was the Elementary School (小學校) system specified for Japanese children, the other was the Common School (公學校) system for all children of Taiwan. Indigenous students had their own schools as well. The school indigenous students attended was called the Savage People’s Common School (蕃人公學校). After the advent of the KMT/ROC government, there is no such differentiation anymore. All elementary schools are called National Elementary Schools (國民小學), and students of all ethnic groups attend the same school and are educated in the same class.

Clearly, in addition to the Japanese themselves, the Japanese government distinguished the Taiwanese (the Hoklo and the Hakka) or payrang from the indigenous people. In contrast, the KMT/ROC Chinese government calls all the subjects nationals (國民). In the Japanese colonial period, the indigenous were treated as an exception. Being named as fan (the savage) and educated in different schools meant that their citizenship was suspended or they were not granted normal
citizenship. Later, under the KMT regime (1945-1994), they were not called fan but
shanbao (mountain folks/siblings) instead. Ostensibly indigenous people were
included in the category of folks or siblings, but in fact they were still excluded from
sharing full citizenship because “mountain” means nothing but an alternative sort of
savageness. After 1994 the status of the indigenous was confirmed in the constitution
and yuanzhumin (indigene) has become the newest term for all indigenous peoples.
This new term represents an alternative kind of citizenship newly recognized by the
government. This short history of the transformation of indigenous identity reflects
how the indigenous people were excluded and incorporated in different periods of
time, and how social boundaries between indigenous people and the state have been
redrawn.

In Falangaw, fan(蕃) is a taboo term. When describing themselves, my informants
from the elderly generation who had got along with the title of shanbao (山胞) for
sixty years told me that they were shanbao or shandiren (山地人), in which the
emphasis was not mountain (shan or shandi) but baw (folks or siblings) or ren (human
beings or people). Now young people of Falangaw like to call themselves yuanzhumin
(原住民) because it denotes the people or human beings (min) who originally (yuan)
have lived (zhu) here for centuries. Their insistence on being called shanbao and
yuanzhumin is not that they agree with the official classification of population but that
they express their claims of citizenship when situating in the condition of marginality.

My informants argued that they were not treated like slaves in the Japanese period. Instead, Tenngo insisted, they were taught how to behave politely and properly. They understood extra-curricula activities like *misatofan* as similar to the patriotism education in the morning rally that Yoshiko talked about. Yet, there was a difference in that *misatofan* was put into practice in a different way: it made a dear relationship with the colonial power by incorporating the colonized into the colonizer’s life world and everyday life. Gramsci (2000: 234-236) argues that when the state develops from the state of coercion to the state of consent, education plays a crucial role to raise the mass of the population to a cultural and ethical level at which political society gives way to private associations of civil society. In this case, both the patriotism education and *misatofan* were parts of the colonial educational system, but the form of consent was founded on the government agents’ direct contact with the colonized, not on civil society. We will see the same theme when I discuss the military service later.

Here we see that the Japanese colonization as experienced by the Falangaw Amis was not coherent. On the one hand, Japanese officials and policemen were remote and harsh, but, on the other hand, the educational system and its agents were close and dear. After the Japanese left, things changed. For example, no more *misatofan* was practiced in the educational system. Palac, Tenngo’s son, told me that when he was an
elementary school student, his teachers did not understand Amis students at all. One teacher whom the students disliked was even nicknamed *maymay* (duck) because of the teacher’s queer way of speaking and walking. Nicknaming teachers was unimaginable to Tenngo; no one would do this to teachers in her childhood. Tenngo and Palac, the mother and the son, belonged to different generations and had different experiences and imaginations about different state regimes.

**Bureaucratic Experiences: Military Service**

Another collective experience of the state is military service. In the last years of Japanese colonization, male Taiwanese youth were forced to attend the battlefield. Indigenous people of Taiwan during that period had a good reputation for their physical competence. The Japanese government organized a Taiwanese indigene troop, the renowned Takasago Kiyutai or Takasago Volunteer Corps *(高砂義勇隊)*, to fight against the American troops in South East Asian forests. My informant Fiik’s cousin in the Takasago Volunteer Corps died in battle. Not all indigene soldiers held the same viewpoint about the war. Some felt proud to fight for the country, while others were reluctant to being recruited and tried to escape. Two of Piya’s brothers died in battle in the World War Two, and since their deaths their spirits have been enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja, Tokyo.\(^\text{87}\) Piya visited Yasukuni Jinja and worshiped in 1986. He

\(^{87}\) Yasukuni Jinja is a shrine dedicated to the soldiers who died in battle fought on behalf of the Emperor of Japan.
confirmed the value of his brothers’ deaths. Tenngo’s brother Laway experienced the war and survived. Unlike Piya, he resented the Japanese. “Why did the Japanese come to Taiwan? Why didn’t they just go back to their own county?” Laway questioned. Here the different viewpoints about the Japanese coming from families of different social positions are clearly manifested.

The KMT government took over Taiwan after the end of World War Two. In the first half of the period of the KMT regime (1945-1975), the difficulties that Falangaw Amis people faced in their everyday life remained the same. The Chiang Kai-shek/KMT government lost the civil war and brought 2 million soldiers to Taiwan in 1949. The government not only faced the threat of the Mao/CCP regime but also played a role in the global cold war assigned by the US. If we check the names of the age-sets, we will find that after la Minkok (Team of the Republic of China, 1947), the next four age-sets, la Tankok (Team of Tank, 1950), la Koleyn (Team of Military Training, 1953), la Kimo (Team of Kinmen, 1956), and la Taycio (Team of Taichung, 1959), were all about Chinese troops and places of military training and service, showing some aspects of how Falangaw Amis people experienced the Chinese regime.

During that period of time, Amis young men who took military service in the Army found the experience painful. Oki, a la Kimo member, recalled that when he was in
the Army he was always punished because he did not speak Mandarin at all and did not understand his superior’s commands. Panay, a la Taycio member, also had difficult times in the Army. In the first three months Panay cried every day because he did not know how to speak and write Chinese. Receiving no Japanese education at all, he still could use the Japanese Katakana alphabet to write letters to his family. Forty years ago in Taiwan, every letter that soldiers wrote had to be censored before it was sent. The letters written by Panay brought him some penalties because the KMT government just took over Taiwan. To the KMT, common people’s speaking and writing Japanese symbolized nothing but treason. Some phrases still prevalent in Falangaw reveal how Falangaw Amis regarded the Chinese soldiers and military service in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, when Amis people say that someone is taking military service, it is a euphemism for someone’s death. Quite a lot of photographs of that period of time in Falangaw were about family feasts for seeing their sons off to military service.

After the 1970s, the Chiang Kai-shek regime firmly controlled Taiwan and the relation between Taiwan and China was not as tense as it had been. Military service

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In the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was common for soldiers and policemen to enter people’s homes searching for valuables. The Amis called the Chinese kuapin, meaning military officers (kua) and soldiers (pin). Of course the Chinese who arrived Taiwan after 1945 were not all soldiers, but the way the Amis called the newcomers tells us about the most impressive experience they had about state regulation in that period of time.
under the government’s propaganda became a passage to male adulthood and a proof of masculinity. To my landlord Laway, his history of being a soldier became a source of self confidence, especially when facing difficulties in his life. Taiwan is still a country that practices conscription. Every healthy young man who was born before 1997 and is above 18 has to perform 20-months of military service. After completing the compulsory service, soldiers are free to sign a contract with the army, and once the contract is signed the soldier becomes a career soldier. According to official statistics, the indigenous population in Taiwan was 1.9% in 2010, but the percentage of indigenous soldiers in the Army was 2.8%, indicating that many indigenous soldiers chose to stay in the Army after completing their compulsory military service.89 Many of my informants were career soldiers, including Tenngo’s grandson Wei-lin.

Why did they join the army? From an economic perspective, being a career soldier is one of a few ways that indigenous people can earn a stable income (Chu 2008). Moreover, indigenous soldiers are the foundation of Taiwan Army’s Special Forces because of their renowned physical competence. My informants always liked to share what happened when they served in the special forces as frogmen, military policemen,

89 The information can be found at:
http://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.html?CID=940F9579765AC6A0&DID=0C3331F0EBD318C2E0E37333B4A47E72, and :
and marines. Narrating these stories strengthened their self image, an image magnifying their physical competence and masculinity.

However, the meaning of being a soldier is much more than strengthening one’s self image. Some interviews of Takasago Giyutai veterans conducted fifty years after the war suggest that their experience of being a soldier revealed “the complicated struggle for humanity under colonialism” (Huang 2001: 222). To those Takasago veterans, fighting for the nation was a journey of both bodily and mentally internalizing the state ideology. The Japanese colonizers witnessed the Takasago soldiers’ competence, but the Takasago soldiers thought that their fearless engagement in battle just manifested Yamatodamashi or the Japanese spirit that the Japanese colonizer taught them. Indeed, noting the cowardice of some Japanese soldiers when facing battle, the Takasago soldiers saw themselves as “more Japanese than Japanese” (Ibid.:222). By being soldiers, they achieved citizenship via their bodily and mental internalization of state ideology. More importantly, they also offered a hidden or euphemistic criticism of colonialism. This viewpoint can also help make sense of my landlord Laway's stories of his military life when he was drunk.

To explain some Amis peoples' positive attitudes toward compulsory military service, we should take their history of accepting patriotism education into account as Yoshiko suggested. “Our bodies are the wall of the country,” a lyric mentioned in
chapter 1, should have a Janus-faced interpretation. On the one hand, it tells of the bitterness that the indigenous people have tasted; on the other hand, it expresses pride and self-confirmation as well. The later can be understood as their unique way of confirming their citizenship when other channels of participation were not open to them.

As an ethnic minority, Falangaw Amis people do not speak Hoklo and Hakka, the payrang’s languages or the languages of the dominant majorities, although they have lived very close to payrang for many decades. They do speak Mandarin, the national language, for they think that it is a good thing to connect with the governing power directly just like they spoke Japanese seventy years ago. That was why my informants told me that being a career soldier would be better than being hired by a payrang boss. They trust that by choosing the government as the boss they will be well treated and will not be dominated by payrang.

By discussing education and military service in their everyday life, two different kinds of closeness between the colonizer and the colonized are introduced. In the Japanese style, the relationship was built upon a hierarchical difference between teachers and students: the students were included in the government agents’ life world and were inculcated intentionally; while in the Chinese case we see that the relationship is more equal, as shown in the case of Palac’s school experience.
Work Experiences on Fishing Vessels

Nothing exemplifies the experience of exile better than being a fishing vessel laborer. Palac’s case is a good example. His family lost all their farmland and moved to Kaohsiung City, where he and his father Iciang restarted their life as fishing vessel laborers. Palac belonged to la Congtong, an age-set with one third of its members working on fishing vessels when they were in their twenties. They chose to do this job because they were allowed to draw their salary in advance, which really helped a lot when they had economic difficulties. However, to my informants, a career as a fishing vessel laborer did not lead to a good denouement. Palac divorced with his wife and all his children left him. Other fishermen who went back to Falangaw could not adapt to the social transformation, becoming unemployed and being regarded as losers.

Two of Palac’s friends Ngayaw and Taipak had similar life experiences. Ngayaw became a Taoist shaman after he ended his fisherman life. He was a controversial person in Falangaw. People said he was polite before he was fisherman but after coming back from the sea he became arrogant, thinking that he knew more than others. Like Palac, he did not have a successful marriage.

Ngayaw told me that being a fisherman changed his life course; the first time he was possessed by kawas was on a fishing vessel. The last time I met him in Falangaw, he asked for a favor. “Next time when you are back, can you bring me national flags
of different countries from Canada? I want to use them to decorate my temple.” He told me that his power to communicate with the spiritual world was related to his fishing vessel laborer experience of travelling around the world. Such an experience, according to him, made him sensitive just like an antenna receiving air waves from the sky. Certainly Ngayaw was not the only case. Tinko, after his retirement from his athletic and coaching careers, came back to Falangaw to become a Taoist shaman and serve his Amis fellows. His power and prowess, recognized by his followers, were not just from his mastery of Taoist canons and rituals. They were mostly from his experiences of winning the Olympic medal and being a glittery star on the athletic arena of the world.

The next one was Taipak (a nickname meaning Taipei in Mandarin), a smart and charming man who used the money he saved to run business and made a big fortune after he quit his job on the fishing vessel. Later he changed drastically; he spent all his money in women and drinking. The most famous hearsay about him was that when he was still rich he often used bills to clean the dust on his shoes in front of a crowd to demonstrate how rich he was. He spent all his money fast, and his wife and children refused to accept him again. Now sometimes he lives with his elder sister, but most of the time he wanders alone in Taipei.

It is their fishing vessel labor experiences that expanded the world view of many
Amis men. It seems that nothing can really startle them if we do not forget what Palac
told me about his adventures in foreign countries. The connection between Ngayaw’s
religious practices and his experience of sailing overseas emphasized by Ngayaw
himself should not be neglected either. The experience of drifting away from the
hometown surely can be interpreted as a consequence of marginalization. For some
people, this collective experience altered the traditional Amis concept of the body.
Commenting on the fishing vessel laborers’ flamboyant, surreal, and vainglorious
manners, elderly informants always lamented that old-fashioned Amis virtues were
decaying. This suggests that the traditional balance between an individual body with a
kawas in it and the hierarchical order confining proper behavior in raloma’an and
masakaputay is no longer compelling. This new body has experienced a much wider
outside world and consequently has a different body/person/self imagination. To
conquer all the hardships on the ocean and in foreign countries the power of kawas
outmatches the governing regulation of the family and the age-set, allowing
possibilities of new connections to emerge.

**Conclusion: State of Regulation and Beyond**

In this chapter I presented the everyday life of the three families and contextualized
their experiences of everydayness. My informants often sighed that Falangaw Amis
people were in a state of disunity just like a sheet of loose sand. The disunity, in fact,
resulted from the government’s repartitioning both geographical space and symbolic social space. After the repartitioning, Falangaw people became more heterogeneous than ever: different Amis people inhabiting different social positions had different connections and perspectives of the state apparatus. However, in their everyday life, they were either seeking to build individual or direct relationships with the state, or drifting away from their homeland. Those Falangaw Amis who survived the trends of urbanization and atomization generally accepted the repartitioned social space and changed some of their habits in their everyday life. Then, is there any form of social solidarity existing in Falangaw? Or, what is it, if any, that keeps the concept of Falangaw from being a void idea?

Falangaw people had common experiences of some forms of state regulation, such as burial and human waste management, housing space arrangement, patriotism education, and military service conscription. They also experienced exceptions or state failures to regulate the land problem and their work in betel leaf production. In various ways, Falangaw Amis were excluded from being on the ordinary track of law observed in Taiwanese society at large. Then what can we see when we go beyond the state of regulation?

To answer this question, I reviewed inconspicuous aspects of Amis people’s everyday life. My inquiry revealed a trend of atomization in the sphere of family (the
vertical descent of loma’ gradually overwhelmed the horizontal connections between loma’ as Amis people lost their land, conflict between siblings, and the experience of exile from Falangaw. In addition to atomization and marginalization, I also explored different kinds of attachment with the state, each a variant of indigenous citizenship. Some people of kakita’an families chose to be civil servants; some decided to run some kind of Ethnicity.Inc (Comaroff and Comaroff: 2007), such as Chuyin and Simoy’s workshop to promote Amis culture as a basis for a close relationship between themselves and the state; meanwhile common Amis families had less channels to claim citizenship, unless they chose to be career soldiers. However, most of the Falangaw Amis people belong to none of the categories presented above; they are either farmers and betel leaf pickers or the unemployed. They are the ones who would tell the researcher that they are politically neutral, but when the election comes they are enthusiastic in participating in election campaign gatherings, and most of them support the ruling KMT party.

In short, in Falangaw people of different social positions engaged in various practices to express their attitudes toward the state, but it seems that all of the Falangaw Amis people shared a common experience of atomization and fragmentation. They demonstrated their citizenship idiosyncratically because each of them had his or her way to survive in the space of hegemony created by the effect of
state regulation. Are there any other kinds of collective Amis subjectivity and/or collective forms of dialogue and resistance tenaciously generated out of the state of regulation? If yes, then what are they? In chapter six I will answer these questions by discussing the Falangaw Amis’s extraordinary experiences.
Chapter Six: State of Performance, State of Exodus:
Extraordinary Experiences and Political Festivals

Hoki, my informant, brought an official document, a document applying for financial support, to my office in 2003 when I was working for the Taiwan government. He came to seek help because a troupe he organized was invited to perform traditional Amis songs and dances at Queen Elisabeth Hall, London, United Kingdom. Feeling excited to have this chance to demonstrate Amis artistry in front of the European audience, he was also anxious because he knew that the travel budget London promised was far from enough to cover everything. The document was written in standard government format, with every detail of the troupe’s travel specified. Although the performance had nothing to do with Taiwan government, the singers still insisted that the government should be informed.

Stage singing for official occasions, to the Falangaw Amis, is an extraordinary experience. By this I mean that it does not happen on a regular daily basis; it is official, it is global, it connects the traditional and the modern, the local and the center, and power relations imposed from the top and ascending from the bottom. It is also considered typical in the sense of characteristic, or representative of a group’s identity.
(Abrahams 1986:56). Thus, Falangaw people’s stage performance is extraordinary; it represents Amis culture in way that cannot be seen in their regular life. For example, when performing their dances and songs on stage, performers have to wear traditional costumes, which they do not wear everyday; they display typical, sometimes stereotypical, songs and dances that represent the essence of Amis culture to the audience.

Baseball is the second issue that will be addressed in this chapter. Both baseball and stage singing were bodily performances initiated and promoted by the Japanese and the Chinese colonial regimes. In the last part of this chapter I present some political festivals, or special ritual- or festival-like activities that serve to fulfill contemporary political needs, such as kiloma’an and election campaigns. I demonstrate how local Amis people use them as platforms to present and manage power relations both from the perspectives of the bottom-up and the top-down.

Why do such extraordinary experiences matter? Victor Turner (1988: 85, 87) places performance at the center of anthropological inquiries, arguing that ritual, drama, carnival, film, and spectacle are performative genres that separate the quotidian from the extraordinary. These performances generate reflexive dynamics between the objective and the subjective. The construction of the self and local people’s worldview is the consequence of that dynamic procedure. Based on this premise, some conflicts,
struggles, and negotiations implicit in quotidian life are manifested symbolically or euphemistically in extraordinary practices. Examining those practices will lead to the discovery that the trajectories of both the country’s and Falangaw’s development are intertwined, rendering it difficult to untangle the cause-effect relationship between state regulation and local agency.

To clarify this relationship the chapter addresses Amis people’s travel experiences and bodily performances. Both travel experiences and bodily performances involve a negotiation of power relations between the local and the outside world. The state, to my informants, is not abstract at all; it exists not just in abstract governmental regulation but also in their concrete experiences of and reflexive performance to state regulation, just as the cases of stage performance, baseball, and the political festivals demonstrate below.

**Stage performance**

Singing and dancing was Amis people’s everyday life some decades ago, before Han immigrants arrived in Falangaw. Singing was not just an entertainment. Some kinds of singing, such as songs sung in *kiloma’an* and the *pacidal* (rain prayer) were religious while other songs sung in quotidian circumstances such as in paddy fields consolidated people of different families. Simply put, singing and dancing to the Falangaw Amis were routine, and they were not performed for the entertainment of
outsiders.

In 1916 a Japanese prince inspected Taiwan. To greet this prince the Japanese officials commanded indigenous peoples, including the Amis, to wear traditional costumes and perform songs and dances. During the period of preparation, the magistrate of Taitung Chou (州, administrative district in the Japanese period), made a special note in an official document, saying “The prince could ask for watching Amis dancing, therefore we should take this into consideration when picking the Amis singers” (Taiwan Sotofuku 1999: 169). Seven years later, in 1923 the Japanese Crown Prince Hirohito went on an inspection tour of Taiwan. Six indigenous peoples, Atayal, Saisiat, Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan, and Amis, were summoned to Taiwan Sotofuku (Taiwan Governor General) and were trained to dress and behave correctly. Finally the Prince arrived and granted a meeting with the indigenous people. After being called by the Prince

The Amis male team (29 persons) and the female team (21 persons) presented the dance to entertain the Crown Prince.

The male team sings:

We are blessed by the gods. Crops grow well and we have abundant harvests.

To thank the gods we dance and pray for harvests in the next years.

The female team sings:
Dancing in front of Your Highness is our honor.

Granted by Your Highness’s mercy our everyday life is free from worry.

With the deepest gratitude to your watching our trivial dances, we feel terribly frightened.

(Ibid.:1999:340)

Apparently the Amis became famous for their dances a century ago, and their singing and dancing were transformed from daily practice into stage performance. Such transformation was linked to state formation, because both the Japanese and the Chinese colonial regimes needed something to prove that indigenous people, the most heterogeneous component in these empires that aspired to be nation-states were both submissive and contributory. To an integrated state indigenous people’s programmed stage performance would be one of the best proofs of tractability.

Concretely speaking, being Japan’s first colony, Taiwan presented the problem of difference and standardization that Japan would need to manage when facing all the disparities existing in the whole empire. For this reason the prince inspected Taiwan to confirm that after years of colonization, the most uncivilized indigenes had become docile and manageable. In the eye of the Japanese colonizers, the Amis were more civilized than other indigenous peoples living in mountain areas like the Atayal, the Bunun, and the Tsou. Thus, they were assigned to perform dances and songs on special occasions, not just to offer entertainments but also as a sign of compliance. In
the very beginning of the colonial encounter between the regime and indigenous people, all the indigenes were regarded as savages. However, some indigenous peoples living in mountain areas still practiced headhunting and slash-and-burn agriculture and were regarded as wild. In contrast, other peoples who had given up headhunting and practiced rice-growing agriculture were regarded as docile. It was the latter groups, such as the Amis, that bore the responsibility of proving the indigenes’ obedience to colonial governance, and demonstrating the empire’s rich cultural diversity by performing their dances and songs on official occasions. What I want to emphasize here is that it was not the artistry of singing itself but the government’s assessment of the Amis that led to their selection as the proper group to stage the dances and songs.

From the standpoint of the Falangaw Amis, the performances gave them opportunities to travel. The Japanese colonial government arranged for Amis people to travel to Taipei, the capital city of colonial Taiwan, and Japan, the colonial center, to give performances. During the Japanese period, the arrangement of such travels was an important colonial policy, and different stages of Japanese colonization had different guiding principles and targets for carrying out this policy (Cheng 2005). In the early stage of Japanese governance, the goal of the policy was to intimidate and domesticate rebellious Taiwan indigenes, therefore key persons such as chiefs,
headmen, and elders were targeted for official travel to Taipei or cities of Japan.\textsuperscript{90}

To the indigenes those traveling experiences were impressive: not only was the sense of imagined community (the country or the nation) imposed upon the indigenous travellers, just as Benedict Anderson (1983: 142) described in the case of pilgrimage, but they also expanded their worldview and found their own way of participating in colonial modernity. For example, the Japanese government held the Exhibition for Memorizing the 40\textsuperscript{th} Inaugurating Governance of Taiwan in Taipei in 1935. In this 50-day-long Exhibition, there was an area of \textit{banya} (蕃屋 or Aborigine House), demonstrating the Japanese government’s achievements in managing indigenous affairs. In addition to some demonstrations of indigenous material culture, six performances of indigenous dancing and singing were presented, and four of them were staged by the Amis. The Exhibition was a huge success. It presented the achievements of Japanese colonization, immersing all the tourists and visitors in a carnival-like atmosphere. According to a local journal, the indigenous dancers’

\textsuperscript{90} The Japanese government paid for all the traveling expenses and indigenous people were taken to visit modern buildings, trains, battleships, army camps and military maneuvers. However, in the later stages of Japanese colonization, the government arranged more trips but encouraged indigenous people to travel at their own expense. The main target shifted from elderly key persons to young students and \textit{Seinenkai} (Youth Organization) members. The goal of travel was different as well; those young people were guided to visit some politico-cultural sites, such as temples, imperial palaces, and Yasukumi Shrine (Cheng 2005:100).
performances attracted 25,000 people, and the audience's acclamations made the exhibition hall chaotic (Cheng: 2005: 217).

Through stage performance not only did the Amis have the experience of spectacle and state ritual like Clifford Geertz (1980:102) suggests, they also found that they could participate in state formation, and play a role in the scenario of celebratory modernity: Japanese, the civilization initiators and the rulers, and indigenous people who needed to be civilized, could work together under the scheme of this colonial hierarchical order for the goal of achieving a better future. An experience like that was extraordinary and meaningful to the Falangaw Amis; they did not regard it as an annoying obligation. Instead, Falangaw Amis people thought that this experience should be remembered, so in the same year, 1935, they named the newest age-set la Taipak or Team of Taipei to commemorate their people’s trip to the Exhibition in Taipei (Taipak).91 Rather than passively receiving the arrangements, they actively used the opportunity of travel to expand their worldview and, most importantly, they integrated those experiences into their own cultural institutions.

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91 It was Laway, or Omura Sensei, the kakita ‘an of that period of time, who took the lead in the trip to Taipei. And later in 1937, responding to a call from the colonial government, he led people to travel to Japan, the colonial center. Interestingly, his grandson, Laway (Wang Ching-jian), a KMT county councilor, did his political pilgrimage too. He took Falangaw singers to China in 2006, the year when the DPP achieved the presidency and the KMT sought to resume connections with China to counteract the DPP.
In today’s Falangaw, all the people who attended the Exhibition are dead. Hoki said that his father, a Taipak member, always said “Nihon dai ichi” (Japan is the best) and did not believe that Japan could lose the war against the United States in 1945. Even after World War Two, most of those who were born during the Japanese colonial period still thought that they were more Japanese than Chinese in the issue of citizenship and nationality. Singing and dancing to the Falangaw Amis was a way to manifest their citizenship.

After World War II, with the end of Japanese colonization and the coming of KMT governance, the government’s propaganda image of Taiwan indigenes shifted from untamed savages thirsty for headhunting to naively vivacious singers and dancers wearing their traditional costumes. The social position of the Amis has become one of the strongest ingredients when Taiwan needs to present a self-portrait abroad (Anderson 2009:306). In ordinary days, these Amis singers are farmers growing rice in their fields no different from all other farmers in Taiwan, but when being invited to sing and dance in concert halls they wear their costumes and become “tribal” singers and dancers. It suggests at least two things. One is that no Amis singer really makes a big fortune by stage performance. Second, when traveling outside of Falangaw, they know that they have to “indigenize” themselves by wearing traditional costumes and carrying stage props they do not use in their everyday life. The costumes and props
present some sort of Amis indigeneity, in which naivety, an agrarian way of life, and male valor and masculinity are demonstrated on the stage.

The performance of indigeneity is the result of the collaboration of the performers, the state apparatus, and the audience. The state apparatus offers them stages on which to sing and dance. It also sets up the keynote of the performance, i.e., the benign, docile, and merry indigenes singing while working and thanking gods for granting harvests. However, the performers still decide the repertoire. Tenngo showed me a film shot in 1988, in which a performance was given in Taipei before the Falangaw singers made their debut in European countries (Tenngo herself and her husband Iciang were members of the troupe). When watching the film with Tenngo, she told me that all the stage props were designed and made by Iciang.

Of all the stage props a huge cow costume impressed me most. Tenngo told me that it was Iciang’s idea to make that cow costume because he thought that the audience enjoyed watching the scenario of growing rice in paddy field. Many singers told me that Kodaway or the Merry Drinking Song now is indispensable in their program repertoire because of the Olympic Event (see chapter 1). This song now is an icon-like referent of the Falangaw Amis. Not only does this song often appear in Falangaw people’s congregations, it also has become the theme of the Falangaw Amis Age-set Advancement Association since 1995, the year Falangaw Amis turned their
age-sets into a legal corporation, and it features every year in the opening ceremony of kiloma’an.92

Miladiw or singing in traditional Amis society was not the way we see in today’s Falangaw. The singers are conscious that miladiw, in a strict sense, is different from some western concepts such as yinyue (music) and biaoyan (stage performance) (Tan 2009: 74-81). In other words, miladiw is a multivalent phenomenon connoting religious, social, and gender relations and should not just be simplified as entertainment. To understand Amis singing it is necessary to go back to the Amis concept of the person as presented in chapter 3. To the Amis, the voice comes from the mysterious inside part of the human body, and directly represents one’s inner essence. Therefore, singing should be deemed as a specific way of communication or dialogue in and between different social groups and between people and kawas (supernatural beings). That is why traditionally people seldom sang alone. Most solo-style Amis songs that people sing today in Falangaw are, in fact, of modern invention, and solo-style songs are not included in official performances. Miladiw activities can be roughly distinguished into two categories: one is religious singing, used in rituals like pakacidal (sun prayer) and kiloman’an, and the other is secular singing, such as singing while working in the paddy field or while feasting. These two

92 This song can be heard at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VO9PnONq2E
categories cannot be mixed together. For example, it is taboo to sing *pakacidal songs* while working or feasting and only ritual songs are allowed on occasions like *kiloma’an*.

Here the relationship between different social groups and between human beings and supernatural beings is clearly manifested. Take secular singing, for example. The famous Amis polyphonic singing, according to my informants, comes from their *mipaliw* (labor exchange) practice, suggesting that when working in vast paddy field farmers respond with their *mipaliw* partners via polyphonic singing.

Even in secular singing, *miladiw* still has something to do with the supernatural. Rice wine is the key necessity in ordinary singing gatherings at home. When answering why rice wine was inevitable, my informants just said that rice wine helps open their throats and makes their voices better. However, before singing, usually the oldest singer would pour rice wine onto the ground slowly and whisper prayers. Singers do this simple ritual to communicate with *kawas* because Amis secular singing is impromptu; they often put new lyrics into certain melodies in which names of attendants or absentees, whether alive or not, must be mentioned. I witnessed many singing congregations like that. After doing the ritual with rice wine, usually the lead singer put my name and the goal of my visit into the song sung by all the singers. When answering the question about to whom they sang, I was always told that the
song was dedicated to both the visitor and the kawas or the malitengay (the ancestors).

As presented in chapter 3, calling other people’s names like that could be dangerous, and that is why they need rice wine for the ritual before and during their singing.

In previous times, miladiw was an inalienable part of everyday life. However, some changes happened after the arrival of the modern colonial regimes and such changes should be seen as social catalysts that trigger more changes. To discuss these changes properly, let me turn to the perspective of materiality.

First of all, writing, usually Katakana symbols, is employed to help stage singing performance (Fig.6.1). Traditionally, Falangaw Amis people did not write their songs or related practices down because everyone sang idiosyncratically, although the melody remained basically the same. However, when their songs have to be staged they need to provide the repertoire and lyrics, so that the organizer and the audience can understand what their performance is about. A new requirement of accuracy has replaced the impromptu style practiced in their daily life. This introduction of writing into singing brings at least two important influences: standardization of content and form of singing and the transformation from improvisation to accuracy.
Secondly, electronic equipment such as microphone and tape recorder, has been introduced and changed some aspects of singing in their daily life. Originally voices were representations of the interior of human bodies, so the Amis insisted on a holistic way to deal with singing. The first time I attended kiloma’an was in 1996, and I noticed that when people were singing to greet kawas they did not use microphones. That contradicted my earlier experiences of kiloma’an in other indigenous communities in which people’s singing was amplified by microphones and their dancing was accompanied by recorded music. My informant, Diway, explained that they wanted to present the most traditional/original kiloma’an to ancestral spirits, and that was why they did not use that equipment. Yet, things were different in the kiloma’an of 2009. When greeting kawas, the lead singer sang the chants with a microphone. Unlike one part of an unalienable whole, singing had become something
that can be arranged and managed. Diway, the *mili’eciway* (lead singer) of Itukalay (la Congtong), said something quite different from what he told me in 1996: “We use microphones so that everyone can hear the singing clearly and it helps preserve and promote our tradition, just like our singers performing our traditional songs on the stage.”

In addition to microphones, tape recorders were used to manage their singing as well. When living in Tenngo’s home, I was told that she recorded dozens of tapes when they attended casual meetings and formal congregations. Listening to the tapes recorded some twenty or thirty years ago with her and guests, Tenngo commented on today’s singers by the standards of deceased singers’ singing preserved in her tapes. Tape-recording allowed Tenngo to make comparisons which could not be made before the era of tape-recorder because the tapes provided a proof to demonstrate her own idea of aesthetics and authenticity of *miladiv*. To some people like Tenngo, singing gradually became standardized or something with formalized content and aesthetic standards, although the standards are always contentious.

Thirdly, some Amis clothing styles were altered because of the introduction of stage performance, and such alterations have loosened preexisting rules about social roles. For example, according to Laway na Asam, the *tatasay* (head scarf) we see today in Falangaw is a new invention, not the traditional style. Laway witnessed the invention
of this new *tatasay* when he was a member of a famous troupe, Gaoshan Wuji or the High Mountain Dancing Ensemble, in 1994. A traditional *tatasay* is a long and thick hand-woven scarf, a time-consuming thing to deal with, and worn exclusively by *malitengay* (elderly men). According to Laway, some twenty years ago in an official performance a *malitengay* decided that wearing *tatasay* was troublesome, so he simplified the long thick scarf into a hat-like hoop. This reformation became a fashion in Falangaw. Now only few *malitengay* people wear traditional *tatasay* in festivals and official congregations. Nowadays people treat *tatasay*, no matter whether it is the traditional or the new style, less seriously, since they just see it as a costume. Sometimes I saw children wear it in *kiloma’an* or on the stage when they were dancing. But *tatasay* meant something quite different in the past; it symbolized maleness and seniority, and young people were forbidden to wear it. This example demonstrates that the staging of Amis singing introduced initially by state apparatuses has caused some transformation in social relations.

To understand the politics of the stage performance better, it is necessary to introduce some key persons. Kurosawa Takatomo (1895-1987) was one of the first-generation Japanese ethnomusicologists to study Taiwan’s indigenous music. Two of Kurosawa’s most famous researches are about Amis polyphonic singing and Bunun eight-part harmonic singing. Why did the Japanese government support
Kurosawa’s research, especially as ethnomusicology seemed irrelevant and useless to the War? In fact just like all ethnographic surveys conducted for facilitating Japanese colonization, ethnomusicological research was expected to help realize the goal of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, because during the period of World War Two, the Japanese military believed that music was one of the best weapons that could consolidate people of different backgrounds (Wang 2008:72).  

Difang was one of Kurosawa’s informants. After World War Two, following Kurosawa’s traces, some Chinese and Taiwanese ethnomusicologists, such as Lu Bing-chuan, Shih Wei-liang and Hsu Tsang-houei, came to the countryside to document folksongs during the 1960s to 1970s. When they arrived in Falangaw, Difang worked with some of these ethnomusicologists again. Shih Wei-liang and Hsu Tsang-houei started the Folksong Collection Movement (Mingge Caiji Yundong) in the middle 1960s and the 1970s. This movement was to form the so-called “modern China” by understanding the communities and varieties of folk musical forms within

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93 Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or Dai tō a Kyōeiken (大東亞共榮圈) was a political slogan and strategic constitution proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro in 1938. The content of this political slogan was to advocate a union of the Japanese empire (including her colonies Taiwan and Korea), East Asia, and South East Asia to fight against colonial powers of the Western world. Under such a political ideology, the whole Sphere should have something, such as music, in common, and such thing should develop in different evolutionary stages according to the development of civilization.
the political boundary of the Chinese nation, including areas at the margin. This movement shared a very similar political objective with what Kurosawa Takatomo strived to achieve under the political climate of the Japanese Empire’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. That was why no sooner had this movement begun than it got support and promotion from the KMT government.

Some of the echoes of this movement were from China Youth’s Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps (National Salvation Corps for short), a KMT organization founded by Chiang Ching-foo (Chiang Kai-shek’s eldest son) for inculcating in the youth ideas of patriotism. It is worthwhile to mention here that the National Salvation Corps, although not an official institution, inculcated in young students dogmatic doctrines by recruiting them into the Corps during the period from the 1960s to 1990s, i.e., the period of cold war against the Chinese Communist Party, and that was why this organization was named China Youth’s Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps. To reach this goal, not only did the National Salvation Corps send high schools and college students to the countryside and remote indigenous communities. Many indigenous songs and dances were also incorporated into their summer and winter camp programs. By doing that, indigenous melodies and folksongs were transformed into songs with Chinese lyrics or some make-believe indigenous songs, such as Kaushan Qing (The Green of High Mountains), Women Doshih Yijiaren (We All Are One Family), and Malan Guniang (The Malan [Falangaw] Maid), which were
popular among university students (Huang 2012:33). Many Amis teachers, including Piya’s son Tayo and his cousins, taught Amis songs in the camps (Ibid.: 31).

Under such a circumstance, indigenous people were envisioned through simplified stereotypes like “men are as strong as mountains”, “girls are as beautiful as waters,” and they are innocent and carefree. A distinct sense of otherness was formulated by the state in this process. In addition, the National Salvation Corps’s incorporation of indigenous elements into its educational programs had two other nationalist purposes. One was to teach young students, through moral lesson of these songs, to behave like pristine indigenes, i.e., having a strong body and a pure or docile mind, in order to serve the country. The other was that those songs told the students about the diversity of the country’s ethno-scape, with all ethnic diversity integrated into an inseparable wholeness, because “we are all one family.”

Why did this movement start and flourish not in other decades but in the 1960s? In the KMT government’s first fifteen years in power, the political climate was extremely unstable, as explained in chapter 1. After the mid-1960s, the KMT government realized that violent oppression could not be the only means of managing disparities, so culture became one of the government’s main concerns, especially after Mao Zedong ignited the Cultural Revolution which destroyed almost everything traditional in China. Chiang Kai-shek thought that Mao’s smashing of Chinese culture could be a good chance to get power back by claiming the central status of Chinese
culture in Taiwan, the newly gained colony in the marginal area of the Chinese nation. So he took the initiative of the Chinese Culture Revitalization Movement and founded a semi-official council to fulfill this goal.

In a political atmosphere like that, some seemingly irrelevant institutions, such as the KMT’s National Salvation Corps, civilian organizations like the Council of Chinese Culture Revitalization Movement, and staff of academic institutions, were working together in the same direction, if not cooperating together under the command of the central government. In addition, it was at about this time that the industries of popular culture began to thrive. Taiwan Television (TTV), the first television enterprise in Taiwan, was founded in 1962, and record companies appeared in the same period. Many indigenous songs, or songs describing and imitating indigenous styles, could often be seen or heard on TV and radio programs and had nation-wide popularity beyond the circle of those college students who attended National Salvation Corps’s summer and winter camps. Lu Jing-zi (盧靜子，Shizu), an Amis singer from Falangaw, was well-known in Taiwan; Malan Guniang (The Falangaw Maiden), an Amis song, was one of her most famous songs sung in TV

94 It should be noted here that Taiwan did not have private TV enterprises until 1997; all the three TV companies were either state-sponsored or KMT-run enterprises. In other words, all the media programs, had to be censored by the government before broadcasting to make sure that they were politically correct according to the KMT orthodoxy.
programs and the summer and winter camps. This song goes: 95

Inaaw hay ya amaaw, sololen kako, ina.

(My mother, my father, forgive me please)

Matini similicayay ko wawa no tao to tireng ako, ina.

(That guy has asked me to marry him, O my mother)

Ano caay kamo pisolol to tireng ako, ina.

(If I can’t get forgiveness from you, O my mother)

Omaan say ko pinang ko nika patay makinotolo toloan no kasoling

(I will lie myself down on the railroad and let the train cut my body into three pieces)

The melody of this song was so popular; different versions of Chinese lyrics were added and sung by famous Chinese singers like Mei Dai, Zhang Lu, and Ching San on TV and radio programs. 96 Thus, arguably Falangaw became the representative of all the indigenes in the 1960s. One of the versions sung by Zhang Lu goes: 97

Layers of remote green mountains look seemingly endless

The vivacious Malan maiden’s lotus-like footsteps moving softly like breezes

95 The Amis version of this song can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPSfYbiR2dE

96 There are a variety of different versions of this song. In addition to the versions mentioned in the text, The Malan Maid is orchestrated and has become a popular symphonic music and an art song. Besides, the status of this song has also been elevated. Now, in Taiwan, we can find this song, the Chinese version, in the music textbooks for elementary school and junior high school students.

97 The song can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UP1mfG7-ivY
She sings from this hill here to the next there

Light red buds of flowers she picked escorted by green leaves, escorted by green leaves

Magnificent Malan scenery looks just like a drawing

The vivacious Malan maiden is more beautiful than flower, more beautiful than flower

The mountain youth is strong and romantic, missing this maiden in his heart

Marrying the maiden and living his life happily, living his life happily

Here a clear difference between Lu’s version and Zhang’s can be easily discerned. In the Amis version, the song is about a girl imploring the impediment to her true love. Lu’s version reflects the social reality of the 1960s, for it tells us that the protagonist, a young girl, has to struggle with her mother in order to win the freedom of marriage. However, before the 1960s in Malan (Falangaw), young people could not decide on whom they wanted to marry. Maternal authority that decided on children’s marriages was important, suggesting that the focus of social relatedness was shifting from a horizontal brother-sister relation to a vertical parent-child relation under the influence of state governance. Interestingly, Zhang Lu’s version draws a picture that is totally different from Lu’s; it demonstrates nothing of social reality but an imaginary scenery of the indigenous, in which the Falangaw Amis, the representative of all Taiwan indigenes, are static and archaic and totally free from agonies of modernization. In
Zhang Lu’s song, Falangaw just looks like an Arcadia where young men are strong, young women are beautiful, adorable, pure, and free love can be expected. In this imaginary world there are no modern things like trains and railroads, and no one would lie on the railroad committing suicide and struggling for freedom of marriage. 

*The Malan Maiden* is an example of how Taiwan’s indigenous people have been imagined. Ordinary Taiwanese who do not have much direct experience of indigenous people imagine the indigenous via these popular songs. The depiction in this song gives the listener a strong pristine image about indigenous people, and the indigenous, of course, are conscious of how the mainstream society conceptualizes them and what roles are they expected to play.

Prevailing in the 1960s this imagination foreshadowed Amis people’s singing being deemed as a national treasure in the 1990s. Difang was one of the earliest singers recruited by ethnomusicologists like Hsu Tsang-houei and his student Wu Rung-shun as an informant. Through this connection Difang, together with his company, was invited to perform songs in the concert halls of Taiwan’s big cities. The members Difang recruited mostly were his mipaliw partners (see chapter 5). It was in 1988 that

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98 Before I did my fieldwork in 2009, I lived in a friend’s home near Falangaw. My friend’s mother, a local Han Taiwanese, loved singing this song very much. Although not having many Amis friends there in Taitung city, she told me how popular this song was on TV and radio programs for decades in Taiwan.
these Amis singers, with Professor Hsu Tsang-houei’s help and full financial support from the Taiwan government, were invited to offer touring performances in European countries. The most important stop was the Maison Des Cultures Du Monde, Paris, France (Fig. 6.2).

Fig. 6.2  Concert held in Maison Des Cultures Du Monde, Paris, France, 1988.  
Courtesy of Chun-yen Sun.

The concert was to present a synoptic Oceanic landscape of indigenous music, and
the Amis’s polyphonic singing and the Bunun’s eight-part harmonic singing were the representatives of Taiwan (here again we see the influence of Kurosawa Takatomo’s academic legacy). According to Tenngo, a member in the troupe, their performance was the most popular. Owing to the success of their performance, their voices were recorded in Paris, and subsequently an album was released.

Difang’s fame reached a climax at the Olympic event in 1994 as presented in chapter 1. Difang became an icon of Taiwan’s indigenous culture. Magic Stone, one of Taiwan’s biggest record companies, released two albums for Difang, in which traditional Amis songs were rearranged and transformed into a New Age music style (Fig: 6.3). Encouraged by Difang’s success, a record company issued an album for Tenngo and Iciang too. Many troupes, such as The Amis Great Singers (Ameizu Dageshou), The Sound of Pestle (Chuyin), and The Pristine Sound of Mountain and Ocean (Shanhai Yuanyin), were organized during that period of time to accept invitations from both home and abroad. These singers went to Europe (Austria, Netherlands, England, France, Germany), Asia (China, Japan, Malaysia), and America (United States and Mexico). One of the remarkable travelling experiences that Chuyin members liked to recall was that in 1999 they were invited to give an MLB (Major League Baseball) opening performance when Chuyin toured in the United States.
Staged performances are not only passive responses to the demands of government institutions; some songs were created and performed as dialogues with or criticisms of state regulation. Incorporating historical imagination and daily experience into the newly created songs, singing here unfolds its positivity. For example, Piya lyricized an ancient Amis melody and put this song, the Song of Kulas Mahengheng, into the baseball game guidebooks. Although this song is not sung in kiloma’an and other public gatherings, it has gained great popularity in Falangaw. This remarkable song sings: 99

*Nani Palidaw i lilies no fulang*

From Palidaw and along the seashore

*Kasaliholihoc Cilangsay*

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99 There are variants of this song, and here I adopt Chun-yen Sun’s documentation (Sun 2011:80-81).
Going through all curve pathways and arriving at Cilangasan

Litelitengan iya iya hohayay

Very long time ago

Malataw Linamay a milayap

He was directed by Malataw and Linamay, the gods

Mahengheng iya iya hohaya

O Mahengheng!

U mi’edemay u mikeliday

He led Amis people

Hamata hangoyos no niyaro’

As the eye and the mouth of us all

U wama ita iya iya hohayay

He was everyone’s father

Midipot to Amis a mapolong

Taking care of all of the Amis

Mahengheng iya iya hohayay

O Mahengheng!

Mililid ko kapah tala’amis

Young men carried him northward
During the wartime even the Japanese had to bow to him

He was the leader

Who founded Falangaw

O Mahengheng!

This song is worth our attention for two reasons. First, it is a product of modernity. The content of the lyric tells a lot of things that cannot exist in a traditional Amis society. The most important message in the song is that it recaps the historical narrative of the South Genesis introduced in chapter 2. Piya, the lyric writer, condensed all the essence of this Genesis in this song, in which all the Amis were from Palidaw and Kulas Mahengheng is elevated as the Father of the Amis Tribe.\footnote{This song is so popular, everyone sings it in Falangaw but no one knows the identity of the composer and the lyric writer. Ethnomusicologist Chu-yen Sun deduces that Piya, the great grandson of Kulas Mahengheng, was the lyric writer (Sun 2011:85).}

Such a concept of the Amis Tribe is a modern invention which relies upon the nation-state metaphor, such as the genesis and the founding father, as I have argued in chapter 2. Second, it was through baseball games, a sport both the Japanese and
Chinese colonial regimes favored and promoted, that this song became popular and canonized the south genesis and the status of Mahengheng as self-evident truths.

Another example is about a newer invented song, The Song of Xin Malan, composed and written by Tenngo, which was staged on April 19 and 20, 2010, at the National Taiwan University, Taipei. This song sings

\[ Xin\ Malan\ niyaro'\ i\ no\ niyam \]

New Malan (Falangaw) is our hometown

\[ Ka'amis\ no\ Malan\ Rongjia\ kami \]

It locates in the north of Malan Veteran House (Rongjia)

\[ "Ano\ icuwa'ay\ no\ sanay\ kamo?" \]

“Then, where is your hometown after all?”

\[ "Sapikepiked,\ sa'ikung'ikung" \]

“You just go through these curves and those detours”

\[ Xin\ Malan\ naluwan\ dianta\ kami \]

We are the naluwan radio station of Xin Malan

This short song looks like a humdrum piece at first glance. Nonetheless, it contains rich information about Falangaw people’s quotidian experience and critiques toward

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101 The text of the song is based on Chun-yen Sun’s documentation (Ibid.: 96-97). Besides, the concert held at the National Taiwan University was organized by Chun-yen Sun. Sun, a student of the late Professor Hsu Tsang-houei, is an ethnomusicologist specializing in Falangaw Amis polyphonic music.
the government, expressed in a euphemistic and self-ridiculing way. In the beginning, the song says that Xin Malan is their hometown. Xin Malan (meaning new Falangaw, or Fukid in Amis.), a place next to Malan Rongjia or Malan Veteran’s Home, is one of Falangaw’s satellite communities established since the Han flowed into Falangaw and seized most of their land. Many Amis people, including Tenngo, were reluctant to move to Fukid, and did not like the crowded surroundings. That is why in this song when answering the question about the exact location of Fukid it says that to find it you have to go through many curves and detours. Usually people would laugh when they hear this answer in the song for the first time, yet it is actually a gentle sarcasm and protest against the government’s policy of relocation.

Furthermore, the song has a motif of exile or movement. Interestingly, this motif also appears in the Song of Mahengheng and the new genesis of the Falangaw Amis. This motif is about how people wandered through different curves and detours and finally arrived in Fukid, their new hometown. Both songs depict the process of exile and the craving for settling down.

The Song of Xin Malan contains more ingredients than those of self-ridicule and protest; it also offers a confirmation of the present and an outlook for the future. This song calls their new hometown Xin Malan, a Mandarin name, rather than Fukid, a traditional Amis toponym, suggesting that this new niyaro’ (community or hometown)
to them means more in a sense of modern statist administration than in the sense of
classical Amis history. Such a confirmation is further expressed in the last sentence
which tells the listener that the singers are “the *naluwan* radio station of Xin Malan”.

*Naluwan*, a word can be heard in the famous song *Gaosan Qing* introduced above, has
become a popular word synonymous with indigenous people. In other words, the
singers conceive of themselves as Xin Malan’s indigenous radio station, broadcasting
indigenous voices via songs to the outside world. The image of a radio station is

**Baseball**

When doing fieldwork in Falangaw, many of my informants would watch live
television coverage of US MLB games almost every morning. Chien-ming Wang, a
New York Yankees pitcher from Taiwan, was a super national hero during that period
of time. In Taiwan people call baseball *guoqiu* or “the national ball,” meaning that it is

a sport of all people of Taiwan.

Here Piya should be mentioned again. Piya started his baseball career in Chiayi, a
county of the western Taiwan, in the early 1930s. Kondo Hyotaro, a coach teaching
baseball at Kano (Chiayi Agriculture and Forestry Public School), came to Taitung in
1928 to recruit four indigenous students, one Puyuma and three Amis. The Kano Baseball Team consisted of a Japanese coach and Japanese, Taiwanese, and, of course, indigenous students. Three years later, in 1931, the Kano Baseball Team defeated all high school baseball teams in Taiwan. In the same year, representing Taiwan, the Kano Baseball Team went to Japan to attend the so-called Koushien Contest (The Japan High School Baseball League Contest), a nation-wide high school baseball contest held annually in Japan, and won a silver medal.\footnote{\textit{Kano}, a movie based on the history of the Kano Baseball Team’s winning a silver medal in the 1931 Koushien Contests, was released in Taiwan, and it soon became a blockbuster in February, 2014. A trailer of this movie can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvBvkp-r4C4} This was the best achievement Taiwanese teams ever had during the Japanese colonial period. The success was so huge that it attracted many Falangaw Amis students, and Piya was one of them who went to Chiayi to learn baseball from Kondo Hyotaro. Piya later became a Kano member, attending the Koushien Contest in 1936 (Fig. 6.4).
The Kano Baseball Team was so successful, it won four championships in Taiwan, and represented Taiwan to attend Koushien Contests in 1931, 1933, 1935, and 1936. After World War Two, all the indigenous Kano members became teachers or civil servants. For example, Piya was elected as Taitung County councilor in 1954, and Chen Geng-yuan, Piya’s school senior from a Puyuma village, became the principal of Taitung Agriculture School. Chen Jian-nian, Chen Geng-yuan’s son, was elected as county magistrate (1993-2001) and became the first and so far the only indigene undertaking such a position in Taiwan history.

Kano members who occupied those positions in Amis communities formed a network and organized regional contests or tournaments held in later years. Of some thirty tournaments, Tayo, Piya’s son, recalled, there have been five tournaments held
in Taitung City or by Falangaw people. For example, the late kakita’an Maysan, aka Huang Zhung or Omai Sensei, organized a contest in 1973 exclusively for indigenous baseball teams, and after his death Falangaw people held the Huang Zhung’s Cup Baseball Tournaments (1982-1986) to commemorate his contributions. Subsequently, in 1987 Piya and Chen Jian-niang organized the Geng-yuang’s Cup Baseball Tournament to honor Chen Geng-yuan’s contributions and his memorable baseball life. Later, Piya, Kulas Mahengheng’s great grandson, organized the Mahengheng’s Cup Baseball Tournaments (1987-1989) to glorify Falangaw’s most eminent kakita’an, Kulas Mahengheng. It is in the guidebook of this Tournament that Piya put down some things that he called Amis tradition and culture, such as a brief life history and a picture of Kulas Mahengheng, a history of Amis people’s migration from Palidaw (the southernmost spot of Taiwan) to Falangaw (see chapter 2), and some information about kinship (names of ngasaw) and names and meanings of all the age-sets.

In Piya’s mind promoting baseball is equivalent to revitalizing Amis tradition. In the guidebook Piya writes:

Goal: By hosting baseball games we connect different shanbao’s age-sets together and facilitate the communication between those age-sets, study and maintain shanbao’s traditional culture, inherit our ancestors’ ways of living, promote the spirits of respecting the elderly, industriousness,
solidarity, and thrift to achieve a peaceful and happy society (Guo 1989:3). It seems that Piya regarded baseball as a salvation or solution when indigenous people face predicaments in the modern world. Piya’s son Tayo and his student, also a retired baseball couch, Lin Tien-song confirmed it. Lin recollected:

Some forty years ago Piya trained us. Although he didn’t beat us, we young boys were terribly afraid of him. Piya was so demanding, and we all deeply understood how serious he was about baseball. We often cried not because of physical punishment but because of his words about how disappointed he was and how awkward we were. Yes, just these few words made us cry. Piya always emphasized the importance of discipline and hard work. I have learned some things very important from him. In addition to skills, techniques, and strategies, his teaching about being polite, disciplined, and punctual is still helpful to me. Piya influenced me a lot. I was very strict to my students too and always let my students know that if we Amis didn’t treat baseball seriously we would have no future.

Tenngo and her son Palac recollected that when baseball was in its heyday almost everyone in Falangaw dropped their work to attend baseball games. When the reconstruction of the Taitung City Stadium was completed in 1983, Falangaw Amis people named the newest initiated age-set la Kulanto or the Team of Sport Ground.

103 Here we see that the Amis call themselves shanbao, meaning the mountain people or the siblings living in mountains. In chapter 5 I explained the differences between shanbao as used in Taiwan before 1994 and yunzhumin(indigenes) after 1994.
The newly completed sport ground was meaningful to Falangaw people because it offered a place for baseball games. Baseball tournaments were not solely Falangaw’s business; the National Salvation Corps of the KMT and Taitung City also played the role of sponsor. Primary and high schools in Taitung supported the games as well. Some Kano alumni and their pupils who worked at those schools used their personal social resources to get the place and equipment to facilitate contests or tournaments.

In addition to the connection between Falangaw and the outside worlds, baseball consolidated some things very local and traditional too. In the baseball contests ngasaws or raloma’ans had their own baseball teams competing for the championship. That is to say, baseball consolidated kinship relationships and integrated Falangaw. Besides, some families in Falangaw, such as the Guo and the Yang, are famous baseball families. Take the Guo family or na Kakita’an, the family descended from the legendary kakita’an Kulas Mahengheng, as an example. Since the 1940s the Guo family has had eight professional baseball players. Among these players Piya’s maternal cousin’s son Kou Yuan-zhi is a legend in Taiwan. He was a pitcher in Taiwan’s national teams, helping his teams win three world championships in the Big League Baseball contests in the United States from 1969 to 1975. Later, he went to Japan (1981-1996) to join the NPB (Nippon Professional Baseball) and became a record keeper. If Kou Yuan-zhi was the idol of the last generation, then Lin
Chih-sheng (Ngayaw), this family’s new pride, inherited Kou Yuan-zhi’s glory and became one of the brightest baseball stars in today’s Taiwan.

The Guo family is not the only family that garners fame in Falangaw. The Yang Family has 15 professional baseball players, and some of them also went to Japan to play baseball in the NPB, including Yang Dai-kang, the most popular baseball player in Hokkaido Nippon-ham Fighters, Japan. This suggests that baseball is a family business, not just a personal affair. To do this family business well, horizontal links between baseball families have to be formed via marriages. For example, Piya’s sister Yinna married Kuano, a Falangaw Amis baseball player of Piya’s age. Kuano and Yinna’s son was Piya’s student and now teaches baseball in Tai-yuan Junior High School in Taiyung, Taitung. Therefore, though this marital connection Piya’s influence surpassed the boundary of Falangaw and reached Taiyuan, an Amis community north of Falangaw. The Yang family developed horizontal marital connections to solidify itself too, and the case of the Yang family is even more extreme: the Yang family of Falangaw has a marital relationship with another Yang family of Tomiac, an Amis community north of and 100 kilometers away from Falangaw. Two families connected together to support each other and their common language is baseball (Lin 2011:19).104

104 The Yang(楊) family of Tomiac is different from the Yang(陽) family of Falangaw. Just like their
Political Festivals: Kiloma’an and Election

Kiloma’an is an annual ritual that thanks kawas for millet or rice harvest. It is the only ritual that combines the domains of male masakaputay (age-sets) and female loma’ (house/family). Not only does kiloma’an have a ritual function, it is also educational, entertaining, and political (Huang 1994). However, owing to the gradual demise of traditional agriculture (fewer and fewer Amis people grow rice now), in today’s Falangaw kiloma’an is more political than ritual. Multivalent, if not conflicting, powers of national and local politics play different roles in Kiloma’an, which has become a festival-like activity, undertaken mainly for political needs. That is probably why fengnianji (kiloma’an) is officially translated as “harvest festival” rather than “harvest ritual” in official English documents and websites.

Election, an activity that also motivates and combines families and age-sets, on the contrary, is not purely political in Falangaw. Not only can some rituals be observed, it looks really like a carnival-like festival. In this section I use “political festival” to denote how both kiloma’an and election have traversed the boundary separating the

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Falangaw in-laws, the Tomiac family has many famous baseball professional baseball players in Taiwan.

105 Although today’s kiloma’an is more political than ritual, it still has a ritual element. However, as I have mentioned in chapter 4, the ritual aspect of kiloma’an is based on traditional millet or rice agriculture. Nowadays only a few elderly Amis still grow rice, and fewer and fewer people believe the taboos of kiloma’an which were strictly observed in the past.
rural and the urban and have changed the way people conceive themselves and experience the state.

**Kiloma’an**

The 2009 *kiloma’an* was held from July 12 to July 19 in Malan (Falangaw), Taitung City. Below is the procedure:

*Misahafay* (July 12):

In the morning *mihiningay* (la Kulanto) members declare the start of *kiloma’an* on the street. On the same day the *mihiningay* and the *pakanongay no isefiay* (the Teenager of the Elderly, la Ceyacey) members go to every household to collect *ineng* (money for *kiloma’an*).

*Panengneng* (July 13):

*Isefiay* members (the Elderly) go to the *sefi* (Men’s House), and all the men under *isefiay* gather at the square to accept the tasks given by *itukalay* (the Faki or the eldest age-set of the Big Tent). The head of *itukalay* does *misatola’*, a ritual praying for peace. After *misatola’* everyone dances.

*Pafata’an* (July 14):

In the morning the *itukalay* leader does the prayer and gives orders to the age-sets below *itukalay*. After finishing this ritual all age-sets below *isefiay* go to the seashore, and two tents, *taay lalon* (the Big Tent) and *mimingay lalon* (the Small Tent) are erected. And *miki’* (the Sea Ritual) start from this day.

*Miki’* (July 15):
All the men under *isefiay* have to live in the tents for three days. Women are not allowed to approach the tents until the afternoon of this day.\(^\text{106}\) Women bring rice cakes, cigarettes, rice wine, and beverages to visit their relatives (their husbands, sons, and maternal relatives). But they are not allowed to step into the tents. People call this visit *pawsa*.

*Palaylay* (July 16):

All members of the Small Tent come to the Big Tent and are inspected by *itukalay* members, the *faki* or the head of the Big Tent.\(^\text{107}\) After the inspection, all the people line up and go back to Falangaw by using the dancing steps called *palaylay*. After their *palaylay* back to Falangaw, they gather at the *sefi* (Men’s House) and receive the *isefiay* people’s inspection.

*Sahomay* (July 17):

The representatives of all the age-sets come to the *sefi* to take rice cakes and pork back to every age-set’s base.

*Pipipay* (July 18):

All the Falangaw people gather at the dancing square and attend physical, singing, and dancing

\(^{106}\) *Miksi* is a ritual that demonstrates the gender difference. Women are not allowed to visit men’s tents every year when the sea ritual (*miksi*) comes, only on the *miski* days of the second and the third year in the three-year cycle are they allowed to go the tents at some specific times (the second and the third afternoons of the *miksi* days) to visit their male relatives. Women bring some rice products, rice cakes and rice wine, with them when visiting men’s tents and men serve their visitors with the fish they caught during the sea ritual. Here we see the man: woman:: fish: rice scheme as I have presented in chapter 4.

\(^{107}\) For detailed information about *sefi*, the Small Tent, and the Big Tent, see chapter 4.
contests and prizes are awarded. In the end mihiningay announces the details of revenue and expenditure of this year’s kiloma’an.

The Joint Kiloma’an (July 19):

For the origin and details of the Joint Harvest Festival, please see below.

My informants always claimed that Falangaw’s kiloma’an still maintains its traditional content and appearance, and based on this foundation, they further emphasized that Falangaw was the most traditional among all Amis communities. Probably this is right. Harvest ritual in most Amis communities has become a one-or-two-day festival-like activity, in which singing and dancing, rather than ancestral worship, is the main content (Huang 1994). Yet, my informants could be wrong. They did not recognize that what they had seen in kiloma’an was not really traditional but the consequence of negotiations with the governing powers.

For example, to hold the opening and closing ceremonies they need a square for people to congregate. Before the 1960s, when the Amis still were the majority in Taitung City, they gathered at a square located beside Amisay, the biggest sefi. It was a plain square without any stage. When dancing, people, formed a spiral hand in hand. Itukalay members, the Faki, were in the central layers, and at the remote layers stood the youngest, pakanongay or the uninitiated boys. Itukalay people were in the center not because they were the most elderly but because they had to host kiloma’an.
Standing on the same horizon, no one would think that the *itukalay* people were essentially different in status because the hierarchical difference between *itukalay* and other *kaputs* (age-sets) was gradual and relative (the more central, the higher status), not arbitrary and opposite. Yet, it is not the case anymore. After the 1960s, the Amis were forced to sell most of their land to the Han, including the land where six *sefis* stood. Having no place to dance in *kiloma’an*, the Amis borrowed the playground from Hsin-shen Elementary School. In Taiwan every elementary and high school and military camp has a speech stage, and beside it stands a big pole for the national flag. People call this *silingtai*, meaning the stage (*tai* or *tai*) for giving military commands (*司令* or *siling*).

Does this change matter? Before 1990 or the end of the Cold War, primary and high school education in Taiwan was militaristic. Not only were military officers stationed at every high school, college, and university to monitor students and correct students’ “wrong” doings, high school students were also required to wear khaki uniforms and military-style peaked or forage caps, and practice military or patriotic songs and military marching at school. Every morning the principal gathered all the students in the playground, lining the students up in front of the *silingtai*. After inspecting the student troops the principal lectured, and finally the morning ceremony ended with national flag raising and national song singing. When the flag was rising students
raised their hands and gave the national flag their standard military salutes. All students did those things every school day before 1990, and some of the students in today’s Taiwan are still taught to do the same things. Military officers are still stationed in every high school, college, and university. In short, the speech stage is a symbol of authority to everyone who gets obligatory education, regardless of the student’s ethnic background. It is natural for the Amis to accept the symbolic power relationship deployed in a space like that since they too are educated in elementary and high schools.

What changes has the shift of space made? First of all, itukalay (the Faki) is exclusively elevated. On July 13 (the Panengngeng Day) and July 18 (the Pipipay Day) I witnessed that all the itukalay members were sitting high on the silingtai (Fig. 6.5). The relationship between itukalay and other age-sets is no longer the central vs. the peripheral but the high vs. the low. Furthermore, itukalay’s height is absolute, a situation without precedent in the relative, center-periphery scheme. Nowadays in Falangaw all the other age-sets stand on the same horizon below itukalay. This symbolizes that itukalay holds the power to decide everything in kiloma’an.

An example of the new hierarchy occurred in the kiloma’an of 2002, when Chen Shui-bian, the President of Taiwan at that time, visited Falangaw. Due to Chen’s age coinciding with la Congtong (Team of President) members, some itukalay (la Tinkok)
members wanted to do special arrangements to honor Chen. Nonetheless, most of the isefiay members disagreed with this suggestion, and there were severe confrontations between the isefiay (the Fufu or the Grandfather) and the itukalay (the Faki or the Uncle) members. Isefiay members thought that itukalay went too far and was over the top. But some itukalay people still insisted that they were the ones, not the oldest isefiay people, who could really make the final decisions.

Fig. 6.5 Itukalay people sitting on the silingtai in the opening ceremony of kiloma’an

Secondly, kiloma’an has been transformed into an activity that looks just like a military parade or annual athletic meet with an opening and a closing ceremony. It new includes an Amis Tribe Flag raising and Amis Tribe Song singing, lectures given by VIP guests (usually they are high-ranking officials sitting high on the speech stage).

108 The event of Chen’s visiting Falangaw was controversial partially because Chen is a DPP member. In previous chapters I have explained why most of my Amis informants do not like the DPP.
such as county magistrate, county councilor, city mayor, and Legislators), a programmed procedure, and an awarding and closing ceremony.

Some rituals performed in the days of *panengneng, pafata’an, and miksi’* still can be seen, but people are not so convinced of the power of those *kiloma’an* rituals because in today’s Falangaw most people are not rice growers. Fifty years ago people would not practice *kiloma’an* as we see it in today’s Falangaw. *Kiloma’an* has become a political festival that adopts some things from official ceremonies, while also reproducing and altering social relations. The adaptation of the speech stage in *kiloma’an* since the mid 1960s has elevated the status of *itukalay*. This elevation coincided with the period when Falangaw people started practicing virilocal marriage, and the meaning of *faki* expanded from MB (mother’s brother, or the married-off *faki*) to both MB and FB (father’s brother, or the stay-at-home *faki* who takes wife into his own *loma’*), as presented in chapter 4. The adoption of the speech stage in *kiloma’an* and the shift of marital residence and the redefinition of *faki* are not two independent things; they are mutually reinforcing. In other words, Falangaw Amis people who had experienced state rituals combined these experiences with cultural practices, such as the changing role of *faki* discussed above.

Given the intersection of official power and local cultural logic as the main characteristic of modern *kiloma’an*, conflicts between local practices and the
government can always be seen in *kiloma’an*. By looking into these conflicts, we can understand how local cultural logic has been both at odds with, and in cooperation with state power, and how power relations have been formulated between the community and the government.

Two remarkable events that occurred during the period of *miksi’* or the Sea Ritual (the afternoon of July 13, 2009) will illustrate.

The first event was an *ipawiday* (la Cedas) member’s confrontation with both a county magistrate candidate and an *itukalay* (la Congtong) member. The KMT candidate, later the county magistrate of Taitung, came to the tents to canvass the people for votes. The *ipawayday* member interrupted the candidate and asked him “why should we Amis support the government which did nothing to prevent us from losing our land and the *sefis”*? The candidate was furious and had a quarrel with him. Wupay, the religious leader of both *itukalay* and the Big Tent, tried to silence the young man and also had a quarrel with him.

The second event happened in the evening of the same day. Three men from the Small Tent came to the Big Tent to give *itukalay* members a routine report about how things were going in the Small Tent. Perhaps the event earlier in the afternoon had upset Wupay. He reproached the Small Tent people for not being respectful to him when giving their report. He was furious. However, many people in the Big Tent,
including Wupay’s younger brother and his itukalay fellows, questioned Wupay about
the appropriateness of his rage. Feeling so angry and receiving no support, Wupay just
went away without saying anything. Wupay’s departure caused a huge panic and rift
between himself and all the people of the community. Unlike other age-set members
who are allowed take a short leave from the tent during miksi’, it is absolutely taboo
for a tatangalan no itukalay (the religious leader of itukalay, the position Wupay held)
to leave the tent because his absence would seriously endanger all the Big Tent people.
That was why Wupay became a public enemy in Falangaw. He did not, and according
to some of my informants he dared not, show up on the remaining days of the
kiloma’an. Many la Congtong members considered deposing him from his seat of
tatangalan after this event.

How can we understand these two events? At the first glimpse, it appears
reasonable to see the first as a demonstration against or a resistance toward the official
hegemony. However, it is more complicated than suggested in this simple state
hegemony-local resistance scheme. Being the tatangalan of itukalay, Wupay told me,
he was quite conscious about his pivotal position in kiloma’an. Moreover, there would
be elections at the end of 2009 (five months after the kiloma’an). Some Amis
politicians like Laway (aka Wang Qing-jiang, see below) organized a Joint Kiloma’an
and expanded it from the local county scale to the national scale. Wupay knew that in
that Joint Kiloma’an he would also play the most crucial role: doing the prayers for all
the Amis people and guests. As introduced in chapter 3, to the Falangaw Amis, self
assertion and rule obedience in social groups are two seemingly contrary behaviors
based on the same concept of personhood. Kiloma’an is an arena where these two
contrary behaviors contend. Yet, people’s different power relations with state
apparatus and agents triggered conflicts. Unlike Wupay who, during the time of my
fieldwork, always highlighted to me his connections with bigwigs, the ipawiday man
had no special connections with government agents; his protest was either for self
assertion or for expressing his resistance toward government agents. Wupay had a
different viewpoint. He disagreed with that man not just because he liked to manage
his social capital but also because he thought that a man two age-grades younger than
him (itukalay) should not say anything without the recognition of the elders on
important occasions like kiloma’an, especially before significant officials.

Did Wupay stand on the side of rule obedience? Not really. His anger toward that
ipawiday man suggested that he demanded others respect his role of tatangalan,
because he was fully conscious that the modern kiloma’an was not a purely cultural
and religious but an event that required the support of state power. In this case instead
of a simple relation of government repression and local resistance we see the
interlocking embeddedness of the community and the government. Different social
actors in their different social positions, although sharing the same cultural logic, developed different and inconsistent connections with the governing powers.

The Joint Kiloma’an/Harvest Festival was held on July 19, 2009, the day after the end of Falangaw’s kiloma’an. The Joint Harvest Festival is the most extreme form of the political festival, in which the so-called Amis culture it claims to revive is almost reduced to dancing and singing. The content and form of the Joint Harvest Festival dated back to the Japanese colonial period. People of different indigenous communities were gathered to perform for high ranking officials’ pleasure and fulfill the goal of symbolizing the integrity of the nation-state, as shown above. Gradually, the practice of the Joint Harvest Festival overlapped with the division of administrative areas and power relations in regional politics. That is to say that it became connected with local-level elections. That was why, before 1996, or before the era of Taiwan’s democratization, all the Joint Harvest Festivals were held exclusively by local governments and were intended to mobilize support for the regime. However, after the burgeoning of democracy following Chiang Kai-shek’s and Chiang Ching-guo’s deaths, the KMT could not monopolize power anymore. Facing the challenges of bentuhua or nativization mainly from the DPP and other opposition parties, the KMT government needed to seek support from local politicians to win elections, and local big men and politicians employed this trend for their own benefits.
Therefore, with the support of key persons like County Counselor Wang Qing-jian (aka Laway), the government offered the location (the City Stadium) to facilitate the Joint Kiloma’an in 2009. Officials and politicians, such as legislators, the county magistrate, county counselors, and the city mayor, attended the opening ceremony to give speeches, trying to suggest that the credit for this pow-vow-like meet should go to them (Fig. 6.6).

![The 2009 Joint Harvest Festival held in Taitung City](image)

Fig. 6.6  The 2009 Joint Harvest Festival held in Taitung City

Below is the program of 2009 National Amis Joint Kiloma’an:

- **08:30~09:00** check in
- **09:00~09:40** the march of Amis communities
- **09:40~10:00** traditional song singing
- **10:00~10:15** Amis Tribe Flag raising, Amis Tribe Song singing, and salute to ancestral spirits
- **10:15~10:25** introducing officials and VIP guests
10:25~10:50  the organizer’s address, mayor’s and VIP guests’ addresses
10:50~11:00  praying for the blessings from ancestors
11:00~11:10  blessing opera
11:10~11:20  harvest festival dance
11:20~11:50  rally dance
11:50~13:00  lunch time
13:00~15:50  singing and dancing contest
15:50~16:00  prize awarding
16:00~16:20  closing ceremony, flag-lowering ceremony

The seven-day traditional kiloma’an and the Joint Kiloma’an make a modern kiloma’an, which could not be organized without the Falangaw Amis Age-set Advancement Association, an officially registered organization founded in 1995. All the founders have a close relationship with the government; either they are from kakita’an families (such as Wang Ru-zhi, Wang Qing-jian) or they work for the government (Lu Zheng-fu, and Ro Fu-qing). Those founders are mikidipongay or minkokay, meaning intellectuals or white-collar people. All the association members are age-sets members, the president and members of the board of directors are

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109 In Amis dipon means Japan and minkok indicates the KMT regime or zhunghua mingguo( the Republic of China). Mikidipongay and minkokay denote the people who behave like the Japanese or the Chinese, and the literate Amis or the government’s employees.
"itukalay members (the Faki or the Uncle), board of supervisors are isefiay members (the Fufu or the Grandfather), and the position of general manager are undertaken by a mihiningay member. The roles of isefiay, itukalay, mihiningay in the traditional Amis age-set system are parallel to the functions that these members of different age-sets undertake in the Association. That is to say, the founders hoped that the basic power structure would remain the same when masakaputay or the age-sets were modernized or converted into a modern corporation.

Why 1995? A new policy called Sheqü Zongti Yingzao (社區總體營造) or the Integrated Community Construction Program was put to practice in 1994. This program was to help a community integrate its people, culture, scenery, and production when facing impacts of modernization, and local communities were encouraged to found associations to accept minimum financial support from the government to do their own cultural business. Ostensibly the government seemed to respect the local and decentralized the power to revitalize local cultures. Actually it was a sign of privatization. Cultural policy was transformed into the private business of local communities, no longer a public affair. All the government had to do was to contract out the project to local community associations. It no longer had to manage local cultural affairs but just give very small amounts of money and let local people manage their own problems."
This is the background of the foundation of the Association. After 1995 *kiloma’an* was hugely changed by the Association. I have presented how the model of the baseball game and the baseball game guidebook influenced Falangaw in chapter 2. But the baseball guidebooks were just circulated among the baseball players; the Association adopted the contents of Piya’s baseball guidebook and compiled the Kiloma’an Guidebook, sending it to almost every Falangaw Amis family. The first guidebook was published in 1995, the year the first Joint Kiloma’an was held. Almost every year the association publishes new guidebooks when *kiloma’an* comes, and the contents of the guidebooks published in different years are almost the same. Take the 2003 Kiloma’an Guidebook as an example. The contents are: the procedures of the opening and closing ceremonies, the flow chart of *kiloma’an*, the life history of Kulas Mahengheng (in the epilogue of this life history, the peace-seeking spirit that Mahengheng pursued in his lifetime is highlighted), the detailed name list of *kiloma’an* staff, the history of migration/exile of the Amis Tribe (including the genesis of the South Origin), the goals and the rituals of *kiloma’an*, the origin of *kiloma’an* and *kaput* (age-set) system, the introduction of *miksi’* (the Sea Ritual) and the tasks fulfilled in age-set activities, the history of the twelve Families (or *ngasaws*, according to the north Amis), and the historic figures of the Falangaw Amis (Fig. 6.7).
It is not difficult to find that the guidebook is not merely about kiloma’an, but also a textbook of Falangaw culture and history. In other words, it is standardization of culture and history. Not only does it standardize many detailed and miscellaneous procedures to facilitate the practice of kiloma’an; it also offers a definitive version of Amis history and culture.

Then what is the goal of kiloma’an? In the 1996 Guidebook of Joint Kiloma’an, the anonymous editor says:

...
and that is the reason why *kiloma’an*, the ritual of *masakaputay*, should be expanded from *kiloma’an* held in individual communities into the Joint Kiloma’an. Moreover, by promoting the Joint Kiloma’an young Amis can get their lost root and confidence back, and the goal of adding some healthy energy to the society can hopefully be achieved (Anonymous 1996:40).

Here the goal of thanking the gods for blessing their agrarian harvests disappears and some motifs about root-seeking and salvation by practicing traditional rituals are clear. Besides, the theme of dialogue and contribution to the mainstream society appears as well. This indigenous voice does not blame the government for the loss of Amis culture. On the contrary, it suggests that the future of the Amis depends on the health of the mainstream society, and their traditional ritual, *kiloma’an*, plays the key role of energizing the society. Here in this statement, the image of the indigenous is very benign and constructive; the reader can hardly discern any idea about the conflict between Amis culture and the country.

However, in the Guidebook of 2009 some different themes emerge. In addition to common themes like solidarity, harmony, and contribution to society, marketing Amis culture and sightseeing resources are the new targets and goals (Anonymous 2009: 3). Apparently, culture and tradition gradually become de-contextualized or, more concretely, a matter of business that bridges Falangaw and the external world.

**Election**
Singkiw, a loan word from Japanese, meaning election, is another political festival. Singkiw, like kiloma’an, integrates the domain of age-sets and kinship groups and can be regarded as a bridge connecting the country and the community. There are many levels of election in Taiwan, from presidential elections to neighborhood elections. During my fieldwork I witnessed a local level election held in Falangaw for county counselor, in which Falangaw had two candidates, Laway and Lamlo.

**Laway**

Wang Qing-jian (Laway), 59, a KMT and also a la Contong member, was one of the candidates. His grandfather Laway (aka Omura sensei) was a kakita’an during the last years of Japanese colonization. Laway had renewed his term of office several times. During the time of the county counselor election campaign (October 2009 to December 5, 2009) I attended the opening ceremony of his election headquarters. The ceremony was held on November 25, 2009 with four hundred people attending. In the front door of his headquarters, an altar was set with offerings (rice wine, juice, radish, and garlic), baseball bats and caps, and an incense burner dedicated to kawas. Radish, pronounced like caitao in Taiwanese (Hoklo), is a homonym of auspiciousness, and garlic, another auspicious symbol, pronounced like suan, is a Hoklo homonym of winning the election (dongsuan) (Fig. 6.8).
Fig. 6.8 Laway’s altar

Laway was a policeman in Taipei some twenty years before he became a county counselor. He knew how to manage his social capital and had many Han friends. Laway was not a Christian, and that was why there was a Han style altar in front of his headquarters. But it was not purely Han because the Han would not put so many bottles of rice wine and inedible things like baseball bats and caps on the altar.

Just like common Taiwanese people preparing their weddings or funerals in the countryside, Laway erected tents on the street, set a stage, and put some two hundred plastic stools in it. That morning, before the ceremony started, Laway and his staff, the la Congtong fellows, burned incense and paper money and did rituals behind the altar to pray for victory. In that opening ceremony, a cap with Laway’s name and election number on it was distributed to everyone, and all the supporters sat on the plastic stools just as people did every evening in their own yards. After a short
opening introduction delivered by Laway himself, some VIP guests like the county magistrate and city mayor came to address the crowd, saying how competent Laway had been as a county counselor and why people should support KMT candidates. Subsequently, a flag-bestowing ceremony took place. Tayo, son of Piya, also a member of a kakita’an family (na Kakita’an) and a retired baseball coach, bestowed a flag with Laway’s name and election number, and a baseball bat to Laway, and then Laway waved the flag and the bat symbolizing that Laway hits a homerun, and the crowd loudly cried “maala”. Laway then bestowed the flag to the staff and supporters from Falangaw’s satellite communities (Fig. 6.9). Every one of them was summoned to mount the stage in turn and took the flag Laway bestowed and waved it vigorously. Finally before stepping down from the stage the flag taker must answer a question: “How many votes will your community offer for Laway?” “I promise we Matang people will offer 300 votes.” Then the Matang representative waved the flag again and everyone there shouted loudly together: “maala! maala! maala! maala!”
Unlike some battle cries, like “go” and “donsuan”, heard in other campaign gatherings, Falangaw people always use *maala* to signify victory, literally meaning to take or to grab something. Here using *maala* in the campaign congregation assimilates the election with winning a trophy or demonstrating personal competence. This fits the way they used baseball game as a metaphor and staged the plots of baseball games in the opening ceremony.

After the formal procedures came the part that interested people most. Singers sang songs and lunch and rice wine were provided to banquet all the people at 11:30. People enjoyed this atmosphere very much. It was a long lunch. Many people still lingered there at 3:30 that afternoon. In fact some people always stayed at the headquarters throughout the days of the election campaign. In the headquarters, cigarettes, rice wine, betel nuts, and fruits were prepared for the guests. There was a
kitchen in the headquarters, and some women, Laway’s relatives, worked there to provide meals and snacks. However, everyone who came to the headquarters in mealtimes was welcome to dine together. From November 25 to December 5, Laway’s headquarters looked just like an endless festival. Thus, instead of hiding themselves at home as they did on ordinary days, Falangaw Amis people crowded the headquarters, sitting on stools, chatting, drinking, and chewing betel nuts under the arcade, regardless of their Han neighbors’ complaints. Some people living in different satellite communities came back to find their relatives and friends. An invisible Falangaw that cannot be found on ordinary days seemed to emerge there and then.

Laway did not stay at his headquarters all the time. As the old Falangaw had scattered into Falangaw and its satellite or derived communities, Laway had to visit all these communities to seek support. I accompanied Laway many times and found that his visits had a pattern. Before Laway’s visit, his staff would contact the key person of that community, and the key person, usually the neighborhood head, assembled the crowd to await Laway’s arrival. Laway said something very short to the crowd. He did not talk much about his policies. He just asked for support and suggested that the Amis would have a bright future if he could renew his term as a county counselor. No sooner had Laway finished his talk than his staff brought food (stewed chicken with rice wine and fried rice noodles), drinks (green tea and rice wine)
and betel nuts to the crowd. Laway left for the next visit, leaving the people to enjoy the food and the atmosphere of conviviality.

**Lamlo**

Lamlo, 62, a member of La Ceyacey, was another candidate. His background was quite different from Laway’s. First of all, Lamlo was from a common Christian family, not a *kakita’an* family. Owing to his connection with Christianity he left Falangaw and attended Tamkang High School, a famous Presbyterian high school in northern Taiwan, and later attended university. Lamlo was exceptional in Falangaw, because most of the Falangaw Amis, especially people of Lamlo’s age, practiced an Amis-Han syncretic belief, not Christianity, and very few of them had higher level education. During his early adulthood, he stayed in Taipei and participated in human rights movements, especially the Movement of Returning the Land to the Indigenous People, which reflected his dissatisfaction with the KMT government’s statecraft toward indigenous people. He joined the TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union), a party which claims Taiwan’s independence from China.

Lamlo also had headquarters, where his supporters also chatted and dined. However, due to his religious belief, he did not practice Han-style rituals. Instead, he and his priest led the crowd to pray, although most people there were not Christians. Lamlo’s headquarters opened on November 18, 2009 with a ceremony. The arrangement of this
ceremony was similar to Laway’s: there were tents, a stage, flower baskets, plastic stools, and people wearing caps with Lamlo’s name and number. But since Lamlo was a non-KMT candidate, no KMT officials made speeches. The atmosphere was slightly different from Laway’s opening ceremony. Lamlo did not do Taoist rituals in the beginning; he prayed to God instead. There was no flag waving and bestowing, and no summoning leaders of satellite communities. Everyone attending the ceremony was free to talk. Kaput (age-set) and raloma’an (family) leaders and women mounted the stage in turn to say something supportive and express their political opinions. Women’s voice was absent in Laway’s opening ceremony, and Lamlo’s opening ceremony looked more democratic than Laway’s because everyone was allowed to express his or her opinions. If Laway’s opening ceremony represented the hierarchical side of the Amis power spectrum, then Lamlo’s illustrated the egalitarian side of the spectrum. After the lengthy speeches, women and young girls performed songs and dances while all the guests enjoyed the lunch (Fig.6.10).
Lamlo’s visits to his voters were somewhat different from Laway’s. In addition to contacting key persons and assembling the crowd, he knocked on as many doors and shook as many hands as he could. When he arrived in a community, residents opened their doors, let off firecrackers, and shouted “maala,” and all the community was bathed in an aura of festival, just like celebrating lunar New Year holidays.

**Election Day**

The last day before the election day was the busiest. Both camps sent a fleet of cars and trucks carrying hundreds of people (staff and supporters) to all the scattered Amis clusters. On the first car of the procession fleet stood the candidate, followed by other cars with staff members and supporters. They beat drums borrowed from Taoist temples and threw ignited firecrackers onto the street. Some residents also set off the firecrackers they had prepared and shouted “maala” when the fleet passed.
The climax came in the evening of December 5, 2009. With the end of voting at 5 p.m. people amassed at Lamlo’s and Laway’s headquarters, staring at the TV’s broadcasting the results. The atmosphere in Laway’s camp was depressed until the result showed at the last moment that Laway was elected. Knowing that the battle had been won, people in Laway’s camp were ecstatic. Laway burned incense and did the ritual again to thank kawas. Fireworks and firecrackers were set off, and the noise lasted for twenty minutes.

People crowded at Lamlo’s headquarters celebrated Lamlo’s victory very early because he got the second most votes among all the candidates. Responding to the request to make a speech, he humbly thanked God and his eighty-year-old mother. People in Lamlo’s headquarters were high on emotion and celebrated Lamlo’s victory happily, but the noise of firecracker was not as loud as in Laway’s headquarters.

**Further Discussion**

Singing traditional songs on stage, playing baseball, *kiloma’an*, and election are not parts of quotidian life. Then, what can we learn from these extraordinary experiences? To answer this question, we must ask: what can such extraordinariness reveal, or how to define extraordinariness? Extraordinariness is crucial because I argue that to local indigenous people the state, an abstract but effective existence existing both in and beyond the form of bureaucratic legal system, institutions, party politics, could also be
concretely regarded as the consequence of a series of events. To understand how the state can be regarded as a series of events we can draw from analysis of Falangaw people’s *masakaputay* or age sets, in which the way they perceive and incorporate exterior things is clearly manifested.

What differentiates an event from a repeated action is that an event makes a difference. A significant event that changes a social group usually gets people involved in dialectic struggles between personal interests and the larger system of power relations. Marshall Sahlins (2000:321) calls this dialectic relation mediation, defining mediation as both instantiation (reduction from system to action) and totalization (amplification from action to system). Sahlins’s theorization of event or extraordinariness is helpful because it facilitates the understanding of mechanisms and the dynamism of power relations when a big impact comes. To Falangaw, the arrival of the state was an unprecedented event, which was registered in their age-sets. For example, some age-set names such as la Hongti (the Japanese Emperor [commemorating the death of Emperor Meiji]), la Dipon (Japan), and la Minkok (the Republic of China) were created to signify such unprecedented events or experiences.

To the Falangaw Amis, the first significant event about the modern state was the arrival of the Japanese regime. Kulas Mahengheng, as a key person when the Japanese came and the Qing Chinese soldiers fled and plundered, decided to cooperate with the
Japanese and pacify the riots. His act was totalizing in Sahlin's sense: it both expanded and homogenized the Amis and permanently changed Amis people’s power relationship with the regime, as I showed in chapter 2.110 Based on Sahlins’s theorization (Ibid.), I would suggest that the totalization formulates both Kulas Mahengheng, a hero contributing his life to the future of his people, and the Amis, a peace-loving people. Such totalization reveals how the Amis regard both themselves and the official governing power and how they instantiate this totalization in their personal actions. For example, Wupay offered an explanation for his wrath in *kiloma’an*: “We Amis don’t like quarrels. So I was angry when the young man said something impolite in front of the legislator.”

Many of my informants claimed that it was their tradition to be benign wherever they were, and whoever they met. Resistance, a word often used to describe Taiwan’s indigenous people’s attitude toward the government as mentioned in chapter 1, seems an unfamiliar concept to them.111 Thus, singing, baseball, and election can also be viewed as significant events that mediate individual actions and structural power relations. But how do these extraordinary experiences of events make sense? A

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110 Not all indigenous tribes made the same decision when the Japanese arrived. There were severe conflicts between Japanese troops and the indigenous communities, such as the Seediq, the Atayal and the Bunun, in the early years of Japanese colonization as shown in chapter 1.

111 For a detailed history of Taiwan indigenous people’s resistance and movement, see Tien (2010) and Iciang Parod (2008).
significant event that makes sense must transform experience to knowledge, and a significant experience always brings contrasts with previous experiences. To diminish the contrasts or to bridge the gaps between new experiences and the preexisting ones, two different levels of practices, the practical and the interpretative, are needed (Rudie 1994: 30). The practical level of practice includes bodily practice, and the interpretative level of practice is the action that conceptualizes something new into a symbol, a metonymy, or a text. Both levels are creative processes that have indexical and reflexive functions to create a common space to embrace the contrasts and to transform experience into knowledge (Ibid.: 35-39).

Here it was the local Amis who filled the gap of the contrast between the experiences of the days before and after the advent of the modern regimes, by bodily practices such as singing/dancing, festival or ritual activities, and baseball. Besides, Kulas Mahengheng was canonized and transformed from a historic figure into a symbol of the Amis Tribe. The work of the canonization was actually inspired by some state rituals. Accompanying the canonization of Kulas Mahengheng were the materialization, textualization, and moralization of baseball, standardization of singing, and formalization or legalization of age-sets, making Kulas Mahengheng, baseball, and singing, the icons and metonymies of Amis culture and history. Thus, my informants claimed that “miladiw (singing) is our culture” or “kiloma’an
represents Amis culture,” and the structure of baseball game rules was employed in building the framework of modern *kiloma’an*. The life history of Kulas Mahengheng appears in the *kiloma’an* and baseball contest guidebooks, the textbooks of Amis history and culture, and Mahengheng was transformed from a community leader into the Father of the Amis Tribe.

In sum, through the practices I have described a series of extraordinary events were converted from experience into knowledge, the knowledge of the state. Such knowledge has resulted from Falangaw Amis people’s collective experience of the impact of the state since the time of Mahengheng, and it is deposited in the age-set system, in local people’s daily practice, and in some individuals’ extraordinary experiences as shown in chapter 2, 5, and this chapter. Having incorporated the state power into their hierarchical power order, concretely the content of knowledge indicates that the state, on the one hand, exists high above the people, and, on the other hand, individuals can harness it to empower themselves in Falangaw’s age-based hierarchical system, or upgrade the whole Falangaw community in both national and global contexts, as demonstrated in the examples of election, stage singing, and baseball.

This explains why Wupay was so mad about what the younger man said in front of both him and the KMT magistrate candidate. Based on Wupay’s recognition of this
knowledge, the young man’s words challenged the existing power relationship between the government and the indigenous or the governed. Wupay somewhat identified himself with those government agents. As my informants mentioned, Wupay was a man who liked to make VIP friends and sometimes sounded bossy and bureaucratic. Although based on this knowledge, Wupay went too far: he tried to force those Amis people to accept his hierarchical status by employing government agents as his backup regardless of other people’s self assertions. He violated the ideal equilibrium between individual competence and hierarchical order in Amis culture, as presented in chapter 3, and made some people think him arrogant and egocentric.

Therefore, there were different viewpoints concerning the process of the making of the knowledge of the state. When discussing this event with Tenngo, Tenngo just said that Wupay had become a sakaniway, a person who boasted, lied, and was not kangodo (embarrassed) to say anything, just like her criticism about Laway which I presented in chapter 3. “But it was not the case. Wupay spoke sincerely when he was young,” Palac added. To Komod, Wupay’s age-set fellow, what Wupay said in miksi’ was just to flatter people of the upper class.112 “He just wanted to join the game of the upper class, and he forgot who he really was,” Komod said. To some who disliked and disagreed with Wupay and well-to-do people such as Tayo, it was a question of

112 To protect the informant, Komod here is a pseudonym.
struggle between different classes. People like Wupay, to some of my informants, sacrificed inner integrity, the traditional Amis virtue, for higher social status.

Moreover, practices that fill the gap between new experiences and the existing system are not just about the transformation of experience to knowledge; they are also the sources of reflexivity and dialogue. Victor Turner (1988:24-25) argues that ritual- and ceremony-like activities separate the quotidian from the extraordinary and place people into a state of liminality. Within the threshold between the secular and the sacred some sort of performative reflexivity inverts, interrogates, and negotiates the power structure of the quotidian world. This is the reason why most of my informants told me that they loved election campaigns and why the ipawiday person challenged both the official authority and the age-set hierarchical order in kiloma’an.

During the election campaign, Falangaw people crowded into candidates’ headquarters and blockaded streets to make a temporarily carnival-like space. “The feeling of the old Falangaw, the un-divided Falangaw, is back again,” said one elder who attended a congregation at Laway’s headquarters. The competition between candidates had not caused a schism in Falangaw. Instead, all the scattered Amis people were mobilized to get together, participating in the same activities (although under different candidates’ flags), “just like what we did in the old Falangaw,” said an informant. Obviously, during the days of the election campaign, the regulation of
everyday life in urbanized social space was suspended and transgressed, and the whole election campaign looked like a carnival. Suspension and transgression like that, of course, could be described either as a way of returning to the life of the good old days, to quench nostalgic cravings, or as an anti-structure of state regulation. Here anti-structure means *communitas* or “a bond uniting... people over and above any social formal bonds” (Turner 1974:45).

Interestingly, it is the state apparatus or the government that gives Falangaw Amis the opportunity to position themselves in the anti-structure of state regulation. This partially explains why the Amis like the KMT more than the DPP. The KMT has ruled Taiwan for over sixty years (from 1945 till now, except the DPP era, 2000-2008). Due to the Chinese migrants’ numerical minority in the population, the KMT has to employ the strategy of divide and rule, meaning that the KMT must manipulate local factions and prevent them from uniting together to challenge the KMT regime. Thus, local leaders were recruited, and a patron-client framework was used to prescribe the relationship between them and the regime (Wu 1987). To manage this patron-client relationship, local leaders, encouraged and supported by the KMT, used every means, including vote buying and feasting the voters, to win elections.

Different from the KMT politicians, the DPP candidates spent more time telling the voters their political views than feasting their voters. In Taiwan’s elections, there are
two electoral strategies, faction-based and ideology-based, to motivate electors. When running in an election, usually KMT candidates take the first strategy and DPP candidates take the second (Joseph Bosco 1994:30). Compared to DPP candidates’ ideology appeals, KMT candidates run election campaigns by exploiting the patron/client relationship. Thus services were offered and social connections were reached before the election campaign. To maintain or extend webs of social connection, social relationships like kinship and social/organization membership are used. That is why the functions, competitions, and rivalities among factions or kinship/social organizations can always been seen in elections of Taiwan. To reinforce the relationship and the connection, candidates need people to help them. Usually the helper is the the village faction head or enthusiastic people in factions (age-sets and kinship groups in the case of Falangaw), known as thiâu-á-kha (support pillar) in Hoklo and also used in Falangaw (Ibid.: 35). The thiâu-á-kha people, in the 2009 election, gathered the voters prepare food before the campaign congregation was held. Yet, the most important work for them to do was to hand out offers to voters on behalf of the candidate. There are two kinds of offer, one is a gift like soap, cap, and fan, and the other is money. Money means pure purchase or vote buying, which is different from the gift sent to the voter (Scott 2010: 733; Bosco 1994: 39). Being a thiâu-á-kha usually has to do with vote buying, and election bribery has been seriously monitored
and banned by the police. Violators could be sentenced and put into jail. My informants were reluctant to say too much about thiâu-á-kha and told me not to disclose anything detail about it in my work. However, in Falangaw, I witnessed how thiâu-á-kha people did their work and found that those were alive and kicking in election campaign also behaved actively in occasions of family or age-set gatherings.

My informants always told me that they did not like the DPP because DPP politicians did not understand how to “get along with” them. Although it was the KMT regime which initiated this mode of statecraft, the later DPP regime (2000-2008), no matter how reluctant, still had to follow this rationale of governance. DPP politicians also had to attend feasts, weddings or funerals, celebrations, and festivals, and, in this case, the practice of statecraft had to bend to local customs.

My informants did not like the DPP not only because the DPP politicians did not attend their weddings, funerals, and festivals as often as the KMP politicians did. The tense relationship between the Han Taiwanese (the Hoklo and the Hakka) and the Amis should also be taken into account. In previous chapters I showed how the Amis have sometimes been verbally attacked by their Han neighbors when singing together, and how the Han have taken their homeland away. Most of my informants identified the DPP as a party mainly composed of Han Taiwanese people (especially the Hoklo), that partially explains why the Amis have a negative attitude toward the DPP.
However, in the discourse of ethnic integration or *zuqun ronghe* ("Women doshi yijiaren" or "We are one family"), a politically correct discourse strongly promoted by the government, Amis people were dissuaded from confronting the Han in public. But the Amis found that they could benefit from this political correctness as well: every ethnic group shares the same status under the flag of ethnic integration. To most of my informants it is the KMT, a party still controlled by a handful of mainland Chinese, not the DPP, which represents the state or the hegemonic governing power.

Both the Japanese and the Chinese regimes are settler colonial regimes. Many of my informants accepted and supported the KMT, just like their parents had supported the Japanese regime seventy years before. One reason that can explain why they like the Japanese and the KMT regimes more than the DPP regime is that the DPP is deemed as a *payrang* party which is untrustworthy, especially when Falangaw people recall experiences of interacting with *payrang*. When watching TV news, my informants often commented that Chen Shui-bian and DPP politicians were *maco’os* (greedy thieves), stealing money from the people.

It seems that the Falangaw Amis are overwhelmingly under the control of the colonial regimes. However, they took a different pathway to prove their equal share of citizenship. Having very limited space to assert themselves in their everyday lives, they achieve an alternative citizenship by stage singing, baseball, and participating
and organizing political festivals to survive the plight of politico-economical and cultural marginalization.

Therefore, rather than just the issue of patterns of voting and polls and the juridical relationship between an individual and the governing power, citizenship sometimes could be better comprehended as acts of communicative participation, audiencing practices, or spectatorship on occasions like traditional celebrations and festivals, for instance like the case of the eastern Indonesian Island of Sumba (Kuipers 2003). Spectatorship in this case is crucial as well, because such citizenship connects tradition and modernity.

That is the foundation of the political festivals I examined in this chapter. Here festivals become political, and politics is gradually ritualized or festivalized. The political festival is the result of negotiation or the bridge that links local people to the governing power. Following Roy D’Andrade (1993:48), who defines schema as a simplified interpretative framework used to understand events, and argues that some proper key words can reveal the content of schema, I have shown that maala (grab or take) was an essential word used in campaign gatherings. A political festival, such as election campaign, is the stage where the Amis concept of the person, a cultural scheme, and the power of the outer world meet, contend, and negotiate, and “The very participation of indigenous peoples in the political field of elections means that they
Baseball and *kiloma’an* can also be understood in the same light. When there were baseball games in Falangaw, streets were occupied and feasts were served, everyone was bathed in a carnival atmosphere, and the urban regulation of residential behavior was transgressed. Victor Turner calls this atmosphere *communitas* and he argues that the bonds of *communitas* are anti-structural in the sense that they are undifferentiated, equalitarian, direct … relationships. It tends to ignore, reverse, cut across, or occur outside of structural relationships. …[It is] a desire for a total, unmediated relationship between person and person, a relationship…[that]safeguards their uniqueness in the very act of realizing their commonness. *Communitas* does not merge identities; it liberates them from conformity to general norm (Turner 1974:174).

Given the integrative and subversive potentialities of *communitas*, it is easy to understand that extraordinary activities like *kiloma’an* and election campaigns can both consolidate and subvert. The event concerning Wupay during the *miksi’* of *kiloma’an* needs to be mentioned again. The conflict can be interpreted as two different but interrelated resistances happening in an extraordinary practice: a resistance to state authority and a resistance to the elderly. Nevertheless, the theory of resistance in this case cannot explain everything, as aspects such as self empowerment and social reconsolidation should be considered as well. Even though the
confrontation between the two men can be understood as the craving for self
expression or different personal relations with the state apparatus, it can also be
interpreted as some Amis people’s reflexive disputes about the meaning of Amis
culture and the future of the Amis Tribe when facing the threat of state regulation and
losing their traditional way of life.

But what is the foundation of the disputes? The importance of performance lies not
just in what Victor Turner says about *communitas*, we also need to consider the issue
of symbolic capital, meaning that by the performance we can understand how the
Falangaw Amis have positioned themselves and have been positioned in the field of
state power. It is not difficult to imagine that the state imposes the system of cultural
capital onto its subjects primarily via education. However, the condition of
colonization should be taken into account. In Falangaw only a very small percentage
of people have university diplomas.\(^{113}\) All they can count on is their physical

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\(^{113}\) Most of my middle-aged informants who have university diplomas were baseball players. For
example, Tayo was a good high school baseball player and got admitted into the Department of
Physical Education, National Taiwan Normal University, and later became a baseball teacher. The
percentage of Amis graduates of postsecondary education in 2013 is 4.86%, while the percentage of all
the graduates of postsecondary education in Taiwan is 5.75%. It looks like the disparity between the
two is not huge. However, it was not the case 30 years ago. The university admission rate 30 years ago
was under 20%, but the 2013 rate of university admission in Taiwan was 94.5%. The number of
postsecondary schools in Taiwan in 2013 was 159, and it was under 30 in the 1980s. All my significant
informants who have college and university degrees got their postsecondary education 30 to 40 years
competence which has been exploited by the different regimes for decades. The tension between the Han and the Amis should also be considered. After fifty years of contact with the Han, the visible distinctions between themselves and the Han have become blurred, and physical competence in sports and performance of collective spectacle seem to be plausible answers. I was always told that kiloma’an, dancing, singing were their culture/tradition because “payrang (the Han) don’t do it.” Amis culture is simplified and rendered as extraordinary rituals and performances not merely because of the government’s intentional promotion, but also because such extraordinary practices help answer who they are and what they should do when facing the problem of losing everything they call tradition or culture.

Considering the case of the military service and silingtai or speech platform, we understand how state regulation makes the new body and how preexisting customs were transformed. Such formations of new habitus make a field in which the state

ago. No statistical data on education levels of the 1980s can be found in Taiwan government’s electronic archives. However, the rate of Falangaw people’s getting postsecondary education in the 1980s is much lower than that of today.

All the official statistics can be found at:

http://blog.xuite.net/wellsli/003/42682383
http://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.html?CID=940F9579765AC6A0&DID=0C3331F0EBD318C2D382D0750610516B
becomes the nearly exclusive source of symbolic capital, and that is why songs have to be written down and standardized, age-sets must be transformed into a legal corporation, and baseball game rules are applied to regulate the practice of kiloma’an.

Soon after the arrival of the first modern government arrived in Taiwan in 1896, a system of entitlements of honor, prestige, and recognition were introduced, especially via some government-granted or –favored activities like baseball, stage singing, and election as shown in this chapter. It was new because the form of capital was altered from person to person relationship (based on the egalitarian principle between two people of same age and the hierarchical principle between the younger and the elder, and personal competence in speech and problem solving) to this symbolic form of capital. Thus, a new value system or a new mode of domination, the fame and entitlements bestowed by the government, replaced the old one, a social capital system based on interpersonal interaction.

Gradually, social stratification emerged. Some families endeavored to play a role in activities such as singing and baseball. For example, some kakita’an families like the Wang family (Wang Qing-jian’s family), the Huang family (Huang Zhung’s family), and of course the Guo family (na Kakita’an) were very zealous in promoting baseball and running for elections or offering help to support KMT candidates. All three families had one thing in common: they were all the kakita’an families. Of all
the examples the Guo family was the most extreme. The Guo family had an eminent ancestor (probably the most eminent in all Amis communities), Kulas Mahengheng, and had a close relationship with baseball. Not only did Piya devote almost all his life to promoting baseball and combining baseball and Amis tradition (the Harvest Festival Guidebook, the guidebook based on the baseball game, written by Piya, as the textbook of Amis culture and history), he and his son Tayo also got involved in local elections. Moreover, Tayo’s wife Panay founded Chuyin Culture and Art Ensemble, having brought Falangaw Amis people’s voices abroad many times. My informants told me that today’s county counselor or legislator, a position earned by election, was equal to kakita’an in the past. Such an equation shows the shift in the mode of social/cultural capital accumulation and the adaptation to this shift.

To maintain their privileged status, many people of kakita’an families and mikidipongay (literate or well-educated) persons in the Japanese colonial period devoted themselves to those extraordinary things later in the KMT period. Falangaw was thus altered. Traditionally a man could be a kakita’an only if he was eloquent and popular enough, and no one would think that an eminent position like kakita’an was monopolized by certain persons or families. However, nowadays in Falangaw many of my informants said that some families treated baseball, singing, and elections like a business. “Unlike them, we are just common civilians.” It is this social differentiation
that caused the quarrel between Wupay and the Ipawiday young man. People who stood against Wupay complained that Wupay just wanted to ingratiate well-to-do families and government officials, and, some insisted, that is not what Falangaw really was or should be.

Who were these “well-to-do” families? Basically they were kakita’an families, meaning that each of them had an ancestor, a male married into their family, who undertook the position of kikata’an. Unlike common Amis families, these families had close relations with politics. Some of them were either county councilors or KMT agents running errands for the KMT during the election campaign. Compared to common Amis families, these families had different strategies to survive the impact of modernization. All of them had more high school and university graduates and civil servants (madipongay, maminkokay). They regarded Amis culture as a business and ran cultural business (the Wang [na Dihal] and Huang [na Kakita’an] family), played and held baseball games (the Guo [na Kakita’an] and the Huang families), organized singing troupes (Guo), and ran for county councilor (Wang, Guo). All of the families were prone to cooperate and had direct connections with government institutions. Moreover, they made some adaptations when facing modernization. For example, they adopted girls of other families as daughters, and arranged patrilocal marriage for sons and matrilocal marriage for daughters to maintain the privileges they already had.
However, they kept distance from their fellows. Only a few of them worked as farmers and participated in age-set activities and *kiloma’an*. They deemed themselves as mediators going back and forth between local people and the governing power. Some people of common Amis families identified these *kakita’an* families as conceited and arrogant, benefitting themselves by staying away from the traditional way of life and working with the government. But it is unfair to say that all of them were just clients or agents of the state apparatus, doing everything just for the interest of their own. Piya did his best to promote baseball and the Palidaw genesis and proposed that baseball should be a solution to the predicament of modernity and the future of the Amis.

Here we see how the state deployed an objective mechanism or single standard of honor or entitlement, which gradually took over the old standards or systems of honor that valued an individual's competence in the pre-state era. To facilitate this deployment some platforms are needed. Here we see the reason why political festivals like the modern Harvest Festival, election campaign, stage performances and baseball games are crucial, because without them the state idea and the power of the government institutions cannot penetrate an indigenous community like Falangaw and governance would be less efficacious. By employing these platforms as the intersection of the local and the state system those *kakita’an* families maintained their
privileged status.

Yet, the consequence of the working of an “objective mechanism or single standard of symbolic capital” does not totally accord with the government’s expectation. There are always some adaptations, adjustments, and negotiations. Marshall Sahlins (1985:147) uses concepts of double contingency or risk to denote that there is no guarantee that both the traditional categories the social agents rely on, and the realities of the outside world, will stay on the prescribed tracks.

In the beginning all the Amis people were forced to accept the statist system of symbolic capital, but due to the built-in mechanism of reflexivity existing in performance people started to employ the statist system of symbolic capital for their own ends. Therefore, although the kakita’an families occupied the platform of extraordinary experiences where kiloma’an, baseball, stage singing, and election happened, there were always challenging and competing voices emerging outside of these families. For example, Lamlo, a man who was born in a common Amis family, participated in the county councilor election and competed with Laway (Wang Qing-jian), another candidate who was born in a kakita’an family.

Apparently the Falangaw Amis had their plans. Accepting some prescriptions and suggestions given by the state apparatus, they knew that singing, baseball, and other kinds of bodily performance like sports really meant something, something relevant to
indigeneity in our modern time. Some Falangaw people took the initiative in accepting invitations from foreign countries, hosting the Joint Harvest Festival, or using the Festival as a stage for dissidents to present their disagreements about what culture, tradition, and the relations between indigenous people and the nation should be. They composed songs that criticized or satirized state policies, and disseminated their own version of Amis genesis.

Symbols relevant to and inspired by the state idea such as the Tribe Flag, Tribe Anthem, and the ritual of the founding father (Kulas Mahengheng) always appear on the occasions like stage performance, baseball games, and political festivals. Since 1997, the first time I visited Falangaw, I witnessed a sense of self-assertion and community making that became stronger every time the songs were sung, baseball was mentioned and played, and political festivals were put to practice. After eighty years of political surveillance Falangaw Amis smelled the aura of liberation, using all the knowledge of the state they had learned from their experiences to pave the way for their own future and trying to present both the predicaments they were facing and possible answers.

What are the predicaments facing Falangaw Amis? To answer this question a brief review of their encounter with different modern regimes has to be offered. Japan was the first modern regime that Amis people experienced. Although Japanese
colonization modernized Falangaw, the social and geographic boundary between the Amis and the outsiders and the sphere of kinship (sarawinawina), social organization (masakuputay), and political leadership (kakita’an) basically remained intact. Japan lost the war in 1945, and the Allies entrusted Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. After losing the civil war in China, the KMT regime brought two million refugees to Taiwan and started its colonization in the climate of global cold war. Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-guo exploited the global cold war to obtain financial and political support from the US in exchange for protecting the western world from Communism. The KMT government became an autocratic regime buttressed by the US. However, China’s getting the seat and Chiang Kai-shek government’s losing the seat in the UN in 1971 changed the power structure. In subsequent years the Chiang regime lost diplomatic relations with all the important countries, including the US. During that period of time (1971-1990), Taiwan was isolated in the global community. Chinese nationalism became hegemonic in the fields of education, cultural performance, and political ideology. A sense of exile from the motherland, a craving for going back, and the authenticity of Chineseness were emphasized in school education and the government’s propaganda. But there existed a tension between the practice of hegemonic Chinese nationalism and the plight of diplomatic isolation in the international realpolitik. Such tension caused the rise of a counterforce and later
an opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party or DPP.

The DPP’s political stance is usually categorized, mainly by the KMT, as some brand of Taiwanese nationalism. Gradually the struggle between the KMT regime and its counterforce was simplified as Blue-Green hostility, in which blue represents the KMT or Chinese Nationalism and green represents the DPP or Taiwanese Nationalism. After 1990, the trends of democratization and neoliberalization prevailed in Taiwan; the DPP got more seats in the Legislative Yuan and the final climax was that it won the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. The tussle between the blue and the green camps seemed to tear Taiwan into two parts; it has caused some disturbances, severe conflicts in the Legislative Yuan and on the streets ever since then. Alongside the track of Taiwan’s political development was the disintegration of the Falangaw Amis community. Many people lost their land, language, and traditional way of life. Falangaw was urbanized and Amis people either were forced to exile elsewhere or became strangers walking in their urbanized hometown.

What are their answers? On the one hand, Falangaw Amis people emphasized the value of peace and the avoidance of conflict, as practiced by Kulas Mahengheng. At the same time, they actively employed government-sponsored performances such as singing and baseball for their own purposes. The observance of newly invented rituals of Kulas Mahengheng together with performances elevated the meaning of exile. As
introduced in chapter 2, exile, or seeking for a destination, is an important motif hidden in the new genesis, which includes Kulas Mahengheng’s anchoring the Amis in Falangaw. The combination of Mahengheng and body performances in political festivals transforms the meaning of exile from forced migration to a heroic expedition to foreign places.

In the beginning, under the condition of exile, the KMT government sent the singers and the baseball players abroad to attend concerts and competitions in order to get a diplomatic breakthrough. Falangaw Amis marched across the borders of the community and the country, reached strange cities and counties via stage singing and baseball and, in the process, proved who they were. Here a sense of movement is crucial. Moving beyond the boundaries of both Falangaw and Taiwan did not make Amis singers and baseball players rootless cosmopolitans, they instead exploited the resource of grand occasions such as the Olympics and the MLB games to quench the country’s anxiety about diplomatic isolation and to transcend the plight of exile they faced in real life.

In contrast to some of Taiwan's other indigenous groups, Falangaw Amis’s attitudes toward the governing power go more in the name of peace and coexistence than that of resistance and autonomy. Yet, from their appropriation of symbols of the governing power as shown above, I argue that Falangaw Amis got inspiration from their exile,
and transformed their dismal fate of exile into a promising solution for their real life predicament. The solution is remarkable: not merely does it offer a promising answer to the difficulty they are facing, it also presents a feedback to the governing power. It suggests that all the people living in Taiwan could transgress the rigid, oppositional, blue-green frame and imagine a different future just like what the life history of Kulas Mahengheng taught them, and what they have learned from their experience of singing and attending baseball contests in foreign countries.¹¹⁴

Conclusion

Extraordinary experiences and political festivals presented in this chapter are crucial because they demonstrate that power relation between indigenous people and the regime is by no means one-way traffic either from the top-down or from the bottom-up. A dialogic relationship exists between them. In other words, rather than a set of abstract rules that regulate people’s everyday life, the state, for Falangaw Amis, is a concrete and mutual-constitutive process. The state is so concrete that it means little without the results of practice. That is why in the colonial context baseball and

¹¹⁴ In Falangaw, on many occasions, informants expressed the opinionion that all peoples should live peacefully in Taiwan regardless which political color they belong to. For example, on the day na Kakita’an held the celebration for Kulas Mahengheng’s birthday and announced the plan of the movie making (see chapter 5), Wucian, Piya’s younger brother, told me that the movie could help integrate people of different ethnic groups and political stances, just like his great ancestor did some one hundred years ago.
indigenous singing were extraordinarily significant to both the government and to the Amis. Without these two things it was difficult for the government to efficiently deploy its statecraft and the Falangaw people could not find the bridge that connected the past, the present, and the future. Given the concreteness of the state, experience and practice of spectacle should be situated in the center of our concern, for sports and bodily practices can arouse sensual excitements which simultaneously unite and differentiate localities and social classes to achieve the goal of re-localization.

Extraordinary experiences of the state often appeared in political festivals, in which different and opposite power relations and reflexivity breed. The consequences of political festivals were not just some changes that state bureaucracies intentionally made; people who participated in those political festivals used symbols and ideas that the government bestowed to deepen their self understanding, to make their own history, and to offer their feedback and critique. Through these events and practices, they commented on the policy of relocation, on Falangaw Amis people’s land losing problem, on politicians’ interruptions in kiloma’an, and on tensions between people of different ethnic backgrounds and antagonistic camps. The messages of the critiques and feedback are about how Falangaw Amis have practiced and performed in the fate of exile, and how the fate of exile could be transcended and be viewed differently.
Let me conclude my thesis by telling a story. An Amis professor told me an anecdote about his father, a kakita’an of Kakawasan in the Japanese colonial period. One day the kakita’an was summoned to the government office for business, but he was stopped in front of the portal by the guard. “Who are you? This place is not for people like you,” the Japanese guard reproached. “Who am I? I am a subject of the Great Japan Empire,” the kakita’an replied in fluent and standard Japanese. The guard was stunned, saying nothing and allowing him to get in.

Kakawasan is located on the north bank of Beinan Creek, quite near Pusong (see Fig. 1.3). Before the 1960s Kakawasan was under the influence of Falangaw, and some of its age-set names were adopted from Falangaw. This anecdote indicates that ideally citizenship is universal. Everyone living under the same state regime should be equal and cannot be discriminated no matter what his/her gender, age, social/economic status, and ethnic/racial background. Obviously the kakita’an knew that and utilized it to negotiate and outwit the colonizer. In other words, the state, to the kakita’an, was not abstract at all; it existed in the language he spoke, the content of his speech, or simply put, in his experience, knowledge, and practice.

Both this anecdote and the case of the Falangaw Amis suggest that the state is not
necessarily oppressive all the time, indigenes are not totally disadvantaged, and the
relationship between the governing power and the indigenous is not completely
one-dimensional, top-down domination or bottom-up resistance. Instead, there exists a
multi-dimensional power relationships between the two. To sum up and to make my
points clearer, below are four sections recapitulating all the data and analyses in the
previous six chapters.

**Person and People**

Falangaw Amis people’s daily practice and social transformation can be better
comprehended through their concepts of the person and the self. “Our bodies are the
wall of the nation” indicates a new concept of the body/person, in which a new
inner-outer boundary of the body replaces the old one. The old body concept, the
inner sacredness lodged within human flesh, has transformed or expanded to
incorporate the value of government-bestowed honor, privilege, and symbolic capital.
Little by little, Falangaw people began caring less about the equilibrium between
demonstrating personal competence and obeying traditional cultural constraints in
different sorts of social relatedness. The transformation caused some conflicts in
Falangaw, because not every person or every family had the same relation to
government-offered symbolic capital. Furthermore, people were encouraged to
connect with government-bestowed honors and privileges as a means of
self-expression, and such doings could be interpreted as revitalizing the traditional Amis culture.

Simoy’s workshop (chapter 5), Wupay’s rage in miksi’, na Kakita’an’s family business (baseball and stage performance), and Laway’s and Lamlo’s running for county councilor, are all examples of connecting to the state-granted power. However, connections like this have generated greater social differentiation, which was rarely seen before the advent of modern regimes. This violates egalitarianism, a basic principle of the Amis concept of the person. Thus, gossip and criticism based on Amis body images, such as sakanîway (liar), akawang ko ngoso’ (highly-posed nose) and awa kangodo (shameless) were everywhere in Falangaw, suggesting that the social transformation was so vast that some basic cultural logics cannot be congruent with it.

The concepts of the Amis body can also be employed to understand some key persons. For example, Kulas Mahengheng, a man who undertook the position of kakita’an in his twenties (twenty years earlier than other kakita'ans), was obviously an extraordinary man. In Falangaw no one would say that Mahengheng was an arrogant person shamelessly expressing himself, because people understand that the boundary between personal competence manifestation and institutional restraints on personal behavior did not fit Mahengheng. It was Mahengheng who connected the niyaro’ with the colonial power and elevated the status of Falangaw. Thus,
Mahengheng should be evaluated in the context of the modern regime, not of a traditional tribal society. However, local cultural logics were not fully overwhelmed by the impact of the state power. Mahengheng’s sterility (and later other kakita’ans’ sterility, presented in chapter 5) was interpreted as his over self-expression, suggesting that the core concept of the body was still valid and influential.

**Family**

One of the most salient changes that state policies have made was post-marital residence. Informants and research results confirmed that kinship in Falangaw has shifted from matrilineality to patrilineality. However, given the fact that loma’ or family/house is the basic unit of Amis kinship, lineality is not the ultimate concern of Falangaw Amis. The relationship between siblings is no less important than the relationship between parents and children. Thus, the key transformation of Amis kinship was not the shift from matrilineality to patrilineality. It was more about the shift in marital residence, specifically the shift from uxorilocal residence to virilocal residence.

Here the role of faki (maternal uncle) is crucial. Originally a faki connected his natal family and the family he married into. Later, when the KMT government tried to regulate all the customs that did not look like patrilineality, virilocal residence became popular in Falangaw. At-home fakis thus dominated both family and public affairs.
After demolishing the position of kakita’an, Falangaw decided to replace this position with itukalay, or the age-set of Faki. Besides, the Joint Kiloma’ans held by itukalay age-sets in all Amis communities in Taitung City illustrated how the local socio-cultural system appropriated state regulation, and how faki, a concept of social relatedness, connected the local with the state.

Family relationships in Falangaw also became different. Horizontal relationship between siblings turned sour, and conflicts between siblings were also increased. Such conflicts had something to do with the state policy confirming the rights of property, which made inheritance or the relationship between parents and children really matter. Social relatedness in the family thus shifted from the horizontal, the relationship among siblings, to the vertical, that is the relationship between generations. Due to the government’s promotion of patrilineality, men did not marry out, their wives married into their homes and they became powerful at-home fakis instead. Hence, unlike what the Amis people argued, socio-economic change such as land loss could not be attributed solely to Han people’s purchasing their land, causing discord between siblings. It was also the result of the encounter between state policy and Amis kinship.

The alteration of post-marital residential practice and family structure did not contradict the rule of Amis kinship. Therefore, matrilineality is not the core of Amis kinship (as the general public and the Amis themselves thought); rather, the traditional
Amis kinship should be regarded as house-based and uxorilocal. What state policies in marriage really changed was the post-marital residence. The house-based principle, the core of Amis kinship, still remained. And the consequence of that transformation of Amis kinship was the promotion of the status of faki.

Traditionally women were more influential in family, while men dominated public affairs outside of family. Neither gender could overwhelm the other. After the penetration of the state regulation, the division of labor between women and men in a traditional Amis community became different: men, faki or maternal uncles, controlled both family and public affairs. Here we see the role of faki as a link that connects cultural logic and the idea of legitimacy.

Some Amis families adopted strategies to navigate these changes. For example, some kakaita’an families adopted daughters to continue their families. These privileged families, such as na Dihal and na Kakita’an, let both their sons take wives and daughters take husbands into their families to consolidate their family status. These families cooperated closely with the government, and were involved in baseball, the cult of Mahengheng and the new genesis, local elections, and modern-style kiloma’an. In other words, some social distinctions between the privileged families and others were generated partially based on their different responses to the government’s management of family affairs.
Community

*Niyaro’ no Falangaw* or the original form of Falangaw community had a dense population and at one point, a clear boundary that distinguished them from non-Amis peoples. However, the Falangaw Amis community as a whole nowadays is composed of several scattered communities, and residents have a sense of being exiles in their own land. Living in such an alienated but familiar area, something needed to be done to keep Falangaw from disintegration.

Baseball and political festivals were two of the things that Falangaw people managed in order to maintain the boundary of the community. Initially both of them had something to do with state policies. But later on, some Falangaw people, Piya and some people of *kakita’an* families, for example, transformed them into the tools to unite scattering Amis families and communities. To achieve this goal, some social engineering work needed to be done. One of these works was the promotion of the Palidaw genesis, and those who promoted it, the *kakita’an* families, were very close to the government. As I have shown in previous chapters, baseball was closely connected to historical memory or the genesis of Falangaw; and Piya, the most important key person, had a close relationship, like his great grandfather Kulas Mahengheng, with the Japanese government.

Obviously, political festivals such as *kiloma’an* and election campaigns now
become the means to integrate all the Falangaw Amis together, and every political festival now celebrates the Palidaw genesis and canonizes Kulas Mahengheng. Here the state was employed as a resource to achieve something for local people’s own good. Some idioms and symbols of the modern state, such as the founding father, the national flag and anthem, the Shintō or Martyrs’ shrine, and state rituals such as national flag raising, are exploited to reconstruct the disintegrating Amis communities of Falangaw. Here the state appears in the form of some kind of materiality (for example, the flag and the anthem of the Amis tribe and the standardization of Amis singing and dancing), being used like bricks or concrete for the purpose of community construction and social extension.

Under such community construction, what does the Falangaw Amis community look like? At first glance, the Falangaw Amis in Taitung city were invisible, scattered or hiding in urbanized and Han-dominated downtown areas. Nonetheless, in some Amis people’s imaginary or in the picture of their own community construction, Falangaw looks different. First of all, Falangaw is imagined or constructed as an entity structured with symbols and idioms of the state, such as a founding father, a modern-sounding genesis, state rituals and etiquette. From the performance of these state rituals was created a collective and abstract ancestral spirit that also existed in the Shintō shrine of the Japanese State or the Martyrs’ shrine of the Chinese/KMT.
Second, Falangaw is the leader of the Amis Tribe. Falangaw people justified this self-proclaimed leadership by promoting the Palidaw genesis and organizing or hosting Joint Harvest Festivals.

Third, the main contents of Amis culture are traditional arts like singing and dancing and kiloma’an. Besides, although baseball is not originally Amis, it is used to express indigeneity or the Amis spirit and always presented together with singing and dancing on occasions like election campaigns.

Fourth, masakaputay (the age-sets) become the bridge that connects Falangaw and the external world. Not only does masakaputay practice mikaput (incorporating people of different ethnic groups and social statuses into it), it also transcribes events that impress the Amis into age-set names. Members of the age-set bear the name until the end of their lives. Through such practices, and through kiloma’an, a connection is formed. Here we see that kiloma’an and masakaputay have been transformed from an annual ritual of millet/rice harvest and a social institution storing community history into a political ritual that connects Falangaw to the external world.

**The state**

What is the state? How to define the state in Taiwan when taking the case of Falangaw Amis into account? First of all, Taiwan’s special condition in global politics should
be considered when discussing the state-indigenous relationship. Owing to difficult
diplomatic problems the government has faced in the global world, in Taiwan the
governance of indigenous people should be scrutinized through the lens of this
difficulty.

I argue that Taiwan is a country with a peculiar and exceptional statehood, both in
external global politics and in the internal governance of its peoples. Under such a
special conditions, indigenous people were treated differently in various aspects of
governance, from categorization or identity prescription, imposing Han names,
arranging living space, and education. Yet indigenous groups in Taiwan are not
homogenous in culture, economy, and relation to the governing powers, and relations
have also varied under different ruling regimes. In the case of the Falangaw Amis we
find that in the beginning both the Qing Chinese and the Japanese governments had
rapport with the Falangaw Amis, because the Amis were close to the government
office in Taitung and made contributions to pacify local riots, especially when the
first Japanese troop came to eastern Taiwan. Things changed after the end of World
War Two, when the KMT lost the civil war in China and fled to Taiwan, and many
Falangaw Amis people lost their land and left their hometown. In some respects, the
KMT exiles and Falangaw Amis shared a common fate.

To the Falangaw Amis, what is the state? To answer this question I argue that it is
necessary to go back to Falagnaw Amis people’s way of conceiving things. The Amis used their *masakaputay* or age-sets to recognize events happening in their life world. By the names of age-sets, external events were incorporated into the Amis people’s system of social relatedness and put into practice. In other words, by examining *masakaputay*, the track of the invisible state, from the perspective of the Amis, can be manifested.

Moreover, the state became visible to Falangaw people through their ordinary and extraordinary practices, such as education, baseball, and the political festivals discussed in chapter five and six. To Falangaw Amis people, their daily life seemed to become atomized and fragmented because of the power of the state, which replaced traditional authorities such as regulation from elder age-sets. However, losing traditional way of life and being atomized also meant the freedom to connect with government agents and official institutions. For example, promoting baseball was a state policy in the Japanese period, but some Amis people such as Piya, who was not that close to traditional affairs, actively connected Falangaw with the regime, exploiting baseball as a resource for community (re)construction.

Obviously extraordinary experiences, such as baseball and stage performance, were relevant to the state. And these experiences made the boundary between things of the Amis and things of the state blurred. For example, baseball in Falangaw could not be
separated from the Palidaw genesis and the cult of Kulas Mahengheng. Similarly, Amis people’s stage performance was not just a top-down demand from the government; it also contained some Amis people’s will to express themselves to the external world.

In a word, the state exists in local people’s experiences and practices both in ordinary daily life and on some crucial occasions. At the first glance, local communities like Falangaw were absorbed into the state system and became part of it. Through indigenous people’s experience and practice, the state becomes visible, and it also makes sense to say that the indigenous are a part of the state system. However, this simplified scheme is far from enough. Instead of just pinpointing how the state and Falangaw people came together, some further questions should be asked and answered. What made these events crucial? What kind of events were they? And how did the Amis experience and practice them? All these questions can be summarized and rephrased as: how to describe the formation of the conjunction between local people’s cultural schema or logic and the state power?

In this research I argue that when considering how indigenous people have been ruled, the peculiarity of Taiwanese statehood should be simultaneously taken into account. So too should Falangaw Amis agency, as Amis people did not passively take whatever state institutions imposed upon them. Oftentimes they regarded things the
state imposed upon them as a resource to reconstruct their community. But the question about the specificity of the conjunctures at which relations were forged still remains unanswered. To answer it, I present below four conjunctures that bound Falangaw and the government together.

First of all, Falangaw was instrumental in a special conjuncture of regime shift when the Japanese colonial power arrived in 1896. The Qing soldiers were unwilling to surrender and waged guerrilla warfare against the Japanese troops. To avoid loss and suffering, the Amis took side with the Japanese. Since then a close relationship between Falangaw and the governing power has occurred. Different from many indigenous communities, for example, the Seediq, Falangaw had a rapport with the regime because of the special historical context.

Second, Falangaw Amis adjusted some kinds of social relatedness, such as kinship and age-set, and extended some key cultural concepts, such as the ideas of the body, to accommodate the impact of the state. Here we find that the consequences of the accommodation were not just changes in the material level. Almost every symbolic form of power relationship in Falangaw has also been reconfigured. Significant changes can also be found in Falangaw people’s extraordinary experiences, such as election campaigns, harvest festivals, and stage performances, in which social relatedness and logics of cultural practices are transformed to connect with state
powers. Therefore, we see that the status of *faki* was concretely and symbolically elevated in both the kinship and the age-set system. Moreover, some former *kakita’an* families participated in local elections, running for positions like borough chief and county councilor, and gradually Falangaw, originally an egalitarian community, became a class-like society led by these families.

Third, after World War Two Falangaw and the KMT regime shared a similar fate of exile. Being an exiled regime from China, the KMT government was excluded by the global world and governed the island by manipulating ethnic politics. One form of manipulation was to put some indigenous people in a special, or sometimes exceptional, category in political, social, and economic aspects. Owing to the KMT’s manipulation of ethnic politics, Falangaw Amis people felt themselves nearer to the Chinese regime than to Taiwanese people like the Hoklo and the Hakka. However, given the special categories Falangaw Amis people have been assigned to, discontent and resistance toward the regime and the will to reconstruct and justify themselves emerged as well. The land problem and the betel leaf trade are two examples in which Falangas Amis felt that the KMT regime had mistreated them.

Fourth, the neoliberal trend started in Taiwan some twenty years ago, and affair of culture were turned into business. Unlike what the Japanese and the KMT governments did to indigenous people some decades ago, the contemporary
government stood off and meddled less in indigenous affairs, leaving indigenous people to decide what their lives should be, just like the ideal revealed in the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law. The government’s standing off can be interpreted that Taiwan is both in the democratic and the neoliberal trends. I argue that this neoliberal trend did not loosen the connection between Falangaw and the government. Instead some Falangaw people felt freer to employ resources from the government. For example, they applied for subsidies from government departments when there were harvest festivals and stage performances. Falangaw people also used government-offered symbolic capital and symbols of the state to rebuild Falangaw.

**Conclusion: Experiencing the State beyond Resistance and Regulation**

In this thesis I showed what happened when the state regulation encountered an indigenous community, not from the top-down perspective but mainly from the perspective of how the indigenous community experienced the state regulation and reformulated their practices in ordinary life and on extraordinary occasions. In the case of the Falangaw Amis of Taiwan, the relationship between indigenous people and the state was not one of resistance versus regulation, but was something beyond the two.

I am not saying that in Falangaw there was no resistance toward state regulation, or that the state was but regulation to them. What I want to stress is that local
indigenous people, in some specific historical and socio-cultural contexts, could use
or collaborate with state regulation for their own cultural revitalization and
community construction. This is possible because state regulation is always porous
and inconsistent (for example, in the Japanese period policemen were scary to the
Amis, but school teachers were dear to them); especially they vary with different
periods of time. In the case of Taiwan, we have found that the state apparatus assigned
different peoples to different categories in different eras. In the past state regulation
may mean repression, exclusion, and regulation, but later on it may become the source
of freedom and innovation, especially after the 1990s.

Power does not just run in the game of repression and resistance; it is more much
subtle and multi-dimensional, working in complicated systems like blood capillaries
in the human body to generate actions. Situated in a complicated power system like
that, on the one hand the indigenous were always categorized, imagined, and
marginalized. However, they also looked for ruptures of the power system, trying to
be part of it but using it as a resource to empower themselves and claim their
indigenous citizenship.

In this research I present how the impact of the state has molded the subjectivity of
Falangaw Amis people, and how they latter have indigenized state regulation by
reviewing their everyday lives and extraordinary experiences. I have shown that some
Falangaw people proved their value in their atomized everyday life in some fields like stage performance, sports, and military service. Through these practices, Falangaw Amis people got some knowledge about the state, materializing it to produce things like the flag and the anthem of the Amis Tribe, the new sefi, founding father, new genesis, and modern kiloma’an, to mention just a few. These became resources for reconstructing their fragmented niyarō’. More importantly, Falangaw people’s experience and practice are not one-sided reactions to state regulation; it also fed back to the state, making Taiwan, a country with problematic statehood, more visible and able to survive in the global world, and more peaceful, tolerant, and polyphonic in national politics, through sports and music.

Why does the state matter? This research suggests that the impact of the state shapes indigenous peoples’ lives and experiences, but indigenous people also use it to empower themselves. Simultaneously the state is remade to become more multivalent. From the modernist point of view, citizenship is regarded as “a secularized version of the more primordial bonds of tradition, religion, and locality” and “stands in opposition to the particularistic forms of commitment to society which are characteristic of family, the village or the tribe” (Turner 1993:5). This viewpoint hints that citizenship should be universal as a consequence of secularization. However, here we see that the Falangaw Amis have tried to offer a sacred version of citizenship and
re-tribalize themselves by using idioms and symbols of the state, and the birth of the Amis Tribe, a political imaginary of modern state, is the result.

The state always tries to unify all disparities, although usually it fails to achieve this goal (Scott 1998). The form of indigenous citizenship explored in this research pluralizes the composition of the nation. The term “indigenous” originally refers to something primordial and relevant to self determination in relation to land and culture. It also has connotations of collective attachments and international politics of marginality (Niezen 2003:9). These meanings of indigenous do not quite fit the case of Falangaw. The Falangaw Amis do not look for self-determination or some sort of independence from the government. They support the existing state system (although they also criticize the government and state policies) and are willing to be part of it. That is why the state matters. In Taiwan we cannot ignore the content and form of the state if the problem of indigeneity is to be studied. Conversely, the invisible state always manifests itself in marginal indigenous people’s daily and extraordinary experiences and practices.

In Falangaw, indigenous experience and the state penetrate and constitute each other, and it has been the goal of this research to demonstrate the process and the consequence of this penetration and constitution. What is Falangaw Amis people’s next step? Will they further pursue their community construction by adopting
concepts of universal human rights and connecting with global indigenous movements?

Probably they will. But whatever their next move is, by and large, they still cannot alienate themselves from the state. And if their distance from the state changes significantly, it will simultaneously transform the content and form of the state in Taiwan.
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