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Population displacement and forest management in Thailand

by

Jean-Philippe Leblond

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POPULATION DISPLACEMENT AND FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND

Jean-Philippe Leblond
PhD Candidate in Geography
jp.leblond@umontreal.ca
Canada Research Chair in Asian Studies
Université de Montréal
3744, rue Jean-Brillant, bureau 420
Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3T 1P1

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Abstract
In the 1980s in Thailand, it was estimated that 10 million people were occupying land legally defined as forest (thereafter legal forest). During the following decades, a variety of state agencies tried to solve the problem through applying a mixture of population displacement projects and legalisation by granting usufruct rights or full land ownership to illegal squatters. This article focuses on the first approach, which has become the most high-profile state intervention in forest areas. Previously published information on the subject is scarce and mostly anecdotal. The paper therefore attempts to supplement the debate by offering the first comprehensive review of conservation-induced displacement (CID) across Thailand, focusing on the 1986-2005 period. Results show striking inequality first in the geographical distribution of CID projects and ethnic composition of the people displaced. I find that Khon Tai (Southerners), Central Thais, Khon Muang (Northerners) and Karen have scarcely been affected by CID while the opposite is true for Northeasterners and particularly for non-Karen hill tribes. Results also suggest that the number of people displaced by forest management, which amounted to at least 51,000 people from 1986 to 2005, has significantly declined since c. 2001. I propose a series of explanations of these peculiar results, and discuss their significance in light of Thailand’s changing forest policies. My interpretation rests heavily on the nature and evolution of the state motivations for CID projects, particularly those pertaining to geopolitical questions, and the unequal yet increasing political costs and constraints in implementing CID projects.

Keywords
Thailand, forest management, conservation, national security, population displacement, ethnic minorities.
Glossary

ALRO: Agricultural Land Reform Office
CID: Conservation-induced displacement. In this text, it refers to state-led displacements where state actions were motivated, justified or linked in any way to the conservation or management of forests or forest land.
CPD: Cooperative Promotion Department
DLD: Department of Land Development or Land Development Department
DNP: Department of National Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (formerly a division of the RFD)
DOL: Department of Lands
DPW: Department of Public Welfare
EGAT: Energy-Generating of Thailand
FIO: Forest Industry Organization
KJK: Khor Jor Kor program
NGO: Non-governmental organizations
RID: Royal Irrigation Department
RFD: Royal Forest Department. It was the main institution responsible for forest management from 1896 to 2002. Since then, three departments are responsible for forest management: the RFD, the DNP and the Marine and Coastal Resources Management Department. The term “forest authorities” refers to all core agencies responsible for forest management.
SLD: State-led displacement. It refers here to changes of residence directly linked to actions or threats made by state officials or organisations.
WVO: War Veterans Organisation
STK: Sor Tor Kor, or National Forest Land Allotment project

Introduction

During the twentieth century, the Thai state intensified its control over the use of and access to natural resources - a trend that has been particularly striking in regards to forest resources and forest land since the mid-1980s (ICEM, 2003; Vandergeest, 1996a; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). Up until this period, regulations aimed at interdicting human occupation of legal forests had been made increasingly severe, and were applied over a vast and expanding territory. Occupation and cultivation is currently forbidden in all three types of legal forests, namely, in decreasing order of legal penalties and level of law enforcement: protected areas, national forest reserves and non-demarcated legal forest land, also called ordinary forest - paa thammada - or 1941 forest - paa 2484. However, prior to the mid-1980s the implementation of these forest regulations was unequal, and generally absent. This was due in part to institutional problems and resource constraints, but more importantly to the fact that forest conservation objectives were subordinated to other more important governmental objectives. These included assuring the security of the state in the face of a growing communist movement within Thailand and in neighbouring countries; and economic development, understood as a key tool to win the hearts of insurgents and sympathizers (Bamrungsup, 1999; Bunbongkarn, 1996; Hirsch, 1987; Isarabhakdi, 1989; Lohmann, 1993; Rigg and Stott, 1998; Vandergeest, 1996a).

In the 1980s, with the growing popularity of environmentalist ideas, the increased scarcity of accessible harvestable forests, and the logging ban in natural forests in 1989, the Royal Forest Department (RFD) faced both a profound crisis and an opportunity. Having lost its main purpose and core justification for its budget - the management of forest exploitation - the RFD henceforth elevated forest conservation and reforestation as its primary objective (Pye, 2005a; Vandergeest, 1996b). But the RFD was confronted with an important problem. A substantial portion of the land area under its jurisdiction, and subject to its conservation and reforestation efforts, was occupied and cultivated by approximately 10 to 12 million so-called “squatters”. In fact, an unknown yet substantial portion of these occupants of legal forests had a legitimate claim to the land, either because they occupied the territory prior to its demarcation as a gazetted legal forest, or be-

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1 On the regulations pertaining to different types of legal forest land, see Fujita (2003), Khambanonda (1972), and Vandergeest (1996a).
cause they were encouraged by security authorities to encroach on forest land in an effort to defeat communist insurgents active from the 1967 to the 1980s (Burns, 2004; Hirsch, 1987; ICEM, 2003; Lohmann, 1993). The problems of the RFD were compounded by the fact that agricultural colonisation, which was of stupendous rapidity during the 1960s and 1970s, persisted in the 1980s and thereafter. As such, it posed a continuing threat to the RFD’s territorial control. For good reasons, the RFD feared it would lose control over contested territory as important pressure to legalise the occupation of legal forests was exercised from within and outside the state apparatus, and in particular from the Ministry of Interior and Members of Parliament, This was achieved for example by transferring the legal ownership and responsibility of the land from the RFD to the Agricultural Land Reform Office. To this threat, the RFD responded by devising plans and strategies to stop further encroachment and remove occupants from legal forests. Among the methods to attain this goal were stricter enforcement of existing forest laws, the intensification of efforts to expand the area under strict protection and, more importantly for this paper, the promotion and implementation of population displacement projects (Vandergeest, 1996a; Vandergeest, 1996b).

As underlined by Walker and Farrelly (2008) and many others, the resolution of the encroachment problem has been at the center of forest politics in Thailand, and the cause of severe and sometimes violent conflicts since the mid-1980s. While the RFD and many conservation-oriented (dark-green) government officials, scholars and NGO activists have called for a complete reordering of upper-watersheds (which would necessitate the voluntary or involuntary removal of residents and the confiscation of their land), threatened villagers and sympathetic (light-green) activists and scholars have resolutely fought such moves. They have organised small and large protests, built networks among threatened communities and raised awareness of the important negative social consequences of population displacement projects, the lack of respect of human rights by authorities, and the existence of flaws or important omissions in the discourse underpinning such drastic actions. Moreover, they have convincingly argued that upland ethnic minorities (the so-called hill tribes) are subject to racially-based discrimination (Delcore, 2007; Johnson and Forsyth, 2002; Vandergeest, 2003; Walker, 2001).

Despite the profusion of academic and journalistic contributions on the encroachment question and the use of conservation-induced displacement (CID) to resolve it, information on CID remains scarce, mostly anecdotal. Basic questions pertaining to the number and ethnic status of the people displaced, the conditions under which movements occurred, and the location of cases have yet to be answered. Walker and Farrelly (2008) recently offered a rare attempt at clarifying the subject. Focusing on Northern Thailand, where the threat of displacement is most likely the greatest, the authors reviewed the literature and found only a limited number of CID cases since the mid-1980s in the region.² They argued that there is a great imbalance between, on the one hand, the great attention devoted to CID and the level of fear it inspires and, on the other hand, the very few, yet often cited, CID cases described or merely mentioned in the literature. The authors’ conclusions are rather controversial. First, given the dynamic activities of academics, journalists, NGOs and farmers’ movements denunciating CID projects, the limited number of CID cases uncovered indicates that population displacements in the North are most likely rare. Second, they suggest that the most serious livelihood problems affecting upland residents does not come from state-led CID projects, but rather from state-imposed resource access restrictions or possibly from inter-village conflicts which led in two well-known

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² According to my calculation, they identify 7 cases (or group of cases) of CID which occurred in Northern Thailand since 1985. One of them (“Hmong villages in Nan”; p. 384) however does not qualify as CID as defined in this paper as no change of residence apparently occurred. The authors also contested the existence of an 8th case (Ban Khun Klang, Doi Inthanon National Park) reported by a well-known Thai scholar.

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cases to attempted evictions. As such, the “spectre of eviction” is thus exaggerated. Third, Walker and Farrelly argue that light-green activists and academics should revise their political strategy and discourse by focusing on the most common ‘actual’ threats and consider population displacement as an extraordinary menace. In line with previous work (Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Johnson and Forsyth, 2002; Walker, 2001, 2004 and 2007), they favour a rights-based approach in which defenders of upland residents would collaborate with state institutions involved in infrastructure and social development. This strategy of “bringing development to the uplands” (my formulation) would help secure residence, land and resources rights to upland residents while making their access to infrastructure, welfare services, education, and agriculture extension more equitable.

The objective of this paper is to enhance our understanding of the recent evolution of forest policies in Thailand, of which CID has come to represent the most aggressive and feared intervention. I undertake this by considerably extending the review offered by Walker and Farrelly, both in geographical coverage and in depth. The paper identifies and formally analyses 60 cases of CID which occurred between 1986 and 2005. Several of these have never been discussed in English-language academic literature. The discussion is supplemented by a rapid review of, and comparison with, other population displacement projects. Based on the review, I argue that (1) conservation-induced displacements were of much greater importance in the late 1980s and early 1990s but then decreased significantly in both the number of people displaced and the size of displacement projects, (2) non-environmental justifications and motives played a key role in many CID projects, particularly prior to 1986 and from 1986 to 1995, (3) the risk of displacement is overall much higher for upland ethnic minorities than ethnic Thais (lowlanders), but (4) within both categories, great inequalities can be noted, for example between Karen and non-Karen upland ethnic minorities. Based on a discussion of the causes of these facts, I argue that CID projects are still a threat, but only in specific and rather marginal cases, where targeted groups are disadvantaged inter alia by their small population size, political and physical isolation, involvement in illicit activities, and absence of a long and documented land use history. For the vast majority of occupants of legal forests, the risk of displacement is effectively low.

The paper is divided as follows. In section 2, I review briefly the evolution and nature of major state-led displacements programs during the twentieth century. I then present in section 3 a review of CID cases from 1986 to 2005. Finally, key results are discussed in the fourth section.

2) Overview of major state-led population displacement projects

In this paper, state-led population displacement (SLD) is defined as population movements (or physical displacement) caused directly and purposefully by actions or the threat/promise of such actions by state agencies and officials. As such, I use the term displacement throughout the paper to refer to one part of the recently broadened definition of displacement as proposed and adopted by several authors and institutions, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. According to the latter definition, displacement covers both physical (or geographical) displacement (change of site of residence) and economic displacement, the latter referring to restrictions of access to resources and land, even if it does not entail physical displacement (Cernea, 2006; Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; Vandergeest et al., 2007a). The promotion of this second definition in international organizations was made in order to secure adequate compensation for all impacted persons, including those whose site of residence did not change. In the paper, I will not focus on restrictions of access to resources and land, even though it is widespread in Thailand, has important repercussions on legal forests residents and can even lead, after a certain delay and sometimes in conjunction with other causal dynamics,
to forest residents migrating to a new site of residence (on the importance of such indirect displacements, see Vandergeest et al., 2007b). The term displacement comprises both eviction (a change of site of residence without housing or housing land compensation) and resettlement (or relocation; a change of site of residence with housing or house land compensation). Conservation-induced displacement (CID) is defined as SLD justified or motivated at least in part by forest management and conservation objectives.

It should be noted that in the context of this paper, the question of voluntariness is not fundamental to the definition of displacement. It is common to define displacement as necessarily requiring an element of coercion or force (e.g. Muggah, 2003; Vandergeest et al. 2007a). This position is not universally adopted (e.g. Bartolome et al., 2000), as evidenced by the use of the terms ‘voluntary displacement’ and ‘involuntary displacement’ (e.g. Cernea, 2005; IFC, 2002). In fact, determining to what extent a move is forced, coerced or voluntary is an important moral and legal issue, but it is also an extremely difficult task subject to a series of methodological and theoretical arguments and counter-arguments (Beazley, 2009; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007; High, 2008; High et al., 2009). Given (1) the purpose of the paper – examining conservation-related state-led population movements -, (2) the intrinsic difficulty in establishing (in)voluntariness, and (3) the extent and quality of the data I use, there is little utility and much risks in including here voluntariness as a defining feature of ‘displacement’. In order to avoid being trapped into lengthy and potentially unproductive discussions of the voluntary or involuntary nature of a particular SLD case, I consider for the purpose of this paper that SLD includes all state-initiated population movements purposefully produced by state institutions and actors. This includes a range of situations, notably state-sponsored settlement schemes, which are typically considered as ‘voluntary’. In the following section, I will briefly review the history of state-led displacements, including CID projects.

Since the abolition of the absolute Thai monarchy in 1932, at least 14 state agencies have implemented a great diversity of displacement and land allocation projects in rural areas. Table 1 presents an overview of major land settlement and land allocation programs. Based on the limited available information3, I distinguish between programs in which most or all participant households were displaced and programs in which most or all participant households received land or land use rights without necessarily having to change their site of residence. According to this classification, there are two major SLD programs, namely the Self‐Help Settlements Project and the Forest Village Project. The former started in 1940 and has since accommodated landless and land poor people affected for example by infrastructure development, urban and economic policies (e.g. ban of trishaws in Bangkok), and security operations. The Forest Village program was started in the mid-1970s and focused on national forest areas presumed at risk of communist infiltration or deforestation. A substantial proportion of the participant households in these projects changed their site of residence. Table 1 contains adjusted figures of the Forest Village program following data reported by Chuntanaparb and Wood (1986, p. 21 & 26) which show that at least 42 percent of participating households were not displaced but

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3 Detailed descriptions of the Forest Village Project, the National Land Allotment Program, the Agricultural Land Reform Program, the Sor Tor Kor project, and some types of self-help settlements can be found in the literature (ALRO et al., 2006; Anon, 1981; Amyot, 1988; Aramphongphun, 1990Chantachai, 1998; Chirapanda, 1982, 1994 and 2000; Dembner, 1988; Hafner, 1995; Hafner and Apichatvullop, 1990; Hearn, 1974; Hirsch, 1989a and b; Kunmart, 1990; Lightfoot, 1981; Onchan, 1990; Sasaki, 2002; Suehiro, 1981; Thapa and Weber, 1988a and b). To my knowledge, other projects have rarely if ever been discussed in the English or French language literature. Further research on these various programs is clearly needed in order to gain a solid understanding of the history of SLD in Thailand.

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Table 1. Major settlement and land allocation programs in Thailand, 1935-2005

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<tr>
<th>Programs (Agencies)</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programs primarily devoted to resettlement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help settlements (DPW)</td>
<td>5,825</td>
<td>103,143</td>
<td>128,972</td>
<td>231,954</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War veterans (WVO)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Villages (FIO)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Villages (RFD)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,472</td>
<td>23,129</td>
<td>57,632</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Villages (RFD), population displaced</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>13,439</td>
<td>33,487</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total (population displaced)</strong></td>
<td>5,825</td>
<td>108,059</td>
<td>146,133</td>
<td>267,401</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programs primarily devoted to land allocation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land allocation (DOL)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>60,674</td>
<td>274,100</td>
<td>703,924</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land co-operatives (DCO)</td>
<td>25,490</td>
<td>56,393</td>
<td>69,485</td>
<td>108,745</td>
<td>160,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Development (DLD)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>12,390</td>
<td>14,359</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform (ALRO)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>81,257</td>
<td>1,208,316</td>
<td>1,523,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Forest Land Allotment or STK (RFD)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>624,048</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>131,326</td>
<td>1,063,249</td>
<td>2,748,067</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>239,385</td>
<td>1,209,382</td>
<td>3,015,468</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The table excludes several displacement projects (see text), including an unknown proportion of CID cases from 1986 to 2005 discussed later in the paper. 2. DPW (Department of Public Welfare), DCO (Department of Cooperatives), ALRO (Agricultural Land Reform Office), DOL (Department of Lands), WVO (War Veterans Organization), DLD (Department of Land Development), FIO (Forest Industry Organisation), RFD (Royal Forest Department). 3. A dash (-) indicates the program was not active at the time. 4. The RFD’s Forest Village and STK projects were authorized in 1975, but the latter only started in 1982. In 1993, they were both transferred to ALRO. 5. Assuming 58% of the beneficiaries were displaced, as implied by data in Chuntanaparb and Wood (1986)


simply received land. It was impossible to make similar adjustments for the Self-Help Settlement Project. As discussed below, most of the displacements associated with these projects should be seen as compulsory. Potential exceptions exist in regards to some self-help settlements, notably those established in the border region of the Muslim South. Despite a severe lack of information on these projects, it is reasonable to assume that Buddhists who joined these settlements were encouraged, but not forced or coerced, to do so. Although the Agricultural Land Reform and the Land Cooperative programs are classified as primarily devoted to land allocation, some beneficiaries have been displaced (Hirsch, 1989b; NESDB, 1974; see CID cases 13/27 and 15 in Annex). Overall, participation in land allocation programs is presumed to have been largely optional and has in effect often increased tenure security. In fact, the conversion of national forest reserve land into Agri-

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4 Three of the four self-help settlement projects discussed by Anon (1981) are apparently in a similar situation. The fourth one was created to accommodate dam displaced. This study however does not offer a thick description of the origin of the settlers and of their destitute status. At least some of the settlers were operators of trishaws and thus subject to a loss of access to livelihood means. To my knowledge, other projects have rarely if ever been discussed in the English or French language literature (but see Chirapanda and Worwate (1980)).
tural Land Reform areas greatly reduced the number the number of occupants of legal forests in the 1990s and 2000s (see Sections 3.4). It should be noted however that land rich households in the host communities (typically more than 15 or 25 rai) have seen their ‘surplus’ land taxed or confiscated and redistributed to newcomers (e.g. Hirsch, 1989a; Hafner and Apichatvullop, 1990). Based on the table, and keeping in mind the lack of detailed data, it can be broadly estimated that the total number of people displaced by SLD was relatively modest from the first phases of the project in 1935 to 1966, but then rapidly increased during the following decades to almost 150,000 and 300,000 households in the mid-1980s and early 2000s respectively. There are however serious reasons to believe that the total number of people displaced by the state is much greater.

First, the data in Table 1 only lists the number of residents of resettlement areas. However, many SLD projects simply evicted people and did not include a resettlement scheme. This occurred in many post-1986 CID cases identified and reviewed in section 3. It also occurred in war operations when the military bombed or threatened to destroy upland ethnic minority settlements, and suspected communist villages. The data also leaves out people displaced by projects involving resettlement schemes but who were excluded or chose not to move to resettlement areas. Thapa and Weber (1988) for instance report that two-thirds of those displaced by dams opted not to be part of planned resettlement schemes. According to my compilation, at least 210,000 people have been displaced by dam constructions since the 1960s (unpublished data). Assuming the ratio between spontaneous and planned resettlers cited by Thapa and Weber is correct, 140,000 people (28-35,000 households) should be added to Table 1. Involuntary exclusion from resettlement schemes occurred for example to those who settled late in areas designated for dam construction (Hirsch, 1989a) or to ethnic minorities without citizenship and who were suspected to be recent immigrants. Indeed, Thai nationality was often a prerequisite for receiving state benefits and support in resettlement and land allocation projects. Third, it appears the data compiled excludes households resettled by institutions or projects not listed in the table, notably the RFD’s Royal Project for Hill-Tribe Development and the Forest Industry Organisation’s Forest Village project, whose reforestation activities involved the relocation of upland ethnic minorities and others (Barney, 2005; Boonkird et al., 1985; Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986). Moreover, it does not mention Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), both of which managed resettlement programs associated with dam construction (Thapa and Weber, 1988b). Another important group of people excluded are those who were informally, yet clearly encouraged by the Army and other security forces to colonise and resettle in regions at risk of communist infiltration (Ekachai, 1990; Phongpaichit et al., 1996; Riethmüller, 1988). As discussed below, this was part of the military strategy to defeat communism. Encouragements included promises of land titles, clearing of land, road construction and the provision of development funds. Tens, if not hundreds of thousands of people have thus been encouraged to settled in previously forested areas. This type of migration could be considered as a form of state-led displacement given the definition given above. As a result, the number of people displaced by the state is without

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5 In the case of Tab Salao dam, two-thirds of the people displaced by the dam were excluded from the resettlement scheme (Hirsch 1989).
7 There were 2,610 households in Forest Industry Organization’s forest villages in 1973, but only 2,000 in 1982. 309,328 rai of timber plantations were established by 1982 (Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986, p.56-58). 1 rai = 0.16 ha.
doubt much greater than what is reported in Table 1.

Given these problems, it is impossible to determine the number of people displaced by CID projects simply from looking at official statistics and documentation. It is nevertheless known that CID projects existed prior to the main period of study, 1986-2005. For example, at least four displacement operations took place in protected areas prior to 1986 and thus could have been motivated, at least in part, by forest conservation objectives. These cases, which are probably not compiled in Table 1, occurred in Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuary in the 1970s (200 households displaced), Phu Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary in the late 1970s and early 1980s (500 households displaced), Phu Phan National Park in 1985 (43 households displaced) and Phu Rua National Park also in 1985 (Anon, nd-b; DNP, nd; Ghimire, 1994; Midas Agronomics Company, 1991; Noikorn, 2000b; Phongpaichit et al., 1996; Trisurat, 1995). In at least one case, that of Phu Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary, the primary motive was apparently national security. More importantly, the FIO and the RFD’s Forest Village programs were motivated by forest management objectives. The first, in 1981, had already displaced about 2,000 people settled in its forest villages, while the second displaced 13,439 households from its inception in 1975 until 1984. For reasons outlined previously, the total number of people displaced by these projects is without doubt much greater. After 1984, the RFD’s Forest Village program continued at a similar pace. When it was concluded in the early 1990s the RFD had about 57,000 households in its settlements, 33,487 of which were displaced according to my estimate calculated on the basis of data reported by Chuntanaparb and Wood (1986; see Table 1 and previous explanation).

It should however be noted that prior to the mid-1980s conservation and reforestation were rather marginal motivations or official justifications for SLD projects listed in Table 1. Indeed, the use of self-help settlements for reforestation or conservation purposes only arose in the late 1980s with the relocations from Thung Yai Naesuan to the Phop Phra Self-Help Settlement (case 11/18 in Annex). Overall, self-help settlements were mostly associated with cases of forest destruction and agricultural expansion, and were primarily planned as relocation sites for people displaced by national security operations (see below), agricultural expansion projects and infrastructure development projects (Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986; Chirapanda, 1982; NESDB, 1977). On the other hand, forest management was part of the objectives of the Forest Village program, but again there are doubts whether this really was its key objective, at least prior to the mid-1980s. The program consisted of the regrouping of illegal occupants into a single and large settlement area in which transportation and irrigation infrastructure were to be developed in a cost-effective manner (Hafner and Apichatvullop, 1990). Eviction from watershed areas was compulsory and on some occasions highly violent (Pye, 2005b). The inclusion of evacuees in the new settlement was officially voluntary but not automatic as authorities could decide to exclude some evacuate households from the project (Kunmart, 1990; Pragton, 1987). A maximum of 2.4 hectares of land was typically offered (usufruct rights) as compensation to those who were allowed and chose to settle in the resettlement site. In the mid-1980s, the program was seen as facing important constraints (e.g. high costs, lack of social foresters) and led to intense conflicts when the land allocated to evacuees was already claimed and used by long-time occupants (Pragton, 1987; Kunmart, 1990). In terms of forest management, the program officially had led by 1986 to the enrichment of forests and the establishment of tree plantations over a combined area of at least 1 million rai (Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986; Pye, 2005b, p. 97). It should however be emphasized that although the program was officially under the authority of the RFD, it was in fact a creation of security forces (Pye, 2005b, p. 71). Moreover, as for many government endeavours of the late 1970s such as royal projects and self-defence villages, the program was concentrated in strategic forested areas close to communist strongholds, or in villages believed to be under their influence.
(Pye, 2005b; Hafner and Apichatvullop, 1990; Figure 1). Here it aimed at increasing the control of the state over potentially dangerous populations and at winning over their allegiance through development work (Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986; Hafner and Apichatvullop, 1990; Kunmart, 1990). In fact, national security was officially the primary objective in two of the three types of forest villages, namely those under the National Security Program (also called Local Development for Security Project) and those under the Royal-Initiative Program (also called the Royal Local Development Project; Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986; Pragtong, 1987; Kunmart, 1990; see Figure 1). They represent 46 percents of the total population registered in forest villages as of 1986 (Pragtong, 1987). However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Forest Village Program was linked to two massive and costly military projects which made greater use of environmental justifications: the Greening Northeast (Isan Khieo) Program and the Khor Jor Kor Program. Information on these programs will be given in Section 3 which deals specifically with post-1985 CID projects. What is important to note here is that both programs were also justified – and presumably motivated – by national security objectives (Aramphongphun, 1990; Pye, 2005b; Xiao-hui, 1990).

Given the importance of national security and geostrategic questions in the history of SLD programs and in the remainder of the paper, it is useful to conclude this discussion by presenting a few SLD projects strictly motivated by security questions. These projects appeared for the first time in the 1960s as communist forces in mainland Southeast Asia and within the country gained strength. Two important schemes under the Self-Help Settlement program were implemented with the aim of facilitating the assimilation and control over ethnic or religious minorities. The first, which ran between 1961 and 1969, resettled approximately 160,000 trusted Buddhists from northeastern Thailand to self-help settlements in the Malay-dominated southern border provinces of Thailand.

Figure 1. Location of forest villages established between 1975 and 1986 and major communist strongholds of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) during the insurgency.

Notes: Marks gives little information on the Wattana Corridor if only that it was a major communication route used by the CPT. This area was also outlined in Chai-anan Samudavanija et al. (1990, p. 63-4) as a key area in the ‘L-Plan’ of the CPT, which aimed at isolating the Northeast from government control. Areas under communist influence were found in two-thirds of Thailand’s provinces (Kistemaker, 1980) and are much larger than what is here depicted as major communist strongholds. Notably, communist forces controlled villages or used areas in the Eastern Phetchabun range and south of the Wattana Corridor, thus forming an ‘L’ (see location of CID cases 7, 19, 40 and 13/27 in Annex).

ample, military. The second took the opposite approach and sought from 1968 onwards to resettle scattered upland ethnic minorities of the North, which were believed to be easily indoctrinated by communists, in settlements easier to control, usually in the lowlands. Evacuation from sensitive highland areas was mandatory and individuals and communities who did not comply were considered communists and attacked (Forsyth and Walker, 2008, p. 46; Gillogly, 2004; Hearn, 1974; note that I am not referring here to the nikhom chao khao project started in the early 1960s). In July 1972, more than 12,000 people resided in these self-help refugee settlements (Hearn, 1974, p. 190). Another important source of strategic displacements derived from the so-called strategic development military approach (called the villages surrounding the jungle strategy in Samudavani et al, 1990). During the first years of the insurgency in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the military used excessively violent search and destroy operations which succeeded only in making enemies of the affected rural population. The failure of this approach lead to another, this time centered on counterinsurgency measures which had gained in popularity, at least in some quarters of the military. The strategic development approach aimed at defeating communism by reducing social and political grievances through, for example, major investments in governmental and royal development projects and on the other hand by encircling insurgent strongholds with deforested land and newly-established villages populated by loyal subjects. These newly created villages were to receive as much state development aid as possible. The strategy was approved by the King in 1976 during a speech in Phitsanulok (Bamrungsuk, 1999, 132) and was put in practice in sensitive areas, notably close to borders and communist strongholds. It was applied formally through the Self-Defence Border Village Project (578 villages created between 1978 and 1981; Bamrungsuk, 1999, 146) and the Nam Khek Royal Development Project (35 strategic hamlets of 50 households created between 1979 and late 1980s; Anon, 1985; Riethmüller, 1988), as well as informally, as mentioned previously. A last form of SLD motivated by national security occurred in the 1980s, after communist insurgents surrendered their arms and reintegrated into society. Military or government authorities allocated these groups land through formal or informal arrangements in well-controlled areas. This occurred close the Thai-Malay border, where the Communist Party of Malaya operated, and close to former Communist Party of Thailand strongholds near the border with Cambodia, Laos and Burma (Anon, 1989a; Anon, 1990b; Anon, 1991; Hack, 2008).

It is generally believed that conservation and reforestation, as a motive and justification for displacement projects, only gained prominence from the mid-1980s onwards (e.g. Pye, 2005b). As we will see, CID projects after 1985 were not solely motivated or officially justified by environmental issues. In fact, internal and external geostrategic considerations again played an important role.

3) Conservation-induced displacement from 1986 to 2005

The decision to restrict the formal analysis to post-1985 CID cases is based on the fact that information on prior CID projects is scant and insufficient for the kind of analysis produced in this section. Moreover, conservation and reforestation were prior to 1985 a rather marginal motivation or justification for displacement projects.

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8 For example, according the list presented in (Anon, nd-a), 28 royally-initiated projects were created between 1952 and 1973, or 1.3 per year. However, from 1974 to 1980, thus after the 14 October 1973 massacre, the number rose to 329 projects, or almost 55 per year.

9 This approach is thus highly similar to the Forest Village program and in particular to its subset projects under the direct responsibility of military and royal development projects authorities. Some of these self-defence villages were created specifically for this purpose (e.g. in the Nam Khek Royal Development Project). In other instances, such as the ALRO settlement studied by Hirsch (1989b), existing settlements were incorporated into self-defence projects.
At the time, the level of enforcement of forest laws was lax and highly unequal. Any attempt to do the opposite would have created much hardship and injustice. As a result it would have subjected forest officials to the risk of violent retaliation from affected population and, more importantly, it would have increased the potency of communist propaganda (Fujita, 2003; Lohmann, 1993; Vandergeest, 1996a). It is thus only in the 1980s, after the demise of communist forces, that CID became a major governmental endeavour.

Following the adoption of the 1985 Forest Policy, which incidentally marked a turn to a more interventionist and aggressive approach to conservation and reforestation (Sricharatchanya, 1987), officials and politicians have shown great enthusiasm and ingenuity in promising and devising plans of massive population displacements from legal forests. In February 1986, more than 5,000 upland ethnic minority people were ordered out of mountain ranges in the west of the Central Plain, a move which immediately preceded or followed the creation of new protected areas in those areas (Kesmanee, 1987; Kesmanee, 1988). In July 1987, the Isan Khieo project was started. It aimed at settling 55,000 households in 53 forest villages (Xiao-hui, 1990). In 1987, provincial authorities in Nan province were planning the resettlement of 60,000 upland ethnic minorities people (Smucker, 1987). In October 1989, Phairote Suwanakorn, the head of the RFD, announced that most of the 240,000 upland ethnic minority people of the northern region would be resettled in a cooperative efforts between his and the Local Administration Department as well as the military and the police (Anon, 1989d). In December, the same Phairote declared that 600,000 upland ethnic minority people had to be relocated (Kanwanich, 1989). A year later, the Army announced its Khor Jor Kor (KJK) program, which aimed in its first phase at displacing 25-50,000 families (Phongpaichit et al., 1996; Pye, 2005b). In May 1992, a few weeks before the KJK program was cancelled, the Anand Cabinet announced another plan devised by the military, this time aimed at resettling or limiting land use of 1 million people in upper watershed areas of the North, of which 90% were upland ethnic minorities. The project was called Watershed Rehabilitation Project, or Ro Fo To (Charasdamrong, 1992; Phongpaichit et al., 1996). The Anand Cabinet also announced in July 1992 and adopted in September 1992 another project called Kho O Tho which also aimed at displacing people but without the use of force (Kurashima and Jamroenprucksa, 2005). More recently, the Third Master Plan on Community Development, Environment and Drug Control in the Highlands, which was due to begin in 2002, aimed at resettling at 1,115 hill villages (Ekachai, 2002; Hengsuwan, 2003). As will be discussed below, most of these enthusiast and large-scale resettlement plans have failed to be implemented. CID projects in Thailand have therefore been of a radically smaller scale.

3.1) Notes on methodology

In this review, a CID case constitutes the displacement of a group of households or villages located within a single administrative zone, typically a national forest reserve or a protected area. According to my classification, the Khor Jor Kor program led to 8 documented CID projects. When a group of people was subject to several episodes of displacements, each was considered a separate case. Based on the moment displacement took place, cases were classified in one of four time periods (1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2000-2005). In two instances, one in Khao Ang Rue Nai Wildlife Sanctuary and the other in Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary, the CID project extended over almost a decade. For the sake of the analysis, these projects are considered as double cases (database contains two cases where only one project occurred). The number of population displaced targeted by the program were to be displaced. Others were to be affected but not displaced.

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was divided equally between the two periods. When only the number of households displaced was available, I conservatively allocated 4 persons per household for all periods of time and ethnic groups. This has probably lead to an underestimation of both the number of people displaced and the bias against highlanders (highlander households are typically larger than lowlanders').

Several potential cases were excluded from the list because (1) a source mentioned a plan for resettlement but there was no indication it was actually implemented, (2) the project was believed to have involved solely land confiscation but not changes of site of residence or (3) the nature of the data source was considered insufficiently reliable or likely erroneous. Also, the displacement of refugees from one camp to another and the repatriation of so-called illegal immigrants were not considered CID cases, except when there was indication that people repatriated had been living and cultivating land in legal forests for several years.

Information on cases was collected from academic articles, unpublished reports, newspaper articles and Internet sources. Information and tip-offs obtained through fieldwork in Phetchabun and neighbouring provinces were also used. Of the 60 CID cases found to have occurred from 1986 to 2005, 41 were documented based at least partially from an academic source or from Thailand’s National Human Right Commission. Out of the remaining 18 cases, 12 were documented based on official sources, typically a governmental website or newspaper articles citing state officials. Although most cases were identified based on at least one reliable source, this review is plagued by an important problem, that of the low quantity and quality of information available on all but the few well-studied cases. 18 cases were documented based on one source only, 14 could be described only in the sketchiest terms and several contradictory information had to be reconciled. It should also be noted that most of the quantitative information obtained (size of population displaced, amount of compensation, etc.) was compiled by government officials and not by independent researchers. The approximate location of each case was determined using the best information available (often the location of province, district and sub-district combined with that of the national forest reserve or protected area involved). Due to the imprecision of some of the location information available and the existence of multi-village cases, one should assume that the displaced population resided within a 30 km radius of each point in the GIS database. Given the lack of detailed information mentioned above, this review does not claim to have documented all CID cases. Indeed, I was unable to document forest villages created by Isan Khieo project. According to official documents, 46 forest villages were created under Isan Khieo (Pye, 2005b). Pye (2009, pers. comm.) however doubts that the military were able to accomplish such a large resettlement task. This caveat was taken into account by the author in the presentation and analysis of the data and should in no way diminish the validity of this review’s key findings.

3.2) Types of displacement projects and means of enforcement

There is a great variety of conditions under which CID in Thailand occurred. In some cases (e.g. cases 12, 28, 48, and 52), people were simply evicted or repatriated to neighbouring countries, without, apparently, any form of compensation.

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11 For example, Veerawat Theeraprasart (former superintendent of neighbouring Thung Yai Naenessuan Wildlife Sanctuary and later activist in the NGO Project for Ecological Recovery) reportedly said that about 10 villages of ethnic minorities (including Karen) have been moved out by the buffer zone policy of Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuary (Anon, 1994e). This case could not be confirmed by other source despite the high-profile nature of the area and project and the existence of relatively abundant literature in the area. In fact, it appears the buffer zone relocation plan has still not been into effect in 2003 (Sato, 1998; Anon, 2003). A list of non-included potential cases can be provided upon request.

12 These are large cases involving the displacement of several villages often located many kilometers apart. Each multi-villages case was mapped into a single location.
in cash or in kind. Several small-scale projects only allocated, sometimes informally, a small housing plot for the displaced population (cases 9, 34, 35, 38-41, 44, 47, 54 and 56). \(^{13}\) Large projects however typically involved the provision of agricultural land to at least part of the displaced population (cases 1-7, 11/18, 13/27, 29 and 32), although the allocation process could be plagued by controversy and corruption (Pye, 2005b). Projects such as those emanating from the Khor Jor Kor program and others excluded some or all of the displaced population from land allocation schemes based on their citizenship status, attitude towards authority, means of livelihood, official housing registration location, date at which they arrived in the legal forest land or relationships with officials in charge of the project (cases 1-4, 11, 12, 13/27, 19-26, 48). When agricultural land was provided, the quantity of land available varied from a reported low of 1.5 rai per household (case 35) to 15 or even a reported 20 rai per household in the Phop Phra self-help relocation scheme, Tak province (cases 5, 6, 18). There has been little serious work on the mid to long-term social impacts of resettlement schemes. Information available strongly suggest that when land was allocated to displaced persons, the capacity of farmers to make a decent living out of agriculture in their new surroundings could be limited significantly by a lack of land, poor soil quality, scarcity or unreliability of water sources and a lack of well-managed infrastructures (17th Field Artillery Battalion, nd; Intaramanon, nd-a; Intaramanon, nd-b; Intaramanon, nd-c; Intaramanon, pers. comm. October 27, 2008; Kesmanee, 1989; Kesmanee, 1995; Panyacheewin, 1990). \(^{14}\) The result has been an increased reliance on off-farm sources of revenues, both legal (wage labourer in agriculture, construction, reforestation project, etc.) and illegal ones (prostitution, drug trafficking, illegal logging) as well as other social problems (Anon, 1994b; Panyacheewin, 1990; see case 29 for a case in point). Authorities have at times informally authorised displaced populations to continue to use their former land, at least temporarily (cases 5, 29, 41, 42 and 44). In case 50, the decision by the Thaksin government to accommodate previously displaced persons was met by strong opposition by local forest authority officers, who acted in defiance of the cabinet resolution. \(^{15}\) In other instances, the displaced population disobeyed authorities and returned to their former area (e.g. cases 19, 43 and 46, and some villages involved in the Khor Jor Kor program). This was followed by their prompt re-eviction from the area, or at least the preparation of plans to do so.

At least one implementing agency could be identified in 49 of the 60 documented cases. The most important agencies were forest authorities and military forces as they participated respectively in 76% and 58% of the cases (Table 2). They are followed in importance by local authorities (18%) and paramilitary forces (Border Patrol Police and Thahan Phran, 16%). Military and paramilitary forces were much less involved in displacement projects in the second half of the study period than in the first. Displacement projects in the 1980s and early 1990s were often designed or approved by the National Security Council or the head of the respective regional Army and then authorized by cabinet resolution. In some rare instances, the project originated from local officials (case 35).

To convince people to move, authorities relied on the carrot and stick approach. Techniques were at time devised and implemented by military units specialized in psychological warfare (case 11, see also Khor Jor Kor cases). In regards to the carrot, people were promised abundant good-quality land, tenure security, transport and irrigation infrastructures, educa-

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\(^{13}\) For several cases, I was unable to determine if agricultural land was provided or not.

\(^{14}\) These problems are reminiscent of those found in other SLD projects in Thailand (see Chuntanaparb and Wood, 1986; Haefner and Apichatvullop, 1990; Thapa and Weber, 1988a; Thapa and Weber, 1988b).

\(^{15}\) A similar situation occurred in 2002 when local officers contravened a Thaksin cabinet resolution and displaced through violent means villagers occupying parcels of land privately held, but located in a national forest reserve (Anon, 2002; Sakboon, 2002a).

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Table 2. Rate of participation of various state agencies in the implementation of CID cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases where implementing agency is known</th>
<th>Rate of participation (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forest Dept²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995¹</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The column lists the number of cases where at least one implementing agency could be identified. 2. Forest Department (or forest authorities) refers to officials and employees of the RFD or DNP based in national, regional, provincial, district or local (e.g. national forest reserves, national parks) offices. 3 Local authorities refer to district-level officials, as well as village and subdistrict chiefs. 4. It was assumed that the forest authorities and the military participated in all cases linked to the Khor Jor Kor project.

Sources: Annex

Tableau and health services. In some instances, financial compensation was paid, but the amounts were insignificant (1,400, 3,000 and 7,400 baht¹⁶ per household in case 58, 13/27 and 29 respectively) or very modest (50,000 baht per household in case 50). These sums were therefore unlikely to fully compensate for the loss of livelihood. Diverse techniques of persuasion and coercion were used. Authorities stressed the need for villagers to be good subjects and to accept sacrifices for the good of the nation. At times, they emphasized the support the displacement project was enjoying from members of the Palace.¹⁷ When resistance was met, as was often the case, alternate strategies were adapted. Officials publicly shamed resisting households as being egoistic. They intimidated villagers by stationing heavily armed troops within or close to the village, abusing them verbally or threatening them with arrest, physical violence and evacuation without compensation if all did not agree to move ‘voluntarily’. Divide and rule tactics were also used by giving or promising important financial benefits to some local leaders or by spreading false and contradictory information. If that was not successful, direct and even violent actions were used such as blocking roads, mass arrests, beating and other forms of physical violence (which in case # 28 resulted to some villagers losing consciousness) and the destruction of property. These actions were perpetrated by state officials, police officers, military or paramilitary troops or by members of other factions in the village. Violent operations were frequent in the first decade of study, but appear less frequent thereafter (but see cases 44, 46, 55, 59). In general, displacement projects offered no room for negotiation, let alone the participation of the population in the choice of relocation area; at most relatively minor accommodations could be given in the form of the temporary authorization of cultivating land as discussed previously, or the inclusion of

¹⁶ Up until the devaluation of the bath in 1997, 1US$ = 25 baht.

¹⁷ This is a controversial act and was part of the justification for the transfer of Plodprasop Surawasdi as head of the RFD in 2002 (Samabuddhi, 2002).

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a larger population in the resettlement schemes (cases 13/27, 39). However, it appears that since the late 1990s some communities have been able to enter into negotiation with authorities, obtaining small parcels of land for cultivation or financial compensation (e.g. cases 49-50).

There is little information available on projected, let alone actual, cost of CID projects. Data collected show an enormous variation. Some projects were reportedly very cheap, notably case 35 which did not require a special budget. Others on the other hand had a cost estimated at over a million baht per household (Table 3). In most instances authorities estimated the cost of displacement between 50,000 and 170,000 baht per household displaced, or 2,000 to 6,800 dollars. These reported costs are considerably lower than what is observed in dam projects, particularly since the mid 1990s (see below).

3.3) Geographical distribution

The geographical distribution of cases is presented in Table 4 and Figure 2. Approximately 60% of cases occurred in the Northern region, 29% in the Northeast, 10% in the Central region and 2% in the South. In the 53 cases for which the size of the population displaced could be determined or estimated, a total of 51,634 persons were displaced. Of these, the largest share, 46% (23,915 people), resided in Northern Thailand, a third in the Northeast, 21% in the Central region and 0.2% in the South. Figure 2 further illustrates the unequal distribution of CID. While some areas are devoid of CID cases, most notably in the South below latitude 10.9° N, others offer a high concentration of cases and people displaced. The most noticeable ‘hot spots’ of CID are located along the Burmese border, in the lower half of Tak province (Western Forest Complex, former communist stronghold) and in upper Chiang Rai province (former stronghold of the CPT and of drug lord Khun Sa).

A further analysis of the location of cases using elevation, national boundaries, national forest reserves and protected areas revealed the following. CID cases are located at elevations ranging from less than 150 m to more than 2000 m asl, with an average elevation around 600 m. CID cases are mostly located in upland areas (Figure 3 in Annex), as is expected given the geographical distribution of forests and conservation areas. In general, CID cases are located relatively close to national boundaries (mean distance of 52 km). Twenty-four cases (41%) are located at less than 25 km from the border and thirty-five (58%) at less than 50 km. They led respectively to the displacement of 5,862 and 22,906 people, or 11% and 44% of all displaced persons. Upland ethnic minority people represent 73% and 81% of those displaced from sites located respectively less than 25 and 50 km from the border. Also, as expected the vast majority of cases occurred in protected areas (41 cases) and national forest reserves (53 cases). Overall, 44,171 people (86%) and 48,962 persons (95% of total) were respectively displaced from protected areas and national forest reserves. In both cases, upland ethnic minorities represent a little less than half the displaced population (48% in protected areas, 43% in national forest reserves). If one considers cases solely in national forest reserves (not overlapping protected areas), the proportion of upland ethnic minorities drops only to 26% (19 percentage points below their national average representation in CID).

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18 Author’s calculation produced by overlaying ESRI elevation data with the approximate location of CID cases.
19 Four cases without an estimate of the displaced population were located at less than 25 and 50 km.
20 Limits of protected areas are from a 2006 GIS database of the DNP. It includes both demarcated and planned protected areas. The size of the population displaced is known for 39 of the 41 cases. Protected areas are typically established on land already demarcated as national forest reserve. As a result, 35 cases occurred in both category.
21 National forest reserve areas from a 2004 GIS database of the DNP. The size of the population displaced is known for 47 of the 52 cases.
**Table 3. Budget and compensation offered in selected proposed or realized CID projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CID projects</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(rai/hh)</td>
<td>(baht /hh)</td>
<td>(million baht)</td>
<td>(baht/ hh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>144,330</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chom Thong</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 11/18</td>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 13/27</td>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>7 to 15</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>108,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>71,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,204,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thung Salaeng Luang</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Yai &amp; Thap Lan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai Kha Khaeng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>506</td>
<td>1,261,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khlong Wang Chao</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>approx 10</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>76,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Population displacement and forest management in Thailand
Figure 2. Distribution of CID cases from 1986 to 2005

Notes: The map indicates the location of the original site of residence of displaced persons.
Sources: Annex.
Table 4. CID cases and population displaced by administrative region and main ethnic groups, 1986-2005

| Regions     | CID cases | Population displaced
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Share within country (%)</th>
<th>Size of population (persons)</th>
<th>Share within region (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowlanders2</td>
<td>Share within region (%)</td>
<td>Upland ethnic minorities</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. 1 When the number of households displaced was known but not the total population, I conservatively assumed an average of 4 persons per household. In six cases, an estimate of the population displaced could not be produced. Three cases occurred in the Northern region (all affected are upland ethnic minorities) and three in the Northeast (all non-upland ethnic minorities).
2. All non-upland ethnic minorities people are considered lowlanders.
3. Resettlements which took place as part of the Khor Jor Kor project are treated as different cases.
4. Total greater than 100% as one case involved both lowlanders and upland ethnic minorities people.

3.4) Population affected

As discussed previously, the literature on forest politics and CID focus on the plight of upland ethnic minorities, who are believed to be subject to unfair and disproportionate actions from forest authorities. The results of this review provide considerable support to this idea. I calculated the number of people of different ethnic origin at risk of relocation and their proportion effectively displaced (Table 5). The size of the population at risk of relocation is not known with exactitude.Reportedly, it evolved in opposite direction for lowlanders and upland ethnic minorities. While the former is believed to have decreased from 10-12 million in the 1980s-1990s to 1 million in 2002, the latter increased from 457,000 in 1985 to 915,000 people in 2002 (Anon, 1989b; Buergin, 2000; ICEM, 2003, p. 59 and 113; Toyota, 2005). The number of lowland forest occupants was the result of a phenomenal growth in land allocation by projects such as the Sor Tor Kor of the Royal Forest Department, which was transferred to the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) in the early 1990s, and the Agricultural Land Reform Program of the same organisation and which received unprecedented governmental support during the 1990s and 2000s (see Table 1; ALRO et al., 2006; Chirapanda, 2000; Kurashima and Jamroenprucksa, 2005; Nalamotoon, 2003). As a result, 6.5 million ha of national forest reserves, or 12.5% of the national area, was transferred from the RFD to ALRO in the early 1990s, a move which was resisted by forest authorities.

22 Author’s calculation based on the assumption that all upland ethnic minorities are at risk of relocation.
Table 5. CID and ethnicity: population at risk and proportion displaced, 1986-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Population at risk of CID c. 1995†</th>
<th>Population subject to CID (1986-05)</th>
<th>Proportion subject to CID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons (A) % of total</td>
<td>Persons (B) % of total</td>
<td>‰ (B/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upland ethnic</td>
<td>793,185 7.2</td>
<td>23,314 45.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>402,095 3.7</td>
<td>1,279 2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hmong</td>
<td>126,147 1.1</td>
<td>9,327 18.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 2</td>
<td>264,943 2.4</td>
<td>12,708 24.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowlanders</td>
<td>10,206,815 92.8</td>
<td>28,320 54.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,000,000 100.0</td>
<td>51,634 100.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Upland ethnic minority population (1996) from Kampe (1997). Total population at risk represents total number of residents in national forest reserves and protected areas in the 1990s. Estimate of total number of illegal encroachers is from ICEM (2003) and is said to be valid “throughout the 1990s”. The entire upland ethnic minority population of Thailand is presumed at risk of CID. The remaining non-upland ethnic minority population at risk of CID is grouped in the category lowlanders.

2. Other upland ethnic minorities include Lahu, Lisu, Yao, Akha, Lua, H’tin, Khamu and Mlabri, (FAO, 2000). Thaksin Shinawatra’s Assets conversion scheme also contributed to the reduction of the number of occupants as it facilitated the emission of land titles in non-demarcated legal forest areas (ALRO et al., 2006; Hutashing, 2005; Kasem, 2004; Laohong, 2009; Nabangchang-Srisawalak, 2006). Given this marked reduction, I use the number of occupants of legal forests at mid-point in the period of study as an estimate of the population at risk of displacement throughout the period. The results strongly suggest lowlanders and upland ethnic minorities have not been treated equally. While upland ethnic minorities represent approximately 7% of the population at risk of relocation, their share of all displaced people amount to 45% (Table 5). In fact, while 4.7 per thousand (‰) of all occupants were displaced by conservation during the period of study, this proportion was 29‰ for upland ethnic minorities (6 times higher) but 0.27‰ for lowlanders (1.7 times lower). A closer look reveals great inequality between upland ethnic minorities. The most important group, the Karen, was apparently only marginally more at risk of relocation than lowlanders (3.2‰ vs 2.8‰ displaced). On the other hand, 75‰ of Hmong people at risk of relocation were effectively displaced, that is 27 times the proportion of lowlanders. Other upland ethnic minority groups, which include Lahu, Lisu, Akha and others, also appear much more subject to CID than Karen. The reasons for such unequal treatment are further explored in Section 4.2. Although calculations could not be done with the many groups classified as lowlanders, it appears substantial inequality also exists within this category. Inhabitants of the lowlands in the South (Khon Tai), Centre (Siamese) and North (Khon Muang) have scarcely been subject to CID, while the opposite is true for Isan people, the main lowland group in the Northeast. In fact, only 1,396 people or 6% of the people subject to CID in the North were not upland ethnic minorities and are thus presumed to be Khon Muang. Also, in the sole case involving lowlanders and located in the Central region, case 13/27, a substantial proportion of the displaced population was composed of migrants from the Northeast.

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23 In fact, the area transferred to ALRO was initially greater, at 7.08 million ha. For a review of the process and political power play leading to the transfer, see FAO (2000) and Kurashima and Jamroenprucksa (2005).
3.5) Evolution of CID from 1985 to 2005

CID projects are also unequally distributed across time. Both the number of cases, size of the population displaced and the mean size of cases (people per case) show a clear declining trend (Table 6, Figure 2). While 4,000 or 5,000 people were annually displaced by conservation during the 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 periods, their number declined to 1,619 and further to 240 persons per year during the following two periods (1996-2000 and 2001-2005). It is noteworthy that the decline would have been more important during the third period had it not been for three important cases of land occupation of state forest land which represents the bulk of the population displaced during the period. These cases all occurred in the Northeast between 1998 and 2000 (cases 39, 48 and 50). Farmers were displaced in the 1970s or early 1980s from the area but had not received promised compensation. With the increased hardship caused by the 1997 financial crisis and in the atmosphere of civic activism which prevailed, a strategy of land occupation inspired by the Brazilian Landless Worker’s Movement was used to attract attention from the media and state authorities. The goal was thus not so much to claim back a particular piece of land, but rather to force state authorities to settle long-standing injustice (Phatharathananunth, 2006).

I calculated for each time period and ethnic group the proportion of the population at risk effectively displaced by CID projects. Results reported in Table 7 strongly suggest the risk of displacement decreased for all groups. The decline is particularly striking for Hmong.

3.6) Non-environmental motivations for CID

All cases included in this review were motivated or at least justified by forest conservation or reforestation objectives. To fully understand the nature and changes to CID projects in Thailand, it is crucial to note that other motives were also at play, or at the very least that non-environmental justifications were also used. These pertained to the defence and pursuit of the political, financial and official interests of the various agencies and actors involved. First, as mentioned previously, population displacement projects represented for the RFD the surest method to counter moves made by other state agencies and politicians. The latter repeatedly and at times successfully campaigned to have major illegally occupied areas degazetted and transferred to other state agencies, notably the Agricultural Land Reform Office. Potential implications of this transfer include budget and personnel attrition in the RFD, decreasing chance of resuming forest exploitation – a wish many in the RFD still harbour - and an upsurge in deforestation and agricultural expansion. Many foresters indeed consider that such ‘soft’ governmental measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Population displaced (persons)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Estimate of displaced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>population available (A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>per case (B/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51,634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. See notes in Table 3; 2. Data includes 3 cases of land occupation. Without them, the number of CID cases drops to 15 and the number of people displaced to 2,982 or 229 per year.
Sources: Annex

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towards squatters lead farmers and influential figures to believe that further encroachment will eventually be legalised (Pye 2005; Nalampoon, 2003; Vandergeest, 1996a).

Furthermore, CID projects represented for the RFD and forest entrepreneurs a great opportunity to renew the dynamism of the Thai forest sector through the development of a strong pulp and paper sector. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the logging industry was experiencing serious problems of low easily accessible harvestable forest stocks and a lack of tree plantations (Rigg and Stott, 1998; Srikosamatara and Brockelman, 2002). For many, a strong pulp and paper sector and the vast fast-growth tree plantations it requires was an ideal solution as it could kill two birds with one stone: assuring the future of the RFD and its revenues and financing costly CID projects. Similarly, pecuniary motivations are presumed to have played a key role in the decision by the military to propose and strongly defend large-scale CID-cum-pulp-and-paper projects such as the Green Isan and Khor Jor Kor (Barney, 2001; Lohmann, 1991; Phongpaichit, 1995; Puntasen et al., 1992; Pye, 2005c; Rigg and Stott, 1998). Several CID cases identified were thus a direct result of the efforts to clear the land of resisting villagers and allow the allocation or renting of national forest reserve land for fast-growth tree plantations (cases 7-8, 19-26, and probably 13/27).

The interest of military forces in CID was not solely financial. First, in the 1980s, many scholars and journalists forwarded the idea that the involvement of the military in development work, environmental affairs, and CID, derived from a concerted strategy to defend their political and budgetary importance in a context where many civilians used the decline of the communist threat to call for military budget cuts and the end of military interventions in politics (Bunbongkarn, 1996; Samudhavanij, 1989). They also pointed out that the Isan Khieo program partially aimed at facilitating the rise of Army Commander in Chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to premiership (Bunbongkarn, 1996; Ekasingh et al., 2007; Xiao-hui, 1990). In emphasising political or budgetary motivations, these authors in effect downplay the role of another motivation explicitly given by military authorities, namely that these CID projects were part of a military strategy to defend the country and the monarchy against national security threats. The latter include not only military aggressions from domestic or external armed groups (e.g. the Vietnamese Armed Forces in Cambodia), but also flows of illegal immigrants and refugees as well as the production and traffic of drugs. It is true that the military have tended to exaggerate or extend beyond recognition their definition of a security

---

Table 7. CID and ethnicity: evolution of the proportion of the population at risk effectively displaced by CID projects, 1985-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upland ethnic minorities</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hmong</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowlanders</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sources: Annex and (Buergin, 2000; ICEM, 2003; Kampe, 1997; Maneesai, 2004; Toyota, 2005),
Table 8. National security as a justification for CID, by population groups and time periods, 1986-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total population (persons)</th>
<th>Population displacements linked to national security matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All people (persons)</td>
<td>All groups (persons) (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>19,779</td>
<td>17,951 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995i</td>
<td>22,417</td>
<td>16,358 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>8,094</td>
<td>355   4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>500   42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51,474</td>
<td>35,164 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annex

In this sense, security matters could have been used discursively to justify CID projects, but were not part of the military’s underlying motivations. However, I would argue that the apparent demise of the CPT was not interpreted by military authorities as the end of all security threats, but rather as an opportunity to intensify operations aimed at securing border areas and controlling dangerous subjects such as communist sympathizers, upland ethnic minorities, illegal immigrants, and drug producers and traffickers. Although it is impossible to conclusively settle this debate, it is noteworthy that links between security questions and CID were not only explicit in several instances, notably the Phop Phra Self-Help Resettlement scheme (cases 11/18)25, the Green Isan and Khor Jor Kor programs (Pye 2005b, Xiao-hui, 1990), but they were was also stated in the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991) which emphasised the need to develop security sensitive areas notably through the establishment of self-defence settlement (NESDB, 1987, p. 362-363). As such, and in accordance with Michaud (1994), I would argue that environmental concerns were used discursively by the military to facilitate traditional security operations such as the relocation of upland ethnic minority people in easily-controllable settlements comprising or located near an important population of loyal subjects, in particular former anti-communist peasant-soldiers. This strategy was in direct line with the strategic development approach used during the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Section 2).26 According to my calculations, about 68% of all people affected by CID were displaced by projects linked in one way or another to national security questions such as the threats from communism, non-assimilated upland ethnic minorities, foreign (Vietnamese) invasion, illegal immigration or drug production and trafficking (Table 8). The proportion is similar between hill

24 For example, deforestation has been defined as a menace to national security.

25 According to an anonymous senior officer, this project was part of a “security strategy to establish defense communities in sensitive border areas throughout the country” (Anon, 1987).

26 Phongpaichit (1995) and Phongpaichit et al. (1996) suggest the military held another political objective linked to the communist threat in pursuing population displacement projects; that of ‘cleaning up’ the mess they produced in their counter-insurgency operations. As mentioned in Section 2, military forces formally and informally encouraged encroachment of legal forest land by loyal peasant-soldiers in hope of encircling communist strongholds.
tribes (66%) and lowlanders (70%). For both groups, the proportion of displacements linked to national security was particularly important in the first period when it could be linked to, respectively, 97% and 91% of the displacements. In the second and third periods, the relative importance of national security declined for upland ethnic minority groups, but then regained importance between 2001 and 2005. On the other hand, for lowlanders national security remained an important cause of CID in the second period but then disappeared altogether.

4) Discussion and Conclusion

This review outlines several important points which deserve further attention. They pertain to the characteristics of CID projects, their unequal social and geographic distribution and finally their evolution through time.

4.1) Characteristics of CID and non-CID projects

Conservation-induced displacement projects as defined in this paper were implemented in Thailand since at least the 1960s. Compared with other types of state-led displacement projects, they directly affected a rather more modest population, perhaps one fifth of the total displaced population (Table 1 and 4). Moreover, it appears forest management objectives played, overall and historically, a limited role in state-led displacements given the fact that national security and economic objectives played an important, if not necessary, part in the decision to finance and implement most of the pre-1986 CID cases and a substantial proportion of post-1986 cases. A second point worth noting is the fact that CID projects have generally occurred under harsh conditions: non-respect of human rights or the constitution, use of force and threats, lack of adequate livelihood alternatives after the displacement, financial compensation either absent or insufficient to compensate for livelihood loss. A similar situation can be found in many pre-1986 SLD cases managed primarily for national security. However, development-induced displacement projects which occurred in the 1990s and 2000s have been considerably more attractive in a financial sense to the displaced population than CID projects. For example, illegal occupants received in the Pasak Cholasit Dam Royal Project 50,000 baht per rai – *not per household* - plus specific compensation for their house and trees planted (Anon, 1996d). The compensation rates in dam projects have indeed become so important that these projects are now plagued by sudden surge in the number of affected persons and major insider dealing schemes in which state officials and local and national influential persons use privileged information to acquire land at low cost and from unsuspecting villagers, which would need to be expropriated (Anon, 1994a; Inchukul and Hutashining, 1998; Samabuddhi, 2005; Singha, 2003). A striking contrast thus emerges between conservation and dam projects: while conservation-related displacement and land confiscation projects rarely affect rich or influential persons, a fact also noted by other observers (e.g. Ekachai, 2000; Trébuil, 1995), comparatively wealthy individuals seem to be disproportionally affected by dam construction (Pers. obs. in Phetchabun province, 2007 & 2008; Singha, 2003; Anon, 1994a).

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27 In 2000, Plodprasop Surawasdi, then head of the RFD, justified his leniency towards three resorts illegally established in a national park by the fact that the resort owners had invested several million dollars in their projects and could further lose important sums if their contracts with tour operators were not respected. On the other hands, he said, villagers only resided in shacks and could without much problem be displaced and their property destroyed (Ekachai, 2000; Noikorn, 2000a). Another revealing case has loomed large in Thai politics since late 2006. It was revealed that General and Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont, at the time Prime Minister of the coup-installed government, had illegally acquired a parcel of land in Khao Yai Thiang National Forest Reserve. Despite three years of study and procedure, the case has not yet been settled. It appears however that the General will not be subject to criminal prosecution but will have to cede the property of the plot to the RFD. This and another similar case in Chanthanaburi province are highly politicized and are used by the opposition as proof of ‘double standards’ in the treatment of forest.
4.2) Explaining the unequal distribution of CID

Conservation-induced displacement has been highly unequally distributed across the country and between social groups. Clearly, the difference has been too consistent to be an accident and should thus be seen as part of the Thai state’s de facto forest policy. How might such an implicit policy be best explained? The idea that the distribution of CID reflects variations in the number of illegal occupants must be rejected. This was previously demonstrated in regards to upland ethnic minorities (see Table 5 and 7) and is also irrelevant to explain the quasi absence of CID cases in the South. As shown in Table 9, occupants are present in national forest reserves all over the country. The RFD further estimated in the late 1990s that 21,181 persons illegally resided in wildlife sanctuaries in the South. This represents 27% of the national total (Sato, 2003). Clearly, other factors have played in favour of Southerners and Karen and against non-Karen upland ethnic minorities and other groups.

Part of the explanation can be found in an analysis of the geographical peculiarities of the motives and constraints faced by the promoters and enforcers of CID projects. It is thus striking that areas and populations disproportionately affected by CID projects have also been areas and populations of high political interest in regards to one or several of three key political objectives of CID: environmental protection, assuring the security of the state, and reaping profits and revenues from reforestation or conservation.

In regards to the first objective, important concentrations of CID were found in upper-watersheds, at mid to high elevation. According to the predominant view in Thailand, a vision largely shared among academics, environmentalists, politicians and members of the Palace, the lack of forests in upper-watersheds leads almost directly to major disruptions in the hydrologic and climatic conditions on which lowland areas’ economic well-being depends (Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Petchprayoon, 2008; Sidle et al., 2006; Tangprayoon, 1998; Thanapakpawin et al., 2007). High elevation areas have thus become a primary focus of environmental activism and forest authorities’ interventions. This predominant interest for upland forest was translated in formal (overt) forest policies through for example the delimitation in 1985 of watershed classes which was thereafter used in the decision process leading to the gazetting of new protected areas or the resolution of land encroachment conflicts (Anon, 1995a; Kurashima and Jamroenprucks, 2005; Midas Agronomics Company, 1991; Vandergeest, 1996a; Vandergeest, 2003). The emphasis on upper-watersheds can also be seen in the decision in 1989 of a committee formed by the military, the police and officials of the Department of Local Administration and the RFD according to which most of the 240,000 upland ethnic minorities of the North would be relocated out of upper-watershed areas, but lowland occupants would either be resettled in forest villages or be allowed to stay in their location (Anon, 1989d). The focus on upper-watersheds affects the social composition and location of CID in two ways. First, upland ethnic minorities are concentrated in upper-watersheds and have only recently begun to buy land in the lowlands. Secondly, mountain ranges are located mostly in the North and along the western border with Burma, where they form the upper-watershed of the Chao Phraya basin. They are however mostly absent from the South (Figure 3 in Annex). While droughts and flooding in monsoonal Thailand, in particular in the Chao Phraya Basin, have become major political issues (Handley, 2006; Rigg, 1995), they are less politically important in the South given its geographical differences: small river basins, smaller and fewer mountain ranges, and, when present, a much shorter dry season.

law infringement (Post Reporters, 2010a and b; The Nation, 2010). See also footnotes 35 and 39.
Another factor playing in favour of Southerners and against other lowlanders and upland ethnic minorities is the perception by authorities and influential academics and activists of the environmental impacts of their respective agricultural practices. While permanent rubber and fruit trees plantations in the South maintain tree cover and are generally perceived as performing the hydrological functions of forests, the cultivation of annuals in other regions, which is often done under shifting cultivation systems or with the help of chemical inputs, are generally perceived as major sources of deforestation, water pollution and other forms of environmental degradation (Delang, 2002; Forsyth and Walker, 2008; McKinnon, 1989; Pungprasert, 1989). This negative environmental perception is particularly acute for upland ethnic minorities in general, which have been repeatedly blamed for deforestation, this despite contrary available evidence (Delang, 2002; Delang, 2005; Pungprasert, 1989). As further discussed below, the fact that some upland ethnic minority groups, notably Karen, are associated with rotational shifting cultivation, a form of agriculture increasingly perceived as environmentally sustainable, helps explain why they have not been targeted to the same level as other upland ethnic minority groups.

The second motive behind CID projects was to assure the control of subjects deemed dangerous or of dubious loyalty to the state: communist insurgents and sympathizers, illegal immigrants, drug producers and traffickers, upland ethnic minorities in general. Individuals or groups perceived as dangerous are not uniformly distributed across the country or ethnic groups. They are mostly located in remote mountainous regions of the country, close to the borders and near former communist strongholds, of which the most important ones were in the North and Northeast. It is thus not surprising that CID “hot spots” are located in areas formerly controlled by communist insurgents (compare Figure 1 and Annex Figure 3) and drug gangs (e.g. northwest of Chiang Rai province), or in areas suspected to count a high number of illegal immigrants. At the same time, the over-representation of upland ethnic minorities in the displaced population could be caused by the fact that they are perceived as more likely to be engaged in seditious and otherwise dangerous activities. This perception, which hopefully is fading away, derives from many factors. First, it was believed their physical isolation and resistance to assimilation made them more exposed and receptive to communist propaganda. This, coupled with the counterproductive bombing of villages by Thai military, sent an important proportion of upland ethnic minorities, notably Hmong, into the woods and among the communists (Mottin, 1980, p. 59; Thaxton, 1974; Leblond, Jean-Philippe PhD Candidate - Université de Montréal

Table 9. Regional distribution of illegal villages located in national forest reserves and regional distribution of CID cases and population displaced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Illegal villages in national forest reserves c 1989</th>
<th>CID cases</th>
<th>Population displaced by CID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of villages</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>5,164</td>
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<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>4,857</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,903</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Anon, 1989b) and Table 2.

28 It should however be noted that the Communist Party of Thailand was active in mountain areas of the South, as was the Malaya Communist Party in the border region with Malaysia (Figure 1), a factor which, presumably, should have favoured the existence of post-1985 CID projects in the region. Given the distribution of forest villages managed by security forces and established by 1986, it nevertheless appear that authorities perceived the security threat in the South as less important.
Second, opium cultivation, outlawed since the 1950s, was mostly practiced by Hmong, Akha and other highland upland ethnic minority groups. Finally, the wars in Indochina and Burma sent a high numbers of refugees into Thailand, many of which were of upland ethnic minority origin. They were seen as particularly problematic due to the difficulty in identifying and sending them into refugee camps.

The third motive underlying the demand for CID projects was to assure the development of fast-growth tree plantations for the production and export of pulp and paper. For reasons outside the scope of this paper, authorities concentrated their efforts on dry “degraded” forest reserves in the southeastern portion of the Central region (where case 13/27 is located) and in the Northeast. Again, the South was not the primary focus as none of the five production centres to be established were located south of 13 degrees north (Puntasen et al., 1992; TDRI, 1989). Overall, thus, it appears the unequal distribution of CID and unequal risk of displacement derive in part from the peculiar geography of the motives for CID projects.

Equally important is the question of the geography of political influence and constraints. Several factors must be emphasized. First, during the period of study, the democratic governments which were most active in authorizing and implementing CID projects were those of Prem Tinsulanonda, a non-elected prime minister (1980-1988) and Chuan Leekpai (Democrat Party, 1992-1995; 1997-2001). Prem and Chuan are Southerners with deep political affiliations in the region and were called the first and second prime ministers of the South (McCargo, 2005 and 2006). Also, both governments were formed primarily or to a substantial degree by the Democrat Party, which main power base is the South and is rather less popular in the North and Northeast (Askew, 2008). For these governments, the negative political impacts of implementing CID projects could – presumably - have been perceived as less important if the projects did not affect their electoral base. In contrast, Chiang Mai born Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister from 2001 to 2006, adopted a different approach. As will be seen below, during his premiership far fewer CID projects were authorized and implemented. Contrary to the Democrat Party, his electoral base was found among rural folks and migrants from the North and Northeast, precisely those whose livelihood – or that of members of their families and friends – was affected by land insecurity and the threat of CID.30

Let us now turn to the contrasting situation of Karen and non-Karen upland ethnic minorities. In this respect, several political factors must be discussed. First, it was estimated during the 1980s and 1990s that between 40 and 60% of upland ethnic minorities with a legitimate claim to citizenship were denied the precious status (Bhrukasari, 1989; Johnson and Forsyth, 2002; Michaud, 1994; Rerkasem and Rerkasem, 1994; Toyota, 2005; Vaddhanaphuti and Aquino, 2000). Without citizenship, uplanders are continuously suspected of being illegal immigrants and can be subject to repatriation without notice. They are further devoid of the limited basic rights and freedoms accorded by the various constitutions31, including the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or land confiscation, the right to vote and the freedom to travel outside their district. This severely limits their economic

30 In the absence of direct evidence on the inner working of these governments, the preceding argumentation is speculative. The link between electoral politics and forest policy in Thailand is nevertheless a subject worth exploring. In other contexts, notably in late 19th century France, the need to secure rural votes was associated with substantial changes in formal and informal forest policy away from forceful expropriations and displacements (Larrère et al., 1980; Whited, 2000).
31 On the peculiarities of Thai constitutions and recent court decisions limiting the scope of the rights and freedoms they grant, see for example (AHRC, 2006; Lawyers Council of Thailand & Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2007; McDorman, 1993).

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29 It was estimated that 90% of the Hmong of Phetchabun and Tak provinces as well as 70% of those of Nan and Chiang Rai fled to the forest, while most of those in Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son did not (Mottin, 1980, p. 59).
well-being, their direct political influence and their capacity to make their situation known to the larger public, as this often requires the staging of demonstrations in large cities (McDorman, 1993; Toyota, 2005; Vaddhanaphuti and Aquino, 2000; Vandergeest, 2003). Moreover, Thai citizenship is often a prerequisite of land allocation projects (Chirapanda, 2000; Pye, 2005b). As discussed below, these projects have played a great role in reducing the number of lowlanders at risk of displacement. The proportion of upland ethnic minority groups with Thai citizenship varies both between provinces and ethnic groups. In provinces such as Chiang Rai where the fear of illegal immigration is high, authorities have been slower and more reluctant to process citizenship demands (Fujioka, 2002; Kesmanee, 1994). As seen in Figure 2 and in Annex, this is one area where CID projects have been particularly frequent and often involved forceful repatriation. It appears that success in obtaining citizenship has been unequal with Karen having greater luck than other groups (Maniratanavongsiri, 1999, p. 34-35). According to Tapp (1986, p. 54) “Hmong in particular find it hard to get rights of citizenship since it tends to be assumed that they are all recent immigrants, despite contrary historical evidence.” Johnson and Forsyth (2002, p. 1600) moreover state that: “evidence from Northern Thailand shows that established groups (like the Karen) were far better able to claim and negotiate community status than were traditionally migratory groups, such as the Hmong and Akha, whose lack of citizenship has quite visibly undermined their ability to negotiate with government.” In 2002, after important efforts have been made to regularise the situation of highlanders, 85% and 84% of Karen and Hmong had Thai citizenship, but the proportion was only of 43% and 58% for Akha and Lahu people respectively (2002 data of the Department of Social Development and Welfare Security).

A second political factor to take into account is the fact that upland ethnic minorities in general commend much less sympathy from their ethnic Thai neighbours and lowlanders have trouble thinking of them as equal fellow citizens (Gillooly, 2004). As seen previously, they were and continue to be largely perceived as environmental destroyers lacking loyalty to the Thai state and in general fundamentally different from their ethnic Thai counterpart (Bhrusasri, 1989; McKinnon, 1989; Pungprasert, 1989; Vandergeest, 2003). For this reason, there is little risk the government will lose political capital by implementing CID against such an unpopular group. This lack of sympathy is however less of a problem for some ethnic groups and communities. Differences in the perception by the public of the environmental and agricultural practices of the diverse upland ethnic minorities groups could help explain this inequality. Indeed, Karen have come to be defended vigorously by a vocal and energetic network of NGO activists, academics and even state officials who stress their environmentally benign traditional practices and low-level of commercial engagement (Anon, 1992; Anon, 1994d; Anon, 1996e; Dearden, 1995; Fahn, 1994; Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Kunstadter et al., 1978; Laungaramsri, 1999; Laungaramsri, 2002; Rerkasem and Rerkasem, 1994; Sakboon, 2002b; Techawongtham, 2003; Tomforde, 2003; Torsricharoen, 2001a; Torsricharoen, 2001b; Walker, 2001). In doing so, they however lend credence to the ideas that non-Karen upland ethnic minorities groups deserve to be displaced or treated with less clemency or that the protection against displacement should be conditional to the individuals and communities meeting some environmental, economic or social criteria (Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Vandergeest, 2003; Walker, 2001; Johnson and Forsyth, 2002). Other upland ethnic minorities, and most importantly the Hmong, have effectively acquired a strongly negative environmental and social image, that of rich farmers heavily involved in commercial, environmentally destructive and egoistic agriculture (Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Vandergeest, 2003).

A last political factor which negatively affects upland ethnic minorities is the facts that (1) plans for population displacements have often

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prioritized small communities which have little chance to become officially recognized by the Department of Local Administration (Walker and Farrelly, 2008) and that (2) upland ethnic minorities are more likely than other groups to reside in small and isolated settlements located in a forested landscape. For example, according to 2002 data of the Department of Social Development and Welfare Security, upland ethnic minorities represent the bulk of the 1.2 million people residing in highland settlements. These settlements are quite small, with mean size of less than 270 persons (DSDWS, 2002). On the other hand, while ethnic Thai illegal settlements can also be small and isolated (see DSDWS, 2002 and cases 50, 55 and 57), many ethnic Thai occupants live in much larger villages located in more densely populated regions (i.e. closer to neighbouring villages), and are generally much more integrated economically and socially with the local centres of power. As such, they are more likely to be officially registered, and thus to host local government offices, and receive development funds. For these reasons, the political constraints in displacing upland ethnic minority people, and in particular those without citizenship or of non-Karen ethnicity, are much lower, overall, than in displacing ethnic Thais.

In other words, and to recapitulate, I argued in the preceding paragraphs that the unequal distribution of CID across regions and topographic zones as well as between ethnic groups should be understood in the context where both the desire of the state to displace people and the constraints it would face in doing so were also unequally distributed both geographically and socially. While Southerners had the privilege to inhabit a region where the threat of waves of illegal immigrants coming and hiding in remote areas was almost nil, environmental motivations for implementing CID projects were of little importance, but the political cost of doing so were high for the most of the study period, non-Karen upland ethnic minorities on the other hand were disadvantaged due to their lack of citizenship rights, their geographic location and distribution, their perception as a national security and environmental threat, and the low political cost for the government in implementing CID projects against them.

4.3) Decline of CID

A third important result of this review is the extent to which the number of people and cases of CID declined during the second half of the period of study (Table 6). To understand this change, it must first be emphasized that the number of people classified as occupants declined from the 1980s to 2005 from 10-12 to approximately 2 million people. But the diminution of the total number of occupants is not the whole story as it cannot explain the reduced risk for the remaining occupants of all ethnic groups of being subject to CID. As depicted in Table 7, this reduction occurred during the second half of the study period and in particular between 2001 and 2005. To understand this change, I believe, one must again analyse the nature of the state motivations in implementing CID projects and the political and practical constraints it faces. In regards to the former point, it is striking that that the evolution of the domestic and regional politics has made CID (but not displacements and repatriation in general) less important. First, threats to national security have been somewhat reduced. The Communist Party of Thailand disbanded itself and its members reintegrated society. Thus, the threat from an internal revolutionary movement gradually lost its potency during the 1990s. At the same time, the legitimating capacity of national security threats coming from communism disappeared as well. On the eastern front, with the political stabilisation of Cambodia and the retreat of the Vietnamese Army units, the threat of an invasion of Vietnamese forces or of a massive influx of Cambodian refugees also lost its credence. As for Burmese refu-

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32 On the requirements for a village to become an official administrative village, see Toyoda (2005) and DSDWS (2002). Surveys in the late 1980s and mid 1990s have found, respectively, that 42% and 35% of hill tribe villages were official administrative entities (Aguettant, 1996).
Refugees and illegal immigrants, their influx continued and even intensified in the 2000s. However, contrary to the situation in the 1970s and 1980s, they are to a large extent no longer clearing and cultivating land in remote areas but are rather mostly found in refugee camps and, for approximately 2 million of them, in low-paying agricultural and non-agricultural jobs (Latt, 2009; Pongsudhirak, 2009; The Shan Human Rights Foundation, 2003). As such, their displacement by the state, which is still occurring, was not classified as CID (Anon, 1998a; Ganjanakhundee, 2009; Ganjanakhundee and Nation, 2009; Kasem, 1998; Sattha, 1998; Sattha, 2000; Sciortino and Punpuing, 2009; Than, 2006). At the same time, the government has devoted important efforts to regularise the situation of the 40-60% upland ethnic minority people without Thai citizenship. Although the process was problematic, it nevertheless resulted in almost 80% of upland ethnic minorities having Thai citizenship in 2002 (data from the Department of Social Development and Welfare Security). Moreover, while the prospects were great in the 1980s and early 1990s of making profits from large-scale eucalyptus plantations, the interest later faded as foreign companies realized the level of opposition the projects were facing and the difficulty to find unoccupied land. Instead, promoters of pulp and paper productions shifted to smaller schemes involving contract farming (Barney, 2004; Barney, 2005; Mahannop, 2004; TDRI, 1989)\(^{33}\). Finally, in regards to the environmental motivation, official statistics compiled by forest authorities showed that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the situation of forest loss in Thailand considerably improved. Several observers also noted that the movement of land colonisation more or less stopped in recent years (Fukui, 1996; Phélinas, 1995; Rigg and Stott, 1998; Siamwalla, 1996). In this context, large-scale CID projects can hardly be justified. Either official statistics are right and there is no real crisis at play, in which case there is no need for heavy handed relocation policies to support forest conservation. Or, the statistics are wrong, and there actually is a critical deforestation problem, but in that case how could the public believe in the professionalism of forest authorities and in their capacity to implement such a complex project when they are not able to produce reliable data on which to base the decision? Overall, thus, it seems a change in the context decreased the importance and credibility of the “traditional” motivations for CID.

As discussed by Walker and Farrelly (2008), implementing CID projects is no easy task. There are first important practical problems. To convince farmers to move permanently requires finding alternative livelihoods, which is generally in the form of arable land. As was often discovered, the risk is otherwise great the villagers will go back to their previous sites (see cases 19-26, 44 and 47), encroach in other areas (cases 4, 11/18) or get involved in undesirable activities (cases 4, 11/18 and 29). Forest authorities have experienced great problems with locating arable land which has not yet been claimed by other villagers, or is not forested (Aguettant, 1996; Walker and Farrelly, 2008). The question of land availability and quality is now a core constraint for the implementation of displacement-inducing projects in general and a key reason for the strong resistance of threatened communities. In at least one instance, the difficulty of finding and developing at low cost a resettlement area was cited by officials as a reason for the cancellation of a CID project (Anon, 1996b; Anon, 1996c; Buakamsri, 1994; Chichuluk, 1994). Funding of resettlement projects represents another problem. As seen previously, resettlement projects in the early 1990s have conservatively entailed a cost ranging from 50,000 to 170,000, with some going as high as 1 million baht per household (Table 3). These expenses have likely increased since then. Given these costs per household, the budget of large-scale projects could easily run in

\(^{33}\) Other causes were also at play in this decision, in particular a drop in domestic demand and increased debt problems for Thai pulp manufacturers. These problems were linked to the 1997 financial crisis and the devaluation of the baht. Thanks to Keith Barney for pointing this out.
the hundreds of millions of dollars.\textsuperscript{34} During the 1980s and early 1990s, the financial burden of implementing large-scale resettlement projects could be financed through loans from international aid agencies such as USAID or the World Bank (Eudey, 1989; Vorapien, 1995), “shared” with the military and other agencies (Phop Phra resettlement, Khor Jor Kor and the Ror For Tor program)\textsuperscript{35}, or perhaps reimbursed with the profits anticipated from eucalyptus plantations schemes. However, these sources of funding have more or less disappeared in the late 1990s with the growth of opposition to large eucalyptus plantations and the disinterest of foreign aid agencies in helping such an economically successful country finance socially-destructive and strongly opposed CID projects.

Important new legal and political constraints have also emerged. First, from late 1992 to 2005, Thailand was governed by a fully elected cabinet and Lower House. Their members, it is presumed, understood that their future depended on their electoral success. Overall, they proved to be quite sensitive to popular demands and media campaigns. At the same time, grassroots and NGO-led popular movements gained enormous strength and became well-organised and linked to media organisations. These popular movements started in the 1980s with campaigns against the Nam Chaoan Dam and forest exploitation, and were boosted by the popular victories in the summer 1992 against the military-installed government of Suchinda Krapayoon and the Khor Jor Kor program (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989; Leuangaramsri and Rajesh, 1992; Pye, 2005b). They pursued their actions in the 1990s under several umbrella organisations, notably the Small-Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan, the Assembly of the Poor and the Northern Farmer’s Network. As a result, there has been during the study period an undeniable reduction in the capacity of officials and governments to impose their views and projects as the population – and that includes upland ethnic minorities – is now less likely to accept deferentially and without contestation the will of figures of authority. In the fight against displacement, villagers demonstrated vigorously (Anon, 1995b; Anon, 1998b; Athakor, 2001b; Phatharathananunth, 2006; Watershed, 1995), took arms against authorities or menaced to do so (Anon, 1999), claimed they would rather die than be moved (Sukpanich, 1996), or even threatened to commit suicide in front of Government House in Bangkok (Anon, 1996a). Moreover, since the adoption of the People’s constitution in 1997, at least two CID projects (case 47 and 54) have been criticised for being in contradiction with the constitution. Although this is not considered in Thailand a sufficient reason to cancel CID projects\textsuperscript{36}, it did embarrass the government and forest authorities. In some instances, these critics and protests against CID attracted significant media attention (see case 28 and 47) and this ran the risk of damaging politically the government. It appears this strong opposition has been instrumental in the modification or cancellation of several projects, including the Khor Jor Kor and Ror For Tor programs as well as the third Master Plan on Community Development, Environment and Drug Control (on the latter, see Athakor, 2002; Ekachai, 2002; Hengsuwan, 2003).

\textsuperscript{34} The RFD, the DNP and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment want to use the controversy over the illegal acquisition of land by General Surayud Chulanont to evict massively, and apparently without due process, a great number of people from 190 ‘critical areas’. The number of planned evictees range from 45,000 people to 400,000 households (Ekachai, 2010; Post Reporters, 2010; Wipatayotin & Charoenpo, 2010). The RFD asked for a budget of 1.5 billion baht (approximately 45 million US dollars) to fund a recently established task-force planning to seize illegally acquired land in national forest reserves. Importantly the substantial budget is for seizing land, and not for resettlement. It is unclear exactly who is threatened and if it could lead to population displacement. Presumably, many plots are not inhabited, but are rather used as secondary homes, resorts or agricultural land.

\textsuperscript{35} The Chief of the Forest Land Resettlement Coordination Section of the RFD listed among the benefits of the involvement of the military in CID projects their effectiveness in obtaining and defending large budgets for displacement projects (Aramphongphun, 1990).

\textsuperscript{36} See footnote 32.
Strong opposition movement to CID projects combined with a democratic government has however not been sufficient to fully halt CID programs. Indeed, government receptivity to anti-CID positions has greatly varied, with the most drastic change probably occurring when the second Chuan government (1997-2001) was replaced by the first Thaksin government (2001-2005). While the former proved heavily receptive to the ideas of dark-green environmentalists and whose movement in favour of large-scale CID projects was rapidly gaining in popularity in the late 1990s, the latter apparently favoured a line more compatible with the anti-CID movement. For starters, Thaksin recruited Prapat Panyachatrapksa first as Deputy and then Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, under which was the RFD and his fiercely pro-CID director, Plodprasop Surasvadi. Prapat, who is close to anti-CID grassroots groups and NGOs, and Plodprasop intensely struggled notably on the key issue of illegal encroachers and displacement, a struggle which Plodprasop eventually lost (Atthakor, 2001c; Nation, 2002; Tantiwitthayaphithak, 2002). Under Prapat and Thaksin, some CID projects were stalled (Anon, 2003) or in the process of being resolved peacefully and without forced displacement (case 49; see also (Atthakor, 2001a). Moreover, the demarcation of new protected areas, which had previously been particularly rapid, was in effect stopped in late 2001 and the administrative process for demarcation made much more restrictive. Indeed, while it was common to demarcate protected areas first and resolve conflicts later, the policy was radically changed. Heads of future protected areas now have to show that the local population accept the protected area. The proof takes the form of the signatures of locally-elected bodies, i.e. village and subdistrict heads and Tambon Administration Council members. In principle, this new approach, which was still used in early 2008, should have been introduced much earlier as it derives from the 1994 Tambon Administration Act and the 1997 Constitution. For unknown reasons, it was only implemented during the early 2000s. It is hard to determine the true motivations of the various governments for favouring pro or anti-CID positions. One thing is sure however: contrary to the urban and Southern-based Democrat-led government of Chuan Leekpai, the political success of Thaksin was directly dependent on his popularity among rural voters of the North and Northeast and urban migrants, precisely those most likely to be pleased by a soft approach towards the so-called illegal encroachment problem.

To recapitulate, I argue in the last section that the recent decline of CID in Thailand can be linked first to the motivations for CID projects losing their importance or legitimising effect. National security threats declined, business interests for large fast-growing tree plantations faded, and official forest statistics contradicted the idea that a forest crisis existed. At the same time, the practical and political constraints in implementing CID projects increased tremendously due to an active anti-CID movement, new legal hurdles and the election of a government more sensitive to the plight of individuals and communities threatened by displacement.

4.4) The future of CID in Thailand

In the preceding sections, I showed that CID projects have displaced an important number of people from 1986 to 1995, but were previously and afterwards of much less importance. During the 2001-2005 period, CID cases were few and rather small in size. Since then, only two CID cases could be documented. The first consisted in the displacement of 60 immigrant households from the Mae Pai National Park by military and
paramilitary forces (Boonpath, 2008), and the second in the eviction from Dong Yai national forest reserve of 1000-2000 villagers who used land occupation as a demonstration strategy (Anon, 2009b; Wipatayotin, 2009). What does this mean for the future of so-called illegal encroachers? Is the risk of displacement low, as argued by Walker and Farrelly (2008)? If so, is that the case for all communities?

The causes of the decline of CID are profound, but not necessarily irreversible or sufficient to prevent the displacement of all communities. First, the network of urban NGOs, journalists and academics opposing CID projects are in general uncomfortable with the idea of defending all individuals and communities against displacement irrespective of their history, location, and agricultural practices. Contrary to Walker and Farrelly (2008) and Johnson and Forsyth (2002), anti-CID light-green activists, journalists and academics oppose an approach based on universal human rights. This could be because they fear its consequences if successful: greater access to full land titles and development funds which could lead to further advances of commercial agriculture, degradation of the traditional community culture and ultimately the taking over of the land by capitalist outsiders and greater environmental destruction. Perhaps their position is rather simply grounded on a political calculus based on the fact that the concept of human rights has been and remains unpopular in many upper quarters of Thai society. Whatever their reasons, the net result is a highly unequal capacity for threatened individuals and communities to defend themselves against displacement. At the same time, the proponents of a strict enforcement of forest laws (including through CID) are still active in the state apparatus, dark-green NGOs and the population in general. It seems likely that CID projects will continue to be proposed.

Politically, the departure of the Thaksin government might have changed the context back in favour of CID. The 2006 coup-installed government modified an important aspect of local administration by transforming village and sub-district heads into state officials elected to life, or rather until retirement age. Once elected, the future of these central local political actors will rest on their appreciation by Ministry of Interior officials and not by the electorate (Bangprapa, 2007; Post Reporters, 2007). As a result, individuals and communities risk seeing their capacity to mobilize and resist against CID projects profoundly reduced. Also, the coup-installed government and its successors have authorized the demarcation of several new protected areas (Chongcharoen, 2007; The Nation, 2008; The Nation, 2009). This could signal an increase of the risk of displacement in the future. At the same time, recent media articles mention several plans of population displacement projects either proposed or in the process of implementation (Anon, 2008a; Anon, 2008b; Inchan, 2009; Meesubkwang, 2008; Nanuam and Charoenpo, 2007). To this must be added the possibility that the environmental and political context could change further. If the proposal of the People’s Alliance for Democracy to reduce the influence and number of elected representatives is adopted, the political cost of implementing CID projects could be profoundly reduced. Also, the environmental motivation for implementing CID projects could increase in the future if, for example, credible statistics showed high rates of new deforestation. These changes in context are however only hypothetical. CID projects are thus likely to remain subject to important constraints.

Given the above analysis, I argue that the window of opportunity for large-scale CID projects has long been closed and should remain so for years to come. Relatively large communities with a long history of occupation, and in particular communities practicing traditional low-input

38 It is moreover likely that the villagers who recently moved in and are still occupying land in Khon San forest in Chaiyaphum will be evicted, as were those who attempted the same tactic in 1998-2000 and recently in Dong Yai forest (Anon, 2009a; Ekachai, 2009). See also footnote 28 and 35 on the demand by the RFD for a special budget to fund land confiscations on a massive scale. If pursued further, this plan could result in a major political conflict and provide an interesting test of the veracity of my conclusions.
agriculture or those located at great distance from rich natural forests are safe from direct displacement. However, small, infra-structure poor and isolated communities with difficulty proving their long-term occupation of the land and which furthermore are located in a forested and mountainous region are still at risk of displacement. This is particularly the case if the community is located close to politically sensitive areas or is composed of non-citizen upland ethnic minority people or individuals involved in illicit activities. Future CID projects are likely to rely more on promises of citizenship, development funds and financial compensation than to the use of direct violence as the risk of negative press attention is high. Descriptions of recent plans of CID projects thus put great emphasis on the voluntary nature of the displacement (Meesubkswagen, 2008; Nanuam and Charoenpo, 2007; Paengnoy, 2006; Silp, 2007; Wipatayotin, 2006). To produce this voluntariness, forest authorities are also likely to continue to rely on a strategy aimed at making the life of illegal occupants as difficult as possible, for example by blocking infrastructure development, restricting access to land and forest resources, harassing communities through frequent raids, and intercepting the registration in the Department of Local Administration database of newcomers in the village (Jonsson, 2005, ch 5; Maniratanavongsiri, 1999). This registration is necessary to access to local health care services (Maniratanavongsiri, 1999). Through these “soft” measures, forest authorities would increase the chances the population will agree to participate in a CID project or, even better, will slowly move out of the village. These measures have already been shown to work (case 35 and 55). Through this alternative approach, and paraphrasing Vandergeest (2008, pers. comm.), proponents of CID unable to displace people directly adapt their tactic and aim at an indirect form of displacement. A change of strategy in this direction could already be seen during Thaksin’s premiership, for example through the new forest village scheme, or the use of a swiss-cheese geography for future protected areas (Roth, 2004; Roth, 2008; pers. obs.). This apparent change of strategy will be explored in another paper.

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### ANNEX

**Table 10. Sources and characteristics of CID cases identified, 1986-2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Hill tribes</td>
<td>Displ Type</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>2554</td>
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<td>AC, C, Ak, Hm, Ka, Li, La, Yao</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Mae Wong NP</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>R, Agr, Pr, Rap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>P. Khamphaeng Phet - Hill Tribes outside Hill Tribe Center</td>
<td>824</td>
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<td>5</td>
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**Second Period: 1991-1995**

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**Third Period: 1996-2000**

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**Fourth Period: 2001-2005**

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<td>2001</td>
<td>Ban Joh Woh Akha, A. Phrao, C. Chiang Mai</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ban Hua Nam, A. Mai Ai, C. Chiang Mai</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>E/R?, NoAgr</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>Khao Kho NP, C. Phetchabun</td>
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<td>E, No-Agr</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>Sangkhlaburi district, Kanchanaburi</td>
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<td>Total: 48, Hill tribes: 48</td>
<td>La, Mil/Vio</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.** An interrogation mark following a code (ex: AC?) means the code is most likely valid, but some uncertainty remain.

1. **Location**
   - C: Changwat (province)
   - A: Amphoe (district)
   - T: Tambon (subdistrict)
   - NP: National Park
   - WS: Wildlife Sanctuary
   - NFR: National Forest Reserve

2. **Types of displacements**
   - E: Eviction, no arrangement made to allocate housing or agricultural land to the displaced population
   - R: Relocation, arrangements made by authorities to allocated land to the displaced population
   - Acc: Authorities made some accommodations to the displaced villagers (ex: informally allowed them to use, at least temporarily, their former agricultural land)
   - Agr: Agricultural land provided by the state (in parenthesis the number of rai per household officially allocated by the state)
   - NoAgr: No agricultural land provided
   - Pr: Problems, complaints by displaced people are discussed in the literature (ex: land quality, land or water scarcity, conflict with neighbors or former occupants)
   - Rap: Case involved the repatriation of people to neighboring countries.

3. **Population:**
   - AC: Population included people who participated in counter-insurgency overt and covert policies (including forest village and border village programmes)
   - C: Population included former communist insurgents or people suspected to be pro-insurgents
   - Ak: Akha
   - Hm: Hmong
   - La: Lahu

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Li: Lisu
Lue: Lue
Lw: Lawa
Pop: More people are likely to have been displaced
Yao: Yao

4. Process:

Who approved the project?

Cab: Displacement decision approved by a Cabinet resolution, or at least by the Prime Minister
NSC: National Security Council or high military office designed or approved the plan for the population displacement

Who participated in the implementation?

FD: Forest Department (Royal Forest Department or the Department of National Parks) is involved in the implementation of the displacement order
LO: Local officials are involved in the implementation of the order Mil: Military involved in the implementation of the order
NoP: No participation of the villagers in the process
Par: Parmilitary (i.e. Thahan Phran or Border Patrol Police) involved in the implementation
PO: Provincial officers are involved in the implementation of the order
Poi: Police involved in the implementation of the displacement order

How was it done?

$Co: Costs. Villagers must pay for moving their possessions or for renting land on which to build their house
$Cp: Monetary compensation paid to displaced households
Ar: Arrests made prior or during the displacement operation
Cf-S: Process is marked by intra-state conflicts
CitP: Citizenship card promised by authorities in exchange for the villagers agreeing to move
IDL: Infrastructure development limited by the state in the former area as a mean to coerce people to move
IDP: Promises made by the state that infrastructures will be provided in new area
F/T: Villagers feared arrests (or land confiscation, or for their physical safety) or received threats by authorities
FP: False promises made to the villagers
Ld-L: Authorities encourages people to move by promising they will never have land security
M: Monarchy. Authorities used references to or symbols of the Monarchy to help convince people to accept the relocation. Includes also cases where members of the Palace overtly promoted the relocation project
No$Cp: No compensation paid to the displaced population
PsyW: Authorities admit on using psychological warfare to get the people to move
Rs: Resistance by the population is described in the literature
Vo: Violence was used by authorities
VoC: Claim by authorities or in the literature that the move was “voluntary”

5. Justification

Ass: Assimilation of hill tribes
Cf: Conflicts with other villages
Dev: To facilitate the development of the population
Dr: Fight against opium cultivation or the smuggling and trafficking of various drugs
Imm: Fight against illegal immigration
LI: land invasion case, i.e. land occupation as a form of demonstration
NS: National Security: case justified partly by national security matters (control former communist insurgents, relocate former anti-communists peasents-fighters, fight against illegal immigration, fight against opium cultivation or drug smuggling)
Ref: Reforestation
T: tourism
W: Watershed protection or rehabilitation

6. Other
KJK: Case part of Khor Jor Kor Project
IL: Illegal logging in collusion with authorities in the area after the displacement occurred
NGO: NGOs are involved in the displacement project
RP: Royal Project or royally-initiated project present before or after the displacement took place.
U: Uncertainties. Important lack of information on the case
Figure 3. Location of individual CID cases in relation to the topography

Notes: For information on individual CID cases refer to the preceding table.
Sources: Elevation: ESRI 2003 World Data
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119. Intaramanon, P. (nd) Muubaan Huai Hian (Lahu) is a hamlet of Ban San Paayaang muu 10 tambon Wiang, amphoe Fang, changwat Chiang Mai. Email sent to J.P. Leblond, October 27 2008.

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Population displacement and forest management in Thailand


