From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration: Examining the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta

by

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Abstract

Innovations in communication and transportation industries have improved and increased the potential for the movement of individuals, commodities, and capitals across international borders as they respond to global environmental and socio-economic stimuli. Extant studies have focused on adult transnational migrants, and youth migration is highlighted only in relation to the adult experiences. However, movement of young adults as independent transnational migrants is an emerging trend in international migration. There is a general lack of awareness on the working and living conditions of youth migrants. This research was therefore informed by the urgent need to understand the migration experiences of youth with the view of protecting young migrants and ensuring that migration leads to their development and those of their home and host countries.

The thesis employs data collected with interpretative phenomenological analysis, IPA in a qualitative field study conducted in 2013 in the Republic of Malta to examine the lived experiences of Europe-bound migrant Nigerian youth. By resisting the banal Push and Pull explanations for transnational migration, which literally blames migrants and the countries of origin for current trends in global migration, the thesis advances the understanding of global youth migration from the perspectives of Indigenous world views, anti-colonial, and
antiracist theories. It disturbs, and by so doing, unpacks as colonial project, the existing dominant imaginaries around immigrants from the developing world. These imagined mindsets have informed immigration policies and praxis that have continued to generate and sustain the migrant other.

The study uncovered the enormous transit and settlement challenges that transnational migrant youth contend with as they are polarized into social and demographic opposites (male and female migrants, legal and illegal, citizen and alien) by the advanced border-surveillance technologies and authorities of receiving states. Within this intersectionality lies migrant struggles and resistance as they aim for the countries of their destination. It therefore concludes by recommending a holistic and multilateral approach to resolving the issues of global youth migration. The approach (es) adopted must include addressing the major driving forces of the 21st century migration, which is social insecurity and economic marginalization.
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From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

Chapter One

Introduction

Twentieth century innovations and expansions within the communication and transport technology sectors have reduced the world to a global society (Solimano, 2010; Appadurai, 1996). This has improved and therefore increased the potential for the movement of individuals, commodities, and capitals across international borders as they respond to global environmental and socio-economic stimuli. It has been observed, however, that transnational borders are relatively more open to capital and commodities than they are to migrant individuals (Allen, 2008; Solimano, 2010). Copious literature and data exist on the socio-political and economic dimensions of adults involved in international migration (Castles & Miller, 2009; Valiani, 2012; Adepoju, 1984, 1993, 2000, 2008; Parrenas, 2005; Sassen, 1988; Appadurai, 1996), while youth migrants are treated as part of familial collectives. Sylvia Wong (2009), the United Nation’s Technical Specialist for Adolescents and Youth at the UN Population Fund, made a startling demographic revelation on young people and migration. Speaking at a panel to mark the 2009 International Migrants Day at the United Nations Headquarters, New York, Wong stressed that:

Young people, ages 15-30 represent the largest proportion of migrants, however this age range is steadily getting younger. Tens of thousands of adolescents risk their lives and cross borders without legal documents, in search of temporary or permanent work, as there are virtually no income generating opportunities in their home countries. Also, many of these young people migrate to reunify with family members who have already established lives in the country of destination. Escaping conflict, natural disasters, violence, and persecution are among the other varying reasons young people migrate. (Wong, 2009, p. 3)

Since the movement of young adults as independent transnational migrants is an emerging trend in international migration, it is disconcerting that little or no literature exists focusing
on the motives, drives, and remote and immediate experiences of youth migrant subjects. It is also disturbing that minimal research exists on the implications of this trend for the socio-political and economic well-being of first the migrant individuals, then the sending and receiving nations. This is particularly true when the movement is skewed in favor of the Northern hemisphere or from the developing to the industrialized world. It is also surprising that no detailed academic qualitative or quantitative research has been conducted that focuses on youth migration and its downsides. At the panel on Youth Migration at the United Nations Headquarters, New York, during the 2013 International Youth Day it was agreed that:

There is a general lack of awareness on the working and living conditions of young migrants. While migration of young people can open up valuable opportunities, it can also pose risks or leads [sic] to unacceptable situations, including exploitation and discrimination. To protect young migrants and ensure that migration leads to their human development as well as contributing to the development of both their home and host countries, the key questions that will be address [sic] revolve around the motivation for young [sic] to migrate, the key issues and challenges facing young migrants and contribution that youth migration can make to economic and social development of both sending and hosting countries. (UN, 2013a)

It is of vital importance to this thesis to indicate that ‘young people,’ as used in the statement above, actually referred to young adults or youth; for as some scholars have set out to theorize migration with reference to youth (Chatty, 2010; Heidbrink, 2012, 2014), their foci were on independent migrant children or what most authorities refer to as unaccompanied minors (Oropeza, 2013; Heidbrink, 2010). This thesis proceeds to define youth as a specific age bracket of a demographic whole within the working or productive population of a society, as will be seen in subsequent pages. Thus, it shifts from the definitions of Chatty (2010) and Heidbrink (2010), whose works are apparently concerned with independent migrant minors as could be inferred from the statement:

The emergent juridical category of “unaccompanied alien child”—an
individual under the age of 18 who has no lawful immigration status in the United States and who has no parent or legal guardian to provide care and custody—complicates the construct of personhood defined by U.S. immigration law. Recognized by the state only inasmuch as he is a derivative of the actions and status of his parent(s), the legal identity of the unaccompanied alien child is both contingent and dependent: an "impossible subject" who cannot exist in juridical accounts of personhood due to his illegal immigration status and his paradoxical position as an alone but dependent minor. (Heidbrink, 2010, p. ii)

This study investigates the experiences of migrant young adults between the ages of 18 and 30. Many investigations and theorizations have focused on adult migration, but youth migration is highlighted only in relation to the adult experiences. It is not therefore surprising to observe that existing transnational migration policies from the international and domestic spheres are adult-specific, and light mention is made of young adult migrants and their peculiar experiences. Therefore, transnational migrant youth might be facing enormous peculiar challenges on several fronts. My thesis examines the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta, Europe, with a view to ascertain inter alia, the driving force(s) behind the current global rise in youth migration. It uses Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, IPA, to explore the motivation for the youth to migrate, the flow and trend of youth migration, and challenges facing young migrants from their countries of origin through transnational borders to their host countries. The attention paid particularly to Nigerian youth derives first from the nation’s political and economic strategic position in Africa; second, from the influence of two, and lately three, major colonial experiences (Arabic, Western, and recently Asian/Indo-Chinese colonization); and third, its positioning as the most populous country in the continent of Africa with a fairly diverse Indigenous population (Isichei, 1984; Nwalutu, 2004; Fafunwa, 1974). This research is timely as the attention of the international community is in the recent times drawn to a pervasive social trend I have been grappling with
for some time. Youth besides women, children and men are ferrying across North African coasts to the borders of Europe in large numbers; fed by the internal displacement of peoples in the Middle-East, Asia, and particularly the ongoing war in Syria. Before now, a majority of the casualties of Africa-Europe migration are men, women, children, and young dark-skinned Africans whose lifeless bodies continued to wash up on the European coast with no one batting an eyelid. The questions that emerge are: what changed? Why is the West suddenly waking up to the challenges and plights of migrants on the Mediterranean Sea? Why is there a sudden policy shift from restriction and detention to reception and accommodation; from burying the remains of vagrant subjects (boat-people, illegal, clandestine, Iswed - Maltese term for a Black person often used derogatorily) to deliberations on opening borders to refugees?

**Transnational Migration Defined**

In natural and social spheres, the world’s geographical, economic and technological resources are not equally distributed. This means that in order to survive, living organisms, including human beings, may, at a given time, leave certain locations in which they are running out of resources that meet their survival needs, or in which their survival is challenged and prospects of procreation are questioned, for areas where they can thrive. Such programmed movement of species to new locations of survival in large numbers is deemed migration. In the words of Clugston (1998), migration is: “The seasonal movement of, usually, whole population[s] of organisms in response to environmental stimuli such as temperature and daylight hours” (p. 501). In human societies, because migration is a demographic process that can bring about changes in the size of human population in a geographical space, its demographic importance is equated with mortality and fertility. Teevan (1992) states, “Human migration can be defined simply as the movement of people
across significant boundaries for the purpose of permanent settlement” (p. 531).

So, who is an international migrant? The significant words in the definitions of migration above include movement, boundaries, and settlement. International migrants therefore are persons who travel from their countries of birth across transnational boundaries into a destination country where they live temporarily or permanently. “The term ‘migrant’ is understood to mean any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country” (UNESCO, n.d.). Thus, it includes those who enter a country irregularly, through trafficking or fleeing from human rights violations, as well as immigrants who are regularly (legally) and permanently residing in a country. For these reasons, it has been repeatedly emphasized that deprivation of human rights in countries of origin is the foremost migration push factor (Kimoon, 2009; Sunderland, 2012; Chua, 2003). It is important at this juncture to clarify between two often misunderstood terms in migration experiences: emigration and immigration. ‘Emigrating’ involves leaving a geo-social space of one’s birth and traveling to settle in another region temporarily or permanently. ‘Immigrating’ entails coming into a geopolitical territory to settle temporarily or permanently. Thus, ‘migrate’ or ‘emigrate’ means to leave a place for another, while ‘immigrate’ means to come into a place to stay. Immigrating usually refers to the crossing of a foreign geographical boundary (as in transnational movement into a new country), while ‘migrating’ can happen within the same nation-state’s geo-territorial limits.

Patterns of Migration and Why People Migrate

An attempt to understand the 21st century transnational migration might start by reflecting on Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994) work on the system of capitalist expansion that has bedevilled the world from the earlier part of 20th century. This system metamorphosed into
today’s globalization; as such, it is imperative to connect colonization with the spread of Western militancy and use of force in quest for control of economic territories from Europe to the Americas, to Africa, Asia, and the rest of the world (see also Allen, 2008). In many of the periods of capital expansion that Arrighi portrayed, what is not highlighted is the subtle link colonization of Indigenous peoples’ culture and ways of knowing shared with the colonizers’ ploy of raising from the ashes of the ruins they created, a host of laborers who, being equipped with Western education and culture may no longer find themselves relevant in their environments and cultures of birth but must migrate to serve at the master’s tables. Anderson (2006) shows how the United States’ colonization of the Philippines in the late 19th century shaped the present pattern and flow of the contemporary emigration of Filipino labor to the US, in which their skills and qualification were under-valorized, and they were under-employed, exploited, and underpaid. In a different thrust, the Norwegian Emigration Center (2008) conducted a session on Youth and Migration aimed at providing European youth with a basic knowledge of migration so as to help them understand the causes and course of action in the 21st century migration. The objective of the session was to draw a connection between the migration of Europeans to the ‘New World’ in the last two centuries and the 21st century immigration taking place today. The outcome of the session becomes crucial for global awareness of the need for tolerance among immigrants-sending and -receiving societies of the world, especially among young peoples. According to the Norwegian Emigration Center (2008), knowledge of the processes of migration will provoke discourses on the concept between young people from the various European cultures and other parts of the world, including the United States, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. That in turn will be a potent weapon to eliminate xenophobia by entrenching better understanding,
openness, and tolerance between the native inhabitants and the immigrants of Europe. It is interesting to realize from this session that two to three hundred years after the major immigration of citizens of Europe to the Americas, Africa, New Zealand, Australia etc., the same set of motives and compelling factors could be traced to underpin most of the current migration of peoples from the former recipient nations to Europe:

More than 50 million Europeans, among them some 900,000 Norwegians, were directly affected by a process that had fundamental consequences for both the countries from which, and to which, the migrations took place. To some, the motivation to emigrate was a desire for freedom from religious and social oppression, while others fled wars and persecution. However most of them pursued a dream of improved economic circumstances. (p. 3)

It is interesting that the Norwegian Emigration Center could draw a connection between the past two centuries of Europeans’ migration to the New World and the present mass movement of people across international borders, from the developing world to Europe. Of considerable importance to this work, however, is the observation that the motives of the 21st century immigrants are similar to those of their peers in previous centuries. It is not an understatement to insist that international mobility of human (labor), goods, and money is vital for the transfer of knowledge, ideas, capital, and entrepreneurial skills. Yet as noted earlier, transnational borders are more porous to goods and capital than to people (Allen, 2008; Solimano, 2010). Most sociologists and scholars of transnational migration have attributed the surge in transnational migration to Push and Pull factors. Socio-economic issues such as unemployment, overpopulation, war and other human-made and natural disasters are referred to as push factors driving migrants away from their environments of origin. Availability of job opportunities, higher wages, higher standard of living, and social security among other factors are referred to as pull factors because they attract migrants into the receiving countries. Going beyond the banality of push and pull debates on the factors
underlying the 21st century migration, Solimano, opting for a freer and more humane international border management, extensively accentuates some critical themes on contemporary globalization as it affects the nations and nationals of source and receiving countries. Most relevant to my thesis is Solimano’s insistence that the global North should not always be fingered as the prime architect and culprit of current South-North flow in global migration. He argues that the migration of citizens of the global South to the North might have been a response to economic and political failures in the global South. In fact, his view affirms that of Sefa Dei’s (2012) work, which blames the underdevelopment of the global South, specifically Africa, on poor judgment, mismanagement, and lack of accountability among the leadership.

My thesis strongly suggests, however, that it might be simplistic to ascribe all South-North movement of individuals across international borders to economic factors since a host of other drives could possibly be at play. Also, as plausible as Solimano (2010) may sound, his work comes short of drawing attention to how the subtle, pervasive, and pernicious Western socio-economic policies and practices have continued to perpetuate indirect hegemonic domination on the South. Moreover, these subtle processes have continued to render all positive development efforts of Southern economies ineffective so that the developing countries of the South remain economically subservient to the industrialized North. One good example is the structural adjustment policies, SAP, that were developed by the IMF/World Bank (Bretton Woods Institutions) against Southern developing economies. Because these practices have continued to weaken all meaningful efforts made by most independent Southern states towards economic self-sufficiency, one could justifiably claim that the North is responsible for the economic woes of the global South, and is therefore
indirectly responsible for the current trend in the South-North migration. It is, however, important to mention that the pattern and flow of international migration is no longer altogether mono-directional, as implied by South-North migration. Instead, there is an omni-directional flow of human, goods, capital, ideas, cultures, and technology (Appadurai, 1996). For instance, as nationals of Southern states and raw materials migrate Northward many Northern-based multinational corporations, in an attempt to reduce manufacturing costs, have resorted to out-sourcing (establishing overseas plants in developing countries and deploying their technical and high management staff to these Southern locations). This implies that North-South transnational migration flow is also a current trend. One of the positions of this work is that migration of individuals across national borders may not always be a result of economic disequilibria. It may be driven by other potential factors that are natural or socio-political in nature, which may include war or natural disaster. I argue that current migration trends and patterns have always revealed the fluidity of migration flow shaped by non-palpable social and environmental factors such as man-made or natural disasters, economic recessions, and political instability. Immigrants’ demographic constitution therefore changes from one geo-ethnic location to another in varying times of history, and destination locations also change with time. For instance, in the late 19th century A.D. (1870-1914), citizens of Western European countries such as Ireland, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Scandinavia formed the bulk of immigrants to the New World countries comprising the United States, Canada, Argentina, Africa, Australia, Brazil, and New Zealand (Solimano, 2010; Allen, 2008). But in the recent economic recession (2007-2009), because capital and labor flow simultaneously to nations that offer better economic opportunities than what is obtained in the migrants’ countries of origin, immigrants are met with hostility and skepticism. Yet immigrants’
contribution to the economic prosperity of host countries is indisputable (Deaux, 2006; Sassen, 1988; Solimano, 2010).

Sassen (1988) notes that from a broadly global perspective, a comprehensive analysis of factors prompting migrants to leave their countries of origin to settle in foreign countries must go beyond domestic considerations of sending nations to reflect on how the foreign policies and economic practices of receiving nations result in an influx of migrants from developing economies. In this case, one can point to the active role of US firms in the disruption of traditional economic structures due to the large-scale development of commercial agriculture. This happens with its associated displacement of small holders and subsistence growers, or due to the massive recruitment of young women into labor for export manufacturing. Sassen’s explanations of the connection between US foreign policies, her economic practices and the flow of immigrant labor into the country may to some extent be true of a few other developing economies. My position in this thesis, however, is that such bilateral links may not adequately account for the mass exodus of citizens of a country like Nigeria to Europe, for instance, because no single European nation has the kind of massive foreign direct investments in Nigeria that could wield the monopolistic influence Sassen illustrated. However, the increasing Western representation in Nigeria’s oil industry may entrench a different kind of ideological influence in Nigeria’s socio-cultural environment. In this respect, I would acquiesce to Sassen’s argument on the indirect consequences of Western foreign direct investment on developing countries to stress that “it is here that the facts of foreign investment and general cultural Westernization acquire weight, as do a liberal immigration policy and a tradition of immigration” (p. 7). On the other hand, the spreading of US military bases in almost all the regions of the world in which they have economic interest
might create what Amy Chua (2003) refers to as aggressive marketing of the US free market and democracy, which tends to generate middle-class political refugees who may share the desire to emigrate to the US. If, however, the US economic, military, and diplomatic activities were strong inducers for citizens of developing countries to migrate to the US, the premise does not substantiate the contemporary surge in youth emigration from Africa to industrialized countries of the North. In fact, the reverse seems to be the case. Until recently, there has been no apparent European military presence in Nigeria. Of course, some diplomatic and economic ties thrive, especially in Nigeria’s booming oil and gas sector. But there are no obvious subversive diplomatic activities from the European countries Nigerian youth tend to migrate to. It is interesting, however, that Sassen believes that the foreign direct investment, FDI, in itself does not cause emigration but is a structure, a highly mediated process that creates conditions for emigration as an option.

Shifting from Sassen’s views on factors that form, drive, and facilitate emigration of citizens from developing countries to the industrialized North, Amy Chua (2003) argues that it is the aggressive spread by the West (spear-headed by the US) of free markets and democracy that creates the 21st century middle class international migrant individuals. Chua believes that the internationalization of the global economy (globalization), which the United States is frantically marketing to the developing world, has dire consequences in terms of the socio-economic and political stability of these nations. Her work features, for the first time, ethnicity in the core of a thesis on globalization and migration. She believes that the Western propagation of free market and democracy to the developing world creates lopsided binary powers in these nations that tend towards instability and war. A rich and economically powerful minority is created by the free market while democracy invents a politically
powerful but economically marginal large population that becomes envious and resentful of the market’s dominant minority. Chua argues that instability and war will result as globalization exacerbates ethnic disparities in wealth and political power distribution, thus producing a middle class refugee who emigrates to the West. While Chua’s work is only indirectly linked to emigration, it is crucial for understanding how the mediated socio-economic and political activities of the West have continued to disrupt existing socio-economic equilibrium in the developing countries. Chua is apt to argue that she does not aim to prevent the promotion of free markets and democracy in the world, while she insists that the version of free market and democracy exported by the US is ill-conceived because no Western nation has adopted the laissez-faire system that the West is imposing on developing countries (see also Sassen, 1988; and Adepoju, 1993). Along the lines of this argument, I will urge for a re-evaluation of the IMF-World Bank hegemonic policies in developing economies as a way of understanding how its introduction of structural adjustment policies manifests as a cutthroat measure to further cripple developing economies of the South. Remarkably, US and other Western countries subsidize farm produce, award tax leverages to corporations, and even dole out lump sums as recovery loans to their suffering industries during economic recessions (as was evident during the 2009 recession). The West uses SAP to forbid such gestures in developing economies and insists on an open door to the free market, which exterminates the fledgling domestic industries of poor nations and forces them to accept the role of dumping ground for Western products and—to a large extent—foreign cultural practices. Chua and Sassen agree that Western external influences pose a disruptive threat to the socio-economic and political stability of developing countries, resulting in the harvest of forcibly displaced peoples from developing economies who migrate as either economic or
political refugees to the West. It is crucial at this point to observe that in all the preceding deliberations, the emphasis was on adult migration and nothing about the youth migrant subjects was highlighted.

**Contextualizing Youth Transnational Migration**

What is youth transnational migration? The answer definitely varies with cultures and geo-ethnic distinction. Since this thesis focuses on Nigerian youth, it uses the limit set by the Nigerian National Youth Corps—a government parastatal charged with overseeing the one year mandatory service for all Nigerian citizens who graduated from their undergraduate studies at age 30 and below. Also, a UN technical paper on youth and international migration insists, “While there is no universally accepted definition of youth, the United Nations defines youth, for statistical purposes, as persons aged 15 to 24 years” (UN, 2011, p.iii). Sylvia Wong, the Technical Specialist for Adolescents and Youth at the UN Population Fund, demographically described youth in migration as young people ages 15-30 who represent the largest proportion of global migrants (Wong, 2009). A working paper published by the population division of the United Nations Organization also highlighted the role of youth in transnational migration (UN, 2011). The paper further defined youth as young adults between ages 18 and 29. Therefore, this study will define youth as adolescent persons between the ages of eighteen (18) and thirty (30) years. The UN working paper indicates that persons within this age bracket are increasingly engaging in cross-border migration more than any other demographic category all over the world. It claims that the main motives for this flow in youth migration are employment, education, family formation, and reunification, as well as conflict and persecution. The paper did not provide data on the migrant youth socio-cultural and economic category or gender classifications, but it made a stunning disclosure respecting contemporary youth involvement in transnational migration. It stated that by mid-
2010, the global number of international migrants aged 15 to 24 was estimated at 27 million. Significant words in the definitions of migration above include movement, boundaries, and settlement. International youth migrants therefore are young adults, unmarried, ages 18 to 30, who travel from their countries of birth, across transnational boundaries into a destination country where they live temporarily or permanently. Understanding the experiences of this category of immigrants elucidates such inconspicuous dimensions as the social, political, and economic milieu within which they have to operate. This includes highlighting inter alia, their inspirations for migrating, experiences on transit across international borders, contributions, or simply what they make to the economic growth of both their host countries and countries of origin. Also critical is the understanding of their experiences of oppression embedded in the colonial and neo-colonial structures and processes within their societies of origin and how it situates them in host environments, as well as incidents of oppression and their measures of resistance, strategies, and skills of survival. This study, which examines the lived experiences of African migrant youth in Europe, also takes into account their peculiar challenges—first as youth—then as immigrants; then the various modes of adaptation employed by these youth when analyzed in demographic contexts such as gender, sexual orientation, class, ability, ethnicity, and religious belief. An area of interest in the sociology of 21st century transnational migration (with regards to this study) was also to consider the contributions and role of youth migration in the global labor force and its consequences for the sending and receiving societies. In contrast to viewing the youth question in the context of familial migration, the ever-rising force of independent youth transnational migrants (from the developing South to the industrialized North) might be both a response to or reflection of increasing demand for youth labor resulting from demographic lapses in the receiving states
such as the current high rate of aging population in the industrialized world.

This study will focus on redirecting the gaze on international migration to that of an insidiously emerging trend in the movement of young adults as independent trans-border migrants. The study is significant because no methodical, scholarly investigation has been conducted on the experiences of youth involved in transnational migration as independent migrants. My thesis is therefore of critical importance to academia and to international migration policy-makers. It is also crucial to the migrant-sending and receiving societies of the world. The study worked on the assumption that potential migrant Nigerian (and by extension, African) youth emigrate due to a disconnect from their Indigenous cultures and worldviews resulting from colonial and neo-colonial influences on the Indigenous cultural and economic structures in their local environments. African Indigenous culture emphasizes the realization of one’s identity and humanity and dignity within the context of membership, and therefore, service to the society, communal responsibility, and accountability; and skillful and resourceful use of one’s personal and environmental endowment (Dei, 2012). Necessitated by the contemporary massive flow of youth from developing African states to the industrialized European countries, the philosophical underpinning and thrust of this work is from a paradigm that recognizes that any meaningful international or domestic enquiry or strategy geared towards the concerns of transnational migration, with a particular interest on youth as migrant subjects, must consider the socio-cultural environment of these migrant subjects. Furthermore, the effects of nature in the environmental conditions leading to disasters and war might be a contributory factor (Simms, 2009; Appadurai, 1996; Solimano, 2010) but the significant drives to transnational migration have been located in the clandestine impacts of globalization and unbalanced power dynamics inherent in
international relations (Chua, 2003; Chomsky, 2006; Sassen, 1988; Valliani, 2012; Allen, 2008; Anderson, 2006); this implies that as a matter of critical importance investigations of this magnitude must consider the influence on their economic and socio-cultural environment by such agents of social change as colonization and globalization. Accordingly, my study first endeavors to uncover the correlation between the influence imposed by colonization on the Indigenous systems within which these young migrants were born and raised and the current drive on youth to migrate. Second, it will explore the connection between the persistent neo-colonial projects (including impact on economy, language, education, culture and belief systems, acculturation or cultural encapsulation) in previously colonized countries of the developing world; in other words, the influence(s) of neo-colonial processes on the Indigenous cultural environment of the youth and the susceptibility of youth to the lures of precarious international migration. My thesis has, in addition to the steps enumerated above, conceptualized youth migration by engaging relevant strategies to accentuate how the Indigenous worldviews subverted by colonization can be harnessed and incorporated into the economic and socio-cultural environment of the youth. Such an exercise, if well executed, will empower local youth, thereby reducing the unhealthy trends and costs associated with African youth emigration. My analysis will thus be shaped by anti-colonial and anti-racist frameworks, as well as by African Indigenous worldviews. As analytical approaches, anti-colonial and anti-racist frameworks, and African Indigenous worldviews are discourses that challenge all manifestations of discrimination, hegemony, and imposing structures, ideas and practices of cultural and socio-political domination (Sefa Dei, 2011). This study, beyond challenging assumptions and inspiring a whole new perspective on the 21st century youth transnational migration, is intended to contribute to literature on youth migration. The thesis
may not claim by any means to have exhaustive investigations into all facets of youth transnational migration experiences, especially from the developing countries to the developed world. It is hoped, however, that the recommendations resulting from my research findings would be useful in reducing the negative trends associated with youth emigration from the developing world—more specifically, from the continent of Africa—and subsequently minimize its tragic consequences while encouraging youth-friendly migration policy formulation that would alleviate the border-crossing challenges facing 21st century youth migrants.

My direction of enquiry becomes crucial given the efforts of the United Nations Organization and other international NGOs such as IOM and UNHCR to ensure the human rights protection of migrants anywhere in the world (UN, 2014; IOM, 2011). It is important to observe that technological advancement among industrialized nations also favorably positions them to institute and operate advanced border screening that informs the binary categorization of migrants between wanted and unwanted, legal and illegal etc., at the disposition of a nation’s immigration authority and border agency (Thobani, 2007; UNHCR, 2013). While I appreciate the invaluable uses the border screening system can be put to in the ‘complex’ 21st century society, I must insist that it will only serve for a balanced flow of international movement of goods, capital, and labor if similar technologies are allowed on both sides of the global divide. The binary construction of peoples’ identifiers into legal and illegal, citizen and alien, smuggled or trafficked, or genuine and refugee could in fact be traced to the previous colonization and hegemonic domination of most countries of the global South by Europe and other colonizers. It is as Sassen (1988) suggested earlier, a ploy to tag immigrants as a ‘problem’ to the receiving nations (see also Sharma, 2005; Li, 2003). It is
therefore the view of this work that the lopsided power relationship in international boundary policing and surveillance is a renewed ploy of the Western neo-colonial and hegemonic grip on the rest of us, which must be resisted, or if possible, avoided altogether.

**Thesis Structure**

This thesis is organized into nine chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction, personal and professional context of the study, and statement of the problem. The second chapter provides the history of transnational migration, the literature review, and context of youth migration in Nigeria. Chapter three presents a theoretical framework and historical background to study with analysis of anti-colonial and Indigenous knowledge discursive frameworks. It uses the theories as tools for situating the 21st century youth migration. The chapter also attempts to project the theories as empowerment for Indigenous people to resist the pernicious culture-encapsulation and oppressive elements of the colonizing world that undermine and negate their knowledge systems and worldviews. The fourth chapter discusses the methodology, which encompasses the method of data collection and analysis. Chapter five gives the reports of the findings of the study. The sixth chapter and part one of chapter seven contain data analysis. My analysis engages participants’ views on the phenomenon of study, the literature, theories, and the researcher’s perspectives in the discourse. Chapter seven discusses how colonization and neo-colonial projects (such as education, economic and social globalization) in countries of origin are serving to prepare people (specifically, youth) to be prospective migrants, and equip them to respond to the challenges imposed by their status as immigrants. Chapter eight discusses the significance of the study while chapter nine offers recommendations and conclusions.
Personal and Professional Context

About 15 years ago in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria, I had severe difficulty digesting the news of and cushioning the shock from the death of two of my diploma students who had attempted to migrate to Europe. As a lecturer, then with the Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO), Benin Extension, I found it difficult to understand why these young adults with a promising future were convinced to take the trip, what their aspirations were, what informed their decisions to emigrate and the ordeals that ended their lives so abruptly. I was nudged to rethink my positioning as a Nigerian gifted with Western education later on the 31st of March, 2005, during my trip to secure permanent residence in Canada. Our flight made a stop-over in the Netherlands en route to Canada, and surprisingly, during check-in routines, my wife and I, as young African migrants, were separated from the queue and taken into an office with complex surveillance technologies for special checks on our travel documents. Apologies were made to us later and we were hurried into the plane. This experience came despite clear indications in my passport that I am a Christian, Understandably so, because after the 911 terrorist’s attack in the United States, Western transnational borders transformed to politicized spaces for migrants restriction, negotiation, and resistance. These gate-keeping and supra-surveillance processes are grounded on biases constructed around migrants’ nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, and cultural affiliations (Sharma, 2005; Nyers, 2010). The discriminatory treatment meted out to my wife and I at the borders of Europe en route to North America created a dissonance in my psyche that kept me ruminating over and reflecting on my belief and pride in Western culture and education as the universal given. It also left me with the lingering question, if racialized youth are treated in such an undignified manner at transnational borders why do they persistently defy the odds to migrate? Furthermore, the current global economic recession plaguing many nations
(industrialized and developing) including European nations might mean hostility against immigrants from the citizens of the receiving nations who would look on immigrants as straining their nations’ dwindling resources (Ki-moon, 2009; Ngai, 2005; Li, 2003). My discernment of and sensitivity to Indigenous knowledge and cultures has been sharpened through many of the courses I took in the University of Toronto graduate studies program that often called my conscience and belief system into question. The epiphanic moments of intra-personal struggle also created instances of apprehension, dissonance, doubt, and fear that later dissolved into self-realization and empowerment through the liberation of my psyche, enabling me to engage in this enquiry. The experiences I garnered in these processes actually lend credence to the assumption of my thesis, that most African youth suffer from cultural disconnect or what Frantz Fanon would call amputation (Fanon, 1963) from their Indigenous societies due to the implanted neo-colonial structures they grew up to inherit (see also Nwalutu, 2014). The experience of self-liberation of the psyche, in the view of Myers (1987), is the fulcrum that equips an individual to realize her/his true self. Myers insists that the consciousness of an African person is completely transformed and enabled when she/he ascertains the conceptual frames of the African culture’s profound structure. When reflecting on Indigenous education and some of the Indigenous skills (such as metallurgy, sculpting, metal-smith, farming—which includes fishing and hunting, medicinal pharmacy, teaching, and jurisprudence, etc.), my earlier experiences living with folks in the Eastern Nigerian countryside congeal into a sense of déjà vu, and consequently, an honest nostalgia for the Indigenous environment, world views, and cultural experiences of my upbringing. However, the pressure of my Western education and cultural disposition also creates a tension within my psyche that is always weighed on the balancing scale and grounded in my experiential
realities, thus creating in me a pattern of judgment and values that continues to strengthen my belief in African Indigenous ways of knowing.

I most certainly acknowledge, as a matter of intellectual humility, the privilege I enjoy as a naturalized citizen of Canada and as a student of one of the best post-secondary institutions in Canada. Therefore, I cannot claim that arguments raised in this work represent the opinions of millions of transnational migrants out there who cannot boast of attaining similar socio-political status, being able to afford the simplest shelter over their heads as legal migrants, or being endowed with the funds to receive any kind of formal education, as I presently do. I am therefore bestride two worlds—one in which academic, economic, and socio-political privileges enjoyed by a few negate the rights of other citizens enmeshed in bureaucratic bottlenecks and policy imperatives, and the other in which the limitations imposed by natural positioning in birth, political policies, and the material realities of the social environment conflate to redefine migrants’ identity and humanity. I am writing from the standpoint of epistemic saliency, defined by Sefa Dei (2011) as speaking from the authenticity of one’s own experiences and voice. In other words, it is a space that allows a local subject to speak from his/her informed knowledge base rather than being spoken for. The consciousness of my positioning in these two distinct worlds and inherent experiences constantly nudges me up to attempt to explore the ever-widening gap between the transnational migrants (specifically, migrant youth) and the receiving societies, which has informed my decision to explore in this thesis the lived experiences of youth transnational migrants from Nigeria to Europe. Three questions have guided the thrust of this work: how have colonization and the current neo-colonial projects in countries of origin served to prepare people (specifically, youth) to be prospective migrants and equip them to respond to
the challenges imposed by their status as immigrants? What role could the disruption of the various Indigenous practices by colonization have played in the current youth emigration from the global South to the North? How might we begin to rethink youth transnational migration?

Problem Statement

The movement of young adults as independent transnational migrants remains exponentially on the rise in the spheres of international migration (Afolayan, 2009, 2013; Wong, 2009; European Youth Centre of the Council of Europe, 2010), and independent migrant youth (particularly Africans) are being subjected to very difficult transit experiences both at transnational borders and in the receiving societies (Ki-moon, 2009; Wong, 2009). The U.N. refugee agency has established that some 30,100 migrants arrived in Italy and Malta from Africa in the first nine months of 2013, compared with 15,000 in all of 2012; this implies that migrant youth are increasingly becoming casualties of transnational migration’s hazards. According to the International Organisation for Migration, 25,000 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean in the last 20 years (Brian & Laczko, 2014). The United for Intercultural Action, a non-governmental organization that tracks migrant deaths reported by the media, says about 6,450 people died in the Canal of Sicily between 1994 and 2012. Of these, 2,000 died in 2011 and 1,700 in 2012. No account of those who perished trying to cross the Sahara desert ever reaches the media. On November 2013, United for Intercultural Action also documented 18,306 refugee deaths resulting from border-surveillance strategies adopted by Fortress Europe. Deaths were documented if they were deemed to share a connection with Fortress Europe’s border militarization, asylum laws, accommodation, detention policy, deportations, or carrier sanctions (United for Intercultural Action, 2014). With these frightening statistics and with the ever-rising reportage in international media on
migrant casualties at the borders of Europe, especially when African youth migrants are the bulk of the victims of the reported incidents, it is pertinent that attention be shifted from managing and encouraging safe migration to attending to the root causes of youth migration. Backward strategizing requires that plans and actions to stem the tide of youth migration or make migrants’ experiences more beneficial to them, their countries of origin, and receiving nations (UN, 2013a) must also attempt to locate, understand, and attend to the drives of this flow from the economic and socio-cultural atmosphere prevalent in the migrants’ countries of origin. And by reviewing the mission and vision statements of the various international organizations related to transnational migration with operational offices in Malta, certain critical questions emerge: what do these NGOs aim to achieve? How do they go about achieving their aims? Does their approach impact all at stake? How does it influence youth transnational migration and/or feed the urgency for this research? The United Nations Organization is awakening to the reality of the surge in youth migration and the risks such movement might pose to all at stake by arguing that:

Young people make up a significant share of the global number of international migrants. In 2010, there was an estimated number of 27 million international young migrants. While migration can often offer valuable opportunities and contribute to the development of communities and society at large, it can also pose risks and lead to unacceptable situations, including discrimination and exploitation. (UN, 2013b)

Surprisingly, in a panel titled “Youth migration and development: Moving development forward,” which was held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to mark the 2013 International Youth Day, the agenda for the section on Youth perspective: Sharing experience on migration—intended to deliberate on the experiences of youth involved in transnational migration—read in part: “To better understand the migration experiences of young people, the event will organize a panel composed by people who are
engaged in the implementation of programmes and other initiatives to promote safe migration and decent work for young migrant people” (UN, 2013). However, this forum only served to air the views of the UN officials and the NGOs implementing international migration policies while leaving out the intended target individuals, the youth migrant subjects who themselves could have been the most credible source of information on their migration ordeals.

It is also obvious that working from the host state, Malta, like the UN Panel earlier cited, the efforts of EU authorities and NGOs are not geared to end or minimize the increasingly unsafe cross-border movement by the young adults. Almost all of the non-governmental organizations were established to either safeguard mainland Europe (Fortress Europe) from border-crossing migrants, or to protect the civil rights and well-being of the migrants within the limits of the geo-social space prescribed by European Union member states. Among these organizations are the International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Integra, FRONTEX, Europol and UNITED for Intercultural Action. Take FRONTEX and Europol, for example, their respective goals include in a nutshell:

Promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. FRONTEX helps border authorities from different EU countries work together. FRONTEX’s full title is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. (FRONTEX, 2004)

It is thus obvious that FRONTEX was developed to protect EU borders from intruding migrants. The agency was set up in 2004 to reinforce and restructure cooperation between national border authorities of member states.

EUROPOL provides support to major international investigations by coordinating operational activities, providing forensic and technical expertise, and access to criminal intelligence and analysis. Europol is taking a leading role in establishing
more effective cooperation between agencies and law enforcement partners, including EUROJUST and INTERPOL. (Europol, 2014)

Again, securing EU member states from the criminal activities of non-nationals is featured mostly in EUROPOL’s agenda. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNITED for Intercultural Action, Europe, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNHCR express their respective statements of action inter alia as:

IOM seeks to harness the development potential of migration and to examine and promote the role of migrants as a dynamic resource for development while also looking into the possibilities of reducing some of the risks and costs associated with migration. IOM actively promotes the need to incorporate migration into development planning and poverty reduction strategies and policies. (IOM, 2011)

As a shift in focus of operation, the next few organizations aim to secure and protect immigrants within the framework of legal requirements provided by the country of destination in Europe.

UNITED coordinates, supports and strengthens a network of 560 organizations from 46 European countries. They all share values such as intercultural communication, diversity and Human Rights. We are concerned about the international situation and about the direct and indirect forms of discrimination, hate crimes and intolerance and highlight intercultural understanding, equal rights for all and a Europe without racism. UNITED enables NGOs across Europe to have access to information, support, contacts, advice and the possibility to participate in the most exciting and effective network in Europe. We need a common voice to speak out against racism and exclusion in Europe. For UNITED, Europe does not end at Schengen-borders. UNITED actively promotes exchange and cooperation between NGOs both from EU- and Non-EU countries. We stand for unity and hope, fascists spread division and fear. Our vision is one of peaceful co-existence and intercultural respect all over the world. Together we want to build a Europe of tolerance and solidarity, a Europe of respect and perspectives. Diversity is for us more than just living our lives next to each other. Intercultural understanding and cooperation is our goal. (UNITED for Intercultural Action, 2012)

United for Intercultural Action is actually the closest to relating with immigrants in view of ensuring a positive experience for the vulnerable migrants. Unfortunately, the activities of United for Intercultural Action are limited to the destination countries. This focus makes it apparently impossible to impact the root drive of migration in countries of
UNHCR, the office’s first challenge was to meet the high influx of boat arrivals from the Libyan coast heading for the European mainland. UNHCR also works closely with the Maltese government, social partners and a number of local organizations and NGOs not only to find durable solutions for refugees and beneficiaries of protection in Malta, but also to advocate and work towards improved access to protection and conditions of asylum in Malta; an increased protection-sensitive asylum system and related policies; to strengthen the capacities of government and partner agencies; and to increase general awareness about asylum issues in the country. (UNHCR, 2005)

The UNHCR focuses primarily on refugees and asylum seekers at the ports of entry. The organization receives refugees, asylum seekers and displaced peoples, who for political or socio-economic reasons flee their countries of origin to find temporary or permanent residence overseas. UNHCR ensures they have temporary shelter and provisions on arrival and assist in relocating them to a more comfortable country where their lives and safety are not compromised. It means that UNHCR is not even concerned with the problems prompting people’s displacement. The Integra, also a Malta-based non-governmental organization, focuses on the integration of immigrants, especially those categorized as illegal or asylum/refugee claimants. In its statement of action it reads:

INTEGRA foundation and ADITUS foundation are currently engaged in the Our Voice project which seeks to support refugee integration in Malta by addressing a critical gap in refugee assistance. The main goals of the project are to enhance the integration of Malta’s refugee and migrant communities, to foster a sense of active social participation by the refugee and migrant population, and to support the creation of formal and informal refugee and migrant networks/organisations. (Integra, 2012)

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) disclosed that some 45,000 boat migrants made dangerous crossings of the Mediterranean to land in Italy and Malta in 2013 (Deutsche Welle, 2014). Irrespective of the goals and efforts of the non-governmental organizations highlighted above, the unrelenting rescue of thousands of young Africans in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Malta and Lampedusa, Italy and the recent urgent call
for attention by Lillo Firetto, the Mayor of Porto Empedocle, are indications that the existing framework of operation that streamlines and manages African youth migration into Europe is not hitting the target. Porto Empedocle is a town where the Italian Navy and Coast Guards deliver rescued migrants. The mayor called on Italian and European Union officials to do more to help the town cope with the situation he called a “crisis” and “radically out of control” (Deutsche Welle, 2014). There is therefore no discounting the reality that the heightened flow of African youth migrants into Europe already constitutes a crisis in the receiving states. How this phenomenon remotely and currently affects the psychological disposition(s), socio-economic experiences, and life goals of individual migrant youth and subsequently, the development of the sending African nations remains a question. Therefore, the three stakeholders here (sending nation, migrants and receiving nation) need careful investigation for understanding how migrants’ movements and migratory experiences are influenced by the host societies and societies of origin. This is a gap this study intends to fill; in particular, understanding the migrants’ peculiar environments in Nigeria equips us with more information on circumstances that drive this migration. It is important to highlight that although the push and pull factors are major drives in adult migration, youth migration can best be understood from the perspective of the cultural and educational environment that moulded the youth’s personalities. A people’s way of life is undeniably their culture. Yet in reality war and aggression are plaguing humanity, displacing them into transnational political or economic refugees. Does this suggest a deviation from the Indigenous standards of peaceful co-existence? It will amount to a digression if I should probe this further at this juncture. It is, however, important to highlight the indications in recent studies of possible differences between the drives, experiences, and motives of adult migrants as opposed to
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

youth migrants (Mansoor & Quillin, 2007; Esipova, Ray, & Srinivasan, 2010). This realization has left academia with the question: what motivates youth to migrate and what are the experiences of the 21st century youth transnational migrants? It is therefore imperative that investigation foregrounding this thesis provides a pellucid lens for gazing at the 21st century youth transnational migration. This effort will provide us an understanding of the drives, patterns, and flow of youth migration as a way of mitigating its negative socio-economic implications first on the migrants themselves, then on the sending and receiving societies.

During the 10th International Migrants Day at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, the United Nation’s Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon accentuates the vulnerability of migrants evident in the discrimination, exploitation, abuse, hate, and harassment they encounter in receiving countries (Ki-moon, 2009). His observation stems from the rising record of movement of people across international borders (European Youth Centre, 2010; Ki-moon, 2009) and persistent variation in the demographic composition of these migrants. Ki-moon’s regrets corroborate increasing reports on the surging rate of African youth involvement in migration to Europe, which is also trailed by persistent incidents of horrific consequences. In this light, this investigation into the burgeoning phenomenon of African youth mobility becomes a necessary way of proffering viable policy options for the host countries and countries of origin. The positive outcome of the study will be two-fold: 1) putting the human resources that youth represent in a society into creative and productive economic use for sustainable development in Nigeria, and 2) stemming the tides of the unnecessary loss of young people’s lives in the desert and international waters.

Conclusion

Since migrant youth are increasingly becoming casualties of transnational migration
hazards, as pointed out by the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, necessary steps must be taken to understand the drives, trends, and ordeals of these youth. The remoteness and heinous nature of the Sahara desert trails also imply that most of the tragedies of youth migration in its transiting hubs go unnoticed. The account of those who died attempting to cross the Sahara desert into Libya en route to Europe never made it to the global newsstands. Most migrants’ deaths were documented if they were deemed to share a connection with Fortress Europe’s border securitization and surveillance or if migrant victims were asylum or refugee status seekers. A suitable strategy requires a thorough study to generate policy imperatives for executable plans and actions to stem the tide of youth migration and its unhealthy consequences. This is yet to happen considering that efforts by the governments of sending and receiving nations and international organizations continue to favor the neo-colonial and neo-liberal approach of managing the situation instead of resolving the social problem entirely. Often efforts to manage youth migration from Africa are planned in the secret chambers of European parliaments, which are out of touch with the realities of the interactions that happen at the states of migrants’ origin, their transit trails, and border crossings. Any candid endeavor to address issues of the surging youth transnational migration must locate, understand, and attend to the drives of this flow from the economic and socio-cultural atmosphere prevalent in the migrants’ countries of origin. However, reviewing the mission and vision statements of the various international organizations related to transnational migration in Malta, it is obvious that the focus on host nations produces a counter intervention that hardly affects the apparent surge in African youth migration and its often unfortunate consequences, albeit subtly.
## Terminologies and Meanings

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<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>Emigration</td>
<td>Leave one’s country to settle temporarily or permanently in another</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Come into foreign country to settle temporarily or permanently</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Traveling from one country to another as an immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN (UNO)</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nation High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clandestine</td>
<td>Term used for immigrants who sneak into a country irregularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iswed</td>
<td>Maltese term for a Black person often used derogatorily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migrants</td>
<td>Immigrants who arrive in a foreign country without required traveling papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat-people</td>
<td>General term for migrants who arrive in boats, especially from sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
<td>SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Rescue Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Refugee Convention</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CORC</td>
<td>Committee on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>PON</td>
<td>Principle of Non-discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>POBIC</td>
<td>Principle of the Best Interests of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integra</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization in Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aditus Foundation</td>
<td>A non-governmental organization in Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED for Intercultural Action</td>
<td>EU based activist group for immigrant’s rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurojust</td>
<td>European Union law enforcement system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>Agency that provides support to major international investigations, coordinates operational activities, provides forensic and technical expertise, and access to criminal intelligence and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>EU agency that promotes, coordinates, and develops European border management. It stands for the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortress Europe</td>
<td>Mainland Europe as opposed to the coastal border countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCFR</td>
<td>National Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Union Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTIP</td>
<td>National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Two
Review of Literature

This study follows the personal narratives of Nigerian youth migrants from their West African state of origin through transit to arrival and settlement in their destination country, Malta. This review will focus on the literature of global transnational migration and extrapolate to African and Nigerian experiences while considering such factors as the drives, flow, trends, and issues of this migration. Furthermore, it will explore the history and trends in African migration while delving into Nigerian migration, specifically of youth migrant subjects. The attention of stakeholders and international organizations to the phenomenon of transnational migration has been drawn by several happenings ranging from the establishment of the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) in 2005, the United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development in 2007, to the agreement of the UN General Assembly for annual forum on transnational migration (Adepoju, 2008a). The sudden shift of trajectory of world bodies to international migration has been directly associated with two major observations. First is the sudden rise in migration remittances accruing to developing nations (compare $96 billion in 2001 with $206 billion five years later), which is external development funding that is stifling these countries’ dependence on overseas development assistance (Adepoju, 2008a). The second major observation that renders Adepoju’s work invaluable to my thesis is the brain-drain that migration, specifically youth migration, might constitute to the sending nations, which are often developing economies. The impact of the loss of skilled professionals and much of the workforce of a nation’s demography may be felt in the long-run, which accounts for the shift in slogan of stakeholders to potential benefits of transnational migration for both the sending and receiving nations (see IOM, 2011; Adepoju,
It is no longer a myth that more than half of the 21st century international border-crossing migrants are youth who migrate independent of their families and close relatives to settle in foreign countries (Wong, 2009). The questions that remain unanswered are: why would the youth (particularly African youth) leave their familiar domiciles and societies for a foreign land and often precarious socio-cultural environment? Where are they migrating from and to where? How are they migrating, with what outcome, and at what cost? These questions will guide the thrust of my thesis and inevitably, the course of this literature review.

The literature used in this review falls into two major categories: 1) scholarly academic contributions, and 2) studies and reports conducted by renowned international agencies and organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Bank. The paucity of materials with direct thrust on experiences of youth involved in transnational migration means that under academic contributions, the broad perspective of this review examines conceptual issues of migration such as the pressing need to theorize youth migration: its causes, motives, processes, and consequences. Studies and reports of international organizations and popular media sources, on the other hand, are fueled by the urgent need for informed data on transnational migration. The data of academic and discursive significance include statistical information on the global, political, and socio-economic consequences of migration, as well as data on the demographic composition of transnational migrants with a particular interest in youth. The complex nature of transnational migration as a topic of social science inquiry requires that this review would, where appropriate, endeavor to intersperse data from reports or studies of international organizations and those of NGOs. It would combine these studies with the
hypotheses and analytical views of contributing scholars as a way of elucidating varying points and eliciting balanced connections or contradictions. Each of these broad categories of information is deemed relevant for troubling existing dominant (or taken-for-granted) notions on 21st century global migration as a way of understanding the experiences of youth who migrate from developing economies. Data available from the two categories of migration studies will also reveal the trends and patterns of youth migration as an emerging social phenomenon in international relations. These in turn will form a strong basis for exposing the gaps, if any, in the previous studies conducted on transnational migration, and draw from the departures and convergences in relation to youth transnational migration.

**Historical Antecedents of Transnational Migration in Africa: Pre-colonial, Colonial, and the Present**

Historical evidence continues to indicate that Africans traveled into, and had academic, religious, and business relations with Europe (Berg, 2008; Isichei, 1983; Akanle, 2013), the Middle East, and the Gulf areas before, during, and after the double tragedies of slavery—trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic (see Murray, 1989), and colonization—Arab and Western colonization. Although it was not clear through archeological findings how the Negroid people arrived in Southern Europe, evidence has indicated their presence in Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Europe prior to the 15th through 16th century trans-Atlantic slave trade (Akanle, 2013). In fact, in a recent work on *The Africanity of Spain*, Toasije (2009) succinctly problematizes the systematic expunging of contributions of the pre-historic African settlers to the historical development of Iberian Peninsula by the contemporary European Spanish authorities, arguing that

African peoples have an ancient presence in the Iberian Peninsula. In fact, Spanish identity especially has been forged on the frontlines of African and
European interaction. Iberians from Africa and Celts from Central Europe were the two major peoples in the protohistoric times and their encounter came to create the so called Celt-Iberians. It was the natural mixture of influences. Later, in the Iberian Peninsula, there were Phoenician and Greek colonies that were replaced by the collision between the Carthaginians from Africa and the Romans from Europe during the wars between Rome and Carthage from 264 to 146 BC.” (Toasije, 2009, p. 348)

Toasije’s work is relevant to my thesis for its critical exposition of the disruptions perpetuated to existing socio-cultural systems of developing states by globalization, which in itself is colonization in disguise. Toasije explores the historiography of Afro-European relations in the Spanish history and the contributions of African Spaniards to the socio-cultural development of Spain. He touches on the social and cultural Europeanization of Spain perpetrated by the Spanish authorities, especially by the government and the media through racialization and criminalization of African migrants in the country (see also Latour, 1993). By relating the struggle of Africans currently living in Spain to the collective struggles of Africans in Europe, Toasije intimates that the entrance of Spain into the European Common Market and its emergence as a fully ‘advanced’ capitalist country, with bitter anti-immigrant policies, raises concern. He criticizes the move by Spanish authorities to oversee the possible obliteration from scholarly debates and social equation of the Africanity of Spain, as well as the contributions of African-Spaniards to the socio-cultural history of the country. Toasije’s work draws essentially from the Spanish historiography, yet it is not different from the rest of the works on Africa-Europe migration. It obviously was not directed to demographic details of migrant individuals arriving in Europe from Africa, which means the emphasis is still on adult migrants. However, it hinted about the EU’s exertion of mortal force to repress the inflow of immigrants into Spain and other EU countries using the military and leaders of North African countries. Berg’s (2008) Crossing Boundaries is a
review of Natalie Zemon Davis’s *Trickster Travels*, an ethnographic narrative of a pre-colonial African scholar, geographer, traveler, and business man, Al Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad, later to be called Leo Africanus. Al-Wazzan (Leo Africanus), who migrated throughout Africa and was later captured by Spanish pirates, also travelled and lived in Europe over a long period of time. The import of Berg’s work to this segment of the review is its challenge of the dominant views of a socio-politically and economically reclusive and dormant pre-colonial Africa. It also captures the regional and transnational diplomatic, religious, and business relations and migration that were in existence between Europe and the pre-colonial Africa. The synopsis reads in part:

For Al-Wazzan, the embrace of Islam provided a unity, but it was the movement and mixture of peoples that held his Africa together. It was a territory of trade relations and political relations including warfare, domination and tribute. To most Europeans, by contrast, Africa was ‘the other,’ a ‘continent of extremes in the European imagination.’ Al-Wazzan provided Europeans with a different Africa, one of vast spaces populated by peoples whose everyday lives ‘in towns, villages, mountains, and sands’ he chronicled in fascinating detail. (p. 230)

The history of African migration has thus been charted by commerce, inter-ethnic wars, and political and diplomatic engagements of leaders of the various ethnic groups in the continent, and could therefore be said to be mostly an internal flight-alternative of displaced individuals and official engagement opportunities for ruling authorities. It implies that pre-colonial African intra- and inter-national migration could be categorized as voluntary and sometimes involuntary (Akanle, 2013). The greatest known case of forced migration in Africa was perpetuated by slave trade. While many scholars have deliberately overlooked the impact of Arabic colonization and trans-Saharan trade on the continent, this review will recall that the most heinous crimes of forced migration were enacted during trans-Saharan slavery (Murray, 1989; Osahon, 2009). And the enormity of the indelible effects of Arab
(Islamic) hegemony in Africa has been so subtle and insidious that most new generation Africans subsume the colonizer’s cultures in African heritages. In Northern Nigeria, for instance, Arab and Islamic colonization existed for upwards of 300 years prior to the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Western colonization (Fafunwa, 1974; Isichei, 1983; Nwalutu, 2004). Many Africans were pillaged across the trans-Saharan highways and marketed as slaves to Europe and the Middle East (Osahon, 2009). And the same dehumanizing theorizations and philosophical defenses of the act of slavery perpetuated by such renowned Western philosophers as David Hume, Fredrick Hegel, Montesquieu, and Rousseau against Africa and Africans (see Yelvington, 2001) were also advanced by many Arabic (Islamic) writers (see Murray, 1989; Osahon, 2009). It is equally important to stress that the trans-Atlantic slave trade significantly influenced the rate of forced migration recorded in the pre-colonial African continent. It is debated that between six and 30 million Africans were forcefully ferried across the Atlantic to Europe and the New World during the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Akanle, 2013). Drawing largely from the literature on transnational mobility, it is important to highlight that economy-induced transnational migration had occurred in many African geo-ethnic spaces before the Atlantic slave trade and colonization started. For instance, Akanle (2013) cites the migration of the “Ejigbo people of contemporary South-Western Nigeria [into] Cote d’Ivoire; the Ogbomoso people of contemporary South-Western Nigeria into Ghana and the Igbos of contemporary South-Eastern Nigeria into the coastal areas of West Africa” (p. 12; see also Olutayo, 1999). These are concerned with adult migration and are specific to intra-continental migration but Toasije (2009) also points to the prehistoric movement of peoples of African descent into the Iberian Peninsula in the present day Spain, in Europe. A closer examination of the work of Olutayo (1999) indicates that
economy-induced migration among the Igbo peoples of Eastern Nigeria started in the early 1800s (p. 153). The above citations are indications that voluntary and forced regional and transnational migrations are not new trends in African migration, although the patterns and causes might differ. The disruptions imposed by colonization to the existing cultural and socio-economic structures in colonized environments also meant subversion of the Indigenous peoples’ means of livelihood, compelling many to seek solace in white-collar jobs. The socio-cultural inclination of as many as secure these opportunities eventually are unwittingly transformed into, and encapsulated by, the colonizers’ worldviews, which in turn induces the desire to migrate because they might no longer find themselves relevant in their Indigenous geo-cultural spaces (Lebakeng, 2010; Sassen, 1988; Valiani, 2012). Nevertheless, pre-colonial and colonial migration in Africa is beyond the scope of this thesis, so my review will rather focus on the current trends in transnational migration as they relate to youth migrant subjects.

Colonization, political instability, and social unrest as well as natural and human-made disasters all might be uppermost in the lists of current drives for the trend, flow, and size of emigration from Africa to other continents (Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza, Shaw, & Shimeles 2011; Chua, 2003; Simms, 2009; Sassen, 1988). According to the literature on African migration, with the exception of education-driven migration, the majority of post-independent African migrants were initially content with regional migration (Adepoju, 2008b; Falola & Afolabi, 2007; IOM, 2009; Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza, Shaw, and Shimeles 2011; Ndao, 2012; Berriane & de Hass, 2012). Transnational migration in the 21st century Africa might be informed by a myriad of factors. And as a hot topic in the social science debate, scholars have reasoned that intra-continental or regional migration still
accounts for a larger percentage of the movement of peoples of African descent across national borders (de Haas, 2007; IOM, 2009; Ndao, 2012).

**Nigerian Youth and Transnational Migration**

Nigeria has in recent times witnessed a high influx of immigrants from its neighboring Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member nations as part of the intra-continental migration that is equally ongoing in Africa (Adepoju, 2000; 2008a; Akanle, 2013; Berriane, Aderghal, & Amzil, 2012). Recent documentation, however, reveals that more people emigrate from Nigeria to overseas countries than the recorded number of immigrants coming into the country (Afolayan, 2009). It is important to highlight that the categories of potential emigrating Nigerians are more of educated professionals (Falola & Afolabi, 2007), as consistent with Sassen’s research (2003), as well as indigent youth with low levels of education who are unable to procure necessary documents (Brachet, 2012; Ndao, 2012; Nwalutu, 2014). A Nigerian profile on migration published in 2009 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) streamlined efforts by the government and other stakeholders to regulate and manage migration processes so as to channel their positive outcomes towards development. However, the high rate of irregular migration in the West African sub-region and inadequacies of documentation equally mean that regulating emigration will remain as much of an uphill task as restrictions on immigration itself. The record level of migration activities in the country has been attributed to several factors, including its ever-rising population, the fluctuating economic atmosphere, and the porosity of the nation’s borders—all of which might be part of the push factors paradigm. Interestingly, and crucial to my thesis, is the understanding that with its burgeoning population, Nigeria has been declared a youthful nation in studies and reports published by the United Nations and
other international bodies (World Economic Forum, 2014; Zubema, 2012). A publication of
the World Economic Forum on Nigerian demographic and economic prospects reads in part:

With an estimated population of 170 million people, Nigeria is the seventh most
populous country in the world. The country has a very youthful age structure,
with nearly three-quarters of its population under the age of 30. Even if its
fertility and mortality rates decline substantially, Nigeria will still have a youthful
age structure which is projected to increase by 40% by 2025. (Global Agenda,
2014, p. 3)

The obvious implication of this demographic report is that youth comprise a larger
percentage of emigrants leaving the country for overseas or other regional destinations.
Moreover, recent records have shown a steady rise in the number of Nigerian youth
emigrating for education purposes. It is important also to note that among the positive effects
of the upsurge in migration in Nigeria has been a dramatic rise in the flow of official fiscal
remittances into the country (Falola & Folabi, 2007; Afolayan, 2009; Akanle, 2013). For
instance, a significant rise in remittances from two billion to 17 billion Dollars was recorded
between the years 2004 and 2007, and in 2007 specifically, remittances from Nigerian
nationals overseas accounted for 6.7% of the country’s gross domestic product (Afolayan,
2009). The transcontinental destination of most Nigerian migrants is Europe, the United
States of America, Asia, and the Oceania countries. Of course, the implications of the mass
exodus of youth from the population of Nigeria is farther away from the scope of this thesis,
but understanding the lived experiences of these migrants from origin through transit to their
destination remains, in so many ways, critical to the efforts to evolve youth-friendly border
policies and praxis to support the rising trend of global youth migration.

**Perspectives on Youth Migration: Factors that Drive Youth to Cross International
Borders as Independent Migrants**

In a study identifying the global potential migrants, where they want to go, and why it
matters, Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan (2010) noted from a survey on youth migration
conducted by Gallup from all the regions of the world that “factors that fuel the desire to leave one’s country vary by country, region, and human development level, but a common theme is opportunity—whether it is the chance to reunite with family members who are already abroad, to start a new business, to feel free to express one’s views without fear, or to live where children are treated with respect” (p. 19). As earlier stressed, the predominant emphasis is on migration and the migrant decisions and experiences of adults, while youth and children are accounted for (as is the case here) only as reuniting with family members who are economically established abroad. This discursive approach does not take into account the sheer size of youth migrants admitted to currently represent the largest segment of the 21st century global migrant population. The most salient of the survey’s findings is the positive correlation between the existence of transnational social networks and the people’s desire to migrate. In other words, a potential youth migrant develops the desire to travel and live overseas after listening to the experiences of family members, friends, or others who have traveled overseas. Thus, one’s social network becomes a kind of bolster of confidence for the potential youth migrant to explore the overseas option (see also Akanle, 2013). While Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan (2010) framed their survey around discourses of ‘push and pull’ experiences, other scholars such as Sassen (1988), Valiani (2012), and Appadurai (1996) have expressed views that made the findings very parochial for understanding the complexity of 21st century migration. However, it is particularly with respect to the migration of young adults that the work of Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan (2010) is crucial to this study. For instance, the observation that the quest for employment opportunities overseas is a determining factor only for older adults to migrate (Esipova, Ray, & Srinivasan, 2010) is in sharp contrast to earlier findings that generalized this factor as a key motive for migration.
The study reasons that:

In Europe, the Middle East and North Africa region, and the Americas, older, underemployed adults aged 30 to 65 are more likely to say they would like to migrate than those who are the same age and are employed or not in the workforce. Millions of young people worldwide would move away from their countries permanently if they had the opportunity, regardless of whether they have jobs at home. In most places, except the Middle East and North Africa, Gallup finds that adults younger than 30 who are employed, underemployed or not in the workforce are equally likely to desire to migrate. (p. 18)

It is fascinating to observe from the responses in Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan’s (2010) study that are similar to other related works reviewed; employment opportunity, improved income, and improved standard of living are also a crucial part of the push and pull factors underpinning Egyptian youth migration. The International Organization for Migration in Egypt conducted a survey to understand how Egyptian youth perceived the social, political, and economic future of their country and to what extent the turmoil, reform, and uncertainty might directly or indirectly influence their decision to migrate. The responses were affirmation of findings of previous surveys and the current distribution of Egyptians working abroad (Pitea & Hussain, 2011). According to the study, “young Egyptians are willing to migrate mainly to Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia (26%), UAE (23%) and Kuwait (11%), followed by the United States (12%) and Italy (5%)” (p. 6). It is interesting to see that the current political crisis and the resulting socio-economic uncertainty in Egypt might induce adult Egyptians to migrate, these factors do not have a significant impact on the youth decision to migrate. Fifteen per cent of respondents agreed that the current situation makes them want to migrate, while forty-one per cent confirmed that the current crisis situation has little influence on their decision to migrate. An upwards of forty-four per cent of respondents indicated that they had decided to migrate before the January 25, 2011 crisis. The findings of this survey challenge some of the earlier works suggesting that crisis
situations in developing economies fan people’s desire to migrate. While this could be true of adult migrants, the same may not be said of independent youth migrants. It is correspondingly essential to examine how these young adult migrants are received in the host countries in the context of limited access through territorial borders.

**Youth Migration in Unequal World: Patterns and Trends as Functions of a Skewed Power-play**

The governments of African nations (and by extension, other sending countries of the South) wield little or no influence on welfare outcomes of their migrant citizens whose remittances have so many implications for the fiscal well-being of their domestic economies is highlighted in Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza, Shaw, and Shimeles (2011). Of great import to my thesis are the observations that information on the nature, demographic constituents of migrant subjects, impact, and patterns of migration is an indispensable precondition for improved management of migration. And such understanding is lacking among developing economies due to inadequate information on migration processes in these countries (Brachet, 2012; Ndao, 2012). On the contrary, advancements in technology, communication, and transportation in the industrialized world mean appropriate gathering, processing, use, and manipulation of data on migration to suit the parochial agenda of developed nations. The work of Ratha et al. (2011) further shows that economic prosperity and the acquisition of the colonialist form of education influence the flow and pattern of human migration from the developing South to the North. And in Appadurai’s (1996) and Sassen’s (1988) works it does seem that economic considerations and leisure are the major considerations in the North-South migration, going by the earlier discussion. Ratha et al. (2011) also observe that approximately two-thirds of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, especially migrants who are economically indigent and do not possess some recognized level
of Western education, migrate to other countries in their economic region, which is consistent with Brachet (2012), Bhabha (2011), and Ndao (2012). What is not accentuated in Ratha et al. (2011) but is referred to, without deserved minutiae in Brachet (2012) and Ndao (2012) is that sub-regional migrations are often the first transit initiatives to transnational migration among indigent African youth migrants. The contribution of their work on the understanding of migration patterns and flow is the connection they make between the economic status of migrants and the destination of these migrants (see also Adepoju, 2008). Nevertheless, while economic status might not be the sole determinant of migrants’ destination, for the transnational migrant youth it is a likely factor in the decision about the mode of migration to engage. The economic status of migrants is often one of the factors determining how far and to what destination they can go. For example, migrants from richer countries tend to migrate more to destinations outside of Africa, while potential migrants from economically disadvantaged countries choose to migrate more to their neighboring countries which they have assessed to have more buoyant economies (Ratha et al., 2011). The argument raised here might apply to adult migrants, but the spontaneity and flux in the 21st century youth migration, as observable from other data sources (see Bilsborrow, 2010; Collins, 2011; Higley, Nieuwenhuysen, & Neerup, 2011; MOE, 2010), seem to contradict this claim. In fact, poor migrant youth from Eastern Europe and Asian countries as well as those from the Middle Eastern and North African countries seem to be influenced by economic status only with respect to the mode of transportation and movement they employ during their migration, but not with respect to their choice of destination countries (see Brachet, 2012; Black, Crush & Peberdy, 2007). The outstanding thesis of the above analysis that is critical to understanding migration causes, drives, and flow (with particular reference to youth) is the
revelation that current patterns and trends of migration are shifting with the demographic composition of migrants. Noteworthy also is the result of household surveys conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, which show that “migrants tend to be young adults (two-thirds of Burkina Faso’s emigrants were between the ages of 15 and 40) and male (more than 90 percent in Burkina Faso), generally with some education beyond primary school” (Brachet, 2012, p. 2). This observation is in agreement with most of the literature on transnational migration in this review (see Wong, 2009; IOM, 2009; Brachet, 2012; Ndao, 2012), and it grounds the urgent need to understand how the disproportionate power relations between the industrialized world and developing nations influence the cross-border experiences of transnational migrants, specifically youth migrants from the developing nations of Africa.

**A World Without Borders: Re-examining International Migration and Border Surveillance**

Must sovereign states be adjured to keep their territorial borders open to foreign migrants? This work has reasoned that the migration of individuals across national borders may not be just a result of economic factors but due to other potential factors or combinations of factors that are natural or socio-political in nature; for example, overpopulation, unemployment, war, and natural disaster. In this context, I would argue that the current migration trends and patterns have always revealed the volatility of migration flow shaped by non-palpable social and environmental factors such as man-made or natural disasters, economic recessions, and political instability. Immigrants’ demographic constitution therefore changes from one geo-ethnic location to another in varying times of history, and so do destination locations change with time. For instance, the previous chapter hinted that in the late 19th century A.D. (1870-1914), citizens of Western European countries formed the
bulk of immigrants to the New World countries (Solimano, 2010; Allen, 2008). In like manner, the recent economic recession (2007-2009), as in the periods following the Second World War, also induces people’s mobility in regions of the world where they feel their means of survival threatened. More of this mobility is obvious among two categories of migrants and also depicts the direction or shift in direction of migration flow. The first category includes economic and political migrants who flee unfavorable conditions in their countries of origin to temporarily or permanently live in foreign lands. In this category, political migrants often move regionally from one country into the next within the sub-region or continent. Some may as well migrate beyond the sub-region to other international territories of their choice, again depending on their ability to secure relevant traveling documents. While political migration-flow is South-South or South-North sometimes, it is important to note that youth migrants are rarely observed to be political migrants. Nonetheless, to defy the often restrictive border surveillance systems of the foreign countries into which they choose to migrate, youth migrants claim asylum or refugee status on arrival, and many times their applications are turned down (see Pisani, 2012). Economic migrants, on the other hand, feature not only individuals but also corporate bodies. In a bid to reduce the cost per unit of their products and services, multinational corporations are de-investing from the North and moving their production lines and staff to the developing countries of the South. This movement apparently offers production advantages as it enables these manufacturing and service-providing giants to harvest cheaper labor and raw materials from the sources (Appadurai, 1996). More of the migrants in this segment move from developing to industrialized countries. These two broad categories are by no means exhaustive since the current youth migration is, as clarified earlier in this chapter, driven by factors other than
political or economic well-being. The post-911 fear of terrorism in industrialized nations and the recent economic recession have created rigid and heavily equipped border-surveillance spaces, implying that certain immigrants are restricted from entering countries of their choice. How the identity of such migrants intersects with other factors to construct them as inadmissible bodies is beyond the scope of this study, yet immigrants’ contribution to the economic prosperity of host countries is indisputable (Deaux, 2006; Solimano, 2010). Scholarly contributions on the question of border control and surveillance are immense. Moses (2006) makes a sweeping and compelling argument for an international movement of people across open transnational borders irrespective of country of origin or destination. Moses’ work examines the historiography and morality of immigration, and weighs their impact on the balancing scale of social and scientific analysis guided by political, economic, and moral forces.

His findings validate a call for no immigrant restrictions in global transnational borders; therefore, he substantially engages almost every possible objection against the restriction of transnational borders to migrants. Moses’ thesis is plausible, comparatively rational, and morally reasonable, but morality finds no grounds in international relations. The socio-political reality of Moses’ proposition for unrestricted transnational borders is widely contested or rejected. Nevertheless, it appears that the major opposition to the entire idea of open territorial borders to migrant individuals is coming from the state authorities, specifically authorities of industrialized nations. There may be more political biases against Moses’ proposition than is obvious here, but its political dimensions will not find effective deliberation outside the economic context. Moses and Letnes (2004) observe:

In contrast to earlier periods of globalization (e.g., late 19th century)—and the openness of other factors, goods and services markets—labor markets remain
remarkably protected. Whereas governments claim impotence in the face of other globalizing forces, they remain remarkably potent in shielding domestic economies from international labor flows. (p. 1609)

Obviously, a nation-state would feel pressured both internally and externally to safeguard its territorial, economic, and political interests. What is not clear, however, is if these border protections that translate to restrictions and gate-keeping on labor-migration apply equally to all transnational migrant individuals. In the place of what I view as an impractical open-border system, as prescribed by Moses, my thesis would advance a less-rigid, more universal entry-port for all countries of the world whether they are located in the Northern or Southern hemisphere. This is because international or regional migration is beneficial in all facets of human life to both developing and industrialized nations alike. Definitely consideration of the benefits accruable through migration has nudged the United Nations Organization, International Organization for Migration, and other Western based NGOs to begin reformulating and re-engaging their staff to encourage and manage international migration as a viable option to development (Lonnback, 2014; IOM, 2011). In their earlier work in which they argue for less restriction of transnational border to labor migration, Moses and Letnes (2004) explore the economic costs to international labor restrictions. The work attempts to provide a more reasonable and politically-relevant rationale for a lesser restriction on transnational border. It asserts:

Our results suggest that the estimated gains from the liberalization of global immigration controls have increased substantially. Indeed, we find that even a small liberalization of international migration restrictions can still yield substantial gains. In particular, we estimate that a 10% increase in international migration corresponds to an efficiency gain of about US$774 billion (1998) dollars. (p. 1609)

It is critical, however, to consider such questions as: are citizens of a certain hemisphere immune to border gate-keepers on assumption of citizenship of a dominant global system
that has constructed these borders wittingly to admit certain body categories and reject the ‘Othered’ bodies (Spivak, 1988; Stasiulis & Bakan, 2005)? Are certain borders marked for socio-political permeation and exploitation while others are jealously guarded from ‘illegal’ and unwanted ‘aliens’? Are certain traveling documents fortified to disarm border surveillance systems and render their carriers easy access to all countries through international gate-keeping systems? In the earlier chapter of this thesis, I recounted how my wife and I were separated from the queue in the Amsterdam airport, Netherlands, during our trip to Canada in 2005 and taken to a special surveillance office to be scrutinized while most migrants carrying ‘acceptable border documents’ were simply ushered onto the plane with a wave of hand. What does it mean to be constructed as an ‘Other’ migrant and how does this experience engage the migrant to rethink her/his global citizenship? These are lines of enquiry to be explored in an effort to understand how transnational border gate-keeping has polarized global citizens into admissible and inadmissible migrant bodies.

**Structural Inequity and the Politics of Transnational Border Restrictions**

In an effort to understand how the notion of power fundamental to state security frameworks conflates with and influences the treatment of immigrants, Bourbeau (2011) draws from social and securitization theories. He also uses theories of migration to explore the role of political agents, the media, and circumstantial influences in the process of migration securitization in Canada and France. Bourbeau uses content-analysis of editorials of major newspapers and public opinion polls in France and Canada in search of better understanding of the securitization of transnational borders with a specific focus on France and Canada. His findings are that the refugee crisis of the 1990s and the enormous speculation of flow perpetuated worries and concerns in areas covered by the study.
Bourbeau locates his argument for immigrants’ restriction and securitization at Canada borders in the contiguous Canada-US borders. USA was targeted in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, and according to the editorials reviewed in Bourbeau’s studies, such restrictions and surveillance were not necessarily the case before the attack. One would conjecture that border proximity to the USA might have engendered apprehension that led to securitization in Canada post-9/11. And since France is geographically afar the incident of 9/11 could not have a similar effect in that country. Contextual factors have also been established by this study to have considerable impact on the level of securitization of transnational migration. The relevance of Bourbeau’s work is essentially that of unravelling the confluences of environmental, socio-psychological, and political factors that interact to stimulate a state or its agents to securitize immigration in their geo-territorial spaces. In my view, there has been an unfair choice of study locations. Bourbeau’s study could have been spread not across two immigrant receiving states of the West as the case was but between a Southern sending nation and a Western receiving nation. The ideology behind the analysis of two Western states, irrespective of what justifications we might have, is still the insidious neo-liberal, colonial, and imperialist underpinning that constructs migrants, specifically those from the Southern hemisphere, as a problem to the peaceful existence of the receiving countries of the industrialized North. I am not sure Bourbeau’s use of content-analysis of the print media, consideration of exogenous shocks, and public opinion poll were justifiable choices for the magnitude of the work executed in the study. Contemporary media audiences are more invested in electronics. Social media and application of this methodology could have grounded his work suitably to overcome the hurdles of internal validity and generalizability of the outcome. By also sampling the opinions of the elite, technocratic, and
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

scientific audience, the author might have over-represented the middle and upper socio-economic classes in the study with little or no attention to the majority in the working class who obviously constitute the bulk of contemporary migrant demography. The reason for this deduction is that only a negligible number of people read newspapers presently, which accounts for the recent mergers and closures of some print-media setups in developed nations (particularly in North America). Even in developing economies, the cost of production resulting in the high cost of the final outputs has put print media readership at the mercy of electronics media. One would have expected therefore that Bourbeau should have considered the advantages that electronic media reports provide, especially the internet technologies.

In a more distinct but intrinsically relevant study, Kapur (2005) examines how the current extraordinary movement of people across international borders exposes “the porosity of borders, the transnational reality of subaltern existence, and the contingent foundation of international law” (p. 137). By interrogating how, on one hand, encounters with the constitutive others, or the transnational migrant subject, disrupt and disturb universalists’ notion of international law, she exposes the Modernists’ perspective on international law that attempts to counter, curtail, restrict, and resist the cross-border ‘Othered’ migrant body. Kapur’s work is pertinent to this thesis to the extent that it exposes the power imbalance in the management of international borders and movement of goods and persons across these borders. It is especially disconcerting that the whole idea of universality of cross-border movement as it relates to the international migrant subjects receives its definition, interpretation, and meaning from the West. Documented evidence doesn’t, however, suggest that citizens of the industrialized West are more involved in transnational migration than citizens of the developing South (Higley, Nieuwenhysen, & Neerup, 2011; Deaux, 2006a).
The lopsided structure and control system inherent in transnational border politics ostensibly apportion power of attorney of international borders to Western states and their citizens – the right to enter and leave any sovereign territory without restriction – when such opportunities are denied international migrant subjects from the South. If therefore the ability to challenge, alter, or validate the legitimacy in international law as it affects cross-border migration is based on the individual’s position about the modernist argument of human progress, or level of alignment with the dominant social group, such legitimacy leaves much to be desired. In a similar study, Deaux (2006c) examines the patterns of US immigration to understand how they influence domestic policies. The work explains how the combination of three socio-political factors: policies, demography, and social representation, have continued to shape the trends and flow of contemporary transnational migration and immigrant experiences. In his view, the United States government’s policies on immigration and the demographic realities of the country are two elements interlocking to produce a specific flow into the country and immigrants’ experiences in the United States. The third factor, social representation, is not as tangible as demographic data, yet is, according to Deaux, even more critical in shaping immigrants’ experiential realities in their host societies. Social representation as the articulation of “attitudes and images that a community holds about immigration—in general, as well as about particular groups of immigrants—is a critical member of the triad” (p. 13). Apparently Deaux has directed the trajectory of this argument on adult migration with respect to US immigration, leaving one to question if the interlocking triad factors—policies, demography, and social representation—would produce different policy options when confronted with non-dominant bodies at the US border. Considering that often policies are influenced by the subjective views of a country’s authorities rather than on objective
derivatives of data analysis, how might Deaux’s assertion play out in youth, and specifically African youth, transnational migration discourse? In the same vein, the process of social representation in the prevailing media, and interpretation of events, ideas, and processes also influences a people’s political actions. The primary position of Deaux’s hypothesis derived from the understanding that a shift in public opinion in the US, for instance, resulted in the 1986 promulgation of Immigration Reform Control as a precautionary and deterring measure against migrant influx. The purpose of Immigration Reform Control, it seems, was to replace open door policies with border surveillance and gate-keeping aimed at checking the surge in illegal immigration and punishing those who were implicated in the influx of illegal immigrants. Further, Deaux forecloses the space for appreciating and reviewing dynamic demographic shifts in constituents of the transnational migrant population as is currently witnessed globally. Deaux’s work subsumes the experiences of transnational migrant youth in the analysis of the US national Immigration Reform control of 1986 without highlighting how different bodies of migrants are represented and subsequently treated by the three socio-political factors accentuated in the argument. For instance, we are learning nothing special about how this restriction of immigrant flow influenced youth migrants’ experiences in the country. It does not depict how the restriction resulting from the social construction of difference at the US borders responds to, as an example, Latino migrant bodies filtering into the US from Mexico borders as opposed to migrants from Western Europe. Also, Deaux’s work did not show the voices and opinions that were silenced even among the US citizenry, for it was certainly the voices and opinions of the dominant Euro-American individuals that were reified and valorized as the voice of America. In other words, it is the opinion of this segment of Americans that determines who becomes legal or illegal, and who must be
repatriated or retained to become American citizens—not the opinions of the Indigenous peoples of America, African Americans, Latin Americans, and other immigrant settlers whose narratives must not be swept under the carpet if the history of the United States must be viewed holistically.

In a comparative analysis of the efforts of immigration authorities in the United States and Australia to effectively sustain a balance between the continuous large-scale inflow of immigrants, the majority of whom were from developing countries, and the task of immigrants’ economic and social integration, Higley, Nieuwenhysen, and Neerup (2011) corroborate Deaux’s (2006c) thesis on the use of social representation by the citizenry to construct images and identities of immigrants. Relevant to my work is the demonstration, which derives from Higley, Nieuwenhysen, and Neerup’s earlier work, the *Nation of Immigrants*, that so long as positive economic conditions thrived, state authorities would have no difficulties balancing the surge of immigration and the pressure such an influx poses on available socio-economic amenities and life support systems. This is not the case during economic recessions. It wouldn’t be out of place to reason, therefore, that immigrants are made scapegoats of the destination country’s economic woes. Nevertheless, Higley et al. only featured the experiential realities of adult migrants. They ignored how social representation, immigration policies made by authorities at various periods of economic shifts, and the economic conditions in the US and Australia influence the current outburst of transnational youth migration.

**Problematizing Border Control in the 21st Century: Is There Precedence?**

Transnational border mobility, surveillance, and state control of territorial borders are as old as the creation of nation-states in the Mercantilist period, specifically during the 1648 Westphalia treaty marking the end of the Thirty Year War. Surveillance and control of
transnational mobility have also been major concerns of the international community prior to, during, and after the two World Wars, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 (Moses, 2006). While the earlier passports and other documents were actually used to protect foreign travelers in England, the Magna Carta of June 1215 granted merchants “unhindered travel in accordance with ancient and lawful customs” but the state (sovereign) “retained the right to expel or exclude specific groups of aliens” (Moses, 2006, p. 40; Kapur, 2005 p.141-2), an experience similar to what currently happens at all transnational borders. I will draw from Browne’s (2007) submissions on border surveillance and gate-keeping. Browne (2007) visualizes border-surveillance identity documents as currently the key technology in the state management of human mobility—the production procedures of which, if critically analyzed, shed light on the processes of state and nation formation. This contribution foregrounds my earlier view that most industrialized nations and multinational NGOs are actually not interested in addressing the root cause(s) of the surge in transnational migration but in migration management. It also foregrounds the procedures in the production and issuance of the Canadian Permanent Resident Card (PRC) as a border gate-keeping mechanism; and by so doing reveals how documentation and other procedures in the introduction of the PRC construct people through the logic of binary opposites into differentiated and identifiable state subjects.

In a critique of a state’s domineering influence at transnational borders, Anderson, Sharma, and Wright (2009) argue for no borders as an imperative, concrete socio-political project. The resistance to the power of the state at transnational border control is gradient and mostly unfavorable to those constituted as Other. The unpacking of subjectification of the migrant Other ostensibly leaves migrant citizens of the Southern hemisphere at the mercies
of border authorities in the industrialized North. Globalization has been used as a tool to polarize the world and its citizenry into similar binary categories of industrialized and unindustrialized, developed and undeveloped, civilized and uncivilized, with lopsided power imbalances in the interplay of politics amongst affected citizens of the two divides. It is important to note that the previous and present World Orders originated in the North, which positions itself as both the mouthpiece and centerpiece of global politics. The question emerging from this discourse should aim to address the unenviable positioning of migrants from the subjugated South at the entry point into Northern territory. As Sharma (2005) reasons:

In contemporary discourses of national security, it is the eradication of the “dangerous foreigner” that is paramount to notions of protecting the “homeland.” This demands of “us,” the nation’s subjects, that “we” be vigilant against “outsiders” seeking increasingly clever ways to circumvent national border controls and thereby usurp the authority and integrity of the nation-state. Such rhetoric is, of course, readily apparent in the post-September 11 war on terror with its widespread practice of nationalized, racialized, and gendered profiling of security threats. Yet, it is important to remind ourselves that such national security agendas have long been in place. (p. 88)

Anderson, Sharma, and Wright (2009) examine borders as an ideological project that generates and reinforces social difference. Their work, which is grounded in notions of no-borders, examines some responses to injustices produced by state border surveillance apparatuses and reasons that although some of these responses were needful to subvert the hegemonic influence of the state exerted at the national borders, they were inadequate. The shortfall of the responses stems from their inability to genuinely and justifiably contest the dominance of state and its constitution of people into its subjective citizens and its claim to nationhood. The position of Anderson, Sharma, and Wright in this discourse is as sublime as it is subtle. As in Moses (2006), the no-borders project discards notions of citizenship and
statehood while foregrounding the critical role borders play to the success of neo-liberal capitalist projects. Although this posture of argument is logical and morally sensible, its plausibility is undermined by the realism that the nation-state has come to stay in domestic and transnational relations. While no youth-specific questions are raised, it is baffling that the attention of sociologists is yet to be alerted by the unhealthy trend of youth transnational mobility. Besides, the veracities of the present socio-political upheaval make it inconceivable and chaotic to imagine a world without transnational boundaries. My view, however, is that, as an alternative to Anderson, Sharma, and Wright (2009), more flexible restrictions at the borders that might not infringe on the fundamental rights of traversing individuals (Stewart, 2010) as is the case with capital and commodities, are essential. The supremacy of control over a defined territorial land mass has since the Westphalia treaty been determined by an abstractive authority called state. And a territorial landmass subsumes the inhabiting individuals who must show loyalty for the authority of the state and security of the constituting individuals to be assured. In this case, the intrusion of unsolicited foreigners might suggest a threat, or at best, an intrigue. It is therefore critical to mention that due to the domination and control of global borders by the industrialized world, citizens of migrant-sending countries are irredeemably under the strangle-hold of dominant nations’ migration policies even in their own countries. The use of moral suasion and other diplomatic and economic pressures induces tension and fear on developing states such as African countries. It means that these nations are compelled to cower under the policies of their former colonial masters at the jeopardy of the freedom of movement of their citizenry, which would not be the case in societies of the industrialized world.

**Borders by Proxy, Politics of Border Crossing: A Case for Migrants at the Margin**

The battle of border control is presently going far beyond the ambits of the nation-
state to imagined territories. Against this backdrop, Bigo (2005) examines the link between the prevailing border securitization, penalization, and incarceration with respect to Western countries and the new form of border surveillance. Under the new border control system, industrialized nations exert a push-back at unwanted immigrants through border expansion. In other words, they police their contiguous borders beyond limits recognized by international treaties to be the exclusive economic zones. Policing from a distance implies adopting a delocalized border-strategy for a new social and imagined territory within and outside the territorial boundaries of the nation-state Guild (2005), which raises a critical question in the contribution that asks: “Who is entitled to move?” (p. 14). Guild notes that globalization is the positioning of economy-driven mobility above the authority of the nation-state in which multi-national corporations secure passage across the barriers of transnational borders using their economic powers. Guild recognizes that: “The right to move for economic gain, however, whether in the form of goods, capital, service or persons, in a globalizing world is increasingly limited to those who are already economically advantaged” (p. 14; see also Bahman, 2010), and I would add, to those deemed acceptable to the host nations. For instance, in Araujo (2014), the realization of another group of subordinate “Other” in more recent developments as opposed to the usual African migrants poses a serious problem of conscience and re-evaluation of action to the immigration policy makers in Portugal. Until now, immigrants probably were the “illegal Africans,” so dubbed by the nation-state’s coloniality of power and tropes of racism. But now, Brazilians and Ukrainians are part of the burgeoning migrant labor border-crashers in Portugal. The notion of cultural diversity in a supposedly homogenous Portugal thus becomes a concern for the critics of Portugal’s immigration policy. I argue therefore that accepting the narratives of globalization
as a precursor for racism in immigration discourses in Portugal as elsewhere, subsumes neo-colonial projects into the dynamics of push and pull rationality, which apparently obscures the role of the extant colonial projects that globalization represents.

In the contemporary constitution of race and debates on immigration in Portugal, as in other European countries, current influences and the perpetuation of subjugation through colonial legacies are always occluded (Toasije, 2009). I argue that Araujo’s (2014) use of the term post-colonial is both illogical and unrealistic because it is an assumption or outright denial of the presence of colonization in the current global socio-political processes. Neocolonial subjugation is not just the persisting epistemic salience (lived experiences) of countries of the developing South but a continuously breeding and mutating socio-political virus. Therefore, contemporary narrative on immigration and diversity in Portugal as in many Western states humanizes colonization through the logics of history and Indigenous connections. This denial of colonization and efforts to establish a false link to intercultural relations in the state appear to be providing excuses for the immigrant-receiving states to wittingly evade the racism concerns engendered by the presence of the migrant Other in their societies. It is important to also stress that Guild’s (2005), Toasije’s (2009), and Araujo’s (2014) works were not so much concerned with the demographic constitution of the African migrant population highlighted in their treaties as on the oppressive politicking and policies of the current EU leadership directed towards possible elimination of the migrants’ encroachment on European mainland. However, if Phillips’ (2014) notion of mixed-migration is brought into the dialogue, carefully assessing the various categories of migrants in boats arriving at EU shores will ensure that the violation of migrants’ rights provided for in international charters does not occur. Such steps for instance will safeguard the rights of
vulnerable migrants such as children, youth, women, and people with disabilities. Careful assessment of immigrants will prevent repatriating genuine asylum and refugee migrants to their countries of origin where their lives would be in jeopardy.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, attention to the victims of contemporary migration and border restriction policies typically are focused on female and children migrants. But overlooking the various categories of individuals constituting the migrant population invisibilizes the excluded bodies and minimizes the rationality of modifying existing policies to improve their migration experiences. Measures should be initiated to contextualize and theorize the transnational border crossing experiences of youth migrants and migrants living with disabilities. Until conversations on migration are broadened enough to encompass various categories of migrants, as well as the interlocking chains and processes of events that generate their lived experiences, full knowledge of the global migrant subjects will remain mere conjecture. This reasoning emanates from the understanding that terminologies and categories matter so much in the perception, consideration, and interventions migrants receive at the border and within host societies. Many youth migrants are actually situated in the intersections and often at the margins of the migrant categories. Also, clarifying between categories would enable scholars to aspire for a nuanced narrative of individual migrants as a more authentic account and epistemic saliency (lived experience) of the migrant subjects.
Chapter Three  
Theoretical Framework and Historical Background to Study

Definition-wise, theories are an empirically tested and methodically proven statement that provides consistent and sustained evidence of a logical relationship between variables. In social sciences, theories might offer a broad description of a phenomenon by providing a philosophical way of making sense of its existence or the reasons behind its manifestation. My study, which investigates the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta, is therefore guided by three theoretical frameworks: anti-colonial, anti-racist theories, and Indigenous knowledge discursive frameworks. These philosophical models permit critical analysis of the intersections and the departures of power relations in the politics of global mobility or transnational migration. The movement phenomenon involves on one hand labor, capital, technology, and service; and on the other, the processes of knowledge production, validation, and dissemination (Appadurai, 1996). My thesis focuses on human mobility, with specific interest in youth. It is crucial to stress that the theories in use share the inherent potential to examine how wielding control of the dynamics of power intrinsic in the global processes of knowledge production and validation as well as transnational border movement of persons has become a subtle method adopted universally by the dominant group to subjugate the less developed world. With these theoretical frameworks, it is possible to foreground the disruption and subjugation of Indigenous socio-economic structures as well as the cultural encapsulation that results in the production of the Southern migrant other (Sassen, 1988; Valiani, 2012; Chua, 2003). The works of anti-colonial and Indigenous theorists such as Fanon (1952, 1963), Dei (2010a), Freire (1970; 1994), Semali and Kincheloe (1999), Smith (1999), and Wane (2011) provide me the needed cue to critically and demonstrably examine how the oppressive subjugation of the cultural heritage and
knowledge systems of Indigenous African communities by colonization and neo-colonial processes results in people’s displacements and the current trend of youth emigration.

As analytical approaches, anti-colonial and antiracist frameworks and African Indigenous worldviews are discourses that challenge all manifestations of hegemony and imposition of ideas and practices of cultural, economic, and socio-political dimensions. In this work, I will be examining the contributions of colonization and neo-colonial processes on the displacement of African youth from their remote and immediate economic and socio-cultural spaces. The thrust of this segment will be on the colonialists’ manipulation of the colonized people’s cultural heritages using such destabilizing tools as imposition of foreign language(s), education, and medicine. The representation is guided by the assumption that potential transnational African youth migrants move abroad due largely to a disconnect from their Indigenous cultures and worldviews that might have been subverted by colonial education and neo-colonial projects in their domestic environments. Wane (2011) insists: “It is necessary for us to go back to the source and ask ourselves how has colonialism, as a theory, a project, praxis, and discourse managed to produce and reproduce itself—politically, socially, culturally, materially, and ideologically?” (p. 281). African Indigenous education is located in the context of Indigenous cultural heritages that have been subverted by the Islamic and Western colonization (Sefa Dei, 2010a; WaThiong’o, 2005; Lebekeng, 2010). And African Indigenous culture emphasizes a realization of one’s identity and humanity within the context of service to the society, communal accountability, skillfulness, resourcefulness, and reciprocal use of the environment. The overarching inference of the assumption of this work derives from the postulation that African youth born and raised entirely in Arabic and Western cultures might lack these qualities with respect to their
localities, and therefore would most likely find themselves irrelevant to their socio-economic and cultural environments. A question arises, how does the loss of Indigenous knowledge systems through neo-colonial projects and acquisition of colonial (foreign) education predispose Nigerian migrant youth to the colonizers’ cultures and worldviews, and consequently influence their decision to emigrate overseas?

**Neo-colonial Processes and African Youth Migration: Implications of Subtle Re-colonization**

This section considers the colonizers’ furtive repression of Indigenous worldviews symbolized in the subjugation of the people’s cultures, language, education, and medical practices. It draws largely from Frantz Fanon’s treatise on colonialism and its impact on the psyche of the colonized peoples. It further explores ways in which current neo-colonial encounters shape the experiences of the immigrant Nigerian youth, subsequently influence their decision to emigrate to overseas, and equip them to weather the storms of transnational migration in Malta. As a working definition, I will define neo-colonialism as the strategy an imperial state adopts in seeking to impose political and economic domination on another independent state or territorial land mass but not coercively forming the state into a colony. As an analytical approach, anti-colonial discourse seeks to dismantle colonialism and neo-colonial structures and influences “visible and invisible, as well as finding ways of dealing with psychological traumas” (Wane, 2011, p. 281) resulting from the encounters. I must stress that colonialism is a continuum in the systematic process of capital expansion of the imperialists. It does not matter who the imperialists are or where they hail from; they share peculiar characteristics that feature mostly in the repression of the Indigenous socio-cultural heritages of the colonized peoples and subsequently engender economic domination of the colonized. My thesis is specific about the various forms of foreign domination African
peoples have endured because hitherto all emphasis is on Western hegemonic strangleholds on the continent. Most works on African colonization seem to underplay the impact of Arab colonization that was perpetuated earlier in the century through North Africa, which is still ongoing in Sudan and other countries bordering the Sahara Desert. Of late, Asian (Indo-Chinese) colonization is stealthily creeping into African continent also. It becomes necessary to highlight this chain of events because if the present dispensation of African youth migrating is due to the initial double-cultural amputation inflicted by Arabic and Western colonization, worse would be expected of the future African youth that might have to contend with the triple tragedies of cultural encapsulation when the Indo-Chinese encroachment comes into the equation. Dei and Kempf (2006) reason that the power of the anti-colonial framework lies in its offering of new philosophical insights to challenge the dominant colonial discourses of the industrialized world (see also Mudimbe, 1988) in order to pave the way for southern Indigenous intellectuals and political emancipation. Sefa Dei (2011) draws from Fanon’s understanding of colonial violence as a double-sided phenomenon, which reflects on the colonizers’ violence as domination and hegemony, and violence as the colonized people’s resistance. In essence, colonial violence is not merely depicted as valorization, but as a necessary response; and a politics of identity, which goes beyond racial identity to class, culture, national liberation, and resistance. It also speaks to cultural values of national consciousness and national belonging through symbols, signifiers as a source of liberation and pride, the dialectic of experience that shapes history and its narration of experience. Fanon connects colonial experiences to the psychiatry of racism, emotional tools, and traumatic damage, and the psychology of oppression and control of the mind as weapons of oppression. Africans and other colonized peoples all over the world have borne and
continue to bear the frightening emblematic scars of injuries colonization and neo-colonial practices have perpetuated on them and their environment. It is the working postulation of this segment of my thesis that the negative effects of colonization on African Indigenous education and the ways of life of the people are unquantifiable, leading to most of the socio-economic and political crises the continent is experiencing at the moment (Sefa Dei & Kempf, 2006; Sefa Dei, Hall & Rosenberg, 2008; Sefa Dei, 2010a). Fanon believes that the development of a critical embodied consciousness is a primary objective. Therefore, adopting a Fanonian and anti-colonial perspective is a useful engagement that theorizes the mechanics and operations of colonial and re-colonial relations and the implications of imperial projects on such socio-cultural instruments as the processes of knowledge production, dissemination, and validation; the understanding of Indigeneity and local Indigenousness; and the pursuit of agency, resistance, and subjective politics. Colonial in this context is understood in the sense of not simply ‘foreign or alien,’ but more profoundly as imposing and dominating. This definition of the term colonial offers an expanded understanding of colonial relations and the oppression it produces. It shifts the focus on knowledge about the variegated forms of the systems of capitalist expansion, conquest, and domination. It also depicts the extent of state cultural control of resources and human subjects and other direct and indirect processes of colonization; for instance, technological, educational, knowledge, and ideological domination (Dei, 2011, p. 9). Also, WaThiong’o (2005) considers the implications of imposition of the colonizer’s language(s) on Africans as a major destabilization of the Indigenous peoples’ mode of communication and transmission of cultural heritages. This is consistent with Lebakeng’s (2010) and Dei’s (2010) works that insist that Western colonization disrupted and destroyed (albeit incompletely) the African Indigenous epistemological and philosophical
basis of knowledge production. The vicious extermination of many African languages was one of the results. Most vital to this thesis is Lebakeng’s argument that the West’s shrewd under-valorization and demonization of Indigenous African worldviews, including labeling the continent’s contribution to world civilization and knowledge systems as inferior, primitive, and pagan, as well as ascribing the continent’s shortcomings in socio-economic development to its cultures, is chiefly an attempt to justify the partitioning, subjugation, and continued exploitation of Africa. Therefore, it is an essentializing posture based on unequal power dynamics rather than proven inherent capabilities and vulnerabilities. The unremitting disruption and exploitation of African cultural and socio-economic legacies by colonization has led to so many sad social and environmental consequences such as soil erosion, atmospheric pollution, and loss of cultural and natural wealth. And I must add, of course, the ongoing forfeit of the continent’s vast human resources to the colonizers through migration (see Simms, 2009). In this way, development for Africans and other Indigenous peoples has become synonymous with the acquisition of Western styles, systems, standards, expertise, and problem-solving methods without prior consideration of the relevance of these skills to the geo-ethnic communities of the African continent. And by a similar standard, an improved quality of life or better life becomes to African youth only possible beyond the borders of the continent. Nonetheless, concerning the displacement and extermination of most African Indigenous languages and the imposition of Arabic and Western languages, the Indigenous peoples of Africa have continued to exercise some level of resistance. WaThiong’o (1986) reasons:

But the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in
themselves. (p. 3)

The perpetuation of the colonizers’ educational policies and practices in the post-independent school curriculum of African countries remains the greatest asset of the colonizers’ control that continues to secure the bondage of the formerly colonized peoples. The neo-colonial processes amputate the Indigenous peoples from their cultural heritages and cultural environments through infliction of traumatic wounds on the psyches of the colonized. Thereafter, it creates a void left by loss of self-esteem and as a consequence, loss of humanity. The aspect of WaThiong’o’s work relevant to my thesis is the insistence that the most critical area of the colonizers’ dominance is the mental universe of the colonized (WaThiong’o, 1986). This notion was corroborated by the views of Dei and Kempf (2006) that the colonizer did not only seize land, but also minds. If colonialism’s influence had been merely the control of land that would have required only one form of resistance, but when information is also colonized, it is essential that the resistance must interrogate issues related to education, information and intellectual transformations. (p. ix)

The reasoning above is similar to an outcry of the renowned South African activist in 1971. Steve Biko declared, “The most potent weapon of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed” (Biko, 1987, p. 92). Bringing the perspective of mind into the discourse of colonization is crucial to understanding the impact of domination in the psyche of the colonized or oppressed peoples. Lebakeng’s (2010) work argues further that the West denigrated and almost wiped out invaluable African epistemologies and languages in favor of the Judeo-Hellenic ethnographies. This results in African knowledge systems and languages (as means of development, transmission, and instruction), not being accorded deserved attention in African schools, hence being excluded from the socio-economic, political, and educational
policy components. My thesis would reason that Lebakeng’s recognition of the impact of the earlier colonization of Africa by the Arabs—such as the extermination of the Nubians, Berbers, and other Indigenous peoples of Africa—thematically rhymes with his succinct presentation of African historiography. Yet his silence on the impact of the Arab invasion on African cultural heritages leaves one wondering if there is not as much damage, subversion, and dislodgement of the Indigenous African peoples’ ways of knowing by Arab culture, considering that hitherto, the former states of North, and by extension, sub-Saharan Africa, are not only occupied by but under Arabic cultural influence. Today’s generation of Africans, Nigerians inclusive were born into either Arabic/Islamic or Western/Christian beliefs or cultures, and they unfortunately have come to understand these as their African heritage. They are completely unaware of their real foundations, which were subverted by the dual colonization experiences. Nevertheless, Lebakeng, like other scholars in the social sciences, has continued to focus majorly on the impact of Western colonization while Arabic/Islamic incursion continues unabated. Competing Islamic and pro-Western forces’ engagements in Sudan, North-Eastern Nigeria, and many other Sahara Desert-bordered countries, represent the neo-colonial struggle to have a strong grip on the leftovers of colonization; this has continued to influence the mass displacement and subsequent migration of Africans.

I would argue that what colonization introduced was first the Arabic, then Western cultures, ways of knowing, and worldviews that were deliberately imposed to undermine the existing ontological and epistemological apparatuses of development, and ways of knowledge creation and transmission rooted in African Indigenous worldviews. Western ways of knowing came with a philosophy that continuously fails to acknowledge the humanity of African peoples based on their past history and civilization. This is one way
imperialists rationalize their oppression and exploitation in the African continent. I therefore acquiesce to the views expressed by eminent African scholars that the colonizers’ essentialization of Arab and Western knowledge systems is quite unrealistic because African knowledge systems predated colonization; the idea of Eurocentric knowledge as the universal way of knowing is thus contestable since all knowledge is, first and foremost, local (Dei, 2010; Lebakeng, 2010). My work does not aim to romanticize underdevelopment in Africa or project Indigenous peoples as passive players in the arena of global polity. Either they are complicit to their own oppression and subjugation or their resistance does not match the barrage of the oppressors’ traumatizing assaults. The reality is that the battle to save the leftovers in African cultural heritages, the war to decolonize, and the violence enacted to salvage the relics of Indigenous cultures of Africa has gone far beyond the physical boundaries of the continent. Africans in the Diaspora (who chanced upon the colonizers’ acclaimed civilization and found falsehood in it) have volunteered in the struggle. And those who have been confronted with the realities of the colonizers’ deceits and realized what Aime Cesaire (2000) refers to as the culpable lies of the colonizers are not left out. Africans within and outside the continent are rising, dusting their eyes of all deceit, and fighting to regain their humanity that was trampled upon and is still being denigrated by the colonizers. But many Indigenous Africans living in the continent, who are still in the stupor created by the colonizers’ spells, must awaken to the realization that no one will make them more African than they already are (nobody has the capacity to teach them their cultural heritages. The existing neo-colonial processes can only equip them with foreign traditions and transform them into strangers in their natural habitat. If decolonization measures are not implemented, even their offspring would be out of touch with their cultural past, present, and future; hence
will both be irrelevant in their environments of birth and unable to survive there in). For if they would linger in this lethargic euphoria their offspring might spend the rest of their lives in absolute blankness with respect to their true identity. The unhealthy effects of colonization are not felt by the victims (colonized) alone; colonization equally affects the perpetrators of capitalist expansion. According to Fanon (1963), the psychic trauma of violence suffered by the victims of colonization due to amputation from their cultures and the torture symbolized in colonization is shared between the colonized and the colonizer. Cesaire (2000) even saw the colonizers’ trauma as gangrene, a decay that would eventually consume the vector. Cesaire insists:

What am I driving at? At this idea that no one colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization – and therefore force – is already a sick civilization, a civilization which is morally diseased, which irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, one denial to another, calls for its Hitler, I mean its punishment. (p. 39)

In any case, avid resistance to colonization and neo-colonial projects, which are lacking either because of ignorance or weakness, spells victory to the colonizers’ ploys. For instance, at the moment, an average Nigerian secondary school graduate cannot read, speak nor write fluently in any of the country’s 350 languages. It is equally uncertain, given the high cost of education, that this student can meet the foreign language requirements comparable to their colleagues in the industrialized world. It means being left in a linguistic dilemma. Memmi is not equivocal about the psychological competition for the colonized person’s life by the internalized forces of his/her cultural language and the colonizer’s imposed language(s) systems. In Memmi’s (1965) opinion:

Possession of two languages is not merely a matter of having two tools, but actually means participation in two psychical and cultural realms. Here, the two worlds symbolized and conveyed by the two tongues are in conflict; they are those of the
colonizer and the colonized. (p. 107)

A general dictum has it that where two elephants fight, the grass suffers. This can’t be more factual than in the case of the colonized persons’ linguistics dilemma. Fanon (1952) insists that “to speak a language is to appropriate its world and culture” (p. 21). Gradually, as the colonized people juggle two languages, the cultural language, which has been their tool of Indigenous education, communication, expression, data storage and transmission, succumbs to the pressure of foreign language(s) imposed by the colonizers. The cultural language gradually wanes and might eventually die off. Rightly so, when the essentialized contemporary educational systems, social communication and professional relationship processes are enacted using the dominant languages. Memmi further argues:

The colonized’s mother tongue, that which is sustained by his feelings, emotions and dreams, that in which his tenderness and wonder are expressed, thus that which holds the greatest emotional impact, is precisely the one which is the least valued. It has no stature in the country or in the concert of peoples. If he wants to obtain a job, make a place for himself, exist in the community and the world, he must first bow to the language of his masters. (p.107)

The cultural encapsulation suffered by Nigerian youth through acquisition of foreign (colonial) education and cultures, as in the case of linguistic skills means loss and eventual death of their Indigenous cultures and socio-economic structures (Sassen, 1984), which might equally entail a passionate strife to appropriate the colonizers’ languages, culture and worldviews.

**Why Would the 21st Century African Youth Desire to Travel to Europe?**

Articulation of a reasonable response to the above question must consider first of all Fanon’s (1952) postulations on the psychology of colonialism in which the colonized, specifically Africans, are represented as devoid of a past and absent of a present. The second attempt to draw a connection between colonization and African youth migration must also
consider Fanon’s concept of ‘collective catharsis’ (p. 124), in which global mass media are subtly used by the colonizers to simulate a conscience-purging for their dominant publics by projecting the colonized as evil and deserving of whatever maltreatment has been meted out to them. Besides underscoring the psychological trauma colonial violence and torture inflict on the colonized, the amputation first from self and then from the colonized people’s socio-cultural environment that eventually results, Fanon further accentuates his view of the psychology of colonialism. He reasons:

When I meet a German or a Russian speaking bad French I try to indicate through gestures the information he is asking for, but in doing so I am careful not to forget that he has a language of his own, a country, and that perhaps he is a lawyer or an engineer back home. Whatever the case, he is a foreigner with different standards. There is nothing comparable when it comes to the blackman [sic]. He has no culture, no civilization, and no “long historical past.” (Fanon, 1952, p. 17)

The denial of the Africanity of Africans, the repudiation of the continent’s rich history, the abjuration of Africa’s contribution to human civilization and technological advancement, and the negation of the Indigenous people’s epistemological and philosophical bases of knowledge production, validation, and dissemination are the colonizers’ justification for the coercive invasion, occupation, and exploitation of the continent. By way of erasure of the Indigenous cultures of Africa, the heritages of African peoples are stereotypically demonized and castigated as barbaric and uncivilized. The Arabic and Western cultures, medicine, education, and worldviews are on the other hand reified, valorized, and therefore taken up as modern, desirable, and civilized. These eventually are the ideas the colonizers translate into the dominant educational policies and praxis and the academic curriculum for teacher education; and these are what young Africans are taught in mainstream institutions of learning from kindergarten through post-secondary education. Nigeria is a giant knitted from pieces of large African kingdoms that colonialists dismembered for their economic and
administrative advantage. The country is partitioned by its invaders into predominantly Islamic North and Christian South. The history of what became known as Nigeria from the year 1914 was thus a product of the colonizers’ cut-and-join fabrication out of great and prosperous African Kingdoms (Fafunwa, 1974; Isichei, 1983; Mbeke-Ekenem, 2000); all of which today could no longer trace their origins but struggle to hang on under the chains of their colonial lords. This means that Nigerian educational curriculum, policies, and praxis are partitioned between the Arabic Sharia system or mixture of Arabic and Western systems in the North and the Western system in the South. Upon graduation from the colonizers’ educational programs, African graduates are brainwashed and their humanity is erased so that to survive in the new world of the colonizer, they must both take up the status imputed on them as second class and continue with proselytizing duties assigned to them by the masters. Fanon sums it up:

From the moment the black man accepts the split imposed by the Europeans, there is no longer any respite; and ‘from that moment on, isn’t it understandable that he will try to elevate himself to the white man’s level? To elevate himself into the range of colors to which he has attributed a kind of hierarchy? (p. 63)

Since neo-colonial projects are anchored in chains of mutative continuum, the enlightened products of colonial education are often apprehensive of digging into their past for the truth about their existence; therefore, they must not rewrite histories that never existed. They abhor the Indigenous cultural environment within which they were raised. The idea of the Indigenous education and schooling they had before the encounter with the colonizers has become a myth (a mere socialization process, not education, as one of my Western educated friends once derisively told me) or at worst still, a mental fabrication. The unequal power relationship between the colonizer and colonized is framed and sustained in shrewd and blinding racism, and that is because it is designed to be a sustained practice or
until the colonized realizes self. The struggle to be a white man in black skin becomes a
haunting paradox that African youth must live through. Fanon rightly posits:

And if, at a certain point in his history he has been made to ask the question whether
he is a man, it’s because his reality as a man has been challenged. In other words, I
start suffering from not being a white man insofar as the white man discriminates
against me; turns me into a colonized subject; robs me of any value or originality;
tells me I am a parasite in the world, that I should toe the line of the white world as
quickly as possible. (p. 79)

The misapprehension engendered by the colonizers’ application of collective catharsis
produces differing outcomes for both the offspring of the colonizers and those of the
colonized. To the colonizers’ young adults, collective catharsis is a vent, outlet, or channel
through which to release excessive energy amassed through colonial violence. Print and
electronic media are strategized to project characters constructed around binary opposites.
The colonized are always portrayed as evil; they are essentially demonized. Since the
colonized youth have been consumers of the negative image portrayals in the texts they read
from lower to higher academic terrains, they internalize these labels and aspire to attain the
colonizers’ statuses. Fanon asserts,

These same magazines are devoured by the local youth. And the Wolf, the Devil, the
wicked genie, evil, and the savage are always represented by Blacks or Indians; and
since one always identifies with the good guys, the little black child, just like little
white child becomes an explorer, an adventurer, and missionary “who is in danger of
being eaten by the wicked Negroes. (Fanon, 1952, p. 125)

It is no surprise, therefore, that an average African child trained in the Arabic or Eurocentric
school system (which is itself the embodiment of neo-colonialism) might go to any length to
arrive in Europe. The colonizers’ educational systems as an aspect of the neo-colonial
vestiges are therefore the fulcrum around which the colonizers’ gambit for re-colonizing the
21st century Africans revolves. Therefore, one of the major theses of this work is that
colonization and neo-colonial encounters in so many ways influence the formation and
current flow of youth emigration from Nigeria. I will continue by examining how colonial projects in countries of origin influence people (specifically youth) to emigrate and equip them to respond to the challenges imposed by their status as immigrants. Colonization has racism as its underpinning, and the anti-racist framework is critical of the socio-political structures and systems that perpetuate social group categorization to sustain differential and unequal treatment. Race, as Dei (2010) argues, “works through well-rehearsed narratives and broadly predictable ways to position Whites as superior to the ‘Othered’ body. Apart from such saliences, there is also the issue of particularity; for example, difference produces its own set of experiences” (p. 16).

**Frantz Fanon and Colonization in the Light of Youth Migration**

Frantz Fanon, an exceptional medical scientist, psycho-analyst, theorist, philosopher, and social activist, stresses that the cruelty, oppressive violence, and brutality of colonialism have incurred lasting trauma, wounds, and injury of a physiological and psychological nature on the psyche of the colonized peoples. Fanon describes the psyche of the colonized people in terms of their thought patterns, social and psychological health. His work addresses the largely unequal power dynamics between the colonizers from Europe and the colonized peoples of North Africa, specifically Algeria; he thus provides insight into the mental state of the colonizers and colonized individuals. Fanon has proven that both the colonizer and colonized persons suffer certain levels of psychological wounds by the colonizers’ deeds, but the impact is felt more on the colonized, who struggle to develop some impotent psychological medicine to heal their guilt, which only the purifying power of violence from the colonized can effectively purge. One of the major observations from Fanon’s work relevant to my thesis is that colonization is the same and carries a similar measure of consequences on the colonized persons irrespective of who is meting it out and on whom it is
perpetuated; this is true whether speaking of French on Algerians, Arabs on Africans, Euro-Americans on the Native “Indians,” Euro-Canadians on First Nations peoples, the combined team of Europe-descended peoples on Africans in Apartheid South Africa or the Arabians and British on Nigerians. In other words, even when the motives of the colonizers of these different Indigenous peoples might be seen differently, the psychological impact on the colonized peoples is similar. The major phase of the sociological attack is to annihilate the Indigenous cultures of the Native peoples and assimilate them into Arabic and European cultures.

In the *Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon (1963) looks into how colonial violence steeped in cruelty and oppression results in all forms of mental disorder of the colonized peoples. He argues that “for many years to come we shall be bandaging the countless and sometimes indelible wounds inflicted on our people by the colonialist onslaught” (Fanon, 1961, p. 181), a reasoning that is obviously an indication of the urgency of the need for decolonization that may bring about psychological healing to all oppressed peoples, even to the oppressor. I must argue here that although Nigerian youth do not directly face the kind of critical wounds expressed by Fanon, they face a more serious type of wound. That is the spiritual trauma of losing their Indigenous identity and having to live all their lives and not be recognized as humans by the colonizers, who are still rooted in Foreign Direct Investments either in the booming oil industry, power and steel industry, or other subsectors of Nigerian economy. How then do the cultural dilemma and education of Nigerian youth influence their predisposition to leave for Europe?

**Western Colonial Versus Nigerian Indigenous Education: Implications for Youth Emigration**

The repression of African Indigenous ways of knowing and imposition of foreign
knowledge bases have made an average Nigerian youth a master of European history who knows little about how her/his village came to be. It should be the other way around. Children must learn their Indigenous alphabets and numerical systems, as well as their oral history and information on Igbo societies, for instance, and the social norms and values before (or as they are) training to acquire Western education. Large numbers of youth were born and raised in urban cities due to the rural-urban migration that remains one of the social demographic characteristics of most developing countries of the world today. The implication is that a large number of Nigerian youth do not possess Indigenous education and are unfortunately bereft of its cultural values that are supposed to be an aspect of their identity. This is because the Indigenous Nigerian knowledge systems that are grounded in African cultural heritages are almost not part of the current schooling and educational policies and curricula that are still majorly Arabic or Eurocentric. It is critical to ensure that educational systems are relevant to the society operating them. Wane (2000) advocates for learning processes to be placed in context of the local environment. In other words, educational policies and praxis must be relevant and tailored to meet the people’s socio-cultural and environmental needs. Wane reasons that: “In traditional societies, learning embraces every aspect of life, including socio-economic realities” (p. 58). The idea of making learners environmentally relevant never was part of the colonizers’ vision, hence has no place in the educational policies and curricula students use. It means that after graduation from different tiers of colonial education, Nigerian youth will find themselves out of touch with their environment and culture. Upon realization of their irrelevance to the local environment, they are more likely to be susceptible to reaching out for the colonizers’ cultural environment where they may find some form of hope and relevance. It is still not clear to me why, 53
years after Nigeria gained her political independence from Britain, her youth are still left without an African-based education. The effect is that many of these youth graduating from colleges and universities soon realize that although they live in Africa, they are far more European than the Europeans when it comes to culture and socialization. It also means they face serious inadequacies when relating to people in their societies who live in the villages. This might actually be one of the reasons they prefer to migrate to Europe. I must emphasize here that this thesis is not clamoring for jettisoning of European or Arabic education. It is rather an attempt to draw attention to the frustration and despondency new generation Africans (the youth) find themselves in when much of Arabic and Western education does not empower them to be confident, capable, and self-reliant in dealing with technical, economic, and socio-political problems arising in their local environments. It is not surprising therefore that these youth find solace from their local irrelevance and unemployment in migrating to settle in industrialized and developed countries of their admiration. They plan and carry out these movements often without the knowledge, and therefore approval of members of their families because of fear their plans and mode of their accomplishment might be deemed very risky.

**Education and Schooling in African Contexts**

Education from the African perspective is therefore a process for transmitting culture in terms of continuity and growth and for disseminating knowledge either to ensure social sustenance or to guarantee a rational direction for the society or both. I must reiterate here that neither Arabic nor Western colonization brought education and schooling to Africa. In fact, what these two colonial experiences did and continue to do is impose Arabic and Western concepts of education and schooling on African peoples by severing them from their rich heritages. This is where it becomes vital to explain that education and schooling in
Indigenous African societies are different experiences that serve related purposes. In Africa, education for an individual starts at birth with the family, clan, and village and continues to the entire town, while schooling is used to impart specific knowledge. For example, children are educated on general social ethics (such as honesty, resilience, and perseverance), morals, and norms as they relate with members of their extended families and play-mates; as they engage in community assignments and meetings; and during age group-appropriate activities (as they transit through maturity, from one age group to the other). Parents and adults in the extended family system, those in the community, spiritual leaders, community elders, senior age groups, and other custodians of culture in the society work together to engender a holistic social education for children. While African Indigenous education involves the co-construction of knowledge that happens at the spaces of peoples’ economic, social, and political interactions, schooling takes place within defined and organized spaces and at times (but not always) under one professional who may be in charge of several students at a time. For instance, while joining their parents in farm work young people learn not just the processes of Indigenous agriculture but also meteorology, geography, and some aspects of biology. On the other hand, youth intending to be carvers or blacksmiths pass through specified years of training in a professional workshop. In some cases, the students have to board and travel with their teacher—for example, those training as herbalists or religious priests. It is important to point out that African Indigenous education also occurs in integrative spaces. Academic exercises may include studies of local histories, legends, the environment (including local geography, flora, and fauna), poetry, proverbs, mazes, riddles, and storytelling. It implies that children and young adults learn while engaging in participatory education through ceremonies, rituals, recitations, entertainment, and
demonstrations. One other aspect of the African Indigenous educational system is its ability to transform an individual holistically—anchored on African Indigenous spirituality, it systematically transforms the child or youth into a being with an appropriate balance between the spirit, soul, intellect, and body—who works in harmony with her/his society and environment. It amounts to arguing that education in an African context, unlike schooling, is a sustained process that follows an individual from the cradle to old age, and possibly to the grave and life beyond. Thus, Africans respect the aged because they are assumed to be both custodians of knowledge and transmitters of wisdom. In the Indigenous African schooling systems, students, besides acquiring specific economic skills, are equipped to be respectful, resilient, self-confident, and responsible members of society. Their oral and practical curriculum is laced with challenging case studies of moral instructions, logic, and sometimes adventurous journeys. At the time of graduation, which is done differently in different African societies, each professional group conducts special induction sessions for their new entrants. For artisans and graduating apprentices in businesses requiring fixed capital investments such as metallurgy, blacksmithing, sculpting, agriculture, weaving, pottery, fishing, and hunting, the initial capital to take off is provided by their parents’ thrift societies or through communal contributions (where a graduate is an orphan) bearing in mind that an individual becomes who s/he is because of his/her community. They owe their duty, obligation, and responsibilities first to their communities, then to their families. Students schooled in other specialized areas such as medicine, rain and weather control, military, midwifery and nursing, and other social services are immediately absorbed into the service of the community. Note here that in Indigenous African societies, professionals and persons of renown create niches for themselves not by the amount of wealth they possess as individuals
but by how they devoted their skills to the service of their communities. Therefore, youth are
communally raised to serve their communities. In these societies, almost all trainees and
schooled entrants into various professions immediately find job opportunities in their
communities, thereby contributing to the community’s socio-economic growth and
development. The training and skills students acquire are therefore environmentally and
culturally relevant, and are grounded in the peoples’ cultural heritages transmitted through
ages of social relationships. Thus, the foreign worldviews and pedagogical styles promoted
by Arabic and Western colonial education are unconnected to the peoples’ environmental and
experiential needs and ways of life, and have consistently failed to meet the developmental
yearnings of African peoples both at home and in the Diaspora.

Colonization as a Distortion and Disruption of African Indigenous Education

The earlier work of Abdou Moumouni (1968) depicts African Indigenous education
as producing specific qualities in its adherents, including intimate ties with social life, both in
the material and spiritual sense, its multi-valent character, both in terms of its goals and the
means employed to meet those goals, and its gradual and progressive achievements in
conformity with the successive stages of physical, emotional, and mental development of the
student (Fafunwa & Aisiku, 1982). While Abdou Moumouni’s (1968) work focuses on the
impact of Indigenous African education on a child, my study underscores the benefit of
African education on all categories of adherents or students besides its central thesis that
knowledge production and dissemination should be environmentally driven. This notion is
buttressed further in Fafunwa (1974), who states that in African Indigenous education
“botany and zoology are the subjects of both theoretical and practical lessons, in which
special attention is paid to local plants and animals” (p. 14). It is critical to mention that
education, whether Indigenous or Western, has a central aim of perpetuating a given culture.
Shu (1982) has earlier observed that Cameroon’s diverse postcolonial educational history and cultures stemmed from its cultural experiences under the stressful domination and hegemonies of three European powers, namely Germany, France, and Britain. An additional tragedy in the educational system referenced in this work is that in this “neo-colonial” era all the countries whose educational systems were reviewed not only jettisoned their Indigenous educational systems, but according to Solomon Shu, also made the educational systems—policies, curriculum, pedagogical approaches, and contents of their colonizers—their educational priorities, notwithstanding the inappropriateness of the systems for their future development. In other words, the institutions and agencies established by the colonial masters became the launching pads for developmental retrogressions. Although Shu maintained that there is an ongoing harmonization of Cameroon’s Indigenous education with the French and English systems to come up with a particular Cameroon educational system, he sounded pessimistic on the possibility of its realization due to an apparent paucity of financial and material resources. It is important to note here that the inadequacy of funds for supplies also accounts for similar difficulties experienced by other African countries studied, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Highlighting the dangers of sourcing the supplies required for basic education and development from former colonizers who are in the first place responsible for the existing jeopardy is actually a major thrust of this chapter.

**Neo-colonial Projects: Perpetuating Colonial Education through Foreign Fiscal Aid**

As I hinted earlier, in terms of colonial influence, Africa and its countries are yet divided between Arab, Western, and, just recently, Asian colonial influences. (Many schools and mosques in northern Nigeria were built through some form of financial supports from wealthy Arab colonial benefactors, and the peoples of northern Nigeria are culturally
submissive to these donors as opposed to their Indigenous communities). Education in Arabic culture and religion thus becomes the first basic education a child is exposed to in its Indigenous environment. Similarly, Western aids and grants to primary education in Nigeria have tended to perpetuate Western values and cultural heritages, leaving the recipients almost oblivious to their Indigenous cultures and traditional ways of life. As a tool for ensuring the dominance of colonial education, the foreign donors ensure that educational policies and praxis, which are reflected in the curricula, are in accordance with their domestic prescriptions for the recipient nation. My thesis in no way intends to under-value the positive effects on African educational development of aids given by international agencies. Rather, it aims to highlight not only the continuous disruptions on Nigerian fiscal policies and programs perpetuated through the grants by donor nations (the majority of which are Western) but also the subversion of Nigeria’s future socio-cultural and economic development engendered by the imposition of Western educational policies and practices. A major disturbing feature of foreign aids and grants to Nigerian education according to the literature reviewed is their apparent focus on the donor nations and their agencies while glossing over the peculiar educational, socio-economic, and environmental needs of the recipients. Donation decisions do not in most cases require the recipients’ inputs, which means that the donor’s national interests (cultural, economic, and political) are not divorced from the aid packages they prepare for developing countries. For instance, reviewing the Hawes, Coombe, Lillis, and Coombe’s (1986) report on education priorities and aid responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, one might ask the question, whose priorities are reflected? Is it the priorities of the British and other Western donors or those of the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa? This context generates the realization that despite the use of the term
“bilateral” in the report, it is all about the goals set by various donors in Europe, as well as the imposition of the donor’s style of national education and training on the recipient. “Natural style is a very important factor in the bilateral aid process. It tends to remain constant whatever the content of the aid package may be, and it has very close connections with the donor’s natural education and training system” (p. 120).

Once more, it is not difficult to appraise the damage to existing educational and cultural heritages of the aids-receiving nations taking into account that several Western nations are involved in the provision of educational aid to Nigeria (and by extension, Africa). The resulting imposition of foreign educational, philosophical, and ideological policies and praxis is hegemonic to say the least. Since the practices are imposed against the people’s Indigenous practices, they are colonial and these are in this study referred to as neo-colonial projects. “Just as there was no single missionary type in colonial Africa but very different styles associated with the Basel, Anglican, Dutch Reform, and countless others, many of which were distinguished by the culture of the sending country, so the development assistance agencies tend to represent certain traits associated with their own countries” (Hawes, Coombe, Lillis, & Coombe, 1986, p. 120; see also Lewis, 1965; Graham, 1966). It even becomes difficult to articulate and successfully execute educational and developmental programs in Nigeria given the multiple foreign cultural and political pressures at play. Whether these multiple cultural vitiations were intentional or not remains immaterial. The very fact that these programs have evidenced continuous and consistent failure to augment or boost the country’s educational and developmental goals, and consequently might be associated with youth emigration from the country, calls for a reappraisal of foreign aid acceptance policies in the Nigerian educational system.
In fact, Julius Nyerere’s review of neo-colonial educational systems in Tanzania has critically outlined several decolonization and development education features that this work finds worthy. He reviewed the system of education and attitudes of the people toward education in his country’s post-independence era. Nyerere’s work (see: Fafunwa & Aisiku, 1982), favored a locally designed educational policy and plan that would not only revolutionize people’s objectives and goals in education but would also be geared toward the developmental needs of the peoples of Tanzania. His preferred education is one that is “thoroughly integrated into local life and teaches people the basic skills while exciting in them curiosity about ideas taught them” (Fafunwa & Aisiku, 1982, p. 246). In a call for a re-evaluation of the infringement on non-Western people’s traditional systems of knowledge production, legitimization, and dissemination by Western and other capitalists, Smith’s (1999) work projects a critical step toward undoing the Western deprivation and negation of the Indigenous systems and processes of knowledge production and consumption. The relevance of her work to this chapter is based on the evidence of the excesses of European imperialism that calls for the decolonization of research methods to accommodate educational research paradigms other than Western (Wane, 2007; Smith 1999; Wotherspoon, 2009; Wierma & Jur, 2009). By exploring the intersections of imperialism, knowledge, and research, Smith not only accentuates the frustrations faced by non-Western researchers in dealing with Western paradigms but also sets an agenda for engaging Indigenous research as a way of reclaiming subverted Indigenous ways of knowing.

**Neo-colonial Projects, Subjugation of Education, and Nigerian Experience**

Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is a territorial entity formed from the merger in 1914 of large and powerful kingdoms, egalitarian societies, emirates, and sultanates. The physiognomies of nationhood are brought to bear on the description of pre-
colonial Africa – the concept of one historical background, one language, one religion, and one territorial or contiguous landmass is a myth most countries in the continent have come to accept and anchor their collective fates on. Thus, it might be reasonable to assert that the vast nations comprising the pre-colonial Africa were disrupted, partitioned, and rearranged by the colonialists to suit their administrative and economic interest. The resulting impact is the present chaos where Indigenous peoples are scattered across different countries and amongst peoples whose cultural, historical, and religious heritages were distinct from those native to them (see Isichei, 1983; Harunah, 2003; Akanle, 2013; Adepoju, 1993). The vast socially distinct but culturally similar African nations were united under a federal structure by Lord Laggard to form Nigeria. The colony and protectorate of Lagos was merged with the Oil River protectorate in 1906 to form the colony and protectorate of Southern Nigeria. This was merged in 1914 with the protectorate of northern Nigeria in furtherance of the British colonial interests in the West African sub-region, so that the country Nigeria is one of the outcomes of the colonial masters’ opportunistic marriages. It is important to mention that many of the pre-amalgamation social groups had had commercial and diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern states, Asia, and Europe (Isichei, 1983; Akanle, 2013; Toasije, 2009). The pernicious impact of colonization on the peoples’ Indigenous systems and processes of knowledge production and dissemination was immense (Dei, 2012; Lebakeng, 2010) and the outcome is an almost complete subversion of the people’s cultural and socio-political orientations. The language, history, religion, and social structures were distorted to give way to the colonizer’s worldviews. For Nigeria, and by extension other African nations, political independence from the West has not and might never translate to economic freedom, and the imposition of such hegemonic capitalist paradigms as the structural adjustment policy, SAP,
is globalization—yet another version of neo-colonial capitalist quest under the guise of free-market and democracy (Baxter, 2008; Simms, 2009; Adepoju, 1993; Akanle; 2013); and the consequences are far reaching. Many scholarly works on African affairs albeit grounded on the premises of push and pull factors of migration (see Adepoju, 1993; 2000; Akanle, 2013; Falola & Afolabi, 2007) ascribe the present day emigration of African youth to the industrialized North to the inevitable consequences of SAP. It is beyond the scope of this segment of this thesis to further delve into migration other than how it impacts Nigerian youth.

**Conclusion**

Among the views strongly upheld in this work and in response to some of the contributions in the scholarly works used is that the paternalistic solution offered to African education and development issues from the West neither recognizes the Indigenous people’s epistemic saliencies (lived experiences) nor respects their local worldviews. Of immense significance to this thesis is the understanding that Indigenous education and schooling are educational and institutionalized training practices developed or adopted by a people prior to colonial contacts. African societies were noted to have advanced educational and technical (non-Arabic and non-Western) training systems before these colonialists invaded the continent. Therefore development should start with what people know about themselves—besides the interpretation they share of their lived experiences, their interpretation of what is happening to them. The role of African academia with respect to Africanizing education (bringing to bear local content and tailoring curriculum and pedagogy to meet community needs) in the continent is also crucial to nurturing youth who possess skills relevant to their socio-cultural environment. The thrust is on African scholars and researchers in institutions of learning to come up with locally relevant curriculum, pedagogical strategies, and
philosophical bearing on policy formulation. From the dimensions laid out above, other issues emerged regarding redirecting institutions of learning in Africa toward an evolving Afrocentric approach aimed at using the combined resources of human, environmental, and Indigenous technologies in meeting the developmental needs of the continent. In my view, this approach might entail researching into and documenting the various African communities’ epistemologies and historical past and dusting them up for new African institutional libraries that may serve not just as the contemporary database of African technologies and knowledge systems but also as a reference for future generations that will stir them toward socio-economic self-reliance.
Chapter Four
Methodology

This segment of my study outlines the research methodology guiding the thrust of the investigation. Methodology in research is the philosophical notation encompassing the justification for as well as all procedures in an investigation. Research method, on the other hand, is the procedure of a systematic inquiry on a social or natural phenomenon aimed at eliciting a better understanding of the occurrences, conditions, or problems in a particular context. While my study engaged the interpretative phenomenological method in a qualitative research methodology capturing interviewee narrative, it also made use of the auto-ethnographic method as a way of reflecting on my personal experiences with the 21st century transnational migration. This personal perspective assumes an epiphanic nuance on the role of colonial and existing neo-colonial systems and structures in stimulating youth emigration from Nigeria (Yegidis & Weinbach, 2009; World Economic Forum, 2014). Therefore, auto-ethnography as an approach engages a systematic analysis of one’s personal experiences so as to foreground the implications of the cultural dynamics within the context of such experiences (Holman Jones, 2005). This approach is an alternative to and destabilization of the conventional methods of carrying out social science enquiry. It is an introduction to a more flexible process that is germane to the realities of social life (Tami, 2001). The use of ethnographic methodology is justified for availing the researcher of the “liberty to produce meaningful, accessible, and evocative research grounded in personal experience, research that would sensitize readers to issues of identity politics” (Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2010, p. 275). In this study, I employed auto-ethnography to mirror my
personal experiences first, studying and working in Nigeria as a lecturer and eventually (as if arguing against my desire) migrating to live in North America, specifically in Canada; and second, working (as an African) in the Island of Malta to garner data for this thesis. An aspect of my auto-narrative featured also in chapter one in the personal and professional context section where my multiple identities as an educated male African transnational migrant, equipped to transverse transnational boundaries, was abruptly challenged, leaving me with a rude re-awakening; this experience caused a dissonance that troubled my initial confidence in the power of westernization.
Qualitative vis a vis quantitative research design

The choice of qualitative methodology in this study stems from its grounding in data creation methods that are flexible and sensitive to the social context of its application as opposed to the rigid, structured, and standardized methods obtainable in quantitative methodology. Quantitative methodology almost always permits no flexibility, and flexibility remains an invaluable characteristic that is critical for success in any empirically sound social research context. In addition, qualitative methodology offers a contextual understanding of rich details of data and generates the opportunity for a more holistic analysis and explanation.
of data than would be made possible by other approaches (Mason, 2002). This approach is crucial for a detailed understanding of the complex processes of decision-making engaged by the migrant youth at various transit points in their movement. It is also an important tool for generating data from immigration policy makers and implementers within a study population. Because of its flexible and holistic nature, qualitative methodology presents itself as a platform for understanding the social representation process through which immigrants’ identities are created via the interaction of public opinion and domestic politics in receiving countries. It amplifies the opportunity to generate data on value systems in the society, public opinions on social issues, community concerns, cultural values, and aspiration by means of descriptions and explanations created during interviews. Merriam (2009) stresses the richly descriptive nature of the product of qualitative inquiry. The data collection method in my research consisted of structured and semi structured interviews. In all forms of qualitative research, some and occasionally all of the data are collected through interviews (Merriam, 2009). To effectively generate the data, I traveled to the island of Malta to engage one-on-one with my participants in the processes of their migration. The ability to directly elicit information from the partakers is one of the merits of qualitative methodology.

Qualitative research is increasingly essential to contemporary social research because of its ability to view the phenomenon studied holistically (Wiersma & Jur, 2009). This becomes necessary as complexities of human life cannot be captured in a parochially structured pattern of study inherent in some quantitative research methods. This method also enabled me to operate in a natural environment in relating with human beings whose dispositions change within different contexts and in response to varying stimuli. It enables flexibility in design since in reality, social phenomena in the world are flexible and their
study and predictability should as well be flexible.

**Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis as a Methodological Approach (IPA)**

This segment of the research uses interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to enhance the understanding of migrant Nigerian youth experiences in Malta, Europe. IPA uses in-depth qualitative analysis, which is its major distinction from psychology. It is more interested in the use of qualitative and experimental methodology. Both psychology and IPA agree on a common goal—that of establishing how people think (make sense) of what is happening to them, differing only on how the thinking can best be investigated. IPA as an analytical methodology provides me an avenue into various trajectories of qualitative data interpretation and analysis. As a methodology, IPA requires a small sample because it involves a detailed portrayal of the perceptions and understanding of the individual respondents in the interview. It implies that a long time is also required to analyze individual transcripts. It does not mean, however, that IPA is opposed to generalization of research findings to a larger population. It focuses on doing a painstaking analysis rather than generalizing the outcome of the study. The near homogeneity of my population of study absolved me of the stress of striving for a random sampling, and I alternatively engaged purposive sampling on a homogenous group of people. The samples were drawn from a demographical unit comprised of Nigerian youth in Malta who shared a similar socio-economic status. My study was anchored therefore on theoretical rather than empirical generalizability (Smith & Osborn, 2007); and with the commitment to the IPA foremost requirements—that of understanding and giving needed voice to the claims and apprehensions of my interviewees - as well as contextualizing and making sense of these concerns through a psychological lens (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006).

**IPA as a Methodological and Analytical Framework**
The major assumption in interpretative phenomenological analysis is that the analyst is interested in learning something about the participant’s psychological and sociological world. That may be in the form of constructs, perceptions, and beliefs that are reflected or suggested in the participant’s responses. In other words, meaning (its context and complexities) is the central key to understanding the participant’s world. I therefore engaged the text and interpretation process effectively to uncover the masked and layered meanings implied in participants’ responses, which in itself is the light into their mental and social world (Fade, 2004). IPA is used here to analyze the one-to-one interviews of youth migrant subjects so as to develop deeper descriptions that might help to illuminate their personal experiences. One of the goals of this study is to prepare grounds for possible policy modifications at the sending nations, transnational borders, and receiving countries, in response to the current surge in youth transnational migration. IPA can be used to develop theories and/or effect paradigm shifts that could inform policy change (Fade, 2004).

IPA’s Theoretical Roots

IPA finds its origin in health psychology (Smith & Osborn, 2007; Smith et al., 1999), and it is theoretically grounded in critical realism and the social cognition paradigm (Fade, 2004). Critical realism upholds the continuous existence of a constant and sustained feature of reality that does not depend on human intellectualization. This means that “differences in meanings individuals attach to experiences are considered possible because they experience different parts of reality” (Fade, 2004, p. 647). On the other hand, the social cognitive theory is grounded in the idea that what people say and what they do contains a direct or indirect depiction of the differences in meaning. The suggestion is that analyses of interviewees’ responses are realistic approaches to understanding these divergent meanings. Scholars of social and health psychology have debated IPA as a methodology because of its central word,
‘phenomenology.’ The idea of phenomenology was first brought to light by Edmund Husserl in 1936 when he objected to the view that empirical science is the basis for understanding the world. He argued instead for a “life world” or what presently is referred to as “lived experience,” insisting that the central understanding of the meanings of entities in the world could be gained through intuition. Differently put, we can understand anything in the world by perceiving it in a manner unadulterated by our past experiences and opinions. Based on this foundation, I would argue that my beliefs or preconceptions are not biases to be eliminated in the analysis but are actually necessary for understanding how other individuals, in this context the Nigerian migrant youth in Europe, make sense of their experiences. It would seem, following Husserl’s assertions, that an analysis cannot be both interpretative and phenomenological. Yet phenomenological thoughts have evolved over time and in a variety of forms. Of great import to understanding the convergence of phenomenology and the interpretative capability of IPA are the contributions of two social philosophers to the debate: Heidegger (1962) talked of ‘being in the world’ and later, Gadamer (1976) talked of the past as being productive. While the former accentuated the urgency for the world to be perceived from the lens of history and socio-cultural foundation, the latter stressed that the productive past shapes the interpreter’s sense-making of the present circumstances (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006; Fade, 2004). IPA is therefore phenomenological because it seeks to understand how individuals make sense of their lived experiences. It is also interpretative because while acknowledging the interpreter’s peculiar beliefs and views, it reasons that interpretation makes understanding possible.

I will not hesitate to state that mere extraction of information from Nigerian youth and other immigrants in Malta who are the target population of this study would be both
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insufficient and inappropriate if it failed to highlight the peculiarities and complexities of the current African youth movement and efforts by scholars to proffer approaches for its investigation. This is because the narratives of the youth migrants would essentially flow from their countries of origin, through transnational borders, to their present transit space or destination. This informs the need to understand migrants’ holistic experiences right from the contexts of their environments of origin and follow through to the receiving societies instead of viewing them from the lenses of transnationality as obtained in the industrialized world.

Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza, Shaw, and Shimeles (2011) observe that information on the nature, demographic constituents of migrant subjects, impact, and patterns of migration is an indispensable precondition for the improved management of migration, and such an understanding is lacking among developing economies. And this dearth of information on migration processes in these countries is often worsened by the secrecy invoked by potential migrants in order to elude the high-handed state authorities in their countries of origin (see also Brachet, 2012; Ndao, 2012). On the contrary, advancements in technology, communication, and transportation in the industrialized world mean appropriate collation, processing, use, and manipulation of data on migration to suit the insular agenda of these nations. Before the segment on the demographic categories of my study population, I wish to examine the methods of data collection.

**Data Collection Methods**

It is important to quickly highlight the population of study from which the sample evolved. Prior to my field trip for this study, I took major graduate courses on: sociological research methods, migration and globalization, and globalization and transnationality: gender and labor perspective. These guided my thoughts on issues of contemporary transnational migration and relevant research procedures. These courses also sharpened my mind and
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shaped my understanding of the tension that exists between the dominant cultures of the capitalist (industrialized/colonizing) world of the Northern hemisphere and the developing (colonized) countries of the South as it affects, first of all, the motivations, flow, and trends of the contemporary youth migration, and then, the migratory experiences of potential migrant youth from developing economies. This tension was also obvious in the response of interview participants as will be discussed later. The most significant example was the uneasiness of some participants in imagining that Indigenous worldviews and education are distinct from the current colonial practices in cultural environments where they were born and raised. Most of the participants believed that the Arabic and Western education and religions were actually their Indigenous heritages. One participant insisted that he was born and raised in a township and English was his Indigenous language; he was thus oblivious of the more than 350 Indigenous languages in his country, Nigeria. I circumvented a derailment from my study objectives by constantly reflecting on the two interview methods that were used in my research proposal, which were the structured and unstructured interview methods. This effort was necessitated by the need to allow free expression of opinions and, where necessary, deliberate on the issues that arose during the interview.

**Structured and Unstructured Interview Methods**

The guided nature of structured interview warrants that in a section, the interviewer asks all respondents the same series of pre-set questions that may have a limited set of response categories (Fontana & Frey, 2003). Basically it implies that structured interviews involve one person (that is, an interviewer) asking the respondent a list of pre-set questions about a topic that is in line with the phenomenon of study. The interviewer has the chance to explain complex details in the question for the comprehension of the respondent. So by engaging in structured interviews as
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a data extraction method in my study, it was necessary that my interviewees had ideas about the topic and what I expected from each question. For example, when I asked, “What is your status in Malta?” most of my interviewees responded by explaining their migration and documentation situation in Malta. Some would straight out tell me they were granted refugee status, some were asylum seekers, other documented immigrants arrived as students, but for many their documentation simply said, ‘rejected.’ Some respondents went the extra mile to reveal the complexities, contradictions, and delays in their documentation process, hoping that the study was an opportunity to bare their minds—by making their plights and feelings known to the Maltese border authorities—who they perceive to be oppressive in dealing with them. The direct nature of the questions also means that the structured interview method significantly simplified questions that would otherwise be too complex for some of the interviewees to understand so as to provide positive and relevant responses. It also offered an enabling atmosphere for some of them to review critical questions and sometimes request clarification. As the interviewer, this method enabled me to field questions from the respondents and to clarify and simplify them as easily as they could be understood.

In the segment requiring the use of unstructured interview methods, I availed the respondents of the opportunity to engage their individual agencies and autonomy. The interview style was largely unstructured and interviewees had the freedom to render their stories in a way more germane to their experiential and biographical details. I also provided guidance to the interviewees so as to keep the information flowing (Cresswell, 2009). Since the unstructured interview method offers the
participants more freedom to explore the topical issues by themselves, they generated lines of interrogation critical to the research topic, and to such dimensions that initially was not covered by the research questions. The unstructured interview also elicited more relevant responses from the interviewees. As Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) hint, constructive investigation becomes a transformative undertaking when it is directed to efforts that trouble and interrogate social injustices in any human society. The elaborations made possible by the unstructured interview method I used in my field work helped to accentuate the challenges that transnational youth migrants encounter from their countries of origin through transit and in their destination countries.

It must be noted that qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical paradigm that is ‘interpretivist’ in orientation due to concern with how the social world is interpreted, experienced, comprehended, constructed, and constituted (Mason, 2009, p. 3). It also involves the collection of different types of empirical materials, including case studies; personal experiences or narratives; introspective; life stories; interviews; observational, historical, interactional, and visual images or texts describing routine and problematic moments and meanings the individual ascribed to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 2). Interestingly, different versions of qualitative research tend to understand and assume divergent approaches to the elements of qualitative study. Some might focus on interpretations, others on discourses, many on practices, processes, or constructions, but “all will see at least some of these as meaningful elements in a complex—possibly multi-layered and textured—social world” (Mason, 2009, p. 3). It is therefore a research approach
covering several forms of inquiry that guides our understanding and explanation of the meaning of social phenomena, which poses little or no disruption of the normal environment or context of the phenomenon (Merriam, 1998). Given the data generation methods of the qualitative approach that are both flexible and amenable to most social contexts, my research was deemed suitable for a qualitative investigation. Merriam (1998) outlined a major feature of qualitative research to include the researcher’s interest in understanding the meaning people make of a rare social phenomenon. In my field work or data collection the participants and I deliberated on transnational migration, as well as the understanding of Indigenous as distinct from formal education with clear instances from the lived experiences of the interviewees. The process is consistent with the initial objectives of my investigation, which were to understand participants’ transnational migration experiences from the onset through transit and settlement in Malta as well as to explore the influences of Arabic and Western education in their migratory motives, decisions, and approaches to challenges encountered in these processes. Another feature accentuated in Merriam (2009) is that the researcher is viewed as the major instrument of data collection and analysis. I employed structured and unstructured data collection methods, which located me in the center of the study, and since field work is positioned as a major feature of a qualitative study, my field work took me to the Island Republic of Malta, Europe, where I recruited and had direct interviews with all the participants in my study. In addition, an inductive approach was identified as the third major feature of qualitative research, meaning that conclusions drawn from the investigation and subsequent extrapolation, if any, must evolve from the logics of observation. My
study relied heavily on observations made in the field and individual narratives on the transnational migration experiences of the interviewed youth. The validity of its conclusion therefore would absolutely remain an outcome of the interviewees’ epistemic saliency. Since the qualitative approach is flexible and provides researchers the opportunity to operationalize their investigation in ways that make the most sense for their study, the validity concerns were resolved through the use of relevant theoretical frameworks and engagement with the literature in the analysis of findings. This is consistent with Eisner (1998), who insists that:

> Qualitative inquiry places a high premium on the idiosyncratic, on the exploitation of the researcher’s unique strengths rather than on the standardization and uniformity (p. 169)

Another rationale for my selection of qualitative research in this study was that it is valuable for acquiring a better understanding of policies; its formulation and implementation; a social group’s behavior, community concerns, cultural norms, and values; and aspirations through descriptions and interpretation of interview documentations. As previously mentioned, I made the interview unstructured in style to allow as much autonomy as possible for the interviewees to freely relate their narratives. In that case I was, in Creswell’s (2002) words, a meek facilitator through the process in order to keep the storyline unhindered.

**Sample Recruitment (The Choice of Malta)**

The island Republic of Malta was the chosen location of this project for multiple reasons: the first reason is Malta’s strategic location. Situated in the center of the Mediterranean Sea, Malta is 50 miles to Sicily, 176 miles east of Tunisia, and 207 miles north of Libya (the latter two countries being transit locations for most African immigrants en route to major European countries), which accounts for why Malta has one of the largest numbers
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of Nigerian youth migrants in Europe. Malta, compared to other European countries, is small though densely populated (a country with approximately 423,282 people in 2013), which made commuting to and from resource locations for my study easy. The country covers just over 122 square miles in land area. Unlike major destination countries in mainland Europe, Malta has two official languages, Maltese and English, which eradicated latent communication obstacles. It was documented that a major part of the year 2013 saw 24 boats carrying more than 2,008 sub-Saharan African migrants to Malta from the shores of Libya. Of this population, 63% were male, 12% were female, and 25% were declared to be children upon arrival (Malta Asylum Trends, 2013). The U.N. refugee agency has established that some 30,100 migrants arrived in Italy and Malta from Africa in the first nine months of 2013, compared with 15,000 in all of 2012. It is equally important to observe that migrant youth are increasingly casualties of transnational migration hazards. According to the International Organisation for Migration, 25,000 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean in the last 20 years (IOM, 2012). Fortress Europe, an Italian observatory that tracks migrant deaths reported by the media, says about 6,450 people died in the Canal of Sicily between 1994 and 2012. Of these, 2,000 died in 2011 and 1,700 in 2012. No account of those who perished trying to cross the Sahara Desert ever reaches the media.

I recruited participants from different locations in the Island Republic of Malta. While some of the interviewees were recruited at the premises of the University of Malta in Msida, others were recruited at the Nigerian community meeting venues in the cities of Birkirkara and Msida. Some of the interviewees were also recruited at the immigrant Open Detention Facility in Marsa. Adequate caution was applied to ensure that none of the recruited migrants at Marsa Open Detention Facility fell under the category of detainees requiring emergency
release such as pregnant women and their spouses and the unaccompanied minors. The rationale for the selection of this site was to give many of the formerly detained youth immigrants who lived in and around the facility the opportunity to participate in the study. Protracted protocols and timing constrained me from conducting a study inside the facilities, or selecting detained migrants at Sarfi maximum detention center. Besides, I gathered from interviewed sources that the Sarfi detainees were either new arrivals or immigrants who had not completed the mandatory 18-month detention period at this location, and since my proposal set a minimum of five-year stay in Malta for a youth immigrant to participate in the interview, migrants at Sarfi detention facility were not included.

Demographic Details

I recruited 34 interviewees in all. I conducted 34 field interviews and six focus-group meetings. Twenty-eight migrant youth and six Maltese were interviewed in the study, which took place from July 28 through October 27, 2013 in the Republic of Malta. Of the six Maltese youth, two were female and four were male. One of the four Maltese interviewees was actually the administrative coordinator of a large international NGO based in Malta and Italy. Of the 28 migrant youth, four were Filipino youth migrants (two were female and two male). The decision to recruit Filipino youth migrants was rather an alternative to the original choice of youth migrants from the other European states. This decision was informed by the realization upon arrival in Malta that citizens of European Union member states are treated to some degree as equal to the Maltese citizen. The decision to interview citizens of other European states who immigrated into Malta was to have a basis for triangulation by comparing Nigerian youth migrants’ experiences with those of European youth migrants. This purpose would be defeated if as citizens of one economic community (European Union)
immigrant youth of other European states share, to some degree, the same level of rights and privileges as the Maltese. To account for this shortcoming, Filipino immigrant youth who were classified by Maltese as ‘third citizens’ were recruited instead. The term third here does not necessarily imply that these youth were from the third world or a developing country, but again, Maltese citizenship could be better understood with the illustration of three-tier concentric circles. At the center or the first circle were the bona fide Maltese citizens, who were citizens either by birth or naturalization. The second tier of the circle is the position of non-Maltese who were certified citizens of the European Union, EU member states. Individuals who were neither Maltese citizens nor those of any of the member countries of the European Union were located at the outermost circle, and these were the third citizens. Interview sources disclosed that this became the case after Malta joined the EU on May 1, 2004. Twenty-four Nigerian migrant youth were interviewed at different locations in Malta. Six Nigerian females and 18 males were interviewed.

In the table (see Appendix F), six participants are from the South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria, six are from the South-West zone. Ten participants are from the South-East geo-political zone of Nigeria, and two from the North-Central. The representation is not evenly distributed among the different regions in Nigeria. This is because the study aimed to sample participants from the six geo-political zones in the country but had no definite emphasis on equal regional distribution. It is important to emphasize here that most of the interviewees and participants in the project have lived in Malta for five years or more. This is because I considered that at this length of time one might qualify as a resident in Malta. I must acknowledge that the number of participants in my study sample is by no means average representation of all the Nigerian and Philippines immigrant population in the
Republic of Malta. Nevertheless, these participants were randomly selected from the main
geo-political zones in Nigeria (South-East, South-West, South-South, North-West, North-
East, North-Central). Most of the interviewed migrants arrived in Malta for various purposes
other than education or to join family members who had been established overseas.
Obviously this category of migrant youth composed of representatives of the large majority
of desperate youth at the margins whom Sassen (2006) described as evolving and engaging
alternative modes of migration to circumvent the restrictive, repressive, and securitizing
systems constituted by the various border apparatuses of the receiving nation-states.

Profiles of Nigerian and Filipino Migrants from the Lenses of IPA

It is necessary to hint that for all the participants, pseudonyms are used both in
the table and in the profile details to protect participants’ privacy as a fulfilment of
the ethical requirements for this study. It is crucial to also clarify that when Refugee
Status (awarded often to displaced persons in foreign land who do not have
alternative flight opportunity in their countries of origin) is given to migrants, they
can travel around EU states. This is similar to Asylum Status, which is given to
migrants who left their countries of origin for reasons of political oppression.
However if one is Rejected, meaning that either their refugee or asylum applications
were turned down, they may be given temporary permits (normally a card or paper
allowing them to stay temporarily in Malta. This is subject to yearly renewal. And the
individual could be deported any time and from anywhere), then such individuals are
not permitted to travel out of Malta. It is also very important to stress that all the
migrants have countries in Mainland Western Europe as their target destinations, not
the coastal areas they saw only as transit destinations.

Okey Noble is a 28 year old male migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria. A
primary school certificate holder, his main drive for travelling to Europe was to attain a better life (or economic wellbeing). He was persuaded to travel by his friends who knew some people that had successes after travelling to live in Europe. Okey arrived in Libya in a company of other migrants. They travelled first to northern Nigeria by road then used the services of desert lorry operators to arrive in Niger Republic. They were then guided through desert pathways to Libya. Okey lived in Libya for a year and six months. He succeeded in concealing some of his money from border agents and desert robbers, who extorted money from them, beat and assaulted many before letting them continue on their journey. So Okey had money enough to pay boat arrangers to continue his trip to Europe. Okey arrived in Malta without incident after five days of sailing on the Mediterranean Sea in a small boat overloaded with 60 migrants. They landed at the shores of Malta not knowing it was not Italy; however, due to fear that they might meet bad weather if they continued to Italy, they disembarked. Maltese border authorities took them inland from the shore, promising to take them to Italy after some of the migrants insisted they were headed to Italy. They were refreshed and documented, and Okey was held in detention for one year and six months before being released to the Open Detention Center. He received a temporary permit and used it to sneak into the city to work at construction sites. He remains undocumented but has a work permit he renews annually. Okey has lived in Malta for 12 years. He speaks Igbo and English moderately but can neither read nor write fluently in these languages. Okey has farming as his only Indigenous skill. He was a petit trader in Nigeria before his decision to migrate to Europe.

Ife Nike is a 27 year old South-Eastern Nigerian male migrant. He was a
secondary school drop-out who had economic motives for deciding to travel to Europe. Ife arrived in Malta in a small boat in the company of other migrants. Their trip from northern Nigeria brought them into Libya, where he lived until the 2010-2011 revolution that ousted Col Gaddafi. He escaped Libya with other war refugees hoping to reach Europe, but after four days adrift a floatable device on the Mediterranean Sea, they were grateful to be rescued and brought ashore. However, to their disappointment, they were brought not into Italy but to a small island country called Malta. He has lived in Malta for five years; this includes the one year six months of his detention. Ife is not documented because he has a Rejected status on his refugee application. But he was issued temporary documents on compassionate grounds, which is subject to annual renewal. Ife speaks moderate Igbo and English with difficulty. He cannot read nor write either of these languages fluently. He was raised in the northern Nigerian township, so has no Igbo Indigenous skill.

Chief Ojo is a 32 year old male migrant from South Western Nigeria. He initially emigrated from Nigeria into Libya but had to flee the Libyan war of 2011 as a refugee. Chief arrived in Malta with other war refugees from Libya. He was a high school drop-out, but has a good command of spoken English and can speak but not write Esan, his native language. He was detained for 18 months before being released and issued a permit as a refugee. His permit allows him to travel around in Europe but he can only reside in Malta. It is renewable every year. Chief was raised in the Esan speaking region of Edo state, Nigeria, and has skills in traditional medicine. He has lived in Malta for nine years.

Cathy Ogom is a 28 years old female migrant from South Western Nigeria.
She arrived in Malta to join her mother, who lives and works in the country. Cathy’s mother made all her daughter’s travelling arrangements so she got the necessary documents before leaving Nigeria. It was a seven hour connection flight from Lagos, Nigeria via Dubai (UAE). Cathy had a high school certification before leaving Nigeria and while in Malta she studied to earn her BA and MA from the University of Malta. Since she arrived with a Student Visa, although she has lived in Malta for 10 years, Cathy was issued a temporary work permit. She has no Indigenous skills from her Ora region in Edo state of South Western Nigeria because she was raised in northern Nigeria. Cathy speaks fluent English but can neither read, speak nor write the Ora language.

Ego Udo is a 48 year old male migrant from the South Southern Nigerian geopolitical zone. As a youth, Ego arrived in Malta from a Nigeria on Student Visa to pursue his higher education. He had all his travelling documents and flew directly from Lagos, Nigeria for about seven hours on a connecting flight from London, England. Ego earned a first class honours degree and a master’s degree from the University of Malta. He gained employment with the government of Malta. Ego married a Maltese, had children, and was awarded Maltese citizenship. He has lived in Malta for 30 years. Ego was an avid artisan in the Indigenous weaving, carving, and farming of the Akwa Ibom region of Southern Nigeria. He speaks fluent English and Efik, and writes and reads both proficiently.

Edwin Mbah is from the South-Eastern Nigeria. A 35 year old male migrant of Igbo extraction, his migration trip to Europe was driven by perceived social insecurity and poor living conditions. Edwin migrated to Libya through northern
Nigeria via Niger Republic. He lived in Libya for three years, performing all manner of survival economic activities while saving for money to pay his way to Europe on board travelling boats. He sailed on the Mediterranean for five days with other migrants before their overcrowded boat was rescued by Maltese Navy authorities who brought them ashore at the Malta coast. Starvation and dehydration took their toll on the migrants (majority younger males and women) such that at the point of disembarkment 12 dead bodies and several sick persons were in the boat. Upon arrival in Malta, Edwin was detained for 18 months. He was granted a temporary compassionate document to live and carry out low skilled economic activities in Malta since he has only a primary school certificate. Edwin speaks fluent Igbo but can neither speak, read nor write English and Igbo fluently. He was a subsistence farmer in Nigeria.

Chris Uzo is a 23 year old male migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria. His parents both died in one of their business trips in northern Nigeria where the family resided, leaving him to care for his younger siblings. Chris had no original intent to travel to Europe but lived in Libya for five years, during which time he was making enough money and remitting to his younger ones. The Libyan revolution of 2010-2011 saw him and other Sub-Saharan Africans targeted by the Rebels on accusation of serving as mercenaries to Col. Gaddafi. He fled in a crowded boat amidst other refugees, as the only way out of Libya, after NATO placed an air embargo on Libya to prevent ammunition supply to Gaddafi. With no place in mind, just hoping to arrive in any country outside the Arab regions, Chris arrived in Malta after four hectic days of rough sail on the Mediterranean without food or water. Their boat was
rescued by the Maltese Navy. Chris was detained for eight months and released with a female detainee and a baby boy born to him. His application for refugee status was denied. Chris got coupled with a detained female migrant who became pregnant, and they had a baby shortly after release from detention. He lived in Malta after his detention but without a job or documents to travel. Since he has a lower level education (high school dropout), Chris couldn’t do any significant job to survive but depended on the government’s meagre welfare allowance to support his wife and baby. He speaks Igbo and English and can minimally write and read the two languages.

Aloy Ona is a 22 year old male migrant from the Southern Nigeria geopolitical zone. He was born and raised in one of the townships in his region by poor parents who later died before he could graduate from primary school. Aloy learned welding as an apprentice in a workshop belonging to his father’s friend. He decided to migrate when his friends told him of the Europe-by-Land opportunity. He did not understand its full implication but felt it would improve his living condition to live and work in Europe. Aloy travelled through northern Nigeria into Niger Republic with some of his peers who were also guiding him through the journey. He did survival jobs in Niger and barely made enough money to transport himself to Libya. One of his friends in the group always supported him with money when he was in dire need. Upon arrival in Libya in 2009, after two years in Niger Republic, he got a job as a welder but was always underpaid and verbally abused. But during the 2010-2011 Libyan crises he started finding the environment more and more hostile and deadly. He joined other fleeing Sub-Saharan Africans caught in war-torn Libya to
escape to Europe in a small engine boat. The overcrowded boat was rescued by the Maltese authorities after five days of physically exhausting sail on the Mediterranean Sea, during which they had no provisions of food and water. The sanitary conditions in the boat were extremely poor, and six migrants died and were cast overboard. After hospitalization in Malta, Aloy was put in detention for 18 months. He was released to the open detention center but his refugee application was rejected. He has lived in Malta for six years under a restricted permit. Aloy has no skills from his Indigenous background. He communicates in moderate English and pidgin but speaks fluent Edo. Aloy can neither read nor write any of these languages.

Lucky Enji, a 32 year old male migrant from the South Southern Nigerian geo-political zone, arrived in Malta in 2008 on his way to Europe in search of a better life. Better life in this context implies a condition of living that guarantees migrants’ social security, descent shelter, clothing and reliable and commensurate economic opportunities. From Kano city in northern Nigeria he joined migrants on a hazardous trip to Libya via Niger Republic. He lived in Libya for three years, working hard to raise money to continue his trip to Europe. Lucky paid boat organizers and sailed for Europe. After five days of rough sailing on the Mediterranean Sea he was rescued with other migrants in the same boat and detained for 18 months. He has lived in Malta for eight years but only has a temporary residence permit. Lucky is a primary school dropout. He speaks Igbo and basic English and has no skills other than in traditional farming.

Osita Uba is a 29 year old male economic migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria. He left northern Nigeria in a lorry for Niger Republic with two of his friends.
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The journey through Sahara Desert proved too tough for his friends, so they retreated to Nigeria. Osita doggedly made it across to Libya by the service of a desert guide who received some money from all the migrants he was guiding through dangerous Sahara pathways. Osita lived in Libya for one year eight months during which he skimped and saved to pay the boat fare across to Europe. The migrants were actually told they were sailing in a ship, so they paid the money requested by organizers only to discover in the night of departure that it was a floatable device. Osita arrived in Malta in a floatable device via the Libyan coast in the company of many other migrants. His trip from Libya to Malta lasted four days when Maltese authorities spotted their floatable device and rescued them off the coast of Malta (as they made their way to Italy). Osita was detained for one year six months. Since he did not complete a grade six education he couldn’t do any job requiring skills or technical know-how after he was released to the open detention centre. To survive, he worked with construction firms as a laborer. Osita has lived in Malta for nine years. He was denied refugee claim but has a temporary permit. He speaks simplified English and fluent Igbo but can neither read nor write these languages.

Fred Ogun is a 37 year old male migrant from South Western Nigeria whose main motive for migrating to Europe was to improve his education. Fred has lived in Malta for eight years but his application for refugee status was rejected. He lives in Malta with a temporary residence permit that is subject to annual renewal. Fred had primary school education and was a petty trader in Nigeria. His journey to Malta on his way to Europe lasted four years. Fred travelled with friends through northern Nigeria to Agadez, Niger Republic for six months. He arrived in Libya from Duruku,
Niger Republic in four months and lived three years in Libya. Fred joined migrant boats conveying other migrants to Italy. Their trip was met with tragic incidents in which some migrants died, but they were rescued by the Maltese Navy after five days of sailing and drifting on the Mediterranean Sea. Fred speaks Edo and English languages but has can only write and read basic English.

Nkem Oti is a 33 year old female Nigeria migrant from South Southern Nigeria. She travelled to Malta at age 14 to join her older brother who was well established in the country. Her brother graduated as a chemical engineer from the University of Malta. Nkem arrived in Malta on board a connecting flight from Lagos, Nigeria via London, England. She has lived in Malta for 19 years. Nkem graduated from the University of Malta with a degree in nursing and a certification in veterinary service. She presently works with Malta General Hospital. She only has a work permit pending the approval of her application for permanent residence. Nkem’s Indigenous skills include hair plaiting, community activism, and story-telling. Nkem speaks Anang, Ibibio, Efik and English languages. She is competent in reading and writing all these languages.

Idon Eke is a 35 year old male migrant from the Nigerian South-South geopolitical zone. He arrived in Malta after a seven hour flight from Lagos via Dubai to join his wife who lived and worked in the country. Idon has lived in Malta for seven years. He has a visitor status permit, which is temporary and therefore renewable every year. Idon holds a two-year college diploma as a pharmacy assistant from Nigeria but is finding it difficult to secure permanent residence and a job. His Indigenous skills include weaving, farming, and the use of some Indigenous musical
Instruments. Idon speaks Anang, Efik, Ibibio, and English. He reads and writes in English proficiently.

Ever Tobe is a 28 year old male migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria. He was born and raised in a Nigerian Niger-Delta village. Ever left the country for Europe because of social unrest in the Niger Delta, and poor living conditions. He dropped out of his undergraduate studies in the Delta State University of Nigeria due to lack of funds. His Indigenous skills include fishing and farming. Ever arrived in Malta via Libya after sailing in a small boat for four days across the Mediterranean Sea in the company of his newborn son, wife, and other migrants. His wife became pregnant on transit through Niger Republic and delivered their son in a Libyan hospital, but the hostilities they encountered in the Muslim dominated, war-torn society made them decide to quickly weigh their anchor. Upon arrival in Malta Ever was detained for 18 months and has lived in the country for five years. He lived in Libya for two years upon arrival from Nigeria via Niger Republic. The latter journey took him six months, and hitherto, Ever and his family have only been awarded a temporary permit. Ever speaks Urhobo, Itsekiri, and English languages but reads and writes only English.

Sower Ume is a 29 year old male migrant from the Nigerian South-Eastern geo-political zone. He arrived in Libya from Nigeria through the Sahara Desert-bounded Niger Republic. Sower lived and worked in Libya for three years until the Libyan uprising that saw most Sub-Saharan African migrants attacked by the Libyan warring factions. He fled Libya for Europe in a small migrant boat along with several others. Theirs was another tragic five-day crossing that saw 10 of the migrants (out of
the 52 passengers, mostly younger men and women) dead due in part to sea-sickness, which made many puke, and largely due to lack of food and drinkable water. The death toll could have been more as they fought to reach Italian coasts, but their boat was intercepted and brought to land off Malta shore lines by Maltese naval vessel. Sower holds a degree in business management from a Nigerian university. He only speaks fluent Igbo but speaks, reads, and writes English. His sole Indigenous skill is farming. Sower’s detention lasted 18 months, and he has lived for five years in Malta but was given only a temporary permit. His application for asylum was rejected, for which he forwarded an appeal while still awaiting the outcome.

Kam Esit, 24, is a female migrant from South Western Nigeria. She left Nigeria for Europe because of social insecurities and unrest. She travelled to Libya in a group of five other migrants. The group arrived in Niger Republic within three months of their departure and spent one year before proceeding to Libya. Kam lived in Libya for one year six months before joining other migrants to make their crossing into Europe in an inflatable boat. They were rescued after four days on the sea. Kam was detained for 18 months. She has a high school certificate. She speaks, reads, and writes fluent English, but had no Indigenous language since she was raised in a township. Kam’s only Indigenous skill is cloth-dying. She has lived in Malta for 11 years and her application for refugee status was rejected.

Ana Udo is a 28 year old female Nigerian migrant from the South East geopolitical zone. She emigrated from Nigeria in search of a better life in Europe. Ana travelled from the northern Nigerian city of Kano into Niger Republic from where, in the company of other travellers, she used desert lorries and the services of desert-
guides to arrive in Libya. She spent a year and four months in a camp in Libya before gaining passage to Europe in an improvised boat. She paid the Libyan boat arrangers, and after five days of travel, which they were promised would only last a day and night, they were rescued by Maltese officials. Most of them were in bad shape—exhausted and faint from lack of food and water, and sick from the repulsive sea odour. After hospitalization, Ana was detained for a year and six months. She has lived in Malta for nine years with a temporary permit issued to her on compassionate grounds. Ana holds a secondary school certificate. She speaks fluent Igbo, but reads, writes, and speaks English moderately.

Devon Ina is a female migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria. She emigrated from Nigeria to seek improved conditions of living in Europe. Devon holds a secondary school certificate from Nigeria. She arrived in Niger Republic and proceeded to Libya after seven months. Ina lived in Libya for two and half years before paying to join a migrant boat headed to Europe among other travellers. They were rescued after five days on the Mediterranean. Devon was detained for 18 months, and her refugee application was rejected. This means that she is living with a temporary annually renewable permit. Devon speaks Igbo, but reads, writes, and speaks English moderately.

Andy Uja is a 32 year old male migrant from North Central Nigeria. He emigrated from northern Nigeria into Libya via Niger Republic in the later Gaddafi era and eked out a living doing labor-intensive jobs. Andy fled Libya in the company of other refugees in the early part of Libyan crisis. He arrived in Malta after a six-day sail on the Mediterranean Sea on board a rickety boat. He was detained shortly on
arrival in Malta for six months. He was released to the open detention center with
another female migrant, and a baby was born to them after he got his freedom. Andy
lives with a temporary permit because his asylum application was turned down. Andy
has Arabic primary school (grade 6) certificate equivalence. He was a traditional
subsistent grain farmer in Nigeria. Andy speaks Hausa and pidgin English.

Titi Lana is a 26 year old female Nigerian economic migrant from the South
West geo-political zone. She migrated into Libya from Niger Republic on her way to
Europe. She began her journey to a better life in Europe after hearing speculation
among her peers about Europe-by-Land and believed it was a survival possibility. She
started out with a limited amount of money in hand. As a hydrophobic, Titi never
imagined her journey would ever involve crossing a dangerous sea in a boat. But she
spent five days in the company of other migrants sailing across the Mediterranean Sea
in a small over-crowded boat. Titi, like other migrants, became sick shortly after their
boat set sail from the Libyan coast due to sea odour and also due to lack of food and
drinkable water. The migrants were rescued by the Maltese Navy after the fifth day
and they were brought ashore. Titi was hospitalized for treatment and subsequently
detained for 18 months. Her application for refugee status was rejected, but Titi holds
a temporary residence permit. Titi has lived in Malta for eight years. She holds a
secondary school certificate from Nigeria. She speaks English with ease but has no
knowledge of any Indigenous Nigerian languages as she was born and raised in the
metropolitan city of Lagos. She is skilful in Indigenous African hair-weaving arts.

Jide Noki is a 31 year old male migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria. He
arrived in Libya on his way to Europe. He settled in Libya for three years and
engaged in economic activities so as to raise sufficient money to continue his trip. The protracted crisis in Libya saw Jide and other refugee migrants escape from Libya in small boats heading to Italy. After 4 rough days on the Mediterranean Sea they were rescued by Maltese authorities. Jide was in detention for a year, six months. Since his release from detention Jide has lived in Malta for 6 years. He was granted temporary refugee status. He speaks Igbo and basic English but writes and reads English moderately. Jide holds a secondary school certificate from Nigeria but has no Indigenous skills.

Udder Alo is a 29 year old male migrant from the South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria. Udder holds a college diploma from Nigeria. His purpose for migrating to Europe was to gain improved educational training and skills. Udder, who got detained for 18 months on arrival in Malta after a five-day sail on the Mediterranean, has lived in the country for 10 years. He holds an annually renewable residence permit because his application for asylum was rejected. Udder speaks fluent English but has no Indigenous skills as he was raised in one of the townships in Southern Nigeria.

Ray Yaro is an 18 year old male migrant from South Western Nigeria who emigrated from Nigeria into Libya via Duruku in Niger Republic. He lived and worked in Libya for four years before the prolonged Libyan crises. Ray fled Libya to escape the persecution and killing of Sub-Saharan Africans in that country when he considered that his life was no longer safe. He hoped to continue his post-secondary studies in Libya but no sooner did the war break out than he realized it was not going to be possible. As a war refugee or one of the internally displaced people, Ray joined
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a boat conveying other migrants to Europe. They travelled for five days before they were rescued by Maltese Navy ship and brought ashore thence. Ray was detained for 18 months before being granted refugee status on compassionate grounds and he has lived in Malta for eight years. Ray has no Indigenous skills. He speaks Bini and basic English languages and can read English.

Profiles of the Filipino Interviewed Migrants

Lisa Cruz is a 31 year old male Filipino migrant who arrived in Malta by air to resume a job position he was offered by his government. Lisa holds a BSc nursing degree from one of the Philippines’ universities. In Malta, he works in the hospitality industry as a hotel room attendant. Lisa has lived in Malta for five years and holds an extended residence permit spanning his three-year contract period, which is renewable at the volition of the migrant. Lisa hopes to continue his migration to the United States of America at the expiration of his contract. Lisa speaks English and Tagalog but can only read and write English. He was a skilful traditional farmer in his country.

Tessie Denva is a 32 year old female Filipino migrant who was recruited into the labor export program of the Philippines government. She was trained and sent to Malta. Tessie arrived in Malta by air and has lived in the country for six years. She regrets leaving her young children and husband but takes solace in the telephone communication she has every day with her young family, hoping she will be home when her contract period expires. Tessie works as a waitress in a hotel but she holds a certificate in physiotherapy from the Philippines. Her contract is renewable every three years. She speaks English and Tagalog. She has no Indigenous skills.

Christy Jugo is a 28 year old female Filipino migrant who arrived in Malta as
an economic migrant. She is among the group of migrants recruited, trained and sent
to industrialized nations by the government of the Philippines as a way of generating
revenue and creating employment for its citizens. Christy arrived in Malta in a long
connecting flight from Manila. She holds a degree in management but trained in the
government proficiency program as a nanny. Christy has lived and worked as a nanny
in Malta for six years. She speaks English and Tagalog but has no Indigenous skills.
Christy’s work and residence permit covers the duration of her contract. Like other
contract workers, her contract is renewable.

Alan Dobe is a 29 year old male Filipino migrant who arrived in Malta on
board a flight from Manila, Philippines to commence work in an industrial laundry
outfit. He holds a college diploma in physiotherapy from the Philippines. Alan has
lived in Malta for five years and holds a residence and work permit that covers the
duration of his contract. Although Alan’s contract is renewable after three years, he
admits he is on transit and will continue migrating to mainland Europe when the
opportunity comes.

**Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis and Recruitment of Participants**

One of the merits of IPA, particularly when applied in a qualitative field work,
is that it encourages the researcher to meet and interview the participant in the latter’s
choice of location. The need to include wider categories of Nigerian migrant youth as
participants in the study was met by my insistence on an earlier introduction to the
meetings of the Nigerian community in Malta. Engaging youth who migrated to
Europe for academic purposes, those who migrated to join their family relations, and
the independent transnational migrant youth enriched the study with different
perspectives, experiences, and views that would be lacking if the study interviewed
only the independent youth migrants. While interacting with these youth who were from different geo-political zones in Nigeria and had arrived in Malta through different modes of transportation and arrangements, I noticed that most of them were raised in urban cities with very limited introduction to traditional skills, values, and education throughout the course of their primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Others were raised in traditional home settings in the country-sides (villages). Because of this, participants’ opinions on colonization, Indigenous knowledge, and education were influenced by the community and environment of their upbringing, types of schools (primary and secondary) attended, and their levels of interaction with other societies/individuals during the course of their education. Shortly after receiving confirmation letters of ethical approval from the University of Toronto and the University of Malta (please see Appendix for copies of the approval letters), and completing the mandatory University of Toronto School of Graduate Studies Overseas travel orientation for students, I conferred with one of my professors who hailed from Malta, and he provided me with information on his colleagues in the University of Malta, Msida. Upon initial communication with these professors, I requested and was fortunate to receive the name of a specific contact person for the Nigerian community in Malta. Besides assisting in the logistics of my trip, my contact voluntarily took me to all the community meetings. As a former graduate student of the University of Malta, and presently, a director in the Ministry of Education, Malta, he was the founding father of the pan-Nigerian Association in Malta. Upon my arrival in Malta on the 3rd of August, 2013, he also provided me with a list of immigrants he knew, some NGOs, and other Maltese departments from which to source archival
documents for secondary data, as I requested. After the contacts were established, I started meeting with various groups and systematically issued invitation letters to those who volunteered to participate in the study inviting (please refer to Appendix for participant’s letter of invitation) them to participate in the interview. From the 30 letters of invitation sent out for the first time, twenty seven (27) replied and agreed to participate. Three of these volunteers who resided in the open detention facility invited me to their residence at the Open Detention Centre, Marsa, as the only condition for them to participate in the interview. These youth wanted me to see first-hand the condition of living in the detention facility. At the Open Detention Facility at Marsa the officials insisted that as a matter of protocol I must write to the director (who then was on vacation) and the Ministry of Interior, Malta, and upon their positive response I would be allowed entrance into the facility. I followed the procedure to communicate with the director of the facility via email. The response was complicated with further prescriptions that would require nearly half a year to complete, but I was allowed to interview detained migrants (participants) who volunteered, only outside the premises of the facility, an offer I instantly accepted. The three volunteers who initially agreed to participate on condition that I carry out an unobtrusive investigation of their condition of living in the facility defaulted from the study, arguing that I was not different from Maltese media agents and journalists whose interviews only tended to worsen the treatment meted out to them by the government and people of Malta. I did not face any attrition resulting from their withdrawal since they hadn’t signed the consent forms, and as much as I had only planned to interview 24 Nigerian migrants, I was not deterred.
As soon as I received the consent of desired number of participants for my study, I scheduled the interviews and communicated information on dates, time, and venue to interviewees in different locations in Malta. My interviews with the 24 Nigerian youth migrants who participated were accomplished in a little less than two months (precisely a month and 24 days). Most of my interviewees from Nigeria were both committed and punctual to the appointments, since they believed it was an avenue to express their opinions and share views on their lived experiences. My interview schedule with Filipino migrant youth suffered two cases of attrition, where the participants (a male and a female) opted out of the study after signing the consent form, informing me that they were dissuaded from the interview by their Maltese employers to whom they disclosed the appointment so as to secure time off from work. In either case, I obliged their request to leave, because I had made room for study exigencies symbolized in this attrition. This is contained in the ethical review form I submitted to the Universities of Toronto and Malta’s Research Ethics Boards. It is important to highlight that Filipino migrant youth were interviewed during the field work only to provide reference as triangulation.

**Participant’s Privacy and Informed Consent**

I provided my study participants with the informed consent protocol form so as to create a safe space for free expression of ideas. They read, affirmed their understanding of the content, and signed the agreement that their participation in the study was voluntary. I have therefore applied necessary cautions to safeguard the confidentiality of the interviewees’ information by using pseudonyms in the report. This was in line with my promise to each participant that I was going to be the only person who would know their real names, and that I would keep the only copy of those names secured for disposal later, after the analysis was completed. This was in
accordance with university policy on the privacy and confidentiality of the participants.

**Data Collection Tools Using IPA Questions**

My interview questions follow IPA recommendations, therefore interrogate with a view to understanding participants’ interpretations of their experiences. The questions were designed in unambiguous, clear, and concise language and simplified further for participants where I perceived that they were having difficulty understanding the questions. This effort ensured the accurate capturing of information from the participants. I used an electronic voice recorder to record the details of interviewees’ responses. The electronic recording gadget was helpful in enabling me to concentrate on the conversations with interviewees without having to take anecdotal notes at intervals. Besides, the recorder made transcription of the information gathered easy, since I could play it back and forth until I got the desired message. Silverman (2000) reasons that tapes and transcripts are public records available to the scientific community in a way that field notes are not. Further, the use of audio recording during face to face interviews provided me the opportunity to observe the facial nuances and body languages of participants during the interview and transcription of data. Additionally, I reflected on my personal experiences migrating from Nigeria to Canada on the 31st of April 2005 (albeit with necessary documents and modes of transport). My experiences during the field trip at the various transit borders and here in Canada have continued to shape my views and have become the key source of inputs in most of this thesis such as in the introduction/statement of the problem and data analysis.

**Interview Questions**
After my participants’ recruitment and interview scheduling were completed, I started travelling to the various venues on the dates and times scheduled to meet with each participant. I met most of the interviewees on campus at the University of Malta, Msida, in the open gardens and in offices. I also held interviews with migrant youth at the relaxation spaces at the front of the detention centres. Each interview lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. The questions were read out to interviewees. The structured questions started with a sub-theme that had eight questions related to participants’ socio-cultural information. Eleven questions looked into the respondents’ Western education and training and how these wielded an influence on migrants’ decisions to travel, culminating in a grounding question that explores interviewees’ experiences in Malta as non-citizens. The unstructured questions explored interviewees’ migration experiences. The first sub-theme has seven questions exploring the factors leading to a surge in youth migration from the developing to the developed world. The second sub-theme had 10 questions that examined the transnational border surveillance as it affects migrating youth and attitudes of receiving society to immigrant youth. The open questions used in the study definitely meant that in the course of the interviews, other questions that were not initially part of the listed questions emerged. Often, additional questions were generated from participants’ responses. This was particularly the case where the unstructured questions were used. The table below gives a summary of the research’s target questions, objectives of each question, participants, and data.

**Research’s Target Questions**

My preliminary questions to research included the following enquiries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Objective of the</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Data</th>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Get the definition</th>
<th>Nigerian youth</th>
<th>Youth of European descent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>How might we define transnational youth migration?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigerian youth</td>
<td>Youth of European descent</td>
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<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>What socio-political or economic factors influence youth decision to migrate?</td>
<td>Establish factors influencing youth migration.</td>
<td>Nigerian youth migrants</td>
<td>European migrant youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>How and what legal barriers did youth migrants encounter at the Malta port of entry?</td>
<td>Identify elements of border surveillance and social interrogation.</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth/European migrant youth</td>
<td>Structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>What perceptions of Nigerian immigrant youth do Maltese hold against their continued settling in Malta?</td>
<td>Find out the opinions of Maltese against Nigerian immigrant youth.</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth</td>
<td>Unstructured interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>How do Maltese perceive non-citizens living among them?</td>
<td>Find out the opinions of Maltese on immigrants generally. This shapes public opinion and immigration policies</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth/European migrant youth</td>
<td>Structured interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>What are the attitudes of Maltese authorities (immigration personnel and police) toward immigrant youth?</td>
<td>Understand how Maltese authorities react to discourage or encourage immigrants youths to settle in Malta.</td>
<td>Migrant Nigerian youth/European migrant youth</td>
<td>Structured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>What are the economic, social, and political constraints faced by immigrant youth in settling in Malta?</td>
<td>Find out the structures of repression constraining migrant youth in host nations.</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth/European migrant youth</td>
<td>Unstructured interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>What efforts do immigrant youth apply to navigate around perceived barriers posed by social, political, and economic systems in Malta, such as accessing resources?</td>
<td>Establish how migrant youth resist subjugation and the skills they use to re-establish their humanity and survival.</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth/European migrant youth</td>
<td>Structured interview</td>
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<td>09</td>
<td>How does Western education equip migrants to survive in Malta socio-economic spaces?</td>
<td>Find out how Western (colonial) education acquired in Nigeria equips Nigerian migrant youth to find employment in Malta.</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth</td>
<td>European Migrant youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Given every opportunity, would migrant youth prefer to return to their countries of origin?</td>
<td>Find out if migrant youth are in deadlock and would prefer to return home or continue to stay in Malta.</td>
<td>Nigerian migrant youth/European migrant youth</td>
<td>Unstructured interview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The use of the unstructured interview method to explore the above questions created an enabling environment for free expression of views through conversations between the participants and researcher. This facilitated the creation and sustenance of a high degree of trust for free and honest exchange of views, which allowed participants to engage with how they individually experienced transnational migration. By creating an environment of mutual trust and respect, the qualitative research strategy empowered my participants to relay, undeterred, their individual migration narratives and the corresponding implications for policy imperatives.

**Data Validity**

The validity of the data collected was reaffirmed by sending the transcribed texts by
email to seven of the participants who expressed willingness to review their sessions. Among
the participants who indicated interest in reviewing their session was the regional coordinator
of one of the international NGOs based in Valletta, Malta. The rest were interviewed migrant
youth in Malta. These participants responded back to confirm that the transcribed data fully
represented their contributions to the interview and pointed out that they would be honoured
to read the completed dissertation. The remaining 21 participants did not express an interest
in reviewing the transcript.

Research Purposes
To examine the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in the Republic of Malta

Claims/Interpretations
These will be the findings of the research

Key Research questions
What factors influence Nigerian youth decision to migrate to Europe?
How do the Arabic and Western educational systems in Nigeria serve to generate migrant youth?
What role does the foreign direct investments, and fiscal involvements of industrialized

Theoretical frameworks
Anti-colonial, Indigenous and knowledge and anti-racist theory

Methodology
IPA, Qualitative and quantitative research methodology
Conceptualizing Research

The diagram above depicts the five stages of qualitative research I employed to conceptualize my study. The first stage relates to research purpose. This deals with the problem statement and the justification for conducting the study. The second stage emphasizes the methodology used to achieve the study goals. The third stage explores how the different theories speak to the research study; the fourth stage presents the key claims. The fifth stage is where the author weaves the participants’ voices and theoretical perspectives around the thesis of the study. Conclusively, the methodology chapter has examined key activities that transpired in the course of data collection (seeking ethical approval from the researched area, participants’ recruitment, and actual interview process, etc.). The interviews carried out in this field work produced sound and rich data that have been reported in chapter five below.
Chapter Five  
Data Presentation

This chapter presents the findings of the study designed to investigate the lived experiences of African migrant youth in the Island Republic of Malta. With the interview proceedings electronically recorded, the transcribed responses generated one hundred and fifty (150) pages of written text that are reported in order of the interview questions. During the 34 interviews and six focus-group meetings conducted in the Republic of Malta from August through October 2013, 28 migrant youth and six Maltese were interviewed (see: Appendix G). Note that for ethical considerations and in line with the requirements of the University of Toronto, and the University of Malta Ethics Committees, pseudonyms are used throughout this thesis report to protect interviewees’ privacy. Of the six Maltese youth, two were female and four were male. One of the four Maltese male interviewees was actually the administrative coordinator of a large international NGO based in Malta and Italy. Of the 28 migrant youth, four were Filipino youth migrants (two were female and two male). Nigerian interviewees were 24, out of which six were female and 18 male. 34 youth were interviewed. Twenty-eight interviewees—representing 82.4%—were immigrants, while six interviewees—representing 17.6%—were Maltese. Twenty-four of the interviewed youth, representing 70.6%, were male, while 10 (29.4%), were female. Besides the fact that male interviewees were more predisposed to speak with me (a stranger-interviewer), there appeared to be an air of apprehension, fear, and inhibition, particularly among female migrants of West African descent; hence a disproportionate number of male relative to female African migrants were interviewed. Of the 28 migrant youth interviewed, 20 youth—representing 71.4%—were male and eight interviewees—representing 28.6%—were female.

Based on the interviews, foremost in the findings was that the majority of the youth
migrants interviewed were primary and secondary school leavers; most of the youth migrants were also classified as asylum or refugee status migrants because their mode of immigration into Europe was deemed irregular. Only five of the interviewees from Africa possessed university degrees or college diplomas as opposed to all the Filipino migrants, who, although they possessed degree qualifications in their professions (largely, the health sub-sector), were trained and certified by their home government to undertake menial jobs like cleaner, nanny, house-help, hotel or restaurant attendant, before being recruited to leave their country for Europe. Of the four participants with degrees, only one received this qualification from the home university before migrating to Libya and subsequently to Malta. Two gained their degrees at the University of Malta by migrating to join family members; one of them came specifically to study in Malta. He thereafter married a Maltese and settled in the country. Statistical representation of the tables (see Appendix G) will elucidate the responses for different variables the interviewees responded to. It is critical to observe that of the six geo-political zones in Nigeria, the North, particularly the North-East and North-West, had zero representation among Nigerian migrant youth in Malta. This is an interesting development considering that it is through these regions that most Nigerian migrant youth on transit make their way through land borders of Sahara Desert-bounded countries until they arrive in Libya. The emerging question will be: does it suggest that the waves of migration and factors driving the youth from the other geo-political zones in Nigeria do not exist in these regions of the North? Are there cultural justifications or does Abebe Shimeles’ (2010) idea that migrants from developing economies tend to prefer migrating to countries that were their former colonial masters hold true in this case? Further investigation based on Shimeles’ assertion might reveal if northern Nigerian youth are also troup ing out in large numbers to Arab
nations to which they are mostly affiliated by colonization through culture and religion. The implication would be a rethinking to ground colonization or neo-colonial processes as a major driving force of youth migration. If Shimeles’ reason is anything to go by, then more youth of Southern Nigeria would rightly gravitate toward Europe or its extended territories in the Americas, Scandinavian countries, and Oceania. My argument derives from the historical notation that places Arab colonization of Nigeria at 300 years prior to Western colonization (Fafunwa, 1974; Bray, 1981; Isichei, 1983; Graham, 1966).

The interviewee sample indicates that youth from South-Eastern Nigeria constitute the largest number of Nigerian youth migrants in Malta. Nearly half of the interviewed youth (10 interviewees), representing 41.7%, are of South-Eastern Nigerian origin. Six migrants each from the South-West and South-South, representing 25% respectively, were interviewed, while two youth from the North-Central zone, representing 8.3%, were interviewed. There were no Europe-bound youth migrants from the North-East and North-West geo-political zones of Nigeria. More than half of the interviewed youth were between 26 and 35 years of age. In fact, 13 youth, representing 54.2% of the interviewees from Nigeria, were between 26 and 35 years of age. Only three respondents (12.5%) were between 36 and 45 years. Eight of the youth, representing 33.3%, were in the age bracket of 15–25 years.

**Narratives From the Field**

More insight will arise from the use of reports drawn entirely from the migrants’ experiences in narrative form to anchor the remaining segments of the findings of this investigation. These reports will present the epistemic realities of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta by following them through their decision to travel, the motives, the journey itself, transit-border ordeals, and experiences in receiving countries. This approach will add vim to
the flow of the work knowing that the voices of migrants will feature pre-eminently in the subsequent chapters to validate the narratives. From the data collected in the Island Republic of Malta, certain motives of these migrants have emerged. I will employ interpretative phenomenological approach to prosaically review the accounts of the migrants interviewed through the field studies conducted in Malta from August to October 2013.

Motives

The findings of this research suggests that potential African youth migrants to Europe have in recent times proven resilient and apparently unruffled by news of tragic experiences of fellow migrants who have gone before them. How often and to what extent this realization applies to the experiences of the Nigerian youth migrants in Malta will further be examined with subthemes applicable to the experiences of select youth migrants. Okey was a young man, 28 years old, a high school dropout from Nigeria. He was not able to continue his studies because no one could pay his school fees, and as the first born among his siblings, who shared poor, aged parents, he assumed the mantle of bread-winner for the family. He is a strong-willed, resilient, and determined person. Thus, when his musical and movie disc vending business fell short of meeting the family’s financial needs, he started looking for alternative sources of income. Around this time, one of his friends brought to life their initial thoughts of travelling to Europe by linking him with another young man who promised to help take them to Europe. They provided the finances requested hoping that their friend would secure their travelling documents and book their flight tickets. This euphoria melted into reality when they arrived in the northern Nigerian city of Kano on their way to the border country, Niger Republic, and unbeknownst to them, en route to a North African country, Libya. It was at this point that they realized they were making the journey by land as opposed to by air. This respondent’s account will be classified into what in this thesis will be
termed economy-triggered migration.

Another set of respondents (Osita and Ray) had different factors triggering their migration. Osita graduated in 2004 with an honors degree in microbiology from the University of Maiduguri, in northern Nigeria. He was unable to secure any meaningful job and was too financially handicapped to pursue his graduate program. Many years passed after he had completed his one year mandatory National Youth Service (NYSC), and he was still left without a job. My respondent was persuaded and financially assisted by his friend to travel to the Republic of Libya where he engaged in a reasonably rewarding job that sustained him and enabled him to remit money to his parents and siblings who lived in Nigeria. This situation was suddenly changed for the worst in the onset of the political upheaval that ousted Col. Muammar Gadhafi engulfed the peaceful terrain of Libya. This respondent was among several seriously wounded people who were rushed to foreign countries for the treatment of wounds inflicted by artillery fire and grenade attacks. His drive to Europe could be termed unrest-triggered migration.

Such was the experience of respondent Ray, a 19 year old. He is currently an outpatient at the Mount Camel Psychiatric Hospital, Malta. Ray was 15 when their boat was rescued by Maltese authorities as part of immigrants fleeing Libya. He had the dead body of his younger brother (then 12 years old) lying on his knees. His brother died from five days of severe dehydration on the sea as they fled from Libya due to political crisis. The compact, 20-passenger boat cramped with 80 passengers meant no provision was made for their relaxation and refreshment; as such, they had to sail on the Mediterranean Sea for four days without food or drinkable water. When his younger brother became one of the casualties of the trip, my respondent vowed never to let his brother’s body be cast into the abysmal
graveyard that the Mediterranean Sea represented to African youth migrating to Europe from the desert to the sea. He folded the corpse to his already hurting knees for lack of space in the cramped boat. At the time of their rescue, hunger, dehydration, melancholy, sorrow, and psychological trauma had taken their toll on his psyche and mental health. He was taken by ambulance to the Mount Camel Mental Health Hospital in Malta and ever since then, he has remained an outpatient of the health institute. However, this respondent’s ordeals began in northern Nigeria where he had lived with his parents and four siblings in Kano city until 2006 when the merciless attack of the terrorist Boko Haram Islamic Jihadist army claimed the lives of the rest of the family members, leaving him, then 14 years old, and his 8 year old brother as the only survivors. A neighbor who developed a keen interest in the orphaned boys whose parents were killed in the insipience of Boko Haram attacks in Northern Nigeria, falsely promised them a better life in Niger Republic, a bordering country further up on the northern border of Nigeria. Upon arrival in Niger, the helper they now viewed as uncle secretly sold the two boys into slavery to a female restaurant owner. They served as much as possible to keep body and soul together until their employer/owner sent them to a rich man in Libya with some money to pay their way. Unfortunately, they did not realize that they were being sold again as slaves. Upon their arrival in Libya, the political unrest meant that the country was no safe haven for escapee orphans. The young boys escaped from their master and fled to the refugee camp from where they sailed out of Libya in the company of other migrants. This is another case of unrest-triggered migration.

Fred, a participant in a focus group meeting held at the Marsa Open Detention Centre in Malta on August 13, 2013, relayed his ordeals. Now 18 years old, this respondent lived with his widowed mother and elder sister in Chad Republic, a few kilometers north east of
Bornu State, Nigeria. At the very tender age of six, the respondent was playing with his peers in their neighborhood when, according to him, he accidentally pushed one of his peers down a well (deep water borehole). Many of the community members from the victim’s side were infuriated and as a way of settling the score in the predominantly Islamic region of Chad Republic demanded that the boy be released by his widowed mother so that he would be killed. Fearing that the worst could happen, his mom sent him and his elder sister away to Niger Republic where they neither had any friends nor relations. In Niger Republic, they served as waiters in a traveler’s restaurant in Agadez. Fred and his sister made contacts through some of these travelers who promised to take them along to Europe. They fled with this group to Libya on their way to Europe—a trip that proved so fatal, his elder sister died and was cast into the sea on the fifth day of travel due to lack of basic food and water (as he stated they were unable to drink salty Mediterranean Sea water). His experience was informed by Islamic prescriptions as opposed to the Indigenous African case resolution processes. This is a typical case of colonization-induced migration. It is a culture-encapsulation-triggered migration. Indigenous African cultures have an amiable way of resolving unintentional homicide that does not spell out vengeance or death to the culprit. The colonial or imposed Arab/Islamic culture operational in Chad enthrones Sharia legal principles, which are merciless and prescribe ‘murder for murder.’

**Desert to Sea: The Transit Experience**

Irrespective of individual migrants’ drives or motives for leaving their countries to settle in a foreign nation, the common destination of all African migrant youth in Libya was expected to be Europe while Libya was merely a transit-location. In most cases, the trip across the Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea was the major barrier to the success of the migrants’ ventures; many migrants who fell victim to swindlers and robbers but determined
to reach their destination further became misled by the desert mirage and would see the vast Sahara Desert as a few hours walk across. Many never lived to tell their stories. A journey from Agadez (Niger Republic) through Duruku (also in Niger Republic) would only leave an exhausted, gaunt, and extremely dehydrated few rescued into Libya if they were fortunate. Other migrants who were lucky to have their money intact and suffered no vehicle breakdown along the route would make it to Libya atop a large combo truck jammed with cargo sandwiched in with passengers, majority of whom are migrant youth. Unfortunately, the rampant incidents of desert deaths among migrants hardly make it to the world media. So hitherto no effort has been made by the international community to stop this unnecessary waste of precious lives. Okey, a male Nigerian migrant youth in Malta, reveals that the journey in Niger Republic took them across many cities. They went from the northern Nigerian city of Kano in a truck into Zinde in Niger Republic, and then they lived in Zinde for a while. It was actually in Zinde that Okey, who until now was deceived by his guard-friend, realized that they were going to travel by land and not by air. They couldn’t at this point think going back was easier even when they couldn’t fathom the distance and ordeals between them and Europe. The narrative of Okey’s trip through the Sahara Desert-bounded countries to Libya essentially mirrors the experiences of almost all African youth migrants traveling to Europe by land. Okey boarded another desert-truck from Zinde to a Niger city called Argadez, and according to him, “It was very, very sunny and difficult to survive in that area.” Then they took another truck going to a city called Druku in the same country, Niger, as they piloted their way to Libya. And to arrive in Druku they spent many days on the road. He revealed:

> It was a lot of nights on the way, with mosquito and everything. It was such a difficult journey all the way. But because I was determined to arrive in Europe I continued
travelling with the group without giving up. In fact, at this point, going back to Nigeria was an even more difficult journey to imagine.

When they eventually arrived in Druku, they joined another truck bound for Libya. Chief, an interviewee who also participated in one of the focus group meetings, recollected:

So on our way to Libya we met a lot of challenges—we met rebels who were essentially a bunch of armed bandits—and we also met Niger Republic’s border police. Each of these groups took turns to strip you of all your money. They will strip you of everything. Even some women among us were raped, and some died on the way.

Upon arrival in Libya, the migrants realized that life as they knew it was never going to be the same, yet they were uncertain if it was going to turn out for the better or for worse. The idea of retreating back to Nigeria was out of the question. Okey narrated, “In Libya, it was not easy as well, because it is an Arab country and you can’t even walk on the street. They will be stoning you and all those things. But then we stayed there, having in mind that our intention was to arrive in Europe. So I spent two years in Libya, and it was in hard labor.”

**Libya and the Sea of Life and Death**

The next tragic experience in the 21st century Africa-to-Europe youth migration is on the Mediterranean Sea. The endless stretch of Mediterranean Sea along the coast of Libya through Malta to the Italian island of Lampedusa remains a big wall to scale among the majority of the transnational migrants from Africa who aspire to arrive in Europe. This deep and ominous stretch of water has remained the unpopular graveyard of many migrants, sailors, and transnational sales persons or merchants. For most African migrants headed to Europe from North Africa, the journey starts from Libyan coasts. Respondents disclosed that during the Libyan crisis, they were herded into an open, improvised refugee hall by some people among them who suddenly assumed the mantle of leadership as trip organizers. However, respondents who travelled before and after the crisis revealed that their trip was
coordinated by a foreperson; this individual naturally sprang up from among them and took
the initiative of collecting money from potential travelers a night or so before they were
marched off toward the sea and hidden in nearby bushes until the boat (whose owner or
builder was always never made known) appeared at the beach in the moonlit night. They
could remain in hiding for an undetermined number of days, often famished as they ended up
using up whatever supplies they had brought along for the trip. Besides, the many days of
failed departure deadlines helped to not only toughen the hunger stricken migrants, but also
intensified their passion to leave the incarceration that was now turning into a torment. The
boat organizers would demand payment of a stipulated sum of money from each migrant and
in return promise them a safe passage through the Mediterranean by ship. Of course, many of
the migrants at this time had exhausted whatever money they had started with, some along
the long trip from Sub-Saharan African countries to Libya. Some insisted they were robbed
of all they had at one of the borders between Niger Republic and Libya; others were robbed
on their way to the Libyan border. Whatever cash remained with those who were not robbed
they used to transport themselves and to secure access across international borders as they
were compelled to pay bribes to border agents for access to each border they crossed. While
most of them did not have means of survival, few had the courage to go and beg for alms
during the day. Others who couldn’t beg got casual or menial jobs or barber jobs at best, all
in an effort to both survive and pay the fare the eluding boat men would charge at the end.
Often when a boat is made ready, it is in such secrecy that everything is scheduled at night.
The moon will be at its peak to provide just enough light for one to barely see the birth-marks
on his or her palm. The boat men are not really pilots. They merely serve as go between in
purchasing the boat from the manufacturers or dealers and secretly make the same available
to the impending migrants. The fare is charged according to what each migrant can afford. The quote usually must start with a big amount from which bargaining goes down the scale. And because everybody wants to leave the camp for fear of police raiding the illegal dwelling, as well as for fear of not having enough food and water to survive, leaving appears to be the only and best option. They cannot disperse into Libyan society where, according to some of the respondents, the Arabs would put them into slavish forced-labor or worse still, lock them up in privately made prisons in some of their compounds. These prisons according to most of my interviewees, were designed to punish the “Black skinned” people. Ever, a successful migrant who passed through this ordeal in Libya, said it was the darkest day of his life. His dream was to leave the oil-polluted Niger Delta region of Nigeria where he was born. He left for Europe because of social unrest and impoverished living conditions resulting from the environmental degradation caused by the exploration activities of the Shell British Petroleum and several other foreign oil and gas prospecting companies in the Niger Delta. He felt that Europe could afford him much better living conditions. His migration was driven or triggered by internal socio-economic and cultural displacement.

**Youth Migrants and their Pains**

Ever’s hope was almost destroyed when his wife delivered their son on transit in Libya and was treated, according to him, more like a cow than human being. The Libyan authorities even refused to give any documents to certify the birth of his son. He was determined to engage in any economic activity that would help him care for his wife and newborn baby, but just then the employer decided to punish him by jailing him in his family-owned dungeon built deliberately to punish the Blacks, as Ever was repeatedly told by his hirer. He stopped pleading for his wages and turned to plead for his life, but that apparently was a joke. After the second day, he was no longer concerned about his life but was now
crying for his wife and newborn baby, who were definitely unaware of what had become of him. Given the chaos Libya became after the battle that ousted Colonel Muammar Gadhafi from power, he thought, “ Surely my wife will believe that I have been killed since the Arabs have become more ruthless with foreigners, especially African youth”. On the fourth day, when his captor came down into the pit to drop some slices of bread and water for him, Ever summoned the courage to let him know that he was hurting God and an innocent baby by keeping him in the jail instead of paying him his deserved wages for the work done. Then his captor listened and the following day assigned him to further cleaning jobs in his house. After he completed this assignment, his captor let him go. He was only anxious to see his wife and baby and was greatly relieved to learn that they were being cared for by other migrants who realized the new mother was in distress. Libya therefore was no longer an option for this respondent. He had to leave at once before he fell victim to more predators; for instance, he could fall into the hands of Islamic extremists who might not only see him as a “person of color,” a non-Arab, but also as a Christian. Experiences like this toughened migrants who, after hearing the sad news of those who went ahead of them, would still insist on giving the trip across the Mediterranean a try. Migrants like Ever were ruffled and became more convinced that this venture was a matter of life and death. If they remained in Libya, a certain future of pain and suffering lay ahead. So death would only be a question of time. On the other hand, if they set sail, even on a raft, they had a fifty-fifty chance of being rescued and taken care of. So many gave up whatever currency remained in their hands for a trip of no return. Stakes were higher for the first contributors because they paid the huge amount demanded by the boat organizers. Since these middlemen also saw their role in arranging for these boats as a business, they tried to extort as much as to keep their business lively for the
next group of migrants. Thus, it was not a charitable exercise to help men, women, and children in distress. In fact, the idea of herding the migrants into improvised refugee camps was to both evade the radar of Libyan police surveillance and make the nocturnal boarding of all intending migrants a possibility, especially during and after the war.

For these journeys, the currency of payment often depended on what the migrant has, American dollars, Euros or Libyan Dinars or the equivalent. According to one of my respondents during the interview in Malta, the boat men were not altogether hardened. They still have some traits of human kindness. When asked to explain this notion in light of the secretive nature of the boating business and the cut-throat charges migrants must pay the boat organizers, my respondent looked intensely petrified for seconds before telling me that he did not pay a dime to travel on the same boat many were asked to pay a couple of thousands of dollars to be part of. I wanted to know how he did the magic but he simply told me it was no magic. If, after accommodating those who paid so much, the boat organizers considered that there were still spaces to take in those who were wallowing in poverty but who showed passion for the trip, they would have pity on them and award them free passage on board the boat. However, this was not the case with my interviewee. His free passage came as a result of sheer human valiance, ignorance, and callousness. The travelers were ignorant and brave as far as crossing the Mediterranean Sea was concerned, and none of them had ever attempted such a risky trip.

Many among the interviewees confessed that they had never had occasion to travel on any stream on a floating object not to talk of riding on boat across a river as passengers. They were simply told by the callous and vicious boat arrangers that it was a mere one and a half day trip across the sea. If someone hadn’t crossed a river, how could she or he imagine a sea?
And like their ill-fated colleagues who perished trying to cross the Sahara Desert on foot, when they looked at the vast mass of arid land before them they couldn’t see beyond human eyes. Thus, a journey they supposed would last a few hours endlessly mocked them with hunger, extreme dehydration, heat, exhaustion, and eventually, death. However, the boat arrangers know the perils lurking in the sea. They knew that boats are not what one needs for a journey across one of the world’s tumultuous and shark-infested seas. They also knew the journey propelled by the low horse-power Yamaha or Kawasaki outboard engine will last several days, at least four and a half. This is why they were callous—they were certain that many of these lively souls will soon become carcasses turned apart in the deep by lobsters and monster fish, yet they still want lion shares of the free meal. They should have at least informed their passengers of the number of days they were to spend on the sea, and by so doing prepare them for the long journey home to the nether region. They were callous to know that these hordes will soon vanish into oblivion on a seven day ride across the sea without bread or drinkable water to keep their poor souls together, and not mention it to them. The boat arrangers’ ploy was deliberate. They arranged a 12-seater boat for 38 passengers. They continued to talk about a ship—not a boat—until the passengers arrived at the shore that night to a great shock. Many of the migrants were reported to have jumped into the water and waded back to shore when fear of impending danger gripped their inner beings. Others with a heart of stone chose to die or live; after all, staying back in Libya would still amount to the same ominous binary choices.

Udder, one of my respondents, has a testimony that bares another intrigue, which is even more unimaginable. He did not pay boat arrangers to board the boat because he volunteered to pilot the boat across the sea from Libya to Europe. He agreed to do so when
he was told he would not pay the fare if he accepted the responsibility. Another young male migrant, Aloy, agreed to take charge of the compass, read and interpret it, and direct the pilot. What an uninformed pilot and captain duo! These men had never in their lives performed these professional and critical functions. In fact, neither really understood what the compass and boat’s outboard engine were until they were shown these technologies at the point of departure. However, they would let themselves and this hopeful lot down if they reneged on their accepted duties. They considered the risk worthwhile because they would not pay for the trip, and might even become heroes after all. Moreover, they were convinced they had nothing to lose either way.

Deaths at the Sea

For another male respondent, the reality of the trip became obvious the night of July 28, 2006. As usual, the boat arrangers piloted their cramped and overloaded boats into the sea that was barely lit by the reflection of the moon on the rough and wavy Mediterranean water. One of the boats was made by craftsmen from wooden planks, while two had fiberglass bodies. The wooden boat was larger, and because it looked roomier and stronger, many of the migrants—approximately 450 passengers, including a few women and children—were on board this boat. About three nautical miles after the boat began its journey, the arrangers handed over control of the vessels to the volunteers, a fire started in the engine compartment of the wooden boat, and panic-stricken passengers aided in sending the ill-fated boat to the bottom of the sea with screams, splashes, and wails that ripped the air but never attracted any rescue time; not from the almost dark, unstable, and rough waters of the Mediterranean Sea nor from the tense Libya security operatives. Those who could swim at all started wasting their little energy until death and the unforgiving rough Mediterranean took their tolls on them. That was going to be the beginning of the death trauma of the entire trip. The other two
boats continued their voyage to Europe.

It was the second day of the trip and many of the migrants on board the first boat were coming to terms with the challenges the trip was going to pose for them. Unfortunately, they were mostly ill-prepared for these experiences. They had just a bottle of water and a loaf of bread that one of the migrants sneaked into the boat. The cramped nature of the boats meant there was no space for victuals, provisions, or other necessities. The water was first commandeered and kept by the pilot and captain to be administered to children and the two pregnant women in the boat. My respondents reasoned that the boat arrangers were callous because they knew the duration of the journey and hazards involved but failed to prepare the migrants in any way. Unbeknown to the migrants, the trip was going to last at least four days and they would be counted exceptionally lucky if a turbulent storm did not arise within those days and nights of struggle. On the fourth day, many of the exhausted, dehydrated, and sick migrants were lapsing into delirium and some went from coma to death. Ray, a 15 year old respondent who was escaping from Libya to Europe with his 12 year old brother grieved the death of his brother during the Mediterranean crossing. They surveyed the wide sea for any sight of a fishing boat or ship to rescue them or at least throw some provisions onto them on board. The 12 year old and eight other occupants of the boat eventually and sadly succumbed to the pressure of starvation and dehydration to their death. His brother had no strength left to cry. He was now gaunt and even unsure of himself at this point. After his younger brother passed on, my respondent tried hard to wake him up, thinking his brother had fainted. He scooped some salty but cold sea water into his brother’s tightly sealed lips as he nudged him from side to side. He then rolled his body onto his knee and continued hoping that his brother had merely fainted and would regain consciousness when help came. Fear of death gripped
him when he counted six dead bodies, including men, women, and children cast overboard from the boat. At this point, he suspected that his brother could have died. He started shoving him frantically and used his remaining strength to groan as he called his brother’s name. Tears did not come immediately, but did come eventually as he held his brother’s remains and refused to allow the young men who volunteered to intern the body in the frightening dark cold sea to touch it. He tenaciously held his brother’s body onto his hurting knees until rescuers arrived to their aid the fourth day, and that was in an island called Malta.

**Rescue and Detention**

The destination all the migrants had in mind was Italy. If they could make it to the island of Lampedusa, Italy, they hoped to declare themselves refugees and asylum seekers, then secure the means for an onward journey into mainland European countries. Some of these migrants even nursed the idea of someday leaving Europe on a more legitimate move across the North Atlantic to the Americas. It was, however, an eventful one-week experience out there in the open sea. The unlucky migrants, even with these grandiose plans, could only secure an unenviable improvised resting place in the precariously deep and restless grave that the Mediterranean Sea represented. As they were being yanked into rescue vessels by the Maltese Mariners, the migrants protested to the rescuers, requesting that they be taken to Italy, and were given that assurance; still, the young migrants were determined that surviving anywhere in the world was far better than dying at sea. My respondents said they therefore ended their protest and started cooperating with the agents.

Information was needed from each of them for documentation. They now learned that they were currently in the island of Malta located in the Mediterranean Sea (80 kilometers south of Sicily, 284 kilometers east of Tunisia, and 333 kilometers north of Libya). They were given coverings for warmth because it was in the early hours of the morning. The sick
were immediately taken to the hospital in ambulance vehicles; the critically sick were airlifted to the hospital while the dead were taken away to the morgue. It was like death do us part when my respondent, Ray, was separated from the remains of his younger sibling. He tried to cry and wave in despondency, but he couldn’t summon the strength to resist those government agents. He said he knew that he was out of shape (as any 15 year old who had involuntarily dry-fasted for seven days). He could feel the air pushing him around and could barely even speak audibly. The Maltese immigration and refugee agents drove him in an ambulance to Mount Camel (psychiatric hospital). Days later, when he came to his senses, they arranged and brought him to a cemetery where they pointed him to a grave they claimed was his brother’s. He got further broken down to hear that the body he had carefully preserved and brought along was interred without him being present. He bemoaned his fate but insisted that they exhume the body so he would be sure they had truly buried his brother; however, his plea was silenced. After some scuffles, he was taken back to the psychiatric hospital. He was so distraught about his brother’s fate that he ran away from the hospital and chose to live in the streets of Malta from where I fielded one of my interviews with him. He believed the Maltese health experts colluded to take his brother’s body to a laboratory where it was used for studies. For that reason, he concluded that they were not trust-worthy. From time to time, according to him, the Maltese health officials would track him down with the police, overwhelm him with force, handcuff, and carry him back to the hospital for more doses of steroids and agitation suppressants. He was then moved to the juvenile facility from where he would escape again to live in the streets. Maltese authorities made provision for unaccompanied minors or migrant children to be housed in the Juvenile Facility, which is under the Maltese ministry for justice and home affairs (Hilmy, 2014; Pace, Carabott,
Dibben, & Micallef, 2009).

The narrative trailing the first rescued boat was nonetheless of less incidents and casualties compared with the second boat. In fact, of the 38 passengers on board the 12-capacity boat, 15 people, including men but the majority women and a few children, died. Many started vomiting due to seasickness, and that was shortly after the boat organizers disembarked from the boat. The implication was that dehydration set in early on these people and because there was no trace of drinkable water and food to replenish them for the six days this trip lasted, many gave up before rescuers arrived. The boat almost got into irredeemable trouble when the engine stopped in the middle of nowhere. That was on the night of the fifth day. The survivors were now afraid that their fate was ominously turning out to be similar to those who had perished. Those who had reserved just enough strength to talk were glaring helplessly at one another, praying in their minds, and hoping help would come. There were still a few who stood between life and death. They lay down on the boat floor within any available space and leaned silently as the boat drifted. One of these migrants who barely clung to life was my respondent, Chris, who had just reached his 12th birthday. He was from Chad Basin near Maiduguri, North-Eastern Nigeria. My respondent’s mother prepared and sent him and his 15 year old sister in exile to escape the demand of his clan’s men that he be put to death. His killing was to be the Islamic Sharia prescription for propitiating the land he had polluted by accidentally pushing another playmate into a water borehole where the victim died. The punishment, which was not meted out by his clansmen due to his escape, was this time, by fate, suffered by his sister in his stead. That means that instead of the 12 year old boy, it was his 15 year old sister who went from puking to exhaustion and death. She suffered extreme dehydration and passed away. At the time of this interview six years later,
my respondent could barely resist tears as he bemoaned the fate of his family. He however said he was lucky to be alive at the end of the ordeal. He stated that he was lying on some people’s feet lapsing in and out of consciousness when his beloved sister died. My respondent was only six years old when he accidently committed murder. His clan’s Islamic culture demanded that he should die by stoning to cleanse the land of the innocent blood. The very young age of the offender was immaterial to his clan’s resolve for vengeance (and it was also immaterial to the victim’s relations who sought to retaliate) as a way of cleansing the land of pollution implied in such an outrageous crime. The rituals of such cleansing demand the death of the perpetrator of unprovoked murder. As they fled this country at the auspices of his mother, my respondent’s then 12 year old sister was to be his guide to wherever they could find life on the planet earth. Upon arrival in Niger Republic, they served in a desert traveler’s restaurant at Agadez, which provided them with food and barely enough money to meet their other needs. As soon as they got the hint from some of the travelers that they could find easy passage to Europe from Libya, they started skimping and saving for that escape.

A year later, they were able to reach an agreement with some of the travelers who visited their restaurant to accompany them to Libya. The siblings’ arrival in Libya was ill-timed. It was the most socio-politically tense period in the history of that country. Their arrival coincided with the uprising and bloodbath that eventually ousted Col. Muammar Gadhafi from power. At this period, migrant Africans, especially Sub-Saharan Africans, were killed or threatened by each side of the aggression—accused rightly or wrongly of joining forces with opponents or being war mercenaries. For this respondent, his age did not even matter to the Arabs. If he stayed in Libya, he would die, so again the sister discussed their exit with others who were organizing to flee Libya for Europe. They were happy to learn
eventually that they were not going to pay for the trip. According to my respondent, it would have been the best if the ill-fated trip had cost him anything but the life of his sister. The living experiences of my respondents in Malta detention centers were generally not good but considering how far these migrants have come, it is difficult for them to complain at the onset. After refreshments were served them at the port of entry, the rescued migrants were taken to the outpost of Malta’s Ministry of Interior for interrogation, documentation, and one year, six months detention. The sick faced the same experiences after discharge from the hospital.

**Migrants with Motives but no Skills**

After being documented, African youth migrants were incarcerated for one year and six months. Their experiences in the detention environment were described by almost all my interviewees as being at best prison-like experiences. The food they were served and the other living provisions were not only substandard but were also provided at irregular hours. They were herded out into the field in groups to receive two hours of sunshine. Each of them was allowed two hours to go outside and exercise in the sun and then rushed back into the heavily protected maximum detention house that was originally comprised of several clumps of camp tents. That was a consistent condition they had to cope with for 18 months. One of my interviewees who had arrived in Malta earlier recalled similar treatment from the officers and maintained that all complaints of verbal abuse that they lodged with the police offered no sympathy. For him, the dingy tent was unpleasant and unhealthy in the summer and worse during the winter. He escaped to the city twice, worked with construction firms apparently without documents, and found his way into the detention facility again. Spending 18 months in this unhealthy state does not at the end guarantee that the migrants will secure documents from the Maltese government or the European Union to reside in Malta or any European
country of their choice. In fact, some of the people I interviewed disclosed that most of their colleagues were deported back to their countries shortly after detention. Aloy, a male migrant youth from Nigeria, pondered:

But the major problem after my 18 good months in detention is that I didn’t have a hope to get a resident permit. I didn’t know what was going to happen the next day. I did not know if the authorities would decide to deport me back to my country of origin, Nigeria. I was very nervous about this uncertainty.

Regarding their detention in Malta, Mbah, a Nigerian youth migrant regrets:

Oh! we are treated like criminals. The crime we committed is that we left our country for this place. We first of all arrived in detention camp in Sarfi. After one month and three days they took us to the detention camp called Lister Barrack Alfa. We spent 12 good months there. They gave us food and water, but the food they gave us we called them dog food: rice without salt, without pepper, without any good nutrition. Yes we are Africans we have our own food, but at the moment, at least they’re supposed to consider the nutritive value of the food they were giving us.

Corroborating Mbah, another migrant Uzo recounts:

We’re left for one and a half years, it wasn’t easy. Life in the detention was terrible! You’re only allowed outside to take the sunlight for two hours each day. After two hours you are locked up inside till the next day again. This camp is not just like a prison, it equals a prison. They will open the door, you will go outside, and when the two hours expire they will chase you inside again. You remain there until they decide to set you free.

According to Ife, another migrant from South-Eastern Nigeria, a larger percentage of the African migrants deported were female youth, the reason being that they were unable to provide justifiable reasons for leaving their countries of birth. Others were said not to possess the requisite skills. Could it suggest that as female they couldn’t do the type of tasks in construction firms that their male counterparts readily undertake? Ife ruminates:

It was very pathetic considering all the suffering these ladies had to undergo with us right from Niger Republic through the desert all the way to Libya. Then the hurdles of the Mediterranean crossing after which we all faced 18 months of detention. It was unfair to have them deported. It was true that most of our female colleagues did not have prerequisite skills, but the government has training institutes for immigrants. They shouldn’t have been sent back to go and suffer in Nigeria. I am very sorry for
them. Not a single woman remained among those that arrived in my boat. The government of Malta deported all to Nigeria.

In other words, they were not employable in any meaningful trade or profession. It is uncertain, though, if they were capable of learning trades and if the Maltese government was willing to provide such opportunities. Escape from detention was more frequent when the migrants were housed in camping tents because it was easier to plan and execute an escape, according to one of my respondents. Today, a fortified detention structure transformed the idea of detention into a tough jail time. An interviewee, Fred, decried his detention ordeals:

We had no choice but to abide by the directives of detention enforcement officers. You don’t want to risk being killed unnecessarily after all the struggles and sufferings in the Desert and the Sea, you know. After all, we don’t have any other way of surviving. The Nigerian government can’t come over here to save us. We first of all arrived in the detention camp Sarfi. After one month and three days they took us to another camp called Lister Barrack at Alfa where we stayed the rest of our detention. After we were rescued, they kept us in the detention facility for one year and eight months, but it was not just for one year but one year in hard labor. We were living in a tent, both in cold and in summer. And they were giving us the food of affliction. It was like, if you like you eat; if you don’t like, that is your problem. So it also happened that sometimes police on duty would be insulting you and cursing you and telling you all kinds of things, even to the extent that the police would come to you and would be abusing you and swearing at you and when the chief officer came and then you tried to explain, they would not do anything. And the fact that they would not even allow people to visit us so that they would not see what we were passing through made the situation worse. And sometimes we staged riots to demonstrate the poor treatment because we got tired of all the things they were doing to us, so that the people outside would hear our voices. I don’t think it is good to keep a person, a human being, in a tent for one year, even for some one year eight months before freedom. And that’s how we lived in detention.

In fact, two male detainees were reportedly killed by guards. One was shot after an altercation ensued between him and one of the military guards. According to my interviewee, the victim escaped initially and found his way to Italy but was soon repatriated to Malta. He attempted to escape again but fell foul with guard authorities and was shot during the altercation that ensued. The second victim was, according to my source, beaten to death by
the detention staff in an altercation that degenerated into a free for all fight. Related to a series of unnecessary deaths at the camp, my interviewee, Lucky, gave details:

No one was deported because of sickness, but h-m-m! Don’t talk about death; many of my colleagues died and some are still dying. The fact is that the dead migrants are more fortunate to be buried here than to be left for the wild beasts in the desert or the sea. I remember that so much struggle and stress made one of my friends sleep and die. He did not wake up. Just like that. In fact, as I am talking to you now tomorrow you may hear that Lucky is dead; just like that. The other friend of mine, unfortunately something hit him at construction site where he worked and he died. When we were released, one of the boat mates called John was complaining of stomach problems and doctors in the General Hospital here told him that he would have a surgery. He was released from detention camp in three months so he could have treatment because he could not be undergoing surgery and treatment in the unenviable detention environment. When he was released from detention, the hospital called him and conducted the surgery. After five days he was able to stand on his own. Since no one was catering for his needs, and he had to be fed, he joined a construction company; I have forgotten the name of the company. Then he went there for his barber job. Then, unfortunately with a surgery plastic on him, a crane fell down from above; that was all. He just passed away. It was such terrible news for each one of us. There was another friend that was shot and killed by a soldier at the camp. The soldier yelled at him, “I will shoot you. I will shoot you,” and shot him there in the camp. There was one again who complained of a problem with his teeth. From teeth problem to eye problem to brain problem and he just died at the hospital.

However, peace returned in the detention facilities after more military officers were deployed to the facility. Another issue emerging from the migrant youth detention centers is that of unaccompanied children migrants who often are detained in the same cell with older migrants. The illegal immigrant detention policies of the European Union clearly provide for unaccompanied minors.

**Psychological Trauma and Child Migrants’ Pathologization**

Ray, one of the respondents, said he was traumatized by the actions of the authorities who buried his late brother and rendered Ray hopelessly addicted to drugs by the treatment they offered him at the psychiatric hospital. Ray was just 15 when he was rescued with other migrants. He believes that his incarceration with adult detainees was an additional source of psychological torment for him. Unaccompanied minors are by European Union provisions to
be kept with the ministry while their cases are investigated (Council of Europe, 2008; Constable 2014), but this was not the case with African migrants. The reality is that shortly after rescue and medical treatment these migrants, regardless of their ages, are detained in the maximum security detention facilities for 18 months. Those who declared themselves to be Minors would have samples of bone tissue taken for bone mass analysis, a process that takes several months to complete. And it is after the test results corroborate the ages they claim to be that the children’s statuses are changed to Unaccompanied Minors and they are moved to children’s facilities that are directly under the Maltese Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs. The idea of detaining children with adults who are not their immediate relations for a relatively long duration—pending the outcome of their bone mass test—does not bode well for the healthy development of the transnational migrant children. Whether this practice also applies to citizens of EU member states and Asian migrants remains an area for future investigation. Whatever age African migrant children claim to be is not what the authorities wish to accept without proof; body size is immaterial as well. Having many of these young men and women huddled together for such a long time, day and night in a jail-like environment, naturally would exert a form of psychological pressure, particularly on the children, which might leave them feeling that freedom has been denied them.

**Coupling for Freedom: A Way of Restraining the Vagrant Bodies**

“You have just one opportunity to escape,” they were told by detention authorities. “All of you who are single could couple and become pregnant.” They were told that as soon as pregnancy is achieved or a baby was conceived they would be moved to the more humane Open Detention Centers. What a paradox! But that advice, as horrible as it might sound, was not without adherents. They contracted marriages by themselves. Many detained migrant youth realized shortly that although they were released from the main detention facilities,
remaining in the open center was an only option because until the court heard their cases, they had neither the working nor the residence permits. Some of these youth managed on a daily basis (although at times unsuccessfully) to sneak out into cities and do under-the-table jobs. They served at building construction sites, washed dishes in restaurants and hotels or any such menial jobs they could lay hands on, just as a means of survival (to feed their young families and pay for their Open Centre accommodation). My interviewee, Obosi, recounted:

Then they took us to the detention camp. I was always thinking of how to find jobs to do and raise some pocket money, and upon the realization that our camp had open surroundings (unlike the tightly secure prison they have today), I took advantage of it. I sneaked out before day-break, and then took the bus to town. After work in the evening I found my way back into camp. I didn’t realize they were taking roll call. We were first in detention camp at Sarfī. We were then moved to a more secure Lister Barrack at Alfa detention, maybe because some of us were sneaking in and out of the Sarfī camp. We spent a good 18 months there in the camp. Some of us stole out to the city because many ugly things were happening there, which a human being God created should never experience, but we bore them all. For instance, the authorities were giving us food and water. It was kind of, dog food, for example, rice without salt or pepper.

In the Open Centre, each couple is given a portable container, which is a make-shift home that may not be ideal for summer or winter due to its obvious lack of adequate ventilation and insulation or useful home gadgets. Each family pays one euro, sixty cents per day. Interviewed migrants believe that the supervision in the camp environment with respect to migrants’ male-female intimacy was anything but appropriate. This is disconcerting considering that migrant children are often temporarily detained with the adults. Many young men and women there contract lethal communicable diseases such as HIV and Hepatitis strains. They simply have to add these to their worries and possibly live with them all their lives.

**Born on Transit: To Unknown Nationality**

What of babies delivered on transit and/or in captivity in Malta? Which nationality is
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ascrivable to them? The answer to this question is nebulous. Several of these couples responding to my interview questions were upset that when they went to document their babies and secure birth certificates for them, the Maltese authorities would scribble “unknown nationality” in the birth certificates. Some of them protested, requesting that their children’s birth certificates bear the nationality of their parents’ origin. “That was a reasonable position because in the constitution of countries like Nigeria, it is stipulated that anybody whose parents or either one of whose parents is a Nigerian becomes automatically a Nigerian,” said Ever, a migrant youth of the Niger Delta origin. “Whether the Maltese authorities would care to know that is a question,” he said with regret. In fact, one of my female respondents, a Nigerian who joined her brother’s family in Malta as a minor was the most furious about this issue that directly affected her despite her more than 20 years’ stay in Malta. She completed her high school education in Malta and later trained in the University of Malta as a Registered Nurse and started work in the General Hospital (Matta Dei). She married and brought her husband over from Nigeria. They had two baby boys, but the same ugly story reared its head. The authorities did not accept these children as Maltese. “As far as you are a ‘third nation citizen,’ I am not sure what becomes of children born to persons from European Union, but as for the third nation citizens their children go with the label, ‘unknown nationality,’” she stressed.

For those youth migrants who have found freedom to some extent, life is not all baleful. They found accommodation and whatever job they could to eke out their living. Maltese society does not seem to like dark skin colors as one of the respondents, Ife, informed me. You are perceived as ‘stinking’ inside the public transit buses no matter how much you bathe your body every day. Answering a mobile phone call on bus in transit is only
condoned if the person using the phone is a Maltese or other European. Even Asians may be tolerated—at least for a while. Maltese, especially the untraveled and the non-so-literate, factor in passionate hatred and racism while responding to the “Clandestine” or “the Iswed” (another name for Black skin). In one of my field research outings, I lost my bearings on the city-transit bus in Birkirkara, a city in Malta. And hoping to reconnect by joining the next available bus back to my base at Msida was absolutely difficult because several efforts to ask prospective Maltese passengers failed to produce positive results. None of those I inquired from wanted to offer a second of their time to listen to me. After a series of such attempts I decided to enter the transport office to inquire from the officials. This and other related field experiences left me with a better understanding of the nuanced responses I received from my interviewees. That does not mean, however, that all Maltese share a similar disposition toward African immigrants. On the contrary, the more enlightened citizens and those who have traveled to other countries outside of Europe always insist that as long as one came into Malta legally, they are fine with immigrants from any part of the world.

**Fear of Unknown Versus Maltese Reactions to Immigrants**

One of my female interviewees, Anna, a Maltese citizen and student of the University of Malta insisted that Malta as a country needs more young immigrants, but those with skills and education. She noted that after her studies, like many others who are citizens of the European Union, she might want to travel to work overseas. Thomas, a Maltese male shopkeeper interviewed requested that I send a message to the governments of the “Clandestines’” country of origin. He insisted I should ask those in authority in those countries to sit up, put their economy together, and help their youth rather than allow them perish in the open and helpless world. This unreserved Maltese subscribes fully to the policies of border restriction against vagrant and those often referred to as ‘illegal’
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immigrants (Maloney & Kontuly, 2010; Mares, 2011; Maloney & Korinek, 2010). He reasoned that youth migrants are not only illegal intruders but take jobs away from the citizens. He argued that Malta was once devastated by poverty with many living in the streets, the elderly panhandling, and many others begging. When the new government which had the right policies and the capacity to execute them came to power, everything changed. Today every Maltese is cared for. As paradoxical as the claim that immigrant youth are taking jobs away from Maltese is, many of my Nigerian youth respondents insisted that, on the contrary, the kinds of jobs most of them do are actually those rejected by average Maltese citizens. A participant from Northern Nigeria who works in one of the construction sites insisted:

If you are working with the Maltese, they just use you as if you are an animal. And they are not even paying you commensurate wages for the work you do. We are hired to do cheap labor here. Most often the types of jobs Maltese youth will never accept to do is what we do. At the end they use all the fiscal logic to take almost everything you earn back into their pocket. We pay taxes in almost everything, and yet as undocumented immigrants we do not get any benefits from the government. This is sad indeed.

In his detailed interview about the labor market and youth migration in European Union, an international migration NGO top executive reasoned:

The authorities in developing countries even understand that the conditions of their youth population will worsen by staying in the country; they will have no future because the economy is not doing better. What we think as important, that is what we call ‘orderly migration,’ which is that we have in Europe, a continent where there is demand for labor, not only because of the economy but because the population is ageing, as is true even in Malta. Malta will need labor. The population is declining and will decline further 23 years down the road. They need to import labor to maintain the same economic prosperity. The issue is what kind of labor they will need. Maybe the society does not recognise this or they don’t like the migration profile they are getting at the moment.

As blatant as this revealing statement sounds, it also allows an insight into what is truly the driving force of the 21st century youth migration. It would appear at the surface that
industrialized nations do not need immigrants and are doing everything to stop the stifling deluge immigrant influx constitutes, but the reality is worse than imagined. And understanding what slavery and colonization did in the past history of human civilization, one is not baffled that the neo-colonial tactics only changed but are still very active in generating—albeit without military coercion—voluntary migrants to serve in industries in the developed world. The focus is neither on the youth and the tensions that see them uprooted from their natural environments and compelled into a hazardous journey, nor on the instabilities bedeviling the developing economies from whence they emigrated. It is all about what the West needs (Lonnback, 2014; MaCurdy, Nechyba, & Bhattacharya, 1998; Mahtani & Mountz, 2002). Specifically, it needs labor to make up for its demographic shortcomings. Again, it becomes a case of total lack of consideration on the part of the industrialized world for the destabilizing pressure of its political and socio-economic activities in the developing South. It is therefore intriguing that in the West people are deliberately prejudicial, callous, and stereotypical about immigrants. Yet, one would ask, couldn’t the governments of these youth’s countries of origin do better than just close their eyes and pretend nothing is happening around them? One of my interviewees has an idea of what could be done in Nigeria to reduce or eradicate youth emigration. Dona, one of the focus group participants, observed:

If I am asked what needs to change to forestall the persistent youth emigration from Nigeria, I would start with the government. We have everything, but the selfish avaricious politicians are not using it for the benefit of the masses. If the resources we have in Nigeria are harnessed and well managed for the benefit of the citizenry, nobody will dream of travelling overseas. There are some people in Nigeria who are by fair or foul means economically rooted. They have some people to support them, so they don’t even think of coming to Europe except on vacation or business trips. Many of these youth are in school studying, and many of them are doing business. They can’t even think of coming to Europe. But when a person is not getting what he needs to survive in a society, he is not contented. In his mind, he will be thinking that
outside there, he can find something better. I am saying these things from my experience because if a child is eating well in his mother’s house, he cannot start looking elsewhere to find something to eat.

As they refuse to see what goes on among the youth, the politicians in Nigeria, and by extension Africa, deliberately ignore the ongoing depletion of the immediate demographic workforce and their future leaders, which the youth population represents. One of the male Nigerian youth migrants interviewed, Andy, who with barely secondary (High School) level education was fortunate to be employed as a technical assistant in a home hardware shop, gave his viewpoint on this topic. He believes that the Maltese government could do more to alleviate the sufferings of his colleagues. He does not see why an immigrant, whether labelled as illegal, asylum seeker, refugee or not, would live in a country for eight years and still wouldn’t be given documents for permanent stay. Another male interviewee, Okey, who twice has been engaged to marry and separated from two Maltese women says that marrying one gives a youth immigrant all the papers he needs. “But it is a daisy game,” he noted. According to him, many of the migrant youth have ended up falling into the hands of some loathsome Maltese female welfare-seekers who quickly conceive babies and opt for separation subsequently, in which case the migrant becomes perpetually impoverished since he is tasked by the authorities to provide for the baby and its mother. Such delinquent and indolent mothers also collect welfare from the government and resist every attempt to obtain gainful employment. Okey, who on different occasions had dealings with two of these women, narrates from his lived experiences. He had a baby with one of the women he was engaged to marry, but with both women, as soon as he started talking of marriage, they separated from him. The mother of his son took custody of the baby after dragging him to court and he was billed by the authorities to pay certain amounts of Euros monthly for the
upkeep of the woman and her son. That was a bitter lesson that he disclosed to me. “I was only permitted to make requests and wait for approval each time I want to see my son,” he lamented. Regardless, he was very lucky in the sense that he has a good job that leaves him with some cash after all these expenses. Many in similar entanglements are not that lucky.

The same respondent said he was trained in his workplace as a technical handyman so he could go with the shops’ delivery vans and do necessary fittings where required. Okey works hard to the satisfaction of his employer but does not merit a justifiable pay. One of the days he tried to negotiate his wages with his employer, he was told, “You know I hired and retained you because I got you cheap,” he remembers. His Maltese workplace colleagues are good to him except for always reminding him that he is an Iswed (Black) every time they intend to bully him. He developed a parody for driving home his message that all human beings are made of the same stuff irrespective of their skin colors. The interviewee uses anti-racist parody as a response to recalcitrant racism, relating:

We should not be discriminating based on skin colour, Black or White. But me, I don’t have any problem because I am used to it. I have been in this country for quite some time and I know that the issue of racial discrimination is a given; it is predominant. But people should see other people in the light of God’s creation. So the most important thing is for people not to be over-reactive about skin colours, whether black or red, but their contributions to the socio-economic wellbeing of the society in which they live. I used to tease my Maltese colleagues at work when they bullied me with racism that I have pink and sometimes green blood in my veins. And then whenever I got injured at work and blood oozed out I asked them to gather to see the sample of my green blood. And I would make the joke that my blood is green. Why should we discriminate when the blood in everybody is the same?

As related above, any time Okey sustained a cut that bled during his official assignment he would call on his colleagues and show them his pinkish or greenish blood colors. When they protested that it was red, he would sardonically deny that and maintain that his blood was yellow because he was Black, unlike them. By this allegory he slyly dragged them back into
his logic without aggression or vituperates and they would laugh it off. No sooner is their freedom secured than the migrant youth realize how tasking it might be to meet their daily needs in the Island Republic of Malta, a country of less than half a million people. Contrary to the aspirations and expectations of many migrants whose initial destination was Italy, some migrants left Italy for Malta in search of jobs since they could barely survive in Italy. Ife, one of these detouring migrants who was documented and issued with permits in Italy but made his way to Malta in search of a job, reveals:

My first destination was Italy. I came to Malta because life in Italy is so difficult. It is hard to survive as an immigrant in Italy because Italy is a place whereby you can’t find job, and most Africans in Italy are begging in the streets to survive. So I don’t want to beg because it will amount to stooping low. So I had to leave Italy for Malta so I could find something to do to earn a living. The authorities in Italy gave us documents, but with our permits we can’t get work there. Even Italians don’t have work. Less than 40% of the population is employed, but 60% of the population remains without work. So many people are surviving at the margins. Some women and men have literally joined the sex-trade industry as prostitution, some survive by begging, so such lives are not good for young people, so I decided to move to Malta where I can find a job.

In a desperate bid to find their financial foothold, many of the Maltese migrants would line the streets of Marsa, next to the Open Detention Centre. And often they might wait in vain all day to be hired by drivers who would drive along in search of daily labor supplies to their construction sites, factories, hospitality businesses, and private homes.

**Wages by Gradient of Skin Color**

Wages are definitely down to rock bottom since the labor supply here is in excess of demand. It is regrettable that most of those interviewed in my study at one time or the other have gone through these experiences. Female youth migrants whose applications for refugee or asylum status were not rejected often find job opportunities in restaurants and hotels where they do minor cleaning or room-keeping jobs. The male migrants most of the time bear the brunt of the jobs working under intensive heat and humid atmosphere and often complain of
unjust wage differentials between them and individuals of other ethnic groups. One of the interviewed male migrants argued that their wages are parochially calculated to favor people of lighter skin colors; first the Maltese, then people of European descent, Asians, and at the lowest level people of African descent whose earnings ranged from three to five Euros per hour. It is interesting to learn that this amount hardly changes for African migrants irrespective of the task they are assigned. Edwin, one of the interviewees insisted:

You know you can never be paid the same amount of wages as the citizens. It is not good but there is nothing we can do. I maintain, you can never be paid the same amount. Why? I am not sure, but even the Filipinos are paid more than Africans. I haven’t worked with them so I don’t really know for certain how much they are paid. But I asked one of them and he told me how much they are paid per hour. I think it is unfair because we Africans work very hard and undertake more risky jobs. The Filipino guy told me that he was paid five Euros, and the wage differences are not supposed to exist especially between Filipino immigrants and Africans. It is very difficult to find Blacks paid up to five Euros. Most of them receive four Euros or four fifty per hour, something like that. Again it depends on the job of the person; I mean the qualification and all those things.

But this account, which is consistent with all responses of my interviewees, contrasts sharply with that of one of the lucky migrants earlier cited who works as a technical handyman in a home hardware shop. He insisted he has had to engage his employer in a serious discussion to raise his wages on two occasions; and on one of those occasions he was told that he was hired and retained because his boss had gotten him cheap. However, his narrative was not altogether rosy.

Freedom Sans Protection: Youth Migrants’ Deaths and Injury at Labor Sites

After gaining their freedom from detention, youth migrants had the option of either living temporarily at the Open Centre or leaving to find some accommodation in the city. Many preferred the latter option. In his narrative one of my participants, Okey, insisted that he had longed to leave the detention environment altogether. This flagrant disposition of readiness at all times, as well as resilience and resourcefulness, soon left him with a bitter
lesson of life: three of his fingers were permanently and hopelessly disfigured in an avoidable job accident. It was not the now grotesque shape of his once fine and elegant-looking fingers that bothered him most. It was obviously the ordeal culminating in this scar that became his perpetual nightmare—one experience that made him nostalgic for home, one in which he also learned how rough his sojourn in Malta would be if strict carefulness was cast to the winds. At the moment of his injury he had just been granted his partial freedom (it was partial because no such migrant ever got Maltese permanent residence if s/he did not first marry a Maltese citizen). He had not received his work permit but desperately needed money. So he dashed into the streets at Marsa to hire himself out to construction firms. At the construction site, he became so overtly attached to the job that he decided to project to the firm executives the sense that he was a disciplined, determined, and skillful person. He decided to relieve one of the forklift operators for lunch break. One of his fellow migrants was assigned to watch the environment while he manned the operation of this giant crane forklift. He had never driven a car, but as was the case, they all learned from the boat arrangers during their Libya–Malta trip that life often is fraught with risks and only those ready and willing to take risks survive. But this is just where the ideology proved destructive. The construction workers may have assumed the young migrant already knew how to operate the vehicle as he claimed, so they simply assigned a helper to him; after all they had incredibly cheap labor. This soon proved not to be the case. Hardly had he mounted the operator’s seat when he noticed that things were not working well. Yet undeterred, he started applying all the manipulations he had observed the professional operator making a few minutes ago; then suddenly the vehicle tilted to one side and the other migrant who was supposed to be helping him was playing with some stone pebbles he had gathered from the concrete mixing unit. The respondent’s
reflex action was to extend one hand to the wall and by so doing keep the crane forklift from crashing into the wall. That was a costly mistake. The crane fell, crushing his left hand fingers to the wall. They were almost severed. A cry of anguish and intense pain ripped the air, alerting both his helper and the construction workers who were now relaxing and enjoying their sumptuous lunch provisions. My respondent hadn’t got any residence papers nor had he received the work permit. That he was free to live in the Open Centre or find accommodation does not mean he could not be deported at any time if Maltese authorities decided to do so. His ordeal was not peculiar, but he was luckier than two other fellow migrants who lost their lives in similar work sites accidents. Okey said he was taken to the hospital for treatment. First he was taken to a private hospital and had to wait for a very long time for the surgeon who owned the hospital to finish his assignment in the government hospital before attending to him.

**Incriminating the Voiceless: Migrant Youth and Hospitalization**

The critically injured worker was bleeding profusely and in serious pain, and his employers realized that it would be lethal to delay further and wait for the doctor. They decided to draft a statement that incriminated the young immigrant and move him to the government hospital. They said they were good Samaritans trying to help a lousy migrant who left the menial job he was hired for and sneaked into the crane to give it a try while the construction crew were on lunch break; they then stated that he ran into trouble shortly thereafter. He was not asked what or how it happened by hospital staff who might even have known what went wrong but wouldn’t do any more damage to the Maltese than had been done by the presence of the migrants in Malta. They simply had to do their duty to humanity—give him the required treatment—and let sleeping dogs lie. His employers were not altogether unreasonable. Although they paid him no damages for being injured on the job
and he had no insurance coverage as he lacked a document of residence, they visited him in the hospital and made him feel needed. Moreover, he was given a little release of cash here and there, so he felt a little comforted. During his convalescence months, his employer told him he could be coming to the site to do minor chores to earn his living. His regret was that of not waiting to secure at least a working permit so he would work with an insurance coverage.

**Vision Cut Short: Migrant’s Goal at its Waterloo (Border Restriction and Proxies)**

Another respondent’s experience poses a paradox to an avid observer. Many of the youth migrants shared a mindset of reaching Italy. To this set of migrants, arrival in Malta is a stepping stone. It is the realization of a lifelong dream for many of the migrants to arrive in Europe from the sea. One arrives possibly in the Italian Lampedusa Island and from there takes an onward journey to mainland EU countries. To Ife, however, it was one thing to be in Italy and another to arrive at such a time as now. The economy of European countries is not welcoming at all, and Italy as a nation is hard hit. The impact on African youth migrants is unimaginable, and for this respondent and his colleagues who, instead of moving further from Italy into heartland Europe decided to return to Malta after obtaining their limited permits, it was a nightmare. The European Union member states have new policies that limit the movement of migrants to their first country of entry. The introduction of a border fingerprint database also means that this surveillance system is followed to its logical objectives. Once a migrant’s fingerprint is taken in one of the member nations, it is recalled and subsequently used to expose and repatriate recalcitrant migrants. It works because only a few manage to dodge their ways through this complex surveillance system. And many a time those who sneak away to other countries in the E.U. after documentation are caught and repatriated to their home countries. At the Ministry of Interior, Msida, Malta, this peculiar
respondent who arrived from Italy in search of a menial job was denied the opportunity. Without a work permit, Ife and his colleagues may not find even the lowest paid job in Malta. They were told that since Italy was their first port of entry they should head back to Italy. Their experiences became an eye opener for the majority of the youth migrants in Malta who assumed that arrival in Malta was a landmark achievement in their struggle to arrive in Europe. They might have realized since then how stuck they are in Malta due to having their fingerprints stored in the Maltese database. Securing Maltese temporary residence and/or work permits may have removed their hope of ever leaving for other parts of Europe permanently. While regretting his arrival in Malta instead of Italy, one of my respondents reasoned—and this position or view was shared by many other youth migrants—that whatever obstacle or setback he has suffered were caused by the Maltese government. In fact, most of the youth migrants interviewed argued that the Maltese government is receiving so much financial support from the European Union to provide for the migrant community but uses the wealth to care for their citizens and engage in development projects while the migrants are left to languish in wants and struggle to meet even their basic needs. Another interviewee, Chief, argues that most of them who were ready to do any manner of work to survive are neither given such opportunities nor issued a work permit so they can legally secure jobs. He maintained that their Maltese employees abuse and verbally assault them. As a final statement in this segment, I must admit that the research findings are fascinating while at the same time inviting further exploration, particularly the understanding that among the emigration drives were: economy, unrest/insecurity in country of origin, displacement, as well as colonial/cultural triggers. While some interviewees indicated that economic well-being was their major drive for migrating to Europe, many highlighted other issues, such as
insecurity in their country, need for improved technical skills, and peer-group influence from friends who have traveled to Europe through a similar route as the interviewees.
Chapter Six
Data Analysis

The previous chapter highlights the findings of my field study, but this chapter will engage the voices of my interviewees in discussions along the key themes raised in the findings. Engaging in the field of study and anecdotally chronicling the narratives of participants has been rewarding and very informative. The interpretation of the participants’ stories has, however, been a very daunting part of this research. Nevertheless, it is a fulfilling dimension of the writing process as it afforded me the much-desired opportunity to evaluate the qualitative data gathered during the field exercise using an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).

Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)

The application of interpretative phenomenological analysis in this segment of my thesis affords me the opportunity to explore in great depth how my research participants (Nigerian youth migrants in Malta) make sense of their transnational migration experiences. Understanding the epistemic realities of African youth migrants to Europe is the central goal of this study. And the merit of IPA as an analytical tool is the light it casts on the broader context such that it might justifiably be argued that in IPA breadth is literally sacrificed for depth (Smith & Osborn, 2007). The main currency for an IPA study, according to Smith and Osborn, is to explore “the meanings particular experiences, events, states hold for participants” (p. 53). The rationale for adopting interpretative phenomenological analysis, therefore, is that the concept of study, which is the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta, requires the elicitation of meanings individuals involved attributed to events and life experiences as they came up in their interview narratives. The approach is phenomenological because it involved an in-depth examination of the participants’ “life-
world” (Smith & Osborn, 2007, p. 53; Fade, 2004). In other words, the effort is geared toward understanding the personal encounters and experiences of each interviewee. The focus is on discerning the individual’s personal perception or narrative of situations, events, or objects rather than attempting to generate an “objective statement” of the circumstances or situations (Smith & Osborn, 2007, p. 53). Research exercise is, according to IPA, a very dynamic process requiring the researcher’s active engagement as s/he gets into the personal world of a participant. The gate into the interviewee’s personal world is made complex, however, by the researcher’s personal perceptions that are key for making sense of the participant’s personal world through interpretative exercises. IPA amounts to saying that both the participant and researcher are simultaneously engaged in making sense of the participant’s personal world. That is, IPA revolves around what Smith and Osborn (2007) refer to as a “double hermeneutic” or a two-way interpretation. My study followed Nigerian youth migrants from their environments of origin through the decisions to travel overseas; the initial intra-African journeys, transiting through the Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea, rescue, arrest, and detention. These also include migrant youth’s prohibition and apprehensions at the transnational border surveillance systems and their lived realities in the receiving country. In each of these units of events, I use IPA to help unravel meanings ascribed to the events by the migrants. I seek to understand what each event was like from the participants’ viewpoints. I engage in detailed IPA by asking critical questions on the texts extracted from participants’ responses to interview questions. This is accomplished without overlooking the concern for how meanings are constructed by persons within their personal and social world.

**Emerging Themes on Transnational Youth Migration**

In an examination of the data collected from my field interviews and focus group
discussions, a series of recurring themes emerged, the analysis of which is critical to understanding the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in the Republic of Malta. The data was carefully synthesized based on the key themes. I incorporated the theoretical framework and extant literature on transnational migration to engage participants’ voices. Using IPA, I sought to understand how Nigerian migrant youth made sense of their life-world before and during their movement from Africa, and during their sojourning in Europe. The recurring themes in participants’ responses include: economy (or quest for better life), tragic journey, desperation, oppressive detention, persecution, and racism. Other sub-themes are: cultural disconnect, preferential treatment (meted out to West as opposed to East African migrant youth), differential treatment (of African male as opposed to female migrants; Africans as opposed to EU or Maltese students), labeling and name-calling (Clandestine, boat-people, illegal, Iswed). Also featuring prominently among the sub-themes were issues of border restrictions and criminalization of African youth migrants. In order to have a detailed interpretative analysis of participants’ responses, this chapter focuses on five (5) overarching sub-themes synthesized into sub-headings as follows: economic quest for better-life and the participants’ motives and drive to migrate to Europe; desert to sea: the tragic journey; racism and the framing of the label (clandestine, boat-people, illegal, Iswed/Black), strategies for keeping the unwanted vagrant at bay. Australia, Europe, and the US specifically used this to form public opinion against immigrants so as to attract the wrath of politicians and policymakers to promulgate laws on border restriction; Preferential treatment meted out to the East as opposed to West African migrant youth; male as opposed to female migrants; students who were citizens of EU or Malta as opposed to Africans; oppressive detention, border-restriction and criminalization of African youth migrants. Surprisingly the theme that unequivocally
grounds the research assumption of this dissertation remains cultural disconnect. How then does cultural disconnect inform Nigerian youth’s mass emigration to Europe?

**Cultural Disconnect and the African Youth Migration to Europe**

Besides the interpretative phenomenological analysis in use, this segment of my analysis was also guided by anti-colonial framework and African Indigenous discourse. These discourses confront hegemonic and imposing structures and practices of domination. African Indigenous worldviews are essential at this point to create an insight into the experiences of the Nigerian migrant youth who themselves are people of African descent. My thesis drew from Lebakeng (2010) and Sefa Dei’s (2010) arguments that the West’s shrewd denigration of Indigenous African worldviews and the continent’s contribution to the world civilization and knowledge systems as inferior and primitive is chiefly an attempt to justify the partitioning and continuing exploitation of the continent. This is an essentializing posture based absolutely on unequal power dynamics rather than on proven inherent capabilities and vulnerabilities. The colonizer’s culture and worldviews are projected as universal and inevitable. In this way, development for Africans and other Indigenous peoples has become synonymous with the acquisition of Western styles, systems, standards, expertise, and problem solving methods. Fanon’s (1952) work reflects on the repressed trauma the colonized peoples suffer from the effects of their violent amputation from their culture. For example, raised entirely in one of the Nigerian townships was one of my interviewees, Aloy, a male Nigerian primary school leaver, who migrated to Europe after he lost both of his parents. He has lived in Malta for six years. He reacts to my question regarding his knowledge of his culture:

> When I was in Nigeria, I lived in the city so I didn’t stay in the village. I stayed in Edo State, yes Benin City. I speak the language but not very strongly. I did not learn anything because I lost my father when I was only seven years old. So I was left with
my mother. I was only seven years plus not eight when my father died. I am 18 years old now. When my father was alive, my father didn’t lead me to our village, where our kinsmen live. I wish I knew my relations in the village; I don’t think I would have left Nigeria to travel to Europe or come to Malta.

Another interviewee, Cathy, a female Nigerian who arrived in Malta as a teenage family member to join her mother who was a long term resident healthcare worker also revealed her disconnect from her culture:

I am not Bini. I am from a very small minority called Eme-Ora. I do not have much of Eme-Ora culture because I never lived there. I am from there, but I never lived there because we lived in Northern Nigeria; precisely, my family lived in Kaduna. My mom traveled to Malta, and we were living in Nigeria. Yes, my family, they are very keen on education; so Western education is a big part of my heritage. It even goes to define my success in this far away country. Like we see it that for you to be successful, you have to go through that part, right? You know, so I always wished to go to school and I didn’t really need someone to talk me into doing it; I wanted to.

Similarly, two interviewed members of the focus group, Chief and Lucky, acknowledged:

From my own opinion I learned football right from primary school. I left Nigeria as a footballer, so I left Nigeria in order to play football because I believe that I will have a better option. But in Nigeria if you don’t have kobo (money) to bribe your way, you will never be recruited into the league. In Nigeria if you are a footballer, that is your recipe for poverty, but when you go to Italy, you see that you will be living big and it will be good for you. So we use our own natural talents to develop the skills so that we will be great later (Chief)

What I can say like me, I am into trading. Like I said earlier, those things don’t help in Nigeria because even if you are into anything in that country, it will not help you because the country is already in crisis caused by unemployment, so if you move to Europe even if you don’t have or you have any skills, even if you don’t use it in any better job, you will still have the opportunity here to advance the handiwork or the skill you have, so to me and in my opinion, there are a lot more advantages here in Europe than in Nigeria. Before Nigeria can improve with respect to job provision, the country needs to improve in many fronts, including education and security. So if those things are still missing down there, there is no means of living a good life in that place. (Lucky)

Fanon’s insight as a physician and psychiatrist was brought to bear in his notion of transferred trauma. He believes that repressed trauma in the colonized peoples’ subconscious
is intrinsically latent as long as colonization or its structures are not eliminated. This aggressively inflicted trauma constantly seeks a vent in the social sphere. In his words:

We are entitled, however, to ask how total identification with a white man can still be the case in the twentieth century? Very often the black man who becomes abnormal has never come in contact with Whites. Has some former experience been repressed in his unconscious? Has the young black child seen his father beaten or lynched by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism? To all these questions our answer is no. So where do we go from here? If we want an honest answer, we have to call on the notion of collective catharsis. (p. 124)

The repressed traumatic experience that colonization and neo-colonial projects transmit produces cultural alienation and loss of identity on the colonized people’s psyche. The disconnect(ion) reproduces the colonized individual who must take up the colonizer’s identity in order to be recognized or valued. In a similar treatise, Wa Thiong’o (1986) captures Fanon’s views in a few words:

Colonialism imposed its control of the social production of wealth through military conquest and subsequently political dictatorship. But its most important area of domination was the mental universe of the colonised, the control, through culture, of how people perceived themselves and their relationship to the world. Economic and political control can never be complete or effective without mental control. To control a people’s culture is to control their tools of self-definition in relationship to others. (p. 16)

African youth, as might be the case with citizens of other developing economies, are left in desperation, apparently to attain the status of being considered modern. The quest for the colonizers’ education and the subsequent socio-economic transformation is craved with neither consideration of the immediate and remote implications nor of its environmental and local relevance. Also, the extant literature, (Isichei, 1984; Harunah, 2003; Fafunwa, 1974) indicates that African states have not only been occupied by, but also under, Arabic cultural influence. The sway of the colonizing Arab’s cultural disruption on African youth is similar to those of the West. For instance, in Islamic-dominated regions of Nigeria, the youth believe
that equipping themselves with Arabic culture, the know-how, and worldviews is inevitable for their survival. However, the relevance of these foreign qualities to their immediate environment is not given any iota of consideration. The implication also is that the young Nigerians raised in Northern Nigeria for instance would, and do, crave and migrate to live in wealthy Arab states. The intersection of Arabic and Western cultural requirements in the affairs of these young Africans also creates tension depending on their final migrant destination. Bearing in mind that they have both Arabic and Western basic education, they are embodied by these two foreign heritages. Often they are confused about social expectations in the society they immigrate into as they represent the two conflicting cultures (Arabic versus Western). This reality is better expressed by Dona, a participant in one of the focus groups who related aspects of his experiences in Libya:

I lived in Northern Nigeria for so many years and understand Sharia law. So settling in North Africa, which is Libya was not a problem because I really understand what Sharia laws require, you understand? So abiding by the dictates of Sharia makes you stay out of the trouble of violation of Islamic laws because when you talk about Sharia or Islamic law, it is a law that has to do with ‘no mercy.’ Forgiveness is sin; you have to be punished according to the law or what the law says about any offence or how you violated it. So you have to be punished according to the stipulation of the law for that particular offence you committed according to the holy Koran as they called it. Nevertheless, life wasn’t too bad, but it wasn’t so good either. At times you had horrible experiences, such as hearing the Arabs call you bad names, like slaves and that sort of thing you know. And that country is a country that shares no regards for human right. All they know is their Sharia law. The Sharia law is what governs them, both the constitutional affairs, social affairs, and otherwise. And as far as you are not an indigene of that society you don’t have access to social and economic benefits of the state. So all you have to do is to keep working and working. I believe from my own point of view and my experience in Libya that there is no African or West African who lived there that can boast of being employed in a suitable job position. We were all doing menial and survival jobs. We all had dead end jobs. Nevertheless, you still earn your living and stay out of their crime, you know. There were challenging situations facing every foreigner or immigrant but it takes a lot of might for you to understand what those things mean to them. And understanding what it means makes you stay out of trouble with the police, people, community, and society you know, and that was it. So I was in Mosrata city but because of the war in the year 2011, that was the revolutionary war that ousted Gaddafi, I was severely
wounded. My house was on the very center of the cross-fire and the government forces’ snipers were on the roof, so the revolutionary forces insisted on bringing down the roof because of those snipers.

The present generation of Africans who were born into either the Arabic and/or Western culture came to perceive these as their African heritage. Expounding on the Algerian people’s resistance to the domination of France, Fanon (1965) shows how the colonizer could wield power over the colonized through such cultural tools as foreign language. Fanon compellingly argues that embracing the colonizer’s cultures, and specifically language, renders the colonized people susceptible to the direct control of the colonizer. He reasons that, “using the French language was at the same time domesticating an attribute of the occupier and proving oneself open to the signs, the symbols, in short to a certain influence of the occupier” (p. 91). The imposition of colonialists’ cultures expressed in language, arts, historiography, spirituality, and medicine through foreign education (that lacks an iota of Indigenous African cultural content), is tantamount to domination as argued elsewhere in Wa Thiong’o (1986):

For colonialism this involved two aspects of the same process: the destruction or the deliberate undervaluing of a people’s culture, their art, dances, religions, history, geography, education, orature, and literature, and the conscious elevation of the language of the coloniser. The domination of a people’s language by the languages of the colonising nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the colonized. (p. 16)

The implications of denigrating Indigenous technologies and environmentally relevant considerations are enormous. The social and environmental consequences are immense, including cultural encapsulation, atmospheric pollution, and loss of human cultural and natural wealth. Lebakeng (2010) and Sefa Dei’s (2010) works argue further that the West disparaged and almost wiped out invaluable African epistemologies and languages. This results in African knowledge systems and languages (as means of development, transmission,
and instruction) not being accorded deserved attention, hence being excluded from the socio-economic, political, and educational policy formulations. Again Frantz Fanon (1952) stresses that: “the Blacks have had to deal with two systems of reference. Their metaphysics, or less pretentiously their customs and the agencies to which they refer, were abolished because they were in contradiction with a new civilization that imposed its own” (p. 90) as Dona, one of my interviewees attests below:

Yeah, speaking of that, you know in Northern Nigeria unlike in the South there is a different culture and way of social interaction. It borders on Arabic culture, you know. No matter your background, your socio-economic status, or the level of education you have you learn to be humble in dealing with others who are of low social status. Mostly we deal with equality there; you can imagine even when one is a street boy or an Almagiri do you understand, you can find an Alhaji (respected for having performed Hajj or a traveler who have gone to Mecca, or rich person) eating and drinking with you from the same plate. It is very common; it’s very common there, do you understand? There in the North due to Islamic culture, we don’t have such social hierarchies or dichotomies as in the South. You don’t have the rich and the poor with respect to social life or social relationship.

The youth produced by the neo-colonial Arabic and Western colonial structures in Africa as shown above therefore are bereft of environmental survival skills that might include resourcefulness, resilience, and knowledge inherent in African Indigenous cultures. However, acquisition of foreign culture could prove profitable as a survival tool in the colonizer’s homestead where the fleeing youth might find solace. One of my interviewees, Canne, reflects:

Of course my education from back home has helped in many significant ways toward my settlement in Malta. I can speak in English. English is very good. If you’re able to read and write, it helps you communicate with people, and here you have to communicate with different types of people. Western education helps you if you are looking for a job, especially in this country. You will be able to speak to the Maltese and they will understand you. You know what you are looking for. If you are to write application for that job, you will be able to write it. So the level of education I had in Nigeria helped me a lot.
These youth are therefore socio-economically displaced, and as is the case with people displaced by war and natural disaster all over the world, migrating to an area perceived to offer greater chances of survival remains a preferred option.

**Quest for Better Life and the Participants’ Motives and Drive to Migrate to Europe**

The obvious inclination would be to argue that youth from the developing world are driven by the banalities commonly categorized under push and pull factors, in which case the motive for their trans-border movement would be easy to locate in the quest for economic freedom. This perspective is consistent with the views of most NGOs and migration authorities in Malta and wider Europe. In a response to a question on drives and motives of the current youth South-North migration, during one of the focus group meetings, Angus an executive of a leading humanitarian NGO along the Mediterranean coasts of Europe argued with satisfaction:

> That is a problem, all these people come here – the boats arrive almost every week or almost every day, and what you see is the same people with the scenario of fighting for peace and improvement because the condition at home is unbearable. Some are persecuted but several of them are just economic migrants. So what is triggering migration is certainly the economic condition in the sub-region.

The idea of economic drive as the main trigger of youth migration might be a simplistic take on a much more complex phenomenon, which could pass for a test in understanding the motives for adults’ transnational migration. Such reasoning actually suits the goal and missions of most humanitarian organizations founded by the West to alleviate and manage what they perceive to be a major global threat. Nevertheless, Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan, (2011) observed through a survey on youth migration conducted by Gallup from all the regions of the world that:

> Factors that fuel the desire to leave one’s country vary by country, region, and human development level, but a common theme is opportunity—whether it is the chance to reunite with family members who are already abroad, to start a new business, to feel
free to express one’s views without fear, or to live where children are treated with
respect. (p. 19)

Again, the underlining assumption is adult migration and Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan’s
(2011) study shows bias for the push and pull paradigm. Sassen (1988) urges caution in
attributing drives and motives of the 21st century transnational labor mobility to the push and
pull factors, which parochially apportion blame on the migrants and their sending nations. In
fact, most of the studies in the extant literature have not been able to elicit the drives and
motives of youth migration, but as earlier stressed, the predominant emphasis is on the
migration and migrant decisions and experiences of adults, while youth and children are
accounted for only as reuniting with family members who are economically established
abroad. This perspective does not take into account the sheer numbers of youth migrants
admitted to currently represent the largest segment of the 21st century global migrant
population. Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan’s (2011) survey findings established a positive
connection between the existence of transnational social networks and the people’s desire to
migrate. One of the participants in my interview, Lucky, affirms:

Anyway, Malta was not my—and to most of us—the main destination. Actually in
those days we would see people that came from overseas, such as returnees from
Europe, and they were well, they were ok. And then when they came back you saw
them having cars and building houses and their family looked different and all those
things. So when I saw this situation I would say, I have been here in Nigeria and
nothing is happening. So I got determined that I wanted to travel, and like I told you
earlier, when I set my mind to do something I always like to do those things. So when
I saw these things happening I felt that my destiny was not in Nigeria, because I
believed that it would be much better when I come to Europe. So, that is why I started
planning and dreaming and working toward leaving Nigeria.

In other words, a potential youth migrant develops the desire to travel and live overseas after
listening to the experiences of family members, friends or others who have traveled overseas
(see also Akanle, 2013). Thus, their social network becomes a kind of boulder of confidence
for the potential youth migrant to explore the overseas option. While Esipova, Ray, and Srinivasan, (2011) framed their survey around discourses of push and pull experiences that many scholars have viewed to be very narrow related to 21st century migration (Sassen, 1988; Valiani, 2012; Appadurai, 1996), the findings, specifically with respect to the increasing migration of young adults, is important to this study. For instance, the observation that the quest for employment opportunities overseas is a determining factor only to the desires of older adults to migrate is in sharp contrast to earlier findings that generalized this factor as a key motive for migration:

In Europe, the Middle East and North Africa region, and the Americas, older, underemployed adults aged 30 to 65 are more likely to say they would like to migrate than those who are the same age and are employed or not in the workforce. Millions of young people worldwide would move away from their countries permanently if they had the opportunity, regardless of whether they have jobs at home. In most places, except the Middle East and North Africa, Gallup finds adults younger than 30 who are employed, underemployed, or not in the workforce are equally likely to desire to migrate. (Esipova, Ray, & Srinivasan, 2011, p. 18)

Youth migration therefore could result from a combination of factors that are quite distinct from the motives of adult migrants. Most outstanding as revealed in responses of my interviewees are motives that are psychological and socio-political in nature. These include a general feeling of despondence and hopelessness in the youth demography, apparently resulting from perceived mismanagement of resources in their countries by the ruling elites. Other factors are displacement and force-migration, education, family reunion, unemployment, poverty, influence of peer group, overpopulation etc., some of which could still be classified under push and pull factors. The findings of my study speak to an insidious, but more prevalent factor impelling youth, particularly Nigerians to emigrate. It is an apparent atmosphere of dissatisfaction with the socio-political and economic systems prevalent in their societies that nudges young adults to seek redress through violence.
Alternatively, they may leave their environments of origin for good and this, according to extant literature (see Esipova, Ray, & Srinivasan, 2011, p. 18), is peculiar to youth migrants in all developing economies. One of my interviewees, Chief, illuminated:

Actually, just as I earlier said, this is the actual truth and nothing but the truth. Nigeria is ruled like autocratic society, not just autocracy, it's ruled by a family. I remember when eh-m what one Professor Charles Eto said, “I’m sorry in Nigeria there is no youth. When there is no youth, it means that there is no freedom there because Nigeria is ruled by a group of people. Something like one family that decides what we are going to do. And which is not supposed to be. In Nigeria there is no freedom. If the youth did not move out, maybe Nigeria could have been just like the second war zone in Africa, just like Somalia.

Youth are dissatisfied with the ruling class whom they see as autocratic and wasteful. They also regret the insecurity resulting from such leadership that renders their lives meaningless, short, and hopeless. Leaders of African countries are in a slumber induced by the relief resulting from the demographic purge mass emigration to Europe has come to symbolize. In an argument almost consistent with the views expressed by the respondent above, Albert Memmi (2006) believes that to most African leaders whose exclusive economic zones extend into the Mediterranean Sea, youth migration is a new strategic tool for diplomatic negotiations:

They can discreetly negotiate a slowdown of these unstoppable human waves against certain benefits: access to fishing zones, more beneficial loans or exchanges, reduction of customs tariffs, and so on. A leader of a black country was quite frank about this. “No one in Europe could stop immigration,” he said, which is probably accurate. We can do little against the impulse. He made the error of adding, cynically, “If necessary, we will build bridges between Africa and Europe” (pp.74-5)

To the other interview participants the massive youth emigration from the continent has nothing to do with transnational diplomacy. The leaders of their countries of origin simply lack the morality and the required principles to bear rule. Most rulers of African countries are corrupt, irresponsible, and dictatorial. According to Idon:
I think we have a bad government. Tribalism holds everything; and this applies to governance. The political leaders are not different. The responsibilities and corruption among the leaders in the government trickle down to the citizens of Nigeria. I can say that this is the problem of Nigeria—corruption! The whole problem of Nigeria is corruption, what brings this corruption I can say is in the people’s leadership.

Consistent with Idon’s views, Osita, also reasons:

…but if they stop the corruption in the government, if they stop, they know what they are doing. But if they stop what they are doing, Nigeria will be good. Promise and fail; the politicians will promise to do a lot of things in their platforms or manifestos during their campaign. They will promise that their government will be building infrastructures, power supply, water, roads, and manufacturing units to create jobs but they have never kept any of these promises. Even the government’s contracts are given to the people the politicians know will give more bribes. Of course, the state is the problem.

With a different perspective, Solimano (2010) draws attention to some critical issues on contemporary globalization as it affects migrants and their sending and receiving nations. Relevant to my thesis, however, is his assertion that blame should not be apportioned solely to the global North for the current South-North flow in global youth migration. He insists that migration of citizens of the global South to the North has been a response to the perceived economic and political failures in the global South. The leadership have consistently failed to deliver the dividends of democracy in these developing countries. They would rather focus on selfish ends and personal aggrandizement and looting of public coffers. The above views echo repeatedly in the focus group interviews with Edwin, Osita and Devon and Aloy’s contributions:

Nothing could have happened because it is always like that; we have been in a country where citizens are not provided for. So we were lacking a lot of things; we lacked power supply, we lacked water and good roads. And because you don’t know what to do, if you remain in Nigeria there is no likelihood of change in the system. No, I don’t think there is any change in the offing because it is one family that is ruling us; when one is going out you know who is coming to take over. This has continued to create a lot of problem for the citizenry. (Edwin)
In a similar response, Osita reflected:

Considering the situation if these people moving out are not moving out, if they are not moving, there will be a lot of crisis in Nigeria; everything in the country will be affected by so much violence and youth related crimes. There will be a lot of fighting everywhere, in fact if youth are not migrating Nigerian situation could have been worse so it is God’s providence that people are moving.

Devon’s view was consistent with those of Osita and Edwin. He stressed:

In my own opinion, I want them to divide Nigeria; that’s it because the leaders are only after their pockets and securing the futures of their immediate families. That is not leadership. They forget that they are members of a larger society to which they must be accountable. If the youth remain there, there will be war in Nigeria. The youth might start a revolution against corrupt leaders just like the young military officers did in 1967.

And Aloy shared similar views, for according to him:

To support what Devon has said, in my opinion, I always think that the country is too big to be one. So the first thing is to divide the country because if the youth did not leave the country, those of us that are here might not even have the opportunity to leave the country perhaps because of war, insecurity, and other things that will be happening there. The politicians do not care about average citizens who simply struggle to meet life needs. So I think the best thing is to leave the country in order to save people’s lives.

These views are consistent with those of Sefa Dei (2011), who blames the underdevelopment of the Global South, specifically Africa, on poor judgment, mismanagement, and (as deviation from African Indigenous principles of leadership), lack of accountability among the leadership. I strongly suggest, however, that it might be very unrefined to ascribe all South-North movement of individuals, particularly those of youth, across international borders to economic factors since a host of other factors could possibly be at play. With no intention of romanticizing the woes of underdevelopment in Africa, I would insist that as reasonable as Solimano (2010) is, he comes short of drawing attention to how the insidious and invasive socio-economic policies and practices of the North have continued to perpetuate neo-colonial
hegemony in the South. Sassen (1988) and Appadurai (1996) clearly point to such other practices as the socio-economic domination of developing economies that later would entrench unfettered encapsulation of the Indigenous cultures in these societies. To Sassen (1988), the subversion of a peoples’ Indigenous culture by the West (and by extension all colonizers), and the imposition of foreign culture that follows is often masked as Foreign Direct Investment, FDI. The colonial project means a massive takeover of land and natural resources in developing nations by Western multinational corporations who would be providing primary input to feed the needs of their domestic industries. The disengaged Indigenous population who thrived by subsistence economic activities are re-harvested into a wage labor system that leaves them with barely enough to meet their daily needs. Gradually, their language and worldviews are supplanted through the imposition of those of their employers (note: Chinese investments in Africa and imposition of Chinese languages in some Nigerian and Kenyan schools in the previous chapter). This colonization strategy disrupts existing socio-economic structures while amputating the people from their Indigenous cultures; this renders them culturally bereft and therefore environmentally irrelevant. Thus they are prepared, albeit subconsciously, to be potential migrants. Through their pernicious economic strategies and the pseudo-economic move that FDI represents, the developed countries render all positive development efforts of Southern economies ineffective, so that the developing countries of the South remain economically subservient to the industrialized North, as the testimony of this Nigerian from the oil rich Niger Delta shows:

Like they said in the history of education, before education came into the Western World, we were first abiding in our traditional educational system. So we knew how to do everything before Europeans came to colonize us; so those things we learned, those cultures of ours in education which we knew before were immobilized by the Europeans. Yea, when I was young, my grandpa, my grandma, those days in the village, we used to go to the garden, to farms, and cultivate food produce. We carried
out fishing in non-oil-polluted rivers. This is not the story at the present. I learned a lot from my parents about the farming and fishing too. That is what we were taught in the village until oil and the oil companies destroyed our farmlands and our waters.

One good example of economic subjugation is the use of structural adjustment policies, SAP, that were developed by the IMF/World Bank (Bretton Woods Institutions) against Southern developing economies (Adepoju, 1993; Nwalutu, 2014). Although the leadership of developing countries are partly to blame for the ailing socio-economic systems in their countries, it is crucial not to overlook the subtle but stronger external pressures from the industrialized world. Because colonial projects in developing economies have continued to weaken all meaningful efforts made by most independent Southern states toward economic self-sufficiency, it could be justifiably argued that the North is also to a large extent responsible for the economic woes of the global South, and is therefore indirectly responsible for the current trend in the South-North youth migration. Ever, a Niger Delta youth migrant who dropped out of his undergraduate program due to poverty, stated:

Actually, the nation Nigeria is a wealthy nation but with a very bad leadership. The revenue and the system of government are not too stable for the people. They said it is democracy, but the democracy we know is supposed to be government of the people and for the people, but the people don’t have a word or say in the governmental body. So I decided to migrate from my nation to Europe to see if proper care and attention which is not being given to the people in the nation could be given to me. That is the reason why I migrated out; with problems of Boko Haram and fighting for the oil; bombing, killing, and everything that made me decide to migrate to the European nation today.

The works of Sefa Dei (2011a) and Nwalutu (2014) are crucial to understanding the indirect link between the encapsulation of Indigenous cultures by colonization and neo-colonial practices and the current youth emigration from the African continent. The unsettling of African Indigenous heritages by imposed cultures and foreign education has left African youth with little or no knowledge of their past and immediate environment. In the words of
Frantz Fanon:

The claim to a national culture in the past does not only rehabilitate that nation and serve as a justification for the hope of a future national culture. In the sphere of psycho-affective equilibrium it is responsible for an important change in the native. Perhaps we haven’t sufficiently demonstrated that colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today. (Fanon, 1963, p. 120)

The present dispensations of African youth respond to inevitable socio-political and economic circumstances prevalent in their natural environments with derision and apprehension. I will insist that discourses on Indigenous education (as it currently affects transnational migration) in the extant literature reveal the massive disruptions and suppression perpetuated on Indigenous peoples’ cultural heritages by colonization and the prevailing neo-colonial projects in their environments. I argue that such subtle and deliberate manipulation has helped in no small measure to shape the cultural perceptions of the majority of the new generation of young Africans who prefer and aspire to attain the colonizers’ culture. It has also whetted the youth appetite for the colonizers’ world and worldviews, so that the present African – Europe migration of young adults is actually the visible expression of this shift.

Desert to Sea Versus Europe by Air: Is it Always a Tragic Journey?

The mode of African youth migration to Europe is a function of their migration drive. As indicated earlier in this chapter, among identified factors compelling Nigerian youth to migrate are social insecurity, socio-political displacement (resulting in force-migration), education, family reunion, unemployment and poverty, and influence of peer group. Information from the findings has shown that youth who re-joined their relations or travelled for education arrived in Europe by air. In fact, four (4) youth migrants, representing 16.7%,
of my participants arrived in Europe to either join their relations or engage in further studies. As many as 20 migrant participants, representing 83.3%, who travelled out to Europe due to other factors such as unrest/war, economic reasons, or peer influence, arrived by boat. Making this connection enables a vivid insight into the pressure and untoward circumstances under which the majority of African migrant youth operate. The lived experiences of each of these segments of migrant youth are also dependent on the drive/motive of migration. Those who arrived to join their relations or came for further studies never had to go through border restriction hurdles and hassle. Cathy, one of my interviewees who joined her mother, states:

Basically it wasn’t a hard experience for me. It was just a matter of saying yes or no, and I got on the plane. So let me tell you exactly how I arrived here. My mom had applied for me and it was quite easy in those days being that my mom was already residing in Malta. So in a week I got my Visa with which to travel down and we purchased my ticket. I flew from Lagos I believe, and to Kenya, which was Nairobi, same day with a reconnecting flight to Dubai, and landed in Malta. Basically that was my narrative how I came and why I came. I was seventeen at that time.

A few of the youth who immigrated into Malta from Nigeria for educational purposes had some hurdles to clear. Besides paying their tuition and meeting all academic requirements, they were issued with limited immigration documents, which were regimented and monitored to ensure that they were not used for migrating into other European countries. Ego, a Nigerian-Maltese, came to study in the University of Malta and thereafter secured a job, married a Maltese, and now lives with his family in the Island Republic. He recollected—although with some reservation—that his experiences were not with any immigration hiccoughs as long as he met his tuition and academic requirements. He reasons:

So that’s how I started to be in Malta. We were not all that respected, we were not all that received, but we were only received because I have to pay all my fees. We were only five Africans at the big University of Malta; only five black men in the whole university. Nevertheless, the focus was just studying and earning my own future. It was only until 1988, when I graduated my first degree with first class that I was then accepted to be at the same level and as human as the Maltese—not as a Maltese
citizen - but still as an immigrant. I had to renew my stay in Malta every single month. If I had in effect skipped the month, police would be at the door because I was an immigrant. And every month I had to declare my money because if I didn’t have enough money, I would not be able to stay. In fact we were five to be precise, and then we ended up only two students because the other three could not afford to stay, so they were repatriated immediately.

Almost all the migrants who arrived by boat share similar narratives of harrowing border experiences, uncertain immigration status, and marginalization in the environment they have come to regard as home. For example, Fred states:

It took about four or five days to reach here. When I reached here, they said that we entered illegally. They had to detain us according to their laws. Sometimes the boat would stop; sometimes they would repair the boat. The risk we faced is not something we can ever explain. It is from the desert to the sea; and the life from Nigeria to Libya and this place is all risk. So all is risk; starting from there to here all is risk. So when we reached here, they said we would be detained one year or one year six months or six months before we would be free. That’s how I was detained for one year before I was out. The government has been promising us citizenship and it is going to eight years now or more. I came here in 2005. We are just praying that one day they will give it to us. All we have now is the one year paper that they gave to us. I thank God I am alive.

Sassen’s (2003) emphasis on “alternative circuits of survival” (see also Gebre & Ohta, 2005; Cooper & Buruciaga, 2010; Giovanna, 2010), gives a clear depiction of the implications of displacement of citizens from their familiar societies that results from globalization, and how the indigent folks, specifically African youth, are further driven to the margins to migrate through alternative means for the sake of a better life. As hinted by Nwalutu (2014, 2015), citizens of the North or those with privileged national identities move globally with no restrictions. Due to the limits imposed on them by their identities as citizens at the margin, and the transnational border restrictions imposed by advanced economies, migrants from developing economies do often resort to irregular or, as is generally referred to in Europe, illegal migration, as demonstrated by Andy:
Just from Nigeria to Niger and from Niger to Libya. Yes, I went through so many processes in the desert because I was young and fresh and had little experience with how those things worked. So I continued struggling for several months in Niger and after several months, I arrived in Libya. I wrote some things out after I had made some connections and continued my journey to Libya. I arrived in Libya in May. I was just a learner. I started serving people, helping to lay tiles for building contractors at construction sites. I was laying tiles before I got a problem. I stayed in Libya for nine years; after eight years I went back to Nigeria to see my family. After three months in Nigeria, I got back to Libya. Then I came back in December 2010 after two months; that was in February of 2010, the year war broke out. I regretted coming back into Libya. I regret that always as I remember it could have cost me my life. I never planned to come to Malta. We arrived in Malta because we were lost. We were going to Italy and then we were trying to get to Lampedusa in Italy. That was how the Navy rescued us and took us to Malta. This is how they scoop migrants from the sea and hem them in. I wasn’t an immigrant then. They just bring people here and frustrate them.

The battle of border control is presently going far beyond the ambits of the nation-state to imagined territories. Against this backdrop, Bigo and Guild (2005) examine the link between the prevailing border securitization, penalization, and incarceration as they affect Western countries and the new form of border controlling (policing from a distance) or from delocalized borders to new social and imagined territory within and outside the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Guild (2009) raises a critical question in his book contribution as she asks: “…who is entitled to move?” (p. 14). Guild notes that globalization is the positioning of economy-driven mobility above the authority of the nation-state in which multi-national corporations secure passage across the barriers of transnational borders using their economic powers. Of import to this thesis is Guild’s recognition that: “the right to move for economic gain, whether in the form of goods, capital, service or persons, in a globalizing world is increasingly limited to those who are already economically advantaged” (p. 14)—and I would add, to those deemed acceptable to the host nations. Chief, one of the participants, states that “they come to Africa to harvest oil, gold diamond name them, all natural resources, and they allow them pass the Europe border. Now we are not allowed to
come to Europe to find opportunity.” The idea that the economy is the overarching drive in Nigerian youth migration to Europe subsumes the banal push and pull paradigm and undermines the rationales espoused by the evidence from testimonies of most of the participants in my interview. Lucky, a Nigerian youth participant, argues for a different understanding of youth migrants’ motives:

I don’t hate anyone; myself I am a human being like them even though they are White and I am Black, we are the same, so I don’t have bitterness for anyone. I don’t hate anyone. I don’t have anyone in Europe or Malta. When I left Nigeria, I didn’t leave [thinking] that I am going to Europe. I left Nigeria to go to a place better for me that would be okay for me to live. That is why I left Nigeria, you understand? For me everything happening in Nigeria today, that is, whatever the government is doing, is fake. I say this because if things were as they should be in Nigeria like we have in Malta, Europe, and Asia, I don’t think I would leave my country. If they had the [right] kind of management and everything was okay, I would not travel out of my country. The irony is that outsiders do not know what average citizens suffer in Nigeria. If you meet some Maltese, male or female, and they ask you where you are from and you say, “I’m from Nigeria,” they ask you, “Why did you come here?” They will tell you that Nigeria is rich; and that Nigeria is okay, so you don’t need to come to Malta. And that you should have stayed in your country, you understand?

In a critique of the state’s domineering influence at transnational borders, Anderson, Sharma, and Wright (2009) argue for no borders as an imperative, concrete socio-political project. The resistance to the power of the state at transnational border control is mostly unfavorable to those constituted as ‘Other.’ In his responses, Chief, one of the Nigerian migrant youth in Malta, laments:

So remember there was a day in Marsa that some journalists came to the detention facility and were interviewing people, a friend of mine asked one of the journalists a question, to which the journalist could not give a good answer, because looking at it differently, all the material resources that come here from Africa to Europe, they are all right here in Europe, but we the human beings that come in here from Africa to Europe, we have no rights in Europe.

Andy, Lucky, and Chief’s views reiterate the arguments of Anderson, Sharma, and Wright
(2009) and Moses (2006), who call for transnational borders that admit all migrants without discrimination. Anderson, Sharma, and Wright (2009) consider transnational borders as an ideological project that generates and reinforces social difference. They reason that injustices are produced by state border surveillance apparatuses, and the resistance exhibited by border-crossing migrants and immigration activists is needful to challenge the hegemonic influence of the state at national borders. This view is consistent with the opinion of Dona:

> The policy they have toward immigrants is very poor; you understand? The idea of humanitarian aids is very poor in terms of the professed protection of refugees. It is a very poor approach and I don’t know, there’s a way they do it, you know. It is more like people from West Africa are not recognized as refugees, but people from East Africa are mostly the people they recognize as refugees. And then because for me I don’t know the problem they have with people from West Africa, that is something that I have been asking on a daily basis because it is people from West Africa that contribute more to their economy because they are the people that are willing to work and pay taxes. Meanwhile, their applications for asylum are rejected, whereas the people from East Africa are the people that are not willing to work and they are being given the protection. Not only are they given protection, they earn the benefits or whatever support. You know when you listen to the people you hear different insinuations and different sayings. But the people they recognize as refugees are the people that give them trouble. And giving them these troubles, they generalize the whole thing to all Africans. You can imagine if a Somalian committed a crime now if they want to speak about it they won’t even mention Somalian, they say this African.

Nevertheless, I contend that African youth migrants perceive the activities of multinational NGOs and activist organizations to protect transnational migrant individuals as grossly inadequate because they have consistently failed to contest the dominance of state, its constitution of people into its subjective citizens, and its claim to nationhood. Edwin, one of my interview participants, deemed his treatment by Maltese authorities and citizens as uncouth and inappropriate:

> What I understand as a person from Africa is that we like and cherish foreigners who come to Africa. They are treated like gold. We respect them and treat them well. But we from Africa are being treated like slaves. Why is it like that? The government, I believe some of the government, must have travelled to other countries, either in Africa, and they should realize how they were treated. Do they think they are better
than Africans? Are they better than the people of Africa or do they think they are
gods that make the Blackman to respect them and they don’t respect the Blackman
when they are in their continent? This is the thing I don’t like in their system. They
treat us blacks with contempt, and make us look inferior, you understand?

In Moses’ work (2006), the no-borders project discards notions of citizenship and statehood
while exposing the discriminatory and devious role nation-states indulge in at the territorial
borders that facilitate the success of neo-liberal capitalist interests. The system of global
capital expansion, which Arrighi (1994) argues to have mutated into the present day
globalization, has rendered borders of developing nations porous to capital, commodities and
individuals. It has equally fortified borders of industrialized nations to become semi-
permeable, restrictive barricades that admit all but subordinated bodies (mostly nationals of
developing economies) deemed to be of less economic importance to the receiving states
(Foucault, 1982; Hagan & Palloni, 1998; Guild, 2009). Canne, another respondent, reflected:

I lived in Libya for nine years. Then I came over here three years ago. On the 19th of
May, 2009, I arrived in Malta. I’ve been locked up. They call it, aah, what do they call
it? Detention, it is not a detention, it is prison; no sunshine, none whatsoever, and no,
no, there is no good food, no decorum. It is so horrible. So many people came here as
journalists or some form of government agents to investigate how we were feeling.
They interviewed us and we gave them our feedback, not knowing that they were sent
by Malta government so they were working hand in hand. Those things that they say
they were sympathizing with us, they want to know what we were passing through
bla bla bla. After we’ve voiced everything out, they took it back to the government
and the government started using it to solve their own problems while turning against
us.

In the contemporary constitution of race and debates on immigration in European countries
and more specifically, in Italy, Malta, Spain, and Portugal, current influences and the
perpetuation of subjugation through colonial legacies are always deemphasized. Toasije’s
(2009) work shows that the implication of Europeanization of Spain is deliberate expunging
of contributions of Africans to the historiography of Iberia Peninsula (Spain). And the sudden
realization in the Portugal immigration arena of another group of subordinate “Others” in
more recent developments, as opposed to the usual African migrants, is a serious problem of conscience and re-evaluation of action to the immigration policy makers in Portugal (Araujo, 2014). Until now, immigrants probably were the “illegal Africans,” so dubbed by the nation-state’s coloniality of power and tropes of racism. But now, Brazilians and Ukrainians are part of the burgeoning migrant labor border-crashers in Portugal. The notion of cultural diversity in a supposedly homogenous Portugal has thus become a concern for the critics of Portugal’s and by extension, European immigration policies, which are in fact anti-immigrant in implementation (Gooding-Williams, 2001; Dale, 2000; Nyers, 2010). I argue therefore that accepting the narratives of globalization as a precursor for racism in immigration discourses in Portugal as elsewhere in Europe subsumes neo-colonial projects into the dynamics of push and pull rationality, which apparently obscures the role of extant colonial projects that globalization represents. Therefore, contemporary narrative on immigration and diversity in Portugal as in many Western states depoliticizes colonization through the logic of globalization, history, and Indigenous connections. This denial of colonization to establish a false link to interculturality wittingly evades the ethnicity-based discriminations and tropes of racism engendered by the presence of the migrant Other in the territorial borders of the host society.

**Social Representation, EU Border, and African Youth Migrants**

Name-calling and the act of mislabeling transnational migrants by the receiving societies using mass media are noted ways of creating biases that would engender restrictive government policies against immigrants, particularly when the economic and fiscal conditions of the receiving states are unfavorable. It is no different for African youth migrating into Europe. Most of my interview participants in Malta were conversant with the
racist inclination of the citizens and had resolved to live with such racist tags as clandestine, boat-people, illegal, and Iswed (Black). Andy, a 32 year old male migrant, had this to say after his eight-year stay in Malta:

Malta citizens were full racists, separating White, Black, etc. They say, we are White, you are Black. Many of these things are happening till tomorrow, till next tomorrow; but we are adjusting out of it. We know how to cope with them, we know how to move with them; so even sometimes when we join in a bus together we know how to cope with them. For me when I join the bus with them, I will switch off all my phones, my two phones, so I will not be able to make any calls until I come down from the bus. Because when someone calls you, maybe your boss or colleague calls you and you answer in a bus, they started hissing, “Iswed mhm! Amadona” They say Amadona is mother of Mary; they say Iswed is Black. They should get their Black bus, etc. The Maltese receive phone calls in transit, making themselves as lively as they can in their conversation with no interruptions.

Literature on transnational migration is replete with practices in which tragic incidents involving migrants were invoked into labels for all the migrants by the receiving societies as a way of stigmatizing them and sweeping up bad sentiments from the politicians to generate unfriendly immigration policies. These are socio-political strategies for keeping the unwanted vagrant at bay as could be inferred from a Maltese interviewee, Tony:

They are illegal. I am sorry to say they are illegal. If you travel to England, even if you travel by boat without passport and no documents, they won’t let you. Not even Sweden or Norway because you are illegal; they won’t let you. It is as simple as that. Okay, there are atrocities of fighting in that place where they are coming from and they run away from their country but still other governments should help them; the government of that country should give help to restore peace in that country.

Australia, Europe, and the United States have used racist representation specifically to form public opinion against immigrants so as to attract the wrath of politicians and policy-makers to promulgate laws on border restriction. Invisiblization and therefore indirect negation of the individuality and agency of migrant bodies both occur when negative representations and essentialized racial stigmatization bring migrant individuals into a label. This has immense implications for how youth migrants are received and treated by their host societies and
government. Respondent Sower, a 29 year old male respondent who has lived in Malta for 10 years, spoke of his socio-economic status in Malta with regret:

I have no job; even as of now, I am jobless. When you go to meet NGO authorities, you think they help immigrants; no, they don’t help nobody. They are only helping Somalians and East Africans. What about we that go through war? What about we the West Africans? You see right here we have been rejected; they don’t have anything to do with us. And still they collect money on our heads. They still collect money from the European Union (EU) because of me.

Phillips (2014) stresses that all people don’t have the same reason for leaving their homes and getting onto boats to migrate, and that all people rescued at sea are migrants, but the one-size-fits-all policy response fails to recognize the differences in migrant populations that they have to deal with, which might consist of country of origin, gender, age, race, and ability, as well as family make-up, including existing connections migrants have in host countries. In her view:

Beyond technical distinctions over terms and language there is a lack of personalisation of the human side of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants seeking to enter Europe by sea. It can be very difficult to find individual stories behind the frenzied media headlines claiming thousands more people are potentially on their way to Europe by boat mainly departing from Libya. It is only through individual stories and nuanced accounts of why people leave their homes and their mixed motivations for departing, that we will better understand the factors driving mobility along this route which in turn can shape policy solutions (Phillips, 2014).

Similarly, Bjarnesen (2014) expresses disappointment over what he sees as a struggle by politicians, legislators, state administrations, and political activists at African migrants’ detention centers to ascribe whatever label they deemed suitable for immigrants, whether these migrant individuals should be referred to as migrants or refugees. I posit that the construction of racist labels and negative ascriptions plays into the Western politics of border restrictions and securitization (Ndiaye & Robin, 2012; Okafor, 2003; Posnock, 1997). It is a system in which global citizenship is polarized into binary ascriptions: Legal and Illegal,
Regular and Irregular, documented and undocumented, according to the disposition and perception of migrants by the receiving societies. The power dynamics at transnational borders systematically eliminate, incarcerate, or repatriate the unwanted marauders from developing states, especially when screening involves the Othered migrants (Nwalutu, 2015; Moses & Letnes, 2004; Peri, 2010). However, no reciprocating restriction is permitted without sanctions at the borders of a developing state for the favored citizens who are from industrialized economies. Coloniality of power thus becomes apparent at the politics of transnational borders polarized between admissible and inadmissible subjects (Quijano, 2000). Border restriction and securitization is not just representation but construction of difference and imposition of hegemonic control of bodies both at the domestic borders and imagined territories of the dominant states. In a rhetorical question targeting the references made of transnational migrant bodies in the European media and at political debates, Jesper Bjarnesen asks: What should we call someone who has crossed the sea in a fishing boat and arrives in Lampedusa without any identification papers or other legal documents? (Bjarnesen, 2014). My thesis argues that negative representation, racist labeling, and random humiliation of migrants of African descent by Maltese is not peculiar to migrants who arrived from the sea. Even Malta-trained migrant specialists are not exempt from negative representation and discrimination by some of the citizens of Malta. Nkem, a University of Malta-trained Nigerian youth working as a medical nurse, described her experience serving in one of the hospitals:

Before, I used to work in a state hospital and sometimes if my colleagues were on break and I had clients or relatives come to visit patients, I was faced with them and said, “Hi, can I help you?” I could understand the language just a little bit, [on a basic level] and sometimes they would have what you called permission; they would say, “Not clandestine,” meaning, “Not you Black.” Clandestine in Maltese also means Black. Like immigrant, not you coming through water. So the perception is very bad
because they see you in the street tomorrow; they say that you are coming through water. You know because each and every one, the IQ is zero for them. When they see you they think that you are all from the sea.

Cathy holds a master’s degree from the University of Malta and works in one of the big commercial outfits in the country. She arrived in Malta as a teenager to join her mother, who was a medical nurse in one of the central hospitals in Malta. She mused over her experiences:

Yeah! So, now, increasingly, lately, there have been this problem with irregular people coming with boat. So they are more afraid and fed up with it. Whether you are regular or irregular, they just try as much to put people in a tight hole, so anything they can come up with, even if it is not legally correct and they’ve been giving a blind eye to EU laws. There are European Union directives which Malta… there are two things we are talking about here; being that I came here legally, I fall into a different category. Now being that when you talk of detention, international law requires Malta by force to accept anyone that is coming in and seeking asylum. Now whether you actually will be detained as a refugee or not at the end of the day has nothing to do with Malta accepting them in the first instance.

Migrant African youth who came into Malta to study as international students were also under severe state restrictions and surveillance (obviously no tag distinguishing this category from boat migrants), so they were not perceived differently by Maltese. Respondent Ego, a First Class honors student who also holds his master’s degree from the country’s university, remembered:

We were only welcomed in this country because of the tuition we had to pay as of necessity. We the African people in the University of Malta had to individually prove our worth to be accepted by the Maltese society within which we dwelt. Our academic performance thus became means of proving that contrary to the status attributed to us as inferior people, Africans are as smart, and sometimes even smarter than the citizens. For instance, I graduated on top grade in my first degree with first class honors division, but that did not place me at par per with Maltese citizens; it only earned me recognition as an acceptable and respected immigrant. It did not however spare me the continuous monitoring of the Maltese police and immigration authorities. And every month I had to declare my money because if I didn’t have enough money, I would not be able to stay. In fact we were five to be precise, then we ended up only as two students because the other three could not afford to stay; they were repatriated immediately. On top of that we were monitored, wherever we went,
we had to carry our passports. If a police [officer] found us in the street, the first thing he or she would ask us is if we brought our own passport. It was not a joke, it was trauma, yes Michael.

Of critical importance to this work is the understanding that unilateral decisions on tags or labels for migrant bodies confine to the receiving states the power of attorney to dispense treatment to immigrants on their own terms rather than following the provisions of the international humanitarian law. For instance, the United Nation High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR’s, humanitarian intervention determines that while economic migrants choose to move in order to attain better lives, refugees are people fleeing for their lives or for their socio-political freedom. It becomes crucial to highlight that the displaced people flee their states of origin for freedom, either of economic or political disenfranchisement. Interventions are solicited in either situation, and receiving states, as a matter of international obligation, are not supposed to repatriate or deport those deemed useless to their society, or go against the will of the migrants. In the stipulations of the guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Convention) provides that: “No contracting party shall expel or return ‘refouler’ a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of a territory where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982; International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979).

Deaux (2006) examines the patterns of US immigration to understand how they influence domestic policies. This work explains how the combination of three socio-political factors: policies, demography, and social representation have continued to shape the trends and flow of contemporary transnational migration and immigrant experiences. In his view,
the United States government’s policies on immigration and the demographic realities of the country are two elements interlocking to produce not just a specific flow of immigrants into, but immigrant experiences in the United States. The third factor, social representation, is not as tangible as demographic data, yet is, according to Deaux, even more critical in shaping immigrants’ experiential realities in their host societies. Social representation as the articulation of “attitudes and images that a community holds about immigration—in general, as well as about particular groups of immigrants—is a critical member of the triad” (p. 13).

In an effort to understand how the notion of power fundamental to state security frameworks influences the treatment of immigrants, Bourbeau (2011) draws from social and securitization theories, and migration thoughts to explore the role of political agents, the media, and circumstantial influences in the process of migration securitization in Canada and France. Bourbeau uses content-analysis of editorials of major newspapers and public opinion polls in France and Canada in search of a better understanding of the securitization of transnational migration with a specific focus on France and Canada. His findings inter alia are that the refugee crisis of the 1990s and the enormous speculations on the flow entrenched worries and concerns in areas covered by the study. The contiguous border reference to the target of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack triggered securitization that, according to the editorials reviewed, was not necessarily the case before the attack. One would conjecture that border proximity to the USA might have engendered apprehension that led to securitization in Canada post 9/11, and since France is geographically afar, the incident of 9/11 could not have a similar effect on the country. Contextual factors have also been established by this study to have considerable impact on the level of securitization of transnational migration. The relevance of Bourbeau’s work to my review is essentially that of
unravelling the confluences of environmental, socio-psychological, and political factors that interact to stimulate a state or its agents to securitize immigration in their geo-territorial spaces. In my view, there has been an unfair choice of study locations. Bourbeau’s study could have been spread not across two immigrant receiving states of the West as the case was, but between a Southern sending and Western receiving nation. The ideology behind the analysis of two Western states, irrespective of what justifications we might have is still the portentous neo-liberal, colonial, and imperialist underpinning that construct migrants—specifically those from the Southern hemisphere as a problem to the peaceful existence of the receiving countries of the industrialized North. I am not sure Bourbeau’s use of content-analysis of the print media, consideration of exogenous shocks, and public opinion polls were justifiable for the magnitude of the work executed in the study. Contemporary media audiences are more in electronics and social media, and application of this methodology could have grounded his work suitably to overcome the hurdles of internal validity and generalizability of the outcome. By also sampling the opinion of the elite, technocratic, and scientific audience, the author might have over-represented the middle and upper socio-economic class in the study with little or no attention to the working class majority. The reasons for this deduction are that only a negligible number of people read newspapers presently, which accounts for the recent mergers and closures of some print media setups in developed nations. Even in developing economies, the cost of production resulting in the high cost of the final outputs has put print media readership at the mercy of electronics media. One would have expected therefore that Bourbeau had taken the advantages that electronics media reports provide, especially the internet technologies.

Kapur (2005) attempts to expose the challenges posed by the ambiguities and
insecurities resulting from the erosion of traditional components of modernity to both the sovereign subject and sovereign nation-state as it affects transnational borders and regulation of national border-crossing migrant. In this vein, he examines how the current extraordinary movement of people across international borders exposes “the porosity of borders, the transnational reality of subaltern existence, and the contingent foundation of international law” (p. 137), by interrogating how, on one hand, encounters with the constitutive Others or the transnational migrant subject disrupts and disturbs universalists’ notion of international law, and on the other hand, the modernists’ perspective on international law attempts to counter, curtail, restrict, and resist the cross-border migrants. The lopsided structure and control system inherent in the transnational border politics ostensibly apportions power of attorney of international borders to the industrialized world (see Konig & de Regt, 2010; Kjaerum, 2013; Kamal, 2010) and its citizens—to enter and leave any sovereign territory without restriction—when such opportunities are denied international migrant subjects from the South. Therefore, if the legitimacy in international law as it affects cross-border migration is validated, challenged, or altered based on the individual’s position about modernist argument of human progress or level of alignment with the dominant social group, it leaves much to be desired. This becomes the case considering that often policies are influenced by the subjective views of a country’s authority rather than on objective derivatives of data analysis. In the same vein, social representation in the prevailing media and interpretation of events, ideas, and processes also influence a people’s political actions. The primary thesis of his paper was derived from the understanding that a shift in public opinion in the US, for instance, resulted in the 1986 promulgation of Immigration Reform control as a precautionary deterrent measure to replace open door policies with border surveillance and
gate-keeping aimed at checking the surge in illegal immigration and punishing those implicated in the influx of illegal immigrants. The view of my thesis, however, is that Deaux forecloses the space for appreciating and reviewing the dynamics of demographic shifts in constituents of the transnational migrant population as is currently witnessed globally. Her work subsumes the experiences of transnational migrant youth in her analysis of the US national Immigration Reform control of 1986, for we are learning nothing special about how this restriction of immigrant flow influenced youth migrants’ experiences in the country.

In a comparative analysis of the efforts of immigration authorities in the United States and Australia to effectively sustain a balance between the continuous large-scale inflow of immigrants, the majority of whom were from developing countries, and the task of immigrants’ economic and social integration, Higley, Nieuwenhysen, and Neerup (2011) corroborate Deaux’s (2006) thesis of the use of social representation by the citizenry to construct the images and identities of immigrants. The illustration from the earlier work, The Nation of Immigrants depicts the state authorities as having no difficulties balancing the surge of immigration and the pressure such an influx poses on available socio-economic amenities and life support systems during economic prosperity. This has been proven not to be the case during economic recessions. Youth migrants are not altogether ignorant of these experiential realities of their host nations, as Rikash, a participant of one of my focus group meetings, expressed:

Eh, I won’t describe the government of this country as being fair or not, being a small place, when I say a small place, this is an Island and seeing a lot of immigration—immigrants, you don’t expect the government to be happy. So they are afraid because they don’t know what is going to happen in the future. And a lot of them here, they don’t travel, they haven’t experienced cultures. We are just like new to them. Because I remember when we came to Malta in 2007, things were not like this. They were improving. Then you enter a bus with Maltese, they will be looking at you, and when they see you, they will start closing their doors, asking, how come their color is
Black? They are illiterate, so it is only the ones that travel and have seen other cultures and experienced a lot of life that can tell them how it is or what is happening. In other words, immigrants are made the scapegoat of the destination country’s economic woes. Higley, Nieuwenhysen, and Neerup (2011) are parochially focused on the experiential realities of adult migrants with no details on how social representation and immigration policies made by authorities at various periods of economic shifts and the economic conditions in the US and Australia influence the current global rise in transnational youth migration as it affects their border-crossing experiences.

**Border Restriction and African Migrants Through the Lenses of Anti-colonial/Anti-racist Discourses**

Racism is a preconceived process that derogatorily labels an individual or group for the purpose of segregation, marginalization, domination, and imposition of hegemony by the dominant individual(s). It is an act of social representation and construction of difference aimed at positioning the dominant social group to enjoy certain exclusive privileges that are girded around socio-political power imbalances and barricaded from the subordinate individual(s) with taboos of normativity. It is difficult to talk about race without looking into power relationships, which is where the 19th century Western colonization and present neocolonial structures and processes play critical roles. Sefa Dei (2011b) reasons that as antiracist agents we must move to an inclusive race-based analysis of colonial relations with the understanding that representation is not only about subject identities and identifications but also about fundamental issues of economic, material, and structural manifestations in existing human conditions. Antiracist theory therefore must aim to redress these fundamental issues. As an analytical approach, anti-colonial framework is a perspective that challenges all manifestations of hegemony and imposition of ideas and practices of cultural and socio-
political domination. In other words, any exercise of self-assertion or self-location is meaningful if it seeks to challenge or disrupt existing social dynamics of power imbalances.

Relating the discourses of anti-racism to the phenomenon of African youth’s experiences at the transnational borders, particularly at the extended borders of the European Union, the realities of the lopsided power relationship begin to emerge. The systems of border securitization and surveillance are designed to intercept and detain signifiers of racialized bodies or their representation. Terms such as victims of traffickers, illegal migrants, Clandestine and boat-people are racist coinages of representation and markers of social difference at the borders of the European Union. The disturbing reality of representation of difference is the positioning of the racialized individual(s) at the margins of the social echelon. Okey, a Nigerian migrant youth who has resided in Malta for 12 years recounted his experiences living among the Maltese:

But to stay here and work, the character of people here in Malta is horrible. The character of people, the Maltese themselves, because here there are no human rights, they can do something and get away with it. And if you have a case with a Maltese man, even if the man is guilty, you’ll consider yourself a loser, so what we do in order not to find ourselves in their net, we have to, I mean, know how you live your life. If they do something wrong, you leave them, you understand.

It is a paradox that most narratives of the youth interviewees regarding their unpleasant experiences in Malta often are inconsistent with their responses to any suggestion to leave Europe and return to Nigeria. While recognizing that he was not treated fairly by Maltese authorities and was not accorded due recognition and respect in the Maltese society, Okey did not hesitate to interrupt when I asked his thoughts about returning to Nigeria, “that [would not] be an option at all, at all.” The thought of returning to Africa was far from being among the solutions he contemplated. When I interrogated him further to understand his reasons for not intending to return to Nigeria, A.’s explanations pointed to the sheer level of
decadence and corruption even among public servants, and more specifically, among the law enforcers. This could still be articulated under insecurity and disorderliness in the society they left behind. Okey reinforced:

Because for example here in Malta now, you see when we sit here, police just drive around. In Europe, when you see a police or when something is going on, everybody likes to seek the opinion of police because whenever you call the police, people know that the police, they are coming to make peace. But in Nigeria, sometimes when you are in somewhere or someone is saying, “Police is coming,” you take off, or maybe start running, which is not supposed to be. Because even the police, they are not doing their job. So, if they see you, maybe on the way, they just call you, “come here”! Before you know it, they drag you and take you to the station. The next thing now you start hearing what, you don’t even have an idea, what you don’t even know. Now they will tell you that you committed a crime and must be bailed or risk going to jail, which is not what should ever happen.

The youth in every society are more prone to be victims of injustice and vulnerable to marginalization. More so, in societies where corruption is endemic and a larger percentage of the population live below poverty level (which accounts for why most of my participants reason in unison that more than anything), insecurity tops the list of their reasons for risking their lives in the precarious trip to Europe. Responding similarly to my suggestion on returning to Nigeria, another female participant, Rikash, who also has been in Malta for close to 11 years, reacted while highlighting fears of social insecurities in Nigeria:

No, no, no, not yet! I don’t plan to; generally life here is more comfortable. Umh, you’re not worried about your house being attacked, insecurity, um, and although it is not going good here, you have means of surviving. There are opportunities, better opportunities here. You have to be very rich to live a comfortable life in Nigeria. I believe that those mosquitoes biting and infesting you with malaria and a host of other issues are not to be worried about (laughs). You know like killings, laws needs to be updated. It’s still like we live in the 1950s in Nigeria. I don’t know how to put it—I have very much—like human life means nothing in Nigeria.

Also corroborating Rikash’s remarks, Obe, a young Nigerian male in his mid-twenties, who has spent 11 years of his life among the Maltese reacts rather more idealistically and quietly:

No, I think it’s not only me complaining. Ehm, even EU nationals that are not Maltese
are also complaining of discrimination. They’ve been charged 60% higher in water and 30% in electricity, or the other way round, and they’re protesting. It’s just the country is known to be friendly, but when it comes deep down to things the government will try to [screw] everybody. It’s 50-50, I think. I don’t find it that bad personally about how the people relate to me.

Some of the male participants perceived the Maltese as dealing with them in a subtle rather than outright hostile manner. The subtlety and shrewdness are more evident in financial and economic terms. The migrant youth believed that they were pressured by their Maltese employers into spending every little money they worked hard to earn in Malta or risk being unemployed. According to Obe:

> There are good people here as well as bad ones and everywhere there are some good and there are some bad people. So the good ones, they will like you as a Black man; they will call you to work for them, you understand. And one thing here when you are working, they will be calculating how much they are paying you, how you spend your money, you understand? If they ask you do you have a girlfriend, if you don’t have a girlfriend, it is a problem. They will [take] the job from you. They will pay you off and tell you not to come again. And so you have to lie and tell them yes, you have a girlfriend, and you used to go to the club with your girlfriend. And is not the girlfriend from your country, if you say you don’t have a Maltese girlfriend you lose your job because they want you to spend the money they pay you in their country.

Spaces such as the transnational borders have the tendency to reproduce hegemony, dominance, and privileges because such spaces also come with particular histories and readings. Therefore, the experiences of the racialized bodies of African youth in European borders cannot be fully grasped in discourses of split binaries of regular or irregular, legal and illegal migrants, because we are not unaware of the maxim that occupying certain spaces comes with meanings and politics. Racial positioning of whiteness at international borders implies that Europe wields an unlimited power to extend its authority of border surveillance to the North African sea ports of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. These ports are patrolled by FRONTEX, an EU border security agency charged with keeping the unwanted vagrant bodies out of mainland Europe. One would be tempted to ask what
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Complicit role the leaders of these African frontline states are playing to make EU aggressive border policies and praxis worthwhile. The answer is worse than imagined. Many young Africans have been brutally gunned down at the borders of North Africa on passage to Europe (see Brachet, 2012; Baxter, 2008; Toasije, 2009). It is paradoxical, however, that Europeans travelling to Africa do not face the same harassment, criminalization, restrictions detention, and deportation that African youth migrants suffer at the borders of Europe. Whiteness is a system and also a property. There is, therefore, a politicization of biological pigmentation at the spaces of representation. Whiteness thus becomes a pigmentary passport of privilege. Dei (2011) reasons that whiteness has no meaning outside of colonialism and oppression. Applebaum (2005) further points out that:

The discourse of meritocracy functions to marginalize certain groups of people by allowing whites to direct attention away from their own privilege and to ignore larger patterns of racial injustice. The assumption that people get ahead as a result of individual effort or merit conceals how social, economic and cultural privileges facilitate the success of some groups of people but not others. Moreover, it allows the privileged to see themselves as innocent bystanders rather than participants in a system that creates, maintains and reproduces social injustice. (p. 286)

To young Africans therefore, colonization and racism brought about major severance (that Frantz Fanon referred to as amputation) of the colonized peoples, first from themselves and then from their environment, culture, and knowledge base. Thus alienated from their languages (Wa Thiong’o, 1986), knowledge of their past, and environment (Sefa Dei, 2011a; Lebakeng, 2010), and having lost touch with their identity and humanity, devoid of liberty and freedom as human beings (Fanon, 1967), and completely oblivious of the basis of their humanity (Sefa Dei, 2011; Wane, 2007), the colonizer’s imposed ways of knowing became reified, essentialized, and taken up as the way of salvation from the supposedly “primitive” entrapment the colonized knew before the encounter. After the partitioning and subsequent
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The colonization of Africa by Europe, for instance, the West realized that the task was not just to rid the continent of its epistemological and ontological bases and cultural heritages; it was also contest the legacies of earlier Arab colonization and cultural vitiation. In his *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon (1952) depicts his view on human nature, which must not be encased or subjugated for it is human destiny to be free. The annexation of Africa, imposition of foreign rule, and cultural suppression coupled with ruthless brutality meted out on the colonized bodies, was in Fanon’s view a measure of “violence” that left significant damage on the psyche of the colonized, depriving them of their freedom and liberty. To Fanon, each of these tasks might require violence for decolonization, which is as much a “violent phenomenon” as colonization itself (p. 99).

The acculturated young Africans became persistently irrelevant to their cultural environments and would immigrate to Europe as a measure of claiming whiteness. These colonized and racialized bodies foresee freedom in claiming whiteness because whiteness can be claimed and embraced by non-White bodies. Criminalizing these migrants, restricting them, and denying them the freedom they crave is still another display of power imbalance and a reenactment of race at the disposal of the dominant social group. Therefore, the engagement of anti-racism is also about acknowledging that despite the relative salience of different identities, and the situational and contextual variations in the intensities of oppression, race privilege and White identities are real and profound (Dei, 2011). Again rupturing the ontological question of race, Sefa Dei (2011) not only affirms the reality of race but stresses its saliency. This apparently is because discourses of racial realism projects race as real not because of any biological essence but because it has material, political, emotional, symbolic, and practical consequences, a notion that is bolstered by the effects of its social
and political ramifications. Although race has featured tremendously in certain social representations, it is incapacitated without such colonial tools as repression or outright erasure of most of the heritages of the colonized—for instance, history and language. Also, tools of cultural encapsulation—which includes subversion of religion, healthcare, and processes of knowledge creation and dissemination through neo-colonial projects—are massively deployed, resulting in erasure of individual humanity of the racialized bodies. Anti-racism starts with acknowledging the self as an important entry point, for according to Dei (2011), if there is one thing that cannot be appropriated from the subject, it is the body; and with it the subject’s intellectual agency—for instance, the agency of the colonized, racialized, oppressed, and minoritized. In other words, while “embodiment” is about the particular experiencing of the body and how it is acted upon in a given socio-historical and geo-political context, the notion of embodied knowing is about coming to know, which remains a perspective that can be attained by developing an attachment or a particular connection to knowledge. To the culturally, economically, politically displaced young Africans, the knowledge of the privileges of whiteness that was etched into their medulla oblongata by the repressed trauma of colonization and neo-colonial subjugations needs a vent. The scorching heat of the Sahara and the boiling waters of the Mediterranean weighed together against the trauma of loss of one’s humanity becomes as much as child’s play as these youth remain determined to reach Europe, undeterred even by the threats of death.

Bensaad (2007) suggests that border tensions between the North and its Southern migrants (transgressors) are not about what the industrialized nations could do or continue to do. The surging labor mobility across the Sahara via the Mediterranean toward Europe, for instance, is an illustration of how the ‘inclusive-exclusive’ European hegemonic influence
creates ripples that extend to far flung territories. These territories in turns re-open new spaces for ‘maneuver’ (p. 51). It is also about strategic spaces; about the synthetic links and fluxes that the Sahara has come to symbolize. It is also about alliances migrants formed to subvert the exclusivities of the dominant enclaves. Ali Bensaad reasons that:

It is because of the Sahara, that the Maghreb and the larger Mediterranean are experiencing dynamic globalization that alters both migratory patterns and the idea of borders. This globalization is not just limited to the draw of the North and the attraction of Europe. It is at base a product of a regional dynamic, a drawing together across the Sahara of North African and sub-Saharan regions. The changes the two sides are undergoing, and which unite them, have provoked and increased the volume of traffic within the region toward the Mediterranean portal to Europe, where it joins and adds to the Euro-Maghreb traffic. (p. 51)

Bensaad’s work explores the Mediterranean divide and its reverberation in the desert regions of the Sahara with specific interest in the new migratory routes engendered, as well as the border barriers the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea constitute to Europe-bound African migrants. His narratives defy imagination, that the Sahara is re-emerging as a route of mobility for Africans, this time not to Arab slave-markets, not even involuntary as in the case of those shackled and in procession to be dispatched to Arabian lords; but voluntarily, to an ‘unsoliciting’ Europe, and on a nightmarish journey across 4000 kilometers of the world’s hottest desert. Bensaad’s views resonate with Edwards’ (2012) work that analyzes the uncertain and unenviable statuses mainland European states ascribed to the peripheral Mediterranean states of Cyprus and Malta as being of Europe and at the same time not Europe even though they were admitted into the European Club (EU). The contradiction remains that mainland Europe must incorporate these Mediterranean states as strategic ports of entry to launch out further into wider Mediterranean border expansion for an effective border securitization. Yet historically and geo-ethnically mainland Europe constructed the Mediterranean states not as European states but through the signification of Mediterranean
space. Maria Pisani, a Maltese NGO director and pro-migrant activist insists:

“Fortress Europe’ has been consistent in its attempts to prevent the ‘unwanted’ from making their way to the mainland. The Dublin II Regulation ensures that those who manage to reach the EU will remain at the periphery rather than make their way to the nations of Northern Europe – we are reminded that border crossing is not a choice available to all” (Pisani 2012, p.2).

It might not then be surprising if these countries’ admission into the European Union had a sole objective of positioning them as fronts to capture, detain, and possibly deport deviant migrants from Africa, to keep them from trooping into and asphyxiating mainland Europe. Edwards argues:

The reconstruction of European institutional collective identity remained minimal due to liminality and ambiguity of the Mediterranean journey. The one construction that did emerge as a result of the inclusion of the Mediterranean states within the European enlargement journey was spatial, for the inclusion of Malta and Cyprus was linked to a ‘Southern’ enlargement that accompanied the ‘Eastern’ enlargement of the fifth enlargement. In this way, the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta reconstituted the identity of the European project through the ongoing mastery of space, reconstructing and yet also reaffirming the civilizational identity of the project within enlargement. (p. 141)

It is not surprising that Bensaad concludes that although the Sahara has become a ‘periphery’ to Europe, a holding zone to clandestine’ flux (due in part to its impenetrable terrain) and armed repression of Arab countries; granting the resistance mounted by Maghreb authorities against this flow, the volume of migrant traffic headed to the fortified borders of Europe (Fortress Europe) “do not always get that far” (p. 52; see also Zontini, 2008). Bensaad’s style of writing merely posits globalization as a normative socio-political event insinuating changes in the beckoning arid soils of underdeveloped world. He fails to see through the spectacles of Arrighi (1994), Amy Chua (2003), Klein (2007), Adepoju (1993), Sassen (1988), and Akanle (2014), that globalization is in fact a continuum, and a mutated
façade of colonization and the global systems of capital expansion. Bensaad’s (2007) work, however, challenges Gebrewold’s (2007) contribution to discourses on migration and foreign policy imperatives. While Bensaad’s work depicts foreign policies and cross-border migration as transnational spaces within which global migration stakeholders (sending nations, migrant individuals, and receiving nations) must interact to tease out the way forward, Gebrewold (2007) tersely imposes the continent of Europe on Africa. It is about what the EU said or does – the post-9/11 security fears in Europe – and its implications for the recalcitrant Africa. Citing a series of terrorist attacks in and outside European countries as an example of need for urgent EU security measures, Gebrewold, like many pro-West writers, sees the African continent not as an equal player in global policy decisions but as a receiver of the Masters’ orders. Adepoju (2008b) thinks otherwise. He argues for bilateral consensus between the sending and destination countries as a way to effectively monitor and coordinate the smooth transition of migrant persons across transnational borders. While stressing the need for coordinated and coherent migration policy management in the West African sub-region, Adepoju insists that “migration cannot be managed effectively through unilateral action: many states are simultaneously origin, transit and destination countries for various types of migration. Hence, bilateral relations should be forged between the departure and receiving countries within and outside the sub-region” (p. 43).

The 9/11 attacks in the US, and the London and Madrid bombings were mentioned but nothing was said about prior attacks in Kenya or elsewhere in Indonesia; never in anticipation of the Mumbai attacks. If these terrorist attacks as purported in Gebrewold’s (2007) work trigger amber alerts in the EU security watch, how do we reconcile that with the EU efforts to curtail migrant flows from Africa? Do African nations share equal powers to
put a hold on European natural resource exploitations in Africa? How do we respond to terrorist attacks in Europe or elsewhere in the world (for instance, the recent attack at Norway and the Oklahoma bombing) involving person(s) of European extraction? The author fails to recognize that home-grown terrorism could result from poor domestic policies and praxis – what a nation does or fails to do rather than being – the coarse contribution of unsolicited immigrants and more specifically those of African descent. From the colonizers’ lenses, Gebrewold sees a political paradigm shift in EU policies on Africa and other developing world (see Suli, 2014; Council of Europe, 2010). The question remains whether African countries’ policies would ever influence European migration into the continent. By positioning African continent as crisis-ridden to justify forced migration in some African countries, Gebrewold overlooks the various upheavals perpetuated by the Western interests in developing economies (Baxter, 2008; Simms, 2009; Klein, 2007; Chomsky, 2006) and its resultant migration in various parts of the world: Africa, South America; Eastern Europe, Middle East, and some Asian countries. The writer situates Europe in a most delusional messianic posture, which shares spotless human right traditions and values that must act to save a deplorably beggarly and crisis-bedeved Africa:

Could the various forms of African crises be an opportunity for the Europeans to reaffirm their European identity and their traditions of human rights values by helping the Africans, especially the African migrants who stand in front of their doors? Are there any shared European norms to address this problem? How could the African problems be solved, and by whom? (Gebrewold, 2007, p. 11)

It is therefore the view of my thesis that the Sahara Desert and the immigrant-repressing armed Maghreb states have been constituted into the European Union’s border-by-proxy; a traffic-controlled strategic space that has been surreptitiously engaged by globalization syndicates in the West to screen off the unwanted migrants while producing safe passage for
the master’s-choice labor, goods, services, and capital across these borders. The Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea might as well have been constructed as the D-day (victory defining day) battle-ground for the resisting migrant subjects who, by engaging the formidable Fortress Europe, are compelled to make a daring decision between life and death.

**Conclusion**

The movement of persons and resources from the Southern hemisphere to the industrialized North, the command centers of global capitalism, continues to induce energies of which the resultant impact is millions of displaced politico-economic migrants. The migrants so generated flow backwards to the center of the ripple, from South this time to the North. The import of this understanding to this work is not so much the connection between globalization and migration as the highlight of the link between the criminalization of migrants by the receiving states and the tough border crossing restrictions they must undergo, especially in Europe. Apparently, the beginning of the 21st century saw less and less emphasis on free migration, but sovereign entities in the comity of nations (specifically the dominant industrialized North) strive, albeit very hard, to streamline who comes into their territories and who doesn’t. Name-calling and the act of mislabeling transnational migrants by the receiving societies using mass media are noted ways of creating biases that would engender restrictive government policies against immigrants, particularly when the economic and fiscal conditions of the receiving states are unfavorable. It is no different for African youth migrating into Europe. Most of my interview participants in Malta were conversant and had resolved to live with such racist tags as Clandestine, boat-people, illegal, and Iswed (Black). The securitization of international borders also brings about the criminalization of irregular migrants, which further complicates their mobility as this category of migrants travel under a menace of being killed, repatriated, or detained. The border surveillance and
restrictive strategy that expand EU borders beyond its territories into the imagined African land and water territories aim to regularly intercept migrants from their domestic environments of origin. This regulatory imposition of hegemonic control is an archetype of the ongoing neo-colonial power display in the relationship between the industrialized North and developing South. The disequilibria of power in the context of transnational border relations is delicately embedded in the system to evade investigation, but it is a reality.

Transnational borders have the tendency to reproduce hegemony, dominance, and privilege because such spaces also come with particular histories and readings. Therefore, the experiences of the racialized bodies of African youth in European borders cannot be fully grasped in discourses of splits binaries of regular or irregular, legal and illegal migrants, because we are not unaware of the maxim that occupying certain spaces comes with meanings and politics. Sustenance of power-imbalance at the transnational borders implies that European youth traveling to Africa and other developing nations do not experience the enormity of border-restrictions and racialization meted out to Africans, which makes it logical to reason that Whiteness is a pigmentary passport of privilege at transnational borders. The struggle to take up Whiteness and its accompanying privileges has proven tragic to Nigerian and by extension, African youth migrants emigrating for improved living conditions in industrialized world. Thus at the spaces of border representation, whiteness means a nothing outside the tropes of neo-colonial oppression.
Chapter Seven
Discussion

The first part of this chapter is the continuation of my data analysis that engages the voices of my field informants. The second section of the chapter analyzes youth migrants’ experiences using discursive framework fore-grounded in the tripartite intersection of anti-colonial theory, Indigenous worldviews, and antiracist theory. The multiplicity of the thoughts in the chapter accentuates the complex, competing, and layered perspectives for reflecting on the current African youth’s transnational migration into Europe. These perspectives open up possibilities for both the deconstruction and interrogation of the dominant assumptions and teleological views on the 21st century youth transnational migration currently ongoing between Africa and Europe.

Part One

Neo-colonial Strangleholds and African Youth Struggles for Life

The dominant, colonialist posture constitutes and has continued to perpetuate the notion of the developing South as a supplier of raw materials and human resources rather than as an equal player in the global politico-economic arena. It becomes necessary to anchor my thesis on Indigenous anti-racist and anti-colonial thoughts because the African continent has been a victim of the triple tragedy of Arabic, Western, and currently Asian/Indo-Chinese colonization. Each of these hegemonic and subjugating experiences share a common goal: disrupting, distorting, and repressing the cultural heritages of Africa while vehemently denying her rich historiography as a pre-contact civilized continent. I added Asian colonization because it is subtle and ongoing in many naturally endowed African countries. I am arguing that the objective of resource exploitation symbolized in
Indian and Chinese Foreign Direct Investments in many African countries is another phase of imposition of hegemonic control. It is not happening between dynamically equal partners, but the investors share the upper bargaining and negotiating power, and gradually we are seeing cultural penetration in large and rich African countries such as Nigeria and Kenya. Chinese languages and cultures are being manipulated into school curriculums. Do we have a replication of this practice in China (is any of the 450 Nigerian languages introduced into Chinese curricula in China) for the benefit of Nigerians living there? Recently a Chinese restaurant in Kenya drew the ire of the natives by displaying a notice that read, “No Blacks,” If this is happening on African soil in the 21st century; it is not difficult to understand why the local jobs and available resources have been high-jacked by foreign investors and their citizens. Meanwhile, the Indigenous youth are socio-culturally and economically displaced. The imposition of Arabic and Western cultures perpetuated through the colonization of knowledge, language, and medicine aim to obliterate the Indigenous heritages of the people (Wane, 2000; Willinsky, 1998; Wane, 2011). Therefore, the colonialists’ denial of African people’s philosophical and epistemological contributions to human civilization as justification for their hegemonic imposition and persistent disruptions of the colonized people’s worldviews also creates more of an identity and socio-cultural dilemma in young Africans who imbibed Arabic and Western education. They are neither equipped to be relevant in their local environments nor possess the biological necessities to fit snugly into the colonizers’ roles. This ambivalence was captured in Franz Fanon’s (1952) *Black Skin, White Mask* in which Fanon painted images of African men and women (who, having lost their humanities to colonization) struggle in vain to mimic Western identities and culture as a way of being acceptable to the colonizers. This theoretical perspective provides a related but
peculiar claim to strategies for dislodging dominant oppressive systems (colonial projects) that has consistently turned contemporary African youth into tools and stooges for boosting the colonizers’ economic interests. It is disquieting to me that veteran scholars and social scientist have continued to use the term ‘post’, in reference to colonization; suggesting that it was a thing of the past. Obviously the dominant logic would be that colonization era started and ended with the Arabian and Western militarized occupation of foreign territories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for economic and political gains. As plausible as this posture of reasoning might appear, ignoring such palpable transitions of colonization from militarized invasion into subtle and insidious economic and political mazes of: globalization, democracy and free market systems, the structural adjustment policies, imposition of military bases, positioning of certain currencies as globally acceptable unit of exchange, formation of regional economic and political unions, manipulation of global wealth to create artificial recessions; and the use of foreign aids to insinuate unrest and social displacement in developing countries will definitely hurt developing economies more than the actual use of force perpetuated by the dominant social groups in the incipience of the colonization process. This is likely the case because the milder the label, the more deadly the poison. Much so because the gamut of politico-economic maneuvers were aimed at, and has succeeded in polarizing the world into: capable, industrialized North; and the vulnerable undeveloped South. My thesis therefore projects colonization as a continually mutating virus whose primary goal is to permeate, take up and transform the DNA of its host into its DNA and subsequently replicating its cells as opposed to those of the vector it inhabits. Youth are estranged from their culture in the countries of origin by the ongoing neo-colonial projects embedded in education and cultural encapsulation, prompting them to migrate (York, 2001;
Wane, 2007). On arrival in the receiving societies the migrant youth are criminalized, racialized, and segregated against. This trend is more envisage among African youth migrants in Europe. It is even more pathetic to observe that on arrival in the colonizers’ societies the oppressed and subjugated youth who are transformed into global migrant subjects are again under-valorized, under-rated and partitioned into binary opposites of admissible and inadmissible, rejected and accepted migrant bodies.

**Refugee/Asylum—Crisis of Identity in Youth Migration: Does the Airlifting of Somali Migrant Youth from Malta to the United States of America Pose a Paradox?**

The reoccurring question from most of my West African respondents throughout the recently concluded data collection on the research capturing the lived experiences of Nigerian youth migrants in the Island Republic of Malta is, “Why are we subjected to criminal treatments of one year and six months detention in an atmosphere worse than the world’s notorious prisons, after which we are given no papers while other youth migrants from East African countries like Somalia are accommodated, documented, paid allowances, and even airlifted to the United States?” In fact, as more and more boats arrived at the shores of Lampedusa, Italy and the Island of Malta, loaded to the brim with young African migrants, many of them were observed to be of East and West African descent. More than 58 percent of the young adults who arrived in boats at recent times were of Somali descent. Many of them confirmed that the UNHCR and IOM airlift them thence to the Americas, specifically, the United States. Migrant youth of other African nationalities are not as lucky. They have to face the dire consequences of their “illegal migration.” This is inferred from the account below from a Sower, a participant in one of the focus group meetings:

Listen, we came to Malta as refugees. They said they rescued us, but they locked us up in detention almost a year and half before we regained our freedom. We were then like prisoners regaining freedom after years of incarceration. They kept us in the make-shift tents like animals in the tarpaulin which soldiers are using in the bush and
jungle; you know what I am talking about. It was a struggle – when it was cold, we were freezing and - when it was hot, we were baking. We voiced out our detestations but no one would forward them to the appropriate authorities, so what should we do? We were there just like prisoners; we couldn’t leave the Island and travel to Italy. We made our living by ourselves. No one gave us anything to eat, nothing! No residence permit and they claimed that we are refugees, and we are here as rejected refugees.

Nobel, another focus group meeting participant, added:

After all, we don’t have any other way of surviving. So when our boat arrived in Malta the authorities, kept us in the camp for one year and six months, but it is not just for one year but one year and six months like prisoners sentenced to jail with hard labor. We were living in makeshift tents, in both winter and summer, in a tent and they gave us food. They left you with no choice – if you like, you eat and if you don’t like - that is your problem. So all this happened. At times, the cops would be insulting you and cursing you and verbally abusing you with all kinds of untoward remarks. When the chief officer came and you tried to lodge any complaint they would not listen to you. This was made worse by the fact that they would not even allow people to visit us so that we could channel our vexations through them to the authorities.

Migrant youth from West Africa were detained for a comparatively longer period (one year, six months) in extremely unhealthy prison-like environments. Even when released into the “Open Center,” most respondents who did not fall under the category “granted refugee” or “asylum” statuses were from West Africa. Their applications for asylum or refugee protection statuses are often rejected. They are often called “Rejected” and face deportation threats or are given options to appeal their rejection. Those whose appeals are turned down, are left with no further option but to await deportation. They are given little opportunity to survive as they are undocumented. This category of youth migrants live in Malta on temporary documents that may allow them to move around in the country, but such documents hardly allow them to secure work permits. To survive, this group of youth are subjected to slave-like labor conditions in which they do all kinds of odd jobs in construction companies and their wages are exploited more often because they have no legal status to contact the law enforcement. Many a time, their work environments lack the necessary
protective gears leading often to undocumented, and therefore uncompensated, work related injuries and sometimes death, as a participant, Idon testified:

When something happens to us in our work places...there is a name they call us. They refer to us as Boat people, or Clandestine. So when something happens, and mainly when it happens regarding a Clandestine, like I said, they don’t take it to be...it’s like you are nobody, like you are a minus, not important or something like that. For instance, there was this young man from Nigeria who went to...this happened not quite long ago, it happened recently. He was having eye problems. He went to the hospital and they booked an appointment for him. Then he went again for the appointment and lost his sight. The story I am going to tell you led to his death. So when he went for sight-recovery surgery, the operation was supposed to be for the eyes. So from there they say it led to his brain and from his brain it led to his heart...and they continued operating in all these areas of his body. They were carrying out surgery on him...remember it was supposed to be on the eye, I don’t know, that is what I am saying it was supposed to be in the eye. So after then they end up killing this guy. It is like they used him as a study object...to practice on him. So that is how they killed this guy and the government did not do anything about it and the story just died.

Most of the migrant youth who fall into the category of the rejected often question why they are not provided with documents to enable them secure better jobs in better labor spaces. Although these youth are desirous of such opportunities to make positive contributions to the host country’s economy, they are discriminated against, disparaged and not given the relevant legal backings to fulfill this goal. It implies that African youth migrants are covertly invisibilized and indirectly rejected in the host society. Many of these undocumented African migrants who have been denied asylum and refugee statuses also face all kinds of work-related exploitation and verbal abuse such as being labeled and facing discrimination in public spaces. Where they manage to secure odd jobs they face wage discriminations of the basest sort; they are not paid equally with their documented peers Obe, one of the participants, clarified:

But here in Malta, they also still don’t offer us opportunities we look for. It is only sometimes, most of the menial labor which the Malta citizens will not even go for, that they will try to push us into as Black people. It ought not to be so, yet even when
we accept to do these odd jobs as hard-working people who are determined to survive they shortchange our wages.

The youth are subjected to performing the most tedious tasks such as heavy lifting, cleaning of chemicals or hazardous work sites, with no medical insurance, and they receive peanuts in compensation compared to their documented colleagues or migrants from other European or Asian nations. Some of the West African youth interviewed continued to reflect on their responses that apparently they are paying heavily for the welfare that their East African brothers enjoy. They often wonder if the air-lifting of Somali migrant youth to North America is a subtle way to deal with recalcitrant pirate activities perpetuated notably by the Somali youth off their country’s coast at the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, noting that simultaneously, the incidence of such disturbances to Europe-bound ships has dropped stopped.

Is Globalization an Insidious Tool for the Re-enslavement of African Youth Through Migration?

In his recent allusion to history of slave trade up until the 19th century, the speaker of the parliament of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, draws a connection between the present mass emigration of African youth to Europe and the Trans-Atlantic slavery. He regrets: “It is sad that while the Transatlantic slave trade saw Africans chained and forcefully taken to foreign lands, the harsh economic realities at home today (and I would add, political insecurities and mismanagement of resources), force our people to embark on suicidal journeys into Europe and other parts of the world. This is very scandalous. We must initiate urgent and concerted efforts to end the suicidal voyages” (Ekwermadu, 2015). Globalization, an emblem of a thriving neo-colonial project, is a continuum in the world’s changing economic order. Sociologists have argued that globalization is actually a part of a historical process of capitalist expansion and restructuring
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whose origin could be traced to around the 15th century Europe (Arrighi, 1994; Appadurai, 1996). Relevant to this thesis is the startling exposé that although globalization, as a concept, started making waves in the socio-economic and political spaces in the 1990s, the world had undergone four “systemic cycles of accumulation” that led up to globalization, within each of which a major Western power (European nations and lastly USA) dominated world social, political, and economic space, mainly through the use of military force (Arrighi, 1994 p.39; Global Economic Justice Report, 2003). The span of colonialism and all its attendant structures and policies (including those on knowledge production and dissemination) which today are generally referred to as conventional education, flows from the various eras of the Euro-American cycle of capitalist accumulation. All the structures put in place by the dominant state and their capitalist stakeholders in each era are meant to guarantee the highest maximum benefit first to the empire state and then to their invested interests in the colonized regions of the world. One of the characteristics of each cycle of accumulation as a form of colonial experience is that following military conquest aimed at territorial and subsequently material expansion, the dominant state demonizes, debunks, and under-values the political, socio-cultural, and economic structures and practices of the conquered territories (Allen, 2008; Moses, 2006); the state’s purpose is to legitimize its violation of the sovereignty of states established in the Westphalia treaty (Arrighi, 1994) and be in a position to establish a system that will eventually be useful for perpetuating its dominance. The connection of this process to African youth migration is compellingly accentuated in Cetti (2012). The massive transfer of power and resources from the Southern hemisphere to the industrialized North, the ‘command centers of global capitalism’ (p. 10), continues to induce quakes and their resultant tsunami of millions of economic migrants. Relevant to this study is not so much the
connection Cetti’s made between globalization and displacement and subsequent migration, as the highlight of the link between the criminalization of migrants by the receiving states (see also Ndiaye & Robin, 2012; Uccellini, 2012), and the tough border crossing restrictions they must undergo, especially in Europe. These EU countries visibly are morally impelled to accommodate refugees and asylum seekers (Moses, 2006). Drawing from Sassen’s (2003) emphasis on “alternative circuits of survival,” we have a clear depiction of the enormity of the displacement of citizens from their familiar societies that results from globalization and how the indigent folks—specifically African youth—are further driven to the margins to migrate through alternative means for the sake of a better life. As hinted in Nwalutu (2014), citizens of the North or those with privileged national identities move globally with no restrictions, but migrants from developing economies, due to the limits imposed on them by transnational border securitization, do often resort to more hazardous and dangerous irregular migration. The securitization of international borders also brings about the criminalization of irregular migrants, which further complicates their mobility as this category of migrants travels under a menace of being killed, repatriated, or detained.

The border surveillance and restrictive strategy that expands EU borders beyond its territories into the imagined African land and water territories aims to regularly intercept migrants from their domestic environments of origin. This regulatory imposition of hegemonic control is an archetype of the ongoing neo-colonial power display in the relationship between the industrialized North and developing South. The disequilibrium of power in the context of transnational border relations is delicately embedded in the system to evade investigation, but it is a reality, especially when subordinate migrant bodies attempt to
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cross trans-national borders. EU countries could and have negotiated their ways into patrolling the territorial waters of Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal in order to intercept and turn back migrant boats conveying African youth to Europe (Frenzen, 2014). No proportional measure has been endorsed by Europe to help African nations to intercept most of their corrupt leaders who looted government coffers and escaped as fugitives into Europe and other developed countries. It is necessary to draw the connection between the migrant youth fleeing their countries and tyrants who siphoned their countries’ wealth to the industrialized North because when we consider the push factors driving youth migration, the weak domestic economic system arising from mismanagement comes to mind (Solimano, 2010, Mueller, 2009; Dei, 2012). In fact, Mueller’s (2009) work contains a comparative review of leadership processes as they influence economic development in Nigeria and Switzerland. Mueller argues, albeit tactlessly, that “political institutions can foster economic growth or hinder it. In Nigeria, they have hindered it. When the world price of oil has been high, Nigeria’s politicians have either channeled oil revenues into their own bank accounts or wasted them on luxury government cars, helicopters, and other perks of office” (p. 10). The depiction in Mueller’s work is as sincerely accurate as it is ironically deceptive, which accounts for my provocative reference to his word as insensitive. It has always been the case that when the dominant West and other colonizers represent the Southern economies as poor, corrupt, or lacking prospects, they do not see how their foreign policies toward Southern nations have resulted in cultural, socio-political, and economic mayhem. Following his reputed work on global warming and wealth of nations, Simms (2009) reasons:

In 2002, Nigeria was producing around 2 million barrels of oil a day. Crude oil accounted for 80 percent of government revenue and 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The approximate $11 billion earnings from oil sales, shared equally, would give each Nigerian about 27 cents a day. But Nigeria racked up financial debts of $5.6
billion at market rates under its military dictators. Just servicing its debts in 1999 and 2000 cost Nigeria $1.4 billion each year. Several mainstream (European, addition mine) banks including Barclays, HSBC, and Merill Lynch were censored by city regulators for flouting anti-money laundering rules in relation to accounts linked to Nigerian dictator General Abacha. He stole an estimated $4 billion dollars from his country.” (p. 102)

Unfortunately, most of Nigerian fugitive politicians alive or dead have been noted to have stashed away the nation’s wealth into their Swiss, British, American, some Arabian gulf states, and French accounts (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000), and I am yet to see where Mueller’s work mentioned the complicit role of his beloved country, Switzerland, in milking a developing nation dry while depicting why Nigeria is poor and Switzerland rich. For as much as my thesis resolutely condemns the voluptuous, avaricious, and unpatriotic cravings of African leaders and their lack of vision, I also believe that if the colonizers are not as corrupt as the images they paint of developing nations, countries like Switzerland, Britain, France, and the USA will not only repatriate to Nigeria (and by extension most African countries) all the stolen funds in their banks but will also help to arrest and bring these embezzlers to justice. However, as a general axiom goes, there is no morality in international relations, so subversion of a nation’s sovereignty and autonomy happens when the national interests of the powerful nations are imposed on the least strong, notwithstanding the human and material costs. African migrants to Europe face ample challenges both in transit and in their host societies. Boswell (2003) notes that even in Western Europe, domestic and international human rights provisions are violated when anti-immigrant politicians and authorities are dealing with immigrants. She reasons that:

Right-wing populist parties in Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and France have paid little heed to international or domestic human rights provisions, to the concerns of ethnic minority groups or to the requirements of EU cooperation. At least while such parties remain in opposition, they are relatively free to advance agendas which do not conform to domestic and international liberal and human rights standards. (p. 4)
It is important to mention that the EU’s extended border surveillance strategy has resulted in the mass killing of migrant youth from sub-Saharan African countries who were making their ways through North African countries to Europe (Berriane & de Haas, 2012; Toasije, 2009; Baxter, 2008; Brachet, 2012). And that most of these hapless young migrants were gunned down within African territories goes to depict how far Europe and other colonizing powers of the world could and have gone to violate the same international human rights, maritime and refugee laws they claim to champion. In his work describing how Europe’s racialization of African migrants in Spain results in violent border push-backs and killing of innumerable migrants, Toasije (2009) narrates:

One only has to see that there has been little scandal in the Spanish press after the declarations of the Minister of International Affairs of Morocco, Taieb Fassi Fihri, who announced to the media that the Spanish King Juan Carlos I called the Moroccan counterpart Mohamed VI, three times in the same day to ask for help with the entrance of Africans in Ceuta and Melilla in October 2005 (El Pais, 2005). As a consequence, the Moroccan government, bending under the pressure, sent to the Saharan desert hundreds of African citizens, an unknown number of whom died of starvation and the government reinforced the military presence in the borders, killing dozens of people by shooting them as they tried to climb over the walls. (p. 350)

This type of atrocious massacre could have been deemed genocide with perpetrators summoned to the International Court of Justice at Hague if it wasn’t carried out in defense of Fortress Europe. The aggressive and tactical moves that care the least about what drives young migrants to engage in their precarious journey, share the basic and overriding focus of securing Europe from the influx of invading Africans.

Part Two: Discussion

Involuntary Coupling as Alternative to Detention and Eventual Deportation: Children Without any State

The incidents surrounding the birth and nationalities of offspring of Nigerian youth migrants in Malta casts an ominous pall over Malta’s claim of equity and fair treatment to
African immigrants. It thus creates a new trajectory for understanding the complicit roles of the Maltese (and therefore EU) border-authorities at the making of ‘stateless children,’ that is, children born to migrant couples. The duplicity of Maltese authorities in this work termed coupling the youth, or at best, marriage under duress, as a bait to release the youth from detention centres might have been informed by one major reason: to keep them from initiating further moves into mainland Europe. Of course, the chances of marrying a Maltese after release from detention would also be foreclosed and deportation would be easy at the right time. The construction of difference in the voyeuristic gaze on infants born without a state chronicles the epic of societal and constitutional failures to provide for those created and systematically constructed as the marginal others. Besides being pressured into licentious lifestyles as a way of ensuring they spend their hard-earned money in Malta, Nigerian youth migrants offer rare insight into the trauma of having been positioned to choose between two life-changing ordeals. The testimony of Jide confirms these offensive anomalies in a country deemed to have and respect human rights:

Because of the insecurities, killings, and maiming of Islamic militants in Libya and the imposed No Fly Zone during the uprising that ousted Colonel Gadafi, one did not know how to fly back to Nigeria, the only way for me to escape the war was to join people escaping to Europe. So I came over here. The authorities manning the detention gave us options, which included serving one year and six months in detention; and I have never been in jail. I have never tasted anything like jail; it was very horrible for me. Another option was to get a girl-friend, and as a couple, that is, wife and husband, have a baby. I met a lady from Nigeria, we came together from Nigeria on the same boat and as the authorities were trying to generate more difficulties for us, we felt helpless. We had to choose to either have a baby (or babies) and be freed from detention or serve one year and six months. They told us to have babies and I can say this anywhere or any time. They said, you impregnate your wife and you have a baby or you serve all your one year six months. These are the options, “If your wife is pregnant, then you will be free, you understand.” And also after serving one year and six months, deportation may come to you eventually. So have it in your mind, they can deport you at any time after serving one year and six months. So it was either you impregnate your wife or you serve one year and six months and you don’t know what will happen…Yes, even the children born here in
Malta on their birth certificates, the Maltese write ‘No Country.’ They don’t belong to any country, you know. The racist disposition of ordinary citizens of Malta to the immigrants makes it more and more annoying, believe you me. When you are working with them they are angry. They are angry, saying, “You are taking their money to your country.” They will be telling you to go back to your country. They will say things like, “We don’t need you here,” bla, bla, bla, you Iswed.

The choices Nigerian youth migrants made were between serving 18 months in detention environment they described as a “worse-than-jail” experience, or bow to involuntary coupling and impregnation of fellow migrant female detainees (so that on confirmation of the pregnant condition of the female youth, the couple regains freedom and is transferred to live at the open detention facilities). If subjectification of babies of migrant individuals constitutes the matrix for reflecting on the differences constructed at transnational borders; it entrenches inequalities symbolized in nationality, ethnicity, race, gender, class, religion, family and sexuality (Constable, 2014), then they also are focal lenses for viewing the socio-political dynamics of transnational border spaces and their intrinsic power imbalances as Kam offered some insights:

…We found ourselves in Malta at last, and the Maltese border authorities prescribed had jail terms for us to serve. They called it detention. But this is not detention. It is jail, it is a prison experience. We were there, and many people who served a year and a half were after deported to their home countries. When their detention period ended some people were observed to have become depressed, and many became outright crazy or mad as they couldn’t shoulder the rough experiences of suffering in the detention centre. When they develop mental health issues from detention after the one year six months, they take them to Mount Camel (Malta Psychiatric Hospital). You can’t stay there. You let me ask you a question, can you stay at a place for one year six months? What would it look like? Some people entered there and came out with mental illness. I can point you to some of them in the streets of Malta. See, they are here...I don’t know how to speak English because I am not educated. I come from a poor family. I struggled to eat, travel by land, travel by sea to make my day bright, but now I am in Malta, and I live in Malta with my wife, with my two children. But the problem I have now is that Malta declined our application for refugee status. They gave me Rejected, they gave my wife Rejected, and they gave my children born in their land Rejected. All we are asking the government is freedom, papers to move
around, but nobody seems to be listening.

Questions to interrogate these inequities are: do babies of the privileged citizens of the West who migrated to the developing countries for any reason get caught up in the derisive quagmire of statelessness as is the case with those born in the industrialized world whose parents are migrants from developing economies? Do offspring of migrants of ethnic nationalities other than Africans face similar denial of citizenship and ascription of statelessness in Malta? To further clarify the complex and confusing entrapment in which children born to Nigerian immigrants in Malta became stateless citizens, it will be necessary to explore the provisions of Nigerian constitution and that of the Island Republic of Malta.

**Citizenship According to Nigerian and Maltese Constitutions**

According to Section 25, subsection 32 of the 1999 amended constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a child is automatically a citizen of Nigeria if he is born in Nigeria before or after the country’s independence (October 1, 1960), and/or whose parents or grandparents belonged to a community Indigenous to Nigeria. Any child who was born outside Nigeria becomes a Nigerian automatically if both or either of the parents is a Nigerian. In like manner, the constitution of the Republic of Malta under the Malta independence constitution of 1964 (as amended by Acts 10 of 2014), Chapter 3; or Chapter 188 of the Maltese Citizenship Act CAP.188 of September 1964 – every person born in Malta before or after independence becomes a citizen if either of his parents “became or would for his death have become a citizen of Malta.” The cited provisions of Nigerian and Maltese constitution are explicit about citizenship by birth in both countries. However the Maltese immigration officers do not see fit to ascribe any nationality to children born to Nigerian migrants. “Even after having children,” says Ana, one of the interviewees “there are no documents for my children that were born here, neither do I have residence or work
documents. My husband and I have been here for six years with the kids.” By the provision of Nigerian constitution, children born overseas to Nigerian parent(s) automatically become Nigerians at birth, but the Maltese border and detention authorities inscribe on their certificates of birth, “Unknown Nationality,” even at the protestation of parents that their children are Nigerians. These things happen even when the parents are legally working in Malta as this couple, as Nkem explained:

I’ve been here for 20 years. I was expecting to be part of them as I told you earlier on; I have my husband, my kids (interviewee E). Yes, my children were born here. But they were denied Maltese citizenship. They said they are “Children of unknown country,” so that is what they told us when they gave us certificates. On their birth certificate it was written “Unknown,” which means they neither belong to Nigeria nor Malta, until when we queried them they said, “OK, if you like they can be called Nigerian citizens but not Maltese citizens until they stay here for 18 years.” So those are the limitations.

Racism and Name Calling (Labeling): Shaping Policies Through Negative Representation of the Unwanted Other

It has been proven that three major socio-political factors have consistently shaped domestic policies on migration (Deaux, 2006), the leading factor being the social representation which significantly influences domestic policies on migration. But demography is also a factor in the equation. The three elements have continued to shape the trends and flow of contemporary migration and experiential realities of the migrant individuals. For instance, Deaux (2006) believes that the United States government policies on immigration, the demographic realities of the country, and the intangible factor of social representation are interlocking to produce specific experiences of migrants in the United States. Social representations in this respect are the articulation of attitudes and images that a community holds about immigration in general, as well as about a particular group of migrants. African transnational migrant youth are facing enormous pressure both on transit and in the societies they have made their homes abroad as a result of the unfriendly policies
authorities of their host countries have continued to put into place. These obnoxious immigration policies were informed by the attitudes, images, and miscommunications sponsored by the media and held against them by the host societies. The story is not different in Malta and by extension the entire European Union. Immigrants are generally not favored by the attitudes and disposition of most citizens of the receiving states; and worst still, during economic downturns (recession) when racism and dints of nationalism combine with angst of economic woes to construct immigrants as economic burdens or leeches and a possible drain on the resources available to the citizens (Ki-moon, 2009). The unfortunate paradox in this narrative is that once a label is created around immigrants of a particular race or ethnic group, it matters little how they entered into the receiving state. Everyone identifiable within the gamut of the superscription becomes automatically enmeshed in the gauze of the negative representation. For instance, every youth of African descent in Malta, irrespective of their status as students, diplomats, international service personnel, or naturalized citizens, is labeled Iswed (Black), boat-people, illegal migrants etc., until any of them proves otherwise. One of the interviewees, Oti, who has resided in Malta for 20 years and who completed her studies from the University of Malta, recalled:

Exactly, I was one of the Nigerian migrant youth in Malta that came by flight. I was very fortunate, actually. On the border crossing, to be honest, when I met some Maltese colleagues, some of them would ask me: “How did you come to Malta?” Do you have an airport in your country?” I would say, “No, we fly like monkeys from tree to tree.” They would ask, “How then did you land in Malta?” And I would reply that we have big fields and trees that extend to Malta. Oh my God! I was very young when I came here. The Maltese perception of immigrants of African descent is very bad because if they see you in the street of Malta they would assume you are rescued from the sea.

In fact, evidence from other interviewees suggests that the label ascribed to them by society also influences (except in a few instances) their accessibility to social determinants of health
and their subsequent rating in the labor market in terms of wage differentials between them and the other third citizens in Malta. The negative social construction of race in the case of Nigerian youth migrant workers significantly impacts their positionality as well as the consequent remuneration of their work in the labor market as evidenced by the following two Nigerian migrant workers. The first, Titi, clarified:

A lot of people are fed up with this country. They are all crying for documents so they can leave this country because here there is a lot of racism. Even when you walk on the streets, they mock you and laugh at you. When you work with them they treat you like an animal; even the way they treat and wages they pay to immigrants of other nationalities is different. They pay us less because we’re Black. Even where I work they pay us €5.56 per hour as care workers, and I got my certification from England and everything, but because I’m Black they will not pay me the same wage as other nationals [who work] as care workers due to my skin color. They pay me about €3.50 Euros an hour, which is unfair. Others receive five euros and above in the same job, and to be a care worker for the elderly is not an easy job. I have no choice; I have to be patient and endure everything at least for now. It is difficult but all I am saying is that the authorities should do something to change this misperception because the Blacks here are really suffering.

In support of the claims of race-induced maltreatment of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta Andy reasoned:

Alright! I observed that in Malta Nigerian youth are bedevilled by what I call “suffering and smiling.” Let me explain, it is in Malta for the first time that I realized that you are not liked by everybody. Although most Maltese will pretend to be friendly, I see many of them as hypocrites. They will talk good things in your presence, and will talk bad about you in your absence. So why did I say this? There is a lot of racism in this place. Instead of calling you your name, they will call you “Iswed”; then they will call you Blackman, some will call you monkey. They will call you all kinds of things...Iswed means Blackman, but all these things I believe, have been on-going through ages of history, encounters, and experience. They did not start today. In my work environment for example, my manager always tells me that he is keeping me because he gets me cheaper, they are paying you less. You know you can never be paid the same thing as the citizens, and it’s not how it is supposed to be. It is not good but there is nothing we can do.

Comparing the two testimonies above from Nigerian youth migrants with that of a Filipino youth migrant worker, the positive social construction of race also affected the value
placed on his labor, which directly and positively influenced the remuneration of his labor.

Alan, a young male Filipino migrant, reflected:

The government is treating me well. I am earning a wage similar to others from here. I have an agency and we (work under the agency. Thus the citizens treat me well. Although they are not so close to me as such, they are friendly or so I think; I have been here only four years. I have not made any friends here because I have my relatives here. If my aunty were not here, I would not have come. I came to hear about Malta for the first time through my aunty. I never knew that there was a country called Malta before now. Given all my experiences so far, I think it was worth it coming here because I have not had very bad experiences.

In other words, the socio-economic experiences of youth migrants are determined by the attitude of citizens toward them that in itself is a function of the socio-economic policies based on race and social representation. Denigration of Africans by people of other ethnic groups is either an effect of natural hatred and rancor informed by jealousy of their capability to survive at all odds, or abhorrence informed by the long-term impact of the dual tragedies of Arab and European slavery and colonization of the peoples of the continent. Notwithstanding the various explanations offered by scholars like Fanon (1962), Lebakeng (2010), and Sefa Dei (2010), I wish to go by the former explanation. Africans thrive physically, culturally, economically, and physiologically despite the unconscionable and uncountable assaults they have suffered from dominant marauders at various stages of their development.

I would intersperse a personal experience to accentuate my view that the racial attitude toward peoples of African descent, and more specifically African immigrants, is entirely based either on blunt and arrant ignorance or on the pathological racist inclinations of the perpetrators. In one of the best universities in North America, in 2008, a female professor who claimed that she was teaching inclusive education decided to make the only African born male student in the class of about 65 students bow his head in shame. She told
the class a story about her little nephew’s first encounter with a Black man who had just arrived in town and paid her family a visit. She narrated how the baby screamed uncontrollably and almost lapsed into convulsions because of the encounter. Yes, she succeeded, as I was utterly humbled. However, I was not ashamed then, as now, of whom I am, my identity, or my humanity. For the involuntary angst of being put on the spot, I did not tell them that a similar incident happened way back in the ancient egalitarian society of Eastern Nigeria. The first White missionary who arrived in a particular town was mistaken for a sacrilegious leprous being. The villagers believed he was an omen of disaster and identified his bicycle as another evil conveyor that enabled him to enter anywhere he pleased. They quickly attacked him and hung his bicycle on a tree; the latter action actually gave them up to the search team conducted by the armed British infantry. The village was attacked and almost destroyed. I should have pointed them to the evergreen work of the late Chinua Achebe (*Things Fall Apart*). The ethnocentric narratives of the dominant that continue to reproduce themselves at multi-ethnic societies and transnational borders are also a symbol and reproduction of difference. Although immigration into Malta as in all EU states is attracting diverse socio-political discursive perspectives because people arrive from all over the world to settle in the Island, only in respect to African migrants are persons not originally born in Malta referred to as “immigrants” (Pisani, 2013, p. 68).

**Nigerian Youth Migrants at the Intersections of Oppression**

Female African youth are generally perceived to be at the receiving end of all forms of immigrant oppression in the EU receiving states (Pisani, 2013). The emerging question is: how do race, ethnicity, gender, and legal status affect young African migrants in Malta? The oppressive racialization of the peoples of African descent at the borders of Europe has consistently produced ripples of impact on two major categories of global citizens that are
always subsumed under various narratives on transnational migration. The impact is felt more by young African female migrants and children born within the borders of the receiving states, who, due to certain legal stipulations, do not qualify as citizens. These are the most vulnerable sets in the narratives of Africa – Europe youth migration. Both the young women and children born without states are particularly susceptible to abuse, exploitation, detention or even deportation. The pernicious forces of racism, gender, ageism, and legal status conflate at the spaces of border securitization in the industrialized world to produce what the sociologist, Patricia Hill Collins, articulated as an interlocking system of oppression on African female youth migrants and the children they have in transit or—often—in their host societies. Bringing Hill-Collins (1990) into anti-racist and anti-colonial discourses on youth migration unleashes her views drawn largely from Black feminist thought, that decolonization will mean succor for the oppressed given the emergence of a transformed consciousness of individuals and the social revolution of the political and economic institutions, which in itself “constitutes essential ingredients for social change” (p. 221).

**Woes of Female African Migrant Youth in Malta**

The removal of internal borders among member states of the European Union coincides with the declaration of the free movement of persons within the Union to create a more ominous tension symbolized by the increased restriction of borders against non-European nationals. The border restriction against non-EU nationals also implies a rise in the criminalization of African migrants and others who are perceived as irregular, clandestine, or undocumented migrants. Against this backdrop the European Union Commissioner for Human Rights decried the untoward practices of migrant criminalization and repression as unethical. The commissioner further noted that the practice is counter-productive as a measure against irregular immigration (EU Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008). It is
critical to this thesis to also hint that African youth migrants’ criminalization is a violation of existing international laws and standards and mounts unnecessary, indirect pressure on migrants to resort to more perilous alternative modes of reaching their intended destinations (de Haas, 2006; Sassen, 2006). It is also crucial to observe that instead of reducing irregular migration, criminalization and restrictions at EU borders have rather a conflicting outcome as the influx of migrants is increasing and activities of human smuggling syndicates are also on the rise (Castles & Miller, 2009; Pisani, 2011a). The category of youth mostly affected by the emerging EU border securitization and policy imperatives in Malta is the female youth migrants. Understanding how policies enacted by the EU immigration authorities jeopardize female African youth migrants’ chances of survival would enable a critical unraveling of how the actions or inactions of privileged individuals have continued to uphold the subordination of migrant others. The female African youth migrants in Malta have a higher possibility of deportation back to their countries of origin after the mandatory one year, six month detention. My study reveals that their claims for asylum and refugee status compared with those of their male counterparts are often rigorously challenged and denied. As Ife, a male interviewee who arrived in one of the migrant boats, elucidated: “The Maltese government deported them back to Nigeria. Not a single woman remained in my boat. They deported all to Nigeria.” One major reason for the deportation extracted from the experiences of female African youth migrants was their vulnerability in the Maltese labor market. For as Pisani (2011b) argues “the situation is further aggravated by the present financial crisis, and yet, despite their irregular status, migrants continue to meet the labor market’s demand for unskilled labor” (p. 25). However, the young female migrants might not risk the tedious work at the construction sites and farms, where their male counterparts are assigned to work. The
Stockholm Programme, which laid out the critical priorities for the EU policies on immigration, has apparently been tacit about the rights of irregular migrants who cannot safely return to their states of origin. This air of silence is ambiguous because it also violates the international declarations on the rights and freedoms of refugees and asylum seekers. It fails to address issues of the exploitation of these individuals. For female African youth migrants, the pressure to resist repatriation coupled with the denial of all statuses means they cannot leave the Island of Malta for mainland Europe. Therefore, as a measure of resistance to deportation and consistent with Schwenken, (2003), some of the female migrants defy the consequences to feign mental and psychological conditions, which are made obvious in the voice of Uder, one of the migrant participants in the focus group meetings:

Yes, I believe as a human being spending 12 months in—we are talking about 365 days—in one place, the Maltese government should at least consider giving us status documents. Until now we have not received a court document, travelling document, or temporary-stay document; we have nothing. I just have what they call a police report, meaning police knows that I am in Malta; which means they may decide at any moment to deport me back to my country. I am not scared of being deported back to Nigeria; I am not afraid of it. But it shouldn’t come after I spent one year six months in detention. I had a friend, who was my boat-mate, because she doesn’t want to be deported back to Nigeria, she feigned madness while she was not in any actual sense crazy. Instead of deporting her, the authorities took [her and] all of them in this category to Mount Camel. They took them to the psychiatric hospital; they started treating them as mad people; and after they received the treatments and went through the interventions they became mad indeed.

Alo, another participant in one of the focus group meetings, reflected:

The Maltese Psychiatrists would tell them: “Listen, if you are not sick, if you are OK, don’t allow me to inject you or [have you] take all those drugs (medications).” But they would insist that they were mentally challenged. Today, if you go to the Open Detention Centre at Marsa you will see that many of them are crazy. They are now helplessly mentally deranged. They go to that extent because when you hear of Europe you think it is paradise; you think it is where your destiny is. They want to stay in Europe and they don’t know what’s called Europe; so they decide to feign that they are insane. This has happened to men and women but disproportionately women
out-number men. They are in the psychiatric hospital spending six, seven, eight months there before they are released. Remember, you will not go into the psychiatric hospital without being treated for mental health, and that is the cost of their resistance to deportation threats from Maltese authorities.

A female interviewee, Devon, reflected on the suffering and risks they had to undergo to arrive in Europe and decries the callous treatment from the Maltese authorities. She recounted:

After suffering from the Sahara Desert, passing through the Libyan war and crossing the deadly Mediterranean Sea, even surviving its waves and turbulence, we managed to arrive safely. Do you realize that some of us even died? And some were so sick that after they arrived that they were lifted to the hospital in ambulances; and after landing in this country they sent us to detention for a year and six months. It is not fair. That’s why many people when they were released from detention started going crazy. They became mad and started misbehaving, and they started acting abnormal. It was unfair because we passed through a lot of stress; even staying in real prison for one month would be by far much better compared to the stress we passed through when we were coming to this country. But the government authorities added to this stress by subjecting us to another round of one year and six months in the detention facility. It was awful. Even the food they gave us was in the most unfriendly manner. They would throw spaghetti at us like animals. And they would serve us spaghetti in the morning, maybe with one egg, spaghetti in the afternoon, and spaghetti in the night; every day we continued to eat the same food. And even when we had people outside who wanted to give us things, the inhuman detention policies and conditions did not permit that. Even when people provided clothes for us, they would refuse to give them to us, [even though] we were not prisoners.

The Maltese authorities reacted quickly by sending these young women to the nation’s top psychiatric hospital for treatment and many have lapsed into full blown mental illnesses. Another experiential reality of the female African youth migrants in Malta touches the critical nerve center of their reproductive rights. As hinted earlier in this chapter, authorities at the various immigrant detention facilities in Malta are prone to offering the youth a shrewd alternative that undermines the long, unhealthy 18-month detention. The offer for male and female youth is to couple and achieve pregnancy. When the female detainee becomes pregnant, the couples are released to the better environments of the Open Detention
Facilities. Some of the interviewees who yielded to these misconstrued “opportunities” never had it easy. With a monthly allowance of one hundred and thirty Euros (€130.00) from which each family was expected to pay one Euro per day for their lodging, there was little left for the couple to take care of their needs or to provide the bare necessities of life for their newborn or unborn baby. On a visit to one of the Open Detention Facilities at Alfa, I witnessed firsthand what it means to live in poor health, in hunger, and in abject poverty in a country that has the means to provide for the detained inmates, which is an unfair experience. The first couple I had an appointment to interview was not ready for the interview because both were too hungry, too weak, and apparently malnourished. If that was an example of what Open Detention Centers look like then whatever lies behind the fortified castles of the main Detention Center would be better not imagined. Hence, these interviewee couples appealed to the border authorities:

I travelled through the Mediterranean Sea. I spent five days on the rough Mediterranean Sea before the Maltese came to our rescue. So they rescued us—I have a wife and a son—and they rescued us with other singles and other couples, pregnant women, and some singles. We were detained in the Detention Centre in Malta for about two weeks with my baby and my wife. We were subsequently set free to the Open Detention Centre. They gave us an apartment which is not comfortable but is manageable; nothing with a mattress and no cooking materials. They promised that they would give [us] cooking materials but never did (Tobe, Ever).

The distressing condition of youth migrants who yielded to the pressure of ‘coupling’ in the detention as a way of avoiding the protracted and depressing one year six month detention is epitomized in this interviewee’s narrative:

While they promised to give us one hundred and thirty Euros every month, what does one hundred and thirty Euros solve for a family? It’s not enough to eat for 10 days or even till half of the month for 15 days, you and your wife. What does €130.00 do for you and your family? It means nothing! Also, if you have to work, you have to be paying them for the government camp. For the government camp that they provided where people should be staying, you have to pay again. If you have to go and work, they will drive you out. I have a wife, I have a baby, I have no job. They will drive
you out of the camp. They drove me, my wife, and child out. They asked me to leave. I experienced so many things. That’s why I am saying I am not afraid of exposing what Malta is doing. They are not taking care of the immigrants. They only receive money to care for immigrants from the United Nations and they treat the immigrants the way they want. I was one of the victims. I saw it all. I rented a house after they drove us out. Only God knows how I survived, with the help of friends. They kept lending me money monthly. Every month, they lent me money for me and my young family to survive. I borrowed 250 Euros every month. I have the receipts with me to prove what I am saying; I have things to prove how much I was paying for my house rent every month. I have no job; even as of now, I am jobless (Mba).

In all, the female image is the most brutalized by the oppressive policies and praxis that in the first instance denies her rights as a world citizen. After delivery, their babies also become enmeshed in the intractable puzzle of statelessness (to be discussed in full shortly).

**Female Genital Mutilation, an Excuse to Offend: Maltese Authorities’ Racist and Colonialist Gaze at African Female Youth Migrants’ Sexual Bodies**

Of alarming importance to this theme is the unfounded assumption that all the female youth migrants (being originally from Sub-Saharan Africa) must have at younger ages undergone female genital mutilation (FGM). The neo-colonial voyeuristic gaze at African females’ reproductive bodies in this situation assumes another dimension. While my thesis in no way intends to deny the existence of FGM as a ritualistic practice in some African societies, it aims rather to interrogate the psycho-politics and the psychic manifestation of neo-colonial powers inherent in the systems that construct certain socio-cultural bodies in developing economies as negative, primitive, and unhealthy while rationalizing similar practices in developed nations. FGM should be viewed in the same light as the vicious system of cultural suppression in the industrialized world that would simultaneously uphold or at best remain silent about practices similar to what was denounced in developing societies. Otherwise, what explanations can neo-liberal capitalist organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) give to pressure the governments of some African nations into promulgating domestic laws and complying blindly with “international” declarations
against FGM (termed female circumcision)? At the same time, WHO and the like NGOs are turning a blind eye on the surging trend of universalization, commodification, and commercialization of female and male sexual organ mutilations and surgeries (leading men to become women and women to become men) that is currently taking place in Western societies in the glorified name of vagina (labia) tightening and reduction surgery or transition of gender, etc. These lopsided transnational dynamics are better located in the broader framework of unequal power dynamics between the players at the stages of global politics. In his *Black Skin, White Mask*, Franz Fanon (1952), uses a juxtaposition of White and Black races within the context of colonization to unveil the problems of Black identity in the milieu of Western racist and colonial repressions. This brings to question again first the assumption and therefore practice by Maltese health officials of reconstructing Sub-Saharan female migrants’ vaginas after child-delivery in their hospitals without first obtaining any kind of informed consent from the patients. This leaves us with the tasteless question—could this have been informed by another sexual and fecundity issue, in this case, the anxiety of the colonialists? According to Pisani (2011):

Initially unsure as to how to address the particular post/antenatal needs of female asylum seekers, the Maltese medical profession has seen fit to, following childbirth, conduct reconstructive surgery on the vaginas of these women who have undergone FGM. The women themselves were not informed of this decision and the corrective procedure was conducted without their informed consent. (p. 69)

As an activist, Pisani might have been obsessed with the violations of the privacy rights of the young female African migrants in question (and) the obnoxious practice in her country, Malta; but overlooked the covert possibility that the fear and anxiety over migrant bodies’ fecundity could have spurred another sterilization exercise that was perpetrated on the subjugated bodies without recourse to the ethical requirements of personal consent. A
similar incident was reported about Ethiopian female migrants in Israel (see Nesher, 2015; Kneli, 2013). In Fanon’s (1952) work, Blackness was projected by the colonialist West as a symbol for all negative values or instincts, so that the sexuality of the Black man symbolized a troubling sexual deviation in the White man’s imagination. This subconscious state of mind devolved to the projection of European sexual anxieties and guilt onto the superscription of the Blackman so that the potency of the Black man created a sense of inadequacies and insecurity in the Whiteman’s psyche whereby he (the White man) was jealous about and unarguably craved the potency of the Blackman. The parallelism is evident in the words of Angus, an executive of a leading NGO in Malta, who reasoned:

What we think of as important ...what we call “orderly migration” is that we have continents or regions where there is a demand for labor, not only because of the economy but because the population is ageing, as [is the case] even [in] Malta. Malta will need labor. The population is declining and will decline further 23 years down the road. They need to import labor to maintain the same economic prosperity. The issue is what kind of labor they will need. Maybe the society does not recognise this or they don’t like the migration profile they are getting at the moment. The issue for us is that they have to prepare ...and they have to prepare the society to understand—the whole society—that migration is a benefit, is a plus. It may be a burden at the beginning, but in the long term it will pay off because those resources are needed in the country. Even if they don’t have the skill when they come, the country can help to prepare them in order to enter the labor market and contribute to the economy. But that is an issue that takes a lot of time, and certainly, politically, is very complicated because you know policy makers from governments; they make policies [based] on the short term because they have the contingencies. So those are the issues that are ...but I believe that migration in this part of the world, meaning Europe, is normally decidable, it is a need. It is a real fact that they need the migration. So it is better that they start by thinking of putting in place the right policies in order to integrate the people, and I would say, not only to integrate them but to include them, because integration means “you are with us,” but inclusion means “you are part of us.”

The colonial system is replete with tensions created by sexual anxieties over the Blackman’s potency, and Fanon makes the connection between this phenomenon and the display of aggression by White folks toward their perceived source of sexual threat, leading to the lynching of Black men by White men in the post-war United States of America. What
must be further explored, however, is whether the Maltese health officials’ reconstruction of
Black female migrants’ vagina after delivery has, as its underpinning, any sterilization
motive. The action of the health authorities adds to the concerns raised by West African
migrant youth about how they were treated in detention camps shortly after their rescue from
the sea. The verbally abusive threats reminding them that they must go back to their countries
and leave Malta for the Maltese are as distasteful as the subtle harsh treatments they suffered
in the hands of detention and border officers. However, nations of the world, or to be specific
consenters or signees of the various multinational laws, including the law of rescue at sea and
refugee and asylum seekers’ laws, have a duty to ensure that these laws are observed within
their territorial borders.

Conflating Transnational Laws at the Peril of African Migrant Youth

The number of Vietnamese refugees taking to the South China Sea during the
country’s civil war was enormous. Many of them, like some African migrants youth today,
crammed into non-seaworthy boats to escape the onslaught of persecution and war. Many
merchant ships that came in contact with these boats offered to rescue the Vietnamese
migrants, and according to the international maritime rule, they were required to disembark
them at the nearest country. Malaysia and Thailand felt so overwhelmed that they refused to
receive the escaping Vietnamese migrant refugees and asylum seekers into their territories, so
the ship owners who observed the “rescue at sea convention” involuntarily had to bear the
cost of rescuing the migrants (Newland, 2003). I would at this juncture reflect on what
happened to Ukrainian sailors who murdered African stowaway migrant youth in 1992. As
Nick Davies (1995) insists, “These murders were committed as a direct and predictable result
of laws that have been passed and blessed by France and Britain and almost every other
government in the European Union” (n.p). It is a justified deduction then to argue that the
killer-crew acted under the pressure of the European Union to violently destroy the lives of those they viewed as aliens, deviants, and law breakers. It is an intractable puzzle, though, if the crew would have acted differently were the murdered eight young men European stowaways, and this remains a point of sober reflection.

**Conclusion**

The lopsided power dynamics at play in transnational borders with respect to the invisibilization of African youth migrants should be seen in light of a broader framework of unequal power dynamics between the players at the stages of global politics. The mass deportation of Nigerian female migrants by Maltese, and by extension EU, authorities is a clear violation of the refugee and asylum rights of these migrants, who should never have been repatriated to territories in which their lives and security were jeopardized. Also, the assumption and therefore the practice by Maltese health officials of reconstructing Sub-Saharan female migrants’ vaginas after child-delivery in their hospitals without the informed consent of the women could not have been unconnected with the racist treatment African migrants endure in the hands of Maltese authorities, because this unhealthy treatment has never been meted out to women migrants of other nationalities in Malta. It is also possible that the attack on Black female reproductive bodies has been informed by other fears of sexuality and fecundity—on the part of the West—in this case a psychologically fixated anxiety of possibly being overrun by the influx of African migrants. The uncertainty, however, lies with the covert possibility that the fear and anxiety over migrant bodies’ fecundity could have spurred another sterilization exercise that was perpetuated on the subjugated bodies with no recourse to legal requirements or personal consent of the affected persons, which should not have been the case in the 21st century Europe.

Another area of interest is the conflicting intersection between the domestic policies
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

and maritime laws of the receiving states and international refugee law. My view is that the root cause of youth migration must be addressed if the phenomenon would be minimized or eradicated. Tackling youth migration would not be achieved by the existing policies and practices of border restriction and migrants’ management as is presently the case. For migration stakeholders and policy makers, there is, however, a need to tease out distinct categories of youth migrants so as to properly analyze and make provisions that might be tailored to and expedient for each group’s needs and social integration.
Chapter 8
Discussion 2

Stoking the Surge in Transnational Migration of African Youth: The Complicit Roles of Western and Eastern Colonizers

The Western and Eastern colonizers (by Eastern colonizers I mean Iran and the oil-rich Arab states) must take a reflective and retroactive gaze to articulate how their foreign policies in the developing countries have continued to engender massive displacement and therefore current flow in migration from the developing economies (Chomsky, 2006; Klein, 2007; Chua; 2003). While drawing attention to the roles of the dominant societies in generating the current surge in transnational migration, I do neither intend to romanticize the traumatic experiences of the migrant subjects from developing economies nor negate the agency, and therefore the complicit role Nigerian migrant youth play in their European border oppressive experiences. I would rather hint that the migrant youth wield a lot of power in determining their migratory experiences. The migrant youth have agency and do in fact exhibit this in a way of resistance against the host societies’ attempt to irrationally or unconstitutionally repatriate them. In this way, they also contribute to their subjectification and subjugation. The reflective gaze this thesis calls for might be necessary for the rich and developed nations to halt and reassess the roles of their economic and socio-political external policies and praxis in constituting the migrant Other. In other words the industrialized and colonizing world must review how their foreign policies and transnational relations have continued to produce and shape the current surge in migration from the South to the North. This step might substantially equip these nations toward initiating de-escalation roles in unrests and crises situations in African states, the Middle East, and other developing economies.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have been implicated for stoking the fire of religious and
violent political uprisings in the Middle East, Syria, Africa, and Yemen. They fund, support, and supply weapons to Islamic fundamentalists of their interest. What happened in Libya should serve as an eye-opener to the EU and to all Western countries. The late Col. Muammar Gadhafi was never himself a peace-model, at least in practice, but he managed to hold Libya and other North African nations in check against Islamic fundamentalists. Today, four years after the West-backed coalition killed him, Europe and the world would testify that Libya is now a haven for nurturing and escalating the most anti-West and worst terrorist activities ever in record. France, Russia, USA, Britain, and China were incriminated in funding, supporting, and supplying weapons to perpetrators of Rwandan genocide Boko Haram in West Africa and ISIS in the Syrian wilderness respectively (see Penketh, 2014; Simpson, 2015; Abusidiqu, 2014; Yan, 2013). In fact, French nationals were reportedly caught serving as mercenaries among the Boko Haram terrorist group that has been on rampage in North-Eastern Nigeria although France demanded the mercenaries back from Cameroon and continue to deny this information (see Tembang, 2015). It is important to highlight the contributions of Western and Arab states in insinuating and escalating violence in developing countries, especially Africa and the Middle East; because the resultant political and socio-economic displacement joins forces with cultural encapsulation induced by colonization to bring about the socio-political and economic upheaval in these societies, and the refugees generated by these circumstances seek relocation and resettlement in the peace havens that developed economies represent (at least to the hapless imagination of the migrants). It is also important to underscore my concerns about the unilateral efforts of Europe to tackle the problems arising from migrants crossing transnational borders between Africa and Europe.
The worrisome fact remains that EU efforts result from her fear of being choked out of existence by the influx of unwanted wandering aliens. The union’s efforts are at best an attempt to manage rather than find lasting solutions to the problems faced by the migrant persons. Such Western initiatives are devoid of consideration of the causes of the movement and the implications for migrants and the countries they left behind. Discourses informed by this frame of operation are rife among some social scientists and writers, which accounts for my disagreement with Gebrewold’s (2007) contributions on African migration and foreign policy imperatives. I am not alone, for Bensaad’s (2007) work also challenges Gebrewold’s assumptions. While Bensaad’s (2007) work depicts foreign policies and cross-border migration as transnational spaces within which global migration stakeholders (sending nations, migrant individuals, and receiving nations) must interact to tease out the way forward, Gebrewold (2007) tersely imposes the continent of Europe on Africa. It is about what the EU says or does—the post-9/11 security fears in Europe—and its implications for the recalcitrant Africa. Citing a series of terrorist attacks in and outside of European countries as an example of the need for urgent EU border securitization measures, Gebrewold, like many other pro-West writers failed to see African continent as equal player in global policy decisions with respect to transnational border movement of her citizens. Adepoju (2009) thinks otherwise. He argues for bilateral consensus between the sending and destination countries as a way of effectively monitoring and coordinating the smooth transition of migrant persons across transnational borders. While stressing the need for coordinated and coherent migration policy management in the West African sub-region, Adepoju insists that “migration cannot be managed effectively through unilateral action: many states are simultaneously origin, transit, and destination countries for various types of migration.
Hence, bilateral relations should be forged between the departure and receiving countries within and outside the sub-region” (p. 43).

It is imperative for industrialized Europe and the West as a whole to realize the important role developing economies could play—if given the autonomy and support they desire—in creating stable transnational border systems. Following the most recent influx of displaced peoples into EU waters, and the boat mishaps resulting in the death of many migrants, the EU and United Nations are rising to these realities. Reflections on the outcome of EU deliberations on the surge in immigration and related tragedies, which will be reviewed in the later pages of this chapter, are evidences that they are coming to terms with the need for multi-lateral cooperation among stakeholders in tackling transnational border crossing problems.

Meanwhile, I wish to redirect the focus of this thesis to the untoward foreign policies and praxis of the industrialized world that have continued to spur the flow of transnational migration. British citizens, including the son of a late former British female prime minister, were either caught or incriminated in African countries for plotting and sponsoring the overthrow of democratically elected African governments. A similar narrative about the West’s involvement in South America, Asia, and states on other continents is popular. Everyone in the world has one ethnic group or the other to blame for the crisis or genocides in Congo, Biafra, Luanda, Burundi, Chechnya, Libya, Syria, etc., but no one ever asks how they started and who planned and executed them before they got out of control and why. It might rightly be argued that the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) could not have happened or lasted were Britain out of the nation’s politico-economic equations (see Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000; Simms, 2005). Hitherto, the British subversion of Nigerian people’s socio-political and
economic systems is evident in the leaked and globally publicized “infiltration” and disruptions of the Nigeria’s political and economic systems by Britain as reflected in the reports on a briefing given to the American Ambassador to Nigeria, Robin R. Sander, in February 2009 by Shell Executive VP, Ann Pickard (see Nwalutu, 2014, Smith 2010). The Shell Petroleum Corporation in Nigeria and other Western-based multi-national corporations and NGOs are used to permeate governments and introduce divisions and disruptions in African and developing states’ governance, which is an atmosphere that favors the economic interests of the colonizers. European based NGOs are noted to have featured prominently in the election monitoring exercises in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria due to their country’s oil interests in the sub-region. The crises generated by the activities of the East and West in developing societies (Chua, 2003; Baxter, 2008; Chomsky, 2006) result in war and of course displacement, which gives rise to refugee situations and subsequently, mass migration, the likes of which is being witnessed on the Mediterranean borders of Europe. Meaningful African leaders of the past have been killed or ousted from power with the aid of the West and other colonizers. The leaders often favored by the colonizers are corrupt leaders who would milk their nations dry and foolishly deposit the looted wealth in Arab or Western coffers overseas while their subjects wallow in abject poverty (Simms, 2005; Mueller, 2009; Baxter, 2008; Memmi, 2006). The late Murtala Mohamed of Nigeria, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Patrice Lumumba of Congo and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, all in one way or the other had the hands of the West and other colonizers in their blood. It is not imaginable how any citizen of a developing economy has participated in the disruption of any democratic process in Eastern countries or European societies. If therefore the pernicious foreign policies of the colonizing world do not change for the better and they are expecting
miracles toward alleviating the current surge of migration to the industrialized world, their
efforts at best would only amount to chasing with the hounds and running with the hare. Not
surprisingly, existing migration literature shows that migrants tend to move toward their
former colonial masters (Shimeles, 2010), which leaves one wondering if Warwick
Anderson’s (2006) narratives on the 19th century USA’s shrewd constitution of the
Philippines citizens into its 21st century labor migrants also holds true for the rest of
developing world today.

**Northern Nigerian Youth: Out of the Africa-Europe Migrants Equation**

It is crucial to highlight the critical sample characteristics of the field study in the
Republic of Malta, which shows a near absence of youth migrants from the Northern part of
Nigeria among the numerous respondents interviewed. The question remains therefore: why
do Northern Nigerian youth eschew cross-border emigration even when most migrants from
the other parts of the country transit to Niger Republic, Libya, and other Sahara Desert-
bordering countries en route to Europe via the cities of Northern Nigeria? There is the
possibility that youth from Northern Nigeria are conversant with the regular flow of migrants
through their environment and might equally have served in one way or the other to facilitate
this flow as Marconi (2010) argues that the “urban areas, are indeed the places where
migrants can get useful information on how to migrate further, as well as find anonymous
accommodation, income opportunities, and the social support needed to recover from their
previous travel and organize their onward journey” (n.p.). The plausible explanations for the
obviously paradoxical disinterest of the Northern Nigerian youth demography toward
overseas migration might perhaps include an absence of the push and pull factors originally
thought to be solely responsible for transnational migration. This may sound illogical
considering that a larger percentage of the Northern Nigerian demography faces similar
adverse socio-economic situations as their peers in the South and even worse (see Nwalutu, 2014). Another possible explanation could be tied to Shimeles’ (2010) work on migration patterns, trends, and policy issues in Africa in which he argues that:

Post-independence Africa maintained relationships with former colonial powers that continue[d] to this day. Particularly France, Belgium, and United Kingdom cultivated special relationships with their former colonies in Africa that included privileges for travels, study and business opportunities. It is easier for migrants from Francophone areas to travel to France and Belgium, those from Anglophone areas to UK and so on. As I argued elsewhere (Nwalutu, 2014), these relationships are neither as clear-cut as Shimeles purported nor as devoid of inequitable power dynamics as his work portends. For if citizens of the former colonies are finding the movement into the colonizers’ territorial spaces easy then the backlog of detained migrants and rejected refugee and asylum seekers at strategic entry ports of European Union would be minimal. It has been the view of this thesis that the colonized African countries—and by extension, the developing countries of the South—never actually regained their economic, cultural, and socio-political independence from their colonizers. They only partially got political reprieve from the violence and servitude that were the original strategies used to subjugate colonial subjects and compel them to compliance by the colonizers (Fanon, 1952). It is also critical that this work reflects on the role of such cultural inclinations as religion, language, and the like (Indigenous peoples’ tools disrupted, high-jacked, and shrewdly encapsulated or overshadowed by the colonizers worldviews) to create migrant subjects. The subjugation of the colonized individuals aimed to and indeed successfully rid them of their humanity and identities. They therefore could no longer fit into, survive in, or find themselves relevant to their natural environments, and had to migrate to actualize the masters’ long-held dreams.

Missing in Action, Northern Nigerian Youth’s Absence in Africa – Europe Migration: Is Arab Colonization Responsible?
Critical to my thesis paper, as I highlighted in my review, are the two major colonial invasions in Nigeria because each has a tremendous political, economic, and socio-cultural impact on the lives of the people colonized. This adds significant clarification to our understanding of the flow of youth migration in Nigeria. Most emphasis on the impact of colonization on Africa and African culture and philosophies is elaborated in the effects of Western-Christian colonization with little or no recourse to Arab-Islamic colonization. Unfortunately, Nigerians, like citizens of most of the previously colonized African states, imbibed the education and cultural values and belief systems of the colonizers (Fanon, 1963; Memmi, 1965; Wa Thiong’o, 1986); and this could have substantial implications for both the youth’s decision to travel abroad, the direction of their movement, and the choice of their destination. Some of the literature hinted that formerly colonized peoples, being equipped with the language and other socio-cultural values of the colonizers, tend to migrate to countries of their former colonial masters (Shimeles, 2010; Pitea & Hussain 2011; Hilton, 2011; Anderson, 2006). Countries like Nigeria are therefore almost equally partitioned between Arabic-Islamic (North) and Western-Christian (South). The implication of this partitioning is that most of the time, youth from different regions in the same country would prefer to migrate to developed rich states of either the Middle East or the West. Since the problem of youth emigration from Nigeria (as in other parts of the world) is relatively recent, and the procurement of reliable data on the problem is only possible in the long run, it is the view of this work that data generated in the short run in respecting this phenomenon be considered prejudicially inadequate; thus further studies are required to explore this phenomenon from the perspective of the sending nations, in this case, Nigeria, and also to track the migrant youth through the borders experiences to the destination countries. I will
continue to reflect on the role of religion, for instance, as a shift in trajectory for understanding the absence of Northern Nigerian youth in Malta. As a way of accentuating the insidious power dynamics in the ongoing neo-colonial relationship between developed countries and their former colonies with respect to the movement of people, goods, and services across international borders; Shimeles’ (2010) view that close cultural relationships exist between independent African countries and their former colonial masters retains a clue to the possible influence of the ongoing colonial projects (perpetuated through education, language, and religion) on the migrants’ destination decisions. There is more likelihood therefore that little is known or highlighted in current discourses about Arab /Islamic colonization and cultural encapsulation in Africa, which existed hundreds of years before Western/Christian colonization, the indelible influence of which is still prevalent in the continent. The influence of Arabic colonization over many African nations, specifically North African countries, is immense. Arabic/Islamic domination existed in Nigeria for upwards of 400 years before Western incursion (Fafunwa, 1974; Isichei, 1983). The implication is that the youth in Northern Nigeria are more engrained in Islamic religious practices, Arabic culture, and language than they are in Western cultures, which might account for their apparent reluctance to immigrate to Western countries. Therefore, the choice of migration destination for Northern Nigerian youth, just like their Egyptian counterparts as observed in a Gallup survey (Esipova, Ray, & Srinivasan, 2011), could have been influenced by their cultural relationship with their colonial masters, the oil-rich Arab states. Further enquiry in this area might be necessary to unravel this assumption so as to resolve the question surrounding the noticeable absence of Northern Nigerian youth migrants in the context of Africa – Europe migration. Resolving the puzzle posed by the absence of youth from
Northern Nigeria is crucial to adding clearer perspective to the patterns of flow of youth transnational migration because Northern Nigeria is a major transit hub for migrants aiming to reach Europe via Niger Republic, Libya, and across the Mediterranean Sea.

While academic and political discourses on transit migration mainly focus on the challenges for and responsibilities of transit countries, very little reference is made to the physical challenges in migrants’ transit routes. The strategic hubs where a multitude of networks converge and intersect to facilitate the mobility of migrant individuals are referred to here as the “transit cities.” Often migrants after leaving their countries of origin are stuck in their stopover destinations longer than they anticipated for reasons ranging from inadequate funds to inability to secure border passes. This observation is in line with Hugo, Tan, and Napitupulu’s (2014) work, which reasons that:

Often migrants cannot move directly to their intended final destination because they lack the appropriate documentation or are not able to meet the entry requirements of that destination. Countries of transit are an important element in the growing complexity of international migration, especially for asylum seekers and others engaged in irregular migration.

Many of these migrants end up becoming permanent residents by default as was the case of many of my interviewees who, although they originally aimed to arrive in Europe, stayed back and settled for living in Libya only later to be displaced again by the wars that ousted Col. Gadhafi from power; thus, they were brought into Malta as war refugees. As they settled in Libya, most of them engaged in viable economic activities that had tangible impacts on their families back in Nigeria as well as the local economy and socio-spatial settings in which they found themselves. Obviously, one of the major physical challenges to migrants of this category was the border restriction practices and surveillance systems that
meant they would never legally arrive in their intended destination as they had no valid travelling documents. Further studies in this area of youth migrants’ experiences might reveal or refute the idea that border restriction and surveillance practices contribute to the desperation of migrant individuals and subsequently, in more migrants’ fatalities and tragic incidents.

**Tragic Implications of EU Policing of the Mediterranean for African Youth Migrants**

The extension of the Europe’s border securitization and restriction policies to African coasts to safeguard against migrants’ incursion into Fortress Europe has depicted Europe and the West as stalwarts of global capitalist expansion. The annexation of Libyan, Tunisian, and Moroccan coasts to prevent immigrant boats from departing to Europe, as strategic as it appears, draws the notion of imaginary territories or what I elsewhere tagged “border-by-proxy” (see Nwalutu, 2015). Such efforts would naturally engender the question: could any African state, in a bid to secure its territories from Arabic or Western incursion, be allowed to extend its territorial borders beyond those recognized by the comity of nations? If the answer is no, then there is unfair practice in the EU’s use of FRONTEX and Europol on African coastal waters for whatever reason. Even when it is flagged off as cooperation between Europe and the Mediterranean coasts of Africa, such engagements have been used to brutally, albeit indirectly, exterminate prospective Europe-bound African youth migrants (see Brachet, 2012; Baxter, 2008 Toasije, 2009).

**Deployments at Mediterranean Sea: Has EU any Provisions for Accountability to the Comity of Nations?**

The enormity of the dangers sea-crossing youth migrants have to contend with is made more frightening by the notorious Left-to-die at sea incident. This case accentuates the paradoxical outcome of deceptive propagation of international orders (that are always unilateral initiatives of Western-based institutions). These laws are violated and become legal
and binding when—and only when—a person of a developing economy is not a victim but a Westerner is involved. In the Left-to-die at sea incident, the small boat ferrying migrants out of Libya ran out of fuel and supplies. One of the passengers used a cell phone to communicate with an Eritrean priest in Rome who alerted the Coast Guards and NATO Headquarters in Italy. The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) enjoins governments and all stakeholders to:

“... ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea... regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found” (Chapter 2.1.10). The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Art. 98: 2) also passes a responsibility on every coastal state party to:

“...promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements co-operate with neighboring States for this purpose.” (Heller, Pezzani, & Situ, 2012, p. 10)

However, that was not the case with these unfortunate African migrants because despite the turmoil and displacement these foreigners suffered in Libya, the collection of EU, NATO, and other border enforcement personnel watched gleefully while almost all 71 of the migrants perished on the Mediterranean Sea. And hitherto no single individual or group has been held accountable for this massive loss of precious lives. Revealing the struggles and experiences of migrants on transit, Sunderland (2013) reasons that:

Some of those attempting by land and air—the vast majority of irregular entries into Europe—take considerable risks: hiding in and under trucks, stuffed into car trunks, crammed into containers where lack of air, food and water have claimed hundreds of lives. Discover en route or at the border can mean mistreatment at the hands of smugglers, unwilling transporters (e.g. truck drivers), and border guards; detention or summary return to a country of transit or country of origin, or as Human Rights Watch has documented, being dumped in the desert along remote stretches of North African borders and left to die. (p. 3)

In the Left-to-die at sea case, the mixed ethnic group of immigrants was escaping the onslaught of the Libyan dictator, Gadhafi, but the incident that follows would begin to unsettle the humanitarian angle of the EU’s, NATO’s, UNHCR’s, and IOM’s operations on
the Mediterranean Sea. While dallying over whose responsibility it was to rescue the boat
conveying this batch of migrants out of Libya, the West watched 63 of them, including 20
women and two babies, die in the infamous “Left-to-die” case:

72 migrants fleeing Tripoli by boat on the early morning of March 27, 2011 ran out of
fuel and were left to drift for 14 days until they landed back on the Libyan coast. With
no water or food on-board, only nine of the migrants survived. In several interviews,
these survivors recounted the various points of contacts they had with the external
world during this ordeal. This included describing the aircraft that flew over them, the
distress call they sent out via satellite telephone and their visual sightings of a military
helicopter which provided a few packets of biscuits and bottles of water and a
military ship which failed to provide any assistance whatsoever. The events, as
recounted by these survivors, appeared to constitute a severe violation of the legal
obligation to provide assistance to any person in distress at sea, an obligation
sanctioned by several international conventions. (Heller, Pezzani, & Situ, 2012, p. 9;
Strik, 2012)

The 21st century Africa – Europe youth migration has continued to produce ambivalence due
to the apparent resistance exhibited by the migrants who continue to invent inexhaustible
alternative routes for reaching their goal. It also positions itself as a reminiscence of the
historical slave movement from Africa first to the Middle East (during the trans-Sahara slave
trade) then to Europe and the Americas during the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The difference
obviously is that force and subjugation were used in the slave trade era while in the present
situation the migrants themselves are free agents of their fate and willing victims of their
decision. Yet in each case, many sons and daughters of Africa perished in the treacherous
heat of the Sahara and rough sea crossings. Nevertheless, labor supply lies at the heart of
both incidents. The recent, most tragic boat accident on the Mediterranean claimed 800
people while more and more boats were rescued. EU policy makers decided after impromptu
deliberations to take more drastic and decisive actions by authorizing EUROPOL and
FRONTEX to destroy at sight every migrant boat within the imagined territories of Libya.
The goal according to Europe is to frustrate the activities of migrant smugglers from reaching
the shores of Europe. This thesis views the EU’s resolve not as anti-traffickers but anti-immigrants since more migrants are likely to be killed by the assaults of FRONTEX, which elsewhere in this work, it has been noted, owes nobody any accountability for its personnel’s actions in international waters. The migrants are determined never to give up, which re-echoes the voice expressed in the work of Memmi (2006) that nobody can stop this flow of migration, or worse still no one can stop the flow of blood. Europe has originally used tactical sea operations such as Mare Nostrum (Our Sea) and Triton programs to securitize its sea borders but these efforts have intensified rather than ameliorated the crisis that the current Africa – Europe migration symbolized. The decision to attack and destroy migrant boats has already started yielding expected dividends, for many Asian, Middle Eastern, and African migrants are devising more dangerous ways to tear down the barriers of Fortress Europe even if by allowing their blood to flow again. Grdanoski and Testorides’ (2015) report states that:

A group of migrants trying to reach European opportunity via what's billed by smugglers as a “safe” route—trekking along train tracks through the Balkans—was hit by an overnight train in a remote river gorge in Macedonia, killing 14. The deaths of the undocumented migrants from Africa and Asia underscore how, even as tens of thousands risk drowning in the Mediterranean to reach European shores, many others gamble with their lives by taking perilous overland journeys to reach Hungary, a popular back door to the 28-nation European Union.

It has been argued that the industrialized countries have yearning gaps in their labor market to be filled by immigrant youth or those migrants whose drive is employment opportunity. Yet many have various other reasons for leaving their states of origin that must be addressed, and it must be noted that the attempt to frustrate migrant efforts would not only be resisted but would also trigger a re-invention of migrants’ ingenious but more hazardous approaches or tactics. This view is consistent with de Haas’ (2006) argument that:

Rather than curbing immigration, increasing surveillance in the Strait of Gibraltar and elsewhere has led to a general diversification in attempted crossing points since 1999.
Migrants now increasingly make the journey by sea from more eastern places on the Moroccan coast to mainland Spain; from the Tunisian coast to the Italian islands; from Libya to Italy and Malta; from the Western Sahara to the Canary Islands; from Algeria to Spain; and most recently from Mauritania, Senegal, and other West African countries to the Canary Islands. Policies to stop migrants from coming have also had a series of unintended, counterproductive effects. First, increasing repression in North Africa has led several migrants who intended to stay there to reconsider their plans and to move to Europe. Second, the use of more diverse and longer sea routes has vastly increased the area that EU countries feel they must monitor to “combat” irregular migration. Third, smuggling methods have become more professional, with smugglers using larger and faster custom-made boats and zodiacs instead of vulnerable fishing boats.

Nevertheless, adequate and proper coordination of transnational relations is required to systematically resolve the youth migrant crisis. My view in this thesis remains that the governments of sending and receiving nations must mutually and fairly coordinate their policies and praxis to better engage youth migrants. The practice of managing youth migration has failed and will continue to fail to achieve its objectives so long as the root cause of youth irregular migration (social insecurity) is not addressed. My take is that the struggling youth migrants might likely find an alternative route to their destination if there is no multilateral coordination of functions to assist them.

**Conclusion**

This study sees different perspectives highlighted in the contributions of most transnational migration scholars, which digress from the initial reasoning that economic and political factors were the sole driving-forces of transnational migration as a welcome shift of paradigm. These contributors are, however, apparently more concerned with how transnational migration affects adult migrants and the receiving nations than they are about its impact on the youth migrants and the countries they left behind. In this thesis, I reason that any appropriate procedure for generating effective migration policies that will impart the current surge in youth transnational migration must take into account the cultural
environment that produced these youth. It would also be crucial to reflect on the influence of colonization on their social spaces and therefore explore opportunities for reintroducing the youth to their Indigenous heritages that colonization eroded away. This might involve a novel systematic approach of synthesizing existing colonial education with (in this case African) Indigenous worldviews and educational philosophies. By so doing, new generation Africans will be made socio-economically relevant to their cultural and ethno-geographical spaces as an alternative to risking their lives in precarious overseas migration. Further studies on the trends of African youth migration are therefore inevitable for generating extensive data on the phenomenon. This is necessary as only holistic and comprehensive information on the factors influencing the decision of youth to travel abroad, as well as the patterns and flow of youth movement and the experiences of youth in their host societies, are required by the comity of nations for effective and efficient monitoring and management of youth migration. These measures are also alternatives to the current fire-service arrangement, which seems to have failed to ameliorate the plight of migrant youths. They are therefore critical for the protection of vulnerable youth migrants and for putting in place policies that would ensure the protection of their human rights both on transit and while living in their destination societies. So long as the transnational border crossings are not effectively regularized in developing societies and most of the trips are not documented (not embarked on with proper travelling documents), they fall under the category of emergency situations created by human-made or natural disasters and therefore are a risky experience altogether.

I must not fail to hint that the new EU decision to dispatch FRONTEX and EUROPOL against migrant boats in the Mediterranean to destroy migrant boats at the incipience of their journey is a violation of international regulations and might yield tragic
unintended consequences. International regulations prescribed that boats intercepted in the territorial sea or contiguous zone of any EU member state should be disembarked in the same territory. But the regulation provided a condition that allows authorities to still order an alteration of course of migrant boats that have made it thus far. This action is in flagrant violation of not just the fundamental rights of the migrants but also the international refugee and maritime laws that demand that EU member states should, under the circumstances discussed above, use all available means to identify intercepted persons so as to afford migrants the opportunity to assert a non-refoulement claim (Sunderland, 2012). The aggressive and heightened anti-immigrant operations of FRONTEX beyond EU territories informed a paradox that requires closer details—because at the auspices of FRONTEX many more migrants’ deaths were recorded in the Mediterranean Sea (Sunderland, 2012). For instance, during the 2011 Libyan revolution that ousted Col. Gadhafi, FRONTEX sent its joint operations of ships and aerial surveillance to Libya in support of Italy to frustrate an influx of migrants from Africa. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, also deployed 21 ships at the Mediterranean as a tactical bid to foil arms supply to Gadhafi regime (Sunderland, 2012). The intensification of the Libyan crisis, as would be expected, drove an ethnically mixed multitude of immigrants from Libya, many of whom perished in the sea in the full glare of EU border agency personnel.

The challenges inherent in the intersections of international laws and codes of practices with respect to the operation of the EU state’s border officials toward migrant individuals, especially migrant African youth, points unfortunately to the state’s commitment or lack thereof, and compliance to its obligation and to the tenets of universal human rights law. EU member states’ adoption of criminal laws that stipulate offences solely to check and
restrain migrants is in itself a major contradiction and challenge for the international human rights laws that permit no discrimination of individuals based on gender, nationality, or status. It apparently becomes even more conflicting when one segment of the law permits nationals of a state to enter or leave its territories while foreign migrants are by another segment of the same law forbidden movement across the nation’s borders. Besides, a clear understanding of the demographic constituents of migrant population involved in Africa – Europe migration and critical information about their cross-border ordeals will expose how all categories of subjects are labeled together and subsumed under one title—“boat people” or “clandestine”—at the receiving societies, which also allows no distinction in terms of how vulnerable individuals such as minors (children), women, and migrants with disabilities are subjected to policy restrictions at the border. Indications are that most of the attention paid to the victims of contemporary migration and border restriction policies are narrowly focused on female youth and children. But overlooking the various subcategories of individuals constituting the migrant population invisibilizes the excluded bodies, minimizes the rationality, and forecloses the possibility of modifying existing policies to improve their migration experiences. It is crucial to point out that as attention is devoted to fighting human trafficking in current transnational migration, especially as it affects human flow from the developing South to the industrialized North, scholars should endeavor to sift through the mesh formed by a large number of indigent but desperate voluntary migrants who must arrive at their destinations and the unfounded media speculations about existing trafficking syndicates lurking to prey on passive individuals. This implies that an understanding of the thought processes of intending migrants and their determination to reach their goals at all costs might bring about a shift in the view of transnational migration stakeholders and
scholars and possibly chart a new trajectory, which may imply the modification of existing policies for the accommodation and effective handling of the globally burgeoning cases of irregular youth migration.
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

My thesis research titled “From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration: Exploring the lived experiences of Nigerian youth migrants in the Island Republic of Malta” was based on an interpretative phenomenological field work undertaken in the Island Republic of Malta between August and October 2013. It included 34 interviews and six focus group meetings. Twenty four migrant youth who arrived in Malta from different geo-political zones in Nigeria were interviewed. In addition, six migrant Filipino youth were interviewed during the studies along with eight Maltese for triangulation and balanced data. Some interviewees were regular migrants, but the majority of the youth were irregular, rejected or undocumented migrants. The aim of interviewing Nigerian migrant youth was to elicit information on their experiences from their responses to questions framed around such variables as motives and intentions for migrating, mode of transportation employed, and experiences both on transit and in their host societies.

It was gathered that among the major drives for the current youth transnational migration were the prevalence of social insecurity in their countries of origin and the need for improved living conditions or a better life, which pries open an incidental question of what a “better life” actually means. Other factors included employment and displacement by war, political instability, and the desire to attain higher education or gain modern professional skills. Only a few of the migrants travelled to Malta to join their relations. Of all these factors, social insecurity and need for improved living condition featured predominantly, followed by economic needs. This was observable in the interviews with Nigerian youth; in this sense they differed from the Filipino migrant youth, whose prime desire was to improve
on their professional skills. All migrant youth shared similar intentions of being economically capable of remitting money to relations back in their countries of origin with the exception of those who migrated to join their relations in Malta. All interviewed Filipino youth were indentured workers who arrived in the Island Republic through their domestic government agencies in a collaborative labor-supplying program they share with the Maltese government. They received their travelling documents and working permits to stay in Malta for their contract period through their government agencies. These Filipino migrants were largely trained health professionals who were recruited, trained, and certified by their domestic governments and exported to perform unregulated low class jobs in Malta. They had to pay back a certain percentage of their wages within the contract period to their domestic government through their agencies. They were employed in such unclassified job areas as home-keeping, child-care, bar-tending, cleaning, and hospitality services. Apart from Nigerian youth who fled the Libyan uprising, some of whom were actually brought over from Libya as refugees and wounded victims of war, those seeking a safe haven were migrant youth who left Nigeria and transited through Sahara Desert-bounded countries until they arrived in Libya. Most of them aimed to eventually reach mainland Europe but were rescued off the Mediterranean coasts of Malta and Lampedusa.

The youth insisted that they were constrained from attaining their goal by logistic short-comings, finances, and the inability to procure required travelling documents. They therefore made the decision to use alternative means of transportation (Europe by land) – and a less predictable but dangerous route across the Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea. Instead of direct, easier, and safer movement from source to destination countries, they used indirect migration in which they had to transit through many countries, employ the services
of clandestine agents to arrive at the known migration nerve-center, and from there, board improvised boats across the Mediterranean to Europe. It is crucial to highlight that migrant transit states are as important to the entire process of transactional migration as the other elements scholars focus on. Transit destinations are as important to the migrants’ epistemic realities as their states of origin and destination. In fact, earlier cited works accentuate the complex interactions that take place in transit spaces between migrants and other stakeholders in transnational migration in the Sahara Desert, Libya, Indonesia, and around the world. Migrants encounter unimaginable extortions and robbery attacks, even physical assaults and all manner of abuse, at the hands of dubious border officials. The females among them sometimes suffer sexual assault from criminals who waylaid them in the migration routes. Often migrants are killed if they fail to meet the demands of the armed robbers. The governments of Sahara Desert-bounded countries have worked in collaboration with EU border agencies, EUROPOL, and FRONTEX to prevent Africa – Europe migrants from embarking on sea journeys that would bring them into mainland Europe. This means that many of the migrants have also been killed in transit during altercations with overzealous border officials. The extension of the EU border restriction and securitization measures to the Mediterranean coast of North Africa means equipping radically ruthless officers to mow down recalcitrant migrants. Many of my interviewees, who originally aimed to arrive in mainland Europe, decided to settle in Libya because they found the country conducive to engaging in all kinds of economic activities, enjoying the thriving living experiences they never had in their country of origin. These youth consistently believed that the dictatorial regime of Gadhafi in Libya was more peaceful and conducive for their survival than during the revolution that ousted and killed Gadhafi; they held this view irrespective of their
religious differences as they are mostly Christians. Therefore, some of the migrants stated that they reconsidered remaining in Libya, thus worked, settled, and were remitting money to their relations back in Nigeria from there rather than taking the risk of going across the Mediterranean to Europe. The quintessential years of transition in Libya came to an abrupt end in the uprising that ousted Gaddafi, which was also marked by a series of xenophobic raids and attacks on immigrants (more specifically, non-Muslim Blacks from other African countries) accused by the revolutionaries of serving as mercenaries to Gadhafi forces. As an Arab Islamic state on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, Libya was a strategic commercial nerve center in ancient trades between Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Its centrality as one of the historically powerful Arab states remains indisputable. So it also serves as indispensable transit hub for the 21st century Africa – Europe youth migration. Libya’s ancient historical connection with Malta depicts the ancient Arab commercial enclave as sharing common linguistic and cultural traits with Malta, which coincidentally lies a few kilometers away into the Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, by joining the European Union in 2004, Europe’s shrewd border expansion won Malta as a strategic space for intercepting, incarcerating, and deporting unwanted African immigrants perceived by the EU states as both a security threat and socio-economic burden.

Libya doubles as a transit space and entry-port for African youth migrants who intend to enter Europe as immigrants; most of them only realizing later that they have to declare themselves as asylum seekers and refugees in order to be accommodated or considered favorably. Libya is the preferred transit point, especially for immigrants from East, Central, and West Africa; and others from Asia and the Middle East who might perceive strong restrictions and securitization at the coasts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Due to its
proximity to the East, Central, and to some extent, West African countries, migrants arrive in Libya via land-routes across other transit countries such as Niger Republic, Mali, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Middle Easterners, Arabians, and other Asian migrants also transit to Europe through Libya via Egypt. Boats are arranged with middlemen, organizers, and a network of migrant settlers who have found the business opportunities of rendering services to Europe-bound migrants intending to cross the Mediterranean increasingly lucrative. The crossing is negotiated between collections of intending passengers who are temporarily housed in a refugee camp. Using boats and other improvised floating devises to reach Europe from Libya is a very treacherous and hazardous four- to seven-day crossing and has continued to claim many lives. It however takes the courage of people who are resolved to die or earn—by dint of bravery or fate—the better life that eluded them in their countries of origin. A few of my interviewees, as a distinct category from those who arrived in boats, flew directly into Malta from Nigeria either as international students who came to acquire higher education or as youth arriving to join their relatives. In either case, Malta citizens and authorities reserve no distinction in the way they relate with the immigrants, especially those from Africa. According to Nigerian youth migrants, there is a prevalence of racism and anti-immigrant uprising targeted against sub-Saharan Africans who are simply regarded as rejected, Clandestine, Boat-people, Iswed, or Illegal, notwithstanding their means/purpose for coming into Malta. The Maltese media and public opinion have in no small measure incited the instruments of representation and construction of difference that have entrenched different forms of negative representations and policies, which young immigrants have to daily live with. The majority of the youth migrants, for instance, live on the margins of Maltese society, where they eke a living below poverty lines. They neither have legal
documents authorizing them to have access to descent jobs nor means of normal livelihood.

The new policies introducing fingerprint surveillance systems in all EU member states also ensures that migrant individuals are confined to the state where they were disembarked from the boat after rescue. In other words, an onwards journey into Fortress Europe is now out of the question. The result of these and other anti-immigrant measures is the spate of frustration that is common among youth migrants who have staged several demonstrations in Malta in the previous years. They have to live off of some stipends of 130 Euros per month (with some of them paying up to 49 Euros on rent at the Open Detention facilities, at 1.65 Euros per day). This was after the migrant youth were released from the 18 month detention (which many of them described as worse than imprisonment). Another option is to endeavor to carry on with under-the-table menial jobs, mostly at construction sites, and these are labor-intensive jobs suitable only for able-bodied male migrants. Such jobs were evidently hazardous, and according to my interviewees, were assigned to immigrants because Maltese citizens would not accept jobs that were so demeaning and in such unsafe conditions. The immigrants had no insurance coverage and were often not provided with protective equipment for such risky undertakings. In most cases they got injured or killed. In the event of construction accidents involving youth migrants, they argue that the greedy and unscrupulous contractors colluded with medical officials to do bogus reports incriminating the voiceless migrants. One of my interviewees, whose hand was disfigured, was thankful that he did not die when construction equipment almost crushed him. Another interviewee, whose friend was killed by a collapsing crane at one of the construction sites, expresses angst that nothing was done to bring the contractors to justice or to pay commensurate compensation to his friend’s family back in Africa; according to him
this would not have been the case were the victim a Maltese or EU citizen, even if the unfortunate accident had happened in Africa or elsewhere in the developing world. While the plight of these migrants lingers, more and more boatloads of migrants arrive and are expected at the coasts of Malta or Lampedusa.

Why then are Nigerian migrant youth in Malta resisting all efforts by Maltese and EU authorities to have them repatriated? Outstanding among the responses is the complex theme of socio-political insecurity in their country of origin. Additionally, the hope that Malta is merely a transit location – an arms-length to European mainland – and opportunity that will shortly turn around to their favor keeps the migrants optimistic. After all, they have overcome the worst scenarios symbolized in the crossing of the Sahara Desert and the tumultuous Mediterranean Sea. Some of the youth are expectant that better policies will come someday in the future that will turn around their plights, and they will reach Europe. They are oblivious to or consciously ignorant of the strength and resources put forward by the EU to deter them from the mainland Europe. Given the urgent and critical need for data on the trends and experiences of youth currently involved in transnational migration, the thought patterns and available literature on the phenomenon appear to have left substantial lacunae in guiding our understanding on the problem by deferring the answers to some of the vital questions on the 21st century youth migration. Despite increasing cases of youth migration all over the world, their movements are still accounted for as part of a family reunion. The emphasis in most literature is directing our gaze to a rather dangerous and surprising reality—that the movement of young adults across international boundaries as independent migrants is intensifying. There is also an apparent lack of consensus on the factors influencing young people’s decision to migrate. The diversity of views expressed by the
various studies on the motives of transnational migration will not congeal to reliable data for serious policy decisions, nor will the paucity of information on the trends, flow, and patterns of youth migration. While people from different regions of the world might have particular motives for migrating to settle overseas, most of the works reviewed hid their shortcomings under the cover of inadequate data, specifically as it affects migration from developing countries. As plausible as these claims may sound, the reality is that the world is facing a crisis of enormous dimensions. If nothing is immediately done to address the increasing flow of young adults from the developing South to the industrialized North, both the sending and receiving nations will be adversely affected one way or the other (developmentally and logistically). It is only through adopting empirically sound thought-posture on the matter that policy-enhancing information on youth migration will emerge. In addition, the limited existing literature on youth migration simply discusses the generic and fundamental issues of human rights protection and labor market prospects for migrant youth, thus placing the priorities of youth migrants at par with those of their adult counterparts.

My view, however, is that some kind of distinction would naturally exist between the inspirations and motives of transnational migrant youth and their adult counterparts, no matter how insignificant, and such underpinnings could be a pointer to the information on patterns of the rising trend and flow of youth transnational migration. Also, as hinted earlier in previous chapters, scholars who propounded the idea of omni-directional flow of labor (human) migration, argued that labor goes from South to North, and vice-versa. Capital, technology, and investment, move South-ward. These by implication go without recourse to the question of power imbalance between the North - South divide when it comes to border
control and surveillance. My thesis would rather locate the interlocking determinants of migrants’ experiences in government policies, demography, and social representation. Almost all available literature is silent about international migration, policy, and power-imbalance as they apply differentially to South and North migrant subjects. For example, there is still no information indicating that the migration and border surveillance policies of nations in the global South affect the territorial border-crossing of nationals of the North as those of the North do on Southern migrants. Such information would be available through the analysis of data on the peculiar experiences of individual migrants at the ports of entry; and since this is crucial for understanding how international border gate-keeping and surveillance systems are grounded in the neo-colonial and neo-liberal agenda, my future study, which will be carried out in the Island Republic of Malta, will generate a comprehensive view of youth migration experiences by comparing experiences of Nigerian migrant youth with those of migrant youth of European descent.

Presently, observable changes are emerging in the demographic composition of Africa – Europe migration. A large collection of refugees and displaced population from the war-torn Asian, Middle Eastern, and Arab North African states of Afghanistan, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Yemen are competing for survival spaces with those originally migrating from Africa. The latest evidence from media and public outcry following the capsizing of migrants’ boats that claimed hundreds of lives along the Mediterranean coast of Libya suggests that Europe is feeling asphyxiated by the deluge of immigrants. That singular drowning of mixed migrants of different nationalities was not an isolated case, because the estimated number of immigrant deaths on the Mediterranean Sea per year is totaled at fifties
of thousands. As a follow up to the most recent case, therefore, a series of EU meetings was summoned, culminating in a decision to downplay the internal politics of refugee management allocations and sharing between the mainland European countries and the gate-keeping states at the Mediterranean borders. The resolution by stakeholders to support EU Mediterranean Coast Guards with more funds and equipment in order to forestall the further encroachment of migrant boats into European waters must have come out of panic, because appropriate assessment of previous anti-immigrant experiments symbolized in Triton and Mare Nostrum could have revealed that instead of eradicating or reducing the influx of irregular immigrants, the use of force to suppress immigrant adventures has always generated counter-productive consequences. Migrants become more creative and desperate and the outcome is better not imagined. As important as the EU’s decision to equip FRONTEX and EUROPOL to patrol the Libyan coast and destroy impending migrant-boats, a critical re-assessment of FRONTEX’s performance on the Mediterranean Sea would reveal rather aggressive and violent intentions on the part of EU states.

The idea of authorizing the EU sea and border agencies to destroy immigrant boats at Libyan ports is an encroachment on the territory of another sovereign state’s territory, apparently taking advantage of the failed state the West has made of the post-Gaddafi Libya. It is also a call to destroy hundreds of lives of migrants and a step out of caution as more migrant causalities would be likely in unregulated FRONTEX operations. This time migrant casualties would be buried in silence and out of the radar of global media; they would go unnoticed like their colleagues who perished crossing the Sahara Desert. Obviously, EU states would prefer this option to allowing incidents of death on the Mediterranean Sea where
the world looks on EU activities with suspicion. No matter how one views it, there is hitherto no mechanism in place for the EU to monitor and regulate the activities of its international policing agents. If, therefore, no one is to be held accountable in the event of flagrant violation of migrants’ rights then the whole border restrictive measure is bound to produce chaos and wanton destruction of innocent lives. For instance, in an interview with a Finnish newspaper, *Fifi Voima*, as highlighted earlier in the thesis, the FRONTEX director, Ilkka Laitinen, absolved FRONTEX of responsibility for any misadventures during their operations, shifting it rather on the EU member states. The question is: why the aggressive policy and why now? Within the European Union, member states are embroiled in a new form of politics – that of nationality and citizenship in which there are three gradients of belongingness – and therefore appropriation of rights and privileges were envisaged. The negative experiences of Western Germany after the collapse of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989 were probably caused by the shock engendered by the influx of citizens of Eastern Germany in search of job opportunities and a better life. Unprepared for the enormous pressure the immigrants would have on their existing resources, Western Germany staggered under the weight and quickly devoted resources to raising Eastern Germany from the squalor it represented as a way of reducing the movement to the West. The Germans eventually succeeded, but not without a hard lesson of what the sudden influx of immigrants would mean for a thriving economy. As one of the stakeholders and vested interests in the European Union, therefore, Germany and such experienced economies as Britain, Italy, and France are wary and tread the plane of the economic community with caution. The economic and socio-political mindsets ensconced by some of the EU member states through their previous immigration realities obviously influence their disposition toward African youth migrants.
In the Island Republic of Malta, the first citizens, the Maltese, enjoy all available rights and privileges provided by the state. The second citizens, immigrants from other EU member states, enjoy limited rights and privileges while the third citizens, those who emigrate from countries outside EU member states, have no privileges at all unless they obtained citizenship by naturalization. Migrants who were second citizens or citizens of other European states always complain of marginalization and racism in the EU states of their domicile. Citizens of Eastern Europe who arrived in industrialized economies like Germany, Britain, and France after their countries joined the EU, are facing racist push-backs in these countries too. Evidently, marginalization and racism aren’t really peculiar to African migrants in the EU states, yet the effects of anti-immigrant fallouts are more visible on African migrants than on any other group in the European Union. A majority of the youth migrants interviewed described their living conditions and socio-political status in Malta with such disturbing words as: “horrible,” “miserable,” “poor,” “bad,” “uncertain,” “frustrating,” and “deplorable.” They were, however, more concerned about restrictive measures put in place by Maltese authorities to hinder them from attaining their goals of reaching mainland Europe. Some of these measures include restricting them to only survival jobs and allowances and rejecting their requests for asylum and refugee status so they are not issued resident or working permits. Other measures are enforced to prohibit youth in major detention centers from communicating with the outside world or being visited by friends or relations until they are released to the Open Detention facilities after 18 months. Interviewed migrants also indicated that they did not intend to continue their mainland Europe migration without proper documents in order to avoid confrontation with police and border officials. Therefore, they
were visibly worried about the indefinite reluctance of Maltese authorities to issue them with travel documents; and many of them described the Island as an unfortunate “entrapment” they must struggle to extricate themselves from in order to actualize their goals. Ultimately, migrant youth jostle between competing needs requiring them to regularly prioritize, re-evaluate, and initiate choices to navigate around complex obstacles in their way. They are resolved to resist any efforts to send them back where they came from notwithstanding their poor treatment in the host states. According to interview responses, this resolve stems from a series of justifiable reasons other than the economy. Youth migrants make decisions on how and what to do to arrive and settle in their destination countries. They are also encumbered with the responsibility of securing necessary documents that will enable them to improve their education and skills. This move enhances their prospects of securing gainful employment so as to take care of themselves and be in a position to make remittances to their loved ones back in Nigeria. Finally, I wish to maintain that the absence of governance or a regulatory system at the transit coasts of North Africa, coupled with the persistent low levels of development, wars, poverty, cultural vitiation, and social displacements happening in sub-Saharan Africa are indications that youth migration will remain a challenge to both the sending and receiving states. The EU-intended push-backs on migrants using FRONTEX are bound to result in more bloody consequences. The migrants might resolve to settle in the war-torn and hostile Arab states of North Africa, which by and large are deemed more economically progressive than their countries of origin. This decision might yield double implications: first, cultural and ethnic racism would mean that the profoundly Islamic citizens would start attacking and killing youth migrants who are primarily Christians as was the case during the revolution that ousted Col. Gadhafi. Second, the citizens of Arab states
themselves might decide to migrate out to Europe in large numbers in search of better pastures, which is already the case given the ISIS insurgency. Also, youth migrants might explore alternative routes to enter Europe, which could expose them to even more dangers.

**Re-theorizing Youth Migration**

**South – North Youth Migration: A Function of Neo-colonial Antigenic Drift**

It is expedient for me at this juncture to provide another way of thinking about the ever-rising cases of African youth migration to Europe as a way of disturbing the hackneyed concepts of Push and Pull, which both rationalizes Western management approach to the unhealthy trend, and blames the surge in migration on the socio-political and economic lapses in the sending countries. It becomes imperative for me to start by raising the question: how might we begin to rethink youth transnational migration? Rethinking global youth migration becomes crucial to unsettling existing assumptions, policies and praxis that have neither yielded positive outcomes towards reducing global youth migration trends nor ameliorated the transit ordeals of the migrant subjects. Almost all extant migration theories are grounded in the banal Push and Pull narratives, which essentially projects immigrants as burdens to the receiving societies (largely the industrialized countries of the North). This theoretical inclination both blames the sending nations for the migrants’ woes and beclouds the contributions of the host states to the making of migrant subjects, and the benefits receiving states derive from the contributions of immigrants to the economies of the host countries.

I have detailed how colonization has frustrated and continued to thwart and subvert Indigenous people’s worldviews, socio-economic and geo-cultural environments. The disruptions imposed by colonization and neo-colonial processes leave in their trail an unending troupe of environmentally irrelevant, economically marginalized and socio-
politically displaced individuals, who having been equipped with the colonizers’ cultures and world views would migrate overseas. It is often easy to summon the apparition called “Post-Colonial” as a knock-out point to anyone who dares to blame colonization as a cause for the 21st century youth transnational migration. And the term, post-colonial has been shrewdly invented by the colonizers to continue to sustain the stifling grip of colonization on the hoodwinked and hapless lots who are caught in the labyrinth of neo-colonialism. It is however very likely that colonization did not end with the attainment of political independence of the colonized peoples of the South. In fact colonization, an imposition of political, economic or cultural power (on a social group by another dominant group) is actually an insidiously sustained domination strategy that could be manipulated, mutated and twisted to keep the colonized perpetually on a secured economic and socio-political leash of the colonizer.

**Antigenic drift, a micro-biology concept in the context of colonization: Implications for youth migration**

I will advance an understanding of the constantly changing form of colonization with an illustration from one of the features of influenza virus. In its antigenic drift there are small but constant changes in the genes of influenza virus overtime, which reproduce viruses that are related but antigenically different. Such transformations make it difficult for a human immunologic memory to recognize and respond to it appropriately. These changes that result in viruses with completely distinct antigenic properties are the reasons flu vaccines are composed every year and people are advised to take new flu shots each year. Similarly, colonization and structuring of neo-colonial projects is deliberately and systematically designed. It is executed as an ongoing project whose existence has continued to be sustained by two factors: one is the colonizers’ skillful but questionable and deliberate repudiation of
every attempt to uncover its evergreen nature. The second sustaining factor is the inherent
ability of neo-colonial process to mutate and take up different forms at different periods.

**Implications for the South - North Migration**

Colonization, an offspring of the global system of capital expansion has been traced
by social scientists and migration scholars through the early 19th Century Europe. In its
inception, invention of machinery stepped up production leading to industrial revolution.
Sourcing of raw materials for manufacturing units further pommeled Europe into plantation
agriculture, and hunting for cheap source of labor through slave trade. The Arab trans-
Saharan slave trade supplied slaves from Europe and Africa for domestic use and cottage
production in the Middle East and North Africa. The European transatlantic slave trade fed
the growing need for labor in extraction industries and plantation economies of Europe,
Africa and the Americas. The antigenic drift in the system of capital expansion in Europe led
to a systematic mutation that saw Europe as a militarized colonizer of many established
kingdoms and Indigenous societies whose natural and human resources were harnessed to
meet the developmental requirement in Europe. The abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade
and granting of independence to the formally annexed territories spurred another era of
antigenic drift. These did not come until the West had weaved another maze for subjugation
of developing economies. The 20th Century World Order brought an economic policy with a
façade termed globalization, free market and open democracy. With these strategies came the
structural adjustment policies, the use of loans and foreign aids to destabilize developing
nations. The aim of this phase in the antigenic drift of Europe’s system of capital expansion
was to create massive displacement of people who would migrate to feel the labor and human
resources gap created by aging population in the industrialized world. The various phases of
antigenic drift discussed so far are not coincidental but planned, articulated, and executed.
Therefore, the colonizers’ economic interest is the centrepiece of capital expansion and neo-colonial projects around which the Global Orders are weaved.

Ultimately a subtle slavery era has emerged in which (the colonizers do not stain their moral conscience, if it exist at all) by using military force to annex or coerce people into slavery. It is a system designed to impel the politically and economically displaced peoples of the developing world to cross transnational borders in search of better conditions of living that has been destroyed in their home countries. It is therefore designed to consummate the total subjugation of the displaced migrants. On that note many policies are put in place in the receiving nations to continue to under-value the migrants’ educational qualifications and professional skills. Even after updating their qualifications and skills, the system is designed to deny most of the immigrants certain privileges so that their status as quasi-slaves would be consolidated. They work hard and pay the most taxes (while ‘real citizens’ enjoy tax benefits and largess) to keep them afloat economically. For instance most immigrants and their families barely can afford food, shelter, clothing, education, and access to good healthcare in their host societies. And these are actually the social determinants of healthy livelihood. My work is therefore insisting that the current trend in youth transnational migration is not different from, but actually tantamount to modern day slavery in disguise. It is a mutated form of enslavement. It is a deliberate creation of the changing faces of colonization, which is why the colonizers (industrialized world) focus majorly on migration management.

**Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research**

In this thesis, I have explored the lived experiences of Nigerian youth migrants in the Republic of Malta EU. Based on the findings already outlined in the previous chapters, my recommendations will be directed toward the stakeholders in the 21st century youth
transnational migration, including: youth migrants (to be imparted through) youth education; governments of the states (nations) of origin; and governments of the receiving nations.

**Implications for Youth Education**

Africans must realize the interconnectedness of their Indigenous education with the peoples’ epistemological and philosophical underpinnings, which often is reflected in the relationship they share with their environment and their fellow human beings. So the project of decolonization must, in my view, start with the continental Africans and the Diasporas (that is, those born in and outside African geographical borders uniting to forge a new identity for the citizenry). This is possible through social cohesion built through revisiting and re-establishing Indigenous African modes of knowledge production and dissemination that will be tailored to meet the educational needs of Africans, specifically the youth in the 21st century world. This will definitely require a thorough investigation to unearth all Indigenous African languages, technological and scientific foundations, and modes of leadership (based on accountability and responsibility) which had either been swept aside or buried beneath the vestiges of imperial projects. Attempts to reinvent African epistemologies and historical past in this direction might not find a welcome in the estimation of Arab or Euro-American trained Africans and scholars whose education has left them both sympathetic and subservient to colonial methodologies and influences. It might also suffer a set-back resulting from disunity among African regions whose opinions, language, and approach should be accepted to champion the cause of African socio-economic and technological development. In my view, the contention about whose language to be made African lingua franca should not constitute a barrier to the continent’s unity and development, as Igbo’s east of the Niger would insist, “Every nation’s firewood meets their cooking needs.” Moreover, inventories and databases should be stored in the designated
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regional universities and centers of research and development to be accessed by all parties for future developmental goals. In this way, African youth will be afforded ample opportunities to learn about Africa, her rich cultural heritage, and her spirituality-based philosophy of life. African youth educated in the continent’s rich culture and resource forms would, instead of emigrating overseas, find a solution to life problems in the skills bequeathed them in their communities, and they would employ the same responsibly for the wellbeing of their communities at large.

The curricula and policies of African institutions of learning, from kindergarten through university should be made to abide by African languages and cultures. The policies, curricula, and pedagogical practices would all be evidence-based and tailored to meet the needs of the learners in African society. Institutions of higher learning should be culturally sensitive as a way of incorporating the experiences of talented individuals in the society who do not possess Western education such as farmers, medicine vendors and specialists in healthcare, meteorologists, etc. Research must be guided by our worldviews and ways of investigation—not the rigid Western methodologies (Smith, 1999; Stolzenberg, 2004). This will create the openness needed to orally gather data needed from Indigenously educated folks and document this information for posterity. The question to guide us will be: where were we and what did we have before the colonial encounter? I do believe that if most of the African inventions and discoveries in science can be effectively investigated, analyzed, documented and reproduced, the present generation of Africans would not only feel proud to identify with such a rich collection of scientific ingenuity but would also aspire through contemporary technologies to make them relevant to our dispensation by bridging the gap between the past and present in terms of structures, rules, and praxis. African spirituality,
which emphasizes honesty, accountability, and strength in communal co-existence, should be a guide for building new African identity in which Africans all over the world would be represented. Our Indigenous education also grounded in African philosophies will focus on redefining relevant paths for posterity in such scientific domains as arts, medicine, astronomy, environmental and social sciences. The trajectory of Africa’s cultural, political, and socio-economic development must also aim to deliver just and equitable outcomes now as to bolster the future generations of Africans. States in Africa must seek a way of reincorporating Africans in the Diaspora in all fields of endeavor to evolve African-based solutions in meeting the developmental needs of the continent and beyond.

Ascribing the current massive emigration of Nigerian youth to the size of its population, economic climate, and porous borders as depicted in the IOM’s 2009 report on Nigeria, is simply another hogwash version of the banal push and pull factor narratives. I earlier clarified this to be an exoneration of the receiving countries from complicities in the making of global migrant subjects. Such parochial perspectives have been craftily devised by colonizing nations to depict migrants from colonized world as constituting burdens to their socio-economic domain. Unfortunately, the use of neo-colonial projects by the global dominant powers in developing economies is consistently pervasive. Hitherto, disruption and destabilization of Indigenous structures that people depend on for survival are insidiously embedded in the use of foreign direct investments FDI, language, medicine, religion, cultural colonization, and unending manipulation of the economic base of developing countries. Nigeria, and by extension other African countries, have abundant natural and human resources. Colonial education produces egocentric and selfish leaders who have continued to embezzle funds meant to develop their communities and dump these fiscal resources in
foreign accounts while the rest of the population languishes in abject penury. The governments of African states must therefore reinvent their Indigenous worldviews in education. They must reassess existing educational systems—the policies, curricula and pedagogical practices and incorporate environmentally relevant policies, and praxis that would transform children into environmentally relevant youth. Indigenous education teaches, among other things, skills and survival strategies, resilience, and the use of natural resources to cater for the present without compromising the future. In this context, the young ones, as members of the communal whole, would begin to learn to be accountable and responsible citizens. They would selflessly work hard to uphold the values and achieve the collective goals of their societies instead of attempting to avoid the problems by engaging in irregular migration. Developing countries of migrants’ origin should take appropriate steps to prevent irregular migration. This must be through a sustained effort to incorporate the vast reports of studies on migration into policies on education. This might translate to teaching youth and unaccompanied minors transnational migration as a course in institutions of learning starting from primary schools, secondary to higher education. The aim must be to drive home the precarious and often tragic consequences of this phenomenon.

**Sending Nations**

Nigerian youth are not just the productive segment of the very nation’s socio-demographical context but comprise its future leaders. They have to be raised with honesty and be guided with untainted wisdom. The leaders of Nigeria, and by extension other African developing economies must not drive their youth to desperation through dishonest political practices and maneuvers, that have continued to engender insecurity in the society. The leaders must transform themselves into mirrors of credibility, accountability, and responsibility (that are qualities of African Indigenous leadership) for their youth to emulate.
Nigeria has abundant natural and human resources that its leaders must harness to provide the youth with modern infrastructures, like power supply, schools, skills-training centers and technical institutes, hospitals, roads, etc. The wealth of the nation should not be pillaged to favor few criminally minded politicians while the society is thrown into the chaos of poverty and lawlessness, as it appears to be today in the hands of angry youth. The multiplicity of ethnic based militia and fanatics (Boko Haram, Odua, MEND MASSOB, etc.) is the result of the poverty and despair the politicians have created over a long period of wasteful spending and looting of public coffers. The incumbent Nigerian leadership must, as a matter of urgency, provide the basic necessities of life to the citizens, and none will even imagine stealing away through the dangers of desert and sea to the uncertainties of foreign lands. One of the interviewees rightly stated that if the youth do not emigrate, given the socio-political tensions, Nigeria could descend into another Somalia. The youth must be taught and equipped to uphold such virtuous qualities as resourcefulness, resilience, and credibility, and to be responsible citizens. They will naturally be inclined to these skills if they are equipped early enough in life with Indigenous African knowledge and worldviews that are grounded in individual spirituality and the interconnectedness of lives. The youth would thus represent a competent and resourceful demographic constituent that would use available resources to meet their pressing needs and those of their societies rather than engage in migration.

More studies on youth migration should be carried out by the relevant Nigerian ministries in order to obtain extensive and rounded data on the phenomenon. The information obtained must translate into meaningful migration policy imperatives that will address youth involvement in the process as well. Also, the authorities in Nigeria must go beyond the colonizers’ strategy of migration management that is practiced at the moment by diversifying
its economy from oil into job creation ventures for the ever-rising youth population. If they must permit youth emigration, the government should then engage a more collaborative effort with receiving nations to work out modalities for equipping prospective migrant youth with internationally accredited skills and education and required travelling documents. This effort will evolve from the recognition of the migrant youth’s contributions to the economy and Gross National Product, GNP, of the sending society. GNP means the estimated total worth of commodities and services by citizens of a country, on its land or on foreign land, calculated over a year interval. GNP is calculated as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) plus net income, NI, which is inflow from assets abroad minus net payment, NP, which is remittance to foreign assets in the country. Nigeria has continued to pay more attention to migration management, and as I hinted in chapter one, managing youth migration is simply not the easy way out. It amounts to attending to the symptoms of a disease while the patient dies. Evidently, youth migration to Europe from Africa is becoming a huge tragic concern both to Africa and to the receiving nations. As the most populous country in Africa, Nigeria must initiate a leading role in addressing youth-related concerns in its domain. Insecurity, unemployment, poverty, and unenviable living conditions were highlighted in the interviews. The efforts of Nigerian leadership in conjunction with IOM to manage issues of youth emigration and internally displaced persons, IDPs, are commendable—at least for being a timely intervention. It is not, however, an effective or appropriate long-term solution to the serious social concern that youth emigration represents. This accounts for why the presence of IOM and creation of National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) have not succeeded in reducing or eradicating youth emigration from the country. The country might borrow a leaf from the Philippines government. In that case, Nigeria
needs to establish two labor-exporting agencies (one for permanent and the other for temporal employment) through its National Commission for Refugees (NCFR). The government might use its ongoing relations with the European Union to solicit assistance from the National European Union Development Fund (EDF) to establish skill training centers that will prepare prospective migrants and equip them to be labor-market ready for industrialized economies. The representatives of the sending and receiving countries here work closely to establish areas of labor need and develop skills training programs to meet these needs. In this way, the youth would benefit from the skills gained, and the hope that they are prepared to legally travel to work overseas would definitely discourage them from engaging in tragic illegal migration adventures. The sending nation would equally benefit more from remittances of its citizens and be in a better position to monitor the youth abroad and ensure that they are not exploited.

**Strategies for Resolving Youth Emigration Issues in Nigeria: Educational Approach**

The current education policies and praxis must develop subjects or courses on transnational migration. This should inform changes in curriculum in primary and secondary schools, and in the tertiary institutions aimed at teaching, using audiovisual (films and documentaries) to make a positive impact on the worldviews of young Nigerians. More research on youth migration should be carried out by tertiary institutions in the country and findings made available to policy institutes. Presently, universities and colleges engage in and encourage trivial research projects that are environmentally irrelevant and neither evidence-based nor geared to meeting local needs. Such researches have no local input or focus and are based on colonial or (imposed Western) methodologies. They are unable to provide means for meeting local socio-economic needs. As viable strategic imperative, social groups such as religious institutions, NGOs, women, men, and youth groups must all be engaged in the
dissemination of information on youth migration using Indigenous ora-media channels and
relevant documentaries arising from investigative research findings. Also, media
documentaries, news features, PSAs (public service announcements) on the web, prints,
radio, TV, etc., must be harnessed and put to use in dissemination of the information on
eradication of hazardous youth emigration to Oversea countries.

Receiving Nations

Most of the receiving nations in the 21st century youth migration are industrialized
countries who have ageing population as a peculiar demographic trend. A decrease in birth rate,
decrease in death rate, improved standard of living and healthcare means that the populations
in most of these countries favor people in old age categories more. These seniors are mostly
retirees from active service who might have one health support need or the other. Therefore,
the governments of these countries, specifically countries of the West, have used open door
immigration policies to fill in the gaps in the active or productive age bracket of the
population. Such policy measures include: provision of educational scholarships to foreign
students, as well as cross-border recruitment of professionals and specialists for short and
long term employment opportunities. Only a few of the interviewees in my study fell into
these categories, implying that a large percentage of youth migrants today do not follow the
regular migration protocols. Under normal conditions, the receiving nations may not have
adequate resources to contain the influx of this category of migrants, yet the influx of youth
migrants into industrialized societies of the West could be attenuated to yield a positive
outcome. A well planned and executed educational and skill development program would
ensure that these youth are transformed to contribute meaningfully to the economic well-
being of their host societies rather than being perceived as welfare burdens. This means that
receiving nations should act fairly in the reception and documentation of the migrant youth
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

once they arrive in their territory. There should be a fair reception and treatment of youth migrants in the receiving states in recognition of their contributions to the economy and Gross Domestic Product, GDP, of the host society. GDP is an estimated value of the total worth of a country’s production and services, within its territory (by her citizens and foreigners) calculated over a year interval. GDP is computed as consumption plus investment plus government spending plus exports minus imports. The understanding that migrant youth make positive contributions to the economy and are not a burden to the society also implies evolving policies for their proper integration into the mainstream of the host society. Authorities of the host countries should empower these youth by providing them environmentally relevant skills and training and the necessary migration documents. It will also mean according humane and non-parochial or discriminatory treatment to all youth migrants. Considering the motivations of the youth to have dared to sacrifice their lives, only crisis situations—political, economic, social etc.—could drive young adults into such a desperate attempt. Therefore, authorities of the host societies should not be discriminatory or selective about how to treat them. This means that migrant youth should all be given the same equal opportunities for survival in their adoptive societies. Foreign policy initiatives of the industrialized nations should reflect consistent political and economic pressures on the home governments of the migrant sending countries. The desired political cum economic pressure should be geared toward providing and sustaining economic infrastructures that will support youth’s socio-economic survival in their countries of origin. It was highlighted earlier in this work that money meant for building modern schools, hospitals, roads, and other utilities in developing economies is often stolen by politicians who either deposit it in banks or transfer it for foreign investments abroad while their subjects wallow in abject
penury. Industrialized economies are equally morally obligated to intervene in this area. Often politicians with questionable characters are accorded asylum by the industrialized nations after they have embezzled and deposited the wealth of their nations in these countries.

It is a pathetic irony that the youth transformed into transnational wanderers by the unpatriotic activities of dubious politicians are also denied refugee and asylum statuses. Enough of the axiom, which continues to assert that there is no morality in international relations! In support of development in Southern states and effective management of global youth concerns, the unpatriotic politicians who seek asylum after embezzling public funds in their countries and depositing them in banks located in industrialized countries, must be turned in to their domestic authorities for prosecution and the money stolen must be returned to the poor countries where they belong. In this way, the industrialized nations will indirectly be reducing youth migration. The authorities of industrialized nations must be seen to be genuine in their approach to this pervasive social trend and not direct their angst toward migrant youth by deporting them. We should bear in mind that if migrant youth are summarily sent back to their countries of origin without vigorously addressing their driving factors, they will definitely reemerge, this time employing a more self-risking, hazardous migratory strategy to ensure they succeed. This basically is the experience in the European, Australian, and North American borders.

While theorizing that youth transnational migration experiences may require more than reviewing the influence of colonization on the migrant subject, my thesis strongly recommends that appropriate rethinking of this trend would do well to accentuate the role of
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

colonization and the disruption of migrants subjects’ Indigenous cultural environment in generating potential transnational immigrants in the 21st century. The paradox remains that so long as the international organizations, policy-makers, and the other stakeholders on transnational migration continue to channel their efforts on managing migration to optimize the benefits and reduce risks (IOM, 2011), engaging theories to meet praxis might remain a mirage, especially in assuaging the long-term effect of youth migration on the African continent. The allocation of funds should not be mainly intended to achieve border securitization and restriction goals. Rather, it should be geared toward resolving the challenges inherent in the intersection of international laws and codes of practices with respect to the operation of EU border officials toward migrant individuals. There should be clearly spelled-out boundaries for policies and praxis that is devoid of implementation loopholes. Also, regional transnational border agencies such as FRONTEX and EUROPOL should be monitored, their actions evaluated regularly, and they must be made accountable and punishable for violations of migrants’ rights at the international waters or within EU frontiers as a measure to reinforce the credibility of international promulgations and forestall future breaches of its provisions by other sub-regional enforcement agencies globally. The rescue of distressed migrants at international or territorial waters must be an imperative function for all international maritime operatives irrespective of the victim’s nationality, sex, ability, or ethnicity. Besides the UNHCR’s provision to publicly commend the gestures of seafarers who rescue migrants (Sunderland, 2012), individuals or agencies that have failed to carry out this civic and humanitarian responsibility should be held culpable regardless of origin or creed. This will reinforce the tradition of seafaring codes of which the purpose is to respond to migrant distress calls (see Strik, 2012; International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974). To further safeguard the provisions of and forestall possible violation of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, defaulting agencies or individuals must be held accountable at the international court of justice instead of leaving different countries to apply measures as they deem fit. In 1990, the Island Republic of Malta endorsed the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which of course includes the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Although the government of Malta declared its intention to include the CRC into domestic law, it has yet to do so. Even where it incorporated the CRC, the border authorities have always claimed that the abruptness of immigrant rescue makes it difficult to accommodate youth migrants in different locations immediately. My view is that the EU government should through its Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC, provide a standout facility for unaccompanied child migrants. The authorities should use prima facie evidence submitted by the rescued children until evidence is ascertained to the contrary, which is based on the Principle of Non-discrimination, PON, and the Principle of the Best Interest of the Child, POBIC. Part of the implementation of a policy is making provision for accommodating the children who fall into this category. Finally, the authorities of Malta were incriminated by interviewed unaccompanied minors who claim that bone density samples were taken and it normally takes long for the confirmation of age of the applicant to be done before they are moved to different children’s facilities. This means child-migrants or unaccompanied minors are detained with adult migrants who are not related to them for as long as their ages are being determined. Interviewee testimonies also indicate that this pattern of treatment is peculiar to African migrants only. But state obligations under the CRC apply to each child within the state’s territory and to all children under its authority without discrimination. This
might include asylum seekers, refugees, and migrant children notwithstanding their nationality and immigration status.

Recognition of recent inevitable changes in the demographic constituents of the Africa – Europe migrant population might yet require both urgent and drastic measures by the member states of the European Union to cushion its fallouts. A drastic situation calls for drastic action. Youth besides women, children and men are ferrying across North African coasts to the borders of Europe in large numbers; fed by the internal displacement of peoples in the Middle-East, Asia, and particularly the ongoing war in Syria. The fear of inundation with immigrants by the EU member states is now more real than initially subsumed under myth. The EU member states might allay these fears by building a Buffer-City in any of the Islands or a selected unoccupied spots at the outskirts of Europe. Resources and money spent annually in rescuing and detaining migrants indefinitely can now be harnessed and put towards this project. The city needs to be designed and constructed using EU standards. Social utilities, economic infrastructures and amenities should be constructed to reflect EU standards. These provisions will ensure that immigrants feel at home and protected enough to avoid risking further onward journey to mainland Europe. Health institutions, religious structures, schools, and services-firms like banks, postal systems, as well as manufacturing units must be provided so that migrants will be economically and socially engaged in the city. Provision of permanent houses, communication and road networks, electricity, pipe-borne water and other infrastructures befitting a modern city will add solace to the needs of the migrants’ craving for safety and protection. EU member states will produce mayor of the city rotationally. The need for EU mayor means neutrality of policies and praxis at the disposal of the diverse migrant communities as well as sustained maintenance of EU standards
throughout the city. Military and policing exercise is best monitored by EU bodies such as FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUROJUST.

Suggestions for Future Research

During the field data collection exercise, as the chapter on methodology will clarify, several vital observations were made that might be useful as a focus for future scholarly investigations. First, contrary to expectations that a certain number of immigrant Nigerian youth would be interviewed from the six geo-political zones of the country, it was observed that almost all the interviewees were from the South-East, South-West, and South-South zones, thus raising the question: don’t youth from all the geo-political zones of Northern Nigeria migrate? Given that Arab colonization and cultural domination lasted about 400 years in Northern Nigeria before Western imperialist domination took over the entire country (Fafunwa, 1974; Isichei, 1983), I strongly recommend that further studies be carried out to refute or give credence to Shimeles et al.’s (2010) view that colonization influences the trend and flow of the South-North migration. The second area requiring future investigation is the role of gender in youth migration. Only a few female youth migrants were interviewed. My data revealed that a disproportionate number of female youth migrant subjects were repatriated by Maltese authorities. Further, in the data collection, cases of unaccompanied minors emerged, and since it is outside the focus of this thesis, understanding the drives and experiences of African children in transnational migration might be an interesting topic for future research that would inform policy shifts.

It was fascinating to observe in the literature that contrary to the title of this thesis, global migration flow is no longer unidirectional—that is, largely from the Southern hemisphere or developing world to the industrialized nations of the North (Appadurai, 1996; Solimano, 2010; Schiller, 2009) but is multi-directional. People, materials, technology, and
information are continuously exchanged in flows from the South to the North and vice versa. If Appadurai’s assertion is entirely true, then understanding the economic implication(s) of the supposedly balanced interaction between the industrialized North and the developing South would help us to see the frivolity in admitting without question that global migration flow is truly as multi-directional as Appadurai’s work suggests. The works of Allen (2008), Sassen (1988), Simms, (2009), Valiani (2012), Willinsky (1998), and Anderson (2006) show how foreign direct investment (FDI), cross-border outsourcing, informed by decisions to lower production cost, and leisure trips are the major driving forces for Northern citizens migrating to the South. On the contrary, citizens of developing economies of the South have an enormous list of pressures from what have been termed push and pull factors to seek greener pastures from their countries of origin. One of the areas requiring scholarly future investigations is the unequal power play at the border-crossing or port of entry between citizens of developing and developed nations. It will be necessary to explore the historical context of encounters between African migrant youth and the people of Malta. Such research undertakings would be central for analyzing the prejudices, hardships and social relations between the youth migrants and their host society. Contextualizing the historiography of Western Europe’s hegemonic power over the South (margins) and to some extent the Eastern European countries, which have only recently been granted the right to call themselves “Europe”, is critical for understanding why and how the migrants receive the treatments they are given at the borders of Europe. Browne (2007) believes that at the spatial intersections of border politicking, citizens of developing states face involuntary categorization and discrimination through comprehensive surveillance technologies. Migrants are separated into binary opposites: the desirable and the undesirable migrant subjects as a measure to restrict
the unwanted migrants. What is not clear is whether this system of screening applies to leisure-seeking; and investment-minded citizens of industrialized world at the entry-ports of developing countries. Future research projects will shed light on the superior versus inferior power dynamics at transnational border crossing as a function of a migrant’s racial identity and country of origin.

Finally, further investigation is urgently needed to verify the claims of discriminatory treatment (such as differentiated wages in labor market) meted out to migrant youth from other European countries as opposed to those from Africa on one hand and Asian youth migrants on the other in the receiving societies such as the island Republic of Malta. I would suggest a timeline study (2-5 year period); of a group of at least twenty four (24) potential migrant youth; 4 from each of the six geo-political zones in Nigeria or any other West African country. The study will follow migrant youth from origin through transit to the receiving country as a way of grounding this work for policy applications.
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Appendices

Appendix A

July 31st, 2013

Dear Madam/Sir,

Information Letter for Interviewees

I am PhD candidate in Humanities, Social Sciences and Social Justice Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto (OISE/UT). I am doing a research on Youth and transnational migration. I will be examining the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta. The key aim of this study is to contribute to literature on youth migration, provide data for relevant policy formulation, and establish ways in which reinventing the Indigenous African worldviews subverted by colonization can equip and empower local youth, thereby reducing the unhealthy trend in Nigerian youth emigration. The reason that I would like to speak with you is that, as an immigrant youth, your perspective will be quite significant in contributing to policy reform on international migration for youth.

I would like to invite you to participate in an interview about your experiences with the following: the processes of migration and your thoughts about the existing border surveillance systems as it affect the migrating youth, and integration processes for youth migrants in Malta. Your estimated participation time will be about 45 minutes and this shall take place either in the university or a place that is reasonably convenient to you and safe for both of us. All information derived from the interviews will be used for research and academic purposes only. Your identity will be kept entirely confidential. Please feel free to say if you are not interested in participating, or are unable to participate at this time.

If you do not want to make a decision at this time, please let me know when I should contact you again. You may also reach me at the following telephone number/email in Malta a convenient time: Tel:  , e-mail: michael.nwalutu@mail.utoronto.ca; nwalutu@yahoo.co.uk

Please read the enclosed consent protocol, and let me know if it is acceptable to you, and if you would like to participate in the study. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Onyedika Nwalutu
Appendix B

Consent form for individual interviewees

Research topic: From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration: Examining the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta.

The aim of this study is to examine the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta with a view to providing information for formulation of policies that will improve care for, and settlement of immigrant youth in sending and receiving countries. My research will contribute to literature on youth migration, and establish ways in which reinventing the Indigenous African worldviews subverted by colonization can equip and empower local youth, thereby reducing the unhealthy trend in Nigerian youth emigration. Information gathered from this exercise will be used in my PhD thesis and will also be presented at conferences, produced into journal articles, working papers and book chapters. The reason that I would like to speak with you is because of your experiences in the processes of migration and settling in Malta as a youth immigrant.

I would like to confirm your agreement to participate in this research. If you do not wish to take part, please feel free to say so. If you agree, and there are topics that come up during the course of the interview that you do not want to discuss, please do indicate. If at any point you decide that you do not wish to continue with the interview, please let me know and we will stop immediately. In that case I will not use any of the information you have provided. All the data you have given to me will be deleted and not used any more in the study. However, I request that you give rationale for withdrawal from the study.

Participation in this study may involve answering/addressing the attached questions/topics.

I would like to have your permission to record the interview. The audio file will not have your name attached to it, and will only be listened to and transcribed by myself. If you wish, I will provide you with a copy of the audio recording and/or the transcript. I will keep the audio files for three years after the study is completed; they will then be deleted. Transcripts with no name attached may be kept for five years after the study is completed (in case a follow up study is warranted). If you are in any way uncomfortable with the interview being recorded, please indicate; in that case I will just take written notes during the interview.

All information contained in this interview is confidential and anonymous. Only I know the names of the people who are being interviewed, and there will be only one copy of these names, which I will keep under lock and key/saved as an encrypted file.

Any report I write for this study will ensure that you are kept anonymous. For example I might speak in a general way, saying that a particular issue was reported by several of the people interviewed. Or I might quote you by saying that one individual interviewed said……. In no instance would anyone reading the study be able to guess that you are the person who was interviewed. Also, pseudo names will be used to further protect your identity.

If after the interview has been concluded you would like any follow-up information, or a summary of some of the research results so far, please indicate by providing your e-mail or mailing address below.

One copy of this consent protocol and letter of introduction will be left with you for your
records. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact the Office of Research Ethics the University of Toronto at ethics.review@utoronto.ca or 416-946-3273.

Please read the consent protocol carefully. If you agree to participate, please sign below.

I, ___________________________, agree to participate in an interview for the project on Youth and transnational migration: Examining the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta.

I, ___________________________, agree/ do not agree to this interview being recorded (please check appropriate response).
I would like a summary of the research results to be sent to me at:

____________________________________

Date:

Signature:
Appendix C

July 31st, 2013

University of Malta Research Ethics Committee

Dear Sir/Madam,

Ref: Request for permission to conduct interviews in University of Malta, Msida, Malta.

I am a PhD candidate at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, studying under the supervision of Professor Njoki Wane. I am expected to complete a thesis as part of my graduate studies requirement. My thesis research topic is on the “Integration of African Indigenous Science in Faculties of Higher Education in Uganda”. My objective is to conduct interviews with immigrant youth in Malta in the process of data collection for my thesis. The time frame for my study is from early August to late October 2013. I am therefore seeking permission from your Research Ethics Committee to conduct this study since I will be dealing with human subjects in the course of the study.

The method of the interview with the participants will be one-on-one engagement through structured and unstructured method in which I will ask questions and electronically record their responses with digital voice recorders.

Acceptance letter from your Research Ethics Committee is significant for this study to be cleared by the University of Toronto Research Ethics Board. With this regards, I will greatly appreciate your timely response.

All information derived from the interviews will be used for research and academic purposes only. Participants’ identity will be kept entirely confidential. Confidentiality of information extracted from the participants taking part in this study shall be protected under the University of Toronto Freedom of Information & Protection of Privacy Act (http://www.fippa.utoronto.ca/Page4.aspx). If you have further questions, please feel free to contact the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Toronto at ethics.review@utoronto.ca or 416-946-3273.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Onyedika Nwalutu
Phone: 647 722 6722
Email: michael.nwalutu@mail.utoronto.ca

July 31st, 2013
Appendix D

Structured Questions

Your Names Sir/Madam, are?
How might I classify your gender: Male; Female; other (specify)?
Which Nigerian state, city, town or village do you hail from?
How would you rate your speaking, reading and writing of the language(s) in your state, city, town or village?
Could you tell me more about the Indigenous culture of your ethnic group in Nigeria?
How would you rate your understanding of the Indigenous cultures of your immediate Nigerian ethnic group?
What traditional values, skills and mores of your Indigenous culture can you say you possess and cherish?
Did you learn any handiwork, skill or patterns of behavior strictly from your Indigenous culture?
What other Nigerian language(s) do you speak?
What are your academic qualifications? Completed graduate program; Undergraduate; others (specify)?
What special handiwork and skills do you possess from Nigerian education you had?
Were these skills or handiworks learnt from schools, training or established organizations?
Did you learn these skills or handiworks from traditional organizations or social groups and training centers?
Were you earning a living with these skills in Nigeria prior to your migration to Malta?
Why did you decide to travel to live oversea?
Do you have any relative or friend that you are living with here in Malta?
Did any of your relatives or friends living overseas talk you into accepting to travel overseas?
Have you any convictions that influenced your decision to travel to oversea?
Was Republic of Malta your intended destination when you were living Nigeria? If not explain?
What employment do you hold here in Malta?
How does your schooling in Nigeria equip you to fit into Maltese society (in terms of language, work, further education etc.)?

Unstructured questions (for Nigerian and non-Nigerian interviewees)

Could you explain to me the socio-political or economic factor(s) that influenced your decision to migrate?
Could you tell me in details how you made your journey out of Nigeria to Malta?
What expectations and hope did you nurture that would be realized on your arrival overseas?
Do you still nurse those hopes and expectations or have you changed them? What really changed?
Given the opportunities, financial help and the relevant documents would you return to your country (or Nigeria) to live?
If you have the appropriate documents, finances and the relevant enabling opportunities would you travel to live in any other European country?
What original destination of travel did you have in mind? What changed and how long do you intend to live in Malta?
What legal barriers did you encounter as immigrant at the Malta port of entry?
Could you identify elements of border surveillance and social interrogation you encountered at Malta port of entry.
What perceptions of Nigerian immigrant youth do Maltese hold against their continued settling in Malta?
In your view, how do Maltese perceive non-citizens living among them?
What are the attitudes of Maltese authorities (immigration personnel and police) to immigrant youth?
What are the economic, social and political constraints faced by immigrant youth in settling in Malta?
What efforts do immigrant youth apply to navigate around perceived barriers posed by social, political and economic systems in Malta, such as accessing resources?
How does Western education equip migrants to survive in Malta socio-economic spaces?

Michael Onyedika Nwalutu,
e-mail: michael.nwalutu@mail.utoronto.ca; nwalutu@yahoo.co.uk
Appendix E

July 31st, 2013

Interview questions (structured questions).

Participants’ individual and socio-cultural information
Your Names Sir/Madam, are?
How might I classify your gender: Male; Female; other (specify)?
Which Nigerian/ European geo-political zone (country, state, city, town or village) do you hail from?
How would you rate your speaking, reading and writing of the language(s) in your state, city, town or village?
Could you tell me more about the Indigenous culture of your ethnic group in your country?
How would you rate your understanding of the Indigenous cultures of your immediate ethnic group in Nigeria/ Europe?
What traditional values, skills and mores of your Indigenous culture can you say you possess and cherish?
Did you learn any handiwork, skill or patterns of behavior strictly from your Indigenous culture?

Respondents’ Western education and training influence on migration
What are your academic qualifications? Completed graduate program; Undergraduate; others (specify)?
What special handiwork and skills do you possess from (Western) education you had in your country?
Were these skills or handiworks learnt from schools, training centers or established organizations?
Did you learn these skills or handiworks from traditional organizations or social groups and training centers?
Were you earning a living with these skills in your country prior to your migration to Malta?
Why did you decide to travel to live overseas?
Do you have any relative or friend that you are living with here in Malta?
Did any of your relatives or friends living overseas talk you into accepting to travel overseas?
Have you any convictions that influenced your decision to travel to oversea?
Was Republic of Malta your intended destination when you were living your country? If not explain?
What employment do you hold here in Malta?
How does schooling in your country of origin equip you to fit into Maltese society (in terms of language, work, further education etc.)?

Unstructured questions (Interviewee’s migration experiences)
Factors leading to surge in youth migration from developing to developed world.
Do you think of any socio-political or economic factor(s) that influenced your decision to migrate?
Could you tell me in details how you made your journey out of your country to Malta?
What expectations and hope did you nurture that would be realized on your arrival overseas?
Do you still nurse those hopes and expectations or have you changed them? What really changed?
Given the opportunities, financial help and the relevant documents would you return to live in your country?
If you have the appropriate documents, finances and the relevant enabling opportunities would you travel to live in any other European country?
What original destination of travel did you have in mind? What changed and how long do you intend to live in Malta?

Transnational border surveillance as it affects migrating youth/ attitude of receiving society to immigrant youth.
Were there any legal barriers to be encountered by immigrant youth at the Malta port of entry?
Could you identify elements of border surveillance and social interrogation any youth immigrant is likely to encounter at Malta port of entry?
In your opinion, how amicably or aggressively do Maltese react to migrant youth who are new in their society? How would you describe the attitude of Maltese to foreign settlers’ determination to live permanently in Malta?
In your view, how do Maltese perceive non-citizens living among them?
In your view describe attitudes of Maltese authorities (immigration personnel and police) to
foreign migrant youth?

What efforts is your country’s governing body putting in place to stem youth emigration?

In your view, are the efforts of local and international NGOs in your country reducing youth migration?

**Topics for Focus Group Discussion**

- likely causes of youth emigration in developing countries
- major implications of youth emigration from developing countries
- the economic, social and political constraints faced by immigrant youth in settling in Malta?
- efforts do immigrant youth apply to navigate around perceived barriers posed by social, political and economic systems in Malta, such as accessing resources?
- does Western education equip migrants to survive in Malta socio-economic spaces?
- how Indigenous knowledge systems and cultures could stem the tide of youth emigration in developing countries
- youth migration and your thoughts about the existing border surveillance systems in Malta
- measures of integration of youth immigrants adopted by the government of Malta.

Michael Onyedika Nwalutu,
e-mail: michael.nwalutu@mail.utoronto.ca; nwalutu@yahoo.co.uk
Appendix F

Participant Profiles (Nigerians and Filipinos)

(Please note that pseudonyms are used here due to ethical considerations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>G. zone</th>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Dura -tion</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Indig/Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noble, O</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>S. E.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Comp/Prim</td>
<td>Farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike, I</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>S. E.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Secon/Comp</td>
<td>Elocution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ojo, C</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>S. W.</td>
<td>War/Libya</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Second/</td>
<td>Medical</td>
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<tr>
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<td>S. W.</td>
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<td>Air</td>
<td>Work/Doc.</td>
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<td>Higher/Edu</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comp/Prim</td>
<td>Farming</td>
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<tr>
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<td>S. E.</td>
<td>War/Libya</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Comp/Secon</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
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<tr>
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<td>S. S.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Comp/Prim</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enji, L</td>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>S. S.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comp/Prim</td>
<td>Farming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osita, U</td>
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<td>S. E.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Prim/Drop</td>
<td>None/Speaks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ogun, F</td>
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<td>S. W.</td>
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<td>Temp/Doc</td>
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<td>Comp/Prim</td>
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<td>Oti, N</td>
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<td>S. S.</td>
<td>Join/Relat</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Perm/Resid</td>
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<td>Idon, E</td>
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<td>S. S.</td>
<td>Join/Relat</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
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<td>Farming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobe, E</td>
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<td>S. S.</td>
<td>Soc/Unrest</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Univer/</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ume, S</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>S. E.</td>
<td>War/Libya</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Farming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Esit, K</td>
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<td>S. W.</td>
<td>Soc/Unrest</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Comp/Secon</td>
<td>Dye/cloth</td>
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<td>S. E.</td>
<td>Better life</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Comp/Secon</td>
<td>Minstrel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ina, D</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>S. E.</td>
<td>Better life</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Comp/Secon</td>
<td>Read/Write</td>
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<tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>War/Libya</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Temp/Doc</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Arabic/Prim</td>
<td>Farming</td>
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From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Migration Reason</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Known Skills</th>
<th>Age in Europe</th>
<th>Reason Rejected</th>
<th>Hair Weaving</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>S. W.</td>
<td>Better life</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Secon/Drop</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noki</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>S. E.</td>
<td>War/Libya</td>
<td>Temp/D</td>
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<td>Secondary</td>
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<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alo</td>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>S. S.</td>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>Temp/D</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
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<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
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<td>S. W.</td>
<td>War/Libya</td>
<td>Temp/D</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Prim/Drop</td>
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<td>Air</td>
<td>Work/Perm</td>
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<td>Farming</td>
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<td>Denva</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Philipp</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Work/Perm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Philipp</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Work/Perm</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Degree Mgt.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dobe</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Philipp</td>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Work/Perm</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY: (The Six Geo-political Zones of Nigeria and the states or provinces)

1. N. E. = North-East (states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe)

2. N. W. = North-West (states: Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa, Zamfara)

3. N. C. = North-Central (states: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau) & FCT not a state

4. S. E. = South-East (states: Anambra, Enugu, Imo, Abia, Ebonyi)

5. S. W. = South-West (states: Lagos, Ekiti, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ogun)

6. S. S. = South-South (states: Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa)
Appendix G

Further representations of some of the responses of interviewees (specifically Nigerian immigrants) to fielded questions are tabulated as follows:

**Interviewees’ gender (Maltese youth inclusive)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Nationality</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigerians</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipinos</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltese</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

**Gender of immigrant youth (Nigerians and Filipinos) interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: Specify</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nigerian youth by geo-political zones**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geo-political Zone</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td><strong>100.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36–45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive for the Trip</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reason(s)</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Relative</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War/Unrest</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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<table>
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<th>Mode of Transport</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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</table>
### Number of years lived in Malta (including 18 months of detention)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of Years</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Immigration status of Nigerian youth in Malta who were interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Documented/Permanent Resident</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented/Temporary Permits</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Relationship with Maltese citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship with Maltese</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cordial</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strained/Tenuous</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Relationship with Maltese authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship with Authorities</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cordial/Helpful</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Oppressive | 12 | 50.0
--- | --- | ---
Not Cordial | 8 | 33.3
Total | 24 | 100

**Reason(s) for staying back in Malta (resisting voluntary repatriation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason(s) for Staying Back</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safer than Country of Origin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier to Enter EU Mainland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Economic Opportunity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Job/Married</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indigenous education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Language Skills</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read/Write</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Indigenous cultural skills**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Skills</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artisan/Crafts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/Spirituality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.7</td>
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**Indigenous cultural values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Values</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honesty/Respect</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humility/Resilience</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability/Responsibility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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**Foreign (colonial) education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western/Arabic Education</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foreign (colonial) skills**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western/Arabic Skills</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artisan/Handyman</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H

Source: de Haas, 2006. Migration Policy Institute
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

Maps of Nigeria showing the thirty six states, the federal capital territory and the six geo-political zones
From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration

**States**

1. Anambra  
2. Enugu  
3. Akwa Ibom  
4. Adamawa  
5. Abia  
6. Bauchi  
7. Bayelsa  
8. Benue  
9. Borno  
10. Cross River  
11. Delta  
12. Ebonyi  
13. Edo  
14. Ekiti  
15. Gombe  
16. Imo  
17. Jigawa  
18. Kaduna  
19. Kano  
20. Katsina  
21. Kebbi  
22. Kogi  
23. Kwara  
24. Lagos  
25. Nasarawa  
26. Niger  
27. Ogun  
28. Ondo  
29. Osun  
30. Oyo  
31. Plateau  
32. Rivers  
33. Sokoto  
34. Taraba  
35. Yobe  
36. Zamfara

**Federal Capital Territory**

Abuja

**Map of Nigeria states**

Source: Google map and Wikipedia.org

https://www.google.ca/#q=map+of+nigeria+states