Platonic Recollection and Illumination in Augustine’s Early Writings

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

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Abstract

Will any longest possible straight line inside of a circle have to pass through the center? Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 CE) certainly thought so and he thought that others would too. The experience of learning such “intelligible things” (intellegibilia), as he called them, fascinated him, and unlike most contemporary philosophers, thought the experience was loaded with epistemological and metaphysical implications. The implication for which he is particularly famous is his contention that the experience requires “illumination” from the divine. There are disputes about what this contention means precisely, but it begins from the claim that there is an analogy between seeing visible things and knowing intelligible things. Just as seeing visible things happens by means of the illumination of the sun, so also “seeing” intelligible things happens by means of an illumination from God. Without this divine illumination, intelligible things would not truly be “intelligible,” i.e. knowable.

This illumination theory of learning is typically interpreted as an alternative to a Platonic recollection theory, since it seems not to require innate knowledge and the soul’s preexistence. The Augustine scholar Gerard O’Daly, for example, says that from start to finish, Augustine’s theory of illumination was an “explicit and unequivocal” alternative to Platonic recollection. My
contention in this dissertation is that this was not always the case. I argue that at least in his pre-baptismal (and post-conversion) writings (386-7), Augustine not only entertained but also accepted Platonic recollection as a complement to illumination. In making my case, I provide original insight into interpreting Augustine’s *Soliloquies* and his obscure *On the Immortality of the Soul*. This insight reveals his attempted reconciliation of these theories and his underlying philosophical motivations. I also argue that Augustine’s preferred way of reconciling the theories in these works was highly unorthodox, entailing, among other things, that the soul was uncreated and consubstantial with God. These rarely defended claims indicate that the nature of Augustine’s conversion to Christianity is commonly misunderstood and suggest avenues for re-examining Augustine’s later writings and legacy.
Acknowledgments

My completion of this dissertation owes so much to many people. First, I would like to thank my university professors, especially James Muir, my undergraduate professor (and Cicero) who “converted” me to philosophy, the late Sabine MacCormack, my MA project supervisor, Peter King, my dissertation supervisor, and Lloyd Gerson and John Magee, my other dissertation committee members. I owe the latter three particular thanks for their unique insights and patience in reading and correcting obscure drafts much less interesting than Augustine’s. I am also grateful to Martin Pickavé for suggesting this topic to me, to Phillip Cary for kindly agreeing to be my external examiner, and to Brian Dobell, Matthew Siebert, and Ryan Topping for helping me to deal with the topic with much greater skill and depth than otherwise would have been possible. Very special thanks goes to my sister, Keri, and to my parents, Dan and Carol, who have always loved and supported me, and, in so doing, helped me to overcome the difficult personal issues that threatened to prevent this project’s completion. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Rad, whose contribution to completing this work of recollection cannot be calculated. It is dedicated to him.
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Abbreviations

Series and Lexical Works

BA    Bibliothèque Augustinienne: Oeuvres de saint Augustin. Tourain: De Brouwer, 1947–.
CCSL  Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953–.
CSEL  Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Vienna: [various], 1866–.

Works of Augustine (AL abbreviations)

Acad.  De Academicis / Contra Academicos (Against the Academicians)
agon.  De agone christiano (On the Christian Struggle)
bapt.  De baptismo (On Baptism)
beata u. De beata uita (On the Happy Life)
ciu.    De ciuitate dei (City of God)
conf.  Confessiones (Confessions)
cons. eu. De consensu euangelistarum (On the Harmony of the Gospels)
c. ep. Man. Contra epistolam Manichaei quam uocant Fundamenti (Against the Basic Letter of the Manichees)
dial.  De dialectica (On Dialectic)
diu. qu. De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (On 83 Diverse Questions)
doctr. chr.  De doctrina christiana (On Christian Teaching)
ench.  Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate (Enchiridion)
ep.    Epistulae (Letters)
exp. Gal. Expositio epistolae ad Galatias (Explanation of the Epistle to the Galatians)
exp. prop. Rm. Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos (Explanation of Several Statements in the Epistle to the Romans)
f. et symb.  De fide et symbolo (On Faith and the Creed)
Gn. adu. Man. De Genesi aduersus Manicheos (On Genesis Against the Manichees)
imm. an.  De immortalitate animae (On the Immortality of the Soul)
lib. arb.  De libero arbitrio (On the Free Choice of the Will)
mag.  De magistro (On the Teacher)
mor.  De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum (On the Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life)
mus.  De musica (On Music)
ord.  De ordine (On Order)
an. quant.  De quantitate animae (On the Quantity of the Soul)
retr.  Retractationes (Retractations)
s.  Sermones (Sermons)
Simpl.  De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum (To Simplicianus: On Diverse
### Questions

- **sol.** Soliloquia (Soliloquies)
- **symb. cat.** De symbolo ad catechumenos (To Catechumens: On the Creed)
- **trin.** De trinitate (On the Trinity)
- **uera rel.** De uera religione (On True Religion)
- **util. cred.** De utilitate credendi (On the Usefulness of Believing)

### Other Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambrose</td>
<td><strong>Fid.</strong> De fide (On Faith)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac</td>
<td><strong>De Isaac uel anima</strong> (On Isaac or the Soul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anselm</td>
<td><strong>Prosl.</strong> Proslogion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td><strong>DA</strong> De Anima (On the Soul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Cat.</strong> Categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Metaph.</strong> Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cicero</td>
<td><strong>Academ.</strong> Academica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Diu.</strong> De diuinatione (On Divination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Nat. D.</strong> De natura deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Off.</strong> De officiis (On Duties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Tusc.</strong> Tusculanae disputationes (Tusculan Disputations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descartes</td>
<td><strong>Meditations</strong> Meditationes de prima philosophia (Meditations on First Philosophy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermias</td>
<td><strong>In Phdr.</strong> Commentary on the Phaedrus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iamblichus</td>
<td><strong>Myst.</strong> De mysteriis Aegyptiorum (On the Egyptian Mysteries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>In Tim.</strong> Commentary on the Timaeus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leibniz</td>
<td><strong>Discours</strong> Discours de métaphysique (Discourse on Metaphysics)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Monadol.</strong> La monadologie (Monadology)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plato</td>
<td><strong>Parm.</strong> Parmenides</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phd.</strong> Phaedo</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Phdhr.</strong> Phaedrus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Phlb.</strong> Philebus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Resp.</strong> Republic</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Symp.</strong> Symposium</td>
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Thetiaetetus
Timaeus

Plotinus
Enneads

Porphyry
De Abstenentia (On Abstinence from Animal Food)
Isagoge (Introduction)

Proclus
Elements of Theology
Commentary on the Parmenides
Commentary on the Timaeus

Pseudo-Simplicius
Commentary on the De Anima

Simplicius
Commentary on the Physics

Syrianus
Commentary on the Metaphysics

Victorinus
Aduersus Arium (Against Arius)
Note on Translations and References

Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of Augustine’s writings are my own, from the editions provided in the bibliography. The translations of other writings are often from other scholars, in which case they are indicated in the footnotes. My reproductions of ancient and medieval texts follow the conventions of the relevant edition, such as whether they use “v’s” or “u’s” for Latin terms. I standardize the relevant Latin terms to “u’s” when I discuss them in the text (e.g. _ueritas_ not _veritas_). When referring to Augustine’s writings, I include, where applicable, the book, chapter, and paragraph number (e.g. _conf._ 1.1.1), and in important cases I also include line numbers (e.g. _sol._ 1.15.29.16-17). When the intended line numbers from the CSEL edition are ambiguous (since some of them are duplicated in that edition), I include the page number in brackets. The reference _imm. an._ 12.19.22(121)-2(122), for example, refers to the text from line 22 on page 121 of that edition to line 2 on page 122. When transliterating Greek terms, I use circumflexes to indicate long vowels (e.g. _epistêmê_).

*Key Translation Conventions*

soul = _anima_

SOUL = _animus_

truth/true thing = _uerum_

Truth = _ueritas_
Timeline of Augustine’s Relevant Writings and Life Events

354   Born in Thagaste
386   **Conversion to Christianity in Milan** (end of August)
386   Goes to Cassiciacum (September)
      *Contra Academicos, De beata uita, De ordine* (Cassiciacum Trilogy)
386-7  *Soliloquies* Bks. 1-2
      *Epistulae* 1-3
387   **Return to Milan** (early March)
      *De immortalitate animae* (unfinished draft of Bk. 3 of *Soliloquies*)
      Begins writing *Disciplinarum libri*: *De grammatica, De dialectica, De rhetorica, De musica, De geometria, De arithmetica, De philosophia*. Only *De dialectica* (incomplete; authorship disputed) and *De musica* (incomplete) are extant.

---------  **Pre-baptismal writings** †  **Post-baptismal writings** ‡  ---------
387   **Baptism by Ambrose in Milan at Easter Vigil** (night of Apr. 24-5)
      Vision at Ostia, Death of Monica
387-88  Goes to Rome
      *De quantitate animae, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum* (/390), *De libero arbitrio* Bks. 1 and 2(?) (-391/395), *Epistulae* 4-14.
388   Returns to Carthage and then to Thagaste
      *De Genesi contra Manicheos* (/389), *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* (/396), *De musica* Bk. 6 (388/90)
389   *De magistro* (/390), *De uera religione* (/391)
391   **Ordained priest at Hippo**
      *De utilitate credendi* (/392), *De libero arbitrio* Bks. 2(?) and 3 (/395)
392   *Sermones* (-430)
393   *De fide et symbolo*
394   *Expositio epistolae ad Galatias* (/395), *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos*
395   **Consecrated as successor to the Bishop of Hippo** (becomes bishop in 396)
      *De doctrina christiana* (/426)
396   *De agone christiano, Contra epistolam Manichaei quam uocant Fundamenti, De diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*
397   *Confessiones* (/401)
399   *De trinitate* (-422/6), *De consensu euangelistarum* (/400-?)
410   Sack of Rome
413   *De ciuitate dei* (-426/7)
422   *Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate*
426   *Retractationes* (/427)
430   Death

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1 With the exception of the *Epistulae* and some of the details of *lib. arb.*, the dates for Augustine’s writings are J.J. O’Donnell’s listings in *Confessions*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), ixvi-lxix. The dates for the *Epistulae* are based on CCSL 31. The dates for Augustine’s life events are based on P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 2000), 64-7.
Introduction

1. The Intention of this Study

Consider the following claim: any longest possible straight line inside of a circle will have to pass through the center. Most people will grasp that this claim is true immediately upon understanding it and will not be able to conceive of how it could ever be false. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) was fascinated by the experience of learning such “intelligible things,” *(intellegabilia)* as he called them, and thought that the experience was loaded with implications. One claim for which he is especially famous is the claim that such learning happens by means of an “illumination” from the divine. The precise content of this theory is contentious, but the basic idea is analogous to sensible sight. Just as seeing visible things happens by means of the illumination of the sun, so also “seeing” intelligible things happens by means of an illumination from God. This is not supposed to be miraculous or supernatural or a special revelation from God; it is simply how one’s ordinary cognitive faculties operate when learning intelligible things, whether one believes in God or not.²

In Augustine’s later writings, such as *On the Trinity*, this illumination theory of learning is an alternative to a Platonic recollection theory. There, Augustine rejects the idea that learning intelligible things requires that the soul had to preexist this life and he may have gone as far as to reject innate knowledge as well.³ Rejecting the former is to reject a specifically Platonic form of recollection and rejecting the latter is to reject recollection generally. Whether Augustine accepted illumination as an alternative to Platonic recollection also in his earlier writings, however, is less clear. Especially in the works written immediately after his conversion in 386, Augustine shows signs that he thought that Platonic recollection was integral to illumination.

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² Mary Clark defends this point in *Augustine* (New York: Continuum, 1994), 20-21.
³ *trin.* 12.15.24.12-19
This is the interpretation of R.J. O’Connell\(^4\) and others, as we will see. Other scholars, however, disagree. The one to defend this opposing side of the question most thoroughly in recent times has been Gerard O’Daly, who contends that from start to finish, Augustine’s theory of illumination was an “explicit and unequivocal” alternative to Platonic recollection.\(^5\) He contends that the pre-baptismal Augustine rejected Platonic recollection, though one could also maintain on this side of the question that he was merely neutral about it.

The primary purpose of this study is to establish that this is mistaken and that Augustine did in fact accept Platonic recollection together with illumination in his earliest, pre-baptismal writings (386-7). Taken merely in its weakest sense, this thesis is not new. Although there has been a sizable contingent of scholars along with O’Daly who disagree with it, including R. Jolivet, R. Holte, R.A. Markus, Ronald Nash, Goulven Madec, Mary Clark, and Paige Hochschild,\(^6\) many scholars agree with it to one degree or another, including those who are more traditional in other respects. Étienne Gilson, for example, concedes that the early Augustine “inclined” to Platonic recollection,\(^7\) and James Lowe, who wrote a more recent book length


\(^7\) *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), 71. See also p. 72 and notes 11, 12, 15. Gilson does not agree with this thesis precisely, as we will see in the next chapter. He agrees that Augustine “inclined” to Platonic recollection in the early writings, but thinks that it did not fit together with his illumination theory even then, which he was already developing as an independent alternative to it.
treatment of memory in Augustine, follows him in this estimation. But the way that I intend the thesis is bolder than these scholars take it. To varying degrees, they think that Augustine held the doctrine only tentatively, as a side doctrine, and/or as something he soon completely relinquishes. John Rist, for example, says that Augustine initially was “prepared to tolerate [it]” – as if it were a bad but inescapable smell – and contends that he likely rejected it by the time of *On the Teacher* in 389. My view, however, is that Augustine was enthusiastic about the doctrine, that it was central to his pre-baptismal project, and that he had not yet begun seriously to consider an alternative (I leave for another study the question of how long Augustine accepted it). To put it another way, I am contending that Augustine understood his illumination theory at the time simply to be Platonic and had not yet begun to develop his characteristically Augustinian version.

My thesis does not go as far as to claim, however, that Augustine thought that he “knew” Platonic recollection was true. While I maintain that his early commitment to Platonic recollection was significant, he explicitly mentions in his *Retractations* that regarding the preexistence of the soul, a doctrine essential to Platonic recollection, *nec tunc sciebam, nec*

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9 Rist, *Baptized* (1994), 30-31. Even Alfaric thinks that Augustine had abandoned Platonic recollection by *On the Teacher* (L’évolution (1918), 494 n. 4). Note that Rist’s interpretation is interestingly different from Gilson’s. Gilson thinks that Augustine abandons Platonic recollection and the preexistence of the soul at the same time, whereas Rist thinks Augustine continues to accept the preexistence of the soul as late as the *Confessions*, despite rejecting Platonic recollection much earlier (*Baptized* (1994), 111-112). This, in my terminology, makes him less traditional and more radical than Gilson.
Introduction

ad hoc scio, “I did not know then, nor do I know now.” This shows that even in his earliest writings, he was not confident enough about Platonic recollection (because he was not confident about preexistence) to say that he “knew” (sciebat) it. But “knowledge” is all that the passage rules out. It does not rule out “belief” or “acceptance,” and so leaves room for various weaker degrees of epistemological commitment. My claim that Augustine “accepted” Platonic recollection in the pre-baptismal writings should be understood as a relatively strong degree of belief that had not reached the status of knowledge. This is in contrast to the two other dominant options that he did not accept it (whether rejecting it or being neutral about it) or that he was weakly committed to it.

There are only a few scholars who go this far. O’Connell and Phillip Cary are in the neighbourhood, as are others in the O’Connell tradition, and they have done excellent work.

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10 retr. 1.1.3, commenting on Acad.
11 Frederick van Fleteren and Madec think this passage demonstrates that Augustine was never more than neutral about the preexistence of the soul, and thus about Platonic recollection (Van Fleteren, “A Reply to O’Connell,” Augustinian Studies 21 (1990): 136-7 and Madec, “Révisions” (1996), 122-3). Yet this does not follow. There is nothing inconsistent about saying that he believed in or accepted the preexistence of the soul and Platonic recollection while maintaining that he did not think he knew these things.
12 In lib. arb., Augustine distinguishes two degrees of assertion, literally, degrees of “saying,” that suit this point very nicely. Responding to Evodius, Augustine says, “Why then did it seem to you that that which you yourself are convinced is obviously false ought to be affirmed (affirmandum), or at least ought to be said with some hesitation (cum aliqua dubitatione dicendum)?” (lib. arb. 3.1.1 “Cur ergo tibi uel adfirmandum uel certe cum aliqua dubitatione dicendum uisum est, quod perspicue falsum esse ipse conuincis?”). “Affirming” here appears to be a strong sort of assertion that is appropriate for knowing or at least believing with a high degree of certainty. “Saying” something “with some hesitation,” on the other hand, appears to be a weaker sort of assertion that nevertheless indicates a genuine belief and is not appropriate for things about which one is noncommittal. When I say that Augustine “accepted” Platonic recollection in his pre-baptismal writings, I am only committing myself to saying is that he believed it in the sense that he “said it with some hesitation,” not that he thought he knew it and/or that he “affirmed” it.
13 For Cary’s views about the strength Augustine’s commitment to Platonic recollection in the early Augustine, see Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 96, 100, 178 n.4, and passim.
14 Roland Teske is a noteworthy example (“Augustine’s philosophy of memory” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 148ff), as is Terryl Givens (When Souls Had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in Western Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-113, 121). There are also some in O’Connell’s tradition who do not recognize or simply ignore the centrality of Platonic recollection to Augustine’s early writings. Ronnie Rombs, for example, enthusiastically agrees that the early Augustine believed in the preexistence of the soul, but thinks that this was motivated by concerns about original sin and guilt and
on the topic. Given their contributions, one might ask why this book length treatment of the topic is necessary. One reason is that their accounts have not yet been sufficiently persuasive to most scholars. Besides not persuading those who think that Augustine was neutral or weakly committed to it, they also have not persuaded many scholars who do not think the topic worth engaging at all. Another reason, and one which is behind the first, is that their treatments of the topic have not been entirely comprehensive and/or precise. Roughly speaking, O’Connell gets things mostly right, but does not treat the question comprehensively, and Cary treats the question more comprehensively, but does not get some important details quite right. My contribution to the issue in this study is to remedy both of these deficiencies by focusing on the second. I aim to settle the dispute persuasively by providing a comprehensive and precise treatment of the question that shows the centrality of Platonic recollection, as something part and parcel with illumination, in Augustine’s pre-baptismal writings.

2. The Scope and Method of this Study

This study is comprehensive in three main senses: (1) It thoroughly argues that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection in general in Augustine’s pre-baptismal writings, (2) it reveals the specific kind of Platonic recollection he accepted; and (3) it explains, at least in part, why he accepted it. I explain each of these in turn and indicate some of my key claims. By accepting Platonic recollection in general, I mean that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection in the broadest sense such that it can apply to Plotinus, Proclus, and Plato himself, regardless of exactly how they understood it, and, in Plato’s case, regardless of whether he personally believed the doctrine. This general sense has two essential features. The first is the “innate knowledge feature,” which maintains that learning at least some intelligible things is a matter of recollecting not significantly by concerns relating to Platonic recollection (Saint Augustine & the Fall of the Soul: Beyond O’Connell & His Critics (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2006), 39, 212).
innate knowledge of them. The second is the “Preexistence Requirement Feature,” which holds that in order to have this innate knowledge, the objects of that knowledge had to be consciously experienced (i.e. consciously known) in a previous existence.

*Platonic Recollection in General:*

1. **Innate knowledge feature:** Learning at least some intelligible things is a matter of recollecting innate knowledge of them.
2. **Preexistence requirement feature:** Having this innate knowledge requires that the objects of that knowledge had to be consciously experienced (i.e. consciously known) in a previous existence.

The innateness of the knowledge in the first feature refers primarily to the idea that the soul has possessed it at least since earthly embodiment (whenever that was, just before birth). The second feature has two main parts. One is the “requirement” part and the other is the “preexistence” part. The requirement part is the idea that “innate knowledge requires the previous existence.” Without this connection between innate knowledge and the preexistence, one does not have Platonic recollection. The preexistence part, on the other hand, is the idea of the previous existence itself, conceptually distinct from the requirement part. I do not specify what sort of previous existence it had to be, except that it had to occur prior to existing in the womb.

A key thing to note about this second feature is what the term “experience” is supposed to mean. It is supposed to include both the ideas of occurrent acquaintance and knowledge. I am occurrently acquainted with something when I am seeing it, for example, and I am no longer currently acquainted with her when I turn away from it. The inclusion of this idea in experience should not be surprising, but the inclusion of the latter might be.\(^{15}\) My justification is that since the objects experienced are “intelligible” things, the idea that an experience of them is a case of “knowledge” would be a natural implication for a Platonist. I choose not to use the term “acquaintance,” however, because it does not suit as well when the object experienced is “the

\(^{15}\) An “experience” of something does not always have to entail “knowledge” of it, as for example when one talks about the sense experience of animals or the experience (ἐµπειρία) of the craftsman who does not have ἐπιστήμη of his craft (Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1:1, 980b-981b).
happy life,” as we will see, and as a rule I tend not use the term “knowledge” because it less readily implies an occurrent acquaintance. Even the phrase “conscious knowledge” (as opposed to innate or unconscious knowledge) does not necessarily imply an occurrent acquaintance.

Someone could be thinking about her vacation in Montréal while staying in Toronto, and so she would be “consciously knowing” Montréal while not being currently acquainted with it. The sort of conscious knowledge of the Forms at issue here, however, has to involve an occurrent acquaintance, which is why I call it a conscious experience. I explain other ambiguities about these features and why they should be considered Platonic later in this introduction.

The second sense in which this study is comprehensive is that it shows the kind of Platonic recollection Augustine accepted in the pre-baptismal writings. This is especially important for understanding how the many confusing passages related to the question fit together. I have identified six main questions relevant to identifying the kind. The first four questions pertain to innate knowledge and the remaining two pertain to the human soul (and by extension, the preexistence requirement). For Augustine, the objects of innate knowledge that are of particular interest to us are the eternal divine Forms up to and including God (as opposed to the soul). Since he will often speak as if these Forms “exist in” the human soul, we can ask the following questions about the knowledge:

*Question Pertaining to Innate Knowledge:*
(1) Is the soul’s innate knowledge identical to the Forms themselves or is the knowledge something distinct that merely *corresponds* to the Forms, such as innate notions?
(2) Does this innate knowledge exist in the soul *constitutively* in some sense or is it something distinct from the soul?
(3) Does the innate knowledge exist in memory or outside of memory?

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16 For sensible experiences, the acquaintance implied would be mediate, but for the intelligible things at issue here it will typically be immediate, depending on the philosopher under consideration. Other authors will use similar terminology and concepts to describe the preexistent awareness of the Forms in Platonic recollection. John Rist, for example, speaks of it as an “experience” that is also a case of “direct knowledge.” The terms “experience” and “direct” show that he considers the preexistent knowledge to involve an immediate occurrent acquaintance. See *Baptized* (1994), 30-31.
(4) Does having innate knowledge of the Forms mean that the soul is continually experiencing them even when it is not consciously doing so?

The point of some of these questions needs some clarification. The first question is meant to allow for the possibility that the soul’s innate knowledge is identical to the Forms in the manner of Plotinus, rather than simply being something that merely corresponds to the Forms. The second makes room for a possibility that Augustine seems to entertain in On the Trinity, in which the soul appears to have innate knowledge of God, for example, but where the knowledge is simply God’s present presence to the soul while remaining entirely distinct from it. I raise the question here not because I consider this later work in this study, but to set the stage for considering it in the future. The third question is meant to allow for the counterintuitive possibility that the soul has innate knowledge that does not technically exist in memory. The fourth question allows for the Plotinian idea that the soul is always knowing the Forms even when completely unaware of it.

The remaining two questions pertain to the nature of the human soul that has the innate knowledge. I pose them as two questions, but one can distinguish many questions embedded within them. The first has to do with the soul’s relation to other souls and the second has to do with the soul’s relation to God (and/or the Forms generally).

Questions Pertaining to the Nature of the Soul:
(5) What does innate knowledge entail about the relations between souls, possibly including the World Soul?
(6) What does innate knowledge entail about the likeness of the soul’s nature to God?

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17 As I discuss in detail in Chapter 6.
18 trin. 14.15.21
19 The meaning of “constitutively” existing in the soul in this question is supposed to communicate the idea of being “part of” the soul or ontologically mixed with the soul in any sense, whether substantially, accidentally, or in some other way. It contrasts with the idea of “being distinct from” the soul in the sense that one flower is distinct from another. See Rist, Baptized (1994), 31, who uses the term in the same sense and context.
20 As, for example, in Enn. 4.8.8.
This fifth question includes the question of whether preexistent souls exist individually or merely corporately and indistinguishably. It also includes the question of whether souls are one with each other to any extent, including possibly with the World Soul, should it exist. The term “World Soul” in this question refers to an alleged soul that animates the universe as a whole as opposed to animating an individual body within the universe. The sixth question arises because Augustine seems to infer from innate knowledge that the soul must have an affinity or likeness to God. It includes the question of whether Augustine infers the soul’s intelligibility and incorporeality on this basis, but it also includes questions of whether Augustine infers much more controversial things on this basis, such as that the soul is uncreated and consubstantial with God. Another controversial question that it includes is whether Augustine infers that the human mind or reason is like God in a stronger sense than the human soul. This allows for the possibility, for example, that Augustine believed that the human soul is created and that the human mind or reason is uncreated, which is a view that he notes some people believe in *On Genesis Against the Manicheans*, and that he himself shows signs of believing prior to his baptism.

I call the kind of Platonic recollection that I contend Augustine accepts in the pre-baptismal writings “First-Way Platonic Recollection.” I use this name because it is the kind of Platonic recollection expressed on the “first way” (out of four) according to which Augustine infers the soul’s immortality in *On the Immortality of the Soul*. The view’s content, for the most part, is comprised of the more controversial answers to the six questions. This means that the soul’s innate knowledge is the Forms themselves, that these Forms constitutively exist in the soul, that the innate knowledge is not in memory, and that the soul is always experiencing its innate knowledge, even while not conscious of it. It also means that the soul is both individual

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21 *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.8.11
and yet unified with all souls, including the World Soul, and that the soul is omnipresent, eternal, unchanging in substance, uncreated, existing by means of itself, and consubstantial with God.

These are weighty and controversial doctrines, I realize, but what they mean and the reasons for them will become clearer as I proceed. I do not think that Augustine was as strongly committed to most of them as he was to Platonic recollection in general, however. He seems to prefer them given the choice, but he also considers less controversial options as possibilities, as we will see. I am not the first to claim that the early Augustine accepted these doctrines – both O’Connell and Cary claim to find most of them as well – but I am the first, I believe, to derive them thoroughly from the early texts and to explain how they fit into Augustine’s project. I may be the first to maintain a further controversial claim, however. This claim is that the pre-baptismal Augustine believed that human reason (or the human mind) is uncreated and consubstantial with God regardless of whether or not the human soul itself has been created. Thus, precisely when Augustine entertains the possibility of a created soul in his pre-baptismal writings (as he does), this is not the orthodox Christian view because he is not considering a created human reason at the same time. The reasons for this final claim will become clearer as we proceed.

The third sense in which this study is comprehensive is that it explains why Augustine accepted this particular kind of Platonic recollection. The question “why” can be understood as looking for two different things: the purpose for something and the reason or ground for something. With respect to purpose, I demonstrate that Augustine used Platonic recollection to argue for the immortality of the soul, much like Plato did in the Phaedo. With respect to reason or ground, I uncover key arguments and principles that Augustine took as reasons for accepting his preferred Platonic recollection view. These arguments and principles can be distinguished according to whether they are related to innate knowledge or to the preexistence requirement. They also can be distinguished according to whether they relate to these features in their general
or specific senses. We will see that there are several arguments that may be behind the Innate Knowledge Feature in general, but the one that most clearly is, as we will see, is what I call Plato’s Deficiency Argument. We will also see that Augustine accepts the key principle belonging to the preexistence requirement in general, which I will call the “Past-Conscious-Experience Principle.” Finally, we will see that there is one crucial principle behind the specific version of these features that is most responsible for the two sets of controversial doctrines listed above, particularly for the ideas that the innate knowledge is the Forms themselves and that the soul is consubstantial with God. I call it the Identity Principle of Knowledge. Phillip Cary has recently argued that Augustine was not aware of this principle, and so was not consciously using it, \(^{22}\) whereas I contend that the opposite is the case.

So much for being comprehensive. What about precision? The key to being precise is to use a reliable method. A method that will not be sufficient for our purposes is the method of finding the most explicit passages relating to Platonic recollection (for and against) and comparing them. This proof-texting method is a good place to start and would be sufficient for more obvious topics, but for the more intractable and ambiguous ones, it will not do. The problem is that each side in the debate can plausibly take the passages in their favour as more reliable and find a reasonable way to cast doubt on the passages not in their favour. Another method that will be insufficient for our purposes is to supplement this first method with appeals to other authors that Augustine might have read, such as Cicero, Plotinus, and Porphyry on the one hand, and Ambrose and Victorinus on the other. This too will be helpful and to some degree necessary, but the question about which works Augustine had read and/or how much he took from these works is controversial, making it difficult to establish a solid foundation on which to build. Even given a careful application of this method, the method makes it easy for the other

side to wield the accusation of *eisogesis*,\(^{23}\) i.e. of reading foreign views into the text that are not really present, which is the charge that Van Fleteren levels against Cary\(^ {24}\) and is implied in his criticisms of O’Connell.\(^ {25}\) This is a charge I would like to avoid as much as possible. A related danger that I would like to avoid, one that those on O’Daly’s side commonly do not,\(^ {26}\) is imputing Augustine’s later views to his earlier writings without sufficient care. Augustine explicitly tells us that his views developed as he wrote,\(^ {27}\) and so we cannot unduly assume that his later views accurately reflect his earlier views.

How then do I expect, like Descartes, to establish a solid foundation on which to build? My proposed solution is to seek first to understand Augustine’s passages within the logical structure of his argument, both within the particular works in which they arise and in closely related works. Bringing in outside influences (including Augustine’s later works) will sometimes be necessary, but I will minimize this when laying the foundation. Having done this rigorously, I then more liberally bring in outside influences, while always being sensitive to the possibility that Augustine’s thought developed. This strategy will include paying attention to the fact that most of the texts at issue are dialogues and so must be interpreted with an eye to their literary details. My use of this method is not new – indeed, most scholars use it to one degree or another – but my application of it to this topic, I think, is more rigorous and methodical than has so far been accomplished.

With this method in mind, my overall plan in this study is as follows. I begin by using the

\(^{23}\) The opposite of *exegesis*.


\(^{25}\) Van Fleteren particularly does not take kindly to O’Connell’s idea that the narrative of the preexistence, fall, and return of the soul forms the basic Plotinian matrix of Augustine’s early works. See “Reply” (1990), 135 and *passim*.

\(^{26}\) This is true of Van Fleteren, for example, who regularly defends using later works to interpret earlier ones (“Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the Thought of Augustine,” *Augustinian Studies* 4 (1973): 34).

\(^{27}\) *retr.* 1.Prol.3
proof-texting method to show why there is a *prima facie* case to be made for Platonic recollection in Augustine’s early writings from 386-391 and also to show why this method is inconclusive (Chapter 1). This involves examining the main passages and arguments for and against finding Platonic recollection in Augustine’s early writings. It has the side benefit of helping the reader to become familiar with the interpretive issues under dispute. Having shown why the results of this method are inconclusive, I turn to my method of understanding these passages within the logical structure of Augustine’s argument, focusing on the pre-baptismal writings. My initial focus will be on those pre-baptismal writings in which Platonic recollection is most evident in the argument: the *Soliloquies* and *On the Immortality of the Soul*. To guard against wrongly importing outside ideas, I first consider these works alone as much as possible (Chapters 2-4). After this, I open up the inquiry to all reasonable outside influences and examine the other relevant pre-baptismal works, *Against the Academicians*, *On the Happy Life*, and *On Order* (Chapters 5-6). This will be sufficient, I believe, to demonstrate that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection in general and First-Way Platonic Recollection in particular as part of his pre-baptismal illumination theory.

**3. Implications of this Study**

This bold conclusion is connected to several broader debates in Augustinian studies. One of these debates concerns the roles of Neoplatonism and Christianity in Augustine’s conversion in 386. In the early 20th century, the debate tended to be framed in terms of whether this conversion was to Neoplatonism or Christianity. The traditional scholars maintained that it was to Christianity, and the more radical ones, most famously Prosper Alfarcì,28 contended that it was

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28 Alfarcì concludes, “Moralement comme intellectuellement, c’est au néo-platonisme qu’il s’est converti plutôt qu’à l’Évangile” (*L’évolution* (1918), 399).
to Neoplatonism. Since Courcelle’s *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin* in 1950, however, scholars have generally agreed that the two options were not mutually exclusive and that Augustine sincerely converted to both. The debate now is rather about the nature of the synthesis between the two and where the emphasis lies. O’Daly, Gilson, Rist, and O’Connell can be placed on this continuum of emphasis. O’Daly is the most traditional, maintaining that Augustine’s beliefs were consistent with Christianity and that in cases where there was uncertainty in Christian circles about a doctrine, such as about Platonic recollection, he tended to withhold assent or reject it. O’Connell is the most radical of the four, maintaining that although Augustine’s conversion to Christianity was sincere, he accepted some Neoplatonic doctrines that were under debate in Christian circles (such as Platonic recollection), and he even (unknowingly) entertained and accepted some outright heretical doctrines, including the uncreatedness and divinity of the soul. The other two scholars fit somewhere in between. This study supports and extends O’Connell’s view, hopefully functioning to bring it further into the mainstream.

A related debate pertains to Augustine’s sources prior to his conversion. There are two main questions. To what extent had he read and was he influenced by Christian writings? To what extent had he read and was he influenced by non-Christian writings? Nello Cipriani is at the forefront of those who address the first question. He argues that Augustine had read many Christian Platonist works prior to his conversion, including Ambrose’s *On Faith* and Marius

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30 Rombs remarks that “Although no scholar after the work of Courcelle, Boyer, and O’Meara continues to question the authentically Christian nature of Augustine’s conversion, O’Connell raised the related questions as to the degree and the character of Augustine’s assimilation of Neoplatonism and its compatibility with the Christian faith he received in Milan,” (*Fall of the Soul* (2006), 6). For earlier examples of a similar conclusion, see Douglas Johnson, “*Verbum* in the early Augustine (386-397)” *Recherches Augustiniennes* 8 (1972), 25 and Madec, “Une lecture de Confessions VII, 9, 13-21, 27 (Notes critiques à propos d’une thèse de R.J. O’Connell)” *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 16.1 (1970): 79.
Victorinus *Against Arius*, and that he therefore had a much more detailed awareness of “pro-
Nicene” views at his conversion than commonly recognized. As for the second question,
everyone agrees that Augustine had read some *libri platonici*, books of the Platonists, prior
to his conversion, and the main question has been which books these were. All scholars now
accept that some of these books were by Plotinus and that they likely did not include works of
any other Neoplatonist with the possible exception of Porphyry. Beyond this, substantial
disagreement remains. Some scholars think that Augustine had not yet read Porphyry at his
conversion and others do. Of these, some believe Plotinus was the main influence and others
believe that Porphyry was the main influence. Some scholars also think that Augustine had

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31 “Le fonti cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nei primi Dialoghi di S. Agostino,” *Augustinianum* 34 (1994): 259-60. Many scholars follow Cipriani to one degree or another in this estimation. The most relevant to this study are Lewis Ayres (*Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 37) and Chad Gerber (*The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology: Contextualizing Augustine’s Pneumatology* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 23-24).

32 Paul Henry (*Plotin et l’Occident* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), 68-139) and Pierre Courcelle (*Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources*, trans. H. Wedeck (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 165-189 (originally published in French in 1943)) were the first rigorously to establish that this was the case.

33 Courcelle (*Late Latin Writers* (1969), 165-189, esp. 180) and John O’Meara (*The Young Augustine* (London: Longmans, 1954), 153-4 and *Against the Academics*, ACW 12 (Westminster: Newman Press, 1950), 23 especially n. 110) present compelling cases that Augustine had indeed also read Porphyrian works at his conversion. Olivier du Roy, on the other hand, contends that Augustine only first read Porphyry sometime after his post-conversion retreat at Cassiciacum (*L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1966), 70-71, 186-95). In this, he is followed by Eugene TeSelle (*Augustine the Theologian* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1970), 48-55), Ayres (*Trinity* (2010), 17 n. 16) and Gerber (*Spirit* (2012), 15). O’Connell is slightly more open to a Porphyrian influence, but still doubts it, and contends that even if it were present, there is no discernible contribution that Porphyry would have made beyond what Augustine could have found in Plotinus (*Early Theory* (1968), 20-26). O’Connell, however, is opposed to Du Roy’s contention that Augustine’s (alleged) post-

34 O’Connell, for example, argues for Plotinus (*Early Theory* (1968), 25) and O’Meara argues for Porphyry (*The Young Augustine* (1954), 153-4; *Against the Academics* (1951), 23 especially n. 110.). Brian Dobell also makes a case for Porphyry but does not insist on it (*Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 234-5).
read a lot of works and others very few.\footnote{35}

This study will not attempt to answer these latter questions to any significant degree, nor does it depend on answering them. Its success depends primarily on Augustine’s writings rather than anyone else’s. When I do appeal to Neoplatonic treatises as Augustinian sources, they are Plotinian treatises that the majority of scholars acknowledge that Augustine had read at the time of his conversion,\footnote{36} and in the case of *Ennead* 4.7, which is slightly less accepted, I establish with greater certainty that the pre-baptismal Augustine had read it. With respect to the first question about Christian sources, this study has more significant implications. Against Cipriani and others, I show that Augustine likely did not read Ambrose’s *On Faith*, Victorinus’ *Against Arius*, and some other Christian works, including the Prologue to the Gospel of John. This is controversial but is more plausible than it first appears, as we will see. The primary reason for it is that Augustine shows no awareness of *logos* terminology for the Son of God in his pre-baptismal writings. This lack of awareness is significant because it helps to explain why the pre-baptismal Augustine, as a sincere Christian, could have entertained heretical doctrines.

The remainder of this introduction focuses on explaining the conceptual and argumentative frameworks relating to Platonic recollection as a doctrine in order to prepare the reader to confront the questions of this study. On the conceptual front, I provide a more detailed explanation of the terms involved in the two essential features of Platonic recollection. This is intended to establish what it would mean for Augustine to accept Platonic recollection, and to

\footnote{35} With respect to Plotinus’ treatises, O’Connell (*Early Theory* (1968), 9-10), for example, is on the higher side and Van Fleteren (“Reply” (1990), 133) is on the lower side.

\footnote{36} Scholars now more or less unanimously agree that Augustine at least had read *Enn.* 1.6 (*On Beauty*), 3.2-3 (*On Providence* 1-2), and 5.1 (*On the Three Primary Hypostases*) at the time of his conversion. Several other treatises are also widely accepted, such as *Enn.* 1.8 (*On What are and Whence come Evils*) and 4.7 (*On the Immortality of the Soul*), though scholars are sometimes unclear about when they think Augustine had read them. For lists of Plotinian treatises that Augustine likely had read at his conversion and later, see A. Solignac, intro. and notes, *Les Confessions*, BA 13 (Paris: De Brouwer, 1962), 110-111; Du Roy, *L’intelligence* (1966), 69-71; O’Connell, *Early Theory* (1968), 9-10; E. Teselle, *Augustine the Theologian*, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 44-45; Van Fleteren, “Reply” (1990), 133; Cary, *Invention* (2000), 158 n. 11; and Ayres, *Trinity* (2010), 17 n. 14.
provide the framework for determining what kind it was. On the argumentative front, I identify some of the arguments and principles that one could reasonably expect to be behind Augustine’s acceptance of each of the two essential features in the pre-baptismal writings. This will help to find Platonic recollection in those works and to identify what arguments and principles he found particularly convincing. In the process of doing these things, I also defend the idea that the two features I have identified truly are the essential features of a properly “Platonic” version of a recollection theory of learning.

4. Platonic Recollection and its Conceptual Framework

My explanation of Platonic recollection terminology proceeds by considering each of the terms involved in its two essential features. I distill the two features into the following single expression of the doctrine: “the human soul learns at least some intelligible things by recollecting innate knowledge that resulted from consciously experiencing those intelligible things in a preexistence.” In what follows, I consider the terms by indicating (1) what Augustine roughly means by them, (2) why I choose the English translations I do in controversial cases, and (3) what further questions the terms may raise.37

I begin with the meaning of the phrase “human soul.” Augustine, like Plato,38 thinks that a human being (homo (Lat.), anthrôpos (Gk.)) is a living thing that is composed of a rational soul and body, and so the “human” part of the phrase specifies that we are speaking about rational souls that are connected with a human body.39 For Plato, this does not mean that we ourselves are therefore essentially soul/body composites, however. He argues that we are most essentially our souls (i.e. that the “self” (autos) or person is the soul) and therefore that we are not

37 More information on many of these terms can be found in C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon (Basel: Schwabe, 1986–), though this work is not always reliable about such terms when it comes to the questions of this study.
38 e.g. Meno 86a
39 ord. 2.11.31
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essentially human beings. This raises the question about whether the early Augustine thinks the same thing, which I argue later that he does. As for the term “soul,” we find that Augustine uses two Latin terms with slightly different meanings that can reasonably be translated as “soul”: anima and animus. The term “anima” is a general term like Aristotle’s psuchê. At base it refers to the principle of life in any living being, and can have greater or smaller numbers of faculties or “levels of activity” (gradus actionis). Plant animae only have the nutritive faculty, animal animae add the sensitive faculty, and human animae add the rational faculty. This amounts to three kinds of animae – nutritive, sensitive, and rational – though Augustine will often split them into two kinds, irrational and rational. The term “animus” is a specific term referring to any rational anima, that is, any anima that has the faculty of reason in it. All animi, therefore, are animae, but not all animae are animi. Since an animus necessarily has reason in it, it also

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40 For an extensive defence of this interpretation of Plato, see Lloyd Gerson, Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

41 Chapter 5.

42 Augustine did not take on this understanding of soul from reading Aristotle directly, but from Platonic sources that had incorporated the Aristotelian view into the Platonic framework, as, for example, in Plotinus, Porphyry, and Cicero. This view, for example, is adopted throughout Enn. 4.7, a treatise that I will confirm later that Augustine had read at the time of his conversion.

43 Augustine takes the existence of life to imply anima at beata u. 2.7. My paraphrase of his reasoning is as follows: We know we are alive, so we possess life (uita). We also know that we possess a body (corpus). So we consist of body (corpus) and life (uita). Therefore we at least exist as body (corpus) and soul (anima).

44 an. quant. 33.75. Properly speaking, Augustine says, the levels should be called “activities” (actus) of the soul (an. quant. 34.78). He also mentions that these activities can all be active at the same time.

45 All three faculties are discussed in De quantitate animae: Nutrition/growth – 15.25-22.40, Sense and its distinction from Reason – 23.41-30.61. See also 33.70-76 where Augustine further distinguishes between seven faculties of human souls. The first two are the nutritive and sensitive faculties and the last 5 are distinct faculties constituting the rational faculty.

46 imm. an. 16.25

47 Animus, then, can be thought of as a species of anima, where its specific difference is rationality. As far as I know, Augustine does not use the terms “genus,” “species,” and “specific difference” to classify the relation between anima and animus. However, he comes close to doing so in ord. 2.11.31 where he defines a human being as a rational and mortal animal (homo est animal rationale mortale), and says that “animal” is the genus and that “rational” and “mortal” are two differentiae. He also shows his awareness of genus/species taxonomy in imm. an. 5.7, where he says ‘First, let us see the number of ways what is called a ‘change of animus’ may be accepted. Those which, I think, are quite evident and clear to us are two in genus (genus), but are discovered to be many in species (species)” (Prius ergo, quot modis accipiatur animae quae dicitur mutatio, videamus; qui, ut opinor, manifestiores dumtaxat clarioresque
necessarily has a “mind” (mens) in it, since reason cannot exist apart from mind. “Animus” and “mind,” however, are not therefore interchangeable. “Animus” necessarily refers to an anima that has a mind in it, but it does not necessarily exclude the lower faculties of anima, viz., nutrition and sensation, as “mind” does. On the other hand, it does not necessarily include them either. At least in Augustine’s early writings, for example, angels seem to have animi and yet lack these lower faculties. Disembodied human animi, moreover, if such things exist for Augustine, may also lack the lower faculties.

The terms anima and animus cause problem for translators because there are no two English terms that adequately capture their distinct semantic ranges. Most are happy to use the term “soul” for anima as I will do here, but they have difficulties finding a suitable term for animus that sets it apart from anima. Given that animus necessarily includes reason, some scholars translate it as “mind.” I avoid this alternative in this study for two reasons. First, the English term “mind” is semantically (and traditionally) closer to the term “mens,” which, as we have seen, refers to something that is in the animus and excludes things that “animus” can include. Further, Augustine often takes mens as equivalent to ratio (reason), and so using the

\[\textit{nobilis due sunt genere, specie vero plures inveniuntur).}\]

48 *Acad.* 1.2.26-30 and *lib. arb.* 1.9.19.

49 See *an. quant.* 34.78 “Of the things that God has created if there is something other [than sensible things], then it is either worse than or equal to [the human soul]: worse, as the soul of beasts, equal as [the soul] of angels, but nothing better.” Here is the passage with some prior context to justify my glosses: *Si quid vero aliud est in rerum natura praeter ista, quae sensibus nota sunt, et prorsus quae aliquid spatium loci obtinent, quibus omnibus praestantiorem animam humanam esse diximus; si quid ergo aliud est eorum, quae deus creavit, quiddam est deterior, quiddam par: deterior, ut anima pecoris, par, ut angeli, melius autem nihil.*

50 *Acad.* 1.2.5.26-30 “Who would doubt that what is best in man is nothing other than that part of his animus which each of the other things in man properly obey. But these things, lest you ask for another definition, can be called mens or ratio.” (Quis, inquam, dubitauerit nihil esse aliud hominis optimum quam eam partem animi, cui dominantem optemperare conuenit cetera quaeque in homine sunt? Haec autem, ne aliam postules definitionem, mens aut ratio duci potest.); *lib. arb.* 1.9.19 “... therefore, since it is apparent that [this superiority] is in the animus, we did not find that it should be called anything other than ratio; later we recollected that it is called mens or spiritus. But if ratio is one thing and mens another, it is certainly agreed that only mens can make use of ratio, from which it follows that whatever has ratio cannot lack mens.” (ita cum in animo esse appareret, quid aliud appellandum esset quam ratio non
term “mind” would obscure the distinction between “animus” and “ratio.” This would be fatal to understanding the Soliloquies Project. The central question of the Soliloquies Project is about the relation between animus and ratio, as we will see, and so terminology assuming that they are identical would leave the project incomprehensible. Second, translating animus as “mind” obscures the term’s semantic kinship with the term anima or “soul,” particularly with respect to its being a principle of “life.”

What then can be done? The most precise solution would be to translate animus as “rational soul,” following Augustine’s own occasional use of anima rationalis. I think this is too cumbersome to be practical. The solution that I adopt in this study is to retain the term “soul” for animus but to place it in small capitals: SOUL. This has its own problems, such as its aural indistinguishability, but I think it is the best practical alternative.

When a clearer distinction is necessary, I use the Latin terms themselves, anima and animus. As applied to the Platonic recollection claim, then, one can rightly say that the human soul or anima learns intelligible things, but it is more precise to say that the human SOUL or animus learns them, since it is the kind of soul that possesses reason and mind by definition.

We turn next to the term “learn,” or discere. As a rule, Augustine takes the term to mean “acquire conscious knowledge,” and so it has two essential implications. First, the fact that

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51 See Acad. 1.2.5.26-30. But cf. the previous note. Ratio is not necessarily equivalent to mens, though it will always be something in mens.

52 Cicero, as Augustine would have known, implies that animus is a principle of life. Cicero also tells us that the term derives from anima and that it was common practice to identify the two (Tusc. 1.19).

53 e.g. imm. an. 13.22, uera rel. 55.110.

54 Augustine makes this clear in De magistro when he argues that one cannot learn from signs because
learning is a “conscious acquisition” means that it is a process of moving to a state of greater awareness with respect to knowledge. I discuss this awareness in more detail below and defend my use of the term “conscious” to describe it. Second, the fact that the result is “knowledge” means that the resulting state is not mere true belief. For Augustine, knowing something does entail having a true belief about it but having a true belief about something does not necessarily entail knowing it. Therefore, merely acquiring a true belief about something without knowing means that no learning has taken place.

This raises the question about what Augustine means by knowledge. Augustine tends to understand “knowing” in two senses that are typically captured by the verbs (1) *nouisse* (and sometimes *cognouisse*) (2) and *scire*. Like the relation between *anima* and *animus*, *nouisse* tends to be more general and *scire* more specific, though Augustine is not as consistent with these terms as he is with the former. *Nouisse* (and *cognouisse*) is perhaps most helpfully translated as “to cognize” and Augustine often uses this sense of knowing to apply both to cognizing sensible things (*sensibilia*) and cognizing intelligible things (*intellegibilia*). The former is a weaker kind of knowledge and the latter is knowledge in the strongest, strictest sense. *Nouisse* seems to refer to the soul’s cognitive “grasping” (*capere*) of these things by means of an acquaintance (whether mediate or immediate) and typically contrasts with merely believing something from authority, though Augustine appears to admit some knowledge from authority in

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55 *mag.* 11.37
56 *These two senses are particularly evident in mag.* 12.39-40.
57 *e.g. mag.* 11.36
58 *e.g. mag.* 10.33.132-3.
59 *mag.* 12.39, *mor.* 1.12.20
60 *See lib. arb.* 3.21.60.28-29 “In the case of these things [sc. present sensible things], we cannot grasp (*tenere*) them if we do not experience (*experimur*) them by means of some sort of cognition (*cognitione*).” (*... in quibus quicquid non experimur cognitione qualicunque tenere non possumus.*)
61 By “mediate” acquaintance I have in mind knowing by the senses and by “immediate” acquaintance I have in mind knowing by reason.
later works. It also entails that what is cognized is true (uerum) in some sense and that the soul has some manner of objective certainty. Therefore, one does not typically cognize something if it is false and/or if one has never been acquainted with it and/or if one has uncertainty about it. *Scire* tends to be a term for the strict kind of *nouisse* that is only possible of intelligible things (though Augustine departs from this usage slightly in later works). It is a “knowing” where the soul not only grasps (*capit*) the object, as with sensible things, but also grasps it thoroughly (*per-cipere*). It is also a case where the soul grasps its object by means of reason or mind (as opposed to the senses). Other terms that the early Augustine uses for this strict kind of knowing are *intellegere*, which I translate as “understanding,” and *percipere*, which I translate as “perceiving.” *Intellegere* is always used in the strict sense to apply only to knowing by reason, but *percipere* becomes used in the general sense at some point in Augustine’s post-baptismal works to include knowing by sense. One should be careful to note that although Augustine begins to use *percipere* this way in his post-baptismal works, he has not changed his mind to think that one can *scire* sensible things. What Augustine typically means by *percipere* is...

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63 *trin.* 15.10.17  
64 *e.g.* *trin.* 12.22ff.  
65 See *imm. an.* 6.10.20-22(110) “But the things that are grasped (*capiuntur*) by sense are also sensed (*sentiuntur*) to be outside of us and contained in places, for which reason we do not even affirm (*affirmo*) that they can be grasped thoroughly (*percipi*, i.e. “perceived”)” (*Sed ea, quae sensu capiuntur, extra nos etiam esse sentiuntur, unde ne percipi quidem posse adfirmantur*). This suggests that sensible and intelligible things can be “grasped” (*capi*) but only intelligible things can be “grasped thoroughly” (*percipi*). Augustine also suggests that sensible things cannot be *percipi* shortly after his baptism as well in *ep.* 13.3 (c. 387/8). He says the same thing in *diu. qu.* 9, but it is unclear whether this was before or after his baptism. He published *diu. qu.* shortly before he was ordained a bishop in 396, but it contains questions he had addressed all the way back to his conversion (*retr.* 1.26(25).1). It at least must have been written before *De magistro* (c. 389/90) because Augustine does apply *percipere* to grasping sensible things at *mag.* 12.39.  
66 *an. quant.* 26.49 “Do you not then concede that knowledge (*scientia*) is nothing other than when some thing is perceived and cognized by by firm reason (*firma ratione*)?” (*Hoc nonne concedis scientiam non esse nisi cum res aliqua firma ratione percepta et cognita est?*)  
67 In *imm. an.* 6.10 prior to his baptism, Augustine restricts *percipere* to knowing by reason, but in *mag.* 12.39 after his baptism, he expands it to include knowing by sense.
what Descartes means by percepere when he speaks of “perceiving clearly and distinctly.” It is not perceiving in the sense of “sensing” or “sense-perceiving,” though it can include it. The term that Augustine usually (but not always) uses for sense-perceiving is sentire, a term that I always translate with cognates of the term “sensing” to distinguish it from percepere. Like nousisse (and cognoscere), scire will also typically imply truth, acquaintance, and certainty, but it will do so more strictly.

Deriving from the verb scire is the noun scientia. This noun ordinarily refers to knowledge in the strict sense, and it can also mean “science” if taken in the broad sense (i.e. as including all academic disciplines and not restricted to natural science). Even when it means science, however, knowledge is also often implied, as we will see. Corresponding grammatically to nousisse is the noun notitia, but its conceptual relation to the verb is not straightforward. It is not controversial that this noun can refer to the general kind of knowledge implied by its verb (and so could be translated “cognition”), but whether “notitia” always does this is controversial. Some scholars think that notitia can simply refer to an “awareness” that is not a genuine cognition, such as a “notion” or “concept” that does not perfectly correspond to its object.

As with anima and animus, it is difficult to translate nousisse and scire (and their corresponding nouns) into English in a way that accurately distinguishes them. It is uncontroversial to use “know” for scire and “knowledge” for scientia (except in those cases where it should be translated as “science”), and so I will be consistent about this. But it is

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68 As in Meditations 3.35, for example.
69 mus. 6.5.10
70 In his later writings, Augustine toys with using scientia also for the less strict kind of knowledge (trin. 12.14.22ff), but in the early writings seems to use it only for strict knowledge (e.g. Acad. 1.7.19, 3.11.26, an. quant. 26.49, 30.58, lib. arb. 2.3.9).
71 ord. 2.18.47.1-4
72 The Latin term cognitio can also refer to this general kind of knowledge (lib. arb. 3.21.60.21-29).
73 MacDonald, “The Paradox of Inquiry” (2008), 31ff.
difficult to know what to do with 

\textit{nouisse} and \textit{notitia}. The problem with \textit{notitia} is that although it is the noun grammatically corresponding to \textit{nouisse}, it may or may not correspond to \textit{nouisse} conceptually. To deal with this problem, I simply leave \textit{notitia} in Latin when it arises in quotations so as not to prejudice the question. The problem with translating \textit{nouisse} is that it is difficult to find a word that distinguishes it from \textit{scire} and yet at the same time accurately captures its concept. Translating it as “cognize” is a possible solution, but since I have to use the concept regularly throughout this study, I think that to translate it so is unnatural, confusing and even misleading. The English term “cognize” is not nearly as colloquial as \textit{nouisse} and its meaning is vague and often broader. It would also overemphasize the less strict sense of knowing at the expense of the strict sense, which \textit{nouisse} implies more readily than “cognize.” My inadequate, though I think best, solution is to use the English term “know” to include the meaning of \textit{nouisse} for the most part, and thus for “know” to be open to including the less strict sort of knowing. For this reason, I also use the English term “knowledge” to refer to its nominal form, whatever the Latin word to which its concept corresponds (whether \textit{notitia} or \textit{cognitio} or both). In some special cases I will opt to use the general terms “cognize” and “cognition,” as a reminder that \textit{scire} and \textit{scientia} are not intended and thus that the things at issue are not necessarily strictly known.

We can now be more precise about the parameters of what Augustine means by learning. Since there are two main senses of knowledge, there can be two main senses of learning. Learning can mean acquiring knowledge in the general sense, including both less strict and strict senses of knowing, and it can mean acquiring knowledge in the strict sense, including only the strict sense of knowing. I leave it as an open question for now which is more properly called learning.

The next term is “intelligible things” (\textit{intelligibil\textit{ia}}). By this, Augustine refers to all and
only those things that can be “understood” (*ea quae intellegi possunt*) and therefore known strictly.\(^74\) They contrast with “sensible things” and/or “bodily things”\(^75\) and include the soul and the eternal and unchangeable Forms (e.g. Equality itself, Truth itself)\(^76\) up to and including God. It might seem strange to call God a “Form” (*forma* or *species*), but it is a term that Augustine uses for the Son of God\(^77\) and so with some hesitation and for the sake of being concise I apply it to the Trinitarian God as a whole as well. All intelligible things are incorporeal, which is a necessary condition for them to be understood.\(^78\) While both the soul and the divine Forms could be objects of recollection, I assume that the divine Forms are the interesting objects of recollection, whether or not the soul should be included. This is where the main controversy lies.

Our next term is “recollecting,” which is a translation of *recordari* and *reminisci*. This contrasts with what Augustine means by “remembering,” or *meminisse*. While the very controversy of this study is how literally these terms should be taken when applied to learning, their ordinary literal meanings are less controversial, despite being slightly different from our ordinary use. The terms *recordari* and *reminisci* refer to the act of recalling or bringing something from memory into consciousness, which is why I always translate them with forms or

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\(^75\) *mor.* 1.12.20 “And if the SOUL (*animus*) is an intelligible thing (*res quaedam intelligibilis*), that is, one that becomes known only by understanding (*quaet tantum intelligendo innotescit*), the other creature is everything sensible, that is everything that offers some quasi *notitia* (*quasi quandam notitiam*) of itself through the eyes or ears or smell or taste or touch and that is necessarily inferior to what is grasped by the intelligence alone (*intelligentia*)” (*et si animus res quaedam est intelligibilis, id est quae tantum intelligendo innotescit, alia creatura est omne sensibile, id est quod per oculos uel aures uel olfactum uel gustum uel tactum quasi quandam notitiam sui praebet atque id deterius sit necesse est, quam quod intelligentia sola capitur*). For another example of the distinction, see *mag.* 12.39.
\(^76\) Augustine uses the term *forma* for these things in *uera rel.* 36.66 and he asserts the equivalence of the terms *ideae*, *formae*, and *species* for the eternal, unchangeable intelligible “reasons” (*rationes*) for things in *diu. qu.* 46.
\(^77\) In *ep.* 12 to Nebridius, for example, Augustine says that the Son of God is “the very *disciplina* and form (*forma*) of God” (*disciplina ipsa et forma dei*), and in *ep.* 11.4 he says that *species*, his other word for “form,” is properly attributed to the Son of God.
\(^78\) *imm. an.* 6.10 “But the things that are grasped (*capiuntur*) by sense are also sensed (*sentiuntur*) to be outside of us and contained in places, for which reason we do not even affirm (*affirmo*) that they can be grasped thoroughly (i.e. “perceived,” *percipi*)” (*Sed ea, quae sensu capiuntur, extra nos etiam esse sentiuntur, unde ne percipi quidem posse adfirmantur*).
The term *meminisse*, however, does not seem to include this meaning, but consistently refers to retaining or recording something in memory but not to recalling it. Our English term “remembering” is not restricted like this, but since it is the only common term that includes this meaning, it is the one I use. For Augustine, then, I am remembering and not recollecting as I walk through the grocery store and retain the memory of where I parked my car, and I am recollecting and not remembering when I go outside and bring this memory to consciousness so that I can find it. Plato draws a similar distinction between *anamnēsis* and *mnēmē*. Even when I am not directly translating Augustine, I reserve the English term “remembering” and its forms for this restricted “retaining in memory” meaning. When I intend the “bringing to consciousness” meaning, I either use “recollecting” or “recalling” and their forms.

Next we have the phrase “innate knowledge.” I discussed the “knowledge” component above and said that it had a strict and a less strict meaning for Augustine. One of the questions of this study is in which sense Augustine intends innate knowledge. Is it strict knowledge (*scientia*) or is it something weaker? As for the idea of being “innate,” we can find this idea in Augustine’s use of the term *insitus* (literally, “inserted”). In *On the Quantity of the Soul*, Augustine has Evodius explicitly suggest that prior knowledge (*scientia*) in the soul is *insita*, but defers the question of whether this is the case for another (unknown) time. The term in this sense seems to have two ordinary implications. First, it implies that knowledge is something that the soul

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80 See *Philb.* 34a10-34b9 “[Socrates:] So if someone were to call memory (μνήμην) the ‘preservation of sensation’ (σωτηρίαν ... αισθησίως), he would be speaking correctly, as far as I am concerned. [Protarchus:] Rightly so. S: And do we not hold that recollection (ἀνάλαμπτως) differs from memory (μνήμης)? P: Perhaps. S: Does not their difference lie in this? P: In what? S: Do we not call it ‘recollection’ when the soul regrasps (ἀνάλαμπτας) as much as possible by itself, without the aid of the body, what she had once experienced (ἐπαμένεις) together with the body? Or how would you put it? P: I quite agree” (D. Frede trans., slightly modified).
81 *an. quant.* 26.50.27(195). Cicero explicitly uses *insita* to describe the innate “notions” (*notiones*) of Platonic Recollection (*Tusc.* 1.57). He may simply intend it to mean “inserted” rather than to include the idea of innateness, since he covers the idea of innateness in the passage with another expression.
possesses at least for as long as it exists in this life, i.e. since earthly embodiment.\textsuperscript{82} This is its most essential component. Second, it implies that there is something constitutively in the soul to comprise that knowledge. One of the questions of this study is what exactly this “something” is. There are two main possibilities: (a) it is a “notion” or “concept” that is distinct from but corresponds to the object of knowledge, and (b) it is the very object of knowledge itself within the soul comprising its knowledge. So having innate knowledge of the divine Forms for Augustine will ordinarily mean that the soul possesses the knowledge (at least) since its earthly embodiment and that it either has notions (or concepts) of the divine Forms constitutively in it or that it has the very divine Forms themselves somehow constitutively “in” it. I say \textit{ordinarily} because while the idea of “innateness” typically has the second implication, I will not insist that it always has it for Augustine. As I hinted above, \textit{On the Trinity} may advance the view that the soul has innate knowledge and yet that there is no component constitutively in the mind at all, and we should not rule out this possibility from the start.

Next we come to the key phrase “consciously experience.” The phrase does not explicitly occur in Augustine, but each of the terms does in one form or another, as does the general idea. The Latin terms most closely corresponding to “experience” are the verbs \textit{experiri}\textsuperscript{83} and \textit{pati}.\textsuperscript{84}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{82} I say since “earthly embodiment” rather than since “birth” (as the term literally implies) or “conception” to remain noncommittal about exactly when soul and body come to be composed in this life for Augustine. I also use it to remain noncommittal about whether or not the soul preexists. The idea of “earthly embodiment” is open to the idea of preexistence but does not necessarily entail it.
\textsuperscript{83} e.g. \textit{lib. arb.} 3.21.60.203 “In the case of these things [sc. present sensible things], we cannot grasp (tenere) them if we do not experience (experimur) them by means of some sort of cognition (cognitione)” (... \textit{in quibus quicquid non experimur cognitione qualicumque tenere non possumus}). See also \textit{an. quant.} 33.70. As Augustine attempts to explain the nature of the soul without fully understanding it himself, he says that his reward will be that “while I explain, untutored, what the soul is capable of, I experience (experior), with confidence, what I myself am capable of” (\textit{dum quid valeat anima, indoctus expedio, quid ipse valeam, securus experior}). This is not an example of using the term \textit{experior} for a prior unconscious experience of the intelligibles, but it is an example of using it for an experience of something in the sense of a cognitive acquaintance with it.
\textsuperscript{84} e.g. \textit{conf.} 10.17.26.9-10 “...the memory retains [these notiones or notationes of the affections of the SOUL] even when the SOUL is not experiencing (non patitur) them...” (\textit{quas et cum animus non patitur, memoria tenet}).
As I explained above, the idea of (cognitive) “acquaintance” is essential to this term and at least when applied to intelligible things, “knowledge” is also essential. Two Latin terms that can be translated as “consciousness” are *intentio*, lit. “intention,” and *cogitatio*, lit. “thought.” The idea of “paying attention to” (*ad tendere*) seems to be essential to these terms and thus that being “conscious” of something means paying attention to it. Augustine often speaks of turning one’s *intentio* to something or bringing something to *cogitatio*, just as people might say that they pay attention to something or become conscious of it. We can now put the terms together. One is consciously experiencing something when one is currently cognitively acquainted with it and paying attention to it.

This phrase allows for a three-fold distinction in the way that the soul can be cognitively related to an object of cognition. First, the soul can be related such that it is not experiencing the object at all, whether consciously or not. This is the case either when one has never experienced the object in any way, or when one remembers or recollects an object but has no cognitive acquaintance with it at the present time. Augustine’s favourite examples are his cognitive relations to Constantinople, which he has never seen, and to Carthage, which he has seen but isn’t seeing at the present time. In neither case is he experiencing a city at all, though he used to be experiencing Carthage. Second, the soul can be related to the object such that it is experiencing it, but not consciously. This is the controversial possibility that O’Connell takes to be true for Augustine’s innate knowledge in his early writings. For O’Connell, the early
Augustine follows Plotinus\textsuperscript{87} in arguing, if hesitantly, that the soul is always “still there,”
experiencing the intelligibles even when its consciousness is turned away from them.\textsuperscript{88} On this
view, innate knowledge is not a case of holding something in memory disconnected from its
object, as would be analogous with sense memory. Instead, it is a case of continually
experiencing them, despite the fact that the experience is unconscious. Third and finally, the soul
can be cognitively related to an object such that it is consciously experiencing it. This is the case
for sensible things when the soul is sensing them, such as when it is seeing Carthage or listening
to music. It is also the case for intelligible things when these intelligible things are being
understood (\textit{intelleguntur}), such as when the soul consciously “sees” that the three angles of a
triangle must equal two right angles.

With respect to cognizing the intelligibles, this third cognitive relation has some
ambiguities that are important to note. One can distinguish three potential kinds of conscious
experience of intelligibles. The first is the momentary flash of insight that occurs when one
understands an intelligible truth. The second is thinking about the intelligible truth after the
insight is over. The third is holding this intelligible truth in memory such that it is easily
accessible for later. The first two can be classed as conscious experiences reasonably enough,
given that Augustine’s terms for consciousness are “intention” and “thought.” The third,
however, is more controversial. Something held in memory is not something that one is thinking
about or intent on or paying attention to, and so it would seem to be unconscious, even if still
experienced. The problem with understanding it as unconscious, however, is that we lack a way
of distinguishing this case from the second (Plotinian) cognitive relation to objects above. That
is, it is difficult to distinguish between the fool who is unconsciously experiencing his (innate)

\textsuperscript{87} The \textit{locus classicus} in Plotinus is \textit{Enn.} 4.8.8.1-9. See also \textit{Enn.} 1.1.10, 2.9.2.5-10, 3.4.3.24-27, 3.8.5,
4.3.12, 4.7.13, 4.8.4.31-32, 5.3.4, 6.4.14.
\textsuperscript{88} O’Connell, \textit{Early Theory} (1968), 153-168, esp. 168.
knowledge and the wise man who is unconsciously experiencing his actual knowledge when he is not thinking about it. There is a radical difference between the two because the former is foolish and the latter is fully wise, and considering them both as unconscious experiencing the Forms obscures this difference. The best solution, in my view, is to take this third case as a conscious experience (admittedly in a weaker sense) rather than an unconscious one. This makes sense for two reasons. First, the knowledge in this case is so easily accessed by consciousness and so completely informs the soul that it is far closer to being consciously experienced than unconscious innate knowledge is. Second, Augustine himself assumes this understanding when he indicates that the wise man is completely “turned toward” (conuersus) wisdom (unlike the fool, who is “turned away” (auersus)) and yet the wise man clearly could not always be explicitly thinking about his wisdom.89 I will call this the “weaker” sense of consciously experiencing something in contrast with the other stronger senses.

Using the phrase “conscious experience” in the definition of Platonic recollection has an additional benefit that is important to mention. The doctrine is commonly thought to require that the soul has to preexist because it has to “learn” or “acquire its knowledge” then, which implies that the soul began its conscious experience at some point in time. But this is only one of several possibilities. It is also a problematic possibility because it is subject to an infinite regress objection. If learning in this life requires prior learning in a previous life, then the prior learning in a previous life would seem to require prior learning as well, ad infinitum. To say that the soul had to “consciously experience” the intelligibles in a preexistence, however, allows for this possibility but also allows for the possibility that the soul never began the conscious experience, and so is not necessarily subject to the regress problem. This lack of beginning, moreover, can be taken in two main ways. In one way, it could be a lack of beginning in the sense that the soul was

89 See imm. an. 4.6, 11.18, and 12.19.22(121)-2(122). I discuss the terms conuersus and auersus in this context more extensively in Chapter 3.
created already consciously experiencing the intelligibles. In this case, the conscious experience would have a beginning in a sense, since it would begin at the same time as the soul’s existence, but it would not begin in the sense that the soul learns the intelligibles. In another way, it could be a lack of beginning in the sense that the soul is eternal and was always consciously experiencing the intelligibles, which would mean that the conscious experience had no beginning at all. Thus, the “conscious experience” terminology allows for three preexistence options:

Preexistent Conscious Experience Options
1) The preexistent soul, whether eternal or created, learns the intelligibles at some point in its preexistence
2) The preexistent soul is created and began consciously experiencing the intelligibles at its creation
3) The preexistent soul is eternal and was always consciously experiencing the intelligibles

Making conceptual space for all of these options is especially important because Augustine shows signs of believing in each one of them at different times.

Finally we come to the term “preexistence.” As applied to the soul, I take it to mean that the soul existed prior to its earthly, individual embodiment. I define it in this way to leave several options for preexistence open. First, the soul can be said to preexist whether or not it is an individuated preexistence. Even if the soul only preexisted corporately “in Adam” or indistinguishably in some preexistent world soul, it can still be said to have “preexisted” as long as it has existential continuity with that corporate being. This suggests that Augustine’s traducianism option for the origin of the soul, where individual souls in this life are derived from one corporate soul, is a preexistence view.90 Second, the soul can be said to preexist whether or not it is embodied in that preexistence. Augustine sometimes alludes to the possibility of preexistent spiritual bodies91 and he also seems to entertain the possibility that preexisting souls...
are involved in governing the body of the universe.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, the claim that the soul preexists does not have to mean that it fails to have a body, it simply means that it does not have the individual “earthly” body that it has in this life. One might therefore ask what it means for the soul not to preexist. The soul can be said not to preexist if the individual earthly-embodied soul only came into being at the same time as it became united with its earthly body. This refers to the “creationist” view of the origin of the soul that Augustine lists as an option in \textit{On the Free Choice of the Will} 3.\textsuperscript{93} We can leave it open whether this embodiment would happen right at conception or at some later time in the womb.

Putting these things together, it is clearer what it would mean at minimum for Augustine to accept Platonic recollection. It would mean that he accepts that the human \textit{anima} or \textit{animus} acquires conscious knowledge (in a strict or less strict sense) of at least some eternal and unchangeable Forms by recollecting innate knowledge of these Forms. This innate knowledge, in turn, would have resulted from being consciously acquainted with them in a preexistence that may or may not have been individual or bodily.

\section*{5. Possible Arguments and Principles behind the Doctrine of Platonic Recollection in Augustine}

We now have a better idea of the conceptual space occupied by Platonic recollection in general as articulated in Augustine’s own terms. We also have a better sense of some of the questions to be discussed in this study, including the most central question of all: whether Augustine in fact accepted Platonic recollection. I now identify some reasons from the Platonic tradition that might have motivated Augustine to accept it. This will help us to determine whether Augustine accepted it and, if so, why. It will also help us to understand why the doctrine


\textsuperscript{93} \textit{lib. arb.} 3.21.59
is reasonably called Platonic. I divide them into reasons for innate knowledge and reasons for the preexistence requirement. There are at least four of the former and two of the latter.

*Reasons for Innate Knowledge:*
1. Targeting and Recognition Argument(s)
2. Deficiency Argument
3. Language Capacity Argument
4. What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known Argument

*Reasons for the Preexistence Requirement:*
1. Past-Conscious-Experience Principle
2. Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle

In what follows I explain each of these and suggest why Plato could be interpreted as accepting them. My claim is not that they were all necessarily accepted by Plato, but rather that they could be taken to be accepted by him (and often were), whatever he actually thought.

I first look at the Targeting and Recognition Arguments for innate knowledge. These arguments are based on what some call the Targeting and Recognition Problems,\(^94\) and can be found in Plato’s *Meno*. “How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all?” says Meno, and “if you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?”\(^95\) The first is a targeting problem because the concern is that one cannot target one’s search for the object of knowledge unless one already knows it. The second is a recognition problem because the concern is that one cannot recognize the object of knowledge that one seeks when one encounters it unless one already knows it. The two problems in turn generate the paradoxes of inquiry and learning. If correctly seeking (inquiring, targeting) and finding (learning, recognizing) an object requires that one already knows it, then it seems that there is no need to seek and find it in the first place. Socrates’ answer to these problems and paradoxes in

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95 *Meno* 80d (Grube trans.).
the *Meno* is to argue that learning is a matter of recollecting innate knowledge. Precisely how the argument works, however, is controversial. One thing that is clear is that merely arguing that the Targeting and Recognition Problems are genuine problems is not enough. Even if they do genuinely prove that learning requires innate knowledge, it does not follow that human beings therefore *have* innate knowledge. For this an additional premise is needed. That premise is that “acquiring knowledge is possible.” Once it is granted that the Targeting and Recognition Problems are genuine and that acquiring knowledge is possible, it follows that human beings have innate knowledge. This is why the example of the slave boy in the *Meno* is so important. If Socrates can show that even a slave boy *can* acquire knowledge apart from the authority of others, then it is likely that all human beings can acquire knowledge. Otherwise, the innate knowledge conclusion would not follow.

The next reason for innate knowledge is the Deficiency Argument, which is an argument found in the *Phaedo*. It has two key premises. First, it holds that we can correctly judge that

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96 *Meno* 81a-85d. Socrates does not use the phrase “innate knowledge” to describe the prior awareness that is in the soul in the *Meno*, but seems to say that they are “true opinions” (*alêtheis doxai*) (85c). This might lead one to think that what is innately in the soul is not genuinely knowledge but only opinion. There are several reasons, however, to think that “knowledge” (*epistêmê*) is what Socrates means. For one, the text speaks about recollection as “regrasping” (*analambanein*) knowledge (*epistêmên*) in oneself (*Meno* 85d), suggesting that what is in oneself is already knowledge. For another, the mere fact that Socrates’ proposed solution to the paradoxes is “recollection” suggests that he wants to maintain that the prior awareness is genuinely “knowledge” just as one does in ordinary cases of recollection where knowledgeable people recollect their knowledge that remains knowledge even when they are not thinking about it. For another, the *Phaedo* describes the prior awareness in the soul as a “pre-knowing” (*proeidenai*) (*Phd.* 74e), which suggests the same would be true for the *Meno* unless Plato changed his mind between works. For yet another, it would not make sense for Plato to have maintained that *epistêmê* of the Forms (a superior epistemological state) could be derived from mere true opinions about them (an inferior epistemological state). In his magisterial book *Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), Christoph Helmig takes it as obvious that Platonic recollection, whether as expressed in Plato or in later Platonists, essentially includes the idea of innate “knowledge” of the Forms. One thing that the evidence of the later Platonic tradition establishes is that even if Plato himself did not truly believe in innate knowledge, the doctrine of “Platonic recollection” still rightly can be interpreted as essentially including it, since this is how the subsequent tradition interpreted it. Cf. Gail Fine who denies that the innate knowledge is genuinely “knowledge” in “Inquiry in the *Meno*” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, Richard Kraut, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 213.

97 *Phd.* 72e-77c.
particular things are genuine cases of equality (or a similar property, like unity) and yet that those cases are deficient in comparison with equality itself (or unity itself). For example, we can correctly judge that two equal sticks are genuinely equal and yet deficient in equality. The second key premise is that we could not do this unless we already had knowledge of equality (or unity) itself. From these, two conclusions follows: (1) There exists a Form of equality (or unity) distinct from its instantiations, and (2) we must have innate knowledge of this Form and any other Form for which the two premises hold. It is called the Deficiency Argument because its logic crucially depends upon one having the ability to recognize that any particular instantiation of a Form will be deficient in comparison with the Form itself. Finding this argument throughout Augustine’s early works will be some of the best evidence that he accepts innate knowledge there.

The previous two arguments fairly uncontroversially appear in Plato, even if their details are disputed. More controversial is whether the last two can be found there. It is also possible that these last arguments are both simply versions of the Deficiency Argument, though I will treat them as separate for the time being. We begin with the Language Capacity Argument. Its basic argument is that the human capacity for language, a capacity which requires the ability to classify sensible things under general categories or concepts, is not possible without the existence and innate knowledge of Forms to ground these categories or concepts. There will be room for dispute about how many Forms have to be innately known on the argument, but that some have to be is essential. Some scholars argue that this is what Socrates is referring to in the Phaedrus when he describes the sort of preexistent soul that can become human.

But a soul that never saw the truth (mêpote idousa tên alêtheian) cannot take a

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98 Phd. 74a-75b.
human shape, since a human being must *sunienai kat’ eidos legomenon*, proceeding to bring many sensations (*aisthéseon*) together into a reasoned unity (*eis hen logismói*). That process is the recollection (*anamnêsis*) of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead.\(^{100}\)

Whether the language capacity interpretation is correct depends in part on what *sunienai kat’ eidos legomenon* means. Nehemas and Woodruff translate it as “understand speech in terms of general forms,”\(^{101}\) which quite clearly entails that language itself requires innate knowledge of the Forms. The same is implied by Helmig’s translation, “understand universal/generic names.”\(^{102}\) I suspect that these translations are overly interpretive and that the translation should rather be “understand in terms of so-called form,” but even with this more neutral rendering, one can make a good case for the Language Capacity Argument. Language does bring sensations into a kind of reasoned unity under general categories and so it is not a big stretch to infer that the mere capacity for language is that to which Plato is referring.\(^ {103}\) The other possible interpretation of the passage is that it is the human capacity for *dialectic*, not *language* in general, that implies innate knowledge of the Forms, as a later passage seems to confirm.\(^ {104}\) Whatever Plato thought,

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100 *Phdr.* 249b-c (Nehamas and Woodruff trans., slightly modified) “οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε μὴποτε ἴδούσα τὴν ἀλλήλων εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνέναι κατ’ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἴνα ἀσεβήσθων εἰς ἐν λογισµῷ συναρµόμενου. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἑκείνων ἢ ποτ’ εἶδεν ἡµῶν ἢ ψυχὴ συµπορευθέσα τῷ καὶ ὑπεριόδουσα ἢ νῦν εἶναι φαµεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὅν ἄντως.”


103 *Parm.* 135b5-c3, too, appears to support this interpretation, since Parmenides says that without allowing for Forms for things, it “will destroy the power of discussing (τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι) entirely.” Proclus takes the passage to have the same implication (*In Parm.* 4.894.3-18). Some modern scholars disagree, however, taking διαλέγεσθαι to mean “dialectic,” as Gill and Ryan translate it in their translation (Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works* (1997), 369), rather than the more general “discussing.”

104 In *Phdr.* 265c-266c, Socrates says that the two most important things to grasp in his speech are the methods of collection and division that make up the art of dialectic. The way Socrates describes the method of collection appears to correspond to what he says in this passage. For a defence of the idea it is only the capacity for dialectic or “higher learning” (not language) that requires innate knowledge of Forms for Plato, see D. Scott, *Recollection and Experience. Plato’s Theory of Learning and its Successors* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 74-80.
though, one can see why a student of Plato might get the former impression.

Next is the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known Argument. Although this argument does not appear in Plato very clearly, it does appear quite clearly in Augustine’s post-baptismal writings.\textsuperscript{105} It has three basic steps. The first is the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known Principle: we cannot love something of which we have no knowledge. Second, it claims that in order to love intelligible things, we must know the intelligibles themselves and not mere instantiations of them. Third, it claims that we do love at least some intelligible things, such as beauty, even before learning them. From these three steps it follows that we know at least some intelligible things before learning them. Not everyone agrees that the argument proceeds as I have represented it because they deny that it is supposed to entail innate knowledge of intelligible things.\textsuperscript{106} However, they agree that the reasoning exists in Augustine in some form.\textsuperscript{107} Probably even fewer agree that the argument can be found in Plato at all. Once we are alert to it, however, it starts to look like it is implied in the \textit{Phaedrus} and \textit{Symposium}. In the \textit{Phaedrus}, Socrates argues that those whose memory (\textit{mnêmê}) of the Forms is good enough are struck with longing for those Forms upon seeing their images down here.\textsuperscript{108} One could take this to imply that one’s longing for, i.e. love of, the Forms is an indicator of the existence of a “memory,” i.e. innate knowledge, of them. In the \textit{Symposium}, Diotima claims that love is neither wise nor ignorant but somewhere in between.\textsuperscript{109} One could interpret this to mean that the soul possesses unconscious innate knowledge of wisdom as something between wisdom and ignorance that explains the

\textsuperscript{105} Whether the argument as a whole appears in Augustine is controversial, but there is no doubt that the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known Principle appears there because it regularly appears throughout his works: e.g. \textit{lib. arb.} 2.9.26, \textit{mus.} 12.34, \textit{conf.} 10.20.29, \textit{trin.} 10.1.1-10.3.5.

\textsuperscript{106} MacDonald argues that in the \textit{Confessions} the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known Principle is only supposed to imply the need for a weak sort of prior “awareness” of intelligibles, not outright knowledge itself (“Paradox of Inquiry” (2008), 30-37).

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Phdr.} 250a-d.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Symp.} 204a-b.
soul’s love of wisdom. As I said above, I do not insist that Plato really accepted all these arguments or even intended them; I merely point out that they are plausible interpretations of what Plato says.

We now turn to the reasons for the preexistence requirement. It is interesting that in all three works where Plato strongly suggests that learning is a matter of recollecting innate knowledge (Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo), he is never open to the possibility that human beings simply received it at birth. Instead, he argues that innate knowledge requires that the soul existed before embodiment during which time it either first learned it or always possessed it. As Socrates says of the slave boy in the Meno, “Did he not either grasp (elaben) at some time the knowledge that he now possesses or else always possess it (aei eichen)? Meno: Yes.” Why is this? As I have already suggested, Plato’s reasoning is that the soul could not have innate knowledge unless it had consciously experienced the objects of that knowledge at an earlier time. This is precisely what each of these works suggests in one form or another. The Phaedrus passage above is the clearest. According to Socrates, a soul that “never saw the truth” in its preexistence “cannot take a human shape, since a human being must understand in terms of so-called form, proceeding to bring many sensations together into a reasoned unity.” Socrates goes on to say that this process “is the recollection of the things our soul saw” in its preexistent circuit traveling with god. Since this recollection would not be possible without having “seen” the truth, recollection (and therefore innate knowledge) requires a past conscious experience of that truth. I take this to be the most general, essential reason behind the preexistence requirement. Let us call it the Past-

110 Cf. G. Rawson, “Platonic Recollection and Mental Pregnancy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.2 (April 2006): 138-140, who does the opposite of what I suggest here. Instead of interpreting the Symposium’s view of learning, which he calls a dispositional “mental pregnancy” view, as a Platonic recollection view along the lines of the Phaedrus, he interprets the Platonic recollection view of the Phaedrus as a dispositional “mental pregnancy” along the lines of the Symposium. I disagree, but do not insist on it here. I only insist that the interpretation above is a reasonable possibility.

111 Meno 85d. “[Socrates:] Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἢν νῦν οὕτως ἔχει, ἢτοι ἐλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἄει εἶχεν; [Meno:] Ναι.”
Conscious-Experience Principle.

*Past-Conscious-Experience Principle*: Souls cannot have innate knowledge without a past conscious experience of the objects of that knowledge.

The same principle is implied in Plato’s other two recollection works. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates argues that one must have “grasped” (*eilêphenai* < *lambanein*) the knowledge previously,\(^ {112}\) and in the *Meno*, he argues that one either grasped (*elaben*) it previously or always possessed (*aei eichen*) it.\(^ {113}\) “Grasping” is quite reasonably a reference to a conscious experience,\(^ {114}\) but “always possessing” is less obviously so and will take some explanation. In the *Meno*, Socrates says that “always possessing” knowledge means “always knowing” (*aei epistêmôn*) it,\(^ {115}\) and he implies that this refers to the kind of knowledge that the mathematician has of math.\(^ {116}\) In other words, the one who “possesses” knowledge does not merely have unconscious innate knowledge but has knowledge in the conscious, if weaker conscious, sense. As I argued above, the weaker sense is still rightly called “conscious” knowledge even when the person is not explicitly thinking about it at the time, since the access to consciousness is so quick and easy and because the knowledge completely informs the soul. Thus, there is little doubt that the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle really is an essential reason for Plato’s preexistence requirement.\(^ {117}\)

\(^{112}\) *Phd.* 75b5, c2.

\(^{113}\) *Meno* 85d9-10.

\(^{114}\) The contexts make this clear in several ways. For example, Socrates says that “re-grasping” (*analambanein*) knowledge within oneself is the same as “recollecting” (*anamnêiskesthai*) it (*Meno* 85d6-7), which would not be true unless “grasping” involved bringing something to consciousness, just as “recollecting” does.

\(^{115}\) *Meno* 85d12.

\(^{116}\) *Meno* 86a6-8.

\(^{117}\) I may not yet have satisfied those who have a vested interest in denying that the Prior-Conscious-Experience Principle is essential to Platonic recollection. They might agree that it is one possible reason for preexistence on the view, but they could say that it is not the essential one. But if it is not the essential one, then I would contend that it is not a Platonic recollection view, as the subsequent philosophical tradition attests. Leibniz, for example, believed in innate knowledge of a sort (in the form of “perceptions”) and thought that it requires that souls (and indeed all monads) preexist (*Monadol.* 14, 56, 61, 73, 82), but he says that his view is not a Platonic recollection view because he thinks the soul never had to “think distinctly” (*pensé distinctement*) about these things (*Discours* 26, *Monadol.* 14). Cicero also thought that Platonic recollection necessarily implied that the SOUL previously “had been active in the
It is not, however, a sufficient reason for the preexistence requirement. For the requirement itself to follow, one must add an uncontroversial premise: the past conscious experience could not have been in this life.\textsuperscript{118} The general argument behind the preexistence requirement, then, can be summarized as follows:

\begin{quote}
General Argument for the Preexistence Requirement
1. Souls cannot have innate knowledge without a past conscious experience of the objects of that knowledge. (Past-Conscious-Experience Principle)
2. The past conscious experience cannot have occurred in this life.
3. Therefore, souls cannot have innate knowledge without a past conscious experience of that knowledge in a previous life. (Preexistence Requirement)
\end{quote}

Note that the preexistence requirement itself is hypothetical. It only states that if souls have innate knowledge, then the soul must have had a past conscious experience of its objects in a previous life. It only follows that the soul actually does preexist when combined with the Innate Knowledge Feature.

The Past-Conscious-Experience Principle is the most general statement of the essential reason for the preexistence requirement. One can go on to ask why the principle should hold. It has some intuitive force on its own, but it could use some fleshing out to be persuasive. One way that Augustine thinks that Plato fleshes it out,\textsuperscript{119} as we will see, is to understand it as a “Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle.” That is, the reason that the innate knowledge requires a past conscious experience is that innate knowledge is a memory and we can only have memories of things we have previously consciously experienced. This last claim is the Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle.

\begin{quote}
Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle: If the mind has a memory of X, then X must have been consciously experienced at some earlier time.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{118} Socrates argues for this premise in some detail at \textit{Phd}. 75a-b.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ep}. 7.2.
The principle does not mean that the object of knowledge itself has to be in the past, since we clearly can hold many things in memory that still exist in the present. It only means that the conscious experience of it must have been in the past. This gives a little more intuitive force to the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle, since this is how our memories of sensible things seem to work. Since we could not have memories of sensible things without having consciously sensed them at some time (the term “consciously” here should be taken to include sensing things “unconsciously” in the modern sense of the term, since unconscious sensing will still involve actively sensing them through our senses), it stands to reason that we also could not have memories of intelligible things without having consciously “sensed” them at some time.

It is an interesting question whether Plato really accepted the Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle as a more specific version of the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle. The fact that Augustine thought so does not prove that he did, especially since Augustine had likely not even read any Platonic dialogues aside from Cicero’s partial Latin translation of the *Timaeus*. And yet it does seem to be the guiding principle behind the preexistence requirement in the *Phaedo*. The very first premise that Socrates sets down as he begins the recollection argument is this: “We surely agree that if anyone is going to recollect anything, he must have known it previously at some time.” The qualification “previously at some time” (proteron pote) confirms that the knowledge Socrates refers to here is a conscious experience. Socrates’ opening salvo in the recollection argument, therefore, seems to be that something can only be in memory so as to be recollectible if it has been consciously known before, and this is exactly to affirm the Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle.

Thus, we have four possible reasons behind innate knowledge and two possible reasons

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121 Phd. 73c1-3 “[Socrates:] ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ ὅπως, εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθῆσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τὸ ὠτὸ πρότερον ποτε ἐπίστασθαι.”
behind the preexistence requirement. My contention at this point is not that Augustine does in fact accept them in the pre-baptismal writings, but merely that we should be on the lookout for them as we examine these works. If Augustine accepts at least one of the former and at least one of the latter, then we have good reason to conclude that he also accepts Platonic recollection in general. Finding more than one of each will buttress this conclusion and will clarify his thinking about it and the type of Platonic recollection he held. As I now turn to Chapter One, my first task is to analyze the most explicit passages for and against Platonic recollection in Augustine’s early writings from 386 to 391, which is a time period that includes the pre-baptismal writings and some early post-baptismal ones. This will show that there is a prima facie case to be made for Platonic recollection in these early writings and yet that the case made in this way is inconclusive.
Chapter 1 – The Issues of Interpretation

Introduction

My analysis of the most explicit passages for and against Platonic recollection in Augustine’s early pre- and post-baptismal writings (386-391) begins by considering the putative evidence for Platonic recollection. This includes the five most explicit passages that seem to show a commitment to both features of Platonic recollection and it includes two other passages seemingly affirming the soul’s preexistence. I call the first five passages “putative acceptance passages” for Platonic recollection and I evaluate them in terms of the clarity of the truth of the following two claims: that the passage expresses Platonic recollection (in its two features) and that Augustine accepts the doctrine that the passage expresses. I call the former the expression claim and the latter the acceptance claim. Some passages, as we will see, are clearer on one or the other and some are equally clear on both. After doing this, I look at two basic strategies and their corresponding passages that scholars use to deny that the early Augustine accepted the two features. The first strategy denies only the Preexistence Requirement Feature and not the Innate Knowledge Feature. The second strategy denies the Innate Knowledge Feature as well. I argue that when all the passages cited have been considered, the evidence suggests that the early Augustine accepted both features, but I concede that this conclusion remains contentious.

1. Putative Evidence for Platonic Recollection

The first putative acceptance passage arises in Soliloquies, Augustine’s fourth extant work, written in 386/7 at Cassiciacum before his baptism. The work is a two-book dialogue between Augustine and an internal teacher, Ratio (Reason). At the end of Book 2, Ratio says approvingly,

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122 The dates are approximate and are based upon O’Donnell, Confessions, vol. 1 (1992), lxvi-lxix, unless otherwise indicated. The Retractationes is the main primary source for these dates.
[1] Those who are well educated in the liberal disciplines are of this sort, since by learning they root up and in a certain way dig out [the disciplines] that were without doubt buried (obrutas) in themselves by forgetfulness (obliuione). While neither of the claims at issue is unambiguously true in the passage, they do seem very plausible. When the speaker, Ratio, says that learning the disciplines involves rooting up and digging out the disciplines, “that were without doubt buried (obrutas) in themselves by forgetfulness (obliuione),” one can reasonably take this to be an expression of each feature of Platonic recollection. The idea that people have disciplines buried “in themselves by forgetfulness” suggests that the disciplines are present in memory and so latently known, and the idea that the disciplines “were...buried...by forgetfulness” suggests that there was a time when they were not buried by forgetfulness and so were consciously known, which presumably would have been before birth. Neither feature, however, is entirely clear because not all of their parts are explicit. One can also take the passage to indicate that Augustine accepts what it expresses, since the passage is expressed approvingly. It is true that one cannot say this with certainty because it is not Augustine’s character that expresses it but his teacher, Ratio. However, Augustine’s ordinary practice is to put his opinions into the mouths of the teachers in his dialogues, and thus it is reasonable to assume that anything that Ratio unambiguously accepts,

123 sol. 2.20.35 “Tales sunt, qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eruditi, siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione obrutas eruunt discendo et quodam modo refodiunt.”

124 Augustine’s dialogues always feature a teacher speaking with one or several students. In all of the dialogues except the Soliloquies, Augustine himself is the teacher (in mus. his character is simply called “Teacher” (magister) throughout) and he is regularly explicit about his personal opinions, even if they are offered only as probabile, as plausible. This is in contrast to Cicero’s more reserved and sometimes outright misleading self-portrayal as Augustine himself notes in ciu. 5.9. In this, Augustine’s strategy is intentional. Augustine thought philosophers in his own day ought to be truthful and strongly opposed the ancient use of “noble lies,” while admitting that their lies may have been helpful under the circumstances. He did not think philosophers in his own day should always make their views explicit, however, holding that they were justified in withholding their opinions or being reserved in their expression in cases that might be harmful or inappropriate for their audience. For discussions about Augustine’s truthfulness, his criticism of prior philosophers, and his policy of reserve, see M. Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 45 (1999): 66-7 and E. Fortin, “Augustine and the Problem of Christian Rhetoric,” The Birth of Philosphic Christianity, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996): 79-91.
Augustine the writer also unambiguously accepts. So while the expression claim seems quite clear, the acceptance claim seems even clearer.

Any doubt about the clarity of these claims appears to be removed by the second putative acceptance passage. The passage is a comment on *Soliloquies* 2.20.35 from Augustine’s much later review of his works, the *Retractations* (426/7). The *Retractations* appears to say that in *Soliloquies* 2.20.35 he really was accepting Platonic recollection, a view that he has since abandoned.

[2] Again, in a certain place, I said, “those well educated in the liberal disciplines without doubt root up and in a certain way dig out by learning those things that were buried in themselves by forgetfulness.” But I also disapprove (*improbó*) of this. For it is more believable that even those who are ignorant of them, when properly questioned, respond with true things about a given discipline because, to the extent that they can grasp it, the light of eternal reason is present to them, where they view these unchangeable truths, and not because they knew (*nouerant*) them at some time and forgot them, as it seemed to Plato or others like him.\(^{125}\)

In this passage, the later Augustine disapproves of the *Soliloquies* passage for a very specific reason. The reason is that he now disapproves of Plato’s view that learning the disciplines involves recollecting what had been known at some earlier time and forgotten. In this case there is no ambiguity that the “earlier time” refers to a pre-birth existence, since Augustine tells us he is speaking of Plato’s view, and so the expression claim is clearly true about the *Retractations* passage. The acceptance claim, however, is clearly false because Augustine explicitly says that he “disapproves of” (*improbat*) the Platonic view. Applying these observations to the *Soliloquies* passage, however, suggests that the expression and acceptance claims about *that* passage will be true. Since the *Retractations* disapproval of the *Soliloquies* passage is due to the fact that Augustine disapproves of Platonic recollection, the *Soliloquies* passage must have been

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\(^{125}\) *retr.* 1.4.4 “Item quodam loco dixi quod disciplinis liberalibus eruditi sine dubio in se illas obliuione obrutas eruunt discendo et quodammodo refodiant. *Sed hoc quoque improbo. Credibilis est enim propterea ueba respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos eorum, quando bene interrogantur, quia praesens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen rationis aeternae, ubi haec immutabilia ueba conspicient, non quia ea nouerant aliquando et obliti sunt, quod Platoni uel talibus uisum est.”
expressing some form of it. Further, the fact that the later Augustine saw it necessary to express his “disapproval” of the passage suggests that he had originally approved it (i.e. accepted) it. And so by taking the Soliloquies text together with the corresponding Retractationes text, the early Augustine’s conscious acceptance of Platonic recollection before his baptism in the Soliloquies seems unmistakeable.

The third putative acceptance passage arises in On the Quantity of the Soul (387/8). Augustine indicates that this is his seventh extant work\(^\text{126}\) and lists it as the second written after his baptism.\(^\text{127}\) It is a dialogue between Evodius and Augustine, where Augustine plays the role of the teacher. At one point, Augustine exclaims to Evodius that

\[\text{[3]}\text{our opinions contradict each other so much that to you the soul (anima) seems to have brought no art [with itself] and to me it seems to have brought every art with itself, nor [does it seem to me] that what we call learning (discere) is anything other than recalling (reminisci) or recollecting (recordari).}\(^\text{128}\)

Although it is not as clear as in the previous passage, the expression claim is still quite clear. The fact that learning is merely a matter of “recollecting” the arts (i.e. the liberal disciplines) that the soul has brought with it suggests that they are innately known. Further, the fact that the soul has “brought” every art with it suggests that it must have brought them from somewhere else,

\(^{126}\) That is to say, it is the seventh extant work that he completed. Augustine had begun several works on the liberal arts prior to De quantitate animae and his baptism, but he completed none of them except the book on grammar, which itself is not extant. See retr. 1.1-1.8(7), especially 1.5.6. The one work that is extant of these writings is De dialectica, but it is incomplete. Its authenticity has also been a subject of debate, though Darryl Jackson has made a good case for it in his introduction to Augustine: De dialectica (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975). Given its content, it does not figure significantly into the questions of this study, despite being a pre-baptismal work.

\(^{127}\) retr. 1.7(6).1 and 1.8(7).1. Note that it is not entirely clear how Augustine ordered his writings in the Retractationes in every case, whether it was by when he began them or when he completed them or something else. His ordering of De libero arbitrio suggests that it was according to beginning, since he tells us that he completed it much later, but his ordering of De moribus appears not to fit this pattern. It precedes De quantitate animae and De libero arbitrio in the Retractationes, but it may have been begun only after these works because it clearly rejects pre-baptismal doctrines that they show signs of accepting (e.g. the eternity of the soul), as I mention later.

\(^{128}\) an. quant. 20.34 “Magnam omnino, magnam et qua nescio utrum quicquam maius sit, quaestionem moves, in qua tantum nostrae sibimet opinions adversantur, ut tibi anima nullam, mihi contra omnes artes secum adtulisse videatur nec aliud quicquam esse id, quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci et recordari.”
presumably a preexistent conscious experience. This latter inference is less clear, but makes some sense. “Bringing” implies transferring something that one is holding from one place to a different place, which fits well with the idea of the soul changing from a preexistent state of having conscious forgettable knowledge to a state of having unconscious recollectible knowledge. Although what the passage expresses is not entirely clear, it is clear that Augustine accepts the view, whatever it is, as his own. In the Soliloquies passage, the interlocutor Reason made the assertion, giving Augustine possible distance from the view expressed, but here Augustine’s character unambiguously says that this is how “it seems to me” (mihi uideatur).

The fourth passage is found in the first book of On the Free Choice of the Will (387/8-391/5). Augustine wrote the first book and parts of the second after On the Quantity of the Soul and thus also after his baptism, making it the eighth extant work that he began. However, he only completed the second and third books after becoming a priest, possibly as late as 395, making it possible that he changed his mind somewhere along the way. Again, the work is a dialogue where Augustine is the teacher and Evodius the learner. Evodius has just exclaimed how much it bothers him that we should suffer such bitter penalties in this life, since we are fools who have never been wise. To this, Augustine responds as follows:

[4] You say this as though you have clear proof that we have never been wise; for you are thinking of the time since we were born into this life. But since wisdom is in the SOUL (cum sapientia in animo sit), whether the SOUL (animus) lived in another life before its partnership with this body and whether it lived wisely at some time is a great question, a great secret to be considered in its proper place.129

The scenario in this passage is roughly the reverse of the previous. In the previous passage, the acceptance was clearer than the expression, whereas in this passage the expression is clearer than the acceptance. The expression nevertheless is not unambiguously clear because one could
question whether the passage is expressing the Innate Knowledge Feature. It is obviously expressing the Preexistence Requirement Feature because it says that the “wisdom in the SOUL” may require that the SOUL has lived “wisely at another time” and “in another life before its partnership with this body,” but it is not as obviously expressing the Innate Knowledge Feature because the expression “wisdom in the SOUL” (sapientia in animo) does not explicitly mention anything about knowledge or innateness. We know with more certainty that the acceptance claim is unclear because Augustine explicitly withholds assent from what he is expressing. It is a “great question” (magna quaestio) and a “great secret” (magnum secretum) that ought to be considered in its proper place whether wisdom is in the SOUL and whether the SOUL lived wisely in another life. He is obviously postponing a revelation of his commitment on the matter, if he has any, until a place where the topic can be treated appropriately. So while the truth of the expression claim is more or less clear, the truth of the acceptance claim is not. Note, though, that if one is permitted to take this passage together with the previous passage (an. quant. 20.34), where the acceptance was clear and the expression was not, we would seem to be able to infer that he really does accept and express Platonic recollection. Note also that Augustine’s hesitance about Platonic recollection applies only to the Preexistence Requirement Feature and not the apparent Innate Knowledge Feature. He thinks it a difficult question to determine whether the SOUL was consciously wise in a preexistence, but he has no doubt that “wisdom is in the SOUL’ (sapientia in animo sit), whatever that means precisely.

The fifth putative acceptance passage can be found in Letter 7. The dating of the letter is disputed, but it was almost certainly written after his baptism and before On Music (388/90). Augustine wrote it to his friend Nebridius to correct one of Nebridius’ views about memory. In

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130 CCSL dates ep. 7 at c. 387/388. Du Roy dates it at c. 388/9, right before De musica (L’intelligence (1966), 180-81 n.7). De musica is the terminus ad quem because it distinguishes phantasiae and phantasmata for the first time and because Augustine treats them as synonymous in sol. 2.20.34 and assumes the same synonymity in ep. 7.4.
the process of arguing against Nebridius’ view, Augustine raises the topic of Platonic recollection and seems to accept it as a matter of course.

[5] Some people unfairly criticize (calumniantur) that very noble Socratic discovery (inuentum), by which it is affirmed that the things we learn are not inserted into us as though new, but are recalled into memory by recollection (in memoriam recordatione reuocari). They say that memory is of past things, but that the things that we learn by understanding always remain and cannot pass away, as the author Plato himself says, and so for this reason are not past things. These people do not notice that that vision (visionem) is past by which we at one point have seen these things with the mind; since we have flowed down (defluximus) from them and begun to see them as other in different ways, we see them again (nos reuisere) by recollecting (reminiscendo), that is, through memory (per memoriam).131

The expression of Platonic recollection in the passage is very clear because of the reference to Socrates. It is the Socratic/Platonic recollection view he is speaking about, not a Christianized metaphorical version. But even apart from this reference, both features of Platonic recollection are fairly obvious. The preexistence requirement, in particular, is spelled out in Augustine’s response to the view’s critics. The critics say that the view does not make sense because learning intelligible things is learning present things, while memory is only of past things. But, Augustine contends, this fails to distinguish between the pastness of the things and the pastness of the vision of the things. The theory does not state that the intelligible things themselves are past, only that the vision of them is in the past, and it is this past vision that provides a memory of them that is recollectible. Since this is more or less to say that there was a preexistent conscious experience of intelligible things that accounts for innate knowledge of them, we have the preexistence requirement.132 That Augustine really is talking about preexistence is supported by

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131 ep. 7.2 “Nonnulli calumniantur aduersus Socraticum illud nobilissimum inuentum, quo asseritur, non nobis ea quae discimus uluti noua inseri, sed in memoriam recordatione reuocari, dicentes memoriam praeteritarum rerum esse, haec autem quae intellegendo discimus, Platone ipso auctore, manere semper nec posse interire, ac per hoc non esse praeterita. Qui non attendunt illam visionem esse praeteritam, qua haec aliquando mente uidimus; a quibus, quia defluximus et aliter alia uidere coeipimus, ea nos reminiscendo reuisere, id est, per memoriam.”

132 It is important to note that Augustine’s response here does not reject the principle that “memory is of
the phrase, “we have flowed down (defluximus) from [intelligible things] and begun to see them as other in different ways,” which fits with the idea that the soul fell from a preexistent vision of intelligibles into the sensible world\(^{133}\) and now only sees their sensible images.\(^{134}\) The acceptance claim is more open to question, though it too seems a reasonable enough interpretation.\(^{135}\) Augustine calls the view “that very noble Socratic discovery” that others “unfairly criticize” (calumniantur), which are strong words for someone who is merely indifferent about the view. Against the possibility that inuentum could really mean “invention,” rather than “discovery,” as is possible in Latin, we could mention that Augustine is going out of his way in this passage to defend the view from its critics. One could still deny the acceptance claim, however, by arguing that he is only speaking in defence of others who accept Platonic recollection, merely playing their spokesman, while refraining from accepting the view as his own. So while Augustine is certainly expressing Platonic recollection in this passage, he is not unambiguously accepting it.

I have now considered the five most explicit passages that seem to show – and in my view, do show – that the early Augustine at some point at least provisionally accepted Platonic recollection. To these putative acceptance passages, I now add some passages seemingly in favour of the soul’s preexistence. Finding preexistence alone does not necessarily imply Platonic recollection, but it does remove one of the most common objections to it. O’Connell lists several such passages in his “Pre-existence in Augustine’s Seventh Letter.”\(^{136}\) Of these, I look at two,

\(^{133}\) As O’Connell explains in “Seventh Letter” (1969), 72.

\(^{134}\) The expression *aliter alia* in the last sentence derives from the Greek άλλα άλλως, and in this context appears to refer to the idea that the soul only sees the Forms on earth “as other in different ways,” i.e. the soul sees their deficient likeness or images. I defend this idea and explain its significance to our topic in Chapter 5.

\(^{135}\) O’Donnell goes as far as to say that Augustine shows “explicit allegiance” to Platonic recollection here (*Confessions*, vol. 3 (1992), 176-77).

\(^{136}\) 67 n. 3. To the Platonic recollection passages discussed above, he adds *Acad.* 2.9.22 “The SOUL will return more safely to heaven since it supposes that it will ... triumph over the passions in returning to the region of its origin” (King trans., slightly modified), as well as *beata u.* 1.1, *imm. an.* 4.6, and several
one before his baptism and one after. In On the Happy Life 1.1, the pre-baptismal Augustine writes to his dedicatee, Manlius Theodorus, as follows:

For, since God or nature or necessity or our own will, or a combination of some or all of these – the matter is very obscure, but is taken up that you might shed light on it – has thrown us out into this world, seemingly blindly and scattered all over, as if into a stormy sea, how few would come to know whither they have to strive or return unless at some point some tempest, which to fools would seem adverse, should connect those who are wandering and ignorant, unwilling and obstinate, to that most desirable land?\(^{137}\)

The metaphors of us being “thrown out” into this world as if into a stormy sea and having to “return” to that most desirable land, i.e. the land of the happy life, are what most immediately seem to suggest preexistence. They seem to mean that we previously existed as happy and that we somehow lost this happiness and entered the world of fortune and uncertainty from which we have to “return.” The preexistence interpretation is supported by Augustine’s uncertainty as to what did the throwing, i.e. as to what caused us to lose our happiness and enter the world of fortune. Was it God or nature or necessity or our own will, or a combination of some or all of these? If it was nature, necessity, or will without any reference to God, then preexistence would seem to be the only option, as O’Daly himself concedes.\(^{138}\) A non-preexistence option for some of them would at least be technically possible, however, if one argues that they were the causes of Adam’s fall and that we somehow partake in them even though our souls did not exist at that time in any sense. If the cause was God to some degree, then a non-preexistence view is more

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\(^{137}\) Here is the passage in full: “Si ad philosophiae portum, e quo iam in beatae uitae regionem solumque proceditur, uir humanissime atque magne Theodore, ratione institutus cursus et voluntas ipsa perduceret, nescio utrum temere dixerim multo minoris numeri homines ad eum peruenturos fuisse, quamuis nunc quoque, ut uidemus, rari admodum paucique peruient. Cum enim in hunc mundum siue Deus siue natura siue necessitas siue voluntas nostra siue coniuncta horum aliquia siue simul omnia – res enim multum obscura est, sed tamen a te iam inlustranda suscepta – ueluti in quoddam procelssum salum nos quasi temere passimque proiecerit, quotusquisque cognosceret, quo sibi nitendum esset quaue redeundum, nisi ali quando et inuitos contraque obnitienses aliqua tempestas, quae stultis uidetur adversa, in optatissimam terram nescientes errantesque conpingeret?”

\(^{138}\) O’Daly goes as far as to say that these latter three causes “would necessarily imply pre-existence” (O’Daly, “Pre-Existence” (1974): 228).
clearly possible. Augustine could reasonably have meant, for example, that God metaphorically “threw us out” into this world in the sense of creating our souls at the time of earthly embodiment. But in this case preexistence is also a reasonable interpretation, both on account of the language of “throwing us out” and because it fits with the possibility articulated in On the Free Choice of the Will 3.21.59 where God “sends” individual preexistent souls into this world. The question comes down to this: Is Augustine’s uncertainty in this passage fundamentally an uncertainty about which preexistence view is correct or is the uncertainty meant to include uncertainty about preexistence itself? The fact that the former interpretation is even possible is significant, since later in On the Free Choice of the Will 3.21.59, Augustine goes out of his way to emphasize that non-preexistence is a plausible option. So the passage does make a good case for Augustine’s acceptance of preexistence at the time, despite not proving it for certain.

The preexistence passage after Augustine’s baptism arises in Letter 7, and is part of his attempt to explain to Nebridius why the soul does not possess innate sensible images.

I want you to understand from this that, although you [rightly] sense that there are such a great number of motions of soul (animus) that are free from all the images about which you are now asking, the soul (anima) receives the body as its portion (sortiri) by some completely different motion than by the thought of sensible forms (sensibilium cogitatione formarum), forms which I do not think that it can suffer before it uses the body and the senses.139

There are two relevant questions here. At what time does the soul “receive the body as its portion” (or more literally, “choose the body by lot” (sortiri corpus)) and what is the time “before” (priusquam) the soul uses the body and the senses? Since they both seem to be times when the soul has no thoughts of sensible forms at all, the only option appears to be a pre-embodied existence. Letter 7 has several other passages seeming to corroborate this preexistence

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139 ep. 7.7 “Ex quo intellegas uelim, cum tam multos animi motus esse sentias, expertes omnium de quibus nunc quaeris imaginum, quolibet alio motu animam sortiri corpus quam sensibilium cogitatione formarum, quas eam, priusquam corpore sensibusque utatur, nullo modo arbitror pati posse.”
Augustine also clearly accepts whatever he is expressing here, as the form of a personal letter suggests and as the assertive language in the passage itself also indicates, and so an acceptance of preexistence seems very likely.

Such passages as these have been the reason that Augustine scholars in the last two hundred years have concluded, sometimes hesitantly, sometimes boldly, that the early Augustine did accept Platonic recollection for a time. Gilson’s cautious conclusion is that, “In view of the unmistakable language he uses during the years 387-89, and the manner of his subsequent retraction, I am inclined to think that at first Augustine accepted the genuine Platonic doctrine [of recollection].” O’Connell’s more audacious conclusion is that the early Augustine not only accepted some form of Platonic recollection but also that he held a specifically Plotinian version of it. O’Daly and other scholars, as we have seen, have concluded the opposite. In spite of the

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140 See ep. 7.3.36-40 “If the soul, before it uses the body for sensing bodily things, can imagine the same bodily things, and if it had been affected better, which no sane man can doubt, before it became entangled with these fallible senses, then the souls of those sleeping are affected better than those awake, and the souls of those who are insane are affected better than those lacking such a curse...[which is obviously false]” (Si anima, priusquam corpore utatur ad corpora sentienda, eadem corpora imaginari potest, et melius quod nemo sanus ambigit affecta erat, antequam his fallacibus sensibus implicaretur, melius afficiuntur animae dormientium quam vigilantium, melius phreneticorum quam tali peste carentium...) (my emphasis). Augustine’s argument here is against the claim that all sensible images already exist in the soul and that sensing is merely recollecting these images rather than acquiring them from sense experience. The argument relies on the principle that one will always be “affected better” by anything that is epistemologically prior in the soul, i.e. anything that one can “be affected” by in the soul without input from the senses. See also ep. 7.5.86-89 “For the remaining two classes, a question could reasonably be raised, if it were not manifest that the soul is less submissive (obnoxiam) to falsities (falsitatis) not yet having suffered the vanity of sensible things and the senses” (De duobus reliquis ture adhuc quaeri posset, nisi manifestumes et animam minus esse obnoxiam falsitatibus nondum passam sensibilium senssumque uanitatem) and ep. 7.5.96-99 “Consequently, in no way will I believe that the soul, not yet sensing by means of the body, not yet struck by mortal and fleeting substance through the vacuous senses, was situated in such a disgrace of falsity” (Quo fit ut nullo pacto animam credam nondum corpore sentientem, nondum per sensum uanissimos mortali et fugaci substantia uerberatam, in tanta falsitatis ignominia iacuisse.).

141 In Saint Augustine (1960), 71 n. 11 and 12, Gilson refers to four of the five passages quoted above as evidence, sol. 2.20.35, retr. 1.4.4, an. quant. 20.34, and ep. 7.2, as well as some less explicit passages. He also refers to retr. 1.8(7).2, which is the “retraction” of an. quant. 20.34, but takes it as non-committal on the question. I agree and therefore only examine this passage in the next section.

142 Gilson, Saint Augustine (1960), 71. For a list of scholars drawing similar conclusions, see the Introduction to this study.

143 See “Seventh Letter” (1969), 73 “And once the mind has been alerted by the few stray texts that
evidence provided by these passages, they claim that other passages show that Augustine either rejected Platonic recollection altogether or at least remained non-committal. In order to refute my claim that the early Augustine accepted Platonic recollection, one only has to prove that he was non-committal. There are two main strategies for doing this. The first strategy is to accept Augustine’s commitment to innate knowledge and deny his commitment to the preexistence requirement. The second strategy is to deny his commitment to both innate knowledge and the preexistence requirement. In what follows, I evaluate versions of these two strategies and the passages scholars use to defend them.

2. Putative Evidence Against the Preexistence Requirement

O’Daly has been the most vocal and long-time advocate of the first strategy in the last hundred years.\(^\text{144}\) He explicitly addressed O’Connell’s arguments in the early seventies with his article “Did St. Augustine Ever Believe In the Soul’s Pre-existence?” (1974) and he added to his opposition in his book *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind* (1987).\(^\text{145}\) There are two main version of this strategy. Since the preexistence requirement has two parts, the preexistence part and the requirement part, one can either oppose both parts or one can oppose the requirement part alone,

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previous scholars have agreed upon as inclining them to think Augustine accepted those two complementary features of Plotinus’ view of man – reminiscence and pre-existence – it is inevitable that the mind start questioning further. What other features are characteristic of Plotinus’ theory of man as ‘fallen soul’? Are they, too, found in the early Augustine?... Once the text is queried for all these features of Plotinus’ doctrine (not precisely Plato’s!), a host of confirmatory details leaps to the eye.” O’Connell’s use of “inclining” here is an allusion to Gilson’s statement above that he is, “inclined to think that at first Augustine accepted the genuine Platonic doctrine.” See also O’Connell, *Early Theory* (1968), passim and especially chapters 6-7.


leaving preexistence itself as something that Augustine accepts. O’Daly adopts the first version, as do most scholars on this strategy. The second version is much less common, but I know of at least one scholar who adopts it.\(^{146}\) O’Daly’s argument on the first version draws the stronger conclusion that the early Augustine completely rejected the preexistence requirement. One could also use the same arguments to draw the weaker conclusion that Augustine was neutral, or non-committal, about the preexistence requirement, which is the only conclusion I hold him to proving here.

What is his argument more precisely? O’Daly’s has a two part argument aimed at the two parts of the preexistence requirement. First, he claims that Augustine was neutral about the preexistence part. Augustine nowhere unequivocally endorses it, he argues, and in fact explicitly indicates his uncertainty about it.\(^ {147}\) Second, he claims that Augustine was not merely neutral but was against the requirement part. Augustine had already developed his characteristic non-Platonic illumination theory by the time of the *Soliloquies*, he argues, and this was a theory where innate knowledge did not require preexistence but was explained by an ever-present divine illumination.\(^ {148}\) How then does O’Daly think that the references to forgetfulness and recollection in the above passages should be interpreted? In the cases where Augustine clearly accepted these terms for learning, he intended them as metaphorical or symbolic of latent and conscious states of knowledge.\(^ {149}\) We have “forgotten” the truths of geometry in the sense that an ever-present divine illumination gives us latent knowledge of them, and we “recollect” these truths when this knowledge becomes consciously known.

\(^{146}\) Rombs, for example, claims that “the question of the soul’s origin as well as the theory of preexistence and ontological fall was important precisely because and only because of its relation to original sin and guilt” (*Fall of the Soul* (2006), 212). This suggests that he thinks innate knowledge never required preexistence for Augustine.

\(^{147}\) For both parts, see O’Daly, *Philosophy of Mind* (1987), 199.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 200. The examples of illumination he provides are *sol.* 1.6.13, 1.8.15, and 2.19.33.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 199
To evaluate the evidence for these claims, let us begin with O’Daly’s first claim, that Augustine was neutral about preexistence. To prove this, O’Daly first offers the negative observation that Augustine nowhere unequivocally endorses preexistence. This observation is true if “unequivocally” is taken in its strictest sense, but on its own it is weak evidence. O’Daly also offers some positive evidence to make his claim about neutrality more persuasive. The decisive passage he has in mind is found in On the Free Choice of the Will 3.21.59.

Now of these four opinions (sententiarum) about soul (anima), whether (1) they come from propagation, or (2) are made from scratch in the individuals being born, or whether they already exist somewhere and either (3) are sent into the bodies of those being born or (4) fall there by their own volition (sua sponte), we must not rashly affirm (temere adfirmare) any. For this question has not yet been worked out (Euoluta) or illuminated (inlustrata) by the catholic commentators of the divine books on account of its obscurity and perplexity; or if it has been done, writings of this sort have not yet reached my hands.\(^{150}\)

In this passage, Augustine provides a list of the four plausible explanations for the origin of soul elaborated in his previous paragraphs.\(^{151}\) On the first, traducian view, souls are not individually created, but “come from propagation” (de propagine ueniant) or, as he says a little earlier, “are drawn” (trahuntur)\(^{152}\) from one original created soul. On the second, creationist view, each soul is individually created for each body being born. On the third, sent-preexistence view, individual souls preexist and are sent by God to earthly bodies. On the fourth, fallen-preexistence view, individual souls preexist and fall by their own volition into earthly bodies. The point of the passage, however, is not to describe the opinions, but rather to make a comment about affirming them, namely, “we must not rashly affirm (temere adfirmare) any.” What does this mean about Augustine’s own commitment? O’Daly is correct, in my view, to claim that it shows a degree of

\(^{150}\) *lib. arb.* 3.21.59 “Harum autem quattuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine ueniant an in singulis quibusque nascentibus nouae fiant an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes uel mittantur diuinitus uel sua sponte labantur, nullam temere adfirmare oportebit. Aut enim nondum ista quaestio diuinorum librorum catholicis tractatoribus pro merito suae obscuritatis et perplexitatis euoluta atque inlustrata est, aut si iam factum est nondum in manus nostras hiuscsemodi litterae peruenunt.”

\(^{151}\) See *lib. arb.* 3.20.56-58 for Augustine’s elaboration.

\(^{152}\) *lib. arb.* 3.20.56
uncertainty about preexistence. But O’Daly wants to take it one step further and infer it shows neutrality about preexistence. That is, he thinks it shows that Augustine has no commitment to one view or the other, provisionally accepting none of them, nor any combination of them, though presumably seeing benefits in each.

The neutrality conclusion about all four views is a possible interpretation, but it does not follow with certainty for several reasons. First, the comment, “we must not rashly affirm (temere adfirmare) any,” technically only rules out affirming any one of the opinions rashly (temere). It does not rule out affirming one of them wisely. Second, even if it is meant to rule out “affirming” (adfirmare) one of them, it still leaves open the possibility of weaker forms of assertion. At the beginning of Book 3, Augustine distinguishes between “affirming” (adfirmare) something and “saying with some hesitation” (dicere cum aliqua dubitatione), where the former is a strong form of assertion typically implying a knowledge claim and the latter is weaker.153 Rejecting the strong “affirming,” then, could still allow the weaker “saying with some hesitation,” which is the only degree of acceptance I am insisting on here. Third, even if Augustine is implying that he prefers no one particular view, it still could be that he prefers a collection of views over the others. Indeed, he could very well prefer the collection of views (1), (3), and (4) over view (2) due to the fact that they are preexistence views and the second is not.154 He could be neutral about (1), (3), (4) individually while strongly preferring them as a group. Whatever the case may be, the passage does not prove O’Daly’s first claim, even ignoring the positive evidence for preexistence discussed earlier.

But what about O’Daly’s second claim? Even if Augustine accepted preexistence, it could still be true that Augustine rejected (or was neutral about) the idea that innate knowledge

153 *lib. arb.* 3.1.1
154 It is important to recognize that view (1) is a preexistence view of a kind since every soul existed prior to mortal embodiment in a non-individuated state.
requires preexistence. This alone would be sufficient to show a rejection of the preexistence requirement, even if it did not rule out preexistence itself. This is when the defenders of the second version of this strategy join the defenders of the first version.

O’Daly’s primary defence of this second claim is to provide three passages from the Soliloquies that he takes as sufficient to show that Augustine held his non-Platonic illumination view, one that excludes the requirement part of the preexistence requirement: sol. 1.6.13, 1.8.15, and 2.19.33. A common feature of all passages is the doctrine that knowing intelligible things is analogous to physical seeing. One knows or “understands” (intellegit) when one mentally “sees” the intelligible object of knowledge. Each passage then goes on to make its unique contribution by specifying a particular condition for this seeing. The first passage (1.6.13) explains that mental seeing requires a correct looking (rectus aspectus) on behalf of the mind. The second passage (1.8.15) suggests that all intelligible things other than God – in this case the contents of the disciplines (disciplinae spectamina) – must be “illuminated” in order to be seen. The third passage (2.19.33) maintains that God and the disciplines must always be contained within our soul (in nostro animo) in order to be seen, which O’Daly interprets to mean that God and the disciplines are innately known. According to O’Daly, then, Augustine’s distinctive theory of illumination has four essential components:

1. Knowing intelligible things is mentally seeing them
2. The mind must look correctly at the intelligible objects of knowledge in order to see them
3. All intelligible objects of knowledge other than God must be illuminated by God in order to be seen
4. God and the disciplines must be innately known in order to be seen.

Since the three passages are supposed to show why Augustine’s illumination theory excludes the preexistence requirement, these four components should be enough to show that it is excluded.

But do they? The first “mental seeing” component need not exclude it, since mental

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seeing is one of the most characteristic Platonic metaphors from Plato himself all the way to Plotinus and Porphyry. The second “correct looking” component also need not exclude it, since it says nothing about whether one has correctly looked in the past. The fourth “innate knowledge” component need not exclude it either, considering that it is the very thing usually thought to require preexistence. And so we are left with the third “illumination” component. Could it be sufficient to exclude the preexistence requirement?

In order to make this judgment, let us look at Soliloquies 1.8.15 in more detail. It is worth considering the passage in any case because it is the first passage to offer an extended explanation of the terminology of illumination in the Augustinian corpus, and will help to ground future discussions. What O’Daly ideally wants to find in the passage is the suggestion that an ever-present divine illumination in our souls is somehow sufficient to cause the latent innate knowledge of intelligibles we have always possessed since birth. This would make a prebirth conscious experience of those intelligibles unnecessary. Here is the passage:

God, of course, is intelligible, and the contents of the disciplines (disciplinarum spectamina) are also intelligible. But they differ very much. Both light and earth are visible, but the earth cannot be seen without having been illuminated (inlustrata) by light. So also one should believe that the things transmitted in the disciplines, which anyone who understands concedes are absolutely true (ut erissima) without any hesitation, cannot be understood (intellegi) unless they are illuminated by another, as if by their own sun. One is permitted to notice that just as there are three things in this [corporeal] sun, that it exists, that it shines (fulget), and that it illuminates (inluminat), so also there are three things in that most hidden God whom you wish to understand, that he exists, that he is understood (intellegitur), and that he makes other things to be understood (cetera

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156 The locus classicus of mental seeing and of illumination generally in Plato is Resp. 507a-509c. An extended discussion of the same in Plotinus occurs at Enn. 5.5.7.

157 There is an explicit passage a little earlier at sol. 1.6.12 “Each of the most certain things of the disciplines are of such a kind as the things illuminated (inlustrantur) by the sun so that they can be seen, such as the earth and all earthly things. And it is God himself who illuminates [them all]” (disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole inlustrantur, ut videri possint, veluti terra est atque terrena omnia. Deus autem est ipse qui inlustrat.). This is merely an introductory passage that 1.8.15 is meant to explain, which is why I say that 1.8.15 is the first extended explanation of illumination terminology. There are earlier places (e.g. Acad. 2.1.2, 2.4.10, beat vit. 4.35 and sol. 1.1.2, 1.1.3) where Augustine mentions or alludes to illumination, but these are not explicit enough to be explanations of illumination terminology.
The claim that the contents of the disciplines cannot be understood unless they are illuminated by another, viz., God, is the claim that O’Daly interprets to imply that God’s general illumination of the disciplines also illuminates us and is *sufficient* to make the contents of the disciplines recollectible by us. While this interpretation may seem natural to a reader of Augustine’s later works, this is not what Augustine explicitly says here and so the passage is not conclusive on its own. The passage at most establishes that illumination is a *necessary condition* for innate knowledge (if there be any) but does not establish that it is sufficient. It is true that the absence of any mention of a preexistence requirement lends some support for the claim that it is sufficient. But this is a negative argument that is vulnerable to positive evidence on the other side, such as we have already found in the *Soliloquies* itself and elsewhere. Therefore, the preexistence requirement still remains a possibility.

It would now seem that O’Daly’s second claim is also unproven. But perhaps we have not tried hard enough. In order to make sense of Augustine’s apparently Platonic uses of “recollection” and “forgetfulness” in the putative acceptance passages, O’Daly argues that they are only metaphorical. This is much less plausible now that we have failed to find a strong reason for Augustine’s neutrality about preexistence or for his adoption of a distinctive non-Platonic illumination theory, but perhaps there is independent evidence in its favour. If O’Daly can show that Augustine’s usage is metaphorical, then this would be excellent evidence for the rejection of the requirement part of the preexistence requirement (O’Daly’s second claim). Is there, then, other evidence for taking the terms metaphorically?

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158 *sol. 1.8.15* “*Inteligibilis nempe deus est, intellegibilia etiam illa disciplinarum spectamina; tamen plurimum differunt. Nam et terra visibilis et lux; sed terra nisi luce inlustrata videri non potest. Ergo et illa, quae in disciplinis traduntur, quae quisquis intellegit verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est [ea] non posse intellegi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole inlustrentur. Ergo quomodo in hoc sole tria quaedam licet animadvertere: quod est, quod fulget, quod inluminat, ita in illo secretissimo deo, quem vis intellegere, tria quaedam sunt quod est, quod intellegitur, et quod cetera facit intellegi.*”
What better evidence could there be than the fact that Augustine seems to do this himself? According to O’Daly, Augustine’s great work of re-evaluation, the Retractations, interprets some of the putative acceptance passages metaphorically, and this suggests that they all should be taken metaphorically. Augustine wrote the Retractations near the end of his life with the intention of reviewing his works (to date) and passing judgment on them. There has been much debate about the degree to which Augustine’s judgments were really “retractions.” While there is no doubt that Augustine really did retract some of his earlier opinions, in many cases his judgments seem more like “justifications,” i.e. justifying the intended opinion and merely retracting the words and phrases used. The question is the degree to which he does this. O’Daly is a scholar who tends in the “justification” rather than “retraction” direction. On the Platonic recollection issue, in particular, he interprets Augustine as primarily retracting the words and phrases while justifying the alleged non-Platonic opinion they were meant to express. I, on the other hand, tend more in the “retraction” direction on this and other issues because I think there was something substantial for him to retract.

In any case, there is one Retractations passage that does speak in O’Daly’s favour, a passage that comments on On the Quantity of the Soul 20.34. The reader will recall that On the Quantity of the Soul 20.34 was clear about acceptance, and was almost as clear about expression. O’Daly himself noted the difficulty of interpreting that passage metaphorically, yet concludes it must be because of how the Retractations speaks of it.

My statement in [De Quantitate Anima] that “the soul seems to me to have

\[\text{retr. 1.Prol.1.1-6. Augustine says that he will “review [his] works... with a judicial severity and point out, as with a censor’s pen, what offends” him (...ut opuscula mea...cum quadam iudiciaria severitate recenseam, et quod me offendit uelit censorio stilo denotem).}\]

\[\text{160 Madec and Harrison, for example, hold that Augustine was retracting very little of substance in his early writings, whereas O’Connell and those in his tradition think the retractions were more substantial. See Madec, “Révisions” (1996), 119-146 esp. 122, 126 and C. Harrison’s review of Madec’s work in Journal of Theological Studies 52 (2001): 382-4.}\]

\[\text{161 O’Daly, Philosophy of Mind (1987), 201.}\]
brought all the arts with itself, nor [does it seem to me] that what we call learning (discere) is anything other than recalling (reminisci) or recollecting (recordari),” should not be received as though it is approved from this that the soul at some time lived either here in another body or elsewhere in a body or without a body, and that previously in another life it learned the things that it answers upon being questioned, since it did not learn them here. For it can happen, as I have already said earlier in this work [i.e. 1.4.4], that it is possible in this way, namely, because it is an intelligible nature and is connected not only to intelligible things, but also to immutable things, having been made according to this order (eo ordine facta) that when it moves (mouer) itself towards the things to which it has been connected or towards itself, it answers truths about these things to the extent that it sees them.]

O’Daly’s interpretation really has some support here. The elderly Augustine’s claim that the 20.34 passage “should not be received as though it is approved from this (non accipiendum est, quasi ex hoc approbetur) [that Platonic recollection is true],” very reasonably could mean, “I did not intend to approve of Platonic recollection at 20.34, despite appearances.” It is, however, not as explicit as it could be. The passive, present verbs “it should not be received” and “it is approved” certainly rule out interpreting 20.34 as though the later Augustine literally intends to approve Platonic recollection at the time of writing the Retractations, but the weak and “present” nature of their grammatical construction make room for the possibility that this was not what he meant in the past when writing 20.34. So O’Daly’s metaphorical interpretation makes a lot of sense of the passage, but there is room for my side to cast doubt on it.

By looking at the other main Retractations passage on the subject, 1.4.4, that doubt appears to be justified. As we saw, that passage strongly implies that Soliloquies 2.20.35 is a literal acceptance (or approval) of Platonic recollection, and so the same seems to be true about the even clearer acceptance of Platonic recollection in De Quantitate Anima 20.34.

\[\text{Chapter 1 – The Issues of Interpretation – 62}\]

\[162\text{ retr. 1.8(7).2 (my emphasis) “In quo libro illud quod dixi omnes artes animam secum attulisse mihi uideri, nec aliu quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere quam reminisci et recordari, non accipiendum est, quasi ex hoc adprobetur animam uel hic in alio corpore uel alibi siue in corpore siue extra corpus aliquando uixisse, et ea quae interrogata respondet, cum hic non didicerit, in alia uita ante didicisse. Fieri enim potest, sicut iam in hoc opere supra diximus, ut hoc idea possit, quia natura intelligibilis est et conectitur non solum intelligibilibus, uerum etiam immutabilibus rebus, eo ordine facta, ut cum se ad eas res mouet quibus conexa est uel ad se ipsam, in quantum eas uidet, in tantum de his uera respondeat.”}\]
Retractations 1.8(7).2, in that case, should be interpreted as I have suggested, since otherwise, the Retractations would contradict itself within a few pages.

O’Daly, no doubt, would respond by turning the tables. One should not use 1.4.4 to interpret 1.8(7).2, one should rather use 1.8(7).2 to interpret 1.4.4. This would mean that 1.4.4, too, is only criticizing the word and phrases and thus that Soliloquies 2.20.35 should be interpreted metaphorically. In my view this solution does more violence to the text than my solution, but it is difficult to rule out the possibility without more substantial evidence. The most that we are able to conclude from these Retractations passages, so far, then, is that O’Daly’s metaphorical interpretation remains unproven. We cannot yet prove that it is false. This becomes even more apparent as we consider other evidence for a metaphorical interpretation. In what follows I look at two additional passages that in my view really do present compelling evidence for a kind of metaphorical interpretation, and thus seem to support O’Daly’s second claim rejecting the preexistence requirement. But we will see that in the end, it is not the kind of metaphorical interpretation O’Daly has in mind.

The two passages suggesting a metaphorical interpretation of “recollection” and “forgetfulness” are found in works written before Augustine’s baptism, an observation that will become significant later. The first passage arises in On the Immortality of the Soul 4.6 and is commonly cited by both sides of the debate, including O’Daly and O’Connell. O’Daly takes it to confirm Augustine’s distinctive non-Platonic illumination view and O’Connell takes it to 164

\[163\] O’Daly provides a reason for taking 1.4.4 metaphorically. He claims that the quoque signals a continuity with the previous passage (sol. 1.4.3), where he more clearly was criticizing only a phrase, viz., his seemingly Porphyrian statement that “these sensible things should be thoroughly escaped” (Penitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda) (Philosophy of Mind (1987), 201). This is not persuasive because one could just as plausibly argue that the reverse is the case, namely, that the Platonic recollection statement shows that the Porphyrian-like statement should also be taken literally, as it likely should. Augustine first indicates that he accepts a literal bodily resurrection only after his baptism in mor. 1.22.40 or an. quant. 33.76 (whichever comes first), and after this one never finds an unqualified affirmation of this Porphyrian-like statement again (see an. quant. 33.76.17-18(225) for a qualified affirmation).

\[164\] Philosophy of Mind (1987), 201.
confirm a Plotinian/Platonic recollection view. Augustine writes,

> It is clear even now that the human SOUL (animum humanum) is immortal and that all true rationes are in its hidden places (in secretis), even though it seems either not to have them or to have lost them, whether by ignorance (ignoratione) or by forgetfulness (oblituione).

For O’Daly, this passage indicates that innate knowledge of the true rationes (divine Forms or ideas) needs no preexistence requirement. Even though the SOUL might seem “not to have [the true rationes] or to have lost them, whether by ignorance or by forgetfulness,” in point of fact none of these are the case because it still has them “in its hidden places” (in secretis). Most importantly, for O’Daly’s view, this reveals that the SOUL did not lose the true rationes by forgetfulness, which means that it never consciously experienced them in a previous life, making the preexistence requirement unnecessary. Therefore, O’Daly says, “forgetfulness” only applies metaphorically in such cases, as a mere façon de parler about innate knowledge hidden in the soul’s secret places.

What then accounts for the innate knowledge? It is God’s ever-present illumination that always remains with the human soul as long as it exists. I will argue for O’Connell’s Plotinian/Platonic interpretation later on, which depends upon taking the passage in the broader context. Even given the broader context, however, there is good reason to think that some sort of metaphorical interpretation is implied.

The other pre-baptismal passage supporting the metaphorical interpretation is found in the dialogue On Order. It arises within a discussion where the character Licentius tries to explain which part of the wise man is wise. Licentius defends the claim that although one can say that

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165 As one can surmise from “Seventh Letter” (1969), 67 n. 3.
166 imm. an. 4.6 “... manifestum est etiam inmortalem esse animum humanum et omnes veras rationes in secretis eius esse, quam vis eas sive ignoratione sive oblivione aut non habere aut amississe videatur.”
167 “This, as we have seen, is a typically Augustinian façon de parler: it is like the ‘so-called forgetfulness or ignorance’ of the soul at De imm. an. 4.6” (“Pre-Existence” (1974), 233).
168 As I argue in Chapters 4 and 5, “forgetfulness” is metaphorical in this passage because the unlearned SOUL does not possess innate knowledge of the rationes in memory, since the intellectual part of the SOUL has no memory. “Forgetfulness” remains literal, however, in the sense that the unlearned SOUL was preexistent in the sense of the rationes and now possesses them within it unconsciously.
the soul itself is wise, properly speaking it is the ruling part (i.e. the intellect) of the soul that is wise, not the serving part (i.e. the sensible part). As part of this discussion, he suggests that for all souls, memory resides in the sensible part only, not the intellect.\(^{169}\) When Augustine objects that intellectual memory might be needed for the wise man on account of the liberal disciplines, Licentius responds,

> What need does he have for memory (\textit{memoria}) when he has and holds all of his own things as present? For not even in sense itself do we call memory to our aid for that which is before our eyes. Therefore, since the wise man has everything before those interior eyes of intellect, that is, since he fixedly and immovably sees (\textit{intueri}) God himself, with whom are all things that the intellect sees and possesses (\textit{uidet ac possidet}), what need is there, I ask, for memory?\(^{170}\)

The passage functions to confirm that Licentius is serious in saying that the intellect has no faculty of memory. His point here is that even the wise man does not need memory, let alone the fool, because the wise man sees all of his intelligible things continually. He admits elsewhere in the section that the fool needs memory in order to become wise,\(^{171}\) but this is only a memory of words and images, and so only requires sense memory. With no intellectual faculty of memory, learning the intelligible things will only be a “recollection” in a metaphorical sense, as will also be the case for “forgetfulness.”

Most scholars agree that this is the opinion that Licentius is expressing, but they disagree about whether it is Augustine’s view as well.\(^{172}\) There is good evidence for thinking that it is.

\(^{169}\) \textit{ord.} 2.2.6 “I also think that memory itself (\textit{ipsam memoriam}) dwells in that subjected [i.e. serving] part [of the soul]” (\textit{In qua parte subiecta etiam ipsam memoriam puto habitare}).

\(^{170}\) \textit{ord.} 2.2.7 “Quid, inquit, memoria opus est, cum omnes suas res praesentes habeat ac teneat? Non enim uel in ipso sensu ad id, quod ante oculos nostros est, in auxilium uocamus memoriam. Sapienti igitur ante illos interiores intellectus oculos habenti omnia, id est, deum ipsum fixe immobiliiterque intueni, cum quo sunt omnia, quae intellectus uidet ac possidet, quid opus est quaeso memoria?”

\(^{171}\) Licentius acknowledges that since he is still a fool, he has to retain the things he learns from Augustine in memory (\textit{ord.} 2.2.7.93-94), but the context makes it clear that this would be retained in the serving part of the soul, not the intellect (\textit{ord.} 2.2.7.79-84).

\(^{172}\) K. Winkler thinks that Augustine accepts it (“La théorie augustinienne de la mémoire à son point de départ,” \textit{Augustinus Magister}, vol. 1 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 511-19). B. Dobell thinks that Augustine is partial to the view, but may have some reservations about it because he objects that the wise man might require memory for teaching the disciplines (\textit{Intellectual Conversion} (2009), 124-5). Ayres
First, throughout the exchange with Licentius, Augustine has been challenging Licentius not as one who disagrees, but rather as someone playing devil’s advocate, with the intention of prompting Licentius to articulate a view that Augustine himself thinks is correct. Second, Augustine hints that he holds the same opinion in another passage in the same exchange. The evidence for both is found just prior to the passage quoted. After one of Augustine’s challenges, Licentius offers an extended response distinguishing the ruling and serving parts of soul, and says that only the serving part has memory. Augustine then remarks that he himself had said the very same things in Licentius’ hearing at an earlier time. This implies that Licentius is, in fact, stating Augustine’s personal view. The passage thus both suggests that all of Licentius’ responses in this exchange are Augustine’s personal views, increasingly refined (including the anti-memory response quoted above), and it directly implies Augustine’s acceptance of the intellect’s lack of memory. A metaphorical interpretation, therefore, seems inevitable. Perhaps O’Daly’s second claim is salvageable after all.

But is it? A big problem with this passage for O’Daly is that the literal reality of which recollection and forgetfulness are metaphors need not correspond to his innate knowledge view. He wants to say that an ever-present illumination from God illuminates the human intellect from its creation, giving it innate knowledge (in the form of innate notions) that only becomes conscious when the intellect turns to ‘see’ the corresponding intelligible objects themselves in this life. This is what “recollection” is supposed to signify. But it is not clear from this passage that any such innate knowledge exists in the soul. Indeed, those who deny innate knowledge, the non-innatists, could claim this passage for their own. They could argue that God’s illumination merely makes the disciplines “present to” the intellect, not “present in” the intellect, and so no

\[173\]

\[ord. 2.2.6-7\]
innate knowledge is intended. The intellect then learns the disciplines present to it, metaphorically “recollecting” them simply by turning and seeing them. The non-inнатists could go on to argue that this is how all of the claims that the disciplines are “present in” the soul should be interpreted from *On the Immortality of the Soul* 4.6 to *On Free Choice* 1.12.24. Other passages from *On Order* could also be taken to confirm this interpretation.\(^{174}\)

If O’Daly wants to insist that the passage nevertheless is compatible with innate knowledge, despite evidence to the contrary, this weakens his grounds for claiming that this passage or the previous passage exclude the preexistence requirement. For if innate knowledge can be intended despite apparent evidence to the contrary, then perhaps the preexistence requirement can be intended despite evidence to the contrary. It does not matter whether “recollection” and “forgetfulness” are metaphorical or not. And so O’Daly’s second claim remains unproven. There are no passages clearly rejecting the requirement part of the preexistence requirement, nor even clearly indicating neutrality.

So far it seems that O’Daly and others who want to deny Platonic recollection in the early Augustine on the first strategy do not have conclusive evidence for their views. There are no passages clearly indicating neutrality about the preexistence part and there are no passages clearly rejecting or indicating neutrality about the requirement part. Given this lack of solid evidence, I think the evidence favours interpreting the five putative acceptance passages as naturally as they can be, as showing that the early Augustine accepted Platonic recollection. The burden of proof rests on those who disagree and the proof is insufficient. Nevertheless, the evidence does seem to cast reasonable doubt on this conclusion. The opposing passages do raise

\(^{174}\) In *ord.* 1.2.4, for example, Augustine declares that the divine seeds (*divina semina*) are not entrusted (*committantur*) to the soul until it has been sufficiently prepared by being purged and cultivated by education (*eruditione*), suggesting that no innate knowledge is present in the soul before education begins. In *ord.* 2.8.25 Augustine explains that the discipline of philosophy, or law of God, “is transcribed, so to speak, into wise souls,” (*in sapientes animas quasi transcribitur*), suggesting that it had not been transcribed into these souls before they became wise. I deal with these passages in Chapter 5.
objections that Platonic recollection interpreters cannot easily answer. This shows, at least, that a more systematic and sophisticated explanation is needed if the Platonic recollection interpretation is to be compelling.

3. Putative Evidence Against Innate Knowledge

But what about those who reject both the preexistence requirement and innate knowledge? Could this group provide sufficient evidence to show that the early Augustine rejected Platonic recollection by showing that he rejected innate knowledge? We have already seen one persuasive passage to this end from On Order, so perhaps this is the correct line of interpretation. Gilson adopts a moderate form of this view. He agrees that Augustine “inclined” to Platonic recollection and therefore innate knowledge in his earliest writings, but thinks that Augustine conclusively abandoned them both by On the Teacher (389/90). He also thinks Augustine was developing his non-innatiest illumination view as a distinct and incompatible alternative to Platonic recollection from the very beginning, i.e. already in On the Happy Life. There are also those who adopt the more extreme form of this view, namely, that the early Augustine never accepted innate knowledge. Even for these, however, following Gilson’s argument is helpful because it provides the important tools for making their case.

To establish Gilson’s case, a good place to begin is with Augustine’s much later and more mature passages that appear to be against innate knowledge most explicitly. Given their later date, they can give no guarantees about the early views we are concerned with, but at least

175 Saint Augustine (1960), 72 n. 15 “By eliminating reminiscence Augustine ipso facto eliminates Innatism.”
176 Ibid., 71, 74. Bubacz agrees on both counts (“Augustine’s Illumination Theory and Epistemic Structuring” Augustinian Studies 11 (1980): 42, 45 and Theory of Knowledge (1981), 13). It is noteworthy how many of the scholars who concede that Augustine inclined to Platonic recollection in the early writings are simultaneously unwilling to grant that his illumination references were simply intended to be one of its essential components. In addition to Gilson and Bubacz here (who think Augustine was non-innatiest about illumination), I noted Hessen and likely Bardy above (who think Augustine was innatist about illumination).
177 Jolivet (Dieu soleil (1934), 118-9) and Madec (“Révisions” (1996), 122-3) more or less take this view.
they can help to establish that Augustine rejected innate knowledge at some point, putting one foot in the door. Of the three most famous examples, two are the *Retractations* passages cited above, 1.4.4 and 1.8(7).2. The third is from *On the Trinity* 12.15.24, which I cite here. After arguing against the Platonic recollection view implied by Plato’s slave-boy example, Augustine writes,

> But one should rather believe that the nature of the intellectual mind (*mentis intellectualis*) has been so created by the arrangement of its creator that it is subjoined (*subiuncta*) to intelligible things by a natural order such that it sees (*uideat*) them in a non-bodily light of its own kind, just as a fleshly eye sees all these things that lie around us in this bodily light, a light it was created to be suited to and to agree with. For it is not because [the eye] knew white and black before it was created in this flesh that it now distinguishes them without a teacher.\(^{178}\)

As with the *Retractations* passages, this passage suggests that for the later Augustine, knowing requires no innate knowledge in O’Daly’s sense – that is, it requires no innate notions distinct from the intelligible things from which they derive – but only a special connection, or “subjoining” between mind and intelligibles. *Retractations* 1.4.4 clarifies that the cause of the subjoining is the non-bodily light, viz., the light of divine illumination, in which the intelligibles are seen. In other words, the divine light connects the intelligibles to the mind, making them present to it and therefore knowable, without any need for innate knowledge or preexistence.

This reading of *On the Trinity* is controversial and is rejected by O’Daly and Nash, for example, who see innate knowledge throughout Augustine’s works. Their case is supported by other passages in *On the Trinity* that speak of “impressed notions” (*notiones impressae*). In Book 10, for example, Augustine declares, “unless we had a notion (*notionem*) of each discipline (*doctrinae*) minimally impressed (*breuiter impressam*) in our SOUL (*in animo*), we would not

\(^{178}\) *trin.* 12.15.24.12-19 “*Sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine disponente conditore subiuncta sic ista uideat in quadam luce sui generis incorporae quemadmodum oculus carnis uidet quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. Non enim et ipse ideo sine magistro alba et nigra discernit quia ista iam nouerat antequam in hac carne crearetur.*”
burn with any eagerness for learning it. [But we do, therefore...etc.] They would claim that the Book 12 passage should thus be interpreted in this light. Scholars like Gilson who deny innate knowledge would argue the opposite. The Book 10 passage should be interpreted in light of Book 12. Any suggestion that knowing requires “impressed notions” should not be taken literally to imply innate notions distinct from the intelligibles from which they derive, but should only be taken to indicate that the soul is subjoined to the intelligible things themselves due to the divine light.

How could this be used to show that Augustine rejected innate knowledge in the early works? Given the putative acceptance passages to the contrary, we cannot simply assume that he held the later view, as other scholars have rashly concluded. The discussion so far suggests a two-part strategy, one negative and one positive. The negative part of the strategy is to show that no apparent references to innate knowledge in the early works clearly resist the deflationary reading that applies to “impressed notions” in On the Trinity. If one can reasonably interpret all apparent references to innate knowledge in the early works in terms of the soul’s subjunction to intelligibles things due to the divine light (as Gilson does, in effect, with “impressed notions”) then we have negative evidence that the early Augustine held his later non-innativist view. This deflationary reading can apply not only to references to “impressed notions,” but also to references about wisdom or the disciplines being “in the soul” (in animo). Just as “impressed notion in the soul” is a metaphor for “subjoined to the soul,” so also “present in the soul” is a metaphor for “present to the soul.”

The positive part of the strategy is to show that knowing only requires the soul’s subjunction to intelligible things due to divine illumination without any need for innate

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179 *Trin.* 10.1.1.15-18 “Ad doctrinas autem cognoscendas plerumque nos laudantium atque praedicantium accedit auctoritas, et tamen nisi breuiter impressam cuiusque doctrinae haberemus in animo notionem, nullo ad eam discendam studio flagraremus.” It is clear that “doctrina” refers to “liberal discipline,” because Augustine provides rhetoric as an example in the next line.
knowledge or notions. Augustine nowhere explicitly says this in the early works, however, so one has to find passages that give reliable evidence for this sort of view. The best passages have three characteristics. They speak of knowing as (1) mentally seeing intelligible things as present (2) in the divine light that illuminates the mind, and they (3) leave out any reference to innate knowledge. Since the intelligible things are present, since the mind can see them because it and they are divinely illuminated, and since no innate knowledge is mentioned, then knowing must be possible because the soul is subjoined to intelligible things by the divine light with no innate knowledge needed.

Let us now consider how this two-part strategy holds up when applied to various passages. We begin with the positive part. In general, those who think that Augustinian illumination was non-innativist will agree that this was at least so by On the Teacher (389/90), which appears to provide the best positive evidence for it. In the words of Gilson, non-innativist illumination is “developed throughout” On the Teacher and “explicitly stated” in the conclusion.\(^\text{180}\) Here is one of the classic passages.

But concerning those things that we see by the mind, that is, by intellect or reason, we’re speaking of things that we view as present in the inner light of Truth, by which the so-called inner man is illuminated (illustratur) and in which he rejoices.\(^\text{181}\)

In this passage, knowing intelligible things is (1) mentally seeing them as present (2) in the inner light of Truth (i.e. Christ or God) that illuminates the mind, and (3) there is no mention of innate knowledge. The third point becomes even more significant upon realizing that Augustine makes no obvious reference to innate knowledge elsewhere in the work either.\(^\text{182}\) Therefore, it would

\(^{180}\) Saint Augustine (1960), 74.

\(^{181}\) mag. 12.40 “Cum uero de his agitur, quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur, quae praesentia contuemur in illa interiore luce veritatis, qua ipse, qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur...”

\(^{182}\) I say that Augustine makes no “obvious” reference to innate knowledge in De magistro, but he may make references to it nevertheless. See mag. 8.24 where Augustine tells Adeodatus that “the law of reason
seem that Augustine thinks that the divine light is sufficient to subjoin the mind to intelligible things such that they can be seen without innate knowledge.

Similar passages can be found in the pre-baptismal works as well. According to Gilson, the first positive, though inchoate, “sketch” of the non-innate illumination view is found in *On the Happy Life* (386).

Now a certain Admonition (*admonitio*), which acts with us so that we may recollect (*recordemur*) God, seek him, and thirst for him without reservation, emanates to us from the Font of Truth itself. That hidden Sun pours this Radiance into our inner eyes. Every true thing that we say is due to this, ... \textsuperscript{183}

In this passage Augustine specifically describes knowing God, but the three components are roughly the same as in *On the Teacher*. Knowing God is (1) mentally seeing him (as present) (2) made possible by the inner light of the “Font of Truth” that emanates to us as an “Admonition,” (3) with no mention of innate knowledge. One phrase that appears to confirm that innate knowledge of any sort is unnecessary is the phrase that the Admonition, which here refers to the Holy Spirit, \textsuperscript{184} “acts with us so that we may recollect God...” It is the divine light alone that makes “recollection” possible (hence the name “*Admonitio*” or “Reminder”) suggesting that there need be no additional innate knowledge or notion within the soul to make recollection or learning possible. The *On Order* passage about intellectual memory quoted above appears to make the same point. The ruling part of the soul can see God (and all the intelligibles) and has no need of “memory” to accomplish this.

Gilson tells us that the next positive evidence comes from the *Soliloquies* (another pre-
baptismal work), where Augustine “proposes” his non-innate enlightenment view. He does not mention particular passages, but we can assume he includes those that O’Daly mentions. In one of those passages, we saw that it was God’s illumination that makes the disciplines intelligible to us, which Gilson could interpret to mean that the divine light’s mere presence to us is enough to make “recollection” possible without innate knowledge. Even if this interpretation is not as obvious as it seems, as I argued above, Gilson could go on to mention an even more obvious passage from *On the Immortality of the Soul* that goes as far as to speak of a “conjunction” between SOUL and intelligibles.

But when the SOUL gazes at (intuetur) these things that are understood (quae intelleguntur) that always exist in the same condition, it shows sufficiently that it [animus] is conjoined (esse coniunctum) to them in a certain marvelous and self-same (eodem) incorporeal way, that is to say, not spatially.\(^\text{185}\)

The reasoning seems to be that innate knowledge is unnecessary because the SOUL is “conjoined” to the intelligibles and that this is sufficient to allow them to be “recollected” and thus known.

The language of “conjoining” is reminiscent of the “subjoining” language in *On the Trinity*, and so would seem to confirm non-innateism. This tiny change in terminology, however, will quite literally have substantial implications, as we will see later.\(^\text{186}\)

In the works between *On the Immortality of the Soul* and *On the Teacher* there are no passages as explicit as these, but we do have a passage from *On the Free Choice of the Will* that suggests Augustine agrees with his view in *On the Teacher*.

God will grant, I hope, that I am able to respond to you, or rather, that you respond to yourself, by means of the same inner Truth, the highest teacher (magistra) of all, teaching within.\(^\text{187}\)

\(^\text{185}\) *imm. an.* 10.17 “Haec autem, quae intelleguntur eodem modo sese habentia, cum ea intuetur animus, satis ostendit se illis esse coniunctum, miro quodam eodemque incorporali modo, scilicet non localiter.”

\(^\text{186}\) That is, it indicates a shift from understanding the soul as uncreated and possibly consubstantial with God to one that is created and distinct in substance from God.

\(^\text{187}\) *lib. arb.* 2.2.4 “Donabit quidem deus, ut spero, ut tibi ualeam respondere, uel potius ut ipse tibi, eadem quae summa omnium magistra est veritate intus docente, respondeas.”
The idea that the Truth (which we know refers to Christ) is the teacher that teaches within, seemingly without the soul needing any innate knowledge, is precisely what is thematized in *On the Teacher (De magistro)*, which suggests that Augustine holds the same non-innate illumination view here as there.

We now turn to the negative part of the strategy. As compelling as these positive passages are for non-innate illumination, the non-innate still has to explain the apparent references to innate knowledge that often occur in the very same works. The hope would be to show that all of them can be deflated reasonably. This is not overly difficult for some of them. Of the six apparent innate knowledge passages discussed so far, four of them could conceivably fit this category. When *On the Immortality of the Soul* 4.6 states that the “true rationes” are in the SOUL’s “secret places,” when *On the Quantity of the Soul* 20.34 says that the soul has “brought every art with itself,” and when *On the Free Choice of the Will* 1.12.24 declares that “wisdom is in the soul,” they all could be taken to mean that the intelligibles are subjoined to the soul by the divine light such that they can be “recollected,” just as with the “impressed notions” of *On the Trinity*. The *Letter* 7.2 passage that more clearly expresses innate knowledge is more difficult to deflate, but one could claim that Augustine was merely reporting Plato’s view, not endorsing it himself. Of the five passages, this leaves us with *Soliloquies* 2.20.35 and the corresponding *Retractations* 1.4.4. On its own, *Soliloquies* 2.20.35 might be deflatable, but *Retractations* 1.4.4 strongly resists this deflation, as we have seen.

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188 See *mag*. 11.38 “Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don’t consult a speaker who makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult him. What is more, He Who is consulted, He Who is said to dwell in the inner man [Eph. 3:16-17], does teach: Christ – that is, the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God [1 Cor. 1:24], ...” (King translation) (*De uniuersis autem, quae intelligimus, non loquentem, qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praeidentem consultimus uteritatem, uerbis fortasse ut consultamus admoniti. Ille autem, qui consultitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitat dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis dei uirtus atque sempiterna sapientia...*).

189 There is a similar, but slightly less clear passage at *an. quant.* 36.81, where Augustine says that the one who is “the teacher of all from above” (*qui desuper magister est omnium*) will not abandon those who seek.
There are other difficult passages that we have not considered, however, that also resist the deflationary interpretation. Most occur in the post-baptismal writings and some of them even use “knowledge” terms. In *On Music* 6.12.34, for example, Augustine says,

> The SOUL (*animus*) would certainly nowhere desire (*adpeteret*) that equality, which we discovered not to be certain and permanent in sensible numbers (*sensibilibus numeris*) but nevertheless recognized was shadowy and transient, *unless it were known somewhere* (* nisi alicubi nota esset*).\(^{190}\)

This passage affirms that one would not desire “shadowy and transient” equality in sensible numbers (i.e. in rhythms) if one did not already know (*nouiisse*) “certain and permanent” equality somewhere, presumably innately. Note that this prior knowledge of equality cannot be a mere rough idea of equality, but, since it is knowledge of “certain and permanent” equality, must correspond to it exactly. *On the Free Choice of the Will*, moreover, explicitly states the paradox of knowledge to which every innatist is committed. In response to Evodius’ claim that he knows some certain truths that belong to wisdom while remaining a fool, Augustine affirms,

> *Then a fool knows* (*nouit*) *wisdom*. For, as we have already said, he would not be certain that he willed to be wise, and that he ought to do so, unless a notion of wisdom (*notio sapientiae*) were in (*inhereret*) his mind. The same is true of the things belonging to this wisdom, things that I asked you about one by one and at the cognition (*cognitione*) of which you delighted.\(^{191}\)

For Augustine, the fact that even a fool has a “notion of wisdom” in his mind allows one to say, paradoxically, that “a fool knows wisdom.” Although he does not know wisdom in one sense, being a fool, he also knows wisdom in another sense, because he is certain that he wills to be wise and that he ought to will this, which sounds very much like saying he has innate knowledge of wisdom of which he is not conscious. The passage thus seems to confirm that having a prior

\(^{190}\) *mus.* 6.12.34 (my emphasis) “*Aequalitatem illam, quam in sensibilibus adumbratam et praetereuntem agnoscebamus, nusquam profecto adpeteret animus, nisi alicubi nota esset; hoc autem alicubi non in spatiis locorum et temporum, nam et illa tument et illa praetereunt.*”

\(^{191}\) *lib. arb.* 2.15.40 (my emphasis) “*Nouiit ergo insipiens sapientiam. Non enim, sicut iam dictum est, certus esset uelle se esse sapientem idque oportere, nisi notio sapientiae menti eius inhereret, sicut earum rerum de quibus singillatim interrogatus respondisti, quae ad ipsam sapientiam pertinent, quorum cognitione laetatus es.*”
notion of wisdom or anything else is not merely the presence of divine wisdom to the mind by illumination, but is knowledge present in the mind, distinct from the divine wisdom, but perfectly corresponding to the divine wisdom.

The same conclusion seems to follow from the fact that Augustine describes these prior notions as “impressed,” as he does in another passage in On the Free Choice of the Will.

Thus, just as the notion of happiness has been impressed on our minds even before we are happy – for by means of that notion we know confidently and say without any doubt that we want to be happy – so also we have the notion of wisdom impressed in the mind before we are wise. By means of that notion any one of us, if asked whether he wants to be wise, answers yes without a hint of doubt. 192

Throughout his early works, Augustine regularly implies that when something has been impressed on the soul there is a distinction between impressor and the impression. At On the Teacher 12.39, for example, he says, “When a question is raised not about things we sense at present but about things we sensed in the past, then we speak not of the things themselves but of the images impressed by them and committed to memory.” Here he is speaking about sense impressions, but presumably the same would apply to intelligible impressions. 193 Two things

192 *lib. arb.* 2.9.26 (my emphasis) “Sicut ergo antequam beati simus mentibus tamen nostris impressa est notio beatitatis – per hanc enim scimus fidenterque et sine illa dubitatione dicimus beatos nos esse uelle – , ita etiam priusquam sapientes simus, sapientiae notionem in mente habemus impressam, per quam unus quisque nostrum, si interrogetur uelitne esse sapiens, sine ulla caligine dubitationis se uelle respondet.”
193 See also *ep.* 7.4 “I see that all those images (imagines), which are often called phantasiae, can very appropriately and truly be divided into three kinds: 1) impressed from sensible things (*sensis rebus impressum*) 2) impressed from things supposed (*putatis [rebus impressum]*) 3) impressed from fixed things (*ratis [rebus impressum]*)” (*Omnes has imagines, quas phantasias cum multis vocas, in tria genera commodissime ac uerissime distribui uideo, quorum est unum sensis rebus impressum, alterum putatis, tertium ratis*). I include this passage as evidence that impressions are distinct from their impressor, but unfortunately the passage only speaks of “impressed images,” not “impressed notions,” which are not exactly the same thing. The images from “fixed things” that Augustine has in mind are not “notions” from intelligible things but rather are images from intelligible things, such as the image or picture of a triangle from the “ratio” or Form of triangle. For other passages suggesting that impressing makes a distinct entity in the soul, see *Acad.* 2.5.11 “The truth that can be apprehended is impressed on the mind by what it comes from in such a way that it couldn’t be from something other than what it does come from” (This is the Stoic definition of a cataleptic impression, a definition Augustine accepts (*Acad.* 3.9.21.60-3)) and *mus.* 6.12.35 “The same is true of the person who was always unskilled not because of forgetfulness but because he never learned (*numquam didicit*). He doesn’t receive the numbers of the art from the one
thus seem to follow. First, having a prior notion of wisdom or any other intelligible thing would not merely be the intelligible thing’s presence to the mind, but would be something in the mind distinct from the intelligible thing in some way. Second, the prior notion in the mind would corresponding to that intelligible thing in some sense, since it would be an impression of it. It is not completely clear whether it would be a perfect correspondence in this case, but it would make sense if it were, since one is “without a hint of doubt.” Therefore, it seems that early post-baptismal passages that speak of prior notions of intelligible things in the mind cannot be deflated even if later passages from *On the Trinity* can. They cannot merely be referring to the presence of the intelligibles due to the divine light, but must be referring to something distinct in the human mind that corresponds to them, seemingly with a perfect correspondence. If so, then this also leaves us with no strong justification for deflating other passages about the intelligibles being “in the soul.” Indeed, once everything comes undone like this, it seems the early Augustine must have believed in innate knowledge after all throughout 386-391.

It was due to the kinds of difficulties enumerated here that Gilson reluctantly accepted Augustine’s commitment to innate knowledge and Platonic recollection in the early works up until *On the Teacher*, despite insisting that he was developing his non-innate illumination theory alongside of it. Taking Augustine as entertaining innate and non-innate views alongside each other is certainly one plausible way of reconciling the conflicting sets of passages in the early writings. Others interpret Augustine as choosing one side or the other throughout the period. Those who claim that his view was non-innate throughout, such as Jolivet and Madec will have to bite the bullet and maintain that the innate passages can be deflated and interpreted questioning but from somewhere within, being active within himself. By this motion the numbers are impressed (*imprimantur*) on his mind and make that affection (*adfectionem*) which is called art (*ars*).” In this latter case, Augustine focuses on the impressions acquired in learning, not the innate impressions suggested in *mus.* 6.12.34, but the point about a distinction between impressor and impression is the same. How the two kinds of impressions would fit together, however, is another question. One could take this passage to suggest that there are no such things as innate impressions.
in light of the non-innatist passages, no matter how awkward it may seem. The thorough innatists about these passages like O’Daly and myself will maintain that the non-innatist passages can be deflated and interpreted in light of the innatist passages, as unlikely as this may seem. Our method of argument so far, however, makes it difficult to resolve the dispute, since each side could continue finding passages that apparently support their interpretation. Gilson and the extreme non-innatists, for example, could appeal to a passage written shortly after *On the Teacher* in *On the Usefulness of Belief* (391/2) declaring, “fools do not know wisdom,” and the thorough innatists could appeal to multiple passages suggesting innate knowledge in *On True Religion* (390/1), also written a short time after *On the Teacher*. For my part, I think the innatist passages are decisive enough to give the thorough innatist’s view the benefit of the doubt, as I have argued here. And yet confining ourselves to the evidence given thus far, it is understandable how the other side can reasonably disagree. The passages offered against innate knowledge have not been sufficiently accounted for on the innatist view, especially the ones in the pre-baptismal writings. At the very least, this seems to suggest some kind of developmental view where Augustine changes his mind. And so we cannot affirm conclusively that Augustine accepted innate knowledge in his early writings from 386-391.

**Conclusion**

I have shown that this proof-texting method of determining whether the early Augustine

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194 *util. cred.* 13.28 “But I do not at all see how he can discern or perceive who in the world [the wise man] is, since it is a fool who is seeking such a person. For one cannot cognize anything by any sort of sign unless one already knows (*noverit*) that very thing of which they are signs. *And a fool does not know wisdom*” (my emphasis) (*sed quinam iste sit, cum ab stulto requiratur, quo pacto quest dinoisci plane atque percipi, omnino non video. neque enim quibuslibet signis cognoscere aliquid potest nisi illud ipsum, cuius ea signa sunt, nonerit. Atqui sapientiam stultus ignorat*).

195 For example, *uestra rel.* 30.55 “Whence is equality of any kind desired (*appeteretur*) in bodies, or whence are we convinced that [any equality that may be seen there] is far different from perfect equality, unless the mind sees that which is perfect?” (*Unde enim qualiscumque in corporibus appeteretur aequalitas aut unde conuincetur longe plurimum differre a perfecta, nisi ea quae perfecta est mente uideretur?*). See also *uestra rel.* 32.60 and 34.64.
believed in Platonic recollection has its limits. Merely comparing individual passages for and against does not resolve the question decisively because there are compelling passages for and against the two essential feature of Platonic recollection at least up to 391. Even if this method were decisive, the explanation for how all of the seemingly contradictory passages fit together would remain a mystery. So we need a better method. The method by appealing to outside works that may have influenced Augustine, whether pagan or Christian, has some merit, but it too has a poor track record in settling the dispute and introduces a new set of disputes. To avoid all of these problems, I propose a method that begins by focusing on understanding Augustine’s passages within the logical structure of his argument, both within the particular works in which they arise and in closely related works, while avoiding outside influences as much as possible. Due to limitations of space and time, I focus my attention to what Augustine thought at the time of his pre-baptismal writings and do not completely settle the issue for his early post-baptismal writings. The former is a sizable enough task. Yet to do this properly, I have to determine what is going on in the early post-baptismal works to some extent. One of my key claims is that the seeming contradictions between the pre-baptismal passages and the early post-baptismal passages are not due to a change in Augustine’s general commitment to Platonic recollection but rather to change in the kind of Platonic recollection he accepted.

My argument is in two main parts. In Chapters 2-4, I focus on the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul alone to argue that Augustine accepts Platonic recollection in general and First-Way Platonic Recollection in particular in these works as complementary doctrines to illumination. In Chapters 5-6, I open the inquiry up to reasonable outside influences to confirm these interpretations and I show that the interpretations are consistent throughout the pre-baptismal writings, including in the first three Cassiciacum dialogues.
Chapter 2 – The Soliloquies and Platonic Recollection

Introduction

This chapter on the Soliloquies and the next two chapters on On the Immortality of the Soul lay the groundwork for showing that Augustine provisionally accepted Platonic recollection in general and First-Way Platonic Recollection in particular in his pre-baptismal writings. I begin with the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul because Platonic recollection is most evident in these works, although it is never an explicit topic of discussion. The main explicit topic of discussion is the soul’s immortality. As I examine On the Immortality of the Soul in the next two chapters, I show that Augustine considers four Platonic recollection views in total. The first of these is the one that Augustine prefers, I argue, and it is the same as the one expressed in the Soliloquies.

In this chapter, I restrict my inquiry to the Soliloquies as much as possible and argue that it expresses Platonic recollection in general and what I will provisionally call an “eternal, constitutive Forms” view in particular. By “eternal, constitutive Forms,” I mean that the innate knowledge in the soul literally is the Forms (including God) constitutively present within it, and that this knowledge requires an eternally existing and uncreated soul. I begin with the Soliloquies alone very intentionally without depending on On the Immortality of the Soul, despite the fact that the latter is a continuation of the Soliloquies Project. This is to show that the Soliloquies itself provides strong evidence that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection of a certain sort. On the Immortality of the Soul was an unfinished draft of the third book of the Soliloquies and was unintentionally distributed, and so it has been thought an unreliable source for Augustine’s views. I do not want this concern to impede the argument before it begins. Once the Soliloquies Project is clear from the Soliloquies itself and once it is clear that the Soliloquies offers strong evidence for Platonic recollection of a certain sort, I use this and other considerations in Chapter
3 to conclude that *On the Immortality of the Soul* has a relatively coherent agenda and is, in fact, a reliable indicator of Augustine’s own views. In Chapter 4, I argue that *On the Immortality of the Soul* expresses four Platonic recollection views of certain sorts, and that the first view is the same as the view expressed in the *Soliloquies*. I also show why it is likely that Augustine accepted this first view. To start this chain of events, let us begin by looking at the subject matter of Augustine’s *Soliloquies* Project as he expresses it in the *Soliloquies*.

1. The *Soliloquies* Project

   The opening statement of the *Soliloquies* is key for identifying its subject matter.

   
   While I was long considering many various things with myself and was for many days carefully seeking myself and my good as well as what evil should be avoided, suddenly someone spoke to me – I know not whether it was I myself or someone else, or whether it was external or internal; indeed, this very thing is what I especially struggle to know.196

   The first part of the passage indicates the general subject matter. Augustine intends to seek himself, his good, and what evil to avoid. Put in another way, he is concerned to answer the following questions: What is my nature? What is its good? What is its evil? The projected plan of the unfinished *Soliloquies* corresponds to this general subject matter. The first book is about what evil is to be avoided, which involves “being purged of the desires for mortal things,” or “completely fleeing from these sensible things.”197 In the *Retractations*, Augustine puts it another way, saying that the first book is about what sort of person one must be if one wishes to perceive wisdom.198 These statements reveal that the first book has to do with moral purification,

196  *sol.* 1.1.1 “Volventi mihi multa ac varia mecum diu ac per multos dies sedulo quaerent miemetipsum ac bonum meum, quive mali evitendum esset, ait mihi subito sive ego ipse sive alius quis, extrinsecus sive intrinsecus, nescio; nam hoc ipsum est quod magnopere scire molior, ait ergo mihi...”
197  *sol.* 1.6.12 “a cupiditatius rerum mortalium iam remota atque purgata...” and *sol.* 1.14.24 “penitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda...”
198  *retr.* 1.4.1.7-8 “qualis esse debeat qui uult percipere sapientiam...”
or the “ordo uitae” (order of life) mentioned in On Order. The next books were to be about his nature and its good, as we know because he says that his overriding concern in these latter books is to know the soul (anima) and God (deus). Knowing the soul is knowing his nature, and knowing God is knowing its good. Indeed, knowing God is achieving its good, since the soul’s good or happiness precisely is knowing God. Thus, the remaining books were to be about intellectual education, or the “ordo eruditionis” (order of education) of On Order.

The subject matter of these remaining books raises several difficult questions. What is the epistemological relation between knowing the soul and God? Can we know the soul without knowing God or does knowing one imply knowing the other? Moreover, what is the ontological relation between the soul and God? Is our nature constituted by soul only or is God somehow part of its constitution? In the second part of the opening statement, Augustine provides what he thinks is the key to answering these and related questions, which indicates the specific subject matter of the Soliloquies. The very thing he especially struggles to know, he says, is his relation to the one who is speaking to him. Who is speaking to him? Augustine gives the name as Reason, or in Latin, Ratio. This initially seems to refer to his own personal faculty of reason, and yet Augustine’s perplexity about its identity suggests that he is not really sure. As he goes on to ask: Is reason one’s very self or something else? Is it external or internal? The point, then, is that the key for knowing the soul and God, for knowing one’s nature and its good, is answering the question, “What is the relation between reason and the soul?”, a process that will involve answering the question “Who or what is reason?” For clarity as we go through the work, I will

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199 ord. 2.8.25ff.
200 sol. 1.2.7 (Deum et animam scire cupio) and 2.1.2 (Deus semper idem, noverim me, noverim te)
201 See ord. 2.18.47, where Augustine says that to the discipline of philosophy “pertains a two-fold question: one on the soul, the other on God. The first makes it so that we know ourselves; the other our origin. The former is sweeter to us, the latter more precious; the former makes us worthy of a happy life, the latter makes us happy...” (Foley trans.) (Cuius duplex quaestio est, una de anima, altera de deo. Prima efficit, ut nosmet ipsos noverimus, altera, ut originem nostram. Illa nobis dulcieor, ista carior, illa nos dignos beata uita, beatos haec facit...).
202 ord. 2.8.25ff.
retain the Latin word *ratio* instead of using the English “reason,” which does not have a sufficiently wide semantic range. I capitalize it as *Ratio* when it refers to the personified Reason that Augustine is seeking to know in the *Soliloquies* and *On the Immortality of the Soul*. Put in these terms, the specific subject matter of the book can be said to be the relation between *Ratio* and the soul.\(^\text{203}\)

While the question about the relation between *Ratio* and the soul is the specific topic of the second and remaining books, it is not the explicit governing topic. In fact, there are two explicit governing topics that Augustine had planned for the remaining books. The first is the immortality of the soul and the second is the longevity of the soul’s understanding (*intelligentia*).\(^\text{204}\) Augustine explains how he arrives at these topics at *Soliloquies* 2.1.1. The reason he desires to know God and the soul in the first place is so that he can attain happiness, which, as we know, is equivalent to knowing God in some sense. But knowing God cannot make the soul happy unless the knowing lasts forever. Knowing that eventually ends would not be enough for true happiness. So then is happiness possible? Can knowing God last forever? This is the question that explicitly governs the remainder of the *Soliloquies* Project. Augustine thinks the answer is yes. In order to demonstrate it, he tells us, he must prove three things. He must prove that the soul can always (*semper*) exist (*esse*), live (*uiuere*), and understand (*intellegere*).\(^\text{205}\)

Proving that the soul not only can but does always live shows that it both always exists and lives,

\(^{203}\) Cary gets things slightly wrong when he says that the specific subject matter is “Who is reason?” and not “What is the relation between reason and the soul?” He puts it as follows: “If all Augustine wants to know is God and the soul, and the identity of Reason is the very thing Augustine was working so hard to know, then the conclusion has to be that Augustine thinks he will understand the nature of God and of the soul once he knows who or what Reason is” (*Invention* (2000), 78). This puts too much emphasis on the identity of *Ratio* and could be interpreted as suggesting that *Ratio* and the soul are identical. My understanding fixes this by saying, in effect, that “Augustine thinks he will understand the nature of God and of the soul once he knows the relation between *Ratio* and the soul.” Knowing the relation includes knowing “who or what Reason is,” as Cary says, but it also more clearly includes knowing “who or what the soul is” as well as the soul’s relation to Reason.

\(^{204}\) See *sol.* 2.1.1 and especially 2.20.36.

\(^{205}\) *sol.* 2.1.1
and so proving that the soul is immortal covers the first two points. However, it does not cover the third. Even if the soul is immortal, it could be that one’s bodily death brings “forgetfulness” (*obliuio*) of everything, which is no happy life.\(^{206}\) To rule out an afterlife of everlasting or cyclical forgetfulness, then, Augustine planned to prove that everlasting understanding was possible. Unfortunately, he only managed to take up the first topic about the soul’s immortality, and even this remained incomplete. The second book of the *Soliloquies* is devoted to it, and so is the unfinished draft of the third book that has come down to us as *On the Immortality of the Soul*. The discussion of the longevity of the soul’s understanding remained unattempted, at least within the framework set by the *Soliloquies* Project.\(^{207}\)

I use the name “*Soliloquies Project*” for the whole subject matter and plan I have just articulated and for the two works devoted to it, the *Soliloquies* and *On the Immortality of the Soul*. The part of this plan most relevant to our purposes is the part about the immortality of the soul. Augustine’s commitment to Platonic recollection can be found in these immortality arguments, beginning with the argument in the *Soliloquies* itself.

2. The *Soliloquies’* Immortality Argument

Augustine’s argument for the soul’s immortality in the *Soliloquies* arises in Book Two. Actually there are two arguments. The first argument is for the immortality of the soul, or *anima*, and the second is for the immortality of the *Soul*, or *animus*. The reader will recall that the soul in the sense of *anima* can include the soul of any living thing and that the *Soul* in the sense of *animus* includes only rational souls. We are primarily concerned with the second argument, since it is the argument that entails Platonic recollection, but it is worth describing the first argument because it supports a Platonic recollection interpretation and helps to fill in some of the details.

\(^{206}\) *Sol.* 2.20.36

\(^{207}\) It took Augustine until the *De Trinitate* to thematize the soul’s understanding in depth.
Augustine’s argument for the immortality of the soul (anima) is an argument from its ability to sense sensible things.\textsuperscript{208} The essential premise is one that anticipates Berkeley: sensible things cannot exist unless they are sensed. He then goes on to say, unlike Berkeley, that since the only thing that can use the senses is soul, the soul must exist as long as sensible things in order for them to exist. This does not necessarily entail that the soul exists forever, but it does entail that it exists for the whole time that the universe exists, past and present, which is pretty long.

Next, in order to prove that the soul always lives while it always exists, he argues that the soul cannot use the senses unless it lives. Now the conclusion follows: the soul is at least as immortal as the universe. Note that the argument proceeds in two main steps: first, prove that the soul always exists (at least as long as the universe); second, prove that the soul always lives (at least as long as the universe). Augustine is dissatisfied with this argument and leaves it aside. His objection is that he thinks it fails to prove the immortality of individual souls, since it could be that some souls die and others are born to take their place.\textsuperscript{209}

One of the key things to note about this argument for our purposes is that if it had succeeded, then it would not only have proven the immortality of individual souls (as Augustine’s objection shows he intended), but it would also have proven that individual souls preexist. The individual souls would have existed for the whole time that the universe exists, after all, and this would include the past as well as the future. The fact that Augustine was only disappointed in the argument’s failure to prove individual souls suggests that he would have been fine with the preexistence implications. Another key thing to note is that the objection shows he is aware of the question of individuality in the case of rational souls, despite never explicitly discussing it in that argument, as we will see. There are two other, admittedly less certain, things

\textsuperscript{208} The argument is found at 2.2.2-2.4.6, and an extended treatment of an objection proceeds from 2.5.7-2.10.18. This extended treatment also turns out to be a transition to the next argument.\textsuperscript{209} sol. 2.4.5.
that this first argument suggests about Augustine views about immortality that will be relevant to
On the Immortality of the Soul. First, the fact that Augustine attempts an argument for the
immortality of the soul in general suggests that he intends to prove the immortality of all levels
of soul, including the nutritive and sensible levels. Second, his criticism about individuality need
not suggest that the argument completely fails, but may simply mean that the immortality (and
thus preexistence) of these lower levels of soul will not be an individual immortality. We will
have to go to On the Immortality of the Soul, however, to find more evidence for these last two
things.

Next comes Augustine’s argument for the immortality of the SOUL in the sense of
animus.\textsuperscript{210} It is analogous to the previous argument. Just as he argued for immortality from
the soul’s ability to sense sensible things, now he argues for immortality from the SOUL’s ability to
know intelligible things. It also proceeds in the same two basic steps: argue first for existing,
then for living. He thinks it is better than the previous argument, particularly because intelligible
things are always true, and not partly false and partly true like sensible things.\textsuperscript{211} He summarizes
the argument through the mouth of his teacher Ratio.

Ratio: “If anything that exists in a subject always remains (semper manet), then
the subject must also always remain. Every disciplina is in a subject, the SOUL
(animo). Therefore, if disciplina always remains, then the SOUL also must always
remain. Furthermore, disciplina is Truth and, as Ratio persuaded us at the
beginning of this book, Truth always remains. Therefore the SOUL always remains
and is never said to be dead.”\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{210} The presentation of the argument is at 2.11.19-2.13.24, and they officially examine objections from
2.14.25-2.19.33. On my interpretation, they also unofficially examine an objection at 2.20.34-35. A
concise outline of the second book, then, is as follows: (A) Introduction (2.1.1); (B) Argument for
Immortality of Anima and Objections (2.2.2-2.10.18); (C) Argument for Immortality of Animus and
Objections (2.11.19-2.20.35); (D) Conclusion (2.20.36). My articulation and subsequent analysis of the
argument have benefitted greatly from Cary’s treatment of it in Invention (2000), 95-104.

\textsuperscript{211} sol. 2.10.18

\textsuperscript{212} sol. 2.13.24 “Omne, quod in subiecto est, si semper manet, ipsum etiam subiectum maneat semper
necesse est. Et omnis in subiecto est animo disciplina. Necesse est igitur semper animus maneat, si
semper manet disciplina. Est autem disciplina veritas et semper, ut in initio libri huius ratio persuasit,
veritas manet. Semper igitur animus manet nec <umquam> animus mortuus dicitur.”
In this summary of the argument, Augustine does not include a key qualification that he made earlier in the text. Earlier he explained that when something exists in a subject, then it exists there inseparably (inseparabiliter),\textsuperscript{213} and so it is something that we can assume should be included here as well. I restate the argument in point form here with this addition. I sidestep the translation problem of \textit{disciplina} for now (which broadly speaking refers to the collection of liberal disciplines, including, for example, grammar and dialectic, and may also rightly be translated as \textit{science})\textsuperscript{214} by retaining the Latin word. The precise meaning of the word is one of the important questions at issue.

Soliloquies Immortality Argument (Animus)
1. Disciplina is Truth (ueritas).
2. Truth always remains.
3. Therefore, disciplina always remains. (1, 2)
4. If something that exists in a subject and so exists there inseparably always remains, then the subject itself always remains.
5. Disciplina exists in the soul (in animo) in the sense that the soul is its subject and so it exists there inseparably.
6. Therefore, the soul always remains. (3, 4, 5)
7. Therefore, the soul is immortal. (6)

We can see the two basic steps of the argument from this reconstruction. Line 6 infers from lines 1-5 that the soul \textit{“always remains,”} i.e. always exists,\textsuperscript{215} and then line 7 infers from line 6 that the soul is \textit{“immortal,”} i.e. always lives. One difference from the previous argument is that Augustine provides no reason for taking the second step here. The main concern in his mind is to prove that the soul always exists. Once this is established, then proving that it always

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{213} sol. 2.12.22
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{214} Translating \textit{disciplina} in this sense as \textit{“science”} is common, especially in French (Bermon, for example, translates it \textit{“la science”} in \textit{“La preuve de l’immortalité de l’âme en De imm. an. 4, 5-6,”} (forthcoming)). Doing so is supported by Augustine’s statement in \textit{trin.} 14.1.1 that while he prefers to translate the Greek term ἐπιστήμη (“knowledge” or “science”) in Job 28:28 (LXX) as \textit{scientia}, it also can be translated as \textit{disciplina}, as long as one recognizes that it does not refer to \textit{disciplina} in the sense of pain for the purposes of correction.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{215} We know that the phrase \textit{“always exists”} (semper est) can be substituted for \textit{“always remain”} (semper manet) because Augustine does this himself at sol. 2.14.25.16-17(79).
lives, he thinks, is relatively straightforward.\textsuperscript{216} The essential inference of the existence step of the argument is to infer that the SOUL always exists because an always-existing intelligible thing, i.e. disciplina, inseparably exists in the SOUL as its subject. Since they are inseparable, then the SOUL will have to exist at least as long as disciplina does, meaning that the SOUL will have to exist “always,” i.e. eternally. Leading up to this key inference (and confirming that an eternal existence is at issue) is the inference that disciplina always exists because it is Truth (ueritas) and Truth always exists. We will look into whether Truth refers to God in some sense later on, but for now it is important to note that it is clearly a metaphysical entity – since it is something that “always exists” – and it is also the case that all “true things” (uera) are true by it.\textsuperscript{217} Note that I always translate the term ueritas as capital ‘T’ Truth and the term uerum as lower case ‘t’ truth and/or “true thing,” whatever the terms are supposed to mean in their contexts.\textsuperscript{218} A final thing to note about the inferences is that while the argument says nothing explicit about inferring that each individual SOUL always exists, we can reasonably infer that this is what Augustine

\textsuperscript{216} In On the Immortality of the Soul, Augustine provides several arguments for the second point. One is that an animus is an anima, which cannot lack life if it exists since life is essential to it (imm. an. 5.9, 9.16). Another is that Ratio, which on the current view under discussion exists inseparably in the soul, cannot exist without life (imm. an. 5.9). Augustine alludes to the first bit of reasoning already in the Soliloquies in the argument for the immortality of the anima, where he argues that the senses cannot exist without life (sol. 2.3.4). It is important to notice that the life-essential-to-anima argument is different from Plato’s fifth argument in the Phaedo (96a-107a), which Augustine explicitly rejects in the Soliloquies (sol. 2.13.23). Like Plato, Augustine accepts that life is essential to soul, but he does not think that immortality follows from this simple fact. One has to prove independently that the soul always exists, and only then does it follow that the soul always lives. The mistake in his mind is to think that essential predication can prove existence. On this point, Augustine resembles Kant. It is also the essential difference between Augustine’s argument for the existence of God from his definition that “God is that than which there is nothing greater” (doctr. chr. 1.7.7 and lib. arb. 2.15.39) and Anselm’s ontological argument from the definition that “God is that than which nothing greater can be thought” (Prosl. 2). The former does not infer existence from the essential predication of existence (or something that implies existence) and the latter does.

\textsuperscript{217} sol. 2.2.2, 2.11.21, and 2.15.28-29. We may thus begin to suspect that ueritas (and therefore disciplina) refers to God in some sense, since it clearly refers to God in the earlier Soliloquies prayer (sol. 1.1.3), but this it is not something we should assume just yet.

\textsuperscript{218} The Latin terms both mean “truth,” but they have slightly different senses and so ought not to be confused with each other. Capital ‘T’ Truth, then, does not necessarily refer to a metaphysical reality or even God, it simply indicates that the term at issue is ueritas rather than uerum. For an explicit, introductory discussion of the differences between ueritas and uerum, see sol. 1.15.27-29. The discussion becomes more complex in Book 2, beginning at 2.2.2.
thinks the argument proves. This is because he does not subsequently raise the objection about individuality as he had done in the previous argument, suggesting that it is no longer a problem. This is all the evidence for this point in the Soliloquies, but we will find the it explicitly confirmed when we look at On the Immortality of the Soul.\footnote{Augustine provides an almost identical argument that individual rational souls must always exist in imm. an. 4.5.18(106)-2(107).}

The most important part of the argument for the purposes of this chapter is the premise in line 5: “Disciplina exists in the SOUL (in animo) in the sense that the SOUL is its subject and so it exists there inseparably.” This premise does the most to show that the Soliloquies is expressing Platonic recollection in general and the “eternal, constitutive Forms” view in particular, since it entails these things. It is also the most controversial premise in the argument for this and related reasons. By “entail” in these cases, I should note, I do not necessarily mean that these things logically follow from the premise (i.e. that the premise is an argument for these things). I more generally mean that the premise somehow logically implies them in Augustine’s terms, however the logic functions precisely. To show how this works, I begin with how the premise entails Platonic recollection in general.

3. The Immortality Argument and Platonic Recollection in General

To see how line 5 entails Platonic recollection in general (for Augustine), it will be helpful to split the line into two phrases: “disciplina exists in the SOUL” and “in the sense that the SOUL is its subject and so it exists there inseparably.” Each phrase entails an important piece of Platonic recollection. The first phrase entails that the SOUL has knowledge of disciplina, and the second phrase entails that this knowledge is both innate and preexistent. We will have to go elsewhere in the text to confirm that the innate knowledge and preexistence are connected by the requirement part of the preexistence requirement, but once we have innate knowledge and
preexistence, this is not overly difficult to do.

How do we know that the phrase “disciplina exists in the SOUL” entails that the SOUL has knowledge of disciplina for Augustine? We know this because it is assumed in one of the stated objections to line 5. Having heard Ratio’s summary of the argument, Augustine’s character objects:

I do not see how disciplina is always in the SOUL, especially the discipline of disputation [i.e. dialectic], since so few are experienced (gnari) with it and whoever knows (nouit) it, was uninstructed for a long time since infancy. For we can neither say that the SOULS of the unlearned are not SOULS nor can we say that this disciplina that they don’t know (nesciant) is in the SOUL.220

Surely disciplina cannot always be in the SOUL, says Augustine’s character, since so few people are experienced (gnari) with it or know (nouit) it. If disciplina could exist in SOUL without being known then the objection would not arise, the passage implies, but this is not an option. In fact, the passage explicitly rules out this option. We cannot say “that this disciplina that they don’t know is in the SOUL.” Therefore, an essential and unquestioned assumption in the passage is that disciplina cannot “exist in” the SOUL without being known. Augustine’s interlocutor, Ratio, provides a response to the objection later on, as we will see, but far from denying the assumption, she implicitly affirms it too.221 Moreover, if we looked beyond the Soliloquies to On the Immortality of the Soul, we would see that the assumption is also implicitly affirmed.222 Nor is it ever denied. Therefore, the phrase “disciplina exists in the SOUL” must mean that the SOUL has knowledge of disciplina. Whether it is supposed to be knowledge in the strict sense of scientia or something less strict, however, remains unclear. By using the verb “nouisse” instead

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220 sol. 2.14.25.16-21 “Deinde non video, quomodo in animo semper sit disciplina, praesertim disputandi, cum et tam pauci eius gnari sint et quisquis eam novit, tanto ab infantiæ tempore fuerit inductus. Non enim possimus dicere aut imperitórum animos non esse animos aut esse in animo eam quam nesciant disciplina.” Augustine might be having some rhetorical fun in the last phrase when he places the term “disciplina,” which in this case is unknown, as far from “in animo” as possible.

221 This implicit affirmation is the role of the famous putative recollection passage in sol. 2.20.35.

222 e.g. imm. an. 1.1.8-14(2) and 4.6 passim.
of “scire,” Augustine leaves the possibilities open.

What about the phrase “in the sense that the SOUL is its subject and so it exists there inseparably?” How do we know that it entails that the knowledge is both innate and preexistent? The steps are straightforward, but whether Augustine really intended them is controversial. Given that disciplina inseparably exists in the SOUL as in a subject, and that disciplina “always exists” in the sense that it exists eternally past and future (since it is Truth), and given that the SOUL has knowledge of disciplina when disciplina exists in it, it follows that the SOUL exists eternally past and future always having knowledge of disciplina. The knowledge is innate, therefore, because the SOUL has possessed it at least since earthly embodiment and the SOUL preexists (and post-exists) because it has always existed and has never begun to exist, just like disciplina.

That, at any rate, is what a straightforward reading of the phrase would seem to entail. Scholars like O’Daly, however, think that Augustine could not possibly have intended the preexistence implications of the phrase, particularly because they think the new convert could not have entertained the un-Christian idea that the SOUL is just as eternal as disciplina and Truth. The key claim under dispute is the claim that disciplina exists in the SOUL inseparably. Based on the argument above, Augustine seems to understand “inseparably” to mean that the SOUL must always have disciplina existing in it for as long as disciplina exists, which entails that the immortality will be symmetrical and eternal, past and future. O’Daly, however, thinks that it only means that the SOUL must always have disciplina existing in it once the SOUL begins to exist, which entails an asymmetrical immortality into the future but not the past. 223 This allows for the

223 Addressing the issue of preexistence in On the Immortality of the Soul, O’Daly says that “[t]he interdependence of disciplina (or ratio) and the soul in 1.1 is not adduced to show that the human soul has no beginning (God’s eternal existence could, for example, guarantee the permanence of disciplina), merely to demonstrate, as does 6.11, that, once granted the existence of soul, its relation to ratio is such that it cannot perish” (“Pre-Existence” (1974): 230). For him, my interpretation of inseparability above is
possibility that the SOUL was created at earthly embodiment while also leaving room for the possibility that the SOUL preexists for other reasons. O’Daly’s interpretation of inseparability, however, does not appear in the text, as we will see, and the former interpretation of inseparability seems to be the only one that makes sense of Augustine’s explicit discussion of inseparability and the immortality argument. This leaves us, I contend, with no choice but to draw the controversial conclusion. To see why this is so in more detail, let us look at Augustine’s explicit discussion of inseparability and its relation to the immortality argument.

Augustine’s explicit discussion\textsuperscript{224} of inseparability leaves many things ambiguous, unfortunately, but his intention with respect to our question is clear. The discussion begins by distinguishing two ways in which something can “exist in” something else.

\textit{Ratio:} It does not escape our notice that something can be said to exist in another in two ways: one is the case such that it also can be separated and exist elsewhere, as this wood in this place, as the sun in the East; the other is the case of something existing in a subject, such that it cannot be separated from it, as the form (\textit{forma}) and appearance (\textit{species}) that we see in this wood, as the light in the sun, as heat in fire, as \textit{disciplina} in the SOUL, and so on.\textsuperscript{225}

The first way is the case where the things can be separated and can exist elsewhere, such as things that exist in a location. The second way is the case where the things exist in a subject and so cannot be separated, such as the form and appearance in this wood and the light in the sun. We might ask whether the class of inseparable things is meant to include everything that can exist in a subject, even accidental properties. The answer has to be yes. None of the examples in this passage are obviously intended to be accidental properties (though one could make a case for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{224} sol. 2.12.22ff
\textsuperscript{225} sol. 2.12.22.4-10(75) “Esse aliquid in aliquo, non nos fugit duobus modis dici: uno, quo ita est, ut etiam seiuangi atque alibi esse possit, ut hoc lignum in hoc loco, ut sol in oriente; altero autem, quo ita est aliquid in subiecto, ut ab eo nequeat separari, ut in hoc ligno forma et species quam videmus, ut in sole lux, ut in igne calor, ut in animo disciplina, et si qua sunt alia similia.”}
the form and appearance in this wood and disciplina in the soul), but a few lines later he refers to the changeable colour in a body as something that fits in this category, which would be an accidental property. Moreover, we hear from the Confessions\textsuperscript{226} that Augustine had read Aristotle’s Categories in which Aristotle claims that by “in a subject,” he means, “what is not in something as a part and cannot be separate from that in which it is.”\textsuperscript{227} Aristotle’s examples include the epistêmê (i.e. disciplina) of grammar in the soul and the white in a body, which are clearly accidental properties (for him) and are things that he says “cannot be separate.” This supports the idea, therefore, that accidental properties are inseparably in their subjects for Augustine too.\textsuperscript{228}

We should note that Augustine never specifically uses the language of “accident” or even “property,” and rather prefers to speak about the way that things exist in their subjects inseparably. In what he says next, he distinguishes between two such ways. The first way is where the things existing in the subject can change and cease to exist while the subject remains, such as the colour or age in this human body. This is the idea of accidental properties that I was talking about. The second is where the things existing in the subject “coexist (coexistunt) in order that the subjects themselves exist,”\textsuperscript{229} such as heat in fire and white in snow. On this way, the subject always will be found possessing the things, and so the things will be unchangeable in that sense as long as the subject exists. We could speak of these things as “essential properties,” as long as we recognize that this also is not Augustine’s terminology. Augustine’s classification, then, can be summarized as follows:

\textit{How X can be “in” Y}

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{conf.} 4.16.28
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Cat.} 2, 1a24-25 “ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὃ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχων ἀδύνατον χωρίς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ὃ ἐστὶν...” As far as I know, Cary was the first to point out the provenance of this idea for Augustine in Aristotle (\textit{Invention} (2000), 102).
\textsuperscript{228} See also \textit{imm. an.} 10.17 for confirmation that accidental properties exist in their subjects inseparably.
\textsuperscript{229} \textit{sol.} 2.12.22.1-2(76) “... ut sint ipsa subjecta, ea, quae in subjectis sunt, coexistunt.”
Whether Augustine would draw even further distinctions is unclear, since his purpose in the passage is not to provide an exhaustive classification.\(^{231}\)

What then does Augustine mean by “inseparably” existing in a subject? Based on what we have seen, there seems to be two senses in which it applies. The first and most essential sense applies to all ways in which something can be in a subject, whether accidentally or essentially ((2)(a) and (b)). This is the key sense in which I suggested that disciplina inseparably exists in the soul above. Something is in a subject inseparably (in this sense) when the thing cannot exist if separated from the subject in which it exists, whether the subject continues to remain or not.

This white is inseparable from this wall because if one takes the white away from the wall or the wall ceases to exist, then the white cannot remain. Similarly, white is inseparable from snow because if one takes the white away from the snow or the snow ceases to exist, then the white cannot remain. The thing is inseparable because it could not exist if it were removed from its subject or the subject perishes. The second sense of existing in a subject inseparably applies only to existing in a subject essentially ((2)(b)). Something is in a subject inseparably when the subject cannot exist if separated from the thing that exists in it. Snow, for example, cannot be separated from the white without the snow ceasing to exist. Whiteness is an essential property to snow, and so it is impossible for snow to exist without whiteness.

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\(^{230}\) I am indebted to Christian Tornau for making this distinction clear in his article “Ratio in subjecto?” (forthcoming in M. Vorwerk, ed. Augustine and Augustinianism).

\(^{231}\) Despite the possibility that his classification may not be exhaustive, I think it is safe to conclude from it that Augustine could not have read Porphyry’s Isagoge. Unlike Augustine, the Isagoge maintains that some things that exist in a subject are separable (e.g. Isag. 13) and it elaborately distinguishes between genera, species, differentiae, accidents, and properties far beyond anything that Augustine shows awareness of here. Cf. Tornau (“Ratio in subjecto?” (forthcoming)), who argues that despite the differences, Augustine had likely read it.
To use standard expressions for these senses, I will express them as kinds of “conditional inseparability.” The first kind of inseparability I will call “first conditional inseparability” (or “the first conditional”) and the second I will call “second conditional inseparability” (or “the second conditional”). I express them positively and conditionally as follows:

**First Conditional Inseparability:** If the thing exists, then its subject exists. (i.e. the thing can only exist in its subject, e.g. this white and this wall, this heat and this fire)

**Second Conditional Inseparability:** If the subject exists, then the thing exists [in it] (i.e. the subject can only exist with the thing in it, e.g. snow and white, fire and heat)

The first conditional applies to all cases of existing in a subject and the second conditional applies only to cases where something exists in a subject essentially. Note that in the first conditional, the claim is that if *this* white exists then *this* wall exists. It is not denying that other whites can exist in other subjects, since white obviously can exist in snow and many other things. Just because this white can only exist in the wall, does not necessarily mean that something of the same kind cannot exist in another subject.

We can now re-pose the question at issue as follows: Which of these kinds of inseparability are supposed to apply to the way that *disciplina* exists in the *soul*? The answer is certainly the first and possibly the second. Since first conditional inseparability applies to all cases of existing in a subject, whether accidental or essential, it has to apply to *disciplina* and the *soul* regardless of their status. For this reason, it will have to follow that the *soul* does eternally preexist and have innate knowledge. The second conditional may also apply to the relation because Augustine may think that *disciplina* exists in the *soul* as an essential property, and this would fit well with the innate knowledge claim, as we will see in a moment. It is important to recognize, however, that *disciplina* need not be an essential property for the immortality argument to succeed, since first conditional inseparability is all that is necessary to infer the
immortality.\footnote{In this, I disagree with Tornau, who contends that disciplina must be an essential property for the immortality argument to be valid (“Ratio in subiecto?” (forthcoming)).}

One could raise an objection about the universal applicability of the first conditional. Are there not clear examples where the particular thing in the subject really does continue to exist even when it abandons its subject? The particular white in the wall, for example, could rub off on my shirt if the wall has been freshly painted, and so the white could exist separately from the wall. Similarly, the particular heat in the fire could radiate to something else and so the heat could exist separately from the fire. So it seems that Augustine would not intend to say that all such things really are inseparable in the sense of the first conditional, and disciplina and the soul could very well be included in such things. This would allow us to say that the eternal disciplina can continue to exist whether or not it exists in the soul.

The objection is a compelling one, but it cannot be what Augustine means for two reasons. First, the whole purpose of the passage about inseparability is to establish the general principle in line 4 of the immortality argument, which would not follow unless the first conditional was universally true. The principle maintains that if something that (inseparably) exists in a subject always remains, then the subject itself always remains. Augustine states the principle in three slightly different ways throughout the passage and makes it clear that it is its take home message.\footnote{Augustine’s first statement of the principle appears in the negative. “Do you not concede that what exists in a subject inseparably cannot remain if the subject itself does not remain?” (sol. 2.12.22.15-17(75)) (nonne concedis, quod in subiecto est inseparabiliter, si subiectum ipsum non maneat, manere non posse?). For the other two statements, see 2.13.23.9-12(76).} But this principle could not be true if the thing that exists in a subject could be separated from the subject, contrary to the first conditional. Therefore, the first conditional must be true for all cases of things existing in a subject for Augustine, including the questionable examples above.\footnote{I do not know how Augustine would explain the problematic examples, but perhaps it would go...} Second, even if we granted that Augustine thinks that there are
exceptions to the first conditional, this would not change the fact that he thinks that the conditional applies to the specific case of *disciplina* existing in the *SOUL*. If it did not, then line 4 would not be true for *disciplina* and the *SOUL* and so the immortality argument would be invalid in an elementary and obvious way. The immortality of the *SOUL* simply would not follow (whether into the future or past) if it were possible for *disciplina* to exist separately from its subject the *SOUL*. So Augustine must intend the first conditional at least to apply to the way that *disciplina* exists in the *SOUL* as its subject, however else he intended it to apply. There are no doubt good reasons to think that he was wrong to do this, but it is evidently what he argues.

This conclusion about inseparability thus confirms the line of argument I presented above. Since the inseparability of *disciplina* existing in the *SOUL* must be a first conditional inseparability – meaning that if *disciplina* exists, then the *SOUL* exists – it follows that the *SOUL* will exist at least as long as (eternal) *disciplina*, and thus will not only post-exist this life, but will also preexist it and do so eternally. *Pace* O’Daly, inseparability with respect to *disciplina* and the *SOUL* entails a symmetrical immortality, past and future. There is no logical space for an asymmetrical immortality that begins at earthly embodiment and lasts forever into the future. It also follows from first conditional inseparability that the *SOUL* has innate knowledge. Given that *disciplina* is eternal, that it can only exist in the *SOUL* (first conditional), and that this is true for each individual *SOUL* (as I suggested the argument is supposed to prove above), then there will never be a case where a *SOUL* exists without *disciplina* existing in it. Thus, it follows that the *SOUL*’s knowledge of *disciplina* will be innate. This innate knowledge reasoning also suggests that the second conditional is true at least *de facto* for *disciplina* and the *SOUL*. If it will never be

something like this. For the first example, he could say that the proper subject of the white is the paint, not the wall, and so the white still remains inseparably in its subject even when it moves to my shirt. For the second example, he could say that the heat that radiates is actually a different heat that becomes activated in different subjects by the heat in the fire and that the fire always retains its own proper heat while it exists.
the case that a SOUL exists without disciplina existing in it, then it will be true de facto that if the
SOUL exists, then disciplina exists (in it), as the second conditional maintains.\textsuperscript{235} I point this out
now because it will be helpful later to know that the second conditional tends to go hand and
hand with innate knowledge.

But what about the requirement part of the preexistence requirement? We have innate
knowledge and preexistence, but is there any indication in the text that the former is supposed to
require the latter? To put it another way, is there some sense in which innate knowledge requires
the first conditional? We know that innate knowledge could not be Augustine’s only reason for
the first conditional, since he provides non-innate knowledge reasons for it elsewhere in the
Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul,\textsuperscript{236} but there is good evidence to think it is still
one of his essential reasons.

The evidence I have in mind is the putative Soliloquies 2.20.35 recollection passage,
which is found shortly after the statement of the immortality argument. As we saw in the last
chapter, it says that those who are well educated in the liberal disciplines, “by learning ... root up
and in a certain way dig out [the disciplines] that were without doubt buried (obrutas) in
themselves by forgetfulness (obliuione).” We also saw that a literal interpretation of this passage
seemed to imply that innate knowledge required a prior conscious experience of that knowledge.
Since we now know that the SOUL has innate knowledge of disciplina and preexists inseparably
with it, there is much more reason to accept this literal interpretation. Indeed, the literal
interpretation fits perfectly with the immortality argument, suggesting the very recollection

\textsuperscript{235} I say “de facto” because we still do not have a reason to affirm the second conditional in principle,
viz., that the SOUL would cease to exist if it were separated from disciplina. To put it another way, we do
not yet have a theoretical reason to rule out the possibility that a SOUL could exist apart from disciplina,
even if we have a practical one.

\textsuperscript{236} As I consider in more detail in a moment, he thinks that disciplina itself has to exist “somewhere”
(alicubi), and that SOUL is a fitting “somewhere” for it to exist. In On the Immortality of the Soul, he also
seems to use an Affinity Argument. The SOUL’s knowledge of the intelligibles implies that it is
sufficiently like them such that they are inseparably, incorporeally conjoined.
connection between the two we seek. Innate knowledge requires preexistence, it suggests, because it requires a time when the objects of knowledge were consciously experienced. Since it makes sense that this conscious experience could not have been at any time (prior to learning) in this life and since we know that the SOUL preexists in any case from line 5, it makes sense that the conscious experience could only have been in a preexistent life.\textsuperscript{237} We should note that the ability to take this passage literally confers an additional benefit on us. It confirms that “forgetfulness,” and therefore presumably “recollection,” really can be used Platonically. “Forgetfulness” can refer to the SOUL’s loss of its preexistent conscious experience of knowledge and “recollection” can refer to the SOUL’s recovery of that conscious experience when it learns in this life.

Now since the 2.20.35 passage arises in the context of an apparently unrelated topic, one might question whether it really is connected to the immortality argument in this way. How do we know, after all, that Augustine has not abandoned his immortality argument for a new line of reasoning? Thus, one might still hope to rule out a literal interpretation. This avenue, however, does not seem open to the skeptic. It is true that \textit{Soliloquies} 2.20.35 arises in the context of an apparently unrelated topic, but upon closer inspection, it appears to be intentionally connected to the immortality argument because it provides the expected answer in the expected place to one of the objections that Augustine’s character raises against the argument. This illustrates my contention that Augustine must be interpreted by paying close attention to the logical structure of the argument.

Let me explain. After \textit{Ratio’s} presentation of the immortality argument as outlined, the dialogue turns to considering three objections to it.\textsuperscript{238} \textit{Ratio} explicitly responds to the first two

\textsuperscript{237} I go into more detail about why, for Augustine, the conscious experience of the intelligibles could not have been prior to learning in this life in Chapters 5.

\textsuperscript{238} Augustine questions 1) whether the Truth always remains, 2) whether the \textit{disciplina} of dialectic is the
objections, and then Augustine (the character) joyously exclaims: “I hear, I come to my senses, I begin to recollect!” (Audio, resipisco, recolere incipio). The reference to “recollecting” (recolere) here is suggestive about what comes next. The text then immediately turns to the third objection. This is the objection to line 5 discussed above: it seems that disciplina (and Truth) cannot always exist in the SOUL because unlearned people, it seems, do not know it. Ratio then tells Augustine that a careful treatment of the objection would require another whole book and that Augustine has enough to think about for one day. The topic then changes abruptly. The interesting thing is that within Ratio’s treatment of this apparently unrelated topic, we find the 2.20.35 passage explaining that learning is digging out the disciplines that were buried by forgetfulness, which is precisely an answer to the third objection. Indeed, it is the expected answer for someone who wants to claim that disciplina is in the SOUL inseparably and is therefore known. Unlearned people know the disciplina that exists in their SOULS inseparably because they know it without being aware of it. They possess innate knowledge of it in a forgotten state and they can later dig it out by recollection.

Could the fact that this is an answer to the third objection merely be a coincidence? I do not see how it could. Ratio strongly hints that she has a solution to the objection because she has successfully treated the previous two objections and she has just talked about treating the third objection in another whole book as though it could be solved like the others. Further, this solution to the third objection occurs right where one would expect to find it in the text, right after the solution to the second objection. When one re-reads the entire context of the passage as

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239 sol. 2.19.33.7(93)
240 When Augustine rearticulates the objection here (sol. 2.19.33.7-10(93)), he includes both disciplina and the Truth.
241 sol. 2.19.33.11-12(93) “Aliud ista quaestio volumen desiderat, si eam vis tractari diligenter.”
242 sol. 2.20.35 “Those who are well educated in the liberal disciplines are of this sort, since by learning they root up and in a certain way dig out [the disciplines] that were without doubt buried (obrutas) in themselves by forgetfulness (obliuione).”
though it is articulating a solution to the third objection, the pieces just seem to fall into place. The apparently abrupt change of topic really is no change of topic at all. The change is merely “topical.” The substance remains continuous.

Why would Augustine conceal the solution like this? Why not simply provide a brief summary directly? There are at least two reasons to refrain from a brief explicit answer. One would be the answer’s complexity. Perhaps he saw it as bad rhetorical form to answer a problem explicitly with a brief solution that itself brings other problems with it. The second would be that he thought its controversial nature would be too misleading and harmful to the uneducated reader (for whom the work was not intended) without a more extended explanation. The new convert would surely not want to mislead the simple believers of his newfound religious faith. But why offer the solution at all if it was too complex and controversial? Well why not? He gave a foretaste of Book 2 at the end of Book 1, so it makes sense for him to give a foretaste of Book 3 at the end of Book 2. It is also possible that he wanted to impress the more discerning reader with his rhetorical concealment, making it that much easier to convince this reader of the substance later on. Whatever Augustine’s motives were for concealing the solution, it is hard to deny that it was his intended solution to the third objection. The 2.20.35 passage, when taken literally, not only provides an answer to the third objection, but also provides the expected answer (given the immortality argument) and it occurs exactly where the answer to the third objection would be expected to appear, right after the answer to the second objection. To my mind, this proves that the 2.20.35 passage is intimately connected to the immortality argument, and so ought to be taken literally and as confirmation of the preexistence requirement.

It appears that we can now draw the conclusion that the Soliloquies is expressing Platonic recollection in general. The immortality argument entails that the soul has innate knowledge and

\footnote{sol. 1.1.1.2-3 tells us that the book is not for the multitude but for the few.}

\footnote{sol. 1.15.27-29}
preexists and the intimately connected *Soliloquies* 2.20.35 confirms these things and suggests that the innate knowledge *requires* the preexistence because it requires a prior conscious experience.

4. Objections

There are some passages that might seem to cast doubt upon the consistency of this Platonic recollection picture. One such passage is from *Soliloquies* 2.19.33. After *Ratio* has dealt with the first two objections to her immortality argument, she says,

> Therefore the soul (anima)\textsuperscript{245} is immortal. Now believe your reasonings (rationibus). Believe Truth. It cries out that it dwells in you and that it is immortal and that its seat cannot be removed from it by any bodily death whatsoever. Turn away from your shadow, Turn back into yourself; There is no death unless ‘that you cannot die’ is forgotten! *Augustine*: I hear, I come to my senses, I begin to recollect (recolere)!\textsuperscript{246}

Some scholars take the statement, “There is no death unless ‘that you cannot die’ is forgotten,” to suggest that the SOUL is only immortal if it comes to know the immortal *disciplina* innately present in it. Failing that, the SOUL truly does die. We are only immortal if we recover or recollect the immortal things within us; if we do not, then we perish into nothingness. This view conflicts with the Platonic recollection interpretation because it denies the first conditional, and thus preexistence. Moreover, it does this in a way that avoids my main defence of the first conditional. I said that the first conditional is clearly intended because if it were not, then the very thing that Augustine wants to prove, that the SOUL exists forever into the future, would not follow. This objection bites this bullet by accepting that there is no necessity for SOULS to exist

\textsuperscript{245} Augustine draws the conclusion here using the general term “soul,” but he means it in the specific sense of “rational soul” because the argumentation in the last few paragraphs has been assuming a rational soul and the premise a few lines earlier on which the conclusion depends specifically uses the term “SOUL” (*sol. 2.19.33.17*(92)). That soul is supposed to mean SOUL is also assumed a few lines earlier at *sol. 2.19.33.2-5*(92).

\textsuperscript{246} *sol. 2.19.33.1-7*(93) “R. *Inmortalis est igitur anima. Iamiam crede rationibus tuis, crede veritati; clamat et in te sese habitare et immortalum esse nec suam sibi sedem quacumque corporis morte posse subduci. Avertere ab umbra tua, revertere in te; nullus est interitus nisi oblitum esse, quod interire non possis. A. Audio, resipisco, recolere incipio.”
forever into the future, holding only that *some* SOULS will exist forever into the future. Thus, it preserves some of the symmetry that I argued was implied by the first conditional. The view it presents is also attractive because it would mean that the early Augustine had a less pessimistic view about the wicked and was not willing to condemn them to a state of eternal suffering.

Nevertheless, the view presented by the objection cannot be right. It is true that it fares well when it comes to preserving the symmetry implied by the first conditional, but it fares poorly in two crucial areas. First, it ends up making immortality depend upon whether or not the SOUL consciously understands *disciplina*, and this would be a separable relation rather than an inseparable one, contrary to the argument. Second and more conclusively, the text makes it clear that the goal of the immortality argument is to prove that *all* SOULS are immortal and not only some. This is clear for several reasons. First, the intended conclusion is always stated as if it included all SOULS and never only some. As the text says in one place, “*Augustine:* Is it thus already clearly evident that the SOUL is immortal? *Ratio:* Absolutely clear, if the things you have conceded are true.” And in another: “*Ratio:* Do not grieve, the human SOUL is immortal.” In all of these cases, the text is saying that SOUL (or the SOUL) by its very nature is immortal, with no hint that it is referring only to some SOULS in the class. Second, Book 2 closes with *Ratio* saying that they will have to discuss the SOUL’s “understanding” (*intellegens*) in later Books because even if they succeed in proving the SOUL’s immortality it could be the case that bodily death brings about the “forgetfulness of Truth” (*ueritatis obliuionem*). That is, even if their...
argument succeeds, it might be possible that the SOUL could always live but have no conscious understanding at all. On the view assumed by the objection, however, this would not be possible.

Third, if we would go beyond the Soliloquies, we would find that Augustine’s immortality arguments in On the Immortality of the Soul also intend the same universal conclusion. One argument in particular proves that the universal conclusion is intended while explaining how the SOUL still can “die” in a sense. If I may be permitted a brief reference to On the Immortality of the Soul, I will explain what I mean.

The controversial phrase under consideration is the phrase, “There is no death unless ‘that you cannot die’ is forgotten!” The objector takes it to mean that the SOUL literally dies once the SOUL forgets disciplina or Truth completely. On the Immortality of the Soul, however, takes this very view as an objection that must be opposed successfully for the immortality conclusion to follow. That is, if forgetfulness entails death, Augustine tells us, then he could not conclude that the SOUL is immortal, as he wishes. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that “forgetfulness” does imply a quasi-literal death, which explains what the controversial passage means. The “forgetfulness” in the sense under discussion is the SOUL’s “turning away” (auersio) from Truth, which does involve a literal loss of being or existence. It simply does not involve a complete loss

what death ought not be preferred to it, if the soul lives such as we see that it lives in a recently born boy?” (Qualis enim erit illa aeterna vita vel quae mors non ei praeponenda est, si sic vivit anima, ut videmus eam vivere in puero max nato?) These clearly indicate that immortality is one thing and consciously understanding or knowing is another.

251 One can find a succinct statement of Augustine’s reasoning on this matter at imm. an. 11.18.23(119)-6(120) “Going back, therefore, if something is to be feared, it is to be feared that the SOUL dies by becoming defective (deficiendo), that is, by being deprived of the form of existing (existendi specie privatur). Although I think enough has been said about this, and it has been demonstrated by certain ratio how this cannot happen, nevertheless it still should be closely considered that there is no other cause of this fear except because it is to be confessed that the SOUL is foolish in a certain [state of] defect (in defectu quodam) and is wise in a more fixed and fuller [state of] essence (in essentia certiore atque pleniore)” (Rursus igitur, si quid metuendum est, id est metuendum, ne deiciendo animus intereat id est dum ipsa existendi specie privatur. De qua re quamquam satis esse dictum arbitrer et, quam hoc fieri non possit, certa ratione monstratum sit, tamen etiam hoc adtendendum est, non esse alien causam huius formidinis nisi quia fatendum est in defectu quodam esse animum stultum et in essentia certiore atque pleniore sapientem).
of being or existence. When the soul forgets “that [it] cannot die” it quasi-dies by losing some of its being, but not all of it. If it did lose all of it, then it would not be immortal, according to Augustine, and that is unacceptable. So then it is safe to put this objection aside.

Another passage that seems to cast doubt on the Platonic recollection picture for many scholars, as it does for O’Daly and Gilson, is the illumination passage discussed earlier.\footnote{Here is the entire passage again: sol. 1.8.15 “God, of course, is intelligible, and the contents of the disciplines (disciplinarum spectamina) are also intelligible. But they differ very much. Both light and earth are visible, but the earth cannot be seen without having been illuminated (inlustrata) by light. So also one should believe that the things transmitted in the disciplines, which anyone who understands concedes are absolutely true (uerrissima) without any doubt, cannot be understood (intellegi) unless they are illuminated by another, as if by their own sun. One is permitted to notice that just as there are three things in this [corporeal] sun, that it exists, that it shines (fulget), and that it illuminates (inluminat), so also there are three things in that most hidden God whom you wish to understand, that he exists, that he is understood (intellegitur), and that he makes other things to be understood (cetera facit intellegi).”} I take the central claim of the illumination passage to be, “God illuminates the contents of the disciplines (disciplinarum spectamina) so that they can be understood (intellegi).” This seems to rule out any requirement for preexistence because God provides a present illumination of the contents of disciplina that is sufficient to ground knowledge acquisition. No illumination from God in a past preexistence is needed. Those who take this interpretation could also appeal to an independent consideration to strengthen their argument. They could claim that the immortality argument does not require preexistence because the first conditional cannot possibly be intended. After all, disciplina, which is Truth and therefore God, no doubt can exist separately from the soul. This is confirmed by Augustine in many other places and is simply common sense. It would be absurd for Augustine to say that the God who created all things out of nothing can only exist in soul, as if God depended on soul for his existence. Such a rejection of the first conditional would support the idea that the illumination passage is denying Platonic recollection.

This reasoning sounds convincing but is not supported by the text. First, the illumination passage itself contains nothing explicitly inconsistent with preexistence, as I noted in the previous chapter. Now that we have met the immortality argument, in fact, we can see how they
fit together. The immortality argument can grant that the SOUL needs a present illumination from God in order to acquire knowledge, but the present illumination itself would be an aspect of the inseparable connection between the SOUL and God that extends into the past and future. God is quite simply always illuminating the SOUL, even into its preexistent past. Nothing about the kind of illumination Augustine outlines in the passage is inconsistent with this. It may even be an indication that Augustine held the Plotinian view that the SOUL is always “still there” continually contemplating the intelligibles, as O’Connell argues, and as I later argue is correct. Second, as we saw above, the text must literally intend the first conditional to apply to disciplina and the SOUL, and therefore it must intend preexistence. This is clear from the discussion of inseparability and from the fact that the very success of the immortality argument depends on it being true.

It is true that despite this evidence, there is still some force behind the objection to the first conditional, and this is why it has so often been ignored. It is very difficult to believe that Augustine could have intended to say, let alone believe, that God, who seems to be equivalent to disciplina in some sense, can only exist in the SOUL (indeed, in each individual SOUL!) as in a subject. This would seem to make God’s existence dependent on the SOUL, something that Augustine seems to reject in the first book of the Soliloquies. My suspicion is that it is the unbelievability of God having to exist in the SOUL that is the main reason Augustine’s earliest Platonic recollection view has been largely misunderstood and often rejected. In order to establish the conclusion more securely, then, I will have to show in more detail how and why this
is what Augustine meant. This task happens to fit together nicely with the task of showing that the Platonic recollection view is an “eternal, constitutive Forms” view, which is where I now turn.

5. “Eternal, Constitutive Forms” Platonic Recollection

The key points to establish have to do with the nature of the innate knowledge and the nature of the preexistence. My contention here is, first, that the innate knowledge of disciplina is the divine Forms themselves up to and including God. This is because the innate knowledge is the very disciplina that is in the SOUL, not innate notions or something analogous, and because disciplina includes all of the liberal disciplines and God himself. Second, the nature of the preexistence is an eternal preexistence. This is because the SOUL has to exist at least as long as the liberal disciplines, which are eternal.

In support of the first contention, the first thing to see is that Augustine intends disciplina to refer to all of the liberal disciplines (and their contents). This is relatively clear and not so controversial in any case. In the immortality argument, Ratio specifies that “Every (omnis) disciplina is in a subject, the SOUL,” showing that she is not simply referring to one or two of the disciplines but to all. Her reasoning suggests why this would be. All of the disciplines are united by dialectic, which is the one ruling discipline that makes all of the disciplines disciplines, including itself. In a sense, it even “begets” (creat) the other disciplines. The reasoning for

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255 In this I agree with Cary when he says, “what is found in the soul is nothing other than the intelligible world, the realm of Platonic ideas...” (Invention (2000), 101).

256 sol. 2.13.24.2-3(79) (my emphasis) “Et omnis in subiecto est animo disciplina.”

257 sol. 2.11.21.13-16 “Therefore, grammar is begotten (creata est) by the same art, the one which you defended from falsity above [i.e. dialectic], such that it is a discipline and that it is true. And not only am I allowed to draw this conclusion about grammar, but also about every discipline altogether” (Grammatica igitur eadem arte creata est, ut disciplina et ut vera esset, quae est abs te superius a falsitate defensa. Quod non de una grammatica mihi licet concludere, sed prorsus de omnibus disciplinis). The verb creata est does not mean “is created” in this passage, but rather “is begotten,” as the context clearly requires, and as Augustine tells us is possible in f. et symb. 4.5.23(8)-3(9) “Also excluded are those who say that the Son is a creature, even though not a creature like the rest of the creatures. For however great they declare
including them all in the SOUL, then, would be that since the disciplines are united by dialectic, one cannot have any of the other disciplines in the SOUL without having dialectic nor can one have dialectic in the SOUL alone without the other disciplines that it begets.

It is less clear and much more controversial that disciplina also refers to God. The key question at issue is what Augustine intends by the term “Truth” (ueritas) when Ratio says that disciplina is Truth. We know from as early as On the Happy Life that Truth in the sense of ueritas is not merely an abstract logical concept for Augustine, but a living, existing, metaphysical divine reality corresponding in some sense to Plotinus’ divine Nous, and the second person of the Trinity.258 Thus, it is natural to expect that in saying that disciplina is Truth, Augustine intends Ratio to be saying that disciplina is God, or more precisely, the Son of God. This seems especially plausible given the fact that she is speaking about the immortal Truth that always exists, a claim necessary for the success of the argument, and not about mere logical Truth that would not seem to have a metaphysical existence. Moreover, immortal Truth would seem to be nothing other than divine Truth. But is it? This is the real question at issue in determining whether disciplina includes God or not. It is clear that immortal Truth of some kind exists in the SOUL inseparably as in a subject but it is a great question whether this genuinely refers to divine Truth, the Son of God. It would seem that it must, since Augustine has no room for a third thing between SOUL and God,259 but it would help to have more evidence from the Soliloquies itself. It turns out that there are two additional pieces of evidence from the

the creature to be, if it is a creature, it has been fashioned (condita) and made (facta est). For “to fashion” (condere) is the same as “to create” (creare), although in the common usage of the Latin language “to create” is sometimes used to mean to beget (gignere); but the Greeks make a distinction (quantamcumque enim creaturam dicant, si creatura est, condita et facta est; nam idem est condere, quod creare. quamquam in latinae linguae consuetudine dicatur aliquando creare pro eo, quod est gignere; sed graeca discernit). The meaning of the English verb “create,” therefore, originally corresponded more closely to the Latin verb condere than creare, even though etymologically it derives from the latter. 258 beata u. 4.34. Augustine tells his interlocutors that the “wisdom” (sapientia) and “Truth” (ueritas) they had been talking about are nothing other than the Son of God (dei filius).

259 See beata u. 1.4 “...for of all things the soul is the nearest (proximum) to God” and an. quant. 34.77 “...nothing is nearer (propinquius) to God among all the things he has created than the human soul.”
Soliloquies that strongly suggest that immortal Truth and divine Truth are identical.

The first piece of evidence is simpler and less conclusive. In Augustine’s opening prayer in Book 1, he explicitly identifies the Son of God with Truth (\textit{ueritas}),\textsuperscript{260} and in the discussions about the immortal Truth (\textit{ueritas}) that exists in the soul in Books 1 and 2,\textsuperscript{261} he gives no indication that the Truth there is anything different. Since these passages occur in the very same work, the two Truths therefore seem to be the same. The second piece of evidence is more complex and conclusive. In the illumination passage of Book 1, \textit{Ratio} depicts the epistemological role of divine Truth identically to the way that she depicts the epistemological role of immortal Truth in the immortality argument of Book 2. Since their epistemological roles are identical, it follows that they must be the identical Truth. Let me take a moment to demonstrate this from the text.

The first step toward seeing how the epistemological roles of immortal Truth and divine Truth are identical with each other is to recognize that by immortal Truth, \textit{Ratio} means “dialectic.” Although she says that \textit{disciplina} as a whole is Truth, she clarifies in the process that strictly speaking only dialectic is Truth and the other liberal disciplines are merely true (\textit{uerae}) by this Truth (\textit{ueritate}). The second step is to recognize that dialectic’s relation to all the disciplines, including itself, is such that it makes them true (\textit{uerae}). We know this from \textit{Ratio}’s reasoning for identifying dialectic with Truth in the first place: 1) dialectic is what makes the disciplines disciplines (including dialectic itself); 2) what makes a discipline a discipline is what makes it true; and 3) what ultimately makes anything true (\textit{uerum}) is Truth (\textit{ueritas}). Therefore,

\textsuperscript{260} \textit{sol.} 1.1.2.6. The opening prayer is specific first to each person of the Trinity and then to the Trinity as a whole, as scholars generally recognize (e.g. Ayres, \textit{Trinity} (2010), 35). Ayres notes that only Doignon in recent years has argued against this (“La Prière des \textit{Soliloquia} dans la ligne philosophique des Dialogues de Cassiciacum,” \textit{Augustiniana Traiectana}, eds. J. den Boeft and J. van Oort (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987): 87-9).

\textsuperscript{261} \textit{sol.} 1.15.27-29 and \textit{sol.} 2.10.18-2.19.33.
dialectic is Truth.\textsuperscript{262} Turning to divine Truth, the third step is to recognize that by divine Truth, Augustine means “Son of God,” which is what we have already observed from Augustine’s prayer in \textit{Soliloquies} 1.1.2.6. The fourth step is to recognize that the illumination passage describes the Son of God’s relation to the disciplines in exactly the same way as dialectic’s relation to the disciplines, only in different words. That is, it says that the Son of God makes it such that the disciplines are true, which is precisely what dialectic does. Thus, it follows that divine Truth, the Son of God, is identical to immortal Truth, the discipline of dialectic.

Since this fourth step is controversial and has rarely been observed,\textsuperscript{263} I defend it here in more detail. That the illumination passage is saying that “the Son of God makes it such that the disciplines are true” can be derived from the illumination passage’s central claim. I summarize the central claim as follows: “God illuminates the contents of the disciplines (\textit{disciplinarum spectamina}) so that they can be understood.”\textsuperscript{264} First, we may substitute the term “God” with “Son of God,” since we know from Augustine’s prayer that the second person of the Trinity is responsible for illumination.\textsuperscript{265} Second, the phrase “illuminates... so that” can be replaced with “makes it such that,” which does not fully capture the metaphor, but also does not add anything extraneous. Third, the phrase “can be understood” can be translated as “are true.” This point is not as transparent as the others, but the \textit{Soliloquies} makes it clear elsewhere that it is the fact that things are true (without any admixture of the false) that makes them knowable or understandable.

\textsuperscript{262} I derive this reasoning from the following passages: \textit{sol.} 2.11.21, 2.18.32.
\textsuperscript{263} Cary also observes it in \textit{Invention} (2000), 98.
\textsuperscript{264} This is the section summarized (Latin text provided in Ch. 1): “God, of course, is intelligible, and the contents of the disciplines (\textit{disciplinarum spectamina}) are also intelligible. But they differ very much. Both light and earth are visible, but the earth cannot be seen without having been illuminated (\textit{inlustrata}) by light. So also one should believe that the things transmitted in the disciplines, which anyone who understands concedes are absolutely true (\textit{uereissima}) without any doubt, cannot be understood (\textit{intellegi}) unless they are illuminated by another, as if by their own sun” (\textit{sol.} 1.8.15).
\textsuperscript{265} See Augustine’s introductory prayer at \textit{sol.} 1.1.3.13-15 where he is speaking about the Son of God: “God, intelligible light, in whom and by whom and through whom all things that shine intelligibly shine intelligibly” (\textit{Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et per quem intelligibiliter lucent, quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia}).
(i.e. intelligible). *Ratio* says at 2.11.20.9-10(71), for example, that “no one can know (scit) false things (falsa),” which when put together with the context tells us that only truths (uera) without anything false in them can be known.\(^{266}\) Fourth, the phrase “contents of the disciplines” can be replaced with “disciplines,” since Augustine is clearly concerned with all of the truths (uera) that can be known concerning the disciplines and not a particular set. Consequently, the central claim of the illumination passage comes out as follows: “The Son of God makes it such that the disciplines are true,” precisely what the immortality section says about dialectic. The Son of God makes it such that the disciplines are true and dialectic makes it such that the disciplines are true, and they both also happen to be named Truth. This cannot be a mere coincidence. Therefore, when Augustine says that *disciplina* is Truth, he really does mean that *disciplina* is God, since the immortal Truth (ueritas) of the immortality argument is identical to the divine Truth (ueritas) of the illumination passage.

Thus, we have no choice but to conclude that the *disciplina* that exists in the SOUL inseparably as in a subject includes all of the disciplines and God himself. Before we can conclude that innate knowledge is literally these very things themselves, however, we have to rule out another possibility. Perhaps one could argue that everything is metaphorical. The SOUL does not actually have *disciplina* (or any part of it) within it, but merely has innate notions corresponding to *disciplina*, or something analogous to notions (e.g. *disciplina* “for SOUL”).\(^{267}\)

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\(^{266}\) Here is the passage in context: “What about the discipline of grammar? If it is true (uera), isn’t it true by that by which it is a discipline? For “discipline” (*disciplina*) is so named from “learning” (*discendo*) and no one can be said not to know (nescire) what he has learned and retains, and no one knows (scit) false things (falsa). Thus, every discipline is true” (*sol.* 2.11.20.7-10(71)). Put in another way, the premises are that a discipline is a discipline because it can be learned, something that can be learned is knowable, and something is knowable only if it is true without anything false in it. From this the conclusion follows that every discipline is true (without anything false in it). The idea that something is knowable only if it is true without anything false is essential to the argument. We know that *Ratio* is concluding that every discipline is true *without anything false in it* because the previous paragraphs make it clear that this was the intended conclusion (2.10.18-2.11.19). For further evidence for this interpretation, see *sol.* 2.15.29 and *sol.* 2.18.32.

\(^{267}\) Bermon adopts a view of this sort in “La preuve” (forthcoming). As he says, “il faut établir une
There are several other things that one could say against this alternative – e.g. the lack of references to *notiones* in the text, texts to the contrary in *On the Immortality of the Soul* (6.10-11), the fact that it would remove the reason for inferring the SOUL’s immortality – but I will focus on a passage in the *Soliloquies* that rules it out decisively. It is the passage that argues that immortal Truth, which we now know is equivalent to divine Truth (= God), must exist “somewhere” (*alicubi*) in order to exist. For if God must exist somewhere, and if this somewhere is the SOUL, then the same would be true for discipina as a whole, which thus must literally and constitutively exist in the SOUL.

We find this passage at the end of the first book. Having just argued that the Truth does not perish but always exists, showing that she is speaking about immortal Truth, Ratio claims that Truth must exist somewhere (*alicubi*). Why so? Because “whatever exists must exist somewhere.” In this case, one does not have the option of claiming that the text is only referring to “notions” of Truth (or something similar) and not Truth in its unqualified metaphysical sense. For “whatever exists must exist somewhere,” and immortal Truth is something that exists.

The passage is a teaser for the second book, so Ratio does not tell us explicitly “where” Truth exists, only that it has to exist in something immortal. She also makes it clear that this immortal “somewhere” will not be a “place” (*locus*), which tells us that she is not looking for a corporeal “somewhere,” but an incorporeal one. That is as far as she proceeds in

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268 sol. 1.15.29.16-17 *quicquid est, alicubi esse cogitur.* As Cary points out (Invention (2000), 104, n. 46), the principle derives from Cicero’s *Academ.* 1.24 *nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur,* where it is represented as one of the views of the Old Academics, and it likely ultimately originates from *Tim.* 52b. In neither passage, however, is there an indication that it applies beyond sensible things.

269 So then does animus have to exist “somewhere” as well? Augustine does not seem to consider the regress problems of this possibility. However, it could be that he thinks the animus plays the role of intelligible matter for God, and so just as corporeal unformed matter itself does not technically have a “place” (*locus*), so also the animus would not have to exist “somewhere” (*alicubi*). It would still be an exception to his rule, however, that everything that exists must exist somewhere. Cf. ord. 2.16.44.12 where Augustine might be suggesting that soul is also not nowhere (*nusquam*).
Book 1. The immortality argument of Book 2, however, shows that she means nothing other than that the immortal thing in which Truth must exist is soul. Therefore, the Soliloquies is serious in maintaining that immortal (and therefore divine) Truth itself truly exists “in” the soul, and not a mere notion or something similar. The same would have to hold a fortiori for all of the disciplines. Thus, our conclusion follows. The innate knowledge in the soul is the Forms (including God) themselves, and not merely their notions.

Establishing these two things about disciplina in the soul has given us what we need to confirm that the text really is saying that the first conditional applies to God and thus that God can only exist in the soul. Since the disciplina that inseparably exists in the soul necessarily includes God and since God himself must exist in soul because he must exist somewhere, it follows that God can only exist in the soul, just as the first conditional states. This finally allows us to say with confidence that the immortality argument really entails Platonic recollection in general as I was claiming in the last section. Cary has concluded that Augustine’s acceptance of the first conditional shows a serious lack of competence for the early Augustine, since Augustine did not realize that it implied that God was dependent on the soul. I agree that Augustine made a serious mistake, but do not think it shows as much incompetence as Cary alleges. As I explain later, Augustine did not intend to make God causally dependent on the soul by this claim, because he still maintained that the soul was causally dependent on God.

Augustine will elaborate on this reasoning in imm. an. 1.1 and 4.5. These passages tell us something important about Ratio’s argument for applying the first conditional to disciplina’s relation to soul, which so far will only be an argument from “fittingness” (as opposed to necessity). Not only is there a reason from the side of the soul for the first conditional, there is also a reason from the side of disciplina. The fact that the soul can have knowledge of disciplina shows that it is a fitting subject in which disciplina could exist with first conditional inseparability, and the fact the disciplina must exist somewhere shows that it needs a subject in which to exist with first conditional inseparability. These reasons together make it fitting that disciplina can only exist in the soul.

So far it is not clear why this has to be true of each individual soul (this is only clarified in imm. an.), but we can assume that Augustine thinks he has proven it about individual souls here because he does not raise the individuality objection that he had raised in the previous immortality argument for anima in general.

Augustine soon rejects the idea that *disciplina* and therefore God must exist somewhere, realizing that it is much more correct to say that the *soul* and everything else exist “in” God rather than vice versa. But Augustine can only do this when he rejects the *Soliloquies* immortality argument, something he does not do until after his baptism.

Now that we have seen that the innate knowledge of *disciplina* is the divine Forms up to and including God himself and that the inseparability really was intended to include the first conditional, we can turn to confirming that the preexistence has to be eternal. I alluded to the basic reasoning above and reproduce it in more detail here. The first conditional tells us that the *soul* must preexist for as long as immortal Truth does. Immortal Truth is eternal. We know this not only because immortal Truth refers to divine Truth, the Son of God, who Augustine explicitly calls eternal (*aeternus*), but also because Augustine argues in *Soliloquies* 2.2.2 and 2.15.28 that immortal Truth has and will always exist. If Truth did not exist at some time, then it would be true that Truth did not exist, which is impossible, since nothing can be true (*u(e)rum*) except by the Truth (*u(e)ritate*). Given that Truth is eternal and can only exist in the *soul*, then, the *soul* must also be eternal and therefore preexist eternally. That is, the *soul* was never, strictly speaking, “created.”

Scholars are typically hesitant to accept this conclusion because of some passages in Augustine’s introductory prayer. At one point, for example, Augustine addresses God as the “God, who created from nothing this world, which all eyes sense is most beautiful.” Since Augustine clearly says that God created “this world” from nothing, scholars think that he is

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273 *diu. qu. 20* “God does not exist somewhere (*alicubi*). ... Yet since God exists and is not in a place, all things rather exist in him than that he exists somewhere...” (*Deus non alicubi est. Quod enim alicubi est continetur loco; quod continetur loco corpus est; deus autem non est corpus. Non igitur alicubi est. Et tamen quia est et in loco non est, in illo sunt potius omnia quam ipse alicubi...*).

274 Augustine applies the term “eternal” to God in *sol. 1.1.4* when he states that the triune God is “one eternal true substance” (*una aeterna uera substantia*).

275 Though the soul still can be eternally “caused,” as I will point out in the next chapter.

276 *sol. 1.1.2.9-10* “*Deus, qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti, quem omnium oculi sentiunt pulcherrimum.*”
saying that SOULS, too, were created from nothing and so cannot be eternal. But this does not follow. In fact, the passage as written excludes the SOUL from its purview. When Augustine speaks of “this world,” he specifies that he is speaking about the world that “all eyes sense is most beautiful,” which means that he is talking about the sensible world. The sensible world is a world that Augustine distinguishes from the intelligible world previously in Against the Academicians, and the SOUL clearly belongs to the intelligible world. Therefore, the passage is only saying that the sensible world was created “from nothing” (de nihilo), not that anything in the intelligible world was created from nothing. Rather than prevent us from concluding that the SOUL is uncreated and therefore eternal, the passage encourages it.

There is another passage in Augustine’s introductory prayer that is more difficult to explain away from the text itself. Shortly after the preceding passage, Augustine says that God “has made man” (fecit hominem) to his own “image and likeness” (ad imaginem et similitudinem). This suggests that human SOULS have had a beginning in time and therefore are not eternal after all, since anything that has been “made” would surely be created in time and since the term “man” (homo) clearly includes both body and SOUL. In order to resolve this difficulty we will have to look outside of the Soliloquies to On Order, which immediately precedes the Soliloquies and is dramatically connected to it. That work suggests that being “made” does not prevent something from being “eternal” and so does not mean created in time. Therefore, there is no contradiction in Augustine saying that the SOUL is “made” in the Soliloquies and simultaneously entertaining the possibility that it is eternal.

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277 Carol Harrison, for example, takes this as a matter of course in Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 82-83.
278 Acad. 3.17.37.
279 In De ordine, Augustine makes several allusions to the idea that the well educated soul ponders certain things in its mind and speaks with itself (secum loquitur) (e.g. ord. 1.3.6, 2.19.50), which is exactly how Augustine describes his own state at the beginning of the Soliloquies. It is also significant that the things that he says the SOUL ponders are things that he addresses in the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul (cf. ord. 2.19.50 and imm. an. 2.2).
I briefly consider the relevant *On Order* passage for confirmation. As part of explaining why an education in the liberal arts is necessary for solving the problem of evil, Augustine identifies some of the “most obscure” and yet “divine” questions for which such an education is necessary.

But what about things that are most obscure and yet divine: how God does nothing evil and is all-powerful while such great evils are done; for what good he who does not lack anything made the world (mundum fecerit), whether there was always evil or whether it began in time; and if it always was, whether it was under God’s arrangement and, if it was, then whether even this world, in which that evil is ruled by the divine order, always was (semper fuit); if however this world began to be at some time (aliquando esse coepit), how evil was held by the power of God before it was; and what need there was to make a world in which evil, which the power of God was already curbing, would be included for the punishment of souls...²⁸⁰

In the first italicized phrase, Augustine asserts that God “made” (*fecerit*) the world, as if this were obvious and should not be denied. He makes the same assertion in a later passage, saying that not to believe that the world was “made” would be “impious” and “ungrateful”.²⁸¹

Nevertheless, the second italicized phrase raises the question of whether the world “always was” (*semper fuit*) or “began to be at some time” (*aliquando esse coepit*). Since the phrase “always was” has to mean “eternal” because it is in opposition to “began to be at some time,” Augustine is saying that while God clearly made the world, it still could be eternal. The same conclusion, therefore, could apply to the soul and the apparent contradiction is solved. There is no problem with the Augustine of the *Soliloquies* saying that the soul is made and yet eternal.

²⁸⁰ ord. 2.17.46.28-38 (Foley trans., slightly modified) “De rebus autem obscurissimis et tamen divinis, quomodo deus et nihil mali faciat et sit omnipotens et tanta mala fiant et cui bono mundum fecerit, qui non erat indiguis, et utrum semper fuerit malum an tempore coeperit et, si semper fuit, utrum sub conditione dei fuerit et, si fuit, utrum etiam iste mundus semper fuit, in quo illud malum divino ordine domaretur – si autem hic mundus aliquando esse coepit, quomodo, antequam esset, potestate dei malum tenebatur et quid opus erat mundum fabricari, quo malum, quod iam dei potestas fenabat, ad poenas animarum includeretur?”

²⁸¹ ord. 2.17.46.50-52 “But if we should say that this world was not made, believing this is impious and ungrateful, lest it follow that God did not shape it...” (Foley trans., slightly modified) (Si autem istum mundum non factum dicamus, impium est atque ingratum credere, ne illud sequatur, quod deus eum non fabricarit – ...).
This suggests an interesting point about Augustine’s early use of the term “eternal” (aeternus). Unlike in later works, where the proper sense of the term refers only to God’s atemporal, unchanging eternity, aeternus’ proper sense here is not restricted in this way. Instead, it simply means that something has no beginning or end, whether it changes along the way (like the world), or does not change (like God). It is true that the On Order passage does not use the term aeternus itself, but there are other early passages that use the term while confirming this meaning. In On the Quantity of the Soul, for example, Evodius suggests that the soul might be aeternus, and Augustine responds by saying that the question about whether or not the soul “always was and will always be” is irrelevant for their present purposes and is a question they will consider later. This indicates that Augustine thinks of aeternus as meaning “always was and will always be,” and the fact they are considering it as a property of the soul (which Augustine always thinks changeable to some degree) confirms that this formulation includes the temporal sense. The same point is further supported by the fact Augustine nowhere restricts the meaning of aeternus to an atemporal, completely unchanging sense in these early writings.

**Conclusion**

The Platonic recollection view expressed in the Soliloquies, therefore, seems to be an “eternal, constitutive Forms” view where the SOUL’s innate knowledge is the Forms themselves up to and including God (constitutively existing “in” the SOUL), and where the innate knowledge requires that the SOUL exist eternally without having a beginning in time. Appealing to the Soliloquies itself appears to be sufficient to show this, with a few minor exceptions. What we

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282 e.g. uera rel. 49.97, diu. qu. 19, and trin. 15.5.7. The later Augustine also acknowledges a less strict sense of aeternus that refers to the temporally created but non-changing caelum caeli (conf. 12.8.9), and an even less strict sense that refers to the “aeterna uita” of those who are saved (ciu. 12.20). Those who are saved have a beginning in time and change in time, but have no temporal end.

283 An. quant. 20.34

284 Exactly how Augustine thinks the soul is changeable in the pre-baptismal writings and whether he thinks it is unchangeable in any sense will be a subject of discussion for later chapters.

285 i.e. in On the Quantity of the Soul and earlier.
have discovered so far, however, raises several questions. Do other works confirm this interpretation? What are further implications of this Platonic recollection view, especially for the relation between the soul and God? Does Augustine accept this view, or does he prefer some other recollection view that is less radical and possibly not even Platonic? In order to help answer these questions, we turn now to examining *On the Immortality of the Soul*, which will provide the broader context for understanding Augustine’s intentions in the *Soliloquies* Project. It will reveal that there are three other Platonic recollection views that Augustine considers, and that they have most of the same surprising features as the view expressed in *Soliloquies*. 
Chapter 3 – *On the Immortality of the Soul* and Its Argumentative Strategy

**Introduction**

In the previous chapter, I mentioned I did not yet want to appeal to *On the Immortality of the Soul* when interpreting *Soliloquies* because it has been thought unreliable as an indicator of Augustine’s views. In this chapter, it is time to argue that it really is reliable and that it is very revealing about Augustine’s views. Why think it unreliable in the first place? The judgment of unreliability is based on three factual observations: first, the unpolished and unfinished state of the text; second, its apparently controversial content; and third, Augustine’s later critical estimation of the text in the *Retractations*. The text itself is clearly unpolished, as one can see from the obscure arguments and transitions, and unfinished, as one can see because it cuts off abruptly in the middle of a discussion. The content is controversial because it entertains doctrines that an orthodox Christian of the time would not hold, as when it suggests that the SOUL “exists by means of itself” (*esse per seipsum*). The critical estimation in the *Retractations* confirms that Augustine thought that the reasoning was obscure because he says that the text is difficult even for him to understand. “First of all, *[On the Immortality of the Soul]* is so obscure in the intricacy and brevity of its reasonings that I have a hard time paying attention when I read it and I myself hardly understand it.”

From these observations, two cases for unreliability have been made. One is that *On the Immortality of the Soul* does not reliably represent Augustine’s own view because it is “a series of notes ... on a Porphyrian work on immortality.” In other words, Augustine may not be expressing his own views but Porphyry’s. This possibility has been suggested by Van Fleteren,

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286 retr. 1.5.1.6-9 “*Qui primo ratiocinatum contortione atque breuitate sic obscurus est, ut fatiget cum legitur etiam intentionem meam, uixque intellegatur a me ipso.*”

who thinks it could be signaled by the fact that Augustine merely calls the work a “reminder” (commonitorium) to finish his Soliloquies in the Retractations. In my view, and as even most conservative scholars admit, this possibility is highly unlikely. Even if the text is based on a lost Porphyrian work to some degree, such as his Symmikta Zêtêmata, the evidence leaves little doubt that the work is a literal draft of Soliloquies Book 3 and thus a work of which Augustine takes ownership. There are two main sorts of evidence for this. First, the way that the Augustine of the Retractations criticizes its statements suggests that they were his own. For example, he says that certain statements in the work were stated “rashly” (temere), which is not something one typically worries about when merely taking notes. Second, the logical structure of the work is nicely continuous with the Soliloquies. As we will see, the first three arguments for immortality (1.1, 2.2, 4.5-6) are variations of the Soliloquies immortality argument and the work is ultimately structured around the question of the relation between soul and Ratio, just as the opening of the Soliloquies foreshadowed. So the work is quite clearly a literal draft of Soliloquies Book 3 and thus Augustine’s own.

The second case for unreliability grants that On the Immortality of the Soul is a draft of Soliloquies Book 3, but to some degree or other holds that Augustine’s intention is too obscure to draw firm conclusions about it. This is because both what he is expressing is obscure and his own commitment is obscure. As Van Fleteren also contends, “The later Augustine finds his reasoning most confusing (one of the many indications that the Augustine of Retractations is many times his own best interpreter),” and “The importance of De immortalitate animae lies in its place in Augustine’s project, not in the specific proofs which Augustine appears to neither

288 retr. 1.5.1
289 Bermon, for example, thinks it is obvious that the work is an unfinished draft of Soliloquies Book 3 (“La preuve” (forthcoming)).
290 Bermon, “La preuve” (forthcoming).
291 retr. 1.5.3
accept nor reject.” This case is more compelling. Augustine says that he himself could hardly understand what he meant and he seems undecided between his several arguments for immortality. How, then, could we expect to understand his intention many centuries later?

My main contention in this chapter is that we can understand his intention to a much greater extent than a cursory glance at the text or Augustine’s own estimation in Retractations suggest. It is true that there are parts that are obscure and perhaps even impossible to understand, but the text still provides a solid enough basis not only to understand particular passages, but also to show that Augustine was operating with a highly sophisticated, though still rough, overall logical structure. The text is not the random collection of obscure and incomplete arguments that it seems, but rather reveals an author who had a relatively coherent agenda. He knew what he was doing, even if he had not yet worked out all the details. My contention in the following chapter is that when one recognizes the main components of this agenda, one realizes that it matters little for our purposes that the agenda was unfinished. That the text is expressing Platonic recollection is sufficiently clear as the text stands. We can also discern the basic kinds of Platonic recollection he was considering, in spite of the obscurity of many of the details.

But could one nevertheless question whether Augustine really accepts what the text is expressing, on the grounds that it is merely a draft and not expressed in a polished, published form? I do not think so. First, the very coherence of the agenda suggests that Augustine accepts much of what he is expressing. Second, there are indications in the text itself that show acceptance, as there are in at least one other work (Letter 3). Third, it is just as likely that Augustine would have expressed his own view in the draft as in the polished form, given the controversial nature of the subject matter. In a draft about a controversial topic about which one has a definite agenda, one can be freer about expressing what one really thinks without worrying

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about harming the reader (say, a simple Christian believer), since there is no reader as yet. In the polished version, however, one may want to obscure one’s view if it is controversial in order not to harm the reader, and there is no doubt that the Platonic recollection view that Augustine seems to accept in *On the Immortality of the Soul* is controversial. As I will argue in Chapters 4 and 6, he seems to accept the view that makes all individual souls one, uncreated and eternal, and consubstantial with God. Thus, rather than being extra suspicious about whether Augustine is expressing his own view on the grounds that it is merely a draft, we should be all the more ready to believe it.

In order to see the coherent agenda behind *On the Immortality of the Soul*, one more or less already has to read it as if it had one, which may seem circular. However, it is not circular to say that in order to find something you have to look for it, even for those who do not believe learning is recollection. My method of interpreting *On the Immortality of the Soul* in this way is as follows. I interpret the text with the expectation that there is a coherent agenda behind it and only concede that there is none if nothing coherent can be found. I take this as having two important interpretive implications. First, I take every word and phrase as intentional and significant, that is, as part of his alleged agenda, unless there is an obvious incoherence. I only conclude that Augustine was confused or careless, which he occasionally was, as a last resort. Second, I take arguments or assertions that Augustine seems to endorse in one context as generalizable to other contexts, *mutatis mutandis*, unless there is an obvious inconsistency. There are several arguments that Augustine seems obviously to intend in this way, such as his argument that the soul always lives (which is not repeated in all contexts where it is necessary), and this suggests that he means other arguments or assertions to be generalizable as well. It is also important to note that with a few exceptions, I will not appeal to works outside of the *Soliloquies* and *On the Immortality of the Soul* to supplement my interpretation for the time being. I aim to
discover the agenda of *On the Immortality of the Soul* in its own terms first and to see how far this takes us and what its limits are. We will examine if the interpretation needs to be adjusted and/or if it can be expanded on the basis of other works in Chapters 5 and 6. To look for the coherent agenda, I begin by looking for the subject matter.

1. The Subject Matter of *On the Immortality of the Soul*

A good place to start in determining the overall subject matter is to look at the title. Augustine’s title, as we know from *Retractations* 1.5, is *De immortalitate animae*. The first thing to observe is that Augustine uses the general term *anima* for soul and not *animus*. The casual reader might assume that this is only careless and that he is really only interested in the immortality of the *animus* or rational soul, but this would not be seeing his choice of terminology as sufficiently intentional. As we saw in the *Soliloquies*, Augustine provided an argument for the immortality of the *anima* and it was clearly an argument for the immortality of all sensible *animae*, and not merely rational ones. Further, his only complaint about the argument there seemed to be that it did not prove the immortality of individual *animae*, hinting perhaps that *animae* might still be immortal in some non-individual sense. The same concern for the immortality of *animae* in general is suggested as one reads through *On the Immortality of the Soul*, though Augustine never addresses the question explicitly in the text as we have it. And so his choice of the term *anima* in the title is likely intentional and not careless.

Another important observation to make about the term *anima* is that it is singular. Augustine could have titled the work, “*On the Immortality of Souls (Animarum)*,” but he does not. Augustine’s intention behind this is less clear. Since Latin lacks a definite article, it could simply have been Augustine’s way of emphasizing, “*On the Immortality of the Soul*,” where “the soul” refers to every individual soul that fits into the category of soul. On this interpretation, he would be attempting to prove the immortality of each individual soul, whether rational or
irrational. This, of course, is questionable, since it is unlikely that Augustine wants to prove the immortality of individual irrational souls, which he told us that he had failed to do in the *Soliloquies*.\textsuperscript{293} On the other hand, it could be Augustine’s way of saying, “*On the Immortality of Soul,*” where “soul” refers a unified hypostatic reality that is not merely a generic category of soul, but is one universal reality that all individual souls fundamentally are. On this interpretation, he would be attempting to prove the immortality of the universal reality of soul, perhaps in the sense of a World Soul. This, too, would be questionable, since the main motivation behind his project expressed in the *Soliloquies* was to prove the immortality of individual human souls – not merely a universal reality of them that retains no individuality – in order to show that they can be individually happy. Indeed, Augustine thinks his personal happiness depends on his individual immortality, which is his motive for the project in the first place.\textsuperscript{294} Another alternative, of course, is that we are reading too much into the singularity of the term “*anima.*”

What then is the answer? As is evident from his arguments,\textsuperscript{295} I think it is certain that Augustine at least intends to prove the immortality of individual *animi*, which to me clearly shows that he is aware of the question of the individuality or lack of individuality of *anima* generally. I also think that he wants to prove the immortality of irrational *anima* in a universal, non-individual sense.\textsuperscript{296} Whether he means to pronounce on the universal immortality of *animus* and the individual immortality of irrational *anima* is less clear. My suspicion is that he wants to reconcile three claims. First, all *anima*, whether rational or irrational, are always really and truly one and thus universal in some sense. Second, irrational *anima* do not have an individuality that

\textsuperscript{293} *sol.* 2.4.5  
\textsuperscript{294} *sol.* 2.1.1  
\textsuperscript{295} See especially *imm. an.* 4.5.18-26(106) and 8.14.14-17(115). I discuss each of these passages below.  
\textsuperscript{296} As is evident in *imm. an.* 15.24-16.25, where irrational *anima* is necessary to provide the form of existing (*species existendi*) to the universe.
is immortal. Third, *animi* do have an individuality that is immortal. We will see evidence that this is Augustine’s intention as we look through *On the Immortality of the Soul*.[297] Before moving on, however, let me mention the clearest reason so far to think that Augustine is arguing for the immortality of individual *animi* while thinking (and possibly arguing) that they are also one and thus universal.

This is evident from the fact that Augustine bases his arguments for the immortality of individual *animi* on versions of the *Soliloquies*’ claim that, “*disciplina* exists in the *SOUL* inseparably as in a subject.” This claim has to mean that *disciplina* exists in *each individual SOUL* as in a subject, since that is the only way that *disciplina*’s continual existence can entail the continual existence of that individual SOUL. Otherwise, the argument would obviously be invalid. This raises the question, however, about how one thing, *disciplina*, could exist in many things, individual SOULS. The answer that such an argument insinuates, which I will argue is confirmed in *On the Immortality of the Soul* and the next work, *On the Quantity of the Soul*, is that all individual SOULS are also one with each other. For if all individual SOULS are also one, then *disciplina* can exist in all of them without making *disciplina* itself multiple. Indeed, this would explain why Augustine leaves the individuality ambiguous in the initial claim. He would want the claim to mean that *disciplina* exists in individual SOULS and in universal SOUL at the very same time, which is precisely what the ambiguity of the claim allows for. And so this is why I think Augustine is arguing for the immortality of individual *animi* while thinking (and possibly arguing) that they are also one and thus universal. As a rule in what follows, I will translate such claims with the article “the”, i.e. as claiming that *disciplina* exist in “the” SOUL as in a subject, because of the implied individuality of SOUL (and because it is less awkward in English). However, since Augustine may also intend the claim to refer to a universal sense of SOUL, and

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[297] My confidence that this is what Augustine intends comes especially from his discussion of the unity of souls in his next work, *De quantitate animae*, which I discuss in Chapter 6.
maybe even in some cases to refer solely to a universal sense, the definite article should not be interpreted as restricting SOUL to an individual sense, nor should it necessarily be taken to refer to an individual sense at all.

As for what the title means by “immortality,” the text is clear. Just as in the Soliloquies, something qualifies as immortal if it exists and lives at least forever into the future. When something exists and lives forever into the future, I will say that it continually exists and lives. It may exist and live forever into the past as well, but that is not absolutely necessary for the designation to apply. Arguments for immortality, in turn, can begin from the existing side or the living side. One can begin by arguing for the soul’s continual existence, as long as one also provides additional arguments for its continual life, or one can simply argue for the soul’s continual life, which then would entail its continual existence. Like the Soliloquies, the argument in On the Immortality of the Soul takes the former two-step approach, arguing for continual existence and then continual life. The Soliloquies, however, provided only a very brief argument for continual life, and this is something On the Immortality of the Soul remedies. Even here, though, the text focuses on proving continual existence, since this is where the real work is done. For Augustine, it is easy to show that the soul continually lives once he has shown that it continually exists.298

The overall subject matter of On the Immortality of the Soul, then, can be stated as the following question: Does (the) soul, whether irrational or rational, exist and live forever into the future in some individual and/or universal way? The part of this project that is most relevant for our purposes is the part that has to do with the animus and the strategy for arguing for its continual existence. For it is the animus, if anything, that engages in Platonic recollection, and one can learn whether it does so engage from the arguments for continual existence alone.

298 Augustine’s arguments for this appear at imm. an. 5.9 and 9.16.
Arguing for the continual existence of *animus* also happens to be the part of the subject matter that the text focuses on, since it is the most difficult step, and it determines the text’s basic literary structure. Focusing on this part of the project, therefore, will be sufficient for determining whether Augustine’s arguments are using and/or expressing Platonic recollection in any way and for finding the backbone of Augustine’s coherent agenda.

2. Augustine’s Strategy for Proving the Continual Existence of the **SOUL**: *On the Immortality of the Soul* 6.10-11

   My intention in the next few sections is to explain Augustine’s strategy for proving the continual existence of the **SOUL** and how it structures the work as a whole. One of my contentions is that understood in the most general terms, Augustine’s strategy for proving the continual existence of the **SOUL** is just like the *Soliloquies*: argue from the **SOUL**’s ability to come to know (learn) eternal intelligible things to the conclusion that the **SOUL** at least continually exists. *On the Immortality of the Soul* does this, however, in ways that are both more precise and more varied than the *Soliloquies*. First, the term that Augustine prefers to use for the eternal intelligible things is not *disciplina*, but *ratio*, or what I will call “*Ratio*,” which Augustine seems to think is more precise but still convertible with *disciplina*. By convertible, I mean that they refer to the same objects but do not necessarily have the same meaning. This “eternal intelligibles” sense of *Ratio* should be kept distinct from the personalized *Ratio* of the *Soliloquies* for the time being, though in the end, I will argue that Augustine means them to be identical. Second, Augustine takes the **SOUL**’s ability to come to know this eternal *Ratio* to prove that there are only four possible ways in which the **SOUL** could be related to *Ratio*, and that on all of these ways the **SOUL** must continually exist. On the first way, *Ratio* exists in the **SOUL** as in a subject, just like Augustine said of *disciplina* in the *Soliloquies*. The other three ways are slightly different, as we will see in a moment, though they are all cases where either *Ratio* “exists in” the
SOUL or where the SOUL “exists in” Ratio. Despite their differences, the four ways are taken to prove the continual existence of the SOUL by something they have in common. On all four ways (with a slight qualification for the fourth way), the SOUL is always inseparably conjoined (coniunctus inseparabiliter) to Ratio in a biconditional way, i.e. in a way that affirms the first and second conditionals. Thus, the argument is that the SOUL can never cease to exist because it can never be separated from eternal Ratio. One of the consequences of this reasoning, as in the Soliloquies, is that the SOUL is eternal (without beginning or end) and uncreated on the first three ways. The fourth way is slightly different because the SOUL is created and not eternal, but even on this way, it still has to preexist.

My intention in this section is to derive the basic outlines of this strategy from what Augustine says in 6.10-11, which are the paragraphs where Augustine reveals the strategy most clearly. In the following section, I expand on some important details that are necessary for understanding that this strategy structures the work as a whole and for preparing us to see why the conjunction between Ratio and SOUL is biconditionally inseparable (with the slight qualification for the fourth way) on all four ways. In the next chapter, I defend my contention that the biconditional inseparability really is entailed by Augustine’s argument for all four ways, and then I show how the four ways entail Platonic recollection of slightly different sorts.

To derive Augustine’s strategy from On the Immortality of the Soul 6.10-11, let us proceed sentence by sentence, starting with section 6.10. I begin by keeping the term “ratio” in lower case until we come to the appropriate definition of it.

Thus I see that all our reasoning power should be devoted to knowing what ratio is and how many ways it can be defined and also to be convinced about the immortality of the soul (anima) according to all these ways.299

This is the most general description of the strategy in terms of ratio. So far, Augustine is only

299 imm. an. 6.10.5-8(110) “Ergo incumbendum omnibus ratiocinandi viribus video, ut ratio quid sit et quoties definiri possit, sciatur, ut secundum omnes modos et de animae immortalitate constet.”
referring to *ratio* in general and has not specified a definition, but the strategy clearly is that one should be “convinced about the immortality of the soul” according to all the ways that *ratio* can be defined. He has not yet mentioned anything about the ways in which the soul can be related to *ratio*, but he will do that shortly. Note that he uses the general term “soul” (*anima*) here, which suggests that even the irrational soul’s immortality, if there be any, is to be proven in terms of its relation to *ratio*. In the remainder of the passage, however, he immediately adopts the term *animus*, showing that his concern, at least for the time being, is about the immortality of *animus*.

Having just said that we should be convinced about the immortality of the soul according to all the ways that *ratio* can be defined, Augustine then defines *ratio* in three ways.

*Ratio* is either (1) the looking power of the soul (*aspectus animi*), by which it gazes at (*intuetur*) something true (*uerum*) by means of itself, not by means of the body; or (2) the very contemplation (*contemplatio*) of something true (*ueri*), not by means of the body; or (3) the true thing itself (*uerum ipsum*) that is contemplated.\(^{300}\)

The most important thing to note for our purposes is the distinction between *ratio* in the first sense of the soul’s capacity to “look at” something true (*uerum*), and *ratio* in the third sense of the “true thing itself” (*uerum ipsum*) that is contemplated. The former must refer to human *ratio*, but what the latter refers to is not entirely clear. What is *ratio* as the “true thing” (*uerum*) that is contemplated? It is reasonable to expect that it refers to the collection of all eternal *rationes*, or intelligible things, or Forms, and possibly even God, just as *disciplina* seemed to do in the *Soliloquies*, but whether this really is its scope so far is unclear. One can also raise the question about the intended relation between the two *rationes*. Is human *ratio* really distinct from contemplated *ratio* or are they identical in some sense? In the *Soliloquies*, Augustine was speaking with what seemed to be his personified human *ratio*, or *Ratio*, as I called it, and now it is a real question how that personified *Ratio* is supposed to be related to the *ratio* here as the

\(^{300}\) *imm. an.* 6.10.9-11(110) “*Ratio est aspectus animi, quo per seipsum, non per corpus verum intuetur, aut ipsa veri contemplatio, non per corpus, aut ipsum verum, quod contemplatur.*”
\textit{uerum ipsum} that is contemplated. Could that personified Ratio be the \textit{uerum ipsum}? If so, could our human ratio therefore be identical with it? The remaining sense of ratio is bit of a surprise. Augustine says that ratio can be the very \textit{contemplatio} of something true, i.e. a successful connection between the other two rationes, as though it were a term for “knowledge” or “awareness.” This sense is not included in our English definition of “reason.” One of its interesting implications is that Augustine’s understanding of knowledge involves a connection or correspondence between the knowing power and the known, between the two rationes.

Next, Augustine considers how ratio in each of these three senses can be related to the \textsc{Soul}. This makes sense because his strategy, as he said, is to be convinced of the immortality of the \textsc{Soul} according to all the ways that ratio can be defined. So he has to consider how these three senses are related to the \textsc{Soul}.

No one disputes that that first one exists in the \textsc{Soul}; about the second and third it can be inquired about; but also the second cannot exist without \textsc{Soul}. About the third, it is a great question, whether that truth (\textit{uerum}), which the \textsc{Soul} gazes at without the instrument of the body, exists by means of itself (\textit{sit per seipsum}) and does not exist in the \textsc{Soul}, or whether it can exist without the \textsc{Soul}.\footnote{\textit{imm. an. 6.10.12-16(110)} “\textit{Primum illud in animo esse nemo ambigit; de secundo et tertio quaeri potest; sed et secundum sine animo esse non potest. De terto magna quaestio est, utrum verum illud quod sine instrumento corporis animus intuetur, sit per seipsum et non sit in animo aut possitine esse sine animo}.”}

Augustine thinks the first two relations to the \textsc{Soul} are fairly straightforward. Ratio as the \textsc{Soul}’s faculty of looking clearly “exists in” the \textsc{Soul} and ratio as contemplation “cannot exist without” \textsc{Soul}. The reason for the former is obvious, since ratio is the \textsc{Soul}’s faculty of looking. The reason for the latter is less so, but it seems to be because it necessarily involves ratio in the first sense, i.e. since contemplation must involve the faculty of looking. The “great” (\textit{magna}) question, according to Augustine, is how ratio in the third sense is related to the \textsc{Soul}. In particular, it is unclear whether ratio as the truth contemplated “exists by means of itself” and does not exist in the \textsc{Soul} or whether it “can exist without the \textsc{Soul}.” This is the relation to
which Augustine turns in order to prove the soul’s continual existence, leaving the others behind. It is not hard to see why. The soul’s relation to ratio in the first two senses is insufficient to prove the continual existence of soul because on their own it is not clear how either of them could be permanent enough to ensure the soul’s continual existence. Ratio in the third sense, however, seems to refer to the collection of eternal intelligible things, and so would possess the permanence required. For greater clarity from now on, I will use the capitalized term “Ratio” to refer to this third collective sense, while keeping the question of whether this Ratio is identical to the personalized Ratio of the Soliloquies in mind.

But what is soul’s relation to Ratio? This is the question to which Augustine turns next. He is not sure what it is precisely, but whatever it is, he argues that it must be some sort of conjunction (coniunctio).

But in whatever way it is, the soul could not contemplate it by means of soul itself [as opposed to by body] unless by means of some conjunction (alia coniunctione) with it. For everything that we contemplate, or grasp (capimus) by thinking (cogitatione), we grasp either by sense (sensu) or by intellect (intellectu). But the things that are grasped (capiuntur) by sense are also sensed (sentiuntur) to be outside of us and contained in places, for which reason we do not even affirm that they can be perceived (percipi, lit. “grasped thoroughly”). But the things that are understood (ea..., quae intelleguntur) are not understood as though placed elsewhere (alibi) than the soul itself that understands. For at the same time [as they are understood], they are understood not to be contained in place (loco).302

The passage even provides an argument for why there must be a conjunction. The overall inference is suggested by the conditional statement, “the soul could not contemplate [Ratio] by means of soul itself unless by means of some conjunction with it.” It is the soul’s ability to contemplate Ratio, which the passage assumes that the soul has, that requires it. But why should the conditional statement be true? The argument is not entirely clear, but the basic reasoning

302 imm. an. 6.10.17-2(110-111) “Quoquolibet modo autem se habeat, non id posset contemplari animus per seipsum nisi aliqua coniunctione cum eo. Nam omne, quod contemplamur sive cogitatione capimus aut sensu aut intellectu capimus. Sed ea, quae sensu capiuntur, extra nos etiam esse sentiuntur et locis continentur, unde ne percipi quidem posse adfirmantur. Ea vero, quae intelleguntur, non quasi alibi posita intelleguntur quam ipse qui intellegit animus; simul enim etiam intelleguntur non contineri loco.”
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seems to be as follows.

1. To say that the SOUL contemplates Ratio by means of SOUL itself as opposed to the body is to say that it grasps Ratio “by intellect” (intellectu) and not “by sense” (sensu).
2. Grasping something “by intellect” (intellectu) is “to understand” (intellegere) or “to perceive” (percipere) it.
3. Something that the SOUL “perceives” cannot be outside of it or contained in places, which, one should note, is why one cannot “perceive” sensible things.
4. Something that is not outside of the SOUL or contained in places [and yet is not identical to SOUL] must be conjoined to SOUL.
5. Therefore, if the SOUL can contemplate Ratio by means of itself then it must be conjoined to it.

Or to put it more briefly, the ability to contemplate Ratio requires that Ratio be conjoined to the SOUL because contemplation is only possible if Ratio is not outside of the SOUL or contained in places. The conditions about not being outside of the SOUL and not being contained in places suggest that Ratio must be “inside” of the SOUL and “incorporeal,” and so it is these things, somehow, that entail that SOUL and Ratio must be conjoined. The argument does not make clear the precise reason for why these conditions follow, but it is worth noting for now that targeting and recognition reasons are one possibility. The idea would be that in order to seek and discover Ratio reliably, the SOUL must have innate knowledge of Ratio, and this knowledge somehow entails that Ratio is “inside” of the SOUL.

A helpful thing that the argument does make clear is that Ratio (in the third sense) is an intelligible thing and that it may even refer to the collection of all intelligible things, or at least to the eternal ones above SOUL, i.e. the Forms. For here, the “true thing” (uerum) contemplated is/are intelligible things and he is inferring that the SOUL’s relation to them is identical to its relation to Ratio, as if they are convertible. This fits with what I have been saying is Augustine’s strategy in its most general terms: argue from the SOUL’s ability to learn eternal intelligible things to the conclusion that the SOUL never ceases to exist. We will find more evidence for the

303 Irrational soul and SOUL are also intelligible things, but they are not necessarily eternal. This is why I specify that I am speaking of “eternal” intelligible things in these contexts.
convertibility between Ratio and eternal intelligible things as we continue.

Now that Augustine has established that there is a conjunction between Ratio as the true intelligible thing contemplated and the SOUL, he has to show that the conjunction is such as to ensure that the SOUL continually exists. This brings us to the next paragraph of text, *On the Immortality of the Soul* 6.11. Augustine begins by distinguishing three possible ways in which the SOUL could be conjoined to Ratio, consistent with the argument given above.

That’s why that conjunction (coniunctio) of the gazing SOUL and this truth (eius ueri) that it gazes at, is either such that the SOUL is subject and truth (uerum) is that which is in the subject, or on the contrary, truth (uerum) is the subject and the SOUL is in the subject, or each is a substance (substantia).

Augustine uses the term uerum (“truth”) for Ratio here, which reminds the reader that he is speaking about Ratio in the third sense, not the other two. It is interesting that he does not use the term ueritas (“Truth”). This keeps the identity of intelligible Ratio as open as possible, while still leaving open the possibility that it is ueritas, since as we know from the Soliloquies, ueritas is also rightly called a uerum. The passage lists three ways in which the SOUL can be conjoined to Ratio. The first way is such that “the SOUL is subject” and Ratio “is that which is in the subject.” The second way is such that Ratio “is the subject” and “the SOUL is in the subject.” The third way is such that “each is a substance.” I make three observations about these ways for the moment. First, the first way looks very much like the view in the Soliloquies where disciplina existed in the SOUL as in a subject. The only difference here is that Ratio, not disciplina, is in the SOUL. Second, Augustine does not yet mention inseparability. Third, the third way is distinguished from the first two ways by the fact that both Ratio and SOUL are substances. This suggests that the term “subject” (subiectum) on the first two ways entails “substance” and thus

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304 imm. an. 6.11.3-6(111) “Quare ista coniunctio intuentis animi et eius veri, quod intuetur, aut ita est, ut subiectum sit animus, verum autem illud in subiecto; aut contra subiectum verum et in subiecto animus; aut utraque substantia.”

305 Recall that I always translate ueritas as “Truth” and uerum as either “truth” or “true thing.”
that Ratio is not a substance on the first way and that SOUL is not a substance on the second way. I will speak more about these ways shortly. The take home point for the moment is that Augustine is listing three ways in which Ratio and SOUL can be conjoined.

Augustine then turns to summarizing his arguments that the SOUL is immortal, both continually existing and living, on all of these possible ways of conjunction. I provide a sample of each here.

If the first of the three is the case, then the SOUL is just as immortal as Ratio is, following the disputation above, because [ratio] cannot exist in the SOUL unless the SOUL is living. The “disputation above” seems to include everything from 1.1 to 5.9, as I will argue later, but we know that it at least refers to 2.2 and 5.9. In these paragraphs, Augustine argues that if Ratio exists in the SOUL as in a subject, then the SOUL, first, always exists and second, always lives. In the passage here, Augustine only offers an argument for the second “living” step of the argument when he says, “[Ratio] cannot exist in the SOUL unless the SOUL is living,” relying on the disputation above” to provide the “existing” step. The disputation provides the “existing” step by adding two premises, as I will show in more detail later. It argues first that Ratio always exists and second that Ratio exists in the SOUL as in a subject inseparably, i.e. with biconditional inseparability. Two results follow. First, it follows that the conjunction is inseparable on the first way. Second, it follows that the SOUL’s continual existence ends up being a case of always existing, i.e. of existing eternally. This second result also follows for this way from the fact that Augustine concludes here that, “the SOUL is just as immortal as Ratio” (tam est inmortalis animus quam ratio).

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306 The same point is also suggested at imm. an. 10.17.8-17(119).
307 Here Augustine only mentions three ways, but as I argue below, he splits the third way into two, giving four ways altogether.
308 This most immediately refers to imm. an. 5.9, but it likely also includes everything back to 1.1.
309 imm. an. 6.11.6-9(111) “Horum autem trium si primum est, tam est inmortalis animus quam ratio, secundum superiorem disputationem, quod inesse illa nisi vivo non potest.”
Augustine then indicates his argument for continual existence on the second way, where the SOUL exists in Ratio.

The same necessity holds in the second possibility. For if that truth (uerum illud), which is called Ratio, possesses nothing changeable, as is clear (apparet), then nothing can be changed which is in it as in a subject.  

This is the only explicit argument that Augustine provides for immortality on the second way. We can see that it leaves the “living” step out, presumably easily added from the arguments from other ways, and focuses on the “existing” step. The argument is that the SOUL continually exists because nothing that is in Ratio as in a subject can be changed. Or to put it another way, Ratio has no changeable or non-essential properties and so SOUL, too, is an essential property and cannot be changed. Therefore, the SOUL will continually exist. The argument here is slightly different from the first way, but we end up having the same two results, as the passage itself makes clear. First, the conjunction between Ratio and SOUL ends up being biconditionally inseparable. Since neither of them ever changes, then their conjunction, too, never changes and always remains. Second, the continual existence of the SOUL on this way is also a case of always existing, or existing eternally, since it is a case of the SOUL never changing, just like Ratio. This is confirmed when Augustine says, “The same necessity holds in the second possibility” as in the first, by which he means that “the SOUL is just as immortal as Ratio” (tam est inmortalis animus quam ratio).

Augustine then turns to how one can prove continual existence and life on the third way. This task, he admits, is more difficult.

Therefore, every battle remains with the third possibility. For if the SOUL is a substance, and as a substance is conjoined to Ratio, someone could think

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310 imm. an. 6.11.9-12(111) “Eadem necessitas in secundo est. Nam si verum illud, quod ratio dicitur, nihil habet commutabile, sicut adparet, nihil conmutari potest, quod in eo tamquam in suiecto est.”

311 The “living” step can be added from the disputation in 5.9, for example.

312 There is a minor textual issue here. I translate the text printed in CSEL and PL: “Nam si animus substantia est et substantia racioni contiungitur....,” which is the best attested. Two manuscripts (CK) have
without absurdity that it can happen that while \([Ratio]\) remains, \([SOUL]\) ceases to exist. But it is clear that as long as the SOUL is not separated from \(Ratio\) and clings to it, then it necessarily remains \((\text{maneo})\) and lives \((\text{uiuere})\).\(^{313}\)

This time Augustine clearly refers to both steps of the argument, existing and living. The SOUL necessarily “remains” (i.e. exists), and “lives,” on this third way, if an important condition is met. The condition is, “as long as the SOUL is not separated from \(Ratio\) and clings to it.” If he proves that the SOUL can never be separated from \(Ratio\), then he proves that the SOUL continually exists and lives. This is Augustine’s basic strategy for proving continual existence on the third way. I will not reproduce the argument in any more detail at the moment because it is more controversial and extends through the remaining sections of the work. I note for now, however, that from this description alone, it is unclear whether Augustine’s argument will include the same two results as for the previous two ways. First, the description speaks about arguing for inseparability, but it could simply be an inseparability into the future and not into the past.

Second, the same point tells us that the argument need not necessarily entail that the SOUL always exists. It could be that the SOUL was created at some time, perhaps even at earthly embodiment, and that it simply continually exists into the future. We will see whether this is really so in the next chapter.

We now have good evidence that Augustine’s overall strategy for proving the SOUL’s continual existence in \textit{On the Immortality of the Soul} is to argue from the SOUL’s ability to learn

\(^{313}\) imm. an. 6.11.12-17(111) “Remanet igitur omnis pugna de tertio. Nam si animus substantia est et substantia ratio cui coniungitur...” The issue is whether or not the text is making clear that \textit{animus} and \textit{Ratio} are each distinct substances. To my mind, the context makes it clear that they are and that the CSEL and PL texts are compatible with this, despite lacking in clarity. Therefore, while the CK manuscripts and the Maurist edition more clearly support my interpretation, there is no need to insist that they are the right rendering because the CSEL and PL texts still suggest the same interpretation.
eternal intelligible things to the conclusion that it must never cease to exist. In these sections, Augustine explicitly tells us that one should “be convinced” that the soul is immortal on all the ways that soul is related to ratio in general, and then he specifies that the ratio he has in mind is ratio as the truth contemplated, or Ratio, which appears to be a term that refers to the collection of all eternal intelligible things (the Forms). Then he argues that the ability to learn these eternal things entails that soul and Ratio are conjoined, and he specifies three possible ways in which the soul and Ratio can be conjoined. Next, he makes clear that his argument is that on all of these ways, the soul must continually exist because it can never be separated from Ratio. On the first two ways, the inseparability seems strict, implying that the soul always exists past and future, and on the third way, it seems that it could be less strict, perhaps implying an inseparability only into the future.

The text also implies that arguing for immortality on each of these three ways (especially with respect to the continual existence step) is what provides the literary structure of the work as a whole. Augustine’s argument for immortality on the first way depends entirely on what he says in “the disputation above” for its continual existence step, which I suggested includes everything from 1.1 to 5.9. This hints that the continual existence step is the much more difficult step and thus takes longer treatment. He also implies that there is no need for more argument about the first way after 6.11, and so we should expect the material after 6.11 to deal with other ways. Following his summary of the first-way argument for immortality comes his discussion of immortality on the second way, which, as I said, is his only explicit argument for immortality about this way in the entire work. In this argument, Augustine does not even mention the continual living step, presumably because it has been proven on the basis of other ways, focusing only on the continual existence step. After that comes a summary of his argument for immortality on the third way. Proving immortality on this way is where “every battle remains,”
he says, which confirms that he has finished focusing on the first and second ways. It also suggests that his argument on the third way is difficult and requires a more extended treatment, and so it makes sense that this would be the topic of the remainder of the work. Further, in saying that his main task is to argue against the possibility “that while \([\text{ratio}]\) remains, \([\text{SOUL}]\) could cease to exist,” Augustine reveals that he is most concerned to prove the continual existence step, and not the continual living step.

Thus, we have good reason to believe that the text’s literary structure is to deal with each of these three ways one after the other and to focus on the continual existence step of the argument. This strongly supports my contention that the argumentative strategy Augustine outlines in 6.10-11 really is the overall strategy of the work as a whole.

3. Augustine’s Strategy for Proving the Continual Existence of the SOUL: Further Observations about the Nature of the Conjunction

I have three further observations to make about this argumentative strategy to confirm that it structures the work as we have it and to prepare us for the next chapter. The first two observations have to do with the nature of the conjunction between \(\text{Ratio}\) and the \(\text{SOUL}\) and is the topic of this section. The third observation has to do with the identity of \(\text{Ratio}\) and is the topic of the next section.

3.1. The Four Ways in which the SOUL Can be Conjoined to Ratio

We have just seen that Augustine entertains three possible ways that the \(\text{SOUL}\) can be conjoined to \(\text{Ratio}\), but in order to interpret the work correctly, it is helpful to observe that he adds a fourth. Or to be more precise, he splits the third way into two. One has to be careful in determining the relevant criterion that splits the third way, however, because Augustine indicates that it can be split in an additional way that is negligible for his purposes of proving immortality.
I point out the negligible criterion first, which is important for other matters, before moving to
the relevant one.

The negligible criterion that splits the third way is the criterion of “one existing in the
other.” This is the same criterion that distinguished the first two ways and Augustine shows that
it can also split the third way. He mentions it in a later passage in the work.

But when the SOUL gazes at (intuetur) these things that are understood (quae intelleguntur) that always exist in the same condition, it shows sufficiently that [the SOUL] is conjoined (esse coniunctum) to them in a certain marvelous and self-same (eodem) incorporeal way, that is to say, not spatially. For in fact either they are in [the SOUL] or [the SOUL] is in them. And whichever of these is the case, either one is in the other as in a subject or each is a substance.\[^{314}\]

Although this passage occurs several paragraphs after 6.10-11, one can see that it rearticulates
much of the strategy indicated there. The first sentence parallels 6.10.17(110)-2(111): argue from
the fact that the SOUL can learn intelligible things to the conclusion that the SOUL is conjoined to
them. Like that passage, it also does not yet mention anything about the inseparability of the
conjunction; it is simply arguing that there must be a conjunction for knowledge of intelligibles
to be possible. After that, there are two criteria for classifying how Ratio and SOUL can be
conjoined, paralleling 6.11.3-6(111). These similarities suggest that the passage was intended to
be continuous and consistent with the strategy in 6.10-11. It contains some interesting additions,
however.

Two of these additions support and clarify two of our earlier suspicions about
Augustine’s reasoning. The first clarifies that Augustine is not simply referring to any intelligible
things, but to “things that are understood that always exist in the same condition.” This confirms
that it is the “always existing” or eternal intelligibles that are supposed to be conjoined to the

\[^{314}\] imm. an. 10.17.8-14(119) “Haec autem, quae intelleguntur eodem modo sese habentia, cum ea intuetur animus, satis ostendit se illis esse coniunctum, miro quodam eodemque corporali modo, scilicet non localiter. Namque aut in illo sunt aut ipse in illis. Et utrumlibet horum sit, aut in subiecto alterum in altero est aut utrumque substantia est.”
SOUL, not ones that are not eternal (if such things exist). The second addition clarifies that the SOUL’s ability to learn eternal intelligible things entails that both the intelligible things and the SOUL are incorporeal, not simply the intelligible things alone. This confirms that Augustine infers the SOUL’s incorporeality from its ability to learn eternal intelligible things and may suggest further that Augustine might have been motivated to do so by affinity reasoning. Affinity reasoning goes back to Plato’s Phaedo, where Socrates argues that the SOUL’s ability to know unchanging and immortal intelligible things (the Forms) suggests that it must be immortal too because it must be “like” (homoia) and “akin” (sungenê) to them. This makes sense here because the idea would be that the SOUL cannot be sufficiently “like” Ratio in order to know it unless it was incorporeal like Ratio, which itself could not be known unless it was incorporeal.

There is a third addition that is particularly relevant to our purposes here. It is in the last two sentences and shows that the “one existing in the other” criterion also splits the third way. Let me explain how this works. The last two sentences indicate that there are two criteria for classifying the nature of the conjunction between Ratio (i.e. the eternal intelligibles) and the SOUL. The first criterion is that “one exists in the other” and the second is that “either one is a substance or both are substances.” The relevant addition to note is that Augustine connects the second criterion to the first with the claim that “whichever of these is the case.” This implies that the “one exists in the other” criterion applies to the case where “each is a substance” (i.e. to the third way) as well, and not only to the cases where only one is the subject (i.e. the first and second ways). That is, Augustine is saying that even when Ratio and SOUL are distinct substances, one of them still “exists in” the other. This gives us four types of conjunction. I illustrate them in the following table, where the numbers correspond to the three ways (and the third way is split into 3a and 3b).

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315 See Phd. 78b-80b, especially 79d1-e6.
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Four Types of Conjunction According to imm. an. 10.17.8-14(119)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only one subject/substance</th>
<th>Ratio exists in SOUL as in a subject/substance</th>
<th>SOUL exists in Ratio as in a subject/substance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinct substances</td>
<td>3a. Ratio exists in SOUL, yet as a distinct substance</td>
<td>3b. SOUL exists in Ratio, yet as a distinct substance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This “one existing in the other” criterion, however, is not the significant criterion that splits the third way, since it has no effect on how Augustine argues for immortality on this way.

For the purposes of considering whether the SOUL is immortal for Augustine, there is another criterion that splits the third way. I call it a “that by which the SOUL exists” criterion. Here, as well, there are two options. Either the SOUL is conjoined to Ratio such that it “exists by means of itself” (per seipsum est) or it is conjoined to Ratio such that it “exists from the highest and maximally existing essence” (ab ea essentia est, quae summe maximeque est), which Augustine tells us is Truth (ueritas).316 One can see that this is the relevant criterion from the following passage.

Going back, therefore, if something is to be feared, it is to be feared that the SOUL dies by becoming defective (deficiendo), that is, by being deprived of the form of existing (existiendi speciei privatur). Although I think enough has been said about this, and it has been demonstrated by unshakeable ratio how this cannot happen, nevertheless it still should be closely considered that there is no other cause of this fear except because it is to be confessed that the SOUL is foolish in a certain [state of] defect and is wise in a more fixed and fuller [state of] essence. But if, which no one doubts, the SOUL is wisest when it gazes at Truth (yperitatem), which always exists in the same condition, and clings to it immovably, conjoined by divine love, and if all those things that exist in any way, exist from that essence, which exists most highly and maximally, (ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est), then either the SOUL exists from that [essence] (ab illa est), or the SOUL exists by means of itself (per seipsum est).317

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316 For the equivalence of the highest essence and Truth (ueritas), see also imm. an. 12.19.4-17(121).
317 imm. an. 11.18.23(119)-12(120) (my emphasis) “Rursus igitur, si quid metuendum est, id est metuendum, ne deiciendo animus intereat id est dum ipsa existiendi speciei privatur. De qua re quamquam satis esse dictum arbitrer et, quam hoc fieri non possit, certa ratione monstratur sit, tamen etiam hoc adtendendum est, non esse aliam causam huius formidinis nisi quia fatendum est in defectu quodam esse animum stultum et in essentia certiore atque pleniore sapiantem. Sed si, quod nemini dubium est, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum veritatem, quae semper eodem modo est, intuetur eique
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The first sentence tells us that Augustine is continuing his defence of immortality on the third way where both Ratio and SOUL are distinct substances, a defence we saw that he had begun at 6.11. We know this because the objection to which Augustine is going back (rursus) is the objection that the SOUL dies “by becoming defective” if it completely turns away from Ratio, which is the first big objection that Augustine brings against the third way in 7.12. So he is clearly speaking about the third way here, not the first and second ways. The last sentence shows that Augustine is going to answer the objection by splitting this third way into two and defending the SOUL’s immortality on both of these ways. The one way, as I mentioned, is that the SOUL “exists by means of itself” (per seipsum sit) and the other is that the SOUL “exists from that [highest and maximally existing essence]” (ab illa [essentia ... quae summe maximeque est] sit), which the passage makes clear is “Truth” (veritas). From now on, I will restrict the name “third way” for the former and call the latter the “fourth way.” 318 Note that since the SOUL is still “conjoined” to Ratio on the third and fourth ways, it will still be true that one of them exists in the other, which technically gives us six ways altogether. But since that criterion is not significant to the argument for immortality on the third and fourth ways (according to Augustine), we can stick with a list of four ways in which Ratio and SOUL can be conjoined.

Here they are again in order:

The Four Ways in which Ratio and SOUL Can Be Conjoined
1. Ratio exists in SOUL as in a subject.
2. SOUL exists in Ratio as in a subject.
3. Ratio and SOUL are distinct substances where one exists in the other, and where SOUL exists by means of itself.
4. Ratio and SOUL are distinct substances where one exists in the other, and where SOUL exists from Truth, the highest and maximally existing essence.

Thus, when Augustine deals with the case where Ratio and SOUL are distinct substances

inmobilis inhaeret divino amore coniunctus et illa omnia, quae quoquo modo sunt, ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est, aut ab illa est animus, in quantum est, aut per seipsum est.”

318 As far as I know, no one has recognized the distinction between the third and fourth ways.
in 6.11-16.25, we should be able to understand the section as structured according to the third and fourth ways. It is not as simple as dealing with them one after the other and there are a few digressions, but it is clear that Augustine begins by dealing with the third and fourth ways together in 6.11.12(111) to 11.18.12(120) (with a brief anticipation of the third way alone in 8.15), and then he turns to dealing with each way alone. In 11.18.12-14(120) he focuses on the third way, dispensing with it quickly, and in 11.18.14(120)-16.25 (end) he focuses on the fourth way with no end of the argument in sight.

3.2. The Conjunction as a Prior Connection to Ratio as Opposed to a Posterior Connection

My next observation about the conjunction is that on all four ways it is only one of two types of connection to Ratio. The conjunction itself is a connection that is prior to learning, and this is distinct from the posterior connection to Ratio that results from learning. The priority of the conjunction is evident from passages considered earlier. In imm. an. 10.17, for example, Augustine says, “...when the SOUL gazes at (intuetur) these things that are understood (quae intelliguntur)..., it shows sufficiently that [the SOUL] is conjoined (esse coniunctum) to them.”

This suggests that the conjunction to Ratio is prior to “gazing at” the intelligibles, and in fact a prerequisite for the gazing. The grammar also allows for translating the “is conjoined” (esse coniunctum) as “has been conjoined,” which brings out the priority more clearly. If one wanted to be especially skeptical, one could question whether the esse coniunctum really implies that the conjunction is prior to the SOUL’s “gazing” rather than simply identical to it, but this is not an obvious interpretation of the passage. The priority of the conjunction is further supported by the argument in 6.10: “But whatever the case may be, the SOUL cannot contemplate [Ratio] by means

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319 imm. an. 10.17 “Haec autem, quae intelliguntur eodem modo sese habentia, cum ea intuetur animus, satis ostendit se illis esse coniunctum, miro quodam eodemque incorporali modo, scilicet non localiter. Namque aut in illo sunt aut ipse in illis.”
of [SOUL] itself unless by means of some conjunction (\textit{aliqua coniunctione}) with it.”

The idea that the conjunction is a “means” to the contemplation in this passage what suggests that the conjunction is prior to the contemplation. It is true that one could interpret the passage as saying that the conjunction constitutes the contemplation, in which case it would be referring to the posterior connection, but this becomes less likely when one reconstructs the broader argument (as I did in section 2 above). As I explain it, the argument is that the fact that the SOUL contemplates \textit{Ratio} shows that \textit{Ratio} cannot exist outside of the SOUL or be contained in places, and it is this observation that allows us to infer a conjunction between the two. Thus, the conjunction is not the same as the contemplation and in fact is a prerequisite for it. So the evidence is fairly clear that the conjunction is a prior connection to \textit{Ratio} (or eternal intelligible things) that is distinct from the posterior “gazing” or “contemplation” connection that results from the learning.

There are several further points to make about the terms related to these two connections to \textit{Ratio}. We have already seen that the term “conjunction” (\textit{coniunctio}) applies to the prior connection, but it is important to note that as a rule it \textit{only} applies to the prior connection and not

\footnote{\textit{imm. an.} 6.10 “\textit{Quoquolibet modo autem se habeat, non id possit contemplari animus per seipsum nisi aliqua coniunctione cum eo.”} \textit{imm. an.} 5.7. For further confirmation that the conjunction is a prior connection to \textit{Ratio} (or eternal intelligible things) distinct from the posterior one, see \textit{imm. an.} 5.7. The relevant bit begins as follows (\textit{imm. an.} 5.7.3-9(108); note that art should be taken as convertible with \textit{Ratio}, as I argue below): “For if the SOUL is subject and art exists in the subject, [and if] the subject cannot change (\textit{immutari}) and also that which is in the subject does not change, who are we to maintain that art and \textit{ratio} are immutable, if the SOUL is proven (\textit{coniunctur}) to be mutable in which these things exist? Now what change is thought to be greater than the change from one contrary to another? But who denies that the SOUL is sometimes foolish (\textit{stultum}) and sometimes wise (\textit{sapientem}), not to mention other things?" (\textit{Si enim subiectum est animus arte in subiecto existente neque subiectum immutari potest quin id, quod in subiecto est, immutetur, qui possimus obtinere inmutabilem esse artem atque rationem, si mutabilis animus, in quo illa sunt, esse convincitur? Quae autem maior quam in contraria solet esse mutatio? et quis negat animum, ut omittam cetera, stultum alias, alias vero esse sapientem?). The text then goes on to argue (5.7-5.9) that even granting that the SOUL changes between foolishness and wisdom, it still can be immutably and inseparably conjoined to art and \textit{Ratio}, which proves (at least in this case) that the conjunction is a prior connection rather than the posterior one.}
to the posterior one. 322 This means that the posterior connection, i.e. the contemplation, should not be spoken of as a “conjunction,” nor can the loss of the contemplation be spoken of as a loss of conjunction. It is also important to note that the technical term for the *loss* of the conjunction is “separation” (*separatio*), as we have already seen from several examples. 323 It too pertains only to the prior connection as a rule and not to the posterior one. 324 Thus, if the SOUL ceases to contemplate *Ratio*, it does not therefore become separated from *Ratio*, but if it ceases to be conjoined to *Ratio*, then it does become separated.

These terms for the prior connection contrast with technical terms pertaining to the posterior connection. “Learning” (*discere*) and “turning toward” (*conuertere*) are verbs for

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322 There is a passage that clearly uses “conjunction” for the posterior connection, but since it refers to the affective part of the connection and not necessarily the cognitive part, it does not seem to be anything more than an exception to the rule. The passage is *imm. an.* 11.18.7-12(120): “But if, which no one doubts, the SOUL is wisest when it gazes at Truth (*veritatem*), which always exists in the same condition, and clings to it immovably, *conjoined by divine love* (*diuino amore coniunctus*), and if all those things that exist in any way, exist from that essence, which exists most highly and maximally, then either the SOUL exists from that [essence], or the SOUL exists by means of itself (*per seipsum est*)” (my emphasis) (*Sed si, quod nemini dubium est, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum veritatem, quae semper eodem modo est, intuetur eique inhaeret divino amore coniunctus et illa omnia, quae quoquo modo sunt, ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est, aut ab illa est animus, in quantum est, aut per seipsum est*). There is also a phrase in 6.11 that may use “conjunction” for the cognitive part of the posterior connection, but I will argue in Chapter 4 that this may not be the case and that if it is, it is at most an exception to the rule.

323 He uses it in this sense, for example, throughout *imm. an.* 6.11. Augustine normally uses the term in its verbal form (conjugations of *separari* or *separare*), but one can occasionally find it in the noun form (*separatio*), e.g. *imm. an.* 6.11.11(112).

324 That Augustine uses it in this exclusive sense is supported by the fact that in *retr.* 1.3.2.22-27 Augustine criticizes himself for using “separation” in the work in a sense that does not apply to the way that sin separates the SOUL from God. It is also supported by the fact that Augustine does not use the term “separation” to apply to the loss of the posterior connection in the works immediately following *On the Immortality of the Soul*. For example, see *mor.* 1.12.21 “The [human SOUL] departs (*discedit*) from God not by place (*non loco*) but by affection and cupidity (*affectione atque cupiditate*), and filled with foolishness (*stultitia*) and misery (*miseria*)” (my emphasis), *an. quant.* 36.80 “[True religion is] that by which the soul binds itself fast in reconciliation to the one God from where it had broken itself off by sin (*unde se peccato velut abruperat*), as it were” (my emphasis), and *lib arb.* 2.14.37.3-5 “For no one can be separated (*separari*) from them [Truth and wisdom] by place (*locis*), but what is called a ‘separation’ (*separatio*) from Truth and wisdom is a perverse will that loves inferior things.” One could take this last passage to be a counterexample, since turning away from Truth and wisdom “is called” (*dicitur*) a “separation” (*separatio*), but one could also take it, as I do, to be a supporting example, because Augustine seems to be asserting his technical use of separation against the more colloquial usage that would apply it to the loss of all connection to Truth and wisdom.
acquiring the posterior connection, and “contemplation” (*contemplatio*) and “wisdom” (*sapientia*) are nouns naming the posterior connection itself. The main opposites of these terms are “turning away” (*aueterere*) and “foolishness” (*stultitia*). Thus, if one “turns toward” *Ratio*, then one acquires a “contemplation” of *Ratio* and changes from being “foolish” to being “wise.” On the other hand, if one “turns away” from *Ratio*, then one no longer has a “contemplation” of *Ratio* and changes from being “wise” to being “foolish.”\(^{325}\) None of these, however, necessarily says anything about the conjunction. Having the prior connection, or conjunction, to *Ratio* is one thing and having the posterior connection, or contemplation, is another.

This terminology has two important implications. First, just as the SOUL’s conjunction to *Ratio* is a prerequisite for learning and contemplation, so also the conjunction is a prerequisite for “turning toward” (*conuersio*) and wisdom. The SOUL cannot turn toward *Ratio* and possess wisdom without already being conjoined to *Ratio*. It is prior to and necessary for these things. Second, *turning away* and *separation* are two very different things. Turning away entails a loss of wisdom, but it does not entail a separation or loss of conjunction. It only refers to the loss of the posterior connection, not to the loss of the prior connection. This is important because otherwise Augustine’s argument for the *inseparability* of the conjunction cannot be reconciled with his contention that the SOUL can often be “turned away” from *Ratio* and “foolish.”\(^{326}\)

\(^{325}\) This relation between *conuersio/auersio* and *sapientia* is clear from *imm. an.* 12.19.22(121)-2(122) “But since [SOUL] has wisdom (*sapientiam*) by turning toward (*conuersione*) that from which it is, it can lose that by turning away (*auersione*). For indeed, turning away is contrary to turning toward. But that being (*esse*) which [SOUL] has from that to which no thing (*nulla res*) is contrary is not such that it could lose it. Therefore, it cannot die” (*Sapientiam vero quia conversione habet ad id, ex quo est, aversione illam potest amittere. Conversioni namque aversio contraria est. Illud vero, quod ex eo habet, cui nulla rest est contraria, non est, unde possit amittere. Non igitur potest interire*). The passage also indicates that the conjunction is something independent of the turning towards, though it does not use the word itself. This is because in saying that the SOUL does not lose its being despite being turned away from the source of its being, it means that SOUL still remains conjoined to the source of its being. For another passage relating *conuersio* and *sapientia* in this way, see 7.12.

\(^{326}\) We will see that inseparability is essential to Augustine’s immortality argument in what follows (see esp. *imm. an.* 6.11). For Augustine’s acceptance that the SOUL can nevertheless be “turned away” from *Ratio*, see *imm. an.* 5.7-9, 11.18.
Scholars regularly miss this point\textsuperscript{327} and so have to explain how Augustine’s argument could be so obviously inconsistent, i.e. holding that SOUL and Ratio are inseparable and yet are often separated by foolishness. My explanation here, however, shows that there is no inconsistency on this front, preserving the unity of Augustine’s argumentative strategy throughout the work.

4. Augustine’s Strategy for Proving the Continual Existence of the SOUL: Further Observations about the Identity of Ratio

Having finished with the two observations about the nature of the conjunction, we can turn to observations about the identity of Ratio. My primary observation in this section is that Ratio is supposed to be convertible with disciplina, art, eternal intelligible things, and Truth. Recall that by convertible, I mean that the terms refer to the same objects but do not necessarily have the same meaning. Thus, some of them may not be completely synonymous with each other because the way in which they refer is different. A secondary observation in this section is that Ratio therefore likely includes God himself. This is a claim that I defend in more detail in Chapter 6, but I point out here that it seems to be a necessary consequence of Augustine’s argument, just as it was in the Soliloquies.

My primary observation is especially relevant to this chapter because it is important for justifying my account of how the four ways of the argumentative strategy structure On the Immortality of the Soul. I claimed that in the first several paragraphs, 1.1-5.9, Augustine focuses on proving the immortality of the SOUL on the first way in which Ratio can be conjoined to SOUL. The most obvious objection to this is that Augustine argues for immortality using several different objects that can exist in the SOUL as in a subject, namely, disciplina, Ratio, and art, and so it might seem that some of the arguments are not based on the conjunction between SOUL and

\textsuperscript{327} Wolfskeel’s commentary on On the Immortality of the Soul goes wildly wrong with this distinction right off the bat (De Immortalitate Animae of Augustine: Text, Translation and Commentary (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977), 2) and never recovers.
Ratio, and so do not fit the argumentative strategy. Proving that these things are convertible, however, shows that they do fit the argumentative strategy because if disciplina and art exist in the soul as in a subject (and thus are conjoined to it), it will be convertible with saying that Ratio exists in the soul as in a subject (and thus is conjoined to it). I also said that in the last several paragraphs, 6.12-16.25, Augustine focuses on arguing for immortality on the third and fourth ways in which Ratio can be conjoined to soul. Here, too, an obvious (though less potentially damaging) objection is that Augustine again speaks about different things to which the soul can be conjoined, namely Ratio, eternal intelligible things, and Truth, and so one could have the same question about the ubiquity of the argumentative strategy. This objection is less potentially damaging because even if there were not a complete convertibility between Ratio and Truth, for example, it would not prevent the paragraphs from focusing on the third and fourth ways. But proving that they are convertible certainly cannot hurt my case and it helps with proving the unity and ubiquity of the argumentative strategy in other ways.

4.1. The Convertibility of Disciplina, Ratio, and Art in 1.1-5.9

I begin with the first several paragraphs (1.1-5.9) and the convertibility of disciplina, Ratio, and art. Do these three things really refer to the same intelligible objects in these passages? I offer two reasons to think that they do.

The first reason is because the arguments in which they occur are very similar, which is evident because they all involve similar versions of at least four basic premises that pertain to the first “continual existence” step of the argument.\footnote{328} I provide these premises here. The material in square brackets requires some (minimal) inference, but the rest is either an explicit quote or a strict paraphrase of an explicit quote.

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\footnote{328} There are also similarities in the second “continual living” step, which is an added complication I leave out.
## Arguments for the Continual Existence of the SOUL in imm. an. 1.1-5.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Disciplina always exists because it is unchangeable.</th>
<th>1. Ratio is unchangeable.</th>
<th>1. Art is unchangeable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Disciplina exists in the SOUL.</td>
<td>2. Ratio either (a) is (est) the SOUL itself or (b) exists (est) in the SOUL.</td>
<td>2. Art exists in the SOUL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Disciplina can only exist in [the SOUL.]

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. On 2(b) ratio exists inseparably in the SOUL as in a subject.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Art is nowhere else except the SOUL and it exists there inseparably.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nothing in which something always exist can fail to exist always.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Therefore, the SOUL [always exists.]*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is evident, every argument in one way or another at least minimally claims (1) X is unchangeable, (2) X exists in the SOUL, (3) X only exists in the SOUL (or exists there inseparably, including first conditional inseparability), and (4) if something unchangeable exists in the SOUL inseparably, then the SOUL always exists (or always remains). One should particularly note premise 3, which includes first conditional inseparability across the board. One should also note

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329 For this premise, Augustine explicitly says that disciplina can only exist in “something living” (in eo quod uiuit) (imm. an. 1.1.1(101), 1.1.11-12(101)), but the premise above (that he explicitly does state) and the context generally show that the premise he ultimately intends is that disciplina can only exist in “the SOUL,” even though he does not write it out explicitly.

330 Augustine does not write out this premise explicitly, but it is evidently intended. The validity of the argument clearly requires it and Augustine explicitly uses this language in 5.9.15-16(109) as if it were a summary of the argument in 2.2. As he says there, “For this reason, if the soul (anima) is a subject (subjectum), as we said above, in which ratio exists inseparably; and also if by that necessity according to which it was shown to be in the subject, the soul cannot be a soul except if it is living, nor can reason exist in it without life, and if ratio is immortal, then soul is immortal” (my emphasis). When he says “as we said above,” the only place where he reasonably could be taken to have said this is 2.2. Note that Augustine chooses to use the term anima rather than animus in this later passage. This does not seem to be significant because there is a benign explanation for it, given the previous sections (5.7-8).

*331 The starred phrases are all taken from explicit conclusions where Augustine’s argument has already explicitly included the second “continual life” step, i.e. saying that the SOUL “always lives” or “is immortal,” and so I infer the prior “continual existence” version in the square brackets. This inference should not be controversial.
that the minimally implied conclusion in every case is that the SOUL always exists, suggesting that the eternity of the SOUL is implied, not that it merely continually exists.

Although all four premises are remarkably similar across the three arguments, there clearly are some differences between them. The question is how significant they are. One difference that is not significant is Augustine’s use of the term “inseparability” for Ratio and art, but not for disciplina. The relevant premises for disciplina (3 and 4) reproduce the same idea, even if they do not use the word, and so it is merely a surface difference. There are two possibly significant differences, however. One is that in the arguments from disciplina and art, the text only says that they “exist in the SOUL,” and does not mention anything about existing there “as in a subject,” as it does for Ratio. As we saw earlier, this sort of relation (one existing in the other) also applies to the third and fourth ways, and so could mean that Augustine intended the argument (or parts of it) to apply to the third and fourth ways and not only to the first. The second possibly significant difference is that in the case of Ratio, Augustine entertains the possibility that SOUL is Ratio, which is something he does not entertain about disciplina and art.

The main question for now is whether these possible differences are significant enough to suggest that disciplina, Ratio, and art are not convertible. Another question is whether they are significant enough to show that paragraphs 1.1-5.9 are not focusing on the first way for other reasons.

In my view they are not on both counts. The first difference could be thought to suggest that paragraphs 1.1-5.9 are not focusing on the first way, but I do not think it does. This is because even if Augustine did leave out “as in a subject,” in order to state the argument more generally such that it (or parts of it) could apply to the third and fourth ways, the main focus is

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332 I say “minimally” because the conclusions that the SOUL “always exists” or “always remains” (which are synonymous) do not necessarily entail the conclusion that the SOUL is “unchangeable,” but the conclusion that it is “unchangeable” does entail that it “always exists” or “always remains.” So all of the conclusion at least entail these latter formulations.
still on the first way. The disciplina argument occurs at the very beginning of the work (in 1.1), and thus occurs right after the Soliloquies where Augustine clearly only spoke of disciplina existing in the SOUL as in a subject. As for the art argument, the section immediately following it brings up an objection to it that specifically speaks of art existing in the SOUL “as in a subject,” suggesting that this is what the art argument had been maintaining. And so Augustine either meant that the arguments from disciplina and art exclusively to apply to existing in the SOUL “as in a subject,” despite not explicitly stating it, or else he meant this to be the primary sense he is focusing on, as is all I am insisting, while being open to the other ways to some degree.

As for the second difference, it could be thought to suggest that disciplina, Ratio, and art are not convertible, but I see no reason to think that this is what it is supposed to mean either. It is true that unlike the others, Augustine considers the possibility that the SOUL is Ratio (2(a)), but just like them he also considers the possibility that Ratio “exists in the SOUL” (2(b)). Moreover, he asserts that Ratio is unchangeable, like disciplina and art, and he even defends Ratio’s unchangeability using examples suggesting that its content is the same as for disciplina. At 1.1.16-18, for example, he says that it belongs to some disciplina that “it cannot happen that a line proceeding through the center of a circle is not the largest of all lines not proceeding through the center,” (imm. an. 1.1.16-18), and at 2.2.3-5, he says that Ratio is unchangeable because “two and four is six” “always exists in the same condition” (semper eodem modo est). This suggests that all mathematical truths belong to Ratio and disciplina, and suggests more generally

333 imm. an. 5.7.1-9(108) “Let us now see to what extent a change (mutatio) of SOUL should be accepted. For if the SOUL is subject and art exists in the subject, [and if] the subject cannot change (immutari) and also that which is in the subject does not change, who are we to maintain that art and Ratio are unchangeable, if the SOUL is proven (conuincitur) to be changeable in which these things exist?” (Nunc quatenus accipienda sit animi mutatio, videamus. Si enim subiectum est animus arte in subiecto existente neque subiectum inmutari potest quin id, quod in subiecto est, inmutetur, qui possimus obtinere inmutabilem esse artem atque rationem, si mutabilis animus, in quo illa sunt, esse convincitur?).

334 imm. an. 1.1.16-18 “Et quisquis fatetur fieri non posse, ut ducta per medium circulum linea non sit omnium, quae non per medium ducuntur, maxima, idque esse alicuius disciplinae, inmutabilem disciplinam esse non negat.”
that all the truths of the liberal disciplines belong to them. And so if any difference is meant to be implied in the meanings of the terms, there still remains a close enough similarity between the arguments to suggest that *disciplina*, *Ratio*, and art refer to the same intelligible objects.

The similarity between arguments was the first reason to think that these terms refer to the same intelligible objects. The second and more controversial reason to think that they do is because the arguments in paragraphs 1.1-4.6 are structured so as to be making an *argument* that *disciplina* and *Ratio* are convertible on the grounds that they are both convertible with art. That is, Augustine is not merely assuming the convertibility of all of these terms (though of art and *disciplina* he is), he is arguing that they are. In order to show this, I want to complicate the matter further by suggesting that this argument is the second argument of a larger two-part argument in these paragraphs. The first argument, I admit, is less obvious, more controversial and not absolutely necessary for my contention here, but it is still relevant and is important later on. It is an argument to prove that human *ratio* is convertible with eternal *Ratio*. This is highly controversial, but is what must be going on in 2.2. The larger two part argument is as follows: (1) Prove that human *ratio* is convertible with eternal *Ratio*, (2) Prove that eternal *Ratio* is convertible with *disciplina* (whose meaning is continuous with its meaning in the *Soliloquies*). The conclusion then follows that human *ratio* is convertible with *disciplina*.

Let me now offer some evidence that this two part argument really is present in 1.1-4.6. The first part of the argument can be seen from evidence that suggests that the immortality argument in 2.2 begins not from eternal *Ratio* itself but from human *ratio*, and then argues that human *ratio* is equivalent to eternal *Ratio*. Let me cite the passage in its entirety so as to isolate the evidence for why this is so. I leave *ratio* lower case for the moment so as not to prejudice the question.

*ratio* certainly either is the SOUL or exists in the SOUL. Our *ratio*, at any rate, is better than our body. Our body is some substance, and it is better to be a
substance than nothing. Therefore, *ratio* is not nothing [but is something, i.e. *ratio* exists]. Again, whatever the harmony of the body is, it is necessarily inseparable from the body-subject, and nothing is in that harmony that is not also in the body-subject. The human body is changeable and *ratio* is unchangeable. For everything is changeable that is not always in the same measure (*modo*), and [*ratio*] is always in the same measure: 2 and 4 is 6. It is also always in the same measure that 4 has 2 and 2, but 4 does not have 2 [only]. Therefore 2 is not 4. But this *ratio* exists. Therefore, *ratio* exists as unchangeable (*inmutabilis igitur ratio est*). Now in no way can something not be changed that is inseparably (*inseparabiliter*) in a subject that has changed. Therefore, *SOUL* is not a harmony of the body. Death cannot happen to unchangeable things. Therefore, the human *SOUL* always lives, whether it is *ratio* itself, or whether *ratio* is in it inseparably.\(^ {335} \)

The argument is convoluted and confusing because it mixes several smaller arguments together in a short space. I reconstruct the argument below to help make more sense of it. Before providing the reconstruction, however, I mention the evidence for why my reconstruction takes Augustine’s first sentence that “*ratio* certainly either is the *SOUL* or exists in the *SOUL,*” to be about human *ratio*. The first and most obvious bit of evidence is that the second sentence explicitly speaks of “our *ratio,*” i.e. human *ratio*, which at least opens up the possibility that the same is true about the first sentence. The second bit of evidence is that Augustine does not provide an argument for the first sentence, but takes it as obvious, which is something he does not do in the immortality arguments from *disciplina* and art. In those arguments, he provides reasons to believe that they exist “in” the *SOUL* (e.g. they must exist “somewhere”), suggesting that this were not an obvious conclusion. Here, however, he treats the idea as if no reasonable person could deny it: “*ratio certainly* (*profecto*) either is the *SOUL* or exists in the *SOUL*” (my

\(^ {335} \) *imm. an. 2.2* “*Ratio profecto aut animus est aut in animo. Melior autem ratio nostra quam corpus nostrum, et corpus nostrum nonnulla substantia est et melius est esse substantia quam nihil. Non est igitur ratio nihil. Rursum, quaecumque harmonia corporis est, in subjecto corpore sit necesse est inseparabiliter, nec alium quicumque illa harmonia esse credatur, quod non aequo necessario sit in subjecto illo corpore, in quo ipsa harmonia non minus inseparabiliter. Mutabile est autem corpus humanum et inmutabilis ratio. Mutabile est enim omne, quod semper eodem modo non est. Et semper eodem modo est ‘duo et quattuor sex’. Item semper eodem modo est, quod ‘quattuor habent duo et duo; hoc autem non habent duo: duo igitur quattuor non sunt’. Est autem ista ratio; inmutabilis igitur ratio est. Nullo modo autem potest mutato subjecto id quod in eo est inseparabiliter, non mutari. Non est igitur harmonia corporis animus. Nec mors potest accidere inmutabilibus rebus. Semper ergo humanus animus vivit, sive ipse ratio sit sive in eo ratio inseparabiliter.”
emphasis). There is no other justification. To account for this lack of justification, especially given that he is speaking of human ratio in the next sentence, the phrase must mean that ratio is human ratio. Human ratio is the one ratio that no reasonable person could deny either “is the SOUL or exists in the SOUL.”

Taking this to be the case, here is my reconstruction of the argument. I add terms in square brackets that seem to be implied by the text and are necessary for validity, though they are not explicitly in the text as written. The curved brackets state Augustine’s explicit justifications for the relevant premise. The round brackets indicate the premises that (purportedly) lead to a given conclusion.

**Argument of imm. an. 2.2**

1. [Our] ratio either (a) is [our] SOUL or (b) exists in [our] SOUL [inseparably as in a subject].
2. Our ratio exists. \( \textit{a fortiori} \), since it is better than our body, which exists
3. [Our] ratio exists as unchangeable. \( \textit{a fortiori} \), since it is better than our body, which exists
4. Therefore, in case (a), [our] SOUL exists as unchangeable. (1(a), 3)
5. Something existing as unchangeable cannot exist inseparably (inseparabiliter) in a subject that changes.
6. Therefore, in case (b), [our] SOUL also exists as unchangeable. (1(b), 3, 5)
7. Death cannot happen to unchangeable things.
8. Therefore, whether (a) or (b) is the case, the human SOUL [i.e. our SOUL] always lives. (4, 6, 7)
9. A harmony of the body inseparably exists in something changeable, namely, the body-subject.
10. Therefore, whether (a) or (b) is the case, [our] SOUL is not a harmony of the body. (4, 5, 6, 9)

The most important claims for our purposes are lines 1-6, since these are the ones arguing that the SOUL always exists. I have already explained why I take the first line to begin with human ratio, so the next thing to note is where Augustine argues that this is equivalent with unchangeable Ratio. This is the implication of the argument behind line 3. The inference that

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336 I included the “inseparably as in a subject” claim as a separate premise in my earlier reconstruction. Here I add it to the first premise simply to make things less complicated. The addition is justified by the claim in line 5, which must be assuming the addition for the argument to be valid.
“our ratio” exists as unchangeable because the ratio 2 and 4 is 6 is unchangeable depends on the premise that “our ratio” is identical to the ratio that “2 and 4 is 6” and presumably therefore is identical to all unchangeable and eternal rationes. The implied premise, of course, is highly contentious. As stated, at least, Augustine seems to infer it from the fact that both our ratio and unchangeable rationes have the same name (ratio), which is hardly a solid basis for an inference. However Augustine infers it, the upshot (given this reconstruction) is relatively clear. Augustine is arguing that human ratio is identical to the collection of unchangeable rationes, i.e. it is identical to what I have been calling Ratio. Otherwise, the unchangeability of SOUL would not follow.

We can now move to evidence for the second part of Augustine’s argument, which is about proving that (eternal) Ratio is convertible with disciplina. This argument is evident from three observations. The first observation is that the work as a whole begins with two very similar but slightly different arguments for immortality, one from disciplina in 1.1 and one using eternal Ratio in 2.2. This raises the question about the convertibility of disciplina and Ratio, a question that one could already suspect is consciously intended. Augustine can assume that we know what he means by disciplina, since he has discussed it at length in the Soliloquies, but he knows that we do not know what he means by Ratio and his similar but slightly different treatment of it in 2.2 does not quite allow us to conclude that the two are convertible. The second observation is that after a digression in 3.3-4, Augustine’s argument for immortality from art in 4.5 involves arguing that art is convertible with Ratio, though not necessarily identical in meaning. In this section, he says, “even though art is said to be one of many, as though it were a certain union (coetus) of rationes, nevertheless art can also be most truly said and understood to be one ratio

337 The digression defends the possibility that the SOUL is unchangeable, something entailed by the argument in 2.2.
That is, although art and ratio have different meanings (since art can only refer to a collection of rationes and ratio can refer to each individual ratio itself), ratio can also have the same collective sense as art, i.e. what I designate Ratio. This is an argument for the convertibility of art and Ratio, if merely a linguistic one. The third observation is that in the continuation of the art argument in 4.6, Augustine calls “liberal arts” what he elsewhere terms the “liberal disciplinae,” indicating that disciplina and art are convertible. Augustine may not have intended this particular statement as the final premise of his argument, but it does show that Augustine thought the convertibility of disciplina and art was obvious. Thus, we have the premises necessary to infer the conclusion to the question: disciplina and Ratio are convertible.

Here again are the steps: (1) raise the question of the convertibility of disciplina and Ratio; (2) argue that art is convertible with Ratio; (3) assume that disciplina is convertible with art (which doesn’t need an argument because it is obvious); (4) allow the reader to draw the conclusion that disciplina is convertible with Ratio. If this is correct, it shows that Augustine is not only expressing that disciplina and Ratio (as well as art) are convertible, but also that he is arguing that they are convertible. Hence my second reason in defence of convertibility: the arguments in paragraphs 1.1-4.6 are structured so as to be making an argument that disciplina and Ratio are convertible on the grounds that they are both convertible with art.

There is a puzzle about this Ratio argument that could cause problems for readers but should not. The argument seems to maintain that the soul is unchangeable, and the puzzle is

\(^{338}\) *imm. an. 4.5.13-15(106) “Quamvis enim ars una multarum quasi quidam coetus rationum esse dicatur, tamen ars etiam una ratio dici verissime atque intellegi potest.”

\(^{339}\) *artes liberales*, in *imm. an.* 4.6.17(107).

\(^{340}\) *disciplinae liberales*, e.g. in *sol.* 2.20.35.

\(^{341}\) See also *ord.* 2.16.44, where Augustine speaks of following the “order of the disciplines” (disciplinarum ordinem) and in the next sentence calls those same disciplines “all of those liberal arts” (artes illae omnes liberales). Augustine also treats ars and disciplina as convertible in *uera rel.* 30.54.2-8 and defines ars as follows: “Now we must ask what is the nature of art itself. By art here, I do not want you to understand something that is observed by experiencing but something that is tracked down by reasoning.” (....ipsius artis natura quaerenda est. Neque nunc artem intellegi uolo, quae notatur experiencing, sed quae rationcinando indagatur.)
how Augustine could think that this is possible given that he admits that the soul changes between foolishness and wisdom and in many other ways. It is such a strange claim and something Augustine so clearly rejects in later writings that one might be tempted to conclude that he does not intend it after all. Drawing this conclusion, however, would be a mistake. Augustine is aware of the puzzle\textsuperscript{342} and explicitly defends his unchangeability conclusion in \textit{imm. an.} 5.7-8 at the end of his argument on the first way. His defence is that he is only arguing that the soul is unchangeable in substance, not unchangeable in “affections” (passiones). The change between foolishness and wisdom is only a change of affection, and so are changes in emotions. It is true that Augustine also maintains here that even if these things imply that the soul is changeable in substance, it can still be immortal, as he argues on the fourth way. But this is not his argument on the first and second ways nor, as we will see, on the third way either.

We have now seen two reasons for the convertibility of disciplina, Ratio, and art as they appear in 1.1-4.6. The first is that the arguments in which they appear are all remarkably similar. The second is that Augustine has laid out the arguments so as to argue for their convertibility, particularly for the convertibility of disciplina and Ratio. In Chapter 6, I further defend the controversial point about whether Augustine really intended to identify Ratio and human ratio, but the rest I take to be fairly clear from the text and as independent of that controversial point. We may also now answer our objection to the ubiquity of Augustine’s argumentative strategy. The differing terminology in 1.1-5.9 does not prevent us from concluding that these sections focus on the first way where Ratio exists in the soul as in a subject. Disciplina, Ratio, and art

\textsuperscript{342} \textit{imm. an.} 5.7.3-9(108) “For if the soul is a subject and art exists in the subject, [and if] the subject cannot change (immutari) and also that which is in the subject does not change, who are we to maintain that art and Ratio are unchangeable, if the soul is proven to be changeable in which these things exist? Now what change is thought to be greater than the change from one contrary to another? But who denies that the soul is sometimes foolish (stultum) and sometimes wise (sapientem), not to mention other things?” (\textit{Si enim subiectum est animus arte in subiecto existente neque subiectum inmutari potest quin id, quod in subiecto est, inmutetur, qui possumus obtinere inmutabilem esse ariem atque rationem, si mutabilis animus, in quo illa sunt, esse convincitur? Quae autem maior quam in contraria solet esse mutatio? et quis negat animum, ut omittam cetera, stultum alias, alias vero esse sapientem?}).
are simply different terms referring to the same reality.

4.2 The Convertibility of Ratio, Eternal Intelligible Things, and Truth in 7.12-16.25

I now turn to the question of the convertibility of Ratio, eternal intelligible things, and Truth, which are key terms that are used for the eternal things to which the SOUL is conjoined in 7.12-16.25. This question can be answered sufficiently by showing that Ratio and Truth are convertible. I have already shown good evidence that Ratio is convertible with all eternal intelligible things in 6.10.17-2(110-111) and 10.17.8-14(119), and the only thing preventing us from drawing the conclusion is the uncertainty of whether this includes the eternal intelligible thing that is veritas, Truth. Further, what prevents us from concluding that Truth is convertible with all eternal intelligible things is that Truth only seems to refer to one of these things and does not refer to the rest of the collection to which Ratio refers. Thus, if Truth and Ratio are convertible with each other, then they are both also convertible with all eternal intelligible things (with the possible exception of SOUL if SOUL turns out to be eternal). I break this question down into two: 1) Is Ratio supposed to include Truth? 2) Is Truth supposed to include Ratio?

Augustine’s answers to these questions seem to be yes, and I offer two passages here to support these affirmations.

The first passage supports both affirmations. It arises right after Augustine’s initial arguments in 6.11 that SOUL cannot be separated from Ratio on the third and fourth ways.

But in fact the very turning away (auersio) from Ratio, through which foolishness comes to the SOUL, cannot happen without a defect (defectus) of [SOUL]. For if [SOUL] exists more when it is turned toward (conuersus) Ratio and clings to it, since it clings to an unchangeable thing that is Truth (veritas), which exists maximally and originally, then when it is turned away (auersus) from it, it has less of ‘being’ itself (idipsum esse), which is to become defective (deficere).

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343 *imm. an.* 11.18.7-17(120) and 12.19.4-6(121).
344 *imm. an.* 7.12.1-6(113) “At enim aversio ipsa a ratione, per quam stultitia contiguit animo, sine defectu eius fieri non potest. Si enim magis est ad rationem conversus eique inhaerens, ideo quod inhaeret incommutabili rei, quae est veritas, quae et maxime et primitus est, cum ab ea est aversus, id
Chapter 3 – On the Immortality of the Soul and Its Argumentative Strategy –159

The passage is leading up to an objection that Augustine will reject, but he always accepts the material here, as I explained in Chapter 2. The relevant claim for our purposes is Augustine’s contention that the SOUL “exists more when it is turned toward Ratio and clings to it, since it clings to an unchangeable thing that is Truth, which exists maximally and originally...” This claim, first, shows that Ratio is supposed to include Truth because when one is clinging to Ratio, then one is clinging “to an unchangeable thing that is Truth.” Yet it also shows that Truth is supposed to include Ratio. The text does not qualify the claim to suggest that Truth is only one of the things clung to when SOUL clings to Ratio, it straightforwardly states it as though they are completely convertible. Clinging to Ratio is clinging to Truth and vice versa.

The second passage specifically supports the second and more controversial affirmation. It arises near the end of the work in the context of the fourth way. Augustine is defending the claim that the body can only get its form of existing (species existendi) by means of soul (anima).

But the body would also take [its form] as closely [as soul] if it did not take it by means of soul. For with nothing between the two (nullo interposito), it would also surely take [its form] as closely [as soul]. Nor can anything be discovered that is between the highest unchangeable life, which is wisdom and Truth (sapientia et veritas), and that which is given life last, i.e. body, except life-giving soul.

This passage, together with the context, indicates that there is a three-tiered hierarchy of being comprised of (1) wisdom and Truth, (2) anima, and (3) body, and that the higher provides the form of existing (species existendi) to the lower. Knowing that the hierarchy must have space

\[ \text{ipsum esse minus habet, quod est deficere.} \]

It is the objection that the SOUL could cease to exist, and thus fail to be immortal, because it could completely turn away from Ratio and thus lose all being.

Although he expresses it as an hypothetical, Augustine clearly intends it as an assertion because it is the justification for his claim in his first sentence. This is typical Augustinian rhetorical strategy.

imm. an. 15.24.13-18(126) “Tam propinque autem etiam corpus sumeret, si non per animam sumeret. Etenim nullo interposito tam propinque utique sumeret. Nec inventur aliquid, quod sit inter summam vitam, quae sapientia et veritas est, incommutabilis, et id, quod ultimum vivicatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima.”
for irrational *anima*, *animus*, and *Ratio*, we can ask the question of where these fit in. The answers must be that irrational *anima* and *animus* fit into the level of *anima* and *Ratio* fits into the level of wisdom and Truth. We know that *anima* can be a general term that includes both irrational *anima* and *animus*, after all, and we find this confirmed a few lines later when Augustine explicitly distinguishes between irrational and rational *animae* so as to suggest that they were both contained in this second level. As for *Ratio* fitting with wisdom and Truth, the context shows that we are talking about the fourth way where *Ratio* is a distinct substance from SOUL, being neither the SOUL itself nor in the SOUL as in a subject, and so it cannot fit on the level of *anima*. Nor can it fit between *anima* and wisdom and Truth because there is nothing “between... wisdom and Truth... and body, except life-giving soul.” The only place left for it, then, is with wisdom and Truth. This becomes even clearer because Augustine implies only a little earlier in the passage that *anima* receives its form from the “eternal rationes,” which we know would have to exist at a higher level than *anima*. Since we also know that wisdom is another name for Truth and that *Ratio* is a term for the collection of eternal rationes, then we can say even more simply that Truth is supposed to include *Ratio*, which is nothing other than to affirm the second affirmation.

These passages, therefore, offer good evidence for both affirmations and thus strongly suggest that *Ratio* and Truth are convertible. A puzzling objection remains, however, to the second and more controversial affirmation. If Truth includes *all* of *Ratio*, then Truth also includes *all* of *disciplina*, and yet, as we observed in the *Soliloquies*, Truth technically only refers to the one highest *disciplina*, the *disciplina* of dialectic, not to all of the *disciplinae*. To put it another way, Truth technically only refers to the one highest eternal intelligible thing, not to all

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348 *imm. an.* 16.25.4-7(127)
349 *imm. an.* 15.24.13-16(125)
350 *beata u.* 4.34.
of them, in which case it would seem that Truth is not supposed to include all of *Ratio* as the above passages suggest. Have I therefore made a mistake in my interpretation? Has Augustine made a mistake? Or is it possible that Augustine intended to hold that Truth both includes *Ratio* and also does not, all at the same time?

The evidence suggests that the third option is the case. Such a reconciliation is already suggested in the *Soliloquies* where Augustine both affirms that *disciplina* is Truth, as if they are convertible, and that Truth is only the *disciplina* of dialectic, as if they are not. However, one can find an even more profound reason to think that they were intended to be reconcilable in this paradoxical way. To understand this, it is important first to recognize that just the pre-baptismal Augustine thinks that Truth is a name for the Son of God, so also he seems to think that *Ratio* is a name for the Holy Spirit. This is evidence from several pre-baptismal passages, but it is most evident from combining two passages in *On Order*. In the first passage, *ord*. 2.5.16, Augustine explicitly and respectively speaks of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as “principle without principle,” “intellect,” and “what emanated from there without any generation for our salvation.” In the second, *ord*. 2.9.26, Augustine does not mention Father, Son, and Holy Spirit explicitly, but he speaks of learning “what besides all things is the principle of all things (*uniuersorum principium*),” “what intellect is,” and “what *ratio* itself is.” Since Father (“principle without principle) and Son (“intellect”) from the first passage neatly correspond to “principle of all

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351 See, for example, *Acad*. 3.19.42.12-16 (King trans., slightly modified) “Yet the most subtle *ratio* would never call back to this intelligible world souls that have been blinded by the manifold shadows of error and rendered forgetful by the deepest filth from the body, had not God the Highest, moved by a certain compassion for the multitude, humbled and submitted the authority of the Divine Intellect even to the human body itself” ([*Non enim est ista huius mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed alterius intellegibilis,] cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas et altissimis a corpore sodibus oblitias numquam ista ratio subtilissima reuocaret, nisi summus deus populari quadam clementia diuini intellectus auctoritatatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque summitteret...). *Summus deus* and *diuinus intellectus* here seem to refer to the Father and the Son, and the *ratio subtilissima* is the best candidate for the Holy Spirit. For confirmation that the Holy Spirit takes the role of “calling back” (*reuocare*) souls, as *ratio* does here, see *beata u*. 4.34, where the Holy Spirit is an *admonitio* that helps us “to recollect God” (*ut deum recordemur*).
things” and “intellect” from the second, Augustine seems to be telling us that the Holy Spirit (“what emanates...”) from the first passage corresponds to ratio itself (i.e. Ratio) in the second passage.

Du Roy and O’Connell have noticed this and, despite having been extensively criticized, have offered it together with other convincing reasons that ratio is indeed a name for the Holy Spirit in the pre-baptismal writings. This points toward a profound (if philosophically unsatisfactory) reconciliation at which Augustine is aiming. Since Ratio is the Holy Spirit and Truth is the Son of God, Augustine seems to be saying that the paradoxical relation between Ratio and Truth is supposed to be analogous to the paradoxical relation between the Holy Spirit and the Son of God. The analogy is not perfect because Ratio and Truth can be predicated of each other and the Holy Spirit and Son of God cannot, but the similarities are highly suggestive. The Holy Spirit and the Son of God do not refer to the same things and yet both are one God, similarly to how Ratio and Truth do not refer to the same things (Ratio refers to all rationes and Truth strictly only refers to the ratio of dialectic) and yet do refer to the same things (Truth also refers to all rationes, just as Ratio does). Put in another way, Augustine seems to think that the relation between Ratio and Truth articulated in the Soliloquies Project is supposed to be the philosophical content of the theological claim about the relation between the Holy Spirit and the Son of God. The fact that the relations are not perfectly analogous does not discount this interpretation because, as we have seen and will see, the early Augustine was capable of stretching the terms of the Catholic rule of faith farther than he will in later years.

But then where would God the Father fit? This is a difficult question given that Augustine suggests that the Truth, and therefore the Son of God, is the highest intelligible thing.

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352 Du Roy, L’intelligence (1966), 125-6; O’Connell, Early Theory (1968), 123-4, 198. Cf. Gerber, Spirit (2012), 62-90, who is the most recent scholar to attack this view at length, contending that when Augustine intends ratio in a divine sense, he means God the Son.
which would seem to leave no room for the Father. *On Order*, however, offers an answer to this question too. It suggests that God the Father is even “higher” than the Son of God, though still equal with Him, because the Father is beyond intelligibility like Plotinus’ One. At the close of his description of the proper order of study in *On Order*, Augustine says, “This is the order of the studies of wisdom through which one becomes fit to understand the order of things, i.e., to distinguish two worlds (*duos mundos*) and the very parent of the whole (*parentem universitatis*), of Whom there is no knowledge (*scientia*) in the soul, save to know (*scire*) how it knows Him not (*nesciat*).” The sentence is about the metaphysical structure of all reality. The two worlds refer to the sensible and intelligible worlds, and the “parent of the whole” is above even the intelligible world because it is not knowable, i.e. not intelligible. So who is this parent? The parent would have to be God the Father alone. It cannot be God the Son because the Son is an intelligible being and so has to belong to the intelligible world. Nor can it be the Holy Spirit for the same reason, especially if the Holy Spirit is *Ratio*. And so the Father is the only plausible “person” left. Thus, God the Father fits perfectly into the interpretation that the Son is Truth and the Holy Spirit is *Ratio*.

Whatever Augustine precisely had in mind on these difficult and controversial questions, we are now able to complete the argument of this section by drawing our conclusion. *Ratio* and Truth are very likely convertible with each other and with all eternal intelligible things (with the possible exception of SOUL, if SOUL is eternal), regardless of their precise Trinitarian applications. I had said that if I showed the convertibility of the first two, then this would show the convertibility of all three. This distinction of terms, therefore, does not prevent us from taking paragraphs 7.12-16.25 as focusing on the third and fourth ways. Whether Augustine is

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353 ord. 2.18.47.16-20 (Foley trans.) “Hic est ordo studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit quisque idoneus ad intellegendum ordinem rerum, id est ad dinoscendos duos mundos et ipsum parentem universitatis, cuius nulla scientia est in anima nisi scire, quomodo eum nesciat.”
talking about the soul as a distinct substance that is conjoined to Truth, Ratio, or eternal intelligible things, the conjunction can always be interpreted as a conjunction to Ratio. We have also observed that there is a puzzle about how Truth can be restricted to the one highest intelligible thing and can also refer to all always existing intelligible things. I have suggested that Truth and Ratio refer to the Son of God and the Holy Spirit respectively and so are convertible and yet distinct similarly to how the persons of the Trinity are supposed to be one God and yet distinct.

Now that I have brought God into the discussion, it is time to acknowledge some more controversial implications of these convertibilities for the soul and its relation to God. Whether Ratio is the Holy Spirit or the Son of God or a general name for God, the fact that Ratio is convertible with Truth suggests that Ratio is God in some sense. This has the controversial implication that on the first two ways where the soul and Ratio are not distinct substances, Augustine is saying that the soul is consubstantial with God. On the second way where the soul is in Ratio, God appears to be the common substance, and on the first way where Ratio is in the soul, the soul appears to be the common substance, and so in both cases they would have the same, common substance. The first way seems to entertain an even more controversial sort of consubstantiality when it entertains the possibility that the soul is Ratio. In this case, the soul and God appear to be consubstantial in the sense that they both are the identical substance. These implications are controversial, and especially the last one, because Augustine so clearly says that the soul is created and not consubstantial with God in his post-baptismal writings, as I discuss in Chapter 6. These are not the post-baptismal writings, however, but the pre-baptismal writings. I will take up the question of the relation between God and the soul in the pre-baptismal writings more comprehensively in Chapter 6, but I think it is important to acknowledge here that there is some evidence against consubstantiality internal to the Soliloquies Project itself. As I will argue
in Chapter 6, I think the evidence is not enough to overturn the implications of a consubstantial soul in these works, but I admit that the evidence against consubstantiality has some strength and so at least invites some caution.

I state the three most difficult pieces of evidence here. First, in *imm. an.* 13.22, Augustine states that “everyone agrees” that God is “better” (*melius*) than the rational soul (*rationalis anima*). This is an objection because it seems that consubstantiality implies equality, and the passage seems to rule out the possibility that the soul could be equal to God. Second, in *Soliloquies* 1.1.4, Augustine tells us that the triune God is “one eternal true substance” (*una aeterna uera substantia*). This suggests that the soul could not be consubstantial with God both because there is no mention of the soul as part of the one eternal true substance and because adding the soul would seem to make God “Quadritarian” instead of Trinitarian. Third and finally, in *imm. an.* 6.10 Augustine says, “About [Ratio as the true thing (*uerum*) contemplated], it is a great question, whether that true thing (*uerum*), which the soul gazes at without the instrument of the body, exists by means of itself (*per seipsum*) and does not exist in the soul, or whether it can exist without the soul.”

This presents a problem for consubstantiality because it raises questions about the convertibility of Ratio and God. If they are convertible, then this passage would be entertaining the possibility that God could not “exist by means of himself,” and so would be dependent on soul for his existence, which is something that it does not seem even the pre-baptismal Augustine would accept.

I leave the debate at that for now and simply stick with the terminology that Augustine explicitly uses in the next two chapters. None of what I say in these chapters is meant unreasonably to skew the debate about the soul’s consubstantiality with God in one direction or the other. Dealing with the three pieces of evidence against it can wait for Chapter 6. Aside from

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imm. an. 6.10.12-16(110) “De tertio magna quaestio est, utrum verum illud quod sine instrumento corporis animus intuetur, sit per seipsum et non sit in animo aut possitne esse sine animo.”
this problem, there is still good reason to believe that for the Augustine of *On the Immortality of the Soul, Ratio* is convertible with *disciplina*, art, eternal intelligible things, and Truth.

Having gone through these features of the argumentative strategy in detail, we can now conclude more confidently that the work as a whole is structured around the strategy’s four ways. Above I outlined the literary structure of the work in a preliminary way and here I offer an outline that is more detailed. It indicates that the text focuses on the four ways roughly one after the other, with slight exceptions for ways three and four.

*Outline of the Literary Structure of On the Immortality of the Soul*

A. 1.1-5.9 Focus on arguing for immortality on the first way.

B. 6.10-6.11.6(111) Articulate the overall argumentative strategy
   6.11.6-9(111) Explicitly summarize the argument on the first way.
   6.11.9-12(111) Explicitly summarize the argument on the second way.
   6.11.12(111)-6.11.22(112) Explicitly introduce and begin the argument on the third and fourth ways together.

C. 7.12-11.18.12(120) Focus on arguing for immortality on the third and fourth ways together (with a brief anticipation of the third way alone in 8.15)
   11.18.12-14(120) Explicitly argue for immortality on the third way alone.
   11.18.14(120)-16.25 Focus on arguing for immortality on the fourth way alone.

The material in this chapter has justified much of this structure. In particular, it is sufficiently evident for our purposes that the work can be divided into three sections, where 1.1-5.9 focus on the first way (section A), where 6.10-11 articulate the argumentative strategy as well as summaries of the arguments on all of the ways (section B), and where 7.12-16.25 focus on the third and fourth ways in some fashion (section C). I provided the least evidence for the structure of section C. I also have not sufficiently explained the arguments for immortality on the third and fourth ways. A discussion of these omissions to some degree or other can be found in the next chapter.
Conclusion

I now draw the conclusion of the chapter, if with some hesitation due to outstanding issues. Augustine is operating with a relatively coherent agenda throughout On the Immortality of the Soul. His subject matter is clear and he has a unified argumentative strategy for dealing with the subject matter that extends throughout the work from beginning to end. The essence of that strategy is to argue from the SOUL’s ability to learn eternal intelligible things, or Ratio, to the conclusion that the SOUL is conjoined to Ratio such that it continually exists and lives. The continual existence step in particular is the focus of the argument, since it is the most controversial point. We also saw some of the key features of the strategy. First, we saw that it entertains four possible ways in which SOUL can be conjoined to Ratio and it argues that no matter which is the case, the SOUL will continually exist because it can never be separated from Ratio. This showed in particular that Augustine’s argument for continual existence depends on the claim of inseparability. Second, we saw that the conjunction to Ratio is a connection to Ratio that is prior to the connection that results from learning. This showed in particular how Augustine’s argument can consistently claim that the SOUL is inseparably conjoined to Ratio even when the SOUL is foolish and therefore “turned away” from it. Third, we saw that Ratio is convertible with disciplina, art, eternal intelligible things, and Truth. In addition to telling us more about various immortality arguments, this showed that even when Augustine speaks of a conjunction to one of these other things, it is still a conjunction to Ratio, and thus is continuous with the argumentative strategy as outlined.

There are several outstanding issues. I have not yet shown that all four ways entail Platonic recollection of slightly different sorts nor have I confirmed that the conjunctions on these ways, especially on ways 3 and 4, are biconditionally inseparable. I also have not fully dealt with the question about the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God. This latter issue will wait
for Chapter 6 when I open the discussion to wider works. I deal with the former issues in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 – How the Argumentative Strategy of *On the Immortality of the Soul* Entails Platonic Recollection

**Introduction**

It is now time to show that all four ways entail Platonic recollection views of slightly different sorts. I do this in two stages. First, I argue that all four ways entail Platonic recollection in general, i.e. that innate knowledge and the preexistence requirement are implied by the content of each way. Second, I explain the kind of Platonic recollection suggested by each way. Among other things, I argue that the first three ways entail a strict “eternal, constitutive Forms” version of Platonic recollection and that the fourth way entails a weaker version of this view where the SOUL is created and not eternal. Having done these things, I end the chapter by defending two further claims. I first contend that Platonic recollection reasoning is important and to a degree essential to the arguments of all four ways and thus to *On the Immortality of the Soul* as a whole. Second, I contend that Augustine not only entertains but also accepts Platonic recollection in general and First-Way Platonic Recollection in particular in the *Soliloquies* Project. In all of these matters for the time being, I rely only on the material in *On the Immortality of the Soul* and the *Soliloquies* as much as possible.

Beginning with the first stage, I show that the four ways are Platonic recollection views in general using roughly the same steps as in the *Soliloquies*. In that work, we first saw that the fact that *disciplina* existed in the SOUL as in a subject entailed knowledge of *disciplina*. Second, we saw that this relation was characterized by first conditional inseparability and that this entailed the preexistence of the SOUL and the innateness of its knowledge (as well as a *de facto* second conditional inseparability). Third, we saw that *Soliloquies* 2.20.35 gave evidence of the need for a prior conscious experience of the objects of knowledge, which suggested the presence of the preexistence requirement.
For the four ways in *On the Immortality of the Soul*, which are expressed in terms of *Ratio* rather than *disciplina*, there is evidence for these same steps. First, there is good evidence that suggests that the “conjunction” (*coniunctio*) between *SOUL* and *Ratio*, whatever its precise nature otherwise, is a conjunction of knowledge. Second, there is good evidence that on all four ways (and with a slight qualification for the fourth), the conjunction between *Ratio* and the *SOUL* is supposed to possess the equivalent of first conditional inseparability (i.e. the contentious version of inseparability), which gives us preexistence and innate knowledge. Third, there is evidence that the innate knowledge requires a prior conscious experience of that knowledge and so requires the preexistence. These are the steps that I defend in the first three parts of this chapter. Since the second step is the longest and most controversial step and since it provides crucial insights into the third and fourth ways, I begin there. After dealing with this step, I turn back to the first step and then move to the third.

1. The Four Ways and Platonic Recollection in General: The *SOUL’s* Conjunction to *Ratio* and the Contentious Kind of Inseparability

In saying that the conjunction between *Ratio* and the *SOUL* is supposed to possess the equivalent of first conditional inseparability on all four ways, I mean that for every way (with qualifications for the fourth way), Augustine means to argue that if *Ratio* (or *disciplina*, art, *et al.*) exists, then each individual *SOUL* is conjoined to it. Put otherwise, he is saying that *Ratio* (*et al.*) can only exist if conjoined to each individual *SOUL*. This is not technically first conditional inseparability in every case, however, which is why I add the qualification “equivalent of.” It is first conditional inseparability on the first way and on the versions of the third and fourth ways where *Ratio* exists in the *SOUL*, but it is technically second conditional inseparability for the second way and for the versions of the third and fourth ways where the *SOUL* exists in *Ratio*. Whether it is first or second, however, does not matter much. What matters is whether it is the
contentious kind of inseparability where *Ratio* can only exist being conjoined to the *SOUL*. If I can show that Augustine intends this contentious kind of inseparability for all ways, then preexistence follows for all ways. A *de facto* version of the converse, less-contentious kind of inseparability also follows, which will suggest that innate knowledge applies to all ways once I show that the conjunction is a conjunction of knowledge in the second part. In order to obviate confusion from now on, I will officially call this “the contentious kind of inseparability” or the “contentious conditional,” whether or not it ends up being first or second conditional inseparability. The converse I will call “the less-contentious kind of inseparability” or the “less-contentious conditional.”

*The Contentious Kind of Inseparability (Contentious Conditional):* If *Ratio* (or disciplina, art, the eternal intelligibles, or Truth) exist(s), then it is (they are) conjoined to each individual *SOUL*.

*The Less-Contentious Kind of Inseparability (Less-Contentious Conditional):* If any individual *SOUL* exists, then it is conjoined to *Ratio* (or disciplina, et al.).

The contentious kind of inseparability is contentious not only because it entails the preexistence of each individual *SOUL*, of course. It is contentious because it means that the *SOUL* will have to exist just as long as *Ratio* exists, i.e. eternally, and may even mean that God can only exist if conjoined to the *SOUL*. Let us now consider each of the four ways to determine if Augustine really intends to express this contentious kind of inseparability for each individual *SOUL*.

### 1.1 The Contentious Kind of Inseparability and the First Way

We already have seen that Augustine almost certainly intends the contentious kind of inseparability to apply to the first way. The previous chapter provided two reasons to think so. First, the validity of the three versions of the immortality argument on the first way require it. Whether arguing from *disciplina, Ratio*, or art, Augustine concludes that the *SOUL* “always exists” or “is unchangeable” or “always remains” or “is just as immortal as *Ratio*,” all of which
could only follow if the contentious conditional holds. Augustine also must think it applies to each individual SOUL on the argument, because otherwise the future immortality of each individual SOUL would not follow. Second, Augustine more or less explicitly asserts the contentious conditional in two of the versions of the argument. We saw this in the third premise of my reconstruction. In one version, the third premise was, “disciplina can only exist in [the SOUL],” and in another, it was, “art is nowhere else except the SOUL and it exists there inseparably.” Since in both cases, these things can only exist in the SOUL, it means they are always conjoined to the SOUL for as long as they exist, just as the contentious conditional says. To complete the picture, I now add a third reason in case any doubt remains. It is that Augustine explicitly provides arguments defending the contentious conditional. We found such arguments in the Soliloquies, in addition to the other two reasons, and so it should not be surprising to find them here too. In what follows next, I consider the clearest and most comprehensive argument.

The clearest and longest argument for the contentious conditional arises in the immortality argument from art. At one point in the discussion, Augustine goes out of his way to assert that the SOUL and art are inseparable in a way that clearly includes both conditionals, especially the contentious one, and then he offers the argument to defend the inseparability. Here is the relevant passage.

Now it is clear that art is not only in the SOUL of the artisan, but is also nowhere else except in the SOUL, and it is there inseparably (inseparabiliter). For if art will be separated from the SOUL, then either [1.] it will be somewhere else besides in the SOUL, or [2.] it will be nowhere, or [3.] it will transfer from SOUL to SOUL continuously. [Not 1. :] But as there is no seat that belongs to art without life, so neither is there life with a ratio unless it belongs to some soul (ulli animae). [Not 2. :] Further, that which exists cannot be nowhere, or that which is immutable cannot fail to exist at some time. [Not 3. :] But if art transfers from SOUL to SOUL, going to stay in that one, deserting this one, then no one teaches art except by losing it, or someone does not become educated (peritus) except by the forgetfulness or death of the one teaching him. If these things are completely absurd and false, as they are, then the human SOUL is immortal.\footnote{imm. an. 4.5.16-26(106) “Artem autem non solum esse in animo artificis, sed etiam nusquam esse nisi}
The first sentence is the one that explicitly asserts both conditionals. It not only expresses that art exists in the **SOUL** of the artisan “inseparably,” which we could think only includes the less-contentious conditional, but it also tells us that art is “nowhere else except in the **SOUL**,” which shows that the contentious one is included as well. The rest of the passage provides the argument for why both conditionals hold. The strategy is, first, to argue that there are only three possible options for denying biconditional inseparability, and second, to rule out each of them as genuine possibilities.

My concern here is only to explain how the argument is supposed to prove the contentious conditional, and so our question is: Why is it that art can only exist within the **SOUL** and nowhere else? Augustine’s claim is that the skeptic will have to assert either that [1.] art will exist nowhere (nusquam) or that [2.] it will exist somewhere else besides in the **SOUL** (praeter quam in animo) or [3.] that art transfers from **SOUL** to **SOUL**, going into one and deserting the other. These are the only options available, according to Augustine. His response then denies that any of these is genuinely possible. Clearly art cannot exist nowhere, he responds, which is a reference to his reasoning in the *Soliloquies*. Whatever exists has to exist “somewhere” (alicubi), he said there, and so conversely that which exists cannot exist “nowhere,” (nusquam). Thus, the first option is out. The second option is out, too, he says, because “as there is no seat that belongs to art without life, so neither is there life with a **ratio** unless it belongs to some soul (ulli animae).” This is a particularly obscure response, but whatever it means precisely, it is clear that

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*in animo manifestum est, idque inseparabiliter. Nam si ars ab animo separabitur, aut erit praeter quam in animo aut nusquam erit aut de animo in animum continuo transibit. At ut sedes arti nulla sine vita est, ita nec vita cum ratione ulli nisi animae. Nusquam porro esse, quod est, vel, quod inmutabile est, non esse aliquando qui potest? Si vero ars de animo in animum transit, in illo mansura, deserens istum, nemo artem docet nisi amittendo aut etiam non nisi docentis oblivione fit aliquis peritus sive morte. Quae si absurdissima et falsissima sunt, sicuti sunt, inmortalis est animus humanus.*
from these two responses, it is supposed to follow that art has to exist in some soul.\textsuperscript{356} It does not yet follow, however, that art has to exist in each individual soul, since art “could transfer from soul to soul,” and so Augustine also has to rule out the third option. It is interesting that this third option is effectively the same possibility that ruled out the immortality of individual sensible animae on the first immortality argument in the Soliloquies. The argument there was that the universe could not exist unless it was sensed by anima, and Augustine pointed out that the job of sensing the universe could simply transfer from anima to anima, not requiring immortality for any individual anima. Here, in the case of rational animae, however, Augustine has a response, one that we have not yet seen. The only way that art could transfer “from soul to soul, going to stay in that one, deserting this one” is if “no one teaches art except by losing it, or someone does not become educated except by the forgetfulness or death of the one teaching him,” and this is obviously false. This is a strange response because it seems that one could deny that one teaches art by losing it and yet still claim that art could transfer from soul to soul in other ways. Augustine, however, does not agree and so he thinks the third possibility is ruled out. From these three responses, the conclusion allegedly follows: art can only exist in the soul, which, as the third option and response confirm, means that it exists in each individual soul all at the same time for all time.

All of these responses are rather cryptic, not to mention highly dubious, and of all of them, the second is probably the most of both. But whatever the second response really means and whether it is true or not, the important thing to recognize for our purposes is that Augustine thinks that it, together with the other responses, proves the contentious conditional for each individual soul. Any disputes about its meaning or the meaning of the other responses do not

\textsuperscript{356} Technically, it only follows that art exists in “some soul” (ulla anima) and not necessarily “some soul” (ullo animo), but the context and the validity of the argument suggest that Augustine intended the soul at issue to be a soul. I am guessing he reverted to “soul” in this second response because of its extra clear connotation of “life” and/or because it was expressed this way in one of his sources.
take away from this fact, which means that we have an argument for the contentious conditional.

The disputes one can reasonably have about them are only about their precise meanings, and their truth, and whether there is more intelligence to them than meets the eye.\footnote{Here is a possible interpretation of the meaning of the cryptic second response. The response’s basic logic seems to be that “a ratio” can only exist in an anima because a ratio must be living and yet can only get its life from some anima, which has “life” essentially. In short, a ratio must exist in some anima because it must get its life from some anima. But why should this entail that art has to exist in some anima? Answer: because art is a ratio. Augustine’s claim that “art” can be called “one ratio” (una ratio), arises just prior to this argument, making this premise clearly available to us. Art is a ratio, then, and just like any ratio, it must exist in some anima in order to get its life. But why must the anima be an animus? Here we have to fill in the reasoning ourselves. Presumably it is because only an animus knows art and so must have a strong sort of conjunction with it, whereas a merely irrational anima does not. Now the implied conclusion follows. Art can only exist in some animus. The same reasoning even more clearly would apply to Ratio, since Ratio is a ratio, and so would also have to exist in some animus. The same, presumably, would apply to disciplina. Indeed, Augustine also argues for the contentious conditional in the imm. an. 1.1 argument using disciplina, though he only goes as far as to argue the disciplina must exist “somewhere,” as he did in the Soliloquies, and abstains from using this controversial premise. Note that one big problem with this interpretation is that if art and Ratio really are convertible with Truth, and therefore God, then it seems that God gets his life from SOUL. My sense is that the Augustine of the Soliloquies Project was capable of this sort of view, but it could also be that he is not arguing that Ratio has to “get” its life from SOUL, but rather that it must exist in SOUL because, being alive itself, it must exist in something living, which can only be SOUL. Whatever his reasoning, Augustine undoubtedly argues for the truth of the contentious conditional, whether it is art or Ratio that exists in the SOUL, as in this argument, or whether it is disciplina that exists in the SOUL as in the 1.1 argument.}

And so we find the same three kinds of evidence independently in On the Immortality of the Soul as we found in the Soliloquies. This shows that when Augustine says “inseparability” on the first way, he intends it to include the contentious kind of inseparability. From this evidence, one can also see that it is an inseparability in the strictest sense and that it applies to each individual SOUL. The SOUL “always exists” just as disciplina “always exists” and it is “just as immortal as Ratio,” which means that Ratio never exists without each individual SOUL also existing. We know that it applies to each individual SOUL because of Augustine’s argument for the contentious conditional from art. Thus, just as seemed to be the case in the Soliloquies, each individual SOUL will not only preexist, but, like Ratio, will preexist eternally without having been created.\footnote{Note that Augustine explicitly applies the term “eternal” (aeternum) to ratio in one of these arguments, thus confirming the propriety of the term. See imm. an. 4.6.19-22(107) “Otherwise, the SOUL}
kind between the (individual) SOUL and Ratio, the SOUL will preexist eternally and cannot have been made or created from nothing. Otherwise, the two would be separable to that extent.

1.2 The Contentious Kind of Inseparability and the Second Way

We have also already seen that the contentious kind of inseparability applies to the second way, where the SOUL exists in Ratio as in a subject. I review the reasons and expand on them slightly. We know that this contentious inseparability has to apply to this way because, according to Augustine, unchangeable Ratio can have no changeable properties and one of these properties is SOUL. This means, therefore, that the SOUL is unchangeable, and thus that its conjunction with Ratio remains unchangeable. To put it another way, the SOUL must be inseparable from Ratio in the contentious sense (in this case in a second conditional sense) because it is an essential property of Ratio. Just as snow cannot exist without white in it, so also Ratio cannot exist without the SOUL in it. This necessarily includes the less-contentious kind of inseparability as well (i.e. first conditional inseparability in this case). Since the conjunction between Ratio and SOUL is unchangeable, it follows that if the SOUL exists, then it exists in Ratio. We can also confirm that the inseparability has to apply to each individual SOUL. Since all individual SOULS at least will be conjoined to Ratio at some point in their existence (given their ability to learn intelligible things), each individual SOUL will also have to be conjoined to Ratio unchangeably because that is the only manner in which they can be conjoined on this way. Hence, it makes sense why Augustine says that on this way too, “the SOUL is just as immortal as Ratio” (tam est inmortalis animus quam ratio).

would beget something eternal by means of a temporal discovery, for it often discovers eternal things. For what is as eternal (aeternum) as the ratio of a circle, or anything else in arts of this kind?” (aliquin aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali. Nam aeterna saepe invenit. Quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli ratio vel si quid aliud in huiuscemodi artibus?)
1.3 The Contentious Kind of Inseparability and the Third Way

The presence of the contentious kind of inseparability in the first two ways is relatively obvious. But what about the third way and fourth ways? Recall that based solely on the material from 6.10-11, it was unclear whether this contentious kind of inseparability applied to the third and fourth ways to any degree. Instead, the door seemed to be open to the possibility that the SOUL was created at embodiment and existed inseparably with Ratio forever into the future, as O’Daly wishes to maintain. I come to the fourth way shortly, but on the third way, where the SOUL is conjoined to Ratio as a distinct substance and “exists by means of itself,” the contentious kind of inseparability again is the only possibility. The key to seeing this is to understand what existing by means of itself entails. The most explicit thing that it entails is unchangeability and some less explicit things that it entails are being eternal (aeternus), which Augustine also sometimes calls being “everlasting” (sempiternus),\(^{359}\) and being unmade and uncreated. Thus, the SOUL that exists by means of itself will be unchangeable, eternal (everlasting), unmade, and uncreated, doctrines that confirm the necessity of the contentious kind of inseparability.

Let me defend these claims by beginning with evidence that existing by means of itself entails unchangeability. In discussing the third and fourth ways together, Augustine tells us that the SOUL

is aptly proved immortal, if it can exist by means of itself (esse per seipsum). For whatever is such a thing is necessarily incorruptible and by this cannot die, because nothing abandons itself. But the changeability of body is clear to see because the world-motion of the world-body itself proclaims it sufficiently. Whence for those who examine it carefully, however much such a nature can be examined, [such a nature] is discovered to imitate that which is unchangeable by an ordered changeability. But that which exists by means of itself (per se est) does not even have need of any motion, since it exists by itself with every abundance (omnis copia) belonging to itself, because every motion is in relation to something

\(^{359}\) In AL 1 (Basel: Schwabe, 1986–), 159, O’Daly tells us that the terms are synonymous for Augustine, and he provides some good textual evidence. To this evidence, I would add that imm. an. 8.14 (sempiternus) and an. quant. 20.34 (aeternus) gloss the terms in exactly the same way (i.e. as meaning always existing past and future).
The first bit contrasts things that exist by means of themselves with bodily things, and specifies that bodily things are obviously changeable. The end of the passage then affirms what we are looking for, that things that exist by means of themselves are unchangeable: “But that which exists by means of itself (per se) does not have need of any motion...” One might question whether “motion” (motus) can be substituted with “change” (mutatio) here, but we know that it can from the context and because earlier in 3.4.21(105), Augustine says that there is, “no change without motion” (nulla mutatio sine motu). It is explicit in this passage, then, that existing by means of itself entails unchangeability.

The broader discussion allows us to go on to infer that existing by means of itself entails being eternal (everlasting), unmade, and uncreated (i.e. not created from nothing), though these things are not stated explicitly and there seems to be some development in Augustine’s thought from the Soliloquies and On Order. The claim that existing by means of itself entails being eternal is obvious enough now that we know that existing by means of itself entails being unchangeable. Since anything that is unchangeable is surely eternal for Augustine, as is also suggested by his reasoning in 1.1, 361 it follows that anything that exists my means of itself will also be eternal. The development in Augustine’s thought is in the connection between being eternal and being made. In On Order and the Soliloquies, Augustine suggested that something can be made (factus) and yet still be eternal, but now in On the Immortality of the Soul his

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360 imm. an. 8.15.17(116)-3(117) “Atque ita de proximo inmortalis probatur, si potest esse per seipsum. Quicquid enim tale est, incorruptibile sit necesse est ac per hoc interire non possit, quia nihil se deserit. Sed corporis mutabilitas in promptu est, quod ipsius universi corporis universus motus satis indicat. Unde diligenter inspicientibus, quantum tali natura inspici potest, ordinata mutabilitate id, quod inmutabile est, imitari reperitur. Quod autem per se est, ne motu opus habet ullo omni copia sibi seipso existente, quia motus omnis ad aliud est, cuius indiget quod movetur.”

361 imm. an. 1.1.14-15(101) “Likewise, disciplina always exists. For that which exists and exists unchangeably must always exist” (Item semper est disciplina. Nam quod est atque inmutabile est, semper sit necesse est). Since unchangeability entails that something “always exists,” it must entail that that same thing is eternal. See also later in diu. 19, where Augustine says that whatever is unchangeable is eternal (quod incommutabile est aeternum est).
reasoning precludes this. That is, he now appears to believe that if something is eternal, then it has to be unmade (or, switching the negations, that being made entails being non-eternal).

This conclusion can be inferred with the help of paragraph 8.14. Augustine begins with a conditional claim that is non-controversial: if something exists but has not been made (factum ... non), then it is eternal. This is the converse of the claim we are interested in. Technically, Augustine uses the word “everlasting” (sempiternum) instead of “eternal” (aeternum), but I will use “eternal” to make things less confusing. Augustine next speculates counterfactually about what would be the case about the SOUL if a body could be eternal. If a body could be eternal (he has the universe in mind here), then every SOUL would also have to be eternal, since every SOUL is better than every body. But then he admits that this reasoning cannot work because any body (e.g. the universe) is clearly made (factum est corpus). This denial is what allows us to draw the conclusion. The only way that bodies being made could prevent the reasoning from working is if being made entailed being non-eternal. Otherwise, the reasoning could work. It follows then that being made entails being non-eternal for the Augustine of On the Immortality of the Soul, or, to switch the negations around, being eternal entails being unmade.

This makes it easy draw the further connection to being uncreated. The only additional premise we have to add is that being unmade entails being uncreated for Augustine at this time (or being created entails being made), which is hardly controversial. The converse is false that being uncreated entails being unmade (since human beings make many things that are uncreated), but it is undeniable that being unmade entails being uncreated. To deny it, one would have to claim that it is possible that something created is unmade, for example, that the universe is created and yet unmade, which is ridiculous. The reasoning, then, proceeds as follows. Since

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362 This is justified because the terms are synonymous. See the note referring to O’Daly just above.
363 Augustine explicitly says that everything created is made in f. et symb. 4.5.23(8)-3(9) several years later in 393 CE.
being eternal entails being unmade, and being unmade entails being uncreated, then being eternal entails being uncreated.\(^{364}\)

We can draw the general conclusion, therefore, that if something exists by means of itself, then it is unchangeable, eternal (everlasting), unmade, and uncreated, by means of the following connections.

1. If X exists by means of itself, then X is unchangeable.
2. If X is unchangeable, then X is eternal (everlasting).
3. If X is eternal, then X is unmade.
4. If X is unmade, then X is uncreated.
5. Therefore, if X exists by means of itself, then X is eternal, unmade, and uncreated. (1, 2, 3, 4)

Based on these connections, we may also go on to draw the conclusion at which we were aiming about the SOUL. On the third way where the SOUL exists by means of itself, the SOUL will have to be unchangeable, eternal (everlasting), unmade, and uncreated. Augustine never denies that the SOUL has any of these qualities on the third way, and the logic of his argument entails that it must. As in the previous ways, however, Augustine must only be insisting on an unchangeability in substance, not an unchangeability in affection.

But then what does “existing by means of itself” itself mean? Surely Augustine would want to say that even if the SOUL is all of these things, it still exists from God. Yet saying that it “exists by means of itself” and not from the highest essence (Truth), seems to exclude this possibility. Indeed, given Augustine’s claim that if the SOUL “exists by means of itself, then since it is the cause (causa) of its own existing and never abandons itself, then it never dies,” it would seem to be self-caused and not caused by God.

\(^{364}\) Some might argue that the Christian tradition in Augustine’s day allowed for a “creation” that was not in time (as Aquinas argued was possible in *De aeternitate mundi*), and so being “created” (*conditus*) could be compatible with being “eternal” (in the sense of without beginning or end) for Augustine. The passages cited above (esp. Augustine’s denial that something can be made and eternal) suggest that Augustine does not agree with this compatibility, however, and I do not find evidence in its favour throughout the pre-baptismal writings. In his later writings, moreover, Augustine explicitly argues against it (e.g. *ciu.* 11.4).
The answer to this question involves distinguishing between the original cause of something’s existence and the continuing cause of something’s existence for Augustine (though these are not his terms). The original cause of something is the cause that is originally responsible for something’s being, whether in a “begetting” sense or a “made” sense, and the continuing cause is what keeps it in being once it already exists. Saying that the SOUL “exists by means of itself” or is the “cause of its own existing” only refers to the latter and not the former. Paragraph 8.14 makes this clear.

Therefore, let this be the beginning of our reasoning, that no reality (nulla res) makes itself or begets itself (se facit aut gignit); otherwise it would exist before (antequam) it existed.\footnote{imm. an. 8.14.7-9(115) “Sit igitur nostrae ratiocinationis exordium, quod nulla res se facit aut gignit; alioquin erat antequam esset. Quod si falsum est, illud est verum.”} Since no reality “makes itself or begets itself,” the SOUL cannot be self-caused in the sense of an originating cause because nothing can be self-caused in this sense, not even God. Moreover, since the SOUL could hardly be the unbegotten first cause of all things, something either must have made it or begotten it. The “begotten” option here as opposed to the “made” option, one should note, is meant to allow for an original causation that is not in time, such as that between God the Father and God the Son. The “made” option, on the other hand, is meant to refer to an original causation that is in time and from nothing (as I argued above), such as that between God and the universe.

But could the SOUL be self-caused in the sense of a continuing cause? The passage goes on to suggest that this is possible. Its first part establishes that since the “world-body” (universum corpus) has been made and not begotten, it has been made by something superior to it. The second part of the passage goes on to explain that this superior maker not only makes the world-body, but continually preserves it in existence. “But this incorporeal power and nature, the effector (effectrix) of the world-body, maintains the world[-body] by an ever-present power. For
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it did not make, and then depart and abandon its effect.”366 Then the passage tells us that the reason that the world-body needs its superior maker to preserve it in existence continually is because it does not exist by means of itself. “For this [world-body] does not exist by means of itself, and if it is abandoned by that by means of which it exists, then it will certainly not exist. We also cannot say that it receives a body by being made such that it can exist already sustaining itself (seipso...contentum esse posset), even if it were abandoned by its creator (conditor).”367 Something may be able to be caused such that it can “sustain itself” and thus can exist by means of itself, the passages imply, but this cannot be true of the world-body. This is what shows that existing by means of itself must refer to a continuing cause and not an originative cause. Having just made this implication, Augustine immediately turns to discussing what would happen if the SOUL existed by means of itself in the 8.15 passage above, suggesting that the implication does apply to it. And so when Augustine says that the SOUL is the cause of its existing on the third way, i.e. that it exists by means of itself, he means that it is its continual cause and not its originative cause. God is still the SOUL’s originative cause on the third way. Rather than being a “making” original cause, however, it is a “begetting” original cause, because the SOUL on this way has to be unmade and uncreated.

We gain further insight into what “existing by means of itself” means in this same passage and later in the text. When something exists by means of anything, whether of itself or of the highest essence, it means that it has the form of existing (species existendi) continually present to it by means of itself or something else. When the form is continually present from something else, then that thing exists by means of something else. When the form is continually present from

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367 imm. an. 8.14.12-15(116) “Quod enim per se non est, si destituatur ab eo, per quod est, profecto non erit; et non possimus dicere id accepisse corpus, cum factum est, ut seipso iam contentum esse posset, etiamsi a conditore deseretur.”
present from itself, then that thing exists by means of itself.\(^{368}\) Note that in both of these cases, something continually exists because of its form (\textit{species}) and not because of its matter (\textit{moles}), if it has any.\(^{369}\)

We now have some idea about what it means for something to “exist by means of itself,” and we also know four of its entailments. It means that something continually (but notoriginatively) provides the form of existing to itself, and it entails that this something is unchangeable, eternal, unmade, and uncreated. We could also ask by way of curiosity whether the converse is also true. Does everything that is unchangeable, eternal, unmade, and uncreated therefore also exist by means of itself? The answer is clearly no for “uncreated,” unless we

\(^{368}\) This is evident in \textit{imm. an.} 8.15.4-10(117): “Therefore, form (\textit{species}) is present to the world-body by means of a better nature, being sufficient [for itself] and maintaining the things it has made. For this reason, mutability does not deprive (\textit{adimo}) the body of being a body, but it makes it pass from form to form (\textit{de specie in speciem}) by a most ordered motion. For no part of it is allowed to be reduced to nothing, since that effecting power manages the whole [body], with its power neither laboring (\textit{laborante}) nor varying (\textit{diside}), and it grants that everything exists that exists by means of it, to the extent that it exists” (\textit{Adest igitur species universo corpori meliore natura sufficiens atque obtinente, quae fecit; quare illa mutabilitas non adimit corpori corpus esse, sed de specie in speciem transire facit motum ordinatissimo}. Non enim quaequam eius pars ad nihilum redigi sinitur, cum totum capessat vit illa effectoria nec laborante nec deside potentia, dans, ut sit omne, quod per illam est, in quantum est). It is also evident in \textit{imm. an.} 11.18.23(119)-1(120), 7(120)-14(120): “Going back, therefore, if something is to be feared, it is to be feared that the SOUL dies by becoming defective (\textit{deficiendo}), that is, by being deprived of the form of existing (\textit{existendi specie privatur}) ... But if, which no one doubts, the SOUL is wisest when it gazes at Truth (\textit{veritatem}), which always exists in the same condition, and clings to it immovably, conjoined by divine love, and if all those things that exist in any way, exist from that essence, which exists most highly and maximally, (\textit{ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est}), then either the SOUL exists from that [essence], or the SOUL exists by means of itself. But if [the SOUL] exists by means of itself, then since it is the cause (\textit{causa}) of its own existing and never abandons itself, then it never dies, as we also argued above” (\textit{Rursus igitur, si quid metuendum est, id est metuendum, ne deiciendo animus intereat id est dum ipsa existendi specie privatur} ... Sed si, quod nemini dubium est, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum veritatem, quae semper eadem modo est, intuetur eique inimmobili inhaeret divino amore coniunctus et illa omnia, quae quoquo modo sunt, ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est, aut ab illa est animus, in quantum est, aut per seipsum est. Sed si per seipsum est, quoniam ipse sibi causa existendi est et numquam se deserit, numquam interit, ut supra etiam disputavimus). Notice in this latter passage how all things “that exist in any way, exist from that [highest] essence,” and yet that the SOUL can either “exist from that [essence],” or “by means of itself.” This is further evidence of the distinction I introduced above. The first claim will refer to originative existence and the second will refer to continual existence, so the SOUL can both exist from the highest essence originatively and yet still exist by means of itself continually.

\(^{369}\) Augustine makes this claim clear in \textit{imm. an.} 8.13.12-14(114) “But if it is not what is in the mass (\textit{moles}) of body, but what is in the form (\textit{species}) of body that makes a body exist, a claim that is confirmed (\textit{approbetur}) by unconquerable ratio, then...” (\textit{Quod si non id, quod est in mole corporis, sed id, quod in specie, facit corpus esse, quae sententia invictiore ratione adprobatur}...).
qualify it to mean “uncreated by God” (since many things are made by human beings and yet uncreated), but a yes answer would seem to be self-evident for the first three, since presumably the only other thing besides the SOUL (and possibly the irrational soul) that is these three things is the Trinitarian God, and God would surely exist by means of himself.\textsuperscript{370} There is, however, a passage that poses a problem for the converse relation. It is the same passage I cited earlier as an objection to the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God. In \textit{imm. an.} 6.10, just before Augustine introduces us to the four ways, he says, “About [\textit{Ratio} as the true thing (\textit{uerum}) contemplated], it is a great question, whether that truth (\textit{uerum}), which the SOUL gazes at without the instrument of the body, exists by means of itself (\textit{per seipsum}), and does not exist in the SOUL, or whether it can exist without SOUL.” This suggests that at least when \textit{Ratio} exists in the SOUL as in a subject, \textit{Ratio} does not exist by means of itself, despite being unchangeable, eternal, and uncreated. The question about the converse relation does not affect our conclusion in this section, however. It still remains the case that if something exists by means of itself, then it is unchangeable, eternal, unmade, and uncreated, and so on the third way the SOUL will be unchangeable, eternal, unmade, and uncreated. This is enough to show that the conjunction on the third way is genuinely inseparable in the contentious sense. We can also infer that since the SOUL (and therefore the conjunction) is “unchangeable” on this way, the inseparability will include the less-contentious kind of inseparability and it will also apply to each individual SOUL, following the same reasoning that we followed on the second way.

1.4 \textit{The Contentious Kind of Inseparability and the Fourth Way}

About the fourth way, we can say right from the start that it cannot entail a strict,\textsuperscript{370} This would not be to say that each predicate entails the others in this direction strictly speaking. It would only be to say that they ultimately refer to the same things. Augustine’s understanding of eternity here (without temporal beginning or end), for example, does not strictly entail unchangeability or existing by means of something’s self, but this need not prevent him from believing that all eternal things are in fact unchangeable and exist by means of themselves.
contentious kind of inseparability between SOUL and Ratio. Augustine makes it clear that the
SOUL exists “from the highest essence/Truth” and cannot be eternal (everlasting) on this way,\textsuperscript{371} and so it must be “made” (\textit{factus}), or created from nothing. Ratio, then, will at least exist without the SOUL before the SOUL was created, whenever that was precisely.\textsuperscript{372} Given that the contentious conditional cannot strictly apply, one might suspect that the fourth way abandons it completely and perhaps even relinquishes any need for preexistence. Has Augustine finally arrived at his mature illumination view? Or does the fourth way nevertheless maintain a weaker version of the contentious kind of inseparability and thus a non-eternal preexistence of some sort? In this section I show that it does. Specifically, I show that the fourth way maintains a weaker version of the contentious conditional such that the SOUL preexists at least as far back as the creation of the universe.

Before turning to the claim directly, I outline the main steps of Augustine’s argument for proving the SOUL’s continual existence on the fourth way. This shows the structure of the text that remains and provides some grounding for the complicated discussion that is coming. We learn from 11.18 that Augustine sets up the argument for continual existence on this fourth way by taking the following claim as established: the SOUL can only fail to exist continually if it turns away from Ratio so much that it is completely separated from it and therefore is deprived of its form of existing. This, the text goes on to explain, could happen in two manners: either the SOUL could be separated such that it ceases to exist straightaway, or it could be separated by changing into an inferior essence, namely, body. The remainder of the text is structured in two steps so as to rule out these possibilities. Step 1: Prove that the SOUL cannot be separated such that it ceases to exist directly (11.18.14(120)-12.19). Step 2: Prove that the SOUL cannot be separated by

\textsuperscript{371} This is clear for several reasons, including the fact that Augustine’s arguments do not entail an eternal SOUL.

\textsuperscript{372} Note that having a created SOUL is still consistent with the less-contentious conditional, since it does not rule out the possibility that the SOUL is conjoined to Ratio for as long as SOUL exists.
changing into body (13.20-16.25).

I say nothing further about the argument for Step 2 in this study, but I mention the essence of the argument for Step 1, since it is often misunderstood and is relevant for later. The idea is that the soul cannot be completely deprived of its form of existing because neither of the possible causes of turning away from the highest essence/Truth, can succeed in making it do so. The possible causes of turning away are “falsity” (falsitas), since it is the opposite of “Truth,” and “nothing” (nihil), since it is the opposite of “highest essence” (summa essentia). Falsity cannot cause the soul to perish because the soul cannot be mistaken (fallere), i.e. be false, without continuing to exist and “Nothing” cannot cause the soul to perish because it is, quite simply, nothing at all. Therefore, the soul can never be separated from Ratio into the future unless perhaps it can be changed into body, which is what Augustine turns to arguing against in Step 2.

We can now turn to the question of whether the soul’s future inseparability with Ratio is also supposed to extend into the past at least until the creation of the universe, i.e. in a weaker, contentious conditional sense. Since the soul’s preexistence itself is much clearer on this way than the contentious conditional, I begin with showing that this way holds that the soul preexists at least as far back as the universe. Then I demonstrate that the preexistence is grounded in a non-strict version of contentious conditional inseparability.

The best evidence for the soul’s preexistence on this way comes from two passages. I summarize the long first passage, imm. an. 15.24-16.25, as follows. Its key initial claim is that anima (in the most general sense including animus) must remain to preserve the universe in being. This is because the body of the universe (or any body) can only receive its form of existing (species existendi) from the eternal rationes through the mediation of anima. Later, the passage distinguishes between animus and irrational anima, and says that body depends upon
irrational *anima* for its form and irrational anima depends on *animus* for its form. *Animus* itself, on the other hand, receives its form from the eternal *rationes* immediately. Therefore, eternal *rationes, animus, irrational anima,* and body constitute an ordered hierarchy, where the lower continually depend upon the higher for their forms of existing. Without this bestowal of form from the higher, the lower could not continue in being.

This shows that *animus* and irrational *anima* must exist at least as long as the universe to preserve it in being. The universe clearly does receive its form of existing for as long as it exists, and this can only happen if it received it from *Ratio* through *animus* and irrational *anima.* Therefore, it follows that *animus* and irrational *anima* must preexist any particular embodiment, at least back to the creation of the universe. The passage arises in the context of treating the fourth way, and given that Augustine seems satisfied with this ordered hierarchy of dependence, must at least apply to the fourth way. I suspect, however, that it is also supposed to apply to the other 3 ways, *mutatis mutandis,* as our interpretive principle of generalizing between ways would suggest.\(^{373}\)

But one might object that this first passage does not prove what I set out to prove because it does not explicitly say that *individual animi* preexist. Indeed, it seems precisely not to be speaking about the preexistence of individual *animi,* since if it were, then it would also have to be speaking about the preexistence of individual irrational *animae.* Moreover, the passage refers to an *anima* that animates the world universally (*World Anim* or World Soul) and so it would seem only to be requiring the preexistence of this *anima.* As the text says,

> Thus, body subsists (*subsistit*) by means of *anima* and exists (*est*) by that very thing by which it is animated, whether universally, as the world (*mundus*), or

\(^{373}\) There would have to be some changes, of course. They key change would be that *animus* and irrational *anima* would not receive their forms of existing from *Ratio* but from themselves on the first 3 ways, despite being ontological posterior to *Ratio.* There may also have to be an exception for the first way if *Ratio* has to depend on SOUL for its form of existing.
particularly, as any one living thing (animal) within the world.\footnote{\textit{imm. an. 15.24.1-3(126) \textit{`Per animam ergo corpus subsistit et eo ipso est, quo animatur, sive universaliter, ut mundus, sive particulariter, ut unumquodque animal intra mundum.'} Note the similarities to Plotinus’ \textit{Enn. 4.7.3 \textit{`But if soul exists, all these bodies serve it for the unified ordering (sustasis) of the world (kosmou) and of each individual living thing (zoiou), with different powers from different bodies contributing to the whole...' }} (Armstrong trans.) (\textit{ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύντασιν κόσμου καὶ ζωὸν ἐκάστου ἄλλης παρ᾽ ἄλλου δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ὅλον συνελεύσης').}\textsuperscript{\textit{374}}

And so while the passage does show the preexistence of some \textit{animus}, it does not on its own show the preexistence of \textit{individual animi}.

Whatever the first passage is meant to imply about the preexistence of individual \textit{animi}, the second passage really does imply that they individually preexist. In this passage, which occurs in Augustine’s discussion of ways three and four generally, he offers the general principle that any individual \textit{animus} is at least as long lasting as any individual body for any view under consideration. The passage also implies that the universe (world) has an individual body. Thus, it follows that any individual \textit{animus} will last at least as long as the universe. Here is the passage.

Likewise, it is necessary that what has not been made or born (\textit{factum or tumue est}) and nevertheless exists, is everlasting (\textit{sempiternum}). Should anyone grant this nature and excellence to any body, he would definitely err egregiously. But why do we fight (\textit{pugnamus})? For we are compelled so much more to grant this nature to the \textit{animus}. So if any body is everlasting, then no \textit{animus} is not everlasting, since any given (\textit{quilibet}) animus must be preferred to any given body (\textit{cuilibet corpori}), and all everlasting things to things that are not everlasting.\footnote{\textit{imm. an. 8.14.10-17(115) (my emphasis) \textit{`Item, quod factum ortumve non est et tamen est, sempiternum sit necesse est. Quam naturam et excellentiam quisquis dat ulli corpori, vehementer errat quidem. Sed quid pugnamus? Multo enim magis eam dare animo cogimur. Ita, si corpus ullam est sempiternum, nullus animus non sempiternus est, quoniam quilibet animus cuilibet corpori praeferendus est et omnia sempiterna non sempiternis.'} It is worth noting Augustine’s strict denial that body is everlasting, which is something that he never says in this work about \textit{animus}. The most he does is to consider the possibility that \textit{animus} is made (and therefore is not everlasting) when he considers the fourth way. This fits nicely with my insistence that the other three ways necessarily imply an everlasting \textit{animus}.\textsuperscript{\textit{375}}}}

\textsuperscript{\textit{374}}\textit{imm. an. 15.24.1-3(126) \textit{`Per animam ergo corpus subsistit et eo ipso est, quo animatur, sive universaliter, ut mundus, sive particulariter, ut unumquodque animal intra mundum.'} Note the similarities to Plotinus’ \textit{Enn. 4.7.3 \textit{`But if soul exists, all these bodies serve it for the unified ordering (sustasis) of the world (kosmou) and of each individual living thing (zoiou), with different powers from different bodies contributing to the whole...' }} (Armstrong trans.) (\textit{ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύντασιν κόσμου καὶ ζωὸν ἐκάστου ἄλλης παρ᾽ ἄλλου δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ὅλον συνελεύσης').\textsuperscript{\textit{375}}\textit{imm. an. 8.14.10-17(115) (my emphasis) \textit{`Item, quod factum ortumve non est et tamen est, sempiternum sit necesse est. Quam naturam et excellentiam quisquis dat ulli corpori, vehementer errat quidem. Sed quid pugnamus? Multo enim magis eam dare animo cogimur. Ita, si corpus ullam est sempiternum, nullus animus non sempiternus est, quoniam quilibet animus cuilibet corpori praeferendus est et omnia sempiterna non sempiternis.'} It is worth noting Augustine’s strict denial that body is everlasting, which is something that he never says in this work about \textit{animus}. The most he does is to consider the possibility that \textit{animus} is made (and therefore is not everlasting) when he considers the fourth way. This fits nicely with my insistence that the other three ways necessarily imply an everlasting \textit{animus}.\textsuperscript{\textit{}}}
mind here, but from the nature of the claim and from his explicit reference to the “world-body” 
(uniuersum corpus) a few lines later, we know he is thinking of the body of the universe. The 
passage admits that the argument fails, but the way in which it fails leaves the relevant principle 
of the argument untouched. The argument only fails because no body can be everlasting, not 
because it is false that any individual animus is at least as long lasting as any individual body.376 
Thus, it follows that any individual animus must last at least as long as the universe. We know 
that Augustine has individual animi in mind here. He speaks of “no animus” (nullus animus) 
and “any given animus” (quilibet animus) not merely “animus,” just as he also speaks of “any 
body” (uli corpori) and “any given body” (cuilibet corpori). We also know that the universe is 
(or has) an individual body that the animus can last as long as, both because this is the one 
individual body that could have a chance of being everlasting, as the argument hypothesizes, and 
because Augustine speaks of the “world-body” as if it were an individual body a few lines later.

The remaining question is whether this general principle applies to the fourth way. For 
my part, I do not see why it should not apply to all four ways. It is one of the only explicit 
reasons given for individual immortality found throughout the work, and it is based on a claim he 
takes as axiomatic throughout his life, namely, that “any given animus must be preferred to any 
given body.”377 Second, it is sufficiently connected to the fourth way to apply to it. The passage 
itself occurs in a place where Augustine is discussing both the third and fourth ways, not the 
third way alone. Moreover, we just saw in the first passage that Augustine thinks animus 
preserves the universe in existence on the fourth way and it would be strange if his discussion of

376 This general principle is assumed by the claim that “if any body is everlasting, then no animus is not 
everlasting,” and reasonably follows from the claim that “any given animus must be preferred to any 
given body.”
377 See, for example, lib. arb. 3.5.16.108: “Therefore, since every soul is better than any body...” (Quia 
igitur omnis anima omni corpore est melior...). This articulation uses anima rather than animus, but it no 
doubt would include animus. See also an. quant. 14.23 where Augustine argues that the fact that the SOUL 
can “see” incorporeal things shows that it must be incorporeal as well and thus that it is better (melior) 
than body. See also uera rel. 52.101.
the longevity of the animus/anima combo that preserves the universe were disconnected from that of any other individual animus. Indeed, if we generalize and combine the passages, as I have been suggesting we can, Augustine’s point seems to be that all individual animi are somehow involved in preserving the universe by providing its form of existing together with the World-Anima. Further, if individual animi do precisely what the World-Anima does (bestow form on the universe), at least in their preexistent state, then his point may even be that all individual animi are unified with the World-Anima in some sense, and therefore also unified with each other. That is, although all animi are many, they are also one.

Excursus on the Unity of Animi

I realize that I have been moving quickly here on fairly obscure evidence in a way that could seem unjustified. I also realize that the relevance of this point is perhaps unclear. Pursuing this point about the unity (or oneness) of SOULS, however, is relevant both generally and specifically. It is relevant generally because it models how this work ought to be interpreted by combining passages and following the logical implications. It is relevant specifically because the question of the unity of SOULS, as I have been suggesting, is relevant to answering the objection that the preexistence is not individual. For my argument to be successful in both of these things, however, I realize I have to provide more evidence.

The clearest evidence that Augustine held a unity of SOULS doctrine at this time is from On the Quantity of the Soul, which is a work Augustine wrote shortly afterwards that picks up from where On the Immortality of the Soul leaves off. I consider this work in Chapter 6 because of the restrictions on this chapter. Even restricting ourselves to On the Immortality of the Soul, however, the unity doctrine is fairly apparent. There are two kinds of evidence that point in this direction: (1) evidence for the unity of SOULS directly, and (2) evidence for the omnipresence of individual incorporeal SOULS while embodied. By omnipresence, I mean omnipresence in the
whole universe, not simply omnipresence confined to a particular body. The SOUL’s omnipresence is evidence for the unity of SOULS because it provides a necessary condition for that unity. If all SOULS are omnipresent, they will completely interpenetrate each other and so will have a chance of being one. Otherwise, it could be that one SOUL is completely in a different place (locus) than another, making unity impossible.

This doctrine of omnipresence is fairly evident. Since on each of the four ways, the individual SOUL is conjoined to Ratio at least at some point in its life, and since the individual SOUL either exists in Ratio or Ratio exists in it, it makes sense that the individual SOUL will be equally as omnipresent as Ratio. Otherwise, the relation of “existing in” would not hold because Ratio could exist somewhere that the individual SOUL does not exist. This is especially the case on the first two ways where one exists in the other as in a subject, since wherever the subject will be, the other thing in it will have to be present also. But it is also suggested on the third and fourth ways. On the third it is suggested by the fact that the SOUL is “unchangeable” insofar as it is conjoined to Ratio and so would not lose its preexistent omnipresence when embodied. On the fourth, it is suggested by a passage where Augustine implies that an individual soul (in the general sense including individual SOULS) “is joined to a body non-spatially however much the body occupies space.”378 We know that Augustine is talking about individual souls here because he is talking about an embodied soul, and since it is conjoined to body “non-spatially,” it would seem to be non-spatial, i.e. omnipresent, even when conjoined to the body.

This evidence for omnipresence is also key evidence for the unity of SOULS directly, as I

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378 imm. an. 15.24.13-17(125) “Finally, if [a] soul nevertheless is joined to a body non-spatially however much the body occupies space, then the soul is influenced (adfectitur) by those highest and eternal rationes, which unchangingly remain and are not contained in any place, prior to the body [being influenced], and not only prior, but also more (magis) [than body is influenced]” (Postremo, si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, summis illis aeternisque rationibus, quae incommutabili manent nec utique continentur loco, prior adfectitur anima quam corpus, nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis).
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discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter. The only way that Ratio, which itself is one and spatially undivided, could “exist in” each individual soul without being divided, is if individual souls are one and Ratio exists in them insofar as they are one. Otherwise, Ratio would have to be spatially divisible. One might also ask about the unity of individual irrational souls. I think that these also have to be one with each other and with all rational souls, but that is not something that is proven by this argument. Coming to a firmer conclusion about this will have to wait until Chapter 6 when we look at On the Quantity of the Soul. For the time being, the conclusion that is relatively well supported by On the Immortality of the Soul, is that on all four ways, all individual souls are omnipresent and one, even when embodied.

Does it therefore follow that individual souls are one with the World Soul? This certainly seems to be the implication given that the World Soul is not merely an irrational soul, but a soul, and so has Ratio existing in it (or vice-versa) just like other individual souls. The same point is suggested by the possibility (here and in other works) that all individual souls must preexist to bestow the form of existing on the world-body, which is precisely what a World Anima also does. One cannot say that the World Soul is superior to other individual souls and bestows the form of existing onto the world-body by means of them because we know that other individual souls take their form of existing directly from Ratio. Thus, it seems that they must be one and identical with it in some sense, even during embodiment. Note how Augustine does not draw a sharp distinction between individual embodied souls and the World-Soul in his one explicit reference to a World Soul: “Thus, body subsists (subsistit) by means of soul (anima) and exists (est) by that very thing by which it is animated, whether universally, as the world

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379 We know that the World Soul has to be an animus for Augustine and not simply an irrational anima because the world-body has to receive its form of existing by means of both animus and irrational anima together, as we learned from the first passage. Presumably, the idea is that the World Anima is an animus, but has an irrational anima component (its nutritive and sensible component) to connect it to its world-body, much like the human soul has an irrational anima component to connect it to its earthly body.
(mundus), or particularly, as any one living thing (animal) within the world.” He does not say that there is one soul that animates the universe and many souls that animate particular bodies; he simply says that soul animates body and that this can be done universally or particularly. This supports the interpretation that individual souls are always one with the World Soul, even in their embodied states.

[End Excursus]

Even granting that all animi really are one (for Augustine), as I have argued in the Excursus, we have also seen from the second On the Immortality of the Soul passage that preexistent animi remain many; that is, they remain individuated before and after embodiment. We are still left with a puzzle, however, and it may even be Augustine’s own. Augustine presumably does not want to affirm the individual preexistence of irrational animae, and yet it is unclear how he can refrain from doing so on the basis of these arguments. The text, unfortunately, gives us little explicit evidence for how he could deny it. One possible option is that if Platonic recollection reasoning really is entailed by all four ways, as I am arguing, then Augustine could think that learning’s need for an inseparable conjunction of knowledge and preexistent conscious knowledge shows that individual souls have to pre- and post-exist this life. It is only souls (not irrational souls) to which the argument applies after all, and so it would pick out the individuality of souls and not irrational souls. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Plato’s recollection argument in the Phaedo seems to be similarly intended. There is one place, however, (as we will see) where Augustine seems to suggest that it is mere incorporeality that entails the inseparable conjunction and consequent pre- and post-existence of the soul (6.11), which would be equally true of irrational souls and so would not explain

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380 imm. an. 15.24
381 Gerson, for example, believes that the recollection argument in the Phaedo concludes that we existed prior to embodiment, i.e. as individuated beings and not simply as a non-individuated soul conglomerate (Knowing Persons (2003), 65, 76-8).
differences in individuality. So a puzzle of some sort remains.

However the puzzle is to be resolved, the conclusion is clear that the fourth way is intended to be a preexistence view for individual souls. Indeed, it makes sense that Augustine would want to uphold the preexistence of the individual soul because without it, it would be unclear how he could also maintain the post-existence of individual souls, as he has been labouring to do. Augustine remains concerned with symmetry. In his mature illumination view he will think an asymmetrical view is surmountable, i.e. that a soul created at embodiment can continually exists into the future, but even then he does not seem to have discovered a philosophical defence. When he speaks about the soul’s immortality in *On the Trinity*, he provides no philosophical argument for it and rather appeals to faith. By granting that the soul is created, however, even the fourth way relinquishes perfect symmetry. The post-existence lasts forever but the preexistence has a beginning, so the fourth way cannot be an eternal preexistence view strictly speaking.

Now that we have seen that individual souls must preexist at least as long as the universe, we can ask if this conclusion is grounded in a weakened form of the contentious conditional. The question is whether Augustine infers that individual souls must preexist for the reason that the conjunction between soul and ratio in this life must regress at least until the beginning of the universe. The two passages we have considered (if they can be combined as argued) suggest that the answer is yes, for two distinct reasons. The first passage suggests that unified, individual souls that are conjoined to ratio are necessary to bestow the form of existing on the universe. The universe cannot receive its form directly from ratio, since it has no

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382 In *trin.* 13.9.12, Augustine informs his reader that some philosophers have come to believe in immortality with great difficulty but have many problems mixed in with it. He goes on to say, “This faith, however, promises by means of divine authority, not of human argument, that the whole human being, who consists of course of soul and body, is going to be immortal, and for this reason truly happy” (*Fides autem ista totum hominem immortalem futurum, qui utique constat ex anima et corpore, et ob hoc uere beatum non argumentatione humana sed diuina auctoritate promittit*).
immediate conjunction to \textit{Ratio}, and so it must receive its form from something that does have
an immediate conjunction. \textit{Souls} are the only things that can have an immediate conjunction,
and since individual \textit{Souls} are all one, then all individual \textit{Souls} must be what bestow form onto
the universe. The second passage suggests that the conjunction must regress at least as far back
as the universe because \textit{Souls} are preferable to any given body whatsoever, including the
universe. Being preferable to any given body does not on its own suggest that it is the
conjunction that has to regress, but the characteristics that make the \textit{Soul} preferable to any given
body do. One thing that makes the \textit{Soul} better than body is incorporeality, and another is that it
receives its form of existing (on this fourth way) directly from \textit{Ratio} without mediation. As 15.24
tells us, something’s ontological proximity to \textit{Ratio} is indicative of its value: “But body does
come to be (\textit{fit}) and, if it took its form (\textit{species}) as closely [as soul], then it would be what soul
\textit{(anima)} is. For this is the difference [between body and soul], and \textit{by this the soul is better,}
\textit{namely, that it takes [form] more closely (propinquius).}”\textsuperscript{383} These characteristics both suggest
that the conjunction has to regress as far back as the universe because they are themselves simply
aspects of the conjunction (incorporeality and receiving form immediately from \textit{Ratio}). Earlier,
we saw that the \textit{Soul}’s ability to acquire knowledge of \textit{Ratio} shows that the \textit{Soul} must be
conjoined to \textit{Ratio} “in an incorporeal way,” and we can reasonably infer that the fact that the
\textit{Soul} is conjoined to \textit{Ratio} immediately would be what makes it possible for the \textit{Soul} to receive
its form from \textit{Ratio} immediately. So then one can say that it is the \textit{Soul}’s immediate conjunction
to \textit{Ratio} that demonstrates that the \textit{Soul} is preferable to any given body. Therefore, the \textit{Soul}’s
preexistence will in a sense be due to the fact that the immediate conjunction to \textit{Ratio} has to
regress, since this is what makes it better than the universe in the first place.

We can unify these two distinct reasons for the contentious conditional by noting that the

\textsuperscript{383} imm. an. 15.24 (my emphasis) “\textit{Sed et fit corpus et, si tam propinquue sumeret speciem, id esset quod
anima. Nam hoc interest eoque anima melior, quo sumit propinquius}.”
one proceeds from requirements of the SOULS themselves, and the other from the requirements of the universe. Each side contributes to showing that it is fitting that the conjunction to Ratio regress into the past. From the side of individual SOULS, their immediate conjunction to Ratio in the present shows that it is fitting that they preexist at least as long as the universe, since this conjunction makes them preferable to the universe. From the side of the universe, the universe could not exist into the past (or future) unless individual SOULS that have an immediate conjunction to Ratio preexisted with it to bestow form upon it. And so just as it is fitting that individual SOULS should preexist solely due to the merits of having an immediate conjunction with Ratio, and thus being better than the universe, so also it is fitting that individual SOULS should preexist due to the additional reason that the universe needs their immediate conjunction to Ratio for its existence. The two reasons come together to make it extremely fitting that the contentious conditional holds for the SOUL and Ratio in a weakened sense, i.e. for at least as long as the universe exists.384

The weakness of this contentious kind of inseparability (in particular, its inability to guarantee future inseparability in principle) explains why Augustine goes on to provide other reasons for the SOUL’s future inseparability on the fourth way, such as that it cannot be separated by falsity (falsitas) or “nothing” (nihil). In short, the argument is that although the SOUL and

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384 It is noteworthy how similar this sort of reasoning is to Augustine’s argument for the contentious conditional on the first way (and possibly the third as well). In 1.1, Augustine argues that since SOUL must be conjoined to disciplina, it is fitting that it be conjoined to it with strict, contentious conditional inseparability, with disciplina never existing without SOUL. He also argues from the other direction that disciplina is something that must exist “somewhere,” and that SOUL is the most fitting “somewhere” for it to exist. The contentious conditional follows, then (viz. that disciplina can only exist in the SOUL), for reasons of fitness from both sides of the equation, from the nature of disciplina and the nature of SOUL. The difference on this fourth way is that instead of arguing for a strict, contentious kind of inseparability between SOUL and Ratio, Augustine argues for a strict, contentious kind of inseparability between SOUL and the universe (i.e. the universe absolutely cannot exist without SOUL), which then yields a weaker, contentious kind of inseparability between SOUL and Ratio that Augustine hopes is sufficient for immortality. That is, given that Ratio must have the SOUL conjoined to it for at least as long as the universe exists, it is fitting that Ratio have SOUL conjoined to it forever into the future as well, even though they could not have been conjoined forever into the past.
Ratio are not inseparable into the future in principle, there is nothing in practice that can separate them. The other ways did not need this additional practical argument since they were all cases of inseparability in principle.

Thus, we have good reason to believe that individual SOULS and Ratio are conjoined with the contentious kind of inseparability on all four ways. On the first three ways, it is a strict inseparability implying the eternity and uncreatedness of the SOUL, and on the fourth way it is a weaker inseparability that nevertheless extends at least as far back as the origin of the universe. This contentious kind of inseparability also entails the less-contentious kind of inseparability de facto because it entails that there can never be a time that the SOUL exists and yet is separate from Ratio. Thus, we can also conclude that each way entails a biconditional inseparability, given that it is qualified in the appropriate ways above.

1.5 A Troublesome Passage

As far as I know, there are no good textual reasons to doubt that Augustine intended biconditional inseparability to apply to the first two ways. There is a textual reason, however, to doubt whether it holds for the third and fourth ways. The troublesome passage in this context is imm. an. 6.11.3-4(112), which occurs in the context of the third and fourth ways. Augustine speaks of a SOUL, “not yet conjoined to ratio” (nondum rationi coniunctus), as though Ratio

385 Here is the passage in context: “But it is clear that as long as the SOUL is not separated from ratio and clings to it, then it necessarily remains and lives. Now by what power can it be separated? Could bodily things [separate it], whose power is weaker, origin lower, and order (ordo) more separate (separatio)? In no way. Then some living thing? But then how? Or is another more powerful SOUL, whoever it is, unable to contemplate Ratio unless it separates another [SOUL] from it? But neither is Ratio lacking to each one contemplating it, if everyone is contemplating it, and since nothing is more powerful than Ratio itself, because nothing is more unchangeable, in no way will a SOUL not yet conjoined to ratio be more powerful than one that is conjoined (nullo pacto erit animus nondum rationi coniunctus eo, qui est coniunctus, potentior). It remains that either 1) Ratio itself separates itself from it, or 2) the SOUL is separated from [Ratio] voluntarily (voluntate)” (imm. an. 6.11.15(111)-6(112)) (my emphasis) (Sed manifestum est, quamdiu animus a ratione non separatur eique cohaeret, necessario eum manere atque vivere. Separari autem qua tandem vi potest? Num corporea, cuius et potentia infirmior et origo inferior et ord separatio? Nullo modo. animali ergo? Sed etiam id quo modo? An alter animus potentior, quisquis est,
could exist without being conjoined to a SOUL and as if a SOUL could exist without being 
conjoined to Ratio, contrary to both conditionals. This would undermine my proposed Platonic 
recollection interpretation of these ways.

Examining the context of the discussion more closely shows that Augustine does not 
really intend to maintain that a SOUL “not yet conjoined to Ratio” is possible. This is initially 
suggested by the fact that the argument in which the phrase occurs is aiming to show that the 
SOUL can never be separated from Ratio on the third and fourth ways. What really settles the 
question, however, is a key claim in his argument for this conclusion. The main strategy of 
Augustine’s argument is to consider several possible causes of separation and attempts to 
eliminate them as possibilities. In response to the suggestion that the SOUL voluntarily causes its 
own separation, just a few lines after the offending phrase, he says,

But who would say that it is not extremely absurd that SOUL is separated from 
Ratio voluntarily, if there could be any separation from each other of things which 
place (locus) does not contain? This indeed can be said against all the 
[possibilities] above, to which we have opposed other contradictions.\footnote{\textit{im. an. 6.11.9-13(112) \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Voluntate autem animum separari a ratione non nimis absurde quis diceret, si ulla ab invicem separatio posset esse rerum, quas non continet locus. Quod quidem dici adversus omnia superiora potest, quibus alias contradicentes opposuimus.	}}

The SOUL would not be separated from Ratio voluntarily, according to this passage, because 
there cannot be a separation between things that are not contained in place. That is, mere 
incorporeality proves the inseparable conjunction. Whatever the weakness of this line of 
reasoning, the fact that Augustine appeals to it shows that he rules out the possibility of a SOUL 
“not yet conjoined to Ratio.” This can never happen because for at least as long as the SOUL 
extists because it must always be conjoined to Ratio on this reasoning. One might question, of 
course, whether the ‘if’ clause really is providing the reason as opposed to making a concession.
On this alternative interpretation, the passage would be saying that it is extremely absurd that the SOUL would separate itself voluntarily even if there could be a separation between incorporeal things. But this cannot be what the passage means because of the sentence that follows: “This indeed can be said against all the [possibilities] above.” The only way that the point can be said against all the possibilities above is if the reason against separation is that incorporeal things are never separate. So then we have no reason to doubt the biconditional inseparability we found affirmed for these ways elsewhere. Note that this sentence about being “against all the [possibilities] above” also confirms that Augustine is not merely making an isolated argument against separation but intends it to apply to the third and fourth ways generally, and possibly even the first two ways. Its application to all ways is also suggested by several passages throughout the work, including two of the general conjunction passages already discussed. It is strange, to be sure, how Augustine could think that mere incorporeality would be sufficient to imply conjunction, and he criticizes himself for saying this in the Retractations. The way in

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387 Note that while this statement removes the objection to both conditionals, the statement in itself only affirms the less-contentious conditional and does not affirm the contentious one. To prove the contentious one for the third and fourth ways, one must look elsewhere in the text, as I did above.

388 imm. an. 6.10 “For everything which we contemplate (contemplamur), or grasp (capimus) by thinking (cognitione), we grasp either by sense (sensu) or by intellect (intellectu). But the things that are grasped by sense are also sensed to be outside of us and contained in places, for which reason we do not even affirm that they can be grasped thoroughly (percipi). But the things that are understood are not understood as though placed elsewhere than the SOUL itself that understands. For at the same time [as they are understood], they are understood not to be contained in place (in loco)” (my emphasis); imm. an. 10.17 “But when the SOUL gazes at (intuetur) these things that are understood (quae intelleguntur) that always exist in the same condition, it shows sufficiently that it [SOUL] is conjoined (esse coniunctum) to them in a certain marvelous and self-same (eodem) incorporeal way, that is to say, not spatially. For in fact either they are in it [the SOUL] or it [the SOUL] is in them. And whichever of these is the case, either one is in the other as in a subject or each is a substance” (my emphasis). This passage is especially conclusive because it occurs in the part of the work that discusses the third and fourth ways, and it specifically indicates that it applies to all of the ways under consideration.

389 retr. 1.5.2.22-27 “But I certainly would not have said what I said, that the SOUL cannot be separated from eternal reason because it is not joined to it in place, if I were at that time already so educated in the sacred scriptures so as to recollect what is written: ‘Your sins separate you and God.’ From this one is to understand that separation can also be said of the things that are joined not in place but incorporeally” (Quod uero dixi animum propterea non posse ab aeterna ratione separari, quia non et localiter iungitur, profecto non dixissem, si iam tunc esset litteris sacris ita eruditus, ut recolerem quod scriptum est: Peccata uestra separant inter uos et deum. Unde intellegi datur etiam earum rerum posse dici
which he criticizes it in the Retractions, however, shows that he had originally meant it.

What then is Augustine doing speaking of a SOUL “not yet conjoined to Ratio” if none of his settled four ways allows for one? There are two possible interpretations that are compatible with biconditional inseparability. Either Augustine was speaking ex hypothesi (i.e. “even if there were a SOUL not yet conjoined to Ratio [but there isn’t], it couldn’t separate another SOUL from Ratio”), or he was using the term “conjoined” for the posterior connection to Ratio as an exception to his general rule of using it for the prior connection. I prefer the first option, but hesitantly, since the sentence also can reasonably be taken to imply the second. I am hesitant to admit the second too, however, because this goes against what is implied by the rest of the passage and elsewhere that suggests that “conjoined” only refers to the prior connection to Ratio. The passage has been understandably confusing for scholars. My strategy of interpretation throughout has been to assume that Augustine was very intentional about what he wrote for the most part, despite it being an unpublished draft. In this particular case, however, I think Augustine was careless.

And so we remain justified in holding that biconditional inseparability applies to the third and fourth ways, and can reasonably conclude that all four views are committed to it with the appropriate qualifications.

2. The Four Ways and Platonic Recollection in General: The Conjunction between SOUL and Ratio as a Conjunction of Knowledge

Having now seen the evidence for the second and most complicated step of proving that

\[ separationem, quae non locis sed incorporaliter iunctae fuerant. \]

As I noted in Chapter 3, there is a passage that uses the term coniunctus for the affective part of the posterior connection, i.e. for the will’s “enjoyment” connection to Ratio (imm. an. 11.18.7-12(120)). But since this use is for the affective part and not necessarily the cognitive part, I do not take it as sufficient to overturn the general rule that Augustine prefers to use coniunctus as a technical term that only applies to the SOUL’s prior connection to Ratio.
the four ways entail Platonic recollection in general, we can now turn back to the first step. This step is to show that the biconditionally inseparable conjunction between SOUL and Ratio is a conjunction of knowledge. If it is a conjunction of knowledge, then, granting inseparability, innate knowledge follows, since the SOUL has the knowledge at least back to earthly embodiment (and actually a lot farther back). The key to noticing that it must be a conjunction of knowledge is to recognize that a main reason for positing the conjunction in the first place is that learning requires prior knowledge and prior knowledge requires the conjunction. That is, learning’s need for prior knowledge is one of the considerations that allows Augustine to conclude that there must be a conjunction. We have already seen that there is a connection between the outer two terms of this claim. In 6.11.18(110), for example, we saw that the SOUL cannot contemplate Ratio “unless by means of some conjunction with it,” which means that the learning somehow requires the conjunction. But the passage did not make it clear that it was due to the need for prior knowledge. It is now time to confirm that this is the case.

The passage that shows this most clearly is On the Immortality of the Soul 1.1.8-14(2). The text a little prior to the passage makes it clear that the passage’s conclusion is that “disciplina exists in the SOUL,” so I include it in brackets at the end.

Likewise, no one can reason rightly without disciplina. For right reasoning (recta ratiocinatio) is when thought (cogitatio) strives from things that are certain (certis) to track down things that are uncertain, and nothing is certain (certum) in the SOUL that the SOUL is ignorant of (ignorat). Everything that the SOUL knows (scit), it holds in itself, nor does knowledge (scientia) grasp any thing (rem) unless the thing pertains to some disciplina. For disciplina is the knowledge (scientia) of whatsoever thing. [Therefore, disciplina exists in the SOUL.]

imm. an. 1.1.8-9(101). Augustine states here that if a certain list of premises are true, all of which happen to be argued for or implied in our passage, “...then disciplina is in the SOUL of man.” (Si ..., est in hominis animo disciplina.)

imm. an. 1.1.8-14(2) “Item nemo sine disciplina recte ratiocinatur. Est enim recta ratiocinatio a certis ad incertorum indagationem nitens cogitatio nihilque certum est in animo quod ignorat. Omne autem, quod scit animus, in se habet nec ullam rem scientia complectitur, nisi quae ad aliquam pertineat disciplinam. Est enim disciplina quariumcumque rerum scientia.”
This is a confusing and elliptical argument, and so I provide an expanded reconstruction. I put my additions to the argument in square brackets based on what Augustine must be assuming for purposes of validity. The rest is more or less straight from the text.

**Argument of imm. an. 1.1.8-14(2)**
1. Right reasoning is when thought strives from things that are certain (*a certis*) to track down things that are uncertain (*incerta*).
2. Nothing is certain (*certum*) in the SOUL that the SOUL is ignorant of (*ignorat*).
3. [Therefore, all things that are certain are known (*scita*). (2)]
4. [Therefore, right reasoning is when thought strives from things that are known (*scita*) to track down things that are unknown (*ignota*). (1, 3)]

5. *Disciplina* is the knowledge (*scientia*) of whatsoever thing. [i.e. *disciplina* and *scientia* are equivalent.]
6. Therefore, knowledge (*scientia*) is only of things pertaining to some *disciplina*. (5)
7. [Therefore, no one can reason rightly without knowledge of things pertaining to some *disciplina*. (4, 6)]
8. [Therefore, no one can reason rightly without knowledge of *disciplina*. (7)]
9. Therefore, no one can reason rightly without *disciplina*. (8)

10. [The SOUL can reason rightly.]
11. [Therefore, the SOUL has knowledge of *disciplina*. (8, 10)]
12. Everything that the SOUL knows (*scit*), it holds in itself.
13. Therefore, *disciplina* exists in the SOUL. (12)

In order to show what I want to show, we can begin by observing that the argument is not completely valid as stated and that this is Augustine’s issue and not mine. The problematic inference is from lines 7 to 8. It does not follow that if someone has knowledge of things pertaining to *some disciplina* that therefore it has knowledge of *disciplina* as a whole. One might question whether this is an accurate reconstruction of the argument because Augustine does not

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394 I use the word “scitus” here because knowing in the sense of *scire* is necessary for the argument’s validity.
395 *Disciplina* and *scientia* have to be equivalent here because otherwise the next line would not follow. That is, *disciplina* is not only the *scientia* of whatsoever thing, but the *scientia* of whatsoever thing is also *disciplina*.
396 This is my paraphrase of the claim, “nor does knowledge (*scientia*) grasp any thing (*rem*) unless the thing pertains to some *disciplina*.”
397 As I discuss below, this premise does not validly follow from 7, but it is a necessary premise for inferring the conclusions in 9 and 13.
explicitly mention these premises, but I do not see another reasonable way for him to draw his two explicit conclusions in 9 and 13 that “no one can reason rightly without disciplina” and that “disciplina exists in the SOUL.” The conclusions are clearly about disciplina as a whole and not a part and their justification seems crucially to depend on the claim in 7 that right reasoning requires knowledge of things pertaining to disciplina. Therefore, they must crucially depend on 8.

The observation that 8 is crucial to the conclusion in 13 shows that learning’s need for prior knowledge is one of the reasons for positing the prerequisite conjunction. This is evident by starting from the conclusion. The conclusion is that “disciplina exists in the SOUL.” As we learned from elsewhere, something that “exists in” the SOUL is conjoined to the SOUL, and so this conclusion is what permits us to conclude that disciplina is “conjoined” to the SOUL. But what allows us to conclude that disciplina exists in the SOUL in the first place? It is nothing other than the claim in 11 that “the SOUL has knowledge of disciplina,” which itself depends on the claim in 8 that “no one can reason rightly without knowledge of disciplina.” Since reasoning rightly either is or is necessary for learning, it becomes clear that learning’s need for prior knowledge leads to the conclusion that disciplina is conjoined to it. The steps of the argument can be summarized as follows:

a. (see 8.) No one can reason rightly (and therefore learn) without knowledge (scientia) of disciplina
b. (see 10.) The SOUL has the ability to reason rightly (or learn).
c. (see 11.) Therefore, the SOUL has prior knowledge (scientia) of disciplina.
d. (see 13.) Therefore, disciplina exists in the SOUL.
e. Therefore, disciplina is conjoined to the SOUL.

This is also confirmed by the broader context, where it is clear that Augustine is arguing that disciplina can exist nowhere else except in the SOUL.

We might also wonder if Augustine has an unstated reason up his sleeve to justify the inference. This is possible, but finding suitable candidates would require much more speculation than I am willing to engage in here.

imm. an. 10.17.8-14(119)
To put it most briefly, learning requires a conjunction to *disciplina* on this argument because it requires prior knowledge of *disciplina*. Prerequisite knowledge is the key middle term that connects learning and the conjunction.

Unfortunately, the text does not tell us more about why this prior knowledge is required beyond saying that right reasoning involves moving from certain things to uncertain things. Of the options available in the tradition, targeting and recognition reasoning would be the most likely candidates, but Augustine does not mention or allude to them in ways beyond what we have already seen. The text also does not acknowledge the apparently contradictory upshot of the argument. If the SOUL needs prior knowledge of *disciplina* as a whole in order to acquire knowledge of *disciplina*, then the SOUL both knows and does not know *disciplina*. Could this mean that I have somehow misinterpreted something? It is true that Augustine does not explicitly offer further reasons for prerequisite knowledge in this work, but he does address the apparent contradiction later in 4.6 and argues that nothing is contradictory about it. This suggests that we are on the right track to think prerequisite knowledge of *disciplina* is one of his key reasons to infer the conjunction.

We can therefore reasonably conclude that the SOUL’s conjunction to *Ratio* is a conjunction of knowledge. Moreover, given that Augustine’s term for knowledge here is “*scientia*,” the conjunction will be a conjunction of knowledge in the strict sense. One might question, however, whether Augustine intended the argument to be generalized to all four ways. The argument occurs in a section where Augustine is focusing on the first way, where *Ratio* (expressed as *disciplina*) exists in the SOUL as in a subject, and so one might think it only applies to the first way. But our interpretive principle that what Augustine expresses on one way can be generalized to other ways, *mutatis mutandis*, unless there is an inconsistency, suggests that the argument does apply to all ways. Generalizing like this makes sense because we have already
seen Augustine helping himself to arguments that cross the boundaries between ways, as he does with the argument that the SOUL must have life if it exists, and because there is no inconsistency in doing so. The interpretive principle of seeing Augustine’s terminology as intentional supports this generalization. In the 1.1 passage, Augustine only speaks in terms of disciplina “existing in” the SOUL and does not specify whether it does so “as in a subject” or as a distinct substance. The passage in 4.6 that confirms my prerequisite knowledge interpretation does the same. This suggests that the argument would at least apply to all conjunctions where “Ratio exists in the SOUL,” whether or not they are distinct substances. Once this is granted, however, there seems to be no reason to deny that the same kind of reasoning applies to the opposite conjunction where “SOUL exists in Ratio.” Since Augustine does not take this kind of scenario to be much different from the former, especially on the third and fourth ways. And so it is reasonable that prerequisite knowledge is behind inferring the conjunction on all four ways.

3. The Four Ways and Platonic Recollection in General: A Conscious Experience as a Prerequisite for Possessing Innate Knowledge

We now have good evidence for the first step that the prerequisite conjunction between SOUL and Ratio is a conjunction of knowledge in the sense of scientia. Combining this with the second step about biconditional inseparability, we can conclude that the SOUL has innate knowledge and that it preexists on all four ways. It has innate knowledge because it will have a conjunction of knowledge with Ratio for as long as it exists (the less-contentious conditional), and it will preexist because its conjunction of knowledge to Ratio (the contentious conditional)

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401 The term “subiectum” does appear in 2.2, 5.7 and 5.8, as discussed earlier, and I argued that Augustine is “focusing” on the first way in 1.1 to 5.9. I am not being inconsistent, however, because I only said that Augustine is “focusing” on the first way in these sections, not that all the things in these sections only apply to the first way. I could also accept that his language is strict first way language in these sections and still have my point, I think. Augustine could intend this part of the argument to apply to the other ways, mutatis mutandis, since there is no obvious problem with doing so.
will extend into the past at least until the creation of the universe for the fourth way, and for as long as Ratio exists on the other ways. This already should be enough to convince skeptics that On the Immortality of the Soul is expressing Platonic recollection on all four ways. Once one accepts these things, one has already given up so much ground that one might as well accept the little that remains. A small final step, of course, does remain. Does the innate knowledge require a prior conscious experience of Ratio that requires the preexistence, as the Preexistence Requirement Feature holds?

On the Immortality of the Soul itself does not provide an explicit discussion of this, but it does provide something. The closest we get to a discussion of the preexistence requirement, as well as Platonic recollection itself, is section 4.6. This is the same section in which the controversial innate knowledge passage arose on which O’Daly relied to argue that references to “forgetfulness” and “recollection” were merely metaphorical. It is worth quoting this paragraph in full and interpreting it in light of what we now know from our examination of each of the four ways to see how O’Daly is mistaken. In so doing, we will see a hint that innate knowledge requires a prior conscious experience of that knowledge and thus requires the preexistence that we know the SOUL has.

The passage raises and responds to an objection to the argument from art in 4.5, where Augustine had argued that the SOUL is immortal because art exists in the SOUL inseparably.

Now if art sometimes is and sometimes is not in the SOUL, which is sufficiently known from forgetfulness (obliuio) and ignorance (imperitia), then the conclusion of this [previous] argument does not contribute anything to the immortality of the SOUL unless the antecedent is denied in one of the following ways. Either [art] is something in the SOUL, which is not in the present thinking (in praesenti cogitatione), or the art of music is not in the educated (erudito) SOUL when it thinks about geometry alone. But the latter disjunct is false; therefore, the former is true. Now the SOUL does not sense that it has something unless something comes into thinking (in cogitationem). Therefore, something can be in the SOUL that the SOUL itself does not sense is in it. How long it is there makes no difference. For if the SOUL was occupied with other things longer than it could easily turn its intention (intentio) back to things thought earlier (in ante cogitata),
then it is called forgetfulness or ignorance. But when we reason with ourselves or another questions us well about certain liberal arts, we do not discover the things we discover (\textit{inuuenimus}) anywhere other than in our SOUL, nor is discovering something a making (\textit{facere}) or begetting (\textit{gignere}). Otherwise, the SOUL would beget something eternal by means of a temporal discovery, for it often discovers eternal things. For what is as eternal as the ratio of a circle, or anything else in arts of this kind? Neither is it grasped such that it has not existed at some [earlier] time nor that it is not going to be at some [later] time. It is clear even now that the human SOUL (\textit{animum humanum}) is immortal and that all true rationes are in its hidden places (\textit{in secretis}), even though it seems either not to have them or to have lost them, whether by ignorance (\textit{ignoratione}) or by forgetfulness (\textit{obliuione}).

The objection Augustine raises is as follows: it seems that art could not \textit{always} exist in the SOUL, since it is obvious that the SOUL is often forgetful or ignorant. This is the same as the third objection in the \textit{Soliloquies} about disciplina existing in the SOUL. Augustine responds similarly by arguing that “something can be in the SOUL that the SOUL itself does not sense is inside it.” Just as the art of music is still in the educated SOUL when it is thinking about “geometry alone,” so also can art be in the SOUL even though it is “not in the present thinking (\textit{in praesenti cogitatione}).” He also responds by arguing that the only place that the SOUL discovers the rationes of the liberal arts is \textit{in} the SOUL, and that this “discovery” is not a “making” or a “begetting” because it is a discovery of eternal rationes.

Before finding the hint about the preexistence requirement, we may observe that the paragraph supports our conclusion that “existing in” the SOUL (and thus being conjoined to it)

\footnote{\textit{imm. an.} 4.6.3-23(107) (my emphasis) “At enim si ars aliquando est, aliquando non est in animo, quod per oblivionem atque imperitiam satis notum est, nihil ad eius immortalitatem adfert argumenti huius conexio, nisi negatur a\textit{ntecedens hoc modo: aut est aliquid in animo, quod in praesenti cogitatione non est, aut non est in erudito animo ars musica, cum de sola geometrica cogitat. Hoc autem falsum est; illud igitur verum. Non autem quicquam se habere animus sentit, nisi quod in cogitationem venerit. Potest igitur aliquid esse in animo, quod esse in se animus ipse non sentiat. Id autem quamdiu sit, nihil interest. Namque si diutius fuerit in aliis animus occupatus quam ut intentionem suam in ante cogitata facile possit reflectere, oblivio vel imperitia nominatur. Sed cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum rattocinantes vel ab alio bene interrogati de quibusdam liberalibus artibus ea, quae invenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus – neque id est invenire, quod facere aut gignere: aliquin aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali. Nam aeterna saepe inventit. Quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli ratio vel si quid aliud in huiuscemodi artibus? Nec non fuisse aliquando nec non fore comprehenditur –, manifestum est etiam inmortalem esse animum humanum et omnes veras rationes in secretis eius esse, quamvis eas sive ignorantone sive oblivione aut non habere aut amisisse videatur.”}
implies knowledge. As in the *Soliloquies*, the objection is that forgetfulness or ignorance seem to rule out the possibility that art exists in the *SOUL*, and this would only be an objection if existing in the *SOUL* implied knowledge of some sort. Augustine’s response, then, confirms that he accepts the point. The art of music still exists in the educated (*erudito*) *SOUL* when it is not thinking about music but about geometry. In other words, the art of music remains *known* even when the educated *SOUL* is only thinking of geometry. Rather than denying the point that whatever exists in the *SOUL* is known to answer the objection, he comes up with a way to accept it.

We can now turn to the hint that innate knowledge requires a preexistent conscious experience of *Ratio*. The relevant text is as follows: “...something can be in the *SOUL* that the *SOUL* itself does not sense is inside it. How long it is there makes no difference. For if the *SOUL* was occupied with other things longer than it could easily turn its intention (*intentio*) back to things thought earlier (*in ante cogitata*), then it is called forgetfulness (*obliuio*) or ignorance (*imperitia*).” Augustine is defending the claim that the eternal *rationes* can exist in the *SOUL* despite not having one’s “intention” turned towards them, i.e. despite not thinking about them, and he suggests that this displaced “intention” or “thought” comes in two kinds: forgetfulness and ignorance. The context suggests that these terms are intended in their ordinary senses. Forgetfulness applies to things previously thought in this life but forgotten (and so it does not apply to innate knowledge) and ignorance applies to things never thought in this life. The interesting thing to note about these terms is that both forgetfulness and ignorance are described as cases of having turned one’s “intention” away from “things thought earlier (*ante cogitata*).” This is unsurprising in the case of ordinary forgetfulness, but highly suggestive in the case of ordinary ignorance. If the things that we have never thought in this life have been “thought earlier,” then they have been thought in a preexistent life. Combining this with the passage’s
implication that we have in our SOULS innate knowledge of these things, which the passage explicitly calls the liberal arts, Augustine is saying that we have innate knowledge of the liberal arts and that these arts have been thought, i.e. consciously experienced, in a previous life.

This is not quite the preexistence requirement itself because one could question whether Augustine is actually invoking the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle, but it is hardly a stretch to assume that he is. Surely the reason that the liberal arts have been thought earlier in a previous existence is because this is necessary for having them innately known in the SOUL. One could more reasonably doubt that the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle applies to the other three ways, since the discussion here occurs in the context of the first way. However, the fruitful interpretive principle set down earlier that whatever is discussed in the context of one way can apply to other ways if there is no inconsistency, mutatis mutandis, seems reasonably applicable in this case. This is also supported by the fact that Augustine’s language about “existing in” does not mention anything about existing in “subject,” allowing the idea to be generalizable. And so it is reasonable to suppose that the requirement part of the preexistence requirement applies to all four ways.403

These observations help us see the mistake in O’Daly’s interpretation of the last three lines of this passage. He argued that they show that innate knowledge has no preexistence requirement. The lines tell us, according to him, that even if the SOUL might seem “not to have [the true rationes] or to have lost them, whether by ignorance or by forgetfulness,” in point of fact it does none of these because it still has them “in its hidden places” (in secretis). His mistake is to think that having the true rationes in “in its hidden places” is supposed to mean something completely different from ignorance or forgetfulness. He is right that having the true rationes in

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403 The generalization to the third and fourth ways is also supported by later passages suggesting that preexistent SOULS play a role in the administration of the universe on these ways (imm. an. 15.24-16.25), since this would hardly be possible if they did not consciously know what they were doing.
the SOUL’s hidden places is not ignorance in the sense of “not having” the rationes at all and he is right that not consciously knowing them is not forgetfulness in the sense that the rationes were known in this life and then “lost.” But it is still ignorance in the sense that the rationes were never thought before in this life, and it is still forgetfulness in the sense that the rationes were once thought in a previous life and are no longer in this life. O’Daly thinks that the text is denying ignorance and forgetfulness altogether, but it is really only denying them in their ordinary senses.

And so we are left with excellent reasons to believe that all four ways are expressing Platonic recollection in general. Augustine’s argument for the conjunction shows that it is a conjunction of knowledge, the biconditional inseparability of the conjunction shows that the knowledge is innate and that the SOUL preexists, and the suggestion that the objects of innate knowledge have been “thought earlier” alludes to the preexistence requirement. All three steps are present in some form and to some degree, just as they were in the Soliloquies.

4. The Four Ways and Specific Kinds of Platonic Recollection

Now that we have seen good evidence that all four ways entail Platonic recollection in general, we can also ask what kinds they entail. I begin by asking if they entail an “eternal, constitutive Forms” version of it, as we found suggested in the Soliloquies. That is, is the preexistence eternal and is the component of innate knowledge the Forms themselves, up to and including God, constitutively existing in the SOUL? From what we saw earlier, the answer to the question about eternity should be well enough established. The first three ways entail the eternal preexistence of the SOUL because the SOUL is unchangeable in substance and must exist at least as long as eternal Ratio. The fourth way, on the other hand, does not entail an eternal preexistence because the SOUL is created.

The answer to the first part of the question about the Forms in the SOUL has at least been
well-discussed if not well-established. The innate knowledge of the Forms does seem to include knowledge of all the Forms up to and including God, with some reservations about the God part. I will take that discussion as sufficient for now. The answer to the rest of the question, however, is a little more complicated and requires more discussion here. The question is whether the innate knowledge in the SOUL really is the Forms themselves (as opposed to mere notions of them, say) constitutively existing in the SOUL. My answer is yes, with slight qualifications for the last three ways.

On the first way, the component of innate knowledge constitutively existing in the SOUL does have to be the eternal Forms themselves and not mere notions of them. The Forms literally exist in the SOUL as in a subject for all eternity, just as in the Soliloquies, and the SOUL seems to be their very substance. So the answer is clear enough on this way. It is also fairly clear on the second way. Even though Ratio is not technically “in” the SOUL but vice versa, the idea is still that Ratio is ontologically intermingled with the SOUL by being its subject or substance. So it is still constitutively “in” the SOUL in a sense. On the third and fourth ways, the answer is less clear, since in being distinct substances there cannot be the same degree of ontological intermingling between Ratio and SOUL. Nevertheless, innate knowledge still entails that one exists “in” the other (whichever one it is), and there is no reference to innate notions. Therefore, it seems that the “existing in” relation describes the content of what it means to know in the sense that the SOUL’s knowledge simply is having Ratio in it or being in Ratio, without any need for intermediaries. It is difficult to say this for sure based on the text as we have it and without

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404 The 4.6 passage discussed above strongly supports the point that the eternal intelligibles themselves exist in the SOUL and not mere notions of them on the first way. When we learn about the liberal arts, Augustine says, “we do not discover the things we discover (inuenimus) anywhere other than in our SOUL,” and he goes on to clarify that this discovery is not a “making” or “begetting” but a discovery of the eternal rationes. And so the eternal intelligible things themselves are the very things that exist within the SOUL. This is further confirmed by the fact that it is the only way that the conclusion about immortality that the text draws at the end could follow.
consulting other texts, but the evidence so far gives us little alternative. And so on the third and fourth ways too, we can provisionally say that the SOUL’s innate knowledge is the Forms themselves constitutively “existing in” it (or vice versa). One has to admit, however, that the SOUL would possess the Forms in progressively weaker degrees on these ways. On the third way, where the SOUL is distinct in substance and yet eternal, the possession would be weaker than the first two ways, where the SOUL is not a distinct substance. The possession on the fourth way, where the SOUL is distinct in substance and created, would be even weaker.

Thus, we have good reason to believe that the first three ways are “eternal, constitutive Forms” Platonic recollection views, as in the Soliloquies, and that the fourth way differs only slightly on these points due to the fact that the SOUL has been created and possesses the Forms in a weaker constitutive sense. But can we perhaps go farther than this? Based on what we have seen in On the Immortality of the Soul, we can reasonably add some doctrines to these Platonic recollection views. The first sort of doctrines we can add pertains to the nature of the innate knowledge, and the second pertains to the nature of the SOUL.

Given what we have observed about the nature of the innate knowledge, two questions in particular arise. First, does the SOUL somehow continue “experiencing” the Forms when it innately knows them even when it is turned away from them? Second, is the innate knowledge literally “in memory”? Given that for all four ways, innate knowledge is the Forms themselves with no need for innate notions, and given that Augustine describes the knowledge as scientia, the strictest knowledge, we have some reason to suspect that the answer to the first question is yes. Having innate knowledge that is the Forms themselves and that is strict knowledge at least provisionally suggests that the SOUL is always occurrently acquainted with them and therefore is always experiencing them. But we cannot yet say that for certain without more evidence.

Regarding the question about memory, the answer at least in the ordinary sense of
memory seems to be no, especially if the SOUL really is always experiencing the Forms. Memory in the ordinary sense is a repository of images of things that the SOUL is no longer experiencing, and so if the innate knowledge is the Forms themselves (and not their images) and if the SOUL is also always experiencing these Forms, then the innate knowledge would not be in ordinary memory. The question then is whether the Forms would be in memory in any sense. The text as it stands does not allow us to draw a clear conclusion. The language of “recollection” and “forgetfulness” suggests that it is, but O’Daly’s suggestion that these terms are metaphorical could at least be right in the sense that while the Forms are innately known they are not technically in memory, just as the On Order passage we consulted in the first chapter seemed to imply.

These answers raise a puzzle, however. If the SOUL is already “experiencing” the Forms in its prior connection to them, then how can we distinguish the prior connection of experience from the posterior connection of actually contemplating the Forms? What are “turning away” (\textit{auersus}) and “turning toward” (\textit{conuersus}) referring to if not to the loss and gain of an experience of the Forms? This is where the terms for consciousness fit in. The SOUL is always experiencing the Forms, but it is not always consciously aware of them. It is the soul’s “intention” (\textit{intentio}) or “thought” (\textit{cogitatio}) that changes, not the experience. A portion of the 4.6 passage supports this interpretation.

Now the SOUL does not sense that it has something unless something comes into thinking (\textit{in cogitationem}). Therefore, something can be in the SOUL that the SOUL itself does not sense is in it. How long it is there makes no difference. For if the SOUL was occupied with other things longer than it could easily turn its intention (\textit{intentionem}) back to things thought earlier (\textit{in ante cogitata}), then it is called forgetfulness or ignorance.\footnote{\textit{imm. an. 4.6} “\textit{Non autem quicquam se habere animus sentit, nisi quod in cogitationem venerit. Potest igitur aliquid esse in animo, quod esse in se animus ipse non sentiat. Id autem quandiu sit, nihil interest. Namque si diutius fuerit in aliis animus occupatus quam ut intentionem suam in ante cogitata facile possit reflectere, oblivio vel imperitia nominatur.”}
Given that having something in the SOUL includes continually experiencing it, and so refers to the prior connection to Ratio, it makes sense that when the thing “comes into thinking” or when the SOUL “turns its intention back” to it, this refers to the posterior connection to Ratio of contemplation. To make it less awkward in English, I prefer to say that it is becoming “conscious” of the experience, but this is not supposed to add anything foreign or modern to what Augustine means here. And so there is no problem distinguishing between the prior experience and the posterior contemplation in Augustine’s terms.

We now turn to the doctrines concerning the nature of the SOUL on the four ways. There are two sorts of doctrines we can add: those pertaining to the relation between SOULS and those pertaining to the relation between the SOUL and God. Of the first sort, we have already seen that Augustine thinks that he is demonstrating the immortality of individual SOULS (though not individual irrational souls) on all four ways. We have also seen that at least on the fourth way, these individual SOULS seem intended to be one with each other, likely including with the World-Soul. This raises the question about whether this unity of all SOULS is supposed to apply to all four ways. Based on the evidence so far, the answer appears to be yes. The very logic of Ratio existing in the SOUL as in a subject and vice versa seems to entail that SOULS have to be unified at least for the first two ways, and there seems to be no good reason to deny that the unity would also apply to the third way if it applies to the other ways. Furthermore, it makes sense that if something controversial like the unity of SOULS applies to the fourth way, which is the least controversial way, then one should expect it to apply to the previous more controversial ways (as

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406 Other passages also suggest that the difference between being turned toward and turned away from Ratio is a matter of the orientation of our “intention.” See imm. an. 10.17.14-17(118) “For who has not experienced when he has examined himself well, that he was able to understand something about himself so much more genuinely (sincerius) to the degree that he removed (remouere) and transferred (subducere) the intention of his mind (intentionem mentis) from bodily senses?” (Quis enim bene se inspicienis non expertus est tanto se aliquid intellexisse sincerius, quanto removere atque subducere intentionem mentis a corporis sensibus potuit?).
long as it is consistent with them). The same reasoning suggests that Augustine means to assert the existence of a World Soul and its unity with all other souls on all four ways and not simply the fourth. So then unless we encounter outside evidence to the contrary, we have good reasons to suspect that the doctrine of the unity of all souls, including the World Soul, is supposed to apply to all four ways.

Of the doctrines pertaining to the relation between the soul and God, we would seem to be able to affirm certain less controversial doctrines that apply to all four ways and add increasingly controversial ones that apply only to the some of the ways. The doctrine that most obviously and least controversially applies to all four ways is that the soul must be like God in the sense that it is incorporeal. A slightly more controversial doctrine applying to all ways is that each individual soul must be universally omnipresent like God, even during embodiment. One might think that this would only apply to the ways where the soul is eternal, but we saw evidence for it on the fourth way, and as we will see in Chapter 6, there are reasons to believe that Augustine still accepts it in post-baptismal works. Moving on to doctrines that apply only to the first three ways and not the fourth, we can posit, in addition to eternity, that the soul exists by means of itself, is unchangeable in substance, is unmade, and is uncreated (though still begotten). As I argued above, Augustine applies all of these doctrines to the soul on the third way, and he also clearly applies eternity and unchangeability in substance to the soul on the first two ways. One could question whether “existing by means of itself” and “uncreatedness” should also apply on the first two ways as it does on the third, but it hardly makes sense to deny it once the others are granted. As for doctrines that apply only to the first two ways, the key doctrine appears to be that the soul is consubstantial with God in some sense. On the second way, it is at least more believable that Augustine entertained this because God seems to be the common substance of the soul and God, but on the first way, where the soul seems to be the common
substance of the SOUL and God, it is much more difficult to believe. We have also seen internal objections to the consubstantiality interpretation generally. Yet since it is difficult to see how else On the Immortality of the Soul could have intended the first two ways, we will retain the consubstantiality interpretation as a plausible hypothesis, recognizing that it needs more testing.

It remains to consider a final controversial doctrine that pertains to the relation between the SOUL and God, and which also happens to pertain to the nature of the innate knowledge. When interpreting On the Immortality of the Soul 2.2, which is in the context of the first way, I argued that Augustine was arguing that the SOUL’s human ratio is identical to the Forms themselves (i.e. to divine Ratio) on all four ways. This raises a scandalous question. Could Augustine have been suggesting that human ratio is not only consubstantial with God, but also identical to God on all four ways, regardless of whether or not the SOUL is created? This certainly has some plausibility on the first two ways. The SOUL and Ratio do not even seem to be distinct substances on these ways and Augustine seems to identify human ratio and divine Ratio in 2.2 in the context of the first way. It also has some plausibility on the third way (though less of it), since the SOUL remains an eternal, unchangeable, and uncreated substance and the SOUL’s innate knowledge of Ratio seems described by Ratio itself existing in it (or vice versa) with no intervening notions. The idea seems much less plausible for the fourth way because the SOUL is created and so the SOUL’s ratio would seems to be created as well, but even here it has some plausibility. Just as on the third way, the SOUL’s innate knowledge of Ratio seems to remain a case of “one existing in the other” with no intervening notions. We cannot be sure that Augustine entertained this doctrine for all of the four ways so far, but it is important to recognize that it is a possible interpretation of the text. I come back to this interpretation in Chapter 6 when I thoroughly consider the question of the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God.

Whatever complement of these doctrines does apply to each of the four ways, we can say
confidently that the four ways comprise four slightly different versions of Platonic recollection. The first two versions are more or less the same, the third differs mainly in that the SOUL is somehow a distinct substance from Ratio, and the fourth most fundamentally differs in that it entails a created SOUL. We can also be fairly confident that the first three ways are “eternal, constitutive Forms” versions of Platonic recollection. I draw one further conclusion about my method of interpreting On the Immortality of the Soul from the discussion in this section. Earlier, I promised to show that it was reasonable to assume that whatever Augustine says about one of the four ways can be applied to the other ways, mutatis mutandis, as long as it is not inconsistent with them. In this discussion, I provided evidence for this without always assuming it. For example, I observed that incorporeality obviously applies to all four ways, I argued that the unity of SOULS should apply to all four ways, and I argued that key doctrines on the third way should apply to the first and second ways. Seeing that Augustine makes these generalizations across ways supports the idea that he makes other generalizations across ways, as my method maintains.

5. The Role of Platonic Recollection in the Soliloquies Project

So far I have shown that Platonic recollection reasoning in general is almost certainly entailed by all four ways, but I have not yet determined its precise role in the Soliloquies Project. Is it merely a logical implication of the four ways, a mere corollary of them, or is it an important and possibly essential argument behind each of the four ways, allowing them to infer their immortality conclusion? The answer to this question is relevant not only because it can strengthen my basic case, but also because it is revealing about Augustine’s philosophical motivations at this early stage. The evidence that we have seen so far suggests that it is an important and possibly essential argument, as I now explain.

We noticed both in Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul that Augustine’s general strategy was to begin from the SOUL’s ordinary ability to learn eternal intelligible things
and to argue from this that the SOUL was immortal. That is, he began from taking it as a fact that the SOUL can learn eternal intelligible things and then asked, “What must be true about the SOUL if it is to be able to learn these things?” From On the Immortality of the Soul, we saw that this ability to learn requires prior knowledge of Ratio, which seemed to be prior knowledge of those very eternal intelligible things themselves. This prior knowledge, in turn, required that Ratio exists in the SOUL (or vice versa) and thus is “conjoined” to SOUL. Thus, from the ability to learn intelligible things, Augustine inferred the conjunction of knowledge.

The next thing that I inferred was that this conjunction entailed preexistence and then innate knowledge on all four ways because Augustine took the conjunction to be inseparable in the sense of the contentious conditional (with a slight qualification for the fourth way). That is, the contentious conditional, combined with Ratio’s eternity, entailed that the SOUL must preexist and it also entailed a de facto version of the less-contentious conditional, which itself entailed innate knowledge. But here we may raise a question: Why believe in the contentious conditional? Presumably the logical structure of Augustine’s argument actually functions in reverse. That is, he first infers that the SOUL has innate knowledge from the previously established fact that learning requires the prerequisite conjunction of knowledge. Second, he infers the less-contentious conditional on such a basis. This makes sense because saying that the knowledge is innate in Augustine’s terms is effectively saying that the SOUL has a conjunction of knowledge with Ratio for as long as the SOUL exists. Third, he infers that the SOUL must preexist because of the preexistence requirement, i.e. because the objects of the innate knowledge must have been “thought earlier.” Fourth, he infers the contentious conditional because having a preexistent SOUL conjoined to Ratio already makes the contentious conditional plausible and

Recall imm. an. 6.10.17-18(110) for the first part of this strategy: “But whatever the case may be, the SOUL cannot contemplate [Ratio] by means of SOUL itself [as opposed to by body] unless by means of some conjunction (coniunctione) with it.”
because there are other reasons to believe it, such as a) that \textit{Ratio} must exist “somewhere,” b) that mere incorporeality implies inseparability, and c) that the \textit{SOUL} is better than the World-Body. Finally, he concludes that the \textit{SOUL} must therefore exist forever into the future as well.

If this line of reasoning accurately reflects Augustine’s thinking, as I think it does, then we can at least conclude that Platonic recollection reasoning is \textit{important} to the immortality arguments on the four ways, since its features function as important premises for inferring immortality. The Innate Knowledge Feature plays an important role in concluding that the \textit{SOUL} is conjoined to \textit{Ratio} at all and the Preexistence Requirement Feature plays an important role in concluding that the conjunction is inseparable in the contentious sense. But we also may be able to conclude that the Innate Knowledge Feature, at least, is \textit{essential} to the argument. It is difficult to make the case that the Preexistence Requirement Feature is essential because Augustine appeals to other reasons to infer it. But it is easier to make such a case for the Innate Knowledge Feature, since it seems to be necessary for inferring the conjunction between \textit{SOUL} and \textit{Ratio}.

An objection to this contention is that at one point in the text, Augustine contends that mere incorporeality is enough to infer that the \textit{SOUL} is conjoined to \textit{Ratio}, which would seem to mean that innate knowledge is not necessary to infer it. But this may not do away with innate knowledge for the following reasons. First, a key reason for inferring the \textit{SOUL}’s incorporeality in the first place is precisely because the \textit{SOUL}’s ability to learn intelligible things shows that it must have prerequisite knowledge of \textit{Ratio}. In other words, incorporeality follows from innate knowledge, in which case innate knowledge would still be necessary for inferring the conjunction. Second, even if innate knowledge were not necessary for inferring incorporeality, as would seem to be the case for irrational souls (which do not have innate knowledge but are

\footnote{I did not mention this particular claim explicitly in section 2 above, but it is a corollary of combining \textit{imm. an.} 6.10.17-2(110-111), \textit{imm. an.} 10.17.8-14(119), and \textit{imm. an.} 1.1.8-14(2) in the way I did there.}
known to be incorporeal), innate knowledge would still be necessary for inferring the proper sort of conjunction to make individual rational souls immortal. Innate knowledge, after all, is the key property (together with the ability for conscious knowledge) that distinguishes between rational and irrational souls in the respective arguments for immortality, and it seems to be what allows us to infer that rational souls (unlike irrational ones) are immediately conjoined to Ratio. Innate knowledge, then, would still be necessary for inferring the SOUL’s conjunction to Ratio because it is necessary for inferring the right sort of individual conjunction to it that entails individual immortality.

Another objection is that Affinity Argument reasoning may be enough to infer the proper individual conjunction to Ratio without the need for innate knowledge. The idea would be that learning requires the appropriate individual conjunction to Ratio merely because it requires a sufficient likeness between SOUL and Ratio. This is certainly a possible interpretation since Augustine seems to appeal to affinity reasoning when inferring incorporeality and other things. However, it could also be that when he is inferring the conjunction on the basis of affinity, he is first inferring innate knowledge, and then inferring affinity to explain the existence of the innate knowledge. In that case innate knowledge still would remain necessary and thus essential to the argument.

Thus, there are plausible reasons to believe that Platonic recollection reasoning is essential to Augustine’s argument for immortality to some degree or other, in addition to being important. Innate knowledge reasoning in particular seems to be woven throughout the argument in a way that cannot be removed without the argument falling apart. Whether preexistence requirement reasoning is also essential is less likely, since there are other reasons for inferring the contentious conditional that Augustine could have thought were independent of it.

\[\text{imm. an. 10.17.8-14(119)}\]
6. Augustine’s Acceptance of Platonic Recollection in the *Soliloquies* Project

While many details remain to be filled and questions answered, some of which will be the task of the next chapters, the evidence from *On the Immortality of the Soul* itself seems overwhelming that it is expressing Platonic recollection of different kinds. None of the four ways appear to offer an alternative to Platonic recollection and they may even take it as essential to their immortality arguments. The work is also quite clearly expressing three different “eternal, constitutive Forms” Platonic recollection views and a fourth view that mainly differs in positing a created SOUL. My discovery of these four different views comes from my discovery that the work is coherently structured around four different ways that the SOUL can be conjoined to Ratio. This coherent structure suggests that Augustine had a coherent agenda, as well as that what he was expressing in this agenda is discoverable to a certain degree and that the work was meant to be continuous and consistent with the *Soliloquies*.

Given that all of these things are true, we have good reason to believe that Augustine accepts Platonic recollection of some sort at the time of the *Soliloquies* Project. All of his four ways entail it, it is important and possibly essential to their arguments, and Augustine does not seem to offer an alternative. Given the strength of this positive evidence for, we would have to have strong evidence against his acceptance of Platonic recollection elsewhere in order to overturn this conclusion.

We can now ask which Platonic recollection view, if any, did Augustine accept? Did he prefer one of the ways in particular, did he prefer a group of them, or was he neutral about them? Internal to the *Soliloquies* Project itself there is very little indication. Since Augustine spends most of his time on the first Platonic recollection view, one could argue that this is the one he prefers. The incompleteness of *On the Immortality of the Soul*, however, encourages caution. How do we know that he was not going to spend more time on the fourth view? How do we
know that he was not going to tell us which view he preferred? There is only one passage internal to the *Soliloquies* Project itself that gives some hint about Augustine’s own preference.

The passage arises in *On the Immortality of the Soul* as Augustine transitions to discussing the fourth way.

Going back, therefore, if something is to be feared, it is to be feared that the SOUL dies by becoming defective (*deficiendo*), that is, by being deprived of the form of existing (*existendi specie privatur*). Although *I think enough has been said about this, and it has been demonstrated by certain ratio how this cannot happen*, nevertheless it still should be closely considered that there is no other cause of this fear except because it is to be confessed that the SOUL is foolish in a certain [state of] defect and is wise in a more fixed and fuller [state of] essence.\(^{411}\)

According to the passage, Augustine is going to continue addressing the objection that the SOUL might die by being deprived of the form of existing, which is precisely what he does for the rest of the work. But note the italicized clause. As far as he is concerned, it has already been “demonstrated by certain *ratio* how this cannot happen.” That is, the arguments he has already provided are sufficient. If we go on to ask to which of the four ways this statement applies, we find that it can only apply to the first three ways and not the fourth. The objection has only been answered conclusively if one of the first three ways is true. As Augustine goes on to say,

> But if [SOUL] exists by means of itself, then since it is the cause of its own existing and never abandons itself, then it never dies, *as we also argued (disputauimus) above*. But if it exists from that (ex illa) [highest essence], then we need to diligently inquire what thing (*res*) could be contrary to it that would snatch the SOUL away from being SOUL (*animo auferat animum esse*).\(^{412}\)

Augustine is saying that he has not yet inquired sufficiently about whether the SOUL can die by losing the form of existing on the way where the SOUL “exists from that [highest essence],” that

\(^{411}\) *imm. an.* 11.18.23(119)-6(120) (my emphasis) “Rursum igitur, si quid metuendum est, id est metuendum, ne deficiendo animus intereat, id est dum ipsa existendii specie privatur. De quae re quamquam satis esse dictum arbitrer et, quam hoc fieri non possit, certa ratione monstratum sit, tamen etiam hoc adtendendum est, non esse aliam causam huius formidinis nisi quia fatendum est in defectu quodam esse animum stultum et in essentia certiori atque pleniore sapientem.”

\(^{412}\) *imm. an.* 11.18.12-17(120) “Sed si per seipsum est, quoniam ipse sibi causa existendi est et numquam se deserit, numquam interit, ut supra etiam disputauimus. Si vero ex illa, diligentem opus est quaerere, quae res ei possit esse contraria, quae animo auferat animum esse, quod illa praebet.”
is on the fourth way. He has sufficiently shown, however, that the SOUL never dies if the SOUL
“exists by means of itself,” which includes the third way and likely the first two ways.\footnote{Even if the first two ways are not included in this statement, we have seen that Augustine takes his arguments on the first and second ways to be conclusive on this point, and they all occur prior to this passage.}

Therefore, when Augustine says that it has already been “demonstrated by certain ratio how this
[objection] cannot happen,” he seems to be saying that he thinks at least one of the first three
ways is true. That is, he provisionally accepts a strict “eternal, constitutive Forms” Platonic
recollection view at this time. He is only considering the fourth way on the off chance that he is
mistaken or to pacify the obstinate doubters.\footnote{This is in contrast to Cary, who thinks that Augustine’s articulation of the fourth way shows that he has given up the previous three ways. See Cary, Invention (2000), 109 “From this point on, Augustine has in effect already given up the Cassiciacum project, or at least the proof of the immortality of the soul that was to be its crowning achievement.” One of the many goals of Chapters 3 and 4 has been to show that this was not the case.}

But did he also indicate which of the first three views he preferred? Besides the fact that
Augustine spends the most time and energy on the first view, we have no other internal evidence.
There is, however, some explicit external evidence from Letter 3 to Nebridius. There, Augustine
explains that there is a line of reasoning with which he “continually charms [himself] as [his]
sole treasure, and in which [he] exceedingly delights.”\footnote{\textit{ep. 3.3.68-69} “\textit{An illa ratiocinatio cui tamquam unicae meae blandiri soleo, et ea me nimis oblectare?”}} That line of reasoning includes the
answer to the question, “But what if the SOUL dies?” If it does, says Augustine, “then truth
\textit{( ueritas) dies, or truth is not the intelligence (intelligentia), or intelligence is not in the SOUL or something can die in which something immortal is. But my \textit{Soliloquies} already secures that none of these can happen, and it has been sufficiently persuasive.”\footnote{\textit{ep. 3.4.80-84} “\textit{Quid si moritur animus? Ergo moritur ueritas, aut non est in intellegentia ueritas, aut intellegentia non est in animo aut potest mori aliquid in quo aliquid immortale est. Nihil autem horum fieri posse Soliloquia nostra iam continent, satisque persuasum est; ...”}}

The argument for the
immortality of the SOUL in the \textit{Soliloquies}, Augustine tells us, has been sufficiently persuasive. It
is his “sole treasure,” and he “exceedingly delights” in it. Since we know that the argument in the
Soliloquies is expressing a variation of the first way, we seem to be able to conclude that he prefers the first way, with all of its strange implications (whatever they are), to all the others. Augustine’s seeming acceptance of the first way here will make the thorough evaluation of this way in Chapter 6 especially contentious.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that Augustine entertains Platonic recollection in general throughout On the Immortality of the Soul and that he very likely accepts it in the Soliloquies Project. We have also seen that he considers four slightly different versions of it and likely prefers the first version, which I call First-Way Platonic Recollection. We can now ask the following question. How plausible is this interpretation of the Soliloquies Project and all the controversial doctrines it entails? So far I have restricted my inquiry as much as possible to the texts themselves, the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul, in order to take them on their own terms according to their own apparent logical structure. This has been profitable because it has shown that we can find a more sophisticated agenda underlying the texts than has ordinarily been recognized and that we can draw some elaborate conclusions from it. Even considered purely internally, however, there are some difficulties with my interpretation, the most serious of which suggests that the SOUL is not intended to be consubstantial with God on the first two ways.

What does not present a problem for my interpretation, however, is Augustine’s discussion of illumination in the Soliloquies. From the text itself, there is no reason to think that illumination is opposed to Platonic recollection. The idea that God illuminates intelligible things so that they can be known does not conflict with the Innate Knowledge Feature or with the Preexistence Requirement Feature. In fact, since the God of the illumination passage and the Truth of the immortality argument turn out to be identical, Augustine is precisely maintaining
that illumination and Platonic recollection are both essential to the same doctrine of learning. Neither doctrine is sufficient without the other.

Now that I have considered the *Soliloquies* Project in its own terms and shown that it suggests that Augustine accepted First-Way Platonic Recollection, I turn to evaluating the plausibility of this interpretation by consulting other works and examining whether the earlier Cassiciacum dialogues suggest the same interpretation.
Chapter 5 – Platonic Recollection and the Pre-Baptismal Writings: Platonic Recollection in General (Category 1)

Introduction

In the previous three chapters, I argued that Augustine expresses Platonic recollection in general throughout the *Soliloquies* and *On the Immortality of the Soul* and that it is important and possibly essential to his argument for the soul’s immortality. From this, I concluded that he therefore accepts Platonic recollection of some sort in these writings. I also argued that Augustine expresses four different kinds of Platonic recollection views in these writings and that he likely prefers the version expressed in the first way.

I turn now to two questions raised by the previous chapters. 1) Is this a plausible interpretation of the *Soliloquies* Project upon considering Augustine’s other works and influences? 2) Did Augustine accept Platonic recollection in general and first-way Platonic recollection in particular in the previous three Cassiciacum dialogues (the Cassiciacum trilogy)? Providing affirmative answers to both of these questions is the last step in proving my thesis that Augustine accepts First-Way Platonic Recollection in his pre-baptismal writings. The two questions are mutually related. Since it is likely that Augustine held more or less the same view in the first three Cassiciacum dialogues as in the *Soliloquies* Project, whatever that view was,

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417 This is reasonable because the first three dialogues are meant to be a trilogy and because the third dialogue (*De ordine*) anticipates material from the *Soliloquies* suggesting that it is part of the same plan. We know that Augustine’s first three works were meant to be a trilogy because they dramatically and thematically interrefer, have similar literary forms, begin with dedicatory introductions, and feature the same main interlocutors. It may even be that they intentionally are correlated with an interconnected set of Cicero’s works (i.e. *Contra Academicos* correlates with *Hortensius* and *Academica*, *De beata uita* with *De finibus* and *Tusculanae disputationes*, and *De ordine* with *De natura deorum*, *De diuinatione*, and *De fato*) (For the interconnection between Cicero’s works, see Cicero’s *Diu. 2.1*. For the correlation between Cicero’s works and the Cassiciacum trilogy, see Michael Foley, “Philosophical Roots” (1999): 51-77.). We know that the *Soliloquies* Project was part of the same plan as the Cassiciacum trilogy because of how book 2 of *De ordine* alludes to the upcoming method and themes of the *Soliloquies*. See ord. 2.18.47-2.18.48.25 and 2.19.50 (cf. especially ord. 2.19.50.31-38 with sol. 1.1.1 and imm. an. 2.2). The *Soliloquies* represents a new beginning, however, because it leaves behind the Ciceronian flavour of the
evidence for (or against) the one functions as evidence for (or against) the other. If Augustine accepted the SOUL’s eternity in the first three Cassiciacum dialogues, then this is evidence that he accepted it in the Soliloquies Project, and if he rejected it in the former, then it is evidence that he rejected it in the latter. Due to this close relation between the questions, I consider them both at the same time in these final two chapters. A more concise way to pose them is to combine them as follows: Does Augustine accept First-Way Platonic Recollection in his pre-baptismal writings? Although I take it as my default assumption that Augustine does accept the same view throughout the pre-baptismal writings, I am also sensitive to the possibility that there are differences, such as the shift in the understanding of “made” (factus) I have already observed.

To order the discussion, I begin with the most general claims about Platonic recollection and proceed to the most specific ones, which also tend to be the most controversial. There are four categories of claims from the most general to the most specific. The first category includes Platonic recollection in general, and the doctrines that typically accompany it. These include the Innate Knowledge Feature and the Preexistence Requirement Feature, but I also take them to include the narrative of the preexistence, fall, and later return of the SOUL that Platonic recollection typically implies. The second category contains the controversial additional claims that I have suggested apply to all four ways: omnipresence, unity of all souls including the World Soul, innate knowledge is the Forms, and the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms. The third category contains the controversial claims that apply to the first three ways only: the SOUL exists by means of itself, is unchangeable in substance, eternal, unmade, and uncreated. The fourth category contains the controversial claims that apply to the first and second ways only. There may be only one doctrine in this category, namely, the soul’s consubstantiality with God, but it may also include the claim that human ratio is identical to divine Ratio, as I will assume for the

Cassiciacum trilogy in favour of a Neoplatonic one, has no dedicatory introduction, is directed towards the few (sol. 1.1.1.1-3(4)), and has a newly-invented name (sol. 2.7.14).
time being. This latter doctrine may also belong to the second category if it applies to all four ways. Given this framework, my contention is that it is very plausible that Augustine accepts the first three categories throughout the pre-baptismal writings, including the Cassiciacum trilogy, and that these therefore ought to become standard interpretations of the pre-baptismal Augustine. I concede that it is less certain that Augustine accepts the fourth category claims, and yet argue that there are compelling reasons to accept them.

As a method of evaluating the plausibility of these claims, I consider them against a recent monograph that tends toward the more conservative side of the issues. Chad Gerber is a recent Oxford graduate whose book *The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology* has made an important contribution to the debate about the relation between the soul and God in Augustine’s early writings. Although he ignores the question of Platonic recollection itself, he has provided an extensive treatment of the more controversial views that I have claimed accompany it. He acknowledges that Augustine accepts most of the first two categories, as I do, but rejects that Augustine accepts the second two, claiming both that the soul is created regardless of the way under consideration for Augustine and that it is not consubstantial with God. To supplement my evaluation I also consider Lewis Ayres’ arguments on these matters from his recent work *Augustine and the Trinity*. Gerber consulted extensively with Ayres in the process of writing his book and their arguments generally complement each other. I take their contributions as the most up to date and serious conservative alternative to my more radical interpretation. I focus on Gerber’s work rather than Ayres’ because his discussion is more directly relevant to our questions about the soul and because Ayres himself refers us to Gerber for a more thorough

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420 They do not agree in every detail, but they strongly agree that the soul could not have been uncreated and could not have been consubstantial with God, the two highly controversial doctrines that I am suggesting Augustine entertained and probably endorsed.
This chapter is solely devoted to the first category of claims. It is intended to show that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection in general in the pre-baptismal writings. Chapter 6 is devoted to the second, third, and fourth categories of claims, and so is intended to show that Augustine accepted First-Way Platonic Recollection in the pre-baptismal writings. In dealing only with the first category here, I consider first the preexistence part of the preexistence requirement, then innate knowledge, and finally the requirement part of the preexistence requirement.

1. Preexistence in the Pre-Baptismal Writings

That Augustine accepted preexistence in the pre-baptismal works, including the whole narrative of the preexistence, fall, and return of the soul, is relatively clear from the evidence we have already consulted, and so I do not have to spend much time on this question. In the Soliloquies Project we saw that Augustine does not even consider an alternative to preexistence and we also saw that regardless of the way under consideration, this preexistence was an individuated state of consciously knowing Ratio, of being wise, from which the soul “turned away” and to which it longs to “turn toward” again. “Turning away” refers to the soul’s fall and earthly embodiment and “turning toward” again refers to its return. In Chapter 1, we found similar evidence for this narrative from Augustine’s earliest pre-baptismal writings (On the Happy Life, Against the Academyans) and from works written just after his baptism (On the Quantity of the Soul, On the Free Choice of the Will 1, and Letter 7).

O’Connell provides a more thorough defence of this narrative in the pre-baptismal

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421 As a prelude to his discussion of Du Roy’s thesis about the strong influence of Neoplatonism on Augustine’s early Trinitarian thought, Ayres notes, “In what follows I have also learnt much from Chad Gerber’s The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology: Contextualizing His Pneumatology ..., a work which should be consulted for further treatment of all the texts I have discussed in Chapters 1 and 2” (Trinity (2010), 20 n. 23).
writings and beyond, and he has shown that it has Plotinian roots.\textsuperscript{422} A recent scholar in the O’Connell tradition casts legitimate doubt on O’Connell’s further claim that Augustine returns to a preexistence narrative at the end of his life,\textsuperscript{423} but even those on the conservative side of the debate now generally acknowledge the narrative’s presence in Augustine’s early writings and certainly at Cassiciacum. Chad Gerber, for example, tells us, “At Cassiciacum ... there are sufficient grounds for believing that [Augustine] takes up every ‘chapter’ of this narrative as written by Plotinus, save the soul’s ontological emanation from Intellect.”\textsuperscript{424} With my added evidence from the \textit{Soliloquies} Project, the debate about whether pre-baptismal Augustine accepted this preexistence narrative should be settled.

Before taking it as completely settled for these writings, however, there is a final objection to address that could cause some lingering doubts. The objection is that as a new Christian, the pre-baptismal Augustine would have been committed to the future resurrection of the body and so could not have believed in the preexistence of the \textit{SOUL}. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body typically means that we are essentially \textit{SOULS} and bodies, and this suggests that we began our existence as body/\textit{SOUL} composites. This is inconsistent with the doctrine of preexistence because preexistence seems to suggest that we are essentially \textit{SOULS}, and so there is no need for bodies either before or after this life. How Augustine solves this puzzle, in my view, is different for the pre-baptismal and early post-baptismal writings, but it is evident in both cases that the resurrection of the body objection does not rule out the preexistence narrative.

\textsuperscript{422} O’Connell, \textit{Early Theory} (1968), Chapters 6-7.
\textsuperscript{423} Rombs, \textit{Fall of the Soul} (2006), 109-205.
\textsuperscript{424} Gerber, \textit{Spirit} (2012), 80. Gerber defends the existence of the narrative by referring the reader to \textit{Acad.} 1.3.9, 2.1.2, 2.9.22 (together with \textit{retr.} 1.1.3), 3.9.20, 3.19.42; \textit{beata u.} 1.1-2; \textit{ord.} 1.7.20, 2.9.26-27, 2.11.31; and \textit{sol.} 1.1.4, 1.14.24, 2.17.31, 2.20.35 (Gerber, \textit{The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology}, 79 n.104). Outside of \textit{ord.} 1.7.20, \textit{sol.} 1.1.4, and \textit{sol.} 2.17.31, all of these references seem to me to support his claim. In the next chapter, I will argue (\textit{pace} Gerber) that the idea of “the soul’s ontological emanation from Intellect” should also be included in the narrative.
In the pre-baptismal writings, this is clear because Augustine makes no explicit mention of being committed to the bodily resurrection doctrine and may even reject it. Augustine’s first explicit endorsement of the doctrine is after his baptism in *On the Quantity of the Soul* 33.76, and this makes the absence of any reference to it in the pre-baptismal works conspicuous. The clearest evidence that he outright rejects the doctrine in the pre-baptismal works is in *Against the Academicians*, since he speaks about how the mind will hasten back to heaven while “throwing off the burden of the whole body” (*proiecto totius corporis onere*), suggesting that no bodily trace will be left.\(^{425}\) If this is the case, however, one might ask how Augustine could define human beings as “rational mortal animals” in *On Order*, because that would suggest that we are essentially composites of souls and bodies.\(^{426}\) The answer is that while it is true that human beings, *hominem*, are essentially composites of souls and bodies for the pre-baptismal Augustine, human beings are not necessarily what we essentially are. Instead, we seem simply to be souls.\(^{427}\) This point, too, is suggested in *Against the Academicians*. In response to the objection that the human being who merely seeks the truth is imperfect, Licentius (in the role of the skeptic) says, “I admit that the one who does not reach the goal is imperfect. But I think that God alone or perhaps the human soul (*hominis animam*) when it has abandoned this body that is a dark prison, knows the Truth. The goal of a human being (*hominis ... finis*), however, is to seek the Truth perfectly; for we do seek the perfect, but nevertheless as a human being.”\(^{428}\)

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\(^{425}\) *Acad.* 2.1.2.

\(^{426}\) In *ep.* 3.4, too, Augustine says that we consist of soul and body.

\(^{427}\) Few Augustine scholars consider this possibility. In the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy*, for example, Markus rightly observes that starting from his conversion, Augustine stresses the unity of *homo* as a soul/body composite, but Markus then assumes without examination that this is what the pre-baptismal Augustine thinks we fundamentally are (“Augustine – Man: Body and Soul,” *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 355-61).

\(^{428}\) *Acad.* 1.3.9.67-72 “Qui ad finem, inquit, non peruenit, fateor, quod perfectus non sit. Veritatem autem illam solum deum nosse arbitror aut forte hominis animam, cum hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosum carcerem, dereliquerit. Hominis autem finis est perfecte quaerere ueritatem; perfectum enim quaerimus, sed tamen hominem.”
Abstracting from the skeptical content peculiar to Licentius (and not Augustine), the implication is clear. The term “human being,” *homo*, refers to the soul/body composite in this life, which in Licentius’ view can only *seek* the Truth perfectly at most. Once the human soul “has abandoned this body that is a dark prison,” the implication is that it is no longer a “human being,” and this is a better situation to be in. It is the only time, according to Licentius, that we not only seek, but also attain our goal of knowing the Truth, which would be the time when we are truly ourselves. If we can attribute this non-skeptical content to the pre-baptismal Augustine, then we can conclude that we are not essentially human beings but *SOULS*, which fits perfectly with the claim that he did not believe in the resurrection of the body in these writings. Admittedly, it is possible that Licentius may not mean that the human soul abandons body altogether in the afterlife, since in specifying that it abandons “this body,” he leaves open the possibility that it takes on a heavenly body. However, his refusal to call us “human beings” (*homines*) in that life suggests otherwise.\(^{429}\)

Even if Augustine did accept the resurrection of the body in the pre-baptismal writings, it still would not rule out the preexistence narrative, since Augustine provides the resources to reconcile the two doctrines in the immediate post-baptismal writings. After first announcing that he believes in a bodily resurrection in *On the Quantity of the Soul* 33.76, he shows that he thinks that the *SOUL* likely preexisted with a heavenly body in his commentary *On Genesis Against the Manichees*. Commenting on the Genesis passage where God blew the spirit of life into the first

\(^{429}\) See also *Acad*. 3.9.20 and 3.17.38. In the former, Augustine says that the Academicians ought to say that “your SOUL will rejoice in [wisdom] completely after this life – that is, when you cease to be a human being” (King trans., slightly modified), and in the latter Augustine says that people can only understand the mysteries if they adopt a different way of life that is more than human. It is true that Augustine seems to deny that the term *homo* only applies to the soul/body composite in *mor*. 1.4.6 where he says that the term *homo* may refer to the soul alone. In saying this, however, Augustine does not mean that a disembodied soul can be called a *homo*. He only means that the term may more properly apply to the soul within the composite, while still necessary entailing the composite.
human being and the human being was made a living soul (*animam uiuentem*),\(^{430}\) Augustine says that if the human being referred to was only initially a body and then was conjoined with a soul, there are two possible options for interpreting the passage. It could mean that the soul had already been made and existed “in God’s mouth,” i.e. “in his Truth or Wisdom,” or, it could mean that the soul was made at that very moment when body and soul were originally joined.\(^{431}\) The first option clearly refers to the soul’s preexistence without any body at all, which Augustine now seems to reject. The implications of the second option are not clear in this passage, but Augustine makes it clear in a later passage that one possibility is that the soul was created with a heavenly body and not an earthly one. On this scenario, Adam and Eve originally preexisted as souls with heavenly bodies, and these bodies only became earthly and mortal after their sin.\(^{432}\) He does not go into detail about the origin of subsequent souls and bodies, but the interpretation leaves the possibility open that all souls preexist conjoined with heavenly bodies, and that these bodies become earthly and mortal once they are born into this life. Another possibility, Augustine suggests, is that the soul was created with an earthly body (though in Adam and Eve’s case still immortal) right away,\(^{433}\) showing that he recognizes the non-preexistence possibility.

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\(^{430}\) *Genesis 2:7*

\(^{431}\) *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.8.10

\(^{432}\) *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.21.32 “... God made them tunics of skin; that is, they set their hearts on the pleasures of lying after turning their backs on the face of the Truth, and *God changed their bodies into this mortal flesh*, in which lying hearts are concealed. It is not to be supposed, after all, that thoughts can remain *hidden in heavenly bodies* in the same way as they do in these present bodies of ours; but just as at least some of the motions of our SOULS are revealed by the expression on our faces, and especially by our eyes, so *I am convinced that in a similar way no motions of the SOUL whatsoever are concealed in the transparent simplicity of heavenly bodies*” (Hill trans., slightly modified; my emphasis) (... *deus illis fecit tunicas pellicias, id est ipsi appetiverunt mentiendi libidinem relicta facie veritatis, et deus corpora eorum in istam mortalitatem carnis mutavit, ubi latent corda mendacia. Neque enim in illis corporibus caelestibus sic latere posse cogitationes credendum est, quemadmodum in his corporibus latent; sed sicut nonnulli motus animorum apparent in vultu et maxime in oculis, sic in illa perspicuitate ac simplicitate caelestium corporum omnes omnino animi motus latere non arbitror*) (my emphasis).

\(^{433}\) *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.7.8 “What in any case was so strange or difficult for God, even if he did make the man from the mud of this earth, about contriving a body for him that would not have been subject to decay, had the man kept God’s commandment and not been willing to sin?” (Hill trans.) (*Quid autem mirum aut difficile deo, etiamsi de limo istius terrae hominem fecit, tale tamen corpus eius efficere, quod*
However, the passage goes on to indicate that it is not the possibility that Augustine prefers.\textsuperscript{434} Therefore, even on the scenario that we are essentially SOUL/body composites and are created SOUL and body together, as the doctrine of the resurrection suggests, the idea that the SOUL preexists this earthly life for the post-baptismal Augustine is not ruled out because he thinks that these bodies could be heavenly bodies. The fact that Plotinus entertains the same possibility in Enn. 4.3, a treatise that we know Augustine had read by this time, supports this interpretation and shows that Augustine need not have been departing from Neoplatonism in accepting it.\textsuperscript{435}

2. Innate Knowledge

And so we can confidently conclude that Augustine accepted the preexistence of the SOUL in the pre-baptismal writings whether or not he also accepted the resurrection of the body (though he seemingly did not). It seems that we cannot be as confident about innate knowledge and the requirement part of the preexistence requirement, however, since both basic ideas make much less obvious appearances in the Cassiciacum trilogy. With respect to innate knowledge, in particular, there are several passages from On Order that seem to rule it out completely. In one place, Augustine says that the “divine seeds,” by which he means the divine Forms, are in no way entrusted to the SOUL before it is “purged and cultivated” by education corruptioni non subiaceret, si homo praeceptum dei custodiens peccare noluisset?).

\textsuperscript{434} As is clear from Gn. adu. Man. 2.21.32 and 2.14.20. Rombs draws the same conclusion (Fall of the Soul (2006), 124). Teske agrees that Augustine accepted that the first human beings preexisted in this work, but he thinks that Augustine wavers between whether it was a bodily preexistence or not (“St. Augustine’s View of the Original Human Condition in De Genesi contra Manichaeos” Augustinian Studies 22 (1991): 150).

\textsuperscript{435} Enn. 4.3.18.13-24 “Nor do I think that we should suppose that they use speech in the intelligible world, and altogether, even if they have bodies in heaven (σώματα δ’ ἐγκύκλιος ἐν οὐρανῷ), there would be none of that talk there which they engage in here because of needs or over doubtful and disputed points; but as they do everything they do in order and according to nature they would not give orders or advice and would know by intuition what passes from one to another. For here below, too, we can know many things by the look in people’s eyes when they are silent; but there all their body is clear and pure and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or feigned, but before one speaks to another that other has seen and understood” (Armstrong trans.; my emphasis). See O’Connell, Early Theory (1968), 161-166 for compelling evidence that Augustine’s is consciously following Enn. 4.3 in De Genesi contra Manichaeos, including in this passage.
In another he says that the discipline of philosophy is “the very law of God, which, always dwelling fixed and firm with him [God], is transcribed, so to speak, onto wise souls, so that they may know how to live so much better and more sublimely, as they contemplate it more perfectly.” In both cases it seems that learning involves acquiring new knowledge in the soul and is not recollecting innate knowledge that the soul already has within it. The same point is suggested in a slightly different way by the On Order passage discussed above about the soul’s lack of intellectual memory. As we saw in Chapter 1, the idea seemed to be that neither foolish nor wise souls have any intellectual memory, and that even the wise soul after it is wise only holds the intelligibles in memory in the sense that it is always seeing them “before those interior eyes of intellect.” The problem for my argument is that this seems to mean that the Forms are merely “present to” the soul prior to learning and not innately known. These passages also seem to do away with the preexistence requirement as a result because there is no innate knowledge to require the preexistence.

If these are the only Cassiciacum passages casting doubt upon innate knowledge and the preexistence requirement, however, they can be made consistent with the Platonic recollection interpretation of the Soliloquies Project with little difficulty. The first two passages can be interpreted as follows. Given On the Immortality of the Soul’s distinction between the prior connection to Ratio of innate knowledge and the posterior connection of conuersio and contemplation, we can simply take these passages to be discussing the posterior connection, the

\[436\] ord. 1.2.4 “assequeris ergo ista, mihi crede, cum eruditioni operam dederis, qua purgatur et excolitur animus nullo modo ante idoneus, cui diuina semina committuntur.”

\[437\] ord. 2.8.25 (Foley trans., slightly modified; my emphasis) “Haec autem disciplina ipsa dei lex est, quae apud eum fixa et inconcussa semper manens in sapientes animas quasi transcribitur, ut tanto se sciant uiuere melius tantoque sublimius, quanto et perfectius eam contemplantur intellegendo et uiuendo custodiunt diligentius.”

\[438\] ord. 2.2.7 “What need does he have for memory (memoria) when he has and holds all of his own things as present? For not even in sense itself do we call memory to our aid for that which is before our eyes. Therefore, since the wise man has everything before those interior eyes of intellect, that is, since he fixedly and immovably sees (intueri) God himself, with whom are all things that the intellect sees and possesses (uidet ac possidet), what need is there, I ask, for memory?”
conscious experience of the intelligibles, without intending to deny the prior connection. That is, acquiring the “divine seeds” in the soul and having philosophy “transcribed onto” the soul would simply be another way of saying that the soul “turns towards” the innately known Forms in order to know them consciously. Although Augustine speaks in these passages as if there were no prior innate knowledge at all, this would be merely for the sake of expedience. Accounting for the existence of innate knowledge in every discussion of learning is cumbersome and confusing due to the paradoxes and controversy involved. It would be especially confusing to the more popular audience at which the trilogy is directed. And so it makes sense that the default for ordinary references to learning would be to ignore innate knowledge language altogether, and thus also to ignore the requirement for preexistence.

The On Order passage about no intellectual memory is even easier to deal with. Denying that the divine Forms exist in the soul’s memory prior to learning does not rule out the possibility that they are known and exist in the soul in some other manner. Indeed, the Forms are known and exist in the soul in some sense after learning without literally being in memory (since the soul has no intellectual memory at all and yet the wise soul is always “seeing” them), and this confirms that they can be known and exist in the soul without existing in memory before learning. The passage even as it stands, then, is entirely consistent with innate knowledge. Indeed, this way of understanding the soul’s pre-learning relation to the Forms fits perfectly with how the Soliloquies Project speaks of innate knowledge. The Project never says that the innately known Forms exist in memory, only that they exist in the soul. Furthermore, in suggesting that the innate knowledge is the Forms themselves, the project suggests that the soul is always knowing the Forms, i.e. always experiencing them, and so it makes sense that they would not be in memory in any ordinary sense.

The On Order passage about no intellectual memory, therefore, supports rather than
opposes my interpretation of the Soliloquies Project. It fits perfectly with the idea that the SOUL’s innate knowledge of the Forms involves always experiencing them and that learning is simply turning one’s consciousness, one’s intentio or cogitatio, toward them so that they are consciously experienced once again. Once they have become consciously experienced in this way, the Forms are easily accessible to the learned SOUL and completely inform it such that even when the SOUL is not explicitly thinking about them, one should still consider them to be consciously experienced. We will consider the reason that Augustine might adopt this sort of view later on. For now, it is enough to see that we have a reasonable interpretation of the On Order intellectual memory passage that fits well with the Soliloquies Project, and that the passage is therefore no significant objection to innate knowledge or the preexistence requirement.

But is this the correct interpretation of the On Order passage, as I would like to insist? The main obstacle to drawing this conclusion is that it is still unclear whether Augustine really does believe in innate knowledge at Cassiciacum, especially given the first two On Order passages above. I provided a way of deflating these passages, but this depended on not taking them entirely literally. To help confirm that they should not be taken entirely literally, I turn now to showing that there are no stronger objections to innate knowledge at Cassiciacum and that there is also strong positive evidence for it.

2.1 Illumination Objection to Innate Knowledge

Let us begin by ruling out the possibility of stronger objections. As I pointed out in the first chapter, O’Daly and Gilson had suggested illumination as an objection, but we can be confident that it is no longer a problem. In the Soliloquies, we saw that the illumination passage there was compatible with the Platonic recollection implied by the immortality argument and it even seemed intended to parallel aspects of the argument. Even the illumination idea that knowing intelligible things is mentally “seeing” them fits right alongside Augustine’s
understanding of Platonic recollection. For him, recollecting intelligible things is not a matter of recalling images or notions of the intelligible things from memory, it is a matter of turning one’s “intention” or “thought” towards the things themselves, innately known and existing within the SOUL (or vice versa). That is, it is a matter of mentally coming to “see” the things it innately knows. The same idea is supported by Augustine’s interpretation of Plato’s view of recollection from Letter 7, written shortly after his baptism. There Augustine says that for Plato, the fact that learning is recollecting a past vision of intelligible things does not rule out the need for a present vision of those things. Learning is “re-seeing” (revisere) those very same things again. Therefore, illumination and its metaphor of “seeing” as found in the Soliloquies Project are not genuine objections to finding Platonic recollection there.

But do we perhaps find references to illumination in the Cassiciacum trilogy that are inconsistent with Platonic recollection? On the contrary, they fit perfectly well with the Soliloquies account. In the Soliloquies we saw that the Son of God or the Truth (ueritas) illuminates the intelligibles in order to make them “true things” (uera) and that this is what makes them intelligible to us. It cannot be accidental that we see a parallel structure in Against the Academics in the discussion of Proteus. The one who can show us something true (uerum), Augustine says, is signified by Proteus who is an image of the Truth (ueritas) itself. This suggests that the Truth (ueritas) is in such a relation to a true thing (uerum) so as to be able to show it to us, i.e. to make it intelligible, just as the Soliloquies articulated. On Order also gives the impression that the Truth makes a true thing intelligible by illuminating it. Licentius, one of Augustine’s young students, tells us, “‘Something (I know not what) has at this moment shone brightly on me by a different, a far different, light. Philosophy is more beautiful, I acknowledge, than Thisbe, than Pyramus, than that Venus and Cupid and all such loves of every sort.’ And

439 Acad. 2.6.13
with a sigh he gave thanks to Christ.”

In this passage, Licentius has gained a new insight from something that has “shone brightly” on him, and he gives thanks to Christ. Since Christ, as we know, is the Son of God and therefore the Truth, Augustine is implying that the new insight has been shown to him by the illumination of the Truth. In this case the dependence of true things on the Truth is less explicit, but the additional step makes perfect sense. The Truth illuminates the new insight, making it intelligible, making it “true,” and this reflection of the true illuminates Licentius’ mind such that he now sees it. The true thing itself does not change to make this possible. It is Licentius’ mind that changes, turning its “intention,” now paying proper attention, in order to experience the illumination consciously. So the illumination references within the trilogy are in accord with the illumination references in the Soliloquies Project and thus give no reason to doubt the presence of Platonic recollection throughout the pre-baptismal writings.

2.2 “Presence to” Objection to Innate Knowledge

A second objection that we encountered in the first chapter was that references to wisdom’s “existence in” (or “presence in”) the SOUL could be taken not to refer to innate knowledge of the intelligibles but merely to the intelligibles’ incorporeal “presence to” the SOUL. Augustine’s later works seemed to understand the matter in this way, as we saw from On the Trinity 12.15.24 and Retractations 1.4.4 and 1.8(7).2, and there were several passages between 386-391 that seemed to suggest that these early works held the same view. On the Teacher 12.40 was the main passage from the post-baptismal works and On the Happy Life 4.35, On Order 1.2.4, 2.2.7, and 2.8.25, Soliloquies 1.8.15, and On the Immortality of the Soul 10.17 were the

440 ord. 1.8.21 (Foley trans.) “alia, longe alia nescio quid mihi nunc luce resplenduit. Pulchrior est philosophia, fataor, quam Thisbe, quam Pyramus, quam illa Venus et Cupido talesque omnimodi amores. – Et cum suspirio gratias Christo agebat.”

441 As beata u. 4.34 tells us.
main passages from the pre-baptismal works. All of these passages except two, however, are entirely consistent with the sort of innate knowledge I have been discussing, as I have already shown from the illumination passages and from the On Order passage about intellectual memory. The only reason that they seem to be evidence against innate knowledge is because they fail to mention anything about it, not because they are inconsistent with it. The only two passages that are inconsistent with innate knowledge, at least when taken literally, are precisely the passages I already flagged: On Order 1.2.4 and 2.8.25. So this “presence to” objection adds no new material to the objection already provided by these passages. Thus, if I can prove that these passages ought to be deflated, then the “presence to” objection also falls.

2.3. Knowledge of the Divine Forms “Exists In” the Soul Prior to Learning at Cassiciacum

Having dealt with additional objections, my next task is straightforward. Provide positive evidence that Augustine believed in innate knowledge at Cassiciacum so that we are justified in deflating On Order 1.2.4 and 2.8.25. The evidence I have in mind comes in two kinds. The first kind indicates that “knowledge” of the divine Forms “exists in” the soul prior to learning at Cassiciacum. The second kind shows that the Cassiciacum Augustine was committed to the Deficiency Argument for innate knowledge and the metaphysical existence of the Forms. Both kinds of evidence, if reliable, confirm that the Augustine was committed to innate knowledge at Cassiciacum.

We can find cases of the first kind of evidence in Against the Academicians. After telling us in his uninterrupted discourse (oratio perpetua) that the wise man assents to wisdom (sapientia) (since otherwise he wouldn’t be wise), Augustine says that the wise man finds the
wisdom to which he assents, *in semet ipso*, “in himself.”⁴⁴² This indicates the point that wisdom “exist in” the SOUL prior to learning. The priority is clear. Wisdom exists “in himself,” i.e. in the wise man’s SOUL, *before* he assents to wisdom, which means it exists there before he is yet wise. Combining this with Augustine’s definition of wisdom in an earlier passage, we can go on to infer that it is “knowledge of the divine Forms” that exists in the SOUL prior to learning.

Following Cicero,⁴⁴³ Augustine tells us that wisdom is the “knowledge (*scientia*) of human and divine matters.”⁴⁴⁴ This tells us, first of all, that all of the divine Forms pertaining to human and divine matters (which would be all divine Forms) will have to exist in the SOUL prior to learning. Second, it tells us that it is “knowledge” (*scientia*) of these things that exists in the SOUL prior to learning. For if wisdom exists in the SOUL prior to learning, and if wisdom is the “knowledge of human and divine matters,” then knowledge of human and divine matters exists in the SOUL prior to learning. This interpretation may seem overly literal, but as we saw in the *Soliloquies* about Truth, *disciplina*, art, and *Ratio* “existing in” the SOUL, Augustine is perfectly capable of taking ordinary language to have remarkably literal implications about reality.

There is another passage suggesting that the knowledge divine Forms exists in the SOUL prior to learning in *Against the Academicians*. At one point in his uninterrupted discourse

Augustine says that there are philosophers

who grant that everything the SOUL takes from the bodily senses can generate opinion (*opinio* ... *gignere*). They deny that this is knowledge (*scientia*), however. They hold that knowledge is contained by the intelligence (*intellegentia contineri*) and lives in the mind (*in mente uiuere*), far removed from the senses.⁴⁴⁵

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⁴⁴２ *Acad.* 3.14.31 “*Si quaeres, ubi inueniat ipsam sapientiam, respondebo: in semet ipso.*”

⁴⁴³ *Tusc.* 4.26.57 “... wisdom is the knowledge of divine and human things, and the cognition of what is the cause of each thing...” (*sapientiam esse rerum diuinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit*). See also *Off.* 2.2.5. Cicero includes the idea that wisdom involves the cognition of the cause of each thing, which Augustine apparently takes to be implied by the first part of the definition.

⁴⁴⁴ *Acad.* 1.6.16 “*Sapientiam esse rerum humanarum diuinarumque scientiam.*”

⁴⁴⁵ *Acad.* 3.11.26 (King trans., slightly modified) “*Sunt enim qui omnia ista, quae corporis sensu accipit animus, opinio* ... *gignere confitentur, scientiam uero negant, quam tamen uolunt intellegentia contineri remotamque a sensibus in mente uiuere.*” See also *ord.* 2.2.5. Trygetius says that it is one thing
Augustine is referring to the *Platonici* here and given what he says later about expecting to find the truth with the Platonists, it is likely that he endorses this view. The key thing to note about the claim is that unlike opinion, which is “generated” from the bodily senses, knowledge “is contained” by the intelligence and “lives in” the mind, suggesting that knowledge already exists in the *soul* prior to becoming aware of it. Indeed, the fact that the knowledge “lives in the mind” seems to foreshadow the *Soliloquies*’ idea that *disciplina*, which could also be translated as “science,” exists in the *soul* as its permanent dwelling place. It is true that the passage does not make it entirely clear that the *soul* contains the knowledge *prior* to learning. It is, however, a reasonable enough interpretation. Aside from the *Soliloquies* echoes, we know that it is what Augustine thought the *Platonici* thought and it certainly is what Plotinus did think in some form. Put together, all of these passages provide a reasonable basis for thinking that the Cassiciacum Augustine believed that knowledge of the divine Forms exists in the *soul* prior to learning, which is effectively to endorse innate knowledge.

### 2.4 The Deficiency Argument for Innate Knowledge

Since one might still think that this is taking the Cassiciacum Augustine a little too literally or superficially, let us look at the second kind of evidence suggesting a commitment to innate knowledge. This evidence is comprised of passages suggesting that Augustine accepts the Deficiency Argument. In saying this, my claim is not that Augustine explicitly presents the Deficiency Argument at Cassiciacum, but rather that the argument is lurking in the background.

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446 *Acad.* 3.20.43.20-24.
447 *ep.* 7.2
448 e.g. *Enn.* 4.7.10.42-3, 4.7.12.8-12 and 6.9.5.10-13 (“The sciences (*epistēmai*) are *logoi* in the soul...”). I say “in some form” because Plotinus does not take the idea of “containment” as literally as Augustine seems to take it in the pre-baptismal works.
particularly in *Against the Academicians*, to be revealed later in the *Soliloquies* Project. To show
that this is the case, I look first look at a post-baptismal work from around 389-391 where the
argument is explicitly at work and then turn back to *Against the Academicians* (386) to find the
same argument. This will have the added benefit of showing that Augustine was committed to
innate knowledge both after his baptism (at least until 391) and before.

A more detailed explanation of the Deficiency Argument is now in order. In my
Introduction, I said that the argument is composed of two main premises, which I stated in terms
of equality and are meant to be generalizable to any sensible instance of a Form and the Form
itself. The first premise was that we can correctly judge that sensible things are genuine cases of
equality and yet that those cases are deficient in comparison with equality itself. The second was
that we could not do this unless we already had knowledge of equality itself. I also said that two
conclusions follow: that the Form of equality exists independently of the particular cases of
equality, and that we have innate knowledge of the Form of equality.

Let us now consider the meanings and implications of these claims in more detail in
terms acceptable to Augustine and Plato. I begin with the first premise. The first term to consider
is “judge.” I use the longer phrase “correctly judge” to make it clear I am referring to a veridical
kind of judgment, but for Augustine the term “correctly” is redundant. He tells us that “judging”
in this sense already implies “cognizing” (i.e. knowing of some sort), which means that it already
implies being veridical. He also adds that judging has a connotation in addition to cognizing.
Judging includes the recognition that something could also be otherwise, as when we judge that
something ought to be so or not. “With respect to cognizing (*ad cognoscendum*),” he says, “it is
enough to see that a thing is so and not so. But with respect to judging (*ad iudicandum*), we add
something by which we signify that it can also be otherwise; as when we say it ought to be thus,
or it ought to have been thus, or it ought to be thus in the future, as craftsmen do with their
Augustine is saying, for example, that when I judge that two things are equal, I not only cognize that they are equal, but I also signify that they could have been unequal, often by implying that they ought to have been equal (or not). Augustine goes on to say that this means that anything that cannot be otherwise, such as God’s eternal law, cannot be judged. God’s law can judge lower things, but, since it cannot be otherwise, cannot be judged itself. In what follows, our emphasis will not be on this second feature of judging, but rather on the first, cognizing feature. I will also infer it to be Plato’s view in the *Phaedo* that when we rightly judge that two things are equal, this is at least a kind of cognition (*gnōsis*) and not merely true opinion.

The next thing to consider is the relation between the sensible cases of equality and equality itself, i.e. between sensible instances of Forms and Forms. In the *Phaedo*, where the example is equal sticks and stones, Plato suggests that these sensible cases of equality are “like” (*homoia*) equality itself, and yet that they also “lack something” (*ti elleipein*) or are “deficient,” (*endea*) with respect to it. The *Timaeus* uses slightly different language. There, Plato says that the world is an “image” (*eikôn*) of the intelligible realm that is its “model” or “original” (*paradeigma*). This suggests that the equality in equal things can be called either a “deficient likeness” or “image” in relation to equality itself.

There are some difficulties in determining what exactly “deficient likeness” is supposed
to mean in this context, and these are debated in Plato scholarship.\textsuperscript{454} One dispute is about whether Plato means “approximate” or not. For example, does he mean that no matter how equal the sticks seem, they are deficient in equality because one will always be slightly shorter (or longer) than the other? Approximation does not seem right, however. If he were only speaking of equality in length, it is reasonable that no two sticks could ever be exactly equal, but Plato has to account for the scenario where there is an equality in number, in which case the equality could be exact. I could have an equal number of sticks in each hand (say 4), and there would not have to be any approximation involved. So then the likeness would have to be deficient in some other way. Plato’s stated reason for the deficiency in the \textit{Phaedo}, unfortunately, is ambiguous. “Do not equal stones and sticks while remaining the same sometimes appear equal to one and not to another?” From this statement, it is unclear whether there is supposed to be a deficiency because (1) the sticks sometimes appear equal to one \textit{thing} and not to another \textit{thing} or because (2) they appear equal to one \textit{person} and not to another \textit{person}. The first idea would be that the equality in the sticks is deficient because the very same sticks are unequal to other sticks and many other things. The second idea would be that the same equality appears equal and unequal to different people. If one is allowed additional liberty with the text, one can also find two more reasons for the deficiency. Stretching the grammar a little, the Greek could be interpreted to mean (3) the sticks appear equal “in one respect and not in another respect.” This third idea would include the thought that the sticks may appear equal in length, for example, but not in diameter. A textual variant also suggests a fourth option: (4) the sticks are deficient because they appear equal and unequal at different \textit{times}. This fourth idea would be that the deficiency is due

\textsuperscript{454} For a more detailed discussion of these and other disputes, see Gerson, \textit{Knowing Persons} (2003), 66-77.

\textsuperscript{455} \textit{Phd.} 74b7-9. “[Socrates:] ἄρ᾽ οὖ ἃθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ὣντα τὸ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τὸ δ᾽ οὐ;”
to the fact that the equality of the sticks changes.\textsuperscript{456}

So then which interpretation is correct? The \textit{Phaedo} itself, unfortunately, makes it difficult to come to a definite conclusion. If I had to choose, I would choose interpretation 1 because it fits the text better than 3 and 4 and because it places the deficiency in the instantiation of equality itself rather than merely subjectively in our perception of it (interpretation 2). Other Platonic works, however, suggest that the ambiguity in the passage may have been intentional to allow for more than one interpretation. The fourth interpretation, for example, seems to be affirmed in the \textit{Timaeus}, when Timaeus says that the sensible realm is far inferior to the realm of Forms because of its always changing, unstable nature.\textsuperscript{457} All four interpretations, moreover, seem to be at work in the \textit{Symposium} when Diotima describes how Beauty itself is superior to all other beautiful things. For her, Beauty “is not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another [interpretation 3], nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another [interpretation 4], nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another [interpretation 1]; nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others [interpretation 2].”\textsuperscript{458} This suggests that all four interpretations each contribute to making something deficiently beautiful and thus to making anything deficient with respect to a certain Form. So it seems that we can take all four interpretations to be genuine reasons for Plato of why instantiations of Forms will be deficient likenesses of the Forms they imitate. To put it more generally, we can say that an instance of a Form is a deficient likeness because the name of the Form can only apply in a \textit{qualified} sense. If the name applies in an unqualified sense, then the thing at issue will be the very Form itself.

There is another dispute that arises from this. Insofar as the likeness is deficient for Plato,

\textsuperscript{456} See D. Bostock (\textit{Plato’s Phaedo}, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 73-8) for a more detailed discussion of these four possibilities.\textsuperscript{457} \textit{Tim.} 27d-29d, 50c-53b. This idea is also hinted at in \textit{Theaetetus} 176a-b and \textit{passim}.\textsuperscript{458} \textit{Symp.} 211a (Nehamas and Woodruff trans., slightly modified).
is it also “unlike” \((\text{anomoion})\)? This would seem to follow as a matter of course. If the equality in equal things is a deficient likeness of the Form of equality, it would seem to be “like” it insofar as it is a likeness and “unlike” it insofar as it is deficient. One reason to think otherwise is that this seems to do away with a principled way of distinguishing between genuine “likenesses” (even if they are deficient) and unlikenesses. The problem is apparent from the \textit{Phaedo}. There, Plato specifically distinguishes two sorts of recollection: one, from things that are “like,” such as seeing a picture of Simmias and being reminded of Simmias, and another, from things that are “unlike,” such as seeing a picture of Simmias and being reminded of Cebes. In the first case, the picture is a deficient likeness and is clearly supposed to be analogous to the way that sensible equality is a deficient likeness of the Form of equality. In the second case, the picture is an unlikeness. The problem, then, is that if the deficient likeness is also “unlike” that of which it is a likeness, then it will be a mixture of like and unlike, and so would not seem to differ in kind from the unlikeness. Even the unlikeness will not be completely unlike, but will also be like, since a picture of Simmias is also like Cebes in many respects (e.g. it is a picture of a man and Simmias is a man). Yet Plato seems to be committed to saying that there is a difference in kind because instances of equality can be not merely approximately equal, but exactly equal, despite being deficient with respect to equality itself. So it would seem that Plato means to say that while the likeness in equal things is deficient with respect to equality itself, it is still not “unlike.”

Answering this question for Plato is complicated and will not be necessary for my argument. We already have a sufficient sense of what he thinks are the key features of the relation between sensible instances and their corresponding Forms for the purposes of the Deficiency Argument. The sensible instances are genuinely “like” their Forms and yet also “deficient” in comparison with them. This deficiency refers to the fact that the instances will be

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\(^{459}\) This is one of Gerson’s reasons for denying that the deficiency entails being “unlike” in some sense (\textit{Knowing Persons} (2003), 66-67).
predicated of their subject with some qualification, though not because they are mere “approximations.” Whether or not mere approximations can also be called deficient likenesses and whether or not the exact instances are “unlike” their Forms for Plato are questions for another time. But what about Augustine? Does he also have these conceptual resources and does he apply them to the relation between sensible instances and Forms?

Yes, he does. This is evident from his Cassiciacum works, and most explicitly in the *Soliloquies*. There, Augustine’s terms for “like,” “unlike,” and “likeness” are *simile*, *dissimile*, and *similitudo*. Our English words “similar,” “dissimilar,” and “similitude” derive from these terms and can be synonymous. In ordinary usage, however, they tend to be more vague and so I will keep with the “likeness” terminology. In the *Soliloquies*, Augustine distinguishes between two classes of likeness. The first is likenesses among equal things (*in aequalibus rebus*), such as the likeness between twins or impressions of a signet ring. This is a symmetrical likeness because each of the things can be said to be “like” the other. One could also calls this the “sameness” sense of likeness, since the two things will be the same in some relevant respect. The second is likenesses among inferior things (*in deterioribus*), as when a reflection is like what it is reflecting. In this case, explains Augustine, there is no symmetrical likeness because the inferior thing is deficient in comparison with the better thing and we can only say that the worse is “like” the better and not vice versa. For this reason, thinking of such likenesses as “the same” would be incorrect. Augustine also divides this class into several species that we will ignore for our purposes.

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460 The source for this section is *sol.* 2.6.11-12.
461 To say that two people are “similar” in looks, for example, tends to be weaker than saying that they look “alike.”
462 *sol.* 2.6.11
463 Plotinus draws the same distinction between the two kinds of likenesses in *Enn.* 1.2.2: “We should note that there are two kinds of likeness; one requires that there should be something the same in the things which are alike; this applies to things which derive their likeness equally from the same principle.
Like Plato, Augustine also uses the term “image” (imago) to describe things that have a likeness to something else, and it can apply in both equal and deficient senses.\textsuperscript{464} The Son of God is an equal image of the Father and a reflection in a mirror is a deficient image of the person reflected. “Image” and “likeness,” however, do not mean precisely the same thing because an image somehow has to derive from (or “be expressed from” (exprimi de)) an original whereas a likeness does not. Two unrelated people who look alike are likenesses of each other but not images, nor is God the Father an image of the God the Son, even though God the Son is an image of the Father. So all images are likenesses, but not all likenesses are images.\textsuperscript{465}

We can recognize that Augustine applies this terminology to sensible instances and their Forms by considering the basics of Augustine’s metaphysics of truth in Against the Academicians and the Soliloquies. So far I have discussed the upper part of this metaphysics, the intelligible world, which we found to include the Truth itself (ueritas) and the true things (uera) that are the eternal rationes, but it also has a lower part that corresponds to the sensible world, which Augustine indicates is made up of “truth-like things” (ueri similes).

\textsuperscript{464} The equality sense is evident in sol. 1.1.4.1-3: “[Augustine:] God, ... who made man to your image (imago) and likeness (similitudinem), which the one who knows (nouit) himself, recognizes (agnoscit)...” (Deus, qui fecisti hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam, quod qui se ipse novit, agnoscit...). The “image” and “likeness” here both refer to the Son of God in relation to the Father and thus clearly have to be equal rather than deficient. The deficient sense is evident in sol. 2.7.13 and 2.9.17.

\textsuperscript{465} Augustine makes this point clearly in div. qu. 74, where he explicitly discusses the similarities and differences between imago, similitudo, and aequalitas. Although question 74 was likely written after his baptism, it is consistent with his usage of the terms prior to his baptism (e.g. sol. 1.1.4.1-3, 2.6.11-2.7.13, 2.9.17, 2.18.32), and so we can assume that there is continuity. The idea that an “image” has to “be expressed” (exprimi) from an original also appears much later at trin. 9.11.16.
The Early Augustine’s Metaphysics of Truth

1. Intelligible Things:
   (a) Truth itself (ueritas) – Son of God, that by which all uera are uera
   (b) true things (uera) – all eternal intelligibles

2. Sensible Things:
   (a) truth-like things (ueri similes) – all sensible things/instances

That the lower part is related to the upper as a deficient likeness is already evident from its name.

If sensible things were equal likenesses, then Augustine would have simply called them “true things” and put them on the upper level, but by calling them “truth-like,” it shows that while they are genuinely still “like” the true things, they are nevertheless deficient. The same point is also evident from several passages. In the Soliloquies, for example, a discussion proceeds as follows:

R. Are such shapes that [geometry] demonstrates found in bodies? A. On the contrary, it is unbelievable how inferior they are proven to be. R. Then which of them do you think are true things (ueras)? A. Please do not think I have to be asked about this anymore! Who is so mentally blind not to see that the things that geometry teaches dwell in the Truth itself (in ipsa ueritate) or that also the Truth dwells in them, whereas bodily shapes, even though they seem to strive towards those other shapes, possess some sort of imitation of the Truth and thus are false?

The passage indicates that bodily shapes are not technically “true things” for the reason that they are much inferior to the geometrical shapes that they strive to be like. So while they are genuine likenesses of them, they are deficient rather than equal. The passage also suggests that the bodily shapes are deficient likenesses of the Truth itself, since they are “some sort of imitation” of it.

The same points occur in a passage in Against the Academicians as well, though slightly less explicitly.

For my purposes, it’s enough that Plato sensed that there are two worlds: an intelligible world where the Truth itself (ipsa ueritas) resides, and this sensible world that we obviously sense by sight and touch. The former is the true world

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466 sol. 2.18.32.13-23(91) “R. Talesne in corporibus figurae inveniuntur, quales illa disciplina demonstrat? A. Immo incredibile est, quanto deteriores esse convincuntur. R. Quas ergo istarum veras putas? A. Ne, quaeso, etiam istuc me interrogandum putes. Quis enim mente tam caecus est, qui non videat istas, quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in ipsa veritate aut in his etiam veritate, illas vero corporis figuras, siquidem quasi ad istas tendere videntur, habere nescio quam imitationem veritatis et ideo falsas esse?”
(illum uerum [mundum]), the latter truth-like (ueri similem) and made to its image (imaginem).\footnote{Acad. 3.17.37.22-6 (King trans., slightly modified) “Sat est enim ad id, quod uolo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum intellegibilem, in quo ipsa ueritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos uisu tactuque sentire; itaque illum uerum, hunc ueri similem et ad illius imaginem factum, ...” We know that Augustine accepted this view because he tells us that he expects to find the truth with the Platonists at the end of Book 3 (Acad. 3.20.43) and because he adopts the view in the Soliloquies (see especially sol. 2.10.18-2.11.21, 2.18.32).}

The deficiency point is not quite as clear as in the previous passage, but there is little doubt that in calling the sensible world “truth-like” and made to the “image” of the “true world” (i.e. of the intelligible world, where “the Truth itself resides”), Augustine means to say that the sensible world is a deficient likeness of the intelligible world. One might wonder whether Augustine accepts the view, given that he attributes it to Plato, but in saying that Plato “sensed” these things (implying that it was a genuine discovery), from his endorsements of the Platonists later in Book 3,\footnote{Acad. 3.20.43.19-24 “As for what is to be sought out by the most subtle reasoning – for my character is such that I’m impatient in my desire to apprehend what truth is (quid sit uerum) not only by believing but also by understanding – I’m still confident that I’m going to find it with the Platonists, and that it won’t be opposed to our Holy Writ” (King trans., slightly modified) (Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est – ita enim iam sum affectus, ut quid sit uerum non credendo solum sed etiam intellegendo apprehendere impatien ter desiderem – apud Platonicos me interim, quod sacris nostris non repugnet, reperturum esse confido).} and from his endorsement of the view in the Soliloquies, we can reasonably infer that he does.

It is also apparent from these passages that sensible things are not only deficient “likenesses,” but also deficient “images” of Forms. The first passage explicitly says that they “imitate the Truth and the second says that the sensible world is “made to the image” of the intelligible world, as we find in the Timaeus. This tells us that sensible things genuinely derive from the Forms in some sense and are not merely like them haphazardly.\footnote{That they are “images” can also be found in many other passages, e.g. Acad. 3.18.40, sol. 2.10.18 and 2.18.32 passim.}

I identify some of Augustine’s reasons for inferring that sensible things have to be deficient likenesses of the Forms in the next section, but I note one interesting point about the
nature of the deficiency here. Whatever Plato thought, Augustine is happy to imply that deficient likenesses, whether between sensible things themselves (e.g. a body and its reflection) or between sensible things and their Forms, are not only “like” their corresponding objects, but also “unlike” them. This is evident from the facts that likenesses are “false” (*falsum*) insofar as they are deficient and that this falsity entails being “unlike.” The point that deficiency entails falsity is evident from the *Soliloquies* passage above (2.18.32.13-23(91)) and from many other places in the *Soliloquies*. Bodily shapes are “false,” he says there, because they merely imitate the Truth. The point that this falsity entails being “unlike” is then evident from many of these same passages.\(^{470}\) In *Soliloquies* 2.7.13, for example, Augustine explains how two eggs that are exactly alike are not false with respect to each other, and yet dream images of human beings are false human beings. He also explains that if the dream images of human beings were not unlike the true human beings in any respect, if they lived, spoke, and were grasped while we were awake as any true human being is, then they would not be false human beings but true ones.\(^{471}\) These are examples of likenesses between sensible things, but the same holds for likeness of sensible instances in relation to their Forms. Indeed, his point in speaking about like and unlike, true and false in this long section of the *Soliloquies* is to demonstrate that all sensible things are necessarily mixtures of true and false either because they are like and unlike other sensible things or because they are like and unlike the things in the intelligible world.\(^{472}\) Augustine will change his mind about whether these sensible instances of Forms properly ought to be called “false” at some point after 391, but he does not appear to change his mind about whether they are “like”

\(^{470}\) It is also the case that falsity entails being “like.” In other words, Augustine is saying that something has to be both like and unlike something else to be false with respect to it. If it is only completely like or completely unlike it, then it cannot be “false.” This point is evident in *sol.* 2.8.15-11.19 and 2.8.32.

\(^{471}\) *sol.* 2.7.13

\(^{472}\) See especially *sol.* 2.8.15-11.19 and 2.17.31-18.32. The whole discussion begins at 2.2.2 and dominates Book 2.
If this is the case, does Augustine have a principled distinction between deficient likenesses and unlikenesses? What makes a picture of Simmias a likeness of Simmias but not a likeness of Cebes, if in both cases the two things are like and unlike merely in differing degrees? Augustine agrees that the two differ by degree (the picture of Simmias is much more like Simmias than Cebes and much more unlike Cebes than Simmias), but what makes the picture a likeness of Simmias rather than Cebes is precisely what makes the picture a “false” Simmias, but not a “false” Cebes. Falsity, for the Augustine of the Soliloquies, is “that which either feigns (se fingit) to be what it isn’t or altogether strives (tendit) to exist and does not exist,” and the same will have to hold true for deficient likenesses. That is, deficient likenesses will be distinct from unlikenesses by the fact that they feign or strive to be the object to which they are being compared. The idea seems to be that the feigning or striving will be something within the likeness itself that makes it a likeness, whether or not it has a human or animal will as its cause. Comedies, sculptures, and the pretended injury of the killdeer all feign or strive to be something else, and so also do reflections in mirrors, the oar in the water, and shadows of bodies. In the former, there is a will behind it, but in the latter it is simply built in. Applying this to the Phaedo

Augustine calls attention to his change of mind in retr. 1.1.4: “Again, having said about the Academics that they knew the truth, the likeness of which they were calling ‘truth-like’, I went on to call this very truth-like that they were approving ‘false’. And I was wrong to do this, for two reasons. First, I was wrong to say that that which is like the true in some way is false, because in its own class it is something true. Second, ...” (Item quod dixi de Academicis, quia nouerant uerum, cuius simile appellabant ueri simile, idque ipsum ueri simile appellauit falsum quod approbabant, duas ob causas non recte dictum est: uel quod falsum esset quod aliquo modo esset simile allicuius ueri, quia in genere suo et hoc uerum est, ...). The change must have occurred sometime between uera rel. and conf., since we see a reference to sensible things as “false” in uera rel. 34.63 (“Obviously every body is a true body, but a false unity.”) and we can find an implicit rejection of it in conf. 7.15.21. Note that Augustine shows no indication that he is changing his mind that sensible things are deficient likenesses. These things no longer ought to be called “false,” to be sure, but they are still only “like the true in some way” and are merely “true in [their] own class” as opposed to true without qualification. The same point is supported by conf. 7.11.17 where Augustine makes clear that all created things remain mixtures of being and non-being: “And I considered the other things below you, and I saw that neither can they be said absolutely to be or absolutely not to be” (Et inspexi cetera infra te et uidi nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse...).
examples, then, a picture or reflection of Simmias will be a likeness of Simmias rather than Cebes because it feigns or strives to be Simmias rather than Cebes. Similarly, the equality in equal sticks will be a likeness of the Form of equality because it feigns or strives to be the Form of Equality rather than inequality. There is some evidence, in fact, that this was what Plato himself intended. When he suggests that the equal things “wish” (bouletai), “desire” (oregetai), and “are eager” (prothumeitai) to be like equality itself, he seems to be intending this to distinguish deficient likenesses from unlikenesses. If so, then one would not have to account for the difference for Plato by denying that deficiency entails being “unlike.”

We now have a more detailed understanding of what the first premise of the Deficiency Argument would mean for Plato and Augustine. In claiming that we can correctly judge that particular things are genuine cases of equality and yet that those cases are deficient in comparison with equality itself, the premise is saying that we can cognize that the equality in sensible things is a deficient likeness and image of equality itself. Or to put it more generally and Platonically, we can cognize that at least some sensible instantiations are deficient likenesses or images of their corresponding Forms. We now turn to the second premise, which says that we could not make this judgment unless we already had knowledge of equality itself. I look first at what kind of knowledge this must be and then at the principle behind the claim.

The “knowledge” portion of the premise is at least a claim that we have some sort of prerequisite unconscious knowledge of the thing at issue. I call it “unconscious” (and do not insist that it has to be “conscious”) to emphasize that it need not entail the preexistence requirement. In calling it “knowledge,” on the other hand, I mean it to be veridical and reliable, at least in the general sense of cognition (gnôsis or cognitio), but I do not mean that it has to be knowledge in the strictest possible sense (epistêmê or scientia). I also infer from the term

\[^{474}\text{Phd. 74d9-e2, 75a2-3, and 75b7-8.}\]
“knowledge” that, at least in ordinary cases, something exists within the mind as a component of this knowledge, such as an “idea,” “notion,” or the very object of knowledge itself. One could also call the knowledge a “cognition,” since this captures the idea of knowledge at least in a general sense and also implies that something exists in the mind without specifying whether any conscious experience has been involved.475

The most important thing to note about the second premise is the principle on which it depends. Why does the ability to cognize that sensible equality is deficient entail that one must have knowledge of the Form of equality? The reason must be that the knowledge of an original is necessary for cognizing that something is a deficient likeness (or image) of it. To express it most generally, the cognition of an original is necessary for cognizing that something is its deficient likeness. This principle has intuitive force even between sensible likenesses. A cognition of Socrates himself, for example, does seem necessary for cognizing that a statue is a genuine and yet deficient likeness of him. Without this cognition of the original, one could not cognize whether the statue is genuinely like Socrates (since one has no direct experience to make the comparison), nor could one cognize whether it is deficient (since for all one knows Socrates is a statue or something even more deficient). At best, one could arrive at a true opinion about it by appeal to authority. So the principle makes some sense. I will call it the “Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle.”

*Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle:* The cognition of an original is necessary for judging/cognizing that something is a deficient likeness (or image) of it.

We do not merely have to infer the principle from what Plato says; we can, in fact, find explicit reference to the principle in the following *Phaedo* passage.

[Socrates:] Therefore do we agree that whenever someone, upon seeing something, comes to have in mind (*ennoësēi*) that what he now sees wants to be

475 For my defence that Plato intends recollection to include innate “knowledge,” see my Introduction, section 5 (including notes).
like one of the other beings but is deficient and cannot be such a thing as that, since it is worse, it is necessary that the one who comes to have this in mind knows beforehand (proeidota) that to which he says it is like, but is so deficiently?\(^\text{476}\)

The key to confirming that Augustine was committed to the Deficiency Argument in Against the Academicians will be finding this principle there.

Now that I have discussed the first and second premises, I turn to one final question about the Deficiency Argument. Why does the prerequisite knowledge of equality itself have to be innate? Even granting the first two premises, perhaps one could argue that we have acquired knowledge of equality itself in this life at some earlier time. This acquisition would have to be before cognizing that the equal sticks are deficient likenesses of equality itself, but it seems that this still leaves some time. In the Phaedo, Plato has an answer that sounds very Aristotelian. In this life at least, knowledge of equality itself or any other Form cannot be acquired except by means of sense experience. We cannot come to know the Forms simply by thinking about them and ignoring the senses, we have to recollect them from experiencing their sensible instances and recognizing that they are deficient likenesses. This is evident from the following exchange.

[Socrates:] Then it is necessary that we know the equal from before the time when, upon seeing the equal things, we came to have in mind that all of these things desire to be like the equal, but have it deficiently.

[Simmiyas:] Yes, that’s right.

[Socrates:] But surely we also agree with this, that it has not come into mind from any other place nor can it come into mind except either from seeing or touching or some other sense; for I say that all these things are the same.

[Simmiyas:] They are the same, Socrates, at least with respect to what the argument is supposed to show.

[Socrates:] Well then it must come into mind from the senses that all the things in the senses are desiring what the equal is and are deficient of it; or how do we say it?

[Simmiyas:] That way.\(^\text{477}\)

\(^{476}\) Phd. 74d9-e4 “[Socrates:] Οὐκοῦδ’ ὠμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἱδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βουλεῖται μὲν τοῦτο ὃν ἔγεν ὡς ἡμέναι ὅν ἄλλο τί τῶν ὑπέρπλου ἔνδει δὲ καὶ ὡς δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] ὅν ἔκειν, ἄλλ’ ἐστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαίον ποὺ τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦστα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκείνῳ ὃ φησιν αὐτῷ προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεικτέρος δὲ ἔχειν;”

\(^{477}\) Phd. 74c9-75b3 “[Socrates:] Ἀναγκαίον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ
From the exchange one might object that what can only happen by means of the senses is knowing “that all of these things desire to be like the equal, but have it deficiently,” not coming to know equality itself. But from what Socrates says next, it is clear that the same condition applies to knowing equality itself.

[Socrates:] Then before we began to see or hear or sense in any other way, it was necessary, it seems, to have grasped knowledge of what the equal itself is, if we were going to be able to refer the equal things from the senses to that place, such that all such things are eager to be like that, but are worse than it.\(^{478}\)

It would not follow that we had to have “grasped knowledge of what the equal itself is” before we began “to see or hear,” i.e. before we began our sensible existence, unless it were impossible to grasp this knowledge without the help of the senses in this life. So the view has an important likeness to Aristotle’s view that all knowledge begins in the senses. We cannot grasp the Forms in this life except by first grasping their sensible instances and recognizing that they are deficient likenesses. Plato does not provide further argumentation for the view in this work, however.

Based on these observations, one can reconstruct the Deficiency Argument as follows.

The italicized lines are modified versions of the first and second premises and the bolded lines are the two conclusions. The other lines derive from some of the additions we have discussed.

The Deficiency Argument
1. We are able to cognize that the equality in particular equal things is a genuine likeness of equality itself and yet is deficient in comparison with equality itself.
2. The cognition of an original is necessary for cognizing that something is a deficient likeness (or image) of it. (Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle)
3. Therefore, we could not cognize that the equality in particular equal things is a

\(^{478}\) Phd. 75b4-8 [Socrates:] “Προ του άρα άρξασθαι ημας όραν και άκουειν και ταλλα αισθάνεσθαι τυχειν έδει που εύληρτάν επιστήμην αυτου του ίσου οτι έστιν, ει εμελλομεν τα έκ των αισθήσεων ίσα έκεισε ανοίσειν, οτι προθυμεται μεν πάντα τοιατ’ είναι οίον εκεινο, έστιν δε αυτου φαυλότερα.”
deficient likeness of equality itself unless we already had a cognition of equality itself. (2)

4. Therefore, we have a cognition of equality itself. (1, 3)

5. Our cognition of equality itself cannot have been acquired through the senses, and so it is not a sensible thing.

6. Therefore, equality itself must be an intelligible thing, cognized by the mind, and existing independently of particular likenesses/images of equality. (5)

7. In our present condition of dependence on the senses, we cannot come to think of equality itself except by means of cognizing that particular cases of sensible equality are deficient likenesses/images of it.

8. Therefore, we could not have acquired our cognition of equality itself in our present condition of dependence on the senses. (5, 7)

9. Therefore, we must have had our cognition of equality itself at least since birth (i.e. innately). (8)

With the last line we have our conclusion that we must have an innate cognition, i.e. innate knowledge, of equality itself. Since the argument is meant to be generalized for any Form and its sensible instance, the conclusion is that we have innate knowledge of all the Forms that we can recollect from sensible instances.

2.5 The Deficiency Argument in Augustine’s On True Religion (389/91)

We are now ready to see that Augustine was committed to some form of the Deficiency Argument throughout his early works from 386-391. I have already noted that Augustine has a detailed “likeness/unlikeness” conceptual framework in Against the Academicians and the Soliloquies and that it fits very well with the Deficiency Argument. What remains is to show that the other key features of the argument are present, particularly the remaining features of the first and second premises. In what follows, I focus on showing that these two premises are present and assume that if he accepts these, then he also accepts other added premises showing that the prerequisite knowledge is innate.

I begin with the most obvious and thorough appearance of the argument, which happens

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479 I use the term “cognition” throughout the argument instead of “knowledge” in order to make it clear that the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle is sufficiently general to include even the most inferior sort of sense cognition (which is not “knowledge” in the strict sense).
to be in *On True Religion* and thus in the post-baptismal works. This work was likely completed just before Augustine’s ordination to the priesthood in 391. The relevant passages derive from a section devoted to showing how the SOUL can rationally ascend from temporal things to eternal things through its ability to make judgments about beauty. Beauty, Augustine tells us there, results from “agreement,” (*conuenientia*) and this agreement requires oneness (*unitas*) and equality (*aequalitas*). His plan is to ascend from the oneness and equality that we see in beautiful bodies to arrive at knowledge of oneness and equality themselves, distinct from all body. The Deficiency Argument turns out to be central and essential to this ascent. Here is the passage that illustrates the argument most concisely and thoroughly.

...[W]ho is it who discovers the highest equality or likeness in bodies and dares to say, when he has considered carefully, that any body whatever is truly and simply one, since all things are changed either by going (*transeundo*) from form to form or from place to place and consist of parts holding their own places, by means of which they are divided into diverse extensions (*spatia*)? [No one.] True equality and likeness, and also true and primal oneness, are not seen by fleshly eyes or any other sense, but by the intellectual mind. For whence is equality of any kind desired (*appeteretur*) in bodies, or whence are we convinced that [any equality that may be seen there] is far different from perfect equality, unless the mind sees that which is perfect?”

The first premise is evident in terms of both equality and oneness. Using a rhetorical question, Augustine asks “Who is it who discovers the highest equality or likeness in bodies and dares to say, when he has considered carefully, that any body whatever is truly and simply one...?” The implied answer is “no one.” All people can rightly judge, when they have “considered carefully,” that any equality and oneness seen in bodies is deficient and cannot possibly be the highest

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480 Augustine explains this strategy at *uera rel.* 29.52.
481 *uera rel.* 30.55 “*quis est, qui summam aequalitatem vel similitudinem in corporibus inueniat auedatque dicere, cum diligenter considerauerit, quodlibet corpus uere ac simpliciter unum esse, cum omnia vel de specie in speciem vel de loco in locum transeundo mutentur et partibus constent sua loca obtinentibus, per quae in spatia diversa diuiduntur? Porro ipsa uera aequalitas ac similitudo atque ipsa uera et prima unitas non oculis carneis neque ullo tali sensu, sed mente intellecta conspicitur. Unde enim qualiscumque in corporibus appeteretur aequalitas aut unde conuinceretur longe plurimum differre a perfecta, nisi ea quae perfecta est mente uideretur.*”
equality or oneness. It is interesting to note that Augustine treats the term “equality” (*aequalitas*) as synonymous with “likeness” (*similitudo*) in this passage, which makes sense because the primary sense of “likeness” is a likeness of equality, not deficiency. Later in the text, it turns out that both “equality” and “likeness” name the second person of the Trinity, the Son, whereas oneness or “the One itself” names the first person, the Father.\(^{482}\) It is also interesting to note that the passage alludes to some of the same reasons for the deficiency of bodily things as Plato. Augustine’s first point about changeability corresponds to reason 4 from the *Timaeus* and the second point about no one bodily thing being completely “one” corresponds to reason 3 from the *Symposium*. Although the example in the *Symposium* was about beauty and here it is about oneness, the principle is the same: the very same bodily thing is a sensible instance of a Form in one respect and its opposite in another respect. Augustine will also offer two seemingly additional reasons for deficiency in a later passage. One is that bodily equality and oneness must be deficient by the mere fact that equality itself and oneness itself “judge them,” since what judges is superior to what is judged.\(^{483}\) The other proceeds from this same observation and goes on to say that equality and oneness themselves could not be used to judge all bodily instances of them unless they themselves were non-bodily. Otherwise, for example, equality itself would yield different results for small things in comparison with large things.\(^{484}\) The fact that Augustine offers so many reasons for the deficiency of bodily instances of Forms is indicative of

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\(^{482}\) *Uera rel.* 36.66

\(^{483}\) *Uera rel.* 29.53 “But to judge of bodies belongs not to life that is merely sentient, but to life that has also the power of reasoning. ... that which judges is superior to that which is judged” (Burleigh trans.)

\(^{484}\) *Uera rel.* 30.56 “But [equality itself] is neither greater nor less in a spatial or temporal sense. If it were greater we should not use the whole of it to judge things that are less. If it were smaller we should not use the whole of it to judge things that are greater. ... Who then can doubt that it is neither greater nor less in a spatial or temporal sense, but in potency surpasses all else?” (Burleigh trans., slightly modified)
how deeply the first premise has taken hold of his mind in *On True Religion*.

The first premise, then, is clear in *On True Religion*. As for the second premise, namely, that we could not cognize that the equality or oneness in particular things are deficient likenesses of equality or oneness themselves unless we have a cognition of equality or oneness themselves, we can find it most explicitly stated in terms of equality. We “are convinced” that any equality seen in bodies is far different from perfect equality, the passage implies, and this would not be possible “unless the mind sees that which is perfect.” In my terms, this amounts to saying that we cannot judge or cognize that bodily equality is a deficient likeness, unless the mind has a cognition of equality itself, which is based on a clear appeal to the Deficient Likeness Principle. In case one has doubts about the priority of the cognition of equality itself, one ought to note that it is presented as a necessary condition for the judgment, and so has to be prior to it. One can also find the priority made clear when Augustine reiterates the second premise a few paragraphs later in terms of oneness.

Whence then is my soul filled with illusions? Where is truth (*uera*), which is seen by the mind? To the one thinking this we can reply in this way: That light is true by which you cognize (*cognoscis*) that these things are not true. Through this light you see that one (*illud unum*) by which you judge that whatever else you see is one and yet that whatever you see that is mutable is not what that [one] is. This passage explains the means by which we see “that one” (i.e. “that One”) that allows us to judge mutable ones. That “means” is the light of truth, a clear reference to illumination and to the intelligible origin of “that one” itself. In the process, Augustine makes it plain that it is by seeing this intelligible one that we judge that mutable things are one and yet are “not what that [one] is,” which makes its priority clear. It is interesting to note that in both passages about equality and oneness, the cognition that makes the judgment possible is a “seeing,” suggesting that the

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485 *uera rel. 34.64* “*Unde ergo impleta est anima mea illusionibus? Ubi est uerum, quod mente conspicitur? Ita cogitanti iam dici potest: Illa lux uera est, qua haec non esse uera cognoscis. Per hanc illud unum uides, quo iudicas unum esse, quidquid aliud uides, nec tamen hoc esse, quod illud est, quidquid mutable uides.*”
cognition is not merely a memory of a past experience, but a present experience itself. This fits well with my suspicions about the Soliloquies Project that Augustine’s innate knowledge involves a present experience of the Forms of which we are not yet conscious.

Given that Augustine is expressing and seemingly endorsing the two key premises of the Deficiency Argument in On True Religion, this is good reason to conclude that he therefore accepts other premises implying that the prerequisite knowledge is innate. But could one perhaps maintain that these claims are merely isolated, half-hearted suggestions by Augustine to which he had no commitment one way or the other? Might he simply be expressing the argument without accepting it? It is unlikely. Indeed, the Deficiency Argument summarized in these passages constitutes the entirety of Augustine’s attempt to ascend by reason to the knowledge of eternal things in On True Religion. Everything in the section (29.52-36.66) contributes in one way or another to proving the Deficiency Argument. This section of rational ascent is also the philosophical core of the work. Leading up to it, Augustine explains what evil is and indicates that God’s providence has provided human beings with a two-fold medicine of the soul (animae medicina) for healing this evil: authority and reason. Then he explains the role of authority in the process of the healing (25.46-28.51) and then the role of reason (29.52-36.66). This section on the role of reason is our section that depends entirely on the Deficiency Argument. The centrality of the section is also confirmed by what follows. After having attempted this rational ascent to eternal things and therefore to God, Augustine then follows a common pattern that is familiar from the Confessions. He turns to considering what prevents us from attaining and keeping this vision of God (i.e. vice), which suggests that our section is analogous to the rational, Platonic ascents to God in Confessions 7.10.16-7.17.23, 10.6.8-10.27.38, and also to On Music 6.10.25-6.12.36 and possibly to On Order 2.11.30-2.19.51. All of these passages follow the rational ascent to God with the observation that such a vision is difficult to maintain and they often
include a section on vice and how to deal with it. The Deficiency Argument in *On True Religion*, therefore, is not simply a minor detail but is something central and essential to the work as a whole. Physically, it even occurs roughly at the center of the work.

The Deficiency Argument does not make such an explicit appearance in Augustine’s other early post-baptismal works. Many of its features underlie the argument in *On Music* 6 – we can find the first premise (about equality)\textsuperscript{486} and an application of the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle\textsuperscript{487} – but we do not find an obvious usage of the second premise. What we find in this premise’s place is an inference to innate knowledge from the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known Principle. “The SOUL would certainly nowhere seek/desire (*adpeteret*) that equality,” Augustine says, “which we discovered not to be certain and permanent in sensible numbers but nevertheless acknowledged (*agnoscebamus*) that it was shadowy and transient, unless it were known somewhere (*nisi alicubi nota esset*).”\textsuperscript{488} We do not explicitly find the Deficiency Argument in this work, therefore, but we do find an argument for innate knowledge that is similar to it and that I would argue is also central and essential to the work’s overall argument.

Despite this lack of an explicit reference to the Deficiency Argument in Augustine’s other early post-baptismal works, it is interesting that they still quite strongly indicate a commitment to innate knowledge. We have just seen that *On Music* suggests such a commitment, and many other arguments and passages throughout this period do so, such as Augustine’s claim in *On the Free Choice of the Will* that “the fool knows wisdom” (2.15.40) and the relevant putative Platonic recollection passages discussed in Chapter 1 (*an. quant.* 20.34, *lib. arb.* 1.12.24, and *ep.* 7.2). We may already quite safely conclude, therefore, that Augustine accepted innate knowledge at least throughout this post-baptismal time period (387-391). This in

\textsuperscript{486} mus. 6.10.28, *mus.* 6.14.44
\textsuperscript{487} mus. 6.10.25.9-14
\textsuperscript{488} mus. 6.12.34
itself makes it more plausible that Augustine accepted innate knowledge in the pre-baptismal works, which it is my ultimate goal in all of this to prove, but it more immediately makes it more plausible that he was committed to the Deficiency Argument in those works. Let us now turn to the evidence that the Deficiency Argument (and therefore innate knowledge) can also be found in Against the Academicians, and thus in the pre-baptismal works generally.

2.6. The Deficiency Argument in Against the Academicians

As in On True Religion, we may infer that the Deficiency Argument is operating in Against the Academicians by finding its two key premises. In On True Religion the premises were articulated in terms of “equality” and “oneness,” but in Against the Academicians they appear in terms of “truth.” The first premise is already quite evident from the earlier observations that in Against the Academicians and the Soliloquies Augustine divides existence into the Truth itself (ueritas), true things (uera), and truth-like things (ueri similes) and maintains that the truth-like things are deficient likenesses and images of the other things. These observations do not give us the first premise in its entirety because they do not explicitly say that “we are able to cognize” that the truth in sensible things is a deficient likeness of the higher truths. This would not be a controversial addition, however, given that Augustine accepts everything else about the two premises. I come back to this point after showing that Augustine accepts the second premise.

The second premise is evident from the facts that Augustine accepts the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle in Against the Academicians and that he applies it to cognizing truth-like things. Both of these points first arise in Augustine’s cross-examination of Licentius in the second book.\footnote{Beginning at Acad. 2.7.16.} Licentius has taken on the role of an Academic skeptic, and is defending their claims that nothing can be known and that therefore one should never assent to anything. To their claim that one can nevertheless approve things as “truth-like,” Augustine responds as
follows: “If someone who has not cognized your father were to see your brother and affirm that he is like your father, won’t he seem to you crazy or simple-minded?” The implied criticism here is that the Academicians cannot approve things as “truth-like” (ueri similes) without already having cognized truth (uerum) itself, just as someone cannot reasonably affirm that someone else’s brother is like his father without already having cognized his father. The Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle is evident here – the brother is like his father, but also deficient in likeness to his father, and one must have cognized the latter to be able to cognize the former – and its application to the cognition of truth-like things in relation to the truth is also evident.

We can find another expression of the principle and its application to truth-like things and the truth in a passage later in Book 3. The passage is a part of Augustine’s explanation of the real agenda of the Academicians. In addition to expressing the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle, it confirms that Augustine personally accepts it.

Someone who gazes upon an original (exemplum) does, indeed, rightly approve an image of it. How then does the wise man give his approval to nothing, or how does he follow the truth-like (simile ueri), if he is ignorant of what truth itself (uerum ipsum) is? Therefore, the Academicians knew (norant) truth (uerum), and gave approval to false things (falsa) in which they recognized a commendable imitation of true things (rerum uerarum).

The principle and its application are evident in the first two sentences, which express the principle in such a way as to suggest that no intelligent person could deny it. “How then does the wise man give his approval to nothing, or how does he follow the truth-like (simile ueri), if he is ignorant of what truth itself (uerum ipsum) is?” Augustine asks rhetorically, expecting a negative answer. I am not sure why Augustine uses the phrase uerum ipsum, “truth itself” in this

490 Acad. 2.7.16.20-22 (King trans., slightly modified) “Si quisquam fratrem tuum uisum patris tui similem esse affirmet ipsumque tuum patrem non nouerit, nonne tibi insanus aut ineptus uidebitur?”

491 Acad. 3.18.40.8-12 (King trans., slightly modified) “Probat enim bene imaginem, quisquis eius intuetur exemplum. Quomodo enim approbat sapiens aut quomodo simile sequitur ueri, cum ipsum uerum quid sit ignoret? Ergo illi norant et approbant falsa, in quibus imitationem laudabilem rerum uerarum aduertebant.”
sentence rather than _ueritas_, “the Truth,” but I suspect it is either because he does not want to introduce the term _ueritas_ yet, or because he means it to refer to the entire intelligible world without restricting it to _ueritas_. That Augustine accepts the principle is suggested when Augustine firmly draws his controversial conclusion. “Therefore, the Academicians knew truth, and gave approval to false things [i.e. truth-like things] in which they recognized a commendable imitation of true things.” His argument, in effect, is as follows: the Academicians claimed to follow the truth-like and not to know truth itself, but this was a mere foil for their real views. Since they were intelligent philosophers, they would have accepted the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle (since it is so obvious), and thus they were secretly communicating that they knew _uerum ipsum_, truth itself, and so were genuine Platonists. Augustine shows no hesitation in accepting and applying the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle to truth-like and true things.

Since I have already shown that Augustine has a metaphysics of truth in _Against the Academicians_ (and in the Soliloquies) where truth-like things refer to sensible instances and true things (_uera_ and the Truth (_ueritas_) refer to their originals, we can conclude that the Augustine of _Against the Academicians_ accepts the second premise of the Deficiency Argument in terms of truth. Since he applies the Deficiency Likeness Cognition Principle to truth-like and true things, and since truth-like things are sensible instances and true things are intelligible originals, it follows that we could not cognize that the truth in particular, sensible true things is a deficient likeness of truth itself unless we already had a cognition of truth itself. Thus, we more or less have the two key premises of the Deficiency Argument. The only thing we are missing is the point in the first premise that “we are able to cognize” this. This seems to be a reasonable

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492 The key reasons for this in _Against the Academicians_ were Augustine’s claims that he thinks he will find the truth with the Platonists (_Acad_. 3.20.43.19-24) and that Plato “sensed that there are two worlds: an intelligible world where the Truth itself (_ipsa ueritas_) resides, and this sensible world that we obviously sense by sight and touch. The former is the true world (_illum uerum [mundum]_), the latter truth-like (_ueri similem_) and made to its image (_imaginem_)” (_Acad_. 3.17.37.22-6) (King trans., slightly modified).
addition, but is not something we should simply assume.

To finish the argument, then, we have to determine if he thinks that all of us as human beings are able to cognize that the truth in sensible things is a deficient likeness. We seem not to have to look very far. As we saw in the passage just prior, he thinks that the Academicians did it, and this suggests that it is at least possible for everyone else in principle. They knew true things, he claims, and gave approval to false things in which they recognized a commendable imitation of true things, which means they correctly judged that sensible things were “truth-like” (though false to the extent that they are deficient in truth), which was made possible because they knew truth itself. Perhaps most other people are too deceived by sensible things to do this in practice, but the fact that some human beings do it, suggests that the capability is a human characteristic.

At this point, one could raise an objection. Implicit in the first premise is the claim that when we first judge that the truth in sensible things is a deficient likeness, we do not yet consciously know truth itself. But the Academicians in this passage seem already to have conscious knowledge of truth itself, and this presumably grounds their judgments about truth-like things, not an unconscious knowledge. So then we do not yet have the first premise after all. It still could be possible that one must gain conscious knowledge of truth itself first before being able to judge that the truth in sensible things is a deficient likeness, contrary to the first premise.

There are problems with this interpretation, however. The biggest problem is that it does not square with Augustine’s claims about the role of sensible things in education. While it is true that Augustine says that education requires turning, even fleeing, from sensible things and “returning to oneself,” education still happens (at least for the most part) through sensible things in the sense that they are “reminders.” As we saw in On True Religion, the philosophical ascent to God happens by ascending from temporal things to eternal things, and the key step in this

493 As one can also see in later works, such as conf. 7, 10 and trin. 11-15.
process is cognizing that these temporal things are deficient likenesses of eternal things. As he sums up in that work, “We are reminded by the things that we judge to gaze at that according to which we judge.”\textsuperscript{494} Judging the temporal things is prior to consciously seeing the eternal things. He even goes on to argue in that work that the vices themselves contain images of truth, so that even they can function as “reminders” (\textit{admonitiones}) of truth itself.\textsuperscript{495} Far from needing to acquire conscious knowledge of truth before being able to cognize its deficient image in inferior things, it is necessary for most, if not all human beings, to proceed in the opposite direction in \textit{On True Religion}.

The same, it turns out, goes for the Cassiciacum trilogy. The philosophical ascent from sensible to intelligible things is not very evident in \textit{Against the Academicians} itself, but it appears clearly in \textit{On Order}, written at the same time. In the educational portion of the second book, Augustine distinguishes between education by authority and education by reason, and devotes a long section to discussing education by reason, just as he does in \textit{On True Religion}. Then he outlines a process of ascending from sensible things to intelligible things, specifically to knowledge of God and the soul,\textsuperscript{496} through judging that sensible things are deficient likenesses and images. Here is a passage to this effect, reminiscent of \textit{On True Religion}. Note how Augustine also personifies reason (\textit{ratio}) in the passage, as though anticipating the \textit{Soliloquies}:

> From here reason (\textit{ratio}) advanced to the power of the eyes. And surveying earth and heaven, it sensed that nothing other than beauty pleased it, and in beauty were shapes, in shapes dimensions, and in dimensions numbers. And it asked itself whether such a line and such a curve or whatever other forms and shapes were there were of the kind which understanding contains. It discovered that they were far inferior and that nothing which the eyes see can be compared in any way to what the mind sees.\textsuperscript{497}

\textsuperscript{494} \textit{uera rel.} 52.101 “\textit{Immo uero commemorati ab his quae iudicamus intueri, quid sit, secundum quod iudicamus ...}”

\textsuperscript{495} \textit{uera rel.} 45.84

\textsuperscript{496} \textit{ord.} 2.11.30.

\textsuperscript{497} \textit{ord.} 2.15.42 (Foley trans.) “\textit{Hinc profecta est in oculorum opes et terram caelumque conlustrans sensit nihil aliud quam pulchritudinem sibi placere et in pulchritudine figuras, in figuris dimensiones, in}
The passage describes a process of learning that involves considering sensible numbers and cognizing their deficiency. This cognition happens by comparing the sensible numbers to the intelligible numbers that “the mind sees” and are contained in the “understanding” (intellegentia). This might seem to suggest that one already has to be “consciously” seeing the intelligible numbers to judge the sensible numbers, but a passage shortly following confirms that cognizing the deficiency is prior to consciously knowing the intelligible numbers.

Something wonderful moved reason and it began to suspect that perhaps it itself was that very number by which all things are numbered, or if it was not it, that the number was the place whither it was busily trying to reach.\footnote{ord. 2.15.43 (Foley trans., slightly modified) “Mouit eam quoddam miraculum et suspicari coepit se ipsam fortasse numerum esse eum ipsum, quo cuncta numerarentur, aut si id non esset, ibi tamen eum esse, quo peruenire satageret.”}

In the previous passage, Augustine implied that reason already “sees” number itself, and yet in this passage it is clear that it is still trying to reach it, and so has not attained it. The “seeing” mentioned in the previous passage, therefore, must be an incomplete and at least partially unconscious knowledge of number. Thus, cognizing the deficiency in sensible things is a means to coming to know intelligible things. The same idea of cognizing sensible things as a means to reaching intelligible things is suggested when Augustine speaks about oneness.

And if this seems endless, let him know (sciat) perfectly (in so far as he has the strength) what is one in numbers, not yet in the supreme law and the supreme order of all things, but in those things which we sense and do here and there every day. For that discipline of philosophy has already taken up his education, and he will discover in it nothing more than what is one, but in a way far higher and more divine.\footnote{ord. 2.18.47 (Foley trans., slightly modified) “Si et hoc infinitum est, tantum perfecte sciat, quid sit unum si numeris quantumque ualeat nondum in illa summa lege summoque ordine rerum omnium, sed in his, quae cotidie passim sentimus atque agimus. Excipit enim hanc eruditionem iam ipsa philosophiae disciplina et in ea nihil plus inueniet, quam quid sit unum, sed longe altius longeque diuinius.”}

Here the idea is clear that someone can first discovers the oneness in sensible things and actions,
and through this can be brought to discover the intelligible “One” that is far higher and more divine that is the subject of philosophy. The passage does not mention exactly how this works, but from the other passages, we can infer that it happens through correctly cognizing that the sensible things are one and then recognizing that they are deficient with respect to oneness. Therefore, Augustine evidently thinks that cognizing that sensible things are deficient likenesses is at least often prior to arriving at conscious knowledge of the original intelligible things.

Whether or not this always has to be the case, it is enough for our purposes to see that it is the ordinary order of education in *On Order*. We therefore have good reasons to believe that Augustine accepted the key premises of the Deficiency Argument in *Against the Academicians* and at Cassiciacum generally. This is

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500 It is interesting that just as in *On True Religion, On Order* leads the reader to the first and second persons of the Trinity. “Number” itself (by which all things are numbered) in these passages is God the Son, and the “One” itself is God the Father. Cf. Cary, *Invention* (2000), 93, who says that the “number by which all are numbered” has to be Plotinus’ One. This cannot be right because this number is intelligible, i.e. knowable, and in *On Order* the One and the Father are beyond intelligibility (*ord. 2.18.47* and *2.16.44*). We also know this because Augustine speaks of the “highest measure” (*summum modum*), which we know from *beata u.* has to be the Father, and treats it as distinct from “number” and “Truth” (*ord. 2.19.50*).

501 That cognizing sensible instances as deficient likenesses is often prior to conscious knowledge at Cassiciacum is supported by many other pieces of evidence. First, we find that Augustine spends a large portion of the second book of the *Soliloquies* trying to determine what truth is by examining sensible things (*2.5.8ff*), and he comes to the conclusion that sensible things are deficient likenesses of truth (*uerum*) before finding truth itself (*2.10.18*), which he then seeks to do in the next section. He also uses Platonic reasoning to conclude that there is a deficiency. We “ought to seek that truth (*uerum*),” he says, “that is not like a two-faced *ratio* that opposes itself so that it is true in one part and false in another” (*2.10.18*). Second, the idea of judging that sensible things are truth-like includes judgments about the sensible instance of any Form, many of which judgments would be easy to make without consciously knowing the Form itself. Sensible equality and oneness are perfect examples. When I judge that sensible equality is deficient, I am judging that it is truth-like equality instead of true equality, and when I judge that sensible oneness is deficient, I am judging that it is truth-like oneness instead of true oneness. As we saw in *On True Religion*, these sorts of judgments are easy enough to make before having conscious knowledge of the relevant Forms. Third, it would be strange if Augustine so drastically changed his mind on the priority of judging in the short time between *Against the Academicians* and *On True Religion*, when all of the other parts of the two premises remain the same. This point is supported by the fact that Augustine alludes to *On True Religion* in *Against the Academicians* (*2.3.8.42-46*), as though he has already conceived it in his mind and has begun writing it. Fourth, Augustine’s confidence in the Platonic distinction between truth-like and the truth in *Against the Academicians* suggests that he thinks that he himself has cognized the deficient truth of sensible things, despite not being a wise man himself. So then Augustine cannot be saying in *Against the Academicians* that one must consciously know in order to cognize that sensible things are deficient likenesses of truth.
evident because Augustine thinks that we can cognize that sensible truths are deficient likenesses of intelligible truths (before having a conscious cognition of those intelligible truths) and that we could not do this unless we already had a cognition of those intelligible truths. This strongly suggests that he accepted innate knowledge for Deficiency Argument reasons in this work and throughout the pre-baptismal works. Putting this evidence for innate knowledge together with the other evidence for innate knowledge at Cassiciacum, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Cassiciacum trilogy is consistent with the Soliloquies Project on the existence of innate knowledge, even if some of the details change.  

3. The Preexistence Requirement in the Pre-Baptismal Writings

We are left with the question of the preexistence requirement in the pre-baptismal writings. Now that I have sufficiently shown that Augustine accepts a wise preexistence and innate knowledge throughout the pre-baptismal writings, I have disarmed significant objections to the requirement and have provided good positive evidence for it. Indeed, it would be very strange if Augustine accepted both that the soul preexists in an unfallen, wise state and that learning is recollecting innate knowledge, and yet that he did not believe in the necessity of the former for the latter. This especially makes sense once we combine this evidence with the positive evidence for the requirement in the Soliloquies Project, namely, Soliloquies 2.20.35, Retractations 1.4.4, and On the Immortality of the Soul 4.6. And so Augustine’s commitment to

Augustine’s acceptance of innate knowledge suggests a possible additional explanation for why he frames Against the Academicians with the question that he does, namely, the question of whether the one seeking or finding the truth is happy. The Academicians think that both are happy because both are wise. Augustine argues that only the latter can be called wise, but he does not seem afraid of pointing to similarities between these two kinds of people to motivate the discussion. He does the same in beata u. 3.19ff by pointing to the similarities between the one seeking truth and the one finding the truth. In doing this, he could be alluding to the idea that the one who is seeking must be innately wise in order for seeking the truth to be possible.

The “wisdom” of the preexistent SOUL in the pre-baptismal writings is evident from the Soliloquies Project (when it indicates that the SOUL’s preexisting state was one of consciously knowing Ratio), and from many of the preexistence passages and putative Platonic recollection passages in Chapter 1.
it seems conclusive. To establish this conclusion more firmly, I now bring in some of the
evidence for the preexistence requirement in the immediate post-baptismal writings as well as
offer one piece of evidence for it from the Cassiciacum trilogy. I take the evidence from the
immediate post-baptismal writings to be evidence for what is going on in the pre-baptismal
writings for two reasons. First, these works were written only very shortly after the *Soliloquies*
Project, and so there is little chance of a shift on the relevant points, and second, it is a
reasonable assumption that any basic but controversial Platonic view that Augustine held in later
works he would also have held in earlier works.

To make the case for the preexistence requirement in the most immediate post-baptismal
works, I begin with the three putative Platonic recollection passages discussed in Chapter 1. The
clearest *expression* of the requirement is in *Letter 7*. There, Augustine clarifies that Plato thinks
that memory is only of past things and thus that there had to be a past vision of the Forms in
order to have them in memory. This is an evident reference to the preexistence requirement
because the Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle is simply a more specific version of the
requirement’s key Past-Conscious-Experience Principle. Given Augustine’s confidence in
defending the principle here combined with the evidence for the preexistence requirement in
previous writings, we now have good reason to believe that Augustine also accepts the principle.
But then how would this be compatible with his denial of intellectual memory in the pre-
baptismal writings? The answer is that Augustine has changed his mind about that point.
Whereas in the pre-baptismal writings, he thought that there was no need for intellectual
memory, he now in the post-baptismal writings thinks that there is a need for intellectual
memory. His contention that the intellectual memory can operate apart from imagination makes
this clear.⁵⁰⁴

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⁵⁰⁴ See Nebridius’ initial question to this effect in *ep. 6.1* and Augustine’s response in *ep. 7.1-2.*
The next clearest expression of the preexistence requirement is in *On the Free Choice of the Will*. As Augustine says to Evodius,

> You say this as though you have clear proof that we have never been wise; for you are thinking of the time since we were born into this life. But since wisdom is in the soul (*cum sapientia in animo sit*), whether the soul (*animus*) lived in another life before its partnership with this body and whether it lived wisely at some time is a great question, a great secret to be considered in its proper place.\(^\text{505}\)

In this passage we do not have a reference to the memory-of-the-past principle, but we do have a suggestion that “since wisdom is in the soul,” then it may be the case that the soul “lived in another life before its partnership with this body,” and that “it lived wisely at some time.” From our discussion about innate knowledge in this Chapter, we now know that the phrase “wisdom is in the soul” really refers to an acceptance of innate knowledge of wisdom, and so Augustine is at least expressing the idea that the innate knowledge of wisdom may require a prior conscious experience of wisdom.

But does he also accept this idea in some form? The passage only offers it as a possibility to be considered later. However, now that we know that the pre-baptismal Augustine accepts the innate knowledge and the soul’s wise preexistence expressed in this passage, it is reasonable to assume that he also accepts the requirement implicitly connecting them in this passage. One might be tempted to bring in the objection that Augustine’s discussion of the four possible origins of the soul in Book 3 shows that he is now non-committal about preexistence here. However, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, the Book 3 passage does not prove lack of commitment, it only prohibits choosing “rashly” between the options. Moreover, Book 3 was written up to 8 years after Book 1, and so it is not a reliable indicator of what Augustine meant when he wrote Book 1.

\(^\text{505}\) *lib. arb. 1.12.24* “Ita istuc dicis, quasi liquido compertum habeas numquam nos fuisse sapientes; attendis enim tempus ex quo in hanc uitan nati sumus. Sed *cum sapientia in animo sit*, utrum ante consortium huius corporis alia quadam uita uixerit animus et an aliquando sapienter uixerit, magna quaestio est, magnum secretum et suo considerandum loco.”
The third putative Platonic recollection passage is *On the Quantity of the Soul*, where Augustine less clearly expresses the preexistence requirement, but where he clearly accepts whatever he is expressing. Speaking to Evodius once again, he says,

> our opinions contradict each other so much that to you the soul (anima) seems to have brought no art [with itself] and to me it seems to have brought every art with itself, nor [does it seem to me] that what we call learning (discere) is anything other than recalling (reminisci) or recollecting (recordari).\(^{506}\)

This is now good evidence that Augustine accepts the preexistence requirement because we can assume that the “art” that the soul possesses is innate knowledge and that this art has been “brought” from a wise preexistence, which suggests that there is a connection between innate knowledge and preexistence along preexistence requirement lines. A more general consideration is that it simply makes sense that the “recollection” that Augustine accepts here would be the same as the recollection expressed in Letter 7 and *On the Free Choice of the Will* 1 (a view that clearly includes the preexistence requirement), since they were all written right around the same time. Thus, the combination of all three passages is excellent evidence that Augustine accepts the preexistence requirement at this time in the immediate post-baptismal writings, which makes it that much more likely that he also accepts the requirement in the *Soliloquies* Project just before this.

We move now to the evidence for the preexistence requirement in the Cassiciacum trilogy to confirm that it likely also extends to these works. The passage I have in mind makes its appearance at the beginning of *On the Happy Life*. After having said that either God, nature, necessity, our own will, or some combination of these “has thrown” (proiecerit) us out into this world “as if into a stormy sea,” he goes on to describe three classes of seafarer (nauigantis) who

\(^{506}\) *an. quant.* 20.34 “Magnam omnino, magnam et qua nescio utrum quicquam maius sit, quaestionem moves, in qua tantum nostrae sibimet opiniones adversantur, ut tibi anima nullam, mihi contra omnes artes secum ad tulisse videatur nec alit quicquam esse id, quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci et recordari.”
can make it to the port (*portum*) of philosophy by which they may return to the land (*terra*) of
the happy life. Just because one has reached the port does not mean that one has reached the
happy life, but it does get one close enough to be able to find it. The first class of seafarer is of
those who are thrown only a short distance away and easily conduct themselves (*sece condunt*) to
the port. The second class is of those who, once thrown into the sea, wander (*peregrinatuntur*)
much farther away from their homeland (*patria*) into the middle of the sea, having been led
astray by its “utterly false surface” (*fallacissima facie*). They can only be brought back
(*reducuntur*) if they run into great misfortune in their desire for pleasures and honours. The third
class is of those who are between the other two and so do not end up as far out into the sea. Some
of these “return” (*repetunt*) to their homeland (*patria*) more or less directly without venturing
farther into the sea and others are distracted and delay their return, also often requiring some sort
of misfortune to turn them around.

My interest in this passage is that it very much gives the impression that the soul’s
“return” to its homeland, i.e. its return to the happy life and thus to God, is not possible unless
the soul has already consciously experienced the happy life and God, as we find in the
preexistence requirement. The material above about the second and third classes already hints at
this. In saying that these people “are brought back” (*reducuntur*) and “return” (*repetunt*) to their
*patria*, the literal implication is that they had already been there before, i.e. had already been
happy at some time in the past. This, in turn, could suggest that this prior conscious experience
was some sort of necessary condition for being able to return. This idea is then supported by the
recollection language in Augustine’s distinction between the second and third classes. What is
distinct about people in the second class, he says, is that when they dare to wander so far from
their homeland, they “often forget it” (*eius saepe obliuiscentur*), suggesting that they had once
not forgotten it and still sometimes don’t. The people in the third class, on the other hand, “still
look back at particular signs and recollect, even amid the waves, their homeland of great sweetness” (*tamen quaedam signa respiciunt et suae dulcissimae patriae quamuis in ipsis fluctibus recordantur*). The first thing that this language suggests is that recollection is necessary for returning to the happy life. The former often forget their homeland, and so are much worse off and presumably cannot return until they recollect it, and the latter always recollect it with the help of particular signs, and so are much better off in their search for the happy life. The second thing that this language suggests is that this recollection had to be of a conscious experience of that happy life, and not merely a God-given innate notion of it. There are at least two reasons that it had to be a conscious experience. First, the very idea of “recollecting the happy life” much more intrinsically involves the idea of recollecting a prior conscious experience than the idea of recollecting wisdom or God. If someone says, “I am recollecting a happy life that I have never experienced,” we would think she does not understand what she is saying. Augustine shows that he believes this himself even in much later writings. When he rejects the preexistence requirement in *On the Trinity*, he insists that while we can recollect God, we cannot recollect the happy life, which suggests that the idea of recollecting the happy life implies the need for a prior conscious experience and recollecting God does not. Second, in saying that people in the third class recollect “their homeland of great sweetness,” the idea seems to be that they recollect the pleasure, the “sweetness,” of that homeland as if they once consciously experienced it.

Combining these reasons with the “return” language and all of the preexistence imagery in this passage, it seems clear that Augustine accepts the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle of the preexistence requirement. If recollection is necessary for returning to the happy life and if this recollection had to be of a prior conscious experience of it, then a prior conscious experience of the happy life (and all the other conscious knowledge that it implies) is necessary for recollecting

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507 *trin.* 14.14.21
4. Platonic Recollection in General and the Pre-Baptismal Writings

I submit that we are therefore justified in deflating the two problematic On Order passages as I suggested above and concluding that Augustine does indeed accept Platonic recollection of some form or other throughout the pre-baptismal writings. The evidence for his acceptance of innate knowledge and the preexistence requirement in these writings is too strong to deny. The evidence also suggests that we are justified in reconciling On Order 2.2.7 with On the Immortality of the Soul 4.6 and the rest of that work in the way I suggested above. The innate knowledge that exists in the soul does not literally exist in memory and this knowledge is literally the very Forms themselves – not images, notions, or representations. The Forms literally exist in the soul in some sense along the lines of the Soliloquies Project, though it is unclear as yet whether this would be as in a subject or as distinct substances. This is why even the fool needs no intellectual memory of the Forms, as On Order 2.2.7 tells us. He has the Forms themselves innately present and known in his soul, or more precisely, in his mind or intellect, and so does not have to “remember” (meminisse) notions of them. Letter 7 suggests that Augustine comes to believe that the innate knowledge does exist in memory in the post-baptismal writings (as I contend in Chapter 6), but in the pre-baptismal writings, this is not his view.

This reading about no intellectual memory is supported by Augustine’s admonitions throughout the Cassiciacum trilogy that we ought to “return to ourselves,” in order to attain wisdom.\(^{508}\) In the post-baptismal writings, Augustine regularly emphasizes that becoming wise is a two-step process of coming to know oneself and then God, and that knowing the former is not

\(^{508}\) Acad. 2.3.8.26 “Sed ad nos redeamus, nos, inquam, Romaniane...” See also Acad. 2.2.4.29 and ord. 1.1.3.50-53 and 2.6.19.
equivalent to knowing the latter but requires transcending oneself.\textsuperscript{509} Cary characterizes it as a process of moving “in then up,” not simply “in.”\textsuperscript{510} These admonitions in the Cassiciacum trilogy, however, suggest a one step process. Although becoming wise still requires knowing both oneself and God,\textsuperscript{511} this is a one step process of “returning to ourselves,” of merely moving “in.” In other words, the process of knowing oneself includes knowing God, which the idea that God (and all the divine Forms) is “in” the SOUL explains very nicely. Cary takes this also to imply that the SOUL is unchangeable and divine in these works in the manner of Plotinus. This could ultimately be what Augustine has in mind at Cassiciacum (as I will argue), but one could also argue that the doctrine remains compatible even with the fourth way where God can be said to “exist in” the SOUL, despite its being created. I leave the question of the uncreatedness of SOUL and its consubstantiality with God until the next chapter. For now, we have enough to conclude that the pre-baptismal Augustine thinks that the SOUL always contains and knows the divine Forms themselves without having them in memory.

The general conclusion of this chapter raises a question, however. If Augustine accepted the preexistence requirement at least up to 388 (\textit{Letter 7}) and innate knowledge at least up to 391 (\textit{On True Religion}), then why does he neglect to mention these things in \textit{Against the Academicians} (386), \textit{On Order} (386), and \textit{On the Teacher} (389/90) where they are relevant to the epistemological topics at issue? Why not come out with them explicitly in these works? It is difficult to say for sure why Augustine did not do this. I suspect that it was partially due to the fact that these dialogues were written for beginners in philosophy. The audience of any of Augustine’s dialogues is indicated, at least in part, by the educational level of the learners in the

\textsuperscript{509} e.g. \textit{lib. arb.} 2.6.14, 2.12.33-13.35, \textit{uera rel.} 39.72, \textit{conf.} 7.17.23, 10.17.26. See also \textit{retr.} 1.1.4 where Augustine regrets saying that the highest good is “in the mind” in \textit{Contra Academicos} rather than “in God.”


\textsuperscript{511} \textit{sol.} 1.2.7, 2.1.1, \textit{ord.} 2.18.47.
dialogue (as opposed to the teacher), and the learners in these dialogues were certainly beginners. The explanation, then, would be that the topic of Platonic recollection was too confusing and controversial to raise with beginners and that it was more important to deal with the introductory essentials of the subject matter at issue. This fits with the fact that Augustine begins hinting at Platonic recollection in his intermediate works, such as On the Quantity of the Soul and On the Free Choice of the Will where the more substantially but still only moderately educated Evodius is the learner. It also fits with the fact that Augustine brings it out even more in his most advanced works of this time period, the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul, where the highly educated Augustine himself is the learner (and Ratio the teacher).

One might ask, however, that if the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul were meant to be so advanced, then why was Augustine still reluctant explicitly to mention Platonic recollection in them, given how relevant it was to his project? The Soliloquies, for example, only hints at it in 2.20.35, and yet my argument has been that it was central to its logical structure. My guess is that Augustine intended to discuss Platonic recollection explicitly later in the project, likely when he was going to discuss the soul’s “understanding” in Books 3 or 4. The Soliloquies itself hints that he intended to discuss it at a later time when the subject matter made it appropriate and when there was sufficient space, and we already were beginning to see relatively explicit references to it in the draft that is On the Immortality of the Soul. Moreover, this kind of gradual revelation of Augustine’s more uncertain, difficult and controversial doctrines was

512 The learners in Against the Academicians and On Order are primarily the teenagers Licentius and Trygetius, one of whom is in love with poetry and the other who has just returned from military service (for an explicit reference to Licentius’ lack of education, see ord. 2.7.20). The learner in On the Teacher is Adeodatus, Augustine’s precocious yet still minimally educated 16 year-old son.
513 There are still hints at Platonic recollection in these works, however, including in De magistro. In mag. 8.24, for example, Augustine tells Adeodatus that “the law of reason itself that has been placed into (indita) our minds has rewarded your attentiveness” (nam uigilantiam tuam mentibus nostris indita ipsa lex rationis euicit), suggesting that they have innate knowledge of the “law of reason.”
514 sol. 2.19.33
standard in the dialogues.\textsuperscript{515} He first goes through the hard work of refining the question, making important basic distinctions, and generally exercising the interlocutor’s intellect. Then, when he figures that the interlocutor is adequately prepared for a detailed answer, he breaks into an “uninterrupted discourse” (oratio perpetua) that argues for his view and lays bare what was implicit in the earlier dialogue portion. This is also when Augustine articulates difficult and controversial claims that he admits go beyond what he has proven and would require more rigorous treatment.\textsuperscript{516} An explicit discussion of Platonic recollection would have fit very well into one of these categories (either into the explicit answer to the question or into the controversial theories related to the question) at the end of the Soliloquies Project. Since the project was never finished, we will never know for sure. But it does make sense that he would in the end have laid bare the Platonic recollection view that was central to the structure of his argument.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection in general in the pre-baptismal writings. I have also shown that he accepted the preexistence requirement at least until 388 (Letter 7) and innate knowledge at least until 389 or 391 (On True Religion). This demonstrates that he also accepted Platonic recollection in the post-baptismal writings at least until 388. Unfortunately, we will not be able to pursue Augustine’s ideas about Platonic recollection in these post-baptismal writings any further in this study. I close by examining some of the more controversial points about the kind of Platonic recollection that Augustine accepted.

\textsuperscript{515} For an extended examination of the literary form of Augustine’s pre-baptismal dialogues and especially the role of the oratio perpetua, see Kenyon, “Augustine’s Cassiciacum Project: Impass and Reflection in Dialogue” (PhD Diss. Cornell University, 2011): esp. 96-7.

\textsuperscript{516} Here are two examples. In the oratio perpetua of Contra Academicos, Augustine says that he is convinced that Platonism and Christianity together will show him the Truth, but he does not claim to have proven it and does not expect the reader to be convinced. In the oratio perpetua of De quantitate animae, he outlines 7 stages of activities of soul with an explanation that goes far beyond what he claims to have proven.
in the pre-baptismal writings. As we saw in the previous chapter, Letter 3 strongly suggests that Augustine accepted First-Way Platonic Recollection. In the next Chapter, I consider how plausible this possibility is by examining the controversial points included in the remaining three categories.
Chapter 6 – Platonic Recollection and the Pre-Baptismal Writings: First-Way Platonic Recollection (Categories 2, 3, and 4)

Introduction

In order to show how plausible it is that Augustine accepted First-Way Platonic Recollection, I begin with second-category claims (controversial claims applicable to all four ways) and then turn to third- and fourth-category claims (controversial claims applicable to the first three ways). The relevant claims in the second category are that all souls, including the World Soul, are omnipresent and one, that innate knowledge is the Forms themselves, and that the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms. The claims in the third category are that SOULS exist by means of themselves and are unchangeable, eternal, unmade, and uncreated. The claim in the fourth category is that SOULS are consubstantial with God. To conclude, I consider the possibility that human ratio is identical to divine Ratio, a claim that may fit into any one of categories 2-4.

1. The Plausibility of Second-Category Claims

1.1 Omnipresence and Unity of all Souls, including the World Soul

Since the claims about omnipresence and unity are closely related (unity entails omnipresence and omnipresence is evidence for unity but does not entail it), I deal with them at the same time. As I do this, keep in mind that in saying that all souls (including the World Soul) are omnipresent and united, I am saying that they are integrally omnipresent to the entire universe and that they remain omnipresent and united with each other to some degree even

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517 I use the term “SOUL” in these third and fourth categories because the doctrines especially concern the human soul. The doctrines will likely also apply to souls in general, however, with the exception that irrational souls will not be eternal/uncreated in an individual sense.
during earthly embodiment. It is not simply a preexistent omnipresence and unity.

I begin by reviewing the evidence from earlier chapters. In Chapters 3-4, I suggested that the basic Soliloquies’ idea that disciplina “exists in” each individual animus entails both doctrines with respect to animus. Disciplina itself is omnipresent and indivisible, and so it makes sense that individual animi would have to be omnipresent and indivisible too to some degree in order for omnipresent and indivisible disciplina to exist in them. Several claims throughout On the Immortality of the Soul also seemed to entail both doctrines. Even on the fourth way, where one might expect Augustine to deny omnipresence, he affirms that individual animi are “joined to a body non-spatially however much the body occupies space,” suggesting that animi are not spatially restricted at all. It was also on the fourth way that we saw the most explicit evidence for the unity of animi. Besides containing a more or less explicit reference to a World Soul, there were passages suggesting that each individual animus must last at least as long as the universe to bestow form upon it, suggesting that they were all one with each other and with the World Soul. We also saw evidence that irrational animae were also meant to be omnipresent and one with the World Soul, since they also were involved in bestowing form on the universe, only at a lower level than animi. We were not, however, able to come to as definite a conclusion about them.

I turn now to the evidence from outside these works that supports these interpretations and shows that Augustine accepts the two doctrines throughout the pre-baptismal writings for all souls. The best positive evidence for the doctrines can be found in a work written shortly after his baptism, On the Quantity of the Soul. Although this is a post-baptismal work wherein Augustine explicitly affirms that the soul is created and not consubstantial with God, it continues on the topic of the soul’s incorporeality from where On the Immortality of the Soul breaks off, seemingly continuous with it along the lines of the fourth way. This suggests that important
doctrines will also be continuous unless there is an obvious reason why not (such as there is about the uncreatedness of soul and its consubstantiality with God). The doctrine of omnipresence appears in a sequence where Augustine begins by suggesting that even during embodiment, the soul (anima) does not seem to be contained in any place (nullo loco). Then, when Evodius objects that this would imply that our souls are not in our bodies (even when embodied), Augustine replies,

Do not be distressed, and take courage! For this thought and consideration invites us towards our very selves and, to the extent that it is proper, wrests us away from the body. As for your supposition that the soul is not in the body of an animated living thing, although it seems absurd, nevertheless the most learned men have found it pleasing and even now I think that some of them exist.

This suggests that Augustine also accepts the omnipresence doctrine. His accepting it is not entirely unambiguous, but his praise of the doctrine, that it “invites us towards our very selves,” away from the body and that “the most learned men” have held it (which is often an allusion to the Platonists), is a very positive sign. Moreover, the fact that they are speaking about the embodied soul of any animated living thing (uiuentis animantis) suggests that he not only has human souls in mind, but also irrational ones.

The doctrine of the unity of these souls appears in a passage that closely follows. After having suggested that embodied souls (animae) are not contained in place (loco), Augustine goes

\[\text{an. quant. 30.60 “Ex quo cui non videatur nullo loco anima contineri?”} \]

\[\text{an. quant. 30.61 “Ne perturbere ac magis bono animo facito sis. Ista enim cogitatio et consideratio ad nosmetipso nos invitat et, quantum licet, avellit a corpore. Quod autem tibi visum est non esse animam in corpore viventis animantis, quamquam videatur absurdum, non tamen doctissimi homines, quibus id placuerit, defuerunt neque nunc arbitror deesse. Sed, ut ipse intellegis, res est subtilissima et ad quam cernendam mentis acies satis purganda est.” For other evidence along these same lines, see an. quant. 14.24: “I ask: must we fear that the human soul, whose more perfect and almost exclusive sight (aspectus) is reason itself, by which the soul endeavors to discover even itself—must we fear that it is nothing, if the same reason should prove that the soul, that is, it itself, is lacking in every magnitude by which place (locus) is occupied?” (metueendumne est, quaeso, ne animus humanus, cuius excellentior et paene solus aspectus est ipsa ratio, qua etiam se invenire molitur, nihil sit, si illum eadem ratio, id est se ipse, omni magnitudine, qua obtinetur locus, carere convicerit?). \]

\[\text{ep. 118.5.33 “Tunc Plotini schola Romae floruit, habuitque condiscipulos multos acutissimos et solertissimos uiros.”} \]
on to argue that they cannot be divided (non posse partiri).\(^5\) From Augustine’s example about worms, this would initially seem to apply only to the unity of an individual embodied soul. The explicit argument is that the soul of one worm remains undivided even when the worm’s body is divided and the parts go on their separate lives. But this naturally raises the question about whether the soul of that one worm is also divided from the souls of other worms and indeed from the souls of any living thing. Augustine does not mention this question explicitly, but the silence is pregnant. He then tells his interlocutor Evodius that he cannot sufficiently understand indivisibility until he has had further training. After what seems like a change of topic, he raises the question about the “number of souls” (de numero animarum), which is another way of posing the question of the divisibility of all souls. Are souls one, one and many, or simply many?\(^6\)

Augustine thinks Evodius needs further training to examine this question properly too, but he says enough to indicate that he himself prefers the second option. This is evident from the responses he gives to each option. If he asserts the first option, he says, then Evodius will be confused how one soul is happy and another is miserable. If he asserts the second option, then Evodius will laugh at him and it will be difficult to make him stop. If he asserts the third option, then he will laugh at himself and he would rather have Evodius laugh at him than be forced to laugh at himself. This last response shows that Augustine at least prefers the second option to the third, which is enough to show that he believes in the unity of souls. His response to the first option also seems to rule out the first option, though that is not quite as clear. It would be strange

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\(^5\) Plotinus regularly argues the same point, e.g. Enn. 5.1.2, 6.4.4, 12.

\(^6\) *an. quant.* 32.69 “For if I were to say that soul is one, you would be confused, because one soul is happy and another miserable, and no one thing can be happy and miserable at the same time. If I say that it is one and many at the same time, you will laugh; nor does it easily occur to me how to suppress your laughter. But if I were to say that they are only many, then I will laugh at myself and I would prefer to be less displeasing to myself than to you” (Si enim dixero unam esse animam, conturbaberis, quod in altero beata est, in altero misera nec una res simul et beata et misera potest esse. Si unam simul et multa dicam esse, ridebis; nec mihi facile, unde tuum risum comprimam, suppetit. Sin multas tantummodo esse dixer, ipse me ridebo minusque me mihi disloquentem quam tibi preferam). For other post-baptismal passages alluding to the embodied unity of individual souls, see *uera rel.* 22.43 and *ep.* 11.4.
if he did not rule it out, however, since it is especially counterintuitive. Moreover, we know that Plotinus himself endorsed the second option in *Enn. 5.1*, a treatise that Augustine had almost certainly read at this time, and so it makes little sense that Augustine means to affirm the first one.\(^{524}\) Combining this with the material from the earlier passage, Augustine is indicating that although souls are many, they are also always one, even during earthly embodiment, just as the soul of the divided worm remains one while being multiplied into each of its divisions.\(^{525}\) Moreover, this unity applies not only to rational souls but also to irrational ones, as we can infer from the worm example. Thus, we have excellent evidence that Augustine accepted the omnipresence and unity of all souls in *On the Quantity of the Soul*, which strongly supports my conclusion that he accepted these doctrines in the pre-baptismal writings.

We do not have such explicit evidence for the two doctrines in the Cassiciacum trilogy, but there is some. The main piece comes from *Against the Academicians*. In his second dedicatory introduction to Romanianus, Augustine says,

> There is only one matter in which I envy your good fortune, namely that you alone are enjoying the company of my Lucilianus. Are you in turn jealous because I called him my Lucilianus? What have I called him except ‘yours’ and ‘everyone’s’ since we’re all one?\(^{526}\)

Augustine’s assertion that he, Lucilianus, and Romanianus “are all one,” suggests that the Cassiciacum trilogy is consistent with the unity of all souls doctrines. It does not specifically confirm that this unity applies to irrational souls, but it does suggest that unity applies to

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\(^{524}\) *Enn. 5.1.8.24-27*

\(^{525}\) For other evidence of the unity of all souls in the post-baptismal writings, see *ep. 9.1*: “Gather yourself to your SOUL, and raise that to God as much as you can! For there you certainly also have me (habes et nos), not through bodily images which it is now necessary to use in our recollection (recordatione), but through that thought (cogitatio) by which you understand that we likewise do not exist spatially” (*Confer te ad animum tuum, et illum in deum leua quantum potes! Ibi enim certius habes et nos, non per corporeas imagines quibus nunc in nostra recordatione uti necesse est, sed per illam cogitationem qua intellegis non loco esse nos simul*). This suggests both that SOULS are unified while embodied and that the unity follows from bare incorporeality.

\(^{526}\) *Acad. 2.3.9.51-2* (King trans.) “*Unum tantum est, unde inuideam fortunae tuae, quod solus frueris Luciliano meo. An et tu enuides, quia dixi ‘meo’? Sed quid dixi aliud quam tuo et omnium, quicumque unum sumus?*”
embodied rational souls, since Augustine, Lucilianus, and Romanianus are all embodied at that time. The assertion also suggests that the Cassiciacum trilogy is consistent with the omnipresence of souls doctrine, since differently located human beings could not be one with each other if their souls were not omnipresent in some sense.

So then it appears that Augustine really was committed to the omnipresence and unity of all souls doctrines throughout the pre-baptismal writings. An interesting thing is that the evidence also suggests that Augustine intended to include the World Soul with these doctrines throughout the pre-baptismal writings and beyond. Augustine quite explicitly affirms the existence of a World Soul in the Soliloquies Project (imm. an. 15.24), in the Cassiciacum trilogy (ord. 2.11.30), and after his baptism (ep. 7.7, Gen. lit. imp. 4.17, uera rel. 11.22, 55.110). The idea that individual rational souls are one with this World Soul throughout these time periods is suggested both from the unity passages above and from passages implying that human souls were once involved in the administration of the universe (mor. 1.21.39, an. quant. 33.73, mus. 6.11.30, uera rel. 22.43).

R. J. O’Connell draws the same conclusions about the omnipresence and the unity of all individual souls (including the World Soul) in the pre-baptismal writings, as I do here, and the evidence has compelled even more conservative Augustine scholars to do the same. Chad Gerber, for example, is happy to grant that at Cassiciacum, “...Augustine clearly affirms the existence of a Universal Soul and the transcendent unity of individual souls.” In saying this,

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528 Augustine also would have read about this idea in Plotinus (c.g. Enn. 3.2.7.23-27. 5.1.2.1-10), which supports this contention.

529 O’Connell, Early Theory (1968), 122.

530 Gerber, Spirit (2012), 79. He cites our imm. an. 15.24 passage, an. quant. 32.69, and ord. 2.11.30. He
Gerber not only means that the “transcendent unity” includes the World Soul, but also that this transcendental unity continues throughout earthly embodiment. He does not explicitly mention the omnipresence of souls, but I take that to be implied by this acceptance of unity. Gerber goes on to say that the doctrine of the World Soul and its unity with all individual souls is present throughout our time period, and possibly much longer. At the same time, he rightly notes that we therefore cannot conclude from these things that Augustine thinks that souls are divine (i.e. consubstantial with God) or uncreated, because Augustine holds the former in the post-baptismal works after he has clearly rejected the latter. From all of these considerations, I conclude that Augustine accepted the unity and omnipresence of all souls, including the World Soul, at least throughout the pre-baptismal writings. We have seen good evidence for both doctrines from 386 to 391 and there is no need to fear that they entail the consubstantiality and uncreatedness of soul. This makes sense with our reading of On the Immortality of the Soul.

The doctrines explicitly appear in the context of the fourth way where the soul is already

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531 As is confirmed by what he says later: “[Augustine] not only retains the Platonic doctrine of the All-Soul in so far as it pertains to a certain transcendent unity of individuated soul, but also in so far as it pertains to the mediation of intelligible form to the sensible world” (Gerber, Spirit (2012), 205).
532 Cary contends that omnipresence is implied by bare incorporeality and that Augustine retained this view at least as far as ep. 137. Interpreting this letter, Cary says, “That even the soul is in a way integrally omnipresent by virtue of its non-spatial mode of being is an implication that Augustine apparently understood and accepted” (Invention (2000), 131).
533 See Gerber, Spirit (2012), 206-8, including note 12, where he cites Teske approvingly: “But even after [Augustine] surrendered his previous claim that the world is an animal, he still – even to the end of his life – maintained a single living spiritual power that adorns and administers the world under God in angels and holy souls” and “the world-soul of Plotinus has become in Augustine a creature that God uses to form, administer, and order the world, but – and this is the point I wish to argue – even as late as the Confessions the idea of the world-soul with which individual souls are identical remains an operative element in Augustine’s conceptual scheme” (See Teske, “World-Soul” (1983), 79, 84 (emphasis in original)).
534 Nor are there other significant objections to the doctrines. Nothing from the Council of Nicea rejects them, and Augustine’s comments in lib. arb. 3.21.59 suggest that as far as he knew, Catholic commentators had not arrived at a rough consensus on the matter. The matter at issue in 3.21.59 is specifically the “origin of souls” but the uncertainty would have to apply to the related matters of omnipresence and number. The traducian option of the soul’s origin, for example, is that individual souls are drawn from one preexisting soul, and this will have implications for omnipresence and unity that the creationist option will not imply.
created, and so they are evidently independent considerations.

Understanding these things helps us to see the mistake of scholars who say that the World Soul is the divine cosmic Ratio from the Soliloquies Project. One scholar who asserts this, for example, says that in entertaining the possibility that Ratio either is the SOUL or is merely in the SOUL, he is entertaining the possibility that the World Soul (which he takes to be divine Ratio) and individual SOULS are not strictly unified. But the fact that Augustine still holds onto the idea of a World Soul and its unity with all souls after clearly placing all souls lower than Ratio on the fourth way (and in subsequent works) shows that this cannot be right. It is true that Augustine entertains the possibility that SOULS are Ratio on the first way (in ord. 2.19.50 and imm. an. 2.2), but this is another consideration entirely. Since the World Soul is itself an animus, a rational soul, it will have Ratio in it in some sense just like any other animus and one can consider whether it too is identical with Ratio or merely has Ratio in it as in a subject. But this is different from the question of the unity of souls with the World Soul. From the beginning, Augustine believes in this unity independently of his views about the relation between SOULS and Ratio.

1.2 Innate Knowledge is the Forms within the SOUL and the SOUL is Always

Experiencing the Forms

I deal with the next two doctrines together as well because they are closely related. I understand them to be related just as the doctrines of the omnipresence and unity of souls, where the one entails the other for Augustine, but not vice versa. The doctrine that innate knowledge is the Forms themselves within the SOUL entails that the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms,

535 Rombs, Fall of the Soul (2006), 52 “Here in the De immortalitate animae and in the De ordine Augustine shows a readiness to grant its existence as World-soul. There is ambiguity, however, in Augustine’s position. Augustine will not write definitively about the relation of the individual soul to the World-soul. Repeatedly Augustine refers to the soul’s connection to Ratio, a synonym for universal Soul, always framing his statement in the form of a disjunction: Reason, as understood as that substantial reality and guiding principle is either in the mind or is the mind.”
but the doctrine that the *soul* is always experiencing the Forms does not necessarily entail that innate knowledge is the Forms themselves within the *soul*. I infer that there is an entailment in the first direction (at least for Augustine) for three reasons. First, the innate knowledge in the pre-baptismal writings (where the first doctrine occurs) is *scientia*, the strictest form of knowledge; second, this strict knowledge is often likened to the experience of “seeing”; and third, the idea that innate knowledge is the Forms themselves suggests that there is no separation or mediation between the soul and the Forms to stop an experience from happening. This situation is analogous to what Augustine says about the mind and its *self*-knowledge in *On the Trinity*. In this later context, the human mind is “present in” itself in a certain sense (since it is itself) and it is always knowing itself (even when not thinking about itself),\(^{536}\) which Augustine clearly understands as a scenario where the mind is always experiencing itself. So it makes sense that there is an entailment in the one direction. There is a lack of entailment in the other direction, however, because Augustine could accept a scenario where the *soul* is always experiencing the Forms but where the part of innate knowledge within the *soul* is only “notions” of those Forms and where the Forms themselves do not “exist in” the *soul* in any strong sense, but rather exist “above” the *soul*. This is the view that Augustine seems to have held in the post-baptismal writings of the early period, as I will explain, and we have to make space for it.

I have already argued in the previous chapter (since it was necessary for my purposes there) that Augustine believed in both of these doctrines in the pre-baptismal writings, and so we will not have to deal with the question of Augustine’s belief extensively here. My argument was that they were implied by the *On Order* idea that the *soul* has no intellectual memory, the *Soliloquies* Project idea that the divine Forms exist in the *soul* (whether as in a subject or as distinct substances), and the Cassiciacum trilogy idea that returning to oneself is sufficient for

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\(^{536}\) *trin*. 10.3.5-10.4.6, 10.11.17-18, 14.5.7-14.8.11
knowing both God and the SOUL. One could subject this reasoning to closer scrutiny, but if the doctrines really apply to all four ways as category two doctrines (as I list them here), then I do not think they are controversial enough to warrant it, with one possible exception. Where they become particularly controversial is if they entail the doctrines in categories three and four, and I do not think they do so in the Soliloquies Project itself. The possible exception is that the innate knowledge is the Forms doctrine could suggest the doctrine that the human mind or ratio is identical to divine Ratio for all four ways under consideration, regardless of whether or not the SOUL is created. This is what I conclude at the end of this chapter, in fact, but it is not a conclusion that I derive solely from my conclusion here that innate knowledge is the Forms on all four ways. The material contained throughout this chapter also contributes to this conclusion.

With this exception in the back of our minds, we can raise a reasonable question suitable to this section: Am I really right to place these two doctrines in category two as applicable to all four ways? One might especially be tempted to think that their application should not be so broad. The Innate Knowledge is the Forms doctrine in particular seems to be an unhappy fit with the fourth way. On this way, it is difficult to understand how the Forms could “exist in” the SOUL in the strong sense we are talking about because the SOUL is created in time and so does not have an eternal symmetrical conjunction (past and present) to them. The doctrine, in fact, might seem to fit only with the first and second ways (mutatis mutandis for the second way where the SOUL “exists in” the Forms) because this is where the “existing in” relation is clearly defined as being “in a subject,” seemingly making the two things consubstantial. This would make the idea that innate knowledge is the Forms more intelligible. Some scholars also think that the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine is an unhappy fit with the fourth way. Phillip Cary, for example, argues that this doctrine tracks the doctrine of the SOUL’s essential unchangeability (i.e. its unchangeability in substance), which means that it could only apply to the first three ways,
and so would be a category 3 doctrine. For him, the idea that the SOUL always has an unchangeable essence outside of time is what makes it possible for the SOUL always to be experiencing the unchangeable Forms. In rejecting this and embracing the SOUL’s temporality, according to him, Augustine signifies that he no longer accepts this doctrine because he no longer thinks a continual experience is possible.\footnote{As a result of this shift, according to Cary, the full unfallen experience of the Forms for Augustine ultimately becomes eschatological. All SOULS experienced the Forms in Adam at the beginning of time and will only be able to experience this unfallen state again at the end of time in the heavenly city. As he says, “Since the mature Augustine has no immutable part of the soul to anchor the fallen soul in eternity, the unfallen state of the soul must be an occurrence in time – more precisely, at the beginning and the end of time, that is, when all souls were one in Adam... and when souls in the Heavenly City are united in the mutual consent of charity, seeing clearly into each other, no thoughts hidden by the opacity of fallen bodies” (Invention (2000), 122).}

1.2.1 Why These Two Doctrines Belong in Category 2: Innate Knowledge is the Forms doctrine

So then am I right to place these doctrines in category two as applicable to all four ways? What is the thinking behind these doctrines, anyway, and are there other doctrines that they track? To do these questions full justice is beyond the scope of this study. There are, however, some conclusions that we can draw with a reasonable degree of confidence. Let us begin with the innate knowledge is the Forms doctrine. Based on my reading of the Soliloquies and On the Immortality of the Soul I submit that we have to remain open to the possibility that the fourth way is meant to include it. Augustine makes it clear that the divine Forms are still “in” the SOUL on this way (or vice versa), a conclusion that Augustine inferred from his contention that the SOUL has innate knowledge of them, and we saw no sign of Augustine introducing innate notions as the component of this innate knowledge in the SOUL. This view does not last for very long. In my view, Augustine abandons this doctrine shortly after his baptism in favour of an innate notions view. The main evidence for this is that he allows for intellectual memory in Letter 7.\footnote{Cf. especially ep. 6 and ep. 7.1.}
speaks of innate notions (*notiones*) of intelligible things in *On the Free Choice of the Will* 2,\(^{539}\) and refers to (innate) *notitiae* of them in the *Confessions*.\(^{540}\) In other words, Augustine soon places it in category 3 or 4 with the doctrine of an uncreated and/or consubstantial *soul* rather than a created one. In the *Soliloquies* Project, however, he has not yet made this shift.

Now if anything, one could question this point that Augustine abandoned the doctrine after his baptism. In *On the Quantity of the Soul*, for example, Augustine still says that the *soul* seems “to have brought every art with it,”\(^{541}\) and in *Letter* 7, he speaks as if the *rationes disciplinarum* themselves exist in the *soul* with no intermediaries.\(^{542}\) In the *Confessions*, moreover, he suggests that when it comes to knowing the liberal arts, God, and the happy life, our memories already contains the *res ipsae*, the “things themselves” (not their images), and that the things are in memory *per praesentiam*, “through presence.”\(^{543}\) All of these things suggest that the Forms still exist in the *soul* after all and so remain themselves the *soul’s* innate knowledge, keeping this a category 2 doctrine even after his baptism.

My first response to this possibility is to concede that the doctrine may linger in *On the Quantity of the Soul*. Augustine wrote it almost immediately after his baptism, and so it is possible that he had not yet developed an alternative doctrine to fit with a created *soul*. It is also possible that he had written a draft of *On the Quantity of the Soul* before his baptism in which he was still assuming the doctrine (and perhaps also the doctrine of uncreated *souls*) and did not bother to revise the relevant parts when he published it post-baptism. Evidence for the existence of a pre-baptismal draft, for example, is that Augustine indicates an openness to the idea that

\(^{539}\) *lib. arb.* 1.6.15, 2.9.26, 2.15.40
\(^{540}\) *conf.* 10.20.29.18-20, 10.21.31.27-8
\(^{541}\) *an. quant.* 20.34.13(173)
\(^{542}\) *ep.* 7.5.92-6
\(^{543}\) *conf.* 10.9.16.2-4 (arts; *res ipsae*), 10.11.18 (arts already in memory), 10.17.26.4-13 (arts; *per praesentiam*), 10.17.26.22-27 (God above and yet possibly also already in memory), 10.20.29 (God and the happy life already in memory; *res ipsa*) (see especially ll. 29-32).
souls are “eternal,” which seems out of place given his insistence elsewhere in the text on created souls.

My second response, however, is to maintain that the evidence for an intellectual memory in Letter 7, innate notions in On the Free Choice of the Will Book 2, and innate notitiae in the Confessions is strong enough to indicate that there has been a shift to an innate notions/notitiae view of some sort. We can see this, for example, by considering the Confessions more closely. It is true that even in the Confessions, Augustine is willing to say that God, for example, is in us or that we are in God, but for a long time now these claims are much more metaphorical than in the pre-baptismal works. God no longer has to exist “somewhere” (alicubi), and he certainly does not have to exist in the soul. Moreover, when it comes to Augustine’s most technical treatment of the soul’s ascent to God, it is clear that properly speaking God does not exist “in” the soul in any constitutive sense. Rather, the mind must “transcend” (transire) its memory to find God since God’s proper existence is “above” (desuper) memory. Nevertheless, Augustine still indicates that God must exist in memory for innate knowledge sorts of reasons, suggesting that we still must have innate knowledge of God. He describes this knowledge as a notitia,

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544 an. quant. 20.34
545 an. quant. 1.2. Cary also argues that there were some remnants of Augustine’s controversial pre-baptismal commitments in the early post-baptismal works (Invention (2000), 109-114). This seems right to me, though I remain unconvinced of some of Cary’s specific claims about them.
546 e.g conf. 1.2.2 “Accordingly, my God, I would have no being, I would not have any existence, unless you were in me. Or rather, I would have no being if I were not in you ‘of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things’ (Rom. 11:36)” (Chadwick trans.).
547 Augustine rules these things out explicitly in diu. qu. 20, shortly after his baptism.
548 conf. 10.17.26.14-19 “I will also transcend this my power that is called memory, I will transcend it to persevere to you, lovely light. What do you have to say to me? You who remain above me, I ascend to you through my soul, I will transcend this my power that is called memory, wishing to touch you where you can be touched and to cling to you where you can be clung to.” (Transibo et hanc uim meam, quae memoria uocatur, transibo eam ut pertendam ad te, dulce lumen. Quid dicis mihi? Ecce ego ascendens per animum meum ad te, qui desuper mihi manes, transibo et istam uim meam, quae memoriam uocatur, uolens te attingere, unde attingi potes, et inhaerere tibi, unde inhaereri tibi potest.)
549 The transition to affirming innate knowledge of God is indicated at conf. 10.17.26.22-27: “Thus shall I also transcend my memory to touch that which separated me from the quadrupeds and creatures of flight and made me wiser than them, shall I also transcend memory to discover where you are, true good, safe
however, to indicate how God can be in both “places.” That is, the reason that God can be said to exist both inside and above memory without contradiction is that it is a notitia of God that exists in memory,\textsuperscript{550} not (constitutively) God himself. The same point likely goes for any divine Form, since they also innately exist in memory\textsuperscript{551} and yet have their proper existence beyond memory in God’s mind.\textsuperscript{552} It is true that Augustine sometimes says that the res ipsae (the things themselves) of God and the Forms exist in memory,\textsuperscript{553} but since he clearly no longer means that they exist there constitutively and since he unambiguously speaks of God’s existence in memory as notitiae, it is evident that he no longer holds the innate knowledge is the Forms view. I take this also to be the scenario in Letter 7 and On the Free Choice of the Will 2. One difference that should be noted, though, is that in the technical terminology of Confessions 10, Augustine does not use the term “notio” for knowledge of the Forms but reserves it for an inferior kind of awareness. This is a change from On the Free Choice of the Will Book 2, but does not seem to be significant for our purposes.

This solution leaves an important question unanswered, of course. Why does Augustine bother to say that the res ipsae exist in memory at all in the Confessions, if he only means that distinctly existing notitiae of the res ipsae exist there? Is he simply being careless? The answer to this question will become clear by turning to the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine,
which is the next topic of discussion. My claim about this doctrine is that it continues into the post-baptismal works and that Augustine believes in it there because knowledge cannot be mere images of the Forms but must be something as like them as possible without deficiency. This suggests that the answer to our question is that Augustine’s references to res ipsae are products of his attempt to emphasize the degree of this likeness. That is, Augustine intends the res ipsae terminology to indicate that the soul is always experiencing the Forms and thus to indicate that its notitiae of the Forms are sufficiently like them to count as knowledge. It is not to say that the Forms exist there constitutively or to say that they have some sort of non-notitiae presence in or to the soul. I turn now to the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine to show that these things are so.

1.2.2 Why These Two Doctrines Belong in Category 2: Always Experiencing the Forms Doctrine

To show that Augustine held the always experiencing the Forms doctrine in the pre-baptismal writings, I first clarify some ambiguities about its meaning. O’Connell and Cary sometimes refer to it as the “unfallenness” doctrine because it posits that even after the soul’s fall and earthly embodiment, its highest part remains always contemplating the Forms in an “unfallen” state.\(^{554}\) Taken simply in this sense, unfallenness terminology is accurate to the doctrine. The terminology is not accurate to the doctrine, however, if this first “experience” sense of “unfallenness” is assumed to go hand in hand with a second “essential” sense of “unfallenness,” which is that the highest part of the embodied soul remains essentially unchanged and eternal in the intelligible world. Plotinus and Proclus and Iamblichus famously disagreed about whether or not the highest part of the soul remained unfallen – Plotinus thought it did and Proclus and Iamblichus thought it did not – but they agreed that its two senses were inseparable. In particular, they agreed that if the highest part of the soul did not remain

essentially unchanged and eternal (i.e. if there is no unfallenness of essence), then it cannot keep experiencing the Forms (i.e. then there is no unfallenness of experience).\textsuperscript{555} When asking about the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine in Augustine, however, I am only asking about an unfallenness of experience, not an unfallenness of essence. This is important to keep in mind because my contention is that while Augustine seems to accept (or at least to entertain) both meanings together in the pre-baptismal writings, in the post-baptismal writings he seems to maintain a commitment to the unfallenness of experience meaning, despite insisting on a created SOUL, and dropping the unfallenness of essence meaning. This is a middle way between Plotinus and Proclus, made possible by disconnecting the two senses of unfallenness. Failing to recognize that Augustine disconnects them – one of Augustine’s many innovations with respect to the Neoplatonic tradition – has led scholars to miss this conclusion.

There are several reasons to think that Augustine not only extends the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine to the fourth way, but also much later into the post-baptismal writings, where a created SOUL makes it unexpected. One of these is that Augustine uses the language of “seeing” to describe the innate knowledge in On the Free Choice of the Will and On True Religion. As he says in the former, “for if you were not seeing (cerneres) [wisdom] with your soul in any way, then in no way would you be knowing (scires) that you both will and ought to will to be wise...”\textsuperscript{556} and in the latter, “For whence is equality of any kind desired (appeteretur) in bodies, or whence are we convinced that [any equality that may be seen there] is

\textsuperscript{555} For the classic expression of Plotinus’ view, see Enn. 4.8.8.1-9. Other references include Enn. 1.1.10, 2.9.2.5-10, 3.4.3.24-27, 3.8.5, 4.3.12, 4.7.13, 4.8.4.31-32, 5.3.4, 6.4.14. For Proclus’ view, see ET 211, and for Iamblichus’, see Fr. 87 of In Tim. (=Proclus In Tim. 3.334.3ff) and Pseudo-Simplicius, In DA 89, 33-90, 25. English translations of the Proclean and Iamblichean passages appear in Dillon and Gerson, Neoplatonic Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), 280, 254-5 and 262-3.

\textsuperscript{556} lib. arb. 2.9.27 “nam si eam nullo modo cerneres, nullo modo scires et uelle te esse sapientem et uelle debere...”
far different from perfect equality, unless the mind sees (uidetur) that which is perfect.\textsuperscript{557} Since the language of “seeing” implies an experience or acquaintance with the object known, then it suggests that the SOUL is always experiencing or being acquainted with the Forms it knows innately.

Another reason to think that Augustine extends the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine into the post-baptismal works is that the \textit{Confessions} seems to suggest it in Book 10. In that Book, Augustine distinguishes between three classes of things according to how they exist in memory.\textsuperscript{558} The first class of things are present in memory “through images” (\textit{per imagines}), and these include bodily things. The second are present “through presence” (\textit{per praesentiam}), and these include the liberal arts (and presumably all of the Forms including God). The third are present “through \textit{notiones} or \textit{notationes},” and these include the affections of the SOUL (e.g. joy or sadness).\textsuperscript{559} We are particularly interested in the second class. What does it mean for the liberal arts (and thus the Forms) to exist in memory “through presence”? I have already argued that it does not mean that the Forms literally “exist in” the SOUL (in the manner of the \textit{Soliloquies}) whether innately or otherwise, but rather that \textit{notitiae} of the Forms exist there.\textsuperscript{560} This point is supported in this passage too by the fact that Augustine does not use the term \textit{notitia} to describe the third class, but only \textit{notiones} and \textit{notationes}, as though not to confuse the latter two with the former. But could existing in memory “through presence” mean that the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms? That seems precisely to be the implication of the sentence immediately following. Describing the third class, Augustine says that, “the memory retains [these \textit{notiones} or

\textsuperscript{557} \textit{uida} \textit{re} \textit{la} \textit{rel.} \textit{30.55} “\textit{Unde enim qualiscumque in corporibus appeteretur aequalitas aut unde conuinceretur longe plurimum differre a perfecta, nisi ea quae perfecta est mente uidetur.” See also \textit{uida} \textit{re} \textit{la} \textit{rel.} \textit{32.60}, \textit{34.64}.
\textsuperscript{558} \textit{uida} \textit{rel.} \textit{10.17.26}
\textsuperscript{559} \textit{uida} \textit{r} \textit{e} \textit{l} \textit{a} \textit{10.17.26}. It is not clear in what sense \textit{notiones} and \textit{notationes} are supposed to be different here. I assume that the English term “notions” is sufficient to capture their meaning for our purposes.
\textsuperscript{560} As \textit{uida re} \textit{10.20.29.18-20}, \textit{10.21.31.27-28}, and \textit{10.23.33.18-19} make clear about a \textit{res ipsa} passage in \textit{10.20.29.29-33}.
notationes] even when the SOUL is not experiencing them (non patitur)...” which is to say, reasonably enough, that one can have notiones or notationes of affections of the SOUL, without actually experiencing those affections. But this raises the question: Is this also true about the first and second classes? Augustine is silent, forcing the reader to make the inference. The answer regarding the first class is clearly yes, which goes without saying because it is obvious that one can have images of bodily things in memory without continually experiencing those bodily things. But Augustine’s silence about the second class seems precisely to indicate that this will not be true about this class. If it were true about this class, we would expect Augustine to qualify it, since it is precisely this class that needs the qualification, given that the memory retains the liberal arts “through presence.” Augustine’s silence, therefore, seems to be implying that one cannot have this second class of things in memory, whether innately or otherwise, unless one is continually experiencing them. Or to put it another way, the SOUL’s notitia of the Forms in memory (innate or otherwise) will involve a continuous experience of the Forms themselves, like the way we experience light all day, but often do not notice it or pay attention to it.

One final reason for thinking that Augustine believes in the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine in these works is that he seems to have a very important epistemological reason for asserting it. The reason is that innate knowledge of the Forms (or any knowledge of Forms) would not truly be “knowledge” unless the mind were continually experiencing them. That is, without a continual experience, the notions (or notitiae) in memory no longer qualify as knowledge, and that is unacceptable. I call this the “Continual Acquaintance Condition for Knowledge.”

561 Augustine also says this explicitly at conf. 10.9.16.
562 The same point is suggested in conf. 10.9.16. Augustine says that having the res ipsae of the liberal arts in memory contrasts with retaining an image of something and leaving the thing outside or letting the thing pass away. Having the res ipsae in memory, it thus seems, means remaining in contact with the res ipsae, always acquainted with and experiencing them.
Continual Acquaintance\textsuperscript{563} Condition for Knowledge: Necessarily, if X is not continually acquainted with Y, then X does not know Y.

This is a surprising doctrine because it seems obviously false, but there is good evidence to suggest that Augustine holds it for knowledge of intelligible things at least up to the \textit{Confessions}.

Our best evidence comes from Augustine’s commitment to two epistemological principles. The precise formulation of the first principle is contentious, but a provisional way to put it for now is that in order to have knowledge, the knowledge must be sufficiently “like” the object of knowledge without any deficiency. Let us call it the “Likeness Principle of Knowledge.”

(1) \textit{Likeness Principle of Knowledge}: Necessarily, if X has knowledge, K\textsubscript{Y}, of Y, then K\textsubscript{Y} must be sufficiently like Y without any deficiency.

To state the principle negatively in a little more detail, we may say that any deficient image or impression of some object cannot be knowledge of that object. I infer this principle from various pieces of evidence. One piece of evidence is the affinity reasoning of the \textit{Soliloquies} Project. There, we saw that knowledge of the Forms seemed to imply an affinity between the \textit{Soul} and the Forms, at least to the extent that both are incorporeal and one exists in the other. We can infer from this, \textit{a fortiori}, that the knowledge itself in the \textit{Soul} also has to be like the Forms, as our principle states. Another bit of evidence is the fact that Augustine agrees with Zeno’s definition of catalectic impressions in \textit{Against the Academicicians}. The first way that Augustine states the definition is as follows: “the truth that can be perceived (\textit{percipi}, i.e. known) is impressed on the mind by what it comes from in such a way that it couldn’t be from something other than what it does come from.”\textsuperscript{564} He also paraphrases it “more briefly and plainly” thus: “something true can

\textsuperscript{563} Properly speaking, the type of acquaintance I mean here is an occurrent acquaintance that is actual and episodic.
\textsuperscript{564} Acad. 2.5.11.12-14 “...\textit{id uerum percipi posse, quod ita esset animo impressum ex eo, unde esset, ut esse non posset ex eo, unde non esset}” (taken from Cicero, \textit{Academia} 2.6.18).
be apprehended by means of signs that do not have what is false."\textsuperscript{565} The former uses the language of impressions, which indicates a likeness, and the latter makes it clear that these impressions cannot have signs that are “false,” which rules out deficiency, fitting nicely with my statements of the principle. Against the Academicians also makes it clear that motivating the principle is that knowledge has to be infallible, i.e. that it cannot have any possibility of error.\textsuperscript{566} A third piece of evidence is the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle discussed in Chapter 5. This principle tells us that the cognition of an original is prior to cognizing that something is its deficient likeness or image, which means that the knowledge of an object could not merely be a deficient image or impression of that object. The impression that is knowledge, therefore, if it can even be called an impression, must be something that has no unlikeness to its object. A fourth piece of evidence is all of the passages from the pre- and post-baptismal writings suggesting that the res ipsae, the Forms themselves, exist in the SOUL as its innate knowledge. I argued that Augustine only meant this literally in the pre-baptismal works, but however he meant it in any of these cases, the underlying idea very reasonably would be that the knowledge must be like its object with no deficiency. So the first epistemological principle in some form or other is almost certainly at work from Augustine’s early works at least up to the Confessions. For the moment, I leave it open whether it is a principle that applies to knowledge in general (cognitio), or whether it is restricted to the strictest kind of knowledge (scientia).

The second epistemological principle is the idea that a loss of acquaintance between subject and object necessarily leaves an impression that is “false” or deficient in some respect to the object. With respect to the Forms, the idea is that if the SOUL stops experiencing or loses its

\textsuperscript{565} Acad. 2.5.11.14-16 “...his signis uerum posse comprehendi, quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est.” Augustine also states it a third way in 3.9.18.11-12: “The appearance that can be apprehended and perceived is such that it does not have signs in common with what is false” (tale scilicet uisum comprehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet signa communia).

\textsuperscript{566} Acad. 1.7.19 and passim.
acquaintance with the them, then at best it would be left with “false” or deficient impressions of them. I call this the “Loss of Acquaintance Principle.”

(2) Loss of Acquaintance Principle: Necessarily, if X gains an impression, I_X, through an acquaintance with Y and then loses acquaintance with Y, then the impression I_X can at best be a deficient or “false” impression of Y.

It is more controversial that Augustine holds this principle than the former. Given that he does hold it, however, it should be clear how the Continual Acquaintance Condition follows. Since the first principle holds that for something to count as knowledge it must be sufficiently “like” its object without any deficiency and since the second principle holds that a loss of acquaintance with the object of knowledge yields only a deficient impression at best, it follows that if one is not continually acquainted with something, then one does not know it.

But why should we believe that Augustine held this Loss of Acquaintance Principle? It certainly would be a strange thing for him to think, especially if it was supposed to apply to less strict knowledge, such as the cognition of sensible things. Surely a witness can still “know” what she saw even when she is not currently seeing it. There are good reasons, however, to think that Augustine at least believed it for knowledge of the Forms. The most general reason is simply how nicely it explains the connection between the Likeness Principle of Knowledge and Augustine’s references to the ideas that having innate knowledge is a case of “seeing” and/or that the Forms themselves (the res ipsae) exist in memory. One would think that once Augustine accepts a created SOUL and intellectual memory in the post-baptismal writings, he could simply say that the SOUL’s knowledge in memory (whether innate or otherwise) is simply notions or notitiae, disconnected from the Forms themselves or any experience of the Forms. Yet this is something that he never does all the way to the Confessions. He does allude to the possibility much later in On the Trinity,567 but this is after a lot of other relevant changes have happened and

567 trin. 12.14.23
so cannot be assumed to be consistent with the works with which we are concerned.

A more specific reason for believing that Augustine held this principle comes from one of the most perplexing passages in *On the Teacher* (389/90). Scholars have long wondered what to make of it because what Augustine literally says seems so obviously false. As a result, some have tried to translate it in more acceptable ways, while others have sought to find a plausible underlying motive to give Augustine credit while disagreeing with the claim itself.\textsuperscript{568} Gareth Matthews is one of the latter and wrote the still classic article on the passage in 1965.\textsuperscript{569} I think his view is in the right track, but to my mind still does not quite uncover Augustine’s fundamental underlying motive, which is a version of the loss of acquaintance principle.

Here is the passage at issue.

But when a question is raised not about things we sense in the present but about things we sensed at some other time, we do not speak of the things themselves but of images impressed by them and committed to memory. I don’t at all know how we say that these things are true while we gaze at (intueamur) false things [i.e. the images in memory] unless it’s because we report not that we are seeing or sensing these things, but that we have seen or sensed them.\textsuperscript{570}

Augustine seems to be making two false claims here. First, he seems to be saying that when we answer questions about sensible things that we do not sense anymore, we only speak about their images in memory and not the things themselves. This seems false because when I speak about Montréal when I am in Toronto, I still feel like I am speaking about Montréal itself and not merely about my previously acquired image of it in my memory. Second, he seems to be saying that we therefore do not even speak true things when we do this, except perhaps in a qualified sense. This seems especially false because I like to think that I can say something “true” about

\textsuperscript{568} Gareth Matthews lists some of these ways in “Augustine on Speaking from Memory,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2.2 (Apr. 1965): 157-8.

\textsuperscript{569} Ibid., 157-160.

\textsuperscript{570} mag. 12.39.17-22 “Cum uero non de his, quae coram sentimus, sed de his, quae aliquando sensimus, quaeritur, non iam res ipsas, sed imagines ab eis impressas memoriaeque mandatlas loquimur, quae omnino quomodo uera dicamus, cum falsa intueamur, ignoro, nisi quia non nos ea uidere ac sentire, sed uidisse ac sensisse narramus.”
Montréal even when I am no longer experiencing it. It is difficult to understand how Augustine could have been willing to accept these claims, but they at least become intelligible if we posit that he is assuming the loss of acquaintance principle for the knowledge of sensible things. The fact that we are no longer sensing something is to say that there has been a loss of acquaintance and would be precisely why the images impressed in memory are now false things (*falsa*), i.e. deficient images. The two claims then follow. Having only a deficient image in memory (1) makes it impossible to speak about the original *per se* and so (2) makes it impossible to say something true about it.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that the opposite holds in the case where one remains *acquainted* with sensible things. In speaking about this acquaintance case, which comes right before speaking about the non-acquaintance case, Augustine implies that when we answer questions about sensible things that we are currently sensing (i.e. are continually acquainted with), we *can* speak about the things themselves and say true things about them. Here is the relevant passage.

> Everything we perceive (*percipimus*), we perceive either by one of the bodily senses or by the mind (*mente*). We name the former sensible, the latter intelligible — or, to speak in the fashion of our authorities, carnal and spiritual. When we are asked about the former, then we answer, if the things we sense are present at hand. For example, while looking at the new moon we’re asked what sort of thing it is or where it is. In this case if the person raising the question doesn’t see the object, he merely believes our words (and often he doesn’t believe them!). He doesn’t learn at all unless he himself sees what is described, where he then learns not from words but from the things themselves and his senses.571

When we are asked about sensible things, Augustine says, “then we answer, if the things we sense are present at hand,” and he goes on to give an example of telling someone about the

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571 *mag.* 12.39.7-14 (King trans., slightly modified; my emphasis) “*Namque omnia, quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis aut mente percipimus. Illa sensibilia, haec intellegibilia siue, ut more nostrorum auctorum loquar, illa carnalia, haec spiritalia nominamus. De illis cum interrogamur, respondemus, si praesto sunt ea, quae sentimus, velut cum a nobis quaeritur intuentibus lunam nouam, qualis aut ubi sit. Hic ille, qui interrogat, si non uidet, credit uerbis et saepe non credit, discit autem nullo modo, nisi et ipse quod dicitur uideat, ubi iam non uerbis, sed rebus ipsis et sensibus discit.*”
moon. The fact that “we answer” (respondemus) is restricted to the case when sensible things are present at hand suggests that we really do speak about the things themselves in this case but not in the non-acquaintance case. Further, the fact that Augustine allows that something sensed in this way, such as the moon, can be spoken about to others suggests that, unlike the non-acquaintance case, we can speak the truth about such sensible things. That there is this contrast is supported by the adversative “but” (uero) to mark the transition between the two cases. It becomes especially apparent when we read the passages consecutively and cut out the details.

(a) When we are asked about [sensible things], then we answer, if the things we sense are present at hand. For example, while looking at the new moon ...

(b) But (uero) when a question is raised not about things we sense in the present but about things we sensed at some other time, we do not speak of the things themselves but of images impressed by them and committed to memory.

The only distinct thing about the two cases that seems to explain the shift is that in the first, one is still acquainted with (or is still experiencing) sensible things and in the second, one no longer is acquainted with (or no longer is experiencing) those sensible things. Thus, it makes perfect sense that the two strange claims about the non-acquaintance case result from the Loss of Acquaintance Principle that a loss of acquaintance yields a deficient image of the original.

It is true that these passages only apply the Loss of Acquaintance Principle to the cognition of sensible things. However, this is excellent evidence that Augustine also applies it in his own mind to the cognition of intelligible things. Surely if Augustine thinks the principle holds for the former, for which it is highly counterintuitive, then a fortiori he would think that it holds for the latter, which is much more plausible. Indeed, it perfectly explains all of the evidence we have seen so far, from the general evidence that knowledge in the soul (innate or otherwise) is the res ipsa and is a “seeing,” to the evidence that the res ipsa in memory actually refers to a continual experience. But then does this passage also suggest that the Loss of Acquaintance Principle applies to the cognition of sensible things throughout our time period up
to the *Confessions* as well? Likely not. My guess is that Augustine’s reasoning developed as
follows. In the pre-baptismal writings, he first accepted the Loss of Acquaintance Principle only
for cases of strict knowledge because he agreed with the Platonists that there was no knowledge
of sensible things, but only opinion. Then, as he began to accept a less strict knowledge of
sensible things (as is evident in this *On the Teacher* passage), he figured that he would have to
apply the same principle to this less strict knowledge to be consistent, which is why it appears in
the passage. Then at some point later, he realized that applying the principle to less strict
knowledge did not make sense and dropped it, while still maintaining it for strict knowledge.

Now that we know that Augustine very likely was committed to the Loss of
Acquaintance Principle, we can put it together with the Likeness Principle of Knowledge to
conclude that he accepted the Continual Acquaintance Condition for Knowledge. In other words,
since knowledge must be like its object without any deficiency and since if one loses
acquaintance with the object then one has at best a deficient impression of it, it follows that one
must be continuously acquainted with an object to have knowledge of it. From the early works to
the *Confessions*, the principle applies to strict knowledge of the Forms, and for at least a certain
period of this same time, it also applies to the less strict knowledge of sensible things. These
were the considerations guiding Augustine’s thinking about knowledge at this time that confirm
for us that Augustine was committed to the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine. The SOUL
is always experiencing the Forms, whether consciously or not, because it always at least has

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572 *Acad.* 3.11.26
574 Realizing that this is the underlying principle of this *On the Teacher* passage leads us to a more
complete interpretation of the passage than the one Matthews provides. Matthews suggests, quite rightly,
that Augustine was motivated by the conviction that someone cannot speak of things themselves (or be
prompted to look at them) unless they are “directly available” to her. Otherwise, she only speaks of (or
looks at) their images at best (“Memory” (1965): 158). But the Loss of Acquaintance Principle provides a
more precise account of why Augustine thought this was so. We only speak of their images (at best) not
simply because they are no longer “available,” which is an ambiguous term, but more precisely because
the loss of availability is a loss of an occurrent acquaintance and experience. This sort of loss is the reason
for merely being able to speak of images rather than the things themselves.
innate knowledge of the Forms and because the Continual Acquaintance Condition says that this
innate knowledge could not be knowledge unless it involved a continual experience. Without the
experience, the “knowledge” would simply be a “false” or deficient likeness to them, and so
could not be knowledge. This shows us that the Always Experiencing the Forms doctrine is not
restricted to the third way, but continues on through the fourth way to the *Confessions*. It does
not track the unchangeability of the *soul*, as would follow from Plotinus and Proclus; it tracks
the Continual Acquaintance Condition for Knowledge.

This conclusion confirms my answer to the question from the previous section, i.e. for
why the Augustine of the *Confessions* sometimes speaks of prerequisite innate *notitiae* in
memory when it comes to the Forms and sometimes of the *res ipsae* or their *praesentia*. He
speaks of *notitiae* because in contrast with the pre-baptismal writings, it is not the Forms
themselves strictly speaking that constitutively exist in the *soul* and comprise the *soul*’s
knowledge, but rather something distinct from them. But he also speaks of the *res ipsae* being in
memory because these *notitiae* are not images or notions disconnected from an experience of the
Forms, but rather are products of a continual experience with them. Otherwise, the *notitiae*
would not qualify as “knowledge” and so could not do the job that innate knowledge is posited to
do.

1.3 *Plotinus’ Role in these Doctrines*

We thus seem justified in concluding that the pre-baptismal Augustine accepted the
omnipresence and unity of souls (including the World Soul), and also that the *soul*’s innate
knowledge is the Forms themselves and that the *soul* is always experiencing the Forms. My
main task in dealing with category two is complete. Before turning to categories three and four, I
would like to discuss the role of Plotinus in all of this. So far I have been made little reference to
him, or to any other Neoplatonic source, in order to show how strong a case can be made for the
Plotinian-type category 2 doctrines from Augustine’s writings themselves. But it is now a good
time to consider what sort of influence Plotinus may have had.

The point that I would argue with the most certainty and mostly briefly is that Plotinus
was one of the key inspirations for Augustine accepting these doctrines in their basic forms. The
doctrines all appear in one manner or another in Plotinus’ treatises, and given Augustine’s
stated enthusiasm for Plotinus at this time, it makes sense that he was an important source.
This is not to say that Augustine took them on slavishly and/or necessarily at the expense of his
known Christian commitments. Indeed, I have shown that Augustine does not follow Plotinus
on some of the details of these doctrines, such as when he detaches the Always Experiencing the
Forms doctrine from the SOUL’s essential unchangeability and uncreatedness on the fourth way.
Yet the fact that he did not adopt all of the details does not prevent Plotinus from being a key
inspiration for the claims that Augustine does accept.

There are some other, more controversial questions that I could consider about Plotinus’
role with respect to these doctrines. Two that I do not address are about which precise treatises
Augustine had read and how much Porphyry enters into the picture. Addressing these questions

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575 I indicated some of Augustine’s possible sources for these doctrines in the footnotes. I reproduce those
here and add a few more to complete the list, focusing on treatises that Augustine likely had read at the
time of his conversion. For omnipresence and unity, see Enn. 3.2.7.23-27; 5.1.2.1-10; 5.1.8.24-27; 6.4.4,
12; 6.5.7-11. For the idea that the SOUL’s knowledge is the Forms themselves, see Enn. 4.7.10, 12; 5.1.3;
6.5.7; 6.9.5. For the idea that the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms, see Enn. 4.3.12; 4.7.13;
4.8.4.31-32; 5.3.4; 6.4.14.
576 Augustine states his enthusiasm most explicitly at beata u. 1.5. For a systematic defence that the libri
platonicorum that Augustine had read prior to his conversion in 386 (conf. 7.9.13) included at least some
treatises from Plotinus’ Enneads, see Henry, Plotin et l’Occident (1934), 69-94. Henry includes proof for
why Plotini is the original term in the beata u. 1.5 phrase lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris and not
Platonis, as some manuscripts have it (pp. 82-9).
577 I agree with those who argue that when he was aware of it Augustine always followed Christian
teaching over Plotinus’ teaching in cases of irresolvable inconsistencies (O’Connell, Early Theory (1968),
27-28). I also agree with those who say that even when they were consistent, Augustine for the most part
did not simply accept Plotinus’ teaching uncritically, but tested his arguments and regularly incorporated
other ideas and arguments into his writings, whether from other philosophical, religious, or literary
sources or from his own productive genius (Ibid., 14-16).
Chapter 6 – Pre-Baptismal Writings: First-Way Platonic Recollection

is a different discussion and has been done extensively by others. There are two controversial questions that I do wish to address, however. Plotinus’ key reason for believing that the soul’s innate knowledge is the Forms themselves and that the soul is always experiencing the Forms is what we may call the Identity Principle of Knowledge. This principle holds that for knowledge to be strict knowledge, it must be identical with its object.

**Identity Principle of Knowledge:** Necessarily, if X has strict knowledge, $K_X$, of Y, then $K_X$ must be identical to Y.

Plotinus will also apply this principle to the subject of knowledge, the knower, in strong and weak senses, as I indicate below. Since this looks suspiciously like the Likeness Principle of Knowledge that I posited was at work in Augustine, we can ask the following two questions: Is the Identity Principle of Knowledge behind any of the doctrines in this chapter for Augustine (including the Likeness Principle), and if so, is it at least partially due to Plotinus’ inspiration?

In the remainder of this section and with the help of the rest of the chapter, I intend to show that these questions should be answered affirmatively for all of the doctrines considered in this chapter. That is, Augustine was consciously motivated by Plotinus’ Identity Principle (in strong and weak senses) to accept all category 2, 3, and 4 doctrines, including the doctrines of the uncreatedness of the soul and its consubstantiality with God. Not everyone who has posed these questions agrees, even if they think that Augustine accepted all of the doctrines. Cary, for example, suggests that Augustine did not have the Identity Principle in mind in the pre-baptismal writings, despite accepting that the soul had to be unchangeable and divine. Cary also thinks that Augustine had not realized how central the principle was to Plotinus’ thought and especially to Plotinus’ epistemology of the “inward turn.” If he had, then he might have realized that his

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578 The best place to begin is O’Connell’s *Early Theory* (1968), especially the Introduction. For a criticism of O’Connell’s views, see Van Fleteren, “Reply” (1990): 133. For sources that provide different lists of the treatises Augustine had allegedly read, see the note to my discussion of *Enn.* 4.7 below.

adoption of Plotinus’ inward turn would set Christianity (and the West generally) on a problematic path, insufficiently focusing on the outward saving reality of the flesh of Christ.\textsuperscript{580} Whether or not Cary is right about these consequences, the claim that Augustine was unaware of the Identity Principle, in my view, does not fit the evidence. The evidence rather suggests that Augustine was consciously aware of the principle in Plotinus and that he seriously entertained it in its strong and weak senses. Indeed, it may precisely have been from taking the principle a little too seriously (and not understanding how Plotinus qualifies it) that led Augustine to make the un-Plotinian contention that the Truth itself (Plotinus’ divine Intellect) unqualifiedly exists in the \textit{SOUL} as in a subject. Whether for good or ill, Augustine adopted his epistemology of the inward turn with both eyes open.

To see this, a good place to start is to notice that Cary’s mistake is primarily due to misunderstanding the essential application of the Identity Principle for Plotinus. According to Cary, the principle essentially states that the \textit{knower}, i.e. the subject of knowledge, must be identical to its object. Thus, when Cary reads \textit{On the Immortality of the Soul} and finds that Augustine places \textit{disciplina} within the \textit{SOUL} as in a subject rather than saying that \textit{disciplina} is the \textit{SOUL}, he says that Augustine was not aware of Plotinus’ Identity Principle of Knowledge, since he does not make \textit{disciplina} identical to \textit{SOUL}.\textsuperscript{581} But this does not get the essential starting point of the application of the principle quite right. For Plotinus, the principle’s primary, essential application is first and foremost to the \textit{epistêmē}, to the science or knowledge, that must

\textsuperscript{580} Ibid., x, 141-2.

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid., 107 “Interestingly, Augustine does not seem to be aware of the possibility that for Plotinus is the literal truth about the relation between the mind [sc. \textit{animus}] and the truth it sees: they are identical. This too is an Aristotelian notion, but it comes from a part of Aristotle’s work that Augustine did not know. There is reason to think that he never did understand Plotinus’s use of the Aristotelian theory that \textit{knowledge is a kind of identity between knower and known}; but even if he did, before very long his rejection of the divinity of the soul put that possibility off limits” (my emphasis).
be identical to its object, not necessarily to the knower who has the *epistêmê*.\(^{582}\) It is true that Plotinus thinks that the knower has to be *like* the object of knowledge too (and possibly identical to it) to a certain degree, but this is a derivative and different claim and it applies to some knowers more strongly than others. In the case of the divine Intellect, it applies in the strong sense, to the point that the Intellect must be identical to its objects of knowledge.\(^{583}\) In the case of the soul, however, it applies in a weaker sense that does not entail a strict identity. To be more specific, Plotinus thinks it entails that the soul must be of the same *generic* intelligible ousia/substance as the Forms, which is weaker than being of the same *specific* intelligible ousia as them.\(^{584}\) So they are not identical specifically but only generically. Thus, we can distinguish between strong and weak claims of the Identity Principle of Knowledge to fit with these two different applications. The strong claim applies primarily to knowledge and says that the knowledge must be strictly identical to its object. The strong claim also sometimes applies to the subject of knowledge when the knower at issue is the divine Intellect. The second, weak claim applies to the subject of knowledge when the knower is the soul, and says that the subject must merely be sufficiently like the objects of knowledge in some way, having a weaker sort of identity, which for Plotinus is that it must be of the same generic intelligible ousia.

Given that these things are so, it is evident how well Plotinus’ Identity Principle suits as an explanation for Augustine’s reasoning in the *Soliloquies* Project. Since it is only the soul’s knowledge and not the soul properly speaking that has to be identical to its object, it explains why Augustine would think both that innate knowledge is the Forms and why the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms, and yet why the SOUL itself need not be strictly identical with them.

\(^{582}\) As I show below in discussing *Enn*. 5.9.7 and 5.9.13.  
\(^{583}\) Although even for Plotinus, the Intellect and its objects cannot be absolutely identical (*tauton*) without also being other (*heteron*), because thought implies a multiplicity (*Enn*. 5.3.10).  
\(^{584}\) As I show below in discussing *Enn*. 6.5.7. The terminology of “generic” and “specific” here are my terms, not Plotinus’.
Since the subject still also must be like the object of knowledge to some degree for Plotinus, it also explains why Augustine would consider varying degrees of likeness to the Forms, whether in the sense of being at least incorporeal, omnipresent, and unified with all souls (as on the fourth way), or in the stronger sense of also being uncreated, unchangeable, and eternal (as on the third way), or in the even stronger sense of also being the very “subject” of the Forms (as on the first way and on the second way *mutatis mutandis*). Thus, Cary’s reason for denying Augustine’s awareness of the Identity Principle does not hold, and a more likely conclusion is that Augustine was consciously motivated by the principle and was inspired to be so by Plotinus.

To confirm that this is what Plotinus thought and to see more clearly how reasonably the *Soliloquies* Project corresponds to it, let us look at some Plotinian passages. My argument in what follows, it should be noted, does not depend on the claim that Augustine had read these specific passages, though it might lead someone to draw that conclusion afterwards. It merely depends on the claim that the Plotinian passages are sufficiently similar to what Augustine says in the *Soliloquies* Project to suggest that Augustine was aware of its essential points and was inspired by them. I begin with a passage from *Ennead 5.9.7*, which is a treatise that few believe Augustine had initially read:

But as for the sciences (*epistêmai*) that exist in a rational soul, those which are of sense-objects – if one ought to speak of ‘sciences’ (*epistêmas*) of these things; ‘opinion’ (*doxa*) is really the suitable name for them – are posterior to their objects and images of them; but those which are of intelligible objects, which are certainly genuinely sciences (*ontôs epistêmai*), come from intellect to rational soul and do not think any sense-object; but in so far as they are sciences (*epistêmai*, i.e. cases of knowledge), they themselves are each of the objects that they [sc. intellects?] 585 think, and they have from within them the object of thought (*noêton*) and the thought (*noësis*), because Intellect is within, which is the first things themselves ... 586

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585 The available grammatical subject of “think” is *epistêmai*, but this does not make good sense of the passage. The subject “intellects” (*noës*) (or something along those lines) makes better sense, but it is only a conjecture.

586 *Enn*. 5.9.7.1-8 (Armstrong trans., slightly modified) “Αἱ δὲ ἑπιστήμαι ἐν ψυχῇ λογικὴ οὐσία αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν – εἰ δὲ ἑπιστήμας τούτων λέγειν, πρέπει δὲ αὐτάς τὸ τῆς δόξης ὅνομα – ὅστερα τῶν
From this passage, Plotinus clearly applies the strong claim of the Identity Principle to one’s knowledge because he says that for something to count as a genuine epistêmê, as a genuine “science” or “case of knowledge,” it must be the very object of which it is an epistêmê. Plotinus’ reason is also clear from the passage. Just as we saw in Augustine, in order for the epistêmê to count as knowledge, it cannot merely be an image (eikôn) of its object, but must be identical to it, which is why sensible “knowledge” is not knowledge strictly speaking. We can also see from this passage that there is no indication that the strong claim also applies to the knower, the soul. Instead, Plotinus describes the relation between the epistêmai and the rational soul (logikê psuchê) just as Augustine describes the relation between the disciplinae (i.e. “sciences”) and the rational soul (animus): they exist “in” it.

We can find the same points in a slightly later passage in 5.9.13.

And there must belong to an individual soul that is really a soul some kind of justice and moderation, and there must be true knowledge (epistêmên alêthinên) in the souls which are in us, and these are not representations or images of their forms as things are in the sense-world, but those very forms themselves existing here in a different mode.587

The antecedent of “these” in the phrase “these are not representations” is not entirely clear in the passage, but it would seem to be all of “true knowledge” and “justice and moderation,” though it is unclear exactly what the relation between true knowledge and justice and moderation is. However it works, Plotinus does seem at least to be applying the strong claim to the true knowledge (or science) that the soul has, and he includes the familiar explanation that if this knowledge were not the Forms themselves, then it would be mere images or likenesses of them,
which is unacceptable. We also find no indication that the strong claim applies to the soul, but instead find the same Augustinian idea that this true epistêmê (i.e. true disciplina?), exists “in” each individual soul. One difference from the previous passage is that Plotinus adds that the “Forms themselves” exist here below “in a different mode” (allon tropon). While everything else fits nicely with Augustine, this does not. It suggests that while the Forms themselves do exist in our souls, the soul cannot properly be said to be the “somewhere” of their existence. It suggests that they have a higher “mode” of existence that has no implied dependence on soul whatsoever.\footnote{588} This raises several questions. For one, we could ask Plotinus how the Forms existing in the soul can be sufficiently identical if they only exist here “in a different mode.” For another, we could ask Augustine whether he realized that the Forms only exist in the soul “in a different mode” for Plotinus and if he did not realize it, then why not. Would it have been because he was not aware of this passage and others like it? Was he perhaps misled by other passages? I leave these questions aside for the moment.

Admittedly, even though the passages so far suggest that Plotinus did not think that the strong claim applies to the soul, there are passages that do seem to suggest it. In Ennead 6.5.7 (On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole II), for example, a treatise that many scholars think Augustine had initially read,\footnote{589} Plotinus writes,

For we and what is ours go back to being (to on) and ascend to that and to the first which comes from it, and we think (nooumen) those things and not images or

\footnote{588} We could also discuss other evidence that the first claim is the essential claim of the Identity Principle for Plotinus. The principle’s origin in Aristotle, for example, shows that it begins from the idea that the knowledge is identical to its object and not necessarily identical to the subject of knowledge (DA 3:4, 430a3-5; 3:5, 430a19-20; 3:7, 431a1-2; 3:8, 431b20-2a1; Metaph. 12:9, 1074b38-5a5). For an excellent summary of the principle in Aristotle, see Stephen Menn, “Plotinus on the Identity of Knowledge with its Object,” Apeiron 34.3 (2011): 235-9. We could also note that it does not make sense that Plotinus thought that the soul was identical to the intelligibles in any strong sense. If he did, then he would have to maintain that the soul is as identical to the intelligibles as the divine Intellect is, which, given his commitment to the inferiority of Soul to Intellect (Enn. 5.1.3.24-5 and 5.9.4.2-3), he clearly does not believe.

\footnote{589} This is what scholars as diverse as O’Connell (Early Theory (1968), 9-10) and Ayres (Trinity (2010), 17 n. 14) believe.
imprints of them. But if we do not, then we are those things. If then we partake in true knowledge (αλήθινῆς ἐπιστήμης), we are those things; we do not grasp them within us from another, but we are in those things. And since others, not only we, are also those things, we are all those things. So then, being together with all things, we are those things: so then, we are all and one.\textsuperscript{590}

The application of the strong claim to the soul seems implied when Plotinus infers that “we are those things” from the claim that we “partake in true knowledge.” For in saying that “we are those things,” he seems to be saying that the soul as the knower is identical to the Forms.

Interpreting him this way, however, would be a mistake. There are two much more plausible interpretations that rule this one out. One plausible interpretation is that when Plotinus says, “we are those things,” he means to imply that we are not fundamentally our souls but our intellects, and that it is us as intellectuals that are those things. This is a doctrine that Plotinus seems to advocate elsewhere,\textsuperscript{591} though it is ambiguous whether he means that our true self really is pure intellect with no admixture of soul at all, or whether our true self is an “intellect” mixed with the highest level of soul that merely accesses the pure intellect that is “ours” in a weaker sense.\textsuperscript{592}

The passage at least does not specify whether the “we” refers to us as souls or as pure intellects, so referring to us as pure intellect is at least is one possibility. The other plausible interpretation is that he is saying that “we are those things,” in the sense of the weak Identity Principle claim, namely, that our souls are of the same generic intelligible substance as the Forms, but not necessarily the same specific intelligible substance.

I submit that this latter interpretation is the most plausible for the following reason.

Plotinus’ emphasis in this double treatise (Enn. 6.4-5) is on the omnipresence and unity of the

\textsuperscript{590} Enn. 6.5.7.1-8 (Armstrong trans., slightly modified) “Ἀνάγεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ ὅν, καὶ ἀναβαίνομεν τε εἰς ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ᾽ ἑκείνου, καὶ νοοῦμεν ἑκεῖνα οὐκ εἰδολα ἀυτῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἑχοντες. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτῳ, ὅντες ἑκεῖνα. εἰ οὖν ἀληθινῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχομεν, ἑκεῖνα ἐσμεν οὐκ ἀπολαβοῦντες αὐτὰ ἐν ἡμῖν. ἄλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἑκεῖνοις ὅντες. ὅτι οὐκ ἐν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον, οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν, ἑκεῖνα, πάντες ἐσμὲν ἑκεῖνα. ὅμοι ἄρα ὅντες μετὰ πάντων ἐσμὲν ἑκεῖνα. πάντα ἄρα ἐσμὲν ἐν.”

\textsuperscript{591} e.g. Enn. 4.7.10.28-30, 5.3.3.19ff.

\textsuperscript{592} See Enn. 1.1.13, 4.8.8, 5.1.3, 5.3.3.19ff. Emilsson also notes this puzzling ambiguity at the end of his excellent book, Plotinus On Intellect, and leaves attempting to resolve it for another time (Plotinus On Intellect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 212-3).
soul with the intelligible world in contrast with the sensible world. His focus, then, is not on the distinctions within the intelligible world—e.g. how the soul is distinct from the One and the Intellect—but rather on the most fundamental distinction of all, how the intelligible world is distinct from the sensible world. Now the most common way of understanding the oneness of the intelligible world in contrast with the sensible world in this double treatise is that it is one in ousia or phusis. This means, at least, that each soul is one ousia or phusis with every other soul and also with Intellect. We know from other works that Plotinus does not mean by this that souls and Intellect are of the same ousia and phusis in the most specific sense—Intellect is technically superior and more properly ousia than souls (and the One is beyond ousia altogether)–but this does not prevent souls and Intellect from being called identical and one ousia or phusis in a generic sense. Thus, it is likely that the soul’s oneness with the objects of its knowledge suggested here is going to be the oneness of having the same generic ousia that contrasts with sensible ousia, not a oneness of having the specific ousia of Intellect. This interpretation fits nicely with how the 6.5.7 passage continues.

So therefore when we look outside that on which we depend we do not know that we are one, like faces which are many on the outside but have one head inside. But if someone is able to turn around ... he will see God and himself and the All; at first he will not see as the All but then, when he has nowhere to set himself and

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593 See Enn. 6.4.2, 6.5.10.39-52.
594 Someone could argue that the distinction between the One and Intellect is more fundamental than the intelligible/sensible distinction, since the One is beyond being and ousia altogether, having no relation whatsoever with what comes after it. This is fair and may be true. My argument above does not depend on denying it, and so I leave a discussion of it for another time.
595 For the idea in this treatise (6.4-5), see 6.4.12.28-34, 6.5.2, 6.5.3 (esp. ll. 16ff), and 6.5.11.12-end. Elsewhere, it can be found in Enn. 4.1.1.1-7, 4.2.1.1-3, 4.7.8.42-46 with 4.7.8.43-47, 4.7.10.14-20, 5.1.2.43-47, and 5.9.14.
596 Plotinus also sometimes seems to include the One with this generic intelligible ousia (e.g. Enn. 6.5.7.10-17 below). I suspect that this a useful, loose way of speaking about it, but not technically accurate due to the fact that the One is beyond ousia (Enn. 6.8.19, 6.9.11).
597 Enn. 6.8.12
598 Enn. 6.8.19, 6.9.11.
599 Plotinus makes these generic and specific senses of intelligible ousia/phusis explicit in Enn. 4.1, esp. 4.1.1. The distinction also can be derived from Enn. 5.1.2.43-47 and 5.1.10, a treatise that the pre-baptismal Augustine had very likely read.
limit himself and determine how far he himself goes, he will stop marking himself
off from all being and will come to all the All without going out anywhere, but
remaining where the All is set firm.  

Plotinus speaks here as though the soul ultimately is one with the All of the intelligible world,
but not in the sense that it is straightforwardly identical with everything there. It is one with
everything there like the skin is one with the living organism. The whole is one substance,
continuous with itself, and yet the soul still is something distinct from other things within it.

This supports my claim that Plotinus is not applying the strong claim of the Identity Principle to
the soul after all in 6.5.7, but only the weak claim, making it only the same generic substance as
the Forms. Interestingly, this final passage has an additional benefit. It shows that the weak claim
of the Identity Principle entails the first two doctrines in this section for Plotinus: the omnipresence
and unity of souls. That it entails the unity doctrine is plain from Plotinus’ reasoning that since
all souls are one with the Forms, they must also be one with each other. That it entails
omnipresence is not explicitly spelled out, but it would follow from the unity claim. If all souls,
wherever they are, are one with each other, then they must also be omnipresent. Plotinus’
understanding of the Identity Principle of Knowledge, therefore, not only entails the two
doctrines discussed in the second section of this chapter, but also the doctrines discussed in the
first section of the chapter.

From all of these observations, it seems clear that Plotinus accepted the Identity Principle
of Knowledge in the way that I have said (with its strong and weak claims) and that Augustine’s

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600 Enn. 6.5.7.9-17 (Armstrong trans.) “ἐξω μὲν οὖν ὄρθως ἢ δὲν ἐξήμεθα ἀγνουόμεν ἐν ὄντες, ὄν
πρόσωπα [πολλὰ] εἰς τὸ ἐξω πολλά, κορυφὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ εἴσω μίαν. οἴ τε τις ἐπιστραφῇ δύνατο ...
θεόν τε καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὕμεται. ὑμεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οὐχ ὡς τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὄν ἤχον ὅπη ἄυτον
στήσας ὄριοι καὶ μέχρι τίνος αὐτὸς ἔστιν, ἀρείς περιγράφειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἄπαντος αὐτὸν εἰς ἄπαν τὸ
πᾶν ἐξει προελθὼν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ μείνας, οὐ ἱδρυται τὸ πᾶν.”

601 O’Connell calls the emphasis on this sort of oneness the “Omnipresence thought-way” in contrast with
the “Emanation thought-way.” The former emphasizes the sense in which everything is unified in the
intelligible world and the latter emphasizes their distinctions (O’Connell, Early Theory (1968), 117-121).
Soliloquies Project very closely corresponds to it. What seems particularly clear is that they both held that the soul’s (i.e. soul’s) knowledge must be identical with the Forms for the reason that otherwise it would be mere images or representations, and that the soul need only be like the Forms in a weaker sense where they can be said to exist “in” the soul. This close correspondence, in my view, is enough to prove that Augustine was consciously motivated by the Identity Principle (with its strong and weak claims) in some sense and that the motivation was at least partially based on Plotinus’ inspiration. Augustine understood and accepted from Plotinus that the principle’s strong claim of identity essentially applies to the knower’s knowledge such that the knowledge has to be identical to its objects, and he also understood that it has a weaker claim that applies to the knowing soul.

Can I also, therefore, go on to conclude that the Identity Principle of Knowledge motivated Augustine, like Plotinus, to accept all of the doctrines of this chapter? It certainly seems to be the case for the category two doctrines discussed thus far. I have already shown that Augustine accepted these doctrines, and given that the Identity Principle motivated Plotinus’ acceptance of them and that Augustine’s reasoning in the Soliloquies Project is very much like Plotinus’, we have good reason to believe that it was at least one consideration motivating them. This is especially evident for the doctrines that innate knowledge is the Forms and that the SOUL is always experience the Forms from the first section of this chapter, but it is even true for the doctrines of the omnipresence and unity of souls from the second section of this chapter, Augustine’s Soliloquies Project idea that divine Ratio constitutively exists in the SOUL (or vice versa) does not make very much sense unless SOULS are omnipresent and one with each other, and so given that the former was motivated by Identity Principle reasoning, it makes sense that the latter would be too.

But what about category three and four doctrines? Given that the Identity Principle is a
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key reason for accepting them for Plotinus, could this also be the case for Augustine? We cannot yet say for sure because I have not yet confirmed that Augustine accepted them. Even though I have provided strong evidence from the Soliloquies Project that Augustine accepted them, I have not yet ruled out all of the objections at work there, nor have I confirmed that the doctrines are present in, or at least consistent with, the Cassiciacum trilogy. These are the tasks to which I turn next. What we can say, however, is that Augustine’s acceptance of Plotinus’ Identity Principle in the Soliloquies Project for the category two doctrines provides us with an added reason to believe that Augustine accepts the category three and four doctrines that I discuss next. After all, it is reasonable to suppose that Augustine knew that Plotinus used the principle to infer the soul’s uncreatedness and consubstantiality with the divine Intellect and it is reasonable suppose that this would have motivated him to draw the same conclusion, a conclusion which we have already seen ample evidence of, as long as his Christianity, as far as he knew, allowed it. Let us now turn to these doctrines to evaluate if this is really the case.

2. The Plausibility of Third- and Fourth-Category Claims

All of the claims from categories one and two are questionable as Augustinian doctrines for various reasons, but most are not questionable due to being heretical. Many of them became heretical later on, but were not heretical in Augustine’s day. The same cannot be said for categories three and four. The category three claims, that the soul exists by means of itself and so is unchangeable, eternal, unmade, and uncreated and the category four claim, that the soul is consubstantial with God, are especially questionable for this reason. Could Augustine even have entertained such heretical doctrines in his pre-baptismal writings, let alone accepted them? O’Connell thinks so and Cary is almost as enthusiastic.602 Gerber and Ayres, however, firmly

602 See O’Connell, Early Theory (1968), 124-131 and Cary, Invention (2000), 100, 109-110, 112-113. Cary is hesitant to say that Augustine entertains the soul’s “consubstantiality” with God, but he freely
draw the line. According to them, Augustine’s early awareness of and commitment to Nicene Christianity meant that he could not even have entertained them. The Council of Nicea in 325 and those writing in its tradition established that the Son of God was uncreated and one substance with the Father and that all things other than God were created from nothing. The SOUL too, then, was created from nothing and so could have none of the attributes inconsistent with this. All of this was sufficiently plain to Augustine in 386, according to them, as evidenced from his own writings and his acquaintance with pro-Nicene writings.603

But is this argument credible? The burden of proof is on Gerber and Ayres to make their case, since we have already seen much positive evidence against it. Indeed, an exclusive reading of the Soliloquies Project seemed to affirm that Augustine at least entertained both category three and four doctrines, and Letter 3 suggested that Augustine also accepted them. Therefore, in order to show that Augustine had already rejected these doctrines, they have to provide strong contrary evidence. Is there any such thing? They certainly think so. I split the purported evidence into three types: (A) evidence from other writings that Augustine may have known, (B) evidence from Augustine’s post-baptismal writings, and (C) evidence from Augustine’s pre-baptismal writings. Gerber and Ayres appeal to various Christian Platonist writings of type (A), particularly Victorinus’ Against Arius and Ambrose’s On the Faith, and they appeal to various pre- and post-baptismal writings of type (B) and (C). They acknowledge that there is no explicit evidence in these sources, but they argue that there is sufficiently strong implicit evidence.604 My purpose in the remainder of this chapter is to show that this is mistaken. In particular, I argue that there is no strong evidence from other writings against either category and that there is only one example of strong evidence from Augustine’s own writings against category four. I also contend along the

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604 Gerber, Spirit (2012), 23-4 (including n. 72), 32, 61, 72-4 and passim.
way that there is additional strong evidence for both categories and that the evidence against category four can be reasonably deflated. I thus conclude that Augustine had not yet rejected category three, and that he probably (but less certainly) had not rejected category four. This is sufficient, in my view, for us to conclude that Augustine (at least provisionally) accepted these doctrines, given the evidence from Letter 3 indicating that Augustine accepted his first-way argument. When I say that Augustine “had not yet rejected” category three and four doctrines, it should be noted, I take this to be equivalent to saying that he “entertained” these doctrines. I take “rejecting” and “entertaining” to be contradictories, therefore, and so evidence for one is evidence against the other.

Let me make four points about my procedure. First, for the most part I deal with category three and four doctrines at the same time, since they are so closely connected. Yet since they are not mutually implicative (category four implies category three but category three does not necessarily imply category four) I also consider them independently at the appropriate places.

Second, I consider the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the soul as the primary doctrine of concern from the third category rather than existing by means of itself, unchangeability, eternity, or being unmade. I choose it because it seems to be Augustine’s primary category later on and because it is the terms in which the debate is often framed. Ayres states his position in terms of “createdness,” for example, when he says that for the pre-baptismal Augustine, “soul – our souls or the world-soul – stands on our side of a basic Creator/created distinction.” In doing this, however, I do not mean to ignore the other doctrines nor merely to assume that they are as connected with uncreatedness as On the Immortality of the Soul seems to indicate. Or rather I do not mean to do this with the exception of the doctrine of being “unmade.” The kind of uncreatedness we are talking about will include the doctrine of being “unmade” (which it does

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605 Ayres, *Trinity* (2010), 25. Note that in his confidence that he is correct, Ayres does not explicitly say which is “our side” of the Creator/created distinction, taking it as obvious.
not do strictly speaking) because we are not talking about artifacts of any kind. Third, for the sake of succinctness I regularly use the term “uncreatedness” to stand for the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the soul and the term “consubstantiality” to stand for the doctrine of consubstantiality of the soul with God. Put in these abbreviated terms, the question of this section is as follows: Does Augustine reject uncreatedness and consubstantiality in the pre-baptismal writings or does he entertain them? Fourth, since we already have substantial evidence against a rejection, much of my argument will simply be negative, showing that there is no strong evidence for a rejection. In places, however, I also provide positive evidence that Augustine entertained the doctrines at issue.

2.1 Evidence from Other Writings: Christian and Non-Christian

I begin with the evidence from other writings that Augustine may have read. The strength of the evidence for a rejection offered by these writings will depend on how strongly three questions can be answered affirmatively: (i) Did Augustine read it? (ii) Does it clearly articulate the doctrine in question? (iii) Would Augustine have felt compelled to accept the doctrine in question if he had read it there? To deny that the writings offer strong evidence for a rejection (or entertainment) one has to deny at least one of these criteria. There are two kinds of such writings at issue: Christian and non-Christian. Gerber’s and Ayres’ contention is that Augustine’s awareness of the Christian writings provides strong enough evidence for his rejection of uncreatedness and consubstantiality to override any supposed evidence to the contrary from non-Christian writings. More specifically, as I suggested above, they claim that his reading of Christian Platonists, such as Victorinus and Ambrose, suggest that he was sufficiently aware of pro-Nicene Christianity to rule out any adverse influence from the non-Christian Platonists.
Plotinus and Porphyry. But how strong is the evidence for this claim?

At first glance, it would seem that there is strong evidence indeed. On Order 2.5.16, in particular, seems to be strong evidence that Augustine had read both Marius Victorinus’ Against Arius (Aduersus Arium) and Ambrose’s On Faith (De fide), each of which seemingly would have convinced him to reject uncreatedness and consubstantiality. Here is the key passage.

The true and, so to speak, genuine philosophy has no other function than to teach what is the Principle without Principle of all things and how great an Intellect remains therein, and what has proceeded from there for our welfare, but without deterioration of any kind. Now the venerable mysteries – which liberate persons of sincere and firm faith – teach, not confusedly (nec confuse), as some say, nor insultingly (nec contumeliose), as many proclaim, that there is one God omnipotent, and that he is tri-potent (tripotentem), Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Moreover how great it is that so great a God has for our sake deigned to take up and dwell in this body of our own kind.

The evidence from this passage in favour of Augustine’s reading of On Faith are the qualifications nec confuse ... nec contumeliose. As Gerber and others convincingly argue, these are common pro-Nicene terms that are intended to rule out Sabellianism, which “confuses” the divine persons, and Arianism, which “insults” the Son by subordinating him. So then from where did Augustine learn them? On Faith is a likely candidate. In the Soliloquies, Augustine tells us explicitly that he had read some of Ambrose’s writings, and On Faith contains many

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607 Ibid.
608 Gerber trans., Spirit (2012), 29 (slightly modified; my emphasis) “...quae uera et, ut ita dicam, germana philosophia est, quam ut doceat, quod sit omnium rerum pricipium sine principio quantusque in eo maneat intellectus quidue inde in nostram salutem sine ullo degeneratione manauerit, quem unum deum omnipotentem, eumque tripotentem patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, docent ueneranda mysteria, quae fide sincera et inconcussa populos liberant, nec confuse, ut quidam, nec contumeliose, ut multi, praedicant.”
610 sol. 2.14.26. Augustine says, however, that he has only learned the “way of living” (uiuendi modum) from Ambrose’s writings and not yet the “nature of living” (uiuendi... naturam), which suggests a familiarity only with Ambrose’s moral writings and not writings about the natures of God and the soul.
variations on these two ideas as responses to the heresies. Although the work never uses both of Augustine’s terms (confuse... contumeliose) in their exact forms nor simultaneously, it does use confusio in several places (Fid. 1.1.6, 1.1.9) and contumelia at least once (Fid. 5.12.149).

The evidence that Augustine had read Against Arius is even stronger. Outside of this On Order passage, the only extant occurrences of the term tripotens, which here as there is used to describe the Trinity, can be found in Against Arius. Since the term is so uncommon and since Augustine likely was reading Victorinus’ Latin translations of Plotinus, it would make sense that he had picked up the term tripotens from reading Against Arius.

This evidence certainly is significant and would seem to be strong enough to show that Augustine would have been convinced not to accept uncreatedness and consubstantiality. This seems especially the case because the second and third criteria hold up quite well. Both pro-Nicene works clearly rule out the uncreatedness and consubstantiality of soul (criterion 2), and Augustine presumably would have felt compelled to rule them out too had a read the works (criterion 3) due to his commitment to the Christian rule of faith. The first criterion, however, is not as settled as it looks. Although On Order 2.5.16 does give us some reason to believe that

611 Against the Sabellian side, he will variously use confundere, confusio, confuse (variations on “confusing”) and against the Arian side he will use separare, separatio, descretio, and descerepare (variations on “separation,” i.e. separating the Father and the Son) and also iniuria, contumelia (variations on “insulting”). See Gerber, Spirit (2012), 32 nn. 110-112 for a list of references.
612 Gerber, Spirit (2012), 30-1. The term appears in Adu. Ar. 1.50 and 1.56 and a Greek version of the term (tridunamis) appears at 4.21 with an explanation that it means having “tres potentias.”
613 Adversus Arium very clearly affirms that the soul is a distinct substance from God (1.56, 1.64), and is fairly clear about the soul being created (1.64, 2.1). At the same time, however, it suggests that the soul, like matter, is eternal (4.25), which suggests that Victorinus may not have been as pro-Nicene as Gerber contends. De fide is slightly less clear, but hardly mistakable (e.g. creation of soul: 1.2.18, 1.5.36, distinct in substance: 1.3.27).
614 The strongest evidence that Augustine intended to adhere to the Christian rule of faith already in these early writings, even when it conflicted with Neoplatonism, is his rejection of subordination in the Trinity. This is evident from the next passage under discussion (ord. 2.5.16) and elsewhere (e.g. beata u. 4.34-35, ord. 1.10.29). Note that with less controversial doctrines the third criterion would not necessarily hold as strongly for Augustine, since he would have less reason to suspect that these doctrines would be ruled out by the rule of faith. Given how controversial these are, however, I cannot but think he would have checked them against the rule of faith before writing about them at Cassiciacum had he known that Victorinus and Ambrose rejected them.
Augustine had read the works, a closer inspection suggests that he had not read them after all.

What rules them out as works that Augustine had read is the many doctrines or expressions that contain that are inconsistent with what we find in the pre-baptismal writings. These are doctrines or expressions that we would expect Augustine to agree with or pick up on given his adherence to the Christian rule of faith and his respect for Ambrose and Victorinus. Yet we find that he does not, suggesting that he could not have read the works. Here are three key inconsistencies with On Faith: 1) In On Faith, the one Trinitarian God is not number (numerus) but the principle of all numbers,⁶¹⁵ which is inconsistent with Augustine’s On Order view that the Son of God is number;⁶¹⁶ 2) in On Faith the full vision of God is impossible in this life,⁶¹⁷ which is inconsistent with Augustine’s pre-baptismal view that it is;⁶¹⁸ and 3) in On Faith Ambrose insists on the importance of the plural verb (against the Sabellians) in saying, “I and the Father are one” (Ego et pater unum sumus),⁶¹⁹ which conflicts with Augustine’s assertion in the Soliloquies that, “the one who begets and the one whom he begets is (est) one.”⁶²⁰ One might think that this last inconsistency is insignificant, turning as it does on the quantity of one verb, but Ambrose makes a big deal about the terminology in On Faith and

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⁶¹⁵ Fid. 1.2.18-19
⁶¹⁶ e.g. ord. 2.14.43. Gerber agrees with this interpretation (Spirit (2012), 42). Other evidence that the Son is “number” can be found in ep. 3.2, where Augustine distinguishes monas from numerus and says that whoever loves the numeri, loves them because of the monas.
⁶¹⁷ Fid. 5.19.236-8.
⁶¹⁸ Augustine provides not so subtle hints for this doctrine in almost all the works of the early period: Acad. 2.2.4, beata u. 1.5, ord. 2.9.26, sol. 1.6.13-1.7.14, an. quant. 33.76, 36.81, lib. arb. 2.2.6, mag. 14.46, uera rel. 46.86 (less clear), 55.110. Only a minority of scholars still deny that Augustine accepted the possibility of this-worldly happiness in these works (e.g. Harrison, Rethinking (2006), 63-7). When Augustine first rejects the doctrine is not entirely clear. Van Fleteren argues that it occurs in 395 in Expositio epistolae ad Galatias 21 (“Augustine and the Possibility of the Vision of God in this Life,” Studies in Medieval Culture 11 (1977): 16), but this is doubtful because the passage he cites is not as clear as it could be and because slightly later in 396, Augustine says that “a few spiritual men attain the cognition of the purest wisdom in this life” (c. ep. Man. 4). Augustine’s clear rejection in doctr. chr. 2.7.11.23, a passage likely also written in 396, may be the intital one. He regularly reiterates his rejection after this time (e.g. cons. eu. 4.10.20 (399/400-?), ep. 147.9.20-21 (413), ciu. 19.1-4ff (413-426/7)).
⁶¹⁹ Fid. 1.1.9, quoting John 10:30. Ambrose indicates that the singular “one” (unum) guards against the Arians’ discreto and the plural “are” (sumus) guards against Sabellians’ confusio.
⁶²⁰ sol. 1.1.4.19.
Augustine later recognizes its significance himself and specifically criticizes the *Soliloquies* formulation (*retr.* 1.4.3).

As for *Against Arius*, two key inconsistencies are as follows: 1) *Against Arius* distinguishes between an interior and exterior *intelligentia* in the Trinity applying to the Father and the Son (4.29), which is inconsistent with the fact that the pre-baptismal Augustine applies *intelligentia* and *intellectus* only to the Son (and never to the Father) (*ord.* 2.5.16, 2.9.26), seeing the Father as unknowable and so unintelligible (*ord.* 2.16.44.15-18, 2.18.47); and 2) *Against Arius* discusses the Greek distinction between *ousia* and *hupostasis* (2.4-6), which conflicts with the fact that Augustine shows ignorance of the distinction even after his baptism (*mor.* 2.2). One could possibly maintain that some of these inconsistencies can be explained because Augustine disagreed with them or did not think they required his belief, but it is unlikely that this would be the explanation for all of them. Another inconsistency I could mention is how clearly *On Faith* and *Against Arius* rule out uncreatedness and consubstantiality and how ambiguous and seemingly accepting of them Augustine is in the *Soliloquies* Project, but, of course, this is the inconsistency we are precisely trying to determine is real or not.

Already from these inconsistencies, the claim that Augustine had read *On Faith* and *Against Arius* becomes difficult to believe, especially knowing the pre-baptismal Augustine’s respect for Ambrose and Victorinus. There is an even more striking inconsistency, however, that to me settles that the pre-baptismal Augustine had not read *On Faith* or *Against Arius*. This is that *On Faith* and *Against Arius* overflow with references to the Son of God as the *uerbum* or *logos* and that the pre-baptismal Augustine never once uses *uerbum* or *logos* as proper nouns for the Son of God. He only uses the Latin term *uerbum* in the ordinary sense of “word” and he never uses the Greek term *logos* at all. Considering how regularly and ubiquitously *uerbum* in

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621 Johnson points out that Augustine does not use *uerbum* as a proper noun until as late as *Gn. adu. Man.* (388/90) (see 2.24.37) (“Verbum” (1972): 33, 36-37).
On Faith and logos in Against Arius occur for the Son alone,\textsuperscript{622} this is astounding. Even the laziest reader of these works could not fail to recognize that logos terminology only applied to the Son of God and that this was standard pro-Nicene terminology. The fact that the pre-baptismal Augustine shows no signs of recognizing this terminology suggests that he had no awareness or acceptance of the propriety of logos terminology for the Son and thus that he was not familiar with On Faith, Against Arius, or any other Christian work employing logos terminology with such clarity and frequency.

Could it really be possible that the great champion of logos terminology for the Son of God later in life was unaware of it before his baptism? Gerber does not think so. He acknowledges the lack of reference to the Son as the uerbum or logos in the pre-baptismal writings, but still takes Augustine to be familiar with logos terminology because of his apparent familiarity with the Prologue of John and for other reasons.\textsuperscript{623} This claim is also well accepted among scholars. Even O’Connell thinks that Augustine was relatively familiar with John’s Prologue and its logos terminology at his conversion.\textsuperscript{624} But is there strong evidence for it? I cannot find any that would qualify as strong. The best evidence for it does not come from the early texts themselves, but from the Confessions. In Augustine’s “I read there, I did not read there” (ibi legi, non ibi legi) discourse in Confessions 7,\textsuperscript{625} he says that prior to his conversion he “read there” (in the Platonic books) that “in the beginning was the Word (uerbum) and the Word

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{622} The following is a representative example: “Let us therefore speak of the Scriptures and first, according to John. For he says that the logos was both ‘in the principle’ and ‘was with God’ and that the logos was ‘God.’ Does he call any other, logos? Only the Son.” Adu. Ar. 1.3 (M. Clark trans., slightly modified) (Dicamus igitur scripturas et primum secundum Iohannem. Dicit enim, quoniam λόγος et in principio erat et circa deum erat et quoniam Deus erat λόγος. Numquid de alio dicit λόγον? Omnino de filio). Victorinus continues making the same exclusive logos-Son association over and over again, to the point that one could argue it is the most fundamental datum of his anti-Arian argument. For an extensive sample from the first part of the first book, see Adu. Ar. 1.3-7, 13, 20, 22-27, 30-31, 33-40, 44-47.
\item \textsuperscript{623} Gerber, Spirit (2012), 46-7 “Interestingly, Augustine does not utilize verbum or logos for the Son until much later despite his obvious familiarity with the prologue of John and apparent role in his intellectual transformation late in 386.”
\item \textsuperscript{624} O’Connell, Early Theory (1968), 116.
\item \textsuperscript{625} conf. 7.9.13-15
\end{itemize}
was with God and the Word was God,\(^\text{626}\) which is a direct quotation of John 1.1 using the term *uerbum* for the Son. A little later in Book 8, Augustine also says that Simplicianus, “congratulated me for not having fallen in with the writings of other philosophers, which are full of deceptions according to the elements of this world, but in with those [i.e. the Platonists] in which *God and his Word* (*deum et eius uerbum*) are everywhere implied.”\(^\text{627}\) Since both of these passages refer to the time before his conversion, they would seem to suggest that Augustine was aware of *logos* terminology for the Son of God at that time and after.

The reason why this evidence is not strong, however, is that we do not have good reason to think that the terminology Augustine uses in the *Confessions* to describe his intellectual views at his conversion is the terminology he literally used at his conversion. The *Confessions* was written more than 10 years after his conversion consequent to a significant deepening of his understandings of Platonism and Christianity and so we would expect Augustine to describe his past in terms more sophisticated than he would have at the time. This is precisely what we find, in fact, right in Augustine’s “I read there, I did not read there” discourse. As Augustine describes what he read in the Platonists and what he did not read there, he paraphrases the Platonists in terms of all sorts of scriptures, at least some of which we can be confident Augustine did not know at his conversion.\(^\text{628}\) The same point is supported by the fact that even some of the intellectual views that Augustine attributes to himself in Book 7, ostensibly describing the time around conversion, were insights that he only gained some time afterwards. The least controversial example is that Augustine’s interpretation of Paul in 7.21.27, emphasizing the

\(^{626}\) *conf.* 7.9.13.6-9 “*et ibi legi... quod in principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum...*”

\(^{627}\) *conf.* 8.2.3.6-9 (my emphasis) “*...gratulatus est mihi, quod non in aliorum philosophorum scripta incidisset plena fallaciarum et deceptionum secundum elementa huius mundi, in istis autem omnibus modis insinuari deum et eius uerbum.*”

\(^{628}\) In *ep.* 21.3 (c. 391) several years after his baptism, Augustine admits that he is still relatively ignorant of the scriptures, despite have recently been ordained a priest.
intensity of the struggle between the law of the mind and law of the flesh, is a view that only solidifies to this extent after his re-reading of Paul in the 390’s. There is also good reason to believe that Augustine’s interpretation of Plotinian thought is more developed in these passages, as Cary convincingly contends. Thus, when the Augustine of the Confessions portrays himself at his conversion as believing that the Son of God is the uesto, it would be rash to conclude that he understood the Son in those terms at the time without other evidence. It need be nothing more than Augustine providing a later gloss on his earlier views, as he did in many other matters.

Even though the Confessions evidence does not qualify as strong on its own, Gerber could contend that Augustine’s use of the term ratio in the pre-baptismal writings does constitute strong evidence and confirms the Confessions evidence. This possible translation of logos does frequently appears in the pre-baptismal writings and even seems to have a divine application to one of the persons of the Trinity, as we have seen. Thus, the question would seem to be settled.

As I suggested in prior chapters, however, Augustine’s use of ratio does not settle the question at all. For this term to show that Augustine was aware of logos terminology for the Son of God in the pre-baptismal writings, Augustine would have to use it clearly for the Son rather than for any other person of the Trinity. Otherwise, we would have to rely on clearer evidence to tip the balance, which I have just argued does not exist. But that is not what we find. As I argued in Chapter 3, the divine recipient of the name ratio is at best far from clear and at worst favours the Holy Spirit. I do not see how it can be understood other than as the Holy Spirit. The On Order 2.5.16/2.9.26 comparison and other passages cited earlier seem to leave no other option, and we

\[\text{\footnotesize 629 For a detailed defence of this point and others more controversial, see Dobell, Intellectual Conversion (2009), 87-106.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 630 Invention (2000), 35-6. Scholars have offered various explanations for the historical anachronisms of Book 7. Cary thinks that this section was meant to be ahistorical, reflecting the ahistorical character of philosophy and its logical connections, making it irrelevant when Augustine precisely attained any given insight (Invention (2000), 35-36). Dobell thinks that the section does roughly track Augustine’s historical intellectual development, but that the time frame of this development was not restricted to 386 prior to Augustine’s conversion, but rather spanned 386-c. 395 (Intellectual Conversion (2009), 27).} \]
could also add the observation that *On Order* is heavily indebted to *Enn.* 3.2, which speaks of a *logos* emanating from divine Intellect that fits uncannily well with Augustine’s description of the Holy Spirit that “emanates” from Intellect in *ord.* 2.5.16. Gerber does mention a plausible contrary passage from *On the Immortality of the Soul* where Augustine seems to identify *Ratio* and *ueritas* (which is significant because *ueritas* is usually a name for the Son), but as I argued in Chapter 3, this seems only to refer to the convertibility of the terms in applying to all eternal intelligible things, not their strict equivalence. So then Augustine’s use of *ratio* tends to contradict the argument rather than to support it. Rather than suggesting that Augustine was aware of *logos* terminology for the Son, it suggests that he was not.

To this argument that the pre-baptismal Augustine was not aware of *logos* terminology for the Son, we can add the further observation that Augustine fails to use such *logos* terminology precisely where one would most expect it. The expected place is Augustine’s *Soliloquies* prayer, since it addresses the persons of the Trinity one by one using many

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631 For a classic argument that Augustine was following *Enn.* 3.2 in *De ordine*, see Solignac, “Réminiscences Plotiniennes et Porphyriennes dans le Début du ‘De Ordine’ de Saint Augustin,” *Archives de Philosophie* 19 (1936): 448-56.

632 See *Enn.* 3.2.2.15-18 “So Intellect, by giving something of itself to matter, made all things in unperturbed quietness; this something of itself is the *logos* flowing from Intellect. For that which flows out from Intellect is a *logos*, and it flows out always, as long as Intellect is present among realities” (Armstrong trans., slightly modified). Plotinus later makes it clear that this *logos* is not identical to soul, but “depends on soul” and is a kind of “outshining” of both Intellect and soul (*Enn.* 3.2.16), showing that he is not referring to soul or Intellect but another divine reality. The fact that this divine reality “depends on soul” is a bit surprising and problematic if applied to the Holy Spirit, but it could be the reason for Augustine’s enigmatic comment in *imm. an.* 6.10.12-16(110) that *Ratio* may not exist by means of itself but by means of soul. This interpretation may also partially get him out of being committed to saying that God depends on *SOUL*, since the dependence would only apply to the Holy Spirit and not the Son or the Father. It is also possible that Augustine decided not to take up this idea of dependence after all.

633 Gerber, *Spirit* (2012), 99-100. The passage is *imm. an.* 7.12.1-6(113), discussed earlier: “But in fact the very turning away (*auersio*) from *ratio*, through which foolishness comes to the *SOUL*, cannot happen without a defect (*defectus*) of [Soul]. For if [Soul] exists more when it is turned toward *ratio* and clings to it, since it clings to an unchangeable thing that is Truth (*ueritas*), which exists maximally and originally, then when it is turned away (*auersus*) from it, it has less of ‘being’ itself (*idipsum esse*), which is to become defective (*deficere.*)”

634 For the most thorough opposing argument of which I am aware, and at which my argument is directed here, see Gerber, *Spirit* (2012), 90-100.

635 *sol.* 1.1.2-4
different names for each. If the *logos* doctrine were as familiar to him as readings of *On Faith* and *Against Arius* (and as a literal reading of the *Confessions*) would suggest, one would expect him to have included it as a name for the Son, since we find a long list of other names for the Son there: *ueritas, sapientia, summa uita, beatitudo, deus bonum et pulchrum*, and *intelligibilis lux*. But he does not. Nor does he show an awareness of any other discernable features of John’s Prologue in this prayer.

The evidence (and lack thereof), therefore, suggests that the pre-baptismal Augustine was not aware of *logos* terminology as appropriate for naming the Son of God, or at worst that his acquaintance with it was so minimal, perhaps, that he could deliberately avoid it. To my mind, either conclusion, taken together with the other inconsistencies noted above, confirms that Augustine had not read *On Faith* and *Against Arius*. They also suggest that he had not read any other Christian work employing clear and frequent *logos* terminology in this sense. If one attempts to avoid this conclusion about *On Faith* and *Against Arius* by arguing that Augustine had read them in spite of the inconsistencies, then one runs into other difficulties, such as severely weakening criterion 3. If Augustine could be so naïve or dismissive of what was written in these works to generate such inconsistencies, then he could also have been so naïve or dismissive to embrace uncreatedness or consubstantiality, whatever the works actually said. From these observations, we may infer a principle for determining which works the pre-baptismal Augustine had read. If criterion (3) applies to a work (that Augustine would have been motivated to accept what was written there), then he cannot have read the work if it contains

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636 sol. 1.1.3

637 This includes Ambrose’s *De Isaac uel anima*, which also is loaded with *uerbum* = Son of God references, and the Prologue of John. Johnson argues that even though Augustine did not use *uerbum* as a proper noun until 388/90, he still was aware of John’s Prologue at his conversion because we can find allusions to its other content in earlier works (“*Verbum*” (1972): 35). The two passages that Johnson cites are *lib. arb.* 1.2.5 and *mor.* 1.16.27. I do not find this evidence convincing because neither of these works are pre-baptismal works, and so settle nothing about whether Augustine had read the Prologue at his conversion. The *lib. arb.* passage, moreover, does not even clearly allude to the Prologue (unlike the *mor.* passage).
clear and/or extensive references to the Son as *uerbum*, *logos*, or *ratio*.

Gerber admits that Augustine may not have read these works, but argues that similarities between Augustine and these works and other clearly pro-Nicene doctrines shows that Augustine had sufficient awareness of the “spirit” of pro-Nicene theology that he could not have entertained uncreatedness or consubstantiality. This kind of argument, however, depends upon finding strong evidence in the pre-baptismal writings to back it up, in which case we are no longer arguing based on Augustine’s awareness of other writings, but from Augustine’s own works, which is something I will do shortly. The Christian Platonist writings in themselves do not provide the kind of strong evidence we are looking for.

Even though the Christian Platonist evidence is weak, some might argue that Augustine’s awareness of Christian creeds provides strong evidence against uncreatedness and consubstantiality. The Greek Nicene creed of 325 or 381, for example, says that the Son of God is “only-begotten” (*monogenê* (Lt. *unigenitum*)), suggesting that the SOUL could not possibly have been begotten (*genitus*) and so must have been made or created. $^{638}$ There are two main problems with this argument, however. First, it is not clear that the pre-baptismal Augustine knew this version of the creed. He likely would not have read it in Greek since he did not yet know Greek well and we do not have explicit evidence that he knew it in a Latin translation at this time. No doubt he had heard Latin creeds while growing up and while attending Mass with Ambrose in Milan, but these creeds need only have said that the Son was the “unique” (*unicum*) Son of God, leaving open the possibility that other things could be “begotten” of the Father as long as they are not called “Sons” of God. $^{639}$ Second, even if the pre-baptismal Augustine was

$^{638}$ For texts of these and other Greek creeds and Latin translations, and for Latin creeds found in Augustine’s works, see A. Hahn, ed., *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962), 161-169, 38-40, 58-60.

$^{639}$ For some Milanese and African creeds with which Augustine was likely familiar, see Ibid., 36-39, 58-59. See *f. et symb.* (393 CE) for Augustine’s first extended creedal discussion. This work refers to the Son
aware of the Greek Nicene creed and the language of the “only-begotten” Son, this still would not establish his orthodoxy. The soul could still reasonably be thought to be uncreated and consubstantial with God because of the Holy Spirit. The Son’s only-begottenness does not exclude the Holy Spirit from being uncreated and consubstantial and so it would not eo ipso have to exclude the soul from being those things. Further, there are examples of Christian Platonists who affirm the Son’s only-begottenness and yet affirm that “begottenness” can apply to other things in a less strict sense, including created things. And so Augustine’s awareness of creeds, even if it included the Greek version of the Nicene creed, does not provide strong evidence for his orthodoxy.

Among the Christian writings that may have influenced Augustine, therefore, none of them in themselves provide strong evidence to contradict our interpretation of the Soliloquies Project. But what about evidence on the other side? Is there strong evidence from non-Christian writings in favour of my contention that Augustine had in fact entertained uncreatedness and consubstantiality and not rejected them? I submit that there is. There are two non-Christian writings that especially provide such evidence. The first is Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and the second is Plotinus’ Ennead 4.7 On the Immortality of the Soul.

To show that these works are strong evidence for my contention, I consider them one after the other in light of the three criteria, beginning with Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. The first criterion clearly holds for this work, as Gerber and Ayres no doubt would acknowledge,

both as unigenitus and unicus (3.3), which shows that he was aware of Nicene terminology in 393. Augustine was also clearly aware of Nicene terminology immediately after his baptism. The first reference in Augustine to the Son as unigenitus is mor. 1.16.28, quoting Matthew 11:27 “Nemo novit Patrem, nisi unigenitus Filius;” and the first reference to the Son as unicus is lib. arb. 1.2.5 “quem Filium Dei unicum dicimus...” This leaves it an open question whether Augustine was aware of the Nicene unigenitus terminology before his baptism. For later creedal discussion involving unicus and/or unigenitus, see symb. cat. 2.3 (Credimus in Filium eius, ..., unicum, dominum nostrum.), agon. 1.1 (unicus, unigenitus), 23.25 (unicus, unigenitus), ench. 10.34 (unicus), 11.36 (unigenitus), 27.103 (unigenitus), and s. 212-214 (unicus, unigenitus).

640 e.g. Victorinus Adu. Ar. 2.1. I am not suggesting that Augustine read this, I am only pointing out that such a position was possible even among pro-Nicene writers.
since there are many quotations and allusions to it throughout the pre-baptismal works.641 The second criterion also holds for the doctrines in question (criterion 2), and it will be instructive to see how explicitly they appear. They appear in the first book in the context of providing arguments for the immortality of the SOUL, fitting with what we found in Augustine. Cicero does not present them in his own name, but presents them as doctrines of Plato, leaving his own allegiance ambiguous.642 Here is a passage referring to both doctrines.

There is then a peculiar nature and power of SOUL, distinct from these common and well-known natures [the four elements]. Thus, whatever it is that senses, that is wise, that lives, and that is active must be heavenly and divine and for that reason eternal. Nor can god himself, who is understood by us, be understood in any other way except as a mind unfettered and free, separated from all mortal materiality, sensing and moving all things and itself gifted with everlasting motion. Of such a kind and of the same nature is the human mind.643

In this passage, we have an explicit affirmation that the SOUL is “eternal” and “divine,” already making it quite clear that it must be uncreated and consubstantial with God. The uncreated conclusion is then confirmed in several other passages in this section, such as when Cicero says that something that is eternal has no “origin” (origo) and never “comes to be” (oritur), making it clear that something eternal has to be uncreated.644 The consubstantial conclusion is confirmed in the passage itself when it says that the human mind is of the same “nature” as the god who must be understood “as a mind unfettered and free.” Since something that has the same “nature” must have the same “substance,” this means that the human mind is of the same substance as god. We

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641 See Hagendahl, *Augustine and the Latin Classics* (Göteborg: Boktryckeri, 1967), test. 291a (Tusc. 1.38 and Acad. 3.17.37), 298 (Tusc. 1.68 and sol. 1.1.4), 308a-c (Tusc. 3.17-18 and beata u. 2.8, 4.30, 4.31), 313 (Tusc. 3.73 and sol. 1.3.8), 319 (Tusc. 4.30-1 and ep. 3.4), 321 (Tusc. 4.43 and sol. 1.11.19).

642 Augustine derived much of his information about Plato from these sorts of passages, whether accurate or not. They functioned for him as an independent standard for his belief that Plotinus and Plato taught more or less the same thing.

643 Tusc. 1.66-7 (my trans., adapted from King; my emphasis) “Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vus animi seuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita, quidquid est illud quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod uiget, caeleste et diuinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est. Nec uero deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et mouens ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno. Hoe e genere atque eadem e natura est humana mens.” Cicero indicates that this is an exact quotation from his *Consolatio.*

644 Tusc. 1.54
know, moreover, that this applies to the soul and not just the “mind” since an earlier passage goes as far as to call the soul itself “god.”

Therefore, the human mind and soul must be uncreated and consubstantial with god on the view that Cicero is articulating. Cicero is careful to say that he does not necessarily believe these doctrines himself, but he unambiguously attributes them to Plato.

The more controversial question is whether the third criterion holds. Did Augustine feel compelled to entertain or accept these doctrines? There are two general reasons, first of all, to think that he did. First, we know that at this point Augustine is inclined to believe Platonic doctrines as long as they do not contradict his understanding of the rule of faith or his own reason, and here Cicero explicitly tells us that he is articulating Plato’s doctrines. Second, Augustine will typically make it clear when he disagrees with Plato on important points and this is not something he does about these doctrines. In Soliloquies 2.13.23-5(77), for example, Augustine rejects Plato’s Phaedo argument that the essential life of soul proves its immortality, and so one would expect that he would also clearly reject such momentous doctrines as uncreatedness and consubstantiality that Cicero has told him that Plato holds, if he really did reject them. A more specific reason to think that Augustine felt compelled to entertain these doctrines, however, is that the Soliloquies Project appears to be in close conversation with and dependent on this section of the Tusculan Disputations (1.17-92). This close conversation is

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645 Tusc. 1.65 “Thus the soul, as I say, is divine, or as Euripides dares to say, god. Indeed, if god is either breath (anima) or fire (ignis), the human soul (anima hominis) is the same; for just as that heavenly nature is empty of earth and moisture, so the human soul is free from either of these things. But if there is a fifth nature first introduced by Aristotle, this is the nature of gods and souls” (Ergo animus, qui <uiget, qui sapit, qui inuenit, qui meminit>, ut ego dico, diuinus est, ut Euripides dicere audet, deus. Et quidem, si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis; nam ut illa natura caelestis et terra vacat et umore, sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est exper. Sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est animorum).

646 For Cicero’s hesitance, see Tusc. 1.17; for his attribution to Plato, see Tusc. 1.39, 1.53-55ff.

647 I say “his understanding” of the rule of faith to point out that it could have been different from the actual rule of faith at the time.

648 Phd. 105d-e. Augustine likely did not learn about this argument from the Phaedo directly, however.
particularly evident from the similarities of the logical structure of the argument for immortality and from the occasional explicit disagreement.\textsuperscript{649} According to this section of the \textit{Tusculans}, Plato’s strategy for proving the immortality of the SOUL is to argue from the soul’s ability to know intelligible things and from the idea that learning is nothing but recollection (\textit{Tusc.} 1.57), exactly like Augustine’s strategy for proving the SOUL’s immortality in the \textit{Soliloquies} Project. Cicero also provides a reason for thinking that immortality implies uncreatedness when he appeals to the principle that something cannot be immortal if it “comes to be” (\textit{goritur}) or has been “born” (\textit{natus est}) (\textit{Tusc.} 1.54, 1.79), and we saw that Augustine had sympathy for this principle (e.g. \textit{imm. an.} 8.14-15) while not insisting on it (\textit{imm. an.} 3.4, 5.8).\textsuperscript{650} These similarities in themselves do not necessarily prove a close conversation with the \textit{Tusculans}, but when combined with the fact that Augustine specifically disagrees with one of Cicero’s points in the argument, the closeness of the conversation becomes hard to deny. At \textit{Soliloquies} 2.13.23, Augustine says that he cannot accept the claim of those who say that death ought not to be feared even if the soul is mortal, which is a criticism of \textit{Tusc.} 1.82-92. For all of these reasons, therefore, and particularly due to Augustine’s close conversation with the \textit{Tusculans}, I conclude that we have strong evidence to think that Augustine would have been motivated to accept the uncreatedness of the soul and its consubstantiality with God articulated there.

Let us now look to Plotinus’ \textit{Ennead} 4.7. There is hesitance in some quarters about whether this work fits the first criterion,\textsuperscript{651} but most scholars agree with some degree of confidence that it does. Wörter (1892) was one of the first modern scholars to suggest that

\textsuperscript{649} One could also point to the paraphrase of \textit{Tusc.} 1.68 at \textit{sol.} 1.1.4, where Augustine paraphrases Cicero’s account of cosmological motion and, like Cicero, attributes it to God.

\textsuperscript{650} See also \textit{ciu.} 10.31, where Augustine shows a clear awareness of and seeming appreciation for this principle among the Platonists: “The Platonists appeared to offer this sensible reason, at least, for being unwilling to believe [in a created soul], namely, that unless something always existed beforehand, it cannot be everlasting afterwards” (\textit{Vt enim hoc Platonici nollent credere, hanc utique causam idoneam sibi uidebantur adferre, quia, nisi quod semper ante fuisset, sempiternum deinceps esse non posset}).

\textsuperscript{651} Van Fleteren, “Reply” (1990): 133.
Augustine had read it at his conversion, and the most detailed and influential defences since have been by De Labriolle (1948), Verbeke (1954), Du Roy (1966), and O’Connell (1968). This has led to it being included on most lists of works that Augustine either “certainly” or at least “probably” read at his conversion. As for Gerber and Ayres, they are open to the possibility that Augustine had read it, but remain hesitant and do not take it seriously as an influence on his pre-baptismal views. In their arguments against Augustine’s acceptance of uncreatedness and consubstantiality, in fact, they ignore it altogether.

The treatise even more clearly fits the second criterion. Consider the following passage from 4.7.10.14-20.

If, then, the soul (psuchê) is something of this kind when it goes up to itself, how could it not be of that nature (phusis) which we say is the nature of everything divine and eternal? For prudence and true virtue are divine beings that would not come to be in some base and mortal thing; rather, such a thing [in which they would come to be] must be divine because it shares in divine things by means of its kinship (sungeneian) and consubstantiality (to homoousion) with [the divine].

Since the soul is of the “nature” (phusis) of everything divine and eternal, and shares in divine

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654 Those who include it are A. Solignac, *Les Confessions* (1962), 110-111 n. 3 (he says that Verbeke “semble avoir montré” it, but not yet “sûrement” nor “très probablement”); Du Roy, *L’intelligence* (1966), 69-70 n. 1 (“très probablement,” which is his highest category); O’Connell, *Early Theory* (1968), 9-10 (“surely,” which is his highest category); E. Teselle, *Theologian* (1970), 44-45 (“possible” or “probable” but not yet “demonstrated”); Cary, *Invention* (2000), 158 n. 11 (“very likely” but not yet “certain”). Van Fleteren, on the other hand, does not include it at all (“Reply” (1990): 133). For him, the only Plotinian treatises that Augustine had certainly read at the time of his conversion were 1.6, 1.8, 3.2-3, 4.3, 5.1, and 5.3.
657 *Enn.* 4.7.10.13-19 (Armstrong trans., slightly modified) “εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἢ ψυχῆν, ὅταν ἔφη ἐκείνην ἀνέλθη, πῶς ὦ τῆς φύσεως ἑκείνης, οἷς φαμέν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνάδιον παντὸς εἶναι; φρόνησις γὰρ ἄρετή ἀλήθες θεία ὅτα πάντα ἐν ἐγένεσι φαύλω τινὶ καὶ θνητῶ πράγματι, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη θείον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἢ τεῖον μετὸν αὐτὸ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ομοούσιον.”
things by means of its “consubstantiality” (to homoousion),\(^\text{658}\) it appears that it could be nothing other than uncreated and consubstantial with the divine Intellect, which would certainly qualify as “God” for Augustine. We know from other treatises that this is the generic sense of nature or substance and not the specific sense. But the passage here gives no indication that there is a more specific sense.

One might be tempted to object that the ideas of uncreatedness and consubstantiality would not have been clear to Augustine since he had read this treatise in a Latin translation and so did not have direct access to the text’s terms.\(^\text{659}\) This is implausible, however, because the Latin terms were likely just as clear. Victorinus was almost certainly the translator,\(^\text{660}\) and he reasonably would have translated phusis as natura and to homoousion with some form of consubstantialis, which he explicitly does with the latter term in Against Arius.\(^\text{661}\) Augustine, then, would have concluded that Plotinus believes that the soul is of the same natura as God and that this is equivalent to saying that it is consubstantialis with and/or the same substantia as God. Augustine surely also would have recognized that being uncreated follows from this. What Augustine would have thought Plotinus meant by “sameness,” however, is less clear. In the pro-Nicene Christian tradition, homoousion or “sameness” in substance as applied to the Trinity meant equality and even identity in substance (identitas in substantia),\(^\text{662}\) and the pre-baptismal

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\(^{658}\) Plotinus’ use of homoousios is rare. He uses it only at one other place, Enn. 4.4.28.55, and to make a different point, viz., that one trace of soul is homoousios with another trace but not another. The term occurs also in other Neoplatonist authors: Porphyry Abst. 1.19, Iamblichus Myst. 3.21, Syrianus In Metaph. 129.3, and Simplicius In Phys. 44.3.

\(^{659}\) conf. 7.9.13

\(^{660}\) In conf. 8.2.3, Augustine names Victorinus as the Latin translator of the libri platonici he had read.

\(^{661}\) Adu. Ar. 2.2.52-55 “Here, in fact, ὁ ὁμοοοόσιον signifies consubstantialis, that which is cosubstantiated, without composition or separation, but always at one in what it is among things with regard to its powers and distinguished by actions” (Clark trans., slightly modified) (Hic vero ὁμοοοόσιον significat consubstantialis, simul substantiatum, sine conposito vel discretione, sed simul semper quod sit rerum virtutibus actionibusque discretum).

\(^{662}\) For the idea of “identity in substance,” see Adu. Ar. 1.59 “Thus we hold, according to order and with God’s permission, that both the Father and the Son are ὁμοοοόσιον and ὁμοοοόσια according to identity in substance” (Habemus ergo secundum ordinem permissu dei et patrem et filium ὁμοοοόσιον et ὁμοοοόσια
Augustine seems to agree with the Trinity’s equality and identity in substance, even if he does not use those precise terms. Plotinus, of course, does not believe that *homoousion* in this sense implies *strict* equality and identity, since he thinks that the soul is subordinate to and so distinct from the two higher divine hypostases, Intellect and the One, as we know from *Enn.* 5.1. Since the pre-baptismal Augustine had likely read *Enn.* 5.1, he should have known this and so would not have concluded that sameness implied strict equality and identity for Plotinus. Thus, he presumably recognized that the consubstantiality of Plotinus’ divine realities was different from the consubstantiality of the Trinity. But how he thought Plotinus reconciled sameness and subordination is unclear. There is little doubt, at any rate, that the second criterion holds for *Enn.* 4.7.

Next, we may ask if the third criterion holds. Did Augustine feel compelled to entertain what he read about the uncreatedness and consubstantiality of *soul* in *Ennead* 4.7? As with the *Tusculan Disputations*, we can start with the corresponding two general reasons to think so. We know first of all that Augustine was very enthusiastic about Plotinus at this time and so would have been inclined to believe Plotinian doctrines as long as they did not contradict his understanding of the rule of faith or his own reason. The standard response to this is that Augustine knew that the doctrines contradicted the rule of faith, but, as we are seeing and will continue to see, looking at Augustine’s own works suggests that this is likely untrue. Second, the pre-baptismal Augustine will typically make it clear when he disagrees with Plotinus on important points, as he does with Plato, and this is not something he does about these doctrines. He does not specifically name Plotinus in his disagreements, but when he rules out subordination in the Trinity, for example, Plotinus will be a target. We also have the same more specific reason for believing that Augustine was motivated to entertain what he read in Plotinus. This is that the

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Soliloquies Project (and especially On the Immortality of the Soul) is in unusually close conversation with Enn. 4.7 (also named On the Immortality of the Soul), and in fact could be considered highly dependent on it. I would not go as far as to qualify this dependence as slavish, but I would say that his reliance on Plotinus is much more raw and undigested than in his other works. In the next several paragraphs, I offer some of the best evidence for this third reason to show just how much Augustine would have been motivated to entertain the uncreatedness and consubstantiality he read about in Enn. 4.7. This evidence at the same time will show with greater certainty that Augustine had read 4.7 by the time of his conversion in 386.

That Augustine is following 4.7 closely is most immediately evident from some basic correspondences in terminology. In 4.7.1.3, for example, Plotinus articulates the question of the soul’s immortality in terms of whether it *menei eis aei*, “remains for always,” similarly to how Augustine uses the Latin phrase *semper manet*, “always remains,” in sol. 2.13.24. A little later, Plotinus suggests that soul orders the world (*kosmos*) and each individual living thing (*zôion*) (4.7.3.32-34), very much like how Augustine suggests that the world (*mundum*) and each individual living thing (*animal*) subsists and exists by means of soul (*anima*) (*imm. an. 15.24.1-3*). Further, in 4.7.8.3ff, Plotinus argues against the possibility that the soul is a *harmonia* just as Augustine does using the very same Greek word (*harmonia*) (*imm. an. 2.2.19, 10(103)). Later in 4.7.9.1-2, Plotinus argues for the soul’s immortality based on the claim that the soul’s nature

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664 In this I follow O’Connell, who says, “And it must be no surprise if the traces of that treatise that find their way into his own slight work of the same title are clearer, firmer, and to some extent less digested than any Plotinian echoes uncovered in the Cassiciacum Dialogues” (*Early Theory* (1968), 137).

665 Since most of the evidence that the early Augustine had read Enn. 4.7 comes from *De immortalitate animae* (written in Milan in 387), it would technically be possible that Augustine only first picked it up once he got back to Milan and not prior to that. I think this is unlikely, however, given how remarkably continuous the earlier Soliloquies is with *De immortalitate animae*, constituting one coherent project, as I showed in Chapter 3.

666 “But if soul exists, all these bodies serve it for the unified ordering (*sustasis*) of the world (*kosmos*) and of each individual living thing (*zôion ekastou*), with different powers from different bodies contributing to the whole…” (Armstrong trans., slightly modified) (ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὕσης ὑποργὴ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ζῴου ἐκάστου, ἄλλης παρ᾽ ἄλλου δύναμις εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούσῃς·)
“has existence from itself” (par’ hautês echousa to einai), which is suspiciously similar to
Augustine’s key proposal that the soul “exists by means of itself,” (per se/seipsum est) in On the
Immortality of the Soul 4.8.15.17-3. Seen only individually, these similarities would not be
significant, but seeing them all together in corresponding texts of the same title is remarkable and
suggests that Augustine is following 4.7 closely. What makes Augustine’s dependence on
Plotinus especially clear, however, is the similarities of their arguments for the soul’s
immortality and some of the key distinctions and principles in them.

We first look at Plotinus’s arguments for the soul’s immortality. He makes use of several
arguments, but I focus on two of the relevant ones insofar as they entail the soul’s eternity. I call
the first one Argument A, where the A stands for “affinity.”

**Argument A:**

(A1) The soul has the ability to attain true virtue and conscious knowledge of
eternal intelligible things generally.

(A2) In order to have knowledge (and attain true virtue), the soul’s nature must be
like or of the same kind as these divine things to the point that it is incorporeal,
eternal, and divine/consubstantial with them.

(A3) Therefore, the soul is incorporeal, eternal, and divine/consubstantial with the
divine intelligibles.

I derive this argument from 4.7.8.38-46 combined with 4.7.10.14-20 above.667 The former
passage contains the fullest account of the argument and the latter adds the explicit idea of
“consubstantiality,” using the term itself. It is important to note that the argument does not yet

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667 For Enn. 4.7.10.14-20, see above. Enn. 4.7.8.38-45 is as follows: “But does the soul attain the
observables of virtue and other intelligible things as eternal, or does virtue just happen to someone,
benefit them and perish again? But who would be the one doing this and from where would it come? For
if there is such a thing, that again would remain. The virtues, then, are required to be eternal and
remaining, like the objects of geometry. But if they are eternal and remaining, they are not bodies. That,
therefore, in which they will exist are of the same kind: therefore it cannot be a body. For the whole
nature of body does not remain, but flows.” (Armstrong trans., slightly modified) (πότερον δε άιδων
όντων των της άρετης θεωρημάτων και των άλλων νοητών ή ψυχή έρασται, ή γίνεται τω ή άρετη,
ώφελει και πάλιν φθείρεται, άλλα τις ο ποιών και πόθεν; ούτο γαρ ἂν ἕκειν πάλιν μένοι. δεί άρα άιδων
είναι και μενόντων, οία καὶ τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ, εἰ δε άιδων και μενόντων, οὐ σωμάτων. δεί άρα καὶ ἐν ὁ
ἔσται τοιοῦτον εἶναι· δεί άρα μὴ σώμα εἶναι. οὐ γάρ μένει, άλλα ρέι ή σώματος φύσες πάσα.)
mention anything about innate knowledge, but merely trades on the idea that in order to be able to attain or acquire true virtue and conscious knowledge of (other) divine, eternal intelligibles, the soul must already be sufficiently like them to be able to do so.\textsuperscript{668} This suggests that it is an Affinity Argument along the lines of Plato’s \textit{Phaedo}, with no specified recollection element so far. It also depends on the weak claim of the Identity Principle of Knowledge (the principle in (A2)) and hints at the strong claim. The strong claim is suggested by Plotinus’ insistence that the soul really attains the \textit{eternal} intelligible things themselves, and not a temporal representation of them.

I call the next argument Argument R, where the R stands for “recollection.” This does not mean that the argument includes all of the features of Platonic recollection, however, since it does not explicitly appeal to the preexistence requirement.

\textit{Argument R:}

(R1) The soul has the ability to attain conscious knowledge of eternal intelligible things.

(R2) Attaining such conscious knowledge must be a matter of recollecting the Forms themselves innately known and existing within us as “sciences.”

(R3) Therefore, the soul must be eternal, since it has eternal sciences, identical to the eternal intelligible things, existing within it.

Argument R derives primarily from the following passage.

And the intellecction (katanoësis) of each ‘itself’ (autoekastou) which comes to be from [the soul] (par’ hauté) from the observables within it (ek tôn en auté theamatôn) and from recollection (ex anamnëseôs), gives [the soul] an existence prior to body and makes it eternal because it has eternal sciences (aidiois epistémais).\textsuperscript{669}

\textsuperscript{668} This is something that De Labriolle, Verbeke, and possibly Bréhier and Armstrong fail to notice. De Labriolle and Verbeke think that Plotinus is arguing for a likeness in 4.7.8.42-45 based on the claim that virtue and knowledge of the intelligibles already have to exist in the soul (De Labriolle, \textit{Dialogues Philosophiques} (1948), 20; Verbeke, “Spiritualité” (1954): 333-4). Yet Plotinus is not yet saying that. He is only speaking about the virtue and knowledge that “will be” (ἔσται) in the soul (4.7.8.44), which is a reference to their full and conscious acquisition, which the soul does not always have. Both Bréhier and Armstrong translate ἔσται as present, which may or may not indicate that they also miss this point.

\textsuperscript{669} \textit{Enn.} 4.7.12.8-11 (Armstrong trans., slightly modified) “ἡ τε ὑπ’ ἄντε ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἀυτῇ θεαμάτων κατανόησις αὐτοεκάστου καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως γεγομένη πρὸ σώματός τε ἀυτῇ δίδωσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀιδίος
Premise (R1) is not entirely explicit in the passage, but it is close. The passage assumes that “intellection” or conscious knowing really does happen, and this reasonably suggests that all souls are at least capable of conscious knowing, whether they actually do so or not. Premise (R2) is also reasonably inferred. Since the eternal *epistêmai* seem to be equivalent to the *theamata* existing within the soul, which in turn seem to be equivalent to “each ‘itself,’” i.e. to the eternal intelligible Forms, Plotinus seems to be saying that gaining knowledge of the eternal intelligible Forms is a matter of becoming aware of, of recollecting, the eternal sciences existing within us. The passage does not explicitly say that gaining knowledge “must be” a matter of becoming aware of these sciences, but the term “recollection” suggests that this is the case. The conclusion (R3) is clearer from the text. The soul has an existence prior to body and is eternal “because it has eternal *epistêmai,*” which is more or less how I expressed it. I add that the *epistêmai* are “within” the soul because they seem to be equivalent to the *theamata,* which are “in” the soul, and I also understand the “gives” in a non-temporal sense. Intellection/recollection could not literally “give” the soul eternity at some point in time, since the “eternity” at issue here is the same eternity possessed by the “eternal sciences,” which are always eternal. The “gives,” then, will simply be an indication that being eternal follows from intellection/recollection. A key thing to note about this argument is that unlike Argument A, it depends on a recollection component. It infers an eternal soul because the eternal intelligible Forms already exist in the soul (presumably as innately known), and not merely because the soul is capable of knowing them consciously in the future.

It is instructive also to ask about the reason for drawing the conclusion (R3) from the idea of innate knowledge. The text simply indicates that the soul must be eternal because it has eternal sciences within it, but does not specify why. It does not mention anything about a...

ἐπιστήμας κεχρημένην άιδιον καὶ αὐτὴν ἐίναι.” Cf. Enn. 5.9.8.
likeness or kinship, nor does it say that the sciences can only exist in the soul, as Augustine does. It also does not say anything about needing a prior conscious experience (the preexistence requirement). Plotinus surely has a stronger reason in mind, however. Since the passage hints at the strong claim of the Identity Principle of Knowledge (presumably the sciences existing innately within the soul have to be the eternal sciences and identical to the Forms because “science” or “knowledge” requires the identity with its object) and since Plotinus has only slightly earlier articulated Argument A with an appeal to the weak claim of the Identity Principle (A2), I infer that Plotinus at least has in mind this weak claim (A2). That is, he makes the inference on the grounds that the soul has to be like or of the same kind as the eternal knowledge it has. Whether there is also a stronger reason than this is unclear. In my view there is no sufficient justification to add Augustine’s reason that it is because the eternal sciences can only exist in soul, which seems to me to go beyond the evidence.670

The borrowing of this weak Identity claim, together with the many similarities between Arguments A & R and their close proximity in the text, raises the question of whether the arguments ultimately were intended to be combined. This seems to be a probable interpretation. The combination of arguments might be something like this.

Arguments R Combined with Argument A (Argument AR):

(AR1) (=A1)=(R1′) The soul has the ability to attain true virtue and conscious knowledge of the incorporeal, eternal, and divine intelligible Forms themselves.

(AR2) (=R2) Attaining such conscious knowledge must be a matter of recollecting the Forms themselves innately known and existing within us as “sciences”.

(AR3) (=A2) For having knowledge (and attaining true virtue) to be possible, the soul must be like or of the same kind as the Forms (or virtue) to the point that

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670 This is in contrast with De Labriolle, who thinks that Plotinus’ argument for immortality depends on the idea that the soul is the “substrate” of the “eternal truths,” by which he seems to mean that they can only exist within the soul (Dialogues Philosophiques (1948), 18-20). My view is that while Plotinus thinks that as sciences the eternal truths exist in the soul, it is not the case that they can only exist in the soul, and so his argument does not depend on this idea.
it must be incorporeal, eternal, and divine/consubstantial with them.

(AR4) Therefore the soul is incorporeal, eternal, and divine/consubstantial with the Forms on either (AR1) or (AR2).

As one can see, the same conclusion (AR4) follows from the facts either that we can attain conscious knowledge in the future (AR1) (= (A1) = (R1')) or that we have innate knowledge/science of the Forms themselves in the soul in the present (AR2) (= (R2)). It follows in both cases by adding the weak claim of the Identity Principle of Knowledge (AR3) (= (A2)).

Consubstantiality, therefore, seems not only a conclusion of Argument A, but also, in effect, of Argument R. It is not only the bare Affinity Argument that entails the soul’s eternity and consubstantiality with the Forms for Plotinus, it is also the Recollection argument, since it too invokes the weak Identity claim of the Affinity Argument.

Where I am headed in all of this is to suggest that Augustine’s main immortality argument in the *Soliloquies* Project is unusually similar to Argument R and possibly also to A or AR. The similarity to R is quite straightforward. First, Plotinus seems to infer innate knowledge from the soul’s ability to acquire conscious knowledge, i.e. he infers (R2) from (R1), which is precisely what Augustine does. Second, premise (R2) of this argument contends that the eternal “sciences” exist in the soul and that learning is a matter of becoming aware of them, which is remarkably similar to Augustine’s idea that the eternal “disciplinae” exist within the soul and that learning is a matter of becoming aware of them. This is particularly telling because *disciplinae* would reasonably have been Victorinus’ translation of *epistêmai*, and so Augustine would likely have read that the soul is eternal “because it has eternal *disciplinae*.” Even if Victorinus had translated *epistêmai* as “*scientiae*,” the result would have been similar, since we know that Augustine thought “*disciplina* is the *scientia* of whatsoever thing,” and so would
easily have made the translation himself.\textsuperscript{671} Third, premise (R2) suggests that the epistêmai are identical to the eternal intelligibles themselves, which is what we found Augustine believes about the disciplinae. It is true that these are three ideas that Augustine could have found elsewhere in Plotinus, but their appearance here with all the other similarities is striking.

Something that is not explicable by other Plotinian passages, however, is the similarity of the inference (R2) $\rightarrow$ (R3) to Augustine’s inference from the existence of the disciplinae in the SOUL to the continual existence of the SOUL on the first way. Even taking the inference at its most benign before bringing in the Likeness Principle, it is an inference that Plotinus does not explicitly make elsewhere, and so if Augustine got it from anywhere in Plotinus, he must have gotten it from here. This conclusion is supported by the fact that this is the one claim in Plotinus and in all of Augustine’s possible influences that provides some explanation for how Augustine could have thought that the disciplinae can only exist in the SOUL as in a subject (i.e. that they exist there with contentious conditional inseparability). It is not what Plotinus likely intended, but there are two reasons that Augustine could have assumed that it is what Plotinus thought. First, Augustine would have recognized that Plotinus’ conclusion does not follow with necessity unless the sciences can only exist in the SOUL, and he may have assumed that Plotinus intended such a necessity. Second, Augustine had read from Cicero that the Old Academics, the ancient Platonists, thought that “nothing exists that is not necessarily somewhere (alicubi).”\textsuperscript{672} Since Augustine at this time thought that Plotinus more or less agreed with this tradition,\textsuperscript{673} he could have assumed that Plotinus was applying the principle here to the sciences in order to strengthen

\textsuperscript{671} imm. an. 1.1.8.13(2) “Est enim disciplina quarumcumque rerum scientia.”
\textsuperscript{672} Cicero Academ. 1.24 “nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur.” We know that Augustine was familiar with the passage from which this sentence derives and thought that the passage was expressing genuine Old Academic doctrine based on what he says in Acad. 3.17.37-3.20.43. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the principle likely derives from something that Plato says in Tim. 52b, but in neither Plato nor Cicero is there an indication that it applies beyond sensible things.
\textsuperscript{673} Acad. 3.18.41-3.20.43.
the argument. In his search for a satisfactory philosophical principle behind Plotinus inference (R2) -> (R3), he put two and two together, Plotinus and the ancient Platonists, to get what he (unfortunately) assumed to be a reasonable candidate (i.e. that everything, including the “sciences,” have to exist “somewhere”). There is no need to attribute this mistake to Plotinus, however, because there is no need to think that Plotinus intended it. There is also no need to attribute the mistake to Cicero or to the ancient Platonists because, unlike Augustine, Cicero does not suggest that the “somewhere” principle applies to anything beyond sensible things. Plotinus and Cicero can be absolved from Augustine’s mistake (which he soon recognizes) while being its most plausible motivation.

To this evidence for a close conversation and dependence on *Enn.* 4.7, I add the observation that Augustine gestures at affinity reasoning in the *Soliloquies* Project and thus could have a version of AR in mind. The weak Identity Principle of Knowledge does not make an explicit appearance in Augustine, but it seems to be a reason for inferring that the SOUL is incorporeal and is conjoined to divine and eternal intelligible things where either one is the “subject” of the other or where each are substances and one still “exists in” the other.\(^{674}\) Plotinus’ conclusion does not mention the part about a “conjunction,” but it does mention incorporeality and “consubstantiality,” which are remarkably similar to the conclusions Augustine contemplates. I do not want to say if Augustine contemplated the (AR1) stream of Argument AR ((AR1) -> (AR3) -> (AR4)), but I suspect that he at least contemplated the (AR2) stream ((AR2) -> (AR3) -> (AR4)) because he seems to infer innate knowledge first and then (from this) the conjunction of a certain degree of likeness (which on the first and second ways seemed to be cases of consubstantiality).

Whatever Augustine thought about Plotinus’ affinity reasoning, the similarity of his

\(^{674}\) See especially *imm. an.* 6.10.17-2(110-111) and 10.17.8-12(119).
argument to Argument R alone provides strong support for the conclusion that Augustine was attempting to follow 4.7 unusually closely. This suggests that he would have been motivated to conclude that the SOUL is uncreated and consubstantial with God, as he recognizes that Plotinus does. This is especially likely given how obviously uncreatedness and consubstantiality follow from Plotinus’ arguments.

I turn now to some remaining similarities that support this same conclusion. The similarities I have in mind center around the key exhaustive bifurcation between intelligible and sensible things (or incorporeal and bodily things) underlying Plotinus’s argument in Enn. 4.7. This bifurcation entails that if the human soul is going to be immortal, then it will also have to be uncreated and consubstantial, since otherwise it would be bodily. We know that the pre-baptismal Augustine does not buy in to this bifurcation as strongly as Plotinus, as is evident from ways 3 and 4, but the signs suggest that he was still sympathetic to it and had not completely rejected it either.

To see this, it is helpful to consider how Plotinus articulates the bifurcation in 4.7. The most instructive passages are 4.7.8.38-46 and 4.7.8.43-4.7.9. According to these passages, all that exists is fundamentally divided into two natures: bodies (or affections of bodies), which are things that “flow,” (ῥεῖ) and incorporeal things, which are things that “remain” (μένει).675 Everything that has the flowing nature exists from another, is moved by another, is changeable in substance, comes to be and passes away, is mortal, participates in being, and should be called “becoming” (γένεσις), whereas everything that has the nature that remains exists from itself (ὁν παρ’ αὑτοῦ),676 is self-moving (εξ εαυτῆς κινουμένη),677 is essentially unchangeable (μεταβολῆς

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675 Enn. 4.7.8.45-6
676 Enn. 4.7.9.14-15, 23-24
677 Enn. 4.7.9.8
κατ’ οὕσιαν άμοιρον,678 will always exist (ἀεὶ ἐσταὶ),679 is eternal (ἀιών), 680 is immortal (ἄθανατον),681 has life from itself (ζῶν παρ’ αὐτοῦ),682 has true being (τὸ ὁντὸς ὤν),683 and should be called “substance” (οὐσία) or “true substance” (ὁντως οὐσίαν).684 So then if one is going to contend that the soul is immortal for Plotinus in this work, it is clear that it must be uncreated and divine/consubstantial because there are no other options.

The pre-baptisma Augustine’s sympathy with this strict bifurcation is already evident from how closely his descriptors of the soul on the first three ways in the Soliloquies Project (whether explicit or implicit) map onto Plotinus’ terminology for “things that remain.” The explicit ones are Augustine’s claims that the soul “always remains,” “always exists,” “is immortal,” “exists by means of itself,” and is “unchangeable in substance.” The soul’s “eternity” is less explicit in Augustine, but logically follows from the arguments on these ways, leaving us with at least 6 ways in which Augustine’s soul is like Plotinus’ things that remain.

His sympathy is also evident from a claim that I defend more thoroughly in the next section, namely, that Augustine is ambiguous about whether he differentiates the intelligible/sensible distinction from the uncreated/created distinction in the pre-baptismal writings, suggesting that these amount to the same thing, and then clearly differentiates them immediately in the post-baptismal writings.685 Indeed, he seems to take the intelligible/sensible distinction as the most fundamental division of reality in these writings, as though all of the other distinctions reduce to

678 Enn. 4.7.9.15-16
679 Enn. 4.7.9.23
680 Enn. 4.7.10.2
681 Enn. 4.7.9.12
682 Enn. 4.7.9.14
683 Enn. 4.7.9.2
684 Enn. 4.7.8,46-48
685 That the uncreated/created distinction is necessarily different from and more fundamental than the intelligible/sensible distinction first clearly appears after Augustine’s baptism in an. quant. 34.77, mor. 1.12.20, and elsewhere (as we will see below). His most systematic articulation of it in the post-baptismal writings can be found in ep. 18.2 (c. 390).
it, and he only denies this in the post-baptismal writings.\textsuperscript{686}

Next, we may ask why Plotinus thinks that immortality requires these other controversial things. Why couldn’t something be immortal while also being created and not consubstantial with God? Based purely on \textit{Enn.ead} 4.7, there are at least two principles that combine to yield this result. First, just as Cicero reports about Plato in the \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, Plotinus contends that what has come to be must also perish.\textsuperscript{687} Thus, if the soul (or anything else) is created and so comes to be in time, then it cannot be immortal because it will have to perish. Second, and relatedly, Plotinus indicates that what comes to be is preserved in being by “participation in being” (μεταλήψει ... τὸ ὄντος) like any old bodily thing.\textsuperscript{688} The only alternative to “participation in being” is having “true being” (τὸ ἄνωτος ὄν) and being called “substance”\textsuperscript{689}.

\textsuperscript{686} One sign of this is that Augustine affirms an exhaustive distinction between intelligible and sensible “worlds” (mundi) in the pre-baptismal writings, and then ceases to speak of the distinction in terms of “worlds” immediately after his baptism. In \textit{Against the Academicians}, for example, Augustine approvingly states that “Plato sensed that there were two worlds (mundos), one intelligible, in which the Truth itself dwells, and another sensible, which we obviously sense by sight and touch; the former world is true, and the latter world is truth-like and made to its image...” \textit{(Acad. 3.17.37)} (\textit{Sat est enim ad id, quod uolo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum intellegibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos uisu tactuque sentire; itaque illum verum, hunc ueri similem et ad illius imaginem factum, ...) Then in \textit{On Order}, he says that we should carefully consider what time and place are “in this sensible world” \textit{(in hoc ... sensibili mundo)} where the parts are not as beautiful as the whole, which is in contrast to “the intelligible world” (illo ... mundo intellegibili) where any part is as beautiful and as perfect as the whole (\textit{ord. 2.19.51}). For other examples of “world” language, see \textit{ep. 3.3, ord. 1.11.32, 2.18.47, and imm. an. 7.12}. After his baptism, Augustine will still sometimes speak of “this world” as though referring to the sensible world, but he will never specifically call it the “sensible world,” nor will he refer to all intelligible things as belonging to the “intelligible world.” \textit{In retr. 1.3.2} (commenting on \textit{ord. 1.11.32}), Augustine does defend the orthodoxy of positing an “intelligible world” in the Platonic sense, but he no longer sees it in an exhaustive bifurcation with the “sensible world.” Instead, it refers to the “everlasting and unchangeable ratio by which God made the world” (\textit{ipsam rationem sempiternam atque incommutabilem, qua fecit deus mundum}), and so excludes the soul and any other created intelligible thing. Ironically, this reference supports my interpretation because it suggests that the phrase “intelligible world” technically refers to all that is uncreated and divine, just as I have been saying. Moreover, Augustine cannot deny that he thought that the soul belonged to the intelligible world in his pre-baptismal writings because there the two worlds are exhaustive and the soul clearly does not belong to the sensible world. To avoid concluding that the soul has to be uncreated and divine in the pre-baptismal writings, then, the skeptic is forced to claim that Augustine understood the “intelligible world” to include created intelligible things in his pre-baptismal works (contrary to Plato and Plotinus) and then changed his mind to apply it only to uncreated and divine intelligible things later on (in line with Plato and Plotinus). This is possible, but becomes difficult to believe as the evidence mounts.

\textsuperscript{687} \textit{Enn. 4.7.9 passim}.

\textsuperscript{688} This idea is not entirely explicit but is behind the reasoning in \textit{Enn. 4.7.85.46-50}. 
(οὐσία) or “true substance” (ὄντως οὐσίαν). Thus, if the soul is to be immortal, then it must also have “true being” and “true substance” and so must be consubstantial with all that is within the intelligible world.

We know from the fourth way that Augustine does not insist on these principles, but from what we have seen from the first three ways, he seems to be aware of them and even motivated by them. We have already seen evidence that he was motivated by the “what comes to be must also perish” principle when talking about the Tusculan Disputations. As for evidence that he was motivated by the second principle, we can look at On the Immortality of the Soul 11.18 where Augustine postulates that the SOUL either exists by means of itself or exists from the highest essence. His suggestions that existing by means of itself means continually bestowing the form of existing on itself and that existing from the highest essence means continually receiving the form of existing from the highest essence seems suspiciously similar to Plotinus’ distinction between having “true substance” and merely “participating in being.” Thus, we can see why Augustine would feel motivated to think that the SOUL is consubstantial with God if it were uncreated. He sees that Plotinus has no third option between having “true substance” and “participation in being” and so would be compelled to include the SOUL in the category of true substance if possible.

Thus, we have strong evidence to believe that Augustine was following Ennead 4.7 unusually closely, especially its argument for immortality and its uncreated and consubstantial implications for the nature of the SOUL. His terminology, arguments, and connected considerations all point in this direction. These observations suggest, moreover, that scholars can be confident about including Ennead 4.7 on the list of the libri Platonici Augustine had “certainly” read at the time of his conversion. Putting these things together with my other observations, I conclude that Gerber and Ayres are mistaken to think that the various previous
authors who might have influenced Augustine present strong evidence that he had rejected uncreatedness and consubstantiality with God. Indeed, the evidence is much stronger in the opposite direction. This supports rather than undermines my interpretation of the Soliloquies Project. If we are going to find sufficiently strong evidence that Augustine was pro-Nicene on these controversial doctrines, we have to find the evidence in Augustine’s works themselves. He cannot be shown to be pro-Nicene based on the pro-Nicene authors he might have read, since the evidence is simply not strong enough that he had read or at least been been swayed by the anti-uncreatedness and anti-consensual message from these works. Our next step is to evaluate the evidence from Augustine’s own writings. I begin with the post-baptismal writings to see if they offer strong evidence for a rejection for these things in the pre-baptismal writings.

2.2 Evidence from Comparing Post-Baptismal to Pre-Baptismal Writings

Gerber’s argument from the post-baptismal writings against the SOUL’s uncreatedness and consubstantiality with God in the post-baptismal writings starts from two true observations.

A. In the post-baptismal writings Augustine explicitly rejects the uncreatedness of SOUL and its consubstantiality with God.
B. Augustine makes similar claims and arguments in the pre-baptismal writings, but they are not as explicit.

Gerber then draws the following conclusion:

C. Therefore, Augustine also rejects uncreatedness and consubstantiality in the pre-baptismal writings.

Gerber recognizes that the conclusion does not necessarily follow, but he thinks that the two observations make it more likely that it does. The inference, however, is suspicious. Could the two observations not more likely prove the opposite conclusion, that Augustine had not yet rejected uncreatedness and consubstantiality? Or could they at least be evidence neutral? My contention in this section is that they seem to prove the opposite conclusion and are at least evidence neutral.
To show this, I begin by looking at Augustine’s settled post-baptismal view about the nature of reality and how the soul (generally) and God fit into it. The easiest way to express this post-baptismal view is in terms of a strict uncreated/created bifurcation. Everything uncreated (and unmade) is unchangeable, exists by means of itself, is eternal, and is consubstantial with the divine, and everything created is changeable (in some way), does not exist by means of itself, is not eternal, and is not consubstantial with the divine. God alone fits into the former category and the soul and bodily things fit into the latter. The soul also has its own unique nature or substance within the created category due to the fact that it is an intelligible substance and only changeable in time. We can find most of this view explained in Letter 18 (c. 390).

There is a nature changeable in place and time (per locos et tempora), as is body, and there is a nature in no way (nullo modo) changeable in place, but only in time, as is soul (anima), and there is a nature that can be changed (mutari) neither in place nor time, and this is God. That which I have suggested is changeable in any way is called creature (creatura), and that which is unchangeable is called creator (creator). This passage shows that there is a strict uncreated/created bifurcation of reality where the former are unchangeable and the latter changeable, and that there are three different kinds of natures, or substances. The first nature is changeable in time and place and thus created; the second is changeable in time only and also created; and the third is completely unchangeable and therefore uncreated. Soul (anima) is placed in the created camp due to the fact that it is changeable in some way, namely, in time only. God is placed in the uncreated camp, since he and only he has a completely unchangeable nature.

This passage does not explicitly say how existing by means of itself and eternity fit into

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689 ep. 18.2 “Est natura per locos et tempora mutabilis ut corpus, et est natura per locos nullo modo, sed tantum per tempora etiam ipsa mutabilis ut anima, et est natura quae nec per locos nec per tempora mutari potest, hoc deus est. Quod hic insinuaui quouquamodo mutabile creatura dicitur, quod immutabile creator.”

690 Note that this supports my earlier conclusion that the SOUL’s omnipresence is not merely an omnipresence in the body but in the universe. If it were only omnipresent in the body, then it would change in place “in some way,” i.e. it would move when the body moves, and this is ruled out.
the system, but it does tell us that everything uncreated is unchangeable and consubstantial with the divine and everything created is changeable and not consubstantial with the divine. Thus, it makes good sense that only uncreated things exist by means of themselves and are eternal and vice versa for created things.\textsuperscript{691} Interestingly, there are two sets of doctrines that now clearly do not fit in with this strict bifurcation: intelligible/sensible, incorporeal/corporeal. For the post-baptismal Augustine the soul is clearly created, non-eternal, and non-consupstantial with God, but it still remains an intelligible and incorporeal thing, and so is more like God than other created things in these respects. This is a departure from Plotinus’ bifurcation in \textit{Enn} 4.7, as Augustine would surely have known.

We can now see how difficult it is for Gerber’s inference to be correct if we look at Augustine’s pre-baptismal treatment of some of these same doctrines. Two of the doctrines in particular on the \textit{uncreated} side are explicitly attributed to the soul in the \textit{Soliloquies} Project: it

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{691} I do not know of an explicit reference to “existing by means of itself” in the post-baptismal works, but if we are entitled to use the terms of \textit{imm. an.}, created things will have to have a continuing cause, and thus \textit{will not exist} by means of themselves, and uncreated things will not have a continuing cause, and thus \textit{will exist} by means of themselves. Some uncreated things, however (i.e. the Son and Holy Spirit) will still have an originative cause (i.e. the Father), even though they presumably exist by means of themselves. The point about eternity is explicitly confirmed in \textit{uera rel.} 49.97, written roughly at the same time as \textit{ep.} 18. “Of course, I separate all changeability from eternity with the look of the mind and I see in eternity itself no extensions of time (\textit{nulla spatia temporis}), because extensions of time consist of the past and future motions of things. But nothing is past in what is eternal (\textit{in aeterno}) and nothing is future, because that which is past ceases (\textit{desinit}) to be and that which is future has not yet begun to be. ... For this reason, eternity alone (\textit{sola ipsa}) could most truly say to the human mind: ‘I am who am,’ and it could most truly be said about eternity: ‘He who is sent me’” (\textit{Mentis quippe aspectu omnem mutabilitatem ab aeternitate seiungo et in ipsa aeternitate nulla spatia temporis cerno, quia spatia temporis praeteritis et futuris rerum motibus constant. Nihil autem praeterit in aeterno et nihil futurum est, quia et quod praeterit esse desinit et quod futurum est nondum esse coepit. Aeternitas autem tantummodo est, nec fuit, quasi iam non sit, nec erit, quasi adhuc non sit. Quare sola ipsa verissime dicere potuit humanae menti: Ego sum qui sum. Et de illa verissime dici potuit: Misit me qui est.}).

Augustine does not explicitly say that created things are not eternal and uncreated things are, but we can infer this from how he connects eternity with unchangeability. Since one must separate all changeability from eternity, then eternal things and only eternal things will have no changeability at all. They do not even have changeability in time because eternity has no “extensions of time” (\textit{spatia temporis}). Therefore eternity and complete unchangeability are convertible. And since complete unchangeability is also convertible with uncreatedness, then eternity is also convertible with uncreatedness. This is confirmed when we see that the one and only thing that is eternal, i.e. \textit{aeternitas} itself, is the one who says to the human mind, “I am who am” (Ex. 3:14), which is obviously God. Since we also know that only God is uncreated at this time (and not the soul) then eternity and uncreatedness will be convertible.
exists by means of itself and is unchangeable in substance. Therefore, in order to maintain that Augustine had rejected the uncreatedness of the SOUL in those works, Gerber would have to claim that the later bifurcation changed in some surprising ways. First, he would have to say that prior to Augustine’s baptism something created could “exist by means of itself,” and that Augustine changed his mind post-baptism. Second, he would have to say that prior to Augustine’s baptism something created could be “unchangeable in substance,” and then that after his baptism, he changed his mind. Saying that something is “unchangeable in substance” is very different from saying that it is “unchangeable in place but not time.” The latter admits change in time in something’s very nature, i.e. in its substance or essence, and the former denies all changeability in place and time in its substance.

It is technically possible that Augustine could have changed his bifurcation of natures in this way in order to maintain a created SOUL throughout these works. Yet it is simpler to say that Augustine kept the bifurcation on these points and changed whether the SOUL fit in the “created” category. This makes excellent sense of the progression in On the Immortality of the Soul itself. On the first two ways Augustine would have kept Plotinus’ strict intelligible/sensible bifurcation of reality, taking it as materially equivalent to an uncreated/created bifurcation, and would have posited that the SOUL is on the uncreated (and unmade) side, meaning that it exists by means of itself, and is unchangeable, eternal, and consubstantial with God. On the third way, he would have adjusted the bifurcation slightly, making two uncreated (and unmade) substances instead of one (God and the soul), while leaving everything on the first two ways the same. On the fourth way where the SOUL is clearly on the created side, he would have changed the strict bifurcation slightly by making it possible for created things to be intelligible and incorporeal, but

692 As I mentioned in Chapter 3, there may be one exception to the strict convertibility of the terms. On the first way, divine uncreated Ratio may not exist by means of itself but may exist by means of SOUL, and so not everything uncreated (by God), unchangeable, eternal, and consubstantial would exist by means of itself.
in other respects it would have been just as strict as on the first two ways. The simplicity of this interpretation compared with the one Gerber is forced to adopt has much to recommend it and lends further support for my inference.

Other post-baptismal rejection passages when compared to pre-baptismal passages also further support my inference that Augustine had not rejected uncreatedness and consubstantiality. I take this to be particularly evident from the fact that the alleged passages rejecting the uncreatedness of the SOUL and its consubstantiality with God in the pre-baptismal works are so ambiguous in comparison with corresponding explicit rejection passages in the post-baptismal works, contrary to Gerber’s claim. Let us consider a run of such passages in order to get a feel for this abrupt switch from being ambiguous to being explicit and so why it seems to suggest a switch in doctrines. Here are some pre-baptismal passages that Gerber takes as evidence that Augustine rejected uncreatedness and consubstantiality.

1. ... when thinking about God, no one should think of him as something corporeal, and the same goes for the soul; for it is the one thing out of all that is nearest (proximum) to God. (beata u. 1.4.91-4)

2. But whence does the soul (anima) take its origin and what does it do here, how much does it differ from God, what does it have as its own that alternates towards both natures [i.e. towards God’s nature and mortal, bodily nature]...? (ord. 2.5.17.59-63)

3. Thus, anyone who does not know these things, and yet wishes to seek and dispute about his own soul (anima) – I do not say about that highest God, who is better known by not knowing – he will err to the greatest extent possible. (ord.

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693 For Gerber’s discussion of these passages, see Spirit (2012), 72-79. He refers to the passages at 74, 76, and 76 respectively.
694 “... cum de deo cogitaretur, nihil omnino corporis esse cogitandum, neque cum de anima; nam id est unum in rebus proximum deo.” Gerber’s reasoning would be that in speaking of the soul being merely “nearest to God,” the passage means that the soul is distinct from God and therefore not consubstantial.
695 “Anima vero unde originem ducat quidue hic agat, quantum distet a deo, quid habeat proprium, quod alternat in utramque naturam...?” Gerber’s reasoning would be that in posing the question about how much the soul “differs” (distet) from God, Augustine means to reject consubstantiality, and in posing the question about what the soul has “as its own” that alternates towards both natures, Augustine means that the soul has its own created middle nature between God’s nature and mortal, bodily nature. It is unclear from the passage itself that the phrase “both natures” refers to God’s nature and mortal, bodily nature, but this is evident from the broader context.
What these passages all have in common is that they suggest a distinction between God and the human soul (soul), and so seemingly reject consubstantiality. They are ambiguous, however, because just as Plotinus takes the soul to be distinct from the other divine hypostases and yet consubstantial with them, they allow for the possibility that Augustine takes the soul to be distinct from God in a sense and yet consubstantial with him in a sense. It is also ambiguous whether the passages really are supposed to imply a genuine distinction at all, with the possible exception of the third, and they say nothing explicit about uncreatedness. The third passage is a possible exception because it really does imply a distinction between the soul and the “highest God” (summus deus). Yet from what Augustine says that distinguishes the highest God from the soul, i.e. that he “is better known by not knowing,” it would seem that Augustine is referring to God the Father here as opposed to the Trinity as a whole, analogously to Plotinus’ One. In that case, there is no reason from this passage to conclude that the soul’s distinction from God the Father would be anything more than the Son’s and Holy Spirit’s distinction, which are persons of the Trinity that at this time are at least distinct from the Father in the sense that they genuinely can be known.

Another key passage that is also ambiguous, but explicitly raises the question of consubstantiality, comes from On Order 2.17.46. It arises in the context of attacking Manichean doctrine and some scholars have taken it to prove a rejection of consubstantiality. 4. In fact [the Manichees] admit that a soul suffers punishment here while they would have it that there is not any difference whatsoever between the substance of

696 “...quisquis ergo ista nesciens, non dico de summo illo deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo, sed de anima ipsa sua quaerere ac disputare voluerit, tantum errabit, quantum errari plurimum potest.” Gerber takes this passage as an example of other passages that speak of God and the soul as distinct objects of knowledge, and so, seemingly, distinct substances.

697 ord. 2.9.26

698 O’Meara, Against the Academics (1951), 169 n. 6.
In saying this, it would seem that Augustine is criticizing the Manichean belief that the soul is consubstantial with God. When understood in context, however, the passage is only explicitly criticizing holding this belief together with the belief that the soul suffers punishment in this life, since this would suggest that the divine substance suffers harm. It is the inconsistency of the beliefs that is the problem (saying that soul is divine and suffers harm), not necessarily either one of them, as Gerber also acknowledges. Thus, this passage too is at least ambiguous about rejecting consubstantiality.

One thing the passage does show, interestingly, is that the pre-baptismal Augustine was aware of the question of the soul’s consubstantiality with God, and so one cannot reasonably contend that the ambiguity in any of these passages is a result of his ignorance of the question.

I now compare these consistently ambiguous pre-baptismal passages to some consistently explicit post-baptismal passages. I focus on the three works written most immediately after Augustine’s baptism, On the Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life, On the Quantity of the Soul, and On the Free Choice of the Will 1-2, which give a good sense of the abruptness. The following passage from On the Quantity of the Soul is a complement to passage 1.

5. Just as we must acknowledge that the human soul is *not what God is*, so it must be set down that nothing is nearer (propinquius) to God among *all the things he has created* than the human soul. (*an. quant. 34.77*)

This passage is a complement to passage 1 because it also uses the term “near” (propinquius) to...
say that nothing is “nearer” (propinquius) to God [than the human soul]. The difference is that
this time Augustine adds that the human soul is “not what God is,” meaning that they have
different substances, and it is nearer to God “among all the things he has created,” meaning that
it, too, is created. Unlike passage 1, this is crystal clear. The next passages are from On the Free
Choice of the Will and focus on asserting changeability.

6. But I ask you: If you find nothing above our ratio except what is eternal
(aeternum) and unchangeable (incommutabile), will you hesitate to say that this is
God? For you know (cognoscis) that bodies are changeable (mutabilia); it is clear
that the life by which a body is animated is itself changeable through various
affections; and ratio is surely proved to be itself changeable (mutabilis) when at
one time it strives to reach a truth (verum) and at another it does not, and at one
time it reaches a truth and at another it fails. ... Ratio must then admit itself to be
inferior, and the eternal and unchangeable being [that it sees] to be its God. (lib.
arb. 2.6.14.35-42, 46-7)\textsuperscript{703}

7. Now if this Truth were equal to our minds (aequalis mentibus nostris), then it
would itself also be changeable [which is obviously false]. For our minds
sometimes see more of the Truth and sometimes less. And for this reason, they
acknowledge themselves to be changeable. (lib. arb. 2.12.34.41-44)\textsuperscript{704}

In the Soliloquies Project, we found that the SOUL had to be changeable in a sense because it
changed from wisdom to foolishness and vice versa, but Augustine did not consider this to be a
change of substance, only a change of “affection.”\textsuperscript{705} It also never led him to assert without
qualification that the SOUL was “changeable.” Indeed, in the Soliloquies Project, when Ratio asks
Augustine whether he knows if he “is moved,” Augustine answers nescio, “I don’t know,”\textsuperscript{706}

\textsuperscript{703} King trans., slightly modified “Sed, quaeso te, si non inueneris esse aliquid supra nostram rationem
nisi quod aeternum atque incommutabile est, dubitabisne hunc deum dicere? Nam et corpora mutabilia
esse cognoscis et ipsam utiam qua corpus animatur per adfectus varias mutabilitate non carere
manifestum est et ipsa ratio, cum modo ad verum peruenerit nitrur modo non nititur et aliquando peruenit
aliuando non peruenit, mutabilis profecto esse conuincitur. ... sed per se ipsam cernit aeternum aliquid
et incommutabile, simul et se ipsam inferiorem et illum oportet deum suum esse fataetur.”

\textsuperscript{704} King trans., slightly modified (my square brackets) “Si autem esset aequalis mentibus nostris haec
ueritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae aliuando eam minus aliuando eam plus uident
et ex hoc fatentur se esse mutabiles, cum illa in se manens nec proficiat cum plus a nobis uidetur nec
deficiat cum minus, sed integra et incorrupta et conversus laetificet lumine et auersos puniat caecitate.”

\textsuperscript{705} imm. an. 5.7-8

\textsuperscript{706} sol. 2.1.1 “R. Moveri te scis? A. Nescio.” For Augustine, the verb moueri can have the broader sense
of “change,” (mutare) and so if something cannot be moved, then it is rightly called “unchangeable”
on the first three ways of *On the Immortality of the Soul*, his arguments rely on the idea that the soul is “unchangeable” (*inmutabilis*).\(^{707}\) Moreover, in *imm. an.* 2.2 Augustine seems to infer the SOUL’s unchangeability from the contention that its *ratio* has to be unchangeable, which suggests that the SOUL’s *ratio* and mind have to be unchangeable too. These observations make the explicit rejection of unchangeability in *On the Free Choice of the Will* really stand out. All of a sudden, Augustine unequivocally says that the human mind and its *ratio* are changeable on grounds that he precisely had denied entailed changeability in *On the Immortality of the Soul*. He does not mention the changeability of SOUL in these passages, but the context suggests that the conclusion applies to the SOUL with even more certainty. Surely the simplest explanation for this abrupt contrast is that there has been a “change.” Augustine had entertained the possibility of an unchangeable and uncreated SOUL and/or *ratio* or mind in the pre-baptismal writings and now he rejects these things in the post-baptismal writings.

The most explicit, abrupt, and extended rejection of uncreatedness and consubstantiality can be found in *On the Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life*, a work that Augustine explicitly locates right after his baptism and effectively right after *On the Immortality of the Soul*.\(^{708}\) Imagine having read all of the pre-baptismal writings with their ambiguity and apparent acceptance of uncreatedness and consubstantiality and then imagine reading these passages. They read like the confession of a new convert who has suddenly seen the error of his ways.

8. ‘Not any other creature (*non alia creatura*),’ [Paul] says, [separates me from the love of God]. Oh man of the loftiest mysteries! He was not content to say, “no creature,” but he says, *not any other creature*, reminding (*admonens*) us that that very thing by which we love God and cling to God, that is, the SOUL or mind

\(^{707}\) *imm. an.* 2.2, 3.3-4, 5.7, 6.11.9-12, 8.15.16-3(117). We do not find such explicit evidence in the Cassiciacum trilogy, but the discussions in *ord.* 2.1.3-2.2.7 and 2.6.18-2.7.21, for example, hint at the conclusion that the mind of the wise man is “unmoved.”

\(^{708}\) *retr.* 1.7(6). I say “effectively” because Augustine makes a short comment about beginning writing his works on the liberal arts between his discussions of *imm. an.* and *mor.* in the *Retractationes.*
(animum atque mentem) is a creature (creaturam esse). (mor. 1.12.20)\(^709\)

The passage is thorough and could not be clearer about the rejection. Not only does it assert that the SOUL is a creature, but it also asserts that the mind is a creature, just in case anyone might think that the SOUL could be created and the mind uncreated.\(^710\) In doing so, it also rules out consubstantiality with God because nothing created can be consubstantial with God. Augustine’s exclamation, “Oh man of loftiest mysteries!” together with his thoroughness are what makes the passage sound like a confession of something he has newly discovered. In a slightly later passage, we find an explicit rejection of unchangeability as well.

9. In no way, however, could we be restored to wholeness by the Holy Spirit if he himself did not always remain whole and unchangeable. He could not do this, of course, unless he were of the nature and substance of God, which alone always has unchangeability and, so to speak, inconvertibility. ... He is not a creature, therefore, because everything that exists is either God or creature. (mor. 1.13.23.6-10, 14-15)\(^711\)

Here, Augustine specifies that the “nature and substance” of God alone has unchangeability, allowing us to infer that any other substance, including the substance of SOULS, must be changeable. This, again, is a real contrast with the Soliloquies Project.

There are similar passages that are less explicit in this work, but are along the same lines.\(^712\) I conclude with what could be the most significant passage. It follows passage 8 above.

\(^{709}\) Teske trans., slightly modified “Non, inquit, separat alia creatura. O altissimorum mysteriorum urum. Non fuit contentus dicere creatura, sed alia, inquit, creatura, admonens etiam idipsum quo diligimus deum et quo inhaeremus deo, id est animum atque mentem creaturam esse.”

\(^{710}\) Augustine explicitly acknowledges this possibility in Gn. adu. Man. 2.8.11, as I discuss below. More precisely, he acknowledges that some could think that human ratio is uncreated (and consubstantial with God) within a created SOUL.

\(^{711}\) Teske trans., slightly modified; my emphasis “Nullo modo autem redintegrari per spiritum sanctum possemus, nisi et ipse semper integer et incommutabilis permaneret. Quod profecto non posset, nisi dei naturae esset ac substantiae, cui soli incommutabilitas atque ut ita dicam, inconvertibilitas semper est. Creatura enim, neque hoc ego sed idem Paulus clamat, vanitati subiecta est. Neque nos potest a vanitate separare eritatiqne connectere, quod subiectum est vanitati, et hoc nobis spiritus sanctus praestat; creatura igitur non est, quia omne quod est, aut deus, aut creatura est.”

\(^{712}\) e.g. mor. 1.27.49.2-4 “For he was not content with one commandment, since he knew that God is one thing and a human being another and that there is as great a difference between them as between the creator and what was created in the likeness of the creator” (Teske trans.) (non enim contentus fuit uno,
and seems to be Augustine offering an apology with an explanation for how he could have made such a heretical mistake as to entertain consubstantiality in the pre-baptismal writings.

10. [SOUL is an intelligible thing.] Thus, since God too cannot be known by worthy SOULS except by means of the intelligence (intelligentia), and although he nonetheless is more excellent than the mind by which he is understood – for he is, of course, its creator and author – one had to fear that the human SOUL might think that it was of the same nature (eiusdem se naturae) as the one who created it because it was counted among invisible and intelligible things, and so would fall by pride from the one to whom it ought to be joined by love. For it becomes like God (deo similis), insofar as it is granted this: when it subjects itself to him to be enlightened and illuminated. (mor. 1.12.20.10-18) 

As I pointed out about the Soliloquies Project, Augustine’s central strategy for arguing for the immortality of the SOUL was to argue that the SOUL’s real ability to know intelligible, immortal things entailed that it had to be so conjoined to them as to be immortal too. In addition to recollection reasoning, this conclusion seems to appeal to affinity reasoning (the weak claim of the Identity Principle), and each of the four ways articulates a certain degree of affinity to God that the knowledge might imply, with the first and second going as far as to imply consubstantiality with him. Accepting affinity reasoning to the extent of consubstantiality is precisely what this passage is warning against, while acknowledging that it is a real attraction.

Since worthy SOULS can know God by intelligence and since the human SOUL is counted among invisible and intelligible things, “one had to fear that the human SOUL might think that it was of the same nature as the one who created it.” The similarities to the Soliloquies Project are uncanny. The passage thus seems to be an implicit admission and explanation for why he entertained (and possibly accepted) that the SOUL was uncreated and consubstantial with God.

qui sciret alius deum esse alius hominem; atque interesse tantum, quantum inter eum qui creauit et id quod ad creatoris similitudinem creatum est).

713 Teske trans., slightly modified “Ergo cum etiam deus dignis animis notus non nisi per intelligentiam poscit esse, cum tamen sit ipsa qua intelligitur mente praestantior, quippe creator eius atque auctor est, uerendum erat ne animus humanus, eo quod inter inuisibilia et intelligibilia numeratur, eiusdem se naturae arbitraretur esse, culius est ipsa qui creauit et sic ab eo superbia decideret, cui caritate iungendus est. Fit enim deo similis quantum datum est, dum illustrandum illi atque illuminandum se subicit.”
Identity Principle reasoning and the fact that the soul is an intelligible thing (which itself might follow from Identity Principle reasoning) drew him in. Yet the passage indicates that the root of his mistake lay much deeper. Believing as he did is a case of falling “by pride from the one to whom [one] ought to be joined by love.” It was most fundamentally due to his pride that he mistakenly thought that the soul was of the same nature, of the same substance, as God, not his reasoning.

I submit that these explicit rejections of uncreatedness and consubstantiality in the post-baptismal writings support my inference rather than Gerber’s. Instead of showing that the pre-baptismal Augustine had already rejected these doctrines, when compared with corresponding pre-baptismal passages they provide strong evidence that he had entertained them. To prove the invalidity of Gerber’s inference, however, I do not have to go this far. It is enough to point out that the later explicit passages are of questionable value for interpreting the earlier more ambiguous passages and so cannot ground a strong objection to uncreatedness and consubstantiality in the pre-baptismal works. At worst for my interpretation, they do not answer the question one way or the other.

2.3 Evidence from Pre-Baptismal Writings and Evaluation of the Soul’s Uncreatedness

So far I have shown that there is no strong evidence for a pre-baptismal rejection of

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714 There are also much later explicit post-baptismal passages that give the same impression, such as ciu. 11.26: “We do in fact acknowledge in ourselves an image of God, that is, of the Highest Trinity. It is not an equal image; indeed, it is exceedingly far away from it. It is not co-eternal and, in brief, it is not of the same substance as God. For all that, there is nothing of the things that God has made nearer to him than this nature; ...” (Bettenson trans., slightly modified) (Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, immo ualde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam et, quo breuius totum dicitur, non eiusdem substantiae, cuius Deus est, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est illius summae trinitatis, agnosceimus...). Augustine’s reference to nothing being “nearer” (propinquius) to God than the nature of the image of God in us, connects this passage with passage 1 above, bringing Augustine’s explicitness here into further relief. Note also that Augustine mentions explicitly both co-eternity and being of the same substance, as though recognizing that one could potentially hold the first without the second, i.e. uncreatedness without consubstantiality, which is the possibility suggested by the third way.
uncreatedness and consubstantiality from other writings that Augustine may have read or from his own post-baptismal writings. The evidence has even seemed to point in the opposite direction. Appealing outside of the pre-baptismal writings for evidence that Augustine was pro-Nicene on these points, therefore, reduces to a question of whether there is strong evidence within the pre-baptismal works themselves. We now turn to these writings. In what follows I examine the best examples that Gerber and Ayres offer that there is such evidence, and conclude that there only seems to be one piece of strong evidence against consubstantiality. I then argue that this strong evidence nevertheless can and should be explained away. I begin by looking at Ayres’ best evidence for a rejection of uncreatedness (and thus of consubstantiality), and show that it does not constitute strong evidence. Then I turn to the one piece of strong evidence against consubstantiality that Gerber provides.

In order to defend his claim that for the pre-baptismal Augustine the SOUL is on the created side of a basic Creator/created distinction, Ayres cites two passages from the Cassiciacum trilogy that are both from On Order. The first is passage 2 cited above, which I have already suggested is ambiguous. I consider my comments there to be sufficient because Ayres does not say enough about it to doubt that assessment. He says more about the second passage, and so I look at it in more detail.

Man (homo) is a rational, mortal animal (animal rationale mortale). Here the

\footnote{Ayres, *Trinity* (2010), 25.}

\footnote{Ayres, *Trinity* (2010), 25 n. 43.}

\footnote{The passage is *ord.* 2.5.17.59-63 “But whence does the soul (anima) take its origin and what does it do here, how much does it differ from God, what does it have as its own that alternates towards both natures [i.e. towards God’s nature and mortal, corporeal nature]...?” How Ayres takes this to be against uncreatedness is not entirely clear. He says that the two naturae refer to the natures of God and the mortal creation, which I think is correct, but this does not show how the soul therefore is shown to be created. If Ayres thinks Augustine is placing the soul among mortal things, then that is a mistake because we know from the *Soliloquies* Project that Augustine thinks that the soul is immortal. It is true that the passage suggests that the soul has something “of its own” that alternates between the divine and mortal natures, but one need not take this to be a distinct “nature.” As we saw in *On the Immortality of the Soul*, the SOUL’s “thought” (cogitatio) or “intention” (intentio) seems to alternate between higher and lower things, and this could very well be what Augustine has in mind here.}
genus is posited, which is called animal, and we see two differentiae added, by which I believe man was supposed to be admonished whither he ought to return and whence to flee. For as the progress of the soul (progressus animae) has fallen all the way to mortal things, so the return (regressus) of the soul ought to be into reason (in rationem). By one word, which is called rational, it is separated from beasts, by another, which is called mortal, it is separated from the divine. Therefore, unless it holds to the former, it will be a beast, and unless it turns away from the latter, it will not be divine.\footnote{ord. 2.11.31 “homo est animal rationale mortale. Hic genere posito, quod animal dictum est, uidemus additas duas differentias, quibus credo admonendus erat homo, et quo sibi redeendum esset unde fugiendum. Nam ut progressus animae usque ad mortalia lapsus est, ita regressus esse in rationem debet; uno uerbo a bestiis, quod rationale, alio a diuinis separatur, quod mortale dicitur. Illud igitur nisi tenuerit, bestia erit, hinc nisi se auerterit, diiuna non erit.”}

Ayres’s case is relatively clear about this passage. According to him, the passage shows that the soul must be created because it affirms the “essential mortality of the soul.” I take it that this is because “mortal” is part of the definition of man (homo), who is a rational and mortal animal, and also because the passage seems to be saying that the soul (anima) itself “is separated from the divine” by the word “mortal.” There are fatal problems with this interpretation, however. Aside from the basic problem of how this would be consistent with Augustine’s attempt to prove the soul’s seemingly essential immortality in the Soliloquies Project, there are problems both from within the passage itself and in the broader work. Within the passage itself, it is not clear that the subject of “is separated” is anima. The subject could also be homo, since this is what was defined as mortale and rationale, and it was also actually used as a subject in the preceding lines (whereas anima was not). If so, then Augustine is not saying that the soul “is separated” from beasts by being “rational” and from the divine by being “mortal,” but rather that man (i.e. the soul/body composite) is separated from them in these ways. Even if anima is the subject, however, the sentence previous to it indicates that Augustine would not technically mean that the anima is essentially mortal. This sentence portrays itself as being Augustine’s most technical account of the matter in the passage, and it only says that the progress (progressus) of the soul has fallen “all the way to mortal things” (usque ad mortalia), which suggests that the soul itself
is indeed not essentially a mortal thing. It also does not say that the soul can *turn into* a mortal thing when it falls, only that it progresses down to the point of mortal things, which is not the same thing as becoming mortal. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Augustine explicitly argues against the possibilities that the rational soul can become either an irrational soul or a body in *On the Immortality of the Soul*, which is motivated by the desire to prove that the soul cannot become mortal.

There is also a passage within *On Order* more broadly confirming that Augustine could not have been asserting that the *SOUL* is essentially mortal in this passage. The passage even seems to indicate that Augustine is entertaining an uncreated and possibly consubstantial *SOUL*, exactly contrary to Ayres’ contention. In *On Order* 2.19.50, Augustine asks,

> Then how is it that *ratio* is immortal and that I am defined to be something at the same time rational and mortal? Or is *ratio* not immortal? But 1:2 or 2:4 is the truest *ratio* nor was it more true yesterday than today nor will it be more true tomorrow or after a year nor if the whole world collapses could that *ratio* not exist. For it is something that always exists... Therefore, if *ratio* is immortal and I, who by either distinguishing or connecting all these things, am *ratio*, then that by which I am called mortal is not mine. Or, if the soul (*anima*) is not *ratio*, yet I use *ratio* and by means of *ratio* I am better, then one ought to flee from the worse to the better, from the mortal to the immortal.

The passage is an answer to the following question: If *ratio* is immortal, then how could a human being be defined as rational and mortal, which seems to be a contradiction? The reference to the definition of human being is a direct allusion back to Ayres’ passage in 2.11.31, which tells us that the answer here will apply to the interpretation of that previous passage. What, then, is his answer? Augustine first proposes that perhaps the soul is *ratio*, in which case “that by which I

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719 imm. an. 13.20-16.25
720 ord. 2.19.50 (my trans., adapted from Foley) “*Quomodo igitur inmortalis est ratio et ego simul et rationale et mortale quiddam esse definior? An ratio non est inmortalis? Sed unum ad duo uel duo ad quattuor uerissima ratio est nec magis heri fuit ista ratio uera quam hodie nec magis cras aut post annum erit uera nec si omnis iste mundus concidat, poterit ista ratio non esse. Ista enim semper talis est... Igitur si inmortalis est ratio et ego, qui ista omnia uel discerno uel coneco, ratio sum, illud, quo mortale appellor, non est meum; aut si anima non id est, quod ratio, et tamen ratione utor et per rationem melior sum, a deteriore ad melius, a mortali ad inmortalis fugiendum est.”
am called mortal is not mine.” Then he proposes that if the soul (anima) is not ratio, but rather uses (utitur) ratio and is better (meliora) by it, then one should flee “from the mortal to the immortal.” The first proposal in particular shows that Augustine could not have been affirming that the soul is essentially mortal in 2.11.31. By entertaining the possibility that the soul is reason while simultaneously accepting that man is rational and mortal, he is precisely entertaining the soul’s essential immortality despite the accuracy of this definition of man. As he goes on to argue, ratio is indeed immortal. This proposal even seems to be a case of entertaining the soul’s very uncreatedness and consubstantiality with God. There are two reasons for this. First, Augustine is arguing that the ratio to which soul would be identical on this proposal is immortal on the grounds that mathematical rationes are true and unchangeable. This suggests that the ratio he is talking about, as well as the soul, are identical to uncreated and divine Ratio. Second, Augustine treats ratio as divine in the previous related passage (2.11.31) without an obvious switch in referent, and this has the same implication. It is true that the implications for the soul’s immortality are less clear on the second proposal, since the exhortation to flee “from the mortal to the immortal,” could be taken to suggest that the soul is something essentially mortal. But given how un-Platonic it would be for something to be able to change its essence from one thing to another (i.e. mortal to immortal), it is unlikely. Augustine, at any rate, does not seem to care to push the issue here. Those who are aware of the Soliloquies Project and its four ways, however, would recognize that this formulation is consistent with each of the four ways. Augustine would simply be saying that whatever precise relation that the human soul has to divine Ratio, its “thought” (cogitatio) or “intention” (intentio) ought to flee from the mortal to the immortal, that is, from mortal, bodily things to the immortal Ratio to which the soul is inseparably and possibly eternally conjoined. However this second proposal is to be cashed out, the very fact that the first proposal entertains the soul’s identity with immortal ratio forces us to the opposite conclusion as
Ayres about 2.11.31. Augustine is not firmly rejecting the uncreatedness of soul and its consubstantiality with God but entertaining them.

Ayres does not offer other passages or arguments for his view but refers us to Gerber’s *The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Writings* for a more comprehensive defence. I have answered all of Gerber’s objections to the uncreatedness of the soul in previous chapters, especially in Chapter 2 Section 5, so I submit that we can draw the first long awaited conclusion of the latter half of this chapter, namely, that Augustine did in fact entertain the uncreatedness of the human soul, i.e. soul, in the pre-baptismal writings. We have seen solid, extensive evidence in its favour and have found reasonable explanations for all objections. Gerber does, however, offer one strong piece of evidence against the soul’s consubstantiality with God that I flagged in Chapter 3, but did not properly answer. It is now time to do so to the extent that it is possible.

2.4 Evidence from Pre-Baptismal Writings and Evaluation of the Soul’s Consubstantiality with God

The strongest evidence against consubstantiality is not so much one passage as a group of passages that together imply that the soul could not be consubstantial with God. With these passages, Gerber poses a dilemma. In his *Soliloquies* prayer, Augustine clearly addresses the Trinity as “one eternal true substance” (una aeterna uera substantia).\(^{721}\) He speaks of it similarly in *On the Happy Life*, saying that the Trinity is one God (unum deum) and one substance (una substantia),\(^{722}\) and he makes it especially clear that there is no subordination or inequality involved.\(^{723}\) Then, Gerber says, if Augustine were as aware of pro-Nicene Christianity as these

\(^{721}\) sol. 1.1.4.14-19 “Quicquid a me dictum est, unus Deus tu, tu veni mihi in auxilium, una aeterna vera substantia, ubi nulla discrepantia, nulla confusio, nulla transitio, nulla indigentia, nulla mors, ubi summa concordia, summa evidentia, summa constantia, summa plenitudo, summa vita, ubi nihil deest, nihil redundat, ubi qui gignit et quem gignit unum est.”

\(^{722}\) beata u. 4.35.284-5 “Quae tria unum deum deum intellegentibus unamque substantiam exclusis uanitatibus uarie superstititionis ostendunt.”

\(^{723}\) The “Admonition” (admonitio), or Holy Spirit, for example, is nothing other than complete God (deum
passages seem to indicate, then he would have known that the very reason that the Trinity can be called one God without subordination or inequality is because it is one substance. “One substance,” after all, is simply a variant of the key expression “consubstantial” (homoousios) in the Nicene creed that is supposed to rule out subordination between Father and Son. Thus, Augustine would have known that if the SOUL were consubstantial with God, then it would have to be equal with God and even “one” with God.

But the Augustine of the Soliloquies Project explicitly seems to reject the SOUL’s equality with God. Later in On the Immortality of the Soul, he says,

But that which is better than the rational soul (rationali anima), everyone agrees (omnibus consentientibus) is God. He surely looks out for the soul and thus the soul cannot be compelled by him to be converted into body.\textsuperscript{724}

Thus, it would seem, Augustine could never have thought that the SOUL was consubstantial with God because here he tells us that God is better (melius) than it. One cannot say God is better or superior or unequal to the SOUL and consubstantial with it, since consubstantiality is precisely what makes something equal to something else. Therefore, he must already have rejected consubstantiality. Gerber recognizes that a possible way to escape the conclusion is to argue that this passage does not apply to the first two (or three) ways, since it occurs within the discussion of the fourth way only, where the SOUL is clearly inferior and distinct in substance. But then he explains that this would not fit with the phrase that “everyone agrees” that God is better than the SOUL, which would seem to generalize the doctrine to all four ways. Indeed, Gerber claims, this indicates that Augustine knew that the distinction between God and the SOUL was a “universal Christian belief” and therefore obligatory for him as well.\textsuperscript{725} The only way to escape this

\textsuperscript{724} imm. an. 13.22 “Quod autem rationali anima melius est, omnibus consentientibus deus est. Qui profecto consulit animae et ideo non ab eo cogi anima potest, ut convertatur in corpus.”

\textsuperscript{725} Gerber, Spirit (2012), 75.
dilemma is to embrace one of its unacceptable horns or acknowledge that Augustine could not have legitimately entertained that the SOUL was consubstantial with God the Trinity. This dilemma, in my view, is the most serious objection to any consubstantialist view.

How, then, am I to respond? My first response is to point out that a resolution to the question of consubstantiality is not necessary for defending my claim that Augustine held an “eternal, constitutive Forms” Platonic recollection view. I have sufficiently shown that Augustine had entertained and probably accepted the uncreatedness of SOUL and this is sufficient to allow Ratio or the Forms themselves to exist in the soul inseparably and eternally. We would simply be at a loss to explain what Augustine meant by considering that the SOUL is Ratio or that Ratio exists in the SOUL as in a subject, among other evidence. My second response is to say that while I cannot provide as satisfying a response to the consubstantiality objection as I would like, there is still a good case to be made not to submit to it just yet. I have several reasons for this, but the best is that the alternative explanation, that Augustine firmly rejected consubstantiality, fares even worse. Let us look at the most serious objections that Gerber bumps up against in order to provide a coherent argument that Augustine rejected the consubstantiality of the SOUL and God.

I begin with the two most immediate problems for Gerber and those who hold anti-consubstantialist views. We have already run across the first immediate problem. It is to explain what Augustine means when he lays out the basic options in On the Immortality of the Soul 6.11: either Ratio is in the SOUL as in a subject, or the SOUL is in Ratio as in a subject, or “each is a substance” (utraque substantia), since it seems that on the first two ways at least, the SOUL and Ratio are consubstantial. They seem to be consubstantial because on the first way, the SOUL is the one, common substance for both SOUL and Ratio, and on the second way, Ratio is the one, common substance for both SOUL and Ratio. What they are is different (Ratio is Ratio and the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{726} imm. an. 6.11.3-6. It is important to remember that “truth” (uereum) in the passage refers to \textit{Ratio}.}\]
SOUL is SOUL), but their substance is the same.\footnote{There is an ambiguity in the early Augustine about whether the “substance” of something refers to the substrate in which something might inseparably exists (as suggested here in \textit{imm. an.} 6.11 and in 10.17) or whether it refers to “what the thing is,” i.e. what is often called “nature” or “essence” (as is suggested in \textit{ord.} 2.17.46, \textit{an. quant.} 34.77, \textit{mor.} 1.13.23.6-10, and \textit{mor.} 1.12.20.10-18). This ambiguity usually is not a problem because substance and essence typically refer to the same thing, but it becomes a problem in cases like this where \textit{Ratio} and the SOUL presumably each have their own essences, and yet only one of them seems to be a substance. I think this ambiguity was Augustine’s own, especially in the pre-baptismal writings, as passages like \textit{imm. an.} 6.11 attest. Augustine’s pre-baptismal understanding of the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God, then, should not be assumed to be the same as the pro-Nicene understanding, where divine things that are consubstantial have the same “nature” (although there is evidence to suggests that he intended this too in some sense (cf. passages 1-4 with 5-10)). In any case, my claim that SOUL and \textit{Ratio} are consubstantial here for Augustine is simply following the implications of his terminology and is not meant to imply that it follows strict pro-Nicene usage. But this does not make his understanding about the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God any less heretical to his pro-Nicene contemporaries.} For those who think that \textit{Ratio} is one of the persons of the Trinity, as Gerber does (he thinks it’s the Son), this is a huge problem. Gerber does not address this passage, possibly because he takes the dilemma above and his defence of Augustine’s knowledge of Nicea as sufficient to explain it away as an anomaly. But this is unfair. The passage, as we have seen, is central not only to \textit{On the Immortality the Soul}, but also to the entire \textit{Soliloquies} Project. It lays out the basic possible responses to the question that Augustine thinks is the key to his project: “What is the relation between \textit{ratio} and the soul?” and thus is the most revealing part of the logical structure of his argument. It at least deserves an explanation.

The second most immediate problem is how to explain a central literary detail that seems all but to confirm consubstantiality. The \textit{Soliloquies} is a dialogue between \textit{Ratio} and Augustine, and yet it is called \textit{Soliloquies}, i.e. “speeches alone.” The \textit{Ratio} that is Augustine’s interlocutor, therefore, seems to be Augustine himself. Putting this together with the argumentative strategy indicated in \textit{On the Immortality of the Soul}, it seems that the interlocutor \textit{Ratio} is also supposed to be identical to the divine \textit{Ratio} to which the SOUL is inseparably conjoined (a \textit{Ratio} that Gerber acknowledge is one of the persons of the Trinity). Therefore, Augustine (and thus any human SOUL) is not only his interlocutor \textit{Ratio}, but also divine \textit{Ratio} in some sense, suggesting
that they are at least consubstantial. This, too, is something that Gerber does not address and is regularly downplayed. And yet it is not an isolated detail from a digression at the end of On the Immortality of the Soul; it is front and centre. To these two immediate problems, we could add all of our other evidence from Cicero and Plotinus and from Augustine’s abrupt and explicit rejections of consubstantiality in the post-baptismal works.

In the face of these two immediate problems, what options does Gerber have? It might seem that the obvious alternative is to deny that the Ratio existing in the SOUL is God in any sense. For if it is not, then to say that “Ratio exists in the SOUL as its substance” or that “Augustine and the Ratio he is speaking with are identical” does not imply consubstantiality with God. But Gerber does not adopt this view for good reason, namely, because it is then too difficult to explain what Ratio is. Those who accept such a view have only two options. They either have to say that Ratio is an intermediate entity between the SOUL and God, or else that it is something constitutive in the SOUL only. The first option is completely unacceptable. As we have seen, Augustine tells us as early as On the Happy Life that of all things the SOUL is “nearest to God,”728 and he never wavers from this opinion.729 He also regularly makes it clear that neither angels nor any other spirits can ever mediate between the SOUL and God.730 Therefore, there can be nothing intermediate. The second option, that immortal Ratio is something constitutive in the SOUL distinct from God, is more plausible, but it still comes with severe difficulties. First, one then has to say that the SOUL itself is unchangeable, and so those who want to deny consubstantiality might find themselves getting them into the very problem they were trying to get out of. Second, even if one is willing to grant that the SOUL is unchangeable (without being consubstantial with

728 See beata u. 1.4 “Animaduerti enim et saepe in sacerdotis nostri et aliquiduo in sermonibus tuis, cum de deo cogitaretur, nihil omnino corporis esse cogitandum, neque cum de anima; nam id est unum in rebus proximum deo.”
729 e.g. uera rel. 55.110, an. quant. 34.77, ciu. 11.26; cf. Enn. 5.1.6.49-50 “...there is nothing between soul and Intellect.”
730 e.g. conf. 10.42.67, ciu. 10.27, 10.32.
God), as I have argued is possible on the third way, then one confronts the evidence that suggests that Ratio really is God that I outlined in Chapter 3. Gerber agrees with me, saying that the divinity of Ratio existing in the soul, “is especially warranted by the fact that Augustine construes not just ratio, but Truth itself in this way. For example the proofs of Soliloquies II call upon Truth itself in the soul and Epistle 3.4 speaks forthrightly about Truth being in the soul in such a way that it would die if its host died!”\(^{731}\) In other words, we must admit that the Ratio in the soul is divine \textit{a fortiori} because we are compelled to admit that the Truth in the soul, which must be the second person of the Trinity, is also divine.

It is for these sorts of reasons that Gerber rejects this alternative and adopts the other. He admits that the Ratio existing in the soul as in a subject is God on the first way, but denies that it implies consubstantiality. In his case he takes Ratio to be the second person of the Trinity, and so equivalent to the Truth (whereas I take Ratio to be the Holy Spirit), but which person it is is irrelevant to the point at hand.\(^{732}\) On the basis of these claims, we can see that his interpretation runs into the two immediate problems articulated earlier (Ratio existing in the soul as in a subject, and Soliloquies as “speeches alone”), which Gerber does not address. But even granting that these can be explained away, his view faces a massive problem. The problem is to explain how it is that Augustine could have entertained that the soul is ratio (Ratio?) without entertaining that soul is consubstantial with God.\(^{733}\) Gerber is aware of the passages that do this (On the Immortality of the Soul 2.2 and On Order 2.18.48) and is forced to contend that ratio in these cases only refers to human ratio, not divine Ratio. But this, I submit, is impossible for both passages.

In On Order 2.18.48, the reason is quite straightforward. There, Augustine specifies that

\(^{732}\) Ibid.
\(^{733}\) Ibid.
the ratio that may be identical to the SOUL may also be identical to numerus (number), which Gerber himself believes is a name for the Son of God, as I do.\footnote{ord. 2.18.48.21-25 “The soul (anima), therefore, holding this order and now handed over to philosophy, first inspects itself, and, now that education has persuaded it that ratio is either itself or its own, and that either there is nothing better or more powerful in ratio than numbers, or that ratio is nothing else than number, it will speak to itself thus: ...” (Foley trans., slightly modified; my emphasis) (Hunc igitur ordinem tenens anima iam philosophiae tradita primo se ipsum inspicit et, cui iam illa eruditio persuasit aut suam aut se ipsum esse rationem, in ratione autem aut nihil esse melius et potentius numeris aut nihil aliud quam numerum esse rationem. ita secum loquetur:...). Gerber does not explicitly say that numerus is the Son of God in this precise passage, but he provides an extensive defence of the regular identification of numerus and the Son in De ordine (including just before in ord. 2.18.47) and for this time period generally (Gerber, Spirit (2012), 50-54). One might think that this passage conflicts with my claim that divine ratio refers to the Holy Spirit and numerus to the Son, since Augustine entertains their identification. I would argue, however, that the passage rather supports it. If ratio were simply another name for the Son, then Augustine would not entertain the possibility that ratio is not identical to numerus here, as he does. My suspicion, in fact, is that when Augustine entertains both the non-identity and identity of these sort of intelligible realities, he means precisely to affirm both assertions at the same time. This fits nicely with the idea that ratio is the Holy Spirit and numerus the Son, since there is a paradoxical sense in which the Trinitarian persons are not identical and also are. Analogously and more controversially, I suspect that Augustine intends the same for the relation between the SOUL and divine Ratio. That is, the disjunction about whether they are non-identical or identical may be meant to assert that both are true rather than that it has to be one or the other, as would fit nicely with the generic sense of consubstantiality found in Plotinus.} Since numerus is divine, therefore, then the ratio identical to the SOUL (and thus the SOUL itself) must be divine as well.

The only way to avoid the unwanted conclusion about this passage is to say that numerus does not refer to the divine numerus, since one cannot avoid it by saying that the passage is speaking of two different rationes (one human and one divine). This is unlikely, however, because the context suggests that Augustine is not speaking of the numerus in lower things, but the numerus “in the supreme law and the supreme order of all things” that he distinguished only a few lines earlier,\footnote{ord. 2.18.47.6-9 “Si et hoc infinitum est, tantum perfecte sciat, quid sit unum in numeris quantumque ualeat nondum in illa summa lege summoque ordine rerum omnium, sed in his, quae cotidie passim sentimus atque agimus.”} and there is no question that this numerus is divine.

The reason in On the Immortality of the Soul 2.2 is roughly the same, but is a little more difficult to see. Let me explain with reference to an abbreviated reconstruction of the argument from Chapter 3. I remind the reader that square brackets refer to my own additions based on what the logic of the argument seems to require. The round brackets I use to indicate the premises
used to draw the conclusions and the curly brackets contain explicit material from the text that supports a given premise. I also leave ratio lower-case so as not to prejudice the question and the bold is for emphasis.

Argument of imm. an. 2.2 for the Immortality of the SOUL
1. [Our] ratio either (a) is [our] SOUL or (b) exists in [our] SOUL [inseparably as in a subject].
2. Our ratio exists. \( \text{a fortiori, since it is better than our body, which exists} \)
3. [Our] ratio exists as unchangeable. \{since 2 and 4 is always 6, etc., which is an unchangeable ratio.\}
4. Therefore, in case (a), [our] SOUL exists as unchangeable. (1(a), 3)
5. Something existing as unchangeable cannot exist inseparably (inseparabiliter) in a subject that changes.
6. Therefore, in case (b), [our] SOUL also exists as unchangeable. (1(b), 3, 5)
7. Death cannot happen to unchangeable things.
8. Therefore, whether (a) or (b) is the case, then the human SOUL [i.e. our SOUL] always lives. (4, 6, 7)

As I argued in Chapter 3, it is important to note that the argument should not be taken as beginning with the assumption that “divine Ratio” either is the SOUL or exist in it inseparably, but rather with the less controversial assumption that our human ratio either is our SOUL or is in our SOUL inseparably. That is the reason I provide the “our” in square brackets. This fits well with Gerber’s interpretation initially, but it does not fit well for long. As I argued in Chapter 3, the fact that Augustine goes on to argue that this human ratio “exists as unchangeable,” shows that he is identifying human ratio with divine Ratio. This is especially likely because concluding that this ratio “exists as unchangeable” is because 2 and 4 is always 6, a ratio that seems to be one of the eternal and divine Forms that make up the divine Ratio.

I do not see a reasonable way for Gerber to escape this problem. One option would seem to be to hold that line 3 refers only to divine Ratio and not “our” ratio. But then the argument would clearly be invalid, since there would be no reason to infer that our SOUL is unchangeable and thus always lives. The same problem arises if we hold that ratio in case (a) merely refers to human ratio throughout and that ratio in case (b) refers to divine Ratio throughout, as Gerber’s
view ends up doing *de facto*. In both cases, it would obviously be invalid to infer that our SOUL is unchangeable and therefore always lives. So there is no way out of the problem outside of resorting to arguing that Augustine could have made an unusually elementary mistake in logic. No doubt he is capable of making logical mistakes, but surely not mistakes this obvious. This bullet will have to be bitten by any anti-consubstantialist who takes Ratio to be divine.

Those who wish to deny that Augustine entertains the consubstantiality of the SOUL with God, therefore, have some difficult problems with which to deal. Those who accept that the ratio that exists in the SOUL as in a subject is divine Ratio will have problems with *On the Immortality of the Soul* 6.11, which suggests that even then they are not distinct substances, with the title of the *Soliloquies* itself, which suggests that the SOUL might be this very divine Ratio, and with *On the Immortality of the Soul* 2.2, which entertains the possibility that human ratio is divine Ratio. Those who deny that the ratio that exists in the SOUL as in a subject is divine Ratio will have either the problem of explaining how there could be an intermediate entity between the SOUL and God or how the divine Truth itself seems to exist in the SOUL as in a subject on the first way. All of this is also in addition to the other evidence I have discussed for consubstantiality from the pre-baptismal writings, the post-baptismal writings, and the other writings that influenced Augustine.

In the end, I think this evidence for consubstantiality is stronger than the evidence against it, and so there must be some way out of the dilemma Gerber poses. But how? There are three main possibilities. One can either accept that the SOUL is equal to God for Augustine, or one can deny that the SOUL’s consubstantiality necessarily implies equality, or one can claim that Augustine had not resolved the dilemma in his mind. The first possibility is not as crazy as it

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This is Gerber’s *de facto* view because he acknowledges that the ratio that exists in the SOUL as in a subject is divine *Ratio* while also holding that whenever Augustine posits that ratio is the SOUL, then he is merely referring to human ratio (*Spirit* (2012), 101-2).
sounds. The only time that Augustine explicitly affirms that God “is better” (melius est) than the soul in the pre-baptismal writings is in the passage from *On the Immortality of the Soul* that Gerber cites, “But that which is better than the rational soul (rationali anima), everyone agrees (omnibus consentientibus) is God,” and this passage could have another explanation. The explanation would be that the phrase “everyone agrees” is merely intended to defend the idea that God alone (and nothing else) is better than the rational soul on the fourth way, rather than the idea that God is better than the rational soul on all four ways. That is, it may not be intended to universalize the sentiment but to exclusivize it (always within the context of the fourth way), against those who might think that something other than God could also be better than the soul.

This possibility also fits nicely with the idea that the soul is Ratio in *On Order* and on the first way. Given that Ratio is the Holy Spirit, this would be entertaining the possibility that the soul is equal to God because there is no doubt that he thinks that the Holy Spirit is equal to the other persons of the Trinity.

But this first possibility does have its problems. As part of the basic problem of how Augustine could think that Nicene Christianity could allow for it, one could ask how God could be a Trinity rather than a Quadrinity, since the soul would seem to become another member of the Trinity (unless the soul is simply the Holy Spirit, Ratio itself). Another problem is that Augustine surely would have recognized that he was disagreeing with Plotinus who clearly says that the divine Intellect is better than the soul, and he surely would also have known that Christian doctrine did not require him to disagree with Plotinus in this way. It is one thing to disagree with Plotinus by positing an equality between the One and the Intellect, knowing that it

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737 *imm. an.* 13.19. The closest Augustine gets to another explicit mention is in *sol.* 1.1.4, where he says that all things serve (serviunt omnia) God and that every good soul obeys (obtemperat omnis bona anima) God, which one could take to be an indication of the soul’s inferiority. He says something similar to 13.19 in *imm. an.* 12.19, that the highest essence which is the Truth is more excellent (praestantior) than the soul, but in this case there is no indication that the claim applies beyond the fourth way.

738 As is clear from *beata u.* 4.34-5, *ord.* 2.15.16 and *sol.* 1.1.3-4.
is required by Nicene Christianity; it is another thing to disagree with Plotinus by positing an equality between Intellect and the SOUL, knowing that it is not required by Nicene Christianity but merely by a unique attempt to reconcile Plotinus and Christianity. Another problem is that Augustine’s On the Immortality of the Soul statement that everyone agrees that God “is better” (melius est) than the rational soul sounds suspiciously similar to Plotinus’ statement in Enn. 5.1 that “[Intellect] is better (kreitton) than soul...”, possibly directly inspired by it. That it was a direct inspiration is not only supported by the fact that this is one of the few Plotinian treatises that scholars universally agree that the pre-baptismal Augustine had read, but also by the fact that Plotinus only applies the term kreetton this straightforwardly to a comparison of Intellect and soul in one other passage in the entire Enneads (in 5.9.4.2-3), a passage that most scholars do not think Augustine had read. These observations, then, speak in favour of taking the “everyone agrees” universally, as intended to include even Plotinus, rather than exclusively.

Given these problems with the first possibility, we may be able to choose the second possibility: deny that the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God necessarily implies equality with the Trinity. But how? The most plausible explanation seems to be that Augustine roughly follows Plotinus: distinguish between a generic consubstantiality with God and a specific consubstantiality and say that the SOUL is only consubstantial in the generic sense. This allows Augustine to maintain that the SOUL is consubstantial with God without making it equal to God’s specific substance. If this really is Augustine’s solution, then his pre-baptismal understanding of Plotinus would be more accurate than is commonly thought.

This possibility is attractive and I tentatively prefer it to the former. I especially like it

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739 Enn. 5.1.3.24-5. Including context, the sentence is, “οἷον δὲ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ταύτῳ μὲν τούτῳ δήλον, ὅτι κρεῖττον ψυχῆς τινάσαε οὐσίας.”
740 Enn. 5.9.4.2-3 “ἥ πρῶτον μὲν νοὸς ψυχῆς ἐτέρων καὶ κρεῖττον.” Note that there are also only a handful of less straightforward expressions, all appearing in the same discussion in Enn. 3.5.8-9 (3.5.8.11-13, 3.5.9.6-7, 40-2).
because it makes sense of why Augustine speaks of the Truth as “the highest (summa) essence” on the fourth way, seemingly recognizing that there could be an inferior, but still consubstantial uncreated “essence” or “substance” on the other ways. It also fits well with my suspicions that Augustine had read *Enn.* 5.9 by this time, which is a treatise that contains some significant textual parallels to *On the Immortality of the Soul.* But it also has problems. The main problem is explaining why Augustine would have argued that not only *Ratio* but also the Truth itself has to exist somewhere (*alicubi*), and thus in the *Soul.* This suggests that the *Soul* is God’s very substance (being his subject) and seems to do away with any notion that God has his own separate, superior substance. Put in another way, it seems to understand the “knowledge” or “disciplina” that exists in the *Soul* as being identical to the divine intelligibles themselves in the strongest sense, and not merely identical to them in the sense that they exist in the *Soul* “in a different mode,” as Plotinus says in 5.9. Yet another problem is explaining how Augustine could have entertained the possibility that the *Soul* outright *is Ratio,* if he were not willing to think of the *Soul* as being equal with God.

Given these problems, I ultimately prefer a combination of the second possibility with the third. Taken by itself, the third holds that Augustine had yet not resolved the dilemma in his own mind, and so was stronger towards neither of the first two possibilities. This third possibility can also be combined with one of the other two by weakening their claims, as I think should be done with the second. My suspicion, in other words, is that Augustine wanted to believe that the *Soul* is consubstantial with and inferior to God and yet he had not worked out how (or whether) this was possible to his own satisfaction. He felt convinced that the *Soul* was consubstantial with God in some sense in order to satisfy the weak claim of the Identity Principle of Knowledge, and

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742 Though perhaps in saying that either the *Soul* *is Ratio* or it is not, he precisely means to imply that the *Soul* “is” *Ratio* in the generic sense, but “is not” *Ratio* in the specific sense, as I suggest in a note above.
he also figured he had to believe that the soul was inferior to God, for Christian, Plotinian, and his own reasons. On top of this, he also felt compelled to argue for the immortality of the soul on the grounds that God can only exist in the soul as in a subject, which he thought was Plotinus’ argument in *Enn.* 4.7. Yet he had not yet worked out how to reconcile these 2-3 competing claims. The inconsistencies that we are encountering in Augustine’s argument, therefore, could be the very inconsistencies that Augustine himself was discovering and wrestling with in writing *On the Immortality of the Soul*. I spent a lot of time defending the coherence of Augustine’s *Soliloquies* Project in Chapter 3, and it is precisely at this point where I think it is reasonable to say that it breaks down. The agenda was coherent on all three of the above fronts until he tried to reconcile them with each other in detail.

We are now ready to draw the conclusion of this section. Despite a lingering puzzle, the evidence appears strong enough to show that Augustine entertained the possibility that the soul is consubstantial with God throughout the pre-baptismal writings, just as our interpretation of the *Soliloquies* Project suggested. No evidence was strong enough to show that Augustine had rejected consubstantiality, whether from Augustine’s own writings before and after his baptism or from other writings he may have read, and many of these sources seemed precisely to affirm it. Therefore, when we factor in the evidence from *Letter* 3.2 that Augustine accepted his *Soliloquies* immortality argument, which we know is a version of First-Way Platonic Recollection, we can further conclude that the pre-baptismal Augustine (provisionally) accepted the soul’s consubstantiality with God along with accepting its uncreatedness. I think we are compelled to accept this conclusion, despite the incomplete explanation for how to answer Gerber’s objection and despite its highly controversial nature.

**Conclusion**

My defence of the idea that Augustine accepted First-Way Platonic Recollection in the
pre-baptismal works is complete. In this chapter, I confirmed that he very plausibly accepted category 2 and 3 doctrines throughout the pre-baptismal works and I showed that his acceptance of category 4 was only slightly less plausible. To state it another way, I showed that the pre-baptismal Augustine accepted an “eternal, constitutive Forms” Platonic recollection view (effectively categories 2-3) with the added doctrine that the soul is consubstantial with God (category 4). I have also shown that Augustine was very inspired by Plotinus’ Identity Principle of Knowledge to accept all category 2, 3, and 4 doctrines.

The evidence from this chapter suggests an additional controversial conclusion. It is a conclusion that in one sense pertains to second-category claims and in another sense defies categorization. In On Genesis Against the Manichees 2.8.11 (388/9) after his baptism, Augustine first argues that scripture rules out saying that the human soul (anima) is the nature of God (natura dei sit anima). Then he argues that scripture rules out saying that the “rational power” (potentia rationalis) of the soul is the nature of God, in case people might think that the soul is made but the rational power of the soul is not made. Whoever these second people are, it is striking that Augustine recognizes the possibility of affirming that the human soul is made and that the human rational power, i.e. human ratio, is not. Indeed, it sounds suspiciously like the fourth way. Could this be the very view that Augustine himself entertained on the fourth way (and entertained mutatis mutandis on the third way), in addition to entertaining the soul’s consubstantiality with God on the first two ways?

I think it is very plausible for several reasons. First, as I argued when talking about the second category, Augustine seems to believe that innate knowledge is the Forms for all of the ways under consideration, not simply the first two or three ways. This suggests that the soul’s ratio is identical to divine Ratio for each of the four ways as well, whatever the precise nature of soul, and thus even for the fourth way, where it is counterintuitive. Second, the view fits well
with how easily Augustine argues that human ratio has to be unchangeable or immortal (both in ord. and imm. an.) on the grounds that mathematical rationes are also unchangeable and immortal. For this suggests that human ratio and mathematical rationes (and therefore divine Ratio) are identical regardless of the way under consideration. One could object that this argument only applies to the first two ways because of where it appears in On the Immortality of the Soul, but since we see the argument in On Order in a place where it seemingly applies to human ratio regardless of the soul’s status, the objection loses some force. Third, we have seen that Augustine seems to be inspired by Plotinus’ Identity Principle of Knowledge, which applies first and foremost to the knowledge/disciplina/science within the soul and not the soul itself. This suggests that Augustine would have been most committed to the identity of human ratio with divine Ratio (i.e. knowledge with its object), since this identity is clearly required for preserving genuine knowledge for Plotinus, and Augustine need not have been as insistent about the precise nature of the soul itself where the required degree of identity/likeness is more ambiguous. Fourth, we now know that Augustine’s post-baptismal rejections of the soul’s consubstantiality with God likely were signs that Augustine had earlier entertained that doctrine, and so we have a precedent for supposing that his post-baptismal rejections of a consubstantial ratio within a created soul are also signs that he had earlier entertained that doctrine. All four of these reasons together offer a strong case. The pre-baptismal Augustine seems to have held that human ratio is identical to divine Ratio (and therefore consubstantial with it) regardless of the way under consideration, including the fourth way where the soul is created. When the stars align like this, the observant reader of Augustine ought to pay attention.

In Confessions 9.4.7, Augustine indicates that his Cassiciacum writings were “already serving [God] but still exhaled the school of pride as though it were its last gasp.”

743 conf. 9.4.7 “The literature that I produced there, which indeed was already serving you but still exhaled
Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life right after his baptism, he warns that any SOUL that thinks that it is “of the same nature” (*eiusdem se naturae*) as God on account of being an intelligible thing, “would fall by pride from the one to whom it ought to be joined by love.”\(^{744}\) We now have a much more thorough idea to what in the pre-baptismal writings (and to whom) the *Confessions* criticism is referring.

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\(^{744}\) mor. 1.12.20 (Teske trans., slightly modified).
Conclusion

In this study, I argued that Augustine provisionally accepted Platonic recollection in his early, pre-baptismal writings. Put most generally, that is to say that he believed the first-category claims that learning is recollecting innate knowledge and that the objects of that knowledge had to be consciously experienced in a previous existence. Augustine did not even seem to have entertained an alternative to this view. While scholars like O’Daly and Gilson think that he was already developing his mature illumination theory of learning, Augustine’s references to illumination were compatible with Platonic recollection and seemed intended that way. Moreover, when Augustine considered four different ways in which the SOUL might be conjoined to *Ratio* to prove the SOUL’s immortality, Platonic recollection reasoning was central to the argument on each way, including on the fourth and most seemingly Christian way.

I also argued that Augustine accepted “First-Way Platonic Recollection.” This was at least an “eternal, constitutive Forms” view, I argued, meaning that he accepted that the innate knowledge in the SOUL is the Forms themselves (including God) and that the SOUL is eternal and uncreated. I also showed that Augustine included other second- and third-category claims\(^\text{745}\) as well as the fourth-category claim that the SOUL is consubstantial with God. That he accepted this last claim was not entirely certain, but seemed most plausible given the evidence. Gerber and Ayres had contended that Augustine rejected both the third- and fourth-category claims (Gerber mostly agreed with me about the second-category claims), but I showed that Augustine entertained and likely accepted them.

I concluded by suggesting that the pre-baptismal Augustine accepted a further

\(^{745}\) Second-category claims are that the SOUL (and indeed any soul) is omnipresent and united with all souls (including the World Soul), that innate knowledge is the Forms within the SOUL, and that the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms. Third-category claims are that the SOUL exists by means of itself and that it is eternal, uncreated, and unchangeable in substance.
controversial doctrine that does not fit well with my categorization. This was the doctrine that the human mind or reason (ratio) was identical to divine Reason (Ratio) regardless of the way under consideration. In other words, he seems to have accepted that whether the human soul was created or not, its mind or reason was not created and was in fact consubstantial and identical with God. This is technically a second-category claim, belonging as it does to all four ways, but unlike the other doctrines in this category, it is much more controversial and does not continue after Augustine’s baptism. It is also a second-category claim that Gerber would not accept.

As part of my argument, I was able to uncover some key arguments and principles behind Augustine’s acceptance of these doctrines. For the Innate Knowledge Feature of Platonic recollection, I found that Augustine confidently employed a deficiency argument along the lines of Plato’s Phaedo. Included in this argument was the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle, which states that the cognition of an original is prior to cognizing that something is its deficient likeness or image. I found that this argument and its key principle appeared in Augustine’s earliest Cassiciacum writings and continued at least until On True Religion in 390/1, supporting the claim that he accepted innate knowledge throughout this time. I did not find many other explicit Platonic arguments for innate knowledge, but the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known argument made an explicit appearance in his post-baptismal writings (in On Music), which could suggest that he already had it in mind in the pre-baptismal writings. The Targeting and Recognition Arguments did not make an explicit appearance at all, nor did the Language Capacity argument. The former argument, however, could be implied by one of Augustine’s arguments in On the Immortality of the Soul (1.1) and the latter could be implied by Augustine’s understanding of language in On the Teacher.746 As for the Preexistence Requirement Feature, I

746 In imm. an. 1.1, Augustine argues (as I argued in Chapter 4) that the SOUL cannot acquire knowledge of disciplina without already having knowledge of disciplina. His reason seems to be that otherwise the knowledge would not be certain (certa), and this suggests that he is appealing to the targeting and/or
found limited, but compelling evidence that Augustine accepted its central Past-Conscious-Experience Principle (that innate knowledge requires a past conscious experience of its objects), which is the idea that provides the main impetus for believing that the recollecting SOUL must preexist this life. In the most immediate post-baptismal writings, this principle appeared in the form of a Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle (anything stored in memory must have previously been consciously experienced), but in the pre-baptismal writings this did not seem to be the case. The innate knowledge in the SOUL still required a past conscious experience in those works, but the knowledge itself (which is the Forms themselves) did not technically exist in memory. These were the key arguments and principles behind Augustine’s acceptance of Platonic recollection in general.

Behind the extended and often controversial doctrines of First-Way Platonic Recollection, I found that there was one especially key principle: Plotinus’ Identity Principle of Knowledge. The strong and most essential claim of this principle is that knowledge must be identical to its object. This idea seemed to lead the pre-baptismal Augustine to believe that the SOUL’s innate knowledge is the Forms themselves and that the SOUL is always experiencing the Forms. It also seemed to lead him to believe that human ratio is identical with divine Ratio regardless of whether the SOUL was created or not. The weaker and derivative claim of this principle applied to the subject of knowledge, the knower, entailing that it must be sufficiently recognition arguments. In mag., Augustine argues that we cannot acquire knowledge (notitia) of a word (or any other sign) unless we have already experienced (“looked at” (aspeximus)) the thing it signifies (mag. 10.34). In the case of learning words signifying sensible things, Augustine clearly thinks the experience occurs at some time in this life, but in the case of learning words signifying intelligible things he is not as clear. He certainly thinks that we may consciously experience intelligible things at some time in this life, but one could argue that learning words for these things does not most fundamentally depend on this but upon a continual unconscious experience of intelligible things, something I have argued he already believes. Indeed, this is exactly what the Deficiency Argument, which we know that he accepts at this time, suggests. When all is said and done, the idea would be that in order even to learn words for intelligible things (e.g. “is” and “one”) enough to combine them rightly with words for sensible things, as we do when we are young children, we must already be continually (and unconsciously) experiencing the very intelligible things themselves. An upshot of this would be that the Language Capacity Argument would not be a separate argument from the Deficiency Argument.
like its objects if it is to have knowledge of them. This almost certainly was a reason that the pre-baptismal Augustine entertained and possibly accepted that souls are uncreated and consubstantial with God and it also seemed to be a reason that he accepted that all human souls are omnipresent and one with all souls. The centrality of this principle to Augustine’s pre-baptismal writings also showed that Augustine was conscious of the principle and that he was very likely inspired to hold it from reading Plotinus. He did not insist that it holds as strictly as Plotinus, but it continued to exert influence on his thought to some degree even after he rejected the soul’s uncreatedness and consubstantiality with God in post-baptismal writings.

Many of these findings are surprising. The ideas that Augustine held that the human soul is uncreated and consubstantial with God are particularly so given his obvious commitment to Christianity and the strength of his later denunciations. But the evidence is there, as I believe my method made clear. Given how much the method rooted my argument in Augustine’s pre-baptismal writings and on the writings immediately following them, readers should not be afraid to trust their own eyes about what it revealed.

From these findings, I attempt some broader conclusions. Scholars generally treat Platonic recollection as a doctrine that was relatively peripheral to Augustine’s project in these early writings. This is not only implied by scholars like O’Daly, who think that Augustine rejected it or was neutral about it, but also by scholars like Gilson and Rombs, who think that Augustine was committed to it without making it prominent. This study shows the contrary. Far from being peripheral, Platonic recollection and the reasoning connected to it were central, if not essential to the logical structure of Augustine’s early project. The doctrine itself seemed to be assumed in Augustine’s account of how to turn towards God and attain the happy life, and the reasoning connected to it was, first, behind his refutation of the skeptics (especially the Deficiency Argument), second, behind his argument for the existence of the Forms and God in
the first place (via the Deficiency Argument), third, behind his argument for the immortality of
the SOUL, and fourth, behind his many other conclusions about the nature of the SOUL, from its
incorporeality to its consubstantiality with God. If that does not make it central, I do not know
what does. A related misconception can be found in scholars like Van Fleteren who speak of On
the Immortality of the Soul or the pre-baptismal writings in general as lacking unity or a coherent
logical structure. According to these scholars, the early Augustine was experimenting and had
not settled on a consistent and nuanced way of looking at things beyond some basic
fundamentals. This sells the early Augustine short. While there certainly was a degree to which
Augustine was experimenting and non-committal in his views, his pre-baptismal writings had a
remarkably coherent logical structure and his views were surprisingly settled. His exaggerated
attempts to explain that neither the SOUL nor its mind were consubstantial with God in the
immediate post-baptismal writings attest to this fact. His sudden protestations make little sense if
nothing had previously been at stake.

Given the centrality of Platonic recollection and connected reasoning to the logical
structure of the pre-baptismal writings, one might dare to isolate the claims on which the whole
edifice depends. I speculate that it depends on two factual observations and two a priori
intuitions about the nature of knowledge. The factual observations are: (1) We can consciously
know some eternal truths and (2) We can make correct judgments about sensible things, as we do
when we call them equal, one, true, beautiful, or say that they lack these things. Appropriately
enough, both of these observations are evident in Augustine’s very first work, Against the
Academicians.747 The two intuitions are the two necessary conditions for knowledge that can also
be found in Plato’s Theaetetus:748 (A) Knowledge must be of being, and (B) Knowledge must be

747 The first can be found in Acad. 3.9.18-3.13.29 and the second is implied in 2.7.16-2.8.20, 3.16.35,
3.17.37, as well as in ord. 2.14.39ff.
748 At 152c5-6, Socrates has Theaetetus agree that if sense-perception is knowledge, “then sense-
infallible. For the first condition, Augustine will tend to say that knowledge must be of what is *uerum* and not *falsum*\(^{749}\) but we know that he means this in a metaphysical sense that includes “being.”\(^{750}\) The second condition is suggested by evidence discussed in the previous chapter, including the passage in *Against the Academicians* saying that the one who knows cannot err (*errare*) or be mistaken (*falli*).\(^{751}\)

The second intuition in particular seems to me to be key to the chain of inferences, since it is the doctrine that most plausibly is behind Augustine’s highly significant and consequential contention that deficient likenesses cannot suffice as knowledge. Deficiency reasonably opens the door to error, and so anything that counts as knowledge reasonably could not have any deficiency. This prohibition of deficiency then evidently motivates Augustine’s central and often controversial epistemological principles. It certainly motivates the Identity Principle of Knowledge, as we saw, and it also is a key factor motivating the Deficient Likeness Cognition Principle and Past-Conscious-Experience Principles (the latter because it is a reason why innate knowledge would have to come from conscious experiences of the things themselves to be knowledge). One could make the case that this prohibition of deficiency does not have to entail all of these principles, particularly the Identity Principle of Knowledge, but in the pre-baptismal Augustine’s case, it seems to be the exactly what it does.

The logical structure behind Augustine’s Platonic recollection commitments, then, is relatively straightforward. Granting the two factual observations, both intuitions about knowledge are key for inferring the Innate Knowledge Feature and the Preexistence Requirement perception is always of what is and being knowledge, it is infallible.” (αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἀγενόθες ὡς ἐπιστήμη ὁδός.) This tells us that these are two necessary conditions for knowledge. For a defence of this interpretation and further discussion, including a defence of the claim that the two conditions are jointly sufficient for Plato, see Gerson, *Knowing Persons* (2003), 197ff.

\(^{749}\) *sol.* 2.11.20, *Acad.* 3.3.5.8-10

\(^{750}\) See especially *imm. an.* 12.19.

\(^{751}\) *Acad.* 1.7.19
Feature (category 1 doctrines). The second intuition is then especially key for inferring the many controversial doctrines in categories 2-4, including the identity of the SOUL’s innate knowledge with the Forms (and thus of the identity of the SOUL’s ratio and divine Ratio) and the elevated nature of the soul to the point of consubstantiality with God. There would be other considerations involved in this chain of inferences, and there would be distinct arguments for some of the conclusions, but the centrality of the two intuitions, especially the second, I believe is evident. The second intuition may also be motivating innate knowledge in additional ways if the pre-baptismal Augustine already accepts the other arguments for innate knowledge, particularly the Targeting and Recognition Arguments. Thus, I think that it makes excellent sense to say that these four claims are foundational to Augustine’s Platonic recollection view and the logical structure in the pre-baptismal works generally.

I also draw some conclusions about the works that influenced Augustine, though more research will have to be done. From the fact that Augustine was not aware of logos terminology for the Son of God in the pre-baptismal works (or at least did not take it seriously), we can hypothesize that he had not read any Christian work of note that features logos terminology for the Son of God. I suggested that this ruled out Victorinus’ Against Arius and Ambrose’s On Faith, but it will also rule out many other works, including Ambrose’s On Isaac or the Soul and likely the Prologue of John itself. In the Soliloquies, Augustine does say that he had read some Ambrosian works, but the text suggests that these were only moral writings, not doctrinal ones, and this fits with the principle. As for non-Christian Neoplatonist writings, there is little that I have proven for sure aside from demonstrating more clearly than before that Augustine had read Ennead 4.7 prior to his conversion. In addition to this, however, I posit a general consideration that should be included as a factor against Augustine having read particular Plotinian treatises. Since the pre-baptismal Augustine thinks that Plotinus thought that the divine Intellect could
only exist within the soul, we should be able to rule out treatises where Plotinus makes it clear that this is not the case. I remain at a loss, however, of how to understand the guideline more precisely and how to apply it concretely to treatises that scholars believe Augustine had read. It could rule out a treatise like *Ennead* 6.9,\(^752\) where Plotinus quite explicitly distinguishes between Intellect as it exists in soul and Intellect itself, and it may rule out other treatises emphasizing the distinctions between the divine hypostases, perhaps even including *Ennead* 5.1.\(^753\) But this also could be taking it too far, since the way that Augustine understands the soul’s consubstantiality with God is unclear and may be able to accommodate these texts in the end. The guideline is at least something to keep in mind as one considers such questions.

Some of the trickier conclusions to draw concern the fickle question about the relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity for the recent convert. As I mentioned in the Introduction, since Pierre Courcelle’s study of the *Confessions* in 1950, scholars have generally accepted that the question is not about whether Augustine’s conversion was to Neoplatonism or Christianity, but rather which of the two traditions received more focus or emphasis, given that he converted to both. Taken in these terms, the upshot of this study is clear enough. Augustine’s emphasis on Neoplatonism at his conversion in 386 was much stronger than commonly recognized. This is already evident from the fact that he was not neutral about Platonic recollection in general, but rather accepted it and seemingly had not even begun to conceive of his later non-Platonic recollection alternative. The emphasis is especially evident, however, given my contention that he accepted First-Way Platonic Recollection with all of its

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\(^752\) For evidence that Augustine had read *Enn.* 6.9 before his conversion, see Solignac, “Réminiscences” (1936): 462-463.

\(^753\) The evidence that scholars have offered in favour of Augustine reading this text prior to his conversion is extensive, but it is not as convincing as one would expect. See Henry, *Plotin et l’Occident* (1934), 127-132, 143-4; Courcelle, *Late Latin Writers* (1969), 174-6; Du Roy, *L’intelligence* (1966),123, 157, 160; and O’Connell, *Early Theory* (1968), 177-9. The evidence does show that if he had not read it pre-baptism, he certainly had read it post-baptism.
controversial and sometimes heretical doctrines and Plotinian principles. These show not only a strong emphasis on Neoplatonism, but also a lack of emphasis on Christianity, since the heretical doctrines place his views outside of Christian orthodoxy at the time altogether.

Given these observations, one might reasonably ask whether Augustine’s Christian conversion in 386, sometimes called his “moral conversion” in contrast with his “intellectual conversion,” still fits within Courcelle’s framework. Courcelle claims that Augustine’s conversion was to both Neoplatonism and Christianity. But it would seem that Augustine’s early enthusiasm about Neoplatonism and his heretical beliefs about central and obviously non-negotiable Christian doctrines show that his moral conversion was not as inclusive as Courcelle makes out. Can someone really be considered a proper convert to Christianity when she disagrees with central and obvious non-negotiable Christian doctrines? One way to answer this question would be to say that the pre-baptismal Augustine was a heretic and his conversion was to Neoplatonism and not Christianity after all, in the manner of Alfaric. In my opinion, this goes too far. As we learn from the later Augustine himself, as long as someone holding a heretical view sincerely believes that it belongs to the Catholic faith and does not yet have a clear reason to believe it does not, she cannot yet be considered a heretic. He makes these points considering the Photinian heresy as an example:

Let us consider the two cases in this way. One of them, for the sake of argument, believes what Photinus has thought about Christ, and he is baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church; the other believes the very same thing but is baptized within the Catholic Church, thinking that this heresy is the Catholic faith. I say that the latter is not yet a heretic, unless, once the teaching of the Catholic Faith has been made plain to him, he chooses to resist it, and prefers that which he was holding. Before this happens, it is plain that the one who is outside the Church is worse.\(^{754}\)

\(^{754}\) *bapt. 4.16.23 “Constituamus ergo duos aliquos isto modo: unum eorum uerbi gratia id sentire de Christo quod Fotinus opinatus est et in eius haeresi baptizari extra ecclesiae catholicae communionem, alium uero hoc idem sentire sed in catholica baptizari, existimantem ipsam esse catholicam fidem. Iustum nondum haereticum dico, nisi manifestata sibi doctrina catholicae fidei resistere maluerit et illud quod tenebat elegerit. Quod antequam fiat, manifestum est illum qui foris est esse peiorem.”*
If we switch the heresy at issue, this analysis applies nicely to the early Augustine’s situation, apart from the point about already being baptized within the Catholic Church. He holds heretical beliefs about the uncreatedness of soul and its consubstantiality with God, but he sincerely believes that they are consistent with the Catholic faith. Nor had it been made plain to him that these beliefs were inconsistent. His conclusion here therefore reasonably follows for his own pre-baptismal self. He was not a heretic and would not have been a heretic even if he had already been baptized. Therefore, despite being intellectually inconsistent with Christianity, his heretical beliefs do not show that he converted to Neoplatonism rather than Christianity. His conversion still reasonably was to both, despite lacking intellectually on the Christian side.

On the other hand, to return simply to saying that Augustine emphasized Neoplatonism more strongly than Christianity at his (moral) conversion, as scholars could say who think the early Augustine was completely orthodox, does not seem quite adequate to the reality. What is missing can be expressed in terms of care. The Christian doctrine of the creation of the soul was a central, non-negotiable doctrine that would have been obvious to anyone who took the time to check. Since Augustine did not do this, but impatiently proceeded to write in favour of the Plotinian view, it suggests a lack of care or concern for what the Christian view was. Thus, while his intention to conform to the Christian faith was sincere, there still was a moral failing from the Christian perspective (and not simply an intellectual failing) because the sincerity did not include sufficient care to ensure such conformity. The same conclusion, in fact, is suggested by his early enthusiasm for and seemingly single minded devotion to Platonic recollection in general. It is true that Christianity had not yet ruled out Platonic recollection at the time, but the doctrine was

755 The evidence suggests that he sincerely believed this because he informs us of his belief in the consistency of Neoplatonism and Christianity in Acad. (3.20.43) and because he was clearly willing to abandon other Neoplatonic doctrines (subordinationism in the divine) when they conflicted with Christianity.

756 As his ignorance of Victorinus and Ambrose attests.
contentious and the pre-baptismal Augustine does not appear to have been concerned about the debate in Catholic circles, concern that he would later show in *On the Free Choice of the Will* Book 3. So it seems that there was something morally lacking in Augustine’s Christian conversion in addition to its intellectual shortcomings.

To this conclusion, one might object that Augustine *does* show concern to be consistent with the Catholic faith on all of these issues because he asks Manlius Theodorus for help on the question of the soul in *On the Happy Life* and because he wishes that Ambrose and Zenobius, who are inaccessible to him while he is at Cassiciacum, could help him with the soul’s nature and immortality in the *Soliloquies*. But when we look at the kinds of questions Augustine propounds about the soul and the kinds of help he is seeking, the objection has shortcomings. About Platonic recollection, the pre-baptismal Augustine only appears to be hemming and hawing over the details surrounding it, not about the doctrine itself, which suggests that he is not concerned about its consistency with the Catholic faith. As for the soul’s uncreatedness and consubstantiality with God, Augustine does consider other alternatives, but his concern does not seem so much religious as philosophical. His appeal to Ambrose and Zenobius for help on these questions appears to be an appeal for philosophical help and not for clarification about what the Holy Scriptures or the Catholic faith say. This is further suggested by the fact that Augustine decides simply to continue *rationally* investigating these matters in their absence, without it entering his mind that perhaps he should examine the Holy Scriptures. It is also suggested by the fact that he does not wait to check with them before publishing on the topic. Surely if he would have had adequate concern to be consistent with the Catholic faith, he would have especially

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757 *beata u.* 1.5  
758 *sol.* 2.14.26  
759 In *beata u.* 1.1, for example, he tells us that he is unsure of whether the soul is “thrown out” into this world by God, nature, necessity, or its own will (or some combination), which I have suggested is only a question about how the preexistent soul came to be in this earthly body, not a question about whether the soul preexists.
postponed publishing the *Soliloquies* (*On the Immortality of the Soul* was never officially published) until being able to confirm its orthodoxy. Thus, while Augustine’s conversion to Christianity was sincere, it seems that it did not contain the degree of care for being intellectually consistent with Christianity as Christianity itself demanded at that time, and as Augustine would later demand of himself and others. This is an important sense in which his conversion was more to Neoplatonism than Christianity, and it pushes the limits of Courcelle’s inclusive framework.

None of this is to say that Augustine had initially gotten Neoplatonism completely correct either. Cary rightly observes that just as Augustine’s understanding of Christianity was deficient in the pre-baptismal works, so also was his understanding of Neoplatonism. Moreover, Cary correctly observes that there is a real sense in which Augustine’s understanding of the latter deepened alongside his understanding of the former.\(^760\) This is particularly evident with regard to Augustine’s views about the soul’s relation to God. Initially, the pre-baptismal Augustine thought that it was orthodox Neoplatonism to say that God had to exist “somewhere” and that this somewhere was the soul. As his understanding of Christianity deepened, and perhaps even with the help of its rejection of this idea, Augustine realized that it was not Neoplatonic after all.\(^761\) But these things are beside the point I am making here. My claim is not about whether Augustine got Neoplatonism or Christianity exactly right, but rather how much care he took to get them right.\(^762\) And in that sense, my point about Augustine’s moral conversion still stands.

A question that all of these conclusions raises concerns how long Augustine continued to


\(^761\) This realization is evident from *diu. qu.* 20 and *conf.* 1.2.2. God does not have to exist “somewhere” and it is much more precise to say that the soul exists in God, though even this should not be taken too literally.

\(^762\) Even this is a little imprecise. Neoplatonism and Christianity are not equivalent on this front because “caring” to get Neoplatonism right is not as crucial to being a Neoplatonist as “caring” to get Christianity right is crucial to being a Christian. What is crucial to being a Neoplatonist is caring to seek the truth by reason and not to let authority hinder such an investigation, and the pre-baptismal Augustine seems to be doing just that to a greater extent than he cares to submit to Christian authority. This is the controversial sense in which I am saying that his conversion was more to Neoplatonism than Christianity.
hold these beliefs about Platonic recollection. For category three and four doctrines, it is easy to say. As was evident from my argument, Augustine explicitly rejected the uncreatedness of the SOUL (and related doctrines) as well as the SOUL’s consubstantiality with God very shortly after his baptism, which essentially doomed First-Way Platonic Recollection. He does not tell us what occasioned this sudden change, but I think a likely explanation was his baptismal catechesis. Presumably when Ambrose or another Christian teacher was instructing him on the creed in preparation for the big event, Augustine’s error became manifest.\(^{763}\) For category two doctrines, it is sometimes more difficult to say. I argued that Augustine abandoned the innate knowledge of the Forms doctrine shortly after his baptism and his post-baptismal rejection of the identity of human ratio and divine Ratio seems to confirm this, but whether these doctrines really track each other remains contentious. The other category two doctrines continue longer into the post-baptismal works, and in many cases it is difficult to say whether Augustine ever rejected them.

For example, we know that he never decisively rejected the doctrine of the World Soul (despite losing his enthusiasm for it),\(^ {764}\) and though there is evidence that he rejected the soul’s universal omnipresence, the passages suggesting this are not conclusive.\(^ {765}\) On these doctrines, I leave the precise details for another study.

\(^{763}\) I agree with Cary that there may be some occurrences of these doctrines in the most immediate post-baptismal works, but I take them to be explicable due to the fact that Augustine had already written drafts of those works prior to his baptism and did not think the offending passages were serious enough to revise for the published version. Cf. Cary, *Invention* (2000), 105-114.

\(^{764}\) *retr.* 1.11(10).4 “But that this world is an animal, as Plato and many other philosophers have thought, I have not been able to track down by sure reason, nor have I recognized it so as to be persuaded by the authority of the Holy Scriptures. This is why I took note of a similar statement in the book On the Immortality of the Soul and mentioned that it was said rashly, not because I confirm that it is false, but because I do not grasp it as true that the world is an animal” (*Sed animal esse istum mundum, sicut Plato sensit alitique philosophos plurimos, nec ratione certa indagare potui, nec divinarum scripturarum auctoritate persuaderi posse cognoui. Vnde tale aliquid a me dictum quo id accipi possit, etiam in libro de immortalitate animae temere dictum notau, non quia hoc falsum esse confirmo, sed quia nec uerum esse comprehendo, quod sit animal mundus*).

\(^{765}\) Augustine still argues for the soul’s omnipresence to the universe in *ep.* 137 (see 2.5-6 (c. 411/2)) and then in *ep.* 166.2.3 (c. 415), and then in *trin.* 10.7.9 he appears only to insist that the soul is integrally omnipresent to its own body. The *trin.* passage may indicate a rejection of the omnipresence doctrine, as I suspect it does, but it should be noted that this does not necessarily follow.
For category one doctrines – i.e. for Platonic recollection in general – it is also more difficult to say. I showed that Augustine accepted innate knowledge at least as late as On True Religion (390/1) and likely as late as the Confessions (397/401), and I also showed that he accepted the preexistence requirement as late as Letter 7.2 (387/8). This tells us that he accepted Platonic recollection in the post-baptismal works at least for a time. But for how long? Answering this question definitively also requires a separate study, but my work here at least suggests a reasonable hypothesis within which to operate. The hypothesis is that Augustine accepted Platonic recollection for as long as he accepted the Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle (or some other version of the Past-Conscious-Experience Principle). This hypothesis makes sense because it is not innate knowledge that likely would be the first thing to go but rather the preexistence requirement, and the most obvious way to deny the preexistence requirement is to deny the operative principle behind it. The hypothesis also makes sense because it is precisely what Augustine does in Books 12 and 14 of On the Trinity. He still believes that acquiring knowledge of the Forms requires having a prerequisite “memory” of them – whether this “memory” should be called “innate knowledge” I leave as a question for another time – but he no longer believes that the memory has to be grounded in a past conscious experience of the Forms. Instead, he thinks that God’s present presence to the SOUL is enough to provide the requisite memory.\textsuperscript{766} What we have then is a case where Augustine is rejecting Platonic recollection by rejecting the Memory-is-of-the-Past principle, in line with my hypothesis. I have not yet determined precisely how long Augustine maintained the Memory-is-of-the-Past Principle, but as I have argued in an unpublished paper, he shows clear signs of maintaining it (and innate knowledge) in the Confessions.\textsuperscript{767} This suggests that he accepted Platonic recollection at least

\textsuperscript{766} trin. 14.15.21
\textsuperscript{767} Augustine affirms the Memory-is-of-the-Past principle for notitiae of intelligible things most explicitly in conf. 10.20.29.18-20.
until c. 401.

As for the other arguments and principles behind Augustine’s early Platonic recollection reasoning, I think that we would be surprised at how much continuity there is in later works. It is true that the Identity Principle of Knowledge takes a weaker form, as I have already made clear, but Augustine comes close to the original version in *On the Trinity*.

The Deficiency Argument and the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known argument can also be found in *On the Trinity*, which gives us reason to believe that these things continue to the end of his life. Their precise contents and applications may vary over time – and the degree to which this is true will be a matter for debate – but their forms, I think future studies will show, stay remarkably the same. A key thing that I hope to have established with this study is that such arguments and principles should at least be taken as starting points for understanding the logical structure of Augustine’s later project, since such things were present in and central to his earliest project. I also hope to have established that one should only conclude that he has departed from them or given up on them completely when there is sufficient positive evidence to do so.

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768 Some form of the Identity Principle appears explicitly in *trin.* 9.11.16 and less explicitly in 14.15.21.
769 The Deficiency Argument can be found in *trin.* 8.3.4 and the What-is-Loved-Must-be-Known argument in *trin.* 10.4.6 and 14.14.18.
770 This comment is especially directed at the puzzle about what Augustine thinks of innate knowledge in *trin.* Brittain goes as far as to say that Augustine rejects innate knowledge altogether (“Intellectual Self-Knowledge in Augustine (*De Trinitate 14.7-14*),” 317 in Bermon, E. and O’Daly, G. eds. *Le De Trinitate de Saint Augustin.* Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012). I think this is true in the sense that there is no longer any sense in which the Forms innately and constitutively “exist in” the soul (whether as notions or as the Forms themselves). I suspect, however, that Augustine retains a weaker sense of innate knowledge that is an innate knowledge of the presence of the Forms to the SOUL. This is part and parcel of his newfound idea that there can be such a thing as a “memory of the present.” The present presence of the Forms (including God) to the soul, their “touching” the SOUL without making an impression, is itself a kind of innate *notitia*.
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