An Intellectual History of Early-Pahlavī Demonology, 1921-41/1299-1320 sh.

by

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Abstract

This historiographical dissertation details how ancient and medieval Iranian demonology, including its avatars, motifs and styles of discernment, went through a radical conceptual revolution during the span of modernity, being informed by and impinging all domains of activity in which the demonic can be traced, such as the political, social, economic, technological, philosophical, and moral. Through an analysis of discourses and literatures pertaining to these domains, this study divulges the logic, mechanisms and movements behind the persistent deployment of traditional characterological signifiers of unholiness during a period of the twentieth century that is customarily argued to be a time generally preoccupied with notions of modernization inherited from the European Enlightenment tradition. In this work of inquiry, there is a focus on the early years of Pahlavī rule (1921-41/1299-1320 sh.) when a whole cluster of demonological notions and understandings entered a stage of hitherto unrealized clarity and coalesced struggle for hegemonic supremacy.

Demonological analysis positions adjacent to the assembly of oft-discussed modes of periodization, including mytho-secular nationalist, Perso-Islamic, and modern temporalities, the relatively unexplored natural history of man and its description of humanity's early
confrontation with and gradual civilizational overcoming of Nature's perilous and almost insurmountable forces. Since the inception of modernity, the demonic came to be infused with attributes associated with Nature, including inexorability, purposelessness, and illogicality, and insofar as traditional scions of evil were described as being situated in said Nature, their conceptual potency heightened, relative to both their previous forms and the Iranian populous. The demonism of Nature violently struggles against the analogical reasoning and absolute monotheistic commitment of the Perso-Islamic Shayṭān and the antinomic status of Zoroastrianism's Ahrīman. Adopted strategies utilized to engage with this newly reorganized demonic landscape were varied during the early-Pahlavī period, coordinated as they were by the different social positions, philosophies, and lived experiences of their devisers. However, out of all the texts covered, it was those by the modernist author Ṣādiq Hidāyat that came to a full and heady recognition of the novel demonic paradigm, ushering all together the end of the first Pahlavī period.
Acknowledgments

There are simply too many individuals to acknowledge, and so I will avoid making any ill-fated attempts in this direction. I will, however, confine myself to mentioning those who immediately come to mind. I have to first thank Dr. Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, my doctoral supervisor, for his unwavering support and guidance. In the sense that he is an outspoken defender of the historiographical method and primary source investigation, Dr. Tavakoli's presence in this work is hefty and enduring. The many members of my doctoral committee, some of whom had to part ways due to unforeseen circumstances, also deserve recognition. They are Drs. Amir Hassanpour, Ramin Jahanbegloo, Todd Lawson, Amira Mittermaier, Walid Saleh, Jeannie Miller, Victoria Tahmasebi-Birgani and Shafique Virani. The external examiner from McGill University, Dr. Setrag Manoukian deserves special mention because of the genuine promise that he sees in my work, along with his congenial spirit, which is difficult to draw away from.

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I suppose this goes against convention but not only do I want to thank the visible support staff, but also those who are less visible. First, I want to thank the administrative staff of the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations. I am thinking in particular of Anna Sousa who has always been kind to me during my years in the department. Though suffering from an understaffed work environment, Anna has always able to pull off tasks when they truly needed to be done in a quick and timely manner. I have to thank the staff at the interlibrary loans desk at Robarts Library for having to process many of the Persian language books I reviewed. I should also take the time to thank the public transit workers, custodial staff, food servers and other less visible supporters who made my life a whole lot easier.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support. I want to point out my mother, Vida Khooie, in particular. I have no other way to put it: If it were not for her support, this dissertation would not have been possible. This work is dedicated to her. She is one of the less visible personalities I referred to earlier, but the one (out of everyone else, both visible and less
visible) who had the most impact on the development of this work. I look forward to dedicating more works in your honour, māmān jūn.
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Note on Transliterations and Translations

I have chosen to abide by the Library of Congress (LoC) system of romanization. I capitalized names as consistently as possible. As for titles appearing in the footnotes and bibliography, I chose to capitalize all the principal words. For poem extracts, the transliteration style shifts in order to convey what they might sound like when read aloud. There are instances when I quote a Western-language work that has its own transliteration system, and for many of these I do not alter the transliterated words as a way to remain faithful to the original. I chose not to translate the words designating different forms of Perso-Arabic poetry so as to not besmirch their uniqueness. When I quote from Persian materials I put them in parentheses. The English text that precedes these quotes are not exclusively translations. There are many times when I insert Persian quotes for the purpose of exemplification or elaboration. I do not transliterate the names of Iranian authors who have extensively published or are based in the West where their names are already rendered into Roman script one way or another and for which they are best known. The same principle applies for the names of countries along with well-known cities and religions. There is still yet to be a consensus on the transliteration of certain commonly held terms such as "Nawrūz" so I decided to transliterate them using LoC's system.
Note on Dates

Here I have prioritized the use of the Gregorian calendar because of the situational circumstances behind the dissertation's writing. Whenever reference is made to the lifespan of a personality, event, dynasty, etc. considered directly entwined with Iranian history, the Iranian calendrical equivalent will appear subsequently. Because I refer to Persian sources that were published during the usage of one of three different calendrical systems (taghvīm'hā-yi Ghamarī [gh.], Shamsī [sh.], and Shahānshāhī [sha.]), and also allude to personalities or events where the bulk of their existence transpired during the usage of one of these three systems, each one of them will make an appearance throughout the work. I make use of the taghvīm-i Shahānshāhī sparingly and only in reference to texts published during its period of practice because its time of implementation (1970s) stands outside the time period under investigation in this research project. Before Hijrī, or 'bh.' will be used when referencing ancient personalities who have a direct relationship with Iranian history.

This being said, many historical figures drawn upon lived during the calendrical transition point of the mid-1920s when taghvīm-i Ghamarī fell out of use in favour of taghvīm-i Shamsī. For each person I used the system under which they lived the longest. For national and imperial rulers, besides lifespan I also include the years of their tenure which is indicated by "r." If all I have is a person's date of birth or death, I will make note of this with either a "b." or "d.", respectively.

Concerning citations, when a Gregorian date of publication is indicated, I chose not to provide the Iranian equivalent but did the opposite when the reverse was the case. For Persian works published outside of Iran, I avoided indicating the Iranian year of publication in order for all foreign-based publications to remain consistent with one another, but I do offer the equivalent for Persian-language works published within Iran.

For times in the main body when I refer to a particular decade according to the Gregorian calendar, I avoid offering the Iranian equivalent (which will inevitably disrupt the unit of ten) to maintain narrative flow. Another element of incongruity must be addressed. When converting dates without a determinable month, there is a chance that the time in question may have
happened in either of two years (e.g. 1320/1) because the calendrical systems that are deployed in this project do not overlap seamlessly. In each instance my starting point will either be a Gregorian or Shamsī/Ghamarī date and it will be made obvious which date was my starting point as you progress through the work.
Note on Abbreviations

Some works in the footnotes are abbreviated and a list of them can be found below.

\[ Q \quad \textit{The Qur'an}. \text{ Translated by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.} \]

\[ ZA \quad \textit{The Zend-Avesta (Parts I-III)}. \text{ Translated by James Darmesteter and L.H. Mills. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880-7.} \]

Chapter 1
Introduction

Whether deliberate or not, in "Jabr va Ikhtīyār" (Determinism and Free Will), the Iranian Marxist theoretician Taqī Arānī (1903-40/1282-1318/9 sh.) was participating in a specific mode of conceptual reconfiguration that would come to impact Iranian demonological investigation in a seismic manner. After iterating a deterministic account of causation, he states that without the benefit of "laws or principles" (qānūn yā nāmūs) it would not be possible to "forecast" (pīsh'bīnī) the occurrence of any phenomenon. ¹ This mechanistic conception lent itself to a positivistic and scientific-materialist worldview that would come to inform revolutionary leftist theory in Iran for decades.² However, it is the logic of the following statement that has gone under the radar: "Today, bread is baked in an oven but it is possible (mumkin ast) that if Satan so desires (agar Shayṭān bikhvāhad), tomorrow bread can grow (sabz shavad) on trees like fruit."³ Is this desire of which Arānī speaks not reminiscent of the originary "passionate desire" of Satan in Paradise Lost that is subverted and made to be forgotten by God and Christ in their capacities as "reason and restraint?"⁴ By being juxtaposed to a form of causal reasoning that can be traced back to Aristotle, Satan's desire here escapes logical comprehensibility and coherence. This is rather odd considering how, in the Islamic tradition, the fallen angel is associated with analogical reasoning (qīyās) and thus the "limitations and ultimate unreliability of human intellection."

Though it is customary to stress Satan's oppositional modus operandi (this, too, is evident in Zoroastrian discourse, the traditional domain of Iranian demonological analysis), he has always been theoretically situated within the divine cosmic scheme. As the cleric and constitutionalist Āqā Najafi Qūchānī (1878-1943/1295/6-1362/3 gh.) put it in Sīyāḥat-i Sharq (Eastern Journey),

¹ Taqī Arānī, "Jabr va Ikhtīyār [Determinism and Free Will]," in Āṣār va Maqālāt [Œuvre] (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1977), 147.
² Farzin Vahdat, God and Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 97.
³ Arānī, "Jabr va Ikhtīyār," 147.
"All existents (mawjūdāt) are created (makhlūq) by, are the shadows (ẓil) of, and are dependent (mansūb) upon" God. Even though the "degree of [divine] attribution" (andāzah-yi intisāb) in Satan may not be much to brag about, he is nevertheless enclosed within the Islamic cosmological order. As the "necessary instrument in his Hands," the archfiend "possesses powers only by extension." It is against this background of a contained and instrumentalized Satan that Arānī's comment becomes piercing in its distinctiveness. There is tension between the demonic as it is situated within recognizable and coherent limits and what Arānī is referring to. If demonological discourse during the early twentieth century teetered away from Qūchānī's traditional conception towards one that is more lawless and impervious to disciplining, then how was this received, compounded and guided by literate culture?

This question is inspired by the lingering post-revolutionary (1979/-1357/8- sh.) presence of the "deeply evocative" šayṭān-i buzurg (the Great Satan) as a master signifier deemed by detractors of Iran's current theocracy to be a keyhole through which select schemata directing the often nebulous impulses and policies of a "wild-eyed," "paranoiac," isolated and repressive governmental structure can be observed. For adherents to this system, combative confrontation with the šayṭān-i buzurg is considered to be "the seal of their sacred mission." Though pinned to the United States during the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-81/1358-59 sh. by Āyatullāh Rūhullāh Khumaynī (1902-89/1281-1368 sh./r. 1979-89/1358-68 sh.), the clerical leader of the nation's revolution, the master signifier is remarked as exhibiting a shared conceptual genealogy among the more "oppositionist" strains of Middle Eastern socio-political life. According to William O. Beeman, the superpower is conceived "as an external illegitimate force that continually [strives] [

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8 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 147.
9 William O. Beeman, The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 43.
10 Beeman, The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs", 69.
12 Milani, The Myth of the Great Satan, 47.
to destroy the pure, internal core of the Islamic World."\(^{13}\) When Iran's "inner symbolic life" is foregrounded, the specific usage of the *Shayṭān-i buzurg* designation is argued to become customary and predictable, \(^{14}\) "fit[ting] perfectly into the cultural mold reserved for corrupt forces,"\(^{15}\) for it has less to do with external reception than the way it is calculated by its indigenous audience\(^{16}\) and located within its respective "moral order."\(^{17}\) So overly attached is this conception of the demonic to enduring cultural forms, Beeman's following argument that places *Shayṭān-i buzurg* at the heart of a delicately situated socio-political dissatisfaction\(^ {18}\) fails partially in that it prodigiously places the onus of responsibility upon the pure coincidentality of American conformity to an eternal symbol of antagonism and that the superpower persevered in its implicit fidelity to this coincidence.\(^ {19}\)

While Beeman's position prioritizes the way a phenomenal entity gradually takes on the attributes of a given archetype, \(^ {20}\) the intellectual historiographical approach presented here permits the exposure of dialectical movements internal to the archetypal, symbolic, or figurative entity as it is partially conditioned by subliminal exigencies scattered throughout modernity. The sense of commensurability drawn between *Shayṭān-i buzurg* and the Qur'anic moniker *Shayṭān al-rajīm*\(^ {21}\) must be rejected out of hand not simply because the adjective 'great' is self-evidently dissimilar to 'the stoned one, he who deserves to be stoned, or the cursed one,' but also because demonism's 'greatness' derives from paradigmatic conceptual shifts in the very substantial structure of Iranian demonology over the past two centuries. Beeman either unknowingly or implicitly hints at this logic when he mentions how the signifier *Shayṭān-i buzurg* has more

\(^{13}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 5.
\(^{14}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 25.
\(^{15}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 28.
\(^{16}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 49.
\(^{17}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 129.
\(^{18}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 119.
\(^{19}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 129.
\(^{20}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 67.
\(^{21}\) Beeman, *The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"*, 122.
recently faded from daily usage\textsuperscript{22} to be resurrected when the clerical elite is in need of reinforcing its faltering support base.\textsuperscript{23} This suggests a new formation in Iranian demonology that does not negate indigenous receptivity. Beeman's linguistic anthropology may speak to cultural dynamism\textsuperscript{24} and the "components of discourse"\textsuperscript{25} that aid in the clarification of such activity, but what of the inner mechanics of discourse over time? The importance of reversing dysfunctional communication\textsuperscript{26} should be exchanged for an analysis of the demonological essence of the age as it is located in the deployability of ancient and recognizable avatars or symbols.

Abbas Milani takes a step forward by suggesting that the "air of mythical power incumbent" in \textit{Shayṭān-i buzurg} is derived from Iran's modern experience\textsuperscript{27} but is utterly regressive in his decision regarding geneological attribution. For him, \textit{Shayṭān-i buzurg} was an outgrowth of "intimidated awe [and] embittered animosity,"\textsuperscript{28} an absolute theology devised by a cluster of religious malcontents who had modernity awkwardly cascaded upon their derelict and static intellectual schemas. The bastard system that is now hegemonic in Iran is the only wellspring that could have possibly produced such a moniker for the United States,\textsuperscript{29} for the latter, as the first national embodiment of normative modernity, is the natural target for a 'mythological' device dispatched by a failed and deformed modern totalitarianism. Milani's project is dedicated to obfuscating the demonological category of analysis as a way to constitute a rapprochement between the two nations\textsuperscript{30} because the myth of demonism restricted the rational communicative strategies of the United States.\textsuperscript{31} Its pathological gigantism\textsuperscript{32} additionally precludes impartial

\textsuperscript{22} Beeman, \textit{The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"}, 134.
\textsuperscript{23} Abbas Amanat, \textit{Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism} (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 70.
\textsuperscript{24} Beeman, \textit{The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"}, 5.
\textsuperscript{25} Beeman, \textit{The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"}, 35.
\textsuperscript{26} Beeman, \textit{The "Great Satan" Vs. the "Mad Mullahs"}, 36.
\textsuperscript{27} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 12.
\textsuperscript{28} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 1.
\textsuperscript{29} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 12.
\textsuperscript{30} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 22-3.
\textsuperscript{31} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 95.
historicity due to its steady accompanying stream of ideological noise.\textsuperscript{33} This study takes the exact contrary position by suggesting that it is through an investigation of modern Iranian demonology, in which Shayṭān-i buzurg is comfortably nestled, that one can begin to understand the paralyzing power and force of Khumaynī's utterance and its situatedness in Iranian modernity.

The work of Abbas Amanat permits entry into a broader demonological inquiry when he avoids the pitfalls of Beeman's culturalist fixation and Milani's reactionary dismissal of the demonic by situating Shayṭān-i buzurg within a more atypical strand of descent, specifically the secular content of Soviet propaganda during the Cold War. For Amanat, Shayṭān-i buzurg is related to Khumaynī's chiliastic commitment to an eschatology defined by a conflicting dualism.\textsuperscript{34} Comprehending the importance of millenarian thought within Shi'i thought, Marxist-Leninist partisans inebriated their historical materialist radio broadcasts with apocalyptic lustre, knowing that it would make otherwise reprehensible godless mores more digestible for Iran's official religious community.\textsuperscript{35} In a sense, what is being suggested is that the image of the Great Satan "lurking in the shadow of the revolution, conspiring, seducing, and devouring, [due in part to its] insatiable [...] appetite for the flesh and blood of martyrs"\textsuperscript{36} is in some measure traceable back to a curious moment when American Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas (1898-1980), during two separate trips to Iran in 1949/1327/8 sh. and 1950/1328/9 sh., was chastised as being the "Big Devil" by the Soviet Union's Moscow radio service.\textsuperscript{37} This instance represented a key moment in the transition "from an ethical Satan to an ideological Satan,"\textsuperscript{38} when Iranian communists such as the theoretician Ḫosān Ṭabarī (1917-89/1295/6-1368 sh.) used the Persian radio broadcasts as a means to cultivate a new but simultaneously familiar (insofar as symbolic

\textsuperscript{32} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 32.
\textsuperscript{33} Milani, \textit{The Myth of the Great Satan}, 60.
\textsuperscript{34} Amanat, \textit{Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism}, 36.
\textsuperscript{35} Amanat, \textit{Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism}, 66.
\textsuperscript{36} Amanat, \textit{Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism}, 69.
\textsuperscript{37} Amanat, \textit{Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism}, 213.
\textsuperscript{38} Amanat, \textit{Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism}, 205.
themes were extracted from Perso-Islamic caches) critique against imperialist strategy and entities. The increased politicization of the clerical establishment is also said to have been a related consequence of fundamentally secular discourses propagated by the Soviet Union and their primary conduit into Iran, the Tūdah Party.39

Amanat's interest in Shayṭān-i buzurg is, certainly, related to his general preoccupation with the historiography of Iranian modernity, apocalyptic thought and official modes of marginalization. In this respect, his analysis of the epithet in Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism serves as a major scholarly advance in the study of modern Iranian demonology. But rather than focus on the specificity of Shayṭān-i buzurg as a discursive manifestation of a more politicized religious establishment, why not construe it as the most awe-inspiring moment in a reconstituted demonological epistemology that stretches back developmentally to the very inchoate moments of Iranian modernity approximately two centuries ago? While the identification of the secular matrix in which the transition between an ethical and ideological Satan is highly momentous, one must consider the possibility of determination without direct contact. Demonological avatars and motifs were already in a state of paradigmatic flux, operating within parallel acausal or synchronistic social channels that so happened to collide and crosspollinate during moments of struggle and contestation. As will become evident in this study, the 'greatness' of Shayṭān-i buzurg may have less to do with a modern adaptation of the Neoplatonic logic of ethereal hierarchization than with the vasteness of Nature, a dimension of reality that came to be closely associated with the demonological, in one way or another, in the decades leading up to the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9/1356-7 sh.. In this sense, modern Iranian demonology has less to do with clerical rage than it does with a sense of semantic incommensurability and epochal relativization.40 The emergence of modern Iranian demonology as a result of particular historical circumstances permitted Nature as a lawless striving to become an object of knowledge.41

41 Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology, 2.
Conceptually, demonological signifiers came to articulate, represent, and assist in the resolution of particular novel experiences and associated "theoretical challenge[s]") with which there was a cognitive struggle. The experimental dimension inherent in this encounter between signification and experience prioritizes the way Iranians participated in a process of replaceability where the substance of ancient and medieval avatars altered radically while appearing the same. At the heart of all this is the appearance of an "encountered" anomaly -- as "an essential, necessary and driving moment of knowledge" -- that denoted a dysfunction at the heart of traditional Iranian demonology in terms of its ability to adequately confront a world of novel phenomena. The protracted reformulative activity of Iranians (analogous to a mathematician revising problematic theses and producing alternative hypotheses) helped to devise a distinctive field of knowability and the task is to trace or "reconstruct trajectories" and actualized possibilities that cut through texts, beyond the sovereign intentionality of authors, and without submitting to the dictates of a positivist methodology. The demonological must be seen less as a category of demonization than a set of organizing concepts. In this light, Shayṭān-i buzurg is a pivotal codification, by an exemplar, of a previous

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49 Lecourt, *Marxism and Epistemology*, 75.
55 Hacking, "Historical Ontology," 8.
conceptual revolution that resolved a crisis in demonological semantics. In the midst of an "evaporation of truth," several "overlapping and successive [...] immature" semantic formations emerged, of which a few are described in this study as a discourse on discourse.

Resulting in an altered hierarchization of values, methods and questions,

In this register, Shayṭān-i buzurg is a new demonological object whose novelty can only be recognized when the conclusions of this study are taken to their limits. While there is a sense of narrative consistency in the transition of chapters, it should not be neglected that, theoretically, the history outlined is one that consists of "jerks, sudden mutations, reorganizations of its principles: in short, by dialectical slices." In the end, we are left with a coupling of the concrete and the abstract, the anti-metaphysical and "radical discontinuity" of buzurg appended to, or expressed, in the form of Shayṭān, an everlasting essentialist continuity.

One important query that should be posed is why the epithet continues to be consistently posed as a simple metaphor rather than an expression of a new demonological order? What permits the possibility of this stance, which ignores the process of deracination?

The answer to this question can be partly answered through a brief description of the two most recalled archetypes behind Shayṭān-i buzurg, the Shayṭān or Iblīs of the Qur'anic tradition and Zoroastrianism's Ahrīman or Angrah'Maynīyū. In the former, there is emphasis on evil

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58 Hacking, "Michael Foucault's Immature Science," 94.
63 Lecourt, *Marxism and Epistemology*, 77.
64 Lecourt, *Marxism and Epistemology*, 91.
personified and his ability to pollute (preceded by temptation), derail through error (which often times occurs when he is embraced as a whispering companion), lead the misguided through open recruitment (a form of leadership that would have been absolute if it were not for God's willing and offering of refuge), aggrandize his fearsomeness (even though his machinations are feeble in origin, notwithstanding the power of his initial refusal to bow before man), foment fragmentation, break established bonds, and order the execution of detestable works. For those who embrace or falter before Shayṭān, there is an amnesia of divinity both in the now and in the very beginnings of Adamic history. This sin inevitably opens the path to ruin even though the fall from grace is initially not recognized as such due in part to an inherited rebellious disposition.

In the same way that the Perso-Islamic tradition prescribes ritualistic methods of expelling Shayṭān from one's life, there are apotropaic means of subverting the power of

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66 Q 8:11
67 Q 47:25
68 Q 2:36
69 Q 7:20
70 Q 4:38
71 Q 2:168
72 Q 2:208
73 Q 4:83
74 Q 7:200
75 Q 3:175
76 Q 4:76
77 Q 2:34
78 Q 12:100
79 Q 14:22
80 Q 2:268
81 Q 5:91
82 Q 7:20
83 Q 4:120
84 Q 8:48
85 Q 19:44
Angrah'Maynīyū/Ahrīman and repelling him from the holy realm.\textsuperscript{86} The extraordinarily powerful\textsuperscript{87} (but at times impotent)\textsuperscript{88} Zoroastrian hypostasis of all things nefarious (not simply one of God's agents as in the case of Shayṭān, even though it is possible to make him so through servitude),\textsuperscript{89} the ruffian\textsuperscript{90} and fiend of all fiends,\textsuperscript{91} dispatches an array of sorties against "the world of the good principle"\textsuperscript{92} organized by his creatures (who are constantly threatened by Zarathustra [Zartushť]\textsuperscript{93} and the "good law").\textsuperscript{94} Among these entities are "disease, rottenness and infection" and the most noticeable objective is to deteriorate the unified assemblage that is the body\textsuperscript{95} through invasive means.\textsuperscript{96} Hence Ahrīman, more than Shayṭān, is a purveyor of death and decay,\textsuperscript{97} but they are similar in that they represent the pinnacle of dishonesty.\textsuperscript{98} In this way, humans must be constantly vigilant of vulnerable points of infection.\textsuperscript{99}

While Shayṭān-i buzurg may appear to be an amalgamation of these two conceptions of the demonic, the temptation to accept a couple unique moments in the "great accumulation of the already-said" as overdetermining sources of inspiration is historiographically negligent,\textsuperscript{100} as is the tendency to ascertain an evolutionary trend based on a similar almost primordial "organizing

\begin{center}
86 \textit{ZA I} Fargard 10:5 (10)  \\
87 \textit{ZA II} Ashi Yast 19  \\
88 \textit{ZA II} Zamyad Yast 96  \\
89 \textit{ZA II} Ram Yast 12  \\
90 \textit{ZA I} Fargard 22:2 (5)  \\
91 \textit{ZA I} Fargard 14:1  \\
92 \textit{ZA II} Aban Yast 34  \\
93 \textit{ZA I} Fargard 14: 6 (20)  \\
94 \textit{ZA I} Fargard 14: 12 (39)  \\
95 \textit{ZA I} Fargard 20:3 (12)  \\
96 \textit{ZA II} Farvardin Yast 77  \\
97 \textit{ZA II} Ormazd Yast 19  \\
98 \textit{ZA II} Ardibeihist Yast 13  \\
99 \textit{ZA II} Vistasp Yast 37  \\
\end{center}
principle."\textsuperscript{101} In other words, "the object does not await in limbo the order that will free it and enable it to become embodied in a visible and prolix objectivity; it does not pre-exist itself, held back by some obstacle at the first edges of light."\textsuperscript{102} This dissertation is, in the main, meant to reflect an interruption in the "continuous accumulation"\textsuperscript{103} or "sedimentation"\textsuperscript{104} of demonological knowledge, and a moment in the congealment of a new discourse. It is not specifically about Shaytān-i buzurg, but rather in a moment that led to its later emergence. During this and similar moments throughout the discursive development of modern Iranian demonology, what is observable is not altogether the equatability of the demonic with worldliness or its perishability, but rather the question of whether the world in its givenness is open to comprehensibility at all. In contrary to being embedded in the divine portraiture of moral failings, the demonic is pilfered and restylized as the first interlocutor of man as self-conscious species. And because the demonic is assimilable with Nature as the pre-existing condition of all vital strivings, less is there the demand to return to celestial origins than to divinize reality.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the demonological structure of the first Pahlavī period (1921-41/1299-1320 sh., i.e. the period between the rise and fall of Rīzā Khān [later Rīzā Shāh Pahlavī], 1878-1944/1295-1363 gh./r. 1925-41/1304-20 sh.), a time during which both Arānī and Qūchānī, the two thinkers we encountered at the beginning of the chapter, were active. What was peculiar about this era was the way demonism became construed as being, on the one hand, in a state of complete lawlessness, and on the other, subject to diremption and other operations (including misconstruals) by both a burgeoning state in the midst of an intense consolidation, re-organization, and disciplinary containment of the nation, and members of the nation itself. To put it in a different way, there was a confrontation with a relatively new conception of demonism that was associated with Nature, illogicality, and the ungraspable. While my analysis in part addresses its germination, the main preoccupation of this project is to account for the way this novel conception of demonism was encountered during the 1920s and 30s. Additionally, though it can be argued that this demonism emerged decades prior to the coup d'etat that thrusted Rīzā  

\textsuperscript{101} Foucault, \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge}, 21-2.  
\textsuperscript{102} Foucault, \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge}, 45.  
\textsuperscript{103} Foucault, \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge}, 4.  
\textsuperscript{104} Foucault, \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge}, 141.
Khān onto the national scene in 1921/1339 gh. (the informal commencement of Pahlavī rule and the approximate starting point of this project), a full recounting of this genealogy is beyond the scope of this dissertation. What can be said conclusively is that it was soon after Rizā Khān’s rise that this demonism became the subject of the most extensive attempts at dismantling and conversion (either through sanctification or naturalization), the most radical misunderstandings and incorporations (due to the resilience of preceding epistemic foundations), and the most provocative solicitations of love and submission (a new mode in the mystical encounter with Satan). These dimensions of analysis are almost always omitted, unintentionally or not, by other studies of the period due to methodological specificity.

Let us review the more prominent and well-accepted approaches as they build upon one another. Notice how from each approach to the next the analytical scope broadens so as to capture more disparate currents that are thought to be missed by the previous methodology. My position, similar to the last one you will observe below, involves a significantly broadened scope, but it is not simply done as a way to ameliorate the shortcomings of the previous studies. Rather, the broad scope is a necessity of demonological research as it pertains to this particular time and place.

(i) The classical approach to the early-Pahlavī period is concerned generally with international relations (power politics and geopolitical wrangling) along with the composition and power brokering of elites, often using many foreign sources to substantiate certain claims.  

concern are the biographies of the most distinguished or infamous of said elites. This approach is in some ways typified by Cyrus Ghani in his *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah* where emphasis is placed upon the interests, machinations, clout and alliances of certain power players such as ministers, chieftains, army officers, and courtiers (examples include George Curzon [1859-1925], Starosselsky and Hasan Pirnīyā [1872-1935/1288/9-1354 gh.]), along with the institutions and/or regions that they represent, whether they be the foreign office, provinces, or any other organized entity exemplifying official status according to the perspective of already sanctioned normative bodies. By procuring, interlacing, and presenting to the reader the accounts of key personalities, the historian is believed to be outlining the integral workings behind the fruition of events. As such, the underlying methodology privileges the role of distinguished actors over collectives. "[R]ebels and insurgents," "southern tribes" and entire industries are mentioned as if they are chess pieces ultimately beholden to the strategies of greater men. Politicking, the transmission of important messages (either

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through lesser intercessors, the replacement of important decision-makers or commanders (e.g. H.B. Champain taking over Lionel Dunsterville's role), the designation of appointments (e.g. Rizā Khān's promotion to sardār-i sipāh [commander of the army]), or cabinet shuffles (e.g. Rizā Khān's April 1924/1342 gh. reorganization) are seen as being more influential than the direction of social forces, economic determinants, and other variables. Even when other sectors of society are brought into brief focus (such as shopkeepers, craftsmen and artisans), it is usually done under the looming presence of an outstanding figure (Arthur Millspaugh [1883-1955], for instance).117

(ii) In Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher's edited volume, *Men of Order*, we see an extension of the first position's infatuation with personalities, but with added emphasis on their projects (reform initiatives, ideologies) and interactions with particular social classes.119 Moreover, the move towards the interior has the result of producing detailed but uncritical studies concerning areas that were of much interest to modernist elites (including economic development,
educational reform, etc.). In the case of *Men of Order*, the designated approach is girded by a comparative framework. Processes and motifs of Iranian modernisation such as secularization, the formation of political parties, authoritarian acceleration of the reform process (and the degree to which such reforms were an extension of inherited programs), the adoption of European traditions and codes, the republican endeavours of "secularist elites," the focus on *longue durée* history and native lexicon, state-building, and other related matters are compared and contrasted with, in this instance, the Kemalist project. As an inheritance of the classical approach described above, here the presence of paramount figures such as Rizā Shāh and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938/r. 1923-38) loom large and issues such as the extent of social base support, leadership styles and inclinations, their approach to the question of

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120 Ahmad Minai, "Economic Development of Iran under the Reign of Reza Shah" (PhD diss., The American University, 1960); Mina Marefat, "Building to power: architecture of Tehran 1921-1941" (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988).
123 Zürcher, "Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic," 61.
127 Zürcher, "Institution Building," 110.
the clergy and religiosity in general, successes and legacies, their level of commitment to grounding principles, and the relationship between the personalities are discussed in great detail. Thus, while this approach withdraws to a certain extent from the overdetermining influence of personalities by focusing on the actual facets of modernization, it still retains the classical allure of potent and larger than life figures.

(iii) The third approach to the study of the early or first Pahlavi period takes into account the interaction between established power brokers, their projects, the often neglected subaltern forces that were active during the time, and the unexplored conditions behind the rise of the first Pahlavi state. Room is also made for previously unexamined median classes with their own subjugative tendencies. An example of this sort of approach can be seen clearly in Stephanie Cronin's *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns*. By "[d]eliberately shifting the spotlight downwards" towards "the political 'crowd' in Tehran along with provincial towns and cities as they were mobilized by guild-based and/or clerical leaderships; the urban and rural poor; the new working

131 Elliot, "New Iran," 84.
133 Zürcher, "Institution Building," 98.
134 Cronin, "The Army," 133.
class in the oil fields, junior tribal khans; the lower ranks of the army and politically dissident elements within the officer corps, [...] including] the methods, mechanisms and institutions these groups used to articulate an agenda of their own" can help provide a more complete view of the period and enhance our understanding of the elites as well (insofar as Rizâ Shâh emerged from the peasantry).\textsuperscript{139} There are, additionally, other aspects of the past that are drawn into the fold due to the focus on the subaltern, particularly the constitutional revolution and its championing of a mode of popular political participation.\textsuperscript{140} In the same way that this sustained pedigree is given greater attention, along with its influence on the contestation of authority\textsuperscript{141} (through the inheritance of methods, tools, traditions, discourse, etc.),\textsuperscript{142} the systemic attempt to contain and manipulate subaltern forces is also emphasized, as is the case when Rizâ Shâh's style of paternalistic politics is discussed.\textsuperscript{143} Rather than exclusively investigating the political role of subaltern formations, an understanding of their social composition\textsuperscript{144} (including leadership),\textsuperscript{145} the use of rumours as a communicative tool,\textsuperscript{146} the decision to avoid certain encounters,\textsuperscript{147} and their connection with popular discontent,\textsuperscript{148} may lead to greater insights. At times, the dichotomy between elite and subaltern is complicated when oppositional forces such as the ulama are internally split between the two sides\textsuperscript{149} (also evident before in the case of Rizâ Shâh and his modest origins), and when the state attempted to negotiate or coopt popular agendas and interventions.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{139} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 4.
\textsuperscript{140} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 7.
\textsuperscript{141} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 29.
\textsuperscript{142} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 40.
\textsuperscript{143} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 19.
\textsuperscript{144} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 129.
\textsuperscript{145} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 166-7.
\textsuperscript{146} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 133.
\textsuperscript{147} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 161.
\textsuperscript{148} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 173.
\textsuperscript{149} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 198.
\textsuperscript{150} Cronin, \textit{Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns}, 217.
(iv) Building directly off of the previous approach's incorporation of the subaltern, what marks the distinctiveness of this methodology is the focus on neglected or hitherto superficially glossed domains of inquiry such as gender, iconography, technology, daily life (practices, subjective experiences, lifestyles, occupations), non-state actors and domains (intellectuals, reformers, technocrats, the press, etc.), differential modernities, the structure of educational reformation (curricula, physical education, newly established institutions, etc.), cultural life (literature, theatre, music, sports, architecture, museums etc.) and how these factors interacted dialectically with state-led modernization. One recent work that does well to bring these different strands together is, unsurprisingly, Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner's edited volume, *Culture and Cultural Politics Under Reza Shah*. Cross-disciplinary cultural investigation of this sort permits the exposure of unlikely effective agents (such as the modern middle class and a multitude of active reformists and intellectuals operating mostly from without the state apparatus), the manner of and impetus behind cultural appropriations by commoners (along with the composition of the object of such appropriations), a cultural life that is often considered deadened and stale even though a number of domains were opened up or completely transformed during the period (including sites or instruments of entertainment), pragmatic state-initiated policies and the way they were informed by a well-solicited group of foreign advocates, the relationship between cultural politics and identity formation (through the influence of education and the initiative of key modernists), and the interaction between culture and politics, reformer and state. Here, state agency, or rather the consistency and motility of authoritarian assertiveness, is challenged as the exclusive purveyor of change.151

My own approach most certainly inherits from this last position the need to examine the early-Pahlavī period with more inclusive optics, but this is done not simply through an arbitrarily over-extended conception of the object under examination (in the last position, this object is "culture"). Rather, demonological study in this context necessitates an expansive scope due to a number of reasons: (i) The location of the demonic, in its most simplified form (i.e. discounting the notion of evil and focusing exclusively on demonic figures), is extremely diffuse, permeating

unsuspected domains, including the writings of Marxists; (ii) Notwithstanding this ubiquity, the
presence of demonism is extremely fragmentary (in other words, locating a monograph or even
an article that focuses exclusively on the demonic in any insightful way is rare), thus
necessitating the extended methodological scope as a way to identify patterns, incongruities, and
ruptures; (iii) The identification of the demonological essence of the age is contingent upon a
cross-sectional sampling; (iv) Due to the discursive nature of the study, ascertaining the subtle
variations, inheritances, and intricacies of key demonic figures as they are deployed also requires
a composite framework that is inclusive of multitudinal samples.

It is due to the dispersion of the demonic in Iranian social, cultural, economic, and political
discourses that makes this undertaking both indispensable and revelatory. It is hoped that through
an investigation of the semantic configuration of demonic figures as they appear within
textuality, the essence of certain ideological projects, moral strivings and subjective moods can
be discerned. The presence of characters such as Dajjāl (the Anti-Christ), Shaytān and Ahrīman
can be found in many written works of the time, and lesser beings, including dīvās (demons), jinn
(unseen spirits), shayāṭīn (devils), and dads (beasts) are more often than not close in tow.
Whether occult, mythical, or bestial (think of ʿankabūts [spiders], gurgs [wolves], and mārs
[snakes]), demonic forces are engaged in a number of nuanced ways, whether by typological
figurations of venerable mythical heroes such as Rustam and Kāvah, or occult practitioners that
include among their ranks rammāls (geomancers), jinngīrs (jinn catchers) and jādūgars
(sorcerers). I take all those who ruminated upon the question of the demonic as not only
demonologists, but also demonographers—those who inscribed the essence of the period's
demonism into their textual works, whether they be in the form of prose, poetry, or articles
concerning educational reform or the necessity of conserving Shīʿī norms.

Within the works of these demonographers there are signposts that help to elucidate demonism,
not simply as an inherited rhetorical device or trope, a momentary expression of emotional
impulse, or a band of characters that populate the religio-mythical imagination, but rather as a
concept. This is what makes this project an intellectual history, i.e. the historiography of an idea.
The appendix at the end of this work details almost all the major strands of demonological
inquiry, and as is evident, this approach fits comfortably into the category that preoccupies itself
with the study of a singular demonic species, figure, or demonological concept. However, the
notion of demonism is also a composite or genus that has within itself a multitude of maleficent
beings that contribute to its conceptualization. The most salient and provocative fulminations of these beings take place in major intellectual debates of the time and thus the philosophical appraisal of demonism as a concept requires a demonological historiography of a diffusive array of contemporaneous intellectual works. Both the positioning and functionality of the demonic within these texts benefited from the morphogeneses, inheritances and ruptures within the structure of demonism instantiated by both deeply historical, contentious processes and religio-mythical magnitudes (a concession to both historical materialist and essentialist methodologies). The semantic burden is then carried forth into the realm of textuality where the demonic is further sculpted by the demands of rhetoric, emplotment, argumentative prose and the encounter with related signifiers.

A distinct focus of this project is to increase the standing of demonological discourse as it is embedded within debates on technology, education, religion, subjectivity, and among other matters, national identity. Demonism contributed to the very trajectory of particular debates, and in so doing had reflected within itself (as an omen) the latter's futural formation. To put it in a different way, the demonic is able to reemerge from the text into phenomenal sociality with the outcome of the intellectual debate embedded within it. By placing this great emphasis on discursive functioning, I am conceding in large measure to the field that reserves for itself the study of demonological discourse. It is through discourse that we discover how demonism during early twentieth century Iran came to be associated with the lawless striving of Nature as a result of Iran's experience of modernity. Reminiscent of the primal inexorability that animates the philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), this force started being felt during the mid-nineteenth century and only came to be fully confronted after the First World War (1914-8). What is truly extraordinary is that even though Nature appears through the countenance of familiar and well-entrenched nefarious beings, it goes beyond the conflict with divinity to lacerate and eventually expunge these preceding demonic archetypes. Paradoxically, this meaningless core of modern Iranian demonism is best conveyed through a prime medium of meaning, that is, written language. There are writers who acknowledge it in the main, others who are unaware of its festering presence, and still others who harbour an ambiguous relationship towards it, often not knowing that they are speaking of it. What this suggests is the way Nature took on hegemonic status during the period.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the way the First World War gave prominence to the presence of Nature as an uncontainable force in modern Iranian life. Curiously, traditional avatars of demonism both populated and imbibed this landscape, absorbing into their constitutive fibre its lived experience (troop movements, gattling gun rapid fire, artillery blasts, food shortages etc.), its utter senselessness (Iran's declared neutrality shattered by external powers who used the nation as a battleground for contesting imperial interests), along with the nearly absolute sense of native impotence (Iranian inability to contest what appeared to be a monolithic event). This was not the first time that Nature would manifest itself during Iran's modern experience, but it took place immediately prior to the systematic attempt to engage with it. According to those who were most committed to the cause of authoritarian reform, the demonism of Nature was mistakenly construed as a reproduction of a prior archetype whose defeat was always assured. In the concept of bachah(-yi) Shayṭān, or the satanic child, we see the microcosmic tension between and shift from a stable archetypal inner nature (that a child must abide by) to Nature (those unruly forces that the child ultimately embodies and personifies). The predisposition of this child as an anthropoidal expression of Nature will come to haunt the first Pahlavī era for the entirety of its duration.

In Chapter 3, I present a different method by which this new demonism was handled—diremption or exorcism. Taking an earlier (mid- to late-nineteenth century) instance of Nature's manifestation as a starting point, I describe, in four movements, how modern technology, once perceived as an autonomous mechanical organism that is more demonic than the imagery of approaching Mongolian hordes, can become a divine instrument of the secularized and nationalist religion of the state. What is truly remarkable is that the early union between traditional demonism and Nature as it was localized in modern technology became extricated from and later situated in opposition to this locus. I start with the rifle of the nineteenth century and its association with the figure of a snake. Rather than being overdetermined by the ancient dreadfulness of the snake, the rifle comes to manipulate the symbolism of the snake as it is situated within the ranks of demonomy, or the mythico-religious demonic domain from which all familiar avatars of evil emerge. With oil extraction technologies, we are struck by the extrapolation of scientific ingenuity and application, but there is still a sense of incommunicability in these technologies due in part to the way they are owned and administered by foreign entities. In the third movement, we encounter another highly contentious technology,
telegraphy. The telegraph lines here are ritually purified by Rizā Shāh as the figurative encapsulation of state divinity and technical knowledge. Modern technology in this phase is neutralized and completely instrumentalizable. In the fourth and final movement, the railroad system moves from a position of exploitable neutrality to a state of apotheosis. As one of Rizā Shāh's crown jewels, the railroad serves as the heavenly chariot meant to confront the demonism of Nature (that which served as its prior disposition).

Chapter 4 is predominantly dedicated to two progressive thinkers, the Marxist-Leninist Taqī Arānī and the religious reformist Aḥmad Kasravī (1890-1946/1308-1365 gh.), both of whom contributed to the discussion of this externally confronted, senseless, and vitalistic demonism by affirming its presence in different ways. What must be grasped here is how the understanding of a new demonism went beyond the confines of the state (along with auxiliary coterie of unaffiliated academics, ideologues, and clients) to capture the minds of those who were not functionally or morally linked to the authoritarian dynasty. In the case of Taqī Arānī, the externally situated demonism encountered at the end of the previous chapter has its senselessness and situatedness affirmed (as beyond the frontiers of logic and rationality), but that is not it. Through his materialist methodology, Arānī acknowledges how scientifically disqualified theorems or epistemic objects (implicitly the demonic) can yield discoveries. Even if the notion of the demonic is deemed unsuitable for contemporary scientific parlance, its tracability back to determinable material conditions of life revivifies its place in the world. A separate possibility—which avoids any redemptive sentiment—further disentitles this external demonism of any demonstrable affective power by, in the case of supposedly involuntary corporeal reactions by humans, locating this power within the human neural system. Notwithstanding this attempt at positivistic rigidity, Arānī, during his final defence against state prosecution, (almost unwittingly) finds a place for the nefarious occult within his system when he equates the state with jinn who need to be purged through the apotropaic power of the proletarian masses. Kasravī takes a different approach to the same external demonism by focusing on its proclivity to self-expand perpetually (in the sense of a scattered and ununified dispersion). Here, the corruptibility of truths is of pivotal concern, for in opposition to Arānī's scheme of progressive historical development where demonism as a collection of existents and an analytical category becomes obsolete through gradations, Kasravī is concerned with the rise of demonism, in part through modern man's infatuation and desire to intermingle with the bestial. The contamination of
unalloyed truths is reflected in the direction of Western technological development, which is seen as irreversibly infernal. Kasravī's demonology during the early-Pahlavī period differed markedly from the contemporaneous traditional Shiʿī encounter with the demonic which was deemed deeply political (the demarcation of allies from enemies).

Chapter 5 is concerned with the problem of failed socialization or the subjective regression towards Nature as demonomy. In other words, there are certain practices outside the circumscribed limits of state-led civil cultivation that induce actors to reacquaint themselves with their constitutive status as bachah(-yi) Shayṭān or to become integrated into a pneumatological order where they (as derelicts) are the only humans within a community of spirits. The active and transformative mutual interaction between the spirits and these Iranians is observed from the outside by modernist reformers, some of whom propagate the virtues of voluntarism as a way to redeem man, and others seek to extract the occult beings themselves from their ascribed vocation by subjecting them to objectification. Through the discourse of microbiology the jinn become observable, and to some extent, manipulable by religious scientists, while occult practitioners persist in their social devilry. Associated with local sorcerers and other obscurantists is an entire roster of marginalized actors such as opium addicts and guileful mother-in-laws. The strategy most prescribed to encourage a reversal of this downward spiral is located in the just mentioned theory of voluntarism. Industriousness and the achievements of motility, however, were overshadowed by theoretical ambiguities echoed within the concept of Nature as well (whether it is capable of being disciplined and harnessed or not).

Chapter 6 goes beyond merely observing the failed actor's movement towards the demonic by focusing on the secular nationalist questioning of the bewildering intentionality and desire that would lead Iranians (and the nation as a whole) to initiate such a descent. This is observed most clearly in the poetic motif of demonic amorism where the principle of voluntarism collapses under the weight of love, seduction and lust. In love poetry, even though there is a permeating sense of perfumed and ecstatic impotence, the lover is nevertheless portrayed as having leverage over pedantic authorities when it comes to the understanding of love and the demonic beloved (often the appearance of divinity). Secular nationalist polemics problematize the embrace of demonism as an object of love but does not consider the epistemological dimension behind the encounter with this object (how it is known). In this one-sided approach, demonism is racialized and separated off from native cosmology. What is discovered during this particular analysis is
the way ancient Aryan morality actually contributes to the unfortunate cultivation of demonism. Buzurg 'Alavī (1904-97/1282-1375 sh.), one of the main contributors to this discourse, later on moves away from secular nationalist romanticism and incorporates the demonic into his critique of the state and capitalism. This structuralist approach to the demonic prepares the groundwork for a new conception of demonism that emerges most fervently after the fall of Rizā Shāh.

Chapter 7, the final section of this study, focuses on Sādiq Hidāyat (1903-51/1281-1330 sh.), a prominent romantic nationalist who takes a step away from the inhibitions present in the vantage point presented in the previous chapter. Here, demonism's linkage with Nature is affirmed through the psychoanalytic interest in libidinal economy and unconscious drives. A relatively complex relationship emerges between inner and outer demons through the functioning of projections and displacements. While there are quite a few instances where suicide is evoked as a way to undermine or disburden oneself of the constant pulsations that mark the demonic in Hidāyat's literature, also present is the alluring, tantalizing, but inscrutable anthropoidal layer of Nature that repeatedly draws the attention of narrators. Even Nature itself is present at times as an eerie but warm calling that is capable of relieving subjects of the pain that it itself engendered. The decision to heed this call is one that the early-Pahlavī state never fully committed to, nor did anyone else within literate culture for that matter. In taking a step towards the call of Nature, Hidāyat both fulfilled the demonological logic of the age and brought it to a close.
Chapter 2  
*Bachah(-yi) Shayṭān-i Ṭabī‘at*: State Formation and the Legacy of Lawlessness

The decade-and-a-half period prior to the ouster of Aḥmad Shāh (1898-1930/1315-48 gh./r. 1909-25/1327-44 gh.), the final monarch of the Qājār dynasty (1785-1925/1199/1200-1344 gh.), and the accession of Rizā Shāh, the founder of the Pahlavī dynasty (1925-1979/1304-1357 sh.), was a time in which "great expectations were wilting,"\(^{152}\) and "a serious malaise had set in."\(^{153}\) Parliamentary deadlocks, a resurgent tribalism, foreign invasion and economic exploitation, provincial autonomy and associated secessionist movements,\(^{154}\) social disintegration, and, among other factors that were conducive to a generalized state of disorder, a stagnation in cultural production, all led to a territorially compromised state similar to the one the Qājārs faced and restored in the late eighteenth century.\(^{155}\) Conditions were so deleterious that in dividing active political tendencies of the time one has been coined "the forces of chaos."\(^{156}\) The First World War hastened the deterioration of the constitutionalist ethos but the end of hostilities did little to encourage its stifling. This being said, the overwhelmingly accepted position is that the coup d'etat led by Rizā Khān offered the authoritarian leverage needed to lasso in the prevailing entropy.\(^{157}\) The purpose of this chapter is to offer to the proponents of this stance a counterintuitive rejoinder that reverses their ultimate conclusion. Rather than understanding Rizā Khān's rise as being correlative to a dissipation of the chaotic condition, post-war Iran should be observed from the standpoint of ideology where the state's function in preserving entropy through the very act of rehabilitation is obscurely nestled. Not only does early Pahlavī-era demonology reveal the workings of this logic, the latter also retroactively explains the

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\(^{154}\) Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 102-3.


\(^{156}\) Katouzian, "State and Society under Reza Shah," 17.

unprecedented alterations in the internal dynamics of traditional demonomy, i.e. the pneumatological domain in which evil spirits run amuck. During this period, when rapacious or generally nefarious occult, mythical or animalistic beings rooted in the pneumatological order are deployed by Iranians—though they may invariably appear to be manifestations of a premodern religiosity—they must be recognized as being overdetermined by a very specific historical trauma.¹⁵⁸

Scholars of the early twentieth century are keen on conveying how quixotic reformists desiring the truth of cyclical history to reveal itself in a sense adumbrated the later arrival of Rīzā Khān as the strong-armed rejuvenator of the Iranian nation. Indeed, the narrative of cyclisism is one of the defining features of Perso-Islamic historiography, along with its preoccupation with eschatological expectationalism, but this is not the sole category of temporality that was taken into account in early post-constitutional Iranian history. The customary supplement to cyclism was conveniently located in the idea of *modernus* with its unforgiving split with the past,¹⁵⁹ but even though cyclism absorbed modern temporality into its folds by declaring the nationalist Pahlavī epoch to be the cycle in which the recent past is irrevocably cut off from any determinative engagement with the present, the ancient pre-Islamic past was thought to be open to being integrated into the essential fibre of the nationalist era. Construed by materialist historiography to be the "myth of historicism,"¹⁶⁰ even this idea of reconstituting the ancient past in the present (which in many senses resembles the Renaissance adoration of antiquity)¹⁶¹ lacks justification as the definitive marker of the epochal understanding of temporality. What demonological analysis reveals is the way the fulfillment of cyclical history in the form of a new dynasty, the restoration of an ancient lifeworld, and the shunning of recent decay, was an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the trauma of being birthed in and through a miasmic point of origination where the "latent content"¹⁶² of reality was informed by a complete indifference to time.

¹⁶² See Sigmund Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," in *SE IV-V*. 
What is being posited here in this project is the idea that the early-Pahlavī period introduced the possibility of an "atemporal structure acquir[ing] causal efficacy within the present." In other words, there was something specific about the lawlessness of the 1910s and early 20s that allowed it to remain impervious to any disciplinary measure, and this was its equivalence to a conception of Nature both indifferent and blind. The "unnatural growth [...] of the natural" has been construed as being a definitive mark of modernity, but here one is not simply referring to the unnecessary intrusion of the private realm into the public. There is a feeling that within Nature's domineering presence, there is encapsulated the "totalizing chaos" of modernity.

Because the nationalist state that surrounded the person of Rizā Khān emerged out of this entropic situation, it was indelibly stained by it. What is both peculiar and inviting about this notion of "matter [...] thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force" is that in between the particles, lying within the crevices of icebergs, inhabiting the pupils of every rapacious beast, and every dimension of a mindless Nature are the members of traditional demonomy. In the intellectual literature of the time, these scions of traditional demonism found themselves at home in this understanding of a monolithic Nature. For all intents and purposes, the new state was a product of the demonism it was keen on initially destroying, and this is why the truth of the period lies in the works of Ṣādiq Hidāyat where the act of suicide coincides with the literary recognition of inexorable inner demons (the conflict with demons is simultaneously an assault on the self).

Going beyond the early modern European understanding of demonic epistemology and its superior grasping of the natural order, demons in early-Pahlavī Iran are found within, are stand-ins for, and are expressions of Nature in its uncompromising striving. Rather than account

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for the genealogical movements that permitted this alliance between the demonic and a heedless Natural realm to form, the present and following chapters are more preoccupied with the way a whole cluster of social forces within the roughly two-decade span of the early-Pahlavī period encountered, accounted for, and integrated into their systems the new demonological topography. The most troubling and enduring problematic involves the fact that although the new dynastic state was born in and through the lawless order, according to the opinions of functionaries, reformist apologetics, and the pontifications of the state itself, the Pahlavī enterprise is situated outside and in opposition to a withering malaise. Even though state resources were allocated towards the repression of this primal moment, it nevertheless served as its "condition of possibility."¹⁶⁸

The notion of lawlessness (bīʾqānūnī) is clearly present in the intellectual literature of the time but it should not be confused as a mere unalloyed duplication of antecedent paradigms of evil. For example, though the critique of phenomenal reality as it is embodied in the quarrelsome world-demon (jahān khvud yikī ḍīv-ī patīyārah'īst)¹⁶⁹ may reflect the intense pessimism of the quotidian, a mark of the late-Qājār period, to speak of a world-demon and its oppositional capacity smacks of the traditionalist register.¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, it is not enough to simply say that if the world reveals a smooth path (rāh-i hamvār) to you, know that it is not (maraw khīrah kun

¹⁶⁸ As Slavoj Žižek puts it, "The philosopher who was the first to elaborate this non-historical kernel of historicity was F.W.J. Schelling: his relevance to today's debate on historicism resides in his notion of the primordial act of decision/differentiation (Ent-Scheidung), of the gesture that opens up the gap between the inertia of the prehistoric Real and the domain of historicity, of multiple and shifting narrativizations. This act is thus a quasi-transcendental unhistorical condition of possibility and, simultaneously, a condition of the impossibility of historicization. Every 'historicization', every symbolization, must 're-enact' this gap, this passage from the Real to history." See Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 2008), 66.


¹⁷⁰ In what Whitney S. Bodman calls the "Shayṭānī mode" Satan's strictly formalistic oppositional mandate is derived from "the combat myth of the ancient Near East in which good and evil are symbolized, even incarnate, in figures in perpetual opponent of humankind." See Whitney S. Bodman, The Poetics of Iblīs: Narrative Theology in the Qurʾān (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 19. Though there are, of course, instance in which traditional demonological motifs spillover into the current period under study, the basic premise of this chapter is that through syncretic strategies, a new paradigm of evil is confronted.
What is more salient and applicable to the time period is not the logic of contradictory intentions, but, as the following example clearly shows, the escape into incoherence. As one anonymous writer put it, while Ṣaḥḥāk, the ancient mythical progeny of Ahrīman, the Zoroastrian hypostasis of evil, maintained his dominion over Iran with what was expected of an unmerited usurpation, his sovereignty at least had the benefit of having "limits to its injustices" (ẓulm-i ū ḫad va nahāyatī dāshah) and was based on some semblance of lawfulness (bāz az rū-yi yik qānūni būdah). Due to the utter chaos that had been rot during the late 1910s and early 20s, reality was not distinguishable from a "nightmarish illness" (milat-i Īrān bih maraž-i kābūs muhtalā shudah). There was no space adequate enough to speak of poetry (sh’ir), literature (adab), science (’ilm) or industry (ṣan’at) when the nation was experiencing the agony of death (bi’ḥāl-i niza’ awftādah). Through artifice (makr va ...) Ahrīman and demonic individuals (mardumī dīv khūy) were able to steal Iran's prestige (ābirū) and religion (dīn), thus creating a situation in which the hypostasis of evil became the village headman (kadkhudā) of the national realm. In one instance, when Bakhtīyārī rulers of the Iṣfahān region are the focus of attack by the poet Vahīd Dastgirdī (1879-1942/1298-1361 gh.), their unjust governorship is described as sequential (bih nawbat-i yikī ba’az dīgarī) and a chief tribal notable named Naṣīr Khān, sardār-i jang (commander of war), is said to be in excess of the oppression unleashed by the likes of Ṣaḥḥāk and is similar to Genghis Khan.

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172 For a discussion of Ṣaḥḥāk in the *Shāhnāmah* [The Book of Kings], the eleventh century Persian poet Firdawsī's epic, see Francesca Leoni, "The Revenge of Ahriman: Images of Dīv in the *Shāhnāma*, ca. 1300-1600" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2008), 116.
175 Ḥ. Shajarah, "Hijāb-i Āftāb [The Sun's Veil]," *Armaghān* 2 (1936/7/1315 sh.): 141-2.
176 This notion of sequential rulership by undesirables is prominent in that the nationalist movement of the time stretched the lineage back by millennia. In a more recent description, it is remarked that while constitutionalists of the early twentieth century (active during the revolution of 1905-11/1322/3-29/30 gh.) were able to rebuff (daf’) the sedition (fitnah) of Ṣaḥḥāk the Turk (meaning the lesser autocracy [istibdād-i ṣaghīr] of Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāh [1872-1925/1289-1343 gh./r. 1907-09/1324-27 gh.] who represents the Turkic Qājār dynasty), the wolf cub was released (rahā kard gurgzādah) upon the world. See Adīb Bāyẓā’ī Kāshānī, "Mushāhidāt-i Sī Sālah [Observations of the Past Thirty Years]," *Armaghān* 8 (1930/1/1309 sh.): 624.
(Changīz Khān, d. 1227/r. 1206-27) and his Mongol raiders (Changīz va Mughūl).\textsuperscript{177} Muḥammad Kāmgār Pārsī, the poet whose reproach of the world we first observed, can be redeemed if we acknowledge the conceptual syncretism that was also taking place during the period. While he is steadfast in portraying the world-demon in an oppositional mode, a traditional satanological motif, he is also squarely within this historical period when he advises the reader to avoid following (payravī) Ahrīman because he will lead you down a long path, the end (pāyānash) and secrets (rāz) of which will never become manifest (padīdār).\textsuperscript{178}

From this small sample, a few points can be discerned. (i) As opposed to conventional designations of embodied evil including its antinomic disposition, the intention to misguide, a haughty attitude especially with respect to humans, and a teleological focus on the creation of injustice, the evil that is portrayed here has a superlative quality about it. Unlike secular redemptive politics where evil is a superlative insofar as it is beyond the "bad and shocking,"\textsuperscript{179} evil here is that which is beyond the conventional understandings of evil where an "actual motive force"\textsuperscript{180} is discernable. In being subjected to superlative characterization, evil is in a sense simplified of its traditional complexity, betraying in this narrow measure its congruence with the Islamic understanding of Necessary Being or Essence.\textsuperscript{181} However, in opposition to divinity, there is no design to the movements of this evil. (ii) In the same way that this maleficence is of transcendent rank, the mysteries of its presence are equally inaccessible. In spite of this, the truth of the matter is that there is nothing to be divulged in the first place, for the path to the so-called truths is never-ending. In this case, it is not simply enough to say that evil is "an untimely echo of what was formerly experienced as good—the atavism of a more ancient ideal,"\textsuperscript{182} but rather

\textsuperscript{177} Dastgirdī, "Dād – Sitam," 3-4.
\textsuperscript{178} Pārsī, "Nikūhish-i Jahān," 61-2.
\textsuperscript{181} Mehdi Ha'iri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 120.
that it has no meaning at all. (iii) Because of the all-encompassing nature of this demonism, the possibility of productive activity is foreclosed due to the suffocating presence of purposelessness and fragmentation. The world and reality itself are simply iterations of a "striving and aimless flight." This, of course, is different from simply saying that evil is synonymous with the world for even after the latter's obliteration, the evil striving will persist. (iv) There are successive generations of this evil that seem to indicate its eternity. Not only is this reflected in the rhetoric of political critique, it also appears within the novel, empirical and universal understanding of human history as opposed to the conventional mythico-religious chronological narrativization of human development. Running concomitantly with the rise of socio-political critiques incorporating within themselves the understanding of a lawless and timeless Nature as a hostile force was the emergence of a relatively new form of historicizing that placed an eerily similar conception of Nature at the very beginnings of human experience as a species during the paleolithic period or pre-antiquity generally. And during a time when different approaches to historical periodization were competing for pre-eminence, a novel but syncretic conception of history that dilutes the empirical with the experiential and the cyclical with the timeless, started to emerge. The threatening Nature of the paleolithic period had manifested itself in the 1910s as the experience of total ontological fragmentation.

On the eve of Rizā Shāh's abdication, Mīrʾsipāsī in 1940/1/1319 sh. took the liberty to describe in broad strokes the history of psychology. Speaking of pre-antiquity, he claims that in life the principle of fear (asl-i tars va vaḥshat) was dominant (ḥukmfarmā) and because the "thought of man" (fikr-i bashar) did not have the proper weapons (aslaḥah´hā) and shelter (khānah) to develop beyond this condition, he had to resort to the explanation of supernatural forces (quvā-yi khāriq al-ʿādah). The basis of this fear is thought to be the close proximity to "Nature and all the great awe" (tabī'at va tamām-i 'azimat va haybat-i ān) it induces. The dread inspired by natural

184 Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 92.
185 Mīrʾsipāsī, "Qānūn va Bīmārān-i Rūḥī [Law and the Psychologically Ill]," *Majmūʾih-yi Ḥūqūqī* 1 (1940/1/1319 sh.): 10.
evil is indeed one which has captured the minds of thinkers for millennia\textsuperscript{186} and though unspoken, Mīr’sipāsī joins the collective gesture of the late-Qājār period in raising the spectre of natural evil in a different guise. He recounts how prior to the rise of the Pahlavī dynasty, he came across a stable in which the insane were held outside the northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad. Without any amenities or support care, Mīr’sipāsī vociferates over the inexcusable conditions and applauds the Pahlavī state for adequately addressing the issue of deficient mental healthcare.\textsuperscript{187}

This dilapidation runs part and parcel with hitherto customary understandings of pre-scientific and even pre-Islamic psycho-pathological etiology where jin'zadigī or spirit possession was considered the norm. According to this approach, the source of insanity are the malignant spirits who find their way into the human body.\textsuperscript{188} Like beasts of burden, the mad were often corporally abused for the purpose of exorcizing these beings.\textsuperscript{189} By bringing up this example of late-Qājār neglect, Mīr’sipāsī was implicitly locating a traditional demonological motif (jinn-possession) within a morally inhospitable Natural order (stable where horses and other animals are housed) and connecting that with a contemporary grievance (neglect of mental health concerns). In a sense, the memory evokes the intimate ancient nexus between man and Nature mentioned earlier without reducing it to that logic. Now, the nexus has incorporated within itself the presence of occult beings. Thus, while Dastgirdī is careful to point out that the period's "ruin (kharābī va vīrānī) is not the effect of a flood (bar āsār-i sayl) or the consequence of an earthquake (dunbāl-i zilzilah),"\textsuperscript{190} it is nonetheless the case that Iranian poets, social critics, thinkers and other members of the intelligentsia were participating in the construction of a philosophy of Nature that attempted to convey the exact opposite position, and it is this understanding which would come to haunt the first Pahlavī state throughout its existence.

\textsuperscript{187} Neiman, \textit{Evil in Modern Thought}, 12.
\textsuperscript{188} Amira El-Zein, \textit{Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009), 74.
\textsuperscript{189} El-Zein, \textit{Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn}, 86.
\textsuperscript{190} Dastgirdī, "Dād – Sitam," 3.
Voiced grievances against the riotous (āshūb) state of affairs of the time became entwined with fatalistic musings about the insensitivity of the skies (bī’mihrī-yi āsimān), thus allowing temporal issues to not be allayed but rather aggravated by permitting Nature to take on some responsibility. However, the moment Nature is made partially liable for the late-Qājār malaise, there is a spontaneous spillover into its utter indifference and distance from human intentionality. After all, when Nature is evoked in these writings one is not speaking of the "Whole of phenomena, of phenomenal reality, insofar as it is held together by (and subject to) universal laws." Rather, as is evident in this example, by stating that Iran's garden (gulistān-i Īrān) has become a place of weeds (khārzār), one is pointing directly at an indifferent component of reality that spreads outward in any which direction without purpose. Similar to the way in which the national domain is portrayed as being consumed by weeds, it is also said to have turned into a "thicket (bīshah) full of predatory creatures (jānivar’hā-yi darrandah) who are naturally (tab’an)" inclined towards consuming one another. Here, the traditional concern that demonic hordes are capable of breaching the divine earthly kingdom is combined with the novel observation that the environment (in this case the bīshah) is implicated in the dispossession of royal authority (ikhtīyār) and the negation (salb) of Iranian life (jānī) and property (mālī). In another poetic work, the scorpion (‘aqrab) is presented as a being that is not inherently malicious (khabīs) or tyrannical (bidādgar), suggesting not simply an eschewal but rather an incognizance of moral categories. In a stanza from Firdawsī's Shāhnāmah, re-published in 1927/8/1306 sh., a similar point is conveyed when Zāḥḥāk is portrayed as a "strong cow with agalactosis" (gāv-i purmāyah-

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194 Anonymous, "Risālah-yi Majdiyah," 539.

195 This notion will be expanded upon in a future manuscript.

196 Anonymous, "Risālah-yi Majdiyah," 539.

197 Anonymous, "Musābiquḥ-yi Adabī: Hiya al-Dunyā Fa’ḥẓūrūhā [Literary Contest: This is the World, So Avoid It]," Armaghān 4 (1931/2/1310 sh.): 256.
yi kam’dāyah), a term which simultaneously communicates the irrational and incorrigible momentum of Nature (the strong cow) with an anemic teleology (inability to lactate and thus nourish its progeny towards a designated endpoint). What is paradoxical is that during a moment when issues of accountability, modernization, and the rule of law were prominent topics of the reform movement, an unruly conception of Nature incapable of being reined in was being buttressed. Ḥusayn Kāẓim’zādah Īrānshahr (1884-1962/1301-1381 gh.), an impassioned writer of the time, sought to reverse this conceptual movement:

… they say that Nature (ṭabī’at) is impervious (nimīdānad) to mercy (raḥm) and compassion (muruvvat), and that it does not recognize (nimī’shināsad) equity (inṣāf) and justice (‘idālat). It is here where they suppose (pindārand) that it is the hand of fate (dast-i qazā va qadar) which spreads (mīgustarad) all these things (basāt) and that the will of eternity (irādah-yi azalī) gives rise (ijād mīkunad) to all these occurrences (pīsh āmad’hā), injustices (zulm’hā), and calamities (balā’hā)! Not in the least (ḥāshā va kalā)! The divine will (mashīyyat-i ilāhī va dast-i qudrat-i khudā’ī) would never allow (ravā nimidārad) abjectness (ẓil lat), adversity (badbakhtī), and aberration (gumrāhī) to befall His creations (āfarīdigān-i khvud), for they are nothing but the rays of his light (asha’ah-yi nūr) and the reverberations (in’ikāsāt) of his power (qudrat).

Īrānshahr here brings up the topic of fatalism which has a long and storied history in the annals of Iranian thought. From the fifteenth century Nuqtavī anthropocentric materialist undermining of the fatalistic attitude through the positing of a self-determinative subject to Muḥammad Rizā Shā h Pahlavī’s (1919-80/1298-1359 sh./r. 1941-79/1320-57 sh.) commitment to pre-destination and from the Zoroastrian Middle Persian text Ārdāvīrzāznāmah and its critique of

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198 Firdawsī quoted in Mujtabā Mīnūī, "Jashnhā-yi Īrānī: Mihrigān [Iranian Celebrations: Mihrigān, (or the Fall Equinox)]," Taqaddum 4 (1927/8/1306 sh.): 235.

199 Notice how in the previous episteme this verse would have simply implied evil’s inevitable defeat, or weakness behind the facade of strength.

200 Ḥusayn Kāẓim’zādah Īrānshahr, "Qismat-i Falsafī: Āyandah-yi Bashar (3) [Philosophy Section: The Future of Humanity (3)]," Īrānshahr 6 (1926/7/1305 sh.): 322.

201 Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism, 81.

"the laxity of the Parthian period" and the rise of a fatalistic sentiment\(^{203}\) to the way Marxist works such as George V. Plekhanov's (1856-1918) *The Role of the Individual in History* and in particular their embedded notions of free will and determinism were translated into Persian in the 1950s,\(^{204}\) fatalism has been negotiated with in a number of nuanced ways. What is ultimately missed in Irānshahr's rejoinder though is how during this period another formation is being introduced. Here, the fatalistic conception of an indifferent Natural order is for the most part being integrated into a novel demonological paradigm insofar as the former is construed as being inhabited by traditional Perso-Islamic avatars of evil. Additionally, Nature's fatalistic presence is not intended to directly smite God and His overarching benevolence, for the latter continues to reign in the form of the secularized religion of the state and the role of Rizā Shāh as redeemer. In an uncomfortable and temporary compromise, Nature and divine design come to parallel one another in the sense that while Nature looms forth as the originator of the epoch, the state treats itself and this force as competitors within a traditional combat narrative in which the true vindicators of divine morality triumph over the forces of chaos. There is here a fundamental misapprehension regarding the nature of the timeless force with which the new dynastic enterprise is entangled.

The confrontation between Nature as demonic chaos and the secularized designs of the new state represents a contortion of the conventional debate surrounding fatalism and predestination within the Islamic tradition. The question repeatedly posed is whether or not fate as a pre-Islamic extraction is reconcilable with Islamic predestination. Especially during periods of sublime beatitude, the state of the world is considered to be result of a predestined plan outlined by a merciful God, but extended sessions of duress are more likely to be blamed on Time (*dahr*) which is, more often than not, associated with a cruel and boundless Nature. While attempts have been made to theoretically have Time absorbed into the universality of Islamic predestination, by being aligned with misfortune, Time is naturally transformed into the womb of demonomy in


potentia. When demonism in Nature (as an extension of Time) was actualized in the early twentieth century, it symbolically heralded the move of Satan and his associates away from the realm of ethics to ontology as Nature. Here, Kāmgār Pārsī's statement "jahān khvud yikī dīv-i patīyārah"īst" can be doubly redeemed by allowing it to represent an example of demonism's unity with world as Nature. In the end, what partly made the late-Qājār situation unique was that the emergence of Time as an implaccable force coincided with the staunch modernist desire for rejuvenation--to combat that which had always meant to be endured.

The anti-imperialist perspective has been discussed as being the new front of a secularized fatalism and paranoia, but it is my contention that while there was indeed the emergence of a secularized fatalism during the early half of the twentieth century, when for instance there was a "crossing over of Marxism not only with nationalism but also with older metaphysical and religious notions of destiny, fatalism, and divine providence," the focus of late-Qājār and early Pahlavī-era demonology was an indifferent and purposeless Natural realm that was in the process of absorbing within itself the fragmentary condition of the nation. This took place without compromising the integrity or place of a religio-mythical messianism for the saviour complex would come to serve an integral function as the primordial myth of the religion of the state. As will become evident in the next section, panegyric and apologetic accounts meant to assuage royalist sentimentalism by depicting Rizā Shāh’s universal suppression of aimlessness within the Iranian domain do not for the most part confront the perpetuity of this lawlessness due to their fixation on traditional combat narratives.

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205 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, 140.
206 As the socialist Khafi Maliki (1903-1969/1282-1348 sh.) put it, "Some ... individuals who suffer from imperial-struckness ... do not even think in terms of reform, let alone take any steps towards it. This group of politics-mongers and intellectuals who suffer from the paranoia of the omnipotence of imperialism and the impotence of Iranians (and similar peoples), must justly be called imperial-struck. It is very difficult to argue with those who suffer from this sickness." Quoted in Homa Katouzian, Iran: Politics, History and Literature (New York: Routledge, 2013), 87.
207 Matin-asgari, "Marxism, Historiography and Historical Consciousness in Modern Iran," 308.
While panegyric and apologetic literature of the first Pahlavī period is triumphalistic in its appraisal of the state's disciplinary and reorganizational measures, such as when Rīzā Shāh is credited for converting (gasht) through his majesty (mahābatash) the land of hell (dūzakh mulk) into paradise (mīnū), there is almost a complete unwillingness on the part of authors within this genre to contemplate the repercussions of the new phase of Iranian demonology as it is rooted in Nature. This incognizance led apologetics in the direction of the traditional conflict narrative in which demonism was structurally susceptible to defeat, such as in "the rebel variant of the combat myth." The mythical template that is said to be infused within the collective consciousness of Iranians consists of heroic kings (pādishāhān-i 'ażīm al-sha'n) such as Jamshīd, Firaydūn, Kayqubād and Kaykhusraw and other exemplary personalities such as Kāvah, Qāran, Gīv, Gūdarz, Rustam and Isfandīyār who were able to protect the lives (jān), property (māl), reputation (‘irz̤), and honour (nāmūs) of their people against malefactors including Ṣāḥḥāk and Afrāsīyāb. More than other elements within indigenous lore, it is said that Iranians are acutely aware of the self-defeating roles played by characters such as the White Demon (Dīv-i Sīfīd) and Afrāsīyāb, and when this knowledge is combined with examples of heroism drawn from Islam and imamology in particular, what is left is a set of cognitive tools ill-fit to confront the refined demonism of the early twentieth century. Consequently, the ideological apotheosis of Rīzā Shāh along the lines of this aforementioned template did not serve as a theoretically viable strategy in engaging with a conception of evil situated outside traditional divine cosmology. The irreconcilable difficulty that arose from this quandary forced the malfunctioning of the genre of apologetics, in that in the midst of the narratives that attempted to credit the monarchy with the

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expulsion of evil from Iran's domain, the state itself was forced to concern itself with its original and indefatigable basis.

While it has been argued that Rizā Shāh never "acquired divine status among his subjects," a certain "supernatural agency" was nevertheless attributed to him by his supporters, lending to his deification. Additionally, the symbolism reflecting his rise to glory is inspired in part by the inevitability of the seasonal cycle. The arrival of Nawrūz, or the much celebrated spring equinox, is marked by the emergence of the "triumphant star" (akhtar-i fīrūz), a symbol that is certainly reserved for the monarch. Yet, due to the exigencies that arise out of the new demonological formation, the underlying truth behind the antinomy between traditional combat narrative and a transformed demonism is that Rizā Shāh is devoid of actual potency. The paradox is that when the secularized statist religion comes to fruition, it is from its inception absolutely cut off from absolute power due to this irreconcilability. Similar to the rise of Protestantism in Europe when in the reformed Christian church the Devil attained unparalleled pre-eminence relative to his past forms due to the abnegation of the class of ecclesiasts who had previously helped in containing evil forces, in Iran it was the ideological unwillingness to fully accept the restructured state's origins in the recent past which allowed for a similar growth to take place. As will become evident in what follows, in its very attempt to extricate itself from its lawless condition of existence ("[t]he light of revelation, like other lights, requires a certain amount of darkness as an indispensible condition") the Pahlavī state actually integrates itself into the anarchic Natural order.

217 As Markus Gabriel puts it, "... the very idea of a free-floating solipsistic ego constructing the world out of nothing turns out to be intrinsically incoherent as soon as we realize that the subject itself becomes part of the world,
In 1937/8/1316 sh. the head of the Ministry of Education (Vizārat-i Ma'ārif) phrased Riżā Shāh's emergence in this way: "Suddenly (nāgahān), in the midst (mīyān) of this darkness (tārīkī) and dreadful misfortune (badbakhtī-yi havālnāk) there appeared a luminous flare (mash'al-ī furūzānī namāyān gardīd) who we all know (mīshināsīm) and praise (mīparastīm)."218 What is germane is that while others highlight the monarch's sanctification as a divinely inspired and invincible hero (Khudāvand farmān-ī ṣāḥib/qirānī/bi h mardī sar az āsimān bugẕarānī),219 Riżā Shāh is here not portrayed as having descended from a transcendental realm to serve an eschatological function (even though the flare here may very well be the "light of God" [Yazdān],220 "eternal star" [sitārah-ī jāvīdān],221 or "effulgent star" [sitārah-ī dirakhshān]222 mentioned in other works).223 Rather, part of the very nothingness it supposedly has to transform into a world." See Markus Gabriel, "The Mythological Being of Reflection - An Essay on Hegel, Schelling, and the Contingency of Necessity," in Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism, by Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek (London: Continuum, 2009), 22-3.

218 Valīyullāh Naṣr, "Khulāṣah-ī Nuṭq-ī Jināb-ī Āqā-ī Duktur Naṣr Mudīr Kull-ī Vizārat-ī Ma'ārif dar Jashn-ī Āmuzishgāh-ī Akābir 17 Day [A Summation of a Speech Given by His Excellency and Gentleman Dr. Naṣr, the Head Minister of the Ministry of Education During a Celebration at an Adults Academy on the Seventeenth of Day]," Ta'lim va Tarbiyat (Āmūzish va Parvarish) 9-10 (1937/8/1316 sh.): 506.


220 Shajarah, "Ḥijāb-ī Āftāb," 142.

221 Mīr'sipāsī, "Qānūn va Bīmārān-ī Rūḥī," 12.

222 Nāṣir Āzādpūr, "Khaṭābah: Īrān va Mādar [Speech: Iran and Mother]," Armaghān 2 (1936/7/1315 sh.): 164.

223 Though more affiliated with a nationalism of a pre-Islamic persuasion, there are also instances when Riżā Shāh is positioned as a typological figuration of notable Islamic figures, including the Prophet Muhammad. For example, it is described that during the period of jāhiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) the salvific sun (āftāb-ī saʿādat, symbolizing the Prophet) arose which resulted in the powerful Ahrīman removing his claws of injustice and deviancy (panjah-yi ẓulm va zīlālat) from humanity's neck (garībān-ī bashar). See Muḥammad 'Alī Khalīlī, "Muqaddamah [bih 'Arab dar Īrān'] [An Introduction (to 'The Arabs in Iran')]," Armaghān 5 and 6 (1928/9/1307 sh.): 366. Referring to Riżā Shāh in a similar way may hint at such a derivation.
he is said to have emerged from the darkness in order to deal with the darkness in an almost self-reflective manner, thus striking close to the core of the period's demonology. In a work congratulating Rizā Shāh's son, Muḥammad Rizā, on his wedding to Egyptian princess Fūzīyah Fuʿād (1921-2013/1300-92 sh.) in 1939/40/1318 sh., the nation is reminded of how it can look back in a jocular manner at the recent past (khvandah zad šubh-i sipīd az 'aqab shām-i sīyāh)—meaning precisely the period of darkness out of which Rizā Shāh emerged—for the king, in the form of the ancient mythical monarch Firaydūn, smashed the snake of Zāḥḥāk to the ground. However, there is a convoluted chronology involved in the extolment. While Rizā Shāh is said to have emerged from the distant past, what is occluded is his association with the near past (his actual point of origination). By being posited alongside revered monarchs of the past such as Khusraw I (Anūshirvān, 501-79/125/4-44 bh./r. 531-79/93-44 bh.) and Nādir (d. 1747/1160 gh./r. 1736-47/1148/9-60 gh.), the Pahlavī shāh is made asceptic to the late Qājār darkness and lawlessness, thus contributing to his nationalistic apotheosis. It is said that for eternity (abad) the enemy (khaṣm) will look back at these pages of history (ṣafḥah-yi tārīkh) and shake like straws (kāh)—just not the recent past! Relationally, the shāh is also credited for unfurling the Dirafsh-i Kāvīyānī, a royal standard signifying the glorious ancient past, after it had been tied up for hundreds of years due to the preponderance of Zāḥḥāk the Arab (a racialized

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224 In a story on the cause behind the spread of corruption published during this period, it is remarked that only Satan is the one capable of rebuffing himself (… Shaytān rā ghayr az Shaytān / nakunad daft u bas ḏī ast 'alāj …). When God offers to accept Satan's repentence if the latter decides to terminate the corruption he had created (mīkunam tawbah-yi pishnah at imrūz qabūl / pāk az ḏī ast lawz agar Alburz kunī āt fardā ). He gladly accepts the deal but ends up precisely doing the opposite of what he was told to do, resulting in the continued diffusion of depravity. See Vahīd Dastgirdī, "Yazdān va Jabrāʾīl [God and Gabriel]," Armaghān 5-6 (1928/9/1307 sh.): 283-4. Here, the inability to alter nature is underlined and thus in constant tension with the state's insistence upon the notion that it can create a model citizenry out of a lawless natural darkness.

225 Vahīd Dastgirdī, "Chakāmah-yi Shābāsh [An Ode to a Job Well Done]," Armaghān 1 (1939/40/1318 sh.): 2.

226 Vahīd Dastgirdī, "Chakāmah-yi 'Ilm va Jahl [An Ode to Knowledge and Ignorance]," Armaghān 8 (1926/7/1305 sh.): 498.
component of state ideology that will be discussed later on) who, in some cases is destroyed or routed (Zaḥḥāk rānī).  

Historical memory becomes selective in that while the ancient past is beaconing its presence, remembrance of the Pahlavī reliance upon the recent past fades with the tide. Thus, while individuals such as Farajullāh Bahrāmī who, in a commemorative address in front of the future site of the fourteenth century Persian poet Ḥāfiẓ's (c. 1326-90/727-92 gh.) tomb, speaks of how Ahrīman's presence has been substituted by that of Surūsh, the Zoroastrian angel of glad tidings, and that "discord has elapsed," the minister of education we encountered earlier, in an attempt to further fortify state ideology actually leaks a strategy that compromises the whole logic of absolute Pahlavī triumphalism. As he puts it, the efforts at reform instituted by the state are still insufficient, for "another form of darkness" (tārīkī-yi dīgar) continues to persist "among the people (dar mīyān-i mardum)," mainly "the gloom of ignorance and illiteracy (ẓulm-i jahl va bī'savādī)." Not only is there darkness after the reforms of the transportation infrastructure, law enforcement, industry, along with the complete revision of Iran's international standing, the notion itself is also gradational or in possession of classificatory distinctions. But what is the etiology of this darkness if it is not a manifestation of the imposing darkness that gave birth to the age?

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227 Adīb Bayzāṭī Kāshānī, Qaṣīdah, Armaghān 2 (1935/6/1314 sh.): 154.
229 Adīb Bayzāṭī Kāshānī, Qaṣīdah, 154.
Because the kernel buttressing the citizenry's anemic status was precisely the lawless Natural order out of which the Pahlavī dynasty arose, questions concerning their relationship were incorporated into key institutional and ideological strategies. The mere possibility of positing such a connection was made viable due in part to advancements in contemporary human ecological research, mainly by the "Chicago School of Human Ecology" in the 1920s.\(^{233}\) Arising out of naturalism's interest in the "interrelations and co-ordinations, within the realm of animate nature, of the numerous, divergent, and widely scattered species,"\(^{234}\) the competitive and self-preservative instinct exhibitable in animal life along with the organicism of both animal and botanical biospheres\(^{235}\) became operative in the sociological attempt to understand the manner in which "social equilibrium" was maintained.\(^{236}\) While the "environmental determinism" of the early twentieth century obscured many criteria, it nevertheless exposed the importance of appreciating human-environment interaction.\(^{237}\) What Pahlavī state ideology shared with the traditional human ecological perspective is the commitment to the attainment of social equilibrium under the pretext of a "closed system"\(^{238}\) while also being cognizant of the way an inherited environment (or the persistent and demonic ecology elided by state apologetics) can result in undesirable consequences. As an enterprise that severed itself from the failures of the Qājārs, the new state apparatus was indeed attempting to operate within a solipsistic bubble but it was nevertheless gripped by the challenge posed by an interrelational biosphere. How is one to deal with the (persistent) inheritance of the recent past when this very same past is propagated as being systematically annulled? Accordingly, in the same way that the original human ecological problematic arose out of the way capitalist crises were impacting "dynamisms of human


\(^{236}\) Park, "Human Ecology," 15.


\(^{238}\) Steiner, Human Ecology, 2-3.
interactions within their physical urban environs,"239 the new state's concern with the individual and his environment was engendered in part by the lingering lawlessness that survived into the new dynastic period.

As seen above, Pahlavī apologetics were geared towards the narrativization of absolute demonic excision, but this pocket of literature was contradicted by the imperative to mitigate the demons of illiteracy, drug-use, superstition, and the like, matters derivative of the supposedly excised demonism which clearly remains present. The state's human ecology was ideologically encumbered by this contradiction, for a dominant way the demonic remained operative was in the form of Nature as the reproductive substructure of the citizenry. This was the source from which all potential model citizens arise and to where all those go who fail to live up the expectations and mores of the state. Thus, while it has been claimed that "the advent of a national system of education represented the final dissolution of the boundary between state, society, and culture,"240 pedagogical systems also exposed the lurking presence of an inexorable lawlessness at the ontological substructure of society that already affected this dissolution. Indeed, the "return to a pristine modernity that was felt to exist within the deep reservoirs of Iranian tradition"241 may have been one of the aims of the new educational institutions, but what was the precise manner in which the nature of the child meant to be "socialized into a national culture"242 underwent conceptualization? There are two evident positions on this matter, one that is ideological and the other that reveals a demonological truth while attempting to remain fidelitous to the state's ambition to overhaul the education system.

First, sources inform us that the "light of talent and capability" (chirāgh-i isti'dād va qābilīyyat)243 exists in Iran in the form of children and that it is due to certain "obstacles" (mavān'i) that, in effect, lead to the "gradual diminishment of this light" (īn chirāgh bih tadrīj

241 Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, 89.
242 Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, 91.
The notion of an inherent talent is connected to a similar but ultimately different approach which suggests that "the soul of man [is] naturally created ... pure and uncontaminated" (rūḥ-i ādam dar āsl-i fiṭrat ... pāk va bī‘āla‘yish āfarīdah shudah) and that it is only due to a "corrupt environment" (muḥīṭ-i fāsid). Put in a different way, the soul of man is like a "magical breeze" (nasīm-i sihrī) that if blown through the "garden of knowledge and cultivation" (‘ilm va tarbīyat) will result in his growth. Obversely, if this same soul were to tread through the "sewer of illusions, superstitions, false ideas, corrupt instruction," (gandāb-i mawhūmāt va khurāfāt va ‘aqāyid-i fāsid) it would end up completely reflecting this putrescence. The first approach is, of course, preoccupied with the natural man of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), a philosopher amicably regarded by late nineteenth century reformers such as Mīrzā Fath ‘Alī Ākhūnd’zādah (1812-78/1227-95 gh.) and Mīrzā ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Ţalibūf Najjār Tabrīzī (1834-1911/1249/50-1329/30 gh.). The French thinker would also come to influence major thinkers of the earlier twentieth century, including Taqī Arānī, someone to whom we will return below. Rousseau's position pivots upon the natural goodness of the savage but the manner in which primitive man's devolution is theorized is also open to scrutiny, for how does a content individual deviate from the source of contentment? The second view that natural man will absorb and internalize whatever he is exposed to, even a foul

245 Sayyid Nūr al-Dīn 'Alavī, "Har Chah Hast az Māst [Whatever We Experience Is a Result of Our Own Doing]," Humāyūn 6 (1934/5/1313 sh.): 22.
247 Hairi, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, 44. See also Mazyar Lotfalijan, "Keywords in Islamic Critiques of Technoscience: Iranian Postrevolutionary Interpretations," in Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity, ed. Ramin Jahanbegloo (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 18.
249 As Rousseau puts it himself, "let us not conclude with Hobbes that because he has no idea of goodness man is naturally wicked, that he is vicious because he does not know virtue." See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Men or Second Discourse," in Rousseau: The Discourses and other early political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 151.
odour (bū-yi gand), ultimately upholds the notion of man as a *tabula rasa*, an idea which asserts the original permeability of individual mind and morality. While each approach is stationed upon divergent notions of epistemology, they both share similar characteristics in that (i) neither of them appreciate the significance of Nature's presence, that force which gave birth to the age, including the state (thus being its truth) and its subjects, and (ii) both are ahistorical in their almost care free adoption of Enlightenment theories pertaining to epistemology. While the following position is equally interested in the possibilities of modernization through the utilization of Europe's intellectual heritage, the rootedness of early-Pahlavī epistemology in Nature is revealed through the attempt to maintain the integrity of rational models of pedagogy, explanations behind designed curricula, and the role of the pedagogue himself.

ʻĪsá Ṣadīq (1894-1978/1273-1357 sh.), a major technocrat involved in the educational reformation of the Pahlavī period, presents an alternative view that will realign our attention back towards the demonological essence of the age. In 1925/6/1304 sh., he states that "from three years old onwards the toddler becomes extraordinarily active and, according to our expression, [can be called] Satan (az sīh sālagī bih ba’d ūlīf ādah fa’āl va bih istilāh-i mā Shaytān ast)." At this preliminary level there is already evident here a diametric opposition with the previously stated standpoints in that rather than a positive talent or intrinsic neutrality, there is an inherent demonic tendency within humans from the very beginnings of life and experience. Ṣadīq continues by saying that the child "has absolutely no experience, is not aware of Nature's laws, is extremely capricious, and finally, is completely devoid of internal moral regulations." In a sense, this is a complete replication of the earlier evinced lawless conception of Nature but on a different plateau. The child is no longer posited as the receptacle into which tradition must be poured but rather a pre-subjective entity that must be made to

251 'Alavī, "Har Chah Hast Az Māst," 22.
252 Locke, the proponent of this position, was one of the key thinkers liberal-nationalists of the early twentieth century used as a guide for their polemics. See Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 254.
253 Ṣadīq, "Tarbīyat-i Irādah [Cultivation of the Will]," *Ta’līm va Tarbīyat (Āmūzish va Parvarish)* 7 (1925/6/1304 sh.): 7.
According to the reformer, the child "will be in danger if his will is left to develop on its own through thought and experimentation" (ū rā bih hāl-i khvud guzārand tā kam'kam irādah-ash bih vasīlah-yi fikr va āzmāyish hidāyat shavad khatarāt-i bisyār barāyash dar pīsh khvāhad būd). To reiterate, the question is not so much how to preserve the inherent goodness of a child but how to contain an undomesticated vitality impervious to any moral injunction. In the pre-modern context, discussions revolved around how "the child saw the closeness of his house with that of the neighbors and the protective wall that surrounded all of them: to him, this represented the world of security against the hostile forces of nature and outsiders." Now, however, the child is a small piece of this irascible Nature. Constantly on the verge of self-destruction due to his unchoreographed movements, Ṣadīq agrees with Rousseau and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) that the child would be best off under the tutelage of Nature because "no instructor is superior to that of Nature for there is no other thing that is capable of awakening the human more than the consequences of its works" (hīch āmūzgārī bihtar az ṭabī'at nīst va hīch chīz insān rā bīsh az 'avāqib-i a'māl-i ū mutinabbah nimīkunad). In other words, there is a confrontation with the self in the form of externality.

Here, rather than deploy an abstracted model particular to eighteenth century Europe in an ahistorical manner, Ṣadīq engages with the model in a way that allows the truth of the historical context to shine through. Nature is the best pedagogue because for children it is their genus. In the same way that the child is in possession of a boundless hyperactivity, Nature too is able to counteract his momentum with an equal degree of boldness. Notwithstanding its capacity for Natural evils, it is precisely this overbearing Natural realm that is more capable of instructing children than, presumably, a fully robust state-engineered school curriculum. This is because "Nature is blind and its laws are merciless and indiscriminate" (ṭabī'at kūr ast va qavānīnash ... bī'raḥm va ... bī'taraf [ast]). Like an inexorable avalanche, Nature responds to any and all

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critiques (intiqād) a child may have with resolute negativity. It is Nature's *contingency of necessity* which is wholly acceptable to this great advocate of reformism. However, though the child may be *Shayṭān* and an excrescence of the demonic state of Nature out of which the Pahlavī state itself emerged, he must not be allowed to be exposed to the harm (*mażarāt*) Nature will inevitably bequeath to him. Indeed, the idea of preserving the health of the citizenry for the purpose of nation-building was a top priority for the state so while Ṣadīq came to admit to Nature's superior teaching method, he nevertheless opted to equivocate not simply to uphold the importance of life but also to reinforce the burgeoning state's ideological posturing concerning the cultivation of model citizens.

If we were to take a retrospective glance at the condition of the "old instructors" (*mu'allimīn-i qadīm*) it would become evident that while there were indeed "learned and spiritual individuals" (*ashkhās-i rawḥānī fāzīlī*) among their ranks, they were nevertheless deemed to be "lacking in intellect" (*kam'khirad*) due to their "high-degree of interaction" (*mu'ashirat-i zīyād*) with the "little children of Satan" (*bachahá-yi kūchak-i Shayṭān*). Similar to the way paleolithic man becomes exhausted in his daily confrontations with an all-powerful Nature, the grizzled instructor starts to resemble a stone statue situated along a coastline with tumultuous waves crashing against it, slowly chipping away at its form. While the author Buzurg 'Alavī in

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261 Žižek explains this construction in the following way: "The passage from nature to freedom can be rendered in terms of a very precise reversal of the dialectical relationship between necessity and contingency: 'nature' stands for the *contingency of necessity* (in nature, events occur necessarily, following inexorable laws; however, the very fact of these laws—why such a ratio between velocity and mass and not a different one—is utterly contingent, things are just like that, there is no 'why'), while 'freedom' stands for the *necessity of contingency* (freedom is not just blind contingency, an act is not free just because it is contingent, just because 'I could have decided otherwise'; in true freedom, my abyssal/contingent decision grounds a new necessity of its own, actualized in the chain of reasons—I acted in such and such a way for that reason ...)." See Slavoj Žižek, *Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012), 460.


264 Ṣādiq Rizāzādah Shafaq, "Hadaf va Ahammīyyat-i Maslak-i Āmūzigārī [The Aim and Focus of the Teaching Method]," *Ta'līm va Tarbīyat (Āmūzish va Parvarish)* 10 (1938/9/1317 sh.): 10.
1931/2/1310 sh. speaks of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) well-known Faustian gambit to acquire absolute knowledge through a pact with Satan, here we observe the obverse. With traditional education, the instructor has his powers reduced when in close proximity to the pint-sized shayāṭīn. There is a certain connection between freedom (ḥālat-i āzād), youth (ḥālat-i bachagānah), and the satanic that started to coalesce in a significant way during this period. It is this and other factors, including income range and social standing, which made teaching an undesirable profession.

The function of the teacher as the "sole true medium through which the views and teachings of the ancients are passed on, meaning the agent behind the survival of national unity" (tanhā vāsiṭah-yi ḥaqīqī-yi intiqāl-i 'aqāyid va ārā va ta'līm-i guz̤ashtgān y a'nī vasūlah-yi baqā-yi vaḥdat-i millī) may certainly be an inheritance of the traditional approach, but the primary focus is to reconstitute the citizen in such a way that he will inherit the nation's history in a specifically circumscribed manner. This cannot be done without children being expunged of their satanic origins by "always having individuals acting like angels on their shoulders overseeing their actions" (hamīshah ashkhāṣ mānand-i firishtgānī ki h dar rū-yi dūsh'hā-yi insān nāzir-i a'māl-yi ʿū hastand). At this juncture the way in which Nature's positioning alters in a telling way. While Ṣadīq earlier in his article considers Nature to be the superior pedagogue by virtue of the fact that it is indifferent, later the child is posited as being in relation to a natural law: it is unbecoming of a proto-Pahlavī citizen to "contravene nature or morality through [aberrant] behaviour" (bar khalāf-i ṭabīʿat yā akhlāq raftār kunad). There is thus a move away from Nature to the more gratifying notion of a natural law, and the fulfilled citizen is he who makes the successful transition from one to another.

267 Rizāzādah Shafaq, "Hadaf va Ahammīyyat-i Maslak-i Āmūzgārī," 11.
Physical education also played an important function in separating the child from his associations with the satanic and increasing the prospects of normalized socialization. Starting in the 1920s, physical education was becoming a focus for many pedagogical reformers in the Western world. Using John Dewey's (1859-1952) views on the matter as a foundation, American curricular reform wanted to allow "self-sacrifice, self-discipline, individual responsibility, interpersonal cooperation, and teamwork" to be sprouted through physical activity and sportsmanship. From the workers' sports programs under the auspices of organized labour, along with the shift from gymnastics to sports in school curricula in Europe and North America, to the increased participation of Chinese women in sporting activities later in the decade, and the Soviet introduction of mandatory physical education courses into schools and colleges during the same period, bodily exercise was becoming an important component of nation-building projects. The same can be said of Pahlavī-era Iran when the view was held that the disequilibrium between mind and body can lead to the degeneration of both. However, in prioritizing the importance of physical exercise, intellectuals of the time were also contributing to the transformation of demonological categories in an oblique manner. Indeed, it is the unscrupulous vitality inherent in the body of the child that partially contributes to his moniker Shayţān. In order to promote a functional and self-disciplined citizen capable of corporeal submission to the state's designs, the body must be wrenched from the notion that it is "the

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276 Schayegh, *Who is Knowledgeable is Strong*, 90.
function or creation of Satan and Ahriman (tābī yā makhlūq-i Shayṭān va Ahriman)."277 With this we enter the realm of demonism as a form of obscurantism and the diversion away from the earlier mentioned strategies. Let us enumerate upon these positions as a way to set up the following section.

(i) The first stance is closely related to the experience of post-constitutional fragmentation and the fallout of total war. Here, the underpinning source of dissolution is equated with and worked through the idea of an incorrigible and aimless Nature. However, within many instantiations of this lawless collection of forces the inhabitants of traditional demonomy can be found, whether they are in the form of personalities, beasts, or occult beings. Due to the novelty of the situation (total fragmentation within the midst of modernity), Iranian demonology went through a dialectical transformation in that the same way Nature took on the burden of evil, the traditional avatars of evil within Perso-Islamic civilization took on the eternal strivings of Nature.

(ii) The second position was for the most part localized within the the panegyric and apologetic literature of the time. In their support of a revivalist dynastic enterprise, authors of this genre operated through a mythico-religious paradigm that construed the lawlessness of the late-Qājār malaise in traditional terms. Misrecognizing the presence of Nature as another manifestation of bygone scions of evil, the triumphalism was thought to be absolute and unequivocal. However, at times when state functionaries, modernist reformists, or literary patrons went about joyfully bearing the weight of a victorious rhetoric, a leak would occur, thus betraying the truth of the new paradigm of evil, that its striving can persist even through the authoritarian machinations of an absolutist state.

(iii) This leads directly to the third position which is most evident in the literature of educational reform. In the context of discussions surrounding the notion of a bachah(-yi) Shayṭān, an implicit debate ensues over the concept of the natural. Replacing Nature is the idea of a stable inner nature that should be abided by. The transition is completed but is nevertheless fraught with difficulties. While the child is admitted to be a microcosmic reproduction of Nature, he must nevertheless abide by his inner nature to go beyond Nature. As will become evident further down

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277 'Alī Aṣghar Ḥikmat Shīrāzī, "Tarbiyat-i Jismānī [Physical Training]," Ta'līm va Tarbiyat (Āmūzish va Parvarish) 6 (1925/6/1304 sh.): 27.
below, prior to attaining the rank of an archetypal Pahlavī citizen, there is constantly the threat of subjects slipping back towards Nature. This is reflected most vividly in the figures of the jinn catchers, opium addicts, and veiled women.

(iv) In the position we encountered last, the transition from Nature to a stable and natural inner disposition is not even considered because another strategy is in operation. Here, the mere insinuation of demonism is equated with obscurantism. There is, in essence, an attempt at demystification where Nature is discharged of its causal role. Thus began a period of state-led and reformist oriented exorcism aimed at reversing the stupefaction associated with the mere presence of demonological logic within material reality. The struggle in the determination of Satan's place in the world would reach fever pitch during the Pahlavī period but even in the most rational of quarters, the presence of a lawless demonism can be felt.
Chapter 3

Chahār Khvān-i Tiknuluzhī: From Autonomous Organism to Divine Instrument of the State

Leading off from the final point made in the previous chapter, this section seeks to unravel the process of diremption that was at work during the first Pahlavī period, particularly within material reality. One of the more contentious aspects of the external world involved the way modern technologies originating in the West interacted with Iran's lifeworld (Lebenswelt) which is inclusive of Perso-Islamic demonomy. For example, when the word 'science' was translated into Persian as ‘ilm, it got caught up in the vortex of a pre-existing lexical geneology that was relatively "undisturbed by the miraculous [post-Enlightenment] advance of technology and communications." During the inchoate moments of modernization in early-nineteenth century Iran, modern technologies (primarily in the form of ballistics) too became embedded within an intricate vernacular, iconographic and semiotic network. In their interactions with the figures of traditional demonomy, the most enduring effect instantiated by new technologies was not the way the latter came to express the perennial wickedness of the world, but the way technologies divested demonism of its traditional telos, rendering it purposeless and allowing it to possess only a vacuous intensity. In other words, the diabolical technologies offered Iranians a glimpse into the lawlessness of Nature.

Prior to the violent separation that removed Perso-Islamic demonism from the orbit of modern technologies, the union between the two served as an instance in which scientific knowledge fused with the vernacular and semantics of demonism to give expression to Nature. It is my contention here that Nature's revelation would not have been possible if either side of the equation had the intention of iterating this result independently. As will become evident, the separation of the demonic from material reality was not clean-cut, for not only did both sides


irrevocably alter in structure, the product of their earlier amalgamation (in the form of Nature's revelation) became an added variable that complicated the situation. After a series of movements that first commenced in the nineteenth century but dramatically picked up pace with the rise of Rizā Khān, the diabolical technologies that once allowed Iranians access to Nature became the secularized divine technologies mandated to domesticate this realm of chaotic drives.

While the state's approach to subjective constitution and socialization exemplified not only that Nature is impervious to disciplining measures, but also that it was formally reinforced as the source of proto-citizens, its approach to modern technologies restaged the process by which its conditions of existence were earlier established. In other words, the four movements that will be encountered shortly represent how Nature was refigured as a collection of phenomena to be confronted externally, away from its original immanence. In being posited as an external force, Nature was transformed into an ecological problem that had to be engaged in a constant struggle with, even though, as ecology, it was the locus of the state's birth. The four movements are as follows: (i) When modern scientific knowledge in the form of novel technologies dialectically encountered and became entangled with Iranian demonism, the former bestowed onto the latter its indifference, coldness, and incommunicability, thus allowing for the manifestation of Nature. (ii) Following this was the recognition that after the intermingling of both sides, applied scientific knowledge had a greater determining role than the traditional occult sciences. Even after this admission had been made, the connection between the two sides was not torn asunder because Nature reemerged as a product of their union. Only the possibility of diremption was considered at this point. (iii) Here, the tie that once held modern technology and Iranian demonism firmly in place was forcefully cut by the state as the supreme possessor of technical know-how. Technology finally lost its speechlessness and aimless striving in exchange for absolute submission to the reigning monarch. (iv) Finally, Nature as the product of the former union became fully estranged from technology but was yet to relinquish its dependence on demonism. With this, Iranian demonology fully evolved to its new form, and technology became imbued with the secularized divinity of the state. The two reconfigured sides engaged in complete confrontation, though they experienced amnesia regarding their former unity. To begin, we explore the enigma of the snake-rifle as a reflection of the first movement.

A major ambition of the new Pahlavī state was to reduce the suspicion of modern technologies that had been quite rampant earlier during Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh Qājār’s (1831-1896/1247-1313 gh.)
reign, i.e. the Nāṣirī period (1848-96/1264-1313 gh.). One particular object that had been subject to the ire of the period's demonologists was the rifle. In order to understand why, one must return to the exigencies that marked the dawn of Iranian modernity. Successive Russian victories against Qājār armies in the early nineteenth century necessitated the overhaul of the armed forces under crown prince 'Abbās Mīrzā's (1789-1833/1203-49 gh.) Niẓām-i Jadīd (the New Army), including its selection of weaponry. 280 Not only did the confrontation with Russian rifles expunge all possible sense of security inhabitants of Iran might have once had, the overhead costs of incorporating such advanced weaponry into the army's arsenal resulted in the straining of state coffers, 281 thus adding to the accursed quality of the weapon. Because of the constant rotation of advisory teams which had resulted from altering diplomatic relations with host empires, technological variations became an inevitable problem for regiment arsenals. This was due to the fact that each separate mission brought with itself similar but variegated technologies that produced incompatibility issues. 282 Thus, even when the weapons were in Iranian hands, there were many times when they were inoperable, as if they were not meant for Iranian use in the first instance. Along with the drop off in domestic arms manufactures, 283 all these issues compounded to a boiling point where demonological discourse, already hunkered within the material realm, justified the inclusion of modern weaponry into its ranks of miscreants.

In a poem written sometime during the Nāṣirī period, Dāvarī Māzandarānī illustrates the features of the rifle's enigmatic features. He starts by pondering the identity of this entity which looks like a snake and is delightful to the senses, for even though it is not a reptile it sheds shells like one (chih nām dārad ān mār'shikl-i rū´īn' tan? / kih nīst mār va līkan chū mār muhrah'fikan). 284 Māzandarānī's attribution of an organic existence to the rifle feeds directly off of its perceived autonomous status during the period—a weapon that can determine the fate of an empire but

282 Cronin, "Building a new army," 77.
283 Cronin, "Building a new army," 79.
284 Dāvarī Māzandarānī, "Tufang [Gun]," Armaghān 5-6 (1927/8/1306 sh.): 301.
cannot be properly handled by its subjects. Additionally, this construction feeds off the traditional Islamic symbolism of the snake acting in a punitive capacity, but the crime that invokes its retributory intervention is either unknown or unknowable. The ancient credo "technology imitates nature" captures literally the condition of this entity if it were not the case that the original meaning behind this structural analogy is pivoted upon the concordance of a formal aim. \(^{286}\) Such a purposive vocation cannot be attributable to the snake-rifle. As one of the forms in which the *jinn* are said to take, the snake's equation with a modern weapon allows for the diabolical occult to announce its union with the rifle. The poet continues by saying that when this snake-like entity sheds its pearls, it emits fire and smoke from its mouth, thus further revealing its beautiful physique (\(bih\ vaqt-i\ muhrah/'fishānī\ zi\ kām\ ātash\ u\ dūd/\ hamī\ barāvarad\ Ŭn\ mār'shikl-i\ rū`īn'tan\)). \(^{288}\) Contrary to the wear and tear of actual hardware, the snake-rifle's self-activation actually increases its potency, thus fulfilling the snake's traditional regenerative quality. \(^{289}\) The demonism of the weapon allows it to transcend its degenerative essence by becoming an inscrutable *tour de force*.  

The poem goes on to describe how the shedded pieces trail the snake, rather than being left to rot (\(hamishah\ muhrah\ bih\ dūbāl\ būd\ mārān\ rā\)). \(^{290}\) Of course, this is in reference to the rifle's ammunition but it is also reminiscent of our previous discussion of early Pahlavī human ecology

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\(^{286}\) As Aristotle says in his Physics, "Now surely as in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if nothing interferes. Now action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g., had been a thing made by nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g., had been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way it is now by art; and if things made by nature were made not only by nature but also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. The one, then, is for the sake of the other; and generally art in some cases completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and in others imitates nature. If, therefore, artifical products are for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products. See Aristotle, "Physics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 199a9-199a19.


\(^{288}\) Dāvari Māzandarānī, "Tufang," 301.

\(^{289}\) Ruska, s.v. "Ḩayya."

\(^{290}\) Dāvari Māzandarānī, "Tufang," 301.
where the derivational link between a diabolical state of Nature and its progeny in the form of the Shayṭānī child is established. This link is further established when it is remarked that no sooner has the snake-rifle pumped out children from its womb does it again become pregnant (hamī bizāyad u gardad dubārah ābistan!!!).291 Rather than simply being impregnated, the snake-like entity spontaneously becomes pregnant in an ultimate moment of autonomous self-regeneration—for while pregnant women may need midwives, this one is completely self-sufficient (zanān-i hāmilah muḥtāj agar bih qābilah and / qabūl-i qābilah īn zan nakard sarv-i alan [sic]!!).292 This notion of a self-sufficiency that pushes the world away from it is also embedded in the traditional notion that a snake can sustain itself without necessarily feeding on existents. Simply through respiration can it continue living.293 When it gives birth, its relationship with its children is marked by a sense of primitive ferocity insofar as while other mothers feed their newborns milk, this one forces her offspring to suckle on the blood of her enemies (ghazā-yi kūdak agar shīr-i mādar ast chirā?! / khvurand khūn-i 'adū kūdakānsh jā-yi laban!!).294 Nature's shayṭānī child is likewise thrown into the world and meant to fester in his illusions and mindlessness—an equally violent springing into life.

Snakes are in the traditional discourse intrinsically "hostile to man",295 and the same affectation is conveyed in the frightened fighter who stands before the snake-rifle (kishad chū na'rah-yi hal min mubāriz az dil-i tang / ravān-i mard-i mubāriz bitūfād andar tan).296 During the period of pregnancy, when one would think that a mother is at its weakest, the snake-like entity is actually the most prepared for a vulgar display of power. In this moment, even the valiant eagle is unnerved (chū hāmilah'st bitarsad az ū 'uqāb-i dilīr).297 What contributes to this fear is the novelty of its appearance and what springs from its metal mouth (zi āhanīn dahanash ātashīn...
This novelty does not remain floating on its own for the poet allows it to become syncretically aligned with traditional avatars of evil.

Not even Ghengis Khan is capable of withstanding its attack (*muqāvimat nakunad pīsh-i ḥamlah´ash Changīz*). With this, the poet is not simply equating the rifle with a traditional avatar of evil, he is positing the two in direct opposition to one another and allowing the modern variant to supersede the older. Once this supersession is accomplished, the poet then moves on to equate this heightened power with another maleficent progenitor: Ahrīman. He does this when he describes the effect of the internal mechanism of the loaded rifle being struck to the manner in which fire and smoke emerge from Ahrīman's mouth (*zi intalā-yi shikam chun barāvarad ārugh / barārad ātash va dūd az dāhān chu Ahrīman*). There is here an unequivocal call for a new stage in demonological analysis because Ahrīman serves as the embodiment of that collection of forces given expression to by the amalgamation of applied scientific knowledge and traditional Perso-Islamic demonism. By inheriting this new power, Ahrīman does not simply remain the Zoroastrian hypostasis of evil, but has the potential to become the "founding force" behind the institution of the Law. This is because it is already appended to that variable which will eventually seek to realize his undoing—scientific knowledge. The second movement illustrates the way the latter, in the form of oil extraction techniques, attempts to attain its independence from the parasitism of the demonic.

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301 "… one should recall Freud's thesis on the correlation between repression and (unconscious) memory: the absolute crime cannot be properly 'forgotten' (undone, expiated and forgiven); it must persist as a repressed traumatic kernel, since it contains the founding gesture of the legal order - its eradication from the 'unconscious memory' would entail the disintegration of the very reign of law; this reign would be deprived of its (repressed) founding force. The reason why even the absolute power of the Spirit that nothing can resist - namely, its capacity of Ungeschehenmachen, of retroactively 'undoing' the past - is helpless in the face of this supreme crime is that this crime literally enforces the reign of Spirit: it is the Negative of the Spirit itself, its hidden support and source." See Slavoj Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor* (Verso: London, 2008), 208.
Situated during the lead up to the early 1930s when the Pahlavī state was nearing a full eclipse of all manifest forms of opposition, as the "legally constituted authoritarian government" was spilling over into a form of arbitrary rule that relied heavily upon the extra-judicial internal security apparatus, the second movement accounts for the first and violent attempt to have scientific knowledge removed from the altar of the demonic. The two moments of transition are thus aligned with one another, proving the synchronicty that exists between historical and conceptual movements. For Riżā Shāh the pretense of having to nominally abide by the strictures of tradition can now be dropped the same way applied scientific knowledge can be stripped of the traditionalism of the occult sciences. However, precisely because this is a moment of transition, modern technology remains shackled to the dictates of tradition.

In 1927/8/1306 sh. during a time when the ominous threat of British military intervention lingered as a possible reaction to any mitigations in the uninterrupted flow of oil to the great power, Malik al-Shu'arā Muḥammad Taqī Bahār (1884-1951/1302-70 gh.), along with other parliamentary representatives and ministers, visited two separate oil installations in the southwest operated by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 'Ibādān and Masjid Sulaymān. The poem that Bahār wrote on this occasion serves as a point of mediation within the interregnum that separated the emergence of the autonomous snake-rifle and the full cooption of modern technology. This is made clear in Bahār's remarks on what he sees in the barren deserts of the area. The diversion and sprouting up of the river Kārūn's water through the use of channeled fire (āb rā az kārūn bih bālā burdah’and), and the seemingly never-ending pipelines stretching throughout the desert (naft rā bā lūlah sargard-i biýābān kardah’and), should not be construed as being manifestations of any miracle-working or spell-binding activities (tā nagūţī mu’jiz ast īn

yā kirāmat yā kih sīhr). This strict delineation that separates modern engineering from the extraordinary marks a shift away from the thought that inspired the snake-rifle construction. Pre-modern occult practices can no longer unravel the secrets that had lain hidden for years within the heart of the earth (sāl'hā īn rāz pinhān būd dar qalb-i zamīn). The notion of secrecy within Iran had until this time been for the most part squarely within the domain of religious and occult discourses. Indeed, secrecy was an integral indicator of early Arabo-Islamic discourse and the more important but less regarded dimension inherent in the Shi‘ī notion of taqiyyah, which calls for the believer to maintain the secrecy of occult Imamite teachings. In the case of oil exploration and extraction, the only method through which this secret can be unraveled—or for the complex knots embedded in the earth to be opened (‘uqdah‘ābī būd mushkil dar dil-i khārā, girth)—is through the pressure of science (bā fishār-i ‘ilm). Perhaps an allusion to the first stage of the crude oil extraction process in which natural pressure forces the substance into an underground vertical pipeline, this pressure has a sense of compulsion associated with it. Not only does science divulge secrets once reserved for elite Shi‘ī initiates, it is insistent in its disavowal of magic and the miraculous. This is, of course, a defining moment for the technoscientific and modernizing Pahlavī state.

What is surprising, though, is the way the praise of modern engineering is interrupted when Bahār attributes a strong demonological component to the remaining objects under observation.

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308 Ruqayyya Yasmine Khan, Self and Secrecy in Early Islam (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 1.
311 As Bertrand Russell put it with respect to "Modern Christians" handling new scientific findings against the background of seemingly archaic religious formulations, "Modern Christians are indignant if one supposes that they still believe the ancient formulas, but they do not sufficiently recognize that only the pressure of science has driven them into their present comparatively rational position." See Bertrand Russell, "Science and Religion," in Russell on Religion: Selections from the writings of Bertrand Russell, ed. Louis Greenspan and Stefan Andersson (London: Routledge, 1999), 132.
in the poem. For example, he remarks on how the large metal tanks in the area have taken on the form of a black demon (dīg'hā'ī āhanīn, bar hay'at-i dīv-i sīyāh) and like the depths of hell, two blazing fires can be seen emerging from stacks in the distance (hamchū dū dūzakh, dū nayrān-i mushta'il dīdam zī dūr). Consequently, while the poem details the intrusion of scientific logic and its estrangement from pre-modern revelatory techniques, there is nevertheless a lingering demonological component that is rooted in tradition. There is a sense of permanence and enormity appended to these objects that eclipse their pragmatic functioning. This changes altogether after the Pahlavī state's transition into its arbitrary mode is made complete.

In the 1933/4/1312 sh. poem 'Ode to the Seven Trials of Pahlavī,' (Chakāmah-yi Haft'khvān-i Pahlavī) it is not constitutionally sanctioned authoritarianism that is on display but rather the ascendance of an arbitrary governorship based on the semblance of legality. In this anonymous panegyric period-piece, what becomes immediately discernible is the way in which modern technology—in this case, telegraphy—is emptied of its associations with the demonic. This is an unavoidable Pahlavī prerequisite in the handling of technology, similar to the early moment in European modernity when the mastery of Nature became possible after its diremption from mind.

314 Enayat, Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran, 187.
315 Descartes speaks of the distinction between mind and matter in the following way: "A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be attributed to the body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is simply one of the various modes of thinking." See René Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume I), trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 210.
As part of nineteenth century modernization efforts and through the funding provided by imperial powers,\textsuperscript{316} the incorporation of Russo-British-run telegraphy into Iranian society in part allowed Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh to expand his authority beyond the court gates of Tehran to every province,\textsuperscript{317} but more so permitted the Russo-British-run telegraph stations to function as "mini-legations" for the furtherance of foreign imperial designs.\textsuperscript{318} The transmission of information through such means also allowed for unprecedented state-led eavesdropping, which resulted in a reinforced security apparatus. While diplomatic cables, the negotiation of concessions, banking communications, commercial transactions, and other transmissions allowed for Iran's greater inclusion into the fast-paced international order, the stations also provided sanctuary for local modes of resistance against an increasingly robust state.\textsuperscript{319} Although this utilization by social movements (as was evident during the rapid spread of information during the Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892/1308/9-9/10 gh.\textsuperscript{320} and the show of support by pro-constitutionalists all over Iran and the Caucasus during the early 1900s)\textsuperscript{321} may in some measure redeem the construction of the telegraph lines, their inclusion into the Qājār's state office farming system,\textsuperscript{322} their exploitation by the imperial powers to both integrate Iran into international capital markets and further their own paternalistic role over state and economic affairs, and finally their use by an increasingly informed autocratic leadership, quickly soured Iranian reception of the technology.

Rizā Shāh’s early dealings with the question of telegraphy for the most part concerned this negative attribution. It was during his reign that the monopoly held by the Indo-European Telegraph Company was revoked, thus partially curtailing imperial designs for the country.\textsuperscript{323}

Correspondingly, it is within the context of the Indo-European telegraph line (\textit{tiligrāf-i Hind va

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolutions}, 57.
\item Amirahmahdi, \textit{The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars}, 29.
\item Amirahmahdi, \textit{The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars}, 29.
\item Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolutions}, 73.
\item Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolutions}, 85
\item Amirahmahdi, \textit{The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars}, 81.
\item Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolutions}, 143.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Urūp) that the fourth trial (khvān-i chahārum) of Pahlavī commences. The monarch is portrayed as someone similar to Rustam, the epic hero of the Shāhnāmah, galloping down on his horse to confront a group of moaning ghouls, demons, and beasts (rānd Rustam'vār dar khvān-i chahārum shāh Rakhsh / ghūl'zārī dīd dar vay dīv u dad khidmatguẕār). Although he initially uses a demonological theme that is more characteristic of the pre-Pahlavī period, mainly a neutral or divine space full of unsavory and maleficent elements, the poet later on moves into an understanding of technology that reveals a major strategy of the Pahlavī state. This becomes apparent when spiders are described as spinning a web along the ceiling of the world, an act reminiscent of Babylonian magic ('ankabūtānī bih saqf u bām-i gītī tār'tan / sihr'kīshānī zi jādū-hā-yi Bābil yādgār). This moment is of crucial importance for a number of reasons. For one, we are dealing with a spider, one of the symbolic scions of evil and an entity traditionally known for its mathematical precision. This exactitude is utilized in this instance to construct the world-encompassing web, a network that actually represents the birth of global telecommunication. As in the previous poem, there is a preternaturalism associated with technology, but while the snake-rifle was in possession of an organic excess incapable of proper handling, a position reminiscent of the substantivist view, in this case it is the manufacturer of the telegraph-web that wields the power of sorcery. In accordance with the instrumentalist position, while the global web-network may appear majestic and capable of extraordinary functions, it is its handler which infuses it with diabolical intentionality.

While the spider is known for consuming flies, the poet is surprised at how it is capable of feasting on human flesh ('ankabūtān-i magas'afkan basī dīdīm lik / hīchkas nashnīdah hargiz 'ankabūt ādam'shikār). Here, the purpose behind the presence of the spiders is writ large. The

328 Verbeek, "Don Ihde," 133.
329 Ruska, s.v. "ʾAnkabūt."
telegraph lines are meant to snare humans by beguiling them with the inherent allure of an unknown but tantalizing form of communication. Due to telegraphy's ability to bring entire urban centers, provinces, and empires together, the amount of people getting caught in the web for later consumption can be numbered by the thousands (yik bih yik uftad magas dar dām-i sayd-i 'ankabūt / vandar īn dām ādamī uftad hizār andar hizār). The surprise of the poet becomes increasingly noticeable as the work progresses. He asks in a rhetorical way, who knew spiders were capable of spinning web out of steel (‘ankabūtī kay shinīdastī kih pīrāmūn-i khvīsh / bartanad az rū-ī āhan pūd u az pūlād tār)? The amalgamation of traditional demonic web-construction with modern metallurgy is an example of the syncretism of the time but the purposeful and ideologically-concordant diremption of the two is yet ahead.

Reminiscent of the way telegrams were transmitted for the sake of either communicating secret messages to the benefit of the imperial powers or eavesdropping on the shāh's subjects, it is noted that the enemy is present in the form of spy operatives and that there is mutual cooperation between seditionists and saboteurs (khašm rā jāsūs u kishvar rā balā-yī nāgahān / fitnah’jū rā pāymard āshūbgar rā dastyar). Accordingly, it is with respect to spying that it is said that the carrier who transmits the revelation of the devils is in actual fact the enemy of the carrier of glad tidings (ḥāmil-i vahy-i shayātīn dushman-i payk-ī surūsh). This is followed by the paradoxical assertion that the friends of Ahrīman are inferior to the Creator's enemies (dūst bā Ahrīman-i dūn dushman-i parvardigār). Finally, it is claimed that internal associates or proxies exist in the East to assist the thieves of the West (duzd afshārān hamah dar sharq bar duzdān-i gharb), thus resulting in the crime's fixity within the national abode (duzd-i afshārī chinīn dar khānah chūn shud jāygīr / dastburd-i duzd andar khānah gardad pāydār).

Returning to the topic of telegraphy, it is stated that in order to accrue more profits, metal lines are drawn everywhere, even in the desert and atop mountains (bahr-i kasb-i sīm u zar dar kūh va

hāmūn sīm'kish / sīm'hā-yi āhanīn sīm'āfarīn u zar'gusār), and the sparks that fly off these wires either during their construction or operation are a sight to behold for they are similar to comets falling from the upper atmosphere (ātash afshān dar zamīn hamchūn shahāb az āsimān / barq angīz az havādis hamchū abr andar ayār). While the comet in this instance may appear to be more associable to the Sternschnuppenmythus in sūrāh seventy-two of the Qur'an in which angels pelt shooting stars at jinn attempting to eavesdrop on the heavenly assembly, it is in fact closer in structure to the astrological bad omen. This becomes evident when it is claimed that the leaping sparks are tenacious to such an evident degree that the task of evasion is exhausting for the people, making it equal to the act of tightening a noose around their necks (az jahandah-y barq khastah dast u gardan dar kamand). The electric lightning ends up grappling the legs of those who dare near it without authorization (vaz firūzān ṣā'iqah barbastah pā-yi rāhvār). The telegraphic sparks turn into fires of sedition and what is bemoaned is the lack of a savior to wash down upon the flames like a sea (ātash-i īn fitnah rā daryā kujā sāzad khamūsh). The problem that needs to be dealt with here is the manner in which technology is constructed at the level of signification and exploited for the purposes of fanning chaos. Hence, we are not so much concerned with technology's drawing out from the Qājār inner court out into Pahlavī society for the purpose of economic development, for this deals primarily with the actual location of technology and its degree of dispersion. Rather, what demonological investigation exposes is the manner in which ideology is capable of redeeming instrumentation from its earlier unsavory status, as is evident in this poetic work. This operation is done with the purpose of cleansing technology's ostensibly organic and diabolical excess in order, ultimately, to turn it against the abstract, amoral, and thus demonic state of Nature that heralded Rizā Khān's rise to the throne.

When Rizā Shāh is introduced in a formal manner approximately halfway through the poem, the sorcerers begin trembling (jādūvān bar khvīsh larzānd) due to the memory of their loss during

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the previous trial (az shikast-i khvān-i pīshīn). In a moment of desperation when all appeared lost, electrical wires were thrown into seas and volcanoes (kardah sīm-i barq rā dar bahr u bar ātash'fishān) as a symbol of both semiotic destruction and purification. It is at this moment that a new period of symbolization is possible, the re-inscription of technology as being devoid of demonism—hence approachable, tactile and possible to master. After the momentous act of purification through destruction, the spiders also return, emerging like dragons from a cave ('ankabūtān sar barāvardah chū azhad'harā zi ghār). They attempted to perpetrate a hundred thousand disturbances but did not see any benefit from them (ṣad hizār āshūb kardand u nadīdand hīch sūd). Finally, the dark magic that was behind the production of the telegraph infrastructure was negated and the sorcerer fell from grace (sihr'ḥā bātīl shud u uftād jādū'gar zi kār). What is fascinating is that after all the attempts at sabotage, sedition, and infrastructural destruction, and subsequent to the subversion of the sorcery that originated this sorrowful state of affairs, the first concern is not the tranquility of the body politic but rather the purified state of metal wires pregnant with electricity (sīm'hā-yi āhanīn andām ābistan zī barq). This is, of course, reminiscent of the snake-rifle's pregnancy but with an added twist. In that case, the rifle was organic, in excess of human accountability, self-generative, and demonic, while the telegraph lines, empty now as they are of the sorcerer's spell and free from the spider's dominion, are pregnant in a non-malicious, acquiescent, and almost infantile (in their willingness to have their vital electric energies reallocated for the Pahlavī cause) manner.

In a telling stanza, the pregnant electrical telegraph wires despondently prostrate before the reigning monarch (sar bih khāk-i pā-yi shah sūdand bā ṣad inkīsār) and proclaim their absolute allegiance and servitude to him (bar khaṭ-i farmān tu rā dārīm sar pargār'vār). Such communication between technology and man is indicative of a "material hermeneutics."  

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While telegraphy does convey human language at a functional level, the material infrastructure that allows for this communicative possibility is linguistically silent. The shift from the solipsistic snake-rifle to a communicative telegraphic infrastructure is striking, for the latter speaks the moment it must redress its past involvements. Only the ideologically-circumscribed technoscientific persona of the shāh, as the embodiment of the state, can listen in, probe the meaning of, and respond adequately to the technology's mere presence. In an almost pleading and pathetically remorseful manner, the telegraph lines proclaim how previously they did not see any friends they could turn to in the country, thus forcing them to abide by the edicts of past enemies (dūst dar kishzar nimēdidim bar jā pish az īn / lājaram payraw shudim az dushmanān pīrār u pār). Their repentance will be conveyed through service and apology through devotion (tawbah-yi mā khidmat ast u jān'fishānī i'tīzār).³⁴⁶ This attitude is a reflection of the utter impotence of the wires, though they may be pregnant with electric vitality. Accordingly, what is at stake is the location of technical knowledge (techne). While previously the snake-rifle's regenerative and self-expansive (through its spitting out of children) character was suggestive of its congenital techne, the telegraph-web is dependent on an external patron with the same know-how. This is exemplified in the shāh when he decides to accept the repentance and thus extend the telegraph network (shah pazīruft īn īnābat rā u sīm-i barq gasht).³⁴⁷ While previously in the case of the snake-rifle the accent was on its inscrutable ability to advance the essence of weaponry in a frighteningly autonomous direction, now the technology was dependent on the state's largesse. After all, it was when the electrical lines were brought into the shāh's palace after being involved in the punitive roasting of the spiders-sorcerers (jādūvān-i 'ankabūt az barq-i kayfar sūkhtand) that he proclaimed his willingness to fulfill his promises to the Iranian people (‘ahd'hā barbast u bā sugand'hā kard ustuvār).³⁴⁸

While modern technology is stripped of its incommunicability, indifference, self-regenerative capability, and infinite organic vitality, these and other associable characteristics are retained by the members of Perso-Islamic demonomy. This leaves the entire set of variables in a newly coordinated arrangement. Especially after the next and final movement transpires, what we are

left with is a roster of technologies that are drenched in metaphysical niceties while Iranian demonism emerges as a portal into Nature. Prior to the dialectical movements that transpired after the first encounter between applied scientific knowledge and Iranian demonology, this result would have been inconceivable.

Accompanying Rizā Shāh on a trip to the southwestern province of Khūzistān in 1929/30/1308 sh., Bahār was witness to a fearsome storm (ṭūfān-i mahībī) that hampered the development of the incomplete railway system. When the team travelled via the Kārūn river by ship the storm became so intense that two local commanders (ḥākim-i niẓāmī), Sartīp (Brigadier General) Farajullāh Khān and Sipahbud (Major General) Āqā Valī Fi’lī, were swept into the waters.349 In a highly-charged and descriptive poem, Bahār borrows from the demonological ethos of the time in pitting the diabolical Natural order against the hubris of technological reason. He starts by saying how the waters of the Persian Gulf were breaching hell and flowing through it (Khalīj-i Fārs guftī kaz maghākī / bih dūzakh rikhnah kard u rikhht ānjā), resulting in dark plumes of steam (bukhārī tīrah va tār) and voracious waves. 350 This is reflective of an observation made in the previous chapter, that during this period Nature and traditional demonology, both pre-Islamic and Perso-Islamic, begin to intertwine inform one another. Bahār continues by saying how whales are tossed about in this hell, resulting in loud thunder claps to ring out (nahangān dar chah-i dūzakh fitādand / vaz ishān ra'dsān barkhāst hurrā). Thousands of dragons with bodies like mountains are said to be on the march towards heaven (hizārān izhdihā-yi kūh'paykar / bih gardūn tākhtand az saṭḥ-i ghabrā), and as you begin to think that Ahrīman has covertly been able to strike at Yazdān (tū guftī kaz nahān Ahrīman-i zisht / shabīkhūn zad bih Yazdān-i tavanā), in the background Nature is seen laughing like a lion and Time screaming like a mindless ghūl (ṭabī'at khvandah zad chūn khvandah-yi shīr / zamānah na'rāh zad chūn ghūl-i kānā).351 This idea of Nature's irrational ruination emerging in the form of a maniacal laughter, of course, is in line with the period's demonological tenor. As the traditional cosmic duality engage in battle, Nature and Time are situated in the background ridiculing the whole affair. But there is a twist

350 Bahār, "Ṭūfān," 528.
351 Bahār, "Ṭūfān," 528.
because Nature is already integrated with the demonic so when the heavenly realm of order is punctured by the forces of evil, the force of the waves and torrential rain are added to the assault. However, the deterministic and stalwart positioning of the railway tracks Bahār mentions next is an attempt to obviate the ferocity of the elements: The ground became covered by waves emerging from every angle ( zamīn pinhān shud andar mawj-i bārān / kih az har sū darāmad bī’mahābā) but the rail line was like the path Moses (Mūsā) opened up in the sea (khaṭ-i āhan mīyān mawj guftī / rah-i Mūsā’st andar qa’r-i daryā).352 Opposed to the Nature/demonic dyad is thus the coupling established between modern technology and religious salvation.

Here, it is not simply—as we saw earlier—the persona of the new monarch that is subverting lawlessness. Rather, as Rizā Shāh's figurative extension, it is an advanced modern technology in the form of the controversial railway system imbued with religious purpose that does the job. Through this depiction, the demonic is disrepted from harnessable materiality, and the traditional ascetic discourse that abhors or is at least suspicious of corporeality is shattered. Functioning differently within the Pahlavī mythos, material reality is no longer a nest for titillating demons—rather, due to the location of demonology in the "base materialism"353 of Nature, the material realm, strictly speaking, was partially exonerated of its negative associations. Especially when it came to modern technologies, materiality gained a certain divinity (seen in the idea of Moses parting the sea) but this did not imply a metaphysical basis. Rather, the substance of, for instance, the railroad, was the secularized divine essence of the state. While the notion of adopting materialist strategies of the West would come to be reacted against by indegenous theosophers, religious reformers, and a few nationalist intellectuals of the

352 Bahār, "Ṭūfān," 528.
353 During the interwar years, discussions surrounding materiality turned towards its substratum. For a theorist such as Bataille (1897-1962) who developed the term "base materialism," it was the Gnostic "conception of matter as an active principle having its own eternal autonomous existence as darkness" and a "lawless archontes" that appealed to him. In defining base materialism, he states: "I submit entirely to what must be called matter, since that exists outside of myself and the idea." He goes on to say that "Base matter is external and foreign to ideal human aspirations." See Georges Bataille, "Base Materialism and Gnosticism," in The Bataille Reader, ed. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 160-164.
time, what was not directly critiqued was the local diremption of the demonic from its hitherto ascertained corporeal basis.

Let us recapitulate our findings by starting off with (i) the rifle of the Nāṣirī period. Here, the synthetic attributes and mechanisms that made up the object seemed to be overdetermined by a mysterious yet recognizable reptilian organism. It was decipherable in that as a snake, the organismal aspect of the rifle had a pre-established semiotic history within Perso-Islamic lore, but as a rifle, it was inscrutable in its incommunicability. In other words, what augmented this opaqueness and silence was the very nature of the snake-rifle as an organism whose components were derived from inanimate raw materials. In its reproductive abilities, speechlessness, indifference, and lack of desire to be possessed as an instrument, it was a manifestation of Nature. It both confronted and negated the traditional scions of evil while remaining squarely within known demonomy as an advanced form. What gave it this developed standing was precisely its basis within a deadened materiality, so while the snake-rifle appeared to be overdetermined by a reptilian organism at the level of appearance, what allowed the snake as a recurring beast within Iranian demonology to evolve was every constituent of the object, from its cold barrel, to its trigger, and gunpowder. Thus, rather than assert the customary interpretation that the figure of the snake was a trans-historical dread-inducing being that, in some metaphorical way, reflected the affective force of the rifle, what is more radical is the notion that an inanimate object was able to elevate the snake to a pronounced level of evil hitherto unseen.

This logic is developed in the observations that were made concerning (ii) the oil extraction facility. The union established earlier between demonic organism and machinery is here in this second movement disentangled when it is stated that the process of extraction has absolutely no relation with the occult sciences. However, in the process of separation, the drilling, drainage, and pump technologies that composed this process overtook the level of participation and determinative role the components of the rifle possessed in their reorientation of demonic intensity. What this example exposes is the way scientific knowledge and its practical application, in creating an instrument to help catalyze a fledgling but nevertheless dependent economy, can lead to the augmentation of demonic powers possessed by traditional avatars. Like

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the last stage, what is more pronounced than the instrument's purposiveness or essence is its incommunicability. In the same way that the rifle is alienated from the Iranian soldier due to malfunction or the incompatability of parts, the oil installation is too estranged from Iranian control due to foreign ownership.

This alters in a dramatic way with the introduction of the telegraph-web as a neutral technology and an arena in which a contestation of power is played out between secularized divine and demonic forces. But how did technology enter this state of neutrality after its long partnership with demonism? How was it redeemed? Contributing to the resolution of this problem was the logic that was instilled earlier on, namely that the evolving members of traditional Perso-Islamic demonomy were more beholden to modern technologies than the other way around. The telegraph lines, rifles and oil installations helped to advance the stature of the demons. When these lifeless artefacts were appended to the demonic, the product was the intensity of Nature, but when they were separated all that was left was the coldness and solitude of an empty object. As is evident in the telegraph-web, there is no innate know-how in the object that would deem it threatening anymore. It is subject to the technical knowledge of whoever controls it. By being ritually purified in the same fearsome substance it was once associated with (Nature in the form of seas and volcanoes), the telegraph lines express their full submission to human accountability and control.

The final movement consists of infusing the secularized divine essence of the Pahlavī state into the figure of the railroad system. In this instance modern technology is removed from any association with the demonic and is in active opposition to it. The immensity of Nature is no longer revealed through the technology/demonic amalgam but that which is situated outside as a threatening nuisance. What is tragic is that this external collection of aimless forces was partly expressed through earlier generations of material instruments. From the standpoint of the state, these four movements constitute the completed diremption of both demonism and demonological logic from the purview of modern technology.
Chapter 4
Shayṭān-i Nāma'qūl: Marxist and Religious Reformist Critiques à la Arānī and Kasravī

The previous chapter illustrated how the state was able to restage the conditions of its existence along with its metamorphosis through its coordinated cooption of modern technologies. At the end of this process, Nature became infused with traditional Iranian demonism, thus resulting in the latter's unprecedented estrangement from its previous metaphysical basis. The senselessness that henceforth became an indispensible marker of the demonic was recognized by other social groups at the time, including radical leftists and religious reformists. Although this is more evident in the writings of Taqī Arānī, the highly influential Marxist-Leninist theoretician and physicist, what is discernable in the writings of these progressive modernists is the sometimes tangential but nevertheless keen appraisal of occult and demonic presence as it relates to Iranian social, political, economic, and cultural life. Before delving into these writings, let us once more return to Bahār for he presents us with an entryway into the nexus that connects the question of demonism with that of economics, a field of investigation that is most often found under the purview of the Marxists.

In 1930/1/1309 sh., Bahār wrote a peculiar poem that includes a character strikingly similar to the Nāṣirī snake-rifle we observed earlier but with a crucial difference. Dedicated to the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, the poem provides an account of a typical train traveling along the system, one that is characterized by a fearsome yet innocuous aesthetic. It is precisely in this harmlessness—along with its lack of organic autonomy and indifference—that the train can be differentiated from the noxious reptilian weapon of old. Indeed, while the train is capable of producing clouds with thunder and lightning, it never produces rain (hast chūn abrī sīyah bā ra'd u barq / līk az ū hargiz nimī'bārad mațar).

In like manner, though the locomotive seizes people like a dragon (hast hamchūn izhdihā mardum'rubāy), it is surprising that in this moment of swallowing no human or animal is harmed (vin shigīfī bīn kaz īn

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bal'īdanash / mardum u ḥayvān nimībīnad ẓarar ). It does not provoke mortal dread in the hearts of its passengers for although it is similar to man in that it possesses a brain and head (hamchū mardum sāhib-i maghzast u sar), its movements are preprogrammed by the railway line. It is due to its previously schematized excursion that it is able to distinguish correct paths from perilous pits (rāh rā az chāh bishnāsad). Beyond these attributes, what this poetic work offers as the source of the train's demonism is not simply locomotive technology but rather the financial burdens of upkeep and operational capacity.

Since the late-nineteenth century, construction of a nation-spanning railway system had been a contentious issue, even between the great powers who were seeking out contracts for the furtherance of their national interests. Serious attempts were made by both Britain and Russia during the late constitutional period to attain a concession for its construction, but internal conflict between the two powers destabilized the possibility of a consolidated Anglo-Russian agreement concerning the Iranian question. Though the imperial powers withdrew their support for a railway line soon after, the newly established Pahlavī state in the 1920s revived the project as a viable venture once it began the overhauling of the financial system. The question of finances was one that plagued the project's reputation from its very outset. From the proposed two million pound offering put forth by the British in the prospective 1919/1337 gh. Anglo-Persian Agreement, to Rīzā Khān 's fundraising proposal for taxation on sugar and tea in

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357 Bahār, "Chīstān," 566.
358 Bahār, "Chīstān," 566.
360 Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 331.
362 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 114.
1924/1342/3 gh.,\textsuperscript{363} and the creation of a new class of labourers working in the railway industry,\textsuperscript{364} the economic dimension has always shone through.

Consequently, when Bahār states that the train is difficult to condition (\textit{tarbīyat kardansh dushvār ast u sakht}),\textsuperscript{365} he is not merely referring to some intrinsically unruly disposition, similar to the one identifiable in the Nāṣirī snake-rifle. Rather, he is referring explicitly to the deleterious costs associated with its maintenance (\textit{vandar ān ganjīnah’hā gardad hadar}).\textsuperscript{366} Here we see a shift away from the problem of organic autonomy to that of financial viability. In this instance, economics is entangled with demonology. It is not the probability of bodily harm which induces kings to avoid locomotive transport (\textit{pādishāhān rā buvad az vay ḥazar}), but rather the financial losses that are incurred while trains are in operation (\textit{zīn zīyānkāri kih bāshad andar ū}).\textsuperscript{367} The irony in all this is that while operational expenses are detrimental to overall national health, its movements are nevertheless life-sustaining (\textit{gar bih kār āyad buvad bas jān’fazāy}). Only when it is idle does the train result in the destruction of life (\textit{var zi kār uftad shavad bas jān’shikar}).\textsuperscript{368} This confused paradox reveals the unsustainable premise behind the state's instrumental rationality and modernization initiatives, and it is precisely this, not the Nāṣirī conception of a self-sustaining mechanical organism, that is connected to evil. Moreover, as was observed just earlier, the train is in-itself, like the telegraph network, innocuous and disenchanted of the previous association between materiality and demonism.

The medium through which the train attracts the aura and appearance of the diabolical is the necessary economic shortfall it produces. Additionally, there is an illogical dimension attached to it in the sense that while this reptilian locomotive consumes the nation's wealth, it just as easily vomits it out (\textit{ganj’hārī rā kaz Īrān khvurdah ast / qay kunad īn izhdihā-yi ganj’khvur})\textsuperscript{369} —a full


\textsuperscript{364} Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolutions}, 147.

\textsuperscript{365} Bahār, "Chīstān," 567.

\textsuperscript{366} Bahār, "Chīstān," 567.

\textsuperscript{367} Bahār, "Chīstān," 567.

\textsuperscript{368} Bahār, "Chīstān," 567.

\textsuperscript{369} Bahār, "Chīstān," 568.
display of its wasteful excess and exuberance. At the same time, it is said to be life-sustaining when in operation. This contradiction may in fact be an accidental reference to the way in which productive forces result in unforeseen negative consequences when implanted into social relations ill-equipped for their absorption. In any event, it is this antinomy at the heart of the state's economic modernization initiative that allowed for the train to take on the appearance of a ghoul, its actions to be that of a demon, its strength to be that of an elephant, and finally its movements to be that of a beast (ākh az īn ghūl'shiḵl-i dīv'īl / ākh az īn pīl'zūr dad'siyar).

Bahār somewhat withdrew from the public eye soon after the establishment of the new dynasty and though he was nowhere close to being a political economist, the poem that just observed allows for an appreciation of the connection between the sense of modern incoherence and bafflement and traditional demonology within a political economic register. Curiously, rather than have traditional demonology evaporate into archaic insignificance "with the actual domination over natural powers," the contemporaneous Marxist critique in Iran actually came to reserve a specialized function for the diabolical. On the one hand, this appears to be inconsistent with the focus of Marxists on strict scientific materialist doctrinal development which, one would suppose, made little room for traditional metaphors deployable for direct communicative efficacy and immediate political action. On the other hand, internal to orthodox Marxist doctrine room is already reserved for a homology between the understanding of religious

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370 Bahār, "Chīstān," 567.
372 "It is known that Greek mythology is not only the arsenal of Greek art but [also] its ground. Is the perception of nature and of social relations which lies at the basis of the Greek imagination, and hence of Greek [mythology], possible with self-actors [in spinning factories] and trains and locomotives and electrical telegraphs? What has become of Vulcan against Roberts and Co. [manufacturers of 'self-actors'], Jupiter against the lightning conductor, and Hermes against the [financial practices of the] crédit mobilier? All mythology controls and rules and forms the powers of nature in the imagination and through the imagination; therefore mythology disappears with actual domination over natural powers." See Karl Marx, "Introduction' to the Grundrisse," in Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 156. In this instance, Marx did not see the possibility of myth, or in our case, traditional demonology, coming to inform the world in the midst of modernization, i.e. the hitherto most arduous and universal attempt to subvert nature's autonomy.
entities and the commodity form, as is evinced in the idea of the fetishism of commodities.  

This being so, the activities of theorists who were the products of Iran's far-left transition from social democracy to orthodox Marxism advocated a certain "unswerving" dogmatism that had the world's disenchantment at its basis. It is within this context that the demonic strangely emerges. While theoreticians such as Arānī used a disenchanted and aseptic materiality to disprove manifestations of idealist and religious discourse, he and others of the same ilk nevertheless preserved these manifestations as the face of incoherence and lawlessness. This is not surprising considering the demonological aura of the time.

During his 1938/1316/7 sh. public trial, in which he "spoke vigorously in his own defense," Arānī questioned rhetorically how Iran's toilers (ranjbarān)—or working class—were able to provoke such great fear in the state. By this time, the notion of an identifiable working class had a very short history in the country. Initially deployed by social reformers and democrats in

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374 "It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here ... the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities." See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Volume One), trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 165.

375 Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, 64-5.

376 Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, 66.

377 "... increasing intellectualization and rationalization does not mean increasing general knowledge of the conditions under which we live our lives. It means something else. It means the knowledge or belief that if we only wanted to we could learn at any time that there are, in principle, no mysterious unpredictable forces in play, but that all things--in principle--can be controlled through calculation. This, however, means the disenchantment of the world. No longer, like the savage, who believed that such forces existed, do we have to resort to magical means to gain control over or pray to the spirits. Technical means and calculation work for us instead. This, above all, is what intellectualization actually means." See Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations, ed. John Dreijmanis, trans. Gordon C. Wells (New York: Algora Publishing, 2008), 33.


379 Taqī Arānī, Ākharīn Difā'-i Duktur Taqī Arānī [Dr. Taqī Arānī's Final Defence] (N.p.: Intishārāt-i Ḥizb-i Tūdah-yi Irān, n.d.), 17.
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as primarily a theoretical device, it was only in
the 1920s when the likes of Āvitīs Sulțanzaḍah (1889-1938/1306/7-56/7 gh.) started speaking of
the kārgarān (workers) as an identifiable class. 380 Arānī continues by proclaiming how
surprising it is to see police officials (ma'mūrīn-i shahrbānī) violently tearing apart any paper on
which the word 'toiler' appears. 381 Though seemingly surprised, it is likely that the physicist
convinced himself of how the excessive sensitivity and supposed apprehension evident in the
authorities was legitimate on some level for they were dealing with the working-class as the
'universal redeemer of humanity.' 382 The authorities are said to be even more frightened than jinn
when the latter are confronted by the Qur'anic preamble 'In the name of God' (bism Allāh). 383
Invoked in this instance as a protective or apotropaic phrase, 384 the toilers are similar to this
divine phrase in that they can expunge the authorities and the state as a whole like the ephemeral
jinn. In this way, Marxist critique exposes how the state is equivalent in rank to the spirits with
whom they are in constant conflict, as the previous two chapters have pointed out, and the
working class is capable of exposing state strategy before the state itself is capable of distilling
the crux of the current juncture. After all, "[s]ince the strategy is [...] often not known in advance
within (and by) the State itself, it is not always susceptible to rational formulation." 385

380 Assef Bayat, "Historiography, Class, and Iranian Workers," in Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East:
192-3.
381 Arānī, Ākharīn Dīfā'-i Duktur Taqī Arānī, 17.
382 In response to the question of whence German emancipation will arise, Marx says, "... in the formation of a class
with radical chains, a class in civil society that is not a class of civil society, of a social group that is the dissolution
of all social groups, of a sphere that has a universal character because of its universal sufferings and lays claim to no
particular right, because it is the object of no particular injustice but of injustice in general. This class can no longer
lay claim to a historical status, but only a human one." See Karl Marx, "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
383 Arānī, Ākharīn Dīfā'-i Duktur Taqī Arānī, 17.
384 Alireza Mohammadi Doostdar, "Fantasies of Reason: Science, Superstition, and the Supernatural in Iran" (PhD
diss., Harvard University, 2012), 61.
Furthermore, the *jinn* are essentially homologous to the arguably defunct presuppositions of idealist philosophy in that they are "ideal figments of the brain."\(^{386}\) If the idealist position of the internality of movement, time, and space to the mind (ḥālāt-i žihnī-yi mā hastand) is affirmed, then the sensuous effects of, for instance, telephone calls, must essentially be attributed to a miraculous or magical source (mu’jizah va sihr va jādū).\(^{387}\) Accordingly, dragons, demons, Rustam, Satan or *jinn* are in contradiction to internal logic (tażādd-i bāṭinī-yi manṭiqī),\(^{388}\) for there are no materially based reasons for the supposition that Spirit is constitutive of reality (rūh hamah jā mawjūd ast)—an unfortunate stance which more often than not leads to the claim that our pockets are brimming with tiny slippery devils (shayṭānak’hā-yi rīz va līz).\(^{389}\) Rather than the beings themselves, it is the belief in such spirits that is derivative of factors within the material environment (‘avāmil-i maddī-yi muḥīṭ). According to this stance, there were specific material preconditions which necessitated *jinn*-worship (jin’parastī) at one time.\(^{390}\)

However, though we may be living in a time during which causes (‘illat) are not based on the belief in the effects (i’tiqād bih ta’ṣīr) of idols and the insidious Ahrīman,\(^{391}\) Arānī’s following gesture leaves enough room to contemplate the effect of positing the existence of such beings. Though contrary to logic, it is said that "if their foundations were indeed mistaken (pāyah-yi ghalat), all [subsequent] discoveries (iktishāfāt) would not have taken on actual and scientific forms (ṣūrat-i ḥaqīqī va ‘ilmī)."\(^{392}\) Thus, on one level, the demonic is coupled with the illogical and inconsistent but, on another level, what is deemed illogical can in actual fact lead to real discoveries and is subsequently affirmed. To be sure, the inability to practically display or

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observe such maleficent beings ('amalan nimūtavān izhdihā va ghayrah rā nishān dād)\textsuperscript{393} is underscored, but what is allowed to remain operative is the principle of lawlessness as productive of a "monument," and it is "the lawful aspect of the product itself"\textsuperscript{394} that allows the lawless to remain a viable and workable category of thought.

In saying that the figure of Z̤ aḥḥāk probably has some historical basis (hatman dārā-yi rīshah-yi asāsī-yi tārīkhī ast) in its demonstration of the longevity of stratified social classes,\textsuperscript{395} Arānī is showcasing his somewhat ambivalent approach to the occult and demonological. It will become clear below that the physicist had a virulent distrust of occult nomenclature but instances similar to the one just described betray a degree of both implicit and explicit acquiescence on his part. In the case of Z̤ aḥḥāk, his animosity towards Iran's mythical guardians allows for the grounding behind objective class-based historical progression to shine through. Notwithstanding this concession, Arānī makes a critical remark against Shī'ī preachers who, in active disregard for the precise determinations attributed to technical terms by the hard sciences, adhere to a linguistic flexibility that permits the whimsical contortion of vernacular (magar īn kih mā kalamāt rā bih har ma'nī kih khvudimān khvāstah bāshīm). The example he draws on was the much discussed notion of how the European discovery of microbes (mīkrūb) was actually the disclosure of Satan's deceptive spite (gharaẓ az Shayṭān kih mīgūyand shumā rā gūl mīzanan).\textsuperscript{396}

This microbial conception of Satan is problematic for the Marxist theoretician but he just as easily admitted to Z̤ aḥḥāk's role in history and, as was shown in the introduction to this study, Satan's unity with lawlessness. In one striking example, Arānī differentiates the prognostications of the social sciences ('ulūm-i ijtimā'ī) from the fallacious and flattering (durūgh va tamalluq) forecasts of occult practitioners or "men of faith" who set up shop (dukān),\textsuperscript{397} but uses the same term, pīsh'bīnī (forecast), to account for the activity of each field of investigation. To

\textsuperscript{393}Arānī, Mātirīyālīsm-i diyāliktīk, 31.
\textsuperscript{396}Taqī Arānī, "Irfān va Uṣūl-i Māddī," 119.
\textsuperscript{397}Rahnema, Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics, 113.
paradoxically both deepen and rupture the association between the two, he deploys the term *ghayb'gūṭ* (divination/prognostication) and allows for its double meaning to flourish. What ultimately permits astronomical investigation (the example he provides) to be regarded as a legitimate discipline is its adherence to proven laws (*munajjim qavānīn va ū Tarz-i ḥarikat va favāṣil-i har yik az sitārigān va mawq'īyyat-i har yik az ānhā rā mīdānad*). This case expresses how some elements of demonic and occult nomenclature were wrenched away from their traditional abode and integrated into scientific discourse while others were more deeply engrained into the fibre of lawlessness, as was the case with Satan.

While at times invoked as a relatively abstract principle, his lawlessness also has practical effects, especially when it is localized in phenomenal entities, and this is evinced in Arānī's discussion of 'suggestion' (*talqīn*) and 'meta-will' (*mavarā-yi irādah*). As was illuminated earlier, the child during the Pahlavī period came to be a manifestation of the lawless Natural order which served as the state's existential precondition. Arānī's own satanic child (*bachah-yi shayṭānī*) emerges as an inconsequential obstacle to the musical performance of a military band (*shaypūrchī`hā-yi nīzāmī*). He is inconsequential because even though he is able to distract the musicians by biting into a sour lemon (*līmū-yi turshī*), the cause of the distraction is nevertheless posited as being internal to the musicians through the idea of a meta-will. Without a direct and discernible internal cause (*bidun-i 'illat-i mustaqīm*), it is merely presumed by the actors involved that their reaction is being instigated by an external stimulus such as magic or sorcery (*sihr va jādū*, jinn or spirits (*arvāh*). This is similar to the way in which in capitalist production "the activity of the worker is [perceived as] not [being] his own spontaneous activity." For Arānī, the truth of the reaction is completely internal to the actors involved.

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398 *Arānī, "Jabr va Ikhtīyār,"* 156.
399 *Arānī, Pisikūlūzhī, 259.
400 *Arānī, Pisikūlūzhī, 259.
401 *Arānī, Pisikūlūzhī, 259.
402 *Arānī, Pisikūlūzhī, 259.
403 *Arānī, Pisikūlūzhī, 260-1.
One should not simply abide by the "spirit worship and Spiritism of America's old women" (rūḥ parastī va Spīrītīsm-i pīr-i zan’hā-yī Āmrīkā) and the dictates of jinn-catchers (jin’gīr’hā) by unthinkingly submitting to the jinn-based derivational narratives. Though seismic, the implication of this theoretical movement results in further distortions within Arānī’s system. Although the demonic is allowed to remain operative, its potency is theoretically diminished. At this stage, its only function is to serve as a signpost to the power of interiority and voluntarism. The principle that had served as the harbinger of a modernizing state is now merely a rhetorical semblance of its former self. However, by inserting the power once possessed by the demonic into the recesses of the human mind (in the form of the meta-will), Arānī disposes of the external diabolical moniker and derivation but retains the uncontrollable function that the jinn once possessed. Thus, when we get to our discussion of 1930s fiction writing and its interest in unconscious demonic compulsions, what is retrieved in the story-writing exercise is precisely the lost diabolical heritage of unconscious functionality.

According to the materialist critique, jinn, spirits and gods were engendered as personifications of human qualities and mediated by a distinct class of practitioners dealing with fortune telling (fālgīrī), divination (az ghayb khabar dādan), magic (siḥr), and geomancy (raml). "However, slowly but surely, this profession (ḥirfat) came to serve as the basis of the group's material life (zindagānī-i māddī)" and was able in large part to structure "general opinion" ('aqā’id-i ’umūmī). Before the dialectical materialism was said to be able to adequately explain the social function of self-sacrifice (fadākārī), it was once thought that an individual's social faculties (quvā-yi ijtimā’ī-yī yik fard) were rooted in the influence of the likes of the "ignorant" (jahl) Ahrīman. According to Arānī, during periods of religious reformation (maẕāhib-i ʿislāh) when the space for scientific inquiry is permitted (maydān rā barā-yi 'aqāyid-i 'ilmī āzād

405 Arānī, Pisīkūlūzhī, 260.
407 Arānī, Pisīkūlūzhī, 270.
408 Arānī, Bashar Az Naẓar-i Māddī, 30-1.
mīguẕārad), the practices of divination (ghayb gūṬ) and sorcery (saḥārī) become naturally inhibited.⁴⁰⁹

Because of this form of progress and man's having grown beyond his former general incapacitation (dar ibtidā bashar 'ājīzar būdah),⁴¹⁰ he no longer needs to feel compelled to act based on the injunctions of jinn and devils (hukm-i ajinnah va shayāfūn),⁴¹¹ to feel that he needs to engage in apotropaic rituals—such as tribal tattooing (khāl'kūbī)—to distance himself from their insidiousness,⁴¹² or think that he needs to submit himself to Mawlāvī's (Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī, 1207-73/603/4-672 gh.) periodization scheme describing the progressive perfection of existents (takāmul-i mawjūdāt) in contradistinction to the findings of the natural sciences ('ulūm-i ṭabī'ī), such as fossil-based paleontological mapping,⁴¹³ for he understands that to cleanse one's heart through illusory mystical instructions (dastūrāt-i mawhūm) is equivalent to wanting to dominate the skies by means of a flying carpet (qālīchah) or Sīmurgh, the ancient mythical flying creature of Iranian lore. "Not only has materialist thinking and methodology (tarz-i tafa kūr va uslūb-i māddī) in reality effaced (maḥv kard) such illusions," it has also offered man the conditions and instruments to realize goals such as flight.⁴¹⁴ Above all, it is the dialectical materialist thinker (mutifakkir-i māddī-yi diyālīktīk) who, with the precise and absolute laws of physics and chemistry (qavānīn-i fīzīk va shīmī-yi daqīq va jabrī) under his belt, is capable of brushing aside (pusht-i pā bizanad) the fallacious power of the geomancer's breath (nafās-i rammāl).⁴¹⁵

Prior to moving on to a discussion of religious reformism, let us first summarize and draw some conclusions regarding the at times confusing labyrinth and constantly self-refuting set of movements that is Arānī's demonology.

⁴⁰⁹ Arānī, Pisīkūlūzhī, 272.
⁴¹⁰ Arānī, Pisīkūlūzhī, 275.
⁴¹¹ Arānī, Pisīkūlūzhī, 275.
⁴¹³ Arānī, "Irfān va Uṣūl-i Māddī," 119.
⁴¹⁴ Arānī, Bashar Az Nazar-i Māddī, 31.
⁴¹⁵ Arānī, Bashar Az Nazar-i Māddī, 57.
(i) In conformity with the prevailing historical conjuncture, Arānī deploys a conception of the demonic that is equivalent to lawlessness. Due to his frequent defence of positivist methodology and thought, the function of this conception within his system is to establish the limits of logic and rationality. Moreover, insofar as the conception is a reflection of the illogical, the demonic here serves as a break from the traditional understandings of evil but nevertheless retains the ultimate impotence of demonism.

(ii) However, elsewhere Arānī is not coy in asserting how it is possible for a debunked and thus unsustainable theory or notion to be the primary cause behind coherent and viable discoveries, thus undergirding the impact irrational or outdated forces can have on the world. This position, which undermines the previously stated impotence of demonism, is argued from the standpoint of the paradigmatic revolutions of scientific inquiry.

(iii) Arānī then evokes the imagery of the bachah(-yi) Shayṭān to contradict the second position by saying that if it is perceived that an internal process is caused by an external spirit, one should immediately recognize its nullity in favour of the quasi-psychoanalytic attitude that the internal phenomenon is caused by an equally internal mechanism (meta-will) that is not open to immediate conscious recognition. Arānī's move towards interiority is matched by the more general introspective movement performed by contemporary normative psychologists and authors influenced by psychoanalysis, but while these latter two groups introduced the demonic to this inner world as its new home, the physicist chose to leave the members of demonomy outside to remain homeless in the nothingness of ether.

(iv) The maintenance of the contested stance in the third movement (positing of causal external spirits) is related to an antiquated belief-system that is in-itself rooted in equally archaic material conditions of social and cultural life. Notwithstanding Arānī's attempt to expunge the occult world of any efficacy, he still here grounds this abstract world in the realm of materiality the same way the meta-will of the previous movement is derived from the material functioning of the human brain. This reveals that through the attempt to make the occult world of spirits irrelevant, it can still be preserved as an integral part of a system.

(v) This is seen most clearly in the way Arānī portrays the state as being homologous to the jinn while the working class serves as a collectively instantiated apotropaic ritual meant to expunge
the "relations of production and social division of labour" that keep the state afloat. And in the same way that the state as jinn has attained a "relative separation" from the social relations that helped constitute it, the occult pneumatological world and the meta-will are, respectively, related in a relative manner to the material conditions of life and specific brain processes. Additionally, in equating the state with the jinn, Arānī unconsciously plays into and brings to the foreground an enduring theme in this study: How the state, as an expression of the demonic as Nature, is tasked with the destruction of its origins.

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Curiously, it was not only the dialectical materialists who had reservations about the position of the demonic occult in human life. Religious reformers also engaged with the topic, and in so doing, encountered and contributed to a transformed demonology. Aḥmad Kasravī's role is extremely salient, not simply due to his reknown within reformist thought, but because he also compounds and complicates themes already pervasive within early-Pahlavī demonology. Traditional Shi‘ī thinkers, in contrast, are more preoccupied with demonism's relationship with the question of the political than with the prevailing demonology of the time. Notwithstanding their differences, thinkers who used religion as an integral component of their systems were greatly influenced by momentous shifts in religious thinking that transpired during the nineteenth century.

From the Ottoman inspired pan-Islamist sentiments of intellectuals such as Mīrzā Yūsif Khān Mustashār al-Dawlah (1823/4-1895/6/1239-1313 gh.) and Mīrzā 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ṭālibūf Tabrīzī, to the movement led by Parsi merchants to remove Iranian Zoroastrians from the

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The yoke of limiting Islamic legal mores,\textsuperscript{419} the burgeoning Shi'i 'ulamā as a potent political class,\textsuperscript{420} the pogrom against the millenarian Babi movement,\textsuperscript{421} Bahā’ullāh's (1817-92/1232-1309 gh.) endorsement of parliamentary democracy\textsuperscript{422} and the transmission of his thought by "traveling apostles,"\textsuperscript{423} and the nationalist "inver[sion of] the Islamic system of historical narration" by positing the period of ignorance as beginning with the revelatory period rather than existing exclusively prior,\textsuperscript{424} the late-nineteenth century was a period of immense religious transformation that unequivocally altered the structure of socio-religious inquiry. The vigor and earnestness of the religious critique expressed in the writings of 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Mīrzā Āqā Khān Kirmānī (1853/4-96/7/1270-1314 gh.) and Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī (1838-97/1253/4-1314 gh.) was rejuvenated in a different way a few decades later by the likes of Rizā Qulī Sharī ’at Sangilajī (1890-1944/1307/8-63/4 gh.), 'Alī Akbar Ḥakamī´zādah (d. 1988/1366/7 sh.), and Kasravī. What these thinkers and their supporters shared was a sense of reformism and a desire for a rationally-inspired Islamic renaissance. The accompanying critique of fanaticism, superstition, and traditionalism was construed by the clerical establishment as a serious affront to its socio-political standing.\textsuperscript{425} In spite of this, the reformers persisted in their ambitions, and in doing so contributed to the complexity of the period's demonological essence.

In Kasravī's \textit{Rāh-i Rastgārī} (The Path of Salvation), not only is the necessity of religion declared (\textit{jahānīyān bī´dīn natavānand zīst}), the central place of reason (\textit{āyīn-i khirad}) in the endurance of dispensational unity is also underlined. When rationality is positioned as the internal guide of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[422] Cole, "Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century," 10.
\item[423] Cole, "Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century," 14.
\end{footnotes}
religion, all those elements which contradict this precept are beyond the normative bounds of the creed (rāhnamā- yi dīn khirad ast va har ānchah bā khirad durust nabāshad az dīn bīrūn ast). 426

As he puts it, "let the past be the past" (guẕashtah’-hā guẕashtah). 427 With reason at its helm, religion serves to inhibit dispersion (parākandagī) and the "groundless thoughts" (pindār’hā- yi bī’pāyah) which underpin this scattering. One of these thoughts involves the hypostatic Ahrīman. 428 What is ultimately betrayed in Kasravī’s line of thinking is the way he iterates a specific instance of disavowal (Verleugnung) 429 in which an almost perceptual gloss is made of the wild, lawless, diabolical, and Natural substratum as to negate its inclusion within the determined frontiers of reality. Kasravī says that if one accepts the reality of Ahrīman, there is a simultaneous misunderstanding (nimī´shināsand) of religion. 430 In other words, Kasravī is asserting that like the masses of ancient Greeks where "a growing number relapsed with a sigh of relief into the pleasures and comforts of the primitive" in the midst of great philosophical and medical advances, 431 a crude segment of Iranian society is attracted to Ahrīman’s fallacious might during a moment when rationalized religious discourse is most available for observance.

Ahrīman is presented in a roundabout way as the product and producer of a multiplicity of polluted unknowings (ālūdah- yi ṣad nādānī), 432 variegated forms of idleness (bīkārī), 433 as well as a renewed commitment to idol worship (but’parasti’hā- yi nūvīnī āghāz kardah´and) and the generational perversions (ān gumrāhī’hā- yi mardumān ast kih har zamān chīz-i dīgārī bāshad) which spring up unfailingly 434—the consequence of such nescience being the multidirectional focus of obedience (dar barābar- i ānhā gardan kaj mī’sākhtand). 435 The idol worshippers

427 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 117.
428 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 26-7.
430 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 27.
432 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 28.
433 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 152.
434 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 76.
435 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 28.
(but'parastân) who pursue these avenues will end up in a "shoreless field of thoughts and suppositions" (maydân-i pindär va ingär-i bikarân ast) similar to the pre-Socratic Apeiron in that its limitlessness cannot be reduced to anything but itself. In like manner to the Marxist critique of religion from the standpoint of its being manmade and constitutive of a class of exploitative ecclesiastics, this realm of infinite sliding (laghzishgāh) is said to be the product of the abandonment of Islam's simplicity (dīn-i sādah) in favour of Greek philosophical (falsafah-yi Yūnān) debates put forth by the likes of Aflāṭūn (Plato, 428-348 BC) and Arasṭū (Aristotle, 384-22 BC). Self-constituted thoughts were appended to ancient Greek ideas (tīhâ pindâr'hâ'ī nīz az khvud bih pindâr'hâ-yi kuhan-i Yūnānı̇ afzūdand), leading to the creation of Sufism (Ṣūfī'garī), esotericism (bāṭinī'garī), and kharābātī'garī (doctrine of frequenting taverns). What resulted from all this activity of diluting truths with crookedness (rāstī'hâ râ bā kajī'hâ dar ham āmīktah'and) was the production of empty and meaningless texts (nivishtah'hâ-yi pūch-i bī'ma'nā'tī). Though this meaninglessness has limitless potential, it is essentially based on limited eyesight (andāzah nigāh nadārand), especially of those who are considered to be learned (dānishvarān). They insist upon bringing forth self-circumscribed truths through the weaving of incantations (munājāt'bāfī), verse construction (āyah'sāzī), and sleight of hand (shu'badah'bāzī), while the absolute certainties are left to languish. This being so, there is a

436 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 37.
438 "Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man into the subjectified state; democracy starts with man and makes the state objectified man. Just as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution that creates the people but the people which creates the constitution." See Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, ed. Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 30.
440 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 76.
441 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 39.
442 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 41.
443 Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 76-7.
bestial (chahārpāyān va dadān)\(^{444}\) quality to all these doctrinal constructions in that they are not based on rationality.

In Kasravī's account of the bestial there is a stress upon the overriding dimensions of necessity as well as inevitability (nāchār va nākhvāh),\(^{445}\) and because this condition is situated outside the bounds of the rationalistic religion the Islamic reformer is advocating (kasānī kih dīn rā kinār mī’guzārand hamtā-yi chahārpāyān va dadān’and),\(^{446}\) Natural necessity begins to intermingle with the demonological, since Ahrīman is also located within these coordinates. The historian states that "most Europeans do not separate humans (ādamī) from other creatures (jānivarān)," thus leading to their support of human emulation of animal existence (bih gumān-i īshān ādamī mūtavanād balkah mībāyad hamchūn dadān va chahārpāyān zindagī kunad).\(^{447}\) In this way, the possibility is left open for the irrational to impinge upon the sanctified grounds of his rationalistic conception of religion.\(^{448}\) In endorsing this crosspollination, scholars and philosophers (dānishmand va fīlsūf) are said to have been enemies of humankind (gūyī dushman-i jins-i ādamī būdah’and) and envious (rashk) of animals,\(^{449}\) even though (to Kasravī's unbeknownst) the truth may be more ambivalent than this, for they also "refuse [...] to be like an animal."\(^{450}\) All the same, the threat posed by these thinkers is carefully occluded when bestial

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\(^{444}\) Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 51.

\(^{445}\) Kasravī, Rāh-i Rastgārī, 51.

\(^{446}\) Aḥmad Kasravī, Āyīn [Creed] (N.p.: Chāp-i Rashdīyah, 1977/2536 sha.), (Part I) 52.

\(^{447}\) Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 56.

\(^{448}\) "Of all the faculties of the human mind, it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason stands at the summit. Few persons any longer dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve. It is a significant fact, that the more the habits of any particular animal are studied by a naturalist, the more he attributes to reason and the less to unlearnt instincts." See Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 46.

\(^{449}\) Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part II) 5.

\(^{450}\) In respect to historical memory, it is said, "Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what is meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, and so from morn till night and from day to day, fettered to the moment and its pleasure or displeasure, and thus neither melancholy nor bored. This is a hard sight for man to see; for, though he thinks himself better than the animals because he is human, he cannot help envying them their happiness - what they have, a life neither bored nor painful, is precisely what he
habit (khū-yi dadān) is related to the theft and seizure of others property (duzdī va rubūdan-i māl-i dīgarān) along with the subjugation of the weak (sitam bar nātavānān). In this way, an avenue is opened up for the human (and in one specific instance, politicians [mardumān-i sīyāsī]) to be tied to the bestial without compromising the integrity of an unsullied reason and its function to guide man away from irrationality (ādamī bāyad khirad rā rāhnāmā-yi khvud sākhtah) through the rise of prophets (payghambarān bīh dushmanī-yi ānhā barkhvāståh’and).

Running concomitant with the wave of self-doubt that swept over segments of the Western intelligentsia just prior to and during the Second World War when "technical rationality" simply became synonymous with the "rationality of domination," was Kasravī’s established connection between modern European contributions to science and the manufacturing of hellish instruments (abzār’hā-yi dūzakhī) of war. According to the reformer, prior to the European takeover as the vanguard scientific civilization, the sciences offered humanity more benefits than harm (sūdash bīshtar az zīyānash būdah) but this has now reversed. To put it in a different way, "the Enlightenment has eradicated the last remnant of its own self-awareness." Similar to the way in which Islamic philosophers and mystics supplemented unalloyed truisms with self-circumscribed propositions, European scholars likewise pervert objective scientific findings with trifling ideational (pindār’hā) additives. This tendency is rooted in their insubstantial core wants, yet he cannot have it because he refuses to be like an animal." See Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60.

451 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 56.
452 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part II) 58.
453 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 57.
454 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part II) 10.
456 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 37-8.
457 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 2.
(bīmāyah’and) and illusory claim to mastery (da’vī- yi ustādī mī’kunand) in which "the essence of things is revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination." Economic motive (vasīlah- yi tavāngarī), as a prime indicator behind technology's social ascendency, once again enters the demonological landscape when Kasravī equates profit maximization with the increased production of hellish instruments (shumārah- yi abzār’hā- yi dūzakhī rūz’afzūn ast). Though they have acquired a great wealth of knowledge (dānish- i bīkarān andūkhtah) and talent (hunarmandī zamīn rā bih āsimān dākhtah), it is due to their irreligiosity (b’dīnī; which, as we saw earlier, is connected to the bestial, the irrational, and the diabolical) that the world has become a hell (dūzakh). Confused by the hypnotic grip the hellish instruments have on man (ākhar īn abzār- i dūzakhī chīh arzishī dārad kih jahān īnhamah girifṭār- i āsīb’hā- yi ū bāshad?!), what Kasravī leaves us off with is the strong impression that it was not simply Rizā Shāh who was "fascinated by technological aspects of modernisation." The wicked acts of the authorities (rizālat’hā- yi ma’mūrin), an almost obvious place to look for the demonic, is not the operative location of Iranian demonology during this time. Rather, as seen in the example of Kasravī, a curious fixation on the lawless irrationality of the demonic draws the technological and economical within its orbit, perpetuating a theme much discussed during the period.

While for Kasravī the irreligiosity of Europeans led to the proliferation of hellish instruments, more traditional religious thinkers were prone to commenting on the way heresy or even doubt led to the increase of satanic intrigues and whisperings (dasāyis va vasāvis-i shayāfīn), which

458 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 38.  
459 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 6.  
460 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 38.  
461 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 95.  
462 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 38.  
463 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part I) 52.  
464 Kasravī, Āyīn, (Part II) 18.  
further compounded the trek towards deviation. The notion of satanic influence in Islam is rooted in the distinction between revelation (vaḥy), inspiration (ilhām), and whisperings (vasāvis). While revelation is connected to the prophetic experience of direct intuitive grasping of the divine, and inspiration involves, according to the Avicennean conception, "the influx of certain images into the soul through the influence of the heavenly bodies," the whisperings are the very suggestions that led Adam and Eve off the rightly guided path. As the "temptations of Iblīs," this third category must be carefully differentiated from the previous two. It can be said that these whisperings form the foundations of Satan's home, but the most "venomous whispers" from this abode called either the carnal soul, "ego-self," "concupiscent self," or simply nafs, are internal to man. While "the novice [wayfarer must] extricate himself from the morass of confusing and conflicting desires" to have some insight into what 'Aṭṭār calls the "Divine Mind," the task proposed by some thinkers during the early Pahlavī period was not so much to cleanse the soul but rather to differentiate from among individuals in society those who are partners in religion and the demons who only appear as humans (dīvān-i ādamī šūrat) and are plotting internal schemes (dasāyis-i dākhilī).

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469 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 18.
470 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 68.
471 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 105.
472 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 153.
474 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 185.
475 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 164.
476 Gīlānī, "Qismat-i Falsafī," 135.
477 Ghulām Ḥusayn, "Maqsūḍ Dīyānat Ast Va Marām Ittiḥād [It is the Purpose of Religion and the Aim of Unity]," Taẕaḵkarūt-i Dīyānātī 28 (1927/1306 sh.): 2.
The state itself was concerned with the threat of espionage posed by its growing Western-educated class of intellectuals and civil servants, but Islamic thinkers were more concerned with the whisperings of demons who feigned religiosity, the so-called "foreigner worshippers" (ajnabī parastān), mercenaries of the foreigners (ajīr-ī ajānīb), or simply "their ignorant playthings" (kam fahmī-ī lu'abah-ī ānhā). They are the ones who declare their allegiance to Islam when among Muslims (dar nazd-ī musalmānān iẓhār-ī islāmīyat nimūdah) but take the opposite stance when alone with the shayāṭīn (zamānī kih khalvat bā shayāṭīn mīnamāyand). In doing so, they exercise any available deceit (hamah gūnah nayrang′ bāzī bih kār mība rad) to achieve their base aims. These "friends of the devils" (dūstān-ī shayāṭīn) are to such a great extent "tractable and languid" (narm va sustand) that they shape-shift according to any given circumstance (dar har jā′ī bi h rangī dar āyand). The doubts (shubhah) these human devils (shayāṭīn-ī ins) promulgate have a chance of entering the hearts (qalb) of religious brothers (barādarān-ī dīn) because "every Iblīs with human characteristics" (har Iblīs-ī ādam ṣifat) is able to seduce through their pleasing yet forged countenance (farīftah-ī khushrū′ī va šūrat′sāzī), but in such situations, the believer (who is considered brainless in one specific instance) should always refer to the religious experts for advice (bih ahl-ī khibrah rujū).

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478 Christl Catanzaro, "Policy or puzzle? The foundation of the University of Tehran between ideal conception and pragmatic realization," in Culture and Cultural Politics Under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran, ed. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (New York: Routledge, 2014), 44.


480 Ghulām Ḥusayn, "Īz̤ ā ḥ-ī Ḥaqāyīq yā Kashf-ī Dasāyiς [The Molestation of Truths or the Unveiling of Intrigues]," Taẕakkurāt-ī Diŷānati 34 (1927/8/1306 sh.): 10.


482 Ghulām Ḥusayn, "Īz̤ ā ḥ-ī Ḥaqāyīq," 10.


484 Ghulām Ḥusayn, "Taṣrīḥ-ī Kutub-ī Sābiqah bih Tamāṁ-ī Awṣāf va 'Alāyim-ī Ḥuqrat-ī Ḥuqrat-ī 'Ajjal Allāh Farajah [Confirming to the Highest Degree the Previous Books and Signs of the Arrival of his Holiness, the Ultimately Proven, May God Hasten the Relief that He Will Bring Us]," Taẕakkurāt-ī Diŷānati 11 (1927/8/1306 sh.): 9.

485 Ghulām Ḥusayn, "Īz̤ ā ḥ-ī Ḥaqāyīq," 10-1.
kunîd). Spoken of by the sixth Imam Ja'far bin Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (702-65/83-148 gh.), the latter are the Shi'ī 'ulamā—the most learned (afzal)—who maintain the boundaries that prevent Iblîs and his devils from ambushing the spirits of the faithful (ḥāfiz-îân sarḥaddât hastand kih Iblîs va shayāfîn-î āz ān ḥudûd bih arvâh-yi Shi'ayân-i mā ḥamlah mînamâyand) and reverse the process of being deceived by the ideational injections of the foreigners (farîftah-yi tazriqât-î ajânib shudah).

While the clergy is on the one hand lauded in its capacity as a guardian class, 'Alî Akbar Ḥakami' zâdah is daring enough to equate some among its ranks with precisely the devils they are mandated to combat. These unsavory elements took advantage of the popular correlation between clerical attire and religiosity (dîn va rawḥanîyat râ bih în libās mîshinâkhtand) and sullied the reputation of this venerable institution with their crass behaviour (bad raftârî) and love of rank and money (mâl'talab va jâh'khvâh). Another group that received special attention by religious thinkers due to their association with the demonic were those who claimed to be the fulfillers of Shi'î messianism (iddi'-yi mahdavîyat va qâ'imîyat) as divine caliphs (khalîfah-yi ilâhi) or representatives (namâyandah-yi rahmâni). According to their detractors, they are simply the representatives of Satan (namâyandah-yi Shaytân) and those "individuals who have accepted [these] invented religions of Babism and Baha'ism" (ashkhâṣî râ kah dîn-i mukhra'ah-yi [sic] Bâbiyat va Bahâ'îat râ qabûl kardah'and) are included within Satan's army.

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lashgar-i Shayṭān). Not only were Baha’is generally viewed as heretics by the Shi‘ī, "they were [...] tied up [...] to some sinister but ambiguous British colonial designs." For Ghulām Ḩūsayne, a critical way to combat the fallacious notion that the Shi‘ī messiah entered de-occultation during the last century is through the proper training of children (ta‘līm-i aftāl) in accordance with the Holy Law (muvāfiq-i Sharī‘at-i Muqaddasah). The intrigues and whisperings of the devils are constantly threatening an already endangered religious edifice.

Rizā Khān, in attempting to reproduce traditional Qājār legitimacy through a state-‘ulamā alliance early on in his reign, maintained cordial relations with the religious establishment. However, when he accepted the mutually-interested proposal put forth by Western powers that the dissolution of the capitulation agreements would have to be based on the condition that Iran's judicial system be extricated from the "ulama's legal jurisdiction," what commenced was a concerted "disestablish[ment]" of clerical interests in favour of the secular state. During such straining times, there naturally emerged from within religion a call not for Kasravī’s rationalism but rather spiritual unity (ittiḥād). The element that is capable of sustaining this unity, abrogating the doubts of the devils (daf’-i shubahāt-i shayāṭīn), and declaring the illusions of the false religions (izhār-i mawhūmāt-i adyān-i bāṭīlah), is the propagation of Islamic knowledge and religious truths (nashr-i ma‘ārif-i Islāmīah va ḥaqāyiq-i dīnīyah), and this can be facilitated by religious institutions and gatherings (tashkīlāt-i mazhabī va majāmi’-i dīnī).

National honour (shirāfat-i millīyat) and independence (istiqlāl-i qawmīyat) is said to be thematically tied to this

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494 Ghulām Ḩūsayne, "Ẓikr-i Aḥvāl-i Tārīkhī-ye Mudda‘īyāt va ʿIlāt al-‘Ilal Iddi‘āhā-yi Kāẕibah [Recounting the Historical Conditions Behind the Rise of Pretenders Claiming to Be Messiahs and or the Main Source Behind the False Claims]," Taẓakkurāt-i Dīyānatī 9 (1926/7/1305 sh.): 9-10.
495 Martin, "Mudarris," 74.
The competing response which collectively "caused an uproar among Islam-minded Iranians," came from religious intellectuals adhering to reformism. Instead of maintaining the antiquated strategy of quietism and unknowing (āyā mīhāyist bih hamān vaż ʿīyyat-i ḍīrīnah-yi khvud sākit va bīkhabar nishast?), this position explicitly calls for the "focalization of the universal ideas in the Qur'an (tamarkuz dādan-i afkār-i ṭumūmī dar Qur'an) and the removal of all ornamentations from the religion" (bardāshtan-i pīrayah’hā az Islām); the "contemplation and elaboration of the reasons and philosophy behind Islamic injunctions" (ghawr va tadqīq dar ʿilal va falsafah-yi dastūrāt-i Islām) along with an international exposition of the conclusions drawn (i'lām kardan-i ān dar ʿālam); and the recognition of foreign critiques which should then be followed up by a series of responses (iṭṭilā' paydā kardan az intiqād-hā-yi ajānib va javāb-i ān ast).\(^{500}\)

At this juncture, a line of demarcation can be drawn between the traditional and reformist positions with respect to demonism. For the traditional ShīT thinkers, a movement is catalyzed away from the contemporaneous theosophical interest in nafs (embodied in the thought of Īrānshahr) and towards an external source of seductive whisperings. This shift may be referred to as a product of projection or externalization\(^ {501}\) in which a "radical undecidability"\(^ {502}\) emerges due to the confused subject/other relation. However, due to the grave existential threat experienced by the religious establishment, especially as it observed the "sweeping"\(^ {503}\) project of Kemalist laicism being unfurled in neighbouring Turkey, it is more convincing to suggest that the focalization of dubious and infiltrative actors was in fact due to an actual lived exigency. Furthermore, the traditionalist critique is not predicated upon an unequivocal instance of satanophany against which reactions such as wonderment (thaumazein) or terror (deinon)\(^ {504}\) can

\(^{498}\) Ghulām Ḥusayn, "Īz̤ ā ḥ-a ḡaqāyīq," 11.


\(^{500}\) Qumī, "Vāz̤ʿīyyat-i Kunūni-yi Islām," 2-3.


\(^{502}\) Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 10.

\(^{503}\) Atabaki, "The Caliphate, the Clerics and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran," 45.

\(^{504}\) Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 13.
be expressed, for there is still a sense of indeterminacy attached to the demonic. Unlike the few years leading up to Rizā Shāh’s abdication when (among other things) "corporeal inscriptions of citizenship" through compulsory alterations of dress and urban markers of pleasure and entertainment resulted in the refocusing of traditionalist critique away from the indeterminate foreign provocateur to more visible manifestations of the diabolical, the traditionalists of the early Pahlavī period were for the most part preoccupied with strategic classifications of political import: 'Who is my ally in faith and how can the enemy be discerned?' For the traditionalist thinker, demonic infiltrators within the nation cannot simply be subsumed under the liberal rubric of "debating adversaries," for they are part of a "meaningful antithesis" that will ultimately decide the fate of the religious establishment in Iran. Demonological terms are thus deployed in the process of political differentiation in which an "anthropological optimism" is precluded. What this means is that there is a certain eschatological necessity to the permanence of evil in human activity and that this particular period is marked by the quest to ascertain categorical political distinctions out of this necessity.

Although Islamic reformism flirts with this political quandary, its approach to the demonological resides in an entirely different register. In positing the demonic outside the limits of a universally rationalistic religion, its ranks are left to inhabit the "phantasmal boundaries where maps run out [... and] where reason falters and fantasies flourish." However, it is not left to rot for its propensity towards activity is implied. Similar to Schopenhauer's will which "appears in every blind operation of a force of nature" the marginalized demonism engages in a form of activity that is at its basis irrational. It is "a dark, dull driving, remote from any direct knowledge" but

507 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 35.
508 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 64.
509 Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 3.
510 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 135.
511 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 174.
it is inherently attracted to knowledge. As Kasravī put it, extra-religious matter clings onto Islam's rudimentary truths resulting in grotesque contortions and unlimited proliferations. There is a certain "restlessness and intensity"\textsuperscript{512} associated with the production of worthless mystical and philosophical texts. All the wasted intellectual powers on discussions and theoretical systems "not controlled or tempered by thoughtfulness"\textsuperscript{513} is related to the expenditure of energies among animal species. It is not surprising then that the bestial is also incorporated into the extra-religious realm occupied by the diabolical. Again, but this time in the form of the "unhistorically"\textsuperscript{514} bestial, the demonic intermingles with God's most cherished creation, man, and seduces him into adopting the view that historical memory is not the place of origins in which images of original divine truths are stored but that it "pushes him down or bends him sideways, it encumbers his steps as a dark, invisible burden which he can sometimes appear to disown and which in traffic with his fellow men he is only too glad to disown, so as to excite their envy."\textsuperscript{515}

Not only does the demonic lead to the corruption of man and truth, it also compromises scientific knowledge in the production of hellish instruments. When it is said that the "discontinuous campaigns separated by empty pauses" characteristic of the Second World War (1939-45) is reflective of the "military instruments" that were mobilized throughout the years of conflict,\textsuperscript{516} the opposite procedure is embodied in Kasravi's hellish instruments. In this case, the corrupted scientific knowledge of the Europeans led directly to their production and their use in the world conflagration is rooted in the "inexorable impulse of masses of water rushing down to the depths,"\textsuperscript{517} that irrational force of Nature whose unthinking activity is posited outside the rationalistic faith of the religious modernists. As such, the demonological understanding of the traditionalists differs in a marked way from the reformist fixation on the lawless productions of a

\textsuperscript{512} Schopenhauer, \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, 244.
\textsuperscript{513} Schopenhauer, \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, 245.
\textsuperscript{514} Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," 61.
\textsuperscript{515} Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," 61.
\textsuperscript{517} Schopenhauer, \textit{The World as Will and Representation}, 143.
diabolical swamp situated outside the contours of reality. With the latter group, what is ultimately of greater concern than the location of the demonic at the level of political distinctions is precisely the etiology of demonism itself as it is rooted in solipsistic self-production.

Before moving on to this topic, which is itself an extension of the religious reformist critique, let us review and draw some conclusions regarding the contents of this section.

(i) In keeping with the demonological logic of the time, Kasravi situates embodied evil outside his rationalistic religion, for it is a reflection of eternal dispersion and anachronistic thinking.

(ii) In contrary to the highly centralized and minimalistic structure of Kasravi's reformed Islam, Ahriman is constantly subject to self-expansion, primarily through his fusion with the former's simplified truths. This diverges away from state's strategy of diremption where the demonic is cut off from truth, and the scientific-materialist interest in how the demonic can give rise to truth.

(iii) The historian locates within so-called civilized man the desire to become interlaced with the demonic by way of the bestial, and this attitude is advanced by those who are considered to be at the vanguard of society's intellectual tradition. Thus, in contrary to the state's implicit postulate that proto-citizens are derived from a demonic ontology and the Marxist understanding of subjects having to inhabit a pneumatological world due to the configuration of social relations, Kasravi's man of the Enlightenment has an inclination towards the demonic existence through the bestial.

(iv) This same class of thinkers are said to have been responsible for the creation of technologies that are innately infernal. In opposition to the state's treatment of modern technologies inherently open to redemption and cooption (eventually becoming secularized divine instruments), Kasravi's loathed technologies have the negative intentionality of their creators embedded within them and are thus indissolubly polluted. Only if modern scientific knowledge is rebooted to a pre-modern episteme can this problem be finally resolved. While modern technologies as a whole can be redeemed in the eyes of the state, Kasravi's position is that only scientific knowledge prior to its modern dilution can be open to this possibility.

(v) The position of traditional Shi'i thinkers differed markedly from not only the reform-minded modernists but also all the other positions discussed thus far in this study. For them, the demonic
is intertwined with the question of the political. The integrity of the community had to be maintained through the difficult task of differentiating allies from enemies. More than the other positions, the traditionalists emphasized the importance of propagation as a source of resolution to the problem of the demonic and its foreign genesis. In the final analysis, a sense of ambivalence lingered (due in part to a lack of determinate descriptions) with respect to the demonic, but recurring antagonists helped to allay this.
Chapter 5

*Shayṭān-i Vahm*: Failed Socialization and the Discourse of Voluntarism

The purpose of this chapter is to delve further into the reformist critique by dealing with the question of failed or disrupted socialization. What happens when the earlier mentioned *bachah(-yi)* Shayṭān is incapable of moving beyond Nature by abiding by his nature? In the case of the deluded, the opium addict, and the woman (especially when she is veiled), what is odd is that as they move further away from a functional, domesticated, and rationalized existence towards an otiose, dormant, and trifling lingering, they are construed by reformists as possessing a form of deadened vitality that goes beyond the life of modern subjectivity. With this they reveal how their constitution is in concert with the inhuman rhythms of Nature. In hopes of avoiding a mass movement towards this morose eventuality, both the state and reformers trumpeted the cause of willpower and its ability to lift the proto-Pahlavī subject in the direction of industriousness, judiciousness, and progressive national deliverance.

According to the reformist critique, the traditionalists, in thinking that their religion is "a comprehensive and perfect way of life, far from any defect,"⁵¹⁸ are incapable of seeing the volleys of critical analysis being launched by the foreigners "like rain against the body of Islam" *(tīr’hā-yi dushmanānah-yi intiqād-i ajānib rā kih mişl-i bārān bīh badan-i Islām mībhārad nimībīnand)*. They are said to be "similar to that duck which—to maintain the judgement that it does not see the enemy—holds its head under water with the belief that if it does not see the enemy, the enemy too will not see it and it will attain repose from his patho" *(mānand-i ān murghābī kih sar-i khvud rā barā-yi nadīdan-i dushman zūr-i āb miğārad bi gamān-i īn kih vaqtī kih ū dushman rā nabīnad dushman ham ū rā nimībīnad va az āsīb-ī ū rāḥat mīmānad!!*)⁵¹⁹

Here, what traditionalist thinkers are accused of is an active withdrawal into ignorance. The move is not similar to the two-sided Socratic gesture of affirming "conclusions [...] that are, to speak somewhat boldly, held firm and bound fast by a chain of argument as strong as iron" and

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then disclaiming, in the same breath, these very same conclusions ("I do not claim to know that this is so"). Rather, the traditionalist stance is thought to bear no relation to wisdom whatsoever. While it may appear that the strategy to evade the enemy is based on some thought process, it is shot through so thoroughly with a sense of impracticality that this possibility is remote at best. As a result of personal inducement they are subjectively alienated from the conditions of social life to such an extent that their "entire consciousness is adjusted to blank off reality and discern what seems to be essential on the other side of it." According to the Socialist Theists who rose as inheritors of the reformist cause after the fall of the first Pahlavī shāh, the traditionalists never really engaged in a meaningful way with modernity. In a phenomenological sense, if "turning to the object is the lowest form of activity emanating from the ego," then the traditionalist is perceived as not being able to conduct even this rudimentary gesture.

The systematic occlusion of not only social reality but also the physical basis behind phenomena—which is attributed by superstitious believers to occult beings—is part of what has been called the "visionary gaze" of religiosity. It was this factor, among many others, which was later turning recent university graduates away from traditionalism. For instance, Ḥakamīʾzādah speaks of how epilepsy (ṣar) and its physiological basis in the "extraordinary stimulation of the spinal cord" (tāḥrīk-i fawq al-ʿādah-yi nukhā) is often confused for jinn possession (jinʿzadag). What this implies for the reformist is the believer's tendency to

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523 Taghavi, The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran, 24.
525 Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia, 34.
526 Taghavi, The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran, 50.
occlude the happenings of the world and engage in the practice of obscurantist fideism in which causation is defined by the *fa'āl-i mā yashā'* (autonomous activity)^{528} of phantasmal beings. Internal to the thought system that supports this occult-driven explanation are safety mechanisms meant to instill adherence. An example of this is when it is stated that forgetfulness (*înhā kih bar ā guzashtha hīch bih khātir nadārad*) after the epileptic episode is a reflection of how the victim should not recount his experience to others, for doing so may result in the *jinn* causing more harm to the individual (*bih ā guftah'and kih az ḥāl-i khvud agar bih kasā bigū'ī tū rā bīshtar ağıyat mīkunīm*).^{529} Not only are there internal theoretical barriers to escaping this mode of explanation, practical inhibitions, in the form of *jinn* catchers (*jin'gūr'hā*) and geomancers (*rammāl'hā*), also abound.^{530} Reinforced is the attitude that only experts of the occult sciences are capable of expunging the effects of evil spirits (*daf'-i sharr-i ānhā*).^{531} Instead of abiding by these tricksters (*kulāh'bardār*), Muslims are encouraged by Ḥakamīʿzādah to either visit learned doctors (*ṭabīb-i dānā'ī*) or, in the last resort, attend to personally administered remedies that are in accord with proven practices, such as permitting greater blood-circulation (*libās'hā-yi tang rā az badan-i ā bīrūn āvariḍ va tukmah'hā rā bāz kunid tā khūn bih āsānī jaryān paydā kunad*).^{532} Thus, through this "disenchantment of [...] quasi-magical gaze"^{533} not only is the theoretical problem of pathology solved in its extrication from occult causation, the corrective of medicinal practice based on scientific insights nullifies the need for the exploitative occult practitioners.

In a revealing passage about the *jinn* that follows the foregoing, Ḥakamīʿzādah is able to crystallize a significant aspect of the period's demonology, except, it is done through a longstanding superstitious attitude. During the pre-Islamic period, the *jinn*'s association with augury, fertility, and prowess (as is evident in their legendary swords *ma'thur* and *ifranji*)^{534}

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^{528}ʿAlī Akbar Ḥakamīʿzādah, "Jinʿgūr [Jinn Catching]," *Humāyūn* 3 (1934/5/1313 sh.): 27.
^{531}Ḥakamīʿzādah, "Jinʿgūr," 29.
^{533}Shayegan, *Cultural Schizophrenia*, 35.
^{534}El-Zein, *Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn*, 28. For the names of these two swords I used El-Zein's transliterations.
gave them an exalted status that was divested during the Islamic revelations. Their absolute submission to the Prophet Muḥammad's (c. 570-632/c. 54/5 bh.-11 gh.) mission reflected their "deference to divine omniscience before which all other knowledge gives way" and when the final remnants of their caste "tried to reach heaven, [...] they] discovered it to be full of stern guards and shooting stars" (wa-annā lamasnā al-samā'a fawajadnāḥā mulī'at ḥarasan shadīdan wa shuhuban). However, what Ḥakamī´zādah suggests is that even though Islam reinforced monotheistic belief with its rise (dīn-i Islām īn hamah jiddīyat kard kih āyīn-i yigānah'parastī rā dar jahān ravāj dahad), the jinn of today are no longer considered to be weaker than God Himself (bīshtar-i mardum jin rā kamtar az Khudā nimīdān).

Though ultimately conveyed in a tongue-in-cheek way, Ḥakamī´zādah proposes a possible historical account of how this came to be possible: that the jinn have progressed (taraqqī kardah) the same way humans have, allowing them to perform deeds that were previously too daunting to attempt.

This expansion in power may have less to do with the nature of occult beings themselves and more to do with the dialogic relationship between clients and the industry of occult practitioners which has it that "the outcome of events or situations is [...] alterable through an object. [...] T]his type of magical manipulation has become detached from religion and has attained an unreligious if not anti-religious status." By suggesting that the jinn have in this way gone beyond their religiously-circumscribed position, or pointing out the absurdity or untenability of other popular facets, Ḥakamī´zādah's rationalistic approach is not so much meant to undermine Shi'i Islam, but rather to expose points of deviation. This is evinced when Ḥakamī´zādah declares that "the meaning behind the worship of Yazdān and Ahrīman [basis of the Zoroastrian dualistic ontology] prevails in us" with the only difference that Iranians do not refer to this ontology by name.

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535 Michel Cuypers, The Banquet: A Reading of the Fifth Sura of the Qur'an, trans. Patricia Kelly (Miami, FL: Convivium Press, 2009), 403.
537 Ḥakamī´zādah, "Ṣar' va Junūn va Jin," 15.
539 Rahnema, Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics, 5.
Ahrīman, or Angrah'Maynīyū, is different from Islam's Iblīs/Shayṭān in that while the latter is a patron within divine cosmology, Ahrīman is a differentiated hypostatic being. The Zoroastrian Evil Spirit is oppositional in that his aim is to counteract each instantiation of the divine order. Though, this may be more a sign of his obtusity than anything else. Within this system evil is not feeble, for Jahī, "the archetypical whore," was actually able to rescue Ahrīman by preventing the fulfilment of the divine strategy against him. The most Islam's Shayṭān can do is engage in beguiling machinations while Ahrīman is in possession of creative powers. As has already become evident, even though he is able to produce frighteningly devastating existents such as plagues, insects, and insidious women, the Evil Spirit is in possession of flaws that bar him from pre-eminence. For instance, the Tahmūris myth is an account of how a warrior named Taxma Urupi reigns over and rides Ahrīman as if he were a horse. Based on this description, it can be asserted that even though early Pahlavī demonology may be pointing in the direction of a Zoroastrian conception of evil with respect to its reproductive and proportional dimensions, Ahrīman's relationality is what ultimately ruptures the proposed homology. Pahlavī demonology, in being tied to an amorphous, irrational, and inexorable state of nature, does not abide by any sense of correspondence or relationality in its most general sense. Evil is expansive but lacks direction, is reminiscent of archetypes, but is still slightly amiss.
Though Ḥakamī´zādah's consternation with the construction of hyperbolic *jinn* is both indisputable and palpable, what complicates the situation is his acquiescent attitude with respect to a separate but nearly identical movement—but one with an added caveat. The embellishment of the role of occult beings is criticized when it is based on the groundless supposition that the *jinn* are akin to *Ahrīman*, the evil god (*khudā-yi sharūr*) who was posited as being capable of great feats (*kār'hā-yi fawq al-'ādah*), but the same proportion of influence is permitted so long as these beings are equatable with objects of modern science, such as microbes (*mardum gumān kardah´and kih īnān bīshtar dar ma'raž-i jin'zadigī hastand!! īn 'aqīdah durust ast valī jin-i ānhā hamān mīkrūb'hārī ast kih dar ānhā bih zūdī ta'ṣīr kunad*). Although the Islamic reformer criticized this position in an earlier issue of *Humāyūn* by saying that there are no proofs (*dalīlī*) for such a claim, he follows the statement with a paragraph that is worth commenting on in full:

> The *jinn* are described (*ta'rīf kardah´and*) as being of an aeriform substance (*jīsm-i havā'ī*) that is able to take on any form and has the intellect (*'aql*), understanding (*fahm*), and ability (*tavānā'ī*) to conduct difficult deeds (*kār'hā-yi sakht*). This description (*ta'rīf*) is similar to many other descriptions in that it does not have a veracious fundamental philosophy (*falāsafah asās va pāyah-yi durustī nadārad*). On the contrary, it is woven (*bih ham bāftah´and*) based on one's imagination (*khīyāl*) and presumption (*gumān*).

In ridiculing the position that occult beings are intentional and that their extraordinary actions are based on some semblance of calculus, what Ḥakamī´zādah basically does is not simply disinvest an aspect of these beings that was originally imputed to them by believers, he is disputing the very logic of having the occult cogitate. After all, according to the Qur'ānic account the *jinn* serving the prophet Sulaymān were unable to compute his death—even though it happened before them—until termites (*mūrīyānah*) started gnawing away at his cane (*'aṣā*), resulting in his corpse to collapse to the ground (*bar zamīn uftād*). In this portrayal, Ḥakamī´zādah is not abiding by

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551 Ḥakamī´zādah, "Jin´gīrī," 27.
552 Ḥakamī´zādah, "Ṣar' va Junūn va Jin," 16.
the popular opinion that the jinn are capable of transmitting reports from the unseen (khabar az ghayb). Rather, the jinn are presented as often being the last to know, even if that. In maintaining this position, he is implicitly rejecting the debate over whether Satan is an actor who fills a role but lacks a sense of polymorphism, or a character (in the mode of Iblīs) who engages in narrative growth. Ḥakamī’zādah's occult is devoid of ambivalence on this issue. He clearly opts for the stance that beings such as the jinn "never demonstrate [...] any independence of action." The reformer is not here shirking his strict commitment to Islam's origins by committing this negation. Rather, his view of occult apocatastasis, or its restoration to its original condition, is only one-sided in that he abides by a movement reminiscent of the one that took place in the Medīnan sūrahs of the Qur'an when the "angels have less personality and become more like mechanical extensions of the divine act and message." For Ḥakamī’zādah, the jinn are, in perfect keeping with the time, reduced to such a mechanical level. However, while, in the case of the state, the organic form (demonism) of technology was dispensed with for the sake of its instrumental content, Ḥakamī’zādah takes the emptied out shell of the occult and refurbishes it for further use. This is done when he moves away from the clergy's supposed fixation on "spiritual matters" along with their tendency to simply adopt the superstitious beliefs of the masses for the sake of greater social legitimacy and appends the jinn to microbial phenomena:

However, in a report (khabar) the jinn are known to be of five types (qism), one of them being insects (hasharāt al-arg). Thus, if someone were to consider noxious microbes (mīkrūb'hā-yi mūẕīah rā yikī az aqsām) to be one of the types of jinn, he would not be straying too far (pur dūr naraftah). As has been noted in other reports, the armpit (zīr-i baghal), pubes ('ānah), mustache hair growing beyond the upper lip (shārib), and filth (kiṣāfāt) are [all] dwellings (jāygāh) for jinn and Satan.

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555 Bodman, The Poetics of Iblīs, 18.
556 Bodman, The Poetics of Iblīs, 217.
557 Bodman, The Poetics of Iblīs, 19.
558 Bodman, The Poetics of Iblīs, 50-1.
559 Taghavi, The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran, 52.
560 Taghavi, The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran, 71.
561 Ḥakamī’zādah, "Ṣar’ va Junūn va Jin," 16.
Here, by referring to a "report related by an associate of the Prophet or the Imam," Ḥakamī´zādah is, in effect, maintaining his religious bearings. In keeping with this attitude, he even asserts that parallel to the conflict between the angels (malā’ikah) and devils (shayātīn) is the one between armed immunological soldiers (sarbāz‘hā-yi musallaḥī) and noxious microbes. When the jinn are transformed into microbial jinn, traditional experts of the occult sciences such as sorcerers, geomancers, and jinn catchers are delimited from having any meaningful dialogue with these beings. Out of all the perspectives we have observed thus far, this is the first to theoretically cut the lines of communication between demonic beings and the industry of occult practitioners, for while other attempts were made to push the diabolical into the realm of irrationality, this was the first to also undermine traditional practitioner's dominion by reaffirming the existence of the occult within an empirically verifiable register. Now if, one wanted to establish contact with the jinn and comprehend the faith at a deeper level, a religious scientist would have to be referred to:

However, even though (valī) the existence of the jinn is among the givens (musallamāt), its truth (haqūqatash) is for us indeterminable (nalma‘ūm), and the opinions (‘aqāyidī) the people harbour with respect to the jinn have neither a religious (dīnī) nor scientific (‘ilmī) basis (asās). In the previous issue (shumārah), I the author (nigārandah) stated that if anyone considers [it possible for] th[ese] weak creature[s] (mawjūd-i za‘iff) to be made to heed (gābil-i i’tinā) or submit (farmān ‘burdār) to one’s [will], it would be nice for them to command (amr farmāyand) the author be punished (mujāzāt) by them in order for him to [cease] his audacious (jisārat nakunad) [impingement] of their holy rank (maqām-i muqaddas). All the same, he is still healthy (sālim) due to your favour (iltifāt).

In this facetious quip against the traditional occult practitioners, Ḥakamī´zādah's conviction that they are essentially impotent reinforces the already established commitment to the incommunicability of the microbial jinn. The implications of these foregoing theoretical movements are seismic. Though they are silenced, by affirming their incorporation into scientific

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564 Taghavi, The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran, 7.
discourse Ḥakamī’zādah gives the microbial jinn "respite from [its divine] punishment" and the traditional occult practitioners are relegated past their situatedness within actual socio-economic relations and into the realm of pure fancy (pāyah-yi 'aqīdah-yi khvud rā faqāt rū-yi khīyāl guẕashtand). Cast off from both the shores of modernity and the pneumatological world that they once knew, this collective has come to fulfill the Orientalist perception of the Persian as an individual who only deals with its "objects contemplatively" because the occult beings with whom he once had contact is wrenched from his dominion. For these occultists "the object [is] altogether [removed] from the scope of practical desire" even though they believe that they are still in contact with it. A distinction must be made between the objective occult (in the form of the microbial jinn) and the debilitating subjective occult where spirits of the mind sprinkle the landscape of consciousness but are forever barred from the prying hands of humans:

A man said, "I made it home to see a jinn catcher (jin'gīrī) sitting with die (tāsī) placed before him under a veil (chādurī) and in the midst of summoning (ihzār) jinn. After a period of time a squeaking (jīr jīr) noise emerged from the die and he said 'those better than us (az mā bihtarūn) have been prompted and are speaking. I stepped forth, placed my hand underneath the veil, and saw that he had a string in his hand that he was using to pull on the die. I said, the jinn you captured (taskhīr kardī) with great effort (zaḥmat) is the one I caught easily."

This anecdote can be read in a couple of ways. For one, it can be asserted that the skeptical observer's discovery of the anatomy of deceit or the material conditions behind the illusion that the jinn have been prompted allows him to be closer to occult happenings and beings. This is a paradoxical proposition but one which undergirds Ḥakamī’zādah's approach. It is his commitment to the veracity of microbiological laws and findings which lends to his proximity to the occult. However, the individuals who are immersed in the logic of the very material conditions of illusion, such as the jinn catcher in the above anecdote, is, unbeknownst to him, the furthest

566 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 18.
567 Ḥakamī’zādah, "Jin’gīrī," 27.
569 Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume I, 610.
570 'Alī Akbar Ḥakamī’zādah, "Dāstān'hā-yi Shīrīn [Some Sweet Stories]," Humāyūn 9 (1934/5/1313 sh.): 32.
removed from the occult. He is stuck in "an inexhaustible self-yielding of imagination, a harmless play,"\textsuperscript{571} but is unable to discern his frighteningly inescapable occupancy within fancy. He is not simply pulling the strings, he is part of the illusion that the strings manifest. This leads us to the second and connected reading, that the observer's easily discovered \textit{jinn} is the \textit{jinn} catcher himself. This inversion actualizes an observation made earlier, that the rationalization of the \textit{jinn} is spontaneously accompanied by the casting off of the traditional occult practitioners into the deepest recesses of illusion. Their imaginations are "satisfied in the freest way with its hundreds of changing turns of phrase and conceits,"\textsuperscript{572} but they lack the self-awareness to realize their own location within these conceits. On one level, it can be said that this entire scenario is an example of how "the product of social activity is reified into an autonomous substantial content that subordinates to itself its own generative force"\textsuperscript{573} when the \textit{jinn} catcher proclaims that the \textit{jinn} (the product of his illusory social activity) are better than us humans. However, what is more salient is the \textit{jinn} catcher's complete loss of symbolic reality, even though he is a human operating within a discernable industry that is caught within determinable socio-economic relations, and how the \textit{jinn} are given a sizeable dose of ontological leverage. The second anecdote reinforces these statements:

A person came to the bedside (\textit{bālīn}) of a deceased individual in order to read the Qur'an. Once he sat down he saw the deceased moving within the coffin. However, he blamed (\textit{takhṭa'ah mīkard}) his senses (\textit{ḥis}) and consoled (\textit{dildārī mīdād}) himself. He eventually saw something jump out of the coffin and run off (\textit{farār kard}). At this point he grew impatient (\textit{bīʿāqat shud}), yelled (\textit{faryādī zad}), and passed out (\textit{bīhūsh gardīd}). Once [everyone] gathered and brought him to consciousness it became apparent that the first Qur'an reader (\textit{Qur'ān khvān}) had left his his food in the coffin (in order to protect it [\textit{maḥfūz bāshad}] from theft [\textit{dastburd}]) prior to leaving and that the cat went into the coffin to eat it, which [resulted] in the movement. This unfortunate man thought that Satan had penetrated (\textit{ḥulūl nimūdah}) the corpse (\textit{jasad}) of the deceased and that he had to engage in battle (\textit{jang va nabard}) with him.\textsuperscript{574}

\textsuperscript{571} Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume I}, 611.
\textsuperscript{572} Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume I}, 610.
\textsuperscript{574} Ḥakamī´zādah, "Dāstān 'hā-yi Shīrīn," 32.
In this account, a further step is taken with respect to the occult practitioner's relationship with occult beings. Here, rather than being exposed by a partial external party, the Qur'an reader—a profession often ranked alongside sorcerers, geomancers, *jinn* catchers, and the others—falls for a technique one of his colleagues might just as well had resorted earlier as a way to heighten the belief of his clients. What this anecdote makes manifest is the unintentional self-deception that takes place when one gets too involved in one's own machinations.\(^{575}\) This "is nothing but the very movement of unilateral self-deception, of the hubris of positing oneself in one's exclusive particularity, which necessarily turns against itself and ends in self-negation."\(^{576}\) The Qur'an reader's self-negation (passing out) occurs when the creation of his industry reverses its trajectory and comes hurtling towards its originator. This is encapsulated in the dictum that "the secrets of the Egyptians were secrets also for the Egyptians themselves."\(^{577}\) To frame it in the context of the bond between traditional occult practitioner and client, the former's "external reflection on the victim is already an inherent reflective determination of the victim himself."\(^{578}\) What makes this story "sweet" for the reformers is that as time passes, it became increasingly apparent that only the witches, sorcerers, arithmomancers, and the others who are falling for their own schemes. This continual withdrawal into a fanciful world of their own creation is the same as being submerged in that lawless Natural order out of which the Pahlavī state emerged, for the space of illusion is just as over-populated with demonic spirits as that of the late-Qājār landscape.

Prior to examining the strategies used to evade the slippage back into the period's chaotic and miasmic origins, it would be imperative to discuss illusion (*vahm*) and its link with the line of terms we observed earlier, including irrationality, the bestial, and Nature. The concatenation is not arbitrary in the least for all the concepts linked with the diabolical are in possession of strikingly similar qualities. Illusion fits squarely within this series, especially in the form of *Shayṭān-i vahm*

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\(^{577}\) Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 83.

\(^{578}\) Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 83.
(illusion qua Satan). While *vahm* as a form of perception is in our case associated with the "haze of stupefaction," this was not always the case. The medieval Persian polymath Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, 980-1037/399-456 gh.), for instance, spoke of *vahm* (*aestimatio* in Latin) in terms of the animal's (and human's) estimative capacity to pick up on the intentions of external beings. In other words, it is the ability to detect the imperceptibles of perceptible entities (*andar maḥsūsāt chīz'hā-yi nāmaḥsūs bīnad*). Accordingly, it is the most crucial of all the internal faculties and the "basis of our character, whether influenced or uninfluenced by reason." Its innovation by the philosopher served to compensate for the shortcomings of Aristotle's faculty psychology and build off (either directly or indirectly) of the ideas proposed

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by Porphyry (234-305) in his *On the Soul*,\(^{587}\) in that it was differentiated from its accompanying faculties by having its own experience-derived and partially imaginative\(^{588}\) cognitive objects, the pre-conceptual abstract quiddities\(^{589}\) such as a father's kindness towards his child.\(^{590}\)

Unlike the way the traditional occult practitioners are pushed by Ḥakamī´zādah into the phantasmal world of their own creation, a realm robbed of the *jinn* with which they once thought to be in contact, Ibn Sīnā's *vahm* actually serves an important role in practical knowledge. As a "leading sub-intellectual faculty," *vahm* is given a variety of functions\(^{591}\) but what its basis for practical knowledge offers us, in juxtaposition to the solipsistic withdrawal of the *jinn* catcher's fancy, is its contribution to the movement of external souls and bodies in the form of *wahm al-āmil*.\(^{592}\) Manifesting itself in this way, *vahm* has the ability to be harnessed as "hypnosis and suggestion" to manipulate external reality,\(^{593}\) something modern *jinn* catchers and sorcerers are unable to do precisely because they are caught in a revised conception of *vahm* as solipsistic fancy. Although the Stoics came close to developing Ibn Sīnā's conception of *vahm* generations before he was even born, their *oikeiosis*—or "perceptual-moral theory of [...] 'appropriation,' according to which whatever is perceived by the external senses is interpreted internally by the soul as the bearer of certain values"—did not live up to the "purely psychological" quality of the Persian polymath's faculty.\(^{594}\) In the indirect inheritance of Ibn Sīnā's discovery and the alterations made to it by successive thinkers, Islamic reformers in the 1930s were able to

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\(^{589}\) Hall, "Intecl, Soul and Body in Ibn Sīnā," 65-6.

\(^{590}\) Mohammad Ardešir, "Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy of Mathematics," in *The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions*, ed. Shahid Rahman, Tony Street, and Hassan Tahiri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 56.; Davidson's example is of a sheep recognizing the danger inherent in being around a wolf. See Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 89. While these two examples help to get the general point across, it would be wise to not associate the faculty too closely with instinct.


\(^{593}\) Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sīnā," 492.

transform this doctrine by giving it a social psychological function. No longer would the concept serve as a psychological mechanism to evade hairy situations, but rather come to reflect an almost inescapable epistemological darkness. But how did vahm take such a turn?

Between Ibn Sīnā and the first Pahlavī period, many Persian thinkers dealt with the philosopher's novel conception in a number of ways. For example, the polymath Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149-1209/543/4-605/6 gh.) was comfortable enough to group the faculty in with "blind belief (i’itiqād al-muqallid), ignorance, doubt, [and] guesswork."595 For the philosopher and poet Afzāl al-Dīn Kāshānī (d. 1213/609/10 gh.), vahm is situated between the two poles of human awareness, intelligence and sense perception. In close proximity to imagination (khayāl) as a medial faculty, vahm is associated with the plateau of sense-intuition,596 a term thought by some modern scholars to better reflect than "estimation" the essence of the faculty.597 Moving forward a few centuries, the originator of Transcendental Theosophy Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640/1049/50 gh.) took an active interest in attacking the Avicennean faculty, especially its objects which are "merely imagined things, without any being in concrete reality."598 Vahm is thought to be a source of error, but one that is not an obstacle for the true of faith: "the true knower sees everything in its Source, without error in sensation or confusion in the (mind's) estimation."599 During the same century the Twelver Shi'i theologian and faqīh Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī (c. 1627/8-1698/9/1037-1110 gh.) most known for his influential role in Safavid political and religious life, moves the concept in a different direction. In his case, vahm comes to denote human supposition as opposed to fancy, a concept represented by the term mutikhayyalah.600

595 Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 238.
597 Chittick, The Heart of Islamic Philosophy, 318.
Though offering varying nuances, what all these positions share is a commitment to technical rigor. Though not vexed by this commitment to detail within branches of knowledge such as falsafah and fiqh, the reformers of the early-Pahlavī period nevertheless refer to vahm's common denotation as it is linked to takhayyul (imagination) and ṣann (opinion or belief).\(^{601}\) This was not totally uncommon, for even technical users themselves were not always prone to differentiating vahm from notions such as imagination and supposition.\(^{602}\) The reformers take this (un)specific definition and append the diabolical to it in creating the concept of Shayṭān-i vahm again this should not be construed as being entirely novel for the Persian conception of vahm, in particular, carries with it a sense of "malevolence"\(^{603}\) one would not be so quick to associate with flights of fancy. Moreover, this stance is not devoid of technical ancestry, for the likes of pseudo-Ibn al-'Arabī and 'Azīz Nasafī (13th c.) take vahm's association with the animal soul (established earlier by Ibn Sīnā) and tie it to Iblīs due to its being "the hottest spirit within the body" and a perennial antagonist of 'aql, the pure Intellect. Vahm as fanciful imagination is associated with the lower world ('ālam-i ṣaghūr) and is known for its proposensity to be boastful of its stature and productions.\(^{604}\) In another instance it is said that when the estimative faculty (wahmiyyah) is actualized, "[t]he rational animal can and in fact does fall prey to all the deliriums and monstrous inventions of the imaginary, obstinately rejecting the judgement of the intellect."\(^{605}\)

From this it should be clear that when the Islamic reformists refer to Shayṭān-i vahm, the concept can indeed ultimately be linked back to Ibn Sīnā's project to improve upon Aristotelian psychology, but its sinews are charged by the centuries long journey it took through moments of pedantic rigor, conceptual indetermination, along with its mystical encounter and subsequent subordination to 'aql. The concept is given added vigor by the demonological essence of the age alongside the reformist tendency to desire the partial rehabilitation of the occult in accordance with rationalist discourse and the disaccreditation of its previous handlers, such as the jinn

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\(^{602}\) Chittick, *The Heart of Islamic Philosophy*, 332.
catchers and arithmomancers. When these enumerated factors are positioned alongside the statement that the closing of one's eyes (chishm furū pūshad) to God will result in a devil (Shayṭānī) being sent to befriend the person, it becomes clear that the person is actually being closed off to the world and left in perpetual darkness. As vahm, this closed off space serves as the precondition for demonic visitation or production.

The faqīḥ, writer and poet Sayyid 'Alī Akbar Burqa'ī Qumī (1899/1900-1987/8/1278-1366 sh.) speaks of how the people (ādamīyān) continue to remain unaware of the spell of illusion (ṭilism-i vahm) and its mischievousness (shayṭanat). By appending the word ṭilism to vahm, the "coexistence of fantasy and social realism" is temporarily occluded to emphasize the deepening of illusion as a mode of perception. This deepening of illusion that distances the deluded ever further from the world is not akin to the "radical self-contraction" associated with absolute freedom. Rather, it is meant to reflect the deepening insubstantiality of the pride, modus operandi, and claims put forth by those who continue to stubbornly abide by misbegotten beliefs. The incognizant attitude of Iranians with respect to ṭilism-i vahm is surprising considering how, contra the other senses, vahm persists in its insubordination to man (hamah havās musakhar va farmān'burdār-i insān gasht magar vahm). As has already been observed, Qumī related this lack of control to Satan's refusal to bow before Adam (chunān kih firishtagān ādam rā sajdah kardand juz Shayṭān), a mark of his inferiority to man.

After this display of power on the part of illusion, Qumī returns to the statement concerning the closure of one's eyes before God but in a different guise. Unlike the deconstructionist notion of a revenant whose movements and timing are wholly erratic and unpredictable, Qumī's demons

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608 Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America, 21.
611 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 27.
only emerge at the dead of night when nothing substantial about reality changes except for the colour of the skies (hamagān dānand hingām-i shab kih farā risad va tārīkī sarāsar-i ģītī rā farāgīrad jahān dīgargūn nashavad juz ģītī rang-i dīgarī bih khvud gīrad). Although there is no actual distortion to the world (jahān dīgargūn nashavad), vahm causes such great a disturbance (chih hingāmah'i barpā namāyad va chih shūr va ghawghā'ī mī'angīzad) that both reason and the most valiant of men cower in fear (Tahamtanān rā ġūshah nishīn va dilīrān rā bar jān-i khvīshtan būmnāk va khurd va kalān rā tarsān va larzān dārad).613 In essence, because nothing of substance actually alters in the world, vahm reacts to the mere appearance of change (in the form of transition from day to night). Although one can counter such a stance with the statement that "persistence of the appearance of permanence"614 has itself an illusory basis, Qumī nevertheless suggests that it is this misperception of night's substantive difference that leads to the thought that "demons, wild beasts, and ghouls have absolute sovereignty over the world and are in step with the soldiers of death" (gūyī dīvān va dadān va ghūlān farmān'ra va muṯlaq-i ģītī va bā sipāḥīyān-i marg dūshādūshand).615

Although used in a metaphorical capacity, this notion of Natural darkness reflects is partially rooted in the genealogical logic of the period's demonism. As has already been conveyed, these years were pivoted upon the implicit notion that "at every step inanimate nature thwarts the will of the individual through chance, just as animate nature does so through conflicting purposes as well as through wickedness."616 While above a more explicit connection is drawn between this condition and the manifestation of demonic beings, Qumī inserts in between these two stages a step that results in a partial recalibration of the sequence. By stating that there is an illusory basis behind the supposition that there is a substantive qualitative shift in the Natural order upon nightfall, demonism's derivation is potentially stripped of its basis in an inexorable conception of the material world as "a catalogue of inexplicable forces"617 and relocated in man's psychological faculties. This being said, Qumī's following gesture further complicates the situation, for instead

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616 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 115.
617 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 122.
of fully removing the Natural darkness out of the equation, he moves in the opposite direction by stating that it was simply a stand-in for ignorance (har gāh tārīkī-yi shab ādamīyān rā dar chinān band afkand, chūn ast ḵāl-i kasānī kih dar tārīkī-yi nādānī bāshad). In maintaining this equivalence, he maintains his fidelity towards the demonological essence of the age as an "indissoluble residuum that cannot be reduced to form." The darkness of night is supposedly exactly like day in that it is only illusory perception which posits it as substantively different, but yet it nevertheless corresponds to ignorance. When night is nothing but a different shade of day and night is equivalent to ignorance, the exactitude and sense of determination associated with night as being the exclusive locus of ignorance collapses, and it is Nature which best typifies this sense of indetermination.

Demonological genealogy must now take account of this added factor. Night as Natural darkness is united with ignorance but diabolical beings do not simply spring from this darkness. In actuality, vahm, in being instigated into actuality by night as Natural darkness/ignorance, is the "virtual space of spectrality" from which demonic beings emerge. The sequence is further complicated when Qumī goes on to state that there are devils in the world who throw these creators of illusory beings off a precipice into a deep abyss (shayāṭīn dar jāmah-yi ādamīyān darāyand va īnān rā bīrāhah barand va dar partgāhī zharf afkanand). In the beginning of this study, we were exposed to two primary variables, Nature and the presence of demons within this landscape. Now, Nature as ignorance gives rise to a particular form of perception (illusion) which in turn leads to the production of nefarious spirits and there are external social devils (in the form of jinn catchers, arithmomancers, geomancers, etc.) who maintain the deluded personality's proximity to Nature as a way to continue the reproduction of spirits.

Qumī's example of a social devil is the corrupt evil-doer of the age (sīyah'kār-i tabah'ružgār) Sayyid 'Alī Muḥammad Bāb (1819-1850/1234-66 gh.). The Bāb is said to be able to "incite the
faculty of *vahm* in their [the deluded ones] hearts* (quvvat-i vahm dar dil-i ānān kār kunad).* Among the thinkers we have thus far covered, Qumī is the first to provide a sustained analysis of not only demonological genealogy but also the social devils who are purportedly in league with the incommunicable and inexorable darkness of Nature and wish to integrate all Iranians into the matrix of this origin. Thinking that the miracle of the Qur'an was in its being composed in Arabic, the Bāb is accused of attempting to duplicate this formal measure in his own works so as to titillate the hearts of believers (*bih gumān-i īn kih Musallmānān bā mu'jizah būdan-i Qur'ān-i 'Arabī āshnāyand kitāb-i khvud rā bih 'Arabī darham bāft*) and thus further "*vahm's oppression* (*bīdādgarī-yi vahm*). Because the hearts of individuals who succumb to this belief are "*found in the darkness of ignorance* (*dilān rā dar tārīkī-yi jahl yāft*), a purposeful attempt is made to occlude this reality through the formalism of Arabic writing. What Qumī essentially does to counter this attempt is to "neutralize [...] its symbolic efficacy" by stating that at its most basic level the strategy is meant to gentrify misperception into divine Truth. One of "the modes of its symbolization" is at the level of language (the use of Arabic) and the other is the exploitation of the Shī'ī discourse of eschatological return via the figure of Bahā'ullāh (*va yā chūnān Bahā' kih daryāft-i [sic] Shī'ī bih raj'atī ... 'aqīdatmand ast raj'atī barā-yi khvud pīsh'hīnī kard*).[625][626]

In a plea for prudent thought and action, Qumī calls out for someone judicious enough to be able to break the spell that attempts to convey nullity through the vernacular of truth (*kujāst ān khiradmandī kih īn tilism rā bishkanad*).[627] While the voluntarism of the time suggests that there is an inherent "resist[ance to] melting away into nothing,"[628] the *faqīh* is of the opinion that it is possible for those caught within the torturous snares of ignorance to be eternally destitute (*ārī

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624 Qumī, "Ṭilism'hā-yi Sih'gānah," 10.
627 Probably a mispelling. Should have been "*dar bāft-i*".
629 Qumī, "Ṭilism'hā-yi Sih'gānah," 10.
630 Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, 438.
tā ādamīyan nādānand dar shikanjah-yi ťilism-i vahm jāvīd bimānand). Even though Islam attempted to expunge illusion of its strangehold through the force of knowledge (‘ilm), it is suggested that there persists the tendency to give causal force to that which is essentially ineffectual (vahm) (chih bīhūdah mardumī kih bar pindār’hā-yi nāchīz ašarī bār kunand!!).631 While Ḥakamī´zādah is finally able (in some measure) to "address himself to spirits"632 by allowing his Islamo-rationalistic system to enfold the jinn, Qumī is here not willing to cede that much. Clearly opposed to the "[in]distinguish[ability] between the future-to-come and the coming-back of a specter,"633 the faqīh opts for the "intellect as the divinely illuminated light and prophet" (’aql chirāgh-i afrūkhtah-yi khudā’ī ast ’aql payman barīst) able to clearly discern good from evil (nik va bad rā bāzshināsad),634 or "between a spirit and a Wirklichkeit [reality]."635

Ultimately, it is the darkness of Nature (tārīkī-yi ṭabī’at) or the spell of Nature (ţilism-i ṭabī’at)636 that should be avoided. Qumī’s critique of the line of causation that results in the creation of illusory occult beings due supposedly to the "activity of intuitive perception,"637 can be traced back to man's being taken hostage by habit and Nature (girawgān-i ādat va ṭabī’at). This malfeiscent realm of Nature has the potential to emerge more frequently than the divine itself. As implied by remarks made by the religious scholar Shahāb al-Dīn Hamidānī (1904/5-58/9/1322-78 gh.), even when the Prophet apparently emerges in a dream, it might as well be a manifestation of Satan (az kujā ma’lūm mīshavad kih īn kasi kih dar khvāb didah shudah payghambar ast tā bigū’īm Shaytān bih īn šurat nimītavānad darāyad) because we can never verify the veracity of claimed instance of divine appearance (faḥmīdan-i īn ma’nī mawqūf bih īn ast kih dar ḥālat-i bīdārī ān ḥazrat rā shakhšan va šuratan didah bāshad), especially if we are dealing with ordinary

631 Qumī, "Ţilism’hā-yi Sih’gānah," 11.
632 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 13.
633 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 46.
634 Qumī, "Ţilism’hā-yi Sih’gānah," 12.
635 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 47.
636 Qumī, "Ţilism’hā-yi Sih’gānah," 12.
dream life. While on one level this can be seen as a "partial devaluation of the dream [...] within [...] larger context of (post)colonialism and modernization," it can also be construed as a focalization of the dream's demonic origins and its connection with illusion.

Within this system, emphasis is placed on the individual to move away from anything that is capable of dragging him back to the demonic matrix that first posited his existence as a bachah(-yi) Shayṭān. This thought was instantiated—as already observed—in the realms of dream and illusion but it also appeared in discussions of other varieties, including the smoking of opiates and the practice of veiling. In the case of opium, the stimulant's use in Iran can be traced back to the Sassanian period (224-651/410/09 bh.-30 gh.) but it became increasingly ubiquitous during the rule of the Safavids when excessive consumption by imperial elites led to great deteriorations in the quality of governance. During the late pre-modern age there lacked any significant stigma against the consumption of opium, and this allowed the drug to spread throughout society. Even Safavid soldiers engaged in the practice, but this unfortunately resulted in depleted military strength and efficacy. Besides also being prevalent among Sufis and the literati, the stimulant's affordability and use in medical applications allowed for widespread common consumption. Predictably, the drug had its more morbid side in that it was often used as a way to commit murder or suicide. Though difficult to police, the accumulated disadvantages led to several crackdowns over the centuries, as was the case during the rule of Shah Tahmasb (1514-76/919-84 gh./r. 1524-76/930-84 gh.) and the Nāṣīrī era.

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Though out of the two Pahlavī shāhs Muḥammad Rızā was more known for his anti-drug initiatives, opium-use was a contentious issue during the early dynastic period as well. Rejecting its palliative qualities (zahr-i afyūn rā makhvān taryāk yā dārū-yi dard / ishtibāh ast ay barādar in ḥikāyat ishtibāh), it is said that the opium-user is most alive when he is next to his pile of coal (or brazier) where the drug is prepared for use but nowhere else (zindah andar pā-yi mangal murdah har jā-yi digar). Lacking in blood flow (sharīyānash az khūn), sense (a'zāyash az ḥis), corporeal vivacity (jismash zi jān), action ('azamish zi jazm), purposeful thoughts (fikrish zi jāh), alertness (chishmash zi khvāb), and mental acuity (maghzash zi hūsh), the user is, in spite of all this, most alive when he is close to the source of his disfunction. In other words, as a moment of speculative unity, he is most alive at the source of his morbidity (the brazier is the locus of his deadened vitality). Removed from any determinable telos, the opium-user is nothing but a small packet of energy, a piece of his miasmic origins in Nature. Not only is this reduced life not the "qualified life" proposed by classical Greek thought, nor is it the form of "natural life" that became hegemonic with the inception of the modern age. As the "decisive event of modernity, [...] the politicization of bare life" is a separate phenomenon from what the opium-user or the delusional jinn-producer embody. Sacred (bare) life, which is "invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely both life's subjection to a power over death and life's irreperable exposure in the relation of abandonment.” On the contrary, what this study is concerned with is the prospect of and social prohibition against the return to one's demonic natural origins. The proto-Pahlavī subject who has lost his way is not a person who has "entered into an intimate symbiosis with death" even though he does not "belong [...] to the world of the deceased." Rather, this person gets too

649 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 3-4.
650 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 83.
651 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 100.
close to an eternal but non-teleological vitality, a condition with which the state is constantly attempting to come to terms.

Drug use constituted one of the sites where Nature bore an insurmountable challenge to the sensibilities of culture, the project of modernization, and state-circumscribed propriety. However, there were times when this latter group of antagonists aided in the perpetuation of addiction. As Dastgirdī puts it in a surprising tone, the government is complicit in allowing the world to go dark (dar shigiftam tā chirāh dawlat ijāzat mīdahad / tā kunad millat chinīn rūz-i sipid-i khvud sīyāh). After all, it was this opiated nation which heralded this government in the first instance (dawlat ārī muntakhab zīn millat-i afyūnī ast).652 The speculative unity observed earlier has its abstracted equivalent in the relationship between the opiated masses and the state. The condition of the state's possibility is located in a demographic that it loathes—insofar as its explicit mandate is to subvert the use of opiates—but one whose existence it fosters and perpetuates.653 At the basis of this assemblage of movements is opium as Satan (kīd īn Shayṭān chu havāyat barandāz-i [sic] bihisht).654 Or, as put in another account, opium is considered the repository of every negative trait and conduct, including ugliness, evil, corruption, and sedition, placed therein by Iblīs ('āqibat-i har nikbat va shar va fisād va fitnah rā / jam' dar afyūnī chu āhan pārah dar khumpārah kard). The drug is capable of turning brave, pious and wise individuals into deplorably lazy, obtuse, and degenerative shadows of their former selves (har ghayūr u muttaqī u ghāfil u farzānah rā / lā'ubālī u safīh u tanbal u bīkārah kard).655 The citizenship-based implications of this sort of assessment are quite clear.

653 This is homologous to Deleuze and Guattari's observation regarding capitalism: "What we are really trying to say is that capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism's limit. For capitalism constantly counteracts, constantly inhibits this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free rein." See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 34.
654 Might be a mispelling. An appropriate substitute might be "barandāzad".
655 Dastgirdī, "Afūn," 422.
656 M. Nāṭiq, "Musābiqah-yi Afūn [The Opium Contest]," Armaghān 9-10 (1927/8/1306 sh.): 595.
While citizenship has been understood from the standpoint of European inspired sartorial or aesthetic reforms and the sense of self-abnegation, moralism, and agency provided to male "citizen-soldiers" through their enforcement, lifestyle and hygienic culture, the reformist project of citizen renewal (tajaddud) through the ultimate backing of state power, the lexical background of the concept of citizenship in Iran, and the organizational backing of citizenship rights, to name a few, what needs to be explored is the manner in which proto-citizens can be led off the well-trodden path of rectitude and how the accompanying descent from grace is catalogued and ultimately understood in early Pahlavi Iran. Indeed, the citizen was expected to engage in a diligent process of self-disciplining and to "become a consumer of [particular] meanings and [...] commodities" but what happened when this was not lived up to? Perhaps a look at women and the practice of veiling will contribute to an answer.

Women undoubtedly have had an intimate relationship with the odious occult due to systematic misogyny, societal structuration in accordance with patriarchal norms, limited opportunities for self-narrativization, the way some occult beings (such as angels, fairies, and ḥūrīs) are deployed in poetry as a trope designating feminine beauty, and, among other things, even ascetic norms established by Sufi injunction. When the face of a woman is revealed, Satan's enticing speech

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660 Moallem, *Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister*, 70.
662 Kashani-Sabet, *Conceiving Citizens*, 151.
664 Vahdat, *God and Juggernaut*, 63.
could be heard. After the end of an epoch, every semblance of evil during the period has the ability to orbit around female sartorial practices. And where occult practitioners are located, there too a majority female clientele can be found. From the evil designs of mother-in-laws depicted in films, proverbs and anecdotes to the way pregnancies in a remote village can be compromised if expecting mothers do not protect themselves from penetrating jinn, women are considered to be the prime interlocutors with evil beings, often acting as "the potential or actual fifth column" capable of undermining national security. Even progressive thinkers as late as the last decade of the nineteenth century considered the unlawful interaction between members of the opposite sexes to be a source of evil. And although demonological focus on the female gender increased in a significant way in the 1960s and 70s, where the "de-eroticized" archetype of femininity was starting to become increasingly pestered by her lecherous, urban-prowling and scandalous sister, the 1920s and 30s was the period in which formative development of the ideal secularized model took place.

One particular reason the categories of the feminine and the occult are drawn together is that sexual allure or seduction emanating from the women has traditionally been considered to have preternatural origins. The spellbinding quality that is perceived to be inherent within sexual

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670 Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 192.
673 Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 33.
attraction is capable of disturbing the ability to comprehend the direction of one's desire as well as rationality and its basis in sober and calculative reasoning. In Šādiq Hidāyat's Būf-i Kūr (The Blind Owl), the tense relationship between the narrator (a pen-box illustrator) and his wife is in large measure due to this debilitating captivity. Consumed by lustful urges, the narrator asks himself whether he actually wants to sleep with her or not (āyā haqīqatan man māyil būdam bā ū bikhvābam).679 Akin to the way forgetfulness and uncertainty in dream recollection does not injure but rather assists the task of analytic interpretation,680 here the disconcerting skepticism regarding the narrator's own comprehension of his inner life does not leave him totally lost, for he is then able to grasp his desire as it is activated through preternatural means. All he knows is that his new bride was able to figuratively inject him with an unspecified poison (nimūdānam chih zahrī dar rūh-i man, dar hastī-yi man rīkhtah būd) that made every atom of his body require every atom of hers (nah tanhā ū rā mīkhvāstam, balkah tamām-i zarrāt-i tanam, zarrāt-i tan-i ū rā lāzim dāsht).681 In this very instance there is no remark made about the narrator's "spiritual merit"682 or his culpability in the affair, but rather his hatred for what she is capable of harnessing. As a consequence of this derision, the narrator is able to not only position her as a prostitute (due to her promiscuity) but also to equate her with witchcraft itself (īn zan, īn lakkātah, īn jādā).683 Notice how magic is not positioned as one of her contingent qualities but is instead part of her very essential constitution. She is witchcraft in the same way that she is woman, is magical insofar as she exists, and in being a prostitute she takes the profession out from the realm of labour and into that of the preternatural.

As an expression of cogitatio immoderata, or when a plethoric longing slips into phantasmal ideations, the "feminine phantasm [...] take[s] entire possession of the pneumatic system of the

680 See Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams."
681 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 90-1.
683 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 90.
lover,” but the narrator in turn is filled with the desire to possess her in full, even if this risks the complete eradication of humanity proper (ārizū-yi shadīdī mīkardam kih bā ī dar jażīrah-yi gumshudah’ī bāsham kah ādamīzād dar ānjā vujūd nadāshtah bāshad). However, unlike the prototypical notion of an amorous bond based on two symmetrical loci of possessive love, what is experienced here are two possessive but distinctive gestures, one actual and the other phantasmic. Paradoxically, while the phantasm’s possession is all-encompassing and its "collateral influence over the subject's psychosomatic condition is highly deleterious,"686 the narrator can only dream of sequestering themselves off from the rest of the world. The woman as phantasm, prostitute and witchcraft has more actual possessive power than the narrator who is relatively more grounded in the world. And even though the wife wield's such great dominion over the narrator, she appears to be more interested in the idea of cavorting and mating with beings associated with the occult—the region that constitutes her being. The pen-box illustrator asks himself whether an Indian snake or dragon would entice her more than the idea of being with him (āyā ān vaqt ham har jānivar-i dīgar, yik mār-i Hindī, yā yik izhdihā rā bih man tarjīh nimīdād). Whether—like the European experience—perceived female involvement in the occult was based on the notion of their insatiable sexual appetite, them being the ambassadors of a constantly evolving popular culture, the challenges associated with a "demography of despair" in which the needs of elders are left unmet, or a confluence of these and the aforementioned points, the association persists to this day.

Besides the spellbinding essence of a woman who is able to bring within her folds a discombobulated lover, women are also perceived as the most active agents in both the creation and dissolution of familial and amorous bonds. Often times, as is evident in Hidāyat's "Murdah Khvur'hā" (The Ghouls), competition between two wives over the inheritance left by their

supposedly dead husband (it turns out in the end that he is not dead after all, but that he only
suffered a temporarily debilitating heart attack) takes place within the matrix of the occult, for the
process of stealing a man from another woman (tū ū rā az man duzdīdī) after the unfailing loyalty,
love and nourishment she provided her family (shawhārī kih man mūhāyam rā dar khānah’ash
sīfīd kardam, yik pisar misl -i dastah-ī gul barāyāsh buzurg kardam) can only be done if the
husband is given a mandrake to eat (mihr gīyāh bi khvardash dādī). In the same way a late-
seventeenth century Parisan woman in and around the time of the Affair of the Poisons can
purchase from a recognizable supplier and apply to her lips an oil that will induce amorous
feelings in a love interest, the younger wife in "Murdah Khvur’hā" is accused of consulting
with merchants in the Jewish quarter of town for a way to out maneuver the man's older spouse.
In addition to the already discussed female/occult coupling, this example gives voice to the way
women have natural and/or longstanding allies in their machinations. During Iran's Islamic period
literate members of the Jewish community were known for their role as preservers and
perpetuators of several branches of knowledge, including discourses on magic. In the
seventeenth century, leaders of the community were accused of utilizing black magic to
undermine royal authority, and the stigma attached to the Jews because of this and other
accusations led to the commonly held opinion that they are one of the more notorious suppliers of
knowledge and products related to the occult sciences.

In a third but related characterization, women were thought to be Satan's manifested form
(Shayṭān-i mujassam) and the gate to hell (darvāzah-yi jahannam). It is not uncommon for
reports within the Islamic tradition to consider women Satan's emissaries (though the obverse is

692 Amanat, Jewish Identities in Iran, 41.; Aptin Khanbaghi, The Fire, the Star and the Cross: Minority Religions in Medieval and Early Modern Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 104.
but what excited reformists of the time was the prospect of Iran following the European lead by granting women liberties of which they were at the time deprived. According to this logic, when the nation subsumes women under its regime of rights, they both vacate the realm of disenfranchisement and are rinsed of their association with the satanic, but what does enfranchisement have to do with repelling the satanic? They are connected only insofar as the bestowal of civil, political and economic rights is staged within a new historical epoch and paradigm—known as modernity—that abhors the notion of any rational actor being marginalized and typecast as conduits to the occult's infernal darkness. The paradigm's exclusivity lies in the systematic extirpation of the satanic as it leeches upon the objects, goals, technologies, and projects that aid in its self-definition. Although the epoch is predominantly known for what it has given up of the past, such as when "unique existence" is smothered by "the phony spell of a commodity" and copious reproduction, the satanic is the site where tradition in the form of grievances and accusations is thrown into modernity, thus constituting one of the most active loci from which the past can be hermeneutically unsealed. In essence, the challenge is to be able to penetrate the heart of what is deemed evil to find oneself at home with tradition, while the predominant strategy of the period (embodied in state ideology) is to combat the presence of the satanic as the irascible mark of tradition in order to proceed along the path of "methodical alienation" from the traditional mould. In executing this diremption where women are rinsed of the satanic by being opened up to liberty and drawn out from under the chādur into the bright light of enlightenment, it is thought that the true splendour of an authentic past can be salvaged (even though they are in fact closing that gateway for themselves).

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In Hidāyat's "Ābjī Khānum," readers are presented with the conservative argument that when women became *qirī va firī* (frivolous, shallow, cowardly, backbiting and overly attentive towards personal appearance), effects beyond immediate social relations were able to be felt, such as the increase in the price of bread (*nān girān shud*). According to this position, the punishment that will be dispensed for such individuals will be so severe that when in hell, an encounter with a snake will occasion finding refuge with a dragon (*dar jahannam mār‘hā’ī hast kih ādam panāh bih izhdihā mībarad*). Being unveiled is, of course, an important component of the *qirī va firī* woman's identity and a focus of demonological accusations. While on the one hand the unveiled woman can in hell have her body held up by her hair alone (*dar ān dunyā bā mūhā-yi sarash dar dūzakh āvizān mīshavad*), the veiled woman on the other hand is perceived as being in a perpetual state of imprisonment (*tāzīyān mīgūyand zan bāyad dar chādur-i siyāh bāshad*). Rather than seen as a marker of "religious sociability" or notions such as piety and virtue, veiling patterns and the way they are imbued with meaning are simply elided as the "phantom imaginings of the hegemonized."

But what do these misguided ideations mean in the context of this discussion? Like the *jinn* catchers and opium addicts, veiled women are considered to be manifestations of the inexorable darkness out of which the new state arose but while the latter has convinced itself that it never originated from the miasma and confronts it in the mode of absolute externality, thus rejecting its own "immanent inconsistency," the veiled woman is nestled too close to the origins. Her ancient female ancestors assisted in the defence against the Ahrīmanic horde (*gurūhī az dushmanān-i Ahrīman mānand*) by producing from behind her skirt highly adroit warriors of great

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699 Hidāyat, "Ābjī Khānum," 76.
700 Hidāyat, "Ābjī Khānum," 76.
701 Āzādpūr, "Khaṭābah," 162.
valor and distinction (az dāman-i mādarān-i īrānī-yi dilīr mardānī khāstah va az naw sarzamīn-i pāk-i khvud rā tābnāk va bihisht-i barī nimūdah), but afterwards when Iranian women became "senselessly" drenched in black cloth, effectively becoming hidden (chandī būd kih mādarān-i mā bikhvud dar zīr-i jāmah-hā-yi sīyāh pinhān va sīyāh’pūsh būdand), they became dormant and withdrawn.

Observe the implicit but integral distinction that is made between the productive skirt (dāman) and the dormant chādur. While this elementary distinction seeks to regurgitate dominant and state-sanctioned attitudes regarding sartorial choices, motherhood, and nationalist morality, it ignores the "ambivalence of residues." When the ancient patriotic woman reveals from behind her skirt the likes of Cyrus the Great (Kūrush, d. 530 BC/1187/6 bh.), Ardīshīr I (180–242/456/5-392/1 bh.) and Khusraw I, what is not accounted for are the wastes associated with birth, childrearing, and the period of dormancy when the matriarch cannot engage in reproductive or household activities. Obversely, the dormant woman who is not only withdrawn under folds of fabric but also behind the four walls of a dark home (dar chahār dīwār-i tārīk dar kulbah-yi tār), is capable of producing phantasms of herself within the minds of others (such as lovers) and conjuring spells that have the potential to adjust familial, social, and economic bonds and fluctuations. In this sense, she is not totally unproductive as has been suggested (dar zindān-i andāhnākī zindānī būd kay farzandānī khusraw va dānishmandī bā andīshah-yi tābnāk paydā mīshud). Seen from this angle, the two women have more in common than what appears at first sight, as is the case when the categories of being and nothing first enter human thought. They both have within them "murder and procreation, cessation of life and vitality."

What is remarkable about state ideology is its implicit recognition of the reconciliation between the two types or classes of women—the comprehension of the "two determinations as

705 Āzādpūr, "Khaṭābah," 163.
709 Āzādpūr, "Khaṭābah," 163.
710 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 96.
moments." The mother who produces children for the state may be a reflection of her upright patriotic ancestor but her offspring resemble the products of the dormant chādurī. The bachah(-yi) Shayṭān is the product of an odd but enduring amalgam that is more at home in the chaotic darkness of the late-Qājār world than the quixotic musings of the Pahlavī elite. As being part of this odd self-contradictory family there is no sense that the child has "overcome [aufgehoben] his personal aloofness[, ...] find[ing] himself and his consciousness within a whole." Even within the family he is an extension of the lawless origins, and the primary tool that he is offered to escape the reality that haunts the veiled woman, the opium addict and the jinn catcher, is the will.

Before moving to a discussion of voluntarism, allow us to briefly summarize our findings and draw some further conclusions that will guide future investigations.

(i) When the bachah(-yi) Shayṭān or proto-Pahlavī subject fails to become properly socialized into the rational order established by the state or is incapable of living up to the standards of modernity established by secular and religious reformists, the regression or lack of initial development is described here as the collapse into irrationality and ignorance. What makes this germane for our study is the way this entry corresponds with the person's induction into the pneumatological order, a shared but delimited space of experience. In other words, ignorance is simultaneously the realm in which spirits run amuck. Here, both real (industry of occult practitioners guarding the frontiers of the pneumatological realm) and fictional (dread vis-a-vis the demonomy) obstacles abound near the depths, preventing escape. This is an understanding that is shared by most if not all modernists.

(ii) Beyond merely historicizing the occult as it is situated within human history, Ḥakamīzādah proposes an immanent mythical historicization of the pneumatological order that is reminiscent of the Islamic chronologization of events within the angelic and heavenly realms. In this case, however, the described recuperation of occult powers by the jinn is said to be the result of human

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endeavor (or, more precisely, lack thereof). This brings to the foreground the question of agency, a topic that will be broached in the following section of this study.

(iii) The increased role of the occult in Iranian social life was in some measure reconciled through its association with microbiology. Yet, in supporting this connection, Ḥakamīzādah creates a point of contention with the first postulate or movement where a link is drawn between pneumatology and ignorance, because here a firm connection is made between objects of occultist practice and microbiological research, the *jinn* and microbes. Thus, occult beings coincide with scientific truth, a conclusion that diverts away from aforementioned treatments of the two variables. For Kasravī, demonism fuses with and thus corrupts the simple and divine truths of the ancients; the state's strategy of diremption allowed the demonic to be cut off from the truths of modern technology; and the scientific-materialist stance was partially invested in how the demonic can give rise to truth.

(iv) One of the effects of Ḥakamīzādah's support of the microbiological conception of the *jinn* is the latter's reduction to mechanical, non-cognitive and incommunicable beings. This is similar but ultimately different from the demonic technologies discussed in a previous section, for while these technologies embodied a form of excessive organic life that was beyond human calculation, the microbial *jinn* are completely subject to the scientific method. There was thus no need for the process of diremption that was required for the instruments encountered by the new state. Because the microbial *jinn* are reserved purely for scientific inquiry and management and are thus most communicable (in their incommunicability) when in the presence of a microbiologist, they entered a stage of objectivity that was previously not possible. As a result, the traditional occult practitioners became barred from interacting with these redeemed occult beings in the way they had done so in the past. So while the state separated the demonic from modern technologies as a way to establish a line of communication with these instruments, the coincidence of microbes and *jinn* inhibits the access of traditional experts of occultism to a part of their longstanding dominion, thus forcing them to withdraw deeper into illusion.

(v) By being alienated from the newly established objective pneumatology (coincidence of *jinn* and microbes), the traditional occult practitioners are forced to withdraw into the realm of subjective pneumatology. In other words--and this is the focus of the chapter--these experts of the occult sciences enter a deeper and more intractable bond with the meaningless of Nature by
means of illusion. The foregoing can be summarized in the following way: Prior to the rise of the microbial jinn, expert occultists and all other human subjects subsisted within a world that consisted of both phenomenal and pneumatological dimensions and these experts of arcane methods and knowledge were mandated to police the traffic between these two realms. With the coincidence of microbes and jinn, this arrangement was not simply effaced (as would have happened if the jinn themselves became subject to systematic doubt). Rather, the relationship between the pneumatic and the phenomenal entered a stage of significant distortions. In the process of entering phenomenality as microbial and objective jinn, the spirits became subject to empirical investigation, but in doing so extended beyond the purview of the expert occultists. With the integrity of pneumatological realm now compromised, the only spirits these experts have access to are those which are only subjectively constituted. While access to the subjective jinn is possible, it is not acknowledged by the occultists that this access is only entirely perspectival, for even though they are located within the mind, they are entirely autonomous. This is because they are treated as still subsisting within an untampered pneumatological realm when in reality they are locked within the inner world of the experts. In this way, Ḥakamiʿzādah reconfigured the entire topography of reality but not the functioning of the occult practitioners themselves. In fact, they operate as if nothing had changed, even though everything had. In this way, by only having access to the subjective occult, they only police the frontiers of illusion and engross their clients in even deeper states of darkness. Moreover, while the introduction of the conception of the microbial jinn was meant to enhance the standing of traditional experts within modernity, it actually produced the opposite result.

(vi) This study first began with the observation that demons can be found inside Nature. At this point, Qumī builds upon this observation through the figure of the social devil, i.e. the occultist who was in the last movement confined to the position of subjective pneumatology. After equating Nature with ignorance, Qumī situates between Nature and the demonic the faculty of illusion. In the context, the social devils are those traditional occult practitioners who maintain the deluded state of their clients, thus preserving the subjective reproduction of spirits and the structural integrity of intersubjective pneumatology as well.

(vii) In the same way that the deluded mind is most active and vivacious when it is furthest away from reality, creating entire constellations of interactive spirits, the opium addict is paradoxically most engaged in life when they are closest to the source of their ruin. There is no moment when it
is suggested that a person is capable of coinciding completely with Nature the way the *jinn* coincide with microbes. A certain degree of separation is constantly maintained.

(viii) Women, particularly those who are veiled, appear as unfortunate trailblazers in human-occult interactions. They are at times perceived as being overbrimming with sexuality, making use of sorcery to achieve their aims, and slipping into a phantasmal mode of being. When women are veiled and thought to be at their most dormant, they are simultaneously conceived as being capable of producing the most active array of spirits. The truth of the age is revealed in the figure of the *bachah Shayṭān* as the product of a union between two classes of women, the fertile ancient archetype and her despicably dormant descendent who is locked behind the veil.

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In an anecdote recounted during this period, a drunkard (*bi hāl-i mastī*) from among the Abbasid elites named 'Abbās encounters the Christian physician Jibrā’īl b. Bakhtīshū’ (d. 828/212/3 gh.) and after being asked how he is doing, the patrician responds that he is content enough for the physician to be made envious (*khaylī khvush va ṭawrī ast kih dilat mīkhvāhad*). In a witty rejoinder, Jibrā’īl says that neither he, God nor even Satan would envy his condition (*ḥāl-i amīrzādah ṭurī ast kah nah man mīkhvāham va nah Khudā va na Shayṭān*). This greatly infuriates the young elite who demands an explanation. The physician responds by saying, "I wanted you to be caliph and king of the Arabs, God wants you to be obedient to him and a doer of good, and Satan wants you to be an absolute infidel and without religion" (*man dilam mīkhvāst tu khalīfah va pādishāh-i 'Arab bāshī, Khudā mīkhvāhad bandah-yi farmān'burdār va nikūkār bāshī, Shayṭān mīkhvāhad kāfar-i muṭlaq va bīdīn-i šīf bāshī*) but it turns out that 'Abbās is unable to fulfill any of these expectations. The young patrician is not exactly among the "free-spirits" who have "escaped again and again from the musty agreeable nooks into which preference and prejudice, youth, origin, the accidents of people and books or even exhaustion from wandering seemed to
have banished us." He is portrayed simply as someone who has, without initiative or intent, fallen through the cracks of both moral and immoral expectations. Jibrā'īl's own hope appears to be already beyond good and evil as a triumph of will but 'Abbās slips below each standard where his pestering existence annoys one of the highest and most learned physicians of the land. Besides the drunkard being left speechless, this short story reveals two important points. While the young patrician's inebriated condition of existence might exclude him from being in league with Satan during the Abbasid period, what the current study seeks to underline is that it is precisely through the very exclusion of 'Abbās from the series of expectations outlined by Jibrā'īl that provides him with demonic credentials. It is through his contravention of the traditional law that circumscribes adherence to Satan that makes him Satanic.

This condition is also reflected in the way Rousseau's (Rūsaw) life is described as a tug-of-war between Ahrīman and Yazdān, which thus leaves in abeyance any pending state of stability. Though not about Rousseau personally, this nebulous mode of abeyance in which assistance does not come (dast kūtāh kardah) from either side is in one account said to be due to "the feebleness of the fundament of one's life" and its situatedness within the "flood channel of annihilation" (asās-i zindigiyash sust va bar masīl-i fanāst). The problem is that because the hopeless are caught in the clutches of Ahrīman, not only is one's life perceived as inalterably feeble, mere existence is unable to be taken advantage of as a source of striving (nimīdānand chigūnah az 'umr-i khvud istifādah). Though usually left unadmitted to, there are times of self-

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713 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 55.
715 This is similar to the way in which Oedipus falls for fate in his very attempt to avoid it. By being theoretically positioned outside of the law of evil, 'Abbās (according to early-Pahlavī standards) is enclosed within evil. See Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011), 175.
716 Şādiq Rizāzādah Shafaq, "Rūsaw Va Rumān (Zhūlī) [Rousseau and the Novel 'Julie']," Armaghān 11 (1931/2/1310 sh.): 730.
718 'Ḥarīrī, "Mardum-i Dānā," 84.
reflection and regret that allow the unfulfilled moments of life to bubble to the surface as grievances, testimonies, and repentences. A poet declares that his life, which is now over, was completely uneventful and now burnt out (‘umr dar biḥāṣīlī shud jam' u chūn kharman bisūkht).\footnote{720 Rashīd Yāsimī, ”Ghazal,” Armağān 6 (1933/4/1312 sh.): 409.} However, there is also the fatalistic attitude which, when explicitly avowed, manifests as morose and yet prideful lethargy, as is evident in the credo al-‘ajalah min ‘amal al-Shayṭān ("haste is the work of Satan"). When the mardumān-i rāḥat‘talab (literally, "the comfort-seekers") make use of this rhetorical "weapon" (ḥarbah),\footnote{721 ‘Alī Akbar Ḥakamī´zādah, ”Bahānah-yi Tanbalī [Pretext to Being Lethargic],” Humāyūn 7 (1935/6/1314 sh.): 19.} they are thought to be ultimately referring to an ethos set in place by the Safavids when they suspended from the term "Satan's deed" (‘amal-i Shayṭān) "every kind of knowledge (maʿrifat), attainment (kamālāt), innovation (ikhtirā'āt), reform (iṣlahāt) and the means of scientific (‘ilmī), social (ijtimā‘ī), and political (ṣīyāsī) human progression (taraqqīyāt-i basharī)."\footnote{722 Sayid Hasan Taqīzādah, ”Fiqdān-i Naqshah Mustalzim-i Fiqdān-i Budjah [The Absence of a Necessary Plan for a Lacking Budget],” Taqaddum 5 (1927/8/1306 sh.): 250.} Another dimension of fatalism is its utilitarian value. At once a metaphysical concept, fate can become a location of displacements where those who have satanic characteristics (Shayṭān'sifat) dispose of their sins (gunāhān).\footnote{723 Yūsif’zādah (Ghamām) Hamidānī, ”Ghazal,” Armağān 1 (1928/9/1307 sh.): 52.}

What the subtext exposes is that during this period an inherent but partially unspoken connection is made between the interstitial and the demonic. According to the postmodernist position, "Evil was visible, opaque, localized in the territories of the East. We [Westerners] have exorcised it, liberated it, liquidated it. But has it, for all that, ceased to be Evil? Not at all: it has become fluid, liquid, interstitial, viral."\footnote{724 Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, trans. Chris Turner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 40.} The relationship that we are establishing between the interstitial and demonism is not simply the move from solidity to liquidation. Rather, it is more about how the inability to live up to any standard leads to the interstitial position. The mediate position between the categories of good and evil is not reserved for the critic of how "[t]he power of moral prejudices has penetrated deeply into the most spiritual world,"\footnote{725 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 31.} but rather the existence that lacks in expectations and inclinations. The meaningless compulsion to exist is reflected into this
position and from it blossoms the fatalist and his engrossment in a world perceived to be inundated with demonic activities. With the stripping of all moral niceties, future projects, and meaningful activity, what one is left with is an individual strikingly similar to prehistoric man in terms of his embodiment of Nature's self-preservative striving. Even though the literature under review speaks to this embodiment, it also reports on man's confrontation with Nature, and it is this internal contradiction between embodiment and confrontation which really defines the quagmire of the subject during the early-Pahlavī period.

Similar to the lethargic fatalist whose life is shaved of all purpose and situatedness within circumscribed moral categories, the original condition of man was undeveloped both materially and spiritually (insān fāqid-i tamām quvā-yi māddī va ma'navī būdah). During this time, he had to aggressively confront the Natural environment surrounding him (mubārizah-yi insān avval bā iqlim shurā' shudah), thus fulfilling the implicit demonological logic of the 1920s and 30s that the closer one gets to the primitive origins of humanity both in terms of condition and habitat, the less hospitable life becomes. As has already been observed, what is troubling and threatening for both the state and social reformers are those who gain proximity to these origins and enter an eternal trance-like lingering where they exert an insubstantial vitality, just enough for them to dream of jinn, hover around the brazier, and lurk through corridors under a chādur. The ideological stance that underpins the epoch's adherence to voluntarism is that this state of Nature can be comprehended and its obstacles purged (avval bih 'avāmil-i ʿtabī'at āshnā nimūdah ast va bih vāsiṭah-yi hamīn āshnā'ī tavānīstah' and mavānī'-i ʿtabī'ī rā bar taraf nimāyand) through man's hegemonic rule (tasalluṭ-i ʿhukmrānī). Though, while Nature's irascible core is declared abnegated, it simply reappears in a different form later on. This is similar to the relationship between rain and wetness in that there is an "identity of content." Reminiscent of primal Nature and the hazards its overbearing presence brought before prehistoric man, Ahrīman's feared
conquest (fatḥ va ghalabah bā ’āmil-i shar yā Ahrīman) in the midst of civilization brings with it strikingly analogous effects. For instance, the focus on the lack of security (amnīyat az mamlikat bar taraf gashtah), tranquility (āsāyish az mardum salb shudah), and subsistence requirements (qaḥṭī dar jāmi’ah paydā khvāhad shud), along with the predatory threats that loom large (dushmanān-i khārijī bar mamlikat ḥamlah khvāhand nimūd) serve to establish this link. Maḥmūd Maḥmūd, the author of the piece that expresses these ideas, is basically arguing on the side of the "imprisoned, chained type of spirits who [...] would like to strive for with all their powers [...] the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone."731

In any event, the task of man, according to a rough cross-sectional consensus, is to extricate himself from his demonic origins, which indirectly consists for Rasūl Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd) in the triple alliance between the Natural environment (iqlīm), corrupt religious figures (rijāl-i maẕhab), and despotic government (ḥukūmat). Like the other two within the roughly coordinated bond, the Natural environment is in possession of a merciless (bīraḥm) drive and intrinsic facility (isti’dād-i ẕātī) to thwart human progress (nimuv va rushd va taraqqī). However, by periodizing Nature's dominion over man within a particular timeframe that has now expired for thousands of years (har kudām dar dawrah-yi iqtidār va zimāndārī-yi khvud kih hizār’hā sāl ūl kishīdah), it appears that man has superseded the threat posed by the material world, which contradicts this study's premise that Nature with its constitutive demonism is the principle threat to the state. This being so, if the earlier observation that Ahrīman's feared conquest in the midst of civilization is quite simply the Natural environment's rejuvenated form, then the same visceral threats to prehistoric man's life persist during the early-Pahlavī period in a different form as well. More customary typological figurations permitted ancient mythical figures such as Zāḥḥāk to emerge in the form of later despots, but what long duree periodization during the 1920s and 30s allowed for is a complete reversal of this logic. A fragment of phenomenal reality (lawless

729 Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd), "Nasl-i Āyandah-yi Irān," 373.
730 Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd), "Nasl-i Āyandah-yi Irān," 373.
731 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 54.
Nature) is posited alongside humanity's very first self-conscious experiences as a species, and a mythical figure from an immemorial past becomes its contemporary placeholder.

Hence, during the Pahlavī era when not only was demonism being combated, reality itself was being divested of its presence, thus resulting in an asceptic utilitarian materialism, key theoretical movements involving a volatile Natural order (precisely that included element which authorized the cleansing of society of obscurantist mythical understandings) were actually permitting demonism to gain unprecedented forms of presence and influence. In other words, Nature's intrinsic facility (isti’dād-i zātī) to inhibit human development became ensconced within the demonism of the jinn catchers, the opium smokers, the veiled women, and others. In perfectly consistent fashion, Maḥmūd asserts that as the faculties of understanding and insight (quvah-yi fahm va tamyīz) expand their influence into the realm of Nature, the obstacles presented by corrupt religious figures and despotic governments will split at the seams (hamīn kih dāyirah-yi fahm-i bashar dar 'ālam-i ṭabi’at tawsī’ah paydā nimūd va tavānish quvā-yi ṭabi’ī rā bi naf’-i khvud bih kār andāzad va bih bāţin-i āsār va ‘alāyim va jalavāt-i ‘anāşur-i ṭabi’at pay barad dīgar māvānī’i ḥukūmat va rijāl -i mazhab nimītāvānand sa ḍd-i ṭarīq-i ū gardand), thus confirming their inextricable linkage. Nature is embedded within religious and governmental entities sprinkled throughout civilizational history, thus allowing it to be catapulted from its solitude in prehistoric times to the modern period.

Keeping in mind these foregoing remarks, it should be noted that many of the defining and salient instantiations of diabolical scheming during this period are, in some way or another, smited by the (already accounted for) threat of Nature's return, and the only way to counteract this possibility is through voluntarist initiati ve. Even in the traditional religious discourse with its focus on the pertinence of the political, saying that the faithful should trust themselves (i’timād bar nafs-i khvīsh) and display caution when the foreigners attempt to entice them into partnerships (aqvāl va ‘uhūd-i bīgānīgān)—which in actuality is similar to the way "Iblīs, through the appearance of friendship, [...] tempted [...] Adam and Eve to stray from obeying God's instruction and path" (Iblīs bā iţhār-i dūstī [...] Ādam va Ḥavvā rā ighvā nimūdah az mutābi’at-i dastūr va ṭarīq-i haq

733 Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd), "Nasl-i Āyandah-yi Irān," 370.
munḥarif sākht)—permits a nuanced reading. Rather than more solidified and reliant anchorage points such as the clergy or divine injunctions, the believer is advised to rely upon the self (nafs), and this is different from the Iblīses of the world (Iblīs-i 'ālamand) who focus on the self by not owning up to personal and public sins (tā zindah 'and yik nafas az kār-i zisht-i khvīsh / nī tawbah mīkunand u nah taghyīr mīkunand). While the faithful use the self as refuge against the deceptive appeals of strangers, the diabolical schemers submit to the self's own desire for refuge from disapprobation and introspection. The former notion's exceptionality is nothing but a reflection of the singularity of its demonic accompaniment. In other words, the rise of the will as a redemptive strategy of the self was meant to combat a very specific conception of evil that was prominent during the time.

What was ideologically sanctioned and considered constitutive of early-Pahlavī subjectivity was the demarcation between a willful self and man's perceived demonic origins. The closest one usually came to observing them in tandem was when a statement such as the following was made, that if a certain upright person possessed the authority of right (qudrat-i haq), he would not permit one hundred thousand Iblīses crawling throughout his robe (khirqah) to prevent him from doing what was just. If the statement were revised in such a way whereby the person emerged out of an Iblīs infested robe, which in actuality was his locus of existence, and was somehow able to estrange himself from this locus through the authority of right, then its author would in fact be pinching the navel of the period's contradictory ideological structure. For a proper understanding of this contradiction, which posits the demonic Natural realm as both the "fertile and desolate" master of life and yet subordinate to the will of man, a review of the notion of volition or will (irādah) is in order.

734 Ghulām Ḥusayn. "Dar Ḥukm-i lmūz Kitāb-i Muqaddas-i Qur'ān ast va Dīyānat-i Haqāq Dīyānat-i Islāmī ast va Bas [The Judgement of the Age Decrees that the Holy Book is the Qur'ān and the True Religion is Islāmī and That is That]." Taẕakkurāt-i Dīyānāt 7 (1926/7/1305 sh.): 9.
735 Yūsīf zādah (Ghamām) Hamidānī, "Ghazal," 52.
737 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 15.
In the Islamic philosophical tradition, man's rational soul is comprised of a series of components, including the will (irādah), and the sense of command exercised by the will over any subordinate entity it stands before is identifiable in Ibn 'Arabi's notion of taskhīr bi-al-iradah ("constraining by will"). However, subordination is not a reflection of absolute impotence for it is possible for the non-will to act upon and subjugate the will through the element of the situational, and this is called taskhīr bi-al-hāl ("constraining by situation"). An example of this is "the taskhīr [constraint] exercised by the subjects over their king who is charged with the task of taking care of them, e.g., defending and protecting them, fighting the enemies who attack them, and preserving their wealth and their lives, etc." The early-Pahlavi conception of voluntarism appears to be completely impervious to this situational counter, insofar as it asserts the absolute right of will. In a reversal of the theological argument that God's "Qualities of Action" cannot be reduced to His Essence, but are rather additives, proponents of human volition during the 1920s and 30s held activity to be so dear to subjective constitution and national redemption that it became inextricably linked to human essence. For proponents of this position, Nature should not be conceived as "a sum of actions by conscious and volitional [occult] beings, a tremendous complex of arbitrariness," but rather the place where humanity can exert its will in the understanding and utilization of natural laws. The belief that "[w]illpower was [...] not only the single most important factor in a person's ability to exercise self-control and self-reliance, but also the key psychological quality in a nation," has already been discussed in significant and sophisticated depth. As is rightly noted, "[t]he trouble with the notion of willpower as the key to

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740 Ibn 'Arabi quoted in ibid., 185.
human action, however, was its vagueness, something that had troubled nineteenth century Western psychologists,744 and so when the will was positioned directly in front of a unique conception of demonism which was equally unsystematized and almost confused in orientation, the theoretical apparatus sustaining the new understanding of will collapsed as a viable subjective strategy.

The move away from the Islamic philosophical principle of the will as being inherent to the rational soul to the novel understanding of the faculty's eventual diminishment if not cultivated745 is reflected in the perceived plot by lethargic individuals to dismantle its catalytic effectiveness (dar pay-i ānand kih bih chih vasīlah ān rā az kār bāzdārand).746 Not only was the will conceived as "a central instrument of human action and ultimate mirror of personality,“747 it was also understood to be behind the figurative movement of the world itself (tanhā quvah kih tamām-i charkh 'hā-yi zindagānī-yi bashar rā bi gardanish āvardah quvah-yi irādah ast). It is the key ingredient behind any sense of functionality for it is akin to a stimulative faculty (quvah-yi muḥarrikah). It is even said to be derived from the original ethos of Islam (ānchih rā kih Islām hamah jā bih mā dastūr mīdahad sa'y va 'amal ast). Only baseless pretexts ('uẕrī) deployed by ostrich-like individuals (mardumān-i shutur'murgh) are used to defend the obscenities (har kār-i nāpasand) and filth (kiṣāfātī) that can easily be swept aside by a culture of wilfull action.748 In such statements, the "subjective cultural implications of the presumably objective, value-neutral science of psychology"749 become obvious. Moreover, it suggests that the discourse of voluntarism was deeply invested in the demonological perceptions of the time.

It is the precondition of having one's heart become the arena of whisperings and the place of passion (dil-i tū 'arşah-yi vasvās va jāygāh-i havāst) that leads to the embrace of the cleric's fatalistic attack on the will, and it is this pact which returns the person back to his origins, the

744 Schayegh, Who is Knowledgeable is Strong, 157.
745 Schayegh, Who is Knowledgeable is Strong, 158.
747 Schayegh, Who is Knowledgeable is Strong, 166.
749 Schayegh, Who is Knowledgeable is Strong, 166.
locus of the non-will and the fount of demons (tū rā zi rāh-i Khudā sū-yi Ahrīman rānd / kih khvud'sitāy khaṭā'bāvar ast u dīv'sitāst / halā kih pand-i chinīn ablahān bih kār mīnad [sic] / kih pand-i Shayṭān bastan bih kār qahr-i Khudāst). Consequently, in suggesting that a weakened will, according to Iranian modernists, is "lowest common denominator of a range of abnormal behavior," one is committing an accidental elision of the period's demonological conceptions and how there was an implicit appreciation among a cross-section of intellectuals of Nature's ferocious and demonic indifference along with its influence over a wide range of entities and phenomena. Ideological imperatives necessitated a confrontation with the demonic origins and this resulted in a series of diremptions, gentrifications, and reversals. Eventually, as Rizā Shāh turned back to bid the nation farewell, demonism came to triumph over will in the form of an amorous attachment to the depths of the unconscious.

Before moving on to a more extended discussion of the relationship between the amorous and the demonic (beyond what was said with respect to women), let us systematize the foregoing series of movements.

(i) The first movement here marks the moment when adherence to evil no longer entails deviation, as is the case in traditional moral thought, but rather laxity in making any determinable stance. The inability to align oneself with the demonic is in-itself a demonic gesture. This position is closely associated with the fatalists and their resolute conviction in the futility of intervening in the world, but what subordinates demonic lethargy to even fatalism is the lack of motility proper.

(ii) When modern man slips into an amoral stance, what is immediately recognizable is his reflectiveness of pre-historic man's original condition, especially in his interactions with Nature. Additionally, both are in a constant state of duress and morbid distress insofar as they are in proximity to their origins. This, paradoxically, allows them to possess a form of unmatched vitality that helps them to somehow beat the odds. This being so, ideology only admits to their lack of developmentalism, their trifling and meaningless existence, along with their resistance to culture.

750 Probably a mispelling. This should be "maband".

751 'Alī Aṣghar Ḥarīrī, "Mardum-i Dānā [The Learned Ones]," Armaghān 2 (1939/40/1318 sh.): 84-5.
(iii) What compounds the connection between the modern and pre-historic is the way the abominable and ineradicable notion of Nature as it was perceived by paleolithic man was posited as having been transmitted through time by its allies within civilization (depraved religious institutions and governments). Thus, secular nationalist ideology was not only interested in connecting the present with an unsullied and triumphalistic antiquity, but also the culturally barren landscapes of pre-history.

(iv) What religious traditionalism and secular modernism share at this moment is their commitment to the self as a possessor of a will capable of circumventing Nature in all its manifestations. The basis of early-Pahlavī voluntarism is the will's absolute and inviolable right to ignite and maintain the progress of the nation. This being said, the ambiguity surrounding the theoretical understanding of the will reflected the equally nebulous appreciation of its object of attack, demonic Nature.
Chapter 6
*Ahrīman dar Āghūsh-i Īrān: ‘Alavī and the Fusion of Love Poetry and Secular Nationalist Polemics*

The main preoccupation of the first part of this chapter is dedicated to the aftermath of volition's collapse as a viable and coherent subjective discourse. The perfect expression of this failure is seen in the way one of Buzurg 'Alavī's literary characters, in an act that is in conformity with practical ancient Aryan morality, is found clutching to his bosom a demon that would later come to spell his undoing. If this is not peculiar enough, it should be added that the encounter between an ancient Iranian outlaw and a demon-child is the result of the convergence of two distinct genres: love poetry (the locus of an amoristic demonism) and secular nationalist polemics (the site of a racialized demonism). While the encounter reveals the contours of state ideology and its prescribed demonology in a way that was hitherto unexpressed, there is an unavoidable sense of disavowal and moralism that restricts the resolution of the deadlocks that lie within the heart of the period's official demonological discourse. Beyond this, 'Alavī was also instrumental in popularizing the use of demonological nomenclature within the social sciences, particularly political economy, and a discussion of this constitutes the second part of the chapter.

During the early-Pahlavī period when the discourse of volition was deemed ideologically sacrosanct and primary in its capacity to subjugate shiftless existence, the very engagement with notions such as depreciated willpower, fatalism, lethargy, and aimlessness resulted in the discourse's entanglement with demonism insofar as these and other elements were themselves subject to demonological investigation. Whereas the attempts made by the state to exorcise reality of not only demons but also the logic of demonism itself were successful in some measure (as was the case with modern technologies), the execution of voluntarism was only nominally so. As is evident in some of the literary works of the time, especially those by the jewel of early- to mid-Pahlavī-era literati, Ṣādiq Hidāyat, the miscarriage of voluntarism was finally reflected in the distinctly lustful and amoristic relationship consecrated with the demonic. This amorous moment is not constituted by "the caesura of the One through the evental energy of an encounter" but

rather something closer to the "desire to be One"\textsuperscript{753} (even though it is suggested that such a desire already sets itself up for failure),\textsuperscript{754} where the subject openly acknowledges and dives into the demonic. They who "collapse" into demonomy "disappear into this unity, leaving behind no distinction from it and hence no determination for it."\textsuperscript{755} This, in a way, triggers a sense of "permanent impermanence," and an attack on "the reality principle,"\textsuperscript{756} states that the will was thought to have overcome in its frontal assault. This being said, the idea of amorous relations being laced with the scent of demonism is not entirely novel.

The intermingling of amorism and the demonic, more often than not, took place in the field of poetics which derived much of its imagery from Islamic narratives. It is thus unsurprising that especially during early-Islam poetry was considered the "Koran of Satan."\textsuperscript{757} While the poetic enterprise itself may have been deemed satanic, the way demonic figures are deployed in classical and modern poetry is anything but one-sided. Parodization, for instance, permitted the devil to take on the appearance of a shaykh who enjoined followers to engage in sexual intemperance under the sign of the divine law.\textsuperscript{758} This in turn allowed the satanic not only to fulfill its function as a "lure,"\textsuperscript{759} but also exert its haughtiness through the facade of pedantic adherence to the Law. Working off the theme of Iblīs' jealousy of Adam, Ḥāfiz commits a few of his verses to describing how Iblīs' Beloved is everywhere and subject to universal embrace, a circumstance that greatly

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hegel, \textit{The Science of Logic}, 50.
\item Jason Bahbak Mohaghegh, \textit{New Literature and Philosophy of the Middle East: The Chaotic Imagination} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 144-5.
\item Bodman, \textit{The Poetics of Iblīs}, 11.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
aggravates the firey being's ghayrat ("jealousy and offended honour").\textsuperscript{760} Although there is in poetry a split between Satan's "embodiment of analytical, loveless intellect and his overbrimming love for his Lord,\textsuperscript{761} members of the early-Pahlavī literati such as Hidāyat implicitly opt for the latter conception which in turn permits their flirtation and confrontation with the demonic. The literature is suffused with Satan's "amorous gestures of coquetry" which does not simply "entangl[e] the soul in the world of lesser spiritual attainments,"\textsuperscript{762} but rather the unconscious basis behind individual idiosyncrasies, memory recollection, and even existence. Though it might not appear as such, these writings are indirectly connected to the idea that one should not be too engrossed in a loving union with the Lord, for "this nourishment fattens the soul and makes it lethargic."\textsuperscript{763} The best solution may might as well be to "encounter [...] the face of Iblīs" which simultaneously affirms "the glory of the Separated One's perfection."\textsuperscript{764} Whether through parody, jealousy, extreme fidelity, or simply the place one escapes to when one is too enraptured in love, there is a pervading romanticism that grips demonism. Not so much in conjunction with the nationalistic love affair with the "homeland as female, a beloved, and a mother\textsuperscript{765} and its tracability back to "Sufi allegorical associations,"\textsuperscript{766} demonism's connection with the romantic is inspired by a certain transgressive spirit, a masochistic joy in frustrated ambitions, and is essentially revelatory. While the "heteronormalization of love was central to the shaping of a number of political and cultural transformations that signify Iranian modernity,\textsuperscript{767} its link with demonism meant to cultivate a growing appreciation of ideology's disavowal of the period's
ontology. This builds upon but ultimately diverges away from conventional understandings of the linkage, those to which we will now turn.

On the one hand, the common use of Satan as a measure expresses the aesthetic and romantic quality of certain entities. In one case, the passionate desire for a beloved is thought to be capable of taming the visceral energies of Satan. Out of the vascillation between distinct hellish and heavenly moods (ān khūy-i hamchū dūzakh-i ū har chih mīkunad / ān rūy-i chūn bihisht buvad 'ugr' khāh-i ū) that are produced by intense love, Satan is simply reduced to being a loyal dog in front of the threshold of love (bīchārah sagīst bar dar-i īn khānah). Moving away from the idea of supplanting Satan, there is also the idea of equaling him in his guilt. A joke made in a royal court, for instance, describes the lustful disposition of an old and aesthetically detestable woman to be in proportion to Satan's guilt (māyil-i shahvat az ān bīsh kih Shayṭān bih gunāh).

In another case, the disdain a poet has for a rival's poetry is reflected in the observation that the latter's works are indeed beautiful, but only insofar as they are deemed as ornaments adorning a demon (barā-yi zīvar-i 'ifrīt shīr rā dar gūsh). His fame is accused of being achieved the same way Satan reached his state of infidelity (chū kufr-i Shayṭān shīr-i vay ishtihār āvarad). By being used as a criterion of measure, Satan becomes "determinate in itself" because while his guilt, degree of seduction, etc. can themselves be measured, their treatment as a single amalgam can itself be a standard of measurement.

On the other hand, a greater emphasis is placed on the relationship between the evil being's relation to either love or the object of love. In a poem by 'Abbās Furāt-Yazdī (1894/5-1968/9/1273-1347 sh.), a lover's days have gone depressingly dark (rūz-i man tīrahtar az shām shud az āh-i darūn) because his beloved is out of reach. In addition to being stripped of "intelligence, heart, and religion" (līk hūsh u dil u dīn burd chih āsān az man), the love that is

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768 Mullā Muḥammad Ṣūfī, Untitled Poem, Armaghān 1 (1931/2/1310 sh.): 38.
769 Qā'ānī Shīrāzī, "Qaṣīdah," Armaghān 5 (1934/5/1313 sh.): 325.
770 Nijāfī, "Taslīyat [Condolences]," Armaghān 6 (1933/4/1312 sh.): 419.
772 'Abbās Furāt-Yazdī, Ghazal [1], Armaghān 1 (1929/30/1308 sh.): 23.
dispensed with results in an "infinite debt" insofar as there is a constant giving involved.\textsuperscript{773} When a shaykh is asked how it is possible to liberate oneself from Satan (as the embodiment of this love), the cleric responds by saying that he does not need to go to such lengths because upon seeing him Satan is already in a state of flight (\textit{guft bā šaykh ḥarfī kih zi Shayṭān bigurīz / guft har sūy garīzān shudah Shayṭān az man}).\textsuperscript{774} The shaykh is thus too caught up in his own hubris to realize that the expulsion of Satan is also the casting off of love. The point is "[if]o remain in debt"\textsuperscript{775} and maintain some sort of standing with respect to Satan. In another poem, Furāt-Yazdī places the evil being (this time Iblīs) in a different position in relation to love. Here, life is presented as not worth living if union with the beloved (possibly God) is not consummated (\textit{zindagī-yī bīmadad chishmah-yī ḥayvān narīsād}) but Iblīs is seen as an entity out to thwart benediction (\textit{bad z chism-i bad-i Iblīs bi rīzvān narīsād}),\textsuperscript{776} not serve as an equivalent to love. As a counterpart to the shaykh in the previous poem, the preacher asks why love does not visit him (\textit{guft vā'īz zi chīz az 'ishq marā nīst nāsīb}).\textsuperscript{777} The preacher is a sobered version of the earlier mentioned shaykh in that now he knows what his hubris has cost him. However, because the preacher in a sense maintains his air of superiority even in defeat, the poet responds by saying that love will never descend upon the unknowing (\textit{guftam īn dawlat-i pāyandah bi hīnādān narīsād}).\textsuperscript{778} Not only are religious figures incapable of tracing the steps of love, they are completely impervious to Satan's altering appearance. In here lies already the sense that thinkers outside the scope of formal institutionalized religion are better equipped for the task of dealing with the demonic as a variegated phenomenon.

Predictably, even when these thinkers are supposedly at their lowest point emotionally, psychologically, and existentially, this engagement with the demonic not only does not falter, but at times intensifies. Working with the theme of trickling downward or the spiralling descent, one


\textsuperscript{774} Furāt-Yazdī, Ghazal [1], 24.

\textsuperscript{775} Kierkegaard, \textit{Works of Love}, 143.

\textsuperscript{776} Ḥabūs Furāt-Yazdī, Ghazal [2], \textit{Armaghān 8-9} (1928/9/1307 sh.): 481.

\textsuperscript{777} Furāt-Yazdī, Ghazal [2], 481.

\textsuperscript{778} Furāt-Yazdī, Ghazal [2], 481.
poetic lover describes how the state he is in is reminiscent of how the cup a drunkard is holding begins to shake, resulting in its contents to spill out (balī pīyālah zī dast-i khumār larzad u rīzad). Although the contents may be the poet's "primary object of desire," there is nevertheless an anxious and extemporaneous quality to the description of being present with the beloved (again, possibly God). In this case, it is not so much that "universal love" has an inherent inclination towards "the suffering, underprivileged, degenerate" and that this reflects back as the weakness of universal love itself. Rather, it is the indubitable power of the poet's expression of love that not only weakens him, but also permits him to submit to it and rejoice. He continues by saying that he is like a yellow leaf hanging onto a branch in the heart of winter, waiting for his beloved to bring him some green to expel sorrow from his heart (bīyār sabz'khaṭṭā may mīyān – kīh tā ghamam az dil / chu barg-i zard-i day az har kinār larzad u rīzad). These and other verses have within them the trappings of divinity but something peculiar happens during the penultimate stage of the poem. The divine beloved takes on the appearance of the demonic in its affective capacity. The beloved's hair is described as being similar to the snakes hanging off of Zāḥhāk's shoulders, the same snakes that feed off the blood of the youth for nourishment (bibīn zī zulf chū Zāḥhāk yik dū mār bīh dūshash / kīh khūn-i khalq zān dū mār larzad u rīzad). As such, the divine's appearance and the capacity of this semblance to affect the lover as his very core, is construed in clear demonic terms.

Not too unlike the Prophet Muḥammad's experience of "utter terror" during the Mi'rāj (the Night Journey) when he gets too close to Divinity, picturing the beloved's hair as Zāḥhāk's snakes displays how the appearance of demonism does not necessarily carry with it a sense of moral

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780 Meisami, Structure and Meaning, 35.
reprehensibility. Even during the Platonic phase of ancient Greek philosophy, thinkers were not averse to the idea of positing an intermediary role for demons insofar as they "share[d] in the divine as well as in the corporeal."\(^{785}\) While all these examples can be delicately differentiated, what they share—whether in the sense of appearance, affective capacity, or active interplay—is the uneasy notion that one can access a heightened existential mood through the demonic or its associated affectations. Medieval and modern amorous poetry thus set up the groundwork for a confrontation and recuperative liaison with maleficient beings, but not just that. The established basis meant, in a forthright manner, to deal with the lawless indifference of early-Pahlavī demonism. First, the beloved is a hūrī who is held close to one's breast even though there is full awareness of her Satanic essence (ḥūrīst Shayṭān dar baghal).\(^{786}\) In the second movement, the demon is still embraced, but not only is there no immediate awareness of its malign character, the self-assigned task of the lover is to actually nurture and cultivate it. As part of the "basic grammar" of Iranian nationalist ethos,\(^{787}\) the evolved lover embraces the demon through the "cliché [motif of] Persian hospitality"\(^{788}\) and in doing so deposits demonism within the unconscious of nationalist ideology. This is one of the unacknowledged undercurrents of Buzurg 'Alavī's short story "Dīv! ... Dīv!" (Demon! ... Demon!).

The story was a part of a racialized nationalist discourse in which Arabs in particular (among ethnic groups such as Mongols and Turks) became associated with not only degeneracy and ineptitude but also sexual and linguistic excess.\(^{789}\) Stretching back to the early nationalists of the late nineteenths century, such as Ākhūnd´zādah and Mīrzā Āqā Khān Kirmānī, they were posited as the irreducible originators of every reprehensible manifestation of Persian vice and


\(^{786}\) Anonymous, "Ghazal," Armaghān 8 (1931/2/1310 sh.): 545.


incivility.\textsuperscript{790} Arab predilection for immoral instigations of every variety was considered inviolable, which made it easier for them to be "other[ed]."\textsuperscript{791} Emerging much farther back in time, it has been noted that "anti-Arab animosity enjoyed an authentic and traditional pedigree which not only drew on traditional historical myths, such as the \textit{Shāhnāmah}, but had been embedded within Iranian Shi’ism in traditional rituals such as the cursing of the Caliph 'Umar (579-644/44/3 bh.-24 gh./r. 13-24 gh.) and the general dismissal of the first three caliphs as illegitimate."\textsuperscript{792} While there were intellectuals such as Taqīzādah who attempted to counter this nationalist assault by crediting Islam for its benefits,\textsuperscript{793} the discourse surrounding "the victory of savages over civilized people"\textsuperscript{794} predominated. Due to a great deal of factors, including the anachronistic retrieval of an unsullied pre-Islamic past and the construction of a genealogy of decline focused on the malignant Arab,\textsuperscript{795} along with the erection of a centralized state through the implications of the 1919/1337/8 gh. Anglo-Persian treaty\textsuperscript{796} and geopolitical consolidation, there was created a state-sanctioned and nationalistic revivallist movement that was both reflected in and influenced by the writings of the time.

In a disappointed tone, Dastgirdī in 1934/5/1313 sh. spoke of how the residents of Iṣfahān were being neglectful of the deceased greats of the city (\textit{gūyī Iṣfahān farzandān-i khalaf-i khīsh rā bidrūd guft}) as was evident in their dilapidated grave sites and the embarrassing results of renovation efforts (\textit{valī saranjām dakhmih bih shikl-i khijal'āvar āghāz bāqī mānd}). Dastgirdī asserts that this condition must be the result of the very constitution of Iṣfahān's current residents, for no collective except for a polluted race (\textit{nizhād-i ʿālūdah}) would be capable of deserting the city's glorious past. They equate a demon with the angel of glad tidings (\textit{dīv rā bā Surūsh}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[790]{Ansari, \textit{The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran}, 30.}
\footnotetext[791]{Ansari, \textit{The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran}, 58.}
\footnotetext[792]{Ansari, \textit{The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran}, 145-6.}
\footnotetext[793]{Ansari, \textit{The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran}, 150.}
\footnotetext[794]{Majid Sharifi, \textit{Imagining Iran: The Tragedy of Subaltern Nationalism} (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 82.}
\end{footnotes}
hamsang khvāndah) and consider Ahrīman to be superior (bartarī) to Yazdān. Of note is the way the two comparisons do not end in the same result and how the first somewhat leads to the second. The indistinction between demon and angel is what leads to the triumph of the Evil One because Ahrīman is nothing but the sense of indifferentiation. This is not the same as saying that Ahrīman burst forth from "the undifferentiated mode of pre-existence [as a repetition of] the cosmogonic act of formal manifestation." Rather, Ahrīman is indifferentiation itself as it sits uncomfortably within "formal manifestation." Comprised of Turks and Arabs, this unsavory collective are pressing undue and relentless stress on the city's authentic inhabitants (farzandān-i ḥaqīqī-yi isfahān rā dast-i sitam az garībān bar nimīgīrand), prompting Dastgirdī to call on the backing of state power. This is done by holding Prime Minister Muḥammad ‘Alī Furūghī (Ẓakā' al-Mulk, 1875/6-1942/1292-1361 gh.) to his word that he will divert resources to the rejuvenation of a specific burial ground (dar Ṭihrān shumā va'dah-yi 'umrān va sākhtan-i maqbarah-yi ustād Kamāl al-Dīn rā bih mā dādīd). As a way of guilting it into action, Dastgirdī is able to reinforce the state's mandate to refurbish the nation in a reversal of the logic of interpellation which suggests that "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects." As part of the intelligentsia that helped to usher in the state's nationalist ideology, Dastgirdī is helping to reestablish the state as the saviour state they envisioned during the turbulent 1910s. While the notion of ethical indifferentiation as the emblem of evil triumphant is brought under scrutiny, the acquiescent attitude that initially submitted to demonism and held it close to the bosom of the nation for centuries is also a point of perplexity. The latter was brought to the foreground during the Firdawsī Millenium Celebration (Jashn-i Hīzārah-yi Firdawsī).

Held in 1934/5/1313 sh., the Firdawsī Millenium Celebration was a collection of concurrent international events commemorating the medieval poet's achievements. Orchestrated by the state

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as a way to promote its anachronistic revival of pre-Islamic Aryan supremacy, the celebration focused on Firdawsī's moment of linguistic preservation as a key determinant of this project. In a poem marking the occasion, Sharīf al-Salṭanah takes his audience back to the ominous days that prompted Firdawsī to engage in his epic poetic enterprise. Similar to Dastgirdī's Iṣfahān, Firdawsī had to contend with the reality of the rule by the most depraved (furūmāyagān jāy'gīr-i mahān). Parallel to the dilapidated and forgotten Iṣfahānī burial sites, the author of the Shāhnāmah was faced with a forgotten language, custom, and justice (zabān-i nīyākān biraftah zi yād / namândah nishānī zi āyīn u dād). Similar to the fragmentary state of 1910s Iran, the garden of Iran was pronounced dead due to the infestation of weeds (gulistān-i Īrān shudah khārzār). Nothing of the past's "richness" remained (namāndah zi purmāyagān yādgār). This is due to the fact that after the usurpation of the Sassanians, the country was converted into a "den" for Turks and Arabs (girānmāyah bungāh-i Sāsāniyān / shudah Tāzī u Turk rā āshīyān), another similarity with Dastgirdī's account in which he characterizes some of Iṣfahān's inhabitants as being inauthentic. Brimming with agitation and grievances (chinān az nahādash barāmad khurūsh / kih āvard andar sarash khūn bih jūsh), Firdawsī was given a divine injunction to unsheathe the sword of language (bih gūsh āmadash nāgahān az surūsh / kih tīgh-i zabān bar gushāy u bikūsh) for the sake of memorial.

In swearing to abide by this injunction, Firdawsī "swear[s] in a language that no human language has the power to make [him] abjure, to disrupt, that is to say, to make [him] perjure [himself]. The oath passes through language, but it passes beyond human language. This would be the truth of translation." Incited by grievances but ultimately called upon by the divine beyond, the poet translates glorious Aryan memories into inscribed form. In doing so, he proves that when

language comes, it is because the "promise ha[d] already taken place." Firdawsī's memory became the repository of anterior divine revelations, thus assuring the success of the enterprise of recollection. What is unique about the Firdawsī Millenium Celebration is that more than resuming what Firdawsī was memorializing, the state was recollecting the act of recollection itself. Even though the "remembered remembering that occurred yesterday does not belong to the present remembering as a really inherent component of its concrete unity," there is nevertheless an appreciation of the power of Firdawsī's consciousness and a desire to access it. By allowing "the whole complex of the earlier consciousness [to be] reproduced," the state, along with its supporters among the intelligentsia, can probe into the question that Firdawsī must have supposedly asked himself: Why was Ahrīman held close to the bosom of the nation (paẓīrad dar ăghūsh-i khvud Ahrīman)? Because the early-Pahlavī period itself is a period fraught with both exorcisms and inclusions of the demonic, in displacing this question into Firdawsī's mouth, individuals such as Sharīf al-Salţanah can avoid asking themselves the same, for their self-assigned task was to remind the state of its promise.

Through the pledge he made to the divine, Firdawsī had his heart filled with hope that he can purge Ahrīman's roots from the land (padīd āmad andar dilash rawshanī / kih chūn barkanad bikh-i ahrīmanī), and Dastgirdī also exhibited a relationship with oath-making but at a different level. He, in fact, is the placeholder of the divine in Firdawsī's account, the source from which the call for accountability emanates. More than that, in announcing that he is waiting to see Prime Minister Furūghī act on his earlier made promise to initiate a revitilization program (muntaẓir-i dīdār-i nâtījah ĭm), he is the enunciator and enforcer of the law by which the state

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is defined. Here, the moral law coincides with the law of remembrance and the fulfillment of the latter is the same as "the exclusion of every determining ground of inclination."{813} In other words, when the Prime Minister is called upon to stand by his pledge, he is expected to strive to attain "complete conformity"{814} with the law of remembrance insofar as it is through this conformity that one can truly unlock why the Iranian nation ultimately embraced Ahrīman and what it took for him to be expelled. The revitilization of a burial ground is the same as forensically recreating the grounds for the Evil One's arrival and in this way, the logic of nationalism becomes intertwined with the embrace of evil and the pledge. This is because, as is evident in 'Alavī's short story, "Dīv! ... Dīv!", the return to an originary Aryan morality that preaches charity and hospitality welcomes evil into its embrace as an execution of principle. When the crafted Aryan morality pledges to commit to its standards, it becomes "the originary performativity that does not conform to preexisting conventions [insofar as its] force of rupture produces the institution or the constitution, the law itself."{815} In opening itself to evil, Aryan morality creates the nationalistic law which probes into the originary embrace. This problematic is explored in explicit detail in 'Alavī's work.

The leftist novelist Buzurg 'Alavī is a towering figure in modern Iranian literature. Politicized at a relatively young age, due in part to his father's role in the Constitutional Revolution, 'Alavī was able to combine socio-political critique with his interests in Persian classics, Western literature, and German Romanticism to contribute in a novel way to the burgeoning modernist literary tradition. Add to this the influence of figures such as Arānī and Hidāyat on the direction of his work, he was able to set his own precedent in fiction writing. {816} Adopted in part from Hidāyat, 'Alavī's psychoanalytic orientation has been argued to have drawn him closer to "personal and psychological problems" and beyond his reputed standing as a critic of prevailing social norms. {817}

{814} Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 102.
{815} Derrida, Specters of Marx, 36-7.
{816} Hasan Mir'ābedini, Encyclopædia Iranica, s.v. "'ALAVĪ, Bozorg."
Published alongside two other short stories by Hidāyat and S. Partow in a 1931/2/1310 sh. collection called Anīrān (Un-Iran), 'Alavī's "Dīv! ... Dīv!" builds off Hidāyat's earlier written Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān (Parvin, Daughter of Sāsān). As such, it serves as an extension of the latter's vitriolic abhorrence of Arabs and the desire for Iranism to triumph over the supposed degradations wrought by the Islamic conquest. Even though it may indeed be the case that the story recapitulates the nationalist credo of eventual communal triumph through self-willed resurrection,818 its seminal importance does not lie therein because this attitude was quite rampant and ideologically sanctioned at the time. Most intellectuals guided by this attitude were on a quest "to define the history of the Iranians against and with their successive invaders,"819 but this vantage point has more to do with national self-identity than our concern the demonology of the age. A "personification" is certainly taking place in which the invading Arabs are manifested as demons,820 but beyond the supposedly "hysterical" slander, what can be said of demonical perceptibility, structure, and function within the narrative? Through "the medicalization of the past," the Arab was construed as a "foreign disease,"822 but was it curable, capable of being coped with, terminal, or an inexorable entity whose power must somehow be co-existed with? Before getting into "Dīv! ... Dīv!", let us first delve into the logic of its precursor, Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān.

Both of these works can be placed under the category of "romantic nationalist fiction" and they share a certain "simplicity] in sentiment and raw[ness] in technique." Their features in many respects "reflect sentiments from the Pan-Persianist ideology and cult which swept over the

820 Dehdarian, "Bozorg 'Alavī on the young literary scene," 243.
Iranian modernist elite after the First World War, a period that offered the possibility of transmuting the "idealized" into the "real." But whereas Parvīn is more committed to a linear narrative and the rather sterile othering, "Div!" is able to communicate in a more nuanced manner a similar message to that of its antecedent, thus also thwarting this sense of similitude. In the former, one of the major points of anxiety involves the selling off of Iranian women into slavery (middani dukhtar‘hā rā mīfurushand?), and while 'Alavi's work helps in the reproduction of this motif, Aryan morality and the question of embracing evil constitute its main structure.

Commencing with the prospect of war resuming with the Arabs (hamah mīgūyand hamīn rūz‘hā jang dar mīgīrad) during the late Sassanian period, one glaring preoccupation presented within Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān is the threat of the Iranian artist patriarch Chihrah Pardāz having to substitute as muses the veneer of the Arabs (chihrah-yi Tāzi‘hā) for his daughter and Sassanian court notables (agar hamān dastgāh-i pīsh barpā būd man yikī az chihrah pardāzān-i darbār būdam). What makes this prospect haunting is not only the fact that the Arabs are nothing but bloodlusting Ahrīmans and demons seeking to tear asunder the foundation of Iranianness (gūyī dastah‘i az Ahrīmanān va dīvān tishnah bi h khūn hastand kih barā-yi barkandan-i hunyān Īrānīyān khurūshīdah‘and), but that Chihrah Pardāz must use a technical skill always directed towards beauty, symmetry, and coherence to convert into pictorial or representative form the essence of Arabs. In the same way that a signifier is capable of marking the demise of the signified by abstracting it to a purer level, Chihrah Pardāz, precisely and only through Aryan

829 "[I]t is the Hegelian phenomenological idea that the word is a death, a murder of a thing: as soon as the reality is symbolized, caught in a symbolic network, the thing itself is more present in a word, in its concept, than in its
artistic techniques, has the great potential to take what is most despicable in the Arab and make it more vivid and repulsive, thus amplifying evil through the medium of beauty itself. This is why the patriarch's final act as an artist is to draw a portrait of his daughter, and in doing so he raises her as "an object [...] to the dignity of the Thing." Not only is the portrait meant to act as a source of remembering for the father after he hands off his daughter Parvīn in marriage (in pardah 'i kih az rū-yi tū mīkīsham anjāmīn kār-i man khvāhad būd chūn mīdānam kīh nāmzadat parvīz dīr yā zūd tū rā bīh zarī mībarad), his eternal commitment to this one image allows him to close off the possibility of artistically reproducing evil at a higher level. What it also does is reproduce Parvīn at a level in which she becomes incorruptible. Even though he knows that his connection with his daughter is the most precious relation in his life, he knows that it has a good chance of being contaminated by Ahrīman's usurpation of power (gūī farmāfarmāʾ-yi hurmuz siparī shudah Ahrīmanān va dīvān bar bungāh-i ū jayguzīn shudah'and). There is, in this moment of sublimation, a "final demand to be deprived of something real" and inevitable. Even though the portrait is claimed by Chihrah Pardāz to protect and keep him company (chihrah-yi dilnāvāz-i tū az man dīlāri khvāhad kard), what exactly is being protected against? It is guarding against not only the portraiture of the Arabs but what exactly this implies, mainly the absolute corruptibility of his daughter. As a way to transfer this power of protection onto Parvīz as he prepares to join the resistance against the Arab armies, Chihrah Pardāz hands over the portrait to him, which, he is told, will be returned to him after the cessation of hostilities.

immediate physical reality: even if we turn from the word to the thing - from the word 'table' to the table in its physical reality, for example - the appearance of the table itself is already marked with a certain lack - to know what a table really is, what it means, we must have recourse to the word which implies an absence of the thing." See Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2008), 145.

831 Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 16.
834 Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 16.
This sense of false insulation is incapable of eliding the perception that Iran is a heaven (bihisht rā rū-yi zamīn didand) in the midst of being infiltrated by the Ahrīmans. Moreover, the Arabs are "told by their commanders that if you kill or are killed you will go to heaven" (sardārān-i ānhā guftah’and agar bikushīd yā kushtah bishavīd miravīd bih bihisht). Though this reflects, in some measure, the theory of celestial spheres in Islamic philosophy and its rootedness in the Qur'anic verse, "[God] created the seven heavens, one above the other," the Arabs remain oblivious to this significance. They are portrayed as if, at the height of their overzealous commitment to the Islamic creed, their destruction is even capable of ploughing through one of the heavenly domains (hamah khushi’hā rā dar Īrān chishīdand marz va būm ābādī’hā va kishtzār’hā rā virān kardand), turning it into a bleak graveyard (Īrān īn bihisht-i rū-yi zamīn yik gūristān-i tarsnāk-i Musalmānā shud) and overall hellish realm (bihisht-i shumā dūzakh-i mā shud). In an onslaught of "imaginary revenge" where Iran's divine landscape is creased, bored into, and dishevelled of every civilized nicety, the Arabs contravene the values they not so long ago birthed. Unlike their language which is deemed developmentally "arrested," the Arab demons and beasts themselves are brimming with too much energy as they tear away from their chains (dīvān va dadān zanjīr-i khvūd rā pārah kardah’and). This is the perfect opportunity for the Iranian elite to "exorc-analyze the spectrality of the specter" because their worst nightmares

837 The Qur’an, 69:3.
839 Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 32.
844 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 58.
are finally coming to fruition in concretized form. In other words, they have the opportunity to deconstruct the phenomenon that stands before them, and only precisely because the Arabs stand before them, but all they can do is reflect on their wretched sleeplessness (dar jilaw-i dīv’hā-yi būmnāk dīgar nimītavānam rū-yi tushak bikhvābam)\(^{845}\) and ask the most rudimentary of questions, such as why Ahūrā Mazdā created Ahrīman in the first instance (chirā Ahrīman rā āfarīd’)?\(^{846}\)

Before opting to kill herself with a dagger to the heart over the prospect of being the Arab commander's wife (khanjar rā bīh dū dast girftah bā hamah-yi zūr va tavānāt-yi khvūd mīzanad rū-yi pistān-i chapash va bidūn-i īnka hāla bikhvād mīkhvurad bīh zamīn),\(^{847}\) Parvīn engages in an anti-Islamic diatribe where she declares the God of the Arabs to be no one else but the vindictive Ahrīman of Zoroastrian cosmology (khudā’ī kih shumā mīparastīd Ahrīman, khudā-yi jang, khudā-yi kūstār, khudā-yi kīnāh’jū, khudā-yi āndārdah ast kih khūn mīkhvād).\(^{848}\) The same way Western Orientalists are able to identify external phenomena as being somehow derived from their world,\(^{849}\) Parvīn posits Islam as being a manifestation of the Zoroastrian Evil One. This is both positive and negative because although the evil she abhors is integrated into one of her and her community's moments, it is still an instance of "passive apprehension"\(^{850}\) insofar as the equivalence established between the God of Islam and the Zoroastrian Evil One is simply uttered as an expression of rage and vitriol. "The breaking of [Parvīn's] hard heart"\(^{851}\) is required prior to her becoming conscious of the act she is committing at the level of speech act or performative phrasing.\(^{852}\) Even though she is persistent in her operation of othering, it nevertheless takes place within her community's cosmological order. The outside other is brought into the inside but in a precarious way, because this movement also ejects Ahrīman from his status

\(^{845}\) Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 33.
\(^{846}\) Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 36.
\(^{847}\) Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 54-5.
\(^{848}\) Hidāyat, "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān," 46.
\(^{849}\) Said, Orientalism, 67.
\(^{851}\) Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 407.
as being internal to the Zoroastrian system. The corrupt Arabian sewage (munjalāb-i chirkīn-i tāziyān)\(^{853}\) that has seeped into the Persian Empire is thus reasserted as being outside the realm, but with company. Ahrīman is himself overdetermined by Arab externality, which thus redeems Zoroastrianism of its corrupted dualism. This is consistent with the manner in which Sassanian theologians attempted to return "Ahura Mazdāh or Ohrmazd to his ancient eminence."\(^{854}\) However, Hidāyat's construction is ultimately a departure from this mould because through all these implicit movements, Parvīn is able to speak of an Iranian system only occupied by the Good, the asceptic, and the moral.

Though thematically and sentimentally similar to Hidāyat's work, 'Alavī's "Dīv! ... Dīv!" ultimately takes a different path by highlighting the direct but unconscious embrace of the demonic as a gesture internal to Aryan morality. In Hidāyat's later works in the 1930s and early 40s, he is able to bring this relationship to conscious life, thus fully revealing the demonological essence of the age.

Similar to Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān, 'Alavī's story begins at the calamitous epicentre of the Arab invasion or its adjacent moments, as is evident in the whimpering (nālah-yi zan'hā-yi Pārsī) and streaming tears of Iranian women (chishm'hā-yi ashkbār-i zan'hā-yi nāzī), along with the blood-stained alleys (khūn-i garmī kih hanāz lakhtah nashudah ast). The Kufan market where the story is initially set has a strong pandaemonic tone to it, where war booty is auctioned off to the highest bidder (ān pārah qālī rā bih qaṣmat-i hizār dīnār barā-yi pādishāh-i ḥabashah mīkharand) in the midst of broad daylight killings (yik zan-i 'Arab hamān mard rā az 'aqab bā kārd mīkushad). The first glimpse into the demonic is made when Ahrīman is heard being cursed (yikī nifrīn bih Ahrīman mīfiristad) as Iranian women are sold off as slaves. Among these women is Arnavāz,\(^{855}\) the person who would later be sold into slavery and become mother of a child fathered by her owner.\(^{856}\)

\(^{855}\) Buzurg 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv! [Demon! ... Demon!]." in Dīv! ... Dīv!, Vābā, and Yikah va Tanhā [Demon! ... Demon!, Cholera, and Singular and Alone] (Mu'assisah-yi Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1978/9/1357 sh.), 5-7.
\(^{856}\) 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 11.
Away from the market in a distant shack (kulbah), a group of male Iranian outlaws contemplate the events that are transpiring within their crumbling empire. In opposition to the opinion that Iran will enter oblivion soon enough, and similar to the way Hidāyat's Parvīn plots out the war as a microcosmic recasting of Zoroastrianism's cosmic dualism, the old man (pīr-i mard) in the group states that because the invasion is an instantiation of Ahrīman's confrontation with Ahūrā Mazdā, Iran will surely survive because the former's defeat is predicated upon a strict determinism (dar īn jang-i Īrān va Tāzī dushmanī mīyān-i Ahūrā va Ahrīman jilvahgar shudah ast. chigunah mumkin ast kih Ahrīman barā-yi hamīshah bar Ahūrā chīrah gardad? Ahūrā jāvidānī ast. Ahrīman murdanī ast). While Parvīn's gesture of equating the Arabs with Ahrīman had the consequence of condemning the Evil One to an endless wandering outside Zoroastrianism's cosmological order, the old man's positing activity moves the accent towards Ahrīman's moribundity and not his independent prowess as it originates from the abyss. This is ultimately a departure from the Sassanian theological reassertion of Ahrīman's clout. Put simply, "Ohrmazd, it is true, no longer had any serious rival on his own side, but his position vis-a-vis his eternal enemy was very much weaker than it had ever been in the Prophet's mind." 

Upon hearing the old man's characterization of the Arabs as evil beings, another member of the group named Zarāvand agrees with him by saying, indeed, "they are demons" (āh, chih rāst guftī, īnhā dīv hastand). What late Sassanian orthodoxy was able to do through its revisionist theology was to emphasize Ahrīman's "evil substance" which undergirds his absolute affinity with the abyss and notorious connection with all things noxious, and this is clearly reflected in the storyline of "Dīv! ... Dīv!" where the initial descriptions of evil attribution are unequivocal and direct. At this stage there is no sense that the Arabs are (even capable of) concealing their true demonic Nature through human intention because even though they are in some sense anthropoidal, their inhumanity is clearly patent. Nor can it be suggested that due to their "arrested development" and thus proximity to the barbarism of Nature, the Arabs were in-themselves

857 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 8.
858 Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, 191.
859 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 8.
860 Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, 51.
861 Said, Orientalism, 234.
(especially in the act of conquest) a force of Nature that has hidden its secrets, especially the internal residence of "demonic souls." There is a glaring quality about the essential constitution of the invaders that escapes all ambiguity and nuance.

Along with the sense of obviousness that was attached to infernal presence was the intuitive ability to detect the approach of darkness, which was imminent (ṣīyāḥī az dūr bi sū-yi mā mīyad). This observation was realized in the "distressed voice of a child" (ṣidā-yi parīshān-i bachah) coming from the front of the shelter, which "frightened everyone" (hamah rā harāsān kard), causing Zarāvand to trip over and smother the fire that was keeping the place warm, which then gave off a dark plume of smoke that filled the air (Zarāvand az jā just va bih sū-yi dar rafī, dar rāḥ pāyash bih chahārpāyah khvurdah, bar rū-yi ātash uftād. shu’lah khāmūsh shud. dūd-i ghalīzī tamām-i utāq rā farāgirift). As a symbol of veracity, the fire served prominently a few minutes earlier when the equivalence was drawn between Ahrīman's forces and the Arabs for this truth emerged the moment the flame was stabilized within the hideout. However, when the child emerged, a chain of events resulted in the fire being smothered, and truth along with it. Although the first utterance of the child—who will turn out to be Arnavāz's son Garzuvān—is in conformity with the truth at the level of content (when he mentions that his moribund mother is in need of immediate assistance), the prescient intuition voiced earlier about the coming darkness and the smothering of the fire point beyond the content of the moment. When the child declared that his mother's health is declining (mādaram dārad mīmīrad), the reader along with the hunkered down men are made to think that the disparaging signs are reflections of Arnavāz's deteriorating health, while the truth is in fact elsewhere. Acting as a diversionary technique, the mother's impending demise is meant to show how reader judgement is fallible in pursuing it as the fulfillment of the ominous signs. The truth of the signs is located in the point of enunciation, the

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863 'Alavī, "Div! ... Div!," 10.


865 'Alavī, "Div! ... Div!," 10.
child and his "terrifying phantom-like Voice." When the child finally appeared after his voice led to the suffocation of the fire, the terrifying aspect of the voice dissipated for all that stood was the child, "the moment of embodiment." The seemingly innocuous visage of the child dislocated the suspicion, looming darkness, and smothering of truth, even though his voice betrayed his eternal culpability. In order to better understand the position of the child within this story, it would be apt to step back away from the hideout along with the encounter to what is heard over the horizon prior to the child's emergence.

The general mood of the time was earlier defined for the outlaws by the distant whimpering of a woman and the way it was negated by forceful and bellowing winds (gāhī āhang-i nālah’ī bi gūsh mīrisīd [...] amā na’rah’hā-yi mahīb-i bād ān rā az mīyān mīburd). This movement is homologous to the way chivalry (javānmardī), masculinity (mardī), love (mihr), and truth (rāstī) are eclipsed by the "predominance of demon[s] and beast[s]" (dīv va dad chīrah gashtand). On the one hand, the wind can be seen as a moment when Nature is interactively engaged in the mourning process of the woman by expressing the overriding ineffability of her grief. In this way, she can take some solace in Nature's participation in her deeply personal emotional life, insofar as ineffable grief "is embodied as nature in the determination of externality." However, the wind can also be construed as a purely negative magnitude in its unthinking mercilessness, making the moment of eclipse—when the woman's crying is covered over—a totally trifling happening in the larger scheme of things. This problem can be partially clarified through the homologous juxtaposition involving the Aryan values and the prevailing demonism. Here, the encounter can be construed along the same lines as the wind's intersection with the woman's cries—the demons can either be the embodiment (or expression) of Iran's ancient values or its destroyers. When

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867 Žižek, "In His Bold Gaze My Ruin Is Write Large," 234.
868 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 7.
869 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 7-8.
Arnavāz's son enters the storyline and seeks refuge among the group of Iranian outlaws, he comes to manifest both aspects of demonism. On the one hand, he is cultivated and protected by way of an applied Aryan morality, but on the other—and this because he is born of an Arab father—his inherent demonism in the end is realized as having never dissipated. Thus, contrary to the idea of the noble spirit who is in the process of "coming up" to Nature, Aryan nobility unconsciously permits lawless Nature to enter its embrace.

It was during the hurried trek to visit the child's ailing mother does Zarāvand kneel down to hug him (Zarāvand ū rā dar āghūsh girift). While previously the possibility was presented that the gusts of wind served as the embodiment of the anonymous woman's grief, here the child—all appearances aside—comes to encapsulate the ferocity of winter, with its frightful multidirectional winds (bād kih az chahār samt mīvāzīd, štīdā-yi mahībī mūdād) and whiplashing snow (barf bar sar va rāyishān shāllāq mīzād). In the same way the child's visage mollified the sudden intrusiveness of his distressing yet frightening voice, here his perceived vulnerability and love for his mother (ū giryah mīkard va mīdād: 'mādaram. mādaram!') conceal his origin in the exacting but arbitrary savagery of Nature and the Arabian hordes that are its unequivocal manifestations. In Zarāvand's clutches lies the "kingdom of hell" and even though this should be producing a feeling of sublimity, the embrace only betrays Zarāvand's inclination to console and sympathize as these are markers of a beneficial Aryan morality. He is not led to a definitive "contempt for the world" but rather to a sense of bewilderment (bāvar nimīkard) where he is not only forced to confront the truth of the identity of the child's father (āyā īn bachah az ān shutur'chirān ast?), but also the choice of whether or not he should continue assisting the child at all because he is nothing but a demon child (gūyī bachah dīvī dar āghūsh dāshī).

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873 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 10.
874 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 10.
875 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 10.
gesture, Zarāvand instinctively clutches the child even more tightly than before (*Zarāvand bachah rā dar āghūshash fishār dād*), and it is through this that he makes his decision before he spells out the consequences. In other words, he does not allow himself to be "powerfully moved" by the being in his arms because his moralism already overrides his reaction to his discovery. After all, Zarāvand does not abandon the child to the winter but takes him back to the hideaway to keep him warm by the fire (*ammā ū rā bih kulbah burd. ātash rā rawshan kard bachah rā garm kard*). Notice how once again the fire is stabilized. As a marker of truth, this "centre of [Zarathustra's] cultus" reveals how the child's demonism has become conscious but yet incomplete, for morality or duty as "universal abstract essentiality" restricts access to the full sublimity of his "wrath[ful] Nature."

Arnavāz's dying wish is for Zarāvand to take the child into his custody and raise him to become an Iranian, for the thought of having an Arab son repulses her (*agar hanūz mihr-i man dar dil-i tū bāqī ast, az bachah-yi man nigahdārī kun. [...] ārţūyam hamīn būd kih bih Īrān bīyāyam. ēnī bimīram va pisaram Īrānī bishavad. hīch vaqt nakhvāstam kih yik nafar Tāzī az man bi vūjūd bīyāyad*). Is this not the credo of the 1920s and 30s but in a different form? Salvation from recent errors (late Qājār stagnation/Arnavāz's concubinage and the birth of a diluted offspring) can only be resolved through proper cultivation and reformation (state-led and reformist supported modernization/the child's transformation from a demon child into an Iranian). However, what is revealing about the work is the way it conveys the internal failure of this process. Again, as Arnavāz utters her dying wish the fire is extinguished (*shūlāh khāmush shud*). As is becoming increasingly apparent, although it is a conduit to the Divine, fire is

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878 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 11.
879 Kant, "Observations," 18.
880 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 11.
881 Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, 47.
884 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 12.
885 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 12.
within the narrative in a state of constant flux. Though the extinguishing fire may superficially be seen as representative of Arnavāz's own descent into death, it can also be connected to the pre-established failure of Zarāvand's imposed mandate. In the face of truth's fluctuations, the Lie as the "ultimate source of impurity" moves at a constant and inexorable rate and emerges as the promised demon (dīv-i mawʿūd).

Later on in the story which takes place years onward, Zarāvand states that if the few remaining patriots such as himself were to be expunged, there would be nothing left to prevent an all-out invasion and desecration of every aspect of Iranian life (ammā az īn dilam mīsūzad kih dīgar kasē az mā namāndah ast. bāraftan-i mā Īrān ham khvāhad raft. āngāh dīvān tākht va tāz khvāhad kard). Unfortunately, what he is neglecting to confess to himself is that he helped to cultivate this evil by agreeing to raise Arnavāz's child, and in so doing planted the seeds of his community's destruction. As the Arab forces close-in on their new hideout after their previous location was divulged to the enemy, Zarāvand asks who among his group could be responsible for their current misfortune, for—knowing that only they themselves knew of their location—only one of them could have committed this betrayal (mā chand nafar bīsh nīstīm va man nimīdānam va nimītavānam bāvar kunam kih kī az mā bizikhār ast. kīst kih khāngāh-i mā rā dar Khvurūbād bih Tāzīyān guftah ast?). This leads him to contemplate the plausibility of all of them being demons (hamah dīv shudah´īm). Out of despair, he is able to go beyond "not recognizing [him]self in that reflected object" of demonism to becoming the demon himself in an act of alienation, but Zarāvand is still incapable of coming to grips with his participation in the furtherance of evil. Even though he is presented as a stalwart defender of Aryan morality, this is only nominal for he is totally incapable of maintaining the vivacity of the flame of truth.

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886 Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, 74.
887 Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, 81.
888 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 12-3.
889 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!," 13.
890 Hegel, Phenomenology, 79.
After Zarāvand speaks, the Iranian wife of Garzuvān (Arnavāz's son) enters a hateful tirade against her husband, accusing him of being the demonic traitor (ū dīv ast, ū dīv ast, ū dīv ast!) they are speaking of because Arab blood flows through him (īn khūn-i chirkīn-i tāzī ast kih dar ā jilvahgar shudah ast). Even though everyone knew the truth of this, they did not want to believe it (hamah mīdānistand kih Garzuvān pisar-i Arnavāz bā 'Arab'hā sākhtah ast, valī hīch kudām bāvar nimīkardand). Garzuvān's wife detects the pretense and launches an attack against Zarāvand himself, charging him for offering the demon refuge when he was better off leaving him out for dead (chirā ā rā az khānah’at bīrūn nakardī?). The implicit consequence of her outlash is precisely what has been argued thus far, that it was Zarāvand's fidelity to ancient Iranian values (coinciding here with criminality) that allowed him to reconcile with the promised demon (bizihkār tuyī kih bā dīv sākhtah’ī), and this decision resulted in his own transmutation into a demon (bā ā hamdastī kardī va dīv shudī). While her acting out does reveal this partial truth, it also divulges another truth insofar as the act of acting out entails its own "veiled showing." In remaining silent about her conviction and knowledge throughout her years of marriage (sih sāl ast kih man zan-i ā hastam. dar īn muddat man bih khū-yi nikbat-i ā pay burdam), she herself became implicated in Zarāvand's decision to give Garzuvān refuge. This is indicative of a transition from individual to communal error, thus making the wife's diatribes (az hamkhvābī bā īn dīv bīzāram) absolutely hollow and farcical. Even her later killing of Garzuvān (shamshīr rā az dast-i nātāvān-i Zarāvand girīfthā va ān rā bih sīnah-yi shawharash furū kard) does not truly vindicate the community, for it does not resolve the contradiction at the heart of Aryan morality as it has been thus described. Although the end of the story attempts to display the band's

891 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!,” 13-4.
892 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!,” 14.
893 « L'acting ont, c'est essentiellement la monstration, le montrage, voilé sans doute, mais non pas voilé en soi. Il n'est voilé que pour nous, comme sujet de l'acting out, en tant que ça parle, en tant que ça pourrait faire vrai. Sinon, au contraire, il est visible au maximum, et c'est pour cela même que, dans un certain registre, il est invisible, montrant sa cause. L'essentiel de ce qui est montré, c'est ce reste, sa chute, ce qui tombe dans l'affaire. » See Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire: Livre X (L'angoisse) (Paris: Seuil, 2004), 146.
894 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!,” 14.
895 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!,” 15.
896 'Alavī, "Dīv! ... Dīv!,” 16.
heroism as they combat the Arabs, it ultimately fails. The only person who is truly exculpated is Garzuvān for he was nothing but an automaton responding to the directives issued by his internal Nature.  

The foregoing can be summarized and concluded in the following way:

(i) The interruption of voluntarism was evidenced through the endurance of the almost perennial topic of demonic amorism (reflected in works that deploy the demonic in the form of a measure or an expression of love), especially within the minds of those who were supposed to be most responsive to the idea of absolute individuated volition (Western educated, secularized nationalist, influenced by the modern European intellectual tradition, etc.).

(ii) In love poetry that can be traced back to the medieval period, there is present the sentiment that representatives of institutionalized religion are incapable of handling the demonic, especially as it appears within the matrix of the amoristic. This leaves open the possibility for modernists to insert themselves as those who have the most insight concerning demonic amorism because they are already the natural antagonists of the aforementioned representatives of institutionalized religion.

(iii) What allows for demonism to become more palitable in the context of love is the way it at times appears as a quality of the divine Beloved, and so the approach to the demonic is made

897 This conception is different from the idea of abiding by Evil as an ethical stance. This is because there is no moment when Garzuvān is presented as having to deliberate over the choice of either staying with the Iranians or returning to the Arabs. He is at this point in the story completely voiceless. This differs markedly from the frightening Voice that rang through the initial hideaway earlier on in the narrative. Though he started with a distressful cry, his life ends in his silence, a reflection of how he was inally reduced to mechanically abiding by his inner Nature. The idea of having Evil elevated to an ethical principle is described in the following way: "[T]his person did not yield to evil under the influence of bad circumstances; Evil lies in his very 'nature.' At the same time, of course, he is—like every human being—radically responsible for his character. The necessary implication of it is that, in an 'eternal,' timeless, transcendental act, he must have chosen Evil as the basic feature of his being. The transcendental, a priori character of this act means that it could not have been motivated by pathological circumstances; the original choice of Evil had to be a purely ethical act, the act of elevating Evil into an ethical principle." See Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 101.
permissable by way of the original trajectory towards the divine. In this way, an encounter with the demonic can be construed as being positively ecstatic and conjugal.

(iv) Following this one can adumbrate a series of three movements that capture the whole: (a) The open acknowledgement by love poetry (which can be argued to have medieval origins) that the demonic can be approached by way of the Beloved; (b) The disavowal of this awareness of demonic presence (through demonism's withdrawal into the unconscious) as well as the subsequent and partially unrecognized cultivation of the demonic under the false pretext that it can outgrow itself. This notion—as it is embodied in 'Alavī's "Dīv! ... Dīv!"—is the most unrecognized yet apt reflection of the state's encounter with demonism; (c) Here, the awareness of (a) has returned but in a renewed way, for demonism's withdrawal in (b) is also conserved. Now, what is recognized is the presence of demonism as a constant (unconscious) and seductive (in a masochistic way) pressure. Reflected most prominently in the works of Hidāyat, this position ends with emancipatory suicide as the revelatory truth of the age (insofar as the origin of the state is located in demonic Nature, the destruction of the latter culminates in the dissolution of the state itself). The stance illustrated in (c) is laid out in the final section of the study.

(v) In order to appreciate 'Alavī's "Dīv! ... Dīv!" it is important to acknowledge how demonism was especially racialized during the 1920s and 30s as a result of the hegemony of secular nationalism. The problematic that is in need of solving is the question of why Ahrīman (in the form of the foreign other) was ever embraced in the first instance? This is precisely the question that underlies 'Alavī's work.

(vi) There are several points that can be taken from the romantic nationalist fiction work "Parvīn Dukhtar-i Sāsān": (a) A deliberate attempt is made to avoid the sublimity of the Arabs and the corruptibility of the Aryan caste; (b) By pillaging the heavenly Iranian realm and insofar as this domain is precisely the paradisal future revealed to Muslims in the Qur'an, the Arabs are portrayed as contradicting the truths of their own religion; (c) Instead of analyzing how their nightmares have come to fruition, the Iranians only express grievances and rhetorically inquire into redundant theodical matters; (d) By being appended to Ahrīman, the Arabs are partially rinsed of their externality by being brought within the Zoroastrian cosmological system, but insofar as the Arabs are persistently posited as wholly other, what ends up happening is that after the Arabs are drawn into the recognizable cosmological system, they again withdraw outside of it,
but this time take Ahrīman with them. This results in the aseptic and simplified metaphysical scheme that satisfies secular nationalist sensibility.

(vii) A similar amount of remarks can be said regarding 'Alavī's "Dīv! ... Dīv!": (a) While at the beginning of the story the reader is reminded of Ahrīman's necessary moribundity, this contradicts how demonism is played out in the narrative as precisely an inexorable force; (b) Initially, evil attribution is presented as being intuitively palpable and perceptibly obtrusive. The Arabs are not human enough to conceal their evil through intentionality, nor do they reflect the pre-modern notion of nature as a cache of the arcane. This position contradicts one of the primary problems presented in the narrative, mainly the inconspicuousness of the child's evil. As a manifestation of Nature the child's perfunctory essence is fully exposed, though he is treated as if he has concealed his true identity. In a moment of contradiction, the Iranians first assert the obviousness of evil then later on treat it as having been hidden all along; (c) Narrative truth is encapsulated in the symbol of the fire but the signs are not read adequately enough to prevent the story's concluding calamity. Additionally, while the the appearance of truth is in constant fluctuation (with the constant lighting and extinguishing of the symbolic flames), it is only the Lie as Nature that is constant and unimpeachable; (d) Due to Iranian misrecognition, demonism comes to be embraced as a consequence of applied Aryan morality and is cultivated as if the child who harbours it can be rehabilitated. This reflects the general ethos of the early-Pahlavī period and its inherent incoherence; (e) What is displayed at the end of the narrative is the Iranian unwillingness to admit to involvement in the cultivation of demonism through the over-identification with Aryan moralism.

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Though incognizant to him, 'Alavī came to reflect a new brand of intellectual demonographer whose task was not simply to relocate the locus of the demonic, but also to reveal the internal logic of the demonological essence of the age. And while "Dīv! ... Dīv!" was unable to resolve the deadlocks inherent therein, it nevertheless served as an advance in the understanding of how nefarious beings thought to be most at home in occultism, superstition, primitive religious rituals,
and the like, can become entangled in state programmes, avante garde intellectual debates, and technologies to such an extent that to understand the nefarious would be equivalent to comprehending the conventional objects of social scientific study but in a completely unexplored dimension. One area into which 'Alavī has followed the demons is that of capitalist imperatives, relations, and structures.

Different from the rentier state capitalism of Muḥammad Rizā Shāh and its basis in petrodollars,898 his father's reign was known for its adherence to etatism—or state capitalism899—and its commitment to a command economy. This platform allowed for unprecedented developments in industry and infrastructure, which in turn led to the formation of a small but heavily concentrated working class and a restructuration of Iran's urban centres. Budgetary growth through oil production royalties, customs levies, income taxation, state monopoly profits, and deficit financing900 started to create the necessary conditions to finally permit Iran to partially transition away from nineteenth century barriers to capitalist accumulation as they appeared in the form of an outmoded and restrictive commercial policy, misallocated agricultural surplus, and the immobile wealth hoarded by merchants and landowners that was not permitted to take on the character of self-expanding capitals.901 Corresponding in minimal measure to the way the figure of the Devil in European Christendom entered a phase of exponentially increased potency and externalization during the proto-capitalist transformations of the sixteenth century,902 it can also be said that the entrance into Iran of capitalist nomenclature, relations, and effects, carried the demonic further away from its pre-modern grounding by allowing it to "condense"903 the logic of the ongoing reorganization of the prevailing economic model. While this argument is convincing in many respects, to suggest that demonism "began to

899 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 140.
900 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 146-8.
903 Lizardo, "The Devil as Cognitive Mapping," 611.
change representational form as a direct byproduct of capitalist-inspired reforms is clearly a sign of economic determinism. This being said, 'Alavī nevertheless permitted earlier demonological developments—to which he was appended—to become integrated with Marxist critique, resulting in further creative figurations.

Whether deployed as a form of grievance against the illegitimate acquisition of wealth or within the discourse of internal relations, demonism has had a presence within economic discourse for quite some time. In the latter case where Maḥmūd Maḥmūd has evolution (takāmul) juxtaposed to revolution (inqilāb), concluding that the prioritization of spiritual progress (taraqqiyāt-i rūḥī) over simplistic modes of material developmentalism would be more beneficial for national progress, the satanic emerges in the form of the industrial nations and their predatory advances (dasā'is-i duval-i ṭammā'-i Shayṭān-i ṣan'at) that thwart the possibility of this strategy coming to fruition. Taqī'zādah, the iconoclast he was, takes a different approach. Evoking the imagery of doomsday (shūr va nashūr) to describe the incessant activity of stock exchanges in metropolitan centres such as Paris, London, and New York, and the immense prowess of an attacking dragon (izdīhā-yi ʿawlat) to convey the character of American and European Banks, the intellectual argues that Iran should engage with the monolithic mode of production of which these institutions are a part, and cease squabbling over archaic notions such as usury (ribā) in the local settings of Ardabil, Marāghah, Iṣfahān, and Burūjird. However, to truly understand 'Alavī's pedigree it would be wise to take a look back at the way 'Arānī's understanding of money-worship (pūl'parastī) is conveyed through the structure of idol-worship (but'parastī). Of

904 Lizardo, "The Devil as Cognitive Mapping," 615.
905 Rashīd Yāsimī, "Shahāb [Shooting Star]," Armaghan 6-7 (1926/7/1305 sh.): 373-374.
907 Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd), "Takāmul Yā Inqilāb," 873.
908 Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd), "Takāmul Yā Inqilāb," 880-1.
course, the notion that bourgeoise practice "resemble[s] that hideous pagan idol who would not
drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain"\(^\text{911}\) is instilled within the very origins of Marxist
theory and 'Alavī is able to provide money's status as an idol an important place in his Chamidān
(The Suitcase).

In this narrative the presentation of the demonic as an obtrusive third element that disrupts the
potential of a dyadic union—that between the narrator and a Russian love-interest named
Kāṭūshkā—both perpetuates and contradicts the way Satan is situated in what has been called the
traditional "mahram/nāmahram paradigm" where lawful relations between members of the
opposite sex (through either blood or familial bond), when contravened, spills over into the realm
of the nāmahram or unlawful interaction.\(^\text{912}\) Demonism's role in both cases remains concordant
precisely due to evil's persistence as the third term, where nāmahram lovers are never left
alone.\(^\text{913}\) However, they ultimately differ in function because while traditionally the satanic third
serves to incite the consummation of a nāmahram bond, in the case of Chamidān the demonic
emerges in the form of a structural prohibition. The interdiction does not emanate from tradition
sources of authority (nah pidar va nah mādar),\(^\text{914}\) for they appear inconsequential at this point.
Afterall, the "sentimental veil" of the family has been ripped off by the intrusion of bourgeois
relations.\(^\text{915}\) Nor can it be said that any particular person is coercing Kāṭūshkā (hīch kas ū rā
majbūr nimīkard) to marry someone she is not in the least interested in,\(^\text{916}\) for the satanophanic

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\(^{913}\) "According to a popular racist and sexist myth, Italian men, during the sexual act, want the woman to whisper
into their ears obscenities about what she has been doing with another man or men – only with the aid of this
mythical support can they perform as the proverbial good lovers in reality. Here we encounter the Lacanian 'il n'y a
pas de rapport sexuel' at its purest: the theoretically correct point of this myth is that even at the moment of the most
intense bodily contact with each other, lovers are not alone, they need a minimum of phantasmic narrative as a

\(^{914}\) Buzurg 'Alavī, "Chamidān [The Suitcase]," in *Chamidān* (Tehran: Mu’assisah-yi Intishārāt-i Nigāh, 1998/9/1377
sh), 16.


\(^{916}\) 'Alavī, "Chamidān," 16.
event does not occur in the appearance of individuality at all. As such, morality is effectively jettisoned in favour of a structuralist explanation, but it is not clear whether for the narrator of Chamidān this structure is defined by "totality" or "levels' or 'instances." On the one hand, determination comes from three different loci: money (pūl), society (jāmi‘ah), and environment (muhīf), but on the other, all these instances are localized in "a sinister, tattered, and frightening demon" (dīv-i manhūs-i mundarīs-i mahīh). By suggesting that these are the sources of coercion (majbūr mīkard) that prevent Kātūshkā from establishing any meaningful union with the narrator, 'Alavī is again able to advance the demonology of the age to the sociological analysis of structure. In this way, there is an odd truth to Maḥmūd Maḥmūd's claim that modern sociologists ('ulamā-yi 'ulūm-i ijtimā‘ī) have inherited the Zoroastrian preoccupation with Ahrīman. Besides the demonic social, "the universal and natural validity of the signs and abstractions engendered by the market mechanism" such as money leads to "the universal and natural validity" of the idea of the demon in the Iranian context. In this instance, the malignant being does not need to hijack Kātūshkā's body to make her sell herself for a lifetime (biravad khvudash rā bifurūshad, barā-yi yik 'umr bifurūshad), because it is the external demonic structural and relational substance in the form of money and the environment that coerces her to assume the "definite form [...] of social consciousness" necessary for her to sell herself.

In abiding by the notion that "the structure precedes its elements and reproduces them in order to reproduce the structure," 'Alavī's Chamidān not only repeats the necessary defeatism that prevailed in "Dīv! ... Dīv!" with its focus on Garzuvān's immutable Nature, the disheartening

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917 Svendsen, A Philosophy of Evil, 22-3.
918 Althusser, "Ideology," 134.
919 'Alavī, "Chamidān," 16.
920 Nakhshabī (Maḥmūd Maḥmūd), "Nasl-i Āyandah-yi Īrān," 373.
921 Taussig, The Devil, 10.
922 'Alavī, "Chamidān," 16.
tenor of its narrator's Weltanschung is carried over into another of 'Alavī's works, "Intizār" (Expectation). Here too the presence of "Dīv! ... Dīv!" is made known, particularly in the idea of becoming the demon you directly help to cultivate. Similar to Chamidān, the narrator in "Intizār" is able to identify a troubling relationship between a character and the demonic as the crux of the narrative, and this takes place right in the beginning when a communist political prisoner who also so happens to be a sculptor (yik nafar zindānī-yi siyāsī [va] mujassamah'sāz) teaches the narrator and a fellow prisoner identified only as M the basics of his craft. In similar fashion to the way an actor transitions from his role as representative of an essence located in a script to the moment of coincidence with that which he mimics, "Intizār" presents readers with a major character (M in this case) who comes to resemble a mask, but there is an added twist. Not only is he the creator of the mask, M also comes to slowly embody the mask insofar as he already has within him the undeveloped essence that is fully actualized in the mask. By participating in the creation of grotesque and comedic forms, from the heads of a dog (kalah-yi sag) and a monkey (kalah-yi maymūn), a Satan mask (māsk-i Shayṭān), along with the caricatures of well-known personalities (kārīkātūr-i ādamhā-yi ma'rūf), M is able to give full expression to this internal essence that has yet to manifest itself in full at the level of psychological life and behaviour. The status of the masks and sculptures as fully actualized reflections of an undeveloped but existent core is seen in the way they appear to leer back at their creators and potential visitors (radīf-i 'arūsak'hā pahlū-yi ham īstādah būdand, hamah yik qīyāfah, hamah bā yik adā. radīf-i kārīkātūr-i palangarī [sic] bā dahan kaj, chismhā-yi ishārah kunandah va khvandah zanandah khīrah bih ādam nigāh mīkard). Here, the representation is more real and actualized than the essence it mimics because the mask as representation is M's bodily reality in a futural state.

926 Hegel, Phenomenology, 452.
927 'Alavī, "Intizār," 38.
When M looks down at the sculptures and masks, he bellows out a frightening laugh (khvandah-yi vaḥshatnāk) but the laugh is not so much in this instance a "violent agent for change" than a reflection of a change that is germinating at the core of his being. The narrator announces early on that his audience should not be surprised (mawjib-i ta'ajjub nashavad) by how M will quickly come to resemble the constructed figures ('azīzān-i M bih shikl-i 'arūsak dar mīāyand). Even though M's sculpted products were odd in the sense that their eyes were unnatural (makhsūsan chishm'hā-yi 'arūsak'hā ghayr-i ṭabī būdand), this unnaturalness had a strong component of reality attached to it. In fact, the general prison population's ignorance regarding the cause of M's growing insanity ('illata sh rā nimīdānand) is precisely because of their unwillingness to equate this unnaturalness with reality. They did not realize that when he was laughing in front of the demonic objects of his own creation, he was doing so because he was looking straight into the heart of his hidden insanity (dar tah-i ān khvandah dīvānīgī pinhān). The laughter may not in fact be the "absolute discharge [of ...] unutilizable [...] psychic energy" because not only does the laughter intensify over time, most of M's being is directed towards the production of these bouts of laughter. Only when M's laughter enters a new stage of frightening intensity and he begins to purposefully alter his appearance in strange ways, particularly around his eyes (mīkhvāst kih chishm'hāyash bā māl-i dīgarān farq dāshtah bāshad), does the attention of others become aroused. In addition to dreaming that his eyes are as bright as headlights (khvāb dīdam kih chishm'hāyam mīdirakhshad), the change in appearance draws M closer to the grotesque features of the carved masks and sculptures. The transformation was complete when one morning he was caught screaming in the corner of a cell where he had himself perched up like an owl (bi

930 'Alavī, "Intīzār," 38.
932 'Alavī, "Intīzār," 39.
933 'Alavī, "Intīzār," 39.
934 'Alavī, "Intīzār," 40.
936 'Alavī, "Intīzār," 42.
Here, M comes to represent the representation of the mask, thus distorting the logic of representation itself. In "Intizār", 'Alavī is thus able to again deploy the logic of an emulated demonism while in the process reinforcing the role of the influenced agent in the cultivation of the said demonism.

While 'Alavī served a crucial function as a demonographer, he did not fully exploit the way his remarks that incorporated the demonic reflected the deadlocks present at the core of ideology and the secular nationalist state. For example, just a couple years after the abdication of Rizā Shāh, the author wrote an account of prison-life in what turned out to be his Panjāh va Sīh Nafar (The Group of Fifty-Three). Even though it was published during a time of unprecedented freedoms, 'Alavī did not take advantage of this to scout the outermost extremities of his previous observations, perhaps because he perceived the demonology of the period to have reached its own limits. From the standpoint of his nationalistic tale "Dīv! ... Dīv!", it is clear here that a full reversal is taking place where the entire demonological project of the early-Pahlavī period—of which he was a part—is derided.

Though perceived as the supreme modern entity capable of avenging and sustaining the legacy and law of the fallen Iranians in "Dīv! ... Dīv!", the early-Pahlavī state is considered in Panjāh va Sīh Nafar to be the cause and result of the darkness of the 1920s and 30s (ḥukūmat-i dawrah-yi sīyah). As days go by, the satanic intentions of these so-called redeemers of the past—in this case, the Qaṣr prison authorities—become increasingly more apparent (rūz bi rūz qaṣd-i shayṭānī-yi zindānbānān dar āzār risāndan bih mā āshikārtar mīgardid). The locus of darkness has radically altered and is now nestled deeply within the bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus. In this space, the "special technical expertise" harbourled by the officials is located in their duplicity (dū rūṬ). Mid-level prison administrators had to manoeuvre around the pressures emanating from both higher ranking officials (raṬīs-i zindān) and the incarcerated (zindāniyān). In this self-preservation dance, the demonic becomes recognized for the first time as being

937 'Alavī, "Intizār," 47.
939 Weber, Economy and Society, 958.
940 'Alavī, Panjāh va Sīh Nafar, 105.
intertwined with administrative technique (az ṭarafī dar mavāqi’-i sakt sa’y mīkard kih zindānīyān rā sharūr va Shayṭān qalamdād kunad va az ṭarafī dīgar dar mavāqi’-i ‘āddī mīkūshīd bih har vasīlah’ī shudah khabar-i khushī barā-yi zindānīyān bīyāvarad va dil-i ānhā rā bih dast āvarad). By tracing this and similar strategies back to the ruling class, the indispensability of demonization (az īn jahat ānhā rā dīv-i ādam’kush va khūn’khvur qalamdād mīkūshīd) in maintaining normative socio-political conditions is brought to the fore as a centuries-long conspiracy to restrict the grounding of progressive politics. In one fell swoop, 'Alavī conducts a full-on reversal of his earlier nationalistic stance by asserting that the Sasanian rhetorical attack against Arab standing was solely for the sake of perpetuating courtly power (taṣavvur kunīd hingāmīrā kih nihzāt-i İslām dar miyān-i qabā’il-i ‘Arab ījād gardīd va qudrat va sulṭah-yi darbār-i sāsānīyān rā tahdid mīkard, agar ān rūz az yikī az umarā-yi darbār-i sāsānī rājī’ bih īn nihzāt su’ālī mīshud, chih javābī mīshinidīm?). Not only is there a reversal, there is a complete unwillingness to contemplate the possibility presented in "Dīv! ... Dīv!" that the heart of moral authority can slip into its obverse when adhered to too stringently. Nevertheless, Panjāh va Sīh Nafar presents us with an entirely new demonological logic that will be discussed in a future study.

The foregoing can be summarized and concluded in the following way:

(i) One of the more unrecognized but decisive contributions of "Dīv! ... Dīv!" was its ability to reveal the groundwork of the state and this was made possible through the aegis of an external demonological investigation. Though this was certainly not his intention, the work helps to situate 'Alavī's other writings within the domain of critical theory as hermeneutical challenges to normative systems of power. In this way, demonological implements spilled over into the critical dimensions of the social sciences and vice versa.

(ii) While there was debate at the time over whether it would be prudent or not to involve the nation in the demonism of the increasingly globalized capitalist order (even proponents, by way of Taqīzādah, did not hesitate to deploy the figures of traditional demonomy to characterize the

941 'Alavī, Panjāh va Sīh Nafar, 105.
942 'Alavī, Panjāh va Sīh Nafar, 193.
943 'Alavī, Panjāh va Sīh Nafar, 193.
system they wanted the nation to become entangled with), 'Alavī was able to focus more on the way the notion of money serves as a structural third term in challenging the fulfillment of an amorous bond. This is a development but also a departure away from the traditional understanding of Islam's moral third term as the satanic suasion to illicit nonfamilial relations. This reflects the way the demonic in modernity is many times construed as a frustrating pressure that that is unable to attain its goal.

(iii) In "Intižār," 'Alavī's demonic structure is localized in the mask-ī Shayṭān as a futural depiction of M's fully developed psychopathology. The mask is a determining structure in two important respects: (a) It is both an expression of an inchoate psychosis and its construction is dependent upon the technical knowledge of the communist sculptor, two factors that distance the mask from M's conscious handling; (b) The mask, in reflecting the full development of M's condition, determines M's narrative development throughout the story.

(iv) In the final analysis, 'Alavī prepared the groundwork for an acknowledgement of and engagement with the demonological deadlocks of the time but did not exploit it personally. This was due to his unwillingness to truly accept demonism as an intimate moment. This task was confronted in a serious way by Hidāyat.
Chapter 7  
*Jahannam-i Shahvatī*: Hidāyat and the Fulfillment of Early-Pahlavī Demonology

Out of all the thinkers we have covered thus far, it was Hidāyat's interrogation of the demonic that brought early-Pahlavī demonology to an end. Primarily by way of mapping out the unconscious as a modern demonomy, he was able to recognize demonism as one of his moments (a reflection of what the state only tenuously and incompletely acknowledged of itself). His awareness was predicated upon a long intellectual process marred by queries concerning the dichotomy of good and evil, their possible intermingling, along with the desire to keep them apart.  

Hidāyat was able to contemplate how the pure at heart are at times haunted by demons in their sleep, and how demonic darkness can lead one to the essence of things. He was able to situate evil within racial tensions, to have it instrumentalize humans for its own ends, and to have it be susceptible to capture. Through these and other means, Hidāyat was able to bring the period's demonological deadlock into focus as part of an epochal problematic in need of resolution. The crux of the matter is that (i) the call for order in the late-1910s and early-20s emanated from the locus of pure fragmentation which was construed at the time as a demonism both chaotic and inexorable. (ii) The engagement with the nation's fragmentary condition took place from a pre-modern demonological paradigm, thus occluding the immensity of Nature and its incorporation into a recently modified demonism. (iii) An unmitigated attempt to quell this new demonism would spell the suicidal end to the call for order itself insofar as its bearers emerged from the heart of Nature. The early part of Hidāyat's corpus and his own suicide reflect the logic of this series. Let us first begin this final component of the study with an examination of the way Hidāyat approaches evil's internal and external forms.

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As has already been discussed, psychological and medical discourses of the early twentieth century were able to effect a shift in the ontological structure of mischievous occult beings whereby demons and jinn became embedded within microbiological networks and psychic processes as quantifiable and containable entities. In a sense, the objects of pneumatological study—as they were situated in the wider world with their own strategies of sustainability, mobility, and reproduction—were able to "penetrate [...] the pores" of the scientific field and the human body like "the fierce heat of a smokeless fire." Hidāyat too tracked this movement but did so while admitting to the drive-like persistence of the period's demonism. The infernal domains exist in man (dūzakh dar khvud-i ashhāṣ ast) Hidāyat declares through his Zindahbih Gūr (Buried Alive), and this declaration is the predicate to the well known dictum, Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo ("If I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions"). Hidāyat both locates hell within man and is able to bring it to conscious life as an object of contemplation.

By locating the demonic at the level of the unconscious and man's sexual economy, Hidāyat was able to bypass the scientific commitment to containment by admitting to demonism's chaotic substructure. This, of course, has a psychoanalytic derivation and Hidāyat makes this clear when he praises Freud for elucidating man's "libidinal hell" (jahannam-i shahvatī) as the basis of life (bā kamāl-i jur'at sabit mīkunad ki h asās-i bashar rā- yi shahvat-i zindagānī mīkunad). In his most well-known and regarded work, Būf-i Kūr, the issue arises when sexual gratification is denied not due to personal "disgust, shame and morality" but rather the rejection of a partner. In this case, it is the narrator's wife who, on the occasion of the first night of their marriage, eschews the sexual act the moment it is most expected (hamān shab-i 'arūsī vaqtī kih tū-yi utāq

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950 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 31.
951 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 31.
953 Quoted in Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams." The sentence is originally from Virgil's Aeneid.
In having the object of desire left out of his reach, this thing which "has separated itself off as organ" helps to draw out the narrator's constitutive element. After the wife retreated to her side of the bed and turned off the lights, thus providing closure to her attempts at placating his desire (marā aslan bi̊h taraf-i khvudash rāh nadād, chirāgh rā khāmūsh kard va raft ān taraf-i uṭāq khvābīd), she began "to shake like a willow" (mišl-i bi̊d bi̊h khvudash mīlarzīd). She knows full well that by rejecting the narrator's advances, she is contributing to the development of a "nervous illness" that was already incipient within him—as is the case with most (if not all) of Hidāyat's main characters. She shook as if she were "thrown into a dark pit with a dragon" (ingārī kih ū rā dar sīyāh chāl bā yik izhdi hā andākhtah būdand). Thus, it is through the inhibition of sexual gratification in this register that leads to the appearance of nefarious beings. While they would traditionally be conjured through prescribed and ritualistic commands by specialized vendors or practitioners learned in the occult sciences, now the simple inhibition of sexual pleasure is enough to make them appear.

The connection between a nagging libidinal pressure (which may potentially—but most likely not—end in an ecstatic moment) and the infernal, as embodied in the dictum "From Heaven, across the World, to Hell" (vom Himmel durch die Welt zur Hölle), permeates throughout many of Hidāyat's works. At times, as is evident in his short story "Girdāb" (Whirlpool), the only way to escape the demon that compels one to destroy friendships and social conventions for the sake of fulfilling one's sexual desire is to kill it (ākhārash ghalabah kardam va dīvī kih dar man paydā shudah būd kushtam, barā-yi înki̊h bi̊h tū khīyānat nakardah būsham), but the act is

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956 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 87.
958 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 87.
960 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 87.
962 Quoted in Freud, "Three Essays On The Theory Of Sexuality." Originally from Goethe's Faust.
simultaneously suicidal. The relief brought about by suicide is also evident in "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kusht" (The Man Who Killed His Ego), when, sometime after the recounting of a poem by the eleventh century Persian poet and scholar, Nāṣir Khusraw (1004-1088/9/394-481 gh.), in which rightly initiated believers are encouraged to famish the dragon (emblematic of nafs) who restricts access to the treasures of authentic being (tū dārī izdihārī bar sar-i ganj / bikush īn izdihā, fārīgh shū az ranj). the protagonist Mīrzā Huṣayn 'Alī becomes disillusioned with the entire sufi project of asceticism. Even though he was at one time inspired by the thought of expunging "the beastly and Ahrīmanic nafs" (kushtan-i nafs-i bahīmī va Ahrīmanī) from within himself, Huṣayn 'Alī was never able to fully rid himself of the dominance of doubt (shak va tardīd), especially with respect to the veracity of the supposed truths that lie behind appearances. The only way to remain faithful to his mystical quest is for him to enter the plane of "complete negation and denial" by killing himself.

In this way, it is not surprising that Hidāyat distanced himself from the position endorsing the demonization of death. For instance, on the occasion of the death of a musician of noted repute named Dāryūsh Ghulām Ḥusayn in 1926/7/1305 sh., a poet recounts his grief and dissatisfaction with the operations of the world (uf bar īn rūzigār-i nāhanjār / dād az īn charkh-i kaj'raw-i khvudsar). In his description, the poet portrays death as chang-i Ahrīman-i ajl (claws of the Ahrīman of death), a source of imagery that precipitates Hidāyat's own form of grief. In "Marg" (Death), he indulges in the way death is able to remove from a person's shoulders all their pain and sorrow once they pass on (ay marg! tū az gham va andūh-i zinda gānī kāstah bār-i sangīn-i ān rā az dūsh bar mīdārī). In comparing death to an "affectionate mother" (tu mānand-i

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966 Katouzian, "The Man," 204.

Hidāyat displays his full commitment to the call of "conscience" in its "character of summoning Da-sein to its ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of being a lack." In other words, there is a deliberate and relieving confrontation with the face of death, even though this visage has been portrayed by many to be dread-inducing. Rather than the feeble mood expressed by the latter perspective, it should be proclaimed that death is the source of a brilliant light, not darkness. By calling it the furious Ahrīman, some are mistakenly confusing death for that inner demonic vitality that ceases to quit its incessant pressures—the inner force that is engaged by an ever-failing repressive apparatus.

There are other times when suicide is not on the horizon as a viable solution, as is evident in "Lālah," a short tale that obliquely confronts the prohibitionary sexual craving of a paternal figure for a young girl under his custody. In this case, the older peasant who was previously unafraid of either wolves or ghouls can have the entire world turn infernal, with mountains shaking his core and strangers appearing to him as demons and dragons when an illicit love interest disappears into thin air.

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970 Hidāyat, "Marg," 122.
971 Heidegger, Being and Time, 232.
972 Hidāyat, "Marg," 122.
973 See Sigmund Freud, "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety," in SE XX, 87-156.
975 Šādiq Hidāyat, "Lālah," 95.
conflict that revolves around his growing attraction results in a situation where he "withdraws his acknowledgement of [...] self-reproach" by allowing the objects of the world to take up the responsibility. Accordingly, by having theatre experience in "Alavīyah Khānūm" described as a process of the audience being affected by a performance that is in-itself a rendering of their thoughts and being (hamah-yi īn majālis ta'šīr-i makhşūsī dar tamāshāchīyān mīkard, zīrā yik tikkah az aʃkār va hastī-yi khvudishān rā rū-yi pardah mīdīdand), Hidāyat advances the notion that not only can demonism be externalized, the projected objects can return to provide novel sensations for individuals. This process is split between alienation and identification because while the "spectator [is set] at a distance from the performance" insofar as the initial projection of inner demonism was nothing but an attempt at alienation, having the disposed psychical experiences represented for spectatorial consumption allows for the moment of identification to be possible. Referring to the re-staging of Ghadīr Khum—the event that is believed by the Shīʿī to be the moment when the Prophet Muḥammad announced his son-in-law 'Alī bin Abī Ṭālib (599-661/23 bh.-40 gh./r. 656-61/35-40 gh.) to be his successor—Hidāyat draws attention to the way hell (jahannam), among many other elements, is displayed during the performance. Through the motif of the infernal realm and others, viewers are given an opportunity to collectively experience the associated emotions and thoughts (yik naw' iḥsās-i hamdardī va yigānagī-yi fikrī hamah-yi ānhā rā bih ham marbūṭ mīsākht), internal processes that were initially rejected.

While these concerns may prompt an escape from primal instinct and inwardness all-together, there are also times—as is the case in "Mīhan'parast" (The Patriot)—when finding refuge in the inner confines of the dream state and its melange of memories and desires is a way to escape the hell that is phenomenal reality (dubārah chishmash rā bast, mišl-i īnkhī mikhvāst az īn jahannam

Unsurprisingly, at times the more pernicious elements of the external world had a racialized tone. In "Ṭalab-i Amurzish" (Asking for Absolution), as the caravan in which the narrator is initially situated approaches the pilgrimage city of Karbala where Ḥusayn bin 'Alī's (626-80/4-61 gh.) shrine is located, instead of sensing the holiness of the location, he calls the last stretch towards the city limits "the vestibule to hell" (mīšl-i īn kīrād dālān-i jahannam shudah bāshand) due to the harshness of the weather conditions. When he entered the city and observed the surroundings, he noticed that the buildings that were almost without any planning placed alongside one another. Acting as an "uncongenial patch," the blue dome of either a shrine or a mosque connected the unsightly mud homes neighbouring it (gunbad-i ābī yi ān namāyān gardād kī hānāh-hā-yi gilī mīl -i vaṣlah-yi nājūr būd). In this instance, the patchwork is not meant to cover over a "hole [...] in reality," but to serve as the background of a savagely invasive order. Among the small shops (dukān-hā-yi kūchak) and broken walls (dīvār-hā-yi kharābah) an assemblage was formed consisting of shameless and ill-mannered Arabs with the most unsavory of appearances (dar īnjā izdiḥā-yi mahībī barpā shud: 'Arab-hā-yi pāchah varmālīdah, ṣūrat-hā-yi aḥmaq fīnah bih sar). Like its mismatched backdrop, they appear as an eclectic bunch, speaking a variety of languages. While Persian is spoken without the slightest hindrance or effort (zabān-i Fārsī hāf mīzadand), Turkish is spoken in a distinctly garbled and broken manner (yā Türkī balghūr mīkardand), and Arabic is jutted out from the deepest regions of the throat and intestines (′Arabī az bīkh-i galū va az tū-yi rūdah′hāyishan darmī′amad). Not only does Arabic emerge from the deepest regions of the body, when it emerges from the mouth, the sound waves retain some of the primal physicality of

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982 Hidāyat, "Ṭalab-i Āmurzish," 75.
984 Hidāyat, "Ṭalab-i Āmurzish," 75.
985 Hidāyat, "Ṭalab-i Āmurzish," 75.
986 Hidāyat, "Ṭalab-i Āmurzish," 76.
its origins as it gurgles through the air ("dar havā ghulghul mīzad").\textsuperscript{987} It is almost literally a voice "with flesh and bones,"\textsuperscript{988} where its allegiance to the bubbling movements and fissures of deep internal biology overtakes the subtle and cultured Persian as the latter sits perched up near the opening of the mouth. In between these multitudinal vocalizations and the mismatching urban layout is what may as well be called "the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither"\textsuperscript{989} even though they are not of a lumpen strain. They were all scampering about and using fine-tuned strategies to lure in customers for whatever trinket or service they were offering at the time (\textit{īn jam'īyyat bih anvā'-i gūnāgūn jalb-i mushtarī mīkard}). There was a mourner for hire (\textit{yikī nāwḥāh mīkhvānd}), a chest beater (\textit{yikī sīnah mīzad}), a seller of prayer clays, rosaries, and shrouds for the dead (\textit{yikī muhr va tasbih va kafan-i mutabarrīk mīfurūkht}), a jinn catcher (\textit{yikī jīn mīgīrīfī}), a prayer writer (\textit{yikī du'ā mīnīvīsh}), and a landlord seeking temporary lodgers (\textit{yikī ham khānah kirāyah mīdād}).\textsuperscript{990} Thus, at all three levels—urban layout, language, and social composition—there is a sense of a disorganized patchwork in play. The chaotic melange has multiple layers, one imposed on the other, patches upon patches. These patches, which ostensibly act as appearances hiding an essence, are themselves the essence\textsuperscript{991} of the Arabs.

In the same way that the Arabs in "Ṭalab-i Amurzish" appear to be another tile in the oddly assembled landscape of Karbala, with its inhumane heat, sand-covered alleys, and motley mass of vendors, the narrator of \textit{Būf-i Kūr} sees in the little brother of his promiscuous wife a scruple of the satanic spirit that he saw in her (\textit{durust shabīh-i ān lakkātah būd, va yik tikkah az rūh-i shayṭānī-yi ū rā dāsht}),\textsuperscript{992} and that this enables the boy to become enmeshed in his own landscape. This is immediately made clear when his face is described as being emotionless and without spirit (\textit{az īn šūrat'hā-yi Turkimanī-yi bidūn-i ḥāsāt, bīrūh}),\textsuperscript{993} for such a countenance is not caused by

\textsuperscript{987} Hidāyat, "Ṭalab-i Āmurzish," 76.
\textsuperscript{990} Hidāyat, "Ṭalab-i Āmurzish," 76.
\textsuperscript{991} Hegel, \textit{The Science of Logic}, 339.
\textsuperscript{992} Hidāyat, \textit{Būf-i Kūr}, 165.
\textsuperscript{993} Hidāyat, \textit{Būf-i Kūr}, 165.
enchanted occult beings "whose mischief and mayhem touch all facets of life." Rather, the inanimate face and its rootedness in satanic spirit were caused by a prolonged multi-generational engagement with life as Nature (farākhvur-i zad va khowurd bā zindagi). Rather than being a conversion of man into Nature, the harlot's brother is in actuality an extraction of the Natural expanse, as is evident in the way his mouth tastes like the end of a bitter cucumber (ta'm-i dahanash rā midānīstam, mišl-i ta'mī kūnāh-yi khyār-yi talkh mullāyim būd). In fact, it is even said that the boy was portended by Nature itself (mišl-i in kī haš'at qablan pīsh'bīnī kardah būd) so even though he and his generations fought against Nature, they were also part of its fate, being re-constituted along its lines and becoming integrated in its logic (mišl-i in kih ajdād-i ānhā ziyād zīr-i āftāb va bārān zindagī kardah būdand va bā jabī'at jangīdah būdand va nah tanhā shikl va shanāyil-i khudishān rā bā taghyīrātī bih ānhā dādah būdand, balkah az istiqāmat, az shahvat va ḥirṣ va gurusnigī-yi khudishān bih ānhā bakhshīdah būdand).

While the previous two stories offer readers the notion of an external evil that is integrated with its Natural and physical environment, Ḥājī Āqā presents an instance when a momentary slippage of Satan into the human body for the sake of a fleeting pleasure (khub agar yik vaqt Shaytān zīr-i jildam raftah, barā-yi tafrih būdah) is deemed permissible, even for a self-styled saint (har chī fikr miškā man hīch kār-i badī tu 'umram nakardam: nah 'aqaq'khvur būdam, nah qumārbāz). This adherence to the veneer of the law while permitting illicit encounters with the demonic to proceed, due primarily to the pretext that such moments are trifling at most, reflects a formalism that leaves open the possibility of exploiting loopholes within the juridical edifice and using popular acquiescence to otherwise one-sided laws to further particular interests. This difficulty is raised later on in the story when a statesman (one of "the infernal swine") is lambasted for furthering his interests under the sign of hellish laws (qavānīn-i jahannām-yi in ijtīmā' faqāt barā-yi difā' az manāf'i'-i khūk'hā-yi jahannām-yi afsār gusākhtah-i mišl-i tū durust

994 Awn, Satan's Tragedy and Redemption, 32.
995 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 166.
996 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 161.
997 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 166.
998 Ṣādiq Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā (N.p.: Kitāb'hā-yi Parastū, 1964/5/1343 sh.), 112.
As was the case in the writings of 'Alavī and even state-sponsored reformists, the human ecological factor is introduced when an implicit correlative link is drawn between the laws and the general social environment, for if it were not for an accommodating milieu, the cultivation of such a model of statesmanship would not have been possible (in muḥīṭ-i past-i nangīn ham imṣāl-i tu rā mīpasandad va az tu taqvīyat mīkunad [...] tuf bih muḥīṭi kih tu rā parvarish kardah). Here, Hidāyat is more interested in proving the insoluble depravity and thus fixity of particular interests than their ability to be recognized in universal interest as "substantial spirit." After all, the stateman's growing ailments and thus his quickly approaching death in no way prompt him to veer off his current course (bā vujūdī kih rū bih margī va az dard pīch va tāb mīkhvūrī bāz ham dast'bardār nīstī).

Contrary to the notion that this obstinance is a reflection of the way private passions, as that "river [which] digs itself deeper and deeper into its bed," can conquer even the cessation of life, Hidāyat's intention is to reveal the inherent feebleness of individuals who allow Satan to enter their skin pores (Shayṭān zīr-i jildishānRAFT). In the case of "Vilingārī" (Carelessness) where the author directs his attention to the ruling class and the propagators of ideology, the satanic element is meant to convey a negative form of illumination out of limitation. In other words, Satan's sudden presence reflects the equally abrupt realization that there is a course available to be taken out of their otherwise frightful and precarious existence which not only does not compromise base inclinations, but permits them to run amuck. This is how they are able to persist in their facade of strength while they obscure the reality of their ineptitude and impotence (yik dastah tarsū-yi rashīdnamā kih kār-i ḥisābī az dastishān bar nimīāyad). Through skillful and conniving rhetoric (bā zabānbāzī va pusht-i ham andāzī) ideologues are able to deceive "herds of...\[999\]...\[1000\]...\[1001\]...\[1002\]...\[999\]...\[1000\]...\[1001\]...\[1002\]...\[1003\]...\[1004\]...
mute gladiators" (gallah gallah az īn pahlavānān-i zabān bastah) into fighting in the name of jihād (holy war), shāh (king), mīhan (country), and nizhād (race). This form of inheritance is not the enriched notion of having the past handed down to oneself through oneself as a situated and self-affirmative being, but rather the insipid, infuriating, and ridiculously invasive reproduction of a feebleness that is constantly rescued by the sudden appearance and penetration of Satan.

Notice how this conception of the demonic differs markedly from the one presented by Hidāyat earlier—a demonic that emerges from within as an incessant and torturous pressure. This insistent strain is not only witnessed from the perspective of interiority for it can also be perceived in others, especially when the onlooker either has a certain proclivity towards the experience of such moments or has within him the same but imperceptible tendencies. In Būf-i Kūr, the ethereal woman presented early on in the story is able to lure the narrator to the constitutive inhumanity of her being—the satanic breath. What draws a great deal of the narrator's attention are her eyes, which are said to be magical (jādū), a horrific conjurer (mahīb-i afsūngar), capable of reprimanding with great acridity (miśl-i īn būd kih bih insān sarzanish-i talkhī mīzanad), agitated (muṭtarib), surprised (muti'ajjib), threatening (tahdīd kunandah), and promising (va'dah dahnadah), all as one oddly-fitted patchwork. Her eyes act both as a promise and a horrific conjurer in that they are capable of luring him to "terrifying and supernatural spectacles" that she

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1005 Šādiq Hidāyat, "Vilingārī," 154.
1006 Šādiq Hidāyat, "Vilingārī," 78.
1007 “The finitude of existence thus seized upon tears one back out of endless multiplicity of possibilities offering themselves nearest by—those of comfort, shirking and taking things easy—and brings Da-sein to the simplicity of its fate. This is how we designate the primordial occurrence of Da-sein that lies in authentic resoluteness in which it hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility that it inherited and yet has chosen." See Heidegger, Being and Time, 351.
1008 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 12.
1009 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 18
herself was at that moment perceiving (bā chishm'hāyash manāẓir-i tarsnāk va māvar-yi ṭabī'ī didah būd). In this moment the narrator is able to "fix [...] in his mind" the features of the ethereal being insofar as she is witnessing a dimension that he is incapable of glimmering within himself. At one moment, the eyes come to be grounded within the narrator's being as a highly luminescent and meaningful source of attraction that can help guide his life (partaw-i zindagī-yi man rū-yi īn gūy'hā-yi barrāq-i pur'ma'nī mamzūj va dar tah -i ān jaẕb shud ), but it is also a mirror (āyanah-yi jaẕāb) that can transport the narrator's being to a place beyond meaning and human thought (hamah hastī-yi marā tā ānjā'ī kaih fikr-i bashar 'ājiz ast bih khvudash kishūd). Even though it is mentioned that very few people have been able to witness this beyond (har kasī nimītavānist bibīnad), what is striking is the way that this meaningful experience of the meaningless is not so much in regard to an external phenomenon, but precisely the internal pressure that is constantly building-up. While at times a "relieved pressure from within [is ...] exchanged [...] for oppression from without," here externality is simply a placeholder for internal pulsations, such as the vississitudes of a fully ensconced satanic breath. After all, later on the narrator is forced to admit that her eyes were able to cut through his corporeality to access crimes of which he himself was unaware (misl-ī īn kih az man gunāh-hā-yi pūzish-i nāpaẓīrī sarzadah būd kih khvudam nimīdānistam).

What is the Nature of the above-mentioned satanic breath and its relation with the ethereal woman's visions of a dread-inducing supernaturalism? This is clarified in "S.G.L.L.,” a science-fiction tale set in a world where there is no room left for archaic desires and the troubles associated with a Nature beyond human consumption and control. Here, the stunning beauty of a woman is thought to be made possible when "her soul was breathed into either by Satan or a supernatural divine force" (nafas-i shayṭānī va yā quvah-yi māfawq-i khudā'tī dar ān rūh damīdah

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1010 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 19.
1012 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 18-9.
1014 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 58.
While Satan's breath is capable of infusing the soul with a radicalized inclination toward vice, the breath of the divine is the key ingredient to life itself. What is curious about the ambiguity surrounding Hidāyat's indecision is that there is something about the Nature of the breath that is reflected in the woman's complete immobility and indifference (nigāhash tīrah bidūn-i mayl, bidūn-i irādah va ḥarikātash mānand-i 'arūsak-i qashangī būd). However, the confusion may be wholly justified when the woman is understood to be an instance of movement within immobility, where a brimming divine vitality emerges from a seemingly inanimate object. Alongside "wax-work figures, ingeniously constructed dolls and automata," her statuette-like appearance protrudes into one's perspectival field in its mode of self-contradiction—as a hyper agile jinn or fairy (ḥālat-i qashangī kih bih khvudash gīrīfţah būd bīshtar ū rā shabīh-i yik ādam maşnūţī yā yik 'arūsak kardah būd — ādamī kih mumkin ast dar khvāb bibīnand va yā dar maşal 'hā va afsānah'hā-yi jīn va parī taşavvur bıkunand ū rā jīlvah mūdād). Closely reminiscent of Nature in terms of its immense immovability and lethal but arbitrary aggression, the woman expresses a sense of eternal indifference to human presence (nah khushṭāl bi naţar miţāmad va nah ghamnāk). Although it appears that she might be divine, there is nevertheless "something cold and monstrous about her."

The same features are equally noticeable in the figure of Mihrdād in "'Arūsak-i Pusht-i Pardah" (Puppet Behind the Curtain), especially the moment when he is walking down a bustling street. Here, the character saunters along as if he were the only person present, being clearly incognizant of his surroundings (bī ānkih kasī rā dar rāh bibīnand va yā mutivajjah-i čīzī bishavad).

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1017 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 267.
1021 Žiţek, Living in the End Times, 104.
Going beyond the temporal legislators, policy designers, politicians, or apologetic ideologues who have their farcical showcase of vigor amplified and thus fortified by sudden satanic partnership, here something radically different takes place. Rather than being encouraged to lead simpletons into battles for the sake of advancing personal interests, Mihrdād is reduced to a cardboard cutout or a statue without a soul or will (mišl-i ādam-i muqavvā‘ī, mišl-i mujassamah-yi bīrūh va bī’irādah rāh mīraft). Compared to the "survivors" of the satanic encounter who simply had their base inclinations heightened, Mihrdād is in this moment dehumanized and detached from all inclination. In doing so, he "discharges the survivors of authority" the moment Satan appears to have captured his soul (mišl-i ādamī kih shayṭān rūhash rā taskhīr kardah bāshad).

What is implied in Hidāyat's occasional reference to depersonalization and dehumanization is that past a certain limit (such as when Mihrdād appeared as a cardboard cutout), the human dimension dissolves into the singularity of the satanic breath. In Būf-i Kūr, the narrator speaks of not worrying about having his will drafted (āyā maqsūdam nivishtan-i vašīyat’nāmah ast?) because he does not have property that can be seized by the court, nor even a religion that can be pillaged by Satan (nah māl dāram kih dīvān bikhvurad va nah dīn dāram kih shayṭān bibarad). The logic of the statement implies an evil that is capable of outliving human biological life, the material restraints of property, along with the bounds of established religion. Here, it is not enough to simply say that "man finds [primordial] evil and continues it [...] as sinner" but that evil in its originary mode, antecedent to order, outlives the known world. And in outliving the the known world, evil's embodiment remains silent and withdrawn. This is made evident in "Āfarīngān" (The Requiem) with its depiction of the afterlife in a Zoroastrian setting. Taking place in tower of silence (dakhmah) where the dead are left to decompose and have their putrid flesh plucked at and eaten by vultures and other scavenging birds, the protagonist Zarbānū is the newest addition among an entire roster of deceased Iranians (jasad-i zarbānū tanhā miyān-i

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1026 Hidāyat, Būf-i Kūr, 68.
ustukhān'hā va gūsht'hā-yi tajzīyah shudah-yi murdigān-i dakhmah-yi khāmūshī sipurdah shud). 1028 One of the earliest moments of the story involves one of Zarbānū's neighbours complaining over how Ahrīman is supposedly tormenting him (ahrīman-i badkār az man chīh mīkhvāhad?). He goes on to bemoan the presence of a multitude of demons who apparently appeared out of nowhere (dīv'hā, chiqadr dīv! īnḥā dīgār kujā būdand?). 1029 This, of course, is the classic religious interpretation of what a soul will endure immediately after death—the familiar shock and awe of having religious narratives recounted in temporal existence come to fruition. However, Nāzparī, another occupant of the tower, later intervenes to say that the man is insane (īn mard dīvānah ast), 1030 thus pointing analysis in a peculiar direction. This is not simply an instance of a person speaking to a deceased individual while forgetting that the latter has actually withered away, 1031 or the more bizarre notion that a dead person is unaware of his own passing. 1032 Rather, in "Āfarīngān" Zarbānū's anonymous neighbour knows full well that he is dead, but thinks of the afterlife as if he were living. Nāzparī does not miss the complete absurdity of this position when she mentions how he is the laughing stock of the small group (yik haftah bīshtar ast kīh mā az ḥarf'hā va ḥarakāt-i ā kāyf mīkunīm). 1033 The person is, in fact, in a dazed postmortem dream state in which he imagines his condition to be defined by earthly norms, where it is possible to imagine the soul's journey through different tiers of the afterlife (gāhī khīyāl mīkunad dar kirūsīmān ast, gāhī dar hamistīgān ast va gāhī ham dar dūzakh ast). 1034

One of the goals of "Āfarīngān" is thus to underscore the notion that the evil that persists after the known world is gone is not that which has been circumscribed by normative religious creed. In order to locate the actual essence of embodied evil, one must simply allude to Zarbānū's earlier

1029 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 102.
1030 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 103.
1031 See Breuer and Freud, "Studies on Hysteria."
1033 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 103.
1034 The transliteration of this word might be off.
1035 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 103.
question: "Are we in hell" (āyā dar dūzakh hastīm)? This uncertainty is revealing in that the doubt itself is symptomatic of the defining feature of hell during the period in which Hidāyat is writing. The infernal is the indifferent Nature that imposes itself as both a lifeless immobile mass and a devastatingly destructive but arbitrary aggressor. By allowing Zarbānū's anonymous neighbour to regurgitate the Zoroastrian fantasy of what will cross the mind of a deceased transgressor of the holy law, Hidāyat is revealing to the reader that he is more conscious of the precise structure of evil than even those who have passed on. The issue is tackled head on when Zarbānū asks Nāzparī whether all the concepts of the afterlife preached by Zoroastrian clerics of the temporal order are in essence farcical and without any veritable basis (ya'nī mīkhvāhī bigū'ī kih amshāspānān, īzānān, fīrishtgān, dūzakh, hamistigān, kirūsimān va hamah-yi īnhā durūgh ast?). She responds woefully, expressing how the disillusioned among them had at one time or another believed in the substantiality of such nomenclature, but have now come to realize the true Nature of the afterlife (afsūs, mā ham rūzigārī bāvar mīkardīm!). In the midst of their conversation, an astonished Zarbānū questions whether Nāzparī is in fact an agent of Ahrīman who is intent upon coaxing her into believing that concepts such as dūzakh and Ahrīman are non-existent (tū kih az țaraf-i Ahrīman nīstī? tū kih nayāmadah'ī marā gūl bizanī?), but what she does not truly grasp is that the eternal monotony of the afterlife, regret over lost chances in life, the irreparable disconnect from loved ones, and the tormenting stagnation of stillnessness are components of Ahrīman's revealed face. Rather than having sent Nāzparī for the task of deluding those who are new to the tower of silence, Ahrīman is actually divulging himself as he is beyond the characteristics given to him by normative Zoroastrian mores. He is the "boundless world, everywhere full of suffering, with its infinite past and infinite future." Nāzparī elaborates upon this position by speaking of the insignificance of man in his confrontation with the cosmos and the limits of his thoughts up against this immensity (dunyā bih qadr-i fikr-ī ādam'hā maḥdūd nīst. tū gumān mīkunī kih ādamīzād-i kūchak va bīchārah bā zindagi-yi pastī kih rū-yi zamīn kardah, marg va zindagi, hastī va yā nīštīyash dar dunyā ta'šírī dārad?).

1036 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 103.
1037 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 104.
1038 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 379.
1039 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 104.
Like the state's hope in eradicating the darkness of its origins all throughout its existence, there is a sense of hope attached to the living in "Āfarīngān" that, when expressed by the dead, seems wholeheartedly absurd and delusional. The living can at least be optimistic for what the afterlife holds (rū-yi zamīn yik umīd-i farār hast ān ham marg ast, marg! valī īnjā dīgar marg ham nīst)! 1040 However, this is ultimately self-defeating because the living are susceptible to dragging optimism with them into the afterlife. The message that the story is trying to convey is that Zarbānū's experience of losing faith in the "cognitive forms of the phenomenal world"1041 should take place while one is living so that when one enters the afterlife, the shock of being condemned to the whims of "a blind will" (mā maḥkūmīm, mīshinavī, maḥkūm-i yik irādah-yi kūr hastīm)1042 would be non-existent. The protagonist's surprise over the fact that the conflict of opinions present in lived sociality has spilled over into the afterlife (dar īnjā ham magar ikhtilāf-i fikr va 'aqīdah hast?)1043 reflects her incognizance of Nature's own "conflicting purposes"1044 and how it is this Nature that is the definitive mark of this infernal afterlife. It is in this context that the thought arises that no one actually transforms into demons or angels upon death (ya'nī kasī nah firishtah mīshavad va nah dīv).1045 Rather, one is left to contemplate the process of being degenerated into Nature's embrace. Only later does Zarbānū come to realize this important point and as she does, she is forced to admit that they are all in hell (pas hālā fahmīdam mā hamah mān gunāhkārīm va dar dūzakh hastīm), 1046 irrespective of their moral conduct in life.

The eternal contemplation of Nature begins with its seductive bearing. Its temptation intensifies when in man the "reflection of the eternal, primal pain, the only ground of the world"1047 heightens to the point where Nature's voice becomes audible. Showcased vividly in "Bun'bast"

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1040 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 105.
1042 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 105.
1043 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 106.
1044 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 115.
1045 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 106.
1046 Hidāyat, "Āfarīngān," 108.
(Dead End), its seduction becomes palpable for the main character, Sharīf, when for him the world loses its colourful lustre (تَأَذَّرْ رَعَى دُنْيَا-يَذِي زَاهِرَ بِیرانگ و مَهْو بِنَازَر-ی شَرِیف جَیلَه مَیکَارَراه). Different from the dour and bleak reality that obscures the "sky of wilāyat" in Iranian Sufism, the veil of darkness that is thrown over Sharīf's perception (میِّل-ی وَقِب کِیه هَمَاه چَی زِه از پُشته-ی پَرْدَه-ی کیدیر-ی دُود میِّبَناد) prompts death's redemptive signpost to emerge in the form of the tumultuous sea. All he wants is to die and allow the sea's thrashing waves to announce his utter worthlessness by whipping him about until he finally comes to rest near the shore (یمِّخْوِه‌ی کیه بیمیراد و باًد از چَنْد سَعَت، اَب-ی دارَیُه تَی-ی ی رَا [...] کینَار-ی سَاهَل بیِّیاندَزٌاد). In this way, the sea is representative of "the world tribunal, the Last Judgement," that entity which dictated the fates of both his friend and his son by swallowing them whole. As Sharīf stands adjacent to the rolling tide, a "spellbinding and sad humming once against commences" (دُبِّرَاه زِمَزَیمَه‌ی افَسْنَگ و گَهمَنَک-ی خوِد رَا شُرِّعَی بِکونَاد). The mysterious force (غوْوَه-ی مَرمُوِیز) that was once used by occult demonic agencies to lure susceptible individuals into a pact that would bestow them control over the forces of Nature is now expressed in and through one of these forces. However, instead of luring Sharīf into illusion, the thrashing demonic waves were actually offering to obliterate misguided human hopes and misfortunes (بِه سَعَ-ی وَقِب هَمَاه-ی بَدباکُتْی‌هَا رَا میِّهِشُوَت و اَرِیزُها-ی مَوْهُم-ی زِیندَگی رَا بَا خوِدَوُش میِّبَرد میِّکیشَانَاد). The source of delusion has now become the locus of salvation and redemption. The dark sea was calling out to him as it tugged him closer and

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1050 Hidāyat, "Bun'bast," 59.

1051 Hidāyat, "Bun'bast," 59.

1052 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 378.

1053 Hidāyat, "Bun'bast," 59.


1055 Hidāyat, "Bun'bast," 59.
closer into its embrace (ṣidā-yi mawj’hā bīkh-i gūshash zimzimah mīkard: ‘bīyā... bīyā...’ āb-i tīrah-yi daryā ā rā bi sū-yi khvudash mīkhvānd). Unfortunately for Ḥidāyat, he was generally unwilling to ruminate over the possibility of dying in and through the demonic in creating a novel lifeform. This being so, he was nevertheless aware of how a character such as Sharīf had an inclination towards "retreat[ing] into himself, [and] recogniz[ing] himself and the world."  

In retreating towards inwardness, there is at times a mindful recognition of the way internal life is associated with the iniquities of the thrashing waves we observed above. In essence, the retreat into the self and away from the thrashing waves is identical to walking into the waves because the subject has "reflected into itself" the daunting immensity of the sea as having always been there. In his "Tārik’khānah" (Dark Room), Hidāyat evinces this detail in unequivocal terms when he makes the narrator speak of how he yearns to be like wild creatures in the winter who burrow into the earth for shelter (mīkhvāstam miṣ-i jūnivarā-yi zimistānī tū sūlākhī furū biram). Of course, this does not mean that he literally desires to join the wild creatures in their seasonal practices. Rather, the narrator wishes to burrow into the darkness of the world as it exists within him (tū tārīkī-yi khvudam ghūṭahvar bisham va dar khvudam qavām bīyām). While most seek to escape this realm (amā hamīshah mardum sa’y dāran az īn tārīkī va inzivā farār bikunan), he considers it the most valuable component of his being (ḥālā pay burdam kih pur arzishtarīn gismat-i man hamīn tārīkī, hamīn sukūt būdah). Everyone is said to be in possession of this inner darkness (īn tārīkī dar nahād-i har junbandah’ī hast) but that it only comes into view when the appearances of phenomenal reality are escorted to the side (vakhtī kih az dunyā-yi zāhirī kinārah gūrū mīkunīm bih mā zāhir mīshah). Besides equating the creature's burrowing into the world

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1056 Hidāyat, "Bun’bast," 59.
1057 "Death itself is not extinction, is not a return to inorganic lifelessness, but the beginning of a new kind of existence which lies on the path of development to something higher." See Sigmund Freud, "The Future of an Illusion," in SE XXI, 5-56.
1058 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 419.
1061 Ṣādiq Hidāyat, "Tārik'khānah," 134.
with the human's inward retreat, "Tārīk'khānah" is also able to equate Ahrīman's externally based intrusion into the human body with the awakening of internal instinctual drives (intiẓār-i furūd-i Ahrīman ru dāram, mīkhvām hamūntawrī kih hastam dar khvudam bīdār bisham). In performing this move, Hidāyat is able to assimilate different modes of demonic directionality that reflected varying epochal traditions, the modern interest in internal drives and the pre-modern fixation on external sources of corruption.

A syncretism of this sort did not leave the concepts of demonism unaltered. In "Zindah bih Gūr," for instance, the impulse to die—which emerges from an internal demonism—has such a powerful hold on man that if it is not willing to augment itself and permit cessation, no external source of closure, whether it be in the form of cyanide (sīyānūr khvurdam dar man asarg nakard) or opium (taryāk khvurdam bāz ham zindah'am!), can determine the moment of death. The impulse to die, as the new form of demonism, is indefatigable in its obstinance. Even if a demon from the past, in the form of a dragon, were to emerge and determine that the man in whom the impulse to die remains unagitated or relaxed is better off dead, his lashings would have absolutely no effect (agar izhdiḥā ham marā bizanad, izhdiḥā mīmīrad!). When the locus of fear is transferred over to internal psycho-somatic processes, the demons that were once thought to cause great distress withdraw from "the cause-and-effect world." To compound the difficulty faced by more traditional conceptions of the demonic, there are times when cognition actively assists impulse in its whimsical striving. Take the narrator's comments on fortune telling for example. While previously uninterested in superstitious practices, there is a specific reason why he now has a new predilection for the movements of the occult (chand rūz būd kih bā varaq fāl migiriftam, nimīdānam chiṭawr shudah būd kih bih khurāfāt itiqād paydā kardah būdam). Instead of using his power of rationality to discipline or filter the inner impulses, he utilizes his cognitive powers in the pursuit of an activity that completely conforms to these inner impulses. Moreover,

1062 Šādiq Hidāyat, "Tārīk'khānah," 135.
1063 Hidāyat, "Zindah bih Gūr," 35.
1064 Hidāyat, "Zindah bih Gūr," 35.
he declares that this is all that he could do (ya'nī kār-i dīgarī nadāshtam, kār-i dīgarī nimītavānīstam bukunam).1067 The certainty of chance inherent in fortune telling with its gambling of the future (mīkhvāstam bā āyandah-yi khvudam qumār bizam)1068 coheres with, enables, and facilitates the inner impulses in their arbitrary striving. He constantly re-dealt himself the cards to the point where the result perfectly aligned with the internal striving (niyāt kardam kih kalak-i khvud rā bikanam, khūb āmad),1069 thus through an "empty gesture"1070 cementing the unity of occultism and internal pulsation.

Neither through combat, supplication, or fortitude,1071 but rather by relocating the accent of occult power to man's inner world of pressures and pulsations, can the prowess once attributed to the traditional notion of demonic artifice be reduced to match its value. Evident in many figurative uses of the demonic as a way to devalue another entity by way of association, there was an implicit recognition that while the demonic may in its functioning misguide humans, it is not worth it to remain aloof because of the added risk of misfortune that may befall the wretched soul as a result of divine planning. This may appear to contradict 'Alavi's observation that the demonic is located in capital but not so, for while the leftist author couples the two as a way to express the occult powers of capital (such as spontaneous reproduction), the figurative usage that is being referred to here treats the association of the two as a sign of inevitable or already secured devaluation. This can be seen in Ḥājī Āqā where after stripping the nation of its being (hamah-yi hastī-yi mamlikat rā bālā kishīd), stealing the monarchical jewels (javāhirāt-i saḻāratī rā duzdīd), and taking irreplaceable antiques with him ('atīqah´hā rā bā khvudash burd), the so-called great leader of the nation (qā'id-i 'ażīm al-sh'an [i.e., Rizā Shāh]) left behind only his portraits as they were once hung on the walls of homes, administrative offices, and public spaces (ḥālā yik musht 'aks-i rangīn-i khvudash rā tū-yi dast-i mardum bi yādgār gužashtah).1072 Now

1070 Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, 151.
1072 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 131.
that he has left after abdicating, the symbolic power of these images has become void and they are no longer among the images that "swarm [...] commonplace existence."

In fact, they are not worth more than the cursed Satan (bih la’nat-i Shayṭān nimārzah). In "Ābjī Khānum," the process of devaluation is taken further when practices of divine worship and beseechment—which are normally posed as being the polar opposite of the demonic—are collapsed into infernal worthlessness (hamah-yi ŭn namāz va rūzah ‘hāyāt bih la’nat-i Shayṭān nimārzad).

Hidāyat's uniqueness is locatable in his ability to allow the demonic as "the world as it is before the human imagination begins to work on it" to interact with man at his most nihilistic moment. This is the juncture when the taboo against a false hopefulness is transgressed, allowing the evil power to take "its vengeance by casting a spell over the wrong-doer." However, the spell is revelatory and persuasive. In "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kusht," when Huşayn 'Alī was at his weakest due to his failing ascetic regimen and "disgust with his own pathetic disability," as well as his disillusionment over the credibility of his spiritual guide (murshid), Shaykh Abū al-Fażl, "a demon or dragon awoke within him" (vik dīv yā izhdihā dar ŭ bīdār shudah būd). In the midst of his exhaustion and thirst (khastah, tishnah) the emergent fiend within injures and poisons him (ū rā payvastah majrūḥ va masmūm mīkard), but the implication of Hidāyat's prose is that the poison quenches Huşayn 'Alī's thirst in a moment of "demonic epiphany, where [he] see[s] or [has a] glimpse [into] the undisplaced demonic vision" that emerges from within. The anger evident on his face (ṣūrat-i ‘aṣabānī) is overdetermined by an impassive blemish in

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1075 Hidāyat, "Ābjī Khānum," 79.


1077 See Freud, "Totem and Taboo."


1079 Hidāyat, "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kusht," 143.


1081 Hidāyat, "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kusht," 143.
that it includes his wide open and expressionless eyes (chishm'hā-yi bāz va bī ḥālat). He is aimless in that he blankly stares out into the sky (nigāh-i ū dar faṣā gum shudah būd) but this is predicated upon a certain "pressure felt at the base of his brain" (fishārī dar tah-i maghz-i khvudash his mīkard) which spread throughout his face (az ānjā tā zīr-i pīshānī va šaqlqah'hāyash mī'āmad va mīyān-i abrū'hā-yi ū rā chīn andākhtah būd). 1082 Although the demonic pressure emanates from within, pressing against every sinew, blood vessel, and bone, the pain that is beyond the realm of humanity (dard'hā-yi māfawq-i bashar his kardah būd) is also the basis of philosophical truth (dard'hā-yi falsafī rā kih barā-yi tūdah-yi mardum vujūd-i khārifī nadārad mīdānist) 1083 and "the enhancement of the species." 1084 The pain is synonymous with the emptiness of Huṣayn 'Alī's hands after an entire life of searching for meaning (az ḥāṣi-l-i 'umr chīst dar dastam? hīch!) 1085—it is the pain of nothingness. The "flickering of nothingness" 1086 that was once the effect of consciousness acting upon the world has become cataclysmically immense, to the point where the end resembles the point of origin. In the midst of the infernal pressures of an arbitrary Nature during the 1910s and early 20s, the hope in authoritarian reform and the reprobation of an omnipresent demonism through a secularized nationalist religion of statism only turned out to be palliative. Through the psychological and existential struggles of his literary characters, Hidāyat was able to bring to conscious life how not only reformist optimism failed to extinguish an uncontainable conception of demonism, it actually participated in its perpetuation. Huṣayn 'Alī's suicide is quite simply a conscious absorption into the throbbing and pressurized demonism existing as the substratum of the period's ideological support system.

In the post-abdication work Ḥājī Āqā, what is observable is an inchoate shift towards a new demonological paradigm, as was evinced above in 'Alavī's early 1940s writings as well. No longer

1082 Hidāyat, "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kushṭ," 143.
1083 Hidāyat, "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kushṭ," 143.
1084 "We think that hardness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and the heart, life in hiding, stoicism, the art of experiment and devilry of every kind, that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents, serves the enhancement of the species 'man' as much as its opposite does." See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 54-5.
1085 Hidāyat, "Mardī kih Nafs rā Kushṭ," 143.
present is the epiphanic demonism emanating from within and its subsequent reception. Here, the necessity of reimposing an enchanted holism upon the world is underscored as a means to restricting the diffusion of movements associated with Iran's northern neighbour, the Soviet Union (mītavānīm jilī-yi īn junbīsh 'hā-yi tāzah kih az ūraft-i hamsāyah-yi shumālī bi īnjā sirāyat kardah bigīrīm). The return of a premodern pneumatological order with its variegated forms of enchantment, occultism, and superstition is in part made possible through the intentional contracting of ghouls for socially incendiary activities (ba'd ham yik narrah ghūl bar īshān mītarāshīm tā īn daf'ah ḥisābī pidarishān rā dar biyārah). Here, the ghoul becomes functional and partisan, characteristics that were rare if not inconceivable during the 1920s and 30s with its basis in a lawless demonic Nature. It can also be considered a strategic necessity to form bonds with devils and jinn as a way to perpetuate socio-economic norms (dar šūrat-i luzūm mā bā ajinah va shayātīn ham dast bi yikī khvāhīm shud tā naguzārīm važ ūyyat 'avaż bishah) because without them the existential basis of an entire class would become obsolete (ʻavaż shudan-i jāmī'ah ya'nī marg-i mā va amšāl -i mā). While early-Pahlavī Nature helped to establish a specific texture to reality that aided in ideological coherence, class formation, subjective constitution, and the like, this was considered to be an inadvertent consequence of the epoch's chaotic origins. In Ḥājī Āqā, the creation of actuality is iterated after an alliance is brokered between traditional class privileges and the demonic. It is this pact which leads to a reality inundated with qamah'zans (individuals who self-lacerate their heads as a way of mourning for the martyrdom of Imām Ḥusayn), sīnah'zans (individuals who engage in mourning rituals through chest beating), bāfūr'khūnahs (opium houses), jin'gūrī, rawzah'khvānī, tikyahs (religious theatres), ḥusaynīyahs (establishments where mourning rituals are held), ākhunds (clerics), chāgū'kishs (those who carry knives around and are easily provoked), along with anti-unveiling speeches and sermons (nutq va maw'azah bar zidd-i kashf-i hijāb).

Rizā Shāh's departure in many ways allowed a few features of the miasmic 1910s and early 20s to resurface in variable form, including the reoccupation of the country by British and Russian forces; restriction of civic engagement in the shaping of Iran's future leadership; economic

1087 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 202.
1088 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 202.
1089 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 202-3.
adversity due to crippling inflationary spikes, wealth imbalances, intensifying class antagonisms, and the like; renewed political contestations between several groupings, including courtiers, the ulama, parliamentarians, remnants of tribal leadership, and land magnates; distrust of royal authority, and return to what modernists considered an archaic religiosity. Even though these parallels existed alongside a sense of ontological fragmentation, there was little indication of an inevitable determinism behind the abdication or the spiraling course of the nation. As such, from repetition difference is drawn and demonism becomes wrenched from its earlier ontological basis. Now, rather than perpetuating evil by trying to subvert it, the demonic is presented as an indispensible ally in the reconstitution of reality. In fact, political exigency necessitates the reformulation of actuality. No sense of goodness is being advocated—simply the will to preserve a clique's traditional standing in society.

As was seen with 'Alavī, the use of demonic nomenclature in Ḥājī Āqā's speech is explicitly connected to political strategy and calculation. In order to preserve the interests of established merchants and landowners, reality must enter a regressive course in which the Pahlavī state's techno-social exorcisms can be reversed. Utilizing nefarious agencies as facilitators, social practices, palliative methods, and technologies are once again ingrained within

1090 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 172.
1092 Moazami, State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran, 44.
1094 Katouzian, "State and Society under Reza Shah," 34.
1096 "The role of the imagination, or the mind which contemplates in its multiple and fragmented states, is to draw something new from repetition, to draw difference from it." See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 76.
1097 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 203.
1099 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 203.
moral and demonological matrices (chirā davā-yi farangī bikhvurand kih jigarishān dāghūn bishah, chirā chirāgh-i barq bisūzānand kih ikhtirā-ī shayṭānī-yi farangī ast?). By having the traditionalist Shīʿi critique emerge after years of state-driven censorship during a time when various burgeoning social movements were vying for legitimacy, its rhetoric is deemed inauthentic, purely utilitarian, and thus lacking any coherent or admissible history. By endorsing the spread of rumours such as the idea that the radio is actually the Anti-Christ's mule (miśl-i daf'ah-yi qabl kih shuhrat dādīd rādiyaw hamān khar-i dajjālah kih yik chism bih pīshānī dārah va az har tār-i sīmī hizārān šidā mūdah va az īn qabīl chūz'āā), the possibility of rebooting the world back to its pre-modern and primitive pneumatological basis will be further advanced because not only do nefarious agencies help to reconstitute the enchanted lifeworld, the demonic returns in its symbolic or vernacular intensity as well.

This final chapter of the study can be summarized and concluded in the following way:

(i) By way of the psychoanalytic focus on libidinal economy and unconscious pressures as the interiorization of an inexorable Nature, (a) Hidāyat is able to formulate the engenderment of traditional scions of evil as a symptom of sexual frustration. (b) The emergence of the internal demon, whether through sexual excitation or frustration, is at times deemed exterminable, but in contrary to the traditional and theosophical ascetic approach to the demonic nafs as open to purification, the attempt to expunge Hidāyat's internal demon is simultaneously suicidal. (c) Contravening the Islamic prohibition on suicide is considered the greatest of virtues. Rather than move from divine mercy (life) to eternal hellfire (death), suicide permits a movement away from the persistent affliction of demonic pressures (life) to the plane of disburdened non-existence (death).

(ii) When deadlocks at the centre of psychological life remain unresolved, sometimes, rather than have internal demons emerge, objects of phenomenal life are transformed into nefarious beings through projections and displacements. (a) On the one hand, this is constitutes a process of alienation that attempts to create a fissure between demonic beings and their internal origins, but

1100 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 203.
1101 Hidāyat, Ḥājī Āqā, 204.
(b) on the other, their instantiation within the world allows the figures of demonomy to be experienced the way a beautiful and stimulating theatre performance can be experienced.

(iii) Whether a result of being thrown into the world from a place of interiority or actually originating from a pernicious external source, demonic aggressivity can result in a withdrawal into the inner subjective domain. (a) The chaotic patchwork that is withdrawn from is not an appearance that conceals a simple undifferentiated essence, but is rather a disturbing and invasive disruption of this dichotomy. (b) This layered configuration of depthlessness is reflected in Nature and its multitudinal arrangement. (c) As one of its layers, the anthropoidal figuration of this depthless Nature is on the one hand racialized, and on the other, characterized by a disenchanted demonism.

(iv) Here, elements from movements (ii) and (iii) are present by virtue of the way (a) Hidāyat makes it permissible to experience the beauty of demonic Nature in its external situatedness. This differs from the observation that (b) formal or one-sided adherence to the law can result in a pleasurable encounter with the demonic. Here, the traditional motif of bodily intrusion by spirits is upheld as being a consequence of feebleness, unethical conduct and the furtherance of private interests.

(v) When demonic Nature or its anthropoidal layer are encountered externally, it is quickly realized that (a) they are related to internal pressures and crimes hidden from even the self. As noted in the previous movement, this piercing quality differs from the traditional motif of being afflicted with occult spirits, for there are in this instance revelatory, guiding, and revolutionary aspects to the encounter. (b) Hidāyat's portrayal of Nature recycles attributes observed earlier in the study with respect to late-Qājār disorder: movement within immobility, indifference in the midst of arbitrary aggression, the hum of vitality in soullessness, the life of evil beyond life, the distortion of cognitive mapping and a withdrawn obtrusiveness. (c) Building off of (a), it is clearly remarked that Ahrīmanic death as incessant thought within eternal idleness differs from death as a narrative entry into a second life. Hence, death within demonic Nature is differentiated from death within Islamic discourse. (d) In the external encounter with Nature, the optimism of eternal life should give way to the satisfaction of thinking eternally of withering away in Nature. In this way, false optimism is restricted from following one into the afterlife when one hears Nature's voice.
(vi) As a direct consequence of the previous movement, the return to inwardness is conceived as being equivalent to walking into Nature insofar as this interiority is a reflection of Nature. The movement into this demonism makes impotent both modern and pre-modern embodiments of evil and morbidity (from dragons to cyanide). The devaluation evident here reflects the way demonism is deployed in a figurative way to debase objects it is associated with.
Chapter 8
Epilogue

Returning to the introduction of this study, if it can be remarked that Khumaynî's Shayṭān-i buzurg is a descendent of the bachah(-yi) Shayṭān, the Ahrīmanic tufang, the literary anthropoidal demon, and other identified demoniacal conceptions, as they are expressions of an inquiry into the contingency of Nature, then the hostage crisis, which served as such a pivotal mantle piece of the 1979 revolution, can be observed as the first major incursion into a tangibly analyzable fragment of a fully reified demonism. This leads to what may be rendered a new demonological science in accordance with the hitherto two century development of a modern Iranian demonology. What warrants this claim is the way the rehabilitation, erasure or diremption of the demonic was subordinated to the study of the United States (through the mapping out of the embassy complex, the interrogation of the hostages and the analysis of shredded confidential files) as a contingent and thus unpredictable demonic power. Of course, this is not based on Khumaynî's direct intentionality or the internal logic of Shī'ī thought, but what the epithet Shayṭān-i buzurg only provides us obliquely. This dissertation presented to the reader an integral moment in the development of this term outside its pragmatic ideologization. Sanctioned demonological (dīvshināsī) or satanological (Shayṭānshināsī) texts in Iran today are lacking in that they regurgitate traditionalist categories, observations and theoretical structures because their authors misperceived the undergirding fabric or "fundamental arrangement"\textsuperscript{1102} of Khumaynî's utterance.

The following step in this investigation is to further demarcate the cluster of distinctive moments, or "the threshold of a new positivity,"\textsuperscript{1103} that allowed Nature to become an object of knowledge through the demonological. The germinative process that ensued has in part contributed to the contemporary theocratic determination of what aspects of the demonic can be construed as harnessable, usable, and consumable by the Islamic nation and what will remain abhorrent and subject to derision. In this sense there is a definitive sense of pre- and post-revolutionary discursive consistency that was partially explicated in the current inquiry. Here, I attempted to


\textsuperscript{1103} Foucault, \textit{The Order of Things}, xxv.
explore multiple synchronous strategies utilized during a momentous period of state-led national consolidation, the most advanced of which was Hidāyat's conscious engagement. Khumaynī was, in a sense, "caught" in the same epistemological order Hidāyat's demonology inhabited, but his Shaytān-i buzurg is the result of a differently arranged algorithm based off of hardly stalwart rules.

Indeed, a crucial question to ask is how it became possible for theocratic institutions to deliberate over and even contemplate an engagement with the demonic outside the mode of cosmological antagonism tradition has so graciously bequeathed us. The theocracy has only partially delegated to itself the task assigned to the Shi'ī clergy of yore, that is, to safeguard the faithful through the repulsion of all that is morally repugnant. The primary objective now is the specialized determination of how best to incorporate the demonic into the communal realm to serve as the vehicle of divine reason. The response to the argument that public consciousness has become disinvested of its interest in Satan due to the neoliberal dissolution of boundaries, which thus annuls the latter's source of staying power, is partially correct in its appreciation of demonological historicity (though it commits the classic ideological occlusion of dislocated boundaries and nodes of struggle), but by suggesting that the satanic has become privatized as an internal self-cultivating moment of conflict and passage it implicitly reassures us of the persistence of the traditional episteme. Historical examination reveals how the demonological came to embody a deracinated world devoid of sense or meaning. In this dissertation I gave expression to this new reality through the appointment of the word 'Nature' and in the reviewed literature, there were many instances when natural forces came to reflect the de-narrativized order. Of course, it is almost predictable that there will be those who wish to "isolate the new against the background of permanence" by suggesting that the chaotic dimension of Nature is the return of the magus' Ahrīman, but the difference between reminescence and reduplication

1104 Foucault, The Order of Things, 48.
1106 Kazemi, "Religious intellectualism, globalization, and social transformation in Iran," 229.
must be stressed. Even if one were dealing with an instance of duplication (which is not the case here), the "field of use" involved should be taken into full account.

When the demonic came to be associated with Nature, Satan--under the newly developed scientific conception of history--came to be situated at the beginning of time, and as the fundament of phenomenality he was partially redeemed over the decades in the mode of objectification (think of Hakamī'zādah's discussion of the microbial jinn). According to most--if not all--run of the mill studies of Iranian modernity, Satan should have been left in the abandoned granery of tradition, but what has been discovered here is that he presented for Iranians a gateway into a new understanding of reality that positioned him as the most prudent tool in the return to the Godhead, and this is seen in the current theocratic mission to divinize a chaotic reality. Here, truly, the Ṣūfī desire to vindicate Iblīs is in the process of being realized, but not in the manner that the medieval mystics had hoped.

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1108 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 104.
Appendix: The Different Approaches to Demonological Investigation

Before demonological research can be conducted, it must be construed as a viable scholarly enterprise, especially after its delegitimization during the Enlightenment. In its focus on the "unflinching attempt to name, comprehend, and defend against all that threatens, frightens, and harms us," demonology is thought of as a "unified field theory" that deserves serious attention.\footnote{Bruce Lincoln, "The Cosmo-logic of Persian Demonology," in \textit{Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars: Critical Explorations in the History of Religions}, ed. Bruce Lincoln (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 31.}

There are different strands of demonological research present today. Below you will find descriptions for most of the major strands of demonological inquiry:

The study of a singular demonic species, figure, or demonological concept, in its focused complexity, breadth and analysis, regularly goes beyond the antiquarian approach. It is 

predicated upon the notion that the investigation of a single figure, species, or concept will help shed light on an entire worldview that has persisted into the present by way of cultural memory. There is an examination of traditionally conceived understandings of demonic ontology, imagery, semiotics, representations, and otherness, as well as demonism's vicissitudes throughout history via multiple accessible mediums, including literature, religion, art, folklore and film. In pursuing a singular object of study, there is a tendency to emphasize its exceptionality and at times the way it is presented as being worthy of sympathy and even allure. In this manner traditional moral absolutism is fragmented in the face of the object's multifacetedness and paradoxes.

(iii) The investigation of Satanism and all its cognates, including modern occultism. The interest is rooted in the general interest in subversive subcultures.

(iv) Essentialist demonology has at its core the unflinching belief that the demonic is reflected in archetypal formations that persist largely unaltered (save for superficialities) throughout time.

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1117 Reider, _Japanese Demon Lore_, xxii.
1118 Reider, _Japanese Demon Lore_, 1.
1120 Reider, _Japanese Demon Lore_, 182.
Liberal historiographical demonology is preoccupied with tracing recent rights violations, such as general political disenfranchisement and genocide, back to pre-modern forms of persecution, particularly those that were aimed at European Jewry and the witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In this approach, demonism is thought of as either a propagandistic tool for inquisitorial classes to undermine ill-fated minorities and subversive elements or an instance of primitiveness that is sustained among contemporary purveyors of evil. The predecessors to this position were equally strident in their "crude rationalism," especially concerning their unequivocally triumphalistic attitude with respect to scientific enlightenment and the complete caesura between preternatural and naturalistic inquiry. Liberal demonology emphasizes the relationship between demonism and premodern superstition, thus disqualifying contemporary evocations of the demonic for their supposed triviality.

Postmodern demonology consists of a celebratory appraisal of the demonic by virtue of its proximity to the otherness of monstrosity.

Historico-political demonology focuses on the way the study of the interaction between political and legal structures, the political instrumentalization of demonological rhetoric

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1127 Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, 181.
through demonizing literature,\textsuperscript{1132} political marginalizations\textsuperscript{1133} and movements,\textsuperscript{1134} the fostering of connections, relations with particular party platforms, the inducements and aims (along with associated propaganda) of demonologists and political authorities, denominational sectarianism and alliance-building, and the status of power with respect to demonism and its identification. There is less interest in the element of irrational spectacle within demonological works and a greater concern for the sustained interest-sharing strategies by actors vying for political legitimacy. For this and other reasons, it is not possible to speak of a "pure demonology"\textsuperscript{1135} even though there were historical instances when demonology was thought to have been purified of the political.\textsuperscript{1136} In the estimation of the proponents of this approach, demonology is constantly sullied by issues of political organization,\textsuperscript{1137} the pacifications that occurred\textsuperscript{1138} after periods of tension\textsuperscript{1139} and outright hostility,\textsuperscript{1140} the unravelling of consensuses,\textsuperscript{1141} intrigues\textsuperscript{1142} and paranoia,\textsuperscript{1143} the sporadic amorphousness of allegiances,\textsuperscript{1144} the condemnation of the morals of elites\textsuperscript{1145} and the degree of effectiveness exercised by demonological discourse on elite opinion,\textsuperscript{1146} and other related factors.

\textsuperscript{1132} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 77.  
\textsuperscript{1133} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 20.  
\textsuperscript{1134} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 57.  
\textsuperscript{1135} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 4-6.  
\textsuperscript{1136} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 42.  
\textsuperscript{1137} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 23.  
\textsuperscript{1138} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 47.  
\textsuperscript{1139} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 25.  
\textsuperscript{1140} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 30.  
\textsuperscript{1141} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 26.  
\textsuperscript{1142} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 29.  
\textsuperscript{1143} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 137.  
\textsuperscript{1144} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 29.  
\textsuperscript{1145} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 95.  
\textsuperscript{1146} Pearl, \textit{The Crime of Crimes}, 101.
Historico-comparative demonology\textsuperscript{1147} takes a middle ground approach between the stance that valorizes the absolute idiosyncratic character of local studies and the position that engages in abstract generalities by allowing a delicate, subtle and limited comparative framework to be deployed as a way to better comprehend demonology. It is argued that by comparing and contrasting, more comprehensive understandings can be arrived at, especially considering the diversity of receptions.\textsuperscript{1148} The "development of terminologies or typologies" through this method can lead to greater theoretical breakthroughs and in turn help organize the findings of future research. In allowing anomalous cases to take on greater prominence, comparative analysis can help in the testing of hypotheses.\textsuperscript{1149} For example, did authorities and laypersons in different locales have similar understandings of demonic sects?\textsuperscript{1150} How did journalistic print media operate with respect to the demonological in the different cases? How far did they go to promulgate reports of demonic activity?\textsuperscript{1151} Was there an agreement between different local populations regarding the most volatile figures subject to demonological analysis?\textsuperscript{1152}


\textsuperscript{1148} Johannes Dillinger, "Evil People": \textit{A Comparative Study of Witch Hunts in Swabian Austria and the Electorate of Trier}, trans. Laura Stokes (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 3.

\textsuperscript{1149} Dillinger, "Evil People", 7.

\textsuperscript{1150} Dillinger, "Evil People", 193.

\textsuperscript{1151} Dillinger, "Evil People", 149.

\textsuperscript{1152} Dillinger, "Evil People", 102.
The historiography of accultural, syncretic, or adaptive demonology\textsuperscript{1153} is similar to historico-comparative demonology in the sense that it overcomes analytical provincialism by confronting two or more comparable cases of investigation, but this approach focuses more on the actual intermingling of thought-systems. Conducted mainly through anthropological research, what is most salient about this sort of study is the complex process of local appropriation of a nearly always invasive imperial or colonial religiosity. What makes it complex is the way aspects of indigenous religion are incorporated into new cosmologies and rituals, how the demonic becomes a buffer between the indigenous and the newly arrived missionary religions, the manner in which domination of the colonized is never fully complete but is constantly in a state of fluctuation. The classic interpretation of rationalization and disenchantment (\textit{Entzauberung}) is challenged by the role of hybridity, translation, and the penetration of enchantedness into modernity. In these new religious systems, the image of the Devil plays a large role in conversion, the comprehension of modernity,\textsuperscript{1154} and the contemplation of the civilizing mission.\textsuperscript{1155}

\textit{Literary demonology}\textsuperscript{1156} may or may not be historical in orientation but it is surely an investigation of the problem of evil.\textsuperscript{1157} It is concerned with the way demonism is expressive of


\textsuperscript{1154} Meyer, \textit{Translating the Devil}, xvii-xxiii.

\textsuperscript{1155} Meyer, \textit{Translating the Devil}, 111.

\textsuperscript{1156} For this short description I use W.J. Leatherbarrow's \textit{A Devil's Vaudeville: The Demonic in Dostoevsky's Major Fiction} (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), but there are other studies that focus on demonology from a literary perspective, and they include: \textit{Fictions du Diable: Démonologie et Littérature de Saint Augustin à Léo
particular literary motifs (such as threshold, imposture, alienation, characterological roles, subtexts, doubles, signs or markers, physical descriptions, and narratives, as well as how specific conceptions of demonism derived from a multitude of

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1160 Leatherbarrow, *A Devil's Vaudeville*, 166.
1161 Leatherbarrow, *A Devil's Vaudeville*, 60.
1162 Leatherbarrow, *A Devil's Vaudeville*, 162.
sources and traditions\textsuperscript{1167} (such as "[t]he semiotics of popular demonology")\textsuperscript{1168} "pollute the narrative terrain."\textsuperscript{1169} In this sense, there is less focus on "metaphysical system[s] ascribable" to authors and more on the internal dynamics of texts.\textsuperscript{1170}

(xv) \textit{Historico-philosophical demonology}\textsuperscript{1171} has as its object of analysis the historical development and constant reorganization\textsuperscript{1172} of the category of formal demonology and the notions embedded therein. Important points of consideration include demonology's autonomy,\textsuperscript{1173} its relationship with divination,\textsuperscript{1174} theology,\textsuperscript{1175} local mythology,\textsuperscript{1176} philosophical cosmology, the hermeneutics of religion, philosophy's self-definition and the philosophical life. Additionally, instances of doctrinal syncretism,\textsuperscript{1177} the heritage\textsuperscript{1178} and context of ideational formation, functionality and limitation, and the etymology and semantics of notions and categories\textsuperscript{1179} help to delineate the very germination of demonology as a contemplatable category of thought. At times, it is even important to delve into regions of investigation where only an inchoate semblance of demonological logic can be detected (prior to the determination of demonology as a definable field).\textsuperscript{1180} The status of demons as intermediaries within hierarchies of being\textsuperscript{1181} (or the nullification of this theory),\textsuperscript{1182} and

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\bibitem{206} Leatherbarrow, \textit{A Devil's Vaudeville.}, 2.
\bibitem{207} Leatherbarrow, \textit{A Devil's Vaudeville.}, 76.
\bibitem{208} Leatherbarrow, \textit{A Devil's Vaudeville.}, 178.
\bibitem{209} Leatherbarrow, \textit{A Devil's Vaudeville.}, 27.
\bibitem{210} Nāṣir Maḥmūd Wahdān, \textit{Maḥfūm al-Shayṭān fī al-fikr al-ʿArabī} (Cairo: N.M. Wahdān, 1999).
\bibitem{211} Andrei Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne : Histoire de la notion de Daimōn de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniens} (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 323.
\bibitem{212} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 240.
\bibitem{213} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 67.
\bibitem{214} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 108.
\bibitem{215} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 238.
\bibitem{216} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 2-3.
\bibitem{217} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 100.
\bibitem{218} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 13.
\bibitem{219} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 86.
\bibitem{220} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 98.
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generally the venture to map out their topography is of importance.\textsuperscript{1183} The question of whether demons are of several species,\textsuperscript{1184} if they are qualitatively ethereal\textsuperscript{1185} or physical,\textsuperscript{1186} or if their configuration permits or denies the full majesty of the divine\textsuperscript{1187} are questions that are engaged with great technical precision.

(xvi) Critical demonological historiography is committed to problematizing the habitual positing of overextended continuities evident in traditional histories of the demonic\textsuperscript{1188} but may in fact be influenced by the ideological demand to focus on the historical kernel behind modern rights violations or the postmodern fixation on monstrous alterity (evident in the renewed interest in, permissibility and viability of such research within academia). Nevertheless, there is here a greater focus on (political, religious, social, cultural and economic) contextualization, subsidiary questions concerning rupture and continuity,\textsuperscript{1189} and the deployment of conceptual tools derived from the social sciences. Through contextualization, it becomes increasingly apparent that the form of the period's demonology is necessary and integrated into its respective lifeworld, thought-patterns\textsuperscript{1190} and "widespread contemporary concern[s]."\textsuperscript{1191} Authorial affirmation of a series of shared demonological expectations and understandings\textsuperscript{1192} that constitute a period's "criteria of intelligibility"\textsuperscript{1193} underscores this point. It is not simply the case that any given

\textsuperscript{1182} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 144.
\textsuperscript{1183} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 112.
\textsuperscript{1184} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 124.
\textsuperscript{1185} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 98
\textsuperscript{1186} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 116.
\textsuperscript{1187} Timotin, \textit{La démonologie platonicienne}, 185.
\textsuperscript{1188} Johnstone, \textit{The Devil and Demonism in Early Modern England}, 8.
\textsuperscript{1189} Johnstone, \textit{The Devil and Demonism in Early Modern England}, 12.
\textsuperscript{1190} Clark, \textit{Thinking with Demons}, 489.
\textsuperscript{1191} Clark, \textit{Thinking with Demons}, 255.
\textsuperscript{1192} Clark, \textit{Thinking with Demons}, 332.
\textsuperscript{1193} Clark, \textit{Thinking with Demons}, 252.
demonology is an absolute reflection of the day's hegemonic inquisitorial powers. With this being said, the sense of complete historical determinism is tempered by how, for instance, archetypal religious values render possible the very emergence of demonologies. This category can be broken down further:

(a) The investigation of demonological discourse does not necessarily concern itself with the question of whether the referents of demonologies have any basis in reality, for what is of primary concern is the way discursive and representational aspects assert actuality (thus iterating the collapse of reality and discourse). History is here "unhook[ed ...] from its traditional realist moorings" and epochal contestations can be located within textuality. The "semantic dependence" of contrary positions is evident in demonological writings where nefarious elements are forced into a subordinate role in "hierarchical oppositions" (a major motif of early modern intellectual debates). What a focus on discourse further permits is an examination of otherwise unlikely morphologies (not causalities), such as the role of early modern demonology in the

1194 Clark, Thinking with Demons, viii.
1195 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 437.
1197 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 7-8.
1198 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 94.
1199 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 317.
1200 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 62.
1201 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 135.
1202 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 49.
1203 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 683.
proto-scientific revelation of nature's secrets (à la Bacon), and connections that are not properly fleshed out, including the transition of content from specialist to common literature and the interplay between literature of superstition and demonology. What links all these disparate fields together is the underlying commitment to the idea that demonology is capable of seeping into and even overdetermining major intellectual debates of the day.

(b) *The investigation of demonic linguistics,* which is argued to have not been adequately studied prior to Sylvester Prierio's *De strigimagis,* is an area of research that requires utmost delicacy, due to the silence of demonic language, and perseverance, considering the impossibility of full systematization. Rooted in postmodern methodology and consciously submitting to the metaphysical assumptions and logic of Renaissance demonologists, the approach to demonic linguistics prioritizes the way a "salvific potential" emerges not through the inquisitorial "discourse of divine law" but rather in the person who is linguistically penetrated by the infernal—but what exactly is the nature of such an invasion? "[D]emonic utterances remove their signifieds from the realm of presence" (to put it in a different way, they are relieved of the signifier

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1204 Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, 255.
1205 Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, 438.
1206 Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, 479.
1207 Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, 684.
through their appearance in "storms, diseases, possession, melancholy"), 1214 empty the possessed of their own voices, 1215 "a fire consuming the creation," 1216 and are thus meaningless 1217 and solipsistic 1218 (insofar as the mind, in picking up demonic language as virus [not language as language], takes that virus, transforms it into a language, and thus "listens to its own annihilation."). 1219 While this definition appears to nullify or distance the demonic from language, devils are nevertheless considered to be "skilled and astute semioticians," but only insofar as they speak "chaos and annihilation." 1220 Through the act of avowal by those who are possessed, this meaninglessness can be transformed into comprehensibility 1221 and a mode of redemption. 1222

(c) The study of corporeality in relation to demonology 1223 concerns the ways demonism and demonology interact with the human body. The corporeal aspect is capable of drawing focus away from absolute psychic investigations 1224 and towards personal assignations of "cultural significance and moral meaning to subjective corporeal experiences," 1225 the

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1214 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 10.
1215 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 14.
1216 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 135.
1217 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 129.
1218 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 75.
1220 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 5.
1221 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 8.
1222 Maggi, Satan's Rhetoric, 19.
1224 Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 87.
1225 Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 166.
active and passive dimensions of the body,\textsuperscript{1226} and the way its semantics, fluids and parts (limbs, appendages, organs, etc.) interacted with the social\textsuperscript{1227} insofar as the body itself is a reflection of a particular social and moral order.\textsuperscript{1228} Corporeality can come to serve a central role in social conflicts,\textsuperscript{1229} and the dreams and visionary experiences that depict a form of spiritual freedom from the body\textsuperscript{1230} can actually represent the need to separate oneself from these conflicts.\textsuperscript{1231} What arises ultimately is the question bodily control and discipline.\textsuperscript{1232} It is not easy to answer this question because one is not dealing with a beast of burden. The body is conceptualized as both spiritual and material, matter and meaning, enclosed and permeable, and most of all, embodied.\textsuperscript{1233}

(d) The investigation of demonological iconography\textsuperscript{1234} is preoccupied with way a visual cultural, syntactical and lexical treatment of demonism\textsuperscript{1235} can convey a particular

\textsuperscript{1226} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 95.
\textsuperscript{1227} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{1228} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 97.
\textsuperscript{1229} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 119.
\textsuperscript{1230} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 195.
\textsuperscript{1231} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 87.
\textsuperscript{1232} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 38.
\textsuperscript{1233} Van Gent, Magic, Body and the Self, 7-8.
meaning to audiences, especially during times of overhauling tumult and radical reorganization. In this way, the invention of a new tradition (new meanings instilled through repetition), social cohesion (defining collectivity), sculpting public discourse ("dissemination of [... a] master narrative"), institutional legitimization,
1236 and the entrenchment of new authority,
1237 can all be expressed through the language of imagery. The language can itself be a point of intersection allowing mythological and religious icons to merge with the art of new social movements,
1238 leading to a distinctive style of demonological satire and caricature. 
1239 Through the medium of visual presentations, internal and external enemies can be defined and thus differentiated,
1240 acceptable novelty is able to triumph over the repulsive residues of the past,
1241 mass spectacles during holidays can reinforce demonization efforts inherent within official discourse,
1242 the role of class and gender in demonological discourse can be clarified,
1243 and technical matters such as style of depiction, colour
1244 and metaphorical representation
1245 can inform spectatorial consciousness with respect to categories and identifications (if black

1235 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 9-10.
1236 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 1-3.
1237 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 9.
1238 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 7.
1239 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 9.
1240 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 191.
1241 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 212.
1242 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 193.
1243 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 190.
1244 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 32.
1245 Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 205.
is the colour of reaction, then the appearance of a black swan may evoke a negative response).

(e) Historico-dramaturgical or performative demonology deals with the way the social fascination with demonism bled into the works of playwrights which was then staged for viewing audiences. Main issues include the status of demonological beliefs and descriptions once they are transferred onto the stage, the dramaturgical participation in the construction of new meanings regarding the demonic, and the reconstitution of theatrical representation. In accordance with New Historicist thought, the stage should not simply reflect the context of its emergence, but also reflect on it. At one moment, a production may allow an orthodox, royalist demonology to become noticeable, while in another exorcism can be observed as a metadramatic tool. There are times when demonism is united with familiar motifs, such as eschatology (perhaps for greater effect), but another example may parody demonism's association with the familiar as part of the playwright's critique of a certain form of religiosity. The ability to stage reintegration into the social order through the taming of demonic


1247 Van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre, 6-7.
1248 Van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre, 16.
1249 Van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre, 140.
1250 Van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre, 181.
1251 Van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre, 131.
1252 Van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre, 95.
forces, to have demonic forces evoked (even transformed) in such a physical manner without the manifest threat of prosecution or even stigmatization, and to even allow the demonic to dance around questions of identity and selfhood gives credence to the idea that the stage served as a setting where prevailing social debates were engaged.

(f) Historical-materialist demonology (or monsterology) is committed to the cause of social history and how local or indigenous narratives (folklore, poetry, etc.) of demonism interact with economic determinants (particularly capitalist relations). In accordance with Marxist methodology ("critical-dialectical procedures"), there is an interest in the naturalization of monstrosity and the nascent moments of this naturalization (recent entry of bourgeois relations within pre-capitalist formations) when the obtrusion of the demonic permits greater examination. It is for this reason that historico-ethnographic research of demonic beliefs is of central concern. Demonic imagery are expressions of corporeal violations by an overhauled economic order but the question is asked: Why is there a perceptual disconnect between cultural artefacts and the capitalist world-system? Through the dramatised exaggeration of demonic imagery (and its "estragement-effects"), it is possible to puncture techniques of mystification.

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1253 Van Dijkhuizen, *Devil Theatre*, 47.
1254 Van Dijkhuizen, *Devil Theatre*, 166.
1255 Van Dijkhuizen, *Devil Theatre*, 36.
1256 Van Dijkhuizen, *Devil Theatre*, 73.
There is an appreciation of the demonic occult insofar as the circuitry of capital epitomizes its logic (it is "fantastically real") but a rejection of its postmodern celebration.  

(g) Psychoanalytic demonology uses the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis such as splitting, sublimation, defence mechanisms, repression and the unconscious to explain historical movements even though this has traditionally been considered anachronistic by historians. Due to the utilization of these concepts, it almost becomes inevitable that the topics most dear to psychoanalysts emerge as crucial fixtures of historical discussion, including the relationship between erotic dreams and pollution (along with the anxiety over such dreams), the libidinal excess of women, and the "psychic processes" of subjects. There is an interest in bringing to the foreground that which is officially deemed trifling as a way of unlocking the pathological symptoms of the age, and the way subjective passivity can be a foil for the way an intense latent activity that only becomes apparent later after the revelation of suppressed impulses in different form.

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1266 McNally, Monsters of the Market, 6-7.  
1267 McNally, Monsters of the Market, 10.  
1269 Dyan Elliott, Fallen Bodies: Pollution, Sexuality, and Demonology in the Middle Ages (Phidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 114-5.  
1270 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 14.  
1271 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 85.  
1272 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 7-9.  
1273 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 14.  
1274 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 49.  
1275 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 36.  
1276 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 8.  
1277 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 11.  
1278 Elliott, Fallen Bodies, 35.
Demonology from the standpoint of dialectical phenomenology\textsuperscript{1279} deals with the historical and co-determining encounter between subjects and demons. Imagining this confrontation has implications regarding socio-religious identity formation, the evolution of spiritual beings from intermediaries to shapeshifting malignant rivals, the way we understand the adoption process whereby previous demonological teachings are incorporated into novel paradigms, and how the other can be located within the self. In this approach, there is a strong willingness to submit to the richness and enchantedness of the spiritual world of the past so as to appreciate the subtleties of pre-modern phenomenological experience. Without being anachronistic, there is only a limited deployment of modern conceptual tools, which is meant to not overwhelm the sincerity of this experience and the way it "address[ed] pressing intellectual problems."\textsuperscript{1280} For example, victory over the demonic was meant to anticipate or reflect doctrinal legitimacy and pre-eminence,\textsuperscript{1281} and demonological construction paralleled the constitution of an ascetic self\textsuperscript{1282} and assisted with the resolution of sociological ambiguities\textsuperscript{1283} through the clarification of roles and decisions.\textsuperscript{1284} By listing and describing the methods, names and traits of demons encountered, thus rendering them more tangible, the subject was led on a path of both phenomenal mastery\textsuperscript{1285} and was made to better appreciate as well as evaluate one's emotional and psychological life.\textsuperscript{1286}


\textsuperscript{1283} Brakke, \textit{Demons and the Making of the Monk}, 80.

\textsuperscript{1284} Brakke, \textit{Demons and the Making of the Monk}, 117.

\textsuperscript{1285} Brakke, \textit{Demons and the Making of the Monk}, 70.

\textsuperscript{1286} Brakke, \textit{Demons and the Making of the Monk}, 77.
(i) The study of vernacular religious demonology\textsuperscript{1287} is concerned with quotidian religious practice and its anthropological study. Additionally, it is the location of the demonic within the quotidian that is of central concern.\textsuperscript{1288} Methodologically speaking, attention is paid to "local and common discourse, expressed in belief and ritual, for interpreting and expressing ideas that derive from complex and shifting sets of religious ideologies and practices." Exclusive focus is not on a singular culture but on "manifold" formations and the need to distinguish the hegemonic from folk or other systems dissolves under the primacy of common practice. The vernacular conception of religion can be said to be a "demonic idiom" in that its transformations parallel those of social life,\textsuperscript{1289} and this permits a whole variety of sources to present themselves as open to analysis, including scriptures, primers, inscriptions, documents, memoirs and gazettes. One cannot within this framework easily separate oral literature from hieratic works because vernacular consciousness did not easily create limitations upon possible sites of inspiration.\textsuperscript{1290} What pervades investigations in this field is a commitment to identifying demonic self-productions and not the way official discourses are imposed on collectives.\textsuperscript{1291} Nevertheless, what is noticeable were the ways vernacular religion became co-opted into separate movements,\textsuperscript{1292} "actively influenced the construction of official and ecclesiastic canons,"\textsuperscript{1293} and was itself contorted in part by official orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{1294}


\textsuperscript{1288} Von Glahn, *The Sinister Way*, 4.

\textsuperscript{1289} Von Glahn, *The Sinister Way*, 12.

\textsuperscript{1290} Von Glahn, *The Sinister Way*, 155.

\textsuperscript{1291} Von Glahn, *The Sinister Way*, 18.

\textsuperscript{1292} Von Glahn, *The Sinister Way*, 75.

\textsuperscript{1293} Von Glahn, *The Sinister Way*, 220.
Some other areas of investigation include: **Women, gender and demonology**; **Music and demonology**; **Iranian demonological studies**; **Demonology and rumours**; **Demonology and law**; **Demonology and medicine**; **The historiography of demonologists**; The study

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of demonological origins;\textsuperscript{1302} The study of demonology and religion,\textsuperscript{1303} and Demonology and modern psychiatry, neurology and sociobiology\textsuperscript{1304}


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