Taking its cue from the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutionalization of the criminal law’s unwritten general part, this article illustrates the interaction between criminal law theory and constitutional law that process implies. It does so by applying a criminal law theory of why and when force in self-defence is justified in order to assess the constitutionality of the self-defence provisions of Canada’s Criminal Code. The assessment concludes that, though frequently criticized for excessive complexity, the Code’s provisions on self-defence accurately track the nuances demanded by the theory of self-defence best qualified to interpret the provisions. That theory, I argue, puts dignity rather than self-preservation at its centre.

Keywords: self-defence/criminal law/constitutional law/dignity/self-preservation

1 Introduction

Of all common-law legal systems with written constitutions, Canada’s has perhaps gone furthest in raising unwritten principles of penal justice to the status of binding constitutional norms. Whereas, in the United States and Israel, judicial oversight of penal matters has been mostly confined to the review of executive action for procedural fairness and of specific offences for permissible criminalization, in Canada, this supervision has taken a more ambitious turn. There, the Supreme Court has construed its mandate under the written constitution to include the review of legislation touching the criminal law’s general part – the part comprising criteria of culpability, justification, and excuse applicable to all criminal offences – in light of common-law principles of substantive justice. As a result, common-law fault requirements and defences have been transformed from presumptive limits on penal legislation defeasible by clear statutory language into binding ones subject only to emergency override or to the politically stigmatic notwithstanding clause. Thus, statutory constructive murder provisions and absolute liability offences carrying prison sentences have been struck down as a violation of ‘fundamental justice’; and the highly restrictive statutory defence of duress has been held accountable to the

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standard of its more liberal common-law counterpart. True, the common-law ship has not made the voyage to the Charter without a considerable loss of cargo – witness, for example, the gap between *Pappajohn v The Queen* and *R v Martineau* on the role of subjective fault in criminal liability. Nevertheless, there has been an important movement, unique (I believe) in the common-law world, toward the elevation to constitutional status (or ‘constitutionalization’) of the unwritten general part’s constraints on the state’s use of punishment for the purpose of crime control.

This development has implications for a proper understanding of criminal law theory’s relation to constitutional law. Implicit in the constitutionalization of the criminal law’s unwritten general part is a recognition that the general part covers the same matter as that referred to by a written constitutional provision enjoining officials to act justly in depriving people of their liberty. Contrary to an influential opinion, the general part does not elaborate the communal ethics of censuring wicked characters; it delimits the political legitimacy of restraining right-bearing persons. It thus already draws with sophisticated precision the constitutional line distinguishing the state’s justified use of force against a person from a private agent’s unjustified use of the same force. In turn, this sameness of concern implies that a criminal law theory of the general part (or any aspect thereof) is also a theory of the meaning of constitutional language entrenching against legislative majorities the person’s right not to be deprived of liberty unjustly. And this means that a sound criminal law theory of any defence belonging to the general part is also a theory for testing whether a statutory delineation of the defence meets the constitutional requirement.

This article takes its cue from the new understanding of criminal law theory’s relation to constitutional law implied by the Supreme Court of Canada’s ongoing constitutionalization of the general part. In it, I defend and apply a criminal law theory of self-defence to test the self-defence provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code against the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ standard of fundamental justice. In doing so, I

2 *R v Ruzic*, [2001] 1 SCR 687 [*Ruzic*].
3 [1980] 2 SCR 120.
mean at once to illustrate the interaction of criminal and constitutional theory and to assist the development the first paragraph describes.

Section 7 of the Charter states that ‘every person has a right... not to be deprived [of liberty]...except in accordance with... fundamental justice.’ In The Motor Vehicle Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada held that fundamental justice means more than procedural justice, that it includes substantive constraints on the state’s penal power, and that the most basic of these is that the innocent may not be exposed by the terms of a law to the possibility of imprisonment. Accordingly, the Motor Vehicle reference is potentially authority for the Court’s reading into section 7 a constitutional right to those common-law defences the gist of which is that the accused is innocent from the standpoint of the criminal law – that he or she does not deserve to be punished judicially.

By general agreement, self-defence belongs within the category of defences called justifications rather than within the category called excuses. Someone who pleads self-defence claims that he had a legal permission to repel force with force, not that his admitted wrong ought not to expose him to punishment. Now, of all the common-law defences, self-defence would seem to be the most amenable to constitutionalization because a person who justifiably used force in self-defence is an innocent person if anyone is. One may reasonably debate about whether a negligent or grossly negligent actor is an innocent from the standpoint of the criminal law, and so one may question whether the Canadian common-law requirement of subjective fault for true crimes ought to be elevated to constitutional status. One may reasonably debate about whether excuses such as necessity and duress render an accused legally innocent or guilty but excused and about whether, if the latter is true, an accused has a constitutional right to the common-law version of these defences. One may also reasonably debate about whether someone who justifiably takes property to save life is an innocent, since his justification arguably presupposes rather than erases a wrong. One may even reasonably debate about whether a defence of consent to a charge of assault always renders one innocent, since the accused may have abused a position of authority. However, (I feel safe in saying) one cannot reasonably debate about whether someone who uses necessary and proportionate force in self-defence against a real wrongdoer is an innocent. Such a person is not justified in a wrong; rather, he or she has committed no wrong in the first place, for the wrongdoer had no

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9 Ruzic, supra note 2.
permission to perform the action the defender prevented. That a self-defence justification renders one legally innocent seems no more controversial than that an unforeseeable absence of volition does so.

Where controversy begins, however, is where controversy within the criminal law of self-defence begins. An actor whose force is justified by self-defence is an innocent, but when is force in self-defence justified? A statutory law of self-defence will violate section 7 of the Charter if, in circumscribing the defence, it withholds a justification from someone who is justified, for it will then have exposed innocent persons to deprivations of liberty. Are the self-defence provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code vulnerable to invalidation on this basis? In what follows, I limit my discussion to the sections pertaining to ‘defence of person,’ leaving ‘defence of property’ to one side.

II Issues in the law of self-defence

I believe that the consensus among Canadian criminal law writers is that the sections dealing with self-defence are among the murkiest and most complex in the Criminal Code. There are no fewer than four sections on ‘defence of person,’ each apparently applying to a particular paradigm case. Section 34(1) applies to the case where A uses force to repel an unlawful attack (assault) A did not provoke, not intending death or serious bodily harm to the attacker. The section states that A’s force is justified if necessary to repel the attack. Section 34(2) envisages the case where A kills or causes serious bodily harm to B in repelling B’s assault. The section states that A’s force is justified if he caused death or serious bodily harm under a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily harm and if he reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary to preserve himself. Section 35 deals with the right of self-defence of an unlawful aggressor. It says that the aggressor may use subsequent force against his victim if (and presumably only if) he (a) reasonably apprehends death or serious bodily harm from the person he assaulted, (b) reasonably believes the force is necessary to preserve himself, (c) did not himself endeavour to cause death or serious bodily harm before the necessity of preserving himself arose, and (d) retreated as far as he could before applying the force necessary to preserve himself. Section 36 defines provocation to include provocation by ‘blows, words, or gestures.’ Finally section 37 applies to the case of self-defence
against a threat of imminent attack. It says that the use of force to prevent
an attack or the repetition thereof is justified if the force used is no more
than necessary and if it is proportionate to the nature of the threatened
assault. These provisions give rise to the following questions.

A WITHOUT HAVING PROVOKED THE ASSAULT
First, section 34(1) of the Criminal Code restricts the right of self-defence
to those who did not provoke the attack they suffered. Those who provoke
violence against themselves by blows, words, or gestures are not permitted
to use force to repel the force they have provoked unless the response to
their provocation is excessive or disproportionate.

Does a provoker rightly forfeit his right of self-defence against the person
he or she provoked? Or does confining the statutory right of self-defence to
non-provokers allow punishment of an innocent? Of course, the answer
depends on what counts as provocation for the purposes of section 34(1).
Must the provocation that results in forfeiture of one’s right of self-defence
be an assault or a threat (by words or gestures) of imminent assault, or are
threats of harm falling short of an imminent assault sufficient? Are even
taunts or insults sufficient, as they are for the defence of provocation?

On these questions, section 34(1) is silent. It simply states that ‘[e]very
one who is unlawfully assaulted without having provoked the assault is jus-
tified in repelling force by force…’13 This can be read in two ways. On
one reading, absence of provocation is what constitutes force an unlawful
assault, so that the only kind of provocation that bars a right of self-
defence in the provoker against the party responding to his provocation
is the sort that would justify the response as an act of self-defence; that is,
only an assault or a threat of imminent assault counts as a right-forfeiting
provocation. Alternatively, the assault is unlawful with or without the pro-
vocation, so that if A has provoked (say by insulting words or threats of
harm in the distant future) B unlawfully to assault him, he forfeits his
right of self-defence even though B’s response was unlawful.

Either reading leads to problems. If ‘without having provoked the
assault’ means ‘without having unlawfully assaulted or threatened immi-

13 Ibid.
phrase it interprets. However, if ‘without having provoked the assault’ means without having provoked an attack that is unlawful despite the provocation, then someone who baits another into unlawfully assaulting him is deprived of the right to defend himself against a wrongful attack. And since even bad people have a right to defend themselves against wrongful attacks, this reading would allow the punishment of someone who, though open to moral criticism, is innocent before the law. On this reading, therefore, ‘without having provoked the assault’ is an unconstitutional limitation of the right to self-defence.14

I shall argue that the reading of section 34(1) that renders it consistent with the Charter is one that its words will reasonably bear. Appearances notwithstanding, this reading does not treat the phrase ‘without having provoked the assault’ as idle; for it interprets this phrase as establishing in Canadian law a certain theory of the right to self-defence according to which the right is asymmetrical as between aggressors and defenders (only defenders have the right), so that there is normative closure to permissible violence. Since there are theories of self-defence that treat the right as symmetrical or possibly symmetrical as between aggressors and defenders, the work performed by the phrase (according to this interpretation) is of no inconsiderable importance.

Yet another question is raised by the ‘without having provoked’ qualification. Some might argue that this limitation permits punishing someone who uses pre-emptive force against a person he reasonably but mistakenly takes for an assailant and then, still labouring under his mistake, defends himself with necessary force against the putative assailant’s defensive force. Here, the mistaken actor certainly provoked the person he mistook for an assailant; and if his force was justified in the first place, then so must be his subsequent use of defensive force if his mistake is still reasonable. So, those who think that the reasonably

14 But suppose A insults B, hoping to provoke B into assaulting him so that he might then attack B with impunity. One might argue that, by removing this possibility, the ‘without having provoked the assault’ qualification prevents an abuse of rights, ensuring that the culpable are not unjustly exculpated. However, it is doubtful that the qualification is needed for this purpose. Anyone who responds to insults with force is a wrongdoer against whom preventive force is permissible. If the provoker’s responsive force exceeds what he could reasonably believe is needed for prevention or (even if needed) is meant as a lethal or seriously harmful response to a non-dangerous threat, he will not have a defence. What if the provoker intends the other to employ potentially lethal force against him, knowing that he can best the other in a fight to the death? But this situation is covered elsewhere. Someone seeking a pretext to kill comes under section 35 of the Criminal Code, which denies a right of defensive force to a provoker who endeavoured to cause death or serious bodily harm before he was assaulted. So, the would-be abuser of rights is prevented even without the restriction of justified force to non-provokers in section 34(1). Such a general restriction would in any case be overbroad.
mistaken ‘self-defender’ is justified or ‘warranted’ in using force against an imagined assailant will also think that the ‘without having provoked’ qualification must be declared inoperative in such a case; for otherwise an innocent will be punished.\(^{15}\)

I shall dispute this view. Against it, I’ll argue that the reasonably mistaken self-defender is non-culpable, not because his force is justified (it isn’t), but because he lacks a culpable mind to go with his wrongful assault. Since neither his initial nor subsequent use of force was permissible, his situation constitutes no exception to the rule that provokers have no right to use force to defend themselves against the necessary and proportionate force of those whom they have provoked with force or threats of imminent force.

**B PROPORTIONALITY**

Another issue of controversy concerns the requirement of proportionality. This requirement is a limit on the right to use the force that would be necessary to repel an unlawful assault. Section 34(1) of the Criminal Code denies the right to use necessary force to someone who, without a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm, intends to cause death or grievous bodily harm. In other words, even if nothing short of lethal force would succeed in repelling a non-lethal threat, the defender’s force will not be justified if he intended lethal force. Successfully to plead self-defence against a non-lethal assault, one must not intend disproportionate lethal force. This does not mean that lethal force is permitted against a non-lethal threat as long as it is not intended; for section 34(2) states that causing death or grievous bodily harm is permissible only under a reasonable apprehension of the same by the defender and only if the defender reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary to avert death. Thus, someone who accidentally kills an assailant he knows to be harmless may not claim self-defence in justification of the homicide, though he may plead lack of mens rea for a wrongful death. Nevertheless, section 34(1) does seem to say that intending disproportionate force is sufficient to forfeit one’s right of self-defence – that causing death is not necessary – even if lethal force is necessary to repel a non-lethal threat.\(^{16}\)

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16 American Law Institute, *Model Penal Code* (Philadelphia, PA: American Law Institute, 1962) § 3.06(3) agrees. It, too, denies the right to use deadly force to repel a trespasser who is not threatening dispossessions, death, or serious bodily harm. But deadly force is defined in ibid § 3.11(2) as force one uses *for the purpose* of causing death or serious bodily harm or that one *knows* creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm. Thus deadly force is not restricted to force that causes death.
There are two issues here. First, is the requirement of proportionality a justified limit on one’s right to the measures necessary for self-defence? Does this requirement rightly take away one’s right of self-defence when the force necessary to repel an assault or a trespass would be disproportionate force? Or does the requirement of proportionality permit punishing an innocent? I’ll argue that the answer depends on what work the proportionality requirement is understood to be doing. If it is a requirement that defensive force be measured to what the aggressor deserves, then it exposes to punishment someone who only did what was necessary to defend his right and who is being held accountable to the constraints of a public role – that of punishing authority – it would have been a crime for him to have taken upon himself. So, since the constraints of the role do not apply to him, the proportionality requirement (on this view of it) permits punishing an innocent. That requirement would also permit punishing an innocent if, as George Fletcher thinks, the duty to use proportionate force is a duty of virtue to forgo one’s right to use necessary force for the aggressor’s sake;17 for the state would then be punishing someone for failing to display charitableness even though he committed no wrong to another person. The question, then, is whether the proportionality requirement can be understood as a requirement of justice apart from virtue and also apart from the justice of punishment. I’ll argue that it can be and that the proportionality requirement is thus a constitutionally permissible limit on the right to necessary self-defence.

The second problem raised by the proportionality requirement concerns the Code’s apparent indifference to reality. Both section 34 and section 35 frame the proportionality requirement as a mens rea issue – as an issue about intent rather than one about fact. Thus, section 34(1) bars a right of self-defence to someone who merely intends lethal force against a non-lethal threat, whether or not (apparently) his force actually imposes a serious risk of death; section 34(2) bars a right of self-defence to someone who kills or seriously harms another without believing his own life or bodily integrity is in danger, even if it is; while section 35 bars a right of self-defence to an unlawful aggressor who reasonably fears death or serious bodily harm in response to his aggression if he himself intended serious bodily harm to begin with, whether or not the force he initially applied was actually lethal or dangerous.

On their face, these provisions seem to expose innocents to punishment. Can it be true that one loses the right of self-defence if one intends lethal force against a non-lethal threat even if the force one uses is in fact not lethal (suppose the defender strikes an unarmed

17 George Fletcher, ‘Punishment and Self-Defense’ (1989) 8 Law & Phil 207 at 208 [Fletcher, ‘Punishment’].
assailant with a pipe he thinks is made of lead but that is actually made of rubber)? Or suppose one intends lethal force against a lethal threat one mistakenly believes is non-lethal (the intruder is, contrary to the defender’s belief, armed and prepared to shoot). It would seem that section 34, by defining the proportionality requirement of rightful self-defence as a requirement that the defender possess a certain state of mind, would allow punishing for thoughts alone someone whose response to an unlawful intrusion was both necessary and proportionate; while section 35 could expose to punishment someone who repels force that is actually disproportionate to his provocation just because it would not have been disproportionate to the provocation he intended. But is this not to punish for inward vice someone who has committed no wrong (or, in the latter case, no additional wrong) to another? 18

My answer will be ‘no.’ I’ll argue that the Code’s focus on intention here is correct – that disproportionate force in self-defence (unlike disproportionate punishment) is unjust force only because it joins to coercion the culpable denial of rights that a justification otherwise negates. Therefore, someone who intends disproportionate force culpably causes death or serious bodily harm even if the force he uses in fact matches the kind of force used against him. Because, moreover, proportionality in the context of self-defence is a state of mind, an unlawful aggressor (not being a mind-reader) cannot know whether the victim’s response to his aggression is disproportionate, and so he is entitled to act on reasonable beliefs. But he cannot reasonably believe that his victim’s response is disproportionate if he himself intended death or serious bodily harm, for he must be assumed to have intended to succeed. Accordingly, I’ll argue, neither section 34 nor section 35 exposes innocents to punishment by virtue of barring a right of self-defence on the basis of intentions alone.

C THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIED ACTOR
The case of the unintended proportionate response is a special case of the unknowingly justified actor (UJA) – the bête grise (if I may) of criminal law theory. Assuming that ‘if’ means ‘if and only if,’ then section 34(2)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code denies a justification to someone who kills without believing his life is under threat even if, in fact, it is under threat or without believing lethal force is needed to repel a lethal threat even if it is actually needed. That is to say, these provisions deny a justification to the actor who is unknowingly justified in using lethal force. Observe, however, that this qualification is not in section 34(1). There is no explicit requirement that the actor know he is being

18 Stuart, supra note 11 at 495, writes that the reference to intent in section 34(1) of the Criminal Code is ‘confusing and curiously misplaced.’
unlawfully assaulted in order to be justified in using force against a real assailant. It is enough that he is being assaulted. The Model Penal Code (MPC), however, disagrees. Section 3.04(1) states that self-protective force is justified when (I assume this means when and only when) the actor believes (reasonably) that the force is necessary to protect himself. So the MPC denies the right of self-defence to the UJA generally.

The case of R v Dadson is usually taken as common-law authority for the view that the UJA is not justified in breaking the law. There, a police constable shot a man who he thought was only filching some wood but who, in fact, was a felon for having stolen wood many times before. The constable would have been legally justified in shooting an escaping felon, but since he did not know the thief was a felon, he was found guilty of shooting with intent to wound. On its face, therefore, Dadson lines up with the MPC as denying tout court a justification to the UJA.

Does denying a self-defence justification to the UJA unconstitutionally allow punishment of an innocent? I’ll argue that it does in the case of a private actor faced with a non-lethal threat but not in the case of a public official. Dadson is a case involving a public official. I’ll also argue that the justification for repelling force with force enjoyed by the unknowingly justified private actor does not benefit the actor who uses lethal force not knowing he is justified in using lethal force. Dadson is also a case involving the unknowingly justified use of lethal force, and so it can be distinguished both on this ground and on the ground of the ‘public official’ exception; despite a widely held belief to the contrary, Dadson is not authority for denying a justification to the UJA generally. If successful, therefore, my argument will show that the nuanced Canadian position embodied in section 34(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code is exactly right, whereas the MPC, which denies a justification to the UJA generally, exposes some legally innocent (though morally blameworthy) actors to punishment.

D PUTATIVE SELF-DEFENCE
A fourth issue of controversy concerns putative self-defence or a reasonable but mistaken belief in the need for defensive force. In R v Petel, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a reasonable but mistaken belief that one is being assaulted justifies the force that would be necessary if the facts were as the accused believed them to be. It is not necessary that there have really been an assault; and so evidence of prior threats goes

19 Supra note 16.
20 (1850), 169 ER 407.
21 [1994] 1 SCR 3 [Petel].
22 Ibid at 13; see also R v Malott (1997), 121 CCC (3d) 457 at 464 (SCC).
to reasonable belief, not to whether there was, in fact, an assault.\textsuperscript{23} This supposed permission to use force against an imagined assailant is not found in the words of section 34(1), which says that everyone who is unlawfully assaulted is justified in repelling force with force. However, section 34(2) says that a reasonable belief in the existence of a \textit{lethal} threat is sufficient to justify \textit{lethal} force. Accordingly, \textit{Petel} extends the putative self-defence justification from a case of reasonable belief in the need for lethal force to a case of reasonable belief in the need for force simply. It seems that there need not be a real assault of any kind to justify lethal force. The MPC agrees with \textit{Petel}. Section 3.04 says that a non-reckless and non-negligent belief in the need for force justifies force and that a non-reckless and non-negligent belief in the need for deadly force justifies lethal force.

The case of \textit{R v Gladstone Williams}\textsuperscript{24} offers an entirely different solution to the problem of putative self-defence. There, the accused saw a man punching and dragging a youth. Believing he was witnessing an assault, the accused came to the aid of the victim by punching his attacker. In reality, the attacker was lawfully trying to arrest a robber, and so the accused was charged with assault occasioning bodily harm on the man making the arrest. He was convicted at trial after the recorder instructed the jury that the accused must prove a reasonable mistake that someone was being assaulted in order successfully to plead defence of another. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that instruction to be wrong. It said that a mistaken belief in the need for self-defence or defence of another negates \textit{mens rea}, and the mistake need not be reasonable. In some places, the judgment can be read as saying that an unreasonable mistake suffices for the defence of self-defence, and of course, that cannot be correct if self-defence is a justification. But I think the better reading is that a mistaken belief in justificatory circumstances, whether reasonable or unreasonable, exculpates because the accused then lacks criminal intent.\textsuperscript{25}

I'll argue that the distinction drawn in section 34(1) and (2) between simple force and lethal force is the correct one to draw in determining whether putative justification justifies normally unlawful force. According to this argument, both Petel and the MPC are correct in regarding the actor reasonably mistaken about the need for lethal force against a real wrongdoer as justified, but they are both wrong in regarding the reasonably mistaken self-defender in general as justified. Someone reasonably mistaken about the need for defensive force is, I'll argue, not justified in using force against an innocent. He is indeed non-culpable, but exculpation comes, not from justified self-defence, but, as

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Petel}, supra note 21 at 15–7.
\textsuperscript{24} (1983), 78 Cr App R 276.
\textsuperscript{25} See ibid at 280.
Gladstone Williams tells us, from the lack of a culpable mind. By contrast, someone reasonably mistaken about the need for lethal force against a real wrongdoer is, I’ll try to show, justified in using lethal force, as section 34(2) states. Accordingly, my argument will lead to the conclusion that section 34 is exactly right on the rights of the putative self-defender. Put in terms of the Charter, the latter’s section 7 injunction against depriving an innocent of his or her liberty does not demand that a court interpret the Code’s section 34(1) as affording a self-defence justification to the person reasonably mistaken about the need for defensive force simpliciter.

To substantiate all the aforementioned claims, I will adopt the following plan of argument. In the next section, I outline two theories of the right to self-defence and compare them for their ability to account for what I take to be the uncontroversial elements of the positive law of self-defence. Then, I derive from the theory that best explains those uncontroversial features solutions to the controversies delineated above. What are the uncontroversial features of the legal right of self-defence? They are very few. Indeed, there may be none if the feature is described too specifically. Nevertheless, I believe there will be broad agreement on the following ecumenical propositions.

First, those who disagree over whether the right of self-defence is exercisable against someone reasonably but mistakenly taken for an unlawful threat will agree that the right does not extend to defending oneself against someone known to be a lawful threat; and they will certainly agree that the right does not extend to using force against someone who is not, or is not perceived to be, a threat at all. Second, a defender has a right only to the force he or she reasonably believes is necessary to repel an attack; force that a reasonable person in the defender’s shoes would consider unnecessary is excessive and a criminal assault. Third, there is no duty to retreat from an assailant before using force not dangerous to life or limb. Though legal systems differ over whether there is a duty to retreat before using lethal or seriously harmful force, they agree that a defender using harmless force may stand his ground.26 I’ll assume that a sound theory of permissible self-defence must at the very least preserve these three features of the law of self-defence.

26 German law imposes no duty to retreat in either case on the theory that right need never yield to wrong; see the discussion in George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) at 865–6. The Canadian Criminal Code 34(2) (b) and the Model Penal Code, supra note 16, § 3.04(2) (b) (ii) impose a duty to retreat before using lethal force. However, this duty does not hold when the defender is at home; see Lavallee v The Queen, [1990] 1 SCR 852; Model Penal Code, ibid § 3.04(2) (b) (1).
The theories of self-defence I want to compare for their ability to account for the uncontroversial features of the legal defence may be called the self-preservation theory and the dignity theory. The self-preservation theory is espoused by (among others) Aquinas and Hobbes, whereas the two most famous proponents of the dignity theory are Hegel and Kant.

A THE SELF-PRESERVATION THEORY
Aquinas explains the right of self-defence in the following way:

Nothing keeps one act from having two effects, one of which is in the scope of the agent’s intention while the other falls outside that scope. Now, moral actions are characterized by what is intended, not by what falls outside the scope of intention, for that is only incidental, as I explained previously.

Thus, from the act of defending himself there can be two effects: self-preservation and the killing of the attacker. Therefore, this kind of act does not have the aspect of ‘wrong’ – on the basis that one intends to save one’s own life – because it is only natural to everything to preserve itself in existence as best it can. Still an action beginning from a good intention can become wrong if it is not proportionate to the end intended.

Consequently, if someone uses greater force than necessary to defend his own life, that will be wrong. But if he repels the attack with measured force, the defence will not be wrong. The law permits force to be repelled with measured force by one who is attacked without offering provocation. It is not necessary to salvation that a man forgo this act of measured defence in order to avoid the killing of another, since each person is more strongly bound to safeguard his own life than that of another.

But since it is wrong to take human life except for the common good by public authority, as I already explained, it is wrong for a man to intend to kill another man in order to defend himself.

27 These theories are broad enough to encompass most of the plausible theories of self-defence current today. This is so because, together, they engage the two most general attributes of the human being: its living body and its freedom. Distinct from these theories, however, is the ‘lesser evil’ approach, which subsumes both attributes under the category of ‘interests’ capable of being harmed. I do not deal with the ‘lesser evil’ theory here, for I have criticized it elsewhere; see Brudner, supra note 6 at 193–7. For ‘lesser evil’ accounts of self-defence, see Paul Robinson, ‘A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability’ (1975) 23 UCLA L Rev 266; Boaz Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) at 93–106.

The foregoing passage from the *Summa Theologica* is the *locus classicus* of the double effect theory of self-defence – the theory according to which otherwise wrongful harm is permissible if it is an incidental effect of carrying out a lawful purpose rather than a desired result or aimed-at means of achieving a desired result. What I wish to focus on, however, is not that theory but rather the claim that the permission to use force in self-defence derives from the more basic permission to do what is necessary to preserve oneself in existence. According to Aquinas, human beings have this permission because it is ‘only natural’ for them to preserve themselves in existence as best they can. The permission thus derives from nature. Natural things are permitted to behave as the law of their natures inclines them to behave. Moreover, the natural inclination to self-preservation is, according to Aquinas, not peculiar to human beings; it is, he writes, common to ‘everything,’ by which he presumably means every living thing. So human beings are permitted to do what is necessary to preserve themselves because it is in their nature as biological entities to do so. The bearer of the permission is the living body.

Hobbes, too, bases the right of self-defence on ‘the right of nature,’ which he defines as ‘the liberty each man has to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature – that is to say, of his own life – and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.’ The right of nature is thus a liberty to act in all ways one may judge useful for self-preservation; and in a stateless condition, where everyone has reason to distrust everyone else, this right of nature is a right not only to self-defence against actual aggression but ‘to anything, even to one another’s body’ to make sure of one’s safety.

From the right of nature, Hobbes distinguishes a law of nature. Yet the law of nature does not set limits on one’s natural liberty to do whatever one judges useful for self-preservation. Rather, it imposes an obligation to exercise this liberty – to do what is necessary for self-preservation and to forbear from doing ‘that which is destructive of [one’s] life or takes away the means of preserving the same...’ It is the law of nature so understood that enjoins human beings to quit the state of nature in which their lives are insecure, to surrender as much of their natural liberty to an omnipotent sovereign as is necessary for peace and security, but to ‘use all helps and advantages of war’ if others hold out or defect.

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30 Ibid at 110.
31 Ibid at 109.
32 Ibid at 110.
Moreover, the same law of nature that obliges human beings to seek peace for the sake of self-preservation also forbids them from surrendering to the sovereign their right of self-preservation; and so they do no wrong in resisting by force those who threaten to kill, wound, shackle, or imprison them, even when those who threaten them do so at the sovereign’s command. \(^ {33} \) Indeed, argues Hobbes with the uncompromising rigour for which he is famous, they do no wrong even in resisting the force of the sovereign in enforcing the law, for the right of self-preservation belongs to the guilty not less than to the innocent. \(^ {34} \)

If the right of self-defence derives from a natural law enjoining self-preservation, then the features of the legal right identified above as being beyond serious controversy become problematic. Nothing in a right of self-preservation logically limits the right to defence against an unlawful threat or against a threat perceived as unlawful. As Hobbes shows, the right must also extend to lawful threats posed by law-enforcement authorities as well as by lawful defenders against one’s own unlawful aggression, even when these threats are known to be lawful by the person whom they threaten. Accordingly, a right to self-defence based on a natural right to self-preservation is symmetrical as between aggressor and defender even in a civil condition. Neither is privileged over the other, and so someone who comes to the aid of a victim of aggression becomes an ally of a particular interest who may also be resisted. \(^ {35} \)

Further, nothing in the right of self-preservation logically limits it even to a right of self-defence against threats of force. Thus, if I cannot preserve myself except by killing a competitor for scarce means of survival (for example, oxygen in a caved-in mine), then the right to self-preservation permits me to kill my competitor; though he threatens me, not by force, but simply by his existence. Nor can the right of self-preservation be logically limited to a right to defend oneself against threats. Thus, if I cannot preserve myself against an aggressor except by means that will also kill a non-threatening bystander, the right of self-preservation permits me to kill the bystander. If the right of self-defence derives from a natural right to self-preservation, then all these actions are not simply wrong but excused; they are permitted. In this way, the right of self-defence becomes a particular instance of a more general right of necessity to preserve oneself at another’s expense. On this view, the right of self-defence is a right of necessity against threats of force,

\(^ {33} \) Ibid at 112.  
\(^ {34} \) Ibid at 178.  
\(^ {35} \) True, Aquinas denies the right to a provoker, but this qualification is incoherent within the self-preservation view of the defence. I argue this at length in Brudner, supra note 6 at 197–205.
where the concept of a threat of force has no special significance—does no special justifying work. Hence the right of self-defence loses its specific identity.

Nor can a right of self-defence conceived as a natural right of self-preservation account for the positive law’s limitation of the right to that of necessary force or even to that of force reasonably perceived as necessary. This is so for the reason that Hobbes gives. In a state of nature, where no one is secure, a right of self-preservation is a right to do anything subjectively seen as helpful to self-preservation. Thus, killing a potential enemy is permissible, for a potential threat is thereby removed, and everyone is a potential enemy. In a civil condition, where each may have confidence in the other’s fear of the sovereign as well as in the sovereign’s ability to protect him, the liberty to do whatever is helpful to self-preservation is cut down by law to a liberty to do what is reasonably necessary; but this limitation lasts only as long as a person fearful for her safety can trust in the sovereign’s protection or trust that her tormentor will be cowed by the threat of certain punishment. In some cases (e.g. domestic estrangement), neither of these conditions will obtain, and so the right of self-preservation will revert to the shape it has in a state of nature; it will be a right to do whatever is subjectively thought to be helpful to self-preservation. As a consequence, the level of force exercised by the defender will be beyond review; ‘necessity,’ the Hobbesian judge will intone, ‘knows no law.’

Nor, finally, can the self-preservation theory of self-defence account for the widely recognized right to stand one’s ground against a harmless aggressor in repelling him with harmless force. This is so because, assuming a civil condition and no exceptional circumstances undermining trust in the sovereign, the right of self-preservation is a right to do only what is reasonably necessary to avert bodily harm to oneself. But this limitation implies a requirement to back down from a harmless aggressor, who, after all, does not engage the right to self-preservation. Here, turning the other cheek is not simply a self-regarding duty to act magnanimously; it is a legal duty to another, breach of which lays one open to an assault charge.

B THE DIGNITY THEORY
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes,

Abstract right is a right to coerce, because the wrong which transgresses it is an exercise of force against the existence of my freedom in an external thing. The maintenance of this existent against the exercise of force therefore itself takes the form of an external act and an exercise of force annulling the force originally brought against it.36

By ‘abstract right’ Hegel means the paradigm or framework of law whose fundamental end is the protection of the agent’s capacity to act from ends it freely chooses against the force and constraint of other agents. The agent’s capacity to act from ends it freely chooses is what is meant here by ‘freedom,’ and it is this capacity that, in distinguishing agents from things, endows the agent with the dignity of a right-bearer. My freedom to act from ends I freely choose can be negated only by force directed toward ‘the existence of my freedom in an external thing’ because, while force cannot touch my metaphysical capacity always to have chosen otherwise than I did, it can prevent my exercise of this capacity in a particular choice; for the exercise is possible only through a physical body that can be held, pushed, or abducted by overpowering force according to the laws of physics. When applied with the voluntariness signifying a claim of permission, such force is ‘wrong’ because inconsistent with the agent’s right, founded on its dignity as a free being, to act from ends it freely chooses.

The right to act from ends one freely chooses entails the further remedial right to coerce or to apply force to a wrongdoer in order to prevent his act of force; for if there were no right to prevent actions inconsistent with the right to act freely, the latter right would be non-existent, hence self-contradictory. The right to use preventive force in self-defence thus derives from the more fundamental right of an agent to act from freely chosen ends. Force in self-defence is justified insofar as it is nothing but the force necessary to the realization of that more basic right. This means that the aspect of provocative force that is salient from the standpoint of a right to repel force with force is not the threat the provocation poses to the body but the threat of interference it poses to freedom (and hence the affront it poses to dignity) through the body. Conversely, the bearer of the permission to repel the provocation is not the living body but the free will.

Kant says something similar. In *The Doctrine of Right*, he writes,

Resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is consistent with it. Now whatever is wrong is a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws. But coercion is a hindrance or resistance to freedom. Therefore, if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e. wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindering to freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, is right. Hence there is connected with right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it.37

Since coercion hinders freedom, coercion that prevents a hindrance of rightful freedom promotes rather than hinders freedom. Therefore, a right to freedom in accordance with universal laws entails a right to use force to hinder hindrances to rightful freedom. In contrast to the initial act of coercion, the preventive one is 'right' and therefore engenders no right in others to prevent it in turn.

The upshot is that a right to self-defence is not a right to self-preservation or even a right to safety against bodily harm. It is rather a right to realize one’s right of free agency against actions inconsistent with that right. This means that the right to self-defence is a right to use force only against threats that engage, or bear implications for, the right of free agency – that is to say, against threats inconsistent with the right. Only such threats are wrongful threats and only wrongful threats engage the right to self-defence. The wrong need not be a criminal wrong with *mens rea*. It need only be an action that is inconsistent with another agent’s right of free agency as limited by generally binding laws. An action will be inconsistent with that right if, and only if, it is a voluntary act (involuntary motion does not engage the right because it implies no claim of permission inconsistent with the right’s reality) that either interferes or threatens an imminent interference with one’s freedom to decide for one’s body as one pleases, whether or not it threatens harm. A threat of imminent interference is sufficient, for if an actual interference with free choice were necessary, one would be required to permit an interference before responding; and that requirement would be inconsistent with having a right against interference. To be coherent as a right, therefore, the right to act on ends one freely chooses requires a temporal buffer, and the permission to prevent an imminent attack reflects this requirement. Because the buffer zone is entailed by the right, an imminent assault is already an assault – a transgression of someone’s rightful boundary. Nevertheless, ‘imminent’ does not necessarily mean ‘temporally immediate.’ Since the point of the buffer is to fulfil the right to act free of others’ interference, the requirement of imminence is satisfied by a threat of interference the victim reasonably believes he could not successfully defend his right against were defensive action further delayed.

The dignity theory of the right to self-defence explains the uncontroversial features of that right. Because the right of self-defence extends only as far as necessary to realize the right to free agency against actions inconsistent with it, it is a right to repel only wrongful threats, not threats of harm as such. That is to say, it is a right to repel only threats that, by restraining or directing one’s bodily movements without a self-defence justification to do so, amount to an infringement of the right to act freely. Thus, a wrongful assailant cannot claim a right of self-defence against the person he assaulted, because the threat to him
is not a wrongful threat; it is justified by his assault as necessary to realize the victim’s right of free agency. It follows that the dignity theory can, whereas the self-preservation theory cannot, explain the asymmetrical nature of the right of self-defence – can explain, that is, the privilege enjoyed by the defender and law-enforcement authorities over the aggressor. Further, because the dignity theory understands a right of self-defence as a right to realize a right of free agency against actions inconsistent with that right, it alone clearly separates the right of self-defence from a right of necessity (if such there be) to preserve oneself against non-wrongful threats of bodily harm or non-threatening bystanders.

Further, the dignity theory explains the ‘necessary force’ limitation on the right to self-defence. Since the right to use force is justified only as necessary to realize the right to free agency, unnecessary force is wrongful force against which the original attacker may defend himself. Even in a state of nature, the right of self-defence is a right only to necessary (not merely helpful) force, though each is judge of what is necessary. In the transition to a civil condition, agents renounce the right to judge for themselves what is necessary, but they do not suffer any substantive diminution of their natural right. Consequently, when public protection is unavailable, they do not revert to a condition where they may use the force they think merely helpful to self-preservation. Rather, they simply reacquire the right to self-help and to judge reasonably what is necessary to realize their right of free agency. Hence, their judgment of necessity is subject to review by a court for reasonableness.

Finally, the dignity theory explains the absence of a duty to retreat from aggressive force before using harmless preventive force. Since what is protected against force is the agent’s dignity as a right-bearer rather than its body, the agent who is attacked may stand his or her ground even though retreat is possible; there is no requirement to use force as a last resort, for such a duty would be inconsistent with the dignity the right is meant to protect. Why there is a duty in Canadian law and in the MPC to retreat before using lethal or seriously harmful force I try to explain below.

iv How the dignity theory shapes the right to self-defence

Since the dignity theory of the right to self-defence can account for the uncontroversial features of that right, whereas the self-preservation theory cannot, we can usefully mine the dignity theory for solutions to the controversies mentioned at the outset. This will determine whether the restrictions on the right to self-defence in the Criminal Code violate the Charter’s injunction against exposing innocents to punishment.
A without having provoked the assault

Does the qualifying phrase in section 34 (1), ‘without having provoked the assault,’ mean ‘without having assaulted or threatened imminent assault’? Or does it mean ‘without having provoked’ in a broader sense encompassing threats of future violence (inchoate threats), words or actions reasonably mistaken for threats, insults, or taunts? To see more clearly what is at stake here, consider a variation of the facts in Lavallee v The Queen. Suppose that, instead of threatening his domestic partner with death after house guests departed, Kevin Rust had threatened her with death the following week if she did not kill him first. Suppose that, as he turned to walk away from her, she pulled out a gun and aimed it at Rust and that Rust then shot her dead. Would Rust’s action have been murder or justified homicide?

On the narrow reading of provocation as assault, Rust’s action is a justified homicide, for his threat of future harm did not constitute an assault (there was time for the victim to report a criminal death threat to the police and perhaps to seek refuge in a shelter), and so he may avail himself of the right of self-defence. On the broad reading of provocation, by contrast, Rust is guilty of murder, for he certainly ‘provoked’ his partner’s assault with a weapon. The narrow reading renders section 34(1) consistent with the Charter, for wrongful assailants who intentionally use force to repel the lawful defensive force of their victims are not innocents; yet this reading seems to give no interpretive weight to ‘without having provoked the assault.’ By contrast, the broad reading puts that phrase to work but exposes to punishment someone who only defended himself proportionately against an unlawful threat of imminent death.

The dignity theory resolves this conundrum. For the dignity theory, the only kind of provoker who triggers a right of self-defence in the person provoked is someone whose provocation consists either in an assault or an imminent assault (in the sense defined above); for only such provocations engage the right to act from freely chosen ends. Those whose provocation consists in inchoate threats or in actions misperceived as threats or in taunts or insults do nothing inconsistent with the provoked party’s right to act from ends it freely chooses; and so they are free to resist any force the provoked party uses against them. The same is true of those whose provocation consists in the use of force to defend their rights. But this means that the dignity theory picks out wrongdoers as the only kind of provokers who may not avail themselves of a right of self-defence against those who use force against them. Hence it exposes no innocent to the possibility of punishment.

38 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
It might be objected that the provoker whom the dignity theory deprives of a right of self-defence may be a wrongdoer, but he is not necessarily a criminal wrongdoer, since he need not have the *mens rea* for a criminal assault. He may be a child, or someone acting under an insane delusion, or someone simply mistaken about the need for self-defence. The response, however, is twofold. First, this actor will have his criminal law defence of insanity or lack of *mens rea*, and so his not being able to plead self-defence does not expose him to punishment; it simply removes that defence from his otherwise well-stocked arsenal. Second, it is important to focus on those whom the dignity theory does not deprive of a right of self-defence. It does not deprive non-trespassers of a right of self-defence against those whom they have provoked by vague threats or insults, and so it does not expose to punishment those who intentionally use force to defend themselves against violent responses to their non-trespassory provocations. In that sense, the dignity theory does not expose the legally innocent to punishment for criminal assaults, whereas the broad interpretation of ‘without having provoked’ would.

The question, however, is whether the dignity theory’s interpretation of ‘without having provoked the assault’ is one that the words of section 34 (1) will reasonably bear. Does not that interpretation render the phrase redundant? If so, then the only reasonable interpretation of that phrase probably renders it an unconstitutional limit on the right to self-defence.

The dignity theory’s interpretation of ‘without having provoked the assault’ does not render that phrase redundant. This becomes clear once we consider the phrase against the background of the controversy in self-defence theory between self-preservation theorists and dignity theorists. For those who think that the right of self-defence rests on an inalienable right of self-preservation, provocation cannot be a reason to deprive the provoker of his right of self-defence against the person responding to his provocation, not even if the provocation consists in an assault or imminent assault. For the self-preservation theory of self-defence, the right of self-defence is symmetrical even as between lawful and unlawful threats. By contrast, the dignity theory of self-defence preserves asymmetry as between lawful and unlawful threats, for it views only provocations that engage the right of free agency as triggering the right of self-defence; threats posed by those defending their right of free agency against impermissible actions, while they threaten bodies, do not infringe rights, and so they do not trigger a reverse right of self-defence in the provoker. Accordingly, by adding the phrase ‘without having provoked the assault,’ the drafters of section 34 (1) may be taken to have legislatively resolved the controversy between the self-preservation and dignity theories of self-defence in favour of the dignity theory. Provocation amounting to an assault deprives the provoker...
of a right of self-defence against the person repelling his assault. It would not do so for the self-preservation theory.

B PROPORTIONALITY

We come now to the qualification on the right to use necessary defensive force imposed by the requirement of proportionality. Someone who repels a threat not dangerous to life or limb intending to kill or seriously harm the trespasser may not claim a right of self-defence even if lethal or seriously harmful force was necessary to repel the threat. At first sight, this constraint seems at odds with the preventive rationale of self-defence, for it requires the defender to forgo a defence of his property or self-ownership right if nothing but lethal force will repel the trespasser. Indeed, Fletcher\textsuperscript{40} thinks that the proportionality requirement is out of place in a coherent law of self-defence – that it either belongs to punishment or derives from a duty of ethics to moderate enforcement of one’s strict right for the benefit of the attacker. But if either of these possibilities were so, then the proportionality requirement would be an unconstitutional limitation on the right of self-defence. For if the requirement were one of just punishment, then the defender would be held accountable to a role it would have been criminal for him to have adopted; and if it were a requirement of virtue, then it would expose to punishment for want of charity someone who only did what was necessary to defend his right.

The dignity theory of self-defence explains the proportionality requirement as a requirement of just force separate from both the limits on just punishment and from a duty of virtue. According to the dignity theory, the defender is not justified in using lethal or seriously harmful force to repel a challenge to a property (including self-ownership) right, even if no lesser force would succeed, because agency is the capacity for ownership and so cannot be subordinated to a particular ownership right without denying the possibility of the right the defender seeks to realize.\textsuperscript{41} On this view, the point of the requirement of proportionality between response and attack is not that the attacker must receive no more than he deserves. It is, rather, that the force used to defend the right cannot impliedly assert an order of ends (ownership over personality) that denies the possibility of rights. Accordingly, a disproportionate response negates justification by reintroducing the right-denial that constitutes a criminal \textit{mens rea}. What was supposed to be force that realizes rights of free agency becomes force that impliedly denies their possibility.

\textsuperscript{40} Fletcher, ‘Punishment,’ supra note 17.

\textsuperscript{41} However, an imminent threat of serious bodily harm justifies lethal preventive force because such a threat does more than violate a self-ownership right. Since agency exists only in a functioning body, such a threat threatens agency itself.
That is why it is sufficient to forfeit the right of self-defence that one intend what the law regards as a disproportionate response, whether or not one’s response in fact matches the provocation. And that is why an unlawful aggressor (who cannot read his victim’s mind) forfeits his right to defend himself against a lethal response in fact mismatched to his provocation if, by virtue of having intended lethal force, he cannot reasonably believe that it is mismatched. Because the proportionality requirement withholds the right of self-defence only from those whose use of force against an agent signifies a denial of rights, it does not expose innocents to punishment.

The same rationale that underlies the proportionality constraint also demands that lethal force be applied to repel wrongful lethal force only if escape is impossible. Just as the capacity for ownership (i.e., agency) cannot be subordinated to a particular ownership right, so the capacity for rights cannot be subordinated to a particular exercise of rights. Only when killing a wrongdoer is necessary to preserve agency can one kill without denying the priority of agency that makes a right to coerce in self-defence possible. Accordingly, the duty to retreat in the face of lethal force is quite consistent with the right to stand one’s ground in the face of simple force. Both phenomena embody the idea that the dignity of agency, not the natural inclination to avert harm, underlies the right to self-defence.

C THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIED ACTOR
Section 34(2)(a) of the Criminal Code states that a reasonable belief in the threat of death is necessary to a justification of lethal force. Thus, someone who kills a lethal threat not knowing him to be one is not justified in his lethal force. As we saw, however, this limitation is not stated in section 34(1), which deals with self-defensive force simpliciter. Nothing in section 34(1) explicitly deprives the unknowingly justified user of non-lethal force of his right of self-defence. It would seem that if section 34(1) is correct, then section 34(2), by depriving the UJA of a right of self-defence, exposes an innocent to punishment. Conversely, if section 34(2) is correct, then section 34(1) must be read as incorporating the same limitation on the UJA, for otherwise the law would exculpate a guilty person. I shall argue, however, that both sections are correct.

Those who view the criminal law through the lens of morality will say that, for someone to be justified in a coercive act, it must be the case, not only that there were sufficient reasons to act as he did, but also that he

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42 Model Penal Code, supra note 16, § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
43 The German view that right need never yield to wrong forgets that proportionality is an aspect of right.
acted for those reasons. For only in that case could one say that the subject who performed the action was justified in the action; and it is with the subject alone that morality is concerned. Because moral justification depends on the conformity of one’s motive with the objective reason for justification, moral theory will view the UJA as lacking justification for his coercive act. So, too, will those whose theory of justification generalizes from the case of justification for public officials. Since the official’s justification for a wrong is that it was necessary to achieve a public purpose, the official must act for that purpose if he wishes to cloak his coercive action with the justification of public authority. Otherwise he acted as a private individual who must find his permission elsewhere.

However, sections 34 and 35 deal with private actors, not public officials. Moreover, morality’s judgment of the UJA departs from the law’s judgment in the case of unknown justification by consent. Someone who enters a house marked ‘open house, all welcome’ believing he lacks permission is not legally guilty of a trespass, though he is a trespasser at heart and though he might be guilty of attempting an impossible trespass. The dignity theory of justification explains why this is so. Because that theory views justification from the standpoint of an action’s consistency with rights rather than from the standpoint of what the action says about the character who performed it, it is concerned only with actions as they may or may not impinge on rights. Actions inconsistent with another’s right of free agency are wrongful and may be repelled with force; those consistent with that right are permitted. Consensual entries are consistent with the owner’s right of free agency within his exclusive domain; therefore, they are permitted, regardless of the invitee’s motives or beliefs. The invitee may deserve punishment for attempting a trespass but not for committing one.

The dignity theory applies with equal force to the case of unknown justification by self-defence. Since the attacker is really a wrongdoer, the victim has a right to use the force necessary to realize his right of free agency against an action inconsistent with that right. Because the attacker had no permission for his action, the force that blocks the action violates no right of the attacker, and so the attacker is precluded from applying further force. The UJA’s beliefs and motives change nothing; for, in contrast to the moral point of view, the right-based one focuses on the external action rather than on the inner person and on what the action implies for the reality of another agent’s rights. Just as actions inconsistent with rights may be performed from benevolent motives, so may actions consistent with rights be performed from wicked motives; and that is the case with the UJA.

44 Gardner, supra note 6 at 91–120.
Accordingly, legal (as distinct from moral) justification for private actors requires the existence of justificatory facts alone; with a nuance I’ll come to presently, it does not require that the agent act for the justifying reason, and so section 34(1) does not exculpate the guilty in the case of the UJA.

Suppose, however, that A knows B is about to assault him but does not know that B intends to kill him. Nevertheless, thinking to exploit a legal opportunity afforded him by B’s assault, A intentionally employs lethal force against B and kills him. Here, the dignity theory’s account of the proportionality requirement determines that A must indeed act in the knowledge that B intends him death or serious bodily harm in order successfully to plead a justification for a homicide; for otherwise A intended a disproportionate response. Intending a disproportionate response negates justification, we said, by implicitly asserting an order of ends (ownership over personality) destructive of the right of personality the defender was alone justified in defending; that is, it changes the meaning of the defensive action from one of right-realization to one of right-denial. This occurs, however, not only when the defender intends what is in fact a disproportionate response, but also when he intends a response the law would regard as disproportionate were the circumstances as the defender believed them to be. Thus, someone who kills an assailant not knowing that the latter intends him death or serious bodily harm makes a choice to which a culpable denial of the possibility of rights is imputable. That makes him a criminal deserving of punishment; and since he intentionally caused death, he is responsible for a homicide in the degree known as murder. No doubt, the defender’s lethal force was in fact proportionate. However, this is irrelevant here, because the point of the proportionality requirement of rightful self-defence (in contrast to that of punishment) is not to match force to the assailant’s desert; it is to preserve the public meaning of the defender’s choice as one of right-realization rather than right-denial. What is wrong with disproportionate force in self-defence is the intention to do that to which a right denial may be imputed. And so, if the defender chooses what, given his beliefs, is a disproportionate response, then he chooses culpably regardless of the true state of affairs. Hence section 34(2), in refusing to bestow a legal justification on his action, does not expose an innocent to punishment.

D PUTATIVE SELF-DEFENCE
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Petel, a reasonable but mistaken belief that someone is about to assault you justifies your force

46 Supra note 21.
against the imagined assailant. This supposed justification for the putative self-defender is not expressly given by section 34(1) of the Criminal Code, though it is given by section 34(2) to the defender reasonably mistaken about the existence of a lethal threat from a real wrongdoer. Must a permission for the putative self-defender be read into section 34(1) in order to satisfy constitutional law? Would denying a right of self-defence to someone who uses force in the reasonable but mistaken belief in the need for self-defence mean punishing an innocent?

Currently, the prevailing Anglo-American view is that the justifiably mistaken defender is justified. Those who think that legal justification depends on moral justification will regard him as legally justified (or ‘warranted’ or ‘agent-perspectively justified’), for they will see justification as depending solely on the principle informing one’s action; how circumstances in the world fortuitously turn out does not affect the moral quality of the will. If this is indeed the correct position, then the ‘without having provoked’ qualification on the right to self-defence would have to be interpreted so as not to include the reasonably mistaken self-defender as a provoker; otherwise an innocent would be deprived of a right of self-defence against the person he mistook for an assailant and who is now repelling his force with force.

Yet this view is not without problems. In particular, to regard the putative defender as justified in using defensive force against an innocent is to sacrifice asymmetrical justification and hence normative closure to permissible violence; for surely an innocent is justified in resisting the putative defender’s threat, while the putative defender, if he was justified in the first place, must be justified in resisting in turn, and so on. We would thus revert to the mutually inconsistent justifications characteristic of a state of anarchy, wherein each is judge of right and wrong. Now, it might be argued that someone who gives another person reasonable grounds for believing that he is an assailant is not an innocent; he is a wrongful provoker who forfeits his right to respond to the preventive force he provoked. This position might rest on the idea that boundaries between agents must be drawn along lines both could accept, and the standard of reasonableness is the one that fairly allocates the risk of mistake as between two parties to an interaction. So if it is reasonable for A to believe that B is an assailant, then B is an assailant.

47 Model Penal Code, supra note 16, § 3.02(1); Smith and Hogan, supra note 45 at 245.
However, this argument fails, for it falsely assumes that the standpoint of the reasonable person in the circumstances of one of the parties to an interaction is an impartial standpoint. To see that it is not, consider a case of mistaken identity. Say a plainclothes policeman (A) is making an arrest. B happens on the scene and, reasonably believing that A is a mugger, tries to prevent the arrest with force. If we agree that the policeman is innocent despite the reasonableness of B’s belief and that he may therefore resist B, then a putative justification will give rise to symmetrical justifications. Moreover, there is no principled way to carve out a mistaken identity exception to a general rule that A’s reasonable belief that B is an assailant makes him an assailant.50 This is so because the reason this rule is unjust in the mistaken-identity case applies to all cases: as between two parties whom we posit as objectively innocent, the standpoint of the reasonable agent in the shoes of one of them is not an impartial standpoint. The only standpoint that is impartial as between two epistemically partial perspectives is omniscience (another limited perspective might be neutral in being indifferent to both but by definition it would not be impartial).

Accordingly, the position that a reasonable but mistaken belief in the need for self-defence suffices for a justification engenders symmetrical and inconsistent justifications – the very state of affairs a civil condition is supposed to cancel. And yet the opposed position seems equally problematic. According to that position, the putative defender is excused rather than justified; and, since excuse presupposes a wrong, the innocent party can resist.51 This no doubt saves asymmetry, but if the putative defender’s mistake was reasonable and the truth was knowable only by an omniscient observer, then it seems unjust to require him to rely on an affirmative excuse; for such an excuse presupposes a culpable wrong (a wrong with mens rea), and no one can think that the justifiably mistaken actor’s wrong was culpable.52

The problem is easily resolved, however, through the approach taken in Gladstone Williams.53 Someone who transgresses a boundary under a sincere but mistaken belief in the existence of justificatory circumstances has chosen nothing from which a denial of rights may be inferred. Therefore, his transgression is not a culpable one justifying punishment. Nevertheless, it is still a transgression; for, as there was really no act inconsistent with the putative defender’s right, his force was not justified by

50 Ibid at 200–1.
52 I defend the view that an affirmative excuse presupposes rather than negates culpable wrongdoing in Brudner, supra note 6 at 235–6.
53 Supra note 24.
right-realization. Therefore, the innocent party has a right to resist the putative defender; and the putative defender, though a tortfeasor, is exculpated from crime by virtue of his mistake. This is the intuitively correct result – reached without sacrificing asymmetry of justification or requiring the justifiably mistaken defender to rely on an affirmative excuse. He is exculpated rather than excused, but exculpation comes, not from justification, but from the absence of a culpable mind.

Accordingly, no constitutional right against punishing the innocent would be violated by reading section 34(1) according to its plain meaning: that the justification of self-defensive force is available only against real wrongdoers. Nor need the ‘without having provoked’ qualification be read down so as not to apply to the reasonably mistaken self-defender. He is indeed a provoker for the purposes of section 34(1) and so may not resist the force of the person he provoked; but if he does, he will be exculpated for lack of mens rea.

However, the case is different, I want to argue, with respect to the actor who is reasonably mistaken about the existence of a lethal threat from a real wrongdoer, as section 34(2) states. Suppose A approaches B menacingly but without intent to kill. B, reasonably believing that A means to kill him (A had previously announced his wish to kill B), steps backward as far as he can and then draws a gun. A stops and retreats, but B now advances, pointing his gun at A. A then pulls out a gun and shoots B.

Section 34(2) permits the use of lethal force to someone who reasonably (not just correctly) apprehends a wrongful threat of lethal force, provided he reasonably believes no escape is possible. Our earlier remarks about proportionality show how counting putative justification as justification in this case avoids the symmetrical permissions that make putative justification legally absurd as a justification tout court.

One of the rules of proportionality, we saw, is that the defender may use lethal force against a real or apprehended threat of unjustified lethal force only as a last resort; for only under that condition is the capacity for rights (agency) prioritized over a particular exercise of rights. So, the defender (D) may use lethal force against a wrongful aggressor (A) whom he reasonably but mistakenly perceives as a lethal threat only after he has retreated to the wall. Likewise, the wrongful aggressor, though he may use defensive lethal force against a disproportionately lethal response to his attack, may do so only if he has retreated as far as he can. But if A is obliged to retreat when D’s permission crystallizes (after D has exhausted his alternatives), the permission to use lethal force is not symmetrical. And yet A is not legally helpless because A’s

54 Here I borrow from Brudner, supra note 6 at 218.
55 As does the Model Penal Code, supra note 16, § 3.04(2)(b).
56 Criminal Code, s 35.
retreat ends D’s permission to use force of any kind and puts both parties back to their legal position before the confrontation. If D persists with a real threat of lethal force, he is now the wrongdoer, and so A may use lethal force against him, while D may not resist. Thus, permission remains asymmetrical throughout.

v Conclusion

Inspired by the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutionalization of the criminal law’s unwritten general part, this article has sought to illustrate the interaction between criminal law theory and constitutional law that process implies. It has done so by applying a criminal law theory of why and when force in self-defence is justified to assess the constitutionality under the Charter’s section 7 of the self-defence provisions of Canada’s Criminal Code.

That inquiry has uncovered no blemish. Though the Canadian code’s provisions on self-defence have frequently been criticized for excessive complexity, it turns out that the complexity in the law accurately tracks the nuances demanded by the theory of self-defence best qualified to interpret the provisions. The ‘without having provoked the assault’ qualification is neither redundantly narrow nor unconstitutionally broad; for it importantly establishes in Canadian law the dignity theory of self-defence, according to which the right of self-defence is asymmetrical as between aggressors and defenders. The proportionality requirement imposes on the defender neither a duty of charity nor a constraint of punishment to match response to desert; rather it ensures that right-realization is not corrupted into right-denial, and so the focus on the defender’s intention (and on the aggressor’s beliefs) rather than on fact in assessing the proportionality of his response turns out to be well placed. Likewise, the omission in section 34(1) and inclusion in section 34(2) of a reference to reasonable beliefs are both correct, for the unknowingly justified private actor is generally justified in law, if not in morality, but the actor who unknowingly applies proportionate force applies force with the implicit right-denial that constitutes culpable force. Moreover, putative justification is not generally a justification, for otherwise justification would be symmetrical as between aggressor and victim; however, it is a justification for someone who believes reasonably (though incorrectly) in the existence of a lethal threat from a real wrongdoer; for in this case justification rests asymmetrically on victims. People who use force under a reasonably mistaken belief in the need for non-lethal defensive force are wrongdoers without criminal intent rather than justified actors; and so the Supreme Court erred in reading a ‘reasonable belief’ justification into section 34(1).
The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code has not withstood constitutional scrutiny as well the Canadian code. By denying outright a justification to the unknowingly justified actor, it can expose someone whose action is innocent to the possibility of imprisonment; and by granting a justification to the person reasonably mistaken about the need for self-defence, the Model Penal Code gives its imprimatur to the inconsistent justifications the rule of law is meant to abolish.

VI Postscript

Before the general election held on 2 May 2011, the Parliament of Canada gave first reading to a bill to, *inter alia*, amend the self-defence provisions of the *Criminal Code*. Bill C-60 died with the fortieth Parliament but may be resurrected in the forty-first. Therefore, some remarks on the bill are necessary.

The proposed amendment condensed the four existing sections on defence of persons into one general provision. In doing so, it obliterated all the nuances of the present law, merging into one defence both the justification of self-defence and the plea of mistaken belief, both the justification of an innocent and the justification of an aggressor, both the justification against simple force and the justification against lethal force. Since it is impossible to lay down general requirements applying indifferently to all these categories, the bill did not attempt to do so. Instead, it enumerated a list of factors the courts may take into account in determining whether the force used by the accused was ‘reasonable in the circumstances.’ On the list were the accused’s role in the incident, the nature of the threat, the extent to which the threat was imminent, the proportionality of the response, the gender, age, and size of the parties, the history of their relationship, and the availability of alternative means. The list was not exhaustive; the courts were allowed to consider unnamed factors.

The effect of the proposed amendment would have been to leave almost entirely to the courts the task of reconstructing the law of self-defence that the bill demolished. In that sense, the amendment would have virtually de-codified the Canadian law of self-defence. Now, one might think that, since the bill committed itself to very little by way of delineating a law of self-defence, it would have been difficult to find

constitutional fault with it. Not so. The very emptiness of the provision was cause for constitutional concern. Since the proposed section said only that the courts may take into account the accused’s role in the altercation, the nature of the threat, the proportionality of the response, and the availability of alternative means along with other named and unnamed factors, it permitted the conviction of someone despite the necessity and proportionality of her response (or the acquittal of someone who used unnecessary and disproportionate force); it permitted the conviction of someone who met non-lethal force with non-lethal force without first retreating; and it permitted the conviction of someone who provoked an assault but whose provocation did not itself amount to an assault. That is, the proposed amendment would have given the court wide discretion to weigh a number of factors in determining whether a response was reasonable even though right answers are available. The existence of that leeway may be counted an unconstitutional exposure of innocents to the possibility of imprisonment.

In sum, the government proposed to replace a subtly nuanced law whose detailed provisions satisfy constitutional requirements with a blunt and non-committal law whose very vacuity was probably unconstitutional. And it may do so again.

58 The proposed amendment’s only substantive commitment was to deny a defence outright to the UJA. The accused must have reasonably believed in the existence of a threat, and his action must have been for the purpose of countering it. I have argued that these requirements expose attempters to punishment for a complete assault where the UJA is a private actor using non-lethal force. The existing law gets it right.
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